Between Utrecht and the War of the Austrian Succession: The Dutch Translation of the British Merchant of 1728

Koen Stapelbroek

To cite this article: Koen Stapelbroek (2014) Between Utrecht and the War of the Austrian Succession: The Dutch Translation of the British Merchant of 1728, History of European Ideas, 40:8, 1026-1043, DOI: 10.1080/01916599.2014.971533

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01916599.2014.971533

Published online: 06 Nov 2014.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 97

View related articles

View Crossmark data
Between Utrecht and the War of the Austrian Succession: 
The Dutch Translation of the *British Merchant* of 1728

KOEN STAPELBROEK*

Department of History, University of Helsinki, Finland

Summary

The aim of this article is to shed light on some elements of the context in which the Dutch translation of the *British Merchant* of 1728 was published. At first sight the translation appears to be a straightforward mercantile handbook. No additions are made to the English language original of 1721, other than a set of tables. Yet, precisely in this mercantile function lies a different political significance. The argument of this article, built up through contextual reconstruction and analysis of a number of pamphlets, trade handbooks and periodicals, is that the *Historie van den algemenen en bijzonderen koophandel van Groot Brittannien* provided an instrument to its Dutch readers, presumably consisting to a large extent of merchants and politicians, for coming to grips with the reality of international commerce that had emerged following the War of the Spanish Succession. Understanding, and subsequently being able to react to, the recent history of British trade and Hanoverian commercial politics had by the 1720s become a key factor in the development of Dutch trade and of the new outlooks on international politics that were required to preserve the Republic. The article suggests that the publisher of the Dutch translation of the *British Merchant*, a Huguenot from Delft, along with other Dutch Huguenot publishers tended to translate and publish specific texts that paved the way for a commercial politics that combined allegiance to Britain and Austria with a vision of European trade that was of French origin and contrasted with British principles of foreign trade.

Keywords: Dutch Republic; trade; translation; British Merchant; commercial treaties.

Contents

1. Introduction ................................................................. 1026
2. The *Historie van den koophandel van Groot Brittannien* (1728) ............ 1028
3. Liberty and Trade in the Princely City of Delft: Boitet’s Publishing Politics . 1030
4. Le Long and Dutch Huguenot Printers: A Political-Commercial
   Mini-Prosopography .......................................................... 1032
5. Hesitant Hanoverians ...................................................... 1035
6. Dutch Huguenot Political Economy? ....................................... 1039
7. Conclusion .................................................................. 1042

1. Introduction

The eighteenth-century history of European peace and trade is traditionally recounted—within different historical sub-disciplines—as a sequence of periods of war and peace.

*E-mail: koen.stapelbroek@helsinki.fi

© 2014 Taylor & Francis
Within this narrative, each phase of conflict or settlement has been given a variety of labels and characteristic qualifications by successive generations of historians in later times. The Seven Years’ War, for instance, in recent years has come to be known as the first ‘World War’ and also as the first global trade war. This same war also has been identified as the point at which the intensity of the translation of economic texts from one European language into another dramatically increased and at which, one might suggest, the cumulative adaptation of local knowledge about trade became compounded into a general internationally spread body of thought with its own language.¹

This article focuses on a publication from a few decades before the Seven Years’ War that cannot be directly associated with a specific instance where warfare or the settling of conflict itself directly sparked the initiative to translate a specific text. As is well known, the British Merchant itself was published at various intervals in 1713/14, in the midst of a heated party political pamphlet debate following the voting down by the House of Commons of the commercial treaty with France that had been agreed at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession. Yet, in 1728, the year a Dutch translation appeared, the only (smaller) conflict that may have provided a similar occasion for translation was the Anglo-Spanish War of 1727 to 1729, in which the Dutch Republic was not militarily involved.

More generally, ‘the period between the Peace of Utrecht and the elevation of William IV in 1747’ has been called ‘the most orphanlike treated and hence also the worst understood period in the history of the Republic’.² In a similar way, but with a characteristic flourish, the main historian of a previous era, H. T. Colenbrander, at the turn of the twentieth century judged that following battles against Cromwell and Louis XIV, the most heroic struggle of the Republic in the period following 1713 was against naval shipworms.³ Whether such damning sarcasm is justified or not, it certainly fits with the standard narratives of the decline of the Dutch Republic that stem from the later nineteenth century. Within such narratives the War of the Spanish Succession is (rightfully, no doubt) understood to have impoverished the Dutch state by increasing its debts as a consequence of the war effort, without generating new commercial opportunities. The decline of the United Provinces into a nation of rentiers, then, according to this narrative, was a combination of a political, military, economic and moral decline that took place simultaneously (and of which the appearance of the naval shipworm was an indication—some explained that the teredo navalis was imported through VOC ships and even saw its appearance as divine punishment, inspiring prayers for relief in churches of various denominations and synagogues).⁴

In an attempt to reclaim some of the limelight from these shipworms that have occupied the national historiography of the Dutch early eighteenth century, the following argument is designed to indicate some aspects within Dutch publications of the time that appear significant in the wider European political debate of the period. The aim is to show

---

how, in the absence of revolutionary upheavals and military clamour, different positions on the regulation of interstate trade that would play out against each other at various points in the rest of the century developed. The question, put differently, is whether underneath the interlinked stories of shifts in commercial power and events at the level of political alliances, a different perspective on the years following the Peace of Utrecht may be developed to account for how in this ‘tranquil period’ \(^5\) the fundamental positions on commercial politics evolved into a form that fit with the logic of ‘jealousy of trade’ in the later eighteenth century.\(^6\)

Precisely the indirect character of the motives—whatever these may have been—that inspired the Dutch translation of 1728 of the \textit{British Merchant} gives reason for looking into this text and its surrounding contexts. In fact, the collected issues of the \textit{British Merchant} themselves were only published in 1721, and had two more full editions in the 1740s (1743 and 1748) during the War of the Austrian Succession. These very facts point in the direction that between the Peace of Utrecht and the Seven Years’ War the relevance of the issues discussed at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession remained constant. Moreover, it seems from the way in which ideas about commercial treaties circulated that these issues were considered in this period not merely locally, but as part of European discussions on the international organisation of trade. For these reasons, it becomes interesting to look into the Dutch publishing context of the translation of the \textit{British Merchant} to see how this particular work fits within the development of Dutch political economy and its preferred sources and the ways in which it modelled itself upon foreign texts in the light of actual political events and moral and religious sensibilities.

