Do Elections lead to Informed Public Decisions?
2003-08-22
Research Paper
This publication is part of collection
| Related Files |
|---|
View PDF Version
(2003-0671.pdf, 0.4MB) |
Democracies delegate substantial decision power to politicians. Using a model in which an incumbent can design, examine and implement public policies, we show that examination takes place in spite of, rather than thanks to, elections. Elections are needed as a carrot and a stick to motivate politicians, yet politicians who are overly interested in re-election shy away from policy examination. Our analysis sheds light on the distance created in mature democracies between the political process and the production of policy relevant information; on the role played by probing into candidates' past; and on the possibility of crowding out desirable political behaviour by increasing the value of holding office.
Keywords
Classifications using
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) Classification System
- D78 : Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
- D72 : Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 : Asymmetric and Private Information
Automatically Extracted Terms
- project
- vt +1
- voter
- policy
- value
- design
- payoff
- electorate
- decision
- re-election
- information
- office
- condition
- politician
- election
- implementation
- examination
- period
- status
- equilibrium
