Cooperation in a modified version of the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game
January 1997
Article
pp 613-619.
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In this paper we consider a series of finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games in which the payoff the players receive in a period depends on how they have played the game in the past. We show that this modification of the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game makes cooperation a feasible equilibrium configuration in the beginning of play.
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Automatically Extracted Terms
- period
- player
- pay-off
- equilibrium
- future pay-offs
- defection
- future
- period t
- strategy
- cooperation
- result
- proof
- condition
- behavior
- period pay-offs
- number
- example
- prisoner
- finitely
- dilemma
