The Politics of Mainstreaming - A comparative analysis of migrant integration governance in Europe

Xandra Maan, Ilona van Breugel and Peter Scholten
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1. Introduction

Mainstreaming is often seen as the new ‘trend’ in the governance of migrant integration in Europe. In the aftermath of the multiculturalism backlash (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010) and the so-called assimilationist turn (Joppke and Morawska 2003), the governance of migrant integration is once again being revised. Although often interpreted and framed in very different ways in different (local, national, EU) policy settings, mainstreaming captures a ‘turn’ in integration governance at various levels, including the EU, the national and the local levels (Collett & Petrovic 2014; Van Breugel, Maan & Scholten, 2014). Mainstreaming is part of the European Common Basic Principles, but framed and applied very differently in national and local policies throughout Europe. For instance, whereas mainstreaming may involve interculturalist policies in cities like Barcelona and London, it is also used in a more narrow sense to refer to abandoning group-specific measures and government retrenchment in other cities such as Rotterdam and Paris.

Mainstreaming is mostly known as a policy technique used in areas such as gender, disability or climate policies. However, less is known about the mainstreaming of immigrant integration policies. Mainstreaming refers to an amalgam of efforts to abandon target-group specific policy measures and to coordinate integration measures as an integral part of generic policies in domains such as education, housing and employment. In this regard, mainstreaming is about the substance of policy as well as about the coordination of those policies, in a way that is reminiscent of mainstreaming in other issue areas such as gender and disability. However, the precise meaning of mainstreaming, how it differs from other policy approaches, what is mainstreamed in the first place, why and when governments choose to mainstream their policies, and whether it is indeed more effective than other approaches, remains unclear. For instance, to what extent is mainstreaming more than yet another pendulum shift between specific and generic policies, as we have seen more often in integration policies over the past decades (see also Koopmans et al., 2005)? And is mainstreaming applied to all migrant categories, or are there categories for whom mainstreaming might be less appropriate? And, perhaps most importantly, is mainstreaming merely a fashionable policy innovation, or does it reflect the growing maturity of integration policy within governments?

In the first report of the UPSTREAM project, a more precise conceptualization of mainstreaming immigrant integration governance was developed (Van Breugel, Maan & Scholten, 2014). In this project mainstreaming is understood as a shift toward generic policies oriented at a pluralist society and involving poly-centric forms of governance. This means that we do not follow how mainstreaming may be conceptualized in European, national or local policy discourses nor that we refer only to cases where the concept of mainstreaming is used explicitly: our study applies to all situations that fit our conceptualization of mainstreaming.

For this conceptualization we connect the notion of mainstreaming to the literatures on diversity, super-diversity, interculturalism and poly-centric governance. Several factors were identified in these literatures on how and why mainstreaming takes place. These factors will be explored in more detail in this report. Diversity literature claims that mainstreaming is a response to the growing scale of diversity as well as to the ‘diversification of diversity’; migration-related diversity has become so intense (especially in specific urban regions) that it is of relevance to all mainstream policies (Hollinger 1995, Vertovec 2007). Additionally, the growing number of migrant groups as well as their hyphenation over several generations make it increasingly difficult to speak about distinct migrant ‘minority groups.’ Interculturalism frames
mainstreaming as a response to the multiculturalism backlash, abandoning group-specific policies for a ‘whole society’ approach aimed at inter-ethnic contact and defining a shared sense of belonging (Zapata Barrero 2015). Finally, the literature on poly-centric governance connects mainstreaming to the notion of multi-level governance; besides the continued relevance of national policies, European policies and especially local policies have become more pronounced over the last decade (Scholten 2013).

This report, based on the second phase of the UPSTREAM project, focuses on the rationale of mainstreaming: what is mainstreamed to achieve immigrant integration, how have mainstreamed integration policies been developed in terms of policy processes, and why did governments decide to mainstream? The implementation and impact of mainstreaming will be the subject of subsequent work packages. Key questions in this study are:

1. **What** forms of mainstreaming can be identified? To what extent are migrant integration policies mainstreamed, and to what extent are other policy strategies preferred?

2. **How** have these mainstreaming policies come about? What factors have contributed to or obstructed the mainstreaming of integration governance?

3. **Why** has integration governance been mainstreamed (or not)? What explanations can be found for the mainstreaming of integration governance? How can differences between cases be explained?

This report brings together the findings from France, Poland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Spain and the EU. The selected countries all have different governance structures in the domain of integration; the level of centralization differs, for example, between France, the Netherlands and the UK and there is a distinction between the ‘old’ immigration countries (such as France, the Netherlands and the UK) and the ‘new’ immigration countries (such as Poland). Also, a study was conducted on the mainstreaming of integration governance from the EU level. Within the country studies, the project looks at two cities that are selected on the basis of their differences in terms of integration policies (see table 1) in addition to looking at the national level.

**Table 1: overview of cases in the UPSTREAM project**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>City 1</th>
<th>City 2</th>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Saint Denis</td>
<td>Lyon</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Warsaw</td>
<td>Poznan</td>
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<tr>
<td>The United Kingdom</td>
<td>London-Southwark</td>
<td>Bristol</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>Barcelona</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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As mainstreaming speaks to the embedding of immigrant integration into generic policies it is required in methodological terms to not focus only on integration policy as an institutional policy domain per se. Therefore, we will focus on two policy areas in which immigrant integration policies usually play a key role: education and social cohesion. Obviously, the EU level study does not include a local-level analysis.
but rather a more in-depth analysis of these two policy areas as embedded in various institutional actors at the EU level.

The data collection consists of a literature review, complemented with around twenty semi-structured interviews per case. The literature review focused on policy documents, parliamentary and council records, reports of (advisory) research councils and secondary literature. These documents were analysed to search for references to aspects of mainstreaming as defined in our conceptualization in the previous stage of the project. The complementing interviews were conducted at national and city-level with policymakers across different institutions and departments, relevant civil-society stakeholders and experts from research councils. In total, 100 interviews were held (18 in the UK, 16 for the EU, 20 in France, 16 in the Netherlands, 20 in Spain and 10 in Poland).

This report briefly outlines the main findings from the EU case, country cases and local cases in chapter 2. The main focus of the report is on comparing these findings and drawing inferences on the three main questions in this report; what is mainstreamed, how does mainstreaming come about (assuming it does), and why do governments choose to adopt or reject mainstreaming. This comparison will be structured in accordance with the project’s conceptual and theoretical framework that will be outlined in some detail below.

What? Mapping different forms of mainstreaming
The first research question to be addressed in this report concerns what forms of mainstreaming can be identified in the case studies. To what extent is there evidence of mainstreaming according to our conceptualization of it? And what do governments attempt to achieve by mainstreaming, or when they avoid mainstreaming in favour of more specific and targeted policies. This question is addressed in this project through the ideal-typical model construed by Van Breugel, Maan and Scholten (2014). This typology (see figure 1) builds on the literature of diversity and super-diversity (Vertovec, 2007) on the one hand and on target group constructions on the other (Schneider and Ingram, 1994; Yanow & Van der Haar, 2013). On one dimension, we distinguish between policies aimed at a monist society, based on an essentialist concept of ethnicity and core culture(s); and policies aimed at a pluralist society defined by diversity and the crossing and blurring of ethnic and cultural boundaries. A key question here is whether a model sees a culture, either a minority or majority culture, as something absolute and immobile or as something dynamic and flexible. The other dimension, the policy targeting dimension (the ‘dilemma of recognition’), distinguishes between generic and specifically targeted policies. The key difference here is whether a model explicitly targets specific migrant groups or whether it targets the entire population.

Following these two axes, four ideal-typical models of immigrant integration can be defined; differentialism, multiculturalism, assimilationism and interculturalism (see figure 1). Important is that for this study, following the literature on super-diversity and interculturalism, we hypothesize that mainstreaming will be primarily adopted as a policy strategy for achieving interculturalism. This reflects the conceptualization of mainstreaming as a shift from specific to generic policies, and an orientation towards the whole diverse society. However, whether this is so, or whether mainstreaming is adopted as a strategy for achieving very different modes of migrant integration (like assimilationism) is one of the questions that should be answered in this report. Also, we are very interested in the ‘routes’ that countries take before turning to mainstreaming, for instance whether mainstreaming constitutes a shift from assimilationism to interculturalism, from multiculturalism to interculturalism, or any other sequence of models that is theoretically possible.
Based on this typology, this project has mapped the shifts in integration governance on the relevant dimensions. It is according to this theory-based strategy that we have attempted to uncover mainstreaming policy strategies, rather than a strategy based on the use of the notion of mainstreaming in practice. First, regarding policy targeting, we have mapped to what extent policies in the spheres of integration, education and social cohesion have been generic or specific. Specific policies are aimed at (migrant) target groups, whereas generic policies are aimed at the broader categories. This speaks to the notion of a ‘dilemma of recognition’, as phrased by De Zwart (2005): on the one hand, any form of socially constructing target groups will have inadvertent labelling or even stigmatizing effects, while on the other hand, generic policies leave policymakers no tools to deal with specific problems or inequalities (Yanow & Van der Haar, 2013, p.251). De Zwart (2005) describes three possible responses to the dilemma: accommodation, denial and replacement. Accommodation resembles multicultural politics: redistributive policies that accommodate the present group distinctions. Denial, on the other hand, fits assimilationist politics best. It argues against the benefits of redistributive policies and therefore does not target specific groups. Finally, replacement is seen as a compromise between the other responses: in this approach, the government constructs its own social categories, often taking the social problem as a starting point and framing it as being “more inclusive than the folk categories they replace” (De Zwart, 2005, p.140). Mainstreaming can be understood as a form of replacement when specific policies, aimed at migrant/ethnic/cultural groups are replaced by ‘proxies’, involving generic, colour-blind measures aimed at the entire population, while still addressing the same social problems.

Secondly, we have mapped whether policies were oriented at promoting a form of cultural monism or rather at promoting pluralism. Whether mainstreaming is a tool for achieving monism or pluralism is, in this project, an empirical question. However, when speaking to the broader literature on (super-) diversity (e.g. Vertovec, 2007; Hollinger 1995), it is argued that the increased scale and scope of diversity makes mainstreaming inevitable. Due to successive flows of immigrants and the increasing internal diversity with regard to the first, second or third generation of immigrants, society has become so diverse, that constructing target groups based on a single variable such as ethnicity would be ineffective and sometimes even impossible. In addition to the dilemma of recognition, ‘recognizing’ would have become inherently difficult. It is theorized that the known national models of integration (e.g. Koopmans & Statham, 2000) and corresponding perspectives on cultural diversity, such as multiculturalism (e.g. Kymlicka, 2010; Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2010; Meer & Modood, 2012), assimilationism (e.g. Alba & Nee,
1997, 2005; Brubaker, 2001; Kivisto & Faist, 2010) and interculturalism (e.g. Wood, 2009; Bouchard, 2011; Cantle, 2012; Zapata Barrero, 2013), are not able to cope with super-diversity to the same extent. Because of the monist perspective on the ‘mainstream society’ of assimilationism and the ‘groupist’ perspective of multiculturalism, interculturalism seems to be the candidate most likely to adjust to the situation of super-diversity (VanBreugel, Maan & Scholten, 2014).

Finally, in our conceptualisation of mainstreaming, we also draw attention to the governance implications that mainstreaming entails. We expect mainstreaming to go hand-in-hand with the move from state-centric modes of governance to poly-centric modes of governance, implying deconcentration and decentralisation in policy-making and responsibilities. Deconcentration refers to the sharing of responsibility for integration policy across various stakeholders, both governmental and non-state actors, whereas decentralisation refers to the multilevel coordination and sometimes also, multilevel dispersed responsibilities. State-centric models of integration tend to “oversimplify policies and overstress the alleged coherency and consistency of these policies” (Duyvendak & Scholten 2012, p.268). The national models are poorly equipped to respond to the increasing diversification and multi-level setting of today’s governments. The EU, the national level, local levels and sometimes even regional levels all have to coordinate the same topic, while “the divergent dynamics of agenda setting on these diverse levels can result in different ways in framing immigrant integration” (Scholten 2012, p.47).

The key element when defining the mainstreaming of immigrant integration is the shift from specific targeted policies to generic policies. Following our typology as introduced in the preceding paragraphs, mainstreaming may either lead to assimilationism or interculturalism. The development of super-diverse societies may imply that more and more countries will adopt a pluralist mind-set, which would lead to interculturalist policies. However, whether this is actually the case is one of the questions to be addressed in this report. In addition, we expect mainstreaming to go hand-in-hand with a shift from state-centric to poly-centric (horizontal and vertical) governance, another expectation that will be reviewed in this report.

**How? Tracing the process that leads to mainstreaming (or not)**
The second question to be addressed in this report concerns ‘how’ and under what conditions mainstreaming has or has not taken place. In what context have immigrant integration policies been mainstreamed (or not)? This question refers primarily to mainstreaming as a policy process, focusing on the (types of) actors involved in this process, key turning-points in this process such as specific incidents, and contextual developments that have an effect on mainstreaming processes.

To answer this question, this project will conduct a process tracing analysis. This process tracing is directly connected to the findings of the first part, focusing on ‘what’ is mainstreamed, and trying to account how these policies and measures have come about. This process tracing focuses on identifying actors that played a role in these processes, policy frames, and key events or developments that may have had an effect on the process. This involves an analysis of the following factors:

- **Actors**: which key actors played a role in the formulation of these policies? This may, for instance, include ministers, senior policy officials, non-state actors, local governments, certain political entrepreneurs, or expert advisory bodies.
- **Policy frames**: what rationale is given for the choice to mainstream integration policies?
- **Decision moments**: what key decision moments can be identified when policies have been formalized or changed?
- **Incidents:** have there been incidents or relevant problem developments that have contributed to a framing/reframing of policies?

**Why? Accounting for why mainstreaming did (or did not) take place**

Finally, this report also addresses the question why governance bodies either choose to mainstream their integration policies, or decide not to do so. What is the underlying political rationale for mainstreaming? To answer this question, a conceptual-theoretical framework was developed based on Kingdon’s multiple streams approach (2003) to explaining policy processes. Kingdon distinguishes three ‘families of processes’ that, when conjured at specific moments by specific actors or events, can determine policy processes and dynamics. The streams he distinguishes are: problem setting, policy context and political setting. These streams have different internal dynamics; but when the streams ‘conjure’, or when specific couplings are made between problems, policies and politics, policy change will be the result. This theory provides us with insight into policy-making process. However, some adjustments are necessary before we can use the theory in our specific study and policy-field. Overall, we are interested in elements that influence the decision regarding whether or not to mainstream. This is a combination of actual policy change as well as a question regarding the victory of generic policy proposals over specific policy proposals within the policy stream.

Based on the conceptualization of mainstreaming (Van Breugel, Maan & Scholten, 2014), we will address a set of expectations regarding how and why mainstreaming will take place under specific circumstances. This includes expectations on how the problem setting (migration history, diversity, perceived integration issues), policy context (policy history, spin-offs from other areas, crisis or retrenchment) and political setting ( politicization, populism, and individualisation) account for different mainstreaming strategies.

Regarding the problem-context of policies, we expect that a longer migration history, both in different kinds of immigrants as well as internal generations and generally a greater degree of diversity are increasing the likelihood of mainstreaming integration policies being used. However, this likelihood is reduced when there are explicit and numerous perceived integration problems. Secondly, with respect to the policy context, we expect that mainstreaming immigrant integration will be stimulated by the extent of experience with mainstreaming in other policy domains (referring to cross-pollination between departments) and the increasing influence of the crisis and in the wake of governmental retrenchment. On the contrary, countries or departments that have a lot of experience with the use of specific policies may be less likely to switch to mainstreaming. Finally, increasing political and media attention and increasing populism around migration and integration debates make it more and more difficult to justify specific policies. Therefore, we expect that these elements from the political context will also be involved in the decision to mainstream. In this report, we will test these expectations in all cases studied and thereby answer to what extent certain developments, incidents, structures or political reasons form the rationale for the switch to mainstreaming immigrant integration as the new policy approach.

