

Politics of Flight

A Philosophical Refuge

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Politics of Flight
A Philosophical Refuge

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For PM

For each word that we have truly shared ...

Either I am a nobody, or I am a nation

(Walcott, 2007, p. 114).

Preface: Crowded Lonesome Road

Our triumphs can never compensate for this. Perhaps our triumphs are not even the point. Perhaps struggle is all we have because the god of history is an atheist, and nothing about his world is meant to be. So you must wake up every morning knowing that no promise is unbreakable, least of all the promise of waking up at all. This is not despair. These are the preferences of the universe itself: verbs over nouns, actions over states, struggle over hope (Coates, 2015, pp. 70-71)

Prefaces are always written in the end, perhaps because only in the end one knows how to start, or should have started. These a-chronic and a-synchronic starting words are meant to charm the reader into an investigating journey that has already ended; it is an act of seduction where promises are made for future and innovative questions, although answers will never come. The ecstasy of philosophy is its mad play with the new, which is always old, with the unwanted answers and forever delayed comforts. And perhaps it was this permanent postponement of ease to find an answer to the tragedy of refuge and statelessness in our time that has clogged my will to finish this dissertation. Each day the roads of those who leave their homes in order to live get more and more congested. So, who am I to make a sincere remark on the matter.

Who am I? Am I a thinker or a refugee? The experience of flight, fleeing from one place to another in order to save my life, gave birth to my master thesis, my application for NWO (The Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research) and has empowered the endurance of this research. The fact that my personal experiences intertwine with my philosophical reflections is neither really surprising – I was once upon a time a refugee - nor exceptional – it is the consequence of loving (*filo*) wisdom (*sophia*) of a life. With Giorgio Agamben in mind, I state that *each philosopher must recognize the personal experiences that form and deform the topology of one's thought*. This primordial scene is in some cases more than obvious and in other cases so hidden that one easily claims objectivity. In the case of this book, there is a clear indication of an intrinsic relation between my personal experiences and the written words. This personal involvement, nevertheless, does not make this dissertation a personal and subjective research of a self, a self-reflection in a psychological sense. This investigation is neither more subjective nor more objective than any other research on the notion of *flight* or the notion of *other*. So, although the event of flight has affected me as a writer on a personal level, the experience and reflections upon this experience are not the property of a self. The notion of flight rather functions in a political milieu: meaning a network of theoretical and political reflections. Fortunately, during the process of this research, the exclusiveness of the *I* of this writer is rather lost than found, but without abnegating the experience.

Still, it was the complexity of this experience that stagnated my ability to put an end to this long road of investigation. While I started this study with the raw childlike political hope to find vocabulary for the experience of refuge, for the past ten years my writing has rather been characterized by stuttering gestures. A lot has changed. Political atmosphere in Europe has become more hostile since my arrival. There is this painful realization that my words have nothing to add to the intensity of exclusion of our time, my efforts will not save a single refugee. The stagnation endured until in a conversation with my co-supervisor Henk Oosterling I realized that I was not speaking to the excluded ones. They never were in need of intellectuals to comprehend the intensity of their experiences. My writings are meant to give in to the critical task of philosophy to extend the academic thinking. I make an appeal to philosophy to generate a new rhetoric for the political discourse of our time beyond the cynicism of disappointed idealists and the fear of populists. Philosophy's affirmation in our time is its capacity to unlock a new language in which ambiguity and difference become potent elements to create new forms of relationality. For this strategic discursive act, philosophy needs a form of alertness, not only toward the world, but also toward itself. Philosophy must implement an attitude in life, in which theory and practice are intertwined. Philosophy's involvement is in Agamben's words its capacity to create new gestures of communicability in order to commune differently.

We¹ are always part of a community, even in the loneliest hours of writing. Societies form and deform us as we are. My contemporary home, The Netherlands, seems to make a name in the world by anti-refugee slogans. This country is, however, as pluralistic as any other place. It was the belief and funding of initiators of project Mozaïek of The Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) that created the opportunity for me to write these pages. In their care for equal academic opportunities for minorities they made these types of intellectual exercises possible. I am forever grateful for their confidence in me.

A home is a world; a country; a city; and sometimes simply a family. I am fortunate to be a child of Haydeh and Reza. With their intellectual, emotional and daily support they have given me a sense of belonging. Their belief in change and their intense love of the world have made me to never give up the will to fight. Belonging is what we long for, a longing that is present in a sister's love for her brothers: my older brother Nima, who has always been there for me my whole life, through war, exclusion, flight and survival; and my younger brother Sina, who could sense what I feel on the other side of the world, the impossible child of war who showed us to surpass the tragedies.

Families extend and families are individuals that we want to call family. I am thankful for my sister-in-law Esther, for her sweet words and her immense sense of optimism, and the strength of my adopted sister Afra Rooble who has always reminded me to live rather than to survive. I am lucky that

¹ Who is *we*? In *The Communist Horizon*, Jodi Dean (2012) adequately states that we suffer from a *we-scepticism*, a sense of loss of collectivity. It is this collective affect that enforces her political writing and therefore she states: "I write 'we' hoping to enhance a partisan sense of collectivity" (p. 12). I share her idea of collectivity. Whenever I state 'we' I do not intend to invite the one who goes along with my thought, thus not the one that simply agrees with me, but the one that thinks along with me, in the sense of producing thought instead of stagnating in agreement.

this busy busy aunt still can count on the love of her nieces and nephews: Dana, Isha, Sam, Yasmin and Ilia; and the welcome feeling in the house of my adopted aunts and uncles Sussan Sanobari, Mahmoed Chavoushi; Ilda Omrani and Mostafa Gholami, and my adopted cousins Sherman, Shermin, Jobin. In this sense of family at last but not at least, I thank John van Male, for his unconditional care, his daily encouraging SMS-messages, the fury of his engagement and his everlasting irony. Without his immense support I would not have come this far.

I am not only blessed with a warm family but also with friendships that have made me surpass my fears and uncertainties. I thank Gregor Niedlich, Maurice Specht, Arnaud Zwakhals and Piotrek Swiatkowski – my philosophical companions – for combining the joy of reading with good food and inspiring conversations; Vincent Wiegel, Willem van Eekelen and Maha El-Metwally for their critical attitude that in the past 25 years has encouraged me to question prejudices that limited my growth; Beerend Winkelman for his willingness not only to share the terror of writing a dissertation with me but also the joy of finalizing it; Ivna Elsperman, Carla Delgado, Cindy den Herder and Karin Blom for their efforts to show me that there is a life beyond writing a dissertation; Siebe Thissen, Femke Kaulingfreks and Zihni Özdil for their intellectual support to acknowledge the reality of exclusion; Marianne Molendijk, Bert van Scherrenburg, Corina van der Laan en Claude Mushikangondo for never giving up their struggle against the harshness of the world; Parisa Yousef-Doust for sharing her intense talent to create images of the political reality in which we live; Rineke Kraaij and Izaak Dekker for their inspirational tireless energy to change the world; Cokky Kraaij for her rebellious desire to disrupt stagnated authoritarian relations, Josien Hofs for showing me that there is always a possibility of a sweet laughter that could break through the bitterness of politics; and finally Ton Westenbroek for his biography that despite its sorrows has always generated a doorway to happiness.

Next to family and friends, in the past years colleagues have inspired me to deepen my thoughts on the subject. Due to the research team Iohannah I was fully introduced to the works of Hannah Arendt. I specially thank Dirk De Schutter, Marc De Kesel, Remi Peeters, Theo de Wit, Veronica Vasterling and Marieke Borren for their critical comments. I thank Jodi Dean and Halleh Ghorashi for showing me how intellectual reflections and plain activism against exclusion must coincide at all time. I thank the members of the International Network for Alternative Academia – especially Alejandro Cervantes-Carson, Charlene Delia Jeyamani Rajendran, Albin Wagener, Setsuko Adachi, Robert Burton, Michael Kearney and Paul Prinsloo. With their brilliant lectures and comments they have introduced me to new perspectives on academic thinking. At the Philosophy Department at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam I am grateful for the warm interest of Marli Huijjer, Awee Prins, Donald Loose and Han van Ruler in my subject and perspective on philosophy. I am also thankful for the manner in which Heinz Kimmerle has put intercultural thinking on the agenda. I specially thank Paul Schuurman for always checking up on me, not only as a colleague but also as a friend. I also thank my colleagues at the both departments for Social Work at Universities of Applied Sciences in Rotterdam for their interest for my philosophical reflections and support. Especially Hans Streefkerk, Antonio da Silva, Jan Seters, Guido Walraven, René Akkermans, Evelyne Oorbeek, Hugo Gorissen, Patrick Pronk, Ragnar Dieneske, Frans Spierings, Szabinka Dudevski, Jeroen Oversier, Yvonne Aronson, Jean Marie Molina, Paul van der Aa, Michiel de Ronde, Maud Belmer and Amina Kefi.

Their unexpected support has shown me that despite the immensity of cruelty in the world, there are always individuals that care for the sake of caring. And last but not least, I am blessed with my students, for due to their honesty, openness and willingness to learn in the past four years they have motivated me to connect philosophy to the practice of life.

We do not only commune but also permanently communicate. And although writing seems to be a lonely process, every written work exists due to a vital conversation with others. Let me start with my supervisor Jos de Mul for his interest and commitment, his endless effort and patience. He was always prepared to listen and encourage despite the long pauses. Even through my momentary despairs he never hesitated to believe that I was able to end this process. Brenda Beckett has accompanied me with every word, every sentence and every hesitation. Her capacity to sharpen your language and broaden your vocabulary combined with her sincere love for creativity within language is an example for politicians and policymakers to how learning a language could be inclusive rather than an exclusive process. Next, Richard de Brabander did not only read through and comment on my first impossible draft, but during the past few years he intellectually challenged me to question my own normative standards and impossible demands by convincing me that a written work is never finalized. Wisely he persuaded me that there is no perfection or conclusion in writing but merely a moment of decision in which you let go, start to expose your words to a world and decide to become vulnerable for her critique.

A special thanks to the two women who I am honored to call my paranymphs: Carolien van den Bos and Suzanne Kern. The battlefield of exclusion is an unending tiresome road, and it is a shared will to fight against impossibilities of the world we live in that can pull you out of the misery of becoming a disappointed idealist. It is in the inspirational manner in which these two individuals relate to life that I preserve myself to become a cynic. Carolien – for almost 19 years now – has given me the privilege to share every human emotion possible. She has walked with me on the edge of every word, she has screamed with me through every madness, and she has laughed with me with every mistake. There are only a handful admirable people in this world who could have her knowledge of the cruelty of the world yet the magnificent ability to love the world as she does. It is this love of the world that my paranymphs share. Suzanne, who touched my soul in minutes, has the admirable capacity to fight injustice in impossible times. This is the woman who never wanted to tempt me, nor make me a social acceptable speaker. She is the social worker that forces thinkers like me to feel the ground beneath, to feel the mud, to see beauty in ferocity. She thought me, as older sisters do, to become the woman that I wanted to be.

Indeed in the act of writing you are never alone. Every word communicates, and most probably every word I wrote communicated to my teacher, mentor and friend: my co-supervisor Henk Oosterling, who has guided me from the beginning to the end. Our engagement was far from the standard academic interaction. Him being the child of a common longshoreman and me being a child of war and refuge, we have never been at ease with distant intellectual philosophical exercises. It is through his sense of activism and political engagement that I have decided to think differently about the philosophical implications for refuge and migration. We have fought, yelled, disagreed, cried and

laughed through lines. Oosterling is not an easy road to walk; yet I am glad to state that it was in our conversations that I have been broken to the bones of my thoughts and have been rebuilt again. It is in this process that I have become the philosopher that I wanted to dare to be.

And finally there is you to whom I dedicate this writing: Piet Molendijk. We have often not walked the same road. Our connection is in a sense a pure difference, you being the creature of stability and long soft talks; me being the arrhythmic sleepless presenter of short loud exclamations; you who absorbs thought and I who spits ideas immediately; you that adores rest and me that knows nothing but restless life. 16 years passed, losses were shared, promises changed and some were broken. Yet, some things remained. It was our difference that made me change my attitude in life. It was in your capacity to still shed a tear and your everlasting indignant glance that I learned that the world is not as it should be. It was through your tenderness that I started to love the world again, for which I am forever thankful. *Amor fati*, *Vwieti*, we will always share *amor mundi*.

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Introduction: How to Enter?

And when a child is born into this world
It has no concept
Of the tone the skin is living in
And there's a million voices
And there's a million voices
To tell you what she should be thinking
So, you better sober up for just a second
(Youssou N'Dour & Neneh Cherry, *7 Seconds*,
1994).

Starting Points of Thought

There is always an initiating experience that motivates a writer. There is an event in life that initiates thought, and the need to express, whether on a personal or a scientific level. In my case the two levels intertwined years ago while reading Giorgio Agamben's *Means without End* (2000), in which he states:

The refugee, formerly regarded as a marginal figure ... has become now the decisive factor of the modern nation-state by breaking the nexus between human being and citizen (p. x).

And then a little further on;

Only in a world in which the spaces of states have been thus perforated and topologically deformed and in which the citizen has been able to recognize the refugee that he or she is – only in such a world is the political survival of humankind today thinkable (p. 26).

This deformation of contemporary political thought is a result of the decreasing distance between the so-called citizen and the so-called non-citizen. This claim shocked me. As a child refugee and as a philosophical observer I had experienced and reflected upon the marginality of being a refugee. Agamben's approach challenged my ideas. The facts that I believed to be true for many years suddenly began to crumble. The figure, called refugee, whom I considered to be marginal, became a decisive factor. I considered flight as an experience to belong to a group: the refugees. However, after studying Agamben's work flight transformed into an event that entangles all citizens. In the end, the

disquieting experience of refuge – that I was determined to forget in order to move on – articulated a paradigm shift that, according to Agamben, may bring about the survival of humankind and the coming of a new community.

The two experiences – that of finding refuge (political/flight) and that of finding the truth (philosophy) – overlapped. By this I do not mean that a life-experience does simply express itself in philosophical reflection. Rather, the experiencing and thinking started to share each other's focus and perspectives. In my personal experience the focus was on the many roads my family travelled through different countries to finally arrive in The Netherlands. In my reflections on Deleuze and Guattari's (1987) philosophy I encountered the concept 'lines of flight' as strains of thought that rupture fixed categories and lead thought to unexplored levels of thinking. Flight as a frightening experience with a political focus was mirrored in a philosophical perspective in which thought starts to feel uncanny, misplaced in a sense. Forced to leave because of a subversive political orientation, finding new ways to express what matters in order to create a new life, finding new ways of looking at daily life, constructing new alliances, learning to speak in a different tongue; these are all aspects that will be connected to philosophical and political reflections of the below-mentioned four philosophers. I will argue that a politics of flight entails different forms of subjects and different forms of expression, all intertwined as in a Gordian knot.

Companions in Thought

Scholarly and artistic works have always been my sources of inspiration. Although this research is inspired by a diversity of philosophers, artists, writers and political thinkers, there have been a few companions in thought that provided me with the most crucial notions to explore a politics of flight: Hannah Arendt (1906-1975), Giorgio Agamben (1942), Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) and Félix Guattari (1930-1992). On the background, the texts of Michel Foucault (1926-1984) and Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) have also been very helpful.

Arendt's personal experiences were a tremendous inspiration for *thinking a politics of flight*. Her elaborations on daily policies and political ideologies in relation to the 'other' provide insight in realities such as migration and refuge. She is a born outsider, in life and in thought. And although her biography is there for the picking as an obvious justification of her involvement in this research, it is rather her thoughts and reflections on the notions of totalitarianism, politics and exile that have been crucial in my explorations. Her thought on *natality*, as well as her discourse on the notions *action* and *speech* constituting *inter-esse* open a vast landscape with new perceptiveness.

Agamben is another important inspiration. He is inspired by Arendt's critique on human rights and by Foucault's elaborations on different types of political discourses. He criticizes the reality of the law as an expression of a specific form of life. His exploration has been crucial in the thematization of political and legal patterns through which different notions and relationalities² are defined and organized. Deleuze and Guattari's reflections on the method – or rather *non-method* – of

² With this notion, I indicate the process of *becoming relational*. In my further analysis, I will argue that in relationalities the event of relating precedes fixations such as isolation, exclusive distinction and identification.

rhizome – rhizomatics – have provided me with yet another set of tools to analyze a politics of flight. These tools enable me to delineate the escape patterns through which this politics demonstrates its potential to deform and reform itself.

Notwithstanding their differences, these thinkers are connected by their specific philosophical attitude. First, their critical considerations always focus on affirmative thinking. Second, they share a passion for multiplicity, resulting in dismantling of rigidity and permanency of any form of subject or identity. Third, they consider philosophy to be inherently political. Finally, they disconnect creativity and modern subjectivity by defining their connection as an *event* – a relational occurrence – instead of a merit of a subject. It is due to this attitude that these four political philosophers challenge the contemporary discourse on exclusion.

Next to philosophical reflections on the contemporary state of society and interdisciplinary scientific approaches on the matter, the artistic expressions of *flight* have an *affective* impact. Art dissolves the distinction between *pathos* and *logos*. Art produces another form of ‘knowing’. Modern art is the subversive engine in which being affected has its own logic: a logic of sense (Deleuze, 1990) becomes a logic of sensations (Deleuze, 2004). Thus, while scientific research maps out the general line of connections and disconnections between different types of subjects, and while philosophical reflection differentiates on an abstract level different types of discourse that produce and inform subjects, artistic practices form a milieu in which subjectivity loses its exclusive discursive space. Art shows how affects and concepts, body and subject, i.e. the living person and its discursive milieu, never exhaustively overlap. There is an in-between that insists.

Trilogical Focus

The focus of this research is a politico-philosophical elaboration on the contemporary event of flight. The trilogy ‘life-expression-politics’ is crucial for my reflections. What instantly matters in this event by empowering the act of fleeing is apparently survival as a compulsion of *life*. This is a biological impulse of an organism intuitively fleeing danger in order to stay alive. The event of life is, however, more than the surviving of an organism or a political subject. In this research, life is considered as a vital force. Life is a becoming, a process, which is common to every living being. As in wartime, even within the experience of flight, life is an ongoing process that is sensed *as such*. Life always exceeds the experience of a personal life; it is never fully captured by an individual, not even in extreme experiences. In its extremity life rather divides an individual or better: one’s supposed coherent identity. Events such as severe illness or malnutrition can change a person unrecognizably. What is this ongoing event of life and how is such an event related to the notion of politics? Can a life be perceived *as such* beyond any expression? Or is expression – from daily communication to other forms of expressions like art – crucial for the political experience of life?

I pose these questions because an inquiry into a flight is on the one hand obliged to thematize life in a political context and on the other hand it needs to deal with the inability to comprehend or determine the full meaning of life. Due to its ‘fundamental’ trait of becoming, life *expresses* itself in a great variety of forms. The foundation and object of the modern state is the modern citizen that by philosophers has been conceptualized as an autonomous subject that takes care of his/her own life.

This research rather focuses on multiple processes of subjectification. Life as a force does not only refer to this specific modern subjectification. It is by virtue of its variety that expressions of life transcend any notion of universal thinking or ideology that fixates this movement in general categories. In itself this is already a political statement: by seeing politics as a strategy to redistribute given power relations we do justice to the differences between people.

Flight is a political expression in itself. How does politics as a collective expression of life relate to flight? First of all, it is perceived as a state of exception. Yet, more than an outcry of survival, flight is implicitly a plea for another community. Just like the political society that refugees enter, this community is shaped and framed by ideas, some even with universal claims on what it means to be a human being or a citizen, i.e. a political subject. The expression of flight is thus also bound to a discourse as a coherent set of practices and concepts that explains and legitimates the acts of groups and individuals. The differences in expression are not simply explained by the use of different languages and ‘isolated’ cultures, but rather emerge out of a multiplicity of experiences, ideologies and religious beliefs, cultural, social and economic backgrounds, and finally different political discourses.

Although the analyses in my research are limited due to the philosophical point of view taken, this inquiry is already implicitly influenced by a multiplicity of academic disciplines, different forms of ideology, processes of subjectification and expressions of resistance. Nevertheless, the current discourse on flight is based on the state of exception and fully dependent upon the modern Western discourse of civil- and human rights. In spite of the fact that expressions of flight are exceptional expressions of a politically exceptional life, an analysis of flight thus does not only need to deal with an unending variety of expressions of life, but also with multifarious frameworks that shape the experience of flight. At best a study of flight is done in a vast interdisciplinary field of knowledge.

Given these preliminary remarks, what is an expression of flight? I will be clear that there is no coherent and simple expression but rather a cacophonous field of expressions with unending affects, voices, noises and images, from within and from without. The human rights discourse that envelops the images of disillusioned people knocking on the gates of Fort Europe is punctuated with opinionated slogans of politicians, analytical comments of scientists, performances of artists, and the banal daily routines of civil servants. For those that succeed in being accepted, especially Muslims, the need to explain themselves against the background of global terrorism, resonates in an observation of what Hannah Arendt (1978^a) describes as the position of Jews as refugees during the Second World War:

We wonder how it can be done; we already are so damnably careful in every moment of our daily lives to avoid anybody guessing who we are, what kind of passport we have, where our birth certificates were filled out – and that Hitler didn’t like us. We try the best we can to fit into a world where you have to be sort of politically minded when you buy your food (p. 61).

Thinking how flight expresses itself is immediately intertwined with the way politicians typify this as a problem. This inquiry is initiated by the obligation to map out the third element of the trilogy:

politics. How do political framings reduce the unending variety of life forms and multifariousness of their expressions? How does *politics* relate to the process of flight? Politics is an immense centipede thudding its countless legs through all aspects of life. This research explores and tries to comprehend the potentiality of life and communities as well as the permanent intimidation of this potentiality. Consequently, a crucial question insists. *Given this vast spread of the notion, is it still possible to define and apply politics analytically?* For me it is obvious that in the process of flight there are no apolitical spaces, in the sense that every aspect of one's life is connected to and penetrated by political discourse. In order to answer the question on *quiddity* of a politics of flight and to handle the vastness of the notion of politics still analytically, we need to explore multiple approaches. In order to see the relationality within such multiplicity we need to forge tools that enable us to make adequate distinctions, yet respecting the differences.

In spite of the current globalization and multiplicity of the media that connect people all around the globe, the idea of macropolitics still owes its legitimization to modern policies that are founded on the *sovereignty* of the state and the *autonomy* of the subject. Within the process of flight such policies have severe implications for the formation of a subject and a sense of belonging. The first step – in order to tackle the problematic state of autonomy and sovereignty – is to differentiate the notion of politics. This concept has been differentiated in diverse directions. Claude Lefort distinguishes between two French notions: *la politique* (politics of the state) and *le politique* (the political). *La politique* refers to the daily governmental, institutional, cultural and intellectual practices that were qualified already as macro-politics. *Le politique* indicates a discourse on the production of a community (Loose & Van Houte, 1992, p. 16). In his lectures Lefort states that this distinction is not ontological: the two types of *politics* relate to one another (Steinmetz-Jenkins, 2009). The level of this political discourse in relation to macro-politics can be qualified as *meso-politics*. It is on this meso-political level that Isabelle Stengers (2010) situates the political activities of critical groups in western society that oppose *la politique*. If the resistance and self-organization of citizens against the exclusion of so-called illegal refugees has a political impact, then this is an example of meso-politics that intervenes on behalf of human interests.

There is yet another level of politics: a *micro-politics* of bodies and desires. This affective domain has been thoroughly analyzed by Foucault (1977, 1978, 1985 & 1986^b) in his texts on discipline and sexuality. Deleuze and Guattari's (1983 & 1987) analyses in *Capitalism and Schizophrenia 1. Anti-Oedipus* and *Capitalism and Schizophrenia 2. Thousand Plateaus* – are also explicitly micro-political. Analyzing the affective relations as part of a bigger power play – macro and meso – the distinction between the private and the public, between desires and interests is problematized. We need to disclose this micro-political dimension in order to understand the violent reality of a refugee's private life in which the (threat of) death of men and women as individuals – private – gives simultaneously birth to a life that is public, yet lacks a *voice* within the public domain. The disruption of the private is the glitch as well as the engine of this speechless experience. The erasing of the distinction between the private and the public eventually problematizes the clarity of different levels of politics such as micro-, meso- and macro-politics. It is therefore relevant to reevaluate the relation between private and public against the background of this threefold political landscape.

A politics of flight also problematizes the absolute distinction between religious and secular politics. Less than the explicit religious beliefs of individual refugees this problematization targets the non-metaphysical – and apparently objective – claim of secular forms of politics. Totalitarian state politics bears witness to this diffuse milieu of ideologies with homogeneous tendencies. In order to thematize this I will not exclusively refer to philosophical analysis. Art practices and especially literature address this subtle shift far more insightfully. Orhan Pamuk is an exemplary ‘political’ writer who permanently undermines a clear distinction between secular and non-secular forms of politics. In his book *Snow* (2005), through the story of the writer Ka, Pamuk stages the metaphysical tendencies of a religious group *and* that of the secular military power. Within the setting of one small snowbound village he systematically pictures the modern history and the contemporary state of Turkey. The story starts with the image of young Muslim women who live in a world in which their political urge to resist through wearing the symbolic headscarves is neither understood by their religious parents nor by the secular public system. They see no other way out than committing suicide, a blasphemous act, by hanging themselves from the ceiling using the same scarf. Although the ‘crypto-religious’ tendencies of secularism have been scrutinized thoroughly in some political sciences and philosophy,³ within the political discourse of Western policymakers it is imperative to map out the underlying dominant normative tendencies of secular politics.

In literature, a current political discourse produces this double affect of repulsion and attraction. As such, it is the domain of contradictions. On the one hand, it refers to banishment and loss of a ‘way’ of life – action is prohibited and speech is silenced – and on the other hand it refers to the *political* hope for a better way of life. Politics incorporates both destructive and repressive terror and a *potentiality* to build new communities. Politics of flight cannot but address explicitly multiple forms of violence; not only physical, political and social, but also psychological and mental as a result of the impact that multiple, contradictory discourses have on the bodies of those that are lost somewhere in-between. Still, dealing with brutal politics also refers to a potentiality, a force to change one’s course of life. Thus, the process of flight does not only emerge out of fear of death, but also out of a critical and affirmative attitude, i.e. a process of transforming, deconstructing and creating new communities. Therefore, my final argument will be that flight is not merely a traumatizing experience of an exceptional phase of one’s life, but it is also an experience of self-conscious political life. This would be an affirmative inscription of what I call ‘politics of flight’.

Politics of Flight: Exile, Segments, Inter-est

That is why my final chapter ‘Politics of Life’ is on a coming community, a notion conceptualized by Agamben (1993^b). In this community, an affirmative politics of flight transforms fear into being interested. The result is a politics of inter-est, as Arendt (1958) proposes in *The Human Condition*. The German and Dutch notion of ‘interesse’ has a double meaning in English: interest as being

³ To mention just one rather idiosyncratic example, Marc De Kesel (2010) states that each monotheistic religion originates in a critique towards its predecessors. The Enlightenment is so understood as the next big ‘religion’, or ‘myth’.

interested and as a return in investment or benefit. I will emphasize the first meaning, by criticizing the second. The coming community demands a type of ethics, not based on identities, but firmly rooted in interest as being interested, i.e. on relations and differences, as Deleuze and Guattari sketch in the two volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. In order to understand the focus of Part II of my research we have to understand that this inquiry is neither a simple plea for, nor a charge against democracy. Democracy and coming community are not one and the same. They ought to be approached differently. In line with Ghorashi (2010), I argue that the current democratic states are complex, historical communities with totalitarian, multicultural and open communing tendencies. Coming community distances itself from *an idea* of democracy as a form of representation that presupposes an identity. Coming community is not about representing a people in the same way. It rather gives in to Derrida's (1992^b) idea of *democratie à venir*. It criticizes the idea of such representation. According to Lefort the representation of a people neither refers to the permanent identity of a people nor to representation of a reality. Representation always appears in a symbolic field of order or what he calls the political. And within this symbolic process identity of a people is formed and deformed permanently (Steinmetz-Jenkins, 2009, pp. 110-111).

Different interests are assembled within a discourse based on inter-est in the Arendtian sense. It is the event of a common interest creating a people, rather than the other way around, namely individuals – as *the* people – being represented in order to have their specific interests served. The coming community is not based on management of interests, but the interest itself creates a community. This is why coming community does not depend on institutions or types of government. It can appear on every level of a community. As long as an interest is practiced on all these levels – micro, meso, macro – coming community is in becoming. This also happens within totalitarian regimes, be it in an opposite and repressive way. To understand democracy is to understand all its effects, its beauty as well as its possible horrors. Claude Lefort (1988) states that democracy is centered on an empty space that belongs to no one. This anonymity has different outcomes, as he – inspired by Tocqueville – suggests. Lefort is ambiguous on the fact whether exclusion is something that *precedes/comes after* democracy or *appears in the middle of it*. I will plead that democracy contains inclusive and exclusive forces simultaneously.

I will argue that different types of political regimes do not follow one and other sequentially, but presuppose one and another. Although in Part II three types of politics are described separately, they are always intertwined. The fifth chapter - 'Politics of Segments' – sketches the second layer within a politics of flight: a multiculturalist approach. This approach differs from the way the coming community is speculated upon. In order to disclose the coming community within the multicultural society, I will describe the transition from multicultural to *intercultural* politics. I will elaborate on the notion of loyalty within multiple communities. Could an individual have multiple loyalties within a multicultural setting? In current multicultural societies, this is experienced as a problem. In this chapter I will explain how political ideas on ethnicity, culture and contextuality create a tension that cannot be resolved within the nationalistic discourse that still dominates the debates in western macro-political policies. Vertovec's (2007) notion 'superdiversity' shows how third generation migrants are politically disadvantaged due to rigid multicultural categorizations. And how can we explain the decision of city mayors to allow illegal stateless persons – i.e. refugees – to be sheltered – bread and

bed – and sustained by groups of volunteers – i.e. citizens – while neglecting national policies? These contradictions and dilemmas are infrastructural aspects of multicultural societies. Yet, this dissertation does not opine the failure of multiculturalism but rather criticizes multiculturalism's tendency as a final solution. Multiculturalism, specifically in its tendency to empower separate identifiable groups, is a phase in the process of politicizing flight.

These integrative, yet – in daily practice – excluding tendencies of multicultural society are triggered by a collective fear of post-war societies: fear to fall into the trap of fascism or Stalinism, in short, the fear to repeat totalitarianism, denying democratic politics. Current debates with nationalist chauvinistic overtones have fueled this collective affect. But how do notions such as migrant and refugee function within this totalitarian discourse that I characterize in chapter four as 'Politics of Exile'? Does the idea of refugee camps fit into the discourse of multiculturalism? And if not, what kind of community and politics are still implicitly insisting in the global political discourse? With Agamben's analysis of exclusion and Arendt's elaboration on totalitarianism, combined with her reports on the banality of evil, I will sketch a layered milieu in which these three types of politics – politics of exile, politics of segments and politics of life – are intertwined in the process of flight.

Paradigm as a Tool

In order to sketch these three types of politics we need analytical tools. In Part I of this research these tools are forged. I apply the Foucaultian idea of philosophical thought as a toolkit, an idea that is shared by Deleuze and Guattari. In chapter three I will explicate the way Deleuze and Guattari distinguish different approaches in thought: philosophy with its concepts, sciences with its formulas and functions, and art with its affects and percepts as two aspects of sensations that are triggered by works of art. After applying these 'objects of thought' to a politics of flight I will – inspired by Agamben – conclude that they do not suffice to analyze the explosive situation of refugees and migrants. We need to pay attention to the effects of policies within politics, that are, as René ten Bos (2015) argues, full of bureaucratic contradictions and dilemmas. In order to elucidate this dimension, we need a fourth tool, i.e. object of thought: paradigm. Let's take the notion of 'citizenship' as an example. This is a concept. Through the history of philosophy this notion has been explored as a critical tool to empower and emancipate individuals within modern societies. It is a function. Sciences like economics and sociology have provided factors that effectuate this emancipatory process. It is an affect too. Citizenship is also a disciplining category. Avant-garde art practices have critically reflected upon these disciplining aspects of citizenship. It is precisely this dimension that is not thematized paradigmatically in this threefold exploration. Paradigm thus refers to the discursive tendencies within politics that define, enforce and create potential forms of belonging.

This idea of paradigm – introduced by Agamben – is different from Kuhn's (1970) paradigm. Kuhn's paradigm concerns the basic discursive infrastructure of science of nature. Neither is this paradigm comparable with Foucault's (2005^a) episteme. Episteme is the discursive infrastructure of human sciences. Foucault's (1980) transformation of episteme into dispositives by including power structures that regulate the knowledge production of human sciences is not adequate either. Agamben's paradigm is implicated as an element of Foucault's dispositive. Agamben's paradigm shapes the

discursive infrastructure of state of affairs in politics and policy-making. It is however comparable to what Deleuze and Guattari call an object of thought, which in philosophy is inscribed in concepts, in art as affects and percepts, and in science as functions. In adding the political as an affective transversal, cutting through concepts, functions and sensations, yet being a concept itself, I will introduce another idea of politics, which in the third part of chapter three will be specified by adding a hyphen in-between politics and philosophy: politico-philosophy. This programmatic gesture will be elaborated on in chapter three in such a way that paradigm can be used as an analytical tool to examine the excluding and including mechanism within a politics of flight. In this study with politico-philosophy I do not refer to the sub-category of academic philosophy. It is rather the necessary fine-tuning of the focus of contemporary philosophy.

This is the affirmative focus of this research. Each research needs a focal point of view, even more when one moves in a layered domain that connects life, expression and politics. Initially there was a central notion.⁴ Reading Agamben's radical analysis of the state of being of refugees and paradigm I decided to take *flight* as a leading notion. However, concentrating on this notion led to endless other themes, such as citizenship, identity and belonging, human rights, nation-state, *homo sacer*, totalitarianism, multiculturalism, communities to come. This dissemination eventually undermined the *dominant* position of my focal point. In further analysis *flight* and *refugee* gradually became tools to disclose an even more complex field of research in which other aspects of political discourse demand to be addressed. The ever-increasing emergence of multiple 'sub'-questions and related topics have for a long time challenged my ability to formulate the main question. On top of that the inadequacy of our language to communicate the subtlety of certain experiences made me highlight the importance of other forms of expression, such as literature, cinema and visual arts. Philosophy and art complement each other in my effort to comprehend the specific politics and policy on flight. More than often 'reading' a work of art explains more than reading a philosophical essay as Foucault showed when he added Diego Velasquez' Las Meninas in *The Order of Things* (2005^a). In implementing works of art, I hope to *sensitize*⁵ my readers for understanding the effects of paradigms. Thus, although flight initially was the exclusive object of this inquiry, it eventually started to function as a crowbar to disclose a *milieu* that 'harbors' *a politics of flight*.

An Unconventional Flight

Conventionally milieu refers to a person's social environment or our physical environment. In this study, however, the notion milieu emphasizes the physical, social and political interactions, i.e. the relational infrastructure as a territory that disposes both bodies and discourses. Shortly: milieu is the discursive carrier that binds and unbinds bodies. In what kind of dimension of thought does this

⁴ In this study words such as *notion* and *theme* are neutral indications that could refer to all four *objects of thought*: concept (philosophy), function (science), percept/affect, i.e. sensation (art) and paradigm (policy). In this inquiry *flight* relates to all these four objects of thought.

⁵ In this study, the term *sensitize* is more adequate than the verb *visualize*, due to the fact that it refers to all senses, thus an experience of a body as a whole. In the first chapter I will explore the importance of this experience.

interaction take place and how does it acquire meaning? What do we see and sense when watching the lifeless corpse of the three-year-old Alan Kurdi on the shores of Turkey? And also, what do we experience knowing that the conclusive argument for the Brexit was an anti-migration sentiment and xenophobia? *Flight* is rooted in a discourse far more complex and layered than most of us are prepared to acknowledge. We are right in the middle of it all. In the second chapter I will elaborate on and argue for flight as an eventive milieu that can and needs to be conceptualized and sensitized in different ways. This event accumulates and creates different contents and expressions, i.e. different types of territories and different political utterances. The world of Alan Kurdi in its expression and bodily experience radically differs from the world of the citizens voting for Brexit. Yet, as I will argue, these two separate worlds globally inherently constitute each other. Milieu is not merely the physical territory from the body to the earth. It also has an affective layer where people are connected and informed into a community by a specific discourse. The latter is also part of a milieu. Thus *thinking* – which for that matter is also inherent to the milieu – of a milieu of flight has an ontological as well as an epistemological vector.

Briefly we can thus state that flight is a discursive construct, connecting ideas and bodies. It creates a milieu, a topos: a space where something happens, an event. In this inquiry *flight* chiefly refers to a *relational event*, in contrast to the conventional, *psychological* interpretation of the notion of flight as will be argued in the first chapter. The conventional analysis reduces the event or the experience of flight to a particular subject: the *refugee*, who is often defined through (inter-)national juridical discourse. With this particular subject as the main socio-psychological focus the event becomes an exclusive personal or group-bound event that, given a conventional juridical definition of flight has the following characteristics:

1. A particular dual set of geographical territories:
 - a. the place from which the refugee flees, usually addressed as *the country of origin*;
 - b. the place of refuge; which is called the *country of arrival* or *refugium*.
2. A typical act: *refuge*, which indicates a specific act of fleeing from a specific form of repressive power by a specific subject from a country of origin to a country of arrival.
3. A specific experience as a result of a political gesture: *exclusion*, in which both country of origin and country of arrival take their part. Denying rights such as freedom of speech or assembly in the country of origin, and the legal-system of the country of arrival once this denies the refugee access.
4. A (juridical/political/affective) state of affairs: *exile*. Characterized as a *limbo*, such as refugee camps, exile takes place in-between the country of origin and country of arrival.

Flight refers immediately to verbs such as *belonging to* or *being excluded from* a community. The limbo undermines the distance between the country of origin and the country of arrival. In this study, however I will – in line with Ghorashi (2003) – criticize the idea of exile as “a transitional phase

between separate social realities, namely homeland and the new country” (p. 125). The limbo has the tendency to grow beyond political predictions. This limbo gives rise to the question whether the event of flight connotes more than a momentary change in the course of a particular action and the transformation of a specific subject such as a refugee. As Agamben (2000) suggested a politics that excludes a refugee does not only affect refugees but non-refugees as well. Flight is a process that affects various subjects. By ‘transversalizing’ the *limbo* called exile as an in-between that affects all political relations in a society I will argue against the analytical relevance of the opposition between the country of origin and the country of arrival; as well as politics for refugee versus politics for non-refugee. Limbo is not only a no man’s place; but in words of Marli Huijer (2016) also a no man’s time in which not only those who leave but also those who stay behind – the ones who sense an enforced immobility – are intertwined (p. 41). By implication flight as a political notion refers to a more complex milieu than the exotic personal experience of a refugee. By defining limbo in such a manner, not a particular state of politics but politics in general (i.e. being part of a community) is at stake. As a result, flight does not only discursively change due to different types of society, but in its process also creates multiple communities that emerge simultaneously. In other words, the process of flight engenders different levels of relating. *Flight* brings about multiple discourses of subjectivity that relate permanently to multiple coinciding territories.

It is through this idea of coinciding territories that I *reconsider* the discursive setting in which the current crisis of the refugees is reflected upon. In my view, the contemporary political analysis that give rise to policies concerning refugees are outdated. Contemporary theoretical and practical ‘dominant’ discourses are insufficient to adequately portray this so-called crisis in the 21st century, let alone address it effectively. To summarize, the crisis of the refugee, migrant or so-called minorities as Harry Belafonte (2016) and Noam Chomsky (2016) state, is not an external problem or the problem of the other. As Schinkel (2008) argues integration is not the problem of the other but a problem implemented by policies that define individuals as integrated *us* and non-integrated *other*. The crisis of the so-called newcomer is immanent to the Western world. In order to visualize the various responsibilities of all the parties involved, I rather reverse the perspective. Not looking from here to there; but looking from there to here, as well. What does the eye of the other say about our presuppositions such as oppositional thinking and categorization of others. In order to do so, in my research I implement critical conceptual tools which are introduced by Deleuze and Guattari (1987) in their *A Thousand Plateaus*. What are the intrinsic dimensions of this crisis and how do we enforce critical thought into daily and theoretical understanding of the state of refugees?

In this research, the relationality in-between life and expression is viewed on through Deleuze and Guattari’s semiotic quadrant: matter/form and content/expression. In the first part, the methodological context is elaborated and brought into relation with Arendt and Agamben’s work. After Part I *Dispositioning a Milieu* in which I dispose the conceptual and paradigmatic frameworks of thinking within politics of flight; in Part II *Exposition of Milieus* the quadrant is used to approach the diversity of practices within the politics of flight. This provides a politico-philosophical diagnosis in which the relationships between bodies and expression are always carried out in the same way in each chapter: from *form of content* to *form of expression* to *matter of expression* to *matter of content*. Form of

content is the territorial setting in which bodies are assembled in a certain way; these assemblies are strengthened by form of expression. Yet forms break and degrade, they never fully touch the unthinkable reality. They do not always give room to the voices, gestures and images (matter of expression) that defy the absoluteness of these forms. Yet, I end each chapter with the matter of content; which simply indicates life itself in all its varieties and in all its possible connections to a discourse. Each chapter ‘concludes’ with matter of content, due to the fact that, as I argue, *life* is the most neglected phenomenon in politics. The ending is however not for the sake of finality; but for the sake of a process. As a feedback loop this ‘recapitulation’ bends back toward the start; toward enforced forms of content and forms of expression, in order to create another form of politics. How do we express endlessness? How do we approach a limbo as a topos of in-between that escapes our discursive vocabulary of here versus there? Let us start with a question:

How do we approach a politics of flight?

Part one: Positioning a Milieu
Tools of Thought for a Politics of Flight

What I came to understand is that change is not a choice.
Not for the species of plant, and not for me.
It happens, and you are different. ...
Maybe the only distinction between the plant and me
is that afterward ...
I lied about my change
(Kaufman & Kaufman, 2002, p. 80).

Chapter 1: A Matter of Approach

What I offer is a model of the archive not as the conversation of self into a textual gathering, but as a ‘contact zone’
(Ahmed, 2014, p. 14).

1.1 Approaching from Within

In order to research a subject, a researcher must find and set forth the manner in which she methodologically approaches a subject. This chapter thus starts with ushering three questions:

1. How to approach a politics of flight?
2. Who is the subject of politics of flight?
3. What is flight as an event?

In the first two sections (1.1 & 1.2) the manner of approaching a politics of flight will be examined. On an experiential level, which is needed in order to surpass the conventional way of approach, a politics does not only thematize a global event, but – as Foucault (1977) argued with his thesis on disciplining – also concerns the embodiment by individuals. In order to understand the effects of flight as a discursive practice we have to start from within this experience.

Approaching from within leads us to reconsider not only how this multiple discourse fragments identity of people but also shows how these identities are always already problematic. They always assemble multiple discourses. Applying the notion of rhizome, proposed by Deleuze and Guattari (1987), elucidates the transformative quality of the experience of flight in which the fragments of identity or individual dots are assembled by acting and speaking, as Arendt (1958) shows through her idea of interest. In the third section (1.3) this connection will lead to extend the types of subjects that are interested in this politics through their different involvements within the process of flight.

In the final section (1.4) flight is analyzed as an event from which unpredictable connections can emerge as a result of its potential (Agamben) and virtual (Deleuze) supplement. Acknowledging a creative production of new political coherence as Arendt does in her notion of natality opens dimensions in a politics of flight that surpasses, yet does not neglect, the sheer negative and

traumatizing experiences that are associated with flight and refugees. Flight does not appear as a deterritorializing yet critical experience and event. It rather emerges from a desire that is immanent in life: the will to be born again, the will to begin.

What is a method? The etymology of the word shows that this notion originates from the Greek word *méthodos*, which is a combination of *meta*, meaning ‘after’ and ‘above’, and *hodos*, meaning ‘way’. Method thus means the way that one retrospectively has been traveling. The road is already there, and the one who uses this *method* pursues a thing that is already there. Methodology means scientific inquiry that retrospectively legitimates its pursuit. The contemporary meaning of the word refers to a procedure through which structural elements of an investigation, whether in thought or in the physical world, are explored. Reflection on methodology has regularly been presented as finding *the right* method, and has also often been criticized due to this assumption. Paul Ricœur (1970, pp. 33-36)¹ and Michel Foucault (1994) refer to the three great ‘masters of suspicion’ – Marx, Nietzsche and Freud – who have invalidated the linearity of and *truthness*² in methodological thinking and the presumption of the interpretation of an objective reality outside language. Within the works of these *suspicious minds*, Foucault suggests, lies “once again the possibility of a hermeneutic” (p. 272).

Interpretation can never be completed, this is quite simply because there is nothing to interpret. There is nothing absolutely primary to interpret, for after all everything is already interpretation, each sign is in itself not the thing that offers itself to interpretation but an interpretation of other signs (p. 275).

Such hermeneutics thus does not plead for an evolving historical process toward a true interpretation and understanding, as Jos de Mul (2004) in line with Dilthey and Schleiermacher points out. This hermeneutic rather taking its interpreting character seriously, present itself as an *infinite task* and remains critical in movement by defining itself as *incomplete* (p. 119). Along with a philosophical and historical critical attitude toward truthness of an interpretation and the method, contemporary thinkers – in sociology, cultural studies and gender studies – problematize the moralistic assumptions

¹ Ricœur at first appreciates Marx’s, Nietzsche’s and Freud’s attempts to problematize consciousness respectively through notions of economic necessity, perspectivism and unconsciousness. While Descartes doubted the material world but not his consciousness, these ‘masters of suspicion’ explore the problematic forces within consciousness. However, Ricœur also criticizes these three masters due to the fact that according to them the liberation from the illusions of consciousness lies in the same unreliable consciousness. Hence creating an aporia. Michel Foucault on the other hand appreciates this aporia as an engine of hermeneutics and thought. In his *Door schijn bewogen: Naar een hyperkritiek van de xenofobe rede*, Oosterling (1996) explores the effects of this aporia on methodology in French philosophies of difference.

² I prefer to use the neologism *truthness*, instead of the common notion truthfulness. In truthfulness lies a moral obligation of honesty and the involvement of the subject in this obligation. What I rather indicate by truthness is the assumption of methodology to be independent of the subjectivity of a researcher as well as the discourse to which a researcher belongs. Truthness intends to surpass the moral approvals and judgments of such a discourse. It refers to the presumption of factuality and objectivity. Truthness also differs from truthiness. Truthiness refers to a feeling, an intuition for truth without the need to justify itself. Truthness on the other hand refers to a process of analysis and objective evaluation independent of feeling and intuition.

of a 'right' method.³ They argue that each method in its procedure creates its own rightness and its own reality. A method creates its own truth. It is in this attitude that methodology has become a science of finding *a* path rather than walking *the* path. Martin Heidegger even speaks of *creating* a path instead of finding one.⁴

The truthness of methodology and interpretation is also problematic due to the experiences of multiple structures of thought and logics. The political and social transformations within and outside the academic world have weakened the certainties of a right method. Different genders, sexual preferences, social classes, economic and cultural backgrounds create different truths and different types of consistency. This does not, however, justify a disengaged attitude, let alone indifference. The flows of migration in the twentieth century, as well as the aftermath of enslavement, (de)colonization, First and Second World War, Cold War, Balkan War, Golf War, the massacre of Bosnians, Syrian War, war on terror and the movement of millions of refugees nowadays have challenged the idea of unrelatedness between different forms of truth. Different forms of emancipation, due to multiple backgrounds, have confronted the so-called 'majority'⁵ in their homogeneous lines of argumentation. New sciences such as gender studies and postcolonial studies, as well as multiple alternative medical treatments emerge. The 20th century is not only a century of wars, and great confrontations, but it is also a century of multiple types of confrontations. Geopolitical confrontations on the macro-level as well as clashes on multiple micro-levels of bodies have begun to defy the concept of a single ruling group. The 21st century will be a century of minorities, not necessarily in the sense of occupying power but in the sense of visibility.⁶

³ In social studies, we could think of Karl Marx's idea that different social classes cause different types of thought, or Max Weber's idea that religious backgrounds influence economic discourses. On the level of cultural studies thinkers such as Edward Said refer to cultural bias in anthropology. They criticize the western approximation of non-western cultures. In gender studies Luce Irigaray played a significant role by visualizing the male preferences within the language. Language is often structured hierarchically: masculine designations are more appreciated than feminine designations.

⁴ In *Off the Beaten Track*, Heidegger (2002) introduces this idea in a motto: "'Wood' is an old name for forest. In the wood there are paths, mostly overgrown, that come to an abrupt stop where the wood is untrodden. They are called *Holzwege*. Each goes its separate way, though within the same forest. It often appears as if one is identical to another. Nonetheless, it only appears so. Woodcutters and forest keepers know these paths. They know what it means to be on a *Holzweg*." This idea is also apparent when Heidegger connects *Dasein* to design (*Entwurf*). Although, *Dasein* is thrown in the world, it nonetheless has the ability of designing this *thrownness*. Understanding thus appears in this amalgamation of being thrown *in-the-world* and the idea of *designing thrownness*. Awee Prins (2007) states that in this urge to design our *Dasein* we are fixated to define and structure our state of being and in this process, we eliminate the secrecy that is inherent to our existence (pp. 284-285).

⁵ In this document, the term majority indicates those having political power and not numbers of individuals. I will come back to the topic in a more systematic way in third and fourth chapter.

⁶ I will elaborate on this rise of the minorities in the fifth chapter that concerns the multicultural society. For now, it is crucial to notice that the 20th and 21st century are unprecedented due to the revolt of the working class, feminism, anti-colonialism, anti-enslavement, emancipation of LGBTQQ and migrants. The emancipation of minorities is slowly changing the image of the ruling class. The rise of Internet has further affected this process of visibility in which not only the control society has become stronger but it has also stimulated different types of relations between minorities beyond the national borders around the world. Emancipation, due to its transnational trait, is in current times not merely a local issue, but is *shared* as well as *imposed* all around the globe. Jos de Mul (2010) thus calls Internet a *meta-organization*, which cannot be characterized by old terminologies such as *big brother* on the one hand and *democratic open source* on the other. It contains

The methodological line of thought on flight in this chapter follows the lines of a development of this visibility. The notion of flight, as an act of refuge, is as old as men's knowledge of its being. In the well-known creation myth in the Abrahamic religions, it is mentioned that Adam and Eve were banned from paradise; in their experience of shame they were forced to flee towards displacement and homesickness. Nevertheless, in the 20th and 21st century the immensity of numbers of refugees as well as the political relevance of the subject of flight is unprecedented in comparison to the centuries before. In 2012 there were more than 45 million and in 2014 almost 60 million refugees and internally displaced persons worldwide (UNHCR, 2013^b & 2015). Refuge and forced migration are nowadays not incidental consequences of wars and famine, but paradoxically an exceptional, yet permanent state of affairs. The refugee camps in Jordan and Pakistan inhabited by generations of Palestinians and Afghans, the transformation of the biggest refugee camp in Dadaab in Kenya into an urban infrastructure by mostly refugees from Somalia and also from Sudan and Ethiopia, and the mass refuge of Syrians to Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan are some examples of the long duration of these affairs. Refuge, migration and statelessness have become some of the main problems of modern politics. Due to the immensity of the problem it has become impossible to find a method in order to resolve or dispose of this impasse of permanent exceptional state of affairs. How does one handle the migration of millions of people, and even more so, how does a state react to 'a group' that except for their act of forced migration have no other commonality?⁷ Knowing no homogeneity, refugees and migrants are from all over the globe. The spectrum of differences – in culture, gender, political and religious orientation, and economic and social background, not to mention that of different generations – obstructs the search for a method to orientate action and thought on these issues. Flight has different expressions and contents, as a result of which it gives rise to a complex setting of notions and discourses, defining both body and mind of the involved subjects, which in further analysis I will call *politics of flight*.

Striving to reach a common goal or following a single road suggests a preformatted method. However, a single method, whether it is created or found, is inadequate due to the complexity of politics of flight. Already in the first steps of an examination I have discovered that by choosing a single method one not only limits one's thought on the matter, but one can even make lies sound like truths. Human trafficking does not only appear on the road, but – as Schinkel (2008) argues – also within the rigidity of a methodology to enforce subjects into one form of existence and thinking. Truthness functions within its own logic. Within the multiplicity of thought, unitary truths become problematic and in some cases even deadly. Yet, I do not simply plead for a lack of method. The

the fears of pessimists as well as the hopes of optimists. It is fundamentally *out of control*, containing active and reactive forces at once (pp. 41-49).

⁷ The notion of *commonality* is in line with the notion of relationality. Commonality refers in the first instance to a trait, a state of being or an identity, that multiple individuals share. I like to point out that a gathering of individuals identified as refugees have no common trait in their identity except their act of flight from one place to the other. In the sixth chapter the notion of commonality will instead indicate a common relationality that is neither determined by an identity nor predicts a certain formation of an identity.

critique of a single method is deconstructive: in destructing the idea of a single method there is the acknowledgement of the multiplicity of methods, disciplines, structures and discourses within politics of flight. Next to the previously mentioned differentiation, the articulation of this politics occurs academically on multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary levels. Refugees and refuge are familiar notions in juridical, political and social sciences, as well as in feminist, cultural and anthropological studies. The chaos within a politics of flight is thus not caused by a lack of something, but rather by the abundance of discourses and their ongoing transformation. The experience of chaos is not one of emptiness but rather the disability to keep up with the speed of transformation within this politics. As Deleuze and Guattari (1994) argue:

Chaos is characterized less by the absence of determinations than by the infinite speed with which they take shape and vanish ... The problem of philosophy is to acquire a consistency without losing the infinite into which thought plunges (in this respect chaos has as much a mental as a physical existence) (p. 42).

Chaos is not without structure. The unpredictability of chaos appears in the interwovenness in-between causality and contingency. The goal of resolving chaos is only intelligible to those who believe in the permanency of structures. From the human perspective, we do not have the ability to survey the chaos and to determine its structure or the lack of it. Structured thought means in a sense making a cut within the chaos, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest, in order *to acquire consistency*. This act, as they show, which is performed not only in science, philosophy and art, but also in politics and religion, must sense its own normative act of cutting. Within this act of cutting, multiple engagements and formations of structures become unavoidable. The analysis of politics of flight is therefore a philosophical act of *decision* too,⁸ a cutting through the excess of life and politics. Cutting means multiplying differences. Due to its multidisciplinary trait, this politics is therefore gifted as well as burdened with a multiplicity of expressions. Its Babylonian chaos does not only appear in philosophy, science and politics but is also uttered in other forms of expression such as art practices. Philosophical engagement in cinematic and literary works expresses in yet a different way this Babylonian tension. So, no matter how thorough a thinker engages herself within her own field of research, a politics of flight remains an immanently multifaceted surface. Chaos is permanently present within its methodological approach of its object.

Due to this methodological multiplicity within the chaos of paths, I prefer to speak of another act than that of finding the right method. Politics of flight is not in need of a final and definitive method but its multiplicity needs multiple *approaches*. In order to relate to the notion of flight one must start to

⁸ Decision (*de* = stopping & *caedo* = to cut) has the double meaning of parting as well as coming together: *stopping to cut*. It is however crucial to note that in its complexity, decision is not the equivalent of choice. As is suggested by Heidegger decision is a) not a sheer choice, b) not a sheer human act, even when they are involved. Decision is according to Heidegger owned by being and not an anthropological phenomenon (Maly, 2008, pp. 58- 63). In 1.3 I will argue that even if decision is considered to be a form of action, as Arendt would argue, it befalls the subject rather than being defined and calculated by the subject.

approach this ‘object’ rather than structuring it according to a particular form of thought. The idea of *approach*, in its etymology as well as in its contemporary meaning, has multiple useful elements.

1) First, approach means *coming near or nearer to something or someone in distance*. There is a territorial and vectorial element implied. In 2.4 the territorial effect of politics of flight will be delineated as a milieu of flight. An approach refers to positioning and in this sense, refers to the second part of the word milieu, *lieu* as in *place*. The nearing aspect of this act could be reduced to a measure and a distance. Being further away is in opposition to being closer and hence suggesting a greater distance in view and perspective. In this distinction, the act of approaching is placed somewhere between a general view – a bird’s eye view – and a particular view – as is the case with the humble worm’s eye view. Throughout this study, however, I will time and again argue that the events of a politics of flight cannot be categorized as generalities or particularities. Being an unprecedented event (1.4) it is rather experienced as *a singularity*. Individuals are neither particular outcomes of general notions such as ethnicity, like Moroccan or Dutch, nor idiosyncratic expressions of an identifiable amalgamation of culture, such as Dutch Moroccans (5.3.1). An individual is a complex singular event and cannot be exclusively defined in clear categories. The mayor of Rotterdam Ahmed Aboutaleb has lived through endless processes of identification, in which any form of identity would fail to fixate him. With his public statement “*je suis Charlie*” after the terrorist attack on the Charlie Hebdo office in 2015 he even radically means to present himself as mayor of a European city.

Philosophical insight, in this analysis of politics of flight, is not something that is gained or possessed. As we will see in 2.2, thought in this politics, as problematizing vector, functions as an engine to keep processes going, instead of ending a process. It is all about transformative knowledge rather than final judgments. There is so to speak a sense of emergency in an approach. It has no previous agenda. The experience of approaching does not necessarily refer to measuring physical distances or spaces. It also points at an *affective*⁹ dimension of nearing someone or something. Heidegger’s (1996) notion of *de-severance* (*Ent-fernung*) refers to such dynamics. De-severance does not indicate farness or closeness in space but refers to the intensity of *Dasein*’s engagement *in* the world, its *being-in-the-world* (pp. 138-144). On this affective level, to approach is to decrease the *farness* of something even when you are near. Being-near is here understood as being-placed in the middle of a discourse as a milieu (see in this study: 2.4).

2) Instead of the physical far and near, the coming near of the act of approach implies a second meaning: *dealing with*. Approach also indicates engagement and the act of relating to. This, however, must not be understood as an intentional act wherein someone relates itself to someone or something already existing in a definitive form and matter. Approach means *relating*. It is a process in thought in which the researcher *and* the research are born simultaneously. The emphasis is on the engagement as a relation rather than on the engaging *relata*. Think of the discovery of penicillin. The approach was

⁹ In Deleuze and Guattari’s oeuvre *affect* contains the idea of sensitization. It is the full involvement of the body, while measuring refers mostly to the reflective processing of what is conceived by the eyes. Affect indicates (e)valuation through the body. See for a summary: Colman, 2005, pp. 11-12.

neither intended by the subject, nor could be defined as a preliminary methodology. Approach rather indicates that the subject as the discoverer Alexander Fleming is set in the middle of a process. It is the unintentional and non-methodical engagement of Fleming that gives rise to a spontaneous emergence that led to the discovery of an object: penicillin.¹⁰ The approach is, nonetheless, not a random process. The manner of approach gives rise to a certain structured context. Each individual who approaches politics of flight is influenced by a set of reference frameworks that predetermine one's manner of approach. Still, this does not imply that it is limited to a previous set out goal. The approach is open, meaning it allows spontaneity and gives room to new engagements. It creates a context in which the subject as *discoverer* and the object as *discovered* emerge simultaneously. Any form of foundation or justification retrospectively appears within the context of approach and is not simply prior to it.

3) Third, approach refers to the notion *aggress*. As such an approach contains elements of *attacking*. This aspect of approaching is rather deconstructive than hermeneutical. The violence of an approach lies in its eventuality; it deactivates existing coherent relationships and creates new consistencies. In the notion of approach the act of cutting into the chaos is not camouflaged. It is *aware of its own violent nature*, its own tactical moves and strategic focus. Approach also refers to the notion *advance*, which refers to the confrontational approach of an enemy as well as to seduction as understood in the expression *making advances*.¹¹ Approach has thus an affinity with the notion of *force* – as not yet articulated power – in order to gain access to or enforce a passage; and to the notion *accede*, meaning producing an entrance in order *to enter*. To enter as in *to arrive*¹² and *to come*, does not imply a coming from an outside, entering an inside. Chronologically it does not distinguish itself from being-in-the-middle. One *is* always already *in media res*, in-between, i.e. inter-ested, an Arendtian notion that is explored in her *The Human Condition* (1958). Arriving – which means that one is always already in the middle of an event – in approaching indicates becoming connected and related to, predispositioned by an ontology of being in the middle, of a milieu. Approaching is thus *dealing with* this being positioned in an ever-changing middle, as a result of the ongoing analyzing and categorizing.¹³ The idea of *dealing with* means dealing not from a confrontational distance, but within the engagement that places the subject in the middle, completing the meaning of the word milieu in this study: *mi*-middle – *lieu*-place. As such an approach deals with a certain intensity of *immanent*

¹⁰ "When I woke up just after dawn on September 28, 1928, I certainly didn't plan to revolutionize all medicine by discovering the world's first antibiotic, or bacteria killer ... But I guess that was exactly what I did" (Brent, 2017).

¹¹ See: *Oxford English Dictionary*. "Advances made to a person for the purpose of improperly influencing his action."

¹² Derrida (1993) speaks of *absolute arrivant*, which indicates a subject, an act, a place, or an event. Nevertheless, in all cases it is not possible to indicate or define this *arrivant*. It is, as he puts it, *de-identified*. It is not the entrance of a refugee or a migrant, due to the fact that such entrance identifies a territory by its borders, defining the other as foreign. *Arrivant* is that which is not expected, there is no prior knowledge, it does not realize a promise, it is not the invention or occupation of a promised land. There is no *telos*, and thus in this sense not a defined chronology of past, present and future. Whatever it may be, wherever it may occur, it takes us by surprise (pp. 33-35).

¹³ In intercultural perspective, the Japanese notions *ma* (in-between/harmony) and *kiri* (cutting/rupture) are clarifying. They indicate the eventuality of a milieu rather than qualities or results of a subjective action. Oosterling (2000^a) states: "'Ma is the place in which a life is lived' ... In *ma*, in other words, *communis* is both sensed and embedded, while in *kiri* the operative, deferring and differentiating forces that 'work' 'within' this continuum are stressed" (pp. 73-74).

engagement within a milieu. There is neither outside nor inside, neither interiority nor exteriority. In less technical and a more jargonistic terminology: we are part of the problem *and* part of the solution. Still, this exclusive distinction situates us again within an oppositional thinking that we want to avoid. This is done in this research by problematizing the problem. In chapter three I will tackle this by introducing the notion of paradigm. As an object of thought within politics different types of paradigms create different types of relationality that lead to multiple types of communities on micro-, meso- and macro-level. It will be argued that politics of flight is not only *polyparadigmatic* on a philosophical level or scientific level (De Mul, 2004, 124); but more so on a political level.

4) Finally, the porosity of the notion of approach allows the taking of a position, the making of a statement and the offering of a proposal, a *proposition*. Nonetheless, this proposition is never absolute nor final. It is always preliminary. In this research Agamben's notion of potentiality (1.4.1) is applied to analyze the options that these three types of approach could offer. Through these options thus I intend to engage with the potentiality of politics of flight.

In the next paragraph this multifaceted idea of approach is rephrased using Deleuze and Guattari's (1987) elaboration on the concept and the ontology of a *rhizome*. Since rhizome resists the idea of finality within potentiality, this notion is an adequate tool to configure complexity and multiplicity of the philosophical act of approaching flight and its politics. Yet, this is not the object of political philosophy as a separate branch of the philosophical trade. With Deleuze and Guattari I will argue that ontology and politics are equiprimordial. And in 3.3 I will draw the conclusion that politico-philosophy – with the hyphen – is an image of thought that connects life to its expression, connects thought to its practice: life-expression-politics.

Since, in approaching a politics of flight we have to deal with a variety of disciplines, a 'rhizomatic' approach seems adequate. First, a rhizomatic approach of flight opposes the need of a single methodology with its overall view on subjects, objects and events. Strictly spoken rhizomatics is a non-method; still it is not a destructive force. Rhizome de-ranks a method and resists the tendency to enforce a main entrance to an exclusive domain of knowledge that finalizes truth finding. By opposing the idea of a main gate a rhizomatic approach opens multiple entrances. In this research, I will argue for multiple entrances within politics of flight.

Second, a rhizomatic approach makes room for an interdisciplinary study of politics of flight. Politics of flight is intertwined by multiple academic approaches, but also by non-scholarly discourses, such as ideological, religious and journalistic ones. Due to the potential of multiple entrances, a rhizomatic approach de-ranks the relevance of sources by neither categorizing them as objective or subjective, factual or fictional, which remain in an anguish of the truthness of the matter. An artistic expression is as relevant as a juridical or philosophical work. Images can sensitize more than academic lectures and policy reports. The photographs of Yto Barrada's project *Sleeper* expresses within the image of migrants and their sense of lost identity and dislocation more than extensive analyses on these themes. The faceless figures affect the viewer on another level (La Biennale di Venezia, 2007, pp. 26-29). On this experiential level, a rhizomatic approach sensitizes discursive networks that connect different forms of expressions. An approaching act of a politics of

flight, even in an academic setting, needs to relate to these multiple entrances, because these are all states of affairs within this politics. This does not mean that a researcher is capable of being exhaustively interdisciplinary. Her research is focused, yet principally porous, and open to all sides. A researcher must be aware of her incapacity to open all of the many entrances. Nevertheless, she comprehends the necessity to engage despite this inability to identify.

Third, a rhizomatic approach, due to its non-hierarchical interdisciplinarity, does not only deconstruct the exclusiveness of some types of relationship, it simultaneously creates space for new manners of arrival. Rhizomatics is about different forms of inclusion, differences and engagement, than only about those types of inclusion that come along with exclusion, identity and indifference. Due to its violent nature of rupturing, it is full of optional roads. This approach, as we will see in the coming chapters is affirmative in its critical act. I would rather call this ethical, due to the fact that questioning the manner of approach means questioning the manner in which one relates, wants and needs to relate to others. Furthermore, a rhizomatic approach has no teleological tendencies: it is always leading somewhere, but this need of consistency emerges within its act of research. A goal presupposes an accurate path as the right way of thought or right method. As I will elaborate later on, through the trilogy life-expression-politics, it is precisely because of the different attitudes of communities that the image of flight is shaped and reshaped beyond any given finality. Finally, despite its ethical trait and due to the permanent multiplicity of approach rhizomatics lacks a specific morality, notwithstanding the fact that different forms of moralistic discourses appear and disappear on its surface. In the second part I will elaborate more on this ethical and moral character of a rhizome and its relevancy for politics of flight.

1.2 Rhizome: The Logic of Roots

1.2.1 An Open Book

In order to elaborate on the notion of politics in *politics of flight*, and in order to understand the global setting in which it is positioned, it is important first to diagnose a politico-economic dynamic that is highly explicative for globalization: *capitalism*. In 1972, the cooperation between two thinkers, academic philosopher Gilles Deleuze and political activist and therapist Félix Guattari, led to the publication of a book that broke with the conventional critical theories on capitalism. *Anti-Oedipus* (1983) is the first volume of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* and the first product of a long productive partnership between the two thinkers. In this first part, they introduce the notion of desire as a machinic dynamism: “Everywhere *it* is machines – real ones, not figurative ones: machines driving other machines, machines being driven by other machines, with all the necessary couplings and connections” (p. 1).

Machinic expresses that desire and interest, although two distinct features thematized in the oeuvres of Freud and Marx, are nevertheless interrelated. Deleuze and Guattari reach beyond Freudomarxism that had its heyday in the late 60’s. Desire, which refers to vital flows, is revolutionary in itself due to the fact that it is capable of escaping the structures of power and of creating interest of its own. Each desire has its interest(s) and each interest tends to capture desire. In contrast to the capturing mechanism in capitalism their ‘libidinal’ philosophy opens multiple vectors for an

unconditional flow of desire. A subject is a desiring machine¹⁴ that results from the connecting and cutting of flows of desires that are generated within and between bodies. Power, in the case of the capitalist machine, attempts to instrumentalize these forceful desires for the concentration of power, as happens in the marketing and advertisement business. The power of capitalism operates by processes of simultaneously stimulating and fixing flows of desire: decode and recode.

That explains why Deleuze and Guattari characterize capitalism as schizophrenic. The decoding – stratified as de/reterritorialization and politicized as both anarchistic and fascist desire – tends towards destruction: desire desiring its own demise, its own death, as we witnessed in the past century in totalitarian systems. They reason that capitalism like no other ideology engages with the double structure of desire, due to its schizophrenic traits: opening and fixing. It permanently poses contradictory economic and social demands, creating double binds: if you want this, you need this. For instance, it simultaneously advocates a fully free market economy, yet sets boundaries with high import tariffs. As Ten Bos (2015) argues, while neoliberalism firmly opposes bureaucracy; nonetheless it permanently produces bureaucratic policies in order to control the economic flows (p. 141). Capitalism continually strives for stabilized and institutionalized optimization while time and again creating a crisis in order to open up new markets. As Georges Bataille (1897-1962), one of the foundational sources for philosophies of difference, argues: economy is ruled by the logic of abundance and transgression. Scarcity is produced in abundance. Its logic is a permanent state of transgression.¹⁵ The crisis is a necessary condition for the sustainability of economy, just like the existence of ‘The Truth’ thrives on the deconstruction of other ‘truths’. Capitalism understands more than any other system that creation and destruction, i.e. production and consumption, cultivation and dissipation, are the two sides of the same coin. Values in capitalism refer to the same dynamic; they are also produced and consumed. Deleuze and Guattari argue that any critique towards capitalism can never escape its logic. Capitalism’s dynamic is immanent. It does not yearn for the definitive answer or solution, but merely for the next absolute solution. It consumes its own critique in order to keep moving fast forward.

Nevertheless, this immanency does not mean the end or the futility of criticizing capitalism. Critique must flow permanently in order to challenge the idea of ‘value’ or in an epistemological sense the idea of ‘truth’. Deleuze and Guattari (1983) do not plead for freedom of speech, but for a freedom of streams of critique: streams that within the schizophrenic logic can only exist due to the obstructions. This immanent flow of friction or resistance emerges when the death driven tendencies are no longer considered to be external, as competing transcendent forces: politico-economic infrastructure (Marxism) versus a repressive father figure (Freudianism). Given the primacy of desire, for Deleuze and Guattari there is no exclusive opposition between the collective (Marx) and the

¹⁴This idea of desiring machine must not be confused with ideas such as *selfish gene* of Dawkins. Machine here refers to complex processes that, as we will see, do not find their point of origin through one form of discipline, in this case biology. It refers to the complexity of processes and the relationality in-between processes.

¹⁵ Although the western economy intends to characterize itself as an economy based on lack, with the Potlatch in mind Bataille argues that every economy is based on dissipation of abundance rather than the calculated use of scarcity. The western economy endures in wasting not only goods and products, but also men, truths and thoughts (Oosterling 1989, pp. 84-88).

individual (Freud). Moreover, schizophrenic desire is not ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in itself; it is both fascist and anarchist. Anarchism can become self-destructive; as does fascism, which on a bodily level is qualified by them as micro-fascism. The micro-fascist desire longs for its own termination. That is why Foucault in the preface of the English translation of *Anti-Oedipus* suggests, that their book is a “tracking down of all varieties of fascism, from the enormous ones that surround and crush us to the petty ones that constitute the tyrannical bitterness of our everyday lives” (p. xiv). In *Anti-Oedipus*, the schizophrenic trait of capitalism – decode and recode, deterritorialize and reterritorialize – overdetermines all politico-economic processes. As I will show in the second part, it is not only in totalitarianism (chapter 4) that fascism becomes self-destructive, but even within multiculturalism (chapter 5) micro-fascism and capitalistic schizophrenia enter implicitly and explicitly in our daily lives. All this has consequences for approaching a politics of flight. A politics of flight has to diagnose this micro-fascism in order to understand multiculturalism in its double bind: both as an emancipatory force of inclusion *and* a segmenting force of exclusion. What comes to the fore depends on the manner of approach.

This ‘multiversity’ of approaching political processes is further elaborated on in their *Capitalism and Schizophrenia 2: A Thousand Plateaus*. The chapters are labeled as plateaus, a notion they take from Gregory Bateson.¹⁶ The first chapter introduces their critique on methodology, which was already applied in the experimental style of *Anti-Oedipus* but was redirected, due to criticism it received. Due to their emphasis on the liberation of desire in its affirmative force – nomadic, resisting, liberating, fleeing the ‘system’ – in the reception of the book the anarchistic tendencies were favored. Still, for Deleuze and Guattari the doubling of re/decoding is imperative. Nomadic and sedentary ways of life are supplementary and not dialectically opposed. The same goes for lines of segmentation and lines of flight that disclose every attempt to close the system. The second volume is even more radical: in its content and in its expression. *A Thousand Plateaus* is not a book structured according to a methodological logic. It is a rhizomatic experiment in itself. Rhizome is thought and thought is life. Then again, this book as a rhizomatic book is not a book of life or on life, but rather the expression of the manner in which a book comes to life, and stays alive. It is a performative expression of how a book *becomes* active and engaged. The rhizomatic ontology – not as *being* but as continuous *becoming* within and without thought, i.e. affective – engenders different forms of philosophy. Their book thus does not intend to philosophically explain the process of flight, but rather intend to pro-activate thought in its engagement within a world of flight. This notion of flight has been an inspiration for this research on politics of flight.

Deleuze (1990) has already explained this supplementarity in an analysis of the adventures of *Alice in Wonderland*. From the perspective of *being* Alice either gets taller or smaller. From the ‘perspective’ of *becoming*, however, Alice rather *grows* into all directions. It is not the measure of taller and smaller that matters, but the process of *growing*, in which “becoming does not tolerate the separation or the distinction of before and after, or of past and future” (p. 1). As Patricia Pisters (2003) explains:

¹⁶ Deleuze and Guattari (1983) cite Bateson in *A Thousand Plateaus* as the inventor of the term *plateau* (pp. 21-22 and 520 n.20). Bateson used this term for the first time in his *Steps to an Ecology of Mind* in 1972.

The paradox of becoming is that there are always two things happening at the same time: when Alice grows larger, she simultaneously becomes larger than she was and smaller than she will be (when she grows smaller, she is simultaneously smaller than she was and larger than she will be). ... All these paradoxical movements of becoming also undermine the fixed personal identity – hence Alice’s doubts about her own name (pp. 108-109).

It is due to this folded time that there is no linearity in becoming and thus no finality. It happens now and here, in the actual. Its core of virtuality (as I will show in 1.4.2) will become a crucial concept in explaining how becoming unfolds within politics of flight. It is evident that the Aristotelian notion of potentiality (as I argue in 1.4.1) is redefined and upgraded by introducing Agamben’s use of the notion of impotentiality.

Let me summarize my approach of a politics of flight this far. Using all these notions of philosophers like Arendt, Agamben, Foucault and especially Deleuze and Guattari, when it comes to a (non)method, what I intend to show is that a refugee is not someone that we can define as a fixated being; it is a becoming that influences all those who are involved within this politics of flight. As such flight is never out there. It is an immanent trait, a vital vector, within our globalized societies. It does not only affect the lives of those who move, but also the lives of those who remain behind (Huijjer, 2016). As a line of flight, it traverses ‘our’ very way of thinking and acting. To be even more precise: the lines of flight within Iraqi, Syrian, Eritrean, Ethiopian and Somali individual bodies in the refugee camps, erected at the outer fringes of Europe, are formatted by Western geopolitics. This idea of becoming – rather than being – also creates a different idea of life as an expression of politics, i.e. of political ontology.

However, approaching the idea of becoming, *A Thousand Plateaus* starts on an experiential level: as a reevaluation of the way in which one experiences a book. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) discern thought as a rhizomatic flow from mere analysis of a reality outside a book. Their book is neither about discovering and clarifying an object or a clear analysis of a factual matter, nor does their book function merely as a tool to acknowledge a rationalizing subject – the authors and their psychological state of mind, expressed in ideas and experiences. Deleuze and Guattari agree that the content of any book “is made of variously formed matters” (p. 3), but that this *content* still differs from its *expression*. Both content and expression do not oppose each other as theory and practice, but supplement each other in multiple time zones and on diverse scales. Eventually their focus is on pragmatics.

This distinction between *content*, on the level of embodied matter, and *expression*, on the level of discursive enunciation, are crucial in the rhizomatics of Deleuze and Guattari. This was already thematized by Saussurean structuralism. Yet, their rhizomatics reaches beyond structuralism, even beyond post-structuralism. In *A Thousand Plateaus* Deleuze and Guattari criticize Saussurean structuralism that discerns solely matter from form. They acknowledge Hjelmslev’s addition of the notion content and expression (pp. 43-45) to analyze the logic of signs more adequately. The notions matter and form must not be seen as an alternative to *body* and *mind*. They are neither oppositional to

one another, nor do they refer specifically to human beings. Deleuze and Guattari also adopt and adapt Hjelmslev's notion of stratification. In order to explain the multiplicity of their ontology they unfold the earth – the rhizomatic setting in which we live – into layers. On the first layer, the zero degree, there are no differences. We cannot imagine this layer. It is not a foundation that can be grasped and analyzed by us. In a systematic sense – not chronologically – multiple layers unfold. Yet, these layers are not hierarchically stapled, they rest 'upon' the zero-degree layer, or better: are immanent to this 'indiscernible' zone. Upon this 'indiscernible' zone 'something' forces itself upon something else. Two distinct processes unfold: content and expression. This creates two different types of formed matter. Expression is not the form of content; and content is not the matter of expression. Content and expression each have their own matter and form.

In the next chapter (2.3) I will elaborate on these two notions, but for the time being it is crucial to notice that content and expression, although distinct, unfold upon each other too. Their relation is not oppositional and dialectical, but *differential*. First, differential indicates that the oppositional difference is not the only form of *difference* but as we will see, difference is manifold. Second, difference does not only appear in-between things; but is *inter* as well as *intra*. An owl does not only differ from a sheep; but also differs from the owl in the next tree. The owl even differs from itself during the process of life. It does not only change biologically, but also within the manner that it expresses itself. With the term differential, I thus refer to the complexity of multiplicity of difference. Furthermore, content and expression are not complementary, but *supplementary* to each other. This indicates that they are not the two parts of a complete picture (as we will see in 1.4.2); in other words, they do not *complete* one another or move one another toward something in a form of a progress; but as supplementary processes they affect one another rather in multiple directions. Content appears within expression and expression appears within content.

Finally, due to being distinct processes, content and expression create two different types of rhizomatic connections that constitute the previously mentioned desiring machine. Deleuze and Guattari now introduce the notion 'assemblage' as the successor of desiring machine. Bodies connect on an affective level; utterances connect on a discursive level. Both types of assemblage – assemblages of bodies and assemblages of enunciation – are systematically distinctive, but their interaction leads to an ontologically non-discernable relation between assemblages of bodies and enunciation. The original French term for assemblage is *agencement*. Assemblage highlights the relational element as well as the process, thereby accentuating the machinic aspect. Nevertheless, according to Oosterling and Thissen (1998), the notion of *agens* (agency) is lost in the translation of *agencement* to assemblage. *Agens* means 'to put in motion', 'to steer' and 'to act'. The etymology of the word *agens* also problematizes the fixation of an entity, whether as subject or identity, but still contains an agency, be it not as an intentional subject, but as a vectorial force (pp. 15-16; Schuilenburg, 2009). *Agencement* then refers to processes of attraction and repulsion in which different contents (bodies), as well as different expressions (enunciations) are interdependently enveloped into a provisional whole, i.e. a consistent and coherent meaningful practice. In applying the English notion of *assemblage* these traits of *agencement* are included in the further analyses. In the three chapters in Part II the importance of the distinction between content and expression as well as their different operations in politics of flight will be elaborated on. For now, it suffices to state that

totalitarian assemblages of bodies and assemblages of enunciation inherently differ from assemblages within multicultural society or a coming community.

Let us return to the Deleuze and Guattari's (1987) idea of a book and elaborate on the implications of these two types of assemblages for reading a book. A book has content and expression. It contains formed matters – sometimes Deleuze and Guattari use the notion 'substance' instead of matter – in the sense that it refers to multiple types of assemblages, both bodily and enunciatively. The Bible, until recently in the Christian world perceived as *the* Book of all books, is a controversial, but nevertheless good example. It is an assemblage of different religions and thus different approaches. The Old and the New Testament refer to Judaism and Christianity and is acknowledged, though in different settings, by the Islam. The Holy Book, written in Aramaic, Hebrew and Greek is also multilingual due to a multiplicity of narrators and territorial settings. The Bible is a textual assemblage connected to assemblages of bodies: multiple communities. From the ancient Egyptians and the Romans to contemporary communities such as Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox Christians or other denomination, assemblages of bodies come along with assemblages of enunciation. Originally written in Hebrew and Greek, for Catholicism use of this book in Erasmus' Latin translation depends on the clergy's knowledge of this language. In Protestantism, it was proliferated in a variety of folk languages, starting with the Lutheran German translation. So, the Bible is not a timeless or unchanging inert body, but a dynamic rhizomatic network. The so-called 'common source' has shown multiple functions and entrances throughout centuries and throughout the world. In this sense, this book already exposes a sense of politics of flight in its long-lasting history, debunking classical oppositions such as the West and the East.

This, however, does not mean that a book is necessarily chaotic. A book is an open assemblage, meaning that although it has a consistency and is coherent, it is nevertheless open to the world for whatever connection. Not only on a textual level – intertextuality – but also on an affective and ethical level. It can be read time and again in completely different registers. Therefore, Deleuze and Guattari argue that its consistency is not due to a particular subject, but to a process of *agencement* in which writing and reading 'subjects' are formed, deformed and reformed instead of being producers and consumers of a meaning.

However, what does an assemblage of bodies imply? Foucault's (1977) analysis of Bentham's panopticon as the basic format of modern subjectification is a good example here. The construction of the prison building creates an assemblage of bodies. Not only inmates, but also guards, and beyond the human: bricks, walls, windows and lights. These are not separated entities, but they are interrelated and positioned in the formation of assemblages of bodies. This is the content of the panopticon. Senseless in a sense: formed matter. The panopticon also creates 'assemblages of enunciation': subjects are not only subjected to a physical regime, but also to a discursive regime that they internalize: a discourse of politicians, judges, moralists, psychiatrists, criminologists. It is a disciplinary discourse of visibility in which prisoners are seen without seeing the one that guards them. They embody the discourse. This envelops bodily assemblages, giving these meaning by naming them 'delinquents'. The content as assemblage of bodies is supplemented by this discursive

expression. These utterances that give breath to them, ‘inspire’ them, bring them to life, but are never fully covering all affects of these bodies as desiring entities. The assemblage of enunciation is internalized by the prisoner as delinquency. They ‘become’ delinquents. Delinquency individualizes and subjects the body. It is not about the individuality of a prisoner, but its formation as a *docile body* within this ‘assemblage of enunciation’ (pp. 195-228). In connection with this discourse on delinquency Foucault speaks of *disciplinary power* that – in words of Deleuze and Guattari – creates ‘assemblages of bodies’ and ‘assemblages of enunciations’ that unfold consistency over a period of time.

Panopticon	Content	Expression
Form	Prison	Delinquency/subjectivity
Matter	Bodies	Penitentiary practices

I too will argue that politics of flight consists of multiple ‘assemblages of bodies’ and ‘assemblages of enunciations’ that in overlapping constitute a discursive configuration: the refugee, the migrant. Once the docile body is fully stripped of any form of expression and is downgraded to numbed matter, the Agambian notion of *homo sacer* becomes highly instructive. I will elaborate on this in the fourth chapter.

Could we by now provide an answer to the question ‘how to approach a book?’ It is not the how of the approach – *méthodos* – but the act of approaching itself that ‘matters’. There is no final how, only momentary hows. A book is an indefinable, yet consistent process – a network of networks of meanings and affects without hierarchy – engaging with everything that affects it or that is affected by it. It is indefinable due to the unpredictable ways it connects to everything over time. The reception of Karl Marx’ *Das Kapital* is a clarifying case. Through the 20th century not only in the West, but all over the globe different interpretations and connections have been developed and various activists have related their ideology to this book. While some religious leaders condemned it, others such as Khomeini implicitly introduced and accentuated Marxist economic and socialist traits into and within a theocratic discourse (Afary, & Anderson, 2005). The revolution against the capitalistic world thus mobilized the working religious class among others. It is reasonable to state that *Das Kapital* is multiple in its proponents as well as in its opponents.

The reduction of a book to a single subject, theme or object, overlooks the ability of a book to connect to different matters and forms as a result of which its content and expression changes all the time. This reduction gives a poor view on the multiple ways in which books connect, i.e. on “the exteriority of their relations” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 3). Deleuze and Guattari argue that whether we open or close a book, a book is more characterized by its function, by its exteriority instead of its interiority. Yet these oppositions miss the point. Interiority and exteriority are situated within an immanence. A book for Deleuze and Guattari is first and for all *a surface* and as such it is embedded in a context, due to its association to what lies outside its ‘subject’. In the ‘final’ instance for them a book is a performative expression, which substantiates and forms assemblages on a

discursive level, while affecting its reader's bodies, transforming their 'being' into an assemblage itself. In a strict sense a book is, in the phrasing of academic education, a body of knowledge (BoK).¹⁷

1.2.2 *The Body and its Procedures*

A book is a body. Bodies are connected and reconfigured on different levels. Although bodies aim at consistency, nonetheless this consistency is constantly deterritorialized by forces that work upon its matter and form. This unarticulated field of forces is by Deleuze and Guattari qualified as a *body without organs* (BwO). This notion, introduced by Cotard in the 19th century, was reused by playwright, actor and director Antonin Artaud in 1947¹⁸ in his radio play *To Have Done with the Judgment of God* (1988):

For you can tie me up if you wish,
but there is nothing more useless than an organ.

When you will have made him (God TR) a body without organs,
then you will have delivered him from all his automatic reactions
and restored him to his true freedom.

Then you will teach him again to dance wrong side out
as in the frenzy of dance halls
and this wrong side out will be his real place (p. 571).¹⁹

In the transcendental focus of this judgment, due to the illusion of an exteriority (God), law and order are defined, regulated and executed. Judgment is a bifurcating – cutting – process in which different binary phenomena and actions are identified and related to a normative structure. Categories of good

¹⁷ I have experienced this openness in education during my teachings to future social workers at the two Universities of Applied Sciences in Rotterdam. Philosophy lessons for them are never merely academic. They have to implement their readings in their reflections on life stories and their concrete attitude toward others. With certainty, I could state that while I was teaching them how different philosophers thought about life, they taught me how philosophy can become a life, beyond its academic isolation, creating a body of knowledge (BoK).

¹⁸ The notion of 'Body without Organs' is first used by the French psychiatrist Jules Cotard (1840-1889). He describes it as a syndrome. Patients that suffered from it have trouble experiencing their bodies as an organism, they either thought that they were going to die or that their body was a hollow space. They experienced their body as a body without organs. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) are not explicit in their reference to Cotard. The French version of *A Thousand Plateaus* does not mention the name Cotard. He is cited without reference. In the English version translator Brian Massumi corrects this (p. 150, and p. 531 translators note 2) See also: Ten Bos, 2009, p. 61.

¹⁹ In this radio play another character calls Artaud, who himself is a character in his play, a mad man. Artaud chatters on and on about the Americans stealing the sperms of children in order to begin a war, to make soldiers. A war that always refers to multiple enemies, while their identity remains the same. The body is a *pursuit of fecality*, the shit is that which exists, and turning the body, his body, into a closed entity is that which suffocates him. But when the body explodes as the result of the suffocation it shows its untouchability, its ungraspability. Men, however, make themselves entities, make god entities, and make themselves gods. "They have found a new way to bring out god and to capture him in his microbial noxiousness" (Artaud, 1988, p. 569). In chapter 4 I will elaborate on this wholeness of identity and the multiplicity of the 'enemy.'

and evil, allowed and prohibited, internal and external are some of the commonly known forms of bifurcating. *Dancing wrong side out* does not indicate becoming evil, but refers to a way of thinking beyond these oppositional categories. Inspired by Artaud, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) argue that despite an omnipresent tendency of judging and its suggestion of inevitability, *organizations* are always supplementary to an unorganized body, the BwO or, as they also qualify it, *earth*. In this study, I will explore the manners in which different types of organization within different types of politics form and deform bodies of those who are involved within politics of flight. This study is focused on the connection of bodies; not their unrelated distinction.

Only by realizing that my flesh is your flesh and also the flesh of the animal, rises the suspicion that there can be suffering, that there may be joy, that the planet has created sensitivities (Ten Bos, 2011, p. 34, Translation TR).

Let us now examine the manner in which this BwO relates to regular bodies. In *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze (2006) introduces his rather minimalist idea of a body: a body, he writes,

is a field of forces, a nutrient medium fought over by a plurality of forces. For in fact there is no 'medium', no field of forces or battle ... Any two forces, being unequal, constitute a body as soon as they enter into a relationship. This is why the body is always the fruit of chance, in the Nietzschean sense, and appears as the most 'astonishing' thing, much more astonishing, in fact, than consciousness and spirit (pp. 39-40).

Conventionally, *a* body, let us say for example a human body, is defined as an organism, which is characterized by the internal interdependency of its specific and functional organs in opposition to external forces. The human body is further defined by dualities; the most encompassing is the opposition between body and mind, or body and soul. Identity thus contains and refers to the inside, an interiority, which in the science of biology indicates the interiority of a body and in religious or Cartesian context the interiority of a cogito – *res cogitans* – or consciousness as opposed to a double exteriority: the material body – *res extensa* – and the superior mind of God.²⁰ Within this setting the bodies of the same type of 'closed' organisms show analogous structures and functions. The heart is placed on the left-middle side of the body, the mouth functions as an eating mechanism and the functions of the nose are breathing and smelling. Nevertheless, despite these commonalities, a body, even a human body, can *do* more than one assumes it to do. The act of breathing and eating already by definition connects to an outside. Bacteria penetrate our body all the time and pregnancy testifies of how organs can change their ordinary position.²¹ Nowadays we can even survive the loss of an organ.

²⁰ Mysticism in most religions deconstructs this duality between individual souls and God(s). Individual souls become part of God, while losing their individuality, and potentially share godliness.

²¹ See for example the quote on a pregnancy site: "But the bladder isn't the worst of it. Your lungs get squashed up into your throat. Forget having room for them to actually fill with air. Your stomach is smushed up into your ribs, with barely any room to expand for food. And your intestines? They get pushed off to wherever they can fit" (Neal, n.d).

It can be replaced by artificial objects or technology. Jean-Luc Nancy's (2008) text on his experience of an artificial heart is an ode to this openness. A new organ, a heart, penetrates Nancy's body. His identity and his immunity are undermined. There is a sense of strangeness from within his body. Although Nancy states that there always has been a distance between *himself and himself*, the intruder forces an opening, *an incision*, making him suffer in-between the force of intrusion and the desire not to be-penetrated by it (pp. 161-170).

It is such porosity that inspires Deleuze (2006), with Benedictus Spinoza and Friedrich Nietzsche in mind, to define a body neither as a fixed entity, a closed whole, nor even as a medium on which external forces operate. A body does not have a relationship to forces; it *is* a relation between forces, "whether it is chemical, biological, social or political" (p. 40). A body is a middle, a milieu as a transforming knot of forces that work upon each other. It is not a substance and as such not a medium. While consciousness referring to the ego indicates an inferior whole in relation to a superior whole – such as the soul of a human referring to the ultimate Spirit – a body is a network of inferior or reactive forces *and* superior or active forces. Body is a living thing not because it effects force or is affected by forces, but because it is an interactive plane of these two types of forces, in which the quality of a force corresponds to the "difference in quantity", and creates a *hierarchy* (pp. 39-40).

This idea of a body matures in *A Thousand Plateaus* against what Deleuze and Guattari (1987) call a *body without organs*. BwO is a limit configuration; it is the interactive field of forces in which the conventional body as an organism and as a well-defined organization is deterritorialized. This deterritorialization does not indicate a lack of organs, but rather the absence of an all-encompassing, a unitary meaning and the normal positioning of formed matter. It has no content yet and no expression. References to psychopathology with its different 'abnormalities' and to art-practices enable Deleuze and Guattari to position this BwO. BwO is not without an eye, a mouth or a nose, but the functions of these parts are no longer determined and absolute, hence in terms of Artaud *wrong side out*.

The BwO does not oppose the organs: it opposes the limits of the organism and makes multiple connections that go beyond the organism's organization as it is traditionally defined (Pisters, 2003, p. 110)

I see this in the picture taken from Miles Davis' face. It is not only his nose that breathes the air in and the intensity of his mouth that pushes the energy out. His whole body, his whole face flows through the trumpet and the intensity of the closeness of his eyes. His face runs into his hands, and even more so into the trumpet. The musical instrument is not outside his body, nor an object that has penetrated the body defining an outside and an inside. Both body and artistic medium are expressions of an assemblage. The air and the face, the hand and the instrument have all become sound that is not organized along the axes of interiority and exteriority. It flows, without limitation, streaming living matter that in its expressiveness is connected to the world that surrounds it.

Deleuze and Guattari (1987) call the ultimate BwO: *the earth*. Despite the codifying power of judgment and power's interests to stagnate the de-codifying process, the BwO or the earth is the non-stagnating living process that escapes such desire. BwO is thus not a thing that we can long for,

imitate, or strive for. With all its horrors and beauties, it is beyond the reach of an ego, beyond human will and intentionality. Nevertheless, we are merely seven handshakes away from any person on earth. As we will see, it is these types of bodily assemblages that create another idea of connection within politics of flight.

The body without organs is not a dead body but a living body all the more alive and teeming once it has blown apart the organism and its organization (p. 30).

How is this all related to their idea of a book? Along these lines Deleuze and Guattari argue that although a book seems to be a well-structured organism, a closed whole with a chronology, starting with introductions and ending with conclusions, it is nonetheless a BwO, a non-organized matter, because it opens to all sides, affecting, accumulating forces, eager to connect to whatever is within its reach. This means that there is no self-contained interiority to a book; it is a porous surface in permanent exchange. As such, Deleuze and Guattari qualify a book in a Nietzschean way as an intensity that undermines intentionality, a writing that deterritorializes both writer and reader. As Foucault shows, it triggers the birth and the death of an author.²²

Other art expressions also sensitize their audiences for this experience: an experience of an intensity of being plugged in, folding upon itself, trying to find consistency on whatever level or plane (plateau), as I will explicate in 2.4. The Wachowski's *Matrix Trilogy* (1999 & 2003^{a&b}) is illustrative. Although the protagonist Neo seems to long for the reality of the world beyond the Matrix, nevertheless only in the machinic intensity of the Matrix he becomes a real body. He becomes somebody in the networks of machine and men. In the first part, he is still aware of the importance of this connection, the relevancy of being plugged in. The second and third part of the trilogy are in need of differentiation and dramatization of the world outside the Matrix, by highly sexually oriented dance parties and love scenes between Neo and Trinity. As De Mul (2003) suggests it is mostly the oracle that understands the non-distance between men and machine. The Canadian filmmaker David Cronenberg is in this sense more fearless. His *eXistenZ* (1999), despite its poor special effects and acting, is a daring sensitization of the machine and human body as an unorganized open living thing. The plugging-in object, in contrast to the Matrix, is as fleshy and alive as the body that it enters. In line with Pisters (2003), we could state that Cronenberg creates in the intense intersection in-between human and machine a *new flesh* (p. 171). In the end, it is not clear whether the protagonists are ever disconnected, or merely plugged-in in multiple ways.

How does this imply the bodies of refugees? As we will see in 1.3.1, these bodies also escape identification due to the fact that shaping and deshaping of these bodies – their sense of living or dying – cannot be pinpointed to one form of discourse or one type of territorial politics. This is why

²² In his text 'What Is an Author', Michel Foucault (1986^a) does not only problematize the one-on-one relation between work and an author, but also the unity of the author as well as the unity of a work. They are both open forces, and function as a discourse instead of subject and object. I will elaborate more on this in 3.2.1.

Deleuze and Guattari (1987) prefer the term machinic. Machinic²³ is a spontaneous process of folding and unfolding an open field of forces, the BwO. Deleuze and Guattari also speak of *the abstract machine*: the engine of the process of stratification, destratification and re-stratification, or de/re/territorialization (see in this study: 2.3.1). Think of the earth and its transformative processes in which mountains rise, rivers dig deeper, and volcanic emissions change landscapes and climate. These are processes, through which forces emerge, becoming trees, birds, mountains and humans, which are produced, changed and devoured by the earth. Since our current ‘geological’ period is marked as the *Anthropocene* men have become part of this earthly dynamics. They have become its generators and its victims at the same time.

Although within this machinic dynamics meanings and binary structures are time and again generated and degenerated, the abstract machine is nevertheless systematically ‘prior’ to dualities like good and evil, insider and outsider. As Deleuze and Guattari in their lectures often suggest, there are multiple machines: love-machines, war-machines, Kafka-machines, bureaucratic-machines, and hence fleeing-machines. These multiple machines are events unfolding upon the abstract machine. The abstract machine is the plane on which these multiplicity of machinic procedures function. In connection to a book, Deleuze and Guattari even argue that a book is never merely approached through one type of machinic procedure. For example, while we connect some books to one type of ideology or belief, such as religious books or *Das Kapital*, the machinic intensity of a book, according to Deleuze and Guattari (1987) doesn’t coincide with an ideology; literature is not about *ideology* (p. 4). While ideologies define a writing through one type of methodology, they characterize literature as *an assemblage*, arguing that its approach is always multiple due to its intense relationality with BwO.

1.2.3 Books: Trees, Roots, and Rhizome

We shifted from books via bodies to literature as a specific art practice. Literature is more than a cumulative production of artistically valued books. Deleuze and Guattari firmly state that literature, although always already meaningful, has nothing to do with generating *a* meaning, or *a* specific signification. It is rather an act of mapping of that which is not there – let us call this provisionally: fiction. Creating literature, writing a book is not about something that is there – a research on existing matter – but rather a looking far ahead to that which is about to come, or as Derrida (1992^b) calls it *à venir*. That which is *to arrive* – thus within politics of flight those processes that are overlooked by dominant discourse – is not something that will occur in the future. It is not non-present. It is the unexpected (p. 78). It is an ethics that such an *arriving* presents that initiates the approach in this research. A book, or to be exact: this book, is not about finding a method to understand what is or was, it is an approach, an essay to engage and to assemble. I will elaborate on different forms of engagements by examining three types of books distinguished by Deleuze and Guattari (1987, pp. 5-7).

²³ The term machinic must not be confused with the term cyborg. Cyborg often refers to organism, mammals or other, or to structures and networks. Machinic rather refers to the process, forces that create a context in which such thing as organism or forms of networks could unfold.

1) The first type, *the root-book* is a classical book, the structure of which is visualized according to the image of a tree. It has a vertical axis like a tree with bifurcating branches. The world is defined according to an arborescent logic that is a *binary logic*. Every position bifurcates, branches into two. The root-book is based on the idea of a closed organism that pretends to reflect, imitate and understand *Nature*. It progressively explores the world, knowing it better and better, climbing higher and higher, just like a tree, like a pyramid. As Willem Schinkel (2008) shows, such idea of a closed organism with its hierarchical structure implements itself in political thinking. Not only humans and animals, but also a society starts to define itself as a closed organism, and a hierarchical unity in terms of a social ladder. The other becomes a disease entering the unity of a body. Such binary tendencies ramify the world into oppositional branches, a dichotomized logic of contrary double-unities of subject-object, truth-false, real-fiction, good-bad, beautiful-ugly. It is obsessed with causality and successions. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) take psychoanalysis and some linguistic procedures as exemplary cases. Fairy tales have also a strong binary structure of thought, the good fairy and the bad witch, the helpless princess and the heroic prince. Although these oppositions seem to be simplistic and outdated, nevertheless these still are effective in political, social and cultural discourses.²⁴ Some Bollywood and Hollywood productions still visualize these simplistic thoughts and beliefs.²⁵ In the fourth chapter I will elaborate on how nationalistic tree-minded mechanisms function within this binary machine of exclusion.

2) The second type is *the radical-system*, also called the *fascicular root* book. This typically modernistic book has deactivated the main branch, the *tallness* of the tree. It has multiple roots and distrust the clarity of the objects. Nevertheless, despite its critical attitude, its suspicious approach towards the objects and the perception of an individual with respect to those objects, this book still holds on to a unity, namely the unity of a perceiving subject, no matter how dysfunctional this perception might be. There is nothing objective that can unite the subject, but a higher level of being can restore this tormenting disintegration. This idea of disintegration is also very popular in contemporary cinema. Christopher Nolan's *Memento* (2000) plays with this idea of a sense of losing the objectivity of an event and a confused subject trying to gain some sense of consistency. The protagonist Leonard Shelby has lost his short-term memory, and through notes he tries to remember what has happened to his dead wife. The film starts at the end of the story and the image of the lost protagonist, trying to retrace the story back to its beginning. The film is shot in a double time sequence: real time in black and white, the reversed time sequences backwards in time in color. The

²⁴ In his *The Kite Runner* Khaled Hosseini (2003) visualizes this tension between the old-fashioned sense of good and evil and the new forms of binary divisions of right and wrong. Although the protagonist Amir seems to feel shame for the social and cultural positions and status of himself and Hassan, he feels this shame not for the essential political hierarchical setting but merely due to the unknown brotherhood with the person he thought was merely his servant. Moreover, the book keeps the binary setting between the west and the east. Afghanistan remains in clear cliché setting of repression, and America is, despite its problematic attitude towards migrants, the land of the free. Donald Trump's policy finally put an end to that illusion.

²⁵ Tarsem Singh's *Mirror Mirror* (2012) shows this irony. While the story intends to break through the common idea of Snow White's story, by little people's efforts to teach her to be independent and rebellious, she is still the one that is expected to cook dinner and make breakfast for these men.

image of a man he just killed on the picture he made and the fading dead body, while the scene is moving backwards, is powerfully illustrative. Still, despite the loss of memories, the story remains in search of a truth at the end, which is at the same time the beginning of the story. Another consistency is the repetition of Leonard's grieving act, he burns his wife's belongings time and again. This reminds us of Deleuze and Guattari's (1987) reference to a *circular unity*. They argue that thought lines in a *fascicular root* book present themselves within a circle, which binds the branching of thought in a bundle, a segment, in order to gain a higher calling. In the fifth chapter I will show how multiculturalism shape itself in terms of circular unities.

The world has become chaos, but the book remains the image of the world: radicle-chaosmos rather than root-cosmos. A strange mystification: a book all the more total for being fragmented. At any rate, what a vapid idea, the book as the image of the world (p. 6).

3) The final type is a book that emerges without any intention of finding a higher dimension or the unity of a subject. Deleuze and Guattari call this a *rhizome*.

In truth, it is not enough to say, 'Long live the multiple', difficult as it is to raise that cry. No typographical, lexical, or even syntactical cleverness is enough to make it heard. The multiple *must be made*, not by always adding a higher dimension, but rather in the simplest of ways, by dint of sobriety (p. 6).

The rhizome does not intend to manifest a unity; under the ground it branches rather through the unity. There is no ultimate or personal direction; every direction is possible. And the multiplicity of this possibility is the intensity of the rhizome, an intensity breaking through the stiffness of organism and the commonality of thought. "The rhizome includes the best and the worst: potato and couchgrass, or the weed" (p. 7). It is a *burrow*²⁶ dug by rats and rabbits, without a certain and hierarchical direction, without a *certain* perspective. A rhizomatic book can be entered in various ways; there is no final interpretation. It could be read upside down, penetrable from all sides. We could even wonder whether there is a book that can be characterized as solely tree-minded or merely fascicular. Even the binary logic of fairy tales is not total, a girl talking to a wolf and a wolf becoming a grandmother, in a sense feeds our fear of the animal, but the absurdity of the communication between the two distinct species is, nevertheless, an entrance of another kind.

Nonetheless, rhizome is not a road to happiness. Neither does it oppose the *root-book* or the *fascicular root*. Eventually, the tree and the radicle are related to the rhizome. They are different types of multiplicities (differential) but also relational and supplementary. No matter how rigid a tree-line of thought and power is, the uncontrollable branches of the rhizome still penetrate the tree from its basis. For Deleuze and Guattari thus rhizome is the reality of an underground that does not only affect our bodies but also our way of writing and thinking. Thought is – as we will see in the next chapter – not

²⁶ This is how Deleuze and Guattari (1986, p. 3) describe Kafka's hotel in *Amerika*. See for an analysis of entering the burrow: De Brabander, 2000.

in order to create unambiguous knowledge, but rather to *disquiet* the so-called certainty of knowledge as unchanging objective facts. In other words, rhizomatic thinking does not create *the* approach but multiple approaches.²⁷ In the sixth chapter I will discuss the disquieting process of the rhizome by elaborating on Agamben's and Arendt's notions such as coming community and communicability.

In line with this idea of multiplicity of approaches we could state that books are rhizomatic. Nevertheless, we cannot conclude that a writer intentionally can manufacture a rhizomatic book. Not even Deleuze and Guattari (and neither I) are capable of such a thing. Rhizome is what happens within a process of writing and reading, surpassing the subject-object relation. It is a process that breaks the book open, and decenters writer's intentions and the reader's expectations along the line. To state: "I will write a rhizomatic book", is simply absurd. Every book is rhizomatic, which means that I do not know how this book will function in discourses that are already attached or will be attached to it. To state that *politics of flight* is a rhizomatic process, a *burrow* with multiple entrances, does not result in anyone knowing all these entrances. I merely intend to point out some generally known as well as unknown entrances as far as I can see them, fully aware of the fact that these will actualize a very few of the virtual entrances in *politics of flight*. Finally, I do not intend to show a rhizomatic process as opposed to *arborescent* and *fascicular* process. Everything that appears in *politics of flight* is not beyond its rhizomatic trait. *Arborescent* and *fascicular* traits appear in the middle of it. In Foucault's terminology, this book is approaching different types of discourses that appear in this politics and does not create a methodology to define these discourses *once and for all*. In words of ancient philosopher *Òrúnmìlà*, as Sophie Bósèdé Olúwolé (2014) cites:

No wise person can tie water unto the edge of a wrapper. No knowledgeable person knows the number of sands. No traveler can get to the end of the world. A sharp knife cannot carve its own handle (p. 32)

²⁷ Hypertext fiction on the Internet is a good example of the multiplicity of approach. *Flight Paths: A Network Novel* (Pullinger, Joseph & Participants, n.d.) as a hypertext fiction narrates – in text, moving images, photography and sounds – the story of Yacub, a man from Pakistan. First, he moves to Dubai in order to find a job but then he finds himself working hard, not getting paid and starving in a working camp. He decides to leave, and is tipped by a smuggler to squeeze himself in a small airplane shelf. While he is "freezing hot and then burning cold" in the flying airplane, Harriet, a woman from Richmond, is shopping in a supermarket. Suddenly, she looks up, while Yacub, released from the airplane, crashes on her. The stories start separately, but intertwine eventually. However, *Flight Paths* remain straightforward. There is connection but no interaction. Van den Bos (n.d.) states along with Michael Joyce that there are two types of hypertext fiction, exploratory and constructive. While the first creates multiple outcomes within a fixed outcome, the second creates unending openings due to the fact that each reader can create their own entrances in the text. However, most hypertext fictions are rather exploratory than constructive. Nevertheless, hypertext fiction is not without consistency. Van den Bos (n.d.) states: "Those associations are not arbitrarily either, but may form a thematic structure. Both structures are closely related." She describes a hyperfiction that is a map of a body, thematically as well as structurally. "The hyperlinks between the texts are placed within this framework, which creates the effect of associating all the textual information with this body." See also Van den Bos, 2000.

1.2.4 Non-fixating Traits

Within this multiplicity of approaches some approaches are at loggerheads with other types of approach. Deleuze and Guattari, as well as Foucault, criticize dialectical thinking, of which the exclusive trait is oppositional. The world is divided into mutually exclusive sections that are sublated in order to articulate a new, enriched opposition. This thought rests upon the idea of relational exclusion in overarching inclusion: eventually concepts and notions constitute one another due to their oppositions, before these are reunited on a higher level as the upbeat to a more enriched exclusive identity. Right constitutes left just by being its exact opposite. Dichotomies deduce their meaning from this negating logic. There is no day without a night, no inside without an outside and no subject without an object. Nevertheless, not every binary setting functions the same. Zoroastrianism or yin yang theories also have such binary logic. Some binary settings such as man and women in yin yang theory demand balance and harmony, others appreciate one above the other such as good and evil, and in some cases even day and night, by associating for example light to goodness and darkness to something sinister. In Nietzschean agonistic thought two mutually powerful forces are at war with each other, it is not harmony but this conflict that is appreciated in Nietzsche's thought on tragedy. In Hegelian discourse the conflict between two forces or elements lead to a third option that annuls the two into another or higher level. In the logic of exclusion within politics of flight however another binary force is at hand. Exclusion creates normative and juridical oppositions such as friends and enemies, citizens and stateless, inhabitants and migrants. Nonetheless, here is neither balance of yin yang at work, nor Hegelian universalistic *sublation*: a *sublation* that is only applicable for western educated heterosexual male species. The totalitarian state cannot live without the permanent conflict between the two. Neither is it a Nietzschean agonistic setting of mutually combating forces. In the discourse of exclusion, as we will see in the fourth chapter, one position is always strategically stronger than the other.

Philosophies of difference testify that although the previous forms of binary approach have the metaphysical, epistemological and ethical pretense of grasping and understanding the world, they are nevertheless far from it. The world exists of differences, but difference is not exclusively oppositional to comprehend. Difference is a becoming as well, a foundational differing that Derrida (1982) calls *différance*, which indicates that a definitive meaning is always postponed, temporalized; it is never 'over there' to be grasped in thought and language. There is always an ungraspable supplement in the margins that is produced in the very process of understanding as a discursive *restance* and *resistance*. This 'foundational' differing is graphically grasped as the distinction between *a* and *e*: *Différance* motorizes all *différences* (pp. 1-27). That is why Derrida starts his text by stating that *différance* is "literary neither a word nor a concept" (p. 1). *Différance* can only be spoken of through a *sheaf* or as a *sheaf*. It is a discursive gesture, *soundless*,²⁸ he states, a written word that functions through and in-between text, through and in-between contexts. Derrida's affinity with rhizomatic traits of *différance* is evident when he states that "the word *sheaf* seems to mark more appropriately that the assemblage to be proposed has the complex structure of a weaving, an interlacing which permits the different

²⁸ In section 2.3 I will critically elaborate on notions such as silence and soundlessness.

threads and different lines of meaning – or of force – to go off again in different directions, just as it is always ready to tie itself up with others” (p. 3). The graphical visualization of a philosophy of differences is a network, not a pyramid.

Always differing and deferring, the trace is never as it is in the presentation of itself. It erases itself in presenting itself, muffles itself in resonating, like the *a* writing itself, inscribing its pyramid in *différance* (p. 23).

Différance cannot be *exposed*, not because it opposes presence, but because it is beyond the oppositional thought, beyond present and non-present. It is rather *secretive* and *discrete*, Derrida states. It can only be spoken of *indirectly*, even in his own text: “*différance* is not, ... it has neither existence nor essence. It derives from no category of being, whether present or absent” (p. 6). It is the *non-ontotheological* non-being, a non-foundation that gives rise to that which is called history, theology or ontology. *Différance* is thus in *its effect* both *temporizing* and *spacing*. And finally, *différance* is not just between things, but immanent to them. Things just differ, and they do not differ from something else specifically. It is within this setting that *différance* functions beyond oppositions such as *active* and *passive*, and oppositions that result from this opposition, such as *subject* and *object*. *Différance* is not punctual, but arbitrary, procedural. *Différance* is an *interval*. “In constituting itself, in dividing itself dynamically, this interval is what might be called *spacing*, the becoming-space of time or the becoming-time of space (*temporization*)” (p. 13). This does not imply that oppositions do not exist, but that these are aspects of this interval, traversed by *différance*. The so-called oppositional ‘elements’ are already multiple in themselves. As we will see in the process of this study, it is this idea of *différance* in connection to the idea of rhizome that creates multiple political and ethical attitudes within politics of flight.

In Derrida’s deconstructive discourse rhizomatic thought resonates. Rhizomatics (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987) subscribes the idea of approach as *différance* rather than as dialectical. What are the traits of the rhizome once it is no longer the opposite of the tree and the fascicular roots? First and second, the principles of *connection* and that of *heterogeneity* characterize the rhizome. Within a rhizome each line is virtually connected to all other lines. Rhizomes as forces are everywhere. Caught in power structures these life forces are momentarily stratified in discourses: political, social, artistic, philosophical or scientific. However, the rhizome traverses discourse and ‘forces’ ideas beyond stratified limits. If we return to politics of flight, we can now state that this politics is a double binding articulation given the double sense of ‘of’: *genitivus objectivus* and *genitivus subjectivus*: flight being both the object of politics and flight having a politics of its own. And as such politics of flight has an affinity with what Deleuze and Guattari mark as ‘lines of flight’, since within the rhizomatic dynamic they discern two forms of lines: *lines of segmentation* and *lines of flight*. Flight appears when a line becomes thinner: when within a unity as a cluster of power things start to fragment and disconnect.

Within a rhizomatic field where root-thoughts and fascicular ones are permanently created, these roots are under permanent threat of dissolving in the exponential growth of rhizomes. In line with this interplay, in his *Logic of Sense* Deleuze (1990) is not surprisingly fascinated by Lewis Carroll’s

(1982) *Alice in Wonderland*. The story is not about a simple negation of all that is normal; it is not a glorification of the absurd, of the madman. It is all about intensification, linking the rooted tendencies of Alice and her fascicular tendency to distinguish herself and the penetrating liquefaction of her inner and outer world, of what *ought to be* and what *can be*, of language as an object and a subject in itself:

‘Have you guessed the riddle yet?’ the Hatter said, turning to Alice again.

‘No, I give it up,’ Alice replied. ‘What’s the answer?’

‘I haven’t the slightest idea,’ said the Hatter.

‘Nor I,’ said the March Hare.

Alice sighed wearily. ‘I think you might do something better with the time,’ she said, ‘than waste it in asking riddles that have no answers.’

‘If you knew Time as well as I do,’ said the Hatter, ‘you wouldn’t talk about wasting *it*. It’s *him*.’

‘I don’t know what you mean,’ said Alice.

‘Of course you don’t!’ the Hatter said, tossing his head contemptuously. ‘I dare say you never even spoke to Time!’

‘Perhaps not,’ Alice cautiously replied: ‘but I know I have to beat time when I learn music.’

‘Ah! That accounts for it,’ said the Hatter. ‘He won’t stand beating. Now, if you only kept on good terms with him, he’d do almost anything you liked with the clock. For instance, suppose it were nine o’clock in the morning, just time to begin lessons: you’d only have to whisper a hint to Time, and round goes the clock in a twinkling! Half-past one, time for dinner!’ (p. 71).

Alice is aware of the rules, of the existence of imperatives in thought and behavior. She does not hesitate to mention them time and again. Nevertheless, there is no rigidity or rejection in her interaction. While in the first instance she preaches on the objective experience of time and characterizes its waste as unpleasant, she easily adjusts to the logic of the Hatter, and starts to speak of Time as a person that she must beat when she plays music. She is easily seduced to another logic and becomes equally consistent in this new form of logic. Moreover, she is not shy to admit her lack of knowledge. It is this *bending trait toward different types of knowledge* that matters in order to function within the rhizome, and thus in the end our engagement within politics of flight.

Next to connection and heterogeneity, a rhizome is also characterized as *multiplicity*. It is not multiplicity but a form of unity as a closed whole, as an organism, that is secondary to rhizome. Such unity indicates a capturing of power within a multiplicity of forces. Multiplicity, however, does not have an object and a subject, not even as the repressor and the repressed. Multiplicity is not a minority as opposed to majority (as I will show in 3.4). It is measured by intensities as a field of yet non-specified forces. Whenever these intensities are decreased or increased due to secondary divisions within the rhizome, the nature of a multiplicity starts to change.

An assemblage is precisely this increase in the dimensions of a multiplicity that necessarily changes in nature as it expands its connections. There are no points or positions in a rhizome, such as those found in a structure, tree, or root. There are only lines (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 8).

No knots yet, no nodes, no self-reflective individuals, let alone autonomous entities in this chaotic network. Let us return to the BwO as chaotic multiplicity and the human body as a whole or a unity. Although we pretend that the unity of our body is something essential and permanent, the procedure of our existence – the penetration of the sperm through the structure of the egg, the event of change and the shared fluid within the womb, as well as the multiple diseases due to bacteria and the process of digestion during our lives – already indicates otherwise. Our body is first a momentary assemblage, second a unity of particles. *Dust to dust, ashes to ashes, multiplicities to multiplicities*, as one might say.²⁹

While the procedures of signification are permanently in force, a rhizome signifies itself in a paradoxical way – next to connection, heterogeneity, and multiplicity – through *the principle of a-signifying rupture*.³⁰ The rhizome and its *principle of a-signifying rupture* refer to content and expression. A connection, an overpowering force, a fragmented line of flight can break through or be derived from the inside, from the middle. Deleuze and Guattari do not speak of isolated points of departure or arrival. They accentuate the process as a becoming, in terms of lines, due to the fact that the event of relating is prior to the categorizing of relata such as subject or object. According to these philosophers of difference, even entities are connected lines, knotted connections and not indivisible permanent atoms, no non-dividable entities, no in-dividuals. As I will show in 1.3, within the rhizomatic connectivity nodes occur, nodes in networks rather than prepositioned entities that start to connect with others motorized by transcendent principles. That is why Deleuze and Guattari prefer to speak about subjectification or *agencement* as a process.

Nothing escapes this *multiplification*, this constant folding. No connection, even when it is qualified as a certain entity by a momentary signifying power, can evade other connections that undermine an exclusive and excluding finalized expression. In each connection another connection is expressed and repositioned and new connections are created. Transformation of piled-up segmentations starts with lines of flight. In addition to this, whenever transformations start to repeat themselves, they start to become common sense. In other words, whenever a line of flight slows down in its speed, bending back upon itself becoming meaningful in a unifying moment of multiplicity, Deleuze and Guattari speak of lines of segmentation. There is no prior ontology in which lines are qualified as right or wrong; primary and secondary. In segmentation lines that what ‘matters’ is defined in terms of

²⁹ Unity and multiplicity do here in no sense refer to moral notions. There are multiple forms of unity and each refers to and creates another moral discourse. The three final chapters in this dissertation refer to three different types of unity and different types of moral discourses: totalitarianism, multiculturalism and coming community.

³⁰ In 2.3.1 I will elaborate on De Saussure’s linguistics and its relation to Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of a-signifying rupture.

articulated and meaningful force, i.e. of power. This is the basic line of politics in the strict sense of the word. Here a politics of flight finds its different impetuses.

1.2.5 Mapping in the Middle

Let us evaluate our findings through an example: an occurrence that as a line of flight inaugurated a massive revolt in our time. The act of Mohamed Bouazizi, the Tunisian vendor who set himself on fire, on 4th of January 2011 started multiple revolts that eventually were claimed by existing political factions. However, the event itself is a contemporary articulation of rhizomatic emergence. It is easy to see Bouazizi and his act as a line of flight. The deterritorializing force of his suicidal act is more than obvious: disconnecting yet fully embedded. The unbalance of global economics, the repression of the poor and the arrogance of Tunisian leaders in their belief in their everlasting power, are clear signs of repressive power. The hardly coherent multiplicity of lines of flight, which is present in the daily life of the peoples of the Arabic world, was in need of a rupture. Bouazizi unintentionally became this unorganized and unplanned rupture. The act of the vendor testifies of an a-signifying rupture that breaks through ‘the order of things’. Its rhizomatic momentum dismantled the binary logic of the irrelevant poor and the hegemonic elites. Nevertheless, Bouazizi’s act of rupture simultaneously creates new segmentations. The vacuum drawn by the rupture is immediately filled by new forms of discourses and significations. Once the forces of revolt are connected to a political discourse the process is transformed into a revolution.³¹ A so-called irrelevant person turns into *the* hero of a new form of ideology. The *unintended* subversive impact of his act has become the engine of a new community with its *intended* revolutionary goals. Subversive ideas start to segment in new forms of power and new forms of repression. The differential relationality in-between the two types of lines (flight and segmentation) – in their simultaneous presence in each vectorial force, i.e. in each flow – shows that deterritorialization and reterritorialization, decoding and recoding are two sides of the same coin.

In addition to this ‘simultaneous eventuality’, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) conclude with the last characteristic of a rhizome, which is important for the specific notion of approach that is applied in this research: the difference between *cartography*, as in the practice of mapping, and *decalcomania*,³² as in transference and tracing of a pattern or a model. Rhizome is not bound to a transferable model. As a multiplicity, the knots that emerge within a rhizome are ‘approachable’ but not according to a method. The rhizome cannot be copied. It cannot even be traced back to a clear cut in which they came into being. There is no original happening. Thus, although from western perspective different events in the Middle East were homogenized by the term Arab Spring, the last six years have shown us a complexity that cannot be grasped by a singular idea, term or act. The expressive act of mapping

³¹ Oosterling (1989) states that *revolution* is a “totalitarian illusion in which the fragmented forms” of resistance are considered to belong to a whole. *Revolt* is on the other hand an undefined and unconstructed force that breaks through the organized state, as “intensities beyond the intensions of the subject” (pp. 134-135, Translation TR).

³² Decalcomania is the process in which a design or image is transformed from a paper to a glass or other materials. In this sense decalcomania refers more explicitly to the transference of a model than copying. It also indicates differentiation of matter and nevertheless the hegemony of image.

already changes the presupposed object into something else. Events do not have permanent structures of traits that can be comprehended and transposed as such to other situations. *Processual* knots are not tied indefinitely, but are constantly untied and retied, de- and recoded. They fold in and unfold, producing preliminary centers that factually are in-betweens, inter-actions. There is no essence. Thus, although Bouazizi was a singular individual with his connective story, he did carry the burden of a whole world in economic and political sense of the word. His story began long before his birth.

Yet, the classical understanding of a book as a root-book is still captivated by the presumption of an origin and an essence. The tree-book is the practice of tracing, tracing a structure within an event, tracing of an already existing, yet covered origin. It tends to describe the existing reality and it is determined to reproduce this reality. It jumps to conclusions, presupposing the *relata*. Thus, it performs within the logic of *relata* as permanent, yet transferable forms rather than nodes within the dynamics of lines and relations. Holy books are often understood as texts that can be copied time and again, even in thought, neglecting their call for further education and alertness of mind. It was such a call that gave the young Pakistani Malala Yousafzai the courage to fight against rigid interpretation of her religion and the sacred book Koran.³³ In that sense the Islamic fundamentalists as well as the anti-Islam fundamentalists agree on the understanding of Islam as a single form of logic and an incompatible form of thought that could be produced endlessly over time and through people. And nevertheless, there are those Muslims, who apparently are not exciting enough for the main media, who oppose this rigid analysis of both parties, often with their lives. The streets of Libya, after the attacks in 2012 on the American ambassador, were not only occupied with hundreds of radicals, but also with masses who opposed the violence.

The logic of the tree-book creates a traceable discourse, with deep-rooted values and final judgments. The rhizome on the other hand functions indifferently. It is “*a map and not a tracing*” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 12). A rhizomatic book does not intend to imitate the world. The world and the book do not blindly follow each other’s pattern, or assume the other as a model, but they rather affect one another simultaneously and mutually as a result of which thinking in not anticipating the outcome stays open to new unexpected connections. Rhizome is not a map of that which is already there, but a map of the possibilities of connections,³⁴ redefining implicitly a territory. Ontology directly refers to creation, to inventing, to a micro-politics of writing. And that is precisely the role of thinking (as I will argue in 2.2). The rhizome makes its elements approachable from all sides and as such thematizes its potential relationality, always emerging from the middle, the *inter*, the in-between. Everything is ready for transformation. There are multiple entrances, no entrance is more important than the other. This is in contrast to a model based on centrality offering a main entrance, and hence a

³³ “Are those equal, those who know and those who do not know? It is those who are endowed with understanding that receive admonition”, (39:9) and “Those truly fear God, among His Servants, who have knowledge: for God is Exalted in Might, Oft-Forgiving.” (35:28)

³⁴ In 1.4.2 I will elaborate on notions such as actuality, virtuality and reality. The rhizome is not a virtual or possible world next to the actual world, but what we call actual is merely a cut within the rhizome. In her Possible-worlds theory, Marie-Laure Ryan (2005) elaborates on this tension within literary works. As Ryan concludes, while classical understanding of possible world intended to argue for a form of consistency within the fictional work, the postmodern literature rather wishes to dismantle a clear line between what is fictional and what is non-fictional or actual.

strict methodology to find and explore this main entrance. The act of Bouazizi was not merely an event that is limited to the Arabic world. The act that drove this individual to his self-destructive gesture is connected to world-politics.

As we will see in the second part of this study, given the reality of international politics in the twentieth century Deleuze and Guattari (1987) are convinced of the dangers of decalcomania, politics based on notions such as identity, citizenship and assimilation. But this warning is not an appeal to create new dichotomies.³⁵ It is not the despotic world of models against the 'flower' world of the rhizome. Nevertheless, Deleuze and Guattari are fully aware of language giving little possibilities to escape the binary terminologies. Their practice of co-writing, however, longs for transformation of linguistic approaches. It calls for permanent shifts and approaches not in order to *come closer* to an essential truth, but in order to *engage* with the multiple, to perform a will to truthness by permanently shifting the parameters of thought – and as we will see in the third chapter the paradigms of politics – in order to affirm the process of the critical. There is not a world of mapping versus a world of tracing on a parallel level. "It is a question of method" they argue, "*the tracing should always be put back on the map*" (p. 13).³⁶ The method is not a model to be followed; it is neither a bifurcating, well-rooted, blossoming tree nor a totally fragmented, dispersed rhizome on its own. Thought is an act of mapping, always maneuvering in-between. Thinking is an inter-act. It is an *inter...mezzo*.

Art practices can explicate this 'inter' more explicitly. The intensity between Susan Orlean's *The Orchid Thief* (1998); Charlie Kaufman and Donald Kaufman's screenplay *Adaptation* (2002); and Spike Jonze's film *Adaptation* (2002) bears witness to multiple, intertwined approaches. Orlean's book is already interdisciplinary in itself, oscillating between journalism, literature and scientific research. Moreover, the book differentiates between her approaches and the passionate madness of John Laroche for orchids. Her approach is slow but persistent. Laroche's passion on the other hand is sudden; it grows at an unbelievable speed and dies in an instant. Orlean's sober approach and Laroche's intense and furious mad approach transform through Charlie Kaufman's panicky, uncertain and schizophrenic as well as manic approach. He is approaching his approach by dividing himself into two characters in the script: the twin brothers Charlie Kaufman, with his paralyzing accurate approach, and Donald Kaufman, with his aimless approach. Donald Kaufman is the first fictional

³⁵ Within the modernistic terminology, it is easy to accuse Deleuze and Guattari of inconsistency, by stating that while they plead against opposition they somehow introduce a new terminology that equally creates new dichotomies, such as flight lines/segmentation lines and mapping/tracing. However, as Oosterling (1996) suggests Deleuze and Guattari do not simply plead against dichotomies. They merely show that dichotomies, which we introduce as convenient tools to structure our thoughts, do not have an ontological status, but merely function strategically within epistemology. And even within epistemology although dichotomies permanently appear they are nevertheless never permanent and static (pp. 600-602).

³⁶ This is in a sense a form of tracing that Derrida (1982) is pointing out. Tracing for Derrida appears on the map, it is without goal, an adventure with playful blind tactics, that opposes the conventional difference between theory and practice. It is not beyond reason, but beyond the opposition between reason and insanity (p. 7). "I have attempted to indicate a way out of the closure of this framework via the 'trace', which is no more an effect than it has a cause, but which in and of itself, outside its text, is not sufficient to operate the necessary transgression" (p. 12). However, Derrida is aware of the dangers of this tracing. Later in the text he states that: "trace is not a presence but the simulacrum of a presence that dislocates itself ... It becomes a function in a structure of generalized reference. It is a trace, and a trace of the erasure of the trace. Thereby the text of metaphysics is *comprehended*" (p. 24).

character to win an Oscar. Kaufmans' script is layers of approach. It is not imitation or tracing, but how to enter the book comes along with the how of entering the film. The 'initiating' scenes thematize the entrance of the film into itself and its own process of entrance, but also how the film and the book disorganize one another as open organisms. The book enters the film and the film enters the book. However, through the fascinating screen there is a character that remains a ghost. Kaufman wonders how orchids approach. They migrate, attach, transform, reshape. They multiply, connect in form to all that surrounds them, wasps, men, trees, and monkeys. There is not an orchid approach, but *orchidical approaches*.

1.3 (Dis)connecting the Dots

1.3.1 An Unidentifiable Subject

Knots, knots that are tied and untied permanently, how do they relate? How do we de- and reconnect the knots, the dots, in trying to map a specific territory? If methods are not absolute, how do we then orient our approach towards this field of connected dots? In other words, how does one as an individual engage within a *politics of flight*? Let us first address the question as to *who* is entering. Politics of flight is often defined by and debated through its specific subject: *the refugee*, sometimes less specifically approached as *the migrant*. Understanding this politics demands an approach on a specific modern philosophical notion that, after it was proposed by philosophers like Kant and Hegel, was adopted by human sciences like psychology, sociology, and political science: *subject*. What is a subject? Besides being *crucial* as a theme, a person or some body, even a thing within an event or discourse, the subject refers first and for all to power relations. First as something or someone *exposed to a certain* (repressive) power, and second as an actor or agency that internalizes and identifies with this power structure in order to become part of it. A subject *undergoes*, internalizes, individualizes and emancipates. It addresses and activates its passivity in order to become part of a whole. It is forced into membership or participation. The combination of the Dutch *Social Support Act* (*Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning*) and economic crisis in The Netherlands accentuated the relationality between notions such as participation and self-sufficiency (*zelfredzaamheid*) on the one hand and on the other hand the governmental policy imposing the structure of such self-sufficiency. Not only newcomers, but also mentally and physically challenged, children and elderly are obliged to participate in certain patterns of citizenship (De Brabander, 2014).

Yet, philosophically a subject is more than a docile individual or an individual forced to participate. A subject in modernistic philosophy – in the age of Enlightenment and Romantic era – is defined as a thinking, acting and feeling entity that internally remains the same. Epistemologically a subject has been characterized by the oppositional distinction between subject-object.³⁷ Metaphysical and

³⁷ Often this refers to a Western, modernistic view after Kant's distinction between subject and object. The Cartesian distinction between body and soul on the other hand still has metaphysical overtones. While Descartes does have the pretense that the object or body as a mechanism can be known to the subject, Kant limits the knowledge of subject by famously stating that the object in-itself remains unknown to the subject. Thus, the two philosophers differ in their approach

ontological tendencies, however, also appear within the idea of subject due to its association with the notion *identity*. The etymology of identity refers to preservation of an essence, *idem*: the same. Identity is that which remains the same despite changes in course of life. Despite this tradition, *subject* and *identity*, given their historical uses, are not the same but rather opposites. Subject depends in its formation immediately on that which overarches or surrounds it, and as such differs from it. So, as I indicated above, following philosophers of difference, I rephrase subject as a *process* of subjectification – *assujettissement* – as has systematically been done by Foucault.

Subject is related to power, be it a more differentiated power. Foucault distinguishes three forms of power, each with a different approach to the notion subject and its operation. The first is called *sovereign power* in which subject is a juridical term, which appears within politics merely in its exclusion. The second form of power is the *disciplinary power* that forms and identifies subject due to its belonging to different types of segments within the society, such as a laborer in a factory or a student in the university. Foucault discusses the third form of power in his lectures on *security*. This form of power focuses on access, codes and passwords that determine the subject's entrance into a society. I will elaborate more on the forms of power in the fourth- and fifth chapter.³⁸ There is also a fourth form of power in which Foucault (1986^b) thematizes *the relation of the self to itself*. In the final chapter I define this subjectification as an open rhizomatic agency that is in immediate contact with the forces that shape and de-shape its formation.

This subject *undergoes* a permanent formation due to its unavoidable, yet indefinable, engagement within a discourse, shared with others. The subject is defined through its discursive relations with self-reflective practices, shaping his desires and taking care of the self. A subject is *crucial* only due to the discourse that defines it as such and not the other way around. Its relevance is a related relevancy. Identity on the other hand refers to that which lies *within* an entity, founded in a transcendent entity, either religious or philosophical. This unshakable foundation remains the same even if time and territory are changed.³⁹ It is that which is kept outside the discourse and events that surround and embed this entity. Identity is in this sense a tree-book, with an internal truth or essence, or at best a fascicular-book that despite the multiplicity of truths remains 'a self-reflecting whole', an identifiable entity. While the subject refers to a rhizomatic *becoming* due to the changing discourse of *subjectification*, identity is the unchangeable 'essence': that which *is* as it once *was* and as it will *be*.

to subject. While Descartes still believes in an essence that remains within reach for the cogito, an essence that even with a 'fundamental' doubt remains intact, Kant's view on the subject is more procedural, a transformative implication of changing knowledge due to the gained experiences.

³⁸ These types of power are explained by Michel Foucault mostly in his *Discipline and Punish* and in *The History of Sexuality*; volume one and two. In volume one *The Will to Knowledge* Foucault introduces the notion *biopower*, and later in his lectures, *Security, Territory and Population, Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-78*, he elaborates on the theory of *security*. The term security is also used by Deleuze in *Negotiations, 1972-1990*. In the course of this study I will return to these types of power.

³⁹ In the second part I refer to etymology and a function of this notion within policies instead of to the philosophical debates around it. The idea of identity remains archaic in policies while debates around it – in science, philosophy and arts – show the subjectifying mechanisms and external influences on the formation of identity.

We can conclude from all this that the *who* in the question ‘who is entering a *politics of flight*?’ can be misleading once it refers to an individual that *intentionally* makes a decision to acknowledge him/herself as an identity within certain discursive practices. It is necessary to rephrase the question and ask who is the subject that is always already embedded in a politics of flight. Bouazizi was already positioned within this politics. But who becomes a participating *member*, i.e. an active subject – not a passive object – of politics of flight? Within contemporary politics it is assumed that this is only reserved to a *refugee* that is officially acknowledged as such. Even migrants or the individual who unfortunately is called an economic refugee cannot politically claim to belong to this discourse. This belonging is politically and juridically certified. They are persons who are:

outside their country of origin and unable or unwilling to return there or to avail themselves of its protection, on account of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular group, or political opinion. Stateless persons may also be refugees in this sense, where country of origin (citizenship) is understood as ‘country of former habitual residence.’ Those who possess more than one nationality will only be considered as refugees within the Convention if such other nationality or nationalities are ineffective (that is, do not provide protection) (Goodwin-Gill, 2013).

The becoming of a refugee is immediately associated with a temporal and territorial dual setting: the starting point in the *habitual residence* or *country of origin* and the desirable ending point, namely the country of arrival or *refugium*, where the fear of the refugee is considered to be *well-founded*. The subject *refugee* refers in this binary setting to a multiple *act*. First, *resistance*, which is in some cases considered to be active, for example by choosing to be active in a certain political party; but more often than not is seen as passive, for example by being born into a certain ethnic, religious and hence politically and socially excluded group. Second, the refugee’s act is defined by the act of *flight* and *banishment*. While it seems that flight is an active act and banishment a passive one, both are in their intentionality passive. The *fear* that makes one flee and the power that banishes are both forced upon the subject. Fleeing is in this sense not an act, but a *re-action*. Third, *refuge* is the crucial act of the refugee and indicates *hope* of the possibility of entrance as well as fragile *trust* in the ‘chosen’ territory, the refugium. Within this discourse, to flee as a verb denotes more passivity than activity. The inclusion of the subject lies outside the act of refuge, the acknowledgment of the citizenship depends entirely on the political mood and legal system of the country of arrival. The refugee’s activity lies merely in his effort to gain the hope that this country will comply. In the contemporary reflections on refuge resistance, fear, hope and trust are thus modes wherein this subject *experiences* the act of flight, the core of which is the experience of *escape*.

Refugee is the subject that is effectuated and forcefully defined, thus *identified*, by a state of affairs called *exile*. Both the country of origin and arrival refer to the *experience* of escape in terms of exile. In such a logic of exile a refugee is defined as a *subject* that is formed through a binary temporal and territorial *intermezzo* set in-between the country of origin and the country of arrival or refugium. Seen from the perspective of the country of origin refuge refers to multiple processes of resistance, flight,

banishment and exclusion. As Ghorashi (2003) and Schinkel (2008) show the country of arrival with its logic of integration and assimilation creates equally new forms of exclusion. However, a *politics of flight* is not a synonym for *politics of exile*. While on a juridical, political and affective level *exile* seems to demand it all, it nevertheless remains a unilateral vector compared to the multiple entrances of *politics of flight*. Politics of *exile* is merely one side of the story. Nevertheless, it *identifies* an exclusive subject of flight. This one-sided ‘identification’ is due to the rigidity of the approach to the subject of this politics of exile. This subject appropriates 1) the experience of escape and 2) the act of flight within a restricted discourse. Politics of flight, however, is not a solitary or singular discourse but multiple-faceted, as we will see in 3.4. For now, we need to “do something” in order to change our “concept of what it means to be a subject” (Pisters, 2003, p. 31).

1.3.2 *The Subject Back on the Map*

It is crucial to notice that in this research I do not intend to exclude the process of identification or a sense of identity. I rather plead against identity as the *only* possible formation of subjectivity and hence the only foundation for belonging to a community. In *A Thousand Plateaus* Deleuze and Guattari (1987) start with a political statement on the notion of identity via *naming*. A name is neither an identity nor a truth; it is merely a routine. Keeping one’s name just happens “out of habit, purely out of habit.” This habit, contradictory enough, is persistent not in order to maintain an identity, but to lose its relevancy. It is not the negation of a name that loosens the subject in her rigidity, but its casual repeatability, in order “to make ourselves unrecognizable.” It is not the negation of saying ‘I’, but rather a fading of *the value* of this saying act. Just think of how people introduce themselves at a party: they introduce themselves; names are exchanged and often forgotten immediately. The names are just habitual initiators to a conversation. Deleuze and Guattari thus do not strive for an antithesis to identity, nor a Cartesian paradoxical doubting in which the *I* remains intact instead of being questioned or becoming fluid. By surrendering to thought beyond the sheer pondering of a narcissistic mind, in their cooperative work they rather long for a “point where it is no longer of any importance whether one says I. We are no longer ourselves. Each will know his own. We have been aided, inspired, multiplied” (p. 3).

In writing books together, their act of writing is thus not a compromising act of thought, or a summoning of two distinguishable thoughts, from one point to the other. It is an event of in-between, instead of a *multi*-subjective act that is still in need of the relevancy of its subjects as fixed points of reference. Fixed subjects refer to identities, or identifiable subjects, while Deleuze and Guattari rather subjectify identity by defining it as a process or *agencement*. *Inter*-subjective therefore means a process of subjectification in which a subject is *mapped out* in a transformative field of formation and deformation. It does not gather distinguishable and *traceable* identities that are synthesized by compromise in thought. In terms of Foucault’s (1977, 2007) theses on power: while the subject that undergoes the sovereignty is placed on the peripheries, the subject of disciplinary discourse is pinpointed to a segment in the society – worker, teacher, prisoner – and the subject of security longs for the passwords in order to enter and participate fully in and under control; an *agencement*, however, remains untraceable, stays connected to all sides, neither in nor out. *Agencement*, which includes more possibilities than a subject of sovereignty, discipline, and security is not an *I* but a process of negotiation that structures the I.

Negotiation is the manner in which – in conversation with Claire Parnet – Deleuze typifies his collaboration with Guattari (Deleuze & Parnet, 1991, p. 17). This process of negotiation politically puts the subject, as well as the identity of any *I*, back on the rhizomatic map. The simultaneous event of deformation and formation of identities/subjects becomes noticeable. What they oppose is not the formation of identity, but its universal assumption. Deleuze and Guattari argue against this generality-particularity opposition or dialectics by thematizing singularities. Neither the general idea such as *the* repressed women nor a particular idea of *a* repressed woman in Pakistan could define the complexity of Malala. Each typification of her personality – woman, Middle East, girl, child – fails short in understanding her singular membership. Malala is a singular complex synergetic process, meaning she is connected to the world not in a predictable but in an outstanding manner. This manner is not permanent; it changes with each of her appearances.

The process of disintegration of an identity takes place permanently. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) clarify this through the threefold of coding, decoding and recoding, or, territorialization, deterritorialization and reterritorialization. Their thought is a territorial one: matters shift and reposition. Change is territorial, earthly. Within this territorial setting the subject is not a traceable body that endures through time, but a territorial mode, a momentary overpowering segmentation.

It is a question of making a body without organs upon which intensities pass, self and other — not in the name of a higher level of generality or a broader extension, but by virtue of singularities that can no longer be said to be personal, and intensities that can no longer be said to be extensive. The field of immanence is not internal to the self, but neither does it come from an external self or a nonself (p. 156).

