

# Constructing America

A constructivist contemplation of the relationship between the Franco-German  
Americanization-debate and national identity, 1918-1933

*De constructie van Amerika*

*Een constructivistische reflectie op de relatie tussen het Frans-Duitse amerikaniseringsdebat  
en de nationale identiteit, 1918-1933*

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Dedicated to my parents, in gratitude.



## 1. Introduction

*“Amerika, das Land der Träume,  
Du Wunderwelt so lang und breit,  
Wie schön sind Deine Kokosbäume,  
und Deine rege Einsamkeit!”*

[...]

Friederike Kempner, 1903<sup>1</sup>

*“America, the land of dreams,  
you magical world so long and wide,  
how beautiful are your coconut trees,  
and your vivid solitude!”<sup>2</sup>*

[...]

Friederike Kempner, 1903

### 1.1. Topic Introduction and Research Questions

As early as 1903 the German writer Friederike Kempner grasped an ambivalence which would become the nucleus of the literary America-reception for the following decades. In the first few lines of her poem *Amerika*<sup>3</sup> (see above) Kempner depicts the United States of America<sup>4</sup> as shimmering land of boundless possibilities, but simultaneously raises awareness for its potential risks: the solitude of the individual in the midst of a mass-society. This dichotomy between admiring and admonishing the United States from a distance, became the centre of a lively America-debate that reached its preliminary highpoint during the 1920s. This debate was in no way a German peculiarity, but was rather part of a shared canon that extended beyond the German border and was similarly prominent in France. The America-debate was however not limited to the simple perception of the USA as a model, be it in

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<sup>1</sup> Friederike Kempner, *Gedichte* (Berlin: Siegismund, 1903).

<sup>2</sup> All English translation which follow in this thesis will have been made by myself.

<sup>3</sup> Kempner, *Gedichte*.

<sup>4</sup> Hereinafter also referred to as USA and United States.

economic, political or social terms, it was just as much a reflection about American influences in France and Germany, subsumed under the term Americanization. Debating America at the beginning of the twentieth century went hand in hand with a profound contemplation about its influences on other parts of the world.

Similar to the America-perception of the time, the Americanization-debate was just as much divided into admiration on the one hand and rejection on the other. Two opposing camps would be at the heart of this debate and were embedded into older historic narratives: pro- or philo-Americans and anti-Americans. Pro-Americans would welcome American developments and accomplishments and demand the adoption of the American model in Europe. Contrastingly anti-Americans would reject American influences and preach caution regarding the negative effects of Americanization on society. Americanization as a technical term could thereby include economic, political, social and cultural influences, originally American and directed towards other countries such as Germany and France.<sup>5</sup> It was essentially a discourse regarding a value transfer from the New World to the Old, negotiated in relation to the own nation state. This oscillating debate of American influences will serve as a framework for the research on hand, which, in essence, will investigate the Americanization discourse in Germany and France between 1918 and 1933. Thereby the study on hand will investigate the following main research questions: *What is the relation between the Americanization-debate (i.e. pro- and anti-Americanism) and national identity in Germany and France in the 1920s? What are the main differences and similarities between the pro- and anti-American authors in France and Germany? How can we explain these differences and similarities?* The research will thus primarily explore the construction of national identity in Germany and France through investigating the perception of the USA in primary sources.

## **1.2. Social relevance in past and present**

The German and French America-reception during the interwar-period is no closed off debate, but rather part of a long historical tradition that is as old as the USA itself.

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<sup>5</sup> In the US, the term “Americanization” was used earlier to point to the process of integrating migrants into American society. This Americanization movement in the USA consisted of private initiatives, including big companies like the Ford Motor Company. Chapter 2 will investigate the concept of “Americanization” in more detail, including its earlier meanings and usage.

Since colonial times, different visions of America were debated in Europe, mainly rooted in the strong colonial transatlantic connection. One of the earliest narratives was comprised of the idea that America - as land of opportunity - was a pre-civilised social utopia. The USA served as a political model, which had the opportunity of starting from scratch and consequently became a platform for visions and hopes about the future. This idea of an “America experiment” would prevail up until the nineteenth century.<sup>6</sup>

During the nineteenth century, the perception of America was largely influenced by the European waves of immigration. Emigration from Germany to America had been more voluminous than from France and a rather positive image of the USA as land of freedom and opportunities prevailed in the German reception. Some critical voices towards America, mainly stressing the lack of American culture, can nevertheless be traced back to the beginning of the nineteenth century.<sup>7</sup> The French America cognition of this period can in return be characterised as largely lackadaisical spiked with occasional cultural condescension.<sup>8</sup>

The ascent of the USA during the second half of the nineteenth century gave rise to a new form of America reception which would focus on America's economic potential, its geographic expansion and its cultural exports. Suddenly the visions of America were no longer confined to a place across the Atlantic, they were brought to Europe through Americanization and were set in relation to the national realities. Around 1900 the America-debate entered a new phase where hopes and fears were no longer projected on America, but rather related to American influences, thus Americanization. Similar to the simple “America-debate”, the Americanization debate was equally double-barrelled and divided into pro- and anti-Americanism. Even though both strands reach back until the American Revolution (1776-1783), it was the combination of this ambivalence and the current national reality which plunged the discourse into a new phase around the turn of the century, where the “idiosyncratic dependence”<sup>9</sup> of pro- and anti-Americanism culminated in the

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<sup>6</sup> Astrid Grewe, *Das Amerikabild der französischen Schriftsteller zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen* (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1985), p. 15f.

<sup>7</sup> Thomas Raithel, “‘Amerika’ als Herausforderung in Deutschland und Frankreich in den 1920er Jahren”, in *Deutschland - Frankreich - Nordamerika: Transfers, Imaginationen, Beziehungen*, ed. by Chantal Metzger and Harmut Kaelble (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2006), 82–97 (p. 86f)

<sup>8</sup> Idem., p. 86f.

<sup>9</sup> J. C. E. Gienow-Hecht, ‘Always Blame the Americans: Anti-Americanism in Europe in the Twentieth Century’, *The American Historical Review*, 111 (2006), 1067–91 (p. 1073) <<http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/ahr.111.4.1067>>.

Americanization debate.

Debating Americanization became a prominent part of the public discourse in the industrialised nations in Europe. As early as 1893 Frenchmen Émile Barbier had stated that “America is invading old Europe; it is flooding it and will soon submerge it”<sup>10</sup> clearly discussing the Americanization not only of France, but of Europe in general, without actually referring to it as a concept or technical term. It would take another nine years and the British journalist W.T. Stead (1849-1912) and his famous work *The Americanization of the World*<sup>11</sup> to address the concept as such and make “Americanization” a popular term. Stead combined pro- and anti-Americanism by linking them to an inevitable expansion of American politics, economics, culture and military and hoped that Great-Britain and the USA could jointly rule on the dawn of the Anglo-Saxon century.<sup>12</sup>

In Germany, it was Max Goldberger (1848-1913) who published *Das Land der unbegrenzten Möglichkeiten*<sup>13</sup> (Land of boundless possibilities) in 1903 and depicted America, as the title already suggests, as a land of boundless possibilities whilst debating its industrial and economic influences. During the same year Wilhelm von Polenz's (1861-1903) *Land der Zukunft*<sup>14</sup> (Land of Future) picked up an important narrative for the unfolding Americanization debate: the idea that America's past was Europe's future. By 1913 the German writer Bernhard Kellermann (1879-1951) published a work entitled *Der Tunnel*<sup>15</sup> (The Tunnel) which made an explicit reference to this connection between the USA and Germany through its title. It symbolised and elucidated the dominant idea that American developments would in the near future also reach Europe.<sup>16</sup> Shortly before the First World War the debate about America and its influences had thus become the geographical run-up for a discussion about the German and French future.

The existing America-perception would however be fundamentally impacted by

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<sup>10</sup> Émile Barbier, *Voyage au pays des dollars*. (Paris: E. Flammarion, 1893), p. 336f. Cited in Philippe Roger, *The American enemy: The history of French anti-Americanism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 137, footnote 19 (p. 470).

<sup>11</sup> W[illiam] T[homas] Stead, *The Americanisation of the World, of the Trend of the Twentieth Century ...* (London: The 'Review of reviews' office, 1902).

<sup>12</sup> Gienow-Hecht, 'Always Blame the Americans: Anti-Americanism in Europe in the Twentieth Century', p. 1073.

<sup>13</sup> Ludwig Max Goldberger, *Das Land der unbegrenzten Möglichkeiten. Beobachtungen über das Wirtschaftsleben der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika*. (Berlin; New York: F. Fontane & Co.; Brentano's, 1903).

<sup>14</sup> Wilhelm von Polenz, *Das Land der Zukunft* (Berlin; Chicago: F. Fontane ; Brentano's, 1904).

<sup>15</sup> Bernhard Kellermann, *Der Tunnel* (Berlin: S. Fischer Verlag, 1913).

<sup>16</sup> Dieter Heimböckel, "Zivilisation auf dem Treibriemen: Die USA im Urteil der deutschen Literatur um und nach 1900," in *Mythos USA : "Amerikanisierung" in Deutschland seit 1900*, ed. Frank Becker and Elke Reinhardt-Becker (Frankfurt/Main ; New York: Campus, 2006), p. 50f, especially p.53.

the First World War. Pro- and anti-American narratives that did indeed have their roots well before 1900 were bundled and intensified through the Great War which served as a magnifying glass, repositioning the Americanization debate into the broad public. With the American war-entry in 1917, the USA had literally and metaphorically arrived in Europe. The First World War would exemplify the American predominance economically and militarily. When the war reached peace negotiations by 18 January 1919, the American supremacy among the allied forces had become self-evident and was personified by its President Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924). His famous 'Fourteen Points' were the benchmark for the peace negotiations and would help to concretely shape the European future. The USA was thus no longer- as Kempner's poem had suggested a few years earlier- a magical world, far away across the Atlantic, it had become part of the political reality and decision-making in Europe.

This new political time-period would consequently, especially in France and Germany, trigger a wave of publications discussing the "American-model", its advantages and influences, but simultaneously its disadvantages and risks. The fact that America as phenomenon had become concrete, amplified, popularised and repositioned the America-perception and with it the America debate. America became a projection surface for a German and French debate about American influences and beyond that a debate about modernity and the future. Pro- and anti-American circles would discuss the USA and its influences and place them in relation to their own national reality. Indeed, American influences had become omnipresent in the post-war period. Taylorist<sup>17</sup> and Fordist<sup>18</sup> methods were applied in the economy, whilst American movies and consumer products would influence the cultural everyday-life. At least until Hitler's ascension to power in 1933, the USA would be an important reference point for political, economic and cultural questions in Germany and France during the 1920s.<sup>19</sup>

Diverse interwar-publications about the USA and a profound interest in the "American-model" were not limited to Germany or France. They were rather part of a European canon that would show similar characteristic in countries such as the Netherlands. The Dutch historian Johan Huizinga for example in 1918 published a

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<sup>17</sup> Taylorism refers to standardization of workflows, based on scientific management, initiated by Frederick Taylor.

<sup>18</sup> Fordism refers to industrial mass-production, named after Henry Ford pioneering this economic development.

<sup>19</sup> Viktor Otto, *Deutsche Amerika-Bilder: zu den Intellektuellen-Diskursen um die Moderne 1900-1950* (Paderborn: W. Fink, 2006), p. 15f.

work entitled *Mensch en menigte in Amerika*<sup>20</sup> which intended to contribute a historical background to the ongoing America-debate. When Huizinga visited the USA eight years later in 1926 he published his impressions in *Amerika levend en denkend*.<sup>21</sup> In his second work Huizinga offered an ambivalent assessment of the American society, torn between admiration of the economically potent USA and wariness of its influences on Europe such as materialism, mechanization and cultural mediocracy.<sup>22</sup>

As one can see, the USA and its influences on other parts of the world have a long historical tradition. The USA as a social model has always been discussed ambivalently, people were always either for, against or indecisive, but never indifferent towards it. With the American participation in the First World War and the following political and economic involvement on European soil, the United States had a large social relevance during the interwar period. The vast number of publications about the USA are a tribute to the important position it held in the public discourse.<sup>23</sup> The social relevance of the America debate and of this research therefore extends from the past into the present. Pro- and anti-Americanism are also today part of an ongoing social canon which correlates American influences and the national reality.<sup>24</sup> Burning American flags in the Middle East flicker across the television screens and parliamentary committees investigate the impact and purview of the National Security Agency (NSA). Clearly the connection between American influences and their impact on national realities is still socially relevant and discussed controversially. The research on hand tries to demonstrate its historical roots and idiosyncrasies for the 1920s.

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<sup>20</sup> Johan Huizinga, *Mensch En Menigte in Amerika: Vier Essays over Moderne Beschavingsgeschiedenis* (Haarlem: H.D. Tjeenk Willink & Zoon, 1918).

<sup>21</sup> Johan Huizinga, *Amerika levend en denkend: losse opmerkingen* (Haarlem: Tjeenk Willink, 1927).

<sup>22</sup> Cornelis Van Minnen, 'Dutch perceptions of American culture and promotion of dutch culture in the United States', in *Four centuries of Dutch-American relations : 1609-2009* (Boom, 2009), pp. 431–41, esp. 431-435.

<sup>23</sup> Egbert Klautke, 'Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland Und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges Duhamel', in *Welche Modernität? Intellektuellendiskurse Zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich im Spannungsfeld nationaler und europäischer Identitätsbilder*, ed. by Wolfgang Essbach (Berlin, 2000), 173–91 (p. 4, particularly footnote 12), and Egbert Klautke, *Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten: 'Amerikanisierung' in Deutschland und Frankreich (1900-1933)* (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 2003), p. 283f.

<sup>24</sup> For a recent example on German anti-Americanism see: 'Aggressive Stimmung in Erfurt Jetzt geht es gegen die „Amerikanisierung des Abendlandes“', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 24 January 2015 <<http://www.faz.net/aktuell/aggressive-stimmung-in-erfurt-jetzt-geht-es-gegen-die-amerikanisierung-des-abendlandes-13388968.html>> [accessed 28 September 2015].



### **1.3. Scientific relevance and periodisation**

The America perception and debate during the 1920s was particularly prevailing in Germany and France. Both countries shared a similar fate after the First World War in terms of the redevelopment they faced as consequence of the wartime devastations. Infrastructure and economy had been heavily impaired, let alone the military and civil casualties. Although dissimilarly victor and loser of the war, both countries awaited similar difficulties regarding their political and economic national realities, but also in terms of their national identity. Whenever America as exemplary model was debated, it was placed in relation to the national reality and potential future. Whilst pro-Americans supported the adoption of the American economic model, anti-Americans dismissed the cultural consequences of the uniform American mass-society. German and French pro- and anti-Americanism in the interwar period became a reflection about the applicability of the American model on the national reality and its consequences for the future.

The research on hand will take up this cornerstone and investigate at the heart the relation between Franco-German pro- and anti-Americanism and (the respective) national identity. The research is therewith part of a field of study that has been at best marginally researched: the relationship between the Americanization discourse and national identity. Whereas each concept by itself has been well researched (which will be covered in Chapter 2), the causal relationship between them has only been assessed very sparsely and only for a different timeframe. The main contribution of this research to the academic debate is therefore the explicit exploration of how and why Americanization and national identity interrelate.

The periodisation of the research on hand will be the timespan between 1918 and 1933. The year 1918, with the end of the First World War, marks a historical turning point and logical starting point for this study. 1918 saw the “14 Point Speech” by the US-President Woodrow Wilson as well as the First World War armistice and the following peace negotiations (for which the “14 Points Plan” became the basis). In November 1918, a republican revolution swept through the monarchic Germany and the subsequent proclamation of the republic radically changed its political system. The developments of 1918 thus shifted the distribution of power in Europe and changed the role and importance of the USA in European affairs. As a consequence,

the America- and Americanization-debate entered a new phase, which was influenced by the historical incidents, and would prevail until the 1930s.

The year 1933 will figure as endpoint for this study as it shifted the political climate in Germany once again. In January 1933 Adolf Hitler was appointed Chancellor of Germany and by March the Enabling Act had amended the constitution of the Weimar Republic to the effect that Hitler had the power to enact laws without the involvement of the Reichstag. Even though the constitution of the Weimar Republic was not invalidated, it lost its democratic function and consolidated the seizure of power of the Nazis. The rise of the Nazis in 1933 marked the beginning of a period which gradually changed the political landscape of Europe in its entirety. Therefore, even though not marking an explicit caesura for France, the year 1933 was in this sense at least of indirect political importance. This study will thus temporally conclude with the end of the Weimar Republic.

#### **1.4. Theory and Methodology**

Besides directing the research towards the concept of national identity and resting it on a transnational framework<sup>25</sup>, the research also draws upon its theoretical orientation as an innovative strategy. This study will be using Constructivism as International Relations Theory (not to confound with Constructivism in Psychology, Education or Sociology where it has a different meaning) and is therefore at the interface between the fields of History and International Relations. Whilst the explicit use of International Relations Theory is not very common in historical research it does offer several benefits when applied to present-day phenomena as well as historical developments. Constructivism, stressing the social construction of meaning and the intersubjective definition of social realities, is very eligible when researching socially constructed concepts such as Americanization. The scientific relevance of

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<sup>25</sup> Transnational history investigates the reach and movement of people, ideas and institutions across national borders. It generally refers to the period since the emergence of the nation-state and involves empirical research in more than one nation's archive. For additional information see: 'What is Transnational History?', *Ian Tyrrell*, 2008 <<https://iantyrrell.wordpress.com/what-is-transnational-history/>> [accessed 24 December 2016]; 'Promises and Perils of Transnational History' <<https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/december-2012/the-future-of-the-discipline/promises-and-perils-of-transnational-history>> [accessed 24 December 2016].

In this study the transnational framework mainly refers to how Americanization, pro- and anti-Americanism as abstract concepts were part of larger narratives, rather than being German or French peculiarities.

the research on hand consequently also rests upon its theoretical underpinning, the application of constructivist theory and methodology which shall be briefly elucidated in the following section. A separate chapter (chapter three) will provide an in-depth description of the theory and methodology.

Constructivist theory entered the field of International Relations Studies at the end of the 1980s. It developed out of an epistemological swing in the social sciences on the one hand and out of the fact that existing theories of international relations neglected the importance of identities and interests on the other, only focusing on the exertion of power rather than its causality.<sup>26</sup> Epistemologically the humanities had entered a phase where the interpretational gap between subject and object had been overcome with developments such as the linguistic turn, acknowledging that language was a major determinant in constituting reality and the meaning that derived from it. This novel focus on meaning and the construction of reality, gave birth to Constructivism, which as the term suggests centres around the social construction of meaning. Meaning derives from social relations and representations, ultimately leading to intersubjective interpretations as the main benchmark for the creation of social reality.<sup>27</sup> The ontological dimension of Constructivism complemented the ongoing debate in the field of international relations, which up until the 1980s had been dominated by (Neo) Realism stressing the importance of material forces in an international relations framework where states were the major actors. Constructivism, radically challenging Realism intellectually and opposing theories such as Liberalism rationally, largely neglected the importance of material forces as such and rather focused on the socially constructed concepts behind these forces which would define their meaning and importance for social realities. Constructivism would henceforth view power as a constant in international relations and build its intellectual framework on identities, interests and the interplay of structure and agency. The causality of power rather than its exertion is of interest to the Constructivist.<sup>28</sup> In conclusion, structures (in very basic terms all forms of social order and representation) and agency (the individual's possibility to autonomously

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<sup>26</sup> Audie Klotz and Cecelia Lynch, *Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2007), p. 15.

<sup>27</sup> Ian Hurd, 'Constructivism', in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, ed. by Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, *The Oxford Handbooks of Political Science* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 298–316 (p. 300f).

<sup>28</sup> Klotz and Lynch, *Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations*, p. 15. The constructivist conception of power will be developed in more detail in chapter 3.1.1.

make choices and exert control) provide the philosophical background to the social theory of Constructivism, identities and interests define the behaviour of political actors.

As already discussed, this research will primarily investigate the relation between national Americanization-debates and national identities. From a constructivist standpoint, national identities generally consist of two basic elements. First, they provide a distinction from others, a sort of “us” versus “them”. Second, they are continuous over time. This continuity over time is not a given, as national identities need to be renegotiated in relation to the social reality: they need to be reinforced through social relations and representations.<sup>29</sup> One of the key tasks for this research will be to determine the processes which lead to the creation of these national identities, for example their reinforcement over time and space. Thereby the main criteria of analysis will encompass the mutual constitution of identities, as well as the rejection, incorporation and the reinforcement of national identities.

Methodologically the study on hand will not only draw on constructivist theory, it will also combine it with the case study method and comparative historical research. The research design is therefore eclectic by combining multiple research methods. As for any other research, the methodology will be chosen in accordance with the research topic. By investigating German and French pro- and anti-Americanism as two separate cases, the case study method hence provides an adequate research framework. Case studies answer how and why questions in a closed ontology and epistemologically favour deductive approaches based on the positivist paradigm of knowledge accumulation.<sup>30</sup> Case studies can be subdivided into single and multiple-case designs, with this research being a multiple-case design (four cases).<sup>31</sup> Both cases will be analysed regarding possible similarities and differences in their respective Americanization-discourse through a cross-case comparison.

This cross-case comparison will be carried out through comparative historical methodology. The comparative historical method is epistemologically located in qualitative research. Its main focus is to investigate whether shared phenomena

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<sup>29</sup> M. Montserrat Guibernau i Berdún, *The Identity of Nations* (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), p. 9f.

<sup>30</sup> Peter Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, ‘Eclectic Theorizing in the Study and Practice of International Relations’, in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, ed. by Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, The Oxford Handbooks of Political Science (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 109–30 (p. 111f).

<sup>31</sup> Jennifer Rowley, ‘Using Case Studies in Research’, *Management Research News*, 25 (2002), 16–27 (p. 21f).

between cases can be explained by the same causes. Comparative-historical research in combination with a cross-national case study offers two different research approaches: nomothetic and ideographic. The nomothetic approach aims at finding generalised causalities applicable to the universe of cases, hence demanding a multiple-case design. The ideographic approach aims at finding explanations for one particular case, leaving aside the larger universe of cases. This research will use an ideographic approach, investigating each case for itself with a narrative-causal explanation framework. Thereafter the results can be compared to allow possible generalizations.

The final methodological step relates to the chosen multiple-case design. Any multiple-case design distinguishes between holistic and embedded approaches. The former regards each case as one unit of analysis, taking a bird's eye perspective on the case, whilst the latter investigates multiple sub-units of the case on hand. Holistic approaches are favourable when no logical analytical subdivisions emerge. This will be in fact the case for the research on hand. The units of analysis the Americanization-discourse could offer (for example how economic, cultural or political forms of Americanization were perceived) are too large-scale as variables to make serious assumptions about them in a cross-national context. To bridge this complication, it will be most beneficial for this research to use non-fictional literature as medium to investigate the Americanization-debate and its relation to national identity. Literature does not only a priori consist of discourses, it actually depicts and processes the social reality and therefore incorporates all the possible variables one could investigate on a superordinate level. It is therefore the broadest and yet most precise starting point to investigate constructed concepts such as pro- and anti-Americanism, i.e. the appropriate approach for this research. In conclusion, the research on hand will use a constructivist approach to investigate the Americanization-discourse in non-fictional literary sources through a holistic and ideographic cross-national case-comparison.

## **1.5. Source Selection**

In order to investigate the Americanization discourse and its relation to national

identity through literature, this research will look at four authors which are representative of respectively the German and French pro- and anti-Americanism. Past research has shown that one can consider the works of these authors on America as prevailing reasoning, containing a majority of the argumentations of their respective circles. According to the literature this relevance mainly stems from the authors' role in the respective pro- and anti-American groups in their countries. They were thus part of like-minded organised circles, wrote books about the USA and gave speeches on the subject. This research is consequently following the secondary literature in assessing that the four authors are important and in fact representative in the debate.

The source selection additionally arises out of practical reasons. For each of the four authors there exists primary archival material on their life and work as well as secondary literature. The selection of the four authors is hence based on a combination of practicality and their importance in the secondary literature. This selection however naturally has some limitations. By following the secondary literature in its representability-assessment one has to accept that it is possible the importance of the authors might be overestimated. One equally has to accept that the authors are not representative of the entire debate but only of those authors whose work has been researched. Bearing in mind these limitations this research will investigate the America-related work of Julius Hirsch, Lucien Romier, Adolf Halfeld and Georges Duhamel.

The selected literature consists of either travelogues or is based on journeys to the USA and therefore depicts a, at least for the authors, accurate description of the American model. The sources offer a combination of the prevalent argumentation in the public discourse, the perceived reality and inevitably the personal experiences of the authors. The life of the authors will therefore be of great importance for this research, as the background of the authors helps to contextualise and understand their specific ideas, despite conveying the widespread argumentation.

The main source for the German pro-Americanism will be the work *Das Amerikanische Wirtschaftswunder*<sup>32</sup> (The American Economic Miracle) by Julius Hirsch (1882-1961), published in 1926. Hirsch was a German-Jewish economist who taught at the University of Cologne. Between 1919 and 1922 he was Secretary of

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<sup>32</sup> Julius Hirsch, *Das amerikanische Wirtschaftswunder* (Berlin: S. Fischer, 1926).

State in the German Ministry of Commerce where he was involved in the post-war reparations negotiations and the economic development of Germany. In 1933, he emigrated to Copenhagen and then further to the USA in 1941. In the USA, he worked for the U.S. Office of Price Administration, before becoming a private consultant and holding a lectureship in economics at the New School for Research in New York.<sup>33</sup> His economic background becomes particularly evident in his publication *The American Economic Miracle* where he provides a statistical and structural analysis of the United States, highlighting the advantages of the American model. He depicts the USA as the incubator of a positive future which could also lead Europe and particularly Germany towards progress, prosperity and modernity. To Hirsch Germany should lastingly aspire the American (economic) model.<sup>34</sup>

Lucien Romier (1885-1944), a French journalist, will represent the French pro-Americanism. Despite doing a PhD in the field of history, Romier took part in the economic orientation of France during and after the First World War. In 1916, he became head of transport and customs at the 'Association Nationale de l'expansion Économique' and in 1917 worked for the economic department of the Ministry of War. Maintaining his position as journalist, he became chief editor of the newspaper *Le Figaro* by 1925 and was president of the Société d'économie Nationale in the late 1920s. In October 1927, he became member of the Redressement Français, a circle promoting technocratic corporatism through modelling the French society after the American example. Romier's America-image is a connection of his works *Qui sera le Maître, Europe ou Amérique?*<sup>35</sup> (Who shall be Master: Europe or America?) from 1927 and *Idées très simples pour les français*<sup>36</sup> (Very simple ideas for the French) from 1928. In the former work Romier compares the USA and Europe and determines which parts European countries should adapt from the American model. In the latter, he argues that mechanisation and rationalisation would lead towards a raised and superior living standard through adapting American methods in the French economy.

Contrary to this position, the French anti-Americans argued in the completely opposite direction and claimed that standardization and mass-production would

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<sup>33</sup> 'Guide to the Julius and Edith Hirsch Collection Undated, 1810-1982, Bulk 1942-1960AR 1254' <<http://findingaids.cjh.org/?pID=431109#serI>> [accessed 29 September 2015].

<sup>34</sup> Hirsch, *Das amerikanische Wirtschaftswunder*, p. 258.

<sup>35</sup> Lucien Romier, *Qui sera le Maître, Europe ou Amérique?* (Paris: Hachette, 1927).

<sup>36</sup> Lucien Romier, *Idées très simples pour les français* (Paris: Kra, 1928).

destroy creative individuality. As for French pro-Americanism, the anti-Americanism was formulated in a specific intellectual circle. The so called 'Ordre Nouveau' (New Order) took an anti-capitalist and anti-materialist stand and became the hub of French anti-Americanism during the 1920s. A representative author of this circle is the French journalist Georges Duhamel. Duhamel (1884-1966) was a medical doctor and journalist of broad public influence. After an editorship at the journal *Mercure de France*, Duhamel volunteered during the First World War as a military doctor. He processed his wartime experiences in the novels *Vie des martyrs*<sup>37</sup> (1917) and *Civilisation*<sup>38</sup> (1918), for which he received the Prix Gancourt- France's most prestigious literary prize. His literary fame allowed Duhamel greater financial independence and funded extensive travels. They would be the basis for various publications about other countries such as the *Scènes de la vie future*<sup>39</sup> (Scenes of a future life) from 1930, reflecting on his voyage to the USA. The *Scènes de la vie future* is a travelogue which criticises the USA and its socio-economic model on various levels. Duhamel dismisses the American mechanized machine- and mass-culture which would destroy the individual. He contradicts the American material values with, according to Duhamel, real moral values of France. These arguments were simultaneously the predominant statements of the French anti-Americanism during the 1920s. These anti-American narratives were however not only confined to France but rather part of larger transnational arguments.

Similar arguments can hence be found when surveying German anti-Americanism for the 1920s. German anti-Americans criticised the USA on the background of their post-war political revisionism and simultaneously on an economic and cultural level. As in France, German anti-Americans argued that standardisation, rationalisation and mass-production would destroy individuality. From a cultural perspective, German anti-Americans criticised the lack of a high standing American culture which entailed only basic values such as materialism. A German author who represents this argumentation is the journalist Adolf Halfeld. Halfeld (1898-1955) worked as a correspondent for the newspaper *Hamburger*

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<sup>37</sup> Georges Duhamel, *Vie des martyrs, 1914-1916*. (Paris: Mercure de France, 1950).

<sup>38</sup> Georges Duhamel, *Civilisation, 1914-1917* (Paris: Mercure de France, 1918).

<sup>39</sup> Georges Duhamel, *Scènes de la vie future* (Paris: Mercvre de France, 1930). All the references regarding this work in this thesis refer to the second edition: Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, *Scènes de la vie future. 2 éd. rev. et améliorée avec introd., analyse, notes, jugements et citations par Armand Bottequin*. (Audenarde: Sanderus, 1952).



Fremdenblatt in New York from 1924-1929 and London from 1929-1932. It was during this time that he gathered the background knowledge for his eventual travelogue *Amerika und der Amerikanismus*<sup>40</sup> (America and Americanism) in which he elaborated on his experiences made during his years in the United States. *Amerika und der Amerikanismus*, published in 1927, is a clear rejection of everything American, radically rejecting all American influences. Main argumentations circle around the USA being a planned society, opposed to the European cultural heritage. Halfeld argued that the USA would promote a materialistic mass-society which would destroy individuality in the long run.

These arguments by Halfeld represent the German anti-American argumentation of the 1920s as much as the other authors represent their respective intellectual circles. These four authors and their works will therefore be the core research focus to investigate the relation between the Americanization-discourse and the concept of national identity. Bearing in mind constructivist methodology, the creation and influence of national identities for the individual is of major importance for the research on hand. A key idea will therefore be to understand why individuals are drawn to and attain certain identities, create identities and how those identities influence their self-understanding. In this sense, the social context of the authors is very important for the investigation of the constitution of the subject. The sources will thus be investigated with reference to the biography of the authors and in relation to the larger socio-economic developments of the 1920s.

## 1.6. Structure

In order to develop and answer the research questions the thesis will be structured into a theoretical and empirical part. It will first be necessary to provide a historiographical overview of the existing literature on Americanization, pro-Americanism, anti-Americanism and national identity. Chapter two will thus position the present research in the academic debate and help to formulate clear-cut definitions for the concepts analysed in this research. Investigating the existing literature will not only allow definitions for this research, it will also show how the

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<sup>40</sup> Adolf Halfeld, *Amerika und der Amerikanismus: Kritische Betrachtungen eines Deutschen und Europäers*. (Jena: E. Diederichs, 1927).

research questions will expand the academic debate. Chapter three will develop the theoretical and methodological approach this research will use. Having already briefly touched upon Constructivism, the Case Study Method and Comparative Research in this introduction, chapter three (Theory and Method) will provide an explanation and operationalization of these concepts. This will be important to place the research in an epistemological framework and to clearly formulate the methodological toolkit being used in the empirical part. Chapter four encompasses the historical background of the research. The relation between national identity and the Americanization-discourse is strongly influenced by the international-relations of the 1920s. It will therefore be important to formulate this background in a separate chapter, where the focus lies on the Franco-US relations and German-US relations between 1918 and 1933 while referring to pre-war developments as well. This should improve the understanding of some of the reasons behind pro- and anti-American perceptions for the given timeframe and shed light on whether the researched authors reacted to political developments through their literature. Chapter four thereby provides the structural cohesion between the national contexts of Germany and France and the case studies to follow.

The core part of the research will be undertaken in chapter five on pro-Americanism and chapter six on anti-Americanism. Both chapters have a similar structure as they first provide a general perspective of pro- or anti-Americanism during the 1920s and then address the research questions in two separate case studies, one on Germany and one on France. It will be here where Constructivism will be applied on the selected sources and the authors Hirsch, Romier, Halfeld and Duhamel will be investigated. Researching the biographies will allow a deeper understanding of their ideas and arguments. The works they have written on the United States will be analysing dominant narratives and deconstructing these with constructivist methodology, placing structures and agents in relation to national identities. Both chapters will ultimately compare the results i.e. the relation between pro- and anti-Americanism and national identity, comparing similarities and differences. The final chapter of this research, chapter seven, will answer the research questions and conclude the thesis with an outlook on potential further research related to this study.

## 2. Historiography

The Americanization-debate and national identity as separate entities have been extensively researched in the academic literature. Publications which make a connection between the two and relate them to one another however come down to a handful. Said publications only hint at an existing connection and treat it as a mere by-product of larger debates about Americanization. Studies which focus on the relation between pro- or anti-Americanism and national identity in its own right are currently non-existent at all. It is therefore necessary to review the historiography on the Americanization-debate and national identity separately before relating them to one another. The following section thus reviews the research on Americanization, pro-Americanism, anti-Americanism and national identity separately and thereby thematically rather than chronologically. The main objective of this section is to define the different concepts and investigate how the Americanization-discourse has already been connected to the concept of national identity, particularly for the 1918-1933 period. Despite this periodisation, the authors and works examined in this historiography cannot be confined to the interwar period as the definition and discussion of concepts such as Americanization are part of an ongoing and independent debate. Many recent publications for example treat the perception of the USA from an up-to-date standpoint, but reach far back in time to elaborate their arguments. It is thus impossible to contemplate the Americanization debate in the interwar period without considering its historical continuity, surpassing the given time period. Overall the focal point will however remain on the period from 1918 until 1933 and the geographical areas France and Germany.

### 2.1. Americanization

Finding an all-encompassing definition for Americanization proves very difficult due to its fluidity across time and space: the meaning of Americanization varies depending on the time period and the area which is subject to American influences.<sup>41</sup>

In the USA itself for example Americanization historically referred to the

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<sup>41</sup> For a collective volume on modern-day Americanization see: Ulrich Beck, Natan Sznaider and Rainer Winter, *Globales Amerika? Die kulturellen Folgen der Globalisierung* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2003).

naturalization of foreigners that wanted to attain the US-citizenship. In 1916 Frances A. Kellor from the National Americanization Committee in New York wrote an article entitled *Americanization: A conservation policy for industry*<sup>42</sup> arguing that it were a responsibility of the United States to naturalize immigrants in order to grow its industry and economy.<sup>43</sup> This historical meaning and use of the term Americanization differs from what it is considered today and from what it is considered during the 1920s. Researchers nowadays generally agree that Americanization refers to a certain value transfer from the USA to other parts of the world. The actual characteristics of this value transfer are however viewed and assessed differently. Most publications stress either economic, cultural, political or a combination of these influences as constitutive of the concept. This perception of Americanization has prevailed over the past decades and even in the wider public there exist reoccurring debates about the diverse influences of the USA on other countries.<sup>44</sup> The body of the existing Americanization-literature can therefore be divided into authors stressing economic, political or cultural aspects as its central characteristic.

The most widely researched form of Americanization is its economic aspect. Economic Americanization is most frequently associated with the post-World War II period, but there exist various publications that investigate it during the interwar-period and earlier. Harm Schröter for example dates the economic ties between the USA and Europe back to the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and identifies the economic influence of the USA as a combination of political, technological and cultural factors.<sup>45</sup> In another publication he distinguishes three major waves of Americanization: the 1920s, between 1949 and 1973, and from 1985 until the present.<sup>46</sup> Schröter argues that as the USA had become a leading economic power after the First World War, European countries tried to adapt similar American economic processes to improve their national economic position. They for example constructed larger units of production to achieve economies of scale and combined

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<sup>42</sup> Frances A. Kellor, "Americanization: a Conservation Policy for Industry," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 65 (May 1, 1916): 240–244.

<sup>43</sup> *Idem.*, p. 241f.

<sup>44</sup> See footnote 24.

<sup>45</sup> Harm Schröter, *Americanization of the European Economy: A Compact Survey of American Economic Influence in Europe since the 1880s* (Dordrecht: Norwell, 2005).

<sup>46</sup> Harm Schröter, "Economic culture and its transfer: an overview of the Americanisation of the European economy, 1900-2005," *European Review of History: Revue Européenne d'Histoire* 15, no. 4 (August 2008): 331–344.

Fordism and Taylorism with Scientific Management systems to produce business models after the American example.<sup>47</sup> Schröter thus perceives Americanization during the 1920s as the adaptation of American economic processes.

Besides Schröter other authors also perceive changing economic processes as a sign of Americanization. This research ranges from studies on changes in academic management education to papers that debate whether the use of consumer-credit was a sign of Americanization before the Second World War.<sup>48</sup> Others scholars assess innovations associated with Fordism and Taylorism as constitutive of the concept during the interwar-period. These are namely at the heart of Mary Nolan's work on Americanization in Germany during the 1920s where she argues that the key concept which characterised German society in the Weimar Republic (1919-1933) was rationalization.<sup>49</sup> Rationalization was strongly connected to Americanism and Fordism and became the major component of the German road to modernity. Nolan investigates the effects of rationalization across gender and class with the conclusion that generally all parts of society agreed on its importance. To Nolan rationalization was therefore central in explaining the success and collapse of the Weimar Republic and the main component of Americanization.<sup>50</sup> Hubert Bonin and Ferry de Goey take a differentiated stand in their book *American firms in Europe: Strategy, identity, perception and performance (1880-1980)*<sup>51</sup> where they argue that on the one hand European businesses certainly adapted American practices and the American business-model, but American businesses in Europe also had to adapt to the existing conditions, namely the local market. There hence existed a certain hybridization of the transatlantic business-model.<sup>52</sup> In this sense economic Americanization was certainly influential but needed to be renegotiated with regard to the national reality.

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<sup>47</sup> For a study on the Americanisation of Scientific Management see: Alfred Kieser, "The Americanization of Academic Management Education in Germany," *Journal of Management Inquiry* 13, no. 2 (January 6, 2004): 90–97.

<sup>48</sup> Alfred Kieser, "The Americanization of Academic Management Education in Germany," *Journal of Management Inquiry* 13, no. 2 (January 6, 2004): 90–97; Jan Logemann, "Americanization through Credit? Consumer Credit in Germany, 1860s–1960s," *Business History Review* 85, no. 03 (2011): 529–550.

<sup>49</sup> Mary Nolan, *Visions of Modernity: American Business and the Modernization of Germany* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

<sup>50</sup> Belinda Davis, 'Review of Nolan, Mary, *Visions of Modernity: American Business and the Modernization of Germany*' (H-German, H-Review, 1996) <<http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=334>> [accessed 2 July 2012].

<sup>51</sup> *American Firms in Europe: Strategy, Identity, Perception and Performance (1880-1980)*, ed. by Hubert Bonin and Ferry de Goey (Genève: Librairie Droz, 2009).

<sup>52</sup> Berti Kolbow, 'Review of Hubert Bonin and Ferry de Goey, Eds., *American Firms in Europe: Strategy, Identity, Perception and Performance (1880-1980)*', 2011 <<http://www.sehepunkte.de/2011/01/18546.html>> [accessed 13 January 2013].

Similar to De Goey and Bonin, Michel Gueldry and Michael Gott have also observed a hybridization of Americanization through the assimilation of offered cultural and economic products in different social settings.<sup>53</sup> Gueldry and Gott focus mainly on the Americanization of France post World War II and define it as a combination of US-cultural exports and their assimilation in France. According to Gueldry and Gott the increasing Americanization of French popular culture is one of the main reasons for cultural pessimism and anti-Americanism.<sup>54</sup>

An older work by Emily Rosenberg combines the economic and political dimensions of Americanization and is entitled *Spreading the American dream*<sup>55</sup>. Rosenberg investigates the relation between the German public and the private sector from the 1890s until the end of World War II and defines Americanization as a special ratio between how much the public sector promotes, cooperates and regulates the private one. Authors who combine economic and cultural characteristics to define Americanization are Alf Lüdtke, Inge Marßolek and Adelheid von Saldern.<sup>56</sup> In their analysis of Americanization in Germany in the 20<sup>th</sup> century they combine economic elements such as Fordism with cultural phenomena such as the American mass culture to explain the German America-image and define Americanization. Mel van Elteren has defined it as a combination of political and economic notions in his book *Americanism and Americanization*<sup>57</sup>. Van Elteren conducts a survey of Euro-American exchanges and particularly investigates the use of the terms Americanism and Americanization against the background of European and American history. In order to understand the dynamics and perceptions of, as well as the preoccupations with, Americanization, many factors have to be considered according to Van Elteren. These include military, political, economic, cultural and social dimensions. Overall Van Elteren thus aims at getting a more balanced view of the terms “Americanism” and “Americanization” in relation to the socio-historical context whilst highlighting the difficulty to clearly define it.

Next to economic and political dimensions many publications (also) define

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<sup>53</sup> Michel Gueldry and Michael Gott, “The Americanization of France,” *Yale French Studies* no. 116/117 (January 1, 2009): 37–51; particularly p. 37f.

<sup>54</sup> *Idem.*, p. 47.

<sup>55</sup> Emily Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945*, 1st ed. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982).

<sup>56</sup> Alf Lüdtke, *Amerikanisierung: Traum und Alptraum im Deutschland des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1996).

<sup>57</sup> Mel van Elteren, *Americanism and Americanization: A Critical History of Domestic and Global Influence* (Jefferson N.C.: McFarland & Co., 2006).

Americanization as a cultural process. Rob Kroes and Robert Rydell have pointed out how the typical characteristics of cultural Americanization, such as mass entertainment, mass culture and consumerism, had to first develop in the USA itself at the end of the nineteenth century. In their book, *Buffalo Bill in Bologna*<sup>58</sup> they investigate in particular the rise of consumerism and mass culture which transformed American society after the Civil War. Indeed, consumerism and mass culture are today most frequently associated with cultural Americanization.<sup>59</sup> The importance of popular culture and mass culture in spreading American influences have been highlighted by Heike Paul and Katja Kanzler in *Amerikanische Populärkultur in Deutschland*<sup>60</sup>. Paul and Kanzler investigate the function of popular culture in Germany at specific historical moments, which they present chronologically from the mid-nineteenth century. The central argument is that the influence of popular culture leads to a culture transfer through an adaptation-process. This adaptation-process is always individual and makes the influence of popular culture distinct for different historical contexts.<sup>61</sup>

An author who combines economic, political and cultural forms of Americanization and has published multiple works on the topic is Egbert Klautke. In *Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten: "Amerikanisierung" in Deutschland und Frankreich (1900-1933)*<sup>62</sup>, Klautke carries out a survey of a gradual build-up of American influence in France and Germany on a multitude of levels and how this American influence was perceived by society. His work surveys early receptions of the USA, starting at the end of the nineteenth century, including the perception of American imperialism, Taylorism and early anti-Americanism before the First World War. Klautke contemplates the political dimension of Americanization through surveying the American dollar-diplomacy after the First World War and the economic dimension of Americanization is elucidated through the rationalization of the German and French economy during the 1920s. Klautke attributes its cultural dimension to

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<sup>58</sup> Robert Rydell and Bob Kroes, *Buffalo Bill in Bologna: The Americanization of the World, 1869-1922* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

<sup>59</sup> See: Philip Melling, *Americanisation and the Transformation of World Cultures: Melting Pot or Cultural Chernobyl?* (Lewiston N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1996). Angelika Linke, *Attraktion Und Abwehr: Die Amerikanisierung der Alltagskultur in Europa* (Köln: Böhlau, 2006).

<sup>60</sup> Heike Paul and Katja Kanzler, *Amerikanische Populärkultur in Deutschland* (Leipzig: Univ.-Verl., 2002).

<sup>61</sup> Waltraud Sennebogen, 'Review of Heike Paul and Katja Kanzler, *Amerikanische Populärkultur in Deutschland*', 2002.

<sup>62</sup> Egbert Klautke, *Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten: 'Amerikanisierung' in Deutschland Und Frankreich (1900-1933)* (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 2003).

the importance of American mass-culture in France and Germany, mainly in the form of the film industry<sup>63</sup>, Jazz music and Tiller-Girls.

In conclusion, the majority of the literature defines Americanization as a multi-layered value transfer from the USA towards other parts of the world. Thereby a dynamic exchange exists between this value transfer on the one hand and the assimilation of American influences in national contexts on the other. Most publications specify diverse characteristics as constitutive of the concept, mainly depending on the time period. For the period 1918-1933 Americanization was essentially a combination of American economic and cultural influences and their political implementation. This characterization will consequently figure as definition of Americanization for the research on hand.

Economically, most publications perceive the application of Fordism and Taylorism with their key concept, rationalization, as a sign of Americanization. Culturally, changes in pop-culture towards mass-entertainment (including American movies, Jazz music, radio and dance) and consumerism are associated with the concept. Its political dimension relates to the level of public state involvement in the private sector (less involvement here being a sign of Americanization). In addition, the debate on Americanization shows, that it is a very hybrid concept. The perception and assimilation of American influences are considered as important as the influences themselves. Particularly different national contexts apparently change the perception of American influences and the way these are adapted and assimilated. The following sections will therefore investigate the historiography of pro- and anti-Americanism for different national contexts, i.e. France and Germany respectively.

## **2.2. Pro-Americanism**

The literature on the perception and evaluation of Americanization is imbalanced. Whereas opposition to Americanization, thus anti-Americanism with its long historical roots, has been well researched, this is not quite the case for pro-Americanism. Google-Scholar for example shows about 30,600 search results for

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<sup>63</sup> For a study on cinema and film industry in the Weimar Republic see: 'Cinema and Film Industry in Weimar Republic, 1918-1933 - Cinema-and-Film-Industry-in-Weimar-Republic1.pdf' <<http://peopleonsunday2010.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/Cinema-and-Film-Industry-in-Weimar-Republic1.pdf>> [accessed 22 December 2016].



articles treating anti-Americanism, whereas only 1,570 results appear for its positive counterpart.<sup>64</sup> Most of the articles on pro-Americanism thereby focus on the period since 2000 and formulate a special kind of anti-anti-Americanism rather than conceptualising pro-Americanism in its own right. One article in *The Economist* from 2003 for example investigates pro-Americanism in former communist countries.<sup>65</sup> Here the main argument evolves around most central European countries still being pro-American out of gratitude towards the USA for its spread of democratic and capitalist values.<sup>66</sup>

Similar arguments can be found in another relatively recent article by Anne Applebaum.<sup>67</sup> Applebaum investigates some of the current characteristics of pro-Americanism which include the appreciation of: political freedom, economic liberty and the declaration of independence as a benchmark for liberal constitutions.<sup>68</sup> People or countries who are pro-American today either identify their ideology as in core American or are grateful to the USA for past deeds and hence experience a nostalgic attachment.<sup>69</sup> The research on the historical forms of pro-Americanism is equally limited in quantity but attributes the concept other characteristics qualitatively. The literature on the concept in the interwar period mostly approaches it as admiration of the USA's economic force and innovations and a call for their application in the own national economy.

Egbert Klautke provides a detailed investigation of the Taylorism- and Fordism-debate during the interwar period in Germany in his book *Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten*.<sup>70</sup> He points out how the German pro-Americanism started as a fascination with Taylorism and then became in essence an admiration of Fordism. Klautke furthermore points out various German publications during this period which debate Fordism and call for its adaptation in Germany. He demonstrates that there indeed existed a positive perception of the USA and Americanization in Germany, but he does not refer to it as pro-Americanism. Klautke rather focuses on depicting the evolution of the debate about Fordism and rationalization through discussing their

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<sup>64</sup> As of 25.01.2017

<sup>65</sup> 'Central Europe and the United States: We Still Rather like the Americans', *The Economist*, 30 January 2003 <<http://www.economist.com/node/1560869>> [accessed 12 January 2013].

<sup>66</sup> 'Central Europe and the United States'.

<sup>67</sup> Anne Applebaum, "In Search of PRO Americanism," *Foreign Policy* no. 149 (July 1, 2005): 32–41.

<sup>68</sup> *Idem.*, p. 34.

<sup>69</sup> *Idem.*, p. 35.

<sup>70</sup> Egbert Klautke, *Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten*, pp. 183–238.

proponents.

Philipp Gassert investigates the German admiration of the USA between 1923 and 1939 based on the Fordism- and modernism-debate (and the relationship between the Nazi ideology and the modernism narrative of the Weimar Republic). He neither explicitly uses the term pro-Americanism, but rather researches the positive perception of Americanism (which is basically a synonym of pro-Americanism for Gassert) and modernism. Gassert defines Americanism as a coming to terms with the social and cultural breakthrough of modernism during and after the First World War and states that Americanism was used as an “umbrella-term” during the 1920s for anything that could be linked to being modern.<sup>71</sup>

Mary Nolan has researched the modernization of Germany and the steady application of Fordism and Taylorism in the industry during the 1920s.<sup>72</sup> She focuses on the German fascination with American innovations such as mass production and standardisation. As seen above Nolan argues that the key concept which characterised German society in the interwar-period was rationalization, a concept all parts of society perceived as crucial for progress.<sup>73</sup> According to Nolan, debating modernism and rationalization under the American aspect gave the debate more immediacy. Whilst once again not explicitly referring to the concept of pro-Americanism, one can conclude that according to Nolan pro-Americanism could be described as a positive perception of mainly economic American innovations, functionally used to promote modernity.

The publications on French pro-Americanism during the interwar period are equally rare as for its German counterpart. Again, an exception is Egbert Klautke's *Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten*<sup>74</sup> where he dedicates one section to Americanization and rationalization in France. He summarises and connects a vast number of publications by French pro-Americans of the 1920s, including the pro-American intellectual circle “Redressement Français”. Moreover, he provides an insight into the dominant narratives and characteristics of French pro-Americanism which include an admiration of rationalization and Taylorism. Despite this recital, Klautke lacks a

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<sup>71</sup> Philipp Gassert, “‘Without Concessions to Marxist or Communist Thought’: Fordism in Germany, 1923-1939”, in *Transatlantic Images and Perceptions*, ed. by David E. Barclay and Elisabeth Glaser-Schmid, Publications of the German Historical Institute (Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 22.

<sup>72</sup> Nolan, *Visions of Modernity*.

<sup>73</sup> Davis, ‘Review of Nolan, Mary, *Visions of Modernity: American Business and the Modernization of Germany*’.

<sup>74</sup> Egbert Klautke, *Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten*.

distinct definition or conceptualisation of pro-Americanism in France. He however does recognize the general lack of existing publications on French pro-Americanism of the 1920s.<sup>75</sup>

Klautke's article *Amerikanismus und Antiamerikanismus im Frankreich der Zwischenkriegszeit*<sup>76</sup> raises similar arguments as the section in his book. He discusses the main debate about “Americanism”, again through focusing on prominent intellectuals who shaped the debate. Klautke's main argument is that the discussion of Fordism and Taylorism overlapped with the rationalization debate on the one hand and the Americanization debate on the other hand.<sup>77</sup> He additionally argues that “Americanism” became a synonym for modernization during the interwar period, in France and Germany respectively.<sup>78</sup> In conclusion Klautke demonstrates how pro-Americanism during the given time period can be seen as an endorsement of modernization and rationalization which were attributed to being American at heart.

Walter Sommer investigates the America-perception of French intellectuals and politicians during 1924 and 1939.<sup>79</sup> He dedicates one chapter to the pros and cons French publicists saw in the American mass-civilisation.<sup>80</sup> He discusses the arguments of prominent pro-American authors such as Siegfried, Tardieu, Maurois, Braunschvig and Romier. According to Sommer these authors praise the progressiveness as well as the synthesis of mass-civilisation and elite culture of the USA. Similarly to Sommer, Astrid Grewe also investigates the French America-image during the interwar-period through salient writers and publications.<sup>81</sup> Grewe analyses various features of the America-image of two main streams of publications: the liberal-conservative “Ordre Établi” and the anti-traditionalistic “Parti du Mouvement”. Pro-American perceptions were predominantly voiced in the “Parti du Mouvement”, whose authors were more open to technological progress and saw the USA as economic role model.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Idem., p. 10.

<sup>76</sup> Egbert Klautke, ‘Amerikanismus und Antiamerikanismus im Frankreich der Zwischenkriegszeit’, in *Amerikanismus, Americanism, Weill: die Suche nach kultureller Identität in der Moderne*, ed. by H. Danuser and H. Gottschewski (Schliengen, Germany: Edition Argus, 2003), 67–90 <<http://www.editionargus.de/pd-535780167.htm?defaultVariants=%7BEOL%7D&categoryId=10>> [accessed 29 September 2015].

<sup>77</sup> Idem., p. 22f.

<sup>78</sup> Idem., p. 23.

<sup>79</sup> Walter Sommer, *Die Weltmacht USA im Urteil der französischen Publizistik, 1924-1939* (Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 1967).

<sup>80</sup> Idem, pp. 55–144.

<sup>81</sup> Astrid Grewe, *Das Amerikabild der französischen Schriftsteller zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen* (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1985).

<sup>82</sup> Idem p. 110f.

A recent publication is Robert L. Frost's article *Fordism and the American Dream in France, 1919-1939*.<sup>83</sup> Frost elaborates that the French Fordism discourse mainly consisted of two branches: rationalization and consumerism. The implementation of this American-style rationalisation was however mostly limited to large firms. Generally American rationalisation-methods were modified by and adapted for the French industrial preconditions. Positive perceptions of the USA here related to an adaptation of American rationalization methods which reconstructed an industrial production process which Taylorism had tended to break apart. Together with Bernadette Galloux-Fournier's unpublished dissertation *Voyageurs français aux Etats-Unis, 1919-1939. Contribution à l'étude d'une image de l'Amérique*.<sup>84</sup> this represents the current state of research.

Overall the existing research on pro-Americanism during the interwar period is very limited. This is as much the case for Germany as for France. The literature predominantly does not refer to the term “pro-Americanism”, let alone define or conceptualise it. One of the few exceptions is Jessica Gienow-Hecht who argues that philo-Americanism and anti-Americanism are structurally linked to one another and exist in juxtaposition. In her eyes philo-Americanism was a liberal European utopian vision of the USA which faded with the rise of industrial capitalism and modernity. This European disappointment eventually led to anti-Americanism.<sup>85</sup> Gienow-Hecht does not provide a clear definition of pro-Americanism, but addresses the concept as such and recognizes it as elementary counterpart of anti-Americanism. This is unfortunately as far as the research in terms of conceptualisation currently goes.

In terms of a positive perception of the USA there do exist some publications for Germany and France respectively. Most researchers here focus on authors who conveyed a positive image of the USA, mostly with regard to its economic model character. The body of literature thereafter allows it to conceive and define pro-Americanism during the interwar-period as a combination of the following three factors: first, an admiration of the American economic-power all-inclusively, second, an admiration of Taylorism and Fordism and a subsequent call for their adaptation in the own country and thirdly, a progress-optimism that was connected to American

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<sup>83</sup> ‘Fordism and the American Dream in France, 1919-1939’ <[http://www2.cddc.vt.edu/digitalfordism/fordism\\_materials/frost.htm](http://www2.cddc.vt.edu/digitalfordism/fordism_materials/frost.htm)> [accessed 29 September 2015].

<sup>84</sup> Bernadette Galloux-Fournier, “Voyageurs français aux Etats-Unis, 1919-1939. Contribution à l'étude d'une image de l'Amérique” (ANRT, 1988).

<sup>85</sup> Gienow-Hecht, ‘Always Blame the Americans: Anti-Americanism in Europe in the Twentieth Century’, p. 1070.

influences. This conception is equally valid for Germany as it is for France, despite both debates showing some minor differences with regard to terminology.

### 2.3. Anti-Americanism

A negative perception of the USA and its influences on other parts of the world has a long history, nevertheless anti-Americanism has been rejuvenated in the public-discourse over the past decade.<sup>86</sup> Led by foreign policy specific criticism also cultural and economic exports of the USA have triggered waves of global criticism. It is not surprising that these recent rather anti-American years have been monitored and heavily debated in the academic literature. A vast number of publications thus investigate present-day anti-Americanism whilst attributing the concept a historical legacy.<sup>87</sup> The scholar Michael Curtis argues that unlike in the past there today exist real differences between the USA and Europe, which include foreign policy, environmental issues and the cooperation in international institutions.<sup>88</sup> In *Anti-Americanism in Europe*<sup>89</sup> Curtis retraces the history of German and French anti-Americanism and historically defines anti-Americanism as a metaphor for the misperception of US society and culture.<sup>90</sup> It is the psychological consequence of alienation on a political and philosophical layer and consists of an attribution of general problems to the USA.<sup>91</sup> Present-day anti-Americanism on the other hand is generally a resistance to modernity and an opposition to globalization, supposedly eroding national identity.<sup>92</sup>

The dimension of anti-Americanism's historical continuity is equally addressed by Herbert J. Spiro in *Anti-Americanism in Western Europe*<sup>93</sup>. Spiro differentiates four main reasons for anti-Americanism: first, the popular kind, second, anti anti-

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<sup>86</sup> For a recent essay on the historiography of anti-Americanism in the twentieth century see: Egbert Klautke, 'Anti-Americanism in Twentieth Century Europe', *The Historical Journal*, 54.3 (2011), 909–23.