2. The \textit{Historie van den koophandel van Groot Brittannien} (1728)

As mentioned above, the various instalments of the original publication of the \textit{British Merchant} were not put together, rearranged and supplemented with other texts until 1721 when they were published the form of a multi-volume book. For that occasion Charles King wrote an introductory text and divided the publication into three volumes, each with their own dedication. In the 1721 edition, the old texts were not only rearranged but also appeared under a new guise. The original aims of the publication had been crystal clear and were straightforwardly polemical. As the last words of the first issue of 7 August 1717 put it:

Let the \textit{Mercator} endeavour to persuade his Readers that our Commerce was retriev’d by the late Treaty with \textit{France} or at least would have been had that Treaty been made effectual by a Law. The \textit{BRITISH MERCHANT} shall prove that our \textit{Commerce} was preserv’d by not passing that Law.\(^7\)

---


\(^6\) Istvan Hont, \textit{Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective} (Cambridge, MA, 2005).

With the publication in 1721, the original question of what the 1713 Anglo-French commercial treaty would do for British commerce, as considered through the balances of trade with Portugal, France and Spain, turned into a wider programmatic question about the ‘natural Channels’ of ‘the inclinations and Wealth of the People of England’. On this issue it was in the interests of all modern states to cultivate trade. King’s preface included a lengthy history of trade from antiquity to the present day, which was followed by a three-page-long quotation from Pierre-Daniel Huet’s Memoirs of the Dutch Trade in All the States, Empires, and Kingdoms in the World, which had been translated in English in 1717 and in 1722 would be published in a new edition. Huet’s message when he composed his manuscript in the late seventeenth century, at the request of Colbert, was that having trade was a decisive factor in modern politics and determined whether or not a state was capable of defending itself—and that commercial monarchies like France could and should make trade a fundamental political object. For Huet, and for the people who quoted and paraphrased the same passages, like Joshua Gee and William Wood, the original model remained the United Provinces. In the case of Huet at the end of the seventeenth century, right before the establishment of the Conseil de Commerce, the idea of his work was that France could rival England and thereby protect itself from being overrun by Britain in Europe, by emulating the Dutch. When Gee published his The Trade and Navigation of Great Britain Considered in 1729, he already added that:

But if that Gentleman [i.e., Huet] had lived to our Time he would have seen much more Reason to have applauded the Skill and Conduct of their own Council of State and Chamber of Commerce than to have equalled us with the Dutch in the Regulation of Trade.

When King inserted his quotation from Huet, it was not followed by a declaration of admiration or envy of France, or by Huet’s idea that all states should equally develop trade to create a sustainable form of inter-state competition, but immediately by the argument, developed over six pages until the end of the preface, that compared with other states, Britain had a larger potential to become great through trade: ‘I shall next endeavour to shew that there is no Nation so well qualified to carry on a glorious and advantageous Commerce as we are’.

When the Dutch translation of the British Merchant appeared, in two large volumes, it bore a title that differed from the meaning of the original. The Historie van den algemenen en bijzonderen koophandel van Groot Brittannien, door alle gewesten van de waerelt (Delft, 1728) was neither a history in the sense of a conjectural history of trade culminating in Britain, nor a longer factual history of the development of the various branches of British trade, but could be read by members of a Dutch audience as a very specific story about recent events and opinions about the regulation of trade in

---

8 Charles King, The British Merchant; or, Commerce Preserv’d, 3 vols (London, 1721), I, v.
10 Joshua Gee, ‘Conclusion’, in The Trade and Navigation of Great-Britain Considered: Shewing that the Surest Way for a Nation to Increase in Riches (London, 1729), 7–8. This is also paraphrased in William Wood, A Survey of Trade: In Four Parts. Together with Considerations on Our Money (London 1722), 62.
12 King, The British Merchant, I, xxxiii.
Britain for the purpose of coming to terms with the outcome that these events and opinions produced.

Comparing the 1721 original and the 1728 Dutch edition, the Dutch edition is a pretty much complete and faithfully translated text, with three exceptions. One, immediately after the long quotation from Huet, King’s preface comes to an abrupt end. In other words, the argument that Britain is, more than other nations, capable of rising above the other states once its commercial politics are given due attention is cut short. As to the reason for this brusque editorial intervention, one can only guess at this stage. Two, the highly political dedications to each of the three volumes (to Sunderland, Pulteney and Paul Methuen) have been eliminated, along with the list of subscribers. Should the aim of the translation have been to show the political connections of the British Merchant’s argument, this would not make sense. Three, at the end of the last volume, the Dutch edition includes 75 pages with the complete tariff list of duties to be paid on incoming and outgoing goods according to the 1713 commercial treaty that was never ratified.

All in all, this Dutch translation fulfils a number of functions that coincide with the characteristics of a business manual. The Historie van den koophandel van Groot Brittannien gives information about tariffs, incoming and outgoing trade volumes and the profitability of trade in certain goods. In general it produces an overview of the way in which British foreign trade was structured since the earliest years of the eighteenth century and arguably since the time of the Scheme of Trade that was put forward in 1674 and included in the 1713 periodical that was also produced by a number of the same people. On a more abstract theoretical level the Historie van den koophandel van Groot Brittannien explained the determinants of commercial success, in particular the importance of British policies of discriminating between national markets with a positive and those that have a negative balance of trade.

3. Liberty and Trade in the Princely City of Delft: Boitet’s Publishing Politics

Other examples of books and pamphlets within the portfolio of the publisher from Delft who issued the Historie van den koophandel van Groot Brittannien may help us close in on the (Dutch political) identity of the work. Who was Reinier Boitet? \(^{13}\) Born in the city of Delft and baptised 19 January 1691 (he died in 1758), Boitet’s family history insofar as it is known leads back to the city of Orléans. His grandfather and namesake Reinier Boitet took refuge in the United Provinces and married in 1651 in the village of Loosduinen, by The Hague. His grandson took up his work as a publisher around 1720 and published his first newspaper, the Delfsche Courant, in 1721. Next to his Beschryving der Stadt Delft (1729), formal fiscal publications of the city of Delft and Delfshaven and some popular poetry, Boitet published quite a number of writings that reveal a certain political profile.

