http://hdl.handle.net/1765/30
series: ERS-2000-17-ORG

Organizational Change and Vested Interests


Research Paper
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The nature of organizational change and the value of headquarters is analyzed in a dynamic bargaining model. Organizational change can be either imposed, or voluntary and immediate, or voluntary and delayed. Headquarters derives it value from preventing surplus reducing endogenous commitments.



Keywords


Classifications using Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) Classification System
Automatically Extracted Terms
  • change
  • person
  • period
  • person 1
  • delay
  • headquarters
  • person 2
  • bargaining
  • value
  • proposal
  • party
  • commitment
  • model
  • payoff
  • equilibrium
  • subgame
  • management
  • surplus
  • figure
  • acceptance