In summary, throughout this comparative analysis, we will assess the following expectations:

- **Problem setting.** Several problem trends may account for mainstreaming or other policy strategies from the typology of WP2. A general expectation from interculturalisation literature is that policies are more likely to be mainstreamed when the percentage of the population with a migrant background is relatively high, when migrant communities are relatively well
established (1st, 2nd and 3rd generations) and when there are many different migrant groups (described together as a situation of super-diversity). Furthermore, it has been argued in the literature that mainstreaming is less likely to the extent that problems associated with specific groups are more severe, whereas it may be more likely when the social position of migrants becomes more comparable/average.

- **Policy context.** Some factors from the policy context may explain mainstreaming. This includes the history of integration policies, previous experiences (positive or negative), institutional path-dependency that prevents change. Also, there could be spin-offs from other policy fields where policy mainstreaming has been implemented (such as gender, disability). Finally, it is also necessary to address the influence of the financial crisis and government retrenchment on migrant integration policies (to what extent was mainstreaming caused by government cutbacks and retrenchment).

- **Political setting.** We may expect some political factors to promote or inhibit mainstreaming. For instance, it has been argued in the literature that politicization and mediatisation would promote the tendency toward more generic colour-blind policies, whereas group-specific policies would be more likely to emerge in depoliticized settings. The same may apply for populism and the rise of anti-immigrant parties; such parties inhibit group-specific policies and may see mainstreaming as a means for achieving assimilationism (rather than interculturalism). Finally, when the (political/public) perception of society is more individualized (less communitarianist), it can be expected that parties are more likely to support the mainstreaming of integration policies; more communitarianist politics, is less likely to support the mainstreaming of integration policies.

**Guide to the report**

After this introduction, chapter 2 first answers the ‘what’ questions for the different case studies. We will emphasize several characteristics and patterns regarding the three elements of mainstreaming in the national and local cases and separately for the EU.

Subsequently, in chapter 3, we will compare the case studies for all three central questions: what was mainstreamed, how, and why? What generic inferences can be drawn in terms of ‘what’ is mainstreamed across Europe, and what patterns emerge between the different local, country, and EU cases? How does this speak to the typology of mainstreaming; is mainstreaming indeed a tool for achieving interculturalism, or is it something different? And is there a pattern between the cases in terms of how mainstreaming did or did not come about; what actors, frames, decision moments and focus events were key to this process? And finally, can we explain the choice to mainstream using the expectations formulated earlier?

Finally, the report is concluded in chapter 4, looking at the implications of the outcomes of this study for the developed conceptual framework and looking ahead to the implications of the findings for the following stage of the project; studying the street-level implementation of mainstreaming immigrant integration (UPSTREAM work package 4).
2. Mainstreaming in Europe

This chapter summarizes the findings from the country and EU cases on the mainstreaming of integration governance. It primarily addresses the ‘what’ question in the context of this project: what is mainstreamed in terms of integration governance? Addressing the conceptualization of what mainstreaming means (as discussed in chapter 1), the case descriptions will be structured according to whether generic or specific policies have been identified, whether policies were aimed at monism or pluralism, and whether mainstreaming was associated with state-centric or poly-centric modes of governance. Per case, we will focus as much as possible on general mainstreaming trends, bringing together findings for the domains of immigrant integration, education and social cohesion, and from the various levels involved in this project. The material that is presented in this chapter is based on the original country and EU-reports that are published on the project website.¹

The case studies described in this chapter will provide the basis for the comparative analysis in chapter 3. In this context, it is important to reiterate that this project follows a dissimilar case study design. Not only the city cases per country, but also the countries have been selected to represent a sample that is dissimilar in terms of factors that are relevant to this project: problem setting, policy context and political context. It includes countries that have a relatively long history of immigration (France, the UK, the Netherlands), as well as new immigration countries (Spain, Poland). It includes countries with very different models of integration, including more accommodating traditions (the UK, Spain) as well as more assimilationist traditions (France, recently also the Netherlands, to some extent Poland). In terms of political context, it includes countries where migrant integration has been fiercely contested in the political arena (France, the Netherlands, to some extent the UK), as well as countries where this issue still has a relatively low political profile (Spain, Poland). Finally, the project also includes a separate study of the EU level, as a level that is of increasing relevance to migrant integration in general and that more specifically has played an important role in promoting mainstreaming as a common basic principle of integration.

2.1 European Union

Due to its structure as a supra-national union, the European Union is typically in a delicate power-balance with the sovereignty of its Member States. With regard to immigrant integration the European Union has no official legislative competence and, equally the European Commission has no enforceable agenda or clear mandate in this field. However as migration policies are a European competence, immigrant integration has been on the European Agenda since 1999² as a logical corollary to (legal) migration policy. Since then the European Union and Commission have published several guidelines and advising principles on the matter. With the Common Basic Principles on Integration as published in 2004, and a year later the Common Agenda for Integration, the EU gained a “quasi-competence” (Petrovic and Collet 2014: p. 5) on integration. These publications can also be considered as the introduction of the term mainstreaming in the context of immigrant integration (at the EU level)³.

Policy and legislative responsibilities are typically divided between the Directorate General for Home Affairs (DG Home) and other related DG’s such as Education and Culture (EAC), Employment and

¹ See www.project-upstream.eu
³ Later also addressed in the Second Handbook on Integration (2007), the Integration Indicators (2011) and most recently “framed as a ‘holistic approach’ under the Greek Presidency of the European Council (2014)” (Petrovic and Collet: 2014: p.3)
Social Affairs (EMPL) and Justice (JUST). While DG Home typically targets newly arrived ‘third country nationals’, the other DGs target EU-citizens in general, only touching on integration issues in a later stage of the immigrant’s residence in the European Union, generally labelled as issues of ‘social inclusion’. Like immigrant integration, education policy is limited to soft, intergovernmental EU policy-making, with common standards in education policy, “identifying education and training as key pathways to a ‘knowledge economy’, and core for the attainment of the EU’s overall objectives related to full employment, economic reform and social inclusion, as now covered under the EU2020 agenda” (Petrovic and Collet 2014: p.14).

Monist/Pluralist
Integration policy at European level has not followed a specific model, although traces of interculturalist ideas can be traced within the Common Basic Principles and the ‘two way process’ of integration. Whilst harder to recognize in other policy fields, education is typified by a strong recognition of diversity. “The main reason for this may be that education is less contentious at EU level, because the EU institutions have little to say in this policy matter” (Petrovic and Collet 2014: p.21). The DG for Education supported research on (e.g.) intercultural approach in education (Eurydice 2004), the 2008 green paper on inclusive school approach and the 2012 SIRIUS research and policy network focused on the education of children with a migrant background emphasizing an inclusive lens in education. Social inclusion within education and training is also emphasized in the EU2020 framework. All these measures and initiatives emphasize the diversity and plurality of its students.

General/Specific
While education policies and programs explicitly address (ethnic) diversity, social cohesion policies are phrased in more generic terms, grouped together under vulnerable or marginal groups. “Social inclusion policy at EU level takes on a needs-based or barriers-based approach, looking at specific challenges such as unemployment, poverty, age (both young and old), gender (underrepresentation), exclusion or non-participation” (Petrovic and Collet 2014: p.31). These are linked to the EU2020 targets focused on reducing unemployment and poverty.

While mainstreaming at the EU level was introduced as a multi-stakeholder engagement to stimulate shared responsibility for integration policies, it now risks becoming a mean to dilute and sideline the issue. “According to some experts, the Netherlands have been quite influential in promoting their national discourse at the EU level, making it increasingly difficult to discuss targeted measures for immigrants at all” (Petrovic and Collet 2014: p.10).

State-centric/Poly-centric
As a supra-national political body the European Union and Commission typically operate in a polycentric way, primarily working with national governments. These operate in a delicate balance. As only few Member States (namely the ‘old’ immigration countries) had formal integration policies in the early 2000s, there was a ‘momentum’ for the European Commission to take the lead on framing a common approach to integration policy. “However, as national expertise has grown in this area, so has the desire to minimize the EU’s oversight. As a result, EU integration policy has not developed significantly as a policy area over the past ten years, including the concept of mainstreaming” (Petrovic and Collet 2014: p. 13).

Within the European Union the different DGs target respectively newly arrived ‘third country nationals’ (DG Home) and EU-citizens in general (other DGs). This differentiation in scope and
mandate, and subsequently the diverging policy-priorities and objectives, have proven to be a challenge in mainstreaming immigrant integration policies as policies are typically not coordinated across DGs (Petrovic and Collet 2014: p.3). Social inclusion of vulnerable groups, for example is framed in generic terms covering integration as one of its dimensions, and could be regarded as a mainstreamed approach. However as a politically sensitive topic and subordinate to other economic-crisis related priorities the topic is virtually absent (p.8, p.31), illustrating the risk of mainstreaming when integration policies are not coordinated or supported sufficiently across DGs.

Conclusion
While integration policy was put on the European agenda as an extension of legal migration policy, “it is becoming less and less sustainable as a siloed policy area” (Petrovic and Collet 2014: p.13). Mainstreaming was subsequently introduced to stimulate shared responsibility and engagement in issues of integration, however, there is currently little momentum towards broadening out the integration portfolio. This carries the risk of dismantling integration policies. “Despite the framing of guidelines and a common approach, Member States still retain complete competence over integration policy, and believe in a limited role for the EU, according to the principle of subsidiarity” (p.13). It is in this politicised field that the polycentric policy making of the European Union operates.

2.2 United Kingdom

Immigration is an old phenomenon for British society. Immigration trajectories have long been closely entwined with the British colonial history, with the New Commonwealth countries, South Asia and the West Indies as main sending countries. During the 1970s and 1980s, more Asian and African migrants arrived and the share of asylum seekers, economic migrants and migration increased as a consequence of EU policies related to the free movement of labour. More recently the UK has experienced an increase in short-term and circular migration. The biggest issue on both the past and present political agenda is the wish to restrict immigration, especially the increasing CEE-migration, and the possibilities for doing so. Restricting immigration by setting strict borders is, however, complemented by equality policies for migrants within the borders, resulting in an oxymoronic approach to immigration and integration.

Bristol and London-Southwark
A port city with 432,000 inhabitants, Bristol is by far the biggest city in south-western England. With 88% of the 2001 population categorised as White British, Bristol was at par with the English average, with small pockets of well-established Afro-Caribbean and Pakistani minority populations. But the period 2001-11 has seen a significant increase in the Black African population, from 2.3% to 6.0%, as well as an increase in the number of Eastern European immigrants, with the White British population declining to 78% of the total. Of particular significance is the increasing Somali population, with Bristol having the second-biggest Somali-born population in the UK in 2011 (after London). The increase in immigration over the past 10 years has, together with pressure on the housing stock, resulted in a changing residential geography of Bristol’s BME population, with more immigrants moving into traditional white working class areas away from the city centre, in particular in northern Bristol. In the late 1990s, deprived parts of Bristol were targeted through neighbourhood renewal initiatives, but
since 2007, community engagement has been designed to include neighbourhood partnerships as the main vehicle for consultation and dialogue at the local level.

Southwark is an inner-city London borough with a total population of 293,000 in 2011. Whereas the White British proportion of the population has been declining, from 52% in 2001 to 39% in 2011 (similar to the overall London trend), the Black population has remained stable, at 27% of the total 2011 population, but twice the London average. Southwark borough is characterized by significant ethnic/racial and socio-economic divides. Formerly a white working class area, Northern Southwark has seen significant post-industrial changes, with the former docklands being converted into expensive housing units. At the same time a steep increase in the immigrant population has led to tensions over access to social housing. Central Southwark has been a destination for immigrants since WW2, and the proliferation of difference has led to neighbourhoods here being characterized as super-diverse. Under New Labour (1997-2010), many deprived areas in Southwark were targeted through resource-intensive neighbourhood renewal programmes. But austerity measures have, since 2010, resulted in retrenchment of public services, and community councils, held at neighbourhood level, now represent ‘universal’ platforms for community engagement. In addition, community consultations held in different parts of the borough provide an avenue towards more issue-led resource allocation.

Monist/Pluralist

At the national level, a pluralist perspective prevails; however, monist approaches are also recognisable. For a long time, migrants were seen as ethnic minorities rather than migrants. Only in the 1960s was a start made to implement integration policies rather than de facto assimilationist policies. In the policy response to the London 2005 terrorist bombings, Secretary of State at the DCLG Ruth Kelly, explicitly cited Vertovec (2007) to describe the uneven geography of super-diversity in Britain. Consequently, the concept of super-diversity was central to drafting the new guidelines for the management of diversity at the local governance level and establishing new funding streams. Although the ‘British mix’ has become increasingly diverse, discussions are still ongoing to describe Britain as a multi-faith society rather than a multicultural society. In addition, the approach to strong borders is often accompanied by quotes such as ‘British jobs for British workers’ and increasing attention is being paid in education to the ‘common island history’, British norms and values, and British literature. In other words, an assimilationist perspective co-exists with the awareness and recognition of a diverse population.

The often known ‘British’ multiculturalist model was actually developed unevenly and mostly locally and implemented without national support since 1985. Subsequently, 2001 marked a multiculturalist backlash at the national level among others by requiring avoidance of group-specific funding and translations into languages other than English. However, at the local level we can still recognize lingering multicultural practices and a more prominent pluralist mind-set. The proliferation of differences is expressed most in super-diverse small inner-city areas with long histories of migration settlement. London Southwark is one example of these super-diverse areas. Increasingly, the borough is noticing that there is no straightforward correlation between ethnicity and language proficiency or between BME status and social deprivation. An observation that Bristol can confirm since the socio-economic diversity within their BME population is also considerable. Over all, London Southwark emphasizes that diversity is the norm, and a positive characteristic, celebrating its high levels of diversity rather than problematizing it.
General/Specific

British integration policies of the last ten years are hard to box into the ideal typical models of integration. In the late 1990s a neighbourhood renewal policy frame [NRP] was prominent. This frame reflected the localism agenda and the wish to address inner-city deprivation. Its main goal was to bend mainstream instruments to intensively intervene in deprived areas. Whereas this area-based approach disproportionately benefited minority populations, this was not the original intention since targets were identified on the basis of deprivation indicators rather than ethnic, racial or migrant statuses of the area. A community cohesion approach was implemented parallel to the NRP frame, consisting of assimilationist, differentialist and interculturalist elements which were hardly ever specifically targeting immigrants. The Ethnic Minority Achievement Grant, once implemented as a ring-fenced budget enabling schools to narrow achievement gaps and to fund additional support for bilingual learners and under-achieving ethnic minorities, was mainstreamed into the Dedicated Schools Grant in April 2011. In addition, the explicit ring-fencing of budgets for EAL provision (English as Additional Language) was removed. Instead, a pupil premium was introduced that was connected to an indicator of social deprivation rather than heritage. This would exemplify the use of generic approaches to meet the needs of specific groups who are being left behind, without compromising the principle of localism. Finally, the social mobility agenda has been implemented increasingly often since 2012. It addresses socio-economic inequalities within mainstream policies, thereby providing a good example of mainstreaming.

At the local level, London Southwark shows similarities with the national social inclusion agenda, emphasizing the improvement of mainstream services to address socio-economic inequalities, often targeting age-defined categories. In addition, the inclusion of children in mainstream learning processes is emphasized while providing resources for interventions addressing the needs and opportunities of individual children. Bristol’s start of the community cohesion framework consisted of initiatives specifically targeting immigrant and BME communities. Although this specific focus has shifted significantly since then, Bristol still runs an English as Additional Language unit, at request of the schools, and also provides several specific measures which are (amongst others) focused on fighting racism and supporting Roma children. Additionally, Bristol is committed to the provision of ESOL as key component in access to the rights and responsibilities of citizenship.