Unsurprisingly, for a Dutch Huguenot serving a specific target audience, Boitet published a range of quite aggressively anti-Catholic works (the targets of which included Cardinal Alberoni, the Fourth Article on religion in the Peace of Ryswick, a Jacobite conspiracy and Scottish rebellion, aspects of the Reformation, and the abuses of the

---

Catholic church in the Southern Provinces of the Republic. The anti-Catholic and anti-Bourbon (and anti-Spanish Habsburg) themes come back in his heroic eulogy of Prince Eugene of Savoy, as well as in his centennial article published in his Hollandsche Historische Courant in 1748 on the events leading up to the Peace of Münster, in which Philip II is portrayed as a near anti-Christ figure and directly opposed to the pious Calvinist William of Orange leading his oppressed nation out of servitude. Among other interest in journals for the Peace of 1648, which ended the Revolt and confirmed Dutch independence, and that breathed the same spirit, Boitet’s commemorative history was directly copied by the Nederlandsch Gedenkboek of Europische Mercurius, which was a direct source for Isaäc Le Long, another Huguenot printer whose publications will be discussed below.

The same religious-political aspects play a role in a collection of works on the peace treaties and diplomatic affairs of the time, which included pamphlets like the Slang in het gras, of 1712, that warned against the fatal consequences of a separate peace with France and the Lettre a un ami a la Haye, touchant le danger où se trouveroit l’Europe, et principalement la Grande-Bretagne, en cas que la quadruple alliance n’eût point de succès. The message of the latter pamphlet was the same as the one of a poem which Boitet published in 1718 in support of Cadogan’s efforts to include the Republic in the Quadruple alliance. Boitet also published poems by the Rotterdam writer Jacob Zeeus, who towards the end of the War of the Spanish Succession was one of the public voices that warned against the Dutch war effort not being rewarded by the British ally, which had come under Tory ‘Papal’ rule, but that the Dutch would instead be sold short by their deceiving ally in the course of the peace negotiations.

Furthermore, some of his publications reveal a notable allegiance to the House of Orange and his observations on the 1748 land-tax uproar in the Northern Provinces and in Amsterdam show his conciliatory attitude towards domestic faction politics. His readership would have been interested in and sympathetic to British Whig politics.
associated with Walpole from the time after the ‘Whig Schism’ and in these same years have been highly critical of modern public finance and credit: Boitet translated Cato’s Letters under the title Brieven door een voornaam Lord en lid van het Parlement van Groot-Britannen, op den naam van Cato geschreven: behelzende, een levendig tafereel van het gedrag der gewezene bewindhebbers van de Zuid-Zee-Kompagnie (1722). In the same category, Boitet also sold the satirical De groote gilde der heedendaagsche financiers (1748). Interestingly, as a possible counterpoint to schemes in which public finance and trade institutions were joined to float the national economy and the state debt, Boitet also published Pierre-Daniel Huet’s Histoire du commerce et de la navigation des anciens, which was translated as Historie van den Koophandel en zeevaart der aloude volkeren (1722).

4. Le Long and Dutch Huguenot Printers: A Political-Commercial Mini-Prospography

Boitet was only one of a number of Dutch publicists of Huguenot descent. Another major figure in the Dutch printing world of the early eighteenth century was Isaäc Le Long, who was born in Frankfurt am Main in 1683 (he died in 1762 in Hanau) and who lived and published in Amsterdam from 1714 to 1744. His main work first appeared in 1714, entitled De Koophandel van Amsterdam, Naar alle gewesten des Weerelds and was a reworked version of Jacques le Moine de l’Espine’s commercial manual that was first published in 1694 and reprinted in 1704. The various updated editions of the Koophandel van Amsterdam of the early eighteenth century (1715, 1719, 1724, 1727, 1734, 1744) included commentaries on the political circumstances of the time, echoing news periodicals and pamphlets published in the Republic.

Among Le Long’s portfolio of printed works was another work by Huet that did not concern trade, but biblical antiquarianism. The seventh edition of the Traité de la situation du paradis terrestre, published in French by Jean Anisson, was rendered in Dutch as Verhandelingen van de Gelegenheid des Aardschen Paradijs (1715). Huet’s commercial ideas, however, entered Le Long’s publishing projects through the Koophandel van Amsterdam (either directly or through the Traité général du commerce, first published in 1700 in Amsterdam by Samuel Ricard, another Huguenot)—just like, vice versa, traces of the first edition of De Koophandel van Amsterdam of 1694 can be found in Huet’s text.

22 Abel Boyer, Het leven en de regering van Anna Koningin van Engeland (Delft, 1736); Het publiek en privaat leeven van den ridder Robert Walpole (Delft, 1742).
23 The subtitle of the translation of Cato’s Letters referred to the well-known collection of prints on the 1720 financial crises that was published as Het groote Tafereel der Dwaasheid [known in English as The Great Mirror of Folly]. One of the contributors to the Tafereel was the Huguenot Bernard Picart, on whom, see Lynn Hunt, Margaret C. Jacob, and Wijnand Mijnhardt. The Book That Changed Europe: Picart and Bernard’s ‘Religious Ceremonies of the World’ (Cambridge, MA, 2010).
25 See Lucas Jansen, ‘De koophandel van Amsterdam’: een critische studie over het koopmanshandboek van Jacques Le Moine de l’Espine en Isaac Le Long (Amsterdam, 1946). From 1727 the gradually growing work consisted of two volumes. Later editions were printed until the tenth edition of 1801/2; see the table in Jansen, ‘De koophandel van Amsterdam’, 5.
26 Jansen, ‘De koophandel van Amsterdam’, 33–34.
This was not a particularly special feature of Le Long’s work. Huet’s history of commerce was also engaged with by Jacques Savary des Brûlons in his *Dictionnaire universel de commerce*, which was adapted into English by Malachy Postlethwayt in 1751 as *The Universal Dictionary of Trade and Commerce* and in its third edition was dedicated to Theodore Janssen, one of the figures behind the original publication of the *British Merchant* in 1713. Just like the *Dictionnaire universel de commerce* was an update of the programmatic and political project that had given rise to *Le parfait négociant*, which had been published by Jacques Savary senior since 1675 (and of which parts had been copied into Le Long’s *Koophandel van Amsterdam*), so Postlethwayt addressed Janssen by declaring that the plan of the work he presented was based ‘upon Principles no Way incompatible with those you have always espoused’.27

In a similar way to how French and British writers incorporated Huet’s narrative account of the history of commerce into their own projects, Le Long implicitly adapted Huet’s and others’ outlooks onto the politicised reality of commercial competition between states in the late seventeenth century to an early eighteenth-century Dutch perspective. Whereas the earlier editions were more strictly focused on giving technical-professional mercantile information, in the edition of the work of 1727, when a second volume was added with updates on all the chapters that were included in the first volume, a number of pamphlets concerning Dutch trade with other states and the developments of French and British trade politics were included.28 Next to the aim of giving new information, the aspect of ‘political instruction’ became more prominent. In this sense, the book in 1727 became more like the *British Merchant*, which would be published in Dutch in the following year.

