The Politics of Mainstreaming Immigrant Integration Policies

Case study of the Netherlands

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1 - Introduction

The Netherlands has often been depicted as one of the strongholds of a multiculturalist approach. Specific measures that have been adopted to further the integration of ‘ethnic minorities’ have been discussed extensively, both in national and international (academic as well as non-academic) political discourses. Indeed, especially in the 1980s, the Netherlands established various policy practices that involved strongly targeted group-specific measures, which would also have a strong influence on policies adopted in other European countries. Take for instance the consultation structures with migrant organizations that were mimicked in many other countries, preferential treatment programs for minority members on the labour market, preferential funding schemes for migrant children at schools, or a variety of very ‘visible’ measures to promote the integration of minorities such as broadcasting agencies for different (religious) communities.

At the same time, the Netherlands has also been one of the first countries that discarded the multicultural model in the 2000s, and adopted a more assimilationist approach. Rather than integration, adaptation became a key policy objective, and rather than focusing primarily on socio-economic participation, the socio-cultural sphere now became much more central to policies. Take for instance the focus on Dutch values and norms in civic integration programs. Again, the Netherlands was not the only country to go through an assimilationist turn in the 2000s, but perhaps one of the countries where the discourse around assimilationism emerged the earliest and was the sharpest.

More recently, a new ‘trend’ or ‘phase’ seems to have gained ground in the Dutch setting, marking possibly a new turn in the development of migrant integration policies; ‘mainstreaming.’ Especially since the end of the 2000s, and more specifically since the new government coalition led by the Liberals came to power in 2010, mainstreaming seems to play an important role in the Dutch policy discourse. However, already in the early 2000s the Dutch government was one of the architects of the European Common Basic Principles of Integration, which first featured the idea of ‘mainstreaming’ as one of the basic principles for integration policymaking (Penninx & Scholten, forthcoming). As mentioned in the EU case study (Petrovic and Collett, 2014), this was one of the first times that mainstreaming emerged on the policy agenda. Furthermore, in 2013-2014 the Dutch government commissioned an international study on how best to ‘mainstream’ integration policies (Collett & Petrovic, 2014) and organized a high-level policy conference on mainstreaming. Likewise several research institutes and scholars have looked into the matter of mainstreaming, or related questions of super-diversity and targeting in the field of immigrant integration (see Engbersen, 2014; Dagevos & Grundel, 2013; Boutellier et.al., 2012; Ham & van der Meer, 2012; Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, 2012; Peeters, 2012; RMO, 2012; Van der Zee et.al., 2012). As such, the Dutch case is of broader relevance to understanding the mainstreaming trend on a European scale as well.

However, what is meant by ‘mainstreaming’ remains rather indistinct in national as well as local policy discourses in the Netherlands. In particular, mainstreaming seems to be used in the Dutch context to refer to a retreat from group-specific measures and the embedding of policy measures into generic policy frameworks like education, social affairs and housing. Research shows that this
trend has indeed been very distinct in national as well as local policies (Scholten, 2013). However, in actual (national and local) policies, the term mainstreaming is rarely used explicitly. Also, it is very unclear whether the Dutch approach also features other elements of mainstreaming that we defined in the literature review of this study (Van Breugel, Maan & Scholten, 2014), such as poly-centric governance and a ‘whole society’ approach that actively approaches diversity as a generic topic to various (if not all) policy areas. Criticasters of Dutch mainstreaming argue that it has been driven rather by politics of retrenchment than a desire to set a ‘whole society’ approach towards diversity. This makes the Dutch case not only a very central case from an international perspective, but also a very crucial case for understanding the meaning and implications of mainstreaming in terms of actual migrant integration policies.

This report analyses the politics of mainstreaming in the Dutch case, based on the definition of mainstreaming that was defined in the literature review conducted in the previous work package of this research project (Van Breugel, Maan & Scholten, 2014). We understand mainstreaming as a shift toward generic policies oriented at a pluralist society and involving poly-centric forms of governance. This means that we do not follow how mainstreaming may be conceptualized in Dutch policy discourses nor that we refer only to cases where the concept of mainstreaming is used explicitly; rather our study applies to all situations that fit the definition and characteristics of mainstreaming as sketched in the previous work package of this research project. The focus of this study is on the rationale of mainstreaming, rather than the implementation and impact of mainstreaming that will be the subject of subsequent work packages. Key questions in this study are:

1. **What** forms of mainstreaming can be identified? To what extent are migrant integration policies mainstreamed, and to what extent are other policy strategies preferred?

2. **How** have these mainstreaming policies come about? What factors contributed or obstructed the mainstreaming of integration governance?

3. **Why** has or has not integration governance been mainstreamed? What explanations can be found for the mainstreaming of integration governance? How can differences between cases be explained?

When analyzing the Dutch case, we will address a set of expectations that have been formulated for this work package, regarding how and why mainstreaming will take place under specific circumstances. This includes expectations on how the problem setting (migration history, diversity, perceived integration issues), policy context (policy history, spin-offs from other areas, crisis or retrenchment) and political setting ( politicization, populism, and individualization) account for different mainstreaming strategies in the Dutch case. In particular, we expect mainstreaming (as in our definition) to be more likely in cases with a long migration history, very sizeable migrant groups, absence of perceived group specific problems, a history of mainstreaming and spin-offs from mainstreaming from other areas, absence of retrenchment, low politicization of integration, weak presence of populism, and a relatively high degree of individualization of society. Subsequently, addressing the ‘how’ question, we will address the hypotheses formulated in the previous work package: if mainstreaming takes place, does that indeed take the form of a ‘whole society approach’ oriented at interculturalisation and a polycentric mode of policy coordination?
Precisely as mainstreaming speaks to the embedding of immigrant integration into generic policies it is required in methodological terms to not focus not only on integration policy as an institutional policy domain per se. Therefore, we will focus on two policy areas in which immigrant integration policies usually play a key role (that have been selected in the context of the UPSTREAM project at large): education and social cohesion. Furthermore, in order to account for the ‘polycentric’ dimension of mainstreaming, we will not only look at national policies, but at local policies as well. Therefore, besides a national policy analysis, this study also involves an analysis of two cities that are known for their decidedly different integration approaches: Rotterdam and Amsterdam (Scholten, 2013). The analysis is based on qualitative (content) analysis of national as well as local policy documents, records of parliamentary and council meetings, research and advisory reports and relevant secondary literature. Furthermore, 16 semi-structured interviews were held (6 at the national level, 10 at the local level), which includes policymakers as well as politicians, NGO representatives and experts (see appendix I for overview of respondents).

In the following chapter an overview will be given of immigrant integration policies in the Netherlands, and the traces of mainstreaming in particular. Subsequently chapter 3 and 4 provide an analysis of mainstreaming in the fields of education and social cohesion, at the national as well as the local level. The report is concluded in chapter five, highlighting the main trends of (non-)mainstreaming in the Netherlands.
2 - Immigrant integration in the Netherlands

In order to understand when, how and why immigrant integration policies are mainstreamed, it is important to first understand the social context and policy setting in which this would take place. In the theoretical overview that was produced in the previous work package (Van Breugel, Maan & Scholten, 2014), various factors were defined that could be relevant to mainstreaming, such as migration history, degree of diversity, and policy history. These factors will be discussed in some detail in this chapter, focusing both on the national as on the local level. This also includes an analysis of the history of national policies, which provide an important context to the analysis of education and social cohesion policies in subsequent chapters.

2.1 Brief sketch of migration history

Although the Netherlands is not a traditional immigration country such as the United States or Australia, it does have a relatively long history of immigration when compared with other European countries. Modern immigration to the Netherlands can be characterized in different phases with immigrants coming from the former colonies, including Indonesia and Suriname since respectively the 1940's and 1970's; the so called ‘guest-workers’ recruited from Southern-Europe, Turkey and Morocco in the 1960's; subsequently asylum migration from the 1980's as well as considerable family migration also since the 1980s in particular, and more recently a new flow of labour migration in the form of ‘mobile-EU-citizens’ working and living in the Netherlands since roughly 2004. Of the 3.6 million immigrants (on a total population of almost 17 million) the Netherlands currently counts, 2 million are of non-western descent (see table below).

Table 1 – ‘Allochthon’ population in the Netherlands

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>15 654 192</td>
<td>16 105 285</td>
<td>16 334 210</td>
<td>16 574 989</td>
<td>16 829 289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allochthons</td>
<td>13 033 792</td>
<td>13 140 336</td>
<td>13 186 595</td>
<td>13 215 386</td>
<td>13 234 545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-western allochthon</td>
<td>1 278 453</td>
<td>1 558 353</td>
<td>1 720 050</td>
<td>1 858 294</td>
<td>1 997 584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western allochthon</td>
<td>1 341 947</td>
<td>1 406 596</td>
<td>1 427 565</td>
<td>1 501 309</td>
<td>1 597 160</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** adapted from CBS

The terminology used in the Dutch immigrant-integration debate has always been contested. The terminology used with reference to migrants is also of key importance to this project, as mainstreaming is all about how to focus policies while the targets of policies are particularly difficult to define. While the current debates speak alternately of ‘migrants’, ‘ethnic minorities’, ‘newcomers’ or ‘young men of Moroccan- and Antillean-Dutch descent’, the Dutch migration debate was long
characterized by the group-based notion of ‘ethnic minorities’ and later the distinction between ‘allochtoon’ and ‘autochtoon’ citizens. The term ethnic minorities provided the basis for the group-oriented Minorities Policies of the 1980s, focused on specific groups such as ‘Turks’ and ‘Moluccans’. Later the term ‘allochtoon’ was introduced, based on the Greek words allos (‘other’) and chtoon (‘country’), the term ‘allochtoon’ refers to someone who is born abroad or of whom at least one parent was born abroad. While intended to introduce a more neutral term with a focus on integration (WRR, 1989), the ‘allocht- on -autocht- on’ division have become hotly debated terms themselves. In official discourse the ‘allochtoon’-‘autochtoon’ terminology was abolished, replacing it with a variety of alternatives, such as newcomers, new-Dutch, Dutch-Turks and Surinamese Dutch. Since so-called second- and even third generation immigrants are often targeted too (so those born in the Netherlands), descent rather than migratory status plays an important role in these terms. In this report we will primarily speak of respectively immigrant- and native-citizens, unless specifically referring to the terminology as employed by Statistics Netherlands such as in the tables below.

Currently the ‘allochtoon’-‘autochtoon’ distinction is still applied in official statistics, as kept by Statistics Netherlands. The Netherlands has an advanced statistical database keeping track on all sorts of social-economic information of its citizens, including data on immigrant background. In their data Statistics Netherlands distinguishes between an ‘allochtoon’ of a Western, or non-Western background as to distinguish between the foreign-born with socio-economic difficulties and those that fared better in society, curiously marking for example Indonesians and Japanese as Western ‘allochte-ones’ (Guiraudon, Phalet & Ter Wal, 2005, p.78). Annually, respectively Statistics Netherlands (CBS) or the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) publishes a report on the social economic position of immigrants and the status of integration in the Netherlands in different social fields. While immigrant integration policies are increasingly moving towards generically targeted policies, the monitoring of ethnicity still plays an important role. While not as explicit as before, this is has to do with the Dutch aim of “evenredigheid”, i.e. proportional participation for comparable groups with or without a migrant background” (Verbeek, Entzinger & Scholten, forthcoming) as monitored in these yearly studies. In the 2011 Memorandum on Integration the Coalition explicitly addressed the importance of ethnic monitoring under generic policies “to hold a good overview on the process of integration and effects of generic policies” claiming that amidst the cuts in integration-budgets the resources for monitoring should be maintained (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties [BZK], 2011, p.12).

Statistical monitoring is well developed and institutionalized at the local level as well. Our case studies, the cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, have their own research and statistics departments and advisory bodies. Both cities annually publish generic monitors on the demographics and social-economic- and political developments in the city, as well as specific monitors on the status of ‘diversity and integration’ (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2004; 2010; 2012) or later ‘citizenship and integration’ (2013) in Amsterdam and ‘participation and citizenship’ in Rotterdam (2009; 2010;

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5 All translations to English by the authors of this report.
6 Respectively the ‘Bureau Onderzoek en Statistiek’ and the ‘Adviesraad Diversiteit en Integratie’[ADI] in Amsterdam and the ‘Onderzoek en Business Intelligence’ in Rotterdam.
As part of a special Antilleans-program the municipality of Rotterdam also published specific monitors on ‘Antillean Rotterdammers’ (2009b; 2011Xb). Equally Rotterdam publishes a monitor on the EU-foreign workers program. Additionally some specific publications have been very influential on Rotterdam policy making, such as a prognoses on future city-demographics as published by Statistics Netherlands in 2003 which eventually caused a debate on (forced) spreading of disadvantaged citizens through the city (see chapter four). While more recently the joint publication on the ‘The Status of Integration’ (Scheffer & Entzinger, 2012) in the cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam was one the causes that put integration back on the map.

A diversification of the immigrant population

A complicating factor regarding the use of target group labels in the Dutch immigrant integration debate is the diversification of migration-related diversity in the Netherlands. Not only have the absolute numbers and relative percentages of people with an immigration background increased significantly (in some cities around 50% of the total population), the diversity of involved immigrant groups has increased significantly as well. Furthermore, some of these migrant groups have been in the Netherlands for so long, that there is a very sizeable second (for some groups now even larger than the first generation) and even third generation as well. As such, the label ‘super-diversity’ applies rather well to the Dutch situation.

To understand this diversification, a brief account of Dutch migration history is required. The independence of Indonesia in 1949 and that of Suriname in 1975 led to the main migratory movements from the former colonies in the second half of the 20th century, a large part of these migrants held Dutch state-citizenship. The guest workers that were recruited in the 1960’s and later arriving ‘spontaneously’ came to the Netherlands for economic reasons. While their presence was believed to be temporary, the so-called guest workers eventually did settle down in the Netherlands, later having their families coming over to build up their lives in the Netherlands. After labour migration of this category ended in the 1970s, family migration in the form of first family reunification and later family formation continues until the present day.

The four biggest groups of non-Western immigrants in the Netherlands are the Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans, originating from these first two waves of immigration. Their number is still increasing, primarily by the birth of second generations rather than by immigration. This makes the group of non-western immigrants relatively young (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek [CBS], 2012, p.30). Since a few years the majority of the Turkish and Moroccan population is of the second generation (Huijnk, Gijsberts & Dagevos, 2014, p.32). While not officially counted as immigrant or ‘allochtoon’ the so-called ‘third generation’ immigrants form a new group in immigrant integration policies. Officially the definition of ‘allochtoon’ limits itself to first and second generation immigrants (by registering country of birth up to once parents), and ‘third generation’ therefore should be considered ‘Dutch.’ However in 2010 the Ministry of Wellbeing, Health and Sport had a study conducted on the so-called third generation immigrants, in order to gain insight in the processes of integration and to examine the effectiveness of immigrant integration policies on the ‘third-generation’ 7. In the study they stress the difference between first, second and third generation immigrants as well as the diversity within these generation with regard to their diverse background and different levels of social economic integration (CBS, 2010). The growing group of ‘third

7 While not registered as such information on the third generations can be drawn from the municipal registers based on country of origin of child, parents and grandparents as far as these are available (CBS, 2010).
generation’ immigrants increasingly forms an important portion of the perceived immigrant-groups and targets of policies and monitoring (Gijsberts, Huijnk and Dagevos, 2012).