Thus, what does the deterritorializing act indicate for a politics of flight? If life as a singular process is that which matters in the process of flight, how does this singularity affect and how is it affected by political processes that cannot but speak in terms of generalities and particularities? There is a difference in-between science of identity and politics of identity. Ghorashi (2003) argues: “While anti-essentialist tendencies within social sciences are celebrated, essentialist approaches toward culture, nation, and ethnicity are actually everyday practices.” (p. 210). A politics that reduces more than sixty million people to one term: *tsunami of migrants*? Although in rhizomatic thought the permanency and essentiality of the subject is problematized, the functionality of subjectification within a certain time and a given machinic process is acknowledged. Subject has a *face*, not as an eternal model or transcendental invisible power, but as a momentary shaped and deshaped event, defining modes of desire within a certain time and space. This is one way to read the notion *interface*. Within the multiplicity of body without organs subject’s face is not a particular body, but a territory, *a map*, that is penetrable from all sides, a territory that is deterritorialized and reterritorialized by forces through different processes of subjectification. It is not a particular biography – neither activism or

symbolism, nor Nobel prizes – but the dynamics of a world that passes through Malala’s wounded face.⁴⁰

The face represents a far more intense, if slower, deterritorialization. We could say that it is an *absolute* deterritorialization ... Now the face has a correlate of great importance: the landscape, which is not just a milieu but a deterritorialized world (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 172).

In order to emphasize the relevancy of this permanent territorial change and the related processes Deleuze and Guattari replace the notion of subject with the meta-term *agencement* in which relation appears on behalf of its own process and not as a sheer intentional act of a particular person. It is desire, as discussed before, that relates connective forces to an *agencement* (assemblage) or machinic procedure.⁴¹ That is how the dots are connected. Machines and assemblages accumulate affects that express themselves as attraction and repulsion. Entities move from one assemblage to the other as one machinic procedure is connected to other machinic procedures. A subject is a momentary segmentation within this process of *agencement*. It is a *flickering dot*. Nevertheless, even in this momentary, self-reflective state of ‘being’ a subject is many-faceted. This is sensible in the complexity of Tofik Dibi’s struggle against discrimination. This Dutch-Moroccan politician and writer experiences his life in-between multiple forms of discrimination based on his religion, ethnicity and homosexuality. Each time he pleads for one, he is forced to endure another type of discrimination. In an interview with Jeroen Pauw his dilemma is more than visible. Every time he tries to explain the complexity; Pauw forces him to pinpoint it to his ethnicity and religion. No one on that table understands the complexity of the multiple forms of exclusions in his life (Dibi, 2016).

Let me situate the previous analyses on subject, power, desire and *agencement* within the horizon of our capitalist politico-economic regime. How do contradictory tendencies in capitalism – de/recoding, de/reterritorialization – determine our analysis on the subject of flight? Here the *glocal* trait of capitalistic modes of subjectivity comes to the fore. On the one hand, capitalistic dynamics triggers global economic flows, defining subjects such as migrants, guest laborers, political refugees, but also transnational CEO’s and tourists. Yet, as we have seen in the previous section, the juridical definition of a refugee does not contain any reference to this economic necessity of migration and world’s politics. On the other hand, capitalism, while expanding globally, still functions within a modern nationalist and regional discourse that contradicts cosmopolitical globalism/localism that Anthony Kwame Appiah (2006) hopes for. Individuals are defined as African migrant, Middle Eastern or Asian

⁴⁰ István Szabó’s film (1981) inspired by Klaus Mann’s *Mephisto* with the same title sensitizes a man’s attempt to create permanent faces, the man’s face and a stage face. Despite the main character’s persistence and because of the turbulences of his time the two faces are affected into something indistinguishable from the original two faces. In addition, the world enters these faces. It is the terror of the totalitarian regime that finally makes the two faces collapse on one another. The final scene in the film of the desperate Hendrik Höfgen is the image of a man who has been disowned by his own face. There are no true faces. Nobody is just an actor. The world always draws and changes its marks on the face of men. The mask is the master.

⁴¹ In *Thousand Plateaus*, they speak of assemblages and in *Anti-Oedipus* of machinic procedures.

guest laborers, Syrian political refugees, Dutch expats and Chinese tourists. Although refugees arrive from all over the globe, the acknowledgement of refugees as subjects is reduced to the state of affairs in the country of origin and the country of refuge. For example, refugees from Eritrea in England, hoping for a migrant friendly atmosphere in England, need to justify their global act of migration by explaining the specific local political danger in Eritrea while the political setting of both countries is dependent upon global processes. Slavoj Žižek (2016), in trying to pinpoint ‘the political economy of refugees’, gives an indication as to where we should start in the case of an African country as Congo to solve the problem:

Just remove the foreign high-tech companies from the equation and the whole narrative of ethnic warfare fueled by old passions falls apart. This is where we should begin if we really want to help stop the flow of refugees from African countries (p. 46).

Moreover, the contradictory traits of the capitalist geopolitics is not only present in the traveling and migrating subject, but equally current in the residential state of being of the so-called local inhabitants. In the fourth chapter I will elaborate on the logic of the origin and essentiality of the politics of ‘we, the true inhabitants’. Though it is manifest on a local level, its particularity feeds global discourses too. So, the nationalistic tendencies in the West against Islam are not a local critique. Global disapproval of this religion feeds the local exclusion. The right-wing Dutch politician Geert Wilders’ expression ‘we do not want to become Saudi Arabia here’ situates local justification within a globalized perspective. The brutal slaughter of socialist youth in Norway in the summer of 2011 by Anders Behring Breivik who claims to have been inspired, among others, by Wilders is a clarifying example of the *global* effect of these forms of nationalism. Xenophobia is thus a *glocal* affect.⁴²

Without intentionally resisting this nationalistic discourse, in becoming a migrant one is determined by these *glocal* affects. As we will see in the fifth chapter, nationalistic discourse is equally present in the affective discourse of migrants, using notions such as nostalgia and homesickness as the result of rapidly changing territories. A sense of history, whether from the country of origin or from the refugium, is often idealized in order to regain a retro-sense of nationalism in cultivating a sense of loss. All these multiple subjects are mapped in an approach of a politics of flight that has to take into account a globalist localism – forms of nationalism that emerge around the globe⁴³ – as well as a local globalism – for example the tourist industry that pumps people around the globe. So, although the migrant and the refugee are exemplary entities in the flows of migration, neither of them can fully *appropriate* the process as a subject. The experience of flight disseminates in a political field upon which multiple contradictory subjects – such as insider and outsider, migrant and inhabitant, *allochthones* and *autochthones* – are engaged in territorial discourses and paradoxical modes of thought, covering a spectrum from local globalism to global localism.

⁴² See for a daring illustration of how these ideas indoctrinate children to identify themselves with violence elsewhere: *Dutch Children Apologize for Terrorism* (El-Fassi, 2015).

⁴³ For an elusive elaboration on this issue see: Ceuppens & Geschiere, 2005.

1.3.3 *Inter-esse: Unappropriatable Experience and In-Between Action*

A subject results from *experiences* and *actions*. Yet, how do these two notions – experience and action – relate to the previous analyses of subject and subjectification of refugees? The ‘agent’ of the *agencement* within a politics of flight does not belong to a particular individual. It is a focused affection that multiple individuals *experience*. The notion of experience is related to action based upon repetitive perception. Active perception leads to knowledge and by active repetition this knowledge is finally embodied as skill; hence the adjective *experienced* contains both knowledge and skills of a subject.⁴⁴ Although initially the subject seems to have control over what is happening, experience also implies compliance.⁴⁵ Experience is not something orchestrated by an individual, it is rather the process of being affected by an event as well as a tryout to see what happens. This experimental practice of being affected asks for endurance. Some experiences even paralyze their subject. Nonetheless, an experience does never close a subject in upon itself. An experience unfolds the subject, opening it to all sides, altering its coordinates. In the strict sense experience articulates an *inter*. It is an event of *in-between*.

The complexity of the relation between the subject and experience is visible in Loveleen Tandan and Danny Boyle’s blockbuster film *Slumdog Millionaire* (2008). The film starts by shocking the viewer with the image of a young man, almost a child, being tortured. This is Jamal, the *almost* weekend millionaire. He is born and raised in the slums and against all odds knows all the answers to the questions. A multiple-choice question is presented: “Jamal is a) a cheater, b) lucky, c) a genius or d)” Thus, at first the final choice remains open for discussion. The host of the Indian version of *Weekend Millionaire* assumes, despite his own slum heritage, that the boy is a cheater and gets him arrested. The detective in charge confronts the boy, with almost no education, with the first defined three choices, without expecting the open fourth option. The answer is none of the above. Jamal is neither a mastermind that has gained all the knowledge, nor has he organized a deception. He is most definitely not lucky. He has experienced the answers. The answers often rather indicate incomprehension, hence the baffled face of the boy during the show. He knows the answers despite the incomprehension of the slaughter of his mother. The experience is political and collective, shared

⁴⁴ Oosterling’s (2009^a) understanding of the notion of skill is instructive here. Skill, gained by patience, self-discipline and self-critique, is a process in which the body itself rather than the mind becomes reflexive. Nevertheless, through Hannah Arendt and Richard Sennett, Oosterling argues that skill is not something owned by a particular subject, but gained and endured in a process, in-between men and media. Moreover, skill is not gained once and for all, but is a permanent process of adaptation (pp. 286-303).

⁴⁵ In some religious practices, it is exactly the compliance or submission that gives rise to the experience of the divine or the whole. This is not only experienced in Islam but also within the mysticism in Christianity and Judaism as well as in Buddhism and Hinduism. Submission indicates the disappearance of subject as the initiator, the humble attitude. Knitter (2010) even argues that it is this fundamental virtue of *humility* within religions that can create possibilities for interreligious dialogue. Instead of finding a true and unchanging self, religion could also create a possibility for a connected and transformable self (p. 261). Here, however, I aim at more than the religious aspect of submission. Subject is submitted to forces, as Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche have already shown. Submission within the concept of experience indicates thus that the subject is first affected in order to act, instead of being the one that initiates experience.

by his slum companions Salim and Latika. The experiences in a sense disassociate the antagonist from its position. And as if filmmakers Tandan and Boyle are shocked by their own daring, they anxiously end the film by connecting the dots of the fourth option in a rigid manner, and losing the openness in-between the dots – dots that belong to transitory networks. The movie ends with an extreme celebration of Jamal’s character. The experiences are retrospectively reduced to the honest character of the boy; the morally confused Salim dies in remorse while killing the actual bad guy and Latika gains beauty despite her scarred face. The collectiveness is lost, and the subjects are manifested in a happy ending; which was not the case for the real actors who had to go back to the slums. In the end, Jamal’s face does not map out the amalgamation of a collective experience, but the person Jamal has become the exclusive *owner* of his experience. The multiple-choice is completed and answered. The openness of the final option is closed metaphysically: d) *it is written*.⁴⁶

What has become problematic in a politics of flight is exactly this possibility of appropriation of an experience. The rhizomatic connectivity of experience is cut down in particular segments in order to project truthness on an individual. Walter Benjamin (1999) speaks of *poverty of experience*. “Experiences are lived similarities”, that cannot be measured by science, but must be endured in life. He deeply regrets that in modernity experiences are not lived and passed on from generation to generation. We live without a past, we think that we can experience without our body (p. 545 & 553).

For never has experience been contradicted more thoroughly: strategic experience has been contravened by positional warfare; economic experience, by the inflation; physical experience, by hunger; moral experiences, by the ruling powers (p. 732).

With this *poverty of experience* in mind, Agamben (1993^a) starts his *Infancy and History, on the Destruction of Experience* with the following statement:

The question of experience can be approached nowadays only with an acknowledgement that it is no longer accessible to us. For just as modern man has been deprived of his biography, his experience has likewise been expropriated (p. 15).

Experience is not owned, but can it still be approached in the middle of a politics of flight? How do we relate the action of refugee – refuge – to their expropriated experience? I think Arendt does offer some perspectives here by insisting that action appears in the middle, in-between men. Her analysis focuses on a political subject, that remains open or is shaped on the open field of politics, the public space. I will elaborate on this in the third chapter. The openness of the subject is due to the fact that men are conditioned by their plurality. It is *difference* that makes men equal. In Arendt’s approach

⁴⁶ The political aspect of the film also becomes obscure in a scene with two Americans arguing against the lack of rights of children in India while not addressing the fact that international American companies gain their profit by child labor. This idea is underscored in the lives of the slum children who participated in the film. While the film’s profit grew sharply, after the shootings the children had to go back to the slums (Osterhout, 2010).

(1958) to politics, an approach without ideology, equality does not emerge from sameness, but from distinction. The distinction disconnects and connects the dots, at the same time. She calls this middle *inter-esse* (being-in-between). Connection and disconnection become differential aspects of one and the same experience. They lose their assumed oppositional character. It is in this inter-esse as a relational distance, that action takes place.

If men were not distinct, each human being distinguished from any other who is, was, or will ever be, they would need neither speech nor action to make themselves understood. Signs and sounds to communicate immediate, identical needs and wants would be enough (pp. 175-176).

It is this complexity of equality in plurality that characterizes Arendt's thought on the condition called *human*. The uniqueness of every life is thus emphasized in the interplay of action and speech. Action means in this distinctive creature not a realization of an essence, but rather initiation of something that has not been there before. Action means to *begin* or *initiate*. A human is free due to the fact that this being can create something new, being proactive by activating action. It is the principle that Arendt calls *natality* – the ability to be born (which I will elaborate on in 1.4.3). Humans can *perform* a *miracle*, meaning that they can initiate something that is as unexpected as it is unessential. Nevertheless, Arendt's thought must not be typified as an appeal for a new form of isolated and fixated subjectivity. The initiation in action does not take place within a single individual, but always in the middle of plural individuals and within the plurality of an individual, in public space. In this *interaction* between men *action* is thus always accompanied by its twin: *speech*. Action and speech as procedural traits of men are relational. They appear *in-between* men. The equality of plurality is the event of speech and action as *inter-esse*.

In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human world, while their physical identities appear without any activity of their own in the unique shape of the body and sound of the voice (p.179).

Speech is the *disclosure*⁴⁷ of the initiating subject. However, despite Arendt's distinction between physical identities and personal identity, I postulate with the intend to prove that Arendt's subject is not an identity as I critically defined it, but a subject, a relational line within an assemblage of subjects and multiplicities of subjectification. Despite her focus on *humans*, I argue that her use of this term is not applied in order to generalize, but rather to *multiply*. Arendt shows how generalization is inevitable in even the simplest ways we approach and refer to each other. Whenever we want to

⁴⁷ Dirk De Schutter (2005) justly argues that in this disclosure Arendt negates the fact that subject is not only active but also passive. It endures the identity that is given to him (pp. 40-41). I argue that if we expand Arendt's thought, the *who* is not in opposition to the *what* (identity) of a subject, but is placed on another level. It is not something that simply activates the subject and decreases its passivity. Instead the disclosure brings alive a relationship. An emphasis on the relation instead of subject undermines the opposition between active and passive.

describe who a person is, we start immediately to categorize its characteristics. This often happens in a comparative manner – such as high-educated refugees are more useful for our societies than so-called low-skilled refugees – in which a person becomes an identifiable object due to its comparable characteristics with other objects. In this way, according to Arendt, we do not talk about *who* a person is, but rather *what* a person is or could do. Due to the urge to compare individuals, we lose sight of the very *uniqueness*, or rather singularity, of a person and force someone merely *to be* a particularity of a generality (pp. 181-188).⁴⁸

As we will see, the notion of *citizen* indicates such a particularity within the generality called *the nation*. Arendt would rather argue that exactly that which makes an individual *a person*, namely a uniqueness articulated in its action and speech – meaning incomparable traits that appear in a political space – remains ineffable and indescribable, because actions bring out relations that just cannot be indicated. The *whoness* is not something that can be possessed or captured by a person to whom this *whoness* refers, Arendt states. “On the contrary, it is more than likely that the ‘who,’ which appears so clearly and unmistakably to others, remains hidden from the person himself” (pp. 179-180). The term *hidden from the person himself* is, however, misleading. It refers to an essence that is, in this case, not captured by the individual. In this study, I rather argue that there is nothing hidden, nor is something of a self better known to others than to ourselves. A self is not a being, it is a becoming, a process. A process is not knowable once and for all. It is rather approachable as everlasting changing performance. At present, Patrisse Cullors – a co-founder of the *Black Lives Matter* Movement – is one of the individuals that tirelessly shows how performance and politics are intertwined in one and the same movement. For Cullors performance politically enforces visibility and sensitization of transformative relationality of an individual life in a greater context of multiple exclusions. She resists the force of whatness of politics by showing the whoness of those who are excluded (Peled, 2016).

Action and speech are the revelation as well as the initiation of a *who* that is performed⁴⁹, always in the middle, always in-between, ignoring the *whatness* of the matter. That is why Arendt calls theatre the most political form of art. Characters are not owned by the actor but are explored in performance. The *who* is an event of speech and action. Arendtian ‘speech’ shares this unfolding trait with Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) ‘expression’. The theatrical characters are not instrumental for protagonists, but processes that unfold. What appears, as something in speech and expression, is merely a flickering light, gone before it can bluff its way into existence. The relational taking-place of action and speech

⁴⁸ Arendt’s distinction between what and who is inspired by Augustine’s *Confessions*. In his devotion and analysis Augustine gives rise to the idea of individuality, but through this individual experience of devotion the very *I* becomes an immense uncertainty. Arendt (1996) states: “For the more he withdrew into himself and gathered his self from the dispersion and distraction of the world, the more he ‘became a question to himself’ ... What Augustine expects of God is an answer to the question ‘Who am I?’” (pp. 24-25). According to Augustine as humans we fail to understand who we are, only God is capable of such an understanding. Along with this Arendt (1958) states: “the conditions of human existence – life itself, natality and mortality, worldliness, plurality, and the earth – can never ‘explain’ what we are or answer the question of who we are for the simple reason that they never condition us absolutely” (p. 11).

⁴⁹ This refers to the verb acting within the act. However, performance and acting here do not refer to a fictional state of the subject. Following Arendt’s thought only in these momentary appearances the subject appears as really human. It is in this event of appearing and disappearing, that the flickering vulnerability of men, what makes them human, happens.

now and here in-between people is the creation of a world of plurality of men, not the ego of *Man*, Arendt (1958) states. It is, however, *not* about a specific type of action or a productive act. The action proceeds for its own sake, it relates for the sake of the relationship, and not in order to comply with some people's interest. The act, how objective it may seem to be, always reveals the *who* of its actors in this relationality. The intangible who acts and speaks by its in-betweenness, by its *inter-est*. Acting *enacts* and *activates* an entrance.

These interests constitute ... something which *inter-est* ... Most action and speech is concerned with this in-between, which varies with each group of people, so that most words and deeds are *about* some worldly objective reality in addition to being a disclosure of the acting and speaking agent (p. 182).

At the rear of the *objective* in-between lies something else, something that sheds another light upon the quality of inter, namely the *subjective* in-between. This second form of inter owes its existence to the relationship of acting *with* and speaking *to* one another. The subjective in-between has thus neither a graspable substance (formed matter), nor is it a designated empty space between objects and agents. It cannot be materialized, yet it creates a reality, a web of human relations. In this web, the who is not something that permanently *is* but something that vulnerably and momentarily *appears* in *inter-action* and *inter-speech* as an *intersubjective* reality.

The chief characteristics of this specifically human life, whose appearance and disappearance constitute worldly events, is that it is itself always full of events which ultimately can be told as a story, establish a biography; it is of this life, *bios* as distinguished as mere *zōē*, that Aristotle said that it 'somehow is a kind of *praxis*' (p. 97).

Action as a moment of *praxis*, in which a who appears beyond itself, is for Arendt a beginning, but never an absolute beginning. It is a beginning that always inserts itself into an already existing network of actions. The birth of these small events – natality – creates a unique life story. This story is not isolated; it concerns and affects the web beyond its own borders. The life that is produced in this web is unintentional and spontaneous. In an acting person – an *agent* who is neither the author nor the creator – a story begins. This beginning is relative, i.e. relational: always already in the middle of an existing narrative. It is a momentary assemblage of events within the infinite movement of the webbing of human stories. A life story, even with tree-minded or fascicular tendencies, is in this sense a node in the rhizomatic field of stories.⁵⁰ Action and speech, just as the experience, although initiated

⁵⁰ Paul Ricœur (1992), in his rejecting of one-sided identities, agrees with this who and storytelling of Arendt. Stories have the characteristics of movement and change; their structure has the ability to connect different points of life. In connecting, changing and transforming, stories take different shapes in life. In his work, Ricœur seem to oscillate in-between acknowledgement and critique of the Aristotelian structure of a story, with a clear beginning, middle and end. A story has multiple births and deaths, as Maan (1999) states in her critique on Ricœur by radicalizing a critical tendency that already exists in Ricœur's work, for example in his analysis of Robert Musil's *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften*, a novel without beginning, middle and end.

and endured by the subject, create unexpected processes. One cannot own the unexpected. This is not necessarily because men do not choose to act, but rather because the ‘original’ impact of every act is impossible to trace and select in the tightly woven web of actions and speeches.

It is within this Arendtian description of action that I expand Deleuze and Guattari’s *agencement* and reintroduce subjectivity without intentionality in order to criticize the conventional understanding of flight within a politics of flight. I first argue that action has rather been denied than acknowledged, due to the binary setting in which flight accordingly takes place. Refugees must identify themselves by the choice to leave the country of origin and to seek refuge in the country of arrival. There are general characteristics of the refugee, due to the well-known repression of the country of origin and the political and legal possibilities for admission of the country of arrival, which justify the whatness of a particular subject as being a refugee. The narrative has a beginning: political or economic turmoil in the country of origin. The refugee’s narrative also has a clearly targeted end: the stability and wealth of country of arrival. What is missing is a middle or *mi-lieu* in multiple senses of the word, the middle in which, as Benjamin (1999) suggests, the experience of flight is *lived*. There is *inter* in which in acting differentiated *whos* are performed.

Second, Arendt’s understanding of action expropriates action from a particular subject. Acting within a politics of flight – from *resistance* to *flight* and forcing an entrance to a western country – indicates a relational chain of acts rather than qualifying intentional behavior of a unified subject. Articulating an act as resistance is only possible within a political discourse, i.e. a coherent set of collective enunciations embodied in practices. Its multiple relations produce multiple forms of resistance. Banishment is only one of multiple outcomes of resistance. This multiplication is also implicated in the affective structure of refugees. Within a politics of flight fear, associated with the act of flight, is itself a multiple and shared affect. The multiplicity of this affect, as well as that of affects such as *hope* and *trust*, connect and disconnects subjects: the one who remains behind is in fear of exclusion and banishment, the one who leaves is in fear of rejection and a stateless life, and the one who is confronted with the migrant is in fear of intrusion and loss of its economic benefit. It is in terms of Sara Ahmed (2014) *an affective politics of fear* that creates opposing identities of us versus the intruder. The relationality and multiplicity of action form a web in which subjectification of identities is intertwined with differentiation of subjects, multiplication of unappropriable experiences and expropriation of the act of flight as owned by a particular agent. Refuge is an action experienced within a web of narratives, yet from the perspective of clear identities this web is torn apart in an event called forced migration or a tsunami of migrants.

Let me clarify this web in reflecting upon the experience of homesickness. This form of distress is often used to describe one of the strong affects of the person who migrates, flees or is banned to another place. The affective and literary notion of abroad in Arabic, *gharib*⁵¹, refers to the term *gharb*,

⁵¹ The affectiveness is sensitized in the Arabic word *ghorbah*, meaning the loss of the familiar, land and language. This word – often used in songs in Arabic, Persian and Turkish – is also connected to the *mother*, the one that brings comfort and grounding. Her smell and her colors sensitize the home. Being-*gharib* is this unbearable burden of the foreigner that lives in

which means the West as well as the place where the sun goes down. Thus, the subject, in spite of its hope for a better life, is travelling toward a place where the sun goes down, which explains its homesickness and the songs about it. What one migrant or refugee experiences is a particular manifestation of a collective affect. However, this affect had been transformed in the 20th century as a result of global movement and migration. This did not only change the world of the traveller, it also deterritorialized the world and home of the inhabitants of both the country of origin and the country of arrival. Within a geopolitical perspective – beyond nationalistic, chauvinistic discourse – homesickness has become a common state of mind, not at all limited to the experience of a specific subject, such as *the refugee* or *the migrant*. As Huijer (2016) shows, generations of European people remained behind after mass migration of Europeans to other places such as United States and Australia. These people felt a sense of loss, loss of a community while seeing villages becoming ghost towns. Yet again – from the perspective of modernity and its demand to be adventurous – they were often seen as stragglers, those who were too rigid to leave. They were often too poor to begin the journey. In their way, they longed and cared for a preservation of a culture. This nostalgic affect has turned into a glocal assemblage of both bodies and enunciations. According to Huijer this sense of loss and homesickness while staying behind eventually contributed to a negative sentiment toward migration as such, thus also rejection of refugees who in their eyes are the new adventurous fortune seekers who will once again turn their world upside down. This, however, does not mean that the experience of homesickness even for those who remained behind is a universal or uniform experience. In its contextual relationality, it can appear and is endured virtually by any subject that is articulated within a politics of flight, both in the country of origin and the country of arrival, yet each time in a different manner.

There are those who yet have hard feelings about their experience of being left behind in a whole different way, as Huijer argues in connection to refugees. Atousa Bandeh Ghiasabadi's *12 Days of Waiting* (2008) shows the complexity of the subject of flight in connection to those who merely witnessed their love ones leave. It pictures an ordinary Iranian household of a middle-aged man and woman with Tony Blair on TV. Spring 2007, 15 English soldiers have been captured by the Iranian regime. It is almost *Nowruz*, Iranian New Year. The soldiers are captured 12 days ago and the couple is waiting for their daughter to call from England. Finally, the phone rings. The conversation between mother and daughter is psychologically contradictory. The dialogue seems to be casual and ordinary while the mother's face is distressed. She is comforting her daughter while crying. It is now the father's turn to comfort the child in distance. *Things happen.... Life is this happening.* ... he melancholically laughs with the same lump in his throat. Things happen and the thing that has happened here is *farness* (*doeri*⁵²). *Farness happens*, especially to sensitive people like them, the father tells the child. This farness is not an ordinary statement indicating the measurable distance. It rather specifies the affect in which the parents and the child as well as the English soldiers are subjected to a relational process of endurance. The farness of their daughter's country of arrival has

gharb, the west or the land where the sun goes down and the mother has been left behind. See for an analysis of this notion: Nekuee, 2004.

⁵² This term is translated as homesickness in the subtitle, but indicates more.

entered their home. Their daughter has British nationality. She has a passport. While the world of the parents seems to have become hollow in the images of dry land and rotten fruits, the daughter has residency. She is grounding while the parents are leafless. The couple has become the departed ones. While the daughter is settling down, they are banned. The fuzzy image of women sitting at the back of a riding truck is telling. They sit with their back to the road, moving backwards. The filmmaker, the other migrated daughter who resides in The Netherlands, speaks:

*Now my dear friends ... So, my sister is not coming back anymore ... And my parents will be alone ... International crisis is over... Nobody wants to attack Iran ... For a short while ... One Week? ... One Day? ... One hour? Who Knows? ... We are waiting.*⁵³

Waiting. Waiting for the unexpected, which is life, *life that happens*. What is this *happening*? In the first two sections the manner of approaching a politics of flight has been examined: approaching from within led us to consider the logic of roots as rhizome which gave us the key to how the disconnected dots or fragmented experiences can be connected again. Next to this question of ‘*how to approach a politics of flight?*’, in this section the question of reconnecting the dots in order to configure ‘*who is the subject of politics of flight?*’ has been explored. Still, another question emerges: ‘*what is flight as an event, i.e. a political process?*’

Just as the *how* and the *who*, this *what* is not an exclusively identifiable phenomenon. Flight cannot be assigned to one fixed form of subject. Its analysis is not limited to one type of methodology. Flight is eventually an *event*. Even physically it situates its subjects in-between, but the eventual in-between does not presuppose two already articulated relata. So, we have to approach this event too from within in a rhizomatic way in order to connect the dots. Flight, as an event, reaches beyond the actual migration from the country of origin to the country of arrival. (Dis)connecting the dots - subjects, actions and experiences – is an indication for an awareness that an approach of this politics must face the full *potentiality* of an event. Agamben articulates event as a *potentiality* of politics due to its unpredictability (see: 1.4.1). Deleuze takes a different turn and introduces the term *virtuality* to show that the actual occurrence triggers and is triggered by new assemblages (see: 1.4.2). Arendt introduces the term *natality* to emphasize the emergence of new biographies (see: 1.4.3).

1.4 Event: Not Merely the Actual

1.4.1 Another Potentiality beyond to Be or not to Be

An illustration of the philosophical use of the notion of event might be enlightening for answering the question: ‘*what is flight as an event?*’. Michel Foucault (2005^b) indicates that a revolution seen as an event is neither the effect of what came before it nor can it be judged by its aftermath. This analysis,

⁵³ The final debate between Barack Obama and Mitt Romney on 23rd of October 2012 shows how this waiting will persist. During the presidential primary elections in 2016 it is not only Donald Trump but also Hillary Clinton that openly opposes Iranian government (Jacobs & Siddiqui, 2015).

especially on the Iranian Revolution, brought him in great trouble. How could someone like Foucault imagine such an historical occasion not to be related to its past and future? There has been, however, a misconception in understanding Foucault's elaboration on the matter.⁵⁴ What he meant was not that a revolution is *unrelated* to its past and future, but rather that such an event in its immensity carries a potentiality that is neither merely an outcome of what has happened – it always enters something new – nor is this potentiality totally captured by the actuality after the revolution.

Something being an event implies that there are multiple, emergent outcomes and any politics after the revolution is *a possibility*. An event encapsulates infinite possibilities. Although the event of flight is caused by actual political actions and although it seems to precede a form of life – such as imprisonment, banishment or residency in another country – it is never merely defined by this *actual* past and that *possible* future. In order to enhance Foucault's argument Agamben's view on *potentiality* is instructive. According to Agamben (1994) we live in an age that neither allows orientation back to a thing in the past, nor provides something accessible to refer to in the future.⁵⁵

Suspended in the void between old and new, past and future, man is projected into time as into something alien that incessantly eludes him and still drags him forward, but without allowing him to find his ground in it (p. 108).

In order to think an event, one must start by elaborating on the notions of actual and potential. The distinction between actual and potential goes back to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and is preceded by yet another distinction, namely that between *matter* and *form*. While matter and form were at first

⁵⁴ See: Afary & Anderson, 2005. 20 years after Foucault's death and 25 years after the Iranian Revolution, Afary and Anderson make an extensive analysis of Foucault's involvement in Iran. They had access to new available sources, such as the Iranian articles, and they have extensively interviewed more still living witnesses than before. Moreover, their book is the first integral translation of Foucault's newspaper articles on the subject into English. In his review, however, Jonathan Rée (2005) describes this as a book without love for Foucault. Foucault's experience of this revolution was much more complex, see for example his letter (Foucault, 2005^b) to Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan from April 1979. Next to Rée's objection, I even argue that Afary and Anderson's thought does show little affinity with the Iranian Revolution due to the fact that their appreciation of the event is in full dependence of the state of affairs in the aftermath of the revolution. Ghorashi (2003) on the other hand shows the complexity of various affective relationalities toward this revolution and the multiplicity of its experience by different generations.

⁵⁵ Leland de la Durantaye (2009) connects this idea of loss of an actual past and actual future in Agamben's *The Man Without Content* to Arendt's idea of a loss of past or tradition in contemporary way of life. Agamben focuses on art and argues that there is a disconnection between the artist and its public space. However, as always is the case with Agamben, each loss or crisis is also a *potential* for another approach. It is for this reason that De la Durantaye calls *potentiality* the most crucial concept in Agamben's work. The disconnection between the past and present means a loss of orientation. When there is no clear past, there is no linearity towards the future, and thus present is all that there is. This radical present – in which ideas, objects, or something such as essence is not *transmittable* from the past to the present or the future – becomes in its emptiness open and freed from the burden of the past. It does not focus on fixed matter, but on the act of creation (pp. 26-55).

simultaneous moments of a substance, in *Metaphysics* they become diachronic.⁵⁶ In the Aristotelian thought, form is the *final* moment of substance; or rather its *actualization* as formed matter. Matter remains mere *potentiality* as long as substance is not realized in its form. Within this Aristotelian perspective, the concept of potentiality (*dunamis*) is the opposite of actuality (*energeia – entelecheia*). Potentiality means in the first instance force, including the power to become this or that. It indicates change, movement and process (*kinêsis*) (Cohen, 2009).

Aristotle emphasizes the meaning of potentiality in its relation to actuality. In the Aristotelian teleological logic potentiality is measured by the capacity to become *complete*. It marks the ability to become actual. The actual is what matters, because there the essence is realized. Actuality is equal to realization and thus reality. Potentiality gets its full meaning in its finalization as formed matter (Cohen, 2009). Take for example Auguste Rodin's *The Walking Man*. Each part of the sculpture, each part of the incomplete yet fully articulated body answers to its form as a walking movement. Even more so, the process of walking hints a completion by the forceful stride into *one* direction. The non-actual potentiality is understood as perishable and incomplete. Only that which has become actual realizes itself, and becomes eternal. For Aristotle eternal is that which no longer is in need of the perishable possibilities within the potential. This is perfection (Cohen, 2009).

This teleological frame for a long time defined and evaluated something happening or occurring – an event – by its outcome. As such events, such as revolutions and flight, become *means to an end*, within a binary setting of a starting point and an end as an outcome; or in terms of Deleuze and Guattari: the seed as a potential tree. Actual is linked with being real, with existence, and in the end – due to its finality – to actual movement, with the movement *as it should be*, opposing the potential as well as the virtual. Actual indicates exactness, factuality, and truthness, and is in the end considered to be genuine and just. In the final stages of this line of reasoning, potentiality loses its association with the notion of force, once it is associated with notions such as passivity and latency. Yet, it is this first meaning of potentiality, i.e. *force*, that reverses the Aristotelian argumentation. An unconditional force in potentiality conditions the actual. In this sense, it makes the actual conditional, thus creating a relative reality. This is for Agamben potentiality: the ability itself, the capability in which the actual is merely *a marginalized* outcome rather than *the only* outcome, let alone the best outcome. Only from a teleological point of view and applying notions such as efficiency as part of a fourfold causation – *causa materialis, formalis, efficiens* and *finalis* – potential becomes inferior to actual. This thought is also thus criticized by Arendt – as we have seen earlier – once the potentiality of a who is exclusively reduced to a whatness. It is this teleological approach that is also problematized by Agamben (2000) in his *Means without End*.

Let me return to the topic of this chapter – rhizomatic approach – and rephrase this in the perspective of Agamben's expression *means without end*. An approach does not only negate a method of appropriation but does not function as an end either. 'Means' indicates *middle*, not as in the middle of

⁵⁶ This is in contrast to what Deleuze and Guattari (1987) suggest, namely that form and matter are neither diachronic nor synchronic. In their simultaneous appearance, they are rather asynchronous. Form and matter are not historical but territorial; there is no beginning or ending.

a road – in between a beginning and an end – but as a vectorial force without reference yet. It can connect to all sides to every thing. A means functions for the sake of this middle. Equipped with this idea of a middle as a means without end – crucial in lectures of Agamben, Deleuze and Guattari and implicitly thematized in Arendt's political philosophy⁵⁷ – they approach events. Event, in their thinking, is a process in the middle. It is an articulation of in-betweenness, both spatial and temporal, yet not *limited by* respectively a lost motherland and an already known destiny, a past and a future. The middle carries the possibility of other options, i.e. *new* options. The *new* of this potentiality, in accordance with the event itself, cannot be appropriated, organized or speculated on. Deleuze and Guattari stress the emergent quality. Arendt emphasizes its spontaneity and natality.

What does this impossibility to appropriate, organize and speculate on an event – in this case an event of flight – means for the experience of flight by individuals who are not yet subjectified by the layered and ambiguous discourse we have been reflecting upon?

This does not mean that today there are no more experiences, but they are enacted outside the individual. And it is interesting that the individual merely observes them, with relief ... the overwhelming majority of people have no wish to experience it, preferring instead that the camera should (Agamben, 1993^a, p. 17).

The medium *camera* is decisive in this quote. There is of course a distinction between the real experience of wars, famine, revolutions and flight, and the cinematographic experience. The cinematographic 'registration' of reporters gains knowledge. According to Agamben (1993^a) the contemporary inability to gain or give meaning to experience is precisely caused by the modern alignment between knowledge and experience. Modernity as it is articulated in works of thinkers like Kant instrumentalize experience in the process of gaining knowledge. This is the founding process for the constitution of subjectivity. Yet, to increase knowledge is an endless process that according to Kant cannot be completed. The subject never becomes a whole. The instrumentalization of experience by the knowing subject deprives the experience from its singularity. It is reduced to a particularity within a series of similar particularities, the quantification of which leads to universalized propositions on general truths. The subject, being an epistemological construct within this process of knowing – labeled by Kant as 'transcendental apperception' – is thus never able to gain this essential truth factually. It undergoes the experience, but is never in full possession of 'its' experience (pp. 19-27).

So, Agamben diagnoses a contradictory trait within this process. While experience is reduced to that which can be transformed into knowledge, the subject of modernity is split in two: between a subject that *has* knowledge but does not *undergo* the experience fully, and a subject that *undergoes* an experience but does not *gain* knowledge. Take *Slumdog Millionaire*: this is not only the bewilderment of Jamal, but moreover that of the detective. Jamal has undergone something, while the detective has only knowledge of it. The two characters are never at ease with each other. The experience of the

⁵⁷ Although Arendt (1958) speaks about a *means as an end* the analysis is akin to that of Agamben.

sublime is the exception to the rule: it is an exemplary articulation that initially ruptures the subject, ruptures the manner in which we understand of experience the world, according to De Mul (2004).

This experience of the complete contingency of the world is pregnantly expressed in the negative pleasure that the sublime – the chaotic, completely purposeless character of nature – arouses in us. The sublime makes us realize that an answer to the question ‘Why and for what purpose is the world?’ cannot be given (p. 83).

Returning to our approach of a politics of flight a question emerges: who is the subject that has the knowledge of flight and who is the subject that experiences the event of flight? Do I have knowledge of a politics of flight because of my experience of fleeing or because of my theoretical efforts to understand what has happened to me? Do policymakers and refugees differ in being respectively the subject that has the knowledge of and the subject that endures the event? The least we can say for the time being is that a politics of flight in its inclusion of multiple subjects undermines the duality of knowledge and experience, or more obviously between theory and practice, as we will see in the next chapters. Flight as a discourse implies both theory – i.e. in Deleuzian and Guattarian terms: an assemblage of enunciations – and practice – i.e. an assemblage of bodies. Due to the multiplicity and complexity of the subjects of a politics of flight on the one hand and the interconnectedness of the sublime experience as such on the other, the experience of flight and its escaping trait cannot be limited to the subject called refugee, nor could its approach be merely judged by policymakers.

The events in Paris on January and November 2015 and in Brussels on March 2016 show how the subject that watches and the subject that is being watched are intertwined in a global political network of violence, a violence that “cannot be dealt with in purely formalistic or moralistic models” (Pisters, 2003, p.80). *Nobody is just a spectator*. A politics of flight has immense unseen facets, some are our dreams, and some are our nightmares. Our political decisions do not only affect our taxes but also concern the state of affairs on Egyptian and Israeli border, prisons with no way out and no prospect of inclusion.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, the inappropriateness of the experience of flight creates an unexpected potential of relationalities. The experience appears in a discursive field in which the experience itself becomes a force relating multiple subjects rather than distinguishing between experiencing subjects and informed subjects. The so-called experience of one subject is simply *an* occurrence in a rhizomatic affective field that connects all kinds of subjects.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Even from the perspective of the binary logic of country of origin and country of arrival, refugees often find themselves stuck in the middle. One of the horrifying examples of our time is the torture, rape and murder of Sudanese and Eritrean refugees in the Sinai. They are not even political prisoners, but merely stateless, in no-man’s-land. And if they are able to reach Israel, they will be excluded and stigmatized as *infiltrators*. This is visualized in Israel’s construction of one of the biggest prisons in the world. This prison is not made for the so-called criminal, but for the so-called outsider. See on this issue: Van Nierop, 2012.

⁵⁹ Deleuze also often speaks of this unappropriated trait of experience. In the sixth chapter I will elaborate on the relation between the concept of experience and experiment, where Deleuze and Guattari play a crucial role. However, in Deleuze’s texts as well as in those with Guattari, the experience becomes subjectless, while I rather argue that although it is not owned by a particular subject, it is nevertheless endured by differentiated subjects. This is due to the cruciality of the notion of subject and subjectivity for a politics of flight.

The unpredictability of the possibilities of various connections within a politics of flight forces us to approach potentiality in a different manner. What is the potentiality of the event of flight? Agamben reverses the aforementioned *interpretation* of Aristotle, which for that matter is still present in both the Hegelian notion of *Spirit* and the Marxian notion of *Labor* as universalizing forces that direct collective learning processes. While potentiality is here defined as that which is not-yet-actual, Agamben (1999^a) creates a pseudo-Hegelian antithesis or speculative proposition: “*All potentiality is impotentiality*” (p. 182). He defines potentiality full range: also as a possibility *not to be*. Potentiality is “a *hexis*, a disposition or ‘a having’”, which indicates both the *presence* to be and the *presence* of not to be (p. 179). Through Aristotle’s aporia of seeing darkness – noticing that which cannot be seen – Agamben points to the experience of sensation. Sensation loses its teleological actuality as an instrument to see something, but is rather *experienced as a potentiality*, or as he calls it: “the *possibility of privation*” (p. 181).

Potentiality ... maintains itself in relation to its own privation, its own *sterēsis*, its own non-Being. This relation constitutes the essence of potentiality. To be potential means: to be one's own lack, *to be in relation to one's own incapacity*. Beings that exist in the mode of potentiality *are capable of their own impotentiality*; and only in this way do they become potential. They *can be* because they are in relation to their own non-Being. In potentiality, sensation is in relation to anesthesia, knowledge to ignorance, vision to darkness (p. 182).

It is through this possibility of non-Being that Agamben defines freedom of men. Freedom, as we often see in contemporary times, indicates on the one hand the *power to do* something, for example Barack Obama’s expression *Yes, we can*, and on the other hand a form of refusal, for example the so-called populist refusal voting mode⁶⁰ in Europe and United States through which men do not choose for an ideology but rather negating the existing ones. Agamben reasons that freedom is neither the mere upholding of an act, nor the refusal of it: “To be free is, in the sense we have seen, *to be capable of one's own impotentiality*, to be in relation to one's own privation. This is why freedom is freedom for both good and evil” (p. 183).⁶¹

The freedom *to be capable of one's own impotentiality* is a kind of metastatic feedback loop: the concept bends back upon itself. It is the same as to see *how* we see. It problematizes our way of perceiving. In terms of the citation on camera as a mean of knowing: our impotentiality to see and

⁶⁰ It is crucial to note that the populist refusal vote is not merely a racist or anti-migrant vote. In The Netherlands, they vary from PVV, to Socialist Party, Pirate Party, Animal Party. The notion *populist* must not result in pinpointing them to one form of ideology.

⁶¹ In *The Coming Community* Agamben (1993^b) clarifies this by reference to Glenn Gould, who is not defined by his ability to play the piano, nor his inability to play it. According to Agamben Gould is “the only one who *cannot not-play*” (p. 36). In the scene where Gould plays Bach’s Partita #2 in *The Art of Piano* this is more than obvious. Gould plays intensely, and suddenly stops playing, stand up and moves to the window, but in some sense the sound remains resonating in the air, and Gould remains playing the piano through his mouth by expressing the notes. When he returns to the piano, and start playing with his hands, there is no real gap between these moments (*Glenn Gould plays Bach*, n.d).

know without our cameras and televisions. Yet, Agamben's problematization does not lead to total inertia. This experience of potentiality does not necessarily lead to mere passive zapping from one channel to another. One can also choose not to not-act. This idea of potentiality thus alters the idea of actuality as well. In Agamben's thought, and his reading of Aristotle, actuality is no longer the final realization of potentiality. It is the other way around; the impotentiality of potentiality *survives* the momentary actualization. It is always *preserved* in the actual (p. 183-184).

In the principle of reason ('There is a reason why there is something rather than nothing'), what is essential is neither *that something is* (being) nor *that something is not* (nothingness), but that something is *rather* than nothingness. For this reason it cannot be read simply as an opposition between two terms – *is/is not*. It also contains a third term: the *rather* (which is related to the Old English 'raþe' meaning quick or eager, and which in Latin is *potius*, from *potis*, that which is able), the power to not not-be (Agamben, 1993^b, p. 104).

Politics of flight is the exploration of this *rather*. It is this concept of impotentiality and freedom in the sense of to *not not-be* within a politics of flight that I will explore in the next chapters, reflecting upon the middle as *mi-lieu* of politics (chapter 2) and providing the conceptual tools (chapter 3) to analyze different political regimes that try to exclude, integrate or internalize the ambiguity of the other, the migrant, the refugee. What does it mean to-not-be, within the actualization of an identity, of an other, of a refugee, not as something or someone, but as an *evental* process that resist the homogeneity of citizenship's actuality?

1.4.2 Deleuzian Repetition beyond Identity: Virtual/Actual

Potentiality is vitality, it is life itself. When we connect the idea of an event to 'its' potentiality, we surpass a reduction of this vitality of an event to actual analyzable historical facts. We take its liveliness to yet another level when it is connected with the idea of virtuality as understood by Deleuze. In his work and in his collaboration with Guattari, Deleuze too introduces apparently 'oppositional' notions: flight lines versus segmentation lines, decalomania versus mapping. In this sense Deleuze seems to retrieve the Hegelian duality and recaptures his dialectics. This is at odd with his and Guattari's critical philosophy on Hegel. How do these twofold notions differ from Hegelian oppositions? In note 35 I argued that these are rhetorical gestures. The relation is not oppositional but supplementary. That also counts for virtuality and actuality. Nevertheless, Deleuze's work must not be designated as anti-Hegelian. Such a conclusion would create a contradiction that Deleuze and Guattari reject. In their affirmative thinking, I would rather like to argue, they appreciate the multiplicity in thinking itself. Hegel's merit is the introduction of movement, i.e. history in thought, and hence his introduction of dynamic difference. In his analysis thought thoroughly *becomes* a process.

Deleuze and Guattari's critique radicalizes this becoming in Hegel's analysis. They push his thoughts beyond its teleological and oppositional traits that reduce differences to oppositions and lift negation via sublation to ever more self-conscious identities, that in a geopolitical sense eventually legitimize western supremacy over other cultures; especially African culture and philosophy. Their

rhizomatic anti-methodology is drenched of Nietzschean terminology: forces that do not oppose, but enforce upon and annihilate one another. Just like Agamben's treatment of 'means', their 'methodology' is a dialectics without beginnings and ends, as Deleuze's describes in *Difference and Repetition*. In this book Deleuze (1997) connects two notions: *difference* and *repetition*. It is this Deleuzian understanding of difference that I intend to explore in my analyses of politics of flight. Within this politics the idea of sameness has dominated for a long time. Deleuze's exploration of difference problematizes the idea of sameness. Except, what does repeat itself, since difference is beyond sameness?

In traditional approaches these two notions – difference and repetition – are either seen as opposites or as two secondary traits of an overarching notion: *The Same*. What remains *The Same* is The Identity of The One. As we will see in the fourth chapter, it is this idea that leads to a politics of exile. Deleuze's critique is that difference in this approach is not absolute. The idea of Sameness always *represent* itself in difference, hence makes difference secondary to The One that always keeps the same Identity. According to such analysis repetition does not impose change or real movement, but is always the repetition of the same. In contrast to this, Deleuze opens another entrance by stating that the ideas of *difference* and *repetition* are neither oppositional nor secondary to the idea of *The Same* that has haunted philosophy since Plato.

1) *Difference*, from Deleuze's perspective, is not an aspect of The Same in its repetitiveness, but underlies as well as undermines the idea of The Same. Deleuze demonstrates *difference in itself*, by distinguishing *conceptual difference* from the *concept of difference*. *Conceptual difference* regulates the process of thinking, in which concepts are categorized according to a logical matrix. Only in the second instance this order allows for differences and subcategories, such as *homesickness* and *dislocation*. For example, the general category of 'home' enables me to make a distinction between my home and your home, my land and your land, my people and your people. This in the final instance oppositional distinction depends on the identity of the category and thus the concept 'home' is *represented* in the distinction (which I will elaborate on in 5.4). Exactly this secondary status of difference in the conventional interpretation of thinking is criticized by Deleuze. His critique targets the four principals of logical thinking in which representation predominates:

There are four principal aspects to 'reason' in so far as it is the medium of representation: identity, in the form of *undetermined* concept; analogy, in the relation between ultimate *determinable* concepts; opposition, in the relation between *determination* within concepts; resemblance, in the *determined* object of the concept itself (p. 29. Underlining TR).

Identity, analogy, opposition and *resemblance* are the four legs upon which *logical reason*⁶² founds the concept of The Same as primary. What *differs* not only then becomes secondary, but also inferior

⁶² It is important to make a distinction between reason in a broader sense of the word, and *logical reason* in the strict sense of the word. Reasoning, in its strict logical sense, gives rise to the idea of The Same, yet in a broader sense creates a certain consistency that is open to difference that is not secondary to the idea of The Same. It is this latter form of consistency that

or even worse, *evil* or *monstrous*. In 4.3 and 4.4 this moral implication of the difference as secondary will be elaborated on, while in 6.3 I focus on the implication of difference as the affirmative ground zero of thought and ethics, which refers to the *concept of difference*. According to Deleuze thought is an experiment with the concept of *difference* not depending on The Same but as *difference in itself*. Thus, in contrast to the idea of The Same that generates the duality between particularities and generalities, the concept of difference according to him connects two other notions in a supplementary way: *singularities* and *universality*. The ‘thing’ that repeats endlessly is the universality of singularities. There are endless homes, yet *a* home does neither represent The Home, nor is an inadequate instance of the idea of The Home, as in *homesickness*. A home is not this particular home that must complete *the* Ideal sense of hominess.

2) *Repetition*, the second notion that Deleuze thematizes and transforms, is often seen as a secondary manifestation of The Same, a recurrence in which each element represents its predecessors. There is an alleged *origin* that reproduces the repetitive elements. The first form of repetition is *habit* – habit of reading, writing, walking, going to war, identifying. Sometimes something becomes a habit out of an original act that precedes the repetition: like handshaking with your right hand, always brushing your teeth the same way or addressing the other with her proper name. Habit or the act of repeating something in the now-moment resembles something other than itself, whether from its past or its anticipated future. Habit by definition indicates repetition of things that resemble one another. Habit synthesizes the past and the future in its *present* action. The idea of homesickness thus synthesizes an Ideal Home in the past, with the hope of finding or the despair of never finding the Same Home in the future (as I will argue in 5.4).

The second form of resemblance assumed in repetition is *recognition*. The expectation of resemblance guarantees the *shortcoming* of the repeated element. And the shortcoming that finds its foundation in the difference, how minimalistic it may be, is always immanent within the repetition. Recognition appears in remembering, the image of a thing or an experience that resembles something that has *passed* and is reproduced in the *memory*. Deleuze calls habit and memory *naked repetitions*. The dominance of The Origin – such as The Home – that is repeated, gives the *naked repetition* on the one hand a *static* trait, meaning what repeats itself always resembles the same thing; as well as a *negative* trait, meaning despite repetitions’ effort to resemble the origin, it always fails to do so.

Deleuze’s critique targets the illusions from which this idea of failure springs. Difference is not a defect of repetition. “We can never say that two things are the same because of the difference implied in any repetition” (Williams, 2003, p. 33). Deleuze (1997) introduces another form of repetition, *a covered repetition*, which does not symmetrically repeat The Same, but rather repeats *asymmetrical* and *incomparable* singularities. And again, he refers to Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s *eternal return* is not the repetition of one life over and over again, but repetition of life – which differs every time – endlessly (as we will see in 6.5). The difference is not secondary, it is the *dynamic* force behind repetition. In the same vein, there is no such thing as Writing, but endless individual writings, each with its own *intensive* variety. The *spiritual* rather than materialistic repetition is the everlasting

has been explored by Deleuze and Guattari in their analysis of milieu in *What is Philosophy?* and *A Thousand Plateaus*. This will be addressed in the next chapter.

presence of individual synthesis and not an endless recurrence of the same element. This synthesis is characterized by Deleuze as *passive*, which does not indicate non-productivity, but rather pre-personality. “*Repetition is a condition of action before it is a concept of reflection*” (p. 90). It does not emerge from the cogito (*logos*), as Descartes suggests. The synthesis is not initiated by a person, but by that which is endured by an individual. The synthesis is thus not something that can be planned, it rather disorganizes its predecessors. In other words, literally in line with Nietzsche, Deleuze states that the only thing that repeats itself is difference in itself. “Repetition is, for itself, difference in itself” (p. 94). The only thing that always happens is *difference*, or what is called *pure becoming*.

For eternal return, affirmed in all its power, allows no installation of a foundation-ground. On the contrary, it swallows up or destroys every ground which would function as an instance responsible for the difference between the original and the derived, between things and simulacra. It makes us party to a universal *ungrounding* (p. 67).

The repetition, *the repetition for itself*, is thus not a horizontal recurrence of the same concept, but “repetition is difference without a concept” (p. 23). Deleuze synthesizes the titles of the first two chapters by stating in a quasi-Hegelian manner: “If difference is the in-itself, then repetition in the eternal return is the for-itself of difference” (p. 125). In *naked repetition* – habit and recognition – the repeated becomes a metaphor for that which is repeated, as if it could repeat something naked without any supplementary elements. In *covered repetition* every part carries a mask that cannot resemble the other due to the immanent difference. Nonetheless, again these two forms must not be seen as opposites. Covered repetition is the heart that endlessly beats through the assumed resemblance of naked repetition. As we will see in the fifth chapter it is this *masked repetition* that undermines the memories of subjects of multicultural society. Their habits and memories refer to some shared identity in the past that can be repeated, naked as it were, in the present. The difference results in affaects ranging from disappointment and reactive resentment to nostalgia (see: 5.4). The recent Brexit bears witness to this retro-imperialist nostalgia. In the sixth chapter in trying to sketch an affirmative approach to this supplementary difference the repetition of memory answers to this active affectivity of difference. Then remembering indicates a repetition of memories as new creative syntheses and not as a phantom of an imagined past. Arendt’s notion of natality offers productive connections.

Yet, before exploring this notion and finalizing this chapter, it is instructive for an understanding of Deleuze’s revision of the notions of *difference and repetition*, to explore his notion of the *individual* against the background of the already introduced notions of subject, person and identity. As James Williams (2003) points out, individual does not indicate a person as a conscious human being who resembles an identity and acts in analogy to, yet negating other human being’s identity. Individual cannot be exhaustively subsumed as a member under a species or as an object under a category or concept. As indicated before, according to Deleuze individual is not a fixed moment in time and space, but rather a *process*, a synthesis of infinite connections. While a person intends to *manifest its identity* and a subject in a Kantian sense is the essence of self-consciousness, an individual is *eventive* in *experimenting*. An individual rather permanently disorganizes itself, not as a self-conscious person

or a normalized subject, but as a process that thinks on its own accord, the latter term suggesting resonance with other individuals. There is more to an individual than a person can express or a subject can reflect upon. This difference between an individual as a node in a network with endless virtual connections and a person as a *self*-conscience body results precisely from a crucial distinction between *the actual* and *the virtual*.

The virtual and the actual form the doublet that creates *reality*. Thus, reality for Deleuze (1997) is not a state of affairs as an objectifiable configuration of facts and acts, but rather vital difference that gives rise to the virtual as well as the actual. “The virtual is opposed not to the real but to the actual. *The virtual is fully real in so far as it is virtual*” (p. 208). When he states that *ideas are real* he refers to this twofold aspect of reality in which ideas as virtual forces are *dramatized* in actual concepts. There is an equality of appreciation between the two in reality in which “the virtual is the condition for change and evolution in the actual” and “the actual is the condition for determinacy in the virtual” (Williams, 2003, p. 52).

Ideas are virtual in being affects or intensities. The virtual must not be confused with an abstract idea, or still Platonic based fiction. It is rather sensed and experienced as that which cannot be represented. Its reality is anchored in this difference. As an affect, an idea is more than a logical and analytical entity. Although affect refers to an experience of a body, nevertheless it is “all the while trans-historical, trans-temporal, trans-spatial and autonomous” (Coleman, 2005, p. 11). Affect is the experience of what I have explored before as a body without organs. This experience involves all senses, also the mind that Nietzsche labeled as our biggest sense organ. The title of the 52nd International Art Exhibition of La Biennale di Venezia in 2007 *Think with the Senses - Feel with the Mind. Art in the Present Tense* refers to such an idea of affect. Deleuze (1997) thus argues that unrealistic abstraction belongs to the realm of the actual, the realm in which connections are cut off or reduced to oppositional positions in order to create comprehension of an object. What we consider to be an isolated actual object is rather the thing that has been *distanced* from ‘its’ virtual ground from which it is born.

Virtual is not synonymous to possible. Possibilities, think for example of science fiction movies, are still enthralled by re-presentation. Something is possible, i.e. imaginable in the sense that it aims to become actual. Possibility remains in the realm of the actual but then as a *fictive* trait. As a fictive projection, it strengthens the *communis* of *identification*. Virtual on the other hand dispenses with ideas of representation and original, which gives rise to the very opposition of fictive/non-fictive.

Thus, with actualisation, a new type of specific and partitive distinction takes the place of the fluent ideal distinctions. We call the determination of the virtual content of an Idea *differentiation*; we call the actualisation of that virtuality into species and distinguished parts *differentiation*. It is always in relation to a *differentiated* problem or to the *differentiated* conditions of a problem that a *differentiation* of species and parts is carried out, as though it corresponded to the cases of solution of the problem (pp. 206-207).

The differentiation in the virtual thus appears as a *problematization*, while actualization differentiates – as we will see in the fifth chapter – for the sake of *solutions*. The homo sapiens that stretches itself, standing on his feet to see and orient better, solves the problem of being spotted before he spots the enemy. Species, organs and laws of nature and men are solutions to specific problems. The problem as such – problematization – remains on the level of the virtual, in a state in which it makes a connection to all that is at hand, and not solely to what is needed for a specific solution. *Completeness* is another aspect of the virtual. Deleuze (1997) nuances matters by stating that *completeness* does not mean that the virtual is a totalistic whole. Being *whole* is articulated in the realm of the actual: the organism or organization as a whole of elements. The actualization as a whole means *differentiation*, *integration*, and *solution* (p. 211). The quality of the actual object is bound to space and time, a movement *gradually* from A to B, for example an integration policy that through an assimilating process intends to gradually normalize the other toward a citizenship with recognizable and controllable habitual performance. The affects within the virtual other have the creative *potential* to differentiate endlessly. The virtual is aimless, which does not mean that it does not move, it moves without aim, connecting forces that strive to enhance themselves. The example of the difference between brainwaves in analytical thought and creative thought is in that sense illustrative. During analytical thinking the brainwaves appear as short lines between A and B. The movement is fast but does not leave the left side of the brain. The creative thinking, which starts on the right side of the brain, on the other hand, shows multiple long stretching lines that penetrate the entire brain. The movement is slower and the directions of the vectors are unpredictable (Dart, 2013). The creative brain is rhizomatic (Pisters, 2003, p. 7). It is also fascinating to know that creativity is enhanced in the frontal lobe of the brain by interference with the inhibitory mechanism.

How does the virtual connect to time? The virtual is the *past* but not a particular past. It is a past as an endless multiplicity of that which has been. This past is not defined by chronological order and not even a multiple chronology. Bouazizi is not a product of a specific Tunisian history, or Arab history, but an amalgamation of a world history of colonialism and capitalism. It is non-chronological, not because it rejects chronology, but because the chronological line that we are presented with is merely one mode of what is real: namely the actual history books. The virtual is *capacity*, not as something that can be identified and imagined. The completeness of the capacity means that it is real beyond that which could be actually imagined in our minds and dreams. Bouazizi's deed physically did happen then and there, but in a virtual sense resonated in political thinking everywhere. This idea of capacity brings about the connection between Deleuze and Agamben. In this respect, there seems to be no difference between the two words potentiality and virtuality for Deleuze (1997). Both virtual and potential are characterized as *complete determination* (pp. 175, 209). The affinity with Agamben's thought becomes even more obvious when Deleuze shows how the non-being of the virtual does not function as a negative.

There is a non-being, yet there is neither negative nor negation. There is a non-being, which is by no means the being of the negative, but rather the *being of the problematic* ... Critiques of the negative are never decisive as long as they invoke

the rights of a first concept (the One, order, being); they are no more so as long as they are content to translate opposition into limitation (pp. 202-203, italics TR).

The non-being of the virtual and the potential for Deleuze and Agamben is thus not a negation; it is not a determination of the The Same, rather a determination of endless repetition of difference within the reality of the virtual. The non-being is *eventive*. What lies, relatively before and after an event are actualized states of affairs, whereas the virtual event is a convergence of forces that cannot be captured in spatio-temporal concepts and thought such as country of origin and country of arrival, or Arab Spring. Bouazizi's life is a much bigger story than words that intend to comprehend it. There is in Deleuze's sense of the word neither something that happens before or after an event, nor is the event a *mere reaction* to the state of affairs. There is neither essence nor finality in an event. Event is what lies, has lain and will lie underneath any actual state of affairs. It is in Agambian sense the impotentiality that is never lost in the moment of actualization. What we call actual is rather a particular outcome of the event. "The event is not what occurs (an accident), it is rather inside what occurs, the purely expressed" (Deleuze, 1990, p 149). A home is not an entity, a whole – a building, a nation, designated emotions – it is a complete reality that surpasses our ideas of what is comfortable and what is not.

This is what we call 'home'. Every household is an aurally marked territory. Homes are created by sound walls: a radio that is playing, singing, and speaking voices; the sound of the washing machine; and other sounds (Pisters, 2003, pp. 189-190).

1.4.3 Permanency of Birth

How do pure expressions of an event in Deleuze's thought and aimless experience of an event in Agamben's reflections relate to the analysis of political act and speech in Arendt's lectures? The connection is the unpredictability of that which is about to emerge. Arendt calls this emergence: *natality*. Birth, creativity and event are political forces in this Arendtian notion. Dirk De Schutter's (2005) analysis of Arendt's notion of revolution is instructive here. The Dutch word *omwenteling* – *re-revolution* – D. De Schutter states, exactly expresses Arendt's vision of revolution, first by referring to rotation, meaning repetition of the same cycle; second, by referring to *blasting* (Dutch: *toer*) of an engine; and third to a radical *change* in the order of things. The three meanings of *omwenteling* are in accordance with the three conditions that for Arendt characterize a human action (p. 14). This is: the repetition of the birth of new organism in *labor*, the repetitive work for the fabrication of new objects in work, and the repetition of difference in a new *action*. When Arendt speaks of natality, she is beyond labor and work, referring to the emergence of endless difference in the realm of action and speaking in public space. This political natality is thus distinct from the 'ontic' birth of a living organism and the production of cultural objects in the realm of work. Confronted with the totalitarian tendencies in her time, Arendt argues that the emphasis on birth of the *body* in the cycle of life has decreased our capacity to be born in the realm of politics. While the *body* refers to that which conditions us, effectively limiting us, politics is the realm of freedom. In Arendt's work *life* seems to refer to merely a conditioned life, leaving freedom of political natality in the abyss of a lost world of

human interaction. Nevertheless, as Anne O'Byrne (2010) argues in her *Natality and Finitude* the three forms of newness in labor, work and action, are not hierarchically divided in Arendt's work. Their interaction with one another is far more complex than is often assumed. Even the notion of body is not unambiguous in her work. In chapter three I critically examine Arendt's understanding of body and life.

How does this natality relate to the notion of death? In her *Love and Saint Augustine*, Arendt (1996) opposes to the emphasis on death in the history of philosophy – iconized by her teacher Martin Heidegger – by the idea of beginning, the idea of natality. “Since man can know, be conscious of, and remember his ‘beginning’ or his origin, he is able to act as a beginner and enact the story of mankind” (p. 55). While Augustine defines man as something between the *not-yet*, which indicates the birth, and the *no-more*, which denotes death, Arendt accentuates the first by stating:

The negation of life through the ‘not-yet’ has a positive meaning: it has to do with what followed upon the ‘not-yet’ ... Therefore, the ‘not-yet’ of life is not nothing, but the very source that determines life in the positiveness of its being. Life must refer back to its own ‘not-yet,’ because life in the world will end (p. 71).

Arendt's natality indicates that birth is not a simple beginning process of life that results finally in death. Natality is the capacity to appear endlessly in the realm of politics, creating new forms of relations that cannot be predicted beforehand. Natality with its infinite potential is the engine of immortality. In *The Human Condition* (1958) she continues to emphasize the fact that it is the immensity of our human actions – actions that makes us appear in the world of human relations – that give us a name that could endure time. Thus, political natality does not result in death, but in immortality or as O'Byrne (2010) states *political immortality* (p. 81).

O'Byrne too shows that the two notions – birth and death – must not be understood as opposites. They are not polar concepts, due to a fundamental asymmetry between the two. In words of Heidegger, death is that what *belongs to us* the most. There is an intense form of loneliness that appears in the possibility of death. Even if others are present in the very moment of our dying, death is what happens to us alone. Birth on the other hand is never ours alone. Our birth needs the cooperation of at least two other individuals. Birth is thus by definition relational. It is within this relationality, with birth's reference to another time than that of death, that the *symmetry* between death and birth is *disrupted* (pp. 7-9).

If death delivers us from the world, whether into paradise or hell, oblivion or having-been, birth introduces us to a world that is not of our making and to a past that we have the impossible task of making our own (p. 6).

Instead of defining natality as the first part of a polar set, O'Byrne defines it in accordance with David Wood as a *liminal* concept.

Because they are neither inside nor outside (or *both* inside *and* outside), neither here nor beyond (or *both* here *and* beyond), neither within the philosophical

practice in question nor wholly outside it (or *both within and outside*), we have to set each liminal concept in a more complex set of relations (p. 10).

In line with this we could state that the asymmetry between death of the body, which as will be argued in Chapter 4 becomes the decisive factor of totalitarianism, and the natality within political plurality, are central here. While the totalitarian death reduces the body to merely its *whatness*, it is the *whoness* of the singular individual that is at stake in the political natality. The question is: who draws the consequences of the Deleuzian virtual, Agambian potentiality and Arendtian natality? It is this idea of birth as a productive mechanism that becomes more and more explicit in Arendt's (1958) work, especially in *The Human Condition*. There is no finality in natality.

Greatness ... the specific meaning of each deed, can lie only in the performance itself and neither in its motivation nor its achievement (p. 206).

The current geopolitical situation asks for a new ethics for a community to come that acknowledges the differential connectivity of individuals that have to participate in a political community beyond the utilitarian normative thinking of policymakers. How do we 'approach' a refugee: as an identity or as an individual in Deleuzian sense? Following Arendt's line of thought, we could state that it is impossible to outline the web of stories around *who* a refugee is. This is merely approachable through the initiation of action, and not due to goals or motivations of a particular person. Action is a performance affecting the actor as well as the other, as we have seen in Bouazizi's case.

Through these characteristics, Arendt discusses how frustrating action and narrative can be. Her analysis is still instructive for an understanding of our age of transparent communication on the World Wide Web. The web of narratives is unlimited because of the *unpredictability, irreversibility* of its actions and the *anonymity* of its actor. These three traits are the engine of political birth. Action, even reaction, initiates something by altering a course in the network of human relations. The *who* is not traceable. The outcome of any alteration, however, is unpredictable. It gives rise to multiple processes and each branching or bifurcation in this rhizomatic field leads to endless other outcomes. The endlessness of branching roots in what affects and is affected by uncountable, anonymous actors. Once a connection is made – and virtual others are given as a result of this one connection – it is not possible to move backwards and reverse an act in time and space due to the multiplicity of branches that have been created. Each act is irreversible (pp. 190-192, 223). Bouazizi's act cannot not have happened.

Must we then oppose Arendt's thought to that of Deleuze and Guattari, who speak of *reversibility* of connections in the process of mapping? Deleuze and Guattari agree that a current connection can transform, multiply and even vanish. Only the act of *tracing* an origin removes the alternative connections. Selective tracing carries the consequence that some connections seem to be irreversible. Approaching the matter of refugees therefore means mapping its virtual existence, not tracing its actual situation, or pretending their indwelling in Turkey and Libya can hold the flows of migration. Arendt's idea of irreversibility of an action indicates that an action, the moment that it appears in the public realm, is detached from its actor, whether this refers to the refugee or the policymaker. The

death of an actor is thus asymmetrical to the death of an act. What Arendt means, is not that an act can never change its course. She only emphasizes that an actor is incapable of intentionally reversing its act. In sync with Deleuze and Guattari's analysis, Arendtian action is not an object that is owned by an actor. It is a process that operates on actual differentiated and virtual differentiated fields. It virtually has the potentiality to move anywhere. What makes an action change course is not the actor but another act, or in Deleuze's Nietzschean perspective: another force. The clash of forces creates other entrances that enable actors to take different directions. Arendt speaks of deeds that can be interrupted in their everlasting effects, in their everlasting consequences and in the case of totalitarianism in its course of destruction. However, what interrupts the course of action, discourse and political violence, is not the consequence of that which is already present. The interruption appears as a miracle. Arendt (1958) states:

The new always happens against the overwhelming odds of statistical laws and their probability, which for all practical, everyday purposes amounts to certainty; the new therefore always appears in the guise of a miracle (p. 178).

Are miracles possible in a politics of flight? *Miracle* does not mean that it is an intervention of gods. An intervention is never an introduction or creation of something new. It is rather a manifestation of what once was, but has been forgotten. It refers to an already existing essence. When Arendt speaks of a miracle, it is in the true sense of the word, namely that which comes to existence without a prior plan or logical causality. She calls this miraculous eventfulness in the discourse of men *natality*. Natality means that whatever is, whatever force imposes itself as the final direction, has the potential to cease to exist.

The life span of man running toward death would inevitably carry everything human to ruin and destruction if it were not for the faculty of interrupting it and beginning something new, a faculty which is inherent in action like an ever-present reminder that men, though they must die, are not born in order to die but in order to begin" (p. 246).

With Deleuze and Guattari I see natality as the deterritorializing effect of the abstract machine, as the engine that keeps assemblages in motion. Nevertheless, in this deterritorialization, natality is never *merely* critical; it never tends towards death, but is rather the *affirmation* of the *new*. Flight does not utter itself as a negative yet critical experience and event, but occurs due to a yearning that is immanent in life: the will to change, the desire to start something miraculously new. The question is:

What kind of thinking and expression does this affirmative critical attitude within politics of flight petition for?

Chapter 2: Mapping a Milieu Called Politics of Flight

This is impossible, that no one would come to this door. Is the noise of the world so cacophonous that mine cannot be heard? I ask only for one person! One person coming to my door will be enough

(Valentino Achak Deng in Eggers, 2008, p. 162).

2.1 Difference = Relational

Rhizome; open bodies; body without organs; earth expressing itself in assemblages of bodies and enunciations; subjects disconnecting themselves from fixated identities in their process of subjectification; actions that surpass the intentionality of their subjects; actions and events that, due to their unpredictable potentiality, virtuality and natality, problematize the actual solutions to problems of our time; these are all notions – outlined in the previous chapter – that characterize an introductory approach toward a *politics of flight*. All these phenomena, however, do not provide us with a straight answer. They are in the first instance meant to criticize and diagnose every answer that pretends to be permanent and definitive. Within the contemporary state of affairs – the crises of refugees and political urgency to find an answer to these crises – this type of approach incites a distanced attitude toward the political needs of our times. Is it wise to problematize the rules of the current state of affairs with these yet imprecise notions while our political reality urges us to act in order to overcome the impasse of war and death around the globe? Although this impreciseness by some is typified as an unrealistic and vague attitude concerning the reality of the day, I will time and again argue that it is exactly this intended clarity of rules of engagement of contemporary politics that creates the crises that we face today. In order to engage within another politics of flight we need to face the need to oversimplify our global involvement within current macro-politics. We have to sketch the *milieu* in which a new politics of flight can be expressed. This *mi-lieu*, this space of in-betweenness takes flight as a primary force of our human condition. Not as a negative disposition to escape reality, but as an affirmative condition that cultivates a sensibility for transformation, for – in the words of Deleuze and Guattari – becoming.

Yet, we first need to address a misconception that has dominated the discourse within philosophy toward this impreciseness that occurred in the late 20th century polemic against postmodernism. *Thinkers of difference*, such as Agamben, Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze and Guattari have often enough been accused of haziness and a cloudy approach toward reality. It is argued that these so-called postmodernists tempt us to lean back and do nothing, stupefied by the fragmentation

that we face. In their so-called anything-goes attitude they appeal to ‘nothing’ and as such are the latest heirs of Nietzschean nihilism. From a binary perspective, these thinkers – due to their severe critique towards overarching *universalistic* moralistic tendencies – are blamed for being *relativists without a cause*.

In this study, I sketch a different approach (chapter 6) toward politics of flight by examining the tension between universalism (chapter 4) and narrow relativism (chapter 5). Furthermore, also due to the fact that the abovementioned thinkers of difference inspire this study, it is instructive to elaborate on the disqualification of postmodernism as a narrow form of relativism. Thinkers of difference are also characterized as deconstructivists, meaning that they are accused of not taking a self-evident given into account but merely believe in socially constructed facts. Social constructivism and deconstructivism, as stated before from an oppositional perspective, bear witness to a cynical form of relativism, so the argument goes, to an *anything goes* mentality. In this section against this presumption I will argue that radical critique of universalism does not need to result in a disconnected and indifferent form of relativism. Nonetheless, this chapter will not only deal with the tension between universalism and a narrow form of relativism. In the second part of this chapter (2.2) I will elaborate on the tension between *comprehension* and *incomprehension* by evaluating the presupposed opposition between the two notions. The notions of communication and miscommunication will also be treated in order to sketch the *image of comprehension*, *communicability* and *thought* within politics of flight that I intend to amplify in this study. I will explore how Arendt pleads for incomprehension as an immanent trait of comprehension. This is in line with Agamben’s thoughts on knowability and communicability. This section will end with an exploration of Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of *an image of thought*. This is the stepping-stone for the construction of a new *image of thought* that is needed to explicate a politics of flight. In a way thinking is made porous in order to open up to a world and a territory of thought, life and expression. In section 2.3 I will set out the territories in which thinking on politics of flight takes shape. Returning to topics of Chapter 1 I will further explore the articulation of a body without organs through this image of thought by elaborating on the idea of assemblages of bodies and of enunciations as well as relation and difference between content and expression. All this enables me to outline in section 2.4 the idea of politics of flight as a layered milieu, answering the question as to what kind of milieu politics of flight is and which image of and on thought does occur within such milieu. The layers of this milieu will then be explored.

Let us start with an exploration of the attitude of my companions in thought toward universalism. First, so-called postmodernists attack the supposed objectivity of truth in relation to so-called evident facts. Truth presupposes an epistemological and, given the Nietzschean inspiration, a moral certainty. The confusion between facts – ontology – and truths – epistemology – matters here. *Truth is not a representation of an objective reality – a pretense to truthness* as I have analyzed in the first chapter – *but a construction of a given that is shaped by the discursive grid in which it renders meaning*. Not only language but also physical ‘objects’ are screened by this discursive grid. As Ten Bos (2015) argues, we live in a discursive intensity in-between intersubjects *and* interobjects. Both subject and object gather meaning in relating, in which the opposition in-between subject and object disappears.

For example, I have back problems. None of the above-mentioned philosophers denies the plain fact that I have a head, a neck, arms, and muscles; or the fact that I feel pain. These are facts, or as Deleuze would put it, actual facts. Nevertheless, the truth about my back problems depends on the construction of a discourse in a society that has taught me to sit for long hours behind my computer and yoke my muscles until they ache. The fact of my back problems is in this sense constructed within a specific practice and discourse in which object and subject are interwoven. No one denies that objects, things and people do actually exist. However, these matters of facts exist in a world where all that exists is related to one another and everything becomes meaningful within a specific context. This meaning is established in differing, as I have shown through the analysis of Derrida's concept *différance* (in section 1.2.4).

Critics of postmodernism, like Jürgen Habermas (1985), time and again refer to the French thinkers of difference as 'neoststructuralists'. This emphasis on *différance* also results from a structuralist inspiration. In structuralism, the primary constituent of meaning is difference. Moreover, meaning is not constituted by a transcendent principle; as language is analyzed from an immanent point of view (De Saussure), so are cultures (Lévi-Strauss), texts (Barthes, Kristeva) and philosophical and political discourses (Foucault). Yet, different from postmodern thinking, these thinkers pose that the foundation of meaning is not relativistic in the narrow sense of indifference and non-connectivity, but *relational*. We always gather meaning within a fundamentally relational reality. In making statements and in judging we construct truth games, as Foucault (1989, p. 70) has shown in his later works in connection to the idea of *parrhesia*. Truth games are a pragmatic 'sub-category' of discourse. Hence truth concerns different patterns of relationality. This unavoidable ontological relationality underpins narrow interpretation of epistemological relativism, which therefore should be redefined as epistemological relationalism. Admitting that people elsewhere think and act radically different than we do and that we cannot compare let alone judge their 'truths', does not imply an idea of *anything goes* or *non-relationality*. It asks from us another idea of cosmopolitanism. Appiah (2006) suggests a "conceptual change" (p. 143).

Nevertheless, the idea of the other as being radically disconnected from us, the West, determines the discourse of politics toward refugees or people with different beliefs. Inspired by my companions in thought, I would rather explore thinking as differing *in* relating, on whatever level. In short, politically it is of paramount importance to make a distinction between two approaches: *thinking in difference* and relativism in a narrow sense of the word. An indifferent relativistic attitude is as sterile as a totalitarian state of mind. So-called postmodernists as Deleuze, Guattari, Foucault, Derrida and Appiah for that matter never qualified themselves as such. They do not only criticize totalitarian tendencies of identification, but also narrow relativist claims of absolute disconnection, let alone the political indifference that results from this. They all accept the fact that, in spite of the differences there is always a claim on truth, be it provisional and contextual. This truth is a fixation within a truth game or discourse. Despite their monotheistic affinities and historical relations, in the dominant political discourse of today Judeo-Christians and Muslims are by both sides locked into two types of discourses that are permanently at odd with one another. Both fail to justify their positioning toward the other due to their belief of disconnection. Thinking in difference demands a permanent engagement with the other, because the other is not an external given that abruptly enters your world. From an immanent point of view both are related and embedded in a complex tensional field. The

other is *within* us, as Julia Kristeva (1991) stated. Thinking in difference is not indifferent and does not exclude action. It even demands action and engagement *from within* this complex setting, in which the actor is always at stake. Precisely this problematized subjectivity creates agency or *agencement* as Deleuze and Guattari argue that is embedded in a complex global process of subjectification. The Syrian and Sudanese problem is also a problem of the West. The Palestinian and Somali problem is also a problem of the West.

In criticizing universalism thinkers of difference also argue that their repositioning of the truth claim is always provisional, never definitive or conclusive. In this complex configuration of differing – of deconstructive *différance* (Derrida), genealogical hermeneutics (Foucault), transcendental empiricism (Deleuze) or rhizomatic mapping (Deleuze & Guattari) through conceptual change (Appiah) – disconnection and connection do not oppose each other, they supplement one another. Inspired by Heidegger's *Mitsein*, Jean-Luc Nancy and Laurens ten Kate (2011) propose the notion of 'cum' as a sense of *being-in-common*, which brings together, yet separates us. They suggest that "we are in charge of the *avec* or the *inter* in, for and by which we *exist* in a strict, literal and radical sense: that is, to which we are *exposed* (p. 43). The word that explicitly addresses this supplementary tension is *partage*: sharing in differing.

Thinking in difference explores this ambiguous exposition. The relational approach of Foucault, Agamben, Derrida, Deleuze & Guattari, Appiah and Nancy is in sync with Arendt's idea of plurality. How do we situate Arendt's position in this polemic between universalism and non-connective relativism, whether epistemologically or normatively? Although inspiring, Arendt's use of multiple discursive tools and styles of writing is yet often experienced as confusing. Marieke Borren (2009) justly states that the diversity in Arendt's work and her lack of justification of a methodology brings about a difficult task in defining her approach.

Arendt's method is not external to the topics she investigates, unlike more conventional research paradigms, which put the scholar in the position of an observer over and against the topic under investigation (p. 16).

As the so-called postmodernists Arendt accepts the immanency of the systems and structures she investigates. Therefore, Borren states that Arendt is a *situated thinker*. From the perspective of relationality, thinkers of difference are akin with the manner in which Borren describes Arendt as a thinker who is positioned in the *mi-lieu* of her investigation. Arendt's experiences with a specific type of politics of flight during her lifetime have determined her approach toward the totalitarian state of mind. She has dedicated her intellectual life to an exposition of a public life that is eradicated by totalitarianism.

Arendt's work has been defined through various disciplines and methodologies, a fact that Borren also acknowledges. Nevertheless, she characterizes Arendt as a hermeneutic phenomenologist and explicitly rejects Arendt to be defined as a postmodernist. Given my redefinition of postmodernism and given the fact that Borren's argument implicitly bears witness to some common prejudices towards postmodernism – i.e. its plea for narrow form of relativism – I reject Borren's explicit opposition to postmodernistic tendencies within Arendt's thought. Given the primacy of

plurality and difference, Arendt does not favor an epistemology that is disconnected from this ontological relationality. Arendt also emphasizes relationally embedded meaning. Borren acknowledges this approach in her analysis of Arendt's notion of narrativity: "Though based on knowledge of the facts, storytelling does not reveal the truth, but the meaning of what it relates" (p.37). Yet, this 'relational' approach differs from a narrow sense of relativism; by giving in to a broader understanding of relativism as a demand to implement contextuality in the manner of thinking. In the act of relating the trap of dogmatism is avoided. Neither skepticism nor nihilism is the issue here. In Kant's philosophy, which is appreciated by Arendt (1982), both reductions – dogmatism (Wolff) and skepticism (Hume) – are blamed for rendering a truth that is *mutually exclusive*, unable to think the *bonds* that are inherent to the difference between them (pp. 32-34). Judith Butler (2009) too acknowledges and appreciates this Arendtian Kantianism: "how this apparent epistemological thinking actually implicitly commits us to a social ontology." Skeptic attitude in thinking – whether on an epistemological or ethical level – is in this sense not a unitary attitude. In relation to relativism it can give rise to an anything goes non-connective mentality, or as *a critical approach* it can give in to relativism in a broader sense, i.e. implementing difference and relationality in its contextual manner of thinking. In line with Butler, we could thus say that both forms of attitude have a social ontological impact; they both have a political impact in the discourse of difference, as we will see in this chapter.

As with Nancy and Ten Kate (2011), we could state that a contextual and critical approach keeps a distance but does not detach. It permanently searches for the right balance between propinquity and critical distance. Borren (2009) shows that Arendt's ontological claim in thinking – which implies in terms of Deleuze and Guattari a political claim – is respectfulness.

Arendt rejects subjectivity as much as objectivity in favor of an intersubjective perspective. The Arendtian scholar is not a third-person disengaged observer, but neither, for that matter, is she a first-person participant or actor (p. 41).

Arendt situates difference beyond the subject-object dichotomy. In being reflective she is simultaneously subject – first-person - and object – second or third-person; in any sense, the other person that gives rise to an intersubjective relationality. She stresses the – in Aristotelian sense of the word – *virtue* of articulating a relational epistemology that still claims a truth as a connector in a given context. This approach is what Deleuze (1997) in his pragmatic thinking labels as *transcendental empiricism*: reflective thinking without the pretense of not being contextualized. Transcendental empiricism is a method of empirical research wherein "nothing can be said in advance, one cannot prejudge the outcome of research.' As with pragmatics, one must experiment" (Bell, 2006, 412; Deleuze; 1997, p. 143).

Deleuzian pragmatism distances itself from an idea of *the* reality, in order to face *a* reality with all its complexities. The impreciseness of the terms introduced in the first chapter – such as rhizome, subjectivity, action, experience and event – are not meant to create an inactive vacuum, but rather to create *active agency* – an *agencement* – that openly engages within an ungraspable state of affairs. In a dialectical sense, the *universalistic agents* (chapter 4) – due to their distanced, totalistic, excluding view - and the *non-connective agents* (chapter 5) – due to their fragmented and segmented view – fail to engage with the tension between differences and connection beyond opposition and

negation. The *relational agents* (chapter 6) – due to their supplementary type of engagement – are prepared to put themselves and their view on the line, as René ten Bos (2011) repeatedly argues. As we will see in the next sections, Arendt's and Agamben's sensitized susceptibility propagates an attitude toward thinking and knowing that surpasses both the absolute certainty of the universalist and the absolute uncertainty of the non-connective relativist. While universalists are certain of comprehending reality by their believe in the Truth and these relativists are certain of incomprehension by their believe in a disconnected diversity, relational agents problematize the opposition between comprehension and incomprehension by stressing their supplementary contextuality.

2.2 Thought as Practice

2.2.1 Incomprehension: Immanency of Supplementarity

What does thinking imply in the context of politics of flight? Arendt (1965) suggests that the sin of Eichmann and men like him was not stupidity but *thoughtlessness*. It was within this thoughtlessness that *the evil* became a *banal* figure.

That such remoteness from reality and such thoughtlessness can wreak more havoc than all the evil instincts taken together which, perhaps, are inherent in man – that was, in fact, the lesson one could learn in Jerusalem. But it was a *lesson*, neither an explanation of the phenomenon nor a theory about it (p. 288, italic TR).

No explanation, no theory, a lesson learned to track vice and virtue. If thoughtlessness is the *banality of evil*, how does thought contribute to a *lesson* that does neither explain nor theorizes – in other words does not comfort us with clear answers? And how does thinking about thought – the core business of philosophers – relate to this lesson on thoughtlessness?

Arendt's reflections – which are contextualized by experiences of resistance, banishment, flight and refuge – offer multiple tools to reflect on the experiences of refugees. Her critique explores the mind-set that we need to reflect upon through and within the state of affairs of refugees today. Her analysis of the reality of human rights in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* and her reflections on the concept of evil in *Eichmann in Jerusalem, A Report on the Banality of Evil* provide us with juridico-political tools to visualize both the radicality *and* the banality of evil. While thoughtlessness, as we could see in Eichmann's trial in which he pleads for his innocence by his obligation to obey authority, shows itself in a disengaged attitude; Arendt pleads for an intersubjective attitude that demands an engagement with those whose fates are decided by our actions.

In her analysis of the Eichmann trial Arendt shows that this intersubjective perspective aims at a lesson that does not explain; a lesson that is experienced but needs no theoretical justification because in its evilness it triggers an evident experience of how ruthless defining an order as a truth and obeying it can be. In order to understand such a claim, one must read Arendt's notes on comprehension within the extreme political setting of the Second World War. What does an

understanding of politics mean in this context? *The Origins of Totalitarianism* is Arendt's (1968) extensive effort to comprehend the relation between the three political concepts: antisemitism, imperialism and totalitarianism. Arendt starts with problematizing the definition of the three terms:

Antisemitism (not merely the hatred of Jews), imperialism (not merely conquest), totalitarianism (not merely dictatorship) – one after the other, one more brutally than the other, have demonstrated that human dignity needs a new guarantee which can be found only in a new political principle, in a new law on earth, whose validity this time must *comprehend* the whole of humanity while its power must remain strictly limited, rooted in and controlled by newly defined territorial entities (p. ix, *italic TR*).

In order to resist the impasse between totalitarian universalism and indifferent disengagement, she pleads for a comprehension that in a supplementary manner extends itself to the whole of humanity *and* yet limits its power to a territory. What does this overall extension with limited power mean and can this approach be compared with Deleuze's transcendental empiricism?

The birth of new politics must implement a complexity of involvement with the whole of humanity while remaining limited in order to avoid becoming totalitarian. The lesson is comprehension, yet not of an ideology of truthness. As a need instead of an explanation, it does not oppose incomprehension. In terms of Deleuze and Guattari: in order to engage with the rhizomatic field of thought within politics of flight, political action – which in Arendt's analyses is always an *inter-action* – must not solely involve clarity of policies (as we will see in 3.4) but also an engagement with its a-signifying trait: the uneasiness of not grasping the whole, a line of flight. Incomprehension in Arendt's analyses is a process of thought that never finalizes itself in a dogmatic comprehended fait accompli. She pleads for a *comprehension in incomprehensible times* in order to initiate further action in resisting a brute actuality. This comprehension is relational, i.e. a literally 'inter-ested' action instead of distanced thoughtful analysis.

Comprehension does not mean denying the outrageous, deducing the unprecedented from precedents, or explaining phenomena by such analogies and generalities that the impact of reality and the shock of experience are no longer felt. It means, rather, examining and bearing consciously the burden which our century has placed on us – neither denying its existence nor submitting meekly to its weight. Comprehension, in short, means the unpremeditated, attentive facing up to, and resisting of, reality – whatever it may be (p. viii).¹

Comprehension is an affective practice in which the participants are sensitized by incomprehension of the horror. The photo of the washed-up corpse of the three-year-old Alan Kurdi in the arms of a

¹ In her article 'Understanding and Politics (The Difficulties of Understanding)' Arendt (1994) makes similar remarks: "Many people say that one cannot fight totalitarianism without understanding it. Fortunately, this is not true; if it were, our case would be hopeless" (p. 307).

rescuer on the beach of Bodrum taken by press-photographer Nilüfer Demir in September 2015 is an example of such sensitization.² Such an image affects us and is affected by our affective reactions. Through this sensitization comprehension as a revolting eventive process demands a transformation of the actual. In the case of the boy's death this meant an enormous disgust with policies toward refugees within European media and public discussions. The public seemed perplexed and speechless on how a European civilization could let such a thing to happen. As Ten Bos (2011) argues, the image of this child creates a *sense catastrophe* (p. 47). The image of the boy creates a catastrophe in defining oneself, or one's society. As Ahmed (2014) shows the disgust felt here is not for the sake of the other, not for the sake of Alan, but for the sake of losing one's idea of national identity as a tolerant and open society that respect human rights. Thus, we tend to forget, forget the dead flesh (Pisters, 2003), that reminds us that the idea of a we as tolerant people is as dead as the child.

It is such forgetfulness or the will to pass by this tragedy by returning to old manners of thinking that Arendt refuses to understand. Along with Arendt, we state: *I prefer not to comprehend* – in a conventional sense – in order to comprehend the urgency that change is needed. Being speechless, one is urged to speak and this very speaking is an act. Incomprehension within comprehending – supplementary not oppositional – does not release us from the responsibility to *judge*. Judgment is unavoidable and as such a historical necessity. Nevertheless, judgment in its decisiveness must always realize its own paradoxical temporality: neither a reflection on the *true* meaning of the (f)actual, nor simply a communication of the evident. Our comprehension of Alan Kurdi unfortunately limits itself to the latter. Yet, “understanding precedes and succeeds knowledge” (Arendt, 1994, p. 311). Comprehension is a process that cannot be fully reduced to *vita contemplativa* (Arendt, 1958, p. 17). We have to understand the injustice. Arendt rather pleads for a comprehension that leads to action. Comprehension is part of life – a living process – as *vita activa*. Yet politics is not an actualization of understanding. Despite the miscomprehension or rather incomprehension of the horror, the relational agent understands the need, or even better the urgency of resisting. The relational agent does not force a discourse onto the other, but respects the difference by acknowledging the responsibility to act as a virtue, not a law. Going beyond Truth, as a living process political thought needs to create permanent lines of flight. It demands to sense Alan Kurdi-es every day everywhere. Or in Kantian terms: transforming the exemplary – the singular situated – via a reflective judgment into a regulative aesthetic idea that guides our thoughts and acts. It is within this “aesthetic experience,” as de Mul (2004) argues, that “opens up an original experience of the world that breaks through the ontological primacy of theoretical reason” (p. 92).

Why this reference to Kant? Arendt's (1982) reflection on judgment is based on the works of Immanuel Kant. Her analysis on political judgment does not refer to Kant's ethical notion of judgment – *Critique of Practical Reason* – but to his aesthetical notion of judgment – *Critique of Judgment*. Within this work, ideas such as *sociability* and *communicability* become the *sine qua non* of judgment. Arendt states that – while Kant's first and second *Critique* refer to any intelligent species – the *Critique of Judgment* is oriented specifically toward men and their relationships. “He spelled out

² See also on this issue Rahimy & Molendijk, 2016.

man's basic 'sociability' and enumerated as element of it communicability" (p. 19). Sociability indicates that men create a community through communicability. It is here that she refers to the ancient understanding of *sensus communis*. *Sensus communis* does not indicate an opinion that is shared by majority, which was implemented in Kant's thinking, but as Arendt understands it, it refers to an unavoidable inter-speaking relationship that creates a world through communities.

Within this connection that *imagination* – "the ability to make present what is absent" (Arendt, 1982, p. 65) – re-presentation comes to the fore. In Arendt's reading of Kant re-presentation is more than just a copy or tracing of the original. Re-presentation is *the appearance of something that is not present*. It maps out potential roads or in Deleuze and Guattari's terms: *lines of flight*. In the imagination within the *sensus communis* something emerges that neither belongs to the reality of the objects, nor to the isolated interiority of the subject. Imagination is not bound to the realm of the actual. Yet, "by placing the particular in the context of the whole and thereby giving it meaning, imagination makes it possible to *understand* the world" (De Mul, 2004, p. 82). What is re-presented is the *virtual* Gordian knot of stories as the outcome or expression of inter-subjective relations. Re-presentation is thus not less real than the presence of an object, but its reality has a different quality. Arendt (1958) even argues that this inter-subjective world is as real, or even more real, than the world of objects. When men become men distancing themselves from oppositional setting of objects and subjects as well as isolated subjective interests, the world becomes the realm in which men become fully engaged due to a *disinterested* attitude. Disinterestedness within Arendtian thinking does not mean indifferent, but indicates that one connects oneself to what is present. One widens her mind in *Selbstdenken*. According to Dirk De Schutter (2007) this *disinterestedness* must not be confused with neutrality manifesting a righteous personality or self. It is rather literary selflessness, the act of selflessness in connection (p. 31). The selfless disinterested individual always stays connected to others, i.e. interested. *Selbstdenken* then relates to Deleuze's transcendental empiricism that connects the uplifting movement of reflection to that of a contextualized practice, as we will see later.

Arendt (1978^b) speaks of a plurality that is present as *inter hominess esse* (p. 74). As incomprehension supplements comprehension, disinterested has a supplementary appearance as inter-esse. The realm of inter-esse is a dynamic and unpredictable world that is in need of another form of judgment, another form of thought, another comprehension than what has been argued in Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason*. Agents are sensitized by an ambiguous tension between uninterestedness as non-connectivity and a kind of reflective disinterestedness. Precisely the latter is of relevance for politics of flight. Which choice do we make? Will we approach the other within this politics with an idea that *their* interest is at odd with *our* interest and hence strengthen uninterestedness; or do we – in Jodi Dean's (2012) sense of 'we' – implement a connective inter-esse through a reflective disinterested attitude, meaning the ability to look beyond our momentary interest? How do we then *judge* such inter-est?

In accordance with Kant, Arendt (1982) distinguishes between the *determinant judgment*, the judgment that categorizes and fixes particularities according to generalities of understanding, and *reflective judgment*, in which particularities do not represent a general law but "perceives' some 'universal' in the particular" (p. 83). In line with Veronica Vasterling (2003), I rather qualify these exemplary particularities as *singularities*. In between these singularities difference and relationality take place. This form of judgment is thus not *deductive* like a determinant judgment, but rather

seductive: it communicates in order to convince. Yet, *seduction* is not enough. Hitler also seduced the masses. What remains essential to reflective judgment, according to Arendt (1982), is plurality. Judgment can only be established in communication with those who think in difference. This plurality – or in Deleuze’s thought: pragmatic attitude towards difference – that is often exposed, is still as an affect neglected in politics of flight.

The image of Alan Kurdi touches us due to its disturbing aesthetic qualities. It is within this susceptible sensibility that political judgment – but also moral judgment – must never become general, not even relatively general. According to Vasterling (2003), Arendt precisely on this point distances herself from the Kantian categorical imperative. It is the singularity of the aesthetic judgment that seduces and convinces. So, Arendt (1978^b) is pleading for a reflective judgment that is in permanent disapproval of its own eternal pretention, yet inviting its practitioners to take a pragmatic, contextualized stand. Again, here relativism in a narrow sense is transformed into relationism, avoiding the trap of indifference. This even counts for self-reflection. ‘Private’ thinking appears as a “soundless dialogue of the I with itself”, as an “actualization of the original duality or the split between me and myself which is inherent in all consciousness” (pp. 74-75). Therefore Butler (2009) states that in Arendt’s thought *plurality* remains in both public and private sphere *a plural voice* and a *differentiated voice* of a relational agent that cannot be neglected in both moral and political judgment.

You are never alone within your silence. There is a solidarity of the silence (Ten Bos, 2011, p. 65. Translation TR).

For action to stay creative – natality – this judgment permanently remains in the pain of labor, giving birth to new forms of expression. Judgment indicates uneasy repetition, the repetition of difference as such, not of difference as a copy if the same. “To be confronted by reality does not automatically produce an understanding of reality or make one feel at home in it” (Arendt, 1978^a, p. 167). The core of this judgment is the ability to communicate, i.e. communicability: permanent dialogue and disagreement in order to act. Even the moral and political subject must differ in itself to maintain its thinking capacity. As an agent, it is in permanent dialogue with itself and others. Eichmann lacked the ability for such a dialogue and according to Vasterling (2003) he was incapable of being a public political subject – with its political judgment – as well as a moral private subject – with its moral judgment. Vasterling states that it is not surprising that Arendt not only spoke of thoughtlessness in Eichmann’s case, but also of *lack of imagination*. It is this ‘transcendental’ – in both Arendtian and Deleuzean sense – imagination that we need in a politics of flight in order to engage through different types of approach, enhancing reflective disinterestedness. While political judgment has to take into consideration the perspective of others, moral judgment requires independency from these judgments and perspectives. As a process of constructing instead of finding truth – beyond the pejorative narrow relativism – thinking remains effective in both moral and political forms of judgment.

Comprehension is always already embedded in an affective context. Knowledge has a body, a body of knowledge. Comprehension is tensional. Jean-François Lyotard, a keen reader of Kant’s third Critique, speaks of *sensibility*: a reflective judgment that does not totalize causes pain. This pain is in

need of a specific expression. According to Lyotard *art* makes this pain sensible and communicable (Molendijk, 2003, pp. 81-112). Can we relate the above-mentioned imagination to Lyotard's notion of sensibility that is cultivated by a reflective judgment and see art practices as a sensibilizing convincing practices, as Lyotard proposes? *Turbulent*, a work of the artist Shirin Neshat (1998, 2005, pp. 96-105), is in this sense *exemplary*. Two screens face one another. First a man sings, beautifully and eloquently about his unfortunate heart. In the background, we see a crowded house with an audience in admiration of his voice. When he stops singing, on the second screen a woman with an ambiguous face starts to sing. Yet she has not one voice, but multiple voices that cover any individuality in her voice. There is no audience, no one to hear, except the man on the first screen who is perplexed by the expressiveness of her non-language. The woman does not speak, but screams multi-vocally. The voice does not break your heart; it rather breaks your comprehension. As we will see, it is exactly this multivocality that is lost in totalitarianism (chapter 4), segmented in multiculturalism (chapter 5) and re-valued in coming community (chapter 6).

2.2.2 Communicability: A Thing Called Thought

Arendt appreciates both the vulnerability of thinking and its potentiality to resist. Yet what within this incomprehensive comprehension is still a point of reference? "What is *the thing of thinking*", Agamben (1999^a, p. 29) asks. For him thought has no specific territory, like in theory versus praxis. Thought is always practical, in the sense that it performs itself in its eventuality. It is this idea of thinking that I intend to develop in connection to politics of flight. Thinking is a process, an (*Ent*)wicklungsfähigkeit, an ability to develop, or, as Deleuze and Guattari would put it: a process of (un)folding. It is the creative folding and unfolding of lines of thought on plateaus. This (un)folding act of thought is performed by what Agamben, in line with Arendt and hence Kant, calls *communicability*: the potential to communicate. Communicability is not merely language, but rather the experience of language as such: the ability to communicate. Thinking is the experience of *linguality* in which the very thing of thought is this linguality, the sayable in which the unsayable is immanent, which is in line with Agamben's idea of (im)potentiality (as we have seen in 1.4.1). Yet, language, Agamben states, is not restricted to men. Every creature has a voice, a language. Nonetheless, he argues that men are the only creatures who are not born into a language. Men have to *infiltrate* language; they are in an unavoidable process of adopting and adapting, i.e. of learning.

The thing itself is not a thing; it is the very sayability, the very openness at issue in language, which, in language, we always presuppose and forget (p. 35).

Agamben projects this potentiality within an act of knowing as a skill (ability): "that *by which* the object is known, *its own knowability and truth*." Knowability thus does not refer to an external origin or external element: language is "the very medium of its knowability." This is the very thing that comprehension cannot grasp, precisely because it unfolds within this comprehension. So there seems to be an aporetic tension within language: "*sayability itself remains unsaid in what is said ... that knowability itself is lost in what is known and in that about which something is known*." Still, in a sense this aporia only bothers us, silences us at the moment that language is used to define and express something that does not belong to it. The aporia is not unproductive; rather the endurance of

the unsayable within the sayable renders the possibility of “the coming to speech of speech” (pp. 32-34).

This unsayable was sensible on February 2016 in the eastern state of Saxony, Germany, when a mob of anti-refugee protesters attacked a bus full of refugees with the slogan “We are the *people*, go home!” (Oltermann, 2016^a). And exactly in this slogan a deep-rooted European image of thought on life was sensed. The other lacks being a people, and although the refugees did perhaps not understand the words as such, the affect was felt. Their panicking faces visualize the rejection of their humanity by not belonging to a people or a community. Go home, in this sense does not indicate going back to a community, but the wish to separate the non-people from the people. This dehumanization in a political sense is extensively analyzed by Agamben (1999^b) in his reflections on the concentration camp and the so-called ‘*Muselmann*’ to which I will return in the fifth chapter. Typifying refugees as *vermin* days later (Oltermann, 2016^b) shows how the idea of non-people is derived from the idea of refugee being a non-human. Yet, as we will see in chapter four, it is *a* definition of a people that creates a non-people and vice versa. This opposition creates the reality in Saxony in which some lives have the benefit of being a people and some lives have not. What remains unsaid is life itself as connective vector, as an impotentiality within fierce potentiality of speech. Is it possible to boldly imagine an idea of a people and expression that surpasses the binary setting of us the expressive people versus them the non-expressive non-people?

The productivity of experiencing such subversive immanency – the impotentiality within potentiality and the unsayable within the sayable – is also present in Agamben’s analysis of thinking. Within this configuration thought is an event. The experiential quality of thinking is the experience of an event. The act of philosophy is the event of thought, in which the practice of thinking – *thinking as such* – becomes an experimental experience with affective relations rather than a distant reflection on foundations. The subject or discipline does not control and manage this act; the subject is simultaneously formed, deformed and reformed in this experiment as a performance, i.e. the expression of forming. The thoughtful subject unfolding its pure potentiality becomes porous. This experience of thought as an experience of multiple entrances in thought and language is at stake in politics of flight. It is its territory, its *mi-lieu*. For this reason, it is argued in the first chapter that approaching this politics starts from the middle and not from outside: in the mob and the bus in Saxony or in the imagination and communication of a different reality. In the latter flight means focusing on crack in the foundation of the subject, on an immanent rupture, which, as a form of comprehension without understanding, demands an experimental attitude towards the paradigmatic embedding of thinking. Politics of flight takes this rupture as a point of reference in order to imagine a new focus that creates new consistency. The affirmative aspect of *imagining* this politics does not imply closing this rupture but rather connecting life to its form, or as Agamben (2000) puts it: to a *form-of-life*. A life, as we will see in the final chapter, in which the way of life is not detached from its vital forces. Arendt’s title *The Life of the Mind*, does sensitize this ‘empowerment’ in a different way. The *vital* (im)potentiality of thought – natality of *vita activa* or performance of form-of-life – is what Agamben appreciates as the philosophical act: a self-affectation that Lyotard calls a *tautagoric* quality of thinking, in which difference, differing, and what Lyotard calls the ‘différend’ or dissensus, insists:

“thinking informs itself on its own state. This is not a discursive, but a sensual informing on and about the *différend* in-between capabilities.” (Molendijk, 2003, p. 93, Translation TR).

To think does not mean merely to be affected by this or that thing ... but rather at once to be affected by one’s own receptiveness and experience in each and every thing that is thought a pure power of thinking (Agamben, 2000, p. 9).

The way which we approach politics of flight determines the manner in which we are receptive and experience the ambiguities in such politics. This is why in the previous chapter I pleaded for another understanding of a subject of flight. If subject – as a process of potentiality – is porous and transformable, then the subject of this type of politics must be thought beyond the juridical definition of such subjects. The subject of a politics of flight – being both the anti-refugee protesters as the refugees – is twofold: it is the one that talks and acts as well as the one that is under discussion. This double bind needs disclosure in order not to implode. The relational agent as a subject needs both focus and agency. In Agamben’s words this politics needs an affective thinking which is not exclusive. It is, in its rhizomatic connectiveness, all-inclusive, yet, as Arendt (1968) argued, not generalizing. In its performative self-reflectivity it affects and is affected. Thought is immediately political in this performance. When Agamben speaks of language and thought he refers to a sense of commonality. Thought is no longer defined as an instrument of non-contradictory understanding (Hegel), alienating ideology (Marx), or transparent communicative action (Habermas), nor as the outcome of an argumentative line of thought. Thought is potentiality that becomes real through an active actualization. Thought, as potentiality containing its own impotentiality, resists the boundaries of its past – the identities that are already constituted – literally opening the space of its origins for new connections to emerge. Only in this sense thought is ‘original’.

Only a thought that does not conceal its own unsaid – but constantly takes it up and elaborates it – may eventually lay claim to originality (Agamben, 2009, p. 8).

This is repetition of *difference in itself*, as an ontological given, not an epistemological construct.

2.2.3 *The Sense of Thinking*

How are we able to think? What kind of thinking can we imagine? Thinking of difference is not focused on something to hold on to, forever, always, and everywhere. Something, some thing unfolds within the porosity of thinking. This seems quite idealistic but as we have seen Deleuze (1997) does not speak of transcendentalism versus empiricism, but synergizes them in his thought as *transcendental empiricism*. Time and again this notion appears in his texts. Transcendental empiricism does neither indicate that the idea can be grasped and sensed exclusively in a material sense, nor that the idea could become something understandable in the course of transcendental apperception, as Kant claimed. An idea is something that being *explored* and *explained* problematizes. Problematization means that an idea is neither fixated in an object, nor appropriated by a subject. This unavoidability of problematization informs a politics of flight. As an *experiment*, an idea has no intention: it is an *intensity* that sensitizes both subject and object. Yet when we speak of sensitization

we also speak of the *violence* – and not the harmonious benevolence – of this intensity beyond good and evil, beyond any fixed opposition. This rupture manifests itself once we try to reach out to the limits of thinking, breaking through the chronology of memories, and *imagining* not fixated images of the other – merely another corpse on the shore – but *difference in itself*, Deleuze argues. Alan Kurdi is not like any child, yet his death ruptures our illusion of legitimacy of children's right for any child.

So how do we imagine thought? Stupidity and madness – or the perplexity of the public in case of Alan Kurdi – are not errors that enter the mind from outside, as if a pathological deficiency enters our perfectly organized thought, as a *dogmatic image of thought* suggests. The dogmatic image still holds on to the idea that objects and subjects remain the same as immovable phenomena. Thus, what is thought remains in the realm of *sameness* of the object and the subject, and finally in the harmony that is represented by this immovability. That explains Eichmann's lack of imagination. According to Paul Patton (2000) Deleuze:

argues that it is not the reassuring familiarity of the known which should provide us with the paradigm of thinking, but those hesitant gestures which accompany our encounters with the unknown (p. 19).

A politics of flight is the ex-position, ex-ploration and ex-planation of this hesitancy. The stupidity that appears in thought reflects this blind spot.

Cowardice, cruelty, baseness and stupidity are not simply corporeal capacities or traits of character or society; they are structures of thought as such (Deleuze, 1997, p. 151).

Stupidity appears when the virtual state of the problem is reduced to actual solution(s), when the potentiality of flight is marginalized by policies (as we will see in third chapter) that do not acknowledge this tension. Such oversimplification is noticeable in the reduction of the problem of exclusion of some European youth to radical ideas of movements such as Al Qaida or Islamic State. The inhabitants of cities and villages in Syria and Iraq sense the consequences of such oversimplification.

Deleuze resists this type of reduction in order to break through the dogmatic image of thought. Another image implies other acts. Imagine the way power was visualized before Foucault (1977) developed his idea of discipline, proclaiming that visualizing power is no longer in need of a pyramid that suggests repressive control from above. Visualizing power is more adequately served by the visual of a panoptic gaze that is situated within networks on the nodes of crossing lines. This study too does not limit itself to given images, but proposes multiple images for reflections upon flight. This demands a process of *learning*, and any teacher knows that there is nothing manageable or predictable in the act of learning. Learning means the acquiring of *skills* that adapts to the specificity of the medium involved. This process runs its own course and can neither be anticipated from actual knowledge, nor even by current uses of a medium.

Learning is the appropriate name for the subjective acts carried out when one is confronted with the objectivity of a problem (Idea), whereas knowledge designates only the generality of concepts or the calm possession of a rule enabling solutions (Deleuze, 1997, p. 164).

Learning is knowledge in process. Nowadays we know that learning does not stop when we leave school. Lifelong learning is mandatory. This asks for a specific skill of questioning, encircling the problem, more than merely getting to know the right answer.

Is philosophy also about learning? Philosophy is about the ability to question, even more so about the radical act of questioning the question, exposing the roots in a rhizomatic approach of its 'object'. Deleuze and Guattari's *What is philosophy?* has an instructive opening. After many years of negotiations, the *multiple* Deleuze and Guattari (1994) wonder about the ontological status of philosophy. This wondering as an initiating act is connected to their *old age*, and in some sense to the ending of a process. This end, however, is rather initiating than finalizing. Even in their so-called last cooperative work they are still 'processing' and inventing concepts. 'What is it I have been doing all my life?', they ask (p. 95). The translators Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell characterize their book as a manifesto instead of a textbook. I prefer to call it an *introduction*. This does not refer to the beginning, but to a permanent initiating tendency in the practice of philosophy: introduction as natality of approach. It refers to a beginning that will never end, even after they died. Paradoxically their thinking has become a *living category* after their deaths. They are friends of wisdom, philosophers, not as mortal men, but as living potentialities.

The *sensitization* for a politics of flight is related to this natality of *philosophical introduction*. *What is sensitized is a process of learning*. What does sensitizing more in detail mean? In line with Agamben's question "What is the thing of thought?" we can ask "what is the thing of sense?" within a politics of flight. Sensitization asks for engaging with a world on an exemplary basis, transversing its assemblages of bodies and assemblages of enunciation. The questioning act is, however, not for the sake of disorganization, but for the sake of creating new entrances in thought. The political image of Alan Kurdi, his lifeless body, is not merely an exemplary visual image in a media discourse, but also an *affect* that cuts deep in our flesh. This is the reason why I prefer to use the term sensitization instead of visualization. Sensitization refers to a complex expression that reaches beyond the clarity of an image or an evident, comforting feeling. Sensitization hits the body with its senses, decentering the subject; as well as the implemented hierarchy, in-between emotions as Ahmed (2014) argues. It is time to think beyond psychological, biological and cultural identifications of emotions and in line with Ahmed think of the complexity of the *politics of emotions*. The questions "What is the thing of thought?" and "What is the thing of sense?" problematize the clarity of *an* assignable thing in both thinking and sensing. Avant-garde art practices question both body and mind systematically and permanently. This is one of the reasons why a politics of flight has at least a philosophical as well as an artistic component (see: 3.2). Sensitization in thought within politics of flight shows how intertwining life and thought are. It shows how content and expression amalgamate.

2.3 Intertwining Content and Expression

2.3.1 Double Capture of Assemblages

What does all this entail on a philosophical plane, once we situate this practice within an Agambian, Deleuzo-Guattarian milieu? Do refugees voice their state of being and their state of mind? Language is the first thing that comes to mind. Yet, language is precisely one of the most problematic issues within the debates on whether they should integrate or assimilate. On a practical level the tension between the mother tongue and the foreign tongue can lead to misunderstandings. Yet, on a deeper level sheer communicability is at stake in every interaction. What kind of other expressive means can migrants rely on to adequately express their pain and joy, their fears and hopes? What is the relation between content – the assemblages of bodies – and expression – the assemblages of enunciations – within a politics of flight? How can we revalue the stuttering and silence, other than as a lack of language proficiency? I will firstly use the tools that Deleuze and Guattari (1987) developed in order to more adequately approach this problematical state of mind and being in terms of content and expression and then apply an Agambian reflection on the constitutive role of silence.

Where do we find politics of flight? Whom do we meet? Is it there, over there, in the refugee camps in Kenya, Sudan, Pakistan, Jordan, Turkey, Greece? Does it happen on the borders of Europe, on the walls that must be passed in Morocco or Eastern Europe? Is it sensed in the cold of the winter, in the snow-banned refugee camps, or is it somewhere in my warm living room? Is the expression of politics of flight in the body of the Eritrean refugees who are tortured, enslaved and prisoned on the borders of Sudan, Egypt and Israel; or is it placed within the rhetoric of politicians?

The milieu of a politics of flight is a complex rhizomatic network of assemblages of bodies and assemblages of enunciation. How do these two types of assemblages relate to one another? If we scrutinize the events in Saxony, we must not only analyze the connection between two types of expression but also two assemblages of bodies. The relation between these assemblages refers to one of the most complex problems within Deleuze and Guattari's thought: the difference and connection between content and expression. The intricate relation between content and expression and their distinct nature play key roles in the mapping of the notion of flight and its political implications.

		<i>Content</i>	<i>Expression</i>
Substance	<i>Form</i>	Reterritorialization	Reterritorialization
	<i>Matter</i>	Deterritorialization	Deterritorialization
		<u>Assemblages of bodies</u>	<u>Assemblages of enunciations</u>

How does a life express itself? And what does it mean that a life is never fully captured by its expression? In *A Thousand Plateaus* Deleuze and Guattari (1987) explore these questions.³ They refer

³ Here I foremost explore Deleuze and Guattari's (1987) elaborations in the third, fourth and fifth plateau of *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 39-148.

to Arthur Conan Doyle's character Professor Challenger,⁴ who defines *the earth* as a body without organs with "free intensities or nomadic singularities" (p. 40). The concept of the nomadic body is critical and overlaps with the political body of the refugee and the migrant. Nonetheless what do they try to say when they characterize the earth in terms of intensities and singularities? Everything flows without being fixated. There are no goals, no targets, no intentions. Intensity is solely force and force is in the first instance unformed and without substance. It is sheer matter that needs to be 'in-formed'.⁵ Substance is not the same as matter. The earth is initially *unformed matter*. As a body without organs it is matter, but not substance. Substance already inheres form. The 'In-forme' occurs simultaneous with the capturing act of the formation of matter that always produces a rest that resists total formation, yet this surplus motorizes further formation. Formation of unformed matter is what Deleuze and Guattari call *stratification*. The earth as the total of life forces is, as Deleuze and Guattari call it, a *plane of consistency*. As such it is the arena that on the one hand gives rise to unformed intensities that destratify and on the other hand simultaneously triggers the processes of coding and territorialization. Yet, as we have seen in the analysis of the case of Mohamed Bouazizi in section 1.2.5, these processes of deterritorialization and territorialization are always simultaneous. In line with Nietzsche's understanding, Deleuze and Guattari state that force is always multiple: pull, push, pressure. Force is immanently multiple, given these inherent tensions. They call this dynamics *machinic* as opposed to mechanical. The latter already presuppose an organic logic and structural form. Mechanical thus rests, in words of Schinkel (2008), upon on an idea of an atomistic whole in which every part functions in accordance to the consistency of this atomistic whole, or super-organism (p. 73). Machinic on the other hand is pure force, unformed but nevertheless directional and effective in creating stratification. Initially the earth itself in the first instance does not make a distinction between the two types of assemblages: content and expression.

The plane of consistency knows nothing of differences in level, orders of magnitude, or distances. It knows nothing of the difference between the artificial and the natural. It knows nothing of the distinction between contents and expressions ... these things exist only by means of and in relation to the strata (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, pp. 69-70).

An assemblage is the result of this relating. It cuts into the unformed matter, packing and wrapping, i.e. folding forces into strata, becoming literally com-compact.

The materials furnished by the substratum constitute an *exterior milieu* for the elements and compounds of the stratum under consideration, but they are not exterior to the stratum. The elements and compounds constitute an interior of the

⁴ While Sherlock Holmes is the wise and analytic character of Arthur Conan Doyle's novels, Professor Challenger is the passionate and violent character within his work. See the novels: *The Lost World*, *The Poison Belt*, and *The Land of Mist*.

⁵ In reference to Bataille's 'informe', Oosterling (2000^b) shows how in information society the forming and in-forming of individuals as informational subjects – *homo informans* – is enveloped in a supplementary field of forces. The process of information also produces the 'informe' as chaos. They are equiprimordial (pp. 44-45).

stratum, just as the materials constitute an exterior *of* the stratum; both belong to the stratum, the latter because they are materials that have been furnished to the stratum and selected for it, the former because they are formed from the materials. Once again, this exterior and interior are relative; they exist only through their exchanges and therefore only by virtue of the stratum responsible for the relation between them (p. 49).

Implicitly Deleuze and Guattari develop a geophilosophy of an earth that from the start is in permanent state of creation and destruction. Imagine a planet, a lonely planet full of seismic activity and flowing with lava, orbiting around a star; the infant earth that was bombarded by meteorites bringing little water cells. Imagine then another planet crashing into this ball of fire, billions of years ago. The collision deterritorialized its nature and the dust of this collision gave birth to its own little satellite, *the moon*. The companion that remained with earth is in the end also the thing that gave earth the ability to create life. As a parastrata it forced the earth to move slower and slower, to become seasonal and to cool down. The earth that moved around its own axis in 5 hours, now completes its circle in 24 hours, and is getting slower and slower due to the gravity of the moon. It was also the moon that by its effect on the oceans, causing the ebb and flow of tides, brought movement to the earth. This movement as *epistrata* gave birth to organisms, with multiple *contents* and *expressions*. These were our ancestors, the bacteria that still occupy and penetrate our bodies. The moon is also the thing that kept life from perishing. By capturing the meteorites beforehand, the forces that shaped the uneven surface of the moon, are those forces that could not reach the mother earth. But the moon has yet to finish its signature on us. The child of collision is still moving further and further from us, almost four centimeters a year, and after a billion years its distancing departure would make earth an inhabitable planet. That which *gave* birth to life, *sustained* life, would eventually also *take* life (BBC, 2012).

The earth remains immanent to all different strata. There are connective interstrata and *metastrata* (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 40). Meta – inter alia meaning *beyond* – indicates that the unformed earth – life – as a field of forces is present within as well as *beyond* the stratum. As such the earth challenges the coding act of the layers from within. Life overflows every codification. Inside out, outside in. Resistance is always intensified from within, immanently. The multiplicity of earth and machinic intensities are never exhausted in assemblages. Assemblages are multiple and differentiated as well, open to all sides due to earth's rhizomatic dynamics. I thus ask the reader to imagine something that is already there, the earth itself with all its dimension of reality. Yet, we have to *imagine* the implication of such an ontology within our epistemological and ethical structure of thinking, in order to understand that politics of flight confront us with much more than bureaucratic rules and juridical rights.

Deleuze and Guattari acknowledge that the dynamics of earth always has a double articulation: 1) molecular and nomadic 2) molar and sedentary. Systematically the 'first' machinic act is where chaotic matter, molecular singularities, is *formed* as *substance* within the two machinic layers. Matter becomes formed matter: substance. The second articulation reacts to the unformed forcing of the machinic by formalizing it, by reducing function to form and reducing matter to substances (formed

matter). Deleuze and Guattari call these conjunctions *molar* entities. *Form* thus “indicates the way in which different intensities are related in an idea as they are expressed in actual individuals – the chaos of the virtual becomes determined in this way” (Williams, 2003, p. 21). In this sense, the molecular and nomadic have an affinity with virtual differentiation; while the molar and sedentary have more affinity with the actual differentiation (see: 1.4.2). In case of the events in Saxony, differentiated bodies are sectioned as severe differentiated identifiable phenomena: the people and the non-people. By broadening the subject of politics of flight a breaking point is introduced in this differentiating politics of Us versus Them.

Molecular and molar articulations refer to form and to matter; they both have a twofold setting. Nevertheless, the structure that contains this twofold setting is not the final articulation. The differentiation/differenciation is never absolute or simply oppositional. The non-people is always immanent within the people. And this is where, in Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) exploration, Professor Challenger meets the Danish linguist Louis Hjelmslev. Despite the fact that Hjelmslev is speaking of linguistic processes criticizing De Saussure’s too simple a distinction between matter and form, Deleuze and Guattari give him more credit by increasing their understanding of his work. They rather see him as a Spinozist geologist (Pisters, 2003, p. 9). In the assemblage of the professor and the linguist, the first articulation, in which the unformed matter of the body without organs becomes formed matter (substance), is called *content* and involves the assemblage of bodies. The second articulation, in which affects are formalized and bring about their own substance, is called *expression* and involves the assemblage of enunciations. Content and expression both contain their own specific substance, their own specific relation of matter and form (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). In the case of Foucault’s (1977) disciplinary panopticon: this connects the docile bodies that are incarcerated with the discursive practices of the prison, justice, and human sciences. In case of Saxony: both the revolting and attacked bodies are encapsulated in a geopolitical discourse, in which human right and national policies no longer match.

Things are, however, never easy with Deleuze and Guattari (1987). There are different forms of multiplicities. There is something called an *intermediate state (epistrata)* through which content and expression are distinct and related at the same time, as well as a differentiation immanent to the two types of assemblages. And they “apply the term ‘parastrata’ ... in which the central belt fragments into sides and ‘besides,’ and the irreducible forms and milieus associated with them.” Yet, a “stratum exists only in its epistrata and parastrata, so that in the final analysis these must be considered strata in their own right” (p. 52). Returning to our example, neither the assemblages of bodies of anti-refugee protesters can be reduced to their expression ‘we are the people’; nor the bodies of the refugees can be reduced to their outcry of fear of rejection and their appeal to human rights. Yet, the two types of assemblages – bodies and enunciation – do affect one another. The rejection within the slogan “We are the people!” does not only silence the refugees’ expression, but the judgment “Go home!” refers to and rejects their bodily presence. The pain within the bodies of Eritrean refugees is the embodiment of a world-politics that in its expressions permanently neglects the existence of these refugees.

Everything is in its own right per definition relational. Their pain is immanently connected to our comfort. In line with their relational geophilosophy, Deleuze & Guattari, (1987) argue, that each

assemblage – whether it happens in the setting of content (bodies) or in the setting of expression (enunciations) – multiplies itself in two different types of articulation (pp. 40-45).

Content and expression are two variables of a function of stratification. They ... intermingle, and within the same stratum multiply and divide ad infinitum. Since every articulation is double, there is not an articulation of content *and* an articulation of expression – the articulation of content is double in its own right and constitutes a relative expression within content; the articulation of expression is also double and constitutes a relative content within expression. For this reason, there exist *intermediate states* between content and expression, expression and content: the levels, equilibriums, and exchanges through which a stratified system passes (p. 44).

It is not likely that one could point out these articulations in their pure appearance – in contrast to what Descartes suggests is the case with mind and matter – due to the fact that every articulation is another double bind of content and expression, into infinity. Thus, although we are witnessing the consequences of worldwide discursive policy on refugees (expression) by observing their washed-up corpses or their physical isolation in refugee camps (content), the immensity of the affects of these discursively expressed bodies is still beyond our imagination.

The double bind of content and expression is always at hand. Let me once more simplify this with an example: learning language. An infant's contact with language articulates itself not only as expression but also as content. The expression articulates itself in brainwaves and the neurophysiological development of the brain. A lack of lingual interaction will thus not only lead to a lack of lingual abilities in the further development of a child, but as such even affects the body and its development on a physiological level, which is distinct from its lingual articulation but nevertheless relative in this distinction (Tallal, 2013). Patricia Kuhl (2010) for example, argues how babies, *as world-citizens*, are capable to distinct sounds in different languages, while after six to eight months, due to physiological transformation of auditory brainwaves, they become *cultural bound listeners*. Discursive expression – whether it concerns refugees or language development of an infant into a cultural subject – is thus not only a matter of expression but also a matter of content, as Foucault (1977) shows by pointing out how docile bodies follow the disciplining discourse in prison in order to develop subjectivity (as is discussed in 1.2.1). In this doubling act – assemblage of bodies and assemblages of enunciations – it is impossible to categorize expressions as a system wherein one could easily hop from one to the other, from expression to content and vice versa. Think of the W.E. Hill's image called *my wife and my mother-in-law*,⁶ Wittgenstein's (1953, part II, §xi) use of the image that either could be seen as a duck or as a rabbit or Dali's painting *Espana*. 'One' image contains two forms and matters, but the mind is incapable of capturing both at the same time, and yet they are in a sense indistinguishable. There is no common final point of formation of the matter. Form and matter occur simultaneously as

⁶This image was published in an American humor magazine in 1915, but in 1888 in Germany there was already a postcard in circulation with the same optic idea (Wikipedia, 2014).

substance, which means they change and transform simultaneously. There is no degree or perfection, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) state: degrees merely are “in terms of differential relations and coefficients ... it is a question of speed, and speed is differential ... What qualifies a deterritorialization is not its speed (some are very slow) but its nature” (pp. 48, 56).

If content and expression are systematically distinct and nevertheless related in their distinction, what is it that holds the two together? What comes ‘beforehand’ in which the distinction is not yet there? The *abstract machine* is this ‘pre’position. The distinction between content and expression is the distinction between two aspects of stratification: one (expression) that creates regimes of signs or assemblages of enunciation; and the other (content) gives rise to the regimes of bodies or assemblages of bodies. The abstract machine on the other hand is unformed *diagrammatic* force that functionalizes matter. It is for Deleuze and Guattari (1987) not something or someone, not an entity, but a *force* in the Nietzschean sense of the word. Although the abstract machine contains both expression and content, they do nevertheless not define it exhaustively. “The abstract machine is pure Matter-Function – a diagram independent of the forms and substances, expressions and contents it will distribute” (p. 141). Matter is not captured by physiology, which already refers to the substance of content. Function must not be equalized with semiotics of expression. The abstract machine is a diagram, which, according to Deleuze and Guattari, differs from a general perception of the concept of diagram that in the end is reduced to semiotic substances and forms such as *index, icons, symbols, axioms*, transcendental ideas, or the regime of bodies as matter and form of content. For Deleuze and Guattari a diagram indicates intensity that is not reality itself or a semiotic force, but that which generates reality. It is the paradoxical unformed constructing force of “real that is yet to come.” It is “*virtual* yet real” (p. 142, 95). Through our comfort is the idea of tortured bodies a virtual reality; thus, in order to incomprehensively comprehend this reality, we need as Ten Bos (2011) suggests, radically put ourselves at risk. Risking not only physically, but more so expressively.

Let us return for a moment to our example of Saxony. It would be oversimplifying to categorize people as those who exclude (the anti-refugees) and those who are excluded (the refugees). As Noam Chomsky states in the documentary *Requiem for the American Dream* (Hutchison, Nyks & Scott, 2015) the hostility between populations and the manner in which groups in their fear of exclusion and deception exclude other groups, lies in line with the neoliberal policy that through the twentieth century has promoted individualism and consumerism by demolishing a sense of solidarity and connectedness. Demonizing one group for the sake of other neglects the virtual political reality of the day. The answer is perhaps not another type of opposition, but lies in the imagination of something that is yet not present. As Chomsky states in this documentary:

I don't think we're smart enough to design, in any details what a perfectly just and free society would be like. I think we can give some guidelines and, more significant, we can ask how we can progress in that direction.

This explains why the abstract machine is the dark side of the assemblage, just as the dark side of the moon where meteorites crash. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) speak of machinic assemblages to expose

the complex relation between the assemblage and the abstract machine. The body of the assemblage rises in the process of formation out of the unformed plane of consistency, the plane that also guarantees its permanent deterritorialization. Nevertheless, the assemblage rises as a two-headed creature. One head is sensualized by the formed matter, i.e. substance of its content and the other by substance of its expression. This double articulation never ceases in its relation to the plane of consistency or the abstract machine.

We may draw some general conclusions on the nature of Assemblages from this. On a first, horizontal, axis, an assemblage comprises two segments, one of content, the other of expression. On the one hand it is a *machinic assemblage* of bodies, of actions and passions, an intermingling of bodies reacting to one another; on the other hand it is a *collective assemblage of enunciation*, of acts and statements, of incorporeal transformations attributed to bodies. Then on a vertical axis, the assemblage has both *territorial sides*, or reterritorialized sides, which stabilize it, and *cutting edges of deterritorialization*, which carry it away (p. 88).

These analyses clarify that content and expression are defined and function differently than the classical dichotomies such as body and mind, matter and language, object and subject. Content is not an object or matter, but as an outcome of the abstract machine it pre-figures dichotomous notions. The form of content as “technical social machine” initiates a formation of power as a regime of bodies. The rallying of refugees in refugee camps at the moment is an example of such regime of bodies. The same trait also applies for expression. It is not grammar or language as such, but the whole “semiotic collective machine that pre-exists them and constitutes regimes of signs” (p. 63). The slogan ‘we are the people, go home’ is not accidental, but an outcome ratified by a regime of signs and regimes of emotions within a differentiating politics of Us versus Them (Ahmed, 2014) that according to Chomsky moves a population to look at a so-called hostile migrant or people of color instead of the policy itself.

Nonetheless, as is argued in the previous chapter and the chapters to come, in this study politics of flight is not merely typified by one form of regime of signs, but by multiple and often conflicting regimes of signs. There are even expressions in this politics that are not yet enclosed within a specific regime. This is the reason that this rhizomatic politics was characterized as an *a-signifying rupture* (in 1.2.4). In order to understand not only the context of this *a-signifying rupture*, it is vital to dwell upon Ferdinand de Saussure’s linguistic structuralism. De Saussure’s understanding of language initiates *thinking in difference*, which has been articulated by Derrida, Foucault, Agamben, Deleuze and Guattari. De Saussure’s analysis criticizes two traditions. First, he rejects *atomism* in language (Russell), where words as isolated entities contain meaning; second, he discards historicism in language (Hegel), where words gain their meaning by referring to their historical context and use. There is, according to De Saussure, *no* origin to which language refers. Language is an autonomous system, and independent of a world outside itself. Furthermore, he states that language is not about words but about *signs*. Signs, which are embedded in social and political structures, can be words, but also images, and gestures (as we will see in 2.3.5). Signs are not atomic, but they are relational

entities. According to him *semiology* is thus a discipline that studies language as an immanent system of interrelated signs. This system does not refer to a world, does not include an intentional subject or is rooted in a historical process outside itself, but gains consistency of form within itself. Tonal matter (spoken: sound) and graphic matter (written: a stroke) are captured in a mental form (concept) as a result of which a sign is born. An internal consistency matches an external consistency wherein signs refer to other signs – the sign of people referring to other signs such as rights, citizenship, belonging and nation-state – and gain meaning through this state of relationality on a grammatical, syntactical and semantic level. De Saussure explains the sign, referring to different aspects through which this system of signs could be analyzed.⁷

1) First, *synchronic* instead of *diachronic analysis*. De Saussure's analysis of language accentuates the synchronic aspect of language. In terms of the case of Saxony: the idea of people refers to how we in the present circumstances of the European Union and its borders speak about people. De Saussure does not negate the value of diachronic analysis. In the case of Saxony, the idea of people does also refer to a historical development of the notion. Nonetheless, he emphasizes that diachronic is rather a sequence of synchronic analyses.

2) He also speaks of *streams of sounds* and *streams of thought*. Language is neither merely sound, nor merely thoughts, but the assemblages of the two. It is through this amalgamation that sounds and thoughts become signs that gain meaning. Language is thus not an indifferent transmitter of information, as we have seen in Agamben's idea of sayability, but an inscrutable process that constructs and forms combinations of sounds and thoughts.⁸

3) De Saussure distinguishes between *langue* (system) and *parole* (speech). There is not such a thing as *the Language*. Language is always a contextual interplay between a *langue* and *parole*, or as Kuhl (2010) suggests we are cultural bound listeners.

4) De Saussure then concentrates his inquiries on the structure of the *langue* as a system, and the manner in which signs refer to other signs. The fourth distinction is that between *signifiant* (*Sa*, signifier: the image or sound of sign, its sensory trait) and *signifié* (*Sé*, signified, its concept). While the difference between these two in *parole* remains unnoticed, within *langue*, De Saussure states, they could be studied separately. De Saussure discerns within the sign systematically four traits:

- a. *arbitrary*: although within a given context words we use, like 'chair' refer directly to a concept, in a strict sense there is no necessary bond between *Sé* and *Sa*. Phonetically each language has a different word for a people, but still when we think of a concept people – a collection of human bodies often gathered on or in relation to a territory – the specifics are all relational. Moreover, there is no universal bond between the word 'people' and the ideas that discursively form the collection of bodies as content.

⁷ In my reference to De Saussure I have made use of the analysis of Hénault (2010) and Oosterling (n.d).

⁸ See also: Tallal, 2013 & Kuhl, 2010.

- b. *negation*: a sign derives its meaning by differing from other signs through negation. Negation is an aspect of difference. The sign 'car' relates to the sign wheels, windows, but nevertheless negates them by being something else, namely a car. In the case of our example, the idea of *the* people is exclusive: in negating others as not belonging to the people the contours of a people are negatively drawn. It is this negative positioning that will be discussed in chapter four.
- c. *relation*: given all this, signs are primarily known through relational qualities. In relating they get meaning. This means that the idea of a non-people is immanently related to the idea of *the* people.
- d. *difference*: each sign gains meaning by phonetically, lexically and semantically differing oneself from another sign. A 'b' is not a 'p' although both are labials, the first voiced and the second unvoiced. Their specific meaning or value can only be expressed by this difference. In this very strict sense *the* people differs only from refugees because the first are formally voiced and the latter are unvoiced.

5) It is this understanding that leads De Saussure to make the final and fifth distinction between *difference* (langue) and *oppositional* (parole). De Saussure thus believes that the system of language is differential and not necessarily oppositional. Negation does not always mean oppositional setting. A car is not - negates - a bicycle, but is not opposed to it. They can even be made into an assemblage to provide multi-functionality. The concept migrant differs from the concept refugee, yet they are in no sense oppositional. *They simply relationally differ and the difference constitutes their meaning.* In context of Foucault's understanding of discourse and epistemic structures, Deleuze and Guattari's understanding of signs, but also Derrida's understanding of *différance*, De Saussure's influence is more than obvious. In criticizing metaphysics and transcendentalism these philosophers of difference provide an analysis from an immanent point of view. That is why they were initially labeled as post- or neo-structuralists. Just as Deleuze and Guattari, De Saussure resists the idea that language solely exists in order to communicate something outside a language: a real thing out there. This 'matter' first has to be (in)formed. The four previous traits create tools to problematize the notion of the Other within politics of flight. In an Agambian perspective it is the immanency of langue within parole – the unsayable within the sayable – that feeds difference.

Yet, becoming a refugee supersedes linguistic reality. In his emphasis on language as a linguist and his fear of reduction of language to an outside world, De Saussure ignores the ontological aspect fully. In other words, De Saussure's analysis does provide us with tools to understand the complexity of language but does not provide us with tools to approach the sensation of a body, the body of a refugee or the body of an individual whose skin color differs from others. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) on the other hand neither negate the tangible world, nor state that expression is without ontology. The ontology of expression and content as performance is not reductive, but relational, be it in a supplementary sense. The body of the so-called other can never be captured in a discourse yet its onto-physiological reality always permanently affects and is affected by a discourse. A statement on being *the* people eventually led anti-refugee protesters to burn the refugees' housing places in Saxony (Oltermann, 2016^b). Both expression and content have their self-regulating *form* and *matter*.

Louis Hjelmslev, also a structuralist was inspired by De Saussure, yet criticized him, precisely on this reductive relation between matter and form and the supposed explanatory power for the exclusive difference between signifier and signified. It is Hjelmslev who overrules this pairing in the sign by reflecting on the relationality between content and expression.

A form of content is not a signified, any more than a form of expression is a signifier. This is true for all the strata, including those on which language plays a role (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 66).

Deleuze and Guattari add both content and expression to their four-folded presentation – form of content, form of expression, matter of content and matter of expression – in order to show the subtle nuances of how forces converge and disseminate on different layers. Once there is no longer a transcendent meaning that overcodes all relations, more adequate discursive tools are needed to map the specific assemblages. Yet what remains decisive in all of these assemblages – *agencements* or subjectifications – is the permanent presence of deterritorializing effects of the rhizomatic earth: the openness of forms and matters to other strata in which they appear differently. Although any substance of content and substance of expression betray the unformed tendency of the body without organs, nonetheless these substances also remain vulnerable to the forces of the unformed earth. The substance of content becomes disengaged due to the force of the body without organs. Despite its semiotic urge expression gives rise to enunciations that escape the current regimes of signs. As Deleuze and Guattari (1987) state, expression is not only the voice of regimes of signs but also of a-semantic cries that escape signification (p. 7). Thus, the slogan of Saxony is not the only voice in Germany. There are those voices that resist the hegemony of Us versus Them. On 20st of March 2016 in Berlin another slogan catches the eye: “My right is your right”. It is in this slogan that another idea of a people is differentiated within the exclusive idea of *the* people: The other is explicitly included (*My Right is Your Right*, 2016). Other slogans transversalize these two: “Wir schaffen es”. Yet, behind this macropolitical discourse lurks an economic imperative of declining workforce that need to be compensated. All these assemblages of enunciations oppose, even contradict each other, while in between their strata the bodies of both the protesters and the refugees unwillingly intertwine within one and the same political discourse.

Different substances in content and expression create different assemblages. In connection to politics of flight not one, but several forms of assemblages are at work within this politics. First, they all have different form and matter in their content as well as their expression. Second, each time due to this differentiation content and expression relate differently to one another. In section 2.4 I will therefore demonstrate that the milieu of flight is always already a multiple milieu: it contains multiple assemblages that create their own form and matter within a certain milieu. However, first a closer look on the notion of expression is needed. Which ideas on enunciation constitute a politics of flight? I referred to art practices, but the most important and problematic expression is what underpins and differentiates communication: language.

2.3.2 A Foreign Tongue: Voicing the Silence

Does intermingling of bodies and expression within politics of flight indicate that there is equality within this politics? It depends how we define equality. As we will see in the last three chapters different ideas on equality creates different forms of relationality within this politics. There is an equality of existence within politics of flight. Both the screams of tortured bodies of Eritrean refugees as well as slogans of anti-refugees belong to it; yet there is an inequality in the manner of existence; in the manner in which our sense hear, taste, see or touch. There is an inequality in the manner in which our language and signs approach the other. Hegel's *Aufhebung* only resisted the contradictory paradigms that concerned the male western individual. It left women and people of color for the unknown abyss of prejudices. What are the expressions that let us surpass such ignorance?

Agamben's reflections on language problematize language as the only form or even the dominant form of expression. As we have seen in our current visual culture images perhaps have nowadays a more expressive impact. How does Agamben approach language, i.e. how do we speak of "the *thing* of language"? In *Infancy and History* (1993^a) this *thing* does not refer to an essence, but to a process, an experiment. In a politics of flight the milieu is always multilingual. When language is incapable of expressing affective intensities, hesitation, stuttering and even silence become indications for another communication. What does hesitation indicate? What does silencing of refugees mean in case of the events in Saxony? Are lack and loss inherent in language – or expression for that matter – of politics of flight or are these only seen that way as the result of a specific idea on expression? And when speech is silver and silence is golden, is silence still a lack of expression?

In Agamben's *Language and Death: The Place of Negativity* language is 'essentially' related to death. Agamben (1991) predominantly refers to Hegelian analysis and Heideggerian elaboration on the matter, as well as to the history of Christianity, linguistic thought and Western poetry.⁹ The discussions are focused on the 'place of negativity' and on the question: "What if humankind were neither *speaking* nor *mortal*, yet continued to die and to speak?" (p. xii). In line with Arendt (1958), Agamben thus problematizes the relation of death and language as essential to the human nature. They both criticize Heidegger's thought in which death and its experience in silence become the authentic experience of humanity. Agamben (1991) intends to liberate ethics from this negativity. This time his efforts are to liberate ethics "from the *informatibility* (or *sigetics*) to which Western metaphysics has condemned it" (p. xiii). What does this sigetics as *the art of silence* entail?