<sup>87</sup> See: Bernard-Héni Levy, "Anti-Americanism in the Old Europe," *New Perspectives Quarterly* 20, no. 2 (2003): 4–10.

<sup>88</sup> Michael Curtis, "Anti-Americanism in Europe," *American Foreign Policy Interests* 26, no. 5 (2004): 367–384 (p. 368, 370).

<sup>89</sup> Michael Curtis, "Anti-Americanism in Europe," *American Foreign Policy Interests* 26, no. 5 (2004): 367–384.

<sup>90</sup> *Idem.*, p. 371.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>92</sup> *Idem.*, p. 382.

<sup>93</sup> Herbert J. Spiro, "Anti-Americanism in Western Europe," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 497, no. 1 (January 5, 1988): 120–132.

Communism, third, policy-specific anti-Americanism, and fourth, elitist anti-Americanism.<sup>94</sup> Spiro sees the core of anti-Americanism as an opposition to US constitutional values.<sup>95</sup> According to Spiro any form of American success has always appeared as a European failure to the Western European elites.<sup>96</sup> To European elites the USA couldn't possibly succeed because it was lacking tradition, a multi-cultural and -racial society as well as aristocracy. This led to a condescension on the “American experiment”.<sup>97</sup> Spiro thus understands anti-Americanism as a social class specific approach, arguing that the Western European ruling class has always been anti-American, ordinary people have always been pro-American and the British governing class has always shown a certain level of condescension on the USA.<sup>98</sup> According to Spiro the higher the social class, the stronger the anti-Americanism, out of envy of US-predominance.<sup>99</sup>

Ideas of condescension on and disappointment of the “American experiment” are equally advocated by Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht. In *Always Blame the Americans: Anti-Americanism in Europe in the Twentieth Century*<sup>100</sup> Gienow-Hecht argues that anti-Americanism is mainly based on cultural condescension of established elites.<sup>101</sup> From a historical point of view anti-Americanism begins with the American Revolution and the fear of European traders that their business could be disrupted.<sup>102</sup> Before the First World War mainly the conservative elites, such as the Frankfurt School in Germany, proclaimed anti-American tendencies, which helped to “cement national positions in the discourse on modernity”<sup>103</sup>. During the interwar-period a general ambivalence between the welcoming and rejection of American developments was visible. After the Second World War anti-Americanism encompassed political criticism embedded in cultural criticism.<sup>104</sup> Gienow-Hecht generally distinguishes three main periods of anti-Americanism in Europe: Pre-1945,

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<sup>94</sup> Idem., p. 121.

<sup>95</sup> Idem., p. 122.

<sup>96</sup> Idem., p. 123.

<sup>97</sup> Idem., p. 123f.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid.

<sup>99</sup> Idem., p. 126.

<sup>100</sup> J. C. E. Gienow-Hecht, “Always Blame the Americans: Anti-Americanism in Europe in the Twentieth Century,” *The American Historical Review* 111, no. 4 (October 1, 2006): 1067–1091.

<sup>101</sup> Idem., p. 1071.

<sup>102</sup> Idem., p. 1073.

<sup>103</sup> Idem., p. 1075, in reference to Philipp Gassert, *Amerika im Dritten Reich: Ideologie, Propaganda und Volksmeinung, 1933-1945* (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1997), p. 12f.

<sup>104</sup> Idem., p. 1089.

the Cold War period and the post-Cold War period.<sup>105</sup> Thereby Gienow-Hecht not only provides a history and variety of definitions for anti-Americanism but also relates it to pro-Americanism, arguing that both concepts can only exist in juxtaposition. According to the author the term anti-Americanism is misleading and badly chosen as any term with “ism” as a suffix normally signifies an ideological movement, which anti-Americanism is not. The author nevertheless makes no proposition to rename the concept.<sup>106</sup> Gienow-Hecht explains that there exist some grand-narratives of anti-Americanism around which it evolved, which are cultural, political or economic and demonstrate the different varieties of the phenomenon.<sup>107</sup> In addition, the meaning of the concept exclusively derives from the subject, not the object, in other words, the concept has no autonomous meaning, it is the constructed meaning the anti-Americans attribute it that constitutes its meaning.<sup>108</sup> Gienow-Hecht stresses that, overall, anti-Americanism is something constructed and independent of the actual reality.<sup>109</sup> Moreover, in most countries there exists an ambivalence between the consumption of American popular-culture on the one hand and the rejection of US-policies on the other. An ambivalence that partly roots in an admiration of the United States, or as the author puts it: “There is an Americano-ophile lurking inside every anti-American”.<sup>110</sup> An ambivalence that supersedes the cultural criticism and shows the mutual dependence of anti- and philo-Americanism.<sup>111</sup>

Despite many authors stressing the historical continuity of anti-Americanism, various publications discuss the peculiarities of anti-Americanism during the interwar-period in its own right. For Germany and France, the existing research on anti-Americanism between 1918 and 1933 is extensive. One reason therefore is that in contrast to pro-Americanism, anti-Americanism has always been recognized as such, not only by Europeans but also by Americans. As early as 1900 the New York Times published an article entitled *Europe's Anti-Americanism*.<sup>112</sup> Not only is there an active reference to the term anti-Americanism, it is also explained as a “widespread hostility manifested on [the] continent”.<sup>113</sup> Evidently anti-Americanism has always

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<sup>105</sup> Idem., p. 1068.

<sup>106</sup> Idem., p. 1069.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

<sup>109</sup> Idem., p. 1090.

<sup>110</sup> Idem., p. 1084.

<sup>111</sup> Idem., p. 1089.

<sup>112</sup> ‘Europe’s Anti-Americanism’, *New York Times (1857-1922)* (London, 24 April 1900), 1 edition.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid.

been part of the public vocabulary. The ongoing awareness and active support of anti-Americanism across time has facilitated research about it, be it for different countries or time periods.

German anti-Americanism during the interwar-period has consequently been very well researched. Authors have particularly focused on the cultural dimension of anti-American images and prominent authors who wanted to defend German cultural values against American cultural imports. Dan Diner has in this respect contributed two important publications which trace the German hostilities towards the USA from the nineteenth century until the present. His first work *Verkehrte Welten*<sup>114</sup> from 1993 (which was published three years later in English<sup>115</sup>) investigates German anti-Americanism from 1800 until the end of the Cold War, more precisely the aftermath of the Gulf War.<sup>116</sup> Diner contrasts German anti-Americanism, which reflects a special and particularly German political mentality, with a milder America-hostility in other Western European countries.<sup>117</sup> He argues that first anti-American images relate to the German Romanticism during the nineteenth century. With the First World War these biases changed and during the interwar-period German anti-Americanism was primarily formulated by intellectuals who dismissed the American popular-culture aimed at mass-entertainment. The USA became a gimmick for cultural fears and biases fuelled by Weimar Republic's path to modernity.

Besides Diner, Egbert Klautke contributed to the research on German anti-Americanism with multiple publications.<sup>118</sup> His already mentioned book *Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten* dedicates one chapter to the German anti-Americanism between 1900 and 1933. Here Klautke demonstrates how its main characteristics included criticisms of the American mass-culture, criticism of American materialism and how the legacy of the First World War affected anti-American positions. In addition, he connects multiple authors who published anti-American works during the interwar-period.

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<sup>114</sup> Dan Diner, *Verkehrte Welten: Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland : ein historischer Essay* (Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn, 1993).

<sup>115</sup> Dan Diner, *America in the Eyes of the Germans: An Essay on Anti-Americanism*, English language ed. (Princeton NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1996).

<sup>116</sup> Diner's *Feindbild Amerika* is a revised version of his earlier work and, being published in 2002, includes more recent developments such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Here Diner argues that there existed strong German sympathy with the USA after the attacks which eventually diminished and anti-America voices re-emerged. Dan Diner, *Feindbild Amerika: über die Beständigkeit eines Ressentiments* (Berlin: Propyläen, 2002).

<sup>117</sup> Klautke, *Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten*, p. 13 & Diner, *Verkehrte Welten* pp. 34, 36.

<sup>118</sup> For a case study on German anti-Americanism see: E. Klautke, 'Die halbierte Moderne: Amerikanismusdebatten und Amerikanisierungsängste im Augsburg der Weimarer Republik', in *Amerika in Augsburg: Aneignungen und globale Verflechtungen in einer Stadt*, ed. by P. Gassert and others (Augsburg, Germany: Wißner, 2014), 167–84.



Two of these often-quoted authors, the German journalist Adolf Halfeld and the French writer Georges Duhamel, are subject of another publication by Klautke.<sup>119</sup> Both authors represent the predominant argumentation of the anti-American intellectuals in Germany and France and inherit a central role in the opinion making about the USA. Klautke sees many parallels in the criticisms of Halfeld and Duhamel with both authors strongly dismissing the mass-culture of the USA.

Viktor Otto equally investigates German intellectuals and their negative America-images in his publication *Deutsche Amerika-Bilder*.<sup>120</sup> Otto particularly focuses on the processing of these images in literature and theatre. Other researchers focus less on the America images conveyed in the literature and approach anti-Americanism more conceptually. Klaus Schwabe for example reflects the different anti-American tendencies of the 1920s from a more political perspective.<sup>121</sup> Schwabe differentiates three main reasons and forms of the German anti-Americanism during the Weimar Republic. Firstly, political and cultural anti-Americanism dismissing the importance of material values in the USA and its lack of an intellectual elite. Secondly, anti-Americanism was a form of anti-modernisation tendencies, viewing the USA as forerunner of a modernity that was incompatible with Germany. Thirdly, Schwabe perceives the trauma of the German defeat in the First World War, mainly blamed on the USA, as most important reason for German anti-Americanism during the 1920s.

Mary Nolan argues that the USA was in Germany since the early twentieth century mostly resented for what it is, not what it does.<sup>122</sup> She defines anti-Americanism as “anxieties about and criticisms of Americanization and Americanism”<sup>123</sup>. According to Nolan the dimensions of mass-production, -consumption and -culture were added to the anti-American argumentation after the First World War, with the USA as an emerging hegemon.<sup>124</sup> After the Second World

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<sup>119</sup> Egbert Klautke, ‘Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld Und Georges Duhamel’, in *Welche Modernität? Intellektuellendiskurse zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich im Spannungsfeld nationaler und europäischer Identitätsbilder*, ed. by Wolfgang Essbach (Berlin, 2000), 173–91.

<sup>120</sup> Viktor Otto, *Deutsche Amerika-Bilder: zu den Intellektuellen-Diskursen um die Moderne 1900-1950* (Paderborn: W. Fink, 2006).

<sup>121</sup> ‘Klaus Schwabe: Archäologie Des Anti-Amerikanismus’ <<http://www.db-thueringen.de/servlets/DerivateServlet/Derivate-1560/schwabe.html>> [accessed 12 January 2012].

<sup>122</sup> Mary Nolan, “Anti-Americanism and Americanization in Germany,” *Politics & Society* 33, no. 1 (March 1, 2005): 88–122 (p. 88). Nolan here explicitly refers to Dan Diner's *Feinbild Amerika: Über die Beständigkeit eines Ressentiments*, p. 8.

<sup>123</sup> *Idem.*, p. 91.

<sup>124</sup> Nolan, ‘Anti-Americanism and Americanization in Germany’, p. 93.

War anti-Americanism added the lack of high culture and resentment of mass-production as destruction of German craft tradition to its rhetoric.<sup>125</sup> In the first half of the twentieth century, Nolan argues, German anti-Americanism mainly rejected modernity and capitalism and was furthermore fuelled by anti-Semitism.<sup>126</sup> The connection between anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism has also been drawn by Michael Curtis who argues that particularly economic anti-Americanism was amplified by anti-Semitism.<sup>127</sup>

Many publications today connect German anti-Americanism to French anti-Americanism.<sup>128</sup> Thomas Raithel argues that both debates show many parallels even though the topicality and actual Americanization of Germany was more advanced than it was in France.<sup>129</sup> Raithel perceives the “American challenge” as a combination of increasing American-style economic rationalization and a spread of mass-culture. In an important rather recent publication on the development of French anti-Americanism Philippe Roger traces French anti-Americanism over the past 250 years and describes how anti-Americanism has always been a cultural peculiarity of France.<sup>130</sup> He perceives the fear of an erosion of national identity combined with an Anglo-phobia as main reasons for French anti-Americanism over time. Particularly interesting is Roger's assertion that intellectual anti-Americanism was partly also a humanism, thus a defence of man against inadvertent influences.<sup>131</sup> This argumentation is something we will notably see through the literature of Georges Duhamel. Besides humanism also the idea of French superiority will be addressed through Duhamel's works. In the academic literature, the connection between French superiority (and inferiority) and anti-Americanism have most notably been investigated by Anthony Daniels who perceives them as constitutive of the French

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<sup>125</sup> Idem., pp. 94, 99.

<sup>126</sup> Idem., p. 89.

<sup>127</sup> Curtis, ‘Anti-Americanism in Europe’, p. 373; also see Andrei S Markovits, *Uncouth Nation: Why Europe Dislikes America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), especially chapter 5 “Twin Brothers”: European Anti-Semitism and Anti-Americanism, pp. 150-200.

<sup>128</sup> A recent historiography on French anti-Americanism between 1919 and 1932 can be found in: Robert Boyce, ‘When “Uncle Sam” Became “Uncle Shylock”: Sources and Strength of French Anti-Americanism, 1919-1932’, *Histoire@Politique*, 2013, 29–51.

For a study on French anti-Americanism since 1970 see: Jean-François Revel, *L'obsession anti-américaine: son fonctionnement, ses causes, ses inconvénients* (Paris: Plon, 2002).

<sup>129</sup> Raithel, “Amerika als Herausforderung in Deutschland und Frankreich in den 1920er Jahren” .

<sup>130</sup> Roger, *The American enemy*.

<sup>131</sup> Idem., p. 373-409. For a study on the relation between Humanitarianism and the First World War see: Bruno Cabanes, *The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism, 1918-1924*, 2014.

anti-Americanism.<sup>132</sup>

Egbert Klautke contributed to the research on French anti-Americanism through two publications. In chapter eight of *Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten*<sup>133</sup> he investigates major anti-American intellectuals and their publications after the First World War in France. Moreover, Klautke highlights various parallels between the French and German anti-Americans, especially in their economic and cultural criticism of the USA. His article *Amerikanismus und Antiamerikanismus im Frankreich der Zwischenkriegszeit*<sup>134</sup> raises similar arguments as his book and focuses particularly on the dismissal of American cultural-imports such as movies and jazz music.

David Strauss' *Menace in the West*<sup>135</sup> provides an overview of French anti-Americanism since the eighteenth century up until the book's publication in the 1970s. Strauss dates the roots of French anti-Americanism back to the USA's constitutional beginnings in 1776. Strauss demonstrates how the Franco-American relations on a political level added to negative images of the USA over the centuries. For the interwar-period Strauss traces the anti-American position back to three publications of 1927 by André Seigfried, André Tardieu and Lucien Romier.<sup>136</sup>

As we have seen, there exists considerably more literature on anti-Americanism than on pro-Americanism in general and for the interwar-period. One reason for this phenomenon is that anti-Americans were much more vocal about their convictions than pro-Americans. In the scientific literature anti-Americanism is seen as part of a historical continuum. While some authors trace it back to the constitutional foundation of the USA, most publications divide anti-Americanism into three main phases: pre-First World War, the interwar period and post-World War Two. Conceptually it is possible to approach anti-Americanism across all epochs as a strong dismissal of the USA and its influences, mostly based on irrational prejudices. Thereby many negative developments can be connected to the USA as the concept of

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<sup>132</sup> Anthony Daniels, 'Sense of Superiority and Inferiority in French Anti-Americanism', in *Understanding Anti-Americanism: Its Origins and Impact at Home and Abroad*, ed. by Paul Hollander (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2004), 65–83.

<sup>133</sup> Egbert Klautke, *Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten*.

<sup>134</sup> Egbert Klautke, 'Amerikanismus und Antiamerikanismus im Frankreich der Zwischenkriegszeit', in *Amerikanismus, Americanism, Weill: die Suche nach kultureller Identität in der Moderne*, ed. by H. Danuser and H. Gottschewski (Schliengen, Germany: Edition Argus, 2003), 67–90 <<http://www.editionargus.de/pd-535780167.htm?defaultVariants=%7BEOL%7D&categoryId=10>> [accessed 29 September 2015].

<sup>135</sup> David Strauss, *Menace in the West: The Rise of French Anti-Americanism in Modern Times* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978).

<sup>136</sup> Idem., p. 67.

anti-Americanism itself lacks clear focus.<sup>137</sup> Most publications define anti-Americanism as a combination of cultural criticism, anti-modernisation tendencies and a condescension on the perceived socio-cultural inferiority of the American society. Whilst there do exist some minor epochal differences these characteristics seem to exist time-independent and will figure as definition of anti-Americanism for the study on hand.

For the interwar-period there existed an interesting historical particularity between an increasing Americanization of the society on the one hand and growing anti-Americanism on the other. While the Americanization of Germany seemed to be more advanced than in France, also its anti-Americans were more vocal. This German anti-Americanism combined a negative legacy of the First World War, revisionism of the Treaty of Versailles, anti-modernisation efforts regarding economic rationalisation and strong cultural criticism against American mass-cultural imports. In France, the political aspects of anti-Americanism differed. As opposed to the legacy of the First World War, criticism of perceived American (financial) imperialism was a French peculiarity. Nevertheless, similarities between both countries prevail, particularly regarding cultural anti-Americanism: main arguments include a criticism of mass culture and materialism which would lead towards a loss of human individuality.

## **2.4. National Identity**

National identity has been thoroughly covered in the existing research. It has been approached and analysed from various angles and research areas, including psychology, history and sociology. Particularly the construction of national identities and their influence on individuals and groups have been at the centre of this research. Different criteria have been considered as constitutive of national identity in order to find an all-encompassing definition. A connection between a positive or negative perception of the USA and national identity is however rare. This section will thus consider the publications that have already made a connection between national identity and the Americanization-discourse while first surveying the historiography

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<sup>137</sup> I here agree with the assessment by Gienow-Hecht in: 'Always Blame the Americans: Anti-Americanism in Europe in the Twentieth Century', p. 1072.

on national identity itself, including its definitions and key attributes.

### 2.4.1. National Identity in Historical Research

First considerations about national identity in the field of history were mainly influenced by research on the concept of nationalism. This nationalism research in a historical perspective was propelled by the following three historians: Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner and Eric Hobsbawm. In 1983 Benedict Anderson initiated these contemplations through analysing nationalism and the nation-state in his work *Imagined Communities*<sup>138</sup>. His publication developed the idea that nations were socially constructed communities, i.e. imagined communities, and provided a modernist interpretation of nationalism. This modernist interpretation of nationalism places the origins of nations in modern times.<sup>139</sup> It is thereby in strict contrast to perennial theories which stress the permanence of nations.<sup>140</sup> According to Anderson the nation was a recent social construction, created by the people who imagined themselves as part of it. National identity was in this sense a feeling of belonging to a community which was fundamentally associated with and subordinated to this conception of a nation.

The idea of the nation being a social construction was equally developed by Ernest Gellner in *Nations and Nationalism*<sup>141</sup>. According to Gellner the nation was a modern and constructed phenomenon rather than being a time-independent and fixed entity. It was mainly the product of the social and cultural changes that occurred through the industrial revolution, more concretely the migration from rural to urban areas which occurred through the shift from an agricultural to an industrial society. Gellner argued that in order for people with different backgrounds to work for the good of the community there existed the necessity of a common identity. This demand was met by creating a common identity with a common past, language and

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<sup>138</sup> Benedict R. O'G Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

<sup>139</sup> Nenad Miscevic, 'Nationalism', in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. by Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2014 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2014) <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/nationalism/>> [accessed 22 March 2017].

<sup>140</sup> Montserrat Guibernau, 'Anthony D. Smith on Nations and National Identity: A Critical Assessment', *Nations and Nationalism*, 10.1–2 (2004), 125–41 (p. 126) <<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1354-5078.2004.00159.x>>.

<sup>141</sup> Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). Also see: Ernest Gellner, *Nationalism* (Washington Square, N.Y.: New York University Press, 1997).

heritage, which effectively was national identity.

Similar to Anderson and Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm's work on nationalism perceives the nation-state as a construction.<sup>142</sup> According to Hobsbawm, nations are brought into being by nationalism and are hence a modern formation. They have changing national identification patterns which influence the individual. Hobsbawm and the other early scholars on nations and nationalism consequently perceived national identity as a component of nationalism but did not conceptualise it in its own right. To them, the relationship between the nation-state and nationalism was at the heart of the research. Despite a contemplation of national identity, they focused more on the “national” part than the “identity” part.<sup>143</sup> This changed in the 1990s when scholars such as Liah Greenfeld and Maria Montserrat-Guibernau investigated the concept and different criteria of national identity as such.

In 1992 Liah Greenfeld provided a slightly different approach when she differentiated it from other collective identities and introduced the idea of ethnicity.<sup>144</sup> To Greenfeld national identity was not simply a territorial or political identity, nor was it a unique identity such as Germanity or Frenchness. These unique identities would sometimes exist centuries before national identities were created. Ethnicity was thereafter not constitutive of a national identity even though it often incorporated ethnic characteristics. National identity by itself, was tied to the concept of a nation-state and “provided an organizing principle applicable to different materials to which it then grants meaning, transforming them thereby into elements of a specific identity”.<sup>145</sup>

In *The identity of nations*<sup>146</sup> Montserrat Guibernau provided a historical and conceptual investigation of national identity. Guibernau argued that up until the nineteenth century, a concept such as national identity was unknown, as ideas such as individuality and uniqueness were of relative unimportance in international relations.<sup>147</sup> Only since the nineteenth century did reflections about the uniqueness of people and groups emerge and lead to a reflection on identities. Identity became an interpretation of the self that established who the person in social and psychological

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<sup>142</sup> E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

<sup>143</sup> David McCrone, Frank Beckhofer: *Understanding National Identity*, p. 12f.

<sup>144</sup> Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism : Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 12.

<sup>145</sup> Idem., p. 13f.

<sup>146</sup> Montserrat Guibernau, *The Identity of Nations* (Cambridge: Polity, 2007).

<sup>147</sup> Idem., p. 9.

terms was.<sup>148</sup> All identities hence emerged within a system of social relations and representations. According to Guibernau two basic distinctions regarding identity were its continuity over time and its difference from others.<sup>149</sup> These have become the main characteristics of national identity: an identity that would move from the past into the future and an identity that would represent a community with shared values and roots, different from other communities. Continuity and differentiation therefore led to key concepts regarding identities, the differentiation and comparison between us and them.<sup>150</sup>

Montserrat Guibernau defined national identity as “[...] a collective sentiment based upon the belief of belonging to the same nation and of sharing most of the attributes that make it distinct from other nations. National identity was therefore a modern phenomenon of a fluid and dynamic nature. While consciousness of forming a nation may have remained constant for long periods of time, the elements upon which such a feeling was based may have varied over time.”<sup>151</sup> Guibernau argued that the elements which constituted national identity were the following five attributes: psychological, cultural, historical, territorial and political.<sup>152</sup> To Guibernau national identity was a construction, it had no meaning a priori and wasn't autonomous- it only had the respective meaning people attributed it. National identities were constructed through different images, rituals and institutions whilst they were reinforced through the creation of common enemies and the concept of citizenship as distinction between us and them.<sup>153</sup>

Today, the conceptualisation of national identity remains part of an ongoing debate.<sup>154</sup> The majority of the literature approaches its constitutive characteristics from different angles but there exists consensus on the fluidity of national identities across time and space. Hereafter national identities are comprised of different characteristics, depending on the nation-state and the time period. Amanda Scorrana argues that because of this fluidity, nations need symbolic representations to reinforce

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<sup>148</sup> Idem., p. 10.

<sup>149</sup> Idem., p. 10.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid.

<sup>151</sup> Idem., 11.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid.

<sup>153</sup> Idem., 25.

<sup>154</sup> For a rather recent debate on the characteristics of national identity see: Stefan Manz, ‘Constructing a Normative National Identity: The Leitkultur Debate in Germany, 2000/2001’, *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development*, 25 (2004), 481–96 (p. 481).

their identity.<sup>155</sup> Scorrana picks up the idea of ‘imagined national community’ from Anderson and outlines that people use these symbolic representations and combine them with their personal experiences to create national identity.<sup>156</sup> To Scorrana the central feature of national identity is shared history and it can be influenced by selective historical narratives (specific versions of the past).<sup>157</sup> Other scholars focus less on the reinforcement of national identity and explore its different characteristics, whether psychological, territorial, cultural or others.<sup>158</sup> Nevertheless the legitimacy of some of these national identity characteristics has been questioned. Denis Sidinic for example argues that a specific territory (e.g. city or state) is an attribute for citizenship but not for national identity. National identity is based on a shared feeling of belonging while citizenship itself existed long before the nation-state as a guarantee of rights.<sup>159</sup>

What has most frequently been considered as the main characteristic of national identity is its ethnic dimension. Indeed, contemplations about ethnicity and the ethno-nation as predecessor of the nation-state are in many ways a prerequisite for research about the nation and national identity. These contemplations synergise questions about the nature of the nation with questions about the properties of belonging to a nation, i.e. national identity and identification.<sup>160</sup> Debates about the ethno-nation can generally be divided into two opposing camps: civic and ethnic positions. The former chair a voluntaristic definition of the nation, created through collective political will. Ernest Renan can be considered one of the founding fathers of this position, as he argued as early as 1882 that the nation was a construction established through the will of the population.<sup>161</sup> Ethnic positions by contrast perceive the nation as a “non-

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<sup>155</sup> Armanda Scorrano, “Constructing national identity: national representations at the Museum of Sydney,” *Journal of Australian Studies* 36, no. 3 (2012): 345–362.

<sup>156</sup> *Idem.*, p. 346f.

<sup>157</sup> *Idem.*, p. 349.

<sup>158</sup> Benoit Bertrand, “Germans must shift their image of national identity,” *Financial Times Online* (London, April 9, 2004), 1 edition.

<sup>159</sup> Denis Sidinic, ‘Psychological Citizenship and National Identity’, *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology*, 21 (2011), 202–14, especially p. 206.

<sup>160</sup> For a recent (December 2014) and comprehensive article about nationalism, the nation and national identity see: Nenad Miscevic, ‘Nationalism’, in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. by Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2014 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2014) <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/nationalism/>> [accessed 22 March 2017].

Miscevic also provides an extensive bibliography on the subject. (For questions of accuracy note that Miscevic provides a wrong date for Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities*. It should be 1983 instead of 1965.)

<sup>161</sup> Ernest Renan, “‘What Is a Nation?’”, Text of a Conference Delivered at the Sorbonne on March 11, 1882’, in *Qu’est-Ce Qu’une Nation?* (Translated by Ethan Rundell), by Ernest Renan (Paris: Presses-Pocket, 1992).



voluntary community of common origin”<sup>162</sup>, based on an ethnical bond. A conception of national identity would in this sense precede any form of the nation-state as political entity. One of the fathers of this position was Johann Gottfried Herder who during the mid-18<sup>th</sup> century, thus before the German nation as political entity existed, described a form of German national spirit, based on common history, culture and language.<sup>163</sup>

Debates about the origins of the ethno-nation however exceed civic and ethnic dimensions and also relate to its authenticity, i.e. how long conceptions of the ethno-nation reach back in time.<sup>164</sup> Here it is once again possible to distinguish two differing strands: primordial (or perennial) views and modernist views. Primordialists argue that the ethno-nation has existed since pre-modern times, hence emphasizing the permanence of nations, while modernists perceive the nation as a modern creation (such as Hobsbawm, Gellner and Anderson above).<sup>165</sup> A milder yet very prominent primordial vision which is somewhat located between radical modernist and perennial views is advocated by Anthony Smith. Smith has developed the theory of Ethnosymbolism in which he perceives the origin of nations and national identity in a pre-modern and collective ethnic identity.<sup>166</sup> Ethnosymbolism further stresses the importance of symbols and culture in the creation of nations, nationalism and national identity.<sup>167</sup>

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<sup>162</sup> Nenad Miscevic, ‘Nationalism’, in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. by Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2014 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2014) <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/nationalism/>> [accessed 22 March 2017].

<sup>163</sup> Wulf Koepke, ‘Herder’s View on the Germans and Their Future Literature’, in *A Companion to the Works of Johann Gottfried Herder*, ed. by Hans Adler and Wulf Koepke, NED-New edition (Boydell and Brewer, 2009), pp. 215–32 (p. 221) <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7722/j.ctt14brn7>> [accessed 23 March 2017].

<sup>164</sup> Nenad Miscevic, ‘Nationalism’, in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. by Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2014 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2014) <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/nationalism/>> [accessed 22 March 2017].

<sup>165</sup> Idem. Modernists can be further distinguished between realists und anti-realists. Realists perceive the nation as modern and real formation (such as Hobsbawm and Gellner) while anti-realists perceive the nation as modern yet completely imagined formation (such as Anderson).

<sup>166</sup> Montserrat Guibernau, ‘Anthony D. Smith on Nations and National Identity: A Critical Assessment’, *Nations and Nationalism*, 10.1–2 (2004), 125–41 (p. 126). This mainly relates to: Anthony David Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin Books, 1991).

In the above article Guibernau argues (pp. 127ff) that Smith has later moved away from his definition of the nation and national identity, more specifically in Anthony David Smith, ‘When Is a Nation’, *Geopolitics*, 7.2 (2002), 5–32.

<sup>167</sup> For further literature on ethnosymbolism and the study of *ethnies* see: Anthony David Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin Books, 1991); Anthony David Smith, ‘When Is a Nation’, *Geopolitics*, 7.2 (2002), 5–32; Anthony David Smith, *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History* (Polity, 2010); Anthony David Smith, *Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach* (Routledge, 2009);

John Hutchinson has also significantly contributed to the theory of Ethnosymbolism, particularly in relation to cultural nationalism., see: John Hutchinson, *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism: The Gaelic Revival and the Creation of the Irish Nation State* (London, 1987); John Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict* (London; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE, 2005).

Debates about the ethno-nation and its origins consequently seem essential for considerations about the ethnic dimension of national identity. This is particularly the case for countries such as Germany and France where ideas of exceptionalism and ethnicity have historically been part of the national identity narratives.<sup>168</sup> This is especially related to the distinction between ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ nationalism, “the former being allegedly Western European and the latter more Central or Eastern European, originating in Germany [...]”<sup>169</sup>. In this sense, the civic dimension of national identity tends to be associated with France, the ethnic with Germany. Such distinctions are equally reflected in differing forms of citizenship, more precisely between birth right citizenship and ancestral citizenship, i.e. *jus solis* and *jus sanguinis*.<sup>170</sup> Nevertheless scholars have argued that irrespective of such differences the French and German conception of national identity are not that different after all. Raphaël Cahen and Thomas Landwehrlen for example argue that particularly the modernist interpretation of national identity allows the assessment that both conceptions are similar ideological products, intended to legitimise political action through establishing a ‘national-nature’ (“nature de la nation”).<sup>171</sup>

Even Colette Beaune, who presents the traditional juxtaposition of the civic and ethnic dimensions of national identity, perceives the “patrie” (fatherland) as a core feature of French national identity.<sup>172</sup> The fatherland-narrative in this sense does show some similarities to the German “Volk”-narrative. First contemplations about this narrative can be related back to Herder (see above) and his ideas about the national spirit of the German people (“Nationalgeist”). Even though the idea of “Volksgeist”

<sup>168</sup> For the ethnic dimension of German national identity see: Harold James, *A German identity: 1770-1990* (New York: Routledge, 1989); Brian E Vick, *Defining Germany: the 1848 Frankfurt parliamentarians and national identity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002); Thomas Banchoff, “German Identity and European Integration,” *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 3 (January 9, 1999): 259–289.

For an overview of works on the French national identity see: David Bell, “Recent Works on Early Modern French National Identity,” *The Journal of Modern History* 68, no. 1 (March 1, 1996): 84–113.

For a study on French nationhood see: Suzanne Citron, *Le mythe national: l’histoire de France revisitée* (Paris: Les Éd. de l’Atelier, 2008).

<sup>169</sup> Nenad Miscevic, ‘Nationalism’, in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. by Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2014 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2014) <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/nationalism/>> [accessed 22 March 2017].

<sup>170</sup> For a detailed study on the difference between the French and German citizenship, nationhood and nationalism see: William R Brubaker, *Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany*, 1990.

<sup>171</sup> Raphaël Cahen and Thomas Landwehrlen, ‘De Johann Gottfried Herder à Benedict Anderson : retour sur quelques conceptions savantes de la nation’, *Sens Public*, 2010, p. 13 <<http://www.sens-public.org/article794.html>> [accessed 22 March 2017].

<sup>172</sup> David Bell, “Recent Works on Early Modern French National Identity,” *The Journal of Modern History* 68, no. 1 (March 1, 1996): 84–113, here in particular p. 89; in referral to Colette Beaune, *The birth of an ideology: myths and symbols of nation in late-medieval France* (Berkeley, Calif. [u.a.]: Univ. of California Press, 1991), p. 90.

is predominantly associated with Herder, the term was actually coined by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.<sup>173</sup> Anne-Marie Le Gloannec describes the mythical element of “Volk” (populace) as historical constant for the creation of one German entity.<sup>174</sup> According to Le Gloannec the German national identity has two theoretical dimension, the “primordial” dimension (time-independent ethnic bond between people) and the “situational” one (reaction to other identities).<sup>175</sup> To Le Gloannec particularly the idea of “Sonderweg”, of a special German path in international affairs, is a cornerstone characteristic of the German national identity.<sup>176</sup> This notion of exceptionality is also elucidated by Daniel Unowsky who argues that the German identity implies an assumption of superiority and imperialism.<sup>177</sup> To Unowsky “Germanness” as ethnical bond is a classical narrative of the German culture and identity.<sup>178</sup> Harry Pross adds an emphasis on German individualism and Lutheran-tradition to this exceptionality-narrative.<sup>179</sup>

#### 2.4.2. National identity and the Americanization-debate

In the body of the literature on Americanization, anti-Americanism and pro-Americanism there exist some authors who have touched upon a relationship between national identity and Americanization. The most explicit reference to this relation can be found in Richard Kuisel's work *Seducing the French*.<sup>180</sup> Kuisel's account of the French confrontation with Americanization post-1945 includes a connection between the French America perception as well as the French self-perception. According to Kuisel, French pro and anti-Americanism was at one level “[...] a reflection about personal identity and the future [...]”<sup>181</sup>, the phenomena of pro- and anti-Americanism thus a relationship between French encounters with the

<sup>173</sup> Woodruff D. Smith, ‘Volksgeist - Bibliography’ <<http://science.jrank.org/pages/8147/Volksgeist.html>> [accessed 24 March 2017].

<sup>174</sup> Anne-Marie Le Gloannec, “On German Identity,” *Daedalus* 123, no. 1 (January 1, 1994): 129–148; here p. 129.

<sup>175</sup> Idem., p. 131.

<sup>176</sup> Idem., p. 144.

<sup>177</sup> Daniel Unowsky, “Comments: Contesting and constructing national identity in Central Europe,” *Nationalities Papers* 29, no. 3 (2001): 493–497 (p. 494).

<sup>178</sup> Ibid.

<sup>179</sup> Harry Pross, “On German identity,” *Media, Culture & Society* 13, no. 3 (July 1, 1991): 341–356 (pp. 344, 350).

<sup>180</sup> Richard F Kuisel, *Seducing the French the Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993) <<http://content.cdlib.org/xtf/view?docId=ft4w10060w&query=&brand=ucpress>> [accessed 18 May 2015].

<sup>181</sup> Idem., p. xi.

American reality and a sense of self-identity i.e. national identity.<sup>182</sup> The connection Kuisel draws for the French debate, Gesine Schwan similarly makes for the German post-WWII Americanization-discourse. She investigates anti-Americanism and anti-Communism post-1945 whilst also referring to pre-war intellectual traditions. Schwan argues that the conservative anti-Americanism of the interwar-period was functionally used (by the middle class to counter a loss of status through democratization) to preserve the German cultural and political peculiarities and identity.<sup>183</sup> In a lengthy treatise on the history of French anti-Americanism Philippe Roger makes a comparable deduction by arguing that French anti-Americanism was historically at least partly a defence of what it meant to be French, hence national identity.<sup>184</sup>

Whilst not explicitly connecting pro- or anti-Americanism to the concept of national identity, other authors have indeed touched upon the link between the America-perception and the national self-perception. Peter Berg for example argues that the German America-image of the interwar-period was complementing the German perception of its own national position and historical role. The America-perception incorporated certain hopes, images and fears- which were not necessarily objectively true as such- but were functionally used to argue in political and social discussions.<sup>185</sup> Gienow-Hecht, who surveys the development of anti-Americanism in Europe in the twentieth century, remarks for the 1920s that “[...] images of America served to cement national positions in the discourse on modernity”<sup>186</sup>. Once again a (positive or negative) perception of the USA seems to allow a reference to the national realities and (re-)positioning of the national self-perception i.e. through discussing American developments authors could formulate how the national future should look like or what it was supposed to look like in a trade off with conserving the national identity. On that note, Thomas Raithel argues that the German and French America-images of the interwar-period were connected to new developments in Europe, attributed to Americanization. These developments would challenge the

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<sup>182</sup> Idem., p. xii.

<sup>183</sup> Gesine Schwan, *Antikommunismus und Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland: Kontinuität und Wandel nach 1945* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999), p. 55.

<sup>184</sup> Roger, *The American Enemy*, pp. 219–253.

<sup>185</sup> Peter Berg, *Deutschland und Amerika, 1918-1929. Über das deutsche Amerikabild der zwanziger Jahre*. (Lübeck: Matthiesen, 1963), p. 8.

<sup>186</sup> Gienow-Hecht, ‘Always Blame the Americans: Anti-Americanism in Europe in the Twentieth Century’, p. 1075. referring to Philipp Gassert, *Amerika im Dritten Reich: Ideologie, Propaganda und Volksmeinung, 1933-1945* (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1997), p. 12f.

European identity and provoke admiration and rejection. Most importantly they would be seen as relevant and influential for the European future.<sup>187</sup>

A last publication which conceptually relates anti-Americanism to collective identities is *Anti-Americanism in world politics*<sup>188</sup> by Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane. In an effort to conceptualise anti-Americanism Katzenstein and Keohane differentiate its cognitive structure, its emotional component and its normative standpoint. In regard to the latter the authors argue that “assessments of the United States can serve as identity markers or as ways to regulate behaviour”<sup>189</sup>. This mainly relates to situations where collective identities can be fostered through the existence of a powerful “other”. In these circumstances “anti-Americanism can be a potent and useful stand-in for otherwise missing symbols of collective identity.”<sup>190</sup>

## 2.5. Conclusion

Surveying the existing literature on Americanization and national identity has shown that only few publications relate both concepts to one another. Whereas authors such as Schwan and Kuisel connect pro- and anti-Americanism to national identity on a superordinated level, the actual mechanisms of identity formation and their possible correlation with the Americanization-debate have been at most suggested. Studies which address this relation in its own right are currently non-existent. Investigating this relationship and its mechanisms will be the starting point for the study on hand.

The historiography on the concept of Americanization has shown that it is perceived as a combination of economic and cultural influences and their political implementation. In addition, authors stress, that next to the American influences themselves, their assimilation was important as well. What was actually perceived as Americanization thereby depended on the national context and lacked clear focus. Diverse criteria have been identified as being signs of Americanization (which could be related to anything modern) making it a very hybrid and subjective concept.

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<sup>187</sup> Raitzel, ‘Amerika’ als Herausforderung in Deutschland und Frankreich in den 1920er Jahren’, p. 84.

<sup>188</sup> Peter J Katzenstein and Robert O Keohane, *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007).

<sup>189</sup> Idem., p. 13.

<sup>190</sup> Ibid.

Particularly the subjective dimension of Americanization has thus far been overlooked in the literature. As we have seen whether a development is conceptually attributed to Americanization ultimately lies in the eye of the beholder. This research can expand the academic debate by explicitly acknowledging this subjective dimension and investigating authors and contexts through which Americanization was debated during the 1920s.

The subjective dimension is equally important when authors assess Americanization positive or negative. The existing literature on pro-Americanism during the interwar-period conceives it as an admiration of the American economy potency as well as an admiration of Fordism and Taylorism combined with a demand for their implementation. The literature thereby lacks a clear definition of pro-Americanism and only vaguely conceptualises it, insufficiently appreciating the subjective component. One has to bear in mind that pro-Americans as well as anti-Americans generally assessed the exact same developments, just from a different perspective. Valuing American influences positive or negative was a personal choice therefore the circumstances which affected these opposing perspectives need to be studied further. This is equally the case for pro-Americanism as it is for anti-Americanism.

In contrast to the limited number of publications on pro-Americanism the body of literature on anti-Americanism is much larger. As a consequence, anti-Americanism has been better researched, defined and conceptualised for the interwar-period than its counterpart. Publications generally define anti-Americanism as a combination of historical legacies, such as German revisionism after the First World War, and cultural factors which include anti-modernism and cultural condescension towards the USA. Despite these conceptualisations all-encompassing definitions for the interwar-period remain difficult and vague as anti-Americanism is often used as umbrella for various negative developments associated with the USA. Moreover, anti-Americanism can either be directed at the USA for what it is or for what it does, namely its international influences i.e. Americanization.<sup>191</sup> This adds to the difficulties in clearly defining anti-Americanism, particularly for different time periods and on a transnational level. The literature has consequently identified

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<sup>191</sup> This relates to: Mary Nolan, "Anti-Americanism and Americanization in Germany," *Politics & Society* 33, no. 1 (March 1, 2005): 88–122 (p. 88). Nolan here explicitly refers to Dan Diner's *Feinbild Amerika: Über die Beständigkeit eines Ressentiments*, p. 8.

different reasons for anti-American voices in France and in Germany, despite many transnational similarities. While vocal anti-American authors of the 1920s and their surrounding have been well researched the connection to pro-Americanism is less common, especially on a conceptual level. The research on hand can hence try and add some insights to the juxtaposition of anti- and pro-Americanism.

In order to investigate the relationship between the Americanization-debate and national identity it has been important to survey its historiography. Despite different approaches to define national identity one can overall conclude that national identity is a construction that underlines the shared belief of belonging to one community, distinct from other communities in its fundamental characteristics. These fundamental characteristics can be very diverse and range from ethical and cultural factors to geographical ones. Core features of any national identity include the differentiation between “us” and “them” and its fluid nature. The key is furthermore that national identity is always constructed and not given. Generating an identity is a psychological necessity, generating national identity however is not. National identity is not generic, it is specific. What is thus more important than the conceptual dimension of national identity is its construction. With national identity not being a necessity, there always exists different means and reason for its constitution. This is the main contribution this research can add to the debate. With an interconnection of national identity and the Americanization-discourse there exist new possibilities to conceptualise the discourse and explain its construction. As we have seen some researchers have already hinted at this connection, for the interwar-period it has however only been marginally explored. Researchers have argued, that anti-Americanism has been used to re-enforce national images and peculiarities in times of an identity-crisis. The main contributions of this research will thus be to further deepen this construction and explore the general relation between the Americanization-discourse and national identity.

The Americanization-debate strongly relates to how and if American influences can be assimilated in particular national contexts and realities. In this sense, the national self-conception and self-perception is a determinant in assessing American influences positively or negatively- which inevitably ties national identity to pro- and anti-Americanism. The underlying reasons for the Americanization-debate hence seem to be a combination of national self-perception and subjective convictions. In

order to fully investigate both dimension this research will use Constructivist theory and apply it to selected prominent authors of the 1920s. The historiography has shown that the Americanization-debate has thus far not been researched through the spectacles of a specific theory. Constructivism can be very suitable for the research on hand as it incorporates a conception of national identity and aims to explain the social construction of man-made concepts such as Americanization. The theory can aide in conceptualising the juxtaposition of pro- and anti-Americanism, thereby bridging a gap in the academic literature, and repositioning the Americanization-debate. The scientific relevance of this research therefore lies in the expansion of the academic debate it provides: mainly by intending a new multi-layered analysis of the correlation between pro- and anti-Americanism and national identity for France and Germany respectively. The research is thereby not only innovative in regard to its orientation in the field, but will also expand the debate by making use of methodological and theoretical concepts that have as such not yet been applied on this specific topic. The comparison between Germany and France as comparative inquiry develops the already existing research on transnational comparative studies and tries to expand the debate by fundamentally linking it to national identities on the basis of a Franco-German cross-case synthesis.<sup>192</sup>

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<sup>192</sup> In *Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten* (p.12), Egbert Klautke has called attention to the lack of transnational studies which compare the Americanization debates in different European countries. This research hence draws upon the existing research and tries to expand the debate by fundamentally linking it to national identities on the basis of a Franco-German cross-case synthesis.



### 3. Theory and Method

The research in the empirical section of this thesis (chapter 5 and 6) will be conducted from a constructivist perspective. Constructivism is a very diverse theory that has different meanings in different scientific disciplines, whether Psychology, Education, Sociology or International Relations. Constructivism as such is a meta-Theory, not specific to one discipline, but a theory about theory, based on an innovative triangle of ontology, epistemology and methodology.<sup>193</sup> In this regard it is important to stress that this research will use Constructivism as International Relations Theory. Any reference to Constructivism in the following sections refers to how the theory is understood in the field of International Relations.

#### 3.1. Constructivism

##### 3.1.1. Constructivist Theory

The theory of Constructivism emerged in the 1980s out of two separate developments which went hand in hand. Firstly, an inability of existing theories of International Relations to account for the rising importance of identities and interests in politics. Secondly, the development of new post-positivist approaches in epistemology and ontology which influenced the humanities across all disciplines. The theory of Constructivism is thus embedded in a larger philosophical and epistemological debate which has fundamentally influenced how the theory is constituted in International Relations.<sup>194</sup> In order to fully conceive the theory it is therefore necessary to first consider how Constructivism is connected to post-positivism.

Post-positivism refers to a pivotal shift in the sciences away from positivism

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<sup>193</sup> Cornelia Ulbert, 'Konstruktivistische Analysen der internationalen Politik: Von den Höhen der Theorie in die methodischen Niederungen der Empirie' (presented at the Tagung der Sektion Internationale Politik der DVPW, Mannheim, 2005), p. 1f. For other considerations about Constructivism as Meta-Theory also see: Stefano Guzzini, 'A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations', *European Journal of International Relations*, 6.2 (2000), 147–82.

<sup>194</sup> For a recent study on the history of Constructivism see: Emanuel Adler, 'Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions, and Debates', in *Handbook of International Relations* (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2013), 112–44.

For a general study on the history and historiography of International Relations see: Brian Schmidt, 'On the History and Historiography of International Relations', in *Handbook of International Relations* (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2002), 3–22.

which had stressed empiricism (the idea that observation and measurement were the basis for gathering knowledge) and deductive approaches (theories and hypothesis could be tested in a closed environment to be confirmed or rejected). Post-positivists are critical about the human ability to perceive and interpret reality with certainty and rather stress that every observation is inherently biased by the experiences and worldview of the observer. Rather than believing that objectivity resides in every scientist, only the mutual supervision and criticism of the scientific work could approach something close to objectivity. The debate between positivists and post-positivists in International Relations is referred to as “the third great debate” (also sometimes referred to as “the fourth great debate”). Constructivism, which claims that we construct and interpret the world based on personal or social construction, thus developed through post-positivist approaches to epistemology (driving question: how can we gather knowledge?) and ontology (driving question: what “is”?).<sup>195</sup>

Another important philosophical root of Constructivism dates further back than the “third debate” and begins with the linguistic turn. The linguistic turn reassessed the importance of language as a form of action that was being constitutive of the world. Particularly Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*<sup>196</sup> bridged the interpretational gap between subject and object through stressing the social nature of language and the inherent meaning it entails. His work was thus a point of departure for language philosophers, speech act theories and eventually also influenced Constructivism. When Nicholas Onuf introduced the term Constructivism in 1989 he indeed began his elaboration with Wittgenstein.<sup>197</sup> In this first formulation of a constructivist approach, Onuf perceives language as a central aspect for the creation of reality. Furthermore, Onuf bases his theory on “the idea that ‘people *and* (sic!) society construct, and constitute, each other’ ”<sup>198</sup>. This idea of a mutual constitution of structures and agents is based on Anthony Giddens' structuration theory and Alexander Wendt's *The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations*

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<sup>195</sup> ‘Positivism & Post-Positivism’ <<http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/positivism.php>> [accessed 28 September 2015].

<sup>196</sup> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975).

<sup>197</sup> K. M Fierke and Knud Erik Jørgensen, *Constructing International Relations: The next Generation* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), p. 4f, in relation to: Nicholas Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1989).

<sup>198</sup> Maja Zehfuss, ‘Constructivism in International Relations: Wendt, Onuf, Kratochwil’, in *Constructing International Relations: The next Generation* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), pp. 54–75 (p. 58f), in reference to Nicholas Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), p. 36.

*Theory*.<sup>199</sup> This interplay of structures and agents is connected by what Onuf considers as “rule”. Rule is the institutionalization of deeds through which individuals create their reality. Social rules “make the process by which people and society constitute each other continuous and reciprocal”<sup>200</sup>. One should note here that deeds consist of speaking words rather than physical activity, something that is developed in Onuf’s speech act theory.<sup>201</sup> Similar to Onuf, other Constructivists have stressed the importance of language in the creation of an intersubjective context. Friedrich Kratochwil for example focuses on the dimensions of everyday language and on the norms and rules that guide human behaviour. To Kratochwil particularly the intersubjective nature of human action (based on rules and interpretation) takes place in a normative framework.<sup>202</sup>

Despite the importance of language and post-positivism, Constructivism also developed out an increasing insufficiency of existing International Relations Theory to account for identities and interests. In 1987, two years before Onuf had coined the term Constructivism, Alexander Wendt introduced the Agent-Structure problem to IR scholarship.<sup>203</sup> His article *The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory* demonstrated two main ideas. Firstly, Wendt took up the structuration theory of Giddens, implying the mutual constitution of agents and structures. Secondly, Wendt argued that despite the structures being non-material and non-observable they were “real” and occupied a crucial role, they existed through agents practice. This demanded a departure from empiricism and therewith also from positivism. Wendt therefore significantly contributed to the “third debate”. The key concept of Wendt’s conception of Constructivism, connecting structures and agents, focused on identity. This approach is based on the belief that the ideas of the individual about his/herself and his/her surrounding are shaped by human interaction and simultaneously shape this interaction.<sup>204</sup> In addition to Wendt’s Structure-Agency investigation, his article *Anarchy Is What States Make of It*<sup>205</sup> from 1992 developed how people’s actions were

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<sup>199</sup> Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). & Alexander Wendt, ‘The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory’, *International Organization*, 41 (1987), 335–70.

<sup>200</sup> Nicholas Onuf, ‘Constructivism: A User’s Manual’, in *International Relations in a Constructed World* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 58–78 (p. 59).

<sup>201</sup> Zehfuss, ‘Constructivism in International Relations: Wendt, Onuf, Kratochwil’ p. 59.

<sup>202</sup> Idem., p. 65.

<sup>203</sup> Fierke and Jørgensen, *Constructing International Relations: The next Generation*, p. 5. in relation to: Wendt, ‘The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory’.

<sup>204</sup> Zehfuss, ‘Constructivism in International Relations: Wendt, Onuf, Kratochwil’, p. 55.

<sup>205</sup> Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, *International*

based on meaning and how meaning developed out of interaction. This led to his important argument that anarchy (a system without a hegemon), is contrary to the belief of Realists or Neo-Realists, no given in international relations, it is rather constructed through the states in the system. And this construction is strongly based on (collective) identities which provide the basis for the interests of the actors (e.g. the states).<sup>206</sup>

Because of diverse approaches and the different origins of Constructivism it has been difficult to locate or define the theory clearly. The common denominator relates to the construction of meaning and mainly consists of the idea that identities, interests and meaning as such are made by people and not objectively given by nature. These shared ideas and identities, rather than material forces, define the mutually constitutive construction of agents and structure. In an attempt to locate and define Constructivism scholars have accredited the theory a Middle Ground. Emanuel Adler for example placed Constructivism between individual and structural approaches on the one hand and materialism and idealism on the other.<sup>207</sup> Others have proposed to move beyond the concept of identity. They seek an analytical approach to identity with the goal of re-conceptualising it: how can one categorise the concept or how can one define self-understanding.<sup>208</sup> Again others have stressed the necessity of new methodological approaches to the concept of identity.<sup>209</sup> Alongside ideas to rethink the concept of identity there have been efforts to reboot Constructivism as a whole. These consist of more radical approaches to Constructivism, which most of the time are comprised of new approaches to epistemology. They move beyond the construction of meaning and challenge what can even be considered as real or reliable acquisition of knowledge. To them “reality” is but an experience and “there exists no world at all apart from the conceivable mind of the subject”.<sup>210</sup> Radical Constructivism does not want to depict any absolute reality, it is rather a model of knowing or acquiring knowledge through constructions of a more or less reliable

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*Organization*, 46 (1992), 391–425.

<sup>206</sup> Zehfuss, ‘Constructivism in International Relations: Wendt, Onuf, Kratochwil’, p. 57f; Alexander Wendt, ‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State.’, *American Political Science Review*, 88 (1994), 384–96.

<sup>207</sup> Emanuel Adler, ‘Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 3 (1997), 319–63 (p. 331).

<sup>208</sup> Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, ‘Beyond “Identity”’, *Theory and Society*, 29 (2000), 1–47.

<sup>209</sup> Lars-Erik Cederman and Christopher Daase, ‘Endogenizing Corporate Identities: The Next Step in Constructivist IR Theory’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 9 (2003), 5–35.

<sup>210</sup> Ernst von Glaserfeld, ‘An Introduction to Radical Constructivism’, in *The Invented Reality*, ed. by Paul Watzlawick (New York: Norton, 1984).

world - on the basis of subjective experience.<sup>211</sup> The simple approach that meaning is created and constructed through human interaction clearly opens up various conceptions of Constructivism. Despite the theory's diversity, we will hereinafter consider what scholars today generally seem to agree that Constructivism “is” and which features will be most important for this research.

Constructivism, as the word already suggests, relates to the social construction of meaning.<sup>212</sup> Ideas, perceptions and relations are bound by their intersubjective understanding. The social relations that people uphold, construct them into the actual way they are. The world is made what it is by doing what we do and by saying what we say.<sup>213</sup> Every epistemological contemplation in this sense is premised on constructed ideas, beliefs and identities.<sup>214</sup> Meaning is therefore always socially constructed, whether of things or thoughts.<sup>215</sup>

Constructivists start from the benchmark that the way one interprets a certain process actually produces one's social reality.<sup>216</sup> Material things or non-material developments have no meaning a priori, but attain a certain meaning through the importance and values we attribute to it. This specific interpretation does however not only relate to the individual as such, but also influences the subject through its intersubjective understanding.<sup>217</sup> Society in this sense shapes the ideas after which the institutions (a framework for individuals, not to confuse with “institutions” as in international institutions) are modelled. These institutions then reflect back upon the individual by shaping societal coexistence. People make society and society makes people.<sup>218</sup> In a constructivist world, the individual is thus not only influenced by the world, but can actively change it.<sup>219</sup> The Constructivist sees power as a constant, a dominant idea that reinforces or undermines meaning and constitutes identities and interests.<sup>220</sup> The constructivist conception of power in this regard draws upon the power-conception by Michel Foucault who views power as discursive and rested in

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<sup>211</sup> Ibid.

<sup>212</sup> Hurd, Ian, ‘Constructivism’, in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, ed. by Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, *The Oxford Handbooks of Political Science* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 298–316 (p. 300).

<sup>213</sup> Onuf, ‘Constructivism: A User’s Manual’, p. 59.

<sup>214</sup> Hurd, ‘Constructivism’, p. 301.

<sup>215</sup> Idem., p. 300.

<sup>216</sup> Klotz and Lynch, *Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations*, p. 3.

<sup>217</sup> Idem., p. 7.

<sup>218</sup> Onuf, ‘Constructivism: A User’s Manual’, p. 59.

<sup>219</sup> Klotz and Lynch, *Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations*, p. 3.