Another category of immigrants that can be distinguished are refugees, consisting of various groups of very different origin. The last twenty years immigrants from mainly Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran and Somalia have come to the Netherlands for political and humanitarian reasons. The influx of these groups consists mainly of family-members of settled refugees rather than asylum-seekers themselves (CBS, 2012, p.11), although recent figures over the years 2012-2014 show a gradual increase of asylum migration again. Thirdly there is the group of mobile workers from Poland, Bulgaria and Romania. Next to the strong increase of immigration of these groups between 2004 and 2007, emigration has also risen (CBS, 2012, p.12). In general, there are strong patterns recognizable between immigration and emigration. The migration ‘balance’ (immigration minus emigration) varied from 50 thousand in 2000 till minus 30 thousand between 2005 and 2006, since 2008 the migration balance has been stable, reaching approximately 30 thousand per year (CBS, 2012, p.42). The economic crisis in the Netherlands has not yet led to a decrease in immigration (CBS, 2012, p.41).

The diversification of migration groups, in terms of descent, generation and more in general in their levels of social-economic integration and participation raises questions in terms of targeting immigrant integration policies. In 2004 for example standard group-based minority-policies were no longer considered appropriate, one of the reasons mentioned is the fact that “within and between minority groups there are big differences in terms of degree of integration and in terms of disadvantages” (Tweede Kamer, 2004b). This indicates a first cautious step towards generic policies. The unofficial category of third generation migrants also raises questions as to when integration is achieved; when does the third generation become ‘integrated’? Or will there also be a need to define a fourth and fifth generation? What does this say about the Dutch case, in contrast to for example the French case where newcomers after five years are considered ‘French’ (Bozec & Simon, 2014). To get a better understanding of the Dutch particularities in the field of immigrant integration and its patterns of mainstreaming some of the main developments in immigration policy are addressed below.

### 2.2 City cases: Amsterdam and Rotterdam demographics

The diversification of diversity applies perhaps most to the two major cities of the Netherlands Amsterdam (811.185 inhabitants8) and Rotterdam (619.826 inhabitants9) that have received most immigration over the past decades. Known as respectively the capital- and a harbour city, Amsterdam and Rotterdam show distinctive patterns in demographics and politics. However, both can clearly be defined as ‘super-diverse’ cities, although in somewhat different ways.

The four major immigrant groups are present in both cities, though Rotterdam has a bigger Antillean population (3.6% in 2010, against 1.5% in Amsterdam) while Amsterdam hosts a bigger population of Moroccan descent (9.0% in 2010 against 6.6% in Rotterdam)10. The development of these groups

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10 All data based on (Scheffer and Entzinger, 2012). More recent, comparable data are not available thus based on the data from 2010.
are rather stable through time, with the rise of ‘other non-western groups’ as its most remarkable exception in Rotterdam (rising from 7,5% to over 10% between 2000-2010). The Surinamese population forms the biggest ethnic group in both cities making up respectively 9,0% in Amsterdam and 8,9% in Rotterdam.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2 - 2010 demographics by descent</th>
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<tr>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antilleans</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moroccans</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other non-western immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western immigrants</td>
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<tr>
<td>Native population</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>number</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese</td>
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<td>Antilleans</td>
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<td>Other non-western immigrants</td>
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<td>Western immigrants</td>
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<tr>
<td>Native population</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from Scheffer and Entzinger (2012)

Since the EU-expansion in 2004 and 2007 the number of migrants from Central- and East-Europe to the Netherlands has grown. Particularly Rotterdam, amongst other areas, hosts a large number of these so-called ‘EU-mobile citizens’ with 9.088 official registrations at the Municipal Populations Register in 2012. Because many of these immigrants are not registered some believe this number should be multiplied by two or three to equal the number actually present in the city (Engbersen, 2014, p.7).

Both cities are highly diverse, with a large cohort of young, second generation, immigrants. The segment of second generation immigrants has risen quickly since 2000, with second generation immigrants (western and non-western) making up 20,8% and 21,4% percent of the total population in Rotterdam and Amsterdam (against respectively 26,9% and 28,4% first generation immigrants) (Entzinger & Scheffer 2012, p.68). In the age category of 0-14 years old immigrants make up 61,1% (52,5% non-western; 8,6% western immigrants) and 62,7% of the total population in Rotterdam and Amsterdam.

**Rotterdam**

Rotterdam is a working-class city that has, up to 2002, almost permanently been led by the social democrats, the Partij van de Arbeid. The city is often characterized as a social laboratory, experimenting with new policies exploring the boundaries of what is legally permitted, such as the ‘Wet Bijzondere Maatregelen Grootstedelijke Problematiek’, also known as the Rotterdam Act, aiming at residential desegregation of low-income groups (as a proxy for ethnicity) throughout the city. On the other hand, social cohesion and well-being policies in Rotterdam for a long time had a rather informal character, aimed at the support of minorities or immigrants through specific projects by an emphasis on cultural expressions and role models (e.g. the action-program ‘Veelkleurige Stad 1998). “Migration policies had an atmosphere of ‘let a thousand flowers bloom’. The sudden rise of
Liveable Rotterdam [at the 2002 elections] was a conceivable response of part of the Rotterdam population to this attitude” (Rensen, 2013, p.218). This newly launched local party, launched by Pim Fortuyn, received almost 35 per cent of the votes in the 2002 and gained 17 seats (Uitermark & Duyvendak, 2008). Liveable Rotterdam can be considered the local expression of the backlash against multiculturalism.

After its spectacular electoral victory Leefbaar Rotterdam formed a coalition with CDA and VVD (2002-2006), putting immigrant integration high on the agenda. This marked a transition to restrictive and more normative integration policies after years of labour led coalitions. Instead of the dialogue and connection that were central to immigrant integration before, the policies from then on centered around the immigrants own responsibility in ‘their’ (integration) disadvantages. Despite partly settling the casualty around these policy practices, the cooperation with many migrant self-organizations continued for a long time, only breaking down under financial pressure (and larger administrative reforms) years later. So despite being framed in strong terms, categorical policies and financial support continued for a long time, illustrating that the political pressure is perhaps only the first step in putting these reforms on the agenda. Between 2006-2014 it was citizenship rather than integration that was on the agenda, focusing strongly on social cohesion, participation or bonding. Integration and migration are completely absent in this period, or “reformulated in terms of safety issues” (Van Ostaijen & Scholten, 2014). One exception here is the special program ‘Antillean approach’ (see a.o. De Boom, Van San, Weltevrede & Hermus, 2009; Burgemeester en Wethouders [B&W] Rotterdam, 2009c).

After losing power in the 2010 elections, Livable Rotterdam recently retained control over the Rotterdam City Hall in 2014, by winning the local elections with a tiny margin from the Social Democrats. A recently installed Coalition of Leefbaar Rotterdam, D66 and CDA once again explicitly addresses immigrant integration as an independent policy field. Over the past years it has also addressed new issues, such as the settling and integration of immigrants, or mobile citizens, from Central- and Eastern Europe.

Amsterdam

Amsterdam too has a significant immigrant population, counting for roughly 50 percent of the city population. The city has a fairly stable political climate, with a long tradition of Social-democrat (Partij van de Arbeid) rule in the City Hall. In this setting immigrant integration policies have become less contested than in Rotterdam, being characterized by its multicultural policies with a strong emphasis on emancipation. However the city was befallen by the sudden murder on filmmaker and columnist Theo van Gogh by a radicalized second generation Dutch-Moroccan in 2004. This put segregation, polarization and radicalization on the map changing the outlook of integration in Amsterdam. These developments will be addressed in more detail in chapter four on social cohesion policies.

When compared to the national level and to Rotterdam, the actual move away from integration polices to citizenship and diversity policies came rather late in Amsterdam, around the year of 2010 (B&W Amsterdam, 2003). Although self-organizations are not supported as such, financial support is available on the basis of projects (Ham & Van der Meer, 2012). The citizenship and diversity
department takes on an active role in bringing the projects and organizations together\(^{11}\). Despite the generic approach Amsterdam also took part in the Antilleans and the Moroccans-approach. Although the latter is framed in generic-youth terms and social-economic background (2012). While coordinated at the city level, many of the immigrant integration policies are executed from the district-level.

Both cities do no longer speak of immigrant integration policies but instead work on citizenship and diversity, which can be understood as a development of mainstreaming. How exactly this developed will be addressed in the specific fields of education and social cohesion in the subsequent chapters.

2.3 Background of national migrant integration policies

Although the use of the term mainstreaming is relatively new in the Dutch case study, the process of mainstreaming (Van Breugel, Maan & Scholten, 2014) has been of relevance for a much longer time. Especially the issue of whether to conduct generic or specific policies has a long tradition in Dutch policies. To some extent this applies as well for the dimension of policy-centric governance, especially in the context of policy decentralization. Therefore, this paragraph will give a brief historical account of ‘mainstreaming’ in Dutch immigrant integration policies.

From Ethnic Minorities to Integration Policies

In the first two decennia after the Second World War the Netherlands was primarily characterized as an emigration country. Consequently, early immigrant integration policies up to the late seventies consisted solely of separate ad-hoc policy measures relating to foreign workers (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid [WRR], 2001, p.168) and a few policies targeting Surinamese, Antilleans, Moluccans, travelers and gypsies- scattered between different departments. In this period it was believed that a coordinated integration policy was not required as “the Netherlands was not and should not be an immigrant-country” (Tweede Kamer, 2004, p.28). The aim of ‘integration while maintaining one’s own culture’ was strongly informed by the idea of temporary residence (Tweede Kamer, 2004, p.19-23). In the seventies a number of incidents (e.g. hijacking of trains by Moluccan youths, riots and attacks on Turkish dwellings in the Afrikaanderwijk in Rotterdam) put interethnic-tensions and the socio-economic deprivation of several immigrant groups on the agenda.

Faced with the growing tension between the norm of not being a country of immigration and the reality of rising numbers of immigrants and clearly signals permanent residence, the Dutch government drafted its first ‘minority’ policy in 1983. This involved the launch of an Ethnic Minorities Policy, with a focus on the social-economic disadvantage of immigrants and an improvement of their legal position. This policy marks a shift towards emancipation of specific minority-groups. Immigrant integration policies in this era focus on social skills and the Dutch language, as well as education in the own language and culture, and, additionally intercultural education. Minority self-organizations that stimulated emancipation were supported financially (Tweede Kamer, 2004, p.37). Primarily specific in focus, immigrant integration policies were oriented towards a plural vision of society with “a sustainable multicultural character” (Tweede Kamer, 1983).

\(^{11}\) Interview with head of the department citizenship and diversity, Amsterdam, 20th of June 2014.
The nineties saw a move from Ethnic Minorities policies to integration-policies, with a focus on citizenship and integration in Dutch society (Tweede Kamer, 1994). The shift indicates a transition from specific approach on the emancipation of minorities to an intensification of generic integration policies (Scholten, 2011, p.138). This can be understood as a first move towards mainstreaming. On the one hand this meant a move from specifically targeted minority policies to more generic integration policies in terms of policy-targeting. However it should be remarked that, strongly informed by the idea of proportionality, this decade was still characterized by a high degree of specifically targeted policies to increase levels of participation in the fields of education, housing and the labour-market such as the 'Wet Bevordering Evenredige Arbeidsdeelname Allochtonen' (Wet BEAA), an act intended to encourage the equal labour participation of immigrants.

The move towards more generic integration policies was closely associated to a shift from Ethnic Minorities policies as a stand-alone field to stronger deconcentration of policy responsibilities to colleague-departments and decentralization the local level. This also reflected a clear trend of mainstreaming in this period already. The Memorandum of 1994 addressed the role of municipalities in “shaping and implementing immigrant integration policies”, whilst the national government kept a “regulating and controlling task” (Tweede Kamer, 1994: p.23). Parallel, the so-called ‘Big Cities Policy’-programs (Grotestedebelheid: GSB) were drafted between 1995-1999 and later between 1999-2003. The programs focused on the fields work, education, safety, livability and care and the physical, economic and social infrastructure in urbanized-areas. Combined in one Ministry of Big City- and Integration Policies in 1998\textsuperscript{12}, immigrant integration policies in this period were likewise phrased in broad terms, focusing on ‘active citizenship’ and the role of the native population in integration policies as well as the high diversities amongst immigrants (Tweede Kamer, 2004, p.48). These developments involved a move toward horizontal and vertical policy governance, which can be considered the first case of mainstreaming in terms of polycentric governance (Van Breugel, Maan & Scholten, 2014, p.25-26).

Based on gender policies mainstreaming is associated with a de-concentration of policy governance, sharing policy responsibilities between different (non)-governmental actors, as can be recognized in the move to generic policies in the nineties and later with the abolishment of a separate Ministry in 2012.

\textsuperscript{12} While initially coordinated from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Big City- and Integration Policies in 1998 was the first Ministry focusing on immigrant integration affairs as a separate field. However as a Ministry without portfolio the Ministry formed part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In the subsequent coalitions this was continued in different forms under the Ministry of Justice (2002-2007), Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (2007-2010); the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (2010-2012). Since 2012 Immigrant Integration no longer holds a separate Ministry but is now again hosted generically, this time under the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. For an overview of the Ministries see appendix II.
In 1985, along with drafting the first Immigrant Integration policies a national advisory committee on the same topic was established (LAO). Based on "the Dutch tradition of consultation and consensus based conflict management" (Musch, 2010, p.112) and a pillarized model of integration., ".. the political elites of different groups of ethnic minorities were integrated in a national advisory and consultation structure, asking them to establish representative organizations who could be consulted for policy proposals." (Musch, 2010, p.104-105). In 1997 this structure was reformed to the new 'Consultation Committee on Minority Policy' (LOM). The Committee served as an official consultation-structure in which the government regularly consulted a selected group of ethnic minority-organizations on relevant political and societal developments. While previously entitled as official advisers to the government (Musch, 2010, p. 105), this power was restricted however a regular consultation structure was maintained. Throughout the years the Committee represented immigrant-groups from Southern Europe, Turkey, Morocco, the Moluccans, Suriname, the Caribbean, China and an organization representing refugees. Under Verdonk (2003-2006) the representativeness of the organizations was under discussion, with a revision of the financial support for these organizations as these were considered too strongly dominated by first generation migrants. While throughout the years LOM's mandate broadened from consolatory advise to 'signaling' and 'canalizing' sentiments in the migrant communities and the Dutch society and additional councils and advisory platforms were initiated in the turbulent early 2000's overall the functioning of the structure and its representative bodies has remained relatively stable, until it was withdrawn all together in 2013 as part of a broader move away from specifically targeted policies. In line with the latest Agenda on Integration (2013) it is acclaimed that people should be addressed "on their talents and behavior individually instead of their descent or the ethnic group they account themselves too, or are accounted to by others" (Eerste Kamer, 2013). Instead, the government believes a flexible dialogue without a legal basis or fixed representative groups is more suitable (Eerste Kamer, 2013). Beyond this official discourse however the move should also be understood in a shift away from specific and 'beneficial' policies marked by the backlash against the multi-cultural inheritance of its preceding years. The austerity-measures announced in the Integration Memorandum of 2011 marked the demolition of other players too, such as Forum, a knowledge institute for 'Multicultural Affairs'.

Based on policy developments since the seventies we can conclude that immigrant integration in these twenty years has developed from temporarily to accommodative policies geared towards emancipation of specifically targeted 'minorities', based on a multicultural model. In the nineties some first steps towards generic policies were set with the move from ethnic minorities to integration policies. However at the same time immigrant integration policies remained informed by the idea of proportionality, continuing all sorts of specifically targeted programs. The introduction of

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13 Anchored in the Act on Consulting Minority-policy (WOM)
14 Interview with program coordinator migrant organization, Utrecht 30th of June 2014.
15 In response to the murder on filmmaker Theo van Gogh an additional Integration Council was established in 2005, involved in the implementation of policy measures. Between 2004 and 2006 a special Islamic platform was established in the context of integration issues. Eventually in the structure of the Inter-Islamic Platform of governmental issues (IPO) e.g. the 'Contact-body Muslims and Government' (CMO) and 'Contactgroup Islam' (CGI) were regularly consulted. By now these structures have been abolished, although CMO is still consulted on a flexible basis.
a separate Ministry responsible for integration meant an institutionalization of specific and separate immigrant integration policies.

