DISCIPLINING GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA

A comparison of the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment and the African Union’s African Peer Review Mechanism

Saba Kassa
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Het disciplineren van goed openbaar bestuur in Afrika

Een vergelijking tussen de ‘Country Policy and Institutional Assessment’ van de Wereldbank en de ‘African Peer Review Mechanism’ van de Afrikaanse Unie

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and in accordance with the decision of the Doctorate Board

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Dedicated to Admassu Kassa and Yemesratch Tesfaye.
For showing me that education is the greatest equaliser of all.

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<td>APR</td>
<td>African Peer Review</td>
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<td>APRM</td>
<td>African Peer Review Mechanism</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>CPIA</td>
<td>Country Policy and Institutional Assessment</td>
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<td>FY</td>
<td>Financial Year</td>
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<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>NGC</td>
<td>National Governing Council</td>
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<td>NPoA</td>
<td>National Plan of Action</td>
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<td>PBA</td>
<td>Performance-based Allocation</td>
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<td>WB or Bank</td>
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A famous African proverb says ‘it takes a village to raise a child’. As a new mother to a beautiful son, I know this to very to true, but the same can be said about the PhD process. I would have never been able to write this dissertation without the support of ‘the village’. Therefore, I am forever grateful to my promotor Prof Wil Hout for guiding, supporting and encouraging me throughout this entire process. When people would ask me how I would manage to combine work and studies, I would always say it was because I had the most wonderful promotor. I cannot express how incredibly valuable it has been to have you lead me in this process and with your kind and gentle words showing me how to keep improving my work. I am also immensely grateful to my co-promotor Prof Mohamed Salih. Prof Salih inspired me to keep pushing myself further and encouraged me to pursue this PhD. I am eternally grateful for your encouragement and support at the start and throughout this PhD process. I am also very grateful to the Institute of Social Studies and for providing me with all the support and facilities I needed. I am particularly thankful to Ms Dita Dirks from the PhD support office, who supported me in all the steps immensely. Needless to say, the thesis would not have been possible without the cooperation of many people, gracefully giving their time to speak with me and help me. To them, I am indebted forever.

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Disciplining Governance in Africa

A comparison of the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment and the African Union’s African Peer Review Mechanism

Abstract

This study examines the promotion of governance in the African Continent. It compares the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) of the World Bank to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) of the African Union. These governance assessments represent differing conceptualizations of governance, particularly reflected in their content and approach. This study therefore aimed to critically examine the manner in which the CPIA and APRM discipline governance standards on the African continent. The study answered the following principal research questions: how do the content, process and outcome of the CPIA and APRM support or challenge the good governance agenda; its relation to aid, and what does this mean in the context of power relations of the World Bank and the African Union? As the research focused particularly on governance conceptualization, it focused within the CPIA on Cluster D: Public Sector Management and Institutions and within the APRM on Theme A: Democracy and Political Governance. The research methodically grounded the discourse and praxis on good governance by relying on the analytical framework provided through governmentality theory and the application of this framework to development policies through the concept of developmentality.
In order to answer the research question, the study probed five supporting sub-questions. The first sub-question asked: how are governance standards given shape in the content and design of CPIA and APRM? The main aim of the question was to describe the ways in which the content and design of the CPIA and APRM promote the adoption of governance standards in African countries. The analysis showed that governance standards are given shape in the content and design of the CPIA and APRM. The CPIA content comprises discursive frames on good governance that reflect the norm that (good) governance is central to sustainable development and to aid effectiveness. As such, CPIA is designed as a form of indirect rule of the World Bank over aid recipients. This comprises a productive power as the World Bank generates knowledge on the performance of the aid recipient and uses the Bank’s performance-based allocation system as a discursive practice to incentivise proper conduct. Similarly, the APRM content comprises African discursive frames on good governance that considers a more political operationalization of governance and incorporates African standards as reference. However, the APRM is designed as a form of counter rule against external influences on the African development agenda. This design reflects a form of resistance as it uses similar language, frames, methods and discursive spaces as that of the donors to present a counter approach and method to promoting governance.

An investigation of the application of CPIA and APRM assessments through a case study of Ethiopia deepened the investigation. The second research question hence asked: how have CPIA and APRM assessment processes been conducted in Ethiopia? While the first question set forth the design of the assessment processes, this question focused on their empirical application by describing and analysing the processes whereby the CPIA and APRM assessments have been undertaken in Ethiopia. The analysis informed that CPIA is a technology of surveillance of the World Bank that assessed adherence to the good governance norm and generated knowledge on the conduct of Ethiopia. The CPIA monitored the conduct of Ethiopia by assessing its adherence and deviance to governance standards regarding public sector management and institutions. Furthermore, the knowledge generated from the assessment formally informed development finance allocation provided by the International Development Association of the World Bank. The analysis of the appli-
cation of the APRM assessment in Ethiopia showed that the process monitored Ethiopia's adherence to African governance norms and generated knowledge on its policies and practices. However, the Ethiopian government controlled the assessment process and dismissed the findings of the report in regards to the theme Democracy and Political Governance. Therefore, the analysis concluded that the inter- and intra-discipline mechanisms of the APRM were rather weak.

The third research question departed from this assessment and asked: how have CPIA and APRM applications influenced the promotion of related governance standards in Ethiopia? This question broadly probed the outcomes of the assessment process and more in detail how the assessment has promoted its governance standards. In relation to the CPIA, the analysis showed that the translation of the Bank's knowledge to power over the aid recipient was ineffective as the Bank did not make the appropriate link between norm, performance and punishment/reward. In particular, the analysis showed that the CPIA is only one factor determining Bank development allocations and a multitude of internal and external factors informed the final country allocation. As a result of this, the CPIA process did not discipline the government to adhere to its policy standards. Similarly, the outcomes in the case of the APRM were also limited and did not discipline Ethiopia to adhere to its governance standards. Inter and intra-state disciplining of government was weak as the horizontal peer pressures were limited in persuading the government to accept the governance standards and vertical societal pressures were limited due to the restrictive state structures.

The fourth research question focused on the salient observations from the case study of Ethiopia and replicated this to three secondary case study analyses of Rwanda, Nigeria and Ghana. In particular, the fourth question focused its analysis on: similar or different dynamics influencing the application of the CPIA and APRM in Rwanda, Ghana and Nigeria? In relation to the CPIA, the analysis explained that (similar to the case of Ethiopia) the translation of knowledge to power over the aid recipients was ineffective as the Bank did not make the appropriate link between norm, performance and punishment/reward. The case studies furthermore showed that dynamics regarding the ability to effectively absorb development finance and the relative level of economic devel-
Development and national income also influenced these aid allocation processes of the World Bank. In relation to the APRM, the analysis showed that the process (similar to the case of Ethiopia) did not discipline Ghana, Nigeria and Rwanda to adhere to its policy standards due to weak inter and intra disciplining mechanisms. Inter-state disciplining was weak as the peer review process primarily functioned to give internal and external political legitimacy to the review process and outcomes. Intra-state disciplining was weak as the APRM domestic processes operated within the confines of established state-society engagements and did not alter these by mandating a participatory approach and a monitoring role for non-state actors.

Building on these insights, the fifth research question focused the analysis on: what strategic considerations inform the functions the CPIA and APRM perform for the World Bank and the African Union? The analysis zoomed in on the strategic considerations of the World Bank and the African Union that influenced the application of the CPIA and APRM, and aimed to provide a more comprehensive understanding of their functions and operation. The analysis showed that the CPIA functioned formally to increase aid effectiveness but informally operated as a tool of the Bank to increase its geopolitical influence in aid recipients. In the case of the APRM, the analysis suggested that while the APRM formally functioned to strengthen governance in the content, it informally supported member states’ wishes to increase their political legitimacy. This disjuncture between the discourse and practice of the Bank on the one hand and the African Union, on the other hand could be explained by understanding these assessments as instruments that serve to normalize and legitimize existing dynamics, structures and practices that govern the power relations between these actors.

The overall findings of the research suggest that while the content of the CPIA and APRM support the good governance agenda, the processes and outcomes are actually in disjunction to this discourse and does not influence aid allocation processes. The findings of this study suggest that this is because the processes and outcomes of the CPIA and APRM are used as instruments of the World Bank and the African Union to normalize, legitimize and reproduce development structures that govern the power dynamics between the West and the Bank on the one hand,
and the African Union and its member states on the other hand. By relying on the developmentality framework it is possible to view this parody as being logically connected.
Het disciplineren van goed openbaar bestuur in Afrika

Een vergelijking tussen de ‘Country Policy and Institutional Assessment’ van de Wereldbank en de ‘African Peer Review Mechanism’ van de Afrikaanse Unie

Samenvatting

Het onderzoek is verder gestructureerd door middel van ondersteunende deelvragen. De eerste deelvraag stelt de vraag: hoe zijn normen met betrekking tot het openbaar bestuur vormgegeven in de inhoud en het beoordelingsontwerp van CPIA en APRM? Het hoofddoel van de vraag is om te beschrijven hoe de inhoud en het beoordelingsontwerp van CPIA en APRM normen gericht op het openbaar bestuur bevorderen in Afrikaanse landen. Uit de analyse komt naar voren dat normen over het openbaar bestuur vorm worden gegeven in beide de inhoud en het ontwerp van CPIA en APRM. CPIA inhoud bevat discursive kaders over openbaar bestuur die de norm weerspiegelen dat (goed) openbaar bestuur centraal is voor duurzame ontwikkeling en tevens dient om de effectiviteit van ontwikkelingshulp bevorderen. Als zodanig is CPIA ontworpen als een vorm van indirecte macht van de Wereldbank over hulpontvangers. De Wereldbank gebruikt de kennis over de prestaties van hulpontvangers als de basis voor besluitvorming over hulpallocaties en zodoende stimuleert dat ontwikkelingslanden de nodige verbeteringen te maken in het bestuur. In tegenstelling, APRM inhoud omvat Afrikaanse discursive kaders omtrent goed openbaar bestuur en de operationalisering is meer gericht op politieke aspecten hiervan en hanteert ook Afrikaanse normen als referentie hiervoor. APRM is echter ontworpen als een vorm van tegenmacht tegen externe invloeden op de Afrikaanse ontwikkelingsagenda. Dit is een vorm van weerstand aangezien het soortgelijke discursive kaders en werkwijzen gebruikt als die van de donors om een alternatieve methode voor het bevorderen van bestuur te bevorderen.

Het onderzoek naar de toepassing van CPIA en APRM is vormgegeven middels een casestudie over Ethiopië. De tweede deelvraag stelt derhalve de vraag: hoe zijn CPIA en APRM beoordelingsprocessen in Ethiopië toegepast? Terwijl de eerste vraag het ontwerp van de beoordelingsprocessen uiteenzet, richt deze vraag zich op hun empirische toepassing door het beschrijven en analyseren van de processen waarop CPIA en APRM beoordelingen in Ethiopië zijn uitgevoerd. Uit de analyse blijkt dat CPIA een instrument van toezicht is van de Wereldbank die de naleving van normen omtrent goed openbaar bestuur beoordeelt en daarmee kennis opdoet over de bestuursprestatie van Ethiopië. CPIA onderzoekt deze prestatie door te analyseren in hoeverre
normen omtrent openbaar bestuur worden nageleefd in de overheidssector en haar instituties. Informatie die voortvloeit uit deze beoordeling wordt gebruikt als basis voor besluitvorming over hulpaallocaties verstrekt door de ‘International Development Association’ (IDA) van de Wereldbank. Uit de analyse van de toepassing van APRM in Ethiopië blijkt dat het proces de Ethiopische naleving van de Afrikaanse openbaar bestuursnormen heeft gecontroleerd en specifiek kennis opleverde over beleid en bestuurspraktijken. Echter, de Ethiopische overheid domineerde en controleerde het beoordelingsproces en verwierp de bevindingen van het rapport met betrekking tot het thema ‘Democracy and Political Governance’. Op basis van dit inzicht concludeert de analyse dat de inter- en intra-staat disciplinerende mechanismen van APRM tamelijk zwak waren.

De derde deelvraag bouwt verder op deze bevindingen en stelt de vraag: hoe hebben CPIA en APRM gerelateerde openbaar bestuursnormen bevorderd in Ethiopië? Deze vraag onderzocht meer in het algemeen welke uitkomsten voortvloeiden uit het beoordelingsproces en meer specifiek of normen omtrent goed openbaar bestuur waren bevorderd. Uit de analyse blijkt dat binnen CPIA de vertaling van de kennis van de Wereldbank tot indirecte macht over de hulpontvanger ondoeltreffend was omdat de Bank geen goede koppeling maakte tussen norm, prestatie en straf of beloning. In het bijzonder bleek uit de analyse dat CPIA slechts één factor was die de toekenning van de allocatie van financiële ontwikkelingshulp bepaalde. Naast de CPIA score van de Wereldbank beïnvloedde een groot aantal interne en externe factoren de uiteindelijke financiële allocatie van hulp. Als gevolg daarvan heeft het CPIA proces de Ethiopische overheid niet kunnen beïnvloeden om zich te houden aan de bestuur beleidsnormen. Eveneens waren de uitkomsten in het geval van APRM gelimiteerd en de Ethiopische overheid was niet gistermuleerd om zich te houden aan de openbaar bestuursnormen. Het inter-staat disciplineren van de overheid was zwak, omdat de horizontale groepsdrukken uitgeoefend door de andere APRM landen beperkt waren om de overheid te overtuigen om de openbaar bestuursnormen te accepteren. Het intra-staat disciplineren van de overheid was zwak omdat de nodige maatschappelijke druk niet kon worden uitgeoefend door de restrictieve staatsmaatschappelijke verhoudingen in Ethiopia.
De vierde deelvraag concentreert zich op de meest relevante waarnemingen uit het casusonderzoek over Ethiopië en replicate dit naar drie secundaire casestudy analyses over Rwanda, Nigeria en Ghana. De vierde deelvraag focust zich specifiek op de vraag: of soortgelijke of andere dynamiek invloed hadden op de toepassing van CPIA en APRM in Rwanda, Ghana en Nigeria? In de context van CPIA liet de analyse zien dat (net als in Ethiopië) de vertaling van kennis over bestuursprestatie naar macht over de hulpontvangers ondoeltreffend was om beleidsveranderingen te bevorderen, omdat de Wereldbank geen directie relatie maakte tussen norm, prestatie en straf of beloning. Uit de casestudies bleek verder dat de dynamiek ten aanzien van de mogelijkheid om ontwikkelingsfinanciering effectief te gebruiken en het relatieve niveau van economische ontwikkeling en nationaal inkomen ook deze hulpverdelingsprocessen van de Wereldbank beïnvloedde. In relatie tot APRM bleek uit de analyse dat het proces (net als in Ethiopië) Ghana, Nigeria en Rwanda niet had beïnvloed zich te houden aan de beleidsnormen, mede door zwakke inter- en intra staat disciplinaire mechanismen. Interstaat disciplinaire mechanismen waren zwak doordat groepsdruk processen voornamelijk tot doel hadden om interne en externe politieke legitimiteit te geven aan het beoordelingsproces en de uitkomsten. Intra-staat disciplinaire mechanismen waren zwak, omdat de processen van maatschappelijke druk uitoefenen op de overheid binnen de contouren van de gevestigde structuren tussen de staat en het maatschappelijk middenveld opereerde en deze niet veranderde door een participatieve aanpak en een controlerende rol voor niet-gouvernementele actoren te verplichten.

Op basis van deze inzichten onderzocht de vijfde deelvraag: welke strategische overwegingen bepalen de functies die CPIA en APRM hebben voor de Wereldbank en de Afrikaanse Unie? De analyse zet uit welke strategische overwegingen de toepassing van CPIA en APRM bepaalt voor de Wereldbank en de Afrikaanse Unie. Uit de analyse bleek dat CPIA formeel tot doel had om de effectiviteit van ontwikkelingshulp te verbeteren maar informeel een instrument was voor de Wereldbank om de geopolitieke positie en invloed over hulpontvangers te vergroten. In de context van APRM liet de analyse zien dat terwijl de APRM formeel tot doel had om het openbaar bestuur in Afrika te versterken - het eveneens informeel een mechanisme was om de politieke legitimiteit van de lidstaten van de Afrikaanse Unie te vergroten. Dit verschil tussen ener-
zijds de theorie en anderzijds de praktijk van deze beoordelingsprocessen van het openbaar bestuur kan worden verklaard door deze beoordelingen te zien als instrumenten die dienen om bestaande dynamieken, structuren en praktijken te normaliseren evenals het legitimeren van de machtsrelaties tussen Wereldbank en de Afrikaanse Unie.

Deze bevindingen van het onderzoek suggereren dat, terwijl de inhoud van CPIA en APRM de politieke agenda van goede openbaar bestuursnormen ondersteunen; de processen en uitkomsten eigenlijk afbreuk doen aan dit ontwikkelingsdebat en geen invloed hebben op de toewijzing van hulpverlening. De bevindingen van deze studie geven een indicatie dat dit komt doordat de processen en uitkomsten van CPIA en APRM worden gebruikt als instrumenten van de Wereldbank en de Afrikaanse Unie om ontwikkelingshulp te normaliseren, legitimeren en als zodanig de dynamiek tussen het Westen en de Wereldbank enerzijds en de Afrikaanse Unie en haar lidstaten anderzijds verder te reproduceren.
Introduction

1.1 Governance, development and Africa

Governance matters for development. This assertion forms the backbone of current international efforts to promote socio-economic development in developing countries, and is central to the focus of this study, the African continent. International organisations such as the United Nations assert that partnerships with and for the continent are needed to address the current state of governance in Africa. Through continued international cooperation and engagement, a good governance agenda furthering socio-economic development can be promoted (United Nations 2016). The need to reform governance in Africa is further emphasised in the World Bank’s World Development Report for 2017 on Governance and the Law, wherein the importance of governance frameworks for designing interventions in support of socio-economic development is articulated (World Bank 2016a).

The title of this dissertation is inspired by the work of Rita Abrahamsen on ‘disciplining democracy in Africa’, which critically examines the pursuit of democracy and good governance by the World Bank and Western donors in Africa (Abrahamsen 2000). In examining the application of the good governance agenda on the continent, this study elaborates on the discourses of governance in international development. In identifying the different stages in the formulation of the governance discourse, a central focus of this research is the current favoured approach of aid selectivity, whereby ‘good’ governance is a condition for the receipt of development assistance. This approach is examined by specifically focusing on one of the most prominent and influential examples of
aid selectivity for the continent, namely the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) of the World Bank. Through this mechanism the World Bank assesses (governance) performance and need, and allocates resources to developing countries across the globe accordingly. In particular, the CPIA measures the conductiveness of a country’s policy and institutional framework to ensure the effective utilisation of scarce development resources (World Bank 2016b). The mechanism is intended to create incentives to contribute to improved governance and sustainable development in developing countries (Arndt 2008: 283).

Discourses on and approaches to promoting good governance not only emanate from the West. An African articulation of the need for good governance as related to socio-economic development is for example also advocated in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Adopted by African leaders in 2001, this framework was inspired by the wish to further sustain democratic processes on the continent and simultaneously shape economic policies to harness sustainable development. The partnership envisions a prosperous continent that can interact with the West on equal terms, and articulates what democracy and governance mean to its citizens and governments. This vision of development in Africa is anchored in the view that weak governance impedes socio-economic development and hence should be a concern for all African governments (NEPAD 2001). This to be achieved through the African Peer Review Mechanism, meant to contribute to the governance agenda across the continent by ‘identifying weaknesses, setting benchmarks and monitoring progress in meeting them’ (Busia 2010: 31–32).

As of February 2017, 36 African countries have acceded to the APRM: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia. Seventeen of these countries have completed the full country review process (Gruzd 2016). This “home-grown” initiative, with its vision of transforming the governance of the continent by relying on peer learning and pressure, provides an
interesting approach to addressing governance-related challenges. This mechanism differs significantly from Western mechanisms such as that of the CPIA in strengthening governance processes, and the APRM provides an African articulation of democracy and good governance contrasting with Western conceptions of governance.

Following the observation of differences in African and Western conceptions of and avenues for attaining good governance, this study aims to critically examine the manner in which the CPIA and APRM discipline governance standards on the African continent. An investigation and comparison of these two governance assessments is merited: both play a key strategic role in the promotion of governance on the continent, but the applications of the assessments differ significantly, and they are further influenced by strategic considerations of the World Bank and African Union, respectively. The study hence seeks to answer the following principal research questions: how do the content, process and outcome of the CPIA and APRM support or challenge the good governance agenda: its relation to aid, and what does this mean in the context of power relations of the World Bank and the African Union? This study seeks to contribute to development theory and policy by creating a more comprehensive understanding of the CPIA and APRM as mechanisms for furthering good governance agendas underpinned by different conceptions of governance. Moreover, it presents a theory-driven analysis of external interventions in existing governance arrangements, particularly in developing countries.

In order to answer this research question, the study probes five supporting sub-questions. The first sub-question asks: how are governance standards given shape in the content and design of the CPIA and APRM? The main aim of the question is to describe the ways in which the content and design of the CPIA and APRM promote the adoption of governance standards in African countries. An investigation of the application of CPIA and APRM assessments through a case study of Ethiopia deepens this investigation. The second sub-question hence asks: how have CPIA and APRM assessment processes been conducted in Ethiopia? While the first question set forth the design of the assessment processes, this question focuses on their empirical application by describing and analysing the processes whereby CPIA and APRM assessments have
been undertaken in Ethiopia. In particular, the analysis aims to unpack the manner in which the assessments are given shape in physical contexts by reflecting on the application of the different stages of the assessment process through the perspective of the actors involved. The third sub-question departs from this assessment and asks: how have CPIA and APRM applications influenced the promotion of related governance standards in Ethiopia? This question broadly examines the outcomes of the assessment process and provides a more detailed picture of how the assessment has promoted their governance standards. The fourth sub-question focuses on the salient observations from the case study investigation of Ethiopia and replicates this to three secondary case study analyses of Rwanda, Nigeria, and Ghana. In particular, the fourth question focuses the analysis on: whether similar or different dynamics influence the application of the CPIA and APRM in Rwanda, Ghana, and Nigeria? Building on these insights, the fifth sub-question focuses the analysis on: which strategic considerations inform the functions that the CPIA and APRM perform for the World Bank and the African Union? The analysis zooms in on the strategic considerations of the World Bank and the African Union that influence the application of the CPIA and APRM, and aims to provide a more comprehensive understanding of their functions and operation.

1.2 Research design

1.2.1 Research strategy

The CPIA and APRM are prominent and important governance assessments influencing the governance discourse and practice on the continent. In order to facilitate an in-depth understanding of their operation (including their content, processes, outcomes, and contextual considerations influencing these), this study builds up the story of the CPIA and APRM through the five sub-questions and ultimately provides an answer to the main research question. This study furthermore relies on the empirical investigation of CPIA and APRM applications in African countries. The multiple case study approach further supports this examination of the various causal relations observed (for instance between content, process and outcomes), and promotes an understanding of these processes in particular country contexts (Yin 2009: 20). Focusing on multi-
ple cases also creates an opportunity to distil lessons and considerations that are relevant for the entire continent – the scope of these governance assessments (Gerring 2006: 86).

1.2.2 Case selection

The case selection strategy is informed by the relative dimensions of theoretical interest within the CPIA and APRM, and on their characterisation within the population of interest (Gerring and Seawright 2008: 296). The population of the study comprises fourteen African countries that have undergone CPIA and APRM assessments, namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. The content, processes and outcomes of the respective assessments inform the relevant theoretical dimensions to be examined for each governance assessment. In the case of the CPIA, a critical feature influencing the assessment is the concept of aid dependency. Since the assessment is utilised to determine access to World Bank development funds, it is pertinent to consider aid dependency dynamics and considerations influencing the engagement between the Bank and aid recipients. In the case of the APRM, the main feature influencing the assessment process and outcome is the participatory framework present in a country. As the assessment is a country-driven process involving different segments of society in its application, it is necessary to include dynamics related to state-society relations. Indeed, CPIA processes may be more complex in countries with moderate or low levels of aid dependency, and APRM processes may be more complex in countries with more restrictive participatory frameworks.

While this study comprises a multiple case design, it distinguishes between primary and secondary cases, which are informed by and selected based on dynamics related to aid dependency and participatory frameworks. By focusing on different cases, the research combines the benefits of a more elaborate in-depth investigation of a single case study design, and by replicating these findings to secondary country case study investigations (secondary cases) it also allows for an understanding of the findings in relation to different country contexts, thereby synthesising across cases. With this in mind, countries where the CPIA and APRM
are applied can be organised based on aid dependency dynamics and participatory state-society relations. Aid dependency dynamics are operationalised specifically through the measure of net Official Development Assistance as a percentage of gross national income and participatory state society relations are operationalised through the measure of voice and accountability\(^2\) of the World Governance Indicators for the year 2014.

**Figure 1.1**

*Aid dependency as percentage of Gross National Income of the case study population*

Source: (World Bank 2016c).
Introduction

Figure 1.2
Voice and accountability scores of the case study population

The fourteen CPIA and APRM countries display different characteristics in relation to aid dependency and voice and accountability as the respective dimensions of interest. This allows for the identification of cases that may provide a more challenging country context in which CPIA and APRM processes take place. These more complex country contexts provide a fuller understanding of the contexts in which CPIA and APRM assessments are applied, as they deviate from the “good” governance norm promoted through both mechanisms. In this regard, the study seeks to explain deviations in relation to the content upon which these assessments are based, and can possibly generate surprising outcomes in relation to the dimensions of interest. Following this logic, the most appropriate case would be a country with relative low levels of voice and accountability and low levels of aid dependency. Based on this, the study zooms in on Nigeria and Ghana, the two countries that have the lowest levels of aid dependency, and on Ethiopia and Rwanda, which have the lowest voice and accountability scores (countries indicated in green). However, as none of these four countries fit this exact description (scoring low on both dimensions), the decision was made to focus...
the analysis of the primary case on a country that comes closest to this description. It is with this in mind that the primary case for critically examining the application of the CPIA and APRM is the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

Ethiopia is characterised by moderate levels of aid dependency, with net official development assistance as a percentage of Gross National Income, and gross capital formation at 6.5% and 17%, respectively (World Bank 2016c). In addition, low levels of voice and accountability are reflected through the presence of a restrictive governance environment, with the ruling party controlling 100% of the seats in parliament and the presence of restrictive civil society law governing the interactions between state and society. Moreover, Ethiopia is also an interesting case as, in contrast to other African countries, it has an established domestic governance structure, and its first engagement with external actors in the context of aid was as a sovereign state. Consequently, the government of Ethiopia engages with external actors on more equal grounds, and relying on its own development agenda further strengthens their position vis-à-vis the donors. However, having had no colonial experience and relatively limited trading relations, the state apparatus is less used to engaging with external actors, resulting in a more closed approach and perceived unwillingness to engage with, for instance, donors. In contrast, other African countries started receiving aid following independence, and many African countries have weak domestic political and bureaucratic structures (Furtado and Smith 2007: 1). Ethiopia is hence an interesting case for examining the application of the CPIA and APRM, as it can bring to the fore the various dynamics that may constrain the application of the respective governance assessments. It is this critical investigation that could provide a more comprehensive understanding of the content, process and outcomes of the CPIA and APRM. Furthermore, Addis Ababa is also the political capital of Africa, hosting the African Union and the headquarters of many international and African organisations. Certainly, Ethiopia provides an interesting case both for theoretical and practical reasons.

The replication logic for more rigorous case study selection underpins the selection of the three other country case studies. Using this logic, one country is chosen to mimic literal replication (expecting similar results),
and two countries are selected to mimic theoretical replication (expecting contrasting results for anticipated reasons) (Yin 2009: 54). Based on the findings from the aid dependency and voice and accountability scores, the following case studies are most appropriate to replicate the findings from the primary case study of Ethiopia:

- Ethiopia, as the primary case study, is characterised by moderate aid dependency and low voice and accountability;
- Rwanda (literal replication) is characterised by high aid dependency and low voice and accountability;
- Nigeria (theoretical replication) is characterised by low aid dependency and low voice and accountability; and
- Ghana (theoretical replication) is characterised by low aid dependency and high voice and accountability.

These four countries form the units of analysis, with a specific focus on the aspects of the assessments engaging with democracy, governance, public management, and institutions.

1.2.3 Data collection and analysis

The data collection for the analysis of the five sub-questions is based on three key principles: triangulating multiple sources of data; creating a case study database; and maintaining a chain of evidence (Yin 2009: 54). In particular, semi-structured interviews and document analysis as two methods for qualitative data collection informed the findings of the study. The utilisation of these two methods of data collection allows the study to reflect on the content of the two mechanisms and for the research to relate this reflection to the empirical investigation of processes and outcomes related to the assessments. The empirical data informing the analysis of all the five sub-questions is based on document analysis. The document analysis focused on the collection and analysis of documents relevant to the content, process and outcome of the CPIA and APRM, as well as on the strategic functions these mechanisms fulfil for the World Bank and the African Union. In particular, the following documents were collected and analysed:
• Literature and policy documents on CPIA and APRM content and functions produced by the World Bank, the African Union, and other institutions (informed sub-questions one and five);

• CPIA Reports and APRM Country Review Reports, the National Plan of Action (NPoA) including the progress report (where available), and CPIA and APRM implementation reports prepared by continental actors focused on Ethiopia (informed sub-questions two and three); and

• CPIA Reports and APRM Country Review Reports, the National Plan of Action (NPoA) including the progress report (where available), and CPIA and APRM implementation reports prepared by continental actors and focused on Rwanda, Nigeria and Ghana (informed sub-question four).

The document analysis provided crucial information on the CPIA and APRM and was useful in that documents provided broad coverage of the topics of interest and could be analysed repeatedly (Yin 2009: 54).

The empirical data informing the analysis of sub-questions two, three and five is also informed by the findings emanating from semi-structured interviews conducted between June and September 2015 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Interview questions were developed for three types of respondents, namely individuals involved in the CPIA, individuals involved in the APRM, and academics and practitioners working in the areas of governance-promotion in Africa. Interviews with the first two groups of respondents supported the analysis of sub-questions two and three, whereas interviews with the latter respondents supported the analysis of sub-question five.

In the case of CPIA, interviews were conducted with individuals working at the World Bank and involved in the preparation of Ethiopia’s CPIA (both in Addis Ababa and Washington, D.C.). The interviews were conducted with the World Bank staff only, as the CPIA is an external country assessment and therefore no interviews were conducted with counterparts on the side of the Ethiopian government. The main objective of these interviews was to understand the process of preparing the
CPIA from the perspective of the World Bank. The findings informed
the evidence of sub-questions two and three.

In contrast, in the APRM process the government assumed a leading
role, and interviews were conducted with actors involved in the various
stages of the review process in the preparation of Ethiopia’s APRM re-
port (as mentioned in the Country Review Report). The main objective
of the interviews was to capture and understand the process and out-
comes of the preparation of the mechanism from the perspective of the
various actors involved, including governmental actors. The findings in-
fomed the evidence of sub-questions two and three.

The last group of interviewees provided key insights into the strategic
considerations informing the utility of the CPIA and APRM for the
World Bank and the African Union and informed the evidence used to
answer the fifth sub-question engaging with governance frameworks.
Interviews were conducted with academics and practitioners working in
the areas of governance-promotion in Africa (practitioners working at
regional and research institutions such as the United Nations, the United
Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the United Nations Devel-
opment Programme, the African Union, and at think tanks focusing on
governance), as well as with academics in the field of political science.
The experts and academics engaged with these topics based on their pro-
fessional empirical experiences, providing an understanding of the over-
arching mechanisms in which these governance assessments operate.
Interviews were conducted face-to-face, via Skype, or via email. A de-
tailed description of the list of interviewees and interview questions is
included in Annexes I and II.

The analytical strategy of the study is based on the development and
application of theoretical propositions (Yin 2003: 111-112). These prop-
ositions are informed by the theoretical framework and guide the analysis
of the evidence collected in the study by supporting the explanation of
relevant dynamics pertaining to the themes addressed in the five sub-
questions. The propositions tie in the various concepts discussed in the
theoretical framework: good governance, conditionality and selectivity
and coercion, donor-aid recipient dynamics, aid allocation, and nation
branding. In addition, the propositions relate to more analytical concepts related to governmentality and developmentality such as indirect rule, conduct and “conduct of conduct”, productive power, surveillance (monitoring), discipline, self-rule - optimisation – governance and responsibilisation, punishment, norms and normalisation, resistance, as well as the intersection between knowledge and power. These dynamics are analysed using pattern-matching techniques, thereby creating a link between the propositions and the empirical data by comparing empirically observed patterns with predicted or theoretical patterns (Yin 2014: 143). Cross-case analysis techniques whereby each country case study is analysed separately and the findings thereafter are synthesised across the country case studies further support this process for sub-question four in particular (Yin 2003: 111-112). The research design is visualised in figure 1.3.

*Figure 1.3*
*Research design*
The internal and external validity of the research is upheld by the reliance on the propositions informed by the literature review (Yin 2009: 54). Furthermore, multiple cases are analysed, which leads to a better understanding of the major concepts and their relations. Construct validity of this research is upheld through the use of multiple sources of data collection and the maintenance of a chain of evidence. To this end, document analysis and interviews are used as complementary strategies to gather empirical data. The combined use of a document analysis and interviews increases validity as it enables the gathering of more empirical data relevant to the analysis of the cases. The validity of the interviews is upheld by interviewing different organisations involved in CPIA and APRM processes. In addition, the interview reports were shared with all respondents for comments to ascertain that each interview report accurately reflected the interview content. The validity of the document analysis is upheld by using different sources of written data. The case study database further supports the reliability of the study (Yin 2009: 54).

1.2.4 Research limitations and ethical considerations

The first limitation of the research relates to the accessibility of key documents on CPIA and APRM processes. Secondly, due to the sensitive (political) nature of the study, a tape recorder was not used during the interviews. To counter this, the researcher focused on developing a good record of the interview and also shared and crosschecked the final interview report with all interviewees. Thirdly, the research was highly dependent on the ability to access CPIA and APRM informants and their willingness to contribute to the study. Indeed, it proved complicated to access these key experts, as these processes indirectly engage with the performance of the Ethiopian government, which is a highly sensitive topic.

Several ethical considerations were made in the conduct of the study. The most important ethical consideration relates to the topic of this research, which is politically sensitive. Hence, this situation required a delicate approach to the data collection. When a respondent was approached, the topic and scope of the research was discussed and the respondent was assured of anonymity. This supported not only the willingness of respondents to participate, but also facilitated an open con-
versation with respondents, with reduced fear of repercussions that may result from the publication of the study.

1.3 Organisation of the thesis

The study is further organised as follows: Chapter two comprises the theoretical framework and provides an analytical lens and framework that supports the analysis of the CPIA and APRM. It presents an overview of development policy and modalities promoting governance in developing countries and places this discourse and praxis on governance in an analytical context by relying on the concept of developmentality. Chapters three to seven are the empirical chapters and discuss the findings of the research organised by the five research sub-questions. Chapter three provides an empirical account of the content and design of the CPIA and APRM and analyses how these promote the adoption of governance standards; chapter four provides an empirical account of the application process of the CPIA and APRM in Ethiopia and specifically scrutinises how the respective assessments have been undertaken; chapter five puts forth an empirical account of the outcomes of the CPIA and APRM in Ethiopia and focuses on the manner in which the assessments have promoted governance standards; chapter six replicates these findings to the cases of Rwanda, Nigeria and Ghana and analyses the dynamics that influenced the application of the CPIA and APRM; and chapter seven analyses the strategic considerations that inform the functions of the CPIA and APRM for the World Bank and the African Union, respectively. Finally, chapter eight presents the emerging findings and theoretical reflections.

Notes

1 As of April 2016.
2 Estimate of governance (ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance).
3 The principles of data collection as described by (Yin 2003) support the establishment of construct validity and reliability of the case study evidence. Triangulation supports the development of ‘converging lines of inquiry’, thereby allowing
researchers to investigate the case from various angles. The case study database comprises the data and the report of the researcher, and, hence, is kept separate, allowing the raw data to be accessible for review. Maintaining a chain of evidence further increases the reliability of the case study investigation, allowing an external observer to trace the various steps taken, i.e. from research questions to theory and analysis and finally to conclusions, thereby allowing the derivation of evidence (Yin 2003: 97, 98, 101, 105).
2 Governance and Development

2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides the theoretical lens and framework for the analysis of the CPIA and APRM and presents an overview of development policies and modalities for promoting governance in developing countries. The chapter places the discourse on and praxis of governance in an analytical context by relying on the concept of developmentality. It firstly presents an overview of the role of governance in international development by highlighting how it has been applied in past and present development practice, and proceeds to provide a definition of good governance. The chapter then focuses on past and current modalities embraced in promoting governance in developing countries. In doing so, the chapter specifically elaborates on the modalities of aid conditionality and selectivity. It proceeds to contextualise these official policies by analysing the determinants of development assistance and particularly how other factors besides good governance may influence aid flows to developing countries. The chapter analytically grounds the discourse on and practice of good governance by relying on the analytical framework provided through governmentality theory, illustrating how the good governance narrative may be understood as a discursive technique to normalise thinking around this topic (Abrahamsen 2004: 1459). This frame of thinking has been extended and applied particularly to development policies through the concept of ‘developmentality’ (Lie 2015a). By relying on the concept of developmentality, the chapter presents propositions related to the CPIA and APRM for each of the five sub-questions, thereby providing the basis for an empirical analysis of these assessments.
2.2 Governance and development

2.2.1 The role of governance in development

The discourse on development has dominated relations between rich and poor countries following the end of the Second World War. This discourse rests on the construction of the global North as “developed” and, subsequently, the global South as “underdeveloped” and, hence, “developing”. This binary classification of countries as either developed or developing has redefined global power structures and over time has evolved into a ‘mode of thinking and a source of practices’ justifying the engagement of developed countries in developing countries (Escobar 1988: 429-430). The latest conceptualisation of development strategies focuses on governance and synthesises various strands of literature, explaining the relative roles of the state and the economy in developing countries.

Broadly speaking, it is possible to distinguish different phases of academic thought on governance. Initially, the focus in the literature on governance was on the technocratic means to improve state and government systems and on providing a legal framework for market-based development. Thereafter development thinking emphasised the process of development, stressing a greater role for citizens and the state in development planning. The current and third phase of thinking is influenced by an emphasis on the importance of power and politics in shaping development, and on the role of governance programmes in this regard (Hout and Robison 2009: 2-3). Although the concept of governance has stood central to development policies for the past three decades, its relation to development remains contested. A number of economic and political theories posit that the link between governance and socio-economic development is evident. Conversely, it has been proposed that economic development, instead of governance, promotes the establishment of good institutions (Dijkstra 2013: 9, 14).

While the concept of (good) governance has been a central focus in development theory, it remains a contentious concept, and its definition is still imprecise. Often, two aspects of governance - namely, the manner
in which public authority is accessed and exercised – are highlighted (Rothstein and Teorell 2008: 166). Consequently, good governance is often viewed as an objective tool for improving public financial management, and is applied in the context of the promotion of political reforms and the inclusion of stakeholders (Hydén 2011: 5). Despite various definitions of good governance, the concept is related to ‘providing efficient public and private management for markets’ (Hout and Robison 2009: 4). Indeed, governance in its application as concept is concerned with efficient public administration, the rule of law, and regulation of the market. The good governance agenda can be located within neoliberal discourses on the role of the state and markets, and in attempts to create authority outside politics and traditional public administration. Furthermore, actors such as civil society organisations are drawn into the process through ‘participation and inclusion’, thereby bypassing more traditional actors such as the parliament and political parties (Hout and Robison 2009: 4).

2.2.2 The Washington Consensus

The first and second oil shocks of 1973 and 1979, and the thereupon following macroeconomic crises in Latin America, Asia and Africa, informed a line of thinking in development promoting economic reform and the reduction of the role of the state in the economy (Kanbur 2000: 40-41). This school of thought was particularly influenced by neoclassical economics, which emphasised the value and impact market processes have for enabling economic development (Fine 2001: 132-135 as cited in Hout 2007: 11). This theoretical perspective focused particularly on the advocacy of market deregulation, grounded in supply-side economics. The logic behind this perspective was that economic reforms could result in faster output of growth and rising real incomes by stabilising the macro-economy and by adjusting the markets to operate more efficiently (Taylor 1997: 147). These concepts were operationalised in the Washington Consensus, which reflected the idea that Southern governments should reform their policies by focusing on macroeconomic stability, open markets, and the liberalisation of domestic products and markets through privatisation and regulation (Gore 2000: 789-790). Williamson (1993) codified these as ten general prescriptions and referred to them as ‘the common core of wisdom embraced by all serious economists’ (as cited in Gore 2000: 790).
The World Bank (and the International Monetary Fund) followed this approach with the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programme and stabilisation packages in developing countries. The Programme included a loan of convertible currency, which was given to states on the condition that economic reforms would be implemented, with the final aim of stabilising growth by moving away from a negative balance of payment (Riddell 1997: 1299-1300). Through two stages of reform, namely stabilisation and adjustment, the policies were intended to transform economic structures and institutions. This strategy replaced the previous state-led development paradigm and addressed economic stagnation by promoting market economies under downsized governments (Leftwich 1993: 607). The following measures were the most commonly implemented: the devaluation of currency; the liberalisation of trade; the reduction of the role of the government; the elimination of subsidies; and increases in primary exports (Riddell 1997: 1299-1300).

An essential part of structural adjustment programmes was concerned with the performance of the state and the removal of incentives for rent-seeking and corruption (Khan n.d.: 109). While reforms were often implemented through broader alliances established within governments and between political elites, this process resulted in opportunities for rent-seeking behaviour. The privatisation of large state monopolies for instance created an opportunity for privileged oligarchies to appropriate public resources. In relation to property rights, it provided an opportunity for entrepreneurs to claim state and community assets, such as land rights where titles were not clear. In addition, opening up economies to global markets also increased the ability of private interests to access financial flows and investors. Moreover, these neoliberal models of managerial authority also legitimised authoritarian rule, as the focus was placed on economic efficiency and the protection of markets from checks and balances provided through the parliament (Robison 2009: 17).

Such processes assumed various forms in developing countries, and particularly in Africa where, for instance, this agenda contributed to the consolidation of a “new political class that reproduces itself through neoliberal clientelism” (Harrison 2006: 109). The adjustments had quite un-
expected political impacts, as the reform process required changing the status quo in society. Established interests and groups were impacted, creating new winners and losers. Paradoxically, international financial institutions had to engage in policy dialogues on the implementation of economic reform packages. Indeed, actors that stood to “lose” from these reforms could wield their influence to negatively impact the programmes. It became clear that the implementation of reforms required strong political commitment and bureaucratic capacities. As a result, international financial institutions became more aware of the importance of political factors for influencing development programmes and of the salience of a strong and relatively autonomous state for implementing relevant reforms (Leftwich 1993: 607).