Drawing heavily upon Dutch periodicals (notably the *Europische Mercurius*) and pamphlet debates since the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, Le Long commented on the demise of the South Sea Company, John Law’s Mississippi Scheme,29 the events surrounding the Company of Ostend, the introduction of the new Tariff of 1725 in the United Provinces and the political and commercial dimensions of the British ownership of the *Asiento*. While the English nation had managed to come to a near perfection of its arrangements of trade and manufacturing through tariff protection and prohibitions on imports and consumption, it had made an error, for which Le Long held the ‘Court party’ responsible, to shift the state debt to the South Sea Company. Likewise, Le Long accused the British Tory government at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession of leaving the alliance ‘in a sinister way’ to close a very profitable deal with Spain and France30. In a similar way, the negotiations between France and England in 1712 which considered the exclusion of all other states from trade with Spain and the Spanish Americas were held up as a model—in 1727—of how France, with reference to the aforementioned Bourbon-Catholic ‘snake in the grass’, continued to pose a threat of ‘Universal monarchy’ also in modern commercial times in which a unity of Franco-Spanish commerce would destroy the balance of power.31

28 Le Long copied some parts from J. P. Ricard’s French enlarged edition of his own work that had appeared in 1722, which inspired Jansen to think—quite reasonably—that publishing competition between Ricard and Le Long was the motive for adding a second volume; see Jansen, ‘*De koophandel van Amsterdam*’, 110–12.
29 Jansen, ‘*De koophandel van Amsterdam*’, 133–37, 171–75.
30 Jansen, ‘*De koophandel van Amsterdam*’, 167.
31 Jansen, ‘*De koophandel van Amsterdam*’, 180–81.
In contrast with these political designs by France and by British Tory politicians, Le Long deemed proper trade divinely blessed, as were the profits of the Dutch East India Company, while the collapse of the ‘Windhandel’ and John Law’s scheme were equally divine moral punishments. Here, there is a parallel with Boitet that extends along the range of Le Long’s publishing policies. Le Long supported the idea that there was a Dutch ‘right’ to forbid the Company of Ostend and he promoted its joint Anglo-Dutch destruction. He also attacked the designs of Cardinal Alberoni, treated the Polish Succession as expected, reflected on the history of Protestantism and from the 1730s onwards advocated the rights of the Herrnhutters. All in all, Le Long comes out as a pretty standard defender of the Protestant alliance and the advantages of trade that reside in having Britain as a ‘natural ally’ against the always profoundly distrustful French.

Roughly this same range of publications was covered by the Hague publisher Guillaume de Voys, who originally published the already mentioned Lettre a un ami a la Haye, touchant le danger où se trouveroit l’Europe, et principalement la Grande-Bretagne, en cas que la quadruple alliance n’eût point de succès (1718). De Voys published William Temple’s letters from The Hague in French and Jean Dumont’s considerations on the causes of the War of the Spanish Succession, as well as on the subjects of the effective exclusion of Austria by Britain from the peace negotiations in 1713, the Anglo-Dutch Barrier treaty, Dutch history, and the condition of the Huguenot churches in the Republic.

Interestingly, when it came to translating political economic treatises, Boitet, Le Long and other Dutch publicists did not choose English Whig authors like Joshua Gee and others. Instead, while Boitet published Huet, Le Long was quick to recognise Jean-François Melon’s Essai politique sur le commerce (1734) as a suitable text in his opinion and made it appear in Dutch in the following year as Staatkundige toetse van den koophandel: of Aanwysinge van proefhoudende middelen, om den koophandel op vaste gronden te ondernemen (1735).

A last aspect of the Huguenot publishing portfolio that seems relevant at this point is its connections to a culture of religious diversity that occasionally related to freemasonry (Jean Rousset de Missy, the famous mason took over editorial responsibilities from de Voys at some point, as did Jacques Basnage) and more generally to a certain moralism.

33 Joan Bion, Verhandelinge, daarin ontdekt worden: De rampzaalige gevolgen, die de Engelsche en Hollanders van de oprechtinge der compagnie van Oostende te vreesen hebben (Amsterdam, 1726).
34 Het aanmerkenswaardige leven en bedryf van Stanislaus Leszinsky, koning van Poolen (Amsterdam, 1738); Bedenkingen, omtrent De Hooge Geallieerde Partijen van de Poolsche Kroon etc. Opgestelt door O.V.B. en [...] nyt het Hoogd. verlaalt (Amsterdam, 1733).
35 Verklaaringe der Herrnhutsche Broeders etc. In ‘t Hoogduytsch bij haar selve opgestelt en in ‘t Nederduytsch overgeset (Amsterdam, 1738).
36 William Temple, Lettres de monsieur le chevalier Temple, ecrites durant son ambassade à La Haye au comte d’Arlington, & à M. le chevalier Jean Trévor secrétaires d’estat sous le règne de Charles II (The Hague, 1710).
37 Jean Dumont, Recherche modeste des Causes de la présente guerre. En ce qui concerne les Provinces-Unies (The Hague, 1703). Dumont was the author of the famous Les Soupirs de L’Europe, etc; Or, The Groans of Europe at the Prospect of the Present Posture of Affairs (London, 1713, first published in French in 1712).
38 Raisons pourquoi sa majesté impériale n’a pas concouru a la paix concluse à Utrecht le 11. avril (The Hague, 1713).
40 Apologie du Synode de Nimegue: Pour servir de réponse à la Lettre Circulaire de Mr. de Joncourt aux Eglises Wallonnes: Par laquelle il demande la Retraction de l’arrêté dudit Synode (The Hague, 1708).
about politics and economic development. A specific example of the latter is Jean Dumont’s *Recherche modeste des Causes de la présente guerre, En ce qui concerne les Provinces-Unies*, published by de Voys, in which Dumont holds ‘the spirit of Richelieu’ responsible for the breakout of warfare. Regarding the spirit and political ambitions of Richelieu and his persecution of Protestant Frenchmen which were detrimental to the French nation, the idea was that the impairment of religious freedom represented a distortion of French social and economic development that fuelled Louis XIV’s preference of conquest over commerce. Indeed, it became a major commonplace around 1700, not just among British and Dutch writers (it was included in Le Long’s *Koophandel van Amsterdam* and in the *British Merchant*) and refugee Huguenots, but also among French deputies to the *Conseil de Commerce*, and to writers like Huet, that the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes had cost the French state dearly and had been a major political economic error vis-à-vis the French interest. Apart from any specific facts about the important roles of Huguenots in Dutch and British finance and trade, the underlying abstract idea was that to be properly competitive with Britain and the United Provinces on the basis of reciprocity and pure exchange, it was the spirit of Richelieu that simultaneously constrained French economic development and had necessitated the development of a political alliance by other states against this spirit. In line with this perspective, it was also essential that Austria was included in the alliance and not excluded for narrowly interested political reasons.

