http://repub.eur.nl/res/concept/jel-P35/ Recent publications classified by JEL Code P35 en http://repub.eur.nl/static-eur/img/logo.png http://repub.eur.nl http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/7577/ 2006-03-10T00:00:00Z Bearing the legacy from central-planned system, the tax system in local China still lacks transparency and, in many cases, the liabilities of firms, especially those with extensive influences, are subject to negotiation despite the new tax-reform 1994. Applying Hirschman’s Exit-Voice theory, we construct a game model of interplay between firm and local government, in terms of exit and voice for preferential tax treatments, thereby revealing dynamics of these two options under rational entrepreneurship of economizing transaction cost. Suggested by the model, exit not only induces firm to opt for voice, it also underpins firm’s voice that forces local government to compromise. Particularly, when holding private information of exit cost, firm is able to mimic behaviors of those with high mobility so as to boost the effectiveness of voice. The empirical cases fully illustrate such rational entrepreneurship of exit plus voice to profit from local preferential policy. Zhu, Z. Hendrikse, G.W.J. Krug, B. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/7188/ 2005-12-21T00:00:00Z China like other transition economies needs to establish a tax system compatible with a market economy, in particular, an efficient tax administration system with capable tax bureaucrats. The paper singles out the general and China-specific features by which central government attempts to accompany economic transformation via tax farming to tax bureaucratisation in tax administration. Based on empirical study in two provinces this paper shows that without including local government agencies and their budgets, China’s fiscal federalism cannot be analysed and argues that China’s emerging tax system depends on the institutional and organizational design that shapes the interaction between central government, local governments and economic agents. Zhu, Z. Krug, B. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/7175/ 2005-12-19T00:00:00Z (Last revised version December 2005) To address the problem why China, as a communist country, moves in the opposite direction when the public sector has undergoing a continuous growth in most Western economies since the World War II, we offer a new approach that the de facto fiscal decentralization curtails government size in transition China in addition to conventional explanations. Meanwhile, by analyzing panel data and various variables used by previous empirical studies, this paper tests the Leviathan hypothesis for vertical decentralization, horizontal fragmentation and intergovernmental collusion at central-provincial and provincial-local level. Our empirical results not only explain Chinese shrinking government size, but also lend support to Leviathan hypothesis, especially, under the condition of the absence of traditional democratic electoral constraint. Zhu, Z. Krug, B. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/1821/ 2004-12-10T00:00:00Z This paper offers a new data set and window to empirically test Leviathan theory in the sense of China's transition economy. By combining time series and cross-section regression analysis and various variables used by previous empirical studies, we test the Leviathan hypothesis for vertical decentralization, horizontal fragmentation and intergovernmental collusion at national and provincial level, respectively. Our empirical results lend support to Leviathan hypothesis, especially, under the condition of absence of traditional democratic electoral constraint. Zhu, Z. Krug, B. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/1787/ 2004-10-29T00:00:00Z This article firstly present a systematic overview on national tax regime by classifying China’s tax regime into three broad phases in context of underpinning market-oriented institutional development during last two decades and, then, in supplement to previous literatures that largely stop at provincial level, unveil the complex and obscure local tax regime based on sub-provincial field research in Zhejiang and Jiangsu province. The authors observed dual existing tax regimes: the hard and standardized state tax regime under central custody versus de facto soft and flexible local tax regime under local promotion and argue that despite central persisting initiatives in unifying tax regime and recentralization, local variation and divergence continue to play indispensable role in implementation of central reform due to China’s sheer size, geographical, cultural and resource endowment disparity as well as local state’s self-interest seeking inevitably induces localized adaptation of central policy and, consequently, calls for further decentralization. Zhu, Z. Krug, B. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/1841/ 2004-01-01T00:00:00Z China like other transition economies needs to establish a tax regime compatible with a market economy. The paper singles out the general and China-specific features by which national legislation attempts to accompany economic transformation. Based on an empirical study in two provinces this paper shows that without including local government agencies and their budgets, China’s fiscal federalism cannot be analysed. This paper argues that China’s emerging tax regime depends on the institutional design that shapes the interaction between firms (as major tax payers at the local level), local government agencies, and the national tax administration. Krug, B. Zhu, Z. Hendrischke, H. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/1842/ 2004-01-01T00:00:00Z This paper attempts to explain how institutions in the reform era of China have evolved by looking into the FDI policies and regulations. As history matters, we don’t look solely into the previous direct stage to the reform era, and rather look into a longer history starting from prior to the 14th century. The study shows that a dimension of time is crucial to understand institutional change in China. Though the initiation of the open-door policy in the reform era is commonly regarded as path-break event, we claim that this institutional change is a path dependent event from a longer historical view. The path takes a zigzag that is shaped by interaction among interested parties: the central government, local governments and economic agents (foreign investors in terms of the open-door policies). The historical study shows that mutual needs and their behaviours influence their attitudes which further influence institutional building. This also further implies how Chinese institutions may evolve in the future and what we should concern more about institutional changes in transitional economies. Zhang, X. Krug, B. Reinmoeller, P. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/817/ 2003-09-03T00:00:00Z Ten Central and Eastern European countries, as well as Cyprus and Malta, have applied for membership of the European Union. Membership involves, among others, alignment of the taxes on tobacco products. Within the acquis communautaire, accession countries can choose between a predominantly specific and a predominantly ad valorem excise regime. The choice affects revenue, tobacco consumption control, and EU competition. This paper examines the arguments and concludes that a predominantly specific regime seems to be the preferred choice. Cnossen, S.