The positive results of these polices were limited as recessions and slow growth followed in many countries that adopted the prescriptions (Khan n.d.: 109). These experiences with structural adjustment borrowing alongside a change in the international context resulting from the collapse of communist regimes, the rise of pro-democracy movements in the developing world, and the resurgence of neoliberalism in the West, gave rise to different ideas regarding factors influencing development outcomes (Leftwich 1993: 606).

2.2.3 The Post-Washington Consensus

The relevance of neo-classical economic analyses for development has been the subject of debate since the end of the 1980s. Several non-neo-classical approaches supported the reorientation of development theories away from focusing solely on markets. For instance, institutional economics emphasises the role of institutions and forms of governance in development (Hout 2007: 12). In particular, the work of Douglass North on new institutional economics addressed the “rules of the game” in institutions and development and showed how these processes influence development trajectories. At the same time, the literature on East Asian tigers showed that the state could be a catalyst for development but that there is no single model of state action that could generate beneficial developmental outcomes. This informed the understanding that what actually mattered was the quality and performance of the state, particularly as reflected by its state institutions for development (Grindle 2010: 4).
In addition, information-theoretic economics stressed the role of governments in addressing various market failures (Hout 2007: 12). The latter perspective, particularly advocated by economist Joseph Stiglitz, saw market failures as a consequence of unequal access to information for different economic actors. The importance of government interventions in the market economy was incorporated in the “post-Washington Consensus”, which embodied the regulatory role of the state in development (Hout 2007: 14-16). Although characterised as a “post” consensus, scholars have argued that neo-classical economists still view the market as the main vehicle for development, but stress that institutional mechanisms are necessary for the proper functioning of markets (Hout 2007: 16). Rational choice political economists furthermore argue that it could be logical for coalitions to work together to make raids on the state, rather than to establish collective goods in support of the economy. These understandings informed the need to focus attention on support for more structured programmes for institutional change (Hout and Robison 2009: 3).

In order to address these issues, it was proposed that enlightened technocrats, who operate above the demands of politics and vested interests, lead and implement reforms. These technocrats could then neutralise distributional coalitions by altering institutional incentives (Hout and Robison 2009: 4). Institutions can be viewed as constellations of incentive structures, and the belief remains that the behaviour of politicians could be altered by incentives built into institutional reforms (Hutchison e.a. 2014: 25). However, also strategies relying on the inclusion of technocrats were unable to address the poor regulation of markets. It is here where ideas of good governance came to the fore by creating an authority that operates outside of politics and traditional administration. It would incorporate individuals directly into market processes through programmes of participation, ownership and inclusion, thereby bypassing politics and established coalitions (Hout and Robison 2009: 4).

This line of thinking focused on political actors by viewing them through the lens of rational choice theory. New Public Management
providing the theoretical base of thinking and entailed a preference for market-orientated approaches to government practices. Institutionalism focuses the attention on the role of the state as a ‘market complementing institution’ (Harrison 2005: 245). This new thinking also emphasises that development theory and practice should address institutional, human, social, as well as physical aspects, referring to services such as water, energy and transport. In addition, attention should be paid to microeconomic elements, embodied in growth and productivity in agriculture and services – key to long-term poverty reduction (World Bank 2003: 8).

Influenced by these various perspectives on governance, the World Bank initiated a new approach to development in 1998, embodied in the Comprehensive Development Framework. The framework emphasises the roles of all development actors (government, multilateral and bilateral donors, civil society and the private sector) in poverty reduction and sustainable development. In particular, it stresses the notion that development requires a long-term and holistic development framework – it should be results-orientated as well as country-owned, through a country-led partnership (World Bank 2003: 8). This approach provided the conceptual underpinnings for the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (which became the pinnacle of the Comprehensive Development Framework) and fed into global initiatives such as the Millennium Development Goals and the Monterrey Consensus (World Bank 2003: ix). Whereas the latter two initiatives supported the notion that aid levels should be increased and directed towards the reduction of poverty, it is the former initiative that provided the framework for increasing aid effectiveness. In particular, developing countries that wished to access the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative and concessional lending provided by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund had to prepare a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. The strategy paper was to be developed based on a country-driven process, and its content was to be grounded in a comprehensive, result-orientated and long-term approach to poverty reduction. Moreover, it was meant to support a partnership approach by involving relevant domestic actors and by facilitating more coordinated support of development partners. The latter partnership approach was also intended to facilitate the transition of project to programme aid through, for instance, the provision of budget support (Dijkstra 2015: 2).
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005 and the Accra Agenda for Action of 2008 built on these ideas (OECD 2008: 1). The Paris Declaration affirmed that ‘partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development policies and strategies, and co-ordinate development actions’ (OECD 2008: 3). In the same vein, the Accra Agenda aimed to accelerate and deepen the implementation of the Paris Declaration (OECD 2008: 14). It was expected that the commitment to increasing aid levels, alongside the application of these new principles in supporting development, would result in poverty reduction and, in particular, in the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (Dijkstra 2015: 3).

2.3 Modalities of promoting governance

2.3.1 Aid conditionality

The promotion of governance has taken centre stage as the objective of development assistance and is also a means for achieving better results related to development assistance. Based on this understanding, donors are increasingly relying on the outcomes of governance assessments as the basis for the provision of development assistance (Hoebink 2006: 133). Scholars have attributed this latter development to various global challenges and changes. Broadly speaking, these changes relate to the end of the Cold War, the fall of Communism, and the push for democracy in the developing world. During the Cold War, aid policies were heavily influenced by geo-political considerations as Western and Eastern nations supported different developing countries, and some Southern nations strategically played into these dynamics in order to increase financial support to them. The end of the Cold War halted this development as Russia limited its financial support to developing countries to stabilise its economic development. Western nations followed this approach by reducing, reallocating or cancelling financial and political support for regimes labelled authoritarian (Abrahamsen 1997: 130). This strategy also helped the West to justify a reduction in the share of development assistance allocated to Africa, as there was now stronger competition among countries for development assistance. Indeed, it provided a ‘morally comfortable rationale for a basically self-interested policy to
abandon the continent and leave Africans to their own devices' (Abrahamsen 1997: 131).

Donors have been making aid conditional upon the implementation of specific policies for the last thirty years (Dijkstra 2002: 307). The so-called first-generation conditionality focused on the implementation of economic policies (e.g. the Structural Adjustment Programme). Political conditionality (or second-generation conditionality) refers to the use of ‘punitive measures by foreign governments and international donor organisations to promote certain political objectives, such as good governance and democracy in recipient countries’ (Tjonneland 1998: 186). Notable is the use of political conditionalities comprising a package of terms that is ‘achievable through aid negotiations and what is regarded as legitimate in terms of breaching the sanctity of national sovereignty’ (Baylies 1995: 321). In cross-conditionality, donors make funds available based on the existence of agreements with other organisations (e.g. the International Monetary Fund). The integration of policies focused on poverty reduction into conditionality packages may be labelled as third-generation conditionality (Dijkstra 2002: 308-309).

But there are also paradoxes associated with the practice of aid conditionality. Firstly, it is possible to question why aid recipients should require incentives to implement policies that are beneficial for the country. Secondly, while donors provide aid tied to the implementation of particular policies, this may simultaneously create a moral hazard on the side of the recipients (as the provision of aid creates a disincentive to implement reforms). Thirdly, by setting conditions for the provision of aid, donors actually contradict the content of these policies that are supposed to focus on supporting processes of democratisation. Indeed, by setting conditions for aid, donors limit national sovereignty and, consequently, democratic decision-making processes (Dijkstra 2002: 309-310).

2.3.2 Aid selectivity

From 2000 onwards, the current development paradigm has undergone a shift from aid conditionality to selectivity. This shift is informed by the outcomes of various reassessments of development assistance in the
1990s prompting the need for increasing aid effectiveness. In particular, three dynamics can be distinguished, namely the lack of focus on poverty reduction in the 1980s and early 1990s, previous forms of development assistance that did not accommodate the preferences of developing countries, and the realisation that political conditionalities were only partly effective due to principal-agent problems affecting donor-recipient interactions (Hout 2007: 22-23). The effectiveness discourse embraced by development actors resonated well with the New Public Management approach to development, providing renewed legitimacy of development assistance by focusing on targets and mechanisms of delivery, and by paying more attention to the policy framework of aid recipients (Hout 2007: 4-5). Consequently, development agencies faced with difficulties started to favour a strategy in which good governance is seen as a prerequisite for aid.

This discourse on selectivity, wherein the consideration of prior actions in allocating aid was advocated, became more formalised in the late 1990s, heavily supported by the World Bank and promoted to other agencies (Van Waeyenberge 2009: 795). Research by World Bank economists Burnside and Dollar (1997 and 2004) and Burnside and Pritchett (1998) was critical in this debate (Hout 2007: 19). The research illustrated that aid is effective (in terms of higher growth) only in the presence of “good” policies and that ‘aid does not lead to good policies’ (Burnside and Dollar 1997: 3-4). Collier and Dollar (1999) further extended these findings by observing that aid has no impact on growth unless provided in a good policy environment. These conclusions hence informed the need for allocating aid to countries with an appropriate policy framework in place (Van Waeyenberge 2009: 795).

Currently, donors base decisions concerning development assistance on the quality of political governance in recipient countries (Arndt 2009: 68). In’airat (2014) also observes that donors give preferential treatment to countries with good governance (p. 63). In making such decisions, governance assessments and their outcomes are critical for donors, not only because they provide an overview of the political and economic landscape of a country, but also because they are able to provide inputs useful for aid selectivity. In this regard, Collier (2005) notes the following:
If ex ante conditionality works as an incentive, then selectivity is bound to work as an incentive because it has all the incentive effects of ex ante plus no credibility problems. Ex ante conditionality is now so contaminated by the credibility problem that the only way we get an incentive effect is with ex post conditionality (that is, with selectivity). If one is keen to get incentive effects from aid, then ex post conditionality is the only hope (p. 115-116).

2.3.3 Conditionality and selectivity as forms of coercion

Conditioning aid (be it through straightforward conditionality or ex post-conditionality/selectivity) is expected to stimulate reform in aid recipient countries. Conditionality particularly aims to incentivise and induce governments to implement reforms. Furthermore, providing aid only to countries with a specific policy environment is considered to enhance aid effectiveness and can in turn also act as a stimulant to further improve governance frameworks (Collier et al. 1997: 1400-1401). For instance, aid selectivity is informed by the supposition that countries with better governance frameworks are better equipped to absorb aid. This would hence act as an incentive for promoting governance reforms in specific countries (Doornbos 2001: 102-103). Moreover, conditionality provides donors with the opportunity to specify how aid should be expended. However, aid may result in negative actions by providing governments with a disincentive for cancelling certain policies. Moreover, conditionality may act as a signal to other donors that the respective government is committed to policy reform (Collier et al. 1997: 1400-1401).

The process through which conditionality and aid selectivity aims to induce change in recipient countries can be viewed as an instrument of pressure. In this sense, aid is used as leverage for the promotion of specific objectives or agendas in recipient countries. The coercive nature of these modalities that rely on (dis)incentives for engaging in particular behaviour is hence highlighted (Stokke 1995: 11-12). By focusing on the concept of coercion, it is possible to explain how ‘outside coercive scrutiny, evaluation and regulation’ can pressure aid recipients to conform to governance standards (Frumkin and Galaskiewicz 2004: 285). Aid recipi-
ents may diffuse external pressures by changing practices to reflect processes and structures that are deemed legitimate, resulting in isomorphic transformation (Frumkin and Galaskiewicz 2004: 285-286). This process of institutional isomorphic change follows coercive formal and informal pressures exerted by organisations that aid recipients are dependent on, and by cultural expectations of society at large. These pressures on aid recipients may be experienced as ‘force, as persuasion, or as invitations to join in collusion’ (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 150).

Dynamics of donor-aid recipient relationships and power differentials influence the nature of pressures exercised through conditionality and aid selectivity (Frerks 2006: 19). An important characteristic of this approach is related to the asymmetrical aid dependence relationship between donor and aid recipient. In this regard, donors are cognisant of the reliance of developing countries on development aid and use aid as financial leverage (Bořzel and Hackenesch 2013: 540). Countries that heavily depend on aid may assent to pressure and may consequently seek to improve their governance frameworks in an attempt to secure aid (Dijkstra 2015: 5). However, Borchgrevink (2008) suggests that, where directly imposed conditions threaten regime survival, aid conditionality could actually result in strong resistance on the side of the recipient, as conditions could increase risks and threaten the survival of the regime. Therefore, it may be better to refer to regime aid dependency (p. 217). In summary, while aid dependence relationships are asymmetrical, both donors and aid recipients possess forms of leverage, capacity and resources that can be utilised (Frerks 2006: 19-20). It is therefore proposed that processes through which aid outcomes are established can be viewed as a negotiation between donors and aid recipients, instead of as the one-sided channelling of aid. In these negotiations, both aid recipients and donors possess different forms of capital, which are determined by economic, political and institutional conditions, as well as by ideological factors (Fraser and Whitfield 2008: 6-7).
2.4 Determinants of aid allocation

2.4.1 Good governance as an input to aid allocations

It is expected that the new commitment of donors to aid selectivity based on the outcomes of assessments will result in aid provision to developing countries with sound governance records. A substantial body of literature has ensued, aimed at explaining observed aid allocations, evaluating aid allocations in light of various normative criteria, and examining the levels of aid specific recipients should receive through a focus on inter-recipient allocations (Harrigan and Wang 2011: 1282). While the determinants of aid allocation have been the subject of many quantitative analyses, the findings remain inconclusive (Winters and Martinez 2015: 516). For instance, In’airat (2014) finds that donors give preferential treatment to countries with good governance records (p. 67). However, in another study of major donors (the United States, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and multilateral organisations), Harrigan and Wang (2011) find that the donors were responsive to the policy environment of aid recipients, but that some donors were less concerned with favourable policy environments. In particular, Harrigan and Wang (2011) argue that the United States focuses more on its own interests, reflected for example in its emphasis on geo-political links with recipient countries (p. 1290-1291).

2.4.2 Other factors influencing aid allocations

This illuminates another dimension of aid allocation: although the formal objectives of conditionality and selectivity aim to provide incentives and pressures for governance reform, other factors also influence aid allocation decisions. What could assist in explaining these dynamics is a focus on normative and political goals of conditionality and aid selectivity. Indeed, although these techniques and the aspiration for good governance are perpetuated as technical solutions for harnessing development, their construction is value-laden, influenced by socio-economic and political interests, and cannot be separated from the identity and interests of those promoting such solutions. It is for instance critical to highlight the influence of states providing the majority of financial resources for aid on the agenda of the Bretton Wood Institutions (the Bank and the International Monetary Fund). An example of this could be the rise of ne-
liberalism in the United States, Britain and Germany in the early 1980s. In addition, the good governance agenda holds within it ideological preferences of what constitutes “the good society”, underpinned by liberal principles. Such normative agendas only can be considered neutral to a government who already has accepted these principles. Intimately linked to such agendas is a broader global agenda promoting a liberal world economy, and development programmes supporting the opening up of national economies to international capital, thereby actively aiming to maintain the hegemonic world order (Abrahamsen 1997: 144-146).

Harrison similarly observes that the World Bank is rooted firmly in Western culture, influencing the liberal worldview and impacting the Bank’s engagements with developing countries (Harrison 2005: 242). Similarly, Doornbos (2001) asserts that donor interventionism works “towards the establishment of new global-institutional patterns of ‘hegemony’, through a ‘disciplining’ … including the governance of ‘self’, of state, policy structures in individual countries, to conform to the norms set by the global institutions” (p.96). If the good governance agenda would be adopted it would provide another avenue through which institutional globalisation can be furthered (Ibid), thereby revealing the interconnectedness of African states and the political forces in the global discourse on governance (Abrahamsen 2000: 1). It moreover sheds light on the need to view “development” strategies as a form of discourse giving rise to mechanisms of domination over the global South (Escobar 1984: 384).

By discussing these perspectives, it is possible to view development aid as a vehicle for the promotion of foreign policy objectives. These foreign policy objectives comprise geo-strategic interests, security interests, and other special bilateral ties (economic, political or strategic) that may override more formal aid selectivity criteria (Börzel and Hackenesch 2013: 540, Alesina and Dollar 2000: 33). A prominent example is the manner in which the United States and its allies have wielded development aid as an instrument in the War on Terror. This process of ‘securitisation’ of aid shows how aid is rendered subservient to security-related and political interests linked to the counter-terrorist agendas of donor countries (Frerks 2006: 7-8). Alesina and Dollar (2000) note that
We find considerable evidence that the pattern of aid giving is dictated by political and strategic considerations. An inefficient, economically closed, mismanaged non-democratic former colony politically friendly to its former colonizer, receives more foreign aid than another country with similar level of poverty, a superior policy stance, but without a past as a colony (p. 33).

Hence, governance assessments such as the CPIA and APRM and their outcomes provide an important input for decision-making related to development assistance. This conditional link creates an asymmetrical power relationship between donors and aid recipients. However, aid selectivity is more than a mere technical tool. The political objectives underlying it explain how aid is used not only to incorporate developing countries into the liberal world order, but also to promote foreign policy objectives. It is therefore important to focus specifically on the apparent disjuncture between assessments and the discourse on and practice of achieving good governance, on conditionality and selectivity, and on aid allocation. These aspects of aid provision are scrutinised by relying on the work of Foucault on governmentality. Moreover, this study focuses on the adaptation of this concept of governmentality to the field of development theory and practice by relying on the work of Lie on developmentality.

2.5 Governmentality

2.5.1 Introducing governmentality

The French philosopher Michel Foucault delivered thirteen annual lectures at the Collège de France in Paris between 1970 and 1984. The 1978 and 1979 lecture series, titled “Security, territory and population” and “The birth of Biopolitics”, respectively, gained particular prominence and scholarly interest. In these lectures, Foucault explored a novel research theme of governmental rationality (Gordon 1999: 1) that he called “governmentality”. The concept of governmentality quickly became a valuable tool for understanding power and rule related to the state and society, and has been taken up within a wide array of fields, such as
crime, education, housing, local government and public service reform, social welfare and social work (McKee 2009: 465-466). Foucault’s work on governmentality also featured heavily in post-colonial literatures and academic fields, and in theories such as political theory, literary criticism and historiography. Governmentality provides critical insights into the field of development studies, for instance through the interrogation of governmental rationalities linked to development in the post-colonial era (Mezzadra et al. 2013: 1). By viewing development as a product of discourses related to development, it is further possible to shed light on the workings of power and knowledge, thereby allowing for a critical examination of policies and practices. This reinterpretation of development as discourse reveals the various systematic ways in which Western countries manage and control developing countries and in effect create and perpetuate the notion of the “Third World”. A governmentality analysis pays particular attention to the historical conditions giving rise to specific discourses on development and the inherent structures and relations of power and knowledge that result from the practice of governmentality (Escobar 1984: 384).

In his book “Discipline and Punish”, Foucault explains a particular kind of political analysis called the “microphysics of power”. This analysis is informed by the interrogation of disciplinary techniques forming part of the modern penitentiary prison. By using this analogy, Foucault suggested that it was possible to understand aspects of modern society by reconstructing “techniques of power” that controlled the behaviour of citizens. The analyses used to study techniques of power, applied to for instance prisoners, could also be applied in the study of techniques used to govern society at large (Gordon 1999: 3-4). Indeed, Foucault explained the concept of governmentality in three ways: firstly, as the exercise of a very specific but complex form of power that targets the population; secondly, as the development of government as a form of power resulting in governmental apparatuses and capacities for appropriate actions; and, thirdly, as the result of a process in which the state of justice is transformed into the administrative state, thereby becoming increasingly governmentalised (Foucault 1991: 102-103). According to Foucault, governmentality emerged from and is based on models of Christian pastoralism, as well as on diplomatic and military techniques embraced within the Treaty of Westphalia and on instruments related to the “art of
government” and, particularly, the 18th and 19th Century conceptualisation of policing (Foucault 1991: 104).

Governmentality elaborates a modern form of power characterised by pastoral care and by normalisation and consensus techniques. This form of power is termed “productive power”, working through knowledge and discursive practices in constraining actions (Abrahamsen 2004: 1458–1459. It refers to the mentalities of those in government and their views of rule (Merlingen 2011: 150), and conceptualises this power as ‘the encounter between the techniques of domination exercised over others, and the techniques of the self’ (Foucault 2004: 655 as cited in Schwak 2016: 430). Through these techniques, citizens adhere and conform to state domination and transform their behaviour to adhere to the perceived state of “normalcy” and norms (Schwak 2016: 430).

An important aspect of governmentality regards power relations, which Foucault explains through the concept of “conduct”. Conduct refers to the guiding and leading of citizens based on mechanisms of coercion, and to behaving within ‘an open field of possibilities’ (Foucault 1982: 789). In particular, this concerns a modality of power that engages with the manner in which the ‘subject governs itself – i.e. the conduct of conduct’ (Lie 2006: 13). Foucault provides this alternative conceptualisation of power, which is conceived as relational. He describes this power as operating through various sites and levels, flowing in multiple directions as opposed (or complementary) to a mechanism of control over subordinate classes, and as providing spaces for resistance (Stoddart 2007: 204-205). This conceptualisation of power further is supported by the concept of “biopower”, a form of power or politics over members of a population. Foucault connected the concept of biopower to the theme of government, arguing that governments are engaging with the particulars of individual behaviour, and that, consequently, citizens are using this same practice and engagement for political counter-responsive. The study of governmental practices hence also sheds light on forms of resistance by the population (Gordon 1999: 4-5).

In order to study power relations, Foucault proposes the establishment of a number of foci: A establishing a number of points, namely, the
system of differentiations that permits actions based on the actions of others (relationships of power result in differentiations, for example in terms of legal position, traditions, and status); the type of objectives pursued by those acting upon the actions of others; the means through which power relations are established; forms of institutionalisation; and degrees of rationalisation (Foucault 1982: 792). Foucault asserted that, during the 18th and 19th Century, states assumed control of power, and that these power relations progressively have been governmentali-

2.5.2 Governmental technologies

Governmental technologies comprise mechanisms, procedures, instruments and other technologies through which conduct is shaped in order to achieve certain objectives (Lemke 2011: 49-50). The exercise of power within government is rationalised through the use of specific techniques such as the delineation of concepts, the specification of borders and objects, as well as through the provision of arguments and justifications. These techniques offer governments strategies to address problems and stimulate “appropriate” behaviour (Lemke 2011: 44). In particular, governmentality allows for the identification of political rationalities linked to strategies and programmes (Cotoi 2011: 116). A political rationality specifies which appropriate standards should be attained and the road ahead to achieve these standards. These political rationalities are stand-alone systems of meanings, operating at a higher level than perspectives and intentions of actors. Within these systems of meanings, there are problematisations of threats and opportunities. Power operates based on these rationalities, problematisations and translations, and is structured by experts (Merlingen 2011: 152-153), allowing political elites to manage the various affairs of a territory and its population, and to allocate spheres of action to different authorities (Rose 1996 as cited in Cotoi 2011: 116).

The concept of governmentality explains how citizens are made complicit in their own governance through the constraint of their behaviour by consistent monitoring of conduct and assessments of deviance from standards (Merlingen 2011: 152). These standards of appropriate behav-
iour are conceptualised as norms and play a critical role in modern power. According to Taylor (2009) ‘[t]he norm establishes what is normal’. Techniques of normation and normalization in turn function to ‘make normal’ (p. 52). Power is “sedimented” through this process in which norms are seen as natural. When norms are considered natural, they in turn promote conformity with other norms held at individual and societal levels. Through this process, it is possible to distinguish between the “normal” and the “abnormal” and consequently to intervene to ensure conformity, thereby effectively reducing the opportunity to present opposing views (Taylor 2009: 53). Taylor (2009) furthermore argues that

On the one hand, [the state intervenes] within both individual bodies and populations in order to bring them into conformity with particular social norms. On the other hand, in doing so such techniques perpetuate the power relations that the norm founds and legitimizes by reproducing norms within the sociopolitical landscape to the point that they come to be seen not as produced at all but simply as natural and necessary (p. 52).

Disciplined conduct is then achieved by training citizens to adhere to particular routines, surveying their behaviour, and punishing them for deviating from the norm. This discipline is not focused on creating obedience, but rather on the ‘self-optimisation of subjects through individual liberty and freedom of choice’ (Dean 1999: 19-20 as cited in Löwenheim 2008: 258). Through constant surveillance, the necessary “knowledge” is created to be able to classify citizens according to their (non-) conformity, and normalising judgements further illuminate the power dynamics of these engagements (Paternak 1987: 108). This also shows how power and knowledge influence and shape normalisation and how, even without surveillance and discipline, power is exerted through this process of normalisation (Briscoe 2008: 17). Citizens in turn are framed both as responsible for not conforming to the norm and for improving their future behaviour. Hence, through surveillance citizens are held responsible for their own conduct (Löwenheim 2008: 259). In other words, a citizen becomes the ‘principle of his own subjection’ (as cited in Mokuolu 2013: 54). The state on the other hand assumes the role of facilitator and monitors the behaviour of citizens through this form of indirect rule (Lie 2006: 14-15).
2.6 Developmentality

2.6.1 Introducing developmentality

The concept of governmentality provides a corresponding framework for understanding forms of control and governing as well as modes of thought. It is possible to rationalise power by providing meanings and definitions of problems and by identifying instruments to address said problems. The concept also provides a lens for viewing the way in which states can be subjected to self-control in the same way that modern individual citizens are subjected to self-control within states. This exercise of control can be applied to the conduct of the Bretton Woods Institutions to describe the exercise of indirect control in international relations, governing at distance in an unrepressed manner, and holding developing countries responsible for the conduct of their own affairs (Anders 2005: 39). The concept of governmentality helps us understand these transitions from direct to more indirect rule aimed at shaping state behaviour and action in a particular direction (Lie 2015a: 27). These dynamics are encapsulated in the concept of “developmentality”, which explains how new forms of governing and being governed are entrenched within official development discourses. Developmentality is thereby defined as a form of governmentality (Lie 2015b: 724).

Lie coined and first employed the term developmentality in 2002 (see Lie 2004). At that time, the term had only been applied in the field of child psychology. Since then, there has been a proliferation of applications of governmentality in the context of development studies and specific references to developmentality have also been made (for instance, Ilcan and Phillips 2010 apply the concept of “developmentalities” in analysing the Millennium Development Goals). However, Lie uses developmentality to describe and analyse the new aid architecture and focuses on the practices of development – in contrast to the more top-down perspective of development embraced in development literature that utilises a governmentality perspective (Lie 2015a: 1-2).

Developmentality draws on the particularities of governmentality analyses within the development sector and on donor and recipient insti-
tutions’ explicit intent to reform inherently asymmetrical aid relations. The developmentality perspective moreover helps disengage this association with the state and state power, while retaining key features to analyse similar governance dynamics and mechanisms within the development sector (Lie 2015b: 724). It describes the new aid architecture as a form of indirect rule that focuses on complicity through techniques of self-discipline. This involves altering mentalities in significant ways, hence the term developmentality (Lie 2015a: 29). It concerns the development of a discourse with a knowledge structure, and with both a conceptual and institutional apparatuses influencing social life through various strategies (Ferguson 1990 as cited in Cotoi 2011: 120). Thus, this mode of power inscribes a logic of unconscious self-governance within the frame of the governors and in this case, donor mentality (Lie 2015b: 724-725). This power is productive as it operates ‘through self-reflecting, conscious development actors, representing forms of action and relations of power that aim to guide and shape (rather than force, control or dominate) the action of others’ (Lie 2015b: 725).

Developmentality is linked to the rationalised practices embraced by the global development apparatus informing a particular type of knowledge formation as part of the new aid architecture, and shaping the conduct of actors through reciprocal partnerships. This is reflected both in the current development narrative of good governance, as well as in the development modalities embracing partnerships and participation. However, developmentality provides an analytical understanding of the suggestion that, contrary to the understanding that countries are in the driver’s seat of development, in actuality donors are applying new forms of governance and discipline by retaining control through shaping the conduct of aid recipients (Lie 2015b: 734-735). This relates to the overarching concept of governmentality wherein Foucault perceived power as expressed through dominance, discipline and governmentality (Lie 2015a: 244).

The overall aim of donors (or governors) is for recipient countries to accept their (good governance) policies. Lie suggests that the language utilised to achieve this aim presents the recipient as free, but that this freedom is limited to the discursive frames of donors. Developing countries are granted freedom in the development of country strategies (i.e.
ownership) and simultaneously are expected to self-govern to attain these set standards. Furthermore, countries are expected to perform and are held accountable through various governance techniques. Freedom then becomes the manner in which countries absorb and adhere to the mentalities of the donors (or governors) and eventually becomes a means of rule. States become self-disciplined agents enlisted and made responsible for their own development. In this regard, the new aid architecture through its focus on governance amounts to developmentality.

A number of statements here qualify this argument. Firstly, states are made responsible for their own development (through applications of the concept of ownership). Secondly, this self-governance is both a means to and end of the good governance agenda and is intended to shape behaviour in line with its principles. Thirdly, states are monitored from a distance through instruments and assessments measuring, monitoring and reporting performance. Fourthly, aid disbursement is based on the performance assessment of a client/developing country, and can be explained by referring to concepts such as surveillance, punishment, and reward. These actions all show the relational aspect of power, which makes it crucial to move beyond discourse analysis of donor rhetoric to closely scrutinise the manner in which these surveillance tools are applied. To be sure, developmentality is not a machine of disciplinary power as, in fact, recipients possess power and can resist. Hence, by viewing governance assessments as contributing to the creation and perpetuation of developmentality, it is possible to understand how governance standards are disciplined, and how aid recipients may drive resistance (Lie 2015a: 30-34).

2.6.2 Promoting governance as a technique of developmentality

Good governance is promoted as a global ‘modality of state rule’ (Zanotti 2005: 466) whereby the push for good governance orients policies toward institutional reforms, promotes mechanisms of efficient administration within states, and promotes international and national monitoring instruments to stimulate performance. It engages with reluctant governments by enlisting disciplinary instruments (Zanotti 2005: 466). Instruments such as the monitoring and auditing of performance support processes of standardisation and individualisation at the end of aid
recipients. Standardisation refers to the common goals of institutional reform, and this process is individualising in regard to tools for the self-improvement of countries (Zanotti 2005: 473).

As noted before, two processes are simultaneously occurring. On the one hand, states have assumed ownership in creating their own strategies for development (i.e. the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) and therefore have space and responsibility for self-governance. On the other hand, this space is curtailed due to the limitation of strategies to a certain realm of approved governance contexts (Lie 2015a: 28). Aid recipients are inscribed to follow a particular mentality of development and as a result exercise self-control – a process that can be described as an ‘indirect mechanism of surveillance’ exerted by donors (Lie 2006: 16). This is evident when analysing the production and simultaneous regulation of freedom, the production of accountability and regulation of empowerment of developing countries by bringing in states as responsible agents, and constraining this within set standards of conduct (Abrahamsen 2004: 1463).

Developmentality thus emerges not only as a direct effect of the new aid architecture with its increased emphasis on ownership of country development strategies and aid effectiveness, but is also an explicit goal in development strategies enacted by donors (Lie 2015a: 239-240). Lie (2006) states that ‘governmentality in the aid sector is both an effect of how aid relations are organised and an explicit intention on donor part through disseminating the same system of governance through the good governance paradigm. Hence, developmentality’ (pp. 15-16). The explicit intent of state formation to lead to developmentality can be observed by regarding governance as both the form of institutional setup and good governance as the characterisation of governance systems (Lie 2015a: 68). Although developmentality is an indirect form of power, it is more intrusive and profound, operating through recipient countries. This is where it resonates as a form of productive power, influencing the behaviours of actors who have been made responsible for development, but simultaneously remain accountable to donors for self-governance and the implementation of own development strategies (Lie 2015a: 242).
Developmentality relates to the production of this conducive environment – an environment wherein governance frameworks are conducive to the receipt of donor policies (Lie 2015b: 726). Several techniques are deployed to exercise this form of power, including more explicit tools such as conditionality and other, more implicit mechanisms of control such as pushing for aid recipient accountability towards the donors and applying checks and balances systems. A critical instrument related to this is the undertaking of donor audits (Lie 2006: 16). Such audits or assessments comprise a range of tools meant to assess the state of governance in a particular country (OECD/DAC 2008: 1). Assessments are instruments of productive power as they engender states to respond to performative conditioning, thereby improving country performance (Abrahamsen 2004: 1463).

Changes in the aid architecture have given rise to new forms of power modalities reflected in donor-aid recipient relations, and in modalities governing access to development assistance reflected particularly in aid selectivity (Lie 2006: 12). Indeed, the aid architecture transitioned in content and modality from structural adjustment policies and conditionality to a comprehensive development framework (and the application of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers) and aid selectivity. As Lie notes,

World Bank’s new management and planning regime under the umbrella of Comprehensive Development Framework makes government the responsible part of Bank-driven intentions as the government produced poverty reduction strategy (PRSP) makes government responsible for whatever proposed despite it – when following the policy trails and trajectories – is the Bank that indirectly defines policy and directly chooses which of the government proposed policies to support (Lie 2006: 15).

Thus, states have been granted more freedom, but these freedoms have been curtailed in order to adhere to the principles of the new aid architecture. Indeed, coercive conditionality is not needed when states have accepted the dominant ideas of the new aid architecture (Lie 2015a: 26). Developmentality and selectivity therefore distinguish themselves from each another, with the latter focusing development efforts on countries with an already-existing conducive policy environment and,
hence, without need for conditionality, whereas the former refers to the production of these conducive environments. Lie states that, ‘[a]s such, developmentality is a productive power contingent on influencing the actions of others who are then made responsible for governing and developing themselves’ (Lie 2015b: 726). Selectivity conditions recipients to accept good governance principles whilst excluding non-performers from development aid, acting almost as a conditionality technique. Freedom thus makes states complicit in their self-rule. The good governance agenda maintains and reproduces hierarchies and power relations by framing aid recipients as in need of good governance, thereby legitimising the prescription of its policy choices (Abrahamsen 2000: ix-x).

These powerful global normative standards influence the manner in which governments adapt and attempt to brand their countries to adhere to this normalisation of good governance (Schwak 2016: 428). Indeed, nation branding is understood as ‘a form of cultural policy (as “display”) that means to unify the nation-state and uphold the symbolic legitimacy of a particular social order’ (Varga 2013: 14). This process allows for the (re)legitimisation of the nation state as an anchor of identity (Varga 2013: 2) and provides an explanation of how nations seek to reconstitute themselves through ideology and praxis (Kaneva 2011: 118). An obvious display and identity that aid recipients may aim to showcase is adherence to international standards of governance (as a result of normalisation). These are reflected in inter-state dynamics influencing the need for developing countries to adhere to the ideology of the dominant development agenda. However, this international display of good governance may not necessarily translate into practice domestically (intra-state), in other words actual adherence to what is considered as a good governance framework, while agency and forms of resistance by the government further influence these processes.

2.7 Conclusion
The theoretical framework presented in this chapter provides an overview of the recent evolution of development approaches, marked by a shift in focus on and modality through which development cooperation is delivered. In terms of focus, good governance is viewed as providing
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the necessary prerequisite environment through which countries can achieve sustainable development. While initially good governance was seen as an outcome of development aid efforts, it is currently also viewed as the necessary “ingredient” for increasing aid effectiveness. As such, donors provide development assistance more selectively, and particularly on the basis of whether or not aid recipient countries possess good governance frameworks. This selectivity principle is a clear break from the past, when development cooperation was based on attaching conditions to aid. Hence, good governance has become both an input to and outcome of effective development aid.

While aid selectivity is propagated as a technical tool for improving the effectiveness of development assistance, it also operates as a political instrument for donor pressure. As aid recipients are dependent on development assistance, the selectivity principle generates coercive pressures on aid recipients to conform to the good governance norm. These pressures are influenced by donor-recipient relationships and power differentials dynamics. To be sure, development aid in itself is an important vehicle for the promotion of foreign policy objectives. In order to shed more light on this apparent disjuncture between the discourse surrounding and practice of governance assessments, conditionality and selectivity, and aid allocation, the theoretical framework used for this study relies on governmentality theory and its adaptation to the development sector, as captured in the concept of developmentality.

Governmentality theory provides a theoretical lens for understanding transitions from direct to more indirect modes of rule that aim to shape and guide the behaviour of citizens (Lie 2015a: 27). The governmentality framework focusing on the interaction between the state and citizens also has been applied successfully by Lie in the context of the development sector to explain how donors apply new forms of governance and discipline to shape the conduct of aid recipients. Developmentality draws on the particularities of a governmentality analysis within the development sector and on donor and recipient institutions’ explicit intent to overhaul inherently asymmetrical aid relations (Lie 2015b: 724). It positions donor and aid recipient relationships in a context of ownership and partnership within development cooperation. However, the framework also shows how governments are disciplined on the appropriate content
of development through the use of various techniques of rationalisation, including governance assessments. Governance assessments provide a tool for surveillance and the outcome of the respective assessment is an input to aid selectivity criteria, thereby punishing or rewarding aid recipients for good behaviour. This prompts aid recipients to exercise self-control and to accept the donor’s framework of thinking.

These frameworks of thinking inform the empirical analysis of the CPIA and APRM. More specifically, the analysis relies solely on the developmentality analytical lens and combines this with critical conceptual insights provided by governmentality, such as indirect rule; conduct and ‘conduct of conduct’; productive power; surveillance (monitoring); discipline; self-rule (self-optimisation and self-governance) and responsibilisation; punishment; norms and normalisation; resistance; as well as the intersection between knowledge and power. In order to facilitate this approach, the analysis is guided by theoretical propositions that are based on the developmentality lens and concepts from governmentality and supports the explanation of relevant dynamics pertaining to the themes addressed in each of the five sub-questions. These also tie in with other concepts discussed in the theoretical framework, such as good governance, conditionality and selectivity and coercion, donor-aid recipient dynamics, political determinants of aid allocation (the strategic function of aid), and nation branding.

Sub-question one: How are governance standards given shape in the content and design of the CPIA and APRM?

1a: CPIA content comprises discursive frames on good governance;
1b: The CPIA is designed to serve as a form of indirect rule of the World Bank over its aid recipients (productive power);
1c: APRM content comprises African discursive frames on good governance; and
1d: The APRM is designed to serve a form of counter-rule (resistance) against external influences on the African development agenda.
Sub-question two: How have CPIA and APRM assessment processes been conducted in Ethiopia?

2a: The CPIA is technology of surveillance (auditing/monitoring) that assesses adherence to the good governance norm and generates knowledge on aid recipient conduct; and

2b: The APRM is a voluntary monitoring mechanism that assesses adherence to African governance norms and generates knowledge on policies and practices of African countries.

Sub-question three: How have CPIA and APRM applications influenced the promotion of related governance standards in Ethiopia?

3a: CPIA knowledge is translated into power over aid recipients by punishing or rewarding behaviour deviating from the good governance norms (performative conditioning, discipline) through development finance and based on the selectivity principle (relational power reflected through donor-aid recipient dynamics and power differentials influence this, particularly aid dependency);

3b: The CPIA is an instrument of productive power that operates through aid recipients and engenders self-rule and optimisation (the responsibilisation of aid recipients) and results in the normalisation of good governance;

3c: The APRM challenges external development strategies and coercive financial pressures exerted by donors by relying on the development of domestic country strategies of development (influenced by intra-state discipline dynamics, particularly domestic participatory framework); and

3d: The APRM represents continental institutional isomorphic change and continental branding of African values on governance that challenge the normalisation of good governance (influenced by inter-state discipline dynamics).

Sub-question four: Did similar or different dynamics influence the application of the CPIA and APRM in Rwanda, Ghana and Nigeria?

This sub-question aims to replicate the main findings on the application of the CPIA and APRM in Ethiopia to these three secondary
case studies. It therefore relies on the same propositions as sub-question three.

Sub-question five: Which strategic considerations inform the functions that the CPIA and APRM perform for the World Bank and the African Union?

5a: The CPIA is an instrument that aims to support the geo-strategic (security), political and economic interests of the West; and

5b: The APRM is an instrument that aims to support the geo-strategic (security), political and economic interests of African countries.
3.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the content and design of the CPIA and APRM. It focuses on answering the following research question: how are governance standards given shape in the content and design of the CPIA and APRM? The main aim of the analysis is to describe the content and design of the CPIA and APRM and to understand how these assessments promote the adoption of governance standards. The description is informed by an analysis of strategic documents of the World Bank and the African Union, complemented by academic literature on the CPIA and APRM. The content and design of the CPIA and APRM, and the manner in which these assessments promote governance standards, are analysed through the analytical lens of developmentality (including relevant concepts related to the governmentality framework) described in Chapter 2. The analysis is further supported by the theoretical propositions that guide the explanation of relevant dynamics.

3.2 The content and design of the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment

3.2.1 The content of the CPIA

Context

The CPIA measures the quality of a country’s policy and institutional framework. “Quality” pertains to the conduciveness of a country’s institutional framework to fostering ‘poverty reduction, sustainable growth,
and the effective use of development assistance’ (World Bank 2009: 1). The CPIA process determines the size of concessional lending and grants to low-income countries. It has fulfilled this function since the 1980s (Tang 2010: xi). Concessional lending refers to the lending undertaken by the World Bank Group’s International Development Association (IDA) for ‘terms with significant grace periods, long repayment periods, and very low interest rates’ (World Bank 2016b). Two premises inform the use of CPIA outcomes as a guiding anchor in determining IDA allocations. Firstly, IDA resources are important to developing countries in supporting economic growth and poverty reduction, and in improving citizens’ living conditions. Secondly, these resources are utilised most effectively in a context of sound policies and institutions (Tang 2010: 29).

The neo-classical growth model serves as the theoretical foundation for explaining the effect of aid on growth (and, subsequently, its effect on attempted efforts to reduce poverty and raise living standards). This model considers aid to fill an external and domestic finance savings gap, and therefore supports investment leading to growth. Based on this premise, scholars have sought to further explain this mechanism, but have also challenged it by arguing that aid finances consumption, not investment. A seminal paper by Boone (1994), wherein he asserted that aid finances public and private consumption, particularly affirmed this. However, a World Bank working paper authored by Burnside and Dollar (1997, 2004) found that aid is effective – meaning that aid has a positive effect on growth – when provided in a context of “adequate” policies. However, in the decade following the publication of this report, no consensus had been reached regarding the impact of aid on growth (Tang 2010: 29-30). Despite the absence of consensus, this premise, in addition to the importance of adequate policies and institutions (governance), reflect the overarching belief of the Bank on aid effectiveness that informs the design of the CPIA.