**The Dutch Assimilationist turn**

The focus on local governments and the accessibility of generic facilities and instruments remained central to immigrant integration policies throughout the early 2000’s (Tweede Kamer, 2004, p.52). However, like many European countries, the Netherlands experienced ‘an assimilationist turn’ in this decade (Scholten, 2011, p.138). With the visibility of ongoing immigration, particularly consisting of family- and asylum migration, and high fertility rates among ‘old migrants’ (Scholten, 2011, p.185) integration was placed in the context of restricting immigration (see: Minister voor Grote Steden- en Integratiebeleid, 2002) and furthering civic integration as a condition for the successful integration of immigrants (Tweede Kamer, 2004, p.56).

The early 2000’s mark a turbulent political period in immigrant integration. In an influential opinion piece published in one of the national newspapers, social-scientist Paul Scheffer (2000) declared the renowned Dutch multicultural model ‘a tragedy’ and ‘a failure’. The opinion piece led to a Parliamentary debate and marked a shift in thinking on immigrant integration and issues of identification. The presumed ‘Dutch tolerance’ is under pressure, hardening the tone of the debate. The strong language of the ‘new realist’ approach translates into the spectacular rise of Pim Fortuyn and his party LPF in the 2002 elections (Scholten, 2011, p.197). Fortuyn phrased immigrant integration in assimilationist terms, defining migrants in terms of socio-cultural, and religious differences: “[i]n order to preserve Dutch culture and identity and to compensate for the social-cultural deprivation of migrants, Fortuyn argued for a more obligatory approach to integration that also involved adaptation to Dutch norms and values” (Scholten, 2011, p.196). After their successful election the LPF formed part of the Coalition of the Balkenende I Cabinet, which listed immigrant integration high on the political agenda. Resulting in a sharp and obligatory tone in the Memorandum on Integration, with a strong focus on combatting segregation in a physical, social and mental sense (Tweede Kamer, 2004, p.60; Scholten, 2011, p.196).

On the whole all these development led to public unrest on the effects of immigrant integration policies, eventually leading to a parliamentary Investigative committee, also known as the Blok Committee, that was meant to evaluate the ‘causes for failure’ of Dutch immigrant integration policies16. In the midst of this commotion the ‘Integration policy - New Style’ was published in September 2003. The Memorandum stresses the importance of unity and sharing, "Shared citizenship’ for both immigrant as well as native citizens is the aim of the immigrant integration policies" (Minister voor Vreemdelingezaken en Integratie [VI], 2003), explicitly challenging "the previous acceptance of differences as a value in itself". In terms of mainstreaming the policies strongly move away from accommodative and specifically targeted policies. Another notable development is the emphasis on social cohesion and the social cultural dimension of integration. Moving away from the old slogan 'integration whilst maintaining one's own culture' integration is addressed in terms of 'shared citizenship'. While this partly opens the integration debate to a more

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16 After an extensive study of immigrant integration policies of the last thirty years the Committee concluded that the process of integration for many immigrants had been "a total or partial success" (Scholten 2011: p. 194). The whole process of the research, and particularly its moderate outcome led to strong response in- and outside the Parliament, as the Commission’s conclusions strongly diverged from the public and political sentiments on immigrant integration.
generic and dual process, most policy measures seem to be directed at the cultural adaptation of immigrant to the Dutch norms and values.

So, while policies in the early 2000’s moved away from the multicultural, specifically targeted policies of the previous decade the influence of the assimilationist turn seems contraire to mainstreaming. Whilst placing the more inclusive message of social cohesion and a more generic approach of integration on the agenda, policies still mainly separately target immigrants, now in terms of social cultural adaptation. This 'dilemma of recognition' is typical of the policy model of assimilation: by emphasizing the costs of accommodation, e.g. stigmatization and reinforcing cultural boundaries, the tradition promotes denial (De Zwart, 2005, p.139). In terms of policy governance, immigrant integration remained a separate policy field under the coordination of its own Minister (though still without portfolio)\(^\text{17}\). The polarization and mediatization of the integration debate that mark this period put the policy field at the center of attention.

**Recent developments**
While the early years of 2000 were characterized by a strong focus on commonality and a shared sense of citizenship, emphasizing the necessity to speak Dutch and to have a shared set of values and norms, the debate on immigrant integration shifted once again between about 2007 and 2014. In this period the emphasis was increasingly put on neighborhood policies, connecting immigrant integration to issues of urban affairs. It was under the fourth Balkenende government (2007-2010), that the programme for urban neighborhood priorities was launched (‘Krachtwijken’), very similar to those that had been developed in France. Furthermore, possibly as a reflection of the strong presence of Christen Democrats and the Christian Union in this government, more emphasis was put on intercultural and interreligious dialogue programs, taking plurality, openness and an understanding of diversity as basic principles to overcome segregation and discrimination. On the other hand a stronger emphasis on the integration obligations of immigrants is visible in the development of civic integration courses in these same years. The Civic Integration Act in 2007, obliging non-EU immigrants to take a civic-integration exam before obtaining a residence permit, formalizes the link between immigration and integration further. The preparation of this law had, however, begun during earlier government coalitions, as of 2003.

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**The citizenship frame; from social inclusion to civic integration courses**

The assimilationist turn in the early 2000’s, which led to the awareness that *social* and *cultural* integration did not automatically follow from social and economic mobility and emancipation within the own group, led to the introduction of obligatory civic-integration courses and a naturalization-exam. These were aimed at promoting citizenship and social cohesion. Whilst already introduced in 1994, the term 'citizenship' served as a 'guiding principle for a new vision on the presence of people from diverse cultures in the Netherlands' (Pierik, 2012, p.31; Tweede Kamer, 1994). The government thereby explicitly targeted newly arrived migrants, as well as immigrants residing in the Netherlands for a longer time *and* native Dutch citizens. Whilst the citizenship terminology on the hand opens the integration debate to a generic message addressing both immigrant and native Dutch citizens, on the other hand this terminology initiated the debate on social and cultural integration, eventually leading to the Act on Civic Integration of Newcomers (WIN) in 1998. The Act was replaced by the act 17 For an overview of the Ministries see appendix II.
on Civic Integration (WI) in 2007, which introduced an obligatory civic-integration exam. In 2012 the Act was again adjusted, withdrawing the financial support previously offered to participating immigrants. While the citizenship-discourse on the hand links integration to a broader generic message, the increasing restrictions on the civic integration courses and exams link the topic to immigration in a narrow sense and should be understood in terms of restricting regulation and the assimilationist backlash against redistributive policies (De Zwart, 2005, p.139).

At the same time this period saw the rise of the new Party for Freedom (PVV) who gained nine seats in the national elections of 2006, and has been represented in parliament ever since. With immigration high on the agenda the PVV has dominated many discussions on and the framing of immigrant integration issues, from double nationalities18 to a proposal for tax on headscarves19, and parliamentary debates on the ‘costs’ of immigration20 and the so-called ‘Moroccans-debate’21.

While the first steps in mainstreaming were set in the nineties, with a move to more generic integration policies, decentralizing part of the policy responsibilities to colleague-departments, the field was further deconcentrated during the 2000’s. The Cabinet explicitly distanced itself from the “relativism enclosed in the concept of the multicultural society” in 2011 (Ministerie BZK, 2011, p.15). In the memorandum the Cabinet states that increased pluriformity and diversity do not automatically lead to shared norms, but that this instead requires effort of those who come to settle here. The government expresses in more linear and assimilationist terms now that: “Our society has indeed been partly shaped by the migrants that settled here too, but is not interchangeable for any other society what so ever...integration herefor is about integration in Dutch society.. .. Dutch society in all its diversity is the society in which those who come to settle in the Netherlands, have to learn to live, to which they have to adapt and have to fit in” (Ministerie BZK, 2011, p.5). The Integration Agenda (Minister van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid [SZW], 2013) of the current government continues the focus on “Dutch society and its values” (Minister SZW, 2013b) and strives for equal treatment of all its citizens, working towards a society where people can develop themselves unhindered and independently to contribute to Dutch society. So while the move to generic policies was initiated in the 90’s already, it was primarily the rephrasing in assimilationist terms that indicates a second step in this direction in the 2000’s. With a strong focus on individual responsibility and a monist adaptation to Dutch society the question rises in how far this links to the concept of mainstreaming.

In terms of policy targeting the increased diversity amongst immigrant groups in 2004 led to the consideration that group-policies in general are not useful, focusing on generic policies in ‘most areas’ instead (Tweede Kamer, 2004c). Reaffirmed in the more intercultural years of 2007, where specific policies are only applied under ‘extra-ordinary’ circumstances. In 2011, this is taken a step further under the motto ‘future over descent’ policies are centered around individuals rather than

21 The debate was requested by the PVV following the death of a soccer-referee who got molested by a group of youngsters of immigrant descent. The PVV framed the incident a ‘Moroccan-problem’ and an example of ‘Moroccan-violence’. Retrieved from, http://www.spitsnieuws.nl/archives/binnenland/2012/12/dood-grensrechter-marokkanenprobleem
groups, therefore specific problems are from then on “addressed through generic policies only” (Ministerie BZK, 2011). Overall we see a shift in emphasis here from emancipatory specifically targeted policies in the 80’s to the accessibility of generic policies in this period. This development is characterized by a move from a multicultural approach to a recognition of increased diversity and individualization of targeting on the one hand, and general decentralizations in the social sector on the other. As summarized by one of our respondents: “sometimes it is said that it [mainstreaming] is a new development, however, de facto this development has been going on much longer already”.23

Roughly speaking, throughout the years immigrant integration policy has been limited to civic integration courses and re-migration policies. In fact, in 2011 it was announced that the budget for immigrant integration will be reduced to zero by the year of 2015. The Integration Memorandum of 2011 stated that by 2015 all subsidies from the national government for integration will be cut (Ministerie BZK, 2011. p.11); “knowledge, based on research and networks, will then be the most important service of our department”23.

While throughout the 2000’s the respective Ministers took an active coordination role (see a.o. Minister VI, 2003; Tweede Kamer, 2005) references to colleague departments are very scarce in the 2011 Memorandum. Though slightly extended again in 2013, in general the past years are characterized by strong decentralizations in the social sector and move towards the so-called ‘participatory-society’. While the policies fields of integration and education partly overlap, and occasionally coordinate, education policies fall under the responsibility of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science and are thus ruled from a different department than immigrant integration policies. Except from the period between 2007-2010 and the current government since 2012, the ministerial position on integration has been held by CDA (Christen Democrats) candidates, noteworthy with regard to religion-related questions such as faith schools and the freedom to choose a school24. How these two policy-fields relate and how mainstreaming has affected this, will be addressed in chapter three on education policies.

In terms of vertical governance, the cooperation between the state and local governments is central. Throughout the last ten years, social cohesion, as a prime objective of immigrant integration policies, is increasingly phrased in local and neighborhood terms, placing the work- and living-environment of people central in the policy design (Tweede Kamer, 2006). The national government works together with local governments through programs such as ‘Big Cities Policy’ (since 1994), more recently the GIA-program or specific programs such as the decentralized ‘Antilleans Policy’25. The aim of GIA, ‘Collective Integration Agenda’ in 2008, was to adjust local and national integration policies, creating dual, though unified policies (Huinder, 2013, p.197). This can be considered a preamble to big decentralizations that followed in 2011. Consequently GIA II (renamed ‘Collective Integrated Approach’) in 2012 focused around questions of mainstreaming, dealing with immigrant integration issues through generic policies26.

22 Interview with policy advisor at the Integration and Society-department at the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, The Hague 26th of June 2014
23 Interview with Head of the Integration and Society-department at the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, The Hague 28th of May 2014
24 Between 2007-2010 and since 2012 there is a Minister from the PvdA
25 Initiated from the national level by financial support for seven municipalities with the largest Antillean-community.
26 Interview with policy officer Forum (knowledge-center for multicultural affairs), Utrecht, 27th of June 2014
2.4 Conclusion: the context of mainstreaming in the Netherlands

This chapter has made clear that mainstreaming has been an incremental development in the Netherlands over the past two to three decades, rather than a sudden policy punctuation over the past years. Although it is true that the term mainstreaming has not been used until very recently (and even now tends not to be mentioned explicitly in policy documents), a shift from target group specific to generic policies has been taking shape already since the 1970s. Ever since the 1970s when policies were primarily target group specific and ad-hoc, the balance between specific and generic policies has been shifting towards the latter. Already in the 1980s in the context of the Ethnic Minorities Policy, the aim was to have generic policies wherever possible, and specific policies wherever required. This was reflected in particular in target group specific policies in the socio-cultural domain, but generic policies in the socio-economic domain (where the budget was concentrated). The Integration Policy of the 1990s made the generic focus of policies even more distinct, abandoning the focus on minority groups for a focus on individual migrants that were to become citizens in the Dutch context. Although the assimilationist turn of the early 2000s partly continued this civic turn in Dutch integration policies, it also reintroduced a group-orientation, especially by problematizing the socio-cultural background of specific groups.

The most recent policy episode, which starts around 2007-2010, can be considered a closing piece to this trend from target-group specific to generic policies. Integration policy has now been largely deconstructed as a separate institutional policy domain, at the national as well as the local level. Especially at the national level, this is also clearly reflected in budgetary terms, with a zero-budget foreseen after 2015. However, recent developments around EU labour migrants but also around the radicalization of Muslim youth in the Netherlands do seem to put immigrant integration back on the agenda.

This shift toward generic policies, as one of the key dimensions of mainstreaming, should be seen as a reflection of shifting beliefs about the role of immigration and diversity in Dutch society. Just as much as the group specific ad-hoc measures in the 1970s were a reflection of the belief that migrants were not stay permanently and that the Netherlands should not be a country of immigration, should the current generic-policy approach be seen as a full realization that the presence of immigrant groups as well as the phenomenon of immigration as such should be considered permanent traits of contemporary Dutch society. It is in this respect that mainstreaming in the area of migration-related diversity shows similarities with for instance gender mainstreaming and disability mainstreaming.

As we have seen in this chapter, such generic policies also adequately reflect the deepening of diversity in Dutch society, or what we have described as the ‘diversification of diversity.’ The growing number of people with a migration background, the growing number of different migrant groups being present in Dutch society, but also with increasing fragmentation within groups over different migrant generations, it has simply become impossible to speak of distinct immigrant or minority groups. For some groups the second generation, who never really migrated in the purse sense of the word, are now larger than the first generation that actually migrated; also in some places in the Netherlands, including Rotterdam and Amsterdam to be examined in this research, the percentage of the population with a migration background approximates the 50%, making it hardly realistic to speak of minorities.
We can conclude that there is a paradox in this development. The deconstruction of integration policies into generic policies can be seen as a signal of awareness of the deep transformative effect of immigration and diversity at society at large, affecting almost all policy areas rather than being a separate policy area in itself. However, as has been observed in this chapter, questions can be raised (and are addressed in subsequent chapters of this report) about the extent to which this mainstreaming is effectively coordinated and managed in terms of awareness of migration related issues, or whether mainstreaming in reality comes down to policy dilution and government retrenchment.

One key issue in this respect relates to the second dimension of the typology of mainstreaming that has been discussed in the literature review of the previous work package of this research project (Van Breugel, Maan & Scholten, 2014) the extent to which mainstreaming actively involves a ‘whole society’ approach at the interculturalisation of society at large (rather than the integration of specific migrant groups). The budgetary developments over the past couple of years as well as the lack of a ‘horizontal’ policy coordination structure being installed after the deconstruction of the ‘vertical’ coordination structure of the past integration policies, cast doubt about whether this whole society approach has actually been effectuated. There are in the Dutch case no traits of a ‘community cohesion’ approach such as has been established in the United Kingdom over the past decade.