State-centric/Poly-centric

Responsibility for migrants and integration has typically fallen within two departments: the Home Office is charged with immigration and border control and the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) is in charge of community cohesion. The principle of localism, connected to projects such as government through community and the neighbourhood renewal program, has had a strong influence on the early development of decentralized government in Britain. Since 2010, there has also been a perceivable increase in deconcentration. The emergence of the Big Society philosophy, increasingly addressing citizens’ social responsibilities, and the 2012 policy framework for integration “Creating the Conditions for Integration” (by the DCLG) are important turning points for increasing governmental retrenchment. Civil society was inspired and stimulated to address issues that are important to them, instead of large-scale, centrally led and state-funded programs. This approach is also recognisable at the local level. For example, the Bristol corporate plan 2014-2017 uses a mainstream approach emphasizing inequalities of health, wealth and opportunity and includes public
consultations and partnerships with civil society organizations, businesses and local universities. Finally, the trend of deconcentration is also recognisable in the connection between the state and schools. Schools received more responsibilities and the requirements to target the needs of specific groups were reduced. However, in connection to the assimilationist wishes, the school curriculum was centralized to increase attention to British elements of history and language.

Conclusion
The pluralist perspective is more prominent at the city level, which could be a consequence of the manifestation of super-diversity in those areas. Whereas the pluralist perspective is also recognisable at the national level, this is often complemented with a monist, assimilationist, perspective focussing on British people, values, history and language. The community cohesion framework on integration combines elements of assimilationism, differentialism and interculturalism often without focussing explicitly on immigrants. Additionally, the neighbourhood renewal frame, social mobility frame and big society frame all focus on bending mainstream institutions to address socio-economic inequalities. Area-based approaches targeting social deprivation areas are a preferred policy tool in these frames as well as the growing use of poly-centric governance, especially deconcentration. Some of these frames originate in the 90’s, which means that mainstreaming is not a new, but an increasingly used policy technique in the UK.

2.3 The Netherlands
The Netherlands has a long history of migration, with a diversity of migrants coming from the former colonies, guest workers recruited from Southern-Europe and North-Africa, refugees and EU mobile workers. Based on the idea of 'proportional participation' the Dutch government keeps a close track of immigrant participation in different fields. The Netherlands has an advanced statistical database, which in its data collection distinguishes between *allochtoon* and *autochtoon* citizens: those born abroad or whose parents were born abroad and native Dutch. Studies on so-called 'third generation' migrants are also conducted. Originating in Dutch multicultural immigrant integration policies these statistics have played an undiminished role in policymaking since the 'assimilationist turn' in the early 2000s and policy-developments since then.

The diversification of diversity applies perhaps most to the two major cities of the Netherlands Amsterdam (811.185 inhabitants\(^4\)) and Rotterdam (619.826 inhabitants\(^5\)) that have received the most immigration over the past decades. Both cities are highly diverse, with immigrants – including a large cohort of second and third generation migrants – making up over 50% of the population. Amsterdam politics are considered rather stable with a long tradition of multicultural policies. Immigrant integration in Rotterdam on the other hand is often perceived as being a more contested topic, strongly influenced by the local right-wing party of Liveable Rotterdam (*Leefbaar Rotterdam*). In general, Rotterdam is known for its pioneering policies, for example in the field of social and housing policies.

Social cohesion and well-being policies in Rotterdam for a long time had a rather informal character, aimed at the support of minorities or immigrants through specific projects by an emphasis on cultural expressions and role models. The electoral victory of the local populist party Liveable Rotterdam in 2002 can be considered the local expression of the backlash against multiculturalism.

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Since then immigrant integration has been high on the agenda, marking a transition to restrictive and more normative integration policies after years of labour led coalitions. Instead of the dialogue and connection that were previously central to immigrant integration, the policies from then on centred on the immigrants’ own responsibility for ‘their’ problems with integrating. In practice, this cooperation with many migrant self-organizations continued for a long time, only breaking down years later under financial pressure (and larger administrative reforms). So despite being framed in strong terms, categorical policies and financial support continued for a long time, illustrating that political pressure is perhaps only the first step towards putting these reforms on the agenda.

In contrast to the turbulent political context of Rotterdam, Amsterdam has a fairly stable political climate, with a long tradition of Social-Democrat (Partij van de Arbeid) rule in the City Hall. In this setting, immigrant integration policies have been less contested than in Rotterdam, characterized by multicultural policies with a strong emphasis on emancipation. In 2004 however, the city was shocked by the sudden murder of filmmaker and columnist Theo van Gogh by a radicalized second generation Dutch-Moroccan. This put segregation, polarization and radicalization on the map, changing the outlook on integration in Amsterdam. While diversity had always been taken for granted in Amsterdam policies, it now became a contested topic that required active interference by the local government, linking diversity and integration policies to polarization and radicalization.

In the period that followed, generic citizenship policies started to dominate the local Dutch immigrant integration debate. Rotterdam took a lead in this. Between 2006 and 2014 it was citizenship rather than integration that was on the agenda, along with a strong focus on social cohesion, participation or bonding. Integration and migration were either completely absent in this period, or “reformulated in terms of safety issues” (Van Ostaijen & Scholten, 2014). One exception here is the special program for Antillean migrants, the ‘Antillean approach’ (see a.o. De Boom, Van San, Weltevrede & Hermus, 2009; Burgemeester en Wethouders [B&W] Rotterdam, 2009c). When compared to the national level and to Rotterdam, the actual move away from integration policies to citizenship and diversity policies came rather late in Amsterdam, around 2010 (B&W Amsterdam, 2003). Although self-organizations are not supported as such, financial support is available on the basis of projects (Ham & Van der Meer, 2012). The citizenship and diversity department takes on an active role in bringing projects and organizations together. Despite the generic approach Amsterdam also took part in the Antilleans and the Moroccans-approach, although the latter is framed in generic-youth terms and social-economic background (2012). While coordinated at the city level, many immigrant integration policies are executed at the district level.

Monist/Pluralist
Typified by its multicultural policies, the first Dutch ‘minority’ policies in the eighties were drafted in a pluralist perspective on society, targeting immigrants separately as to emancipate them within their respective groups. It was the assimilationist turn in the early 2000s that shifted the focus from structural integration to social and cultural integration, rephrasing this in a generic message of social cohesion. This entailed a stronger emphasis on cultural adaptation, shifting in the direction of a monist perspective on society. A number of incidents nationally and internationally led to a further politicization of the topic. Newly founded populist parties such as LPF, Liveable Rotterdam and the Freedom Party placed the topic high on the political agenda. Whilst plurality and diversity can once more be discerned in immigrant policies between 2005 and 2011, the Cabinet explicitly distanced itself from the “relativism enclosed in the concept of the multicultural society” in 2011. Stating that
increased pluriformity and diversity do not automatically lead to shared norms, but that this instead requires effort on the part of those who come to settle here indicates a shift to a more monist view on integration. The Integration Agenda (2013) of the current government continues the focus on "Dutch society and its values" (Aanbiedingsbrief Agenda Integratie 2013) and strives for equal treatment of all its citizens.

In the field of education diversity and pluralism are a constant, and are therefore perceived as a fact that simply has to be dealt with or as something that should be actively 'experienced' and stimulated, supporting a pluralist stance on society and education. Throughout time the amount of attention paid to specific problems of immigrant integration in education has diminished. The field of social cohesion policies is mostly decentralized and strongly informed by diversity at the local level. Specifically in the ‘citizenship programs’ (replacing most immigrant integration policies in Rotterdam since 2007 and in Amsterdam since 2010) are based on a plural notion of society and the population. In the cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam mainstreaming is considered 'inevitable' as specific policies have become difficult to implement taking the increased diversity of the general and school population into account.

**General/Specific**

In 2004 the increased diversity amongst immigrant groups led to the consideration that group policies are not useful, initiating a shift to generic policies. In 2011, this was taken a step further as under the motto ‘future over descent’, policies were centred around individuals rather than groups. Overall, we see a shift in emphasis here from specifically targeted emancipatory policies in the 1980s to the accessibility of generic policies today. This development is characterized by a move from a multicultural approach to recognition of increased diversity and individualization of targeting on the one hand, and general decentralisations in the social sector on the other.

In education, specific instruments, such as the system for additional funding for schools, are being replaced by instruments targeting by the parents’ level of education, an example of a needs-based proxy in integration governance. Overall, social cohesion policies are mostly phrased in generic terms that target neighbourhoods mainly by income, or address everyone on a city level as citizens of that city. In Rotterdam the move to generic policies was strongly informed by a move away from the previous more assimilationist period.

**State-centric/Poly-centric**

Along with general decentralisations and austerity measures much of the policy responsibility for integration has been decentralized to lower levels of governance. The move from separate immigrant integration policies to generic policies also entails a narrowing down of the field to civic integration courses and re-migration policies. In 2011 it was announced that the budget for immigrant integration will be reduced to zero by 2015.

For education both the national government and municipalities are increasingly considered as directors, facilitators and information providers, rather than actual policy makers, with much policymaking taking place at school-level. Housing and social cohesion policies are typically being decentralized to the local and even neighbourhood level. The case of Rotterdam illustrates the need for a coordinated approach to address issues of immigrant integration under generic and de-concentrated policies (responsibilities). There, a move to generic policies initially meant a complete absence of immigrant integration issues in any of the policy fields.
Conclusion
Departing from the multicultural immigrant integration policies of the 1980s, the Netherlands experienced an assimilationist turn in the early 2000s. It is in this move to generic policies that developments of mainstreaming can be recognized. In the national discourse this seems to be heavily focused on a move away from integration policies, or at least from framing them as such. At the local level this seems to be more informed by pluralism, where mainstreaming follows as an inevitable consequence of increased diversity. However, this does not automatically result in a coordinated approach to integration.

2.4 Poland
Poland is a net-emigration country that expects to become a net-immigration country by 2020. In the past, several waves of population change have been experienced, such as the changes in population after World War II, during the communist regime and the emigration of Jews after the anti-Semitic campaign of 1968. Nowadays, immigration to Poland consists for the greater part of short-term immigrants (e.g. seasonal and circular workers) who are not regarded as residents. Another immigrant group not perceived as immigrants are the so-called ‘traditional minorities’; groups of people that inhabited a particular territory for at least 100 years. Refugees are primarily considered as immigrants. Most refugees are Chechens, who allegedly often use Poland as a transit country to travel further west. Overall, the percentage of long-term ‘immigrants’ is so low, that if they would all reside in Warsaw, they would still only form 3% of the city’s population. This low percentage of immigrants and the lack of visible challenges concerning immigrant integration have resulted in the virtual absence of immigrant integration in the political debate and media discourse and a general ‘lack of interest’ in immigrant integration. Consequently, supporting integration and preventing ethnic discrimination are relatively new policy fields.

Warsaw and Poznań
Two main differences between the selected Polish cities can be identified. The first reflects the scale of immigration. According to some estimations, Warsaw is inhabited by 45 thou foreigners, 25% of the entire foreign/immigrant population in Poland and 2.5% of the entire population of the capital city. However, the ‘real’ numbers are difficult to estimate due to the predominantly temporary character of immigration to Warsaw. According to the Office of the Capital City of Warsaw, at the end of 2013, there were only 18,349 foreigners registered there. When it comes to Poznań, the numbers are also blurred. Michał Buchowski and Jacek Schmidt estimate that foreigners constitute between 1% - 1.5% of the city’s population of more than 500,000 (see: Buchowski, Schmidt 2012: 11). This influences the numbers of foreign pupils in both cities’ schools - over 1000 in Warsaw and less than 200 in Poznań.

The authorities of the Capital City of Warsaw seem much more aware of possible issues related to cultural diversity in the fields of education and social cohesion than the authorities of the City of Poznań. It is reflected in the Capital City’s educational programs, such as, The Program of Development of Education in Warsaw in the Years 2013-2020 and the Educational Policy of the City of Warsaw for the years 2008 - 2012; or the social programs, such as: the Social Strategy of Warsaw – Strategy for Solving Social Problems for the years 2009 – 2010 and Diverse Warsaw (2011 - 2013, extended to 2014). Neither the 2006 Educational Policy of the City of Poznań report, nor the
Development Strategy of the City of Poznań to 2030’ (2010) mention migration, diversity or heterogeneity.

Another striking difference between the two cases is their level of NGO-ization. There are over 10 immigrant and refugee or pro-immigrant and pro-refugee organizations in Warsaw, which provide legal and language assistance, publish their reports and recommendations and advocate migrant causes in other ways. There is no such group in Poznań, apart from the Migrant Info Point, which opened in 2013 and provides practical advice to foreigners. This seems to reflect the difference in the general numbers of NGOs in the two cities.

Monist/Pluralist

After the Second World War, during the communist period, silencing the issue of ethnic minorities and diversity as well as attempts to create (the illusion of) a homogenous nation state served as a pillar of the state and its new territory. Nowadays, there is still little attention paid to cultural diversity, even though sixty percent of the long-term immigrant residents in Poland is represented by four ethnic groups: Ukrainians (31%), Vietnamese (11%), Russians (10%, including Chechens) and Byelorussians (9%). Due to the low number of immigrants, the few places of origin and the absence of multiple generations (except for traditional minorities), Poland cannot be classified as super-diverse. In addition, the Polish government treats the ‘traditional minorities’ (such as the Germans) as cultural communities on their own, reemphasizing the Polish monist perspective on society.

At the local level we can recognize some attempts to propagate the cities’ limited diversity. For example, Warsaw launched the project ‘Diverse Warsaw’, to promote non-discrimination and tolerance towards diversity, and Poznan participated in the global ‘Open Cities’ project and mentioned ‘tolerance and openness to other cultures’ in the city’s candidacy for the 2016 European Capital of Culture. However, this attention for diversity is very limited and is not extended to general, educational or social cohesion-focused policies.

General/Specific

Overall, Poland’s immigrant integration policies can be described as partly non-existent and partly a mixture of differentialist and multiculturalist policies. Anti-discrimination and social policies apply to immigrants without specifically mentioning them, while some social policies are explicitly excluded for holders of a temporary residence permit. These policies do not reflect a deliberate decision-making process with regard to the position of immigrants. Multicultural and differentialist elements can mainly be recognized in education, in which students may follow additional Polish lessons if they have language difficulties, take cultural and linguistic classes in their mother tongue or attend international classes. The latter are organized and co-funded by the home countries and are allowed to provide their own curriculum in their own language. Difficulties however arise when arriving at the final exam, which is identical to the exam taken by all other Polish schools. Other more differentialist policies apply to the ‘traditional minorities’, which are entitled to benefits such as education in their mother tongue (used by +/- 36.000 children in 2005/2006), the introduction of bilingual inscriptions in public places and the right to preserve languages and traditions.

The municipality of Warsaw has not implemented any other specific policies focused on immigrant integration in the light of social cohesion, besides the project ‘Diverse Warsaw’. More specific measures are implemented in education, including the establishment of an advisor for educating foreign children and assistants for Roma children and establishing several centres of
excellence regarding immigrant topics. In Poznan, on the other hand, issues concerning diversity and migration are not mentioned at all in policies regarding education and (social) long-term strategies. The city does refer to the demographic situation (population decline, migration imbalance) as a crucial issue for future development of the city. But it does not mention diversity, tolerance or measures to address these issues.

State-centric/Poly-centric
NGOs play a major role both at the national and local levels in Polish immigrant integration policy. By using EU-funds (such as EFI), Poland is obliged to accept and fulfil the agenda, not directly as a state but as organizations and institutions dealing with integration issues. At the national level, the NGOs support this by working out recommendations about integration policies and how to coordinate them. At a local level, the city governments cooperate with and delegate to NGOs that represent migrants and their interest. Therefore, decision-making is not only dispersed across the national and local levels, but also between governmental and non-governmental entities at the local level. However, horizontal sharing of policy-responsibility at the national level is minimal, due to the non-addressing of immigrant integration. Overall, the governance of immigrant integration is more state-centric than poly-centric.