The issue of governance first came to the fore in a 1981 Bank report on Sub-Saharan Africa. The report stressed the importance of developing an efficient public sector and improving incentives and institutional support for economic development (World Bank 1981: v). This line of thinking was also put forth in the 1989 Bank report on Sub-Saharan Af-
rica that pinpointed the failure of public institutions as the cause of weak performance, and stressed the need for good governance as well as the creation of a better relationship ‘between the government and governed’ (World Bank 1989: xii). The 1991 Bank discussion paper included further reflections on governance and defined it as ‘the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development’ (World Bank 1991: i). The paper argued that governance is relevant to the work of the Bank, as governance relates to good order and discipline in the management of resources. The report focuses on four dimensions of governance, namely ‘capacity and efficiency issues in public sector management; accountability; predictability and the legal framework for development; and information and transparency’ (World Bank 1991: 7). The 1992 Bank report on relating governance to development complemented these statements by adding that good governance is ‘synonymous to sound development management’ (World Bank 1992: 1).

The continuity in the Bank’s thinking on governance is exemplified in its 2002 World Development Report. The report includes four elements that are key to the role of the state as regulator: securing property rights; a regulatory regime promoting competition; establishing macroeconomic policies for stable market activity; and the absence of corruption (Hout 2009: 35, World Bank 2002: 99). Later reports also addressed critical political dimensions of reforms, as noted for instance in the Bank’s 2005 report on economic growth in the 1990s. The report proposed the adoption of “strategic incrementalism”, meaning that the Bank would have a diversified reform strategy based on the degree of state capture and levels of administrative corruption in respective developing countries (Hout 2009: 35-36). The issue of governance is again taken up in the 2017 World Development Report on Governance and the Law, which addresses the issues of policy-making and implementation of policies, and particularly the complex political and social settings that influence these (World Bank 2016a). These considerations are all reflected in the Bank’s current overarching Governance Global Practice, which supports countries in building ‘capable, efficient, open, inclusive, and accountable institutions’ (World Bank 2017).
This strand of thought is also fundamental to the content of the CPIA. The assessment is underpinned by the understanding that governance matters for development. In this regard, governance is largely understood in terms of the regulatory role of government. In particular, it is noted that development should be harnessed through the existence of a conducive policy and institutional framework. The Bank asserts that good policies and institutions lead to growth and poverty reduction outcomes, and this approach argues that development is a function of a country’s own effort.

Assessment content
The current design of the CPIA facilitates the assessment of four clusters related to the policy and institutional environment in aid receiving countries, further divided into 16 criteria (Tang 2010: xiii):

Cluster A – Economic Management:
Item 1: Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy
Item 2: Fiscal Policy
Item 3: Debt Policy

Cluster B – Structural Policies:
Item 4: Trade
Item 5: Financial Sector
Item 6: Business Regulatory Environment

Cluster C – Policies for Social Inclusion and Equity:
Item 7: Gender Equality
Item 8: Equity of Public Resource Use
Item 9: Building Human Resources
Item 10: Social Protection and Labour
Item 11: Policies and Institutions for Environmental Sustainability

Cluster D – Public Section Management and Institutions:
Item 12: Property Rights and Rule-based Governance
Item 13: Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management
Item 14: Efficiency of Revenue Mobilisation
Item 15: Quality of Public Administration

This thesis is particularly interested in understanding the manner in which governance assessments promote governance and therefore focuses on Cluster D, which covers the following five items:

**Item 12: Property Rights and Rule-based Governance:**
‘The extent to which economic activity is facilitated by an effective legal system and rule-based governance structure in which property and contract rights are reliably respected and enforced’ (World Bank 2015: 83)

**Item 13: Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management:**
‘The extent to which there is: (a) a comprehensive and credible budget, linked to policy priorities; (b) effective financial management systems to ensure that the budget is implemented as intended in a controlled and predictable way; and (c) timely and accurate accounting and fiscal reporting, including timely audit of public accounts and effective arrangements for follow up’ (World Bank 2015: 83)

**Item 14: Efficiency of Revenue Mobilisation:**
Assesses the overall pattern of revenue mobilisation – not only the tax structure as it exists on paper, but revenue from all sources as they are actually collected (World Bank 2015: 83)

**Item 15: Quality of Public Administration:**
‘The core administration defined as the civilian central government (and sub-national governments, to the extent that their size or policy
responsibilities are significant) excluding health and education personnel, and police’ (World Bank 2015: 83)

Item 16: Transparency, Accountability and Corruption in Public Sector:

‘The extent to which the executive, legislators, and other high-level officials can be held accountable for their use of funds, administrative decisions, and results obtained’ (World Bank 2015: 83)

Each item or criterion is composed of multiple dimensions, and these are further operationalised through different measurement indicators. An example of this is included below for Item 12: Property Rights and Rule-based Governance:

This criterion assesses the extent to which economic activity is facilitated by an effective legal system and rule-based governance structure in which property and contract rights are reliably respected and enforced. Each of three dimensions should be rated separately: (a) legal framework for secure property and contract rights, including predictability and impartiality of laws and regulations; (b) quality of the legal and judicial system, as measured by independence, accessibility, legitimacy, efficiency, transparency, and integrity of the courts and other relevant dispute resolution mechanisms; and (c) crime and violence as an impediment to economic activity and citizen security’ (World Bank 2011: 37).

Measurement indicator of legal framework dimension: Formal property rights are hardly recognized, and informal rights are seldom enforced. Formal contractual arrangements are little used. Manipulation of property and contract rights by government officials or other elites is endemic. Laws and regulations change unpredictably, for example through frequent and unpublished executive decrees (World Bank 2011: 37).

The different criteria, dimensions and indicators are assessed using guideposts that which comprise sources of data and information that can be used to inform the rating (World Bank 2011: 22). The guideposts of
Cluster D – Public Sector Management and Institutions are the following:

1. Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network's Public Sector Group (PRMSP) Governance indicators;
2. Actionable Governance Indicators;
3. Support for Improvement in Governance and Management (SIGMA) and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Standards for Quality of Laws;
5. Index of Economic Freedom ‘Property Rights’ indicator;
6. United Nations Development Program – Program on Governance in the Arab Region (POGAR);
7. American Bar Association – Rule of Law Index indicators;
10. Government Finance Statistics (GFS) Manual and the Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG);
11. World Development Indicators – Table 5.6 on Tax Policies;
12. United States Agency for International Development (USAID)/Collecting Taxes Data System;
13. Global Integrity Index;
14. Development Economics and Data Group (DECDG) Statistical Capacity Index; and
15. Institutional Profiles Database (World Bank 2011: 37, 39, 42, 44 and 47)
3.2.2 The design of the CPIA

Evolution of the design

The CPIA assessment was initiated in the late 1970s, but since has undergone a number of revisions and adjustments, mostly to incorporate changes in development thinking and various lessons learned over the years. Key markers in the CPIA process include the adjustments made in 1998, when governance and social policies were included in the review. Furthermore, the number of criteria was fixed at 20, the scoring system changed from a five- to a six-point scale, and a benchmarking step was included in the rating process (World Bank 2009: 1). The changes introduced in 1998 also emphasised the importance of institutions. In this regard, criteria were added to reflect on the capacity to manage and implement policies, and criteria were adjusted to emphasise institutional aspects. In addition, greater weight was assigned to the public sector management cluster by raising its importance from 14% for the CPIA in 1997 to 20% in 1998. This was entrenched by emphasising that the CPIA assesses policies and institutions implementing these policies, in contrast to development outcomes. The policies and institutions were to be measured based on their respective level at that time, rather than by comparing this to changes based on the former year. This supported the assumption that the nature of policies and institutions were the central determinant of aid effectiveness (Tang 2010: 4-7).

The increased emphasis on public sector criteria continued in 1999, when ‘accountability, transparency, the rule of law and participation’ were articulated as the major pillars of governance, critical for development and the effective use of development resources (Tang 2010: 7). This new thinking on public sector effectiveness was translated into practice by further increasing the weight of the public sector by another 5% to 25% and by moving the criterion “Property Rights and Rule-based Governance” to the public sector cluster. The increased emphasis on social policies also continued in 1999 when two criteria were added to the social policy cluster. In addition, the weight of the cluster rose from 15% in 1998 to 25% in 1999. By increasing the weights of the public sector and social policies cluster, the weights of the economic management cluster and that of structural policies fell to 20% and 30%, respectively (Ibid).
In 2001, it was agreed 1) to include written records in the assessment process, 2) to establish guidance on criteria, 3) to further revise the content of several criteria, 4) to increase the number of countries that serve as benchmarks in the rating, and 5) to define rating levels (World Bank 2009: 1). In addition, in assessing fiscal policy specific reference was made to economic growth (Tang 2010: 7). Comprehensive changes to the CPIA were also undertaken in 2004 following a review by an external panel of experts. Having concluded that the methodology produced robust results and focused on the right issues, the review made recommendations on process and methodology. Based on this, the criteria were adapted and fixed at 16 criteria, with clear definitions and details across all ratings levels. Moreover, equal weights were attached to the four clusters (World Bank 2009: 1-2). In addition, Bank experts would also consider the country context when rating countries (Tang 2010: 9). A major change to the CPIA methodology occurred in 2005, when for the first time the overall score and scores for each CPIA criterion (of IDA countries only) were made public. While the scores became public, the written justification for the scores and the sub-ratings that informed each criteria score remained undisclosed (World Bank 2011: 6). Thereafter, and following the evaluation of the CPIA in 2010\(^1\), several adjustments were made to address concerns related to, amongst others, the overlap of criteria and the consistent treatment of topics across different rating levels. The revised criteria were used from 2011 onwards (World Bank n.d.: 4). Hence, although the content, criteria, and weight of criteria have changed, little change has been made to coverage of the CPIA since the major adjustment in 1998, emphasising the perpetuated focus of the CPIA on the public sector and social policies, and specifying that the CPIA assesses policies and institutions (Tang 2010: 8).

**Rating process of the CPIA**

A two-pronged approach guides the preparation of CPIA ratings. The first process concerns a benchmarking phase in which a representative group of countries is drawn from all six regions (Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia) and rated accordingly. The second process concerns the rating of the remain-
ing countries, in which benchmarked countries serve as guiding standards in the rating of the other countries within that region (World Bank 2009: 2).

The main aim of the benchmarking phase is to ensure that, based on the criteria, the ratings are adequately and fairly applied across countries and regions. The World Bank selects a group of countries from each of the six regions. The group of countries is a representative sample of each region, including countries both with relatively fair and poor CPIA scores. The World Bank country teams from the selected benchmark countries propose ratings for each criterion and include written justifications alongside this. The country economists, with participation of the country management team and sector specialists, are often responsible for this process. Ratings are assigned on a scale of 1 (low/weak performance) to 6 (high/strong performance). The proposal and write-ups are then reviewed by the Regional Chief Economist Office to ensure cross-country consistency within each region. Then, the networks and central departments based at the headquarters review the proposed ratings to ensure cross-region comparability. Finally, the representatives of the Operations Policy and Country Services from the regions, as well as networks and central departments, meet and review the ratings for each criterion and for all the benchmark countries. The representatives consider the various CPIA criteria ratings alongside the written justifications provided by country teams, and also reflect on further comments from other Bank departments and on other relevant support documents such as external indicators (Tang 2010: 50, World Bank 2009: 2-4).

Currently, the ratings of the various criteria are fixed, which allows the various country teams to prepare the rating proposals and written justifications for their respective countries based on the earlier established ratings for the various criteria. The governments of the reviewed countries (including the benchmark countries) are presented with the draft ratings before these are submitted to the various internal Bank review processes. This allows for respective governments to assess areas in which views may differ and for these governments to supplement information to be considered for the rating (World Bank n.d: 8). Similar to the benchmarking stage, the draft country ratings are then reviewed by the Regional Chief Economist Office and thereafter reviewed again by
the networks and central departments at the head office. An important aspect of this process is to ensure consistency of the ratings within and across the regions (World Bank 2009: 3). When the ratings are finalised, these are once again presented to the governments, with implications for the Bank’s programme in the country. Parties then meet to consider how to address identified weaknesses (World Bank n.d: 8).

As noted before, Bank country staff uses the guideposts to outline sources of information and indicators as an anchor in rating the countries. However, other considerations also are taken into account in this process. The first decision Bank staff makes concerns focusing on relevant policies and institutions that are under the country’s control, in contrast to outcomes that may be influenced by factors outside of the control of a government (such as economic growth). The second decision Bank staff makes concerns focusing on assessing the level of current performance against criteria, and not the degree of improvement against those same criteria (i.e. comparing performance in relation to the previous year). The third decision Bank staff makes concerns focusing on actual policy actions and implementation only, and not focusing on intentions or commitments. The final decision Bank staff makes regards including the size of the economy and the manner in which policies are implemented when rating the country. When each of the sixteen criteria has been rated, the average of the specific cluster is calculated, followed by the calculation of an average of all four cluster averages, thereby leading to the final CPIA score (World Bank 2009: 4).

*From CPIA to IDA concessional lending*

The relationship between determining the CPIA score and, consequently, the relative size of IDA concessional lending and grants, is less straightforward than one may imagine. The IDA allocates its resources based on a Performance-based Allocation (PBA) system, which considers the country’s IDA Country Performance Rating (informed by the CPIA score) and, to a lesser degree, per capita Gross National Income (World Bank n.d: 2). The next section describes the process through which CPIA scores inform IDA Country Performance Ratings.
Although the average score obtained within each cluster determines the total CPIA score, each cluster does not bear the same weight in relation to IDA allocations. To be sure, the four clusters are unevenly weighted in the IDA allocation formula: Clusters A-C weigh 8% each (adding up to 24%), and Cluster D (Governance) weighs 68%. The portfolio performance comprises the remaining 8%. Hence, Cluster D bears eight-and-a-half times more weight in the IDA allocation and calculation process than the other clusters (Tang 2010: xi). In this regard, the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group asserts that there is ‘insufficient evidence to conclude that the most heavily weighted CPIA cluster associates better with loan performance than the other three clusters’ (Tang 2010: xiii). In other words, there is no reasonable explanation for the extent to which the score of Cluster D influences the final IDA allocation and calculation process. Based on this, the report concludes that this practice is more than likely related to fiduciary and other concerns of donors, rather than to the objectives of poverty reduction and growth (Tang 2010: xiv). In addition, a base allocation is given to all recipients to be able to maintain an effective country programme and address fixed costs of country engagements (IDA n.d.: 2).

The formula used for the Country Performance Rating is derived as follows:

\[
\text{Country Performance Rating} = (0.24 \times \text{CPIA A–C}) + (0.68 \times \text{CPIA D}) + (0.08 \times \text{portfolio performance})
\]

where CPIA A–C comprises the average of the ratings of CPIA Clusters A, B and C, and CPIA D comprises the rating of CPIA Cluster D (Tang 2010: 11)\(^3\).

The IDA country allocation takes into consideration country needs as reflected by country population and Gross National Income (as a measure of poverty). A 1% increase in population and/or a 1% decrease in Gross National Income both result in an approximate 1% increase in allocation (all else remaining constant) (IDA 2014: 4). ‘Population affects allocations positively (with an exponent of 1) while the level of Gross

3. Note that in the original document, the formula for the Country Performance Rating is slightly different, and the exponent of 1 for population increases is mentioned as an approximate 1%. The given formula is a corrected representation to align with the context provided in the text.
National Income per capita is negatively related to allocations (with an exponent of -0.125\(^2\) (IDA n.d.: 2).

The formula used for the IDA country allocation is derived as follows:

\[
\text{IDA country allocation} = (\text{Country Performance Rating} \times \text{Country Needs}) - (PPI \times \text{GNI per capita})
\]

All countries also receive a base allocation (ibid).

**Figure 3.1**

*The Performance-based Allocation System*

**IDA allocation mechanisms**

The performance-based allocation (PBA) system signals three important matters. Firstly, it stresses that country performance is the main determi-
nant of IDA allocations. Governance is assigned higher importance within the country performance assessment because it signifies development performance and mitigates fiduciary risks for aid funds. Secondly, it stresses that needs matter too, as population and per capita Gross National Income are included in the allocation formula. “Needs” is approximated by per capita income and by using the so-called “ring-fenced exceptions” directing funds to the poorest countries among them. Ring-fenced exceptions provide a tool for specifically targeting special countries such as post-conflict countries, or for increasing funds to regional projects, thereby allowing allocations to increase for countries that are in real need of resources (IDA 2007: 4).

It is to be noted that the overall size of IDA allocations are determined on an annual basis and reflect the following variables: changes in country performance (informed by the CPIA score); performance relative to other countries; changes in eligibility for IDA resources (i.e. relative poverty defined as Gross National Income per capita, which was below $1,215 for the fiscal year 2016, and lack of creditworthiness to borrow on market terms); and grants and availability of resources (as these are determined annually based on World Bank membership contributions). The allocation of IDA grants informs the financing scenario of the Country Partnership Strategy and Interim Strategy Notes (IDA n.d.: 2, IDA 2016b). The specific allocation is provided for the upcoming fiscal year, and indicative allocations 4 are provided for the “outer years” (years following the first fiscal year) to support planning at the country level. In order to facilitate the effective utilisation of IDA resources, the mechanism provides for the option of flexibilities within the replenishment period (IDA 2007: 7).

Various operational realities highlight the need for flexible arrangements, such as the front loading of funds (annual commitment may exceed PBA allocation) or back loading of funds (annual commitment may fall short of PBA allocation) (IDA 2007: 7). The front and back loading of funds does not exceed the range of the indicative three-year PBA envelope for the replenishment period (IDA 2010: 37). Clear guidelines are established for the practice of front and back loading. For instance, front loading is allowed within the first two years of the replenishment period of up to 30% of planned commitments, thereby facilitating accelerated
The content and design of the CPIA and APRM

disbursements. This rule has been relaxed for smaller countries, where front loading is allowed for up to 80%. Resources can also be back loaded in the first two years of the replenishment period (IDA 2010: 37). Another principle concerns the reallocation of uncommitted resources in a country to the IDA pool, which redistributes these to other countries using the PBA system. This also possesses a regional dimension, as dormant funds in regions can be reallocated for up to 10% of the regional PBA allocation to ‘better-performing countries with higher absorptive capacity’ (IDA 2010: 37).

3.2.3 Promoting governance standards through the CPIA

The assessment of aid recipient countries underscores the view that good policies and institutions lead to favourable growth and poverty reduction outcomes. Based on this, the CPIA functions as signal for the relative size of concessional lending and grants to low-income countries by the IDA. Moreover, the outcomes of the CPIA assessment also inform various strategies and processes such as the Country Partnership Strategy and the Country Policy Dialogue. In addition, it supports Bank staff in assessing the degree of portfolio risk and helps identify countries that require further attention related to fiduciary standards and governance. Finally, it also provides a background for the preparation of Country Assistance Evaluations by the Independent Evaluation Group, and offers further input into research on prerequisites for growth and poverty reduction, and for WB Global Monitoring Reports (World Bank n.d: 1-2, 6-7).

Although the main objective of the CPIA relates to the effective use of development resources, its process generates performance-based competition, creating domestic incentives for reform (Riegner 2012: 13). This is particularly achieved through the PBA system, which relies on the outcomes of the CPIA as a major input. In this regard, there could be a strong incentive for governments to adopt CPIA policy standards with the understanding that this could lead to access to increased IDA resources. The CPIA creates incentives through the implicit push for prescriptive policies and environments deemed appropriate for development (Steets 2008: 5). By releasing the CPIA scores in 2005, the Bank has further improved this incentive structure, as countries can better
grasp the link between CPIA scores and IDA allocations. By creating greater transparency and clarity, the incentive structures of the CPIA are better communicated to eligible countries (Watson 20008: 6-7 as cited in Sending and Lie 2015: 998). This gives the World Bank more leverage, and it is likely that aid-dependent countries in particular would ‘attempt to improve their scores in order to receive a higher share of the IDA allocation’ (Dijkstra 2015: 11).

Through the CPIA scores, countries may also be compared to one another, generating competition between countries. To be sure, CPIA scores are determined annually following standards set through regional benchmark countries (in contrast to global fixed standards and ratings), which makes good or bad performance dependent on regional performance (Steets 2008: 41). However, it is important to note one critical caveat, which relates to the fact that, theoretically, country Bank staff based in recipient countries could also have an incentive for supporting further developments in Cluster D and the scores at large, since it is directly linked to PBA and, thereby, their project budgets (Steets 2008: 41). The ratings provided by the staff (country, regional and those at the head office) ultimately inform final CPIA scores and as such provide a major input to IDA allocation processes and consequent allocations. These in turn also affect the size of Bank projects in the respective countries (Tang 2010: 50).

3.2.4 CPIA governance standards and developmentality

The content of the CPIA reflects the evolution of World Bank thinking regarding governance. The CPIA focuses on the quality of a country’s policy and institutional framework (World Bank 2009: 1) – an understanding that is central to the areas that the Bank considers critical in the pursuit of good governance. For instance, the assessment examines ‘the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development’ (World Bank 1991: i). It equates good governance to sound development (World Bank 1992: 1), as reflected in the definition of CPIA’s measure of “quality” of the policy and institutional framework of assessed countries, and focuses on fostering ‘poverty reduction, sustainable growth, and the effective use of de-
The CPIA content and design of the CPIA and APRM

The content and design of the CPIA and APRM (World Bank 2009: 1). The CPIA also links to the Bank's current overarching e Global Governance Practice that supports building ‘capable, efficient, open, inclusive, and accountable institutions’ management’ (World Bank 2017). The CPIA content reflects the Bank’s perspective that good governance is a prerequisite for development and for aid effectiveness, respectively. Based on these two understandings, it becomes clear why the Bank considers good governance both as an outcome of development interventions and as a condition for receiving development finance. In more analytical terms, these understandings of good governance represent “rationalisations” and “problematisations”, and the CPIA may be regarded as a “technology” (Merlingen 2011: 152-153, Lemke 2011: 50).

The intersection between knowledge and power is most evidently reflected in the manner in which the CPIA operationalises good governance. The Public Sector Management and Institutions cluster focuses on five core issues: (1) Property Rights and Rule-based Governance; (2) Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management; (3) Efficiency of Revenue Mobilisation; (4) Quality of Public Administration; and (5) Transparency, Accountability and Corruption in the Public Sector (World Bank 2015: 83). The operationalisation of a broad issue such as public sector management and institutions supporting these five areas reflects a particular understanding or frame that the Bank advocates to its aid recipients. This is further supported by the manner in which the Bank assesses these five areas – through the guideposts reflecting mostly the Bank’s own knowledge, as well as predominantly Western institutions that adhere to these similar understandings (including the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations Development Program, United States Agency for International Development), the World Development Indicators and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. This approach reveals the way in which the Bank accumulates “knowledge” on governance – not only by defining what good governance means and its importance for development outcomes (and as an input in determining development finance), but also by limiting that analysis to the Bank’s approved Western sources of governance measures. This approach represents a clear frame of thinking on governance and is used as a technique to normalise the good governance narrative (Abrahamsen 2004: 1459).
Based on this, it is possible to assert that the World Bank propagates a particular framework of thinking on governance. This framework of thinking on governance is reflected in and reinforced through the content of the CPIA (through its operationalisation in the five assessment items), and by limiting this assessment to sources that reflect similar thought. This creates a cycle in which the knowledge that the Bank possesses becomes reinforced and thus further supports the normalisation of good governance, the Bank’s definition and operationalisation of the concept, and the importance of governance for effective development management.

By way of summarising these reflections regarding the content of CPIA, it is possible to expand theoretical proposition 1a on the CPIA as follows:

1a: CPIA content comprises discursive frames on good governance. These frames reflect the norm that (good) governance is central to sustainable development and to aid effectiveness. CPIA content represents a technology to advance the Bank’s framework of thinking on governance.

The CPIA design comprises a global, regular and extensive process through which aid recipients are assessed regarding their policies and institutional frameworks. The assessors are Bank staff at the country, regional and head office levels that rate countries based on detailed guidelines provided by the Bank. The Bank uses the final rating as an input to determine development finance allocations provided by the IDA. This development finance is performance-based, and good performance is related to high CPIA scores. But the Bank communicates something even more specific: the PBA allocation formula weighs Cluster D (Public Sector Management and Institutions) eight-and-a-half times more than the other three clusters in the final determination of IDA aid allocation. This reinforces the understanding that what matters most to the Bank is performance in the area of governance. According to Lie, new forms of governing and being governed are entrenched within official development discourses, with these discourses thereby acting as a form of governmentality (Lie 2015b: 724). This new governing reflects a
form of indirect rule of the Bank, which can be seen in the manner in which the Bank not only assesses its aid recipients, but thereafter also links good or bad country performance to IDA development finance. This reflects a productive power of the Bank that works through the generation of knowledge on aid recipient performance (behaviour) and discursive practices that aim to constrain the behaviour of aid recipients (Abrahamsen 2004: 1458–1459).

These discursive practices are generated as a result of the Bank’s decision to release the CPIA scores. Whereas prior to 2005 this entire process took place behind closed doors, it is now communicated clearly to aid recipients that governance matters, that policies and institutions are critical, and that this matters to the Bank in its determination of IDA development finance. This process aims to make aid recipients feel responsible for their conduct (performance) and to adopt CPIA prescriptions, which are reflected in the assessment indicators. Indeed, aid recipients are made responsible for their own CPIA score. This process of responsibilisation effectively means that the freedom of aid recipients is restricted to the discursive frames of the Bank (Lie 2015a: 30-34). This is enforced due to the fact that non-adherence of aid recipients to CPIA standards (reflected in low scores) would also result in lower levels of IDA development finance. These practices support the normalisation of good governance.

By way of summarising these reflections regarding the design of CPIA, it is possible to expand theoretical proposition 1b on the CPIA as follows:

1b: The CPIA is designed as a form of indirect rule of the World Bank over aid recipients. The assessment assumes the form of productive power as the Bank generates knowledge on the performance of the aid recipient (through the CPIA rating) and uses the performance-based allocation system as a discursive practice to incentivise “proper” conduct. This approach aims to hold aid recipients responsible for achieving appropriate conduct (in the eyes of the Bank) and to improve performance within the frames set forth by the CPIA assessment.
3.3 The content and design of the African Peer Review Mechanism

3.3.1 The content of the APRM

Context
The historical roots of the APRM can be traced to developments in the 1970s and 1980s, but also to developments in the preceding period. In the 1970s and 1980s the last African countries officially removed their colonial shackles by gaining independence from their colonisers. It was also a period in which African countries engaged with the World Bank and implemented its Structural Adjustment and Stabilisation Policies as part of a larger package of economic and political conditionalities. Politically and economically, it was a very turbulent period: Cold War politics, political instabilities, coups d’état, one-party regimes and economic failures related to increasing foreign debts and declining social development all impacted the continent’s stability (NEPAD 2016).

The issues of authoritarian and unaccountable governing, rising poverty levels and the exclusion of citizens in governance became more pronounced during the implementation of structural adjustment programmes, exacerbated by the adverse effects of globalisation. It was this discontent that inspired the second independence or liberation movement, spurring popular uprisings and protests across Africa. Citizens demanded democratic transitions, the prioritisation of development and participation in decision-making, and the state struggled to assert itself as an agent of development, human rights, governance and accountability (as cited in Osaghae et al. 2013: 397). The global economic crisis also undermined the development ideology that underpinned and legitimised one-party states. While living standards of citizens continued to fall, corruption, mismanagement and human rights abuses characterised the operation of the state. This spurred thinking and action towards Africa’s democratic revival (Abrahamsen 1997: 134).

The drive for democracy was first articulated in the 1970s when African countries called for a ‘New International Economic Order (NIEO) through which they could craft self-reliant, culturally relevant and state-influenced development strategies’ (NEPAD 2016). Similarly, the Organ-
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isation of African Unity shifted its focus from political liberalisation to economic development, and a host of pan-African development approaches were adopted, including the Lagos Plan of Action (1980); the Final Act of Lagos (1980); Africa’s Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (1986-1990); the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme (1989); the African (Arusha) Charter for Popular Participation and Development (1990); the Abuja Treaty (1991); and the Cairo Agenda (1994) (NEPAD 2016).

However, it was not until the turn of the 21st Century that African leaders took these initiatives to the next level. Three parallel initiatives were introduced with the aim of increasing the pace and impact of Africa’s development. The first initiative was the Millennium Africa Recovery Plan, led by South African president Thabo Mbeki, which he presented at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland in January 2001. In that same month, then-President of Senegal Abdoulaye Wade developed the Omega Plan, which was presented at the summit of Francophone African leaders in Cameroon. Later that year and through another process, the summit merged the two initiatives to form a single, coordinated and inclusive plan called the New African Initiative, with South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt and Senegal as its founding members. The latter initiative was reframed as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and was adopted in 2001 by African heads of state and the Government of the Organisation of African Unity. It was ratified by the African Union in 2002 and became the guiding vision and policy framework for pan-African socio-economic development in the 21st Century. The main objectives of NEPAD are to ‘reduce poverty, put Africa on a sustainable development path, halt the marginalisation of Africa, and empower women’ (NEPAD 2016). NEPAD affirms and builds on this new development paradigm and extends the participatory framework to enhance country leadership, ownership, and mutual accountability between donors and recipients. It envisages African solutions as key for adding African perspectives to the governance and development discourse, and seeks ownership and the implementation of appropriate policies (Mohidden 2011: 3).

The New Partnership for Africa’s Development signalled a historic moment across the continent as Africans took their development per-
The CONTENT AND DESIGN of CPIA and APRM perspectives and futures into their own hands. NEPAD envisages the long-term objective of an African-owned and African-led development programme. It reflects a consensus and a determination to change the future of the continent and to improve the relationship of Africa with the rest of the world. NEPAD is a clear expression of the view that the only way forward is to have projects and programmes initiated, implemented and owned by Africans (Busia 2010: 37). Indeed, the vision is grounded in the understanding that socio-economic development of the continent is 1) rooted in changing the way Africans see themselves, 2) changing the global partnership, and 3) promoting a comprehensive development framework, while cognisant of individual country particularities (NEPAD 2001). This understanding follows experiences and insights of African leaders in the context of Africa’s socio-economic development and democratisation processes and represents the most recent vision crafted by Africans in the course of struggles for freedom and independence (Mohidden 2011: 3).

Assessment content

The NEPAD declaration identifies stability, peace and security alongside ‘democracy, good governance, human rights, social development, protection of the environment and sound economic management’ as foundations for sustainable development (NEPAD 2002: 4). Good governance is defined as ‘creating well-functioning and accountable institutions – political, judicial and administrative – which citizens regard as legitimate, in which they participate in decisions that affect their daily lives and by which they are empowered’ (NEPAD 2012: 17). It comprises a comprehensive development agenda focusing on political and social objectives. In this regard, member states agree to work together to pursue democracy and good political governance; economic and corporate governance; socio-economic development; and to establish the African Peer Review Mechanism. This mechanism was developed to promote adherence to and fulfilment of the agreements set forth in the NEPAD Declaration (NEPAD 2002: 3, 10).

The APRM is an African voluntary self-monitoring mechanism mandated to ‘ensure that the policies and practices of participating states conform to the agreed political, economic and corporate governance
values, codes and standards contained in the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance’ (NEPAD 2003a: 3). The APRM assesses progress in four thematic areas, namely democracy and political governance, economic governance and management, corporate governance, and socio-economic development (NEPAD 2003d: 4). As this thesis is particularly interested in understanding the manner in which governance assessments promote governance, the analysis is focused on the first theme, “Democracy and Political Governance”. This assessment of the APRM aims to assess progress towards the following objective: ‘[The consolidation of] a constitutional political order in which democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law, the separation of powers and effective, responsive public services are realised to ensure sustainable development and a peaceful and stable society’ (NEPAD 2003d: 6).

The reviews measure progress towards this objective by formulating nine sub-objectives that are identified as follows:

a. Prevent and reduce intra- and inter-country conflicts;
b. Constitutional democracy, including periodic political competition and opportunity for choice, the rule of law, a Bill of Rights and the supremacy of the constitution are firmly established in the constitution;
c. Promotion and protection of economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights as enshrined in all African and international human rights instruments;
d. Uphold the separation of powers including the protection of the independence of the judiciary and of an effective Parliament;
e. Ensure accountable, efficient and effective public office holders and civil servants;
f. Fighting corruption in the political sphere;
g. Promotion and protection of the rights of women;
h. Promotion and protection of the rights of the child and young persons; and
i. Promotion and protection of the rights of vulnerable groups, including displaced persons and refugees (NEPAD 2003d: 6).
For each of these nine objectives, the review process assesses the accession and implementation of standards according to indicative criteria and guided by examples of these indicators (NEPAD 2003d: 6). An example of this is included below for objective B, which focuses on the constitutional democracy.

**Standards informing objective B:**
1. The Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000);
2. The Conference of Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation (CSSDCA) Solemn Declaration (2000);
3. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1990);
4. The Grand Bay (Mauritius) Declaration and Plan of Action for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (1999); and

**Indicative criteria of objective B:**
1. Are the provisions of the constitution for democracy, human rights, the rule of law and the supremacy of the constitution clear and firm, with adequate provisions for enforcement?
2. Are the constitutionally mandated institutions for democracy, human rights, the rule of law and the supremacy of the constitution properly constituted and resourced for their effective functioning?
3. What is being done to create an enabling environment for meaningful popular participation in all forms and levels of governance?
4. What is the resulting state of democracy and political governance in the country?
5. How easy or difficult is it to change the constitution of the country? (NEPAD 2003d: 8).

**Measurement indicators of objective B:**
1. Adequacy of express provisions in the constitution;
2. Effectiveness of democracy and law enforcement institutions;
3. Independence and effectiveness of Electoral Commission to ensure fair and free elections;
4. Adequacy of legal framework for free association and formation of non-governmental organisations and unions;
5. Effectiveness of independent media in informing the public and providing freedom of expression;
6. Public perceptions of and the degree of satisfaction with democracy and political governance; and

3.3.2 The design of the APRM

APRM structures

The APRM comprises intimately connected continental and national structures and operational processes. At the continental level, the highest decision-making power resides with the APR Heads of State Forum – a committee consisting of participating heads of state and governments. The forum has the key responsibility of overseeing the process and structure of the APRM. It adopts the Country Review Reports, communicates its outcomes to the respective heads of states, and through peer dialogue and persuasion aims to affect change in country practices. It is also the forum that persuades development partners to support the programme of action through technical and financial assistance. The APR Panel is further tasked with overseeing the process and reviews country reports, additionally furnishing the APR Forum with recommendations. The APR Secretariat is tasked with providing support services to the Forum. Finally, the APR Country Team visits participating countries, prepares the Country Review Reports, and assesses progress made as part of the programme of action (NEPAD 2003b: 1–7).

In a further attempt to rationalise the operating procedures, the APR Committee of Focal Points was defined as an intermediary structure between the Forum and the Secretariat. It comprises the personal representatives of the forum members and engages them on the budget process, resource mobilisation, the APRM trust fund, audits, and the interaction between Secretariat, the Focal Points Committee and part-
The committee also oversees the APR Secretariat (APR Forum 2012: 3). Moreover, a recent decision at the African Union Summit changed the operational context of the APRM when it was agreed for the APRM to become an autonomous entity within the African Union system (African Union 2014: 2).

During the APRM review process, the following structures are established at the national level: a national APRM Focal Point (reporting directly to the head of state on the APRM processes); a national commission or governing council (overseeing the country processes and reports); a national APRM Secretariat (supporting the council by providing technical and administrative support and operating ideally independently and with their own budget); and technical institutions tasked with administering the APRM questionnaire and background studies (APRM 2016).

The APRM process

While the aforementioned section clarifies the various structures of the APRM, these are closely linked to the various stages of the APRM implementation process. Specifically, the process entails periodic reviews of policies and practices in four areas: (1) democracy and political governance; (2) economic governance and management; (3) corporate governance; and (4) socio-economic development. (Although this study particularly focuses on the application of the assessment to the first area, namely “Democracy and Political Governance”). Furthermore, four different types of reviews are undertaken – the base review, carried out within eighteen months of acceding to the mechanism, and periodic reviews5, undertaken every two or four years. Besides this, member states can request for a separate review process (outside of the mandated one), and the APR Forum can suggest a review when a member state faces an impending political or economic crisis (NEPAD 2003a: 4–5). As noted before, these reviews all aid in ascertaining that progress is made in working towards achieving political, economic and corporate governance values, codes and standards as outlined in the NEPAD Declaration.

The review process comprises four stages, namely country self-assessments; review missions; preparation of the Country Review Re-
ports; and peer reviews drawn up by participating heads of state and governments. A formal presentation of the report is made at key regional and sub-regional structures. The review process is undertaken under the leadership of the APRM Panel and with support of the APRM Secretariat. In order to kick-start the review process, a Country Support Mission providing support to countries in preparation of the review process is planned (NEPAD 2003c: 3–9).

The process commences when member states of the African Union join the mechanism by adopting the Declaration (NEPAD 2003a: 3). Through this, member states commit to periodic reviews of country policies and practices to assess progress against or compliance with the values, codes and standards set forth in the declaration. The thereupon following Country Support Mission ensures a common understanding of the vision of the process and provides support to the national processes where indicated by the government. Issues that could be addressed in this mission relate to the provision of an improved understanding of the review processes and how these relate to national processes of development management. Other issues include the provision of knowledge related to the self-assessment process and fitting this to the national context; the provision of technical support in preparing the content, context and aspects to consider for the implementation of the draft National Plan of Action (NPoA); and, finally, peer learning through exchanges of best practices. During country visits, various briefing sessions and workshops are organised with national stakeholders. The mission also negotiates the terms of reference of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). When the MoU is signed between the APR Forum and the respective country, the first stage of the APRM process commences (NEPAD 2003c: 4-5, 10).

The process continues at the level of the APRM Secretariat and at the country level. The secretariat requests the completion of a questionnaire forming the basis upon which the country develops and undertakes the self-assessment. After the country completes the questionnaire, it drafts the preliminary NPoA and submits this to the secretariat. At the same time the secretariat prepares a background study of the country in terms of the APRM objectives. The background study also identifies key issues and challenges in relation to the forthcoming review (the Issues Paper)
and informs the country review process to be undertaken in the following step. In the process of developing the Issues Paper, the technical partners of the APRM may provide assistance. If there were further issues to be cleared up before the Country Review Mission, then the secretariat would also prepare a technical assessment, in agreement with the country under review and with partner institutions conducting the analysis (NEPAD 2003c: 5-6).

During the second stage, the APRM country review team visits the country and consults relevant stakeholders (government officials, political parties, parliamentarians and civil society actors including media representatives, academics, trade unions and business/professional bodies). The consultations aim to engage stakeholders on their governance perspectives and to clarify issues raised in the Issues Paper and left un-addressed in the NPoA (NEPAD 2003c: 8).

During the third stage, the country review team prepares the draft report, which considers the findings from the background study, the Issues Paper, as well as key insights from the interactions with stakeholders on the ground (both formal and informal). The Country Review Report also considers the commitments made in the draft NPoA and identifies weaknesses as well as suggested improvements to the programme of action based on the findings of the review process. The final draft is presented to the government and allows for a review of accuracy, an opportunity to react to the findings, and for consideration of the suggested amendments made to the NPoA. The official government response is appended to the Country Review Report, and the NPoA thereafter is finalised (NEPAD 2003c: 8).

During the fourth and last stage, the country report and final NPoA are sent to the Secretariat and the APR Panel, which reviews the Country Review Report and submits final recommendations to the APR Forum. Following this, the APR Forum meets and considers the Country Review Report and presents the final recommendations of the panel. The APR Forum communicates its final decisions to the heads of state and governments of countries under review. These include considerations and action deemed necessary in accordance with their mandate. During these
The content and design of the CPIA and APRM processes, the APR Heads of State Forum exercises constructive peer dialogues and attempts at persuasion (by offering assistance or applying appropriate measures) to affect changes in country practice, where recommended. It is critical for the government to have the necessary political will and commitment to rectify identified shortcomings and, where needed, to request the support of the international community in implementing the NP0A (NEPAD 2003c: 9, NEPAD 2003b: 3). Thereafter, the APRM report is made public and is formally tabled at the key regional structures (NEPAD 2003c: 9).

It is envisaged for the review process (stages one to four) to take no longer than six to nine months. Furthermore, the in-country costs for the review are borne by the respective countries under review. If necessary, the NEPAD Secretariat sets up a mechanism to mobilise resources for participating countries from its external partners (NEPAD 2003c: 9-10). Figure 3.2 provides an overview of the main APRM processes.

**Figure 3.2**
The APRM process

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Source: (NEPAD 2003c: 7).
The review process is a cycle in the sense that the final report does not mark the end of the road. The country is expected to make final amendments to the programme of action and to commence with its implementation. NPoA implementation is to be reviewed regularly and the reports submitted to the forum. The secretariat supports this by organising regional workshops on common challenges, best practices and lessons learned. Through the provision of technical assistance and capacity building, the government is supposed to ensure the effective implementation of the programme of action (NEPAD 2003b: 15-16, NEPAD 2003d: 15-16). Moreover, through sustained efforts from the government, it is expected that new benchmarks and achievements are reached in promoting socio-economic development (NEPAD 2003e: 30-31).

All these processes are harnessed by the commitment of the participating country and its effectiveness in managing the review process, which is anchored in strong national ownership and leadership. Ownership of the process is facilitated by ensuring harmonisation of the NPoA with national strategies such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, the Medium Term Expenditure Framework, other development frameworks such as the Millennium Development Goals and Sustainable Development Goals, alongside on-going institutional reforms and other national reform strategies alike. This requires strong leadership of the government to address capacity constraints to support these harmonisation efforts and, where needed, to request international support for the implementation of the NPoA (NEPAD 2003c: 1-3).

Open and participatory process

The review process should be credible, free of political manipulation and informed by technical competence. This is harnessed by relying on a detailed process description, but also through steering for an open and participatory process. Through this, the APRM engages national stakeholders and facilitates exchange of information and dialogue on burning issues related to democracy and political governance. This increases the transparency of the decision-making process and, ultimately, public trust in the pursuit of national development goals (NEPAD 2003c: 3). Figure
3.3 provides further information on how participatory processes assist in the different stages of the review process.

![Figure 3.3
The APRM participatory framework](image)

Developing a transparent and participatory process is the responsibility of each member country under review. In this regard, one of the first steps each country will take is to establish a focal person (at the ministerial level) who reports directly to the head of state, and alongside him/her a technical committee in support of this function. Furthermore, countries under review and in collaboration with key stakeholders will define a roadmap regarding participation in the APRM. This roadmap should be widely disseminated and includes information on the national coordinating structures, as well as on further information about the...
APRM process and the role of the various stakeholders. Related to this, it is expected that countries under review develop (and publicise) feedback mechanisms between levels of government and civil society organisations. It is also the responsibility of member states to ensure the participation of stakeholders in the implementation of the NPoA, and to report progress on this implementation to the secretariat (NEPAD 2003c: 11-12). This participatory process aims to enhance the state of governance and socio-economic development:

... Such interactions can build trust, establish and clarify mechanisms for on-going engagement and empowerment of stakeholders. These processes will be most effective if they build on existing structures, rather than duplicating or creating parallel processes such that learning becomes cumulative (NEPAD 2003c: 12).