Agamben states that the taking-place of language in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the disclosure of *Da* of *Dasein* in Heidegger's *Being and Time* appear only as a negative. *Dasein*, is nothing in particular. Although it is ontically rooted, it operates on ontological level. It is the ontological experience of death. This death is the *impossibility of the possibility to be*, to be a being. Nevertheless, one could wonder why death is so typically human. Animals die too and plants and objects perish as well. Heidegger (1996) argues that all other beings, such as animals and plants, do not die but merely cease to exist. The thing that supposedly distinguishes men from other beings is

⁹ Agamben (1991) does not negate these thoughts, which can only lead to new forms of negativity, but rather examines them in order to let them operate differently (p. 53).

their silent presupposition of this impossibility to be and the valuation of life through this knowledge. We *know* with certainty that one day we will stop existing. The experience of dying is an experience exclusive to men, and within this experience men experience their *Dasein*. Death does neither complete *Dasein*, does not make it graspable, nor does it refer to the loss of something or someone. It instead exposes more openly the non-existence of *Dasein* while being alive. *Dasein* is being alive and death is the pure experience of what it means to be alive. Heidegger states:

Death, in the widest sense, is a phenomenon of life. Life must be understood as a kind of Being to which there belongs a Being-in-the-world. Only if this kind of Being is oriented in a privative way to *Dasein*, can we fix its character ontologically. Even *Dasein* may be considered purely as life. When the question is formulated from the viewpoint of biology and physiology, *Dasein* moves into that domain of Being which we know as the world of animals and plants (p. 290).

For Heidegger argues that there is no choice; *Dasein*'s life cannot ever escape death.

Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of *Dasein*. Thus death reveals itself as that *possibility which is one's ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped (unüberholbare)* (pp. 294).

It is then not surprising that Agamben (1991) states: "*Negativity reaches Dasein from its very Da*" (p. 5). What is the expression of this *negativity*? What is the language in which *Dasein* 'utters' the impossibility of this possibility of being, the paradox of impossible possibility? This language is sigetics, the speech of silence, the art of speaking through silence. It is the inability of language to grasp the pure sense, pure understanding of *Dasein*, or, as Hegel puts it, a sense-certainty.¹⁰ Agamben cites the young Hegel's poem that was dedicated to Hölderlin. In this poem, through praising Ceres, the Roman goddess of fertility, Hegel problematizes the act of speaking itself. The goddess that lives in a silence of wisdom or wisdom as silence, can only be experienced in the "poverty of words", *empty*, merely "in the echo of foreign tongues would it find its roots" (p. 9). Deleuze and Guattari (1986) also refer to the sobriety of words, especially when referring to the concept of minority language. Nevertheless, this sobriety refers to the possibility of speech and language rather than the impossibility of it. In the sixth chapter I will discuss how this second form of poverty is different from the Hegelian one. It is not stinginess that defines this poverty, but rather redundancy (Ten Bos, 2011, pp. 73-74)

However, for the time being, let us scrutinize this Hegelian concept: 'poverty of words' that combines three notions: silence, emptiness and foreign tongue. What does this imply for the discourse on refugees? How do refugees experience their *Da* in the threat of death or exclusion, silenced by both threatening and yelling masses? Are the refugees an exposition of *Dasein* and is their numbered

¹⁰ Hegel (1977) also states that: "this very certainty proves itself to be the most abstract and poorest truth" (p. 58).

expression a form of sensitization of a sobriety in language, due to their foreign tongue? In order to elaborate the possible answers to these questions we must examine the Agambian notion of silence a bit further.¹¹ Is the notion ‘empty silence’ a pleonasm, a redundancy? Silence, as a lack of voice, resides not outside the language as its opposition, but in the heart of it, as its supplement. Yet, is it justified to see a lack of voice as an expressive mode or do we interpret the terrified faces of refugees during attacks on them as an inability to express or as a form of inexpressibility within a foreign tongue?

Agamben (1991) suggests that language must liberate itself not only from the Heideggerian logic, but also from its grammar, that defines human voice in negation. What matters is a *voice*. But where do we localize a *voice* of men?

*The utterance and the instance of discourse are only identifiable as such through the voice that speaks them, and only by attributing a voice to them can something like a taking place of discourse be demonstrated ... he who utters, the speaker, is above all a voice. The problem of *deixis* is the problem of the voice and its relation to language (p. 32).*

Voice is embedded in an affective field – somewhere in-between body and language (Ten Bos, 2011, p. 182 – 190) – with a spectrum stretching from mere sounds to articulate and communicative meaning. Voice carries the intensity of the intention to gain meaning before this meaning is segmented or determined. The human voice differentiates itself in this manner from the animal *phoné* or mere sound. The physicality of the voice, as waves of air, seems to indicate pure being, the voice of Hegelian *Geist* in itself, not yet understanding himself. The human voice, however, in the tradition of thought on language, singles out itself from mere sound, or pure voice, due to its immediate connection to a discourse as systematic coherence of meaning. Children mimic words as sounds, and it is only in the continuing experience of their psychological development that they are conditioned to put words into a grammar, or as Kuhl (2010) suggests, become *culturally bound listeners*. Human Voice is never pure, and despite its physicality it *seems* always detached from the living phenomenon that utters it.¹² This is due to the fact that the human Voice, no matter how pure it intends to be – a

¹¹ Agamben refers to Hegel’s *Phenomenology* and his elaboration on *deixis* such as ‘this’, ‘now’ and ‘here’. The adverb ‘here’ neither refers solely to a physical reality, nor to a present time, it is multiple. ‘Here’ also refers to all uses of the adverb ‘here’. “‘Here,’ which is a Here of other Heres, or is in its own self a ‘simple togetherness of many Heres’; i.e. it is a universal” (Hegel, 1977, p. 66 & Agamben, 1991, p. 13). Adverbs such as ‘here’, ‘now’, ‘that’ and ‘this’, but also pronouns such as ‘I’ and ‘you’ never refer solely to the reality outside a language, just as the slogan ‘go home’ does not refer to a specific physical place or pronouns such as Us and Them are never captured by specific assemblages of bodies. In other words, these adverbs and pronouns never capture completely what they intend to mean. Language guards its own ineffable state and the impossibility to express. Hence Hegel concludes the immanent negativity of language, according to Agamben. The act of *refuge* functions as a *deixis*: the word or sentences never grasp this slippery event as a ‘now’ that defines the process in which the subject is entangled. Again, this is not an oppositional, but a supplementary configuration.

¹² Faraneh Vargha-Khadem suggests that the ability to speak a language is traceable in our DNA. She did this by examining the DNA of a family, whose members despite their healthy ears speak as deaf people do. She found out that a part of their chromosome 7 was partially broken (BBC, 2009).

purity in which, as Schinkel (2008) argues, *a(n)* language/expression overcodes itself as *the* language/expression (p. 404) – is always destined to oscillate between the mere sound or *phoné* and the determining discourse that bestows it with meaning. When listening to an unknown language that we cannot understand we still are aware that these sounds are meaningful. It is potentially language, i.e. communicability. Language is the negation of *phoné* or voice as mere sound. In terms of De Saussure, the father of structuralism: *phoné* is comparable with the signifier, Voice is the articulated sign.

Agamben (1991) states that the human Voice is always considered to be the death of *phoné* in order to initiate the *taking-place-of-language*. The stagnation into *a* meaning extinguishes the process of voice. So, the expression of refugees – or in Hegelian sense: the foreign tongue – does not lack a voice, or even a human voice, but it lacks a coherent meaningful positioning in a regime of signs, or in Agamben's words: in a Voice.

The voice, the animal *phoné*, is indeed presupposed by the shifters, but as that which must necessarily be removed in order for meaningful discourse to take place ... But inasmuch as the Voice (which we now capitalize to distinguish it from the voice as mere sound) enjoys the status of a *no-longer* (voice) and of a *not-yet* (meaning), it necessarily constitutes a negative dimension. It is *ground*, but in the sense that it goes *to the ground*¹³ and disappears in order for being and language to take place (p. 35).

The characteristics of *no-longer* and *not-yet*, in Agamben's reflections, do not only indicate a relation to the *being* that utters the Voice in this in-betweenness, but also to the temporality of the taking place of language. This temporality, however, must not be understood as a beginning with an end, but as the in-between moments. Thus, the expression of refugees or of anti-racism in Berlin and other cities of Europe are not absent, but appear as *intermezzi* within the dominant discourse, voices appearing within Voice.

Another aspect of this temporality is indicated by the relevance of memory, which always oscillates between the Voice and voice. In Voice memory is reduced to 'true' facts with a certain logical linearity – a history – in which memory loses its *concrete* multiplicity. As we will see in the fourth chapter, it is exactly this reduction of multiplicity to 'true' facts that is at issue in communication with refugees in a totalitarian setting. Through memory the Voice is always embedded in a discourse, whether its meaning is already there or *yet-to-be*. It is the invisible ground that defines our manner of speaking. In words of Foucault the discourse that defines us, yet remains unseen.

Human Voice is a metaphysical thought on language – its 'true' facts intend to distance themselves (meta: above, beyond) from the virtual reality of a rhizomatic multiplicity by creating an

¹³ This ground has some affinity with the concept of earth in the sense that it creates the formation, but remains deterritorializing. The voice that goes into the ground thus does not disappear but remains affective in its hidden state. There is also a reference to Hegel's 'zu Grunde gehen' as a 'Denkbestimmung' at the end of the first part – Logic of Being - of his *Logic of Science*.

immovable fundament: a ground. Furthermore, in this metaphysical ground the relevance of memory is always confined by *gramma: the written word* that it is part of, or *yet-to-be* part of. Thus Agamben (1991) states:

Metaphysics is always grammatology and this is fundamentology in the sense that the gramma (or the Voice) functions as the negative ontological foundation (p. 39).

Death and language are in this way intertwined in the experience of *Dasein*. *Dasein* can never capture its *Da*, its being and its death. Language – as gramma – carries the same burden. It never can contain the voice, due to the death of this voice in Voice of men – just as the staged images in the media can never capture the horrors that are expressed by subjects of politics of flight. Language can never capture its taking place, “discourse cannot speak its taking place” (Agamben, 1991, p. 62). We are always already within language when we try to speak about language. The *Da* of the *Dasein* and language are in the final instance speechless, silent, without words.

The tradition of Christianity and mystic thought has captured this silence as the utterance of God. Isolation, sobriety and stillness of silence indicate a dedication to God that does not represent itself in language, which is already articulated in Hegel’s poem in adoration of Ceres. Nevertheless, according to this Hegelian logic the word is not something of men, but a truth to which men need to come. The word is already there, humans do not invent the word, but merely reinvent it in their desire for knowledge. Even poetry dedicates itself to this negativity. Agamben (1991) uses the example of Provençal poetry, in which the love for language is the love for its taking-place, when language is nothing but itself, when it is about *no-thing*. Here poetry connects itself to the *non-place* of *Dasein* and silence (pp. 57 & 63-74).

What does this excursion on silence clarify as to the situation of refugees? It is within this form of appreciation of silence that thoughts on language in philosophy and literature separate themselves from the rhetoric of politics. In politics, as we will see in 3.3 and 3.4, the *abstract other* of philosophy departs from the *political other* called migrants and refugees. In politics speech is imperative, it is performative (Schinkel, 2008). Not only in Arendtian sense of the word, but also as the demand of adequacy in interviews with refugees. Philosophy appreciates a silence that does not necessarily explain the experience of these political figures. The Voice in politics demands clarity, as we will see in the fourth and fifth chapter. The voice of refugees is expressed in chaos, but how does this chaos relate to this philosophical articulation of Voice as a *double negativity*. On the one hand, Voice negates the voice or the *phoné* in order for language to take place and become a Voice. On the other hand, as we have seen in 2.2.2, the same Voice – once more: the fact of taking place of language – is uncontainable within language itself and affects only in silence. The sayable is always impregnated by the unsayable. Language can never speak of its own taking place.

If this Voice is the mystical foundation for our entire culture (its logic as well as its ethics, its theology as well as its politics, its wisdom as well as its madness) then the mystical is not something that can provide the foundation for another

thought ... Only a liquidation of the mystical can open up the field to a thought (or language) that thinks (speaks) beyond the Voice and its *sigetics*; that dwells, that is, not on an unspeakable foundation, but in the infancy (*in-fari*) of man (Agamben, 1991, p. 91).

This concept of infancy is what radicalizes Agamben's understanding of language and its ethical implications. It is within the concept of infancy that the experience of political life of refugees affects philosophy: by changing the parameters of philosophical thought on language. This is not about the pidgin, the particular use and accent of the foreign language by migrants and refugees. Infancy does not indicate the infant's ability to learn language, but our entire experience of language. While Voice means to distance itself from the original voice of men, Agamben argues that this voice was never there to begin with. While apes gibber, chickens cluck, foxes bark and seagulls scream, men don't have a voice. Nothing is lost, because there was nothing to lose in the first place. It is always in suspension, we are in search of a voice. Ethics, for Agamben, is the manner in which we deal with this suspension. Human thought dwells in this suspension of something that has never been there before. In this sense, the *foreign tongue* is neither an experience of silence in the previous sense, nor an experience of a loss of a language, but a confrontation with this underlying intensity of finding a voice. The foreign tongue does not refer to an expression of a people with a different ethnicity but is *the experience of this everlasting suspense* in thought.

We can repeat that which has been said. But that which has been thought can never be said again. You can take your leave forever of the word once it has been thought.

We walk through the woods: suddenly we hear the flapping of wings or the wind in the grass. A pheasant lifts off then disappears instantly among the trees, a porcupine buries in the thick underbrush, the dry leaves crackle as a snake slithers away. Not the encounter, but this flight of invisible animals is thought. Not, it was not our voice. We came as close as possible to language, we almost brushed against it, held it in suspense: but we never reached our encounter and now we turn back, untroubled, toward home.

So, language is our voice, our language. As you now speak, that is ethics (Agamben, 1991, p. 108).

It is this fragility of thought and the non-lacking characteristic of language that set apart Agamben's reflections from that of the dominant genre in the history of Western philosophy, which has been trapped in binary oppositions, not only that of body and mind, but also that of *worldliness* (indicating reality of objects) and *language* (indicating the only true form of human expression). Due to the fact that language cannot completely grasp reality, it has been seen as a negation, as a process of lack that finds its true meaning in silence. Language is expected to comprehend reality and due to its inability to live up to this expectation it has been detached from reality.

In order to position the foreign tongue, as a process that connects the idea of language in philosophy to the practice of expression in politics of flight, Deleuze and Guattari's distinction of content and expression is instructive. The two articulations are not oppositional, but distinctive, related and supplementary. It is in this simultaneity of distinction and approach that the idea of language as an appreciation of silence is challenged. The problem does not necessarily lie in the appreciation, but in the definition of silence as a *negative*. We can leave the idea of negativity and emptiness behind once we redefine silence as a cacophonous state in which multiplicity instead of emptiness emerges. In words of Heidegger, let us truly speak of silence. Silence becomes a *positive* expression in-between all other forms of expression, instead of *the* true form of expression. Only through this multiplicity of the foreign tongue the focus of philosophy becomes that of political practice, challenging the mode of appreciation in both regimes. Dealing with politics of flight indicates an engagement with the tension between Voice and voices. Such engagement does not need to reflect upon voices as absence or lack, but must sensitize these as rupturing points that challenge the coherency and dominancy of regimes of signs. The second part of this study in the first instance deals with this coherency and dominancy. It will be argued that totalitarianism (chapter 4) and multiculturalism (chapter 5) – although both in their own accord – in their search of a true Voice approach the multiplicity of expression as form of lack or absence of this truthness. It is in the final chapter – where the multiplicity of life and expression explicitly relate to one another due to another approach toward assemblages of bodies and assemblages of enunciation – that this idea of lack is surpassed. However, in order to do so, we need to redefine and thus re-approach the idea of silence. What is the event of silence, its potentiality?

2.3.3 A Cacophony in Silence: The Sound of Silence¹⁴

Let us once more ask the question: is the notion 'empty silence' a pleonasm? Is the emptiness of silence a given? Ten Bos (2011) states that silence *falls*, it *leaks*, it is *emptiness* (p. 61-62). Yet, what does this emptiness mean? Inspired by Agamben's reflections on the difference between Voice and voice as well as Deleuze and Guattari's elaborations on content and expression, I will now argue that the relation between content and expression does not appear in a form of lack towards one another. Can we expect language, i.e. expression *to capture* the full complexity of its content? Let me give an example from the art world that has been experimenting with these complex relations. Art & Language is a cooperative practice of conceptual artists that was founded in 1969. Joseph Kosuth is one of its collaborators. Kosuth's art installation *One and Three Chairs* (1965) is the first proclaimed conceptual art installation: a chair is placed against the wall of the museum, next to a photograph of this same chair and a dictionary gloss on 'chair'. The chair is shown as object, image and text. In this installation language is exposed as being both content and expression. Only by defining the word 'chair' or showing the image of a chair as a replacement of the 'real' chair, both words and image start to evoke a lack. Kosuth, however, shows how they are not each other's replacement, but that they differ as well as relate to one another. As I showed in 2.3.1 in commenting on De Saussure's analysis of the sign, negation is just *an* aspect of difference; not *the* fundamental aspect of difference.

¹⁴ See also Rahimy, 2009 & 2010.

Content and expression are no substitutes for each other. Content and expression are related, but not according to a logical and linear causality: content does not cause expression as – in architecture and design – form follows function. There are multiple relations within a differing whole, especially when the ‘means’ of expression is language. Hegel intended to fill the gap between content (*an sich*) and expression (*für sich*) in a final ‘Aufhebung’ (sublation: *an und für sich*) within an absolute Idea. Deleuze and Guattari also attempt to think beyond the gap, but without the hierarchy or quasi-theological and teleological presuppositions of the Hegelian dialectics. For Agamben as well as for Deleuze and Guattari it is not the relationality within Hegelian thought that is problematic, but rather the finality: the inevitability of his logic towards one final direction, solution and hence appreciation of one type of existence or culture.

So, what is silence? A lack of sound or a leak of sounds? A meaningful expression beyond language? Does the imperative “be silent!” means don’t speak or rather more affirmatively “listen!”?¹⁵ According to Ten Bos (2011) silence is also associated with “motionlessness, fraud, absence, vulnerability, loneliness and withdrawal” (p. 37, Translation TR). Silence is even assumed to come after cacophony. In our analysis of silence we need, in line with Ten Bos, to problematize such assumptions. Silence does not lack sounds. It is rather noisy. In his art installation *4’33* (1952) John Cage forced his audience to experience both silence and a cacophony. Sitting, first in public space, behind a grand piano, suggesting he is going to play for four minutes and 33 seconds, he just ‘waits’ four minutes and 33 seconds to end the performance. In public space, we hear the urban soundscape, while not hearing the music. In the concert hall, the orchestra is listening while the audience is trapped in its own unintended performance of cacophony. What Cage sensitizes is that silence is not an empty moment in thinking, listening or looking. It is a fulfilled, tangible sounding beyond human agency. “What Cage calls silence constitutes the totality of sounds that are not intended by the human subject” (De Mul, 1999, p. 226). Silence is chaos as sheer noise. Is it expression without substance or does it *transform* any form that connects on its surface into matter? Cage magnificently shows that silence is not a moment in speech, as if Voicelessness is its ‘true’ essence. The essential soundlessness of silence is as big a myth as the idea that refugees lack the ability to express their experiences. They do express some ‘thing’; just as the first scream of a newly born child manifesting its existence: “I am here” (Ten Bos, 2011, p. 173). Only within the context of a dominant discourse or regime of signs their expressions are typified as lack and banned.

Let us reverse this logic: coherent speech as a supplement of silence. This occurs the very moment expression informs words, sounds and images with so-called adequate meaning. No matter how directly one speaks, no matter how transparent words pretend to communicate, this can only take place against the background of the omnipresent, cacophonous chaos of silence. The screams are epistemic phenomena, connecting assemblages of bodies to assemblages of enunciation, *a kind of breath* that neither belongs to the body nor to the regime of signs but rather operates as a connective force. It is *plus-de-corps* (Ten Bos, 2011, p. 189); the expression of relational difference.

¹⁵ Heidegger (1996) does speak of the triangle: speech, listening and silence. Listening is affirmative but not as an agreement. It creates room for multiplicity of experience. However, there remains something as ‘true’ understanding in Heidegger’s analysis that in the end reduces the unpredictability in listening (pp. 203-210).

Not words give rise to permanent thinking. Silence does. Silence is the interstratum constituting a difference upon which thoughts manifest themselves momentary. This could be the form of silence Derrida (1982) refers to in connection to 'différance' when he states:

The pyramidal silence of the graphic difference between the *e* and the *a* ... that functions within only a so-called phonetic writing – quite opportunely conveys or reminds us that, contrary to a very widespread prejudice, there is no phonetic writing. There is no purely and rigorously phonetic writing. So-called phonetic writing, by all rights and in principle, and not only due to an empirical or technical insufficiency, can function only by admitting into its system nonphonetic 'signs' (punctuation, spacing, etc.). And an examination of the structure and necessity of these nonphonetic signs quickly reveals that they can barely tolerate the concept of the sign itself (p. 4-5).

The nonphonetic is not only affected by, but also constitutes the signification. The 'pyramidal silence' concerns the A of *différance* that cannot be heard in a comparison with the more regular 'difference'. The *différance* cannot be Voiced, it can only come to the fore in written language, and finally in discourse. In terms of Deleuze and Guattari silence is the body without organs that penetrates the expressive clarity, i.e. finality and truthness in expression. Silence is not mystical. Mysticism, which upholds the negative idea of silence, refers to the *truthful* thing that cannot be grasped, hence negative theology as the discourse of mystics. Silence is not negative, but dynamic and supplementary. It is a becoming, a becoming-music, in which, as Pisters (2003) says, not the utility or correctness of expression is at stake, but rather the event of expression. As cacophony, it refers to permanent change, permanent transformation of expression. Silence is a line of flight. Silence does therefore not negate expression, but resists the permanency of a consistent and logical *gramma*. As we will see in the fourth chapter the clarity of communication that is intended through such laws in language is neither just nor preferable. They do not produce comprehension, they install exclusion; makes us violently deaf for the sounds of tortured refugees and severely blind for their frozen bodies in the refugee camps.

The cacophony of silence is not in opposition to expression or even language. It is another act within expression itself. Not an act of an agent, but an act of speaking itself; the act of inter-speaking that connects subjects in multiple ways. Instead it is the rigidity in some practices of language that creates a setting in which both silence and cacophony are opposed to language. Robert Ashley's musical experiment in *Automatic Writing* (1979) is a profound example of the immanency of this cacophony within language and expression as such. The composer Robert Ashley assumingly 'suffers' from the disease Gilles de la Tourette. He makes sounds without intending it: he speaks other (*heteros*) words (*phasia*) than intended. This type of expression, let us call it *heterophasia*, is often, from the perspective of dominant understanding of language, pathologically characterized as *aphasia*. Aphasia is a mental condition, which refers to either partial or total loss of the ability to communicate verbally or using written words. It shows itself as a difficulty with speaking, reading, writing, recognizing the names of objects, or understanding what other people have said. In case of Ashley, it triggers

involuntary sounds, in which the cacophony penetrates expression, in which the subject literally *undergoes* the expression. Yet, these *involuntarily sounds* are more common than one might think. Different types of slip-ups, saying something while intending to say something else, often accompany the experience of learning another language.

Ashley's artwork *She was a Visitor* (1967) installs such an experience. It expresses a reversed intensity of the *Automatic Writings*. The fragment starts with the sentence '*she was a visitor*', at first there is silence and only the sentence is audible, but gradually a chaos of sounds is introduced, while the sentence '*she was a visitor*' is repeated over and over again. Nevertheless, while the sentence is assumingly unchanged, the intensity of the listener's comprehension of the sentence changes due to the cacophony that surrounds it. What does he mean '*she was*' instead of '*she is*'? What happened to her? The cacophony demands its place in the process of comprehension. The visitor is not present. There is no image. She is solely defined by an everlasting tension of words, stuck between multiple affects: embedded in the unintended singular silence, she *was* and thus cannot *be* present, while at the same time being totally present in an act of listening of the audience. In words of Deleuze (1997), such an artwork sensitizes us for the tension between naked and covered repetition (as I argued in 1.4.2). Although it seems that every word repeats itself in exactly the same way – naked repetition – the intensity that each repeated sentence creates, sensitizes us for covered repetition. What is repeated, is difference itself. It is within this sense, that the listener becomes 'passive', meaning that the action of listening and being affected by it, surpasses her intentionality. More exactly formulated, in such a pre-personal endurance of difference, or in words of Derrida (1982) *différance*, the opposition between passivity and activity "remains undecided ... *différance* is neither simply active nor simply passive, announcing or rather recalling something like a middle voice" (p. 9). This is the in-betweenness of Agamben's supplementary relation of voice and Voice. The listener rhizomatically – subconsciously Freud would say, ideologically Marx would add – connects to all that presents itself in the expression. Listening is hence not the opposite of speaking; it is only due to listening that speech becomes more than a mere noise. Where content is cacophonous, expression becomes multiple. Where silence is not viciously hushed as a negating form as soundlessness, the listener becomes perceptible to multiple sounds of silence, to the noises that remains unheard; to the screams that tell us "we are here" even when "we are over there". Thus, "our task ... is to learn how to hear what is impossible" (Ahmed, 2014, p. 35); to hear the cacophony of this silence.

2.3.4 *Heterophasia and Heterotopia: Voicing and Situating the Other*

Aphasia does not only affect the sensations of the listeners, it also makes them sensible for disorganized syntaxes. From the perspective of the speaker the dictionary defines aphasia as a "disability to understand or express speech, caused by brain damage". It is compared with aphonia: "loss of ability to speak"; and connected to agnosia: the "inability to interpret sensations and hence to recognize things, typically as a result of brain damage." Oliver Sacks (2010) brilliantly writes about these phenomena in his description of the curious case of Lilian Kallir. Mrs. Kallir is a master pianist who could write but not read. She can see details as no other, she is masterly sharp in this sense, but she cannot distinguish a picture on a wall from the wall that it is pinned on. The wall and the picture are all the same to her, while she piercingly observes minimalistic details (pp. 12-31). Clear comprehension is at stake here.

There are different aspects of aphasia. The first concerns the connection between word and image. For example, one sees an apple and calls it a chair. The second concerns the connection between different words from the same family: one wants to say arm but says leg. Aphasia is also connected with not being able to discern words that almost have the same pronunciation, such as *huur* and *hoer*. In Dutch, the confusion between *huur* (rent) and *hoer* (whore) has become a national joke among migrants. Aphasia can be the result of wrong articulation: saying the word *true* as a reference to a proposition on reality, instead of *through* as a reference to the crossing of space, as a result a wrong pronunciation of t and th. Aphasia can also have effects on the manner in which one constructs sentences, the order of words, as in, “yesterday wrote text William”, instead of “the text William wrote yesterday”.

In *The Order of Things* Foucault (2005^a) refers to yet another form of aphasia in order to introduce his specific approach of discourse. In his Preface Foucault points to Borges’ phrasing of a lemma in a ‘certain Chinese encyclopedia’. The definition entails different types of animals that in an occidental perspective have nothing in common:

- (a) belonging to the emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens,
- (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied,
- (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies (p. xvi).¹⁶

Thought is pushed by expression into the abyss of speechlessness. Foucault argues that what disturbs us in this *alphabetical series* is not the semantics of words. It is within language that the order of things becomes spatial, literally spread out on a *plane of language* connecting one thing to the other. The disturbance emerges due to the fact that despite our comprehension of all the words and each category, *the order of things* makes no sense to us. It is the syntaxes of concepts as well as the order of the images that is not familiar to us. Only in the incomparability of discourses such an aphasic amazement arises. On the one hand we try to comprehend, on the other we are confronted with the unfamiliar, with the Other (*heteros*). Does the other find its specific place (*topos*) in language? Scientific *ex-planations* are countered in the above-mentioned artworks and art practices. They unveil their contingency, as does the table of Borges. Foucault frequently refers to the imagination of art in order to ex-plain the concepts he introduces. The crucial image in *The Order of things* is Diego Velásquez’ *Las Meninas* or *The Maids of Honor*. For Foucault, this image ‘shows’ the transformation of the position of the subject in modern discourse. The main subject of the painting are not the court ladies, not even the king and queen that are mirrored in the back-wall mirror, but Velásquez himself

¹⁶ This quote originates from Jorge Luis Borges (1993), *The Analytical Language of John Wilkens*. In this article, Borges criticizes Wilkens’ attempt, or any other attempt to order and organize universal (linguistic) categories. Borges typifies them as acts of *childish Gods*. Each order remains ambiguous compared to others no matter how thoroughly it has been manufactured. The example of the Chinese encyclopedia is introduced in order to point out this ambiguity. It is this contextual coherence that Foucault elaborates in *The Order of Things* as the epistemic discourse that changes over time.

who steps back from the painting he is painting on the painting. In this meta-move, in this feedbackloop, the artist as an autonomous subject enters the stage of history.

In the 'Preface' Foucault (2005^a) also refers to a surrealist painting that was inspired by a commentary of Comte de Lautréamont on which completely incomparable things are assembled in one image:

The table where, for an instant, perhaps forever, the umbrella encounters the sewing-machine; and also a table, a *tabula*, that enables thought to operate upon the entities of our world, to put them in order, to divide them into classes, to group them according to names that designate their similarities and their differences – the table upon which, since the beginning of time, language has intersected space (p. xix).

The move Foucault makes from art via language to discourse analysis is instructive. These three expressive modes supplement each other, though they take place on different planes or strata. *Utopias* are the planes of languages upon which we are comfortable, where harmonized categories and orders calm us because they make sense. It is within *heterotopias* that fear of language emerges in the disturbing appearances of *heteroclitics*, where words refer to unknown tongues and where grammar is disturbed by irregularities. It is within this experience of a *heterotopia* that Foucault refers to aphasia, as 'patients' who do not lack the ability to order things, but rather lack the ability to hold on to a certain order of things.¹⁷ One moment they categorize objects in a certain order, another moment they are flabbergasted by that very same order.

If we go along with Foucault's analysis, within heterotopias concepts such as atopia and aphasia do not respectively indicate a lack of place (a-topia) and a lack of words (a-phasisia), but rather a lack of rationality or consistency: a permanent order. Countering the differentiation of orders within space and language *utopias* are the continuations of invisible homogeneous orders. However, *heterotopias* inspire counter cultures and subcultures that resist the dominant order. In self-reflective *heterotopias*, the process of *taking-place-of-order* or, as Foucault concludes, the operation of *episteme* as such becomes visible. *Gramma* loses its certainty; the silence is voiced once its 'grounding' is stripped bare (pp. xix-xxiii). The order, as Ten Bos (2011) suggests, appears as nothing more than *ripple* (p. 38).

Is it not due to a dominant idea of 'adequacy' that we call these phenomena disorders? Does the language of migrants, Mrs. Kallir and Ashley really pathologically and psychologically fail? Did not Foucault also argument in his work on discipline that the normal is a function of the disciplined abnormal? Does 'thinking' have bodily aspects in affecting and being affected? If so, where does the problem of their inabilities derive from? At the end of the story of Mrs. Kallir it seems that her

¹⁷ See in this case the short film *Expressive Aphasia - Sarah Scott - Teenage Stroke Survivor*. (2010, February 28). It is the story of Sarah. She had a stroke when she was 18 and due to this she has developed a form of aphasia. When she is asked to tell her story, she mostly hails words and not so much sentences. Words such as school, English, book, arm, and leg. When the interviewer asks her what she wants to do now, she says one word: *connect*. She likes to connect. It is the connection that is lost and at the same time challenges her creativity.

disorientations have paralyzed her completely. Even at home for a moment she cannot recall where she is. But then suddenly *her body* remembers the piano. This memory is not directed by a written score, but by her physical awareness. She has a body of knowledge. She does not raise a Voice, but enacts the comforting skill of her fingers that structure her world. She starts to play, not by following the visual order of the notes on the score, but following the intensity of her hands. Sacks (2010) describe it as follows:

Lilian stared upward, singing the melody softly to herself. She played with consummate artistry, with all the power and feeling she had shown before, as Haydn's music swelled into a furious turbulence, a musical altercation. Then, as the quartet drew to its final, resolving chords, she said, simply, "All is forgiven" (p. 30).

Sacks' analyses are fascinating due to his ability *to explain the consistency of multiplicities* instead of giving a reductive analysis with a final judgment of disorder. Sack's approach thus moves beyond the pathological interpretation of Mrs. Kallir's state of mind by not reducing her virtuality or potentiality to the actual 'normal' or molar abilities. How do we then surpass, in line with Sacks, a pathological characterization of refugee's voices? How can we, within a milieu of flight, sharpen our ears to sense the molecular reality of their voices? When we transpose this specific pathology structurally to the context of migrants and refugees, they too seem to 'suffer' from involuntary sounds. In the cacophonous milieu of flight and its multilingual condition, migrants and refugees even seem to 'suffer' from different types of aphasia, which I label as *glocal aphasia*: experiencing a lack of coherent speech in order to express what they have and still experience on both sides of a vector, called flight: the state of exclusion in both the country of origin and the refugium. The 'incapability' to construct and pronounce words as they are ought to be pronounced, is a commonality in the global condition of statelessness and second-class citizenship. The concept of *glocal aphasia* refers to the problematic short circuiting of discourses of different orders of things within a multiplicity of heterotopias. In chapter 6, beyond the totalitarian (chapter 4) and multicultural setting (chapter 5), I will elaborate upon an intercultural setting¹⁸ that decenters the conception of language as the exclusive form of expression. Even stronger: *There is no 'adequate' and 'exclusive' form to express the fear of exclusion.*

These sensitizing experiments bend Voice back upon itself as in a feedback loop. Thinking is experimenting with its own limits by engaging flight lines of incomprehension within its act of

¹⁸ Heinz Kimmerle refers to the distinction between multiculturalism and interculturalism. "*multicultural* issues deal with problems which arise when people of different cultures live together in the same geographical area or on the territory of the same state, and *intercultural* issues deal with problems which arise when people of different cultures, living in different geographical areas, communicate with each other regularly" (Kimmerle & Oosterling, 2000, p. 12). However, when I speak of multiculturalism I refer to a relation that is based on identity (chapter 5), and interculturalism when it does not relate to identity but to inter-est (chapter 6). Thus, interculturalism is also effective within one geographical setting, or rather as Oosterling puts it: interculturalism is a *glocal* process. Oosterling states in 'A Culture of the 'Inter' that the "core activity of interculturality appears to be cultivating the inter" (p. 62). This is Sarah's urge to connect.

comprehension. Avant-garde art bends its form back upon itself by sensitizing its audiences for the flight lines within their preconditioned senses. On the level of our senses: thinking thinks its own dispositive, ears hear their own paradigms of listening, eyes see their own paradigms of seeing. In the same way sensing the limits of Voicing enables us to hear the cacophony of silence. These self-reflective experiences help us to distance ourselves from the arrogance – patronizing and pathologizing tendencies – of ‘correct’ ways of expression. That is why Deleuze and Guattari (1994) at the end of *What is Philosophy?* raise the question as to the productive crossbreeding of philosophy and art. Their respective idea of image of thought intertwines artistic sensations – percepts and affects – with philosophical concepts. On such interstratum silence as a *virtual* field of (im)potentiality unfolds. In Arendtian (1958) terms, sensitized expression gives *birth* to new attitudes within politics. Once we connect this natality to the expression of a foreign tongue, without giving in into the negativity of the notion a-phasisia (no-words). That is why, in line with Foucault’s heterotopias, I would rather prefer to speak of heterophasia – a phasia with molecular temperament. Refugees, migrants, Mrs. Kallir or Ashley do not lack expression, they experience multiplicity of expression, yet are forced by the dominant regime of words to homogenize this multiplicity. It is not the lack, but the affirmation of this multiplicity that – in contrast to the order of language – makes their lives as fascinating as it is unbearable.

Heterophasia is thus another state of mind, referring to another image of thought, rather than a *wrong* state of mind. This image of thought in Agamben’s vocabulary can be labeled as *coming-to-expression*. This is not merely a characteristic of some people, but rather a hiccup in the process of expression that is of relevance to all heterotopic subjects. What I call heterophasia is the *ability* to experience the cacophonous background of silence, releasing language from its totalistic illusion that demands clarity and adequacy. This is however not a postmodern plea for confusion for the sake of confusion, but rather a proposal to approach a space in which noise is not excluded from life for the sake of Voice. Noise does not silence political action, but voices the multiplicity of mesopolitical practice. It happens in front of you, next door where the illegal sexworker screams silently in order not to be deported, in a classroom where students do not speak in order to camouflage their accents, in the dirty halls of shabby bars and in your clean houses where spouses do not know how to talk in difference. It happens within you, through you via others.

Sometimes I disagreed with my own ideas when I heard them from other mouths;
sometimes I heard things from others and then realized that I thought the same
way without even knowing it (Ghorashi 2003, p. 49).

2.3.5 From Language via Image to Bodies: Faces and Gestures¹⁹

How to express oneself? Noise does not only resonate in sounds that we cannot decipher as words and sentences, but also in a multiplicity of meanings and in a fusion of affects that are accompanying language. Qualifying refugees as ‘economic’ refugees produces other affects and triggers other meanings resulting in another politics of flight. Even the same word, say ‘refugee’, triggers different

¹⁹ See also Rahimy, 2012^b.

affects for anti-refugee or pro-refugee protesters. Individuals use words like love and affection differently in connection to their parents, partners, friends or children. Even within a single statement different sensations are virtually present, as we have seen in Ashley's performance. Within the interaction of power – *pouvoir* not *puissance/force* – and knowledge, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) introduce a third element: *temperament*. Language in its temperament loses its universality and differentiates itself into different *styles* of enunciation. These are not personal utterances, but an *assemblage of enunciation* that have multiplied layers within itself. According to Deleuze and Guattari in using language non-linguistic forms of expression connect, such as images, faces and gestures. Yet, the relationality between language and other forms of expression does not indicate a simple analogy, they are supplementary to one another and not a replacement for one another (pp. 92-99, 109). "Words do not replace missing objects. They occupy no empty or hollow spaces" (Foucault, 1983, p. 39). Neither do words replace missing expressions. In case of music Deleuze and Guattari (1987) state:

Once again, the objection will be raised that music is not a language, that the components of sound are not pertinent features of language, that there is no correspondence between the two. We are not suggesting any correspondence. We keep asking that the issue be left open, that any presupposed distinction be rejected (p. 96).

Expression is always multiple. Visual artists such as René Magritte have methodically worked with this idea of multiple forms of expression, which has been acknowledged by Foucault in *This Is Not a Pipe* (1983). Foucault shows that through Magritte's work we can experience the "absence of space, an effacement of the 'common place' between the signs of writing and the lines of the image" (pp. 28-29). Foucault (1994) argues how language determines meaning and at the same time gives rise to a twofold suspicion of its own nature. First, that language does not mean what it says – this is not a pipe – and second, that language refers to its incapability to be the only form of expression. Thus expression "exceeds its merely verbal form in some way, and there are indeed other things in the world which speak and which are not language" (p. 270). Magritte's *The Interpretation of Dreams* is another fine example: four images (a horse, a clock, a jug and a suitcase) are each matched with a (mis)matching word (the door, the wind, the bird and the valise), apart from one, the image of a *suitcase* and the word *the valise*. Yet the image of *a horse* is not in opposition to the word *the door*, they just differ. What is questioned are two regimes of expression: one elaborated on by Guy Debord (2001) in *The Society of the Spectacle*: images refer to each other, producing a visual discourse in its own; and the other – language – discussed by Deleuze and Guattari (1987) in which "all signs are signs of signs" (p. 112). Both are self-referential processes of signification that give rise to what Deleuze and Guattari call a regime, in this case a regime of signs and a regime of images. Heterotopia – with its *heteroclitic* expression – thus harbors a multiplicity of regimes, whether of images or signs. *Heteroclitite* indicates the impossibility "to find a place of residence ... to define a *common locus* beneath" this multiplicity of expression (Foucault, 2005^a, p. xix).

The acknowledgement of this heteroclitic state – or as stated before: the cacophony within silence – is not merely an aesthetic matter. Deleuze and Guattari's preference for the term *regimes* of signs, Arendt's introduction of speech into political action, and the unavoidable connection between community and communicability in Agamben's work, bear witness of the fact that for all these thinkers *expression – and its multiplicity – is a political matter*. The intensive dynamics of deterritorialization and reterritorialization creates different regimes with the prospect of new expressions. Deleuze and Guattari's analysis gets even more complicated, once they present a regime of signs as a *face*.

A face is not a personal trait, but the appearance of these multiple forms of assemblages. In a face the quadrant of content and expression, their form and matter, amalgamates. Face refers to both the assemblage of bodies and assemblage of enunciations. Face intertwines “the organic stratum, the stratum of signification, and the stratum of subjectification” (Lorraine, 2011, p. 36). The *concrete face* is a molar segment, expressing a Voice. It configures social, political, economic and anthropological ideas and images that are dominant in society. What appeared in Saxony is a molecular face – the face of refugees – a face that reacts to a Voice – a molar face. The refugee's face is not only a (con)fusion of these ideas in society, or type of strata, but also expresses rupture with and resistance to these strata.

Each type of politics within a politics of flight creates a different face and emerges from different types of faciality as a process. We are familiar with the binary sets of totalitarianism – such as citizen and non-citizen – and multiculturalism – such as belonging and non-belonging. The signifier shows itself in its *faciality*. *The signifier – as a molar force – is visible*. Sometimes it shows its true face, ruthless and without mercy. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) argue that although the system of signs is deceptive in its nature, it is never *secretive*. It visualizes the structures of segmentation in networks of signs. Within these networks some faces appear and some faces remain in the background due to their inability to connect. “The machine rejects faces that do not conform, or seem suspicious” (p. 177). These faces revolt against the order of signification. It is not without reason that Alan Kurdi's face is buried in the sand. How can one imagine the face of a dead child? The public was unable to imagine Alan Kurdi, so some media even dared to demonize his father by wondering how he could endanger his child on such a journey.

Signification is the process of unification and contribution of consistencies, in which the *order-words* and *order-images* as molar assemblages of enunciations effectuate the assemblages of bodies. Signification, whether in images or words, is the process in which the subject is formed, whether it considers an individual – the citizen, the non-citizen – or a collective – the people, the non-people or the nation-state. Subject is a face too, but not all faces are subjects as a consistent type of agency.

Although from the perspective of *order-words* and *order-images* the *abnormal* or the refugee becomes faceless, losing its singularity, because their ‘faces’ answer to another idea of faciality. Their faces refer to other assemblages of enunciations and bodies. To call these undefined images invisible in contrast to the visibility of the signifier would in a sense be missing the point, namely their molecular virtual reality. In order to give this faceless group a face art enters the stage with its affects and percepts. Does art not enforce images, sounds, and words upon us that affect the audience's both

visually and physically, rupturing the binary sets of the dominant form of faciality? It is the sensitization in art, which ruptures the evident visibility of the signifier. That is, as Deleuze puts it, the very *resistance of art*: its creative act in connecting affects and percepts, creating new sensations and multiple expressions (Deleuze, 1987; Deleuze & Guattari, 1994). Patton (2000) states that “art in its pure form exists in a state of permanent exile, a nomadic state which resists the territorialization of particular styles, genres or modes of capture” (p. 73). It is due to this creative resistance that I refer to art in the previous chapters and the coming chapters. This enables me to connect to an expression that sensitizes for another faciality in surpassing the given state of affairs.

Still, Deleuze (1987) warns us, not every work of art is in a state of resistance. Not every image resists. There are those that confirm the clichés. As Susan Sontag (2003) argues, in their cliché state images could even become *unrealistic* and *surreal*. Such are the images of “battles and massacres” that have become “routine ingredient of the ceaseless flow of domestic, small-screen entertainment” (p. 21). When Jean Baudrillard (1995) boldly states that the *Gulf War did not take place* he refers to the *staged images* that gave an illusion of comprehending a horror that was beyond our comprehension. These staged images refer to a regime of images, in which images in turn refer to other images, as Guy Debord (2001) argued. Images reproduce one another according to the logic of their regime. Although this visual regime operates in a different way than the lingual regimes, they bear witness to the same rigidity. In the world of the spectacle words or stories *dramatize* an image (Sontag, 2003, p. 32). The maker cannot save the image from its destiny: It has to become a spectacle. Images cannot be owned by those who make them. They exponentially connect to other images. They pop up and settle in communities in which meanings and signs are enforced upon them. Even in the case of Alan Kurdi we were not able to protect this extreme image from being framed according to a regime of signs. The intentions of photographers, as Sontag (2003) suggests, do not define or protect an artwork. An image “will have its own career, blown by the whims and loyalties of the diverse communities that have use for it” (p. 39). It is this unpredictability that results from the multiple approaches toward the image. While some images manifest arborescent or fascicular ideas, others become rhizomatic. Sontag senses this arborescent trait when she emphasizes that although the United States is eager to show the suffering that has taken place *elsewhere*, finds it difficult to have a national museum²⁰ exposing its own *history of slavery*.

The Holocaust Memorial Museum and the future Armenian Genocide Museum and Memorial are about what didn't happen in America, so the memory-work doesn't risk arousing an embittered domestic population against authority. To have a museum chronicling the great crime that was African slavery in the United States of America would be to acknowledge that the evil was *here*. Americans prefer to picture the evil that was *there*, and from which the United States – a unique nation, one without any certifiably wicked leaders throughout its entire history – is exempt (p. 88).

²⁰ This text is written before the year 2016, the year that the Smithsonian National Museum of African American History & Culture was opened by Barack Obama.

Still, there are images that deterritorialize and reterritorialize other images by imagining something else than the ordinary ways of imagination, or conventional ways of faciality: They deterritorialize the idea of an I of an individual by disturbing its subjectification in identifying with others. The face of Frederick Treves in *The Elephant Man* (Lynch, 1980) is such a deformation. Treves hears of the existence of a man with horrifying features. He is eager to see the man. It is almost happening, he is near the elephant man's cage. The man stands with his back to the camera, and slowly turns around. And just before the viewer can see the elephant man, the camera turns. We see Treves' astonished, ashamed and shattered face. "There is shame as well as shock in looking at the close-up of a real horror" (Sontag, 2003, p. 42). Why is Treves ashamed? Is he ashamed because of his desire to see; a voyeuristic desire that feeds back upon itself? And identifying with Treves the viewer who needed the spectacle, is horrified too. By turning the camera away Lynch forces the viewer to face its own faciality, its own scopophilia (*Schaulust*), as Freud qualified it. The face of Treves, in Bataille's sense *transgresses* and *transfigures* the faces of the viewer.²¹ What Lynch shows is that it is not the disfigured face of John Merrick that challenges us. It is not the *formless* and *faceless*, but a face like ours, with its enforced consciousness, its related passion, and its unavoidable pain, that challenges us to break through our given regime of images. The resistance of an image is another image.

Images on the one hand refer to reality, not necessarily as a faithful copy, but as to what they suffice to stand for. And then there is also the interplay of operations between the visible and invisible, sayable and unsayable, an alteration of resemblance and dissemblance which is the way by which art constructs images that have affective and interrupting power (Pisters, 2016, p. 146).

With Agamben (2000) I would affirm that a face can on the one hand manifest the sign or the image, but at the same time this very face can rupture the evident transparency of a regime of expression, breaking it into pieces. A face always hides another face; it bides its time. Take Richard Avedon's image of Samuel Beckett (1979). The lines in his face are so deep, that a whole world seems almost to spit out of his wrinkles. His face is not a face of a man, it is a faciality of a life. With hands in the pocket, the eyes stare, as if they expect the spectator to say something. Come on, be brave, name I. It is Samuel Beckett, the great writer, to whom you wish to say something smart. And while you search for words to answer the image, the eyes and the smirk on his mouth ridicule your childish attempts. This double image challenges the idea of signification. Beckett's face is not the negation of the appearance of a face – we do not have to see Alan Kurdi's face in order to comprehend the incomprehensibility of his death – but instead it counteracts the identifying comprehension of a face. In agreement with Agamben, we could state: *don't be your I, don't be your face, instead become your faces.*

²¹ Sontag (2003) shows that Bataille's fascination for horrifying images is neither for the sake of spectacle, nor aesthetic. "Bataille is not saying that he takes pleasure at the sight of this excruciation. But he is saying that he can imagine extreme suffering as something more than just suffering, as a kind of transfiguration" (pp. 98-99).

How can this be related to a politics of flight? *The face is an expressive force*, with molar power and molecular temperaments. So is the body, once it is signified in an assemblage of enunciations. Body being the content discourse is the expression. Yet again, this is not a causal, but a supplementary relation. Agamben (2000) exposes the expressive force of the body as a political affect. He transposes face to *gesture*, though not as a mean to express something behind it. As Ten Bos (2011) states: “Gesture is never a project” (p. 100). “Gesture has no purpose and it is in this sense the opposite of labor” (p. 123, Translation TR). However, this non-purpose does not indicate that gesture is simply a useless act. Gesture has a potentiality, according to Ten Bos, that surpasses the simplicity of the contradiction in-between usefulness and uselessness. Gesture, as Agamben (2000) argues, expresses itself in “the sphere of gestures or pure means”, which is “the sphere of those means that emancipate themselves from their relation to an end while still remaining means”. Means of what, if there is neither substance nor goal? This sphere, Agamben concludes, is eventually “the proper sphere of politics” (p. x). Nowadays this can be understood as the slogan Marshall McLuhan formulated in 1964: “The medium is the message”. Gesture amalgamates content and expression. It becomes an adequate term for reflecting upon a politics of flight not only due to its introduction of *means without end*, but also due to its contemporary reference to a *loss of gesture* in western society. It starts referring to itself, once it is no longer evident, like the pipe in Magritte’s painting. It becomes a mean bent back upon itself. Agamben states that thinking about *gestures* appears the very moment it loses its commonality.

An age that has lost its gestures is, for this reason, obsessed by them. For human beings who have lost every sense of naturalness, each single gesture becomes a destiny ... a gesture in which power and act, naturalness and manner, contingency and necessity become indiscernible (p. 53).

The image of Alan Kurdi shocks us due to its confrontational statement: “how could a continent so obsessed with human rights let me die on its shores.” In losing its grip, gesture sensitizes thinking, initiating deterritorialized thinking. This loss thus does not refer to a loss of specific political gestures, but to the capability of gesturing in general. This is due to the complexity of expressions in our time. It is the complexity of the manners of gesturality that again distinguishes forms of politics within politics of flight. The stability in expression is at stake, not in the least because of the interbreeding of cultures in a globalized world. The images are no longer fixed, language is lacking coherency, and the body becomes hesitant in its gestures.

The gesture is, in this sense, communication of communicability ... being-in-language of human beings as pure mediality ... gesture is essentially always a gesture of not being able to figure something out in language; it is always a *gag* in the proper meaning of the term, indicating first of all something that could be put in your mouth to hinder speech, as well as in the sense of the actor’s improvisation meant to compensate a loss of memory or an inability to speak (p. 59).

Thus, gesture loops back upon itself, becoming a self-reflective process of thinking; process of expressing, or as Agamben states, a *dynamic polarization* and a *virtual movement*. Gesture needs to free itself from its image, its *being*, in order to give in to its becoming. It needs another affirmative approach, not one, as Foucault (1983) argues, that gives in to resemblance – all our homogeneous statements pleading for human rights lacked the ability to break through regimes of faciality. In Foucault's words, we need a *naked affirmation*, which refers to a formation of a gesture itself (p. 34).

Ten Bos (2011) argues that gestures become sincere only when they are aimless, when they are not presenting a loveless inflexibility, but relate in a disinterested manner. *Trusting*, Ten Bos says, while accepting all the consequences; *an aesthetical ethical thinking*. Where do we find such a gesture? Is it Merkel's gesture repeatedly saying "Wir schaffen es"? Am I a cynic for permanently fearing that she will stop saying or meaning those words? Or is a gesture for me to stop eating meat in order to not give in to environmental effects of the western consumerism creating disasters elsewhere, where lands dry and humans flee due to hunger that I caused? Would it help? I don't know. A gesture urges us to act instead of being a promise of an idea. In this becoming, according to Agamben and Ten Bos, gesture in its aesthetic act resists fixation on ourselves on an ethical and political level.

The gesture is the exhibition of a mediality: it is the process of making a means visible as such. It allows the emergence of the being-in-a-medium of human beings and thus it opens the ethical dimension for them (Agamben, 2000, p. 58).

Nevertheless, in the end gesturality in Agamben's thought is not limited to politics alone, but it is as always also a philosophical issue. By introducing the *gag* of language and image into the process of philosophical writing Agamben shifts gesturality to the center of philosophy.

And every great philosophical text is the *gag* exhibiting language itself, being-in-language itself as a gigantic loss of memory, as an incurable speech defect (p. 60).

Is this a heterophasia, that releases language from its representational function, bending it back upon itself, exposing the presuppositions of this medium as Foucault did in *The Order of Things*? Gesture is communicability that differs from clear communication or transparent flows of information via language. Agamben speaks of *being-in-language*. This 'being' however does not refer to words, but rather to something immanent to the transparency and clarity of words. Within the acknowledgement of the multiplicity of expression and the heteroclitic trait of heterotopia, the term *being-in-language* still puts an emphasis on language, instead of expression as such. In a politics of flight, it is the reduction of expression to merely actualized fixed expressions that undermines speech or utterance in general. That is why I would rather speak of *being-in-expression*; *hetero-expressive*.

In line with the argumentation in the previous chapter being-in-expression means the loss of self-evident gestures, not a lack of gestures. The multiplicity in *hetero-expressive* and heterotopia reappears in faces and gestures. Extending the Foucaultian idea of heterotopia this entails the disclosure of multiple approaches within politics of flight. Thinking about and thinking within a politics of flight asks for a diversified milieu in which assemblages of bodies and assemblages of

enunciations intertwine and affect one another. Multiplicity cannot be addressed adequately within one milieu. Its expression asks for a multiplicity of milieus within a milieu, due to the feedback loops and double binds that are hidden in every communication. Given the intertwining of content and expression thinking about the assemblages occurs in different milieu, each with its own regime of signs, regime of images, regime of faciality, regime of gestures.

2.4 Approaching Heterotopic Milieus

2.4.1 Transitory Spaces: Politics and Art

Flight as the starting notion is by now connected to countless other notions. Thinking the coherence of all these notions asks for a specific concept: family resemblances, as Ludwig Wittgenstein points out in his *Philosophical Investigations*. Wittgenstein (1953) speaks of *language-games* that connect words and concepts to one another. There is no essential characteristic that unites and causes such connections, whether in language or other forms of expression. The notion *game* is the key in comprehending Wittgenstein's point. Games are coherent and consistent because of the rules, but there is not one essence that defines all rules. We cannot *grasp* a single essence, we can only *see* their connectivity. "Don't think but look!" Wittgenstein advises (§66). The common, or the *family-resemblance*, is hardly a concept. It has no definition, due to the fact that there are no clear boundaries to what is part of the game and what is not. Once there is overlap, there is a connection. It is thus not a particular territory, but an *area* with open boundaries that comes to the fore in *examples*. These examples do not explain the area, do not define its traits, but instead invite us to *see* "what is common" (§72), to see a set of connected notions. It is *showable*, *approachable*, but what is connected and the way it is connected is not unambiguous. The term 'family' as used by Wittgenstein thus does not point out a transparent familiarity. Yet, Wittgenstein also knows that families are also known for their secrets, misunderstandings and complexities.

While Wittgenstein speaks of family resemblances, Deleuze and Guattari (1994)²² speak of families of milieus. In *What is Philosophy?* they distinguish philosophical, scientific and artistic milieus (as will be discussed in 3.2), but not a specific political milieu (see: 3.4). In line with this distinction this investigation does not intend to clarify *one specific* definition of *the* notion of *flight*. It rather aims to *show* on an exemplary basis multiple types of relations within this notion that is embedded in a network – its familiarity – with other themes. Rather than looking for one clear and universally determined description or image, diffuse limits are *approached* that make this notion consistent. In exposing an immense range of enunciations and imaginations, i.e. after evaluating *the thing of thought*, the multiple relations between *content* and *expression*, and *the thing of expression*, the emphasis is now on the crucial question:

²² Bruce MacClure (2001) argues against the presumption that Deleuze and Guattari have a problematic relationship or sometimes even a nonexistent relationship with Wittgenstein. Nonetheless, according to him, they first and for all problematize the ideas of followers of Wittgenstein, rather than Wittgenstein himself (pp. 84-106).

What is a *milieu* of flight?

It is clear by now that a *politics of flight* is a complex, layered milieu, in which the idea of *flight* operates on different scales and in different manners. As a discourse, it shelters notions such as *refuge, migration, otherness, inhabitants, context, culture, identity, race, history, territory, country of origin, country of arrival, nation-state, refugee camps*, and in its *expressive mode* notions as *mediality, language, image, gesture* and *imagination*. As Agamben suggests each approach toward these notions and their connections creates a different form of ethics, presupposing different types of moral values and pragmatic norms (as we will see in 3.4). The ethics of anti-refugee protesters does not only differ from that of refugees, but also from those Germans who argue for human rights in their pro-refugee demonstrations. All ties with ethical, political, social and economic issues exposes specific configurations. We hop from one milieu to the other. Each configuration creates a type of community. The way men segment themselves into groups (exclusive or inclusive) is however a problem in itself, yet at the same time the engine that motorizes politics. Becoming sensitive for the complex interactions between these (political) milieus starts with a reflection on the way in which different objects of thought relate to one another, yet distinguish themselves from one another – ‘partage’, Jean-Luc Nancy and Ten Kate (2011) say – as well as how they are affected by the intensities within and between milieus.

Moments of intensification are determined by the singularities or limit points of the line of variation in the relation between two elements; specific intensities increase or decrease as what actualizes draws closer or moves further away from the limit points where something different will happen (Lorraine, 2011, p. 37).

This rather abstract circumscription accentuates the emergent quality within every relation that occurs at its limits. How do the intensities of a multiplicity of ideas express themselves at the limits of milieus, where assemblages start to overlap and connect, and discourses are mixed up? How do they, in expressing themselves, relate to a political content of milieu of flight? As we have seen in the first chapter, in the act of flight every expression is political – micro, meso, macro – producing the subject *refugee* and focusing the desire *survival*. This ‘bare’ subject wants to stay alive whatever it takes. What does it take? Because different subjects cannot be isolated and opposed as passive versus active subjects (as we have seen in 1.3) as in a regular political action, the act of flight is an intense act of connection to all directions. Its intensity gives rise to multiple ways of connection, despite the fact that some connections still retain the illusion of disconnection, as we will see in the fourth and fifth chapter. The crucial task for thinking the full range of agency in a politics of flight is to differentiate the ways in which flight reterritorializes and deterritorializes the territory of belonging for all the subjects it concerns.

On a macropolitical level flight is explained in terms of the dominant yet ambivalent discourse. Mesopolitically groups, opposing each other, embrace aspects of this ambivalence, as a result of which the refugee is stuck in between interests that are not (yet) his own. Micropolitically the mode of expression is determined by a basic desire: *staying alive*. Life is the crucial notion: Life as formed matter, i.e. as substance refers to humans as a specific type of living beings. Aristotle qualifies

man as a *zoon politikon*, a political animal. Politics, as was already argued by him, denotes the ways lives connect to one another, once they start operating in public space, affirming existing communities, yet creating ever-newer communities. The event of articulation and the event of connection are simultaneous events in politics. Each articulation gives rise to a different type of community. Politics is not a secondary process; it is a primary process of articulation. Life is basically expressed as a body without organs. Life as a connective force is always affective, no matter how articulated its contents and expression are defined, respectively as human beings (closed organisms) and human language (contained expression). Life, in this broader sense of the word as a yet unformed process – matter – is the integrative connector, the engine of content and expression. As an affirmative force life urges politics to create new contents and expressions, and eventually new forms of life, i.e. ethics.

Do politics and ethics coincide? Yes, but politics is never defined by one coherent form of ethics – as Foucault’s analysis of discipline *and resistance* has shown – but by the handling of multiple and complex ethical dilemmas: Are economic refugees political refugees or economic migrants? For who is owning two passports an option? Politics tries to cohere a diversity of ethical articulations. Yet, the substance of the connections of life as *zoē* and the substance of the connections of life as *bios* are different in nature: life as matter – *zoē* – is informed as content and as expression, assembling via *biopolitics* bodies and discourses. Yet, life-processes and politico-processes intermingle. In contemporary politics, the complexity of life is highly reduced. Our modern societies life sciences – with their strong molar temperaments – aim at *managing* life in every aspect. We want to manage unpredictability in risk society. We do not know who refugees are, so we close the borders for all of them. More than curing ‘diseases’ or decreasing criminal behavior we want to domesticate all potentiality. Avoiding risks urges politicians to argue that closing the borders was argued to be in the interest of refugees and yet it led to a lack of food and heat in refugee camps in Greece and improvisational settlements on the borders of Balkan countries. Politicians also want to avoid the tragedy of drowning. Yet, the reason why they risk their lives in order to survive, the complex circumstances that urges them to plea for their lives are never heard, because that would reveal the involvement of the West.

Foucault’s description of biopolitics and Arendt’s texts on modern totalitarian regimes analyze the political processes that effect and instrumentalize life. The conceptual complexity of *a politics of flight* needs a milieu of thought that can handle this complexity, including both refugees and the groups that want to exclude or include them. Given the unavoidable connection between life and (bio)politics every individual is in some way linked to this milieu and as such part of a process of subjectification. There is a tension between the undefined movement of life – with its intense molecular temperament – and the way life is appropriated by molar macropolitics. Each notion within *a politics of flight* is contaminated by this tension: each specific way of territorialization within personal or collective lives is deterritorialized by life forces.

Can we address and articulate these life forces in a different way than via molar biopolitics? Art has the creative ability to express and confront us with these processes of life. Politico-art – whether working with objects, images, sounds or people – sensitizes us for both content and expression. It does not create to territorialize but to deterritorialize the universal ‘illusions’ in territorial objects and

thought, as we have seen in Robert Ashley's performances (in 2.4.4). Of course, art segments and fixates too, but mostly in order to create flight lines. Art teaches us to look at states of affairs differently. But art as an act of composition always intervenes within a certain milieu of thought. Deleuze and Guattari (1994) situate this milieu on a *plane of composition* (as I will elaborate on in 3.2.3). On this plane, the flight lines are immanent to the processes of segmentation, as a result of which everything can change. Art mobilizes life forces to express becoming. Oliver Messiaen's *Quartet for the End of Time* articulates a vectorial force. Within the borders of prison, and with the use of broken and defective instruments he created a sound that broke through the walls that incarcerates his body (Beckand, 2011). A scene in Darabont's *The Shawshank Redemption* (1994) is moved by the same affect (Pisters, 2003, p. 201). The prisoner Andy Dufresne locks himself inside the warden's office just to play Mozart's opera *The Marriage of Figaro* for the entire prison population. Touched by this, Ellis Boyd 'Red' Redding, his co-prisoner, states:

I have no idea to this day what those two Italian ladies were singing about. Truth is, I don't wanna know. Some things are best left unsaid. I'd like to think they were singing about something so beautiful it can't be expressed in words, and it makes your heart ache because of it. I tell you those voices soared, higher and farther than anybody in a grey place dares to dream. It was like some beautiful bird flapped into our drab little cage and made these walls dissolve away, and for the briefest of moments, every last man in Shawshank felt free (Darabont, 1994).

It does not matter that the lives of the two prisoners and the two Italian ladies differed so much or that their words were incomprehensible to one another. For a brief moment, their lives intertwined in a sound that escaped the limits of their territories, even the ones formed by their identities. Art is this transitory intervention that connects the content and expression of a so-called subject to incomprehensible force of life. Its expressions micropolitically undermine segmentary certainties in disclosing lines of flight. In ex-posing life art creates or unlocks *transitory spaces* hidden in politics, science and philosophy. Art creates events that virtually connect different types of milieus to one another.

2.4.2 Mapping Foggy Planes

A milieu is not a place. It is a dynamic space. A *mi-lieu*²³ is a connective process, articulating forms and matter as substance in order to give political consistency to contents and expressions. It springs from the chaotic surface upon which it operates. As a *differing* process, it maps territories in thought that allow life forces as affects to permanently penetrate this space. In short, a politics of flight is in need of a milieu of thought as an amalgamation of entrances to multiple milieus. Every milieu has, in the words of Deleuze and Guattari (1987), a rhizomatic texture:

²³ See also Rahimy, 2015.

The rhizome is reducible neither to the One nor the multiple. It is not the One that becomes Two or even directly three, four, five, etc. It is not a multiple derived from the One, or to which One is added ($n + 1$). It is composed not of units but of dimensions, or rather directions in motion. It has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle (*milieu*) from which it grows and which it overflows (p. 21).

A rhizomatic milieu simply indicates that philosophical concepts, artistic sensations, scientific functions on different scales – micro, meso and macro – are transversed by politics. They are connected in multiple ways, by a multiplicity of possible micro-worlds and possible macro-worlds. In order to avoid the trap of fragmentation and disconnection we need to answer the question raised in the beginning of this chapter in 2.1: What is that ‘something’ that connects in difference? Concepts do not float groundless in the air. Inspired by Spinoza, Deleuze and Guattari speak of a *plane of immanence*, also known as *One-All*, an “Omnitudo” or *planomenon*, *plane of consistency*, which as a *sieve* contains the concepts. The plane of immanence must not be understood as a super-concept defining the little concepts within it. It is a binding sieve, a porous container that filters concepts out of chaos. It is a segment that moves within the chaos as a plane of *infinite movements* or a *fluid milieu* of *elastic concepts* (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, pp. 35-36). A sticky space in the middle of the chaos. Other notions, such as rhizome and plateau, show the same in-the-middle characteristics: “A plateau is always in the middle, not at the beginning or the end. A rhizome is made of plateaus” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 21). Plateau is a *mi-lieu*, literally a middle-place. Rhizome expands not from the borders but out of the middle.

Rhizome *forms* the in-betweenness of a plateau as its *matter*. Concepts do not connect deductively from the beginning as particular categories that follow a general rule. Nor are they connected inductively in the end like a wrap up. They connect rhizomatically out of the middle in all directions, changing while being articulated, becoming. Arendt’s conception of politics and of public space phrases this middle as a principally provisional being interested. Agamben’s title *Means without End* affirms this notion of milieu as well. Whomever applies the concept milieu is concerned with a constitutive in-between. From this radiant in-between perspective, there are no borders in the conventional sense of the word. Borders indicate well-defined ends and beginnings. Whenever borders come in sight in this milieu it is as a vague or foggy *supplement*.

When Deleuze and Guattari speak about the process of writing *A Thousand Plateaus* they mention plateaus that can be entered, experienced and perceived from all sides, given the diversity of strata. Like Wittgenstein’s approach they are *pragmatic*, not in the sense of ‘anything goes’ or a utilitarian application of thinking to serve macropolitical purposes, but rather as a process that is pragmatically involved in the same constructions and variations that it is ‘describing’. In that sense, a milieu always has a political focus. According to Deleuze and Guattari, ontology is always already a political ontology. Their pragmatism does not favor indecisiveness, but is rather an internal act of decision, an act that does not disconnect its theoretical thought from practical processes. Pragmatic politics does not imply the implementation of an ideology from an outside or a meta-state, but a bricolage that operates from within. Its description is primarily relational and self-reflective, meaning

inter-ested in the complexity of the context, and not disconnective relativistic, indicating an uninterested *whatever*.²⁴ As Deleuze stated: “I have always felt that I am an empiricist, that is, a pluralist” (Deleuze & Parnet, 1991, p. vii).²⁵ Finally, this in-betweenness as well as the reality of the ‘chaosmos’²⁶ of a plateau does not imply that a plane is without consistency. As Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of *plane of consistency* and *plane of immanency* suggest the plane gains an immanent consistency due to the machinic forces that, by folding and unfold in their interaction with other forces, form its matter in assemblages (of bodies and of enunciation). To return to the image of mountains, it is the force of the earth, creating and evading resistance, that makes her mountains rise and valleys deepen in the middle of her territory.

Concepts are concrete assemblages, like the configurations of a machine, but the plane is the abstract machine of which these assemblages are the working parts. Concepts are events, but the plane is the horizon of events, the reservoir or reserve of purely conceptual events (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 36).

Everything can happen every moment potentially. What is the horizon of philosophy then? Where does philosophy as one form of expression find its limits? What is its consistency and how do Deleuze and Guattari (1994) call this specific milieu? “Philosophy is at once concept creation and instituting of the plane. The concept is the beginning of philosophy, but the plane is its instituting” (p. 41). Though in *A Thousand Plateaus* they seem to indicate that *plane of immanence* and *plane of consistency* refer to different disciplines and practices, in their last collaborative work *What is Philosophy?* they use both these notions exclusively to indicate the plane of philosophy. Nevertheless, they state that a plane of immanence is “not the relative horizon that functions as a limit, which changes with an observer and encloses observable states of affairs, but the absolute horizon, independent of any observer, which makes the event as concept independent of a visible state of affairs in which it is brought about” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 36). This immanent trait belongs to every plane. Although a plane of immanence is singular, there is nonetheless more than one plane or more than one kind of plane of immanence. Like concepts, planes also differ in time and change modes over time. A plane of immanence is rather *intuitive*. The chaos yet does not indicate randomness as Manuel DeLanda (2007) and Brian Massumi (1992) argue. It is plurality of consistency. Massumi states that it operates as “the potential for generating from the same equation a variety of diagrams” (p. 22). The potentiality of variation already emerges when Deleuze and Guattari (1994) argue that the plane of immanence is a two-headed creature:

²⁴ In the sixth chapter I will discuss the concept of *whatever* in Agamben’s work. For him *whatever* means exactly the opposite of the conventional understanding of the term in the American talk shows.

²⁵ John Rajchman (2011) even suggests that it was due to Deleuze’s empiricist attitude, as well as his love for logical thought, that he found a way out of the abyss between the Anglo-Saxon tradition of analytic thought and the continental phenomenological discourse.

²⁶ They lend this term from James Joyce.

The plane of immanence has two facets as Thought and as Nature, as *Nous* and as *Physis*. That is why there are always many infinite movements caught within each other, each folded in the others, so that the return of one instantaneously relaunches another in such a way that the plane of immanence is ceaselessly being woven, like a gigantic shuttle. To turn toward does not imply merely to turn away but to confront, to lose one's way, to move aside (p. 38).

Thinking and being cannot be separated. A plane is a dynamic space of matter that rhizomatically informs bodies and enunciations. Ethical thought, methodical reflections and fixated opinions arise on this plane. Yet in our ethical reflections in connection to politics of flight it is essential to criticize the manner in which political ideologies and policies fixate life and thought. This is why in *The Order of Things* Foucault (2005^a) says that it is almost impossible to think beyond a method or ethical discourse. One is never randomly fooling around in the abyss of non-ethical thought. Even in the rupture between two discourses one still hops from one form of logic to the other. Politics of flight is a milieu on which multiple planes with different ethics and morals simultaneously emerge. What are these different types of dynamics within politics of flight? The shift between these are, however, not diachronic but synchronic. Differentiation of these planes is not an easy task, due to the fact that we are always within a plane, in a middle of a milieu, which we intend to decipher. A plane of immanence is always presupposed, pre-philosophical, though not pre-existing to philosophy. An idea as a force, is the coming to existence in and of philosophy, and the plane, on which it emerges, consists of an instituting slice of chaos that brings about the birth of new ideas. Deleuze and Guattari (1994) state:

We will say that *THE* plane of immanence is, at the same time, that which must be thought and that which cannot be thought (p. 59).

It is precisely this necessity as well as impossibility of identifying the plane of immanence that has focused my research on the notion of flight and its milieu. The milieu of flight has been identified by contradictory ethical claims and political dilemmas. In a sense, it can be argued that one is permanently struggling with its inconsistencies and non-consistencies, as a result of which the political milieu differentiates itself from the philosophical milieu. While conventional philosophy needs to overcome the inconsistencies that appear on its plane, politics is aware that it is precisely those inconsistencies, dilemmas and aporia that give rise to its movements. It is the struggle between opposites and the implied contradictions – between democracy and autocracy, monarch and republic, left and right, conservative and progressive, upper class and lower class, oppressed and oppressor, factory owners and the workers, employers' rights and the employees' rights, nationalism and internationalism, the inhabitants and intruders – that brings about the *antagonistic* and *agonistic* process that is often called politics. Yet, politics is not solely an antagonistic field. Antagonism as the key trait of politics – which motorizes critique, opposition, and resistance – is a cloud that camouflages the affirmation of a multiplicity of ethical discourses. In the second part, it will become clear that each type of politics – totalitarianism (chapter 4), multiculturalism (chapter 5) and coming community (chapter 6) – deals with this antagonism from different angles.

Along this line, no matter how great the urge is to clarify a discourse on a plane, Deleuze and Guattari (1994) argue that layers of *illusions* and *fogs* as ‘thought’s mirages’ (p. 49) are always surrounding planes: transcendence, universality, eternity and description. Let us recall the idea of *transcendental empiricism*. The two notions thus need one another, because empiricism alone lacks the ability to create a feedback loop toward its own movement. Isolating *transcendence* one immediately tends to create hierarchies within the immanent. A connection between the two – empiricism and transcendence – creates a pragmatic approach, which is driven by a critical attitude towards such a predisposition. Ideologies, whether religious or not, often anchor themselves in an outside transcendent field, triggering its oppositions²⁷ while pragmatism permanently calculates its own change due to immanent transformations. The illusion of transcendence relates to the second illusion: the illusions that *universals* can explain global processes. For example, universalistic thought reaches out to find resemblance and similarities in human behavior in order to install a discourse on the nature of men, making their actions calculable. Is warfare an immanent characteristic of men, and hence refuge and death its logical outcome?

Such ideological questions and argumentations have often stimulated to draw general conclusions on what human and what non-human is, as we will see in the fourth chapter. However, even functions based upon primitive human emotions, such as anger and fear, are not universal.²⁸ Moralistic assumptions such as *inhuman acts and behavior* often refer to what so-called humans rather than non-humans do. Deleuze and Guattari (1994) suggest that universals do not explain but time and again need justification and explanation themselves. The illusion of universals let us sequentially “fall into a triple illusion – one of contemplation or reflection²⁹ or communication” (p. 49). As mentioned in the first chapter, these illusions have the tendency to refer to a transcending truth or essence beyond their own practice. Opinions result from a certain consistency on a specific plane and, within a milieu of thought, they are mistakenly assumed to become representative of some kind of truth that occurs on all planes in all times. Instead of universal identification we better talk about multiversal unfolding.

The idea of universal gives rise to the next illusion: *eternity*, in which the creative act of ideas is sacrificed for the sake of universalization. While universality is a territorial homogenizing act, eternity homogenizes through time, searching and accentuating the similarities and relating this to an original event or being. The last illusion is that of *description* in which propositions overdetermine the

²⁷ In her critique on monotheism Rita Gross (1991) argues that monotheistic attitude does not limit itself to the monotheistic religions but springs out of the idea of a universal truth. According to her this universal tendency of truth always leads to xenophobic and ethnocentric tendencies, by which each anomaly appears as demonic. Yet, her critique, unfortunately, focuses merely on monotheistic religions, rather than monotheistic attitudes in general.

²⁸ The behavior of chimpanzees for instance is often used to explain the essential violent nature of men. De Waal (1995) argues that the discovery of Bonobo chimpanzees, due to their bisexual, female dominance and their substitution of violence with sexual intercourse, disrupts the idea of human beings as inherently violent and male-dominated evolved chimpanzees.

²⁹ The idea of reflection here refers to a process in which a subject by contemplation could find his true essence – an everlasting identity – and thus can communicate this identity in a clear way. Some interpretations in psychology are still in the ban of such illusion. In this study, however the term reflection is seen as a process in which the identity of the subject is rather lost than found due to its permanent changing relationality.

concept, as a result of which “propositions are confused with concepts”, demanding a reference for the concept on the scientific *plane of reference* (p. 50). Description transcends the dynamics of concepts within their milieu, universalizing and eternalizing them. What defines these notions as illusionary is their urge of fixation within an unfixable process. As fixated points notions assume a beginning, an end, or an essence that without change occurs in time and space.

That so many fogs arise is explained in two ways. Firstly, because thought cannot stop itself from interpreting immanence as immanent to something, the great Object of contemplation, the Subject of reflection, or the Other subject of communication: then transcendence is inevitably reintroduced. And if this cannot be avoided it is because it seems that each plane of immanence can only claim to be unique, to be *the* plane, by reconstituting the chaos it had to ward off: the choice is between transcendence and chaos (p. 51).

The appearance of these illusions as well as the process of territorialization remains unavoidable due to the fear for chaos. Despite its critique on some forms of territorial thinking, my analysis will unavoidably fix new territories, unwillingly suggesting moral judgments with universal tendencies. Even Deleuze and Guattari do not attempt to negate transcendental, universal, eternal and descriptive forces. They will rather argue that despite the illusion that these are external forces they will time and again show that these tendencies emerge immanently. Deleuze and Guattari’s intention, as well as mine, is to map out the processes in which these illusions immanently appear and through which processes re/deform. They just oppose the idea that *only* through these similarities connections become possible and sensible. Difference, as we also have seen in Arendt’s thought, is connection through plurality. Where do consistencies function effectively and where do they block life processes? In which cases are antagonisms productive and in which cases are they destructive?

It is the diversity of these questions that bring about the complexity of mapping out a politics of flight. Milieu of flight is not a one-dimensional space but rather consists of multiple milieus engaged in an amalgamating process. It is within this complexity that every description appears as too simplistic. While descriptions follow a line of thought in order to remain consistent in their logical elaborations, and while cartographers map out only one form of political milieu, the politics of flight instead gives rise to multiple mappings and multiple lines of thought. This could be characterized by the Foucaultian concept heterotopias. Heterotopias are real places outside the main order or space. Nevertheless, this outside is relative. Heterotopias are thus opposed to absolute utopias as mirrors that give an image of a perfect space but without reality. Foucault defines them as virtual as opposed to the reality of heterotopias. This virtual however differs from the virtual in Deleuze’s work.

In his article *Of Other Spaces* Foucault (1967) testifies that even the understanding of history relates itself to space instead of time. History is mapping out time according to spatial coordinates, while the whole range of history is an amalgamation of multiple spaces. According to Foucault heterotopias follow six principles.

1. The first is that heterotopias appear in every culture: “there is probably not a single culture in the world that fails to constitute heterotopias” (Foucault, 1967). No matter how homogenous

a culture appears it to be, it always creates outside spaces that are paradoxically immanent to it. Whenever a practice does not follow the norm, a space is created to include such an action or subject by exclusion. In this sense, radical anti-Muslims and Islamic State are trapped in the illusion of homogeneity of more than one billion people. Some spaces – such as *boarding schools* and *psychiatric clinics* in Foucault's analysis or refugee camps in the analysis of Agamben – differentiate themselves from the 'ordinary' course of life.

2. The second principle of heterotopias is the transformation of their function through time. Foucault gives *cemeteries* as an example. The space of the dead in modern times functions differently and more individualistically than in pre-modern times. The cry of Khizr Khan – whose son Humayun Khan, a US soldier, had died in Baghdad for the sake of America – toward Donald Trump to visit the cemeteries is yet another example of changing discourses in which cemeteries become the objects that determine whether or not the so-called other belongs to a nation-state. In part II I will emphasize the synchronic transformation of territories by accentuating the different manners in which flight is approached by different types of politics: totalitarianism, multiculturalism and coming community.
3. The multiplicity of spaces and functions gives rise to a third principle: Heterotopia is capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several sites that are in themselves incomparable. In the above-mentioned politics, these are thus – despite their coexistence and relationality – not simply interchangeable and comparable to one another.
4. The fourth principle "Heterotopias are most often linked to slices in time – which is to say that they open onto what might be termed, for the sake of symmetry, heterochronies" (Foucault, 1967). The description of European history and territories varies whether you are minority or not. Even through generations there are different lines of experiencing events and different logics of gestural developments.
5. The incompatibility and the connections between these descriptions give rise to the complex fifth principle in which Foucault states that heterotopias are *closed* as well as *penetrable*. The example of doors is in Foucault's analysis extremely clarifying. A door gives entrances and at the same time it closes a space from outside. The same goes for borders. This is also the case with the diversity of types of communities within politics of flight. On the one hand, they exclude one another due to their incompatible characters, on the other hand they break through – or in words of Deleuze and Guattari deterritorialize – one another.
6. The final principle of heterotopias is that they do not define the real space as such, but always challenge the dominant understanding of a milieu. Heterotopias in terms of Deleuze and Guattari have a molecular and nomadic quality. These are real and virtual outside spaces, where what remains hidden or unpracticed within a 'normal' space can be manifested. Colonies were such spaces, according to Foucault. While Europe claimed brotherhood and equality to all, colonies were the spaces where men oppressed and enslaved the other. It is still an awkward idea that The Netherlands before 1945 were the biggest Muslim nation in the world, although this was never experienced as such by inhabitants of the part of The Netherlands that was situated in Western Europe. And while the contemporary 'Western' countries speak of worker's rights and equality, the idea of economic refugees not being political refugees opposes such claims.

Heterotopias operate on a plane of inconsistencies. As such they are not moralistically right per se. They could be forms of resistance as well as spaces where the unwanted are gathered and excluded. It is the complexity of this multiplicity of space, history and morality that makes the mapping of a politics of flight complex *and* necessary. A politics of flight includes a fusion of heterochronic heterotopias. Not only because different ethnical groups are involved. That is too simplistic a conclusion. The history of migration in the west is equally heterochronic and heterotopic to that of different ethnicities.

Hence, the necessity of multiple approaches in order to comprehend what occurs and happens in a politics of flight. As a layered milieu *politics of flight* then will be approached by applying different disciplines such as philosophy, semiotics, artistic, juridical and social sciences, anthropology, but on different scales – micro-, meso- and macropolitical – where different contents (assemblages of bodies) and expressions (assemblages of enunciation) are produced. Consisting of different planes, plateaus or strata, all intertwined and due to its interdisciplinary, interdiscursive, intermedial and inter-strata characteristics, a politics of flight is necessarily interpolitical in a global setting. It is through the multiplicity of the milieus that different perspectives within a notion of flight arise. Yet, to analyze the complex milieu of the trilogy *totalitarianism*, *multiculturalism* and *coming community* I need to define and refine the discursive tools through which I intend to map out their milieus of flight. The next chapter – after the analysis of the manner of approach in the first chapter and the manner of comprehending a milieu in this chapter – will expound the next programmatic question:

*What are the discursive tools that we need to differentiate layers
in politics of flight?*

Chapter 3: Discursive Tools and the World of Politics

Philosophers ... must no longer accept concepts as a gift, nor merely purify and polish them, but first *make* and *create* them, present them and make them convincing. Hitherto one has generally trusted one's concepts as if they were a wonderful dowry from some sort of wonderland: but they are, after all, the inheritance from our most remote, most foolish as well as most intelligent ancestors

(Nietzsche, 1967, pp. 220-221, Fragment 409).

3.1 From Cologne to Lesbos

Language as a challenge does not only concern the refugee, but all other speakers. What is at stake is expression *as such*. I experienced this during a workshop that I had organized for the event *Zicht op Rotterdam* in September 2014 with the title *City and her Expressions*. During this workshop, I showed parts of the film *Nahid=Venus* (Parisa Yousef Doust, 2008). This semi-documentary is about Parisa's aunt Nahid. In Persian language Nahid means Venus. Due to her political activities, the Iranian government imprisoned Nahid. After several years she was released from prison, but the Nahid that was known to her family, had perished. At the moment, she resides in a psychiatric clinic in Germany. She is locked in in an everlasting numbing shock, she cannot communicate and her face is absently present. She has become a pure gaze, fixed eyes looking at the camera. In one of the final shots Yousef Doust fixes this gaze for a couple of minutes. While showing this scene, I noticed that the participants of the workshop after less than a minute became uneasy. They started to look away and move on their chairs. When I asked them to reflect on the scene they immediately distanced themselves and started to talk about global politics. When I asked them why they felt uneasy, they were quiet for a moment. Finally, one of the participants typified her experience as choking. Others confirmed this. One of the participants said: "I couldn't think coherently."

How can we relate and analyze this inability to think coherently? In the previous chapter I characterized politics of flight as a plane of consistency and a plane of immanence. I also argued that different regimes of signs, images, gestures and faciality are at work within this politics. In this final chapter of the programmatic part one – after pleading for different approaches towards the

multiplicity of agent and towards the event of flight (chapter 1), and after arguing for different streams of thought in the heterophasic and heterotopic milieu of flight (chapter 2) – it is time to forge some discursive tools in order to analyze the multiplicity of this milieu. In this chapter I will argue that it is not a lack of expression that characterizes the image and gesture of Nahid in Yousef Doust's film. It is rather the paradigmatic structure within policies approaching *others* that fuel the disquieting experience of "I couldn't think coherently".

Discursive tools are never all-inclusive. In executing this investigation, I have to make a decision in order to cut through the rhizomatic chaos of politics of flight. This decision is twofold: 1) in order to meet the multiplicity of politics of flight, I have chosen to include a set of approaches instead of a singular approach; 2) the chosen sets of approaches must be made immediately relevant for the current state of affairs within politics of flight. Therefor in 3.2 by connecting philosophy, science and art, I can use the correlated discursive tools – concepts, functions and affects/percept (sensations) – to criticize the homogenizing tendencies within political discourse on refuge and migration. Yet the question remains what kind of *thing* these discursive tools critically dissect. In 3.3 I will therefor introduce a fourth domain: politics. It will be argued that an idea of 'the Other' within politics operates differently than the idea of other that is developed within the previous mentioned disciplines. This chapter will, however, not only treat the intra-consistency of the notions within its own domain, but will also focus on their inter-consistency. I will in conclusion typify these cross-breedings with a *hyphen*: politico-philosophy. Finally, in 3.4 I will specify through this hyphen the discursive tools I need to differentiate and analyze the three political configurations which will be explored in the second part of this study and in which a politics of flight is both historically and systematically expressed. As a start, however, let us focus on a contemporary event.

Every day news-items pass, every day the complexity of refuge and the crisis of refugees seem to become more uncontrollable than the day before. The events in Aleppo during the Syrian Civil War bring about a complexity of a world politics – a complexity of assemblages of bodies and assemblages of enunciations – and yet all parties often oversimplify its complexity. On the one hand, Russia – in their regional interest by supporting Assad's regime – bombs the area and weakens the opposing parties arguing that they assist a regime that has been disadvantaged by western imperialism; on the other hand, the west closes its borders out of fear of terrorism, blaming Assad for the disorder in his country while not acknowledging that Islamic State has been created by the ex-military of Saddam Hussein due to previous interventions of the west (Melissen, p. 2015). While the west on the one hand blames the Greeks for a lack of policy toward refugees and makes anti-humanitarian deals with the Turks – for the so-called safety of refugees – in order to stop the refugees to cross the Mediterranean Sea, the Turks are bombing the most potential ally against the IS: the Kurds. In-between both parties human rights are violated for the sake of the established deal. Aleppo is a political heterotopic territory and its people have become the victims of a geopolitics in which parties look the other way or blame the other party for their involvement. The burning of car tires by the inhabitants – to create a fog that impedes the visual ability of the bombers – sensitizes how badly they want to escape an unwanted visibility of the signifiers. While all these parties cynically wage war, time and again the

victims are being criminalized in their intention to flee. The events such as on *New Years Eve 2015/2016* in Cologne cause such criminalizing tendencies to escalate.

What happened in Cologne? How did this single event lead to a new vocabulary or rather strengthen an old vocabulary on the nature of the Other and finally made Europeans close an unethical unlawful treaty with Turkey and imprison refugees in the camps in Greece? During the celebration of *New Year* men – with middle-eastern features – boldly sexually harassed some women. Due to a lack of overview, the police failed to control and arrest the harassers. In the following days, more and more women came forward and people complained about the lack of action of authorities. From the start – due to their features – the harassers were claimed to be refugees from Syria. However, after a while it became clear that these men were mostly migrants with *North African* background. Yet the idea of refugees being essentially dangerous remained intact. The body of a refugee was identified as a rapist, which strengthens the idea of the Other as terrorist and hazardous for western moral, values and norms. In the days after in different states of Europe demonstrations were held for rights of women. The attack of a Syrian refugee, whose asylum was rejected, in Reutlingen in July 2016, murdering a pregnant woman, fully confirmed the collective fear. The image of a policeman, half standing on his bleeding body, justifies a truthness within this fear.

Yet, most participants of demonstrations after the incidents on New Year claimed that their involvement had nothing to do with racism or ethnocentrism. They solely opposed all people who did not respect these rights. Yet, there were no arguments why these participants waited for such an event to put one of the most pressing issues of Europe on the agenda, namely sexism and sexual harassment being the most criminal activity. Even more so through these demonstrations parties such as Pegida (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West) accused the authorities and the media of concealing the criminal tendencies in refugee camps. This concealment referred merely to crimes committed by refugees, but did not criticize the unlawful circumstances in refugee camps created by European governments within and beyond the borders of Europe, for example the flagrant violation of international rights of children. The media and politicians – with future ratings and elections in mind – took over the popularized jargon. Instead of nuancing the claims they rather confirmed the fear by going along with the binary setting of victimized western women and rapist middle-eastern men in general. In an interview with minister Jet Bussemaker on 21st January 2016 on News-Time in The Netherlands this discourse was more than obvious. While her tablemates Hasna el Maroudi and Laila al Zwaini tried to nuance their violent sexual experience beyond the ideas of culture, ethnicity and religion – both expressing their fear of awakening ethnocentric sentiments – the minister did not hesitate to repeatedly speak merely of hostility within Arabic culture against women; leaving out the systematic abuse of women in The Netherlands by men with diverse backgrounds. Even the journalist pretending to understand the others' fear of replacing one type of exclusion with another, finally plainly asked the minister which measures she intended to take as to the *integration* of refugees. And as Schinkel (2008) and Ahmed (2014) argue, through this jargon of integration by defining a criminal act – abuse of women – as an essential characteristic of the culture of the other, a culture of us purifies itself from such an act.

The singular event on this New Year Eve and the experience of these women on micro-level led to new policies in connection to refugee camps and the strategy of integration. Refugees were bombarded by lectures and seminars explaining how one has to behave in a European setting, arguing that western values differ from the values of their country of origin. Flyers were passed in refugee camps with a set of ‘rules of engagement’ toward women. While explicitly associating their religion and culture as hostile, refugees were explicitly asked to distance themselves from the events in Cologne while in the whole history of Europe no white man is systematically asked to distance himself from an abusive act toward a woman by another white man; nor as Schinkel (2008) argues his sense of integration is at issue. In return, the policies that were installed on macro-level translated themselves on institutional levels. Even during the events – such as Carnival in the south of The Netherlands, which is not visited by refugees or men with Middle Eastern background, yet sexual intimidations happen every year – by the associate organization flyers were past in refugee camps with a set of rules of engagement toward women. In return, due to this macro-political attitude on micro-level European citizens – even with progressive background – started to fear the inhabitants of refugee camps. This policy trickled down from a macro-level to mesopolitical, institutional levels. New demonstrations and civil disobediences aroused. Refugee camps were attacked and mayors who tried to nuance the story were threatened. Although they condemned the civil disobedience they sympathized with the underlying fear of these citizens, acknowledging the fear of parents thinking that their daughters were not save near refugees. In this overall sense of fear, the next step to stop the flows of refugees was easily made. Some European countries started to suggest closing the European borders. The *ethnocentricity* of the fear, however, didn’t become part of the mainstream discussions. Instead, the main argument *against* closing borders was rather purely out of economic interests.

The event in Cologne is merely one example of how discourses determine a politics of flight. Personal experiences uncontrollably trigger moral claims, initiating repressive policies. In the previous chapter, it has been argued that the heterotopic milieu of a politics of flight articulates itself as a complex Gordian knot of multiple contents and expressions. I have stated that in order to understand this milieu one needs to include incomprehension within the process of comprehension. These heuristic suggestions problematize the classical idea of investigation. Each research needs a clear set of notions and sharply defined discursive tools that enable scientists and commentators to diagnose events in an adequate way, creating the frames through which a phenomenon is diagnosed. The phenomenon in this research is a milieu called politics of flight. With what kind of tools do we investigate a milieu that due to its complexity, defies any singular logic of framing? Due to its integral character and rather fuzzy agency it can be approached from many sides, being analyzed by different disciplines on different planes of thought. What does this imply for philosophy, science and art?

3.2 Expressive Tissue of Correspondences

3.2.1 Concept: Philosophical Creation

According to Deleuze and Guattari (1994) the practice of philosophy contains an act, which is immediately revealed in the introduction of *What is Philosophy?* That is adequately titled *The*

Question Then.... Inspired by Nietzsche's vitalism, Deleuze and Guattari define philosophy as an act of *creation*. Philosophy aims at the creation of new concepts to meet a problem, and not the imitative conservation of old ones to repeat the problem. If philosophy is a practice of problematizing, then exile is the politico-ontological status of philosophy: in creating differences it distances itself from the ruling discourse. It marginalizes itself. This idea of exile does not explain refugee camps on the same discursive level, but it works as a liminal force (as we have seen in 1.4.3) in the middle of a dominant discourse. As Cornelis Verhoeven (1967) suggests, the ordinary way of thinking and judging – in this case the demonization of the other due to events in Cologne – is questioned.

So, philosophy is not only a reactive act of de(con)struction, but also an affirmative act of creation.

The philosopher is the concept's best friend; he is potentiality of the concept. That is, philosophy is not a simple art of forming, inventing, or fabricating concepts, because concepts are not necessarily forms, discoveries, or products. More rigorously, philosophy is the discipline that involves *creating* concepts (Deleuze & Guattari, p. 1994, p. 5).

Philosophy creates specific objects of thought: *concepts*. Creating is miraculous due to its capability to *imagine* or shape through, despite and beyond the actual (as I have argued in 2.2.1). Philosophy is not a mere critique, but its critical drift *involves* an affirmative act, *creation*, implying a crossbreeding of multiple acts within philosophy. Its affirmative approach is not a simple thoughtless *yes* to everything or anything, like the 'ia, ia' of the donkey in Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Affirmative thought is not the opposite of critical. It refuses to just criticize thought, persisting in a negative mode, as Oosterling shows with the concept of the hypercritical and his plea to think beyond cynicism.¹ Deleuze (1997) boldly states: "the negative is *the objective field of the false problem*, the fetish in person" (p. 208). What does this affirmative thinking indicate?

1) First, this does not mean that the critical act is a secondary act. Affirmative thought is neither a yes nor a no, as is the case with the oppositional tendency of either-or. Thus, while the incident in Cologne led to an idea that you *either* plea for the rights of women *or* the rights of freedom of religion or culture, a critical affirmative thought needs to question the underlying prejudice – for example the misleading preposition that misogyny is something that happens elsewhere – that produces the idea that these two rights are essentially opposed to one another (Crenshaw, 1991). The critical and the

¹ In *Door schijn bewogen* (1996) Oosterling argues that two new forms of critical surpass the traditional Kantian philosophical attitude. First, *hypercritical* – meaning more critical than critical – leads to an aporetic tension that in its reactive expression leads to cynicism. The affirmation of this aporia is becoming active and creative once it acknowledges that the aporetic is an expression of an affirmative in-between: inter-esse. Second, *hypocritical* – meaning less critical than critical – could also be affirmed. In its non-critical use, it leads to a specific form of life: a radical mediocre existence (Oosterling 2000^b). In the 'self-reflective' affirmation – '*reflaction*' – of the aporia, in acknowledging that we are *both* part of the problem *and* part of the solution it reaches beyond cynicism and becomes inter-esse (Oosterling, 2014, 296-297).

creative act of thought are simultaneous in the event of thought. Philosophy thus rather absorbs than eliminates critique.

2) Second, this twofold act of (de/re)territorialisation or (de/re)coding is not a simple negation of old elements in thought. In order to move beyond a global hostile tendency toward women we need to dig deep in our bygone memory. Reconstruction and recomposition actualize the historical factuality of a concept. Deleuze's terminology and methodology – genealogy – however differs from that of Derrida – deconstruction. They approach time and space in a different way. In his breath-taking text 'I'm Going to Have to Wander All Alone', Derrida (2001^b) addresses his admiration for Deleuze and their difference (pp. 192-195). Derrida's deconstruction, in fragmenting the idea, refers to the actual, yet remains attached to the ruptured idea. Deleuze and Guattari's (de/re)territorialisation refers to space, but eventually to relations. It approaches a field or rather a milieu of thought in which history as a non-chronological past intertwines with virtual and actual reality of today (as I have shown in 14.2). Our knowledge of flight does not simply progress or deteriorate in time. We do not get more sympathetic or more hostile, wiser or dumber on the matter. The events of the Second World War did affect the approach toward refugees, yet histories and their lessons are often forgotten in time. Nonetheless, present generations in European cities are much more acquainted with diversity than their parents and grandparents. Their approach is not better or worse than their grandfathers who were born in or just after the war. Their approach is merely different and contains its own lessons. Their terminology does not simply eliminate old territories, but overcodes those due to other, not yet actualized, i.e. virtual territorial relations. In *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987) Deleuze and Guattari redefine territory from spatial into relational terms: a territory is "the critical distance between two beings of the same species". Relationality defines the body and as such the I: "Mark your distance. What is mine is first of all my distance; I possess only distances" (p. 319). Philosophy unfolds through this fortunate yo-yo effect, losing and gaining space.

3) Third, creation and knowledge are not opposites as beginning and end of an act, but they are intertwined in the same philosophical *gesture*. Concept is not the end of a long development, it happens in-between; its creation is an *event*, its quality evental. Deleuze and Guattari (1994) even suggest that a concept is *self-positing* (p. 11). It forces itself upon thinking, emerging as an assemblage, situating the subject from within flows of desire – affective, sensational – in relation to new planes. By implication the thinker does neither own nor control the process of thought. Nevertheless, through its historical development in retrospect philosophy has had a specific image of controlling and directing this chaotic process. When once upon a time Kant decided to appreciate the idea of autonomy as a critical attitude toward authorities and governments, he could not foresee that this idea of autonomy would become a tool for governments to impose an ideal autonomous citizen – a working and taxpaying consumer eventually – on others. The poverty in south of Rotterdam – one out of four children, mostly with migrant background, lives in poverty – and the lack of official services due to the idea that self-sufficiency (De Brabander, 2014) is a virtue, shows how after centuries Kantian autonomy as a so-called political inclusive concept has become an excluding imperative.

Deleuze and Guattari define concept in this way – as self-positing – in order to disclose a *mi-lieu* for philosophical thinking. In *What is Philosophy?* they explore the epistemological status of philosophy, science and art without valuing one practice over the other. Like Arendt and Agamben, they argue that philosophy is not thinking as the production of knowledge of an essence through *theoria*, i.e. *contemplation* (Plato). Nor is philosophy a form of *reflection* (Descartes) defining the basics and fundamentals of life and thought. Finally – as we have seen with the idea of communicability in Arendt’s and Agamben’s thinking (see previous sections: 2.2.1 & 2.2.2) – philosophy is not *communication* (Habermas) – communication being defined as articulation of a well articulated and procedurally rationalized *opinion* especially for the sake of a *consensus*. It is not even an act of *clarification* of statements (the early Wittgenstein). Philosophy is first and for all the *problematization* of the obviousness of clear arguments and the *creation* of concepts. The wondering and problematization within philosophy is thus not for the sake of the spectacle, but rather in order to break through the spectacle, even in its own realm of thinking.² While on the one hand the secretary of state Bussemaker acknowledges that in some European countries domestic violence remains a problem without defining it as a European problem, on the other hand she does not hesitate to define the problem of some Middle Eastern men as a problem of a whole Arab communities: externalizing and universalizing singular events according to the spectacle of the media and populist parties. It is a homogenization of singular events that lead to universal bifurcations: the spectacle of we against the other. As we will see, policies are defined within these homogenizations.

Every creation is singular, and the concept as a specifically philosophical creation is always a singularity. The first principle of philosophy is that Universals explain nothing but must themselves be explained (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 7).

Despite their differences Deleuze and Guattari as well as Arendt and Agamben reject the idea of contemplation, reflection, communication and clarification as a universal trait of thinking that can be applied transhistorically to all men. For them generalization is a result of a radiant affect of a specific assemblage of bodies and enunciations. A non-contemplative, non-reflective, non-communicative and non-clarifying philosophy is, however, not silent. It has its own vocabulary and syntax. It has its own philosophical *taste* and as such is communicable. In her elaboration of Kant’s aesthetic judgment, Arendt (1982) argues that taste is not a personal and unrelated affect. Taste appears only through communicability of a community. Taste is what is shared.

Finally, Deleuze and Guattari (1994) argue that although philosophy is not obsessed by effective functionality and production, it is nevertheless not a useless act. They even ironically state: “to say that the greatness of philosophy lies precisely in its not having any use is a frivolous answer that not even young people find amusing any more” (p. 9). The function of philosophy is its capability

² This is one the reasons why Richard de Brabander (2008) in his introduction to philosophy for ethics for social workers states that philosophy does not wonder or is not surprised by unordinary events, but by daily life. Philosophy is amazed by what we call normal, as Foucault criticized in his oeuvre. In line with Cornelis Verhoeven, De Brabander, however, also suggests that the astonishment within philosophy is not a road to truth, philosophy rather urges us to sustain the astonishment. Wonder for the sake of the permanency of wondering (pp. 11 & 30-31).

to create concepts and disclose new consistencies. That is the image of thought that Deleuze and Guattari propose (as I have shown in 2.2.3).

Yet, the way Deleuze speaks of concepts in *Difference and Repetition* differs from his approach to concepts in his texts with Guattari. In *What is Philosophy?* philosophy is the skill of creating concepts. In *Difference and Repetition* this presupposes the deconstruction of the Hegelian concept – das Begriff – that has been analyzed from its own immanent logic. For Hegel, a concept is the realization of a not yet in its vastness comprehended reality. Except, given Arendt and Agamben's shift from communication to communicability, what is now at stake is the precise status of the concept beyond the interpretation of the notion of concept by German idealism. Let me start by distinguishing *concept*, as indicated by Deleuze and Guattari, from the German word *Begriff* and the Dutch word *begrip*.

Begriff is often translated as notion, idea and even as concept. Both Deleuze and Guattari's concept and the Hegelian term *Begriff* indicate more than a linguistic notion. Beyond the limits of language these 'notions' function within the complexity of different types of expression. Yet the concept as understood by Deleuze and Guattari is not one and the same as the Hegelian *Begriff*.³

1) First, *Begriff* refers to the verb *griff* meaning to handle, to hold, to grip. It refers to *manipulation*. It gets hold of something, grasping its meaning, no matter how momentary this holding may be. In Hegelian dialectics *Begriff* is the sublation of being (*Sein*) and essence (*Wesen*), of something not yet understood and the objectification of it that arise from an immanent urge to understand itself. It is the full comprehension and as a result full realization of being, joining substance (Spinoza) and subject (Kant). As such *Begriff* indicates an understanding that pre-exists subjects and subjectivity. The subject's act of comprehending is secondary to the existence of understanding of the *Begriff* by the Absolute Spirit (*Geist*) that realizes itself through the World Spirit (*Weltgeist*) in the course of human history. In this sense flight is in contrast with the idea of *Begriff*. Due to its nature as an event, as I have argued at the end of chapter one, flight escapes any form of grip.

2) Second, a concept – in this case flight – does not pre-exist its subject but rather emerges simultaneously with its subject. Thus, although – as we have seen through the developments of policies due to the events in Cologne – different parties define the process of flight in order to create coherent understanding of the experience of refuge by pinpointing refugees to clear character traits, the idea of flight contains more dimensions according to Deleuze and Guattari's concept. Concept is an eventual experience that envelops the subject, not something or an idea that the subject can hold on to or that others can use to objectify the process the refugee has been caught in. It is that which engages the subject as an experience; that which manifests and embraces its subject instead of being

³ In 'Round-table Discussion on Problems of Translating Hegel' John Findlay argues that the Hegelian term *Begriff* is not the same as the English term concept, but rather the English term *notion*. He then argues that the term concept means *something well-defined*, while the term notion indicates more than definition or *comprehension* (O' Malley et al, 1973, pp. 253-267). As is shown shortly the term concept in Deleuze and Guattari's work does not indicate a well-defined idea, but a process. However, I do use notion as a broader term in this research, but not as a substitution for or a translation of *Begriff*.

captured by it. A concept is the articulation of a problem – a breaking point within the ordinary way of life – without the comfort of a simple solution to a yet not fully understood being.

3) Finally, *Begriff* in association with understanding has moralistic overtones. It refers to sympathy, hence the affective characteristic of understanding. *Tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner*.⁴ For Hegel, the realization of a concept – in the formal-ontological sequence of the dialectics – implies simultaneously proper moral behavior that is guaranteed by the internalization of the institutional law as a moral law. *Begriff* demands such realization. As such a morality is involved, meaning that there is goodness in understanding the truth as is in realizing the Beautiful. This *Begriff* appears in slogans of movements such as Pegida; or politicians that understand the fear of the public for young single refugees as a form of truthness. Then, it also misleads those who plea for the rights of the refugees while trying to understand their fears and sorrows, neglecting the fact that for us – the citizens of European countries – there is no possibility of understanding the horrors of Aleppo. Even the inhabitants of this city in ruin are perplexed by incomprehension. In Arendt's words, it is this incomprehension of the ugliness of state of affairs that must lead us toward comprehending the necessity of change, necessity of creating new concepts.

Deleuze and Guattari's (1994) understanding of concept triggers multiple affects and implies becoming part of an assemblage, connected transversally to all directions, lines crisscross and connect from and to all directions to one another. Transversal qualify connections that are not bound to the vertical order. The connections are all over the place, as a result of which the implications of an event – such as Aleppo or Cologne – cannot be reduced to one universal morally underpinned discourse. They emphasize the *con* in *con*-cept: grasping together, not synthesizing but assembling in a folded complexity. Concept is an act of composition, combination, and consistency, and as such always needs more companions in thought. Concept is conceived, which means that it affects the body and reinforces engagement. However, this does not necessarily indicate a better understanding of the matter, let alone becoming a better person. A concept does not only have a *becoming* but also a *history*. A concept is new, but not an orphan. A concept moves and mobilizes. In relating to other concepts, its history is disseminated. Its movement implies a past, present and future, however, not *per se* in a linear order. It is a circular connectivity – through feedback loops, i.e. self-recurrent and self-reflective – that creates a milieu. This explains why the conceptual phenomenon flight creates a milieu of thought, which enables us to formulate a *politics of flight*. This milieu does not only connect ideas, notions and concepts, but, due to its heterotopic traits, also intertwines different histories with one another. Cologne is not a singular event; Aleppo is not an isolated city. In a concept geopolitical histories amalgamate. It connects itself not only with the refugee camps in Kenya, with the horrors that are endured by Eritrean refugees, but also with the wall in-between Mexico and United States.

The concept is not paradigmatic but *syntagmatic*; not projective but *connective*;
not hierarchical but *linking*; not referential but *consistent* (p. 91).

⁴ English translation: to understand all, is to forgive all. It is exactly this sense of comprehension that Arendt (1994) rejects the most: "Yet forgiving has so little to do with understanding that is neither its condition nor its consequence" (p. 308).

A concept serves as a shell in which different *components* are assembled forming *consistency*, i.e. an internal intensity that “renders components inseparable *within itself*” (p. 19). So, despite the relational setting of the composing act of a philosophical concept, it nevertheless has a strong immanent *endoconsistency*.

The events of Cologne thus show how micropolitical experiences on an affect level connect with macropolitical thinking on a conceptual level through a type of consistency within an idea of the Other. Yet, even in this setting a concept is not a puzzle that can be cut up into pieces and glued back again to its original composition. Being immanently *evental*, it cannot be analyzed and synthesized in a dualistic, Cartesian way. It is not the sum of its components that defines a concept. Its components are also affective, due to the interdisciplinary composing power of the concept. The unilateral explanation of the events in Cologne slowly created a hostile attitude towards refugees – more than half of progressive citizens of Germany have become hostile toward refugees. It strengthens a gated Europe (Huijjer, 2015) and unlawful state refugee camps, actively forgetting the fragility of new refugees on shore. The composing intensity prevents concepts from being simply used as a means to an end – like an instrumental tool – to describe something else or to comfort a subject in comprehending.

The effects of a concept and its affective components are not predictable because of its virtuality, meaning “real without being actual, ideal without being abstract” (p. 22). Kant’s concept *autonomy* is, as we have seen, an ideal; yet as an ideal it affects daily lives of men and women in modern society. A concept is not an actual object for the taking. Due to its aporetic quality its application immediately deterritorialize the epistemological territory whereupon it emerges and operates, enabling lines of flight. *Autonomy* as a concept is not only a tool for a policymaker but as a process it can also create resistance toward such policy itself. In other words, concept’s ‘object’ is ‘approachable’, but not methodologically conclusively identifiable, as has been argued in the first chapter. If we still want to ‘define’ it, this is the way Deleuze & Guattari propose to do it:

The concept speaks the event, not the essence or the thing – pure Event, a hecceity, an entity: the event of the Other or of the face ... The concept is defined by the *inseparability of a finite number of heterogeneous components traversed by a point of absolute survey at infinite speed* (p. 21).

What do *heterogeneity*, *hecceity*, and *infinite speed* mean in this context? Are these the rough material of tools that allow us to analyze a politics of flight? Part II explicates how heterogeneous this politics is. On top of that each layer of a political milieu – totalitarianism, multiculturalism or coming community – contains a *thisness* that engenders its own unique unfolding. Imagine the concept of body, and the history of this concept. Body is not one concept but consists of multiple concepts. The ancient Greeks applied the concept ‘body’ in different ways than Christian, Islamic, Buddhist Cartesian thinkers or modern scientists. The body that appears in the movement *Black Lives Matter* differs from those bodies of resistance before them. Identified bodies differ from the body without organs as circumscribed by Deleuze & Guattari (as I have shown in 1.2.2). The body of the *homo*

sacer (chapter 4) that Agamben introduces, is not the same as the *body of multicultural segment* (chapter 5) or that of *whatever being* in coming community (chapter 6). So, the concept 'body' affects our philosophical thought on different planes in different ways and in different directions. None of those meanings are conclusive. As for the infinite speed, each concept relates immediately to all directions, but in different speeds and intensities due to its different composition. Deleuze and Guattari's (1994) concept is on the one hand immanently *absolute* by not tolerating any other regime than its own act of intensity, by *its own speed*. A politics of flight intertwines different contents, different types of assemblages of bodies. Yet, on the other hand it is also *relative* due to its exoconsistency, the consistency of the concept in relation to other concepts. In relating to other concepts, it is a historical notion (p. 18).

The concept is a whole because it totalizes its components, but it is a fragmentary whole. Only on this condition can it escape the mental chaos constantly threatening it, stalking it, trying to reabsorb it (p. 16).

This fragmenting trait is crucial. De Brabander (2003) clearly notes:

The meaning of a fragment is not multiple due to the fact that it assembles various meanings or due to the fact that it gains various meanings in a given context, rather [it is multiple TR] because it refuses any kind of unity (p. 112, Translation TR).

Every concept as a fragmentary, porous whole presupposes a problem that can no longer be defined in *conventional* terms. As Appiah (2006) states, engaging with multiplicity is challenging conceptuality. Philosophical concepts share the confusion of heteronyms. Descartes, Marx and Irigaray all spoke of bodies, yet all three meant something else with it. Reduction of the one into the other misses the point of their differences. Heteronyms sound the same, but they disclose multiple streams of thought. This heteronymic trait has also crucial consequences in the elaboration of the notion of flight. Understanding the notion of flight asks for an analysis of the geohistorical complexity in which this notion is embedded. "Philosophy is a geophilosophy in precisely the same way that history is a geohistory" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 95). The multiplicity of geohistorical and geophilosophical components of the notion flight is the theme of the second part of this book.

Yet, if concepts are the 'objects' of a philosophical plane of thought, then who are its 'subjects'? In order to distance themselves from the binary logics of object versus subject, Deleuze and Guattari prefer to speak of *personae* instead of a subject or an identity. Ten Bos (2011) refers to the Latin meaning of the term *persona*: "there where noise goes through" (p.197, Translation TR). It does not refer to fixation but to a process: *going through*. The names on the philosophical *plane of immanence* – Arendt, Agamben, Deleuze and Guattari – do not refer to actual persons. They are already

enveloped in the folds of concepts. These names are not even the remains of something coherent: they do not refer to identities, but to engines of thought. As such these are *conceptual personae*.⁵

The conceptual persona is not the philosopher's representative but, rather, the reverse: the philosopher is only the envelope of his principal conceptual persona and of all the other personae who are the intercessors [*intercesseurs*], the real subjects of his philosophy. Conceptual personae are the philosopher's 'heteronyms,' and the philosopher's name is the simple pseudonym of his personae (p. 64).

Foucault's analysis in 'What is an Author?' explains this in yet another way. Foucault (1986^a) does not wonder who an author is, or what defines the unity of a work. He challenges both the unity of an author as a subject and the unity of a work as an object. *Killing* the author or declaring its death is not an answer either. Although executed by Roland Barthes in 1968 in 'the death of the author' in order to make the subject and its psychology less relevant for its work, Barthes also asks for the work no longer to be identified as a unity. The work is a node in an intertextual network. It is related to all these texts that virtually motorize it. The author and work do not relate in a simple binary opposition of subject and object, but both rather function within what Foucault calls a discursive practice. As such an author's name functions as a conceptual persona. The name organizes a discourse, and even if there are contradictions in an oeuvre, the name unites them as a discourse on contradictions (pp. 101-120). An author is thus according to Foucault "a particular source of expression" (p. 111). As philosophers, we are not interested in what Spinoza ate, loved and ached about. The name Spinoza relates not only to his *Tractatus* and his *Ethica*, but also to all his unfinished works and all the comments on his work that came long after his death. *A name refers to a composition*, Foucault states:

The author's name serves to characterize a certain mode of being of discourse: the fact that discourse has an author's name ... does not pass from the interior of a discourse to the real and exterior individual who produced it; instead, the name seems always to be present, marking off the edge of the text (p. 107).

Summarizing, the discipline of *philosophy* has an 'object': *concept*. These concepts as *objects of thought* in philosophy unfold themselves immanently in their endoconsistency. Concepts relate to one another on a *plane of immanence* or *plane of consistency*. *Planes of immanence* are interleaves upon which concepts are linked, a linkage consisting of mobile bridges that transverses to all sides. The elements within these concepts are *components*. The philosophical plane that connects these concepts is the *plane of immanence*, and the philosophical figure that creates a certain composition of concepts

⁵ The term *persona* etymologically means 'mask' or playing a role or character. On governmental websites, we read about: person x. Although the person is here non-existent, he or she is nonetheless not meant as fictive figure. It refers to a general idea of a certain type of people; like Cindy is 25 years old, is married and has one child. Cindy is here a statistical figure. As we will see shortly, in a philosophical sense 'conceptual persona' does not refer to a statistical phenomenon, but functions as a composing engine.

and thought is called *conceptual personae*. The philosopher is the enunciator, the voice, which is always multiple as we have seen in the second chapter. Nahid in Yousef Doust's documentary is not voiceless, it is the cacophony of her expression that makes us speechless. The task of philosophy thus lies within such assemblages of enunciation – the necessity of expression of multiple exiles in thought – that is accentuated in the idea of communicability in Agamben and Arendt's lectures. These conceptual personae – as Artaud puts it (see my reference in: 1.2.2) – defy judgments by *dancing wrong side out*. Or as Deleuze and Guattari (1994) state: “conceptual personae are also the true agents of enunciation. ‘Who is 'I'?’ It is always a third person” (p. 65). Let us philosophers create concepts that enunciate the pain of misogyny as well as that of ethnocentricity, let us create gestural concepts that engages with the gaze of Nahid.

3.2.2 Function: Scientific Revolution

Next to philosophy, it is both to science and art as separate disciplines that politics refers to establish its coherence. Policies use science in order to legitimize their course of actions. It uses art in order to trigger a desirable affect for support and mental images to comprehend and totalize these as in a Gesamtkunstwerk. In the course of history, not only philosophy, but also science and art have shown a critical approach toward the spectacle of policies. In *What is Philosophy?* Deleuze and Guattari point out that creativity does not only belong to concept in philosophy, but also to other objects of thought: *function* in scientific practices and *affect/percept* or *sensation* in artistic practices. Science works in different directions and creates a different object of thought: *functions*. These are differentiated on the *plane of reference* that holds on to the scientific function. Science works with formulae that ‘represent’ real processes. In art on the *plane of composition*, another object of thought is triggered: *sensation*. Philosophy, science and art are the three disciplines that Deleuze and Guattari differentiate but also connect – a connection that they typify as “a rich *tissue of correspondences*” (p. 199).

Function is a composition of *functives*. The difference between function and concept is that while concept goes along with the *speed*, the function in science *slows down* the process, in order to actualize a perspective on state of affairs. It slows down in order to enable *observation*. The observation is not something that is manageable by the scientist, but the other way around. The scientist becomes the observing eye, in function of the observed thing. Scientific function *refers* to things as state of affairs. As such, the scientific function differs from the philosophical concept, but also from artistic expression. While art's sensation and philosophy's concept are aimless in their self-reflectiveness, the state of affairs within the scientific research is characterized by intense focus on the observing object or phenomenon.

A concept, as we have seen, is the experience of an *event*. Function is the manifestation as well as the observation of a particular *state of affairs*. According to Deleuze and Guattari, while a concept is in consistent *composition* with other concepts, a scientific *functive* is *referential*. Roland Barthes' (1982) discussion of the difference between syntagmatic and paradigmatic is helpful here. The syntagmatic refers to a horizontal process of coherently connecting words in a grammatically well-formed manner and their respective meaning as in spoken language. That is why Deleuze and Guattari refer to the concept as “not paradigmatic but *syntagmatic*, not projective but *connective*; not

hierarchical but *linking*; not referential but *consistent* (p. 91). The body without organs is in this sense an ideal concept, it connects, links and is consistently present. Body without organs is not observable, it cannot be referred to, and it has no hierarchical order.

Paradigmatic refers to the vertical distribution of word categories, which Barthes associates with the language as a *system*. The paradigmatic axis organizes and distributes the syntagma that form a “text without an end” (p. 123). The paradigmatic is bound to a system of organizations and distribution (pp. 117-142). In order to observe a state of affairs science needs to cut in a systematic and precise way in order to focus. Scientists are often honest about their focus. In anthropology, for example, the limits of a research and its conclusions are often systematically noted via choices for a certain method, people, time and space. Furthermore, while syntagmatic thinking relates to the *difference between the meanings* of the words, the paradigmatic thinking focuses on the *categorized meaning* of a word itself. Scientists thus often systematically comment on the manner in which they define and use words. The horizontal connectivity, checked by a focus on immanent consistency are characteristic for syntagmatic thinking. Yet, science and philosophy are not unrelated. Scientists often evaluate philosophical concepts within the state of affairs, and philosophers via their syntagmatic thinking can rupture the system in using the paradigm as a syntagma on a metalevel. Thus, while scientists evaluate the notion of flight within the state of affairs, by evaluating its movements, its psychological, social and economical impact; within philosophy the notion can function as a concept that ruptures through given definitions and interpretations of the term flight. It is in this distinction from scientific thinking that is articulated vertically – paradigmatic – that Deleuze and Guattari (1994) argue for another topology in philosophy: the components of concepts bead together neither vertically nor horizontally but in a *transversal* manner. These connections are not bound to the vertical order of the paradigm. In contrast to science in philosophy there are no exclusive connections, no pyramidal hierarchy but scaled networks, according to them.

Is Deleuze and Guattari’s description of science not one-sided? Thomas Kuhn’s (1970) distinction between normal science and revolutionary science in his *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* gives us a different view. While normal sciences – in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms – stay with the slowness and follow the paradigm, revolutionary sciences stage things that speed up. Kuhn describes its functioning as a form of disorientation and crisis, in which the world as we knew it is turned upside-down, i.e. revolutionized. The crisis is not something planned by the scientist, but the scientist is blown away by it, sucked into an experimental practice: We could even state that some scientific discoveries – such as Galileo looking at the planets realizing that the earth is not the center of the universe – did not only changes the world of science, but the whole spectrum of thinking itself, thus also philosophy. Following this speed, it becomes rather an act of faith than of reason. Kuhn thus states:

A decision between alternate ways of practicing science is called for, and in the circumstances that decision must be based less on past achievement than on future promise. The man who embraces a new paradigm at an early stage must often do so in defiance of the evidence provided by problem-solving. He must, that is, have faith that the new paradigm will succeed with the many large problems that

confront it, knowing only that the older paradigm has failed with a few. A decision of that kind can only be made on faith (pp. 157-158).

As Albert Einstein pointed out: "We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them." A *leap* of faith is an act of speeding up. In these revolutionary moments multiple approaches arise, paradoxical, even aporetic. Yet, after a while some approaches start to cohere, the gaze repositioned and gradually a new paradigm is fixed that from then on regulates the scientific practice. A new era of normal sciences emerges again, until the next paradigm shift. Kuhn shows that every scientific inquiry is regulated even in its experimentation, but that there are times in which the experiment as an accelerating line of flight becomes the core business of sciences. These lines of thought rupture the common understanding of state of affairs. The gaze changes, the world changes. This rupture brings other questions, and produces other images, and thus another image of thinking. Referring to the rabbit/duck double image, Kuhn summarizes this as follows: "what were ducks in the scientist's world before the revolution are rabbits afterwards" (p. 111).

Does all this suggest that the idea of *transversality* is also applicable in the case of science? The Kuhnian revolutions in sciences at least suggest this. Did hegemonic functions or a transversal process of connecting and emerging lead Fleming to the discovery of penicillin? There was no structure, no planning, but an event that made Fleming into the discoverer of the pharmaceutical drug (see: 1.1). Transversal alertness, which by all means sensitizes the rhizomatic trait of thought, thus cannot be excluded from scientific thought. It is this awareness of transversality that creates other types of persona in science. Deleuze and Guattari typify these personae in science not as *conceptual personae* but as *partial observers*. In order to approach a milieu of flight to formulate its politics – in this case a philosophical approach – one needs not only to criticize the ordinary manner in which science has analyzed the process and the subject of flight, but affirmatively arm oneself with ideas of those *revolutionary observers* that break through the hegemony of references.

Putting this to a test in the Dutch setting there are sociologists and anthropologists within humanities that – as Ghorashi (2014) puts it – sensitize the deep-rooted tendency of *pillarization* and polarization within communities and criticize "the culturalization component of categorical thinking" (p. 107). Schinkel (2008) criticizes the manner in which sociologists have implemented policymakers' ideas in their analysis and research without a critical evaluation of these ideas. He invites sociology to rather *punch holes* within the consistency of such an epistemology (p. 10), in order to create room to truly investigate the *complexity* and *contingency* of thought on society (p. 157). In line with Schinkel, Zihni Özdil (2015) explains how racism never left the *plane of reference* by going back to the roots of the so-called neutral distinction between allochthonous and autochthonous. As we will see in this study, through their transversal approach these revolutionary observers create different types of objects in thought – different *funcive* compositions within functions – in order to implement different *planes of reference*. Femke Kaulingfreks' (2015) analysis of civil disobedience of youth in different European cities such as The Hague, Paris and London bears witness to the fact that and how from the perspective of another plane of reference the fears that are nested through events such as Cologne are not something that appear outside our European civilization, these are its products.

3.2.3 Sensations: Artistic Composition

The transversal movements within the rhizome are never over there but always immanently everywhere connected to everything here and now. It is the stage on which we act. Our present globalized networked transactions and interactions can be approached with this concept of transversality that problematizes the hierarchical composition of the modern world. This approach has an aesthetic dimension. In relation to art, Deleuze already thematizes this in his *Proust and Signs* (Deleuze 2008) that was published in 1964, four years before he writes his thesis on difference and repetition and long before his collaboration with Guattari. In this book Deleuze speaks of a *transversal dimension* in connection to literature.

It is transversality that permits us, in the train, not to unify the viewpoints of a landscape, but to bring them into communication according to the landscape's own dimension, in its own dimension, whereas they remain noncommunicating according to their own dimension ... it is always within this dimension of transversality, in which unity and totality are established for themselves, without unifying or totalizing objects or subjects (pp. 108-109).

As a cinematographic image the landscape is complete, yet not total (1.4.2). We know – or believe – that there is more beyond the horizon. In its own dimension it communicates completeness, except without dismissing other forms of completeness or excluding other forms of communication. Deleuze chooses his words carefully: the transversality *permits us*; it is what is endured by us and not triggered by us. Nonetheless, our engagement is not inactive or passive. It is, as Derrida points out, a 'non-passive endurance' (as I have discussed in 1.2.4). It is agency, yet not as a subject that objectifies.

Is it possible within politics of flight to sensitize the public – readers of books, perceivers of media images, adversaries in the debate – for this transversal alertness? If so, then via sensation, via its affects and percepts, sensation being the object of thought of art. Sensing in art, but also within milieu of flight, is more than just imagining. It reaches beyond Kant's transcendental imagination. The body is present. What is visualized has a haptic quality: touching with your eyes as it were, or as we have seen before in the title of International Art Exhibition of La Biennale di Venezia in 2007: *Think with the Senses - Feel with the Mind. Art in the Present Tense*. According to Deleuze and Guattari, art produces these sensations. A sensation enables us to 'sense' the meaning of the work in a physical sense, feeling pain and joy, while sensing. It is in this sensing that the double perspective of (de)territorialization becomes a trait of a politics of flight: Focusing on a virtual *now-here* in the limboesque actuality of the nowhere of refugee camps or asylum centers in Greece, Turkey, Kenya, Pakistan, Sudan and North African countries. The binary setting of the country of origin and country of arrival perishes, for these transversalized territories are not structured according to binary oppositions.

Though the gaze of Nahid in Yousef Doust's film does not show us the tortures, the exclusion, the terror and the exile, we sense the pain. We sense her inability, her distance as well as her propinquity. She touches you through her eyes beyond the screen. Sensitization maps, visualization traces. It is through the visibility of a trace in a regime of visualization – 'what do you

see?' – that the loss of coherency in thought becomes rather a choking silence instead of eventive cacophonous silence. It is not an entertaining film. It is, as Pisters (2003) calls it, a political film:

The aim of the modern political film is to give a fabulation space for the people who are missing but nevertheless are connected to a collective situation and in this way to aid in their becoming (p. 94).

In line with the idea of transversality of art, in Nahid's case I see what I do not see. Sensitization of the milieu of flight permits us to create another image in thought, just by *mapping* differently. Sensitization thus does not merely indicate the ability to see, but engages all the senses in a medial way as a non-passive endurance. Engagement unfolds out of the center of a milieu and connects with results of an inquiry from the peripheries. Nahid is the gaze of our peripheries. Engaging with her demands multiplicity of approaches. It is uttered through multiplicity of expressions: It is not her ethnical background that matters, but her performance beyond existing orders of expressions, beyond dominant regimes of signs, images, gestures and facialities. She is a face, but she is not just one face: She is an assemblage of bodies bringing prisons elsewhere right to the heart of the European madhouses. Sensitization is also related to the explanation of imagination in the most literal sense: mapping on a plane of consistency, where sensation and thought, art and philosophy intertwine. Thought is neither beyond nor in opposition to sensation. It is immanent to it. Sensitization as an intermedial experiment in avant-garde art practices turn the audience into reflective bodies (Molendijk & Oosterling, 2001, p. 11). Imagining does not mean that what is sensed is a fiction. Nahid's body as well as our choking is real, yet their impact is different. What is sensed is a potentiality that is always present in that which is considered to be factual. Or as Arendt (1982 & 1978^b) suggests in line with Kant, it is the imagining faculty that enables men to affectively relate via communicability and enter another community.

Artistic sensation is thus, next to *philosophical concept* and *scientific function*, the third form of object of thought introduced by Deleuze and Guattari (1994) in *What is Philosophy?* For them affect is the haptic experience of bodies, not particular bodies, but the experience of the body as a body without organs, a not yet organized body or a body that escapes organization, such as Nahid's body. The body of the audience is a disintegrating body too, in that it is no longer capable to grasp what it encounters in an art practice, be it in a museum or in a public space. It is within the realm of art that affect does not become a momentary emotion attached to an individual, a feeling that can be appropriated. Affect becomes independent over time, transcending the space in which it is triggered. Affects are always accompanied by *percepts*. Not as a passive but as an active force, connecting to and assembling other percepts beyond the merely personal perception or feeling. There is no here and there, we are choked in our sensing of Nahid's gestural gaze that shows us that the world itself has become a madhouse of wars, terrors and exclusions. Sensation transforms the form of life of the *artistic figure* – the persona of art – on a *plane of composition*. In her film Yousef Doust even engages this idea of artistic personae. The film is a feedback loop, the artist and art have become inseparable in this plane of composition called Nahid=Venus. Just as Venus surrounded by fogs, the images of the

artist herself are hazy and transformative. She shows how the image of her aunt Nahid has more effect on herself than on her aunt. Nahid as well as Yousef Doust herself are the sensation of a collective.

Affects are precisely these nonhuman becomings of man, just as percepts – including the town – are nonhuman landscapes of nature (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 169).

Sensitization or transversal alertness results from feeling, seeing and thinking, from sensation and concepts, from art and philosophy. The dynamics of art becomes a political force in thinking once it starts to disconnect from and reconnect to organisms. This is not only acknowledged by Deleuze and Guattari, but also by Arendt and Agamben. The latter also thematizes art as a force that constitutes the political. As we have seen in 2.3.2, it is through poetry that Agamben defines a human voice. Arendt (1958) calls music and poetry the most *human* forms of arts in their intangibility and finds theatre the political art par excellence due to its reference to political community (pp. 169 & 188). Art does not only create images of thought, but also deconstructs fixed images of thought in sciences, politics and even philosophy. Barthes (1982) states that when a paradigm is *projected* in syntagmatic thinking – as in a meta-position – *creativity* is at hand. Something new emerges: In not yet being an object it is beyond the comprehension of the subject. Barthes calls this creativity *aesthetic*. Aesthetics forces itself in-between the lines. It commits *adultery* in transgressing the limit between paradigmatic and syntagmatic processes (p. 140). As we will see later on in this chapter the image of Nahid appears in-between, its sensation self-posit itself in-between paradigms and concepts.

For Deleuze and Guattari art first and for all *composes*. What does it compose? Like science and philosophy, art is also a domain with its history, its segmentations and fixations. It is often bound to styles, genres and regimes of expression. Yet, as notions shift when science revolutionizes, art in deconstructing its own history unfolds transversal dimensions, creating new affects and percepts, i.e. sensations. It is in this state, that art becomes mad and unbearable, just like the voices in Shirin Neshat's *Turbulent* (see my analysis in 2.2.1) and in the manner in which Nahid incohesively connects words to images. The compositions in both artworks are almost deafening. Within this sobriety⁶ art moves beyond the stage of beauty and touches upon the sublime in rupturing the philosophical, scientific but also political images of thought. In this new vocabulary that feeds an approach – in line with Deleuze and Guattari (1994) – we have differentiated:

1. different planes of thought: *plane of consistency* (philosophy), *plane of reference* (science), and *plane of composition* (art);
2. different objects of thought: *concepts* (philosophy), *functions* (science), and *affect/percept* (art);
3. different personae: *conceptual personae* (philosophy), *partial/revolutionary observers* (science), and *artistic figures* (art).

⁶ Deleuze and Guattari speak of sobriety in connection to Kafka. I will discuss the final chapter.

The transversal movement on and in-between all planes unfolds the rhizomatic field of thought. Drawing Agamben's evaluation of *the thing of thought* (see my evaluation in 2.2.2) means that these kinds of actual differentiations never exhaustively explain the underlying field of virtual connection within politics of flight. They are merely introductory discursive tools to approach a milieu of flight. In approaching the tools have to be refined permanently.

Let me 'illustrate' this with an artistic project: Ingmar Bergman's (1966) film *Persona*. In the story of Elisabeth Vogler different objects, personae and planes of thought meet and intertwine. Planes of thought – within and without – permanently challenge one another, personae that contradict one another in conversation and finally objects of thought that put one another in perspective. Yet, it was exactly through this film that I was inspired by another type of persona: the image of a monk burning himself on television. The image of this persona – which remains a side-figure and is in a sense sensitized in the cacophonous silence of Elisabeth – sensitizes another figure that is in contrast to the previous analyses of Foucault. While philosophical, scientific and artistic personae are not defined by what they eat, drink, nor whether they breathe, the monk presents a figure for whom life itself – the burning body and the end of breathing – is at stake. In this sense, Yousef Doust herself is more than an artistic figure, she has experienced the politics of flight from the other side of European borders. There is a type of personae within politics of flight for whom eating, drinking and breathing matters. Let us breathe once more through another type of persona.

3.3 The Hyphen: Politico-Philosophy

3.3.1 The Other as a Potential World

We are talking politics. I agree with philosophers such as Agamben, Deleuze and Guattari who argue that philosophy is essentially political. Agamben's philosophy is an attempt to articulate new notions in order to engage in new forms of political actions. Deleuze and Guattari's subterritorial thinking – the rhizome – is more than anything a *philosophical* effort to deconstruct the *political* rigidity of our time. Arendt (1994) on the other hand states that there is some kind of *enmity* between the acting individual in politics and the thinking individual in philosophy (pp. 2-3). Due to her disappointment in philosophy and philosophers, Arendt typified herself as a political thinker instead of a philosopher. Yet, she is more defined by philosophical tradition than she presumes. Her political elimination of body finds its roots in philosophical thinking since Plato. Inspired by these divergent attitudes I have to rephrase the necessary link between politics and philosophy, going beyond the opposition of matter and form to the supplementary relation between life and expression. In explaining the threefold *life-expression-politics*, I came to realize that philosophy is a politics as well. That is why I will propose in this paragraph to put a hyphen in between political and philosophy: *politico-philosophy*.

How do philosophy and politics connect and differ? Transversal thinking in art, science and philosophy makes us realize that there must be a transversal dimension in politics too, and by implication in a politics of flight. First, politics needs to be scaled and differentiated as well. Lefort's distinction between *la politique* and *le politique*, Foucault's shift towards micropolitics, and the

emergence of virtuality in the digital world that is as real as the actual world – which asks for an unprecedented articulation of mediapolitics – are examples of such scaling. All of these differentiating maneuvers refer to complexity of different layers within politics that can no longer be grasped by two-dimensional, not even three-dimensional graphics. This new topology asks for a multidimensional idea of political connectivity that is expressed in the qualification ‘transversal’.

I argue that politics of flight does not *have* a transversal dimension. It *is* this dimension *per se*. In order to understand this properly we have to make a distinction between politics and policies, yet without disconnecting them. Policies that are implemented to meet political goals vainly reduce geopolitical transversality to paradoxical formats. Very concretely this means that formally the existing borders of the European Union cannot be crossed, yet factually are transgressed, even shattered in every dimension and direction by the Western government in their deal with Turkey to protect the borders. This paradox clarifies the inconsistencies within the policies. Nevertheless, the approaches to disclose such dimension, as we will see in the fourth and fifth chapter, do not always lead to map the transversal landscape of flight in a new categorical sense. It can even enforce binary categorization more, as is the case in respectively a totalitarian and a multicultural setting. In the sixth chapter transversality finally becomes the *raison d'état* and the *d'être* of politics. Transversal does neither unify nor totalize subjects, but situates and connects them in a layered landscape, i.e. a milieu. A transversal approach connects different scales, loops back unto different strata while preserving differences and respecting singularity. The transversal dimension does no longer permit us to speak of *those* refugees, as I have argued in the first chapter, but acknowledges ‘us’ as participants within a politics of flight. Even in compassionate dealings with refugees by communities that resist governmental policies to no longer house them – bed and bread policies – refugees are singled out and as such disconnected from the regime of expression. Their bodies do not connect to the content and expression of these communities.

Speech, action, natality, a life, bodies, body without organs, form of life, and form-of-life, all these notions are created by the philosophers that inspire this research to explain the problematized globe we are living on. As a world, the globe functions as a complex set of milieus, so intertwined that only a mad (wo)man could see some coherence in it. And if she is able to communicate this coherence, are concepts, the object of thought in philosophy, neutral in their explanation? Do they merely explain or do they also create worlds on their own?

In a conventional sense, it is the task of philosophy to establish truth. She applies concepts as analytical tools to disclose ‘Truth’, lost or still hidden in reality. Every truthness that comes out of this discovery is ‘born’ simultaneously with the creation of the concept. Deleuze and Guattari reverse this relation: An ontology is instantaneously produced with the concept. Yet, this concept does not come out of the blue. It is a concentrated force as a vital reaction to a problematic situation. Life forces concepts to appear. Since, as I have in the previous chapters argued, force articulates itself immediately as a power relation, this ontology is equiprimordial an articulation of the political. This is where thinking and imagination cross breed. Ontology is always already political. The creation of a concept is the creation of a milieu that takes a problematized situation into account. That is why it is not sheer fiction. This problematization is a micropolitical move on the part of the body within a

forceful macropolitical reality. A concept has an internal and an external relationality. On an internal level, it contains *several* components. Due to its gravity, it attaches its components to one another according to a certain density and intensity strengthening its consistency. In *A Thousand Plateaus* Deleuze and Guattari (1987) speak of strata or layers of strata, which form a plateau. However, strata do not only form, i.e. define a territory. They also break and deterritorialize its milieu, as I have shown in the second chapter. There are distinct types of strata, each functioning differently: *Metastrata*, *peristrata*, but also *inter-strata*, attached to different strata, affecting the in-between of strata (pp. 111-115). Concepts can relate to one another on different strata: a *group* of concepts is interlinked with one another on a discursive plane of already intertwined discourses. Different milieus relate to one another as well, as *families* of planes. Thus, despite their internal consistency planes are porous and as such penetrated and affected by other planes.

The question then arises: what kind of a stratum is *a politics of flight*? Is it a form of metastratum, peristratum, or an interstratum? Or does it, instead of referring to one (type of) stratum, or one particular milieu, refer to a family of planes; planes of immanence that are related in their modes of enunciation and bodily assemblages (see: 2.4.1)? It is clear by now that a politics of flight is an interdisciplinary and multi-expressive milieu that creates bridges and lines – segmenting and fleeing lines – between different planes, different streams of thought, assemblages of enunciations and of bodies. Politics of flight is not *a* plane, but covers a family of planes. Different planes have different objects of thought. We already dealt with philosophy, art, science. As we have seen the notion *flight* can operate as a philosophical concept, but in other domains it becomes a scientific function or an artistic affect/percept. In order to sensitize this multiplicity, let us experiment with the notion *other*. How does this notion, which relates to notions such as *migrant*, *refugee* and *minority*, operate on different planes of thought? What does *exile* in a multiversal perspective mean, and how does the notion *other* conceptualize, functionalize, sensitize a milieu of flight? And how does it eventually politicize a milieu of flight? Let us focus on its conceptualization. Deleuze & Guattari (1994) state:

The concept is obviously knowledge – but knowledge of itself, and what it knows is the pure event, which must not be confused with the state of affairs in which it is embodied (p. 33).

A concept must indeed neither be confused with the state of affairs – science – nor the milieu in which it is defined in terms of the discourse of this milieu. Each milieu creates its own illusion of comprehension, universality, eternity, transcendence in describing the singularity of notions such as otherness, strangers and aliens. The problem that the concept *other* unravels, might be unproblematic or meaningless within another discourse and milieu. Thus, I do agree with Deleuze and Guattari that the “problem would change if it were another plane of immanence” (p. 74). For example, while flight motivated by economic considerations is problematic for Western societies, within international corporations and companies the flexibility of economic migration is appreciated and stimulated. In the case of Germany, on a macropolitical level allowing refugees to settle is motivated by the decreasing availability of work force in the future, now the population is getting older and the birth rate

decreases. Different political discourses and policies create a diffuse debate that cannot be unraveled by operating on just one plane of immanence.

Creating a concept is a cutting/piercing act within the chaos, recomposing components on another plane. In a sense, it is the heterophasic process that has been described in the previous chapter: discontinuous elements are brought together and only in the formation of an *other* discourse gains consistency and become rational. The concept of *human* in the human sciences has, according to Foucault (2005^a), been such a concept. This does not imply that there were no humans before. What is new is the manner in which this particular species is analyzed and conceptualized in modern times *by itself out of itself* as a result of which man now becomes an empirical-transcendental double figure. In other words, the concept is new due to its modified, self-reflective quality and the construction of its components, but it has also been ‘invented’ to solve a problem: how to imagine and think about man in a secular world? As we will see in the fourth chapter, Arendt argues that the notion human in *human rights* not necessarily concerns humans but citizens.

Although, a concept is not defined through exterior elements but by its own unfolding of its internal intensities and movements of its components, it is nevertheless related to the chaos and to other objects of thought. Concept as a whole is always a *fragmentary whole*, due to the fact that it is not universal, eternal or transcendental. The concept *other* is no exception. This means that this concept is always approachable from all sides due to the rhizomatic field in which it operates. It is a whole not in its all-encompassing immensity but by its *self-positing* radiant trait. It is not totalitarian in grasping all there is, but radiant in sensitizing everything that marginally connects to the *mi-lieu* from which it unfolds itself. This radiancy, however, differs in each object of thought. The radiancy of the concept *other* is not the same as the radiancy of functions and sensations of the notion *other*. They create different realities and different truths. Yet, neither does it imply that a notion has only one type of radiancy. As we will see in the final three chapters, notions – such as flight and other – can have different types of radiancy,⁷ due to the milieu in which they are articulated.