<sup>220</sup> Idem., p. 10f.

social relations.<sup>221</sup> The discursive power conception particularly relates to the interconnection of power and knowledge. To Foucault the discourse is ‘powerful’ in the sense that it creates knowledge and thereby shapes social reality.<sup>222</sup> His power-conception is however not confined to language and the discourse. Power is also manifested in non-discursive practices which Foucault refers to as *dispositif*. Thereby the subject itself lies at the heart of Foucault's contemplations and how it is created through social practices.<sup>223</sup> The main focus of the Constructivist is hence not the exertion of power as it would be for a Realist or Neo-Realist, but its causality: explaining individual and societal behaviour by understanding the conditions for action.<sup>224</sup> These conditions for action can however not be stated apodictically. Meaning varies over time; therefore, the conditions for action are subject to change as well. Thereby intersubjective understanding can only be presupposed in a specific historical context. In this sense, Constructivism is predestined for context specific analysis.<sup>225</sup> This does not mean that generalizations are impossible. On the contrary, they are necessary to understand the bigger picture. In general, however, the Constructivist favours contemplations within a social ontology.<sup>226</sup>

To the Constructivist the world is thus a construction of our making.<sup>227</sup> It exists through a constant interplay of individuals and society where meaning is

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- <sup>221</sup> Jonathan Gaventa, ‘Power after Lukes: An Overview of Theories of Power since Lukes and Their Application to Development’, Brighton: Participation Group, Institute of Development Studies, 2003 <[http://www.powercube.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/power\\_after\\_lukes.pdf](http://www.powercube.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/power_after_lukes.pdf)> [accessed 21 March 2017], p. 3f; For the constructivist conception of power see: *Power in Global Governance*, ed. by Michael N Barnett and Raymond Duvall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Stefano Guzzini, ‘The Concept of Power: A Constructivist Analysis’, *Millennium*, 33.3 (2005), 495–521. Guzzini here perceives the constructivist idea of power as a combination of Foucault's and Luke's power-conception. For literature on the power-conception of Luke see: ‘Power after Lukes: An Overview of Theories of Power since Lukes and Their Application to Development’, Brighton: Participation Group, Institute of Development Studies, 2003 <[http://www.powercube.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/power\\_after\\_lukes.pdf](http://www.powercube.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/power_after_lukes.pdf)> [accessed 21 March 2017] For literature on the power-conception of Foucault, see: Sergiu Bălan, ‘M. Foucault's View in Power Relations’, *Cogito*, 2.2 (2010); Clemens Kammler and others, *Foucault-Handbuch: Leben - Werk - Wirkung* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2014), p. 273ff; Michael Ruoff, *Foucault-Lexikon: Entwicklung, Kernbegriffe, Zusammenhänge* (Paderborn: Fink, 2013), pp. 146ff; *Spurensuche: Konstruktivistische Theorien Der Politik.*, ed. by Renate Martensen (Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien, 2014), pp. 55ff. For further literature on the constructivist conception of power also see: Emanuel Adler, ‘Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions, and Debates’, in *Handbook of International Relations* (London: Sage Publications, 2013), 112–44 (p. 125)
- <sup>222</sup> Andrea Seier, ‘Kategorien Der Entzifferung: Macht Und Diskurs Als Analyseraster’, in *Das Wuchern Der Diskurse. Perspektiven Der Diskursanalyse Foucaults*, ed. by Hannelore Bublitz and others (Frankfurt/ New York: Campus, 1999), 75–86 (p. 76f.).
- <sup>223</sup> Isabell Lorey, ‘Macht Und Diskurs Bei Foucault’, in *Das Wuchern Der Diskurse. Perspektiven Der Diskursanalyse Foucaults*, ed. by Hannelore Bublitz and others (Frankfurt/ New York: Campus, 1999), 87–96 (p. 94f)
- <sup>224</sup> Klotz and Lynch, *Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations*, p. 15.
- <sup>225</sup> *Idem.*, p. 10.
- <sup>226</sup> *Idem.*, p. 20f.
- <sup>227</sup> Onuf, ‘Constructivism: A User's Manual’, p. 59; and in relation to: Onuf, *World of Our Making*.

continuously mutually challenged and replicated.<sup>228</sup> What links individuals and society are social rules, not restricted to legal rules. These rules tell people what they should do and they match their conduct to this standard. If they do not comply with the social rules they can expect consequences. The ways in which people deal with rules – be it follow or reject them- is called practices. Rules determine who the active participants in a given society are and these active participants are what the Constructivist calls **agents**.<sup>229</sup> Whenever agents reproduce practices and rules, stable patterns emerge and these stable patterns form institutions. A stable pattern of rules and institutions (and unintended consequences) give a society what the Constructivist calls **structure**.<sup>230</sup> Structures and agents are therefore the main units of analysis in a constructivist world.<sup>231</sup> The main objective for the Constructivist is to understand the underlying causality of structures and agents. The causality between the two is not independent but it is rather part of a larger framework, with identities and interests connecting structures and agents. Particularly the role of identities for the agent-structure causality and its role in the constructivist methodology will be contemplated at a later point in this chapter. First, it will be important to explore the relationship between the four key constructivist concepts: structure, agency, identity, and interests.<sup>232</sup>

When considering **agency** one would normally consider agents as people or individuals. People can however act as agents for other people through rules. One could for example consider a politician representing interests for many people as an agent of their voices. People and agents are in this sense not completely interchangeable, whereas the first is a premise for the second. Agents are always people, but people not always agents. Rules give agents choices and only human beings can make choices. These choices are always made on the basis of social constructions. In a given society agents always act rationally in order to achieve goals. Rules and interests tell agents which goals to pursue. Pursuing these goals is what the Constructivist considers rational conduct, even though the conduct might seem irrational from an outside perspective at times. Based on the information available to the agent and with regard to the interests and goals the agent pursues, the

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<sup>228</sup> Klotz and Lynch, *Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations*, p. 7.

<sup>229</sup> Onuf, 'Constructivism: A User's Manual', p. 59.

<sup>230</sup> Idem., p. 61.

<sup>231</sup> Klotz and Lynch, *Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations*, p. 3.

<sup>232</sup> Idem, p. 22.

agent always makes choices rationally. The combination of agent's practices and existing rules, form a stable pattern through reproduction. This stable pattern of practices and rules are called institutions. Institutions thereafter transform people into agents, but simultaneously constitute the environment within which agents perform rational conduct.<sup>233</sup>

When agents act within institutional frameworks they change its features and themselves in the process. Moreover, they might trigger consequences which were unintended and independent of their interests. One example might be how in a given (perfect) market buyers and sellers have no individual influence on the price of a good, they must accept it as fixed. A stable pattern of institutions, rules and unintended consequences create the constructivist concept of **structure**. In basic terms, structure could be broken down to “almost all types of social order”<sup>234</sup>: what people do collectively and how this limits (or aids) individual or agential choice. The reproduction and duplication of behavioural patterns creates social assumptions, thus meaning and stable meaning creates structure.<sup>235</sup> Agents will act based upon these assumptions or patterns, structure therefore gains a causal and normative force.<sup>236</sup> Whether structure can be called “real” in an absolute sense is subject to debate. It is unclear whether they exist in reality or only in the mind. The most important ontological distinction one can make is that “structure is what observes see, whereas institutions are what agents act within”<sup>237</sup>. Whenever agents are affected by phenomena they cannot see, they might change their behaviour in the institutional context. The structure as socially constructed ontology therefore certainly becomes “real” in a specific institutional context. It is only in these contexts, that structure has its normative force and it is here where structure is institutionalised. Structure can in this sense be anything that provides a stable pattern of meaning and is in a causal connection with agency, from a government to an abstract concept.

In the constructivist world, the interaction of agents is at heart influenced by two distinct prepositions: “who we are” and “what we want”.<sup>238</sup> The first relates to the agents' identities, the second to its interests. Whenever agents act in a given society

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<sup>233</sup> Onuf, ‘Constructivism: A User’s Manual’, p. 60f.

<sup>234</sup> Klotz and Lynch, *Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations*, p. 25.

<sup>235</sup> Idem., p. 24.

<sup>236</sup> Idem., p. 25.

<sup>237</sup> Onuf, ‘Constructivism: A User’s Manual’, p. 62.

<sup>238</sup> Klotz and Lynch, *Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations*, p. 87.



the recognizable patterns constitute their **interests**. In order to act upon these interests, agents are not required to be aware of them. If they always were, they might act differently. To the outside observer, the interests are however recognizable. Whilst actors needn't always be conscious about their interests, they don't even have to be self-aware at all, to act as an agent. This level of self-consciousness is commonly associated with **identity**. Most of the time agents are “aware enough of their identities [...] to have an interest in fostering them”<sup>239</sup>. To the Constructivist, identities are a social relationship that represent agential self-perception in relation to others.<sup>240</sup> Mostly, identities are created through comparison, a “self” is constructed though the existence of an “other”. Furthermore, identities vary over time and space, despite providing a fairly stable representation structure on the basis of which agents formulate their interests.<sup>241</sup> Interests and identities both inherit an intersubjective dimension as they are created and formulated through the mutual constitution of agents and structures. Interests are here the product of an agency-structure dichotomy that leads agents to pursue their goals rationally in an institutional environment to foster their identities, whilst being constituted by them at the same time.

Similar to the role of identities as an abstract concept, the properties of national identity are also constituted through structure and agency. After all they are just one form of collective identity. The constructivist approach to national identities premises on the assumption that identity is constructed intrinsically as an actor property, as much as it is determined by the social structure. The social structure in this sense shapes both the behaviour and the identity of the agents. Agents in return play an active role in the fabrication of their own national identities.<sup>242</sup> Similar to what has been developed above, the core distinction for group identities exists between “self” and “other”. This in-/out-group phenomenon shows some distinct features with regard to (national) identities. Psychologists have shown that two groups given competing goals will form negative attitudes about each other and positive attitudes about themselves, even in the total absence of information about the other. Objective conflict would intensify these feelings whereas superordinated goals would reduce them. Later research showed that objective conflict was not even necessary to

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<sup>239</sup> Onuf, ‘Constructivism: A User’s Manual’, p. 64.

<sup>240</sup> Klotz and Lynch, *Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations*, p. 76ff.

<sup>241</sup> Idem., p. 65.

<sup>242</sup> Paul Kowert, ‘Agent versus Structure in the Construction of National Identity’, in *International Relations in a Constructed World* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 101–22 (p. 102f).

produce distinct identities which led to the “minimal group paradigm” (MGP).<sup>243</sup> It is not necessary to do more than divide people into different groups for distinct identities to form. The MGP shows that group identities will inevitably emerge in social interaction. People continuously face the problem of locating themselves and others in the institutionalised society. The result is that people tend to exaggerate their perception of others to make categorization easier. Thereafter differences between members of different groups are exaggerated as well. This tendency of intergroup distinction goes hand in hand with intragroup homogeneity. Members of one group perceive themselves as more alike than they actually are. This differentiation extends to an attributional bias: the behaviour of other groups is explained by attitudes of the group members rather than external factors. This cognitive bias does not extend to the in-group, as there is more information available and the behaviour can be explained through situational constraints and negotiations.

The considerations about the MGP and collective identities leads to three final lessons. First, “whenever distinctive categories for political groups are salient, group members will perceive strengthened group identities (ordinarily evaluated positive for in-groups and negative for out-groups.) Conflict will strengthen these identities and encourage exaggeration of group attributes.”<sup>244</sup> Secondly, people will always tend to exaggerate differences with other groups and underestimate differences within the own group. Thirdly, people will tend to attribute the behaviour of the out-groups to their intent whilst in-group behaviour will be attributed to environmental constraints. Perceived increase in the power of the out-group will strengthen this tendency.<sup>245</sup>

When one places Constructivism in a larger philosophical context, it is helpful to elaborate how the theory is positioned ontologically. All theories can be understood as having empirical aspects on the one hand and normative aspects on the other.<sup>246</sup> Empirical aspects depict the way the theory describes and explains reality.<sup>247</sup> Normative aspects represent to which ideal the theory aspires, how things ought to be, how one should act.<sup>248</sup> Empirical aspects include whether a theory emphasizes

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<sup>243</sup> Idem., p. 106.

<sup>244</sup> Idem., p. 108.

<sup>245</sup> Idem., p. 108f.

<sup>246</sup> Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, ‘Between Utopia and Reality: The Practical Discourses of International Relations’, in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, by Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, The Oxford Handbooks of Political Science (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 3–39 (p. 20).

<sup>247</sup> Idem., p. 20.

<sup>248</sup> Ibid.

structure or agency, is based on a material or ideational approach and what the theory's conception of power is.<sup>249</sup> As already discussed Constructivism stresses the mutual constitution of structure and agency and is thereafter a structurationist theory (as introduced by Giddens, see above). Furthermore, Constructivism is an ideational theory.<sup>250</sup> Material forces are not completely neglected, but their importance and meaning are socially constructed and the causal conditions for this meaning are more important to the Constructivist than the material force itself. The constructivist conception of power is structural, which derives from the features of agency.<sup>251</sup> Agency is in the constructivist world always limited. All agents act within institutions and on the basis of rules and rules limit the range of acts agents can take. Agents are hence never fully autonomous because they are limited by the very rules that allow them to act in the first place. Power must therefore be a structural entity as it restrains agential independence.<sup>252</sup>

The normative aspects of theory differentiate between its value commitment and its orientation towards change.<sup>253</sup> The value commitment of Constructivism on the one hand rests on individual positive freedom and international cooperation on the other.<sup>254</sup> This shows that the foundation of Constructivism is individual and collective and simultaneously highlights the structurationist base of the theory. The constructivist orientation towards change is optimistic.<sup>255</sup> Any kind of change reflects a natural process within a society where values and meaning shift across time. These processes are perceived optimistically as they reinforce the constructivist paradigm that meaning as social construction is inherently subject to change.

### **3.1.2. Constructivist Methodology**

Constructivism offers a unique and diverse methodology regarding its key elements. Whether one focuses on structure, agency, interests, or identity, the Constructivist has different tools to investigate their construction and significance. The following

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<sup>249</sup> Idem., p. 21.

<sup>250</sup> Idem., p. 23.

<sup>251</sup> Ibid.

<sup>252</sup> Onuf, 'Constructivism: A User's Manual', p. 64f.

<sup>253</sup> Reus-Smit and Snidal, 'Between Utopia and Reality: The Practical Discourses of International Relations', p. 21.

<sup>254</sup> Idem., p. 23.

<sup>255</sup> Ibid.

section will elucidate the constructivist methodology to analyse the constitution of identities. Foci hereby lie on how identities are constitutive for the agency-structure debate, how they can be researched methodologically and how national identities are constructed through agency and structure.<sup>256</sup> In addition, this section will operationalise the theory by formulating how the specific methodology will be used to analyse the source material. This methodological toolkit will provide the basis for the empirical analysis of the sources in chapters five and six.

The methodological starting point for the concept of identities is that they vary over time and space and are hence in constant possibility of change.<sup>257</sup> The individual has the natural urge to secure his/her identity. The perceived threat of identity-change per se creates insecurity.<sup>258</sup> This is the key idea to understand the role and importance of identities for the individual. The nature of identities, their inherent possibility for change or fluidity, creates insecurities for the individual that he/she tries to compensate.<sup>259</sup> Due to the fact that identities act as link between structure and agency, identities can work both ways. Structure on the one hand can constitute the identity of agents, agents in turn can however also constitute the identity of structures. The constitutive dualism of those options will be elucidated in the following.

When one considers the case that structure constitutes the identity of agency, it is important to link this back to their definition in the theoretical part. Structure is more than the institutional grid for the agents, but all forms of social order. This can encompass social movements, concepts or generally accepted assumptions. Agency relates to individual acting in society on the basis of rules to pursue his/her intentions rationally. In summary, it can be assessed as a discussion about structure, as

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<sup>256</sup> This section is mostly based on Klotz and Lynch, *Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations*, especially pp. 65-85 on identities. It is the most comprehensive piece of literature I have found as empirical constructivist identity-methodology and therefore the foundation for elaborating the constructivist methodology in this section.

For a more general assessment and elaboration of constructivist methodology see: Cornelia Ulbert, 'Konstruktivistische Analysen der Internationalen Politik: Von den Höhen der Theorie in die methodischen Niederungen der Empirie' (presented at the Tagung der Sektion Internationale Politik der DVPW, Mannheim, 2005), pp. 13ff.

Further literature on constructivist methodology can be found in Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'TAKING STOCK: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 4.1 (2001), 391–416; Jonathon W Moses and Torbjørn L Knutsen, *Ways of Knowing: Competing Methodologies in Social and Political Research* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), particularly chapter 8 on Constructivism.

For the role of constructivist methodology inside the general IR-methodology see: Christopher K Lamont, *Research Methods in International Relations* (London: Sage Publications Ltd., 2015).

<sup>257</sup> Klotz and Lynch, *Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations.*, p. 65.

<sup>258</sup> Idem., p. 66.

<sup>259</sup> Ibid.

representation of socialization constraining the individual, and agency, portraying the subject's (limited) scope for autonomy. Identity figures as link between the two. Dominant representation structures impose identities on the individual which opens up two possibilities: either the individual incorporates the offered identity and makes it part of his/her own, thus constitutes himself/herself in and through the structure, or the individual opposes the new identity and sees his/her position as subject potentially endangered.<sup>260</sup> A logical conclusion would therefore be the defence of the personal identity against the new identification structure. What makes this even more difficult is the notion that identities as such can overlap.<sup>261</sup> In this sense the individual might incorporate certain traits of the new identity but oppose the concept as such. The on-going ontological question in social sciences is whether the individual has a choice regarding this identity-imposition or not, if he/she can really choose to incorporate certain aspects of the offered identity or if this is forced upon him/her. Arguing from a structural perspective, the individual does not have this autonomy no matter how it might seem from the outside.<sup>262</sup> The identification structure is always imposed. There is the possibility of identities being hierarchical or influencing each other, but as such they are always inflicted by the dominant representation. Identities can thus overlap, influence each other and maybe even mutually constitute each other (for example when one identity evolves from demarcation of another one).<sup>263</sup> Agency as such is however according to structuralists only perceived as being autonomous and in reality dictated by the structure. The core methodological challenge for the researcher is to deconstruct those identities and trace the processes that lead to identity-formation. From this starting point, it is then possible to investigate the special relationship between structure and agency. A key methodological tool is the analysis of dominant narratives to discover the identities and how people perceive and think about them.<sup>264</sup> This will in the long-term lead to the understanding of how structures as identification grids constitute agency.

When one now considers the other case, agency constituting structure, it might be useful to once again reflect upon the nature of agency. Agency as mediator between the individual and the collective structure elucidates the possibility of

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<sup>260</sup> Idem., p. 69.

<sup>261</sup> Idem., p. 72.

<sup>262</sup> Idem., p. 67.

<sup>263</sup> Idem., p. 74.

<sup>264</sup> Ibid.

individuals to construct and influence the world they are living in, including the dominant structures themselves. Individualists stress that no structure exists a priori. Every structure receives its constituting identity from the individuals that attribute it this certain meaning. So how does the individual construct identities which in the long term become structures? The starting point is that the human being is a group-animal. It perceives itself as belonging to a certain group or not.<sup>265</sup> Inherently there is thus a comparison-process between the group it belongs to, the in-group, and the others, the out-group.<sup>266</sup> The individual wants to belong to a certain group that he/she values positively and that others value positively.<sup>267</sup> Furthermore, valuing certain characteristics more than others and comparing them with one another creates hierarchies.<sup>268</sup> When many individuals identify themselves with the same hierarchical structure, i.e. perceive some characteristics more important than others, structures emerge.<sup>269</sup> Automatically the collective identification with certain hierarchical values creates a form of social order. In this sense agency, even though only partly autonomous as such, constitutes structure through its special relation with identities. What one has to bear in mind is that identities, just like all other forms of meaning, are to the Constructivist a social construction.<sup>270</sup> It is therefore crucial to understand why individuals are drawn to and attain certain identities, create identities and how those identities influence their self-understanding. In this sense the social context of the individual is very important for the investigation of the constitution of the subject.<sup>271</sup>

The contemplations on constructivist methodology, especially with regard to the concept of identities, will be empirically applied in chapters 5 and 6. On an operational level it will first be necessary to assess if the authors can be considered as agents in a constructivist sense. Secondly one must determine what can be considered as structure in the literature and if structures are constructed by the authors. As we have seen agents will act based upon their assumptions about the structures. Therefore, structures in the sources are causal powers which influence and alter actors' behaviour. These structures could be anything from physical institutions to

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<sup>265</sup> Idem., p. 75.

<sup>266</sup> Idem., p. 74f.

<sup>267</sup> Idem., p. 78.

<sup>268</sup> Idem., p. 74.

<sup>269</sup> Idem., p. 75.

<sup>270</sup> Idem., p. 83.

<sup>271</sup> Ibid.

concepts such as Americanization towards which agents attribute meaning. It will hence be imperative to investigate the meaning (whether positive or negative) the agents attach to the structures and how this changes their actions. In the selected sources, we will particularly be looking at passages where the authors differentiate between groups they consider themselves as part of, the in-group, and others, the out-group. Moreover, we will look at passages where the authors value these groups positively or negatively. As we have seen with the minimal group paradigm, being part of different groups automatically leads to distinct identities. We will therefore especially look at passages where perceptions of differences and of others are exaggerated in order to strengthen group identities. In the case of this study these group identities will generally be national identities. The research will therefore try to highlight how and why the authors construct and perceive certain identities, if identities overlap, are endangered or have to be defended. Here particularly the nature of collective identities and the minimal group paradigm will be important. This relates to the importance of national identities for the constitution and autonomy of the actors. We will consequently aim to find narratives about national identity in the sources and investigate passages where authors try and strengthen group identities i.e. national identities. This could for example be the case when authors highlight the superiority of their group identity. Finally, also the idea of structures imposing identities on individuals and their reaction to this influence will be investigated. The main focus will be therefore on retracing the processes that constitute the conditions for action, identifying and investigating individual and group identities and relating this back to the dualism of structure and agency.

### **3.2. Research Methodology**

In order to decide upon an adequate research method for this thesis, the main precondition is the subject itself. Different subjects require and favour different methods, be it quantitative or qualitative. This research, investigating the Franco-German Americanization-discourse in the interwar-period, favours a qualitative approach. The investigation of concepts, which are per definition abstract, require an interpretative or hermeneutical framework. Concepts as such do not exist in “the real

world”, they are social constructions which only become real through contextuality and intersubjectivity. Without these, abstract concepts would be stripped of their paramount significance. The research topic combined with the constructivist approach will be using qualitative methodology. This does not per se exclude quantitative methods, but I would consider them of at best marginal importance for this research and theoretical concepts in general. The choice of qualitative method for this research is based on the topic of this study. The investigation of the Americanization-discourse will geographically be limited to Germany and France. Pro and anti-Americanism will hence be elucidated in the German context on the one hand, and the French context on the other. This research will thus in essence be comprised of two case studies with subsequent comparison in order to understand the supranational meaning of anti- and pro-Americanism. Consequently, the methodology guiding this research will consist of the case study method on the one hand and comparative historical research on the other.

### 3.2.1. Case Study

Case Study Research has traditionally been seen as method only applied in a preliminary phase of research. Today, these limitations have however been lifted and case studies have become one of the most widespread approaches: they constitute a methodology in itself.<sup>272</sup> Case study research allows the inquiry of entities, hypothesis or concepts which are closed in themselves and are of different or no significance in other social or historical settings. Case studies thus ask *how?* and *why?* questions about a contemporary or historical set of events where the researcher has little control over the variables.<sup>273</sup> The research design of case studies is of a positivist, deductive nature.<sup>274</sup> As already discussed, positivists stress the empirical dimension of knowledge accumulation.<sup>275</sup> No knowledge exists a priori, all knowledge arises from observations of the human surrounding. In this sense, the

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<sup>272</sup> Jennifer Rowley, ‘Using Case Studies in Research’, *Management Research News*, 25 (2002), 16–27 (p. 16).

<sup>273</sup> *Idem.*, p. 17.

<sup>274</sup> *Idem.*, p. 18.

<sup>275</sup> ‘Positivism & Post-Positivism’.



human beings' capacity for observation is the main medium but also main constraint for all knowledge-gathering. As the empiricist, John Locke has put it: "Nihil est in intellectu quod non (prius) fuerit in sensibus"<sup>276</sup> - we can only know what we observe. The deductive dimension of case studies relates to the question whether concepts or theories are used to make observations or whether concepts and theories derive from empirical observations. Deductive methods define hypothesis, questions and concepts prior to the actual data collection and use this method as a metaphorical pair of glasses to make observations.<sup>277</sup> This approach contrasts with inductive methods where propositions, questions, ideas or even theories emerge from the data-analysis itself.<sup>278</sup> Case studies are hence used to make observations in a closed social and historical setting with questions, hypothesis and variables which have been defined beforehand.

Case studies can be differentiated on two layers. First, there exists a differentiation between a single case study and multiple case studies.<sup>279</sup> Multiple cases represent multiple experiments and test propositions in different settings. This makes it easier to make larger comparisons and generalizations due to the replication logic. Single case research places one specific case at the heart of the research and is hence comparable to one single experiment.<sup>280</sup> Multiple case studies have gained popularity over the past years as they provide a bigger overview and are hence more robust to criticism.<sup>281</sup> The multiple case design allows a comparative approach where similarities and reoccurring developments in the cases might be found or where differences can be documented. In this sense multiple-case designs have a more universal eligibility. Single as well as multiple case designs can be further distinguished in holistic and embedded approaches.<sup>282</sup> Holistic studies regard the case as one unit of analysis and take a bird-eye perspective on the case. The holistic approach is preferable when no logical subunits exist or when the theory that underlies the research is itself of holistic nature. Embedded studies on the other hand

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<sup>276</sup> This phrase designates the main principle of Empiricism and Sensualism. The phrase was first introduced by Thomas Aquinas in his *De veritate*, q. 2 a. 3 arg. 19. The principle has a long intellectual tradition and was prior to Aquinas already contemplated by Cicero and goes back to the Greek philosophy, especially Aristotle. Particularly the Epistemology by John Locke in his work *An Essay concerning Human Understanding* has merged the phrase with explaining the origins of human understanding and observation principles.

<sup>277</sup> 'Deduction & Induction' <<http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/dedind.php>> [accessed 28 September 2015].

<sup>278</sup> 'Deduction & Induction'.

<sup>279</sup> Rowley, 'Using Case Studies in Research', p. 21.

<sup>280</sup> Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, p. 46.

<sup>281</sup> Idem., p. 53.

<sup>282</sup> Rowley, 'Using Case Studies in Research', p. 22.

incorporate multiple units (or sub-units) in the case study design. They explore different dimensions and then later combine them to one overall picture. Whereas holistic approaches risk being too shallow, embedded approaches may find it challenging to connect the different units to a bigger picture, an overarching generalization.<sup>283</sup>

This research, being split into the German and French Americanization-discourse will naturally use a multiple case design. Not only does the existence of four cases imply a multiple case design, the approach will also allow a cross-case synthesis. In this sense using two cases per concept adds stability to the research. It will be possible to cross-analyse the cases and compare how the pro- or anti-American argumentation overlaps or differs in both countries. Furthermore, this research will use a holistic approach due to multiple reasons: the cases under investigation, Germany and France are as super ordinated structures not logically dividable into subunits. This means that the different forms of pro-/anti-Americanism might have different origins, be it financial or cultural, there is however no clear distinction between them. Naturally it is impossible to investigate the entire pro- or anti-Americanism in Germany or France. The abundance of starting points makes it hence too difficult to decide upon specific units of analysis. Therefore, this research will choose a unit of analysis that provides multiple perspectives: literature. We will use one author and his written oeuvre as source for each case. Methodologically the research design therefore falls into the small-n category.<sup>284</sup> Small-n studies run the risk of a selection bias, i.e. a selection of cases which fit the researcher's hypothesis. In addition, the limited sample size challenges the possibility for generalizations. By contrast, small sample sizes allow a more intensive examination of the actual cases than large-n research designs. For the study on hand it appears legitimate to use a small-n design, not only because this allows the in-depth analysis of the four authors and their works, but also because the different works are representative of the prevailing argumentation of the respective pro- and anti-American circles (see chapter 1.5. on source selection). Therefore, despite the limited sample size the works of Hirsch, Romier, Halfeld and Duhamel should represent the general argumentation of the respective timeframe.<sup>285</sup> In this sense the research will touch upon different

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<sup>283</sup> Ibid.

<sup>284</sup> The "n" here refers to number of subjects, the study's sample size.

<sup>285</sup> For further literature on the advantages and disadvantages of small-n research designs see: Jack S. Levy, 'Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference', *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 25.1 (2008), 1–18

units of analysis, on a lower level, subordinated under one holistic multiple-case study research design.

Furthermore, the underlying theory of the research, Constructivism, is itself not easily dividable into subcategories. The methodology as chosen and discussed at the beginning of this chapter is advantageous in micro-studies. This entails that the use of constructivist methodology on one specific source, in this case the single unit of analysis, is favourable over applying Constructivism on large societal developments or multiple units of analysis. The structure-agency-identity approach is useful for narrative analysis and specific conclusions which can then be applied for a cross-case synthesis. It would not be feasible to use the same methodological toolkit on various units of analysis (for example economic, cultural, political, or gender specific, pro- or anti-Americanism) as they require individual approaches.

The research design of this study will follow the guidelines of Robert Yin's *Case Study Research*<sup>286</sup> who identifies five main components: first, defining of a research question and second, determining a proposition.<sup>287</sup> This proposition is a speculation about the outcome of the research and figures as expected finding. The third component is the determination of the study's unit of analysis, the case selection.<sup>288</sup> This selection is to be linked to the research question, the expected findings, and the theoretical framework of the analysis. The fourth component consists of linking the research data to the proposition, thus the actual inquiry itself.<sup>289</sup> There exist multiple forms of data collection or gathering of evidence, each likely to yield different results. Generally, case studies should however draw on multiple sources.<sup>290</sup>

Once the analysis has been carried out the fifth and last component of case study research design is reviewing the findings and interpreting them. Consequently, the study should be assessed according to three principles: generalization, validity and reliability.<sup>291</sup> Overall generalizations should only be performed through similar

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<<https://doi.org/10.1080/07388940701860318>>, especially p 8f, and footnote 22 for further references.

<sup>286</sup> Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*.

<sup>287</sup> Rowley, 'Using Case Studies in Research', p. 19.

<sup>288</sup> Ibid.

<sup>289</sup> Ibid.

<sup>290</sup> Idem., pp. 17, 21, 24. : In order to analyse the case study evidence the most important question is whether the findings can be linked to the propositions. The following principles should help evaluating the coherence and quality of the research: First the study should make use of all the relevant evidence. Second, it should consider rival interpretations and possible critiques to the own approach. Third, it should tackle the most significant part of the case study and its research focus. Lastly, any analysis should always draw and relate to the prior research in the respective field. When these principles are contemplated and followed, the case study research should be of solid argumentation and accurate findings.

<sup>291</sup> Idem., p. 20.

findings in multiple cases. Case study findings replication is therefore the basis for analytic generalizations. Case study validity and reliability relates to the epistemological quality of empirical social research. The evaluation of the research rests on four pillars: construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability. Construct validity refers to establishing the correct objective measures for the concepts and topics under investigation, its coherent structure. Here one's focus is on minimising subjective biases by a well-executed connection of data and research parameters (including research question and propositions). Internal validity refers to the internal coherence of the research project, hence its stringent causality. External validity can be understood as a comprised logic that allows generalizations. The inquiry should exhibit particular consistent areas that allow the generalization of the findings. Reliability is established when the structure, execution and implementations of the analysis can be reproduced. This not only refers to its repeatability but also to the documentation of the research.

Despite general consensus on the key definitions and structures of case studies, different approaches and definitions can be found in the literature.<sup>292</sup> Some researchers for example propose six steps, rather than five, to conduct case study research.<sup>293</sup> Others, such as R.E. Stake, differentiate between different types of case studies depending on the purpose of the research.<sup>294</sup> The research purpose is also at heart of Donna M. Zucker's conception of case study research. For Zucker method and analysis are intertwined with each other, any methodological approach therefore depends on the research purpose.<sup>295</sup> In this context Zucker argues that even though case studies are most frequently used prospectively (on contemporary events) there is utility in applying the method retrospectively in historical research.<sup>296</sup> Zucker further reappraises the constructivist paradigm for case study research designs. There consequently exists precedent for using case studies in historical contexts and for applying Constructivism.

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<sup>292</sup> The case study method as positivistic epistemology has sparked some debate and criticism. According to Jennifer Rowley, three main debates about case studies can be identified: their ability for generalization, the role of theory and the authenticity and authority of case studies. See: Rowley, Jennifer, 'Using Case Studies in Research', *Management Research News*, 25 (2002), 16–27, especially 25f.

<sup>293</sup> Susan K. Soy, 'The Case Study as a Research Method', 1997  
<<https://www.ischool.utexas.edu/~ssoy/usesusers/l391d1b.htm>> [accessed 10 December 2013].

<sup>294</sup> Donna M. Zucker, 'How to Do Case Study Research', *School of Nursing Faculty Publication Series*, 2 (2009), p. 2f.

<sup>295</sup> *Idem.*, p. 5.

<sup>296</sup> *Idem.*, p. 1.

### 3.2.2. Comparative Research

The case study method itself is open to be combined with other research methods.<sup>297</sup> As discussed, this research will delineate a holistic multiple-case design with the aim of cross-comparing the individual cases. In order to adequately execute this cross-case comparison it will use the comparative methodological research approach.<sup>298</sup> In this sense the study on hand will be built on a mixed method design, interconnecting case study research with comparative research (and constructivist methodology) for the cross-case analysis. The key features of comparative research methods analyse and explain similarities and differences across societies and are mainly used in cross-cultural studies. In this respect, the cross-national research increasingly takes different socio-cultural settings into account.<sup>299</sup>

Undertaking comparisons has always been driven by the question whether specific shared social phenomena can be explained by the same causes. In addition, they have assisted in developing criteria for the classification of these shared phenomena.<sup>300</sup> Comparisons are the analytical framework to examine and explain social developments and parameters irrespective of national borders. Lately there has been an increasing shift to the contextualization of these developments and with it cross-national comparisons have gained importance, particularly in order to understand national structures, institutions and societies.<sup>301</sup> The research on hand also undertakes a cross-national comparison by comparing Germany and France as case studies and is therefore very suitable for combining comparative research with the case study method.

One can speak of cross-national and comparative research “when individuals or teams set out to examine particular issues or phenomena in two or more countries with the express intention of comparing their manifestations in different socio-

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<sup>297</sup> Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, pp. 62–64.

<sup>298</sup> For a recent study on the Comparative-Historical Method see: Wolfgang Streeck, ‘Epilogue: Comparative-Historical Analysis: Past, Present, Future’, in *Advances in Comparative-Historical Analysis*, ed. by James Mahoney and Kathleen Ann Thelen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 264–88.

<sup>299</sup> Linda Hantrais, ‘Comparative Research Methods’, *Social Research Update*, 1995, p. 1 <<http://sru.soc.surrey.ac.uk/SRU13.html>> [accessed 10 December 2013].

<sup>300</sup> *Idem.*, p. 2.

<sup>301</sup> *Ibid.*

cultural settings [...]”<sup>302</sup>. The method thereby implies the use of similar research instruments and parameters to conduct empirical research with the goal of explaining and understanding similarities and differences. Research findings can thereafter either be the basis for potential generalizations or to gain a deeper understanding of social realities in different national contexts. For cross-national comparative research, it is consequently paramount to take into account the wider social context in order to explain the phenomena under investigation.<sup>303</sup>

Naturally the cross-national comparative approach bears some difficulties regarding the research parameters. It is for example difficult to find a clear-cut and time-independent definition which parameters contribute sociologically to the geographical area “nation-state”.<sup>304</sup> It is therefore also for the research on hand crucial to understand national contexts and intellectual traditions. Consequently, this research will dedicate chapter 4 – Historical Background – to establishing this structural cohesion through the investigation of the national developments and international relations of Germany and France with the USA. This historical background should place the case studies in a larger and more intelligible context. With this contextualisation, the findings of the case studies can and should be interpreted “in relation to their wider societal context and with regard to the limitations of the original research parameters.”<sup>305</sup> A deeper understanding of the case and an improved identification of cross-national similarities and differences, hence national “likeness” and “unlikeness” will be the case.<sup>306</sup>

The comparative methodology has been applied to different research areas. In the field of history, the comparative historical method is a product of methodological pluralism.<sup>307</sup> It combines the within-case method, the comparative method, social scientific methodology and the aggregate units of analysis. In this sense, it presupposes a multiple-case design for the investigation of its similarities and differences. The within-case method explores causal processes within one delineated ontology, mainly by testing pre-formulated hypothesis and theories. It is therefore part of a causal positivist epistemology and distinct from postmodern thinking. The

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<sup>302</sup> Ibid.

<sup>303</sup> Idem., p. 2f.

<sup>304</sup> Idem., p. 4.

<sup>305</sup> Idem., p. 5.

<sup>306</sup> Idem., p. 5f.

<sup>307</sup> Matthew Lange, *Comparative-Historical Methods* (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2013), p. 2.

comparative historical method aims to take a structural view and investigate processes with multiple individuals that produce patterns of social relations.<sup>308</sup> Here there is a strong connection to constructivist thinking. The comparative historical method retains a structural focus without neglecting the importance of the individual and considers the interrelation between structures and individuals, which is simultaneously a fundamental pillar of the constructivist structure/agency approach for the research on hand.<sup>309</sup>

When one contemplates the different research methods which are combinable with the comparative historical method, there exists a close relation to case study research. Firstly, nomothetic approaches aim at finding causal explanations for societal developments and then generalising them to the universe of cases. Nomothetic methods in this sense require multiple cases, as generalizations are superior when resting on a wider research foundation.<sup>310</sup> Contrary to the nomothetic methodology, ideographic methods apply to one specific case and are hence also entitled “within-case” method. Ideographic methods use causal explanations to explore the peculiarities of a particular case. Such explanations are not meant to apply to a larger set of cases and commonly focus on the particularities of the case under analysis. This in-depth analysis of single cases however allows to draw larger conclusions. Social processes can be unravelled through a plurality of ideographic cases which offer the possibility for comparative methods to kick off.<sup>311</sup>

Particularly ideographic and historical approaches seem very suitable for comparative research due to their narrative-causal explanation framework.<sup>312</sup> This research will thus use the “comparative historical method” for the comparison of the German and French Americanization-discourse. Comparative historical methods employ comparisons as a means of gaining insight into causal determinants.<sup>313</sup> This means that they explore the causes and characteristics of a particular phenomenon. Thereby quantitative data such as statistics are mostly avoided as the focus lies on causal social processes. The research questions address concrete real world phenomena. Consequently, the research of social processes and developments is set

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<sup>308</sup> Idem., p. 3ff.

<sup>309</sup> Idem., p. 5f.

<sup>310</sup> Idem., p. 8.

<sup>311</sup> Idem., p. 10f.

<sup>312</sup> Idem., p. 13ff.

<sup>313</sup> Idem., p. 14.

in a fixed environment over an extended period of time. The approach is particularly suitable for small-n comparisons where an emphasis is put on whether the social processes in the case studies are similar or different without neglecting contexts and mechanisms.<sup>314</sup>

The comparative-historical method is like most research methods subject to some criticism. Historians for example sometimes view the method as too general or nomothetic.<sup>315</sup> Radical positivists on the other hand argue that it is impossible to make any sort of general statements as comparative historical methods place inner validity over external validity. The approach is supposedly too ideographic, only focusing on one particular case under analysis.<sup>316</sup> This criticism actually provides a very good explanation of why to use the comparative historical method for this research. The criticism highlights that the methodology seems to be at the interface of ideographic and nomothetic approaches. The research on hand will investigate two separate cases per concept (i.e. pro- and anti-Americanism, thus four cases in total) and the conclusion will thereafter only relate to these specific cases, which is of ideographic nature. The cross-case comparison of these cases according to comparative-historical methodology will however aim for minor generalizations, an inherently nomothetic approach. The comparative-historical method will thus allow to move from the ideographic case studies, beyond a cross case synthesis towards potential nomothetic statements and hypothesis.

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<sup>314</sup> Ibid.; For a study on small-n analysis in comparative methodology see: David Collier, *The Comparative Method* (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 1993) <<https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1540884>> [accessed 12 January 2017].

<sup>315</sup> Matthew Lange, *Comparative-Historical Methods* (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2013), p. 18.

<sup>316</sup> Ibid.



## 4. Historical Background

In order to fully understand the Americanization debate and the French and German America-image of the 1920s, one must take into account the complexity of the transatlantic relations. The investigation of pro- and anti-Americanism during the interwar period cannot be oblivious to the overarching German-American and Franco-American relations. After all, the international relations with the USA influenced the French and German realities. The USA was heavily involved in the European decision-making after the First World War and thereafter influenced politics and economics in both countries. Positive and negative perceptions of the USA were hence at least partially shaped by the transatlantic relations. The following sections 4.1. and 4.2. will consequently depict the history of German-American and Franco-American relations, mainly focusing on the interwar period. Thereby the main goal is not an in-depth investigation of the history of the respective international relations but rather a selective contemplation of how specific historical circumstances led to positive and negative perceptions of the USA. The final section 4.3. will subsequently compare both evolutions and develop how these historical factors influenced the opposing America-images of the 1920s and thereby pro- and anti-American arguments.

### 4.1. German-American Relations

The German-American relations have to be traced back to before the constitutional beginning of the USA as immigration from Germany<sup>317</sup> towards North America goes as far back as the seventeenth century. America as unknown land across the Atlantic held a certain fascination and the promise of better living conditions for German settlers which came as early as 1607.<sup>318</sup> It is estimated that by the time of the American Revolution (1776-1783) between eight and nine percent of the colonists were of German descent which translates to 250,000 people.<sup>319</sup> Diplomatic relations

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<sup>317</sup> What I here call Germany was of course the Holy Roman Empire, a German speaking confederate states system. In order to facilitate the exposition I will here refer to it as "Germany".

<sup>318</sup> Hans W. Gatzke, *Germany and the United States, A 'special Relationship?'* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 28.

<sup>319</sup> Idem., p. 27f.

between Germany and the USA started after the Declaration of Independence in 1776. These relations were mainly commercial, even though protectionism on both sides clearly hindered commercial exchange in the early years. The year 1848, with a liberal revolution in Germany marks the first political junction in US-German relations. The growing strive for German national unity kick-started the revolution of March 1848 where independence and democracy were demanded from the ruling forces of Germany and middle Europe. Even though the revolution failed within a few months, it was apprehended positively in the United States which financially supported the Frankfurt parliament and its intended democracy.<sup>320</sup>

The next turning point in US-German relations was the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871). The proclamation of a German empire under William I was monitored very carefully and with fascination across the Atlantic. Many German-Americans hoped, that the new German nation would develop a more liberal form of government in the coming years. By January 1871 Germans in the USA showed their interests in these political developments by celebrating the German national unification euphorically. On an international level a strong Germany would however pose a challenge to the USA and hinder US-German relations. The following years were hence characterised by economic competition rather than cooperation. The growing German military and economy established a rivalry with the USA and convinced ruling elites on both sides that future conflicts were possible if not likely.<sup>321</sup>

The outbreak of the First World War indeed manifested the differences between the hierarchic military structure of the Kaiserreich and the civic-democratic system of the United States. In the three years of American neutrality (between 1914 and 1917)

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<sup>320</sup> Idem., p. 29.

<sup>321</sup> For the German-American relations between 1776 and 1914 see: Hans W. Gatzke, *Germany and the United States, a 'Special Relationship?'* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 27-51; Reinhard R. Doerries, 'Kaiserreich und Republik. Deutsch-Amerikanische Beziehungen vor 1917', in *Amerika und die Deutschen: Die Beziehungen im 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. by Frank Trommler (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1986), pp. 1-14. For the German America-image between 1871 and 1914 see: Wolfgang Helbich, 'Different, but not out of this world: German images of the United States between two wars, 1871-1914', in *Transatlantic Images and Perceptions*, ed. by David E. Barclay and Elisabeth Glaser-Schmid, Publications of the German Historical Institute (Washington, D.C.; Cambridge [England]; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 109-29. For a historiography of the US-German relations in the interwar-period see: Hans-Jürgen Schröder, 'Deutsch-Amerikanische Beziehungen im 20. Jahrhundert: Geschichtsschreibung und Forschungsperspektiven', in *Amerika Und Die Deutschen*, ed. by Frank Trommler (Opladen, 1986), pp. 491-513. For a study on the US-German relations post-WW II see: Michael W. Blumenthal, 'The Closest of Strangers: German-American Relations in Historical Perspective', *GHI Bulletin*, 2005, 33-46; Detlef Junker et al., eds., *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War: A Handbook, Vol. 1: 1945-1968, Vol. 2: 1968-1990*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

the two countries would repeatedly impinge upon various political topics- such as the German submarine campaign. The unrestricted German submarine warfare against Great-Britain had led to increasing fire on American supply ships heading towards the United Kingdom.<sup>322</sup> In addition to the German submarine warfare as point of conflict, the American President Woodrow Wilson's role as mediator in the European conflict was equally problematic. The mediation efforts made by Wilson were continuously rejected by the Kaiser and the diplomatic leadership partly because of the fear that Wilson would gear his politics towards the Entente rather than Germany.<sup>323</sup>

Conflicts culminated on 1 February 1917 when Germany declared the unconditional submarine warfare on American ships and thereby de facto pushed the United States towards a war entry.<sup>324</sup> The declaration was combined with the Zimmerman Telegraph, an allegiance offer towards the Mexican government which stated that Texas, Arizona and New Mexico should return to Mexico from the USA. It at least seemed as though the German leadership had little to no interest in the American neutrality.<sup>325</sup> On 2 April 1917 Wilson hence demanded from Congress it should accept the German state of war and enter the European conflict. With its war-entry, the USA took over the military strategy of the Entente. By the end of 1917 around 176,000 American soldiers had entered the war, by September 1918 one and a half million American soldiers were stationed in Europe.<sup>326</sup> The USA and its President Woodrow Wilson would also cement this leadership claim politically. The 'Fourteen Points Plan' by Wilson as guideline for the post-war peace-negotiations was a clear sign of this diplomatic American dominance. It became the basis for the

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<sup>322</sup> The Lusitania incident was the sinking of the American passenger ship Lusitania by German submarines on 7 May 1915. About 1200 people died and 760 survived the attack.

<sup>323</sup> Doerries, 'Kaiserreich und Republik. Deutsch-Amerikanische Beziehungen vor 1917', p. 6.

<sup>324</sup> For the German-American war-entry see: Gerhard Weinberg, 'Deutschland und Amerika 1917 Bis 1949', in *Das Deutschland- und Amerikabild: Beiträge zum gegenseitigen Verständnis beider Völker*, ed. by Klaus Weigelt (Melle: E. Knoth, 1986), pp. 21–28; Michael Stürmer, 'The US Role in German Political Culture', in *Das Deutschland- und Amerikabild: Beiträge zum gegenseitigen Verständnis beider Völker*, ed. by Klaus Weigelt (Melle: E. Knoth, 1986), pp. 29–40.

For the lead up to the First World War see: Justus D Doenecke, *Nothing Less than War: A New History of America's Entry into World War I* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2010) <<http://site.ebrary.com/id/10466827>> [accessed 2 November 2016]; Jennifer D Keene, *The United States and the First World War* (Harlow, England; New York: Longman, 2000); Colin Nicolson, *The Longman Companion to the First World War: Europe, 1914-1918* (Harlow, England; New York: Longman, 2001); Margaret MacMillan, *The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914*, 2013; Conan Fischer, *Europe between Democracy and Dictatorship, 1900-1945* (Chichester; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011).

<sup>325</sup> Doerries, 'Kaiserreich und Republik. Deutsch-Amerikanische Beziehungen vor 1917', p. 9.

<sup>326</sup> Idem., pp. 9–11.

armistice negotiations with Germany and included a liberal proposal to the European conflict.<sup>327</sup> The central pillars of the ‘Fourteen Points Plan’, as formulated by Wilson, were the autonomy of nations, free international trade and a para-governmental international institution to guarantee international peace: the League of Nations.<sup>328</sup> When the German leadership sought for armistice and peace negotiations on 3 October 1918, it was on the basis of the ‘Fourteen Points Plan’. Wilson consequently could not dismiss the German request. Even more so, a dismissal could symbolise total defeat for Germany and encourage it to mobilise its last reserves. This could have potentially pushed the war until the end of 1918, if not longer. Nevertheless, Germany had now officially accepted the ‘Fourteen Points Plan’ before France or Britain had. Wilson henceforth sent a positive response to the German leadership, not completely accepting their request, but not refusing it neither, as there had been no consultation with France and Britain.<sup>329</sup>

The negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920) were to decide the outcome of the impending end of the war.<sup>330</sup> On the verge of the conference the USA and Germany had corresponding agendas and most German politicians were very

<sup>327</sup> Klaus Schwabe, ‘Die USA, Deutschland und der Ausgang des ersten Weltkrieges’, in *Die USA Und Deutschland 1918-1975: Deutsch-Amerikanische Beziehungen zwischen Rivalität und Partnerschaft*, ed. by Manfred Knapp and others (München: Beck, 1978), p. 11f.

<sup>328</sup> For studies on Woodrow Wilson and the Fourteen Points Plan see: Wesley James Reisser, ‘From a World of Empires to a World of Nation States: America at the Paris Peace Conference’, 2010; Christian J. Tams, *League of Nations* (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2007); Stephen G. Walker and Mark Schafer, ‘Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson as Cultural Icons of U.S. Foreign Policy’, *Political Psychology*, 28.6 (2007), 747–76; Trygve Thrøntveit, ‘The Fable of the Fourteen Points: Woodrow Wilson and National Self-Determination’, *Diplomatic History*, 35.3 (2011), 445–81.

<sup>329</sup> For an account of the US German relations during the First World War see: Hans W. Gatzke, *Germany and the United States, a ‘Special Relationship?’* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 52–74. For a general overview of the period between 1919 and 1933 see: Zara S Steiner, *The Lights That Failed: European International History, 1919-1933* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

<sup>330</sup> For the Paris Peace Conference see: Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World* (New York: Random House, 2002); Robert E Hannigan, *The Great War and American Foreign Policy, 1914-24* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, Inc., 2016); H. E Goemans, *War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000); Hugh Purcell, ‘Paris Peace Discord - Racism Was Rife among the Leaders of Britain’s “White Dominions”’, *History Today*, 59.7 (2009), 38; Karel Schelle, *Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920) and its Influence* (Brno: Novpress, 2009); Karel Schelle and Jaromír Tauchen, *Paris Peace Conference and World War I Treaties*, 2012; Erik Goldstein, *The First World War Peace Settlements, 1919-1925* (London; New York: Longman/Pearson Education, 2002); Andrew J Williams, *France, Britain and the United States in the Twentieth Century, 1900-1940: A Reappraisal*, 2014, especially chapter 2; Mark Hewitson, *Germany and the Causes of the First World War* (Oxford, UK; New York: Berg, 2004); Seth P Tillman, *Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961); Harrison Hibbert, ‘Paris Peace Conference’, in *Encyclopedia of Global Justice*, ed. by Deen K. Chatterjee (Springer Netherlands, 2011), pp. 809–10; Patrick O Cohrs, *The Unfinished Peace after World War I: America, Britain and the Stabilisation of Europe, 1919-1932* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Patrick O Cohrs, *The Unfinished Transatlantic Peace Order after World War I: Britain, the United States and the Franco-German Question, 1923-1925*. (University of Oxford, 2001).

sympathetic towards Wilson.<sup>331</sup> Wilson wanted Germany to have a strong economy in order to stabilise the country and shape it as a strong block against the USSR. He saw himself more as a referee between the different parties and targeted “peace without victory” as he called it, a peace without complete military and political defeat of Germany.<sup>332</sup> Most important to Wilson however was to bring the League of Nations into being which led him to accept the French and British request to dismiss a German participation in Paris. Without the presence of Germany or any of the other defeated nations, the design of the peace treaty was drafted more negatively for Germany than intended. Germany received 24 hours to decide whether to accept the Treaty of Versailles in this form or decline it.<sup>333</sup> With an impending complete military destruction Germany accepted the conditions. It had to accept war guilt, pay high reparations and accept territorial losses. Wilson's idea of collective security, with an economically and militarily stable and peaceful central Europe was not being converted into action. The Treaty of Versailles had become a punishment of Germany. The 10 months of diplomatic correspondence between Germany and the USA, previous to Versailles, had been characterised by concordance and harmony, but remained only an intermezzo in their bilateral relationship.<sup>334</sup> In Germany the Treaty of Versailles would from now on dominate and influence the national self-perception and foremost the foreign policy geared towards revisionism of Versailles.<sup>335</sup>

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<sup>331</sup> For American perspectives at the Paris Peace Conference see: Wesley James Reisser, ‘From a World of Empires to a World of Nation States: America at the Paris Peace Conference’, 2010.

<sup>332</sup> Doerries, ‘Kaiserreich Und Republik. Deutsch-Amerikanische Beziehungen Vor 1917’, p. 29.

<sup>333</sup> For literature on the Treaty of Versailles and its effects see: Alan Sharp, *The Versailles Settlement: Peacemaking after the First World War, 1919-1923* (Basingstoke [England]; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Royal Jae Schmidt, *Versailles and the Ruhr: Seedbed of World War II*. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968); Louise Chipley Slavicek, *The Treaty of Versailles* (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 2010); Robert E Hannigan, *The Great War and American Foreign Policy, 1914-24* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, Inc., 2016), pp. 174–87; Norman A Graebner and Edward M Bennett, *The Versailles Treaty and Its Legacy: The Failure of the Wilsonian Vision* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); ‘Cleaning up the Mess of Versailles’ <<http://dh.oxfordjournals.org/content/32/2/263.short>> [accessed 2 November 2016]; Max Hantke and Mark Spoerer, ‘The Imposed Gift of Versailles: The Fiscal Effects of Restricting the Size of Germany’s Armed Forces, 1924–9’, *The Economic History Review*, 63.4 (2010), 849–64; Ashley Grimshaw, ‘The Treaty of Versailles: The Major Cause of World War II’, 2014, 1–15; Nikolaus Wolf, Max-Stephan Schulze and Hans-Christian Heinemeyer, ‘On the Economic Consequences of the Peace: Trade and Borders After Versailles’, *The Journal of Economic History*, 71.4 (2011), 915–49.

<sup>334</sup> For the negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference and terms of the Treaty of Versailles see: Manfred Jonas, *The United States and Germany: A Diplomatic History* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 95–150, especially 137-147; Detlev Peukert, *Die Weimarer Republik: Krisenjahre der klassischen Moderne* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1987), pp. 52–57; Schwabe, ‘Die USA, Deutschland und der Ausgang des Ersten Weltkrieges’ pp. 11–61; Doerries, ‘Kaiserreich und Republik. Deutsch-Amerikanische Beziehungen vor 1917’ pp. 47–55 & 55–61; Gatzke, *Germany and the United States, a ‘Special Relationship?’* pp. 75–86.

<sup>335</sup> For literature on the revisionism see: Annika Mombauer, *The Origins of the First World War: Controversies and*

Even though the Treaty of Versailles put a heavy strain on the US-German diplomacy, the post-war point of departure for the interstate-relations was not completely hostile. In fact, it had the potential of a rapprochement, potentially even cooperation.<sup>336</sup> From an American perspective it was highly important that Germany would remain a republic with a democratic political orientation.<sup>337</sup> The USA intended to resume a close relationship with Germany through raising its living standard. This agenda of security and stability through economic cooperation manifested itself in a trade treaty in 1923.<sup>338</sup> The USA hence tried to return to the Open Door Policy through an economically stable Germany.<sup>339</sup>

From a German perspective, it was more beneficial to cooperate with the USA than with France or Great-Britain as the USA was not opposed to a peaceful transformation of the European circumstances in Germany's favour. It was therefore assertive for Germany to reach interlocking interests between both countries. These would show themselves for the first time with the debate about wartime reparations. The reparations debate was nearly unsolvable on an economic level and it had been clear since the Paris Peace Conference that the topic of reparations would lead to tension between the European powers. Germany continuously hoped to get American support for a mitigation of the reparations. The USA itself intended a reasonable agreement of the European powers, especially because its allies also owed the USA wartime debts. Despite this, agreement seemed unlikely. Britain made its demands dependent on how much they owed the USA. France wanted a rigid revenge for the Germany invasion and Germany to pay strong reparations, not even ruling out a military intervention.<sup>340</sup>

The London Conference between March and May 1921 sought to settle this reparations conflict and negotiate a payment plan. Despite the actual finalisation of a

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*Consensus* (Harlow, Eng.; New York: Longman, 2002); Annika Mombauer, *The Origins of the First World War: Diplomatic and Military Documents*, 2013.

<sup>336</sup> Werner Link, 'Die Beziehungen zwischen der Weimarer Republik und den USA', in *Die USA Und Deutschland 1918-1975: Deutsch-Amerikanische Beziehungen Zwischen Rivalität Und Partnerschaft*, ed. by Manfred Knapp and others (München: Beck, 1978), p. 62.

<sup>337</sup> For a study on the American perception of the German republicanism see: Klaus Schwabe, 'Die Vereinigten Staaten und die Weimarer Republik. Das Scheitern einer "Besonderen Beziehung"', in *Amerika und die Deutschen: Die Beziehungen im 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. by Frank Trommler (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1986).

<sup>338</sup> Werner Link, 'Die Beziehungen zwischen der Weimarer Republik und den USA', in *Die USA und Deutschland 1918-1975: Deutsch-Amerikanische Beziehungen zwischen Rivalität und Partnerschaft*, ed. by Manfred Knapp and others (München: Beck, 1978), p. 64.

<sup>339</sup> Emily Rosenberg, 'Economic Interest and United States Foreign Policy', in *American Foreign Relations Reconsidered, 1890-1993*, ed. by Gordon Martel (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 37–51.

<sup>340</sup> *Idem.*, pp. 66–71.

payment plan the reparations problem remained ongoing. The German debt was so huge that it was practically impossible to repay. In addition, the German currency, the Mark, had been in an inflationary spiral since the beginning of the war. To finance the war, Germany had in 1914 suspended the gold standard (one third of the currency had to be backed by gold) and issued war bonds which were to be financed by the population in retrospect. This capital creation through money-printing already depreciated the Mark during the war and encouraged inflation. At the end of the war the accumulated debt could however not be shed on the wartime enemies through reparations, as it had been the case after the Franco-Prussian war. Germany was now itself obliged to pay reparations in the form of foreign currency and material commodities. Even though these commodities were not directly subject to the growing inflation, the German government acquired them through an increase in paper money, which in return increasingly diluted the currency and encouraged hyperinflation. The destruction of the own currency was thereby also a means to demonstrate to the allies that Germany was unable to pay reparations. The whole reparations situation consequently escalated when the German government consecutively failed to pay reparations in late 1922. On 11 January 1923 France took measures in their own hands and occupied the Ruhr area in order to extract the reparations themselves in the form of coal and steel.<sup>341</sup> The German hyperinflation was now in full swing and the economy began to collapse under its pressure. A lasting solution for the reparations problem was thus more pressing than ever. For the USA, a precondition for renegotiating the reparations was a German currency stabilisation.<sup>342</sup> This was effectively realised through the introduction of a new currency, the Rentenmark, on 15 November 1923. The USA consequently began

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<sup>341</sup> To counter the occupation of the Ruhr the German government encouraged a “peaceful protest” of the workers, which effectively meant a full strike of the unions. Strikers were financially supported with money that was continuously printed and thereafter constantly decreased in value. This final component irretrievably prompted the hyperinflation of 1923.

