Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Schlicher, L.P.J.
Author-Name-Last: Schlicher
Author-Name-First: Loe
Author-Name: Musegaas, M.
Author-Name-Last: Musegaas
Author-Name-First: Marieke
Author-Name: Westerink-Duijzer, L.E.
Author-Name-Last: Westerink-Duijzer
Author-Name-First: Evelot
Title: Resource location games
Abstract: In this paper, we introduce and analyze resource location games. We show core nonemptiness
 by providing a set of intuitive core allocations, called Resource-Profit allocations.
 In addition, we present a sufficient condition for which the core and the set of Resource-
 Profit allocations coincide. Finally, we provide an example showing that when the sufficient
 condition is not satisfied, the coincidence is not guaranteed.
Length: 23
Creation-Date: 2019-02-06
File-URL: https://repub.eur.nl/pub/115180/EI2019-05.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Series: RePEc:ems:eureir
Number: EI2019-05
Keywords: cooperative game, core, resource-profit allocations, reallocation of resources
Handle: RePEc:ems:eureir:115180