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    <title>Social Norms and Social Capital; Social Networks</title>
    <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/concept/jel-Z13/</link>
    <description>Recent publications classified by JEL Code Z13</description>
    <language>en</language>
    
    <item>
      <title>You too, Brutus? Category demise in Rotterdam warehousing, 1871-2011 (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/32840/</link>
      <pubDate>2012-06-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        To counterbalance the proliferation of studies on the emergence of new organizational categories, this study asked how organizational categories disappear. In a historical case study of vemen in Rotterdam warehousing, specific mechanisms contributing to the demise of that category are identified, paying particular attention to category labels, schemas, and members’ positioning within categories. A comparison with a similar but more persistent category in the port of Antwerp helps identify the possible causal mechanisms at work. A set of theoretical propositions is presented, as well as suggestions for re-specifying models of industry evolution, including accounting for the impact of posers.
      </description>
      <author>Kuilman, J.G.</author> <author>Driel, H. van</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Infrastructure Development and the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme: Evidence from Bankura, West Bengal (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/38555/</link>
      <pubDate>2012-01-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        Introduction. The immediate goal of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) is to ensure a social safety net for vulnerable groups by providing a fall-back source of employment when other alternatives are scarce. However, its long-term goals are to create durable rural assets and infrastructure which meet local needs and help address chronic poverty and to foster a model of governance based on the principles of grass-root democracy and transparency (Ministry of Rural Development, 2008). While several papers have examined pertinent aspects of the functioning of the programme, such as targeting (Jha et al., 2009), impact on consumption (Ravi and Engler, 2009) and various implementation issues including corruption (Rai, 2008; Institute of Applied Manpower Research, 2008) there is limited work on the quality and upkeep of the infrastructure built through the programme and indeed whether the constructed projects meet local needs. ...
      </description>
      <author>Roy, J.</author> <author>Bedi, A.S.</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Understanding the Diversity of Conceptions of Well-Being and Quality of Life (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/22352/</link>
      <pubDate>2010-06-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        The concepts of well-being and quality of life concern evaluative judgements. There is insufficient understanding
in current literature that these judgements aremadevariously due to the use of not only differing
values and differing research instruments but also differing standpoints, differing purposes, and differing
theoretical views and ontological presuppositions. The paper elucidates these sources of differences and
how they underlie the wide diversity of current conceptions.
      </description>
      <author>Gasper, D.R.</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Understanding the diversity of conceptions of well-being and quality of life (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/18710/</link>
      <pubDate>2009-11-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        The concepts of well-being and quality of life concern evaluative judgements. There is insufficient understanding in current literature that these judgements are made variously due to not only use of differing values and differing research instruments but also differing standpoints, differing purposes, and differing theoretical views and ontological presuppositions. The paper elucidates these sources of differences and how they underlie the wide diversity of current conceptions.
      </description>
      <author>Gasper, D.R.</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Separating Real Incentives and Accountability (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/13977/</link>
      <pubDate>2008-05-27T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        In experimental investigations of the effect of real incentives, accountability—the implicit or explicit expectation of a decision maker that she may have to justify her decisions in front of somebody else—is often confounded with the incentives themselves. This confounding of accountability with incentives makes causal attributions of any effects found problematic. We separate accountability and incentives, and find different effects. Accountability is found to reduce preference reversals between frames, for which incentives have no effect. Incentives on the other hand are found to reduce risk seeking for losses, where accountability has no effect. In a choice task between simple and compound events, accountability increases the preference for the simple event, while incentives have a weaker effect going in the opposite direction. It is thus shown that the confounding of accountability and incentives is relevant for studies on the effect of the latter, and that existing conclusions on the effect of incentives need to be reconsidered in light of this issue.