5. Hesitant Hanoverians

The contours of Dutch Huguenot publishing politics hold a certain relevance against the background of the high diplomacy of the time. Here the dominant question was the Dutch accession to the Hanoverian treaty and the complex of factors associated with this issue. The United Provinces only joined the Hanoverian alliance in 1726 after a stage of hesitation and deliberation that ended a period following the Triple Alliance of 1717 in

---


44 A main argument in support of this position for the annihilation of France with the help of Austria was Jean Dumont’s *Les soupirs de l’Europe*, which spread across parts of Europe when its political usefulness was recognised. Alongside Dumont’s historical works in which the same position was elaborated, Isaac de Larrey—whose family had left France after the Revocation and whose best known work was *Histoire de France sous le règne de Louis XIV* (Rotterdam, 1718)—also developed this argument in his historical-political works. De Larrey’s grandson Thomas-Isaac De Larrey would be one of the two Dutch envoys to Paris in the late 1740s to try to get a renewal of the 1713/1739 Franco-Dutch commercial treaty. On De Larrey’s involvement in Dutch politics through printing, see Gibbs, ‘Some Intellectual and Political Influences’, 277–79.

45 The manner in which accession to the Hanover Treaty and the Ostend trade were intertwined comes across clearly from French documents in the *AE Correspondance politique, Hollande Supplément 10; Mémoires et Documents Hollande 137* (notably the ‘Projet article séparé commerce Pays bas autrichiennes aux indes’).
which the Republic had not concluded any treaty with Britain. As is well known, in previous times, particularly under Heinsius, the Republic had been a faithful and automatic ally to Britain.46 Yet the period after the Peace of Utrecht was marked by a negative perception of the treaties concluded there in 1713, as we already saw reflected in the 1727 edition of Le Long’s *Koophandel van Amsterdam*. A prime example of this attitude is the rather well-known pamphlet entitled *Korte schets* of 1714, which interpreted the Barrier as a costly burden on the state and the commercial treaties concluded by Britain as a betrayal of the Dutch ally and a major threat to the future of Dutch trade and the balance of power.47 Looking back on the War of the Spanish Succession, the hangover from Utrecht did not mean that anyone thought there had been a real choice when war broke out. Despite the existence during most periods in Dutch history of what contemporaries always understood as a ‘peace party’ and one inclined to war in the interest of the Maritime powers, the Dutch war effort was widely supported, as the threat posed by Louis XIV had been too real to ignore and left no space for other options.48 The problem felt after 1713 was also not simply that conducting a joint foreign policy with Britain had resulted in a huge financial burden for the Dutch state and had produced virtually no advantages for its trade.49 The political and economic legacy of the Williamite era, more specifically, was that the Dutch were forced to realise that within the partnership with Britain, they no longer had a real influence over their ally’s decision-making. The breakdown of commercial political relations after Utrecht on the Dutch part was the result of broken expectations about the distribution of the spoils from the War of the Spanish Succession.50

While the mutual disillusion of the maritime powers with each other simultaneous to the various attempts at shoring up Anglo-French relations lasted from the beginning of the talks at Utrecht well into the 1720s and is well documented, the standard explanation in terms of British party politics may be refined just a bit.51 The shift in outlooks onto ending the war when the Whig government was replaced by a Tory ministry coincide with judgements of the negotiations held at Geertruydenberg. As Oldmixon put it, ‘the Treaty of

49 The instruction to La Baune by Fénelon refers to the British dominance in Spanish and Portuguese trade after Utrecht, owing to the earlier Methuen Treaty and the newly acquired Asiento, a commercial treaty with Spain modelled on the 1707 Habsburg treaty of Barcelona and the territorial and trade settlements of Minorca, Gibraltar and Acadia; see Bussemaker, ‘Een memorie over de Republiek’, 119. Even some of the British were deeply ambivalent about the way in which their country bargained for these advantages. The Duke of Shrewsbury by 1711 condemned the proceedings as ‘bargaining for ourselves apart and leaving your friends to shift at a general treaty’; see *The Treaties of the War of the Spanish Succession: An Historical and Critical Dictionary*, edited by Linda Frey and Marsha Frey (Westport, CT, 1995), 431.
50 On the Anglo-Dutch commercial political breakdown at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession over the Asiento, see Lucien Bély, *Espions et ambassadeurs au temps de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1990), 565–68.
Gertruydenberg was in the Hands of Men of Ability and Honour [...] whereas the Utrecht Managers had nothing in View, but the Offices they had usurp’d'.52 David Hume, in contrast associated the failure of Gertruydenberg with a ‘national spirit’ of ‘imprudent vehemence’ and ‘passionate ardour’.53 Yet, in line with Hume’s analysis, it was not just Whig ‘vehemence’ and Dutch loyalty to the British ally, but equally a desire on the part of Dutch negotiators to prolong the war with a view to extra profits in the coming global organisation of trade privileges.54 The idea that the Dutch left their traditional political maxims during the War of the Spanish Succession and only realised afterwards that they had disowned their proper interest was echoed by the French ambassador Fénélon in 1728.55