Also, mainstreaming in the Dutch settings appears strongly correlated to decentralization of integration policies to the local level. Just like the trend towards generic policies, this decentralization development is a much older trend, starting already in the early 1990s and intensifying after the connection with Urban Policies at the end of the 1990s and the Neighborhood Policies of the late 2000s. Although decentralization may be a part of a trend toward poly-centric governance (Van Breugel, Maan & Scholten, 2014, p. 31), it is unclear to what extent in the Dutch setting multi-level governance structures have been put in place to coordinate policy measures at different levels and to prevent policy divergence or conflict. In fact, as research on policies in Rotterdam and Amsterdam shows, the Dutch case may be an example of ‘decoupling’ of policies at different levels rather than ‘poly-centric governance.’ This too casts doubt about whether the Dutch approach can effectively be understood in terms of ‘mainstreaming’ or rather in terms of ‘retrenchment.’ In order to examine these questions we will look at policy developments in the fields of education and social cohesion of the past ten years in more detail in the following chapters.
3 – Education

In the previous chapter we concluded that mainstreaming, or at least the trend from target group specific to generic policies, has been a long and incremental process over the past decades. The recent dilution of integration policy as an institutional policy domain can be considered the closing piece of this much older trend. Therefore, it is methodologically impossible to study the mainstreaming of immigrants integration in the Netherlands by looking only at explicit migrant integration policies. Consequently, two policy domains have been selected in the context of the broader international UPSTREAM project, one in the socio-cultural sphere (social cohesion policies) and one in the socio-economic sphere (education). This chapter focuses on the latter; education policies. It involves an analysis of mainstreaming both in national as well as in local education policies in Rotterdam and Amsterdam.

Education covers a very broad policy area. An ordinary educational career in the Netherlands starts at an age of 4 or 5 years, as children start to attend primary school. After eight years, they will receive a recommendation by their school (-teachers) about the most appropriate level of secondary education. This recommendation is often complemented by the result on the CITO-exam\(^\text{27}\). Many policies distinguish between VMBO (preparatory vocational education\(^\text{28}\)) and Havo, VWO and Gymnasium (levels qualifying for application at a university or a university of applied sciences). A diploma obtained in one of the last three levels is regarded as a ‘basic qualification’ to enter the labour market, whereas VMBO pupils will subsequently have to attend vocational education to obtain this qualification. Quitting school before obtaining a basic qualification is considered early leaving. In addition to the ‘standard’ educational career, there are institutions like preschool (for toddlers between 2.5 and 4 years old), head/fee and bridging classes (for those children who have a language disadvantage during or at the end of primary school), and education for adults, for example focused on language or participation. It is the combination of preschool with the first two years of primary education that is called ‘Early Childhood Education’ [ECE]. The policy domain of education therefore offers many possible moments and venues for implementing immigrant integration measures, both specific and generic ones.

In this chapter we will discuss the three cases introduced before: the national government, Rotterdam and Amsterdam. For each case we will first focus on the problem-context of immigrant-integration in education. What kind of problems are identified and how big are these problems perceived to be trough time? Subsequently, we analyse the policy-context: for example, how is the department organized, to what extent are retrenchment measures apparent and how are jurisdictions distributed among the different levels and departments? Thirdly, we will discuss the political context: to what extent is the discussion about immigrant integration in education influenced by (coalitions of) political parties, political and non-political actors? Finally, we will discuss the content of the policy documents written between 2003 and 2014, discussing issues related to

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\(^{27}\) The CITO-exam is not yet obligatory for primary schools. If used, the exam exists of three elements (Language, Calculation, Study-skills) and one optional element (covering geography, history, natural sciences). The latter element will never be included in the score achieved. The score can vary from 501 until 550. There are several connecting scales between scores and secondary educational levels. Roughly, scores between 501 and 533 will qualify for VMBO (preparatory vocational education) and scores between 537 and 550 will qualify for Havo, VWO or Gymnasium.

\(^{28}\) VMBO is subdivided in four levels, from a practice-oriented to a ‘theoretical’ level.
immigrant integration in education. To what extent can the described measures be labelled as mainstreamed as recognizable by the shift from specific policies to generic policies? In addition, we will pay attention to (shifts in) the mode of governance (state-centric vs. poly-centric) and the (shifts in) the monist or pluralist vision on society.

3.1 National level
First, we will look at national education policies. We will first look at the context in which these policies have taken shape (political/problem/policy context), then at the content of these policies and will then analyse the developments from the perspective of the mainstreaming typology developed in WP2.

3.1.1 Policy background
Problem context
Immigrant children on average experience several disadvantages throughout their educational career. Persistent language problems are perceived as a root cause of many of these disadvantages (Minister Onderwijs, Cultuur & Wetenschap [OCW], 2004). Research shows that first-generation immigrants who did not learn the Dutch language or second generation immigrants who married a partner from their home-country often raise their children in their mother-tongue (Minister Wonen, Wijken en Integratie [WWI], 2007). Consequently, many immigrant children arrive at school with language problems. During primary school, these children can at best partially catch up with the level of native children. Immigrant children on average have a language delay of two years at the end of primary school (Minister OCW, 2003; Minister OCW & Minister VI, 2004), although this language delay is already diminished by 40% between 1995 and 2011 (Minister OCW, 2004b; Mulder, 2013).

The first moment of disadvantage that has triggered much attention is the transition from primary to secondary school. Immigrant children are at this point more likely to be recommended to attend VMBO. In addition, the average CITO-score amongst immigrant children is lower than the average CITO-score of native children (Minister OCW, 2004). This results in underrepresentation of immigrant children at Havo/VWO/Gymnasium and overrepresentation at VMBO classes (Minister OCW, 2004, Minister OCW & Staatssecretaris OCW, 2006). Throughout the years, a positive trend is noticeable in representation of immigrant children at higher levels of secondary school (Minister OCW, 2004b; Tweede Kamer, 2005; Ministerie BZK, 2011). In 2006, 30% of non-western immigrants attend a higher level of secondary education. This is not yet comparable to the 47% of natives, but it does represent a significant improvement (Tweede Kamer, 2006). In following years, numerical information about immigrant CITO-scores or secondary school-level advice is not given anymore. However, some comments are made about the increasing flow of immigrant children to Havo/VWO (Ministerie BZK, 2011, p.4) and the increased average CITO-score because immigrants are catching up on their disadvantages (Tweede Kamer, 2012, p.3).

Early leaving is a persistent problem in the final years of VMBO and at schools for vocational education, especially amongst ethnic minorities (Minister VI, 2003; Ministerie OCW, 2004; Tweede Kamer, 2005; Minister OCW & Staatssecretaris OCW, 2006). Again, there is a positive trend noticeable: the amount of non-western immigrants with a basic qualification has risen from 39% in 2001 to 53% in 2005. Amongst youngsters, 36% immigrants obtained their basic qualification, versus
49% amongst the native population (Tweede Kamer, 2006). From 2008 onwards, information about early leaving is given in generic terms no longer differentiating between immigrant and native students but still showing a rapid downward trend in the total amount of drop-out (Tweede Kamer, 2008; 2009; Minister OCW, Staatssecretaris OCW & Minister Economische Zaken, Landbouw en Innovatie [EZLI], 2011). Influenced by the WRR (the Scientific Council for Government Policy), early leaving was re-emphasized as a problem of ‘overloaded’ students: multi-problem and low socio-economic-status replaced the ‘ethnic’ character of the problem (Minister Jeugd en Gezin [JG] & Staatssecretaris OCW, 2009).

The final issue described here are the so called ‘black schools’29. In what is described in Dutch policy discourse as ‘black schools’, the percentage of immigrant children attending is at least 20% higher than the amount of immigrant children living in the surrounding area. In the same way, white schools can exist when replacing percentage of immigrant children with percentage of native children. (Alleged) Causes of this problem are overrepresentation of immigrants at certain educational levels, residential segregation and parental preferences. Black schools are conceived as a problem in general because they would hinder spontaneous contact between immigrant and native children (Minister VI, 2003; Tweede Kamer, 2005). Moreover, the problem was perceived even bigger for immigrants, because (language) deprivation of immigrant children would be reinforced by attending a black school. However, the SCP (The Netherlands Institute for Social Research) concluded in their Minority Report 2003 that there were signs that ‘black schools’ were more capable of reducing the language delay of immigrant children than other schools (Minister OCW, 2004). This insight was strengthened in the following years, after which the discussion replaced itself to the undesirability of separate schools because of the poor preparation to the modern multicultural society (Tweede Kamer, 2005).

**Policy context**

At the beginning of the new millennium the Ministry regarding education was undergoing many changes. It is in this time that the ministry changed its name into the current “Ministry of Education”, Culture and Science’ (Dutch abbreviation: OCW). As part of a large deregulation project, the amount of laws, general administrative orders and ministerial regulations a school had to take into account decreased with 33% from fifteen hundred to a thousand between 2004 and 200630 (Minister OCW, 2004c). After 2006, no similar substantive reorganization or deregulation took place at the Ministry anymore. Also, the main decentralization of jurisdiction on the educational disadvantages policy took place in 2005, when the responsibility was shifted from the municipalities to the schools. It is in this period that the vertical shift in governance took place the most and the trend of a state-centric mode of governance to a poly-centric mode of governance was furthered.

However, poly-centric governance does not only refer to vertical shifts in responsibilities, but also at horizontal shifts of cooperation, for example interdepartmental coordination. In the National Policy Framework “Municipal Educational Disadvantages Policy” 2002-2006 (Staatsblad, 2001), it is stated that effective educational disadvantages policy is dependent of a variety of other policy fields, such

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29 In the Netherlands, educational segregation discussions are approached from a ‘black schools’, ‘white schools’ and ‘mixed schools’ perspective. This terminology is not (completely) associated with the real skin-color of the individual attendees. Rather, ‘black’ is used as a synonym for students of an immigrant background, whereas ‘white’ refers to native students.

30 Only 25% of these rules and regulations come from the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science. Other main contributors are municipalities (11%) and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (13%) (Minister OCW, 2004c).
as the labour market, housing and safety. For some goals (such as reducing early leaving), there is interdepartmental cooperation (for instance between the ministry of Justice and the ministry of Education). In addition, documents handling the issue of school-segregation refer to neighborhood policies as an important and “real” solution to the problem (Minister Jeugd en Gezin & Staatssecretaris OCW, 2009). Clearly, immigrant integration in education depends on other policy-areas as well. Strikingly, cooperation between Education and Integration seems minimal. Publications about Integration in general are not co-signed by the ministry of Education, although these policies often contain elements that are to be implemented by the ministry of Education. Equally, the publication of letters and reports about integration and education are signed by the minister of Education only, implying that is not a coproduction. Examples are the letter ‘Education, Integration and Citizenship’ in 2003, the letter “OCW and Integration” in 2006 and responses to the advice of the Education Council concerning the countering of segregation in 2005. Therefore, it seems like the vertical strand of poly-centric governance is better developed than the horizontal strand, at the national level.

Another policy-context influence can be recognized in the influence of the 2008 economic crisis on the overall Dutch finances, including the budgets of the Ministry of Education. From 2001 until 2006, the OCW budget increased more than the growth of the Dutch GDP, but this trend reversed from 2007 onwards. In absolute numbers, the spending on education rose between 2008 and 2012 (Ministerie OCW, 2013), however, the actual costs for schools increased more than their additional funding. Therefore, educational financing becomes more and more vulnerable (Algemene rekenkamer, 2013). The budgetary cuts are therefore distributed over all primary, secondary and some tertiary schools. There is no direct relation evident from the policy documents between austerity measures and mainstreaming or the abandoning of specific policies.

**Political context**

Education is an important political topic for several political parties, for different reasons. For two groups of parties, education is particularly important. At first we can recognize the working class parties such as the social democrats (PvdA) and the socialist party (SP) that emphasize qualitative and good education for every child and student at an affordable price (or preferably for free). Secondly, education is important for the Christian parties, such as CDA, CU and SGP, that are historically bound to faith schools. Throughout the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, the so-called ‘school battle’ took place. During this battle, the secular and confessional parties ‘fought’ over the (financial) equality of ‘normal schools’ and ‘special schools’. Whereas regular schools are organized by the government, special schools are governed by a foundation or association. In addition, special schools are often founded with a particular ideological, eg religious, social or educational, vision, whereas normal schools are generally free of a specific vision, more open to all religions and applying a ‘conventional’ way of teaching. From 1917 on, article 23 of the Constitution regulates the right for public schools to have a specific denominational or religious character with equal (financial) status to non-specific public schools. Many of the Christian parties

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31 The years 2008 and 2009 form an exception to the reversed trend because the Netherlands registered a negative GDP in those years.

32 Faith schools are not known in the Netherlands as such. However, since we also have a system of real ‘special education’, for students with special needs such as disabilities or behavioural problems, choosing this translation would be confusing. In the rest of this report we will therefore refer to these schools as faith schools even though special schools may also refer to specific social or pedagogical visions.
are hesitant to apply any measure that might constrain the rights of faith schools or the rights of free school choice that parents have. Between 1981 and 2014, there is only one period (‘98-'02) in which a liberal (VVD) minister hosted the Ministry of Education, remaining years are more or less equally divided between the largest Christian party (CDA) and the social democrats (PvdA). This division reflects the importance that these parties attach to the theme.

Populist parties can influence the mainstreaming process in two ways: either they will push for more mainstreaming in order to not spend more money or recourses on the immigrants or their stigmatizing of the immigrant groups will trigger more specific policies. The arrival of the PVV in 2006 has influenced the educational policies primarily through the questions asked in the House of Representatives, their input in debates and their input through the media. Although the PVV always maintains a vision of specifically framing and naming immigrants as problem-makers and –deliverers, it is also opposed to invest (more) money or resources to these groups. A good example of this stance is the debate that followed on the official request of the PVV of the expenditure made by the Ministry of Education for ‘non-western allochthons’, officially called ‘the debate on the financial consequences of immigration’. In this debate, PVV-member Fritsma emphasizes the immigration-records and mass-immigration, consequently, according to him “the citizens have the right to know what the costs are of continuing mass immigration” (Tweede Kamer, 2009, p.57). Many of the other participants in the debate are primarily concerned that the PVV would like to use the information in a negative way, for example without approaching some costs as investment rather than sunken costs (Tweede Kamer, 2009; 2009b). Although the debate has had no striking policy-outcomes, it is exemplary for the negative sentiment resulting from many of their contributions.

3.1.2 Policy content
As indicated in the introduction, education covers a very broad policy area, including pre-school, primary school, secondary school, vocational and higher education and adult (language) education. Throughout time we can observe a trend of generic policies replacing previous additional specific policies. However, this process did not go steady nor comprehensive: contrary to some of the claims made, trough time several specific measures are still included in the policies.