      </description>
      <author>Vieider, F.M.</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Interlocking Boards and Firm Performance: Evidence from a New Panel Database (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/9514/</link>
      <pubDate>2007-03-29T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        An interlock between two firms occurs if the firms share one or more directors in their boards of directors. We explore the effect of interlocks on firm performance for 101 large Dutch firms using a large and new panel database. We use five different performance measures, and for each performance measure we design three different panel data models, where we allow the effect of the number of interlocks to be linear, quadratic or square root, either with or without lags. Based on all results we conclude that current interlocks can have a negative effect on future firm performance. We show that this negative effect is jointly established by (1) interlocking directors being too busy and (2) by directors being members of a homogenous upper class group.
      </description>
      <author>Non, M.C.</author> <author>Franses, Ph.H.B.F.</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Enterprise Ground Zero in China (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/7853/</link>
      <pubDate>2006-06-30T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        The paper claims that the analysis of the private business sector needs to concentrate on entrepreneurship. Based on fieldwork the paper proceeds by describing how Chinese entrepreneurs perceive the (economic) problems whose solutions pre-determine the economic performance of new firms. Entrepreneurship takes the form of institution building by which the high transaction costs can be mitigated and the value of assets and contracts be protected. The empirical research identified corporate governance, incentive contracts, local autonomy and networking as the crucial “hybrids” for mobilising investment and limiting moral hazard.
      </description>
      <author>Krug, B.</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Framing China: Transformation and Institutional Change (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/7854/</link>
      <pubDate>2006-06-30T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        The paper offers a frame for investigating the extent to which decentralisation, and subsequent locally chosen institutions shape private organisational and institutional innovation. To include the numerous locally based “economic regimes” matters as the resulting business system reflects political institution setting and private organisational innovation. Such a frame is a necessary first step for empirical studies attempting to explain the heterogeneity of China’s business systems, the emergence of hybrid organisations, and last but none the least, the different growth rates that can be observed across China.
      </description>
      <author>Krug, B.</author> <author>Hendrischke, H.</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Institution Building and Change in China (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/7331/</link>
      <pubDate>2006-02-06T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        We advance a conceptual frame for explaining economic transformation in China that combines a dynamic and a comparative perspective by taking the analysis of Fiscal Federalism one step further. Using insights from the comparative business systems literature we show that devolution of power at the beginning of the reform process introduced local autonomy, which stimulated a diversity of local regulatory regimes. As the central political leadership is no longer the sole supplier of institutional change, local governments become equal contributors to the formation of local business systems. Yet, local governments only partially define emerging local business systems. Local governance at the enterprise level is defined by the interaction between political and economic entrepreneurship, or, phrased in institutional terms, local business systems emerge from the interplay between the formal architecture of local autonomy and the informal institution of networking. In a comparative perspective this interaction, and its underlying driving forces for co-operation, namely: procedural uncertainty, relational risk and institutional change, will lead to diversity in outcomes. In a dynamic perspective both market competition and networking will ensure further competition between business systems, while political unification, imitation or scale economies will ask for convergence of local business systems beyond the local nexus.
      </description>
      <author>Krug, B.</author> <author>Hendrischke, H.</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>A Social Network Analysis of Occupational Segregation (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/7418/</link>
      <pubDate>2006-01-27T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        This paper proposes a simple social network model of occupational segregation, generated by the existence of inbreeding bias among individuals of the same social group. If network referrals are important in getting a job, then expected inbreeding bias in the social structure results in different career choices for individuals from different social groups, which further translates into stable occupational segregation equilibria within the labour market. Our framework can be regarded as complementary to existing discrimination or rational bias theories used to explain persistent observed occupational disparities between various social groups.
      </description>
      <author>Buhai, I.S.</author> <author>Leij, M.J. van der</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Strong Ties in a Small World (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/7420/</link>
      <pubDate>2006-01-10T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        In this paper we test the celebrated `Strength of weak ties' theory of Granovetter (1973). We test two hypotheses on the network structure in a data set of collaborating economists. While we find support for the hypothesis of transitivity of strong ties, we reject the hypothesis that weak ties reduce distance more than strong ties do. We relate this surprising result to two different views of society. Whereas the classical view has been that society consists of different communities with strong ties within communities and weak ties between, the community of economic researchers has an interlinked star structure with strong ties between the stars. In such a world, strong ties are more important than weak ties.