Taking this extra aspect of the Dutch disillusion after Utrecht into account makes little difference when one considers the relation between the accession to the Hanoverian alliance and the Company of Ostend. It was the city of Amsterdam that pushed within the States of Holland for the package deal of joint action against Ostend and accession to the Hanoverian alliance.56 Anglo-Dutch commercial interests and political loyalty thus could still be placed into the same frame and converted into one another—particularly if they pointed in the same direction, and if the price was to be paid by Austria. Likewise, the simple mechanics of political alliance and joint interest could explain why Cadogan’s hard-line Hanoverian politics did not catch on and the Republic never acceded to the Quadruple Alliance.57

At the same time, there was a sense in which the post-Utrecht reality not only meant that an alliance with Britain needed to have some commercial advantages attached to be viable, but furthermore that such a commercial-political alliance had to be in line with the maxims of the Dutch state that, one now understood, were to be redefined. The sentiment from the time of the War of Spanish Succession expressed by Defoe that Britain and the United Provinces were fighting ‘hand in hand against France, against tyranny, against popery and ‘face to face in our trade in all parts of the world’, a sentiment echoed by contemporaries across Europe, had expired by 1713.59 The British principles of commercial politics had outlived the maxims of the Dutch state as developed in the seventeenth century60 and the Dutch hopes of buying into British commercial empire by

52 John Oldmixon, The History of England: During the Reigns of King William and Queen Mary, Queen Anne, King George I (London, 1735), 435–36. Compare with John Oldmixon, Torism and Trade can Never Agree: To which is Added an Account and Character of the Mercator (London, 1713).
56 For details about the jealousy of other towns of Holland versus Amsterdam, where the latter supported the accession to Hanover because of Ostend, see Dunthorne, The Maritime Powers, 90.
57 A sketch of Cadogan’s diplomatic style can be found in Johan Aalers, ‘De Republiek en Britse interventiepolitiek rond 1720’, in Interventies in de internationale politiek, edited by Albert Peter van Goudoever and Johan Aalbers (Utrecht, 1990), 83–115. For Cadogan’s well-known ‘Relation de l’état present des affaires en Hollande’ from 1721, see Hatton, Diplomatic Relations between Britain and the Dutch, 215–24.
58 Daniel Defoe, quoted in Dunthorne, The Maritime Powers, 12.
59 Jerónimo de Uztáriz y Hermiaga (1724), quoted in Dunthorne, The Maritime Powers, 74.
60 Ironically, a series of letters show that when Alexander Stanhope, father of James Stanhope, tried to convince Heinsius of the importance of keeping up the Anglo-Dutch war effort in the War of the Spanish Succession, he did so through a combination of threats and references to former Dutch times of the ‘true liberty’ regime of De Witt; see the Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Anthonie Heinsius, Raadpensionaris van Holland en West-Friesland, nummer toegang 3.01.19, inventarismnummer 2224. For a discussion of the balancing politics of Johan de Witt and their further development, see Alice Clare Carter, Neutrality or Commitment: The Evolution of Dutch Foreign Policy, 1667–1795 (London, 1975).
dividing the Asiento and the Spanish South-American trade were crushed at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession.\textsuperscript{61} No matter what party ruled over Britain, the conclusion remained that Dutch commercial politics had to be redesigned.

This challenge was central to the years following the Peace of Utrecht, which was a period of reconstruction of the Dutch state. Apart from the part that had to be reconstructed, it would remain fine to be nominally involved according to the old Anglo-Dutch treaties of the seventeenth century against universal monarchy and to defend the liberties of Europe. Yet, the entire idea of fighting war in the function of the Republic’s trade no longer fit with the reality of international politics and certainly could not be part of the Dutch involvement of the Protestant alliance.\textsuperscript{62} The elements in the 1727 debate in which Defoe and Benjamin Hoadly discussed the reasons for Britain to engage in war with Spain over its Mediterranean trade strongholds were entirely outside the scope of the Republic by that time.\textsuperscript{63}

The Dutch concern was to develop a new general idea of commercial politics which responded to the facts that the national debt had run up to a huge amount owing to the war efforts, that the trade volumes carried by the merchants of the Republic had reduced and that its stagnant economy had seen a migration of investments from the domestic economy to British funds. These conditions called for reforms that could be approached through developing new forms of trade with other states through commercial treaties, changing the tariff, or redeveloping the domestic fiscal system. In any case, the political predicament after Utrecht called for the Republic to sidestep the course it had developed in the previous century and reinvent the role of its economy within the inter-state trading system. Various political decisions and appointments made in this period may be discussed from this angle (for which this is not the place \textsuperscript{64}) and the sequence of economic reform attempts from 1713 onwards to the end of the Republic (e.g., the 1725 tariff reform by Slingelandt or the 1751 proposal to turn the Republic into a ‘portofranco’\textsuperscript{65}).

\textsuperscript{61} Dunthorne sketches the background of such hopes when under Williamite rule Anglo-Dutch commercial and financial circles had integrated, harnessed by a sort of pseudo-ideology, into a ‘protestant capitalist international’; see Dunthorne, \textit{The Maritime Powers}, 13–14. A contemporary like Pollexfen considered Anglo-Dutch trade almost as domestic commerce in 1697.

\textsuperscript{62} For a discussion of the futile attempts by Townshend and Cadogan to put the Republic back onto the path of active foreign politics around 1720, see Aalbers, ‘De Republiek en Britse interventiepolitiek rond 1720’, in \textit{Interventies in de internationale politiek}, edited by van Goudoever and Aalbers.

\textsuperscript{63} Daniel Defoe, \textit{De waarschynelykheid van een aanstaanden oorlog, en eenige redenen van de nootzakeelykhed van dien; om den koophandel te bewaaren} (1727); Benjamin Hoadly, \textit{Onderzoek der redenen op welke het gedrag van Groot-Britani en is gegronfd} (1727). For context, see Andrew C. Thompson, \textit{Britain, Hanover and the Protestant Interest, 1688–1756} (Woodbridge, 2006); Isaac Kramnick, \textit{Bolingbroke and His Circle: The Politics of Nostalgia in the Age of Walpole} (Ithaca, NY, 1992). This idea is not incompatible with the practice maintained by Slingelandt and Dutch states’ party foreign politics in general of exerting diplomatic influence on the international scene without the use of power; see Johan Aalbers, ‘Het machtsverval van de Republiek de Verenigde Nederlanden 1713–1741’, in \textit{Machtverval in de internationale context}, edited by Johan Aalbers and Albert Peter van Goudoever (Groningen, 1986), 29–32.


can be seen from this perspective. To start with, the political and commercial relations between France and the Republic from 1713 developed according to this new situation. The legacy of Utrecht was still highly sensitive and would remain so for a long time, as Fénelon warned his successor La Baune in 1728. Certainly the idea that the Republic had to make a choice between France and Great Britain had to be avoided in conversation. As the Dutch were notoriously suspicious of French approaches, but equally wary of British attempts to lure them into a political alliance, such as that had backfired at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, La Baune was instructed to operate extremely cautiously while the Dutch sought to restructure their national trade on the basis of new political principles.