Besides this, national oversight institutions play an integral role in the APRM – in particular oversight institutions such as the Auditor-General, Public Accounts Committees of Parliament and Human Rights Commissions with constitutional functions covering areas of governance and development. These institutions assist in identifying key areas of reform and ensure competence, integrity of the review, and play a role in drawing up and implementing the NPoA. Furthermore, the intra-governmental processes may link national and local level processes. These include members of parliament bringing in perspectives from their constituencies, regional and local government participation in workshops, and other processes related to the review. Through this, the aim is to obtain local-level inputs and formulate priorities in the context of the broader national reform agenda envisioned in the NPoA. Finally, communities and non-state actors provide crucial information regarding the local context and build ownership and commitment in the implementation of the NPoA. In particular, these actors add local perspectives for action and local accountability, addressing governance at all its levels (NEPAD 2003c: 12-13).
3.3.3 Promoting governance standards through the APRM

The overarching goal of participation in the APRM is for countries to accelerate their progress towards both the adoption and implementation of NEPAD priorities and programmes. These are reflected in ‘the mutually agreed objectives’ and supported through ‘compliance with best practice in respect of each of the areas of governance and development’. In order to accomplish this, the APRM review process relies on the sustained efforts of all actors (government, civil society and private sector actors) to implement the Programme of Action, which includes time-bound objectives and links directly to the national budget (NEPAD 2003d: 2-3). In particular, the APRM review is expected to enhance country efforts in achieving the shared objectives and standards related to democracy and political governance. Following the review process, it is foreseen that countries not only further strengthen their Programmes of Action, but also continue to update this by reflecting on the progress (self-monitoring) and learning from lessons shared by peers. This would furthermore result in the establishment of new benchmarks and targets, which would then serve as the basis for subsequent reviews. At a continental level, it is hoped that these processes will also serve as a basis for consolidating values and standards on governance. ‘If this happens, the APRM will have served its intended purpose’ (NEPAD 2003d: 28-29). Moreover, through the review the mechanism aims to stimulate countries to ‘consider seriously the impact of domestic policies, not only on internal political stability and economic growth, but also on neighbouring countries. It will promote mutual accountability, as well as compliance with best practice’ (NEPAD 2003a: 5).

3.3.4 APRM governance standards and developmentality

Developments in the 1970s and 1980s shaped new thinking on democracy and governance in the continent. A pan-African vision for socioeconomic development in the 21st century was developed that was informed by the need to change the way Africans see themselves, to change the global partnership, and to promote a comprehensive development framework that was responsive to individual country particularities (NEPAD 2001). The NEPAD was meant to be a break from a past wherein international financial institutions set the development course of
African countries, particularly in the 1980s. This narrow focus on economic stabilisation and adjustment aiming to transform economic structures and institutions, along with the promotion of market economies under downsized governments (Leftwich 1993: 607), was replaced by themes such as stability, peace and security alongside ‘democracy, good governance, human rights, social development, protection of environment and sound economic management’ as foundations of sustainable development (NEPAD 2002: 4). This reflects a much more comprehensive development framework that also pays particular attention to good governance. But its definition is far more political than the Bank’s focus on the state as “regulator”, as it centres on ‘creating well-functioning and accountable institutions – political, judicial and administrative – which citizens regard as legitimate, in which they participate in decisions that affect their daily lives and by which they are empowered’ (NEPAD 2012: 17).

The NEPAD focuses on four key areas that are critical ingredients for this new development framework: democracy and political governance; economic governance and management; corporate governance; and socio-economic development (NEPAD 2002: 4). The APRM was developed to promote adherence to and the fulfilment of the objectives and standards set according to each of these themes (NEPAD 2002: 3, 10). In particular, democracy and political governance are operationalised as the consolidation of ‘a constitutional political order in which democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law, the separation of powers and effective, responsive public service are realised to ensure sustainable development and a peaceful and stable society’ (NEPAD 2003d: 6). In order to attain these, the APRM describes nine key areas for this theme and, most importantly, considers African standards as reference (alongside some international standards). While the APRM thus (similar to the CPIA) considers good governance to be critical to sustainable development, it operationalises this within the context of democracy and political governance and as such reflects a much more political definition of governance. This operationalisation not only is more political, it is also domestically anchored in the reliance on mainly African governance standards, and reflects African discursive frames on good governance.
By way of summarising these reflections regarding the content of APRM, it is possible to expand theoretical proposition 1c on APRM as follows:

1c: APRM content comprises African discursive frames on good governance that consider a more political operationalisation of governance and incorporates African standards as reference.

The APRM review process possesses many elements that counter the more traditional governance assessments conducted by donors, including a focus on the voluntary nature of the process (in contrast to an imposed process); country-led assessments involving citizens (in contrast to external assessments conducted without the participation of governments and other stakeholders); governance reports prepared by African eminent personalities (in contrast to Western experts); reviews conducted by peers (accountability to peers, not donors); and the development of programmes of action (instead of reliance on simple scores providing limited information on how to improve governance). This means that the design of the APRM counters the more traditional audit-like checklist reviews conducted by external partners, and could be regarded as a form of resistance. Indeed, it seems that the APRM is designed in such a way to act as a “counter-discourse”, using ‘similar weapons in order to pursue their own interests … with the same vocabulary and espousing the same goals’. These operate within ‘the same discursive space and within the same field of power of the dominant strategy’ (Escobar 1984: 390). As donors are exerting a form of “biopower” over the continent (i.e. pushing for reforms in governance), African leaders are responding by using this same practice and engagement as the basis for political counter-responses (Gordon 1999: 4-5).

In other words, the APRM is designed as a form of resistance that uses similar language, frames, methods and discursive spaces as that of donors to present a counter-approach to governance. Indeed, developmentality is not a machine of disciplinary power (Lie 2015a: 30-34), and there is power on the recipient end to counter and resist the dominant framework of thinking. This approach may also be considered to reflect a form of ‘pan-African (subaltern) geo-politics’ that aims to counter the negative governance imago of the continent by giving the supranational
African brand a “more positive reading” rather than countering in any other way (Browning and Oliveira 2016: 6-7).

By way of summarising these reflections regarding the design of APRM, it is possible to expand theoretical proposition 1d on the APRM is hence expanded as follows:

1d: The APRM is designed to serve as a form of counter-rule (resistance) against external influences on the African development agenda. This design reflects a form of resistance, as it wields similar language, frames, methods and discursive spaces to that of donors to present a counter-approach and method for promoting governance. This also aims to counter the negative governance brand of the continent.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the content and design of the CPIA and APRM. It focused on answering the question: how are governance standards given shape in the content and design of the CPIA and APRM? The CPIA content reflects the understanding that good governance (focused on policies and institutional frameworks) is critical to the effectiveness of development aid. This more technical perspective on governance – which focuses more on the regulatory role of the state – is particularly reflected through the assessment content of Cluster D – Public Sector Management and Institutions. This cluster focuses on the following five themes: Property Rights and Rule-based Governance; Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management; Efficiency of Revenue Mobilisation; Quality of Public Administration; and Transparency, Accountability and Corruption in Public Sector. These themes are operationalised through measurement indicators and guideposts that give direction to sources of information to consider in the assessment.

The design of the CPIA reinforces the importance of good governance and especially the relevance of policies and institutional frameworks for effective development management. The CPIA is a global, annual and comprehensive Bank rating process that assesses the conduciveness of the framework for fostering poverty reduction, growth, and the effec-
The content and design of the CPIA and APRM

tive use of development aid. The Bank uses the outcomes of CPIA assessments as inputs to the performance-based allocation system of the IDA. In this performance-based allocation formula, Cluster D is assigned eight-and-a-half times more weight than the other three clusters. This further reinforces the understanding that for the Bank, public sector management and institutions is a critical component of effective development assistance and that aid recipients ought to pay attention to this when considering their engagements with the Bank.

APRM content – similar to that of the CPIA – is shaped by the understanding that strengthening good governance is important for sustainable development in Africa. However, it considers a much more comprehensive and political operationalisation of governance. This is particularly reflected in the assessment theme “Democracy and Political Governance” that focuses on building and strengthening the constitutional political order in which democracy, the separation of powers, rule of law and an effective public service ensure sustainable development. The assessment content reviews progress towards the attainment of African governance standards, which are mainly guided by various continentally adopted treaties and agreements. While this operationalisation of the assessment according to themes, indicators and standards is quite similar in design to the CPIA, the manner in which the assessment is undertaken could not be more different. The APRM is a voluntary self-assessment that is country-led; involves domestic stakeholders; includes esteemed African personalities that assess the various themes; and ultimately relies on African peers and citizens to engage with the government on the implementation of actionable governance objectives. Thus, the governance standards are given shape by relying on voluntary processes involving domestic actors, but also peers who support, yet pressure governments to implement governance objectives that are outlined in the government’s programme of action. In contrast to the carrot and stick approach of the CPIA, the APRM is designed to build and support the necessary political commitment needed to implement governance reforms.
Notes

1 ‘The evaluation concluded that the content of the CPIA is largely relevant for growth and poverty reduction in the sense that its components map well with the determinants found in the literature; that the ratings are generally reliable and correlate well with similar indicators and there is no evidence of upward bias. The evaluation also found that there is room to streamline and revise some of the criteria and makes some specific suggestions such as broadening the trade criterion, revisit the financial sector criterion taking into account the lessons of the recent financial crisis; adding an assessment on disadvantaged socio economic groups, and strengthening the linkages among criteria’ (World Bank n.d.: 4).

2 ‘The country write-ups should provide: (1) a justification of the proposed scores that directly address the dimensions of each of the CPIA criteria; and (2) the relevant background information to support their proposals; (3) clearly indicate the basis for the upgrade/downgrade of a specific score. When a criterion contains more than one dimension, the write-up should provide a separate rationale for each of them, together with the each dimension’s proposed score’ (World Bank 2011: 5).

3 ‘The country performance rating then undergoes two steps to arrive at a final allocation: ‘first, grant allocations are discounted by 20 percent. Of this discount, 13 percentage points are reallocated to all IDA-only countries, excluding gap and post-conflict countries, and 7 percentage points are made available on hard terms to creditworthy blend countries. Second, for countries eligible for debt cancellation under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative, the debt service due in the relevant fiscal year is netted out from that year’s allocation. The amount deducted as foregone debt service from an eligible country’s gross annual PBA allocation is capped at 30 percent of such gross PBA allocation. This capped deduction will continue to apply during the IDA17 period. As before, the netted-out amounts are redistributed to all IDA-only countries, excluding gap countries’ (IDA n.d.: 2).

4 ‘Allocations for the outer years are subject to a number of uncertainties including the country’s performance, its relative performance compared to other countries, the size of the available IDA envelope, traffic lights, MDRI status, reactivation of countries, and other reasons’ (IDA 2007: 7).

5 ‘It is to be noted that Kenya is the only country to have completed a periodic review (as at February 2017). All other conducted reviews have been base reviews.

6 ‘The composition of the country review team is designed at the onset of each review, and may include the following members: APR Panel members as team leaders, members of the Secretariat, members of the NEPAD Secretariat, ex-
The content and design of the CPIA and APRM

experts, observers from partner institutions, and observers from other participating countries (NEPAD 2003c: 15).
4 CPIA and APRM Processes in Ethiopia

4.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the application of the CPIA and APRM assessments. It focuses on answering the following research question: how have CPIA and APRM assessment processes been conducted in Ethiopia? The main aim of the analysis is to describe the empirical application of the CPIA and APRM, and to analyse the processes through which CPIA and APRM assessments have been shaped, specifically in Ethiopia. The analysis aims to unpack the different stages of the assessment process by drawing on the perspectives of the actors involved. The analysis is informed by observations of different stages of the respective assessments, obtained through interviews and complemented by a document analysis of the Country Review Report, and independent external evaluation report (in the case of the APRM). In the case of the CPIA, it presents evidence on the process through which the ratings have been established and how these were used to inform decisions on allocation contributions. In the case of the APRM, it presents evidence on the process through which the assessment report was prepared, with a particular focus on the four review stages. The processes through which the CPIA and APRM assessments have been conducted in Ethiopia are analysed by applying the analytical lens of developmentality (including relevant concepts taken from the governmentality framework), and is further supported by the theoretical propositions that guide the explanation of relevant dynamics.
4.2 The CPIA process in Ethiopia

4.2.1 Overview

This section synthesises observations obtained through interviews conducted with World Bank staff in Addis Ababa and Washington, D.C. It captures the method and practice of application of the CPIA, as narrated by five individuals that were involved in the process at its various stages (four at the Ethiopia country office, and one officer at the World Bank headquarters in Washington, D.C. who was interviewed through Skype). As noted before, interviews were conducted with World Bank staff only, as the CPIA is an external and Bank-led country assessment. Indeed, the main objective of these interviews was to understand the application process from the perspective of the World Bank. As the CPIA process is an internal Bank mechanism, it also limits the number of people that can participate in this type of assessment (due to the internal nature of the process, but also as the assessment is less comprehensive than, for instance, the APRM). Furthermore, it engages with a more sensitive topic – the relationship between the Bank and the Ethiopian government. Cumulatively, these issues limited discussions on the CPIA process. This was evident in the expression of disinterest by some respondents, and the dismissal of interview requests by others. This unwillingness to participate could be indicative of the political environment in which the Bank operates. As noted by Lie (2015a), he was interested in examining CPIA processes in Ethiopia, but was advised against doing so by diplomats at the Norwegian Embassy in Addis Ababa, who noted that the relations between the development actors were politically tense and that the rather closed government bureaucracy would impede efforts to gain access to recipients (Lie 2015a: 12). He also indicated that processes through which access is denied could say something about the empirical field and processes of exclusion (Lie 2015a: 12). Despite the possible low number of interviews conducted with the Bank in this study, these interviews already provided a number of interesting indications of tensions between intended CPIA outcomes and the reality on the ground.
4.2.2 Rating the Public Management Sector and Institutions Cluster

Observations from interviews on the rating process

The CPIA process in Ethiopia commenced with the setting of regional benchmarks. Benchmarks were established for each of the six regions in which the Bank operates. The Chief Economist Office of the Africa Region identified the benchmark countries for the continent. The officers explained that in 2014, the following countries served as a benchmark reference: Angola, Ivory Coast, Kenya, South Africa, Togo, and Zambia. For these countries, the full write-up and rating were completed, serving as the reference point for the assessment of Ethiopia. Although the process of receiving the ratings of the benchmark countries was clear to the officers, the process through which these ratings were established was less clear. The officers generally understood the function of the benchmark process, but not the exact manner in which the benchmarks were set. It seems – and as per the formal design processes – that the role of the country office is more pronounced in the actual rating aspect of the process (Interviews with World Bank officers, 16 July 2015; 21 July (a and b) 2015).

The officers proceeded to explain how the benchmark countries assisted in preparing the rating for Ethiopia. The rating of the benchmark countries, along with the assessment criteria and guideposts (sources of data), served as reference points for the rating. The criteria were both objective and subjective, requiring the assessing officer to triangulate between different information sources in order to make an informed assessment. The Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Department of the office in Ethiopia coordinated this entire process. The different questions of the CPIA were divided amongst the experts, who used the information on indicators and other sources to prepare the 2014 assessment score and write-up. The governance cluster team of the World Bank office in Addis Ababa was responsible for the assessment of Cluster D of the CPIA. For each question, different reference points were indicated, and questions were further informed by the write-ups of the benchmark countries. Based on the information links provided in the guideposts and criteria, as well as on information provided by partner institutions and grounded in the individual knowledge of governance
policies and developments in the country, the officers assessed the various indicators and provided a written justification for each rating. For Question 13, related to the quality of budgetary and financial management, particularly the 2013 Public Expenditure and Financial Accounting Performance Measurement Framework of Ethiopia provided a critical input to the score. After an internal check and last consolidation, the final assessment was sent to the Chief Economist Office for Africa, which again assessed all the ratings and reverted to the country office with feedback. Thereafter, the final rating and updated justifications were sent to the Global Practices Group on Governance and Public Sector Management at the headquarters, where the rating and justification were again assessed, and the process was finalised after a final discussion with the country office (Interviews with World Bank officers, 16 July 2015; 21 July (a and b) 2015; 4 August 2015).

Some of the officers considered the process to have been quite straightforward and uncontroversial, while another, more critical perspective was touted:

The current governance ratings for Ethiopia could be higher … The rating is more conservative, which may be due to the financial consequences of increased CPIA scores (Interview with World Bank officer, 21 July (a) 2015).

This assertion brought to light the possible political aspects related to the rating of the cluster. In addition, it became clear that the guideposts and assessment criteria are not the only anchor for the country staff in the ratings. As noted before, CPIA guidelines prescribe that country staff should focus the assessment on: (1) the level of performance against certain criteria and not the degree of improvement against the same criteria (i.e. comparing performance in relation to the previous year); (2) policy actions and implementation (including policy relevance and the manner in which policies and their institutions are implemented) in contrast to intentions or commitments; and (3) the size of the economy in relation to the manner in which policies are implemented when rating the country. Considering the assessment criteria in conjunction with all these contextual considerations seems like a rather difficult undertaking, especially
as government action does not take place within a vacuum. Therefore, the Bank officers were asked to comment on how they actually assign scores while required taking into consideration all these difficult contexts. Contrary to expectations, the officers did not note any tensions or difficulties in this process:

The CPIA indicators focus on policies and institutions, rather than on outcomes. The governance team therefore emphasises governance policies/frameworks and institutional measures, with a particular focus on the level of implementation. The criteria do entail both subjective and objective aspects, but by focusing on the aforementioned areas it can be assessed comprehensively (Interview with World Bank officer, 16 July 2015).

In addition, the team used information from domestic sources, such as evidence emanating from country surveys and other locally conducted research, to further support the accuracy of the assessment (Interview with World Bank officer, 21 July (a) 2015). All of the sources used to inform the rating were outlined in the written justification. However, another officer articulated the possible problems and difficulties that arose in accurately discerning the difference between commitment and implementation:

In the case of Ethiopia, commitments and implementation are closely linked and in more sensitive areas, the government implements marginal actions (Interview with World Bank officer, 17 September 2015).

The officers were also asked to comment on the possible incentives they may have to increase the country scores. To be sure, the higher the CPIA score, the higher the IDA allocation of resources, accompanied by an increase of World Bank projects in Addis Ababa. Therefore, Bank officers commented on how the Bank guarantees the objectivity of the rating. This initial assumption was again countered as the officers explained the roles of the various controlling offices and how the scoring was almost a side task of the country office, thus not actually influencing the project portfolio. For instance, one officer explained:
At each of the review stages, the team assesses the ratings and justification in light of the guideposts and assessment criteria set. It is extremely important to provide thorough justifications, and at times the governance team is requested by the Office of the Chief Economist in the Africa Region or the Global Practices Department on Governance and Public Sector Management to provide further explanations, justifications, or we are informed that a rating is not accepted and should be reviewed. It is discouraged to adjust the rating of an item either upward or downward (in comparison to the previous year). What is really sought is a balanced rating (Interview with World Bank officer, 16 July 2015).

CPIA scores have been relatively stable, and only in cases of severe and sudden governance deficits did scores change (Interview with World Bank officer, 4 August 2015).

According to the officers, the internal and external reviews provide the necessary balance to maintain objective ratings of the country, despite a possible inherent incentive to upgrade ratings. Furthermore, there are internal procedures in place to deal with disagreements that may arise on allocated ratings between country offices and the external reviewers, with the final step being arbitrage (Interview with World Bank officer, 16 July 2015). In addition, it was noted that resources would in any case continue to flow to the country office and that the CPIA is simply an additional task to be completed, but not the main job of the team. Moreover, according to the officers there was not much room for interpretation or subjectivity. The process was characterised as a mathematical exercise where the numbers speak for themselves (such as through an assessment of budget deficits). For other criteria assessments, the indicators are clearly operationalised, leaving little space for discretionary judgment (Interviews with World Bank officers, 21 July (a) 2015; 4 August 2015; 17 September 2015).

In keeping with some of the general critiques of the CPIA, the officers were finally asked whether they felt that Cluster D comprised a more narrow and neoliberal perspective on governance, or whether other as-
pects related to democracy also should be included in the review. In this
regard, the officers generally agreed that the seemingly technical govern-
ance criteria were interpreted at a more political level. For instance, one
Bank officer asserted that

Cluster D comprises a mix of both political and economic governance as-
pects. Even the aspects that might seem more related to economics, such
as efficiency and revenue mobilisation, do actually also discuss political as-
pects such as equal revenue distribution among groups and regions. Gov-
ernance is about managing public affairs in a right way, and making sure
that the relation between government and citizen is according to certain
norms (Interview with World Bank officer, 16 July 2015).

Not all agreed on this point, however, as another officer expressed
that issues related to democracy, human rights and freedom of expres-
sion are not covered in the review (Interview with World Bank officer, 4
August 2015).

Analysis

Based on the findings from the interviews, it can be asserted that the rat-
ing process followed the formal processes as set forth in the CPIA
guidelines. This may be unsurprising, as it concerns an annual and rigidly
controlled process through the utilisation of guideposts and preparation
of detailed justifications for each criterion. The process is also firmly an-
chored in validating scores through checking for intra- and inter-regional
consistency. The officers also provided more detail regarding the internal
Bank processes through which the scores are assigned. It would be
worth mentioning that this process relied mainly on two sections, namely
the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Division and the
Public Sector Management Section, housed within the Ethiopia country
office. The former managed the process through which the scores were
prepared, while the latter actually assigned the governance scores (as
would make sense, knowing that Cluster D mostly resides there). Here it
is possible to note that some officers could observe the more political
nature of scoring country performance against formal criteria and also
asserted that the score for Ethiopia might be on the lower end. This
highlights the importance of the guideposts (sources of information) that
are considered for Cluster D and each of the five items it measures. Here an important aspect of what constitutes good performance in Cluster D is evident; and also the manner in which the Bank uses knowledge as a form of power. Others viewed this process as a more technical and straightforward exercise of checking sources and assigning scores according to the guideposts.

However, the broader contextual factors that were considered in the rating process seem to complicate the rating exercise. This is particularly a problem where reforms were marginally implemented. However, to adequately understand implementation, the officers used country sources to verify information. This was further aided by the government making a particular effort to improve the technical aspects related to governance (i.e. public financial management). To regard more sensitive and political topics, the government implemented reforms only at a marginal level. Hence, this allowed the officers to adequately assess the level of performance against key assessment criteria.

The entire process was also geared towards maintaining reliable scoring across the globe. The guideposts and the different counterchecks all alluded to this. However, it also somehow showed that there could be a certain path dependency in the ratings, which illustrates the importance of the first rating. Moving the rating upward or downward means proving that a certain situation changed within that year. This seemed to be more difficult to ascertain for the offices that crosscheck the country scores.

The tension between understanding governance assessments as merely a technical exercise (rather than a political one) also came to the fore in the CPIA. Governance is ultimately a political exercise, and although issues related to democracy are not articulated in the CPIA, the criteria it assesses are clearly linked to the performance of the democratic state. An example of this regards the operationalisation of the fifth indicator covered under Cluster D, namely “Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption in the Public Sector”, which covers the following dimensions: ‘(a) the accountability of the executive and other top officials to effective oversight institutions; (b) access of civil society to timely and reliable in-
formation on public affairs and public policies, including fiscal information (on public expenditures, revenues, and large contract awards); (c) state capture by narrow vested interests; and (d) integrity in the management of public resources, including aid and natural resource revenues’ (World Bank 2011: 47).

Three broad observations can be made regarding the process of establishing the CPIA ratings in Ethiopia. Firstly, the process is detailed and strictly operationalised to such an extent that assessing progress in public management and institutions was seen more as a technical exercise. However, interviewees made remarks regarding the final rating assigned for Ethiopia, which they deemed to be on the lower end due to other considerations of the Bank. In addition, a remark was made regarding the general difficulty of assessing progress and performance, instead of political commitments. Indeed, it could be more complicated to qualify marginal implementation of CPIA criteria.

4.2.3 From CPIA score to IDA allocation

*Observations from the interviews on the IDA allocation process*

The process description stipulates that the draft ratings should be presented to the government. In this conversation, the government is informed of the rationale behind the assessment outcomes and simultaneously given an opportunity to present relevant information that could further inform the process. A meeting could also take place ahead of the rating process with the aim of acquiring further relevant information related to performance. The officers noted that in the case of Ethiopia these conversations did not take place. This was not considered problematic, though, as the assessing team consisted of governance experts that constantly monitored the governance environment in the country. As such, there had been no real need to have a prior consultation with the government, as all information was already known. The government of Ethiopia, through the Minister of Finance and Economic Development, was informed of the final CPIA score through a letter, which also included an invitation to the Ministry to further discuss the allocated score (Interviews with World Bank officers, 20 July 2015; 21 July (a and b) 2015).
However, the government for the last five years did not accept this offer, possibly due to the government’s view of the relative importance of the CPIA. An officer shared first-hand knowledge on the Ministry’s perspectives regarding the CPIA process:

The Ministry of Finance believes that the ratings assigned to Ethiopia are too low, and primarily based on information from outside sources (Interview with World Bank officer, 21 July (a) 2015).

The officers also described the process through which CPIA scores were translated into IDA resource allocation and the relation to the country partnership strategy. In this regard, the officers explained that IDA allocations consider different parameters, including the CPIA score (exponent of 4), population size (exponent of 1), and per capita Gross National Income (exponent of -0.125). The IDA is replenished every three years, and annual country allocations made annually in June are based on the aforementioned parameters. Within the available IDA annual budget and based on the parameters, country fund allocations are made and communicated by letter to the government of Ethiopia in July of each year. The country partnership strategy that acts as a guide to plans and budgets includes only indicative IDA allocations. Official contributions are determined on an annual basis following the CPIA assessment (Interviews with World Bank officer, 16 July 2015; 17 September 2015).

**Analysis**

It is quite interesting to note that there is almost no involvement of the government in the CPIA process. Interviewed officers asserted that there was no need for its involvement, but that it could also be an indicator of the non-participatory nature of this review, resulting primarily from its design, but also from the apparent disinterest of the government in engaging with the rating process. Discontent with the rating process was articulated during an aid forum in which late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi argued that the CPIA rating of Ethiopia was too low because ‘of some of the policy choices we have made, although they are not less effective’ (Bieckmann 2010). This lack of engagement between the Bank and the government on the CPIA rating process raises serious questions
about the ability of the CPIA to create a learning effect, and most importantly signals the presence of incentives by linking performance to outcomes. It seems that the linking of performance and outcomes is most clearly made through the annual IDA allocations. This link was characterised as “soft”, as the officers noted that other factors also weigh in IDA allocations. These are also further outlined in the PBA design, which ensures that country allocations meet country-specific needs (i.e. considerations for poverty levels and size of the economy). It also raises the question that if scores have been relatively stable, how could the CPIA signal incentives to aid recipients? This issue was also raised in passing in the previous section, where observations were made that increasing CPIA scores also created increased financial commitments of the Bank. This is the reverse side of the coin, where increased country performance also commits the Bank to increased financial commitment. This issue also relates to the decision of the Bank not to fully clarify which type of score could secure which level of IDA allocations, made out of fear that this could create demands from aid recipients. Hence, these are some early indicators of the translation of CPIA scores to IDA allocation processes and the manner in which aid recipients were encouraged to adopt the norms and principles underlying the governance criteria.

4.2.4 The CPIA process and developmentality

The CPIA process in Ethiopia followed all the steps as set forth in its design. Even on aspects of the process where disagreement could arise, for instance regarding the preparation of the draft rating, such issues were pre-empted through the design. The respondents elaborated on the different steps of the process and explained these as “routine”, undertaken with almost mathematical precision. At times, however, the rating process was more complicated due to difficulties in discerning between commitments and implementation (reflected in the marginal implementation of particular standards). Nevertheless, the process comprises a standardised and global rating process aimed at achieving reliability and comparability across countries that is both “standardising” and “individualising” (Zanotti 2005: 473). The assessment sets standards related to public sector management and institutions and individualises these standards by indicating country-level areas for improvement.
In this regard, it is possible to view the CPIA as an ‘indirect mechanism of surveillance’ (Lie 2006: 16). The CPIA surveys Ethiopia through the monitoring of conduct and assesses deviance from standards (Merlingen 2011: 152). The conduct of Ethiopia is assessed through the CPIA rating process, particularly adherence and deviation related to standards on public sector management and institutions (Foucault 1982: 789). These standards are conceptualised as norms, and establishes for Ethiopia what is considered an appropriate and, as such, “normal” governance framework. The CPIA can therefore be considered as a ‘technique of normation’ that functions to render particular governance standards “normal” (Taylor 2009: 52). These norms are then considered natural and necessary, in contrast to having been produced by the World Bank. Not only does this process support the process of bringing Ethiopia in conformity with governance standards, it also creates and perpetuates a power relation between the Bank and Ethiopia upon which the norm is based – that of Ethiopia “needing” good governance, and the Bank as the organisation upholding this standard across the globe (Taylor 2009: 52).

A process of responsibilisation further supports this process of norm setting as the government is informed (be it only through a formal letter) of the attained standards of conduct and the financial consequence of their performance. In particular, this knowledge produced about Ethiopia is used to classify it (Patenek 1987: 108), and informs the level of access to finance the IDA provides. Rather than creating obedience, this process aims to show Ethiopia how it can optimise its governance framework by making the necessary reforms (Dean 1999: 19-20 as cited in Löwenheim 2008: 258). Where Ethiopia is held responsible for (non-)adherence to governance standards and is expected to become the ‘principle of his own subjection’ (as cited in Mokuolu 2013: 54), the Bank assumes the role of facilitator and monitor (Lie 2006: 14-15).

However, the observations from the Bank officers on their non-interaction with the Ethiopian government indicates the limited influence of the Bank in shaping and guiding the government’s behaviour and its failure to be disciplined. The Bank officers attribute the lack of dis-
cussions with the government on the draft ratings or final allocations to the government’s disqualification of the content of the review. Indeed, if this discussion would have been imagined as a site of resistance, the government is not even engaging it. This seems to be further limited by the Bank’s favouring of the status quo in relation to the country ratings; consequently, upward and downward changes are actually quite difficult to make. This means that there is a certain path dependency in the assessments, which goes against the principles of aid selectivity, as good or bad performance may not adequately be reflected in the rating due to the financial consequences accompanying this decision. This evidently conflicts with the aid selectivity principle and limits the manner in which the Bank can discipline and push for norm adherence in relation to its governance standards.

By way of summarising these reflections regarding the CPIA process in Ethiopia, it is possible to expand theoretical proposition 2a as follows:

2a: The CPIA is a technology of surveillance (auditing/monitoring) that assesses adherence to the good governance norm and generates knowledge on aid recipient conduct;

2b: The CPIA is a technology of surveillance that standardises governance norms across aid recipient countries, but at the same time individualises these to respective country contexts;

2c: The CPIA monitors the conduct of aid recipients by assessing deviance from standards;

2d: The CPIA rating process establishes norms in relation to public sector management and institutions;

2e: CPIA knowledge on aid recipient conduct informs the IDA finance allocation; and

2f: CPIA inter-state discipline between the Bank and Ethiopia is limited due to the absence of dialogue on the rating process, which indicates a form of resistance on the side of the government.
4.3 The APRM process in Ethiopia

4.3.1 Overview

This section provides an overview of the APRM’s application in Ethiopia. It combines information on the process, obtained from the official APRM Country Review Report, with findings from the interviews conducted with the APRM informants involved in this process, and with the independent external evaluation report. Interviews were conducted with members of the continental APR structures (5 respondents), with continental APRM experts (3), with representatives of the APR structures in Ethiopia – government representatives (1), governing council representatives (1) and civil society representatives (1) – and with local APRM experts (2). By compiling the different data sources, it is possible to contrast the official narrative in the Country Review Report (prepared by the APR Panel) to the lived experiences of those involved at each of the four stages, namely (1) the country self-assessment; (2) the review mission; (3) the preparation of the Country Review Report; and (4) the peer review by participating heads of state and government, followed by the formal presentation of the report at key regional and sub-regional structures. The sections below elaborate on each of the four stages of the APRM process.

4.3.2 Stage One: Country self-assessment

Observations on the motivation to accede to the APRM

Ethiopia was one of the pioneering countries in acceding to the APRM in March 2003. Following its accession, it commenced with operationalising and institutionalising the APRM processes (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2011: 41). As part of the initial APRM processes, the government initiated a sensitisation conference to inform stakeholders of the major processes within the APRM review. These stakeholders included government institutions, civil society representatives, private sector actors and numerous other individuals. Following this conference, the government convened the various national APRM structures, such as the Focal Point, the National Governing Council (NGC), and the APRM National Secretariat (Fisseha and Tadesse 2011: 8).
The Country Review Report does not indicate the motivation for Ethiopia to accede to the process; hence, this question was posed to the various APRM informants. Indeed, the motivation to accede can give an important indication of the level of political commitment to the process. Various informants noted that the accession was primarily guided by the leading role of Ethiopia in the development of NEPAD and APRM instruments. However, although Ethiopia acceded in 2003, the review process did not get off the ground until mid-2007. Here the informants noted that the chairpersonship of late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of the APR Forum could have spurred the country to commence with the review process (Interviews with non-governmental member of National Governing Council, 29 July 2015; and with member of continental APRM Secretariat, 28 July 2015). An APRM government representative noted that Ethiopia’s participation in the APRM followed the interest of the late Prime Minister in the vision of NEPAD and supporting the African Renaissance (Interview with APRM government representative, 11 September 2015).

Ethiopia’s accession to the APRM was also interpreted in more practical terms. More than likely it became more difficult for the Ethiopian government to actively participate in and comment on the reviews of other countries during the Forum meetings, never having had gone through the process itself. This could have contributed to the decision to finally commence the review process. An important aspect of this is the fact that the mechanism forms part of the African Union, which is headquartered in Addis Ababa. As one of the pioneering countries, it would have been critical for Ethiopia to go through the process, since all other APRM pioneer countries had successfully done so (Interviews with member of Country Review Mission, 23 July 2015; 2 October 2015).

The decision also could have been motivated by the need or wish to demonstrate a strong commitment to good governance. The review would provide the possibility for the government to address the negative image it had acquired in the areas of democracy and good governance. In this regard, the review would showcase the commitment of the govern-
ment and uncover areas requiring further strengthening. An important aspect raised in this regard was how this decision related to the foreign policies of the government. One expert stated that Ethiopia’s foreign policy is very much grounded in playing key roles in international and regional bodies such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the African Union, and by having a strong regional presence through its various peacekeeping missions (Interviews with continental APRM expert 21 July 2015; and with national APRM expert, 16 September 2015).

The government sticks to continental decisions for its own benefit as the organisation is used as a soft power, reinforcing its own foreign policy as well as combining soft and military power to legitimise the latter … NEPAD was a cover rather than a serious engagement. The late prime minister used NEPAD, like other international organisations, to promote foreign policy, but without letting that discourse impact the domestic agenda (Interview with national APRM expert, 29 July 2015).

Analysis

It is quite interesting to note that the different APRM informants observed various dynamics relating to Ethiopia’s accession, which also signals the multifaceted aspect of the APRM as reaction to international governance standards. These motivations bring together the desire of adhering to an African development vision whilst operating within an international donor framework. The government representative was the only interviewee to refer to the African Renaissance vision, and the member of the NGC referred to the role of Ethiopia in NEPAD, and as such, supported the broader vision behind the instrument. The members of the Country Review Mission referred to the practical implication of joining the review and chairing the Forum without having subjected the country to a review. The continental and domestic experts considered accession and the commencement of the review as ways to show political commitment to democratic processes, to show leadership in continental frameworks, and to strategically position the country in continental and international spheres. This decision was observed to be more of a tool to obtain external legitimacy for domestic and external actions. In this regard, it is possible to discern the importance for Ethiopia of seek-
ing external legitimacy of its actions, but it can also be noted that these may not necessarily translate into strong domestic political commitment.

Observations on setting up the national APRM institutions and the organisation of the Country Support Mission

In early 2008, the government of Ethiopia enacted the Council of Ministers Regulation No. 142/2008, with the aim of using it to guide the APRM implementation. The Prime Minister’s Office was designated as the focal point for NEPAD/APRM activities, and a special advisor to the Prime Minister was appointed as the APRM National Focal Point. In addition, Ethiopia established its National Governing Council (NGC), tasked with driving national processes. The council was led by the then-Minister of Capacity Building and comprised 23 members, including government representatives, opposition members, and private sector and civil society actors. Alongside the national council, regional governing councils mirroring the national structure were established in the eleven consultative regions. These councils were tasked with coordinating the APRM processes at the regional state levels. At the national level, a secretariat was established in support of the day-to-day work, and a technical research institute was identified to undertake the self-assessment (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2011: 41).

A support mission took place from 10-14 June 2008. The aim of the visit was to officially launch the review process. The eight-member delegation comprised representatives of APRM strategic partner institutions (the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the African Development Bank), as well as of the APRM continental secretariat. The Country Review Report further notes that the government had made adequate budgetary provisions for the review (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2011: 41). Indeed, the Ethiopian government fully funded its own APRM review by allocating US$1.65 million toward it (Fisseha and Tadesse 2011: 10). The Country Review Mission members interacted with various national actors such as the NGC, civil society organisations, and the research institute tasked with undertaking the self-assessment. The team also engaged various stakeholders in Bahir Dar, the capital of Amhara Regional State. Furthermore, marking the start of the self-assessment, the late Prime Minister and the initial lead panellist, Profes-

**Table 4.1**

*Composition of the National Governing Council of Ethiopia*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder</th>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Ministry of Capacity Building, Ethiopian Federal Parliament, Ministry of Youth and Sports, Prime Minister’s Office</td>
<td>Mr. Tefera Waluwa (Chairperson) Mr. Asmelash W/Sellassie Mrs. Aster Mamo Mr. Newaykirstos Gebreab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>United Ethiopian Democratic Forces Coalition for Unity and Democracy Party, Ethiopian Democratic Union Party, Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement</td>
<td>Prof. Beyene Petros Mr. Ayele Chamiso Mr. Ledetu Ayalew Mr. Bulcha Demekessa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing Regions</td>
<td>President of Benishangul Gumuz Regional State</td>
<td>Mr. Ahemed Nasser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>Mr. Getachew Ayenew Mr. Muluwork Kidanemariam Mr. Yergalem Admassu Mr. Tekalegne Abate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>Labour Union, Teachers’ Association, University Students’ Council, Ethiopian Bar Association, Ethiopian Health Professionals Association, Ethiopian Economists Association, Women’s Association (3 seats)</td>
<td>Mr. Kasahun Follo Mr. Yohannes Benti Mr. Yosef Anbessa Mr. Beshada Gemechu Dr. Mengistu Asnake Dr. Welday Ameha Mrs. Asefach Ayenaleme Mrs. Abeba Shumete Mr. Shasha Yadessa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academia</td>
<td>Addis Ababa University</td>
<td>Prof. Andreas Eshete</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The NGC is a critical national body in the APRM, taking the review process from a government activity to a national, country-led activity. It is therefore crucial for the council to enforce autonomous, inclusive (diversity of stakeholders), representative, encouraging, and encompassing broad-based participation (APRM 2016). In the interviews, the respondents were asked to comment on the extent to which the council embodies these principles. The government representative explained that the NGC was composed of around 23 members, including members of various segments of society such as the ruling party, the opposition party,
and actors from civil society. The council was responsible for the preparation of the self-assessment report. The chair of the council, then-Minister of Capacity Building, was also responsible for facilitating the relationship between the Panel of Eminent Personalities and the host country (Interview on 11 September 2015).

The NGC member complemented this information by explaining that the council would meet regularly at the office of the chair. The council had an open character and was inclusive, with opposition leaders forming part of the team and participating in the discussion. As the chair did not try to steer the discussion, the council was able to freely and lively discuss topics of interest. However, the member also critically noted that the meetings and entire APRM process were quite protracted, as members would only meet every few months; these meetings moreover served only to assess reports and documents. Regarding the nature of the civil society organisations represented on the council, the NGC member conceded that these organisations could be better characterised as professional bodies, since they did not specifically operate in the realm of good governance. Moreover, the NGO law may further have restricted participation of these types of organisations and their engagement on political issues (Interview on 9 July 2015).

However, some of the Country Review Mission team members were more critical and asserted that the governing council was mostly hand-picked by the government and tutored in their comments and responses, in addition to being limited in their movements and interactions in the field. Indeed, ‘everything was controlled’ (Interview with member of Country Review Mission, 23 July 2015). Other members also raised serious reservations about the council’s autonomy and adherence to the principles of inclusive and diverse participation (Interviews with member of Country Review Mission, 30 July 2015; 31 July 2015; 2 October 2015).

These critical perspectives could be explained by examining the dual character of civil society in Ethiopia. In this regard, professional bodies are considered the legitimate “civil” society and are intimately linked to the government (Interview with civil society actor, 1 September 2015). A national APRM expert confirmed this by saying that
The NGC represented actors of various segments of society; however, concerns were raised that these civil society organisations were actually linked to the government (governmental NGOs). By and large, the council was inclusive and showed the intent of the government to at least appear representative (Interview with national APRM expert, 16 September 2015).

Analysis

It is noteworthy that the interviewed government representative did not come forward with an assessment, but referred to the approval of the Panel of the established structure as fulfilling the principles set forth in the APRM. The same elusiveness is somewhat found in the answer of the NGC member, who noted that there were lively discussions including opposition members in the NGC, but that the meetings also seldom occurred and often served only to assess reports. The external evaluation report by the Open Society Foundation similarly observes that the chair was responsible for calling meetings of the NGC and that there was no separate meeting schedule (Fisseha and Tadesse 2011: 10). Moreover, while the Country Review Mission did give the green light for organising the national processes, it also made recommendations regarding widening the membership of the council to include ‘more women and other stakeholder groups such as the physically challenged’ (Fisseha and Tadesse 2011: 24). However, the Country Review Mission members raised more critical concerns about the independence of some of the members. While the national experts shared these concerns, they also at the same time felt that the government made concerted efforts to at least make the NGC formally appear to be representative and balanced. This is also somewhat echoed in the external evaluation report, which notes that ‘the Ethiopian NGC was merely a nominal entity, and its functional activities were controlled by its chair and the Secretariat’ (Fisseha and Tadesse 2011: 14). The NGC was mostly engaged in a discussion on budget proposals, and the secretariat executed the work required. The report suggests that the government solely determined the composition of the NGC. In this regard, it had elected organisations that ‘could speak its own language’ (Ibid). In addition, the report notes that there was a
knowledge disparity among members, which made it difficult to exercise the mandate of the NGC (Fisseha and Tadesse 2011: 14-15).

