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    <title>Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights</title>
    <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/concept/jel-P48/</link>
    <description>Recent publications classified by JEL Code P48</description>
    <language>en</language>
    
    <item>
      <title>The Ethics of Organizations: A Longitudinal Study of the U.S. Working Population (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/15405/</link>
      <pubDate>2009-04-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        The ethics of organizations has received much attention in recent years. This raises the question whether the ethics of organizations has also improved. In 1999, 2004 and 2008, a survey was conducted of 12,196 U.S. managers and employees. The results show that the ethical culture of organizations only improved in the period between 1999 and 2004. Unethical behavior and its consequences, however, declined between 2004 and 2008, while the scope of ethics programs expanded in that period. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of these findings for further research and practice.
      </description>
      <author>Kaptein, S.P.</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Enterprise Ground Zero in China (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/7853/</link>
      <pubDate>2006-06-30T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        The paper claims that the analysis of the private business sector needs to concentrate on entrepreneurship. Based on fieldwork the paper proceeds by describing how Chinese entrepreneurs perceive the (economic) problems whose solutions pre-determine the economic performance of new firms. Entrepreneurship takes the form of institution building by which the high transaction costs can be mitigated and the value of assets and contracts be protected. The empirical research identified corporate governance, incentive contracts, local autonomy and networking as the crucial “hybrids” for mobilising investment and limiting moral hazard.
      </description>
      <author>Krug, B.</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Framing China: Transformation and Institutional Change (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/7854/</link>
      <pubDate>2006-06-30T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        The paper offers a frame for investigating the extent to which decentralisation, and subsequent locally chosen institutions shape private organisational and institutional innovation. To include the numerous locally based “economic regimes” matters as the resulting business system reflects political institution setting and private organisational innovation. Such a frame is a necessary first step for empirical studies attempting to explain the heterogeneity of China’s business systems, the emergence of hybrid organisations, and last but none the least, the different growth rates that can be observed across China.
      </description>
      <author>Krug, B.</author> <author>Hendrischke, H.</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Institution Building and Change in China (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/7331/</link>
      <pubDate>2006-02-06T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        We advance a conceptual frame for explaining economic transformation in China that combines a dynamic and a comparative perspective by taking the analysis of Fiscal Federalism one step further. Using insights from the comparative business systems literature we show that devolution of power at the beginning of the reform process introduced local autonomy, which stimulated a diversity of local regulatory regimes. As the central political leadership is no longer the sole supplier of institutional change, local governments become equal contributors to the formation of local business systems. Yet, local governments only partially define emerging local business systems. Local governance at the enterprise level is defined by the interaction between political and economic entrepreneurship, or, phrased in institutional terms, local business systems emerge from the interplay between the formal architecture of local autonomy and the informal institution of networking. In a comparative perspective this interaction, and its underlying driving forces for co-operation, namely: procedural uncertainty, relational risk and institutional change, will lead to diversity in outcomes. In a dynamic perspective both market competition and networking will ensure further competition between business systems, while political unification, imitation or scale economies will ask for convergence of local business systems beyond the local nexus.
      </description>
      <author>Krug, B.</author> <author>Hendrischke, H.</author>
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