Conclusion
Identifying and classifying the Polish approach to mainstreaming is made difficult by the general lack of immigrant integration policies or interest therein. Overall, emigration and immigrant reception are much higher on the agenda than immigrant integration. Due to the inexperience with integration and its small scale, we cannot yet speak of ‘shifts’ in Polish policies. The scale and history of immigration in Poland can, depending on the specific situation, work either in favour of or against the development of mainstreaming strategies. When not specifically considered, immigrants are mainstreamed in generic policies without much consideration, such as in the case of social cohesion policies. However, with regard to education, Poland has arranged many specific, differentialist and multiculturalist policies with regard to language and assistance, although these topics are more extensively developed locally (Warsaw) than nationally. Differences in the experienced scale of immigration between the national government and Warsaw may lead to insufficient provisions for immigrants being made at the national level, which in turn may make it difficult for local authorities to adequately respond to the needs of immigrants or to the translation of unconsidered or unintended national mainstreaming into local activities targeting specific migrant groups.

2.5 France

France is one of the countries that can be defined as an old immigration country. Several waves of immigration have taken place since the mid-19th century, in which many immigrants with different countries of origin and different motives (i.e. work or family-reunification) came to France. Consequently, France has characteristics of a super-diverse society in terms of countries of origin and different generations. However, this super-diversity is hardly represented in the statistics, since the French statistical system has not introduced categories related to ethnicity and origins. Descendants of immigrants and especially the third generation are therefore practically invisible. This non-registration approach is a consequence of the French Republican strand of universalism with regard to immigrant integration. The republican principle of equality is interpreted as rejection of any form of recognition
of groups defined along origins and ethnic lines which led consequently to colour-blind policies. Therefore, integration policies in France consist mainly of reception policies and anti-discrimination policies.

**Lyon and Saint Denis**

Lyon is the third largest city in France (491,000 inhabitants, 2 million in the Lyon urban area), and is highly diverse in terms of socio-economic statuses and ethnic backgrounds. In the area of education, national educational policies being implemented locally in Lyon consist of a mix of specific and more generic policies. Specific programs target newcomer non-francophone students and parents who are not familiar with the French language and the French school system. Beyond these schemes targeting newcomers, there are no specific strategies about ethnic discrimination. When cases of discriminations are mentioned, they concern discrimination in society at large or, when in schools, between pupils and students (harassment, homophobia, intercultural conflicts, religious radicalization). However, the City of Lyon has started an action program focusing on the fight against discrimination, also within the education sector. The program has mainly consisted of projects set up by the municipality of Lyon, aimed at raising awareness among education professionals and students regarding forms of discrimination, including ethnic discrimination.

In the area of social cohesion, immigrants and their descendants are not targeted as such. Policies are rather generic, and do not identify recipients by using ethnic labels, nor do area-based policies target disadvantaged neighbourhoods where ethnic minorities are deemed to be concentrated. However, a few specific actions have been implemented for a decade by Lyon City, particularly in the frame of the Equality task force, a city department that focuses on equality policies and develops more specific approaches to particular forms of discrimination, including those related to origin. Regarding governance, the issue of ethnic discrimination is mainstreamed at the horizontal level through the cooperation between different actors: The Grand Lyon, representatives of the central state, mayors of the different cities and of other decentralized authorities and non-state actors (private companies, NGOs, etc.).

Saint-Denis is one of the largest cities in the Paris region (108 000 inhabitants in 2012). It has a high proportion of working-class inhabitants, including a high number of immigrants (36% of the city population, 39,300 people) (INSEE, 2011). Descendants of immigrants represent a major part of the city’s population (about two-thirds of the youth according to estimations, Tribalat, 2009). As in Lyon, policy actions in the field of education in Saint-Denis are quasi-exclusively based on the identification of school needs, without specific consideration of students’ ethnic and immigrant backgrounds. The only specific programs related to integration in Saint-Denis concern newly-arrived pupils and immigrant parents with language needs. Other policy actions that are related to integration concern educational activities on the history and memory of immigration. In terms of governance, the central State remains the main organizer, although the City is involved in anti-discrimination and memory-related activities.

In the area of social cohesion, a mainstreaming approach to immigrant integration issues can be identified in the following ways:

- Integration issues are considered to be addressed by mainstream institutions or by the immigrant reception schemes of Saint-Denis City. The main rationale for this mainstreaming approach is the high proportion of immigrants and ethnic minorities within the population (a super diversity argument).
- Anti-discrimination policies address all types of discrimination. At last, integration issues are being mainstreamed in policies directed at disadvantaged areas; affirmative actions address the whole population of these areas. Nevertheless, in addition to these generic policies, specific schemes for newly arrived immigrants are being implemented by both state actors locally, as well as by City actors (Citizenship task force). In terms of policy governance, policies directed at disadvantaged areas are also allegedly mainstreamed by involving a large range of public and private actors. However, implementation is proving to be difficult in practice.

**Monist/Pluralist**

The French government adheres to a monist perspective on society, which fits with the assimilationist approach to integration policies. During the past decade, there has been little perceivable change. Overall, there is no real shift away from the monist perspective. This monist perspective is evident in the French ‘civic’ framing of integration; emphasizing immigrants’ individual desire to participate in French society, or when it is defined as a problem, doubting immigrants’ willingness to acculturate and participate in French society. Education is a key-policy field in the monist-pluralist nexus. In the same period, monist measures and pluralist measures have been implemented. On the one hand, awareness and recognition of heritage and memories related to immigrants and minorities was promoted through several measures. On the other hand, schools were given the official mission to foster the acquisition of republican values and the learning of the national anthem in primary schools was made mandatory. In general, Lyon and Saint-Denis adhere to the national monist perspective on society. The communist municipal authority in Saint-Denis is more likely to frame issues in social-class- terminology than to develop an approach based on ethnicity.

**General/Specific**

Mainstreaming immigrant integration is not a new concept for France. Specific policies that do exist predominantly target newly arrivals during their first five years in France (since 2008/2009). Both in education and social cohesion, these measures are often aimed at a quick mastering of the French language, and secondly republican values. Other specific schemes are always implemented ‘behind the scenes’ and if not, they are often controversial. Many French policies are centred on priority neighbourhoods, for example in education these areas receive more staff and funding, and Politique de la ville forms an important part of the strategy regarding social cohesion. Affirmative actions are used in some instances, for example in Lyon with regard to the school-to-work transition. Nevertheless, both municipalities agree that area-based policies are preferred. A second mainstreaming approach can be recognized in anti-discrimination policies aimed at increasing overall equality instead of just integration. In some cases, such as in Saint-Denis, this may lead to other priorities, such as gender discrimination or class inequalities instead of ethnic discrimination. However, anti-discrimination policies in Lyon have led to ethnic discrimination being explicitly addressed. The difficulty is to sufficiently distinguish between anti-discrimination and

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6 Such as in the case of ELCO, education in immigrants’ mother tongue: given outside regular school hours by teachers appointed by their ‘home country’ and co-financed by the Ministry and the home country. The controversies are focused on the provision of ‘separate’ education and encouraging Islamic values.

7 These policies will be more efficient, are more universal, decrease the risk of stigmatization, carry greater legitimacy (as an established policy method) and will trigger less doubts and criticism about the skills of the beneficiary groups.
integration policies on the one hand and priority-neighbourhood policies on the other hand; the line between these policy-fields is often blurred.

**State-centric/Poly-centric**

The connection between mainstreaming and a poly-centric mode of governance is best recognisable in education: organizing educational priority areas involves a great range of public actors at all levels and in different sectors, as well as non-state actors, while specific (recipient) policies are often seen as stand-alone policies ordered by the national (governmental) actors and implemented by a specific school without much coordination. In general, integration-related policies are mainly issued by the French national government. However, some elements of deconcentration and decentralisation can be distinguished. At the national level, the dispersed responsibilities are scattered amongst multiple policy domains. An inter-ministerial committee for integration was created in 1990 to reinforce coordination\(^8\), but did not entirely succeed. Acsé (the national agency for social cohesion and equal opportunities) and its predecessors aimed at financing national and local NGOs in several policy fields and thereby increased the deconcentration of governance. PRIPI and PDI are examples of regional and local optional programmes aimed at adaptation to local needs and contexts of the nationally set framework and objectives. Cities are also allowed to set up their own additional policies. However, municipalities have very limited possibilities to influence how integration and diversity issues are handled in schools and in general these initiatives are confined within the general frame of the French assimilationist/republican model. Therefore we can conclude that in case of generic policies, some forms of poly-centric governance can be distinguished, but the state-centric model is still dominant due to the importance of the national government in issuing social and educational policies.

**Conclusion**

The French Republican framing has heavily influenced their monist perspective on society. Following the egalitarian perspective based on colour-blindness, the assimilationist approach to immigrant integration has been prevalent throughout the past decades. Mainstreaming is therefore not recognisable as a new trend. It is implemented primarily by area-based policies (such as priority neighbourhoods and politque de la ville’s) and via anti-discrimination policies, focussing on all different kinds of discrimination. However, instances of ethnic discrimination are not always acknowledged or identified since the French national system does not collect systematic statistics on this topic. In addition, the governance of immigrant integration in France can be identified as being more state-centric than poly-centric, whereby deconcentration is more institutionalized than decentralisation.

2.6 Spain

In comparison to other Northern countries, Spain can be defined as a ‘new international immigration country’. Before the year 2000, Spain had for decades been a source of migrants both to North-Western Europe and Latin America. This clearly changed in the year 2000. From then on, Spain became one of the main European destinations for immigrants due to the needs of Spanish local markets regarding the expansion of the housing bubble. As a result the share of foreigners among the Spanish

\(^8\) It only met three times: starting in the early 1990s, once in 2003 and once in 2006.
population increased from 2% at the end of the 1990s to more than 12% in 2011 (the peak of the immigration process). The massive influx of immigrants has strongly affected the make-up of its active population and population age structures. The immigrants present in the country come from three main regions. The first two (South America and Morocco) are traditional regions of origin of immigrants in Spain. The third, very recent region of origin is Eastern Europe, especially Romania and Bulgaria. However, the length of the economic crisis has led to the emigration of many of the immigrants who arrived during the previous decade. As a result, the share of foreigners has fallen to 10.7% in 2014. Nevertheless, the massive migratory flows have given rise in Spain to real political, economic and social concerns regarding the ability of society to successfully incorporate all of the newcomers.

Given this very recent and intense migration process, Spain provides a relevant testing ground for the explanatory frameworks used in mainstreaming. In Spain the local and regional context are particularly relevant in the development of immigrant integration policies. Rather than being centrally coordinated, policies have developed from the local level and are subsequently brought together at the national level. Mainstreaming in this context is mainly a local and internal affair, as mainstreaming is not explicitly spoken of, though certain trends of mainstreaming can be recognized.

**Madrid and Barcelona**

Madrid experienced a dramatic change in the first decade of the 21st century. From being one of the greatest European cities with the highest rates of economic and population growth, it has suffered from one of the highest percentages of unemployment (21.5% according to Census 2011) because of the crisis, from 2008. Overall, the urban region of Madrid has grown considerably. This rapid growth is the result of a migration process including people who gained Spanish nationality. Thus, although in 2014 foreign nationals represented 13.2% of the population in real terms, the total of immigrants including those naturalized exceeded 19.6%. This entire population (62.3% of which was born in America) has played a decisive role in the growth of the population of the entire region and in the change of its social structure.

Throughout these years, the major changes in Madrid's population influenced the increase in social inequality. The importance of two specific categories must be highlighted in this regard. On the one hand, we have the expansion of the group consisting of professionals. On the other hand, we have the increasing, ongoing high numbers of foreign workers over the period in question who are often either unemployed or employed within the category of service and sales workers.

Barcelona has a long tradition of immigration reception. During the 20th century many rural workers came to this city from other Spanish regions. However, since the beginning of the 21st century, population growth in Barcelona has been entirely due to the arrival of immigrants from other countries. In 2014, 21.7% of the total population was represented by people born abroad (mainly from South America but there was also a remarkable percentage of people from Europe and Asia), although some of them have obtained Spanish nationality (4.7% of the total population). The percentage of the foreign population is higher than in Madrid because the latter includes within its territory some peripheral neighbourhoods of the kind where immigrants do not usually settle. In the case of Barcelona, these kinds of territories correspond to different municipalities for geographical reasons. The impact of the economic crisis has produced a high rate of unemployment (21.7% according to Census 2011) within the working population of Barcelona. This situation is especially harmful to the immigrants as most of them belong to the most vulnerable social groups within Barcelona.
Monist/Pluralist
In comparison to other European countries attitudes towards migrants are rather positive and immigrant integration has been a little contested topic so far. On the whole there is relatively high diversity awareness, although more assimilationist policies and orientations can be seen in educational and urban planning. Despite the positive attitudes towards immigrant integration, it is possible to identify a twofold approach to integration policies. At the national level the predominant approach to integration is ‘assimilation’, since a monistic perspective on society can be observed in education and urban planning among newly arrivals. However, at the local level there is a prevalence of pluralist policies. Examples of pluralist policies include mediation programs facilitating diversity in Madrid and intercultural diversity programs in Barcelona. Both examples are inclusively targeted at the entire population.

Monist and pluralist policies typically coexist. However, as immigration is becoming a more stable phenomenon in Spanish society, pluralism seems to be becoming an increasingly important factor within generic policy fields such as education. In general interculturalisation is being adopted as a major concept in local policymaking, with generic policies such as 'Intercultural City Barcelona' targeting the diversity of the population. As mentioned above, the particular pluralist context of Barcelona as part of the Catalan region should be taken into account here.

General/Specific
The first specific integration policies were implemented by local governments in the 1990s, after being initiated by local governments, social organizations and the regional government. Since then local and regional governments have adopted plans to improve coordination between the localized integration policies. The policies are both generic and specific in character. In general though, specific immigrant integration policies only make up a small proportion of all policies, and therefore most policies affecting immigrants, such as the inclusion of immigrants in additional educational policies, are generic. The attention for migrants depends largely on the generic frames of health and education policies, and migration departments are considered as being complementary to this.

With the current disappearance of specific programs the trend towards generic policies is being reinforced. While generic and specific policies were previously rather separated, with specific policies exclusively focusing on diversity and migration through e.g. language policies, this differentiation is vanishing with the trend towards generic and more inclusive policies, as diversity becomes a generic concern of the whole society. Another factor to explain the development of generic programmes is the economic crisis, with budget cuts affecting specific programs aimed at migrants. In other cases, political factors and the ‘fear to put migrants into a privileged position’ in the eyes of non-migrants, is putting pressure on decision makers, who want to abandon specific measures in order to avoid antagonising social opinion.

State-Centric/Poly-Centric
In line with the Spanish decentralized political system, immigrant integration policies have always developed strongly from the local level, followed by the national coordination of these policies, as can be observed in the National Integration Plan adopted by central government in 1994 and the 2007 Plan for Citizenship and Integration (PECI). These policy measures generally also involve several non-
state actors. Locally, integration policies develop in collaboration between the local and regional government and social organisations in the area. Non-state actors are also closely involved in the national regulation of policies, such as the Forum for the Social Integration of Immigrants, a tripartite consultative body of NGOs, immigrant associations and regional, municipal and national governments.

These relations are being contested due to the financial crisis and the subsequent budget cuts in the field of social policies, such as the axing of the Fund for the Integration of Immigrants, which was set up to distribute funds between the central, regional and local level of governance, disturbing the vertical collaboration between these levels. Several NGOs and social partners have also disappeared due to budget cuts and shrinking resources. Taken together with changes in central legislation concerning social services, the national and regional levels of governance seem to have become more dominant in immigrant integration policy making, completing a trend towards centralization.