2003-2005: Mainstreaming as decentralization and deregulation
Overall, 2003-2004 marked the beginning of the decentralization and deregulation of many educational arrangements. From this moment on, budgets are merged into the ‘broad subsidy’ municipalities are receiving, and other budgets are decentralized from the national government and the municipalities to the schools. To achieve not only decentralization, but also deregulation, output-indicators are used for supervision instead of process-indicators (Kabinet, 2003). Both primary and secondary schools became responsible for combatting educational disadvantages, without interference of the municipality. The municipality was still responsible for preschool, bridging classes and general school facilities (Minister OCW, 2004). In the multiannual plan “Direction Primary Education” (Tweede Kamer, 2004d), it was stated that the “policy to give schools more capacity by increasing autonomy and deregulation will be pursued with vigour”. The multiannual plan for secondary education supported the same message (Tweede Kamer, 2004e). Interestingly, the municipalities thus stayed responsible for elements that play a big role in immigrant integration in education and which are more prone to specific policies than the general educational process.
Simultaneously, a quite rigorous break with specific policies occurred when it was decided to abolish OALT in 2004. OALT refers to “education in immigrant living languages” and was established in 1998 as a replacement of education in own language and culture (OETC). At first, OETC was established because of the expectation of guest workers returning ‘home’. Later, knowledge of the own cultural background was supposed to raise confidence and a positive development of the mother tongue would positively influence education in Dutch. In the 2003 document “integration policy, new style” the cabinet distances itself from the earlier frames regarding the added value of OALT:

“In the opinion of the Cabinet, approaching minorities in their own language sends the wrong signal. It is not reconcilable with the Cabinet’s concept of shared citizenship. That is why the Cabinet wants to discourage all forms of institutions that directly or indirectly hinder integration by cultivating minorities own identity. The abolishment of OALT is a direct consequence of this principle.” (Minister VI, 2003 p.11-12)

Bold words are used throughout the whole document. For example, immigrant parents should take their responsibilities in raising their children and those of them who did not yet obtain their integration requirements (such as a language diploma) will be obliged to do so under sanctions of social benefit penalties. Consequently, the document is characterized by contrary announcements: on the one hand explicitly opposes specific targeting policies, preferring generic policies instead, and on the other hand (the more negative hand) it frames specific target groups with specific policies again while quite assimilationist imposing them with more self-responsibilities for their integration.

**Needs-based and area-based replacement strategies in school funding**

An important generic turn took place by altering the Dutch educational funding system in 2006. At the beginning of the 21st century, schools hosting children with “disadvantages” are compensated in their funds by the application of ‘weighing’ in the calculation of the size of the schools’ target group and thus their adjusted total school population. Weighing indicators are parental educational level (complemented only in case of native children with parental work-level) and country of origin of parents, the latter results in a higher weighing than just low educated parents.

Over 1.5 million children attended primary school in 2004 and 400,000 of them formed the ‘target group’ as determined by the weighing system. Immigrant children constituted half of the target group (Minister OCW, 2004b). Following the observations of the Commission Blok, more and more attention was asked for the situation of native disadvantaged children (Minister OCW, 2004b). In society, the low educated and low income electorate maintained the sentiment of being subordinated, especially since the overall attitude towards migrants became more unwelcome. For the government, the development of the super-diverse society posed them with an increasingly difficult administrative task when parental ethnicity would stay a condition for weighing. These developments resulted in the alteration of the weighing guidelines, without much opposition, from 2006 onwards. Country of origin was formally removed as condition for a weight and thereby the

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33 In the Netherlands, the educational funding system of primary schools is intertwined with the educational disadvantages policy.

34 For example, a weight of 1.9 was assigned to children with immigrant (low educated) parents. This weight implied that when calculating the adjusted school population on which the funding is based, the child was perceived as 1.9 children. A school would consequently receive almost double funding for these students.


36 The new system was incrementally implemented between the school years 2006-2007 and 2010-2011.
funding system was clearly mainstreamed. This development counteracted the recommendations of the Education Council\textsuperscript{37}, which concluded that ethnicity is still an important condition that should be taken into account (Mulder, 2013). Even in 2013, the Education Council maintains this position, once again recommending reintroducing ethnicity as a criterion for educational disadvantage subsidies (Onderwijsraad, 2013).

In practice, schools in rural areas (with more native disadvantaged children) received more funding under the new guidelines. On the contrary, ‘black schools’ (mostly in large cities) saw their budgets shrinking since many (immigrant) children’s parents are too highly educated for the new weights. In the first years of the new system the schools with overrepresentations of immigrant children received compensation by the ministry. Subsequently, it was followed up by the area-based ‘guideline impulse-areas’ in 2011. This guideline assigns extra money to schools in postal code areas with on average a low education level and high unemployment as registered by the poverty-monitor of the SCP (Mulder, 2013). These areas most often contain the schools that profited of the prior compensation rules.

The weighing-(funding)-system is generally used as an indicator to determine the target-population of several policies. Consequently, all children who were assigned a weight were considered the target population. This implied that immigrant children \textit{automatically} were part of the target population, whereas native children \textit{also had a chance} of being part of the target population. After the change of the system in 2006, this distinction was not suddenly absent, but it was less explicit and less officially targeted. This observation implies that many actions that may seem to be formulated generically by aiming at ‘the target population’, are in fact quite specific, at least until 2006. After 2006, the new (official) generic funding policy was complemented by an area-based guideline, which indicates a replacement strategy as described by De Zwart (2005).

\textbf{Citizenship education as a ‘whole society’ approach?}

Faith schools, Islamic schools in particular, are an exceptional case in the Dutch education and integration debate. Article 23 of the constitution enables the inhibition of Islamic schools. In addition, faith schools are important to several Christian parties, who are thus left without possibilities to oppose Islamic schools. Subsequently, Islamic schools are hardly mentioned in policy documents regarding immigrant integration in education. However, Islamic schools were subject of debate and of five studies throughout the period 2003-2008\textsuperscript{38}. Debates around these reports resulted in strengthened supervision (in case of fraud or bad performances, which both occurred more than average on Islamic schools) and influenced the incorporation of “promoting active citizenship and social inclusion” as official objective of primary and secondary education by law in 2006. The additional official objective was the result of a bill submitted by the PvdA. With the acceptance of this bill, all schools, both non-specific public schools and faith schools, were bound to the following article:

\textsuperscript{37} Advisory board for the Dutch Government regarding Education. Both for requested and unrequested advise.

\textsuperscript{38} Three of these studies focused on the extent of integration provided by the schools, each concluding that Islamic schools are no risk for social cohesion (Onderwijsinspectie, 2002, 2003; WRR, 2006). Another study focused on foreign interference with Dutch Islamic schools (BVD, 2002) and the last study focused on administrative malpractice and fraud (Onderwijsinspectie, 2008).
“Education:

a) Assumes that scholars grow up in a plural society,

b) Also aims at the promotion of active citizenship and social inclusion, and

c) Is also focused on scholars having knowledge of and getting acquainted with different backgrounds and cultures of their peers.”

(Article 8, primary education act and Article 17, secondary education act)

Partly to support schools in the implementation of this act, a ‘canon of our national history’ was written and published in 2007. The canon is meant to be a guideline for history classes in primary and secondary education, which became more mandatory by declaring it an official objective in 2010 (Staatssecretaris OCW, 2010). The canon exists of 50 ‘windows’, from the stone ages until the founding of Europe. Regarding immigrants, there are windows about the relations with Suriname, Antillean Islands and Indonesia and there is a window about ‘multi-coloured Netherlands’, focusing on the increased diversity of society and its influences e.g. on schools, mosques and integration.39

Just as in other countries, the Dutch canon was not received enthusiastically by everyone (Commissie Ontwikkeling Nederlandse Canon [CONC], 2006). The motivation to write the canon came from the discussion about integration, identity and social cohesion in a multicultural society. However, the frontmen of the committee responsible for the canon dissociated himself explicitly from this discussion as a goal of the canon. Consequently, political discussions focused on the official objectives of the canon and the feasibility of the introduction of the canon as obligatory element of education rather than the actual content of the canon. The content was mainly perceived as a matter for experts (Tweede Kamer, 2008b). It are the experts, amongst which the Education Council, that are divided regarding the content of the canon and its perceived “too Dutch-ness” (Onderwijsraad, 2007). According to the Education Council, more attention should be paid to the influence of immigrants and their histories on the common history. However, the Minister explicitly did included that into the purpose of the canon when installing the canon-committee: “It is important that attention is paid to the way in which the Dutch culture is influenced by non-Dutch cultures and vice versa” (Minister OCW, 2005, p.4). Other parties, like the PVV, embrace the Dutch character of the content of the canon (Tweede Kamer, 2008b). The content of the canon is up for revision every five years (CONC, 2006) and is therefore perceived ‘alive’ and able to adapt to new (historic) insights in the importance of modern-day elements.

The content of the canon is the distinctive element deciding whether the canon will fit into a more assimilationist perspective or an interculturalist perspective. With the current critics on the lack of incorporation of other (immigrant) cultures in the canon it is primarily seen as a mean of imposing the ‘Dutch’ history and values. Therefore, the canon seems to be serving an assimilationist goal, despite the request of the Minister who seemed to aim at a more interculturalist goal of the canon. The law on ‘promoting active citizenship and social inclusion’ can in practice be regarded as interculturalist. Besides knowledge of the governmental system (both Dutch and EU system), most attention is given to ‘generally accepted norms and values’, different religions influencing the Dutch multicultural society, and “similarities, differences and changes in culture and ideologies in the

39 Based on information of the official canon web-page, retrieved from, www.entoen.nu (translated: www.andthen.now)
The approach to school segregation

In 2008 mixing school populations was seen as important because it would “increase the language skills of immigrants” and “contribute significantly to the strengthening of social cohesion in society” (Rijksoverheid, 2008). Reducing segregation was included as an explicit intention in the coalition agreement of Balkenende IV. Several pilots were introduced by State Secretary of Education, Dijksma (PvdA), in order to achieve more mixed schools, while sometimes including compelling measures that limit parents’ free choice of schools. Near the end of the pilots in 2011, quickly after the government turnover, the new Minister of Education, Bijsterveldt (CDA), announced the abolishment of anti-segregation policies. The ‘fact’ of the existence of ‘black and white schools’ and the importance of the parental right of free school choice has led the coalition parties (CDA, VVD, partly PVV) to abolish ministerial specific policies on anti-segregation in schools. Many actors, amongst which the Association of Dutch Municipalities, were surprised by the statements of the minister. The PvdA even called for an urgent debate. In this debate (Tweede Kamer, 2011), we can recognize roughly three ‘groups’ of parties with accompanying argumentations: the Left parties (large part of the opposition), the Right parties (the governing coalition, including CDA) and the religious parties. The inaugural speech and complementary report of Prof. dr. Dronkers on ethnic schools (Dronkers, 2010, p.6) took central stage throughout the debate. Especially because he concludes that:

“A larger ethnic diversity of schools in secondary education hampers the educational achievement of both pupils with a migrant background and native pupils.”

“A higher share of pupils with a migrant background at a school hampers educational achievement, but if these pupils have the same origin region (Islam countries; non-Islam Asian countries), a higher share of pupils with a migrant background at that school improves the educational achievement”

Several leftist parties (PvdA, GL, SP, D66) emphasized the integration function of schools in addition to the educational achievements. The importance of one above the other is a political decision which, according to them, should be decided in favour of integration. Finally, the Christian parties (CGP, CU) put most emphasis on the parental right of free school choice and above all: the importance of the existence of faith schools, defending the thesis that faith schools are not responsible for segregation. According to them, anti-segregation is not the responsibility of the ministry, since it quickly interferences with these rights (Tweede Kamer, 2011). One day after the debate, a parliamentary motion was filed by the SP to emphasize the ongoing importance of the conclusion of the Blok Commission, that measures should be taken to oppose (educational) segregation. This resolution was accepted by all parties, except the PVV (Tweede Kamer, 2011b). In 2014, the current State Secretary of Education, Dekker (VVD), re-emphasized that anti-segregation is still not a policy subject for the ministry, municipalities on the other hand are still obliged to have yearly consultation about this subject with the schools. Above all, the subject has been decentralized rather than completely removed of the agenda.

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40 Primary education, official objectives 36-37-38 and secondary education, official objectives 43-44-45.
2007-2014: The continuation of the move towards generic policies

During the following period, the move towards generic policies is continued by reinforcing the frame of undesirability of specific policies and the discontinuation of the final ‘left-over’ specific policies. For example, the 2006 memorandum ‘OCW and Integration’ continues to stress the desirability of generic policies in education: “starting point of immigrant integration in education and science is the inclusive character of the policies. It does not aim at improvements of a certain target group but aims at the improvement of all students” (Minister OCW & Staatssecretaris OCW, 2006). Also, in the 2007-2011 Integration Memorandum it is stated that, according to the Cabinet, specific policies for ethnic groups are undesirable and only justifiable in exceptional situations (Ministerie WWI, 2007). Interestingly, this memorandum devotes quite some attention to the justification of this turn, by emphasizing in what way general measures are proportionally more beneficial to immigrants. This way, they are hinting on a replacement-strategy as described by De Zwart (2005). From 2008 on, specific measures are virtually absent in the documents regarding immigrant integration in education, or education in general. The generic turn is reinforced in the 2011 ‘Integration memorandum’ (Ministerie BZK, 2011, p.11), by stating that “specific problems should be addressed by regular institutions and regular measurements” and “current specific measurements aimed at the problems which occur mostly in some groups will be embedded in regular policies”. Problems such as early leaving, formerly heavily formulated as an immigrant problem, are formulated as general problems, with general solutions. The same holds for language delays and ‘black schools’. Other, more specific, problems are often not mentioned anymore, like the lower CITO-scores, or certain forms of over- and under-representation. Subsequently, in the 2013 ‘Integration Agenda’ (Minister SZW, 2013), some specific problems are recognized, but not acted on specifically. To what extent the problems do not exist anymore is not clarified by the policy documents.

Other monitors or reports might be able to clarify the existence of the problems. The annual education reports of the Education Inspectorate written between 2003 and 2013 form the basis of the yearly ‘policy responses’ given by the Minister of Education. In these annual reports we can recognize roughly the same trend as in politics: although the collected statistics are not made completely generic, the amount of specific data reported has diminished sharply between 2010 and 2011. Previously, ‘allochtoon’ was used in almost every respect to point at possible discrepancies between natives and immigrants. In addition, whole sections were aimed at specific topics regarding immigrants (i.e. discrimination, inter-ethnic ‘incidents’, lagging participation in higher education). From 2011 on, the statistics and their description not only declined, but also changed. Being an immigrant (descendant) is now treated as one of many optional influential characteristics, alongside gender, prior received grades, etc.

3.1.3. Conclusion

This analysis of education policies at the national level clearly confirms the trend from target group specific to generic policies that was observed in chapter 2. Very symbolic developments in this respect are the abandoning of Immigrant Minority Language Instruction, the withdrawal of special measures against ethnic segregation at schools (especially those with relatively high representations of migrants, so-called ‘black schools’) and the abandoning of an ethnicity-based funding scheme for primary schools during the 2000s. At the same time, some form of ‘whole society’ approach was developed in the second half of the 2000s, especially with the state standardized programs for civic education. This includes a standardized canon on Dutch history, which should be considered as a
very concrete implication of the Dutch government’s desire to reevaluate the importance of national norms and values in relation to migrant integration. Finally, clearly matching the mainstreaming typology of WP2, the educational field also clearly witnessed a trend of decentralization; more and more policy decisions, such as how to respond to schools with overrepresentations of migrants, have been delegated to the local level.

At the same time, we observed that the mainstreaming of education policies did not imply a full fading of attention to migrant-related issues in the sphere of education. As we saw in our discussion of the problem context, there is much research in the Netherlands that show that educational deprivation amongst people with a migration background remains very significant. The strong presence of ‘ethnic statistics’ that help making these issues manifest, also plays a role in keeping this issue on the agenda and creating a sense of urgency in terms of educational policies. As such, we can observe that Dutch educational policies have been caught between (amongst others political and budgetary) pressure to mainstreaming and ‘generalize’ education policies on the one hand, and problem pressure generated amongst others by clear ethnic statistics that point at rather significant migration-related educational issues on the other hand. The recent effort from the Dutch Educational Advisory Board to make the argument for re-installing an ethnicity-based funding scheme for primary education should be interpreted in this perspective.

