Redistributive Politics with Distortionary Taxation
December 2008
Research Paper
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This paper proposes a first step towards a positive theory of tax instruments. We present a model that extends models of redistributive politics by Myerson (1993) and Lizzeri and Persico (2001). Two politicians compete in terms of targeted redistributive promises nanced through distortionary taxes. We solve for the case of both targetable and non-targetable taxes. We prove that there is an imperfect efficiency-targetability trade off on the tax side. Politicians prefer targetable taxes over non-targetable ones, especially when the latter are less efficient. Yet, targetable taxation is always used even when it is very inefficient compared to non-targetable taxes.
Keywords
Classifications using
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) Classification System
- H31 : Household
- H23 : Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- D72 : Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 : Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
Automatically Extracted Terms
- voter
- candidate
- taxation
- e ciency
- equilibrium
- redistribution
- tax rate
- targetable
- ciency
- politician
- model
- non-targetable
- instrument
- transfer
- function
- tax rate t
- tax rates
- non-targetable taxation
- money
- distortion