The role of the NGC is critical in the APRM processes, but as can be observed from the various characterisations of its autonomy and composition, it can also be co-opted by the government. The chair of the meeting was the then-Minister of Capacity Building, but in the context of Ethiopia, this also meant that he was a member of the government and of the ruling party. Indeed, there is almost no separation between the legislative powers of the parliament and the executive powers of the government. Hence, the spirit of the APRM principles as they pertained to the organisation of the NGC seemed to be only nominally adhered to.

**Observations on undertaking the self-assessment and preparing the draft report**

The African Institute of Management Development and Governance (based in Addis Ababa) was commissioned with undertaking the self-assessment. The Country Review Report reveals that the institute developed six research instruments, including desk research; undertaking a survey covering 4620 households; conducting interviews with key informants; and holding focus groups discussions alongside administering expert opinion surveys and district consultative forums across the country. The Self Assessment Report was validated through five national and nine regional validation workshops and thereafter submitted with a draft NPoA to the APRM Secretariat in May 2009. The Country Review Report further notes that the self-assessment met the objective of technical competence and that it was ‘sufficiently candid about the governance situation in Ethiopia’. It furthermore recommends the six-stage methodology as an example to other countries planning their review (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2011: 42-43).

The independent external evaluation report provides slightly more information on this process and elaborates that the desk review focused on the collection of secondary data related to the thematic areas of the review. The expert opinion survey was conducted in the nine regional states and Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa city administrations. Around 400 experts participated in the survey and were selected based on their
knowledge of governance issues. In this, the institute sought to create a balanced representation by taking into account age, gender, religion and other key characteristics. The public consultations were undertaken in 33 districts in the regional states and city administrations. The consultations brought together 50 individuals (farmers and residents), as invited by the district administration. In all but one, regional governing council (mirrored on the national governing council), conferences were organised to inform the public about the APRM and its objectives. The household survey complemented this information and aimed to gather national estimates on citizens’ perceptions at the grassroots level. After submitting the draft country self-assessment to the governing council in late 2008, there were over 100 workshops and five validation conferences were organised in January 2009. According to the CEO of the secretariat, about 1,500 participants joined these discussions on the draft report, including members of government, civil society actors, political parties and private sector actors. The self-assessment report was submitted to the APRM secretariat in February 2009. The report was unanimously adopted by the governing council with one vote against it, namely that of the United Ethiopia Democratic Forces (opposition party on the NGC). The independent external evaluation report notes that the NPoA was prepared solely by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development and submitted only at a later stage, namely after the country review visit and without the support of the NGC (Fisseha and Tadesse 2011: 14-16).

The APRM stakeholders reflected on the content of the self-assessment report and considered whether it provided an adequate representation of the democratic and political landscape of Ethiopia. The majority of respondents appreciated the elaborate methodology through which the self-assessment report was prepared, but also raised more critical concerns as to who participated in the various consultations and how these voices informed the self-assessment report and the NPoA.

The government representative elaborated on the preparation of the self-assessment report and explained that the council “headhunted” experienced academics/practitioners and requested them to come together to bid for the consultancy engagement (as there was not a research organisation working on governance issues at that time). The budget for the self-assessment report was approved by the Council of Ministers and
completely domestically financed. The institute selected to undertake the self-assessment briefed the governing council on the data collection strategy. The council reviewed the different research instruments, including the questionnaire, and made adjustments on the latter. Following the adoption of the research instruments, the survey questionnaire was distributed and consultations across the country were conducted with the support of the local governments. The institute held public consultations across 40 regions and provided a space for citizens to give their own impressions on governance. Six focus group discussions were held with different groups (representing women, opposition parties, civil society, the youth, ruling party and others). The focus group discussion with the ruling party in particular provided an opportunity for the government to respond to critical issues brought forward in the assessment process. An example of such issues concerned the contested neutrality of the electoral commission. As such, the report did not seek to present a consensus, but rather reflected different views and perspectives. In its engagement with citizens, the institute remained neutral and created a space for people to speak freely (Interviews with APRM government representative, 11 September 2015; and with national APRM expert, 16 September 2015).

The draft self-assessment report was presented to the governing council, which reviewed the content and provided comments based on group consensus. In particular, the governing council commented on factual errors and ambiguities in the text. The final report provided the basis for the preparation of the NPoA, which was prepared by the government and thereafter submitted to the APRM Secretariat (Interview with APRM government representative, 11 September 2015). However, in the Country Review Report it is mentioned that the main opposition party in the parliament – the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces – commented that there were ‘irregularities and methodological bias in the self-assessment process’; however, only two members of the NGC agreed with this critique on the self-assessment report. Besides this, while the government representative suggests that the NGC agreed on the adoption of the report, the Country Review Report actually notes that the ‘representative of the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces voted against the adoption of the Country Self Assessment Report while the representatives of the Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement Par-
ty, another opposition party in parliament, abstained from voting’ (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2011: 45).

The domestic APRM expert also added that, contrary to the statement of the government representative, the draft report was actually first reviewed by the “inner circle” of the NGC (the Focal Point and Chair of the NGC), who commented on the accuracy of the report. Some comments were made that in certain instances the situation on the ground was not reflected. The institute responded that these were the perceptions of groups on the ground, which could not be changed in the report. To counter this, it was suggested for the government to issue its own comments on some of the findings. Hence, the institute did not feel pressured to alter the content of the report, but dealt with criticism by including it therein. Moreover, the chairman of the council was quite cooperative and understanding. The final report was handed over to the government, which held public consultations on the APRM themes (with over 1,500 participants), of which insights were reflected in the final report and thereafter submitted to the APRM institutions alongside the draft NPoA (Interview with national APRM expert, 16 September 2015).

The NGC member provided more critical observations of these processes and noted that

The self-assessment was conducted in a somewhat routine and bureaucratic manner, with less attention given to actually learning from findings of the study. The focus was on making the outcomes of the assessment “look good”. The research was conducted out of need, rather than out of real interest to learn from the process, and as a result it was not conducted with full scrutiny. The research would have benefitted from more and better focus groups and/or consulting existing youth platforms (Interview with non-governmental member of National Governing Council, 29 July 2015).

The country review members also shared mixed reviews of the self-assessment process, with some respondents observing more positively that the self-assessment report had a multidisciplinary approach and interacted with a broad array of constituencies, while others were more critical of the process (Interviews on, 23 July 2015; 30 July 2015; 31 July
2015; 2 October 2015). The work of the research institute was also further complicated due to constraints in the research environment. In order to counter this and similar situations, the APRM has an in-house mechanism to deal with cases in which the self-assessment report does not adequately represent the situation on the ground, or when the governing council cannot operate independently. In these cases, the role of the review team becomes even more important for revealing the real story, and for the partner institution (such as the Economic Commission for Africa) to prepare its own background report on the situation in the country (Interview with member of APRM Secretariat, 28 July 2015).

The preparation of the self-assessment report was problematic as threats were made to withhold payment should the report not reflect matters deemed appropriate (Interview with continental APRM expert, 21 July 2015).

This brings to light another important aspect, namely the political context in which a review takes place and how this impacted the process in Ethiopia. Indeed, the APRM review does not take place within a vacuum, but often links to a past or upcoming election. Ideally, a review would take place 18 months after a government is elected and comes to conclusion a maximum of six months ahead of the next election. This minimises the risk of the review process focusing too much on the performance of the government. Ethiopia was not much different in that it considered the consequences of the 2005 elections when preparing for the APRM review. The self-assessment process was undertaken ahead of the 2010 elections, and there were serious concerns for the assessment not to bring up any surprises (Interviews with continental APRM expert, 21 July 2015; 31 July 2015).

The self-assessment was undertaken in a centralised, subtly controlled, manipulated and stage-managed manner, raising concerns about the validity and legitimacy of the findings (Interview with continental APRM expert, 31 July 2015).
The civil society actor made similar characterisations and observed that the government controlled the preparation of the self-assessment report. The government (through the Ministry of Capacity Building) was involved in several stages of the process (the household survey was conducted through Addis Ababa University, which was headed at that time by a member of the NGC). The actor noted that it is not clear who was consulted on what and which data was obtained. On different occasions, the civil society actor tried to obtain the basic research data, but to no avail (Interview with civil society actor, 1 September 2015).

Analysis

Since the self-assessment process is so complex, it may be expected to find different perspectives regarding its nature. The APR panel considered the review technically sound, and at face value Ethiopia seemed to have conducted an exemplary assessment process. However, different actors did note concerns about the level of government control over the process, but this seemed to be subtle, and, hence, difficult to put a finger on. One example is that the civil society actor mentioned the inability to succeed in obtaining sought primary data. In the previous section, it was also noted that the term “civil society” may have a different domestic connotation, such as comprising associations that are strongly linked to the government, and one could question whether the civil society representatives invited to participate in the assessment really were independent. The same applies to the household survey, which included youth respondents, but did not make clear how youth was to be defined. In addition, the survey was conducted at Addis Ababa University, but the university’s president also served on the NGC.

Moreover, it was also the inner circle of the governing council that supposedly first reviewed the self-assessment report, and the link between the self-assessment report and the NPoA is not clear, as these reports should have been produced and validated simultaneously. In these reports, it is possible to observe subtle control mechanisms that are not transparent on paper or even in the process, but become clear when critically examining the manner in which the assessment was conducted. The self-assessment and the number of citizen perspectives obtained
seemed to be technically sound, but it is not clear whether and how the more substantive and critical perspectives and voices were incorporated.

The external evaluation report also suggests that despite the elaborate process of establishing the self-assessment report, questions could be raised in relation to the selection process of individuals that participated in all the various research instruments. Furthermore, it is concerning that the government produced the NPoA without consultation of the NGC (Fisseha and Tadesse 2011: 16). Here, the role of the external review panel is further needed, as the members can capture those elusive perspectives while relying on the findings from the continental scoping assessment. The self-assessment process also seems somewhat to continue the narrative that emerged from the establishment of the NGC – that participatory structures and processes were in place, but not so subtly controlled.

4.3.3 Stage Two: Country review visit

Observations on the Country Review Mission

The official Country Review Mission took place from 31 August-17 September 2009, composed of 15 prominent African experts and led by Professor Adebayo Adekeye. The Country Review Report reveals that the Focal Point and the national secretariat facilitated the review mission. It started with a meeting with H.E. Mr. Addisu Legese, then-Deputy Prime Minister of Ethiopia, and a ceremonial handover of the Country Self-Assessment Report and the NPoA to the Head of Mission took place. During the review, the mission interacted with senior government officials and also with representatives of governance institutions. Besides this, the mission also interacted with non-state actors, such as private sector representatives, civil society organisations, women’s groups, and political parties. A few days thereafter (on 2 September 2009), the mission met with the NGC and also held sessions with the President of the Supreme Court, the High Court of Justice, the Constitutional Court, and the Judicial Service Commission. The mission met with ministers and with heads and representatives of 27 ministries, agencies, the National Electoral Board, the Human Rights Commission, the Ethics and Corruption Commission, as well as with the National Bank of Ethiopia. The mission moreover held sessions with different constituencies represent-
ing women, youth, trade unions, universities, civil society organisations, and the physically challenged. In addition, the mission interacted with the private sector, with political parties, and with the parliament. The mission continued its engagements with interactive sessions with stakeholders in Tigray, Oromia, Addis Ababa City Council, Dire Dewa, Harari, Gambella and Benishagul-Gumze. During these visits, the mission also made courtesy calls to district officials. These regional visits served the purpose of validating the Country Self-Assessment Report with stakeholders in the region and gauging their perspectives on governance. Finally, the mission conducted sessions with various key stakeholders, such as women’s groups, people with disabilities, the youth, academics, the media, faith-based organisations, small businesses, private sector actors, trade unions, and community-based organisations. The latter consultations were aimed at producing a comprehensive understanding of governance in Ethiopia. The review was concluded in mid-September, with a wrap-up session with late Prime Minister Melas Zenawi (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2011: 43-46).

The level of participation and interaction during the review mission is a critical aspect of the review. The Country Review Mission confirms the observations from the self-assessment, but more importantly also looks for constraints and best practices unaddressed in this report. Broad participation is the first step to securing this. In this regard, the country Review Mission team engaged with different stakeholders and submitted the final draft report to the government. This report was then discussed at the regional levels and at federal level, and culminated in the country response, which was annexed to the final review report (Interview with APRM government representative, 11 September 2015). Regarding the discussions in the governing council, respondents observed that it was rather difficult to incorporate more critical voices, raised for instance by some of the opposition parties (Interview with non-governmental member of National Governing Council, 29 July 2015).

The members of the mission gave different accounts of the process, on the one hand highlighting the frank discussions, but also government control over the process. The team divided itself and travelled to the various regions of Ethiopia, interacting with a broad array of constituencies, such as teachers, business leaders, NGOs, journalists and opposition
leaders. The team learned of critical concerns of the various groups and was informed on the aftermath of the 2005 elections and government scrutiny of civil society organisations. It was noted that the level of participation not only was high at both the federal and state levels, but also frank, open and critical, although there seemed to have been some degree of self-censorship, with a number of participants requesting individual meetings with Country Review Mission members outside of formal meetings. However, other members of the mission were more critical. For example, one member asserted that the process was not open enough, thereby compromising the representativeness of inputs (Interviews with member of Country Review Mission, 23 July 2015; 30 July 2016; 31 July 2015):

I would not say there was broad-based participation. Wherever we went, heavily armed police or soldiers escorted us. We were even forced to leave the country earlier than planned (Interview with member Country Review Mission, 2 October 2015).

The continental experts also used less kind words to describe the participatory and interactive dynamics of the review, with experts commenting that the process in Ethiopia was the most difficult and closed process of all review processes. There was a strong government oversight role during the entire APRM process. The low levels of civil society participation may have been due to the strict government control of the process and also as a result of the civil society law, which governs the operation of organisations within the field of democracy and governance. As a country that is arguably less versed with democratic governance principles, the law impacted on the ability to have an open space for and discussions on governance, and organisations were self-censoring. In this regard, the experts asserted that freedom of speech in Ethiopia exists nominally, but not practically (Interviews with continental APRM expert, 21 July 2015; 31 July 2015).

There was no independent civil society part of the process. Indeed, the process was skewed, as opposition parties, independent media and “uncivil” society were not engaged … The unique ideology of the ruling party does not see a place for independent civil society to provide input to poli-
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The engagement was artificial and superficial, formal, and not substantive (Interview with national APRM expert, 29 July 2015).

As such, it was observed that mass-based organisations\(^4\) (which the government refers to as civil society actors) were consulted in the review, but non-state actors in the true sense of the word were not involved in the process (Interview with civil society actor, 1 September 2015).

**Analysis**

The nature of the interactions during the review mission has been assessed quite differently, highlighting broad participation of different actors, but remaining unclear on the extent to which participants spoke freely. There seemed to have been some government control during the consultations, evident in, for example, escort parties comprised of government officials, the requests of participants of official meetings for separate side meetings (also included in the review report), and, according to one member, the need to leave the country early. This subtle form of control was picked up on and mentioned in the Country Review Report. Here it notes:

> The National Governing Commission printed only few copies of the historic self-assessment report. Stakeholders had to contend with duplicated summaries of the Country Self Assessment Report. This was frustrating not only to stakeholders but also to the Country Review Mission. Despite this constraint, the Country Review Mission team held an interactive session. The high level of representation at the consultative and interactive meetings is noteworthy. Commendably, all the stakeholder groups were very candid in their assessment of the governance challenges facing the country. At the prompting of the Country Review Mission, institutions such as the Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Body and United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF) made written submissions to the mission (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2011: 45).

The abovementioned observation suggests that the participatory spirit of the APRM processes was only nominal adhered to by the government.
4.3.4 Stage Three: Preparing the Country Review Report

Observations on the preparation of the Country Review Report

This stage is not documented in the Country Review Report, as it regards mainly internal processes such as the preparation of the draft country report and the finalisation of the NPoA by the government of Ethiopia. The respondents commented on the final Country Review Report and on whether they believed that this provided an adequate description of the state of affairs, or whether key issues had been excluded.

The government representative was unable to provide a characterisation of the report, but noted that all comments by the government had been appended to the report. One of the Country Review Mission members and a national APRM expert also referred to the official government response, observing that the government was not happy with some of the review findings; its critical comments were appended to the review report (Interviews with APRM government representative, 11 September 2015; with member of Country Review Mission, 30 July 2015; and with national APRM expert, 29 July 2015). Others agreed that the report provided an adequate description, observing that the report reflected the situation on the ground. The APRM Secretariat Officer was also more positive, asserting that the Country Review Report adequately articulated the best practices and challenges in the area of democracy and good governance (Interview with continental APRM Secretariat member, 28 July 2015; and with member of the Country Review Mission, 2 October 2015).

My understanding was that the Country Review Report, in general, and the Democracy and Political Governance chapter, in particular, reflected an adequate description and reflection of the state of affairs in the country at the time of the review (Interview with member of Country Review Mission, 31 July 2015).

However, some of the continental experts were more critical of the content of the report and felt that some issues were omitted. One expert explained that despite strong government control and oversight, the re-
port did indeed address major concerns related to democracy and governance. It is here where a deeper look into the actual report-writing may explain this contradiction. The report is not only informed by the inputs of constituencies as part of the self-assessment, but also by the background document prepared by the secretariat, which framed the broad issues and concerns. During the Country Review Mission, the independent experts also dug deeper and spoke to various constituencies. As they have no political affiliation with the government, they were only interested in preparing an independent input to the report. The panel is the last control mechanism, which as a result of its political status cannot be influenced by the government under review. However, in this regard, observations were made that relations between the lead panellist and the government actually were compromised. Here, the expert referred to the dynamics of the relationship between late Prime Minister Zenawi and lead panellist Professor Adedeji, and particularly to how the late Prime Minister allegedly attempted to build an alliance with the panel. Another expert was of the opinion that the report was quite comprehensive, critical, honest, and candid about the governance and democratic environment in Ethiopia. However, possibly issues linked to political freedoms were not adequately represented in the report (Interviews with continental APRM expert, 21 July 2015; 30 July 2015). The civil society actor was also quite critical in the assessment and asserted:

The current Democracy and Political Governance chapter reflects more the party ideology on democracy and governance. The APRM often has had predictive characteristics (in the sense that it can alert on issues that should be addressed earnestly), but this is not present in the Ethiopia APRM Country Report (Interview with civil society actor, 1 September 2015).

Following the review, the government of Ethiopia submitted the updated NPoA to the continental secretariat in early 2010. In this regard, the respondents also reflected on whether it provided an adequate policy strategy for concerns raised during the review. This was actually the crux of the entire review process, as the NPoA is a formal commitment of the government to address the concerns raised in the review. It is vital for all critical areas to be included and for these to be well-captured in various
interventions. The members of the country review were somewhat divided in their assessment of the adequacy of the NPoA – one member believed it addressed the main concerns, but other experts were more critical, observing that the NPoA was prepared to raise funds for the various activities abroad. Another expert asserted that this is the major weakness of the APRM, as it is too diplomatic and tends to skate around the issues. Another member raised a more general concern with the manner in which the NPoAs are prepared, as the NPoAs often do not reflect current national priorities. This was also the case in Ethiopia. Indeed, NPoAs should be harmonised with national developments plans and budgeted for accordingly. In this regard, it is important to include the parliament at an early stage of the review. This would address some of the unbudgeted NPoAs. Even if questions would then arise regarding the funding of the plans of action, this could then adequately be addressed by the parliament (Interviews with member of Country Review Mission, 23 July 2015; 30 July 2015; 31 July 2015; 2 October 2015).

The secretariat officer, as well as continental and national experts, was also more critical of this aspect of the process. In particular, the secretariat officer observed that

Not all concerns related to democracy and governance were incorporated in the NPoA, especially in relation to inclusiveness and representation of all ethnic groups of Ethiopia, which did not sit well with the government. As Professor Adeleji was no longer there when the report was being finalised, it was quite difficult to defend some of the stances taken in the report, and a long discussion with late Prime Minister Zenawi on the final report ensued (Interview with member of continental APRM Secretariat, 28 July 2015).

The national expert also highlighted that the government had a different perspective of the role of the NPoA, and explained that the draft self-assessment report provided indicators for recommendations and a framework for the development of the NPoA, which the government could have used. However, the expert noted that there seemed to be some misunderstanding regarding the nature of the NPoA, which the government interpreted as being part of the national development plan.
Hence, the first NPoA submitted to the APRM concerned a comprehensive action plan in preparation of the second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (the government thought of the NPoA as a long-term objective related to the implementation of this programme). The chair of the Panel refused to accept the NPoA and asked the government to prepare a plan based on the findings of the self-assessment. The government thereafter asked the ministries to come up with plans and indicators related to the APRM, which served as the basis of the final NPoA (Interview with national APRM expert, 16 September 2015).

Analysis

The reflection of the different actors on the process of preparing the final report and the NPoA is significant. Turning first to the final chapter on Democracy and Political Governance, some experts believed the content provided an adequate description, while others believed that more could have been included. In this regard, it is important to emphasise that the reference to the government commentary is particularly telling. More than likely, the government would not have had such strong critique of the content, had the review not brought out critical matters. In addition, the independent external evaluation report suggests that the government made considerable efforts to comment on the draft report (Fisseha and Tadesse 2011: 12). The government response is a six-page commentary note on the entire review, where detailed critique is given of the interpretation of the Country Review Mission on aspects related to the review. A few of the comments are included here:

There are no political asymmetries between the regional states. All the states have the same political and legal powers given to them by the constitution. Economic inequalities exist, however.

Party rules (such as democratic centralism) are designed to be applied within the party structure and not in government structures. This is alluded to in a number of paragraphs but is a wrong reading of the relationship between the party and the government institutions in the Ethiopian context.
The allegation that opposition supporters are discriminated against in some services is completely unfounded. All citizens get the services regardless of their political inclination.

There was no crackdown on peaceful protestors and demonstrators. It was part of a planned criminal act to overthrow the government by force.

Ethiopian laws do not require permission from government authorities to conduct public meetings as alleged by the opposition. All they require is notification to the authorities. The media is not intimidated by fear of prosecution. That this is so can be observed from a cursory glance of their content. Censorship is prohibited. If journalists are found to have breached the rules, there is no reason why they should not be brought to justice.

Implicit in many paragraphs is the assumption that the ruling party is not interested in strengthening democratic institutions, including the legislature and House of the Federation. This is a wrong understanding of the policies of the ruling party and the achievements of the Ethiopian government. Since assuming power, the ruling party has established many institutions whose purpose is to ensure the revitalisation of democratic culture and the prevalence of rule of law (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2011: 345-347).

A careful observation therefore could be that the suggested subtle control of the process did not result in an assessment the government was prepared to accept; as it could not change the content, it used its right to formally comment on the findings of the review.

The respondents furthermore noted some issues with the NPoA. Although this is a difficult aspect of the process, as emphasised by the mission members, there were further issues related to the preparation and content of the NPoA. In particular, the response of the national expert is quite striking, as it shows that there was a misunderstanding regarding the purpose of the NPoA. The independent external evaluation report
also picked up on this and stated that the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development prepared the report without consideration of the review process. The report reads:

Government departments (the ministries and some institutions like the Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, the Ombudsman and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission) who do work related to the four thematic areas were told to share their own plans of action for the coming years. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Development then assessed the contents of the action plans and compiled them (Fisseha and Tadesse 2011: 13).

The report suggests that the NPoA was prepared unilaterally, like other government plans. In this process, there was no consideration of feedback from the findings of the participatory processes of the APRM (Fisseha and Tadesse 2011: 13). Hence, there was a misunderstanding regarding the role of the NPoA. This was further aggravated by the absence of a link between the review process and NPoA content. This is another example of how the government controlled the domestic process and the interpretation of APRM principles within the Ethiopian context.

4.3.5 Stage Four: Peer review and presentation of report

Observations on the peer review process and report release

Ethiopia underwent a peer review at the 14th Summit of the APR Forum on 29 January 2011. Heads of state representing nine other countries were in attendance during this meeting, and ministers and heads of delegations represented other APRM countries (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2011: 349). Although the formal presentation and peer review discussion are closed to the public, a summary of the discussions is included in the Country Review Report, providing an understanding of the deliberations. After the lead panellist provided a summary of strengths, best practices and challenges, the late Prime Minister took the floor and made some critical observations. The Prime Minister asserted that the report did not describe the real situation on the ground. He then continued his intervention, noting that the APRM is an African mechanism established
to assess countries based on African principles and culture. He asserted that the mechanism was a response to the imposition of the neoliberal paradigm of economic development, which failed to bring about democratic change or economic growth. He asserted that this vicious cycle of poverty traps and underdevelopment could only be addressed by an activist state. Based on these beliefs, he wondered why the Country Review Report was so critical of the government, since it had intervened to address poverty traps alongside economic growth and democratic developments. He also noted that development is a political process that results in economic and social processes (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2011: 350-351).

Concluding his response, the Prime Minister said that the thematic areas of Democracy and Political Governance, and Economic Governance and Management of the report, were evaluated on the basis of the “rejected, bankrupt and dead” principles of World Bank, and not on the basis of the African principles (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2011: 351).

Analysis

The comments of the Prime Minister are insightful for many reasons. It shows a concrete example of how a state can counter the perceived dominant development and governance narrative. It also shows how a state can use that same language to perhaps defend undemocratic principles. It furthermore shows how, within the APRM, a head of state can suggest that the APRM review itself is still based on neoliberal considerations. It finally shows that a head of state can use this language to counter the validity of the mechanism and its findings, which is also very intriguing. The statements also validate the sentiments of various respondents, who noted that a tension existed between the report findings and what the government believed to be true (or what the government wanted to reflect about its practice to the outside world). It also reflects the tension that was present between the government and the Country Review Mission, and the tension between the participatory nature of the review process, in contrast to central development planning systems of the government. For instance, it explains how the NPoA became based on plans of different governance agencies rather than on the review outcomes.
Moreover, it is notable that the government chose to defend itself in this prime example of the complexities of inter-state disciplining, which is one of the pinnacles of the review process. Even more telling is the fact that although the country was reviewed in early 2011, the Country Review Report was only formally released two years later, in January 2013 and in the presence of current Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn.

4.3.6 The APRM process and developmentality

Within the APRM process, it is possible to discern the larger ideological battles related to governance and development that informed the initiation of the mechanism. For instance, various considerations informed Ethiopia’s accession to the APRM. These considerations particularly reflect the multifaceted aspect of the APRM as it operates within continental and international governance standards. One the one hand, motivations were related to the NEPAD development agenda, but on the other hand, it was also a way in which to show peers and other partners that Ethiopia is committed to strengthening democracy and political governance, as well as to other important themes related to the review. While the motivation of Ethiopia to accede to the mechanism could be viewed as political commitment to the review process, this did not necessarily translate into practice.

Indeed, where the APRM process envisions a country-led self-assessment process, the review of Ethiopia could be better characterised as a government-led process. This is reflected in the manner in which the national structures were set up, the manner in which the NPoA was prepared, as well as the government-attempted control of the external country review. This can best be characterised as nominal adherence, meaning that the process was technically observed and followed, but did not adhere to the spirit of the process. In spite of this, the report provided a critical reflection of democratic and governance aspects that could be further strengthened; moreover, it elicited an extensive critique of the government.
A critical aspect of the APRM is its participatory dynamics, which are reflected in the role and composition of the NGC, in the manner in which the self-assessment is produced, and in the interactions with the external country review team. An important vehicle for securing this is by mandating citizen engagement throughout almost the entire process. However, Ethiopia’s APRM review was mostly a government-controlled process. The review principles clashed with the perspectives of the government on what constitutes civil society (i.e. mass-based organisations) and what role these organisations have in governance. Here it is possible to discern an indication of weak intra-state disciplining of the mechanism’s principles, as the government interpreted citizen participation within its own established frameworks of these engagements and more or less rejected alternative conceptualisations as presented within the APRM.

The inter-state disciplining of the APRM reached its apex at the Heads of State Forum Meeting. However, this is exactly the moment when late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi resisted and rejected the assessment as it pertained to democracy and political governance, and even questioned the basis of the assessment (as reflecting neoliberal mentalities). His comment was fuelled by the content of the assessment and the rationalisation of ideas and recommendations proposed by the Panel. This subtle battle of ideologies also played out in the dynamics between the Panel and the government, between the assessment criteria and final report writing, as well as in relation to the preparation of the NPoA and particularly how it sits with national development planning and implementation policies.

These dynamics seem to indicate that there had been only nominal adherence to the principles of the review. This could be explained as a case of inadequate application of the review principles, but it could also be indicative of other considerations. For instance, Ethiopia’s accession to the APRM and its implementation of the review process may also be explained as a way of strengthening the external legitimacy of the government. The review seemed to the government to be the appropriate thing to do and “looked good” to internal and external actors. Indeed, by submitting the country to such a delicate review, it rebrands the government as one committed to the vision and principles that founded the
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APRM (Schwak 2016: 428). Moreover, the government’s wish to strengthen democracy and political governance (nominally) could also be considered as a response to the overall normalisation of good governance through which good governance is no longer perceived as a norm, but as natural and necessary (Taylor 2009: 52). These considerations also influence the dynamics between African countries, which may respond collectively to the normalisation of good governance by enacting processes that are deemed “legitimate” and appropriate, for instance by pushing for African standards on governance. These inform the nature of the peer pressures exerted during the APR Forum meetings, where leaders persuaded Ethiopia to commit to the outcomes of the review, resulting in collective ‘isomorphic transformation’ (Frumkin and Galaskiewicz 2004: 285-286, DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 150). These dynamics seem to indicate that there are more considerations that inform the application of the APRM.

By way of summarising these reflections regarding the APRM process in Ethiopia, it is possible to expand theoretical proposition 2b as follows:

2g: The APRM is a voluntary monitoring mechanism that assesses adherence to African governance norms and generates knowledge on policies and practices of African countries;

2h: Voluntary accession to the APRM is an indicator of political commitment to African governance norms;

2i: The APRM process monitors adherence to African governance norms, but this does not necessarily translate into adherence to the review’s principles (i.e. government control of the process); as a result, the intra-state discipline of the mechanism could be considered weak;

2j: The APRM review generates knowledge on policies and practices, but this does necessarily translate into the acceptance of its standards (i.e. resistance of the government by dismissing review findings); as a result, the inter-state discipline of the mechanism could be considered weak;

2k: It could be suggested that the APRM process responds to the global normalisation of good governance, as indicated by a wish to “brand” and collectively pursue democracy and political governance on the continent.
4.4 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the application of the CPIA and APRM assessments. It focused on answering the question: how have CPIA and APRM assessment processes been conducted in Ethiopia? The findings suggest that CPIA processes followed the process description as set forth in the technical guiding documents, with the exception being the government consultations on the draft score. While at times the rating was complicated due to the difficulties between governance reform commitments and implementation, the overall process reflected a standardised and routine assessment of Ethiopia’s performance in the areas of public sector management and institutions. The standardised nature of the process meant that the occurrence of disagreements over ratings was pre-empted within the design, and procedures were developed to address this. In this regard, it is possible to view the CPIA as a surveillance mechanism that monitors Ethiopia’s conduct by assessing (non-)adherence to standards regarding public sector management and institutions. These standards are conceptualised as norms and establishes for Ethiopia what is considered an appropriate and, as such, “normal” governance framework. The process comes together by the Bank informing the government of Ethiopia on its CPIA score and how this informs their IDA allocation. While this is meant to make the government take responsibility for its performance, the government actually declined engaging with the Bank on the rating process. This process is further complicated by the suggestion that the Bank’s ratings are path dependent, meaning that upward or downward ratings of Ethiopia are discouraged due to the financial consequences accompanying this decision. This limits the manner in which the Bank can discipline and push for norm adherence in relation to its governance standards.

In contrast to the CPIA process, the APRM review did not take place according to the process description as set forth in the technical guiding documents. Ethiopia’s review process was less participatory, more government-controlled, and less harmonious than envisioned within the APRM principles. This can best be characterised as nominal adherence, meaning that the process was technically observed and followed, but did
not adhere to the spirit of the process. On the other hand, and possibly against the odds, the review did result in a critical assessment of the state of democracy and political governance in Ethiopia and solicited a fair amount of critique from the government. While Ethiopia’s voluntary accession to the APRM signalled political commitment to the mechanism, this did not translate into adherence to the review’s principles. Similarly, while the report generated knowledge on the state of democracy and political governance and indicated areas of improvement, this did not translate into acceptance of the findings by the government. This suggests that the inter- and intra-disciplining function of the APRM is limited. It also suggests that this nominal application of the review could be indicative of a different dynamic, namely that by going through the APRM process, Ethiopia is able to externally and internally brand itself as a country that is committed to political governance. This approach is based less on an internal conviction that pursuing political governance is important, but responds more to the global normalisation of good governance and continental pressures to adhere to this norm.

Notes

1 The framework (PEFA) assesses and reports on public financial management performance and identifies strengths and weaknesses.
2 The IDA country allocations for the Fiscal Year 2014 were 843 Special Drawing Rights (SDR) million (international reserve asset) (IDA 2014: 3).
3 Ethiopia has nine regional states and two chartered cities. The regions are further divided into 68 zones, which are further divided into woredas (districts), and then again further divided into kebeles (municipalities), comprising the lowest level of administration.
4 These concern organisations that align with the government, such as youth and women groups.
5 Outcomes of the CPIA and APRM in Ethiopia

5.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the outcomes of the CPIA and APRM assessments. It focuses on answering the following research question: how have CPIA and APRM applications influenced the promotion of related governance standards in Ethiopia? The main aim of the analysis is to investigate the outcomes of the assessment processes, and principally to understand how they have promoted their governance standards. The analysis is based on the observations of respondents involved in preparing the respective assessments, complemented by a document analysis of the documented outcomes. In the case of the CPIA, it presents evidence on the CPIA ratings and IDA commitments, and places this in the context of the outcomes as narrated in the Country Partnership Strategy, the Bank’s strategic framework for its operations in Ethiopia. In the case of the APRM, it presents evidence on the outcomes of the assessment by focusing on the release of the Country Review Report, the implementation of the NPoA, and the two main drivers of government commitment to governance standards in the review process, namely horizontal peer pressure and vertical civil society monitoring. The outcomes of the CPIA and APRM in Ethiopia are analysed through the analytical lens of developmentality (including relevant concepts taken from the governmentality framework), and is further supported by the theoretical propositions that guide the explanation of relevant dynamics.
5.2 Outcomes of the CPIA in Ethiopia

5.2.1 CPIA ratings and IDA allocations

Observations from the document analysis on the CPIA outcomes

The CPIA assessment culminates from the preparation of individual ratings for each of the five indicators covered under Cluster D (Public Sector Management and Institutions), which firstly feeds into an overall average rating for Cluster D, and then into an overall average rating for Clusters A-D together, which is officially called the IDA Resource Allocation Index (and more informally the CPIA score). In 2014, Ethiopia ranked 11th out of the 37 regional (African) IDA recipient countries, and with an overall IDA resource allocation index score of 3.5 was above the Sub-Saharan Africa regional average of 3.2 (World Bank 2015: 6). The 0.1 increase between 2013 and 2014 is attributed to improved financial management scores, which are covered under Cluster D. Although the grounds for increased and decreased scores are not publicly available, the annual Africa CPIA Report does provide a small glimpse into the reasons for differences in scores. The report explains that Ethiopia enhanced its auditing reporting, noting that at the federal level the auditing coverage was 100% and that reports were submitted in a timely manner. Moreover, the 2013 World Bank Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Assessment, which reviews capacity and provides reform guidance, reported a reduction in the deviation of actuals from the budget (World Bank 2015: 32-33).

Where the CPIA provides an assessment of the institutions and policy environment of aid recipients, the Bank’s strategic framework also provides a guide to the focus areas of IDA support. In this regard, the 2013-2016 World Bank Country Partnership Strategy sets forth the IDA programme for Ethiopia. The Country Partnership Strategy focuses on supporting good governance and state-building efforts by focusing on ‘improving public service performance management and responsiveness; enhancing space for citizen participation in the development process; and enhancing public financial management, procurement, transparency and accountability’ (World Bank 2012: 42). The strategy hails various efforts made by the Ethiopian government in the area of governance, particularly efforts aimed at decentralising authority and improving service delivery, public financial management reforms, on-going fiscal decentral-
isation, public sector reform, the strengthening of legislative and regulatory frameworks, and anti-corruption measures (World Bank 2012: 7–8).

Hence, the CPIA score provides an assessment of institutions and policies, and the Country Partnership Strategy sheds light on the overall framework for the support of Bank operations in Ethiopia. What remains thereafter is the translation of the CPIA score to IDA resource allocation, which guides on the financial scope of the strategy. Figure 5.1 presents information on the CPIA Cluster D score, the IDA Resource Allocation Index (CPIA average for all four clusters), and the IDA Country Performance Rating informing the IDA allocation (calculated through the application to the CPIA of the formula described in Section 3.2.2). The IDA Country Performance Rating is only available from 2006 onwards.

Figure 5.1
Ethiopia Cluster D score, IDA Resource Allocation Index, and IDA Country Performance Rating

Source: Author’s own compilation of data from the World Bank and IDA websites (World Bank 2016c, IDA 2016).
In order to provide insight into IDA allocation dynamics and, particularly, the distribution of funds, the analysis relies on data pertaining to IDA commitments and grants. Commitments refer to ‘the sum of new commitments on public and publicly guaranteed loans’ from the IDA, whereas ‘[g]rants’ are net disbursements of grants from the IDA (World Bank 2016c). Instead of comparing the data on commitments and grants, the aim rather is to show how the IDA allocation mechanism influences both these sources of finance for developing countries. Figure 5.2 presents information on the Country Performance Rating (on the right axis, ranging between 3.2 and 3.5), and IDA commitments and allocated grants (on the left axis in US$).

**Figure 5.2**

*Ethiopia IDA Grants, IDA Commitments, and Country Performance Rating*

The relationship between the IDA Country Performance Rating and IDA grants is further described in the Country Partnership Strategy. Regarding this relationship, the strategy notes the following:
Although over the past few years Ethiopia’s CPR has been relatively stable (e.g., between 3.35 in 2006 to 3.37 in 2011), its provisional IDA16 allocation of US$3.38 billion (e.g., US$1.1bn per year) is close to 28 percent higher than IDA15 allocation due to the increased overall size of IDA16. The Country Partnership Strategy will span the last two years of IDA16 (FY13-14) and the first two years of IDA17 (FY15-16). In FY12 Ethiopia’s new commitments amounted to US$1.12 billion. The lending program for the first two years of Country Partnership Strategy (FY13-14) has been designed with a buffer of about 19 percent (US$1.5bn in FY13 and US$1.2bn in FY14). Given that the IDA allocation for the two outer years of the Country Partnership Strategy (FY15-16) is not available, the Country Partnership Strategy program is indicative and will be reconfirmed based on the IDA17 allocation and discussions with the Government (World Bank 2012: 44-45).

The translation of the Country Performance Rating to IDA commitments is described above. In particular, it shows that in spite of the relatively stable Country Performance Rating (3.35 in 2006 to 3.37 in 2011), the allocation was relatively higher. Also, the forthcoming commitments depend (besides on the future performance rating) on a host of external factors, such as the overall size of the IDA commitments, the terms of IDA assistance to the country based on the debt sustainability position, multilateral debt relief and redistribution, performance and assistance terms of other IDA borrowers, and the number of IDA eligible countries (World Bank 2012: 44).

Based on this, a number of observations can be made. Ethiopia has witnessed improvements in Cluster D. In addition, despite relatively stable country performance ratings, the provisional IDA allocations rose as a result of an overall increase of the IDA pool of IDA16 (FY12-14); moreover, the final annual allocation depends on a multitude of factors, of which the CPIA score is only one.
5.2.2 Outcomes of the Public Sector Management and Institutions Assessment

*Observations from the interviews on CPIA outcomes*

The functional objective of the CPIA is to inform the aforementioned IDA allocations, but its design also has the strong normative objective of disciplining adherence to its standards. These standards are operationalised through CPIA indicators and source guidelines. However, since the CPIA does not release the justification for the annual ratings, nor provides very detailed information on motivations for increased or decreased scores in the annual CPIA reports, a query regarding this was posed in interviews with participating World Bank officers. Through their involvement in the rating process they could provide valuable insights regarding the more normative outcomes of the CPIA, such as whether it informs government decisions to adhere to and adopt some of the prescribed principles as a result of the annual review.

It is to be noted that minor changes have occurred in the overall CPIA score of Ethiopia. This may be attributable to the CPIA rating being a composite of different indicators. In the case of Ethiopia, this means that changes have occurred in the individual criteria scores, but because these often balance each other out, the overall score was impacted only slightly. This changed in 2014 when the overall CPIA score increased from 3.4 to 3.5 between 2013 and 2014. However, it is notable that the CPIA scores and their underlying indicators actually cannot be compared on a longitudinal basis, as indicators’ and scores’ definitions are adjusted on an annual basis. Hence, in actual fact the increased score (to 3.5 in 2014) reflected the improved performance of Ethiopia in comparison to regional IDA recipients for that year (Interviews with World Bank officer, 16 July 2015; 17 September 2015).

Almost all of the officers were of the opinion that the improved performance of Ethiopia was not as a result of the CPIA rating process. According to some of the officers, the government actually was aware that increased CPIA scores could result in an increased IDA allocation (Interviews with World Bank officer, 16 July 2015; 17 September 2015). However, this knowledge did not provide an incentive for the government to adopt the standards of the CPIA. Several reasons for this have
been cited. Firstly, it was commonly understood that the government has a clear development agenda underscored by an emphasis on prudent financial management, but not because it is an assessment criterion of the CPIA (Interviews with World Bank officer, 4 August 2015; 16 July 2015). Secondly, the officers asserted that the relation between performance and CPIA scores is not strong enough, thereby marginalising its impact. Indeed, some of the officers asserted that Ethiopia’s CPIA rating should be higher considering its performance, but that adjusting the rating (in comparison to the previous year) is discouraged (Interviews with World Bank officer, 16 July 2015; 21 July (a) 2015). Thirdly, an important project management component affects the IDA allocations. The IDA funds are allocated and also reallocated on an annual basis following the basic parameters of IDA, but adds on a different set of criteria related to the ability of governments to absorb finances and expend accordingly (Interview with World Bank officer, 16 July 2015). As the officer explained:

… if a country has in the previous year not spent allocated IDA funds, it will impact the reallocation of the following year. As the Ethiopian government “front loads”, with expenditure 30% above the annual IDA allocation, it benefits from the annual reallocation, accessing funds from countries that have less capacity to absorb and spend funds. The government pays particular attention to its ability to absorb and implement projects, thereby benefitting from funds that theoretically could have gone to another country, for example, a country with perhaps more positive parameters. As the country is populous, and with a relative low GNI and stable CPIA score, the Ethiopian government has seen its IDA allocations increase over the years (Interview with World Bank officer, 16 July 2015).