Deleuze and Guattari (1994) argue that a problem engines the heartbeat of the concept (pp. 15-16). They clarify their analysis with an example that is, most fortunately, one of the crucial themes in this thesis: the notions *self*, *I* and *other* (*other person*). Defining oneself and the other is the crux of the identity problem that dominates the discourse on migration and refuge. Cologne and the aftermath fear for young single male refugees are thus merely just one example of a bigger issue. How do the self and the other relate? Deleuze and Guattari state that it is not easy to determine which one of the two, self and other, is a concept and which one is a component of a concept. Which one is a whole, which one a part. Which one is implying which one? Is the *self* so plural that it contains within itself the other persons, the others of the self? In other words, is the self a fragmentary whole, a concept, containing within itself the multiple others as components?⁸

⁷ Radiancy is a notion used in astronomy. It is an optical illusion that results from a perspectival observation of meteorites that seems to move towards us, expanding from one point, while in fact their movement follows parallel tracks.

⁸ This is also a crucial issue in Ricœur’s analysis in the eighties on narrative identities. The self and the other are always intertwined in a life story. They are permanently part of one another.

This is what Bulgarian born, French philosopher Julia Kristeva's (1991) point out in *Strangers to Ourselves*. In this work, she states that the juridical system creates the stranger. This system is based on the idea of sameness, meaning people who are born in a certain country or who are kinsman. It is this idea of sameness that produces the stranger as stranger. Not because the stranger is strange, but because it does not fit into this idea of sameness. She concludes that foreignness is a political and legal construction, i.e. a discursive construct.

Here one comes up against a paradox. If political regulations or legislations generally speaking define the manner in which we posit, modify, and eventually improve the status of foreigners, they also make up a vicious circle, for it is precisely with respect to laws that foreigners *exist* (p. 96).

Then again, Kristeva's point could also indicate the opposite. It could imply that the *other* is the abstract non-identifiable body that brings about a diversity of subjects, as in *difference* containing or creating multiple selves. So, which one is the concept and which one is the component? On this issue Derrida (1982) circumscribes the self as the same that is rooted in this supplementary tension:

The same, precisely, is *différance* (with an *a*) as the displaced and equivocal passage of one different thing to another, from one term of an opposition to the other. Thus one could reconsider all the pairs of opposites on which philosophy is constructed and on which our discourse lives, not in order to see opposition erase itself but to see what indicates that each of the terms must appear as the *différance* of the other (p. 17).

Akin to this idea Deleuze and Guattari (1994) do not even make an effort to answer the question whether the *self* or the *other* comes first. Both supplement each other. They argue that the question *itself* is misleading. It contains the assumption that there are only two options.

1. The abstract object other is a component of a subject self. The concept is the subject self.
2. The subject self is a component of the abstract object other. The concept is abstract object other.

Deleuze and Guattari envision – at least – a third option. Within a *field of experience* the other is not a subtraction but it merely *is*, it is a *Dasein*, a “there is”, a presence. It is a presence without the need to appropriate or get appropriated. Other is there in its singularity without becoming an object: an other person or a subject I. It is not via a dialectical opposition that the other is positioned and known. Nahid is not simply our other, a refugee is not simply a known other, or the opposite of us. They are

the omens of an other world, a world beyond our conception of good and evil; right or wrong, sane or insane. It is rather *an impotential*⁹ world.

The Other Person is always perceived as an other, but in its concept it is the condition of all perception, for others as for ourselves. It is the condition for our passing from one world to another (p. 18).

An impotential world is virtual (as I have shown in 1.4) in so far as different compositions emerge, different worlds with multiple compositions of I and the other person. Inspired by Agamben's (1999^a) impotentiality, we could state that it is not rigidly segmented by the actualization of one form of *life*. The other is not an actualized object or a subject. It is not even the phenomenon that needs to become actualized. It is not a sympathized with or excluded refugee, migrant, patient x or John/Jane Doe. These are merely faces that pop up or are imagined to emerge in this world; they belong to the concept without defining its whole. It is not Nahid that creates a choking affect, it is the segmentations in our minds that cannot define the impotentiality of her expression and hence result in a choking affect.

Next to being an impotential world, the idea *other* has, according to Deleuze & Guattari (1994), two more components: "existing face" and "real language or speech" (p. 17). Does an *existing face* refer to the content of life and *real language or speech* to expression? Or is a face a middle line – an interface – between the content and expression, between bodies and expression? Are life, expression and politics the components of this impotential world? As argued before in the second chapter, a face is a surface that relates content and expression as an interstratum. *A face is a map*. It can on the one hand refer to copied substances of assemblages of bodies and of enunciations. Jack Shaheen (2001) shows how in Hollywood cinema the image of Arab men is endlessly repeated as hostile, aggressive and misogynistic. The comments of Minister Bussemaker, discussed earlier in this chapter, in connection to the events in Cologne are merely a confirmation of a long-lasting stigmatic image of these men. Inspired by Foucault, we could state that regimes of expressions force themselves upon a face, enforcing a specific assemblage of bodies. Yet a face, on the other hand, does not only appear as a construction of a regime. In its liveliness, it is also an unpredictable singular substance – as is the case with Nahid – that is difficult to relate to whether content or expression. According to Agamben (2000) the face is exposure rather than the thing that it exposes. It is a "threshold of de-propiation and de-identification" (pp. 100). Face therefore is conceptual, affective, functional, yet also a living matter on another level. The face is territorializing as well as deterritorializing. Totalitarian face (chapter 4) thus inherently differs from that of multicultural faces (chapter 5) and the faces that appear in a coming community (chapter 6). Similar to this Agamben states that all living beings appear – they are all existing faces – but only human beings intend to appropriate their appearance via expression. Or more

⁹ Deleuze and Guattari speak of a *possible world*. However due to my distinction between possible and impotential in 1.4.2, possible being a not yet actualized phenomenon and potential being rather virtual and eventive rather than a secondary phenomenon to the actual, I have chosen to speak of an impotential world. In order to avoid confusion, due to various uses of virtual world, I have also decided to not use this term.

adequately formulated, a regime of expression “transforms nature into *face*” (p. 91). Nevertheless, despite this intention, the face is an outside, something that happens to us, and not an absolute place of identification.

What connects the women in Cologne who are brutally violated and refugees who are wrongfully stereotyped is the violence of an enforced stigmatized face. These are the exclusions that regimes of faciality create. Both assemblages of bodies become the other as an *object* – women as objects of lust and refugees as objects from barbaric cultures – and not an other as potential world, in the regimes of expression. Yet the impotential world is never lost, a face always remains relational, never relative or universal. This is what Hasna el Maroudi and Laila al Zwaini were trying to plea for, a point that was missed by the interviewer and the Minister (see: 3.1). The face as impotential world in Agamben’s sense of the word defies the homogeneity represented by policies and media. The faces of refugees in Saxony – discussed in the second chapter – thus contradict the slogans that force them to be an isolated face.

Be only your face. Go to the threshold. Do not remain the subject of your properties or faculties, do not stay beneath them: rather, go with them, in them, beyond them (p. 100).

All the same, I argue that due to the complexity of the face, and as argued in the second chapter, due to the multiplicity of faces of an individual the analysis of the oppositional relation between the self and the other remains problematic. Despite the unfortunate existence of the problem, the binary setting affects the ontological state of human interaction. One only needs to look at the expressions on the faces of El Maroudi and Al Zwaini to know how the media forces a regime of signs. Even if the problem between I and the other is inherent to the impotential world, within this world the opposition carries on with its exclusive tendencies. And even if we go along with Deleuze and Guattari’s (1994) evaluation, still we need time to comprehend the unfortunate or illusive opposition between the I and the other. The ideas that gave rise to the ontological state of exclusion cannot be turned ‘upside down’ overnight. Can thought, language, image and even more so, policies motivated and engineered by politics grasp such a *radical* metamorphosis?

Of course, new concepts must relate to our problems, to our history, and, above all, to our becomings. But what does it mean for a concept to be of our time, or of any time? (p. 27).

As I have shown in 1.4.2, Deleuze and Guattari suggest, we are creatures of habit. We are called by our names and we – except the queens and kings – function as an *I* in sentences. Is it possible for an existing concept – for example the concept of *other* – to decode and re-code its components, in this case the *subject* I and the *object/subject* stranger? Can a concept potentially destroy itself and undo its effect, in order to become a sheer impotentiality? It must become this impotentiality in order to break through the rigidity of regimes of faciality in our time.

This ‘discursive transition’ does not only involve the concept but also the connectivity of a concept with functions that revolutionize science and with sensations that artistically resist rigid

notions on state of affairs. The notion of other, just as the notion of flight, does not merely belong to the philosophical plane of consistency. Yousef Doust's and Ingmar Bergman's images affectuate a sense of other as an impotential world, as an unpredictable other. Within the *plane of composition* artists resist the objectification of the other. The image of Ai Weiwei's gesture – lying in the same way as Alan Kurdi on the beach – shows that even dead bodies are not immovable objects, but alive in their potentiality to connect in a world of exile. And as we have seen in 3.2.2, there are those scientists that do not merely observe, but criticize our manner of observation and revolutionize the frames of observation toward others. El Maroudi and Al Zwaini are pleading for another political, sociological and cultural frame, in which they can express their experiences of sexual harassment without the demonization of their cultures – brothers, fathers and husbands – or any other ethnicity. Just as Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw (1991) long before them, they once more ask us to shift the parameters of observation and oppositional critique whereby we surpass the opposition between the rights of women and the rights of refugees; an opposition that in its effect smothers them to speak of their experiences of violence.

In outlining the discursive tools thus far, however, there is a missing link. Nahid is not merely an image of resistance in art, not just an inspiration for philosophers to problematize; nor only a phenomenon for scientist to observe in multiple ways. Something happened to her, she was imprisoned and tortured. A happening that, just as the events in Cologne and the burning body of the monk in Bergman's *Persona*, emerges on another plane, with a different stream of thought and its own specific object of thought. Thus, the question is: what is the *thing* and plane of thought that philosophers problematize with their concepts, scientists observe and revolutionize with their functions, and artistic figures resist with their deterritorializing sensations, i.e. affects and percepts? Our conceptual personae, revolutionary observers and artistic figures are inviting us – in Artaud's words – to *dance wrong side out*. Our critical problematizers, revolutionaries and protesters of these three disciplines are facing something, they are facing the other side of the spectrum. Let us thus enter another world, another plane of thought: *politics* with its own object of thought and its own kind of personae.

3.3.2 *Politico-Philosophy: Active Reflection*¹⁰

Flight has been typified as an event. This event relates to multiple subjects, regimes of subjectification and faciality. Flight operates as a multiple force creating different inter-strata (see: 2.3.1) – multiple forces connecting assemblages of bodies and assemblages of expression. Due to its eventive character and global setting in which it takes place flight thus does not limit itself merely to one type of subject – whether or not according to the legal definition (as I have argued in 1.3). It is due to this connection between assemblages of bodies and assemblages of enunciation that flight as an event is characterized as political, creating a political milieu called: *politics of flight*. Against the aforementioned distinction between philosophy, science and art, we have to return to the question: What is Politics?

¹⁰ See also Rahimy, 2012^b.

Politics is by no means an apodictic science. It proceeds by experimentation, groping in the dark, injection, withdrawal, advances, retreats. The factors of decision and prediction are limited. It is an absurdity to postulate a world supergovernment that makes the final decisions (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 461).

In line with Deleuze and Guattari, with global temperament of politics of flight I do not refer to a global supergovernment. There is not one idea of the political or one type of global political force at hand. Politics of flight is not one but multiple milieus in which different ideas create different communities. As I will argue in this chapter, in connection to flight, there are at least three types of politics. Just as flight politics contains inter-strata creating a milieu that we call community in which:

1. Bodies are assembled in certain ways;
2. Expressions are enunciated according to certain ideas;
3. Assemblages of bodies and assemblages of enunciation relate to one another according to an idea of what it means to create a community.

Politics of flight operates as multiple force, giving rise to inter-strata in which the event of flight and the event of politics intertwine and affect one another in multiple ways. The conjunction *of* indicates that flight has a political aspect as well as is affected by political ideas. When we speak of *a politics of flight*, the preposition *of* does not create a process that starts with politics and ends with flight. Flight is both object as well as the subject of politics: both genetivus *objectivus* and genetivus *subjectivus*. Eventually flight transforms politics and politics transforms flight.

In order to articulate a strong connection between politics and life, we need to connect Deleuze and Guattari's assemblages of bodies and assemblages of expression to 1) Arendt's distinction of labor, work and action and 2) Agamben's distinction between life (*zoē*), form of life (*bios*) and form-of-life. Both Arendt and Agamben see a problematic connection between life and *bios* within contemporary politics. However, their critique leads them in opposite directions. For Arendt (1958) labor is the bodily effort to ensure one's physical survival, but also the survival of a species in the cyclical, periodic change of birth and death. Labor literally refers to life. It refers to primary needs such as eating, drinking, protecting, sheltering, reproduction. While labor is the necessity that is consumed *immediately*, work on the other hand is the linear time of production of objects that often last longer than one's physical life, like artworks that survive their artists, technology surviving their inventors, facilitating generations to come. The endurance of human life as culture depends on work's productivity.

Unlike the productivity of work, which adds new objects to the human artifice, the productivity of the labor power produces objects only incidentally and is primarily concerned with the means of its own reproduction; since its power is not exhausted when its own reproduction has been secured, it can be used for the reproduction of more than one life process, but it never 'produces' anything but life (p. 88).

According to Arendt, the craftsmanship of the worker – especially due to its predictability and linearity of production – is a *non-political* way of life, but the process of production is certainly not an *anti-political* event. However, according to her, the same argument does not apply to labor. Labor is neither an event in the human world nor an interaction between people. The demands stimulated by natural labor undermine human plurality by reducing everyone to the same eating and drinking being, to an organism. In this homogenizing movement – due to its implementation of mindless consumerism within political domain of difference – the individuality and uniqueness of a human being is lost. Exactly in this loss of equality in difference lies the anti-political characteristic of labor. The only equality in labor is that each person is destined to die, while the equality within the third human condition, political action, is achieved through natality. Politics is for Arendt a milieu wherein each individual is free to be born again, free to become someone else (pp. 212-215). In the necessity of life, one loses his political freedom, an experience that only can happen in the independency of everything that is necessary. Yet, Arendt also opines that a human life is bound to the certainty of necessities (labor), the creation of objects to endure beyond the physical life (work), as well as to the domain of freedom (action). Eliminating one aspect of our human condition means the elimination of the other two.

This is Arendt's 'explanation' of life. Labor is conditioned by life; its plane is *life* as a finite process. The domain of necessities contains more than the need to eat and to drink. Arendt believes that our most private form of experience is physical pain. This also belongs to the domain of labor. In labor the pain is purely private. The physicality of pain has no reality in public space. While public space is characterized by the ability to act and speak, pain is portrayed by being the least communicable experience. The intensity of this experience deprives us from the reality of it. According to Arendt, it is the most subjective experience, an experience in which one's sense of *I*, as a construction in language in connection to others, no longer can be recognized as a pure body. Pain is a sense of subjectivity, but in confusion. This subjectivity refers merely to a body without any form of clear expression.¹¹ It is a subject without public performance, Arendt states:

Not only is it perhaps the only experience which we are unable to transform into a shape fit for public appearance, it actually deprives us of our feeling for reality to such an extent that we can forget it more quickly and easily than anything else. There seems to be no bridge from the most radical subjectivity, in which I am no longer 'recognizable,' to the outer world of life. Pain, in other words, truly a borderline experience between life as 'being among men' (*inter homines esse*) and

¹¹ It seems that Arendt recognizes something in pain that breaks even through subjectivity as a unity. In recent researches, it is shown that pain, which is typified as a subjective experience, is in reality far more singular in itself. A person does not always feel the same pain. Pain is not only unshareable with others, but also with oneself. The experience of pain, its intensity – or in Deleuze and Guattari's words its speed – differs in a particular body as well, depending on singular connections in the brain that differs in time and circumstances. In other words, there is no simple analogy between pain-experiences (BBC Horizon, 2010).

death, is so subjective and removed from the world of things and men that it cannot assume an appearance at all (p. 51).

This understanding of private is extremely alien to our understanding of it nowadays. Nahid's body and pain as well as the bodies and the terror of the women in Cologne are not private matters. Nahid's pain did not emerge due to her private life but due to her political life. According to Ahmed (2014), the inexpressibility of pain does not indicate that pain is a-political. Exactly in such contexts as Nahid, Ahmed speaks of the *violence of negation*, the reduction of a body such as Nahid to a *not*. She states, "our question is not so much what *is* pain, but what *does* pain do" (p. 27). Ahmed even argues against the assumption that pain is private and non-relational by expressing that:

the impossibility of feeling the pain of others does not mean that the pain is simply theirs, or that their pain has nothing to do with me ... an ethics of responding to pain involves being open to being affected by that which one cannot know or feel (p. 30).

It is this idea of pain that I will elaborate on in the fourth chapter in connection to torture. Yet, Ahmed's view on the subject also problematizes another problem in Arendt's thought: the distinction between private and public. Arendt's inspiration for distinguishing private and public this way is not derived from contemporary times, but from the ancient Greeks. Next to life as the plane of labor and worldliness as the plane of work, public is the political space of action. The public is the political space and this political space is the only milieu in which action can take place. The term public refers for Arendt to two states of affairs, which are related but not identical.

1) The term refers to the act of making something appear in public by means of which a reality is constituted. Each time we 'publicize' a private matter, we create a reality that, despite its intensity within the personal life, never before has been presented as reality, Arendt states. In order for something to become real it must necessarily appear in public, meaning it has to connect itself beyond the *boundaries of one's body* to others. This realization will always come at the expense of the intensity of the private life.

2) The term public refers to the public space that men share with each other and is distinguished from their personal realm. Arendt calls this political space: the *world*. Within this world it is shown how the human narratives of *whos* function as a process of political actors (see my elaboration in 1.3.3). Humans in political space are not closed organisms in need of individual survival, but intensities in-between political processes. Yet this world must not be confused with earth in Deleuze and Guattari's sense of the word. It is the relational field, the space in-between, that differentiates *and* connects humans: *inter homines esse*.

While public space is defined as the carrier of *freedom* of political action and speech, the private domain is characterized by the necessities of life. Men need both, a plane on which the rules are clear – not drinking indicates the end of life – and an open plane in which actions could potentially be anything.

A life spent in public, in the presence of others, becomes, as we would say, shallow. While it retains its visibility, it loses the quality of rising into sight from some darker ground which must remain hidden if it is not to lose its depth in a very real, non-subjective sense. The only efficient way to guarantee the darkness of what needs to be hidden against the light of publicity is private property, a privately owned place to hide in (p. 71).

The world is the true realm of freedom, but not a world where anything goes. Freedom means the ability to give birth to new forms of politics, the ability to force changes through the natality of actions. Yet, each acting agent on this plane of freedom must be aware of the consequences and the chain of reactions that are out of one's reach, but are nevertheless their responsibility. Freedom in public space means responsibility of open action, burdened with the lack of knowledge of what it could bring about. Freedom of action appears through a triple frustration: the unpredictability of the outcome, the irreversibility of the process and the anonymity of the actor (see: 1.4.3).

All this is reason enough to turn away with despair from the realm of human affairs and to hold in contempt the human capacity for freedom, which, by producing the web of human relationships, seems to entangle its producer to such an extent that he appears much more the victim and the sufferer than the author and doer of what he has done. Nowhere, in other words, neither in labor, subject to the necessity of life, nor in fabrication, dependent upon given material, does man appear to be less free than in those capacities whose very essence is freedom and in that realm which owes its existence to nobody and nothing but man (pp. 233-234).

It is within this unpredictability and irreversibility that action is distinguished from work. The efficiency and instrumental character of work, along with the necessity of labor, are fatal elements for a political action. Politics is not only defined by freedom, but also difference and unpredictability. These characteristics are lost in the realm of work, in which production of objects can be planned and regulated. Politics is a field that needs an openness, in order to avoid totalitarian exclusivity, according to Arendt.

However, in the decades that have passed since the publication of *The Human Condition*, having lived through environmental crises, mass murders and economic wars, and an increase of immense numbers of refugees and stateless people, it has become impossible to distinguish these three planes. The world of objects is not as predictable as Arendt suggests. Production and life are intertwined in global political economy; and cannot be distinguished as easily as Arendt proposes. Yet, Arendt herself admits that it is politics "in the narrower sense of the word" (p. 47) that she advocates. It is politics as she wishes it to be. The question is however: Why does she define not only politics but also life in such a strict way. Arendt's fear of a political body is the same fear that Foucault has for biopolitics. The body, whether included or excluded, has always been the main target of totalitarian regimes. The unwillingness to include the body in politics in *The Human Condition* finds its starting point in her

elaborations in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* in which the body – *zoē* – has become the main object of politics of exclusion.¹² It is within a totalitarian milieu that men become merely living beings without potentiality, merely bodies that are forced to just breathe without thought, refraining from political action.¹³ Then again, deeds such as systematic torture and massacre on a macropolitical level – as Arendt (1970) states in *On Violence* – are political strategies par excellence, although they indicate *the end* and *decrease* of politics in Foucaultian and Arendtian sense.

Neither violence nor power is a natural phenomenon, that is, a manifestation of the life process; they belong to the political realm of human affairs whose essentially human quality is guaranteed by man's faculty of action, the ability to begin something new (p. 82).

Arendt does introduce an aspect of life that previously has been unprecedented: birth. While totalitarianism has death as the true engine of speech and action, Arendt defines politics as birth: It is a process of natality. Although actions are irreversible they also have the ability to cut through processes in order to change their course by giving birth to other forms of interaction. When Arendt excludes life from politics, she means life without a form. When she excludes the body, she means to exclude a body that is identifiable and without potentiality, a body that is constructed in totalitarian politics or in a biogenetic lab.

Despite the implication of this excluded body within politics, life can no longer solely emerge in the safe haven of Arendtian private space; nor is the inclusion of life within political thinking merely destructive, as we will see in the sixth chapter. Life endures and is under siege on all planes of the global space. Lack of food in parts of the world versus the limitless consumption plus obesity in another part politicizes labor as the satisfaction of basic needs as well. Life, thus even in its basic act of breathing – as refugees make tangible – is not merely a natural factor of labor. An idea of politics thus cannot merely limit itself to assemblages of expression – as action for Arendt is always accompanied with speech – without affecting assemblages of bodies and their resistance toward political discourse. Dirk De Schutter (2005) even states that politics always rest on an *ontological principle*. He criticizes Arendt by stating that by neglecting questions such as political implications of sexual differences, and the mere reduction of these types of questions to the condition labor, she has never wondered how life (*zoē*) is implemented in politics (*bios*) (p. 125). Dirk De Schutter (2007) thus argues that political responsibility – which Arendt pleads for – must not only respond to the irresponsibility of humans toward each other, but also to contemporary political issues such as poverty and environmental disasters caused by access of production (pp. 31-33).

Next to these aspects, and neglecting the feminine body as political issue, Arendt, despite her nuanced thinking, fails to understand the complexity as well as the urgency of political movements of people of color, especially Black power movement. As Kathryn T. Gines (2014) shows Arendt's

¹² In the fourth chapter I will discuss Agamben's view on the connection between Foucault's biopolitics and Arendt's totalitarianism.

¹³ See also her article, 'We Refugees' in Arendt, 1978^a, p. 65.

political vocabulary is useful on the one hand to analyze the totalitarian state not only during the first half of twentieth century but also in the ages to come. Yet, Gines also justly argues that in her concrete elaboration of the history of colonialism and the history of racism in the United States – for example in *The Origins of Totalitarianism, On Revolution* and in her article ‘Reflection on Little Rock’ – Arendt does not critically implement her European, white and intellectual perspective on the matter. Resistance against racism as well the political argumentations within such resistance are dismissed as private matters and in some cases even self-centered. Arendt’s political analysis thus shows a fundamental error due to the fact that the political ontology of bodies as well as intersectional manners in which these bodies are excluded from political power, as Crenshaw (1991) shows, do not play a role in the course of totalitarianism as well as the steps to distance from such politics. In this sense in line with Gines (2014) we can state that Arendt’s view on politics is both *insightful as well as problematic* (91). The ontological reality of politics – in which body is actually and virtually implemented in political thought – makes us responsible for the manner in which life is always affected by our actions and prejudices, whether we want it or not. Every action we take – eating, traveling, digitally connecting, or even disposing our garbage – as well our state of sexuality and skin color affects the world on economic, social, cultural and not the least environmental level. Life matters, bodies matter, they matter in a political sense.

How do life (*zoē*) and form of life (*bios*) relate? Agamben’s (2000) distinction in *Means without End* between *life*, *form of life* and *form-of-life* is helpful in order to understand politically the non-rigid body in-between life. The first concept *life*, for which Agamben also refers to the Greek term *zoē*, concerns the general biological fact of life that is shared by humans, animals and gods. This life is not procedural but particular; the life of Aristotle, the life of my cat Lola or the body of Zeus. The second concept *form of life* or *bios* denotes the form that humans share, for example in a particular group.¹⁴ Form of life thus does not refer to life styles, in which individuals create their eccentric lives. It rather refers to political forces that connect each individual life to a collective; hence eliminating the opposition between collective and individual as well as the public and the private. Within politics the private and personal is always collective. The personal experiences of women in Cologne refer to a global image of women. Furthermore, the public and the collective always affect the private and individual life in politics. Collective ideas on refugees lead to the inclusion or exclusion of a refugee as an individual. While the first concept refers to what Arendt indicates as labor, the second refers to the production of work that connects us to other human beings and also partially to the political and social life. Agamben (1998) argues that the problem does not only appear in the manner in which we comprehend life and its form, but the problem also lies in the *rupture* between life and its form. Because of this rupture some lives within contemporary forms of life – *bios* or politics – are merely reduced to nothing else than surviving as a necessary condition. Agamben calls this life – which is

¹⁴ It must be noticed that although Agamben seems to mix the concepts of life and *zoē*, and form of life and *bios*, in the first chapter of *Means without End* he explicitly indicates that the terms *zoē* en *bios* do not refer to our concepts of life as we know it or forms of life for that matter. The concepts in this paragraph originate from Agamben’s work *The Homo Sacer, Sovereign Power and Bare Life; Remnants of Auschwitz, The Witness and the Archive*; and finally, *The State of Exception*. In the fourth chapter I will examine these subjects more thoroughly.

banned from the realm of politics – *a bare life* or *homo sacer*. Modernity, Agamben testifies, has created *states of exceptions* in which naked lives are excluded from politics and banned to extermination camps (see: 4.4 & 4.5). Refugees are the exemplary cases within such politics.

Given the by now unstoppable decline of the nation-state and the general corrosion of traditional political-juridical categories, the refugee is perhaps the only thinkable figure for the people of our time and the only category in which one may see today ... the forms and limits of a coming political community (Agamben, 2000, p. 16).

Within the political analysis of Agamben the concept of life is in immediate relation to the subject of flight that cannot be reduced to what juridically is defined as a refugee. It is a figure that refers to all bodies that populate a milieu of flight or a realm of politics. Agamben's (2000) resistance to such politics is however not a farewell to life, or an immigration of life into a private realm, but rather a fundamentally different accentuation of life within politics. He searches for an idea of community in which neither politics nor life suffer from their rupture. Thus, while *zoē* or *life* represent itself as the biological ticking of *the* naked life, and *form of life* as a process disconnected from life, Agamben introduces a third option: *form-of-life*. It is through the hyphens of this third notion that life escapes the boundaries of politics that block its potentiality by reducing living beings to mere survival. Life does not have isolated moments. Individuation of subject, which insists as a transcendent identity, is merely a *haecceity of singularity*, now-moment of this-ness or that-ness that remain immanent to the process of *a life*. *Form-of-life*, in which life does not become impotent but answers to its non-essentialism, is the only political life for the sake of happiness. This happiness, which I will elaborate on in the final chapter, is not something that can be manufactured by the subject, but only experienced in its elusiveness of the hyphens in-between life and its form.

A life that cannot be separated from its form is a life for which what is at stake in its way of living is living itself ... processes of living are never simply *facts* but always and above all *possibilities* of life, always and above all power¹⁵ ... That is why human beings ... are the only beings for whom happiness is always at stake in their living, the only beings whose life is irremediably and painfully assigned to happiness. But this immediately constitutes the form-of-life as political life (p. 4).

Politics enters the stage when an epistemology of an idea on community forces itself upon an ontology; in other words, when an assemblage of expression forces itself upon an assemblage of

¹⁵ Power is a complex notion in works of Agamben, Foucault, Arendt, Deleuze and Guattari. For them power contains a productive energy. Power thus has different shapes and ethical implications. Nevertheless, in Arendt's view, for example in her *On Violence*, power – which springs from an interaction between political individuals – differs from the sheer forceful violence. In this sense, power always has a positive connotation, as I will elaborate on in the final chapter. In this investigation, however, power (*Macht/pouvoir*) as a concept is been used in a broader Nietzschean sense of the word, always unfolding from within its inner core: Force (*Kraft/puissance*).

bodies. That is why Foucault's thesis on discipline and Deleuze and Guattari's affirmative approach of vital forces diversified the definition of politics, creating the plane of micropolitics.

This study is not limited to an exploration of politics in the strict sense. Politics is not exhaustively defined within the opposition of form and matter, or expression versus life. Politics operating as multiple interstrata is a transversal vector that cuts through all planes. Within the trilogy *life-expression-politics* politics is the third element that binds the first two elements within milieu of flight on different levels or strata. This study researches how from a philosophical point of view politics forms life. It intends to unlock the impasse of our time in which dualities – citizen and non-citizen; people and non-people – by exploring another *political gesture* as Ten Bos (2011) suggests. I have chosen for the term gesture due to the fact that – as we have seen in the previous chapter – within gesture assemblages of bodies and assemblages of expressions connect. Yet I do not mean to create another idea of truthness about life or expression; I rather plead for another relationality in-between life and expression. It is not a plea for a manifestation of a politics but rather creation of another political gesturality in which liveliness of life is not lost in its form. This study is merely an attempt to understand our current transitional times and to create another discourse, not only in order to critically observe the state of affairs, but also in order to affirmatively propose a different attitude toward what it means to create a community without an essential identity. This is not a type of political gesture that needs to find or is distracted from a universal truth. I want to understand truth in a different way; as an appeal, not for the sake of truthness but as a lived exposition of difference. This study aims to unfold space, i.e. literally to ex-plain another field of expression, in which Nahid's expression can be sensitized beyond choking.

The next question that rises is addressed to philosophy. In order to unfold this political gesture, we need to add a transversal dimension to philosophy. This is not a specific branch of philosophy, such as political philosophy. It is *politico-philosophy*. What is the meaning of this *hyphen*? Let us start with the political task of philosophy. It is in exposing the investment of power in so-called general and universalized propositions that philosophy becomes political. Deconstruction is but a first step. In unveiling its presuppositions philosophical deconstruction first and for all articulates itself in its critical attitude not only toward its ancestors, but also toward the reality in which it is placed. Philosophy is in a sense always on a diet; always disembarassed by its heavy weight. In unlocking segmentations and fixations in thought, philosophers permanently asking *why* are principally troublemakers. They are never satisfied in their desire for wisdom, always in search of other options, i.e. always in adoration of the virtual and natal (im)potentiality. That is the reason why philosophy defines itself as a desire, love (*philo*) for, instead of possessing wisdom (*sofia*). It is not *exclusively* the clarity of analysis that she strives for, but rather the exposition of a potentiality of changing minds by sacrificing the comfort of understanding for the sake of the experience of thinking. It cherishes the affect of in-comprehension within comprehension (as I have elaborated on in 2.2.1). Philosophy desires its own endless movement, its infinite speed, as Deleuze and Guattari (1994) phrased it. In line with this manner of understanding philosophy, they argue that philosophy strives to “give consistency without losing anything of the infinite” (p. 42). Her consistency ‘consists’ of configuring segmentary

lines into a network, yet keeping the flight lines open within itself. Herein lies the generative and productive act of concepts.

Philosophy urges politics to reflect and problematize its thinking. Placing a hyphen in-between bears witness to an intrinsic relationship; a marriage in which both parties add something to the table. What does politics enforce within the heart of philosophy? While philosophy longs for the infinite, politics is the force that pulls the philosopher back to the earth, it makes the philosopher feel the mud; the fertile ground that feeds transcendental ideas. Politics makes life in philosophy pulsate. It is always a living body that thinks. Politics problematizes something within philosophy by addressing the oblivion of a body. The pejorative disqualification of the body in Arendt's elaboration is not only due to the horrors of totalitarianism, but also to an ancient philosophical attitude toward body and mind as separate phenomena that she still repeats. Therefore, her reduction of life to the private realm is not a political, but a philosophical gesture. Yet Agamben's term 'form-of-life' is neither merely a political notion nor a strictly philosophical idea. It is an idea that emerges from the hyphen between politics and philosophy.

The hyphen encapsulates all these paradoxical terms: from Foucault's modern 'man' as an *empirical-transcendental doublet* to Deleuze's *transcendental empiricism* (see: 2.1). Although Deleuze (2011) defines transcendental empiricism as purely conceptual, I would rather argue that the term is not merely a philosophical term but a politico-philosophical term as well. It refers to life itself while implementing the act of permanent reflection. A thinking in which life is implemented, and a life that permanently changes itself through feedback loops. How does this life within transcendental empirical thinking differs from the impasse of life as a bare life? How does this idea on life affirms a new gesture politics? In 'Immanence: A Life....' Deleuze, (2011) argues that it is the idea of *a life* instead *the life* that links the two concepts: *transcendental empiricism*. *A life* as an empirical expression, a *stream of consciousness* that cannot be defined by notions such as object and subject; these latter notions belong to *empirical representation*. Nevertheless "transcendence is always a product of immanence" (p. 31). *Transcendental* in Deleuze thought is not above, or beyond, but reflects from an immanent process back upon that very process. In line with Kant but slightly different it points towards the conditions of (im)possibility, but now in terms of impotential and virtual. Transcendental empiricism is *pure immanence* and as such Life, or rather *a life*. While a subject covers the life of an organism (a particular closed whole), *a life* emerges in its singularity in a process as a whole.

We will say of pure immanence that is A LIFE, and nothing else. It is not immanence to life, but the immanent that is in nothing is itself a life. A life is the immanence of immanence, absolute immanence: it is complete power, complete bliss (p. 27).

Politics and philosophy supplement one another, but are not interchangeable. Politics feeds philosophy in its hypocritical thinking on life, and philosophy distresses the rigidity of ideas that within politics fixate life. There is of course a distinction between philosophers and non-philosophers, yet the hyphen cannot be explained as an oppositional connective. As Deleuze and Guattari (1994) state: "the philosopher must become a nonphilosopher so that nonphilosophy becomes the earth and

people of philosophy” (p. 109). It is evident by now that I do not define philosophy as the institutionalized experience of a long academic tradition of thought. By mapping its rhizomatic rooting (radix=root) I radicalize its most significant trait, namely problematization. Philosophy as a problematizing practice deconstructs the conventional way of communication. It makes language hamper and stutter. It is philosophy on a weight loss diet, philosophy as praxis of thought on thought, feeding on itself as it were in challenging her fossilized tree roots, fragmenting segments suggest eternal weightlessness, yet grounding it into a ‘fundamentum inconcussum’ so eternal meaning can blossom in the fruit unfolding in its top branches. In the final instance, philosophy must get rid of its binary assumptions: an opposition between theory and praxis, and hence the binary assumption between knowledge and experience.

In this act of reflection on life within politics, philosophers are never alone. The hyphen connects other thinkers, but also revolutionary scientists that functionalize their concepts and artistic figures that sensitize the act of reflection. With their scaled and multiple observations scientists are capable of inspiring philosophers in their creation of concepts; on the other hand, philosophers, due to their problematization, can challenge scientists out of their routine. Willem Schinkel’s (2008) notion *culturalization* is in this sense an example of a hyphenation between science and philosophy. Urged to observe differently he puts a new idea on the agenda that forces us to think differently on the relevance of cultural differences for political decisions (as we will see in 5.3). Artists are often motivated by philosophical concepts in their resistance to regimes of expression. They never let philosophers forget the sensation of bodies. I have experienced this with Parisa Yousef Doust. Her film on Nahid, as we have seen, has been an inspiration for me. In our collaboration, I have always thanked her for imagining *a life*; and she was always happy with my concepts that gave words to her imagination.

I am a philosopher, and yet I am sitting at a table with multiple companions in thought. On the agenda is the event of flight, and I am assigned with the task to connect politico-philosophy to this event. Philosophy is the permanent act of deconstructing fixed meanings and of redefining and reintroducing new concepts of relationality within political communities. It is the exposition of flight lines that rupture binary relations in order to unfold other connections and segmentations within communities. Philosophy and flight are both cutting edge: they reach out for the other option. Flight starts with an idea of a means (a journey) with an end (residency). Yet, in the course of the act of fleeing, the experiences and the complexity of its eventuality creates differentiated virtual and differentiated actual realities that escape the so-called intentional strategy of a subject, as I have argued in the first chapter. What is created by the event of flight is mediation without an end, but unlike philosophy that intervenes in a body of knowledge – intertextuality – it is literally enacted through real bodies. With the problematization of the idea of means to an end in connection to flight, also the apparent opposition and finally even the distinction between praxis and theory dissolves due to the idea of *form-of-life* as a reflective act. In a *politico-philosophical* experiment I intend to show how flight traverses the rupture between life and its form by breaking the impasse of a bare life. This does not mean that philosophy provides a consistent ‘theory’ for the ‘praxis’ of flight. Precisely in differing each other’s expressivity philosophy and flight are more intricately related to one another. They both, each in their own way, make expression *stammer*.

It's easy to stammer, but making language itself stammer is a different affair; it involves placing all linguistic, and even nonlinguistic, elements in variation, both variables of expression and variables of content. A new form of redundancy, AND ... AND ... AND ... AND is less a conjunction than the atypical expression of all of the possible conjunctions it places in continuous variation (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, pp. 98-99).

This is why in this study the focus not merely lies in the conventional question: what does political discourse implicate for refugees? The focus bends back upon itself in order to experiment with Agamben's effort to impose another question: what does refuge mean for politics? What does refuge mean for philosophy? And eventually what does it mean for politico-philosophy? The hyphen between philosophy and politics also implicates that the political process of refuge maps out the core practice of philosophy: the act of breaking through the banality of segmented thinking. In these different ways, the hyphen expresses an unresolvable bond between politics and philosophy. It rejects the idea that politico-philosophy is just a sub-genre of academic philosophy. And even more so, let us distance ourselves from the idea that it is a genre in western academic philosophy. In order to sincerely implement politics and flight into philosophy, in line with Olúwolé (2014), I state that we must make use of a diversity of conceptual frameworks as well as of a connective framework in order to surpass the monotheistic western conceptual frameworks; thus, also frameworks that divide the world in cliché frameworks of western and non-western philosophy. In order to genuinely embrace the transversality of philosophy, we must comprehend the untraceable connectivity of philosophical thinking around the globe, a connectivity that was always there, long before philosophy started to define itself as from here and from there.

3.4 Differentiating Political Milieus

3.4.1 Naming Political Interstrata

What does politico-philosophical stammering within politics of flight indicate? As we have seen this stammering affects the epistemological attitude toward flight. Politics of flight demands a thinking that implements incomprehension within comprehension; knowability is always affected with the unknown. Secondly, politics does have an ontological implication. Ideas on community and formation of a community in *form of life* relate and affect *life* and lives of individuals. Yet, there is a third aspect within politics of flight that needs our attention: *ethics*. Ideas on community are derived from and in turn produce values such as freedom, loyalty, respect, equality, solidarity, responsibility and security. The interpretation of these values in each community creates a different regime of signs, images, gestures and faciality. The veiled face of decency for a woman is for some a virtue, but for others an exclusive sign of repression or even worse terrorism. There is thus not only a local idea of values, but also a global discourse that effects the manner in which values are actualized as norms and as such are implemented within national policies. Values, but most of all our interpretation and approach of values create different forms of politics. In this study, I will elaborate on how different ethical and

moral approaches create three different types of communities: totalitarianism, multiculturalism and coming community.

Let us thus examine a value, a value that plays a crucial role in political discourse as we have seen with Trump before and after his election: *security*. Security as a value can mean many things. Security can indicate securing freedom; or feeling secure. Yet due to global events this securing of freedom immanently has become a reduction of freedom for the sake of freedom, as Žižek (2002) argues. His analysis on the paradox of democracy – sacrificing democracy for the sake of democracy – has only gained more reality since the publication of his book *Welcome to the Desert of the Real*. Žižek shows that values are not a given; they do not only create tension within a certain time and space due to the multifarious involved parties – the freedom of women and the security of refugees – but also within one and the same statement – sacrificing our freedom to an overruling government for the sake of democracy that is based on values like freedom and equality. We, the European people, love our freedom and privacy; yet gradually we have sacrificed these more and more for the comfortable consumption of technology and the excitement of the spectacle. Our mobiles are controlled and our media expose our private lives. It is perhaps this temperament of modern times that urges Arendt (1958) to reach far back in time to make her point. Contemporary time is in a sense for Arendt a negative inspiration. In modern political discourse the distinction between action, labor and work has disappeared. Through policies and treaties actions have become identifiable as labor and work. The collation of the three planes ends the distinction between public and private, and introduces a new phenomenon: *The Social*. In *The Social* matters that previously have been private – financial problems determining political engagement – invade public space and start dominating this sphere. In this process, the traditional notion of politics brings out the demise of the public sphere as such. Arendt states that in line with this phenomenon new forms of relationality arise. Society becomes the essential form of the human condition: a large family called *The Society* and in a global setting as a *Society of Mankind* (p. 24).

In this society, the distinction between public and private is not only undermined, but their definitions are additionally changed. In ancient times the a-political life in the private domain was stripped of human individuality. Individuality was merely the privilege of the free men in the public sphere. In modern times, however, the private domain is enriched by modern individualism and the intimacy that belongs to such a life, such as the sexual affairs of Clinton and Berlusconi. In this modern era, the private is not the opposite of political life, it penetrates the latter visibly through the social life. It does not however only involve the intimate affairs of lives of those who chose to participate, but often intrudes the life of those who are close to these persons as well. Thus, the distinction between the private and the public in the Greek period is completely different from the one in current times. For the Greeks only the public space was political, all other domains belonged to the private as the law of the house, the *nomos* of the *oikos*, i.e. economy.

Arendt concludes that in her time this distinction, that had been obvious for the Greeks, had lost its clear distinctiveness. In the contemporary age the concept *social* refers to family life that endures in the public domain. What becomes political is kinship within a nation-state: identity instead of difference. We speak of national and social economy, of national culture – which in case of Cologne imposes an artificial conflict between western cultures with other societies – and politics that

has been organized around an idea of the *nation*. For modern men, a notion such as political economy is a common term, while for the Greeks it would have been a *contradiction in terms*. For the ancient Greek, matters such as material interests referred to necessity, and hence they belonged to the private sphere of the house. In the current time, it is this materiality that makes men experience ‘freedom’, or put more appropriately a ‘personal freedom’ rather than a public one. In a sense, Arendt regrets the manner in which freedom in modern times emerges from an individual interest instead of a political affect that indicates a fundamental relationality with others within a public space: *inter homines esse*. Our political choices are often based on personal economical interests; paying more or less taxes. In line with Arendt and Agamben, Ten Bos (2015) argues that within this dominancy of economical interest over ethical and political considerations, humans – defined as political agents – disappear (p. 94).

Thus, although we could criticize Arendt due to her radical distinction between an economic and political realm, yet by accentuating the problematic and contradictory relationship between economy and politics her argument makes sense. According to Arendt, the rise of The Social starts the very moment that private property becomes the main concern of a community and is no longer merely an interest of an individual. Common wealth – which is often used as an argument to exclude refugees – is then purely gained for the sake of common wealth and no more for the sake of independency in a common world. A government derives its legitimacy from its power to guarantee the safety of the properties of various parties. As we have seen in the case of Cologne, even values become modifying properties of a certain society that must be defended against the hostile other. Arendt shows, that these developments are also manifested in the transformation of immobile property into mobile property. Every thing has become a consumer article. Property no longer refers to things that are fixed or tangible. Property also refers to mobile things as a human body or – following Marx – labor. While the safety of property discursively refers to an artificial localization within a nation-state or in case of Europe a nation-continent – and in case of Brexit a European nation-state against other poor European nation-states – due to globalization appropriation motorizes the world economy. This idea is eventually not merely an expressive phenomenon but due to its political characteristics also affects lives. Our consumerism stands in line with 45.8 million modern enslaved people (*The global Slavery Index*, 2016). On the one hand Europe does not respond to the economic motivations for migration and refuge; on the other European international companies prosper and maximize their profits by the exploitation of laborers elsewhere. Within policies on possession properties are no longer objects that are created on the plane of work, but also concern bodies that can be exchanged, and eventually someone’s life that can be decided upon.¹⁶

The social realm, where the life process has established its own public domain, has let loose an unnatural growth, so to speak, of the natural; and it is against this

¹⁶ The term QALY (quality-adjusted life year) illustrates this. The quality of life of individuals in the medical care is calculated by its utility, not for the individual but for the society in general. From this perspective, it could then be argued that the life of an Alzheimer patient has a lower QALY. The utility also depends on your nationality (De Brabander, 2008, p. 132-133).

growth, not merely against society but against a constantly growing social realm, that the private and the intimate, on the one hand, and the political (in the narrower sense of the word), on the other, have proved incapable of defending themselves (Arendt, 1958, p. 47).

For the ancient Greeks private is the place where a *man* must rule over his inferiors: his wife, slaves and children. Let us be fair that – despite Arendt’s adoration for the ancient Greeks – it was exactly those bodies that were excluded from politics. Nowadays this exclusion makes the political figures *per se*. Arendt argues that the household is born out of necessity, while the polis is the sphere of freedom and of choice. And exactly this clear separation guarantees the balanced existence of both realms. Yet contemporary Greeks know better than most Europeans that global politics and economy defines their households. Nevertheless, her analyses on the disruption of this balance caused by the social – because of initiation of the imbalance of power within policies – is relevant for our analysis of political life today. This imbalance does not refer to economical aspects of the social; more than anything the disaster of the social emerges from its tendency to homogenize individuals within a society as loyal members of a society. Nationalism – Brexit is merely an example – favors an idea of one homogeneous mass opposing another. Populist political parties each argue to be a better father for a family – a people – by arguing to serve and protect them. Freedom as the political equality in difference is mutilated and relocated “in the realm of the social, and force or violence becomes the monopoly of government” (p. 31).

As we have seen, when Arendt speaks of politics, she speaks of politics in the strict sense of the word: Politics – public distinct from privacy – without binding ideologies and homogenous identities. Politics in a wider sense, which is the field under investigation here, consists as a milieu of connections, counterfactuals and contradictions. It is a field on which many planes intertwine. Politics is not only an open space, but also consists of rigid strata of isolation and exclusion, as Arendt shows with her idea of the social. Within this network of different planes the political plane of flight unfolds. The economic plane of calculation and the social plane of inclusion/exclusion and identity, the artistic plane of multiple affection and perception, and the philosophical and scientific plane of reference influence the milieu of flight with critical evaluation in concepts and functions as well as resistance to the state of affairs. Politics in a broader sense of the word affects and is also affected by different religious regimes of signs. The secular processes in politics are also affected by religious discourses, or by what Deleuze and Guattari (1994) call a *plane of transcendence*. The differences between these planes do create multiple political communities and different forms of politics. Let us thus finally, against this background of the social as a dominant discourse, map out, i.e. approach from within, as I have argued in the first chapter, the diversity of politics of flight. This approach differs from a clear and distinct tracing:

A map has multiple entryways, as opposed to the tracing, which always comes back ‘to the same.’ The map has to do with performance, whereas the tracing always involves an alleged ‘competence.’ ... Drives and part-objects are neither

stages on a genetic axis nor positions in a deep structure; they are political options for problems, they are entryways and exits (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, pp. 12-13).

Given all these differences and distinctions, how do we then map out a *politics of flight*? Even a map, despite the good intentions of its cartographer, is a reduction, an artificial cutting act within the complexity of a chaotic web, preconditioned by connectivity. My choice for one language, in this particular case English, is already a betrayal of the multilingual trait of *politics of flight*. On top of that, for the sake of comprehension, my act of mapping will reduce the multiplicity of milieus within the politics of flight to three forms of milieus that are not juxtaposed, nor exclude each other, yet are nevertheless distinctive. This cutting act is inspired by Arendt's (1958) idea on political action and the tendency of social to reduce politics to labor and work; Agamben's (2000) trilogy of life, form of life, form-of-life; and finally, Deleuze and Guattari's (1987) distinction between territorialization, re- and deterritorialization (relative and absolute).

Each milieu penetrates and *transforms* other milieus. Deleuze and Guattari speak of different intensities of deterritorialization and distinguish *relative* and *absolute* deterritorialization. The earth is the plane that deterritorializes absolutely. With its body without organs it ruptures any idea that we create on the world. Yet, humans are persistent and inventive. Our evolution and technology is changing the structure of the earth; with environmental disasters ahead. This environmental argument is not beyond the politics of flight. The dryness in some parts of Africa due to environmental changes causes flows of refuge; adults and children that due to a lack of food search for life elsewhere. Yet, they often do not reach a destination. They are often stuck in-between the country of origin and the promised lands. They often die for the sake of survival.

How do we call a politics that creates such limbic territories; territories that belong to no rule yet are the result of policies and ideas on who belongs or does not belong to a community? Within politics of flight as a multiple interstrata I will distinguish three types of interstratum: *politics of exile*, *politics of segments*, and *politics of life*. Each of these interstrata refers to different types of ideas on what it means to create a community.

1) Chapter four is an exploration of this politics. I call this politics: *politics of exile*. As we will see, this has a contradictory logic and in this sense, shows affinity with Arendt's (1958) idea of the homogenization within the social realm and Žižek's (2002) idea of contradictory values. This politics also shows resemblance to Saskia Sassen's (2014) idea of *expulsion*. This politics exists by the force of exclusion of those who do not belong to its territory; or an idea of an identity that regulates the homogenization process of the social. Yet, I have explicitly chosen for the term *exile* in order to emphasize the territorial tendency of this politics. Policies, the spectacle and the political jargon of this politics result from the idea of *here versus there*. Even the weather forecast on TV doesn't neglect to mention how the weather is in 'our country'. The distinction between country of origin versus country of arrival is merely an example of this idea of here versus there. *Here* represents the normal state of affairs and *there* represents the peripheries that do not belong to 'our' social order. "We are the *people*, go home!" was another slogan that was introduced by anti-refugee protesters in Saxony. The territorial effect of *politics of exile* is

characterized as totalitarian and universalist due to its absolute *molar force* (see: 2.3.1). It segments fiercely in dual territories, in which – in Agamben’s (1998 & 2000) words – life is detached from its form of life. It is – in words of Deleuze and Guattari (1987) – a tree-minded society, branching binary and tracing identities in which people and non-people can be separated in excluding territories. The age of totalitarianism is old and there have been multiple critiques and resistance toward universalism. Scientists and philosophers within anthropological studies have often criticized universalistic tendencies of right and wrong within *politics of exile*. Thus, although *politics of exile* still persists, there always have been forces within communities and ideas on community that resist the totalitarian tendency of this politics.

2) Multiculturalism has now for decades offered an idea on community that pretends to implement differences. I call politics within multiculturalism *politics of segments*. This form of politics creates segments within the totalized territories of totalitarianism. Multiculturalism thus has deterritorializing effects on the molar force of a totalitarian distinction between here and there by introducing multiple communities within a larger community. Therefore, in the fifth chapter I argue that this deterritorialization is relative. Multiculturalism creates an idea of *tolerance* toward differences; yet in this attitude it neglects to evaluate connections, especially ambiguous connections. In the setting of Belgium and The Netherlands Dirk Geldof (2013) argues – with Steven Vertovec’s term *superdiversity* – that the reality of European cities are beyond multicultural segments. There is no here and there in the absolute sense of the word, yet there are multiple *heres* and *theres*. The divisions within multiculturalism still divide territories and create a disconnected morality. What you tolerate here, is not tolerated over there. The segments have the tendency to create smaller totalitarian regimes with multiple types of peripheries. Politics of segments does not deconstruct the tracing tendency of politics of exile; it just introduces multiple possibilities of tracing within a segment based on religion, ethnicity, culture and often enough physical appearance such as skin color or sexual differentiation. In Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) terminology it has a fascicular temperament (as I have shown in 1.2.3) due to introducing multiple segmented ideas of regimes of faciality and subjectivity. While totalitarianism enforces one form of life; multiculturalism makes room for multiple forms of life.

The strata themselves [not only on the level of content but also on the level of expression TR] are animated and defined by relative speeds of deterritorialization; moreover, absolute deterritorialization is there from the beginning, and the strata are spinoffs, thickenings on a plane of consistency that is everywhere, always primary and always immanent (p. 70).

3) Having made these systematic distinctions by now we can return to the politico-philosophical gesture that I intend to introduce. The final chapter of this study is an ode to Agamben’s coming community (1993^b); Arendt’s (1958) world and Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) nomadic earth. I call politics that includes these ideas *politics of life*. This life is thus not a life that is regulated by the disciplinary powers of biopolitics or biased by the totalitarian urge to detach life from its form. The preposition *of* in *politics of life* operates as the preposition *of* within *politics of flight*.

Life is both *genetivus objectivus* and *genetivus subjectivus* of politics; meaning a politics that emerges out of life and has living itself as its object. It is a life that does not create a general idea but simulates the impotentiality of earth. A life – in Agamben’s terms form-of-life – is lived for the sake of ‘happiness’. Its ethics is an ethics of inclusion. It is neither global nor local; it is glocal. At this level, it functions as a connective processing of all strata, triggering reflective judgments in which responsibility for the world is not something that we redeem through distanced charity; we live responsibility permanently and immediately in every action. Politics of life is a politics that deterritorializes the idea of here and there, so characteristic for a politics of exile; as well as the act of differentiating detached territories of multicultural politics of segments. It differentiates singular connective communities, addressing its impotential and thus resisting the molar tendencies of the previous forms of politics. It has a molecular and nomadic temperament; yet not by neglecting these molar tendencies but rather by questioning it all the time. Politics of life sensitizes heterotopias and cacophonous silence in which Nahid can become a political life instead of a psychiatric one. It does not trace order and sanity; but maps out rhizomatic relationality in difference. It is this tendency that inheres politics in philosophy; the realm of politico-philosophy. Was it this absolute deterritorializing force that made Rudyard Kipling write something that surpassed his own colonial framed mind?

*Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the two shall meet
Till Earth and Sky stand presently at God’s great Judgment Seat;
But there is neither East nor West, Border, nor Breed, nor Birth,
When two strong men stand face to face, tho’ they come from the ends of the earth.*

3.4.2 Paradigm: Political Objects of Thought

We have mapped out a plane of politics as *interstrata* that create a community by connecting assemblages of bodies to assemblages of enunciations, redefining Arendt’s critique on the social in terms of Deleuze and Guattari. Within these interstrata I have distinguished three types of interstratum: *politics of exile*, *politics of segments*, and *politics of life*. As for the latter Agamben (2000) evaluates its transition as follows:

The great transformation of the first industrial revolution destroyed the social and political structures as well as the legal categories of the ancient régime, terms such as *sovereignty*, *right*, *nation*, *people*, *democracy*, and *general will* by now refer to a reality that no longer has anything to do with what these concepts used to designate ... The new categories of political thought – inoperative community, compearance, equality, loyalty, mass intellectuality, the coming people, whatever singularity, or however else they might be called – will be able to express the political matter that is facing us only if they are able to articulate the location, the manners, and the meaning of this experience of the event of language intended as free use of the common and as sphere of pure means (pp. 109-110 & 117-118).

In this quote Agamben sums up two sets of notions in politics: the political categories of ancient regimes and the new political categories, referring to his companions in thought: inoperative community (Blanchot), compearance (Nancy), equality (Rancière), loyalty (Badiou), mass intellectuality (Hardt and Negri), the coming people (Derrida). The apparently nonsensical notion of *whatever singularity* is introduced by Agamben and will perform a significant role in the exploration of coming community in the final chapter. These new categories however do not indicate that the categories of ancient regimes are bygone. The political categories of the ancient regime insist until this day, as we notice in the political discourse on refugees. They play a crucial role in determining the life of individuals. Both sets refer to the political reality of our time; both sets denote fundamental ideas that characterize these political communities. Agamben (2002 & 2009) typifies these political ideas as paradigms. In other words, the object of thought in politics for Agamben is *paradigm*. In the perspective of Deleuze and Guattari, next to concept, function and sensation this is the fourth object of thought. Politics with its policies is regulated by these paradigms.

3.4.2.1 Paradigm, Episteme, Dispositive

Why the term paradigm? Instead of interpreting paradigm as merely a trait of function or an element of scientific plane of reference, Agamben prefers to explore this notion not scientifically, but politically. Yet how can a paradigm be positioned as a *political* object of thought that differs from a philosophical concept, a scientific function and an artistic sensation? Of course, politics relates to concepts (invented by human sciences and political philosophers), functions (scientific reports for parliamentary committees or scientific statistics for policies), and affects and percepts (sensations mobilizing the masses by means of electoral rhetoric and utopian visions). Yet, in this section I argue that paradigm, such as ‘the people’ and ‘the citizen’ are objects of politico-philosophical thought. Through their paradigmatic ‘radiancy’ these create their own type of assemblages of bodies and enunciative regimes of expression, as we have seen in case of Saxony in the previous chapter. I will argue that it is in Agamben’s (2009) reading of the notion of paradigm that the political discourse discerns itself from the artistic, scientific and philosophical discourse, precisely because in evaluating policies it poses the question of *the political*.

In his analysis of the notion paradigm, Agamben oscillates between Michel Foucault’s *episteme* and Kuhn’s elaboration of paradigm. Foucault does not refer to Kuhn, and in his lecture *What is a Paradigm?* for the The European Graduate School Agamben (2002) wonders whether this is because of a personal and/or academic vendetta. Agamben thus wonders whether Foucault’s use of paradigm as episteme is not a synonym for the term used by Kuhn. Both thinkers refer to epistemological conditions, that constitute discourse while remaining hidden and unknowable within that discourse for those that speak and act from within this discourse. In the end, Agamben defends Foucault by arguing that, although the two thinkers appear to be dealing with the same idea, the paradigm in Kuhnian sense is not the same as Foucault’s episteme. Kuhn focuses on natural sciences – Deleuze and Guattari’s (1994) *function* – and Foucault on human sciences and the combination of knowledge and power that produces subjectivity. So, from the perspective of the political Agamben’s paradigm – due to its reference to power and subjectivity – has more affinity with episteme (knowledge) than with Kuhnian paradigm. Yet, what inspires Agamben in his reference to Kuhn is the manner in which,

according to Kuhn, paradigms while setting rules yet essentially function without rules and explanation. Kuhn (1970) states:

That is why, at the start of this essay, I introduced shared paradigms rather than shared rules, assumptions, and points of view as the source of coherence for normal research traditions. Rules, I suggest, derive from paradigms, but paradigms can guide research even in the absence of rules (p. 42).

In connection to this relation between paradigm and rules, Herbert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (1982) point out the similarities and differences between Foucault's thinking and Kuhn's discussion. Both thinkers suggest that the shifting from one paradigm to the other, or from one discourse to the other, is not a gradual or a quantitative progress. The "radical reordering" of the episteme and paradigms happens "without recourse to an immanent rationality" (p. 69). Nonetheless, while Kuhn suggests that paradigms create rules, but nevertheless can function without them, Foucault suggests that *within* the discourse, although not resulting from a prior rule, principles of a discourse are in their function *rule-governed*. Thus as "explanatory principals ... instead of being described as a *law* operating *behind* the discursive phenomenon, they are described as *rules* operating *within* the discursive itself" (p. 70). In contrast to natural sciences, in which a paradigm creates a consensus, within a discourse of society, or even social sciences for that matter, there are different approaches and even conflicting strategies. The binding elements in a discourse are thus not always explicit and acknowledged paradigms, but also *non-discursive* processes that remain unknown to those that act from within this discourse. Finally, there is a difference between their critiques on normalization. Dreyfus and Rabinow argue that "whereas normal science [in Kuhn's work TR] aims in principal at the final assimilation of all anomalies, disciplinary technology [in Foucault's discussion TR] works to set up and preserve an increasingly differentiated set of anomalies, which is the very way it extends its knowledge and power into wider and wider domains" (p. 198). In Foucault's analysis of disciplining power relations are part of the process. And it is exactly this being part of a process that distinguishes Agamben's paradigm from Foucault's episteme.

Agamben's analysis oscillates in-between that of Kuhn and Foucault. Although Agamben agrees with Foucault that some paradigms answer to a logic of a discourse and function as rules, there are those paradigms – such as *people* in case of Saxony – that operate beyond any logic or trace of rules. Yet this paradigm does not intend to assimilate the anomaly; it rather produces the anomaly of non-people. In the final instance, the introduction of both terms by Foucault and Kuhn – episteme on the level of human sciences as well as scientific paradigm on the level of natural sciences – show how tricky our knowledge of things is. They both question an epistemological condition in thought. Yet, Agamben (2009) states that this act of problematization goes deeper in Foucault's analysis. Foucault's discussion on discourse is much broader by its reference to the society as a discursive amalgamation of many practices, which due to political characterization of Agamben's paradigm becomes more relevant. It is this amalgamation of practices that has given me the tools to differentiate the abovementioned political interstrata.

Unlike Kuhn's paradigm, the episteme does not define what is knowable in a given period, but what is implicit in the fact that a given discourse or epistemological figure exists at all (p. 15).

Next to episteme, there is however another term in Foucault's work that we can link to Agamben's paradigm. By the time Foucault (1980) raises the question of power-knowledge, he has abandoned the archeological notion 'episteme' and introduced the genealogical notion 'dispositive'. The term 'dispositive' in which the machinic aspect of an 'apparatus' resonates, means:

A thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions ... Such are the elements of the apparatus [French: *dispositif* TR]. The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be established between these elements. Secondly, what I am trying to identify in this apparatus is precisely the nature of the connection that can exist between these heterogeneous elements. Thus, a particular discourse can figure at one time as the programme of an institution, and at another it can function as a means of justifying or masking a practice which itself remains silent, or as a secondary re-interpretation of this practice, opening out for it a new field of rationality (pp. 194-195).

Is Foucault's dispositive positioned at the same interstratum as Agamben's paradigm? Or is paradigm a sub-category of dispositive? Although, in some cases Agamben's paradigm functions as a sub-category of dispositive; there are however also differences between Foucault's use of dispositive, and Agamben's use of paradigm. Agamben's paradigm does not necessarily refer to a discursive practice that disciplines or normalizes. Foucault refers to the discursive disciplined 'docile body' as a produced configuration – the law abiding, normalized citizen – but in Agamben's text it is not necessarily a subject or an identity; nor a phenomenon that necessarily creates a logical connection *within* a discourse, as we will see in the fourth chapter.

3.4.2.2 Paradigm: Exemplary beyond Particular and General

The word *paradigm* means literally an example.¹⁷ For Agamben, paradigm is an ex-ample, or as I will show, operates as excluded-inclusion. It is a within-without. Let us examine this through contemporary political regimes. Beyond the factual laws that are installed, a notion like *law and order* is paradigmatic. While the application of laws gives rise to jurisprudence, these processes never exhaustively define the notion of law and order. Thus, while from an ethnocentric perspective Europe accused others – such as Turkey and Russia – for violating international laws and human rights, they do not hesitate to abolish the same laws in their deal with the Turkish government. There are

¹⁷ The word comes from the Latin 'paradigma' and Greek 'paradeigma', that can be translated as 'example'. The prefix 'para' means 'alongside', 'deiknunai' meaning 'to show',: 'alongside shown' or 'what shows itself beside'.

paradigms that rather define the exceptions. Yet, in not belonging to their domain these constitute all that occurs.

The illegal subject is such an inclusively excluded phenomenon. In Foucault's work the delinquent and the sexual 'pervert' function *within* the discourse of disciplinary power by being categorized and locked up in prison and psychiatric clinics in order to be normalized and included again. On the other hand, the *stateless alien* – the inhabitant of the limbolike state of exception – is not enclosed in an assignable territory. It is rather a vector that cuts through everything. The stateless alien is a subject that in being *banned* consolidates the law. While according to Foucault the abnormal is normalized, Agamben shows how the exemplary excluded constitutes the law without being included. Finally, the paradigms in Agamben's work are in the last instance not only discursive, but material, physical bodies that are beyond discipline, i.e. lacking any inclusive expression at all. Agamben identifies this state of being – this state of *life* – as *homo sacer*, as we will see in 4.5.1, distinguishing itself by a disconnection to *form of life* that defines its state of being. In this sense Agamben's idea of paradigm has more affinity with the Foucaultian *non-discursive*. Yet, while the Foucaultian body still has the power to resist or subvert – its *potentiality* to enforce new discourse – Agamben's *homo sacer*, as we will see in the fourth and fifth chapter, bares witness to an inability to break its structures.¹⁸ The young single male refugees – who after the events of Cologne in advance were considered to be dangerous by various parties – did not become part of the regime of bodies; nor were permitted to say something in the regime of signs. Even their expressions of frustration merely serve to confirm the idea that their exclusion is just.

Being careful is about softening the very form of your appearance so that you do not appear 'aggressive' because you are already assumed to be aggressive before you appear (Ahmed, 2014, p. 217).

Figures such as 'homo sacer' and the 'sovereign', or *The Muslim* and *The American* people cannot be reduced to ordinary people. A paradigm such as 'state of exception' is not assignable on a map, as we will see in the fourth chapter. Paradigms like 'security' or 'terrorism' are never captured by laws and measures, their application is never saturated, never satisfied. While the deal with Turkey, considering refugees, still remains ethically and legally questionable and in the final instance probably practically unmanageable, European politicians and policy makers are already looking toward Libya in order to create new refugee camps. Through its radiant vectorality, paradigm does not refer to an origin but operates as an *originary phenomenon*. To explain this Agamben (2009) refers to Goethe's notion *Urphänomen*: "As a paradigm, the *Urphänomen* is thus the place where analogy lives in perfect equilibrium beyond the opposition between generality and particularity" (p. 30). Paradigm is not presupposed but merely exists in its *exposition*, supplementing a remainder 'outside' its exposition. "In the paradigm, intelligibility does not precede the phenomenon; it stands, so to speak, 'beside' it (*para*)" (p. 27). In this sense, a paradigm is partly epistemological (Kuhn), partly para-ontological

¹⁸ This is Arendt and Agamben's central point on the notion of statelessness, which is challenged by Rancière. In section 4.5.2 I will discuss his critique.

(Foucault); and at all times political due to its ethical implication of belonging and non-belonging to a community.

In his text ‘What is a Paradigm?’ Agamben (2009) mentions specific notions that he rephrases as exemplary cases or paradigms that function within the current political discourse.

Homo sacer, the *Muselmann*, the state of exception, and the concentration camps. While these are all actual historical phenomena, I nonetheless treated them as paradigms whose role was to constitute and make intelligible a broader historical-problematic context (p. 9).

A paradigm is a singular phenomenon that is repeated and as the result of this repetition becomes self-evident not only within policies but also in other domains such as the spectacle of the media. In line with Ten Bos’ (2015) analysis of bureaucracy, we could state that paradigms manifest their power in *ink*. They have written effects, and within this ascertainment they operate self-evidently. In being evident they never define, yet radiate their course. In this sense, the term *The Muslim* – which for instance resonates endlessly in Donald Trump’s outcries – has become a paradigm. So, paradigm must neither be understood as something *particular* that gives rise to a general or *universal* state, nor as a *universal* phenomenon dispersed in multiple *particular* states. The particular case of Humayun Khan – dying for the safety of American people – does not change the public image of Muslims. Nor can a general idea on Muslims – despite Trump’s belief – refer both to Islamic State and Malala at the same time. A paradigm, Agamben (2009) argues, distances itself from this dual setting by being a particular to another particular; it is an *analogical* rather than a *logical* relation. Arendt’s use of Kant’s reflective judgment (which I have elaborated on in 2.2.1) is exemplary. Reflective judgment of Agamben’s paradigm is neither merely a sensible object nor a general law. There is Merkel’s “Wir Schaffen das” that stands as a singular expression. One measure on security against a so-called Islamic State threat enforces the next, connecting both measures in a pragmatic way.

A paradigm entails a movement that goes from singularity to singularity and, without ever leaving singularity, transforms every singular case into an *exemplar* of a general rule that can never be stated a priori (p. 22).

One paradigm triggers another without universalizing its content. Paradigms as *The Muslim* and security trigger one another but are not determinative for each other. The paradigm of the hostile other strengthens the paradigm of the nation-state, the idea of borders and finally the illusion of closing off these borders while refugees and food suppliers both are banging on the fence. In order to manifest the analogy – security threat, Muslim and refugee – policies in The Netherlands eventually neglect to mention that most people migrating to The Netherlands since 1996 have a Christian background (Van Dyke, 2016). So, in order to define paradigm, Agamben (2009) leaves behind the idea of the particular that can be compared to another particularity due to a quality that they share referring to a more generalized category. Paradigms engender analogies that make situations analyzable for policies. While academic philosophy conceptualizes, regular sciences formalize and entertaining spectacles sensitize for assemblages of bodies and assemblages of expression, a paradigm assembles a

state of affairs. It is this state of affairs that enable philosophers of difference to problematize, revolutionary scientists to observe and describe critically, and for which critical artists in resisting given forms of life sensitize their audiences. A critical attitude towards exemplary cases cannot emerge from a general rule or sentiment. In unveiling an unjustifiable situation, it asks for permanent engagement as relational agency.

Policies feed on paradigms that produce communities in enforcing a certain way of life on bodies. In terms of Deleuze and Guattari it is on the intertwined field in-between assemblages of enunciation – not only expressions of policy makers, but also expressions of anti-refugees and refugees in Saxony and Cologne – and assemblages of bodies that are included in excluding, that a plane of politics as a cluster of interstrata is created. A paradigm enforces multiple kinds of relationality. Paradigms as singularities, as examples, also influence one another. In interconnecting paradigms create a network of concepts, sensations and functions.

Paradigm is thus also not a *Begriff* in the dialectical sense. It does not deal with the understanding of its own essence, but rather exposes constructions of thought from which it remains hidden and exterior. *Subject* and *identity* differ in this sense. While *subject* refers to immanent intensities and affects, to endurance within its own assemblage as well as sensitivity in relation to other notions, *identity*, in a political sense, behaves as a paradigm that creates communities without explaining what these are. The paradigmatic identity, which gives rise to flight lines as well as segmentation lines, remains an incomplete substance (in content and in expression). It has changing forms and mutable matters. Its form and matter are not compatible. Take misogyny. Being a global problem it does not weaken the form of the paradigmatic application in case of Muslims. In western societies, the Middle Eastern culture male harassment becomes an *originary phenomenon*. “In the paradigm, there is no origin or *archē*; every phenomenon is the origin, every image archaic” (Agamben, 2009, p. 31). The sincere attempts to explore and subtly differentiate ‘Dutch identity’ by politicians and political critics, lacking a conclusive answer have no consequences for the populist impact of the paradigm. Geert Wilders is not interested in defining the paradigmatic quality of the *Dutch identity*. He exploits the manner in which this paradigm serves as a contagious example to constitute a politics of exclusion.

Paradigm as an example is supplementary to an assemblage, a community for instance. Yet, according to Agamben, it is not exhausted by the assemblage. It remains *singular* while at the same time operating as a constituting example for an assemblage, a compositional whole. It is the connective that constitutes the relations within the machine. It is the machine’s peculiar *raison d’être*, the machine’s ‘desire’. *Security* has always been a crucial notion. Yet nowadays it has become a paradigm. In its exemplary impact the paradigm of security also means securing our women from the barbaric other, leading to policies and measurements, such as the internalization of European norms and values by the Others. Khan and Trump operate differently in this paradigm of security, despite the fact that they both do not question the legitimization of the war itself. Both Trump and Kahn awake an exemplary sentiment; the one as a head of state triggers fear and the other as a sad father that has lost his son, triggers compassion. The paradigm itself is not justified, nor culturally confirmed; yet it forces its subjects to react in a specific way. Thus, although the harassment of women was not scientifically backed up to be a character trait of refugees, within the policies that were installed

afterwards and the spectacle that was performed, refugees were required to distance themselves and engage with trainings to unlearn something that was presupposed. Agamben (2009) states:

It is thus impossible to clearly separate an example's paradigmatic character – its standing for all cases – from the fact that it is one case among others. As in a magnetic field, we are dealing not with extensive and scalable magnitudes but with vectorial intensities (p. 20).

According to Agamben, paradigm as a *singular* radiancy inaugurates processes in a *vectorial* sense. With the perspective of Deleuze and Guattari (1987), the abstract machine relates these vectors. The machine is that which allows the vectors to cross one another, creating nodes in complex layers of political states of affairs. Moreover, there is never only one paradigm at work. The abstract machine relates these paradigms within a network of paradigms: terrorism, radicalism, *The Muslim*, a tsunami of migrants, rapists. The machine that empowers the state of affairs always operates not only through a multiplicity of paradigms, but also through a non-reflective incorporation of other objects of thought such as concepts, functions, affects and percepts.

In contrast to Deleuze and Guattari (1994), Agamben (2009) does not juxtapose paradigm to the syntagmatic trait, but argues that the syntagmatic trait of paradigm appears “by virtue of ... nonfunctioning and suspension” (p. 24). A tsunami of migrants and refugees does not explain Europe’s current state of affairs, yet its threatening radiancy keeps the voters in suspense, expecting something that will disrupt their secured lives. In Agamben’s analysis, paradigm creates an exclusive inclusion: In trying to exorcize it, it determines all that happens. A paradigm, such as security, is included in all states of affairs by its *extraction from* this state at all times, by remaining singular and exceptional as a state of emergency, yet inclusive in determining all measures taken. In case of security, paradigm enables states of affairs to connect on a vertical intentional axis, ignoring its transversal tendency of human relationality.

Ontology of insecurity within the constitution of the political: it *must be* presumed that things are not secure, in and of themselves, in order to justify the imperative *to make things secure* (Ahmed, 2014, p. 76).

Agamben’s (2009) paradigm does not ‘mind’, it ‘matters’. It formats and disorganizes. It operates. It articulates itself through living bodies. Precisely these living bodies explain that Agamben’s paradigm is a political object of thought. In interacting with concepts and functions a paradigm can become discursively embedded, but it is most of all highly aesthetic, i.e. experienced via affects and percepts. In that sense, it is more gestural than discursive. In line with Lyotard, sustained by Deleuze and Guattari, we could argue, that paradigm becomes effective through thinking as sensation. A paradigm is, in other words, *sensible* in terms of *sensational* (Molendijk & Oosterling, 2001, pp. 10-12), i.e. it has, in terms of Deleuze, a haptic quality: One feels and ‘sees’ its meaning immediately. The paradigm bends back upon itself, *sensing* its own emergence, as something ‘beside’ (*para*) its own ‘diction’. It radiates meaning.

Approaching a paradigm demands another image of thought. As an object of thought it calls for a form of thinking, which does not necessarily exclude other forms of thinking – science, philosophy and art – but nonetheless differentiates itself from them. It is in *political thinking* that paradigm starts to operate differently than in sciences, also differently from concepts in philosophy or sensations in art. In political thinking the sensing of a paradigm can be compared with the sublime experience as in arts, with the aporetic conceptualisation in philosophy or the impossibility to prove something in an exhaustive sense in science, but in politics this sensing first and for all indicates the oscillation between to be or not to be, between life and death, between belonging and non-belonging. The body in its most barren exposure, its breathing, is that what is exposed in politics.

Politics thus asks for a specific sensibility: Thinking in which sense or sensation is not disconnected from thinking. We already referred to Lyotard who speaks of a *tautagoric* quality of thought. Martin Luther King's dream is exemplary. It refers to a desire, to sensing a desire; yet this sensational comprehension emerges out of his incomprehension for inequality in his time. Criticizing a paradigm asks for a *politico-philosophical* critique, i.e. a thinking in-between as well as a cutting through this paradigm, deconstructing its immediate evidence. It is the task of politico-philosophy to show how paradigm's capability to develop and radiate, affects not only thinking, but life or living as such. Nowadays human rights operate as paradigms. These rights mean something different for different parties, not from an ethical perspective, but from the perspective of policies.

3.4.2.3 Paradigms: Axiomatic, Differencial and Impotential

The ontology that these paradigms disclose is a para-ontology, *para* in the sense of beside and beyond, because an example operates from within to the beyond, i.e. beyond itself being part of a 'whole' that it effectuates. This is its radiant operation. Therefore a paradigm must be distinguished from the creation of concepts as the image of thought that Deleuze and Guattari (1994) propose. While a concept has endoconsistency *and* exoconsistency in relating to other concepts, a political paradigm functions as a pure exteriority. Paradigms operate transversally on different planes, radiating in all directions. Due to this radiancy it has a vulnerable center. In line with Lefort's (1988) analysis of democracy, we could state that paradigm has an empty center; not because it is internally empty, but more due the fact that the consistency of its internal elements and its external connections changes permanently. Moreover, its manner of creating analogies is filled with inconsistencies as has been shown above in case of the European policies to stop the flows of refugees. The different paradigms introduced by Agamben – people, citizen, identity, homo sacer, security, The Muslim, Tsunami of refugees – affect the political interstrata that connect enunciations to bodies, and vice versa. An attempt to define each one in its own fails. There is not one form of paradigm.

In the beginning of this section (3.4.2.1) I have shown that Agamben (2000) introduces two sets of political categories: the old ones of the Ancien Régime and categories of a new political thinking. In the previous section (3.4.1) I distinguished three interstrata in connection to a politics of flight: *politics of exile*, *politics of segments*, and *politics of life*. Due to their essential differences and their fundamental different ways of deterritorialization these types of politics contain different forms of objects of thought. I have typified *politics of exile* as a tree-minded plane with binary tendencies. This plane permanently creates dual oppositional sets: Country of origin and country of arrival; east and

west; north and south; the west as the land of free and the rest as the land of repression; in and out; us and them. The oppositions within this plane create global values in enforcing not reflective but determining judgments (see: 2.2.1). These trigger conflicting sentiments, like fear and security, splitting basic values: freedom of speech versus freedom of religion. As we have seen in Žižek's (2002) analysis, within this oppositional tendency there are multiple inconsistencies. As we will see in the fourth chapter, sacrificing democracy for the sake of democracy is merely one exemplary case. *Politics of exile* desires its own demise, it pleads for freedom within repressive security measures. It is due to this capitalistic tendency that in chapter four I will, in line with Deleuze and Guattari (1983 & 1987), typify the object of thought of this politics as *axiomatic paradigms*.

Let me remind the reader that politics in the *strict sense* – macropolitics in Foucault's analysis – is about who is in power and who is not part of a whole, i.e. of a community. It is all about inclusion and exclusion, about being a law abiding, lawful citizen or an illegal nomad. Policies define the networks – homogenized by categories such as women versus refugees – and thus create types of relations that balance on the verge of being part of and being excluded from a whole. Due to their task to ascertain law and order, macropolitical policies abhor the rhizome. They categorize vertically – the government and the people – and homogenize horizontally – the citizens of a nation-state. Yet, not all policies refer to oppositional or conflicting paradigms. *Politics of segments* – which I have typified as fascicular – rather functions through *differential paradigms*. Identity policies create segments, which do not fully distance themselves from determining judgment of totalitarian regimes, but by accentuating cultural and national diversity they create multiple regimes of determining judgments. *Politics of segments* is a fascicular mechanism, in which several methodologies and approaches are at hand and tolerated. Here the idea of a 'true' method remains, but this time it does not refer to a total whole but to the parts within this whole that I will qualify in the fifth chapter as *multiculturalism*.

The paradigms of the Ancien Régime in Agamben's (2000) quote at the beginning of this section (3.4.2.1) thus function both in *politics of exile* as well as in *politics of segments*, nonetheless they differ in their effects. In this sense, Trump's exclusive typification of people with Islamic background is more in line with the first type of politics and Kahn's plea for inclusion more in line with the second type of politics. Nonetheless, they both do not question the paradigm of nation-state, in this case the United States of America. A politics that becomes rigid in its method is constantly seduced to trace a lost or corrupted origin, while being unaware of its own rhizomatic nature and past. It needs oppositions. Politics beyond this oppositional need has a permanent urge to deconstruct its tracing in order to rhizomatically map its process.

What is the attitude of a politics that needs to move beyond this oppositional thinking; to move beyond the universalizing determinant judgment of axiomatic paradigms and nonconnective segmented determining judgments of differentiating paradigms? How do we name paradigms that empower reflective judgment; or in line with Agamben lead to new categories in political thinking? I call these in line with Agamben *impotential paradigms*. These are paradigms that do not desire to define themselves once and for all, whether globally, national or within a segment. They rather abhor final actualization that stagnates their movements and the intensity of their connections. They do not rest by the connection they make, but permanently long for new connections. They are thus not

potential paradigms that long for a form of actualization, they rather implement impotentiality as the rhizomatic virtual reality that cannot be captured by the actuality of state of affairs. Martin Luther King's dream gives in to such virtuality. Judging such dreams cynically by its effects in the state of affairs neglects to comprehend its impotential affects within politics.

Such impotentiality is also sensible in Arendt's (1958) analysis in *The Human Condition*. Her foundational notions – *action* and *speech* – are never defined. Such paradigms invite a permanent reflection in the same way *inter-est* is protected against any dogmatic content. The singularity of *speech* and *action* – like Agamben's *whatever singularity* and *coming community* and Deleuze and Guattari's *nomadology* and *body without organs* – radiates as an absolute deterritorializing force through the categories of ancient regime. They give rise to a community that expands itself without becoming a paranoid machine that merely functions in the binary or segmentary setting of exclusion and inclusion. Belonging never opposes itself to non-belonging. As Agamben, Arendt proposes a *politics of life*. Impotential paradigms do not pretend; they contain a critical attitude toward their own tendencies toward actualization. Through their reflective act of judgment, they critically affirm impotentiality of connection without reducing *difference* to the order of The Same, as Deleuze (1997) argues (as I have elaborated on in 1.4.2). It is the political gesture that such paradigms affectuate that fortifies my act of writing.

3.4.3 What or Who is a Political Persona?

Let me call upon you Nahid, you sensitize multiple sounds, imagine heterotopia, a face that surpasses our regimes of faciality, and your gestures chokes us with horror. Who are you? Who made you? Which politics do you represent? What shall I call you; the daughter of Venus, the planet of fogs? Your impotentiality is never thought. Let us map the lines of flight that you inspire.

Which paradigm does answer to our question: what kind of object of thought is flight? I have characterized flight as many things: a concept (philosophy), a function (science) and a sensation (art). Yet the main exercise in this study is to evaluate how *flight* functions as a paradigm defining the radiancy of politics of flight. As you suspect, the theorem that I present here is that flight operates as multiple paradigms; it has the tendency to be *axiomatic*; the urge to *differentiate*; and finally, the virtual natality to be an *impotential*. Yet, in order to examine this multiplicity of flight as a paradigm we need to relate this object of thought to persona just as Deleuze and Guattari (1994) relate objects of thought to the conceptual personae, the revolutionary observers and artistic figures. *Who* is the persona of flight if its object of thought is this multiplicity of political paradigms?

Just as paradigm, political persona functions within the interstrata of politics, connecting assemblages of bodies to assemblages of expressions. Paradigm and political persona are thus not respectively the expression and the body of political interstrata; they are *both* the linkage between assemblages of expression and assemblages of bodies. As we have seen (2.3.5) regimes of faciality and gesturality show how political personae interconnect assemblages of expressions to assemblages of bodies. Nahid's face and women in Cologne are not merely bodies; they are interconnective phenomena linking discourses of sanity and insanity, sexuality and repression, to physical bodies. It is this liveliness of the body that distinguishes politics from the previous mentioned disciplines: philosophy, science and art. In politics life and its form are in immediately related. A paradigm does

not only affect the way of living, but living itself. While the life of Kant is fascinating – the man who lived in a small town all his life yet imagined a philosophy that referred to the whole of humanity – Gandhi, Mandela or Malala resisted paradigms of repression immediately as living beings. It is easy to conclude that refugee is the *persona* of politics of flight. Yet as I argued in 3.1 the persona of flight is more complex and more intertwined than conventionally presumed. Politics of flight affects more lives than that of refugees alone. Yet, the manner in which this politics affects the refugees differs. Thus, in line with the previous distinction between paradigms it is merely self-evident to also distinguish different types of persona within politics of flight.

What does otherness mean on a plane of flight? Words may sound the same, but they, as we have seen with Barthes (1982), have paradigmatic dimensions. They are multiple in their signification and due to their connections operate on different planes, strata and milieus. This counts for otherness as a word as well. Deleuze and Guattari (1994) already typified it as a potential world. Yet, as a paradigm it radiates not only as a potentiality, but also through discourses of segmentation. The persona Other is not merely the faceless face of God, the hidden holy other, as is conceptualized by Levinas. Within the same radiant intensity of the paradigm Otherness, the Other can become the underdog and the excluded sacred; for instance, pariahs. Also, the privileged citizen is the other of the non-citizen. With each configuration of the abstract machine, forming multiple interstratic types of political communities, the affect as well as the function transforms: other sense-abilities, other scientific explanations emerge. Yet this otherness never absolutely materializes, in a specific body or a mental frame. It affects the matter of the body, but the other stays immanently virtual. The comprehension of the other as a challenging possibility or as a fearsome reality creates different types of personae within politics of flight. Politics is a milieu that is shaped by multiple rhizomatic diagrammatic lines that connect multiple personae. What does it mean to map this political milieu, defined by complexity and multiplicity of its personae?

In order to answer this question, let us return to Arendt's (1958) conception of a *who* (1.3.3). In *The Human Condition* she refers to action as a political process in which men lose their *whatness* as living beings or producing beings and become *whos* that are exposed in a public space. These *whos* are not entities that decide to be political or not, or decides when and how. As political personae, they unfold themselves as pure inter-esse: in-betweenness that radiates, never leaving the realm of politics. Following Arendt, a political actor is more alive than a laborer or a worker. In words of Deleuze and Guattari (1987), they give in to the rhizomatic temperament of a body without organs; and in words of Agamben (2000) they experience a political life as form-of-life. This hyphenation also endures in Michelle Fine's (1994) analysis when she states that our scientific and epistemological as well as cultural, political and ethical thinking must surpass the binary setting of selfness and otherness; in which both the self and other are doomed to a homogeneous thinking. Through the hyphen in-between I-other she argues we finally implement contextuality within thinking in which an approach of each person becomes a singular approach instead of a particular manifestation of a general idea of an identity. Fine thus disposes of the idea of an objective manner of researching. In a sense, she pleads for a permanent revolutionary tendency within science. Fine states that a researcher must always question her way of observation. The contextuality of the researcher is always intertwined with her manner of approach. My way of approach, my choice for a political gesturality, and my accentuation

of possible themes are not accidental; but they emerge from a life, a life that is connected to politics and refuge as well as philosophy.

How does life sensitize itself within politics of flight? Mohamed Bouazizi and before him the student Jan Palach, and recently the Tibetan monks burned themselves alive. Refugees commit suicide in refugee camps. Then there are those who risk their lives, yet survive. Ghandi starved himself, Nelson Mandela was imprisoned, Malala Yousafzai got shot in the head, Nahid was tortured, the women in Cologne were assaulted. An idea on life, no matter how particular or general it seems to be, in its singular modes and possibilities, effectuates the formation and the transformation of a political community and bodies. In these bodies life itself is at risk, not a particular isolated life, but life in connection to others. From this perspective, Arendt's *clear* distinction between the political and the private, and the unambiguous dissimilarity between life, work and action, are in contrast to her own experiences. It was the harshness of her life as an outcast and refugee within the homogenizing forces that has made her a political thinker par excellence. It was her need of physical survival that forced her to criticize political thinking and human rights. Lefort (1988) states that when Arendt in her interview with Günter Gauss declares that due to the events in Germany in 1933 she is shocked and feels responsibility, she connects thought on politics to a life experience. Lefort also adequately states: "This is neither an anecdotal fact nor a biographical detail. The feeling that she was responsible, that she had to respond to the fearful challenge of totalitarianism made her aware of the motor force behind all thought" (p. 46). Arendt's life is more than anything a political life. In other words, life – which is, as we have seen in the first chapter, always connective – is always related to political expression. It is through her thought on life and politics that I can differentiate different personae within politics of flight.

3.4.3.1 Politics of Exile: Civic Subjects and Limbic Lives

Let us start with the totalitarian regime that is characteristic of *politics of exile*. A regime defined by its oppositional axiomatic paradigms dividing a community spatially in terms of here – the homeland or *Heimat* – and there, in terms of *us versus them*. This is the world that Arendt (1958 & 1968) has examined and that she defines as the realm of the social. It is a community in which according to Agamben (1998 & 2000) life is fully detached from its form through paradigms of the ancient regime such as *homo sacer* and sovereignty. Arendt (1978^a) argues that within this community the other as the one that does not answer to the order is forced into an *either/or*: being a pariah or being a parvenu. She calls both these figures social phenomena due to the fact that they both do not interact within the political: as pariah, they are isolated and excluded and as parvenu they adjust fully to the order by disposing themselves of every element that makes them different. Both pariah and parvenu lose their singular character, by being either homogenized by isolation or by adjustment to the image of an ideal citizen. The Prime Minister of The Netherlands Mark Rutte (2017) wrote a letter to the Dutch electorate in which he stated that Dutch citizens are characterized by 'normal' behavior while never defining what this 'normality' indicates.

Pariahs and parvenus as political figures do not expose their whoness but are merely a whatness; in terms of Arendt merely objects rather than political subjects acting and speaking intersubjectively. In a sense, these two figures refer to Agamben's (1998) two paradigms of ancient

regime: *homo sacer* and *sovereign*. *Homo sacer* relates to the bodies that are *excluded* and *sovereign* refers to the bodies that *decide* on how paradigms of exclusion radiate, i.e. decisively determine both body and mind of the others. Pariah and parvenu are excluded from the order of the sovereign; their individuality is not allowed to express itself within the order. Parvenus just differ in the manner they define their survival. They adjust by forgetting their excluded background. Parvenu is thus not part of the *majority*, but an adjusted politically dead subject within the majority. While their essence consists of forgetting their pariah-background, the sovereign majority ensures that they will never forget it fully.

The pariah Jew and the parvenu Jew are in the same boat, rowing desperately in the same angry sea. Both are branded with the same mark; both alike are outlaws. Today the truth has come home: there is no protection in heaven or earth against bare murder, and a man can be driven at any moment from the streets and broad places once open to all. Along last, it has become clear that the 'senseless freedom' of the individual merely paves the way for the senseless suffering of his entire people (Arendt, 1978^a, p. 121).

Thus, despite the discursive differences we cannot divide personae of *politics of exile* merely into pariah and parvenu. Yet, the two 'ancient' terms – *homo sacer* and *sovereign* – within the dual oppositional setting of totalitarianism invite us to pinpoint two other types of personae. Given my previous examples, the dual set of citizen and non-citizen/denizen/stateless alien/*sans papier*/illegals seems to be the obvious choice. These all can be situated within the discourse of citizenship and nation-state with its claim on respectively autonomy and sovereignty. Yet, with these two types of persona I do not only refer to the people with or without a proper passport. Nahid is, legally spoken, a European citizen; and not all refugees are stateless.

The second set that presents itself is the people and the non-people. This distinction however seems problematic due to the fact that people suggests a collective. Yet, in this study the term people is used as a paradigm and the term persona refers to a collective as well as an individual body. Moreover, the distinction between the two personae – people/non-people – thus relates to a broader discourse that reaches beyond the duality between a collective versus an individual, but also beyond that of legal versus illegal. As paradigms, these must refer to the multifaceted spectrum of politics, including social and cultural interactions that subjectify bodies through policies' formalizations and spectacular visualization. When all this is taken into account the political personae I envision are *civic subjects* and *limbic lives*. The first, *civic subjects*, are personae that signify the paradigm of sovereignty. They represent law and order, not only legally and politically, but also ethically, culturally and socially. In words of Foucault they are the docile subjects that present the norm, normality, and civilization. As we saw in case of Cologne, defending the rights of women is not introduced as something that we all must fight for, but as a right that is merely a product of western civilization; and its exclusive and excluding attack on Muslim males neglects the inherent misogyny within European civilization itself. While the majority creates its own illusion of normality, the other is doomed to barbaric stereotyping. Female refugees with severe sexual abuse background bear witness to lives that are forgotten by all orders. If they tell their tale of rape, they risk being banned by

their families and if they do not, they risk rejection of their asylum request. Nonetheless telling their tale is never a guarantee for entrance; they need to *prove* their rape.¹⁹ And even if their rape gets acknowledged they do not escape the judgment of a vicious misogynistic culture. They implicitly become guilty of their exclusion. They are the *limbic lives* par excellence: individuals, as we will see in the fourth chapter, that are not merely prohibited to enter a community, but even more severely from being admitted to any formation of a community. While the philosophical, scientific and artistic figures unfold and are enveloped in their ‘objects’ – concept, function, sensation – these political figures *pulsate* the radiance of the paradigm of exclusion. These personae are the inhabitants of limbo’s, i.e. of heterotopias that are designated as peripheries by the utopic imagination of totalitarian idealism. As we will see in the fourth chapter, refugees in refugee camps are in terms of Agamben exemplary cases of these personae of limbic heterotopias; nonetheless they are not the only ones suffering from the I versus other binary set of *politics of exile*.

3.4.3.2 Politics of Segments: Differentiated Identities and Multipolar Individuals

The universal agency of the majority – let us classify them for this moment as *human, white, heterosexual, highly-educated, law-abiding, child-producing, non-disabled, non-disturbed, non-traumatized, middle-aged, middle to upper class, Christian or secular, monogamous, married working male citizen* – has often been disputed. As I already argued in the first chapter (1.1) the 21st century is the age of minorities. Minorities – perhaps not necessarily in gaining power, but within the regime of visibility – have gained terrain over the majority. Within a *politics of segments* minorities can dispute the politics of exile, yet differently than within a *politics of life*. In the fifth chapter I will elaborate on the first type of minority through the paradigm of *majoritarian minority*. This type of minority depends dialectically on the majority in order to define itself. So, if we define majority as the articulation of normalization, minorities are characterized by at least one of its traits *ex negativo*: that is the non-whites, women, LGBTQQIAAP+²⁰’s, childless individuals, poor, childlike, elderly, neurotypical and/or physically challenged people, unemployed and polygamists. The sum of these minorities is by far larger than the presupposed majority. Thus, majority is not about numbers, the *quantity*²¹ of the matter, but about the traits that *qualify* or *appreciates* something as ‘normal’. Yet, the manner in which these so-called a-typical individuals resist differs. Within the politics of segments minorities resist by creating segmentalized territories in which they do not resist their counter-identification – they do not resist the definition of who they are as such – but rather the appreciation of this anormality within the society. Multiculturalism thus introduces – especially in connection to sexual, ethnic and cultural background – an exclusive space within the society for different types of communities. Within these communities however the power of normalization is not

¹⁹ See on this issue also Baillot, Cowan, & Munro & 2012 and Refugee Council 2009.

²⁰ Stands for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgendered, Queer, Questioning, Intersex, Asexual, Allies and Pansexual +....

²¹ Along with Deleuze and Guattari, Patton (2000) argues that the difference between minorities that depend on the majority for their formation is a *quantitative* difference while the difference between majorities and minorities that are independent from this homogeneous formation is a *qualitative* difference (p. 48). I think this distinction between quantitative and qualitative is nevertheless problematic. Although minoritarian minorities never distinguish themselves on a quantitative level, the formation of majoritarian minorities is quantitative as well as qualitative.

abandoned. Multiculturalism, as will be shown in the fifth chapter, introduces fragmentary ideas on normality within *an I versus others* discourse. As Geldof (2013) argues, within the European cities persons that do not belong to one of the segments are excluded from all segments, due to rigid and absolute defined understanding of the segments of multiculturalism. He also argues that social and economic problems become a problem of a segment within a society instead of a nationwide or global problem. Thus, politics of segments also introduces two types of persona: *differenciated identities* – subjects that are defined, included, civilized and normalized within a segment – and *multipolar individuals* – individuals that surpass the order of segmentation and hence therefore experience exclusion. These multipolar individuals surpass the nonconnective relativistic manner of agency of politics of segments; they rather experience connectivity between the segments. In The Netherlands, especially a new generation suffers from this exclusion; their lives as we will see cannot be captured within one segment. They experience hostility from all sides. In other words, this politics has its own multiple forms of pariahs and parvenus; their own way of reducing an individual as a who to multiple whatnesses.

3.4.3.3 Politics of Life: Singular Assemblages

The above-mentioned minorities nonetheless also resist in another manner. There are those who resist the identification as such, identification of their sexuality, ethnicity, cultural or spiritual affinities, exposing a who in Arendt's sense. She is perhaps herself a fine example of what she calls *conscious pariah*. This political figure as Arendt (1978^a) argues, does not only resist the order of the majority but is eventually also critical toward the communities that define its belonging through rigid forms of identification. A conscious pariah is also critical in relation to pariah and parvenu (pp. 64-66). Arendt's (1995) *Men in Dark Times* is a tribute to conscious pariahs such as Rosa Luxemburg, her dear friend Walter Benjamin and her beloved teacher Karl Jaspers. It was in accordance with her teacher's attitude that Arendt could experience how a member of a so-called majority could become another type of minority. Deleuze and Guattari (1986 & 1987) also speak of a type of minority that resists the regime of identification as such, proposing a true sense of singularity within political relationality. In line with their thought I call this second type of minority: *minoritarian minority*. Conscious pariahs are individuals that behave extraordinarily in the darkest times. The personae of *politics of life* are thus, as we will see in the sixth chapter, neither a universal nor a segmented relativistic modification of agencement, but relational and singular. It is within the personae of this politics that Arendt's *who*, Deleuze and Guattari's *body without organs*, and Agamben's *whatever being* intertwine. It is within a contextualized and differentiated singularity that in Fine's (1994) words the hyphen in-between I-other can create a life beyond the rupture between life and its form. I call these personae *singular assemblages*. They are those who love to live in an Arendtian world.

This idea of loving the world – *amor mundi* – has been a drive for my approach of politics of flight. Arendt, despite everything, never gave up loving the world. Until her last breath, she kept thinking through this love. The idea was already present in her dissertation. In *Love and Saint Augustine* Arendt (1996) explains that, although Augustine introduces the idea of individuality, he at the same time sacrifices this sense of an *I* in his devotion for the Creator. The *I* that connects itself to its Creator must do this through self-denial in overcoming its fear of death, which belongs to the worldly life. According to Augustine one must not devote oneself to the world but to the Creator and

the future that awaits it. Yet, this self-denial is motivated by a specific form of desire: *love*. And each love, of the world or for thy neighbor, and even the love for oneself, is for the sake of the loving act itself, an act that eventually connects the individual to the divine. According to Augustine love is not a choice but a desire that befalls us. Love creates fearlessness due to its exposition of a future to come; in Augustine's case a future in which the I evaporates in its devotional focus. The existence of men, that lingers between not-yet and no-more, between birth and death, is thus described as a becoming. The life of men is a process of change. It is the very existence of men that obstructs its *being*, or a sense of *essence*. Existence is the lack of essence. In terms of Deleuze and Guattari, the only thing that really exists is a body without organs. "So long as men exists, he *is* not" (p. 26). Essence (the ability to be) belongs to God while men merely can exist temporarily. According to Arendt, this leads Augustine to conclude that while God *is*, men *become*.

Everything that is created exists in the mode of becoming ... Since created things have come into existence, they change and alter ... Strictly speaking, their mode of being is neither Being nor non-Being, but something in between (p. 52).

How does love of the divine and essence-less becoming, in which men although living *in the world* distance themselves *from the world*, relate to Arendt's notion of *amor mundi*? Arendt simply states that love in Augustine's work is not *of* the world, but *in* the world *of* the divine. Nevertheless, this form of love demands in its being in the world a specific attitude. From Augustine's Christian perspective this love creates a *community of faith*. This does not limit itself to the true and just believer, since the sacrifice of Christ does not limit itself to some men but to all men. The community that is based on such faith thus creates a *radical possibility* through which each person relates individually to all others as individuals. This universality binds us in twofold manner. First through Adam mankind is shamefully distanced from God, creating the *world of men*; second, through Christ men has become aware of his sin, and is related to this everlasting sin. The sin does not undo the past that men owe to Adam, but redefines it into another order, Arendt states. Men distance themselves *from* the world through their life *in* the world. The distancing from the world thus paradoxically can only emerge from *radically relating* to all possible individuals *in* the world.

It is crucial to note that for Augustine the love of the other is not love for mankind, or for a shared humanity. Being-human is that which men have gained through sinful Adam. The love is for the sake of the *connection* between each individual to his Creator, the radical possibility between each human and its God. Therefore, loving thy neighbor – at least from the perspective of Augustine – does not literally mean the person next door, but the closeness that each individual radically shares with all others, both foes and enemies, in connection to the Creator. There is no choice in this relationality. We are connected radically. It is this radical link that translates itself into Arendt's idea of *amor mundi*. On a non-metaphysical level the plurality and becoming is connected to this radical bond between men. Yet, Arendt (1958) does not bind men through their shared connection to a Creator, in shame or sinfulness, but through their 'shared' difference.

It is in this idea of *shared difference* that the love of the world, the urge to live in the world, becomes a political rather than a religious matter in Arendt's (1958) later discussions. The act of distinguishing

and in a sense protecting the world – which for her is the only milieu of politics – has been the main drive of Arendt’s political and philosophical work. In *The Human Condition* *amor mundi* is not something done for the sake of another divine world. The love of the world becomes a love *in* the world *for* the world itself. A love for a political world in which people unfold another political gesturality in acting and speaking; a world in which men are not reduced to a whatness, given an essence, but unfold as a who, given its becoming. This study thus, in its critique, does not write against Arendt, but in love for her life and thought writes through her thinking, and approaches her – her efforts, suffering, resistance despite the cost of marginality – as a *singular assemblage* par excellence. She is a child of multiple politics. The question is:

How do we expose the multiplicity within politics of flight?

Part two: Exposition of Milieus

Unfolding Milieus within Politics of Flight

No, no, no, no
I did not become someone different
I did not want to be
But I'm new here
Will you show me around?

No matter how far wrong you've gone
You can always turn around

Met a woman in a bar
I told her I was hard to get to know
And near impossible to forget
She said I had an ego on me, the size of Texas

Well, I'm new here and I forget
Does that mean big or small?

No matter how far wrong you've gone
You can always turn around

And I'm shedding plates like a snake
And it may be crazy
But I'm the closest thing I have
To a voice of reason

Turn around, turn around, turn around
And you may come full circle
And be new here again

Gil Scott-Heron (2010)
I'm New Here

Chapter 4: Politics of Exile

Fury said to a mouse,
That he met in the house,
'Let us both go to law: *I will prosecute you.*
Come, I'll take no denial;
We must have a trial:
For really this morning I've nothing to do.'
Said the mouse to the cur,
'Such a trial, dear Sir,
With no jury or judge, would be wasting our
breath.'
'I'll be judge, I'll be jury,' Said cunning old Fury:
'I'll try the whole cause, and condemn you to
death'
(Carroll, 1982, p. 35).

4.1 The Protagonist of State of Emergency

Exile is an in-between territory where citizenship and belonging remains undecided. Axiomatic paradigms (as I explained in 3.4.2.3) determine the evaluation of refuge and fleeing. How to map and unfold a milieu of exile? What kind of discourse is applied and what kind of politics does it entail? Or rather is politics as a coherent discourse of action and speech even possible in a *politics of exile*? In *Means without End* Agamben (2000) states that politics has become inferior to other domains, such as economics, religion and law. Politics, according to him, has lost sight of its ontological status. This is due to political transformations that have made the application of conventional political categories meaningless. Agamben's implementation of notions such as refugee, being-in-language and gesturality asks for a politico-philosophical critique, in which ancient political categories such as the state of exception, the concentration camp, nation-state and citizenship are revalued and combined with new categories that will be elaborated on in the final chapter. These ancient so-called universal categories still insist inadequately in ever more mobile territories, due to historically recent globalization and digitalization. To counter this insistence Agamben introduces new political issues and forms of communication. He agrees with Arendt's prediction of the loss of politics by arguing that coherent political communication has ceased to exist. However, Agamben does not search for answers in history as Arendt does. In his work natality is the ability to be born again and again as that which

always has to come. This is the impotential paradigm (see: 3.4.2.3) that motivates a community that is about to unfold. This configuration will be dealt with in the final chapter.

Agamben's critical analysis on contemporary politics is nonetheless inspired by Arendt's reflections on totalitarianism and her evaluation of the illusion of human rights. Agamben (1998 & 2005) is also moved by Walter Benjamin's analysis of the contradictory permanence of the *State of Emergency* and Michel Foucault's analysis of *biopolitics* as the underlying grid of the disconnection between *life* (zoē) and *form of life* (bios). Agamben describes our current political space as a zone in which axiomatic paradigms such as *non-citizen and citizen, law and fact, inclusion and exclusion, truth and lie* are diffusely instrumentalized and as a result have become indistinctive. The exclusive meaning and binary tendencies of these paradigms is veiled in a *zone of indistinction*.¹ The notion of *refuge* is crucial in this analysis, not because of its productive potential that could enrich the society or as an icon for juridical or social experiments, but rather as a political paradigm. This emerges simultaneously with a political persona: *refugee*. According to Agamben (2000) it is this figure who becomes the protagonist in political affairs of our time.

It is even possible ... to ... build our political philosophy anew starting from the one and only figure of the refugee (p. 16).

The insistence of ancient political categories creates a milieu in which the refugee becomes the limbic lives. In his lectures Agamben pleads for a politics that highlights this figure in order to break through this form of politics. In this chapter the axiomatic structure of such a politics, as it has been introduced in the third chapter, is mapped out. How do notions such as migrant and refugee function within the discourse on exile, given the fact that refuge, just as flight, is a multifaceted *paradigm*. I will start with a more detailed examination of an axiomatic paradigm in order to explain a *politics of exile* in connection to flight and refuge. The manner in which the axiomatic paradigm of exile affects political territories is examined in 4.2. This section elaborates on the constitution of territories within a totalitarian setting. Arendt's reflections on totalitarianism have influenced Agamben's thought extensively. Nevertheless, Agamben's political reflection is above all a combination of different philosophies in which different thinkers – such as Heidegger, Averroës, Aristotle, Benjamin, Schmitt, Blanchot, Arendt and Foucault – are connected. On top of that in his reflections different styles, disciplines and historical events are combined. Paradigms such as *homo sacer*, a Roman juridical subject referring to a person who has been abandoned from a territory by the law of men as well as the law of Gods, and Greek terms such as *zoē* (naked life) and *bios* (political life) are used to elaborate on the paradigmatic presuppositions of the current refugee camps. Agamben's notions refer explicitly to contemporary politics, outlining a *zone of indistinction* in which the classical bifurcations, such as law and fact, inside and outside, life and death, political and apolitical, become blur. What kind of a milieu gives rise to an axiomatic paradigm like *homo sacer* and its type of radiancy? In order to keynote some crucial traits of a politics of exile I will enhance Agamben's analysis with three crucial notions

¹ The *zone of indistinction* is, explicitly and implicitly, a crucial theme in various works of Agamben. See for example: *Homo Sacer, Remnants of Auschwitz* and *Means without End*.

that are developed by his fellow travellers: the Arendtian (1968) concept of *totalitarianism*, the concept of *biopolitics* of Michel Foucault (1978), and the concept of *control society* by Gilles Deleuze (1995). In terms of the fourfold of Deleuze and Guattari this concerns *the form of content*.

In 4.3 the *form of expression* of a milieu of exile is exposed. How are paradigms such as *law* and *identity* expressed within politics of exile? Through Agamben's vocabulary in this section I will argue that paradigms such as law and grammar define the form of expression within totalitarian state as a form of truthness. Due to this it creates endless zones of expressions that do not belong to its form. Law creates its own lawlessness.

In 4.4 the axiomatic paradigm of *camp*, one of Agamben's crucial notions, is explored. How does the camp, not merely as a physical territory, but more specific as *a matter of expression* create lawless spaces? In the final section 4.5 it is argued that the inhabitants of camps as *matter of content* become *limbic lives* of such a totalitarian territory. I speak of *limbic lives* instead of *limbic bodies* due to the fact that this persona does not only appear as an assemblage of body; but rather functions as an interstrata in-between assemblages of enunciation and assemblages of expression. This persona sensitizes a specific discrepancy in-between form and matter within a state of totalitarianism. This will lead to the conclusion that a politics of exile operates in an axiomatic way that excludes life from its forms. This politics represses a potentiality of life and its multifaceted expression. After having explained how this silencing of bodies is the result of inconsistent policies, in the final paragraph I will raise the question as to how the resistance of these limbic lives creates another milieu. With the aid of Rancière (2004), I will argue that the analysis of the *exclusion* within politics must always be accompanied with the analysis of the multiple effects of the reality of unavoidable *inclusion*.

	Content	Expression
Form	4.2 Territory and Access <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Capitalistic isomorphic state territories and international nationalism - Democracy: tyranny of majority/atomized masses and indifferent people - Consistency of negation: <i>here versus there</i> - Zone of indistinction: multiplicity of power/violence/exclusion - Terror and the spectacle 	4.3 Constitutional Doublespeak <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Totalitarian constitutional law/ undemocratic democracy - Perfect identity: us versus them - Doublespeak - Force of Law: order without localization/lawless locality - Judgment of God □ (ab)normality - Human rights □ homo sacer - Assimilation: moralistic politics - Lawful responsibility - Limit and not borders
Matter	4.4 LL: Unheard voices <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Egalitarian equality - Statistics and bureaucracy - Blood and soil: negligence and resentment - Deformed statements - Fortune seeker: politics versus economy - Hell of cacophonous silence - Camp: expression of a state of being - Gesture of torture: police and homo sacer 	4.5 LL: Exiled Bodies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Biopolitics: the living dead - Limbic bodies - <i>Zoē</i> versus <i>bios</i> - Complete witness - Purification: state of racism - Non-place: faceless face - New ethics of limbic lives - Resisting bodies: gestures and faces - Natality of survival

4.2 Territory and Access

4.2.1 The State and its Overcoding Radiancy

In this section I will elaborate on the *form of content* of politics of exile. First, I will define this form as a nation-state with capitalistic tendencies. It is within this amalgamation that I argue that within politics of exile nationalism and internationalism go hand in hand. Second, through Arendt's analysis of violence and power I will define democracy in the setting of totalitarianism as the *tyranny of majority*. This is due to the tendency of politics of exile to create homogeneous masses; *here* in the center as well as *there* in the peripheries. Hereafter, I will argue that these masses rather are gathered due to a sense of negation instead of connection. Finally, it is argued that this force of negation will lead to multiple forms of exclusion within politics of exile.

Politics of exile is an interstratum. It effects and connects assemblages of bodies and assemblages of expression. It territorializes the earth, the body without organs, by an act of capture, isolating and segmenting a territorial form of matter, a substance, articulating itself in territorial axiomatic paradigms such as (nation-)states, country of origin, country of arrival, borders, inhabitants and foreign policy. Through axiomatic paradigms such policy assumes clear boundaries, clear definitions and opposition between different territories. Although this interstratum finds itself, as any other interstratum, on the chaotic surface of a body without organs, it creates a shield around itself in order to totalize the multiplicity and the connectivity around it as well as to ignore the multiplicity within its borders. A politics of exile operates from within, circling as it were around an imaginary center that extends its segmentational forces.

Strata are Layers, Belts. They consist of giving form to matters, of imprisoning intensities or locking singularities into systems of resonance and redundancy, of producing upon the body of the earth molecules large and small and organizing them into molar aggregates. Strata are acts of capture, they are like ‘black holes’ or occlusions striving to seize whatever comes within their reach. They operate by coding and territorialization upon the earth; they proceed simultaneously by code and by territoriality (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 40).

Every territorialization triggers its specific deterritorializing effects. Striving to seize whatever comes into reach through its radiance. In this chapter I argue that *politics of exile* is radiant in a contradictory manner. On the one hand, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest, it operates as a black hole by absorbing ideas – no matter how farfetched – and transforms these ideas permanently into axiomatic paradigms. On the other hand, this interstratum has a centrifugal force. It permanently forces all imperfection towards the peripheries, creating a state of exile in order to establish its adequate identity. It is a form of politics where the distinction between *le politique* and *la politique*, between force and power becomes obscure, as already suspected by Lefort (1988). The institutions are the engines of political thought and political deliberations manifest the logic of exclusion. It is however too premature a conclusion that the politics of exile is merely a line of segmentation. As we will see later, elaborating on the practice of segmenting, it is driven by an urge to destroy all imperfections, and thus also creates a form of absolute flight-line that ruptures the multiplicity and connectivity of the BWO.

In order to investigate a *politics of exile* we have to ask the obvious question in our present political context that is problematized within for instance the European context: what is a sovereign nation-state? Deleuze and Guattari (1987) state that the “theses on the origin of the State are always tautological ... We are always brought back to the idea of a State that comes into the world fully formed and rises up in a single stroke, the unconditioned *Urstaat*” (p. 427). However, in a genealogical analysis a state emerges from an idea with a temporal and special consistency, whether juridical, ideological or territorial. Deleuze and Guattari speak about a threshold of consistency. This refers to the idea that each formation, despite its tendency to unite and insure the security of the included – *civic subjects* – remains on a threshold through which the uncalculated and the non-included remain invasive – *limbic lives*. They distinguish between two types of *threshold of*

consistencies: towns and states. Towns are territorial networks, or what Deleuze and Guattari label as *phenomena of transconsistency*. Towns polarize internal flows as well as the flowing through entrances and exits. The immensity of networks in Hong Kong is a fine example. While towns operate out of *the middle* and through *horizontal* lines, the State objectifies those territories from a hierarchical *vertical* line. Deleuze and Guattari define the State as a *phenomenon of intraconsistency* that effectuates the resonance of multiple points, “points that are not necessarily already town-poles but very diverse points of order, geographic, ethnic, linguistic, moral, economic, technological particularities” (p. 433). States are by Deleuze and Guattari defined as *apparatuses of capture* that deterritorialize the earth in their attempt to create a homogeneous society, based on a closed territory (pp. 427-435). Thus, while some of the inhabitants of London plead for a network, Brexit appears within the logic of state through the axiomatic paradigm: *us versus them*.

States are not at all transcendent paradigms of an overcoding but immanent models of realization for an axiomatic or decoded flows (p. 455).

Within this perspective a politics of exile can be described as a milieu in which the State functions through the radiance of its paradigms, which function axiomatically. That territorial entity, which is called nation-state, thus rests on the idea of an axiomatic *collective subjectivity* – and a defined persona: civic subject – in which the nation and the people simultaneously function by repetitive patterns as *a refrain* (p. 456). The national anthem is the most explicit form of expression of this refraining. In case of The Netherlands the emphasis on this anthem – which was more implicit before – changed due to explicit nationalistic discourse; for example, during integration courses.

Through repeating some gestures and not others, or through being orientated in some directions and not others, bodies become contorted; they get twisted into shapes that enable some action only insofar as they restrict capacity for other kinds of action (Ahmed, 2014, p.145).

In line with Deleuze and Guattari (1987), we could also state that the refrain of a nation-state relates to modern international political affairs, which they characterize as capitalistic. Once we label this as a market-State, it appears – next to town and state – as the third form of *threshold of consistency*.² Capitalism connects different types of states: totalitarian, bureaucratic, monarchy, and democratic states. First, it has a tendency to permanently *add* and *subtract* new axioms. Second, this *saturation* within the process of capitalism is always *relative*. Capitalism is a permanent immanent struggle in order to expand borders, or fill the gaps. Third, capitalism creates *models* or *isomorphic* traits that become transportable within different types of states. Even socialist states could not escape these models, due to the fact that these models dominate the process of exchange. The examples are not only China or Russia, but economic boycott of countries such as Cuba and Iran shows the immensity of economic force of capitalism to determine policies of such countries. Fourth, *power* that is installed by capitalistic regimes always tends to widen its reach beyond what its axioms initially define as

² In plateau 13 of *A Thousand Plateaus* they differentiate only two thresholds, the town and the state.

territorial. Nevertheless, capitalism simultaneously function from a *center* and by the principle of *unequal exchange* toward the subjects that have no access to this center. These are, from the perspective of the majority, the *minorities*. *The included middle* and the *minorities* on the periphery are the fifth and sixth traits of global capitalism. Un-included or not-fully-included minorities motorize the formation of *undecidable propositions*, the final trait of capitalism, according to Deleuze and Guattari.

It is through this third articulation of a threshold – capitalism – that different types of states, heterogeneous but nevertheless *isomorphic*, are encompassed in a global political procedure. Traits of this political procedure are, as we will see later on, relevant for our understanding of processes of politics of exile and its totalitarian state of affairs, which are by no means limited to one form of community. The undecidability of the above-mentioned propositions cannot disappear within the logic of capitalism. The unpredictability is inherent and permanent to capitalism. Yet, capitalism always creates new paradigms in order to deal with such unpredictability. In words of Agamben (2002 & 2009), these paradigms function as an ex-ample, an outside phenomenon functioning without rules while defining the rules of engagement within capitalistic states. Most slogans in the election of 2017 in The Netherlands on ethical issues such as elderly-care, social-care of vulnerable members of society, education and global state of refugees, were not based on factors that play crucial role in these ethical areas, but on the economic feasibility of the matter.

Nonetheless Deleuze and Guattari (1987) also argue that there are *undecidable propositions* – impotential paradigms – creating other forms of consistency that in relation to this third threshold of consistency function as revolutionary flight lines that infiltrate the capitalistic state of affairs (pp. 461-473).

From this standpoint, when we talk about ‘undecidable propositions,’ we are not referring to the uncertainty of the results, which is necessarily a part of every system. We are referring, on the contrary, to the coexistence and inseparability of that which the system conjugates, and that which never ceases to escape it following lines of flight that are themselves connectable. The undecidable is the germ and locus par excellence of revolutionary decisions (p. 473).

Nevertheless, the question remains whether a global state of affairs merely characterized as capitalistic is sufficient in order to map out adequately and affirmatively the state of migrants and refugees. It appears that the more globally connected and communicative we get, the more intense becomes the desire for a small closed community as a nation-state where an exclusive group of people is connected to a certain territory with a specific history. Schinkel (2011) states that the moment that nationalism loses its natural implementation of a ‘we’; it starts more severely implementing a ‘we’ (p. 16). “Social hypochondria is the convulsive fixation of a social body on its possible unity-threatening diseases, in order to turn the attention of its coming death away” (p. 25, Translation TR). This is not only visible in the rise of ultra-nationalistic parties during the last two decades, but also for example in the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and former Soviet Union. Even the minorities, which have been defined as such by the logic of nation-states, function within this logic, using the same arguments in order to manifest themselves and gain rights for their people, such as has been the case with Bosnia

and Palestine. The president of the state of Palestine Mahmoud Abbas' plea in 2011 for the acknowledgement of a *nation-state* by the *international community* shows the complexity and inconsistency of the world that we are living in. Palestinians know as no other that nowadays only through international relations a people can be acknowledged as a sovereign community and it is only through being defined as a nation-state that a people can be recognized internationally.

What we could call *nationalism* thus is not the opposite of internationalism, but by its very essence is defined in relation to international affairs. Nor are nationalism and the desire for the founding of a nation-state a trait of majority against minorities or migrant communities. The nationalistic sentiments of some minorities with a Turkish background in Europe in 2016, accusing Gülen supporters of the coupe d'état in Turkey, is a good example. Minorities can share with the majority the tendency to statism and thus long to become majorities themselves instead of creating a multiple layered society of communities. What thus still defines a politics of exile is this majoritarian longing, thus *becoming-majority*,³ more than being one. Furthermore, *nationalism* is not necessarily defined through the axiomatic paradigms of ethnicity or nationality. As George Orwell (2007) eloquently shows, nationalism is a "habit of assuming that human beings can be classified like insects and that whole blocks of millions or tens of millions of people can be confidently labeled 'good' or 'bad,'" which is according to him done due to multiple paradigms such as religion, culture, democracy or class, and even by merely being *against* something or all things without the care to define oneself. *Nationalism* is thus not necessarily bound to an existing country or community. In that sense Orwell differentiates nationalism from patriotism, which is rather *defensive* by the individual appreciation of a way of life. Nationalism instead is *offensive* in its urge for power and its need to diminish individual's sense of politics. This shows the centrifugal tendency of nationalistic discourse; it is not based on what one wants but rather refers to that what it does *not* want.⁴ The Erdogan's mass imprisonment of people in heterotopia called prison is merely one example. What is negated is disagreement within inter-speech.

Thus, nationalism with its local logic is not beyond the global tendencies of capitalism. Erdogan's use of *national security*, as an axiomatic paradigm in order to exclude the other, saturates the Western vocabulary on the matter. It is copy: a connection through an isomorphic model. Nationalism, as a *state* affair, does not map out networks, but functions as a refrain of vertical relationality repeating itself around the globe. Tasmin Lorraine (2011) states: "capitalism has precipitated an unraveling of cultures, reducing all cultural difference to a set of variables that can be inserted into a globalizing

³ I am aware of the fact that the term *becoming* in Deleuze and Guattari's thought can never be associated with the paradigm of majority, but rather minorities such as becoming-women, becoming-child, becoming-animal or the becoming-minority. Nevertheless, distancing oneself from the moral point of view and by understanding that flight-lines could develop multiple ways, this becoming could become a trait of minorities as well as majorities. Yet, the types of becomings essentially differ from one another. While totalitarian becoming strives to become a being, Deleuze and Guattari's becoming overflow being and do not long to end their process of belonging.

⁴ This was also the case with patriotic protests against the United States war against terror. Patriots with multiple backgrounds and religious preferences protested against the war in Iraq due to their belief in the American way of life and the fear that the participation of US as a nation in other countries was unfair due to the monopoly of power by the West, especially the US. See for an example: Freeman, 2003.

axiomatic that welcomes difference without being affected by it” (p. 44). The paradigm of security is never defined. We don’t know when we are safe, or what security means. We just identify a growing number of situations that makes us insecure. Both Bush presidents – father and son – justified their military interventions elsewhere – Middle East – for the so-called safety of national security.

4.2.2 A-political Movements

How does the totalitarian state enter this picture? It is exactly this urge of power and this longing for territorial expansion that gave rise to the totalitarian state. How do we approach the totalitarian milieu? It is through Arendt’s discussions of totalitarianism that I intend to set apart the further axiomatic paradigms that form the content of politics of exile.

The elements of totalitarianism comprise its origins, if by origins we do not understand ‘causes.’ Elements by themselves never cause anything. They become origins of events if and when they suddenly crystallize into fixed and definite forms. It is the light of the event itself which permits us to distinguish its own concrete elements from an infinite number of abstract possibilities, and it is still this same light that must guide us backward into the always dim and equivocal past of these elements themselves. In this sense, it is legitimate to talk of the origins of totalitarianism, or of any other event in history (Arendt, 1994, p. 325 n12).

It is within the idea of violence that Arendt’s conception of the human body becomes a political matter, as it became micropolitical in Foucault’s analyses of the penitentiary, disciplinary discourse. Arendt’s analysis sensitizes an event: the end of politics. Totalitarian violence operates on the body by diminishing its connective plurality and political uniqueness, i.e. by homogenizing its vitality. Violence is not an apolitical but an anti-political notion. Although Arendt (1970) does not believe that violence is an essential characteristic of men⁵ or that it could be justified by socio-economic conditions, it is nonetheless a phenomenon that must be analyzed within political thought due to its urge to decrease the political *power* of plurality.

The chief reason warfare is still with us is neither a secret death wish of the human species, nor an irrepressible instinct of aggression, nor, finally and more plausibly, the serious economic and social dangers inherent in disarmament, but the simple fact that no substitute for this final arbiter in international affairs has yet appeared on the political scene (p. 5).

Her elaboration on violence as anti-political process urges her to create a new form of opposition between *power* and *violence*. Power – which is political according to Arendt – is gained by co-

⁵ It is often assumed that warfare has been the reason for our ancestors to create cities in order to protect themselves against enemies by creating walls. Yet recent discoveries of an ancient city of pyramids at Caral in Peru dispute such a theory. There are for instance no walls around the city. As far as it could be argued this city was built in order to connect people in the area, exchange goods and find pleasure (BBC Horizon, 2002).

operative acts of a plurality of people. The concept *act in concert*, expresses literally Arendt's understanding of politics (p. 44). In a concert, the musicians differ in their elements, instruments and expertise, nevertheless only through this network of plurality something can be gained that is as sublime as a musical concert. Just as politics, music evaporates immediately after its performance. The sounds in music and the actions of men in politics affect only in their performance. Power, according to Arendt, is experienced in the moment of action, and is not defined by the *gains* exceeding this process.

It is this non-teleological trait that distinguishes political power from anti-political violence. Violence for Arendt is a force that is in need of homogenization and future purpose. It is goal-oriented and is based on the idea of using every means necessary to realize this goal. Thus, while the *legitimization* of power is based on a collective effort of an act in concert, violence merely *justifies* itself as a means for something that is not yet there (pp. 51-52), for instance a security that is not defined. Furthermore, Arendt argues that while power is realized in a legitimized plural community, violence on the other hand justifies itself through the idea of a majority. This majority does not only indicate the elite, but in case of totalitarianism it also refers to the masses: the so-called '*power of many*'. Arendt thus distinguishes different ways of understanding democracy. '*Power of the many*', the domination by the masses is not equivalent to *power of plurality*. Instead, here democracy loses its plurality – a political trait – by its *tyranny of majority*. Arendt (1958) claims, because men have lost their diversity and have disputed plurality in order to reach a consensus, they will also lose their power of creating a community (pp. 221-227).

An unanimous public opinion tends to eliminate bodily those who differ, for mass unanimity is not the result of agreement, but an expression of fanaticism and hysteria. In contrast to agreement, unanimity does not stop at certain well-defined objects, but spreads like an infection into every related issue (Arendt, 1978^a, p. 182).

Unanimity is radiant. Not only the axiomatic paradigms are not defined through a rule or a logic, but the persona *civic subject* is also not assignable. Erdogan's civic subject does not necessarily live in Turkey; nor is he or she necessarily a Muslim (Özdil, 2016). He manages to gather masses, even outside his territory, defending a certain idea of democracy. Nonetheless, it is this homogenization of the masses and their desires – Wilders, Farage, Trump and Erdogan all speak of the will of *The People* – that creates an idea of democracy as an axiomatic paradigm.

Whenever the realization of democracy has become a political project with the desires of the many as an end, whether this democracy is a means to achieve something or is an end in itself that must be gained at any cost as we often see nowadays, then democracy cannot only be qualified as an impotential paradigm of a politics of plurality. In a certain state, it could need a type of efficiency that will justify the application of every resource, even of extreme violent methods such as torture and harassment just to maintain itself. And precisely in this radiant movement the democratic politics as an *event* – as an experience of power in its performance – to which Arendt (1958) refers, will entirely disappear. As long as we believe that political thought is for the sake of a desired goal, we will remain unable to halt the fatal *instrumentalization* of men for the sake of this goal (p. 229). This utilitarian

trait is crucial for ‘power of majority’ and by implication for a politics of exile, formulated in statements such as: *sacrificing a few – the limbic lives – for the sake of ‘many’*.

For it is quite conceivable, and even within the realm of practical political possibilities, that one fine day a highly organized and mechanized humanity will conclude quite democratically – namely by majority decision – that for humanity as a whole it would be better to liquidate certain parts thereof (Arendt, 1968, p. 299).

In fact, this is still happening on a global scale – outsourcing to cheap labor countries, sweatshops – as the heritage of ethnocentric and racial *colonialism* and *imperialism*, two other axiomatic paradigms defining the form of content of totalitarianism. It is this utilitarian trait, that differs from the Kantian judgment and categorical imperative, in which each individual is a goal *as such*, and the sacrifice of an individual for the sake of the many, will always be in disagreement with the universality of this imperative. Yet, politics, even before Plato, has been occupied with malleability and fabrication of the ideal state, in which the individual is subordinated for the sake of majority. The traditional idea of politics aims at predictability and regulations in order to manifest and maintain order. It sets sights on final judgments and administration of power, and not for the natality of actions that take place for the sake of the event as such. This is politics that functions as his master’s voice, the Voice of majority as we will see in 4.3, which in some cases refers to majority of numbers and in other cases merely to the few with access to power. According to Arendt this politics differs in a crucial sense from *democracy as a process of disagreement*. I will elaborate on this literally ‘alternative’ form of democracy in which the others that differ come to the fore in the last chapter. Yet, in order to disclose this space for re-evaluating politics I need to elaborate on its relevance for the totalitarian movement, that initiates assemblages of unsatisfied, disinterested political masses as the form of its content. The axiomatic paradigm of *here and there* is thus not merely designating country borders – the waters are still resisting our territorial tendencies. *Here* is where the masses agree on their homogenization; and *there* is the object, territory, or body that the masses reject.

Arendt (1968) refers to an established fact that the leadership in the totalitarian regimes, whether it concerns the Nazi regime or Stalinism, is never effective without the support of the masses. Totalitarianism, in contrast to dictatorship, only remains in power thanks to the formation and mobilization of masses. Totalitarian tendencies within the masses do not necessarily come to an end with the death of their leaders. Furthermore, in Arendtian considerations, the totalitarian propaganda is not a brainwashing process of the masses. Masses often act willingly and knowingly,⁶ and are not

⁶ By this I think Arendt (1968) refers to the access to information, or being informed, rather than the intellectual and affective ability to comprehend the consequences of such knowledge. She states that totalitarianism is destructive even towards the intellectuals and artists that did sympathize with their doctrines: “Wherever totalitarian movements seized power, this whole group of sympathizers was shaken off even before the regimes proceed toward their greatest crimes. Intellectual, spiritual, and artistic initiative is as dangerous to totalitarianism as the gangster initiative of the mob, and both are more dangerous than mere political opposition. The consistent persecution of every higher form of intellectual activity by the new mass leaders springs from more than their natural resentment against everything they cannot understand. Total domination does not allow

mere products of their leaders' conspiracy. Finally, the masses do not necessarily act in their own interest, but through the intensity of conviction, which can even lead to their own destruction. Totalitarianism thus remains intact as long as the masses close their ranks in accordance to *uniform* of the (ideo)logical idea of existence and territory. Arendt even suggests that within this process masses censor themselves from illogical experiences, due to the fact that experience refers to multiple possibilities of relationship between the subject and the formation of power. The totalitarian movement thus functions on the homogeneity and immensity of the masses. This is why for such totalitarianism movement a mass eventually needs to become classless.⁷ The introduction of difference, such as classes, will merely differentiate the mass, and stop its movement as a whole and its identification as a mass with their leaders. Masses thus do not characterize themselves through self-interest, or a common ideology, but rather are defined by their inability to be identified with a social group or political ideology. Arendt defines the masses thus as *a-political* or *indifferent people*. Indifferent thus indicates that a people neglect to accentuate their internal differences. The urge of these masses is thus not to give in to a *disinterested* inter-esse; but in their urge of rejection – think of global tendencies, thus not only in Europe, to categorize the other as an enemy of democracy – the indifferent people are determined to break the ties. Brexit is merely a tie-breaker; Trump intends to follow.

Let me give an example from The Netherlands. The Arendtian a-political attitude of the masses is noticeable in the protests in The Netherlands for preservation of the Saint Nicolas festivity and *Zwarte Piet* (Black Pete) who accompanies the old bearded man on the 5th of December each year, bringing presents from Spain for the children. In autumn 2013 the UN announced to start an inquiry in which the figure of the Black Pete was under investigation. Part of the Dutch public experienced the intrusion as offensive. This attitude was strengthened when Jamaican intellectual Verene Shepherd, who is intended to lead the investigation, prematurely uttered her disapproval of the festivity by stating that the figure that represents a colonial mentality is something that cannot be tolerated in our time (NOS, 2013). Almost at the same time a critical report on racism in The Netherlands was published by the European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (Council of Europe, 2013). The comments of the ECRI on a lack of discussion on racism in The Netherlands and the UN initiation of this investigation was later followed by a critique of Amnesty International on racism in The Netherlands (Amnesty International, 2013). The external critique led to severe reactions in the Dutch media and society. A face-book manifesto to preserve the tradition unconditionally with the name *Pietitie* – a

for free initiative in any field of life, for any activity that is not entirely predictable. Totalitarianism in power invariably replaces all first-rate talents, regardless of their sympathies, with those crackpots and fools whose lack of intelligence and creativity is still the best guarantee of their loyalty” (p. 339).

⁷ Arendt (1968) distinguishes between the masses and mobs. Mobs are outside the political process due to their class, while masses remain outside the political discourse due to their non-reference to a class or distinct ideology. Masses are moved by homogeneity and de-individualization, while mobs and bourgeoisie remains in the logic of individual political state and thought. Nevertheless, the mob and the mass remain related, for the leaders of the masses such as Hitler often were member of a mob. However, according to Arendt, even the elites were extremely attracted to the doctrines and the process of totalitarianism. Both mob and the elite felt excluded from the political discourse, which mostly belonged to bourgeois. Totalitarianism starts with this antibourgeois tendency (pp. 313-314, 317-318. & 326-340).

word play connecting Piet and petition – was initiated and in no time gained more than 2 million likes. The term refers to *petition*, while at the same time the web-makers claimed no political engagement. Shortly after, the sixteen-year-old Dutch girl Mandy Roos organized a demonstration, in which the *Pietitie* was presented to a PVV-member of parliament. PVV – Party of Freedom – is a populist party led by Geert Wilders. The main argument of the preservers of the tradition was that the *oversensitivity* of a few people couldn't be an argument to abolish the figure of Black Pete from this traditional festivity. Yet, Roos' argument was based on one individual, namely her little sister, who was upset due to her fear that Black Pete would not bring her presents this year. Her sister became a symbol for all the children in The Netherlands. Such argumentation is, Ahmed (2014) argues, based on the “assumption ... that those who are most afraid are those who are most vulnerable” (p. 68); “*Fear works to restrict some bodies through the movement or expansion of others*” (p. 69). Thousands demonstrated against the foreign critique on the matter. Previous to the matter, none of the current political issues in the turbulent political atmosphere of The Netherlands – such as decrease of social and health insurances, issues that concerned the majority of the Dutch citizens and affected their economic and political status – did motivate such an amount of protests. The issue mobilized the masses, depolitizing a post-colonial practice.

The depolitization as a trait was also embedded in the discussion on the matter. It is argued that this painted figure had nothing to do with race or discrimination. It was just a simple traditional festivity about having fun with children that had nothing in common with political discrimination. Therefore, it is believed that the education of children apparently excludes any political motivation. A few arguments were given. First, in order to suggest that it was not a problem of race Pete's blackness was caused due to the fact that he had to enter a house through a chimney in order to deliver the presents. Yet the soot in the pipe could not explain the sudden appearance of curly hair, thicker lips and clownish clothes. The second argument was tradition, or as Deleuze labels this: the *habit of doing something* (see my evaluations in 1.4.2). This revealed the hypocrisy of the matter, when the PVV party that had based its previous arguments on abolishing the traditional characteristics of the Islamic minorities who according to the party refused to progress and accept the contemporary liberal democracy, on the imbecility of tradition, now in the case of Black Pete suddenly glorified tradition. Tradition suddenly became an axiomatic paradigm that did not need any political reflection. Quinsy Gario, who was violently arrested during the arrival of Saint Nicolas in 2011 merely for wearing a T-shirt with the text “Black Pete is racist”, argues in a TV show that even the tradition has changed in the two centuries of its existence (Pauw & Witteman, 2013).⁸

Yet the pro- and anti-Black Pete people did not divide themselves in classical faces of white versus non-white. Some people with Moroccan, Turkish, Iranian and Hindu background also plead for the preservation of the Black Pete. A man, with Middle-Eastern background, even states on the evening-news that he did not see the problem, due to the fact that it had nothing to do with one's religion. While sensing discrimination against his religion as politically unacceptable, the objection of

⁸ An analysis of the title - *Quinsy Gario does not want the Black Pete with the Saint Nicolas festivity* – of the website is essential here. Gario repeatedly states that he wants a discussion on the matter; he wishes a political evaluation of the figure. It is the lack of political discussion that Gario criticizes the most. The hosts instead merely provoked statements rather than enhancing a discussion with other guests.

the other based on one's skin-color did not seem politically relevant to him. On the other hand, when the Dutch artist Anouk, the chosen representative for The Netherlands for the annual Eurovision Song festival, commented against the preservation of the Black Pete, some bombarded her with imprecations such as *nigger-whore* and *patricide* (Zantingh, 2013). The ambiguity was even more sensed when Tilly Kaisiepo during the protests organized by Mandy Roos intended to support the masses by stating that the UN must instead of attacking Black Pete, be more obliged to protect the Papuans who are persecuted by the Indonesian regime. Yet, she was jeered by the same masses. The protesters called her: *the cancerous nigger that should be sent back to her own black country*. They even attacked her physically, in such a way that the police had to remove her from the demonstration for her own safety (Sharifi, 2013).

The collision between white and non-white is inherent to the figure of *Zwarte Piet*, not only because it is almost always a white person who is painted as a black figure, while in first half of the twentieth century it was played by Surinam sailors, but also in the naming itself. The two elements of naming 'Black' and 'Pete' create in their connection confusion as to what is inside and outside. Black refers to the *other*, the one that does not belong; yet, Piet is one of the most common Dutch male names in The Netherlands. It is then in this line of argumentation that *our* Piet with its clownish clothes and funny acts, has the right to mock *the other*. In this perspective, the whole matter gets an immanent axiomatic quality. Our identity – we-ness – embodies an ambiguity, that covers an elusive argument that the other – who is mocked – has no right to criticize one of ours.

It is within this setting of de-politicization of a political problem that Egbert Alejandro Martina (2013), one of the initiators of the critique on the Black Pete, argues how the community binds itself by an affective trait, namely *pleasure* in the act of mocking itself, and creates a social reality in which violence, in this case racism, is accepted as an engine of sociality. Martina shows how the idea of pleasure as such becomes paradigmatic, and a-normative at the same time. It is neither why nor how one experiences pleasure, nor how pleasure is experienced by others through which the ethics of the pleasure is at stake. Just the fact of *having fun* becomes the sole justification of the practice. *Who are you to deny us just having fun?* Within this axiomatic paradigmatic state of pleasure the other is not approached as a subject that can reflect and react to the matter, but rather as an object that is defined by the sense of pleasure of the majority. This other must not object at any time, due to the fact that its objection might ruin the sense of happiness of this majority. The problem is even magnified by manipulative statements: *Your objection ruins the happiness of children; do you really want to do that?* Yet there is also a sense of surprise that the objectified black body is talking back, and even is in disagreement with the vicious way it is positioned. Martina argues that objectification, in which commercialization of the submitted body of the other is at hand, the black body becomes a commodity, and hence is dehumanized. *Zwarte Piet* is a face within a totalitarian regime of faciality and gesturality. As is argued in the second chapter as a phenomenon of faciality and gesturality it connects content and expression; as well as their form and matter, to one another. Yet in its visibility as a face and gesture it permanently contradicts itself. It is invisibility within visibility. "*Zwarte Piet* is the *not*", Martina states. Even the affects that the body provokes are not of its own but belong to the happiness of the children. It is in this idea of dehumanization that Martina does not reduce the idea of Black Pete to the emotions of some individuals. Against the depoliticization of the masses, he re-

politicizes the figure. The dehumanization, as we will also see further in this chapter, is not limited to emotions of some people, but to a form of politics as a generative process and to the formation of a political milieu.

In this sense, the totalitarian regime of politics of exile axiomatically creates a paradigm of *there* where limbic lives are at stake; and a *here* where civic subjects even define the state of pleasure and having fun, let alone all other aspects and affects in a community. The *here* and *there* define the manner in which politics of exile forms its content. Yet, as we have seen with the analysis of *Zwarte Piet* these paradigms of *here* and *there* do not only create a physical here and there, but also a here and there within the same territory. These axiomatic paradigms effect on *inter-* as well as *intra-*level. On an inter-level, they operate as a black hole sucking all forms of paradigms in order to justify the homogeneous center. On an intra-level the axiomatic paradigms drain the center by pushing all forms of difference toward the peripheries. As Schinkel (2008) argues, a society in order to *negate its death* – meaning denying the fact that its existence is based on an idea, a *con-fiction*, and neglecting the fact that a society permanently changes from within – gives in to a kind of *auto-vampirism*. It consummates its own produced *residue* (p. 307). Schinkel argues that the teleological tendency of such a society rest upon its normative belief that it can move toward a form of perfection; and as a whole each member must act accordingly. It is due to this teleological tendency that such a society creates *residues*; i.e. individuals that are not in consistency with the whole and are doomed to the peripheries.