Conclusion
In comparison to older immigrant countries, Spain has relatively low levels of diversity. In contrast to other countries, the immigrant population consists mainly of first generation immigrants, but this group is growing and becoming increasingly diverse in terms of countries of origin and other characteristics. These relative levels of diversity seem to work in favour of mainstreaming.

In comparison to other European countries attitudes towards migrants are rather positive and immigrant integration has so far been a little contested topic. While specific and generic policies previously coexisted alongside each other, the economic recession is reducing specific policies and organizations working on immigrant integration due to decreasing funds. At the same time, generic policies are being explicitly phrased in more inclusive terms. This resonates with the plural character of certain Spanish regions, such as the Catalonian region, even prior to international migration. Finally, the trend towards generic and inclusive policies seems to be going hand-in-hand with the centralization of the governance of these policies while the role of NGOs is being challenged, in contrast to the strong Spanish local tradition of immigrant integration policies.

2.7 Conclusions
This chapter provided an overview of findings from the EU and country case studies. This involves in particular findings concerning the different forms of mainstreaming that are found in these cases, which provides the basis for the comparative analysis in the subsequent chapter. Table 2 provides a brief summary of main findings per case.

What this chapter has made clear in particular is that mainstreaming should not be considered as a clear and uniform trend across the cases. Instead, there is significant variation between the countries, both in terms of the current state of mainstreaming, as well as current policy trends. In particular, differences remain significant in terms of whether integration governance, even if being mainstreamed, is oriented at monism or pluralism. Whereas in countries like Spain and the UK, as well as on the EU level, mainstreaming stands for an approach that seeks to recognize diversity, in many of the other cases mainstreaming does not have a clear orientation towards diversity. In some cases, mainstreaming stands for retrenchment, or for an approach that attributes responsibility primarily to the individual migrant.
In contrast, there is more commonality between the cases in terms of the trend toward generic rather than target group specific policies, as well as the trend toward poly-centric governance. Although this is happening to different degrees in different countries, most countries have been exchanging specific policies for specific migrant groups for a more generic approach. Also, in most countries we see a trend away from state-centric governance modes, toward deconcentration and decentralisation in particular. In the next chapter, we will attempt to explain these findings in more detail.

**Table 2: Summary of findings per case**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Monism/pluralism</th>
<th>Specific/generic</th>
<th>Poly-centric?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Monist orientation, but more pluralism at local level</td>
<td>Generic policies (area-based) and specific policies targeted at newcomers</td>
<td>State-centric, but slight trend toward localization; no deconcentration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Pluralist at the local level, mixture of pluralism and monism at the national level</td>
<td>Mainly generic (area-based) policies, some specific measures</td>
<td>Poly-centric (deconcentration as well as decentralisation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nether-lands</td>
<td>Monist orientation, local level slightly more pluralist oriented</td>
<td>(strong move to) Generic policies (area- as well as needs-based)</td>
<td>Poly-centric (deconcentration as well as decentralisation), retrenchment of national government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Monist orientation, some pluralism in large cities</td>
<td>Generic (‘accidental), and Specific policies where needed</td>
<td>Poly centric (deconcentration as well as decentralisation), strong role of NGO’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Monist as well as pluralist elements</td>
<td>Mixture of generic and specific policies</td>
<td>Poly centric (deconcentration as well as decentralisation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Recognizing diversity (traces of interculturalism)</td>
<td>Generic as well as specific elements</td>
<td>Poly-centric per definition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Politics of mainstreaming

This chapter provides a comparative analysis of the country and EU findings as presented in chapter 2. The comparison is structured along the three basic questions of this report: what is mainstreamed? And how and why is this being done? This comparison is structured along the conceptual and theoretical framework outlined in chapter one (and in the conceptual report on mainstreaming by Van Breugel, Maan & Scholten 2014). The question of what mainstreaming is, will relate the cases to the typology of integration governance that we have developed to situate mainstreaming as a policy strategy. For the question of how mainstreaming takes place, we will compare the actors, frames, decision moments and focus events that may have played a role in the process of mainstreaming in the different cases. Finally, to answer why mainstreaming takes place, we will assess a number of variables regarding problem setting, policy context and political context that may explain why mainstreaming has or has not taken place in specific settings (or for instance, why it has taken place in specific ways).

3.1 What is mainstreaming? Comparing types of mainstreaming

The UPSTREAM project has developed a typology of mainstreaming (Van Breugel, Maan & Scholten 2014) which distinguishes between three elements of mainstreaming: the cultural perspective on society (monist, pluralist), the targeting of policies (group-specific or generic) and the governance structure (state-centric or policy-centric). How do the different cases examined in this project compare in terms of these three elements? And what patterns can be identified in this respect; is there a single trend in terms of mainstreaming in all the cases, or are there multiple interpretations of mainstreaming and different strategies of how to implement mainstreaming? And how does the EU case relate to the country and city cases in this respect?

3.1.1 Cultural perspectives; mainstreaming lacks an explicit diversity orientation

Especially in interculturalist literature an association is made between mainstreaming and a pluralist view on society, entailing a whole-society approach that embraces diversity. Based on this literature, one would expect mainstreaming to take place primarily in countries with a pluralist orientation. Our findings do not support this expectation, as mainstreaming appears in many cases to be associated with a more monist perspective. In various cases, mainstreaming did not so much involve a whole society approach oriented at acceptance of diversity and plurality, but rather an approach driven by the desire to stress the need for cohesion within a whole society perspective.

In fact, in some cases, such as Poland, the Netherlands and France in particular, mainstreaming was associated with a denial of society’s plurality. In spite of bearing the clear characteristics of a super-diverse society, French society is framed as monist because the Republican principle of equality prohibits any type of distinction between French citizens – recognising all immigrants primarily and solely as French citizens⁹. Mainstreaming is driven by this concern for unity rather than acceptance of plurality. The Polish cultural perspective is shaped by its history of Communism, portraying an image of a homogenous nation. While Poland has opened up to significant

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⁹ Only distinguishing newly arrived immigrants during the first 5 years of settlement in France.
immigration since then, there still is little recognition of diversity, particularly at the national level. In the Netherlands, the clear policy trend of mainstreaming has been driven by an urge to abandon attention to specific groups rather than embracing diversity of society at large; rather, mainstreaming provides a policy strategy for ignoring diversity and retrenching from migrant integration policies.

Only in the UK and to some extent Spain, do we find the correlation between mainstreaming and a whole society approach embracing diversity that we expected based on interculturalist studies. The UK explicitly reframed its diversity policies around the concept of super-diversity in response to the 2005 London bombings. While the previous multicultural frame in the UK had developed primarily at the local level, the redefinition of its policies in terms of super-diversity was very explicitly initiated from the national level. However, important in this context is that policies oriented at super-diversity in the UK are framed primarily as local rather than national policies. Also in the Spanish case, elements of pluralism and monism appear to be combined, fed by a general positive attitude towards diversity in Spain. In Spain too, however, explicit attention to diversity seems to be waning, especially due to the economic crisis.

Whereas an association between mainstreaming and plurality seems rather absent at the national level, except perhaps in the UK, this association appears much more evident at the local level. At least, at the level of larger cities of migration that have been examined in this project. For instance, while the French and Polish monist frame of society are applied rather consistently at the local level the cases of Warsaw and Lyon do show slightly diverging patterns here, with attention for ethnic discrimination (Lyon) and attempts to propagate the city’s diversity (‘Diverse Warsaw’). Also in the Netherlands, citizenship programs at the local level seem more oriented towards a plural understanding of society as a whole (for instance ‘We are all Amsterdammers’). In Spain, both Madrid and Barcelona as diverse cities take active interculturalist approaches. It is at the city level that sensitivity for the (slightly more) diverse composition comes to light, showing traces of a pluralist stance on society.

A pluralist orientation is clearly evident in the EU approach to mainstreaming. This is evident in the clear framing of integration as a two-way process and also in the very concrete emphasis on diversity and enhancing cultural understanding as part of educational programs supported by the EU.

3.1.2 Policy targeting: mainstreaming as a strong trend toward generic policies

Whereas mainstreaming does not appear to involve a clear trend toward a whole society approach that accepts diversity, we do find much more evidence for a trend toward generic policies. Of course, in some countries, most particularly in France, a generic rather than a group-specific approach to integration has been in place for decades. Also in new immigration countries like Poland and Spain, there is no clear precedent in terms of specific group policies. However, a trend toward more generic policies could also clearly be identified in countries that had been renowned for their group specific policies in the past, the UK and the Netherlands. However, we also find that in many cases such generic policies involve explicit proxy strategies, making sure that specific groups are still targeted but without framing this explicitly.

France is most known for its traditional generic (Republicanist) frame of integration, prohibiting any type of distinction between French citizens according to race, origins or religion in favour of colour-blind policies. Apart from policies related to newly arriving immigrants, no policies are specifically related to immigration or integration. Instead policies are framed in generic terms, such as
the priority neighbourhood programs (Politique de Ville) and anti-discrimination programs strongly based on the equality framework. Specific measures are considered controversial, and if applied at all they tend to take place behind the scenes. The national Republican frame also strongly informs policies at the local level, though these place their own emphasis within the equality framework. Lyon tends to be more involved with issues of ethnic discrimination and some traces of affirmative action are recognisable in its education policies.

While based in a very different tradition, Polish immigrant integration policies are also primarily formulated in generic terms. This, however, is often not so much a conscious choice but should rather be understood as ‘accidental mainstreaming’. Due to the low priority of diversity and integration issues these are not addressed specifically but rather collectively addressed in social cohesion or education policies, if they are addressed at all. However, this rather points at the lack of a tradition of integration policies than a conscious choice in how to address these issues by the national government. After all, when necessary, there seems to be little resistance to specific policies. A slightly more mixed picture is drawn at the local level, with more attention for diversity and a mix of specific and generic policies. In the field of education, both locally as well as nationally, specific language programs for traditional minority-languages are offered.

While France and Poland are typified by their (non-)history of generic policies, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands have only recently moved in this direction, each departing from their own tradition of multicultural policies. In the United Kingdom the social inclusion frame was replaced by the social mobility strategy in 2012. Specific policies targeted at, inter alia, migrants have been replaced by a more individual approach aimed at social mobility. In the field of social cohesion this translates into area-based proxy strategies such as the community cohesion framework. In the field of education the move to generic policies mainly entails a move away from specific policies, moving away from special language programs (EAL) and replacing the Ethnic Minority Achievement grant with the more needs-based generic 'Dedicated School Grant'. In the Netherlands we see a similar pattern. Initially driven by increasing diversity, accelerated under strong political pressure, immigrant integration policies have moved away from the former multicultural emancipatory specific policies towards a more generic frame, with a stronger emphasis on the individual’s responsibility to integrate. In both countries education policies are being replaced in line with needs-based terms, focusing on deprived or disadvantaged students in general, while social cohesion policies tend to refocus from specific groups to disadvantaged areas, targeting vulnerable neighbourhoods instead.

The generic framing of policies regarding migrant integration at EU level has a very specific background. The EU hardly has any direct competencies in the area of migrant integration (apart from a number of important spin-offs from EU migration and anti-discrimination policies). As Petrovic and Collett (2014) mention, this has been an important factor behind the mainstreaming of EU policies in this domain; as far as migrant integration is addressed at all, it is through generic measures in fields such as education and social inclusion rather than direct and specific measures. The politicization of migrant integration at the national level has only spurred this development further, with governments like the Netherlands playing an important role in making sure that in as far as EU policies are formulated in this area, this is done so in a mainstreamed way. Although in the 2000s integration had clearly been put on the EU agenda, recent developments suggest that integration has faded off the EU agenda, also in response to pressure from EU member states.

In spite of the strong trend away from explicitly targeted policies to a more generic approach
to integration across all the cases studied, we also found clear ‘proxy strategies.’ This involves strategies where group definitions are replaced by area-based or needs-based definitions of policy targets. However, in practice, the policy often continues to address more or less the same groups. Take, for example, the Politique de Ville in France and the Priority zones in particular, which continue to address the very same neighbourhoods where immigrants are overrepresented, but only without framing the policies explicitly so. The same goes for the Dutch approach toward disadvantaged neighbourhoods and the financing structure for schools, and for the Spanish approach to old Integrated Renewal Areas (ARI). Also at the EU level, policies are formulated primarily in ‘colour-blind’ or generic terms, including policies aimed at specific groups (children, youth, elderly, gender) that may also indirectly address migrants, or policies aimed at specific barriers, needs or issues (such as early school leaving, poverty, low-income households, access to employment and services, access to higher education) that may be faced in particular by migrants. However, the question of whether this effectively ‘reaches’ migrants, or whether such measures imply that migrant integration is no longer a priority, is something that will be studied empirically in WP4 of the UPSTREAM project.

3.1.3 Poly-centric Governance; a strong trend of decentralisation and deconcentration

Thirdly, we also argued that besides its substantive meaning as a concept that refers to changes in policy content, mainstreaming also has a governance meaning referring to changes in how policies are organized. With reference to this governance dimension, we distinguish between decentralisation, or the shift of policy responsibilities between the national and the local level, and deconcentration, or the distribution of policy responsibilities between departments or (non)-governmental organizations.

We found evidence in almost all cases of a trend toward more multi-level governance, involving in particular a more prominent role of the local level. In some countries, like Spain and the UK, the local level had already been prominent in the domain of integration. However, a similar trend toward localization can be found in traditionally more state-centric countries like the Netherlands, France and Poland. While in the Netherlands the move towards mainstreaming goes hand-in-hand with a decentralisation of policy responsibilities, in the UK the move towards the mainstreamed ‘Big Society’ approach was initiated specifically from the national level. In contradiction to the previous multicultural frame of the UK that was strongly developed at the local level, the current mainstreamed community cohesion frame is initiated from the Home Office at the national level. While there is still a strong emphasis on implementation at the local level, the frame is now more coherently utilized from the national level. However, as the launch of this Big Society philosophy has coincided with austerity measures, the plan is often perceived in terms of financial cuts rather than the community cohesion frame. While also taking place within a context of austerity measures, the Dutch development of mainstreaming is moving in the opposite direction in terms of state and poly-centric governance. While the Dutch multicultural model was strongly informed from the national level, policy responsibilities are currently being increasingly decentralized to the local level. When looking at the development of mainstreaming, cities such as Rotterdam and Amsterdam seem ahead of the national level in addressing their super-diverse population and developing generic frames of citizenship policies. Even in France, traditionally one of the strongest state-centric countries in Europe, it is evident that the focus of many integration measures are focused primarily at the local level, for instance in the ‘Politique de Ville’. Spain has a longer tradition of cooperation between national and local (and regional) governments. However, this has been challenged over the last decade by the economic crisis, leading to the demise of several national funding schemes.
In most cases, except perhaps for the state-centric French case, a trend toward deconcentration of policy amongst a larger group of governmental and non-governmental actors is also becoming manifest. In Poland non-governmental organizations play an important role in the formation and implementation of immigrant integration policies. These organizations focus on implementing recommendations from the EU level, in cooperation with the local level. Due to the relative absence of national immigrant integration policies in Poland, the influence of the EU is most clearly recognizable here in comparison to the other country cases. In France immigrant integration policies are implemented in a multiple-field setting, with governmental agencies like the (former) Acé (National Agency for social cohesion and equal opportunities) playing an important role.

