Balancing the Bids, Solutions for Unit Price Auctions
February 2011
Research Paper
pp 1-29.
This publication is part of collection
| Related Files |
|---|
View PDF Version
(2011-0471.pdf, 0.2MB) |
Many organizations use procurement tenders to buy large amounts of goods and services. Especially in the public sector the use of these reverse auctions has grown rapidly over the past decades. For the (reverse) unit price auction experience as well as theory have shown that they can attract skewed/unbalanced bids, i.e. bids where the price structure is distorted to take advantage of estimation errors. This paper shows that by either allowing for some secrecy or post tender competition, incentives in unit price auction change in such a way that can make bid skewing disappear.
Keywords
- procurement
- skewed bids
- split award auction
- unbalanced bidding
- unit price auctions
- post tender competition
Classifications using
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) Classification System
Automatically Extracted Terms
- bidder
- price
- contract
- score rule
- skewing
- score
- auction
- agency
- procedure
- problem
- quantity
- … nal bill
- paper
- function
- bidding
- service
- equilibrium
- … ctional work
- strategy
- amount