6. Dutch Huguenot Political Economy?

There remains the question as to the actual meaning of the publication of the British Merchant in the United Provinces, or put differently the question of how a Dutch audience would have received this text in translation. That the Historie van den koophandel van Groot Brittannien may have been read as a model for the Dutch Republic seems doubtful. Unlike Britain, the Republic was not a territorial monarchy with an extensive manufacturing sector and a large trading capacity, but a small merchant republic with limited manufacturing industry. A trade-based economy would not benefit from the same kinds of measures that had been successful in Britain. Alternatively, the legacy of Utrecht made it unlikely that the British Merchant might have been useful for the purpose of devising the Dutch economy as a satellite economy to Britain’s commercial empire. Might it be possible then that Dutch Huguenot printers contributed through their publications to a redevelopment of Dutch commercial republicanism by suggesting a course of action that took into account the way in which Protestant Whig Britain competed in international markets? While the Republic was forced to look for a new understanding of international trade regulation after the War of the Spanish Succession, in a world in which France and Britain were the main commercial rivals, the moral component of Huguenot politics could be developed into an economic programme that stood in some form of contrast with the economic programme that had been adopted by Huguenot merchants and financiers in England.

As discussed above, the ‘spirit of Richelieu’ was deemed to be not only a cause of the War of the Spanish Succession but also a factor that had distorted French national development. Interestingly, French political and commercial writers around 1700 had embraced the European commonplace that the French attempt at national unification under a single religion had backfired and had in fact increased the commercial competitiveness of France’s direct rivals when bitter Huguenot refugees set up shop in Britain, the United Provinces and German territories. Among other officials who wrote government memoranda that listed this issue, the Lyon deputy for the Conseil de Commerce Jean Anisson lamented the Huguenot diaspora and described the ways in which the local economy had been affected. The was the same Anisson who came from a Lyon dynasty of printers (later generations would be directors of the Imprimerie nationale) and who had been ennobled in 1670—and whom we have already encountered as the publisher of a book by Huet that was translated by Le Long in Dutch. Annisson had

66 For the instructions given to Chateauneuf in August 1713, see Bussemaker, ‘Een memorie over de Republiek’, 50.
political and commercial expertise as a member of the Lyon town council and was sent as a special envoy to London in 1713 with the deputy on the Conseil de commerce for Bordeaux, Jean-Baptiste Fénelon (no family of the famous Archbishop Fénelon who wrote the Télémaque and his nephew and editor, the aforementioned ambassador to the United Provinces, Gabriel-Jacques Salignac de La Mothe Fénelon) to negotiate the ratification of the bill of commerce of 1713. There they found among the staunchest opponents to the treaty of commercial integration with France a number of Huguenots who had profited from the barriers that had existed since 1664.68

One of the central concepts of the 1713 debate that can also be recognised in the text of the British Merchant was the notion of reciprocity.69 The British Merchant was a manifesto for the idea of commercial policy in the ‘Age of Walpole’ that:

A fair Commercial Treaty for England with the French Nation, would have taken care that the Duties and Customs should have been reciprocal in both Countries, and such as least at might have made our Exports equal to our Imports from that Nation; so that a Balance in Money should not be issued out of England to pay for the Goods and Merchandizes of France.70

This kind of balance-of-trade engineering had been firmly established during the second half of the seventeenth century and its logic rested on the idea of a balance of payments.71 Whatever the differences between commercial policies by Tory and Whig governments and proposals coming out of the Board of Trade at various points, this fundamental idea of reciprocity in terms of ‘consequences’, that did not entail a harmonisation of economic interests according to more or less ‘free’ price and quality competition, remained a constant factor.72 This logic was supported and defended by the Huguenot merchant community of London. From the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes the Huguenots in the London merchant community were fully invested (literally, that is financially) in the revolutionary aspects of Williamite Protestant Britain, and were so with Humean ‘vehemence’.73 The same logic, supported by the same social groups also found its way into Joshua Gee’s (one of the original contributors to the British Merchant) The Trade and

---

69 Reciprocity is the object of a series of French discussions from 1712, collected in the Archives Nationales, G7, 1697.
Navigation of Great-Britain Considered: Shewing that the Surest Way for a Nation to Increase in Riches, is to Prevent the Importation of Such Foreign Commodities as may be Rais’d at Home, published in 1729.

Dutch publishers like Boitet and Le Long, however, while solidly in support of the Protestant alliance with Britain (and with Austria), did not publish British political economic treatises by Gee, Child or any other writers of which there were plenty to choose from. Le Long instead translated Jean-François Melon, and Boitet published Huet in Dutch. What might this mean?

Translating Huet from a Dutch point of view was not merely a self-congratulatory memory of the past. Indeed, Huet had identified the Dutch discovery of trade during the Revolt and its audacious deployment in the service of national power, wealth and glory as a revolution in the history of humankind. Yet, the Dutch rise among the ranks of the great nations within Huet’s argument served a higher purpose, that of showing that the balance of power between nations was determined by commerce and that monarchical France and other territorial states should unreservedly embark on a project of economic development in such a way that the respective comparative advantages of states would balance each other out in the inter-state system. Just like the Dutch had been the masters over an early stage of how this balance that regulated both peace and prosperity could be maintained, so Europe’s territorial states, once turned commercial, should soon coordinate together a fully mature version of this dual balance. The Dutch were the historical model for Huet, while the Brits were the nation to compete with.

The publication of the various editions and translations of Huet’s work only came out in the early eighteenth century, yet the preparation of the manuscript, ordained by Colbert, stemmed from the seventeenth century and can be placed alongside a manuscript dated from 1699 by the French diplomat and ambassador to the United Provinces, François d’Usson, marquis de Bonrepos (or Bonrepaus). Bonrepos told virtually the same story as Huet, but declared it was ordered by Louis XIV and framed his argument as a manual for reducing the Dutch trade supremacy over France. While Bonrepos finished his piece with a few comments on the tariff negotiation following the Peace of Ryswick, Huet’s manuscript was published in later French language editions, in Amsterdam, under the original title and ‘augmentée de plusieurs mémoires & du tarif général d’Hollande’. So both Huet and Bonrepos were associated with the creation of a new international regime of commercial relations in which the Franco-Dutch trade treaties of 1699 and 1713 played a key instrumental role.

