Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: van Rinsum, M.
Author-Name-Last: van Rinsum
Author-Name-First: Marcel
Title: Utilizing Incentives and Accountability: In Control in Control?
Abstract: Objectivity and transparency are often considered to be desirable attributes of a performance measurement and incentive system. Subjectivity, on the other hand,
 is typically equated with bias and has a negative connotation. But accounting research
 shows us that a degree of subjectivity, in other words, allowing leeway for supervisors’
 judgments in evaluations, is usually optimal. I argue that we should switch to the term
 ‘discretion’, to be better able to communicate its benefits. Moreover, I discuss the
 benefits and costs of discretion and of transparency. I surmise that a balance between
 objectivity and discretion is required, and that transparency is definitely not always
 desirable. Furthermore, I discuss how discretion relates to the way in which managers
 are held accountable. Holding managers accountable for outcomes is not always
 optimal, yet pervasive. Finally, I outline future research opportunities on discretion
 and accountability, apply the insights about performance measurement to the
 academic working environment, and promote the use of new research methods.
Length: 48
Creation-Date: 2019-09-20
File-URL: https://repub.eur.nl/pub/120287/Inaugural-Address-Marcel-van-Rinsun.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
Series: RePEc:ems:euriar
Number: EIA 2019-078-F&A
Classification-JEL: M41
Keywords: prestatiebeoordeling, transparantie, objectivity, subjectivity, discretion, incentives, accountability, transparency, performance evaluation, measurement system, management control, management accounting
Handle: RePEc:ems:euriar:120287