Why politicians prefer quasi-autonomous organizations


Article
volume 16, issue 2 pp 175-201.
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(BSK-CPM-2004-006.pdf, 0.6MB)

Since the 1980s the number of quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations has increased in most western countries. This article offers a theoretical explanation for politicians’ apparent preference for quangos. The model is based on rational choice sociology, neo-institutional economics and public choice. Hypotheses are formulated on the conditions that are expected to influence politicians’ choice. The statistical analysis, using a database of 124 decisions to establish 392 quangos in The Netherlands between 1950 and 1993, shows that quango proliferation is more a trend than a well-informed choice. This raises new questions for research.



Keywords


Automatically Extracted Terms
  • quango
  • politician
  • policy
  • policy implementation
  • choice
  • government
  • agent
  • executive agent
  • implementation
  • number
  • government bureaucracy
  • sector
  • model
  • bureaucracy
  • van thiel
  • organization
  • decision
  • executive
  • thiel
  • monitoring