Following the collapse of John Law’s financial scheme and the retreat from the Hanoverian alliance that under Fleury had influenced French outlooks on trade politics vis-à-vis Britain, Jean Francois Melon in the early 1730s self-consciously revived Colbert’s plan for emulating British and Dutch commercial greatness. Thus he followed

74 Their placement in the Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères also gives reason to make this connection: Huet’s text (not attributed to him in the catalogue) is entitled ‘Etat du commerce des hollandois dans toutes les parties du monde’ and dated 1697; see AAE Mémoires et Documents, Hollande 49. This is followed by three copies of Bonrepos’s piece, ‘Mémoire concernant le commerce des Hollandois depuis leur establissement jusques en la présente année 1699’; see AAE Mémoires et Documents, Hollande 50–52.
75 Pierre-Daniel Huet, Mémoires sur le commerce des Hollandois, dans tous les États et empires du monde (Amsterdam, 1718).
in the footsteps of Pierre Daniel Huet and the policy perspective that fit with an understanding of the history of commerce that started with the Dutch.\textsuperscript{77}

In the opening chapter of his \textit{Essai politique sur le commerce} (1734), Melon gave an outline of the principles of commercial exchange and comparative competitiveness between Europe’s dominant states and their agricultural, manufacturing and trade capacities. The key idea was that a competitive hegemony could be attained by France following a reorganisation of international trade relations to be based on a true market reciprocity, a state that would be reached once the present British attempts at monopolistic competition had been transcended and French commercial policy had been perfected.\textsuperscript{78} Melon illustrated his famous distinction between the ‘spirit of commerce’ and the ‘spirit of conquest’ by referring to ancient history. If only Carthage had properly taken care of its fortresses, it would have been impervious to Rome’s advances.\textsuperscript{79} Likewise, if a new regime of commercial relations could be instated in eighteenth-century Europe, France could be among the commercial leaders of its time, without any need for or threat of warfare.

Whether or not the selection of texts to be translated by publishers like Le Long and Boitet was inspired by insights like these, the possibility remains that while the Huguenots in England in 1674 and before and after were engaged in political lobbies that culminated in the \textit{British Merchant; Or, Commerce Preserv’d}, Dutch Huguenot publishers stood by their adherence to the Protestant alliance, but, taking their cue from Huet and Melon, redrew the normative lines of international commercial politics to the ideal of having ‘Carthage preserved’.

7. Conclusion

The publication of the \textit{Koophandel} fell squarely into the period that the Amsterdam financier and political writer Isaac de Pinto called that of ‘the long peace’, an era of prolonged suspension of hostilities in which the benefits of peace for the welfare of humankind were to contribute to the final and complete dissolution of warfare. As Pinto concluded, at the outbreak of the War of the American Independence, the third major military conflict in four decades, this had not worked out and more political-institutional guidance would be required.

After looking into the Dutch and European contexts surrounding the 1728 translation and publication in the Republic of the \textit{British Merchant}, it seems one may conclude that in the decades preceding the War of the Austrian Succession the distinctive outlooks onto European and indeed global trade that were developed during the War of the Spanish Succession were consolidated in the European political economic mindset. Here they triggered reflections on the future principles and patterns of foreign trade. Was European political economy to be conducted on the basis of complementarity, comparative advantages and specialisation? Or had the history of commerce arrived at a stage where European states were capable of competing with each other on many different terrains as balanced societies so that even the Dutch Republic had to yield to this reality and, while continuing to exploit trade as its primary sector, also actively promote and protect agriculture and manufacturing? What kinds of intra-European and extra-European dynamics would this give rise to?

\textsuperscript{79} Jean-François Melon, \textit{A Political Essay Upon Commerce} (Dublin, 1738), 136–37.
The development of these questions can be recognised in the contexts that surround the Dutch translation of the *British Merchant* and the editorial selections that Huguenot publishers appear to have been making at the time. In terms of the Dutch predicament, the main issue was: how did the Dutch in the aftermath of Utrecht understand the prospects of survival of the Republic’s trade and territorial integrity? The significance of the *Koophandel* published by Boitet, even though its likely meaning to its readership is hard to pin down with any kind of certainty, lies in that it forms an example of responses by Dutch publishers and printers to the post-Utrecht ‘crisis’ that made it necessary to develop a new way of thinking politically about trade. On the one hand, Huguenot printers’ editorial choices suggested, the alliance with Britain could remain fixed, while on the other, it seemed opportune to look for inspiration in writings of French origin by Huet and Melon for how their principle of reciprocity as the key to regulating trade relations might work out for the Dutch Republic.

The main analytically salient question for the period following the one treated in this article is how the various languages and commercial schemes of liberty, protection and competition that were developed in the early years of the eighteenth century were operationalised in the following decades. Did they tend towards an opposition between the reciprocal integration of national European economies that had a global character? Or did the configuration of the balance of power in the more distant aftermath of Utrecht lean towards a hierarchical subjection of markets to Europe’s dominant states? These questions lie at the core of the political and economic thought of Forbonnais and complicate and problematise the ways in which historiography has opposed simplified (mainly British) party political outlooks. For this reason it is important to see how Forbonnais viewed the *British Merchant* when he translated and also transformed the form and meaning of this text.  

Not long before Forbonnais did so, in 1743 a Dutch Huguenot writer, called Jean-Thomas La Fargue, still referred to Huet and to Charles King’s *British Merchant* on the same page in the context of a discussion of Dutch neutrality and Franco-Dutch commercial relations. He did so in response to an anonymous pamphlet allegedly published by Plumard de Dangeul. If the questions that emerged in 1713 had developed, they clearly had not gone away.

---

80 See Antonella Alimento, ‘Beyond the Treaty of Utrecht: Véron de Forbonnais’s French Translation of the *British Merchant* (1753)’, this issue.

81 J. T. La Fargue, *Staats-spiegel voor den Nederlanden, tegen uitheemsse kunstenaryen en verkeerde bevattingen des tyds* (1743), 132–33.