However, deconcentration also brings challenges in terms of coordination. Policy developments in Rotterdam illustrate that a too narrow and strict move to generic policies risks diluting the issue of integration altogether, as this is not automatically picked up by other departments. Only after a report on local immigrant integration policies was the issue re-addressed and actively coordinated between departments and actors. While immigrant integration policies in the Netherlands have been deconcentrated between departments since the early nineties, there are now plans to reduce the budget at national level to zero in 2015. Whether the remaining ‘knowledge structure’ will be adequate to guarantee that immigrant integration will be sufficiently addressed remains to be seen, and this so-called risk of decoupling is typical of the development of deconcentration and mainstreaming across the researched cases.

3.1.4 Conclusion

When applying the three dimensions of mainstreaming (pluralism, generic targeting, and poly-centric governance) to a comparison between EU and country cases, we found some similarities in terms of what mainstreaming means in these cases. Particularly, we found a clear trend toward generic policies, away from group-specific policies as have been in place in countries like the UK and the Netherlands in the past. Interestingly, for the new immigration countries, like Poland and Spain, this means that the integration policies that are being developed immediately are being shaped as generic rather than specific policies. However, in spite of this clear trend, we also found that many generic policies involved proxy strategies: targeting policies on an area or needs-based orientation rather than a group orientation, but in practice still addressing more or less the same groups. In particular, the targeting of specific neighbourhoods is a clear example of this, and could be found across all cases.

We also found that mainstreaming has a clear governance connotation, referring to a trend toward poly-centric governance. In most cases, even to some extent in France, we found decentralisation to local governments as well as deconcentration to various governmental and non-governmental actors. This means that integration governance has become a multi-level concern involving multiple actors within the governmental sphere and beyond, signalling the growing complexity of governance in this area and a retreat from the model whereby a single policy agency was responsible for all policy coordination. This governance mainstreaming also poses a challenge to integration governance, especially in terms of coordination across levels and between actors. There is a clear risk, as signalled in several cases, that levels are being ‘decoupled’ or that there is a lack of a coherent policy message being coordinated amongst different stakeholders.

What we did not find was an association between mainstreaming and a whole society
approach for accepting diversity. At least, not for the national level. In fact, we found that in some countries, particularly in France and the Netherlands, mainstreaming was associated with a desire to stress cohesion rather than diversity, and to even ignore diversity to some extent. Only in the UK, was a relation found between mainstreaming and an emerging focus on super-diversity. However, this can also be seen as being due to the decentralisation of policies in the UK. In fact, we generally found that the relation between mainstreaming and a diversity orientation applied to cities across all of the various cases, including Lyon, Warsaw and Amsterdam.

When making comparisons between the countries, it becomes clear that mainstreaming only involves a single trend in generic integration policies and poly-centric governance. It only appears to be associated with a diversity orientation at the local level. Remarkably, this applies across all the different cases examined, including the relatively new immigration countries (Spain, Poland) as well as the ‘old’ immigration countries (UK, France, the Netherlands). France stands out from the other cases in that having a generic approach is not so much something new, although the (somewhat more modest than in other countries) trend toward poly-centric governance is. The UK and the Netherlands stand out in that their break with the group-specific policies of the past is perhaps the most pronounced. The EU case stands out in that it not only supports poly-centric governance and generic policies, but also the more interculturalist diversity orientation that is also manifest at the local level.

3.2 How? Comparing mainstreaming processes

After having assessed what forms of mainstreaming can be identified in the different cases, this chapter focuses on how these forms of mainstreaming arose. More specifically, it identifies factors that contributed to or obstructed the mainstreaming of integration governance. In doing this, it will focus on four overarching factors that may have played a role in mainstreaming as a policy process: policy frames, (key) actors, main decision moments and focus events. The aim of this chapter is to assess if there are general patterns in terms of the (social/policy/political) process of mainstreaming.

3.2.1 Framing: equality at the national level, super-diversity at the local level

First of all, we will address the policy frames that are being mobilized in the various cases. Which frames are being used as rationales for mainstreaming or deciding not to mainstream in specific circumstances? Analysing such frames will provide a better understanding of the conditions under which mainstreaming may or may not be opportune. Note that this refers to frames that are used in actual policy discourses in the studied cases as rationales for mainstreaming, which is different from the more theoretical explanations for mainstreaming that we will develop later in 3.3.

What stands out from our findings is that an equality and anti-discrimination frame is most conducive toward mainstreaming immigrant integration. This frame is prominent in France, but also increasingly recognisable in the UK, the Netherlands and Poland. Needs-based or area-based measures aimed at combatting socio-economic inequalities are considered the most appropriate policy tools within this context. The area-based neighbourhood measures are dominant in French policies regarding the Politique de la Ville and Priority Education Zones. However, area-based policies are increasingly recognisable in the UK (neighbourhood renewal policy frame) and the Netherlands (social cohesion policies in particular are becoming increasingly neighbourhood oriented, as illustrated, for example, by the krachtwijken approach in the Netherlands). In all of the countries, needs-based
policies are being installed that are often kept separate from integration policies (e.g. the social inclusion or social mobility agenda in the UK). Overall, the equality approach is considered less stigmatizing than specific schemes targeting immigrants. In France, these measures exemplify old policy tools that carry greater legitimacy than race-specific policies and the pursuit of equality is considered a universal policy (which consequently legitimizes it). The UK, the Netherlands and also Saint-Denis (France, city-level) believe that an equality approach rather than preconceived categories ‘puts the money where the need is’ and, therefore, these methods are chosen from a pragmatic perspective. Likewise, The EU often implements an equality frame, only ‘recognizing’ vulnerable groups, while emphasizing that no specific policy should be focused on them. The choice for ‘vulnerable’ avoids overt stigmatization and prioritization of particular groups, but subsequently runs the risk of carrying little effective weight.

Thus, the equality framework appears to be a strong factor promoting mainstreaming in many countries. By focussing on areas or needs, immigrants may be implicitly (or explicitly) targeted, while not being an explicit target group. However, the striving for equal opportunities may lead to specific targeted policies as well. This is illustrated by the case of Amsterdam, which for a long time argued for the need for additional assistance for immigrants in order to achieve a truly equal position.

Another policy frame that emerged in several cases involves a frame that emphasizes ‘individual responsibility’ in the context of migrant integration. This frame can be both conducive and obstructive to mainstreaming. Framing language comprehension as a ‘duty’ (UK), obligatory civic integration courses (NL) or contracts stating the acceptance of the laws and values of the Republic and the intention to attend linguistic and civic courses (CAI, France) are examples of policy measures drawn up from the perspective that immigrant are themselves responsible for their integration. This frame is often used in the assimilationist notion of integration, which is especially recognisable in France, but also in the Netherlands and partially in the UK. In this context, migrants’ willingness and efforts are held to be central to their integration, and their adaptation to the host-society is perceived as a one-sided effort. This approach illustrates a monist perspective on society. Following this situation, policies can be formulated generically because the immigrants are responsible themselves for keeping up with the rest of the population. Consequently, policies are mainstreamed in only this perspective, but often lack the other characteristics of inclusiveness. Another approach to this frame is more individualistic, less focused on explicit migrants’ responsibilities and emphasizing everyone’s responsibility to be able to participate in society. This approach can be recognized in frames such as the UK’s ‘big society’ and the Dutch ‘participatory society’.

Thirdly, the frame of super-diversity is often mentioned either explicitly or implicitly as a (discursive) explanation for why generic policies are needed. This means that targeted policies would have become increasingly impossible to implement due to the hyphenation of citizens and the large number of characteristics that have to be taken into account. This argument is echoed mostly in the Netherlands (for example when changing the education funding system) and the UK (the shift away from the race relations model). However, the super-diversity frame seems to be best applicable at the local level. Cities (or boroughs), such as Southwark (UK), Saint-Denis (FA), Rotterdam and Amsterdam (NL), increasingly emphasize that diversity is perceived as the norm, leading to a situation in which the distinction between immigrant and native citizen has lost its meaning. This situation leads to the feeling that the needs of immigrants are de-facto addressed by generic policies. However, unless the city
collects data on policy outcomes, it will remain unclear whether generic policies are also addressing the specific needs of immigrants.

Finally, official integration policies are increasingly limited to *immigrant reception policies*. Following this limitation, socio-economic and socio-cultural integration are mainstreamed into other policy fields. This trend is recognisable in all countries, as well as at EU level. At EU level, border-management, asylum and the free movement of people has risen on the agenda, whereas immigrant integration has declined as a priority. In the UK, the approach to immigrant integration policies is twofold, aiming at equality policies for those within the countries, but increasingly enforcing strict borders. Also, many political debates are centred on the ‘influx’ of migrants into the country. Likewise, the Polish government focuses mostly on regulations concerning residence and work permits. Due to the low percentage of immigrants and narrow range of origins, a general lack of interest in immigrant integration is recognisable especially at the national level, to which immigrant entrance policies seem to be the only exception. Finally, in France and the Netherlands (especially during the assimilationist turn) immigrant reception, such as civic integration courses, is perceived as the main focus and eventually the exclusive dimension of official integration policies. This approach to integration policies does offer an opportunity to implement a mainstreaming approach to the socio-cultural and socio-economic integration of migrants.

### 3.2.2 Actors: EU and national politics as driving actors behind mainstreaming

Besides frames, we also examined what types of actors were involved in the process of mainstreaming, either encouraging mainstreaming or advocating alternative policy strategies. Is mainstreaming driven by political actors, or is it a development driven rather by other actors such as policy officials, NGOs and street level bureaucrats? Is mainstreaming driven by national actors, or has it been spurred rather by local actors or by developments at the EU level?

Overall, we see that political actors were often strongly involved in advocating integration governance mainstreaming. In various cases, developments in the political setting were important incentives for mainstreaming. Elections may play an important role in this respect. Clear examples are the ‘re-foundation’ of French immigrant integration policies after the 2012/2013 elections or, at the local level, the presence or absence of Liveable Rotterdam in the coalition, which resulted in significant changes in policy frames and approaches to immigrant integration. In both the Netherlands and France, politicization of migrant integration seems to have contributed to a demand for more mainstreaming, either in the form of the French republican model or in Dutch retrenchment from integration policies.

Furthermore, in several cases we found that research institutes or committees have also had an important role in the process, even though they do not always advocate mainstreaming per se. This applies in particular to the UK and the Netherlands. For example, in the UK, reports such as the Swann report and Parekh report led to more multiculturalist policies and the Cantle report introduced the community cohesion approach in the UK. In the Netherlands, Scheffer’s article entitled ‘The Multicultural Drama’ resulted in the multiculturalism backlash at the Dutch national level. On the other hand, many reports that focus on more explicit policies are influential as well, such as the Dutch WRR report regarding the re-framing of early leavers as ‘overloaded students’ rather than focussing on ethnic categories. However, reports may also lead to political controversies, as happened when a French advisory report suggested abolishing the ban on headscarves, when the Parekh report stated that “Britishness as much as Englishness has systematic, largely unspoken racial connotations” (Parekh,
2000, p.38) and when the Rotterdam Bureau of Statistics published a prognosis of future city-demographics that was interpreted by a politician of Liveable Rotterdam as a disturbing trend that should be interrupted by an ‘immigrant-stop’ (‘allochtonenstop’) or a ‘fence around Rotterdam’. However, although it seems that research institutes may sometimes be important actors in changing policies, acceptance of specific reports and the associated proposed policy measures is highly dependent on the match with the current policy frame. Reports which do not fit the political frame are more often disregarded, as is the case with the advisory reports on the re-foundation of integration policy in France.

Finally, the EU Member state nexus is of particular interest when discussing actors involved in the mainstreaming of immigrant integration. New immigration countries, such as Poland, experience substantial influence by the EU on their integration policies. As our Polish case analysis shows, incentives provided in a European setting via funding schemes such as the European Integration Fund have been an important driving factor behind Polish policy initiatives. Sometimes even more than domestic problem awareness in Poland itself. Important in the context of this project, is that this external incentive structure provided by the EU also promotes mainstreaming as one of the EU’s common basic principles of integration. The influence of such EU schemes on developments in the ‘old’ immigration countries like France, the UK and the Netherlands seems more limited. However, here too the EU has been an important engine of exchanging knowledge and best practices in terms of migrant integration at the city level in particular, amongst others in networks such as Eurocities and the European Migration Network. In return, member states try to influence EU policies regarding immigrant integration. This was made apparent, for example, in the role that the Dutch government played in the formulation of the Common Basic Principles, in which mainstreaming was explicitly framed as one of the principles. However, Denmark’s and Germany's resistance to the inclusion of mainstreaming as one of the main principles was also successful. This example demonstrates that member states may be quite influential at the European level. The political climate in member states also influences the EU’s policy options. Increasing politicization and mediatization of the topic of immigrant integration in member states negatively influences the opportunities of the EU to address migrant-specific policies. The following paragraph (3.3 why?) will elaborate on the influence of national political climates on EU policies.

3.2.3 Decision moments; mainstreaming in the context of austerity and ethnic data

A third element that we looked at when reconstructing the process of mainstreaming integration governance, was whether there were key decision moments at which the choice whether or not to mainstream is taken. In particular, we looked at whether the decision to mainstream coincides with decisions taken in the context of the economic crisis that has haunted Europe since the late 2000s. Is there a relation between the decision to mainstream and austerity and retrenchment measures? Furthermore we looked at the availability of ethnic data and statistics, as one could imagine that the presence of such data would make group-specific issues more visible and consequently raise the urgency to have specific rather than mainstreamed policies. Does the availability or absence of ethnic data encourage or discourage mainstreaming?

We indeed found a clear relation between mainstreaming and austerity measures at the national level in the ‘old immigration countries.’ In the UK and the Netherlands, austerity measures and governmental retrenchment have led to a more poly-centric mode of governance, in which the role of the central and local government is re-positioned from executive partner to ‘inspiring and
enabling’ director. This role re-positioning is part of broader frames, such as ‘big society’ in the UK and the ‘participatory society’ in the Netherlands, which pay increasing attention to the empowerment of the voluntary sector, civil society and individuals. In this context, the reduction of budgets for specific integration departments has often resulted in a decisive step towards mainstreaming, sometimes even long after these frames have changed in favour of generic policies. For example, budgetary cuts have proved to be decisive in the ending of cooperation with migrant organizations (Rotterdam) or think-tanks (national level) in the Netherlands. In France, an ‘inter-ministerial delegate for integration and republican equality’ was installed as part of the ‘re-foundation’ of integration policies. This delegate will not be associated with a specific ministry and will not receive a dedicated budget in order to manage integration policies across all departments. In the context of austerity it was considered impossible to establish a specific integration institution with a dedicated budget.

Overall, governmental retrenchment and austerity measures appear to be conducive to mainstreaming immigrant integration. This influence is especially apparent with regard to the move towards poly-centric governance and the ending of specific-focused institutions or subsidy-relations. However, in a context of austerity and retrenchment, the active coordination and inclusiveness of immigrant integration policies may be ‘lost’ in the process, which instead results in just ‘letting go’ of budgets and integration policies as a whole. A clear case of just ‘letting go’ can be seen in Rotterdam, where the responsible department only realized that the budget cuts had led to the abolishment of specific policies and departments, without a replacing coordination mechanism following the publication of the ‘state of integration’ report. For example, statistical data or monitoring of migrants’ achievements may be used as a coordination method.

We did not find a relation between the availability or lack of ethnic data/statistics and the decision whether or not to mainstream. In the new immigration countries, hardly any ethnic statistics are available. Among the old immigration countries the Republican tradition in France has prevented the collection of ethnic statistics. The idea here is that by collecting ethnic-specific data, governments run the risk of stigmatizing and, therefore, reinforcing the categories that policies are trying to overcome. On the contrary, the EU, particularly the EC and DG Education, regularly invests in and make use of research, updates and evaluations on the position of children with migrant backgrounds in order to monitor specific performance gaps between migrant and native youth. Equally, statistical monitoring, including ethnic-specific data, is well developed at each governmental level in the Netherlands, and to some extent in the UK. Monitoring is deemed essential in order to maintain a good overview of the integration process and effects of generic policies. However, a decline in publicized ethnic-specific data is recognisable at the national level and in Rotterdam, whereas it has actually increased in Amsterdam. This increase may be the result of the more inclusive approach to mainstreaming in Amsterdam.