<sup>342</sup> For literature on the German currency depreciation as well as the fiscal and debt crisis of the 1920s and 30s see: Costantino Bresciani-Turroni and Millicent E Sayers, *The Economics of Inflation: A Study of Currency Depreciation in Post-War Germany 1914-1923* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1937); Albrecht Ritschl and Samad Sarferaz, ‘Crisis? What Crisis? Currency Vs. Banking in the Financial Crisis of 1931’, *Center for Economic Policy Research*, 2009; Richard Tilly, ‘Banking Crises in Three Countries, 1800-1933: An Historical and Comparative Perspective’, *GHI Bulletin*, 2010, 77–89; Albrecht Ritschl, ‘The German Transfer Problem, 1920–33: A Sovereign-Debt Perspective’, *European Review of History: Revue Européenne D’histoire*, 19.6 (2012), 943–64; Peter Temin, ‘The German Crisis of 1931: Evidence and Tradition’, *Cliometrica*, 2.1 (2007), 5–17; Randall D. Germain, ‘Financial Governance in Historical Perspective: Lessons from the 1920s’, *Global Financial Integration Thirty Years on: From Reform to Crisis*, 2010, 25–41; Gerald D. Feldman, *The Great Disorder: Politics, Economics, and Society in the German Inflation, 1914-1924* (Oxford University Press, 1993).

developing financial plans to reorganise the reparations which would result in the Dawes Plan of 1924.<sup>343</sup> The Dawes Plan had been developed by a committee chaired by the American banker Charles Dawes and intended to re-finance the reparation-payments. The basic idea was that the USA would lend money to Europe, particularly Germany, to rebuild its industry. This would increase economic growth, employment, international trade and profits. These profits could be reinvested in the industry and allow a timely repayment of outstanding loans and reparations.<sup>344</sup>

After the economic situation had been temporarily settled, various additional conferences sought to settle further political issues. Most of the conferences saw the German leadership around Chancellor Gustav Stresemann strongly sympathised with the USA to potentially improve the German situation. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 was a representation of this US-German cooperation and called for the peaceful settlement of all international conflicts.<sup>345</sup> Signed by the USA, France and Germany the pact can at least partly be seen as a step towards the revision of Versailles. The Kellogg-Briand Pact disempowered France in relation to Germany as it linked the reparation topic and the rearmament question, both potentially supporting the re-ascension of Germany.<sup>346</sup> A growing interdependence between Germany and the USA in terms of debtor and creditor, resulted in similar interests and was thereby a strong advantage for the German position.

US-German cooperation and mutual dependence was especially visible on the bond market. Main conjunction between both countries were the loans which went from the USA to Germany through the Dawes Plan, between 1924 and 1930. Particularly between 1925 and 1928 more than one billion dollars was loaned to German corporations.<sup>347</sup> These loans were mostly given out in packs of 10 million

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<sup>343</sup> For the Dawes Plan see: Albrecht Ritschl and Tobias Straumann, 'Business Cycles and Economic Policy, 1914-1945', *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe*, 2010; Leonard Gomes, *German Reparations, 1919-1932: A Historical Survey* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), especially Chapter 4: From Dawes to Young, pp.141-191; Benjamin M Anderson, *Economics and the Public Welfare; Financial and Economic History of the United States, 1914-1946*. (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1949); Jonas, *The United States and Germany: A Diplomatic History*, pp. 175-181; Gatzke, *Germany and the United States, a 'Special Relationship?'*, p. 88ff.

<sup>344</sup> For a study on German and American perceptions of the reparations topic see: Werner Link, 'Die Beziehungen zwischen der Weimarer Republik und den USA', in *Die USA und Deutschland 1918-1975: Deutsch-Amerikanische Beziehungen zwischen Rivalität und Partnerschaft*, ed. by Manfred Knapp and others (München: Beck, 1978), pp. 62-76.

<sup>345</sup> For the Kellogg-Briand Pact see: Ramesh Chandra Thakur, *The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

<sup>346</sup> Jonas, *The United States and Germany: A Diplomatic History*, pp. 185-190.

<sup>347</sup> Werner Link, 'Die Beziehungen zwischen der Weimarer Republik und den USA', in *Die USA und Deutschland 1918-1975: Deutsch-Amerikanische Beziehungen zwischen Rivalität und Partnerschaft*, ed. by Manfred Knapp and



dollars and went to large German corporations such as AEG, Thyssen, Krupp and Siemens. This consequently led to a strong interconnection of the German economic situation and American foreign capital.<sup>348</sup>

From an American perspective, it was important to strengthen the German economy in order to support the reparation-payments.<sup>349</sup> Nevertheless the bilateral cooperation was mutually beneficial and profitable. American businesses entered German corporations in sectors such as steel, chemical, and manufacturing. This introduced advanced American rationalization and production procedures such as Taylorism and Fordism. German knowhow was joined by American productivity. The most vital sector for German-American joint ventures was the automobile industry, where strong American and German industry branches met. Henry Ford opened his first factory in Berlin in 1925; General Motors (which bought up the Adam Opel Werke A.G. in spring 1929)<sup>350</sup> and Chrysler would soon follow. By 1930 about 210 million dollars had been invested in the German car industry alone.<sup>351</sup> Even though some people began to speak of a super-alienation of the industry, the American investments were generally well-received in Germany. The cooperation was beneficial for both countries: it increased exports, created jobs and generated foreign exchange inflows. The German foreign policy from Stresemann (Chancellor in 1923) up to Brüning (Chancellor in 1930-32) therefore mainly operated under the agenda of economic and financial cooperating with the USA.<sup>352</sup>

The political consequence for the USA was however that over the second half of the 1920s it lost its position as referee in European affairs. Through the financial and economic cooperation with Germany it was no longer the so called “third party”.<sup>353</sup>

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others (München: Beck, 1978), p. 83.

<sup>348</sup> For the economic interconnection of Germany and the USA see: Jonas, *The United States and Germany: A Diplomatic History*, pp. 181-193. Werner Link, ‘Die Beziehungen zwischen der Weimarer Republik und den USA’, in *Die USA und Deutschland 1918-1975: Deutsch-Amerikanische Beziehungen zwischen Rivalität und Partnerschaft*, ed. by Manfred Knapp and others (München: Beck, 1978), pp. 83-106.

For literature on the American Foreign Direct Investment in Germany during the interwar-period see: Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich, ‘U. S. Capital Exports to Germany 1919-1923 Compared to 1924-1929’, *Explorations in Economic History*, 23 (1986), 1–32; Joan Hoff Wilson, *American Business & Foreign Policy: 1920-1933*, 1971.

<sup>349</sup> For literature on the German reparations see: Leonard Gomes, *German Reparations, 1919-1932: A Historical Survey* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), especially Chapter 4: From Dawes to Young, pp.141-191; Joan Hoff Wilson, *American Business & Foreign Policy: 1920-1933*, 1971, especially pp. 123-157: Allied War Debt and German Reparations; Sally Marks, ‘The Myths of Reparations’, *Central European History*, 11.3 (1978).

<sup>350</sup> Jonas, *The United States and Germany: A Diplomatic History*, p. 183.

<sup>351</sup> Link, ‘Die Beziehungen zwischen der Weimarer Republik und den USA’, p. 95.

<sup>352</sup> Idem., p. 97.

<sup>353</sup> The phrase “third party” here relates to the American policy of non-interventionism and the legacy of isolationism. Since the 19<sup>th</sup> century isolationism refers to an American diplomatic policy based on autonomy and self-reliance. It

The USA revised the Dawes Plan at the end of the 1920s with the Young Plan of 1929, in favour of its own currency- and loan-system. The Young Plan provided a new reduced reparations payment plan for Germany with the medium-term goal of depoliticising the reparations through converting them into private industrial debts. The USA hence reopened the reparations case officially in 1928 and welcomed the regrouping and commercialisation of the debt. In light of these developments Germany slowly advocated its main goal of a complete abolishment of the reparations. Due to the American loans and heavy private investments in Germany it was difficult to oppose this German approach politically. The USA tried to increase private investments without losing the German subjection to reparations, but the economic interconnection would prove too strong. Particularly the financial crisis of 1929 with its effect on Germany as well as the USA was the final turning point.<sup>354</sup> The Hoover-Moratorium suspended the reparation payments for one year and was at least partially a result of US-German rapprochement.<sup>355</sup>

The US-German cooperation had shown the German political elite that a financial solution of the reparation payments would rule out military consequences by France. This political attitude strengthened the German position towards the

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intended to limit international involvements and allegiances (with their subsequent commitments and responsibilities) in order to avoid potential undesired confrontations and wars.

<sup>354</sup> For the economic depression in Germany and concerning economic policy see: N. F. R. Crafts and Peter Fearon, *The Great Depression of the 1930s: Lessons for Today*, 2013; Albrecht Ritschl, 'Reparations, Deficits and Debt Default: The Great Depression in Germany', in *The Great Depression of the 1930s*, ed. by Nicholas Crafts and Peter Fearon (Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 110–39; Gerrit Meijer, 'Issues of Economic Policy in Germany in the Interbellum', in *The Beginnings of Scholarly Economic Journalism*, ed. by Jürgen Georg Backhaus, The European Heritage in Economics and the Social Sciences (Springer New York, 2011), pp. 45–55; Douglas Newton, *Germany, 1918-1945: From Days of Hope to Years of Horror* (Melbourne [Vic.: Collins Dove, 1990), chapter 6: The Crisis Years: Economic Depression, Intrigue, and the coming of the Hitler Chancellorship 1929-1933; Ulrich Kluge, *Die Weimarer Republik* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2006), p. 396ff.

For literature on the general economic crisis and depression in Europe see: Olivier Accominotti and Barry Eichengreen, 'The Mother of All Sudden Stops: Capital Flows and Reversals in Europe, 1919–32', *The Economic History Review*, 69.2 (2016), 469–92; Albrecht Ritschl, 'The German Transfer Problem, 1920–33: A Sovereign-Debt Perspective', *European Review of History: Revue Européenne D'histoire*, 19.6 (2012), 943–64; Nikolaus Wolf, 'Europe's Great Depression: Coordination Failure after the First World War', *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 26.3 (2010), 339–69; Ilja Kristian Kavonius, 'Fiscal Policies in Europe and the United States during the Great Depression', *European Central Bank, Fiscal Policies Division/DG-Economics*, 2009; Cory Gideon Gunderson, *The Great Depression* (Edina, Minn.: ABDO Pub., 2004); Francine McKenzie, 'The Great Depression', in *Guide to U.S. Foreign Policy: A Diplomatic History*, ed. by Robert J. McMahon and Thomas W. Zeiler (Thousand Oaks, 2012), pp. 173–87; Barry J Eichengreen, *Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939* (New York [etc.: Oxford University Press, 1995); Barry Eichengreen and Peter Temin, "'Afterword": Counterfactual Histories of the Great Depression', in *The World Economy and National Economies in the Interwar Slump*, ed. by Theo Balderston (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2003), pp. 211–21; Barry Eichengreen and Peter Temin, 'The Gold Standard and the Great Depression', *Contemporary European History*, 9.2 (2000), 183–207; Barry Eichengreen, 'The Great Depression in a Modern Mirror', *De Economist*, 164.1 (2016), 1–17; Barry J Eichengreen and Kris J. Mitchener, 'The Great Depression as a Credit Boom Gone Wrong', *Research in Economic History*, 22, 183–237.

<sup>355</sup> For the Young Plan and Hoover Moratorium see: Link, 'Die Beziehungen zwischen der Weimarer Republik und den USA', pp. 97–101. Jonas, *The United States and Germany: A Diplomatic History*, pp. 191-193.

French. German foreign policy is a testimony of this approach as it sustainably avoided accepting or even considering the French claims over the 1920s. The French concept of collective security was slowly replaced with the American idea of peaceful change.<sup>356</sup> Truthfully the German-American cooperation was eventually probably not beneficial for sustainable European peace. Through a gradual revision of Versailles, the USA had become Germany's strongest partner - whilst drifting from France. Germany had reclaimed a position alongside the great powers through economic collaboration with the USA. Economic cooperation had temporarily triggered a peaceful evolution of the international order.<sup>357</sup>

## 4.2. Franco-American Relations

The relations between France and the United States equally have a long legacy and stretch back to colonial times. As early as the 17<sup>th</sup> century king Louis XIV colonised large parts of North America and named them after himself: "Louisiana". Main rivals for the French on the North American continent were the British, controlling large parts of the American North-East, and the Spanish, who held Mexico and Florida. First quarrels between France and Britain originated in Europe in 1688 and were later taken across the Atlantic towards the American colonies: the French and Indian Wars. By 1763, after a series of colonial battles, the French and British eventually signed a peace treaty in Paris. Britain, who had been victorious in the colonial wars, claimed the French lands east of the Mississippi, whereas the French territories west of the Mississippi went to Spain.<sup>358</sup>

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<sup>356</sup> The Dawes Plan 1924, the Locarno Treaty 1925 and the Kellogg-Briand-Pact 1928 are all documenting this development. For an assessment of the politics of peaceful change and the Locarno Treaty see: Link, 'Die Beziehungen zwischen der Weimarer Republik und den USA', pp. 101-106; Jon Jacobson, *Locarno Diplomacy: Germany and the West, 1925-1929*. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972); *Locarno Revisited: European Diplomacy, 1920-1929*, ed. by Gaynor Johnson and Bolton Institute (London; New York: Routledge, 2004); Piotr Stefan Wandycz, *The Twilight of French Eastern Alliances, 1926-1936: French-Czechoslovak-Polish Relations from Locarno to the Remilitarization of the Rhineland*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014) <<http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=1700589>> [accessed 2 November 2016]; Patrick O Cohrs, *The Unfinished Peace after World War I: America, Britain and the Stabilisation of Europe, 1919-1932* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) <<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511497001>> [accessed 2 November 2016].

<sup>357</sup> For the evolution of the America-image during the Weimar Republic see: Gatzke, *Germany and the United States, a 'Special Relationship?'*, pp. 75-102.

For an overview of the political evolution of the Weimar Republic see: Detlev Peukert, *Die Weimarer Republik: Krisenjahre der klassischen Moderne* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1987).

<sup>358</sup> For the Franco-American relations between the 17<sup>th</sup> century and 1914 see: Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *La France et les*

With the outbreak of the American War of Independence, France saw a possibility for revenge against the British and of thereby regaining control over some of its lost territories. As a consequence, France supplied funds and materials to the Americans. Many French aristocrats and military officers, inspired by the republican ideals, joined the war on the side of the revolutionaries. With a victory for the revolutionists, France and the United States signed the Treaty of Alliance by 1778, where the United States was formally recognized.<sup>359</sup> With the American Revolution as an example, republican ideas soon also reached France which was responsive to the idea of a new political hierarchy. The post July 1789 French Revolution was partly inspired by American republican ideals. Whereas the United States had sought democratic self-determination, the French revolutionaries aimed for a total overthrow of the political system and absolute individual liberty.<sup>360</sup>

By 1793 France and Britain had again gone to war with each other. The historical ties between the USA and Great-Britain led the USA to sympathise with Britain rather than France, despite the Treaty of Alliance. Trade with both countries continued however, until Britain blocked and seized American ships approaching French ports. In order to avoid a confrontation with Britain, the USA signed the Jay Treaty (1795) which was to facilitate trade and guarantee peace. The French perceived the Jay Treaty as a violation of the Treaty of Alliance and began attacking American merchant ships. Contentions continued on a diplomatic level when in 1797 the French Foreign Minister Charles Maurice de Talleyrand refused to receive an American diplomatic delegation. Both parties however did not want to commit to a

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*États-Unis des origines à nos jours* (Paris: Seuil, 1976); Henry Blumenthal, *France and the United States; Their Diplomatic Relations, 1789-1914*. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1970); 'U.S. - France Relations (1763 - Present) - Council on Foreign Relations' <<http://www.cfr.org/france/us---france-relations-1763---present/p17682>> [accessed 07 June 2016] 'Relations with France Facts, Information, Pictures | Encyclopedia.com Articles about Relations with France' <[http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Relations\\_with\\_France.aspx](http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Relations_with_France.aspx)> [accessed 07 June 2016].

For early French America-images see: René Rémond, *Les États-Unis devant l'opinion française, 1815-1852*. (Paris: A. Colin, 1962); Simon Jeune, *De F.T. Graindorge à A.O. Barnabooth. Les types américains dans le roman et le théâtre français (1861-1917)*. (Paris: M. Didier, 1963); Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *La France et les États-Unis des origines à nos jours* (Paris: Seuil, 1976), pp. 82-90; James Roe, 'France and the USA - A Historical Partnership: Discussing American Influences on the French Revolution', 2013

<[http://www.academia.edu/4454631/France\\_and\\_the\\_USA\\_-\\_A\\_Historical\\_Partnership\\_Discussing\\_American\\_Influences\\_on\\_the\\_French\\_Revolution](http://www.academia.edu/4454631/France_and_the_USA_-_A_Historical_Partnership_Discussing_American_Influences_on_the_French_Revolution)> [accessed 3 November 2016].

<sup>359</sup> For the Treaty of Alliance and the American Revolution see: Jack P Greene and J. R Pole, *A Companion to the American Revolution* (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 2000); Chris J Magoc and C. David Bernstein, *Imperialism and Expansionism in American History: A Social, Political, and Cultural Encyclopedia and Document Collection*, 2015.

<sup>360</sup> For the French and American revolution see: Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *La France et les États-Unis des origines à nos jours*, pp. 19-29.

full-fledged war. Therefore, the conflict, the “Quasi-War”, was resolved in 1800 with the Treaty of Mortefontaine.<sup>361</sup>

The next juncture of Franco-American relations was the American Civil War (1861-1865). Despite official French neutrality, the French Emperor Napoleon III saw the civil war as an opportunity to expand his power in Central and South America. Napoleon III favoured the Confederate States as he hoped to destabilise the Union and gain an ally to secure Mexico. With the USA temporarily unable to enforce the Monroe Doctrine<sup>362</sup>, he placed the Austrian archduke Maximilian of Habsburg on the Mexican throne. The United States refused to accept and recognise the new Mexican government. After the end of the civil war in 1865 the United States therefore increased diplomatic pressure on France to persuade Napoleon to stop his support for Maximilian. Napoleon eventually withdrew the French troops from Mexico and Maximilian was executed by the Mexicans.<sup>363</sup>

When the Napoleonic government was overthrown in the 1870s, the new French republican leadership decided to produce a gift to the United States. It intended to show its admiration of the republican tradition and hoped to strengthen American support for the new French republic. As a result, the Statue of Liberty as symbol of republican values and democracy, sculpted by Frederic Auguste Bartholdi, was donated to the USA in 1886. The statue demonstrated the general friendly relationship between the USA and France in the period up until the First World War.<sup>364</sup>

With the outbreak of the First World War the Franco-American relations entered a new but continuously allied phase.<sup>365</sup> When the USA declared war on Germany in

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<sup>361</sup> ‘Relations with France Facts, Information, Pictures | Encyclopedia.com Articles about Relations with France’

<sup>362</sup> The Monroe Doctrine describes a part of the American foreign policy developed by President James Monroe in 1823. It stated that any interventions of European nations in Latin America would be seen as acts of aggression and would be met with military intervention. At USA would at the same time not interfere in European affairs or colonies.

<sup>363</sup> Henry Blumenthal, *France and the United States; Their Diplomatic Relations, 1789-1914*. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1970). & ‘U.S. - France Relations (1763 - Present) - Council on Foreign Relations’.

<sup>364</sup> ‘Relations with France Facts, Information, Pictures | Encyclopedia.com Articles about Relations with France’.

<sup>365</sup> For the Franco-American relations between 1917 and 1932 see: Henry Blumenthal, *Illusion and Reality in Franco-American Diplomacy, 1914-1945* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986); Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *La France et les États-Unis des origines à nos jours* (Paris: Seuil, 1976); David Strauss, *Menace in the West: The Rise of French Anti-Americanism in Modern Times* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), pp. 109-156.; Grewe, *Das Amerikabild der französischen Schriftsteller zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen*, pp. 35-44.; Walter Sommer, *Die Weltmacht USA im Urteil der französischen Publizistik. 1924-1939* (Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 1967), pp. 17-144; ‘U.S. - France Relations (1763 - Present) - Council on Foreign Relations’; ‘Relations with France Facts, Information, Pictures | Encyclopedia.com Articles about Relations with France’.

For a historiography of French literature on the First World War see: Leonard V. Smith, ‘The “Culture de Guerre” and French Historiography of the Great War of 1914–1918’, *History Compass*, 5.6 (2007), 1967–79.

1917, France was at the end of its supplies and military resources.<sup>366</sup> The USA supplied heavily needed funding and resources for the Allied powers, as well as military support. This could not be matched by Germany, having suffered enormous casualties on both fronts. Under the French Marshall Ferdinand Foch and the strong support of American soldiers, the German troops were pushed from French territory and the western front by 1918. In France, the American support was at first received ecstaticly. Particularly Woodrow Wilson was celebrated as a hero upon his arrival in Paris for the peace talks. The negotiations regarding an armistice and possible peace settlement would however alter France's relationship with the USA. The USA had strengthened its position through its implication in the war. This was reflected by the American aspiration to take up the mediator position in the peace negotiations.<sup>367</sup> These intentions disappointed French representatives who particularly perceived Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points as an overly idealistic approach to the peace-negotiations. The claim that American moral values were superior to the rest of the world and should be the benchmark for the negotiations displeased the French. It proved to them that overbearing moralism was a signature characteristic of American foreign policy.<sup>368</sup> When the French demands at the Paris Peace Conference and later in Versailles were not met, it casted a negative shadow on the relationship between the wartime allies.<sup>369</sup> Demands for a buffer state between Germany and France (under French influence) and a reinstatement of the French frontiers as of 1814 (meaning not just the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, but also of the German Rhineland), had to be dropped under pressure from Wilson and his determination to push through the Fourteen Points.<sup>370</sup>

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For a general study on France and the First World War: John Horne, 'Demobilizing the Mind. France and the Legacy of the Great War, 1919-1939', *French History and Civilization*, Papers from the George Rudé Seminar.2 (2009), 101–19.

For literature on the Franco-German relations during the same period see: Ralph Blessing, *Der mögliche Frieden: die Modernisierung der Aussenpolitik und die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen 1923-1929* (Oldenbourg Verlag, 2008); Conan Fischer, 'The Failed European Union: Franco-German Relations during the Great Depression of 1929–321', *The International History Review*, 34.4 (2012), 705–24.

<sup>366</sup> Grewe, *Das Amerikabild der französischen Schriftsteller zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen*, p. 35.

<sup>367</sup> For the American war-entry and Wilson's approach for peace see: John W. Coogan, 'Wilsonian Diplomacy in War and Peace', in *American Foreign Relations Reconsidered, 1890-1993*, ed. by Gordon Martel (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 71–89.

<sup>368</sup> Sommer, *Die Weltmacht USA im Urteil der französischen Publizistik. 1924-1939.*, p. 17f, with further references in footnote 3.

<sup>369</sup> For the French approach at the Paris Peace Conference see: Peter Jackson, 'A Tran-Atlantic Condominium of Democratic Power: The Grand Design for a Post-War Order at the Heart of French Policy at the Paris Peace Conference', *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, 16.2 (2015), 179–207; Blumenthal, *Illusion and Reality in Franco-American Diplomacy, 1914-1945*, pp. 66–80.

<sup>370</sup> Sommer, *Die Weltmacht USA im Urteil der französischen Publizistik. 1924-1939.*, pp. 17–21.

Relations between the USA and France were further aggravated by disagreements about French security issues.<sup>371</sup> Main concern for France was a distrust for Germany and the fear that a German return to old strength would encourage future aggressions. The aim for the French Premier Minister Georges Clemenceau was therefore an American promise to commit to French security in the near future. France hoped to cripple Germany economically, and thereby prohibit it from possible future hostilities. This would however prove incompatible with Wilson's peace-keeping approach. In addition to the disagreement about territorial security and peace-keeping, disarmament was another controversial topic.<sup>372</sup> In the Fourteen Points, Wilson had demanded a reduction of arms to guarantee future world peace. France did not want to commit to such a disarmament as it feared it could not be able to protect itself against possible German aggression.<sup>373</sup>

In the light of these disagreements, France attended the Washington Naval Conference (1922) which addressed naval disarmament and the international relations of major and minor powers in East Asia (i.e. China). Not only did this present an opportunity for France to make its security case, it also kept the French hope alive that with an agreement at the conference, the USA would retreat from interventions in European affairs and return to isolationism. French hopes were however soon destroyed when the United States, Great-Britain and Japan began discussing naval issues in secret meetings. From then on, the French navy was limited to only about one third of the tonnage of the USA and Great-Britain in the capital ship sector. Even worse was the French loss in prestige as it lost its position among the former members of the Entente.<sup>374</sup>

After the disappointment of the Washington Conference, France refused to attend the Geneva Conference of 1927. It wasn't until the Kellogg-Briand-Pact that an agreement not to use war to settle disagreements in international conflict could be

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<sup>371</sup> For the French security concerns see: Blumenthal, *Illusion and Reality in Franco-American Diplomacy, 1914-1945*, p. 101ff; Strauss, *Menace in the West: The Rise of French Anti-Americanism in Modern Times*, pp. 109–22; Sommer, *Die Weltmacht USA im Urteil der französischen Publizistik, 1924-1939*, pp. 22–29.

<sup>372</sup> For literature on disarmament and the Washington Naval Conference see: Richard W Fanning, *Peace and Disarmament: Naval Rivalry & Arms Control, 1922-1933* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2015); Andrew Webster, 'From Versailles to Geneva: The Many Forms of Interwar Disarmament', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 29.2 (2006), 225–46.

<sup>373</sup> Strauss, *Menace in the West*, pp. 109–112.

<sup>374</sup> For the French approach at the Washington Naval Conference see: Blumenthal, *Illusion and Reality in Franco-American Diplomacy, 1914-1945*, pp. 103–11; Duroselle, *From Wilson to Roosevelt; Foreign Policy of the United States, 1913-1945.*, pp. 152–62; Strauss, *Menace in the West*, pp. 113–15.

reached.<sup>375</sup> The final attempt to solve the disarmament conflict was the World Disarmament Conference of 1932-34. Here once again French and American views differed. The American calling for global disarmament was opposed by the French proposition of a strong international army for conflict resolution. This Franco-American disagreement was symptomatic for the development of the security question over the past decade.<sup>376</sup>

A further pivotal topic for the Franco-American relationship was the debate about post-war reparations.<sup>377</sup> After the end of the First World War France expected the United States to entirely cancel its wartime debt. France argued that it had suffered enormous human and material losses in the years prior to the American war-entry. France reckoned that the American loans had been a compensation for the delay of American troops in entering the European fighting. In addition, France advocated that it had defended American democracy against German military expansion. The USA would however insist on a repayment of these debts. The debt-debates poisoned the relationship between both countries in the post-war years. It displeased the Americans that France retained a repellent attitude towards the repayment of the debt, as it displeased the French that the Americans failed to abstain from the demands in light of the huge sacrifices France made during the war.<sup>378</sup>

In reality the debt issue could not be isolated from the reparations-topic, the American loan policy or the evolution of the monetary situation. With the heavy financial borrowings during the war, the French currency, the Franc, had decreased in value. Particularly during the first half of the 1920s the Franc declined to an extent

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<sup>375</sup> For the Kellogg-Briand-Pact see: Duroselle, *From Wilson to Roosevelt; Foreign Policy of the United States, 1913-1945.*, pp. 166–81; Blumenthal, *Illusion and Reality in Franco-American Diplomacy, 1914-1945*, pp. 161–68; Grewe, *Das Amerikabild der französischen Schriftsteller zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen*, p. 44ff.

<sup>376</sup> Strauss, *Menace in the West*, pp. 115–119.

For the French America image in the interwar-period see: Astrid Grewe, *Das Amerikabild der französischen Schriftsteller zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen*; Sommer, *Die Weltmacht USA im Urteil der französischen Publizistik. 1924-1939.*; Kornel Huvos, *Cinq mirages américains; les États-Unis dans l'œuvre de Georges Duhamel, Jules Romains, André Maurois, Jacques Maritain et Simone de Beauvoir.* (Paris: Didier, 1972); Bernadette Galloux-Fournier, 'Voyageurs français aux États-Unis, 1919-1939. Contribution à l'étude d'une image de l'Amérique' (ANRT, 1988).

<sup>377</sup> Astrid Grewe, *Das Amerikabild der französischen Schriftsteller zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen* (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1985), p. 36ff; Walter Sommer, *Die Weltmacht USA im Urteil der französischen Publizistik, 1924-1939* (Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 1967), pp. 35–38; David Strauss, *Menace in the West: The Rise of French Anti-Americanism in Modern Times* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), pp. 123–38; Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *La France et les États-Unis des origines à nos jours* (Paris: Seuil, 1976), pp. 132–38; Henry Blumenthal, *Illusion and Reality in Franco-American Diplomacy, 1914-1945* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), p. 81ff, 123–133; Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *From Wilson to Roosevelt; Foreign Policy of the United States, 1913-1945.* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 148–52.

<sup>378</sup> Sommer, pp. 35–37.



that the monetary stability became a subject of public and political debate. What added to this problem was that the currency decrease was not only a French problem. The hyperinflation in Germany in 1923 rendered the German government unable to pay any form of reparations to France. This consequently put the French economy under even more pressure.<sup>379</sup>

France therefore insisted on a connection between the debt it inadvertently owed the United States and the reparations it was to receive from Germany. It would however not be until the Dawes Plan that the United States government would be responsive to the French demand of linking debt and reparations.<sup>380</sup> In the previous years they had acted as though there existed no connection. With the Dawes Plan in early 1924 the German reparations were renegotiated. The Dawes Plan not only provided a payment plan for the German reparations, it also terminated the French occupation of the Ruhr. It on the one hand settled and guaranteed the German reparation payments, and on the other provided the French Prime Minister Poincaré with a solution to retreating French troops from the Ruhr without political consequences and without losing face. In this sense, the Dawes Plan not only favoured Germany, it also favoured France.<sup>381</sup> As a consequence the Dawes Plan, at least temporarily, solved and regulated the reparation payments. The debt controversies were finally settled by the Mellon-Bérenger Treaty, signed between France and the USA on 29 April 1926.<sup>382</sup> The Mellon-Bérenger Treaty provided the first written settlement of the debt issue.<sup>383</sup> The USA and France agreed on the amount and rate of the French debt payments: full repayment with a reduced interest rate of 1.67 percent<sup>384</sup> and over a time span of 62 years.<sup>385</sup>

The Mellon-Bérenger Treaty was eventually connected to the Young Plan of

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<sup>379</sup> Strauss, *Menace in the West*, p. 126ff.

<sup>380</sup> For the role of the Dawes-Plan in Franco-American relations see: Stephen A Schuker, *The End of French Predominance in Europe: The Financial Crisis of 1924 and the Adoption of the Dawes Plan* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1976), pp. 171–397; Blumenthal, *Illusion and Reality in Franco-American Diplomacy, 1914-1945*, p. 133ff; Sommer, *Die Weltmacht USA im Urteil der französischen Publizistik, 1924-1939*, pp. 39–45; Duroselle, *La France et les États-Unis des origines à nos jours*, pp. 132–39; Duroselle, *From Wilson to Roosevelt; Foreign Policy of the United States, 1913-1945.*, pp. 148–52.

<sup>381</sup> Sommer, *Die Weltmacht USA im Urteil der französischen Publizistik. 1924-1939.*, pp. 39–42.

<sup>382</sup> For the Mellon-Bérenger Treaty see: Blumenthal, *Illusion and Reality in Franco-American Diplomacy, 1914-1945*, pp. 136–61; Duroselle, *La France et les États-Unis des origines à nos jours*, pp. 132–39; Jean-Baptiste Duroselle and others, *France and the Nazi threat: the collapse of French diplomacy 1932-1939* (New York: Enigma Books, 2004), especially 20ff; Alison Cook-Sather and John E Moser, *Global Great Depression and the Coming of World War II*, 2015, especially 22-35.

<sup>383</sup> Sommer, *Die Weltmacht USA im Urteil der französischen Publizistik. 1924-1939.*, p. 42.

<sup>384</sup> Strauss, *Menace in the West*, p. 130.

<sup>385</sup> Sommer, *Die Weltmacht USA im Urteil der französischen Publizistik. 1924-1939.*, p. 43.

1929 in order to settle the debt-reparations debate lastingly.<sup>386</sup> The Young Plan initially revised the Dawes Plan after it had become clear that Germany would and could not repay the reparations as intended. With the ratification of the Young Plan in 1930, Germany agreed it would pay its reparations regularly as long as France would repay its wartime debt - for 62 years.<sup>387</sup> France therefore had an interest in renegotiating the Dawes Plan into the Young Plan to guarantee the reparation payments. The Young Plan was generally taken up positively in France as it had temporarily settled the reparations debate even though France had to clear the Rhineland it had occupied since 1919.<sup>388</sup> Unfortunately for France, by 1931 the Wall Street Crash and the following German depression made it clear that Germany could not follow the Young Plan and reparation payments had to be terminated.<sup>389</sup> The Hoover Moratorium suspended the payments for one year and at the Lausanne Conference in 1931 the European powers ultimately agreed to reduce the German reparations by 90 percent.<sup>390</sup>

The relationship between France and the USA during the interwar period was not limited to matters of foreign politics. As in Germany the United States invested heavily in the French post World War One economy.<sup>391</sup> After the First World War had destroyed large parts of the French economy and industry, American investments were welcomed. The largest part of these investments was geared towards the oil and electricity industry. American firms brought new methods to France and mainly focused on improving manufacturing. In addition to electric equipment manufacturing, American companies took over large parts of the telephone communication market. This raised some French concerns. The oil and

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<sup>386</sup> For the importance of the Young-Plan in Franco-American relations see: Schuker, *The End of French Predominance in Europe: The Financial Crisis of 1924 and the Adoption of the Dawes Plan*, p. 174ff; Duroselle, *From Wilson to Roosevelt; Foreign Policy of the United States, 1913-1945.*, pp. 148–52; Blumenthal, *Illusion and Reality in Franco-American Diplomacy, 1914-1945*, p. 138ff; Duroselle, *La France et les États-Unis des origines à nos jours*, pp. 132–39; Sommer, *Die Weltmacht USA im Urteil der französischen Publizistik, 1924-1939*, pp. 39–45.

<sup>387</sup> Sommer, p. 43.

<sup>388</sup> For the French Rhineland Policy see: Walter A McDougall, *France's Rhineland Policy, 1914-1924 The Last Bid for a Balance of Power in Europe*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015).

<sup>389</sup> For the economic depression see: Duroselle, *From Wilson to Roosevelt; Foreign Policy of the United States, 1913-1945.*, pp. 191–195.

<sup>390</sup> Strauss, *Menace in the West*, p. 134.

<sup>391</sup> For a detailed account of the American investments in France during the interwar-period see: Mira Wilkins, *The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad from 1914 to 1970*. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 49–166; Michael E. McGuire, “‘A Highly Successful Experiment in International Partnership?’ The Limited Resonance of the American Committee for Devastated France’, *First World War Studies*, 5.1 (2014), 101–15; Charles S Maier, *Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the Decade after World War I* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 53ff, 387–420; Strauss, *Menace in the West: The Rise of French Anti-Americanism in Modern Times*, pp. 139–54.

telecommunications industry were strategic wartime industries and their American control potentially endangered France. The many controversies over debts, reparations and security had shown France that a fruitful collaboration with the United States seemed unlikely and some concerns of an American takeover of the French telephone system were voiced. However, these fears ultimately proved to be groundless.<sup>392</sup>

The French automobile industry was affected to a different level than electronic manufacturing or telecommunications. While France was the European leader of automobile production, the USA was the global forefront. Henry Ford opened an assembly factory in Bordeaux in 1919 and in Asnières in 1925. General Motors maintained warehouses in Marseilles during the same period. Together both firms employed 11,375 French workers. Compared to Germany the actual American investments in the French automobile industry remained limited. Bigger competition came from the American automobile firms through other European countries. General Motors had bought up the Opel-works in Germany in 1929 and produced 200,000 cars annually. Ford in return had built large production works in Dagenham near London with a similar production scale. These works supplanted the French automobile industry as the largest producer of passenger cars.<sup>393</sup>

The largest impact American investments had on France were in the film industry. Prior to the First World War the French movie industry had been the largest in the world, but during the war this industry completely collapsed. In the post-war period the movie industry was taken over by the USA and by 1924 as much as 85 percent of all movies shown in French cinemas were American-made.<sup>394</sup> American dominance in the French movie industry went beyond the films themselves. About 75 percent of the largest cinemas in France were owned by American companies. American investments in the movie industry were therefore far more controversial than investments in other sectors. This was also because the film was originally an invention by the French Lumière brothers.<sup>395</sup>

Overall, during the 1920s, France became increasingly wary of the American investments even though they had been highly appreciated at first. Investments in the oil, electricity, automobile and film industry, were increasingly perceived as a form

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<sup>392</sup> Strauss., p. 140ff.

<sup>393</sup> Strauss., p. 145.

<sup>394</sup> Idem., p. 146.

<sup>395</sup> Idem., pp. 147–150.

of American imperialism, impairing French independence.<sup>396</sup> The debate on American imperialism was a French peculiarity and went beyond the simple private investments of the United States.<sup>397</sup> It was seen as something that incorporated politics and military. The acquisition of California, New Mexico (1848) and the Philippines (1902) were to France some examples of a militant form of American imperialism.<sup>398</sup> French circles argued that this imperialism showed itself particularly in Latin American. According to France the so-called Dollar-diplomacy<sup>399</sup> entailed American investments and trusts which were used to destabilise governments and thereby exploit new American markets. France was displeased with the unilateral interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. It was supposedly used to the American advantage and cast a negative light on international interventions. The USA indeed had a strong naval presence in the Pacific, however mainly in order to defend its position against the rise of Japan. France feared that the USA would aim for naval predominance and at some point, endanger French colonies.<sup>400</sup>

Even though the French theory of American imperialism was not very prevailing, it does show the general tendency of the Franco-American relations in the interwar period. They were marked by a growing suspicion towards the United States. The security issues as well as the debt and reparations controversies had contributed to a growing French discontent with its wartime ally. The relationship between France and the United States moved from wartime cooperation as equals, towards American domination and strong contention points. The callous French mind-set towards the debt repayment and the fact that it insisted on crippling Germany as revenge for the wartime sufferance, did not help the Franco-American cause. Neither did the American attitude of underestimating and defaulting the important French security demands. Nor the strict reclamation of the wartime debt, whilst simultaneously gradually reducing the German reparations. The period of the

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<sup>396</sup> For a study on the French perceptions of US financial imperialism during the currency crisis see: John Keiger, 'Wielding Finance as a Weapon of Diplomacy: France and Britain in the 1920s', *Contemporary British History*, 25.1 (2011), 29–47.

<sup>397</sup> For the French debate about American imperialism see: Joseph A. Fry, 'Imperialism, American Style, 1890-1916', in *American Foreign Relations Reconsidered, 1890-1993*, ed. by Gordon Martel (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 52–70; Sommer, *Die Weltmacht USA im Urteil der französischen Publizistik, 1924-1939*, pp. 46–54.

<sup>398</sup> Sommer, *Die Weltmacht USA im Urteil der französischen Publizistik. 1924-1939.*, p. 46f.

<sup>399</sup> Dollar-diplomacy refers to an American foreign policy created by US-President William H. Taft which intended to ensure the economic stability of a region in order to protect and further American economic interests there. See: 'Dollar Diplomacy | United States Government Policy | Britannica.com' <<https://www.britannica.com/event/Dollar-Diplomacy>> [accessed 27 January 2017].

<sup>400</sup> Sommer, *Die Weltmacht USA im Urteil der französischen Publizistik. 1924-1939*, pp. 47–51.

1920s was hence branded by worsening Franco-American relations without getting truly conflictual to the point where they would become dangerous.

### **4.3. Comparison**

The history of the relations between the United States of America and Germany on one side and France on the other respectively reach back to the 17<sup>th</sup> century. The early interactions in colonial times were in both cases largely shaped by immigration and trade. France generally showed stronger involvement on the American continent over the course of the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century. This is highlighted through the ideological proximity of the American War of Independence and the French Revolution. Both events were inspired by one another and provided both countries with a similar republican constitutional orientation. Territorial interactions between France and the USA such as the Louisiana Purchase or the French involvement in the American Civil War further document the strong Franco-American relationship up until the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Whereas these interactions between France and the United States prior to the First World War were of an active political, commercial and military nature, the interactions between Germany and the USA were more passive in comparison. German-American relations were characterised by German immigration and minor trade agreements. It was not until the Franco-Prussian War and the time leading up to World War I, that relations intensified. The outbreak of the First World War itself figured as magnifying glass for both German- and Franco-American relations. When German hostility pushed the USA into an intervention in the European conflict by 1917, the United States joined an allegiance with France and the Entente.

The post-war situation regarding Franco-American relations and German-American relations was consequently opposing and conflictual. The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles would however slowly change this situation. France and the United States had different conceptions for the peace treaty and the future of Germany. These differences made the USA and France slowly drift apart. This became particularly visible in the debate about wartime reparations. The debt and reparations topic heavily influenced the foreign relations in France as well as in Germany. France pushed for a connection of the debt and reparations issue whilst

Germany worked towards the cancellation of all wartime reparations. In the light of shaping Germany as strong bulwark against the USSR, the USA rather took the German demands into consideration than the French ones. The USA diminished German reparations whilst insisting on the full repayment of the French wartime debt. The payment plans of the 1920s such as the Dawes- and Young-Plan henceforth rather favoured Germany than France and resulted in improving German-American relations and worsening Franco-America relations.

This shift is exemplified by the French concern about the security issue. Since the Paris Peace Conference France had insisted on an American security commitment against future German aggressions. This demand however contradicted the American foreign-policy of isolationism on the one hand and the liberal peace proposal of Woodrow Wilson on the other. Discord in the security debate was intensified by differing views about the rearmament topic. While France insisted on a strong military as shield against German aggressions, the USA tended towards general disarmament. These incongruous differences were further propelled by German-American rapprochement. Weakening the French positions through fruitful German-American relations had the largest potential for Germany to revise the Treaty of Versailles, despite the American ambition for disarmament.

Evidently the relationship between France and the USA and Germany and the USA, did start from different positions. Nevertheless, the 1920s did show a general trend of German-American relations continuously improving whilst Franco-America relations deteriorated. Germany tended to side with the United States in political debates and took a generally anti-French position. This foreign policy approach proved favourable to regain German economic and military power over the course of the 1920s. The interconnection of German and American interests tied up the German situation with the American one up to a point where it became difficult for the USA to make anti-German decisions. Particularly the American investments in Germany are a representation of this policy. Germany welcomed American investments whereas France was more reluctant of American interference in the French markets. American foreign direct investment in Germany supported economic recovery and led to a level of cooperation which no longer allowed the USA to jeopardise this economic partnership politically. The USA as a consequence lost its “third party” position as referee in European affairs.

The Wall Street Crash (1929) and the following Great Depression were the final impulse in altering the relationship between Germany, France and the USA over the course of the 1920s and 1930s. The Hoover Moratorium suspended the reparation payments and the Conference of Lausanne de facto abolished wartime reparations altogether. Germany's foreign policy geared towards revisionism of Versailles through Americanophilia had thus indeed shown effectiveness. Improving German-American relations over the 1920s and deteriorating Franco-American relations had shifted the power ratio from enemies and allies towards political equity. This fluctuation in interstate relations evidently influenced German and French America-images during the interwar-period. Many anti- and pro-American perceptions were rooted in the political developments described above.

German anti-Americanism on a political level for example drew particularly on the legacy of the First World War to voice discontent and anti-American images. Kick-off spots for these images were thereby not confined to the wartime defeat itself. The role of Woodrow Wilson having supposedly betrayed his promises of the Fourteen Points Plan made Wilson the personification of the negative America-image in Germany.<sup>401</sup> This narrative was fed by the negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference. The fact that Germany was denied a presence in Paris and was eventually forced to accept the outcome of the negotiations were attributed to American treachery. Moreover, accepting the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, a peace agreement Germany had not co-authored, became a central pillar of German anti-Americanism during the following years. Revisionism of the Treaty of Versailles thereby figured as cornerstone of the German foreign-policy as much as it was a key feature of political anti-Americanism in the public discourse during the 1920s.

Other developments in the German-American relations did however also produce a positive image of the USA. American support in the German reparations-demands was welcomed by all parts of the political spectrum. After all a reduction or cancellation of the reparations signified a German re-empowerment and was thereafter also supported by anti-Americans. Particularly the Dawes-Plan and associated loan-payments influenced positive perceptions of the USA in the early 1920s. The Kellogg-Briand pact and the appreciation of Germany's rearmament and reparations expectations added to these pro-American images. The largest source of

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<sup>401</sup> For an investigation of the evolution of the German Wilson-image see: Peter Berg, *Deutschland und Amerika, 1918-1929. Über das deutsche Amerikabild der zwanziger Jahre*. (Lübeck: Matthiesen, 1963), pp. 9–47.

pro-Americanism relates to foreign direct investments in the German economy. American investments in German businesses mended the strained economy, increased exports and created jobs. Taylorism and Fordism as American methods increased economic productivity and therewith economic prosperity. US-German cooperation in areas such as the automobile industry are thus the main reason that German pro-Americanism became most prevalent in the industrial and economic sector. In this sense, the interlocking of German and American economic interests was a strong source for the affirmative assessment of Americanization. In the end, it was this interlocking of economic interests that was the basis for American support in the revision of Versailles through the Young-Plan and later the Hoover Moratorium.

In France, the interstate relations with the USA were equally a source of positive and negative America-perceptions. First positive images of the USA can in this respect be largely attributed to shared republican values. Similar ideological underpinnings of the American and French Revolution influenced early pro-Americanism and ultimately also diplomatic allegiances. The Statue of Liberty is a representation of this close Franco-American relationship and can be seen as a token of mutual affection. Eventually these strong political relations climaxed in the First World War allegiance which further amplified pro-American images. The liberation of France added components of gratitude and fellowship to the philo-American narrative. This was particularly visible upon Woodrow Wilson's arrival in Paris for the peace negotiations where Wilson was celebrated as France's liberator. Over the course of the 1920s however political developments between France and the USA were rarely source of positive America-images. It would rather be America's economic potency and American investments in the French economy which characterised French pro-Americanism. American private investments and productivity measures were seen as supportive of the French economy and consequently backboned affirmative America-perceptions.

Nevertheless, the Franco-American relations particularly politically led to negative images of the USA. First and foremost, the Paris Peace Conference kick-started interwar anti-Americanism. The moral high-ground of the USA and President Wilson in dictating the post-war peace negotiations and insisting on the Fourteen Points, displeased the French. Displeasure grew as French demands for a buffer state, general security issues and a restoration of the borders from 1814 were disregarded.



Negative America-images were furthermore influenced through the Washington Naval Conference. The naval restrictions and a weakened French position among its wartime allies were associated with American decision-making. In addition, controversies about the debt and reparation-question persisted over the majority of 1920s. The fact that the USA insisted on a repayment of the wartime loans despite the French casualties prior to the American war-entry was one of the main reasons for political anti-Americanism in this period. On an economic level, American investments in France were as much a source of negative perceptions as they were of positive ones. Particularly American influences in the strong French automobile and movie industry raised preoccupations. They stimulated concerns about American imperialism which effectively became a source of negative image-making and anti-Americanism.

As one can see, the interstate relations in both countries had a noticeable influence on the general perception and assessment of the USA. Positive and negative America-images were thereby in the interwar-period a combination of current political developments and previous historical events. While anti-American images in Germany tended to draw on the repercussions of the First World War, negative French America-perceptions rather developed over the course of the 1920s. French pro-American images in contrast were nurtured by the long history of the Franco-American relations while in Germany particularly the economic rapprochement of the mid-1920s influenced an endorsement of the American model. Despite the importance of this political and economic background for the development of German and French pro- and anti-Americanism they are only one piece in the overall picture. Both concepts represent independent streams which combined diverse characteristics into their affirmative or dismissive narratives. The following main chapters will therefore elaborate these different characteristics in detail. The investigation of the sources can then show to which extent the historical background which has been described above contributed to the actual America-images of the authors and their assessment of the USA.

## 5. Pro-Americanism

### 5.1. Case Study: German pro-Americanism 1918-1933

The European perception of the United States of America has since the very beginning been of a very interesting and particular nature. It appears as though Europeans were never indifferent towards the evolution of the USA and of the American social model. People would always perceive the progression of the United States either optimistic or pessimistic. This European curiosity with America went beyond the practical history we have explored in the preceding chapter. The America-affection was also generated by the belief that the USA was an incubator of the European future. A dominant conception was that American developments would in the near future reach, and thereafter change, Europe. Once American influences did in fact reach Europe and transformed cultural and economic practices at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the concern with the USA would be amplified. People began to connect American influences to a possible Americanization of Europe which led to a heated debate about the potential and dangers of adapting to the American model. The following section will develop the pro- or philo-American perspective of selected personalities, which vocally pleaded for an adaptation of this American model. In their literary works, they formulated the advantages of a- at least partial- Americanization and demanded the implementation of American methods in a timely manner. Before we investigate the complex background of this narrated philo-Americanism we will commence with a general overview of German philo-Americanism, thereafter its French pendant will be presented.

#### 5.1.1. General Perspective

Whilst the main curiosity during most of the 19<sup>th</sup> century had been the political system of the United States, this changed at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>402</sup> With the economic ascension of the USA, technology and economy were now the focus of the German America observation and assessment. The debate about Americanization

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<sup>402</sup> Egbert Klautke, *Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten*, p. 7f.

developed into a debate about the possibilities (and risks) of American technology and the adoption of an American economic-model. In countries such as Germany and France where the economies stagnated at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century the applicability of American methods was of great importance for the progression of the national economies.<sup>403</sup> In a first phase German pro-Americanism was thus geared towards the economic advantages and applicability of the American model. The term which was commonly used to describe these developments was the German word ‘Amerikanismus’ (Americanism). Americanism did not initially incorporate political and cultural dimensions, but was rather an economic model, which could transcend other parts of society and would in the following years, also, have an impact on non-economic areas. Later debates about the American lifestyle and its consequences for private and corporate life would therefore all be rooted in the initial economic developments referred to as Americanism.

The fascination with the American model started out as a profound interest in the standardisation of workflows, initiated by Frederick Winslow Taylor. Taylor had developed a form of scientific management during the 1880s and 1890s which intended to standardise and rationalise production processes. These methods, which would become known as Taylorism, reached their highpoint during the 1910s and increased labour efficiency by standardising labour practices (working hours, wages, and job qualifications) and manufacturing processes. The tool for this economic efficiency model was scientific assessment of management and manufacturing on an industrial level. In Germany, Taylorism as economic model was forced and implemented particularly to rebuild German industry and manufacturing after the First World War. The pursuit of efficiency and productivity would however enter a new phase with the publication of Henry Ford's autobiography *My life and work*<sup>404</sup> in 1923. *My life and work* became the most prevalent and highest grossing America-work in Germany during the interwar years and was responsible for numerous travels to the USA of people who wanted to witness the economic progress first hand.<sup>405</sup> For the Americanism debate this meant that it would shift from Taylorism towards a debate about the nationwide implementation of Fordism. In *My life and work* Ford described his life path and most importantly his innovations of the automobile

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<sup>403</sup> E. J Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire, 1875-1914* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987), pp. 41–52.

<sup>404</sup> Henry Ford and Samuel Crowther, *My Life and Work*, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1922).

<sup>405</sup> Gassert, “Without Concessions to Marxist or Communist Thought”: Fordism in Germany, 1923-1939’, p. 224.

business, namely the development of the Ford Motor Company at Highland Park. From an economic perspective, the mass-production and assembly line workflow Ford had initiated revolutionised manufacturing. It allowed a drop in production costs and thereby boosted the sales of the famous “Model T” due to its affordability. In the following years mass-production (mainly through assembly lines), product standardization and stable well-paying wages became the cornerstones of Fordism as an economic model.

In Germany, the Americanism debate after 1923 thus entered a new phase which was heavily shaped by Henry Ford's economic precept. Had the debate pre-Ford been labour-centred, it was now enlarged to the entire production-process. German pro-Americanism during the mid-1920s hence remained economically oriented but was now pro-Fordism before anything else. One vocal supporter of Fordism was the economist Friedrich von Gottl-Ottlilienfeld. Von Gottl-Ottlilienfeld introduced a differentiation between the practical application he called *Fordisation* (German) and its theoretical and intellectual content which he called *Fordismus*.<sup>406</sup> Von Gottl-Ottlilienfeld thus on the one hand created and on the other hand popularised the term Fordism for the German debate.<sup>407</sup> The elevation of Fordism to a theoretical concept or even ideology led to reflections about its adaptability for other parts of society. Fordism was considered as a third way between unchecked capitalism and the social revolution of Marxism.<sup>408</sup> Pro-Americans argued that Fordism conciliated the social needs of the workers and liberty of the capital. Social unrest could be prevented through modernisation according to Fordist principles and in the context of one ethnic community.<sup>409</sup>

The debate about Americanism thereby once again entered a new phase where modernisation and modernism became a catchphrase and synonym for Americanism. The concept of modernism could surpass the economic area and incorporate specific American developments into the German reality. Modernity as substantial narrative of the Weimar Republic offered various possibilities for the progress of Germany.<sup>410</sup> Conceptually the term rationalization would be at the heart of this modernism

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<sup>406</sup> Idem., p. 229f.

<sup>407</sup> Egbert Klautke, *Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten*, p. 197.

<sup>408</sup> Gassert, “Without Concessions to Marxist or Communist Thought”: Fordism in Germany, 1923-1939’, p. 226.

<sup>409</sup> Idem., p. 242.

<sup>410</sup> For a publication on the future- and modernity-discourse in the Weimar Republic see: Rüdiger Graf, *Die Zukunft der Weimarer Republik: Krisen und Zukunftsaneignungen in Deutschland 1918-1933* (München: Oldenbourg, 2008).

discourse. Thereby rationalisation allowed the redevelopment of society and everyday culture and opened up a possible path towards modernity. These different paths of (German) modernity have been interpreted, according to their destructive potential, by historians such as Jeffrey Herf and Detlef Peukert.<sup>411</sup> Jeffrey Herf has developed the idea of *Reactionary Modernism*<sup>412</sup> in a same-titled publication, which describes the German fascination with technological modernisation on the one hand, whilst increasingly rejecting republican values and democratization on the other. Detlef Peukert has pointed out that this anti-parliamentarian tendency later culminated in National Socialism, highlighting the conflictual potentials of modernity.<sup>413</sup> Rationalisation of the workspace, home space, and everyday life became a continuum of modernism the Nazis would take up.<sup>414</sup> They created a dehumanized version of the rationalization movement, showing the destructive potential of modernity and the danger of concepts as hybrid as modernity and rationalisation.<sup>415</sup> Nevertheless, National Socialism was only one potential version of modernism.<sup>416</sup> Rationalisation, technology and economics were generally viewed independent from politics.<sup>417</sup>

The general trend hybrid concepts such as modernism and rationalization showed, was that even though they were rather apolitical, they began surpassing the economic sector. Pro-Americans began applying said concepts to the social and cultural array of society. Unlike the terms Taylorism or Fordism, rationalisation as key concept of modernity could incorporate and transcend other parts of society, away from industry and economy. Discussing rationalization (and its place in modernity) could germanise different versions of Americanism and lead the way to a broader public debate about American developments.<sup>418</sup> Initially rationalization was seen as purely industrial but began moving past the economic sector: unions and Social Democrats saw large benefits in rationalization as it would harmonize wage

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<sup>411</sup> Detlev Peukert, *Die Weimarer Republik: Krisenjahre der klassischen Moderne* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1987).

<sup>412</sup> Jeffrey Herf, *Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich* (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

<sup>413</sup> Adelheid von Saldern, *The challenge of modernity: German social and cultural studies, 1890-1960* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2002), p. 94f.

<sup>414</sup> Idem., p. 113f.

<sup>415</sup> Idem., p. 114.

<sup>416</sup> Idem., p. 96.

<sup>417</sup> Nolan, *Visions of Modernity*, p. 3.

<sup>418</sup> Idem., p. 71.

levels and working times.<sup>419</sup> Industrials weren't necessarily pro-rationalization as many of them disapproved a full-fledged restructuring of businesses. Nevertheless, rationalization was becoming more than simply increasing efficiency and productivity mechanically or technologically, it began incorporating the complete restructuring of labour and management.<sup>420</sup>

Soon the rationalization concept would surpass economics altogether and was seen as a social system. Rationalization was projected on all parts of society and became a discussion about societal change and the sociocultural future of Germany. The original American reality thereafter only played a subordinated role. Debating rationalization under the American aspect gave the debate scope, focus and immediacy. When pro-Americans discussed the USA with its economic and sociocultural model, it served as an incubator and projection surface for a German problematic. Similar to that which pro-Americans hoped for Germany, the USA had taken its economic model i.e. rationalization and projected it on all parts of society. After all it had been the USA itself which was the first place to experience Americanization as a form of economic evolution. The USA hence became the only reference point for pro-Americans in their rationalization debate and quest for modernism. As Mary Nolan put it: “[For Germans] discussing the USA was the only available language for expressing visions of modernity”<sup>421</sup>. Or to phrase it in the words of Peter Berg: “[the German] picture of America shows an explicitly German problematic”<sup>422</sup>. Americanism was no longer a synonym for economic and technological progress it had become a sociocultural model, a lifestyle with profound social consequences. The Americanism discourse and the progress relation of the rationalization dogma, thus to a certain extent, had an emancipatory force on the social model.<sup>423</sup> Pro-Americanism incorporated an interesting interplay: on the one hand the fascination with rationalization led to a general admiration of the American model, also in sociocultural terms. This sociocultural model, however, on the other hand only became possible through the rationalization of the economy. Rationalization had become a model that was applicable to the entire society and had

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<sup>419</sup> Ibid.

<sup>420</sup> Idem., p. 72f.