4.2.3 Atomized Masses

The absence or lack of political involvement brings about two inadequate assumptions of democratic thought. On the one hand, this thought assumes that the political involvement of the masses contains the ideology of democracy by differentiation of political interest, and on the other hand, democratic thought presupposes that the political neutral state of the masses does not affect the political state of affairs (Arendt, 1968, pp. 305-312). Totalitarianism is the formation of *atomized masses*, Arendt argues. The entanglement of two groups, the elite and the mob, initiates this formation. They seem oppositional, yet the two groups share a common sentiment: They both did not occupy a political position in the prior democratic regime, and they both felt that the bourgeoisie put them aside. The resistance of the masses against this sense of dominant bourgeoisie is obvious in nationalistic jargon of populist parties in Europe, but also in the course of elections in the US in 2016. Trump did not merely use a nationalistic jargon, but along with Bernie Sanders rejected the existing establishment. These sentiments come along with bourgeoisie's loss of sense of political resistance. As Barthes (1982) argues, bourgeoisie – once the icon of anti-establishment – has become an establishment itself. The resistance toward political correctness of the left parties in The Netherlands is even now present within the vocabulary of those parties representing this correctness before. Totalitarianism is an anti-bourgeoisie movement, but moreover a movement of masses without a common interest and thus without a common interest in self-preservation as such. There is not a truthness that connects the masses. There is not a common trait – gender, class or even ethnicity – that connects the masses that vote for right-wing parties in United States or Europe. Even some of the members of Moroccan community – the community that has been targeted the most by PVV – vote for this party. The truth of

such movements is thus not in order to manifest a clear identity, but rather to *negate* something. Masses are thus, according to Arendt (1968) atomized due to their lack of relation to one another, and they have become masses due to their negation of an outside world, that contain all others. It is a movement against different forms of life rather than the affirmation and maintenance of a form of life. It is due to this strong lack of interest that the movement could maintain its strength, even despite its destructive attitude in the preservation of the *negating atomized masses* (pp. 316-317).

A short intermezzo is needed to specify Arendt's emphasis on totalitarianism as a negating movement and compare this with Deleuze and Guattari's (1987) analysis of totalitarianism:

Totalitarianism is quintessentially conservative. Fascism, on the other hand, involves a war machine. When fascism builds itself a totalitarian State, it is not in the sense of a State army taking power, but of a war machine taking over the State. A bizarre remark by Virilio puts us on the trail: in fascism, the State is far less totalitarian than it is *suicidal*. There is in fascism a realized nihilism. Unlike the totalitarian State, which does its utmost to seal all possible lines of flight, fascism is constructed on an intense line of flight, which it transforms into a line of pure destruction and abolition (p. 230).

Although, akin to Arendt, they state that a totalitarian trait was present in Nazi Germany as well as in Stalinism in Russia, nevertheless the extreme tendency of flight lines that time and again 'solve' the aporia of its endeavor is more connected to fascism rather than to the totalitarian state in general. I rather argue that if Arendt had defined totalitarianism in terms of lines of flight and lines of segmentation, she also would have described totalitarianism as an extreme suicidal flight line – due to its intra-level tendency to empty its center in order to keep alive an idea of homogeneity. This is due to her characterization of totalitarianism as a movement instead of a permanent State or a regime.

Given the aporetic foundation of the movement – survival while being suicidal, loyalty within a paranoiac mindset – the consistency of the movement contradicts itself even from within. While it appeals for one form of belonging – the Great German Empire – and one form of perfection – the victory of the Arian race – it layers itself from within by differentiating different states of belonging, different intensities, that manifest themselves by degrees of anonymity and secretiveness. The layers of belonging begin with the leader, who does not need to give orders in order to *affect* general sentiment. The persona of the leader – as a civic subject – is that which remains consistent, while his will changes constantly. Yet, civic subject – subject from whom abnormality is detached while neglecting to define normality as Willem Schinkel (2011) argues – is not bound to a personality but to multiple layers in a society. Each layer is positioned in the rank by its closeness to the leader. The masses are the lowest layer.

How do masses as atomized entities in their negation operate as civic subjects? Schinkel states that they do not do so by defining their identity, but rather through redefining the other as non-belonging masses through an impossible jargon of integration. The civic subjects define the manner of belonging for the other; without fulfilling the promise of integration themselves. It is not by indoctrination –

whether of an identity or an idea of collectivity – that the masses are convinced to remain loyal to the movement. It is rather the consistency of the logic of territorial exclusion that defines the *intraconsistency* of totalitarianism. Arendt (1968) argues that even lies, deception and tricks are allowed – as Trump performs everyday – as long as these were able to convince the masses that these were for the sake of the cause, or an ideology that has negation at its core, and thus remained consistent within the overall narrative. This narrative becomes even more effective in contemporary times due to the effects of the media. De Mul (2017) argues that the spectacle of social media functions as a new type of political phenomenon that defines and shapes democratic processes. *Mediocracy* and *tweetocracy* create a field of untraceable and segmented *information bubbles*: a *fact free politics*. Trump's permanent act of twisting the facts in order to keep on the consistent idea of an external threat for American people remains thus, despite the critique, effective for a large population.

Politics of exile always subtracts new axiomatic paradigms. *Collateral damage* is such an axiomatic paradigm analogically connecting to the axiomatic paradigm of *here versus there* and which due to its oppositional moral implications – or as Schinkel (2008) puts it *digrammatical* moral implications – remains consistent with the narrative of us against them. Orwell (2007) states: “actions are held to be good or bad, not on their own merits, but according to who does them, and there is almost no kind of outrage — torture, the use of hostages, forced labor, mass deportations, imprisonment without trial, forgery, assassination, the bombing of civilians — which does not change its moral color when it is committed by ‘our’ side.”

Political and social homeless masses could sense residency within a consistent ideology, and thus break out of their reality in which they are detached of everything that mattered. Yet, the urge for consistency does not flow from an amoral nature but rather from the need for self-respect, Arendt (1968) claims. Arendt often states that the masses knew about the propaganda lies of the totalitarian regimes with regard to the outside world. Nevertheless, as long as the government could convince the masses of the necessity of these lies for the sake of the movement and these remained consistent, there was no harm done internally. In case of Syria, for example, it is often suggested by the Western media that the Syrian government keeps its faithful citizens in the dark in order to restrain their loyalty. It is however improbable that in the present state of global communication and radical mediocracy (Oosterling, 2000⁶), Bashar al-Assad could maintain such overall ignorance concerning internal affairs. It is more feasible that the Syrian government gains the loyalty of these citizens by maintaining a consistent argument that the West and capitalized Middle-Eastern countries are determined to deprive Syria of its independence and sovereignty, and manipulate Syria's own citizens to rebel against the state. The situation is further complicated by the role of the global media, for which it is nearly impossible to gather some genuine nuanced facts. In modern times, it is not the war between truth and lies, but one partial lie/truth against the other. The US policy also gives in to a consistent narrative of alleged economic necessity and terrorist threat to justify its forced involvement in the Middle East. The millions Syrian, Eritrean and other refugees, literally trapped in-between the multiple excluding doctrines, are the silent witnesses – the limbic lives – of the impact of such totalitarian antagonisms. The current refugees are not the victims of one form of totalitarianism, but of a complex network of totalitarian regimes that oppose, yet feed on one another. Politics of exile always refers to multiple forms of exile. Exclusion is always multidimensional (Levitas, et al, 2007). Arendt (1968) states:

Propaganda, in other words, is one, and possibly the most important, instrument of totalitarianism for dealing with the nontotalitarian world; terror, on the contrary, is the very essence of its form of government (p. 344).

Arendt maps out the plane of totalitarianism as an isolated form of consistency with a double face, the propagandistic face to the outside world and the face of consistent *terror* towards its own people. Totalitarianism as well as other forms of dogmatic government – such as dictatorship, absolute monarchy or oligarchy – is related to terror, i.e. violence not power. Nevertheless, what distinguishes totalitarianism from these forms of governments is their terror does not become an instrument of power, but rather defines and forms its brutal essence. It is not just instrumental but essential. Totalitarianism is a movement and this movement's significant task is not gaining power for one or some people, but the sustainment of the terror as a guarantee for the survival of the movement. While in 2011 Al-Assad repeats in the external media that he will not use force, or that he is not in charge of the groups that use force, or that he will immediately stop using force once diplomatic negotiation starts, it is violent terror consistency within the nation that keeps the loyal masses in his favor (BBC News, 2011 & ABC News, 2011).⁹ The dismantlement of the chemical weapons of Syrian government in 2017 does not help. The damage of terror is already done.

Totalitarianism is never content to rule by external means, namely through the state and a machinery of violence; thanks to its peculiar ideology and the role assigned to it in this apparatus of coercion, totalitarianism has discovered a means of dominating and terrorizing human beings from within. In this sense, it eliminates the distance between the rulers and the ruled and achieves a condition in which power and the will to power, as we understand them, play no role, or at best, a secondary role (Arendt, 1968, p. 325). This vague distinction between the ruler and the ruled in totalitarianism creates a *zone of indistinction*, a notion introduced by Deleuze and Guattari and applied by Agamben, as we will see. Arendt (1968) initiates this thought in her elaboration on the manner in which totalitarianism subverts the distinction between oppositional pairs such as truth/false, reality/fiction, ruler/ruled, offender/victim, for the sake of the movement and the consistency of its logic. The image of the Syrian rebel eating an internal organ of a Syrian Soldier, does not only horrify us by its act, but also due to the fact that it obscures the distinction between the good side and the bad side. Does this deny the consistency of the narrative? In reality consistency does not strive for actualization, and can even contradict its supposed goal of perfection. The movement holds on to its rhetoric of a safe future, while never intending to achieve this end. Other interests are served. The war on terror and the war on drugs are examples of this inconsistent logic. The movement keeps its idiom of a desired solution alive in the diabolization of its multiple opponents. This rhetoric – in which a plea for democracy has lost any reference to difference and plurality (De Mul, 2017) – allows figures such as Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan to call simple protesters and his opponents potential terrorists.

⁹ Assad even in the end admits that international politics is a game that must be played but it is not necessary to believe in such a game, while at the same time he suggests that he does neither own the country, the people, nor the means of violence.

The consistency-hungry masses will accept the fiction as supreme proof of their truthfulness; whereas common sense tells us that it is precisely their consistency which is out of this world and proves that they are a fabrication (Arendt, 1968, p. 352).

Nevertheless, the blur between truth and falsehood is not the only confusion necessary to hold the totalitarian movement together. Totalitarianism, although feeding itself with strict distinction of one versus other, in the end rather weakens the distinction between an inside and outside, local and global, and finally between friend and foe, we and they. Totalitarian regime oscillates between an ideology of the included family members *within* – that as we have seen is never permanent and each member can become the other who is pushed to the peripheries – and the potential enemy from without – who can always appear in the middle of a society. Thus, in words of Ahmed (2014); it is not merely a “coming from within moving outward”; but rather also “*come from without and move inward*” (p. 9). Thus, as I argued before, totalitarianism not only divides the world on an inter-level, but also on an intra-level between one locality and the other, one all against other *alls*. Finally, such division does not limit itself to a macro-level; it feeds on the idea that this movement only realizes itself once every detail of daily life is under its control. Arendt (1968) states, “even a single individual can be absolutely and reliably dominated only under global totalitarian conditions” (p. 392). Totalitarian regime thus does not segment itself, but declares a future total perfection, that is shaped by the principle of “whoever is not included is excluded, whoever is not with me is against me” (p. 380).¹⁰

In this way totalitarianism testifies of the sentiment in George Orwell’s (1993) novel *Animal Farm*. After the banishment of Snowball, Napoleon, the smartest pig, becomes the sole leader of the farm. During his reign, the seven commandments of the idealist Old Major to bind the animals and strengthen them against a common enemy, change. The changes seem small; nevertheless, their political implications are immense. The sixth commandment: “No animal shall kill any other animal” (p. 21) is issued to protect the animals from one another. Still years after his death and the revolution the commandment changes into: “No animal shall kill any other animal *without cause*” (p. 68, Italics TR). The two added words obscure the formation of belonging. In the end, even those who belong become vulnerable themselves. The layers of belonging start to show when a new doctrine is introduced. “All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others” (p. 99). Even so the form of belonging changes its inner core, the central-layer. The leading pigs start to imitate those whom they propagated as enemies: the humans. Slowly they start to change and transform in those two-legged creatures, which they wanted to cast out, by stating: “Four legs good, two legs *better*” (p. 99, Italics TR).

¹⁰ It is remarkable that Arendt, long before the War on Terror, points out the same sentiment, which is associated with among others George W. Bush today. This remark has also been used in Hollywood vocabulary in blockbuster films such as *Star Wars, Episode III The Revenge of the Sith* (Lucas, 2005), when Anakin Skywalker, who soon will become the Darth Vader, states: “If you are not with me, then you are my enemy” and so becomes an untrue Jedi. Yet, apparently the true Jedi had no problem with stigmatizing people by giving specific accents – such as Asian and African ones – to typically facialized aliens in the trilogy of *Star Wars*. Of course, the rhetoric of for and against Jesus’ words in the Gospel of Matthew.

The creatures outside looked from pig to man, and from man to pig, and from pig to man again: but already it was impossible to say which was which (p.104).

The leader creates consistency, but the transformation creates a sense of indecisive *anonymity*: a zone of indistinction. But anonymity is not only due to the transformation of the civic subject and the enemy, but totalitarianism creates anonymity systematically on every level. According to Arendt (1968) the anonymity is also realized due to the ambiguous multiplicity of organization. She shows how the totalitarian regimes never dismantled the old organizations, but rather multiplied them into different branches, even duplicated them. The bureaucratic organizations as well as the murderous ones were multiplied in the movement. This form of multiplicity, which remained intact by permanent removal and new entanglement, insulated its participants from a sense of team spirit as well as loyalty. This anonymity depoliticized the horrors, in so far as it was impossible to address the responsible party. The totalitarian movement amalgamates two extremes. On the one hand, it desires a strong structure to manifest the imperatives of an ideology. On the other hand, the movement needs to avoid any form of stagnation – by implementing traits such as lawlessness, ambiguity and *shapelessness* – in order to remain in motion. Lines of segmentation and flight lines, to phrase it in terms of Deleuze and Guattari (1987), situate the movement of totalitarianism not beyond the law, but install its lawless outcome within the law and order itself, as we will see in 4.3. Yet there is, beside this lawlessness created by the law itself, another phenomenon that disturbs the consistency of totalitarianism in its process: *life*. How does totalitarianism relate to life in its urge for exclusion?

4.2.4 Multiple Powerplay: Totalitarianism and Biopower

According to Agamben (1998), current politics is a state in which lives are systematically excluded and have no access to the political arena. Agamben's main question in *Homo Sacer* is formulated as an aporia:

What is the relation between politics and life, if life presents itself as what is included by means of an exclusion (p. 7)?

Included exclusion indicates that individuals are excluded from within the system, yet as such are paradoxically still included by the system. The political reality of the twentieth century is, according to Agamben, a twilight zone between subjectification of men in disciplinary practices through bio-power, as Foucault described, and the 'exceptional' practice of the totalitarian regimes. Although, Arendt in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* focuses on other events in history than Foucault, both philosophers often point out similar characteristics in contemporary political power. As we have seen in 3.4.1, in *The Human Condition* Arendt (1958) argues that the division between the private and the public in modern 'society' has disappeared. By pointing out the influences of sciences such as statistics, economics, but also 'social behavior' she shows how the human body as such is instrumentalized by society: "through society it is the life process itself which in one form or another has been channeled into the public realm" (p. 45). In her biographical article 'We Refugees' Arendt (1978^a) thematizes another body: *zoé*. This is a *naked body*, nothing more than that. It is a body *stripped* of its ability to communicate with others. This body as a political object has been deprived of its humanity, of its

ability to be a political subject (p. 65). According to Arendt (1968), this limbic life is the victim of a totalitarian ideological power. It is legitimized by an ideology in which a person is not judged by his deeds, but by his assumed *potential* to break the law, i.e. commit criminal acts, which is by Arendt qualified as the *objective enemy* (pp. 423-424).

Arendt's reflection on the axiomatic paradigm of 'objective enemy' – which relates to the paradigm of us versus others – can be compared to Foucault's (1977 & 1978) reflections on the manner in which subjects become internal instruments of an all-pervasive power in the disciplinary society. Yet, this subject is no longer judged by his deeds and status, as it happens with sovereign power. The sovereign in Foucault's sense needs the confession of the suspect, even if this confession is gained by torture. He needs evidence, no matter how falsified, as a proof of an unlawful act in the past. Disciplinary power on the other hand focuses on the potential of the body to transgress the norm, to become an offender or delinquent, a sexually disordered person, etc. in order to normalize and discipline the subject. The disciplinary mechanisms focus on this abnormality in order to construct normality and produce subjectivity. This mechanism is crucial in biopower, in which governing every aspect of a life of an individual, such as desires, sexuality, and work has become the main focus of disciplinary power. It is therefore not surprising that while analyzing contemporary politics of exile, Agamben (1998) emphasizes the importance of the reflections of both philosophers, by arguing that Arendt and Foucault elaborate on different parts of the same form of politics. According to Agamben, Foucault does not elaborate on the extreme outcome of such a biopolitics, namely the politics of totalitarianism.

The inquiry that began with a reconstruction of the *grand enfermement* in hospitals and prisons did not end with an analysis of the concentration camp (p. 119).

Mutually, according to Agamben, Arendt does not acknowledge the importance of the body as an instrument of politics in totalitarian regimes. In her reflections biopower seems to be a subsequent effect of totalitarianism. Agamben states:

Only because politics in our age had been entirely transformed into biopolitics was it possible for politics to be constituted as totalitarian politics to a degree hitherto unknown (p. 120).

To understand the combination of these two forms of politics – biopolitics and totalitarianism – one must elaborate on the relevance of all multiple forms of Foucaultian power in Agamben's work: sovereignty, discipline, biopower and security. Although in his reflection biopolitics seems to be the most explicit reference to Foucault, other forms of power are implicitly present in Agamben's analysis. In his lectures at the Collège de France, in 1978, Foucault (2007) introduces, besides sovereignty and disciplinary power, a third form of power: *security*. The three forms refer to different forms of *space*; different ideas on the configurations of bodies that form the content of power. The space of the *sovereign power* is the *territory*. The civic subjects – in this configuration for kings, queens, emperor and nobility – do not so much care about the number of inhabitants and the wellbeing of these inhabitants in their territory. The relation between the sovereign power and the inhabitants of

the territory defines itself rather in the simple binary attitude of the *law*. The subject relates itself *only* to the sovereign, or even only becomes a limbic life in such territory, by *disobeying* the law of a sovereign, becoming an outlaw. Without disobedience, the individual is non-existent as political or juridical subject.

The space of *disciplinary power* is constructed around the *individual body*. Power is in constant contact with its subject, it is a constant process of subjectification and civilization of civic subjects. This form of power divides space into different cells. Assemblages of bodies are segmented in a matching cell, like the child in the family home, the worker in the factory and the students in the university. Each cell has its own set of *norms*, and the individual body has to adjust itself to these norms. While the sovereign characterizes itself as an excluding power, a power *to let live or to kill*, the disciplinary power is the power of inclusion, it affects the way of living from cradle to the grave (Agamben, 1999^b, p. 83). Nothing escapes this power, or so it is claimed. Each individual must settle in one or more forms of a normative cell. Disciplinary power desires optimalization of productive life and hence effectuates the formation of this life according to its understanding of the norms. The limbic life becomes an a-normative life.

Exactly this urge for perfection loses its force in the *mechanisms of security*. This form of power does not necessarily focus on territory or the particular individual bodies. According to Foucault (2007), the space of security is constructed around the body of *population* as its civic subject, instead of the body of the individual subject or the body of the sovereign. With the rise of statistics, a society no more aims at the repression of an individual in order to affirm the law, nor does it desire disciplining bodies. Security is the economy of *normalization*. Its focal point is not the incarceration of the outlaw or even to execute him in public to reconstruct the broken law, as was the case with sovereign power. Nor is it an educative practice in which the delinquent must become an exemplary individual, as in disciplinary power. The mechanism of security rather asks: ‘What is the *average* of theft that a population can accept?’, ‘What is the cost of treatment of this thief for a society?’; or ‘What kind of political discourse is profitable?’. A society guided by security does neither primarily aim at the upholding of the law nor at the perfection of the norm, but is rather based on statistical *probability* (p. 63). It is driven by numbers instead of an ideology. This paradigm of security thus does not ethically dispute collateral damage or state of being of refugees; but calculates it. The limbic lives are the offerings we make through this average acceptability. Foucault states:

The apparatus of security inserts the phenomenon in question, namely theft, within a series of probable events. Second, the reactions of power to this phenomenon are inserted in a calculation of cost. Finally, third, instead of a binary division between the permitted and the prohibited, one establishes an average considered as optimal on the one hand, and, on the other, a bandwidth of the acceptable that must not be exceeded (p. 6).

Although in his lectures it seems that different types of power refer to different periods in history, Foucault repeatedly emphasizes that all forms have always been present, there is only a difference in the degree of dominance. In this sense Agamben’s critique of the Foucaultian notion of biopower is not accurate, when he states that the power over life has been the practice of power since ancient

times, and is not a contemporary matter as Foucault suggests. The difference in our time is however that *zoé* – the naked form of life stripped from its political subjectivity, i.e. *bios* – does not find itself on the peripheries of politics but exactly at its center. The naked life, which has been abandoned in traditional political discourse to the borders of the territory, becomes in our time an excellent focus of control and repression of life itself. The difference is visibility; according to Agamben (1998).

It can even be said that the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power. In this sense, biopolitics is at least as old as the sovereign exception. Placing biological life at the center of its calculations, the modern State therefore does nothing other than bring to light the secret tie uniting power and bare life, thereby reaffirming the bond (p. 6).

Yet, in defense of Agamben, I believe that although Foucault seems to acknowledge the existence of different forms of power at the same time – it is a systematic and not a historical distinction – he somehow fails to present this in his analysis. In his descriptions one form of power seems to dominate in a specific period. Still, if we involve exclusive practices of sexism, racism and heterosexism, domination of these practices is – even on the matter of visibility – an old and contemporary phenomenon.

In contemporary state the three forms of power, in Agamben's reflections amalgamate explicitly, although his description of political practice starts with the characterizing of sovereignty. Foucault (2007) points out that sovereignty and discipline should not be analyzed as unitary processes. Both mechanisms are multiple.

The effective, real, daily operations of the actual exercise of sovereignty point to a certain multiplicity, but one which is treated as the multiplicity of subjects, or [as] the multiplicity of a people ... Discipline is of course also exercised on the bodies of individuals, but ... the individual is not the primary datum on which discipline is exercised. Discipline only exists insofar as there is a multiplicity and an end, or an objective or result to be obtained on the basis of this multiplicity (pp. 11-12).

Nevertheless, Agamben (1998) would rather not speak of a simultaneous appearance of biopolitics and sovereignty, but rather implies that biopolitics is a trait of sovereignty. The multiplicity for Agamben implies rather a multiplicity of exclusion: different manners in which the body can be used and misused, life can be included and excluded. In that sense Foucault and Agamben are in agreement with Deleuze and Guattari's (1987) statement that resonates in Arendt's distinction between power and violence: "violence is found everywhere, but under different regimes and economies" (p. 425). Power as an outcome of violence instead of plurality, that as such is present today, is the power to exclude. Sovereignty with its persona – civic subject – is for Agamben that which decides on the exclusion of the *naked life*. The civic subject can be a person or a mass, an individual or a population. The force of sovereignty can be an idea, a slogan within the spectacle, a law or other mechanisms of policies of norms and processes of normalization. Sovereignty is a pyramidal grid of processes in which

exclusion – territorial and subjective – is decided upon, while sovereignty itself remains outside the territory upon which it decides. The civic subject's urge to refer to uncivilized manners of the other is accompanied by an uncritical, non-reflective attitude toward the self. In Foucault's graphic visualization the sovereign resides on top of the pyramid, deciding who will live and who will die. In Deleuze and Guattari's visualization the sovereign decides on the manner in which the strata are formed, cutting through the chaos of the rhizome in order to segment and fixate, manifesting its power. And in line with them, Agamben (1998) argues that the paradigm of sovereign is never defined by this power (pp. 15-29).

The rule applies to the exception in no longer applying, in withdrawing from it.

The state of exception is thus not the chaos that precedes order but rather the situation that results from its suspension. In this sense, the exception is truly, according to its etymological root, *taken outside (ex-capere)*, and not simply excluded (p. 18).

Sovereignty is the axiomatic paradigm in Agamben's thought as a radiant center, with absolute flight lines in order to segment. Agamben agrees with Foucault that this sovereignty is closely connected to law and territory. These two concepts as the categories of ancient regime have not disappeared from the political discourse, but their classical connection is transformed. In the practice of power, we are faced with laws, international or national, which do not limit themselves to a specific territory. Yet they have territorial lines of segmentation. As Saskia Sassen (2003) argues, the new power-constructions demand us to *rescale* notions such as *place, local* and *nation*. *Denationalization* is for Sassen not a process that only takes some citizens into account, but rather penetrates the locality of a nation as a global dynamic, transforming the traditional fixed ideas on nationalism as a one-dimensional place. Thus, the idea of *territory* must not be dismissed but rather reconceptualized: Notions of local and global are redefined through *multidimensional scaling*. In order to do this the idea of territory that is formed through axiomatic paradigms must be problematized by revolutionary observations and subversive sensations (as I have argued in 3.2). This political analysis needs another image of thought: A transcendental empiricism that contains multiplicity of hyphens between politics and its counterparts, i.e. a politico-philosophy that connects to life, to revolutionary sciences that demand a critical observation, and to art practices that resist the sensation of the spectacle through other affects and percepts in order to express an impotential paradigm of political territory.

Let me summarize this paragraph that dealt with the form of content. I have thematized different axiomatic paradigms that shape the territories and bodies of the politics of exile. In 3.3.1 I have introduced the axiomatic paradigm of *here versus there*. This section is an introduction to other axiomatic paradigms that analogically relate to this paradigm and affect the form of content of a *politics of exile*. With the aid of Deleuze and Guattari (1987), I relate this type of politics to capitalism, a theme that was already elaborated on in the first chapter. Capitalism is a saturating form of force that is typified by Deleuze and Guattari as a black hole sucking everything in. Second, politics of exile has rather State tendencies instead of town tendencies, due to its vertical orientation and segmentation instead of horizontal networking. It forces a discourse upon the body without organs, homogenizing its

rhizomatic networks. Third, with the aid of Arendt (1968), we have also seen that politics of exile with its totalitarian tendencies does not only function as a black hole, but also has centrifugal tendencies; it cleans its center in order to purify itself. While capitalism defines itself by production and destruction, totalitarianism is mostly a negating force. It does not defend. It is defensively offensive. In homogenizing itself it is suicidal. Politics of exile creates two types of flight lines: the Other over there as a threatening line of flight and the Other in here as an internal negating tendency. The masses that belong to such politics – which can appear in democratic and non-democratic states – define their movement by negation. They do not act on a specific idea but through axiomatic paradigms of *here versus there, us versus them*, and *civic subject versus limbic lives*. These masses, however, do not create a sense of belonging. In their negation, they are better typified by Arendt's notion: *atomized masses*.

Furthermore, politics of exile is consistent in its consistency, meaning that it applies to lies and truths in order to strengthen and manifest its exclusive territorial thinking. Even the ethics of this politics shows the same opposing tendency. Collateral damage and severe security measures for the sake of democracy and freedom are examples of axiomatic paradigms of this politics. The ethics of here is never intertwined with the ethics over there. With the aid of Foucault, in his various lectures Agamben shows how these paradigms affect assemblages of bodies through axiomatic paradigms such as the norm and normalization. Law and order define the course of normality, the world of the civic subject. Still, as I have already argued in 1.3, the subject of flight is more complex. As Foucault (2007) shows there are no safe zones within the power of security. The so-called civic subjects can easily turn into limbic lives. Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein are recent examples. The milieu of exile is thus never conclusively traceable. Its ultimate axiomatic paradigm *sovereign* is never captured by its form of content. It functions as an included excluded phenomenon creating zones where truth and lies, law and facts, civic subjects and limbic lives become indiscernible. This is *the zone of indistinction* of politics of exile.

4.3 Constitutional Doublespeak

4.3.1 *The Multiplicity of Constitutional State*

The previous section dealt with the territorial form of content of *politics of exile*. I have introduced axiomatic paradigms such as here versus there, nation-state, majority, negating atomized masses, terror, colonialism, imperialism and objective enemy that shape the contours of the content of politics of exile. In this section I discuss other axiomatic paradigms in connection to the expression of this politics. The zone of indistinction appears as the result of an intertwining effect in-between axiomatic paradigms that define the form and matter of content and expression of politics of exile. What kind of expression enforces politics of exile? What does create its consistency, give rise to its judgment and normative approach? These questions will be dealt with in this section, which elaborates on the *form of expression* of politics of exile.

Let us revise the state of democracy within politics of exile. With protagonist such as Trump, Wilders, Le Pen and Erdoğan the tendencies of democracy to give into plural forms of expression and lifestyles

is permanently under attack. As De Mul's (2017) title *Panic in the Polder* already suggests the European and American sense of democracy in contemporary times is not based on a rational or factual debate. The *March for Science* around the globe in 2017 is a counter effect of such politics. The debate is rather based on a sense of *panic*, De Mul argues. As we will see in this section it is exactly this manufactured panic attack within politics that fuels the means of violence and terror of citizens *and* non-citizens around the globe. As Ahmed (2014) argues, the panic itself becomes the rational for the vulnerability of a people. Yet, these so-called populist protagonists do not only attack an idea of plurality within democracy, but also the constitutional fundament of such democracy. Through an idea of an objective enemy – which is religiously, politically, ethnically and racially stereotyped – these political movements often plea to change the law that forbids to discriminate based on such characteristics. Their movements are thus not only seen as an attack on democracy, but also as a fundamental assault of the *constitutional state*.

This is due to the fact that modern democracy bases itself on the two principals: *equality* and *freedom*. The integrity of a democratic state is guarded by a set of rules that protect these elementary principals. These rules are the basic elements of a constitutional state that upholds the promise to impartially protect the principals of democracy. Populist attack on equality and hence freedom of some people thus creates a severe imbalance within the constitutional contours of a democratic state. Yet, only based on these two principals we could state that the attack on democracy and constitutional state is not something that merely belongs to populist political parties. First, through the discourse of security and the technology that creates control mechanisms the principal of *freedom* was under attack long before these protagonists entered the stage of politics. Other factors such as systematic ethnic and racial profiling by the police or within the labor market in Western societies also argue against the existence of equality. Second, constitutional state is not an unambiguous system. Within the constitutional framework itself as well as concerning the access to institutional frameworks of a democratic state there are factors that contradict the two principals of equality and freedom. Third, the constitutional state just as the democratic state – especially in relation to one another and ethnically and racially profiled as Western and white – are perceived as ideal state. But just as Ghorashi (2010) argues, democracy and constitutional state do not have a single effect, but multiple effects. They could simply give in to protection of difference as well as become a will of majority that annihilates difference (pp. 23-28). In this section I will thus argue how law and human rights for that matter in a totalitarian setting function as counterparts of the two principals of equality and freedom.

The point is that as long as reality is identified and formulated within the conceptual structure built around the image and logic of Either/Or, read in the exclusive sense, in which every existence is not just independent of the other, but in opposition to it, there can be no rationally compelling and alienable obligation on the part of an individual to recognize and respect the existence and equal rights of other human beings (Olúwolé, 2014, p. 155).

Even more so I will argue how law within constitutional frameworks of politics of exile rather deterritorializes its own existence and merely functions as a centrifugal force.

Politically speaking, it might be an honor to stand outside the law when all men were no longer equal before it (Arendt, 1978^a, p. 112).

Arendt (1968) shows that the total law, or total manifestation of law in totalitarianism, differs on two points with the traditional understanding of the law. The law as an abstract form of metaphysical knowledge is different from human laws, which are often arbitrary and contradictory, *thus* needing the permanent interpretation and calculation of the metaphysical law within an ever-changing jurisprudence. The laws of the totalitarian society aim at an amalgamation of the two, which in its actual working leads to contradictions, i.e. the oppositional temperament of its axiomatic paradigms. The manner in which the so-called universal laws were expected to protect the human dignity are set aside in favor of laws for the sake of security also testify to this temperament.

Next to that the democratic idea that the law was supposed to be made for the self-interest and utilitarian need of the people or community, was mystified. Due to the fact that the masses do not have a clear common interest and only are gathered by a negative sentiment – excluding the enemy, the others – the law – whether based on an idea of nature (Nazism) or an idea of history (Stalinism) – appears as a *suprahuman* matter, yet needs to manifest itself in human bodies. The law is not legitimized by the obedience of the arbitrary men and women and their unpredictable actions, but depends on its *internalization* in each citizen: the possibility and the impossibility to become a civic subject. Again, Orwell eloquently succeeds in the sensitization of such an embodiment of the law as an idea. In *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (1983) the protagonist Winston Smith as *a member of fabrication of truth* is confronted with the falsity of it. The Big Brother of Oceania does not tolerate his betrayal and he is tortured to believe in the reality of the idea once again. Finally, at the end of the novel, when he gives in to the idea, not as a form of obedience from outside, which he was long before prepared to do, but as a total inner conviction, he is murdered. The reader is perplexed. *Why, he believed it.* Except, it is precisely in this violent and brutal end that the totalitarian state shows its essential characteristic: the urge to maintain its movement rather than the preservation of the perfect civic subject. Once the embodiment of the civic subject is complete, the subject itself becomes irrelevant and redundant. Totalitarianism rather lives by increase of limbic lives.

The law – although demanding *obedience* of its civic subjects – thus is not in need of the participation of these personae. Its arbitrary and lawless movements are for the sake of its perfect embodiment in the future. “In the interpretation of totalitarianism, all laws have become laws of the movement” (Arendt, 1968, p. 463), and morally “right is what is good for the movement.”¹¹ Law thus is not in service of the prudential self-interest of men, but becomes “the expression of the motion itself” (p. 464). Yet, if the law does not serve men, their equality and freedom, what does it serve? The law operates according to the ideology, which is literally the logic of *an* idea, Arendt states. From this idea, the movement of totalitarianism gains its consistency. Only one idea as presented in totalitarian regime, not even a multiplicity of ideas, can gain such a substantial consistency. This idea – which in our contemporary times has been many things; such as lack of security or fear for economic decay –

¹¹ Motto in *Organisationsbuch der NSDAP*, p. 7. Cited in Arendt, 1968, p. 412.

gains due to its negating nature within the *politics of exile* an axiomatic paradigmatic quality. Yet, in its manifestation it does not stand alone. Scientific data such as statistics are used to back up the consistency; philosophical concepts such as Enlightenment are functionalized in order to argue for backwardness of the other; and artistic sensations such as comedians mocking the other are implemented as affects to confirm percepts towards the other. It explains its own outcome, process and future. Arendt (1968) even suggests that it is the logic of this idea, this ideology, that keeps totalitarianism in motion, eventually, given its rupturing oppositional founding, devouring its own idea, in order to maintain the logical process and the consistency of the statements up till its suicidal apotheosis. Žižek (2002) relates such suicidal apotheosis to contemporary discourse in which democratic principles are overruled for the sake of democracy. The truth of the matter is never only manifested in the *actuality* of the current state, but just as any panic attack by its *virtual* future. Arendt (1968) states:

The trouble with totalitarian regimes is not that they play power politics in an especially ruthless way, but that behind their politics is hidden an entirely new and unprecedented concept of power, just as behind their *Real-politik* lies an entirely new and unprecedented concept of reality. Supreme disregard for immediate consequences rather than ruthlessness; rootlessness and neglect of national interests rather than nationalism; contempt for utilitarian motives rather than unconsidered pursuit of self-interest; ‘idealism’, *i.e.*, their unwavering faith in an ideological fictitious world, rather than lust for power – these have all introduced into international politics a new and more disturbing factor than mere aggressiveness would have been able to do (pp. 417-418).

The axioms of the totalitarian thought are never applied to a current state of affairs but projected on a coming prospect. This non-substantial, sheer form of content of an idea strengthens the mass oriented anonymity of belonging. It is a form of content that in its formation of atomized bodies destructs any sense of connectivity between assemblages of bodies. In line with Žižek (2002), and in words of Deleuze and Guattari (1987), we could state that the totalitarian machine as an interstratum – in its force to form its content and expression – disfigures its territory and its constitutional framework through two types of lines of flight. One that is suicidal internally – forsaking freedom for the sake of freedom or murdering a people for people’s sake as Assad does – and one that stigmatizes the other as a threatening line of flight from the terrorist to the flow of refugees that will end our civilization as Trump, Wilders and Le Pen see it. Frauke Petry’s *alternative* for Germany is *otherless*. Yet, a non-panicking historic review on the state of panicking Western politics shows that the axiomatic paradigm of here versus there, or us versus them, for a long time does not only define the contours of the content of politics, but also the constitutional frameworks of the expression of politics. There is a law that applies for us – in the virtual here – and a law that applies for them – in the virtual there. It is, in words of Schinkel (2008), a diagrammatic idea of law.

4.3.2 *Force of Law*

I am not a historian. My aid to issues such as these is rather from another nature. I have lived there and I live here, different territories and different perspectives on history. My skepticism of integrity of democracy springs from the multiplicity of historic backgrounds and my skepticism for sincerity of constitutions and human rights just as with Arendt springs from a long experience of refuge and illegality. Both experience define my perspective. My claim here is thus not to introduce another form of neutrality, but rather to dismantle the neutrality claim of Western societies on impartialness of their democracy, constitutional rights and exclusive claim on human rights. In order to dismantle such impartiality one needs to bring the faces forth that are been silenced by such so-called impartial attitude. The last part of this chapter, and more so the whole of this study, is an ode to men and women, boys and girls, that remain silent in our political expression. Then, let us first sketch out the frameworks through which this cacophonous silence (which I have introduced in 2.3.2 & 2.3.3) has been fueled.

Being silenced is not something that happens once in a while, but something that permanently affects the manner of reaction in a country that sees you, even after 27 years, as a permanent host. This silence does not only determine your present condition, as Ghorashi (2003) argues, but also the manner in which you rewrite your past experiences. An incident in my life in the past months is exemplary. Just couple of months ago I met a colleague for the first time. He already knew my name, so the obvious question for him was to ask: 'Where are you from?' My reverse question was: 'Why does it matter?' He did not accept my response and stubbornly asked the question for five times. His response was a refrain of the question that permanently hunts and defines your live. When I said I was born in Iran, he started talking about Iran as if he was born and raised there. Finally, he admitted that his knowledge was based on a novel written by a Dutch writer. He ended his lecture by stating: 'You must read that book, only then you understand the Iranian revolution and the importance of democracy for your country.' He left immediately and I remained behind perplexed. How could an educated man think that I needed a novel to understand a revolution that I have lived through? His ignorance however did not only show a lack of understanding of history there, but also a lack of knowledge of Western involvement in ruination of democracy in Iran since the 1950's. Due to Western economic interest many democratic and social movements in the Middle East – Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and finally Syria – were attacked. Middle Eastern countries as well as African countries are not *a* territory over there, but multiple territories that discursively are essentially intertwined with the international and Western affairs. The people of Palestine were the collateral damages of twentieth century's economic and political discursive colonialism of the West.

Yet, my objection to his ignorance is not only based on his lack of knowledge of this intertwined history, but also the ignorance of the possibility of his ignorance. There was no moment in his attitude that invited me to have a conversation. My knowledge of my own past was not something of interest. Nevertheless, in these Western societies, there are also auteurs that essentially invite us to communicate by explicitly putting their ignorance on the agenda. Jean Baudrillard's (1995) lecture on the Gulf War is an example. He resists the spectacle of the media in connection to the Gulf War, by explicitly arguing that the so-called informed civic subject does not have a clue what a war is. We

have no clue on how and why a war proceeds. Our knowledge is rather based on fictive imagination of the media. The term Gulf War – just as Middle East and Africa – suggests a territorial clarity, while Baudrillard states that the war itself is initiated through an international hegemonic understanding of democracy and freedom. And, even within this hegemonic idea of democracy there is an inconsistency towards democratic processes. Democracy has not only been *enforced* but undemocratic processes in these countries are permanently been simulated by economic traits and initiated warfare by the West. The policy of democracy and constitutional rights elsewhere creates a permanent *state of exception*, undemocratic and unconstitutional territories.

The form of expression of politics of exile, just as its form of content, creates a permanent discursive negation: *a doublespeak*. This doublespeak – or as Schinkel (2008 & 2011) put it diagrammatic talk – shows the same contradictory injection of the axiomatic paradigms of here versus there; us versus them. Territorial thinking unfolds through the ambiguity instead of clarity of the borders of sovereign territory. The ambiguity lies in the contradictory trait of sovereignty that operates by excluding itself from the territory that it decides upon. The Gulf War – the event that started masses of refuge and rising up the walls of Europe – is just an example. Agamben (1998) speaks of an *order without localization* (p. 175). This is the case in the *state of exception*. Guantanamo Bay, often used by Agamben, is an adequate example. Here sovereignty, whether it is the American government, the American law, or the American way of life, creates a territory that is literally placed outside the borders, the way of life and the juridical system of United States. The oppositional setting of the state of exception is however not only territorial, it also defines the application of different rules for the other. While according to the juridical system of Israel an individual falls under the criminal law at the age of 18 according to the same system this does not apply for Palestinian children. They become a juridical subject by the age of 12. These children are not judged by the civic law, the law that is set for civic subjects, but by military law. The state of these children in jails – hundreds of kids exposed to systematic torture, mental, physical and sexual abuse – shows how a child is reduced to a limbic state of being (Witte, 2016).

In this exceptional state, the law lawfully suspends itself to manifest sovereignty. The exception that manifests the power of the sovereign is created as such to ambiguously manifest the sovereignty itself. The law disconnects itself from territory and creates a space in which sovereignty can manifest its full force. Inspired by Jacques Derrida (1992^a & 2000), Agamben (2005) even speaks of *force of law*:

The concept of ‘force of law,’ as a technical legal term, defines a separation of the norm’s *vis obligandi*, or applicability, from its formal essence, whereby decrees, provisions, and measures that are not formally laws nevertheless acquire their ‘force’ ... The state of exception is an anomic space in which what is at stake is a force of law without law (which should therefore be written: force-of-~~law~~) (pp. 38-39).

In this sense, it is possible even to suggest that the *law* (sovereign power), the *norm* (disciplinary power), and *statistic control* (security) do not characterize three different forms of power, but rather that they, in their effects, become indistinguishable. The law, the norm and the control through

security operate as axiomatic paradigms within contemporary politics defining not only its assemblages of bodies as negating atomized masses but also its assemblages of enunciations as *doublespeak*. Normality, defined by statistics, is installed in bodies via norms, manifesting itself with the *force* of sovereign law. Alongside this all-encompassing process of order without locality Agamben also points to its flipside: *lawless locality* as it has been realized in camps. Agamben and Arendt state, in their critique on the *practice* of human rights, that life and death of the limbic lives in the camp do not depend on the law or right to live, but rather on the mood of the police, i.e. the civic subject. Abu Ghraib and The Killing Team are adequate examples of such a lack of law and the rule of the police. This blurring of power, the inability to distinguish between different forms of practice refers to Agamben's notion of the *zone of indistinction*.

Zone of indistinction is the milieu of exile, its form of content; a milieu without an inherent consistency. In this zone, one cannot distinguish between law and life, between life and death, between the people that dominate and the people that have been excluded. A population, as civic subjects, could easily become limbic lives. A population, Foucault already tells us, is identified as statistical facts, masses with diseases, with abnormalities and other statistical characteristics. This identification is the force and the curse of the population. This population becomes rather, as Deleuze (1995) suggests, axiomatically codified by paradigms that form the expression of politics of exile. They are those that have access to and could affect the information flows and those that lack this access. This is the underlying problem of segregation. The discussion on segregation is often conducted by misplaced arguments on freedom of choice. People must be set free in order to choose their network with whomever they prefer to communicate and to commune. It refers to the freedom of communities to isolate themselves from other communities. The problem of segregation is however not that of freedom but rather that of access, as is still at hand in the after pains of Apartheid in South Africa. Closed and isolated communities often suggest a lack of access, as in ghettos, or a privilege to access, as in gated communities (Levitas, et al, 2007). Moreover, in the *control society* populations do not limit themselves to a territory. This is however not the end of locality, but rather implies that each locality is penetrated by discursive axiomatic mechanisms that come from beyond this locality. The engine that expresses types of relationality in a local territory blurs its internal and external distinctive constructions and constitutions (Deleuze, 1995, p. 180).

4.3.3 *The Void of Statelessness*

The event with my colleague is not a momentary incident. It is rather an example of a systematic enunciative field in which the other is defined and explained by somebody else than himself or herself. Ghorashi (2003) shows that even in extremely self-reflective disciplines such as anthropology the so-called observer remains ignorant of the manner in which the paradigms of *here versus there* and *use versus them* are implemented in ones thinking. Even within the experimental anthropology the deep longing for generalization of the other – whether exotic, romantic or demonic – remains powerful (pp. 38-45). This theoretical discipline on multiplicity of voices does not weaken the deep-rooted Voice that determines other people's lives. This Voice contains a form of judgment that Deleuze and Guattari (1987) typify as *a judgment of God* (see also: 1.2.2).

The strata are judgments of God; stratification in general is the entire system of the judgment of God (but the earth, or the body without organs, constantly eludes that judgment, flees and becomes destratified, decoded, deterritorialized) (p. 40).

Of course, this judgment does not exclusively refer to a religious conviction or a belief system. Metaphysical rigidity is as intensely present in the non-religious and anti-religious practices, not only when they are concerned with their fight against religion, but even more in their use of axiomatic paradigms and ideology. The anti-Christian and pro-sexuality movements in the sixties and the political simplification of Islam as well as communism testify to isomorphic forms of rigidity, and to the tendency of an ideology to elevate its central idea beyond reality and other forms of knowledge. Religious practices, as is often assumed, are not beyond the realities of everyday life and politics. Nor are they necessarily segmentary. Knitter (2010) argues that humility – a widespread religious virtue – creates room for interreligious dialogue. As any other form of practice religious practices have the potential to contain multiplicity and connectivity. What is indicated by ‘the judgment of God’ is the impetus of a practice, whether religious or non-religious, to close off its territory from the diversity around it. There is a hierarchical trait in this narrowing focus. This judgment of God, which is invented and acted upon by men, contains a dual operation of segregation and vertical ranking; hence, Foucault’s (1977) critique on the graphic visualization of power as a pyramid. Arendt’s (1968) discussion of human rights and the exclusion of stateless people and refugees from these rights, explicates this *pyramid scheme*. Can human rights function as an axiomatic paradigm?

The very phrase ‘human rights’ became for all concerned – victims, persecutors, and onlookers alike – the evidence of hopeless idealism or fumbling feeble-minded hypocrisy (p. 269).

Arendt’s (1978*) description of the conscious pariah, the meaning of the figure refugee, is extracted from a political point of view and not from the legal standpoint of human rights. This is due to her criticism of the notion as well as the practice of human rights. Arendt emphasizes the manner in which the two World Wars have been a catalyst exposing the impasses of Western civilization. A civilization based on the rights of men, but once the refugees and the stateless, driven from one nation-state to the other, started to claim their rights, the problematic character of these foundations began to appear. When refugees – as human beings without land, home, state and nationality – appealed to their rights merely based on their humanity, they were nevertheless rejected (Arendt, 1968, pp. 269-302). Observing the state of refugees nowadays, not much has changed. International treaties are aborted in order to make a deal with Turkey, despite the warning of Amnesty International for human rights violations within the refugee camps and on the borders, not only with Syria but also at the Moroccan-European walls in Ceuta and Melilla, which are blocking the path of refugees and migrants from sub-Saharan African countries. As Huijer (2015) argues we are slowly changing Europe into a *gated community*. In line with Arendt we could thus state that such an understanding of human rights creates an axiomatic paradigmatic understanding of the term *human*. In its formalization, human rights as a juridical and political form of expression, are disconnected from the *thing* that it refers to: living humans. In Agamben’s (2000) line of reasoning we could state that within human rights the rupture

between form of life and life becomes sensible. The term 'human' within human rights rather refers to the oppositional set: citizenship (humans with rights) versus non-citizenship (humans with no rights), the political personae of which are divided into respectively civic subjects and limbic lives.

Once they had left their homeland they remained homeless, once they had left their state they became stateless; once they had been deprived of their human rights they were rightless, the scum of the earth (Arendt, 1968, p. 267).

Arendt states that modernity – through its idea of nation-states and this division between citizenship and non-citizenship – creates a sense of *rightlessness* that differs from the centuries before. She typifies both the state slavery as well as modern stateless as rightless and cruel. Nonetheless, what differs is the *functionlessness* of the modern non-citizen 'human being'. The refugee has become undesirable because the system has deprived him from any functionality in any society. As Agamben (1998) shows the idea of functionlessness is ancient and concerns the paradigm of *homo sacer*. For Roman law this was a criminal who was banned by the sovereign to the borders of its territory. He is the man that can be killed without being sacrificed or being murdered. This is a state of exception in which the *homo sacer* is both beyond the law of men and the law of God. He has become pure *zoē*, life force (pp. 71-74). *Homo sacer* is not the obvious criminal. Agamben argues that in contemporary biopolitical era it is the stateless, the refugee, and the Other's body that has become the new target of biopolitical power. It is here that the new naked body of the modern *homo sacer* is created within new forms of no-mans-lands (pp. 183-184). From this perspective, in contrast to Arendt, I rather argue that enslavement was not beyond this cruelty. Functionality is in this sense defined from the perspective of the slave-owner – the sovereign as a civic subject – and not from the perspective of men and women who were and are enslaved. Even more so, older or disabled enslaved men and women awaited a senseless death. This emphasis on lack of connection, lack of functionality, is essential in our analysis of *politics of exile* in which *homo sacer*, as we will see, is an exemplary case that appears to be an axiomatic paradigm.¹²

The wars, in Arendt's time and as we have experienced also in our time, have not only triggered extreme inflation and unemployment, but also uncontrollable flows of migration. War, creating multiple forms of exiles, is not only an abnormal period. In line with Foucault and Arendt (1968), we could state that it is rather a mindset that expresses itself by *naming abnormalities* without being able

¹² There is thus a historical connection. Art practices often 'sensitize' their audiences for such political issues far more subtly than newspapers articles. The Kassel Documenta (13) in 2012 pleads for this spatial repetitiveness in the exposition of Charlotte Salomon's artistic work. Salomon was a Jewish-German visual artist who was killed in Auschwitz. She sensualizes the toxic air of exile and death, which as Griselda Pollock (2012) shows, surpasses her ethnicity (Jewish) and her gender (female). While Arendt could flee from the camp at Gurs, Salomon was the nameless woman that left the same camp towards the inhumanity of Auschwitz. The organizers made an effort to show that the impact of Salomon's work is not merely historical by exhibiting images of the horrors in Syria in the same space as the exposition of her work. In this setting Salomon's namelessness gains a name in its extraordinary ability to connect what was to what is and what we fear to be. Salomon's war and contemporary wars are not the same; they are not the repetition of the same, but as Deleuze (1997) argues, repetition in difference. Yet, despite their differences they are able to connect, a tactile affect.

to define the characteristics of the normal. This centrifugal trait also belongs to the form of expression of politics of exile, creating more and more limits. Not in order to include something, but rather in order to exclude more. This is the reason that Agamben (1998 & 2000) repeatedly states that refugees are more than marginal figures. Both Agamben and Arendt state that once the exclusion starts, it spreads itself as an infection through society. What starts with refugees, does not end with refugees. The right-wing jargon always grows more and more in its negating doublespeak, defining the form of expression.

According to Arendt (1968) the affect that fuels this negating form of expression is aimless *hate*. Within the homogeneity of the masses, there are no more organic opponents, such as the laborer and the factory owners, no struggles of the classes. There is a war of all against all. Within this state of war there is not simply an external threat, but the threat is immanent. Despite the idea of a clear-cut enemy – as we see in case of ISIS – in this all against all it is far less obvious who is the enemy. Yet, whatever the conflict, Arendt argues that the consistency of nation-state determines the form of expression. This is not only present in the formation of the juridical system, but also within the jargon of resistance of minorities. Both majority *and* minority believe in salvation through construction or maintenance of a nation-state, Arendt argues. Within the *logic* of politics of exile, minorities – while they had been categorized as a minority by *majoritarian* power – long to become a majority. They intend to build a nation founded upon an assumed shared history and a common regime of signs and images. Simultaneously this nation defines in return the homogeneity of its people. Neither majority nor minority distrusts the nation-state as a mechanism of exclusive belonging. They accept the law and the constitutional framework as the necessary precondition of the nation-state.

However, the belief in the logic of the nation-state creates exclusion itself. Arendt gives an example. In order to enable a long-lasting peace, after the First World War new treaties are agreed upon by the victorious nations. However, although these conventions seem to protect the rights of minorities, they eventually became the very objects of new forms of discrimination upon which the fundamentals were raised of new hierarchical structures. Arendt shows that exactly because of such treaties some people started to become minorities, while many others were not even mentioned. Majority appeared not to be the same as the majority of numbers. While the foundation of law defines itself as universal, endless exceptions were the practical consequences, she states. The end of colonialism of the conquered states was ordained in straight lines that dived Africa. The massacre in Rwanda was to a high degree caused by these mathematical divisions and the favoring of some tribes over others by the colonial powers. The idea of the masses is not a matter of size. The masses permanently gain weight and lose weight. The exclusion of a minority can affect more than half of the population. This was also the case in Iraq. While the ruling government was Sunni, the majority of people were Shia. In Syria on the other hand while the majority is Sunni, the ruling government is Shia. In both countries, the Kurds were excluded independent of their preferences. In Jordan, however, the ruling population has become a minority due to the influx of refugees: Palestinians and recently Syrian refugees. Consequence of such divisions finds its violent echo in 21st century.

During the interwar period, according to Arendt (1968), the so-called inter-European and international organizations remained bound to the nation-states and their needs. The stateless had two options, either they remained outside the law or became an exception within the law. Which often implies that

eventually they would be excluded from the law. The treaties defined the responsibilities of the minorities and obliged them to assimilate. A *painless assimilation* as it was phrased (p. 272). Next to the axiomatic paradigmatic idea of human rights (citizenship and non-citizenship), hate, naming the abnormalities and the logic of nation-state, assimilation is the next axiomatic paradigm of form of expression within politics of exile. However, Arendt (1978^a) notes, assimilation remained an impossible quest, despite all efforts. She gives personalized examples of assimilation, in which men and women, despite the fact that they fully assimilate into societies, are eventually forced to leave. She describes Mr. Cohn who has become fully German, Czech, Austrian and French.

I think I had better not dilate on the further adventures of Mr. Cohn. As long as Mr. Cohn can't make up his mind to be what he actually is, a Jew, nobody can foretell all the mad changes he will still have to go through (p. 63).

Politics of exile demands something, yet makes it impossible to achieve. This is for example the case with high-educated refugees. They often become unemployed in the country of arrival, and if they find a job it is in most cases a form of employment that does not match their level of education (Valk, 2007). Krahn et al. (2000) focus on the state of employment of refugees and immigrants in Canada, raising issues that exceed the borders of Canada. Although the Canadian policy of immigration favors those refugees with high credentials, according to them the reality of the matter is that these refugees in most cases are unable to access occupations that are in line with their level of education. The disadvantage is *systematic*, not only due to racism and sexism, but also due to the lack of tools to access such forms of occupation. The basic language trainings for immigrants do not cover the level of their education and type of occupation. They are not allowed in Job-Training programs, due to the fact that they do not have a job to support the cost. These negative experiences are not restricted to Canadian practices, but are widespread in the Western approach towards migrants from non-Western countries. Krahn et al. even speak of the *institutionalization of Downward Mobility*, in which institutions in advance agree on the value of the credentials without further analyses.

Thus by accepting as fact the assumption that foreign credentials are generally inferior, such programs can reinforce the barriers faced by refugees and immigrants attempting to restart their former professional careers (p. 80).

And what did await Mr. Cohn despite his efforts? Denationalization and further denormalization are perhaps the most powerful axiomatic paradigms of form of expression of politics of exile. Arendt (1968 & 1978^a) argues that the amount of totalitarianism of a country could be measured by the quantity of its urge to denationalize. New juridical-political categories arise, such as statelessness and displacement. These are the political axiomatic paradigms that analogically relate to the paradigm of citizenship and the constitutional rights of some citizens. In 2013 the estimate of human beings that are of concern to UNHCR (2013) is more than 35 million. Four years later it has become more than 65 million. These are not only refugees, but also internally displaced persons, and stateless individuals due to political tribulations, transformation of borders of nation-states and denationalization as modern form of exclusion.

The denationalization, however, affects not only the stateless, but within the state also the citizens or – as Sassen shows (2003) – the nation-state as a whole. It is not the military that leads and controls this process of denationalization, Arendt (1968) argues, but rather the police. The police – as civic subjects – function as a mechanism *to trace* abnormalities. Nonetheless, this tracing is not limited to the borders. Policing acts beyond the national law.¹³ Arendt argues that in a police state the stateless as well as the operations of the police in its blurred ambiguity were outright illegal. Both police and the stateless minorities became criminals due to the fact that their acts are not written or reflected upon in the realm of the law, or have been ‘lawfully’ abandoned from the law. I will elaborate on this in the next section of this chapter. For now, it is important to note that the police and the stateless are related to one another, be it that each is positioned on an opposite end of the legal spectrum. It is the police that locks up the stateless as a criminal or deports him without consulting any authority. The fate of the latter is even worse than the fate of a criminal. Arendt elaborates on the fact that some stateless even become criminals because only as a criminal they could obtain access to the legal system and legal representation.¹⁴ For a mere stateless person the law does not function in a form or representation and acknowledgment. It is not what they *do* that makes them criminals, but what they *are* that puts them in a state of disobeying the law.

The asylum seeker exercising his or her right under international law to seek asylum frequently becomes the ‘unlawful non-citizen’ under domestic law. He or she suffers the ‘imputation’ of ‘double criminality’, having entered in an irregular manner, often with the assistance of people smugglers, and being aligned with ‘crime’ by officials and the media, leading to assumptions about the (il)legitimacy of their claims (Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, 2007, pp. 384-385).

The treatment of refugees is usually rather *deportation*. American TV-series such as *Law and Order* are often a fine demonstration of such logic. While most witnesses are gently pursued to testify in court, witnesses with illegal status are threatened with deportation in order to make them testify against the criminal. Although the lawyers and the detectives appear momentarily morally troubled by their acts, nevertheless it remains morally reasonable for them to use coercion. In the end the illegal men and women, who are not criminals and often the victims, are deported. The law and order logic mainly protects the system and not *a human* as such.

¹³ That is why the Dutch labeled their military campaigns after World War II in Indonesia after it declared its independence in 1945 ‘politioele acties’. Even more interesting as to the experience of identity of the nation-state is the fact that until then The Netherlands had the largest muslim population of the world, due to the fact that their colonies were part of the nation-state.

¹⁴ The complexity between exclusion and criminal activity is also present in the attitude of European Youth. In their rapport *Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror Nexus*, Basra, Neumann and Brunner (2016) make – against the populist religious argument – a connection between criminal past and radicalization of youth. Yet in their research they do not target the systematic racism, economic and social exclusion of these youth from the political arena. In her research Kaulingfreks (2015) rather pleads for a political inclusion of this youth in order to target radicalization as well as criminalization that results from politics of exile.

All discussions about the refugee problems revolved around this one question:
How can the refugee be made deportable again (Arendt, 1968, p. 284)?

In spite of its ideological appeal to the masses to legitimize its illegal operations, formally the totalitarian regime is, as any other regime, dependent on a general consent of its citizens to eliminate its so-called enemy. The discourse of denationalization is then the first step in a long process to gain the approval of the majority. Through denationalization people lose their jobs, properties, and their sense of purpose. In order to stay alive, they become *schnorrers* (beggars), Arendt (1968) states. ‘Men’ are annoyed by beggars, avoid them, do not care for them, and do not even see them. Arendt adequately notes that they become unwanted long before their deportation by arguing that the camps are at the end of a road, that began with a sign that shames and names people as abnormal, the minorities.

Even the Nazis started their extermination of Jews by first depriving them of all legal status (the status of second-class citizenship) and cutting them off from the world of the living by herding them into ghettos and concentration camps; and before they set the gas chambers into motion they had carefully tested the ground and found out to their satisfaction that no country would claim these people. The point is that a condition of complete rightlessness was created before the right to live was challenged (p. 296).

It is within this setting of mass deportation, denationalization and statelessness that rights for men in general – human rights – become elementary. After the French Revolution, human rights were the starting point of the people – as a political entity – to underpin justice. The people, or men in general, rather than God or the King as instances of sovereignty became the object as well as the subject of the law. There is no longer any transcendence for and to the law. Men judge men. Nevertheless, during the revolution the intrinsic equality of all men before god in the realm of men becomes *negotiable*.¹⁵ According to Arendt, through the process of defining a ‘human’ the paradoxical nature of human rights emerges. She shows that the stateless people do not have the traits of humans as they are presented in *human* rights. This is due to the fact that when stateless individuals claim their basic rights they are confronted by the fact that only a *state*, which the stateless lacks by definition, has the justifiable power to defend those unalienable rights. The stateless people have no access to a state and no state is obliged to defend their rights. As Guy S. Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam (2007) dispute,

¹⁵ This is what Nietzsche (2001) actually means when he speaks of the ‘death of God’. It does not refer to the God of religion but to the death of any form of fundament from which certainties can be derived. This ‘nihilism’ is the reason why the madman runs in panic to the market place and wonders if the market men do realize what we have done by murdering God. “Isn’t empty space breathing at us? Hasn’t it got colder? Isn’t night and more night coming again and again? Don’t lanterns have to be lit in the morning?” (fragment 125, p. 120). And Nietzsche also states: “Even less may one suppose many to know at all what this event really means – and, now that this faith has been undermined, how much must collapse because it was built on this faith, leaned on it, had grown into it - for example, our entire European morality. This long, dense succession of demolition, destruction, down fall, upheaval that now stands ahead” (fragment 343, p. 199).

the Convention of 1951 does not guarantee the States to oblige to the international law. The State remains sovereign in its choice to grant asylum, and may have an ethical but not legal obligation to do so. “State practice is replete with examples of asylum given; the humanitarian practice exists, but the sense of obligation is missing” (p. 369).

Entrance to the legal system remains limited to the citizens of those states. The nation-state carries the idea of a family. The idea of *brotherhood* excludes anyone that is not kinsfolks. And the stateless is certainly not family (Arendt, 1968, p. 291). In his lectures Foucault (2007) refers to the notion of family too and its use in the society of security. Nevertheless, he states, this use of the notion of family by the government to define the population eliminates at that very moment the sense of family as well as the classical understanding of government (pp. 104-105). The family – and the love for this family through the hatred for the other, as Ahmed (2014) shows – is not an engine to include people but – just as its counterpart The Society (as I have argued in 3.4.1) and nation-state – an axiomatic paradigm that rather negates.

The lack of access to human rights aggravates prejudice because of what such lack is assumed to indicate. In a society and a time where citizenship, according to Arendt (1968), is associated with civilization and progress as well as with the degree of emancipation of a certain people, the lack of such a privilege becomes equal to a lack of civilization and progress. And precisely this paradox has in Nazism led to the idea that the concept of *citizen* is equated with the concept of *human*. So, the stateless not only loses his dignity but is also transformed into a bare life, a life stripped of its humanity. Non-citizen becomes a non-man. In the moralistic jargon of political parties in Europe this division between civilization of the European civic subject and the uncivilized other is more than obvious. In his letter to Dutch People the prime minister of The Netherlands Mark Rutte (2017) vividly divides the country in two types of people: the civilized Dutch subject that suffers from the barbaric behavior of the other. The list of sexual harassment and violence against civic servants – that apparently is only committed by foreigners and people of color that are born and raised in The Netherlands – is completed with enfeebling accusation of the same civic subject of racism. Rutte’s solution for this axiomatic idea of Dutch people is simple: ‘Act normal or leave.’ To wherever that may be.

Deportation is however not the only horror that awaits the other. While the refugees and the stateless have become the political objects of the modern era, Arendt (1978^a) argues, they are not only deprived of any appeal to juridical process but moreover from (forming a) political community.

Not the loss of specific rights, then, but the loss of community willing and able to guarantee any rights whatsoever, has been the calamity which has befallen ever-increasing numbers of people. Man, it turns out, can lose all so-called Rights of Man without losing his essential quality as man, his human dignity. Only the loss of a polity itself expels him from humanity (Arendt, 1968, p. 297).

It is remarkable, as we have seen in 3.3.2 with Arendt’s division between labor, work and action, that she argues the loss of humanity starts with the loss of economic certainties: It begins by becoming a

beggar, *Schnorrers*. The stateless individual loses its functionality in the world, on economic and social level, and in line with these losses it becomes the excluded. This exclusion however is in the final instance political. The stateless has no access to the public domain of speech and action. Politics, or the public space, as we have seen in Arendt's work, is not about harmonious hegemony but is based on plurality. The disappearance of stateless persons and refugees from the human arena is supplemented by the disappearance of the politics of plurality. Thus, what remains is an apolitical stateless life not only outside the state, but also within it. The stateless, that is a non-existent object for the law, is desubjectified in the world of politics. And, in contrast to Arendt, I rather argue that it is exactly this lack of access to and this blockage to create a community that connects the enslaved people to refugees and stateless people.

4.3.4 *Who is on Trial?*

As we have seen it is not only democracy and constitutional state that are vulnerable and multi-approachable within the doublespeak of politics of exile, but also Human Rights could become a tool in negating basic rights within politics of exile. The discursive axiomatic paradigms of denationalization and denormalization create a new human being: *homo sacer*. Arendt (1968) states: "The world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of being human" (p. 299). How does law, as the form of expression of politics of exile, define the contours of enunciation? The inability of the law and state to handle the reality of something like Auschwitz is more extensively analyzed in Agamben's work. For him there is more to the law than the illusion of neutrality. Law itself carries the responsibility for the horror. Agamben (2000) argues that the state of exception in the camps was not an anomaly. This is not the result of criminal law, but rather is born out of the ability of the law to enforce itself through *the exception* or *martial law* (p. 38). Just as Arendt, he states that the juridical discourse is elementary to the discourse of exclusion. In his analysis of Primo Levi's work Agamben (1999^b) emphasizes the difference between law and justice, arguing that the "law is solely directed towards judgment, independent of truth and justice" (p. 18). However, the *force of judgment*, inherent in law, produces truth, indifferent to its falsity or unjust effect. This judgment presents itself thus as a determinant judgment; and not as an open reflective judgment (as I have shown in 2.2.1). During detailed interview with refugees in The Netherlands they are obliged to confirm every aspect of their past. In August 2016 on his twitter account Wil Eikelboom published an example of how far the absurdity of such determinative questioning can go. A civil servant asks a refugee: "Your birthplace is Bagdad. You have indicated that you have left Bagdad *just* when you were five to six months old. Can you remember anything about Bagdad or Iraq?" On which not surprisingly the answer was: "No, I do not remember anything." Apparently, the civil servant could not comprehend the meaning of the adjective *just*; while continuing his absurd standard questioning.

It is the sensitization of the logic of such absurd consistency that attracts us in Kafka's work. *The Trial* of Kafka adequately visualizes for Agamben that law can only appear in the form of a trial in which "execution and transgression, innocence and guilt, obedience and disobedience all become indistinct and lose their importance" (p. 19). Was K. responsible or innocent, obedient or disobedient? What a trial does is not punishing the guilty or bringing them to justice. According to Agamben, the judgment becomes the punishment itself, by defining an innocent as a person who has never been judged by law.

It drives on the assumption that guilt can be identified and handled by law. The trials against the PVV leader Wilders and dictators of Egypt and Tunisia seem to suggest that it is within the realm of the law that we can judge on political matters. And hence the juridical absolutism was understood as a political absolutism and blocked the political discussion on the matter. Agamben states that such thoughts have gone so far that it has blocked our reflections on Auschwitz. In terms of Arendt (1982) we could state that the determinant judgment has taken away our ability to act on base of reflective judgment. Trials like Nuremberg, Agamben (1999^b) states, create the idea that we have caught the bad guys and can move on, leaving the camps behind us.

With the exception of occasional moments of lucidity, it has taken almost half a century to understand that law did not exhaust the problem, but rather that the very problem was so enormous as to call into question law itself, dragging it to its own ruin (p. 20).

As it is mentioned before, the totalitarian regime in its consistency relies on the production of confusion between lies and truth. The state, with the multiplicity of institutions, forces its masses to participate in their own destruction, and the internalization of the destructive doctrines within each citizen. The doctrines of security are not something that is forced upon the masses; but the masses, in their negation of the other, desires the limitation of the big brother. The masses negate themselves in their negation of the other. As Ten Bos (2015) states: “Every form of *governance* starts ... with *self-governance*. In-between these doctrines capitalism celebrates its growth. Just think of all the bottles of water that we throw away during boarding, just to buy more expensive drinks on the other side. It is through this economic discourse that the impact of politics that is obsessed by objective enemies implements rules that affect both the citizen and the non-citizen. It is terror with commercial benefits.

Yet, it is not just to call politics of exile an a-moral politics. It is rather moralistic in the true sense of the word. It preaches permanently. Dutch norms and values is perhaps the most used phrase during Dutch election. Still, the doublespeak is also implemented in the moralistic attitude of this politics. As we have seen with Mark Rutte before, the civic subject *preaches* what the other must *practice*. Furthermore, in the discourse of politics of exile – where law modifies and forms the expression – the responsibility for upholding norms and values become less and less social or ethical matters. They are legalized. Agamben (1999^b) problematizes the *concept of responsibility*, stating that this concept has been fully inhabited by law. And as we have seen, the policies on refugees – in their negation of international treaties – is creation of national laws in order to avoid responsibility. In line with Levi, Agamben states that the reduction of responsibility to the realm of law in reality leaves us behind with the acknowledgement of a *gray zone*, a *point of (con)fusion* in which it is impossible to point out the responsible and the victim. This zone places itself *before* the distinction between good and evil; not *beyond* it as an illusory salvation found in confessing to a crime or in taking responsibility, Agamben reckons. This mockery of responsibility is visible in the way Islamic State claims to take responsibility for bombing; as well as in Western governments apologizing with meaningless words for the crimes in the past such as slavery and colonization, without the acknowledgement of the present state of affairs. Ahmed (2014) even argues that saying sorry in such context rather function as a tool in order to repair

the image of a nation-state. It is in order to negate the relevancy of the past for the present. *We did it then, we are not doing it now* (pp. 113-118). Ta-Nehisi Coates (2014) shows how after 200 years of slavery the unending policies on housing and segregation in the past decades define the life of descendants of the enslaved people until today. And we have merely to see through Femke Kaulingfreks (2015) analysis of the manner in which European youth from different ethnic background were banned to the peripheries of European cities to know why they lost their appetite for European ‘civilization’. Such manner of taking responsibility refers to a responsibility without a sense of redemption. The terrifying thing is the banality of it, not only of evil as Arendt (1965) states, but at the same time of the good which has become meaningless.

However, in his resistance to such politics Agamben (1999^b) does neither plead for irresponsibility and impunity, nor for another sort of responsibility within the law. He calls for *zones of non-responsibility*. As a disinterested inter-esse (see: 2.2.1) these zones confront us all, not only the so called guilty ones, “with a responsibility that is infinitely greater than any we could ever assume.” The responsibility of the wars, poverty and environmental decay of the world is not of a nation or a government. It is the responsibility of every human living in a global world. “At the most, we can be faithful to it, that is, assert its unassumability” (p. 21). These zones are not zones of all against all as was mentioned by Arendt (1968). It is not about one nation against the other. The zones of non-responsibility *connect* through a *common* responsibility: my colleague and me. They ethically surpass the axiomatic tendencies of paradigms of nationalism that create a world in which most people are either stateless or second-hand citizens due to their religion, ethnicity, color of their skin, sexuality, sexual preferences, age, mental or physical challenges. What Trump did was not presenting a new reality, but a reality that was long present in our societies. The horror of the Second World War is not only the responsibility of Nazi Germany, and the intensity of statelessness in current times is not the responsibility of one part of the world against the other. While Hillary Clinton indignantly protested against China and Russia’s lack of commitment to solve the political horrors in Syria, and calls it accurately *travesty*, nevertheless these horrors are historically bound to a toxic political affair in which Western as well as Non-Western countries were involved (NBC News, 2012).

Do such examples of political meaningless responsibilities endure in the notion of human in human rights? Is the paradigm of *human* a hollow phrase and in this void the engine for the juridical non-existence of rights? Can the rights of a human be more than an axiomatic paradigm of politics of exile? It is unjust to accuse the human-right activists of being naïve men and women whose good intentions cause ill outcomes. Most of our genuine knowledge of refugees, political exiles and prisoners as well as of the causes of famine and environmental pollution originate from the experiences and investigations of these activists. Their plea for justice as well as their disappointment in international institutions such as the UN shows a frustration in the legal mechanisms. In a sense, we could argue that the critical thought on the practice of law – as a form of expression that creates statelessness and illegality – would never have been formed if these activists were not doing what they do. It is the same critical thought that inspires men and women to fight. Critics thus must not cynically accuse the activists but must refer to the discourse of law and universal rights, by permanent evaluation of this discourse, and by permanent awareness of the tendency of the law to give rise to

closed territories as well as the metaphysical elevation of some form of thought above the other. What do we mean by universal? What do we mean by right? These are not transitory questions with absolute answers, but due to the multiplicity and transformability of the world, chronic matters. Actions and immediate decisions are needed; nonetheless these actions take place in the middle of a rhizomatic web of ethical complexities and are never the final course of action. The law is in need of neutrality; nevertheless, the desire for neutrality, no matter how noble it may be has never manufactured actual neutrality. As David Luban (2005) states: “Judges do not fight their culture – they reflect it” (p. 1452). The responsibility we take is the responsibility to rupture the certainty and consistency of determining judgments through reflective judgments. Let us not simply mock the civil servants for their line of questioning, but criticize the law that creates room for such a banal absurdity.

4.4 Limbic Lives: Unheard voices

4.4.1 The Centre and its Peripheries

Both form of content and form of expression within politics of exile emerge out of the pyramidal force of the state. The form of content creates territories of here and there; in which the civic subject of here determines the life of limbic live over there. The expression of this politics is also formed by axiomatic paradigms such as denationalization and denormalization that confirm the territories here and there. As we have seen, the term *human* in human rights within the juridical and political doublespeak of politics of exile operates as an axiomatic paradigm dividing the citizen from the non-citizen; and finally condemns the other to a non-human life. The politics of exile permanently names the other as the abnormal. Yet, the responsibility for such determining judgment of the other as the abnormal is colonized by the law, with its pretense of neutrality. The prohibition of headscarves on schools in France relies on such neutrality. Its neutrality relies on an idea of exclusion of another image of thought. The judgment is determinant to axiomatically divide, as Schinkel argues (2011), the here as neutral – an in line as free and civilized – and the other as non-neutral, repressive and repressed. It is within this logic that secularism sensitizes its tendency for a monotheistic attitude with its judgment as a God of freedom. Yet the values of such politics are not given. Its freedom is commonly sacrificed in its tendency of prohibiting other forms of lives – thus the freedom of the other – and it defines the lives of its civic subjects through security measures. Politics of exile is in other words a *moralistic politics*. Schinkel thus states that *nationalistic normativity* – with its ethnocentric and racist temperament – although pretending to be a *neutral description* of reality; is rather a wishful and *creative prescription* of reality (p. 46-47). Such moralistic politics sets norms and creates a rigid regime of expression: Freedom for women means to have no headscarf. This is an example of a regime of faciality. At all times, it avoids any ethical and political reflective judgment on its interpretation of the values and norms. It weakens the plurality of expressions of freedom by judging some expressions – such as wearing a headscarf – as unequal toward other expressions – such as sexual revolution in the sixties. The doublespeak that forms the expression of politics of exile divides the matter of expression within this politics into axiomatic sets of right and wrong. In this section I elaborate on this binary tendency of the matter of expression within politics of exile; that does not define itself only as a lawful politics but also through moral citizenship as Schinkel confirms.

Moral citizenship is nowadays relatively stronger than formal citizenship. Where former formal citizenship was the price for the immigrant, it is only the beginning today (p. 55, Translation TR).

Law does not appear out of the blue. It is always embedded in a much broader discourse, in this case an ideal *Society of Mankind*. This idea simultaneously emerges with human rights. A society of mankind, according to Foucault (1977, 1978, 1986^a & 1986^b) and Arendt (1958 & 1968), assumes and expects adequate behavior of its members. It focuses on *normalization* and thus excludes spontaneity and natality. The urge of normalization has increased even more with the rise of mass-society. What until then had been only common in the realm of family is now demanded on a much larger scale. In modern times, equality does not concern the expression in difference, Arendt objects, but rather with sameness. In this sense, Arendt problematizes the basic fundament of democracy in another way. Equality becomes an egalitarian force. This attitude ignores the differences that are central to the public realm of politics. Traits such as preference for a political party become rather a personal matter. We could argue that the secretiveness of voting in elections is such a form of privatization. Nevertheless, it implies more than that. The fact that the financiers of some European political parties remain implicit testifies of the same process of privatization. However, Foucault would rather argue that the realm of the private is as much undermined by the demands of normalization as the public domain. Arendt also acknowledges the fact that the private has been lost in modern times. In any case both philosophers define equality as equality in difference. They both fear the dehumanization of individuals by their homogenization in statistics. Due to the modern egalitarian equality, economic and behavioral sciences are undermined by this demand of statistics. The preponderance of normal behavior is that which matters and becomes a natural argument to view others as abnormal. The law of statistics within politics of exile is the law of the majority, Schinkel (2008) argues, due to the fact that distinction upon which categories are discriminated are based on a majoritarian idea of norm and the *normal*. It measures abnormalities. While minorities never define the majority, a small percentage seems sufficient to characterize a whole majoritarian minoritarian community.

The application of the law of large numbers and long periods to politics or history signifies nothing less than the willful obliteration of their very subject matter, and it is a hopeless enterprise to search for meaning in politics or significance in history when everything that is not everyday behavior or automatic trends has been ruled out as immaterial (Arendt, 1958, pp. 42-43).

It is assumed: the bigger the population, the more likely that the statistics are correct and the less the chance of defects. Even if this large amount is superfluous. The modern world is hence not a world as a common space of plural, but its commonality lies in the hegemony of thought in which the plurality

is lost for the sake of mathematical units. It is not that which binds and separates men, but the room in which bodies are melting into each other (p. 283).¹⁶

The monolithic character of every type of society, its conformism which allows for only one interest and one opinion, is ultimately rooted in the one-ness of man-kind ... survival of the species could be guaranteed on a world-wide scale, can at the same time threaten humanity with extinction (p. 46).

Besides these normalizing and violent interventions, the homogenizing effect of society also influences the phenomenon of individuality. Is the originality of an act still possible in a world where every human being must deviate too much from the norm, in a society of clones? The modern era is characterized as a time that belongs not to men but to *no-one*. Modern society is the bureaucratic no man's land, according to Arendt, and according to Huijer (2016, p.14) a no man's time, ruled by no-one. This will not lead to a comfort zone where one can sense one's freedom. According to Arendt (1958), precisely this irresponsibility, in which the non-responsibility in Agamben's sense is absent, has led to the greatest crimes in our history. When nobody can be held ethically responsible and in a juridical sense accountable, there is also no individuality to experience one's freedom. It is within such analysis of a bureaucratic force that we could recognize a force of ~~law~~ – in terms of Derrida (1992^a) and Agamben (2005) – within Arendt's (1958) analysis.

It is true that one-man ... is transformed in society ... into a kind of no-man rule. But this nobody ... does not cease to rule for having lost its personality ... the rule by nobody is not necessarily no-rule; it may indeed, under certain circumstances, even turn out to be one of its cruelest and most tyrannical versions (p. 40).

If political action is nonexistent in this no man's land, then it is no wonder that political speech eventually will become deformed and silenced, Arendt (1958) warns us. If the form of expression of politics of exile is characterized by the *gray zones of irresponsibility* – as we have seen before – than the matter of its expression is not simply a determining judgment, a moral rule that applies universally to anyone. The matter of expression is rather noticeable in *deformed slogans*: 'We take responsibility for bombing!'; 'A war for the sake of security comes with collateral damage.' In modern society action and speech are disconnected, since speech no longer involves action. Speech has become a means to an end: Ideological refrain repeating the same slogans over the globe. Compulsion towards a final goal is an important trait of totalitarianism and politics of exile. Within this milieu speech is only used for the sake of persuasion rather than as an engine for human interaction. Speech therefore is no longer connected to a memory or a sense of history that comes with the immortality of connections in-

¹⁶ The Greek society, which is according to Arendt the most individualistic society, was aware of the danger of large communities and was keen to keep the polis small. This is also one of Arendt's pleas and advises in her book *On Revolution*. I will elaborate on this matter in the last chapter.

between writers and heroes¹⁷ of the public space. Speaking in a social realm has become an instrument of clear communication to achieve *agreement* and sameness rather than to ascertain differences and movement of thought (pp. 26, 179, 232-233). The social banishes *disagreement*, which is a crucial element of communication. In line with the banishment of action, also political speech is, according to Arendt, expelled from the public domain.

Every activity performed in public can attain an excellence never matched in privacy ... While we have become excellent in the laboring we perform in public, our capacity for action and speech has lost much of its former quality since the rise of the social realm banished these into the sphere of intimate and the private (p. 49).

Modern society, with its secularized individuals in the private realm and its statistically approved hegemony in the public realm, has ended the Divine Judgment, Arendt (1958) argues. However, this ending of the transcendent world has not brought man closer to the world of men. It is not an alienation of self, but an alienation from the world that characterizes the modern age. Not having durability and not having stability on the long term has caused the fixation on wealth and property in the present. This is the driving force of modern human life, and is at the same time the sacrifice of what is human, according to Arendt.

From the perspective of Society of Mankind every person is a member of a family. Individuals are tangible entities that belong to a nation-state, to its hegemony of blood and soil.¹⁸ In the nation-state – in which the family of the social means a certain type of citizenship – the political nature of public space is destroyed. Consequently, the private domain of intimacy has become meaningless and lost (pp. 253-257). It is due to the modern society's alienation from the world and some modern science's alienation from the earth that have led to a sense of *worldliness*. In this worldliness, as a form of expression, according to Arendt, negligence and resentment, as matter of expression, dominate the public sphere (p. 54 & 264). All over Europe people are captured by a feeling of resentment of losing European culture, and blame not themselves but the intruding other for this loss. Yet it is exactly due to this resentment itself – within which the complexity of the past and the self-involvement in the loss of culture is neglected – that according to Arendt we lose a valuable thing: *love*. It is the loss of love, love not as a kind of affection for loved ones or as Sara Ahmed (2014) states a love for certain identity or nation-state that is embedded in the hatred for others, but the love as interest in the inter-est, the space of in-between within the human interaction. A faded love, since the urge of responsibility for the beloved space belongs to no-one. In this setting Arendt (1958)

¹⁷ Note that the concept of hero for Arendt (1958) does not refer to an extraordinary person but to a person's braveness to reveal itself in public (p. 186).

¹⁸ There has been often an attempt to disconnect nation-state from the axiomatic paradigm of blood and soil. Bal and Herscovitch (2011) plead to maintain a nation as a community, be it an open community. Nonetheless Arendt argues that despite any good intentions a community defining itself through the jargon of nation-state needs homogenizing processes in order to maintain order.

sorrowfully states that “love of the world ... was the first to fall victim to the modern age’s triumphal world alienation” (p. 264).

What does this imply for our present world and for a politics of exile? Sameness and its statistical demands also dominate the discourse on migration and refuge. The entrance of the other into a society is based on other’s contribution to a society. This contribution is, however, calculated by analogies between this other’s characteristics as opposed to the traits that are considered normal and valuable for the members of society. Not only the other must show no unfamiliar traits, but the society from within is mutually considered to be homogenous as well as unchangeable. As Schinkel (2008 & 2011) shows, a typical Dutch integration-test for migrants from abroad and already living in society is a fine example of such absurdities. While the migrant is obliged to learn certain cultural traits and common idiom by heart – even those which are arbitrary and considered to be private matters of choice such as sending a postcard to neighbors to congratulate them for the birth of their child – it remains questionable whether the great amount of the so-called autochthonous Dutch could pass the test themselves.¹⁹ Nevertheless, the majority of political parties accepted and cheered these forms of exam under the assumption that it is for the benefit of the immigrant. This ‘goodness’, nevertheless, seems only to apply to non-Western immigrants. Even some political and cultural counter acts of intellectuals followed the same logic. By introducing a Dutch-canon²⁰ they manufactured a history, which although showing at its very core a long history of migration in The Netherlands, nonetheless confirmed the consistency of a culture by remaining in the logic of the well-known icons. Moreover, a significant contribution is often defined by property, not only of money or goods, but also possession of a passport or rather the right kind of passport. Not only territorial but also extraterritorial measures,²¹ such as screening in the country of origin and neighboring countries, due to which the migrant is prevented from entering a safe haven legally, *force* the refugee and migrant alike into illegal practices. Such practices “focus on verifying documents, not on the motivations for travel,” Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (2007, p. 377) argue. This verification is often based on discrimination of those unwanted refugees such as for instance Eastern-European Roma; but also, people from countries that in comparison to Syria and Eretria at this moment are defined as safe. Even the statements on the safety of refugees shows a deformed tendency of the matter of expression within politics of exile. While the deal with Turkey is morally justified for the sake of the refugees, Goodwin-Gill and McAdam argue that due to the operation of states far beyond their border “the principle of *non-refoulement* has evolved to encompass non-rejection at the frontier” (p. 378). Such practices show how in political statements of European politicians – in their deal with Turkey pretending to be the champions fighting

¹⁹ See the official website: *Inburgeren in Nederland*. (sd). Ricky van Oers (2013) research on integration demands in The Netherlands, Germany and United Kingdom shows that such processes do not result to more inclusion of the migrants, but are rather mechanisms of exclusion.

²⁰ De Canon van Nederland. <http://entoen.nu>.

²¹ “The rationale behind extraterritorial processing may be seen as twofold: first, to keep asylum seekers geographically distant from potential asylum States, and second (and relatedly) as an attempt to distance States from their legal obligations to them” (Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, 2007, p. 408).

for the safety of refugees – neglected to be transparent about the fact that their own policies on non-refoulement itself dives refugees to the dark world of smugglers in the first place.

The same deformity within statements – as a matter of expression – is also noticeable in the analogy between economic and political issues. The economic state in which the immigrant or refugee leaves his homeland, as well as the economic state of the country of origin and the country of arrival are extremely relevant to the acceptance of this other. Nevertheless, this economic state seems to have a paradoxical relation to the concept of politics. Let us start with an example: *a refugee as a fortune seeker*. The politics of exile differentiates itself in a doublespeak discourse. The doublespeak in connection to fortune seeker is for example, as Huijer's (2016) elaborations shows, present in evaluation of the people that migrated from Europe and people who remained behind. Not only the motives of European fortune seeker show intense similarity with the motives of the fortune seekers of the present; but even more so Europe that is eager to halt the migration from other parts of the world, has in the last two centuries produced immensely more migration flows than any other part of the world (pp. 14-20).

Through vocabulary such as fortune seeker, the refugee – or legally speaking: the asylum seeker – is forced to hold back his desire for a better life and argue that his or her escape is merely caused by the need to escape death. It is purely the threat of death that gives meaning to their lives, hence life becomes merely survival, simply *naked life*. Breathing for the sake of breathing, without experiencing its fortune. The political subject must lack desire for a better future in order to prove its political past. What would be the point of evading danger other than the search for a better life? Even more so, is the threat of life beyond any economic reality? As Derrida (2001^a) argues:

The expression 'immigration control' means that asylum will be granted only to those who cannot expect the slightest economic benefit upon immigration. The absurdity of this condition is manifestly apparent: how can a purely political refugee claim to have been truly welcomed into a new settlement without that entailing some form of economic gain? ... This distinction between the economic and the political is not, therefore, merely abstract or gratuitous: it is truly hypocritical and perverse; it makes it virtually impossible ever to grant political asylum and even, in a sense, to apply the law, for in its implementation it would depend entirely on opportunistic considerations, occasionally electoral and political, which, in the last analysis, become a matter for the police, of real or imaginary security issues, of demography, and of the market. The discourse on the refugee, asylum or hospitality, thus risks becoming nothing but pure rhetorical alibis (pp. 12-13).

What is politics without its desire for happiness? Is escaping only for the sake of safety of a bare life? However, not any safety is sufficient. The types of danger that matter are framed legally: The person has been targeted by its government due to political persecution, religious and sexual preferences and because of racial characteristics. Any other form of danger is irrelevant to the law. It is not death that

is relevant to the law, but the reason why that defines their focus. Not murder, but the manner in which and the reason why one is murdered. Those who are being attacked are merely objects of argumentation. Their urge to survive is not decisive. Only the attackers and their motives seem to form the process of subjectification.

The absurdity of these lines of thought and systematic legal judgments also show the banality of the distinction between economic immigrants and political refugees.²² First, we can draw the conclusion that through this sort of thought a death by extreme poverty is less dreadful than a political death. There is a form of *double moral standards* within a politics of exile, due to the fact that the matter of its expression shows axiomatic tendencies in analogy with its form of content (here versus there) and its form of expression (a lawful doublespeak that divides the citizen from the non-citizen). The matter of expression differs. There are statements for the realm of the here and statements that are meant for the realm of there. Derrida (2001^a) argues that for refugees at the periphery of the wealthy West there is a *clear distinction* between economic reasons and political reasons for fleeing while the politics of the West as the center of power is significantly fueled by economic imperatives.

Barack Obama's *State of the Union speech 2012* is a fine example of such contradictory discourses between the center and the periphery. It starts with the report that the last troops are back from Iraq and almost from Afghanistan. The mess left behind, the fact that in Baghdad multiple car bombings per day has become normal, is not discussed and is systematically avoided. The enemy is identified, either eliminated or weakened in its territories. From Pakistan to Yemen, the safety of Americans is ensured. Iran is fully isolated, and the collaboration with Israel is at its peak. Osama Bin Laden and Khadafy are dead. The rise of the IS is not calculated yet; thus, the military is awarded for a non-individualistic trait: no self-interest. They collaborate optimally and do not leave one another behind. Then again, the tortures in Abu Ghraib and the scenes of the soldiers urinating on the corpses that were left behind by the Iraqi forces during the Allied invasion are not mentioned. The collaboration of US's military with other countries has gained America's respect around the world and the killing-machines are no subject of discussion.

The military topic however covers a small part of the speech and is keenly used to make an example for another political matter: the economy, which is the main subject of Obama's speech. Thus, the military's efficiency must guide America's thought on economic problems, which contains the same MO: neglected and excluded peripheries versus the militarized center. Other issues, such as education and environment are mentioned due to their relevance for economic benefits. There is a plea for egalitarian economic opportunities, which only refer to American citizens. Good education and wise environmental investment are appreciated and stimulated – as Obama often states, “send me a bill” – for two reasons: 1) they create jobs for the American citizens and 2) they will make America independent from other countries, especially ‘instable countries’. It is also within this plea for education that Obama speaks with a twisted form of morality. He pleads for residency of the illegal children that study in the US, appreciates their achievements by becoming *Americans through and*

²² Matthew Hyland (2001) shows how the economical suffering, in which the term fortune seeker is embedded, is not less inferior to political circumstances and suffering. It is then in a sense naïve or unjust to remain the distinction in terms of measuring the affliction. Furthermore, Hyland argues that economic suffering is not distinct from the political unrest.

through, while at the same time he complains about foreign students who merely travel to the US for good education and leave to benefit from it in their own country. As if the actions of these students are worse than the actions of international American companies which exploit people in those so-called instable countries. He even argues that the borders with South America are more secured than ever before. Nevertheless, capitalist corporate business must ensure the same *partial* form of de-internationalization. Here Obama again explicitly differentiates between the norm in the center and the norm for peripheries. Companies must be stimulated to bring back their factories to America, and hire American people; piracy of American products abroad must be stopped; Americans must be stimulated to buy good American products and not that from other countries, while the American companies must strive to sell their products abroad as much as possible. Finally, even the juridical part of political thought is mentioned. In order to support these economic achievements, Obama states that if on the international level the playing field is leveled, America would always win. Thus, let us agree, Donald Trump is not really original. He repeats a refrain.

As in the West political discussions often involve economic interests and ideologies, the severe poverty caused due to such politics is separated from political, religious, racial and sexual characteristics. Thus, within politics of exile the term refugee itself becomes an axiomatic paradigm; dividing the ‘real’ refugee from the fortune-seeker. While Arendt (1958) argues that in modern society political issues have become economic issues, we would rather argue that refugees in the geopolitical discourse have become *economized* in order to become *depoliticized*. This economization finally leads to another assumption, which lies behind the logic of property. The access of an immigrant to the market and its increase of property is immediately associated with the decrease of the property of the citizen of the country of arrival. This argument used by right wing politicians, and not necessarily contradicted by the liberal politicians even in their pleading that one must *share* its prosperity with fellow human beings, shows the contradictory character of the capitalistic economy. While capitalism is identified as a free growth of good and prosperity, in the process of migration the growth of economic wealth for some people means the decrease of wellbeing for another; yet again manifesting the paradigm of I (here) versus other (from there). Even more so while Western companies neglect their taxes in other countries, refugees in the state Baden-Württemberg in Germany cannot possess more than 350 euro.

Who is a ‘real’ refugee? Let us not be naïve. Even the juridical demands for political refuge are no guarantee for finding a safe home. The fear that lies in identification of an enemy also affects the political refugees. As mentioned, limited numbers and economic calculations govern the treatment of these refugees. The detailed interviews are in this sense not so much occupied with a calm conversation with those who have *just* left everything behind, but seem rather to be a cross-examination with the aim of breaking a banal consistency in the life stories of these refugees. The aim of politics of exile – within its form and matter of expression – is economic consistency rather than political reality. As Dirk De Schutter (2005) suggests “consistency is the mental capacity to dominantly draw propositions from premises, but it has lost every connection to the world” (p. 59, Translation TR). Our civil servant expects that refugees remember their life when they were five months old. Within such regime of signs, De Schutter argues, first one insists to be consistent and

second demands *a life* to answer or to be shaped by the consistency of such regime. It is this attitude that connects truthness – in which an idea on neutrality gains a claim on what is true – and consistency to one another in disconnecting life from the natal reality of the world (p. 59 & 63).

From this perspective, we could note that the officials of immigration and naturalization services collect information, not because of the seriousness of the case, but rather to catch the stranger in a lie. The Dublin Regulation is used as a legal argument to deport the asylum-seekers who have applied for refugee status in another country to be sent back to this ‘safe’ country, which often results in deportation to the country of origin or illegality in the countries of arrival. The deal with Turkey is not exceptional, but in line with a political pattern of thinking.

Its expressed aim is to identify a *single* responsible State and to require it to determine the asylum claim thereby reducing the likelihood of multiple, successive applications by asylum seekers, and eliminating asylum seekers ‘in orbit’ (Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, 2007, p. 401).

There appears to be no investigation whether the previously rejected request for asylum in one country was grounded or not, which would have been the case if one was a citizen of one country and was accused of a crime elsewhere, implying that a criminal has more legal protection than an illegal individual. There seems to be no doubt considering the justness of the opinion – the determining contradictory judgment – of a co-European foreign policy. Suspicion concerns the alien, not the ally.

The concept of the ‘safe country’ is a procedural mechanism for shuttling asylum seekers to other States said to have primary responsibility for them, thereby avoiding the necessity to make a decision on the merits because another country is deemed or imagined to be secure ... States justify this practice by arguing that an individual genuinely fleeing persecution would seek asylum in the first non-persecuting State, and that any ‘secondary’ movement is therefore for migration, rather than protection purposes (p. 392).

Goodwin-Gill and McAdam then argue that an asylum-seeker is deprived of any form of individuality; hence the systematic negligence of its motives and singular circumstances, due to which he or she decides to move on from one country to an other.

Let us thus say that within politics of exile the effects of constitutional doublespeak (form of expression) runs deep within political statements and protocols of policies (matter of expression). The Voice of such politics creates voices that confirm the doublespeak. Yet, as I promised this chapter intends to change the perspective of hearing, hearing the voices that are from over there, yet always immanent to the here. Their cacophonous silence is everywhere. Who are these unwanted voices of these unwanted people (matter of expression) that do not fulfill the desires of the Voice of politics of exile and its consistency of the doublespeak (form of expression)?

In the documentary *Dirt* (2008 & 2012) Meghna Haldar eloquently shows how in modern societies, such as India, Canada and the US dirt has become equivalent to unwanted people. The documentary sensitizes that the manner in which we handle our garbage is an indication of the manner

in which we treat our housekeepers, the illegal, the unwanted, the addicts, the non-virgins, the raped, the prostitutes. Haldar's environmental search for the modern state leads her to the modern conception of men, appropriate and non-appropriate men. In this sense, this personal documentary is a fine example of limbic lives, excluded lives that have become normal in all forms of civilization all around the globe. However, while European politicians seem to be at war with Gods of others, Haldar shows us that only a Goddess is capable, although for a short period, to bring out the dirt in all of us. Only the Goddess Durga can rise out of dirt and become divine at the same time. However, after this instant experience of indifference towards class and gender even the deity is banished to the running waters of the river, and men turn back to their oblivious freshness.

Legend has it that Gods created us out of dirt and spit. If we were created in their image, we in turn created them in ours, using dirt. ... Now the first dirt to make the goddess is always procured from the doorstep of a prostitute's house. Since men drop their virtues at her doorstep, this dirt is supposed to be an accumulation of all male's virtue (Haldar, 2008).

Where are our doorsteps? Are they somewhere in Greece, in North Africa, or at the borders of Balkan countries? Or are they perhaps somewhere in a factory elsewhere where children make our clothes, enslaved people make our food, or in the air that we pollute while not experiencing its consequences? Somewhere there, on those doorsteps, we have left our virtues behind, our promises of equality as plurality, freedom for all, and human rights. Beyond those steps lies the hell of limbic lives, their cacophonous silence. There lies another matter of expression of politics of exile creating a discrepancy with form of content of this politics (here versus there) and its form of expression (us versus them), and matters of expression (deformed statements). This hell is not a hell for bad people, but a hell where bodies are contaminated and voices censored. Their voices create *a sense of abjection* within the body of limbic lives. These figures become inexpressible within the current regimes of signs, where the double standards and doublespeak – despite their hypocrisy – create a clear dual reality between here and there, good and evil. The hell is not the realm of evil, but a realm where there is no clarity on who to trust, who to love, who to be. In that realm, one cannot in any sense name oneself as something.

Examples of such a time and space are manifold. In Ghorashi's (2003) research interviewed Iranian women call the years after the Iranian revolution years of hell, not only because of external factors such as violence and repressive laws, but due to their loss of faith in ideas for better times and people that they could trust. The loss of life and empathy, the lack of feeling, is also endured by the Bosnian raped women having the seed of their enemy growing inside their womb.²³ The terror runs so deep in

²³ Agamben (1998) argues how the political significance of rape in the German camps differs from the Yugoslavian war (p. 176). Diken and Laustsen (2005) argue that rape, as a war instrument is not only an instrument of torture but also a strategy of *ethnic cleansing*. The child born as a result of such a rape is often seen as an abject, an *alien* born into the society. (S)he is an insider as an outsider, seen as an abnormality that disrupts the normality from within. By referring to Bataille they argue that this abject not only is beyond the distinction between outside and inside, but "the abject is a sign of a prior animal existence that threatens our identity as humans. ... the abject is not its impurity but formlessness. Those uncanny objects, or

their bodies that it defied every possibility to make a distinction between us and them, here and there. They were left behind with a silence cry. In other cases, even the simplest questions remain unanswered. Who is the raped, who is the rapist in the political discourse of war? A pregnant Somali woman attacked by marauding gangs confides:

“The gunmen issued strange orders. They asked each woman to be raped by her brother. 'Do it immediately,' they ordered,” said the woman ... “Some men are more audacious than others. When they were ordered to rape their sisters, they raped them to save their lives. ... Death is better than doing that.” The attackers ordered her brother-in-law to rape her but he refused, saying: “You are men and I'm a man, and life and death is in the hands of God. Either kill me or spare me.” They killed her brother-in-law and left his body unburied (Straziuso & Malkhadir, 2011).

While fleeing for her life this victim wishes her death, and while rape is not an outcome of a certain culture but in this case an aspect of war and poverty, rape victims are often not recognized as political refugees (Baillot, Cowan & Munro n.d & 2012 and Refugee Council 2009). Furthermore, speaking of rape is a problematic matter even within one language. The multi-discursive level of the problem – not only caused by different languages but also different types of discourse such as social, cultural, juridical and affective ones – makes speaking of such experiences even more problematic. The complexity of this problem seems akin to an aphasic state in which connecting words and images of trauma becomes impossible. Explaining flight for our victim is a practice of a-signifying rupture. This is not due to a lack of consistency within one assemblage of thought, but due to a complex of intertwining different assemblages and in some cases of contradictory consistencies and memories. It is a cacophonous silence, the heterophasia, of an exiled body. Their voices matter, they are *unformed matter*.

4.4.2 Camp: State of Exception

How does all this relate to Arendt's (1958) analysis of the totalitarian State? Does this mean that world politics has organized its present territory – the Center – under totalitarian conditions? The totalitarian regime is the end of the *polis*, because of its banishment of human plurality and relationality. By the concept of the *polis*, Arendt does not per se want to refer to a rigid physical place. Polis was an open space and the law was merely an instrument to guarantee the safety of this openness. Within contemporary politics on the other hand, Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (2007) repeatedly show, international laws are systematically used to close a territory instead of providing access.

objects, are both human and inhuman, both interior and exterior, both repelling and fascinating” (pp. 116-117). The child is, however, not the only abject. The woman becomes an abject by the rape as well, not only by the enemy but also by her own community. Because of her experiences she is no longer available for their traditional role of a female as being suitable for marriage, or innocence of virginity.

At one level, State practice nevertheless permits only one conclusion: the individual still has no right to be granted asylum. The right itself is in the form of a discretionary power – the State has discretion whether to exercise its right, as to whom it will favour, and, consistently with its obligations generally under international law, as to the form and content of the asylum to be granted (Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, 2007, p. 414).

At the end of *The Origins of Totalitarianism* Arendt (1968) analyses two ambiguous characteristics of this state. On the one hand, totalitarian regime is the force that creates masses, one singular body, meaning a total organized body where each molecule mirrors exactly the other. A totalitarian regime is defined as a homogenizing force imposing men to think the same, never to doubt the common norm. Isomorphic statements on such norms repeat themselves. We have just to hear islamophobic statements in different European countries and uttered by different political parties in order to know that the term Islam has become a sign of a regime of signs rather than reference to a religious belief.

Yet, the repetition of the same statements does not create a connection. Politics of exile, due to its negation is, according to Arendt (1968), the accumulation of lonely atomized men and women that lack connective power from within. By depriving the other from entering or forming a community, the civic subject in the end sacrifices its own sense of freedom, an affect that is elementary for Arendt in order for individuals to politically connect. Thus, while the power within politics of exile creates uniform masses (form of content) and a clear law that answers to the consistency of this unifying power (form of expression), the copy paste deformation of axiomatic paradigms of expression (matter of expression) creates an affect even within the masses themselves: *loneliness*. The hell of being silenced is not only in the hell of limbic lives, but enters the core existence of the civic subject. Although at the first instance the two characteristics seem to exclude one another, Arendt argues that the first guarantees the second. Only in a world where there is plurality and thus disagreement – what becomes impossible within isomorphic statements with *tracing* tendencies – will men have the urge to speak to one another. If we all think the same there will be no need to speak, let alone to think. In a world without speech there is neither reflection nor an arguing with one's own alter ego, no private life whatsoever. A conversation between men needs the openness of this relationship with oneself, i.e. difference. Thus, loneliness for Arendt differs from solitude in which the internal plurality is yet intact.

Totalitarianism demolishes not only external plurality, but also intrinsic self-reflectivity and by implication responsibility. Totalitarian exclusion does never bring about new communities. It is rather a movement through which every form of constructing a community is blocked. The sum of majority in politics of exile is in the end *zero*, due to the fact that no one fully answers to all the characteristics of the axiomatic paradigm of majority. There is a scilicet misapprehended tautology between what is understood as majority¹, namely a mass or a large amount of people, and majority² as an axiomatic paradigm. There is no body that contains all its traits. Geert Wilders has Indonesian ancestors and has to bleach his hair, Barak Obama became famous as the first black president, Mao Zedong showed abnormal sexual tendencies, and finally Adolf Hitler was not a German citizen. The sensation of exclusion of the majority² – despite its force to mobilize the masses (Majority¹) –

eventually does not consider one group or some groups, but all the subjects at the center as well as in the peripheries of its territory that are defined and categorized by this axiomatic regime of signs.

Ambiguously the totalitarian movement is characterized by the inertness of its masses. "It destroys the one essential prerequisite of all freedom which is simply the capacity of motion which cannot exist without space" (Arendt, 1968, p. 466). Space is necessary, according to Arendt, in order for an individual to become a political entity. This guarantees human's ability to act and to speak. Loneliness is thus not merely solitude or isolation from the masses. It is instead the world of Heideggerian (1996) anonymous 'Man', which results in the inability of men to think, to communicate even within themselves, while being a part of the masses (Arendt, 1968, pp. 476-479). There is no contradiction between atomization due to political loneliness and the movement of the masses. Thus, Arendt describes *mass society* as an *individualized mass* or *mass atomization* (p. 318 & 323). Through this once more the logic of form of content and expression of politics of exile (homogenization through doublespeak) shows a discrepancy with its effects as matter of content and expression (non-communicating atoms).

Nevertheless, as we have seen before, next to this ambiguous production of lonely mass society, totalitarianism also moves by differentiation of masses: masses that do belong and masses that do not. Refugee is not an individual, but within the regimes of expression of the spectacle and policies of politics of exile it always represents a mass, a mass of migration. It permanently creates multiple forms of peripheries in which the unwanted masses are isolated from the center-mass. How do we define the peripheries in a politics of exile? Peripheries are not only the 'Third World'. Thresholds and doorsteps are everywhere. The territories defined as peripheries could be located in the center as well. There is a difference between *limit* as a sign within the regime of signs of politics of exile (expression) and *border* in a literal territorial sense (content). Peripheries are defined by limits of belonging and not necessarily by borders of nation-states, Saskia Sassen (2012) suggests. The defining factors of the peripheries are their economic and political counter-normative characteristics. This exterior structure owes its existence to the norm. Collateral damage concerns people from other countries or poor American youth without perspective, as Michael Moore (2004) shows, but it is not meant for the elite.

How do we call this axiomatic paradigm (matter of expression) that refers to peripheries that do not belong to the order as faces that are homogenized by regimes of faciality and gestures that are represented as barbaric or repressed? How do we name the space where voices are deafened by the Voice of regimes of signs? Agamben calls this a camp. The manner in which the idea *camp* is connected and disconnected to normative paradigms creates a notion of peripheries. Charlie Hailey (2009) shows that camps have been more common in our history than one suspects: "Camp spaces have become our environment" (p. 3). In contrast to our modern understanding of it, the etymology of the word camp indicates *open field* or *level space*. Nevertheless, the definition of the word in the dictionary presents even more ambiguity. Camps have a multiplicity of inhabitants such as holidaymakers, campers, military, refugee, prisoners, the victims of Hurricane Katrina, or Wall-street protesters. Camp is an unordinary, uncomfortable space and as Hailey shows its existence oscillates between temporality and permanency. According to him to understand camp means that a systematic reflection on our contemporary understanding of *place* is necessary.

Hailey differentiates three types of camps. Camps as spaces that foster *autonomy*, such as Scouting camp or Peace camps. The political degrees of such camps differ immensely. The second type is according to him camp as a mean of *control*. These, such as Guantanamo Bay, are meant as centers in which power-mechanisms of exclusion manifest themselves. The final form of camp refers to those that arise from *necessity*, such as Mass Shelter Camps built after an environmental disaster; or what in Italy is called *hotspots* for refugees. As Hailey shows, refugee issues oscillate between these three types of camps. European refugee camps, such as in Turkey and Greece, are often mechanism of controlling flows of migration, while refugee camps in Jordan oscillate between control and necessity. Refugee camps are also often built on the idea of *autonomy* such as is the case with No Border Camp, in which the camp is used as an open space instead of exclusion space.

For Agamben (1998^a) camps are the defining territorial sign of contemporary politics. Agamben defines camps as a specific political space created by the law as a territory outside the norm. This territory – not only those of the Nazi-regime but also currently in refugee camps and prison camps like Guantanamo Bay – are for him the space in which the decision of an ambiguous sovereignty is practiced (pp. 166-180). It is the space where the axiomatic form and matter of expression brand the abnormal. The exceptions proliferate, not only in Iraq, Syria, Sudan or Eritrea but also in refugee camps in Italy, Spain and Morocco. The international community participates in widening the gap in which lives are not saved for the sake of being human, thereby according to Arendt failing humanity. In his documentary *Pursuit of Happiness* (2012) Mahmoud Chavoushi shows the immense effects of mass migration in Greece for refugees and Greek society that struggle with the effects of global unrest and economic crisis combined with Europe's need to ward off any further movement of the so-called fortune seekers. Chavoushi, who once as a refugee felt a warm welcome in Greece, is now, twenty years later, confronted with a growing racism, severe poverty and deep-rooted hate. His documentary sensitizes his viewers for the deep embedded inhumanity of human life in the camps.

The state of exception is neither external nor internal to the juridical order, and the problem of defining it concerns precisely a threshold, or a zone of indifference, where inside and outside do not exclude each other but rather blur with each other (Agamben, 2005, p. 23).

Understanding the logic of camps, as suggested by Agamben and Hailey, indicates that this territorial space is not merely for the other, the migrant and the refugee. In terms of Foucault the undisciplined other, prostitutes, drug addicts, psychopaths, but also abused and violated women inhabit respectively tippie zones, user spaces, psychiatric clinics and safe houses. These are the heterotopias that find no expression in the utopian regimes of expression. The main lesson of Foucault is that disciplinary power never limits its realization to an exterior territory. It comes from within and manifests itself in ways that we do not suspect: in 'our' hospitals, schools, work, universities, etc. As Deleuze states we never leave one cell to enter another anymore. Control is all over the place. In contemporary society, we are determined from the beginning, even before birth, in our course of life (Deleuze, 1995, pp. 178-179 & Foucault, 2003, p. 243). Under the reign of the discourse of terrorism, Agamben (1998^a) warns us that we all start to live in a camp, in which through sovereign practices, each one of us is its

potential enemy, or as Arendt (1968) argues an 'objective enemy'. This even applies for smokers who have recently been perceived as dangerous for public health or the obese bodies that offend our disciplined way of consuming. All these abnormalities must be reduced to a 'normal' state of being. The war on impurity - being pure Christian, Jewish, Muslim or Atheist; French, Dutch or British; heterosexual, non-smoker, slender and slim – shows, as Arendt already suggested, that totalitarianism has not come to an end, nor that it limits itself to other parts of the world. It continues its war against each form of imperfection, an imperfection from which it aporetically gains its power.

The State apparatus needs, at its summit as at its base, predisabled people, preexisting amputees, the stillborn, the congenitally infirm, the one-eyed and one-armed (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 426).

Thus, the logic of exile in differing between belonging and non-belonging blurs the border between the external and the internal. The manner in which rightwing parties as well as the members of leftwing parties switch from refugees to third generation Dutch youth with different backgrounds is exemplary.

The camp is the engine for 'deterritorialization of territory'. Not only due to its penetration from within, but also due to its ambiguous form of existence. While on the one hand indicating an actual space, from the perspective of the law camp is merely a virtual space. A space that must be discursively excluded from ordinary life as an exceptional space. While the utopic law represents the Voice, the camp is an event of heterotopic cacophonous silence. While the law as a form of expression creates a matter, yet this matter of expression – the heterotopic voices - is included by being excluded from its form.

Life, which is thus obliged, can in the last instance be implicated in the sphere of law only through the presupposition of its inclusive exclusion, only in an *exceptio*. There is a limit-figure of life, a threshold in which life is both inside and outside the juridical order, and this threshold is the place of sovereignty (Agamben, 1998^a, p. 27).

The voices of the camp become virtual in relation to the law. An artistic production like the videogame of *Escape from Woomera* (Oliver, n.d.) is a sneer to this virtual/actual space. This collaboration of journalists and game developers connects the virtual space of the game for the first time to the secretive actuality of the space of a refugee camp in Woomera (Australia).²⁴ The gamer becomes the refugee and must find escape routes. But first of all, the gamer needs to survive. While the common media merely visualizes the captivity, the game maker creates an overall sensation of what it means to

²⁴ Sarah Stephen (2002) describes it as follows: "Woomera detention center is hell on Earth. Located in the middle of the South Australian desert, it can reach 40 degrees in summer and is freezing cold in winter. There are no trees or shade, nothing but the scorching sun. Opened in November 1999, Woomera has the capacity to hold 1400 asylum seekers, five times the size of the Woomera township's population."

be an inhabitant of a camp. We have to look at Lesbos or Nauru to know that the deadly 'game' of exclusion of life still endures.

Behind the powerlessness of God peeps the powerlessness of men, who continue to cry 'May that never happen again!' when it is clear that 'that' is, by now, everywhere (Agamben, 1999^b, p. 20).

The camps are the sovereign nomos of the totalitarian movement, in other words its axiomatic paradigm. This is due to their capacity to realize the indistinctiveness between reality and fiction, between truth and falsity. Statements appear, but they do not sensitize for action. Let us look at the image of Oman in 2016, the Syrian five-year-old boy looking at the camera with a bloody face, mocking our political remarks. Perhaps his image unveils our media spectacle; a bloody face of a beautiful child. In a split second his gaze, just as the hidden face of Alan Kurdi, mocks our shock, saying "really, did you forget this was happening." The horrors of politics of exile's internal state make our political statements unconceivable as realities. It blurs the distinction between the offender and the victim, as we will see. Camps do not only murder, Arendt (1968) states, but also annihilate people, as if they have never existed at all. Just imagine the hundreds of children in Calais in 2016 being silently abused every day. Arendt states that this explains why the location of the camps remained hidden or disguised. It is this ability of eradication of existence that differentiates totalitarian camps from their previous formations. The inhabitants of these camps were made useless, purposeless, and lifeless. "Totalitarianism strives not toward despotic rule over men, but toward a system in which men are superfluous" (p. 457). Here not only life is destroyed but also death, i.e. the ability to die (p. 443). Agamben coins this non-existence as *homo sacer*. The refugee disappears just as thousands of men and women disappear in jails such as Guantanamo Bay.

Camps is thus more than a physical state (matter of content), an expression of a state of (non)being. Carl Schmitt marked this as the *State of Exception*, a notion that Agamben (2005) adapts. In this state politics and law merge through the logic of necessity and emergency. Foucault's normalization does no longer suffice, hence axiomatic paradigms are applied through force of ~~law~~ (p. 24). There are measures within the law for the civic subject here; and lawless measures for them, the limbic lives over there.

If exceptional measures are the result of periods of political crisis and, as such, must be understood on political and not juridico-constitutional grounds, ... then they find themselves in the paradoxical position of being juridical measures that cannot be understood in legal terms, and the state of exception appears as the legal form of what cannot have legal form. On the other hand, if the law employs the exception – that is the suspension of law itself – as its original means of referring to and encompassing life, then a theory of the state of exception is the preliminary condition for any definition of the relation that binds and, at the same time, abandons the living being to law (p. 1).

Next to this blurring of borders between law and politics, law and non-law, law and life, *the state of exception*, Agamben explains, is also ambiguous due to its non-exceptional exceptional state. Schmitt marked the appearance of this state necessary for the times of war. Inspired by Walter Benjamin however, Agamben states that the exception has gained a permanent state in our political life. The axiomatic paradigm of security, also within Foucault's analysis, has disengaged the nation-state from its exceptional siege, and has become a necessity to permanently create a territory that is lawfully suspended from the law (p. 14). The state of exception thus becomes the *nomos* of contemporary politics.

This *nomos* does not only give rise to deformed slogans. The matter of expression of politics of exile is not merely lingual or only a voice. It is also gestural as well as facial. The political violent gesture of torture of the terrorist is one of the practices that emerge from such a necessity. The emergency of a ticking bomb and the urgency to save lives have become favorite themes of Hollywood cinema. In his 'Liberalism, Torture and the Ticking Bomb', David Luban (2005) shows how the practice of torture, which was fearsomely rejected by the American society, within weeks after 9/11 becomes commonly accepted among American citizens. Luban also adequately argues that the liberal tendency in order to plea for or reject torture could not simply be covered by the opposition between left-right, or progressive and conservative. Although liberal arguments against torture seem to be more than obvious, Luban states that modern politics has developed mechanisms in order to weaken such liberal aversion towards torture. It is not merely the logic of deformed slogans: *What 'they' are doing is a lot worse than what 'we' are doing*. The 'they' as victims of torture are also isolated from the realm of actual life. They are *privatized* in an absurd state of *friendship and intimacy*, in which the pain suffered by the one who is tortured becomes unimaginable for liberal understanding of a human-being. Panic, humiliation and the pleasure of mastery is the spectacle of torture, Luban states along with Montaigne. A common form is Victor's Pleasure: "the victor tortures captives for the simplest of motives: to relive the victory, to demonstrate the absoluteness of his mastery, to rub the loser's face in it, and to humiliate the loser by making him scream and beg" (p. 1432). Luban also recalls other traditional traits of torture such as *terror*, *punishment*, and *extracting of confession*. All these traits contributed to the people's fear for the sovereign, and keep them in line. However, what drives the liberal argument in favor of torture is rather the fifth trait, *intelligence gathering*. There is a difference between confession and intelligence gathering, the first is *backward-looking*, the second is *forward-looking*. The liberal does not refer to pleasure of punishing a criminal or causing terror, but rather the prevention of a future disaster that motivates its action. Luban concludes that such an idea could become a *dangerous delusion* where "liberals can for the first time think of torture dissociated from cruelty" (p. 1436). It is the *greater evil* that motivates the liberal to do what he does. Torture becomes the state of exception in which non-liberal liberalism secures liberal way of living.

Luban argues that this aporetic liberal rationality finds its expression in the image of a *ticking bomb*, which forces the opponent to choose between the terrorist and many *innocent people*. The opponent of these interrogation practices slows down the *hero* to save good people. The opponent is thus not ignored but rather ridiculed in his or her unrealistic idealistic image of the world. Even if the bomb is not really there, even if one does not know if the detainee knows something, which is more often than not the case, the idea of its ticking away affirms this logic. You may never know.

Finally, all captives can be tortured for the sake of the one that might know something, yet the logic of the torture remains: We torture one to save the many. Two utilitarian oppositional rationalities of numbers thus emerge that differentiate the peripheries from the center.²⁵ Luban thus argues that while the ticking bomb indicates a momentary emergency, the torture becomes a common practice of a culture. “The ticking time bomb distracts us from the real issue, which is not about emergencies, but about the normalization of torture” (p. 1446). It is this normalization or rather the re-normalization of abnormal behavior – which again shows the dual moralism of politics of exile – that is opposed by Luban. Torture and abuse are neither incidents nor the act of a few people. “Abu Ghraib is not a few bad apples – it is the apple tree” (p. 1452).

It is this state of modern politics that urges Agamben (2005) to characterize it as politics of the state of exception. This state is defined as a no man's land, an empty space, because it is negatively related to the law due to the exclusion of the law from its domain. The state of exception does not simply oppose the inside and the outside of the legal order. It instead constitutes a threshold of *undecidability* in which fact and law slowly devour one another (p. 29). That is what is also analyzed by Luban: The law is adjusted in order to manifest the exception as a rule. This is precisely the efficacy of an axiomatic paradigm: an example that becomes the rule. The exceptional measure as matter of expression of what Agamben typifies as *force of law*. In the wasteland of the state of exception the law is reinforced in the act of extradition and exclusion.

That is to say, the concept of ‘force of law,’ as a technical legal term, defines a separation of the norm’s *vis obligandi*, or applicability, from its formal essence, whereby decrees, provisions, and measures that are not formally laws nevertheless acquire their ‘force’ (p. 38).

In other words, many ad hoc measures and arbitrary regulations (matter of expression) acquire force of law (form of expression) while the law is suspended. Thus, Agamben argues that *force of law* becomes detached from *form of law* in order to manifest a norm that prior to this procedure did not contain the force to manifest itself. The matter of expression also detaches from its form of content: territorial

²⁵ See for an illustration Nolan’s *The Dark Knight* (2008). The Joker is a typical Homo Sacer, nameless, without history. He disrupts plans, and *introduces a little anarchy*. Even the common Mob rather has his head due to the unpredictability of his action. He has been beaten and humiliated by the Batman in order to save the life of two other heroes. The viewer agrees with the main hero and the spectacle of the security of the good people. Joker’s plea comes later and in a sense, shames the same viewer by stating: “The Mob has plans. The cops have plans. Gordon got plans. You know, they’re the schemers. Schemers trying to control their little worlds. ... You were a schemer, you had plans and look where that got you. I just did what I do best. I took your little plan and turned it on itself. ... Nobody panics when things go ‘according to plan’. Even if the plan is horrifying. If tomorrow I tell the press that, like, a gangbanger will get shot, or a truckload of soldiers will be blowing up, nobody panics. Because it is all part of the plan. But when I say that one little old mayor will die, well, then, everyone loses his minds. Introduce a little anarchy, upset the established order, and everything becomes chaos, I am an agent of chaos. Oh, and you know the thing about chaos? It is fair.”

here, which creates the dislocated locality of the camp: the *there*. It is within this distinguishing act that *zone of indistinction*²⁶ manifests itself as the zone of *banishment*.

What is the form of law that expresses itself in the ban? The ban is the pure form of reference to something in general, which is to say, the simple positing of relation with the nonrelational. In this sense, the ban is identical with the limit form of relation. A critique of the ban will therefore necessarily have to put the very form of relation into question, and to ask if the political fact is not perhaps thinkable beyond relation and, thus, no longer in the form of a connection (p. 29).

This state of exception articulates the non-relationality in-between two abstract figures: the *homo sacer* and the *sovereign*. The sovereign shows its full authority through its active suspension of the law. By being both inside and outside the law the sovereign decides on the implementation of the normal and the abnormal. The sovereign includes itself, just by its own exclusion (Agamben, 1998^a, pp. 15-29). The other is exposed to exceptional torture in order to guarantee the safety of the sovereign people who abhors violence against itself. This gesture, however, produces a new form of excluded human condition: the *homo sacer*. Agamben, like Luban, insists that this locality of the state of exception is neither an anomaly nor a historical fact: “*The camp is the space that opens up when the state of exception starts to become the rule*” (p. 39).

In Agamben’s discussion, this state of affairs is no longer just a characteristic of classical totalitarian regimes; it has already become a principle of democratic political argumentation or as Luban suggests the logic of liberal thought on political practice. In line with Žižek (2002), we could state that the state transforms democracy and liberal rights into axiomatic paradigms by arguing that they must be protected undemocratically and illiberally.²⁷ The unconditional protection is the rule that excludes democracy itself.²⁸ This is why Agamben (2000) gives examples of states of exception in the democratic states. In modern politics – and here Agamben agrees with Arendt – birth implies nation and nation implies states. Except, it is exactly this solemnity that is starting to crumble in its reference to its own exteriority.

²⁶ Deleuze and Guattari (1987) speak of three zones: “Every central power has three aspects or zones: (1) its zone of power, relating to the segments of a solid rigid line; (2) its zone of indiscernibility, relating to its diffusion throughout a microphysical fabric; (3) its zone of impotence, relating to the flows and quanta it can only convert without being able to control or define. It is always from the depths of its impotence that each power center draws its power, hence their extreme maliciousness, and vanity.” (p. 226) The zone of indistinction in Agamben’s sense of the word seems to have some characteristic of the zone of impotence in which the power manifests a reality.

²⁷ Žižek (2002) in reference to Agamben ironically states: “If you (pretend to) take the hegemonic liberal ideology seriously, you cannot be both intelligent and honest: you are either stupid or a corrupted cynic. So, if I may indulge in a rather tasteless allusion to Agamben’s *Homo sacer*, I can risk the claim that the predominant liberal mode of subjectivity today is *Homo sucker*: while he tries to exploit and manipulate others, he ends up being the ultimate sucker himself. When we think we are making fun of the ruling ideology, we are merely strengthening its hold over us.” (p. 71) To turn Žižek’s argument against himself: is *homo sucker* an ironic ridiculization of those in power?

²⁸ In his elaborations Agamben quotes Rossiter when he confidently states: “No sacrifice is too great for our democracy, least of all the temporary sacrifice of democracy itself” (Cited in Agamben, 2005, p. 9).

The increasingly widening gap between birth (naked life) and nation-state is the new fact of the politics of our time and what we are calling ‘camp’ is this disparity (pp. 43-44).

It is within this gap and this ambiguity between lawful and lawless that life and its endurance becomes undemocratically decided upon. It becomes dependent on the mercy of those who are in charge: *the police* (Arendt, 1968, p. 283). There is a difference between the police and the army. Hobbes in *Leviathan* speaks of a monopoly of violence by the state, which differentiates itself in military activity in order to protect against the external threat and the police. Military organization could never manifest itself within the borders of state due to its principle of a clear distinction between foreign and non-foreign people. The police, on the other hand, defends the state against the internal resistance. The FBI oath reads as follows:

I [name] do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, *foreign and domestic*; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, *without any mental reservation* or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God (Rudd, 2009, Italics TR).

Arendt (1968) speaks of totalitarian police that blurs the difference between the traditional understanding of military and the police. Police – by which I do not mean individuals but a mechanism – in a totalitarian movement alienates everyone as a foreigner, as *other*. The police are the machine that manifests the centrifugal force of politics of exile. It distinguishes itself from legitimate military by not being trained as military. Legitimate military gives the soldiers a sense of belonging and loyalty as a group. This is usually considered a lifetime loyalty. Police members, however, remain temporal and exchangeable. They are placed in the same peripheries as *homo sacer* and in the obscure blur between law and force of law, while defining the norm through the nomos of exception.²⁹ The events in Egypt and Syria during and after the *Arab Spring* show how military members either lack the will to attack their own citizens or change their tactics and behave as police rather than soldiers. Khadafy even hired foreigners to terrorize his own citizens as foreigners.

State policing or lawful violence ... consists in capturing while simultaneously constituting a right to capture. It is an incorporated, structural violence distinct from every kind of direct violence. The State has often been defined by a ‘monopoly of violence,’ but this definition leads back to another definition that describes the State as a ‘state of Law’ (*Rechtsstaat*). State overcoding is precisely

²⁹ Arendt (1968) states: “Like the secret police of the Soviet Union, the SS formations usually arrived after the military forces had pacified the conquered territory and had dealt with outright political opposition” (p. 421). Police thus create oppositions out of thin air in order to maintain the movement between the other and us. They create chaos rather than the stability.

this structural violence that defines the law, ‘police’ violence and not the violence of war (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 448).

Police is the engine of the totalitarianism’s focus on its utopian future. In order to realize this future, they need an enemy that is neither necessarily present in current time nor bound to a specific place or domain. Neither the Jews, the homosexuals, disabled, sick or communists during World War, nor currently the Muslims, non-Muslims bound to a specific territory, but define themselves as an immanent global threat. They are seen to endanger the freedom of Western countries or to hinder authenticity of the non-Western people. The new enemy, while being placed in camps just as criminals and law offenders, is not necessarily defined and feared by its deeds in the past or present, but mostly by the *possibility* to do something in the future. While Trump emphasizes the fear for the terrorists and lobbies for owning guns – a threat that after 9/11 cost averagely less than 20 lives a year – he neglects the fact that gun-owning in United States costs more than 11.000 lives a year (BBC News, 2016). In this logic, thus Omar Mateen – with his brute actions – immediately becomes a Muslim terrorist, while the same judgment does not apply for other brute murders of gay and non-gay people in United States.

The enemy is never understood as to the crimes and deeds of one person or several, but always becomes a potential hostile collective within the regime of signs of politics of exile.

The chief difference between the despotic and the totalitarian secret police lies in the difference between the ‘suspect’ and the ‘objective enemy’. The latter is defined by the policy of the government and not by his own desire to overthrow it. He is never an individual whose dangerous thoughts must be provoked or whose past justifies suspicion, but a ‘carrier of tendencies’ like the carrier of a disease (Arendt, 1968, pp. 423-424).

And due to the developments to come new forms of enemies and populations are added to this absurd form of ‘objective’ logic, through which each individual can in an arbitrary manner become the police as well as the enemy. Social media enables state politics to handle this ambiguity. In our lustful consumption of media, we are controlled the very moment we are enjoying our freedom (Oosterling, 2000^b, p. 68-70). This leads to another blur within the *zone of indistinction* of a totalitarian regime. “The innocent and the guilty are equally undesirable” (Arendt, 1968, p. 433). The victims become as anonymous as the offenders. The anonymous objective enemy is one of the crucial axiomatic paradigms of totalitarian regime. It is an enemy that, despite the statistics as we see here above, remains a general threat. In its radiancy, it creates non-milieus, which despite their territorial settings, do not define a comprehensible discourse, certainly not a consistency of feeling at home or belonging. Mateen was born in United States, nonetheless his brute crime is judged differently than the crimes of others. Yet as we have seen in de second chapter, such crimes of an individual always radiate to a collective. And vice versa Mateen’s hatred was toward a collective, towards people with different sexual beliefs and preferences who until this day are the targets of exclusion and brutality around the globe. Our Others are never at ease, always beyond a sense of home.

What is unprecedented is not the loss of a home but the impossibility of finding a new one. Suddenly, there was no place on earth where migrants could go without the severest restrictions, no country where they would be assimilated, no territory where they could found a new community of their own (Arendt, 1968, p. 293).

How could we then from this perspective define the act of refuge and the refugee? Is fleeing a reduction of a haunted subject to a political object, called enemy, by totalitarian regimes and totalitarian thinking? Is it the confirmation of the ultimate loneliness in a space of non-difference, a zone of indistinction, where a lonely mass of civic subjects opposes a lonely mass of limbic lives? Or is the act of flight rather the realization of the opposite, an escape from mass solitude, in order to force difference? Flight is a movement towards a community. Even pathological forms of assimilation reflect the urge to enter a community. Flight is an act of participation, a desire to belong. Arendt (1968) poetically writes that in our time:

The question is not as for Hamlet, to be or not to be, but to belong or not to belong (p. 84).

The lack of belonging, despite the intensity of one's attempts to participate, has been the main notion of various migrant and refugee studies. The Afghani's back and forth movement to and from Afghanistan during the last decades indicates such a sense of homelessness. Migrants and refugees often sense their territories as exceptional and unordinary and it has often been an unpleasant awakening to sense this exceptionality in their country of origin as well as country of arrival. Afghan refugee families that return from Pakistan to Afghanistan find themselves in the same condition of living in camps and enduring the cold and the inability to build a home (Tan, 2008). They are forever *replaced* between the illusion of having a home and its lack of actuality. In connection to European citizens that remained behind after the big waves of European migration, Huijer (2016) even argues that they remained behind with a sense of misfortune and pessimism. In a world that romanticizes the European mobile adventurer, those who remained behind sensed their staying as *unheimlich* and immobile within such a world. Although they stayed, the immobility changed their lives by creating a sense of non-belonging to a world of modernity and mobility. Despite their immobility they were also replaced forever. The Politics of exile thus oscillates between this multiple sense of belonging and non-belonging.

4.5 Limbic Lives: Exiled Bodies

4.5.1 The Living-Dead

In the previous section, we have elaborated on the matter of expression of politics of exile. It is by now argued that the matter of expression does not always confirm the form of content and expression of this politics. The unheard voices of the limbic lives as well as atomization of non-communicating masses as matters of expression create a discrepancy between form and matter. In this section I will elaborate more on this discrepancy by focusing on the matter of content: bodies that are produced as a

result of such form of content and form of expression within politics of exile. As we will see, these bodies are more related to the unheard voices and atomization than formatting axiomatic paradigms such as here versus there, and us and them.

The web of speech and action in the in-between space, as an *inter-ested* space of *inter-action* and *inter-speak*, has been torn apart disastrously in totalitarianism, a movement that is characterized by banal disinterest, literally no inter-est in in-between-beings. In violence and war there is neither speech nor action because the war is not occupied with the exhibition of a *who*. There is no action without the revelation of speech; there is no action without a name (Arendt, 1958, p. 180). However, even modern society, despite its far-reaching global economy and digital communications, is at the political level not capable of telling the stories of who its actors are. Due to its uninterested and homogenizing character, there is no remembrance of unique lives that could surpass the mortality of those individuals. Immortality owes its vitality to a political community that will remember its members due to their differentiating act. Except, in postmodern times life stories are neither told nor seen as a form of unpredictable events, but rather fabricated and formatted as objects in face-books or as mass media events. Media pretends to differentiate by the introduction of various types of measurement and sentiment. While in 2011 the prime ministers of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the French president Nicolas Sarkozy are gathered in a media spectacle by accusing each other of racism – which already started in the First World War during which Ottoman Empire allied with the Germans, while French promised Armenians land in order to rebel against the empire – the actual sufferers of this discussion, namely Turkish people living in France and Armenians living in Turkey, remain in the background. The massive deaths, genocides and disasters become the engines of measurements for sadness and the right to complain. *Who suffered the most, the victims of tsunami or the victims of overflow in Pakistan?* Our sensibilities are measured in the cash amount of our financial aid. At the end of the day, what remains are corpses and numbers, casualties, life passed without remembrance, story or any form of history. The silent loss of individual lives that could not belong to the web of men.

The postwar term ‘displaced persons’ was invented during the war for the express purpose of liquidating statelessness once and for all by ignoring its existence (Arendt, 1968, p. 279).

After having articulated the axiomatic paradigm of here versus there (form of content), the captivity of responsibility and judgment by law (form of expression), and finally the force of law leaving us with the unheard voices in the camps (matter of expression), we have arrived at the *matter of content* of politics of exile: *exiled bodies*. *Exile* oscillates in its meaning between the *act* of departing from one’s community and the permanent state of *enduring* the loss of a sense of community. Departure oscillates between death (of one form of life) and natality of a new life, articulated as *partage*, fluctuating between being part of something and to part from something. The thing that is exiled, is a body, a life. Limbic lives thus do not only present us with an assemblage of expressions (voices), but also with an assemblage of bodies. In order to analyze this, we must first elaborate on the political role of the *body* in the modern age.

What is the meaning of life in contemporary political thinking and what is the meaning of an excluded body? In his discussions Agamben presents the refugee as a limit figure of biopolitical power. The refugee gives testimony to the lawlessness of democracy that has sacrificed its basic principles in order to preserve itself and to survive. It seems that the refugees, Agamben suggests by citing Arendt, not only have become *the vanguard of their peoples but of all men*. (Agamben 2000, p. 16 & Arendt, 1978^a, p. 66) Refugee becomes the paradigm of modern politics. In order to pinpoint the heart of the matter - the matter of content – Agamben (1998) reintroduces an ancient distinction between *zoē*, a concept that refers to the fact of life or bare life, and *bios*, a political life or a form of life. In our biopolitical era *zoē*, which for the Greeks was initially excluded from politics, has become the main object or care of the politics all over the globe. The camp is the biopolitical *delocalizing localization* in which those who were not born under a jurisdiction become the inhabitants of a lawless virtual discursive territory: generations of refugees in refugee camps in Pakistan and of Palestinian refugees in camps in Jordan. They are those who are identified as anomalies by the sovereign and forced to (be) part of a non-acknowledged community. These are the naked limbic bodies “that increasingly cannot be inscribed into the order” (Agamben, 2000, p. 43)

What defines politics of totalitarianism, what feeds it, according to Arendt (1968), is “the solid conviction that everything is possible” (p. 387). This possibility not only creates the refugee and the stateless, and does not only blur the distinction between politics and law, between fact and fiction, but along these lines also obscures a distinction that becomes the engine of its destructive nature. Totalitarianism makes it possible to blur the difference between human and non-human, not only by dividing rights of humans into the rights of the citizen and the non-rights of the non-citizen, but more so by obliteration of life in a living being. The final act of totalitarian power through its need to secure perfection is the creation of a life without a form of expression: the lonely masses and the lonely inhabitants of the camp. Can we imagine a life without form, and without a form of expression? Exactly due to the rigidity of its axiomatic form of content and form of expression, politics of exile as a result gives rise to lives and expressions without form. This politics creates a mere *zoē* without *bios*, which in current times is unimaginable even with animals. We have even shrinks for our dogs. Such life appears in the figure of *Muselmann* in German concentration camps that, Agamben (1999^b) states, is the *complete witness*, i.e. the one who is silenced and without testimony. No one alive can testify of the deathly machine. However, these figures are more than sheer witnesses of the gas chambers; they are the ones who became a non-human by the inhuman conditions of the camps: the actual living-dead, long before they entered the gas chambers.

Muselmann is the name given to those in the camps that are no longer able to communicate. Technically the mental state of these non-interactive beings is caused by severe hunger and neglect. Their bodies’ movements slow down and their ability to react decreases fatally. The victims become unable to react to pain or emotional stimuli. They start repeating meaningless words and are unable to communicate with others. After a while they suffer from edemas, causing small and large swellings in the body and, as a result of this, the victims are not capable of natural movements. The stiff bodies resemble, especially for the inhabitants of Auschwitz, the praying and reading of Koran by the Arabs, from which the word *Muselmann*, presumably originates. The limbic state of these bodies even indisposed the guards. The observation of the body without reflexes by fellow inmates, a lifeless body

moving automatically without hope, reminded the ones who wanted to survive of their fatal destiny. The very sight of the *Muselmann* takes their breath away. For the sake of their desire to survive, the *Muselmann* is ignored by the 'healthier' part of the inmates. They are unable to feel compassion or sympathy for the walking-dead. This figure presents the end of life. "Every group thought only about eliminating them, each in its own way" (Ryn and Klodzinski cited in Agamben, 1999^b, p. 43). This is not merely a *clinical diagnosis*. These figures shatter our perception of a human-being. They disrupt our *anthropological* intuitions. Along with Primo Levi Agamben wonders whether the *Muselmann* is still a human-being. So, *If This Is a Man* becomes an adequate title for Levi, who himself stood on the threshold between humanity and its negation. Human as a concept becomes phenomenologically problematic due to the fact that political power has managed to eliminate its ontological (content) as well as its epistemological (expression) traits in order to produce a non-human. Agamben (1999^b) states:

In Auschwitz ethics begins precisely at the point where the *Muselmann*, the 'complete witness', makes it forever impossible to distinguish between man and non-man (p. 47).

Muselmann is the ultimate exiled body as a *non-place*, a *zone of indistinction*, in which it is impossible to distinguish between the physiological elements of life and its political and ethical components, between *zoē* and *bios*. Eventually, in this 'limit situation' it becomes even impossible to distinguish between *life* and *death*. This zone is neither Foucaultian sovereign territory - *to let live and to make die* - nor Foucaultian disciplinary territory - *to make live and to let die*. In this zone *life and death are both made* (Agamben, 1999^b, p. 83 & Foucault, 2003, p. 241). As Foucault (2003) argues the *biopower* does not limit itself to something as individual life. From the eighteenth century on it orients itself by statistical management of populations, or in general the human species. Within this process it is not only the construction of life that fascinates power, but also the manipulation of death, the statistics of death that dominate planning and policies.

Death was no longer something that suddenly swooped down on life – as in an epidemic. Death was now something permanent, something that slips into life, perpetually gnaws at it, diminishes it and weakens it (p. 244).

War, wherever and whenever, is the mechanism that centralizes this death in life. That is the cacophony within the gaze of Oman. In this sense Foucault (1977) turns over Clausewitz' remark by stating:

It may be that war as strategy is a continuation of politics. But it must not be forgotten that 'politics' has been conceived as a continuation, if not exactly and directly of war, at least of the military model as a fundamental means of preventing civil disorder. Politics, as a technique of internal peace and order, sought to implement the mechanism of the perfect army, of the disciplined mass, of the

docile, useful troop, of the regiment in camp and in the field, on manoeuvres and on exercises (p. 168).

Politics purifies the population. This *purification* does not emerge from traditional racism. According to Foucault (2003) biopolitics with its desire for cleansing is accompanied by *State racism* that positions the other as a threat of disease emerges. The other becomes a potential illness that must be quarantined and secured from the rest (pp. 254-256). Foucault thus shows how the civic subject in line with such State of racism legitimize its argumentation:

The fact that the other dies does not mean simply that I live in the sense that his death guarantees my safety; the death of the other, the death of the bad race, of the inferior race (or the degenerate, or the abnormal) is something that will make life in general healthier: healthier and purer (p. 255).

The Nazi's attempt to distinguish themselves from the non-human – by replacing the inmate's names by the tattooed numbers – has been one of the many cruel deceptions of this form of regime. The other's impurity that gives rise to its non-humanity demolishes not only their lives, but also their way of dying as well, according to Agamben (1999^b).

In Auschwitz, people did not die; rather, corpses were produced. Corpses without death, non-humans whose decess is debased into a matter of serial production. And ... precisely this degradation of death constitutes the specific offense of Auschwitz, the proper name of its horror (p. 72).

The *Muselmann's* existence in the *non-place* is the faceless center of the camp. It is face that does not belong to a regime of faciality, *a faceless face*. The invisibility of the face of the *Muselmann* has paradoxically made our own facelessness visible. This limit figure pointing out the limits of any ethics does not merely bring out the impossibility of dignity and self-respect, but, as it is argued, as “the threshold between the human and the inhuman” (p. 55) destroys our *freedom* to be merely human, i.e. living being. The *Muselmann* is the ethical threshold, a ‘point of no return,’ as Agamben calls it. It is the face that makes the civic subject lose its civilization. Remarkably, Agamben seeks for an answer in the same figure, namely in the *Muselmann*. This figure is the ultimate expression of a new form of ethics.