So, as mainstreaming has taken place both in cases with and without ethnic data and statistics, we cannot establish a meaningful relation between the availability of ethnic data and mainstreaming. However, collecting migrant-specific data could reinforce the inclusiveness of the mainstreaming-approach. In fact, this is something that will be examined in more detail in subsequent parts of this project; does the availability of ethnic statistics perhaps not influence the decision to mainstream, but influence its effectiveness by making explicit the effects that generic policies may have upon specific groups?
3.2.4 Focus events; impact on policy in general but not mainstreaming per se

Finally, we examined the role that specific incidents or ‘focus events’ may have played in the process of mainstreaming. We already know that migrant integration policy is typically a policy area where incidents such as terrorist attacks or urban riots have played an important role. However, have such events also spurred the process of mainstreaming per se?

In the context of this project, we found several key focus events that impacted the development of migrant integration policy in general. However, we could not identify a clear relation between these events and mainstreaming in particular. The London bombings of 2005, the 2004 bombings in Madrid and the murder of Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam in 2004 have been particularly important focus events in this sense. However, the differences in the political and policy responses to these incidents are especially noteworthy from a mainstreaming perspective. Whereas the bombings in the UK have had primarily national-level implications, the murder of Theo van Gogh proved to have particularly local implications. In addition, the UK response, as documented in the ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ program, has resulted in an entanglement of cohesion with homeland security and counter-terrorism policies. Funds were allocated to local authorities with significant Muslim populations and counter-radicalisation among Muslim youths was stated as a concrete goal. These measures have led to the stigmatisation of certain groups and resulted in an atmosphere of distrust and disengagement. In contrast, the municipality of Amsterdam started a comprehensive program called ‘We Amsterdammers’, which aimed to counteract radicalization by opposing discrimination and exclusion; avoiding polarization and mobilizing positive powers. Subsequently, the program has resulted in an emphasis on social cohesion, city citizenship, commonality and identification through mostly generic policies.

In the UK, local unrest such as the Milltown riots in northern English towns in 2001 also had a strong impact on integration policies in general, but not so much on mainstreaming in particular. These events did, however, trigger the policy change from multiculturalism to community cohesion. The framework of community cohesion focuses on promoting stronger bonds and shared values at the local level and operates through an area-based proxy for integration governance. Similarly in Bristol, a Race Equality and Community Cohesion Plan was developed in order to tackle tensions caused by rapid local population change, after disturbances occurred in the Barton Hill area in the summer of 2003. The Plan eventually led to a community cohesion strategy. Triggered by specific attention to problems of integration or social cohesion, this led to a package of initiatives largely targeting immigrants and minority communities. Eventually however, this perspective shifted to a focus on the wider community.

However, similar urban unrest in France, the ‘banlieues riots’ in 2005 but to some extent also the more recent Charlie Hebdo affair, only further strengthened the French resolve to continue its mainstreamed ‘Republicanist’ approach. These incidents were, in the specific French political and societal context, rather interpreted as signs that the Republicanist approach needed to be implemented with more vigour. This seems to support the conclusion that focus events do indeed have a strong effect on integration governance, but that there seems to be no generalizable effect on whether or not mainstreaming is adopted.

3.2.5 Conclusion

In this section we have tried to develop a better understanding of mainstreaming as a policy process; under what conditions, and in what way, was the decision whether or not to mainstream taken in the
selected cases? In particular, we looked at whether specific frames are used to legitimize mainstreaming, whether specific actors have played a key role and whether there have been key decision moments for taking the step toward mainstreaming, and finally at the role of focus events.

We found that the legitimation of mainstreaming is often framed in terms of equality and anti-discrimination. Having specific policies is taken as a signal of inequality and alleged to have potential discriminatory effects. In specific cases, this is combined with an individual responsibility frame, stressing that integration is primarily the responsibility of all (new) citizens themselves regardless of their ethnic, cultural or religious background. However, a different picture appears when looking at the rationale given at the local level for mainstreaming. Here, super-diversity as a frame emerges much more prominently than on the national level, stressing that mainstreaming is the most appropriate governance strategy given the essentially diverse nature of the city population. Interestingly, such local framing can be found in cities with very large migrant populations, such as London, Lyon and Barcelona, as well as in cities with relatively few migrants, such as Warsaw.

Political actors and politicians play an important role in the decision to mainstream, particularly on the national level. This applies especially to the ‘old’ immigration countries where integration governance has been a particularly politicized policy area in the national arena. This applies less to the ‘new’ immigration countries and the EU. There we see that EU initiatives (such as funding schemes and networks) play an important role in promoting mainstreaming. EU initiatives such as the European Integration Fund have not only spurred policy developments in these new immigration countries, but have also provided incentives for city collaboration on a broader scale within Europe. As such, at the city level the EU has also been an important actor in promoting mainstreaming.

Our project also shows that the decision to mainstream as taken in several of our cases cannot be separated from a broader context of austerity measures and retrenchment. This applies in particular to the ‘old’ immigration countries, where the relation between austerity measures and mainstreaming was a direct one, at least at the national level. We did not find any clear evidence that the presence or absence of ethnic statistics had any impact on the decision whether or not to mainstream; mainstreaming has taken place in countries with as well as without ethnic statistics. What remains to be seen, in subsequent parts of this project, is whether the availability of ethnic statistics helps monitor the effectiveness of generic policies in terms of impact on specific groups.

Finally, we found that focus events and incidents such as terrorist attacks and urban unrest, as encountered in particular in the ‘old’ immigration countries over the last decade, were not unequivocally conducive or non-conducive to mainstreaming.

3.3 Why? Explaining mainstreaming

After analysing the main patterns of what is mainstreamed and how, this section addresses the ‘why’ question. It aims to develop an explanation for why under specific circumstances, integration was or was not mainstreamed. Applying the multiple streams framework developed by Kingdon (2003), we will address a set of expectations on how developments in the problem, policy and political setting may trigger or prevent mainstreaming. These expectations were formulated by combining this framework with literature on super-diversity, integration policies and governance literature.

First of all, in the problem context, we expect that a longer history of migration and a high degree of diversity will increase the chance of mainstreaming immigrant integration policies. On the other hand however, we expect this chance to decrease when perceived integration problems are
prominent. Secondly, with regard to the policy background of the cases, we expect that experience with mainstreaming in other policy domains (referring to cross-pollination between departments) and the increasing influence of the economic crisis will stimulate mainstreaming, while countries or departments experienced in the use of specific policies may be less likely to switch to mainstreaming. Finally, with regard to the political influence on mainstreaming, increasing political and media attention and increasing populism around migration and integration debates make it more and more difficult to justify specific policies. Therefore, we expect these elements from the political context to be of influence on the decision to mainstream. Equally, individualization or in particular a diminishing tendency to organize in groups or communities, can be expected to lead to mainstreaming. We will describe our findings for each of these hypotheses below, and the main trends across the countries and for the European Union will be given conclusively.

3.3.1 Problem setting: problem developments spur mainstreaming only at the local level

The first stream to be discussed here is that of problem setting, explaining why issues are recognized as problems and how this leads to policy and political prioritization of mainstreaming in integration governance. The first aspect to be assessed concerns the expectation that a longer history of immigration, with different phases and groups of immigrants, increases the likelihood that integration policies will be mainstreamed. However, our findings show more variety in some aspects of the expected pattern. When it comes to mainstreaming as a trend from specific to generic policies, we can identify a pattern in our findings that matches this expectation. Distinguishing between France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom as old immigration countries, and Spain and Poland as new immigration countries, we can indeed observe that the old immigration countries are more inclined to adopt generic policies. France has a long history of generic integration policies. The Netherlands and the United Kingdom, on the other hand were both formerly known for their multicultural integration policies, and have since gone through different phases of integration policies. Mainstreaming is now considered the next, perhaps even inevitable, step. This is particularly recognisable at the local level, in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and the London borough of Southwark. This, however, translates mostly into a move to generic policies and does not necessarily entail the development of more inclusive policies. France also has a long history of immigration, but in contrast to the UK and the Netherlands, it has a tradition of generic integration policies, strongly informed by a Republican ideology which can be linked to mainstream targeting. While for France the history of generic integration policies means a continuation of this policy history, mainstreaming in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom can be understood as a move away from its previous specifically targeted policies.

For the new immigration countries, there appears to be a slight tendency to adopt more specific policies when addressing immediate immigrant needs. This might be explained by the fact that integration needs are new and more prominent, although the ‘young’ political context proves to be influential here too, as will be elaborated in the sections below. The pattern between the history of migration and mainstreaming does not emerge when looking at the relation between migration history and the monist or pluralist orientation of policy, or state-centric or poly-centric modes of governance.

When it comes to plural and poly-centric forms of mainstreaming we see diverging patterns amongst the ‘old’ immigration countries, whereby the UK can be considered more pluralist, particularly when compared to the Netherlands and France. While the long history of immigration seems to be of influence on mainstream targeting in the UK and the Netherlands, it cannot explain the monist or pluralist orientation of policy, or state-centric or poly-centric modes of governance for either the old
or the new countries of immigration. Furthermore, the trend toward poly-centric governance can be found in all countries, though to a lesser extent in France. Here too, no relation can be found between migration history and mainstreaming.

A second expectation to be addressed concerns the relation between mainstreaming and the extent of *diversity*, in terms of ethnicity and religion as well as intergenerational or individual diversification within these elements (Vertovec, 2007; Faist, 2009). In this case France, the Netherlands, the UK and Spain can be considered as highly diverse societies, in contrast to Poland which is thus expected to be less likely to mainstream its integration policies. When looking at the first group of countries this thesis is most clearly illustrated at the local level. On the one hand the super-diversity of, for example, London or Amsterdam demographics leads to a trend of generic policies, as mainstreaming is considered ‘inevitable’ when diversity is literally considered a ‘mainstream’ topic. Despite their multicultural history of specifically targeted policies, the increased diversity of its population has led to a move away from targeted policies. The increasing diversity within groups has made targeted policies ‘impossible to implement’ as Dutch education policies illustrate. Although at the national level this move away from targeted policies in the Netherlands and the UK also seems to be driven by other policy and political influences.

Additionally, the local level proves to be more sensitive to *inclusive* policies than the national level, addressing the diversity of its population even against national trends, as anti-discrimination or diversity initiatives in Lyon and Warsaw illustrate. Of all cases Poland is least diverse. This lack of diversity indeed seems to decrease the probability of mainstreaming. Even in Warsaw, which is slightly more diverse and attempts to address the issue by programs such as ‘Diverse Warsaw’ the emphasis on diversity seems to encourage a targeted response rather than a process of mainstreaming. Therefore, diversity can indeed be considered an important driver for mainstreaming: on the one hand moving away from specifically targeted policies, while at the other hand addressing diversity within generic policies. Although the local level shows a particularly strong trend in this respect, it cannot explain why this does not translate to more inclusive policies at the national level, particularly in France and the Netherlands. Poland’s short history of immigration seems to have a stronger explanatory value than Warsaw’s attempts to address diversity.

Finally, we formulated an expectation regarding the extent to which *integration problems* are perceived, especially in relation to specific groups. We expect that when there is a strong perception of specific integration problems, this will decrease the probability of mainstreaming. Rather, we expect that when specific problems are perceived, this will trigger specific policy responses. Here we can distinguish roughly between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom as countries with a strong perception of specific problems of integration on the one hand, and France, Spain and Poland as its opposites. To a significant extent, this expectation does not fit our findings from these countries. The Netherlands and the UK seem to combine a relatively strong focus on specific integration problems with a shift towards generic policies and poly-centric governance. Since the Dutch backlash against multiculturalism in the early 2000s, migration-related issues in the Netherlands still tend to be framed in group-specific terms. The national integration debate in particular is characterized by strong problem framing, focussing particularly on issues of social-cultural integration and adaptation, and more generically on issues of social cohesion. However, generic policy solutions are being proposed, despite the specific problem framing typical of the so-called ‘dilemma of recognition’. In the UK, policy developments in the field of integration are partially incident driven, with perceived problems of integration coming to the fore through civil disturbance or incidents. In the UK perceived problems of...
integration, targeted through a needs-based proxy, have eventually led to a generic frame of social cohesion intended to 'lift up the entire area', thus stimulating the process of mainstreaming.

On the other hand, integration problems are framed less specifically in France, Spain and Poland. True to its Republican tradition, France does not register or monitor problems according to ethnicity or immigrant background, but rather considers all its citizens French alike. According to the hypothesis this would advance the chances for mainstreaming. While France is indeed known for its generic targeting, the lack of attention for specific problems of integration seems to obstruct a move to an inclusive, whole society approach to mainstreaming. In a later stage of mainstreaming, attention for specific problems can in fact lead to more inclusive mainstreaming, and a readjustment of mainstream services to align with the diversity of its society. In Lyon, for example, problems around ethnic discrimination are addressed explicitly, in contrast to the French tradition at the national level. The attention for these perceived problems does not seem to work against the tradition of generic policies, but instead puts emphasis on the inclusiveness of these policies, as evident from advanced monitoring schemes at the level of (Grand) Lyon. Equally in Rotterdam the move towards generic citizenship policies was supplemented by additional programs on integration, after problems in this domain were addressed in a report on the status of integration in the cities of Rotterdam and Amsterdam, advocating a more inclusive frame of citizenship. In Spain and Poland perceived problems of integration are of little significance in the debate of integration and mainstreaming.

3.3.2 Policy context; mainstreaming in the context of austerity and retrenchment

Regarding the policy context, we have formulated three expectations on how policy developments may account for the presence or absence of mainstreaming in integration governance. We expect that mainstreaming will be promoted by the amount of experience with mainstreaming in other policy domains (referred to as spin-offs between departments) and the increasing influence of the crisis, austerity and governmental retrenchment across European countries. On the contrary, countries or departments that have a lot of experience with the use of specific policies may be less likely to switch to mainstreaming.

First of all, regarding the potential path-dependency of specific (or generic) policies from the past, it is clear that the cases under research have different histories of specific or generic policies. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands in particular are characterized by their strong tradition of specifically targeted policies. The UK case illustrates that the path dependency of specifically targeted policies at the local level indeed seems to resist the national spread of mainstreaming, with a strong initial minority focus in generic community-cohesion programs. As explained above, this path-dependent specific trend was eventually overcome through the needs-based focus of the program. The Dutch case shows a similar pattern, although here eventually the legacy of specific policies and the perception that these policies would have had inadvertent negative effects in terms of labelling and reification of ethnic boundaries, contributed to the shift to generic policies rather than preventing it. Spain shows a combined pattern of specific and generic policies coexisting, though these do not seem of particular influence on the move to mainstreaming.

The absence of a tradition of specific policies in France and Poland can be considered as control cases, and are thus expected to stimulate the move to mainstreaming. France has a strong tradition of generic policies, which shows a strong path dependency. However this generic tradition is based on the Republican tradition and leaves little room for a more culturally sensitive whole society
approach. The French city of Lyon, on the contrary, has more experience with specific policies, particularly in the field of ethnic discrimination, in contrast to the hypothesis, leading to more inclusive mainstreaming. In the case of Poland specific policies in the field of integration are relatively new. Its prior absence can be considered an example of ‘accidental’ mainstreaming, where generic policies are the result of a simple absence of policy priorities in the field of integration rather than a conscious choice of policy targeting. However this cannot explain the current divergence in specific and generic policy responses in the field of integration policies. On the one hand, the Polish policies tend to be formulated in a generic sense as there is little attention for specific groups or policy problems, on the other hand the de-politicized context of immigrant integration issues in Poland leaves room for both specific and inclusive targeting. So, while at first glance the path-dependency of specific policies seems to obstruct a move to generic policies, it is illustrated that they might as well move away from this, or that specific policies can actually lead to more inclusive forms of mainstreaming. The tradition of specific policies might delay the development of mainstreaming, but does not seem to be of decisive influence on any eventual shift towards or away from mainstreaming.