In order to cope with this dilemma of generalizing policies versus persistent migration-related issues, we observed that national policies resorted to specific replacement strategies. For instance, in terms of funding this involved a combination of needs- and area-based measures. A needs-based funding scheme for primary schools was installed by measuring parent’s educational level as a proxy for education deprivation amongst children, which would address natives as well as migrants. In practice still many migrants were targeted this way, but evaluations show that funding to several ‘black schools’ did decrease because of this system. This was combined with an area-based funding scheme, where financial impulses were given to specific neighbourhoods that would be known for educational deprivation, in practice often involving many ‘black schools.’

3.2 Rotterdam

3.2.1 Policy background

Problem context

Rotterdam sees itself as a city of entrepreneurs with a hands-on-mentality, an image they are very happy to convey. Apart from the specific mentality, the composition of Rotterdam’s inhabitants differs from the general composition of Dutch society as a whole and from other large cities, such as Amsterdam and Utrecht. Highly educated workers tend to concentrate in urban areas. In Amsterdam and Utrecht, more than half of the inhabitants is highly educated (53,5% and 58,4%), Rotterdam on the other hand houses only 33,7% highly educated workers and is thus characterized by a relatively low-educated population (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2009c). Language disadvantages are also common among native low-educated ‘Rotterdammers’: in total, there are more than 100.000 people with literacy problems, both immigrants and natives (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2009c). According to a policy
officer “illiteracy is also common among natives, even more than among immigrants”\textsuperscript{42}. In addition, immigrants form thirty-five percent of the population and non-western immigrant children constitute more than half of the children under fifteen. The educational system in Rotterdam is thus confronted with more immigrant children, than native children, and more disadvantaged children than other large cities. Two-thirds of the 90,000 scholars (in 2005) run the risk of developing educational disadvantages (B&W Rotterdam, 2005). Although the population of Rotterdam is thus clearly different from other cities, the main problems are not. (Language) disadvantages, early leaving, lagging participation by immigrant students in higher education and school segregation are the most notable problems to which policies are focused.

In 2006 it became clear that preschools, designed to eliminate disadvantages before children start attending primary school, actually have a segregating effect as long as it is only accessible for children of the target population\textsuperscript{43} (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2006). Consequently, preschool was opened up for non-target group children as well. Subsequently, this and other interventions proved successful as the trend of increasing segregation was interrupted (Wethouder Jeugd, Gezin en Onderwijs [JGO], 2007). At least three main other issues are recognizable in the policy documents. Information given about early leaving and participation in higher education (by immigrants) is formulated generically from 2010/2011 onwards. Prior to 2010, information about early leaving is disaggregated by ethnicity. For example when stating in 2009 (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2009c) that non-western immigrant students are more likely to drop-out, to switch studies and their diploma efficiency is lower. The emergence and existence of black schools (and later also white schools) is seen as a problem from the beginning and remains high on the agenda until 2010. According to the Aldermen, segregation undermines the social cohesion of the city and hinders the improvement of the language skills of immigrant scholars (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2003; B&W Rotterdam, 2005).

Most statistics regarding education published by the municipality of Rotterdam can be found in two series of documents: “the status of education in Rotterdam” and the general document “the status of Rotterdam”. The first document is published since 2011 by the Education department and is formulated very generic, only in 2013 one table differentiating between immigrant and native children is present. Prior, the 2009 Early leaving-monitor was packed with statistics specifically differentiating. The general document is published by the data-department and shows a similar trend as the education department. Between 2005 and 2013, the document sharply diminishes its references to differences between natives and immigrants. Eventually, the only ethnicity-specific information given is about the amount of early leaving and the participation rate of Havo/VWO education by immigrants.

**Policy context**

In general we can observe several influences of the national policies on the policy context of Rotterdam. Most influential in this respect is the transfer of the responsibilities (and accompanying budgets) for the educational disadvantages policy from the municipality to the school boards in 2005. From that moment on, the schools are responsible for learning outcomes and development, whereas the municipalities are responsible for the relation between schools and their social environment, preschool, school facilities (housing, school transport in some cases) and youth

\textsuperscript{42} Interview with policy officer at the department of education, and former policy officer at department of Integration, Rotterdam, interviewed 4\textsuperscript{th} of June 2014.

\textsuperscript{43} Target population refers to the group as defined by the national weighing system of the educational disadvantages policy.
policies in general (B&W Rotterdam, 2005). Especially for continual learning pathways, the transition from preschool to primary school demanded a good coordination after the change in responsibilities. The municipality is no longer the local ‘director’ but rather a partner of several youth institutions. Following these changes, several consultative organizations and structures were changed, established or regained importance. For example, The Rotterdam Education Forum used to be obligatory until this change, after which it changed into an optional cooperation between the municipality and schools\textsuperscript{44} (Kunst, 2004).

Political context
In two cases, Rotterdam played a clear role in national politics. Firstly, the use of double waiting lists at a primary school in Rotterdam hit the headlines in 2002. The double waiting list implied that immigrant or native children were favoured, depending on the aim of the school: increasing the ‘white’ or the ‘black’ population. Alderman of Education, Leonard Geluk (CDA, since 2004), was very enthusiastic about the model and presented the plan for wider implementation of double waiting lists in whole Rotterdam to the ministers in 2004 (Meerhof, 2004, November 23; Trouw, 2004, November 23; Tweede Kamer, 2005b). Both Minister Verhoeven (Education) and Minister Verdonk (Integration) welcomed the initiative. However, questions were asked regarding the legal feasibility of the plan. Therefore, the Ministers requested the Education Council to study the plan and if it was considered not legally feasible, what alternatives could be formulated (Onderwijsraad, 2005). The Education Council concluded that distributing on origin or ethnicity is legally untenable. However, the council considered it necessary to have contact between different populations: “Learning about others will be difficult without others” (Onderwijsraad, 2005, p.9). Suggestions to achieve integration are amongst others: incorporating social integration as an official educational objective for schools, a consultation-obligation between the municipality and schools about integration and anti-segregation measures on a local level and possibly waiting lists based on language problems (as determined by the weighing-system) (Onderwijsraad, 2005). The first two suggestions are followed up by the Minister of Education (as described in 3.1.1/3.1.2) and the last suggestion had primarily local impacts. Amongst others, the specific primary school in Rotterdam changed its waiting list policy towards distinctions based on disadvantages in 2006. Following the predominantly positive advice about the Rotterdam approach, Alderman Geluk started a new plan against school segregation (see 3.2.2).

Secondly, the G4\textsuperscript{45} presented together the ‘G4 youth manifest’ in 2006 (Gemeente Rotterdam, Gemeente Amsterdam, Gemeente Den Haag & Gemeente Utrecht, 2006). With this document, the cities wanted to clarify to the Cabinet that they advocate a new approach to youth policies. Main components of the desired approach are more administrative responsibilities to use accountable targets for schools and youth institutions (even when these institutions are financed by other governmental levels), decompartmentalization of budgets in order to apply local customization, and extra investments in elements crucial to youth development, such as preschool, community schools and wellbeing assistance (Gemeente Rotterdam et al., 2006, p.2). In 2008 and 2009, the municipalities indeed received more budgets for preschool and early leaving. In addition, the State Secretary agreed to give the municipalities more control (Staatssecretaris OCW et al., 2008; Tweede

\textsuperscript{44} The Rotterdam Educational Forum (Rotterdam Onderwijs Forum) started as the obligatory “consultation focused on agreement” as determined in the primary education act.

\textsuperscript{45} The four large \textit{Randstad} cities: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht.
The manifest may be considered a response to the ongoing erosion of municipal powers regarding educational matters.

### 3.2.2 Policy content

As can be derived from the sketch of the Rotterdam population, the city is becoming increasingly diverse for many years. This is also recognized by policy makers. In 1999, the Mayor and Aldermen drafted a ‘Vision 2010’. In this document, they sketch a population in 2010 in which “the distinction between immigrant and native citizen has lost its meaning.” The population changes will occur without policy interference and therefore diversity is considered “a fact, not an issue” (Gemeente Rotterdam, 1999, p.7). Many policy documents endorse this increasing pluralism by using descriptions as: “The classrooms of primary and secondary education in Rotterdam accommodate nearly 90,000 students, covering more than 150 nationalities. There are major differences in religious and cultural orientation, language development and social skills” (B&W Rotterdam, 2005, p.2-3). This development, and the acknowledgement of it, played an important role in the (development of the) policies as described in this section.

**Overall: a trend towards more generic policies**

Immigrant-integration in education has increasingly been mainstreamed in Rotterdam. 2006 can be considered as the starting point of this shift as specific attention was asked for ‘avoiding the use of expressions that work stigmatizing’ in policy documents by the municipality and school boards (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2006b). The program of the Mayor and Aldermen in 2006 (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2006c) was framed generically as well, always speaking about ‘Rotterdammers’ (inhabitants of Rotterdam). Eventually, progress made regarding educational topics such as increased average CITO-scores, Havo/VWO attendance and higher education attendance should be continued by the community schools, the ‘Rotterdam attack of VMBO/MBO’ and collaboration with higher education: all generic measures equally accessible to all scholars or students in Rotterdam (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2009c). According to a former policy officer this trend is seen as inevitable. For instance, with regard to ‘black schools’, he states: “The inhabitants are ‘black’, what kind of policies do you want to implement on that? There are plenty of problems in education, but they are not really ethnic problems” 46. Three subtopics will illustrate this trend more specifically.

**Combatting language problems**

A preventive measure to combat language problems at an early age is early childhood education (ECE), which is composed of two elements: preschool and ‘early school’. Preschool is arranged as a sort of day-care and/or playgroups connected to primary schools with a coherent pedagogical program, co-aimed at language improvements of toddlers between 2.5 and 4 years. Early school is the program that devotes extra attention to language-development in the first two classes of primary school. Early childhood education policies started in 2000 when the ministry provided subsidies to start at combinations of preschools and schools with at least 70% disadvantaged children. From 2002 on, ECE was converted in a structural element of the educational disadvantages policy. As part of the change of the funding system (as described in 3.1.2), both the funding and jurisdiction on ECE changed. This became known as the ‘cut’, since from this moment municipalities were responsible and only received money for preschools, whereas schools became responsible and receive funds for early education. The question regarding the target group of ECE was left to the

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46 Interview with policy officer at the department of education, and former policy officer at department of Integration, Rotterdam, interviewed 4th of June 2014.
municipalities. Oftentimes, municipalities just stuck to the target groups as they would be formulated by the weighing-system a year later when starting primary school. However, since the goals for ECE expanded, implying that in the long run ECE should be available for every toddler, many municipalities opened up ECE to non-disadvantaged schools and areas as well. In addition, this development would counter the emergence of black and white schools through preschools.

After the so-called ‘cut’ in ECE-policies and change of the funding system, Rotterdam decided to maintain the old definition of the target group as ‘children with an actual change of disadvantages, as determined by the weighing-system’ (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2006b). In later documents, the target group is defined as children with at least one parent born in a non-western country or with at least one low-educated parent (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2011c). In addition, parent counsellors are used to visit the families in order to bring toddlers to the ECE-facilities (which is not mandatory and therefore the municipality has no coercive measures available) and to lead parents to inburgerings-, language- or participation trajectories (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2007). From 2007 on, the municipality experiments with ‘flexible ECE’ available at schools with less than 50% disadvantaged children. It would be more effective in reaching disadvantaged children in areas that are predominantly not-disadvantaged and would counter segregation trough ECE (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2007). Currently, ECE in Rotterdam can still be considered a specific measure, since having a parent born in a non-western country immediately qualifies the child for ECE.

Other language policies are framed in a generic way. A first example for pupils is the bridging class, which is meant for “native and immigrant students in primary education who have such a disadvantage in the Dutch language that they cannot participate at their own level successfully in mainstream education” (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2007, p.19). For these classes, language disadvantages are determined by test scores. The same trend of increasing generic formulations can be recognized by adult-focused language policies. The 2007-2010 policies regarding inburgering and illiteracy, called ‘participating trough language’ (inburgering) and ‘Rotterdam reads, Rotterdam writes” (illiteracy), are much intertwined. Target groups are formulated as ‘educators’, ‘women’, ‘jobseekers’ and those who are eligible for social benefits. In the document regarding inburgering, the municipality states that “Trajectories in Rotterdam are not limited to graduating for the inburgeringscourse by newcomers, or achieving better language-levels for participants in educational trajectories. The Mayor and Aldermen chose active participation in society as final goal” (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2007b, p.9). Thus, goals are set at the same standards for native and immigrant inhabitants and part of a formerly very specific immigrant-integration policy is mainstreamed into language policies. Subsequent language policies (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2011d) are focused on similar generic target groups as mentioned above. According to an integration policy officer we spoke to “It varies greatly to what extent education takes up collaboration with integration. Education has a limited mandate itself, since a lot is arranged by the schools themselves. Parental involvement and language policies amongst parents are pushed by the integration department to be addressed by education”\(^47\). The abovementioned intertwinement of integration and language may thus well be partly attributable to interdepartmental cooperation.

\(^{47}\) Interview with policy officer at the department of activation and well-being, Rotterdam, 9th of June 2014.
Anti-segregation

The enthusiastic attitude towards the double waiting list system as described in 3.2.1 is recognizable in the large-scale “Action plan integration at school” which was launched by Alderman Geluk in 2005. The plan aimed at achieving a balanced school population that would reflect the neighborhood population. However, this was sometimes framed more specifically as “concentration of immigrant students at certain schools should be combatted” (B&W Rotterdam, 2005). The approach consisted of five measures: an integral approach to restructuring areas, support for parent initiatives, support for ‘friendships’ between white and black schools, monitoring (dis)colorization of schools and enabling double waiting lists. The program is in principle area-based, focusing on four deprived areas at first and at six additional areas in stage two. It appeared that it took quite some time for the school boards to be able to and to be willing to take part in the program. Therefore, the Department of Youth, Education and Society (YES), had to work closely with schools, school boards, sub-municipalities and other municipal services to make the plan work (Wethouder Onderwijs en Integratie Rotterdam, 2005). In 2009, the last specific progress report about the anti-segregation measures was published, from that moment on the topic is said to be covered in the general education reports (Wethouder Jeugd, Gezin, Onderwijs en Sport Rotterdam, 2009).

From 2010 on, there is a change noticeable in the Rotterdam approach to anti-segregation. The new Mayor and Aldermen ended the active policies and emphasized educational quality rather than anti-segregation (just like the Ministry would do 2011). In a meeting of GIA about anti-segregation in 2010, Aldermen De Jonge endorsed the importance of the topic, but also stated the following: “A neighborhood school? Excellent, albeit one that delivers good educational quality. Then is doesn’t matter whether it is a black school or a white school (...) The most important is to prevent black schools from becoming weak schools” (Forum, 2010, p.4). Although double waiting lists are still possible, parents and schools are responsible themselves for mixing school populations’ trough parental initiatives and school information carrousels. Partly due to austerity measures, subsidies to parental initiatives and ‘friendship-schools’ are ended (Ledoux, Felix & Elshof, 2013). Although quality is seen as the new focal point, the program “performing better” (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2011c) is not linked explicitly to anti-segregation. In addition, the consultation between municipality and schools about the topic has ended (Ledoux, Felix & Elshof, 2013).