<sup>421</sup> Idem., p. 9.

<sup>422</sup> Berg, *Deutschland und Amerika, 1918-1929. Über das deutsche Amerikabild der zwanziger Jahre*, p. 8. The quote is originally in German.

<sup>423</sup> Nolan, *Visions of Modernity*, p. 10; where she relates to: Max Horkheimer and Theodor W Adorno, *Dialectic of enlightenment* ([New York: Herder and Herder, 1972).

thereby conceptually created new political and social realities. When these new realities later became subject to criticism, pro-Americans might have initiated and provoked cultural criticism by anti-American voices, through their universal application of concepts such as rationalization.<sup>424</sup>

In conclusion, the German pro-Americanism post-WWI began as support and implementation of Taylorism in order to rebuild the destroyed German industry and manufacturing sector. With the publication of *My life and work* by Henry Ford in 1923 the debate hereafter developed into a fascination with Fordism. Fordism was perceived as a vision and ideology which could be the solution to larger socioeconomic problems: a third way between capitalism and socialism. The Fordist dogma was then incorporated into one of the central concepts of the Weimar Republic: modernism. Particularly pro-Americans tied up the progress of Germany with a quest for modernism. Thereby the key precept of modernism was the rationalization of all parts of society. This broader application of the concept led to a debate away from the economic area onto a discourse about the socio-cultural future of Germany.

Conceptually pro-Americans never referred to themselves as such but rather functionally used the term Americanism ('Amerikanismus') to describe the positive effects of originally American developments. Americanism was a vague term and could incorporate all of the concepts described above, such as Fordism or rationalization. As Philipp Gassert has said, Americanism "could refer to anything that was "modern" and could even remotely be linked to materialism, efficiency, size, mechanization, standardization, automation, technocracy, uniformity, pragmatism, reform consciousness, naïve optimism, spontaneity, generosity, openness, advertising, democracy, or influence exercised upon the masses."<sup>425</sup> Gassert's statement shows how nearly all developments that were associated with progress could also be associated with the USA. German pro-Americanism was thus in conclusion a functional admiration of the USA, which had its foundation in the applicability of American economic developments, which were eventually projected on the entire society.

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<sup>424</sup> Idem., p. 11.

<sup>425</sup> Gassert, "Without Concessions to Marxist or Communist Thought": Fordism in Germany, 1923-1939', p. 220.

### 5.1.2. Julius Hirsch

Few authors offer a better picture of the characteristic traits of pro-Americanism than Julius Hirsch in his work *Das amerikanische Wirtschaftswunder*<sup>426</sup>. Hirsch provides a technical analysis of the American socio-economic model and argues that the imitation of American developments such as mass-production, mechanisation and rationalisation would lead Germany towards progress and modernity. Hirsch's work thereby touches upon the key features of German pro-Americanism and synthesises the particularities of the concept. His life and work as well as their mutual relation and impact will be subject of inquiry for this section.

The biography of Julius Hirsch can be retraced and researched in great detail due to the extensive body of source material on his life. This material is collected by the Leo Baeck Institute, Center for Jewish history in New York. The Julius and Edith Hirsch collection has been processed in 2012 and contains materials by and about Julius Hirsch and his wife Edith.<sup>427</sup> The source materials have been completely digitalised and range from published works and printed materials to correspondences and manuscripts. The bulk of the collection focuses on 1942 until 1960, particularly, the curriculum vitae does, nevertheless, provide a solid grasp of his life path during the 1920s and will be the basis for this biography. Despite the collection of the Leo Baeck Institute, other biographies additionally provide an overview of Hirsch's life and work. Most biographies, such as the one in the International Biographical Archive however remain undetailed and show chronological contradictions.<sup>428</sup> Finally the *Guide to the archival materials of the German-speaking Emigration to the United States after 1933*<sup>429</sup> provides a complete overview of all the materials available on Hirsch's life. Besides the Leo Baeck Institute there exists a private collection on Hirsch from his wife, which is only accessible through written consent and supposedly contains a short autobiography. According to the *Guide to the archival materials* some material on Hirsch also exists in the American Philosophical Society (a correspondence with Simon Flexner), Harvard University (letters to Fritz Redlich)

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<sup>426</sup> Hirsch, *Das amerikanische Wirtschaftswunder*.

<sup>427</sup> 'Julius and Edith Hirsch Collection; AR 1254; Leo Baeck Institute'.

<sup>428</sup> 'Julius Hirsch - Munzinger Biographie' <<http://www.munzinger.de/search/go/document.jsp?id=00000005198>> [accessed 29 September 2015].

<sup>429</sup> John M Spalek and Sandra H Hawrylchak, *Guide to the Archival Materials of the German-Speaking Emigration to the United States after 1933* [1]. [1]. (Charlottesville: Univ. Press of Virginia, 1978).



and a compiled file in the manuscript division of the New York Public Library.<sup>430</sup>

Julius Hirsch was born on October 30, 1882 in Mandel, near Mainz, to Salomon and Mathilde Hirsch of Jewish descent.<sup>431</sup> His father was a merchant and general agent for an insurance company. After his primary education, Julius Hirsch attended Aachen High School until 1897. In the following years, Hirsch worked for a manufacturing textile firm, a chemical-pharmaceutical business and as a wholesaler. Between 1902 and 1903 he attended the military service. During this time period Hirsch pursued economics and business administration studies at the Aachen Institute of Technology. By 1907 he had fulfilled the university entrance requirements, caught up his baccalaureate and began studies of economics and law at the University of Bonn. In 1909, he wrote and defended his doctoral dissertation entitled “Department Stores in West Germany” and habilitated, as associate professor in economics, by 1913 at the Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Cologne.

During the First World War Hirsch was stationed in France and Poland but was given leave in late 1915 after being wounded. Between September and December 1915, he was reinstated at the University of Cologne. In 1917, he became extraordinary professor for private enterprise economics at Cologne University and received a professorial chair two years later. Since 1916 Hirsch held several public positions, such as being advisor to, member and later chairman of the German Federal Price Control Board. In 1919 Hirsch was promoted to the German State Secretary for the Ministry of Commerce where he also had responsibilities towards the Federal Food Ministry. As part of the Ministry of Commerce Hirsch took part in numerous reparations negotiations up until 1923. He partook in conferences in Paris, Berlin and Cannes, as well as being a member of the German Government Delegation to the World Economic Conference at Genoa in 1922. During this time, he also saw to the food deliveries to Germany and attended meetings with the later American President Herbert Hoover on this topic. In 1923 Hirsch drafted the currency stabilization plans during the allied Ruhr occupation, which were partly accepted through the German Economic Council's Committee on Currency Stabilization.

From 1924 until 1933 Julius Hirsch lectured and worked at the Berlin Graduate

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<sup>430</sup> *Idem.*, p. 418f.

<sup>431</sup> The biographical information and mentioned works in this biography is based on: ‘Julius and Edith Hirsch Collection; AR 1254; Box 1; Folder 5; Leo Baeck Institute’

Business School (Handelshochschule Berlin). Moreover, in 1926, he was appointed Honorary Professor for economics and business economics at Berlin University. One year later he would also become appointed Honorary Professor at the Berlin Business School. The time-period between 1924 and 1933 was very active with regard to his scholarly activities, the public political discussions he attended, his publications and his corporate business activities. In 1925, he held a speech in Paris at the request of the French minister of reconstruction Loucheur on *How Germany stabilized her currency*<sup>432</sup>. One year later he held another speech in Paris, on December 10, 1926, under the chairmanship of the French Trade Minister Bokanowsky entitled *La rationalisation de la production*<sup>433</sup>. The conference was held by the Redressement Français and Hirsch's speech was introduced by its president Ernest Mercier. A final trip to Paris in 1927 saw him discuss the same topic on request of later French President Vincent Auriol. In 1926 Hirsch had given a speech in London at the Imperial Institute on his experiences with the German Cartel system. In the same year, he would also start discussions with a Polish trade delegate on creating a neutral corridor between both countries.

On a governmental level, Hirsch co-founded the German economic inquiry commission, for which he edited twelve volumes regarding wholesaling and retailing. At the end of 1926 he prepared a study on international monopolies for the League of Nations and International Labor Office at the Geneva World Economic Conference in 1927. Julius Hirsch's activities in the private sector were also extensive during the 1920s. He was part of numerous corporate directorships in the industrial sector and banks such as the Nordische Bank für Handel und Industrie (Berlin) as well as real estate. His directorship in the industrial area ranged from cement, with large corporations such as Heidelberger Cement, to textiles- where he was vice-chairman of Berlin Gubener Hutfabrik- and finally to iron and steel companies such as the Upper Silesian Railroad Supply Corporation. All the German activities, be it academic, publicist or in the public and private sector, however gradually ceased in 1933 with the accession to power of the Nazi party. Because of his Jewish heritage his life and work became increasingly threatened. Immediately after Hitler came to power Hirsch was called to act as a professor in Denmark and migrated to

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<sup>432</sup> Julius Hirsch, *How Germany stabilized her currency*.

<sup>433</sup> Julius Hirsch, *La Rationalisation de la production* (Centre d'études et d'action sociales, économiques et politiques, 1927).

Copenhagen, where he became professor for marketing and trade policy at the Copenhagen Graduate Business School. Between 1933 and 1941 he was also the managing director of the Copenhagen Distribution Research Institute. He was the editor of the *Journal of Business Economics* and published various articles and books such as the *Turn of the Economic Tide* in 1937 and the *Latest Developments in Retailing* in 1939, translated into several languages.

In 1941 Julius Hirsch migrated to the United States where he resumed public and private sector activities, whilst remaining active in academia. From February 1941 onwards he resided in New York and began teaching as visiting professor for economics and business economics at the graduate faculty of the New School for Social Research, New York. In 1954, he founded- and became director of the New School's Center of Business Administration, where he would organise round tables and collaborate with other renowned universities, such as Harvard and Northwestern. In 1952, he received an honorary degree (dr. rer. Pol.) from the Free University Berlin, which would be his second honorary degree after one of the Koenigsberg Graduate School of Business (dr. oec. Publ.) in 1931. Additional to his academic work, Hirsch worked for the US Price Administration and was an advisor to public offices. From October 1941 until 1943 he was chief consultant to the Office of Price Control and collaborated in price and food policy questions with Presidential Advisor Bernard M. Baruch until 1950. He would contribute to various reports on food and agriculture for the US Department of Agriculture. In 1948 Hirsch was advisor to Governor Earl Warren of California and from 1950 until 1952 advisor to Senate minority leader Wherry. 1952 saw Hirsch become advisor to the Committee for Economic Stability at the International Monetary Conference in Mexico City and he helped set up the United Nation's expert's committee on international price regulation. In the private sector, Hirsch advised corporations in manufacturing, radio, banking and finance. He for example advised the bank Lehmann Brothers in 1943-44 and the Jeans Manufacturer Levi's. Julius Hirsch died on August 14, 1961 in New York at the age of 78.

When Julius Hirsch died, he left behind an extensive collection of articles and books. The publications he contributed in his area of expertise would often appear in different languages and thus addressed a large audience. *The American Economic Miracle* was his first larger success and was, according to the archival material,

published in 13 editions in German and (partly) translated into Russian, French and Hebrew.<sup>434</sup> Even though the archival material on Hirsch does not verify it, there exists reason to believe that Hirsch visited the USA before writing the book, it would therefore reflect the experiences he gained in the USA.<sup>435</sup> As the title already suggests, Hirsch provides an analysis of the American economy, highlighting its advantages and pleading for a German imitation. As an economist, he carries out a very technical analysis of the American economy, providing many figures and statistics explaining the American success. His main arguments include that he sees the USA as a role-model, which could lead Germany towards progress and modernity. Hirsch supports the application of mass-production, standardisation, rationalisation and mechanization in the German economy, particularly industry and manufacturing. He calls for a combination of American mass-production and German workmanship, an evolution through incorporation of American methods. For Hirsch, any social question can be answered through economic prosperity and even cultural activity is only an expression of economic prosperity. Hirsch favours an interweaving of the European economies through American methods which ultimately leads to stability and peace. According to Hirsch “we must adapt”<sup>436</sup>, as “we cannot do without Americanization”<sup>437</sup>.

The ideas portrayed in *The American Economic Miracle* exhibit a close interrelationship with Hirsch's life. The author's economic academic background is a premise for the macro-economic approach of the book. The arguments raised by Hirsch are generally supported by statistical data, the work thus pursues a very technical and statistical standpoint, even when assessing cultural developments. His academic background in economics thus had an impact on his line of argumentation and the manner he presented data. The fact that Hirsch focuses strongly on economics is nevertheless not only a product of his academic background, it can also be explained by his working experience in manufacturing prior to his studies where he witnessed the production processes first hand for textile manufacturing and chemical-pharmaceuticals. When he later argued in favour of mechanization and

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<sup>434</sup> ‘Julius and Edith Hirsch Collection; AR 1254; Box 1; Folder 5; Leo Baeck Institute’

<sup>435</sup> When Ernest Mercier introduced Julius Hirsch to the audience for his lecture *La Rationalisation de la production* he referred to Hirsch's travels to the USA. For inquiry see: Julius Hirsch, *La Rationalisation de la production* (Centre d'études et d'action sociales, économiques et politiques, 1927). In addition, on page 164 of *Das Amerikanische Wirtschaftswunder* Hirsch recounts that he has visited an American Mail Order House.

<sup>436</sup> Hirsch, *La Rationalisation de la production*, p. 252.

<sup>437</sup> Idem., p. 258.

standardisation in *The American Economic Miracle* he had concrete empirical experience to assess abstract changes in production. This proximity to industry was something Hirsch maintained up until 1933 being part of the corporate directorship of textile, cement and railroad corporations. Once again Hirsch was in direct contact with the production processes and was most likely involved in the rationalisation and process-optimisation of the manufacturing companies. Being part of the industrial decision-makers it must have been Hirsch's desire to educate and convince other industrial leaders of the progressive economic methods he supported through writing his book.

In addition to his academic and industrial background Hirsch's political activity also had an impact on the ideas he presented in *The American Economic Miracle*. As early as 1916 Hirsch held positions in the German Federal Price Control Board, before being part of the Ministry of Commerce and was hence part of the political decision making. His work put him in near-daily contact with the political and economic approach of the USA and the impact it had on Germany. The close work with American delegates could have had a positive impact on the perceptions he had about the general American socio-economic model. After all Hirsch worked closely with the USA regarding the food deliveries to Germany, also attending meetings with Herbert Hoover. His work with the American officials on the food deliveries must have made Hirsch more familiar with the USA in general and re-enforced the idea he would later proffer in his book: that economic prosperity could answer all social questions. Hirsch even dedicated an entire chapter of his book to the key economic principles of Herbert Hoover, clearly showing that the political experiences Hirsch made later re-occurred in his writing. This is equally visible with regard to the reparations negotiations and the currency stabilization plans he handled. As an expert on economic stability and taking part in transnational negotiations, Hirsch could assess the position of the German economy from a European perspective. It is thus not surprising that this topic would be taken up in his book as he argued for an interlocking of the European economies. The political work of Hirsch provided proximity and thereby deeper insight into the socioeconomic model of the USA. This might even have been one of the reasons he emigrated to the USA in 1941.

The largest impact Julius Hirsch's life had on his ideas and arguments is connected to his professional activities. The majority of his various publications were related to or originated from these activities. His work was thereby far from being confined to academic publications. His membership in various national and international commissions required diverse publicist activity. Around the time Hirsch published *The American Economic Miracle* he, for example, prepared a study for the League of Nations. This certainly influenced his positive perception of international cooperation. Hirsch's strong advocacy of pan-European advantages as well as an interconnection with the USA are related to him being affiliated to supranational institutions.<sup>438</sup> A final connection between Hirsch's life and his literary work is related to the historical surrounding. Hirsch, a wartime survivor, experienced economic devastation and food shortages during the war and the post-war period. The restoration of economic activity and a sustainable living standard were political priorities. These developments permanently affected Hirsch's perception of wealth and prosperity. In his publication, he consequently argues that economic prosperity and a high standard of living are the prerequisite for all cultural activities. And as for Hirsch the American model is the most suitable for economic prosperity it is thereafter the condition to achieve social and cultural progression.

The experiences of Julius Hirsch consequently governed the beliefs he conveyed in *The American Economic Miracle*, the publication however also had an influence on his life. The relative success of the book increased the level of awareness for Hirsch, broadcasting his expert status in economic questions. This could have influenced his selection for economic commissions and might have even led to a larger transnational awareness. The various lectures he held in Great-Britain and especially France certainly indicate this. Particularly the lecture on the rationalisation of production Hirsch held for the Redressement Français, is of interest here. His lecture in Paris, on 10 December 1926, under the chairmanship of the French Trade Minister Bokanowsky illustrated the historical development of the modern economy and industry in Germany and France and, thereafter, explained the advantages of rationalisation as a new economic method. According to Hirsch rationalisation as technical process was divided into the rationalisation of work, industry, markets and

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<sup>438</sup> For information on Hirsch's pan-european approach see: Ernst Fraenkel, *Amerika im Spiegel des deutschen politischen Denkens; Äusserungen deutscher Staatsmänner und Staatsdenker über Staat und Gesellschaft in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika*. (Köln: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1959), p. 286.

production. His general argument was that the adaption of modern rationalisation methods was already prevailing in Germany and implemented according to American methods. Hirsch strongly supported the European economic cooperation which would stabilise the economy and lead to prosperity.<sup>439</sup>

Hirsch had been introduced by the president of the Redressement, Ernest Mercier who in his epilogue raised similar arguments Hirsch had put forward in *The American Economic Miracle*. Mercier explained that all forms of social progress and even moral progress could only exist with economic prosperity as their precondition.<sup>440</sup> The general argumentation structure of Mercier and Hirsch regarding economic prosperity and progress is thus nearly identical and shows the transnational dimension of pro-American ideas in the 1920s. The German discourse and the French discourse related and influenced one another. It is even very likely that Hirsch met Lucien Romier, the intellectual head of the Redressement, whose work is representative for the French pro-Americanism. Even though no archival material or sources can prove Romier's attendance of Hirsch's lecture, one can assume that they have met in person.

Evidently there exists a strong relationship between Hirsch's experiences and the ideas he conveys in his book. *The American Economic Miracle* was to educate the public and industrial leaders on the application of new American economic methods. The work reflects his economic background, be it political, industrial or academic as well as the experiences he made during his most likely trip to the USA.<sup>441</sup> Even though Hirsch seemed to have visited the USA before writing the book, it does not necessarily convey a “true” analysis of the American society. He rather provides the readership with his vision for Germany which combines his personal experiences and political convictions. Hirsch's concern was to support the progress of the German economy and its social progress. The fact that his work did reach certain attention, shows that the debate about progress, modernity and Americanization was embedded in the public discourse. The book was published at the highpoint of the America-interest during the 1920s. *The American Economic Miracle* was thus certainly aimed at the general public for educational purposes as well as leaders in industry and politics to convince them of economic changes. Because of his technical approach

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<sup>439</sup> Hirsch, *La Rationalisation de la production*.

<sup>440</sup> Ibid.

<sup>441</sup> See footnote 435.

the book must have been most popular with representatives of industry and economy. The majority of pro-Americans were part of the economic sector anyway and therefore amenable to the US-model Hirsch promoted.

### **5.1.3. “Das Amerikanische Wirtschaftswunder”**

*Das Amerikanische Wirtschaftswunder* was first published in 1926 by the publishing house Fischer in Berlin. The S. Fischer Verlag was, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the most important and prestigious publishing house and its catalogue included famous German authors such as Thomas Mann. Up until the end of the 1920s it was chaired by its Jewish founder Samuel Fischer, until his son in law Gottfried Bermann would take over the company in 1928. The name and the Jewish background of the Fischer publishing house were both likely reasons for Hirsch to choose this particular publishing house. Then again, the fact that his work was published by Fischer speaks for the relevance of the book and gave it a potentially large sales market.

The book is divided into twelve chapters of which the first four elucidate the fundamentals and background to the economic analysis of the USA which is to follow in the main part. The first chapters describe the development of the American economic forces and its preconditions. Moreover, it establishes the “factual basis” of Hirsch's key concept: prosperity. Chapters five through ten provide an in-depth analysis of the various forces of the American economy Hirsch deems important. These include the features and organisation of industry, case studies of the slaughter houses and Ford Motor Company, as well as considerations about the American agriculture, transport system, trade, finance and stock market. The final two chapters, eleven and twelve, depict the relationship between economics and culture and the future development trends of Germany and the USA.

The following constructivist analysis of the book will be carried out through looking at two dominant conceptions which highlight Hirsch's argumentation and simultaneously provide a point of reference for the relationship between the conveyed pro-Americanism and national identity on a conceptual and interpretative level. A first part will be looking at the concept of prosperity (german: Reichtum), its



importance and the means to achieve it. The second part will investigate the socio-cultural consequences of economic prosperity and its impact on the development of the future. When contemplating the statements and arguments of Hirsch it will be necessary to bear in mind their subjective dimension. Despite Hirsch probably having visited the United States and providing a very analytical investigation of the American economy, the focus for this research will lie on Hirsch's motives to portray this specific America-image. Whether the content of the book is accurate and can be verified is of subordinated importance to this research. The goal is rather to understand the causalities of the portrayed America-image and its relationship, if any, with Germany and more specifically with its national identity. As for the American image, the German national identity is a construction, we will thus try and find the means for their creation and a structural connection between the two concepts.

### *The road to prosperity*

The central concept around which the entire argumentation of *The American Economic Miracle* rotates is prosperity. Hirsch presents prosperity as abstract concept and benchmark for the evaluation of success, be it on a personal or more importantly national level. Thereby prosperity is initially pictured as something purely economic, which then at a later stage impacts different socio-cultural settings. The author creates prosperity as a super-ordinated objective, towards which all social and national activity should be geared. The first part of Hirsch's work is therefore dedicated to explaining how the USA figures as a role model for the concept of prosperity. Hirsch begins by developing its fundamentals which are based on the natural resources of a given country. Natural prosperity will then at a later stage translate into the society of a nation or as Hirsch puts it: "Der Reichtum des Landes Amerika wandelt sich mehr und mehr in einen bewußt genutzten Reichtum des Volkes." - The wealth of the country USA is changing more and more into a consciously utilised wealth of the people.<sup>442</sup> In the USA this economic wealth does not, however, rest only on natural richness, it is also combined with rigid work organisation and exceeding productivity. The criteria Hirsch thus uses, to determine

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<sup>442</sup> Hirsch, *Das amerikanische Wirtschaftswunder*, p. 9.

the success of any given country, are purely economic and figuratively culminate in the concept of prosperity.

The analysis of American prosperity is multi-layered and begins with what Hirsch considers its foundations in historical perspective. This includes natural resources, political unity, economic energy, work organisation and the organisation of merchandise and finance.<sup>443</sup> This foundation is the basis for Hirsch's analysis of the USA and already shows which areas are important for a conceptual understanding of prosperity. What prosperity symbolises on a national level, what one would call the “standard of living” symbolises on a private level.<sup>444</sup> Hirsch measures this standard of living by criteria such as wage levels, demonstrating the macroeconomic approach he pursues.<sup>445</sup> The author argues that what constitutes the success of the USA is a fundamental will for economic accomplishment and efficiency. This will is based on the immigration of foreign labour in order to achieve a higher living standard. Not only does Hirsch argue that Europe can learn from this use of workforce, it also clearly shows how both concepts refer back to each other.

Probably the most important requirements for prosperity or *Reichtum* can be found in the American industry. As a consequence, the largest part of the book is dedicated to investigating industry's driving forces. Its cornerstones include rationalisation, the standardisation of consumption and production, as well as evolution in corporate organisation.<sup>446</sup> Hirsch argues that rationalisation allows mass production and mass production inevitably leads to standardised mass consumption. The standardisation of production and consumption thus goes hand in hand. This standardisation in industry is effectively represented by the introduction of assembly lines, which Hirsch refers to as “the landmark of decisive work progress”<sup>447</sup> (“Das Wahrzeichen entscheidenden Arbeitsfortschritts”). Assembly lines were one of the revolutionary means of production that Henry Ford had introduced in his automobile factory at Highland Park and were largely responsible for the affordability and thereafter success of the Model T. According to Hirsch assembly line production is mass production's highest accomplishment.<sup>448</sup> This pro-Fordist attitude is in line with

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<sup>443</sup> Idem., p. 15.

<sup>444</sup> Note here that Hirsch, except for the term “prosperity” does not refer to the “standard of living”. These concepts rather symbolise reoccurring narratives.

<sup>445</sup> Hirsch, *Das amerikanische Wirtschaftswunder*, p. 21.

<sup>446</sup> Idem., p. 30.

<sup>447</sup> Idem., p. 40.

<sup>448</sup> Idem., p. 40.

the general German pro-Americanism of the 1920s and the prevailing appreciation of Fordism at the time. Julius Hirsch's discussion of Henry Ford and his work underlines how pronounced this reception of Ford was in Germany.

Hirsch's appraisal of assembly line production thereby not only relates to the prevalent Fordism-discourse, it also mirrors the historical circumstances and Hirsch's personal experiences. American-style economic rationalisation in German businesses was ongoing and widespread by the time Hirsch published *Das Amerikanische Wirtschaftswunder* in 1926. Standardisation in the industrial sector was one of the main sources for positive America-images as it increased production and profitability. Hirsch experienced these developments first hand through his corporate directorships over the course of the 1920s. As we have discussed in the previous section these ranged from Heidelberger Cement to the Berlin Gubener hat factory and iron and steel companies such as the Upper Silesian Railroad Supply Corporation. Particularly in textile manufacturing such as the Gubener hat factory, mass production and mechanisation were part of the regular manufacturing process already, shortly after the First World War and certainly during the mid-1920s.

Hirsch's argument that assembly line production leads to a decrease in retail prices while simultaneously increasing wages and production is thus little surprising. It simply underlines his positive perception of the American economic model which is presented through innovation of economic methods. Additionally, it however also shows, how important the subjective and personal dimension is in Hirsch's positive assessment of the USA. The author's vocal pro-Americanism and glorification of economic prosperity arise out of the historical circumstances as well as personal experiences. Hirsch's pro-Americanism consequently merges objective characteristics of the American-model with a subjective construction. His assessment for example that assembly line production symbolises labour as humanities highest good clearly exaggerates the relationship between assembly line production, industrial success and socio-economic prosperity.<sup>449</sup> This subjective dimension of Hirsch's pro-Americanism is not only visible through the prosperity-narrative but also through his choice of words. While the title "economic miracle" already suggests his America affinity, Hirsch in addition repeatedly uses terms such as "miraculous" when he discusses American mass consumption, highlighting his pro-American perspective and ultimate

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<sup>449</sup> Idem., p. 43.

construction of a shining America-image.<sup>450</sup>

This construction and functional dimension of a positive America-image through the reoccurring narratives of prosperity and the standard of living is further visible through constructivist theory. As we have seen in the theoretical part the main focus for the Constructivist is to understand the causality of structures and agents. First of all, it is therefore necessary to determine what can be considered as structure and agency in *The American Economic Miracle*. For Constructivists agents are active participants in a given society or a given context (see chapter 3.1.). In the particular context of this source the active participant is the narrator/author, thus Julius Hirsch. Through the ideas raised in his book Hirsch becomes an active part of the Americanization-discourse and the debate about the American-model. From a constructivist perspective Hirsch therefore represents the structurationist interpretation of agency. The author, as agent, is thereby influenced by patterns of stable meaning: the structures. These structures influence the character and convictions of the author and he consequently acts based upon his assumptions about the structures. In this case acting signifies the conscious development of narratives about the importance of socio-economic wealth and prosperity.

The constructivist causality of structures and agents here, therefore, relates to understanding and explaining why the author constructs these dominant narratives. As described above, they can certainly be explained by the historical circumstances of the 1920s and Hirsch's personal experiences. On top of that however Hirsch's call for increased prosperity and progress symbolises that he clearly perceives the German economy as underdeveloped in international comparison. From a constructivist perspective Hirsch's progressive arguments are based upon his assumptions about the state of the German economy, more precisely its backwardness. This particular perception of the German economy showcases the central constructivist structures in *The American Economic Miracle*: progression and stagnation. Hirsch's argumentation throughout the book is essentially an endorsement of progress and innovation and a disapproval of economic conservatism. Structurally, progress and stagnation henceforth exist in juxtaposition. Hirsch seemingly intends to prevent any form of economic stagnation through an appraisal of the American-model, through which he tries to underline the importance of

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<sup>450</sup> Idem., p. 12.

progressing the German economy. The exemplary use of the American model in this sense highlights the functional dimension of Hirsch's pro-Americanism.

The construction and repetition of the progression-narrative is consequently reoccurring throughout the book. It is for instance a large part of what Hirsch deems the most important factors of the industrial success of the United States. These mainly include the general approach and attitude of employers and employees towards industry. According to Hirsch the American society collectively attempts a multi-layered promotion of rationalisation. On top of rationalisation and productivity Hirsch therefore considers the nature of American employees as decisive for industrial success.<sup>451</sup> Particularly the progressive and positive attitude are viewed as determining factors. On an ideological level the American Dream ensures this endorsement of material success and averts any form of class struggle. Progress is in economic terms denoted the “countries general religion”.<sup>452</sup> This metaphorical equalisation of progress and religion highlights the importance and influence of the constructivist progression structure. The author creates and inflates the progress-narrative to the central precept of socio-economic wealth. This is also visible in one of Hirsch's most important arguments: “We will solve the social question through economic prosperity!” (Wir lösen die soziale Frage durch Wohlstand!)<sup>453</sup> Hirsch here clearly suggests that economic prosperity provides more than an intrinsic value and impacts the society as a whole, beyond simple economics. Industrial success and therewith economic progress are ultimately projected onto the social economy. This demonstrates the persistence of the progress-narrative throughout Hirsch's argumentation and its importance as most influential constructivist structure. The phrase “We will solve the social question through economic prosperity!” additionally highlights the functional component of Hirsch's pro-Americanism: Hirsch demonstrates how the carry-over of the US-model ultimately serves the purpose of enhancing the German social structure.

The author's exceptional focus on economic prosperity and its influence on the entire society can not only be explained from a constructivist perspective but also relates to the historical circumstances. As discussed in the section on the US-German relations (chapter 4.1.) the first half of the 1920s was in Germany marked by

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<sup>451</sup> Idem., p. 68.

<sup>452</sup> Idem., p. 70.

<sup>453</sup> Idem., p. 68.

increasing inflation and economic difficulty. When Hirsch published his book in 1926, it appeared three years after the highpoint of the hyperinflation and two years after endorsing the Dawes Plan. Hirsch had himself witnessed how the post-war period was effectively characterised by economic stagnation if not regression. The actual German reality during the mid-1920s thus demonstrated how financial and economic prosperity indeed fostered social and political stability. Thereby Hirsch's professional and academic surrounding certainly supported his awareness of how social development was effectively sustained by economic prosperity. On top of that the actual importance of the USA in developing the Dawes Plan and consequently assisting in a cyclical development of Germany surely encouraged the author's positive America image. After the economic hardship of the post-war years an endorsement of prosperity combined with a high standard of living and a coincident rejection of economic stagnation is thus not surprising, nor is the pro-American attitude of an economist.

In his work, Julius Hirsch thus demonstrates his readership how the culmination of prosperity looks like in the USA and how adopting a similar economic strategy can have positive effects on Germany. In order to investigate the actual features of American economic prosperity he provides two case studies: the slaughterhouse industry in Chicago and the Ford automobile enterprise at Highland Park.<sup>454</sup> In his investigation of the slaughterhouse industry Hirsch, instead of taking a moral approach, rationally examines the industry regarding the technical innovations it has initiated. While Hirsch describes the Chicago slaughterhouses as innovative and exemplary, anti-Americans have repeatedly portrayed the same industry as the culmination of a perverse mass society that values standardisation and productivity over morality. Hirsch contrastingly views Chicago as prime example of standardization, rationalisation and productivity. This contradicting approach to the slaughterhouse industry shows, how similar developments were assessed in complete opposition by pro-Americans and anti-Americans. Moreover, it demonstrates how functionally pro- and anti-Americanism refer to a larger context than simply their relation to the USA or the American economic model. Pro-Americanism and anti-Americanism for that matter have a paramount significance in relation to national realities and identities. Assessing the same developments as antithesis highlights the

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<sup>454</sup> Idem., pp. 79-106.

functional dimension of said concepts and how they relate to a larger framework.

Hirsch's investigation of the Ford Motor Company provides similar insights into the further stages of his pro-Americanism. In an assessment of Ford's corporate organisation Hirsch investigates whether assembly line work and its working monotony have a negative impact on the workers. Particularly this working monotony is once again a frequent criticism of anti-Americans. For Hirsch, however the standardisation of work flows has actually led to positive influences such as fewer corporate changes in personnel. Hirsch thus concludes that it is important to learn from these principles rather than rejecting them on the basis of old-fashioned claims.<sup>455</sup> The author's account of the Fordist methods thus further demonstrates the educational component of his work. It is thereby another example of how the depicted America-image relates to the German reality: in his account of the American automobile industry, Hirsch stresses that Germany should not close itself off from what he calls "one of the most beautiful inventions of modern times"<sup>456</sup>. He demands innovative economical politics instead of asceticism. The automobile thereby metaphorically symbolises progress and development, whereas everything else is discarded as backward. The overarching constructivist structures we have recognised above become very visible through these passages. They highlight the antithesis of progressive economic thinking and backward conservatism, i.e. progression and stagnation. Progression as paramount structure allows to germanise a selective version of the American model without losing what it means to be German. Therefore progression, as constructivist structure, is a catalyst for a new conceptual design of the German future. Hirsch's comparison between the United States and Germany thus emphasises both structures and demonstrates how the portrayed pro-Americanism is connected to the German national reality and in a broader sense also its national identity.

The author's call for a carry-over of the economic US-model demonstrates how he intends to support and foster his personal perception of Germany, which is simultaneously his perception of the German national identity. Hirsch's progress-narrative contains preselected characteristics of the American-model which he uses to encourage German socio-economic prosperity. Progress is the functional utopia Hirsch constructs in order to advance Germany and re-enforce its national identity. It

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<sup>455</sup> Idem., p. 106.

<sup>456</sup> Idem., p. 145.

is created as absolute and inherently positive structure which requires Germany to incorporate innovative economic American-methods to pursue collective advancement. Any form of economic stagnation is by contrast rejected and devalued. The United States consequently serves as super ordained platform which is used to develop prosperity and wealth narratives (and build the structure of progression). Through using the USA as structural platform for progression, Germany does not need to adapt the entire American-model, it can rather extract specific developments for national advancement. It again allows to Germanise a handpicked version of the American economic model, which Hirsch has created as utopian structure. To the Constructivist, emphasizing the advantages of economic prosperity and creating the structure of progression, allow a selective incorporation of the representation structure, into the own German national identity. Thereby the platform USA allows a debate about modernity, progress and a new design for the future, independent of cultural criticism. Progress is unbiased and free of moral connotations while the American-model as a whole is not. For the author, it seems as though a carry-over of its technological and economic aspects is possible without losing the German cultural identity.

The constructivist paradigm of incorporating or rejecting structural identity can also be recognized in Hirsch's account of trade and finance in the United States. Particularly the mail order industry, which Hirsch apparently visited during a stay in the USA, provides many paragons for Germany in regard to its particular evolution and features.<sup>457</sup> The author for example argues that they provide extraordinary production speed and saving of labour. Hirsch here once again stresses the exemplary function of the United States and argues that Germany can use parts of the American developments to improve its own economy, in this case an expansion of the mail order industry. The constructivist progress structure here allows a selective incorporation of the American model and thereby a reinforcement of national identity. This structural incorporation is fundamentally based on the constructivist idea of identity-insecurity. As discussed in the section on constructivist methodology identities are constantly changing and thereafter figure as inconsistent representation structures. They need to be reconstructed and renegotiated in relation to the current individual or national circumstances. Identity insecurity thus demands reinforcement

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<sup>457</sup> *Idem.*, pp. 162ff.



and enhancement of identities, national ones in particular. In this case reinforcing German national identity means applying American developments to support progress: the USA is thus a catalyst that provides the building blocks for a new conceptual design of the German future.

Hirsch's discussion of American commodity trading and mail order businesses also highlights the functional dimension of the American-model. Here the author argues that American innovations in commodity trading will certainly also reach Germany in the near future, the only question is whether Germany should let the USA take the initiative.<sup>458</sup> Once again Hirsch demonstrates, that his pro-Americanism is mainly channelled to advance Germany. The glorification of the American economy was hence only a tool to convince the German public of the advantages economic progress would bring; how it would lead to prosperity and eventually a higher living standard. If Hirsch's pro-Americanism did not have a functional dimension or subliminal goal, he wouldn't insist Germany should hinder American firms establishing commodity trading businesses on German soil. It seems as though Hirsch's objective is to support German independence and sustainability through the incorporation of necessary and inevitable economic processes. This argumentative independence between the USA and Germany becomes particularly visible in the following section on the socio-cultural consequences of prosperity. The independence thereby has a particular impact on the conceptual future design of national identity.

### ***Prosperity and its socio-cultural consequences***

The final chapters of *The American Economic Miracle* are dedicated to the relationship between culture and economics. They discuss the future tendencies of the USA as well as Germany's future development. Once again, the most pivotal relationship between economics and its socio-cultural implementations relates to the American approach to progress. According to Hirsch, the key to American progress is not surprisingly its economy: its construction speed and growth rate. This economic energy is supported by a political and private will for uniformity. To Hirsch this economic will of the USA consists of a strong urge for standardisation. He even uses

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<sup>458</sup> Idem., p. 174.

the term “culture of uniformity”<sup>459</sup> to describe the American quest for standardisation, particularly of production, demand and consumption. Despite the culture of uniformity, the author argues that while German immigrants in the USA are politically and economically American they culturally remain German.<sup>460</sup> This distinction between both countries shows how he fundamentally differentiates between Germany and the USA on a cultural level. The essence and nature of both countries seem different and unique, regardless of his call for economic amendment. Hirsch thereby introduces the first real distinction between both countries irrespective of his claim that Germany should adapt American developments. Additionally, Hirsch argues that there exist differences in the cultural affinity of the German and American upper class: Germans here being more affine to culture than Americans.<sup>461</sup>

These passages demonstrate how Hirsch's work relates to the construction of national identity. The constructivist conception of national identities focuses on the minimal group paradigm and how group identities inevitably emerge in social interaction (see chapter 3.1.1.). The minimal group paradigm illustrates that national identities are mainly created through comparison between groups- the “we-vs-them” dichotomy. Whilst the “self” is assessed positively, outside influences are perceived negatively. As a consequence, people tend to exaggerate their perception of others and of differences. These distinct categories lead to strengthened group identities i.e. national identities. In this particular case, the German identity- which we will call Germanity- serves as the “we”, whereas the American identity serves as “other”. Hirsch's assessment that Germany is culturally superior to the USA strengthens these group identities i.e. reinforces the German national identity. This reasoning highlights structural differences between both countries and the importance of a unique culture for the creation of national identity. As a consequence, Hirsch's cultural conception of Germanity premises on irrational factors rather than economics.

Aside from Hirsch's cultural comparison, his description of the actual cultural characteristics of the USA develops important arguments. The author states that culture was never a phenomenon that was the result of intellectual coincidences, but

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<sup>459</sup> Idem., p. 219.

<sup>460</sup> Idem., p. 221.

<sup>461</sup> Idem., p. 222.

rather the expression and consequence of economic prosperity.<sup>462</sup> As he puts it: “Kultur war nie eine lediglich auf geistigen Zufällen beruhende Erscheinung, sondern stets ein Ausdruck wirtschaftlichen Wohlstandes, sei es einzelner Klassen (oder auch einzelner Familien), sei es ganzer Nationen.”<sup>463</sup> (Culture has never been a phenomenon only based on intellectual coincidences, but always an expression of economic prosperity, be it of particular classes (or particular families), or of entire nations.) Economic prosperity is thus the prerequisite for any cultural activity and cultural progress. This is certainly one of the reasons why Hirsch focuses a large part of his book on the importance of economic prosperity and declaring it any given society's main goal. Through describing the cultural component of prosperity, he underlines its necessity for Germany and further legitimises his claim that economic progress is the basis for national headway. After Hirsch had constructed an absolute version of the American economy, as functional basis for structural incorporation, in the first part of his work, this final part is in contrast strengthening and upgrading Germany on the basis of cultural superiority. This highlights the clear relationship between Hirsch's constructed America image and the German national identity. It once more shows the functional dimension of pro-Americanism which here serves the purpose of reinforcing and reconstructing his version of Germanity.

According to Hirsch cultural differences between the USA and Germany also relate to the evolution of mass society. He argues that the cultural influences of the United States are “not always the best”<sup>464</sup> and that American customs are really not needed in Germany.<sup>465</sup> When the author here refers to Germany he uses the term of “we”.<sup>466</sup> This linguistic approach is one of the typical features used in the creation of national identity: drawing on a subjective feeling of belonging to the same community and inclining superiority. Hirsch linguistically portrays himself as part of the “in-group” which he contrasts with the American “out-group”. In addition, this particular phrasing relates to one of the main constructivist tool of collective identity formation: hierarchy. National identity, as any other collective identity, is based on the ‘we-them-dichotomy’ and this differentiation from others always contains a dimension of superiority. After all national identity rests on providing a social

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<sup>462</sup> Idem., p. 224.

<sup>463</sup> Ibid.

<sup>464</sup> Idem., p. 229.

<sup>465</sup> Idem., p. 231.

<sup>466</sup> Ibid.

representation model, which is at least in parts required to be superior to other identities to emit legitimacy. The fact that Hirsch portrays the German national identity as superior, reinforces it on the constructivist conceptions of hierarchy.

Hirsch's rather negative perception of American mass culture also allows some final assumptions about the features of his pro-Americanism. Even though Hirsch certainly is generally very pro-American, he is not in complete admiration of everything American. His pro-Americanism is in essence economic, which favours a selective incorporation of only economic developments in Germany. Despite Hirsch's assessment that any cultural activity was only the expression of economic prosperity, he apparently thought it was possible to incorporate the economic American-model without adopting its cultural peculiarities. This emphasizes the functional relationship between pro-Americanism and the German national identity: the fact that Hirsch rejects the cultural dimension of the American-model provides the German readership with a preselected toolkit Germany should adapt for progress and modernity. A certain cultural condescension towards the USA here reinforces the German national identity morally and thereby allows the adaptation of economic processes more easily, without losing or subjugating what it means to be German.

The concluding part of *The American Economic Miracle* investigates the possible future developments of the USA and Germany respectively. Hirsch's vision for the German future thereby draws upon historical arguments. He argues that unlike today, "back then" people enthused about the degree of technisation and organisation of the German industry.<sup>467</sup> These passages draw on historical developments and nostalgia to reinforce the perception that Germany is in need of rebuilding its economy to make up for lost times. The use of nostalgia, historical genealogy, superiority and irrationality thereby all support the creation of national identity. Hirsch hence intends a reinforcement of Germanity by promoting it should "return" to its former economic prosperity. With this in mind Hirsch's final thesis reads: "Wir werden uns amerikanisieren [...] weil wir es müssen"<sup>468</sup>: we will Americanise, because we have to. It is once again an explicitly call for incorporation. Clearly the positive image of the American economy Hirsch created in the first part of the book ultimately served the purpose of establishing a receptiveness for economic development, which he perceives as fundamental for Germany's future.

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<sup>467</sup> Idem., p. 252.

<sup>468</sup> Idem., p. 255.

#### 5.1.4. Discussion and Implication of the Research

The two dominant narratives of *The American Economic Miracle* are the conceptual peculiarities of prosperity on the one hand and its sociocultural consequences on the other hand. Hirsch dedicated the first part of his work to establishing prosperity as the main goal for the German society. Prosperity as dominant narrative was characterised by the importance of mass-production and the pursuit of industrial success. According to Hirsch, prosperity was the precondition for progressing the German sociocultural future. In order to lead Germany towards modernity the author created two opposing structures: progression and stagnation. Whilst progression was the ultimate goal for the German society, stagnation had to be fenced off. Prosperity was created as functional utopia to advance Germany and re-enforce German national identity. The structure of progression allowed to germanise a selective version of the economic model USA, which in constructivist terms recreated national identity through selective incorporation. The USA became a platform for a German debate about modernity and a new design for the German future. Therefore, advancing Germany and patching the German national identity, which was clearly broken through the First World War, were the underlying narratives of Hirsch's work. The USA as catalyst provided the building blocks for a new conceptual design of the German future. The fact that Hirsch repeatedly referred to Germany as “we” underlines his desire to improve Germany with his work and shows the clear relationship between the pro-Americanism and the German national identity. After all, “we” versus “them” are the classic tools of creating national identity on a structural and constructivist level. Demarcation and incorporation are leading towards a reinforcement of the German national identity on a multitude of levels.

The second narrative about the sociocultural consequences of prosperity made a clear distinction between the German and the American culture. Here German national identity was structurally opposed to an inferior American culture. This reinforcement was a combination of the we-vs-them dichotomy and the use of hierarchy as tool for the creation of collective identities. Hirsch upgraded the German national identity through reinforcing its cultural superiority towards the USA after the

first part had subordinated Germany to the USA in economic terms.

A comparison of Hirsch's work with the general German pro-Americanism shows that multiple arguments in Hirsch's work fit the dominant narratives. Modernity and rationalisation are both key narratives of the German pro-Americanism, and the general canon of the Weimar Republic. The methods he requests, such as mass-production, standardisation and mechanisation are based on Fordist principles and similar to more general German pro-Americanism of the 1920s. The book nevertheless surpasses the mere pro-Americanism and is interconnected to the historical developments. A call for economic stability and even currency stability must be seen in relation to the post-war hyperinflation, economic depression and the reparations-discussion. These topics not only reoccur in the book, they were reasons for the book. Hirsch himself was strongly involved in the currency stabilization and the reparations-negotiations during the Weimar Republic. In this sense the economic post-war situation, the professional activities of Julius Hirsch and his pro-American work *The American Economic Miracle* all influenced one another.

## **5.2. Case Study: French pro-Americanism 1918-1933**

### **5.2.1. General Perspective**

The admiration of American economic progressivism was geographically not limited to Germany. Pro-Americanism was as much of a French phenomenon as it was a German one. Not surprisingly there indeed existed a connection between the debates in both countries. This connection would show itself through various publications as German and French pro-Americans developed an intellectual exchange. Even though there overall existed less pro-American publications in France than in Germany, the argumentative foundations in both countries were similar: French pro-Americans equally supported the adaptation of American economic methods after the First World War, namely Taylorism. "Taylorisme", as the French would call it, was seen as an answer to Socialism whilst being the backbone of France's wartime ally USA. Taylorism and "machinisme" i.e. mechanisation of manufacturing and industry, were to rebuild the destroyed French economy. The support for Taylorism was thereby

independent of different political convictions and was also supported outside of the industrial circles.<sup>469</sup>

The great significance of “Taylorisme” did not diminish with the publication of Henry Ford's autobiography. Whilst it indeed had some success in France it was nowhere near as prominent as in Germany, where its reviews had led to an own literary genre. The first French translation of *My life and work*<sup>470</sup> appeared in 1925, but relatively few reviews discussed the pros and cons of Fordism. Ford's methods were rather perceived as a more practical and humanised implementation of Taylorism. Ford's work did nevertheless inspire voyages to the USA by industrial pioneers such as André-Gustave Citroen (1878-1935) and Louis Renault (1877-1944). They supported an adoption of Ford's methods in light of Americans economic supremacy and perceived Fordism as example of the possibilities “machinisme” offered, particularly in the auto-industry. Taylorism nevertheless remained a catchphrase and one of the main references for the Americanism debate of the French philo-Americans during the 1920s. Whilst Ford's methods were genuinely apprehended, they did not become the nucleus of a technization debate. There emerged no clear-cut distinction between Fordism and Taylorism as it did in Germany. What the term Fordism was to Germany, Taylorism was to France.<sup>471</sup>

Even without a direct and extensive Fordism debate, the discourse would still centre on industrial mass-production, rationalisation and the genuine adoption of the American economic model.<sup>472</sup> This debate moved in the focus of public attention when a rationalisation movement emerged around the industrialist Ernest Mercier in 1925. The so called Redressement Français (French Recovery) aspired to technocratic corporatism, a Fordist inspired technological and productive modernisation of France through top-down implementation.<sup>473</sup> The Redressement Français published a journal entitled *Cahiers du Redressement Français*<sup>474</sup>, where they would formulate their economic suggestions and reform proposals. The goal was to convince the general public of their productivist goals and ultimately exercise influence on political decision making. The representatives of the Redressement

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<sup>469</sup> Egbert Klautke, *Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten*, p. 215; Sommer, *Die Weltmacht USA im Urteil der französischen Publizistik. 1924-1939.*, p. 97.

<sup>470</sup> Ford and Crowther, *My life and work*.

<sup>471</sup> Egbert Klautke, *Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten*, pp. 216–218.

<sup>472</sup> Idem., p. 218.

<sup>473</sup> Idem., p. 218f.

<sup>474</sup> *Cahiers du Redressement français*. (Paris: Éditions de la S.A.P.E., 1927).

sought to create a French industrial society by modelling it after the American paragon. The Redressement saw the USA as a functioning mass-civilization, which was the ultimate benchmark for prosperity. Liberalism and Socialism would not offer a sufficient resolution to the existence of the mass-phenomenon. The conclusion was hence the rationalisation of French industry to create mass-production, a mass-market, and ultimately a mass-society. The ideological idea behind this approach was that one could only truly assess a society according to its living standard and not its culture and it was only a mass-society that would support this high-living. The design for the French future was one of rationalization and productivity following the American example.<sup>475</sup>

On a political level the Redressement Français favoured a government of functional elites. The oligarchic structure was to be composed of industrialists and economists and renew France with the economy as the starting point. The Redressement advocated the creation of a “union nationale”, a national union of employers, employees and consumers which was to be the prerequisite for the modernisation of France.<sup>476</sup> As the Redressement Français was critical of the parliamentary structures and favoured oligarchy, they have been called the French version of Reactionary Modernism by some historians. Egbert Klautke has for example highlighted parallels between both movements which include the mass-productivist orientation, the technological paragon of the American model and the anti-parliamentarian or anti-democratic tendencies.<sup>477</sup>

To implement their conception of an industrial society, the Redressement Français exerted increasing influence on French politics. They held close contacts to André Tardieu who was member of Prime Minister Raymond Poincaré's cabinet between 1926 and 1928, before becoming elected Prime Minister himself in 1929. As member of Poincaré's cabinet Tardieu became Minister of Transport in 1926 where he promoted the rationalization of semi-public businesses. By 1928 he became Minister of Domestic Affairs under Poincaré's successor Aristide Briand and would succeed him as Prime Minister one year later whilst remaining Minister of Domestic Affairs. Despite the Redressement's close contacts to Tardieu the political influence of the group was kept within limits.<sup>478</sup> They certainly shifted the public attention

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<sup>475</sup> Egbert Klautke, *Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten*, p. 219.

<sup>476</sup> *Idem.*, p. 221f.

<sup>477</sup> *Idem.*, p. 222.

<sup>478</sup> *Ibid.*



towards technological modernisation in industry through their various publications of the Cahiers. The fact that the Redressement counted tens of thousands of members by the end of the 1920s in this sense testifies to their public reach. If the group around Mercier ever did have accountable political influence, it declined after a rupture with Tardieu, even before he seized office in 1930. Eventually the worldwide economic crisis of 1929 destroyed the Redressement Français' goal of a technological modernisation of France.<sup>479</sup>

Also outside the Redressement Français, industrial rationalisation and methods of mass-production were supported and exerted. American economic progress was perceived as a top-down process and French pro-Americans demanded an identical carryover. Progress for France was viewed as a combination of industrial rationalisation on the one hand and domestic consumerism on the other. French industrial backwardness was consequently tackled by applying Taylorist methods during and shortly after the First World War. Thereby a link between Taylorism and corporate welfarism was of a typically French nature. Pro-Americans additionally demanded a strong managerial role of the state in economics. The state was to facilitate a gentler version of Taylorism in the interwar period. Despite these general demands and strong technophilia, rationalisation during the interwar period was almost exclusively limited to large firms. There simply existed too much disagreement over the orientation of rationalization in the political economy.<sup>480</sup>

This rationalisation debate was, alongside the Taylorism discourse, the second focal point of pro-Americans during the 1920s. Interestingly there existed a deliberate exchange between the French and the German rationalisation debate. A lot of the literature on rationalisation (and Fordism for that matter) was received and considered through German sources. In this sense, not only the USA but to a certain extent also Germany was seen as an example of technological and economic superiority to French pro-Americans.<sup>481</sup> The Franco-German exchange process was not only limited to publications, it was also manifested through lectures and presentations. Julius Hirsch for example, whose life and work we have already considered in the previous section, held a lecture in Paris on 10 December 1926 at the invitation of the Redressement Français. In his presentation *La rationalisation de*

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<sup>479</sup> Ibid.

<sup>480</sup> 'Fordism and the American Dream in France, 1919-1939' <[http://www2.cddc.vt.edu/digitalfordism/fordism\\_materials/frost.htm](http://www2.cddc.vt.edu/digitalfordism/fordism_materials/frost.htm)> [accessed 29 September 2015].

<sup>481</sup> Egbert Klautke, *Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten*, p. 227.

*le production*<sup>482</sup> Hirsch elucidated the advantages of general economic rationalisation. The rationalisation-process thereby included industry, production and workforce. Clearly there existed a substantial connection between the patterns of argumentation of German and French pro-Americans. The consensus was that the economic situation of France demanded the concrete application of rationalisation and technization despite all criticism.<sup>483</sup>

Even though key politicians and publicists had very different political orientations, French pro-Americanism was generally independent of political colour. The debate surpassed the technological and economic area and pro-Americans irrespective of their political affiliation would discuss even cultural advantages of the American model. Authors such as Durtain, Maurois, Braunschvig, and Romier intended a balanced analysis of American developments and highlighted its advantages for the French society. According to Dubreuil and Braunschvig for example the American model could be characterised by social harmony.<sup>484</sup> Durtain opposed the dominant idea that the USA was nothing but a mechanized and rationalised society. Maurois and Romier elaborated the dynamic rhythm of the American society and with it the advantages of rationalisation. Particularly the support of American youth and education, opposed to the French and European gerontocracy, were supposedly cornerstones of American superiority. American culture could surpass technological and material realities and offer intellectual paragons the French society should adapt. A synthesis of mass-civilisation and individualistic elite culture was attainable according to leading French pro-Americans.<sup>485</sup>

In conclusion, the French pro-Americanism discourse during the 1920s initially kicked off as an economic implementation of Taylorism in order to rebuild France after the First World War. Post 1925 Fordist methods added to the debate but would never reach the centre of the technization and modernization discussions. The discourse rather focused on the general application of the American model and thereby mixed Taylorist rationalization principles and Fordist mass-production. This debate was particularly promoted by the rationalisation-movement *Redressement Français*, created in 1925 around the manufacturer Ernest Mercier. The *Redressement*

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<sup>482</sup> Hirsch, *La Rationalisation de la production*.

<sup>483</sup> This criticism included negative effects of standardisation, materialism and machine-dependency.

<sup>484</sup> Sommer, *Die Weltmacht USA im Urteil der französischen Publizistik. 1924-1939*, p. 90f.

<sup>485</sup> Idem., pp. 85–97 with further references; especially p. 93.

supported technocratic corporatism and favoured a political rule of functional elites, preferably from the economic sector. With its monthly journal *Cahiers du Redressement Français*, the circle was substantially responsible for the shift of public interest towards pro-American technical modernisation and rationalization. Rationalization as an abstract concept thereby superseded industry and economy and was perceived as a shield concept applicable to the entire society including the domestic sphere.

All perceptions of the US model were thereby independent of political worldviews. Even though pro-Americanism was most frequently supported by liberal-conservatives, namely the Alliance Républicaine Démocratique around André Tardieu, affinity for Taylorism and rationalisation was conceivable in all political camps. Thereby the rationalisation literature was quite often received through Germany. The lecture by Julius Hirsch for the *Redressement Français* in Paris is in this sense a tribute to the close relationship of both pro-American circles. The rationalisation debate in both countries showed large intellectual similarities whereas terminologically there existed differences. Whilst Fordism and modernism were the nucleus of German pro-Americanism, the catchphrase for French pro-Americans were Taylorisme and Machinisme.<sup>486</sup> Rationalisation was conceptually part of the transnational canon. Generally, French pro-Americans tended towards a complete take-over of the American model, whilst German pro-Americans were inclined to only employ certain developments for the German socioeconomic reality.<sup>487</sup> In this sense France was more positive about the social effects of Americanization compared to Germany and its quest for retaining the German culture.

### 5.2.2. Lucien Romier

As we have seen the *Redressement Français* functioned as a platform for the formulation of pro-American ideas during the interwar period. It encouraged their propagation through its large public reach and regular publications. Intellectual head of the *Redressement Français* was the French journalist Lucien Romier. Romier's

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<sup>486</sup> Egbert Klautke, *Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten*, p. 237.

<sup>487</sup> Sommer, *Die Weltmacht USA im Urteil der französischen Publizistik. 1924-1939.*, pp. 85–97.

books *Qui sera le Maître- Europe ou Amérique*<sup>488</sup> and *Idées très simples pour les français*<sup>489</sup> thereby together formulate a representative roundup of the generally prevailing pro-American perceptions.