Within the Bank there is a perverse incentive to disburse cash, as this is part of the internal project management mechanisms. Hence, a harmony is created whereby governments just meet conditionality criteria and funds are then disbursed (Interview with World Bank officer, 4 August 2015).

This suggests that the government’s ability to absorb funds – which is also reflected in its ability to implement IDA projects and programmes – allows it to benefit from the full scale of flexibility arrangements within
the IDA project. This is a paradox in the sense that the score of Cluster D is assessed within the CPIA, but that one of its key criteria, namely effective public management, also impacts the ability of the government to utilise the IDA flexibility arrangements to their fullest capacity. As a result, the government can benefit from annual reallocations of (amongst others) underutilised funds, as it outperforms other countries by front loading funds and effectively utilising these. Hence, on the one hand, the Bank’s partnerships strategy states that IDA allocations can increase for a multitude of reasons, of which the CPIA scores is only one. On the other hand, the World Bank officers explained that the CPIA score does not fully represent actual performance levels, and that effective fund management is an important aspect of IDA allocation processes. In addition, the officers suggested that the government actually has understood the allocation processes quite well by front loading IDA allocations and benefiting from reallocations based on the IDA’s flexible arrangements. All of this suggests that the CPIA process in Ethiopia has not resulted in improving governance by means of linking the assessment process to accessing IDA concessional lending.

Analysis

A recent study on the ability of the CPIA to provide incentives through the assessment process suggests something similar in the case of Ethiopia. The study analyses the discontent of donors with the manner in which the government handled the post-2005 election turmoil, which informed the decision of donors to move away from direct budget support. However, and surprisingly, IDA funding actually increased in the same period (2005-2008) – from US$449.9 million to US$634.5 million. From this the authors conclude that the CPIA does not signal incentives to aid recipients to adhere to its standards as, in fact, this specific period should have seen decreased Cluster D scores and annual IDA allocations (Sending and Lie 2015: 1001). Indeed, Cluster D scores actually rose from 3.1 in 2005 to 3.3 in 2006 and remained at this level until 2008. Moreover, also in this study the authors note that the strengthening of macroeconomic frameworks was due to ‘the own initiative of the government’ (Sending and Lie 2015: 1002). To be sure, the interviews the authors conducted with the government and donor representatives suggest that the government would not alter its development policies to accommodate donor prescriptions. It would rather opt out and risk losing
development assistance as result of this decision (Ibid). The study also suggests that the lack of a strong link between CPIA scores and IDA allocations, as well the difference between what the CPIA prescribes and the content of government policy, suggests that the CPIA is not authoritative (Sending and Lie 2015: 1003).

Similarly, Borchgrevink (2008) examines the relation between Ethiopia and the international donor community and finds that although the donors have applied different policies towards Ethiopia, none of these have had much impact in terms of influencing Ethiopian policies. This is due to both the inability of donors to follow coherent and coordinated strategies, and the strategies employed by the government to resist imposition (p. 195). The author also refers to the turbulent post-2005 election period and the grave concerns of donors regarding the consequent instability. In December of that year, the budget support donors, including the World Bank, the European Commission, the African Development Bank, and the bilateral support agencies of the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany and Sweden, planned to withhold US$375 million, an amount which would equal to over 20% of the total aid received in 2004. In addition, in early 2006 the Development Assistance Group (a forum of 29 bilateral and multilateral donors to Ethiopia) prepared a joint strategy on how to address the situation in a coordinated way, with the aim of following through with political conditionality. However, it became clear that aid was actually not reduced, but reallocated to programmes with stricter earmarking and monitoring procedures. In addition, in February 2006 the second United Nations Development Assistance Framework was signed, with development projects valued at US$1 billion by 2010 (Borchgrevink 2008: 210-212). Furthermore, in March of that same year, the World Bank announced its pledge of US$1.278 billion in debt relief to Ethiopia and the cancellation in June of debt amounting to a further US$2.337 billion. The United Kingdom announced its intent to double its aid to Ethiopia by the 2007–2008 financial year, as compared to the 2004-2005 period. Hence, despite the harsh stance taken by the donor community, in reality aid remained stable and even increased from US$1.910 million in 2005 to US$1.947 million in 2006. Based on this, the author can assert that donors that moved aid to the earmarked programmes did so to continue development operations, to continue engagement with the government, and as a way to enter into and remain in
dialogue with the government on governance. This engagement policy can be understood as a way of creating a space to influence and persuade the government to engage or disengage certain behaviour (Borchgrevink 2008: 212-213).

On the other hand, Ethiopia has been able to manage its relations in a way that limits the influence on its development programmes, and has been willing to take tougher stances within the donor community (Borchgrevink 2008: 217). To be sure, the Ethiopian government has a relative level of autonomy concerning its engagements with donors. This autonomy may be explained by the fact that Ethiopia was never colonised and consequently had a state apparatus in place before engaging with donors. The exchanges with donors are hence viewed as taking place on equal footing, both in the past and present. This is further supported by the confidence the government has in its own development agenda, its entitlements, and its position in relation to the international donor community (Furtado and Smith 2007: 1). While the government is dependent on aid, it has only accepted policy prescriptions of the Bank that fit its own development agenda, and rejecting others. ‘It has largely succeeded in controlling the pace and degree of reform’ (Fraser and Whitfield 2008: 9). The negotiating power of Ethiopia could be explained as due the presence of ‘professional civil services, capable state institutions, strong planning institutions and centralized aid management systems’ (Fraser and Whitfield 2008: 12). This is further supported by the long-held tradition of strengthening the public order and modern bureaucracy. Not only did this provide the space to pursue a domestic development vision, it also gave the government credibility as it pursued this vision with relative low levels of corruption and an effective public service (Fraser and Whitfield 2008: 12). Finally, the translation of a development vision into a coherent strategy allows the government to defend its policies and argue against donor policies it does not deem appropriate (Fraser and Whitfield 2008: 19). More specific strategies the government has adopted entail:

… holding policy dialogues with donors at central level while decisions on spending are made at lower levels; splitting up dialogues into separate forums on narrow themes and thereby avoiding discussion on overarching issues; having an authority structure where decisions are made within the
party and not in the ministries that participate in dialogues; separating donors in different dialogue forums; balancing traditional donors with new sources of funding, such as China, to reduce dependence; and resisting foreign-funded technical assistance (Furtado and Smith 2008 as cited in Borchgrevink 2008: 216).

These studies point to two overall observations. Firstly, the strict application of selectivity by increasing aid to good performers and reducing aid to poor performers is more complicated in practice than it appears. Secondly, the government of Ethiopia has been able to manage its relationship with the donor community in such a way that donors have had limited influence on its development programme and vision. These observations further can be placed in context by linking aid dependency dynamics to the concept of regime survival. In this regard, the threat of aid withdrawal (as was the case in 2005 when the donors were not pleased with the manner in which the government handled the post-election processes) did not actually make the government comply with donors’ wishes. On the one hand, this may be explained by the dependency of the regime on (aid) resources (Hassan 2013: 1), which significantly raised the political stakes of the threat made by donors to levels that were unacceptable to the government. On the other hand, it would also have been politically very risky for the government to comply with the donors’ wishes (as it would have meant that the government would, for instance, not use force to secure its domestic political position) (Borchgrevink 2008: 217). These observations also seem to hold true in the case of the CPIA in Ethiopia. Here, it is possible to see that the CPIA standards have had a limited influence on government policies, and the government has been able to “manage” the IDA allocation dynamics by focusing on fund absorption as reflected in the internal allocation dynamics within the IDA.

### 5.2.3 CPIA adoption of standards and developmentality

This section analysed the outcomes and overall influence of the CPIA assessment process, and particularly gauged how CPIA scores inform the size of IDA concessional finance and thereby disciplines Ethiopia to adopt the prescriptive policies it promotes. The analysis showed that the
World Bank uses the CPIA score as a form of knowledge and disciplines aid recipients – based on reward and punishment through IDA development finance – on the appropriate norms regarding public sector management and institutions. This form of disciplining is not geared towards creating obedience, but rather is focused on making aid recipients responsible for their performance, resulting in the “willing” adoption of the appropriate governance framework (Dean 1999: 19-20 as cited in Löwenheim 2008: 258-259). This furthermore produces a hierarchical relation between the Bank and aid recipients, as it for instance constructs Ethiopia as in need of good governance, which further legitimises the governance norms put forth in the CPIA (Abrahamsen 2000: ix-x).

However, the case of Ethiopia shows that the translation between knowledge and power is not made effectively. Indeed, two critical observations were made in the analysis – that despite relative stable country performance ratings, the provisional IDA allocations to Ethiopia could nevertheless rise, and that a multitude of other factors inform IDA concessional grant allocations; these comprise both internal grant administrative processes (guiding principles of annual reallocations) and external processes that influence the overall size of the IDA pool. This means that the coercive pressures exerted through the CPIA process are inadequate in providing the necessary (dis)incentives to engage in particular behaviour (Stokke 1995: 11-12). Here, a paradox seemingly exists, as the government of Ethiopia has understood that the administrative logic of IDA grant administration processes – defines, but also works against its principal source of power. The government has used this knowledge in its engagements with the Bank. Instead of considering adopting the governance standards promoted in the CPIA, Ethiopia resorts to its own overall strategic vision for national development. In this vision of developmental states, planning and the principles of sound public financial management are strongly emphasised. Moreover, rather than adhering or succumbing to external pressures to exercise self-governance, the focus on public financial management and the absorption of funds has been central to the ability of the government to spearhead its national development endeavours. The paradox is that the CPIA assesses these capacities within the content of the rating, but also again as a criterion in the subsequent allocation and reallocation processes. As a country that has become adept in “managing” donors, it has been able to engage with the
policies that the CPIA promotes (good public sector management and institutions) within the context of the overall strategic vision of its national development agenda.

The case of Ethiopia suggests that the government has been able to manage the impacts of CPIA processes – what initially seemed like a powerful tool of coercion – by engaging with the inherent logic on which the assessment is based, namely that aid is more effective in countries with sound institutions and policies. What emerges is the suggestion that Ethiopia is not being “ruled” indirectly by donors because the CPIA assessment is ineffective in influencing the behaviour of the state (Lie 2015a: 242). Rather, the mechanisms of coercion (access to IDA allocations) can be managed by focusing on the administrative processes that inform the allocation. This means that the productive power of the CPIA is ineffective in shaping Ethiopia’s conduct (Abrahamsen 2004: 1463).

By way of summarising these reflections regarding the outcomes of the CPIA process in Ethiopia, it is possible to expand theoretical propositions 3a and 3b as follows:

3a: The translation of knowledge to power over the aid recipient is ineffective, as the Bank does not make the appropriate connection between norms, performance, and punishment/reward. The CPIA is only one of several factors determining final IDA country allocations. As a result, the CPIA process does not discipline Ethiopia to adhere to its policy standards by engendering self-optimisation; and

3b: Ethiopia is adept in “managing” its engagements with donors and has been able to resist adopting governance standards it does not deem appropriate. This level of autonomy is also grounded in the presence of proper structures of financial management, which paradoxically positively influence the ability of Ethiopia to benefit from annual IDA reallocations.
5.3 Outcomes of the APRM in Ethiopia

5.3.1 Political commitment to implementing the APRM findings

Observations from interviews on the APRM outcomes

Ethiopia underwent its peer review during the 14th Summit of the APR Forum on 29 January 2011. However, the Peer Review Report was only launched in January 2013, two full years later, in the presence of the current Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn. This begs the question of what happened in this period to delay the report’s launch. The external review report describes some of the immediate steps taken by the government following the completion of the review in 2010. The report notes that the NGC was dissolved following the completion of the self-assessment and that no meetings were conducted following the completion of the Country Review Mission; the office of the NGC Secretariat also discontinued its activities by June 2010. The regulation enacted by the government to manage the APRM processes was formally repealed in August 2010, and the rights and obligations were transferred from the NGC Secretariat to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (Fisseha and Tadesse 2011: 10). At the time of the writing of that report, no action had been taken to establish offices or personnel for these tasks, and according to their research, the officials of the Ministry were unaware of the responsibilities that were transferred to them (Fisseha and Tadesse 2011: 19).

During the official launch of the report in 2013, the Prime Minister made the following remarks:

Ethiopia highly values the report, as it would be used as a reference material in designing future plans of the country to improve governance and to address identified deficiencies in the thematic areas studied … Together with the National Plan of Action that Ethiopia prepared, it has a good information base to track progress and chart the road ahead for good governance … Ethiopia joined the APRM out of deep conviction, as the peer review is good for Africa as a whole (Rajaonary 2013).

The NPoA describes the priorities and commitments the government made to address the challenges reported in the Country Self Assessment
Chapter 5

Report and the Country Review Report. The government committed an estimated ‘USD 27.581 billion over a five-year period from 2010 to 2015’, of which US$5.2 billion (19%) was allocated to strengthening democracy and political governance\(^4\) (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2011: 290). The Programme of Action describes specific actions for each of the thematic areas reviewed, and actions for crosscutting issues identified in the report (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2011: 290). The NPoA is coordinated and regularly monitored and evaluated by the House of Peoples Representatives (the parliament), the government Cabinet, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, and grassroots level institutions (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2011: 294-295).

As the NPoA is presented as a logical framework, it is more difficult to provide a summary of its content regarding democracy and political governance. To give an indication, however, it can be revealed that the NPoA contains a commitment to ‘enhance the adoption of international and regional standards and codes’ and lists the various treaties to be signed and ratified, as well as other, related activities such as civic education (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2011: 297-298). Thereafter it provides a detailed list of actions for each of the nine sub-objectives under the theme “Democracy and Political Governance”. It includes specific and very detailed objectives and describes the required specific actions, monitoring indicators, means of verification, on-going initiatives, the agency responsible for implementation, as well as relevant stakeholders engaged in this subject. Moreover, it presents a timeline of action (include a baseline, a plan, and targets within the implementation period) and outlines the expected outputs, estimate costs, and particular monitoring and evaluation arrangements (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2011: 297).

However, since the release of the Country Review Report, Ethiopia has not presented any progress report related to the implementation of the NPoA. It can be noted that member states are not obliged to publicly release these reports, as they only need to be submitted to the secretariat; however, there is no indication that this was done. In the interviews with APRM respondents, this issue was raised, alongside questions regarding the possible motivation for holding off on the report release, since this could be indicative of low political commitment to the process and
NPoA implementation. In this regard, the government representative explained that due to the change of leadership of the government and the minister responsible for the APRM process, the processes were not properly followed up on. He noted that the governing council could have played a role in taking initiative to request the progress report from the government, and that the APRM institutions could have brought this matter to the government’s attention. However, he also noted that this does not mean that no work has been done, only that it has not been reported. In this regard, the government representative believed that annual reporting might be too frequent to assess progress, unless, of course, implementation regards the enactment of legislation (Interview with APRM government representative, 11 September 2015). Issues related to the change of leadership were also touted by other respondents (Interviews with member of Country Review Mission, 31 July 2015; with continental APRM Secretariat member, 28 July 2015; and with national APRM expert, 16 September 2015).

However, the most common explanation provided by the other respondents is the suggestion that the government and, particularly, the late Prime Minister was not pleased with the content of the report (Interviews with non-governmental member of National Governing Council, 29 July 2015; with member of Country Review Mission, 23 July 2015; with continental APRM Secretariat member, 28 July 2015; and with continental APRM expert, 21 July 2015). But other, more political dynamics also may have impacted these processes. For instance, one of the Country Review Mission members shared that the relation between the Panel and the government of Ethiopia deteriorated after the finalisation of the process. Supposedly, the relation between the late Prime Minister and then-Lead Panellist Prof. Adebayo Adedeji was tense, as was that between the APRM Focal Point of the government and the Panel (Interview with member of Country Review Mission, 23 July 2015). Another respondent stated that:

The report launch was delayed, as the government was uncomfortable with the tone and findings of the report, and readily aware that reviews may have negative consequences. As the government is more closed off, there is a certain discomfort with exposing itself to an external review. Also, the government may have feared that the APRM report could possibly
cast any negative shadow on the 2010 election outcome. Hence, the delayed release is a clever, sophisticated and subtle manner in which to manage the consequences of the actual findings. Regrettably, this does not show strong government commitment to the spirit of the APRM (Interview with continental APRM expert, 31 July 2015).

A related issue concerns the lack of institutional platform of the APRM within the government. Indeed, it seems that the lack of ownership of the report created a leadership vacuum to proceed with the report launch and implementation (Interview with civil society actor, 1 September 2015).

**Analysis**

Various explanations are proposed for the delay in releasing the Ethiopian Country Review Report, including the discontent of the government with the critical nature of the report, the fact that the responsibility for APRM implementation was not allocated to an office, as well as the deteriorating relationship between the late Prime Minister and then-Lead Panellist, and between the APRM Focal Point and the Panel. It seems that the report release delay marked a key site of resistance for the government and also particularly indicated a space where the role of the Panel to support APRM processes clashed with the position of the government. Here, the government had the power simply to refrain from releasing the report as a strategy to counter the report’s critical content. It allowed the government to manage its external legitimacy, albeit for a short period, with its African peers and international stakeholders. This would suggest that the government was unafraid of burning bridges where it deemed fit, especially when it came to the Panel.

The government representative also noted that an annual progress report might not have been feasible in the context of the long-term structural engagements in the areas of democracy and good governance. In addition, just because progress reports have not been prepared, this does not mean that no work has been done. This again shows how the government was able to manage the outcomes of the process by co-opting the report within the overall responsibility of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, but seemingly without assigning an office or
agency to its implementation. On the one hand this is good, as the NPoA was never meant to be a standalone exercise, and should find its place within the national development planning structures. On the other hand, however, the lack of a clear indication regarding committed activities (e.g. through progress reporting) allows the government to basically ignore the NPoA, its findings, and to stick to the original course of action in the areas of democracy and political governance. In this regard, it is the horizontal and vertical processes within the APRM that engage with disciplining powers and attempt to persuade governments into committing to the implementation of the NPoA: the exertion of pressure by peer countries and civil society. These drivers of political commitment are examined in the following two sections.

5.3.2 Horizontal pressures to support commitment - the role of peers

*Observations from interviews on the APRM outcomes*

The peer review that took place during the APR Forum was a critical moment in the APRM process. The Forum was also significant because it was a platform envisioned for leaders to share best practices and encourage one another, challenge current governance practices, and support each other in attaining the objectives set forth in the NPoA. In the Country Review Report, an overview is provided of the discussions that ensued during the peer review process of Ethiopia. It is to be noted that the late Prime Minister was perhaps in a more defensive mode during the meeting, as he dismissed the findings of the democratic and governance assessment of his country. Another respondent recalled that the late Prime Minister even walked out of the room in protest. Having said that, the peer review is supposed to occur in a cyclical manner instead of once. (For instance when countries present their progress reports and there is a discussion on outcomes). However, Ethiopia has not presented any progress reports, and this raises the question of whether the peers, namely other African countries, could provide this necessary pressure to implement commitments set forth in the NPoA.

The overall responsibility for the APRM is assigned to a committee of participating heads of state and governments of the Member States of the African Union, together forming the APR Forum. The APR Forum
has the ultimate responsibility for oversight of the APRM’s organisation and process for mutual learning and capacity building, and for exercising constructive peer dialogues and persuasive techniques required to render the APRM effective, credible and acceptable. It is to be noted that given such a wide-ranging mandate, for peer review to be effective, it is important for the heads of state and governments to sufficiently understand and, more importantly, to accept the working of the entire peer review process, its objectives, and their role in promoting and achieving those goals and in sharing these values. Central to this is the modality, manner and earnest with which peer review discussions are supposed to be conducted to ensure effective engagement and consequent commitment to take the necessary remedial measures to attain common objectives. Here, the role of the APRM analytical reports such as the Country Review Report and the progress reports are critical tools to influence reform. However, this has been constrained by the length of the Country Review Reports and untimely and inadequate reporting on NPoA progress (Interviews with continental APRM expert, 21 July 2015; with continental APRM Secretariat member, 28 July 2015; and with member of Country Review Mission, 2 October 2015).

Only half of the countries have been reviewed and the others seem disinterested to start the process. Of the countries reviewed, there are almost no progress reports submitted and when they are, these are not properly discussed, making it a self-reporting exercise (Interview with continental APRM expert, 21 July 2015).

Further concerns have also been raised that the APR Forum has become more or less a club for “comrades”, where, irrespective of performance, countries are not held accountable for their actions. This is attributed to a lack of political will to hold one another accountable, which is related to geo-politics and the absence of strong pioneers. It also suggested that members who are not always present at the meetings undermine the Forum. For instance, some heads of state have a tendency to send representatives to Forum meetings. This is also not helped by the limited time allocated for the APR Forum meetings, which take place on the sidelines of the annual African Union Summit (Interviews with continental APRM expert, 21 July 2015; with continental APRM expert, 31
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July 2015; and with member of Country Review Mission, 2 October 2015).

Significantly, with the departure from office of the pioneer heads of state in the likes of Thabo Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo, and to some extent the death of Meles Zenawi, there is less enthusiasm among the current crop of African leaders for the work of the APRM. This has, to a large extent, worked against the original objectives of the APRM (Interview with member of Country Review Mission, 2 October 2015).

Regarding this, it is critical to note that the late Prime Minister of Ethiopia had a strong character and was difficult to engage with or counter while he was chair of the Forum. The position of the country as a geo-political force in the region, as the home of the African Union, and as home to a large donor community, as well as its big and growing economy, leaves other countries with less of an ability to leverage their influence. Indeed, the APRM Forum members were referred to as “birds of a feather”, with heads of state trying to be respectful to one other, thereby creating a situation where countries undergoing the review are patted on the back without having to make real reforms (Interviews with continental APRM expert, 31 July 2015; and with civil society actor, 1 September 2015).

This is the challenge of the APRM, if it is not to be a “toothless” force for enforcing the accountability of its member states to their obligations under the base document and MoU. But the issue must be seen as a medium- to long-term one, and the power of moral suasion unfolds slowly but inexorably (Interview with member of Country Review Mission, 31 July 2015).

The horizontal pressures of heads of states as exhibited in the Forum meetings have been extremely disappointing. Attendance is extremely low, and meetings are procedural and rushed. In the beginning there was a lively discussion, for example on the report of Ghana, and even the late Prime Minister of Ethiopia made active and critical contributions on the report, but currently the mechanism suffers from fatigue and loss of momentum (Interview with continental APRM expert, 21 July 2015).
Moreover, something could also be said about the receptiveness of the Ethiopian government to peer persuasion or influence, which is the crux of the peer dialogue. In this regard, the receptiveness to external feedback was questioned, and it was suggested that often the government takes on more of a defensive role, which would also influence the level of peer pressure (Interview with national APRM expert, 16 September 2015).

Analysis

Horizontal dialogue is the pinnacle of inter-state disciplining and provides the space for constructive peer persuasion in the context of the APRM. This takes place at the APR Forum meetings, where the participating heads of state and governments convene to discuss country and progress reports. The main aim of these meetings, besides activities relating to learning and sharing of best practices, also relates to the promotion of adherence to the APRM norms that guide the process and content, as embodied in the NEPAD and APRM declarations. However, various challenges arise in this process of normalising adherence to the principles of democracy and political governance. These relate to the technical aspects of these dialogue processes, as it quite a comprehensive task to engage fully with the country reports. Inadequate and untimely reporting by member states further hamper the dialogue processes. Furthermore, the political will to exert pressures remains problematic, as these also reflect the geo-political roles of member states.

Besides this, the Forum no longer includes the original pioneers as gatekeepers of the process, and the review process is influenced by geopolitical considerations that trump the principles of the review. Indeed, not all countries are on equal standing within the Forum, and Ethiopia is a strong and powerful country often assuming leadership roles within international fora. This seems to be reflected in the procedures of the Forum, which have become more formal and procedural, and whose meetings are a side activity to the strategic African Union summit meetings. This, in combination with the strong stance taken by Ethiopia during its peer review meeting and subsequent delay in releasing the report, is also indicative of the extent to which the government is receptive to
external guidance, particularly when it concerns democracy and political governance.

Hence, various structural challenges and country-related factors affect the peer dialogue processes. These are related to the political “weight” the government carries within international fora such as the APR Forum, and these limit the scope of horizontal pressures on the government to adhere to the commitments set forth in the NPoA.

5.3.3 Vertical pressures to support commitment - the role of national actors

*Observations from interviews on the APRM outcomes*

A country’s commitment to democracy and political governance is embodied within the content of the APRM review, but also in the process of preparing the review report, which has a distinct participatory process. Participatory processes help broaden ownership and strengthen commitment and impact in support of the NPoA implementation. The governing council was supposed to be a key vehicle for achieving this, but its functions were formally repealed shortly after the review process was concluded. Hence, this left only the national actors that were involved in the review or those that had an interest in engaging with these processes to promote accountability and commitment to implementing the commitments set forth the NPoA.

The ability for non-state actors to monitor the implementation of the NPoA is first and foremost impacted by the decision to delay the release of the report, along with the lack of clarity regarding the integration of the NPoA commitments within the larger national development agenda of the Ethiopian government. Indeed, it is not clear whether the government implemented the NPoA, as progress reports have not been prepared; moreover, it is not clear which department has assumed responsibility for these tasks:

There is no possibility for civil society organisations to monitor the implementation of the APRM, as there is no responsible institution or per-
son assigned to the implementation of the plan (Interview with civil society actor, 1 September 2015).

A number of contextual considerations also hamper the space for non-state actors to engage in monitoring the NPoA. In this regard, the Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 12/2009 was cited as a serious impediment to this civic space that civic actors required for engaging with the government. The legislation prescribes that non-state actors can only engage with the government regarding issues related to democracy and political governance if a minimum of 90% of its resources is raised domestically. This de facto means that an organisation that receives more than 10% of its finance from abroad cannot engage in any issues related to governance (Interviews with continental APRM expert, 21 July 2015; with member of Country Review Mission, 23 July 2015; and with non-governmental member of National Governing Council, 29 July 2015).

The government believes that improving governance is the responsibility of the state and does not include a strong role for civil society (Interview with non-governmental member of National Governing Council, 29 July 2015).

I do not think that non-state actors in Ethiopia have the courage, let alone the capacity, to monitor the implementation of the NPoA (Interview with member of Country Review Mission, 2 October 2015).

One of the respondents also shared an interesting personal experience related to the organisation of a symposium in Addis Ababa on APRM knowledge with civil society:

I found it difficult to locate civil society organisations willing to participate, and for the research, it took a lot of effort to obtain a valid sample size. Civil society organisations feared deregistration if they were to engage in the study. The study was conducted in an atmosphere of fear, as civil society organisations were even more fearful to speak in comparison to the time of the APRM review … I have not seen this level of opacity and lack
of transparency in implementation in any of the other countries reviewed under APRM (Interview with continental APRM expert, 31 July 2015).

This brings to light an important consideration of these participatory processes – that the APRM provides a framework for participatory processes, but that these are ultimately shaped by the political context of a country. In this regard, the domestic political and legal environment for participatory processes should be problematised further. The ability of non-state actors to participate in an instrumental manner is influenced by their relationship with the government (Interviews with continental APRM expert, 21 July 2015; with continental APRM Secretariat member, 29 July 2015; with continental APRM expert, 30 July 2015; and with member of Country Review Mission, 31 July 2015).

**Analysis**

Various challenges arise regarding the ability of non-state actors to play a monitoring role of the NPoA. One the one hand, this is related to the fact that the government integrated the APRM within the ministerial structures to such an extent that it is not clear which department is responsible for the implementation and who carries financial responsibility for the actions of the NPoA. This is further complicated by the absence of progress reports. On the other hand, there is also a context of stringent state and civil society relations, which are formally embodied by the rather restrictive legislation governing the operation of non-state actors in Ethiopia. In the Country Review Report the civil society Proclamation is problematised, and the late Prime Minister responds to this issue as follows:

On the Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 12/2009, cited in Paragraph 176, the Prime Minister explained that the law aimed to protect the sovereignty of the people of Ethiopia. He indicated that, as done in USA, foreign NGOs are not allowed to fund political parties because that practice compromises the sovereignty of Ethiopia. He noted that foreign NGOs work for foreign governments and that Ethiopia passed this law to limit foreign-funded entities. He emphasised that if an NGO gets 90% of its funding
from abroad, then it was not qualified to operate within Ethiopia as a local NGO (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2011: 351).

While the late Prime Minister worded it slightly differently, the proclamation actually states that local NGOs are those that raise no more than 10% of their funding from abroad. In this context, it is difficult to imagine a role for non-state actors in supporting and monitoring the implementation of the NPoA. In this context it is also difficult to consider these non-state actors as essential actors in the vertical peer dialogue processes. Thus, it seems that the government pushed back on the adoption of the APRM content (governance standards) by constraining the ability of societal actors to engage in the outcomes of the country review. The ultimate aim of the review process is to strengthen democracy, and as such it should be considered as a long-term process, filled with contestation, resistance and improvements along the way. From the initial evidence it is possible to ascertain that the deliberate participatory framework for priority-setting in these areas is already an outcome. However, the evidence also suggests that this not necessarily opens up a space for change, as the APRM operates within the framework of established political cultures. In this regard, these cultures refer to established norms that determine how development planning should take place, who legitimate contributors to these processes are, and the content of such plans and strategies. This approach is captured in Ethiopia’s developmental state model, which is not necessarily democratic and builds upon a strong role for the state in national development planning. These norms may not necessarily fit with the operationalisation of democracy and political governance in the context of APRM, and could provide an initial explanation for the limited outcomes of the review process.

5.3.4 APRM adoption of standards and developmentality

The APRM envisions the acceleration of progress towards adopting and implementing the priorities and programmes of NEPAD, through the self-assessment process and by relying on horizontal peer dialogue processes and vertical national stakeholder engagement processes promoting mutual accountability. Or in the words of the late Prime Minister:
The democratic forms that NEPAD espouses, even when they lack substance, give us the instruments for peaceful transformation. The economic strategies of NEPAD can serve as the guidelines in the struggle for economic transformation. The peer review process of NEPAD gives us the opportunity to learn from and emulate best practice and to pressurise the forces of the status quo to move forward. NEPAD does not provide a quick fix, but a guide for action for the long haul (Zenawi 2002: 4).

However, the late Prime Minister’s external commitment to the principles of the APRM did not translate into tangible outcomes resulting from the process. For various reasons, the official release of the Country Review Report was delayed, marking a late conclusion of the review process and of the subsequent commencement of the implementation of the NPoA. Since then, the government has not released any progress reports, and the status of the APRM and the NPoA remains unclear. The APRM processes pre-empt possible faltering political commitment by institutionalising horizontal and vertical pressures within the mechanism. The horizontal peer dialogue processes take place at the APR Forum meetings and provide a space for rationalising and promoting the norms envisioned in the APRM. Nevertheless, this space is also a site of resistance, as norms openly clash. This was evident, for example, in the public claim of the late Prime Minister that the review of democracy and political governance was based on dead principles of the Washington Consensus.

However, less open forms of resistance reflect internal power dynamics, embodied by concepts such as political “weight” and “status”, which influence the ability to speak critically to a relative strong country like Ethiopia. Furthermore, domestic legislation seriously impacts the vertical processes of accountability governing the engagements of non-state actors with the government, which provides additional evidence of the strained relationship between the government and non-state actors. These dynamics all cast doubt on the ability of either the peer dialogue processes or non-state actors to spur political commitment to the NPoA. Considering the aforementioned, it may come as no surprise that the substantive outcomes of the review process have been limited.
Various dynamics come into play in these processes, such as the role of maintaining external legitimacy, reflected in a political commitment to the process, but, when this commitment requires a contestation in established governance dynamics, this is met by resistance as exhibited in the peer dialogue processes and using various strategies to basically negate the domestic impact of the review outcomes, and act as if it never took place. This observation is problematic, as it conflicts with the vision upon which APRM is based. At a basic level, the inter-intra discipline mechanism is weak and fairly easily can be resisted, but more problematic are dynamics that enable participating states to uphold appearances, undergo the review process, but not face pressure from peers to be held accountable. This could be explained by viewing the APRM not as a form of resistance against external donor agendas on development and governance, but as the possible internalisation of such agendas. The normalisation of the good governance agenda makes it seem necessary (normal and natural) for African countries to pursue democracy and political governance on the continent (Taylor 2009: 52). African countries are continuously disciplined to follow a particular donor framework for development that requires good governance, and are engendered to exercise self-control (Lie 2006: 16). The APRM therefore may be seen not as a form of resistance against this donor agenda, but rather as an example of the “conduct of conduct” where the subject governs itself (Foucault 1982: 789). This is reflected in the development of an elaborate self-assessment process that African countries undertake on a voluntarily basis (an example of freedom) and guides on necessary reforms needed to strengthen governance in APRM member states. Moreover, this approach allows African countries to diffuse external pressures by adopting practices that are deemed legitimate in the eyes of donors (Frumkin and Galaskiewicz 2004: 285-286), thereby “rebranding” the entire continent as one committed to good governance (Schwak 2016: 428).

By way of summarising these reflections regarding the outcomes of the APRM process in Ethiopia, it is possible to expand theoretical propositions 3c to 3d as follows:

3c: The APRM process does not discipline African countries to adhere to its policy framework;

3d: Inter-state disciplining of the government is weak, as the Forum can act as a space for openly dismissing report outcomes or indirectly
retaining legitimacy by nominal compliance, reflected in subjection to the review process without strong compliance regarding progress reporting;

3e: Intra-state disciplining is weak, as the APRM operates within the confines of established state-society structures and does not alter these by mandating a participatory approach and a monitoring role for non-state actors; and

3f: Rather than challenging external development strategies and coercive financial pressures exerted by donors, the APRM seems to have internalised the good governance agenda. The APRM is an example of institutional isomorphism and continental branding of African values on governance that internalise the normalisation of good governance.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the outcomes of CPIA and APRM assessments. It focused on answering the following question: how have CPIA and APRM applications influenced the promotion of related governance standards in Ethiopia? In the case of the CPIA, the findings suggest that they have had no influence on the promotion of related governance standards. This is explained by the inadequate link between governance norms, performance (the rating process), and punishment/reward (the IDA allocation process). The link is not made effectively as grant administrative dynamics impact IDA allocation and in the case of stable CPIA scores, countries can increase their IDA commitments regardless. Indeed, the CPIA is only one factor determining the IDA allocations, and a multitude of internal and external factors inform the final country allocation. Closely related to this is the particular relationship Ethiopia has enjoyed with its donors. In this regard, the government has been able to manage relations in such a way that it has been able to resist adopting governance standards it does not consider appropriate. This level of autonomy is also grounded in the presence of suitable structures of financial management, which paradoxically positively influence the ability of Ethiopia to benefit from annual IDA reallocations. As a result, the CPIA process does not discipline Ethiopia to adhere to its policy standards.
In the case of the APRM, the findings similarly suggest that it has had no influence on the promotion of related governance standards. Horizontal and vertical pressures as the two drivers of change were unsuccessful in promoting the implementation of the NPoA. The inter-state disciplining mechanisms of the APRM are rather weak, as the Forum provides a space for openly dismissing report outcomes or for indirectly retaining legitimacy through nominal compliance regarding the peer review process. This practice is also present in the case of Ethiopia, where the late Prime Minister dismissed and disregarded the findings of the report (in relation to democracy and political governance), and where it remains unclear who is responsible for the implementation of the NPoA and whether any progress has been made in this regard. Furthermore, the role of non-state actors in monitoring the NPoA is limited due to restrictive legislation governing the engagement between state and civil society. This suggests that the intra-state disciplining mechanisms of APRM are also rather weak, as these operate within the confines of established state-society engagements and do not alter this relationship by mandating a participatory approach and a monitoring role for non-state actors. As a result, the APRM process does not discipline African countries to adhere to its policy framework. While these challenges could be understood as reflecting “weak implementation”, it also may be indicative of other dynamics. The APRM seems to have internalised the good governance agenda and as an approach actually responds (rather than challenges) the pressures exerted by donors, allowing the continent to rebrand itself as being (at least nominally) committed to governance.

Notes
1 IDA country allocations have only been made available on IDA’s website since 2012. As this study is also interested in allocation dynamics before this year, the decision has been made to include information on IDA commitments and IDA grants, which are readily made available on the World Bank DataBank.

2 ‘IDA funds are allocated to the recipient countries in relation to their income levels and record of success in managing their economies and their ongoing IDA projects. IDA’s lending terms are highly concessional, meaning that IDA credits carry no or low interest charges. The lending terms are determined with reference to recipient countries’ risk of debt distress, the level of Gross National Income
Outcomes of the CPIA and APRM in Ethiopia

per capita, and creditworthiness for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) borrowing. Recipients with a high risk of debt distress receive 100 percent of their financial assistance in the form of grants and those with a medium risk of debt distress receive 50 percent in the form of grants. Other recipients receive IDA credits on regular or blend and hard-terms with 38-year and 25-year maturities respectively (IDA 2017).

IDA15 covered period of FY09-11; IDA16 covers FY12-14 and IDA17 will cover FY15-17. IDA resource envelopes are provided for 3-year replenishment cycles. The FY13 allocation for Ethiopia of Special Drawing Rights SDR759.2 million (equivalent of US$1.2bn) is firm while the FY14 allocation of SDR 664.5mln (US$1.1bn) is indicative and can change depending on: (i) total IDA resources available in the respective fiscal year; (ii) Ethiopia’s performance rating; (iii) the terms of IDA’s assistance to the country (grants or credits) in the respective fiscal year based on Ethiopia’s debt sustainability position; (iv) MDRI debt relief and the redistribution of the MDRI compensatory resources as applicable; (v) the performance and assistance terms of other IDA borrowers; and (vi) the number of IDA-eligible countries. Note that Ethiopia’s IDA envelope was provided in SDR terms, and the US dollar equivalent amounts are converted using the IDA16 replenishment rate of 1SDR=US$1.50233; however, the exchange rate for each IDA operation depends on the applicable prevailing rate at the time of project approval (World Bank 2012: 44).

3 ‘USD 10.12 Million (0.37 percent) to Economic Governance and Management; USD 14.32 Billion (52 percent) to Corporate Governance and USD 7.99 Billion (29 percent) to Socio-Economic Development’ (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2011: 290).
6 CPIA and APRM applications in Rwanda, Ghana and Nigeria

6.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the application of the CPIA and APRM in different and similar governance contexts. Through an analysis of three country case studies, namely of Rwanda, Nigeria and Ghana, it focuses on answering the following research question: did similar or different dynamics influence the application of the CPIA and APRM in Rwanda, Nigeria and Ghana? The chapter presents the salient observations regarding the application and outcomes of the CPIA and APRM in the primary case of Ethiopia, and replicates these findings through an analysis of similar factors for the case studies of Rwanda, Nigeria and Ghana. The main aim of the analysis is to contextualise the findings pertaining to the case study of Ethiopia to broader dynamics in other African countries (comparative similarity and dissimilarity to Ethiopia). The evidence is informed solely by a document analysis of the CPIA and APRM applications for the three country case studies. In the case of the CPIA, the analysis presents evidence on the CPIA scores, IDA allocations, and governance outcomes as narrated in World Bank documentation, in particular in the Country Partnership Strategy for each country. In the case of the APRM, the analysis presents evidence on the process descriptions in the Country Review Reports, progress reports, and external process and outcome reviews. The application and outcomes of the CPIA and APRM in Rwanda, Nigeria and Ghana are cross-synthesised and thereafter analysed through the analytical lens of developmentality (including relevant concepts drawn from the governmentality framework). The theoretical propositions that guide the explanation of relevant dynamics further support the analysis.
6.2 The CPIA applications in Rwanda, Nigeria and Ghana

6.2.1 Main findings in the Ethiopian country case study

The case study of Ethiopia showed that CPIA processes followed the technical procedures as laid out in the process documents, with the exception being the consultation with the government on draft scores. Although very interesting, this is possibly less relevant from a comparative perspective, as the main tool of discipline is not these government consultations of draft scores. In fact, the CPIA documents state that, besides serving to discuss the initial score with the government, the aim is also to provide a space for the government to present other documents for consideration. However, this is not the main vehicle whereby the CPIA is envisaged to support change. Rather, the process of change is linked to the performance-based allocation system and the selectivity principles guided by Cluster D of the CPIA and final IDA commitments. Hence, the focus of the analysis is the CPIA and its ability to discipline governments through IDA allocation processes. Both the Country Partnership Strategy and the interviewed Bank officers working in Ethiopia revealed that the IDA commitments are higher for Ethiopia due to IDA reallocations and other administrative mechanisms. This suggests that there is no clear-cut relationship between the IDA Country Performance Rating and the final IDA allocation, which should have resulted from the performance-based allocation mechanism. This is problematic, as this undermines the principal logic of the CPIA – linking CPIA performance, particularly in Cluster D, to IDA allocation.

In this regard, the analysis replicates the following main theme and observation:

- The CPIA does not discipline governments to adhere to its policy standards, as internal and external administrative fund disbursement dynamics influence IDA allocations.

In replicating this main theme, it was expected that similar dynamics be observed for the case of Rwanda, which is even more aid dependent than Ethiopia. It was also expected that even less strong disciplining
principles are found for the cases of Ghana and Nigeria, as they are far less aid dependent and therefore even less susceptible to IDA funding dynamics than Ethiopia and Rwanda (Börzel and Hackenesch 2013: 540). The analysis relies on the respective CPIA scores in relation to the other regional performers, the IDA Country Performance Rating, and IDA grants and commitments, as well as on a description of the allocation dynamics informed by the Country Partnership Strategy. These processes are all informed by aid dependency dynamics, which show the first principle of engagement between the government and the World Bank in their roles as aid recipient and donor.

6.2.2 The CPIA application in Rwanda

The aggregate CPIA score of Rwanda was 4.0 in 2014 – the highest aggregate CPIA score of all the regional (Sub-Saharan Africa) IDA countries. Similar to Ethiopia, Rwanda improved its CPIA score with 0.1 in 2014 and has seen steady progress in its policy environment over recent years (World Bank 2015: 6). Unlike Ethiopia, the increase was a result of a different cluster, namely Cluster A – Economic Management. In particular, this increase was based on improvements on the fiscal policy front, as the risk of debt distress declined and further progress was made on the legal and governance structures of debt management (World Bank 2015: 9, 11-12). The Cluster D score of Rwanda is 3.6, which is also much higher than the regional average of 3.0 (World Bank 2015: 71).

