Coughing Up Executives or Rolling the Dice?: Individual Accountability for Corporate Corruption

38 Pages Posted: 13 Feb 2017

See all articles by Sharon Oded

Sharon Oded

Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics

Date Written: 2016

Abstract

“Flesh-and-blood” corporate criminals have long been a major focus of U.S. enforcement authorities in the battle against foreign bribery. Many of the actions taken against individuals were largely enabled due to the cooperation of culpable corporations with investigative authorities. For years, this cooperation was encouraged by the award of “cooperation credit,” which is a mitigated approach toward cooperating corporations. The Yates Memorandum promulgated recently by the Department of Justice, however, has changed the rules of the game. According to the memo, the Department of Justice will no longer provide “cooperation credit” to corporations unless they demonstrate their cooperative approach by “sacrificing” employees involved in bribery. While the newly emerged policy seeks to send a reinforced message of deterrence to corporate executives, a law and economics analysis reveals that the Yates Memo may fall short of reaching its deterrence goals, and in fact may lead to more — rather than fewer — bribery practices.

Keywords: Yates memo, cooperation credit, regulatory credit, enforcement, liability, individual accountability, conflict of interest, sanction mitigation, FCPA, bribery, corruption

JEL Classification: G38, K14, K22, K42, L50

Suggested Citation

Oded, Sharon, Coughing Up Executives or Rolling the Dice?: Individual Accountability for Corporate Corruption (2016). Yale Law & Policy Review, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2016, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2915867

Sharon Oded (Contact Author)

Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics ( email )

Burgemeester Oudlaan 50
PO box 1738
Rotterdam, 3000 DR
Netherlands

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