Lucien Romier's life and work can most thoroughly be retraced through the archival collection of the French National Archives.<sup>490</sup> This collection in Pierrefit-sur-Seine has been donated by Lucien Romier's wife Yvonne in 1980-1981. The inventory is comprised of six parts, containing materials on his biography, correspondences, travels, personal photographs as well as bibliographies of his work. On a biographical level, there exist three different works on Romier. First, a biography by Michel François, published in the Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes in 1944.<sup>491</sup> Secondly a university thesis by Micheline Perrin entitled *Quelques aspects de la pensée politique de Lucien Romier*<sup>492</sup> from 1968, including a four-page biography which is missing in the archival inventory. Finally, a work by Christine Roussel entitled *Lucien Romier*<sup>493</sup> on his life and political work, published in 1979. Even though the archival material includes a part on Romier's travels, it does not contain any information of his voyage to the United States. The work by Roussel however indicates that Romier did visit the USA from 20 April until 8 July 1927.<sup>494</sup>

Jean-Baptiste Lucien Romier was born on 19 October 1885 in Moiré- close to Lyon.<sup>495</sup> He was the third child to Blaise Romier and Jeanne-Marie-Isabelle Berchoud, a viniculture family in the Beaujolais region. Romier attended a Jesuit school in Mongrée before beginning his studies at the École Nationale des Chartes in 1905 where he studied history. By 1909 he graduated as an archivist and palaeographer. Romier continued his historical studies in Rome at the École Française de Rome from 1909 until the summer of 1912 and thereafter at the Institut française d'Espagne in Madrid until 1914. He would round off his studies with a doctorate in history in 1913 on the political origins of the religious wars entitled *Les origines politiques des guerres de religion*. This period of Romier's life was dedicated to historical research and saw the publication of various works which won

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<sup>488</sup> Romier, *Qui sera le Maître, Europe ou Amérique?*

<sup>489</sup> Romier, *Idées très simples pour les français*.

<sup>490</sup> 'Fonds Lucien Romier; 408AP/1-408AP/10; Archives Nationales de France'

<sup>491</sup> Michel François, 'Lucien Romier', *Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes*, 105 (1944), 338–44.

<sup>492</sup> Micheline Perrin, 'Quelques Aspects de La Pensée Politique de Lucien Romier' (Université de Lyon, 1968).

<sup>493</sup> Christine Roussel, *Lucien Romier (1885-1944): historien, économiste, journaliste, homme politique* (Paris: Editions France-Empire, 1979).

<sup>494</sup> Idem., p. 124.

<sup>495</sup> This biography is mainly based on: Christine Roussel, *Lucien Romier*.

him the Premier Prix Gobert from the French Academie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres three times, including his doctoral thesis.

During the First World War a very strong myopia (short-sightedness) hindered Romier's deployment. Nevertheless, also writers and researchers were expected to participate and contribute to the wartime efforts. Romier, being part of the ancillary service as a consequence became part of the economic department of the Ministry of War. One year earlier he had joined the Association nationale de l'expansion économique. Here Romier became head of customs, transport and exchange rates of the Association which undertook a survey on French industrial production and foreign competition. This work would introduce him to the economic sector.

Romier, combining his journalistic activity and economic affinity, would publish various political-economic articles and joined the *Journée Industrielle* in 1921 for which he became one of the editors. On 1 February 1925, he left the *Journée Industrielle* to join the journal *Figaro* where he became editor in chief. On 25 April 1927 Romier resigned from this position due to disagreements with his co-director and began extensive travels through Asia, North Africa and North America. Here his voyage to the USA between 20 April and 8 July 1927 stands out as it triggered his publications on the USA. During this time, Lucien Romier became a member of the *Redressement Français* and was part of its board from October 1927 onwards. His work *Idées très simples pour les français* was published through the *Redressement's* printing platform *Cahiers du Redressement Français*.

From 1925 onwards, Romier had been president of the *Société d'économie nationale* and part of the editorship of the journal *La réforme économique*. Romier also maintained connections to the *Comité franco-allemand d'information et de documentation* which was established in 1926. In 1932 Romier was fielded as political candidate for the *Alliance Républicaine Démocratique* in the legislative elections in Dieppe but was not successful. On 1 June 1934 Romier therefore returned to *Le Figaro* as editor in chief until 28 December 1940. From August 1940 onwards Philippe Petain, chief of state of the Vichy Regime, had repeatedly asked Romier to take on a consulting position in his cabinet. After multiple refusals and despite recurring health problems, Lucien Romier accepted Petain's request and went to Vichy on 8 February 1941. In August of the same year Petain would elect Romier Minister of the State.

Romier's ongoing cardiac health problems forced him to leave Vichy in the winter of 1941 for his convalescence. His deteriorating physical condition forced him to leave Vichy once again from October 1942 until April 1943 for an operation. After Petain had insisted on his return, Romier returned to Vichy one last time. His final political phase was marked by an anti-German stance which put his name on the list of undesirables because of which he was forced to resign on 23 December 1943. Lucien Romier died shortly afterwards of a heart-attack on 5 January 1944 when the Gestapo came to arrest him.

Of special interest for this research is Romier's journey to the United States and the publications which resulted therefrom. *Qui sera le Maître, Europe ou Amérique* was published in 1927 by the publishing house Hachette. In this travelogue, Romier investigates the emergence and characteristics of the economic masses. He perceived the “masses économiques” (economic masses) the greatest challenge for the modern nation-state. His overall image of the masses and their effect on sociocultural life was very ambivalent. Whilst the masses had led to the introduction of important economic developments, they had had a negative impact on cultural life. In his work Romier discussed the USA as a role model on how to deal with this mass-effect. As the USA had been exposed to the emergence of economic masses since its creation, it provided a relevant case study on their effects. His general image of the USA was thereby very positive as the country had, despite some sinister cultural peculiarities, adapted well to the challenges of an economic mass-society. Romier's second work on the USA entitled *Idées très simple pour les français* from 1928 rounds off his America perception. *Idées très simples pour les français* provided France with an economic guideline on how to deal with the emergence of economic masses. Romier characterised the USA as the main example to follow, particularly in economic terms. His ultimate goal for France was a materially prosperous society through application of American innovations. According to Romier the means for prosperity included rationalization and improvements in economic areas such as industry, agriculture and infrastructure. Romier called for a top-down implementation of these practices with as little state involvement as possible.

Romier's biography influenced his perception of the USA and the ideas he formulated in his works. Initially his academic historical background gave him a foundation for sociocultural research and demonstrates an interest in social

phenomena. Through Romier's work in the economic department of the Ministry of War he additionally developed an affinity for and proximity to the economic sector. His subsequent membership in the national association for economic expansion and his editorship of the *Journée Industrielle* added to his close contact with everyday economic developments. These professional activities shaped Romier's perception of the French economy and its potential. In addition, his work led him to travel to the USA which would influence his subsequent America image.

Romier's active membership in the *Redressement Français* had a further impact on his economic worldview and probably also influenced his beliefs about the role of state involvement in the economy. The *Redressement Français*, as rationalization movement, sharpened the economic convictions he would voice in his publications and simultaneously provided a platform and audience for his writings. Especially the active support for political change by the *Redressement Français* can be retraced in the educative purpose Romier stressed in his publications. The conviction for economic change in France is further highlighted through his pursuit of a political career. His affiliation with the *Redressement Français* and his relative prominence as a writer and journalist must have helped him in fostering this political career.

Lucien Romier's publications were certainly prevalent and part of the French public-discourse on Americanization. The reputation of the publishing house Hachette added to the distribution of Romier's first work, as did the large membership of the *Redressement Français*, through which *Idées très simples pour les français* were published. The success of the books can further be explained by the time they appeared: the interest in the USA was at a highpoint during the mid-1920s, particularly because of the visible American investments in the French economy and the constant evolution of the Franco-American relations (see chapter 4.2.).

Despite many influences of Romier's life experiences on his work, the publication of his America related books in contrast also exhibited some influences on his further life and career path. Their success added to his prominence and thereby supported his later political career. In addition, the publications cemented Romier as intellectual head of the *Redressement Français*.<sup>496</sup> This special position in the *Redressement* facilitated an introduction to the later French Prime Minister André Tardieu, to whom the *Redressement* had close contacts.

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<sup>496</sup> Egbert Klautke, *Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten*, p. 220.

### 5.2.3. “Qui sera le Maître, Europe ou Amérique” & “Idées très simples pour les français”

The basis for Lucien Romier's America-works was his journey to North America between April and July 1927. Romier processed his experiences throughout the USA in *Qui sera le Maître, Europe ou Amérique?* (Who will be the master? Europe or America). Contrary to what the title might suggest, the work does not essentially compare Europe and the United States. It rather provides an investigation of what Romier deems the new socio-economic driving force: the emergence and characteristics of a mass-economy. This explanation is succeeded by an investigation of what the effects of the mass-economy are on the USA, where Romier draws minor comparisons with Europe.

*Qui sera le Maître?* was published in 1927 by the publishing house Hachette in Paris. The book is divided into four parts of which the first one describes the historical developments that led to the evolution of the phenomenon of masses and their relation to the nation-state. The second part focuses on Romier's key concept: the ascent of the masses, their influence on politics, their relation to the nation-state and their influence on the gender roles. The third part provides a case study on the USA and its reaction to the mass-phenomenon, subdivided into the social characteristics of the mass civilisation, its cultural consequences on the American mores and the economic basis of the USA. The final part discusses the innovative and conservative approach towards dealing with the mass-phenomenon and its socio-economic consequences.

Romier's America-image and subliminal pro-Americanism was not limited to *Qui sera le Maître?* but has to be viewed in combination with his work *Idées très simples pour les français* (Very simple ideas for the French). *Idées très simples pour les français* was published in 1928, one year after *Qui sera le Maître?* and is significantly shorter. Instead of providing an analysis of the mass-phenomenon and a case study of the USA, it rather, as the title suggests, provides an improvement proposal for the French society and economy and guidelines on how to cope with the development of the masses (partly based on the American example). Romier's mantra



is thereby how to create a “peuple riche”, a prosperous society in order to provide stability for France in the future.

*Idées très simples pour les français* was published through the journal of the Redressement Français, the Cahiers, which were to educate the French society on socio-economic advantages of rationalization and appeared in 35 volumes after their establishment in 1926. The fact that *Idées très simples pour les français* was published through the Cahiers (they were printed by the Éditions S. Kra in Paris) explains their educational approach and their focus on rationalization and prosperity. *Idées très simples pour les français* is divided into three parts with a foreword that describes the backwardness of France and a need for change. The first part develops the current French problems such as housing and employment. The second part is dedicated to creating prosperity in society through developing areas such as agriculture, industry and transport. The final part provides a conclusion on how to reach political stability in France, particularly with regard to state-involvement.

The overall picture Romier constructs of the USA is thus a combination of both books. The first work provides the foundation through an elucidation of the mass-phenomenon and its influences on the USA. This case study of the USA reflects Romier's observations during his travels through North America and is therefore based on personal experiences. This does not necessarily make Romier's statements true, but it certainly gives them a sense of accuracy. The second work, *Idées très simples pour les français*, is designed to provide a guideline for the improvement of France striving towards prosperity. Romier here picks up the intellectual framework he developed in *Qui sera le Maître?* and relates it to the socio-economic reality of France and its orientation toward the future. The following inquiry of both works will thus commence with *Qui sera le Maître?* and investigate the construction of Romier's central concept “les masses” and the America-image he provides, which is partly a reaction to the concept of mass-civilisation. Thereafter the inquiry of *Idées très simples pour les français* will reflect upon the vision Romier produces for France and how it relates to the idea of mass-phenomena and the USA.

### ***Mass-phenomenon and American-model***

The prerequisite and key aspect for Lucien Romier's line of argumentation is the evolution of the masses. Romier considers the development of a mass-society as natural part of the socio-economic human evolution and first provides the readership with the historical background of the mass-phenomenon.<sup>497</sup> According to the author individuals face initial complex tensions which are generated through a combination of the egoistic human nature and increasing universal influences. This tension has been amplified through the mechanical innovations of the First World War. It has effectively led to opposing pairs on a political level, corporatism and socialism, and on a more abstract level the contrast between the universality of material influences and the resilient nature of the nation-state. Romier argues that “now”, thus in the 1920s, the human kind has entered a new phase which is characterised by an equilibrium of society through the evolution of the masses.<sup>498</sup> The human strives for affiliation and solidarity have created the dynamics of what Romier calls the “masse économique”<sup>499</sup>, an economic mass-civilisation which figures as a new benchmark for civilizations. The author argues that any mass-civilisation requires resources, is characterised by its growth, a tendency towards integration and a common will for progress. The beginning of Romier's work thus accounts for the evolution and properties of mass-civilizations i.e. the “masses économiques”. He characterises them as a natural part of human evolution which will eventually affect any given social construct. According to the author this can for example be seen through their relation to the nation-state: he argues that the liberalism and cooperation of mass-civilisations have led to increasing prosperity which in the long run erodes nationalism.<sup>500</sup> The inevitability of the “masse économique” as social evolution here promotes the idea that any nation state in a traditional sense needs to adapt to this new socioeconomic model. In *Qui sera le Maître?* the USA provides an important case study for Romier in how Europe can adjust to the evolution of the masses. Being founded with an already existing mass-phenomenon it is an effective role model on how to cater for the needs of a mass-society.

Before his investigation of the American society the author however first develops the evolution of the masses themselves, the “poussée des masses”<sup>501</sup>, which

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<sup>497</sup> Romier, *Qui sera le Maître, Europe ou Amérique?*, p. 9ff.

<sup>498</sup> Idem., p. 11.

<sup>499</sup> Idem., p. 12.

<sup>500</sup> Idem., p. 19.

<sup>501</sup> Idem., p. 31.

includes the political, economic and cultural dimension of the mass-phenomenon. Firstly, the political dimension here relates to the different forms of government. Romier's account of the relationship between the masses and politics highlights how throughout history there have only existed two democratic republics which have provided exterior security and were based on resource rich territory: the USA and France.<sup>502</sup> According to the author both countries were founded on the principle of equality, with the USA having additionally created a distinct form of prosperity. Romier's argumentation in this sense already suggests the pro-American design of his work to come. He constitutes the USA as economic paragon which has created economic wealth while he at the same time accredits France a similar potential for the future.

Romier further argues that the traditional functions of politics, government and administration have been increasingly influenced by the “masses économiques”. With their strong economic impact, they have effectively denaturalized politics: politicians now need to consider the interests of the masses and their influences on the economy which has decreased the power of political elites. Finance and economics have increasingly become political and diplomatic constants as a consequence of the political capability of the masses. According to Romier, the economic masses and economic evolution will, in the long term, remove class struggle and make the standard of living the only benchmark for the assessment of society. To Romier the “masses économique” entail the positive political potentials of material progress and consumption. Nevertheless, they are incapable of securing intellectual and moral values and thereafter foresee the long-term development of the state. Romier thus argues that politics needs to take into account the material interests of the masses on the one hand, whilst promoting and supporting intellectuals as counterpoise on the other.<sup>503</sup>

This influence of the “masses économiques” on politics and economics is effectively showcased through the economic concurrence between different mass-civilizations. Historically this concurrence is based on natural resources but once material wealth has been accumulated the needs of the masses exceed the securing of natural resources and move towards the conquering of markets. Romier argues that this can be accomplished through either imperialism or protectionism. To Romier the

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<sup>502</sup> Idem., p. 38.

<sup>503</sup> Idem., 33-61.

USA, in particular, today shows an example of protectionism and the author demands that France should emulate this economic approach. This call for French economic protectionism and independence here certainly relates to the historical circumstances. As we have seen in the chapter on the Franco-American relations (chapter 4.2.), the second half of the 1920s was characterised by an increasing French fear of American imperialism. These fears mainly related to American investments in French wartime industries, namely the oil- and telecommunication sector. On top of that, investments in the historically strong French car and movie industry were perceived as restrictions of French independence. Romier's demand for economic protectionism can therefore be seen as a reaction to the increasing investments in the French industry. When *Qui sera le Maître?* was published in 1927 public opinion had already shifted to a sceptic assessment of American investments, despite open appreciation a few years earlier. The author's reasoning consequently does reflect the historical circumstances and the contemporary debate about the pending alignment of the French economy. His novel focus on the economic masses thereby certainly introduced an additional component to the debate.

The role of the “masses économiques” as a dominant and reoccurring narrative in *Qui sera le Maître?* can furthermore be understood through constructivist theory. In order to provide this complementary understanding of the economic masses and showcase their constructivist functionality it is first necessary to determine how they relate to the causality of structures and agents. Similar to the German source by Hirsch, our contemplation thus begins with defining what figures as agent and structure and a subsequent assessment of the actor properties. The designation of agency primarily relates to who can be considered the active participant in the given context. Here, this participation is represented by the author and narrator, Lucien Romier, who consequently figures as agent. Through his investigation of the economic masses and their effect on different societies Romier takes part in the formulation of political opinion. His work is thereby guided by his personal assessment of the “masses économiques” and their all-encompassing influence. They are portrayed as inevitable evolution and overarching concept to which every country is forced to adapt. The “masses économiques” are consequently the first and most dominant constructivist structure in *Qui sera le Maître?*. After all, Romier's entire argumentation intends to establish how a given nation-state should adapt to the

influences of the mass-civilisation. It is also in this context that Romier's pro-Americanism needs to be understood. The USA provides a role model on how a nation, more particularly France, can and should cope with the challenges of emerging economic masses. On top of that the structural dominance of the “masses économiques” forces France to apply new economic models, mimicked after American developments. This endorsement of the American-model here testifies to the transformative-educational character of Romier's work.

Despite this prevailing pro-Americanism, the USA simultaneously for Romier also figures as a cautionary example of how the mass-phenomenon can have negative effects on the culture. This cultural component can effectively be recognised through an alteration of the gender-roles. Romier argues that the mass-civilisation has changed the role of women who have become ejected from their traditional environment.<sup>504</sup> Women have been forced to enter the labour market, leading to a destruction of traditional homes and a reduction in birth rates. Romier perceives this new female-role as a social crisis, where the traditional sense of families has been destroyed through the economic mass-civilisation.<sup>505</sup> It has alienated men from women and created masculine discomfort through an excess of female liberty. Romier argues that it is necessary to educate the masses on these developments as changes in economic and material circumstances have led to changes of the mores. From a theoretical perspective, Romier's account of what he considers the negative cultural effects of the mass-society relates to the constructivist conception of collective identities. This conception premises on the we-them-dichotomy, a fundamental differentiation between the in-group and the out-group (see section 3.1.1). This in- vs- out-group distinction is amplified through a negative assessment and exaggeration of out-group attributes. Now that Romier highlights the negative effects of the “masses économiques” he thus encourages the rejection and negative assessment of the structure.

The cultural dimension of the “masses économiques” consequently provokes a negative reinforcement of the structure which now functionally serves as counter identity. This counter-identity dimension here essentially relates to the constitutive dualism of constructivist identities (see chapter 3.1.2.). To the constructivist, identities can be constructed by the agents as much as they can be dictated by the

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<sup>504</sup> Idem., p. 87.

<sup>505</sup> Idem., p. 95.

structure. Counter-identities in this sense relate to the second possibility: structure constituting the identity of agents. When representation structures impose identities on the individual he/she can either accept and incorporate this identity or reject it. Therefore, in the argumentation of Lucien Romier, the economic masses are constructed as a negative identification structure which is to be functionally rejected by the own identity. The “masses économiques” in this sense figure as a counter-identity. They thereby additionally assist in defining and reinforcing the own identity. The counter-identity figures as “other” allowing the formulation of the “self”, which in this case means the protection of the French national identity against the cultural consequences of the economic masses. The mass-civilisation as an abstract structure demands new ways to protect, reinforce and reconstruct the French national identity in light of the inevitable consequences the evolution of the mass-society has evoked.

In order to identify these new ways, Lucien Romier provides a case study of the USA which describes the consequences of the mass-phenomenon on the nation-state and the unique manner in which the USA has responded to them. According to Romier this American uniqueness is mainly exhibited through the creation of a superior form of living. Different American preconditions have led to a different social model than in Europe which is particularly characterised by its social attraction. The independence of American economic activities and politics have spawned an economic supremacy that has a strong appeal to foreign labour. These immigrants take part in the generation of wealth. The USA is thus the first system that can actually satisfy the masses. Contrary to other nation states where the evolution of the masses met an already existing political framework, the USA developed parallel to the evolution of a mass-society. The American civilisation was thus created by the masses, for the masses and provides numerous advantages: its focus on youth, the collective nature of businesses and its tolerance. Together, these social factors form what Romier calls “l'originalité Américaine”<sup>506</sup>, the “American originality”.<sup>507</sup> Romier assesses the USA as “le type le plus avancé de société économique”<sup>508</sup>, the most advanced economic society, which clearly highlights how France can learn from the American originality.

Despite this role-model character of the USA, the American society does face the

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<sup>506</sup> Idem., p. 107.

<sup>507</sup> Idem., p. 110.

<sup>508</sup> Idem., p. 127.

cultural consequences of the mass-phenomenon. It slowly loses its creative, intellectual and artistic side. Romier therefore inquires whether Europe can prevent these developments from occurring “back home” in the future.<sup>509</sup> His analysis of the USA hence highlights the structural difference he makes between the mass-civilization as an abstract and overarching concept on the one hand and the USA as nation-state on the other. Whilst the USA as a nation-state is economically well adapted to the influence of the “masses économiques” as a main structure it is still subject to cultural hazards. In this sense, the American originality constitutes the socio-economic answer to the mass-civilisation. The foundation of Romier's pro-Americanism is thus functionally based on how the USA adapts to the “threat” or consequences of the “masses économiques” economically.

Culturally however, France needs to follow a separate path than the USA as his treatise on the peculiarities of the American mores highlights. The author argues that the USA as “communauté d'origine économique” has defined the idea of making money the central goal of social interaction.<sup>510</sup> Materialism has consequently radically changed American mores. According to Romier, American social morality is thus only based on material wealth. This new form of American morality does provide some advantages, such as the prohibition of alcohol,<sup>511</sup> but also great weaknesses. The instability of the family for example is a big problem in the USA, a notion Romier had already developed in his treatise on the evolution of the masses. The author claims that the American society is challenged by new gender roles and a destruction of the concept of marriage. Romier here once again underlines the negative cultural consequences of the mass-society. Thereby negative dimensions of the American society are only related to consequences of the mass-phenomena and not the American-model as such. The USA thus remains a sample on how the mass-society effects the nation state and how Europe and France can learn from the given developments.

The conclusion of Romier's *Qui sera le Maître?* therefore reviews the rudiments and lessons one should draw from the evolution of the mass-phenomenon. He argues that the “masses économiques” have influenced and changed the traditional notion of the nation-state.<sup>512</sup> Every aspiration to improve the nation-state and its social

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<sup>509</sup> Idem., p. 137.

<sup>510</sup> Idem., pp. 121,146.

<sup>511</sup> Idem., p. 155.

<sup>512</sup> Idem., p. 207ff.

conditions hence need to be orientated towards the masses. In practical terms, this means that the political systems and ideologies need to be adjusted according to these new circumstances. Romier argues that liberalism, having created an incentive for work, profit and success should stress the collective rather than individual material preoccupation. Socialism on the other hand sacrifices the long-term progress of the masses for immediate interests in terms of class struggle. What Romier thus proposes is a “capitalisme de la richesse circulante”<sup>513</sup>, a capitalist and liberal circulation of goods and trade. A fixed and dividable distribution of wealth leads to economic fragmentation. Economic evolution is thus based on the fluid movement of production and consumption. In addition, this evolution requires a dimension of solidarity to secure collective material contentment. The USA is to Romier an example of this circulating wealth.

According to Romier the only risks of material contentment lies in its finite character. Material prosperity is no final destination, the main conceptual goal is progress, be it economic or scientific. A crucial task for the future is therefore what Romier calls the deproletarianisation of the masses: to educate society on its moral virtues, develop the talents of the individual and thereby allow it independent work. Romier's abstract analysis concludes with guidelines for future development in two main positions: the “position novatrice” and “position conservatrice” (innovative and conservative positions).<sup>514</sup> The innovative position stresses the importance of education for society, particularly regarding science and economics. The conservative position highlights the necessity of supporting society's cultural dimension in light of mass-economical changes. This includes promoting intellectual work, supporting families and encouraging charity. Romier concludes by suggesting that only the role of education and families can positively influence the future.

### ***The “peuple riche”- prosperity for France***

*Qui sera le Maître?* provides the analytical backdrop for *Idées très simples pour les français* which were published one year later. In *Idées très simples pour les français* the approach is less analytical and more pragmatic, providing a clear proposal for the

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<sup>513</sup> Idem., p. 218.

<sup>514</sup> Idem., pp. 207-239.



development of France, particularly its economy. The necessity for change derives from the evolution of the masses on the one hand and the relative backwardness of France on the other. Romier's preliminary remarks are based on describing this backwardness, judging France by its lack of prosperity and effectiveness. Romier feels that France has missed out on the mechanization and modernization movements of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century and is 50 years behind in comparison to other nations.<sup>515</sup> France is currently what Romier considers a “peuple arrière”, a backward populace, branded by the “développement du machinisme”<sup>516</sup> (development of machinery). Despite this backwardness, France however shows enormous potential and Romier argues that if France had a competitive economic environment it would surpass other nations. Whenever a French person is actually part of such an environment in a foreign country he/she excels, or as Romier puts it: “[...] il prend rapidement de l'avance dans toutes les carrières.”<sup>517</sup> These passages by the author here relate to the dimension of superiority in the creation of national identity. As already elaborated previously, national identity is fundamentally based on the comparison between a “self” and an “other” and an apprehended hierarchy between them. The supremacy of the “self” is supported through this comparison with the “other” while at the same time being defined by it. This dimension of hierarchy relates to the constructivist idea of how agency constitutes structure as a form of collective identities (see section 3.1.2.). By claiming that French people automatically surpass others in competitive economic environments/conditions, Romier establishes the superiority of the French national identity. Romier thus imminently bases this sense of “Frenchness” on the constructivist conception of hierarchy. “Frenchness” figures as shared belief of an underlying supremacy of the French national identity based on an irrational and moral argumentation-framework. In a constructivist sense Romier reinforces his perception of the French national identity through means of hierarchy, which is therefore a clear example of how agency can constitute structural identity.

In order to deliberately exploit the potential of France and its population, Romier argues that it is first necessary to inventory the current state of the nation. Romier therefore considers “ce qu'il faut demander d'abord”<sup>518</sup>: the most prevailing French socio-economic problems. In this sense, particularly the social distribution and

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<sup>515</sup> Romier, *Idées très simples pour les français*, p. 10.

<sup>516</sup> Idem., p. 9.

<sup>517</sup> Ibid.

<sup>518</sup> Idem., p. 13.

infrastructure in France are of Romier's main concerns. He argues that the overpopulation and lack of commodities in the cities are the main reason for the deficient birth and elevated mortality rate. He demands an organised development of the urban areas as they inherently determine the development of society. Social progress is inevitably tied to the job opportunities and housing-standards the cities provide. Especially the banlieu, the suburbs of the cities, are poorly urbanised and bear the risks of accidents and epidemics. They consequently need to be adapted to the needs of the workers. This can only be achieved through urban planning and legislation which improves transport and communication between suburbs and city centres. These urban difficulties relate back to the economic masses, as Romier had described them in *Qui sera le Maître?*. According to Romier every country in the world faces these infrastructural difficulties, with the exception of the USA where urban development has preceded population growth.<sup>519</sup>

After this inventory of the French grievances, Romier proposes his guide for the French progression and the sustainable creation of wealth or as he calls it: “comment on fait un peuple riche”<sup>520</sup> (how to create a prosperous/wealthy society). Similar to the work of Julius Hirsch, the concept of prosperity thereby serves as a central goal for the evolution of French society. This prosperity can mainly be achieved through a combination of increased education, rationalisation and production. Economical mechanisation and improved work-organisation can lead towards a higher living standard - the “peuple riche”<sup>521</sup> (wealthy society). For Romier, economic progress is thereafter a combination of an increase in salaries and production, with a simultaneous decrease in retailing prices. Mechanisation and standardisation will lead to a higher economic output per worker. As Romier puts it: “C'est vers là qu'il faut aller”<sup>522</sup> (this is the way we have to go). For these processes, the USA serves as clear example. Romier argues that mechanisation has led to higher productivity which, in return has increased salaries. The pronounced work-specific education/technical instruction, combined with the collective will for material progress have led to the material success of the USA. According to Romier “nous pouvons faire aussi bien qu'eux, et même mieux, [...]”<sup>523</sup> - we can do as good as them,

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<sup>519</sup> Idem., p. 25 & 30.

<sup>520</sup> Idem., p. 37ff.

<sup>521</sup> Idem., p. 40f.

<sup>522</sup> Idem., p. 42.

<sup>523</sup> Idem., p. 41

if not better. Romier thus underlines the potential supremacy of France and refers to it as “we”, portraying himself as part of the “in-group”. From a structural perspective, France can and should thus incorporate the positive characteristics of the American-model and will not surrender the supremacy of its national identity i.e. “Frenchness”. The American-model, which has been created through adapting to the “masses économiques”, is thus the perfect paragon for the reinforcement of the French national identity. Other countries only provide negative examples, such as the Soviet Union, which is characterised by a de-organisation of the public services according to Romier.<sup>524</sup>

In order to actually develop France and create prosperity Romier mainly considers the rationalisation of industry and a development of the national infrastructure. He argues that a collective and rationalised approach to industry and infrastructure will lead to stable growth which in return leads to a higher living standard. Romier bases industrial progress on a combination of education, organisation and the rationalization of man and machine. Rationalization is thereby defined as every man, and every machine - located at the optimal spot- producing the highest quantity and quality in the shortest amount of time, with the least possible effort and a maximized profit.<sup>525</sup> Once again the USA figures as a role model in this respect. Romier argues that France possesses all the necessary preconditions to apply rationalization methods and relates his ideas to the politics of Raymond Poincaré who supported the “rationalization” of the French industry, aiming for lower production costs, more revenue and the protection of the market against foreign concurrence. Overall the rationalisation of industry is the aggregation of methods to increase industrial output. This clear focus on rationalization shows multiple connections to Romier's biography and the prevailing argumentation of the *Redressement Français*. The *Redressement Français* i.e. French Recovery was, in essence, a rationalization-movement which intended a productivist modernisation of France. It was thereby the main voice of French pro-Americanism as it channelled demands for industrial productivity and mass-production modelled after the functioning American mass-society. Together with Ernest Mercier, Lucien Romier spear-headed the intellectual reform proposals for the French economy and voiced them in the publishing platform *Cahiers du Redressement Français*. Lucien Romier's

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<sup>524</sup> Idem., p. 95.

<sup>525</sup> Idem., p. 63.

arguments in *Idées très simples pour les français* hence not surprisingly coincide with the propagated suggestions of the *Redressement*, especially because they were published as part of the *Cahiers*. Romier's call for rationalisation and industrial progress are thus an imprint of his affiliation with the *Redressement* and a representation of the predominant pro-Americanism. A positive image of the USA is in this sense just as much a reflection of his personal subjective convictions and experiences as it is an objective assessment of American influences.

This interweaving of personal narration and political fruition is also reflected in the final part of *Idées très simples pour les français*. Here Romier elucidates his political conception of the French future. His work thus concludes with the political implementation of the reform suggestions he developed in the main part of his book. He consequently argues that any form of multi-layered economic progress needs to be supported by political stability and effectivity or as he calls it “une politique de réalisation”<sup>526</sup> (politics of realisation). For Romier, this political realisation can hardly be implemented through parliamentarianism. Any functioning parliamentary structure could and should only consist of a two-party system, according to the author. France however currently aggregates multiple parties which has led to political fragmentation and hindered executive decision making.<sup>527</sup> On top of that French parliamentarism is challenged by the evolution of Marxism which intends to destroy the socio-economic framework of the parliamentary structure.<sup>528</sup> As a consequence Romier therefore calls for a “union nationale” (national union), a collective committee of functional elites with executive political power. His main purpose is to limit the power and involvement of the state and decentralise France: “il n'est qu'un moyen de fortifier l'État, c'est de limiter sa fonction”<sup>529</sup> (the only means to fortify/strengthen a state is to limit its function/power). Romier perceives the state merely as guarantee of individual liberty and collective progress. The “union nationale” can consequently remove the political power from the legislative and rest it on a more functional executive framework. This can solve ongoing problems such as the financial instability of the Franc more effectively. The national union additionally figures as counter draft to Marxism and can guide France “au fond de

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<sup>526</sup> Idem., p. 105.

<sup>527</sup> Idem., p. 112ff.

<sup>528</sup> Idem., p. 114.

<sup>529</sup> Idem., p. 126.

'l'expérience Poincaré' ”<sup>530</sup> (to the heart of the ideas of Poincaré). Romier's final passages are thus once again intertwined with the ideological objectives of the Redressement Français and the historical circumstances. The creation of a “union nationale” was one of the cornerstones of the Redressement's political precepts. It merged their oligarchic tendency and aspirations for industrial modernisation. Thereby anti-parliamentarism was as much a directive of the Redressement as the endorsement of minimal state-involvement. The Redressement's political influence was mainly constituted through their proximity to André Tardieu, who was minister of interior in the cabinet of Raymond Poincaré by the time *Idées très simples pour les français* was published in 1928. Romier's referral to the “expérience Poincaré” therefore in essence relates to the political design of Raymond Poincaré which was characterised by financial austerity and economic stabilisation.

In conclusion, Romier's reflections in *Idées très simples pour les français* exhibit a close relationship to his membership in the Redressement Français as well as larger connections to the historical circumstances. Therefore, both his positive American-image and pro-American attitude imply a subjective component. Intellectually Romier's *Idées très simples pour les français* is comprised of reform proposals for France and intends to create a “peuple riche”. This “peuple riche” essentially centres on the rationalisation of the French economy through an application of American developments. Romier's conception of “Frenchness” and the general construction of the French national identity is thereby based on the receptivity of economic processes and openness towards modernity. In light of the evolution of the mass-civilization France has been forced to adapt to its inevitable demands. The USA thus serves as a role model to France as the “American originality” provides the most successful model to cope with the emergence of the “masses économiques”. The USA offers an inspiration for the challenges of modernity, more specifically of the mass-society. Whilst the mass-society has influenced the USA negatively in cultural terms the progressive economical methods of the USA offer a paragon of how to adapt the nation state to the challenges of the masses and modernity. Applying American rationalization methods was thereby value free. It did not challenge the French national identity or the French self-conception. Romier could repeatedly reinforce the moral and intellectual peculiarities of France and thereafter its inherent superiority.

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<sup>530</sup> Idem., p. 115.

The general supremacy of the French national identity was not challenged through incorporating American developments, it rather reinforced and refined it in its outlook for the future. The portrayed pro-Americanism was in this sense a multi-layered tool to reinforce the French self-conception in its outlook for the future and thereby inherently also its national identity.<sup>531</sup>

#### 5.2.4. Discussion and Implication of the Research

As discussed above, the America-image and Americanization-perception of Lucien Romier can be fully retraced through his works *Qui sera le Maître?* and *Idées très simples pour les français*. Whilst the former work investigates the characteristics of an emerging mass-civilization, the latter provides a guideline for France on how to cope with the mass-phenomena and achieve prosperity. The USA thereby serves as main model for the realignment of the French economy according to the needs of the masses. On a constructivist level Romier builds up the economic masses as a structure that fundamentally changes political and social coexistence. He thereby builds on the insecurity of personal and collective identities which are threatened through a new dominant representation structure. French national identity thus demands new ways and methods to adapt to these structural shifts. On a cultural level the influences of the “masses économiques” figures as structural counter identity. Romier creates a need to protect “Frenchness”, - i.e. what it means to be French - through fencing off against the cultural consequences of an overarching mass-civilization. The USA thereby serves as case study for the investigation of the effects of the mass-civilization and possibilities for adaptation. According to Romier the USA provides a role model for the ways in which France can adapt to the challenges of the mass-civilization without adapting its negative characteristics such as a decline of mores. The USA and the economic masses structurally overlap, yet remain separate entities. It is in the French interest to incorporate parts of the American-model to fence off against negative characteristics of the masses. Romier's work *Idées très simples pour les français* thereby provides the cultural backdrop. Here a clear separation between “Frenchness”, the “American originality” and the “masses

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<sup>531</sup> I thereby draw a similar conclusion as Richard Kuisel draws for the post-war period: Kuisel, *Seducing the French*, p. xi & p. 6.

économiques” is visible. The economic peculiarities of the USA function as paragon on how to construct the French national identity according to the challenges of the economic masses. Thereby the use of rationalization and the American economic model is value free, France wouldn't lose what it actually culturally meant to be French, its unique national identity.

This subliminal argumentation by Romier shows some similarities to the prevailing French pro-Americanism of the interwar period. Particularly rationalization was a key concept of the more general French pro-Americanism. Moreover, rationalization was also the main theme of the Redressement Français. With his work, Romier thus took part in the quest of the Redressement to change the French economy and subsequently also its political structure. Another characteristic of French pro-Americanism was that rationalization was often used as a shield term and applied to the society in general. Romier is clearly in line with this argumentation as he too projects the change of the French economy on the entire society. His inherent goal is thereby progress in all areas, including areas such as medical research, in order to achieve the final goal of a “peuple riche”, an economically prosperous society.

Finally, Romier's America-image cannot be fully contemplated without a relation to the general historical circumstances. Particularly in light of the ongoing wartime debt-negotiations with the USA, economic independence and self-sustainability was for France more than ever a priority. Moreover, the First World War and the American liberation had shown that there indeed existed new technological and economic circumstances in Europe to which countries like France needed to adapt. Once again, there was a need for self-sustainability of the economy which is reflected in Romier's work. With an impaired French economy and American investments in France, the USA offered an economic model to forge the French economy and therewith its socioeconomic reality and national identity.

### **5.3. Comparison**

The publications by Julius Hirsch and Lucien Romier show various parallels and differences on an argumentative and constructivist level. Both authors personally

visited the USA and therefore portray what to them was an accurate investigation of the American society. Even though their works are not travelogues in an actual sense, the experiences both authors had in the USA are the basis for their publications and subsequent America-images. The focus of both works primarily rests on the economic area and in both cases, formulates strong pro-American views. The economic approach of Hirsch and Romier is paired with an inherent conviction to educate the population and convince it of the necessity for economic progress. Both authors call for the adaptation of the American economic model in order to upgrade and advance the German and French economies respectively. Argumentatively the publications by Hirsch and Romier thus show many similarities. Both authors highlight prosperity as a central concept in their works. To Hirsch prosperity is society's main goal towards which all political and economic activity is supposed to be geared. Romier's counterpart is the "peuple riche", an economically prosperous society and main socio-economical target. The dominant narratives in the works of the authors therefore align. A key characteristic for the adaptation of American economic methods is the rationalization concept. This explicit focus on rationalization is very much in line with the predominant pro-Americanism in Germany and France during the interwar years. Rationalization figured as the most important transnational concept of both circles during the 1920s. It is hence not surprising that both authors are considered as representative of their respective debates. The relative commercial success of their works certainly adds to the special position both authors take up in their respective debates.

Besides the prevailing pro-Americanism, both authors however also agree on a European superiority over the USA in cultural terms. Hirsch argues that the cultural imports of the USA are inferior to what is offered in Germany while Romier states that some cultural peculiarities in the USA, such as the American mores, are inferior to French morality. Despite minor cultural criticism, the publications heavily stress the importance and positive value of the incorporation of American economic methods in the national economies. The starting point for the assessment of the necessity of economic Americanization here however differs between both authors. Julius Hirsch perceives prosperity as the most important goal for any society and thereafter demonstrates how Germany could reach this prosperity through American methods. Romier in return investigates the mass-phenomenon and concludes that in



order to cope with the emergence of economic masses there exists the need for economic Americanization. This differing approach is reflected on a hermeneutic and argumentative level. Hirsch, as an economist, provides a more factual and statistics oriented assessment of the USA and its relation to Germany. Romier being a historian on the other hand demonstrates a more belletrist style with less focus on numbers. Whereas Hirsch focuses very strongly on the advantages of the American model, Romier seems to focus more on France and its potential, for which the USA figures as mere guideline. Finally, Romier's work argues for as little state involvement as possible, which is coherent with the anti-parliamentarian orientation of the *Redressement Français*.

On a constructivist and hermeneutic level there exist an equal number of similarities and differences between both authors. The fundamental toolkit regarding the construction of collective identities can be equally applied on Hirsch's work as it can be on Romier's. It is possible to interpret both works according to the use of the 'we vs. them' paradigm, as well as the reinforcement of national and personal identities on the basis of identity insecurities and selective incorporation. Functionally, both authors use the concept of prosperity to support their argumentation. Structurally, Hirsch and Romier both create unique national identities, "Germanity" on the one hand and "Frenchness" on the other. These structures are contrasted with the USA on a cultural level and a prevailing feeling of superiority of the own national identity is evoked. National identity is thus in both cases culturally re-enforced through hierarchy. Both authors on a cultural level utilize the USA as counter identity and use its negative characteristics to reinforce the positive characteristics of their own collective identity. Structural identity is by Hirsch and Romier created as inevitable representation structure whose characteristics become exaggerated. The selective incorporation of economic American developments in their own national identity does not challenge the essence of the unique national identities and is therefore value-free. Romier and Hirsch are thereby both examples of the possibility and role of agency in the structure/agency interplay. They both take part in the formation of political opinion and try to actively change and influence the socioeconomic reality. Moreover, they voice the arguments of the existing pro-Americanism of the time, represent their views and thereby figure as agents of whom self-determination, independence and representation are its very foundation.

Whilst the creation of structural identity is functionally similar in the publications of Hirsch and Romier, the actual structures themselves differ. Hirsch creates the counter structures progression and stagnation and ties progress to positivity while tying stagnation to negativity. The structural use of progression thereby allows the selective value-free incorporation of American methods and developments into the German national identity. Romier on the contrary creates the economic masses as overarching structure that influences societal coexistence completely. The “American originality” constituted the peculiar America approach of how to deal with the influences of the economic masses. The American originality thereafter figured as structural identity and partial role model for the adaptation to the economic masses. The French national identity could be reinforced by the selective incorporation of American developments without adapting negative cultural influences. Whereas Romier argues in favour of a complete carryover of the American originality, Hirsch rather supports selective incorporation of the American model. This disparity very much represents the general trend of the German and French Americanization-canon. Whereas France was more positive about the social effects of Americanization, Germany favoured a partial incorporation of American developments, independent of the socio-cultural sphere.

These differences also extend to the structural properties of the collective identities. Hirsch endorses progress through the construction of a clear counter identity i.e. stagnation. Romier, in contrast, only functionally uses a counter identity to highlight the cultural superiority of France. From a constructivist perspective one can therefore argue that Romier shows a more structural approach to Americanization than Hirsch. Romier's focus on the inevitability of the emergence of economic masses underlines this very structural approach in the sense that the individual has little possibility to resist the structure and its representation grid. Hirsch by contrast can be seen as arguing from a more agential angle in the sense that he stresses the importance of progress, modernity and prosperity, all on the basis and with the inherent goal of self-sustainability.

## 6. Anti-Americanism

### 6.1. Case Study: German anti-Americanism 1918-1933

#### 6.1.1. General Perspective

German anti-Americanism has a historic legacy that dates back to the German Romanticism and emerging nationalism during the 19<sup>th</sup> century. With the turn of the century and the First World War, negative perceptions of the USA were amplified and altered. German anti-Americanism became a mixture of historical narratives, the consequences of the First World War and the Treaty of Versailles as well as cultural criticism of Americanization. Culturally German anti-Americans of the 1920s radically opposed the American lifestyle and its influences on German society. Succumbing to Americanization meant the downfall of the Occident, therefore Americanization had to be fought.<sup>532</sup> The following part will address the background of German anti-Americanism during the 1920s and review some of its most important authors.

The political background of German anti-Americanism was mainly rooted in the legacy of the First World War. Particularly the American President Woodrow Wilson became a central enemy-image for German anti-Americans after the war. His role in the peace negotiations in Paris and the formulation of the Treaty of Versailles were heavily criticised. But even after Wilson ceased to be president political anti-Americanism remained vocal. Particularly the financial power of the USA was increasingly picked up by anti-Americans. Here anti-Americanism partly merged with anti-Semitism as the political right-wing argued that the USA was ruled by Jewish capital and had transformed into a Jewish state.<sup>533</sup> The political left, mainly supporters of the German communist party (KPD), perceived the USA as the most important capitalist enemy. Especially the Dawes-plan symbolised the financial dominance and influence of the USA and was strongly rejected. The USA was generally perceived as hindering German social and economic development. The political left argued that the USA was hindering a proletarian revolution whilst the

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<sup>532</sup> Egbert Klautke, *Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten*, p. 269.

<sup>533</sup> "Klaus Schwabe: Archäologie des Anti-Amerikanismus." Access: 29.09.2015, 8pm.

political right perceived the USA as hindering Germany's return to world power.<sup>534</sup>

German anti-Americanism during the 1920s, was, however, more than a political rejection of the USA on the basis of historical developments. Economic and cultural influences of the USA would soon become the focal point of German anti-Americanism. Particularly Fordism and Taylorism with their standardization and rationalization processes were perceived as levelling society and destroying creative individual spirit. Moreover, mass production was perceived as only focalising quantity which would destroy the quality of the German handicraft tradition. In addition, industrialization was generally perceived negatively due to over-specification and over-specialisation of the workforce, which destroyed innovation. The main medium in implementing these new economic processes was the reinvention of advertising which was aimed at the masses. Anti-Americans consequently strongly condemned these publicity campaigns and discredited them as an attempt to condition the individual taste of people.<sup>535</sup>

The cultural dimension of American influences was just as prominent and vocal during the interwar years as political and economic forms. Key idea and foundation of all cultural criticism was that the USA was a planned society and had no form of cultural tradition. In opposition to Europe it was not a naturally grown society and could not be characterized as inheriting a culture in the European sense. The values the USA would choose as its own form of culture were money, success and materialism. Particularly American materialism was heavily discarded by German anti-Americans and remained their most fundamental critique. Materialism was seen as dominating all parts of American society, which was symptomatic for the destructive character of the American model. In Germany, American cultural imports such as American movies or Jazz music had become visual artefacts and representations of American influences and were condemned sharply. Furthermore, the supposedly dominant position of women in American society, was perceived as a threat to the German value system. Overall, the anti-American discussion regarding cultural influences thus centred on the idea that the USA had no high culture and would morally corrupt the individual.<sup>536</sup>

Anti-American argumentation was mainly rooted in the intellectual middle-class

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<sup>534</sup> Ibid.

<sup>535</sup> Ibid.

<sup>536</sup> Ibid.

and the conservative political right. Anti-American ideas were transmitted and spread through various publications. Especially the journal *Die Tat* (The Deed) was an important forum for right-conservative authors. These authors formed a very vocal anti-American circle during the interwar years. The most prominent figure of this circle was Adolf Halfeld, who formulated his perception of the USA in a travelogue entitled *America and Americanism*. Halfeld formulated Americanism as a lifestyle that was morally corrupted on all fronts. Other authors, such as Alfred E. Günther took a more nationalistic stance. Günther argued that the most important struggle would be the fight between nationalism and its enemy Americanism. Another important author, Hermann Fackler, particularly elucidated what he perceived as American cultural barbarism. Paul Wengraf debated the opposition of European culture and American civilization and Hermann George Scheffauer, an American, dismissed the mass-culture of the United States. German anti-Americans however generally tended to raise similar argumentations which rested on the lack of American culture, materialism and a loss of individualism.<sup>537</sup> These ideas were part of a bigger, European anti-Americanism. What was a German peculiarity was the fact that, unlike its anti-American neighbours, it had lost the First World War.

### 6.1.2. Adolf Halfeld

The German journalist and writer Adolf Halfeld is today considered as the most representative author of the German anti-Americanism of the 1920s. The most complete collection on Halfeld's life and work is provided by the German National Archives in Hamburg.<sup>538</sup> Other biographical information can be retraced through a short autobiography in Halfeld's dissertation<sup>539</sup> and an entry in the German Biographical Archive from 1935<sup>540</sup>. In addition, there exists a CV in his NSDAP file in the National Archive in Berlin<sup>541</sup>, and an obituary notice in the newspaper

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<sup>537</sup> Klautke, *Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten*, 269–314 with further references.

<sup>538</sup> 'Staatsarchiv der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg; Shelf Mark 731-8\_A 758 Halfeld, Adolf.'

<sup>539</sup> Adolf Halfeld, *Das Imkergewerbe im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert in den älteren Hannoverschen Landesteilen, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung seiner Sonderstellung als geldwerbende Marktproduktion im Bauernhaushalt. Eine Untersuchung zur Wirtschaftsgeschichte Niedersachsens. Inauguraldissertation zur Erlangung der staatswissenschaftlichen Doktorwürde der rechts- und staatswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Hamburgischen Universität*, 1921, p. 5.

<sup>540</sup> Hermann A.L. Degener, *Degeners Wer Ist's? Unsere Zeitgenossen* (Berlin, 1935).

<sup>541</sup> See: Gassert, *Amerika im Dritten Reich*, p. 111, footnote 40 and 41.

Hamburger Anzeiger from 1955<sup>542</sup>. Together with secondary sources the archival materials provide a rather complete overview of his life.<sup>543</sup>

Adolf Halfeld was born on 14 September 1898 in Hannover, northern Germany, to August Halfeld and Friderike née Schuetze of protestant confession.<sup>544</sup> Halfeld graduated from the Leibniz-School in May 1917.<sup>545</sup> After having been in the military service since 1916 a hand injury from his youth years hindered his deployment at the front in the First World War. In the fall of 1918 he began the study of what we would today call political science (incorporating law, economics, history, public administration, politics and sociology) in Berlin. Halfeld studied three semesters in Hamburg, two in Heidelberg and one in Berlin. He received his Ph.D. in December 1921 in political science at the University of Hamburg. Subject of his dissertation was the beekeeper industry in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century in Hannover. His Ph.D. supervisor was the German national economist Friedrich von Gottl-Ottlilienfeld (1868–1958), who was an enthusiast regarding the developments Fordism had initiated in the German economy, an enthusiasm Halfeld in no way shared and dismissed in his publication of 1927. After completing his studies, Halfeld at first became a bank employee in 1922, but quickly changed his career path and became a journalist. From 1924 onwards he became foreign correspondent for the newspapers *Hamburger Fremdenblatt* and *Münchener Neuesten Nachrichten* from New York and between 1929 and 1932 from London. His publication *America and Americanism* is a product of his experiences and travels in the USA during this period (1924-1929).<sup>546</sup>

The main newspaper Halfeld worked for was initially, when it was founded in 1928, a list of all the foreigners that arrived in Hamburg. From 1864 onwards it appeared as a real newspaper under the name *Hamburger Fremdenblatt*.<sup>547</sup> In 1932 Halfeld took over the editorship of the *Hamburger Fremdenblatt* in Berlin which he

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<sup>542</sup> ‘Adolf Halfeld Gestorben’, *Hamburger Anzeiger*, 1955.

<sup>543</sup> Egbert Klautke, ‘Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld Und Georges Duhamel’, Peter Longerich, *Propagandisten im Krieg: Die Presseabteilung des Auswärtigen Amtes unter Ribbentrop* (München: R. Oldenbourg, 1987), p. 314ff; Gassert, *Amerika im Dritten Reich*, p. 111.

<sup>544</sup> Halfeld, *Das Imkergewerbe Im 17. Und 18. Jahrhundert in den älteren Hannoverschen Landesteilen, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung seiner Sonderstellung als geldwerbende Marktproduktion im Bauernhaushalt. Eine Untersuchung zur Wirtschaftsgeschichte Niedersachsens. Inauguraldissertation zur Erlangung der staatswissenschaftlichen Doktorwürde der rechts- und staatswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Hamburgischen Universität*, p. 5.

<sup>545</sup> Klautke, “Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges Duhamel.”

<sup>546</sup> Idem., p. 2f.

<sup>547</sup> Klautke, *Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten*, p. 276f.

would keep until 1945.<sup>548</sup> In 1943, or possibly earlier, he became the chief editor of the newspaper. On 1 May 1933 Halfeld joined the NSDAP. He became a member of the “Mittwochrunde” (English: Wednesday-Circle), a political round-table of the ministry of foreign affairs that consisted of only members of the press. It was designed to give journalists more information regarding the Nazi-German position on foreign affairs.<sup>549</sup> The inherent aim was of course to create a certain synchronization of the broadcasts on German international relations. From 1940 onwards Halfeld thus had close contacts with the press department of the ministry of foreign affairs.<sup>550</sup>

After the Nazis had declared war on the USA in 1941 there was a need for anti-American propaganda and Halfeld's early writings were rediscovered. He published a pamphlet named *The USA engages in the world* (ger.: *Die USA greift in die Welt*) in 1941 and was co-author of another anti-American writing that was published by Friedrich Schönemann (1886-1956). After the Second World War Halfeld translated the books *Our threatened values* by Viktor Gollancz and *Plato's American Republic* by Douglas Woodruff from English into German. These were his last publications as a writer and journalist. Until the 1940s he however was part of the editorship of the publication house Eugen-Diederichs in Jena, Eastern Germany. Through this position, he took part in the formation of the ideas of the German-right in the interwar period. Especially the journal *Die Tat* became popular with the young conservatives at the end of the 1920s and took a nationalist as well as anti-capitalist stand.<sup>551</sup> Adolf Halfeld died on 23 November 1955 in Hannover.<sup>552</sup> The period between 1945 and 1955 cannot be accounted for.

Halfeld's work *America and Americanism* of 1927 was his biggest success as a writer and drew the attention of the America-discourse of the time on him even though he was no conspicuous or prominent figure of the Anti-American circle.<sup>553</sup> Soon after the first edition had been published by the publishing house Eugen-Diederichs, a second edition appeared on the market in 1928 in response to the great

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<sup>548</sup> For an account of Halfeld's positions in the *Hamburger Fremdenblatt* see: Jürgen Fromme, *Zwischen Anpassung und Bewahrung: das 'Hamburger Fremdenblatt' im Übergang von der Weimarer Republik zum 'Dritten Reich': eine politisch-historische Analyse* (Hamburg: H. Christians, 1981), especially 95f, 105f.

<sup>549</sup> Peter Longerich, *Propagandisten im Krieg: Die Presseabteilung des Auswärtigen Amtes unter Ribbentrop* (München: R. Oldenbourg, 1987), 314–316.

<sup>550</sup> Klautke, “Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges Duhamel,” p. 3.

<sup>551</sup> Ibid.

<sup>552</sup> ‘Adolf Halfeld Gestorben’, *Hamburger Anzeiger*, 1955.

<sup>553</sup> Klautke, “Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges Duhamel,” p. 2.

demand.<sup>554</sup> Halfeld's main thesis throughout the book was that American society had become increasingly mechanised and people had lost their individual freedom. He contrasted European culture sharply with the planned mass-civilization of the USA and dismissed American influences and developments. According to Halfeld the American citizen idealised material success as the only goal in life and saw money making as the main value. Halfeld consequently tried to defend individualistic European values against the American mechanisation of life.

But in what relation does this work stand to his life-experiences? How did his lifelong personal experiences influence his book and ideas? An important precondition is that *America and Americanism* is a travelogue, and thus reproduces the actual experiences Halfeld had in the USA during his work as a correspondent for the *Hamburger Fremdenblatt*. Initially it was thus his job that was the reason for him to go to the USA. It is also possible that Halfeld wanted to see the USA for himself after his Ph.D. supervisor Friedrich von Gottl-Ottlilienfeld had been vocally pro-American. The decision to become an international correspondent highlights that Halfeld had an interest in international developments. It furthermore implies that what Halfeld wrote in his publication cannot be assessed as “wrong”. Halfeld described his experiences in the USA and what at least for him was an objective analysis of American society. Nevertheless, what Halfeld wrote in his book was intended to portray a negative image of the USA. His selection of anecdotes and facts was aimed at creating a specific America-image. In this sense, the contemplations by Halfeld cannot be seen as being objective or “true” in an absolute sense. They were the basis for a conscious selection of facts and developments aimed at fuelling anti-American sentiments. Halfeld, as he states himself, felt compelled to educate German society on American developments and particularly wanted to aim this publication at all the Americanization-enthusiasts in Germany.<sup>555</sup>

His biography and previous experiences might have influenced this reflection in multiple ways. An important personal contact Halfeld had with people in favour of the Americanization of German society was during his time as a Ph.D. student in Hamburg, considering that his thesis supervisor was an admirer of Fordism and the Americanization of the German economy. Interestingly, in the blurb of the first

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<sup>554</sup> Egbert Klautke, ‘Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges Duhamel’, in *Welche Modernität?*, p. 3f.

<sup>555</sup> Klautke, ‘Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges Duhamel’, 4.



edition Halfeld declared that his book was an answer to the autobiography of Henry Ford, which had appeared in 1922.<sup>556</sup> Here one might be able to draw a connection to his relationship with his Ph.D. supervisor, who admired Henry Ford. It was people like Friedrich von Gottl-Ottlilienfeld that Halfeld wanted to show what living in an American society “really” meant. People who only monitored the USA from across the Atlantic did not see the bigger picture. He in this sense took part in the formation of political opinion.

As Egbert Klautke has formulated, the main reason for the success of Halfeld's work was probably its timing.<sup>557</sup> It was published at the highpoint of people's interest in the USA in the 1920s. Multiple publications on the USA including travelogues, documentations and historical writings were circulating on the German market. Halfeld's book hence hit the nerve of the time.<sup>558</sup> It was read by a relatively broad public, newspapers published commentaries on his work and people began citing his book in their publications.<sup>559</sup> One can therefore argue that it became a benchmark and standard thesis on the characteristics of Americanism. What is however interesting is that the book never got translated into other languages. A possible reason could be that as Halfeld's main aim was the education of German society it was enough to guarantee the availability of the book in German. Nevertheless, the German language was of course besides French and English one of the most spoken languages in Europe. In any case, the influence of the book in Germany cannot be neglected. Maybe it only directly influenced German anti-American intellectuals, but it became part of the general America-discourse. It was probably this position in the general America-debate that made it possible for him to become selected as part of the “Wednesday-Circle”. In 1941, the “Wednesday-Circle” was made up of 18 German journalists from different newspapers.<sup>560</sup> One can therefore conclude that Halfeld was amongst the most influential journalists of the time regarding the publication and broadcasting of Nazi-German international affairs. The explicit anti-Americanism in *America and Americanism* fit into the anti-American propaganda of the Nazis.<sup>561</sup>

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<sup>556</sup> Henry Ford and Samuel Crowther, *My life and work*, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1922).

