Determinants of Contractual Completeness in Franchising
2010-04-26
Research Paper
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The aim of the study is to explain the determinants of contractual completeness in franchise relationships by formulating and testing various propositions derived from transaction cost theory, agency theory, property rights theory, organizational capability theory and relational view of governance. The degree of contractual completeness depends on behavioural uncertainty (negatively), trust (positively), franchisees’ specific investments (negatively), environmental uncer-tainty (negatively), intangibility of system specific know-how (negatively) and contract design capabilities (positively). The hypotheses are tested with a data base consisting of 52 franchise systems in Austria. The empirical results support the hypotheses regarding behavioural uncertainty, trust and intangible system-specific know-how.
- L26 : Entrepreneurship
- O32 : Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
- M : Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting
- M13 : New Firms; Startups
- contract
- completeness
- right
- trust
- uncertainty
- theory
- decision rights
- contract design capabilities
- journal
- decision
- design
- management
- franchisee
- capability
- franchisor
- franchise
- degree
- transaction
- investment
- result