The 2014-2018 World Bank Country Partnership Strategy sets forth the IDA programme for Rwanda and includes therein three focus areas, of which one is ‘supporting accountable governance through public financial management and decentralization’ (World Bank 2014a: iii). The focus herein lies on supporting the government in the process of decentralising decision-making with the aim of aiding open and participatory processes (Ibid). The strategy hails the country as a success story for efficient donor harmonisation and budget support and as a country where financial assistance through aid has had a positive and sustainable impact (World Bank 2014a: 1). Regarding IDA allocation, the strategy notes the following:
The working assumption is that allocations will be similar to those in the past, perhaps a little higher in recognition of the improving CPIA score and the switch from a mix of grants and credits to credits only. As such, IDA may commit approximately US$200-250 million a year during IDA17, likely spread across three investment operations, two Programs for Results operations and one series of three Development Policy Operations. In addition, regional IDA should be leveraged for some priority investments (World Bank 2014a: iv).

In this context, the strategy clearly emphasises that the improved CPIA score would result in a somewhat higher allocation. However, it also states that this is linked to the switch of a mix of grants and credit as sources of income to credit only (World Bank 2014a: iv). In the section on the World Bank portfolio, the strategy also explains that the ‘IDA16 allocation for Rwanda was SDR400 million which is approximately US$617 million, a 54.7 percent increase from IDA15 (SDR258.5 million)’ (World Bank 2014a: 33). Hence, in the period from IDA15 (FY09-11) to IDA16 (FY12-14), IDA allocations rose by over 50%. In addition, IDA17 (covering FY15-17) will result in similar or slightly higher allocations for this period. When taking a closer look at this, it seems odd that there is an over 50% increase in allocation from the period 2009-2011 to 2012-2014 and a similar or slightly higher allocation for the forthcoming period of 2015-2017. For instance, the Country Performance Ratings were 3.59 in 2009, 3.69 in 2010, 3.7 in 2011 (an average of 3.66 for the period 2009-2011), and 3.63 in 2012, 3.7 in 2013 and 3.72 in 2014 (an average of 3.68 for the period 2012-2014). However, somehow allocation doubled. Figure 6.1 provides further details on the CPIA Cluster D score, the IDA Resource Allocation Index (CPIA average for all four clusters), and the IDA Country Performance Rating, which determines the IDA allocation.
Figure 6.1
Rwanda Cluster D score, IDA Resource Allocation Index, and Country Performance Rating

Source: Author’s own compilation of data from the World Bank and IDA websites (World Bank 2016c, IDA 2016a).

Figure 6.2 presents information on the Country Performance Rating (on the right axis, ranging between 3.4 and 3.75) and IDA commitments and allocated grants (on the left axis, in US$). No data is available on IDA commitments for the period 2006-2009.
The strategy notes that, at the time that the report was drafted, IDA allocations were not fixed, but were expected to be similar to those of the past. Should commitments in FY15 be higher than actual allocations, then the strategy includes a proposal to front load from FY16 and FY17 (World Bank 2014a: 34). The strategy notes the following in this regard:

Actual allocations will depend on (a) total IDA resources available; (b) the country’s performance rating, GNI per capita, and population; (c) the terms of IDA assistance (grants/credits) and the allocation deductions associated with Multi-lateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) annual debt service foregone; (d) the performance, other allocation parameters, and IDA assistance terms for other IDA borrowers; and (e) the number of IDA-eligible countries (World Bank 2014a: 34).

In spite of the possible suggested link between the increased CPIA score and the slightly higher IDA allocation, the strategy confirms that
IDA16 allocations were 50% higher than those of IDA15, although with an almost similar average Country Performance Rating for the two periods (2009-2011 average of 3.66 and 2012-2014 average of 3.68). In addition, IDA17 would remain almost similar or increase slightly more. If not, it could be adjusted through front loading for FY16 and FY17. In addition, actual allocation is not informed solely by the Country Performance Rating, but is determined by five other factors, of which only the Country Performance Rating is under the control of the country. Another interesting observation is that the strategy actually mentions front loading as a way of addressing lower allocations when compared to commitments. Similar to the case of Ethiopia, for Rwanda it shows that the relation between the Country Performance Rating and IDA allocations is influenced by internal and external administrative fund disbursement dynamics.

6.2.3 The CPIA application in Nigeria

The aggregate CPIA score of Nigeria in 2014 was 3.5, which was above the regional Sub-Saharan Africa average of 3.2. The CPIA score decreased from 2013 due to a decline in commodity prices in 2014, which affected revenues from the extractive sector and economic management at large. This also brought to light weaknesses in the country’s fiscal framework and resulted in a decline in the economic management cluster score on fiscal policies (World Bank 2015: 5-6, 9, 11). The 2014-2017 World Bank Country Partnership Strategy describes the strategic programme of the World Bank in Nigeria. It is worth mentioning that with this new strategy Nigeria has officially entered a “blend status”, meaning that it is declared creditworthy and hence open for financing provided by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), also because the country exceeded the IDA operational cut-off level in FY13 (World Bank 2014b: vii). In particular, the strategy focuses on governance and public sector management as cross-cutting pillars that focus broadly on strengthening public financial management systems and public reform, and particularly on strengthening accountability, public expenditure, and investment management (World Bank 2014b: 21, 37).

Figure 6.3 provides further details on the CPIA Cluster D score, the IDA Resource Allocation Index (CPIA average for all four clusters), and
the IDA Country Performance Rating, which determines the IDA allocation.

**Figure 6.3**

*Nigeria Cluster D score, IDA Resource Allocation Index, and Country Performance Rating*

Furthermore, Figure 6.4 presents information on the Country Performance Rating (on the right axis, ranging between 2.9 and 3.2) and IDA commitments (on the left axis, in US$). No data on IDA grants is available, which may be explained by the status Nigeria holds as a “blend” country (with grants offered only to countries with a high risk of debt distress).
Reflecting the blend status of Nigeria, the report notes that that finances for the first two years will be allocated from the IDA and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (US$3.1 billion from the IDA and US$1.6 billion from the IBRD). The strategy further notes that the IDA allocations in the first year are based on allocations in IDA16 (FY12-14), but that the actual amount will depend on:

\[ (a) \text{ the country's own performance}; (b) \text{ its performance relative to other IDA recipients}; (c) \text{ the total amount of resources available to IDA}; (d) \text{ any changes in the list of IDA-eligible countries}; (e) \text{ any changes in the performance-based allocation system for IDA17}, \text{ and (f) the overall size of the IDA17 replenishment (World Bank 2014b: 41).} \]

It is to be noted that these aforementioned factors only apply to the IDA and, hence, to about two-thirds of the funds Nigeria accesses through the World Bank. The report also shows that Nigeria is no longer eligible for compensatory reallocations from the Multilateral Debt Relief
Initiative (MDRI) and that the lending terms will also be hardened from FY14 onward to reflect Nigeria’s level of income (World Bank 2014b: 41). The case of Nigeria is interesting, as it shows that levels of economic development and national income influence the relation of Nigeria with the Bank. Even more pronouncedly than in the cases of Ethiopia and Rwanda, the case of Nigeria suggests that the influence of the CPIA on aid allocations further is limited, as the country accesses one-third of its funds from the IBRD, not the IDA. In the case of the IDA, it again suggests that the Country Performance Rating is but one out of six indicators informing the allocations.

6.2.4 The CPIA application in Ghana

The CPIA score of Ghana has witnessed a steady decline since 2011. With an overall score of 3.4 in 2014, the country’s score is still above the regional Sub-Saharan Africa average of 3.2, but the score is still lower than those of Ethiopia, Rwanda and Nigeria. The reason for the 0.3 decrease of the overall CPIA score was weakening macroeconomic management and governance, as well as slipping scores related to building human resources and a financial and business environment. In the area of Cluster D, there were specific setbacks for three out of the five indicators (World Bank 2015: 6-7). The Country Partnership Strategy of Ghana covers the period 2013-2016. Worth noting is that Ghana was classified as lower middle-income country in 2011 (World Bank 2013: i). The strategy identifies three key focus areas, including sound economic institutions. Through this, the strategy aims to support public financial management, budget institutions, state-owned enterprises, and the enhanced management of natural resources (World Bank 2013: 18-19).

Figure 6.5 provides further details on the CPIA Cluster D score, the IDA Resource Allocation Index (CPIA average for all four clusters), and the IDA Country Performance Rating, which determines the IDA allocation.
Furthermore, Figure 6.6 presents information on the Country Performance Rating (on the right axis, ranging between 3.0 and 4.0) and IDA commitments and allocated grants (on the left axis, in US$). No data is available on IDA comments for the year 2013.

*Source: Author’s own compilation of data from the World Bank and IDA websites (World Bank 2016c; IDA 2016a).*
Similar to the Country Partner Strategy of Ethiopia, Nigeria and Rwanda, the IDA allocations are approximations and are further explained as follows:

The indicative IDA allocation for the new four-year (FY13-16) Country Partnership Strategy period will be approximately SDR927 million (approximately US$1.39 billion). This indicative amount reflects the confirmed SDR allocations of 205.8 million and 257.9 million, respectively, for FY13 and FY14, and the annual IDA16 average of SDR226.63 million. The same annual averages are assumed for each of the two IDA17 years (FY15 and FY16) (World Bank 2013: 42).
The strategy again also confirms the parameters on which IDA allocations are based as:

… (i) total IDA resources available, (ii) the country’s performance rating, GNI per capita, and population; (iii) the terms of IDA assistance (grants/credits) and the allocation deductions associated with Multi-lateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) annual debt service foregone; (iv) the performance, other allocation parameters, and IDA assistance terms for other IDA borrowers; and (v) the number of IDA-eligible countries (World Bank 2013: 42).

Similar to Nigeria, Ghana is also moving towards graduating to a blend status (World Bank 2013: 18). This would suggest that the influence of the CPIA review on final IDA commitments is further limited, as part of the fund would be accessed through the IBRD. The latter operates under different funding conditions to the IDA and, as such, the influence of the performance-based allocation system is limited even further.

6.2.5 Cross-case synthesis - the CPIA application and developmentality

The Ethiopia country case study suggested that the CPIA does not discipline governments to adhere to its policy standards, as IDA allocations are influenced by internal and external administrative fund disbursement dynamics. It was expected that the findings would be similar (or possibly less) for the case of Rwanda (which has higher aid dependency dynamics) and even further pronounced for the cases of Nigeria and Ghana (being less aid dependent). In each of the replication studies, the respective chapter attempted to shed light on the different Cluster D scores, the CPIA score and the Country Performance Rating, and reflected on this in the context of planned IDA commitments and grants. This was also presented alongside the narrative of the Country Partnership Strategy, which informs on planned allocations. It is worth recalling the principal logic of the CPIA and the performance-based allocation system, as suggested by the IDA on its website:
The main factor that determines the allocation of IDA resources among eligible countries is each country's performance in implementing policies that promote economic growth and poverty reduction. This is assessed by the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), which for the purposes of resource allocation is referred to as the IDA Resource Allocation Index (IRAI). The IRAI and portfolio performance together constitute the IDA Country Performance Rating (CPR). In addition to the CPR, population and per capita income also determine IDA allocations (IDA 2016b).

However, the analysis of the country cases suggests that CPIA scores and the Country Performance Rating are not the main factors determining the allocation of IDA resources. Indeed, by taking a closer look at the relationship between Cluster D, the overall CPIA score (IDA Resource Allocation Index) and the Country Performance Rating, as well as at final IDA commitments, limited linear relations are evident. The performance-based allocation principle suggests that increased Cluster D scores provides the largest input to the overall CPIA score, and an increased CPIA score should result in an increased Country Performance Rating and consequent commitments. (Especially since considering that population and per capita income do not change much on an annual basis). Figures 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9 depict Cluster D scores and the Country Performance Rating and IDA commitments for Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria and Rwanda. It is to be noted that as no data is available on grants provided to Nigeria, this data has been excluded from this analysis. When comparing the parameters for each country, it is for instance possible to see that the commitments (although at different levels) somehow behave similarly for the period 2005-2011 (except for Rwanda, where no data is available in the period 2006-2009, and Nigeria, which sees a steady increase in this period). Thereafter, a steep increase and decrease occur (with the exception of Ghana, which sees a steady decrease).
**Figure 6.7**
CPIA Cluster D scores for Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria and Rwanda

![Graph showing CPIA Cluster D scores for Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Rwanda.

Source: Author’s own compilation of data from the World Bank website (World Bank 2016c).]

**Figure 6.8**
IDA Country Performance Rating for Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria and Rwanda

![Graph showing IDA Country Performance Rating for Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Rwanda.

Source: Author’s own compilation of data from the World Bank website (World Bank 2016c).]
If one would look just at the period 2013-2014, it is possible to observe that the relationship between Cluster D scores, CPIA scores, the Country Performance Ratio and IDA commitments are less linear than could be expected from the performance-based allocation system mechanism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2013-2014</th>
<th>Cluster D</th>
<th>Country Performance Rating</th>
<th>IDA Commitment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
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<td>Ghana</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Stable</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Stable</td>
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<td>↑</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own compilation of data from the World Bank website (World Bank 2016c).
The explanation for these dynamics could be assigned to the internal and external IDA administrative fund disbursement principles. To be sure, in all the country case studies the partnership strategy described similar fund disbursement considerations. The case studies of Ghana and Nigeria furthermore show that higher levels of economic development and national income limit the possibility of accessing concessional lending governed by the IDA. Indeed, as countries graduate and enter into blend status, the funds are no longer governed by IDA fund mechanisms, but by those of the IBRD. All these factors determine the annual allocation of IDA resources; however, the case study of Ethiopia also showed the importance of internal IDA flexibility arrangements that aim to facilitate the effective utilisation of resources. These include front and back loading, as well as the reallocation of IDA allocations to better-performing countries with higher absorptive capacities (IDA 2007: 7, IDA 2010: 37). It is possible to see how Rwanda and Ethiopia utilise front loading strategies and how Ethiopia even uses this strategy to benefit from annual reallocations.

Hence, the following factors also determine the final allocation of IDA concessional grants to aid recipients:

- Any changes to the list of IDA-eligible countries;
- The terms of IDA assistance (grants/credits);
- The allocation deductions associated with Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative annual debt service foregone;
- The performance, other allocation parameters, and IDA assistance terms of other IDA borrowers;
- The overall size of the IDA replenishment;
- The status within the IDA and transitioning into IBRD loans and credits;
- Front loading;
- Back loading; and
- Annual reallocations.
The analysis shows that this assumes a more central role than the Bank possibly acknowledged. It is difficult to properly evidence this, as a host of intervening variables determine the annual allocations. However, the analysis suggests that the Country Performance Rating is not the main factor determining the IDA allocations. It also suggests that in the four case studies, it may be difficult for the CPIA to signal incentives through the PBA as a result of the manner in which IDA funds are determined and allocated. Contrary to the dominant narrative that aid dependency provides a lever for the World Bank to govern from a distance (Börzel and Hackenesch 2013: 540), the analysis reveals that this suggestion merits further consideration. For instance, it is important to consider levels of economic development and national income, as these influence how much of the funds actually are governed by IDA’s performance-based allocation system (Ghana and Nigeria). A second consideration is highlighted for the cases of Ethiopia and Rwanda, where relatively high Cluster D scores (respectively 3.5 and 3.6) are on the one hand indicative of the nature of the public management, and on the other hand also of the manner in which countries can absorb and manage public funds. This influences the ability of Ethiopia and Rwanda to manage IDA funds and to make use of the various flexibility arrangements.

Indeed, similar to the case of Ethiopia, the analysis suggests that while the Bank generates knowledge on public sector management and institutions in Ghana, Nigeria and Rwanda, this does not necessarily translate into productive power over them. This is because the Bank does not make the appropriate link between norms, performance and punishment/reward, limiting the ability of CPIA processes and outcomes to shape and guide the behaviour of aid recipients in adherence to its governance standards (Lie 2015a: 242).

By way of summarising these reflections regarding the application of the CPIA process in Rwanda, Nigeria and Ghana, it is possible to expand the theoretical propositions as follows:

4a: The translation of knowledge to power over the aid recipient through the CPIA is ineffective, as the Bank does not make the appropriate connection between norms, performance and punishment/reward. This is because the CPIA score is only one of several
factors determining the final IDA country allocations. As a result, the CPIA assessment is limited in disciplining Ghana, Nigeria and Rwanda to adhere to its policy standards.

This apparent disjuncture between the design and process of the CPIA in light of their outcomes is quite telling. It also goes against the more conventional understandings of the Bank and CPIA. For instance, Van Waeyenberge (2009: 806) asserts that the Bank performs a “disciplining role” and that the CPIA is a strong disciplinary tool to influence the policy spaces of aid recipients. These dynamics inform the need to look beyond the role of CPIA as a mere technical tool of the Bank, to consider more broadly strategic functions guiding its use.

6.3 The APRM applications in Rwanda, Nigeria and Ghana

6.3.1 Main findings in the Ethiopia country case study

The case study of Ethiopia showed that the APRM processes followed the technical procedures as laid out in the process documents, but that the application could be viewed as one of nominal adherence to the process and outcome. The APRM process was less participatory and harmonious and more government-controlled than envisioned in the APRM principles and strategic process documents. Despite this, the review report was able to address critical aspects related to democracy and governance. However, few outcomes followed the process, apart from the mere benefit of having undergone the process – the NGC was dismantled, no responsible office was tasked with implementing the NPoA, and civil society actors and peers had limited influence on the government due to the political environment of the country and the status of the APR Forum. As a result, the APRM has been limited in its ability to stimulate the government to adopt related governance standards.

The main finding and theme arising from the Ethiopia country case study is that the crux of the process, i.e. the implementation of the NPoA (which commits Ethiopia to the adoption of governance standards), is not taking place. According to the APRM logic, here peers (horizontal pressures) and national actors (vertical pressures) play a role in
stimulating and holding governments to account regarding their commitments. Ethiopia had the lowest score in the areas of voice and accountability, and the outcomes of the APRM processes showed these dynamics in action. The government was very critical of the report content and defended its stance in the APR Forum, while the national dynamics are such that any meaningful way for civil society to hold the government to account is lacking.

In this regard, the analysis replicates the following main theme and observation:

- The APRM does not discipline governments to adhere to its policy standards, firstly due to weak horizontal pressures resulting from the possibility to provide resistance to the influence of peers, and secondly due to weak vertical pressures, as these operate within established state-society frameworks.

In replicating this main theme, it was expected that similar dynamics are seen in Rwanda and Nigeria, which have low scores in the areas of voice and accountability that could influence their acceptance of external peer pressures, as well as the influence and scope of non-state actors in monitoring the NPoA. In the case of Ghana, which has the highest score in voice and accountability, it was expected that the country is more receptive to the influence of peers and provides more space for non-state actors to engage in the monitoring of the NPoA. In this regard, the analysis relies on the respective process descriptions in the Country Review Reports, progress reports (where available), as well as on external assessments of the participatory dynamics of the reviews analysed by civil society organisations such as the Open Society Initiative.

6.3.2 The APRM application in Rwanda

The APRM process in Rwanda

Rwanda was one of the APRM pioneer countries, having signed the MoU on 9 March 2003. Following its accession, the Rwandan government established the national offices, such as the APR Focal Point and the NGC, and commenced work on the draft questionnaire. The first
stakeholder workshop was organised in March 2004 and was aimed at sensitising the 200 stakeholders present and launching the thematic groups that would work on the draft questionnaire. A second stakeholder workshop was organised in May 2004, aimed at integrating comments from the participants and launching the technical review teams. The support mission took place from 21-24 June 2004, reviewing the establishment of national structures and particularly advising on reducing the size of the Governing Commission to 8-10 members, of which one or two would be government officials. The support mission also reviewed background documents prepared by the team of the Focal Point, but noted that the APR technical teams had filled out the self-assessment questionnaire without the inclusion of inputs of national stakeholders. The support mission also raised concerns about the lack of institutional basis of the technical review team, which could hamper the self-assessment methodology. Therefore, the recommendation was made that the continental strategic partner institutions should support the technical teams (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2005a: 23-24).

The NGC was inaugurated in the presence of the support mission on 24 June 2004. The commission drew its members from the public, private and civil society sectors in Rwanda and was chaired by the Minister of Finance. The commission and the technical review teams worked together to prepare the draft self-assessment, which was validated through a national stakeholder review meeting that subsequently informed the finalisation of the draft NPoA in March 2005. The Country Review Mission took place from 18-30 April 2005, conducting interviews with various public, private and civil society stakeholders in Kigali. Thereafter, the Country Review Mission visited all the provinces and held consultations with key stakeholders (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2005a: 25-27). The final report was presented during the fifth summit of the APR Forum and subsequently released in Kigali on 13 July 2006 (LDGL 2007: 4).

**Horizontal and vertical pressure**

Similar to the Country Review Report of Ethiopia, the responses of the Rwandan government to the review findings were annexed to the report. However, unlike Ethiopia the government’s response seems to have
been more receptive to the review recommendations. In particular, the government provided an explanation for concerns raised in the review and agreed to address certain aspects in the NPoA. During the APR Forum meeting, the President did raise more critical concerns regarding the misrepresentation of the independence of the Judiciary, the Gacaca Court System, and the management of diversity and political pluralism. The Panel responded quite receptively to these concerns, and the tone of discussions (as captured in the minutes) was more constructive in comparison to those linked to the peer review of Ethiopia (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2005a: 152-153).

The participation of civil society actors in the APRM processes can be observed within the national processes, such as in participation in the NGC, in the consultation on the self-assessment, and in the engagement with the APRM Country Review Mission. In this regard, an external evaluation revealed that the review report included civil society perspectives that collided with those of the government, particularly in the area of democracy and political governance (‘relating to the rights of the Batwa minority, freedom of expression and the role of Gacaca’). This provided evidence of the open nature of the domestic processes (LDGL 2007: 10). However, the external review also concludes that civil society participation overall was ‘belated and insufficient’ (LDGL 2007: 10). For instance, the discussions held in the framework of the APRM meetings were (according to interviews conducted for the report) relatively free and participatory, but belated, as civil society organisations came on board only at a later stage. In addition, the report asserts the civil society participation in APRM bodies and meetings was not “broadly representative”. This was based on the low level of stakeholders present during the various provincial consultations with the Country Support Mission. Then-Panel Chair also conceded to this, noting that ‘the contribution of Rwandan civil society was real but limited’. Certain critical civil society perspectives were only reflected in the Country Review Report following the visit of the country review team. This was mainly the result of low levels of representation in the Commission and in the self-assessment process (LDGL 2007: 10-12).

The independent external evaluation report summates the review process as a government-dominated process. Government officials dom-
inated the NGC, and the self-assessment relied predominantly on official data and documentation, rather than on citizen views. This also had the side-effect that the self-assessment report and NPoA did not stray far from national policies already implemented by the government (LDGL 2007: 13-15). Since the release of the report in 2006, Rwanda has prepared two progress reports in 2006 and 2007, respectively. Besides this, Rwanda initiated a joint governance assessment between the government and development partners.

**Analysis**

When regarding the case of Rwanda, it is possible to draw some conclusions regarding the similarities to the process for Ethiopia, as for both the review was mostly a government-dominated process. This relates particularly to the participatory aspects of the review and less to the peer review process at the Forum meeting, which seemed to have taken place in a far more amicable environment. This could possibly be explained by the fact that Rwanda was one of the pioneer countries acceding to the mechanism in 2003, and by the peer review process taking place a few years later only, when all the “founding fathers” were still in office (i.e. the presidents of South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt and Senegal). This would have provided a sufficient moral block of persuasion, contrasting with the case of Ethiopia, which went through the process in 2011 and in the presence of none of the founding fathers due to leadership changes in Nigeria and South Africa and the non-attendance of the other three countries. In addition, the position of Rwanda, which had emerged from a severe social and political crisis following the genocide, also possibly influenced the need to rebuild effectively its state institutions (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2005a: 29).

All of these factors could have played a role in the different nature of Rwanda’s peer review process. Related to this is the government’s preparation of two progress reports and its initiation of a joint governance assessment with its development partners. Although no progress reports were submitted after this, the country is preparing itself to undertake the periodic review, which shows a stronger political commitment to the process in comparison with Ethiopia.
6.3.3 The APRM application in Nigeria

The APRM process in Nigeria

Nigeria was a key architect of NEPAD and acceded to the APRM on 9 March 2003. From this moment onward, former president Olusegun Obasanjo chaired the APR Heads of State Forum until his departure from office in 2007. After its accession to the APRM, the government took the necessary steps to establish the national structures. In this regard, Nigeria appointed the Secretary to the Government of the Federation and Chief and Commanders of the Order of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as the national Focal Point. Following this, the country also established a national steering group (composed of 22 members) and a national working group (composed of 31 members) to oversee the implementation of APRM processes (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2009: 2).

After setting up the national structures, a Country Support Mission took place from 21-24 March 2005. However, the country encountered some problems in relation to managing and financing the diverse and complex research institutions selected to undertake the national self-assessment. A second support mission hence took place in October 2006. The situation was finally resolved when five lead research organisations were commissioned in the third and fourth quarters of 2006 with accessing the perceptions of Nigerian citizens on the quality of governance. The respective research organisations domesticated and adopted the master questionnaire and used four instruments to undertake the national self-assessment: desktop research; a household survey; interviews with elites or decision-makers; and focus group discussions. By the end of 2006, the draft Country Self Assessment Report and the NPoA were finalised (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2009: 2).

Following the elections in April 2007, President Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar’Adua took over office from President Olusegun Obasanjo. The new government adopted reforms in the APRM structures by appointing a new Focal Point and by expanding the national working group to 240 members. With the new structures in place, the country embarked on a process of validating the self-assessment by conducting stakeholder workshops and serialising the executive summary of the self-assessment report in national dailies and weeklies, as well as by using email and post-
al addresses to receive feedback on the draft themes of the report. Moreover, the draft NPoA was validated through two-phased consultations. The first phase occurred in November 2007, in 14 centres covering the 36 states of the Federation. This culminated in a national dialogue on both the self-assessment and the NPoA, held on 11 December 2007 under the chairmanship of President Yar’Adua. The national working group and the Federal Executive Council validated the self-assessment and the NPoA accordingly. The final self-assessment report and the draft NPoA were submitted to the Panel in January 2008 (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2009: 2-3).

Based on this, the Country Review Mission took place between February and March 2008. The review mission commenced with a public launch attended by President Yar’Adua and continued its engagements with federal structures and non-state actors in Abuja. Thereafter the team split up and covered the country by visiting 16 centres in total, meeting with representatives of the 36 states and interacting with state and non-state actors, including civil society actors, non-governmental organisations, labour organisations, professional bodies, traditional rulers, the media, academics, and private sector actors (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2009: 3).

**Horizontal and vertical pressure**

Following the finalisation of the report, the country underwent a peer review during the Heads of State Forum meetings in June and October 2008 (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2009: 503). The peer review commenced with a summary of the report outcomes and commended the government for having drafted a NPoA with an annual committed budget of US$20 billion (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2009: 506). Although a quite significant amount, this may be considered relatively small when considering the Gross Domestic Product of the country (Bing-Pappoe 2010: 9). Unlike the case of Rwanda and Ethiopia, the report does not include a formal response to the report content, but captures the comments of the President during the peer review. The Peer Review Report shows that the President appreciated the thoroughness of the process and audit exercise. He highlighted the credibility and integrity of the process and reaffirmed his commitment to the NPoA by further
creating more ownership through social and political buy-in. This would also engender public trust in governance in Nigeria (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2009: 506-507).

An independent external evaluation report of the APRM implementation process asserts that one of the critical aspects of the APRM, namely its participatory process, was also complicated in the case of Nigeria. The report asserts that, despite that a fairly wide range of organisations were included in the national working group, most of the self-assessment processes took place under the guidance of a group of organisations selected by the government. It suggests that there was a lack of confidence in the autonomy of the self-assessment process and that organisations wanted to undertake their own shadow assessments. Furthermore, civil society organisations were under the impression that the Focal Point was less enthusiastic about the technical competence and the professionalism with which the self-assessment was undertaken. These processes took place in the same period when national discussions on constitutional reform and the removal of constitutional limits for presidential elections took place (Jinadu 2008: 31). A sincere effort was made to sensitise the general public to the APRM; however, during the validation of the self-assessment report it became evident that there was a very low level of awareness of NEPAD and the APRM, albeit alongside a very high level of awareness of key governance issues in the country. There was also scepticism regarding whether the process would really result in the inclusion of more critical observations in the review report (Jinadu 2008: 32-33).

It is to be noted that Nigeria has since prepared two progress reports. However, the implementation of the NPoA has suffered from ‘structural/technical challenges; and individual, social and political issues’ (Khalil-Babatunde 2014: 2). Furthermore, one of the respondents knowledgeable on the processes in Nigeria explained that the NEPAD office in Nigeria only has limited staff and experienced difficulty following up on the implementation of the NPoA. When the time had come to submit the progress report, a list of questions was sent to the 36 states, but some offices did not even know what the APRM entailed. Hence, the progress report became a collection of outcome statements of other reports (Interview with governance academic, 23 July 2015). However, it is promis-
ing that the country is committed to undertaking the second periodic review.

The country is also currently preparing a peer review exercise at the state level in Nigeria, focused on monitoring performance in service provision (Interview with continental APRM Secretariat member, 28 July 2015). This is further explained on the NEPAD Nigeria website, which explains the implementation activities following the report as follows:

- ‘Periodic meetings with the State Coordinators and Focal Point Officers to brainstorm on their roles and responsibilities as participatory model of development management geared towards their involvement in the process of implementation, the last which was held at Nicon Luxury on the 13th of April 2014’;
- ‘Tracking of NPoA Programme/Projects in the Federal Ministries, Departments and Agencies since 2008’;
- ‘The peer review process has been adopted by State governments which the Nigeria Governors Forum (NGF) is conducting which are known as state-level peer assessments under the State Peer Review Mechanism (SPRM). This is a welcome development, which hopefully will be extended to the Local Government level in order to enhance the overall accountability within the federal structure’; and
- ‘The observation of Elections in the country since the 2011 general elections with the most recent being the Osun Gubernatorial election that was held on the 9th of August 2014’ (NEPAD Government Nigeria 2016).

Analysis

The participatory dynamics in Nigeria were quite similar to those observed for the cases of Ethiopia and Rwanda. For instance, the government was formally committed to having a broad representation of stakeholders, but most of the self-assessment process actually took place under the guidance of a group of organisations that the government selected. However, in contrast to the case of Ethiopia, the leaders embraced the report outcomes with more interest (similar to the case of Rwanda). This political commitment to the process and outcome could
further be explained by the position of Nigeria within the APRM architecture. Based on this, it would be unlikely that President Yar’Adua would publicly dismiss the process outcomes, as his predecessor, President Obasanjo, had heavily promoted this mechanism. Although the country has not fulfilled the regular reporting requirements, it seems to have adopted the peer review model as part of the state peer review mechanism, and is currently in the process of preparing for its second review. This further shows the commitment to and confidence and stake the government has in the mechanism. It is also important to consider these ambitions in the context of the country’s longstanding commitment to pan-African ideals and participatory processes within the broader context of democratic governance struggles (Jinadu 2008: 35).

6.3.4 The APRM application in Ghana

The APRM process in Ghana

Ghana, too, acceded to the APRM at the onset of the mechanism on 9 March 2003. Subsequently, the country started to prepare for the review by creating a Ministry of Regional Cooperation, and NEPAD in May 2003 assigned its head as the national Focal Point. Related to this was the setup of the national governing council, comprising qualified, esteemed professionals and public personalities who are independent from the government. The council appointed four national independent think tanks and research institutions for each of the APRM’s thematic areas and provided recommendations in drafting the NPoA. A Country Support Mission was organised in May 2004; during the visit the Minister of Regional Cooperation and NEPAD signed the MoU on the technical assessment. A national stakeholders forum and a three-day stakeholder workshop were organised during the visit, and a nationwide sensitisation campaign followed. The final consolidated self-assessment report and draft NPoA were submitted to the Secretariat in March 2005.

In the thereupon-following months, the Country Review Mission was undertaken in Ghana, and extensive consultations were conducted with various actors, including state officials, parliamentarians, political parties, and civil society members, such as from academia and the media, as well as representatives of business, trade and professional bodies. The mis-
tion concluded that there was a strong commitment to improving governance and also that the country served as an example to other countries, as it granted the governing council autonomy in executing its mandate. The self-assessment report drafted by the research institutions was also highly regarded (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2005b: 5-10). The final Country Review Report and the NPoA were submitted to the APRM Secretariat in June 2005, and the peer review of Ghana took place in January 2006 (Bing-Pappoe 2007: 16).

**Horizontal and vertical pressure**

Regrettfully, the peer review process is not summarised in the Country Review Report; however, the report does include the government’s response to the final report, which mostly raised points for clarification (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2005b: 10). An independent external evaluation report assessed the stakeholder participation and problematised it by showing that there were issues with balancing public awareness-raising and meaningful consultation. For instance, three civil society consultations had taken place to consider or validate the self-assessment, but many participants believed that these were not sufficiently broad and deep (a similar observation was made for Rwanda). Also, no mechanism was in place to assess whether comments raised during those meetings would be reflected in the report. In addition, three out of the four research institutions contracted to undertake the self-assessment were civil society organisations. Furthermore, concerns were raised regarding the inclusiveness of the council. In relation to monitoring the NPoA, innovative arrangements were developed (as for the case of Nigeria) by building a strategic partnership between the governing council and the National Commission on Civic Education, which together created a framework for the monitoring and evaluation of the NPoA. This programme also included capacity building of civil society organisations in monitoring and evaluation activities, as well as the design of tools such as Citizen Report Cards (Bing-Pappoe 2007: 1, 17).

Ghana’s commitment to the process is particularly evidenced, however, by the effort it made in regularly reporting on the implementation of the NPoA. It has presented nine progress reports on the APRM, and like Rwanda and Nigeria, it is preparing for its second APRM review.
Analysis
Ghana was the first country to complete the full process, and it has been able to set standards in many aspects. It has been lauded as a “shining example” in the APRM processes (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2005b: xi). This is evidenced, for example, in the way the governing council was innovatively set up by allowing for independence and autonomy. But possibly even more impressive is the seriousness with which the country reported on the NPoA, as this seems to be an issue for almost all peer-reviewed countries. Similar to Nigeria, it has extended the participatory dynamics of the APRM in the monitoring and evaluation of the Programme of Action. It is here where the stark contrast with the case of Ethiopia is most evident. Ghana’s commitment to the process and the outcomes could be explained by its long-standing devotion to pan-African ideals. It was one of the first African countries to gain independence following the colonial era, and it played a pivotal role in the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (APR Panel of Eminent Persons 2005b: 129).

6.3.5 Cross-case synthesis - the APRM application and developmentality
The Ethiopia country case study suggests that the APRM does not discipline adherence to its policy standards, firstly due to weak horizontal pressures resulting from the possibility to provide resistance to the influence of peers, and secondly due to weak vertical pressures, as these operate within established state-society frameworks. In replicating this main theme, it was expected that Rwanda and Nigeria would have similar observations, and for Ghana to be more receptive to the influence of peers and to provide a larger space for non-state actors to monitor the NPoA. This was predominantly informed by the political commitment to participatory frameworks of engagement in national processes. In each of the replication studies, the relevant chapter attempted to shed light on the respective process descriptions in the Country Review Reports and the availability of progress reports, as well as on external assessments of the participatory dynamics of the review and subsequent outcomes.
In replicating the findings to the cases of Rwanda, Nigeria and Ghana, it provided a first opportunity to further nuance and contextualise the observations raised for the case of Ethiopia. To be sure, all four countries acceded to the APRM in March 2003, but have had quite different trajectories. First, looking at the case of Rwanda, similar observations were to be made in relation to the participatory processes, which could be explained by the political environment in Rwanda that, similar to that of Ethiopia, allows for state-led development programmes (developmental states), with a strong role assigned to the government in steering national development. This strong government-led development approach did not result in a similar defensive approach in the peer review process, and Rwanda seemed to be more receptive and open to the mechanism, for instance evidenced by its failure to assume a defensive position (as Ethiopia did) during the peer review meeting, and by its willingness to undergo a second review process. This could be explained by the nature of the peer review meeting, which was quite different from that of Ethiopia. The peer review process was conducted in the time when the “founding fathers” were still present. In addition, Rwanda’s political “weight” also may have played a role in the need for it to be more receptive to the observations of its peers. Hence, the case of Rwanda suggests that the domestic environment is critical in providing that conducive environment for the participatory framework of the APRM, but also that political commitment to the process is a critical indicator for embracing the APRM principles.

The case of Nigeria was informative on participatory dynamics that merit further unpacking the indicator of voice and accountability as a variable to study different APRM processes and outcomes. Although Nigeria’s APRM process was not as open as, for instance, that of Ghana, it was more participatory than the government-dominated reviews of Ethiopia and Rwanda (in spite of having quite similar voice and accountability scores). Here, the more liberal nature of democracy and governance adopted could provide one concept to further consider in relation to participatory frameworks for voice and accountability. Participatory frameworks of governance as embraced in different political cultures, i.e. in liberal democracies or developmental states, influence the nature of these frameworks. It showed the importance of not just early accession, but also the role of Nigeria as a “founding father” of the mechanism.
Indeed, it is unlikely for any president that followed in the footsteps of President Obasanjo to go back on one of the key achievements in the pan-African narrative and, hence, the political commitment to the process and the approach to the peer review process was more open and receptive (than for instance in Ethiopia, although they had similar low voice and accountability scores).

Ghana, as expected, had one the most exemplary reviews on the continent (as compared to Ethiopia, Nigeria and Rwanda), and with a quite open and participatory review process and having conducted regular progress reports, distinguishes itself from all other APRM countries. Here, the concept of voice and accountability within more liberal democratic settings could also explain the government’s stance toward the domestic processes (although many problems were also reported). Despite the fact that Ghana was not a “founding father”, it has played similar roles in continental pan-African architectures, which could also explain its political commitment toward the process and outcomes.

Hence, the case studies further explain but also problematise the findings observed in the case study of Ethiopia. Weak inter-state disciplining of governments, or in the case of the APRM weak horizontal pressures on states, can further be explained and problematised as follows:

- Inter-state disciplining of governments is influenced by the relative political weight of a country in relation to that of others (i.e. the position of Rwanda in the Forum when compared to that of political heavyweights Ethiopia, Nigeria and Ghana);
- Inter-state disciplining of governments is influenced by the presence of the “founding fathers” in the Forum (i.e. their presence in the Forum supported the legitimacy and seriousness of the peer review process);
- Inter-state disciplining of governments is normatively influenced by the commitment to and importance given to the pan-African ideals (i.e. Ethiopia’s defence of pan-African concepts of democracy and governance in the Forum and adherence to the principles of the APRM as representative of pan-African ideals; Rwanda’s use of the APRM as a way to further seek the legitimacy of
its democratic institutions; and Ghana and Nigeria as key advocates of pan-African institutions); and

- Inter-state disciplining of governments is influenced by the motivation to further support political legitimacy; hence, a very critical report may fuel resistance (i.e. Ethiopia’s dismissing the findings of the report; Rwanda’s defending some of the governance approaches; and Ghana’s and Nigeria’s openness to critique despite possibly having less of a need to “prove” the state of democracy and political governance in their countries, which also could be indicative of their adherence to principles of liberal democracy).

Weak intra-state disciplining of the government, or in the case of the APRM, weak vertical pressures on the state (as these operate within established state-society engagements), can be further explained and problematised as follows:

- Intra-state disciplining of governments is influenced by the governance approach to national development, which influences the receptiveness of the government to external and more liberal narratives on democracy and political governance (Ethiopia’s and Rwanda’s adherence to developmental state models of governance in comparison to the more liberal democratic approaches embraced by Ghana and Nigeria, which differ in the importance and role assigned to non-state actors in national development processes).

By way of summarising these reflections regarding the application of the APRM process in Rwanda, Nigeria and Ghana, it is possible to expand the theoretical propositions as follows:

4b: The APRM process does not discipline African countries to adhere to its policy standards due to weak inter- and intra-state disciplining mechanisms;

4c: Inter-state disciplining is weak, as the peer review process primarily functions to give internal and external political legitimacy to the review process and outcomes; and
4d: Intra-state disciplining is weak, as the APRM operates within the confines of established state-society structures and does not attempt to alter these by mandating a participatory approach and a monitoring role for non-state actors.

These findings further contextualise the application and outcome of the APRM and, particularly, the reform logic it embraces. The APRM proposes a singular change process, which is applied in very different political contexts and could explain some of the different outcomes of the process. These political contexts influence the nature of the inter- and intra-state processes of disciplining governments, meriting further problematisation. Indeed, the different application and outcomes for the four case studies show the importance of looking more closely at the implicit assumptions that govern the mechanism, which also impact its outcomes. These implicit assumptions are based primarily on the idea that voluntary accession to the mechanism is an indicator of political commitment, and horizontal and vertical pressures operate within this similar context of political commitment to the process and outcomes. The four case studies show that these assumptions need to be unpacked further by paying attention to the different considerations in relation to inter-state discipline of government, namely political weight and the role of the “founding fathers” within the Forum, the normative principles of pan-Africanism, as well as the concept of political legitimacy, both internal and external. In relation to intra-state disciplining of government, it is important to further consider the nature of the political pact embraced between state and non-state actors, which is reflected in the approach to democracy and governance.

These implicit assumptions explain the disjuncture between, on the one hand, the APRM design, content and process and, on the other hand, its outcomes. The core vehicle upon which the APRM rests is political commitment, and voluntary accession to the mechanism shows this commitment. The problem is that while political commitment may be derived from a genuine motivation to improve governance, the limited outcomes of the reviews suggest that other considerations may play a critical role. It is therefore pertinent to look beyond the role of APRM as a mere technical tool of the African Union to improve governance, to consider greater strategic functions guiding its use.
6.4 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the overall application of the CPIA and APRM in different and similar governance contexts through an analysis of three country case studies of Rwanda, Nigeria and Ghana. It focused on answering the question: did similar or different dynamics influence the application of the CPIA and APRM in Rwanda, Nigeria and Ghana? In the case of the CPIA, the findings suggest that for the four country case studies, the CPIA is not the main factor determining the allocation of IDA resources. The analysis suggests that internal and external IDA administrative fund disbursement principles influence these processes. For all the country case studies, the partnership strategy described similar fund disbursement considerations. In the literal replication country case study of Rwanda, it was possible to see how both Rwanda and Ethiopia are able to effectively absorb and manage public funds (reflected in high Cluster D scores), which influences their ability to manage IDA funds and allows them to make use of the various flexibility arrangements within their IDA allocation. The theoretical replication country case studies of Ghana and Nigeria furthermore show the importance of considering levels of economic development and national income, as these influence how much of the funds are actually governed by IDA’s performance-based allocation system. These dynamics limit the ability of the CPIA to signal incentives through the performance-based allocation system of the IDA, as a result limiting the disciplining of Ghana, Nigeria and Rwanda to adhere to its policy standards.

