Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Goyal, S.
Author-Name-Last: Goyal
Author-Name-First: Sanjeev
Author-Person: pgo329
Author-Name: Staal, K.
Author-Name-Last: Staal
Author-Name-First: Klaas
Title: The political economy of regionalism
Abstract: We examine the incentives of regions in a country to unite or to separate. We find that smaller regions have greater incentives to unite, relative to larger regions. We show, however, that on the whole, majority voting on separation and union generates excessive incentives to separate. This leads us to examine the scope of alternative political insititutions and rules in overcoming the potential inefficciency. Our paper  also provides a wide range of examples to illustrate the different instituions used in actual practice to resolve such problems.
Creation-Date: 1999-12-31
File-URL: https://repub.eur.nl/pub/1633/feweco19000103141100.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Series: RePEc:ems:eureir
Number: EI 9957-/A
Keywords: referendum, secession, union, voting
Handle: RePEc:ems:eureir:1633