The *Muselmann*, who is its most extreme expression, is the guard on the threshold of a new ethics, an ethics of a form of life that begins where dignity ends. And Levi, who bears witness to the drowned, speaking in their stead, is the cartographer of this new *terra ethica*, the implacable land-surveyor of *Muselmannland* (p. 69).

Before articulating this new ethics still one issue must be addressed, namely the obscure use of the term *Muselmann* as a reference to the Muslim.³⁰ This act of naming is a testimony that must be thought through. Agamben criticizes the term *Muselmann*, or Muslim, arguing that it refers to a European legend that the Muslim, who faithfully submits to the will of Allah, is the man without a will. In this vocabulary, the Muslim is prejudicially desubjectified.³¹

But while the muslim's resignation consists in the conviction that the will of Allah is at work every moment and in even the smallest events, the *Muselmann* of Auschwitz is instead defined by a loss of all will and consciousness (p. 45).

S Parvez Manzoor (2001) realizes that criticizing this notion will turn him into an anti-Semitic. However, according to him despite Agamben's good intentions it is unimaginable for a Muslim to read in *Remnants of Auschwitz* how he is defined as a creature without life, thought or desire, a will-less man or woman not worthy to live, meant to be killed in the gas chambers. Manzoor argues that Agamben's reflections, despite his critique of the term, remain a Judeo-Christian reflection that does not address the perception of the Muslims. This is indeed odd because in other works Agamben is eager to use Islamic thinkers. The *Muselmann* remains truthfully silenced even so in Agamben's writings.

It is disconcerting to learn that even for the inmates of the camp, the Muslim was the *Untermensch*, the lowest of the low. This is certainly what Agamben has in mind when he, in a moment of brutal encounter with the truth, seeks refuge in 'the postmodern irony' For others, there's no escaping the perverse logic of the Holocaust: While the Nazis killed the Jews, the Jews in turn sacrificed the 'Muslims' (*die Muselmänner*)! (Manzoor, 2001).³²

Manzoor speaks of the *victims of the victims*, which in its repetition affirms Agamben's reflection on the *indistinction* between good and evil. Despite this fact, we must not despair but be urged to ask the questions, each time, no matter how hard they are, no matter how guilty we feel. Let us remember the warnings of Arendt (1968).

³⁰ The term is sometimes written as *Muschelmann*, the shell-man, but according to Agamben (1999^b) this interpretation is not convincing (p. 45).

³¹ This is also shown in the figure of the Muslim women in early Hollywood cinema, as is indicated by Shaheen (2001). See also the documentary *Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People* (Earp & Jhally, 2006). Shaheen however also states that from the second half of twentieth century the female Muslim figure – either fully covered or challengingly uncovered – hops to another prejudice category of murderous terrorist machine. Shaheen howls how in movies such as *Rules of Engagement* (2000), even the murder of children is logically explained by their categorization as monsters with weapons and sweet faces, to which extend the sense of empathy is fully eliminated. The child is dangerous and anonymous, and the description of the film in *Internet Movie Data Base* is sufficient enough: "An attorney defends an officer on trial for ordering his troops to fire on civilians after they stormed a U.S. embassy in a third world country." Not even the specific country is mentioned, but merely an indistinct 'over there', the third world.

³² Manzoor refers here to Agamben's (1999^b) statement: "In any case, it is certain that, with a kind of ferocious irony, the Jews knew that they would not die at Auschwitz as Jews" (p. 45).

Like virtually all other events of our century, the solution of the Jewish question merely produced a new category of refugees, the Arabs, thereby increasing the number of the stateless and rightless by another 700,000 to 800,000 people (p. 290).

A new ethics has to take into account both the naming of the *Muselmann* and Arendt's warning. Not merely as an experience of Auschwitz, but in its meaning for contemporary times. What also remains problematic is the division in time as pre-Auschwitz and post-Auschwitz. Why is our ability to distinguish between man and non-man resolved just after *this* event? Has slave trade, not only from Africa, but also in the ancient Greek, Persian and Arab world, and also in contemporary times deprived men from the clear distinction between man and non-man? Has the female body or the bodies of those individuals with different sexual preferences not always been the target of violence and banned to the threshold of human and inhuman? In connection to the Jewish history, Arendt shows how the forced poverty of this people in Europe had made their life inhuman long before Auschwitz. Novels such as Bernard Malamud's *The Fixer* (2004) are based on such old stories on the repression of the Jewish people, their unbearable lives in the ghetto and their exclusion from politics. This story of the life of Yakov Bok sensitizes how the repression of the freedom to think surpasses the horrors of the physical torture. It is not only on the level of body, but on all levels of living, that the other endures the course of becoming non-human.

Given Manzoor's critique, I will approach the dehumanized condition that Arendt and Agamben analyze via the persona of *limbic lives* instead of the problematic persona of the *Muselmann*. The cartographer of new ethics must thus wonder: Who is the *limbic live* nowadays and where are the invisible camps of pure visibility of the naked life? Is it the Muslim? Or the Palestinians who are not merely Muslims? What makes their dehumanized condition so unbearable is that even in their defense Palestinians are not merely themselves, but always already an object within the agenda of global powers. Or is it the more than one billion people who live in severe condition of poverty? (UN, 2013^o) We also have to ask questions on the role of the *spectacle*. The images of children with kwashiorkor are common nowadays. Also, the image of children with flies on their faces without reflexes to chase them away. Around the globe 21 children die per minute mostly because of the lack of food or from diseases such as diarrhea, malaria and AIDS (UNICEF, n.d.). The stories of these bodies – in the past and in the present – are the unheard voices of exiled bodies. These are bodies that are doomed to the peripheries, isolated in camps that we do not even know about. Or hardly know, like Manus Island where abused Afghani refugees who took pictures of their bloody bodies, were asked by the police to erase these images (Doherty, 2016). The space, the refugees, or the police, or the immanent violence on these bodies are the secrets of politics of exile. How does expression block *communicability* of voices of these exiled bodies, the limbic lives?

To allow such bodies disappear in our own analysis would be to repeat the crime rather than redress its injustice (Ahmed, 2014, p. 57)

4.5.2 *The Natality of Survival: Resistance of Bodies*

In approaching a politics of flight rhizomatically and applying Deleuze and Guattari's fourfold of matter/form and content/expression, we are able to discern different approaches in which paradoxes and aporias occur as indications of diffused and contradictory policies within politics of exile. It also enables us to more specifically pinpoint the political status of the body as a matter of content. We may conclude that down through history the 'Muselmann' is not the only example or axiomatic paradigm of a body without expression, introduced by Agamben. The homo sacer and refugee are both speechless. From this perspective we could wonder whether according to Arendt and Agamben any agency is left for limbic lives within politics of exile? Resistance of forcefully silenced bodies is problematic in their lectures. To them resistance seems not to be a trait of limbic lives, homo sacer, refugee or the stateless, since speechlessness, i.e. political impotence determines these figures. Or at least it is a aporetical configuration: The inhabitant of the camps becomes the true witness precisely because of his incapability to witness. And when at the end of Agamben's *Remnants of Auschwitz* those who survived the horror start to speak, it remains ambiguous whether they testify of the horror or they have lost their ability to merely witness, as was the case with the raped women. The refugee and the stateless have become mere life without expression, i.e. limbic bodies that, according to Arendt, become a-political due to their inability to speak and act, thus inability to form a community. The relation between body and politics is either negative in Arendt's discussions in *The Human Condition* or at best ambiguous in its political significance in her *On Violence*. In her critique of modern society, Arendt (1958) argues that the emancipation of laborers in modern times has not effectively freed men from the necessities of *labor*. With the rise of mass industry, it is merely *the body* of labor that presents itself in the public life. Life, its pleasure and pain, i.e. direct consummation is the sign that shape the contours of our current society, Arendt states.

In the last resort, it is always life itself which is the supreme standard to which everything else is referred, and the interests of the individual as well as the interests of mankind are always equated with individual life or the life of the species as though it were a matter of course that life is the highest good (pp. 311-312).

Thus, in Arendt's view there seems to be an unbridgeable gap between a *body* that feeds its needs and *politics* that strives for freedom. There is no room for body politics in an affirmative sense. With affirmative I do not necessarily mean a happy life or a comfortable bodily experience. I rather argue, as I have done in the previous chapters, that body is a multidimensional phenomenon that even under sever circumstances resist the regimes of assemblages of bodies. Gestures and faces are not only resistant in their expression but also present us with ontological form of resistance. Heterosexism, sexism, ethnocentrism and racism attack bodies and make them passive. Thus, it is time in our approach to change discourse by problematizing exactly this enforced passivity on these bodies as apolitical. Arendt 's view on life is classical Greek in that sense that life, as a biological process, is surgically disconnected from the 'good life' that refers to the political process.

Without mastering the necessities of life in the household, neither life nor the 'good life' is possible, but politics is never for the sake of life. As far as the

members of the *polis* are concerned, household life exists for the sake of the ‘good life’ in the *polis* (p. 37).

Are ‘good lives’ lived without bodies? Are *vita contemplativa* and *vita activa* not connected? In line with Richard Sennett (2008), I thus disagree with Arendt. Sennett, former student of Arendt, disagrees with his teacher as to the valuation of *work* as a political force. In this study, next to work, also the apolitical or anti-political state of labor in Arendt’s work is problematized. Bodies are not merely the necessary property of a-political figures, but also a locus for the political urge to fight for the endurance of life. The *political body* of the refugee undermines Arendt's radical distinction between apolitical labor/work and political action. To comprehend survival is to comprehend how life is never absent in politics. Refuge is an action initiated by a fear of torture, of repression or simply of end of life. This threat not only intimidates life previous to the journey, but also during and after the act of refuge. Some common images, such as the images of suffocations in trucks, floating corpses on the shoreline, refugee camps and deportation to the country of origin, illustrate this idea. Many refugees, in spite of the fact that they are not immediately threatened, choose the most dangerous roads for the sake of a happy life. Natality and not mortality is the bearing of escape. Despite its risk to not survive, fleeing as a fleeting movement is not for the sake of death. Flight, also in Arendtian terms, is an action par excellence because it bears the hope of a *new birth*. Given this natality body and mind must not be distinguished in a new binary setting of labor and politics. Matter and form in expression and content, even in their permanent discrepancy within politics of exile, effect one another.

This rigid implemented passivity on limbic lives has also been criticized by Jacques Rancière (2004). According to him the analysis of Arendt on human rights leaves us in a paradoxical state. These rights either refer to stateless persons who have no rights, or they refer solely to the rights of the citizens who presumably already have civil rights. Human rights thus are either negative or tautological, but nevertheless leave refugees with an apolitical life; a bare life and not a life lived in a community or life that can resist the structure of power. Rancière criticizes the distinction between bare life and political life, or as Arendt would put it, between necessity of labor and social life versus freedom of politics. In line with our terminology we could state that freedom is not only experienced at the level of expression but also at the level of content. Boys and Girls of the suburbs of Paris are not only mentally excluded from the center of the city, but also physically. Thus, their bodily appearance in these areas of power and commerce is a form of bodily resistance.

Yet in defense of Arendt’s lectures, it remains highly peculiar that Rancière does not refer to *The Human Condition*, in which she far more explicitly assumes this distinction. In her chapter on human rights in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* Arendt instead refers to a bare life incapable of forming a community that is essential for a political life. Rancière’s critique starts with a quote in which Arendt states:

Their plight is not that they (rightless, TR) are not equal before the law, but that no law exists for them; not that they are oppressed but that nobody wants even to oppress them. Only in the last stage of a rather lengthy process is their right to live threatened; only if they remain perfectly ‘superfluous,’ if nobody can be found to

‘claim’ them, may their lives be in danger (Arendt, 1968, pp. 295-296 & Rancière, 2004, p. 299).

Rancière wrongfully assumes that being beyond oppression means a lack of oppression or non-oppression. Arendt would argue that the violence in which men and women become functionless as subjects of oppression is the worst kind of terror. Although Arendt’s analysis seems to be ambivalent in her *On Violence* – again, not mentioned by Rancière – she shows that due to the effects of terror on politics, violence must be dealt with in political thought in as far as it effectuates exclusion. State of exception thus is not an a-political notion, but rather an axiomatic paradigm. Neither is politics not opposed to anthropology, as Rancière seems to suggest. This is due to the fact that in Arendt’s analysis merely through political action men become human and thus depoliticization means the negation of anthropology, as Arendt understands it.

Nevertheless, despite Rancière’s negligence to cite the right books, his critique stands. Why are people only humans through such specific political action, and why are they political in negating their social and economic life? Even on the concept of oppression – although Arendt is right to state that oppression beyond oppression is the worst kind of terror – she fails to mention other forms of oppression, such as slavery and misogyny, which were common traits in her examples in the ancient Greek and Roman society. Her inability to react to consequences of slavery becomes obvious in her *On Revolution* (1990) and her discussion of Black Power. Due to her distinction between private and public the experience of enslavement becomes merely a private matter and loses its relevance for political thought. Consequently, people who were enslaved are neither bare lives, due to the fact that they still function as bodies of oppression within a society; nor political due to the lack of their distinct voice in the public realm. In her analysis, she unintentionally makes the people who were enslaved and their descendants’ silent bodies by not mentioning that these bodies too were deprived of the formation of a community. And finally, due to her distinction between body and politics, she fails to see that exactly the bodily resistance against enslavement, misogyny and heterosexism are the finest examples of the past centuries on how bodies could engage within the realm of politics.

Rancière’s (2004) critique also concerns Agamben’s lectures on bare life. He suggests, that bare life, which becomes broader in Agamben’s sense due to the inclusion of Foucault’s concept biopolitics, nevertheless seems to leave persons in “a state of coma”. It becomes an “ontological destiny” which is ratified by a “biopolitical trap ... from which only a God is likely to save us” (pp. 301-302). Bodies have become depoliticized and are eventually placed in a state of exception from which escape becomes impossible. Is there no other option? Rancière’s critique on bare life and human rights, and the trap of either tautology or negation, is motivated by Arendt’s and Agamben’s ambiguous personification as well as abstraction of these notions. Rancière states that rights are not rights of a person, but elements of a *process of subjectivation* in which a person incorporates both elements of statelessness and citizenship. Individuals do not become stateless *or* citizen, limbic lives *or* civic subjects. The loneliness of the atomized masses shows that within this process citizen *and* non-citizen are the two aspects of the same subject.

Even though actual situations of rightlessness may give them the lie, they are not only an abstract ideal, situated far from the givens of the situation. They are also

part of the configuration of the given. What is given is not only a situation of inequality. It is also an inscription, a form of visibility of equality (p. 303).

Rancière also states that *freedom* and *equality* – the basic principles of democracy and constitutional rights – are not qualities of a person but *open predicates* that give rise to a dispute in which subjects not only passively incorporate the consequences of these rights, but also *confirm* and *deny* the process in which the rights are either given to them or deprived from them. Rancière states that the non-comatose subject, despite the injustice done to him or her, remains active and communicative about these predicates. Bana Al-Abed's messages on Twitter show us how a 7-year-old child still has the courage to resist her reality in Aleppo. She bears witness to the fact that the limbic life that refuses to be politically active is at the very same time a civic subject that shows intense political activity.

Politics thus for Rancière is not mere politics within an open community. It is articulated on the *limits* in which bare life unjustly becomes distinguished from political life. Bare life sensitizes politics. If execution of bare life is a political decision, then this exiled body and its cacophonous voice – the matter (of content and expression) of politics of exile that are detached from its form (of content and expression) through the lawful Voice of *here* – must become political, i.e. has to be voiced as well. If Arendt suggests that democracy is in need of disagreement, then *this* dissensus on the limits of politics must be included within the political inter-speech. The refugee activist – who during 2012 throughout The Netherlands opposed the Dutch policy that forced people to live in tents in the middle of the city of Amsterdam – did show such resistance. While sympathizers urged them to occupy a building, the refugees hesitated, realizing that the visibility of their exiled state was politically much more effective than the comfort that was offered by sympathizers (Spijkerboer, 2012). Rancière (2004) labels this as an affirmative included exclusion: “They put together a relation of inclusion and a relation of exclusion” (p. 304). These interventions in public space rhizomatically connect a politics of flight beyond a sheer politics of exile. Rancière and Agamben agree on the fact that an affirmative politics must focus beyond the impossibility of exclusion.

I think that we had rather leave the ontological destiny of the human animal aside if we want to understand who is the subject of the Rights of Man and to rethink politics today, even if out of its very lack (p. 309).

What does this ‘beyond’ a politics of exile mean? In the next two chapters I will elaborate on this issue. The history of exclusion of difference is as old as the history of inclusion of difference. Yet, the manner in which difference is included differs in different forms of politics, policies, and regimes of expression and regimes of bodies. The most dominant discourse on inclusion of difference in our time is called multiculturalism. The question however remains whether multiculturalism could fulfill the promise of difference. Can multiculturalism let us surpass the desire of *becoming majority*. Let us thus for a second resist such longing. Let us hear a little voice in the hell of exile. Let us experience a little gesture. Let us look at Oman beyond the spectacle that numbs its spectators. Political responsibility – a responsibility that is not capitalized by the totalitarian realm of the law, regulated by an axiomatic paradigm of here versus there – starts with an ethical act that surpasses the rigid morality of determinant judgments of an I toward The Other. Let us thus respond to the gaze of Oman. We have

heard you, seen you. Let us touch your face, let our gestures break through the regimes of gestures that have banned you to an exiled life, hypocritically arguing that refugee camps are your best option. Let us leave the camps and the state of exception together behind us, by asking:

How do we map out territories of inclusion?

Chapter 5: Politics of Segments

We do not need, have never needed, settled community, a homogeneous system of values, in order to have a home. Cultural purity is an oxymoron

(Appiah, 2006, p. 113).

5.1 Power and Resistance

Totalitarianism is just one form of formation of power within a politics of flight. In line with Foucault we can suggest that within a heterotopic state of a milieu of flight power articulates itself far subtler than the hierarchical forms of repression and domination. In this chapter I will argue that totalitarianism's characteristics – colonial affects, racist prejudices and imperial pretensions – are still engrained in late modern consciousness that presents itself as multiculturalism. Disciplinary power is more than the destructive force of totalitarian power. It is productive at the same time: it produces subjectivities and identities. As a result of which, the clear binary opposition between power and resistance relapses into a mechanism in which the two movements annihilate each other, but also produce one another. Urban culture testifies of this double exposure. Graffiti, which started as a subversive, illegal practice, nowadays is caught within a *dissensus*. It is conceived as both a legally accepted form of expression and an illegal act of civil disobedience. Both practices produce subjectivity. The war between two graffiti artists Banksy and Robbo is an example of such a transgressive dynamic between legality and illegality, between what is seen as hip and what is seen as sheer pollution. Society's ambiguous in- and exclusion eventually intends to turn this urban art into an incomprehensible matter of expression: a heterotopic voice within an accepted subculture, with a yet comprehensible form (Preston, 2011).

Nevertheless, within various works Foucault argues that it must not be assumed that resistance has become impossible. His own political biography testifies of his deep faith in various forms of resistance. Resistance realizes and actualizes itself from within power constellations. In terms of Deleuze and Guattari, with whom in spite of some controversies he shares his political views, it radiates from the center, following a flight line that has been generated from within the belly of segmented thought. Thus Rancière's (2004) main question on the matter of politics remains: where does the dispute between belonging and non-belonging take place? How do minorities express their resistance and how does this resistance rupture power? Are there different types of minor movements, and different types of minorities, as a result of which there will be different types of resistance against the homogeneity of power? In this study, as already introduced in section 3.4.3, I make a distinction between two types of minorities: majoritarian minorities and minoritarian minorities. This chapter is

dedicated to the first type. Majoritarian minorities resist the majority by redefining the value of the excluded identities in totalitarian thought. This type of minority strives for the empowerment of the subjects on the peripheries by use of the same identities that are defined by and excluded from the center. The majoritarian minorities' movement brings the peripheries into the center of power. They maneuver themselves within the hegemonic discourse. This act of redefinition and transfer gives rise to the second milieu that unfolds within a politics of flight: a *politics of segments*. I introduce the notion 'segment' because it refers to the Latin *segmentum* as a piece or a zone that is cut off (*secāre* (*sectum*)). It has the same etymological root as 'sectarian' and 'section'. These segments were previously incorporated by the axiomatic paradigm of majority, but are now detached. They freed themselves as a new type of paradigms: differential paradigms. These paradigms – as it has been argued in the third chapter – create differentiated wholes, segments each with their own internal logic.

Politics of segments is the battlefield of majoritarian minorities. The need to resist the axiomatic paradigm of majority radiates through emergence of multiple paradigms of identities. Even populist politics of Geert Wilders refer to votes of *minor mob*, which as Arendt suggested, operates from within a state of homelessness, due to their lack of connection to politics and power. It is, according to Arendt's definition of politics, an anti-political movement, not a non-political movement. It defines itself by rejection of the establishment, it presents itself as an anti-established political state of affairs. It is a politics of negation. Their disapproving attitude gives rise to the statements of the right-wing Dutch political party PVV, but also to the political statements against them. As R. A. Koole (2006) suggests populism and anti-government attitude fit both conservative and liberal¹ parties, left-wing politics as well as right-wing politics. Koole also argues that populism and an anti-government attitude can be destructive and productive at the same time. Populism refers to a gap between the common man and politics.² Koole argues that there is however a difference between a political-technical gap – in the sense of the ability to influence politics for example through voting – and a political-affective gap. The homelessness of the mob refers to an affective gap that gives rise to a sense of minority and to political resistance.³

Chapter five elaborates on this affective sense of politics and distinguishes multiple differential paradigms of politics of segments that define the assemblages of both bodies and enunciation of this

¹ Nevertheless, Koole (2006) describes it as illiberal. He also describes politics from this liberal perspective as a sense of compromise between different parties, and searches for possible solutions (pp. 8 & 15). As we have seen in chapter 4, David Luban (2005) shows how liberalism and compromise of different liberal norms can actually bring about justification for torture as a solution to a problem created by liberal politics. Koole's image of Dutch politics thus remains optimistic; the only critique is that non-populist politicians fall into the populist jargon when criticizing populism. Although he repeatedly suggests that politics is more complex than populists represent it to be, he fails to make an argument demonstrating the complexity he defends. Populist thought seems mostly to rebel against the government and political elite. Their consistent rejection of migrants as one of their main themes seems to be minimized in Koole's analysis.

² Citing Suzanne Berger and Margret Canovan, according to Koole (2006), there is a difference between anti-government sentiments and populism. Populism is not only critical of an ideology but also of the repression of a people (pp. 7-8 & 11).

³ Koole (2006) refers to the ambiguous sense of dissatisfaction of Dutch citizens. While on the political level citizens do not seem to be satisfied with politics, statistics show that Dutch people are extremely happy with their personal lives (p. 12 & p. 24 n.54 & Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 2004, p. 72).

politics. As been argued in the first part, differential paradigms base themselves on an illusion of *actual* segments that divide individuals, communities and bodies according to traceable identities. In 5.2 – the form of content – I discuss the construction of multiculturalism, differentiating multiple relationalities and participations by evaluating the characteristics of belonging within this politics. The differential paradigm of loyalty will be discussed as an ambiguous affective paradigm of current forms of politics and multicultural tendencies. In 5.3 – the form of expression – the various ways in which differential paradigms such as context, culture and identity operate will be explored. Context and culture are complex notions; they operate as different types of paradigms. In the previous chapter, we have witnessed the manner in which they give rise to axiomatic differentiation, in this chapter I will elaborate on their segmenting differential effects, and finally in the last chapter they will be deployed as impotential paradigms. In this chapter I will explore the manner in which context and culture create differentiated arbitrary and artificial structures in expression by creating an idea of transparent communication. In 5.4 – the matter of expression – I will treat the manner in which migrants, refugees and homo sacer express themselves. Feelings such as shame, guilt, nostalgia and displacement seem to predominate the discourse of these testimonies. Finally, in 5.5 – the matter of content – I will examine Arendt’s distinction between social subjects, namely pariah and parvenu, on the one hand and conscious pariahs as political resisting bodies on the other hand, and link these analyses within a politics of segments.

	Content	Expression
Form	5.2 Loyalty within Multiple Territories <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Passive toleration - Liberalism, autonomy and community - Minorities within minorities - Multiple doctrines - Adequate segmentalized assimilations - Adequate segmentalized assimilations - Identifiable focus - Molar territories - Segmented morality - Differentiating loyalties 	5.3 Contextualization and Cultural Discourse <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Politics of context and identifiable networks - Politics of culture and segmented normation - Politics of identity of majoritarian minority - Politics of communication and molar segments - Emancipation and tracing identity - Equalizing equality - Common language: transparency, non-violent and exclusive creativity - Excluding freedom of speech
Matter	5.4 Differential Affects <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Private voices of pain - Schizophrenic memories - Inhuman humans - Politics of shame - Identifiable stories - Desubjectified subjectification and the faceless - Analogy of resemblance: re-presentation - Homesickness: nostalgia and resentment - Global differentiated displacement 	5.5 Collective Bodies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Passive non-political refugees - Politics of suppression and politics of mercy - Voluntary blind optimism - Desirable voluntary amnesia - Migrative refugees - Hyper-awareness and masks - Prisonniers volontaires - Passive physicality - Social pariah and parvenu - Political conscious pariah - Life versus forms of life

5.2 Loyalty within Multiple Territories

5.2.1 Coherencies and Territories

In this chapter, the focus shifts from totalitarianism to multiculturalism. Not as much as a historical given, but as a systematic distinction. How do we define multiculturalism? Let me start with a summary of Susan Song's (2010) disquisition in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on multiculturalism, in which all the related notions are mapped out. Multiculturalism is, according to Song, based on toleration in order to effectuate equality for all citizens. The intensity of this tolerance and the manner in which equality is realized is a permanent issue in the process of multiculturalism. How do individuals' rights relate to the equality of groups and when do they conflict? Yet, the emphasis is not on all kind of groups. Song justly argues that multiculturalism – although including

other minorities such as women and LGBTQ – is often associated with specific forms of minorities such as migrants, indigenous peoples or minority nations.⁴ It is worthwhile to notice a distinctive relationship of these groups to the act of migration. Migrants move from one country to the other and thus become minorities; indigenous people on the contrary become minorities due to the movement of other types of migrants, namely colonists⁵; and minority nations refer to a physical immobile force where power structures define them as minorities. According to Song, that which often specifies multiculturalism is cultural differentiation (Parekh, 1999 & Kukathas, 2004) rather than racial difference, although race – despite the fact that it is biologically non-existing – and culture remain related to this form of distinction. Different types of minorities, however, can clash in a multicultural setting. In case of The Netherlands, it is argued that the rights of women and LGBTQ are often at odds with the freedom of religion. The rights of religious groups and their equality are presumed to offend the rights and equality of other groups. And exactly this idea of opposition of rights, Butler (2004) argues, weakens the resistance of both minorities in their mutual resistance and claim for equality. In case of rights of women, Ghorashi (2010) speaks of *culturalizing feminism*, in which emancipation rather leads to polarization instead of improvement of the rights of minority. In this argumentation, the other women – meaning non-western women – at best becomes a passive victim of her culture. The dichotomies also appear in-between the same type of minorities; such as religious minorities. Religious groups can oppose one another. For example, the PVV often argues that Jews and Muslims oppose one another. Yet, being a person with Jewish background from a Middle Eastern or African country is not an argument to include people. PVV excludes people also based on their nationality and in many cases based on their differences in physiognomic appearances. The levels of conflict even strengthen one and other, creating an intersectional reality of exclusion (Crenshaw, 1991). Tofik Dibi (2015) – an ex-politician – is an example of the struggle to combine his homosexuality, with his belief in Islam and Moroccan background. While he is at ease with these different elements in his subjectivity, the world he lives in cannot comprehend the combination of these intersecting elements. Nonetheless for Dibi “it is about selections from intersecting cultures, rather than a selection between one or another culture” (Ghorashi, 2003, p. 218).

⁴ Kymlicka (1995) refers to two categories of minorities. First, *national minorities* appear within the same territory as the majority, but nevertheless strive for a form of *self-government*. Multination states define themselves as such in the course of history. The national minorities often struggle for a form of political, lingual and cultural independency, as has been the case with American indigenous people. The second group is *ethnic groups* or *migrants*, who strive for acknowledgment by the host society as full members while preserving their ethnic differences. Kymlicka speaks of a polyethnic society. Migrants on the other hand are often expected to assimilate to the dominant culture, which Kymlicka calls civic nations or cultures. These minorities are at least expected to adjust on the level of language, legal and political structures. Yet not all forms of immigration function according to this principal. In case of colonization, Kymlicka states, migrants, not as individuals but as a group, recreate a whole new society within a territory, and force the indigenous people to assimilate to their imposed political system. Enslavement is on the other hand a form of forced migration through which minorities are compelled to leave their homeland for the benefit of majority. These people had neither the right to keep their cultural heritage nor were allowed to *integrate into* the society as full members. In the end Kymlicka also states that within the global setting the current states are often both multinational as well as polyethnic (pp. 10-33 & See also: H. De Schutter, (2005, p. 21) emphasis on immobile groups that are characterized as minorities).

⁵ Chandran Kukathas (2004) shows how in case of Australia these migrants excluded other migrants from non-European countries (p. 4).

Dibi does not only endure a rejection of an element of his identity. The non-toleration of his identity is mostly due to the combination of elements. The intersection of his being is, as we will see, fatal for the politics of segments. *Toleration* and *non-toleration* refer to the formation of identities that do not belong to the majority. The formation of a group itself is based on another affect: *recognition*. In a multicultural society groups are formed due to their recognition of a common history, language, sexual preferences, traditions, cultural expression, political inclinations, etc. These traits are also present in the acknowledgement of subjects as refugees. Within international law refugees are thus identified as participants of a minority group that is excluded from the center of power and often persecuted for these specific traits. The formation of groups is, however, not solely due to a sense of toleration, recognition or exclusion. It is also in view of processes of empowerment to improve the legal status of these groups in order to gain the rights and social status that come easily to the majority (Song, 2014) Ghorashi (2003) shows how the existence of different Iranian organizations in California has helped the Iranian migrants and refugees to make the first introductive steps in a new country and how such organization help the members with legal problems. Such groups, even as “essentialist cultural groups” in some processes “can become a basis for negotiation and engagement in a new surrounding” (p. 223). Yet Ghorashi also argues that within such groups there are endless forms of sub-groups. Every group is characterized by *hybridity*. There are, for example groups that aim to improve the status of women in society and in corporate and scientific milieus. Still, such a group often does not remain homogeneous. Every group divides itself in multiple subgroups in order to gain specific privileges that are relevant for that specific subgroup: organizations for Catholic women, for lesbian women, socialist women, highly educated women, childless women, single women, etc. Subgroups divide themselves again in smaller segments, for example the society of highly educated single women.⁶

As Song (2010) also shows, the sense of formation of such communities and understanding of multiculturalism is not merely for the sake of recognition and improvement of one’s status in society. The formation of communities is also a form of resistance against the *atomization*, which results from forms of liberalism that accentuates the rights of an individual above the rights of a community.

The target of the communitarian critique of liberalism is not so much liberal ethics as liberal social ontology. Communitarians reject the idea that the individual is prior to the community, and that the value of social goods can be reduced to their contribution to individual well-being (p. 3).

⁶ Kymlicka (1995) refers to Iris Young and her plea for motivating representation of minorities by profiling a group as people who are oppressed one way or another due to their identity traits. Kymlicka rightly suggests that this considers 80 percentage of the population, due to the fact that only a highly educated, rich, able-bodied, middle-aged, heterosexual male does not suffer from such forms of oppression. Yet, his comment on Young shows an implicit form of prejudice that only this majority is capable of acting beyond its identity, its sub-identity and finally could represent a larger population: “It is hard to see how this criterion would avoid an ‘unworkable proliferation’, since each of these groups has subgroups that might claim their own rights” (p. 145, Italics TR).

The emphasis on individuality seems to conflict with the unity of the group. In referring to Kymlicka and Appiah, Song shows that *autonomy* according to these thinkers does not take precedence over the *community*.⁷ Autonomy and self-respect are the results of internalization of a shared narrative and the recognition of such narrative. What remains problematic here is that on the one hand, self-respect and self-disrespect can be gained both by membership to a certain group; groups can form and empower individuals in their narrative of life; on the other hand, membership to an identified group could also be forced and cause disrespect. For example, minorities could commune in order to gain rights, but migration as a homogeneous characteristic could equally become a tool of exclusion by prejudicial thought. In The Netherlands third generation migrants' children are often thought to lack certain lingual abilities. The fact that this prejudice has severe effect on one's life and that it can become a self-fulfilling prophecy seems to be common knowledge, and nonetheless often neglected in the scientific analysis. This is, as Kymlicka (1995) suggests, an example of unchosen forms of membership due to *internal restriction*.⁸ Song (2010) argues that this membership is not only enforced by the majority, but can also be imposed from within the minority itself. Those who are not willing to join the group are marginalized by both the group and the majority. New minorities emerge: *internal minorities* or *minorities within minorities* (p. 9). In this chapter I will argue that it is in such acts that minority groups show their majoritarian tendencies.

Despite these internal and external political complexities of in- and exclusion, Bhikhu Parekh (1999) characterizes multiculturalism as an expression of multiple *visions on a good life*. These visions are not all equally valuable. They are internally plural, and lack *a political doctrine with a programmatic content*. Multiculturalism cannot be defined exclusively as forms of liberalism, nationalism, socialism or conservatism. All these doctrines are present in multiculturalism, yet multiculturalism always exceeds such doctrines. Parekh states that due to the newness of the concept traditional doctrines and political thought lack the ability to describe the process of multiculturalism. Kymlicka (1995) claims:

All political theories must accord recognition to certain forms of group differences and support certain cultural communities. This is inevitable in any theory which confronts issues of language policy, public holidays, political boundaries, and immigration rules. This is as true of liberal individualists and social internationalist as of conservatives, communitarian, and postmodernists (p. 129).

⁷ On enforced membership Kymlicka (1995) distinguishes between two liberal principals: autonomy and toleration, and although he seems to value both, in case of conflict the first principal seems to overrule the second when he states: "a liberal conception of minority rights will not justify (except under extreme circumstances) 'internal restrictions' – that is, the demand by a minority culture to restrict the basic civil or political liberties of its own members." (p. 152) and "liberals have historically seen autonomy and tolerance as two sides of the same coin. What distinguishes liberal tolerance is precisely its commitment to autonomy – that is, the idea that individuals should be free to assess and revise their existing ends" (p. 158).

⁸ Kymlicka (1995) distinguishes between internal restriction referring to intra-group relations through which members are submitted to the laws of the group; and external protection referring to inter-group relations due to which groups are protected against the power of other groups (p. 35-36 & 109 & See also Song, 2010, p. 4).

Nonetheless, despite Parekh's (1999) plea, the question remains whether multiculturalism is without a *programmatic content* and exceeds beyond the traditional forms of doctrines such as liberalism, nationalism, socialism or conservatism. I prefer to argue that multicultural politics has a programmatic content in its method of division: division by cultural, ethnic and national differences, i.e. division of closed wholes that as territories categorize and identify their members. In this chapter, I will elaborate and criticize this method of division, by arguing that although multiculturalism may not have *one* general consistency, yet its process divides territories with an internal structure of *multiple consistencies*. Multiculturalism is not without doctrine; it is characterized by multiplicity and division of *multiple doctrines*. It resists the homogeneity of the single nation-state through "miniaturizing the state by providing national groups with a 'proto-independence package'" as Helder De Schutter (2005) suggests in his critique of Kymlicka (p. 25). Parekh's understanding of the concept of plurality is influenced by this form of multiple divisions. Although he states that multicultural segments are internally plural, this plurality is in its turn defined as consistent wholes within segments. Each segment seems to divide itself into new *segments* that remain *identifiable*. We could speak of multiculturalism within the multicultural segments. I will argue that these segments are multiple but do not in the end give rise to Arendtian plurality.⁹

The political programmatic content of multiculturalism does not only refer to the internal processes of the segments. Their external relation also shows different forms of consistencies and doctrines on proper relationality. Chandran Kukathas (2004) distinguishes five common forms. First, one could relate by *isolation*. A nation or a community defines itself by exclusion as a homogenous organism. *Fearing* to lose its culture or economic benefits, it decides to exclude migrants from participating in its way of life. Second, in addition to isolation another option arises: *assimilation*. Cultural traits are assumed to be protected if the newcomer adjusts *fully* to the culture, no matter how indefinable and nuanced these rules of conduct may be. The others are only *tolerated* as long as they eliminate their own *fear* of losing their culture, by simultaneously giving in to the fear of the majority by not threatening their culture. Kukathas also shows that assimilation in case of the colonist in Australia worked the other way around: not the migrants but the indigenous peoples – who also became minority by numbers – were forced to assimilate to the European culture – hence also became cultural and political minority. Thus, the European citizens, who plead for assimilation, show their diagrammatic tendencies – in words of Schinkel (2008) – by their long history of failing to assimilate. The third form of relationality according to Kukathas is a *weak multiculturalism*. This form of

⁹ While Kymlicka (1995) acknowledges the complexity and broadness of the notion of culture within the idea of multiculturalism, nevertheless, his definition of culture is limited to paradigms of nations and ethnicity. He states that he does not intend to "use 'multiculturalism' as an umbrella term ... What matters is not the terminology we use, but that we keep certain distinctions in mind" (p. 19). His statements are however problematic. The distinctions made are imposed, rather than justified. The question remains whether any such distinction, even with the inclusion of other forms of subcultures, would pass the test of justification. Kymlicka even admits that refugees could not be subdivided in these categories. The problem of his analysis is even more apparent due to the fact that not necessarily multiculturalism, but culture as such deterritorializes the idea of coherent distinction as well as coherent identifiable multiplicity, as we will see in the next section. Thus, although Kymlicka often makes use of the term pluralism, a clear identification of different types of plurality distances his sense of plurality from Arendt's understanding of the term.

multiculturalism, which is preferred the most by Kukathas, builds on classical liberalism in which difference is tolerated. Even some non-liberal acts are accepted, by minimalistic liberal norms. Kukathas, however, is not explicit on these norms. He pleads for a neutral form of norms. Except, how could neutrality and norms coincide? Norm is by definition not neutral.¹⁰ Moreover, liberalism is only one way of thinking and not a universal form of thought.

The fourth form is *strong multiculturalism*, which lies at the other end of the spectrum of multiculturalism. This form of multiculturalism pleads for active interference of the liberal government. Here multiple reactions are possible. While Kymlicka (1995) would encourage the state to actively protect the variety of cultures, others within strong multiculturalism argue that the state must actively exclude rigid cultures in order to maintain the diversity within. As has been the case with war for the sake of democracy, multiculturalism must exclude difference in order to maintain its internal diversity. Kukathas (2004) states that both forms of strong multiculturalism, despite their differences, are based on a plain belief in liberal values. The final fifth form of relationality that is suggested by Kukathas is *apartheid*. Although *apartheid* often is engaged by the same affects as assimilation, it is rather the opposite of assimilation. Apartheid is multiple isolation, different groups are tolerated in one territory, given strict divisions in this territory. They must not interact. In short, multiculturalism is mapped out on a spectrum in-between weak multiculturalism or lack of interaction on the one end and the strong multiculturalism and total assimilation on the other end.

The sincere believe in liberalism, however, is deeply rooted in Kukathas' thought. His light version of classical liberalism is universalistic in stating that liberalism must also include non-liberal communities: "If the liberal tradition accepts anything, it is that toleration is of fundamental importance, and that toleration requires a willingness to put up with what one dislikes" (p. 19-20). Just as capitalism, Schinkel (2008) argues, liberalism gormandizes the peripheries and its resistance into its center and in doing this in a subtle way neutralizes all opposition. Relations between multiculturalism and liberalism remain persistent in thoughts on how cultural difference and individual rights relate, due to the assumption of opposition between unorganized differentiation as an individualistic trait versus a community that is solely based on sameness. Identity in multicultural society thus oscillates between individual traits and its recognition within different communities, or in terms of Ahmed (2014) an *economy of recognition* in which the idea of recognition gives rise to the *circulation* of the idea itself. The question arises whether these different communities can even appear in the light of sameness, and whether individuality always implies difference. The atomized masses of totalitarianism seemed to blur this difference.

What remains problematic in Kukathas' analysis is an unproblematic toleration. Toleration as an affect is not necessarily connective or peaceful, due to its strong association with the acceptance of something that is essentially disapproved, and often disrespected. Toleration can manipulate people in

¹⁰ In line with Kymlicka, H. De Schutter (2005) states: "Idea of ethnocultural neutrality is simply a fiction, since one cannot be neutral in the field of language and culture" (p. 19). Kymlicka (1995) states: "So the ideal of 'benign neglect' is not in fact benign. It ignores the fact that the members of a national minority face a disadvantage that the members of the majority do not face. In any event, the idea that the government could be neutral with respect to ethnic and national groups is patently false" (p. 110-111).

isolation and apartheid while pretending to be communicative. As Ghorashi (2010) shows, it has the tendency to create passivity in creating relations. She calls this *passive tolerance* (p. 26). ‘I tolerate you, what more do you want?’, can easily become a final argument not to accept difference. According to Ghorashi (2003) in such settings “the emphasis on tolerance is about distance and not respect for difference” (p. 227).

Finally, in Kukathas’ elaboration (2004) the notion of integration and assimilation seem to be identical. Although it must be admitted that more often than not, claims of integration refer to assimilation – such as Dutch integration courses that are merely intended for the non-western newcomers – these notions must be set apart. While the notion of integration initially is meant to involve all groups; assimilation forces a majoritarian form of conduct on minorities, while the majority in the center of power is not obliged to perform in this strict sense themselves. In integration, all groups are included into the transformation in order to bring about a new whole.¹¹ Yet, even in this setting of mutual transformation Schinkel (2008) argues, even the term integration – which has created a market of its own in The Netherlands – creates an idea of a whole and a teleological form of movement toward a new ‘ideal’ and static form of society. It neglects the complexities of difference. Schinkel (2011) states that within *integration market*

diversity becomes a marketable value. ... A plea for diversity is rather a plea for *lack of diversity*. Since, ‘diversity’ in multiculturalism only includes those differences that are harmless to the neoliberal economy and the liberal democracy in which secularism revamps (p. 112, Translation TR).

Integration in the end, even a critical one, remains captured by the idea of a perfect whole, a perfect society. Multiculturalism does not defeat such fundamental ideas on society or its claim for an empirical reality. It rather in its discourse multiplies it endlessly. One perfect assimilation becomes *adequate segmentalized assimilations*. Tofik Dibi refused to implement this demand of multiculturalism; due to the fact that the segments of a society – ethnically, culturally, sexually, religiously or politically – could not comprehend and include the multiple connectivity of his personality.

Relationalities that do not move toward a whole, on the other hand, need plurality within engagement in Arendt’s (1958) sense, which is a process that gives in to change rather than enforcement of a model. Arendt would describe history and culture as a web of stories, as a constant happening in which events cause unpredictable and uncontrollable movements, resulting in undisturbed

¹¹ In line with Parekh, Kymlicka (1995) argues that “integration is a two-way process – it requires the mainstream society to adapt itself to immigrants, just as immigrants must adapt to the mainstream” (p. 96). Yet a clear systematic distinction between assimilation and integration is also lacking when he states: “I believe, however, that some limits on immigration can be justified if we recognize that liberal states exist, not only to protect standard rights and opportunities of individuals, but also to protect people’s cultural membership” (p. 125). This membership comes along with citizenship and even group-*differentiated rights* are bound to this multiplicity of cultural memberships within a state and the idea of citizenship. In a sense, Kymlicka holds on to some form of consistency, that – although majority must adapt to immigrants – yet contradict itself by insisting that the majority culture must survive this adaptation and must be protected.

contradictions (p. 252). In contrast, multicultural territories, which are defined within a consistent whole, whether historical, lingual or cultural, are dealing with persuasion of *recognition* in a controllable and identifiable sameness. In this segmented form of content, there is no room for nomadic lives and unwritten events in a history that blindly follows the dominant linearity. This incongruity is for example shown in interviews where asylum seekers are forced to tell a story that is consistent with the interviewer's scientific and historic knowledge of the refugee's country of origin.¹² The current and accepted reports and statistics on the events in one's country are thus more relevant than the attempted inter-speech of the refugee or the migrant. History, even an individual history, belongs so to speak to a definable majority and demands only the form of consistency, that belongs to such majority. There is no alternative history. The legal system is not able to deal with the *stuttering* in an event, as I explained in 2.4.1 referring to Deleuze. It has no ear for the fatigues of a person who has been on the run for months. It lends no ear to the madness of sleepless nights. It is focused on the efficiency and effectiveness of the rejection and not on a story that appeals to inter-speak. The law is not an instrument of men: both the interviewed and the interviewer are stuck in between multiple legal territories that are defined according to an idea of clear national and cultural segments. The question is not "what have you been through?" but rather "show us adequately that you fulfill our image of you."

Multiculturalism is thus not the final argument of the idea of coherency as such. Multiculturalism shares the *identifiable focus* with totalitarianism. What multiculturalism favors is a multiplicity of coherencies or identities that occur in certain milieu and territory. On a rhizomatic level multiculturalism is a form of relative deterritorialization that breaks the deadlock of totalitarianism from within by unfolding its repressed and oppressed diversity. However, the urge of becoming majoritarian, even within one group, thus remains. Moreover, since there is no genealogy in the rhizome – neither fatherhood nor motherhood, neither brotherhood nor sisterhood – the ontology of a family is nevertheless always on a secondary level added to the connections. It is the assumption of a coherent identity that binds the community and, as we have seen with Foucault, this identity is internalized by its members, as a result of which subjectification takes place. Paradigms such as fatherland and motherland – which could operate as axiomatic as well as differential – show that in tracing the origin an amalgamation occurs between a sense of family and a sense of belonging to a nation/territory.

The tracing has already translated the map into an image; it has already transformed the rhizome into roots and radicles. It has organized, stabilized, neutralized the multiplicities according to the axes of signification and subjectification belonging to it. It has generated, structuralized the rhizome, and

¹²The demanded consistency depends moreover on the judgment of one person. The role of the judges in The Netherlands in asylum procedures is a good example here. The content of the story of asylum seeker is the responsibility of the officer, the judge must only deem on the juridical process. Yet, there is only one officer that reflects on the content of the story of an asylum seeker and there is no second monitoring (Kas, 2013). The consequences of such a regime was demonstrated when Russian asylum seeker Aleksandr Dolmatov was wrongfully considered to be deportable in the system. Eventually Dolmatov's suicide led to severe critique on the asylum procedures in The Netherlands. The same administrative error was done with hundreds of asylum-seekers (Boon, 2013).

when it thinks it is reproducing something else it is in fact only reproducing itself.
That is why the tracing is so dangerous (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 13).

5.2.2 Molar Territories

Is toleration of others by a community evaluated by the criteria related to the history of those others, such as refugees, or is their admission into a society contrasted to the community's capacity to hold on to its identity or segmented identities?¹³ Toleration is allowed as long as crucial change is not the case. While advocates of liberalism plead for freedom and diversity, liberal European governments are paradoxically very anxious about the differences that do not match their national histories. The European culture must thus sincerely acknowledge the fact that her fear is not based on the desire of maintaining the diversity but rather is based on the desire to uphold hegemony – as an axiomatic paradigm as Luban (2005) shows – or at most multiple hegemonies – a differential paradigm that defines the form of content of multiculturalism as *segmentalized territories*. A desire to belong to a hegemonic nationality, as Arendt (1968) argues, is longed for by the citizens as well as the non-citizens. 'Everybody' wants to be part of a family, despite the fact that exactly this urge of illusive and modern way of belonging to a nation is the key to one's prior exclusion.

What the European governments were so afraid of in this process was that the new stateless people could no longer be said to be of dubious or doubtful nationality ... Even though they had renounced their citizenship, no longer had any connection with or loyalty to their country of origin, and did not identify their nationality with a visible, fully recognized government, they retained a strong attachment to their nationality (p. 283).¹⁴

Assimilation, whether within the discourse of the majority or the discourse of majoritarian minorities, has thus a paradoxical agenda: it demands explicitly complete loyalty. Let us examine a Dutch example. With the rise of the 'Pim Fortuyn movement' in The Netherlands and the attack on the Twin Towers in the United States, the relationship between citizenship as a civic subject and governmental

¹³ One of the puzzling remarks of Kymlicka (1995) is – despite his awareness that minorities, national minorities and immigrants, endure systematic inequality in comparison to majority – that in the case of protection of national minorities the majority is disadvantaged the most. "There are many ways of promoting diversity, and it seems likely that protecting national minorities involves more cost to the majority than other possible ways. For example, a society could arguably gain more diversity at less cost by increasing immigration from a variety of countries than by protecting national minorities. The diversity argument cannot explain why we have an obligation to sustain the particular sort of diversity created by the presence of a viable, self-governing national minority" (p. 122). This is due to the fact that in Kymlicka's analysis immigrants, in contrast to national minorities, do not wish to separate themselves from the majority, but have willingly decided to leave their homelands in order to assimilate with another territorial majority. In this sense immigrants do not form a threat, because in his analysis they implicitly, despite the two-sided adaptation, long to assimilate in the country. This is also different from the refugees' state of mind, due to the fact that they did not voluntarily leave their country. Immigrants, according to Kymlicka, choose the liberal states willingly and specifically. Except, the question remains how this assimilation would bring about diversity. Are economic values the determining factors?

¹⁴ This is also H. De Schutter's (2005) comment on Kymlicka and Gellner. In their analysis of multiple cultures, the logic of nation-state remains within the segments as well as in the overall form that keeps the multiplicity together (pp. 23-27).

policies became explicit in the Dutch politics. This relationship was sensed as a gap between the course of governance and the needs of the citizens. Although Koole (2006) argues that this gap in the case of The Netherlands and in comparison to the rest of the world was rather a fiction than reality, the fact remained that this fictive gap, which was sensed on an affective level, rigorously transformed the political composition of the Dutch government. The tension between citizens and government, however, did not lead to discussions on subjects such as emancipation on political, economic and social level; they have instead primarily crystallized specific themes, such as migration, refugees and allegedly unbridgeable cultural and religious differences between the Muslim community and the rest of the society (Schinkel, 2008 & 2011). An atmosphere evolved in which the murder of Theo van Gogh by Mohammed Bouyeri became a motivation for suspecting the entire Muslim community; while the assassination of Pim Fortuyn by the eco-socialist Volkert van der Graaf did not lead to doubting the loyalty of large groups of so-called indigenous Dutch. The suspicion of disloyalty further expanded into not only the simplistic axiomatic paradigm of the *Other* but also differential paradigm of the others so that diverse groups such as Antilleans and refugees, even those who had escaped Islamic regimes because of their own secularism, became objective enemies. Due to criticism of dual citizenships in the Turkish and Moroccan communities, the campaign against Muslims has, for example, also led to criticism of secular Iranian refugees who, entirely against their will, are likewise blessed with dual nationalities.¹⁵ The so-called liberal demand of *individualism*, as Schinkel (2008) shows, *deindividualizes* the same individuals by their ethnicity, culture, religion and finally simply by their otherness (p. 156).

The problem of this double nationality did not merely apply exclusively to these groups, but other Dutch citizens with dual nationalities also endured political exclusion (Jessurun D'Oliveira, 2011). Yet the ethnic and racial stigma of dual nationalities was in some cases demonstrated with more open bias. When in 2010 the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD, a right-wing neoliberal party) and Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA, a right of center party) formed a minority government with the support of Party for Freedom (PVV, extreme right-wing party) one of the State Secretaries Marlies Veldhuijzen van Zanten appeared to possess double nationality: Dutch and Swedish. The PVV and VVD were obliged by their previous rhetoric on dual nationalities to react on the matter. Although the PVV is famous for its endless repetition of slogans, only a few remarks sufficed and they decided to *tolerate* Veldhuijzen van Zanten. The reaction of the Prime minister Mark Rutte (VVD) however was more explicit. Rutte had objected to the double nationality (Dutch and Turkish) of a prior State Secretary Nebahat Albayrak (PvdA, a moderate left-wing party) arguing that in case of Veldhuijzen van Zanten it was a different matter. The Turkish government, according to his argument, interferes with its subjects living abroad; the Swedish government does not (De Mul, 2017, p. 74).¹⁶ Such approach of double nationalities, according to De Mul creates once more a dangerous context for the *monomyth of blood and soil nationalism* (p. 205).

¹⁵ The same is true for Moroccan citizens. They are not allowed to denationalize voluntarily. It is even striking that municipal governments have decided not to register the double nationality of babies, while the question remains whether this non-registration has substantial effect on the possession of forced nationalities (Dubbele pas baby's niet meer in register gemeenten. 2011).

¹⁶ See: 'Lastig kwartiertje over dubbel paspoort', 2010.

While the fear of violent radicalization of multiple points of views raises real questions, the one-sided accentuation of radicalization as well as the simple demonization of an entire community is by some political theorists associated with the political mechanisms of the Second World War. Especially discussion on denationalization fed this fear.¹⁷ The argument is that the discourse of objective enemy and the logic of problematic citizenship – as Arendt (1968) warned us – is not shrinking but growing over time. The Jews and the LGBTQQ+ community, the Romani people¹⁸ and anti-racist activists such as Anton de Kom are not the only the so-called enemies of majoritarian culture. A new enemy is manufactured: a common enemy of the West, ‘the Muslim’ has become a global threat, even in the Middle East. The right-wing parties turned the multicultural tendency of tolerance against itself, by arguing that toleration of groups have led to their freedom to violate liberal values; without examining whether they themselves were upholders of the same values. Yet, in order to implement their axiomatic paradigms of exclusion these parties could simply make use of differential segments of multiculturalism that already divided the Dutch community into sections such as Moroccan, Antillean, Turkish, etc. In order for politics of exile to work, it needed politics of segments to divide territories.

This division however did not limit itself to western countries. Political Islamic movements and parties, whether radical or progressive,¹⁹ are even rejected when they enter the political stage in Islamic countries such as Egypt, Tunisia and Syria. In the West, through their supposed internal characteristics (cultural and religious profiling) owed largely to their external features (racial profiling), they are a danger to society. The criticism is not directed exclusively at those who misbehave and also happen to be Muslim, but to the faith itself. Due to this abstraction, the court acquitted PVV leader Geert Wilders from charges of racism. The Islam and the Muslim were detached in a juridical process and the political implication of such abstraction remains a mystery in the court of

¹⁷ It was however ironic to see how this issue was dealt with in the particular case of Ayaan Hirsi Ali, an anti-Islamic politician who switched from the PvdA to the VVD. When it appeared that she had logically spoken selectively about her past during her interview for an asylum request, information that was broadly known for that matter, Rita Verdonk, minister of integration, who was from the same political party, was nevertheless eager to follow the law consistently. Verdonk pled to reverse Hirsi Ali’s Dutch nationality. Hirsi Ali, who by then worked for the American government on the same issue of denationalizing Muslim Western Citizens, was highly indignant when the same policy was applied to her (De Jong, 2006).

¹⁸ The fact that the extermination of Romani People has never extensively been discussed in literature implicitly states that this form of condemnation as objective enemy rarely has been taken seriously while its effects endure in contemporary politics.

¹⁹ The attitude of the politicians towards Tariq Ramadan and Dyab Abou Jahjah in The Netherlands and Belgium are good examples in this regard. Tariq Ramadan is often accused of doublespeak. His attempt to promote and encourage participation of the Islamic youth in Dutch society and the juridical system is often dismissed by alleged accusations due to his attitude toward homosexuality. Ramadan at all times states that his attitude towards homosexuality is neither hostile in the West, nor in Islamic countries. Dyab Abou Jahjah’s radical attitude towards Western hypocrisy and his sympathy for Hezbollah movement in the Middle East is approached with the same form of hostility. Abou Jahjah’s comments are consistent with the logic of cultural differences. He pleads for freedom of cultural identities as long as they obey the law. In his way of thinking the juridical system is the neutral territory through which political inclusion and exclusion could be justified. The demands of total assimilation are thus unlawful. Yet, despite this problematic belief in the neutrality of the law, Jahjah’s critical comparison between fascism and demands of assimilation based on racial, ethnical and cultural differences remains substantial in the description of a politics that segregates citizens based on their background. Eventually Abou Jahjah’s views on these matters became problematic due to his sympathy for the Hezbollah movement.

law.²⁰ This led to a process, in which hate, terrorism and the repression of women are not attributed to individuals in circumstances with variable characteristics and widely divergent histories, but to religion as such, with the result that the right to freedom of expression appealed to a double moral standard, or as Schinkel (2008) calls it *digrammatical* standards. Statements made by Theo van Gogh and Pim Fortuyn resided under freedom of expression and assumed not to incite extreme and violent behavior. In contrast, statements by imams apparently did awake hatred for the European society and stimulate terrorism.

This intrinsically contradictory *segmented morality* is justified with such terms as disloyalty and disrespect for Dutch society and democratic values and norms. This line of argumentation raises contemporary rhetorical questions such as: How is someone to be respected if he is not completely loyal? The idea of loyalty lies, as we will see shortly, in the simplistic endless repetition of “yes or no?”, and “if you do not agree with us fully, then you are against us completely”, statements that are often associated with George W. Bush and Geert Wilders. It is not only a seemingly unproblematic opposition used against immigrants, but also imposed on other politicians who tend to think more nuanced.²¹ In February 2012 the Labor Party’s (PvdA) leader Job Cohen resigned under heavy pressure. Absurdly, the main critique on Cohen was that he was too civilized to debate with Wilders.²² What lies behind these lines of thought and politics is an idea that presumes a given perception of loyalty; only one specific discursive territory could establish someone’s loyalty. Phrased in the critical discourse of Deleuze and Guattari, Lorraine (2011) states:

Molar segmentarity precludes subtle differentiations, reducing identity to yes–no categories rather than allowing molecular mutations of these roles. ... Everyone must submit to the dualism machines of subjectification, either identifying their subjective experience with one of two opposing categories in a series of opposing categories or being subjected to such identification by others. ... Insofar as one’s identity is regulated with respect to the majoritarian subject, the oedipal subject positions of the family are affirmed and amplified rather than unraveled or undermined through competing lines of identification (p. 51).

²⁰ Parekh (1999) states: “Citizenship is about status and rights; belonging is about acceptance, feeling welcome, a sense of identification. The two do not necessarily coincide.” As to these affairs however the relation between citizenship and belonging is more complex, and less separate as is suggested by Parekh.

²¹ Humor often shows the simplicity of such rhetoric, which changes its opponents while repeating the same slogans. Two Dutch comedians play ex-shit-Moroccans – referring to the way that Moroccans are identified by populist politicians. They are fed up with Polish people, and state that since the PVV has put its target on the Polish their place in the rhetoric of discrimination is decreased. They ironically state that they were the ones who helped the PVV to their success by being the excluded minority, and are flabbergasted that they have jobs now and without a fight can enter dancehalls. In this short film, they mock the manner in which PVV without hesitation moves from the exclusion of one minority to the other (DWDD, 2012)

²² According to Bas Heijne (2012) the problem of Cohen was not that he was too civil, but rather that this civilized attitude failed to connect with the common man. It remained a personal characteristic rather than a connective political trait. It was Cohen’s upper-class attitude within a laborer setting that ended his career as the leader of the social-democratic party.

The segments of multicultural politics thus show *molar tendencies*. They are defined and separated, in other words differentiated by enforcing some reconstructed form of identifiable segment claiming an *actual reality*. In order to implement such differentiation, politics of segments needs more than the willingness of the majority. It needs the belief of its majoritarian minority to implement this segmentation within the content of this politics. In a casual interview on Dutch television *The Girls of Halal* (Meiden van Halal), a Dutch television show, the Muslim girls confront the stand-up comedian Hans Teeuwen with his perverse comments on the girls and Islam. Teeuwen, a very provocative stand-up comedian, rigidly defends his right to offend people, and his rigidity can be conceived as an acceptable form of resistance to totalitarian thought. He is convinced that words cannot harm people, and if people take offence it is due to their own totalitarian thought. There is no moment of self-reflection in his thinking that it is often a male, white, heterosexual, well-educated, not-disabled and prosperous person that demands others to *not* be offended by their enforced state of minority. Nonetheless, when Teeuwen confronts the girls with the fact that another guest in their show excludes homosexuals and women with revealing clothing, the girls offer no riposte. They are unable to compare this form of insult with that of their own. Neither the comedian nor the girls step out of their boxes; they remain loyal to one form of thought and consistency (*Hans Teeuwen en De Meiden van Halal*, 2007)

Is loyalty unconditional?²³ Do immigrants, the children of immigrants and refugees suffer from their double loyalties, and hence due to their alleged indecision immediately become fatally disloyal to the rest of the inhabitants of a society? Are there no more critical questions to be asked, as is the case for military personnel, who must blindly follow orders, or for ‘docile bodies’ as Foucault labeled the substance matter for disciplined subjects? There is no question of reciprocity, just mindless allegiance. This form of loyalty is exclusive due to its reference to closed segments that rhetorically reproduce their own consistency that is presumably incompatible – as Schinkel (2011, p. 144) argues – with other consistencies in other segments of the multicultural construction and the general context of a society. It excludes other forms of loyalty, or turbulences and intensities within their form of loyalty.

The connection between the logic of politics of segments and politics of exile is once again shown when we see how both paradigms of identification within politics of segments are frequently used by the PVV in order to enforce politics of exile. The decision to assimilate to Dutch society, for example by becoming a non-Islamic woman, is misleadingly interpreted as the final liberation of the subject. According to this line of reasoning full submission to the homogeneity of the dominant culture is the key to liberty; *freedom of speech* is placed within one form of consensus in which freedom and speech are fully defined; equality in this interpretation of liberation thus presented as an egalitarian trait. Schinkel thus argues that only in sameness – by defining emancipation of women through standard categories of secular thinking – is equality perceived. The so-called unliberated other is doomed to what he calls *secular purgatory*.

Could we choose to be loyal to some parts of a culture or does loyalty mean total admission to a ‘whole’? If loyalty is rephrased in terms of trust, the kind that is sensed between two friends, then, by

²³ See on this issue also Rahimy, 2007.

definition, loyalty cannot be forced or demanded. It is achieved by mutual respect, voluntarily and always at varying levels. Loyalty to one's friend does not exclude other forms of friendships and loyalty to others. Loyalties are not bound to passports. They are supported by given bodies of thought. As Ghorashi (2003) shows, in an open and communicative context one can be loyal to a specific background, with its tradition of hospitality and modesty, and also fight for freedom of speech, doing everything possible to uphold antidiscrimination laws. These loyalties are not contradictory, nor are they characteristics of a certain nationality or culture. They bear witness to an ethical *plurality of trust*.

The reduction of potential plurality of trust appears within a politics of segments by imposing the idea of a differentiating sense of belonging to a group, i.e. groups that isolate through a fixating and non-connective manner of identification. I have typified such tendency of segmentation and approach in the first part as *fascicular and molar*. The *molar territories* of multiculturalism emerge from an exclusive, oppositional thinking claiming that different territories demand loyalties that by definition must pose obstacles to one another and finally exclude each other. Majoritarian and majoritarian minority movements could not claim such an exclusive state without necessarily becoming totalitarian, even if this totalitarianism refers to one particular segment in a society.

Totalitarian movements are mass organizations of atomized, isolated individuals. Compared with all other parties and movements, their most conspicuous external characteristic is their demand for total, unrestricted, unconditional, and unalterable loyalty of the individual member. ... Total loyalty is possible only when fidelity is emptied of all concrete content, from which changes of mind might naturally arise (Arendt, 1968, pp. 323-324).

History shows us that almost every stratum of thought with universal claims of truth runs the risk of becoming literally exclusive. Indeed, any group that, because of an absolute conviction of being utterly right, no longer tolerates any other political or religious truths, is not only fundamentalist, but also leans toward militant extremism. Also, exclusive universalism of this kind is visible in Guantanamo Bay, coined by Agamben as an exemplary case of excluded inclusion beyond and yet within the law.

Another important example is the car bombings in Baghdad. This city has become a zone of war largely due to American invention "for the sake of democracy" and due to the rigidity of multiple conflicting factions. This state is the result of an amalgamation of multiple exclusive loyalties and thought for which the West as well as the East are mutually responsible. To justify this exclusivity, an image of an enemy is required in order to have an object onto which to graft an illusory, immovable we, an identity of one's own. The image of an enemy is of vital importance for this sense of we. In terms of Deleuze and Guattari the percept and the affect are fused in a sensation that is reproduced time and again by 'sensational' media exposure. It is created by constructing fixed identities, which as a rule are based on ethnicity, religious conviction, sex and political or sexual preferences. This also counts for policies of other countries like Russia. While in Russia homosexuals, bisexuals and lesbians are systematically banned from the protection of the law, in Dutch society the political parties

instrumentalized these groups in order to exclude other minorities. Art practices try to subvert this sensational media exposure with totalitarian traits. As a result, the photographer Erwin Olaf became a victim of both forms of rigidity himself. He preferred neither to become a racist, nor a repressed homosexual. Eventually torn by these affects of segmentalization it became unbearable for him to live in Amsterdam. Anil Ramdas (2012), Dutch journalist and writer, was tormented by depression due to his rejection of segments in thought in a world that demanded such a *differenciating loyalty*. This plurality of connections was also a theme of his final show, shortly recorded before his suicide.²⁴

Once more, what is misleading is the reference to clear loyalty to affect such political ideals as integrity and political notions such as participation. Integrity, with its literal meaning of ‘not to be touched’ – *noli me tangere* – but politically interpreted and applied in the notion ‘integration’ as becoming part of a whole, is affirmed not by critical thought and serious inter-speak between political agents that respect one another while holding different views, but merely by an unproblematic I do belong to this group. Parekh (1999) even states:

The commitment to the political community involves commitment to its continuing existence and well-being, and implies that one cares enough for it not to harm its interests and undermine its integrity. It is a matter of degree and could take such forms as a quiet concern for its well-being, deep attachment, affection, and intense love.

Therefore, when the submission is not total but problematic, the *non-integrity* of the agent is a fact, Schinkel (2008) argues. Even if the subject is fully active in the society, merely being critical of this society bears witness to his non-participation within a segment that he or she is supposed to participate. The lack of sameness thus is not only viewed as the lack of integrity, but also as a lack of being connected to society.

At the same time, as shown before, the discrepancy between individual liberty and loyalty to a group is always implicitly effective. Multiculturalism – the formation of its content – appears in the twist between two differentiating paradigms: identification of a group and identification of an individual and their differentiating affects: loyalty and liberty. At the one hand, it creates groups of people based on specific identity and demands a certain *loyalty* of its members. On the other hand, it imposes an idea of an isolated individual that must *liberate* itself from a group of people. Yet, a molar principle remains intact in both paradigms by their neglect of the rhizomatic connections that underpin both. Neither groups nor isolated individual, due to a certain approach toward affects loyalty and liberty, are capable of surpassing the segments. It is within such logic that multiculturalism creates within its presupposed opposition between individual and group, as well as between segmentalized groups, a non-relating sense of *relativism*. In the end the narrative of multiculturalism, as Ahmed (2014) argues, projects sameness

²⁴ The title of Kort’s article ‘The Man Who Always Wanted to Belong Somewhere’ (2012) misses the complexity of Ramdas’ sense of belonging. Anil Ramdas fought for a sense of belonging but not to somewhere specific, a plural form of belonging by not belonging to a defined group.

into a love for difference. Difference becomes an ideal by being represented as a form of likeness; it becomes a new consensus that binds us together. ... it conceals how love for difference is also a form of narcissism; a desire to reproduce the national subject through how it incorporates others into itself. ... These communities are constructed as narcissistic in order to elevate the multicultural nation into an ideal, that is, in order to conceal the investment in the reproduction of the nation (pp. 138-139).

5.3 Contextualization and Cultural Discourse

5.3.1 Multiple Paradigms and Fleeting Concepts

The idea of distinctive segments as form of content defines a multicultural milieu. Discourse on loyalty in the contemporary European politics in this sense affirms the idea of absolute distinction between these segments. Yet this discourse, with its self-proclaimed imperative of toleration, does neither create a peaceful treaty in-between the segments, nor understands the complexity within these segments and their relation to one another. Segments clash and disrupt each other. It is the impossibility of non-involvement in-between segments. Some artworks sensitize such settings of in-between. Such reterritorialization is sensitized by Danis Tanovic in his recall of the war in former Yugoslavia in his film *No Man's Land* (2001). The misty scenery in which the film starts is pregnant with political themes and affective reactions. The haze stands for being lost, and the outcome is uncertain. The misty figures in the image are shielded from contact with the enemy: friends and foes are both blinded by the mist. How do the men who are trapped in this mist define themselves? How do they relate to the complexity of the uncertain surroundings? The con-fusion reaches its peak when the Bosnian Ciki and the Serbian Nino get stuck in a trench in-between lines of fire. Lines are inhabited by soldiers who, while having been horrified by newspaper images of Rwanda, nevertheless do not comprehend the rigidity of their own way of thinking. Two naked men waving white flags, each facing the other side, introduce the dividing line within the trench. Nonetheless, they depend on one another in order to survive. The two naked targets indicate multiplicity that neither the soldiers on either side of the trench nor the UN peacekeeping forces can comprehend the in-between setting of war. Two means that by extension the number of friends or foes is unknown. Their survival depends on the 'impartial' involvement of a third party, the UN – ironically called UNPROFOR – and their dubious form of humanitarian aid. They are called the *Smurfs* due to their blue helmets. They lack involvement even when everything is under control and no shots are fired. The Smurfs are an uninterested party and arrogantly confident of their own civilization and convinced of the madness of the combating parties. While the French Charlie, an UN merchant, finally, with the help of journalist Jane, detaches himself from the uninterested smurfness, by stating "Neutrality does not exist in the face of murder. Doing nothing to stop it is, in fact, choosing", the bleakness of the state of Ciki and Nino becomes unavoidable. In the end, when Ciki and Nino are finally saved, they murder one another. The war goes on; the uncertainty of the zone of indistinction is endures at all cost.

Art has a role in sensitizing its audiences for different perspectives on identity and belonging. These forms of expression open lines of flight within lines of segments that enables me to criticize the sense of belonging from this molar perspective. There are artists who combine or dismantle a sense of segmentalized loyalty. Tanovic images show how violent such loyalty could become. Nonetheless, through his images Tanovic creates room for another form of loyalty, a connective form of loyalty. The conversations within the setting of the trench permanently oscillate in-between segmented loyalties and connective loyalties. Another, such potential loyalty can also be found in the work of the Chilean Dutch artist, Jorge Kata Núñez. The proposed sketch he submitted for a mural painting, which was made in commission of the Centrum Beeldende Kunst (Centre of Visual Arts) in Rotterdam, shows a trotting world-travelling horse (*La Trotamundos*) (Thissen, 2007, p. 241) whose markings are a map of the globe. Time after time, this ever-in-motion creature escapes being closed in to join up with yet another *we* that opens its arms to him. Núñez, who fled his country in the seventies, portrays the image of a body that has submitted to multiple *we*'s: Chile, The Netherlands, Salvador Allende, communism, mural painting communities, prisoners, tortured people, refugees, eco activists. He never denies any *we* but maps out their lines of connection. In response to a society at odds with itself, one individual demands reciprocity that has been lost as a basic right, while the other abandons that dubious space the moment that the reciprocity of loyalty no longer exists.

The Iraqi writer Al Galidi is a different matter. He lost his loyalty to The Netherlands when he was forced to choose between his dying father and a residence permit. In order not to forfeit his right to the permit, he needed permission to leave The Netherlands to visit his dying father in Jordan, for the last time. Repeated visits to the Dutch Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND) proved fruitless. In the end, Al Galidi put his rights at risk by seeking a false passport. He is rather loyal to his father instead of a nation-state. Before he could visit him, his father died in a strange country without seeing his son. In 2007, following a general pardon, Al Galidi has his residence permit, but for him, it is nothing more than a “massage for a dead body” (Koelewijn, 2007). Al Galidi is an example of a lack of loyalty. Neither Iraq nor The Netherlands offers him a sense of *we*. Only *writing in movements* can claim his affection, loyalty to writers that surpass borders.

If the form of content in multicultural society could be typified, as suggested by Helder De Schutter (2005), as *mosaic*al wholes in which segments are assumed to be distinguishable, what then is the form of expression of such politics of segments that demands disconnecting forms of loyalty? How do we communicate and construct these forms of consistency, reterritorializing a diffuse matter of expression in another way than artists do? In other words, with what kind of discursive paradigms do multicultural segments *form* consistency within expression? One of the paradigms that shape the form of expression of multiculturalism is the differential understanding of the paradigm *context*. Context, although etymologically referring to textuality - con-text - is a broadly used notion. It indicates: “a joining together of texture”. Let us define it as a weave of networks, or as mentioned before it operates as a sieve: a plane of consistency (see: 2.4.2).

Except, despite the potentiality and complex reality that this notion expresses; within the frameworks of expression of a politics of segments this paradigm rather functions as a differential paradigm. First, it can function as an analytical or political tool; thus, as we have seen in chapter three, introducing a

differential paradigmatic characteristics into functions of ordinary sciences or conceptual thinking within philosophy. Political ideologies and thought are often formed by a reference to a so-called contextual reality and to the formation of political subjects in certain, identifiable networks. While classical liberalism accentuates the individual differences in a liberal context, communism accentuates the formation of communities and the formation of power as a socioeconomic context in which individuals are shaped. The differential paradigmatic use of the notion context gives rise to a certain political discourse. Social, psychological, biological or as Schinkel (2008) shows cultural context become singular explanatory elements to clarify individual behaviors or tools for statistical evaluations of a group of people.

Second, context is not only a differential paradigmatic tool to analyze a certain reality but also a discourse strategic tool that eventually can be implemented itself within policies, such as identity politics as we will see shortly, and to counter politician's rhetoric. Context can be used intentionally as a versatile instrument in order to justify a political agenda. This rhetoric could be used to defend the idea that there is a 'given' context, which can be isolated and defined, consequently bringing about political and social decisions. A contextual complexity is vulnerable to molar differentiation into oppositional-segmented contexts that could be detached from one another forming different political points of view. This raises the question whether such a detachment occurred in the case of the conflict between Israel and Palestine. The intertwined territories as well as amalgamated context were maneuvered into two incommensurable contexts, one representing the Western interest and the other the Middle Eastern; with Donald Trump in the middle kissing holy walls after selling guns.²⁵ It was not surprising that the Palestinian performer Taher Najib in a debate *Far From Conflict*, in Rotterdam, in 2009, was amazed that the public could not make a difference between the Jewish people as a historic entity, the State of Israel as form of government, and the west as the overall manipulator of it all. When he was asked: "How can the international community help their cause?"; he fiercely stated: "Please stop helping us!". In his performance *In Spitting Distance*, a Palestinian suddenly is identified by the east, becoming an Arab and by implication the face of terror after the events of 9/11. The discrepancy of contexts is neutralized through the connecting act of spitting. A spit that travels beyond the borders of segments. Najib creates a potential affect of context by resisting its axiomatic as well as differentiating affect.

Opposition can be silenced by introduction of a new context that binds the so-called opposed positions. This was the case when the PVV started a discourse in which East- and Middle-European migrants were characterized as drunk and unmanageable individuals who threatened the harmony of

²⁵In case of The United States, Butler (2004) comments: "Like 'terrorist,' 'slaughter' is a word that, within the hegemonic grammar, should be reserved for unjustified acts of violence against First World nations, if I understand the grammar correctly. Giuliani hears this as a discourse of justification, since he believes that slaughter justifies military self-defense. He calls the statements 'absolutely untrue,' I presume, not because he disputes that there have been deaths on the Palestinians side, and that the Israelis are responsible for them, but because 'slaughter' as the name for those deaths implies an equivalence with deaths of the World Trade Center victims. It seems, though, that we are not supposed to say that both groups of people have been 'slaughtered' since that implies a 'moral equivalence,' meaning, I suppose, that the slaughtering of one group is as bad as the slaughtering of the next, and that both, according to his framework, would be entitled to self-defense as a result" (p. 13-14).

Dutch society. PVV made a website in which the Dutch citizens anonymously could complain about these specific migrants. This website was considered to be juridically unproblematic. Therefore, a political discussion was not necessary according to Prime Minister Mark Rutte. He used this juridical fact in order to waive political comment on the matter. The representatives of Eastern- and Middle-European countries however, who for that matter were previously silent about the same form of discrimination against non-European migrants, began a European campaign. This campaign emphasized their shared territorial context: Europe; their shared economic context: the labor efforts of these migrants; and their shared historical context: the participation of citizens of these countries in the Second World War and their heroic acts in The Netherlands during this time. While PVV divided the contexts, failing to mention the fact that these migrants work in places that many Dutch citizens do not wish to work due to the low wages and harsh work,²⁶ the Eastern- and Middle-European communities challenged the artificiality of the bias context by the introduction of a form of shared context. Yet, this argumentation for a shared context remained within the logic of politics of segments due to its desire to detach from other types of context. The campaigners implicitly expressed that this shared context is needed for their support to empower political parties such as PVV to exclude other forms of migration, namely non-European migrants.²⁷

Next to opposing tendency of context as a differential paradigm, within the framework of positive discrimination, other types of policies rather create opportunities for specific types of context: for example, the context of being a female within an academic setting. Thus, the specific differential paradigm – womanhood – gives rise to processes of empowerment of certain identities within the society. I was able to begin my PhD project thanks to an initiative of The Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). This initiative was ironically called *Mozaiek*. Due to the lack of scientific opportunities for students with ethnic minority background, who have demonstrated academic excellence, a grant was initiated specifically for them. This grant gave them access to the scientific world. Without this grant, I would probably not have written these words. Yet, opportunities also backfire due to their segmentations. The fact that such opportunities exist gave no rise to a fundamental critical questioning of the problem of diversity within universities. The discussion on diversity remained in the segmented logic of this form of politics.

To understand context is to understand that human beings are contextualized. However, to understand the immense effect of contextualization one must examine and dismantle the frequently obtuse presuppositions of the politics of context, meaning the differential paradigmatic use of the term context.

First: *the minority is no more contextualized than majority, nor is it more determined by its contextualization*. Although statistics often accentuate some contexts more than others, each individual is moved and blocked by the context that defines its individuality and commonality. There is no more or less contextualization, like a gradual line starting with a free healthy heterosexual white male and

²⁶ See documentary on the Dutch mushroom company with Eastern and Middle-European laborers (Keuringsdienst van Waarde, 2012).

²⁷ See: Open brief aan de Nederlandse samenleving en haar politieke leiders. (2012); Harde brief die toch niet alles zegt. (2012); and Haakman, (2012).

ending with a repressed lesbian disabled colored girl with a headscarf. The fact that *Mozaiek* initiated a context in which minority intellectuals could start a scientific career does not mean that they are more contextualized than others. It instead indicates that their context is more accentuated and isolated as a specific whole for some in order to exclude them and for others in order to empower them to resist this formation of power. There is no quantitative measure but a qualitative impact of context due to constructions of distribution of power.

Second, one cannot simply define and reduce a context into binary opposites, and isolate different forms of it, in order to manage or analyze their course. A context, as a potential plane of consistency, is too complex to be analyzed into clear schemes of differential paradigms. Context as an abstract notion has a fragile and transforming character. It changes its face over time and in different spaces. The context of a laborer now is not the same as the context of a laborer in 1818, and being a laborer in Germany now is not the same as being a laborer in Singapore. Also, it should be clear that the notion of liberalism in the United Kingdom and Canada systematically differs from liberalism in the United States. Of course, different forms of labor-contexts or liberal-contexts are *related* but this relationship does not naturally imply that they can be *equated*. In line with the reasoning of Deleuze and Guattari (1987 & 1994), it could be stated that there are groups of affects, functions, concepts and paradigms that form a certain plateau. There are also families of plateaus that differ and relate to one and other. This indicates that there is not one particular context, verbal or social,²⁸ that defines a subject. Lines of subjectification are woven into complex interaction and conflict between different contexts. For example: that some persons originate from the same country does not imply that these people share the same strata of contextuality. Due to the complexity of this notion whether on conceptual philosophical level, scientific functional level or political paradigm – in contrast to the differential paradigm of context – understanding the rhizomatic nature of a context and contextuality as a potential plane of consistency does not simply comfort us with clarities but instead creates more confusion and generates different paradoxes.

The differential paradigmatic understanding of context in multiculturalism is inextricably related to another paradigm and its differential typification: *culture*. Next to politics of context, *politics of culture* is determining for the frameworks of expression within politics of segments. Political, social, psychological and artistic arenas are all related to cultural diversity and cultural backgrounds. This form of diversity is appreciated and financed in the case of positive discrimination; and in other cases, feared and rejected. Nevertheless, the question remains what do we mean by *culture*? Does the notion of culture within politics, sciences, art and philosophy operate axiomatically, differentially or impotentially? To which type of images of thought does it give rise? In the previous chapter, we have seen the manner in which politics of exile creates an axiomatic understanding of culture by producing an idea of inferior cultures and a superior Culture. In the last chapter, through the idea of politics of life culture rather gives rise to impotential connections within coming communities. In this chapter, we explore an idea of culture as a differential paradigm within politics of segments.

²⁸ *Verbal context* refers to an assumption of understanding of a certain coherency within a specific language and *social context* refers to the assumption of a coherency and its understanding within the boundaries of a certain identity.

Culture traditionally refers to social relations *between humans*, but nowadays scientists discover more and more that animals are also bound to cultures and have demonstrated creativity in changing its elements. An elephant is an acutely social being, attached to its milieu. However, in the YouTube film *Match made in Africa* an orphaned baby elephant seems to behave differently in an alternative milieu. It comes under the protection of a sheep, and against all odds they create together a different form of community. It is even in this so-called natural state a rhizomatic connection in-between species. Culture and speciesism are often intertwined. Human species gain their superiority often by an assumption that they are superior due to having a culture next to nature. Yet, projecting culture and even language on merely humans is an old-fashioned modernistic idea. However, even in the human world, the concept of culture refers to multiple components such as anthropology, the cultivation of land, and urban life as in urban culture, pop culture, and visual culture. It is also linked to concepts such as art; urban culture for example is often partially measured by its interventions in public space. It implicitly and explicitly presents almost every gestural aspect of human interaction. And as with other notions, the term culture presupposes different forms of oppositions. This is the case in culture and religion;²⁹ culture and nature; culture on a personal level versus a collective level; and finally, main culture as a dominant discourse versus subcultures as events that break through or get repressed by the main cultural strata. Culture, nonetheless, while in every aspect not a segmented concept, can have differential effects through which communities are set apart as segments.

Culture – on the level of nationalism and ethnicity – also functions as a differential paradigm framework in our political interactions and expression. Within such frameworks lies a presumption of a clear understanding of culture, as is indicated by the term *culturalism* (Schinkel, 2008 & 2010). His main argument is that in modern times society is not defined as a mechanism but rather as an organism, divided not only in presumed racial segments but also presumed cultural incompatible segments. It is within these enforced incompatible characteristics that politics of segments gives rise to a relativistic non-relational attitude in-between people and communities. Schinkel argues that it is due to an understanding of society as an isolated organism – rather than in Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) words as a body without organs – that specific ‘organic’ notions emerge such as disease and illness, which must be combated at any cost in order to survive. Nevertheless, Ahmed (2014) as well as many other critical minds within revolutionary sciences maintain the idea that culture is always artificially segmented and as such misused within power constructions in order to axiomatically or differentially detach individuals from one and other. Categories such as western and non-western migrants – presuming a clear European and non-European culture, is an example. Yet if we follow the argumentation of the campaign defending the rights of Eastern and Middle-Eastern Europeans; we could simply state that Moroccan citizens share the same European culture due to their participation in the Second World War. As Song (2010) states: “Cultures are not distinct, self-contained wholes; they

²⁹ Arendt (1978^a) makes this distinction between culture and religion by stating that “culture is by definition secular” (p. 92). She also states that individuals within the Jewish community, despite their secularism, were deprived of a formation of a Jewish culture, because the same secularism forced them to abandon their heritage. Nonetheless, such distinction between religion and culture remains dependent of a secular image of thought.

have long interacted and influenced one another through war, imperialism, trade, and migration” (p. 6).

Cultures, despite its often disconnected relativistic approach, have always been the result of cross overs. Even without these forms of economic and violent penetrations cultures unfold new strata from within. Our global culture is the ultimate laboratory in which, as the effect of digitalization, new cultures are shaped. This remains also the main critique of H. De Schutter (2005) on Kymlicka. De Schutter states that while Kymlicka admits that the content of multiculturalism is intrinsically plural, nevertheless he initiates a unitary form on this plural content. De Schutter thus argues that not only the hegemony of the content must be problematized but also the clarity and transparency of the vehicles (pp. 27-28). “Many people do not live in monocultural national blocks, and there is no reason why political theory should coerce them to do so” (p. 37). According to De Mul (2017) such monocultural understanding of culture testifies of a *cultural autism* that fails to understand the complexity of individual lives in contemporary societies. A homogeneous understanding of culture is not an approach toward the phenomenon of culture; but arises from the miscomprehension through such autistic attitude (p. 100). Due to the complexity and the extent of the notion of culture it is rather questionable that the combination of a Libyan, an Indian and a Spaniard is more culturally diverse than a combination of two Eritrean people. Even two autistic people are not one and the same. Despite their common identification they differ. I do not want to argue or plead for the insignificance of culture but prefer to point out that its significance may have been misunderstood. Culture is significant – there is no question about it – but is it significant in order to name a collective, and in case of multiculturalism multiple collectives; or does comprehension of culture rather forces us to acknowledge an unavoidable diversity? How culture differentiates potentially and dismantles segmented wholes or integrates new wholes becomes a question of permanent relevance.

There is no doubt that no blueprint and no program will ever make sense in cultural matters (Arendt, 1978^a, p. 93).

Despite its immensity, it has become obvious how fragile culture can become. In times of economic and political crisis, when the critical affect of cultural production and protest is needed most, it is almost invariably cut back or entirely discarded. Because culture does not lend itself to universal or uniform interpretation, it has an ambiguous relation to morality and juridical judgment. Despite the fact that culture cannot be reduced to one form of morality, politics of segments gives rise to moral judgments that presuppose certain homogeneity or hegemonies that are disconnected. The political discussion in current political affairs in The Netherlands is often moved by such *segmented normation*, as we have seen in the fourth chapter with the protest activities around Black Pete. Culture can become an axiomatic paradigm, an *object* of moral judgments, in the sense of exclusion as a form of illness, as Schinkel (2008 & 2011) suggests; or a differential paradigm excluding reflective judgment within and in-between segments. It thus has the tendency to become a determinant judgment within the segments of cultures. This often happens with a specific nation-related form of culture, like the Arab culture and its reduction to simple terrorism. It can also appear in a more implicit sense, like the refusal to fund cultural sectors and institutions during war and economic crises. Cultural activities, such as public debates, artistic works and even educational activities are, from the perspective of capitalistic

economic norm, seen as non-profitable activities, some times even morally condemned as unimportant luxuries. Culture thus always oscillates between a segmentarized framework and a fragile impotential paradigm.

Context and culture within a politics of segments refer to yet another differential paradigm: *identity*. Both context and culture in their differentiating mode involve discourses infused by mechanisms of identification. The form of expression of politics of segments as a macro-, meso- and micropolitics is based on identities. Within politics of identities, each identity contains its own differential paradigmatic tendency. There are many thoughts on and many forms of identity. Different structures, each with their own disorders, are implied by a certain perspective on identity. The history of philosophy testifies of numerous reflections on this concept. In a dialectical sense identity as a concept is defined by its opposite – difference – and the reflections on identities trigger other oppositions such as in-itself/for-itself, body/mind, object/subject, consciousness/unconscious, coherency/chaos, continuity/rupture. Philosophical reflections distinguish between multiple aspects, components and forms that are implied by the concept of identity. Feminist and anticolonial studies have problematized these normative differentiations within the concept of identity with its secondary reference to otherness as an excluded margin of a western and male interpretation. Luce Irigaray's work entitled *This Sex Which is Not One* (1985) elaborates on how language forces its categories on consciousness, a logic she inverts by inventing a 'new speak' that favors feminine desire. The arguments between Edward Said (1978) and Ian Buruma & Avishai Margalit (2004) on axiomatic paradigmatic relationship between respectively *Orientalism* and *Occidentalism* bear witness to the differential as well as axiomatic paradigmatic effects of identification in relation to territories. They problematize the images of thought in different disciplines such as philosophy, science, art and politics.

Naming a collective, whether through recognition or for the sake of exclusion, belongs to a certain form of politics of identity, a politics that is popularized in stereotypes such as Muslim-fundamentalist, sexual black man, slutty western women, but also stereotypes as the sensitive female and the macho man. Literature such as John Gray's *Men Are from Mars, Women Are from Venus* (2012) refers not to multiplicity but to extremely prejudiced binary oppositions. In these cases, identity is often *a fed cliché* in a politics of kitsch: used by politicians to ingratiate themselves to voters and irresistible to comedians. Still, the same identity is also for those who it is forced upon an instrument of resistance. The immense amount of migrant-organizations in The Netherlands is already an indication of how majoritarian minorities separate themselves through paradigms of identity in order to form communities and enforce emancipatory empowerment (Van Heelsum, 2004). This at least explains why emancipatory politics in the US is often called *Identity Politics*.

Rather than being a work-in-progress, always moving from segment to segment, I exist in either one segment or another with no variation. Once I 'become a woman,' I am sexy (or not) until I am 'off the market' (i.e., married); once I give birth, I am a mother for life. Segments are overcoded on a uniform grid so that they enter into redundant resonance (Lorraine, 2011, p. 52).

Within the emancipatory movements the link between identity and *recognition* is crucial. Yet, is recognition always in need of identity or can it function flexibly in its act of connecting subjects to others and to themselves? Renante D. Pilapil (2015) argues that the act of recognition between individuals is of importance paradoxically due to the *inability* of an identity to become permanent. And due to this complex connection neither identity nor recognition could last forever or become fixed. Pilapil argues for the necessity and the acknowledgement of misrecognition within the concept of recognition. It is not the negative binary relation that divides the two concepts recognition and non-recognition, but rather the lack of a clear recognition in its reference to the paradigm of identity that visualizes the complexity and the plurality of the concept of recognition itself. Non-recognition is not the opposite but a supplementary force within recognition. Inclusion and exclusion are not simple givens or clear opposites, but as Ghorashi (2003) states: “processes of inclusion and exclusion are at work interchangeably and contribute to the senses of belonging and estrangement” (p. 22).

Still, despite this instable character in-between recognition and identity, and complexity of inclusion and exclusion, politics of segments enforces permanently an idea of fixed clarity of identification upon individuals. Forms of expression in cinema, visual arts and literature can deconstruct the politics of identity in sensitizing its audiences for a far subtler relation between identity and difference. Fatih Akin’s *Gegen die Wand* (2004) is the devastating image of such non-recognition. Sibel and Cahit marry one another, neither for love or affection, nor for the sake of obeying their parents. They marry because they are united paradoxically in both their non-recognition and resistance to recognition within the Turkish as well as the German society. Akin – with the help of excellent actors – shows that in a world where recognition has become the same as acknowledgement of and subscription to an differentiating identity, these ambiguous *multipolar figures* are positioned *against/towards the wall* in becoming almost fatally self-destructive. Within the segments of politics of segments these *multipolar figures* leave in Derrida’s (1982) terms traces of *différance*, the unheard, the unseen, the unwanted. Despite their so-called non-existence within such politics they undermine segments of differential identities in a fundamental way.

Reflection on the politics of identity and the condemnation of simplistic recognition is also a concern for the visual artist Atousa Bandeh Ghiasabadi. In her drawings and writings, she wonders: “what is universal and what is wrongfully generalized,” without rejecting either possibility. She has experienced the identifying *image* that politics on all levels has forced her to be and as an artist has obliged her to produce. How can one defy such a force? At first, she does this by refusing all the characteristics of such a differential identity. On the cover of the book *Sideways, Reflections on Changing Contexts in Art* Bandeh Ghiasabadi’s multipolar affect of such rejection is imperatively sensitized:

What I should avoid:

- Ornaments or decorative elements
- Mosques
- Symbols or metaphors
- Political statements
- Work about women repressed or otherwise

- Women in scarf, veil or chador
- Women naked or poorly dressed
- Women at all
- Language elements like alphabets, poetry or stories
- Subjects referring to immigration, refugees or foreigners
- Autobiographical works because they allude to all of the above-mentioned elements (Various writers, 2010).

During the process of becoming an artist she, however, changes her mode of resistance by refusing to be a total negation. Her paintings do not deny the exotic image, but in some sense, seem to exaggerate the fed cliché image to such an extent that it shames the viewer to think in such identities. The eyes look back, forcing the supposed hegemony to be reconsidered. The images are the recognition and rejection of recognition of an exotic cliché in one and the same act (Various writers, 2010, pp. 9-40). The virtuality of non-recognition is sensitized in an extremely actualized recognizable image, as it were creating a differential counter-paradigm.

Then again, just as the politics of exile, within the framework of politics of segments the force of being identified is not only felt by minorities; but by all. This is the effect of majoritarian minorities, that enforce their segments upon majority as well as minority. Not only are minorities defined through such paradigms, but also other subjects are eventually condemned by being defined as a majority. Ghorashi (2010) states that the *internalization of the process of culturalism* at the end will define the whole process of experiencing culture for all who are involved (p. 131). The act of identifying the sexes not only condemns the female body, but also enforces homogeneity upon the male body. The expression ‘boys don’t cry’ is a blockage of affect that forcefully checks the affective potentiality of the child. Terrence Malick’s film *Tree of Life* (2011) is a complex image of a man following as well as dismantling identities. The character of young Jack, played by Hunter McCracken, is an image of a boy who deterritorializes the image of how a man should be. It is an affective subjectivity rather than a clear identity. The image of the mother is another matter. Mrs. Obrain, played by Jessica Chastain, is unusually young and remains young even when her boys are adults. Is she a ghost of a woman died young, or is she the fed cliché image of woman who over time must remain the same: without wrinkles, in perfect shape? Identity affects us in many ways, creating an antagonistic feeling of shame, arrogance and insecurity all at once (Van Duijvenboden, 2010).

While the paradigm of exclusion often refers to the experience of being a migrant, the inhabitants experience other forms of exclusion. The rise of populist politics may be facilitated by opposing a fictional identity with a fictional enemy. The sentiment of exclusion felt by the supporters of for instance Wilders, Le Pen, Erdoğan or Trump nevertheless remains a reality. The notion of identity is a complex paradigm due to its permanent reference to its own virtuosity to redefine itself, but also to its real effects due to its virtuality. In the end, although there is ontologically no matter of content in an identity, i.e. no concrete body referring immediately and exactly to its characteristics, there is as a matter of expression, nevertheless a reality, due the effects and affects of politics of identity. There is often a reality of restlessness within the experience of identity – this is so ‘not me’ – that has been endured by many men and women everywhere at any time.

5.3.2 *Equalitarian Equality*

Due to the assumption of contextual and cultural clarities as well as the segmentation by transparent identities, the politics of multiculturalism implies an even more specific form of expression: a *politics of communication*. In this section I will focus on how this politics changes the idea of the binary setting between the private and the public by introducing certain forms of subjectivity in the realm of the public. The language of the migrant as a form of expression of minority is often characterized as a broken language, like pidgin, or a lack of the ability to speak properly. This is clearly inscribed in the anti-migrants political discourse, but it is also an aspect of pro-migrants arguments, which aims at helping the migrant to assimilate. It is often the image of the migrants in the media, as the image of a non-English speaking Spanish illegal as a stock character in American crime series. How does this failed apprehension of language relate to politics of communication? How does this so-called non-language relate to Arendt's political public space with its necessity of speech and act?

Argued from Arendt's (1958) perspective, the personal obscurity of an experience of flight is an a-political experience. Given the discursive, paradigmatic embedding of this experience – context, culture and identity – I disagree with this interpretation. Precisely the shadow and the mystery of 'un'speakable experience sheds light on what currently is political. Defining this form of expression as an inability to transmit information in a clear way, testifies to an urge of finality in speech. Yet, Arendt rejects this finalistic aspect repeatedly in *The Human Condition*. The so-called hampered speech of the foreigner bears witness to the plurality that the migrant incorporates due to its peculiar pronunciation and how she relates to the world out of this form of difference. However, the relationality of the refugee to the outside world through its non-language does not necessarily mean that the refugee has become a public subject of exclusion instead of a private victim or sufferer. In a politics of flight the opposition of the political public and the a-political private is ruptured. The wry matter and form of this expression exposes the political realm of the difference, which in modern times drives them to the corners of the periphery. The personal condition of those individuals becomes important for policy-making. Policies on – not of – *difference* in various countries affect the personal image of migrants immensely. Some images come to mind: the image of hunger-striking refugees, who are fighting for survival and risk their own life as the only available political weapon; the image of suicide bombers whose *limbic lives* are the products of political exclusion and are therefore reduced to mere instruments, using their bodies as destructive weapons. These have become common public images. And how do young children of migrants relate to the image of their parents while being obliged to translate in detail every document and conversation for them?

While the politics have become a personal matter for these individuals the politicians and the media seem to deny their individuality by their constant reference to abstract masses and impersonal statistics. It is either mass migration that raises the fear of voters or the anonymous corpses on the beach that sensitize viewers. These all lack personality or individuality, let alone having any form of autonomy. A politics of flight in this sense oscillates between privatized politics and politicized privacy, as well as between individualized masses and massified individuals, or in terms of Schinkel (2008) *deindividualized individual*. All these images share a common trait: the lack of lingual expression of the subject within the realm of politics, i.e. public space. The suicidal bomber, the

hunger-striking refugee, as well as the corpses and masses of refugees lack the ability to express their specific being in a communicable form of expression, i.e. in comprehensible words, identifiable images or recognizable gestures. This lack of communication consequently indicates the disappearance of these lives within the political public space without privatizing their specific individuality. As a result, they turn into being no-body.

The non-linguality of the migrants is a consequence of the hegemony of one language. Its dominance asks for an objective form of communication. Yet, the rise of multiculturalism, as an organization of segments that are embodied by multiple differential paradigms, initially resisted such an idea by the introduction of multiple languages. The Dutch policy in the 1980's *integration with maintenance of one's identity (integratie met behoud van eigen identiteit)* aimed for a multiplicity of languages. Official forms and papers were translated in Turkish and Arabic. This first stage of multiculturalism thus deterritorialized the symmetry of identity and language, into segments with multiple identities and lingual expressions. As Ghorashi (2003) argues, it repeated the pillarization in the Dutch society; a pillarization that was already a common factor with Protestants and Catholics. With migration new forms of pillarization gave rise to segmented collective experiences of specific ethnic identities. The segments however did not occupy the same power in the society. Through this differentiation, although by Arendt (1958) defined as private affairs, matters such as femininity, economic differences, cultural and social differentiation, as well as personal experiences became political. In Arendt's perspective, this simply implied socialization and economization of politics. Yet her analysis is too simplistic. The introduction of these agents in the political realm sensitized different ways in which politics defines its citizens and non-citizens in all areas of life. It gave voice to what was silenced by politics rather than privatizing differences that needed to express their *privateness* or in terms of Ghorashi (2003) their enforced disconnective *pillarization* (p. 226). Rancière's (2004) reference as discussed at the end of chapter four, is in that sense to the point. Olympe de Gouge, the French feminist and writer executed in 1793 due to her resistance against cliché image of a woman, was excluded as a female, not due to her personal life but due to political discourse, Rancière argues. Within an exclusive discursive perspective private matters are always political matters.

The effect of multiculturalism's introduction of segmented collectives into the politics decreased the power of a hegemonic language, and created a space for freedom of speech through multiple forms of language. It created a political sphere in which freedom is sensed on multiple levels: freedom of choice and religion, political beliefs, sexual preferences, etc. So, in the first instance multicultural thought is based on the political right of individuals to choose freely their own subjectivity, i.e. their own relationship to a certain group with its own cultural heritage. This diversified idea of freedom appears at the same level where other notions such as empowerment and emancipation enter the stage. Multiculturalism is thus based on the idea of freedom of preference for a certain community and the need of such communities to empower its participants in order to act on an equal foot in a multicultural setting. Nevertheless, the objective tendencies of totalitarian thought were not entirely defeated. After 2001 these reemerged in the political arena. Yet, multiculturalism remains a *relative* deterritorializing power that however tends to be reterritorialized constantly. Objectivity is multiplied within segments that create their own forms of consistency and promote their own understanding of expression. Expression in this sense does not create room for heterotopic voices – heterophonia – but rather a Voice that starts to multiply itself in a molar rather than molecular way.

Spike Lee's *Jungle Fever* (1991) is a significant image of the multiplicity of differential paradigms of identification and communication. It thematizes their urge to remain disconnected and their tendency to exclusion, despite the empowerment of the subjects in political and social realm. The love affair between the Afro-American Flipper and Italian-American Angie is displayed in a milieu of mutual racism and culturalism, although one community is defined due to its racial differentiation and the other due to its national differentiation. The infidelity of Flipper is condemned not due to its moral implication with respect to his wife, but due to the disapproval of the racial features of Angie. And Angie is judged due to her intercourse with a black man from her community, rather than her intercourse with a married man. The statement of Drew, Flipper's wife, "It doesn't matter what color she is, my man is gone" comments to the negligence towards her personal involvement and betrayal. It is within this setting that the concept of *apartheid* could appear in *multicultural settings*. The subject, that in the first instance seems to be free to choose its community, gets stuck in a discourse of *either-or*. This is what Ghorashi (2003) typifies as *thick* notion of sensing one's nationality or ethnicity, in which a fear for loss of one's cultural or national identity result in a rigid enforcement of such identity. Non-belonging in such a context is neither an option nor recommended. Even partial belonging of Flipper and Angie is not an option. Although in this American multicultural setting multiple consistencies are simulated and empowered, the consistency within a segment remains a rigid neurotic repetition of the anticipated framings. Belonging to a segment, whether forced out of necessity or chosen out of free will, in all cases indicates reproduction of a same identity. To rephrase it in Deleuze and Guattari's (1987) terms, multiculturalism becomes a multiple process of *decalcomania*. Choice of identity indicates *tracing* its features in a segmented community. Mapping in a rhizomatic way aiming to transverses the given oppositions creates, within politics of segments, merely confused *multipolar figures*.

This act of tracing has a specific goal, namely installing a sense of equality. It is due to the group-formation of the black community and not to the openness of other communities that gained African-Americans in United State a marginal sense of equality in law and social hierarchy. This formation, which was not only necessary in the past, but also even within the contemporary United States despite its former president with his African-American roots, is highly relevant. Nevertheless, equality, as Arendt (1968) suggests, is a tricky concept with a tendency to become a problematic disconnecting force. Longing for equality is a main characteristic of our moral and legal system. We strive for equality before the law and the norm, trusting the law's objectivity. In line with Arendt (1968) however we can argue that exactly this equality has become an axiomatic or at best differentiating paradigm due to the miscomprehended assumption that equality indicates sameness: *a homogenizing equality*. All men are legally equal, so all men are normatively the same, and when one does not meet this assumption then one is excluded from the realm of equality before the law, regardless whether this considers the law belonging to God, nature or men. This totalitarian symmetry of the law and the norm as well as differentiated understanding of it that implies sameness within a group of people, creates little room for the inherent plurality of individuals. Arendt states:

Equality of condition, though it is certainly a basic requirement for justice, is nevertheless among the greatest and most uncertain ventures of modern mankind. The more equal conditions are, the less explanation there is for the differences that actually exist between people; and thus all the more unequal do individuals and groups become. This perplexing consequence came fully to light as soon as equality was no longer seen in terms of an omnipotent being like God or an unavoidable common destiny like death. Whenever equality becomes a mundane fact in itself, without any gauge by which it may be measured or explained, then there is one chance in a hundred that it will be recognized simply as a working principal of a political organization in which otherwise unequal people have equal rights; there are ninety-nine chances that it will be mistaken for an innate quality of every individual, who is 'normal' if he is like everybody else and 'abnormal' if he happens to be different. This perversion of equality from political into a social concept is all the more dangerous when a society leaves but little space for special groups and individuals, for then their differences become all the more conspicuous (p. 54).

The destruction of *plural equality* by *equalizing equality* is not an omen for the end of civilization. It is rather born from within the dynamics of civilization and progress. It is, according to Arendt, exactly in the assumption of an evident natural or historical right that men have insisted on inequality. Even nowadays this supplementary logic emerges in our neo-liberal meritocracy: is talent an asset that one gains or that is given? If the latter is the case naturalness again legitimates inequality. Laws pretend to exist beyond human interactions. Arendt suggests that neither nature nor history can justify the relevancy of law and norm. Human rights are all about having the right to rights as human beings. Having abandoned all transcendent instances (wo)men – whether within politics of exile or politics of segments – have become both the object and subject of the law, the maker and the made with all the aporitical implications that are produced within this double bind, precisely as Foucault (2005^a) indicated the epistemic condition of modern man in *The Order of Things*: “Man, in the analytic of finitude, is a strange empirico-transcendental doublet” (p. 318). Derrida (1982) states that we have to take this double bind as a supplementary difference for granted in order to overcome inequality in history and nature.

This new situation, in which 'humanity' has in effect assumed the role formerly ascribed to nature or history, would mean in this context that the right to have rights, or the right of every individual to belong to humanity, should be guaranteed by humanity itself. It is by no means certain whether this is possible (Arendt, 1968, p. 298).

Equality of man is not a given.³⁰ Equality in plurality must be gained. It is an everlasting process in permanent need of attention toward deterritorialization of the assumption of sameness.

Equality, in contrast to all that is involved in mere existence, is not given to us, but is the result of human organization insofar as it is guided by the principle of justice. We are not born equal; we become equal as members of a group on the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights (p. 301).

5.3.3 *Expressive Presumptions and Expressive Ruptures*

Communities are usually based on a sense of shared cultural memory, political history and sensible communication in a common language. However, are such formations of identity always inclusive in forming a community? Communities are created and endure time due to the affects they produce, such as the feeling of belonging. Attachment always has an affective component. Men commune due to a sense of security, trust, recognition, compassion and the ability to express such affects through language. Language thus allows forms of expression in order to enunciate an affect of a community. Setsuko Adachi's (2015) distinction between *empathy* and *sympathy* is a prime example of this affective sense of community and of the affective effect of language. Adachi distinguishes between two affects, sympathy as a form of compassion concerning those who share the same identity; and empathy that concerns compassion towards those who differ from the compassionate subject. Sympathy therefore refers to a collective identity and in Adachi's case even a shared nation-state; while empathy refers to otherness and plurality. Adachi also argues that although according to the Japanese dictionary empathy can be translated in the Japanese language, nevertheless, the term refers to sympathy rather than to empathy as referring to plurality in Arendtian sense of the word. She argues that the term empathy does not appear in the Japanese language and the nuance of a relationship between sympathy and empathy is not sensed by the Japanese. The loyalty of the citizen is measured by the intensity of the feeling sympathy. Oosterling (2016) would argue that this is due to the influence of Confucian emphasis on harmony (*wa*) of the group (pp. 167 & 301).

Nevertheless, plurality is not merely outside a nation, but also arises within a community. Exclusion is not merely an influence of an outside world. As Huijer (2016) argues, membership to a community does not only weaken one's vulnerability in a society, but in its rigid form membership itself can become compelling. It creates a sense of exclusion from within (pp. 99-100). Yet, within such process of compelling inclusion unintended flight lines are always ahead, not necessarily due to

³⁰ Although it seems that Rancière and Arendt disagree on equality, I think this disagreement is only partial. Both thinkers plead for the creation of a space in which politics becomes possible for all whom intend to participate. Both thinkers sincerely believe that all men are equal in their potential to participate in such a discourse. Both thinkers agree that this space gains its power due to disagreement rather than agreement. When Arendt suggests that equality *is not given*, she refers to the historical evolvement of the right to form a community and participate in politics, instead of the idea that men are not equal to one another as such. Both thinkers thus state that equality must not be dependent on an ideology, but politics must create an open space where the already existing equality can be lived. The main difference however between Arendt and Rancière remains in the inclusion of themes in this political space, such as economy and social differentiation, as well as the fact that Rancière would define the struggle for such an open space as a political struggle par excellence. See on this subject also: Schaap, 2012.

individual actions, but often rather the process itself creates a form implosion. Adachi (2015) gives an excellent example here, namely the contradictory character of English lessons given to Japanese youth. While the English language is foreign to them, the content of the lessons focuses on something familiar, that is to say Japanese history.³¹ According to Adachi this technique merely strengthens their sense of nationality. Nevertheless, I rather argue that Japanese youth, who learn about their Japanese history by means of a foreign language, do not necessarily become more Japanese. Since their 'Japanness' is expressed in a foreign language, the expression and translation accentuates the exteriority of this identity. A good example is the translation of the term 'person' after World War II in the discourse of the human sciences. It is translated as 'nin gen' which literally means 'in between being', i.e. a relational being (Oosterling, 2016, p. 194). What seems to be internal is immediately translated and contextualized within a different lingual milieu. Therefore, the ultimate act of confirming their nationality through its expression in a foreign language can also be conceived as a decisive act of *deterritorialization*.

Nonetheless, the homogenizing affect of language remains. Why do these Japanese youths learn English? Why do I write in English? It is often argued that we need a common language, whether it considers a nation or the world as multicultural setting. In politics of segments – nationally and internationally – a language or a regime of expression dominates as a neutral connective expressive domain. Despite toleration as an affect toward multiple segments within multiculturalism, the double discourse of a politics of segments struggles with the connection of different segments within a nation-state or global communication. Solution has often been presented, as we have seen before by Kymlicka (1995), by urging the minorities to master *a common language*, which is usually the language of the majority, arguing that only through mastery of the majority language the presupposed equality can be gained. Within this homogenization of equality via language the multiple consistencies thus remain in need of a minimum overall consistency in order to form a multicultural society. This totalizing perspective is not only given by xenophobic politicians, but also by thinkers who sincerely believe in the multiplicity and plurality of multicultural society. Helder De Schutter (2005) is in this sense a good example. In his article, in which he criticized Kymlicka due to his homogenization of the vehicles of multicultural society, he nonetheless states:

Of course, some juxtaposition will be unavoidable, as it will be difficult for certain institutions (such as cultural centers for the benefit of a particular language) to operate in more than one language. However, this is not a problem: the model can accommodate monolingual and monocultural mechanisms, as long as they are compatible with a general policy that aims to overcome the *monoculturalization* of identities and choice contexts (pp. 35-36).

Can a singular expression overcome monocultural tendencies? De Schutter's (2005) favorite example is Brussels. He published this text in 2005. In the years thereafter, it was specifically this

³¹ The schizophrenic tendencies in Japanese society can be partly explained to be a result of the accelerated modernization Japanese lived through after the World War II.

monolingualism and hence monoculturalism that became an issue in Belgium as well as in the city of Brussels. The Flemish part of the country gave rise to distinct forms of nationalistic oriented political parties. The policies of *Vlaams Blok* (Flemish Block) that was charged in 2004 with racism and changed its name to *Vlaams Belang* (Flemish Interest) was mostly focused on anti-migration, anti-foreigners and anti-Islam rhetoric. The second nationalistic party *Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie* (New-Flemish Alliance) on the other hand rather aimed their focus on the interest of the Flemish language and independency of Flanders in order to maintain the power of the Flemish language. The images of 'non-typical' Belgian faces on the website express their desire to show their nationalism without intending to be racists. The overall success of the moderate New-Flemish Alliance's in the elections of 2009, however, kept Belgium from forming a government for more than a year.

Language, we can conclude, does not produce marginal affects. On the contrary, it is the core business of multiculturalism. Belgium has always been a battlefield of mother tongues. This war was fought on several fronts: between major languages against minor languages as contenders to become the major language; minor languages that contended to become equal to the major language. Why do multicultural theorists then emphasize the unavoidability of a common language? The common language is necessary in order to communicate beyond one's specific segmentation. Nonetheless, this need of communication is based on a simplified understanding of language. Three presumptions are manifest in this simplification: 1) the transparency, 2) non-violent quality and 3) exclusive creativity in the use of language.

1) The first states that language is a transparent instrument to transmit data and information to connect multiple communities and equalize them by access to the same data. However, *this equalization* depends on a *comprehension* of data; the knowledge of the data assumes a subject's ability to *reflect* on these data; and finally, the knowledge of language indicates that subjects can *communicate* their interest and relationship to the society. Furthermore, the presumption of transmission of data does not only refer to the common language but also to languages of the multicultural segments. Translation thus becomes an easy *one on one* transformation of one *sign of regimes* to the other. The subject can formulate its empowerment and interest within its community and eventually transfer these data to the overall discourse via the common language. In other words, the politics of communication in multicultural setting depends on an efficient and goal-oriented instrument of communication pretending to create a neutral lingual setting.

Yet, in this setting translation merely becomes an echo: table (English), tafel (Dutch), miz (Farsi), mesa (Spanish)... Do these words indicate the same thing, or are they lingual nodes in a discourse, with internal multiplicity and plurality? It is often within translation, or migration from one language into the other, that subjects sense loss and because of this become displaced. Loss is however a deceitful characterization. There is not less language in migration. Even if we follow the logic of clear lingual discourse, migrants' knowledge of language only accumulates due to the accumulation of their knowledge of a new language. What is lost, is not words or vocabulary, but rather an affect, namely trust in and control over language. Table and 'tafel' become partially incommensurable due to their relationship to complex contextual settings. Lawyers table is a different table for a refugee than for a divorcee. Translation thus dismantles the transparency and a neutral comprehension of language, not only in the foreign language but also especially in the mother tongue. A state of translation shows

that language, which in the case of the mother tongue is presumed as an asset, has never been ours. Elusiveness of language does not occur in translation, but becomes explicit within it. It is the politics of language, an open language, in which even a mother tongue can become fragile. The politics of expression must then be distinguished from the politics of Voice as correct meaning. In the latter form of politics, migration often equals a sense of displacement, referring to something or someone being in a wrong place at a wrong time. Even after years and many generations, men can still feel this affect of *Unheimlichkeit*. Displacement is also felt by inhabitants through time, referring to a past, their history has perished and their space is unrecognizably modified (Huijer, 2016). *Unheimlichkeit occurs in the loss of consistency.*

Translation is thus not loss but the echo of complexity. As I suggested translation shows that words are partially incommensurable and not completely incommensurable. And it is due to this partiality, as Derrida argues, that men have the urge to communicate. Neither in complete comprehension, where words become unnecessary, nor in complete incomprehension, where words become useless, is a need for language. Only within this complexity between comprehension and non-comprehension language can express its internal playfulness. Translation thus here is neither a strict copy nor a total loss. The novelty of the translated is not a negation of the previous expression but a transformation of its radiance of its voices. This translating affect of what is comprehended and what is not – a quality that Derrida calls *Babylonic* – does however not only occur between different types of language but also within a language itself (McDonald, 1985). There is an expressive tension within and in-between segments of language, there is a *Babylonic confusion*.

2) Next to the presumption of transparent communication, there is yet a second unwarranted presumption that determines the multicultural setting: the nonviolent trait of words and images. This is a common argument that was referred to by the Dutch stand-up comedian Hans Teeuwen. This nonviolent trait is thus not merely an assumption in language, but eventually also in the journalistic imagination of cartoonists like the Danish Kurt Westergaard, who drew images of prophet Mohamed holding bombs. Although physical violence is a different type of expression, this does not consequently indicate that language is nonviolent in the implementation of its form. Drawings and words could lead to physical exclusion as well. The consistent negative emphasis on Middle Eastern and North African physical features of young male youth in Europe and the ethnic profiling of Muslims and African Americans in the United States is not only a problem of the police. The media spectacle is to be blamed too. Political slogans such as Mark Rutte's typification of youth with other ethnic background as *rig*, feed the segmentalized forms of expression within politics of segments. The common language that creates the so-called equality is also the language in which one is typified as non-belonging other. The other does not fit the profile of the equalitarian equality. In case of The Netherlands the multicultural tendency to reduce differences to cultural differences leads to a targeted exclusion of members of a group that is supposed to be typically violent due to their cultural background; with their uncontrolled exclusion from the labor market and public space as consequence. The violent character of such expressions appears in the act of expression itself. Through its act, expression has a performative impact, due to the fact that *reference* to a so-called reality of ethnicity, *produces* a certain reality in the power construction of a society (Schinkel, 2008, p. 283).

How does violence expose itself in orders of expressions? The connection between language and violence is already thematized by Friedrich Nietzsche and neo-Nietzschians such as Deleuze and Guattari. For Nietzsche the violence of language – as a form of expression, Deleuze and Guattari add – lies in its reduction of the plurality of Dionysian life forces to Apollinian concepts and words. The violence of language lies in its reduction of a plurality of differences and in the moral implications that follow from such a reduction. That is why Deleuze and Guattari (1987), inspired by Nietzsche, state that *order-words are judgments of God*; not a religious God, but a totalitarian political order that aims at segmentation – either/or – and exclusion - neither/nor. The question arises whether the *image-order*, which by all means is another order, does not in some cases follow the same logic. In ‘expressing one self’, one frames a context in order to compose a certain consistency. De Mul (2017) shows how, after the introduction of secularization, romanticism implements via art a sense of community to compensate for the loss of religion. Art becomes a practice to *sensitize moral ideals*, and finally a sense of nationalism (pp. 225-228). Even modern avant-garde art has shown that expression is neither neutral nor a-political. In deconstructing hegemonic discourses – images, words, sounds – it defines and shapes new discourses. It positions itself within this discursive practice. Expression is a mesopolitical practice with the affective complexities that each political practice entails. Yet, expression is not the outcome of intentions, but the affective articulation of a medium that communicates more than just the intentions of the sender anticipating the expectations of the receiver. Expression appears in the middle, *mediated* and *mediating*. It is an everlasting *radicality* of mediatization, which by Oosterling (2000^b) is indicated as *radical mediocrity*: selfconsciousness is rooted (Latin: *radix*) in the media and ruled (Greek: *kratein*) by the media.

What does this inherency of violence within language mean for *freedom of expression*? Are insults and offense not violent? Do they have no political implications? The segmentalization of multiculturalism, although implementing a multiple idea of freedom of speech within the segments, neglects to map out the space in-between, creating room for inter-speech. Due to the disconnecting tendency of a politics of segments – each segment claiming its own truth and consistency as we have seen earlier with Meiden van Halal and the comedian – and given the political primacy of the autonomous subject freedom of speech is merely referred to as an individualized right to gain, instead of a political imperative that must be shared. In words of Deleuze and Guattari (1987) opinions can participate as cartographical elements, yet in other cases they are copied in everlasting sameness of a presumed objectified subjective truths. The repetitive comments on the Muslim community, under the presumption of so-called courage to be critical, sensitize its audiences to copying. Within this setting yet another question arises, too important not to be mentioned, yet too immense to be answered. Is the freedom of speech for a cartoonist, novelist, journalist and comedian the same as the freedom of speech for a politician? Do these figures not inhabit different levels in the powerhouse and must their speech not be differentiated as such? And finally does the homogenization of all speech as *freedom of speech* not give rise to an uncontrolled *license* for exclusion instead of a plural debate on the value: *freedom of speech*? The *freedom of speech* is a valuable trait of politics. Nevertheless, the question remains whether *freedom of speech* is appreciated as a fragile impotential connective paradigm or instrumentalized as an axiomatically differentiating paradigm where politics of exile and politics of segments collapse into one and other.

3) Next to the transparency of language within and across segments with their pretension to transmit data in an overall language without any bias and the non-violent neutrality of words/images, finally a third presumption arises: the other's creative thinking that could be implemented in the hegemony of segmented discourse. This creativity is bestowed on one type of subject within a politics of segments, namely the other as migrants and refugees. They must become the agents of change as long as they do connect to the hegemonic regime of words and images. The relation between 'rupture, survival and creativity' is here addressed in order to identify a specific subject of flight, that articulates its creativity from within its own ruptured experience. Rupture as a de-territorializing force creates a subject too, be it that its form of expression differs from the 'regular' subjects. In the lack of words (aphasic state) and the lack of community this subject is forced to create new forms of expression that reterritorializes, i.e. composes his experiences on another stratum, creating a plane of consistency within the artistic world of Museums or literary work. This creativity is instrumentalized in the hegemonic discourse as follows: *how do new-comers contribute to 'our' society?* The refugee and migrant as extraordinary agents of rupture not only become the primary and singular protagonists of the discovery of the new, but also the agents of *this new* in new communities. Self-awareness and creation of a new community supplement each other.

In comparison to ever excluding tendencies of totalitarianism, such argumentation seems to integrate a new and inclusive perspective. It seems to imply a shift in power but in essence it repeats axiomatic and differentiating paradigms. It creates a reality in which the normalized non-migrating citizen – who according to Huijer (2016) is burdened with maintenance of cultural heritage – cannot be creative and the refugee or the migrant thus becomes solely responsible for bringing something exotic or solving an old problem. We argue for refugees that can solve our problems in caretaking of elderly or migrants that can solve our problems in ICT labor market. As we see, in being creative and profitable the other is consequently a closed entity as before. First, the other is defined as an entity that is unrelated to the inhabitants and felt as a burden that must be excluded; than the other is defined through another closed segment of *exoticness* and *utility*. In both scenarios of this differentiating identification the relation between the multiple subjects are silenced and ignored.

Politics of flight creates ruptures in every element of life. Yet the rupture itself cannot be pinpointed to a singular form of subject. Nonetheless, politics of segments, due to its urge to segmentalize and identify its subjects creates constructive meanings for such eruptive events. Art in a sense does not only deconstruct thinking; in some cases, it rather confirms the order of regimes of expressions. The respective 'subjective' approach to rupture has been cultivated in avant-garde art practices, and as such refers to a deeper presumption in the analysis of creativity: rupture as a creative experience. This experience has often been appropriated by the eccentric subject, in this case refugee or the migrant, in other cases the madman or the avant-garde artist. Still whatever being, it is never an ordinary disciplined person. Exactly because creativity is always eccentric and a quality of an undisciplined subject, such as in avant-garde, art becomes incapable of escaping the duality between the normal and the abnormal. It still cultivates and cherishes this duality in order to be acknowledged as creative. As such it remains an essential aspect of hegemonic discourse. Due to its appropriation of rupture, its projection of an enlightened subject, it claims to be an in-between being, an intermediary and finally its prophecy of emancipation of a subject, I call this *the morality of art*. In this modernist artistic perspective, the disciplined subject has to free itself through art from his chains of normality,

presenting this eccentric subject as its hero. Creativity in a politics of flight on the other hand arises from the process of relationality rather than from the eccentric subject or the abject *Other*. In other words, disruption on the plane of politics of flight is not merely a trait of the migrant and refugee but the effect of a differential participation and communication that sensitizes natality not of an isolated subject but as a virtual potential event in the lives of all subjects that are involved on the plane of flight.

Let us thus romanticize neither creativity, nor the above-mentioned type of artistic expressivity. Just as in case of the rhizome, creativity is not a road to happiness; nor is the by the majority excluded subject – abject – destined to be the sole agent of inclusive thinking. Majoritarian minorities – in their attempt to gain power, whether totally or within a segment – can mutually become exclusive. Zadie Smith's (2000) novel *White Teeth* shows the multiple possibilities of lines of exclusion; whether within a politics of exile or a politics of segments. She brilliantly deplores segments – such as religious and secular, colonialism and anti-colonialism, different ideologically framed generations and ethnic background – in order to deterritorialize their differentiating and axiomatic paradigms of non-connection. Through the characters Magid and Millat, Smith shows that a radical tendency to differentiate oneself from the other, is neither bound to a religion, a country, a sex, or any other idea of identity. It is the identification itself that leads to a politics of detached segments. Smith ridicules the idea of the extremists from the other side of the world and sensitizes her readers for the manners in which the western concept of freedom drives some youth to the madness of radicalism.

Philosophical concepts are always integral aspects of a discourse. Politics of segments is a discourse and as suggested by Foucault (1980) each discourse is a network of different dispositives that, as Deleuze and Guattari (1987) phrased this, create a consistency within an image of thought; which in this case we call multiculturalism. Dispositives do not only emerge within politics as paradigms in the Kuhnian sense. As we have seen in the second chapter paradigms relate to philosophical concepts, scientific functions and artistic affects and percepts. These disciplines however have not always shown a critical attitude toward dispositives that give in to the logic of identification. Hegel's qualification of Western thinking as the most viable in connecting being and the mind, neglecting to understand the potentiality of African philosophy as fiercely shown by Heinz Kimmerle (1994), is just an example of how philosophy itself permanently gives in to rigidity of identities. And as Olúwolé (2014) argues, the idea of Socrates as the beginning of philosophical thinking remains in the colonial and binary mentality of western idealism. Long before Socrates other figures in the history of thought – such as Òrúnmìlà and Confucius – transformed and affected thinking.

As for the scientific functions, within scientific vocabularies time after time the same types of identity, based on ethnic differences, are repeated. Scientific investigations of ethnic profiling apply the same jargon, not examining those who do the profiling, but focusing solely on those who are profiled. Despite efforts of revolutionary scientists to break through such jargons of segmentalized thinking, the governmental and scientific statistics persist to categorize illegal behavior in terms of ethnicity. Entzinger and Scheffer's (2012) report on integration is perhaps the most cynical example. Although the authors conclude that ethnic background is not an adequate way of differentiation, their conclusion

does not result in a reflective judgment to rewrite their own report. The introduction of the term superdiversity by Vertovec (2007), Özdil's (2015) elaboration of categorization by the term 'allochthonous' which is based on racial profiling, and the analyses of sociologist such as Schinkel (2008 & 2011) and Geldof (2013) who accentuate socioeconomic exclusion and education backgrounds as elementary factors, all these efforts to break the logic of identity offer a more fruitful approach that is in line with my approach.

Whom do these revolutionary scientists categorize and analyze? In order to understand the consequences of a politics of segments as well as a politics of exile Ta-Nehisi Coates' (2015) plea is simply to reverse the observing eye. It is not a body that shows certain characteristic, but the historic stubbornness of a discourse of identification engrained in the observing self-consciousness that implements an order of gestures on a body. Let us thus with Coates in mind state that politics of segments did not save us from the abyss of exclusion. Even comments on multiculturalism – such as Scheffer's (2000) *Multicultural Drama* or Huntington's (1996) *Clash of Civilizations* – do not surpass the process of segmentation. They persist in applying categories – and whether explicitly or implicitly, whether willingly or unwillingly – that curve the differentiating paradigm of a politics of segments toward axiomatic paradigms of exile: *Us versus Them* and *Here versus There* are still on the agenda.

And what about art and its sensations? There are those arts practices that demonize the outsider. Said's (1978) orientalism thesis bears witness to the way the arts have collaborated with colonialism, racism and imperialism in making the East exotic, cruel and enigmatic. In the history of art women have three options: being naked, virgin or deadly. The fourth option is all these three at the same time. Yet there are artistic works – just as philosophical and scientific works – that surpass paradigms of a politics of segments. Beyond the clash of civilizations, Smith (2000) shows us a clash of affects, of senses, percepts, and more than anything: of sentiments. However, in contrast to the previous, she does not categorize them into nationalities and ethnicities, or other forms of identities. There is no other over there that causes the clash; but the clash of affects appears from within the discourse of a politics of segments; in the very heart of its segments.

5.4 Differential Affects

5.4.1 Witnessing in Shame

Both Rancière (2004) and Agamben (1991) invite us to hear this cacophony of silence; to hear the voices beyond the Voice(s) of totalitarianism and disconnective segments. Except which voices? In politics of segments this concerns the voices of multipolar individuals that owe their pathological state not to a mental or physical state; but to the discourse of differentiated enforced identities. This section thus starts with the expression of the pseudo- and complete-witness of the concentration camp – one of the biggest victims of politics of flight – and the affectuation of the survivor by shame. Furthermore, different groups are thematized: such as war victims of rape. In the second part of this section I will argue that the experience of refugees within the multicultural setting is not beyond shame either. Their shame refers to their departure, and in the case of refugees also to their survival. It is multiplied in

affects such as nostalgia, feeling displaced and homesickness. These affects provide a *matter of expression* that results from segmentalizing impact of form of content – reterritorialized bodies – and form of expression.

As I have discussed at the end of chapter two, Agamben (1991) has a comparable critique on the history of philosophy in which silence is appreciated more than speech or voice. It is even suggested that it is the true form of speech or Voice. Nevertheless, the expression of the excluded subject in Agamben's work remains ambiguous and problematic. His *Remnants of Auschwitz* (1999^b) is on the one hand a testimony of such expressions and on the other hand exposition of the silence of the limbic lives as the true witnesses of the camps. It is in the expressive non-language of the dehumanized body that the reality of witnessing emerges. The *pseudo-witnesses*, those who did not become 'Muselmänner', as been introduced in the fourth chapter, express themselves in shame of this incompleteness, in shame of survival. According to Agamben, this shame differs from the juridical understanding of guilt, and moves beyond the normative judgment and political speech from which the homo sacer was banned.

Whenever the relevance of speech is at stake, matters become political by definition, for speech is what makes man a political being (Arendt, 1958, p. 3).

How do we define politics in relation to matter of expression? As we have seen in Arendt's analysis on the level of form of expression this *relation* is immediate: Political action and speech appear simultaneously. Action speaks in order to articulate itself. Speech is materialized in the production of artistic, philosophical and scientific works – such as books, theatre, films, articles and dissertations – in order to cherish the memory of its birth, its natality. Yet, each time speech runs the risk of becoming silent and action runs the risk of becoming weak in its ability to actualize itself, the potentiality to establish relations in the political arena is diminished and forgotten.

Without speech to materialize and memorialize, however tentatively, the 'new things' that appear and shine forth, 'there is no remembrance;' ... And without power, the space of appearance brought forth through action and speech in public will fade away as rapidly as the living deed and the living word (p. 204).

According to Arendt, the recollection of a human action is dependent upon its communication in the public space. The materialization of this memory even provides man with *immortality* (pp. 95-96). The struggle for communication within community is in the end immanently political according to Arendt (1958). At the same time, Arendt also believes, that some experiences could not be spoken about, like the unsaid events that ravage one's body. She refers to the unspeakable pain and the fleeting nature of this experience. Pain, i.e. (bodily) trauma, is wordless and hence without memory. And since Arendt cannot think of politics without the revelation of speech, she concludes that these are the most private experiences (p. 51).

What is then, from this perspective, the meaning of political enunciation as a matter of expression in the public arena that, due to the violence that is inherent in regimes of signs, does not coincide with forms of expression? In Arendt's argument in which a voice becomes a private matter, we recognize Rancière's (2004) previous critique. Rancière pleads exactly for a political thinking in which these *voices of pain* do not disappear in the abyss of a private life. Agamben's (1999^b) *Remnants of Auschwitz* is an attempt to listen to testimonies of witnesses, witnessing something that is impossible to witness. He argues that it is an attempt to create an *ethical territory* for *future cartographers* (p. 13). Auschwitz must not remain an enigma. By remaining a mystery, it denies us the ability to reflect upon our own time wherein the remnants of this horror are still effective. This is not an instrumental argument, but a comprehension that implements the potentiality of incomprehension and as such triggers resistance and another image of thought (as we have seen in 2.2). Agamben focuses on the experiences of the Jews, as the victims of the nation-state that enforces its own purity on them. He plows through the impossibilities of testimonies that must be uttered, memories that must not be forgotten, unraveling the contradictory structure of the testimonies in connection with the experience of a truth and the impossibility of the implementation of this truth in the simplicity of truthness of the either/or mentality of the totalitarian state of mind. For the survivors, these experiences are the truest things that exist, the truest parts of their life, i.e. *unforgettable experiences*. However, because of the unimaginable character of these experiences, it becomes impossible to understand the immensity of this reality. Thus, the experience is as unforgettable as it is inexpressible within representable frameworks of memory. It is matter of expression that has no form. As such it is *schizophrenic memory*: a memory that resists an unambiguous manifestation within regimes of expression of segments yet without being able to deny itself. These experiences exceed *factual* and *fascicular elements* of political thinking. The impossibility of speech and silence occur at the same time, causing an *aporia*:

The aporia of Auschwitz is, indeed, the very aporia of historical knowledge: a non-coincidence between facts and truth, between verification and comprehension (p. 12).

The reality of the experiences in camps does only defy segmented thinking within human history; but in its connectivity, it transforms life itself. The obscurity of the camp is not the obscurity of plain death. It is the inability to distinguish between death and life, between despair and survival. This indistinguishability is always present in the testimony.

One of the reasons that can drive a prisoner to survive is the idea of becoming a witness ... survival can be a matter of convenience (p. 15).

It is difficult to comprehend the concept of convenience here. Is it the witness' urge to reveal the experience? Agamben states that some want to survive *no matter the cost*, just to be able to bear witness, or for the sake of a future retribution. Nonetheless, the cost is endured in order to speak, no matter what you do. Agamben is aware of this unbearable dilemma and states: "To justify one's

survival is not easy – least of all in the camp. Then there are some survivors who prefer to be silent” (p. 15).

This silence could be the outcome of various forms of experiences, whether that of being in a camp or the life after the survival. Primo Levi is Agamben’s witness par excellence. Levi is a witness who writes without calling himself a writer, finding peace in being able to witness. But most of all he is ashamed of his own survival. He is aware of the dilemma between the betrayal of the unspeakable and the obligation to write. Levi is a witness but not in a juridical sense. He is not an uninvolved third party who can describe the facts, nurturing the illusion of being neutral, nor is he the sole victim who can witness for a specific crime completely. He is the victim witnessing, aware of the fact that the victims and executioners are undistinguishable in their being human, both *shameful*: yet in a different sense, one for taking life and the other for surviving while so many others have not. Ghorashi (2003) speaks of a *survivor’s guilt* by not being a ‘real’ martyr. She cites Minoo: “I could not bear to be alive when so many people dear to me were dead” (p. 107). This ambiguity of not being victim enough is thus blocking the neutrality of judgment, yet demands a judgment. Agamben (1999^b) states:

A non-judicial element of truth exists such that the *quaestio facti* can never be reduced to the *quaestio iuris*. This is precisely what concerns the survivor: everything that places a human action beyond the law, radically withdrawing it from the Trial (pp. 17).

The survivor thus, although knowing that his or her experience exceeds the limits of a form of expression, feels the duty to produce a matter of expression in affecting its audience. The witness is the one that schizophrenically *remembers*. The witness of Auschwitz is in this sense not the one who knows the truth and has endured all the horror as limbic body, but rather the one who remembers, or in my opinion the container of memory, without referring to a cause or making sense of it. “The survivor’s vocation is to remember; he cannot not remember” (p. 26).

Remembering is, in this sense, neither an act through which we understand the matter as in a full report in which every detail is spelled out. Every testimony as a matter of expression carries in its enunciation the inability to speak, the *unwitnessability* of the matter within forms of expression and regimes of signs. Time and again Agamben (1999^b) argues that every testimony carries within itself the *unsayable*, as to the experience that cannot be named. This *unsayable*, however, must not be confused with a divine silence in which the sacredness of an experience is beyond the human tongue. It is rather *human, all too human*. The survivors, although gaining some healing through the act of remembering and putting these memories into speech, always already realize that they lack something: the experience of being ultimate victims, the *complete witness*. For Agamben this aporetic figure is the ‘*Muselmann*’ in these camps, the absolute limbic life without a story, the one without senses, without thought. The survivor is only a *pseudo-witness* telling the incomplete story of the *complete witness*.

It is within this distinction between *pseudo-witness* and the *complete witness* that Agamben’s analyzes for me become problematic. *Remnants of Auschwitz* is an ode to the demand of witnessing for the sake of the unsayable. It is an incomplete testimony for the sake of the limbic lives whose complete story will forever remain unsaid. The survivor – who presents itself as one of the tragic

figures within politics of flight – schizophrenically sense this *shame* of incompleteness and the *duty* to enunciate this incompleteness. Does such a division not lead to a segmented normation through which the distinction in-between pseudo- and complete witness can emerge?

However, at the end of the book, Agamben cites pages from individuals stating that they have been ‘*Muselmänner*’ without mentioning whether these are complete witnesses or still pseudo-witnesses (pp. 166-171). Problematic is that somehow Agamben indirectly claims an essence, that presupposes the possibility of complete witnessing and remembering, but unfortunately is always lost in death. Why must death carry it all and does this completeness in death not bring us back to the problem of singularity (as I have shown in 2.3.2) that Agamben (1991) himself has criticized? No subject in its singularity can define the whole of an event. It is within this expectation that speech becomes lacking, broken and incomplete. Within this line of argumentation two *segments* of belonging appear: the survivor as an incomplete being and the dead as its complete supplement. Both are reduced to inexpressivity, in which the expression of the first is measured by the absence of the last. However, in order to move beyond this segetic impasse, I rather argue that the event is uttered differently in all the subjects involved. Thus, I do agree with Agamben that the survivors can never fully witness for the ones who have passed, yet the dead cannot testify of the event of survival. In death, there is no mentioning of a life in the pain of survival that Levi endured his whole life after the Second World War. In this sense Agamben (1999^b) is trapped in his own critique on philosophical historical discourse in which silence as a void in Voice claims all speech, which was made explicit by Rancière (2004). Death becomes the true witness and thus eventually the true *homo sacer*. Agamben (1999^b) would even go so far as to suggest:

The human being is the inhuman; the one whose humanity is completely destroyed is the one who is truly human (p. 133).

What happens when we reverse the story by surpassing the opposition between completeness and incompleteness in stating that a story becomes incomplete, only from the perspective of segmented regimes of signs that neglect the singularity of an individual biography. In a rhizomatic sense every testimony, although unable to refer to an essence that bears witness to fullness, is in its singularity – despite the fact that it does not represent a whole with its urge to *differenciate*, *integrate*, and *solve* a so-called inability – complete and more so connective (Deleuze, 1997, p. 211). Agamben (1999^b) seems to sense this implicit claim when he remarks: “the remnants of Auschwitz – the witnesses – are neither the dead nor the survivors, neither the drowned nor the saved. They are what remains between them” (p. 164). Each word, according to Agamben, bears witness. A word is always a testimony of something that cannot be named. It refers to a sound, pronounced in solitude, yet connected to the cacophonous silence of sounds.

How does all this elucidate the positioning of migrants and refugees in a multicultural society that forces them to assimilate? How do we surpass the segments of then and there versus here and now. Reading Levi’s words or listening to Nina Simone’s songs I experience a sense of belonging, belonging to those who do not belong. Yet, from the perspective of politics of segments I do not share

their history of being a victim of anti-Semitism or enslavement. Seen from a rhizomatic relationality singular stories touch one and each other, through my grandfather's elaboration on the horrors of the Second World War, my father's narration of the lives of the enslaved people, and even more so through the terror of war, flight and exclusion. Despite these stories I was born and live in a world with *expressions of here's and there's*. I live in a world of east versus the west; Islam versus others; cold and hot war. I was born in a city that for centuries has been a home for many religions – Muslims, Christians, Jews and others – and yet I grew up in countries – east and west – that believe that these segments can never connect. Political slogans merely result in childish accusations such as 'they did it' or 'they started it'. Within the perspective of a rhizomatical ethics – which I will explore in the next chapter – we must conclude that we are all involved in lines of exclusion or what Saskia Sassen (2014) calls a *politics of expulsion*. Sassen shows that this does not only consider the horrors of gas chambers and slavery in the past. Enslavement and exploitation are still a reality of our lives today: The evacuation of refugees from Calais or the transportation of refugees from one border to another happened then and still happens now. What insists is a *politics of shame*³² that touches upon every subject on different strata within a politics of flight, often sensed by those, such as Levi, who are least to blame. And it is through a historical and territorial connectivity in difference that one senses a sense of solidarity:

Solidarity does not assume that our struggles are the same struggles, or that our pain is the same pain, or that our hope is the hope for the same future. Solidarity involves commitment, and work, as well as the recognition that even if we do not have the same feelings, or the same lives, or the same bodies, we do live on common ground (Ahmed, 2014, p. 189).

Thus, the claimed a-significance of a testimony veils the problematic tendency of absolute universal truth of politics of exile as well as the incomplete truths of politics of segments. The a-significance of a testimony most of all refers to singularity of a truth that connects itself to a world in endless manners, beyond the homogeneity of totalitarianism and isolated segmentation of multiculturalism.

Only if language is not always already communication, only if language bears witness to something to which it is impossible to bear witness, can a speaking being experience something like a necessity to speak (Agamben, 1999^b, p. 65).

Primo Levi's voice and Nina Simon's song do neither leave us with the comfort of clarity nor the ease of indifference. They ask us to listen to the chaotic cacophony of heterotopias. Yet, the connectivity of heterotopias disappears in a segmentalized analyses and approach. By this I do not mean that we can

³² Here I refer to a different kind of shame than Sara Ahmed's (2014). In her evaluation of *politics of shame*, a form of *national shame* becomes a tool that reconciles a nation; shame becomes an instrument to strengthen a community's homogeneity. Here shame gives rise to a form of pride, to approach an ideal of nationhood. It is not a fundamental critique to a nation, but a nation in suspense of realizing its ideal self. What I intend to visualize is rather a shame that deterritorialize a community, leave its subjects to a loneliness due to political injustice that is done to them.

reduce different forms of suffering to one another. My attempt is not for the sake of reduction but rather an ode to connection. In a sense, in line with Deleuze's (1997) idea of virtuality that I have explored in the first chapter, I rather suggest that every life-story is in itself complete *and* at the same time *endlessly* connective to other stories. Politics of segments however presumes that connectivity and completeness cannot coexist together. A connection between the limbic lives during the Second World War and the contemporary refugee is by no means disrespectful of the suffering of men and women in Nazi-Camps. Agamben's attempt to connect different lines of history in his other works is not an anti-Semitic act but quite to the contrary. By linking the Jewish refugees and camp inhabitants to all other forms of refugees, discriminated minorities and exiled stateless people, Agamben as well as Arendt make a connection in order to oppose prejudicial tendencies against the Jewish community.