Early leaving

Early leaving is predominantly apparent at VMBO and Vocational Education, in which immigrants are still overrepresented. Although we noticed already that problems are disaggregated by ethnicity till 2010, the approach to early leaving is not. Early leaving is pre-eminently a topic that is dealt with in a generic poly-centric way. In 2003, a covenant was signed by the state, the municipality, the schools for vocational education and the secondary schools to combine efforts to reduce early leaving. In 2007 (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2008) this covenant proved successful having reduced early leaving with 10 percent. A new covenant was concluded upon for four years and again renewed for three years (Staatssecretaris OCW et al., 2007; Staatscourant, 2012). In 2011, the poly-centric approach was continued when a cooperation was founded in which the five biggest school boards have not only united administratively, but also executively. In close cooperation with the municipality, the new policy document was established (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2011e). The ‘joint attack’ is composed
of measures aimed at keeping scholars in school and guiding back those who did drop-out\textsuperscript{48}. None of these measures include ethnic target groups.

\subsection*{3.2.3. Conclusion}

This analysis of education policies in Rotterdam reveals several patterns that are of importance to this research. First of all, that the trend toward generic policies is also manifest at the local level. This does not so much involve a process that is imposed top-down upon the local level by the national level, although budget cuts at the national level were an important factor, but also a process led and driven by the local level in itself. The fact that Rotterdam has a long history in combatting various sorts of socio-economic deprivation amongst its city population plays an important role in this context as well; in many ways Rotterdam continued its educational efforts but then framed as targeting anyone with language problems rather than only immigrants. Rotterdam’s policies are phrased as policies for all ‘Rotterdammers.’ This clearly reflects the super-diverse character of the Rotterdam population, where it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between migrants and natives as well. Remarkably, this is also manifest in a declining emphasis on and even availability of data on the position of specific ethnic groups in Rotterdam. Also, the traditional emphasis of Rotterdam on combating segregation in the education sphere has shifted to the background over previous years.

Secondly, the trend to poly-centric governance is clearly manifest in the Rotterdam case in various ways. National government decentralized many competencies in this policy area to the local level over the past decade, leading to specific changes in the coordination of a.o. early childhood education. This has led the city of Rotterdam to increasingly act as a coordinator in complex networks of actors, including primary and secondary schools, pre-schools, the national government and various other stakeholders. Here the city has clearly taken the role of a facilitator that fits the model of poly-centric governance. Also, Rotterdam has at various occasions, alone or via the G4, has attempted and partly managed to influence national policies; a clear illustration of vertical venue shopping.

\section*{3.3 Amsterdam}

\subsection*{3.3.1 Policy background}

\textbf{Problem context}

The population of Amsterdam is on average higher educated than the population of Rotterdam. However, although Amsterdam has many highly educated (native) inhabitants (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2009c) it also has a large population of (low educated) immigrants. Subsequently, Amsterdam is characterized by a large division along combined ethnic-socio-economic lines. As one of our interviewees formulates it: “\textit{When analysing Amsterdam (...) consistently a strong dichotomy becomes apparent. That dichotomy is simply coloured, and increasingly geographically as well}\textsuperscript{49}.” In 2004, already 70\% of the VMBO students have an immigrant background and the overall ratio of immigrant and native children is 60/40 (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2003; 2004). Just as in Rotterdam,

\textsuperscript{48} Specifically the measures to keep youngsters in school are aiming at the stimulation of appropriate career choices, a rigorous approach to absenteeism and several measures at improving tailored education, for example in working-learning arrangements. Monitoring early leaving, flexible entry moments in vocational education, neighborhood schools and ‘A New Chance’ (a special disciplinary school) are measures to guide youngsters back to school.

\textsuperscript{49} Interview with a former program director of the ‘Wij Amsterdammers’-program, Haarlem, 20\textsuperscript{th} of May 2014.
the immigrant children form a majority in schools. However, due to the ‘dichotomy’, the immigrant (disadvantaged) children are distributed around the city very unequally. As an example: the boroughs “Center” and “Zuidamstel” have on average 14 and 20 percent of scholars with the heaviest weight (according to the weighing system described in 3.1.2), indicating very ‘white’ areas, while the boroughs “Bos and Lommer” and “De Baarsjes” accommodate 89 and 78 percent of those pupils (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2003).

As in the national case and in Rotterdam, Amsterdam largely recognizes the same educational problems. However, due to the specific population composition of Amsterdam, different problems are emphasised sometimes. Two problems that receive more (and longer) attention in Amsterdam are differences in educational careers of native and immigrant children, and segregation in schools, which is taken together with intercultural relations. Differences in educational careers start with the CITO-scores and advices given at the end of primary school. On average, the CITO scores of the ‘white’ areas are 7 to 8 points higher than the scores in the ‘black’ areas. The focus of preschool is therefore directed to black schools (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2003). In 2004, 7900 children attended preschool, of which 84% belonged to the target population that existed for 80% of immigrant children (Gemeente Amsterdam et al., 2004).

A study, conducted in Amsterdam schools in 2006, concluded that the mutual intercultural relationships are reasonable or good. Only 4 out of 25 primary schools and 4 out of 25 secondary schools recorded cultural tensions. However, overall, Moroccan and Turkish scholars felt less accepted and their identification with ‘the Netherlands’ decreased. Their Muslim identity was perceived as a binding factor (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2006; 2006b). In addition, an increase in conflicts between groups with different cultural backgrounds was observed in 2008. Many teachers were not equipped to act against this trend (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2008). Contributing to this increasing division of scholars is the strong diversification of very good schools vs. very weak schools and the above average participation of western scholars at Havo/VWO and under average participation by non-western youth (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2009). Even after taking the geographical divisions into account, many schools are considered either ‘too black’ or ‘too white’ (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2011).

Interestingly, the trend in collection and reporting of educational statistics in Amsterdam runs contrary to the trends as noticeable at the national level and in Rotterdam. The other cases are characterized by declining information on differences between natives and immigrants. However, in the same period Amsterdam increased the amount of information presented in an ethnic group-specific way, both in general as well as education-only documents.

**Policy context**

Interestingly, governmental retrenchment and austerity measures seemed to be received more negatively (or at least to have been more openly contested) by Amsterdam than by Rotterdam. Little or no comments are made about the topic in Rotterdam policy documents. Contrastingly, at several occasions, remarks are made concerning expired or shrunken budgets and accompanying local policy consequences in Amsterdam. A first example is the claimed impossibility of intensifying the ‘inburgering’ policies due to national austerity measures that limit the integration-budgets in 2003 (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2003). Subsequently, in 2004, the abolishment of OALT and budgetary cuts in the municipal educational disadvantages budget influenced the ending of several specific policies,
whereas more money was made available for the generic goals of attaining more teachers and investing in knowledge and innovation (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2004b). In 2005, budgets for inburgering were merged in the overall ‘large cities budget’, followed by the budgets for educational disadvantages in 2006 (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2004; 2005; 2006c). The large cities budget decreased again in 2005, making the goals that are set dependent on the new budgets (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2005). Several small projects (regarding computers at school, community schools and certain elements of preschool) were discontinued to be able to continue the overall process of education. The last stroke was hit in 2006, with the disappearance of municipal educational disadvantages policies and budgets. Some of the budget, intended for preschools and bridging classes, were added to the large city budget and other budgets are given directly to the school boards (after additional budgetary cuts) (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2008b). This change in financing also implied a shift in policy- and financing responsibilities. The role of the school boards increased significantly. The subsequent education policy plans called ‘YOUNG Amsterdam’ (2006-2010) and ‘YOUNG Amsterdam II’ (2010-2014) are consequently a coproduction of the municipality, boroughs and school boards (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2006; 2011).

Political context

With regard to the changing responsibilities of municipalities, both Amsterdam and Rotterdam were initiators of the G4 Youth Manifest described in paragraph 3.2.1. Therefore, the manifest is just as much a part of Amsterdam’s political context as it is for Rotterdam.

Two Aldermen have been remarkably present in local and national media and politics during our period of study. The first is the Alderman of the PvdA, Rob Oudkerk, who was responsible for employment and incomes, education, youth, diversity and the ‘large city policy’ from March 2002 until January 2004. Within this time frame, two incidents are recognizable. At first, in the evening of the local elections of 2002, Oudkerk was caught on tape in a private conversation with Mayor Cohen. Unaware of the fact that one of the microphones was still on, he spoke about ‘kutmarokkanen’ (a difficult to translate negative depiction of Moroccans) as ‘a bunch of annoying guys of Moroccan-Amsterdam origin that create such a mess, that the whole group of people is associated with it’ (NOS, 2002, april 9). Although he apologized for the choice of words, he emphasized that the issue he was addressing is still important. In national politics it is named as a very bad political example several times when discussing diversity, radicalization or polarization, even up to 2009 (Moors, Balogh, Donselaar & De Graaff, 2009). However, on local level it caused little stir in the council.

Subsequently, at the beginning of December 2003 a report about the alleged hindering of integration by an Islamic primary school in Amsterdam was published. A report requested by Oudkerk himself, after comments made by the Educational Inspection Body about that specific school. However, in the research report, the commission concluded that there are no signs of the school hindering integration. On top of that, “the commission believes that local authorities play an important role regarding the acceptance and thus development of Islamic education” (Bellari, Groen, Rentenaar & Spalburg, 2003). Although the commission concluded positively, Oudkerk followed a week later with a proclamation that all faith schools should be closed. According to him, parents should choose a school based on its didactic-pedagogical program rather than religion or denomination. In addition, the pillarized schools in Amsterdam allegedly have merely created segregation instead of integration (Valk, 2003, December 15). Although the statement created quite a stir in schools, local and national media, the topic never made it to the meetings of the council or
the Mayor and Aldermen and therefore it remained a political statement without direct policy implications.

In 2009, Alderman Asscher was confronted with problems with the same Islamic primary school board that was discredited before. Meanwhile, the promotion of social integration and active citizenship had become an obligatory part of Dutch education (see 3.1.2). After renewed investigations, it was concluded that the school lacked efforts to embed this part in their regular education and the overall educational quality of the school was considered ‘very weak’. After a letter of a former school-teacher of the school about the hampering of integration, Asscher and State Secretary Dijksma accelerated financial measures: reducing national subsidies and shutting down local subsidies. In addition, even closing down was considered an option. From 2010 on, the school receives all subsidies again. Partly because they have improved their programs and partly because the State Council declared that such financial measures are only eligible if a school does nothing on a certain subject (Raad van State, 2011).

3.3.2 Policy content

In terms of the content of education policies, Amsterdam seems to keep a specific focus on migrant related issues for a longer period when compared to other cases. Part of this difference is due to the recognizable dichotomy in the city that was observed above and the subsequent policy implications thereof. As we will see in this section, besides preschool and early leaving, anti-segregation and especially anti-radicalization are important policy subfields in the education policies of Amsterdam. For anti-radicalization, the socio-economic integration of immigrants is deemed important. The quality of schools is therefore a priority within this approach: “Every child is entitled to good education. Every child deserves to be able to develop optimally and to fully development its talents. In Amsterdam, it is your future that counts, not your origin. Therefore, all schools in Amsterdam need to be of good quality (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2010, p.10).

Early childhood education

To be able to meet the intention of ‘optimal development of each child’, preschool is an important first link. In 2003 and 2004, preschool was a specific measure, although formally formulated in generic terms and goals of the weighing ‘target population’. The method was twofold: for the children, preschool signalled disadvantages and provided extra support in normal classes at ‘black schools’ i.e. schools with at least 80% children with 1.9 weights. Simultaneously, contact parents with an immigrant background were deployed to lead the parents to language courses. This would subsequently improve the living- and learning-environment of the children (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2003; Gemeente Amsterdam et al., 2004). Starting in 2006, the preschool changed from being exclusively focused on children with disadvantages (implicitly, immigrant children) to being (semi-) open to all children. This change was motivated by anti-segregation intentions and complemented by the expectation that disadvantaged children could benefit from the success of other children\(^{50}\) (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2006d; 2010b). Subsequently, the new act “Developing Opportunities through Quality and Education” entered into force in 2010\(^{51}\): making municipalities and boroughs legally responsible to organize early childhood education for every child of the target group. The

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\(^{50}\) It was called the 80-20 rule: ideally, preschools are occupied by 80% disadvantaged children and 20% regular children (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2006).

\(^{51}\) Officially the act was implemented in 2011, however, the G4 started in advance in august 2010 (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2011).
municipality of Amsterdam left the organization and execution of the act to the boroughs (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2011). The boroughs are consequently responsible for the accessibility of preschools.

The target group formulation of Amsterdam is determined by a flowchart in which ethnicity or country of origin formally plays no role. The most resembling indicator is the question whether the parents speak Dutch or a non-Dutch language with the child. If they do not speak Dutch, the child is considered part of the target group. Other indicators for inclusion in the target group are the educational level, pedagogical inabilities and the degree of stimulating learning environment at home (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2010c).

**Early leaving**

Early leaving is a problem that is often tackled from a generic perspective. Making sure that students make good career-choices, effective transitions and practical and appealing education are main points of interest. In 2003 and 2004, effective transitions are emphasised: the transition of VMBO to vocational education should be improved (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2005b). However, rarely this statement is complemented by more specific measures of how they intend to achieve these transitions.

Between 2004 and 2010, targeting specific immigrant groups takes place incidentally and mostly project-based. The 2005 action plan anti-discrimination discussed the difficulties immigrant students face when applying for internships and the measures the municipality would take to improve the availability of internships for migrants both within its own organization and local businesses (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2008). In 2006, the municipality signed, together with two large schools for vocational education, the covenant “Amsterdam Attack of drop-out” (Minister OCW et al., 2006). Part of this approach is ‘special pathways for youth at risk’; a listing of several projects. Its main focus group was formulated generically as “adolescents in the age of 15-23 years, who did not obtain a basic qualification and who risk losing or already lost bonding with education or employment” (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2006e, p.20). Of all projects, only one is explicitly focused on youngsters with an immigrant background. All projects required intensive cooperation and responsibility-sharing by municipal and non-governmental actors (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2006e). The 2009 quality agenda secondary education promotes the smoothening of transitions to make sure immigrant students will more often attend higher levels of education (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2009). Finally, the 2010-2014 document “YOUNG Amsterdam II” is formulated in generic terms, following the framing of the WRR (discussed in 3.1.1) as ‘overloaded’ students instead of ethnic categorization (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2011).

**Anti-radicalization**

Diversity is central to the policies regarding anti-radicalization, which have in practice been strongly connected to educational policies in Amsterdam. Propagating diversity and tolerance by increasing knowledge on different cultures is a common approach. Exception to this is the 2003 document “belonging and participating” (B&W Amsterdam, 2003). According to this document, which is meant to be a conceptual framework on integration: “citizenship starts with knowledge of our history, culture, basic values of our democracy and state of law and what expectations citizen may have of each other. More attention should be given to this matter in education” (B&W Amsterdam, 2003, p.10-11, underlines added). Only four months later, a follow-up document called “Integration in
Amsterdam: Work in Progress” was published which entails the real policies. In this document they state with a more pluralist mind-set that a “lack of knowledge and respect for each other and each other’s cultural background can lead to intolerance and tension at an early age” (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2003, underlines added). Recent developments would have led youth to become less tolerant and in order to counter that the municipality developed, in cooperation with several secondary schools, a curriculum on diversity aiming at increasing tolerance and diversity-awareness among scholars of Amsterdam (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2003).

After the diversity-emphasis, the emphasis shifts to a connection between integration and radicalization in 2006 (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2006b). Providing perspective to education and work is important for everyone, “but reality is that, at the moment, it counts especially for inhabitants of Amsterdam with a migrant background”. Therefore, several measures are suggested to improve the perspectives of Islamic/immigrant students or recent graduates such as a motivational summer school, managerial coaches and continuation of the project ‘historical awareness’ that aims to make scholars and students part of the history of Amsterdam (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2006b). One of our interviewees highlights the difficulties that came with searching rapprochement to the schools in context of ‘Wij Amsterdammers II’: “It was hard to connect to the schools. (…). Schools have to gain new scholars next year; therefore they do not want to be known as breeding ground for radicalization. That is why we could not succeed in getting a foothold”. Subsequently, another shift is recognizable in 2007: schools themselves are the new focus of anti-radicalization in education by teaching teachers to cope with discrimination and radicalization. Budgets are available for courses, projects and workshops aimed at learning about radicalization, discrimination and ethnic tensions. In addition, intercultural advice and mediation in case of school incidents is made available. School initiatives focused on letting the children experience the city’s diversity in a positive way are given (budgetary) support between 2008 and 2010 via the, by the municipality subsidized, project organization 'VIOS': ‘Safety In and Around Schools’, that consisted (among others) of almost all secondary schools, safety coordinators and the police (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2007; 2008; 2008b; 2009b; 2010d; Wethouder Burgerschap en Diversiteit Amsterdam, 2011).

