series: TI 99-050/1
Why do Policy Makers stick to Inefficient Decisions?
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This paper offers an explanation for why policy makers stick to inefficient policy decisions. I argue that repealing a policy is a bad signal to voters about the policy maker's competence if voters do not have complete knowledge about the effects of implemented policies. I derive the optimal policy maker's decision on continuation of a policy, assuming that voters' beliefs about the policy maker's competence are updated according to Bayes' rule. I show that if the policy maker cares sufficiently about reelection, he will never repeal a policy.
- D78 : Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
- D72 : Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- policy maker
- policy makers competence
- policy makers
- period 1