Let me clarify this with an example. In the documentary *Blood in the Face* (Bohlen, Rafferty, & Ridgeway, 1991) a group of Nazi sympathizers argue that supposedly non-white races do not become red in their face, mostly due to their skin color. According to this line of reasoning non-white people do not feel shame and hence are not human beings; or if they are, they are inferior to the white race. However, they do distinguish between two different groups. The first group includes the Asians, Latinos, African-Americans, etc. This group is dangerous because they multiply themselves too fast, and will become the majority in the United States. The second group according to these neo-Nazis is the Jews. They are in control of the government and banks. While all groups are discriminated against distastefully, the Jews are special due to the prejudice of being in control of the finance and the government. All other groups are apparently not smart enough to do so. While ordinarily there is little interest in this kind of absurd logic, the problem of the distinct segments persists in the logic of those who fight against such racism. In the next scenes one of the main leaders of this group is captured. The TV presenter however does not claim that a racist is captured who is violent against the Chinese, Jews, African-Americans, Mexicans, etc. Instead she states that he is an anti-Semite and anti-government KKK member, thus seamlessly follows the segmentalized logic of the racist. The proposition that the Jewish peoples are dangerous by controlling the government and the banks, blocks their shared interest with all other groups in their fight against racism. In other words, this puts them into a pseudo-adversarial role with regard to other groups with the same interest. Once more politics of exile finds its ally for exclusion through politics of segments.

Completeness and connectivity within heterotopias whether then and there, or here and now, is always *connectivity in difference*. Different affects connect and differentiate different experiences and expressions. There is difference between the experience of those who remain behind in a setting of war and terror; those who flee and lose their lives; those who get stuck in no-man's-lands of refugee camps; those who pass the borders and become illegal; or those who survive the journey and become legal citizens. If we want to segmentalize; we must realize that this process is endless. Each segment has its own expression; and each segment differentiates itself endlessly from within. There is difference between being a single young man in a refugee camp and a married man with a child. There is a difference between an elderly woman and a boy. There is a difference in-between those who can speak English and those who don't. Even within the rightless setting of a refugee camp; there are those who can express this rightlessness within the order of regimes of signs and those who cannot. The horror of such camp defines itself in the permanent inability of each member to give full report of the

reality of a life in a camp. Yet, the incomprehensibility of the matter must not lead to passive endurance; but to comprehension of another kind. That only through connectivity in-between the segments we could create a new form of politics in order to survive the horrors of the camps.

Politics of segments does not only create an idea of disconnective segments; but by neglecting connectivity and completeness in difference it also creates an idea of a process with a beginning and an end through *identifiable stories*. In case of refugees a line that begins with those who remained behind and those who became legal citizens: the 'true' victims and the 'true' survivors. Yet as we have seen in Primo Levi's case survival is not without cost. The sense beneath the experiences of surviving Auschwitz – and for that matter: of any survival – lies, according to Agamben, not in taking the blame, or confessing one's guilt. What lies beneath the unbearable experience of camps and its survival is another affect, another matter of expression: the ungraspable utterance of *shame*, no matter how innocent you are. Guilt refers to debt, something that can overcome itself by claiming responsibility and thereby entering the domain of the law. Agamben (1999^b) therefore argues that the use of the term *guilt* must not be confused with the religious use of it. He gives an example of this paradoxical illusion: "Eichmann feels himself guilty before God, not the law" (p. 23). Yet according to Agamben neither juridical responsibility nor guilt belongs to the domain of ethics, by defining ethics as *the doctrine of the happy life*, as Spinoza did (p. 24). This is essential for Agamben's treatise of the coming community and his conception of happiness as a political notion, which I will elaborate on in section 6.5.

The matter of expression of survival rather maps out an ethical field as a *zone of indistinction* in which it is impossible to draw a clear line of moral argumentation to pinpoint the exact strata through which shame, guilt and responsibility are measured.

What lies before us now is a being beyond acceptance and refusal, beyond the eternal past and the eternal present ... Beyond good and evil lies not the innocence of becoming but, rather, a shame that is not only without guilt but even without time (Agamben, 1999^b, pp. 102-103).

Is the intensity of shame without juridical guilt? In the case of refugees, in words of Schinkel (2008), the diagrammatical tendency of law is always implemented. There is a difference between guilt of doing something and tragic guilt of being something: an illegal. Yet, let us for the sake of analysis start with an analysis of *shame*. The survivor's shame is a complex intimacy. Agamben describes how a man who is about to be shot by a SS-officer turns red, ashamed to be chosen. However, this is not in any case an acknowledgment of one's inferiority, it is rather the unbearable undesired intimacy between the executioner and the victim. Agamben (1999^b) claims that the victim experiences the SS-officer's shame, because the officer is incapable of feeling it. In the case of the survivor, we could say he or she is ashamed to live on instead of someone else. How unjust and undeserved this shame may be, because every life belongs to its own. Beyond the duality of just and unjust, shame sensitizes the impossibility to distance oneself from the death that one has survived; it intertwines the segment of the living and segment of the dead in multipolar ways. Shamed is the one that survives its victims, their

memories and their speech. Shame is penetrated by the unsayable. So, in survival, in their very attempt to save themselves, the subjects are always a *desubjectified subject*. They will never become a whole again and will never be at ease with the identification of whatever segment. No segment, complete or pseudo, based on sexuality, ethnicity or religion, can create a form of expression that relates to this matter of expression.

In shame, the subject thus has no other content than its own desubjectification; it becomes witness to its own disorder, its own oblivion as a subject. This double movement, which is both subjectification and desubjectification, is shame (p. 106).

Shame subjectifies and desubjectifies. So Agamben's analysis of shame does not thematize a total loss of the subject, but the tension or, as he puts it, *a concomitance* between possession and loss of the subject due to the loss of consistency. The subject is unable to express itself either within a totalitarian or a segmented regime of expression. The witness cannot detach himself from the faceless other, the limbic life without speech. To regain a face, the witness must confront this facelessness, which is not beyond the subject as an outside that can be observed and objectified. The faceless is immanent to the witness. It is the immanence as the excess of not-being *Dasein*. Testimonies of survivors, whether of camps, wars and refuge – are articulated within this tension between the event of biological existence (content) and the event of enunciation (expression), between *zoē* and *bios*. The singularity of matter of expression is not merely of someone, but someone's survival of itself, of its own bare life, *homo sacer*. It is the facelessness of an inhuman existence that mirrors in the face of the hero who survived. The tragedy is that the survivor's survival of the inhumanity implies in the destruction of its own humanity.

The paradox here is that if the only one bearing witness to the human is the one whose humanity has been wholly destroyed, this means that the identity between human and inhuman is never perfect and that it is not truly possible to destroy the human, that something always *remains*. *The witness is this remnant* (Agamben, 1999^b, pp. 133-134).

The destruction leaves something behind, not as an object or essence, but rather as a rupture reminding us of our being as an affective nowhere between *living being* and *speaking being*, between humanity and inhumanity, in the non-place of the *logos* and an everlasting life.

The human beings exist in the human being's non-place, in the missing articulation between the living being and logos (p. 134).

And yet it is within this inhumanity that one must approach the state of the witness from another perspective. Just as Agamben, Dirk De Schutter (2005) suggests that witnessing is not about transferring information. It is not about transparency; or a clear translation from one segment into the other. Witnessing such ruptures is not about knowledge in the classical sense of the word. Witnessing expresses a new birth, even a *third birth* according to De Schutter.

To re-begin is not the repetition of what once occurred, but to resume that which remained incomplete in that which has happened, to resume that which has not happened in the past and has remained something to come. To re-begin is to believe in the promise that the new always includes, and always has have included (pp. 24, Translation TR).

Although Agamben's analysis is very radical, it nevertheless is applicable to current situations of other kinds of limbic lives that have always been a common factor in wars: victims of rape. In *Homo Sacer*, Agamben (1998) distinguishes between the rape victims in the Nazi camps, in former Yugoslavia, and other forms of rape. According to him this indicates the transformation of the *nomos* of birth. While the first believed in purity of the German blood, and thus were forbidden to impregnate their victims, this impregnating became the ultimate weapon against Bosnian women (p. 176). I now can thematize the affective state in which raped women live as their basic matter of expression within politics of flight. In enduring its effects, they do not care *why* they are raped. In order to acknowledge their suffering, one must surpass the boundaries of the segment of the raped women. The discourse on war and rape in its consequence for women has *hardly* changed from one discourse into another. It is within a systematic instrumentalization of rape and in the experience of these women that guilt and responsibility become indistinguishable on both a moral and a juridical level. In another way than the women in Germany who were raped by Russian soldiers and the Jewish women who were despite the prohibition raped in the camps, the gang raped women in Sudan, Rwanda, Congo and Bosnia, the children that are sexually exploited in refugee camps, and illegal women who are exploited in sinister prostitution houses in Europe, do not only sense shame, but also experience a sense of *guilt* because they are considered to be *responsible* for jeopardizing the honor of their families, countries and sexes. In their so-called survival, these individuals are often banned from their homes as self-inflicted and therefore responsible victims of war and terror. In some cases, even their juridical plea for justice became fatal for them instead of their offenders (Mees, & Van Zeijl, 2008). An illegal woman who is forced into prostitution cannot claim justice without the risk of being deported.

In contrast to Agamben's analysis, Bülent Diken and Casrsten Bagge Laustsen (2005) comment on the relation between the affects of guilt and shame, in relation to the act of rape in the time of war. While the ones who commit the act of rape are bound by a *brotherhood of guilt*, the one who has been raped is ashamed of a passive sin. This shame is not caused by lack of guilt, but arises rather the very moment in which it is impossible to distinguish between guilt and innocence. It creates through the juridical segments of legality and illegality a new faceless subject with an unidentifiable narrative. Every individual who has been raped asks oneself, unjustly, whether (s)he could have done or not have done something to avoid the rape. While the rapist moves on in dependency on the group, the rape victim stays behind in utter loneliness: "There can be a brotherhood in guilt, but never a sisterhood in shame". Diken and Laustsen argue that the offender is not merely guilty, but is also affected by shame.

What, within a closed community of soldiers, is understood as guilt (as a transgression which proves one's manhood and loyalty), is transformed into shame

as soon as the soldier leaves this community – which is why he does not and why the officers force soldiers to break taboos (p. 124).

However, this shame is never an argument to deny one's responsibility. And as for the survivors, they are haunted by a sense of unimaginable shame for their so-called luck to survive the horrors they endured. They too are affectively stuck between *survivors' shame* and their *exaltation of simple survival*. Yet, what survives is a body, breathing through the past, experiencing a guilt burdened shame. There is no regime of signs that coincides with their matter of expression; nor a segment that includes them as part of a community. They are truly homeless multipolar individuals.

5.4.2 Intersectional Gaps

Rape is a tricky subject. It is not only the horrifying experience that some subjects of politics of flight endure; but it is also a horrifying wrongful accusation that excludes other subjects of politics of flight. Let us thus begin again, referring to stories that are never told, with the distorted image of migrants and refugees that flee wars, while being brandished as rapists and terrorists in their countries of arrival, threatening the homes of those that belong. Who was the first rapist and what color did he or she have? The rapist is always on the other side; biblically removed from the stories that define themselves through purity of one's segments. Yet let us not be naïve, the purity of our normative segments can neither implement the rapist nor the raped.

Let us return to the old book, The Bible, that contains totalitarian and segmented stories; yet in each of its stories it defies both totalitarianism and segmentalization. Who was the Biblical *Hager*? The abused young girl, the woman who was betrayed by another woman, Sarah, the forgotten lover of Abraham. Hager is the mother of Ismael, and thus the mother of people with the other religion: Islam. Hager means the traveller, but she was more than that. Hager was banned. And the moment that her banishment was a reality, her story became a mystery. Her story, which *virtually* affected the reality of the world that we live in today, became an enigma for the *actual* line of historical telling. What Hager presents us with is that whenever a singular reality of an individual life cannot be differentiated and *integrated* as functional for a regime of expressions – the moment that Sarah becomes a mother – the only *solution* that rests is banishment. This banishment is thus not merely a physical banishment but also an absolute banishment from the order of expression. Still, let us not only mourn Hager. Both women – Hager and Sarah – are defined by the order of expression. Their stories are reduced to one *identity*: motherhood. And their motherhood is captured by an everlasting *opposition* of peoples and nations. Motherhood creates an *analogy of resemblance* until this day.

We have never known those women. We are only acquainted with their *representation* in a segmented identity of womanhood that is reduced to conflicting motherhood: mother of Jewish people and the other of Arabic people. Their stories nevertheless are not from the past; nor is the dysfunctional manner of their opposing identity. Already in the introduction of *Out of Place* Edward Said (2000) indicates an exposition of the affects of those opposed dualities. For him being out of place is not merely a physical matter; but his sense of existence is historically out of place. Describing his multiple roots – Beirut, Nazat, Jerusalem, Cairo, Gill (Massachusetts) and more – the Palestinian Said who was

born in the arms of a Jewish woman, the man with a Muslim father and a Christian mother accepts not merely multiplicity but also his essential historical rootlessness. But Said's experience of inability to *voice a sense of home* started long before his birth.

In case of Said it is not merely an artificial segmented multiplicity in his identity, but also an enforced animosity in-between segments. Idea's, ideologies and life stances historically and territorially clash within a form of expression of an individual. We must take care, Said warns us, not to contextualize this phenomenon as a problem of the Palestinian people. This clash has spread itself around the globe, although it becomes explosively manifest in the Israeli territories. Some Israeli youth start to question their state as soldiers and their loyalty to an idea. On the website *Breaking the Silence* (n.d.) numerous testimonies are recorded on the experiences of these soldiers who eventually become the next excluded ones themselves. Their thoughts waver traumatically between a sense of duty to protect their community and their repulsion of repression of the innocent in the name of this protection. In an interview called *Shrek Shrek* a former soldier states that what in the end shocked him the most was what he had in common with the 'enemy'. While considering 'them' merely as enemies he was able to distance himself from the Palestinian. But it was humor of the other that showed their relationship, which made him aware of his destructive acts towards those who were in a sense connected to him. It is within such matter of expression within simple bitter dark jokes – which seems merely absurd from the perspective of form of expression of politics of segments – that *soldiers shame* refers to another form of guilt due to their so-called voluntary act.

This also has been the case with American soldiers and European soldiers. They often sense a detachment to the ordinary society due to their out-of-the-ordinary experiences. The men who operated in the process of exclusion eventually become the new *homo sacer* themselves. A cacophonous silence often seems to be the only remaining expression of homesickness due to a lack of segment that can include them. But what is a home? Already in the first chapter I have elaborated on the complexity of home, displacement and homesickness. In the previous chapter I have elaborated on the manners in which totalitarian regimes of exile create peripheries where the other is permanently forced to experience such displacement. How does a politics of segments relate to the idea of a home and to affects like displacement and homesickness? As we have seen, it is not only the migrants and refugees that sense the duality of opposed identities within their biographies. The clash of civilizations is not only destined for those who are banned. The logic of segments also affects those who are positioned to enforce such banishment. Soldiers are the witnesses of broken societies, dislocated communities, and it is due to these dislocations and their affective confusion that they sense their own detachment, even when their home-societies seem to be stable.

In the documentary *Purple Hearts* (Van Broekhovens, 2005) Tyson Johnson, whose body is literally ripped apart, wants to go back to the army, "I just want to go back to my normal life", he states. It is however not his belief in the war that makes him want to go back. Tyson believes that the war was unnecessary and merely led to the death of innocent people. Still, this disbelief did not stop him from doing what he was told. The reason why Tyson needs to go back to the war is the abnormality of ordinary daily life back home. Emotionally he cannot cope with it; he cannot handle his feelings, whether good or bad. He wants to leave his state of insomnia in a world that once was his home. Tyson's mother thus states that boys and girls such as hers were trained to see the other as

parasites, as *mugged*, but when they return home there is no alternative for them than becoming parasites, *mugged*, themselves. There is no life beyond the military for them. Not in a legal sense but on a social and political sense they become the stateless.

In this documentary, the 21-year-old Sam Ross describes the effect of such a state of war. The notion fear is too weak a qualification of what drives him. The complexity is too immense to be limited by one word. “You forget everything you ever knew and you can only concentrate on one thing, that is either you take care of them or they take care of you.” In such differentiation of segments one political problematic citizen is opposed to the other. Ross came back blind, lost one leg, had a broken body. Nevertheless, he does not regret his life as a soldier. In the end, it was better than living in the deserted mining town where he was born. He replaced one segment of non-belonging for the promise of another segment of non-belonging. Ross’s hatred towards Iraqis is immense and not surprising. The political discourse gives only one option, given its either/or logic: the other is coming to enforce himself into your territorial segment. The other is the cause of your political and socioeconomic misfortune. In line with such logic Ross suggests that they should have bombed the whole country. Yet there is a flickering moment of clarity of enforced segmentalized thinking when he states: “*But of course I was an American soldier, that is the way I was taught to feel*”. The same hatred also devours John Quincy Adams (37), who was injured in his head and finds it hard to speak. The Iraqis remain the inhuman, even for some of the excluded people such as John and Sam. Sam even calls them “people who accidentally live in Iraq”.

Only Tyson recognizes aspects of his life in the lives of people in Iraq as having one and the same destiny: dying as innocent people. What is so different about Tyson? Perhaps something simple, something very old. Something that within Tyson’s life has installed a sense of the complexity of the way people are disconnected and the misfortune of being categorized as an *objective* enemy. Tyson belongs to the *people of color*. He has never been at ease, he has never sensed a sincere belonging to any of the acknowledged segments of the United States of America, be it the denomination colonists – the White Anglo-Saxon Protestants (W.A.S.P.) of Huntington – the Roman Catholic immigrants from Europe that arrived at the end of the 19th century and all the waves of enslaved people, refugees and immigrants thereafter. As the offspring of enslaved people Tyson has always been from here and from there at the same time. He has never been at *Home*. He has always been in-between segments or at best traversing all sections. His existence has always been an explicit *intersectional reality* of not belonging to a segment.

There is yet another aspect we should not ignore. Victims of war are often defined as civilians, which are immediately opposed to soldiers. Whether voluntary or conscripted service the assumption is that soldiers can never become victims of war. The above given examples at least indicate a different approach. This voluntary commitment was already criticized by Michael Moore in his *Fahrenheit 9/11* (2004) in which he shows that the economically disadvantaged part of the society is economically pursued and recruited for the war. In other parts of the world the number of child soldiers – who are beaten, underfed, humiliated and eventually grow up in order to force other children to become soldiers too – testifies to an even higher complexity. Some children are forced to join and others do it voluntarily. This voluntary state however is ambiguous. Children choose such a life due to a lack of options, whether on political, juridical, cultural, social or economic level. Shervin Nekuee (2006) elaborates on such cultural and political lack of possibilities of involvement for the Iranian

adolescents during the war between Iran and Iraq. While these adolescents were neglected as subjects, in the family as well as in society, the war and religious discourse gave them a political identity. In a world where belonging only appears through segments and identifications, the adolescence child – with its intense longing for desire – is perhaps the most vulnerable victim of them all.

The critique on politics of segments is as old as politics of segments itself. Even within the polytheistic and monotheistic hegemonies critical minds have expressed the explicit connection in-between humans, and eventually between all living beings. Within the political setting of multicultural segments with its racial differentiation Crenshaw (1991) has shown how politics of segments, even in its emancipatory expressions, creates overloaded peripheries of life stories that do not belong to a defined segment. Crenshaw title *Mapping in the Margin* shows the rhizomatic connectivity of the center and the periphery. Human beings are never rooted within one segment; they are always already situated at the margins of segments. This becomes manifest in the lives of certain groups. Crenshaw's example is women of color that endure violence. These women express their belonging in the margins of different forms of expression. Crenshaw argues that the voices of these women are never heard by white feminist women, with their appreciation of the female segment, nor by emancipated people of color, with its segmentalization in ethnicity and physical appearance. These women literally disappear in the margins of policies – *intersectional peripheries* – that are solely focused on an outlined segmentary identity.

The problem with identity politics is not that it fails to transcend difference, as some critics charge, but rather the opposite – that it frequently conflates or ignores intragroup differences (p. 1242).

In other words, identity politics does not only create a permanent clash in-between segments, it also fails to understand difference within its own segment. In a feedback loop *inter* always already appears to be *intra*. As Crenshaw shows difference is everywhere. The problem of homogeneity in form of expression is thus not merely a problem of totalitarian axiomatic thinking. Crenshaw states that the idea of equality within these segments – whether for all women or for all people of color – does not result in equal political and social opportunities for all women and eventually for all people to express themselves adequately. It rather creates a *transcendental universal* idea of the fit between subjectivity and segmentary by, for instance, reducing every female story of repression to the same order of repression. “We are equal” is translated as “we are *eternally described as the same*”. Crenshaw shows how the illusions of *transcendence*, *universals*, *eternity* and *description* – criticized by Deleuze and Guattari (1994) in *What is Philosophy?* – create little room for individual stories in which intersectional forms of repression – color of skin, sexual preferences, economic opportunities, religious affiliation, social status, legal status, education and language barriers – create an immense complex context. The women that get stuck in-between become faceless and voiceless. They are not denied one form of access, but multiple forms of access in both politics of exile and politics of segments. In both forms of politics there is a permanent *gap* in-between experience and expression. In order to explicate this intersectional rhizomatic reality of an individual life Crenshaw (1991) calls for a *generalized community ethics* (p.1257).

Crenshaw's critique is yet even more severe. Just as Arendt (1968), Crenshaw (1991) shows how segmented minorities implement an idea of majority within each segment. Thus, segments are not merely defined as *majoritarian minorities* – identifying oneself as a specific minority that is repressed by the majority – but these segments also show a majoritarian tendency towards power within the minoritarian segments: within feminist movement *middle class white women* and within anti-racism movements *male participants*. The question of resistance to power within such emancipatory practices does not allow a *presentation* of individuals with all their various cries for justice, but it rather becomes a question of who is most *representative* for a segment. And according to Crenshaw it is exactly this one-sided representation that creates a severe exclusion of most participants. In other words, in repeating an *intersectional gap* in its representation it becomes once more a matter of life and death, belonging and non-belonging, i.e. of survival on a daily basis.

Thus, the struggle over incorporating these differences is not a petty or superficial conflict about who gets to sit at the head of the table. In the context of violence, it is sometimes a deadly serious matter of who will survive – and who will not (p.1265).

The act of subjectification and desubjectification manifests itself within the order of segments. Subjectification eventually is a discursively mediated split in the middle of an on-going process, which some thinkers – such as Foucault, Agamben, Arendt, Deleuze and Guattari – prefer to characterize as a *processual* subject or a process of subjectification on multiple strata, as a result of which expression and content intertwine continuously on the level of form and matter aiming at a plane of consistency. Language gives meaning to our gestures and facial expressions, in short, mediating relations to our affecting and affected bodies. Let us thus examine the type of defining an *I* that is given to us by politics of segments. As I have argued in chapter one the subject of flight does not limit itself to migrants and refugees. The same applies for each segment of politics of segments that creates a discrepancy in-between form and matter within expression. In terms of Crenshaw this politics misses an intersectional image of thought. Within the segmented order – with its intersectional gaps – the definition of an 'I' is always at odd with the expression of an individual as a changing and connective storyline.

The form of expression within a politics of segments is determined by context, culture and identity. These mobilize the form of the I's within a multicultural setting. The matter of multicultural expression – the plane of affects – is rather filled with homelessness, a sense of loss, and unclarity. This 'substance' is characterized by *homesickness* and *displacement*. The form is in search of consistency and seeks to produce identities as such, while the matter of expression is a yearn for the loss of consistency. This re- and deterritorializing urge creates a schizophrenic reality of belonging, in which one longs for consistency in order to belong to a segmented community, yet its segmented result creates a sense of non-belonging that rhizomatically produces lines of flight.

In artistic practices, such schizophrenic affect is approached in a different way, wrapped in percepts, creating sensations. As we have seen in the third chapter, Yousef Doust testifies in her film *Nahid=Venus* of her own sense of non-belonging. The search for the 'identity' of her aunt – who is

she? – results in her losing her own meaningful identification – who am I? In scientific research the experience of migrants and their offspring is frequently and systematically related to schizophrenia. Selten, Cantor-Graae and Kahn (2007) affirm the increase of schizophrenia under migrants-groups; yet argue that some of the research is based on misdiagnosis due to racial bias. They reason that the increase is not caused by biological predispositions but due to social factors and political settings in which individuals define themselves. These social factors cannot be reduced to an economic position, but refers to self-perception and the social position of migrants in the new world in which they are left with two options: assimilate or segregate. Whether it concerns the whole society or a segment within a society, the fundament of the two options of assimilation and segregation remains. And exactly this form of demands creates a sense of homelessness. In case of Iranian-Dutch women who have intensely tried to adjust themselves Ghorashi (2003) states:

Ironically, the result is that these Iranian women who are active participants within Dutch society feel an emptiness because they have distanced themselves from their own group and are also not feeling as if they belong to Dutch society (p. 230).

The task of a politico-philosophical research is to problematize this unquestioned neutrality of belonging through segmented identities within both politics of exile and politics of segments. Still, as a politico-philosopher you are never alone in thought. Others, revolutionary scientists and artists that defy the temptation of spectacle of exoticism, are the companions that one needs in thought in order to break through disconnecting loyalties and schizophrenic damnation that comes afterwards. The experiences of schizophrenia of migrants cannot be reduced to a neuro-psychological explanation. Schizophrenia rather results from the implementations of political and social paradigms as Deleuze and Guattari (1983) already argued in their *Anti-Oedipus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. In deconstructing the pathological identification of schizophrenia, they propose an affirmative schizo-analysis. Referring to this de- and reterritorialisation of the schizo, in line with their elaboration, I firstly propose that the schizophrenic experience within politics of flight must not be approached as a syndrome of disorder. There are no medicines to ease this painful experience of an intersectional gap. Secondly, this conflicting experience does not limit itself to disagreement between two or more different forms of culture. The schizophrenia is not a banal manifestation of a *clash of civilizations* as a simplistic conflict between binary or segmentalized perceptions on culture. We could even argue that ideas such as *clash of civilization* cause the schizophrenic state instead of explaining it. The sense of conflict is not essential to communities, but is born out of moral, political and economic friction that forces individuals into a one-sided loyalty toward one segment. Nor is cultural conflict an affect that merely appears literally in-between two distinct cultures. As Rancière (2004) suggested politics is rather born in this limit-state.

We still need another approach. The antagonism and its tensional force, due to the imposed conflicting loyalties and judgments, are the prior catalyst of the act of flight and not something that only realizes itself during or after the act of migration. What is called *in-between* is not a clear space between two borders of cultures, but an indiscernible zone. Society is unable to hear the cacophony in this no-man's-land of intersecting in-between. Syria and Eritrea are not over there; they are implemented in

the here; in the economic, political and environmental setting of the here. It is the misty space in-between the process of life and the process of thought; in-between 'I' on its way to become an other I. Or in de terms of expression: the in-between of form and matter of expression.

During the flight, the schizophrenic dilemmas reinforce themselves in-between territories, in-between multiple spaces. Each space contains its own plurality of affects in-between comfort and conflict and their contradictory tensions. Although refugees explicitly question some commonalities in their mother culture, they remain the products of multiple cultures as well. They carry around these commonalities without even noticing it, so to speak. The act of refuge feeds the already installed schizophrenia by sensitizing the absurdities of such unconscious self-evidences. The new territory also contributes to these multiple, conflicting experiences that result not only from participating in an other's culture, but also becoming *an other* in every sense of the word.

The experience of schizophrenia is sensed in the awareness of deterritorialized territories. These territories are, however, more than a reference to an actual space. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) redefined territory relationally as "the critical distance between two beings of the same species" (p. 319). This redefinition emphasizes the tensional aspect of relations. Territory can also be qualified in more radiant terms as in Heidegger's (1996) *Umwelt*. Each *Umwelt* is sensed on an affective plane through its own form of expression: *Stimmung* (mood/attunement). A beautiful example is Ahmet Kaya's *Dağlarda Ölmek İsterim* (I long to die on the mountains). The word for mountains in Turkish is *dağlar*. In this song, this term evokes a double meaning. It sensitizes a sense of home, which is personified in the figure of *anne* (mother). The very same song however also expresses being a *gharib*, a foreigner. *Dağlar* then expresses a sense of loss of an *Umwelt* too. This supplements its sense of home, melting into another affect: nostalgia as a mood that sensitizes a deterritorialized awareness of what has been left behind. Affects such as *nostalgia* and homesickness thus operate on at least two levels. Within a problematic sense of community nostalgia strengthens a sense of loss, pregnant of resentment and in a mode of lacking and shortcoming. Nevertheless, it gives the subject a form of individuality in order to detach oneself from the homogenous mass called others. Since these affects are shared with others, they articulate implicitly another community that is not based on a common form of belonging but on an everlasting non-belonging. In this schizophrenic act the subject *frees* itself from the axiomatic paradigm Other and yet *attaches* itself within a *global differentiated displacement*.

Again, art sensitizes its readers for this literal double bind. Milan Kundera's *Ignorance* (2002) sensitizes such imposed lack. When Irene and Josef visit their homeland, the Czech Republic, they both sense different forms of shortcoming in connection to others. Irene cannot adjust emotionally, mostly due to the fact that her friends seem to ignore her long life in France, while in France her life is reduced to the image of how a Frenchman thinks what being a Czech indicates. Irene senses this almost physically, imagining that one of her I's detach her head from her torso, attaching it to her legs, while the other 'I' stares at her torso blind for other parts of her body. Josef has lost his history due to his detachment to the words and handwritings. *Reading his writing as a child, he remains a stranger to that child all the same*. Nevertheless, as Kundera shows, loss is not a product of mere migration – an unavoidable outcome of nomadic live – but the product of political and cultural discourse in which migration is signified.

La piel donde vivo (Valle Robles, 2011) is a yet another tale of such a political and cultural discourse. Jeroen Lans is the adopted child of a Dutch couple. He was born in Guatemala and was adopted when he was two years old. The boy sensed in the first instance no connection to this assumed homeland. He does not sense homelessness. In his puberty, when he is called names and must endure sentences such as “go back to your own country” he starts to feel lack. Something suddenly seems to be wrong. The boy with a typical Dutch name is forced to respond to the prejudice of others who for no reason accuse him of laziness and thievery. It is within this setting that he develops a sense of resentment, “If only I’d gone to Guatemala.” Thus, in a sense Jeroen becomes a Guatemalan for the first time. Nevertheless, living in Guatemala is not done easily. Jeroen is also a Dutch boy, irritated by the casual attitude toward appointment making in Guatemala. In order to feel some familiarity, he introduces his old life into his new life, for example, teaching his girlfriend to speak Dutch. He discovers that Guatemala has its own forms of harshness – cultural, political and economic. Jeroen learns to appreciate his adoptive parents, as guardian angels. Nevertheless, his life in Guatemala distances him also from his adoptive family. He must develop new forms to communicate with his parents and brother. The sense of homelessness eventually is felt in Guatemala as well. Or as Theodor Adorno once stated: *Once you’ve crossed the ocean, you’re always on the wrong side*. While Jeroen on the one hand states: “I come from Guatemala”, he also believes that he could never become a non-Dutch. Both countries define and demolish a sense of home. Eventually home for Jeroen is no longer a nation-state but becomes a sense of *relaxation*.

Although affects such as shame, resentment, and homesickness present themselves as matter of expressions, *Stimmung* in which these affects are articulated, because of the enunciative context creates other types of matter of expression. Shame sensed by the inhabitants of camps, or the survivors of war, is shame of being alive, shame of survival because others perished. This sense of shame differs from the shame of departure; it is a sense of betrayal by leaving behind family and friends. And this form of shame in its turn differs from the shame of some European guest laborers living in the ruinous pensions and degenerated neighborhoods, being ashamed of lack of achievement in a new country that promised prosperity. Homelessness has different modalities too. In case of the Jewish people, and at this moment Syrian people, losing their entire families; victims of war who are dispelled of their family structures; and migrants that miss their families living far away. In the case of an adopted non-European child by European adults, it does not only create a displacement in the illusionary there and here; but as Van der Tuin et al (2007) argues a reality of long-lasting history of colonialism enforces itself in a singular individual story. Jeroen, already in the contrast in-between his name and the color of his skin, carries the reality of a complete individual biography with endless different forms of connectivity to a history of global politics. Jeroen’s identity is, in terms of Ajit Maan (1999), an internarrative identity – or as I rather call it Jeroen is a fine example of an internarrative *becoming*. His life appears in the middle of multiple narratives that connect the world not only territorially but also historically. This middle of narratives, as Maan argues, is a middle beyond a starting point, and it does not lead to a “resolved ending” (p. 45). Yet, in a world that believes in definable segments of identity – without understanding the complexity of the inter within narratives – Jeroen is left to a discourse of broken biographies with plural senses of loss, plural senses of nostalgia and finally *plural sense of otherness*.

Finally, in this discourse of nostalgia, there is another figure that often has been forgotten in the analysis of migration and refuge according to Huijer (2016): *those who remain behind*. Migration and loss of intimacy and certainty does not only effect those who leave or literally travel, but also those who see their loved ones leave. The sentiment is paradoxical. They lose the intimacy and closeness, they feel a sense of death, but they are not even allowed to mourn this loss. Those who leave, create hollowness. They are *absently present* within the lives of those who are unfortunate enough to not share the adventure of the migrant. Huijer typifies these lives as melancholic lives; they lose their sense of freedom, due to the fact that it is more plausible for an individual to choose to leave than for an individual to choose to be left behind (pp. 49-69).

Given this plurality of matter and forms of expression – affects and discourses – 21st century mankind has to become plural in order to cope with its aporia, contradictions, paradoxes, double binds and dilemma's. That multiculturalism is not the final answer that has been argued for. The differential paradigmatic understanding of the other within multiculturalism is still at odd with the concept of other as possible world (as we have seen in 3.3.1), which eventually is shared with non-migrants. Both the migrant and non-migrant are forced to belong in a sense to the vague community of *the other segment*. As Schinkel (2008) repeatedly argues, any identifiable society or community, is at the end not a given but a construction of an order in communication. A segment, an identity, or definable community is a product of regimes of expression. The terms *wigger* or *bounty* for this 'hybrid' existence shows the moral of segmentation by literally naming those who pass the borders of segments in terms of one and the other. Then again, as we will see, the manner of passing the borders differs too. As Pisters (2003) argues, *the segmental political struggle* “is necessary to create conditions for the creation of desire, for actualizations of becomings” (p.114). Becomings are multiple, becoming minority is multiple. Some give in to the desire of becoming majority, some to becoming minority. Each of these complex expressions is even more so overdetermined by the complexities of a global world, be it each time in different ways. There is radiant connection in-between all in this world, the research of which, whether done by scientists, artists, or politico-philosophers, demands an integrative approach.

Pluralism does not meekly indicate the existence of differences next to each other; it rather indicates the enduring of confrontation and dialog in-between differences (De Mul, 2017, p. 201, Translation TR).

5.5 Collective Bodies

5.5.1 Adaptation or Consciousness

Multicultural differentiating paradigms do not only effect expression, but also the matter of content, i.e. bodies. An active differentiation is not always for the sake of further segmentation, but also for the sake of emancipation. The two emancipatory examples Crenshaw (1991) gives – differentiation due to sex and differentiation of people of color – both started in order to put the rights of individuals on the

agenda. Yet, the outcome was rather the homogenization of representation of a people. In order to focus on the matter of content of emancipation - differentiated bodies – I will start with a semi-autobiographical text by Arendt (1978^a) entitled: ‘We Refugees’ (pp. 55-66). I intend to incorporate the fleeing private Arendt into the public thinking Arendt, connecting her private body to a collective body.

In this article Arendt speaks of ‘complete assimilation’ and ‘mania’, describing despair and the unbearable ruptures in the process of refuge. Having fled to the United States after a short imprisonment in a refugee camp in France, she mourns the impossibility to create a community, not even as a segment, and hence the impossibility of political (re)presentation and emancipation. In the first instance, she discusses the radical distinction between private life and political life as well as the difference between body and politics. These distinctions seem to exclude the experience of refugees as a political experience. According to Arendt, it is the internalized conflicting feelings – such as shame and relief with regard to having survived the Holocaust – that emote the ambivalent attitude of the Jewish refugee during the Second World War, especially those who fled to the United States. Arendt goes so far as to claim that these individuals refuse to identify themselves as refugees.

The text starts with a description of an intense negation through which these refugees trivialize their own act of flight. The people, for whom principles such as the Convention of Genève have been made in order to protect their lives and status as refugees of wars, paradoxically *refused to be identified as refugees*. Instead, they wanted to be identified as migrants or newcomers. She applies a classical distinction between a migrant and a refugee. Migration is not experienced or defined as a trauma. Migration is voluntary and due to economic reasons. Refugees are somehow pathetic and unfortunate; they flee involuntarily due to political circumstances. In her analysis, the migrant becomes a non-political social subject, who merely travels in order to gain a better life. In this line of thinking, not only refugees but also migrants become politically passive victims and a simple fortune seeker. They too are the ones who are deprived of the ability to form a community because migrants travel, be it voluntarily but nevertheless, from one community into the other.

In their attempt to become non-traumatized voluntary migrants the Jewish refugees distinguish themselves from other types of refugees, who are thought to have fled due to their political actions and past. Nevertheless, these ‘migrants’, like the partakers of multicultural society, did *not* form a new segment, but remained disconnected and isolated. Although the German language was commonly used, they refused to recognize themselves as a discrete group. Arendt goes along with this negation, but for slightly different reasons, namely because of her specific definition of a refugee. According to her, refugees do not meet the demands of the convention. The limited definition requires the refugee to be a person who has to flee his or her country due to a political past and political *activism*. Only due to such actions in one’s past can a refugee be identified as a *political* refugee, and not due to his or her action *during* and *after* the act of flight. According to this, an individual is unable to become political *in the process* of flight. While Arendt acknowledges the fact that these persons are driven from their countries because of political reasons, she also points out that this was not caused by a political act on their part. Because of Arendt’s belief in politics as inseparable from speech and action, as a result refugees as well as migrants become *passive*, i.e. *non-political*. They are *non-political refugees*.

In her analysis, there is a fundamental distinction between passivity and activity. Action contains no endurance – as in Derrida’s (1982) ‘non-passive endurance’ – nor the complexity of endurance and control within an event in which both elements of passivity and activity are political. For this reason, Arendt (1978^a) argues that the new form of politics of totalitarianism has created a new form of refugees. The concept of refugee is transformed due to her redefinition of politics: *the politics of suppression versus the politics of mercy*.

Now ‘refugees’ are those of us who have been so unfortunate as to arrive in a new country without means and have to be helped by Refugee Committees (p. 55).

Nevertheless, the refusal *to be* a refugee hides a tragic truth. These travellers are forced to leave, but due to the lack of a previous activity to which to refer, they eventually lack the ability to tell their tale. The burden of this passivity is even more intensely felt in the degrading *aid* of refugee-organizations. Being dependent on refugee committees is not seen as an act of resistance, but is the continuation of the unbearable shame of a passive flight. This is the reason why migrants in the Arendtian sense, in order to avoid this humiliation, often pretend to have left their countries voluntarily in order not to belong to such a degrading segment of identity. This gives them some sense of independence from the politics of mercy. They disapprove of a way of life that is forced upon them by such politics. Their resistance to and disgust with this form of politics does not stimulate new forms of politics. Neither does it produce alternative political argumentation why they left. It favors the negation of politics that homogenized them as a group, as an enforced assemblage of bodies, in the country of origin as well as the country of arrival.

Elaborating on Arendt’s line of reasoning, freedom here does not imply political freedom, but economic or social freedom and *choice* of territory. Arendt states that they often denied that their Jewish background had caused their problems. This denial covers a will to survive that is in urgent need of some sort of *voluntary blind optimism* in order to move on. Acknowledgement of their initial motivation to flee would mean confrontation with uncountable ruptures, disorders, lacks and shortcomings.

We lost our home, which means the familiarity of daily life. We lost our occupation, which means the confidence that we are of some use in this world. We lost our language, which means the naturalness of reaction, the simplicity of gestures, the unaffected expression of feelings. We left our relatives in the Polish ghettos and our best friends have been killed in concentration camps, and that means the rupture of our private lives (pp. 55-56).

Despite their blind optimism; the loss of a home, their pride and moreover the inability to give any signification to their experiences brought them the loss of the ability to form a new language and a community. They do not even define the segments that they belong to. The choice of territories has not brought opportunities to form new communities either, not even in the multicultural setting of the United States. The freedom gained by refusing to become a needy refugee did not open possibilities of new attachments. In the end, the act of flight is experienced as a permanent loss of homes, a

permanent nostalgia, which is accompanied by as Agamben (1999^b) suggests: *shame* to have survived instead of others.

Their private sphere, by Arendt (1958) defined as the sphere of love and inhabited by lovers without the political space of in-between³³, has been destroyed by the politics of totalitarianism, forcing them to leave the loved ones behind, sensing their upcoming death in the gas chambers. This reality is logically negated by optimism, i.e. by a determination to survive the pessimism that results from acknowledging the bare facts. Arendt (1978^a) reports that the refugees were advised to forget. In this act of *desirable voluntary amnesia*, the old memories were driven out in order to adopt the new home as no other had done before them. According to Arendt, a new language was created just to deny the fact that a new human-being was born, a person who was intersectionally betrayed by friend and foe:

Apparently nobody wants to know that contemporary history has created a new kind of human beings – the kind that are put in concentration camps by their foes and in internment by their friends (p. 56).

This imposed non-communication does not only exist between the refugees and the inhabitants of the new country, but this silence also exists among the *migrative refugees* themselves. Arendt believes that this speechlessness concerns more than just the past. Talking of the future is also suppressed in this process. While in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* Arendt (1968) describes the state in which the masses of refugees and stateless arise, her short personal note on refugees in the final instance shows how she, in the country of arrival, is enclosed in another closed whole without entrances. And years later, another refugee, Halleh Ghorashi (2003) writes:

We are people with lost homes and misplaced ideals, people who experienced both the nearness of death and the highest moments of joy in life, and people who learned to survive (p. 18).

What does this survival in a new society indicate? Does survival ever end? While some define a society as segmented, the society itself on a meta-level remains multiple. Yet beyond this distinction the newcomer enters mainly a segmented discourse rather than a segmented community. In Arendt's nostalgic writings, produced during the war, mass statelessness and mass migration are not the promises of a brave new world. Her article 'We Refugees' in a sense, specifically speaks of the experience of non-belonging among contemporary migrants despite their immense efforts. An actual exemplary case of this tension can be found in the reactions to the candidacy of Nebahat Albayrak for the leadership of the Dutch social democratic party PvdA. In the TV show *Pauw & Witteman* (2012, February 27) – discarded by the PVV leader Geert Wilders as left propaganda – the gender and Turkish background of Albayrak is at issue. In spite of the fact that Albayrak is a former State Secretary and fully participating Dutch citizen, Jeroen Pauw and Paul Witteman focused repeatedly on

³³ Love, except love for the world, is by Arendt (1958) even characterized as the "most powerful of all antipolitical human forces" (p. 242).

the fact that Albayrak is a non-Dutch *woman*. When Albayrak remains dismissive of the idea, they turned to the statistician Maurice de Hond, and when the statistician repeatedly suggests that in the end it does *not* matter whether you are a woman or a man for the final vote, they state that numbers are not that important. Then the other segment of her identity – being Turkish – is at issue. The bemused Albayrak questions the relevancy of her ethnic background. Pauw's arguments oscillate between sexual appreciation of Turkish women as well as the fact that this will be an issue for the right-wing PVV. Albayrak's question: "but why is this relevant to *you*?" remains unanswered. In the end, her personal life as an extremely active participant within the political discourse and her achievements are eclipsed by the obsession of the presenters with her gender and cultural heritage. As for the other candidates, gathered round the table, their manhood and whiteness does not seem to influence the content of their policy. But in case of Albayrak her femininity and Turkish background seem essential. This is merely done under the rhetorical guise of what other parties such as PVV would emphasize, but at that very moment the emphasis of Pauw and Witteman themselves is the real problem. Even the condescending attempt of Femke Halsema – Chairwomen of Stichting Vluchtelingen (Refugee Foundation) and former leader of Dutch Green Party – to express female pride in Albayrak's achievements in spite of her Turkish background confirmed these prejudices. It is also instructive to see that the sporadic moment when Albayrak speaks of the content of her policy, Pauw loses all interest.

Neither assimilation nor segregation seems to be the answer, despite the illusionary promises of politics of exile and politics of segments. And the example of Albayrak is just an example in an old process of exclusion and segmentation of identity. Arendt's comment that no matter how hard the Jewish refugees tried to become perfect citizens, and cope with the reality of unreachable assimilation which forces *exclusion* upon them, holds true for the seventy years to come. The refugee and migrant, including their offspring, are seen as the unavoidable other and associated with the same kind of hostile attitude that has driven them away from the country of origin. Even multicultural societies do not have the ability to cope with newcomers and their *coming communities*. Doubts start to nestle in the shared nightmares, when blind optimism is imprudent. In the end, there is something terribly discordant with the optimism of the *migrative refugees*, Arendt (1978^a) reckons:

We became witnesses and victims of worse terrors than death – without having been able to discover a higher ideal than life (pp. 57-58).

If *life* is all that there is, if this life is all that one fights and flees for in these mad times, then according to Arendt such an individual is far from living in the fullest sense of the word. Becoming *merely* life means becoming inert, i.e. becoming a *limbic life* without the ability to be reborn (natality). In an even more radical turn she states that refugees hoped that their beloved ones did not survive so that they did not have to experience this pure nakedness of life. She even envies the dead for their premature salvation. Being dead is better than mere survival and suicide is the last that remains for human dignity and freedom. *Suicide*, not as rebellion or a political act, but as a performance just to reject the helping hand in a politics of mercy. Suicide made refugees become an individual again and not merely a *schnorrer*, a beggar. It is an autonomous, but paradoxical gesture in order to become active subjects

as the only option against the passivity of a needy individual or worse of a *mere* life. And if the drifters have no desire to die, then they create a nice little fairy-tale containing the last remains of a truth: *once upon a time these people were somebody*, persons who were wanted and needed by others. Yet Arendt sorrowfully states that we are in a world, a "mad world" in which "it is much easier to be accepted as a 'great man' than as a human being" (p. 61). Despite the myth that surrounds their lives, refugees develop a *hyper-awareness*: they do not want to act suspiciously. They justify their arrival time and again, and at the same time they adapt exceptionally. They try to impress, so that they do matter. The question is whether I am guilty of charge. Do I in my *hyper-awareness* wear a *mask* in order to adjust to a society in order to hopefully break through the parameters of thought? Perhaps a dissertation is nothing more than that for me.

Arendt argues that in their attempt to adjust fully, the newcomers wear a mask that conceals the facts of their lives. They were exiled before but not anymore. The migrative refugees play the role that has been assigned to them, so that they become more French than the Frenchmen and more English than the Englishmen. It is not authenticity that matters, but rather the *tracing* of traits that gain them access to the society. Not originality or plural relationality but *copying* is the trade of the networks. As they voluntarily yield loyalty, they have become the first *prisonniers volontaires*, captured bodies by the French because they were Germans and not freed because they were Jews. These voluntary prisoners have changed their identity so often that nobody, not even themselves, know who they are anymore. It is an escape from the tragic Jewish existence from which they have been expelled. They are stateless, but simultaneously refuse to qualify themselves as such. Arendt (1978^a) states:

A man who wants to lose his self discovers, indeed, the possibilities of human existence, which are infinite, as infinite as is creation. But the recovering of a new personality is as difficult – and as hopeless – as a new creation of the world (p. 63).

The problem of identity arises due to the fact that in the act of assimilation one is forced to become someone else, and Arendt states that it is impossible to become someone else. I, however, would argue that it is *not* about becoming someone else. The demand of assimilation shows its absurdity by forcing a person who is in constant motion, a person who is the subject of permanent change, to become segmented and identified as someone. In other words, it is not impossible to become someone else, it is impossible to become a *segmented* someone else. It is the differentiated force of identity that creates the pathological state of multipolar individuals. In terms of Deleuze and Guattari (1987) becoming a specific body on the level of forms of content merely connects to one type of assemblages of bodies. Assimilation blocks the change in any subject, inhabitant and other, and forces them to be some *one*, namely an identifiable existence that fits the image of a segment of society. And exactly here lies the impossibility, not of change but in fixation. The subject, in infinite awareness of its otherness, is demanded to become a part of a motionless culture of the majority, i.e. to connect to a majoritarian minority, a non-existing culture with the illusion of evident characteristics, ignoring the intersectional gap as well as the intra-sectional differences that makes Coates (2015) remind his son and us of the complexity of an individual life:

Perhaps being named 'black' had nothing to do with any of this; perhaps being named 'black' was just someone's name for being at the bottom, a human turned to object, object turned to pariah (p. 55).

It is this becoming pariah – not only within a society but also within the segments within society – that defines the existence of refugees, according to Arendt (1978^a). On the one hand a politics of segments – whether to society or a segment of society – does not recognize the past of the newcomers with their vivid experiences, while on the other hand it refuses to recognize common ground in difference between the newcomers and the inhabitants. It ignores the complexity of contextuality as well as the flexibility of cultures, expressions and finally bodies, reducing everything to one and the same order.

Assimilation did not mean the necessary adjustment to the country where we happened to be born and to the people whose language we happened to speak. We adjust in principle to everything and everybody (p. 63).

This politics of segments is in denial of the mobility of the experiences of one individual but also refuses to acknowledge the turbulence, and pioneering act of its 'own' culture. There is no way to determine with certainty to whom or to what the newcomers must adjust. Thus, although the form of content imagines differentiating territories, nevertheless the matter of content as connective bodies are left in twilight state of being. In Agamben's (2000) words we could state that just as a politics of exile, a politics of segments creates a *form of life* that does not coincide with *life*, a life that is not merely *zoē*, but changeable and connective: i.e. alive. Hence politics of segments lacks the ability to become a *form-of-life*, connecting life to its form.

Nonetheless, despite this lack of connection between form and matter, these refugees still wish to comply with the demands of loyalty. Arendt (1978^a) calls them the most *patriotic people in the world*. They live in times in which they repeatedly, in order to prove their devotion, must reject their Jewishness and as well as be aware that they will always be addressed as *exceptional Jews*. And at the same time, they suspect that the more loyal they become and the more they try to assimilate, the more they arouse disbelief in the majoritarian population. This is a perfect paranoid mania, in which each form of identity has been undermined by conflicting loyalties. Arendt argues that this loyalty is neither eternal nor due to conviction, but sheer opportunistic, born out of necessity not out of freedom. Loyalty is not a voluntary act of recognition and familiarity in thought but an act that is urgent in order to avoid deportation or isolation. The patriotic refugees adapt physically and mentally as long as they believe in the illusion of security in a given area. Arendt compares this kind of loyalty with a precious piece of clothing that has been worn for a long time but at a certain moment for obvious reasons is thrown away. Safety is the contradictory engine of the defensive attitude of the inhabitants as well as the engine of the act of refuge; although safety for the one means something different than for the other. When these refugees are forced to relocate themselves, they reveal themselves as loyal citizen to another place that gives them the opportunity to continue the ungrounded illusion of safety, the opportunity to not be the other, in their case, to be a Jew.

If we should start telling the truth that we are nothing but Jews, it would mean that we expose ourselves to the fate of human beings who, unprotected by any specific law or political convention, are nothing but human beings. I can hardly imagine an attitude more dangerous, since we actually live in a world in which human beings as such have ceased to exist for quite a while; since society has discovered discrimination as the great social weapon by which one may kill men without any bloodshed; since passports or birth certificates, and sometimes even income tax receipts, are no longer formal papers but matters of social distinction (p. 65).³⁴

From this perspective, involuntary assimilation over and over again is the better alternative.³⁵ Assimilation thus contains a paradoxical sense of liberation, liberation of life from the state of exception. Nevertheless, through Arendt's writing the figure of *migrative refugees* starts to shift. While in the first instance it referred to displaced persons who are in search of a new and permanent home elsewhere, now it refers to ones who are in constant motion due to obsessive and permanent social exclusion. They are the ones who are permanently drifting. Flight is in this perspective – in Arendt's terms – “not a political act but merely an instinctive *reaction* of blind optimism opposing the discourse of the killing without any bloodshed” (p. 65). It is a form of being, which is negative by nature, a *passive physicality*. However, if a refugee is seen in another perspective and gets associated with a moving flow rather than a forced *being*, we could wonder at what moment a refugee *becomes* a refugee. Is it before, during or after the flight, or does the act of refuge contain the whole process? Did Arendt become a stranger before her escape from Germany, in-between in France or at her arrival in the United States? Or is it a consciousness in the making? Is refuge thought in process and its articulated subjectivity a *conscious pariah*? Arendt's life testifies to an attempt of a refugee to define her minor state, between in what she calls political action and what is understood as the passive endurance of social exclusion. An exclusion that ironically neither for Arendt nor for Ghorashi was something of the past, of the other country with its evil government, but the reality of the present:

My nostalgia did not have much to do with the lost past, but with feelings of loss in the present (Ghorashi 2003, p. 5).

³⁴ When in December 2010 Robert M., a Dutch man, was arrested and accused of sexual abuse of more than 50 children in a day care, the whole system of day cares became an issue. The role of men in day cares became problematic and highly prejudicial. The migrants, however, despite the odds, were even now not free of prejudice. In February 2012 the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment Henk Kamp, in connection to abuse cases, states that there must be more than one supervisor but also that the knowledge of Dutch language of the supervisors must be evaluated and improved by new policy. See: RTL News, 2012, March 2, 19:30.

³⁵ See on this subject the documentary on women from Thailand and their husbands from Friesland, living in the north of The Netherlands. Segmentation is sometimes even visible on their dinner tables, one half Thai food and the other half Dutch food. Some of the women are in love with their husbands and are as happy as any other couple. Others are there due to the fact that life in Thailand is much more unbearable than living in The Netherlands where they cannot adjust. Nevertheless, whether conscious or not they have changed the landscape of Friesland forever. See: *Thaise vrouwen in Friesland* (2012).

Yet again, the question remains whether action and endurance are opposites, even from an Arendtian perspective. If action is characterized as spontaneous, unpredictable and anonymous, action cannot only appear before the flight; it cannot exclude the whole process of flight. In the end of 'We Refugees' it is within the intensity between endurance and control that different forms of minorities are distinguished. According to Arendt (1978^a) there are three types of attitude towards the repressing majority and by implication we could discern three types of assemblages of bodies in contrast to the majority. First, she speaks of a *pariah*, according to her a social figure referring to a person who keeps its identity as an excluded minority. The *pariah* is the most passive form of majoritarian minority. It never resists its exclusion or its identification by the axiomatic paradigm of majority and suffers silently, as an isolated majoritarian minority and through a sense of differentiating brotherhood in exclusion. Pariah's thus appear at the margins of politics of exile; but also at the margins of segments of politics of segments. The second social figure is in some sense the opposite of the pariah. A *parvenu* is a person who adapts fully to the dominant order in order to defend its own interests. In this process parvenu is determined to lose its heritage and identity in order to become one of *the we*, one with the majority. Arendt, however, points out that these adapters, no matter how hard they try, will remain associated with the ones they are trying to forget. They will become the exceptional minorities or *the ones we like*. Nebahat Albayrak's policy towards migration did radicalize the exclusion of refugees and illegals. Afshin Ellian and Ayaan Hirsi Ali adopted the fear of the Christian society for the Islamic world. In her plea Hirsi Ali (2012), while appearing to reject all forms of religion, completes her adjustment to the majority by contrasting one religion to the detriment of the other. It is an either-or way of thinking in which the western enlightenment becomes the *only* form of opposition against religious repression. No matter how hard she tries to ignore the past, all her thoughts are justified by herself, her sympathizers and her opponents, by her identity with her past as a Somalian woman who has been victimized and circumcised. In case of Ellian it is his experiences in Iran that apparently makes it justifiable for him to make comments on Islam in general and globally.

In the footsteps of Bernard Lazare, however, Arendt (1978^a) introduces a third figure, not a social but a political figure: *conscious pariah*. This is the tradition of those who have not denied their past, people like Franz Kafka and eventually Rahel Varnhagen; and I rather add Mandela, Manila and Patrisse Cullors and many others. They have enthusiastically chosen to become other forms of pariahs. Arendt describes them as those with *humanity, humor and disinterested intelligence* (p. 65). They are those who refuse to sacrifice their attitude and their common human sense. In this figure Arendt's view on comprehension and consciousness is sensitized. While the history of the modern nation-state did not distinguish between its victims and has forced itself upon the pariah as well as the parvenus, only the conscious pariah is the one who dares to face the reality of their *shared* misfortune. Here a different understanding of refugees has been introduced, namely the political option that was missing at the beginning of Arendt's lecture. She speaks of the refugees who, for telling the truth, took the risk of being rude or *indecent*; they took the risk of becoming excluded (p. 66). They are the critical minds for whom criticizing the majoritarian minorities does not immediately indicate an adjustment to the majority. These critical minds are opposed to all forms of segments and all forms of exclusion. Arendt qualified Karl Jaspers, the German non-Jewish professor as such a mind. Agamben is for me the conscious pariah who distances himself from majority. This exclusion was intensely felt by Arendt herself due to her analysis and critique during the Eichmann trial (Arendt, 1965). The most

controversial aspect of her analysis of this process – but also in her other works – is that she refused to put the blame on one single community, namely the German. The crime and the criminal are but one aspect, the societal structure is another. It was evil indeed, but not exceptional. It was eventually ordinary, banal. The Eichmanns are no devils with horns, who can easily be identified. She points to the everyday ordinariness: Eichmann was also an ordinary man, a bookkeeper, who had a regular job. In being ‘normal’ he achieved the ultimate evil. Evil is banal.

And with her analysis Arendt, the conscious pariah, called animosity upon herself from the international community. Conscious refugees like her sacrificed their popularity at a price. Due to their conscious acts of rebellion history for them is not an inaccessible past; the conscious pariahs do not suffer from voluntary amnesia. Moreover, politics is not merely a privilege of those who oppress minorities. Conscious pariahs are the political figures of a political historical sense of flight in which Europe, by killing its own minorities, leads to its own demise.

They know that the outlawing of the Jewish people in Europe has been followed closely by the outlawing of most European nations. Refugees driven from country to country represent the vanguard of their peoples – if they keep their identity. For the first time Jewish history is not separate but tied up with that of all other nations. The comity of European peoples went to pieces when, and because, it allowed its weakest member to be excluded and persecuted (Arendt, 1978^a, p. 66).

And exactly these lines show that Arendt’s perception differs from her refugee companions. In the act of consciousness, the act of resistance, she reintroduces the potentiality of flight within the experience of refuge and beyond the differentiating and disconnecting segments. In words of Pisters (2005), pariahatic consciousness is not a simple no, nor an uncritical yes, but rather a political act through *molecular negotiations* in order to create different networks in-between forms of lives, as well as in-between form of life and life itself. Becoming a conscious pariah is not something of the past, as a reason for flight, but rather an act for all times. In the permanent becoming of a refugee the self-aware pariah emerges. However, Arendt also emphasizes that critically reflecting on the act of flight is not only a task of inhabitants, but also a task of the refugee. Every man and woman must become conscious of its potentiality as a pariah and hence as a political subject, operating as multiple within the diversity of political connections responsibility. Arendt is in every sense my hero, despite our differences and fundamental disagreements.

5.5.2 *Resisting Bodies and Segmentary Emancipation*

Politics of segments, as the term already suggests, is not merely a milieu of shame, nostalgia and endurance. Nor is it a denial of exclusion. It has its own mechanisms of resistance and segmentation. It deterritorializes and reterritorializes bodies rhizomatically through its discourse. Multiculturalism is, however, not only a multiplicity of segments, but also multiplicity of *forms of segmentation*, indicating that segmentation is more than merely a nationalistic-cultural phenomenon, but that other groups such as women, laborers and even families segment themselves due to their specific understanding of political, social, economic and cultural structures. Different people are attached to one another, due to the recognition of their identities or recognition of their fate. *Individuals* segment due to a familiar trait

or a common interest with others as nowadays happens in virtual communities. A sense of belonging manifests itself in this multiplicity of segments. Forms of segmentation also differ due to their reference to different types of axiomatic as well as differentiating identities of *we-ness* and *them-ness*; and due to their different types of resistance. Segmentation occurs in order to resist exclusion, *creating isolation* and new forms of exclusion, based on axiomatic as well as differential paradigms such as nationality, sexuality, political orientation, cultural and religious distinctions.

The image of different forms of exclusion, even of those who once belonged to the community, is poignantly expressed in Neske Beks' personal documentary *Eigen Volk (Own People)* (2010). Beks is a woman who as an infant was abandoned by her Gambian father and white Belgian mother, and she was raised by her maternal aunt Anny. As a child Beks does not feel black. She associates black with others, the French Africans who she calls *wie-wiekes*, and English Africans who she calls the *baai-baikes*. Eventually she notices that her appearance is comparable to those *wie-wiekes* and *baai-baikes*. This awareness causes an identity crisis. It strengthens due to the sympathy of those who are closed to her for the racist party *Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest)*. These family members, including her own mother, hate migrants' children who are born in Belgium. A mother with multiracial children states: *they must go back*, while at the same time arguing that they themselves could not be racists because of their own children. And Beks states: *where should I go back to ... I have never doubted Belgium*. Her image of the past is reshaped. Although the exclusion according to them does not fit her personally, Beks feels the exclusion on a personal and interpersonal level. She is involved – she is one of them – and nevertheless excluded. It is in such settings that individuals like Beks become multipolar individuals; oscillating on the margins of differentiating identity segments.

Multiculturalism does not only multiply totalitarian identity into multiple differentiating identities, with the same intensity it also multiplies the unitary exclusion of totalitarianism into multiple forms of exclusions. Koole (2006) suggests that populism creates an image of politics that could be characterized as *caricaturing* (p. 13). Eventually, multiculturalism can lead to *multiple types of populism* each with its own tendency not only to transform the image of politics into a caricature, but also the image of their own differentiating identity and that of others. Measured against this simplification the magnificent achievement of Beks (2010) is that she does not caricature the images. In her documentary, even those who gave in to populist ideas remain complex subjects with plural narratives. This complex and layered image is needed by Beks in order *to move on with her life*, she states; a life that was stagnated by the judgments and the axiomatic and differential paradigm of *I versus other*.

Beks shows that the distinction between confirming an imposed identity and resisting an imposed identity is not easy to make. This is clearly sensitized in the case of language courses for '*allochtonous*' women. These initiatives oscillate between on the one hand empowerment of the women, who are often isolated from the society, and on the other hand the stigmatization of these women as illiterate '*allochtonous*' women. More often is the epithet 'illiterate' accompanied by the image of repressed Islamic women. The naming of one of those initiatives is extremely illustrative: *Duizend en één kracht (Thousand and one power)*. This name, by its reference to the eastern tales of *One thousand and One Nights*, pretends to refer to the rich past from which these women originate,

affirming the Orientalism that Said (1978) criticized. Within this name lies the imposed stigma of their non-western, enigmatic, sexualized past. The name strengthens their isolation due to the lack of a Dutch term, which could include these women as full members of the society. The complexity of multicultural society also arises in the battlefield between different forms of exclusion in which different types of segmentation demand their space and insist that they could not exist in the presence of the other forms of segments. As a result, multiple differentiating paradigms of freedom become conflicting.

Crenshaw (1991) introduced the idea of intersectionality to analyze these conflicts from an unconventional angle. While two groups fight for their freedom, each group is incapable of seeing 1) how some people's interests inter-sect and 2) how some become the forgotten subjects of both emancipatory movements. Crenshaw raises our awareness of how freedom is ambiguously gained. As Arendt (1968) already suggested, the minoritarian majorities do not see that the essence of their minority lies in the process of exclusion *as such* due to the desire to become majority. Are minorities capable of understanding how different types of exclusion nonetheless are connected? Although our exclusions differ, they are yet not opposed. How, in the light of this analysis, should one respond to comments in which homosexuals, women, religious and ethnic minorities are rejected and excluded by other minorities? Are the slogans of the latter justified by freedom of expression, or do these resemble the big mouth of the biggest brat in school, who bullies all the others? Does not freedom instead ask for the enhancement of spontaneous interest, a kind of interculturalism?

Is *emancipatory segmentation* that resists exclusion possible? Arendt often fears segmentation due to the paradigm of identity, using the examples such as laborers, women, and racial segmentation like Black Power. Yet, she did believe that when a Jew is identified, persecuted, and condemned to death as a Jew, one must defend oneself as a Jew. For all clarity, Arendt does not refer to a religious sense of *Judaism*, but to the political implication of the identification as a Jew. From Arendt's perspective, it is not a mystery why women, laborers and Black Americans did not gain the same political privilege. They are always identified by their *bodily traits*: sexuality, physical labor and the color of their skin. As we have seen, she excluded bodies from political affairs. In Arendt's view totalitarianism forces itself upon bodies. While for Arendt bodies remain *anti-political matters*, in the course of totalitarian politics bodies and life – eugenics and a pure racial identity – are the political instruments par excellence.

Agamben, however, contradicts this form of thinking. In his analysis, a Foucaultian biopolitical trait of politics is neither merely a contemporary phenomenon, nor an invention of totalitarian regimes. Body was a political agent from the start, whether as an instrument of inclusion or of exclusion. This being the case for people who were enslaved, women, laborers, or Arabs, Jews, Muslims, Native Americans, Romani people and many more. The totalitarian argument to erase the Jewish people from the face of the earth was not based on the common interest of these people, nor their common political thought. Jewish people are culturally and politically as diverse as any other group. This reality is even neglected in contemporary times by those who oppose them as well as those who claim to defend them. The horrors of totalitarianism operated through the assumption of a

common *raciality*. It was an assumed bodily trait that defined them as objective enemies, which eventually also applied for Romani People, homosexuals, and the mentally disabled.³⁶ Along these lines we could argue that the emancipatory segmentation based on such bodily traits in the multicultural discourse resists repression and exclusion of these bodies in the totalitarianism discourse. In the end, using Arendt's own words, we could conclude that when people are politically condemned as Black-Americans, women or LGBTQQ, they are *mutually* politically forced to defend themselves *as* Black-Americans, women and LGBTQQ. They have no other option than to appear as such in a political discourse.

Heroes are those who dare to step forward, Arendt (1958) states. They are not necessarily extraordinary, courageous or strong men or women, but their mere appearance in the public space is sufficient to *approach* them as heroes. In this appearance, they are detached from their *what*-ness. They appear as a *who* in-between other heroes. In this open space, they *express* their ever-changing *narrativity* in the unfolding story of human interaction. The act of emancipation is in this sense an attempt by those men and women – who were condemned to the *what*-ness of passive political objects – to gain *subjectivity* or to enter a process of subjectification by the exposition of their multipolar individuality in the political space. They explicitly exhibit the ways in which their so-called private lives or bodily traits were condemned by an excluding political discourse. Some even paid with their lives to gain this act of natality.

Identity segments in one form or another, whether for the sake of the liberation of a subject or in order to caricatures and exclude, cuts through the body without organs as the 'primary' matter of content. This splitting takes place on different planes, creating segmentarized individuals. Body without organs is not something merely in-between bodies, visible and distinguishable in-betweens positioned between two identities. It is this in-betweenness that also penetrates each individual as Beks' documentary bears witness of. It embeds individuality and connects individuals. Thus, in the process of splitting – either/or – a subject is forced to accentuate aspects of itself and bind these into a consistent identity, while rejecting all other aspects, nuances and fluctuations. Even apparent intercultural films such as Alejandro González Iñárritu's *Babel* (2006) still fits this logic of identity. While figures are introduced in connection to one another, within a global rhizomatic connectivity of cultures, they are nevertheless profiled and identified as Mexicans with typical Mexican problems such as the illegal Mexican living in the United States, Moroccans with Moroccan characteristics, and white Americans with *typical* cultural traits. Even a Japanese woman stereotyped in relation to her father, enters the stage. In this exposition of multiple and complex relations it is rather the distance than the interconnectivity that is emphasized: the multicultural is not yet an intercultural.

Multicultural discourse in the end creates images as mimicking bodies. These bodies become profiling tools. In their collaborative work, *Exactitudes*, photographer Ari Versluis and profiler Ellie Uyttenbroek (2007) visualize these caricaturized images, which not only expose the appearance of the photographed subjects, but more than this accentuate the similarities in their postures. Identity in the

³⁶ Our political discussions about health insurance with the tendency to exclude people with pre-existing illness or smoking habits accentuates the role of the body in politics in contemporary times.

process of emancipation in a multicultural setting is a process, in which an image has to become universal and transcendental in order to *trace* the multiple similarities of its subjects. The paradigm of identity presumes something that is not there – a universal category – that is not even virtual, in order to actualize a general discourse on its subjects. The emancipation of the victims of totalitarian regimes in some cases needs the imperative of identity in order to resist. In generalizing it will never capture the contingency of the subjects and processes of subjectification. The forms of assemblage of bodies in a multicultural society is in this sense disconnected from the *ungraspable* body without organs in which human narratives, as Maan (1999) elaborates, cannot be isolated to one form of segment. Segmentation creates *forms of life* that are eventually not in accordance with the fluctuation of *life*. The group formation accentuates the identity in order to dismantle and to reject the totalitarian identification and inferiorization of people. In opposing its fragmented collective survival against the big segment of totalitarianism, it however implicitly repeats the latter's very dynamics. Politics of segments fails if in this process of complex transformation itself becomes a permanent and isolated engine of segmentation, not allowing a body without organs to manifest itself in the very process as a political transformative force. Let us thus once more ask a question:

What is a politics of a body without organs?

Chapter 6: Politics of Life

On Minorities' Connections and Ethics

Maybe being powerful means to be fragile.

(Ai Weiwei)

Out beyond ideas of wrongdoing and rightdoing,
there is a field. I will meet you there

(Jalāl ad-Dīn Muhammad Rūmī)

6.1 Returning to the Hyphen

This study is an attempt to sensitize multiple hyphens such as the lines that connect life-expression-politics and politico-philosophy. In short, the hyphen in-between politics and philosophy is used to start a critical practice and approach toward the political and philosophical analysis of contemporary communities and ideas on communities. This research is thus – although inspired by the state of refugees – as has been argued in the introduction, not about refugees. Refugees do not need a politico-philosopher to analyze the complexity and cruelty of the context that they are living in. This research is nonetheless not in order to ignore their voices; it rather intends to accentuate their voice by reversing the question. Instead of asking “What is the state of refugees?”, inspired by Agamben I rather ask: “What does refugees’ state of being say about the manner in which we think about community?” How do these individuals, just as any fundamentally excluded individual within a society, confront us with the manner in which we think about societies and conception of political identities with their including and excluding effects?

Is politics doomed to create an either/or construction of inclusion and exclusion? I have analyzed totalitarianism through a double bind dynamic of international nationalism and inclusive exclusion within the contemporary global context. Such a contemporary glocal mindset is a new form of persuasion of an old colonial mentality of the so-called civilized west versus the barbaric other. The glocal communities are in the spell of an overdetermining affect: *fear*. Left, right or otherwise we are in a state of fear: fear for the Other by the rightwing parties on the one hand and fear for the effects of the first fear by their critics on the other hand. Due to the persistence of this dialectics of fear the elections in United States are by the media typified as a *new era*: the era of *angry white male*. The Trump administration presents a politics that has done with the diversity of a country; let alone the diversity of a world. Trump’s triumph is celebrated around the world by those who share his sense for violence and exclusion. Still, the question is not whether this era is the era of the angry white male; but

whether it is a new phenomenon. I rather argue that the victory of such reactive forms of politics presents the end of an era rather than a beginning of a new politics. I dare not to speculate on how catastrophic this ending will be. Yet, already consumed by fear like others, I wish it to be otherwise.

Angry white man is a segment within the society, a segment that in its vocabulary disconnects itself from other segments. Yet, these segments are not silent. Trumps election gave rise to multiple forms of resistance from these segments: women, LGBTQQ community and people of color. Each defending their rights for existence and equality within community. Such forms of resistance are linked to the notion of multiculturalism. Yet as we have seen in the previous chapter, although multiculturalism deterritorializes totalitarianism to a certain extent, this deterritorialization is rather relative instead of absolute. In chapter five I typified this form of politics as politics of segments. Multiculturalism does not fundamentally break through the fundamentals of totalitarian thinking of politics of exile. Due to, for example, its hold on clarity of context, culture and identity, it has the tendency to segmentalize a society in a *mosaic* way, in words of Helder De Schutter (2005), by disconnecting the members of one segment from the other. Furthermore, the double bind of totalitarianism is also noticeable within politics of segments. Although it pleads for multiplicity, it also implements general parameters – such as a common language and common norms – to hold a society together. Thus, this type of politics does not only create disconnective segments due to its differential paradigms, but within each segment and within the society as a whole it holds on to some axiomatic paradigms of politics of exile. Identity is perhaps the strongest form of paradigm that functions differentially and axiomatically in both forms of politics.

In this chapter I rather argue that we are in need of but also witnesses of another form of politics: A politics that affirms the complexity and incomprehensibility of connections rather than segmentalize in order to gain clarity. This critical approach through the above-mentioned deterritorialization and reterritorialization of the question concerning refugees affects the linkage in-between life-politics-expression. Ideas on community with their political implications implement different types of relationality in-between life and expression. The quadrant content/expression and matter/form that has been introduced in the second chapter and implemented in the analysis of politics of exile and politics of segments, creates a tool to sensitize the fundamental assumptions of these types of politics. Both types of politics, as we have seen in chapter four and five, although each through its own paradigms, create a community in which the connectivity in-between matter and form is lost. Due to the clarity of their defined identities, both types of politics dehyphenize matter and form in expression and in content; as well as in-between content and expression.

The quadrant matter/form and content/expression – introduced by Deleuze and Guattari (1987) – has not been the only primary tool to accentuate the hyphen in-between life-expression-politics. The idea of the hyphen is already introduced by Agamben's (2000) terminology: form-of-life. Through this hyphenation Agamben pleads for a type of politics that implements life in a different manner within its form. In contrast to Arendt – who intends to distinguish life from politics – Agamben sincerely believes that the condition of homo sacer is not the only option of politics to connect *form of life to life* itself. Life is an expressive event, and each expression is essentially alive. The question is what kind

of politics creates a context for a potentiality of this linkage in-between life-expression. Let us finally nuance our hyphens and say:

Life-expression → politics = *politics of life*

Before I unfold a politics of life I once more have to remind my readers of the specific politico-philosophical perspective that motivated my research. Although I refer to concrete policies and well-known media events, my approach is not meant to be scientific – the functions of psychology, sociology, political science – but philosophical in the afore mentioned way. It is a research that is fueled by questioning the questions – by sensitizing the parameters of thought in political contexts and philosophical thinking. This research is an attempt to create a different image of thought through which terminologies such as belonging and inclusion become transformative. This chapter is an *introduction* to such transformation in the image of thought. It is an introduction not in search of truth, but for the sake of initiation of a different approach. Nonetheless, each thought is in need of companions in thought, the critical minds that are everywhere. It needs revolutionary scientists that criticize the parameters of science and artists that do not give in to the temptation of romantic nationalism or segmentalizing exoticism.

This study, with its introduction of tools of thought in order to analyze a politics of flight, was not merely meant to set out the tendencies of politics of exile and politics of segments. The analyses are meant to move forward to a politics that approaches life in an affirmative manner. This politics however does not strive to *acknowledge* diversity. Both politics of exile and politics of segments, by respectively annihilating and tolerating it, acknowledge diversity in their own manner. Their policies do not plead for the diversity of voices within cacophonies. Yet, as Rancière (2004) beseeches, these voices cannot be shut down. The voices are always there, be it in the margins of politics. And although the spectacle presents them solely as the voice of the brute other such as Islamic State or weak passive other who are the victims of Islamic State, I rather prefer not to conceive this state as the presentation of a new voice. With its use of western weaponry and rhetoric it still stands for the era of *us versus them*. Islamic State is our product in all sense. The voices of and in the margins are rather the voices of what Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (2005) calls the ‘*sub-altern*’, i.e. women, men and children who are not heard and have no voice and as such have no political existence (p. 429). Their lives are of no interest. The voices of the margins are the voices of those who suffocated in the camps or lost their breaths on sea. The voices of the margins resound when individuals such as Patrisse Cullors – in their plea for black lives to matter – do not segmentalize but rather argue for another form of collectivity. Cullors’ sense of *connecting the dots* rhizomatically brings a hyphen in-between the voices in order to resist The Voice in another sense. Cullors does not *represent* a movement, she does not wish to take the seat of in the strongholds of the majority. She rather *presents* another kind of minority. A coming minority presenting a coming community to bring about “a new depth, a new breath” (Peled, 2016).

The political space of this kind of minority is by long not an imaginary or utopic one. It has already been occupied by activists, journalist, doctors, artists, thinkers and hackers; all presenting worlds of differences. And yes, some of them are even white, male and heterosexual. The catastrophe of their

shared world is not due to a skin color, a sex, or a sexual preference; but due to a displaced sense of *supremacy*. Supremacy through which some lives seem to matter more than others. What I wish for is thus not a dream. It is rather a politics that affirms the ontological reality of bodies without organs at the center of its thinking; a politics that introduces paradigms that do not reduce individual lives and political subjects to a stifling identity and hence determines their destruction or non-connectivity. The politics that I plead for affirms a relationality of life in its 'eventuality' beyond individualism. This politics does not oppose individuality to the collective, neither the particular to the general. In order to give in to the impotentiality of life its plea for singularity moves beyond axiomatic and differentiating paradigms.

For in the end, the difference is not at all between the social and the individual (or inter-individual), but between the molar realm of representations, individual or collective, and the molecular realm of beliefs and desires in which the distinction between the social and the individual loses all meaning since flows are neither attributable to individuals nor overcodable by collective signifiers (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 219).

'The molecular realm of beliefs and desires' that defines the relationality of an individual is never undividable. An individual is from a schizoanalytical perspective always already a *dividu* as Deleuze and Guattari, in line with Nietzsche, state (p. 341). As has been argued in the first part, the immanency of difference and relationality within an individual is not the result of something that a person chooses to engage with. The immanency inherently constitutes the existence of an individual. The hyphen in-between difference-relationality¹ is both political and ontological. It is this immanent relationality with otherness that cuts permanently through every individual that makes it impossible to reduce any individual to the order of a totalitarian regime or a segment in a community.

Art practices sensitize this irreducibility. It is this endless act of cutting through – of in-cisions as decisions – in the work of Malaysian theatre director Krishen Jit Amar Singh that fascinates Charlene Rajendran (2012). Kirshen combines different types of theatre in order to present the complexity of a multiplicity of cultures and religions within Malaysian society. Krishen's work is contemporary through and through; yet within this setting the historical social and political context is always present. She argues that Kirshen focuses on an *in-betweenness* that is omnipotent and the core of the self-proclaimed multicultural society of Malaysia:

As part of an avant-garde, contemporary and experimental theatre movement, that began in Malaysia in the 1970s and responded to socio-political processes of nationalism and postcolonial reinvention, Krishen's theatre played with contradictory elements, thus resisting singular, unitary interpretations of culture (p. 2).

¹ See also Rahimy, 2011.

With this in mind, Rajendran even *politicizes* the name of the theatre maker by intentionally calling him by his first name Krishen. By this she takes apart two assumptions. First, Amar Singh is not a last-name as is understood by Western standards, but rather the first name of his father. Second, by use of his first name she defies this patriarchal construct. It becomes a name without a history and a fatherland. Rajendran de-identifies Krishen by dismantling the presumptions about his identity as a clear cultural whole. It is the same disconnection that is articulated in Krishen's work, in which the multiplicity of multiculturalism is sensitized in *one body* and not merely between multiple bodies. Krishen transforms multicultural entities and traits even within a singular body. These entities are not individuals but rather dividuals. Krishen visualizes how these entities appear as well as disappear; and in this sense instead of giving in to a permanent form he, according to Rajendran, experiments with transformability. Or in terms of Deleuze and Guattari (1987) with body without organs, a non-organizational entity as a matter of expression that by incisions and decisions, i.e. ethically and politically, composes consistency and continuity on the level of form of expression. A trait such as *being-Chinese* is presented as *being-English* and a *woman* can easily become a *man*, Rajendran (2012) argues. Although Rajendran, in line with Krishen, indicates this process as an immanent form of multiculturalism, I prefer to label it as *interculturalism*, i.e. *cultivating an in-betweenness*.² As Ghorashi (2003) states:

Debates on multiculturalism should not only focus on encouraging ethnic differences – separate ethnicities lined up next to each other – but on the room of multiple identification, or interculturalism (p. 232).

While multiculturalism in its endless differentiation restricts itself to the idea of closed identifiable wholes and suggests some form of measurability, interculturalism is demonstrated by plurality of relations rather than multiplicity of wholes or *relata*. This complexity of relationality excludes the idea of clear measurability, fundament or identification. As Oosterling (2000^a) suggest:

An intercultural 'experience' is not an experience that surpasses cultures, but one that dissolves their metaphysical foundations and installs its 'sense' within local/global tension ... a continuous coming and going. 'Intercultural' seems therefore intrinsically connected with the experience of differences (pp. 81-82).

Interculturalism is about relations between cultures within and outside a body. It does not deal with opposed identities within a hegemonic culture. Any body is a positive schizo. It is time to see multipolar figures not as pathological or social problems – as Schinkel (2008) argues – but as productive members of a society and critical minds that justly deconstruct the fundamentals of the idea of a society as a consistent and logical whole. Within the schizo-analysis, proposed by Deleuze and

² I do not define interculturalism here as a plea for liberal idealism, in which individualism and democracy defined by Western standards determine how pluralism must function as such. *To force* ideas such as liberty and democracy, despite their open settings, is a camouflaged form of totalitarianism. Interculturalism here is rather used literally, meaning inter(between)-cultures.

Guattari (1983), double binds become productive paradigms once the basic concept of identity is no longer the ultimate criterion. Inserting this idea of interculturality within my approach of a politics of flight a third form of community unfolds: a politics of life. This chapter is primarily focused on an ontology of relationality, on a being (*esse*) of in-betweenness (*inter*), that was labelled by Arendt as *inter-est*. While in the fourth chapter I discuss politics of exile and in the fifth politics of segments, this final chapter unfolds in a speculative way a *politics of life*. This politics differs from the Foucaultian biopolitics due to the fact that it does not intend to manage life, but rather gives in to the experience of life in its processuality, in its becoming of subjectivity or 'agencement'. While within a politics of exile and segments life operates as merely *genitivus objectivus* of politics, within a politics of life as the impotentiality of a politics of flight, the preposition *of* is a double binding articulation of the relationality in-between politics and life. In a politics of life, life is both *genitivus objectivus* and *genitivus subjectivus*. Life is not only an object of politics, it manifests a politics of its own. A politics of life is a politics that affirms relationality of difference within an ontology of *inter*. Yet, this *inter* does not limit itself to inter-culturalism. Holding on to the argument of Schinkel (2008), it is time to surpass the emphasis on *culture* as overall defining paradigm. This chapter rather explores the endless impotentiality of multiplicity of *inter*: *inter-beings* as *inter-actions* of *inter-places*, *inter-speech*, *inter-textuality*, *inter-contextuality*, *inter-experiences*, *inter-thoughts*, *inter-spaces* and *inter-times*, *inter-sexes*. Simply inspired by Deleuze's (2011) emphasis on *a life*, we are and have always been in a state of *inter-life*.

Let us thus start a first attempt in unfolding a politics of life while remembering that the process of unfolding such politics is an endless process. In 6.2 I will elaborate on the form of content of this politics of life, exploring one of Agamben's (1993^b) impotential paradigm called *coming community*. It will be argued that this impotential paradigms, as any other impotential paradigms, does not long to end its process, it is not a theological road to an end by longing to *actualize* its potentiality. Impotential paradigms remain faithful to their virtual state in their implementation. As we will see, politics of life, just as the other two forms of politics of flight – politics of exile and politics of segment – has its own lines of segments and lines of flight. Within the complex and layered milieu of flight – just as politics of exile and politics of segments – this politics generates segments and has paradigmatic aspects. Nevertheless, these differ due to their explicit exposition of in-betweenness as well as their transformability. However, the transformability on this plane is not an undesired by-product, but rather a desire in its own. A politics of life explores its paradigmatic impotentiality and asks for an ethics that moves beyond the excluding and segmentalizing morality of the first two politics. An ethics of politics of life gives in to another form of expression. This will be discussed in 6.3, where I will elaborate on the traits of minoritarian minority. In 6.4 I will discuss the matter of expression of this coming community, in which – in contrast to politics of segments – the loss of home, or a sense of home does not indicate a lack. Minoritarian artistic expressions bear witness to this. In the final part – 6.5 – finally I will attempt to give a voice to life as the matter of content. In its communicability life is no longer disconnected from its form of content. In spite of this apparently rigorous application of a Deleuze/Guattarian approach, it is nevertheless merely *an attempt not the attempt* to speak of life in politico-philosophical terms. Written words – despite the immanency of life within them – will always just remain a single touch on the immensity of life.

	Content	Expression
Form	6.2 Coming Community: Changing Territory <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Now-here and no-where - Virtual past and impotential future - Permanency of plurality - Another unity: body without organs - Difference-relationality - A place of ease - Nomadology: mapping multi-territorial time - Passing community: heterotopia - Saturated community 	6.3 Ethical Values instead of Moral Norms <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Power = concert - Punctual communities - New terra ethica: affirmative dissensus - Meso-politics: Inter-est revolution, pragmatics, mapping and belonging - Memory: multiple entrances - Ethical impotential paradigms
Matter	6.4 Ethical Expression: What Really Matters <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Singular assemblages: a who - Natality - Transcendental empiricism - Communicability - Heterophasia = enemy of grammar - Being-into-expression: stuttering and sobriety - The epos of singular assemblages - voices instead of Voices 	6.5 Whatever Life May Be ... <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Equality in singularity through futility - Dividu - Life itself: biopolitical fracture; - An immanent outside - Eventive assemblages - Form-of-life: <i>a</i> life - Example - Whatever being: the irreparable - Belonging as such: <i>happiness</i>

6.2 Coming Community: Changing Territory

6.2.1 Occurring Community: The No-(w)here of the Future

Politics of life is a *coming community*. The coming of this kind of *communing* does not refer to a future utopian scenario. This would reduce it to a politics of exile as a feature of totalitarianism. Arendt (1996), with her characteristic sophistication, states:

The future, the ‘not yet’ of the present, is what we must always fear. To the present, the future can only be menacing. Only a present without a future is immutable and utterly unthreatened. In such a present lies the calm of possession. This possession is life itself. For all good exists for life alone, to protect it from its loss, from death (p. 13).

In this citation Arendt presents another idea of life than she thematized in *The Human Condition*. Here life is the now moment, an occurrence. The digitalized globalization is already problematizing the linearity of historical time as well as its West-oriented interpretation of it. Life has become *onlife* (De Mul, 2017, pp. 255-256). The virtual world is entering the now moments; they have become immanent to the actual face-to-face contact. Every sentence I say as a teacher can and will be used against me by a student with his or her mobile phone in hand. Every intervention based on an analysis of the

immensity of the present is shy in connection to multiple pasts and blind for multiplicity of possible futures. As impotentiality a coming community is always already now-here, not due to its disinterest in the past and future but due to its acknowledgment of the complex multiplicity of the past and future. Arendt's (1968) evaluation of the past in her *The Origins of Totalitarianism* remained shy toward indigenous inhabitants of South Africa; while somewhere in her guts she did sense that one form of voicelessness was related to the voicelessness she experienced in the now-here of her life.

Occurring of a coming community indicates the ability of approaching a *now-here* as a *no-where*, as Deleuze and Guattari (1987) would phrase it, as the ability of entering a now-here as the virtual space of the in-between. Yet, unlike Arendt, Deleuze and Guattari understand this now-here in line with Nietzsche and Foucault as a bodily presence; bodies that are defined by power and yet resist their definitions. Colored bodies, female bodies, transgender bodies, mad bodies, unwanted bodies, unknown bodies. Coming implies the unknown, whether in all that was, or in all that is and eventually in all that will come. This demands an approach that favors Arendtian 'inter-est' yet criticizes her refusal to see bodies as political forces of resistance due to their differentiations such as in the Black Power movement, the gay movement or in feminism. In line with Dirk De Schutter (2005) I argue that it also demands "an attitude that radically opens itself to time, that reaches out to time in all its dimensions" (p. 84, Translation TR). It does not refer to time as a quantitative phenomenon but as a qualitative affect. History has an intense effect on the quality of life of minorities, of women, people of color and people with different beliefs and sexual preferences. In the final instance, it remains impossible to 'describe' an open community that takes care of the intensities of bodies beyond the intentions of self-consciousness. We can only approach this dimension. Is the intention of forming a community not meant to create closed wholes in order to manage our lives and protect us from unknown dangers? And if there are unpredictable forces traversing these communities, making it porous or allowing it to radiate its in-betweenness, how does one describe this 'interest'? What does it mean to state that the unknown of intensities is a virtual transversality that asks for actualization? Is this virtual unknown the impotentiality Agamben writes about?

Deterritorializing movements do not imply that we take off into a transcendental 'other' realm, because all assemblages are formed just as much as other kinds of images: both virtually (in memory) and actually (moving our senses in the present) they affect us (Pisters, 2003, p. 218).

Coming community is an impotential paradigm due to the fact that – in contrast to the previous paradigms – it flaunts its permanent unpredictable impact. While paradigms of identity and security, despite their incapacity to control their impact, pretend to have a clear method and policy to cope with it, the impotential paradigm of *a coming community* does nothing more than explore time and again its own unknowability in order not to identify and universalize. The unknown is however not a mystery. Mysteries long to be unveiled. Coming community instead is a play of masks that do not hide a 'real' face. Coming community is not the opposite of formation but rather an endless process of *formation* and *deformation*, of *coding* and *decoding* on both levels of content and expression, switching continuously between matter to form. There are no pretenses as to the predictability of the emerging

connections. I think this is the crucial aspect of a community to come. The contemporary multicultural discourse offers a starting point because it does not only focus on identity and sameness, but also on differences. What remains unsaid is that difference does not merely indicate disconnection. It does not indicate lines of flight but also differences in segmentation and formation of assemblages.

My classrooms are a good example. For future social workers, it is important to think beyond the boundaries of meritocratic society. I wanted them to sense the immense impotentiality of the people they will meet in their lines of work, people who are pathologically identified as mad, unproductive, un-integrated, criminals and illegals. In order to do so, I asked them to remember a moment or moments in their past where they were defined in those terms, where they were not seen and merely stigmatized as not good enough for the educational system. The classroom was silent for more than five minutes. I asked one of the boys – almost wanting to disappear behind his desk – if he was willing to share his memories. He told the class that his entire school career – even when he was successful according to the meritocratic norm – teachers would tell him that he would fail anyhow. While he was telling his story, another girl was nodding her head intensely. I looked at her and asked her whether she recognized the experience. She said in full surprise: *yes*. When I asked her why she was surprised, she said: *he is so different*. I said: *what do you mean by different?* She said: *you know, the normal things*. Normal things were in their case ethnicity, gender, personality, and other differentiated identity traits. She was surprised that there was a connection that simply and daily surpassed such identities. Along with the boy and the classroom, she realized that in this context identity is just *a* form of connectivity and not *the* ultimate form of connection. It is due to the chaotic and cacophonous trait of this plural connectivity that the content and expression of this community – even within the small setting of a classroom – never becomes *graspable* in one singular form or matter. In each type of concept, function or sensation – meritocratic or pathological – an impotential paradigm difference-relationality insists, creating a variety of perspectives to act upon. Coming community differentiates and differentiates: in actualizing policies it discloses virtual territories, yet at the same time constantly radiating new alliances and relations.

Next to the ultimate indescribability of a coming community, there is a second challenge that concerns the notion of time: the presupposition that this community is in need of ‘coming’, of an anticipation of a future, of – in Derridean terms – as some *thing* ‘a-venir’, that what comes towards us. A classical utopian and idealist visualizes these states of affairs that are not yet there, but are fervently longed for. This is not my endeavor. But then, for which future do I plead *as a writer*? In the fever of heroic ego-trips, the anticipating idealist never sees the *presence* of this coming community. Coming community is neither *merely* a virtuality on the brink of becoming actual, nor *merely* a virtual that hides in the actual. My classrooms and their immensity of connections are in front of me. Coming community has real meaning in being virtual, not a virtual reality but as a real virtuality. No matter how totalitarian a society attempts to be; no matter how many it intends to exclude for the sake of homogeneity, no matter how many agents of meritocracy define children as failures, life remains an actual force from which ‘new’ compositions emerge. It happened on February 2011 in Cairo when Christians decided to join hands in order to protect the praying Muslims and it happened on August 2013 when in the same country Muslims joined hands to protect the church with praying Christians and again in April 2017

when Muslims united with Coptic Christians after the bombing of the Coptic cathedral. Many cynics reminded us of increasing violence towards religious minorities (see: Weber, 2013). Nonetheless, only reminding us of totalitarian tendencies of politics remains unfair to the diversity of politics that occurs at the very same time, as merely presenting us with hopeful images becomes naïve and unjust toward the inequality of the world. Politico-philosophical thinking within a politics of flight becomes only effective, not by cynically scorning one event for the sake of the other, but by mapping the emergence of a third articulation that takes the quality of life as its ultimate criterion: a politics of life.

Regimes rise and fall, due to the fact that they could never definitely close off their borders. Practices of resistance as a matter of fact, i.e. as form of content, are equiprimordial with this urge for totality as a form of expression. The question is not whether and when open community will come, but whether we, as mankind, are capable of comprehending the permanent reality of this open community in the now and here. In fact, this remains the central plea of Agamben. His politico-philosophy is concerned with our interests in a given plurality that always already surrounds us and in which we are embedded. Integration, which has unfairly been associated with the newcomer, means nothing more than the ability of *any* political subject at any time in any community to function and to operate within this plurality. In line with Schinkel (2008) we could state: *who is not integrating?* The answer is: those who propagate integration for others. In short, understanding plurality in this Nietzschean ontological sense means that integration is neither contemporary nor something bound to a specific culture, but rather designates the process in which any subject is positioned in relation to changing territories, that emerge within, around, but always beyond the subject.³ We are all part of the coming community as well as the axiomatic agents of totalitarian thought and differentiating participants in a multicultural society.⁴ Integration is the acknowledgement of this unavoidable multiple involvement. This connectivity has both an ontological and political quality. A rhizomatic approach is both critical and concerned and affirms that change is not something that emerges in the future but that it is a process in which every one is embedded at any time. Yet, there remains also a truth that every end in history necessarily contains a new beginning; this beginning is a promise, the only ‘message’ which an end can ever produce (Arendt, 1968, p. 478-479).

If coming community affirms the permanency of plurality, change and birth, how do we then differentiate a coming community from those politics that intend to neglect and ‘fix’ this permanency? By now it will be clear that this community’s explication asks for another approach and implementation of rhizomatic notions such as territory, people, ethics, expression and life. The image of thought of a coming community is related to multiple other impotential paradigms. As is argued in

³ In *Dialogues* Deleuze in conversation with Parnet (1987) eloquently states: “Becomings are not phenomena of imitation or assimilation, but of a double capture, of non-parallel evolution, of nuptials between two reigns” (p. 2). This is what he calls: “a sort of active and creative line of flight” or in other words “AND...AND...AND” (p. 10).

⁴ In line with Tocqueville, Lefort (1988) states that democracy must “look back at what came before it and, at the same time, to look ahead to what is emerging, or may emerge, in its wake” (p. 14). Although democracy remains in the middle of the process, there is some sort of historical and systematic linearity: totalitarianism and democracy cannot emerge simultaneously. This is an important difference with democracy and my analysis of coming community. Lefort thus is right to state that Tocqueville “fails to see” the immanent “counter-influence” (15-16).

3.4.2.3, impotential is the qualification of paradigms that resist segmentation whether in the axiomatic or differentiating manner. They differentiate by resisting the illusion of an end game. They never take themselves too seriously; they rather take the critical difference as serious point of departure. These *paradigms* become impotential due to the fact that – in contrast to totalitarianism and multiculturalism – they do not create an inside that opposes an outside. There is not an endoconsistency – an internal consistency – that results from creating an exclusive exoconsistency – an external consistency that also defines the peripheries. The form of content of a coming community is rather a willing porous inside that permanently changes, moved by difference in itself. *The* difference is its transcendental component that empirically changes its context, its empiric actualization. Coming community is therefore not a philosophical concept; as a transcendental-empirical idea of a community, as an impotential paradigm, due to its connectivity to life itself as a body without organs, it is a politico-philosophical notion. In line with the Nietzschean tendency in the work of Deleuze and Guattari, Patton (2000) evaluates their urge for creating *untimely concepts* (p. 3). But *untimely impotential paradigm* is a pleonastic construction, due to the fact that permanent change of its components is already given in its impotentiality.

Yet, it is vital to point out that coming community as an impotential paradigm itself is not anti-unity or anti-assemblage. It is not an absolute line of flight. Just as a totalitarian state and a multicultural society, this community is also a type of assemblage, connecting different types of multiplicity and creating a ‘we’. My classroom in its cacophonous silence did sense a ‘we’. Coming community composes a unity.

I am moved by the ‘we’, as the ‘we’ is an effect of those who move towards it. It is not an innocent ‘we’, or one that stands still. It is affected by that which it is against, and hence also by that which it is for, what it enables, shapes, makes possible (Ahmed, 2014, p. 188).

As Patton (2000) states: “The real question is not whether or not there is unity but what form this takes” (p. 29). There are different types of unity, be it that they are not subordinating and hierarchizing. And while totalitarian and multicultural unities are based on the category of identity and hierarchically distinguishing their members by this standard, compositions of a coming community rather appear within an *inter-est*.⁵ Politics of flight creates these unities, not as a singular framework of identity, nor defined by a morality of good and evil. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) argue, that there are not only different types of unity, but within these unities, multiplicities emerge that vary on the one hand in content and expression, and on the other in their form and matter. Politics of flight is multiplicity of unities.

⁵This shared interest however must not be confused with Kant’s *sensus communis*. As Heinz Kimmerle suggests, Kant’s reflections common sense refers to a universal sense in which all subjects agree on the aesthetic value of a matter. According to Kimmerle in contemporary state of mind we can no longer talk about a universal sense but only about a *sensus communis* that sensitizes a particular community, in which agreement and consensus are always supplemented by the dissensus of those who oppose the *sensus communis* (Kimmerle & Oosterling, 2000, p. 11).

Let us return to the story of *multiplicity*, for the creation of this substantive marks a very important moment. It was created precisely in order to escape the abstract opposition between the multiple and the one, to escape dialectics, to succeed in conceiving the multiple in the pure state, to cease treating it as a numerical fragment of a lost Unity or Totality or as the organic element of a Unity or Totality yet to come, and instead distinguish between different types of multiplicity (p. 32).

Agamben's (1993^b) *coming community* is multiplicity as well as connectivity of multiplicities. He distinguishes two types. First, *the state* unites multiplicity by enforcing some kind of identity and structures based on this identity. Totalitarianism and multiculturalism are such states. Second, *the non-state* differs from the state by creating connective lines while refusing to define an overall identity. The non-state does not oppose, it gives in to *the occurrence* of a coming community, implying a given belonging. This belonging is not a matter of identity. It contains *belonging as such*, a belonging without prejudice (pp. 85-87).

What the State cannot tolerate in any way, however, is that the singularities form a community without affirming an identity, that humans co-belong without any representable condition of belonging (even in the form of a simple presupposition) (p. 86).

6.2.2 Multi-Territorial Community

The heading of the part II of this study is 'unfolding a milieu'. Up till now I have unfolded three milieus: state, society and a coming community. The latter is also an impotential *territorial engagement*. How can we approach this? Ian Buchanan and Gregg Lambert (2005) argue that the connection between *being* and *space* has become problematic after the territorial First and Second World War (p. 1). After these events, the combination of totalitarian and nationalistic ideology changed the discourse on territories forever, by the inevitability of the connection between nation-states, citizenship and territory. The totalitarian colonizing of space in effect led to an exclusive displacement, which is shown in the previous two chapters. Space and its inhabitants became disconnected to the extreme. As they argue along with Frederic Jameson, space becomes an *uninhabitable* space (p. 4). The problem of being and space is more obvious in Heidegger's (1996) notion of *dwelling*, space installing the primacy of Being instead of Dasein, where being precedes the 'there'. As the Australian philosopher Patton (2000) shows, in the colonial era the contrast between aboriginal and indigenous people's understanding of space and the European understanding of space is exemplary for these distinct forms of experiencing space. While the original inhabitants experienced it in Heidegger's sense of the word *dwelling* – in Deleuze and Guattari's sense: nomadically – the European conqueror *colonized* and *appropriated* the space. The nomadic mind concerns itself as a component of space while the colonial mind considers space as an object to be owned and modeled by its will (pp. 120-131).

There is yet another aspect we have to take into account. As Buchanan (2005) states, along with Marc Augé, classical binary notions such as *near and far*, *inside and outside* or *public and private* become

problematic in the global space of our time. Even eventually the idea of a human being, precisely in its certainty as the subject imposing his will, has become problematic in the postmodern space of globalization. He argues that although postmodern space is often defined as a space of disorientation and displacement, it is still not the radical change in space that causes nomadic affects. It was precisely the crisis within the subject that exposed this affective nomadology, because of the loss of otherness. Through globalization, cities all over the world become all too familiar instead of radically different. The subject has lost its sense of experiencing otherness. What capitalist globalization shows is that a city like Rotterdam and a city like Teheran have more in common than one expects. They disappoint travelers who seek otherness in an exotic world. As Huijser (2016) argues, there are *neither* old worlds that we can return to *nor* new worlds that we can discover. Through globalization we live in *equal time and space* (p. 13). This lack of otherness makes it impossible for the subject to distinguish itself from all that surrounds it. The disorientation triggers the subject's inability to cope with differences and by implication its ability to *integrate* and to understand connectivity. This caused a sense of becoming *imperceptible* due to lack of distinguishing itself from others. Nevertheless, as Buchanan also argues, such developments do not indicate that otherness has disappeared from the realm of postmodern world. The recognizable other such as exotic people, strange costumes or eccentric architecture has been replaced by immanent otherness and forms of deterritorialization that are now engrained in one's own community. The other is now, more than ever, within us.

Our sense of disorientation within this ambiguous space of capitalism and globalization is not caused by a loss of historical *matter-of-factness* of an identity, in which I and the other were clearly distinguished. It is due to the relation between formation of a community and its understanding of territory. Deleuze and Guattari (1983) elaborate on this in *Anti-Oedipus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. The *socius*, which indicates the *social machine* through which multiple communities appear, expresses itself in three forms.

First, the *territorial process* in which not the possession of a territory but rather the experience of earth itself is the main engine. This is as discussed before the manner in which Aborigines and indigenous people experienced the space in which they live. In this process, random organism creates a *social body* in which kinship codifies the territory and through which a group of organisms, in this case human groups or tribes distinguish themselves from others. Nevertheless, the coding act of the territorial social machine merely effectuates the process of the earth.

The second form of social machine - the *despot* - affects the earth through a process of *overcoding* in which *arborescent* structures create a hierarchy of classes. The body of the despot finds itself in the middle of the earth, surpassing this despotic territory as a divine being. The body of the despot in its connection to an unearthly deity or ideal, thus within the religious as well as secular processes, transcends the territory called earth. Property, the act of possessing the earth, appears thus in the disconnection from the earth as well as the hierarchical state of men in which the despot appears at the top of the pyramid.

In contrast to the coding and overcoding trait of the first two social machines, the third form of social machine is called *Civilized Capitalist Machine*. This is characterized by a process of continuous *decoding*. While the territorial machine is in need of coding the earth into a permanent form of habitual space, and while the despot is in need of overcoding through a perfect and immutable deity,

the process of capitalism is not only defined by coding, but also by permanent manufacturing new codes. Think of shopping malls, each time they are globally copied all over the place, but once they are everywhere, a new format of shopping emerges, as for instance Telnet. Capitalism is not about the code but rather the process of (re)coding.⁶

The strength of capitalism indeed resides in the fact that its axiomatic is never saturated, that it is always capable of adding a new axiom to the previous ones. ... The axiomatic does not need to write in bare flesh, to mark bodies and organs, nor does it need to fashion a memory for man (p. 250).

These three types of social ‘assemblages’, as Deleuze and Guattari will label these in Part 2 of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia. A Thousand Plateaus*, are in no sense sequential or bound to a part of the world or people. Each society with its different forms of politics is an amalgamation of these three types. In an analogous reasoning *politics of exile* and *politics of segments* do not only contain forms of coding and overcoding through historical, cultural and social processes, but time and again reshape and deshape their history and understanding of culture and *socius* in order to speed up the process of coding and overcoding.

The *politics of life* within the coming community is also marked by coding, overcoding and decoding. Nonetheless, the coming community differs from the previous two types due to the fact that it relates immediately to its act of coding, overcoding and decoding, affirming their interrelations. It does not camouflage its own tendency to despotism, but relates to it explicitly by a critical attitude toward its own flaws. In short, while the process of totalitarianism and multiculturalism strive for a perfect new world or more differentiated homes, the coming community affirms the movement, in which past and future blend in multiple ways, being fully aware of flaws as integral part of social structures. Finally, coming community differs from the capitalistic process due to the fact that it is *not* indifferent to its process of coding and decoding. This community is instead characterized by its critical *disinterested* ethical engagement. Only through this engagement, based on an ontological connectivity, can it affirm the impact of life forces. Yet, the coming community is not an end game. The question is not how to await the coming community, but how to notice its presence, no matter how difficult it is to spot it.

What differentiates the coming community from totalitarian regimes and a multicultural society is its primary relation to territory. Not as the earth, neither as the body of the despot, nor as the flowing capital. *Changing territory* is the initial trait of the form of content of coming community, while totalitarianism and multiculturalism define themselves due to conventional historical traits, intending to force those upon territories by limiting their extension. Coming community, as Agamben (1993^b) testifies, starts with an unlimited space of *ease* in which territories, whether indicating a subject, a

⁶ See for the distinction between these three forms of social machines mostly the third chapter ‘Savages, Barbarians, Civilised Men’ in Deleuze and Guattari’s *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 139-269; the thirteenth chapter ‘7000 B.C.: Apparatus of Capture’ in Deleuze and Guattari’s *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 424-473; and for a lucid amalgamation the fifth chapter ‘Social Machines and the State’, in Patton’s *Deleuze and the Political*, pp. 68-87.

collective, or earth, explore its unlimited *territorial potentiality*. Ease in a colloquial sense is about the freedom of stiffness and formality.

Ease is the proper name of this unrepresentable space. The term ‘ease’ in fact designates, according to its etymology, the space adjacent (*ad-jacens, adjacentia*), the empty place where each can move freely, in a semantic constellation where spatial proximity borders on opportune time (*ad-agio*, moving at ease) and convenience borders on the correct relation (p. 25).

Coming community is not without a past. Nonetheless, the contemporary possibilities of connection are always more urgent than the given but outdated historical connections. As Olúwolé (2014) argues within philosophical thinking we must criticize the manner in which we refer to the past and the manner that we continentalize the process of thought. History of philosophy did not start with Socrates; and dividing the history of thought in here and there; creates an unfortunate mind that cannot experience the virtual impotentiality of thinking as such. Only through such impotentiality in thinking we could incomprehensibly comprehend the historical immensity of a coming community, which differs from that of totalitarian nation-state as well as of multicultural society. Communities based on so-called ‘factual’ historical ‘events’ reduce the richness of these events in the past to one form of narrative. A coming community rather explores the non-conventional possibilities of territorial connection as well as the interbreeding and crossovers of historical narratives. In this setting history creates knowledge but does not enforce rules of engagement. Untimely thought within coming community is more adequately approached by rhizomatic nomadology than by conventional genealogy. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) state:

History is always written from the sedentary point of view and in the name of a unitary State apparatus, at least a possible one, even when the topic is nomads. What is lacking is a Nomadology, the opposite of a history (p. 23).

Nomadology is open to a full virtual reality of what has come to pass, what is present, and what will emerge in time.⁷ It is not limited by knowledge at hand in history books; no self-respecting historian would limit itself as such. Time in coming community is thus not a linear given, but a rhizomatic feedback loop, in which new events emerge. *Time is multi-territorial*. Nomadology does not specifically concern the knowledge of concrete nomadic traits of tribes. Deleuze and Guattari rather label it as a war-machine, not in order to produce weapons, but in order to resist the linear logos of the state that defines a territory and history according to one form of narrative. Let me remind my readers of an already given example: The Kingdom of the United Netherlands once was the largest Muslim state in the world. But it could not identify itself in a nomadological way. Nomadology is in this sense a machine of *liquidation* where history and territory lose the solidity that is forced upon them.

⁷ In connection to democracy Lefort (1988) states that democracy is “the historical society *par excellence*” due to the fact that democracy “welcomes and preserves indeterminacy” by understanding the multiplicity of history. This is then according to Lefort in contrast to totalitarianism that by drawing a clear line in history becomes rather “*a society without history*” (p. 16).

Politico-philosophy in this line of thought needs to be an act of mapping ‘probable geometries’ (Harris, 2005) rather than tracing an origin in time. In their transcendental empiric approach, politico-philosophers must “carry out a vast diversion of wisdom”; they need to implement such wisdom “at the service of pure immanence” by replacing “genealogy with a geology” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 44).

The earth is a full body without organs. The video and performance artist Lida Abdul demonstrates this replacement of genealogy with geology in her short films like *White House* (2005), *What We Saw upon Awakening* (2006) and *In-Transit* (2008), deterritorializing the history of war in Afghanistan. In *White House* she simply paints the ruins white in order to create another form of territory. In *What We Saw upon Awakening* men take down the ruins, and in her *In Transition* children claim the remnant of a warplane as their playground. Abdul dismantles the ruins by transforming them with paint through which this space could claim endless other forms of significance. Abdul’s art, as is shown in her *In-Transit*, is based on the idea that “anything is possible when everything is lost”. The men in a literal manner ruin the ruins – deform its deforming and destructive force – while the children install a playful community. Abdul (n.d) states:

Whose politics? In my work, I try to juxtapose the space of politics with the space of reverie, almost absurdity, the space of shelter with that of the desert; in all of this I try to perform the ‘blank spaces’ that are formed when everything is taken away from people. How do we come face to face with ‘nothing’ with ‘emptiness’ where there was something earlier?

6.2.3 Saturated Community

Coming community is a physical space and not merely a theoretical one. Thought on coming community indicates a process of mapping connections within a community. It is not an abstract process, nor ideological, but as concrete as it is tentative. Art, as we have seen in Abdul’s case, sensitizes its audiences for these topologies. Thinking about such community means touching it while looking at it, experiencing it. The haptic qualities of these performances affect thought. Sensations affectuate the experience of impotential paradigms. Men and women who merely speak of coming community without experiencing it are, as Arendt (1958) would put it, speakers without action, which in effect sterilizes speech. Or better: disembodies it. Words are hollow due to a lack of connection to the world in which these people are living. While they intend to speak of coming community they fall into the trap of ideology, by disconnecting their thoughts from life. Coming community asks for an *immediate* approach, for immediate connection. You cannot think of coming community – or in words of Ten Bos (2011) *a politics that is drenched of not only ethics but also aesthetics* – without putting yourself at risk (p. 161). A politico-philosophical approach asks for a political point of view in which the experience of such territory transgresses a binary setting of active production and passive reception.

Choosing to relate to this community means engaging in its permanent occurrence. There is neither an oppositional state between the relata in the relation, nor a hierarchical appreciation of one above the

other. Relata are per definition relational, yet relations can solidify in relata such as nationality, ethnicity, sexuality, shortly identity. Nonetheless, nothing remains what it is. ‘Repetition’ of the same is impossible. As I have argued in chapter one, repetition is always repetition of and in difference. This entails an awareness of coming community as an engine of enduring alteration. There are no permanent borders. There is no outside, no down here and over there. Passages and peripheries are not at beginnings and ends, but through and within the community itself, even that of totalitarianism and multicultural society. Territoriality here means to endure other possibilities of formation of its landscape not within an exotic object or subject, but through its own virtuality. Thus, this community always puts itself at risk due to this relational reflectivity. Self in ‘self’-reflectivity is never an individual state or subjective experience, but always a relational given. Limits are immanent thresholds in which community changes its face and starts thinking in different directions. It is an intensive experience that extends from within. Agamben (1993^b) argues:

The outside is not another space that resides beyond a determinate space, but rather, it is the passage, the exteriority that gives it access – in a word, it is its face, its eidos.

The threshold is not, in this sense, another thing with respect to the limit; it is, so to speak, the experience of the limit itself, the experience of being-within an outside. This ek-stasis is the gift that singularity gathers from the empty hands of humanity (p. 68).

Ek-stasis is being turned inside out. Combining Deleuzian thought to that of Agamben we could state it is *out within pure immanence*. Coming community ‘presents’ itself in the ever-changing territory as a space of *ease* as suggested by Agamben (1993^b), and a space such as in Abdul’s work that is deterritorialized and reterritorialized, decoded and recoded at the same time. Coming community as space of ease is neither easy nor lazy; it is active and intense. It is engagement in a pure sense. However, just as Abdul, Agamben speaks of an empty space. Does openness of coming community imply *emptiness*? Is coming community merely an empty in-between-space on the peripheries of thought that causes ‘tiny displacements’? Agamben states:

The tiny displacement does not refer to the state of things, but to their sense and their limits. It does not take place in things, but at their periphery, in the space of ease between every thing and itself (p. 54).

Is this solely a negative characterization of a coming community, due to and through notions such as emptiness, deterritorialization, and lines of flight? Does this appreciation of the negation not bring back the oppositional logic within binary thought? Deterritorialization alone cannot bring about change; as such it produces either total destruction or total nothingness. Although Deleuze and Guattari often warn us to *not* appreciate one above the other, they do themselves often fall for the romantic charms of the rebellious process. Change only appears within the tension between deterritorialization *and* reterritorialization. Better yet, there are no empty spaces in which deterritorialization emerges as a pure phenomenon. As we saw in Mohamed Bouazizi’s case in chapter

one, every deterritorialization is an immediate reterritorialization, which explains their non-binary, supplementary relation; the one is always imbedded in the other, not as the beginning or end of a process, but as becoming one and the same process. Openness in coming community is thus not equivalent to emptiness as in nothingness; but in the sense of transformative. The openness in this community refers to a non-essential trait of this political milieu. It unfolds so many possibilities that we could not comprehend. Politics of life within coming community indicates a possibility of passing; coming community means *passing communities*. There are no eternal and universal positions, but merely processes. Still, its potentiality must not fall into the trap of shortcoming. Coming community is a *heterotopia*; it is a politics that engages with each topos in a singular intensity; without reducing one particular unity as a shortcoming to a general unity. As a process coming community is always saturated. Its emptiness is fulfilled. While being saturated with radiant forces (*puissance*) that work upon each other, connecting everything without yet defining these relations in terms of power (*pouvoir*), it lacks nothing.⁸

The public realm, as the common world, gathers us together and yet prevents our falling over each other, so to speak. What makes mass society so difficult to bear is not the number of people involved, or at least not primarily, but the fact that the world between them has lost its power to gather them together, to relate and to separate them (Arendt, 1958, pp. 52-53).

The openness of the public space of coming community is free from double forms of resentment. The first – *universal resentment* – indicates a lack of people involved, thus has the pretense to involve all while it can only reach some. This is the resentment of totalitarianism. The second form – *localized resentment* – experiences lack due to the involvement of all while it aspired to the involvement of only a few; such as segmentalized multiculturalism. It senses a lack of intimacy. Coming community on the other hand in its openness does neither sense nothingness nor congestedness. Its openness is defined by the virtuality of connections and it is aware that whether there are two people involved or the whole world, whether it is a global connection or local one, a physical or a digital, the immensity of connectivity is immeasurable in its virtual possibilities. It is always saturated due to this non-*resenting* attitude, as a result of which it has no fixed focus on the past. As Patrisse Cullors states: “We don’t believe that presidency is the way to turn our voices into political power. In fact, local politics changes the national” (Peled, 2016).

Belonging to a coming community is not based on ethnicity, as is the case with multiculturalism. In order to create diversity in the so-called multicultural debates people with different ethnic backgrounds are invited to participate. In contrast, the affirmation of a coming community does not manipulate diversity, but creates an open space in which diversity can expose itself. In the city of

⁸ Defining the open society as empty is also present in Lefort’s (1998) analysis of democracy in which the “locus of power is an empty place.” In his analyses, however, the notion empty does not indicate a hollow shell but rather a milieu that cannot be owned by certain subjects or individuals or ideology. He states, “it cannot be occupied.” Thus, democracy is not without agency, but in the process creates agencies and nevertheless is never captured by those agencies (p. 17).

Rotterdam there are a lot of examples of such places. During the last years, due to financial cuts in the cultural sector, small libraries in the city, especially in poor areas, had to close their doors. Social entrepreneurs such as Maurice Specht and Joke van der Zwaard (2015) dropped the idea of an open library, a library without a loan system. People were free to come in, bring books and take books without any obligation. The cynics, I am ashamed to say including myself, called it a mad idea. The library would never have any books; people would only take out, and never bring them back. I am happy to say that we were definitely wrong. The library has now become a social community, with a lot of books and volunteers. In no time, it has grown into a cultural center, with music, theatre and lectures. Specht and Van der Zwaard didn't want to plan a type of connection (quality); nor dreamt of a quantity of a people. They just created a space of connection; a saturated space whether it is with one or the many. It is an open collective: another form of content.

6.3 Ethical Values Instead of Moral Norms

6.3.1 Power in Concert

The form the content of coming community takes is *saturated and changing territory*. It is this changing character that defines the form of an assemblage of bodies within coming community. The same saturation also appears in the form of expression of this community that assembles its expressions. Still, if within such assemblages neither quality nor quantity is at issue, does it indicate that politics of life gives rise to any form of action? Such evaluation – thinking beyond the given norms of society – refers to fears, old fears of terror and violent anarchy. Nonetheless, coming community is not without ethics. I rather argue that this type of ethics – in which the relationality instead of the relata are at the center of thought – have been *violently* silenced by the doublespeak morality of totalitarianism and at best segmentalized as spiritual non-sense by multiculturalism in order to neutralize its overall impact. Forces within this community do not define themselves as stronger and more forceful, because forces are not yet power. For Arendt power in this community is in its turn distinct from violence.⁹ In *The Human Condition* and *On Violence* Arendt states that power and violence are opposites. While in this study power has been a complex concept with multifarious impacts, in this section I accentuate the manner in which Arendt comprehends power. Power is *potentiality*, which is inherent to the political movement. This productive power – in contrast to force and violence – does not appear within nations and states, according to Arendt. It emerges only and momentarily when plural subjects decide to act due to their momentary common interest: *acting in concert* (Arendt, 1970, p. 44). The term is extraordinarily useful. Concerts are not defined by identities, but by multiplicity. It is through the multiplicity of melodies that music becomes highly affective. Even when different musicians play the same instruments, multiplicity always emerges. Yet, the notion *concert* not only refers to multiplicity, but also to the common trait of music and Arendtian power. Neither a sound nor power could be reserved and saved up for future emergencies, which is the case with violent resources. Power is *in actu*.

⁹ In comparison with Foucault's vocabulary the term power in Arendt has more in common with the concept of *puissance* and violence with *pouvoir*.

Obama's Speech on the State of the Union in 2012, which was discussed in the fourth chapter (4.4.1), suggests a containment of power through its forceful instruments, while to Arendt power cannot be contained even at its peak. We often notice this after a revolution. The *Arab Spring* was one of the recent awakenings of such a dynamic. Once it lost *that* singular form of power – Foucaults *puissance* or force, Nietzsche *Kraft* instead of *Macht* – it could never be recaptured. However, not grasping it does not mean that it loses its effect totally. Years after this event within the movement of *Black Lives Matter* participants speak of a *Black Spring*. The second form is in no sense a copy. It rather repeats an idea of resistance through difference.

Power for Arendt, through its non-violent expression, is connectivity that creates a political reality through inter-action and inter-speeches. Power is not constructed. It is dynamic, an infinite with potentiality. Power is acting in speaking. It does not belong to some individuals, due to their force, strength or the capacity to use violence. Power is not an object or a state of affairs, but a becoming. It is the *inter-esse* that has no fixed eternal or universal materialization. It is an appearance, as Arendt (1958) suggests, independent of matter, numbers or means (p. 200). Power in Arendtian sense of the word is not comparable. It is not about losing or winning a battle. This is the warning of the activist, musician and actor Harry Belafonte (2016) at the aftermath of the US elections in 2016:

Each time it was done, we kind of figured it was the last time we would have to do it. During a lifetime of Paul Robeson, Eleanor Roosevelt, Dr. W.E.B. Du Bois, those who mentored me and guided me and inspired me, that I should have lived long enough to be able to stand here and once again say thanks to all my colleagues, to all of my comrades, to all of the people who have sacrificed so greatly to make this nation whole – we are looking upon a curious time. But I think it's a time that should be used as an opportunity to know that we have to make a much bigger difference than we've made up to now. We should not let the current state of affairs dull the fact that all that we have done was worthless. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Power is the unlimited political potential that keeps people together. It is what human plurality bears within itself. It is divisible without diminishing. In Arendt's (1958) view *force*, which is more than an individual *strength*, runs the risk of becoming a monopoly and thus become *violent* reducing the power of human plurality. Nonetheless, violence can never be a substitute for power, due to violence's unavoidable tendency to destroy the potentiality of the public space. Tyranny, as Arendt shows, is not only frightening because of its cruelty but because of its destruction of everything that exists. "Only sheer violence is mute, and for this reason violence alone can never be great" (pp. 26).

Violence in other words, if we follow Arendt's line of argumentation and comprehending the incomprehensive racial, ethnic and sexual violence around the world, is out on disconnecting. It reacts to connections that are considered to be threatening for its consistency and continuity. Through its fear and desire for security violence becomes the instrument to cut through such relations. Violence is instrumental, always for the sake of something else. Power, however, is for the sake of creation of new

forms of relationality. Power acts in concert, in Arendt's optimistic interpretation of the term. Power is in her analysis not an axiomatic or differential paradigm but an impotential paradigm. It is connective for the sake of relating. In such understanding of power that relate itself to coming community, power however does not become merely a means in order to realize a safe utopian hoped-for future scenario. Her domain is not the forthcoming but a shared past that assembles new ways in the present. Just as action is for the sake of action, speech for the sake of speech, the *legitimization* of power is thus not generated by attaining a goal but exists merely for its own sake. The recent jargonistic term 'empowerment' gets a pregnant meaning once we apply Arendt's perspective. Violence is *justified* as a means to achieve a goal in the future. Although Arendt argues that power and violence appear simultaneously, she also suggests that the ultimate power is the end of violence and the ultimate violence is the end of power.

Power needs no justification, being inherent in the very existence of political communities; what it does need is legitimacy. ... Legitimacy, when challenged, bases itself on an appeal to the past, while justification relates to an end that lies in the future. Violence can be justifiable, but it never will be legitimate (Arendt, 1970, p. 52).

Although I do agree with Arendt that violence is obsessed with a future state, I find the legitimization of power by a *common past* highly problematic. It is partially due to Arendt's analysis that this problematic aspect becomes visible. First, Arendt's analysis in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* shows how problematic an idea of a common past or pure origin is. It is not clear how one reference to a past could not become non-violent; nor that a reference to a future could simply become merely violent. Past and future could even collide in a wishful future by referring to an illusionary past, such as is the case with the KKK-members. Yet, within the idea of legitimization Arendt intends to overrule such collisions. Nonetheless, our past is not given to us; its virtual state does not bend for a clear legitimization. History contains endless untold stories of those who fled, who were enslaved, who were raped, who were oppressed and executed. The true story of exclusion is the history that is not taught at schools and is neglected in many history books. Yet, the virtual potentiality of the present must not lose its natality to a time gone by. Second, a coming community is not a negation of future; it rather gives in, in a different manner, to the potentiality of a future beyond teleological totalitarianism. As Pisters (2016) suggests, there are different ways of understanding future. Her vision of a future is not a simple predictive element of the past, or an impossible vision in the present. She rather envisions a future that effects the present as a line of flight; a future that is *now* as a potentiality (p. 167). Therefore, I prefer to emphasize the potentiality of this Arendtian power on *multi-temporal territorial levels*. Power of coming community within politics of life is not merely *speculative* – referring to a time that needs to come and lacks reality in the present – nor simply *retrospective* – referring to a past that needs to be analyzed in order to create a legitimized vision on present actions. Power within this politics is rather *punctual* in which the virtual reality of the past and future collide with the territoriality of the present; within the nowhere as a now-here. It is within this punctual understanding of time that we must understand the immensity of African philosophy. We are simply in search of *punctual communities* that give in to the sense of difference-relationaliy. Mandela's sense of *Ubuntu* is

perhaps nothing more and nothing less than this. A sense of community that as Olúwolé (2014), quoting Erasmus D. Prinsloo, describes it: “‘A person is a person through other persons’, or ‘I am, because you are’” (p. 143).

Power is in this sense a momentary affective vector. Art practices can elucidate what is argued for in concepts. Just as music power appears in the moment, causing changes and creating unexpected assemblages, inviting its participants to experiment in connecting to the process. In Deleuze and Guattari's terms, it composes sensations. While in Arendt's (1958) view politics is mostly connected to theatre (pp. 187-188), I relate her idea of power also to her understanding of music in its vulnerability and elusiveness.¹⁰ Power is an actuality that does not ignore the virtual field of Nietzschean forces that gives rise to its momentary appearance. As Deleuze would say in line with Nietzsche, power is a force of metamorphosis (Patton, 2000, p. 50), creating momentary passages in order to enter and act differently. Power in this Nietzschean sense appears in order to connect differently is first and for all changing affect. Deleuze and Guattari's sense of power is connected to the concept of *becoming*; indicating that nothing within life remains the same. Change is permanent. Becoming is therefore the generative state of life. How does this becoming as a transversal force translate itself to the level of community where in the conventional sense power relations are the core business of the political? Deleuze and Guattari (1983) share Arendt's sense of connectivity as a basic element of expression of coming community, when they state: “*There is only desire and the social, and nothing else*” (pp. 29). Desire is longing for connectivity and assembling is what gives rise to the social or community. Desire, according to them, is not a longing for connectivity as it ought to be. There is no necessity in connecting in a specific way, although historical definitions such as identity have determined collective desires. Desire, detached from these segmentations, is not affected by an inability to accommodate oneself to a rule but by potentiality of expression. Desire emerges in the social, as an assemblage, as a concerted act and not as a subjective achievement driven by personal intentions and feelings. The subject dwells in desire but is not the engine of it.

Lack refers to a positivity of desire, and not the desire to a negativity of lack. Even individuality, the construction of the plane is a politics, it necessarily involves a ‘collective’, collective assemblages, a set of social becomings (Deleuze & Parnet, 1991, p. 91).

This desire for connectivity differs from Foucault's understanding of power and desire for that matter. This second form of power – in French: *pouvoir* – refers partially to the social, namely the stratified part of assemblage called the social. Desire for Foucault is an effect of normalization. He proposes ‘*plaisir*’ as a non-identifiable form of desire. In Deleuze and Guattari's understanding of desire this is not the outcome of stratification and segmentarity, but rather the primary engine of the formation of

¹⁰ On spontaneity of music and poetry Arendt (1958) states: “In music and poetry, the least ‘materialistic’ of the arts because their ‘material’ consists of sounds and words, reification and the workmanship it demands are kept to a minimum. The young poet and the musical child prodigy can attain a perfection without much training and experience – a phenomenon hardly matched in painting, sculpture, or architecture” (p. 169).

assemblages. Assemblages do not only contain the disciplinary rules, the stratified force or regimes of expression, but also in answering to lines of flight create new assemblages of bodies and assemblages of enunciation in order to connect in a different manner.¹¹ “Desire is revolutionary because it always wants more connections and assemblages” (Deleuze & Parnet, 1991, p. 79). In this sense Pisters (2003) connects Deleuze and Guattari’s desire to Arendt’s sense of power and political action by stating:

Desire never is related to an object (that obscure object of desire). Rather, desire is a fundamental wish to live and to preserve life by connecting with and relating to those things and persons that give us joy, that is, that increase our power to act (p. 20).

How do we increase this desire as a wish for a power to act? The dynamics within the social assemblage, the intensity between lines of flight and lines of segmentation, becomes useful in reflections on an idea of politics as a process aiming at *consensus* through communication (Habermas) versus politics as a process that only results from *dissensus* (Rancière). Is coming community a harmonious state of consensus in which clear communication brings about counter-factual powerfree world? The answer is simple. No! Consensus, *whatever* its intentions may be, always indicates the end of multiplicity. Coming community is essentially open due to its need for plurality. Arendt, Agamben, Deleuze and Guattari, without a doubt, agree on the importance of dealing with the other from within and from without, the necessity of coping with the stranger inside and outside our familiar realm. On the other hand, inter-est with the others is a necessary condition for any form of (human) life. Arendt believes in the potentiality of the power of man in public space, a power of plurality that is not and cannot be translated into the exercise of violence or muted in a peaceful consensus. The public space never loses its *potential* character of multiplicity, whether in subjects, processes or regimes of expression. Misunderstanding is not something that can be removed permanently. Misunderstanding is the supplement of communication; incomprehension is implemented in comprehension. Could we then conclude that coming community is based on pure dissensus as Rancière (2004) suggests?

Consensus means much more than the reasonable idea and practice of settling political conflicts by forms of negotiation and agreement, and by allotting to each party the best share compatible with the interests of other parties. It means the attempt to get rid of politics by ousting the surplus subjects and replacing them with real partners, social groups, identity groups, and so on. Correspondingly, conflicts are turned into problems that have to be sorted out by learned expertise and a negotiated adjustment of interests. Consensus means closing the spaces of

¹¹ “Our only points of disagreement with Foucault are the following: (1) to us the assemblages seem fundamentally to be assemblages not of power but of desire (desire is always assembled), and power seems to be a stratified dimension of the assemblage; (2) the diagram and abstract machine have lines of flight that are primary, which are not phenomena of resistance or counterattack in an assemblage, but cutting edges of creation and deterritorialization” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 531, n. 40). See also Patton, 2000, pp. 68-87.

dissensus by plugging the intervals and patching over the possible gaps between appearance and reality or law and fact (p. 306).

Rancière's emphasis on dissensus emerges from the reality of exclusion. Dissensus is the force of the ones who are unwanted and excluded from the realm of politics. Engagement within dissensus is in this sense the counterpart of exclusion and as such the main theme of contemporary politics. In connection to such exclusion, Femke Kaulingfreks (2016) refers to the riots of youth in poor neighborhoods of Europe – London, Brussels, Paris and The Hague – as a form of dissensus that is not implemented in majority's idea of politics. In line with Rancière, she argues that such riots present a voice, a voice that is unheard by those that define and segment civic subjects as representative of moral rules of totalitarian thinking, and hence define these actions as barbaric and senseless. In order to resist such regimes of signs and gesturality, Kaulingfreks calls these actions *unruly politics*. Such an untimely politics demands the institutions to change their minds; it creates a visibility for those who have been invisible for a long time. These acts are not in order to suggest a new regime; they are “acts in themselves, without immediately demanding an effective outcome” (p. 13). Understanding their state of being thus in Agamben's (1999^b) words demands a different ethics, an ethics that breaks the strata by making defundamentalizing questions the fundament of its process, rather than searching for answers. We must become the *cartographers* rather than *tracers* of a “new *terra ethica*” in order to resist the formation of limbic silenced bodies (p. 69).

In line with Agamben (2000) we could state that just as refugees, these young people are “breaking the nexus between human being and citizen” (p. x). Their forgotten existence, by politics of exile as well as politics of segments, has for a long time blocked their participants. Although both forms of politics rather define them as the enemies of democracy, in the spirit of Arendt (1978^a) we could state that our sense of democracy only can appear in a space of disagreement: “Every believer in a democratic government knows the importance of a loyal opposition” (p. 184). Democracy is in need of the irreducible other; it is in need of unruly politics. In this sense, the rise of rightwing parties are not new faces of democracy as has been argued; but rather the recent extreme visualization of an old idea of supremacy that sacrifices multiplicity. These outrages are not a type of dissensus; but rather exploration of a consensus on supremacy of some people. Loyalty for dissensus within coming community is rather not a loyalty to an identity; but loyalty to difference. Loyalty within this politics of life does not axiomatically break relations, or differentiates segments of reduced connections. It is rather devoted to inherent diversity of life itself.

This sense of necessity of disagreement in order to resist the totalitarian forces is pled for by many political philosophers of contemporary times. Slavoj Žižek's (2011) speech on Occupied Wall Street proclaims the right to resist. It is a resistance that is not for the sake of destruction, but for the sake of blocking the destructive force of capitalism. Stopping the *nightmare*, as he suggests, by a form of awakening in which we westerners do not only make movies about the end of the world, but about the end of capitalism. Žižek postulates that the clarity of communication and consensus has not brought peace but exclusion of dissensus, of other forms of communication. Dissensus indicates change and

transformation. Deleuze (1997) even suggests, “the transcendent object of the faculty of sociability is revolution” (p. 208). Patton (2000) emphasizes this thought of Deleuze by stating:

While some Idea or other is immanent in every empirical form of society, the properly transcendental Idea of society is only actualized during those periods of transition from one solution to the problems which define a society to another (pp. 41-42).

However, is dissensus as an intense necessary line of flight the only event within the social assemblage of a coming community? Dissensus is crucial, but is a politics of flight within the context of a community to come for the sake of difference-relationality a sheer state of disagreement? Rancière’s plea for dissensus focuses on a formation of another community, a community that does not exclude subjects, a community in which we do not fight for equality but acknowledge the fact that we are *equal as such*. Politics thus cannot only rely on the negative, or understand dissensus as a negative power, but instead comprehend it as the affirmation of the irreducible other. We must *agree* that there is an other – within and without – that is equal in belonging. In its critical attitude dissensus needs affirmation in order to produce connectivity. Kwame Anthony Appiah (2006) even breaks through the binary setting between agreement and disagreement in thematizing morality:

When it comes to morality, there is no singular truth. In that case, there’s no one shattered mirror; there are lots of mirrors, lots of moral truths, and we can at best agree to differ (p. 11).

Appiah’s agreement is an affirmative approach of the dissensus. Yet this affirmation must not be confused with consensus. Consensus as well as community based on identity is merely an illusion of connection. As Ten Bos (2011) suggests in order to creating a community we do not need to speak *the same*; but speak *as such* (p. 140). Appiah’s (2006) cosmopolitanism rather installs connectivity of difference as its political engine. What consensus on identity does is accentuation of one form of connection by cutting through all other forms of connection. Consensus and identity, in order to secure their preferred connection, are in essence severe forms of disconnection, of exclusion. Affirmation of cosmopolitanism in difference on the other hand is not only an acknowledgement of multiplicity of connection but also the radiant force that produces new connections. In order to produce new communities dissensus is in need of affirmation. Žižek (2011) already touches upon this point when he shouts to the crowd on *Occupied Wall Street*:

There are truly difficult questions that confront us. We know what we do not want. But what do we want? What social organization can replace capitalism? What type of new leaders do we want?

The negative revolution took place, even in the United States. Trump won through votes of negating an order in a nostalgic way: Make America Great again! And it merely led to nomination of power to those that are already representing majority. But what kind of politics will lead us out of this impasse

of negation versus negation? Political critical affirmation appears neither within consensus nor through sheer negating dissensus but through affirming the tension in-between segmentation and revolution as a bundle of flight lines. There is a plea for a basic need, namely for a territory in which speech in its plurality becomes possible. In Arendt's (1958 & 1968) words we need a public space where political subjects are neither majorities who impose one form of consensus; nor majoritarian minorities that simply disagree with the majority and enforce consensus within a segment. Public space of coming community is the space of *minoritarian minorities* in which subjects agree on the productiveness of dissensus, or as Foucault (1989) suggests: On the necessity of *parrhesia* or the courage to speak freely, contesting the power that is implicitly or explicitly criticized. *Parrhesia* is not expressed in the speech of kings¹², leaders or lawmakers; it is the multiple speech of minority. It is the speech of conscious pariahs. While communism was never realized due to the fact that each so-called communist regime betrayed the principles of equality of all its members, neither democracy was realized due to the fact that the so-called democratic states never remained true to this minoritarian speech of *parrhesia*. Democracy is nothing without its minorities, and without their possible force to dissent. The manner in which mayors in Dutch cities permanently block demonstrations against Black Pete, or allow them only in places where their visibility is minimum and the brutal assault of Jerry Afriyie in his peaceful protest by the police in December 2016, is an example of the decrease of a space for dissensus in democratic states.

The necessity of disagreement indicates that democracy cannot contain only one form of passage, but needs a multiplicity of passages. Democracy is becoming, never at its end, never achieved, always in the process. As Derrida (1992^b) suggests democracy is always *democratie à venir*.

The *same* duty dictates assuming the European, and *uniquely* European, heritage of an idea of democracy, while also recognizing that this idea, like that of international law, is never simply given ... but rather something that remains to be thought and *to come* [à venir]: not something that is certain to happen tomorrow, not the democracy (national or international, state or trans-state) of the *future*, but a democracy that must have the structure of a promise – *and thus the memory of that which carries the future, the to-come, here and now* (p. 78).

Thus, *coming* community as an expression of a politics of life starts with resistance to a binary choice between pure negativity and pure consensus, situating itself in between universalistic macro-politics and relativistic micro-politics with disconnecting tendencies. Coming communities are porous, which in the end implies that the whole world can potentially connect. Nonetheless, the joining of the whole world is not necessary in order for this community to be what it is. It is its radiance that enables it to *become* something else. Only totalitarian states are so insecure and paranoid that the occupation of the

¹²One might think that the stuttering of King George VI in Tom Hooper's *The King's Speech* (2010) is an example of such parrhesia; a king who is unable to speak properly. Parrhesia is more present in the figure Lionel Logue, the teacher. He is the servant who resists full obedience to the king. Nonetheless, his resistance is not for the sake of the multiplicity, but in order to help the king to be a king and to speak as passionately as other kings.

whole world is a guarantee for the *truthness* of their ideology. Coming community is not a choice between objective truthness of universalism or a desire for disconnective subjectivism. By its impact it is per definition saturated, whether the whole world enters it, or merely two people inhabits it. For some *Arab Spring* failed. I rather dedicate an ode to those who stood up and lost their lives; rather than dismiss their affords for the sake of a wishful outcome. The demand for potentiality to create an actual outcome is blind for the impotential force of their political acts.

However, although totalitarianism and multiculturalism are not the only options, the reality of our time often shows that open communities remain small due to their non-desire to colonize the whole world. In *The Human Condition* as well as *On Revolution* Arendt pleads for the anarchy of small communities in which the acknowledgement of their own differences leads to the *awareness* that in this difference each man is connected to every other (Arendt, 1958, p. 246). Nonetheless, acting on this micro-political level alone is not enough to create connectivity. In order to avoid the closed micro-political state of multiculturalism we are in need of a third option, namely a meso-politics as is suggested by Isabelle Stengers. Neither micro-politics in its peculiarity nor macro-politics in its generality *make me think*, Stengers states. Meso is relational; it connects to a political milieu in which differentiation between macro and micro as well as between molecular and molar are not easily made. It is the milieu of political practice that engages with the complexity of agencies as living beings. Stengers states that the meso is related to the *material* instead of matter. It is a form of *metallurgy* in which solid matter such as metal breaks, cracks and transforms itself. Meso-politics is not beyond micro and macro-politics, but an image of thought in which the solidity of macro- as well as micro-politics is permanently *redefined* (Massumi & Manning, 2009). Stengers states:

It concerns not matter, but material. Why does glue stick? Why do metals tend to stress and break? This is a science of the interstices and the cracks. It's a science of defects. It is the kind of science where it is always a question of this material, rather than Matter, and which encounters 'procedures,' like those of metallurgy. ... The macro is matter in general. ... With the meso, on the other hand, it is necessary in each instance to redefine topically how the relations between the micro and the macro are assembled. In other words, it's about everything that the macro does not allow to be said, and everything that the micro does not permit to be deduced (p. 3).

Meso-politics does not negate the small community in its saturated state of becoming, nor does it attempt to isolate it as such. As Stengers emphasizes: Meso is a *rhizomatic force* (p. 7). It creates the possibility for each community to become plural from within and from without. It is through meso-politics that coming community becomes not only territorial¹³ but also ethical impotential paradigmatic in relation to its endoconsistency and exoconsistency. It brings difference-relationality at

¹³ In this interview Stengers does speak of two forms of history, history defined and controlled by us, and history that escapes any control. Although Stengers also speaks of history in the second line, her description is highly territorial, due to use of terms such as Gaia and Earth (Massumi & Manning, 2009, pp. 6-7).

the center of its form in expression and content in an impotential way. Not the actual potential outcome, but the virtuality of impotentiality is appreciated.

