http://repub.eur.nl/res/concept/jel-R51/ Recent publications classified by JEL Code R51 en http://repub.eur.nl/static-eur/img/logo.png http://repub.eur.nl http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/38963/ 2013-05-01T00:00:00Z For refuse collection, we estimate the cost effects of different institutional modes using panel data for almost all Dutch municipalities between 1998 and 2010. The modes we consider are private enterprises, intermunicipal cooperation, municipality-owned enterprises and in-house collection. For private companies, the cost advantage becomes substantially smaller and nonsignificant if municipal fixed effects are included. The cost advantage of intermunicipal cooperation is larger in this case than that of privatization. Dijkgraaf, E. Gradus, R.H.J.M. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/26865/ 2011-11-07T00:00:00Z For refuse collection, we estimate the cost effects of different institutional modes using panel data for almost all Dutch municipalities between 1998 and 2010. The modes we consider are private contracts, intermunicipal cooperation, public provision and own collection. For private companies, the cost advantage is substantially smaller and non-significant if municipal fixed effects are included. The cost advantage of intermunicipal cooperation is larger in this case than that of privatisation. Moreover, if yearly mode dummies and mode duration are also included, we show that for 2004, 2005 and 2006 a large cost increase is visible for privatisation. Which mode offers the most cost-saving opportunity depends strongly on the year and the mode duration. For private contracts, the duration effects lead to lower costs; for municipal cooperation and public provision, there are extra costs to begin with, which disappear after 5 or 6 years. Dijkgraaf, E. Gradus, R.H.J.M. http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/11253/ 2007-01-01T00:00:00Z In this paper we analyse whether collusion exists in the Dutch waste collection market, which shows a high degree of concentration. Although scale effects might be in accordance with this market outcome, the question is whether this concentration is in fact a result of fair competition. Using data for (nearly) all Dutch municipalities we estimate whether collusion exists and what the impact is on tariffs for waste collection. The results indicate that high concentration increases prices and therefore (partly) offsets the advantage of contracting out. The presence of competing public firms might be essential to ensure more and fair competition. Dijkgraaf, E. Gradus, R.H.J.M.