In the case of APRM, the findings suggest that the nature of the drivers of change within the mechanism, namely the horizontal and vertical pressures applied to member states, influence the application and outcomes of the APRM. In the literal replication country case study of Rwanda, it was possible to note similar observations in relation to the participatory processes, which could be explained by the political environment in Rwanda, which, similar to that of Ethiopia, embraces state-led development programmes (developmental states), envisioning a strong role for the government in steering national development. The theoretical replication country case studies of Ghana and Nigeria further
show the importance of unpacking the indicator of voice and accountability and participatory frameworks as variables for studying different APRM processes and outcomes. Indeed, despite having quite similar voice and accountability scores, Nigeria’s APRM process was more participatory than the government-dominated reviews of Ethiopia and Rwanda. Here, the more liberal nature of democracy and governance adopted could provide one concept to further consider in relation to voice and accountability. Ghana, as expected, received one the most favourable reviews on the continent (in comparison to Ethiopia, Rwanda and Ghana), and with a more participatory review process and the regular submission of progress reports on theirNPoA implementation, distinguishes itself from all other APRM countries.

The case studies inform that the APRM process does not discipline African countries to adhere to its policy standards due to the weaknesses of the inter-state (horizontal) and intra-state (vertical) disciplining mechanisms. This is because the peer review process primarily functions to give internal and external political legitimacy to the review process and outcomes, and the mandatory participatory approach of the review does not alter established state-society dynamics. The issue is that the core vehicle of change within the review rests on the notion that countries that voluntarily submit their country for review are politically committed to the process. The problem with this is that, while political commitment may be derived from genuine motivations to improve governance, the limited outcomes of the reviews suggest that other considerations, too, may play a critical role.

Notes

1 ‘The ‘blend’ category is used to classify countries that are eligible for IDA resources on the basis of per capita income but also have limited creditworthiness to borrow from IBRD. Generally, given the access to both sources of funds, blend countries are expected to limit IDA funding to social sector projects (and use IBRD resources for projects in the ‘harder’ sectors). Moreover, as their creditworthiness increases, such countries should be able to take on more IBRD
financing, which in turn allows their access to IDA financing to be gradually reduced. Over time, this results in a gradual hardening of the blend ratio, preparing the country for the eventual graduation from IDA’ (IDA 2001: 1).


c. ‘Fourth Bi-Annual Progress Report January - June 2009, NAPRM-GC, June 2009’

d. ‘Ghana NGC 3rd Annual Progress Report, NAPRM-GC’


g. Second Annual Progress Report 2007 Progress In Implementation Of The National Programme Of Action, NAPRM-GC, December 2007


i. 4th Annual NPOA Progress Report (2009)
7 Strategic Functions of the CPIA and APRM

7.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the strategic functions of the CPIA and APRM. It focuses on answering the following research question: which strategic considerations inform the functions that the CPIA and APRM perform for the World Bank and the African Union? The analysis focuses on the strategic considerations of the World Bank and the African Union that influence the application of the CPIA and APRM and aims to provide a more comprehensive understanding of their functions and operation. The analysis brings together observations of practitioners (10 respondents) and academics (6) working in the areas of governance-promotion in Africa. Practitioners working at regional and research institutions such as the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the United Nations Development Program, the African Union and at think tanks focusing on governance were interviewed, as well as academics in the field of political science. Based on the professional experience of the respondents, the analysis presents evidence on the strategic considerations of the World Bank and the African Union that influence the overall application of the CPIA and APRM. Evidence originating from a document analysis of considerations influencing the CPIA and APRM applications further supports the analysis. These strategic considerations are examined through the analytical lens of developmentality (including relevant concepts drawn from the governmentality framework), and the theoretical propositions that guide the explanation of relevant dynamics further support the analysis.
7.2 Strategic considerations informing the functions of the CPIA

7.2.1 The formal function of the CPIA: increasing aid effectiveness

The previous chapters have shed light on the content, process, and outcomes of the CPIA. The CPIA formally serves to provide the Bank with, amongst others, critical input regarding the quality of public sector management and institutions in aid recipient countries. The IDA uses this information to inform decision-making on access to concessional lending and grants. This formal role builds on the thesis that aid is effective when provided in the presence of sound polices (Burnside and Dollar 1997: 3-4). While the CPIA was already initiated in the late 1970s, it has been used more recently as a formal instrument to assess governance, thereby providing critical input to decision-making processes of the Bank on the allocation of aid. Thus, the CPIA on the one hand builds on the Bank’s wish to increase the effectiveness of aid, and on the other hand supports this by providing inputs that inform the ability of the Bank to be more selective in its aid allocation strategies. Although aid selectivity principles do not directly engage in incentivising the behaviour of aid recipients (Collier 2005: 115-116), they do so more implicitly through aid dependency dynamics, increasing the political incentives of aid recipients to adopt the principles of good governance agenda. In other words, the CPIA and the selectivity principle it guides on aim to increase the political will to implement the appropriate governance frameworks.

However, this link between aid effectiveness, aid selectivity and creating incentives for reform can be contested on various grounds (Interviews with governance practitioner, 9 August 2015; 11 August 2015; 26 August 2015; 31 August 2015; 4 September 2015; and with governance academic, 21 July 2015; 5 August 2015; 25 August 2015). Countries with significant levels of dependency on aid could be persuaded to implement principles in line with the good governance tenets (Interviews with governance practitioner, 20 July 2015; 9 August 2015; 8 September 2015; and with governance academic, 24 July 2015). Others on the other hand may conduct a cost-benefit analysis based on the implications of refusing
governance reforms for accessing development funds (Interview with governance practitioner, 11 August 2015).

It remains problematic, however, for a government to be sincerely politically committed to an externally promoted governance agenda, particularly if initially it had not been convinced of its necessity. The assumption is that the financial dependence of aid recipients on the Bank could generate enough political commitment to implement reforms, but it is unclear how such dependence on aid may create enough incentives to counter already-present contestations against implementing governance reforms (Interview with governance practitioner, 9 August 2015). This is further complicated by the increased role and importance of non-traditional donors in development cooperation (Interview with governance practitioner, 11 August 2015):

I do not think these assessments provide an incentive. They worked reasonably well when foreign aid was a dominant capital inflow in Africa, but with investments taking on a larger role, they no longer have much influence on host governments in Africa. I do not think that the use of governance indicators ever was an incentive. They served more like sanctions when foreign aid mattered to these governments (Interview with governance academic, 21 July 2015).

Moreover, there is also incoherence when considering the principles of the new aid architecture centring on the concepts of ownership, partnership, and participation. These principles create a moral dilemma in this regard: concessional lending is critical in supporting socio-economic development in developing countries, but aid selectivity might push it away from those countries needing it the most (Interviews with governance practitioner, 24 July 2015; 26 August 2015). Thus, the formal function of the CPIA is to support the Bank in signalling the importance of aid effectiveness and the role that good policies and institutions play in ensuring the effectiveness of aid. However, it is unclear how this may work effectively, considering the different levels of aid dependence, the inability to address possible domestic contestations against reforms, the availability of finances provided through non-traditional donors, and the moral dilemma of this approach’s possibly redirection of aid away from
countries that need it the most. This begs the question: why does the Bank continue to pursue these objectives with aid recipients?

7.2.2 The informal function of the CPIA: increasing geo-political influence

Viewing aid allocation processes less as technical and neutral exercises and more as a political exercise allows for further insights into more informal functions of the CPIA. In particular, political considerations guiding aid allocation processes are influenced by geo-political considerations (Interviews with governance practitioner, 9 August 2015; and with governance academic, 21 July 2015; 5 August 2015; 5 August 2015):

Conditionality and selectivity are part of a larger context of global political actors that control the Bretton Woods institutions ... In this regard, an “undemocratic” government may still receive aid if this is of geo-strategic importance. Geo-politics override governance concerns. Ethiopia is a good example of this as a stabilising country in a turbulent region ... Governance assessments show a “surface level” of indicators, but there are subsets of geo-strategic considerations, which, if impacted, will override the first level of indicators (Interview with governance practitioner, 9 August 2015).

This suggests that it is impossible to understand the purpose of the motivation behind conducting the CPIA assessment without giving due consideration both to the identity and interests of those promoting it (Abrahamsen 1997: 145). Indeed, the political interests of the World Bank are intimately linked to the ‘global-institutional patterns of hegemony’ (Doornbos 2001: 96) and, as such, they are linked to powerful political interests within the international framework of the World Bank that influence its engagement with developing countries (Harrison 2005: 242). By bringing in these perspectives, it is possible to view development aid as a vehicle for the promotion of foreign policy objectives. These foreign policy objectives may override more formal aid selectivity criteria (Börzel and Hackensesch 2013: 540, Alesina and Dollar 2000: 33).
In this regard, the relative weight of the United States of America (USA) within the Board of Governors of the Bank, and the fact that almost all of its presidents have been American nationals, is also indicative of the Bank as an extension of the foreign state interests of, amongst others, the USA. This is for instance evidenced by the fact that the USA controls over 10% of the voting power within the IDA – the highest of all member states. This could suggest that the foreign agenda of particularly the USA may influence the Bank’s operations (Interview with governance academic, 5 August 2015). A prominent example of this concerns the manner in which the United States and its allies have used development aid as an instrument in the War on Terror (Frerks 2006: 7-8). This was for instance the case in Ethiopia, where the USA maintained high levels of development aid following the aftermath of the 2005 election, primarily due to the role Ethiopia had as a regional ally in the War on Terror (Borchgrevink 2008: 214-215, Fraser and Whitfield 2008: 18).

In this regard, it could be suggested that the CPIA functions not with the aim of authoritatively signalling standards and incentives, but as an instrument that allows it to engage in policy dialogues with recipients. It allows the Bank to manage its political relations with aid recipients, all the while reflecting both the formal position of the Bank as a rule-based organisation and its political role as an organisation aiming to generate influence in domestic policy arenas (Sending and Lie 2015: 1004). This engagement with aid recipients is critical, as the Bank draws its level of influence based on the dominant power relations it represents (Jonathan 2014: 12). The fate of these practices are ultimately decided by counter-hegemony (geo-political considerations) rather than counter-governmentality (good governance considerations) (Jonathan 2014:14).

7.3 Strategic considerations informing the functions of the APRM

7.3.1 The formal function of the APRM: increasing good governance

The previous chapters have shed light on the content, process, and outcomes of the APRM. The APRM formally serves to ensure that policies and practices of participating states adhere to standards related to
democracy and political governance, economic governance management, corporate governance, and socio-economic development. The mechanism operates based on the consideration that political commitment is critical for the adoption and implementation of standards, and that this further can be harnessed by relying on vertical (societal) and horizontal (peer) pressures. These processes are extremely complicated for numerous reasons. The horizontal peer review process is highly dependent on mutual trust between states, is grounded on a shared confidence in the process, and is conducted on non-adversarial basis (Pagani 2002: 4). However, the horizontal peer review process in the APRM has significant structural issues that influence the manner in which it is currently conducted (Interviews with governance practitioner, 20 July 2015; 22 July 2015; 9 August 2015; 26 August 2015; 4 September 2015; and with governance academic 23 July 2015; 24 July 2015). Yet this has not always been the case, as initially peers really were reviewing the performance of other states (Interview with governance practitioner, 20 July 2015). A governance practitioner said that

The peer review is at the heart of the APRM. It is the crux of the matter. It is about sharing lessons learned and best practices. The problem is that there is not much time allocated to the peer review process. A summary of the report findings is presented and then other presidents respond (Interview with governance practitioner, 22 July 2015).

The peer review process is framed within a context of comrades providing support to one another in the common pursuit of democracy and political governance, but it is problematic to view the peer review process as that of a meeting of equals based on egalitarian principles. Indeed, all member states are equals and hence peers in the review process, but some are “more equal than others” (Interview with governance practitioner, 11 August 2015). This means that in a space such as that of the Forum, it is difficult to ignore the “weight” of different states. This is particularly influenced by the sheer size of the country’s economy or political weight, which in turn influences the manner in which the different countries engage with one another.
The vertical pressures as applied by non-state actors in the review process and the subsequent monitoring of the NPoA are also problematic (Interviews with governance practitioner, 22 July 2015; 24 July 2015; 26 August 2015; 4 September 2015; and with governance academic, 23 July 2015; 24 July 2015). This is grounded in an implicit assumption that political commitment to the process would harness the engagement of non-state actors in the review process, but this is ultimately contingent on the democratic space provided within the state (Interviews with governance practitioner, 24 July 2015; 4 September 2015).

Oftentimes, civil society groups are demobilised as soon as the review is completed. This is in actuality the point where the real work starts. Even the governing council does not perform duties beyond supporting the development of the NPoA. This is a pity – this is where a more lively contribution from the NGC and civil society groups is needed to take the mechanism forward (Interview with governance practitioner, 26 August 2015).

This issue is further exaggerated, as there are concerns with the harmonisation of the NPoA in the context of national development programmes, particularly related to its internalisation, absorption, and costing. This further hinders the ability of non-actors actors to fulfil their monitoring roles (Interview with governance practitioner, 24 July 2015).

Hence, structural issues exist regarding the manner in which the drivers of change within the APRM are operationalised, but the constrained application and outcome of the process do not necessarily reflect the non-authenticity of its governance agenda (Interviews with governance practitioner, 20 July 2015; 22 July 2015; 24 July 2015; 9 August 2015; 11 August 2015; 26 August 2015; and with governance academic, 21 July 2015; 23 July 2015).

... Mutual respect comes from African dispute resolution mechanisms. Self-assessment comes from the idea not to critique. You are innocent until proven guilty – a home-grown idea to address justice (Interview with governance practitioner, 11 August 2015).
While APRM accession has not resulted in increased aid flows to member states (Interview with governance practitioner, 11 August 2015), serious concerns remain regarding the manner in which the APRM is operationalised. Indeed, while the ideals are African, the operationalisation is donor-driven. This is for instance reflected in the manner in which NEPAD and the APRM are financed. Donor funding of NEPAD comprises a little less than 80% of the total NEPAD budget (NEPAD n.d.: 18), while for the APRM member states contribute almost 75% of the funds used for its operations (ISS 2017).

The hand is that of Esau, but the voice that of Jacob (Interview with governance practitioner, 9 August 2015).

The APRM is African in theory and conceptualisation, but the implementation and sustainability is not (Interview with governance practitioner, 11 August 2015).

Thus, the formal function of the APRM is to support the African Union in achieving adherence to continentally-agreed governance objectives. However, the vertical and horizontal pressures upon which the mechanism relies so heavily are ineffective. This begs the question: why does the African Union continue to pursue these objectives and mechanisms within its member states?

### 7.3.2 The informal function of the APRM: increasing political legitimacy

The APRM continues to assume a prominent role in the African governance landscape and is intimately linked to “Agenda 2063”, reflecting the African Union’s most recent strategic blueprint for growth and sustainable transformation of the continent (African Union 2017). This may be surprising when considering the limited outcomes of the review, but less so if the issue of political legitimacy is brought in as important consideration motivating the review exercise. The interconnectedness between African states and the political forces in the global discourse on governance (Abrahamsen 2000: 1) are particularly exemplified in the manner in
even as recently as 10 October 2016, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon highlighted the importance of partnerships with the continent. He urged the international community to support African countries and mechanisms including the APRM in order to improve good governance on the continent (United Nations 2016). During the Africa week, the current chair of the APRM Panel also presented the review mechanism, sharing its achievements and highlighting the new APRM Strategic Plan for 2016-2020, which aims to strengthen the mechanism by adopting and adapting a ‘common tracking framework based on APRM tools for progress monitoring in respect of national programmes of action’. Furthermore, he explained that the current APR Forum Chairperson H.E. Uhuru Kenyatta – currently president of Kenya – is addressing the issue of non-membership through the revitalisation process by calling for the universal accession of all member states. Moreover, the member countries also agreed to double their annual contributions. Nevertheless, the mechanism ‘needs more funding to build more capacity to handle other emerging issues that need to be addressed. Some support will therefore be required for this noble cause … That is the contribution of APRM for Development, Peace and Security in Africa. We need your support’ (Mekideche 2006: 2-5).

This connection between the donor agenda and APRM agenda suggests that African countries are acting in a self-disciplined manner, exercise agency responsibly in a way that is consistent with international norms on governance (Abrahamsen 2004: 1461-1462). It is deemed appropriate, natural and necessary for African countries to commit to good governance, and this therefore also justifies and legitimises their respective governments.

7.4 Strategic functions of the CPIA and APRM and developmentality

The informal considerations that guide the use of the CPIA and APRM shed light on the discrepancy between the content, process and out-
comes of the reviews or, in other words, the discrepancy between the
discourse and practice that guide the assessments. One way to explain
this is by ‘inverting the conventional relation between policy and prac-
tice’ (Mosse 2004). If we consider that practice produces policy (rather
than the reverse), it would provide an explanation as to why develop-
ment actors aim to maintain ‘coherent representations regardless of
events’ (Mosse 2004: 640 as cited in Lie 2015a: 2-3). Policies then serve
to legitimise ‘existing dynamics, lopsided relations and practices and
show the power that ‘established development discourses and structures
might have’ (Lie 2015a: 3). It is therefore irrelevant whether the CPIA
fulfils its formal objectives regarding increasing aid effectiveness or not.
As policies aim to reinforce the practice of the Bank’s possessing the
power to assert influence and control over aid recipients, it is irrelevant
whether this influence is actually limited in practice.

This analysis could also be applied to the APRM member states. Both
donors and the African Union consider the APRM to be very important
for the pursuit of democracy and political governance, but both the do-
ners and the African Union also understand that member states seem to
just be going through the motions. This can be explained by viewing the
APRM as a response to the normalisation of good governance and to the
coercive formal and informal pressures that are exerted on the continent
as a result of this. But possibly more accurate would be to view this as a
form of collusion (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 150), not only on the part
of the member states, but also on the side of the donors. Committing to
and supporting a governance assessment instrument that lacks any hard
compliance tools allows member states to keep up the appearance of
nominally accepting the good governance discourse, and for donors to
keep up the appearance of their discourse influencing the policies and
practices of African countries. These dynamics represent a normalisation
and reinforcement of existing dynamics, relations and structures between
the West and the Bank, on the one hand, and the African Union and its
member states, on the other hand. It legitimises the roles they perform in
development cooperation, with the donor perpetuating its role as posses-
sor of wisdom regarding development that developing countries are “in
need of”.

By way of summarising these reflections regarding the informal and formal functions of the CPIA and APRM, it is possible to expand theoretical propositions 5a and 5b as follows:

5a: The CPIA formally aims to increase aid effectiveness, but informally serves as an instrument of the World Bank to increase its geo-political influence. This discrepancy between the discourse and practice of the CPIA functions to normalise and reproduce already-existing structures, practices and relations that define international development cooperation.

5b: The APRM formally aims to increase good governance, but informally serves as an instrument to increase the political legitimacy of the member states of the African Union. This discrepancy between the discourse and practice of the APRM functions to normalise and reproduce already-existing structures, practices and relations that define international development cooperation.

7.5 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the strategic functions of the CPIA and APRM. It focused on answering the question: which strategic considerations inform the functions the CPIA and APRM perform for the World Bank and the African Union? It brought together observations of practitioners and academics working in the areas of governance-promotion in Africa and complemented these observations with evidence originating from a document analysis. In the case of the CPIA, the analysis suggests that while formally the CPIA functions to increase aid dependency, informally it aims to increase the geo-political influence of the Bank and the actors it represents. In the case of the APRM, the analysis suggests that, while formally the APRM functions to improve governance on the continent, informally it aims to increase the political legitimacy of African member states. This discrepancy between the content, process and outcomes of the CPIA and APRM – the disjunction between discourse and practice – may be explained by the need of both the Bank and the African Union to normalise and reproduce already-existing structures, practices and relations that define international development cooperation.
8 Conclusion

8.1 Emerging findings

This study aimed to critically examine the manner in which the CPIA and APRM discipline governance standards on the African continent. It sought to understand how the content, process and outcomes of the CPIA and APRM support or challenge the good governance agenda, the relation of these mechanisms to aid, and the implications for power relations between the World Bank and the African Union. It relied on the developmentality framework to provide insights into these particular dynamics, arguing that donors are exercising indirect control over aid recipients, governing at distance, and holding developing countries responsible for the conduct of their own affairs by inscribing in them a particular mentality of development leading to the exercise of self-control.

The study showed that governance standards are given shape in the content and design of the CPIA and APRM. CPIA content comprises discursive frames on good governance that reflect the norm that (good) governance is central to sustainable development and aid effectiveness. CPIA content moreover represents a technology to advance the Bank’s framework of thinking on governance. The CPIA is designed as a form of indirect rule of the World Bank over aid recipients. This comprises a productive power, as the Bank generates knowledge on the performance of the aid recipient and uses the performance-based allocation system as a discursive practice to incentivise proper conduct. This approach aims to hold aid recipients responsible for achieving the appropriate conduct and to improve performance within the frames set forth by the CPIA assessment. Similarly, APRM content comprises African discursive
frames on good governance that considers a more political operationalisation of governance and incorporates African standards as reference. However, the APRM is designed as a form of counter-rule against external influences on the African development agenda, reflecting a form of resistance as it uses similar language, frames, methods and discursive spaces to those of donors to present a counter-approach and -method to promoting governance. This also aims to counter the negative governance brand of the continent.

The study firstly analysed the application of the CPIA and APRM assessments by means of an in-depth country case study of Ethiopia. The analysis showed that donors use the CPIA as a technology of surveillance to assess adherence to the good governance norm and to generate knowledge on the conduct of Ethiopia. This practice of surveillance standardises governance norms across aid recipient countries, and at the same time individualises these to specific country contexts, such as that of Ethiopia. The CPIA monitored the conduct of Ethiopia by assessing its adherence and deviance to its governance standards. This rating process established norms in relation to public sector management and institutions. Furthermore, the knowledge generated from the assessment formally informed the IDA development finance allocation. However, the case study of Ethiopia shows that inter-state disciplining of the Ethiopian government is limited due to the absence of dialogue on the rating process, indicating a form of resistance on the side of the government. The analysis of the application of the APRM assessment in Ethiopia showed that the process monitored Ethiopia’s adherence to African governance norms and generated knowledge on its policies and practices. However, the Ethiopian government controlled the assessment process and dismissed the findings of the report. Therefore, the analysis concluded that the inter- and intra-state discipline mechanisms of the APRM were rather weak. Furthermore, the review process gave an initial indication that the process also reflected a response to the global normalisation of good governance and indicated a wish by the government to be “branded” as committed to good governance.

The analysis also examined the outcomes of the CPIA and APRM assessments in Ethiopia. In relation to the CPIA, the analysis showed that the translation of the Bank’s knowledge to power over the aid recipient
Conclusion

was ineffective, as the Bank did not make the appropriate connection between norms, performance and punishment/reward. In particular, the analysis showed that the CPIA is only one of several factors determining the final IDA country allocations. As a result of this, the CPIA process did not discipline the government to adhere to its policy standards by engendering self-optimisation. Another explanation for this limited result was proposed by focusing on Ethiopia’s relation with donors. In this regard, the analysis suggested that Ethiopia is actually quite adept in “managing” its engagements with donors and had been able to resist adopting governance standards it did not deem appropriate. Moreover, the presence of proper structures of financial management paradoxically also positively influenced the ability of Ethiopia to benefit from annual IDA reallocations. Similarly, outcomes in the case of the APRM also were limited and did not discipline Ethiopia to adhere to its governance standards. The inter- and intra-state disciplining of the government was weak, as the horizontal peer pressures were limited in persuading the government to accept the governance standards, and vertical societal pressures were limited due to the confines of restrictive state-society structures. The findings suggested that, rather than challenging external development strategies and coercive financial pressures, the APRM process represented a form of institutional isomorphism and continental branding of African values on governance that internalised the normalisation of good governance.

The study then used the salient observations from the case study investigation of Ethiopia and replicated this to three secondary country case study analyses of Rwanda, Nigeria and Ghana. In relation to the CPIA, the analysis explained that, similar to the case of Ethiopia, the translation of knowledge to power over the aid recipients was ineffective for these countries, as the Bank did not make the appropriate connection between norms, performance and punishment/reward. This was because the CPIA score is only one factor of several determining the final IDA country allocations. Furthermore, the case studies showed that the dynamics regarding the ability to effectively absorb IDA finance and the relative level of economic development and national income also influenced these processes; as a result, the CPIA assessment was also limited in disciplining Ghana, Nigeria and Rwanda to adhere to its policy standards.
In relation to the APRM, the analysis showed that the process, similar to the case of Ethiopia, did not discipline Ghana, Nigeria and Rwanda to adhere to its policy standards due to weak inter- and intra-state disciplining mechanisms. Inter-state disciplining was weak, as the peer review process primarily functioned to give internal and external political legitimacy to the review process and outcomes. In particular, it was influenced by dynamics related to the relative political and economic weight of a country, the presence of the “founding fathers” in the Forum, and the commitment and importance assigned to the pan-African ideals. Intra-state disciplining was weak, as the APRM domestic processes operated within the confines of established state-society structures and did not alter these by mandating a participatory approach and a monitoring role for non-state actors. In particular, it was influenced by the governance approach to national development, which in turn was influenced by dynamics related to the receptiveness to external and more liberal narratives on democracy and political governance.

The discrepancy between the content, process and outcomes of the CPIA and APRM alluded to other strategic considerations that influenced their application. The analysis showed that the CPIA functions formally to increase aid effectiveness, but informally operates as a tool of the Bank to increase its geo-political influence over aid recipients. In the case of the APRM, the analysis suggested that while the APRM formally functions to strengthen governance on the continent, it informally supports member states to increase their political legitimacy. This disjunction between the Bank’s discourse and practice, on the one hand, and that of the African Union, on the other hand, could be explained by understanding these assessments as instruments that serve to normalise and legitimise existing dynamics, structures and practices that govern the power relations between these actors.

These overall findings of the research suggest that while the content of the CPIA and APRM support the good governance agenda, the processes and outcomes are actually in disjunction to this discourse and do not influence aid allocation processes. This is because the processes and outcomes of the CPIA and APRM are used as instruments of the Bank
and the African Union to normalise, legitimise and reproduce development structures that govern the power dynamics between the West and the Bank, on the one hand, and the African Union and its member states, on the other. By relying on the developmentality framework, it is possible to view this paradox as being logically connected. Moreover, it shows the importance of critically analysing past, present and future development policies and instruments as representations of discourses that use truth and knowledge to legitimise power relations within the aid system (Escobar 1984: 392).

### Table 8.1

*Propositions on the CPIA and APRM*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-question one: How are governance standards given shape in the content and design of the CPIA and APRM?</th>
<th>Sub-question two: How have the CPIA and APRM assessment processes been conducted in Ethiopia?</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• 1a: CPIA content comprises discursive frames on good governance. These frames reflect the norm that (good) governance is central to sustainable development and to aid effectiveness. CPIA content represents a technology to advance the Bank's framework of thinking on governance. • 1b: The CPIA is designed as a form of indirect rule of the World Bank over aid recipients (productive power). This comprises a productive power, as the Bank generates knowledge on the performance of aid recipients (through the CPIA rating) and uses the performance-based allocation system as a discursive practice to incentivise “proper” conduct. This approach aims to hold aid recipients responsible for achieving appropriate conduct (in the eyes of the Bank) and to improve performance within the frames set forth by the CPIA assessment.</td>
<td>• 2a: The CPIA is a technology of surveillance (auditing/monitoring) that assesses adherence to • 2g: The APRM is a voluntary monitoring mechanism that assesses adherence to African governance norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 1c: APRM content comprises African discursive frames on good governance that consider a more political operationalisation of governance and incorporates African standards as reference. • 1d: The APRM is designed as a form of counter-rule (resistance) against external influences on the African development agenda. This design reflects a form of resistance, as it uses similar language, frames, methods and discursive spaces as that of the donors to present a counter-approach and -method to promoting governance. This also aims to counter the negative governance brand of the continent.</td>
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the good governance norm and generates knowledge on aid recipient conduct.

- 2b: The CPIA is a technology of surveillance that standardises governance norms across aid recipient countries, but at the same time individualises these to respective country contexts.
- 2c: The CPIA monitors the conduct of aid recipients by assessing deviance from standards.
- 2d: The CPIA rating process establishes norms in relation to public sector management and institutions.
- 2e: CPIA knowledge on aid recipient conduct informs the IDA finance allocation.
- 2f: The CPIA inter-state discipline between the Bank and Ethiopia is limited due to the absence of dialogue on the rating process, which indicates a form of resistance on the side of the government (resistance).

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<tr>
<th>Sub-question three: How have CPIA and APRM applications influenced the promotion of related governance standards in Ethiopia?</th>
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<tr>
<td>3a: The translation of knowledge to power over the aid recipient is ineffective, as the Bank does not make the appropriate connection between norms, performance and punishment/reward. The CPIA is only one of several factors determining the final IDA country allocations. As a result, the CPIA process does not discipline Ethiopia to adhere to its policy standards by engendering self-optimisation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3b: Ethiopia is adept in “managing” its engagements with donors and has been able to resist adopting governance standards it does not deem appropriate. This level of autonomy is also grounded in the presence of proper structures of financial management, which paradoxically positively influence the ability of Ethiopia to benefit from annual IDA reallocations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3c: The APRM process does not discipline African countries to adhere to its policy framework.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3d: Inter-state disciplining of the government is weak, as the Forum can be a space for openly dismissing report outcomes or indirectly retaining legitimacy by nominal compliance, reflected in subjection to the review process without strong compliance regarding progress reports.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3e: Intra-state disciplining is weak, as the APRM operates within the confines of established state-society structures and does not alter these by mandating a participatory approach and a monitoring role for non-state actors.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3f: Rather than challenging external development strategies and coercive financial pressures exerted by donors, the APRM seems to have internalised the good governance agenda. The APRM is an example of institutional isomorphism and continental branding of African values on governance that internalise the normalisation of good governance.</td>
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and generates knowledge on policies and practices of African countries.

- 2h: Voluntary accession to the APRM is an indicator of political commitment to African governance norms.
- 2i: The APRM process monitors adherence to African governance norms, but this does not necessarily translate into adherence to the review’s principles (i.e. government control of the process); as a result, the intra-state discipline of the mechanism could be considered weak.
- 2j: The APRM review generates knowledge on policies, but this does not necessarily translate into the acceptance of its standards (i.e. resistance of the government by dismissing review findings); as a result, the inter-state discipline of the mechanism could be considered weak.
- 2k: It could be suggested that the APRM process responds to the global normalisation of good governance, as indicated by a wish to “brand” and collectively pursue democracy and political governance on the continent.

Sub-question three: How have CPIA and APRM applications influenced the promotion of related governance standards in Ethiopia?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-question four: Did similar or different dynamics influence the application of the CPIA and APRM in Rwanda, Ghana and Nigeria?</th>
<th>Sub-question five: Which strategic considerations inform the functions that the CPIA and APRM perform for the World Bank and the African Union?</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>4a:</strong> The translation of knowledge to power over the aid recipient is ineffective, as the Bank does not make the appropriate connection between norms, performance and punishment/reward. This is because the CPIA score is only one of several factors determining the final IDA country allocations. As a result, the CPIA assessment is limited in disciplining Ghana, Nigeria and Rwanda to adhere to its policy standards.</td>
<td><strong>4b:</strong> The APRM process does not discipline African countries to adhere to its policy standards due to weak inter- and intra-state disciplining mechanisms. <strong>4c:</strong> Inter-state disciplining is weak, as the peer review process primarily functions to give internal and external political legitimacy to the review process and outcomes. <strong>4d:</strong> Intra-state disciplining is weak, as the APRM operates within the confines of established state-society structures and does not alter these by mandating a participatory approach and a monitoring role for non-state actors.</td>
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**5a:** The CPIA formally aims to increase aid effectiveness, but informally serves as an instrument of the World Bank to increase its geo-political influence. This discrepancy between the discourse and practice of CPIA functions to normalise and reproduce already-existing structures, practices and relations that define international development cooperation. **5b:** The APRM formally aims to increase good governance, but informally serves as an instrument to increase the political legitimacy of the member states of the African Union. This discrepancy between the discourse and practice of the APRM functions to normalise and reproduce already-existing structures, practices and relations that define international development cooperation.
Appendices

Appendix 1
List of interviewees

Interviews on CPIA with:

- World Bank, Ethiopia Country Officer on 16 July 2015 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia;
- World Bank, Ethiopia Country Officer on 21 July 2015 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia;
- World Bank, Ethiopia Country Officer on 21 July 2015 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia;
- World Bank, Ethiopia Country Officer on 4 August 2015 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; and
- World Bank, Washington D.C. Head Quarter Officer on 17 September 2015 via Skype.

Interviews on APRM with:

- Ethiopia Government representative on 11 September 2015 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia;
- Ethiopia National Governing Council Member on 29 July 2015 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia;
- APRM Country Review Mission Member on 23 July 2015 via Skype;
- APRM Country Review Mission Member on 30 July 2015 via telephone;
- APRM Country Review Mission Member on 31 July 2015 via email;
• APRM Country Review Mission Member on 2 October 2015 via email;
• APRM Continental Secretariat Member on 28 July 2015 via Skype;
• APRM Continental expert on 21 July 2015 via Skype;
• APRM Continental expert on 30 July 2015 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia;
• APRM Continental expert on 31 July 2015 via Skype;
• APRM National expert on 29 July 2015 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia;
• APRM National expert on 16 September 2015 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; and
• Civil society actor on 1 September 2015.

Interviews on Governance Assessments with Practitioners

• United Nations Development Program, Regional Service Center for Africa on 22 July 2015 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia;
• United Nations Office to the African Union on 16 September 2015 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia;
• United Nations Economic Commission for Africa on 24 July 2015 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia;
• The African Capacity Building Foundation on 20 July 2015 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia;
• International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance on 9 August 2015 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia;
• African Union Commission, African Governance Architecture Platform on 11 August 2015 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia;
• African Union Commission, African Governance Architecture Platform on 4 September 2015 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia;
• African Union Commission, Department of Political Affairs on 26 August 2015 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia;
• World Bank, Public Sector and Governance Group (former member) on 2 September 2015 via Skype; and
• World Bank, Global Governance Practice, on 8 September 2015 via Skype.
Interviews on Governance Assessments with Academics:

- Nigerian Turkish Nile University, Nigeria on 23 July 2015 via Skype;
- University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa on 24 July 2015 via Skype;
- Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia on 5 August 2015 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia;
- Cornell University, United States of America on 25 August 2015 via Skype;
- Overseas Development Institute, United Kingdom on 31 August 2015 via email; and
- University of Florida, United States of America on 21 July 2015 via email.
Appendix 2
Interview Questions

Interview Questions on the CPIA in Ethiopia:

a. As you know, the first part of the process of preparing the CPIA concerns a benchmarking phase in which a representation of countries is drawn from all regions and rated accordingly. Could you provide more information on the process through which the benchmarking countries are selected? Has Ethiopia been a benchmark country, and was this Bank office involved in the ratings for each criterion and written justifications?

b. The second process concerns the rating of the remaining countries, in which the benchmarked countries and their respective countries are used as guideposts (including both as sources of information and as guiding indicators). Could you elaborate on the process through which the Bank office prepares the annual CPIA score for Ethiopia? Which offices are involved? Which sources are used? Who in the office has the final say in the rating?

c. The guideposts (suggested indicators) present an anchor in the ratings; however, there also other considerations to take into account in the rating process: the level of performance against certain criteria, not the degree of improvement against the same criteria; policy actions and implementation (including relevance and the manner in which policies are implemented and their institutions), in contrast to intentions or commitments; and, finally, the size of the economy. This seems like a very difficult undertaking, as government action does not take place within a vacuum. Could you explain how the Bank staff may objectively assess Cluster D for Ethiopia, while taking into considerations all these difficult contexts?

d. Interestingly, there may be an incentive for staff to increase the rating, as this may lead to increased funding for projects supported in
Ethiopia. Therefore, how is the objectivity of the rating guaranteed (in spite of the officer making the rating)?

e. Some of the final steps include the presentation of the draft ratings to the government. How does this process take shape, and has this in some cases provided supplementary information to modify the rating accordingly? Does the government accept the various critical ratings?

f. The final ratings are again presented to the government. Could you elaborate on how the annual ratings are translated into the Bank’s programme for Ethiopia? Are specific concerns addressed in separate, specific strategies? The Country Strategy Paper is a multi-year paper – how may annual ratings of the CPIA affect this?

g. Cluster D focuses on Property Rights and Rule-based Governance; Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management; Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization; Quality of Public Administration; and, lastly, Transparency, Accountability and Corruption in the Public Sector. Some critics may say that this is a somewhat narrow perspective on governance that leaves out political dimensions regarding the way countries are governed. Do you think that such other aspects, i.e. those related to democracy, should be included in the review?

h. As annual ratings cannot be compared (due to the changing underlying guideposts), and because governments cannot firmly see the direct connection between CPIA scores and access to credit, do you believe then that this may still provide a sufficient incentive for Ethiopia to improve its governance environment?

i. How could the CPIA be further strengthened to better achieve its objectives regarding the promotion of governance in Ethiopia? Which other factors should be taken into consideration?
j. Do you feel that African governance assessments such as the APRM may provide an example to the CPIA, as they focus more on structural deficiencies and on contextual factors, in addition to placing the government in the driver seat of governance reform and ownership?

Interview Questions on the APRM in Ethiopia:

a. As you may know, Ethiopia acceded in 2003, but the process did not get off the ground until 2008. The government was designated as the Focal Point for NEPAD/APRM activities, and a special advisor to the Prime Minister was appointed as the APRM National Focal Point. Moreover, a council of ministers Regulation No. 142 was formed to guide the implementation of the APRM processes in Ethiopia. Can you provide insights into the motivations for the Ethiopian government to join the APRM and its dedication to the spirit of the process?

b. A National Governing Council was established and was led by then-Minister of Capacity Building. As the report notes, it was composed of representatives from the government, the opposition, civil society, and the private sector. Do you feel that the council operated autonomously, inclusively (diversity of stakeholders), and representatively, encouraging broad-based participation as theoretically intended?

c. The self-assessment was undertaken by the African Institute of Management Development and Governance, which engaged with six research instruments including 4,620 household surveys and expert opinion surveys, and organised consultative forums across regions. Do you feel that the draft report provided an adequate representation of the democratic and political landscape of Ethiopia? What could have been improved regarding the process or content?

d. This self-assessment report and draft National Plan of Action were handed over to the external Country Review Mission team, which
also interacted with a wide array of actors according to the report. What is your opinion on the level of participation and interaction? Was there a broad level of participation, and could a wide array of actors contribute to the content? If not, which elements should have been included or addressed?

e. The final report was tabled during the 14th session of the APR Forum of Heads of State in January 2011. Do you believe that the content on “Democracy and Political Governance” reflects an adequate description of the state of affairs, or have key issues been excluded?

f. Do you think that the National Plan of Action related to democracy and political governance presents an adequate policy strategy for concerns addressed in the report? If not, what would have been matters that should have been addressed?

g. As you may know, the report became only available to the public in January 2013, and the government of Ethiopia has since not presented any mandatory progress report. Why do you think this was the case?

h. As the APRM process hinges on the application of vertical pressure (from civil society) and horizontal pressure (from other participating states), how would you assess the ability/possibility of Ethiopian non-state actors to monitor the implementation of governance commitments set forth in National Plan of Action? Which barriers to their monitoring capacity exist? How could these be circumvented? Did the UNECA Secretariat provide support or training? What other role could the APRM play in increasing the participation of non-state actors?

i. Do you think that other African countries (peers) can pressure the government of Ethiopia to implement commitments set forth in the National Plan of Action? What would be the main obstacles or concerns?
j. Do you feel that democracy and political governance in Ethiopia have been strengthened because of the APRM process? Which other factors/incentives can further strengthen this process?

k. Some critics believe that the APRM is simply a tool for African governments to appease Western governments and financial institutions, as the initiative lacks the necessary teeth to enforce change. What are your thoughts on this characterisation? Or, relatedly, how African is the African Peer Review Mechanism?

l. What is your opinion on external governance reviews, for instance of the World Bank, that aim to influence governance in Ethiopia by making aid conditional to having a strong good governance arrangement in the country? Would such a financial incentive be a more appropriate tool to stimulate governance reform?

Interview Questions on Governance Assessments in Africa:

a. Could you elaborate on your experience with and/or knowledge of governance assessments in Africa?

b. As you may know, governance assessments are important for donors to assess the improvement of aid recipients in the area of good governance. Interestingly, the World Bank and other major donors are using these assessments scores (such as the CPIA) as the basis for decision-making on aid. Do you feel that this type of aid selectivity provides the necessary incentives for African governments to further strengthen their governance frameworks? Can you elaborate with examples?

c. How may this incentive, which is primarily based on access to finance, stimulate the development of sincere improvements of governance in a country? In other words, can financial motivations create sufficient grounds for governments to sincerely address governance deficiencies? Can you also elaborate with examples? Are there further examples of the impact of the process you may know?
d. Alternatively, the African Peer Review Mechanism, with its focus on horizontal and vertical pressures and government-owned plans of action, may provide a more comprehensive and holistic approach to governance. Do you believe that the peer review provides the necessary pressures on African governments to further strengthen their governance framework? If yes/no, why?

e. Do you believe that non-state actors can participate and monitor the agreed National Plan of Action? If yes/no, why? Can you also elaborate by providing some examples? Are there further examples of the impact of the process you may know?

f. Some critics argue that the APRM, although according to NEPAD rooted in African Renaissance ideas, is merely a framework to appease Western governments and interests in promoting governance. A striking example concerns the accession of blatantly undemocratic regimes. How would you assess the purpose of the APRM and the reason why states voluntarily accede? How “African” is the African Peer Review Mechanism?

g. How can governance assessments stimulate appropriate governance reform and the institutionalisation of good governance? Which actors should be involved? What specific roles can external actors, i.e. Western donors or the African Union, play in this regard?

h. Which other factors influence the adoption of governance policy reforms?
References


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On 16 November 2017 Mrs. Saba Kassa will be defending her Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) degree at the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS) of Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands. In the last four years she has been working on her thesis titled “Disciplining Governance in Africa. A comparison of the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment and the African Union’s African Peer Review Mechanism. Saba holds a Bachelors and Masters degree in Public Administration from Erasmus University Rotterdam and a Masters degree in International Development Studies from the University of Amsterdam.

Saba is an associate researcher with the Basel Institute on Governance in Switzerland. She supports the public governance division in the development and implementation of its various research and technical support projects. Prior to this, Saba worked for several international organisations in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, including the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa; the German Ministry for International Cooperation and the International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance.

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