6.3.2 *Stepping into the Reality of a Terra Ethica*

Meso-politics affirms the in-betweenness that constitutes a coming community in yet another way. This ‘inter-est’ implies not a universally based moral, but a contextually driven ethics. Community is in need of a non-dogmatic ethics. Non-dogmatic ethics is neither present in a paranoiac totalitarian state, nor in the *anything-goes* of relativism or indifference of multicultural tolerance. Such tolerance gives rise to a severe form of subjectivism; in which – as Huijer (2005) argues – modern subject typifies itself as mediocre hasting flexible energetic subject. Such subject flows without reflection and contemplation toward its own cheerful light success.

Non-dogmatic does not mean carelessness or rushness, but demands *engagement* in a world of multiplicity. Non-dogmatic is a disinterested open approach toward other. It cares about the other. The implied ethics is not exclusively interested in a particular form of relationality, such as has been analyzed as the norm by Foucault (1977 & 1978) in his thesis on discipline. This ethics is, in Arendt’s (1958) words, literally inter-ested: being in the middle. In the middle always indicates multiplicities of connection instead of norm focused *mediocrity*, i.e. the ruling (*kratein*) of the means or media (*medium*) (Oosterling, 2000^a). The ‘milieu’ I am unfolding is, as Deleuze and Guattari (1987) phrase it, “a transversal movement that sweeps one *and* the other away, a stream without beginning or end that undermines its banks and picks up speed in the middle” (p. 25). According to Agamben (1993^b) this non-oppositional ethics is precisely the non-dogmatic approach that can bring about an *ethical attitude* as such.

The fact that must constitute the point of departure for any discourse on ethics is that there is no essence, no historical or spiritual vocation, no biological destiny that humans must enact or realize. This is the only reason why something like an ethics can exist, because it is clear that if humans were or had to be this or that substance, this or that destiny, no ethical experience would be possible – there would be only tasks to be done (p. 43).

Non-dogmatic ethics bears witness to man’s freedom to take a stand against the segmentalized imperatives. This ethics relates to multiple concepts that problematize dogmatic state of affairs, ruled by those imperatives. Ethics is at all times political; and each politics manifest itself through ethical attitude. Ethics defines the gesturality of politics. What is the gesturality of politics of life? Let me elaborate the contours of such an ethics through five impotential paradigms: inter-est, revolution, pragmatics, mapping, and belonging.

1) First, if disinterested inter-est virtually covers *all* forms of engagement in this community, how does then this engagement relate to the concept of *deterritorialization*? Deterritorialization here means neither lack of connection nor the act of disconnection. It can create strong or relative ruptures in segmented connections. It can generate extraordinary traits in ordinary connections, but these ruptures always emerge in the expression of other forms of connection that put dogmatic connections in

perspective. A non-dogmatic ethics withholds us from any appreciation or disapproval of the process in normative terms of good versus bad.

Nothing in *A Thousand Plateaus* is unambiguously good or bad and the line of flight is no exception. It is both the line of maximal creative potential and the line of greatest danger, offering at once the possibility of the greatest joy and that of the most extreme anguish (Patton, 2000, p. 66).

Some deterritorializations are *absolute*, as we saw in the second chapter, meaning the rupture so intense that they bring about changes on a molecular level. Some deterritorializations are *relative*, meaning their transformation happens on a *molar* level where they are reterritorialized again eventually strengthening the molar logic. Donald Trump's triumph is in this sense a relative deterritorialization but does not change the order of regimes that create certain types of assemblages of bodies and assemblages of expressions. Also, as we have seen in Crenshaw's (1991) analysis, emancipatory movements often show a molar type of deterritorialization. They still accentuate an identity, and demand an acknowledgment of such identity, but do not criticize the rigidity of identification as such. Beyond such majoritarian minority movements, the minoritarian minorities need to create an *absolute* form of deterritorialization in which the very idea of majority within a society or a segment of a society as such is problematized. However, in both cases – relative and absolute – deterritorializations must not be seen as inescapable black holes, but as ruptures or blurring of *some* relations, and not relationality as such. Deterritorialization is thus in the end not a simple cutting through connections, but the dismantling of the self-evidence of *structures* of connections. Though not morally biased, there are nevertheless positive and negative types of deterritorialization. “Absolute and relative deterritorialization will both be positive when they involve the construction of ‘*revolutionary connections* in opposition to the *conjugations of the axiomatic*’” (Patton, 2000, p. 107; Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 473). These connections are revolutionary in breaking with both totalitarian axiomatic paradigms and multiculturalism's desire to disconnect through differentiating paradigms such as culture and ethnicity. Abdul's work does not negate the history of war in Afghanistan, but deterritorializes its course by creating another type of connection within the ruins. It sensitizes a virtual nomadic past rather than an actual history.

2) Second, this form of politics is in need of *another idea of revolution*. How do we within the non-dogmatic ethical politics of life stimulate and maintain *revolutionary* connections? Do such events as the *Arab Spring* and *Black Spring* indicate an absolute beginning or rather refer to the old tension between lines of segmentation and lines of flight? Jeffrey Bell's (2006) comparison between Badiou's belief in *absolute beginnings* and Deleuze's conception of *folding* and *unfolding* within the process of history is illuminating. Badiou considers revolutions as *actual* breakthroughs; while Deleuze considers revolutions to be *virtual* lines that are bound to the double act of thinking through as well as breaking through the actual lines. There is, however, no opposition between Badiou's thought and that of Deleuze and Guattari. The fact that actual revolutions do not always live up to their expectations does not mean that their event has not been effective, or has produced no new forms of connecting processes. Neither does the actual event of revolution mean that virtual lines can from then on never

emerge. Revolutions are *real* events precisely because they create partial actual processes that immediately trigger new virtual ones. The events in Tahrir Square in 2011 had actual affective impact on its participants and on the audiences all over the world; even if it seems that political discourse has gained its original power. Nevertheless, these actual effects are imbedded in layers of virtual affects, which gave rise to and emerged from the event in Tahrir Square. Tahrir Square did not have one possible outcome but multiple possible outcomes beyond its factual actualization. One of its outcome was a connection – thus not a reduction – of an oppression of a people in Africa and Asia to the oppression of a people in the United States. According to the conventional media, there are opposing political agendas in-between these geographic areas. Nonetheless, through alternative media around the globe activists and human right fighters show another political truth: an unprecedented connection of multiple people fighting for equality.

So, do revolutions indicate new absolute beginnings as modernity claims or do they merely appear as unfolding the folds of history time and again? Here again there is no opposition. Revolutions bring about new beginnings but also fold and unfold within history. The Iranian Revolution in 1979 was in that sense a good example. The history of resistance in connection to Islam was already a common historical fact within this country. The assemblage that emerged within this revolution, in which Shia Islam by political personae such as Ayatollah Khomeini was amalgamated with communism as well as Heidegger's appreciation of death (Afary & Anderson, 2005, pp. 57-66). Nonetheless, although the event emerged from developments in the past, the assemblage actualized something completely different. Deleuze (1995) states:

History isn't experimental, it's just the set of more or less negative preconditions that make it possible to experiment with something beyond history. Without history the experimentation would remain indeterminate, lacking any initial conditions, but experimentation isn't historical (p. 170).

The concept of beginning in Badiou's thought, however, indicates yet another element within these revolutionary processes. Revolutions often emerge from the need to *end* a certain politically segmented authority. The absurd length of reign of Arabic leaders in Egypt and other countries is an example of this type of segmentation. However, despite the innovative traits the focus of revolutions often falls apart due to their sheer force of negative. *Plain negation* could never hold endlessly, and eventually one dogmatic discourse is replaced by another. The Shah of Iran dogmatically removed Islam from public space; Islamic Revolution in return abandoned secularism. While they seem to be oppositional discourses, they share a common trait of not affirming the multiplicity. Let us say, that in order to remain *true to the event* in Badiou's words, revolutions need to see their processes not merely as ending-points but strongly as starting-points in which the affirmative overrules the negative. To see an event as a starting-point indicates efforts to maintain the event, affirmative on what to do rather than merely negation of what was and needs to be abandoned. An event is the very moment that ethical fields of connection with their virtualities actualize without closing of other virtualities. An event is a virtual space, not due to the fact that it has no reality, but due to the fact that it initiates new entrances toward potential worlds. This potentiality is gone once the moral judgment starts to

overdetermine the field. When, in terms I used earlier, the revolt becomes a revolution with an ideological focus; we intend to forget about the impotential force of resistance.

3) Third, the ethics of coming community need not only be deterritorializing and revolutionary but also *pragmatic*, although this seems to be a paradox. While the revolutionary trait enforces ruptures through old exclusive strata of thought in institutionalized power relations, the pragmatic trait creates new practices remaining true to the non-dogmatic multiplicity of connections. Pragmatics thus does not indicate a choice between two evils; or a mediocre choice between two extremes. It is not about consensus, compromise or a gray zone of concessions that expresses the will of majority. Nor is pragmatism a form of toleration of multiplicity. Toleration is not affirmation, but acceptance of something that is still morally or affectively disapproved of.¹⁴ As Ghorashi (2010) argues, toleration in our state of democracy at best gives space for difference – a space in which relationality becomes passive in non-speech toward difference – rather than *create* space and *guard* the space of difference (pp. 26-27). Appiah (2006) states: “Toleration requires a concept of the *intolerable* ... we plainly need to go beyond talk of truth and tolerance” (p. 144). A rheumatoid arthritis patient tolerates the unavoidable pain. In pragmatism differences are affirmed as desired and necessary traits of politics and ethics. Pragmatics does not start from a dogmatic point of view but is in need of an approach from the middle of a multiple ideas on a good life, as Appiah pleads. Pragmatism thus does not befall into the trap of a universalizing and eternalizing truthness. In other words, while ideologies start with primary rules and try to structure a desired perfect identity and society, pragmatism starts in the middle of a milieu, aware of the contextuality of the matter. Yet, in contrast to multiculturalism, a politics of life approaches contextuality as an impotential paradigm instead of a differentiating paradigm. The complexity of contextuality is a virtual reality and not actually definable. An ethical attitude toward such contextuality is thus not self-employed and omniscient; but rather shy and porous.

Such ethics is not external, but immanent. Within politics of life – a politics that implements diversity of life as its basic impotential contextual element – ethics is not a transcendental production of norms for conduct, but the creation of immanent approaches within which values lead to *reflective* judgments in which lives in any sense of the word *matter*. It is not the logic of a certain consensus or determinative judgment, whether small or universal, micro or macro. Pragmatism is the political

¹⁴ John Schimek (n.d) refers to Derrida’s notion of *hospitality* in which plurality is shaped by virtue of *respect* that actively seeks to communicate. Schimek suggests that only due to the virtue of respect can plurality endure in a *peaceful multicultural society*. In contrast, I suggest that his way of thinking surpasses the idea of multiculturalism or multi-religions and instead creates an inter-religious and intercultural territory. In connection to mutual transformation within difference instead of toleration Rita M. Gross (1991) states: “Mutual transformation does not result in new religions or in one universal syncretistic religion, but in the enrichment of the various traditions that results when their members are open to the inspiration provided by resources of others. How much more satisfying intellectually and ethically than mere tolerance or religious ethnocentrism and chauvinism!” Yet, unfortunately her critique merely targets some religions – Christianity and Islam – and does not critically points out the inherent ethnocentrism and xenophobic tendencies of other types of beliefs; for example, secularism. As Schinkel (2011) argues secularism itself creates a *secular purgatory* by paradoxically mono-defining autonomy.

practice of rhizomatic thinking as acting. It is connective, not finalizing. It is this trait of connectedness that, according to Stengers, connects meso-politics to the practice of pragmatism.¹⁵

The meso is a site of invention where the pragmatics of the question is much more alive, more vivid, more difficult to forget than the micro or the macro, which traditionally play a game of truth. The meso must create itself. And each time, the meso affirms its copresence with a milieu. This – sticks that's a relation to a milieu. This breaks, this bends, this is elastic – that implies an action undergone. Every material is a relation with a milieu. ... The contrast success/failure raises different questions, pragmatic questions, in experimental relation with milieus (Massumi & Manning, 2009, pp. 3-4).

Success and failure in Stengers' analysis indicate productivity; failure brings about transformation within the process.¹⁶ Or as Deleuze and Guattari (1986) put it: "Each failure is a masterpiece, a branch of the rhizome" (p. 39). Freed from the normative and moral gesture thus pragmatics means *to experiment*. It is *transcendental empiricism* in which a form of life does not negate its living matter, but within the movement of this matter, it creates its form and image of thought.

4) Fourth, this idea of pragmatism in which '*nothing can be said in advance*' does not simply indicate a reference to a future *actual state*. Ethical pragmatic experiment cannot base itself on a common idea or rule. It cannot trace or copy a course of action. The rhizomatic ethical approach rather *maps out* connections in the middle instead of copy-pasting eternal and universal ideas of a good life. While tracing motivated by long-term memory segmentarizes into identarian structures such as families and nations, mapping rhizomatically decentralizes itself by permanent acts of creating nodes in layered networks that transversally cohere and are composed. The students in my classroom and I were amazed by the process of mapping beyond the traceable identities. That does not mean that the meritocratic rejection of the boy was the same as the girl, but rather that they related through difference in being and experiences.

According to Deleuze and Guattari the rhizome is not familiar with notions such as progress, progressive or the middle mode, the end of the line or a middle defined by finality and averages. We are always already in the middle with variable speeds. Thus, in the end the coming of this community of politics of life is not a future sense of utopia. Utopia and progress indicate a trace to follow. The mapping out of coming community rather indicates the permanent sensitization of possible forms of actions. Communication is crucial. Coming refers to the virtual natality of possibilities of approach now here, *a possible world* that is neither opposed to an actual world, nor defined by one form of method or recognition. This form of community is not a final step in a politics of flight. As such a

¹⁵ Stengers disapproves with Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis on micropolitics that articulates on the level of the body. As an activist and a philosopher of science that studies laboratory practices for her micro is an indication of molecular activity. She favors the agency of non-institutionalized groups as a result of which 'meso' is the level of political pragmatism.

¹⁶ Stenger states: "immanent tension between succeeding and failing, between succeeding, or working together in a mode that creates an experience that sustains us, and failing, which is to say dispersing" (Massumi & Manning, 2009, p. 15).

politics of life does not occur at the end of a line, but in the middle of a process. We are already there in the middle. Even a totalitarian state could give rise to such processes indicating a deterritorialization of totalitarian thought as an ‘inner Emigration’, a term used to describe German writers who were opposed to Nazism yet chose to remain in Germany after the Nazis seized power in 1933. Agamben (1999^a) even radically suggests, “only through an indetermination will it be possible to conceive of an indetermination” (p. 217). This means that within the coming community totalitarian exclusion or multicultural segmentation could emerge too. Coming community is thus no more rhizomatic than other types of societies. It is only explicit, or more expressive about its own unpredictable content. It affirms its ontological basis in an *impotential mesopolitical way*.

5) Finally, the fifth step of the ethics of this politics of life is the acknowledgement of *belonging as a given*. We all – not simply morally or ideologically, but more so ontologically – belong to this world, and due to the diversity that this absolute belonging entails there are no entrances to this world that can be closed permanently. While totalitarianism and multiculturalism are based on one form of entrance and multiple forms of violent exit, the ethical approach of coming community defines each gate, even that of totalitarianism or multicultural identity, as a form of possible entrance. Entrance in coming community indicates the inevitable possibility of *belonging as such*, as we will see in the final part of this chapter. Belonging, in contrast to ideological beliefs, does not occur due to expected characteristics or historical affiliation. Belonging as such is independent of normative structures. Subjects belong whether we like it or not. The Dutch distinction in terms of allochthonous and autochthonous suggests that there are degrees of belonging. Manufacturing distinctions such as ‘the nth-generation migrants’ (Schinkel, 2008) and continuing to define them as allochthonous or a hip-term such as people with migration background – men and women who are forced to semi-belong – demonstrates the desire to define non-belonging rather than participating in the process of belonging as such. Semi-belonging or non-belonging is in denial of belonging to a community.¹⁷ Even so, if we follow the argumentation of Huijer (2016), there are no people with a migrant-background versus people with no migrant-background. In the state of global-being everyone – the traveller and the one that traveller leaves behind – have migrant background. These understand of background through cliché axiomatic and differential distinctions arise from the incomprehension of the unavoidability of belonging. We are travelling, physically, mentally and digitally. In the realm of speech in Arendt’s words, or in the openness of expression in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, each subject belongs with the different intensities, whether the normative rules define it as such or not. In this space each person, stranger or familiar, participates as an agency in inter-speak and inter-action.

The multiplicity of entrances in *politics of life* problematizes a rigid form of entering politics of flight: it problematizes an entrance that is based on an idea of *truthness*, in which facts and truths morally intertwine with one another; create a unitary *recognition* and *memory*. It is within such entrance that

¹⁷ Arendt (1968) tells us that it destroys the possibility of belonging: “The calamity of the rightless is not that they are deprived of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, or of equality before the law and freedom of opinion-formulas which were designed to solve problems *within* given communities – but that they no longer belong to any community whatsoever” (p. 295). I prefer to claim that it neglects the belonging but can never destroy belonging as such.

the ethics of multiple entrances, a multiplicity of connections and responsibility is lost. The rhetoric's of war often relies on such collision between facts and truths. *Whenever fact and truth become the same, the totalitarian force of one form of opinion is not far away.* Fact is that Saddam Hussein stopped breathing on 30th December 2006. Moral truthness of the matter is within the determinative judgment that with his death we have dealt with his responsibility for more than 200.000 civilian deaths of Iraqi political and religious minorities. The evil was over there and we westerners cleansed our hands in innocence and identified and acknowledged ourselves as saviors. The mess we left behind is the result of a collision of facts with truths drenched by ethnocentric moralism.

Within such morality responsibility is ascribed to a subject, a people, fed by an idea of dismantling an evil agency on the other side of the spectrum of good. Ethics of politics of life rather resists such binary setting of responsibility. As we have seen, Agamben's (1999^b) plea for *ethical territory for future cartographers* (p. 13) rather moves through another form of factuality. The ontological reality of each of us belonging as such to a world, means that we are – in one way or other – all responsible. The term *non-responsibility* as an impotential paradigm in Agamben's lecture thus does not indicate that there is no responsibility, but rather that there is no fixed agency or subject(s) that solely carry the responsibility. This means that while a *moral truth* due to a set of norms defines our conduct and judges whether we are or are not responsible, the *ethical reality of rhizome* within a coming community demands us each time to *redefine* in which way we are co-responsible.

Facts are given; ethical truth on the other hand is a result of permanent *research*. How does this ethical truth relate to recognition and memory, i.e. to collective identity? What do we recognize and what do we remember? *Difference and connection: difference-relationality.* Next to the non-synchronic relation between truth and facts, within the meso-ethical process the relation between recognition and facts is mutually non-synchronic. Recognition is a crucial concept in multiple analyses on politics of migration, as we have seen in the fifth chapter. Migration is often seen as a process that leads to recognition or non-recognition, within identity and loss of identity. Recognition – not as a sociological or psychological fact but as a discursive tool of *relating to connections* – thus appears in multiple assemblages of connections. Nevertheless, *whenever recognition denies its meso-multiplicity and appears as recognition of facts or identity, the reduction of all connection to one form of recognition is not far.*¹⁸ Recognition of an identity as *the* tool instead of *a* tool among others leads to the idea of *a main entrance, destroying a rhizomatic approach.* A main entrance refers to a passage that can be entered by or closed to an enemy. It is the entrance of the great Signifier that blocks all other entrances. Consequently, this Signifier blocks an ability to experiment, to relate differently on multiple levels. Deleuze and Guattari (1986) therefor claim:

We will enter, then, by any point whatsoever; none matters more than another, and no entrance is more privileged even if it seems an impasse, a tight passage, a siphon. ... Only the principle of multiple entrances prevents the introduction of the enemy, the Signifier and those attempts to interpret a work that is actually only open to experimentation (p. 3).

¹⁸ See also Patton, 2000, p. 20.

An act of signification is an act of reduced *recognition*. The great Signifier is always embedded in or related to an oppositional structure. Within the frameworks of identity, we always recognize someone as either this or that, friend or foe. As the result of this oppositional recognition, we decide to grant the other entrance or to exclude him or her. And when we do not recognize the other, when we cannot identify the other clearly as a result of blurred facts or a blurred memory, we often become scared and shut the doors anyhow. Or even more so, we are obliged to shut doors. This was sensible when a colleague of mine Naima Chouaati, identified as a Muslim woman with Moroccan background, was complimented by her coworkers as inspiring for other Muslim female students. When she waved the compliment by stating “why am I not allowed to be inspiring for a homosexual white boy?”; her coworkers stated that she must not ask for the impossible.

However, although recognition can have its roots within the structure of binary identities, yet recognition is not outside the rhizome. Could we – in line with my colleague – state that we could recognize and inspire through difference. In other words – as we have seen in the classroom before – we recognize an inspiration through *redefinable* connections, rather than through identity.

A politics of life also dismantles the presupposed one-on-one relation between memory and identity. How do we remember? Deleuze and Guattari (1986) speak of childhood blocks instead of childhood memories.

Memory brings about a reterritorialization of childhood. But the childhood block functions differently. It is the only real life of the child; it is deterritorializing; it shifts in time, with time, in order to reactivate desire and make its connections proliferate; it is intensive and, even in its lowest intensities, it launches a high intensity. He also forms a block of deterritorialization that shifts with time, the straight line of time, coming to reanimate the adult as one animates a puppet and giving the adult living connections (pp. 78-79).

Despite the fact that memory confirms a univocal structure, it is still a passage. Even if memory is an impasse – such as remembering the past in full of shame and guilt in the present as we have seen in the fifth chapter – it is still according to Deleuze and Guattari a part of the rhizome (pp. 3-5). Nevertheless, I would rather argue that memory is not simply a passage within the rhizome; and it is not necessarily arborescent either. It is in the end too simplistic to define memories as personal experiences, or merely effects of a general discourse. Life-stories often change and connect to the impotential contextuality. Ghorashi (2003) analysis of different experiences of and connections to the past in California and The Netherlands is exemplary. She argues that the more open a society gets, the more individuals tend to have a multiple attitude toward the past. The closer a society the more individuals tend to reduce their life-stories to one type of affect, such as shame and nostalgia.

Feeling of home has little to do with your country of origin, but very much to do with the place you can revive your memory (p. 249).

Memories neither belong to the macro- nor the micro-level, but just as truth and recognition, they appear as Ghorashi shows within a meso-level and within an assemblage of connections. Memories obey multiple logics. Memory is rhizomatic in the fullest sense of the word. Inspired by Augustine, Arendt (1996) writes: “Memory undoes the past. The triumph of memory is that in presenting the past and thus depriving it, in a sense, of its bygone quality, memory transforms the past into a future possibility” (p. 48). Although Augustine refers to memory of a Creator and the possibility of a future salvation, the phrase that memory *undoes the past and creates possibilities* is arousing.

Memories appear and disappear, change intensities, take different tracks and create new openings for what is coming. A main entrance appears whenever memories are merely judged by their references to known facts. Arendt’s conception of the narrative, as I have discussed in the first chapter (1.4.3), is rather a plea for narratives and memories that *unessentially* connect endlessly.

The animation film WALL-E (Stanto, 2008) is a fine example of the rhizomatic character of recognition and memory as differentiating impotential paradigms instead of differentiating paradigms of true and false memory. WALL-E is a robot, made to organize the garbage on the planet earth. The air has been polluted so badly that no living being can live there. The remaining human beings live in a spacecraft. But while the humans have become the object of the machines, i.e. the purpose of existence of the machines of consumptions, WALL-E has become a human by creating a home, having a plant and a cricket as a pet. He wants to be alive, or in the full sense a subject, and therefore he records memories in sounds and visuals. He is a non-human, keeping humanity alive, by falling in love and wanting to reveal the truth about their planet. In search of justice he even sacrifices himself, not by losing his robotness but rather by losing his memory and hence dying as a man. WALL-E loses itself or rather himself because his memory card is violently destroyed. He forgets everything, even his love for EVE. Fortunately, the unintentional act of holding hands brings his memory back, his tactile rather than lingual or visual memory is triggered. He remembers EVE and becomes the WALL-E we know. His identity is recognized again by the thankful viewer.

The simplicity of the end, however, must not fool us. The character of WALL-E is more complex than it seems. The memories that were gained by the robot, do not belong to him, they do not even belong to his species, let alone the *affect* caused by these memories. Furthermore, his memories are not straight timelines that refer back to an identity or an essence of WALL-E. On the contrary, only due to loss of his memory he becomes the robot he was made to be, the garbage robot. WALL-E is truly stateless. In a sense, he regains his ‘essence’ and his garbage becomes nothing more than garbage. His memories bring out complexities in his character, memories in which useless garbage becomes multiple lines within a story. Finally, the memories come back although the memory-card is irreparably damaged and is replaced by an empty memory-card that contains nothing of our WALL-E. What affects the recollection is a touch. It is the tactile recognition that triggers his memory, by his hands rather than by his logical linear brain. It is due to the multiplicity of memory that WALL-E turns into a being, instead of being an object, a machine. WALL-E in the end, by connecting on a different level, moves beyond the logic of identity. WALL-E is a becoming, he becomes human by *differing* from human-beings. “The act of becoming is a capturing, a possession, a plus-value, but never a reproduction or an imitation” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1986, p. 13).

6.3.3 Ethical Impotential Paradigms

What kind of cartography or mapping does this interested, revolutionary, pragmatical ethical truth that bears witness to a different belonging ask for? In line with the reflections of my companions in thought, mostly with Deleuze and Guattari I will distinguish an ethical connection from a moralistic judgment. Ethics – or in terms of Agamben (1999^b): *terra ethica* – is redefined in an ontological sense as the rhizomatic field of connections. This explains its interestedness and pragmatical dimension. Everything that is considered to be an isolated subject or object is on this field penetrated and composed by lines of segmentation and lines of flight. Imagine an immense layered network of networks with nodes and meshes. Every seemingly empty in-between space is at the same time the embedding of connections. There are cacophonous silences and an abundance of space of in-between, i.e. inter-est. You and I are connected in different ways; in so many ways that we cannot comprehend. Ethics is not etiquette or netiquette, but comprehension of this incomprehensible immensity of potential worlds of differentiation of connectivity: difference-relationality. Ethics is not based on a definable emotion; it is rather the multiplicity of affects of a body without organs passing our bodies without permission. As Agamben stated, ethics is non-dogmatic, due to the fact that it maps out all actual and virtual forms of connection without judgment. Just as the same air penetrates both the lungs of Adolf Hitler and Mahatma Gandhi without distinction, ethics creates and manifests connections without preferences and without a specific agenda. Ethics of politics of life – in contrast to politics of exile and politics of segments – does not intend to introduce rules and norms in order to tame the unending ontological connections into *orders* of expression. Ethics of this politics rather willingly gives in to this ontological reality. The form of expression of politics of life is merely loyal to the intensity of *différance*; not because it does not know formation and segmentation, but rather because it always questions its own tendency to formation and segmentation. Ethics is neither vertical nor horizontal, but transversal and vectoral due to its multidimensional topology and the emphasis on all possible connections made in its act of mapping. The morality of exile and segmentation overdetermines the rhizomatic transversality of politics by clearly defined and less fluid characteristics, creating in its manifestation of rules a strict sense of traceability. In contrast to this politics of exile the rhizomatic ethical vernacular of politics of life happens on a molecular level. While morality creates molar connections, in line with Stengers, we could state that ethics as a meso-political contextual practice is better localized in-between both molar and molecular process. In this sense, ethics becomes an impotential paradigm rather than an axiomatic or differentiating norm due to holding on to the tension in-between molar and molecular. Enlightenment promised molecular intensities through its propagation for freedom and authenticity via autonomy; yet by defining what exactly an ideal autonomy looks like, it gave in to molar desire to segment territories and people. It is time to enlighten the Enlightenment itself on the meaning of autonomy.

However, we still have to deal with two problems. First, stating there is a difference between molar and molecular does not imply that we can easily distance ourselves from a molar state of morality in order to act according a molecular state of ethics. Although morality is embedded in the ethical field, the transcendental urge of self-consciousness causes man to look at it through moralistic glasses. In the context of laboratory practices Stengers observes:

The question of how to go from the mode of description demanded by water molecules to the molar mode of description, where it's a question of water that we can drink or swim in, is extremely complicated. It's an open problem, not an opposition (Massumi & Manning, 2009, p. 2).

Second, not all molar systems are the same and in each system different forces are at work. Different relative deterritorializing forces create different types of moral molar systems, religious, social, ethical and political. Negative deterritorialization creates a system in which a strong segmentary whole is produced, neglecting positive deterritorializations that enforce *affects* on a molecular level 'beneath' the molar systems. The overdetermined moral system and thought still works through the intensity of these relative forms of deterritorialization. Some moral rules are more intensely 'loyal' to the ethical field than others. "Thou shalt not kill", as one of the oldest moral rules of various religious systems, speaks of such intensity. To consider killing as an evil thing is a moral judgment, while the intensity of the ethical field is present in the judgment, due to the fact that through such judgment appreciation of *a* life and hence prohibition of the destruction of its potential connections navigate the ethical attitude. It is then crucial to state: coming community is an ethical community not due to the fact that it lacks moral judgment, but due to the fact that it is not in denial of its moralistic impact, but permanently, critically and affirmatively connects this morality to the ethical field, to *terra ethica*, mapping out all other virtualities. It gives in to *critical morality*.

Ethics begins only when the good is revealed to consist in nothing other than a grasping of evil and when the authentic and the proper have no other content than the inauthentic and the improper (Agamben, 1993^b, p. 13).

Coming community's morality is *aware* of its own tendency toward totalitarianism and multiculturalism. Awareness here, however, does not indicate a solution or the road to salvation. The problematization is chronic and as a result, referring to Deleuze and Guattari, concepts will be produced constantly. Awareness therefore indicates permanent engagement, inspiring the alacrity to deal with problematizations beyond universalism without falling back on relativism. Appiah (2006) eloquently reasons:

For if relativism about ethics and morality were true, then, at the end of many discussions, we would each have to end up saying 'From where I stand, I am right. From where you stand, you are right.' And there would be nothing further to say. From our different perspectives, we would be living effectively in different worlds. ... Relativism of that sort isn't a way to encourage conversation; it's just a reason to fall silent (pp. 30-31).

We live in the same world, we communicate whether with open or shut senses. And there is always a judgment within the experience of a relationality. Even a neutral state is a state. Yet, judgment that

remains loyal to the ethical field of coming community is principally contextual and oscillates between what Agamben (1993^b) calls the *common* and the *proper*.

The being that is engendered on this line is whatever being, and the manner in which it passes from the common to the proper and from the proper to the common is called usage – or rather, *ethos*” (p. 20).

Ethics within this setting is anchored in *ethos*, just as Foucault proposed in his last writings. Ethos is first and for all connected to the other, to differences. Individual or common actions never abandon their potential to be something else, and mutually give rise to other potential acts. Yet, we can never speculate on the immensity of an action, as Arendt (1958) puts it. It endures until the end of times.

The reason why we are never able to foretell with certainty the outcome and end of any action is simply that action has no end. The process of a single deed can quite literally endure throughout time until mankind itself has come to an end (Arendt, 1958, p. 233).

Nonetheless, ethics of politics of life is not random or without paradigms. Its paradigms rather create an ethical attitude toward the unpredictability of actions and ontological belonging as such. They are impotential ethical paradigms that form the expression of coming community. Moreover, it is also crucial to state that these ethical paradigms never appear individually or hierarchically. While in the jargon of totalitarianism the value of security and in the jargon of multiculturalism the value of loyalty manifest themselves on the top of a moral pyramid, values within coming community always effect one another transversally. They hold on to one another; they stimulate an equal relationality without reducing difference to homogeneity. Defining this relationality is an immense act; and perhaps a subject for another book. But let me clarify my point by evaluating four pairs of impotential ethical paradigms. Yet reading my evaluation one must keep in mind that, as Schinkel argues (2008): “we are always more valuable than a collection of values” (p. 473). Schinkel justly states that discussion of values always remains in the danger of *representation* of a form of metaphysical neutrality. Thus, let us state that within the coming configuration of pairs of values the word *and* is more fundamental than the value itself. It is within this *and* that the processual as well as relational inherency of a value rather than segmentalization of the value is appreciated.

1) *Freedom and responsibility*

Patton’s (2000) notion of *critical freedom* is immensely useful here. He states that freedom, in relation to Deleuze’s Nietzschean understanding of it, does not appear due to a personal satisfaction or realization of an identity. Freedom does not manifest an essence but rather *outflows* the idea of an essence and identity. Freedom unfolds in change, in *self-overcoming*. While traditional liberal thought gives in to grasp an identity, in Patton and Deleuze’s thought it is rather transformation that is the key to *critical freedom* (pp. 2-3 & 83). “In contrast to the traditional concepts of negative and positive freedom, critical freedom thus concerns those moments in a life after which one is no longer the same person” (p. 85). It is within this multiplicity and transformability that we place the plurality of political

acts and the unidentifiable appearance of men in public space, as indicated by Arendt. Nevertheless, despite this freedom to act differently Arendt (1958) also states:

Neither in labor ... nor in fabrication ... does man appear to be less free than in those capacities whose very essence is freedom and in that realm which owes its existence to nobody and nothing but man (p. 234).

Plurality is due to unpredictable actions through which we are initially confused by instead of enabled to choose the right passageway. Or as Appiah (2006) puts it:

Reasoning – by which I mean the public act of exchanging stated justifications – comes in not when we are going on in the usual way, but when we are thinking about change. And when it comes to change, what moves people is often not an argument from a principle, not a long discussion about values, but just a gradually acquired new way of seeing things (p. 73).

Seeing thing implies imaginations, which – as we have seen in the first chapter (1.4.3) – Arendt defines (1982) as “the ability to make present what is absent” (p. 65). The freedom of this plurality comes with a nearly *unbearable responsibility*. We act in public without guarantees, without the ability to comprehend the effects of our deeds, especially in the digital age we are living now. This responsibility does not depend on understanding motives or intentions of ourselves or others, and in this sense such responsibility differs from that of Kant. It is a pragmatic responsibility in the Deleuzian sense. Men are accountable for what they do. At the same time, they are the play toys in a web of events that surpass their birth as well as their death. Pragmatic understanding as a form of resistance against the totalitarian or segmentalizing consistency, is the acceptance that we belong to, are submitted to and nevertheless are anyway responsible for this world we are living in. What we must realize is that – despite the fact that the course of our actions is impossible to grasp by humans, neither in anticipation nor in retrospection because the very reflection already alters the course of events – these actions nonetheless belong to the human world. It is not something metaphysical that is beyond our research or doing. It is our way of consumption that dries and pollutes landscapes elsewhere. The refugees who bang on our doors are not asking for our mercy but call us upon our responsibility. And only through this realization we are able to survive the nightmares of our time (Arendt, 1978^a, p. 174).

2) *Antimemory* and *forgiving*

This pair relates Arendt’s thought to that of Deleuze and Guattari. Coming community is territorial rather than historical, transversal rather than vertical or horizontal. To map it out, it needs what Deleuze and Guattari call nomadology. Rhizomatics as an approach is nomadology and, given the critical retake of truth, recognition and memory, not in line with generally accepted the standard history. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) even suggest some form of *antimemory* (p. 21). There are, according to Deleuze and Guattari only *short-term memories*. I rather suggest that there is a form of transformable memory that implements the ability to remember differently. This creates a space – a

historical connective political space – that is free from the historical sentiment of nationalism or the utopian response of idealism. Yet, though a coming community is not defined by and thus the outcome of historical processes, it is nevertheless related to them. It is not forgetting in a normal sense of the past. When Arendt (1958) scorns the act of forgetting the past, she refers to another form of forgetting: denial of the past. Antimemroy rather acknowledges the rhizomatic connectivity of the past; by resisting the segmented frameworks of written history. Rhizomatic memory is not denial but rather something different. It resists history by resisting its force to exclude those who did not belong or shared that history; who in Hegelian words had no subjectivity. It is a type of memory that revolts due to its nomadological understanding of history. It cuts through historical distinctions such as citizens and non-citizens. Within the realm of transformative memory each subject belongs to a coming community.

Only through such open political space of antimemory we could, in line with Arendt, bring forth the notion of *forgiving*. Forgiving remembers the past, not as a road to an essence, but rather as an awareness to avoid essentiality. It remembers the political appeal to connect differently. Forgiving is for Arendt an act par excellence due to the fact that despite its reference to the past it gives rise to a new political relationality, to being interested or 'interesse'. Forgiving is a mode of *natality*. Forgiveness is not the denial of responsibility, nor amnesia of the horror. Forgiveness is not the end of judgment. Its natality is the actualization of new possibilities without neglecting violent and murderous deeds. The judgement is reflective, not determined. It opens the possibility of a birth of a new actor. However, as any other action to forgive is unpredictable and impossible to plan. It is not an Oprah Winfrey or Dr. Phil show in which the offenders and offended meet, ask for mercy and forgive. As any act forgiveness is spontaneous and beyond the control of the subjects (pp. 236-241). In case of South Africa, we could argue that both scenarios were at hand.

3) *Respect and disagreement*

Within a coming community each agent is a political agent, entitled to political speech. In line with her *ethos of friendship*¹⁹ total negation or total consensus means the end of a coming community. This community only emerges due to plurality, and consensus within plurality is by definition a *contradiction in terms*. Nevertheless, as argued before, negation alone will not suffice either. Coming community is in need of an *affirmative dissensus*. Arendt (1958) suggests the notion of *respect*, which just as forgiving is an act that, due to its potentiality, can start something new. *Respect* by no means implies an agreement. It rather creates space for an event of disagreement by mere acknowledgement of the other as an interlocutor. Other than toleration, respect is in need of speech and affirmative acting. Respect is not a subjective preference but a process in which a political milieu of another kind appears. It is a minimum space of *sensus communis*, without the universalistic pretense. When the Dutch parliament tried to prohibit a debate with the Sharia scholar Sjeik Haitham al-Haddad in VU University Amsterdam, the organizers complied to the demand. Yoeri Albrecht, the director of the

¹⁹ For a comparison between Derrida's notion of friendship and Arendt's see the analysis of Dirk De Schutter (2005). He clearly shows the resistance of both thinkers towards *brotherhood* that essentially differs from friendship. While brotherhood refers to the necessary condition of labor, friendship emerges from within the openness of politics. Friendship does not function through compassion due to an essence that all men share, but through difference that relates (pp. 106-126).

debate-center *De Balie*, offered his center as an alternative, by arguing that disagreement is no reason for exclusion. Although Albrecht disagreed with al-Haddad, he nonetheless referred to a meso-political milieu of respect, beyond his macropolitical preferences (Omstreden sjeik is geland, 2012). Yet, his invitations of disagreements remain uncritical toward the idea of freedom of speech in relation to power constructions in a society based on racism and sexism; and other forms of exclusion.

4) *Hesitation and decisiveness*

Finally, coming community oscillates intensely between hesitation, as an acknowledgement of a lack of ultimate knowledge, and the necessity to decide in order to act anyway. This tension is almost impossible to bear. Just as freedom brings about the burden of responsibility, hesitation brings about the burden to act without certain direction. Deciding to act appears in the process of thinking and as Deleuze shows “it is not the reassuring familiarity of the known which should provide us with the paradigm of thinking, but those hesitant gestures which accompany our encounters with the unknown” (cited in Patton, 2000, p. 19). On the level of cultural, social and economic discourse Arjun Appadurai (2001) speaks of a form of approach that initiates from within a milieu, instead of functioning as an outside objective view. It is an approach with *patience*, it rather listens than teaches.

The tension between the hesitation and the necessity of decision is also shown by Jacques Derrida in *Force of law* (1992^a). Derrida first distinguishes between law as a form of institution and the ethical concept of justice. While the law defines itself by force and intends to order and predict outcomes, justice appears where thought is uncertain. Justice is not an impossible experience, it is an experience of the impossible. And yet, justice is not opposed to action. It is not a prediction or calculation, justice is rather *an appeal, a decision*. Although we could never be certain of the outcome of our actions or their justness, non-action when it is needed the most, is unjust in every sense. Derrida reaches beyond action and passivity in promoting a 'non-passive endurance'. In our diplomatic pinpointing the blame there is no justice to be found for refugees that all around the globe try to escape the horrors of our world. Dissensus could be potentially connective only when we decide to act whenever murder is the case. Decision, however, does not create heroes. It is never an ego trip or done for the sake of security of oneself. According to Derrida decision, as any act, *befalls* subjects. And most definitely it befell those men and women who left behind the western luxury in order to approach those refugees within the context of refugee camps.

Coming community thus creates a space in which paradigms do not regulate a homogenous structure, but instead problematize and challenge one another. They keep each other on the edge and trigger thinking, creating impotential paradigms that ask for action. The impotentiality is not a negative space, an emptiness; it is difference-relationality. Two courses of action are relevant here: jurisprudence and pedagogy. *Jurisprudence* as law in action and not law in books is not, according to Deleuzian pragmatics, about the certainty of the law. It deals with the juridical complexity of a concrete process and gives in to the need to decide in course of action.

What interests me isn't the law or laws (the former being an empty notion, the latter uncritical notions), nor even law or rights, but jurisprudence. It's jurisprudence,

ultimately, that creates law, and we mustn't go on leaving this to judges (Deleuze, 1995, p. 169).

Jurisprudence does not simply trace the law, but if it is done sincerely, it maps out a process unfolding its virtualities. Jurisprudence becomes justice in practice. *Pedagogy* is the practice par excellence in coming community. This practice motivates thought rather than structuring it. Here pedagogy does not give in to the idea of *Bildung*, in which only one type of normalized identity can function as an example. Pedagogy is neither formation, nor accumulation of factual knowledge, but experiment and creation. As jurisprudence, it is thought in practice. Deleuze and Guattari (1994) argue:

The post-Kantians concentrated on a universal *encyclopedia* of the concept that attributed concept creation to a pure subjectivity rather than taking on the more modest task of a *pedagogy* of the concept, which would have to analyze the conditions of creation as factors of always singular moments. If the three ages of the concept are the encyclopedia, pedagogy, and commercial professional training, only the second can safeguard us from falling from the heights of the first into the disaster of the third – an absolute disaster for thought whatever its benefits might be, of course, from the viewpoint of universal capitalism (p. 12).

6.4 Ethical Expression: What Really Matters ...

6.4.1 *The Epos of Singular Assemblages*

In this section I will set out the matter of expression of coming community, or politics of life. Just as coming community – as a *form* of content – occurs as multi-territorial saturated community; and ethical impotential paradigms – as a *form* of expression – map out the intensity of plural relationalities; the *matter* of expression of politics of life undergoes the same process. As we have seen the form of content and the form of expression of coming community are supplementary to one-another. The form of content that identifies itself as body without organs inspires the ethics of politics of life; and the ethical impotential paradigms of politics of life sensitize the difference-relationality of its form. There are ethical layers in which all forms of expression are potentially present. This is the virtual rhizomatic underground on which expression differentiates itself in different types, such as language, image and gesture, and in this process, creates within different types moral segments that we could call grammar or framing. My companions in thought give us tools for decoding and breaking through rules so that one can experiment with concepts, functions, senses/percepts as well as paradigms. By creating another idea of experiencing minority their images of thought do not only deconstruct an attitude towards forms of expression, but also our comprehension of epistemology, ontology and politics. Their reflection has immense ethical and juridical implications.

For Arendt (1958) political natality through action is always supplemented by *speech*. It is the birth of the matter of expression in politics; and exactly this birth of *action* and *speech* are the elements that distinguish us from animals as well as Gods (pp. 22-23). Neither labor nor work is as essential as this

part of *vita activa* for our ability to be a human, for our being-human. Arendt is convinced that a man without speech and action is dead for the human world. Our humanity, in other words, ceases to exist once our active and speaking relationship, i.e. our discursive virtuality with other people is missing, the only plurality in which action and speech are possible.

Men in the plural, that is, men in so far as they live and move and act in this world, can experience meaningfulness only because they can talk with and make sense to each other and to themselves (p. 4).

Speech and action give rise to a *second birth* (p. 176). This *second* always refers to all the births that emerge after our biological birth. It refers to our potentiality within the public space of human relationality. It is a disorientating kind of birth, unconditioned. It is neither the necessity of labor that is keeping us alive nor the utility of work and its worldliness by which the objects are manufactured. This birth connects in a multilinear, i.e. transversal and rhizomatic manner to all other subjects of politics. Yet, the others are a kind of stimuli but not necessary for birth, according to Arendt. The others and the world are impulses for the self to take initiative. Action means taking the initiative or to start. This is not the start of a world or a process in the strict sense, but the beginning of new forms of political subjectification, of ‘agencement’ as Deleuze and Guattari would label it. There lies the true principle of liberty: freedom that is not indicating an initiative based on experiences, but a freedom in which each beginning is unexpected and *wondrously* unannounced, Arendt affirms (p. 177).

Nativity of action is accompanied by plurality of speech. Therein unique and differentiated people can come to the fore. The birth does not take place previous to the speech but is simultaneous, equiprimordial. It is the moment of revelation in which the crucial question: “*who are you?*” celebrates its birth. A *who* is a multiple expression. Due to the *unpredictability* of action as well as its *irreversible* effect within the web of human intercourse, this *who* can never be pinpointed to an identity. The appearance of a *who* in political community does not bring clarification on the nature or *whatness* of the subject but reveals itself in everlasting *anonymity* (pp. 144, 176-178 & 189-192). Unpredictability, irreversibility and anonymity first and for all indicate that politics of the *whos* can never be finalized. It is an ongoing process of connectivity that creates *singular assemblages*. The singular assemblage within this process does not possess a linear narrative, distinguishing its I from the others. It experiences rhizomatic narrative, in words of Maan (1999) an internarrative, in which the subject itself becomes a singular assemblage with transformative endoconsistency and exoconsistency that do not oppose one another, but supplement each other in differing. *Singular assemblage*, as a type of political persona, does not mean to isolate itself from its milieu, nor define itself as a play toy. Within the pragmatics of a coming community it operates and interacts with (exo) and within (endo) milieus. The unfolding of this layered singular assemblage is an exposition, or in Arendt’s terms *a performance*, within a political public space. Its thinking is that of *transcendental empiricism*; meaning its critical thinking does not appear beyond life, but endures the pain of deterritorialization of fundamentals of thinking within the practice of living.

What is thus the speech of such singular assemblage? In *The Human Condition* Arendt does not define or characterize speech. She is aware that any methodological comment on speech would become disloyal to the ethical field of expression of plurality. Nonetheless, within the process of politics of flight it is necessary to differentiate different types of expressive matter; even in speech. How to *approach* expression within the milieu of flight is one of the main questions, due to the different effects that emerge between the multiple forms of power and regimes of expression. Totalitarian state comes along with another intensity within expression than multiculturalism. While the first intends to manifest *a single* order of expression, the other often inhabits multiple segmented orders. Multiculturalism thus implements single regimes of expression within a segment; but, as we have seen in chapter five, through the introduction of *common language* it also creates an overlapping regime of expression on all the segments. The expression of a coming community, however, demands something else. Agamben (2000) suggests:

It is only by breaking at any point the nexus between the existence of language, grammar, people, and state that thought and praxis will be equal to the task at hand (p. 70).

Agamben problematizes two pairs – language/grammar, people/state – in order to restore another pair – thought/praxis. While I in the previous chapter disconnected relationality from the structure of normativity and morality, here Agamben first disconnects language from its given particular structure, namely grammar. Second, he disconnects people from a particular political formation, namely a state or more rigidly a nation-state. Both disconnections are for the sake of restoring another pair, namely thought and practice, or what Agamben also calls *form-of-life*, in which *form of life* and *life* are not reduced to one another yet relate to one another. In the final part of this chapter I will elaborate more on this relationality that is present within the hyphens of form-of-life.

Thus, first there are ethical unformed layers of expression within all possible relations. Then there is a formatting layer in which expression differentiates itself in dissimilar types of expression. This layer is however still open and fully connected to the first layer, as it has been argued in the first and second chapter. Finally, there is the layer of state and order, in which – through normative thought – expression becomes segmented, creating oppositions of correct and incorrect, valuable and not valuable types of expression, in which the potentiality of expression itself, either as language, image or gesture, is lost within the rigidity of a fixed order of expression. Still, is it possible, even within such moral setting in which types of expressions are differentiated to surpass the rigidity of this order of expression? We can even wonder whether the rigidity of the regimes of expression does do justice to multiplicity that is immanent to each type of expression. In line with Heidegger's affection for language, De Mul (1999) states:

‘Language speaks’ ... The usual linguistic view, according to Heidegger, misses language itself ... Only at the moment that language fails, when we cannot think of a word and are momentarily speechless, are we forced to consider the effects of language. (p. 149).

Does this *momentarily speechlessness* in which, as De Mul argues, language for a moment gives in to itself and beyond its instrumentality becomes itself, brings us back to the under-layer as a non-essential matter of expression? Let us yet not be romantic. De Mul's point is rather that within such experience we *comprehend the incomprehensibility of expression*. It is human all too human to understand the impossibility of understanding the rhizomatic 'underground' of expression. Speechlessness is in this sense our flabbergasted human condition.

Yet, once we give in to the virtual reality of a rhizomatic underground of expression, we can problematize Arendt's anthropocentric image of expression. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) suggest that everything expresses itself, even stones and air. Expression appears everywhere. Whenever, we speak of *human* expression, we are framing the molecular intensity of expression into a molar image of expression. It is there that Arendt's political open speech unfolds itself. Agamben (2000) proposes multiple names in *Means without End*: being-into-language, communicability, or *factum loquendi* as such. *Communicability* is not the same as *communication*. Communication defines and segments the rules of engagement by enforcing a grammar and an idea of clear comprehension. In De Mul's (1999) words it is a *linguistic view*. It is grammar in which identity is defined and explored in the order of state. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) call this 'order-word' or regimes of signs. Clear comprehension is based on a clear idea of identity of signs, their designated meaning, hence an idea of possibility of transparent communication. Agamben's (2000) communicability is not based on a shared expressive identity. It is not in actu, but rather alive within an *impotentiality of speaking*. Communicability within Agamben's coming community means to engage with those singular assemblages who are unable to tell a tale within the order and demand of consistency of dominant regimes of expression. Minor minoritarian's expression is born out of a different political life, a life that is not reduced to a linguistic view and communicative order, and exactly due to this it creates narratives without a totalitarian and disconnective differentiating logical linearity. It is perhaps within such intensity of communicability that the words of my companions in thought can intertwine in my mind, surpassing our differentiating identities such as ethnicity, gender or generations.

Within the realm of expression this does not merely suggest a loss of a certain linguistic views. It means that we must lose and forget rigid views on the order of expressions as such; thus also orders of images and order of gestures. Let us be mad and imagine bodies in a different manner, hear the cacophonous sounds they produce, and unpredictable gestures they make. This is Ta-Nehisi Coates' (2015) appeal: Never forget the pain of history, yet resist its enslavement and force of identification exactly by sensitizing singular assemblages.

I have raised you to respect every human being as singular, and you must extend that same respect into the past. Slavery is not an indefinable mass of flesh. It is a particular, specific enslaved woman, whose mind is active as your own, whose range of feelings is as vast as your own; who prefers the way the light falls in one particular spots in the wood (p. 69).

Let us thus within this politics of life not define Heideggerian Holzwege toward National Socialism, but toward the singularity of this woman; singularity that she impotentiality remains to sensitize

despite the totalitarian forces of homogenization of enslavement of a people. The intensity of roads she presents, engages with the prospect of a loss of gesture within a fixed regime of gesturality. This loss, or in terms of Deleuze and Guattari, this anitmemory of gestures, according to Agamben (2000), connects to the experience of a designated other, migrant, refugee or people of color, but also to that of every modern subject (pp. 49-60). In a sense we have all lost, we all suffer from a loss of a specific form of language. Huijer (2016) testimonies of this loss in the experience of nostalgia of those who remained behind, and wished bitterly for their loved ones to return. While they often did not return; their departure fundamentally shaped a sense of belonging of leftover European subject, and the manner in which this subject speaks of itself. Nostalgia, melancholy and bitterness shape the words in which they describe their lives. And as Deleuze (1995) puts it, as a result we are all becoming more and more excluded from the realm of regimes of communication. The entrances are getting narrower by the day and we have no passwords in this age of *control societies* (pp. 176-182).

How do we in line with Coates break through the thick layers of regimes of expression? Coates plea for respect appeals us to resist the obstinacy of grammars of expression; not only in language but also in other types of expression. Through its rules, grammar creates segments in which moral binary terms such as good and evil translate themselves in oppositions such as sufficient and insufficient, correct and incorrect use of expression. The sufficiency refers to truthfulness, an adequate meaning, and adequate use. Insufficiency thus implies falsity, which differs from the term fiction due to the fact that it immediately indicates lies and false intentions. On the level of matter of content insufficiency also refers to specific bodies. It refers to a body that does not belong to the ideal state with its imperative of transparent communication. The images of scarf wearing Muslim women on the advertising flyers for Dutch language courses in The Netherlands are in that sense an excellent example of profiling. In the discourse of totalitarianism, it is always the other that is doomed to a prejudice of a lack to speak adequately. Here, as Schinkel (2008) argues, a linguistic view and a representative image confirm a milieu of exclusion, in which the integrity of the others becomes a matter of discussion merely due to the fact that they are not answering to the demands of regimes of expression.

The tension between open rhizomatic thought and binary arborescent judgment, and the relevance of this tension in minority's language, is shown in Deleuze and Guattari's (1986) analysis of Kafka's work. They take the view that scientists such as psychoanalysts have often maltreated Kafka's work only in order to confirm the binary opposition of sanity and insanity, father and son, oppression and repression. In other words, Kafka's work and Kafka himself have over and over again been victimized according to the grid of bifurcating psychological determination. Deleuze and Guattari, however, rebel against this univocal interpretation by refusing to see his work as an expression of depression, a longing for death, or a superficial revolt against the father figure whomever that may be. Kafka's work is more complex than such simple interpretations want us to believe. These interpretations are in search of an original meaning, a hidden message by the author or, as in psychoanalysis, an expression of a deep-rooted trauma that symbolically works its way through the text. The analysis is based on the distinction between correct/true and incorrect/false interpretation. Or in its structuralist version a closer and less closer reading of the Unconscious as a language. It is bound to the distinction of subject and object. According to this the subject who has expressed himself – the author – and the

subject of the statement – the content of the text – need to overlap, having one and the same identity. They remain the same no matter how much time passes. However, if we follow Deleuze and Guattari's rhizomatic way of thinking, we could rather argue that not only the reader lacks a constant identity, but neither do the text and the author have steady and continuous identities. We could even argue that it is impossible to make a clear distinction between the reader, the author and the work. As is discussed in chapter three (see: 3.1), an author's name is a node in a texture, in a discourse that binds and overdetermines inconsistencies. The expressive persona as a substance permanently transforms: form becoming matter becoming form, shifting from content to expression. Movement of expression is all that matters, it is all that there is. So, while the psychoanalytic reading imprisons Kafka in the univocal context of a problematic father-son/sanity-insanity relation, Deleuze and Guattari subvert this 'particular' interpretation of a 'general' rule by connecting singularities that move transversally on a 'deeper' level of expression. They deterritorialize, in this sense, a differentiating idea of a context, when they argue that Kafka's work can be approached in many ways. In other words, context does not bring in clarity and evident transparency but, as an impotential paradigm, engenders a multiplicity of entrances. There is no main doorway, not a great Signifier or culturally differentiating acceptable way to understand Kafka. We do not want to understand Kafka in one particular way; we rather want to experience its multiple impacts. Kafka has no main Entrance, on the contrary, it is rather a *rat hole (terrier)*, a hallway with multiple entrances, as Deleuze and Guattari explain.

Both Coates and Kafka, in their literary gestural image enforce us to sense the multiplicity of approach as a plurality of entrances. In his lecture Coates is a teacher; not by defining a right approach but by letting us engage with his multiple approaches, his momentary certainties toward political ideas and his permanent doubts. It is not the truthness of an ideology; but the truth of an ontological changing relationality that inspires this author. In words of De Mul (1999), we could state that being into Language, or any type of expression for that matter, has always "*ontological implications*" (p. 150). An encounter with language expresses the truth of ontological foreign variety. In line with Agamben (1993^a), we could state that we must engage the infancy nature of entering an expression. Translation is always there. This is not distinctive for migrants, refugees, people of color and other minorities. What differs, is rather the demonization of this otherness and then the enforcement of this demonization on bodies of minorities through regimes of expressions.

That wisdom is not unique to our people, but I think it has special meaning to those of us born out of mass rape, whose ancestors were carried off and divided up into policies and stocks (Coates, 2015, p. 69).

Demonization does not only affect assemblages of bodies on a content level, but also assemblages of enunciations on the level of expression. Within the instrumental understanding of expression as communication the absence of clear comprehension can only be defined by shortcomings and misunderstandings. Linguistic creativity depends entirely on our excellent apprehension of semantic and syntax. Hesitation and stuttering in language supposedly make us less smart or imaginative. Out-of-the-ordinary impoverished speech defects the instrumental imperative. This instrument, this medium becomes inefficient to pursue the original purpose of language: clear communication with one

another on state of affairs out there or in here. This logic is fueled by the premises of pure language, unambiguous meaning, and transparent subjects. *Exactly because language has been seen as a medium, as an instrument that transmits data from a sender to a receiver, it has become an instrument of alienation, isolation and exclusion as well.* When speech is seen as a tool that brings clarity, the one who hesitates, who stutters, just by the very act of stuttering and not even by opposing a clear question, shatters the assumptions upon which speech is based. If someone stutters, it reminds us of our own inability, of our own stupidity in language. It reminds us of our shortcomings. So, we fear the others and their forced uncertainties. This fear leads us to exclude every person who brings us doubts and worries, until there is no one with whom we can talk; until we forget our own complexity, our own stories as singular assemblages.

Language as an instrument of transparent communication is in the end an instrument of non-communication. There is no sentence that is clear in all its aspects. Language is too much alive to be a docile instrument, a passive transmission of information. Language is neither the slave of the subject nor the object of an idea. Subject and object are rather its play tools. Expression in language does not merely depend upon our knowledge of it, but rather upon our fearless ability to be intoxicated by it. To swim without rescue buoy, for a “word is not something that *is*, but rather something that *gives*” (De Mul, 1999, p. 151). To express means to believe that one cannot fail, that lack of certainty does not indicate loss of expression. A writer does not believe in shortcomings. A writer’s block belongs to the one who believes in a subject that can fail. A writer, on the other hand, is the subject who loses its identity in order to experience the transforming force of expression. As Deleuze (1990) suggests: “the writer has no *logos*, but only an *epos*, which states that one can never go too far in the description of decomposition, since it is necessary to go as far as the crack leads” (p. 332). Hesitation is not negation but rather affection for creativity. Stuttering is an experience one must not and cannot miss out on. It is a characteristic element of any speech. If there are still any oppositions, then it is the one between clarity and creativity. Clarity is the blockage of multiplicity, while creativity thrives on multiplicity. Nonetheless, both are part of an expressive process.

It is language which fixes the limits ... but it is language as well which transcends the limits and restores them to the infinite equivalence of an unlimited becoming (p. 2-3).

If hesitation and stuttering are part of the game, and the rules change and transform every time we play, how can we still communicate? In order to understand this possibility, we need to transform the structure of our thought, the image of thought on language. Agamben (2000) suggests that experiencing language is an experience of pure means. Once the medium becomes the message, as Marshall MacLuhan claimed, it becomes invisible, formatting our connectivity and interactions. For Agamben, too, language as a pure means is not the same as a means to an end. It is not an instrument to send a message, but a *means as such*. It is mediality, i.e. relationality. This is pure *communicability*, as a *being into language* (pp. 109-118).

The experience in question here does not have any objective content and cannot be formulated as a proposition referring to a state of things or to a historical situation.

It does not concern a *state* but an *event* of language; it does not pertain to this or that grammar but – so to speak – to the *factum loquendi* as such. Therefore, this experience must be constructed as an experiment concerning the matter itself of thought, that is, the power of thought (p. 116).

This is the matter of expression. Being into language suggests that we are willing to speak, willing to relate while knowing that we cannot communicate fully and clearly. It is the comprehension of incomprehension and the will to understand anyway. Language unfolds within the tension between comprehension and incomprehension.²⁰ It is a love affair, not for the sake of the perfect lover, but for the sake of the affair. How can love become an affair? How to experiment with the experience of uncertainties and the creativity of not knowing, like children just putting letters and words next to each other without order or purpose? I call this a *heterophasia* and *cacophonous silence* in which *the order* – of words, images and gestures as well as the relationality in-between these types of expression – is deterritorialized. *Heterophasia* is the enemy of grammar, not of expression. Minoritarian expression expresses the desire for relationality, instead of ideology or closed morality. It is a politics of the multiple senses, politics of ‘différance’ and intensities, beyond cruelty of the grammar. It is a politics that has not been already stifled by ‘obvious’ identities. It is energized by life itself.

There will be no unique name, even if it were the name of Being. And we must think this without *nostalgia*, that is, outside of the myth of a purely maternal or paternal language, a lost native country of thought. On the contrary, we must *affirm* this, in the sense in which Nietzsche puts affirmation into play, in a certain laughter and a certain step of the dance (Derrida, 1982, p. 27).

This is Agamben’s (1993^b) point on understanding the non-language or silence, as I explained above in chapter two (see: 2.3.2). Non-language does not appear because words are lacking in the representation of reality outside the language. Non-language is not the negation of language, but a field of forces that appears within language creating room for other approaches toward language. In line with Deleuze and Guattari (1987) we could state that politics of life is energized by another idea of expression, in which:

There is no language in itself, nor are there any linguistic universals, only a throng of dialects, patois, slangs, and specialized languages. There is no ideal speaker-listener, any more than there is a homogeneous linguistic community. ... There is no mother tongue, only a power takeover by a dominant language within a political multiplicity (p. 7).

Is such an idea of expression still possible in our mediatized age in which expressions are framed by Facebook? Although Arendt fears the worst in this age of communication, Agamben (2000) states that it is within this total age of pure communication that we could gain access to

²⁰ See also Derrida on translation and Babylonian confusion (McDonald, 1985, p. 125).

communicability. Communicability is not the negation of communication just as according to Deleuze and Guattari virtuality is not ontologically opposed to the actual. As Bell (2006) states: “the virtual enables the becoming-other of the actual” (p. 407). Communicability immanently “hinders communication” (Agamben, 2000, p. 115). Yet, this is an affirmative gesture. The peaking segmentation of communication, the immensity of its blocking force, creates the desire to break through solid segments, according to Agamben.

The age in which we are living, in fact, is also the age in which, for the first time, it becomes possible for human beings to experience their own linguistic essence – to experience, that is, not some language content or some true proposition, but the fact itself of speaking (p. 115).

Expression does not refer to a reality outside itself. Segmentation, grammar and clear communication are not outside of and do not negate expression. Grammar appears in language as *a* possibility instead of *the* possibility. Just as the moral constructions presuppose the multiplicity of ethics, grammar presupposes the multiplicity of expression, and not the other way around. Another prejudice concerns the idea that all human expression is language or could be contained by language. Given this prejudice, the plurality of human expression is reduced to one type of expression, namely language and in further processes to one form of language, meaning one form of grammar in which different expressions are reduced instead of supplementary to one another.

The lingual gesture is not only mere one form of communication, but in truth it rather lays down language in a non-communicative loneliness (Ten Bos, 2011, p. 153, Translation TR).

When Agamben (1993^a) states that the human “voice has never been written in language” (p. 9), he implies that in spite of the fact that grammar represents the idea of a Voice, it is only within the multiplicity of human expression that we experience voices. It is the multiplicity of voice that breaks through the dominancy of one form of expression, and one form of grammar.²¹ The *ethics of expression* within a politics of life presupposes next to this multiplicity of expression also the cacophony of silence, the probing intensity of the images and a disinterested connectivity of gesturality. It is the *epos of singular assemblages*.

²¹ Verbal communication is a small part of our communication. The tone of our voice and the way we communicate with our body are by far more important and affective. Nonetheless, when I speak of multiplicity of expression, I do mean something else than a form of differentiation in-between verbal and non-verbal communication. First, because this form of differentiation still presupposes transmission of data, and thus judges the communication by the amount of meaningful transmission, whether this is intended or not intended by the speaker. Second, the distinction is not in order to stimulate creation of expression, but rather to enforce opinion. Thatcher’s effort to manipulate her tone of voice was not for the sake of communicability but for the sake of transmission of her ideology. Third, often in these forms of distinctions different forms of expression are reduced to language. The term *body language* is in this sense exemplary.

6.4.2 *Celie's Blues: A Collective Body*

It is not only the idea of communication that has colonized expression for a long time. The idea of silence as non-language or non-expression, which I have discussed in the second chapter, has also functioned as an *essential* affect or sense. What blocks the process of expression is not the desire of communication or an idea such as expressionless silence, but the essentialization of one affect or sense – or in terms of Ahmed (2014) the emotions and interpretation of emotions of some people – above all other affects and senses – above the emotions of all other people. Expression always appears in multiplicity of affects and percepts, in ‘sensitizing’ multiplicity. Coming community thus can only appear and function within this multiplicity. Agamben (1993^a) states that the “first outcome of the *experimentum linguae*, therefore, is a radical revision of the very idea of Community” (p. 10); in Ahmed’s (2014) terms the very idea of politics. The expression of coming community can only be experimental if it does not limit itself to desire for completion, but remains in movement due to the desire of permanent learning. Pedagogy is not for the sake of finalization of knowledge and thus the achievement of an ideal state, even worse an idea of an ideal state for some people. Learn to express means learn to experiment in expression as well as in creating a community. A community that depends on the impotential paradigm of belonging: *belonging as such through difference-relationality*.

We could speak of a geological experimental community once expression is no longer segmented by history and limited to the idea of nationality and citizenship. It then emerges on a differentiated territory, escaping segmented processes. Let me once more sensitize this by showing how this is expressed in literature. This community of expression has been the main drive of Argentine-Chilean-American novelist Ariel Dorfman. As Jonathan Rollins (2009) suggests, Dorfman’s life could be characterized by *serial exile*. He affirms the sense of home by negating its segmentation within a national border. Home is something that happens in-between and through expression; “multiple overlapping communities ... overlapping spaces – that’s where home is” (p. 71). Rollins situates Dorfman in *(inter)textual communities*. Belonging to these communities means participation within expression, not as a particular language, but as a language of experiencing the sense of home in exile, to express beyond the idea of homesickness and typical forms of migration. Exile thus distances itself from nostalgia by surpassing the idea of a definable home or nationality. Dorfman’s expression thus is not only beyond an expression of majority but also far from a majoritarian minor expression that opposes the minor or migrant to that of definable majority. His language is an expression that moves beyond the binary idea of majority and minority. It is according to Dorfman “a language that doesn’t fit here and yet it fits elsewhere” (p. 72).

This is what Deleuze and Guattari (1986) call *minor literature*. Traits that give birth to minor literature, can be transposed to what we could call *minor expression*. This expression, as one might already guess, is not biased by crazy accents, funny words or blurry images. It is not the language of the exotic other, or a dialect. The expression, for instance in literature, is not the minor language as we conventionally understand it. It is not like speaking Kurdish within a Turkish or Dutch setting, Armenian within a Persian setting or Spanish in an American setting. It is not about a ‘typical’ minority. This language is rather a minor act within the construction or use of the so-called major language. It could be for example the use of German by a Turkish person within the German setting, but it could also be the schizophrenics’ use of language within everyday language. This use of

language, because of its *immanent* attack on the major language – unfolding an expressive milieu – but also on language as such, has been gifted with a “high coefficient of deterritorialization” (p. 16). The expression of singular assemblages has a rupturing power just by being possible and at the same time impossible due to its disconnection to the order of language. It is there, without being there as specific historical territory. *It is a crack*. It is a process. It is possible due to the visibility of its impossibilities. Deleuze and Guattari (1986) differentiate three impossibilities within this minoritarian expression (p. 16).

1. First, it appears in the impossibility *not to write*. These writers are aware of their minor use of language. They are affected by expression as such that formats and modulates them, while this expression simultaneously moves beyond their minority. Expression is not a choice. Screaming and facial gestures during torture and pain is probably the most known example. Expression affects and demands utterance. Expression is not of men, but men rather appear as expressive personae in the process. The first impossibility within the minor expression, however, always comes along with a second form of impossibility:
2. the impossibility *to write* in a major language. Minor expression deterritorializes the order of expression and the common binary sets. Thus, although it takes place within the major expression it becomes nonetheless another expression. These two forms of impossibility are then connected to a third form:
3. the impossibility to write in any other language. Dorfman cannot stop expressing something. And although he cannot express himself in the language of the order, he continues to use the major language. In order to break through the concept of strangeness, he must break through the same language that defines him as a stranger. It is the only form of expression that is able to create the rupture beyond the binary opposition of majority and minority. By *becoming a minor*, one loses his identity as *being* a majoritarian minority.

Summarized through the vocabulary of Deleuze and Guattari, we could state that minor expression implies: 1) impossibility of not-expressing; 2) impossibility of expressing within the order of major expression; and 3) impossibility of expressing in any other way than minor expression within the major expression. Deleuze and Guattari (1986) also firmly emphasize that these impossibilities within this deconstructive expression – the deterritorialization of language within language – is by *no* means a personal matter. From its birth, it is *immediately* political. This is not only due to the fact that it consequently breaks through the hierarchical boundaries. Minor expression is above all political because every drop of it, even the most individual and personal one, in its usage of the language, implicitly refers to a *collective* experience. This does not mean that it is a representation of an actual experience nor a specific statement that can be generalized. Neither does it refer to a substance of thought or ideology that has been agreed upon. Deleuze and Guattari argue instead that the act of this form of expression is in itself collective and thus the act of expression itself is political. What is called dialect and out-of-the-ordinary use of language does not belong to the domain of comedy or the so-called cultural apolitical assemblies, but to the domain of politics. Minor language is *deterritorializing* not of a person, but of *a collective* (pp. 17-18). It is the event of *becoming* a community, *a people*, and as such a political act. It is an expression of difference-relationality within politics of life.

The political domain has contaminated every statement (*énoncé*). ... It is literature that produces an active solidarity in spite of skepticism: and if the writer is in the margins or completely outside his or her fragile community, this situation allows the writer all the more the possibility to express another possible community and to forge the means for another consciousness and another sensibility (p. 17).

The *literary machine* of the minor language is a revolutionary machine, Deleuze and Guattari state, exactly because it is without ideology, without a message, yet nonetheless affirming a community. It is the pragmatic enunciation of something else, something that has been missed in the order of a collective, in an exclusive milieu, namely the minor minority as a *mi-lieu* in itself, independent of the binary code of majority versus minority. In minor literature, there is no cause and effect, there is no opposition but difference-relationality in-between the *subject of enunciation*, the subject that writes, and the *subject of statement*, the I that is written about. Expression in this community “*is the people’s concern*,” as Deleuze and Guattari suggest in line with Kafka, arguing thus: “*there are only collective assemblages of enunciation*” (p. 18). In this collective expression one subject is not isolated from the other. Not even in its solitude or isolated imitation in front of the mirror, as for example the bathroom scene in Peter Weir’s *The Truman Show* (1998). Truman imagines himself alone with his own fantasies and dreams. He talks to the mirror about another world, makes funny voices and faces, not knowing that his entire life is at that very moment broadcasted to a TV audience. Even solitude and counter positions are relationalities connected rhizomatically. In *Jews as Pariahs* Arendt (1978^a) speaks of dreams, which are in a certain sense the most private things in our lives that are shared among refugees. Although their content might not be the same, they share intensity; they share a sense of belonging (p. 57). Each singular expression, in its *singularity* assembles a world.

These forms of interconnected solitudes, a multitude counter positions and relationalities are the themes of Alice Walker’s *The Color Purple* (1982). The novel is written as a fictive autobiography of the orphan Celie, in a brilliant form of minor language, namely African-American. Celie has been sexually and physically abused by her father, who turns out to be her stepfather, and she is sold to her husband who continues the multiple abuses. Celie’s blues is perhaps the melancholy of the loneliest of affairs: the maltreated daughter without even having a father. Celie is a song of multiplicity of solitude, multiple isolation, and multiplicity of abandonment: an abused child, a neglected wife, a descendent of enslaved people, a raped virgin, a shy lesbian lover, a mother without her children, and an old woman with scars. And still she is more than this multiplicity of exclusion. Celie is a sister. More than abandoned she is a connection. She is not only the lover of her husband’s lover, but also his broken-hearted companion. She is an antagonist who breaks through the concept of antagonism. She is friend and enemy of the rebelling Sophia. She is not the African-American, but rather the American-African, her otherness is not from another continent but rather forced upon her in the political milieu in which she lives. She is all that one cannot accept in life and all that is more than our ordinary lives. Her expression is the language of minority, not merely by being a black woman, but because in her uprooting language, her solitude is the solitude of more than one collective. She is a political ambiguity, due to the fact that her desire for freedom does not limit itself to one form of group – people of color, women, lesbian, or secondary-citizen. She breaks through the multicultural segments

by engaging in multiple communities. Celie is not an identity but a milieu within the multiplicity of expression. The language of *The Color Purple* has a deterritorializing effect by being pure expression. It is not the ignorance of grammar, but a disregard for the authority of a regime of expression by a collective. At the end of the novel Celie as well as her repressive husband have both left the oppositional identity of abuse and the abuser. Her husband as a member of a so-called male majority becomes a minor.

This literature is, however, neither in search of a symbolic signification wherein the minorities' needs are represented in the major language, nor is it an exotic 'enrichment' of language and culture. What defines Celie's blues in Alice Walker's work – or according to Deleuze and Guattari (1986) Kafka and Beckett's writings – is *sobriety*. Celie's blues is gesturing of such sobriety. It is the simplicity of expression that endures and breaks through a regime that could not comprehend the immensity of their singular writings.

Arrive at a perfect and unformed expression, a materially intense expression. ...
The other [Beckett, TR] proceeds by dryness and sobriety, a willed poverty, pushing deterritorialization to such an extreme that nothing remains but intensities (p. 19).

Celie's language contains this sobriety. It is the frankness of the text that captures the reader. There is no story behind it. Walker's writing is in a sense the avant-garde of the contemporary world in which migration on *multi-temporal territorial levels* indicates much more than simplistic movement from A to B; from country of origin to country of arrival. The limbo is here and now. Although Deleuze and Guattari (1986) make a distinction between being a minor and becoming one, they still do emphasize the fact that in the present-day, migration has an enormous effect on the process of becoming a minority. Finding oneself distanced from one's own language however is according to them not only an issue for the immigrants or their children, but more so a problem of the majority. "How to become a nomad and an immigrant and a gypsy (Romani people TR) in relation to one's own language?" (p. 19). I would like to suggest that the question works out both ways. Within the process of migration both the so-called inhabitant and the so-called migrant need to find ways to become a minority. The relation and the communication with the so-called majority also deterritorialize the migrant's own mother tongue that once upon a time and space had been experienced as a major or majoritarian minor language. In a sense, the migrant must let go of its major tendencies or the desire to become a majority. The process of migration, which affects all subjects, does not only deterritorialize a specific major language or languages, but the concept of a major language as such. In the process of migration each subject must learn *to speak thin*, just as the Dutch poet Jan Arends (1974) once wrote:

I write poems as thin trees.
Who can talk so thin with language as I?
Maybe my father was ungenerous with the seed.
I have never known him, that man.
I have never heard a real word or it hurts.
You only need few words to write pain (pp. 32, Translation TR).

Consequently, this line of reasoning brings us to the next question: can literature be major at all? Is the act of writing not always a minor act? Deleuze and Guattari (1986) would argue that major literature is a literature in accordance with structures that are defined in binary sets of forms of content and forms of expression, and thus could be written by majority as well as majoritarian minority. Major language is ordered around the belief of a specific substance of expression in which form and matter are defined by regimes of expressions. There is a message that must be delivered, information that coherently passes from one subject to the other in accordance with a well-defined form of expression, or a lack of such coherency that must be criticized. Non-nostalgic minor literature on the other hand is in its revolutionary act rather an “*expression machine* capable of disorganizing its own forms” (p. 28). Minor literature is not without matter and form, but it instead exposes its formation while writing. And due to this con-textual ex-position, it challenges the idea of a universal formation. Furthermore, its formation is, due to its appreciation of transformability, open and experienced through multiple intensities. While major language is in search of a form to express its already present conceptualization or functionalization, minor literature lacks this form of organization. Minor language “begins by expressing itself and doesn’t conceptualize until afterward” (p. 28).

Minor literature as a political expression can never be based on an a-priori ideology. It is politics without identity. It is not about a perfect order or about this unique person who is going to save us. Celie is not the one who is going to save us; she is just *a collective body*. It is the collective that moves her. In this collectivity, there is no room for *mere* critique, *mere* rejection. Minor literature is revolutionary, affirmative and relational. There is no ego. It does not only break through segments, but it is creative in production of new forms of connection. The poverty of the language, the sobriety of minor expression is not a form of incorrect usage of the language or poor use of it because the author lacks knowledge of grammar and syntax. There is a difference between sloppy language and creative language. Sloppy language relates to major language due to exploring the lack of love for it. Minor expression is not uninterested but it is *disinterested*. Minor literature is beyond the conception of lack and the hierarchy that lies behind it due to its inter-ested attitude. It is a love *affair*. It is pure expression, unfolding another ethics. It is the frankness of life, the visibility of absurdity of an ordinary judgment. Even more, it is the *ethics of experimentation*.

To speak poorly is *a becoming*, an affective becoming within another sense and another percept. Celie’s blues moves in a different direction. She is in other words a narrative persona, an internarrative becoming, who does not own stories but is rather unfolded in the process; creating entrances, gateways that are not meant to be uncritically followed but to be politically engaged with. Within the idea of righteous paths this writing functions in decoding paths, in destructing lines. Minor expression is the act of ‘*mis*’-leading. While leading towards the correct path belongs to the main Entrance with a leader that leads, this expression alternates between new gateways. There are no unitary leaders or lonely heroes. This is the reason why minors do not need wise men or women telling them what to do. There is no supremacy. Expression in its minor use is the act of composition of sound, touch and visuality, all in one and all in opposite directions. It is the moment that heterophasia becomes something other than a pathology, it becomes the connective force to the ethical base that shrugs expression. Minority is an affective assemblage and the novel its political act. There is no minor Answer or minor Solution.

There are perhaps momentary minor answers, but there is always an insistent and pertinent question: how to become a minor? How to become *else*? How to experiment in expression without heroes and their meaningful grammar or gesture? Without Batman and the Joker, without King Arthur and Lancelot, there is only Morgan le Fay's desire to break free, or Percival's foolish desire for an adventure. But it is a Percival without a holy grail, and a lady of the lake without her Excalibur. It needs courage to make a fool of ourselves, becoming clowns; just to break through the logic of sane and insane, smart and stupid.

To speak poorly is a becoming, becoming within a sense, wherein *the tongue of the other* reminds philosophy of its inability to clarify the world, and philosophers remind the other how to enter the plane of communicability differently. To speak poorly is philosophy on a diet, a philosophy that is not enslaved by its past, but uses its age to enter the now here in different ways: a nomadic act. It is a politico-philosophy of thinking through the multiplicity by raising voices rather than a Voice. It is a nomadic philosophy on a plane of multiplying thought in order to create concepts to endure and express tensions and differences. A minor politico-philosopher experiments like Celie.

6.5 Whatever Life May Be ...

6.5.1 Political Singular Assemblage

How to become a minor? How to become else? Perhaps these questions are, given the line that we have set, not really smart questions. But stupidity was the goal anyhow. Perhaps the question is not how to become; but how to give in to it. We are already minors; we just imagine ourselves at the center of the world. Even our sun is merely a futile light in the immensity of the cosmos. And no, this is not a hazy spiritual remark, but simple physics. Thus, if minority is our state of being; if becoming is our natural state in body and mind – or as De Mul (2017) in line with Schiller presents the reality of our *tragic sublime* existence – than how do we implement such existential futility in our transcendental empiric image of thought? Can we think or imagine *equality in singularity through futility*? It is within this state of going through instead of beyond futility that defines the *sublime ethics* of coming community (form of content); the ethical impotential paradigms (form of expression) and the minor expressions (matter of expression). I know we are futile, yet I don't want us to die, perish and get silenced. Why? I don't know. I have never understood myself. Such desire has no why, it has no truthness. It is a decision, an unchosen choice; it is the natality of life, of being alive of a body that relates beyond me, myself and I.

Difference-relationality is our commonality, which could only be comprehended as a paradox if one clings to the binary settings within thought in which identity and difference are defined as opposites. As I have discussed in the first part of this study, difference does not only indicate multiple forms of disconnection but also implies multiple forms of connection. It is this multiplicity of disconnection and connection that gives rise to a commonality within difference. As Arendt (1958) states:

Plurality is the condition of human action because we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live (p. 8).

However, while Deleuze and Guattari find and search for this commonality in difference through every existing matter, Arendt speaks of a more focused form of shared difference. Difference for her refers to difference in-between the human subjects: interest. What connects humans is that each member of this so-called human society is a unique character. Combining Arendt's thought with Deleuze and Guattari's perspective we could state that each individual, or rather each *dividual* in Nietzsche's (1995, p. 59) words, is a singular open amalgamation in the rhizomatic web of narrativity. This *dividual* is immediately ethical. While *individual*, etymologically refers to that which cannot be divided; *dividual* is the one as a 'partage' in the words of Nancy. And from an ethical point of view, while individual opposes itself to others in order to create an isolated identity, dividual exists as a becoming, as a connective force.

Subject as a *dividu* indicates that, within the *texture* between men, no member can be a representative for another, a group, let alone a people. The idea of a person representing a group or a culture and characterizing those as bridge-builders refers to the axiomatic and segmentalizing paradigm of identity or in best-case identities. And although in the modern process of emancipation identity and representation were imperative to make the change to a new world, these paradigms nevertheless have become permanent and fossilized in a homogeneous identity, as Crenshaw (1991) argues. Their radiations anticipate the isolation of an individual from the multiplicity that gives rise to it, and that is immanent to the individual's being: inter-esse. Even the idea of *multiple identity* in one subject, despite its name, blocks the process of transformation within multiplicity. Such multiplicity pretends to treat a subject in its complexity, like a concept with multiple components. Yet, in this case the segmentation and axiomatic paradigms arise within and not in between individuals.

Let me clarify this by defining myself as a multiple identity. Tina Rahimy is an Iranian-Dutch, middle aged, 'highly' educated, female politico-philosopher. The multiple here is the introduction of multiculturalism within an individual. It introduces the idea of multiple cultural and political strata of a society within an individual, which next to common known cultures such as West-European and Middle-Eastern culture, also refers to an intellectual culture, an academic culture, sexual or generational culture. The relations between these cultures, its multiplicity, are nevertheless identified and homogenized within a whole. The segments remain well defined. A notion such as 'highly educated' already limits the individual within the borders of this identity. Philosophy, as has been argued above, is in itself already a highly diversified multiplicity. What do identifications such as Middle-Eastern, West-European, middle aged, highly educated, female and philosopher mean once we loosen the contours of the *dividual*?

A politics of difference requires the conceptual determination of difference and the specification of relevant kinds of difference, in an ontological, ethical or political sense. ... Deleuze's philosophy ... points to a defense of the particular against all forms of universalisation or representation: every time there is representation,

Deleuze suggests, there is always an ‘unrepresented singularity’ which does not recognise itself in the representant (Patton, 2000, p. 46).

The coming community is inspired by the idea of common heterogeneity and not the multiplicity of homogeneous paradigms of identity. *Dividual* instead of identity indicates that a person who is considered to be a female, Middle-Eastern or philosopher experiences this naming in such a multiple way, resisting this multiplicity to be reduced to general categories. A forced generality camouflages the multiple connections between a person identified as a Middle-Eastern, West-European, middle aged, female politico-philosopher and a person identified as Spanish-Japanese, young, male truck driver. An experience, such as femininity, is not even isolated to what we ordinarily understand as a female body. All this indicates that within the coming community neither the matter of expression can be molded by its form to one coherent discourse, nor the matter of content of this community can be sculpted by its form to an isolated assemblage of bodies, i.e. an organism. This is due to the fact that coming community’s matter of content is nothing other than *life itself*. Politics of life means a politics in which any seemingly self-contained thing is in transition.

Difference is not a trait of humans. It is *the* trait of life. What frustrates totalitarianism as well as multicultural segmentation is the *pariah* act of life. This does not indicate that there is life beyond politics, or secondary to politics. Life is rather the immanent force that breaks through all segments, despite our forced attempts to isolate and identify subjects. Politics, as a formation of community that deals with asymmetric relations emerging from life forces, differentiates itself due to its approach to *life*. In the most positive sense politics affirms the multiplicity of engagement in the unavoidable endurance of life. Integration is how we commune through life or struggle with its non-escapable effects. Arendt’s (1978^a) conscious pariah, due to its movement in thought and its vulnerability in comprehension, is ‘self’-conscious beyond majority or majoritarian minorities. Conscious pariah is the comprehension of the unavoidability of plurality of engagement within and through life. According to Agamben (2000) such politics, which is not aimed at the final actualization of identity, stresses the possibilities of life. It is aware of the necessity that within any political attitude what remains at stake is life itself. A politics of flight too affirms the multiplicity of political attitudes towards life and is thus not only occupied with migrants or refugees. A coming community advocates political life that permanently emancipates itself from biopolitics and moves beyond the binarity of sovereign and homo sacer. In this politico-philosophical approach *thought* is:

the nexus that constitutes the forms of life in an inseparable context as form-of-life.
... an *experimentum* that has as its object the potential character of life and of human intelligence. ... affected by one’s own receptiveness and experience in each and every thing (p. 9).

In this experience, which affirms the plurality of people, community and communication appear not as instruments for the sake of a goal but as pure means, as Arendt had already suggested in different terms. For both thinkers, this is the only way to practice politics. If language is not determined by the state assuming a clear common history, it will become an event, and as such a political experience.

“*Politics is the exhibition of a mediality*” (Agamben, 2000, pp. 116-117). In this line of reasoning community is the mediality of life itself, whether politics defines such a *right* or not. Here Agamben radicalizes Arendt’s statements on the concept of human rights. While Arendt never entirely rejects the *principle* of human rights, just its process and outcome, Agamben radically discards the whole existence of these rights. In his non-segregating political thought, having rights always assumes those who are entitled to have these rights versus those who are not. Coming community is the exhibition of life in which *form-of-life* is not defined through the axiomatic or differentiating paradigm of right-owning citizen.

And it is this thought, this form-of-life, that, abandoning naked life to ‘Man’ and to the ‘Citizen,’ who clothe it temporarily and represent it with their ‘rights,’ must become the guiding concept and the unitary center of the coming politics (p. 12).

Imagining a people within a coming community beyond the idea of citizenship implies an envisioning of *a people* who have escaped the binary setting of legality and illegality in which this notion due to its connection to the state has been imprisoned for a long time. In the third chapter ‘What Is a People?’ in *Means without End* Agamben (2000) elaborates on this binary setting by referring to a quote from Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address in 1863: *government of the people, by the people, for the people*. This phrase according to Agamben unfolds the *biopolitical fracture* in which the people as a governing force distinguishes itself from the excluded people, the poor people, the mob, the third world people. This fracture constitutes the oppositional state of homo sacer and Sovereign. It is the task of a coming community to deterritorialize this fracture by deterritorializing the fracture in which life and its form are separated (pp. 28-35). A people in this form-of-life neither governs, nor is governed. A people “who resist the regulation of the population, who try to elude the apparatus by which the population exists, is preserved, subsists, and subsists at an optimal level” (Foucault, 2007, p. 44). Coming community is a community of a people who dares to say:

We do not have, in fact, the slightest idea of what either a people or a language is (Agamben, 2000, p. 65).

Individuals in such a community thus do not engage in a process in which they manifest their identity once and for all, or gain freedom to fit into a society as an identity, but they instead unfold themselves continuously. As mentioned before, in Arendt’s words they are *whos* who engage in the process of appearing differently within the multiple space of inter-esse. Participation in this sense indicates the intensity of transformability within the unfolding politics of life. This unfolding being both an exposition and a transformation of appearance is thus not only multiple on the level of expression but also on the level of content. The singular assemblage is a discursive expression as well as a connective body. It is an expressive affective *connective body*.

Let me sensitize this thought, using a cinematic example. Kaige Chen *Bàwáng Bié Jī* (*Farewell My Concubine*) (1993) sensitizes its audience for multiple unfolding moments as well as for the *affects* of change in his characters. Chen’s images express the deterritorialization and reterritorialization of

identities in one and the same act. Cheng Dieyi is a boy with girlish face and gets sold by his poor mother to a theatre. In this milieu, in which female actors are absent, Cheng must compensate convincingly for the lack of this body. He must become, not simply a girl, but a woman, the concubine Douzi.

In this cinematic image Chen sensitizes how lingual as well as gestural images forcefully depart from the boy's body. The expression and content do not resemble one another. Cheng's disappearance and Douzi's appearance, however, are contrasted by Duan Xiaolou, the theatrical king Shitou, who is determined to maintain the separation between his theatrical self as a king and his worldly self as a gentle boy and a man who falls in love with beautiful Juxian and not with Douzi. While the twentieth century history of China unfolds itself in transformation into another political milieu, Douzi lacks political participation due to 'her' personal hatred for Juxian, the woman who steals her man. However, while the viewer dwells in the theatrical as well as worldly tragedy between Douzi and Shitou, it is Juxian who perceives the unexpected. When political terror and intensity demand a kingly act of Shitou, he betrays his wife and concubine in order to save his own life. It is within this setting that Juxian's unfolding subject is reflected in the flabbergasted face of Douzi, in which she performs the long awaited noble king who saves the concubine. It is Juxian's politically sober act that forces Douzi to experience her unavoidable political engagement within the community as well as to amalgamate all her personalities. Douzi kills her/himself thus as a man and a concubine on stage.

6.5.2 *Happiness of Life*

How do we define life within the milieu of flight? Is politics of flight solely a milieu of exile in which bodies are condemned to a commune-less life? Can we start thinking through multiple exiled bodies as paradigms without an identifiable milieu? Having come to my concluding statement, I cannot but suggest that these lines of thought miss something important in their approach. First, milieus, whether damned or not, do not include only one type of body nor do they unfold beyond the community. There is no body without community. Agamben's confrontational analysis already shows that an excluding milieu always is prepositioned within a system of law, a regime of expression and a form of community. Guantanamo Bay is never *over there*, the non-citizen state is never beyond the citizen. As science extrapolates a not yet rationalized chaos, art anticipates the invisibility in what it unveils, and the core of philosophy is the unknown, politics, in any setting it may define itself, always includes its apolitical outside, *an immanent outside*. Coming community's awareness is the comprehension that there is no such thing as a *pur sang* exclusive milieu. Second, bodies are assemblages, yet as assemblages they are not definable by an exilic or segmentalizing order. The assemblage is singular, not just because it refers to an individual but because it refers to becoming an individual. Bodies are porous matter, their organs are penetrated and transformed, permanently. Bodies are alive, *eventive assemblages*. As Pisters (2003) affirms, bodies testify of another ethics:

The power of the body is not just physical force ... This ethics consists of the attempt to create as many joyful encounters as possible, which will increase the power to act and to live intensively without harming others (pp. 85-86).

Bodies are more than biopolitical instruments. Imagining bodies merely as passive objects of politics is the problematic assumption in Arendt's (1958) thought. Although she criticizes Heidegger due to his preference for death as the defining moment of thought, and introduces natality instead of mortality within the realm of politics, this natality is nothing but life, an *eventive* beginning that belongs to the plurality of life, and that appears in the middle of life processes. Yet, she was so horrified by acts of the Nazi regime, the reduction of men to lifeless bodies and the final destruction of these bodies, that she fearsomely withdrew the body from the political arena and created a concept of a political milieu in which such exclusion became impossible: interest in public space. Natality is an implicit attempt to re-experience life within politics. What was and is problematic in totalitarianism as well as in biopolitics is not the *introduction* of life within the political thinking, but the *reduction* of life into limbic lives. The betrayal of life happens within politics when segments – total and multiple – dominate the lines of flight, when homogeneity camouflages the multiplicity of life. Criticizing Arendt I suggest that plurality is not a trait of humans that solely come to the fore when they politically engage themselves, but it is a characteristic of life as an essence-less process. It is not a political but first and for all an ontological fact. In a Deleuze and Guattari's perspective ontology and politics coincide. The excluded and murdered figure was not the body itself, but an *idea* of a political body: "What was technologized was not the body, but its image" (Agamben, 1993^b, p. 50).

In order to differentiate these multiple understandings of life within politics, as I discussed in the first part, Agamben (2000) introduces a trilogy: 'life', 'form of life' and 'form-of-life' (pp. 3-12). 'Life' or *zoē*, although multiple, is in science often reduced to the biological organism that strives to survive. When Arendt speaks of labor she refers to this necessity that reproduces life in all living beings within the same circular movement of eating, defecating, fornicating and dying. 'Form of life' is the formatting act in which human beings surpass this survival state of 'life'. It is the political life in which these living beings manufacture as well as create plural forms of community. 'Form of life' is *bios*, indicating a process of distancing oneself from the factuality of life by creating possibilities to choose forms of life beyond sheer survival. This artificial distinction in political thought is still present in contemporary thoughts on politics, but was already problematized by Karl Marx' introduction of the economic infrastructure of politics and by Foucault in his analysis of biopolitics. Inspired by this critical tradition Agamben shows how the distinction between life and its form creates spaces in which not only other forms of living beings but also humans are deprived of their liveliness. Homo Sacer is this immanent state of being – human and animal – where life (*zoē*) and forms of life (*bios*) are imagined *to be dissimilar*. This dissimilarity translates itself – as we have seen in the fourth and fifth chapter – into dissimilarity between form and matter in content and expression. In both forms of politics, the form creates lines of exclusion for the matter of content and matter of expression. While Homo Sacer is enforced to be a limbic live, the civic subject is imagined to be a lifeless ghost that can choose its form but remains without the content called life.

Agamben offers a third option: 'form-of-life'. Life as form remains in its non-exclusive state connected to life as substance. In its non-exclusiveness 'form-of-life' differentiates itself from biopolitics. Biopolitics defines life in order to isolate bodies within a segment of disciplinary power, or include these bodies by exclusion – no identity, sans papiers, secondhand citizen or illegals surviving

in public space – through the mechanisms of security and control. ‘Form-of-life’ includes the potentiality of life that is expressed in its multiplicity in a political assemblage called coming community. This expression has been labeled adequately by the Spinozian title of Deleuze’s (2011) very last text: *Immáence: a Life....* The actualization of thought within immanence of life affirms the virtual immensity of life. Each so-called actual life – human, animal, plant or aliens – is embedded in a virtual texture of flight lines that produces *differentiation* on a virtual level and *differenciation* on the actual level, as we have seen in the first chapter (see: 1.4.2).

Differenciation indicates that there are different types of formation of organism as well as comprehension of these organisms as closed or open forms. Simply put, there are different actual assemblages. The three layers that were present in the matter of expression are mutually present in the matter of content of a community. The first layer is the undifferentiated *earth*, or what by Deleuze and Guattari is called the ultimate body without organs. The second layer is the layer of differentiated organism such as humans, sheep, trees, etc. These organisms are still in connection to the earth that engenders these. They continue to be in line with the multiplicity that defines them. I imagine that the practice of Yoga was not discovered for the sake of finding one’s true identity or a monolithic idea of a self but to gain a cosmological physical connection between the second and first layer of life. The third layer is the process in which organism, specifically human organism, makes itself *essential* as well as placing itself above all other organisms in ‘the tree of life’.

The consequences of such ideas are more severe than one thinks, especially for the human species. Not only are the environmental elements and the animal world neglected in this hierarchy. It also has the fatal tendency to hierarchize: Some lives matter more than the rest. This was not only a characteristic of the Nazi-regime, but as we have seen it is also present in the discourse of enslavement and misogyny in the contemporary world. As Kimmerle (1994) shows, the philosophical thought of the European ‘*Enlightenment*’ itself, with its plea for *human rights*, is determined by the opposition of barbarism and civilization. These thoughts, presented in highly respected thinkers’ works such as those of Hegel and Kant, were even uninformed for their time. The analyses of African cultures, treating Africa as *homogenous*, *statistic* and *lawless*, define them as inferior and without history, hence without subjectivity. In their works Hegel and Kant justify enslavement of men, women and children. Kimmerle argues that their ideas are not even exceptional. Even Rousseau’s reversion of *the noble savage* does not challenge the prejudices about Africa (pp. 85-112). Philosophy thus needs to engage with its own political sense of exclusion. Politico-philosophy affirms the transcendental empiricism of politics of flight only through a sincere self-criticism. Philosophy becomes political by the engagement with minoritarian expression. Kimmerle therefor shows how contemporary African thinkers, like Appiah could engage with Hegel’s thought beyond his racism, appealing to the open-mindedness of these African thinkers in their engagement through different aspects in Hegel’s thought. Appiah and Olúwolé in this sense speaks as minor minoritarian by using the speech of the majority in order to break through a fixated regime of expression.

How does coming community overcome these dominant approaches? Are the members of this community loyal to the first layer, the *earth*? The first layer could never be experienced on a subjective level, due to the fact that such notions as individuation or even dividuation, subject and

organism are not present within this layer. In recognizing the immensity of earth, without having the pretense to comprehend, let alone manipulate it, the coming community's concern is rather to break through the solidified segments of the third layer in order to experience the potential openness of the second layer. Politics deals with the intensity between life and its form. Each milieu within a *politics of flight* – politics-of-exile, politics-of-segments or politics-of-life – expresses different approaches toward this intensity and differentiates types of relationality between life and its form.

The *dividuality* that appears in the eventiveness of life, the singularity that immanently belongs to this dividual being, can be compared in Agamben's (1993^b) words with *whatever being* (*quodlibet ens*). This *whatever*, despite the populist use of the notion – 'Whatever!' – does not indicate indifference. It instead signifies that life, whatever it may be, *matters as such*. It is a singularity that asks for recognition within the process of life and "is thus freed from the false dilemma that obliges knowledge to choose between ineffability of the individual and the intelligibility of the universal" (p. 1). Whatever is that which *belongs per se*, whether the structure of thought and political discourse define it as such or not. In contrast to Shakespeare, Arendt (1968), quoting Proust, reasons, "the question is not as for Hamlet, to be or not to be, but to belong or not to belong" (p. 84). Agamben refuses to answer both questions. There is no either-or. Neither being nor belonging has a negative. There is neither something beyond being, nor a possibility of not belonging. Whatever *whatever* may be, it belongs. The question of political integration as well as philosophical thought – in contrast to the multicultural definition of it – is not whether we belong or not, whether we choose to belong or not, but *how to belong*. As Appiah (2006) suggests, in our political thought "death isn't the only thing that matters. What matters is decent lives" (p. 167). Life teases, it laughs at us when we intend to forget about her. It is determination and voluntarism at the same time. It determines the fact of belonging but not the form of belonging.

Coming community's starting point is the virtual as well as actual viable assemblages of such belonging. Agamben's (1993^b) *whatever* is the experience of *love as such*, in which the love for that which belongs is neither defined by characteristics nor emerges as an object of possession (pp. 1-2). Whatever is an *example*, Agamben states, irreducible to a class, an identifiable group or a scientific category. Paradoxically it is this detachment that strengthens its connectivity. In the end identity, classes and collection are not forms of attachment, but forms of detachment. By calling oneself a white male, one cuts off the myriad expressive forms of connection that are virtually at hand to be actualized. *Example* on the other hand explores all connections, *whatever* they may be.

These pure singularities communicate only in the empty space of the example, without being tied by any common property, by any identity. They are expropriated of all identity, so as to appropriate belonging itself (pp. 10-11).

What remains problematic in the politics of totalitarianism and multiculturalism is the idea of *reparability* of being and belonging. Totalitarianism tends to *repair* the original or perfect state of being, the perfect state or identity. Multiculturalism aims to *repair* the state of belonging. Repair indicates lack, not enough, not good enough. When Agamben speaks of the *whatever* within coming community he speaks of *the Irreparable* (pp. 90-100). A being cannot be more or less, it cannot belong

more or less. Despite our approval or disapproval, happiness and unhappiness, Agamben's point remains that there is no hierarchy in being or belonging. Not only the whatever but the world itself cannot *not be* what it is, and as such it is thus *irreparable*.

The Irreparable is that things are just as they are, in this or that mode, consigned without remedy to their way of being. States of things are irreparable, whatever they may be: sad or happy, atrocious or blessed. How you are, how the world is – this is the Irreparable (p. 90).

Yet, irreparable does not indicate that whatever-being is absolute and defined. It is rather the permanency of transformation that defines this whatever. In order to repair something, we need to have an idea of an origin; toward which we repair things. Whatever being is this lack of essence; incapability to segment absolutely; thus the impotential force that makes things, people and a world change constantly. Being indicates permanent becoming something else. *To be* brings about a being that experiences its being as a permanent *becoming* in differentiated modes. Refugee or not, migrant or not, stateless or not, illegal or not, other or not, people of color or not, women or not, LGBTQQ or not, mad or not, ... *dividuality is not a choice*. So, get used to it.

A being that is never itself, but is only the existent. It is never existent, but it *is* the existent, completely and without refuge ... Without refuge and nonetheless safe – safe in its being irreparable (p. 100).

How does this irreparability relate to politics of flight? The jargon on refuge and migration is a jargon of reparation. The rightwing parties try to repair a society toward a homogenous morality, ethnicity, sexuality or raciality. The past is a one-dimensional time in which everything seems to be great and safe. Yet, other forms of politics are not far from an idea of reparation. Idealists, believing in communism, neoliberals believing in the free market, intend to repair a society towards its future image. A politics based on an ideal image of a society – whether progressing towards a past or a future – is always threatened by those people and those events that force them to change course. They force them to walk another path than that of the linear road of reparation. Politics of flight is thus not only about those who refuge or migrate; nor merely about those events and experiences that shock our intuitions and ideals. Politics of flight is a politics that through politics of life as political thinking creates an idea of refuge within idealist tendencies everywhere and anytime. Politics of life is a politics that *flees from* idealism, essentialism, universalism as well as disconnective relativism. This study never intended to say something about refugees. Refugees already know the sinister cost of dogmatism of ideas. This study intends to *circulate the observing eye*. A politico-philosopher who observes a refugee; but a refugee that challenges a politico-philosopher in her image of the world, justice and society. I am truly schizophrenic.

Let us return to the introduction where I cited Agamben (2000):

The refugee, formerly regarded as a marginal figure ... has become now the decisive factor of the modern nation-state by breaking the nexus between human being and citizen (p. x).

Agamben thus urges us to see that within the image of the other lies the fragility of the image toward ourselves. Our own humanity is *nowhere* at stake. Nowhere, we do not long for something in the past nor dream of a utopian future. See the whatever being nowhere and as irreparable. But does this plea for an acceptance of what there is? Is this a stoic propaganda? No. Politics of life is in absolute sense politics of resistance: resistance toward repression and exclusion. It is a politics that resist in order to create safety and security; not safety and security for merely some people, but safety and security for *all* life. We must not let the exclusionist be the sole owners of these values. It is due to this urgency to fight for safety that I connect to Arendt. Just as Arendt did not wish to banalize the cruelty of her time, I do not wish to justify, clarify or dignify the cruelty of my time. We both comprehend the necessity for change. Politics of life longs for change, change in order to include in a different way. In the final instance, it longs for *happiness*. It is not a politics that hopes to do it in a future, resenting the present by wishing it to resemble a time gone by. Politics of life is now, is changing now, acting now; living in difference now, sensing the *happiness* of difference-relationality now. Whatever being is here, not only in front of you, but also within your changing cells.

Happiness is what remains crucial for understanding Agamben's (1993^b) ethics and ontology. Happiness emerges in an understanding of being as becoming and irreparable. Agamben explores this idea in the notion *maneries*, which is neither essential nor universal, but rather singular. The *manner* in which *whatever being* experiences life is the manner in which this being experiences its connectivity within the *space of ease*, as a connectivity that changes constantly. Manner means a singular participation within the process, whether in life or within the coming community.

That manner is ethical that does not befall us and does not found us but engenders us. And this being engendered from one's own manner is the only happiness really possible for humans (p. 29).

Within this thought Agamben (1999^a) in the end combines Spinoza's idea of *conatus*, in which each being longs for its own way of being, with that of Marxism in which each subject is in need of engendering its manner of being, without the alienation of capital from this singular manner of being. The way of being, however, is not realizing one's true identity or giving in to one's essential characteristics. Being here does not indicate permanency but rather multiple becomings due to its potentiality *not-to-be* that what it ought to be. Not to give in to the actuality and "*to be capable of one's own impotentiality*" (p. 183). This is what Agamben (1993^b) indicates with the concept happiness when he refers to a being and states: "*Whatever is a resemblance without archetype – in other words, an Idea*" (p. 48).

This *idea* is neither a platonic reference to some transcendent essence nor does it refer to any opposition between thought and affect. Whatever is an experimental experience in which affect and thought affectuate a process. Within this process whatever endures all the possibilities and non-

possibilities that define its course and its singular state of being or becoming. That, which lies beside it, on the threshold on which it changes and multiplies, shapes its state. According to Agamben (1993^b), “*whatever, in this sense, is the event of an outside*” (p. 67). This event of an outside is a passage, within the experience of a limit instead of the factuality of a visible border. The outside is still a part of. It is *partage* that creates the sharing in difference (Nancy & Ten Kate, 2011). It is within this immanent limit that life and form, body and politics amalgamate, indistinctively. It is within this immanency that whatever-being experiences a *belonging as such*, a politics in which neither formation of the body nor reduction of life but, as Agamben (2000) often argues, happiness as such is at stake.

The ‘happy life’ on which political philosophy should be founded thus cannot be either the naked life that sovereignty posits as a presupposition so as to turn it into its own subject or the impenetrable extraneity of science and of modern biopolitics that everybody today tries in vain to sacralize. This ‘happy life’ should be, rather, an absolutely profane ‘sufficient life’ that has reached the perfection of its own power and its own communicability – a life over which sovereignty and right no longer have any hold (pp. 114-115).

Coming community creates *a people*, an irreparable people, a people that does not need to adjust on the norm and the will of majority. A cynic would say that it is a politics where pedophiles and abusers can beat their spouse and abuse their children. Let us not comfort the cynic, but let them fear more. They are so naïve still in thinking that these types of abusers are not the majority. Not only in numbers, but also in their attitude, they define other lives through their own. Minoritarian minority despises those who sacrifice another life for the sake of their own. Their happiness and sense of security is always seriously inclusive, related, connected, and not narcissistic. Minoritarian minorities are a people – a we – to come, the living beings that care. Are we naïve? We really don’t care. Are we dreamy? Well our answer will be: open your eyes and see. We have spoken to them all over the place, we have met them in the middle of a warzones, we have whispered with them in the heart of totalitarian horror. We are neither invisible nor countable. Statistics never see the margins, but we are in the corner of your eyes. We believe in life itself, not in an idea how life should be. Coming community’s credo, its verb, its question and action, is to believe independently, without metaphysics, without order. *To believe* in life instead of order means to care, to love the desire itself as “the lover’s particular fetishism” (Agamben, 1993^b, p. 2). The question of philosophy always is: how to live a good life? I’ve been limbic life, I know how to survive, I have been reduced and cursed by many multicultural segments, and I have a love for the worlds of coming communities. Yet, after all these sentences I still do not know:

How to impotentially live a life?

Recapitulation: How to Leave?

Life promised me nothing other
 than her endless modalities,
 And I wrote and wrote about it,
 Until I forgot her promise.

With the current state of affairs of refugees in mind, there is no doubt that a reflection on the notion of flight is even more urgent than 11 years ago, the starting point of this research. In all those years a dilemma remained. Is philosophy an answer or an adequate discipline in order to expose the political reality of today? Do my philosophical considerations not unnecessarily abstract problems? Am I not wasting my time on words instead of helping to reduce the urgent needs for food, shelter and security?

This dilemma was not something that was posed to me by others. Mentioning it now, is not meant to convince the reader of something. This dilemma was given to me, endured by me, during these last years. How do I experience a kind of ease with the intersection of two important phenomena in my life: *refuge* and *philosophy*?

The manner of intersection, in-between these two phenomena, was not easy to identify. Each day it changed its face; each day it confronted me with another affect. Emotions crawled into one another: anger, bitterness, despair, empowerment, happiness, sorrow, joy, madness, disgust, frustration, and the will to resist. Refuge, no matter how long ago it was experienced, has affected this body on a cellular level. It is in my bones. And although each day I experience this cellular reality on another level, it is a reality that I neither can escape nor deny. Refuge is my physical space of uneasiness. And perhaps the only comfort that I could find, was a way of thinking that did not refute this uneasiness; but rather affirmed it, gave words to it. As crazy as it sounds, I never wanted to surpass my trauma. I never wanted it to be treated. I needed a voice, words, gestures and images to affirm its existence. The trauma must remain, the sorrow must not be forgotten, that is my responsibility; that is my empowerment; that is what I owe to those who I left behind. The place of ease was not a choice in-between one of these conflicting emotions; but rather the experience of it at the same time. So, it was not only refuge or philosophy separately that gave me something. The intersection itself, the battle and the love affair in-between them, finally gave me the courage to write these final words.

The ideas of philosophy and refuge are not unfamiliar toward one another. Flight, not only as a double binding act of departure and arrival but also as a form of resistance to a sedentary life, is a recurring notion in the philosophical tradition. Among those who inspired philosophers, are not only iconic ancient Greek figures such as Icarus who flees in order to escape captivity; Oedipus, the banned infant, who departs from his fatherland for the second time in shame; and father of Antigone who refused to follow the rules of Creon. Philosophers were not only inspired by such figures but they themselves often became forced travellers. Karl Marx was driven from country to country while revolutionizing the political discourse of his time. Hannah Arendt, Walter Benjamin, Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse escaped towards a state of statelessness and even death in order to avoid being murdered in the gas chambers. And nowadays Tariq Ramadan, former distinguished professor at the Erasmus University Rotterdam, endures living in multiple exiles.

The examples are countless. Nevertheless, in this study I have wondered how this so-called basic practical act of fleeing relates to abstract thought. Flight is a practice in which the sustainment of life or form of life takes precedence over all other activities. Flight often tends to be categorized as an extremely private act and also to some degree as a self-interested operation. Is flight therefore a means to an end? Is it a personal f(l)ight for the sake of survival? Is it a mere endurance of an experience, *praxis without theory*? Did these displaced philosophers disconnect from their personal experience in their thought? What did they have in mind while fleeing? Does the experience of flight become a source of embodied knowledge *within* the philosophical tradition?

For some philosophers such as Arendt (1994) a connection between a politics of flight and the tradition of philosophy remained problematic.

I have said good-bye to philosophy once and for all. As you know, I studied philosophy, but that does not mean that I stayed with it (p. 2).

Arendt's remarks don't merely affect me on an intellectual level, but also on a personal level. Despite the many disagreements that we have on the level of philosophy, politics and the place of the body within politico-philosophical thinking, she is more than any other philosopher in this study, not only my companion in thought, but also in an attitude towards life, a political life. Her choice to distance herself from philosophy was not merely intellectual, but more so on an affective level. The thing that breaks you the most, the thing that makes life unbearable the most in a totalitarian state of being, is not the enemy. As Judith Herzberg once said, *enemies never come so deep*. What breaks you the most is the betrayal, of friends; of those you respected and loved. Philosophers, those who inspired her the most, were also the ones who remained silence, or even worse collaborated with those who enforced her people in exile and to death. Remaining loyal to such friends is an impossible task. And although she revisited her old teacher, Martin Heidegger, only a simplistic vision on her biography can conclude that she simply forgot and forgave the betrayal.

Yet, at the end of her life, something made her to look back, to relive her old love for philosophy. Perhaps the wisdom of her old age made her care more for those friends – such as Karl Jaspers – who refused to betray her, despite the consequences. The history of philosophy is perhaps full of those philosophers that segmentalized ideas on life and thought; but it is also full of those thinkers who have

resisted a segmentalized thinking. Philosophy eventually also gave rise to words of men and women who resisted the rigid regimes of expressions. Jaspers was a friend in thought for Arendt; Agamben, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, Ahmed and Olúwolé are friends in thought for me. No matter how deep the betrayal goes; you are never alone in challenging rigidity.

Thus, there is something in philosophy that creates room for difference. It is not its history, but its act of questioning; its desire to create breakpoints in thought. And perhaps, at the end of her life, in her experience of *liveliness of the mind*, Arendt finally distance herself enough from those cowardly philosophers in order to make a distinction in-between the philosopher and the philosophical approach. Arendt returned and I never was able to leave. A philosophical approach is not something that we only learn at the university, but something that we experienced with our bones. Philosophy became the place of queries, the place of doubts, a place that we loved, due to the fact that we both know how catastrophic the place of certainty is.

It is through her, that every moment of lonely despair in this study, was always accompanied by the stubbornness to fight. We will not surpass our sorrows, yet we both refused to define politics as simple politics of exile, or a politics of segment in which we would isolate ourselves from those others that differ from us, yet suffer. And although we imagine it differently, in different times, in different places, through different internarratives and interwars, we found something in philosophy that made us want to imagine a different form of community, a different form of political existence and relationality.

What does this desire to remember the trauma as well as imagine something different mean for this investigation? Although I have written many pages, confide different thinkers and sources, and childishly hoped for an academic degree, I have to conclude that a politico-philosophical approach is not simply gained in the academic world or through accumulation of knowledge. Politico-philosophy is more than anything – if it is true to its endless love for wisdom instead of to its teleological affection for knowledge – a matter of *attitude*. It demands a certain yielding to something beyond one's individuality; not by forgetting or distancing oneself from the personal, but by sensitizing the manner in which the so-called personal is interwoven with something that surpasses any form of individuality. Such sensitization is in need of imagination, not because it is less real, but because its reality cannot be comprehended by our limited perspectives. A politico-philosophical attitude testifies not of arrogance, but of stubbornness in humility. It is not soft, but radical, radical in the implementation of the complexity. *It is radical nuanced differentiation.*

At the end, I did not surpass my dilemma. Giving in to the dilemmatic state of politics of flight and a politico-philosophical approach is my way of relating to its *terra ethica* of the reality of difference-relationality. I did not calculate my way out. I did not find myself, because there was nothing to find, neither here, nor there. The political expression of this life, as any other, leaves no option than a *dividual* existence. We are not the other; we are the everlasting changing assemblage of endless connections of this world. Responsibility is not to enforce clarity of communication but through a sense of communicability in politics of life embraces the relationality of the ability of expression: the responsibility of being open to *difference as such*. It is not giving in to the order of the Voice, the

virtuous dogma, but a silence in which a cacophony of voices is immanent; in which multiplicity of expression – words, gestures, images – is given. Welcome to the madness of heterophasia that no grammar in a dissertation can capture. The experiment of expression, beyond the fancy vocabulary of this philosophical experiment; where sobriety of images, gestures and words become supplementary to the *breath of life, a life; form-of-life*.

A life, *whatever* it may be; a politics of life. Imagine that: we are, just as the wasp zooming around us in search of an orchid, whatever beings, irreparable beings. Stop *fixing* us. Stop defining us, defining you and I. We are *eventive assemblages*. We are assemblages of ideas, air and water that flow through our veins. I am not your exotic other, I am not your objective enemy, whether you like it or not; whether you find me smart or devastatingly stupid; I, just as you, *belong as such*. Inclusion was never a matter of choice; it was never a matter of policy. The decision was made long ago; it was an earthly reality. It is the spirituality of simple physics. Whether I am abstract ‘or’ concrete, theory was never without practice. Welcome to the experience of politico-philosophy. There is the hyphen where my happiness lies. The crisis was never there. That is what the eyes of the refugees – the abandoned lives in the refugee camps – are telling us. The crisis is here; the outside is immanent. See the meat that we consume, feel the cheap clothes that cover our body, and look at the bankcard entering the machine. And now experience the despair of the enslaved laborer, the fear of victims of war with weapons that your bank has paid for. Feel the thirst in the dry lands that individuals flee from. Just a couple of seconds in the history of earth and she will become her sister: Venus. It is time to be brave, take a risk, and look one more time in the gaze of Nahid. The repetition of difference. It is time to embrace our existential crisis. Walk through it. Gone with Margret Thatcher alike. There Is No Alternative than difference-relationality. We are already within the rhizome. It is neither a matter of staying or leaving. It matters *as such*. The question is:

How do I start in the middle again?

Politics of Flight – English Summary

A Philosophical Refuge

The notion *refugee-crisis* sensitizes discomfort: the state of exception in which the fleeing individual finds him/herself, a condition that is habitually imagined via media every day. Crowded refugee camps are a day-to-day reality that we know of, yet cannot comprehend. Even individuals who volunteer to travel to these camps, despite their thorough investigation in advance, come away perplexed. They can hardly find the words for their experiences. A colleague – Anne Kooiman – after returning from Lesbos whispers: *I can utter nothing else but silence. How could this so casually happen?* The evoked discomfort within this crisis does not only arise from the forced marginalized existence of the refugee, or the fear Europeans have for the stranger. For Anne, the inconvenience also resides within the dissimilarity in-between the everyday self-evident inhuman condition of life in refugee camps and the comfort of life in the Western world. Anne's silence is saturated by shame. *And here I am, in my safe harbor.* She feels the discomfort of her nationality. When I asked her if she regretted her trip, she decisively said no. She rather experiences this distress instead of the convenience of denial.

This discomfort is deprived from a discourse. The current European political discourse, which makes a self-explanatory link in-between the two words *refugee* and *crisis*, defines this crisis as a self-evident feature of the other, as a state that happens to Europe. The deconstruction of this assumption is elementary in this research into a *politics of flight*. This is not a study of a politics *about* refugees. Already in my introduction, I suggest that neither refugees nor social workers such as Anne need an academic analysis in order to realize that more than 60 million people on this earth fall disenfranchised in-between the cracks. Their marginal existence within a political limbo cannot be expressed in a linear research with an introduction, conclusion and summary. Politics of flight – in which the discomfort is rather endured instead of evaded – attempts to map out a discourse for the uneasiness. In this endeavor, the perspective is reversed. The analysis does not depart from here to there, but redirects from there toward here by reflecting on our politically privileged way of life. The so-called crisis of elsewhere is immanent to the European history. Politics of flight shows itself by unraveling the complexity of political global webs.

The confrontation with the discomfort of the crisis and the disentanglement of political existence are not only experienced daily. They have also been passed on worldwide in the initiation into the philosophical thinking. Philosophy, as a practice of questioning the most self-evident matters – as Cornelius Verhoeven defines it – does not only problematize the answers but also critically scrutinizes the construction of questioning itself. The fundamental assumptions within the manner of formulating

questions and the uncritical use of concepts create the framework of our ideas on society and they define our attitude toward others. Before we can answer the question "What should we do about the refugee crisis?", the philosophical practice of questioning challenges us to evaluate our definitions of the term *refugee-crisis* as well as the self-explanatory link in-between the two notions: *refugee* and *crisis*.

Philosophy does not only involve critical thinking about the world and thinking, but demonstrates itself especially as a reflection that constantly questions its own manner of thinking. The oeuvre of four thinkers – Hannah Arendt (1906-1975), Giorgio Agamben (1942), Félix Guattari (1930-1992) and Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) – has been an inspiration in the interest of mapping out this radical self-examination of philosophy in relation to the world and to its own thinking. These four philosophers do not only question the framework of thought; but also the manner in which philosophy relates to political reality. Each of these thinkers has, in his or her way, confined the link between politics and philosophy as a politico-philosophy. This affirmation – in which politico-philosophy is not a sub-discipline but rather determines the essence of philosophy – confirms the fundamental attitude of this research. It is a critical affirmation in which the researcher draws connective lines in-between the discomfort of flight; the crisis of social thinking; and the philosophical stamina to endure existential crises. It is within this relationality that a discourse *of* discomfort instead of a discourse *about* discomfort can be mapped out.

Part I of this study is an exploration of a vocabulary; it is in search of a language in order to initiate this discourse. The first chapter, in which an approach toward flight is explored, begins with an analysis of the idea of methodology. The liaison between the crisis experienced by refugees and world politics displays flight as an event that cannot be unambiguously explained by a single method. Second, throughout a critical attitude toward legal, political and psychological identification of refugees, it is here argued that refugees are not definable as and by an unambiguous identity. Refugees are not a particular type of people, but an indefinable multiplicity of people. Despite the fact that their lives have been influenced and identified by the macro-political reality, each of them lives an exceptional life. The homogenization of millions of people as one and the same is perhaps the first injustice being committed to them. To chart this injustice while maintaining the global nature of the problem, a politics of flight cannot be limited by evaluating one subject: The Refugee. Indeed, the crisis does not only concern the other. In terms of Arendt, it creates an intersubjective political reality that sheds light on how we can relate to the discomfort of the crisis. This chapter distances itself from the simple opposition between myself and the other. In the words of Deleuze and Guattari, people are rizomatically linked in infinite ways.

In the second chapter a few exclusive oppositional ideas will be problematized. First, there is no conflict between theory and practice with regard to the discourse of politics of flight. The analysis of this politics cannot be found in an "ivory tower" setting, but forms an immanent practice in which the thinker is immediately involved. Second, it is argued that this research does not intend to give a non-connective and objective description of the condition of the other. In line with the above-mentioned thinkers, it will be stated that, beyond the opposition in-between difference and identity,

difference is relational at all times. The analysis in this study is not about an objective analysis with universal claims about the nature of mankind, but neither will it be an exoticizing description of a subjective perception of the other. This philosophical exegesis is an affirmation of thought in which differences are supplementary to the relational responsibility of each subject with respect to this political crisis. This responsibility demands that the cacophonous silence of the refugee camps be given a hearing. This silence does not indicate that it is quiet on the other side of the spectrum; but that the hearing on this side of the world must open itself to the discordant sounds elsewhere.

This opening up of the ears for the cacophony as a deafening silence not only asks for a political analysis of the crisis and the discomfort, but also puts forward the question: “What is meant by the term *politics*?” and “What does politics mean in the construction *politics* of flight?”. The third chapter is an extensive exploration of the complexity of this question. Although politics relates to philosophical concepts and in its policies makes use of scientific observations; in this chapter it is argued that political practices have their own dynamic that cannot be unambiguously understood through philosophical and scientific analysis. The dynamic of politics is according to Agamben *paradigmatic*. According to this thinker political paradigms bring a reality to the fore out of the political frameworks that cannot themselves be explained through this reality. Security and integration are such paradigmatic notions. Although, they create policies such as safety measures and integration courses, they cannot be legitimized by these practices. In order to expose this aporitic multiplicity within a politics of flight; I portray in this chapter several types of paradigms and different types of political practices that are at work in the so-called refugee crisis. I make a distinction between *the politics of exile*, *the politics of segments* and *the politics of life*, each of which is dealt with respectively in the three chapters of the second part.

After mapping out the necessary discursive tools in part one, in which additionally the contours of a different discourse is presented, I differentiate in part two the paradigms according to these three types of politics. In chapter four – where *the politics of exile* is laid out – axiomatic paradigms are crucial. In their effects these paradigms enforce oppositional territories and subjects: here versus there, country of origin versus country of arrival, us versus them. In this chapter, I show the pretensions of this politics to address exclusive dualities while extinguishing every form of difference. The consequences of this xenophobic exilic trait do not only touch the so-called stranger from elsewhere. Even within a society these paradigms draw lines and create *here* antipathies through which the citizenship of certain population groups is permanently in question. The moment that the fleeing individual is no longer characterized as a passive victim; their desperate situation becomes a demand for a different kind of politics.

In chapter five the question whether multicultural society offers an answer is examined. Multiculturalism attempts to break through the destructive tendencies of politics of exile by not approaching the difference in-between individuals in an exclusive oppositional manner. Multiculturalism distances itself from the idea of an ultimate duality between the *one* here and the *other* there, through which the multiplicity of visions and plurality of communities is tolerated. Yet, within the use of notions such as ‘allochthones’ and ‘people with migratory background’ axiomatic paradigms remain in force. Although, it does not divide the world in a simple *here* versus *there*, or *we* versus *them*; still the thinking in identities persists in this politics by multiplying the segments: social,

economic, racial, sexual, cultural and meritocratic. Therefore in this chapter *a politics of segments* will be explored. The paradigms that shape these segments are not axiomatic but rather differential. With the aid of Deleuze, I distinguish between differential and differential. The idea of differential is not in the interest of respecting difference as such, but it refers to differences produced in politics via policies. Differential on the other hand refers to differences that cannot be reduced to identifiable categories. This is why Deleuze speaks of *virtual* differences, not because these are fictional or unreal, but because the reality of such a difference surpasses our *actual* framework of thinking managed by policy – i.e. differential. The politics of segments identifies communities as minorities. Paradigms such as safety and integration and crisis become because of this logic an identity trait of certain communities. The discomfort is externalized.

The discourse that has this discomfort at its core stresses a deconstruction of political vision that segmentalizes the world and individuals permanently. In the sixth chapter – in which I sketch a *politics of life* – is an ode to a *coming community* that affirms the unpredictability of life and temporary condition of all forms of identity. This politics affective-ontologically fortifies difference and ethical relational responsibility. By means of a critical self-evaluation such a politics en‘forces’ self-practices that are inspired by engagement, involvement, and inter-esse; which, in principle, stand open for the impact of singular life. This politico-philosophical self-criticism demands another language and another image than the one that modern thought has produced. Due to its rhizomatic approach, it breaks through the academic disciplinary – thus disciplining – limitations. So are the contemporary art-practices, in which literature, cinema and visual arts strengthen one another, more capable of making the affective dimension of cacophonous silence to be heard. Inspired by Agamben, I speak of impotential paradigms. This paradigmatic dynamic invalidates progressive-linear realizations such as: from potential to the actual, from imperfection to perfection. It fortifies the inspiration of the virtual that is lacking in the differential paradigms of multiculturalism. A politics of life based on a radical affirmation of differential difference resists the assumption of ‘our’ refugee crisis. In this politics it is no longer the case of belonging or not belonging. It acts beyond inclusion and exclusion. *Life, whatever it may be, is: to belong.* To be is by definition relational: *inter-esse*. A politics of life refines the contours of this other discourse on community and commonness. This closing chapter is an ode to singular lives, whatever that may be.

Politiek van het vluchten – Nederlandse samenvatting

Een filosofische toevlucht

Het begrip *vluchtelingen* spreekt over het moment van ongemak, de uitzonderlijke staat waar het vluchtende individu zich in bevindt, een toestand die elke dag weer routinematig mediaal verbeeld wordt. Overvolle vluchtelingenkampen zijn een dagelijkse realiteit die we kennen, maar niet begrijpen. Zelfs mensen die vrijwillig afreizen naar deze kampen keren, ondanks hun grondige onderzoek vooraf, perplex terug. Hun ervaringen kunnen ze moeilijk verwoorden. Een collega – Anne Kooiman – vertelde na haar terugkomst van Lesbos: *ik kan niets anders uiten dan stilte. Hoe kan dit zó gewoon gebeuren?* Het ongemak dat deze crisis oproept, komt niet alleen voort uit het gedwongen gemarginaliseerde bestaan van de vluchteling, of uit de angst van Europeanen voor de vreemdeling. Het ongemak ligt voor Anne ook in het contrast tussen de alledaagse vanzelfsprekendheid van de onmenselijke toestand waarin vluchtelingen leven en het comfort van het leven in de westerse wereld. Annes stilte is vervuld van schaamte. *En hier zit ik dan, in mijn veilige haven.* Zij voelt het ongemak van haar nationaliteit. Toen ik haar vroeg of ze spijt van haar reis had, zei ze resoluut *nee*. Ze ervaart liever dit ongemak dan het gemak van de ontkenning.

Dit ongemak ontbeert een discours. Het huidige Europese politieke discours dat een vanzelfsprekende koppeling maakt tussen de twee woorden *vluchteling* en *crisis*, definieert deze crisis als een vanzelfsprekend kenmerk van de ander, als een toestand die Europa overkomt. De ontkrachting van deze aanname staat centraal in dit onderzoek naar de *politiek van het vluchten*. Dit is geen analyse van een politiek *over* vluchtelingen. Ik stel in mijn inleiding dat vluchtelingen noch betrokken hulpverleners als Anne een academische analyse nodig hebben om te beseffen dat meer dan 60 miljoen mensen rechteloos op deze aardbol schip noch wal kunnen bereiken. Hun marginale bestaan in een politiek limbo is niet te duiden in een lineair onderzoek met een inleiding, conclusie en samenvatting. Politiek van het vluchten – waarin het ongemak niet vermeden maar aangegaan wordt – tracht een discours voor het ongemak in kaart te brengen. In deze poging wordt het perspectief omgekeerd. De analyse vertrekt niet van hier naar daar, maar denkt ook van daar naar hier over onze politiek geprivilegieerde bestaanswijze. De crisis die aan iets elders verweten wordt, is immanent aan de Europese geschiedenis. Politiek van het vluchten toont zich in de ontrafeling van de complexiteit van politiek wereldwijde webben.

De confrontatie met het ongemak van de crisis en de ontrafeling van het politieke bestaan worden niet alleen dagelijkse ervaren, maar zijn ook al eeuwenlang in verschillende delen van de wereld doorgegeven in de initiatieriten van de filosofische denkwijze. Filosofie, als een praktijk van vragen stellen over het meest vanzelfsprekende – zoals Cornelius Verhoeven het aanduidt – is niet louter om

antwoorden ter discussie te stellen maar ook om de gestelde vragen kritisch te ontleden. Juist in de wijze waarop we vragen stellen en in het onkritische gebruik van begrippen liggen fundamentele aannames die onze ideeën over samenleving en de relatie tot het vreemde vormgeven. Voordat we de vraag “wat moeten we doen aan de vluchtelingencrisis?” kunnen beantwoorden, daagt de filosofische praktijk van het vragenstellen ons uit om na te denken over wat we aanduiden met het begrip *vluchtelingen-crisis* en met de relatie die we vanzelfsprekend leggen tussen de twee begrippen *vluchteling* en *crisis*.

Filosofie behelst niet alleen kritisch denken over de wereld en het denken, maar vooral een denken dat permanent zichzelf bevreemdt. Het oeuvre van vier denkers – Hannah Arendt (1906-1975), Giorgio Agamben (1942), Félix Guattari (1930-1992) en Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) – heeft als inspiratie gediend om deze radicale zelfdoordenking van filosofie in relatie tot de wereld en tot haar eigen denken in kaart te brengen. Deze vier filosofen bevragen niet alleen de wijze waarop we denken; maar ook de wijze waarop filosofie zich verhoudt tot de politieke werkelijkheid. Ieder van deze denkers heeft, op haar of zijn eigen manier, het koppelteken tussen politiek en filosofie als politico-filosofie geaffirmeerd. Deze affirmatie – waarin politieke filosofie niet een sub-discipline is maar eerder het wezen van de filosofie bepaalt – bevestigt de grondhouding van dit onderzoek. Het is een kritische affirmatie waarin de onderzoeker het ongemak van het vluchten, de crisis van het maatschappelijke denken en het filosofische uithoudingsvermogen om existentiële crises te doorstaan aan elkaar relateert. Het is in deze verweving dat een discours *van* het ongemak in plaats van *over* het ongemak in kaart gebracht kan worden.

Deel I van dit onderzoek is een uiteenzetting van een vocabulaire; een zoektocht naar een taal van waaruit dit discours geïnitieerd kan worden. Het eerste hoofdstuk dat een exposé van een benaderingswijze – approach – is, begint met een analyse van het begrip methodiek. De relatie tussen de crisis die vluchtelingen meemaken en de wereldpolitiek toont dat vluchten een *gebeurtenis* is die niet eenduidig te verklaren is met behulp van enkelvoudige methodieken. Vervolgens wordt, in een kritische verhouding tot juridische, politieke en psychologische identificatie van vluchtelingen, beargumenteerd dat vluchtelingen niet te vatten zijn als en in een eenduidige identiteit. Vluchtelingen zijn niet een bepaald menstype, maar een ondoorgrondelijk veelheid van mensen, die ieder – ondanks dat hun leven beïnvloedt en geïdentificeerd wordt door de macropolitieke realiteit – een uitzonderlijk leven hebben. Het homogeniseren van miljoenen mensen onder één nummer als een totaliteit is misschien het eerste onrecht dat ze wordt aangedaan. Om dit onrecht in kaart te brengen met behoud van het globale karakter van de problematiek, kan een politiek van het vluchten zich niet beperken door te spreken over één subject: De Vluchteling. De crisis betreft namelijk nooit alleen de ander, maar creëert in termen van Arendt een intersubjectieve politieke werkelijkheid die een andere licht werpt op de wijze waarop we ons kunnen verhouden tot het ongemak van de crisis. In dit hoofdstuk wordt afstand genomen van de simpele tegenstelling tussen ik en de ander. In de woorden van Deleuze en Guattari zijn mensen op oneindig veel manieren *rizomatisch* met elkaar verbonden.

In het tweede hoofdstuk worden opnieuw een aantal tegenstellingen geproblematiseerd. Ten eerste is er geen tegenstelling tussen theorie en praktijk in het discours van de politiek van het vluchten. De analyse van deze politiek vindt niet op gedistantieerde wijze plaats, maar vormt een

immanente praktijk, waarin de denker direct betrokken is. Ten tweede wordt beredeneerd dat dit onderzoek niet de intentie heeft om een niet-connectieve en objectiverende uitleg te geven van de toestand van een ander. Daarbij wordt er, refererend aan de bovengenoemde denkers, vanuit gegaan dat, voorbij de tegenstelling tussen verschil en identiteit, verschil te allen tijde relationeel is. Het gaat hierbij niet om een objectieve analyse met universele verklaringen over de aard van de mens, noch om een exotiserende beschrijving van de subjectieve beleving van de ander. Deze filosofische exercitie is een afirmatie van een denken waarin verschillen supplementair zijn aan de relationele verantwoordelijkheid van elk subject met betrekking tot deze politieke crisis. Deze verantwoordelijkheid vraagt erom gehoor te geven aan de luide stilte van de vluchtelingenkampen. Deze stilte houdt niet in dat het stil is aan de andere kant van het spectrum, maar dat het gehoor aan deze kant van de wereld zich moet openstellen om de kakofonie van elders toe te kunnen laten.

Deze ontsluiting van het gehoor voor de kakofonie als oorverdovende stilte vraagt niet alleen om een politieke analyse van de crisis en het ongemak, maar stelt ook vragen als “wat wordt er bedoeld met het begrip *politiek*?” en “wat betekent politiek in de constructie *politiek* van het vluchten?” Het derde hoofdstuk is een uitgebreide ontleding van de complexiteit van deze vraag. Hoewel politiek zich verhoudt tot filosofische concepten en haar beleid toetst aan wetenschappelijke observaties, wordt er in dit hoofdstuk beargumenteerd dat politieke praktijken een eigen dynamiek hebben, die niet eenduidig te vatten is in filosofische en wetenschappelijke analyses. De dynamiek van de politiek is volgens Agamben *paradigmatisch*. Volgens deze denker brengen politieke paradigma's een realiteit tot stand vanuit een politiek denkkader dat zelf niet verklaard kan worden vanuit deze realiteit. Zo zijn veiligheid en integratie paradigmatische begrippen: zij creëren praktijken door bijvoorbeeld veiligheidsmaatregelen en integratiecursussen, maar kunnen niet vanuit deze praktijken gelegitimeerd worden. Om deze aporetische meervoudigheid van de politiek van het vluchten te verduidelijken, schets ik in dit hoofdstuk meerdere typen paradigma's en verschillende soorten politieke praktijken die doorwerken in de zogenaamde vluchtelingencrisis. Ik maak een onderscheid tussen *een politiek van ballingschap*, *een politiek van segmenten* en *een politiek van leven*, die ieder op zich respectievelijk in de drie hoofdstukken van het tweede deel uiteen gezet worden.

Na de uiteenzetting van het noodzakelijke begrippenapparaat in deel I, waarin tevens de contouren van een ander discours worden geschetst, differentieer ik in deel II de paradigma's naar deze drie typen politiek. In hoofdstuk vier waarin *een politiek van ballingschap* wordt geschetst, staan *axiomatische* paradigma's centraal. In hun doorwerking dwingen deze paradigma's oppositionele territoria en subjecten af: hier versus daar, het land van herkomst versus land van aankomst, wij versus zij. In dit hoofdstuk laat ik vooral zien dat in pretenties van deze politiek om over exclusieve dualiteiten te spreken juist elk vorm van verschil teniet wordt gedaan. De consequenties van dit xenofobe verbanningskarakter raken echter niet alleen de zogenaamde vreemdeling van *elders*, ze trekken ook binnen hun eigen samenlevingen scheidslijnen en creëren *hier* tegenstellingen waardoor het burgerschap van sommige bevolkingsgroepen permanent ter discussie staat. Zodra het vluchtende individu niet meer als louter passief slachtoffer wordt gezien, vraagt hun wanhopige toestand om een andere type politiek.

In hoofdstuk vijf wordt onderzocht of de multiculturele samenleving een antwoord op die vraag biedt. Multiculturalisme tracht de destructieve tendensen van de politiek van ballingschap te doorbreken

door het verschil tussen individuen niet op een exclusief oppositionele manier te benaderen. Multiculturalisme doet weliswaar afstand van het idee van een ultieme dualiteit tussen het *ene* hier en het *andere* daar, waarbij de meervoudigheid van visies en verscheidenheid van gemeenschappen getolereerd worden, maar in de begrippen ‘allochtoon’ of ‘mensen met een migratieachtergrond’ werken de axiomatische paradigma’s nog door. Het verdeelt de wereld niet in een simpel *hier* versus *daar*; of *wij* versus *zij*; het herhaalt niettemin het denken in identiteiten door deze in segmenten te vermenigvuldigen: sociaal, economisch, raciaal, seksueel, cultureel en meritocratisch. In dit hoofdstuk wordt daarom *een politiek van segmenten* uiteengezet. De paradigma’s die deze segmenten ingeven zijn echter niet axiomatisch maar differentieel. Ik maak – met behulp van Deleuzes denken – een onderscheid tussen differentieel en differentieel. Het gaat bij differentieel niet om het principieel respecteren van verschil, maar om de wijze waarop het verschil in de politiek via het beleid worden geproduceerd. Differentieel duidt echter op verschillen die niet te reduceren zijn tot identificeerbare kaders. Het is om deze reden dat Deleuze spreekt van *virtuele* verschillen, niet omdat deze fictief of irreëel zijn, maar omdat de realiteit van zo’n verschil voorbij gaat aan onze *actuele* denkkaders die door het beleid – dus differentieel – worden aangestuurd. De politiek van segmenten identificeert gemeenschappen als minderheden. Paradigma’s als veiligheid en integratie, en crisis, worden vanuit deze logica geïdentificeerd tot bepaalde segmenten. Het ongemak wordt geëxternaliseerd.

Het discours dat het ongemak centraal stelt, vergt een deconstructie van de politieke visie die de wereld en individuen permanent segmenteert. In het zesde hoofdstuk schets ik deze als *een politiek van het leven*. In een ode aan een *te komen* *gemeenschap* die de onvoorspelbaarheid van het leven en de voorlopigheid van alle vormen van identiteit affirmeert, wordt affect-ontologisch het verschil en ethisch de relationele verantwoordelijkheid - bekrachtigd. Door middel van een kritische zelfevaluatie ‘forceert’ zo’n politiek door engagement, betrokkenheid, en inter-esse geïnspireerde zelfpraktijken, die principieel openstaan voor de doorwerkingen van het singuliere leven. Deze politico-filosofische zelfkritiek vraagt om een andere taal en een andere verbeelding dan die door het moderne denken zijn geproduceerd. Zij doorbreekt door haar rizomatische benadering ook de academische discipline – dus disciplinerende – afgrenzingen. Zo zijn hedendaagse kunstpraktijken waarin literatuur, cinema en beeldende kunst elkaar versterken beter in staat om de affectieve dimensie van kakofonische stilte te laten opklinken. Geïnspireerd door Agamben spreek ik van impotentiële paradigma’s. Deze paradigmatische dynamiek ‘ontkracht’ progressief-lineaire realisaties van potentie naar actie, van imperfectie naar perfectie, en bekrachtigt de inspiratie van het virtuele die differentieële paradigma’s van het multiculturalisme ontberen. Een politiek van het leven gaat vanuit een radicale affirmatie van het differentieel verschil in tegen de aannames van ‘onze’ vluchtelingencrisis in. In deze politiek is er geen sprake meer van erbij horen *of* niet erbij horen. Zij handelt voorbij inclusie en exclusie. *Het leven, wat het ook moge zijn, is: erbij horen*. Zijn is per definitie betrokken zijn: *inter-esse*. Een politiek van het leven verfijnt de contouren van dit andere discours over gemeenschap en gemeenschappelijkheid. Dit afsluitende hoofdstuk is een ode aan singuliere levens, wat dat ook moge zijn.

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