      </description>
      <author>Leij, M.J. van der</author> <author>Goyal, S.</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Multi-store Competition: Market Segmentation or Interlacing (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/11627/</link>
      <pubDate>2005-11-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        This paper develops a model for multi-store competition between firms. Using the fact that different firms have different outlets and produce horizontally differentiated goods, we obtain a pure strategy equilibrium where firms choose a different location for each outlet and firms' locations are interlaced. The location decisions of multi-store firms are completely independent of each other. Firms choose locations that minimize transportation costs of consumers. Moreover, generically, the subgame perfect equilibrium is unique and when the firms have an equal number of outlets, prices are independent of the number of outlets.
      </description>
      <author>Janssen, M.C.W.</author> <author>Karamychev, V.A.</author> <author>Reeven, P.A. van</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>No Black Box and No Black Hole: from Social Capital to Gift Exchange (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/6665/</link>
      <pubDate>2005-06-09T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        In this paper, we draw on the literature about gift exchange to suggest a conceptualization of the
emergence, maintenance and use of social capital (SK). We thus open up the black box of how social relations are established, and are able to indicate what can be meaningfully ascribed to social capital. Social capital as a concept cannot be invoked at will to explain situations that are
primarily perceived as favorable. Instead, when the way in which social capital emerges, maintained and used is conceptually clarified, it becomes clear that situations perceived as unfavorable can be ascribed to SK as well, and it becomes clear that SK cannot be drawn on at will, by just anybody. SK resides in what we call a social capital community.
      </description>
      <author>Dolfsma, W.A.</author> <author>Eijk, A.R. van der</author> <author>Jolink, A.</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>The Price of a Price. On the Crowding out of Social Norms (Article)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/11628/</link>
      <pubDate>2004-11-01T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        We study the impact of financial incentives on social approval, showing that in a society with
altruists and egoists, who all care about social approval, introducing financial incentives to agents
to contribute to a socially desirable outcome may actually decrease the number of contributions.
Withdrawing the financial incentive does not restore the norm to contribute and may reduce the
level of contributions even further. When the norm has disappeared, it may be possible to restore
voluntary contributions by first introducing high price and then reducing it, but such an operation
is costly and its success uncertain.
      </description>
      <author>Janssen, M.C.W.</author> <author>Mendys, E.</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>Multi-Store Competition: Market Segmentation or Interlacing? (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/6711/</link>
      <pubDate>2004-01-06T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        This paper develops a model for multi-store competition between firms. Using the fact that different firms have different outlets and produce horizontally differentiated goods, we obtain a pure strategy equilibrium where firms choose a different location for each outlet and firms' locations are interlaced. Moreover, generically, the subgame perfect equilibrium is unique and when the firms have an equal number of outlets, prices are independent of the number of outlets.
      </description>
      <author>Janssen, M.C.W.</author> <author>Karamychev, V.A.</author> <author>Reeven, P.A. van</author>
    </item> <item>
      <title>The Price of a Price: On the Crowding out of Social Norms (Research Paper)</title>
      <link>http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/6861/</link>
      <pubDate>2001-06-30T00:00:00Z</pubDate>
      <description>
        
        There is increasing empirical and experimental evidence that providing financial incentives to agents to perform certain socially desirable actions may permanently reduce other types of motivations to undertake these actions. We study the impact of financial incentives on the desire for social approval, using the example of blood donation. We show that in a society with altruists and egoists, who all care about social approval, introducing a payment into a voluntary system may actually decrease the amount of blood donated. Withdrawing the financial incentive does not restore the norm to donate and may reduce the supply of blood even further.
      </description>
      <author>Janssen, M.C.W.</author> <author>Mendys, E.</author>
    </item>
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