Secondly, we found a clear relation between mainstreaming and austerity measures or government retrenchment. This clearly places the development of mainstreaming within the context of the recent financial and economic crisis in Europe. Particularly, retrenchment seems to reinforce already existing shifts towards generic policies. Several countries report that it is increasingly difficult to implement specific policies, due to the political and economic circumstances, which make it harder to defend specific policies for immigrants. In Spain, the economic crisis has had a highly significant impact on government efforts in the domain of migrant integration, contributing to retrenchment. In Poland, retrenchment measures seem to be having less influence on integration policies, but retrenchment seems to be stimulating or reinforcing the move toward generic policies. On the other hand, several experts are warning of the risk of decoupling and decreasing the effectiveness of policies when the process of mainstreaming is accelerated or driven by cost reduction. In Rotterdam retrenchment measures in 2010 had a decisive influence on the citizenship frame that had been set up in 2006 as an important step in the process of mainstreaming its diversity policies. But here too, the risk of decoupling became apparent after the stringent revision of the citizenship program funds risked doing away with diversity policies altogether, as diversity responsibilities were not taken up by other departments. Only when integration was put back on the agenda through an evaluation, was there more active coordination between departments. However it is exactly this attention for diversity and inter-departmental cooperation that is under threat with declining budgets.

Finally, an important finding from this project is that, contrary to our expectations, we found no connection between mainstreaming in the field of immigrant integration policies and mainstreaming in other policy areas such as disability, gender and climate. This strongly suggests that this is not a case of spill-over or ‘policy transfer’ from one of these areas to integration governance, but that the mainstreaming of integration policies is driven by other influences. Consequently, we have to be very cautious when comparing integration mainstreaming to experiences from these other policy areas, as these are likely to be very different phenomena.

3.3.3 Political stream; politicisation as a motor for mainstreaming at the national level

Finally, concerning the political stream we expected that increasing political and media attention, as well as populism around migration and integration debates, would make it more difficult to justify
We indeed found a strong relation between increased political and media attention, populism and a shift to generic policies. The visibility and negative framing of immigrant integration makes it increasingly difficult to explicitly address integration issues or target specific migrant groups. These patterns can be observed in France, the Netherlands, the UK, and to a lesser extent in Poland and Spain. In France the politicization of immigrant integration reinforces the dilemma of recognition: when framing immigrant integration is increasingly problematized and framed in terms of individual responsibility to integrate, this does not lead to specific policies. Although increasing political and media attention and the (re-)framing of immigrant integration under pressure from the rise of populist parties seem to go hand-in-hand, they are having a very different effect on the degree to which policies are framed inclusively for all. When distinguishing between these two it becomes clear that while increased attention makes it more difficult to target specific groups or unpopular themes, on the other hand political and media attention on integration issues can put the issue back on the map, thereby advancing a more inclusive whole society approach. In the UK, for example, political and media pressure were important drivers accelerating the move from the integration to the community cohesion frame. In the Netherlands it was under political and populist pressure in the early 2000s that social cohesion as a generic challenge of integration was put on the map in the first place, leading to a move away from 'beneficial' specific policies. However if we look at policy developments since then, we see that it was under a subsequent decrease in political pressure that integration issues were once more addressed as political and media priorities locally, leading to the next steps in mainstreaming and embracing a whole society approach towards citizenship policies. Thus, while populism might stimulate a move away from specific policies, it also obstructs the next and essential step towards more inclusive generic policies. After sentiments have calmed down renewed attention for diversity and issues of immigrant integration can lead to a whole-society approach; if not addressed explicitly, policies run the risk of diluting the issue of integration altogether.

The influence of the media and politics seems less pressing in Poland and Spain. In Poland immigration or integration policies have hardly led to any political debate, leaving room for either specifically targeted or inclusive generic policies. What triggers a specific or generic policy response, however, cannot be explained by the influence of political and media attention, leaving the Polish case ambiguous in this sense. The Spanish case seems to be in contrast to the expected trend. Decreasing attention for the topic by the current government, in combination with decreasing funds, are actually driving the Spanish integration debate towards the European discourse of a generic but less inclusive frame.

The EU case shows that politicization on the national level speaks to mainstreaming at the EU level in a very specific way. First of all, political contestation on the national level seems to have made EU member states, such as the Netherlands and France in particular, very reticent when it comes to supporting the development of an EU approach to migrant integration. Furthermore, in as far as an EU approach could develop, this was framed in terms of mainstreamed policies, as a specific approach to migrant integration could not emerge at the EU level. However, as noted in the EU case study, there are few means to ensure that this mainstreaming strategy is effectively implemented across various directorate generals, such as DG Education, DG Home Affairs and Justice and DG Employment. This
carries the risk of diluting migrant integration policies, with mainstreaming being used as an excuse not to have policies on migrant integration.

Lastly, in the political sphere we expected individualization to increase the chances of mainstreaming, as it will become harder to justify specific policies. Most countries are experiencing an increasing individualization regarding the terms and conditions for integration. This individualization can be connected to an assimilationist frame of integration with an emphasis on individual responsibility for integration and adaptation. While France has a long tradition of this individual, Republican, frame, this frame has developed relatively recently in the UK, the Netherlands and Spain.

In France the individualized framing of responsibilities for integration leads to two patterns: a generic and monist perspective on integration with an emphasis on the individual’s willingness and efforts to integrate, and correspondingly the traditional ‘Republican’ value of equality that is applied to frame anti-discrimination issues. In the UK, increasing individualization is linked to the shift from social inclusion to social mobility, now one of the dominant frames in integration policies. In the Netherlands the individualized frame with a focus on individual responsibility for integration has likewise become very dominant in recent years, especially at the national level. At the local level a diverging trend of a more collective citizenship frame has unfolded. We can also observe this diverging trend in Spain, especially between the regional and local level in Madrid, where the former is engaging with a trend towards individualization. Apart from the French case, the frame of individualization seems to be mainly connected to a move towards generic targeting, while obstructing the development of more pluralist and inclusive policies due to the dominance of the individual frame over more collective frames of integration. For the Polish case individualization seems irrelevant to the development of mainstreaming.

3.3.4 Conclusion

When comparing the problem, policy and political context of mainstreaming, we can identify several circumstances that might stimulate or accelerate the process of mainstreaming. For example, demographic circumstances of high diversity or a long history of immigration and integration (policies) seem favourable to the development of mainstreaming, but cannot explain the choice for mainstreaming on their own. Likewise, the policy context of retrenchment can accelerate the process of mainstreaming but once more, this has little value in itself to explain why mainstreaming is applied in the first place. This primarily seems to depend on the political context of the situation.

The degree of diversity might lead to an ‘inevitable’ step towards generic policies but cannot explain why this does not develop beyond the local level in most countries. The choice regarding how to deal with such circumstances seems to depend strongly on the political setting in a country. Political and media attention and populist pressure in the first instance both seem to press for a move towards generic policies since specific policies are hard to defend under these circumstances (perceived as unevenly beneficial). While problems of integration are framed specifically, policy solutions are framed generically (dilemma of recognition). However when populist pressure declines, political and media attention for perceived problems and needs of integration can lead to more inclusive forms of mainstreaming. But it is important to note that the level of political pressure is the primary determining factor here, deciding the direction in which mainstreaming will develop.
4. Conclusions

This report provides an analysis of the rationale of mainstreaming in integration governance: what is mainstreamed to achieve migrant integration, how have mainstreamed integration policies been developed, and why did governments decide to mainstream? This analysis is based on the conceptualization of mainstreaming as developed in the first UPSTREAM report (Van Breugel, Maan & Scholten, 2014): a shift toward generic policies oriented at a pluralist society and involving poly-centric forms of governance. This report provides the basis for an in-depth analysis of the impact of mainstreaming in the subsequent work package. Concerning the politics of mainstreaming, it provides a comparative analysis of findings from the France, Poland, Spain, the Netherlands, the UK and the EU.

Clear trend towards generic and poly-centric integration governance

First of all, our analysis shows that what most cases have in common in terms of mainstreaming is a trend away from group specific-policies towards generic policies, and from state-centric to poly-centric modes of governance. In almost all cases, in as far as group-specific measures had been adopted in the past, there was a clear trend towards adopting generic policies, and embedding integration measures into generic policy areas such as housing and education. Whereas this may be nothing new for France with its Republicanist tradition, this is something new for countries like the Netherlands and the UK with a more multiculturalist policy history. However, we found that new immigration countries are slightly more inclined towards adopting specific measures wherever necessary. In the ‘old’ immigration countries, such as France, the Netherlands and the UK, this was only done for specific groups of newcomers.

In terms of governance, we also observed a clear trend away from state-centric modes of governance to more poly-centric governance. This clearly involves an increase of complexity in the field of integration governance, involving a large set of governmental and non-governmental actors in the policy process, and attributing in particular a more prominent role to the local level. In the Netherlands, UK and Spain, the local level has clearly become more prominent in terms of integration governance, sometimes also leading to significant discrepancies in integration governance between cities within a specific country, as well as between the local and the national level within one country. The case of France stands out to some extent, as localization is taking place, while at the same time the state-centric model is apparently being upheld. This ‘local turn’ in integration governance clearly underlines the need to look at mainstreaming at both the local and national level. Furthermore, in Poland, poly-centric governance involved a growing role of NGOs in integration governance, at both the national and the local level.

In terms of poly-centric governance, the EU seems to play a particular role. On the one hand, national political contestation of migrant integration has limited EU involvement in the field of migrant integration. This has allowed for a ‘mainstreamed’ approach to migrant integration at the EU level, such as formulated in the European Common Basic Principles of Integration and in the Common Integration Agenda. On the other hand, the EU has played an important role in the diffusion of the idea of mainstreaming, primarily via open methods of coordination. This applies in particular to relations with new member states, where very various schemes mainstreaming integration governance
was promoted, but also in relations with the local level such as city networks in particular. For the ‘old’ immigration countries, this relation applies to a much lesser extent.

**Diversity orientation part of mainstreaming on the urban level but not the national level**

However, we also found significant variation in terms of different forms of mainstreaming. This shows that mainstreaming should not be seen as a monolithic process. This applies in particular to the cultural dimension of mainstreaming, or the whole society orientation embracing diversity. Diversity orientation appears to be particularly absent at the national level (except to some extent in the UK). In contrast to this, diversity orientation is part of mainstreaming efforts at the local level. This applies to cities in both the ‘new’ and ‘old’ immigration countries. Furthermore, this diversity orientation is also part of the EU mainstreaming approach, and in fact plays an important role in European city networks where knowledge and best practices in this regard are being exchanged.

The lack of a diversity orientation in national integration mainstreaming marks an important difference with how mainstreaming is understood in other policy fields such as gender, disability and climate. Whereas in those areas mainstreaming involves the development of a generic sensitivity for gender, disability and climate, this seems less the case for integration mainstreaming, at least at the national level. At the local level, integration mainstreaming seems more similar to mainstreaming in those other areas. It is remarkable, however, that no clear references to mainstreaming in those areas were found in any of the cases we examined.

**Discrepancy between national and local mainstreaming**

The findings concerning ‘what’ is mainstreamed clearly relate to what we found on ‘how’ mainstreaming was adopted and ‘why’. The discrepancy between national and local interpretations of mainstreaming is also reflected in the frames that are used to legitimate mainstreaming. At the national level, mainstreaming is framed particularly in terms of promoting equality, anti-discrimination and individual responsibility. In contrast, at the local and the EU level, mainstreaming is more often framed in terms of super-diversity. We found that this even applies to cities that are not super-diverse in the theoretical sense, such as Warsaw.

Furthermore, at the national level mainstreaming appears driven in particular by political factors and by the need for austerity measures and, in some cases, by government retrenchment. The politicization of migrant integration appears to have created a setting, especially in the ‘old’ immigration countries, where group-specific measures are less politically desirable. Furthermore, the economic crisis has prompted governments to cut integration spending, which might explain why diversity orientation is less manifest at the national level. Mainstreaming may then become a vehicle for decentralisation (UK and to some extent France), or retrenchment (the Netherlands). In contrast, at the local level, problem pressure seems to have been a more important engine behind mainstreaming. In some cases this relates to focus events or incidents that revealed the need for a more comprehensive approach to diversity, while in others the recognition of the super-diverse character of city populations provides a more important explanation for why cities choose to mainstream.
Mainstreaming and proxy-policies

However, the discrepancy that we found between the diversity-sensitive ways of mainstreaming at the EU and local levels and the more politicized and austerity-driven mainstreaming at the national level needs, have to be nuanced when looking at the widespread formulation of ‘proxy-policies.’ This applied to both policy areas under study in UPSTREAM; education as well as social cohesion. Proxy policies mostly involve needs-based or area-based measures that may still primarily target migrants, albeit indirectly. Especially in the UK and the Netherlands, area-based mainstreaming involves policy strategies targeting neighbourhoods that are often home to a high proportion of migrants, rather than targeting migrant groups per se. Such a strategy can also be uncovered in the French approach to Urban Priority Zones, the Dutch approach to ‘krachtwijken’ and the Spanish approach to Area Renewal Programs. A clear example of a needs-based proxy strategy can be found in the Dutch case, where parents’ educational level replaced parents’ ethnic background as the basis for financing primary education. Also in the EU case there is a clear focus on specific needs or barriers that may be disproportionately felt by migrants, such as early school leaving, access to services, etc.

Although our analysis shows that such ‘proxy policies’ are clearly at the heart of the mainstreaming of integration governance (to be examined in more depth in work package 4 of the UPSTREAM project), we also found that in many cases we cannot speak of ‘replacement strategies’ in the pure sense. As conceptualized by De Zwart (2005), replacement strategies involve the deliberate development of proxy strategies that target migrant groups without mentioning them explicitly. However, in various cases, such as the EU case in particular, we did not find evidence that proxy policies were being designed with vulnerable migrant groups in mind. Also in France, the presence of migrants does not play an explicit role in the definition of Urban Priority Zones. This may signal that mainstreaming by introducing proxies can contribute to diluting integration policy preferences. In some cases, especially in the Netherlands and to some extent the UK, we found evidence that proxies were deliberately defined as a replacement for group-specific measures. In the Netherlands, the availability of ethnic statistics played a key role, especially at the national level, in calibrating area-based and needs-based policies (such as the financing of schools) in terms of how effective they are in addressing migrant-related issues.

Challenges to effective integration governance

This analysis of the politics of mainstreaming integration governance identified several challenges in terms of the potential effectiveness and impact of mainstreaming, which will need to be examined in more depth in the following report on the practice of mainstreaming. First of all, the trend of polycentric governance dramatically enhances the complexity of integration governance. What are the consequences of the discrepancy between mainstreaming with a diversity orientation at the local and EU level and without this orientation at the national level; does this lead to decoupling?

Furthermore, governance literature shows that in complex settings, maintaining a coherent policy message and communicating policy aims within policy networks are of the utmost importance: to what extent does mainstreaming integration governance involve such a coherent message and communication, or does it risk dilution of integration policy altogether? Regarding generic policies, it is the question to what extent these manage to reach out to specifically vulnerable groups; is mainstreaming something that works in particular for second generation migrants, and are specific policies still required for specific groups and for first generation migrants in particular?
Finally, an important issue that emerged concerns the presence or absence of ethnic statistics. Although this did not appear as an explanatory factor for the presence or absence of mainstreaming, it may constitute an important factor in the implementation of mainstreaming, as the presence of ethnic statistics could help monitor the group-specific impact of generic policies.
References

Country reports


Bibliography