<sup>557</sup> Klautke, “Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges Duhamel,” p. 4.

<sup>558</sup> Ibid.

<sup>559</sup> Klautke, *Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten*, p. 276.

<sup>560</sup> Longerich, *Propagandisten im Krieg*, 314–316.

<sup>561</sup> Ibid.

This touches upon a very interesting development in Halfeld's life, the fact that he became a member of the NSDAP<sup>562</sup>. The relation between his NSDAP membership and his proclaimed anti-Americanism raises some interesting questions. As we have seen, Halfeld's main thesis was the comparison between the individualistic European society and the mass-society of the USA. Clearly when writing his book in 1927, any loss of individual freedom and becoming part of the state's mass-civilization were Halfeld's deepest fears. Six years later, however, he entered the NSDAP, a party that promoted the culmination and perversion of the mass effect. The complete homogenization and submission of the individual under the state were central characteristics of Nazi ideals. What could be possible reasons that Halfeld became part of what he had so rigorously dismissed only a couple of years earlier? It is most likely that Halfeld saw the Nazi-ideology as a protector of the "real German values". In his book, he explicitly states that the USA had succumbed to a certain culture-feminism, an effeminacy, and was in no way a "Volk", an ethnic nation, as Germany was. The Nazi-ideology was particularly based on the idea that Germany was a unique and superior ethnicity and the male had a dominant role over the female. In this sense, the Nazis offered the institutionalization of the values Halfeld adhered to, which is a possible explanation for his membership in the NSDAP. His conviction was possibly also rooted even deeper, such as the racial structure the Nazis propagated or he was just fascinated by the new possibilities and prospects the party offered. There is not enough evidence to answer this question definitively; however, bearing in mind the position Halfeld takes in his book, the Nazis probably offered the protection of the German cultural values he felt were endangered through Americanization.

Another factor of Halfeld's life which has a direct impact on his book is the fact that it was published through Eugen-Diederichs, the publishing house for which Halfeld would later become a regular and important writer. The publishing house itself leaned towards the conservative-right of the Weimar Republic. The publishing house was for Halfeld, therefore, a channel to highlight a specific political stand. In addition, Eugen-Diederichs was a mediator to create public awareness for his book in a circle that would be receptive to his ideas. As Halfeld stated in his book, it was aimed at those who seemed to have a wrong understanding of the USA. He

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<sup>562</sup> Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei

consequently intended to reposition the understandings of particularly those who welcomed American developments such as standardization-processes of Taylorism and the mass-production of Fordism in the German economy. Nevertheless, the book was of course also aimed at society as a whole; Halfeld inherently stressed the educative and enlightening purpose in his writing. The ideological proximity to the publishing house Eugen-Diederichs however suggests that Halfeld was also aiming his publication at like-minded anti-Americans.

Generally, the success of Halfeld's book can be largely explained through the fact that it touched upon a prevalent sentiment in the German society. Halfeld consciously played with the political dismissal of the USA which essentially had its foundation in the First World War. The legacy of Versailles was part of the public discourse and had the potential to evoke a very negative image of the USA (see section 4.3.). Halfeld seemed to have been successful in resuscitating those emotions. The nostalgic tendencies and the romantic reflex that the “good old times” were fading was in addition a strong narrative in German society throughout time and space.<sup>563</sup> This inherent nostalgia was combined with progress-pessimism and jointly formed the fertile soil on which the anti-American tree grew, whose seeds Halfeld had carefully sown.

The anti-American sentiment Halfeld touched upon was rooted deep in the German collective subconscious. It went back to much larger, German and American international relations and their developments for over two decades. Halfeld's forecasts were to be later fulfilled in the sense that the economic crisis of 1929 rocked the German economy hard. The close economic and financial connections between the USA and Europe plunged Western Europe into a deep depression. Halfeld must have seen all his predictions come true as Wall Street's Black Thursday triggered the global depression, despite its origins reaching further back in time. In light of the economic depression, the Nazis gained support as they seemed to offer an answer to the German problems. Conscription gave people work and rearmament stimulated the economy. Halfeld in this sense might have seen the program of the NSDAP as a general solution to the American problem.

Whatever the case, it is apparent that the ideas in *America and Americanism* cannot be contemplated without bearing in mind the bigger picture. Halfeld's life-

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<sup>563</sup> Van Elteren, *Americanism and Americanization*, p. 17.

experiences shaped what he wrote in the book and the publication of the book in turn shaped his further life. In the academic debate the book is nearly entirely investigated with regard to German anti-Americanism. Of course, the book played a major part in this circle, but was aimed at a larger audience, influenced a larger public and related to much wider issues than just the anti-American debate. One could even say that the book reflects the entire relationship between Germany and the United States in the 1920s. Halfeld combined economic, cultural and historical notions that seem to be valuable for the entire German society and compared them with the American society. The book has to be therefore seen in a greater context than it currently is in the academic debate. It can be viewed as reflecting the discourse on the United States as a political system from a German point of view.

### 6.1.3. “America and Americanism”

The title and subtitle of Halfeld's travelogue suggest a very interesting point of departure: *America and Americanism. Critical contemplations of a German and European (Amerika und der Amerikanismus. Kritische Betrachtungen eines Deutschen und Europäers)*<sup>564</sup>. As the subtitle states, Halfeld considers himself to be German and European. This suggests that he contrasts the USA not only with Germany but with Europe in general. He therefore hides behind a European facade, supposedly uniform and contrasting with the USA. This European approach was a common tool of the anti-American writers of the time to generalize their ideas.<sup>565</sup> Therefore, pretending that the book symbolised a European viewpoint can be seen as amplifying the anti-American approach.

The book itself is divided into six parts. Some preliminary comments that figure as an introduction, four separate chapters with three subchapters each and an epilogue. The first chapter entitled ‘Planned and developed cultures’ exploits the different cultural history of the United States and Europe (mainly focused on Germany) and its impact. The second chapter, ‘Form and landscape’, focuses on the American society's relationship to nature and God. The third chapter, ‘The

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<sup>564</sup> This translation was made by myself as no official translation of the book exists. Furthermore all chapter- and subchapter names will also be translated by myself.

<sup>565</sup> “Klaus Schwabe: Archäologie des Anti-Amerikanismus.” [accessed 29 September 2015]

omnipotence of success', elucidates the American values and ideology. The fourth and last chapter, 'Intellectual frames', concludes the publication with a description of the role of women and role models in American society.

The constructivist analysis of this source will not judge the statements made by the author or investigate their historical accuracy. The main aim will be solely on retracing the creation of an America-image and analysing it from a constructivist point of view. The focus will thus be on how the author creates certain structures and how those structures impose identities on the individual. Furthermore, the notion of how the individual accepts or dismisses these identities will be elucidated and what his/her possibilities are to create structural identity. Thereby the source will not be investigated chronologically, we will look at certain dominant narratives that reappear throughout the book and use examples from different parts of the source to illustrate the author's argumentation. The focus thus mainly on three dominant narratives of the author which are the key fundamentals of his anti-American argumentation. The first narrative is that the USA is a planned society and how it contrasts with the idea of Germany as one ethnic nation, a "Volk". The second narrative is the idea that the materialism of the United States is compared to the more cultural values of Germany. The third and last dominant narrative is the comparison between the characteristics of American mass-society, opposed to German individualism. These three dominant narratives encompass the entire argumentation by the author and will in the following be investigated from a constructivist point of view.

### ***The American planned society***

One of Adolf Halfeld's most persistent and reoccurring arguments is that America has no history and does not possess any real culture.<sup>566</sup> The USA as a nation-state has no tradition on which it could base its societal norms. Halfeld perceives the main reason for this lack in culture in the fact that the USA is a planned society. It can only exist through rational planning as it has no historical experiences it may base its orientation on.<sup>567</sup> This society's only goal is development and development

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<sup>566</sup> Halfeld, *Amerika und der Amerikanismus*, p. 6.

<sup>567</sup> Idem., p. 10.

fundamentally contradicts the idea of “Volk”, a nation which is based upon traditions.<sup>568</sup> Halfeld thus constructs a vision of the United States through the use of American characteristics that are not inherently negative. Development and progress for example have, by pro-Americans, been classified as very positive for any society. Halfeld however roots those notions in a much larger framework and creates the idea that those characteristics are a representation of the absence of culture. The real America culture, as it may have been developed through the colonisers, only remains in fragments.<sup>569</sup> These fragments came from a Europe that had a long cultural tradition and was therefore, as such, more than only a continent.<sup>570</sup> From a constructivist point of view, Halfeld here figures as an agent who acts based upon his particular assessment and perception of the USA. He, on the one hand, creates the structure of Americanism which is lacking real culture and on the other hand “Europeanism”<sup>571</sup> which has a long cultural tradition. This European structure is attributed a strongly positive moral value. Halfeld implies that European culture is congenitally better than the American one. This not only gives European culture a special standing but also devalues American culture and thus the structure of Americanism. This structural opposition of Americanism and Europeanism is connected through the constructivist conception of collective identities. Halfeld argues that if German society were to let itself be Americanised, it would not serve its motherland.<sup>572</sup> His assessment highlights how a rejection of American influences is actually required in order to strengthen a feeling of national identity. Conceptually outside influences from another structure bear the potential of endangering national identities and breaking up this uniqueness. Halfeld suggests his readership that the European or German national identity can only be fostered through a rejection of everything American. To support this approach the author further claims that Europe is losing its own cultural spirit. Inherently, he thus tries to protect this seemingly original identity of Europe through writing this book. Again, a parallel to the constructivist identity concept can be drawn. As developed in the part on constructivist methodology the individual, in this case Halfeld, sees his/her own identity constantly threatened by a new dominant structure. A natural reflex is thus a

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<sup>568</sup> Idem., p. 8.

<sup>569</sup> Idem., p. 10.

<sup>570</sup> Idem., XI.

<sup>571</sup> This term is my own creation and not formulated by Halfeld.

<sup>572</sup> Halfeld, *Amerika und der Amerikanismus*, XII.

defence against this new identity, in this case by the rejection of Americanization as a new representation-structure.

For Halfeld, American life meant a step backward compared to the German lifestyle. To prove this, he especially draws on non-material values. The idea of the German people belonging to one “Volk” (ethnicity), as opposed to the American people who have nothing comparable, is developed throughout the book. The American citizen has no personality and can therefore have no such thing as ethnicity. The idea of ethnicity, which was of course in its perversion the cornerstone of the Nazi ideology, has a historical foundation. This can thus not only be attributed to Halfeld but relates to much more general societal narratives. The idea of “Volk” is rooted in the German romanticism of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. German Romanticism, which is of course inherently tied to nationalist feelings, was a first foundation of German anti-Americanism.<sup>573</sup> Halfeld thus again refers to a sentiment in the population that goes much further back than his book. He contrasts the irrational idea of “Volk” with the American rationality of a planned and uniform society. Moreover, he concludes that German culture is fundamentally based on these non-material values.<sup>574</sup> It is the creative spirit that is constitutive of European culture.<sup>575</sup> Education, language and a humanist tradition jointly form the European identity. Halfeld hence judges the two societies and devalues the American society through the revaluation of the German one.

This contrast of the American and European society is taken even further through a comparison of the cultural and geographical unity of the two continents. According to Halfeld the USA as homogenous society was clearly inferior to Europe, as Europe, although fragmented, would symbolise union in its diversity, as opposed to the USA which symbolised emptiness in its unity.<sup>576</sup> Germany is for Halfeld the centre of Europe and thus the most important fragment. It is the creative spirit, irrationality opposed to logic, which is preferable to the standardization of life.<sup>577</sup> Notice again that Halfeld draws on subconscious and irrational concepts to create a sense of European identity. This common identity is however only constituted through the dismissal of American values. Therefore, automatically whatever is bad

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<sup>573</sup> Van Elteren, *Americanism and Americanization*, p. 17; Diner, *America in the eyes of the Germans*, pp. 31–51.

<sup>574</sup> Halfeld, *Amerika und der Amerikanismus*, p. 32.

<sup>575</sup> Idem., p. 33.

<sup>576</sup> Idem., p. 48f.

<sup>577</sup> Ibid.

in the United States is the exact opposite of what happens in Europe, which is in turn automatically good, because different from the USA. The structure of Americanization is therefore also constructed as inherently bad, because it is different from Europe. This European identity could from a constructivist perspective function as the counter-structure to Americanization, which even though possibly endangered has the possibility to overcome Americanization. Through uniting the European population under one structure, Halfeld uses the second constructivist paradigm of identity creation: agency constituting structure. The autonomous individual values European peculiarities over American ones and creates the structure of “Europeanism”. What this would suggest is that the only possibility the European individual has to withstand Americanization is through the collective of Europeanism. This is highlighted through the concluding words of the first chapter. Halfeld states that the norms of Americanization are incompatible with European society.<sup>578</sup> The two structures he creates in his work are thus mutually exclusive. A natural conclusion is that the individual has to choose the structure he/she wants as dominant identity representation. Halfeld himself suggests the absolute merger in Europeanism which fundamentally symbolises the rejection of all American values.

Another important example Halfeld uses to elaborate the planned culture of the USA is the relationship between its ideology and societal reality. Especially regarding the constructivist concept of identity, some interesting conclusions can be drawn from this. According to the author Germans are capable of combining reality and ideology, whereas Americans make their ideology the basis of reality.<sup>579</sup> Halfeld here performs image-creation of the United States through comparison with Germany. He creates identity through structural rejection, another key constructivist concept based on the we-vs.-them dichotomy. As individuals value certain characteristics over others they adhere to a certain identity. Identity, in turn, can thus not exist without its counterpart. Identity cannot constitute itself without the other. The criticism of Americanization is hence not only a dismissal of American norms and values but it also figures as a tool to define and formulate what exactly the specific European and German identity is. Through demarcation with the USA Halfeld formulates what for him the actual German identity is he feels endangered. In this sense, we have another example of structure constituting agency, but this time from another dimension. It is

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<sup>578</sup> Idem., p. 50.

<sup>579</sup> Idem., p. 116.



not the structure of Americanism that imposes an identity on the individual, it is through fencing off this structure that individual identity is created. And those new individual characteristics are then linked and attributed to the counter-structure of “Europeanism”. In this sense, agency in return reconstitutes structural identity.

### *American materialism*

The second fundamental narrative of Halfeld's publication is the opposition of the materialism of the United States and the immaterial values of Germany. As already elaborated, Halfeld argues that money and making money are the only benchmark in the professional life of the American citizen. In Europe and Germany, work itself and its contribution to society are perceived as most important.<sup>580</sup> Halfeld again uses an American development that as such is not negative and contrasts it with Germany in such a way that it attains a negative spin. The materialism of the United States is firmly entrenched not only in the American economy but also in the societal world view. This can be viewed as part of the general narrative that the structure of Americanization and the individual become inseparable through the picture Halfeld paints of the USA. He even calls the American economy a new form of feudalism.<sup>581</sup> Here the negative notion becomes very apparent. The people are in a dependency relationship to the structure. According to Halfeld, the USA had the possibility to develop this society through the clean start it had since the formulation of its constitution.<sup>582</sup> It did not undergo different stages of economic development but began industrialising. Business without moral values was thus the road it took.<sup>583</sup>

It is however not only industry which influenced the American economy. Also, the financial market and the dominant position of Wall Street are, according to Halfeld, characteristics of the American economy.<sup>584</sup> The result is that only few people are very rich.<sup>585</sup> Interestingly, this actually contradicts Halfeld's idea that the American society is completely homogenous and uniform. But this interpretation fits

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<sup>580</sup> Idem., p. 25.

<sup>581</sup> Idem., p. 37.

<sup>582</sup> Idem., p. 38.

<sup>583</sup> Ibid.

<sup>584</sup> Idem., p. 39.

<sup>585</sup> Idem., p. 41.

in with his argument that everyone has the minimum subsistence to keep the machinery of consumption going.<sup>586</sup> More importantly, intellectual work is of no value in the American society.<sup>587</sup> An enlightenment that has its foundation in intellectual reflection is hence not possible in the USA.<sup>588</sup> The youth will grow into the society without questioning its basic premises. The “Homo Americanus”<sup>589</sup>, as Halfeld calls it, is not capable of reflection. The creation of this term is another way Halfeld constructs an overpowering conception of Americanization which influences the individual.

An interesting connection is drawn by Halfeld between the importance of money and its relation to politics. As money is so important, the influence and effect it has are also crucial.<sup>590</sup> In the USA, politicians buy votes and money becomes the only determinant for social status.<sup>591</sup> The author hence implies that money makes people corrupt which seems to be the main reason Halfeld keeps coming back to this main narrative of money being the only American value. As he ties money to corruption, thus moral reprehensibility, he shows that the key value of Americanization is bad. The whole structure is therefore inherently bad as well. The method Halfeld uses to create this negative idea of Americanization is through tying every characteristic of the structure congenitally to ethics. He uses whatever is morally reprehensible in all different parts of everyday life and isolates it. These different parts are then interconnected to a para-structure which therefore as such has to be morally reprehensible. The only identification pattern this structure offers can therefore only be negative. It is the dark side of the United States, the systemic influence of Americanism.

It is also significant how Halfeld combines the idea of materialism and religion. According to the author, religion provides the moral foundation for the American paradigm of success.<sup>592</sup> What religion and its puritan interpretation suggest is that, whenever someone is successful, his/her path must have been righteous. In Europe, however, everyone has their own responsibility that allows them to judge whether

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<sup>586</sup> Idem., p. 42.

<sup>587</sup> Idem., p. 41.

<sup>588</sup> Idem., p. 42.

<sup>589</sup> Ibid.

<sup>590</sup> Idem., p. 72.

<sup>591</sup> Idem., p. 72f.

<sup>592</sup> Idem., p. 87.

what they do is good or bad.<sup>593</sup> Halfeld here clearly implies that the Europeans, by nature, have a sense of moral judgement whereas the religion in the USA only legitimises and reinforces the dominant narrative. The ethics of Americanization form an ideology that combines business and God into one all-encompassing structure.<sup>594</sup> Halfeld claims that even the Church is part of this mass-effect. Because of their publicity and propaganda, religion tries to sell its teachings just like the rest of the American industry.<sup>595</sup> The author hence suggests to the reader that religion, again something that as such should be objectively good and right, has become corrupted through the structure of Americanism.

The author furthermore makes a more general theoretical comparison of the role of money in the USA, which is opposed to the role of money in Germany. Particularly the strive for material success is perceived very critically and morally corrupt. According to Halfeld all material things lose their non-material value through putting a price on them.<sup>596</sup> Wealthy American citizens legitimise striving for success through setting up charity foundations. Money in this sense buys moral legitimacy.<sup>597</sup> Again Halfeld uses positive features such as the setting up of charity foundations and attributes them a negative value through tying them to the moral benchmark of money corrupting the individual. This can be especially seen through his argument that in Europe money is just a tool, whereas in the USA money is the ultimate goal.<sup>598</sup> Life, according to Halfeld, becomes a business for itself.<sup>599</sup> All values are tied to the central value of success. It becomes determinant for self-realization.<sup>600</sup> Here Halfeld again touches upon the dominant narrative of individual autonomy. As soon as self-realization is tied to a certain value that is dictated through society, the free will and autonomy of the subject are restricted. Halfeld thereby reinforced his construction of Americanism as the dominant representation structure that influences all parts of the individual life.

Another good example for Halfeld's analysis of materialism is the American education system. Halfeld begins this analysis by stating that education is not an

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<sup>593</sup> Ibid.

<sup>594</sup> Idem., p. 88.

<sup>595</sup> Idem., p. 91.

<sup>596</sup> Idem., p. 144.

<sup>597</sup> Idem., p. 145.

<sup>598</sup> Ibid.

<sup>599</sup> Idem., p. 146.

<sup>600</sup> Ibid.

American but a European tradition that came with the first settlers.<sup>601</sup> A key idea, developed by Halfeld, is that intelligent creativity is incompatible with the ideal of success.<sup>602</sup> The slowly emerging intellectual layer of writers has no concurrence and has therefore only negligible claims.<sup>603</sup> They are writers who use literature as a medium to fight the machine of Americanism and despite showing some tendencies of the enlightenment, they do not intend to liberate the mind but rather formulate their ideas out of opportunism not systemic criticism.<sup>604</sup> Halfeld in addition argues that the mass-individual is the educational ideal of the American society.<sup>605</sup> Furthermore, the educational system is comparable to a machine that focuses more on quantity than on quality. Halfeld moreover makes an explicit comparison with Germany and declares that the American academic education is far worse than the German one.<sup>606</sup> Again through the demarcation of the “other” the German identity is constructed and upgraded. Halfeld also again draws on the concept of using positive aspects of American society and attributing them with the negative mass-civilization. He for example states that the only reason everyone has the right to be educated in the USA is to form homogeneity and the uniformity of the coming generations.<sup>607</sup>

Halfeld's cultural anti-Americanism culminates in his argument that the American society destroys all free spirit as children are conditioned through the system.<sup>608</sup> Since their birth, children are indoctrinated with the American values of infallibility. What the author is trying to suggest through this account is related to the constructivist agency debate: whether the individual has the possibility for autonomy regarding the structure. Normally, the educative system is supposed to form the autonomous and free will of the individual. If his educational system however fails it is impossible for the individual to attain a degree of self-determination that will allow him/her to question existing structures. Through the educational system, the structure of Americanism is thus constantly reinforced as all possible discontent and disagreement are eroded and conditioned through education.

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<sup>601</sup> Idem., p. 176.

<sup>602</sup> Ibid.

<sup>603</sup> Idem., p. 177.

<sup>604</sup> Idem., pp. 177–180.

<sup>605</sup> Idem., p. 181.

<sup>606</sup> Idem., p. 182.

<sup>607</sup> Ibid.

<sup>608</sup> Idem., p. 185.

### *The American mass-society*

The third fundamental narrative relates to the American mass-society which is in opposition to German individualism. Similar to materialism, which can be found in all parts of the American society, the mass-society with consumerism, mass-production and mass-culture is an equally overarching characteristic. A very good example of how Halfeld describes this mass-society is his account of how immigrants have to undergo a process of naturalization. According to Halfeld, the foreigners undergo a rigid transformation which constitutes the backbone of the American success.<sup>609</sup> The most important idea is that through the process of naturalization, the individual becomes a completely assimilated part of the mass-civilization. This relates to the question of whether the individual, when confronted with a dominant structure, is able to retain his/her autonomy or if a new identity is forced upon him/her through the dominant representation structure. What Halfeld suggests is that Americanization is such a strong structure that the individual has no chance at all to retain his/her autonomy and individuality. The “old” identity and the “new” identity do not overlap; the new American identity is completely imposed on the new arrival. In order to become part of society he/she has to give up his/her old identity. He/she constitutes his/her new “me” though the structure. This reflects back on Halfeld himself. From a constructivist perspective, he thus seems to imply that a structure like Americanization leaves the individual no choice for individual freedom. Here the intrinsic fear of the individual, where his/her identity is constantly endangered, shows itself. Halfeld himself seems to be threatened by the new American values in Germany and feels that his real identity is fading. The natural reaction is the attempt to defend the own identity and this is what the author does through writing this book. The underlying reasons for the publication hence seem to go much deeper than only educational purposes. It is the subconscious fear that the autonomy of the individual is lost. The constitution of the subject as a self-determining creature is endangered through the structure. And Halfeld sees no way to avoid this. The structure in this sense constitutes agency entirely. This is probably also the reason why he constructs Americanization as such a strong negative and all-

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<sup>609</sup> Idem., p. 18.

encompassing structure. He argues that Americanization completely transforms the individual and levels it with the mass-culture.<sup>610</sup> Halfeld thus portrays the structure exactly as he subjectively perceives it in relation to his personal identity. As he sees no possibility for the individual to retaining certain traces of his/her original identity, the importance of agency is neglected. Identity-formation is a one-way process that makes the individual a product of the structure.

Halfeld's further remarks on the societal structure of the United States portray his idea of a mass-society that destroys individual identity. Halfeld states that even though the wealthy dominate the poor, the poor are afraid to reform the system as they have no self-responsibility and fail to take any initiatives.<sup>611</sup> Public opinion is formed through the state. The collective is forced upon the people.<sup>612</sup> This again relates to the idea that structure constitutes agency. This is underlined by Halfeld's final remarks on prosperity as key concept of American domestic politics.<sup>613</sup> Prosperity and wealth do not produce happiness, so Halfeld.<sup>614</sup> Again, positive characteristics of the American society are turned around through suggesting that non-material values are worth more than material ones. Halfeld explicitly states that this mechanised American society has mechanised man, which again underlines Halfeld's fear that the individual could lose his/her autonomy and individuality.<sup>615</sup>

As we have already seen, Halfeld's account on the link between Americanism and religion is very important as it helps to create a mass-society. Halfeld argues that religion plays a very strong role in American society. He even argues that the USA is counter-secular as it tries to develop a state religion.<sup>616</sup> Political functions, for example, require a commitment to religion.<sup>617</sup> This argumentation implies that people that hold political functions did not attain them through intellectual capabilities. Halfeld is painting a picture throughout the book where all political representatives of the American society are a bad choice to guide society. This of course gives the reader the impression that what the American model stands for can only be negative. How can a state represent positive values if its representatives do not? Moreover,

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<sup>610</sup> Idem., p. 19.

<sup>611</sup> Idem., p. 74f.

<sup>612</sup> Idem., p. 76.

<sup>613</sup> Idem., p. 77.

<sup>614</sup> Ibid.

<sup>615</sup> Ibid.

<sup>616</sup> Idem., p. 80.

<sup>617</sup> Idem., p. 81.

Halfeld proclaims that there is a strong religious fundamentalism.<sup>618</sup> This fundamentalism denies the principles of the Enlightenment such as the Darwinian theory of evolution.<sup>619</sup> Through this account the author constructs an image of American society that even denies objective scientific principles such as evolution. It is the slave of its own mass-civilization.

This leads us to what Halfeld calls the “psychology of Americanism”<sup>620</sup>. Halfeld argues that people's physical and psychological features can be regulated like a machine.<sup>621</sup> He in this sense again entirely links structure and individual and denies the individual all autonomy. Halfeld shows that rules and values become subject to imposition in the American society. Furthermore, from a constructivist perspective the influence of the Church could be interpreted as an identification structure that overlaps with the structure of Americanism. Religion to a certain extent influences the structure of Americanism. What Halfeld once again does, is to extract certain characteristics of the American society which, as such, are attributed a positive value and turns them around. In this specific case, he combines those characteristics with the idea that the individual has no personal freedom and is not self-determinant.

The economic dimension of the mass-society and its implications for the individual are another good example to investigate Halfeld's vision of Americanization. Halfeld argues that everyone's life becomes standardised through American values.<sup>622</sup> This uniformity of people and goods is responsible that people can only live and exist in the collective of society. Looking at those statements from a constructivist perspective, these passages show how structure and agency are mutually constituted and reinforced. The unification of society under the same values is the breeding ground for consumption. And what the American economy offers is the mass production that feeds and needs this demand from the mass-society. The cultural and economic dimensions of Americanization are mutually reinforcing. Halfeld's work underlines this connection. He claims that personal taste is being conditioned and the whole market is being unified.<sup>623</sup> Uniformity becomes a utopia through the conditioning and reconstitution of the subject.

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<sup>618</sup> Idem., p. 82.

<sup>619</sup> Ibid.

<sup>620</sup> Idem., p. 83.

<sup>621</sup> Ibid.

<sup>622</sup> Idem., p. 99.

<sup>623</sup> Idem., p. 101f.

The cultural sphere is also part of the process Halfeld characterises as mass-society and adds to the concept that the American collective principle is firmly opposed to European individualism.<sup>624</sup> Whereas Europe lives a tradition from the past into the future, the United States only sees the now. There are no all-encompassing contemplations, only the present counts, and this present has to consist of entertainment to make it liveable.<sup>625</sup> As the exceptional is so rare in the American lifestyle, people seek the exceptional in entertainment.<sup>626</sup> The mass-idols are hyped up through publicity and there is a longing for superlatives.<sup>627</sup> Through those accounts, the author suggests how the individual has completely lost all his/her preferences and characteristics.<sup>628</sup> The only entertainment that remains is what is offered from the structure of Americanism. The boundary between individual and collective has become entirely eroded.<sup>629</sup> The question the author consequently implies is whether or not Europe really wants to develop in the same way.<sup>630</sup> Naturally he states that Europe is individualistic and it is only this individuality that allows a creative spirit which advances society.<sup>631</sup> It is strongly opposed to what Halfeld calls the “selling, success, service”<sup>632</sup> of the United States, where the mass-effect has become the state sovereign.<sup>633</sup> Especially the press and its propaganda reinforce this Americanism. The press is thus misused from the structure to influence mass-society, where morality is contrived.<sup>634</sup> According to the author it is the Puritan spirit that is at least partly responsible for these developments.<sup>635</sup> As there is no balance between work and leisure, the individual has become void. Pseudo-cultural developments such as Jazz music portray a spirit of life that is non-existent and symptomatic of this society.<sup>636</sup> According to the author, Jazz symbolises the mass-mentality- it is no music but simply entertainment.<sup>637</sup> The tabloid culture in addition represents the levelling of knowledge on the lowest possible plane. They create a

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<sup>624</sup> Idem., p. 228.

<sup>625</sup> Idem., p. 229.

<sup>626</sup> Idem., p. 230.

<sup>627</sup> Idem., p. 231f.

<sup>628</sup> Idem., p. 233.

<sup>629</sup> Ibid.

<sup>630</sup> Ibid.

<sup>631</sup> Ibid.

<sup>632</sup> Idem., p. 234.

<sup>633</sup> Idem., p. 234f.

<sup>634</sup> Idem., pp. 236–238.

<sup>635</sup> Idem., p. 238.

<sup>636</sup> Idem., p. 239.

<sup>637</sup> Idem., p. 240.



dream world for the masses where the quantity of the broadcasts is more important than its quality, the optimistic sphere of replacement the mass-society needs.<sup>638</sup> The author sees no possibility that future generations could be capable of changing this.<sup>639</sup>

The American mass-civilization, according to Halfeld, additionally results in a mass-citizen that is made part of a homogenous collective, loses all individuality and is stunned through entertainment to ignore its mental and emotional emptiness. All areas of society are painted black; Americanism is constructed as a machine that destroys subject autonomy. Whenever Halfeld however refers to the press or Jazz music as characteristics of this society he never really goes into detail or analyses the different areas. He simply links everything and anything to the idea of mass-society and how the individualistic spirit is lost. It is all about creating a feeling, an image of Americanism that is per definition negative for society, therefore Americanization has to be a priori a bad development as well. These American developments thus oppose European individualism. The author himself states that showing the difference between the USA and Germany through an objective analysis was his main aim.<sup>640</sup> He argues that it is a crucial task to preserve one's own kind rather than being taken over by alien components.<sup>641</sup> The only thing Europe might learn from the USA is its quality of economic adaptability.<sup>642</sup> For the rest “Amerika ist Amerika, Europa ist Europa”- the USA is the antithesis to Europe.<sup>643</sup>

#### **6.1.4. Discussion and Implication of the research**

The analysis of the source has rested on the investigation of three dominant narratives. The opposition of American planned society and German (as well as European) culture, American materialism as opposed to German immaterial values and American mass-society contrasting with German individualism. Overall, the constructivist investigation has shown that the author raises Americanization to a structure which imposes itself on the German identity and endangers the German

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<sup>638</sup> Idem., pp. 241–243.

<sup>639</sup> Idem., p. 244.

<sup>640</sup> Idem., pp. 247, 249.

<sup>641</sup> Idem., p. 250.

<sup>642</sup> Idem., p. 251.

<sup>643</sup> Idem., p. 252.

cultural characteristics. The analysis has demonstrated multiple approaches where one could contemplate the structure/agency debate. The most dominant idea one could interpret from the source was that the author perceives the American lifestyle as a negative structure that influences individual identity and hence destroys individuality. American values are imposed through dominant representation mediators such as the movie industry and consequently entirely constitute agency. The individual becomes a product of the structure. He/she is not only constituted through the structure but in the structure as this structure has become his/her only reference point. The negative structure of Americanism exploits the population, denies autonomy and is based on a morally corrupt foundation. The materialism of mass-civilization is reinforced through consumer-culture. And it was in the consumer-culture of the United States that the absolute perversion of lifestyle and complete mutual constitution of structure and agency became visible. The structure offered mass production and demanded a society that was prepared to consume. The society on the other hand treasured consumption and craved material mass-production.

The structure of Americanism represented an entirely negative perspective in constructivist terms. It had such an impact on the individual that whenever he/she would behave negatively it was not him/her personally but rather related to the para-structure of Americanism that had conditioned the individual. What Halfeld thus created was a counter-structure. A structure that was imminently opposed to Americanism and hence only provided positive characteristics. Halfeld valued German characteristics over American ones and saw them in opposition to each other. The result was that he created a structure of “Europeanism” or “Germanism” which were the positive counterexample to Americanism. Of course, one has to bear in mind that both structures were created as absolutes. Americanism was created as entirely bad and with it all its characteristics. The counter-structure of “Europeanism” or “Germanism” was created as all-encompassing good. In reality, the American society wasn't as Halfeld portrayed it, nor was the German one. Nevertheless, the importance here is the reason why Halfeld saw the German identity endangered and rejected American influences so radically. This is something that relates fundamentally to the historical background of the time.

As we have seen in the chapter 4.1. on the historical background, the US-

German relationship throughout the 1920s was shaped by increasing American involvement in Germany. Be it through political negotiations such as the London Conference or increasing economic influences through American investments, the USA unmistakably exerted increasing influences in Germany. Together with cultural changes, the Americanization of Germany was the subject of public debate. Halfeld's work consequently fits in very well with the general Americanization-discourse of the time as he debates cultural and economic forms of American influences. Through discarding these American characteristics, he however reinforces the meaning of Americanization as a concept in the popular discourse. Through formulating what he perceives as negative about Americanization, he implicitly defines the concept. Most of his arguments were in this sense neither new nor original. The notion that American influences would alter German society was a dominant narrative in the German Americanization-discourse. Criticism of the USA and Americanization was equally prevalent. Negative America-images during the 1920s were politically shaped by the legacy of the First World War. Particularly for anti-Americans the wartime defeat as well as the negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference influenced negative America perceptions. Revision of the Treaty of Versailles became a cornerstone of political anti-Americanism as much as it became a foreign-policy objective throughout the 1920s. Economic influence of the United States, be it through private investments of the Dawes-Plan and reparations-negotiations added to the anti-American narrative. The USA as a new powerful force was perceived as endangering Germany's position and identity. Halfeld's publication therefore not only reflects the general America-debate and historical circumstances it also mirrors the overarching German anti-Americanism. A negative view of the USA combined with anti-modernization tendencies make it apparent why his work is perceived as representative of the anti-Americanism of the time.

One final concluding notion is that the publication by Halfeld not only relates to the historical background and the debate on American influences, it is actually representative of the Americanization-discourse of the 1920s. It cannot only be seen as a key work on German anti-Americanism of the 1920s. Even though the book paints a very negative view of American influences it nevertheless touches upon all notions that were generally connected to Americanization. Through stating that his publication is aimed at educating those people that have a wrong understanding of

the United States and its influences, he implies that many people do have a wrongfully positive view of Americanization. In this sense, the work represents the absolute ambivalence regarding American influences in the 1920s. Some people perceived American economic influences positively, others, like Halfeld, condemned all American influences radically. As Halfeld touches upon all those different notions of Americanization, he reinforces its understanding and reflects the entire Americanization-discourse of the time. Ironically, it might be exactly his dismissal of American influences that drew increased attention on the concept of Americanization and reinforced its spread and the Americanization of Germany in return.

## 6.2. Case Study: French anti-Americanism 1918-1933

### 6.2.1. General perspective

Anti-Americanism in the 1920s and 1930s was just as much a French phenomenon as it was European or German. In all countries with a high economic output American influences were perceived as very significant and widely discussed. Whereas England had already felt an increasing Americanization before the First World War, France and Germany witnessed American influences in the interwar-period and similar anti-American tendencies emerged. French anti-Americanism of the interwar-period was a combination of cultural-criticism and a negative perception of increasing American-style economic rationalization. Culturally, mass-production and standardization were perceived as the main risks of Americanization. Authors such as Duhamel criticised the American cultural imports and the exclusively technically industrially developed American society whilst lacking moral values.<sup>644</sup> This criticism was shared by Robert Aron and Arnaud Dandieu, who published a book in which they referred to Americanization as a cancerous disease.<sup>645</sup> They were the core of the intellectual circle called “Ordre Nouveau” (New Order) which would publish a journal under the same name. The Americanization-discourse as well as anti-Americanism would thus mainly be proclaimed through publications. The anti-

<sup>644</sup> Klautke, *Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten*, 279–281.

<sup>645</sup> Robert Aron and Arnaud Dandieu, *Le cancer américain*. (Paris: Rieder, 1931). For further information see: Seth D. Armus, *French Anti-Americanism (1930-1948): Critical Moments in a Complex History* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007), p. 19ff.

Americanists of the “Ordre Nouveau” saw Americanization as the main reason for a societal crisis and took an anti-capitalist, anti-materialist and even anti-parliamentarian stand. Interestingly they had close contacts to the German anti-Americans publishing their right-conservative ideas in the magazine *Die Tat*. Both circles shared the idea of a European cultural heritage that opposed American values.<sup>646</sup> The highpoint of French anti-American publications was reached when the newspaper *Le Figaro* launched an investigation at the end of the 1920s if Americanization would actually represent a danger for the French culture. Sixty writers, academics and politicians contributed to the anthology which was published between November 1930 and February 1931. There certainly existed strong anti-American voices (18) and fewer pro-American voices (11), the large majority of 34 contributors however took a neutral position.<sup>647</sup>

An important characteristic of French anti-Americanism as formulated by authors such as Kadmi-Cohen, Octave Homberg or Pierre Laurent, was the idea that France was threatened by U.S. imperialism.<sup>648</sup> This imperialism would reveal itself through the Young Plan<sup>649</sup> and the financial domination of the United States. Indeed, France still had a massive wartime debt it owed the United States. The idea that the United States was implementing a specific form of imperialism through its financial dominance was in this sense a particular French anti-American argument. Other arguments would be very comparable to the German discourse. Octave Homberg, for example, dismissed the increasing share of American movies in France which he characterised as uniform and low-level. Kadmi-Cohen formulated a critique that centred on the idea that the USA would put quantity before quality in economic production.<sup>650</sup>

Even though Georges Duhamel had taken a rather radical negative stand towards Americanization, authors like Aron and Dandieu still found this criticism too weak. They wanted a radical break with the bourgeois tradition and formulated a political

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<sup>646</sup> Klautke, *Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten*, p. 281ff, with further references.

<sup>647</sup> Idem., p. 283f.

<sup>648</sup> Idem., p. 282.

<sup>649</sup> The Young-Plan formulated the German reparations-payment obligations on the background of the Treaty of Versailles. It had been developed from an international financial committee, chaired by the American Owen D. Young, in 1929 and was formally adopted on the 17 May 1930. It stated that Germany had to pay 2 billion Reichsmark of reparations annually, was however deferred through the Hoover Moratorium in June 1931 and cancelled at the Lausanne Conference of 1932. Whereas the Young-Plan was generally perceived positively, some parts of the political right-wing disliked the treaty as the Rhineland had to be cleared of French troops was perceived as an economic and military threat. For more information see chapter 4 and footnotes 355 and 386.

<sup>650</sup> Klautke, *Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten*, 282f.

rather than economic or cultural criticism of Americanization. Nevertheless, more general criticisms prevailed. French anti-Americans proclaimed the idea that the USA had no culture and would only pursue material values. Furthermore, the dominance of the industrial and financial sectors was rejected. The notion that the USA had no cultural values was very prominent and absolutely comparable to German anti-Americanism. Whereas Germans argued that the USA had no culture, the French anti-Americans would proclaim that the USA had no civilization. Civilization in this sense encompassed all values of the nation as well as the idea of a French esprit. Octave Homberg for example contrasted American mass civilization with the elitist civilization of France. Henri Ghéon would go even further and claim that the USA had no civilization at all.<sup>651</sup> The standardised and automated organization of the United States could not be called civilization.

Overall, this criticism of American civilization would proclaim that people would lose their individuality and the individual would become mechanized through Americanization. What went hand in hand with those statements was the idea that Americanization had led from an emancipation of women to a domination of women in society. As we have seen, parallel arguments were also part of German anti-Americanism. What the contemplation of the French anti-Americanism of the 1920s thus shows is that it was rather similar to Germany. Possibly the critique of US financial imperialism was stronger in France as well as an occasional combination of anti-Americanism and anti-republicanism. Nevertheless, similarities rather than differences prevailed between both countries.<sup>652</sup>

### 6.2.2. Georges Duhamel

Similar to the German anti-Americanism of the interwar period, the French anti-Americanism would also produce very prominent and vocal representatives. Particularly the French writer Georges Duhamel published a travelogue in 1930 entitled *Scènes de la vie future*<sup>653</sup> which became a big success and contained the main criticisms which French anti-Americanists had raised in the previous decade.<sup>654</sup>

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<sup>651</sup> Idem., p. 296.

<sup>652</sup> Idem., p. 286f.

<sup>653</sup> The reprint from 1948 contains a large introduction on the author and his works.

<sup>654</sup> Klautke, *Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten*, p. 279f.

Duhamel's work summarized the French anti-Americanism of the 1920s and was hence for France what *Amerika und der Amerikanismus* had been for Germany, a representative manifesto which reflected the spirit of the time. Duhamel's biography has been well researched and can be investigated through different sources. His memoirs *Lumières sur ma vie*<sup>655</sup> thereby provide a detailed account of his life. The manuscript department of the French National Archives in Paris additionally hold a collection of preliminary versions of his publications and notebooks. Information about the circumstances of his America-voyage can be found in Kornel Huvos' publication *Cinq Mirages Américains*<sup>656</sup>. Among the literature on Duhamel and his anti-Americanism the article *Kronzeugen des anti-Amerikanismus*<sup>657</sup> by Egbert Klautke stands out.

Georges Duhamel was born on 30 June 1884 in Paris as the son of a medical doctor and former journalist. Even though his parents would change their residence at least twice a year Georges Duhamel would soon love particularly the Rive Gauche in Paris, the area south of the Seine which was home to an artistic crowd. Duhamel received his Baccalaureat in 1902 and went on to study science and medicine between 1903 and 1909 in Paris. During his studies, he began his first attempts as a writer and poet, nevertheless finished his studies as a doctor in medicine in 1909. His time at university was accompanied by strive for art and discovery. Duhamel would take part in multiple travels with his friends through France, Switzerland, Italy, Austria and Germany<sup>658</sup>. He was also a founding member of the “Abbaye de Créteil”, a local artistic project which would allow artists a life free of bourgeois responsibilities and solely dedicated to their artistic creations.<sup>659</sup> He had cofounded this commune alongside Charles Vildrac, René Arcos, Alexandre Mercerau and the painter Albert Gleizes in 1906 in Créteil, southern Paris. It was here where Duhamel picked up the craft of printing which resulted in his first poetic publications in 1907 and 1908.<sup>660</sup>

<sup>655</sup> Georges Duhamel, *Lumières sur ma vie* (Paris; Paris: Hartmann ; Mercure de France, 1944).

<sup>656</sup> Kornel Huvos, *Cinq mirages américains; les États-Unis dans l'œuvre de Georges Duhamel, Jules Romains, André Maurois, Jacques Maritain et Simone de Beauvoir*. (Paris: Didier, 1972).

<sup>657</sup> Egbert Klautke, ‘Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges Duhamel’, in *Welche Modernität? Intellektuellendiskurse zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich im Spannungsfeld nationaler und europäischer Identitätsbilder*, ed. by Wolfgang Essbach (Berlin, 2000), pp. 173–91.

<sup>658</sup> Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, *Scènes de la vie future. 2 éd. rev. et améliorée avec introd., analyse, notes, jugements et citations par Armand Bottequin*. (Audenarde: Sanderus, 1952), pt. Introduction, p. 13.

<sup>659</sup> Klautke, ‘Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges Duhamel’, p. 8.

<sup>660</sup> Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, *Scènes de la vie future*, pt. Introduction, p. 13.

After literary and literary-critic works in the following years, Duhamel would become “critique littéraire”, literary critic at the *Mercure de France*, a literary magazine and publishing house that dated back to 1672. In 1912, he would take over the editorship of the *Mercure* where he remained permanently employed until the First World War. Next to his literary ambitions he would nevertheless work accordingly to his education as a doctor in a laboratory. With the outbreak of the First World War Georges Duhamel volunteered to be a military doctor at the front. His wartime experiences at the front marked Duhamel and he would gain a deeper-rooted understanding of human brotherhood. He would process his powerful experiences in two publications, namely the *Vie des martyrs* (1917) and *Civilisation* (1918). These publications marked his literary breakthrough and allowed him to give up his work as a doctor and from here onwards only focus on his work as a writer.<sup>661</sup>

During the 1920s Duhamel became one of the most popular French writers. He would publish poetry, novels and travelogues. The latter were a product of his frequent travels, in fact Duhamel travelled several months every year.<sup>662</sup> The works *Le voyage de Moscou*<sup>663</sup>, *Scènes de la vie future* and *Géographie cordiale de l'Europe*<sup>664</sup> are all results of this time. His literary oeuvre would increase his public acknowledgement and fame and would lead to his affiliation and admission into several French literary academies. Between 1935 and 1938 he became executive editor of the *Mercure de France*, after the death of former editor Alfred Vallette. His editorship ended in 1938 and he was replaced by Jacques Bernard, because he had taken an anti-war stand. After the Second World War Duhamel, as major shareholder of the *Mercure* would appoint Paul Hartman as new executive editor, as Bernard had been arrested and tried in 1945 for collaborating with the Nazis. Meanwhile Duhamel would resume his work as military doctor in 1940. Subsequent to the liberation of France, Duhamel quickly published a series of diverse publications and novels since he had not been publishing during the occupation of France. In addition, he continued his extensive travels. Nevertheless, his post-war works did not match the success of his oeuvre of the 1920s and 1930s. Georges Duhamel died on 13 April 1966 in his

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<sup>661</sup> Klautke, ‘Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges Duhamel’, p. 8f.

<sup>662</sup> Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, *Scènes de la vie future*, pt. Introduction, p. 15.

<sup>663</sup> Georges Duhamel, *Le voyage de Moscou*. (Paris: Mercure de France, 1927).

<sup>664</sup> Georges Duhamel, *Géographie cordiale de l'Europe*. (Paris: Mercvre de France, 1931).



house in Valmondois as famous contemporary French writer.<sup>665</sup>

During his creative period, Georges Duhamel published several notable works. As already mentioned, Duhamel had his breakthrough as a writer with his works *Vie des martyrs*<sup>666</sup> in 1917 and *Civilisation*<sup>667</sup> in 1918. The novels are a clear work-up of his experiences as hospital doctor at the front and are to a certain extent an account of four painful years. *Vie des martyrs* (*Life of martyrs*) reproduces Duhamel's encounters with wounded soldiers, their pain and their courage. He wanted to demonstrate the greatness and divinity of the simple man in his most severe moments.<sup>668</sup> *Civilisation* follows up his first novel *Vie des martyrs* and depicts the fictive story of a mathematics professor at the front and his acquaintances. It is an account of the medical and technical advancements and developments at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the terrifying butchery of the war and foremost an ironic criticism of the path a mechanised European civilisation had taken: mechanisation in combination with modernity were the gravediggers of Europe's potential for progress.<sup>669</sup>

Duhamel was awarded the Prix Goncourt for his novel *Civilisation*, France's oldest and considered most prestigious literary award. In both works Duhamel developed one of his key opinions: any mechanic and material society was doomed to fail and was opposed to his ideal – a moral and true society.<sup>670</sup> The idealist Duhamel was deeply convinced that there was a necessity for a spiritual and humanistic civilisation, striving for the ideals of love, brotherhood and beauty, a “règne du coeur”<sup>671</sup> (rule of the heart). In particular, the last words of *Civilisation* symbolise Duhamel's mantra: “La civilisation n'est pas dans toute cette pacotille terrible; et si elle n'est pas dans le coeur de l'homme, eh bien ! elle n'est nulle part.”<sup>672</sup> (There is no civilisation in all this terrible rubbish; and if it is not in the human heart, then it is nowhere.) It seems like Duhamel was a true idealist who believed in a transcendental human goodness, a pure nature of man, which had been failed by a

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<sup>665</sup> Klautke, ‘Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges Duhamel’, p. 9.

<sup>666</sup> Georges Duhamel, *Vie des martyrs*, 1914-1916. (Paris: Mercure de France, 1950).

<sup>667</sup> Georges Duhamel, *Civilisation*, 1914-1917 (Paris: Mercure de France, 1918).

<sup>668</sup> Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, *Scènes de la vie future*, pt. Introduction, p. 20.

<sup>669</sup> Ibid.

<sup>670</sup> Klautke, ‘Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges Duhamel’, p. 10.

<sup>671</sup> Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, *Scènes de la vie future*, pt. Introduction, 21.

<sup>672</sup> Idem., p. 20f.

mechanised system but did inherently and unmistakably carry the natural potential for benevolence, a divine spark.

This idealism could also be found in his *La possession du Monde*<sup>673</sup> where he argued that happiness was based on profound and all-encompassing knowledge of things. The means to achieve this enlightenment was to focus on one's surrounding, nature, animals and first and foremost brotherhood.<sup>674</sup> Duhamel hence recognized a moral value grid that was cast like a fishing net over our very existence and interactions. The idealism merged with romanticism in his multivolume novels *Le cycle de Salavin*<sup>675</sup> and *La Chronique de Pasquier*<sup>676</sup>. The apparent humanism and moralism of Georges Duhamel in his novels probably relates back to his war experience.<sup>677</sup> As already mentioned the wartime experiences as a military doctor had a strong impact on Duhamel and reassured his beliefs of the importance of moral values and human charity. It seems that this humanitarian conviction was already existing in his adolescence, hence his choice to study medicine – a subject based on helping and curing other people – on “doing good”. In addition, the field represents what seemed to have been crucial for Duhamel: personal enhancement through education on the one hand (as seen with *La Chronique de Pasquier*) and humanitarian brotherhood on the other (as seen in *Vie des martyrs* and *Civilisation*). The moralism and philosophy of Duhamel is not only carried by humanitarian, but also metaphysical beliefs. Even though Duhamel was no believer in the church, he contemplated metaphysical paradigms such as the purpose of being. The result was his moralism and the “règne du coeur”, a love for society resting upon the native goodness of people.<sup>678</sup>

A work which combined Duhamel's ideals of morality and goodness with his anti-mechanization beliefs in his early works is his travelogue *Scènes de la vie future*. The book is the result of Duhamel's travels through the USA in the autumn of 1928 with the intention of studying the American way of life which was in Duhamel's eyes the future for the European society.<sup>679</sup> In the *Scènes de la vie future* Duhamel strongly

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<sup>673</sup> Georges Duhamel, *La possession du monde*. (Paris: Mercvire de France, 1919).

<sup>674</sup> Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, *Scènes de la vie future*, pt. Introduction, p. 21.

<sup>675</sup> Georges Duhamel, *Vie et aventures de Salavin*. (Paris: Mercvire de France, 1958).

<sup>676</sup> Georges Duhamel, *Chronique des Pasquiers*. (Paris: Gallimard, 1974).

<sup>677</sup> For further information of Duhamel's moralism and philosophy see: Arlette Lafay, *La sagesse de Georges Duhamel* (Paris: Minard, 1984).

<sup>678</sup> Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, *Scènes de la vie future*, pt. Introduction, p. 20f.

<sup>679</sup> Klautke, ‘Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges Duhamel’, p. 9.

dismissed the developments he saw in the USA. He thereby did not criticise the American people as such, but rather radically criticised ‘Americanism’ as social model.<sup>680</sup> His main points of criticism were the supposedly mechanised society, particularly the machine- and mass-culture, its materialism and the lack of moral values. Duhamel as moralist and humanist sharply contrasted the American mass culture with European individualism. In the USA, the actual improvement and education of the self were disprized for the intoxication of society by mass entertainment, such as the American movie industry and the commercialization of recreational activities like sports.

Naturally the personal experiences of Duhamel influenced his opinions and beliefs and by that also his literary work. As we have already touched upon Duhamel must have always felt a strong altruism, hence his decision to study medicine, which particularly demonstrates itself when he decided to volunteer as a military doctor in the First World War. It seemed to have been this wartime trauma that had a crucial impact on Duhamel's convictions and consequently the literary processing in his books. Particularly the works *La vie des martyrs* and *Civilisation* touched upon some important fundamentals which would later also form the canon of the *Scènes de la vie future*: on the one hand that systemic mechanisation would destroy society and on the other that everyone needed moral ideals in life. This idealism, moralism as well as anti-modernisation and -mechanisation was then taken up in *Scènes de la vie future* and projected onto the USA.

The *Scènes de la vie future* however relate to larger narratives than the personal experiences by Geoerges Duhamel. One of Duhamel's main ideas is that the American citizens would lose their personal freedom through Americanism which signified the uniformity and lack of individualism of the human being. This very particular idea and importance of “personal freedom” is a dominant structure in the French cultural canon. The birthplace of modern day France, the French Revolution in 1789 was a strive for personal freedom against the tyranny of a given political system. This very French contestation of an oppressive system that takes away the personal freedom can also be retrieved from the *Scènes de la vie future*. Here an oppressive American way of life leads to a levelling of the individual and loss of autonomy. This importance of personal freedom and uniqueness of the individual for

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<sup>680</sup> Idem., 10.

Duhamel also relates to his various travels. These travels were a mediator for Duhamel to explore the world and consequently enhance the individual personality; most of all they were a sign of freedom. Travelling meant “libération” to Duhamel, liberation and emancipation.

As already considered in the case of Adolf Halfeld, the observations by Duhamel are neither true nor false in an absolute sense. Duhamel deliberately picks anecdotes and encounters in order to convey a negative picture of the USA. Duhamel wanted to convey a negative picture of the USA because it opposed his ideologies. The book had an educative purpose and intended to warn the French public about the dangers of Americanization and to a certain extent even modernisation. These anti-modernisation tendencies were thereby partly rooted in an early romanticism.

Duhamel's ideas in *Scènes de la vie future* were taken up very positively and the book became a bestseller in France. Some of the positive reactions included Edmond Jaloux (1878-1949) who saw Americanism as the total destruction of French moral and social existence.<sup>681</sup> Gaston Picard built on Duhamel's criticism and argued that he was tired of all those who perceived American influences as something positive.<sup>682</sup> As already mentioned Duhamel's criticism was taken up and reproduced by authors such as Kadmi-Cohen, Robert Aron and Arnaud Dandieu who perceived Americanism as a cancerous disease which had to be eroded. They took a strong anti-material and anti-capitalist stand and combined it with anti-parliamentarian thought.<sup>683</sup> Nevertheless, there also existed some criticism of Duhamel. Jean E. Erhard for example stated that Duhamel failed to understand the American society and was lacking sensibility by condemning everything American, from slaughterhouses to American football, as forms of entertainment. He had completely enclosed himself and was thus unable to judge the USA.<sup>684</sup> Jacques de Lacretelle added that the American way of life was not the future for Europe, it represented a parallel societal evolution. It was particularly impressive because the American pioneers had levelled the European developments of 500 years in only 150. Lacretelle also developed that it was important to partly disregard the own cultural prejudices whenever travelling and openly discover the new culture.<sup>685</sup>

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<sup>681</sup> Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, *Scènes de la vie future*, pt. Introduction, p. 31f.

<sup>682</sup> Idem., p. 32.

<sup>683</sup> Klautke, *Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten*, p. 281f.

<sup>684</sup> Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, *Scènes de la vie future*, pt. Introduction, 30.

<sup>685</sup> Idem., 30f.

Generally, however, the *Scènes de la vie future* were taken up very positively and became a success. This can partly be explained by the timing of the book, published at a highpoint of French interests in the USA.<sup>686</sup> The book was thereby not only aimed at like-minded anti-Americans, but at the French society as a whole, which Duhamel intended to educate.<sup>687</sup> Nevertheless, *Scènes de la vie future* touched upon a certain anti-American sentiment the French society shared at the end of the 1920s. The America-picture which was conveyed in the French literature and press of the 1920s was shaped by books and travelogues about the USA. One of the main subjects was the American economy. Here the financial power of the USA, particularly the tough stance against the wartime creditor France, was debated negatively on the one hand, while, on the other the standardisation and rationalization of businesses by Fordism and Taylorism were assessed rather positive by the entire society.<sup>688</sup>

American developments were thus very apparent in France. Particularly mass-cultural imports such as American movies were often seen as potentially endangering the European identity. There was a high interest and awareness of Americanism and Americanization which was the premise and prerequisite for the success of *Scènes de la vie future*; it met the French literary demand. In addition to the timing of the book and a receptivity of society for anti-American thoughts, Duhamel's degree of popularity certainly also contributed to the sales numbers of his work. The fame of Duhamel preceded him, especially as winner of the Prix Goncourt. It was this fame that contributed to Duhamel becoming chief editor of the *Mercure de France*, the publishing house which published most of his works, including the *Scènes de la vie future*. As chief editor, he was able to control the output of an important French publishing house and was able to spread his ideas, as well as his Americanization-criticism. The *Mercure de France* was consequently a platform for Duhamel to propagate anti-Americanism.

The reflections on Duhamel's life and work have shown that there is a clear connection between his personal experiences, his ideology and the way he processes these through his literature. The First World War had destroyed the idea that universal

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<sup>686</sup> Klautke, 'Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges Duhamel', p. 10.

<sup>687</sup> Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, *Scènes de la vie future*, pt. Introduction, p. 26ff.

<sup>688</sup> Thomas Raithel, "'Amerika' als Herausforderung in Deutschland und Frankreich in den 1920er Jahren', in *Deutschland - Frankreich - Nordamerika: Transfers, Imaginationen, Beziehungen*, ed. by Chantal Metzger and Harmut Kaelble (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2006), pp. 82–97 (p. 90).

progress and mechanical developments could go hand in hand with intellectual and moral principles.<sup>689</sup> The result was that Duhamel despised systemic mechanisation and began to adhere to a strong moralism and humanism which manifests itself in his publications.<sup>690</sup>

### 6.2.3. “Scènes de la vie future”

The *Scènes de la vie future* was originally published in 1930 by the publishing house Mercure de France. The book is divided into fifteen chapters including Duhamel's arrival to the USA, his experiences in and his views on American cinemas, the American car-culture, segregation and the commercialisation of mass-entertainment. The title of the book: *Scènes de la vie future* (English: *Scenes of our future life*) suggests that Duhamel perceives his observations and experiences during his stay in the USA as the future for Europe and France. He picks up a dominant narrative, often touched upon in the literature, which states that the USA was a pioneer of modernity and that the American developments would reach Europe chronologically staggered.<sup>691</sup> American society was not seen as developing parallel to European society, but it was an incubator of Europe's future. Duhamel must have been convinced that what he saw in the USA was also the direction French society would head towards sooner or later, as if he had seen a glimpse of France's future, as if he had seen scenes of his future life. His quest to dismiss American developments was thus fuelled by his objective to protect France from its own possible future.

In order to investigate the America picture Duhamel conveys in *Scènes de la vie future* we will investigate three dominant narratives of the author throughout the book. The first dominant narrative is the mechanised machine-culture of the USA. The second narrative is the American mass-culture and finally the lack of moral values in combination with materialism. These three narratives will in the following be analysed with constructivist methodology focusing on how structures are created,

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<sup>689</sup> Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, *Scènes de la vie future*, pt. Introduction, p. 20f.

<sup>690</sup> Klautke, ‘Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges Duhamel’, p. 10.

<sup>691</sup> Dieter Heimböckel, ‘Zivilisation Auf Dem Treibriemen: Die USA im Urteil der deutschen Literatur um und nach 1900’, in *Mythos USA : ‘Amerikanisierung’ in Deutschland seit 1900*, ed. by Frank Becker and Elke Reinhardt-Becker (Frankfurt/Main; New York: Campus, 2006), pp. 49–69 (50f).

how they impose identities on the individual, how the individual accepts or opposes the structure and finally how individuals rest autonomous and create structural identity, in short, the interplay between structure, agency and identity.

### ***“Civilisation mécanique”***

Georges Duhamel begins his travelogue by describing his journey to the USA. This account plunges the reader into a separation of the “old world” and the “new world” right from the start.<sup>692</sup> As we have already seen, separation is the most important tool for identity forging. The author here separates two opposing sides, the US one the one end and France or Europe on the other. This separation is supported by the author's account of one of his conversations with the captain of the ship. He quotes the captain who claims that the USA is superior to Europe.<sup>693</sup> Duhamel here on the one hand draws on a nationalistic European feeling that rejects the USA by suggesting that Europe is in no way inferior to it. On the other hand, he uses other people to express ideas he wants to convey, a method he uses throughout the book. By re-enforcing narratives through personifications, the author highlights that Americanism has already brainwashed the American citizens which are now the vocal defenders of its ludicrous policies.

According to Duhamel these policies include the questionnaire every foreign citizen has to fill out regarding possible illnesses, which for Duhamel is strongly breaching personal privacy.<sup>694</sup> As we have seen in the previous section, personal privacy, freedom and independence were all key pillars supporting Duhamel's world view. These standardised questionnaires are the messenger of a mechanised and standardised society that is emotionally as sterile as it tries to be clinically. The questionnaires the medical doctor conducts are just as automatized and mechanized as the customs procedures, which are another intervention in the private sphere.<sup>695</sup> Civil Servants are puppets of a system that disregards personal freedom. Already in Duhamel's first experiences in the USA he thus portrays this American system as constricting and adverse. This negative account of the USA is thereby fundamentally

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<sup>692</sup> Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, *Scènes de la vie future*, p. 48f.

<sup>693</sup> Idem., p. 50.

<sup>694</sup> Idem., p. 52.

<sup>695</sup> Idem., p. 57.

influenced by his personal perception of the American system.

From a constructivist perspective, this American system i.e. Americanism figures as structure which influences Duhamel as agent. Duhamel constructs the structure of Americanism as systemic influence that hangs over the USA like a shadow and that is constantly re-enforced by its main actors. Americanism thereby figures as a dominant negative representation structure with seemingly contaminates society.

Duhamel's account of his arrival in the USA adds a layer of differentiation to this systemic influence of Americanism. When Duhamel disembarks, he is told he is no longer in the “old world”, a time “before the First World War”<sup>696</sup>. He consequently arrives in a “new world” which is geographically distinct from Europe and a representation of modernity. This is interesting in multiple regards: first Duhamel proposes that he has now not only entered a new world geographically, but also temporally: he travels into the future.<sup>697</sup> The structure of Americanism thus seems a possible if not most likely future for Europe. Thereby Duhamel concretises the notion that American developments have a direct impact on Europe, they have to be monitored and either be accepted or rejected. With the statement “before the First World War” there is a reference to shifting international power relations. Had the so called old world been the dominant international force pre-WWI, the USA came out of the First World War as a main geopolitical player, if not hegemon. One could interpret that this is all the more reason for Duhamel to raise questions about the socio-cultural environment of the USA and its possible impact on Europe. From a constructivist angle one can argue that the structure of Americanism seems to clearly influence not only personal but also national identities by its superordinate nature. Its overarching constitution transcends territorial and temporal boundaries. This implies that Duhamel perceives the structure of Americanism as very dangerous and plays with, as well as relies on, a protectionist or even nationalistic fear of his readership. He conveys the image that the USA is administrating a cultural imperialism through its overly modernistic and culturally progressive “civilisation mécanique” (mechanical civilisation) one is already confronted with upon entering the “new world”.<sup>698</sup>

What takes a particular role in the machine-culture of the USA and is a

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<sup>696</sup> Idem., p. 58.

<sup>697</sup> Ibid.

<sup>698</sup> Ibid.



stereotype of mechanisation is the automobile.<sup>699</sup> In Duhamel's account of the automobile he elaborates various interesting notions. For one he mentions that women drive cars, which re-enforces the more emancipated role of the American women.<sup>700</sup> To the author, this dominant position of women goes hand in hand with the loss of values.<sup>701</sup> This is symbolised by her steering the car which can be interpreted as being in charge of the entire machinery, the entire society. One can generally view the automobile as a metaphor for the American society: a mechanized and automatized machine, constantly moving forward, having only speed as a measure of progress, regardless of all accidents and pollution, with a woman in the driver's seat and the man in the back seat, "doing his numbers"<sup>702</sup> as Duhamel calls it, placing material wealth over decision-making, placing money over power and culture.

The chapter on the automobile describes how little Duhamel values mechanisation and modernisation. He argues that the automobile has introduced a material hierarchy into a society that was equal before the automobile-era.<sup>703</sup> Now material consumer goods in different models and prices have introduced different social classes. It is no more a "règne du coeur" it is a "règne de l'argent" (rule of the heart vs. rule of money).<sup>704</sup> Money has become the determinant for social status. The car has literally and figuratively become a medium to overtake other people. The description of the automobile in this sense again symbolises the system. Duhamel combines progress-pessimism with systematic criticism of the American societal structure.<sup>705</sup> Again, Americanism becomes a constructivist structure which is inherently bad and can be retrieved in different parts of the societal structure. Americanism is a multi-layered structure which impacts all parts of American life and is particularly characterized by its mechanisation. This mechanisation symbolises the planned and automated structure of Americanism. On top of that mechanization, however, also symbolises autonomy. This again relates to the danger of Americanism. If a structure is autonomous and exists detached from individual influences, it is even stronger and more influential. The structure of Americanism has hence developed a

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<sup>699</sup> Idem., p. 74.

<sup>700</sup> Idem., p. 76.

<sup>701</sup> Idem., p. 77.

<sup>702</sup> Idem., p. 79.

<sup>703</sup> Idem., p. 80.

<sup>704</sup> Idem., p. 80.

<sup>705</sup> Klautke, 'Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges Duhamel', p. 17f.

life of its own like a virus which has become uncontrollable.

Duhamel clearly paints a very negative picture of Americanism and its mechanisation and plays with the fear of his readership. His method is a mixture of differentiation, comparisons and irrational notions which he references back to an underlying nostalgia and culture-pessimism. He takes different parts of Americanism which are positive as such and turns them around, such as technological advancement and social mobility. The concepts themselves would generally be perceived as something very positive, Duhamel nevertheless gives these ideas a negative spin by connecting them to the ideas of indoctrination and the loss of personal freedom and culture. It is thus a cultural nostalgia that culminates in a structural anti-Americanism. This structure turns positive attributes around by drawing on irrational sentiments. All parts of society are connected to an overarching American structure which is inescapable and thereby only provides negative influences.

From a constructivist point of view, all the different features of Americanism as representation structure are reprehensible. There remain no positive attributes as the structure has an entirely negative connotation. The identity the structure provides is constantly re-enforced through multi-layered Americanism. The constitution of the self in and through the structure is an automatic and unconscious process. Thereby the ongoing reconstruction of the self in relation to the structure leads to a loss of individuality. As the main reference point for personal identity, the structure offers a structural identity that undermines individuality through mechanisation and uniformity. The new identity the individual is offered is hence less personal and in an even stronger relation to the structure. The structure consequently superordinates and constantly grows in domination through its interplay with the individuals. The negative side of Americanization is a vicious circle for the agency/structure combination. Agency here has become a tool to diminish its own importance in favour of a structure that provides the individual with an identity that subordinates personal freedom entirely under the mechanised structure of Americanism.

Duhamel's final account of the mechanised nature of Americanism is his description of visiting the slaughterhouses of Chicago which he calls the "royaume de la mort scientifique"<sup>706</sup> (kingdom of scientific killing). His argumentation implies that there exists a scientific and mechanised backbone to killing animals. According

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<sup>706</sup> Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, *Scènes de la vie future*, p. 84.

to the author, the entire meat industry is standardised and mechanised, it is one gigantic planned “culture”.<sup>707</sup> The slaughterhouses are the culmination of mechanisation. The value of life becomes devalued to the point where it has become a minor determinant in the grander picture of the meat industry.

This again has a clear connection to the agency/structure relationship. Americanism as a mechanized structure is exaggerated and presented as autonomous and self-sustaining, regardless of all values. Thereby the structure not only opposes the European or French cultural values, which we will call “Europeanism”, it also opposes the human being itself, an idea we will come back to in the section on morals and materialism. What is clear here is that the structure has influenced the individual to an extent that he/she has surrendered his/her personal reasoning in favour of structural identity. Individuals have become gearwheels in the machine-culture of Americanism. Agency has been entirely deferred into structure. The impact of the structure on personal identity has been so great that individuality has been sacrificed for the religion of Americanism. Duhamel hereby renders Americanism absolute and its dismissal, anti-Americanism, becomes the absolute counter structure. Thereby a rejection of American influences becomes inevitable and a necessity for the individual in order to guard his/her personal freedom.

According to Duhamel, the slaughterhouses symbolise the uniformity and mechanisation of Americanism.<sup>708</sup> One can again view the slaughterhouses as a metaphor for the American society which figures as combination of productivity and the absurdity of the system. This is further conveyed through Duhamel's use of language: he uses multiple adjectives such as “immense” (enormous), “désert” (empty) and “mortelle” (deadly) to describe the abattoirs.<sup>709</sup> In addition he compares the meat-industry in Chicago to his local butcher in France.<sup>710</sup> Duhamel here creates the cultural counter structure of the Occident which is the prototype of his key antithesis: machine-culture versus humanistic culture. Through his account of the butcher he combines the “real” humanistic culture to nostalgia.

His final paragraph of the chapter on the slaughterhouses compares the squealing of the pigs to the shrieking of the wheels of the automobile.<sup>711</sup> One can thus conclude

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<sup>707</sup> Idem., p. 85.

<sup>708</sup> Idem., p. 85ff.

<sup>709</sup> Idem., p. 92f.

<sup>710</sup> Idem., p. 93.

<sup>711</sup> Idem., p. 97.

that the mechanised structure is part of all layers of society and inescapable. The individual and his/her identity are determined by the structure which is multi-layered and culturally reinforced. The “civilisation mécanique”, structurally opposed to the “civilisation véritable” (true civilisation), transcends the public, professional and private life.

### *Mass-Entertainment*

For the first dominant narrative of *Scènes de la vie future*, the mechanized civilisation, we have focused a lot on structure and how the structure destroys individuality and personal identity. The narrative of mass-entertainment however does allow very interesting contemplations about Duhamel's relationship to the agency. In the chapter on his cinematographic experiences he continues his negative account of Americanism. He states that “cinéma n'est pas encore un art”<sup>712</sup>, movies and cinema are not yet an artform as they are not an expression and result of personal creativity. Personal creativity and the possibility for the individual to actually “create” (identities and structures) are however the very foundation of agency. According to Duhamel the movie industry is trying to numb the masses, to stun the crowd with unilateral mass-entertainment.<sup>713</sup> There is no intention of stimulating cultural desires by creativity. In this sense agency and the possibility of the individual to be creative are non-existent. This leaves two very interesting layers of interpretation. First Duhamel implies, that one has to be European in order to possess the ability of free will and self-determination. One can thus abstractly say that Americanism has destroyed the possibility of self-determination and with it the possibility of the individual to oppose or create identities. Only the background of the Occident therefore allows any form of agency and is the counterpart to an all-encompassing American structure. On a second level Duhamel and his work himself are an example of agency. With his book, he participates in the formation of opinion and thus in the endpoint also identities. Through writing this book he thus personifies the very premise for agency. He is the incarnation of the Occident's potential for structural opposition and identity formation.

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<sup>712</sup> Idem., p. 69.

<sup>713</sup> Idem., p. 61ff.

The cinema therefore takes up an important position for Duhamel. It is the stereotype of a structure that indoctrinates a mass-culture through mass-entertainment rather than a real humanistic culture. It is produced “by a soulless machine for a soulless mass-society”<sup>714</sup>. The result is that the individual loses his/her identity through mass-entertainment. According to Duhamel, everything is an illusion cast by consumer entertainment rather than intellectual stimulation.<sup>715</sup>

An important notion of the mass-entertainment narrative is the role of art, including both music and visuals. Duhamel refers to these as the “robinet de musique” and “robinet des images”<sup>716</sup>. They are consequently a standardised product that loses its uniqueness and beauty through reproduction. This idea has been touched upon by Walter Benjamin only a few years later in 1936 in his essay *The work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction*<sup>717</sup>. Benjamin argues that art loses its “aura”, its authenticity and its nature of being special through mechanical reproductions. As Duhamel states, the beauty of imperfection is lost just as much as the imperfection of beauty.

According to Duhamel mass-entertainment destroys this humanistic quest for self-determination of the arts. Whereas art provides the opportunity to surpass oneself proactively, entertainment is a passive irrigation of the senses.<sup>718</sup> Mass-culture and conditioning lead to the dissolution of the possibility that the human nature entails the potential for creativity. This can again be related back to the erosion of agency, an incapability of invention and creation. This importance of creationism touches upon a very romantic notion. In the German literary period of the Sturm und Drang (Storm and Stress) particularly this creative spirit of the so called “Originalgenie”, a creative genius inside every human being, was a central paradigm.<sup>719</sup> Through literary periods such as the Sturm und Drang in the second half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, there existed a strong humanistic tradition in Europe. The idea of a creative spirit, which directly relates to the constructivist paradigm of creating structural identity through agency, seems to be crucial in Duhamel's description. In addition, this quest also relates to the national Romanticism of the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Main political goal of

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<sup>714</sup> Idem., p. 61. “Un luxe industriel, fabriqué par les machines sans âme pour une foule que l'âme semble désertter aussi.”

<sup>715</sup> Idem., p. 62f.

<sup>716</sup> Idem., p. 65.

<sup>717</sup> Walter Benjamin, *The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction* (London: Penguin, 2008).

<sup>718</sup> Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, *Scènes de la vie future*, p. 70.

<sup>719</sup> Herbert A. Frenzel, *Daten deutscher Dichtung I*. (München: Dt. Taschenbuch-Verl., 2001), p. 201.

Romanticism was the grasp of a clear cut national identity for the nation state as social construction.<sup>720</sup> Duhamel thus joins literary traditions and arguments that have been present for over a century.

Duhamel tries to educate the French population regarding the dangers of mass-entertainment as he fears that the loss of culture and the “new religion” have already reached Europe. He thereby implies that the structure of Americanism is contaminating other parts of the world. The structure is “brute”, which could be translated as goring and low, it does not comprise a high culture. The commercialisation of sports for example does not contain something “beautiful” it is simply an animalistic mass-phenomenon.<sup>721</sup> Standardisation and mechanisation have thus taken the form of mass-entertainment and commercialised the private sphere. Not only have the economy and industry become standardised but also the human being itself which flourishes in its uniformity and thereby loses its personality, its soul.

### ***Morals & Materialism***

The third and final narrative which is developed throughout the *Scènes de la vie future* relates to morals and materialism. As we have previously discussed, the author can be characterized as a strong moralist and conveyed this moralism in his other works as well. In the *Scènes de la vie future* this moralism can be strongly retraced in Duhamel's account of the slaughterhouses of Chicago. According to Duhamel it is an industry of killing, where the value of life has been lost entirely.<sup>722</sup> The dominant structure of Americanism is hence free of all moral judgement. It represents the absolute absurdity where the human being has become only an executing force of the structure that has mechanised and industrialised the process of “killing”. Even irrational and immaterial values such as life itself have become standardized. As Duhamel states, it takes exactly 22 minutes to take the life of a beef.<sup>723</sup>

This has a very interesting relation to the combination of structure, agency, identity and morality. Duhamel implies that a person has to be moral and just in order

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<sup>720</sup> Idem., p. 296f.

<sup>721</sup> Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, *Scènes de la vie future*, p. 110f.

<sup>722</sup> Idem., p. 88.

<sup>723</sup> Idem., p. 94.

to be able to oppose the structure. When these personal traces are eroded by the structure, the individual loses his/her only tools to judge whether to oppose or accept the structure. The only result is the total assimilation of the individual in the identity offered by the structure. Morality itself comes from the “good soul” of the individual. This idea conveys the idea that there is something greater and metaphysically divine inside everyone which functions as moral compass. When this moral compass is lost through a negative representation structure that constantly reinforces this structural identity through mediators such as mass-entertainment, the individual loses his/her ability to “be”. The human being henceforth loses its ability to choose from the offered representation structures, assimilate some identity traits and oppose others. Its very nature and personal identity are lost, alienating its constituting characteristics. On top of that the agential possibility to create structural identity is destroyed because the tools for creating structures have been eroded by the dominant representation structure. Agential identity creation becomes impossible without moral values and guidelines as one can no longer identify with something if the criteria for the assessment of right and wrong are lost. This is why Duhamel's moral underpinning is so crucial from a constructivist standpoint: if morality actually figures as determinant for identity then an amoral structure such as Americanism is the highest form of reprehensibility. Any potential for self-determination is destroyed and with it the role of agency. The complete constitution in or through the structure has destroyed all autonomy and self-determination of the individual and hence eliminates agency from the equation of identity-formation through the mutually constitutive structure/agency paradigm. And it is this absolute heteronomy which is mirrored in Duhamel's final statement reflecting upon his Chicago experiences - “Nous devons vivre, mais à quel prix?”<sup>724</sup> (We have to live, but at which cost?).

Duhamel finalises these contemplations about morality in his chapter on segregation where he argues that American standardisation and classification are not only a phenomenon of industry, they are also applied on the human races.<sup>725</sup> They represent the human perversion of a system that has indoctrinated its citizens with an ideology of classifying goods and people according to their characteristics. Duhamel's account of his experiences however also implies that he dismisses this segregation of American society and opposes it by treating coloured people as his

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<sup>724</sup> Idem., p. 98.

<sup>725</sup> Idem., p. 99f.

equal.<sup>726</sup> He thereby shows how he is still in possession of a moral compass. Whereas the automobile introduced a separation of social status through material wealth, segregation symbolises a partition of people according to their “value”. It is here where morality and materialism fundamentally intertwine. The core foundation of morality has been replaced by materialism. One could even argue that this perverted form of materialism, the result of Americanism as structure, demonstrates the culmination of the dangers of Americanization. The influence of Americanization in Europe and the loss of morality might even lead to the individual turning on other people's personal freedom, which figures as highest good. This corrupt structure actually transcends the metaphysical component of death as white and coloured people have to be buried in different cemeteries.<sup>727</sup>

A crucial idea of Duhamel is that African Americans do not have the possibility of identifying themselves with the American nation because Americanism has downgraded them.<sup>728</sup> The elementary feeling of national identity, of “patrie”<sup>729</sup> (fatherland) as Duhamel calls it, can thus not develop. This is a very interesting concern by the author because it highlights the importance he attributes to national identity. As the structure of Americanism denies the individual to inherit national identity, another main personal identification structure is disregarded. A system that denies a part of its population the possibility of feeling national identity can thus only be illegitimate.

One of the final parts of *Scènes de la vie future* describes the authors conversation with a railroad insurance agent. This agent confirms that it is actually cheaper for the railway companies to buy insurance for possible accidents rather than to make railroad repairs.<sup>730</sup> This argument inclines that money seems to be of more value than people. Duhamel deliberately uses this anecdote to convey the negativity and absurdity of Americanism. He again combines morals and materialism by supposing that the latter has replaced the former. The heart of the structure is comprised of material values, the “règne du coeur” is no longer possible. Here both structures clash, the “civilisation morale ou véritable” and the “civilisation matérielle

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<sup>726</sup> Idem., p. 99.

<sup>727</sup> Idem., p. 103f.

<sup>728</sup> Idem., p. 105.

<sup>729</sup> Idem., p. 105.

<sup>730</sup> Idem., p. 119.



ou mécanique”.<sup>731</sup> Human life has been attributed a monetary value through life insurances and represents the ultimate merger of morals and materialism, something immaterial has been replaced with something material.

The insurance agent is to Duhamel a representative of the structure, while being controlled and indoctrinated by it. Structure and agent literally and figuratively merge from a constructivist standpoint. As Duhamel states “‘tout’ vaut ‘tant’”<sup>732</sup> (everything is worth so much). He contrasts a “valeur humaine”<sup>733</sup> and a “valeur marchande”<sup>734</sup> and what one could call a “valeur divine”, human values, material values and divine values. Duhamel here creates three structures- “Americanism” as negative structure and two opposing counter-structures: humanistic “Europeanism” and “morality”. We have already touched upon the use of morality by Duhamel nevertheless in this particular case morality is used as a structure that directly opposes Americanism and reinforces European national identity.

The insurance here is a metaphor for the human being that has willingly sold its soul. For Duhamel, this seems to be more than metaphorical: his belief in something similar to Plato's “idea of the good”<sup>735</sup>, a natural goodness of people linked to their soul, has been lost. The aim of insurances, to protect people, in reality makes them free of all morality as the human life has obtained a monetary value. Betterment leads to demoralisation, “amélioration” to “démoralisation”.<sup>736</sup> The final argument regarding morals and materialism is the idea that “amélioration”, the improvement of people's lives, is fundamentally linked to the improvement of the standard of living by Americanism.<sup>737</sup> Duhamel however strongly argues in favour of what one would call the standard of being and what he himself calls “valeurs non réversibles”<sup>738</sup>. This concludes the constructivist paradigms of structure, agency and identity. There exist two opposing structures, the standard of living, hence Americanism, and the standard

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<sup>731</sup> Klautke, ‘Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges Duhamel’, p. 10.

<sup>732</sup> Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, *Scènes de la vie future*, p. 122.

<sup>733</sup> Ibid.

<sup>734</sup> Ibid.

<sup>735</sup> Plato's theory of forms states that non-material abstract forms, the “ideas” of things, exist and that the material world is modifiable and only a reproduction of these ideas. These overarching ontological entities are the highest and purest form of metaphysical reality. Thereby the highest idea, from which all other ideas derive and are subordinated to, is the idea of the good. The idea of the good is the highest principle and the reason for the goodness of everything, it transcends the existing, and superordinates all forms. See: Otfried Höffe, *Kleine Geschichte der Philosophie* (München: C.H. Beck, 2001), 42ff.

<sup>736</sup> Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, *Scènes de la vie future*, p. 123.

<sup>737</sup> Idem., p. 124.

<sup>738</sup> Ibid.

of being, hence true morality. Americanism as dominant identity structure has destroyed the possibility for the individual to act upon self-determination, it has eroded moral judgement and has as a result destroyed the possibility of identity formation through agency.

#### **6.2.4. Discussion and implication of the research**

The constructivist analysis of *Scènes de la vie future* has focused on three dominant narratives which reoccur throughout the work by the French writer and philosopher Georges Duhamel. These narratives not only symbolise the convictions and beliefs of the writer, they also contrast Americanism as socio-cultural structure on the one hand and the European counterpart on the other. The first narrative, the “civilisation mécanique” contains Duhamel's dismissal of American mechanization and standardization processes. Americanism is raised to a negative structure, which imposes a uniform, “mechanised” identity on the individual and thus erodes individual personality. A counter-structure is created, individualistic and full of personal freedom, a “Europeanism” with entirely positive connotations. Both structures are created as absolutes and thereby exaggerate all features and characteristics of the respective structure. The individual is hereafter supposed to feel endangered by the new American structure which restricts personal freedom and self-determination and as consequence Americanization has to be opposed.

The second narrative, mass-entertainment, is portrayed as the cultural means of re-enforcing systemic Americanism and is contrasted with the true humanistic culture of the Occident. Mass-entertainment, in contrast to real art, contains no potential to surpass oneself and live up to the creative nature of the human being. Multi-layered Americanism erodes the individual's potential to create structural identity and ability to oppose a dominant representation structure. The third narrative relates to Duhamel's idea of morality and materialism, draws upon the other two narratives, and goes even further. The uniform structure of Americanism is not only contrasted with the cultural structure of Europeanism, Duhamel creates a third structure: moralism. For Duhamel, the core of the human existence is based on moral values and Americanism has replaced these with material ones. Americanism thus opposes

the very nature of the human being and is not only an evil counter structure to the humanistic and individualistic European identity, but also to an independent moralism. This is particularly important because it suggests an objective measure that American influences need to be rejected in order to preserve the very nature of being human.

The enhancement of the purely materialistic standard of living is in contrast with the standard of being, which is moral and individualistic. Identity thus seems to have its foundation in a moral and just representation structure. Therefore, agency can only function via moralism. The danger of Americanism is that as it destroys agency, the individual can no longer oppose the dominant representation structure and the self is constituted through the structure. What Duhamel however does *is* agency. He opposes a dominant representation structure and values specific characteristics over others thereby creating structural identity.

The publication by Georges Duhamel thereby on an argumentative level relates to the prevailing French Americanization-debate of the 1920s. Financial imperialism, as well as economic and cultural Americanization were cornerstones of the interwar debate. The Americanization-discourse indeed portrayed extreme positions and manifested itself in a praise of American influences on the one hand, and a dismissal on the other. In this sense Duhamel, definitely was a representative figure of the French anti-Americanism as his argumentations took up the general criticisms of the anti-Americanists of the 1920s. His prominence as a writer here helped to target a larger public which was generally receptive to America related literature. Through reaching this larger public Duhamel actually unwillingly spread and reinforced the idea that there in fact existed an ongoing Americanization of France.

### **6.3. Comparison**

The work *Amerika und der Amerikanismus* and *Scènes de la vie future* pursue very similar lines of argumentation. Both authors base a fundamental rejection of Americanization and Americanism on a criticism of mechanisation and standardisation of the American society which supposedly goes hand in hand with a loss of culture. Both authors in this sense contrast European culture and individuality

with American mass-phenomena and uniformity. What represents the antithesis of “Kultur” and “Zivilisation” to Halfeld, the confrontation of the “civilisation morale et veritable” and the “civilisation mécanique et materielle” were to Duhamel.<sup>739</sup> Both authors stress that material values as well as mass-culture and -entertainment of a planned society oppose the cultural values of Europe. Standardization of the industries, but also of consumer goods, have destroyed individual peculiarities and are contrasted with a European culture, being humanistic, individualistic and immaterial.

This is highlighted through the similarities of the dominant narratives in both works. Halfeld and Duhamel both stress materialism, mass-culture and the planned or mechanised society as the three main pillars of Americanism. Their main goal was to defend the Occident against the influences of Americanization in order to preserve the European cultural heritage and character. They intended to educate the European population with the observations they made during their travels to the USA, which to them were a likely and dangerous future for Europe. They criticised Americanism and Americanization through the example of the USA.<sup>740</sup>

The argumentation of both authors is thereby in line with older criticisms of the USA and anti-modernisation tendencies. As discussed, anti-Americanism was no phenomenon limited to the 1920s, the dominant narratives have been prominent at least since the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century. In addition, a combination of anti-modernization, nostalgia and romanticism have historically been constitutive of cultural anti-Americanism. The anti-Americanism of the 1920s by Georges Duhamel and Adolf Halfeld is hence a specific variation of older critiques of civilisation.<sup>741</sup> This criticism was projected onto the USA,<sup>742</sup> but was not exclusive to Americanism. Both authors have a fundamental attitude and ideology that is very humanistic, protects personal freedom and self-determination. This attitude is projected onto the USA, but could however be applied to any other country. Georges Duhamel for example does criticise similar developments in his USSR-related work *Le voyage de Moscou*. What both authors thus proclaim is more of a pro-individualism, than an anti-Americanism. Nevertheless, the USA is a perfect target for their criticisms. Americanization was a

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<sup>739</sup> Klautke, ‘Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges Duhamel’, p. 16.

<sup>740</sup> Idem., p. 17.

<sup>741</sup> Ibid.

<sup>742</sup> Idem., p. 18.

present and ongoing feature of both Germany and France during the 1920s. The Americanization-debate hence allowed the authors to advocate their deeper-rooted concerns and relate them to a contemporary phenomenon.

This new public debate about American influences became bundled with the end of the First World War. There seemed to have existed a feeling that the USA had surpassed the “old world”, particularly in technology. The predominance of European culture and its approach to modernity had fallen second to the USA. Germany and the USA were both important economic powers with a colonial strive but their standing had been undermined through the First World War. Feelings of national pride and national identity had consequently become increasingly eroded. Germany had to bow to the American military supremacy and France had to rely on the USA for eventual liberation. The national identity of both nations was threatened by a new structure that exhibited military, economic and cultural supremacy. What the authors thus tried was to fence off against American predominance and partly fled back into narratives of national romanticism. This was combined with nostalgic anti-modernization tendencies through which they tried to hold off Americanization. It was an attempt to dismiss Americanism whilst Americanising.

Nevertheless, the USA did offer a broad contact surface. The First World War had shown that the values of the “old world” were seemingly subordinate to the “new world”, that the European nations could not be self-sustaining. Moreover, the unprecedented military and civil casualties indicated that the values of the “old world” about coexistence and human dignity were no longer shared. Functionally both authors would thus dismiss American developments in order to reinforce the pride and national identity of their nations. At the same time, however, an Americanization of the European economy was ongoing, which was at least partly responsible for the recovery of the German and French industries after the war. The authors thus contested a perceived anti-intellectualism and anti-individualism regardless of other “objectively” positive American influences. Anti-Americanism as formulated by Duhamel and Halfeld was a rephrased culture and civilisation criticism resting on five different pillars: anti-modernisation, the legacy of the First World War, the humanistic background of the Occident, a transatlantic shift in international politics and finally the actual economic and cultural Americanization as imported through different-minded values of the USA. They reinforced national identity in the

deep post-war identity crisis in Europe that would also be partly responsible for the political crisis which were to come.<sup>743</sup>

On an argumentative level, there are however not only similarities between the works of Georges Duhamel and Adolf Halfeld. First of all, both authors differ in the style of writing. Adolf Halfeld as journalist gives a rather neutral and factual description of the American society. The writer Georges Duhamel on the other hand uses a more literary-artistic style.<sup>744</sup> Moreover, both works did not reach the same degree of popularity. Whereas both works were commercial successes, George Duhamel as famous writer reached a much larger readership and *Scènes de la vie future* therefore had a much larger diffusion.<sup>745</sup>

When one compares both descriptions of Americanism there also exist some differences on a hermeneutic level. Adolf Halfeld delegitimizes Americanism through pragmatic and historical reasons, whereas Georges Duhamel bases his ideas more on a moral, idealistic and romantic framework. Halfeld strongly contrasts the USA and Germany as two totally opposing systems and keeps comparing the two throughout his work. Duhamel by contrast draws less on comparisons on a national level and more on universal morals. He compares Americanism rather to universal values which are a paragon for France. Even though the ultimate dismissal of Americanism as sociocultural system is similar, both authors take different paths to reach it. For Halfeld Americanism is inherently negative as it signifies the exact opposite of German and European traditions. For Duhamel Americanism is reprehensible because it opposes universal moral values. In both cases, Americanism thus opposes what the authors perceive as the absolute and righteous system. Whilst Halfeld argues more from a pragmatic side, Duhamel uses an idealistic angle. This is also reflected in what is emphasised through the main narratives of the works. Halfeld particularly develops the idea of Germany being one “Volk”, one ethnic nation, which opposes the planned culture of Americanism. Duhamel on the other hand develops his main narrative through the idea that moralism has been replaced by materialism. The stronger focus of Halfeld on the nation-state and its ethnic dimension, i.e. being a “Volk”, suggests that the German national identity was more disordered and dysfunctional than the French one. This certainly again relates to the legacy of the

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<sup>743</sup> Idem., p. 19.

<sup>744</sup> Idem., p. 16.

<sup>745</sup> Ibid.

First World War and the German defeat, opposed to France which was at least formally a wartime victor. The First World War in addition explains Duhamel's emphasis on moral values which is rooted in his experiences at the front. These experiences seemed to have been one of the main reasons for Duhamel's moralism and idealism which is equally reflected in his other works.

On a constructivist level one can again see various similarities and differences between the works of both authors. When we look at the constructivist agency/structure dichotomy it is apparent that Halfeld as well as Duhamel both create Americanism as constructivist structure. It is the dominant representation structure that emits specific traits of identity which can then be either accepted or denied by the individual. This structure is in both cases painted very dark. All parts of the American society and lifestyle are taken up and spun around negatively. Even developments with a generally positive connotation were exaggerated, attributed a negative value and then connected to the structure of Americanism. From a constructivist standpoint both authors would describe Americanism as a structure that had a direct impact on the individual and changed its personal identity radically. The overarching structure of Americanism did not only offer a certain identity, it forced a new identity onto the individual by changing one's very personal identity. The multi-layered structure of Americanism would be constantly reinforced on different levels. Not only would certain narratives and goals be depicted as desirable, they were reinforced on a cultural level by mass-culture and mass-entertainment. As a consequence, the individual could not escape the structural imposition and had barely any chance to oppose this representation structure: the structure was forced upon the individual. Moreover, the identity that was imposed would however inherently contain the central aspects of uniformity and standardisation. The individual would hence over the long run, by incorporating the new identity, render himself/herself more and more uniform and lose his/her personality completely. The identity which was offered by the structure reinforced itself constantly through the individual. The individual would lose all tools to actually oppose the dominant representation structure or even be able to create structural identity. Agency was hence completely eroded.

In order to oppose this dangerous structure of Americanism and preserve individuality, Halfeld and Duhamel created a counter structure. Whereas

Americanism was the absolute of negativity, Europeanism as counter-structure had to be entirely positive. Thereby the own (national) identity was sharpened, enhanced and desirable as the structure of Americanism was endangering the actual constitution of the self. The “self” was constituted through the existence of the “other”. It was image-making and identity creation by comparison, the central mediator for identity formation. In addition to the structural approach, where both authors argued that the possibility for identity formation through agency was eroded, they are both prime examples of personified agency. They not only oppose the dominant representation structure they actually construct structures and reinforce identities through their arguments. Their hierarchical assessment of the American and European antagonism created structural identity through shared meaning. Through writing the books they advocated their ideas and took part in creating and constructing identity. They consequently represent the possibility and potential of agency and identities in the structure/agency paradigm.

Nevertheless, some differences between the works of both authors also exist from a constructivist standpoint. The main difference is thereby that Halfeld is particularly working on creating a counter structure in order to constitute national identity. Duhamel on the other hand is particularly focused on how agency's possibility to create identity is destroyed. While Halfeld argues more from a structural perspective, Duhamel argues more from an agential perspective. Nevertheless, the similarities overweigh: the main structure created by Duhamel is the counter structure of morality. In this sense, Duhamel reinforces and uplifts French national identity from a moral standpoint while Halfeld creates national identity through fencing off against all characteristics of Americanism. Duhamel creates structural national identity though placing it on a moral foundation, he creates legitimacy through morality.



## **7. Conclusion**

### **7.1. Answering the Research Questions**

The study on hand has addressed the German and French Americanization-debate between 1918 and 1933. It has thereby contemplated the works of significant authors who contributed to the interwar-debate about the USA and its influences across Europe. The focal point of the research has rested on the relationship between advocated pro- or anti-American images and national identity. The central research questions of the present study were subsequently how the said relationship between the Americanization-debate and national identity was constituted, what figured as the main differences and similarities between the pro- and anti-American authors and how these could be explained. The following section will answer each of these three research questions separately and elucidate the findings of this research.

*What is the relation between the Americanization-debate (i.e. pro- and anti-Americanism) and national identity in Germany and France in the 1920s?*

In order to answer the main research question, the empirical chapters of this study have focused on the life and work of Julius Hirsch, Lucien Romier, Adolf Halfeld and Georges Duhamel. The America-related writings of these authors contain distinct assessments of the USA, of the American socio-economic model and of its influences on Germany and France. Whilst the former two authors demonstrated positive assessments of the USA and pro-American images, the latter reject everything related to the USA and represented a firm anti-American standpoint. The writings therefore provided a practical case study to investigate the relationship between the propounded Americanization-discourse and national identity. The hermeneutic investigation of the sources was conducted through the application of constructivist methodology. Constructivism as International Relations Theory included a conceptual approach to national identity and simultaneously provided a research methodology that allowed to analyse the sources under their subjective and constructed aspect. The research has consequently shown that there indeed exists a

noteworthy relationship between the Americanization-debate and the concept of national identity. This relationship was, however, distinct for each of the four authors.

The German economist Julius Hirsch advocated a very economic pro-Americanism in his publication *Das Amerikanische Wirtschaftswunder*. Throughout his work, Hirsch constructed the USA as incubator of Germany's and Europe's future. He perceived the adaptation of American influences as a necessity for the progress of Germany. Functionally Hirsch created the opposing structures of progression and stagnation and asserted that only through Americanization Germany could in fact progress. Progress as constructivist structure thereby allowed the value-free incorporation of American developments into the German national identity without losing what it meant to be German. Discussing America gave the debate about progress and modernization more liberty, focus, relevance and immediacy. Pro-Americanism was thus a mediator for a debate about progress and the modernization of Germany. The American-model was constructed as a utopian structure which provided the building blocks for a new conceptual design of the German future. Endorsing America was a platform for the economic advancement of Germany. Despite this prevailing pro-Americanism, Hirsch differentiated Germany and the USA on a cultural level and argued that German culture was superior to its American pendant. The cultural references in *Das Amerikanische Wirtschaftswunder* thus intended to strengthen the German national identity. This highlights the functional dimension of Hirsch's pro-Americanism which was, in essence, a tool for the selective incorporation of the American economic-model into the German national reality and identity.

A similar relationship could be observed in the works of Lucien Romier who figured as a representative of French pro-Americanism. Here, significant references to the USA and its importance for France could be observed in two different publications, namely *Qui sera le Maître, Europe ou Amérique?* and *Idées très simples pour les français*. Both works fundamentally discussed the emergence of the economic masses as main challenge for the modern nation state. For Romier the USA was, in this regard, a case study on how France could cope with the omnipresent mass-phenomenon. In light of French economic and technological backwardness, Romier argued that the progress of France actually demanded the application of American rationalization methods. The USA, as a functioning mass-

society, figured as an economic role-model while simultaneously highlighting the potential risks of the mass-society for France. Romier's guidebook therefore demonstrated a clear connection to national identity: structurally the French national identity could be reinforced through the selective incorporation of American developments without adapting its cultural peculiarities. Instead of a complete rejection, parts of the American structure could be incorporated into the French identity. Similarly to its German counterpart, pro-Americanism was used here to refine French national identity through the incorporation of American rationalization methods without a complete reinvention of the national identity and what it meant to be French.

The relationship between national identity and the America-debates is even clearer in the writings of the anti-American authors. For the German debate, this is visible in Adolf Halfeld's *Amerika und der Amerikanismus*. Halfeld completely rejected all American influences and criticised the American model on an irrational level. For Halfeld, the features of the American society, such as materialism and mass-society, radically opposed German culture, individualism and ethnic character. He thereby functionally opposed the negative structure of Americanism which was created as a counterexample and a counter-structure to Germany. Halfeld actually defined and reconstructed the German national identity through the existence of clear cut negative counterpart, i.e. Americanism. For Halfeld, German anti-Americanism was hence a tool to recreate and reinforce national identity. The unstable political environment of Germany seemed to demand a clear national representation-structure which Halfeld offered through the rejection of the USA. The relationship between national identity and anti-Americanism was thus, in essence, a reflection of the conceptual properties of collective identities: a constitution of "self" through the existence of an "other".

Equal observations could be made for the French anti-Americanism in Georges Duhamel's work *Scènes de la vie future*. Duhamel showed a strong demarcation from particularly cultural American developments. He thereby argued from a moral humanist perspective which created Americanism as amoral and negative counter structure to the French national identity, i.e. Frenchness. The creation of Frenchness as a positive structure was combined with structural moralism which opposed and delegitimized American materialism as a socio-economic model. For Duhamel,

French ethnicity was, in essence, founded on creative individualism. Duhamel's account highlighted how national identity as representation structure was based on hierarchy and superiority. To Duhamel anti-Americanism served as other to refine French national identity and most importantly to reinforce the moral superiority of France.

The empirical chapters have thus shown that the America-debates in the different sources clearly entail a dimension of national identity. While anti-American authors rejected Americanization to reinforce national identity, the pro-American authors refined it by incorporating the American economic-model. It seems as though the pro-American authors thus actually saw the possibility of economic Americanization without cultural consequences, anti-Americans evidently did not. Nevertheless, both parties debated the exact same developments and assessed them in complete opposition. It is thus clear that the works do not illustrate an objective analysis of the American model but rather a construction of either a positive or negative image of the USA. The debate was hence functionally just as much a repositioning of the own nation state and its identity as it was an actual investigation of the USA. For the relevant case studies and sources under investigation this allows the following conclusion: pro- and anti-Americanism in France and Germany during the 1920s were a catalyst for the creation, definition and refinement of national identity. The relationship between the Americanization-debate and national identity was consequently a functional one with the goal of reinforcing the national identity in France and Germany.

***What are the main differences and similarities between the pro- and anti-American authors in France and Germany?***

The investigation of the four representative authors has, on the one hand, revealed the national identity dimension, but on the other, also shown how nuanced the Americanization-debate of the time actually was. The authors are thence representative particularly in the sense that they display the diverse components of the discourse on America. These include the economic and cultural perspective but also perspectives related to personal experiences and historical circumstances. It is

therefore not surprising that the arguments of the different authors showed transnational similarities and differences. As chapters 5.3 and 6.3. have demonstrated, there generally existed more similarities than differences in the transnational canon. The pro-Americanism of Hirsch and Romier, for example, related primarily to economic and industrial developments. Both authors were equally convinced that this approach could lastingly generate economic wealth. Thereby, the concepts of prosperity and rationalisation were at the heart of the argumentative framework. While Julius Hirsch geared his argumentation towards the creation of “Reichtum” (prosperity), Lucien Romier intended to create the “peuple riche”, a wealthy social structure. The main narratives of both writings are thus very much in line with each other. In addition, Hirsch and Romier shared the opinion that even though the USA provided a vital economic role-model, it was secondary to France and Germany on a cultural level. For Hirsch, the German culture was superior to American imports and Romier argued that the actual culture of the USA was destroying the mores. Argumentative differences between both works mainly related to the specific lines of reasoning. While Hirsch elaborated on the American economy and its advantages, Romier rather investigated the current socio-economic situation of France which could be improved by American-style rationalization. As a consequence, Romier's work provided a guidebook for political implementation and thereby demonstrated a concrete political agenda. The creation of a “union nationale” was for Romier the solution to the ongoing problems of the French society. Julius Hirsch on the other hand showed an analytical rather than political approach and highlighted the effective advantages of standardisation and assembly line production in the USA itself. The Ford Motor Company and the Chicago slaughterhouses were to him a paragon for production and consumption.

For the anti-American writers Halfeld and Duhamel the actual focus on the American society was even stronger. In contrast to the pro-American authors, Halfeld and Duhamel argued from a cultural perspective and debated the features of the American society. Their writings thereby related to the USA itself as much as to American influences in Europe. On an argumentative level the works of both authors thus portrayed very similar narratives. Their criticism centred on American materialism, anti-individualism and mass-entertainment. While for Halfeld the German “Kultur” opposed the American “Zivilisation”, Duhamel contrasted the

French “civilisation morale et véritable” with the “civilisation mécanique et matérielle”. Both authors thus contrasted an ethnic and grown European society with a planned mass society of the USA. Main objective of both authors was thence an education of the German and French society about the dangers of Americanization. They explicitly stated that they intended to protect the cultural heritage of the Occident against American influences. Here, the criticism was not confined to the cultural array: economic and political developments were also connected to an overbearing negative American system. Even though this systemic criticism was generally similar, it does entail some argumentative differences. Duhamel particularly developed a moral and idealistic framework and argued that the American model would oppose a shared canon of humanistic universal values. This was reflected in his main narratives where the mechanisation of society became a synonym for a loss of individuality and creative spirit. Halfeld of the other hand especially propelled the ethnic dimension in his writings, arguing that the German “Volk” was incompatible with the planned society of the USA.

### ***How can we explain these differences and similarities?***

The differences and similarities between the examined authors primarily relate to the subjective dimension of their American-perception. As we have discussed in the historiographical section this research has intended to contribute particularly to this subjective component of the debate. The empirical chapters have shown that different assessments of the USA and the American-model mainly relate to the subjective rudiments of the authors rather than objective characterisations. This subjective perception was heavily shaped by the personal experiences of the authors and it has therefore been necessary to investigate their biographies in detail. As a result, there indeed existed an undeniable relationship between the lives of the authors and the ideas they conveyed in their America specific writing. This was particularly evident in the works of Georges Duhamel. Duhamel's focus on morality and humanism was not confined to the *Scènes de la vie future* it also played an important role in his belletristic works such as *Vie des martyrs*, *Civilisation* and *La possession du monde*. Duhamel's experiences as a military doctor during the First World War had convinced

him that there was a necessity for brotherhood and morality in light of the wartime devastation. The mechanical and technological innovations of the war were for Duhamel some of the main reasons behind the many casualties. A rejection of mechanisation together with a calling for morality hence also became cornerstones of his America-criticism. For Adolf Halfeld there exists less information about his biography, therefore a connection to his America-perception is more difficult. Probably the only clear relation relates to Halfeld's focus on the German "Volk" and how he perceived his rejection of Americanization as a defence of the Occident. His later membership in the NSDAP can in this sense be interpreted as though the Nazis offered a defence of the German culture against outside influences and Americanization.

The subjective dimension of the pro-American argumentation is by contrast very clear. Particularly the political agenda in Romier's *Idées très simples pour les français* can be explained through his affiliation with the Redressement Français. His call for a "union nationale" and American-style rationalization were not only part of his writings but actually mirrored the political demands of the Redressement. His America-image was therefore clearly influenced by the political precepts of the Redressement which intended to implement technocratic corporatism. Similar assertions can be made for the writings of Julius Hirsch. Particularly Hirsch's focus on standardisation and assembly line production show a clear relationship to his professional activities. As economist and member of diverse corporate directorships he witnessed the implementation of assembly line production first hand. By the time he published *Das Amerikanische Wirtschaftswunder* in 1926, assembly line production was already part of the production process of the companies he chaired. A specific focus on the advantages of assembly line production and standardisation in his writings can hence be explained by the fact that Hirsch dealt with them on a regular basis. One can thus overall record that the arguments of the pro- and anti-American authors under investigated were influenced by their personal experiences. In this sense, the Americanization-debate certainly contains a subjective component that shouldn't be underestimated and accounts for many of the argumentative differences.

Further peculiarities in the America-perception of the authors were however also influenced by the historical circumstances and contemporary international relations.

This was equally the case for pro- and anti-Americanism. Nevertheless, the relationship was clearer for the pro-Americans due to their focus on the economic realities. Julius Hirsch, for example, debated the benefits of economic prosperity on the entire society and thereby showed a direct relation with the German realities. His prosperity calling here needs to be seen in relation to the instability of the German economy in the first half of the 1920s. The years prior to the publication of *Das Amerikanische Wirtschaftswunder* had been characterised by economic depression and hyperinflation. It was only through the Dawes Plan and a currency reform that the economic situation could actually be stabilised. The historical circumstances consequently demonstrated how economic stability and prosperity would spawn social well-being and an increase in living-standards. Similar assertions can be made for the writings of Lucien Romier who argues in favour of French economic independence and protectionism. His demand for economic protectionism was thereby partly a reaction to the increasing American investments in the French industry. The growing financial involvement of American firms across all areas on the one hand certainly encouraged economic recovery but on the other hand also impaired self-determination. More importantly, however, the demand for economic independence relates to the reparations and debt topicality. While Germany was reluctant to pay reparations to France, the USA insisted on a repayment of the French wartime loans. France was therefore in a dependent relationship of two different sorts which put increasing pressure on the monetary system and the French economy in general. The request for more economic independence and self-determination thus clearly relates to this difficult political and economic situation.

Explaining the similarities and differences in the case studies through the historical circumstances proves a lot more difficult for the anti-American authors. Nevertheless, it is certainly possible to relate cultural criticism such as the rejection of mass-entertainment to undeniable American influences in Germany and France. Particularly on a cultural level the emergence of Jazz music, Tiller Girls and American movies became part of the cultural realities in both countries simultaneously. Specific criticism of technisation and mechanisation however in the works of Georges Duhamel not only relate to American culture but also to the history of the First World War. After all he connected mechanisation to the diminishing value of the individual and thereby held it accountable for the devastations of the



war. For Duhamel's counterpart Adolf Halfeld the First World War seemed to be a more indirect reason for his America-criticism. As the American war-entry was perceived as one of the main reasons for the German defeat his rejection of the USA can be seen as reaction to said defeat. Moreover, the role of the USA at the Paris Peace Conference as author of the Treaty of Versailles added to anti-American images and were a possible further reason for Halfeld's anti-Americanism.

Ultimately, the similarities and differences in the America-images of the authors are however also a reflection of the overarching pro- and anti-American discourse. What the influence of the debate on the authors actually was and to what extent they followed the debate is very difficult to assess. What can be said for certain is that there undeniably existed an ideological exchange between the national camps. While an ideological proximity could be observed between the Tat-circle and the *Ordre Nouveau*, German rationalization-supporters were cherished guests of the *Redressement Français* as the speech by Julius Hirsch in Paris has shown. In this sense, transnational similarities are not surprising and a reflection of ideological interconnection.

## **7.2. Conclusion and Outlook**

Aside from the similarities and differences we have elucidated above, the most important finding of the research on hand was the affirmation of a functional relationship between the Americanization-discourse and national identity. Particularly with regard to national identity these findings allow some conceptual conclusions. The general importance of identity reinforcement across all camps is an indicator for the perceived instability of the national identity in Germany and France for the given timeframe. What could be possible explanations for this weakened identity during the 1920s? The most likely reason is an identity-crisis that is based on the First World War. Germany for one had lost the war and was thereafter confronted with the political instability of the Weimar Republic. The Weimar Republic was on the one hand challenged from the political right, which wanted to return to a monarchy, whilst the political left pursued a Marxist revolution. In France, the military inferiority to the early German aggressions and later reliance on American

aid equally rocked the national identity. There hence in both cases existed a need for the reinforcement of a strong national representation-structure. A reconstruction and reinforcement of national identity in this sense seems to be triggered by an exogenous shock. The Americanization debate hence helped to foster a strong national identity in times of identity insecurity after the First World War. One could even argue that there exists a correlation between the perceived instability of the political system and national identity as a representation structure. In any case, it seems apparent that there certainly exists the need of a clear counter-structure after an external identity shock. The USA thence figured as representation structure, as functional “other” to reposition the own national identity.

That the USA was in fact chosen as a functional model can thereby mainly be explained by the circumstances. The USA was simply the only western country that provided the right characteristics for potential adaptation or rejection. France and Germany would not turn to each other as social models due to their historical hostility. Great-Britain had lost its imperial and economic predominance by the 1920s and the USSR had a political system that was not comparable to France and Germany. These countries therefore did not offer socio-economic models that could serve as representation structure for the creation of national identity. For the 1920s the American model was consequently the only viable model to function as this representation grid. While Americanization itself had already existed before 1914, the functional dimension of the America-debate only became acute after the First World War. One can therefore conclude that this specific Americanization-debate demonstrates a new approach to conceptualise the German and French national identity during the interwar-period.

Evidently these main findings in principle only relate to the case studies, i.e. the writings of the authors we have investigated. The case study methodology runs the risk of exaggerating the actual findings by generalising them to the universe of cases. Therefore, asserting that the Americanization-debate was generally and primarily for every author a catalyst for the reinforcement of national identity during the 1920s is impossible. The conclusions in this section consequently can only and are only related to the four investigated authors. Nevertheless, based on my reading of the secondary literature it is possible to assume that the writings of the four authors do mirror the prevailing arguments of the respective and overarching German and

French Americanization debate. Assuming that they were in fact representative one can consequently argue that at least on a secondary level a relation to national identity was a pillar of the discourse. Adding more authors to the research would in this sense not make the findings more reliable, it would simply add different nuances to the subjective dimension of the debate.

In order to concretely investigate the connection between the Americanization-debate and national identity the constructivist methodology was of fundamental importance. It incorporated a conceptual approach to collective identities and parameters which exceeded the socio-historical circumstances. A focus on agents and their relationship with structures has particularly helped to develop the subjective component of the Americanization-debate. The theory thus offered a methodological starting point that allowed to investigate how the authors constructed an image of the USA. Their America-assessment was certainly, from an argumentative perspective, not innovative and picked up older narratives. But by looking at it from a constructivist perspective it was possible to observe how the authors (agents) deliberately created an image of the USA that was used to either argue for national changes or against them and thereby ultimately contributed to strengthening the respective national identities. For future research the theory of Constructivism and its focus on structures, agents and identities thus offers a very useful methodology particularly to investigate subjective and constructed concepts and images.

In conclusion, the research on hand has thus intended to contribute to this subjective dimension of images and discourses. It has revealed an additional approach for the conceptualisation of national identity in Germany and France during the 1920s. Pro- and anti-Americanism proved to be a catalyst for the reinforcement of national identity in both countries. In this sense, the debate about America was as much a discussion about the national reality and future of Germany and France as it was of the USA. To phrase this in constructivist terms: there is no “self” without an “other”. For the interwar-period the only viable “other” was thus an American-model that served as chisel to deliberately sculpt and polish what it meant to be German and what it meant to be French.



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**Summary in Dutch**  
**Samenvatting in het Nederlands**

De constructie van Amerika

Een constructivistische reflectie op de relatie tussen het Frans-Duitse amerikaniseringsdebat  
en de nationale identiteit, 1918-1933

*Sebastian Jacqué*

Deze studie onderzoekt het Franse en Duitse amerikaniseringsdebat tussen 1918 en 1933. Zij reflecteert op de werken van auteurs die een significante bijdrage hebben geleverd aan het debat tijdens het interbellum over de Verenigde Staten en hun invloed op Europa. De focus van het onderzoek ligt op de relatie tussen pro- en anti-Amerikaanse afbeeldingen en het concept van de nationale identiteit. Als leidraad bij het onderzoek gebruikt de studie het Constructivisme als Theorie der Internationale Betrekkingen, en de methodologie rust op het vergelijkend onderzoek van casussen. Het empirische deel van deze studie behandelt het leven en het Amerika-gerelateerde werk van Julius Hirsch, Lucien Romier, Adolf Halfeld en Georges Duhamel. Op basis daarvan komt deze studie tot de conclusie dat het pro- en anti-Amerikanisme in Duitsland en Frankrijk in de jaren twintig een katalysator was voor het creëren, definiëren en verfijnen van de nationale identiteit. Daarmee bevestigt de studie niet alleen de functionele relatie tussen het amerikaniseringsdebat en de nationale identiteit, maar illustreert zij ook de meerlagige nuances van het discours, dat zowel subjectieve dimensies als historische en ideologische dimensies bevat.

## **Curriculum Vitae**

Sebastian Jacqué was born on 2 September 1990 in Bad Schwalbach, Germany. He studied European Cultures with a specialization in History at the University of Luxembourg. During this period, he partook in the Erasmus Program which allowed him to study one semester at the Friedrich-Meinecke-Institute at the Free University, Berlin. He rounded off his studies with a Master of Arts in History from the Erasmus University Rotterdam with a specialization in Global History and International Relations. Since November 2012 he has studied as a Ph.D.-candidate at the Erasmus School of History, Culture and Communication of the Erasmus University Rotterdam under the supervision of Prof. Hein Klemann and Dr. Ferry de Goey. His research focuses on the Americanization of Germany and France during the interwar-period, Constructivism as International Relations Theory and the concept of national identity. During his studies, he inter alia worked as Freelance Journalist for the Luxembourgish newspaper Luxemburger Wort and as Research Assistant at the professorship of Prof. Michael-Sebastian Honig at the University of Luxembourg (research axis Early Childhood: Education and Care).