**Anti-segregation**

Already in 1986, the Mayor and Aldermen of Amsterdam formulated the intention to reduce the amount of, what in the Dutch context are commonly referred to as, black and white schools (Rekenkamer Amsterdam, 2014). Because of the distribution of responsibilities over the municipality and school(s/boards), explicit measures are sometimes difficult or impossible to take. This is also acknowledged in 2003, when the Mayor and Aldermen emphasize the undesirability of segregation. Besides measures aimed at improved information provision about schools (to parents), the municipality would increase efforts to reach mixed neighbourhoods and invest more in ‘black

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52 Examples are the publication of “the multicultural drama” by Paul Scheffer, the terrorist attacks of 11/9/2001, the election outcomes of 2002 and the Iraq-war (B&W Amsterdam, 2003, p.1)

53 A second complementary project called “the second world war in perspective” started in 2004, after immigrant youngsters disrupted the official 4 May Memorial at several places in the city. Part of the project were history classes given by Moroccan students, trips to the Anne Frank house and an exhibition on the contribution of Moroccan allies in Europe (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2004).

54 Interview with a former program director of the 'Wij Amsterdammers'-program, Haarlem, 20th of May 2014.

55 The first memorandum by the Ministry of Education that refers to the topic originates from 2000, thus 14 years later than the first memorandum in Amsterdam (Rekenkamer Amsterdam, 2014).
schools’ (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2003). In the following years, the connection between quality-improvement of black schools and anti-segregation was not made explicitly anymore. The connection with neighbourhood-segregation on the other hand is re-emphasised at several occasions (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2005, p.127): “Studies show that segregation in Education is primarily a derivative of the living situation in Amsterdam. Measures within Education can compensate this effect only partially”. Between 2001 and 2007, one can recognize many of the same kind of measures and pilots, often also aimed at the establishment of pre-arranged priority areas for application and admission (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2006; 2006b; Rekenkamer Amsterdam, 2014). However, as the research of the Kohnmann Institute (Ledoux, Felix & Elshof, 2013) indicates, the (visions on) policies on anti-segregation can vary substantively between boroughs; a condition that hampers poly-centric governance (Van Breugel, Maan & Scholten, 2014).

The covenant “Colourful Schools’, signed in 2007 by the municipalities, boroughs and primary schools of Amsterdam represented a change in two ways: the covenant illustrates a new and more accountable way of recording agreements between the different actors and the covenant was not merely focused on ethnic segregation, but also on socio-economic segregation (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2007b). Nevertheless, not many of the concrete actions were really ‘new’. In 2008, Alderman Asscher declared the covenant a failure: there was little alignment between schools, coordination was absent, and the allocation of children was non-transparent and even (legally) unequal. The problems were too complex and too different per area to be addressed municipality-wide. Area-based pilots came back and extra attention was asked for weak schools (instead of black schools as done in 2003) (Rekenkamer Amsterdam, 2014). The pilots are considered a failure again (this time by the school boards) and subsequently Asscher requested advice from ADI. However, in the meantime, the school boards took the matter into their own hands and drafted a starting memorandum of anti-segregation in Education (Breed Bestuurlijk Overleg [BBO] PO Amsterdam, 2010). Finally, in 2014, an “Urban Admission Policy” was issued as a coproduction of the schools and municipality. The role of the municipality is supportive by facilitating and providing information. The new admission policy is considered to guarantee legal equality and transparency and to ensure that every child can go to school in their own living environment. Anti-segregation is suddenly framed merely as a possible ‘side effect’, as it is emphasized that the policy is not intended as a dispersion tool (BBO PO Amsterdam, 2014).

3.3.3. Conclusions

The case of education policies in Amsterdam also shows a shift from specific to generic policies, but differs from Rotterdam and from the national level in specific ways. First of all, the shift appears to be less pronounced than in the other cases; Amsterdam seems to have held on to specific measures a bit longer than Rotterdam, such as in the connection to anti-radicalisation policies. Also, a marked difference with the other cases is the continued availability of ‘ethnic statistics’. Secondly, the shift toward generic policies in Amsterdam seems to have been fed less by an explicit policy and political agenda to get rid of target group specific measures. It was less a conscious masterplan to develop generic policies, but more a gradual retrenchment because of a variety of reasons such as budget constraints, as well as a gradual fragmentation of policies throughout different parts of the city. For instance, as the anti-segregation policies show, differences between boroughs were very pronounced. Also in the approach to early school leaving and anti-segregation, Amsterdam is a clear case of poly-centric governance, where local administration constantly engaged in cooperation with
societal stakeholders. Finally, more than the other cases, Amsterdam does combine its shift toward generic policies with a focus on diversity and interculturalisation. This is manifest very clearly in the emphasis on positive recognition of diversity in educational programs, also as part of anti-radicalisation policies.

3.4 Policy explanations
In line with the typology, which is introduced in chapter two, this section will first discuss three elements: the extent to which the society is perceived monist or pluralist, the extent to which the policies are targeting specific groups or the general population and the use and design of polycentric modes of governance. Thereafter, attention will be given to the overall questions: what is mainstreamed and why?

3.4.1 Connection with the typology
In terms of perceptions of monism or pluralism, it is clear that in the national as well as the local cases the diverse character of the school population is realistically recognized. On the local level, the educational departments of Rotterdam and Amsterdam recognize pluralism mostly as a ‘fact’ or ‘reality’: there are many nationalities in primary education (over 150 or 170) and more than half of the school population has an immigrant background. At a national level, pluralism is experienced as a fact, but sometimes also as something that ‘should be experienced’ by children, or as an increasingly negative characteristic.

Over the last decade we can very clearly recognize a shift from specific to generic policy targeting at a national level. Examples of current generic approaches are the programs aimed at early childhood education and reducing early leaving. Abandoning OALT can be considered a clear step away from specific policies, as OALT was one of the last educational elements that accommodated immigrants in explicitly maintaining their own culture and using it to emancipate and integrate in the Dutch society. A second clear step away from specific policies was the changing of the school-funding system. Whereas immigrant children used to receive more budget for combatting disadvantages, a ‘needs-based replacement’-strategy came into place when replacing ethnicity with parents’ level of education. Following the argumentation of the government, this change entailed a focus on the “real” problems and ensured that “money goes to were its needed” (Minister OCW, 2004b). Likewise, adding obligatory ‘social integration and active citizenship’-courses in school can be considered an interculturalist approach, since “encouragement of interaction, understanding and respect between different cultures and ethnic groups” is considered a central element of the interculturalist approach (Van Breugel, Maan & Scholten, 2014).

Amsterdam started in 2003 with a document with almost an assimilationist notion: immigrants and immigrant children had to learn “our” norms, values and rule of law (B&W Amsterdam, 2003). However, this approach was replaced very quickly by a more interculturalist notion, which remained in place since then. Diversity-awareness, tolerance, and projects focused on the “common Amsterdam history” try to create a more common sense of belonging. Measures against educational segregation are mainly generic in nature and aimed at furthering integration. Amsterdam pursued these measures longer than Rotterdam and the national government did and also signalled to the national level that the topic was still high on the local agenda. Overall, Amsterdam has an approach that involves both specific and generic elements. Immigrants are perceived to need additional
support on several matters in order to emancipate and integrate fully. However, this specific targeting has declined in all areas. For example, early childhood education was disconnected from black schools in 2006, the anti-radicalization measures based on provide immigrant youth with ‘perspective’ were replaced by the school-based measures in 2006 and the early leaving approach stopped targeting immigrants in 2009. Therefore, we would say that Amsterdam changed gradually from a predominantly specific approach to an interculturalist approach.

Contrary to the other cases, Rotterdam seems to be using mainly generic policies throughout the whole period of observation. Sometimes, it is recognized that immigrants are overrepresented in a certain problem. Sometimes, goals are formulated in terms of immigrants as target groups, but only next to the goals for the whole population. Eventually, even after naming specific problems, or specific measures, little or none measures are mentioned to address that specific issue in a way for that specific group. Consequently, integration is often taken together with the reduction of educational disadvantages, which is a problem among the local low educated population as well. Exception to this trend is the use of ethnicity as one of the two most important indicators for the formulation of preschool target groups. Overall, the approach of Rotterdam can be described as a ‘needs-based replacement’-strategy, thus focusing its policies on problems rather than groups: “It remains an ongoing quest. First, the immigrants came from former colonies, then guest workers, refugees, migrants from eastern and central Europe. What’s next? You have to react on it constantly. New problems lead to new groups. But you should always start with the social problem”.

Another element of the typology is the expectation that the process of mainstreaming is accompanied by increasing use of poly-centric governance modes. Both decentralization (vertical) and deconcentration (horizontal) would occur. Following the paragraphs above, Rotterdam should be the frontrunner in poly-centric governance, followed by the national government and finally, Amsterdam. However, decentralization is heavily influenced by the national government that replaced responsibilities from itself, to municipalities, to the schools. As a Rotterdam policy officer mentioned: “a lot is arranged by the schools themselves. Therefore, education only has a limited mandate in that area”. At a local level we can recognize an increasing use of covenants and policy co-production. These methods allow municipalities to contribute to, and coordinate educational policies, even though they are formally not their authority. Therefore, on this topic, both the national government and municipalities are increasingly considered as directors, facilitators and information-providers, rather than actual policy makers. Regarding deconcentration, having other departments or ministries, such as education, taking upon themselves responsibility for elements of integration is crucial to avoid the topic of integration sliding completely of the agenda. According to the same Rotterdam policy officer, that is a challenging component of mainstreaming. Overall, cooperation between departments (such as integration and education) is in none of the three cases institutionalized.

56 Interview with policy officer at the department of education, and former policy officer at department of Integration, Rotterdam, interviewed 4th of June 2014.
57 Interview with policy officer at the department of activation and well-being, Rotterdam, 9th of June 2014.
58 Idem.
3.4.2 What is mainstreamed and why?
The policy field of education is broad, but many elements are mainstreamed by nature due to constitutional rights. Examples of these rights are education for every child, freedom of school-choice and the freedom to found schools with a specific religious, social or educational vision. However, as demonstrated throughout the chapter, there are certain policy-topics that are more likely to be involved in the integration of immigrants; such as ECE, early-leaving, anti-segregation at school, language policies, anti-radicalization and above all, the funding system. Many of these topics have not been approached entirely specific, however, it was noticeable that immigrants were overrepresented in the overall target population of (for example) ECE and early leaving. Throughout the last ten years, specific policies in all these topics are increasingly mainstreamed into generic policies.

The next question to answer is why these educational policies are mainstreamed. The most evident explanation can be found in the development of the problem setting in the Dutch case: increasing diversity coupled with the long migration history of the Netherlands. The Dutch population of schoolchildren is increasingly diverse in country of origin and generations of immigrants. In the large cities, more than half of the children are of immigrant origin, partly due to the higher fertility rate of ethnic minorities. The increasing diversity caused the local governments to see mainstreaming as ‘inevitable’; policy implementation became more difficult when more and more ethnicities had to be taken into account. Examples on a national level are OALT, which was continuously extended with new languages, and the funding system, in which especially the multi-generational factor became a statistical burden. Although the population became increasingly diverse, many policy documents mentioned specific progress of certain ethnic immigrants (such as: Already 4% of second generation Moroccans attend higher education, compared to first generation Moroccans). Through time, attention for specific problems of immigrants decreased. However, when assessing the impact of this trend on the increased mainstreaming of immigrant-integration in education we may end up in a circular argument. At this stage it is impossible to conclude whether problems decreased first, are subsequently not mentioned anymore and can consequently be mainstreamed or whether the political decision to mainstream is the root cause of the decrease of attention for specific problems. Therefore, we can state that there is probably a correlation between the degree of perceived integration problems in integration and the tendency to mainstream policies, however, the causal relationship is questionable.

A second explanation of mainstreaming immigrant-integration in education policies can be found in the increasing influence of the crisis and especially governmental retrenchment. At a national level, the large decentralizations and waves of mainstreaming seem to be unconnected. The municipalities were already made responsible for several (specific) education policy implementations (such as OALT and the implementation of the educational disadvantages policy). However, the change of the funding system in 2006 did coincide with a shift of responsibilities from the municipalities to the schools. After this shift, we can notice more policies resulting from coproduction between the municipality, schools and other actors. Examples of these co-productions are the youth policies of Amsterdam (YOUNG Amsterdam I and II; Gemeente Amsterdam 2006; 2011), the recent document on Amsterdam’s Admission Policy (BBO Amsterdam, 2014) and several covenants of both municipalities as well as the ministry (Gemeente Amsterdam 2007b; Staatscourant 2012). These co-productions are more likely to be mainstreamed than their municipal predecessors. After
decentralizations, the ministry and the municipalities are left with generic policies to provide the knowledge infrastructure, more often referred to as the (new) director’s role of the government\textsuperscript{59}. Governmental retrenchment in austerity measures seems to be less influential with regard to mainstreaming immigrant integration in education. Amsterdam is the only case that emphasizes austerity measures. However, the consequences are mostly connected to inburgering rather than educational topics.

Finally, immigrant-integration in education is not one of the most mediagenic topics of the Ministry of Education. Search on a topic such as the financing system of higher education students and you will find much more than when searching on topics regarding immigrant integration. If it is explicitly mentioned in the media, oftentimes it are negative examples such as Islamic schools hampering integration or for example big claims made by politicians (such as the abolishment of anti-segregation measures in 2011). Populist parties, such as PVV, use the media more often to bring forth their anti-immigration statements. Its rise in 2006 and its parliamentary support connection to the Cabinet in 2011 coincide with two waves of mainstreaming of immigrant-integration in education. However, it is not possible to explicitly link the influence of the PVV to these waves of mainstreaming. Especially in 2006, since many of the changes that were implemented from then on were initiated before the founding of the PVV. However, the overall change in Dutch sentiment, following the rise of the LPF in the early 2000’s, may have contributed to the increase in mainstreaming educational policies.

\textsuperscript{59} Interview with Policy-advisor at the Integration and Society-department at the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, The Hague, 26\textsuperscript{th} of June 2014.
4 - Social cohesion

The second policy domain on which our analysis focuses is social cohesion policy. This policy domain was selected because it constitutes one of the most important socio-cultural policy domains that may be affected by the mainstreaming of migrant integration policies. In the Netherlands social cohesion came to the fore in the shift from the integration policies focused on social-economic participation to an awareness of the social-cultural dimension of immigrant integration since the assimilationist turn of the 2000s. This shift was initiated by a series of incidents, nationally and internationally "that strengthened the consciousness that cultural diversity has its drawbacks too" (Tweede Kamer, 2004b), such as the politically motivated assassination of writer and director Theo van Gogh. The consternation caused by the assassination resulted in widespread debate on the social distance and segregation between immigrants and the native population of the Netherlands and the effects of immigrant integration for so far. This marks a more normative development in immigrant integration policies, emphasizing debates on common or Dutch norms and values and identification.

Moving away from specifically targeted immigrant integration policies, integration became a concern of the society as a whole, approached from a perspective of social cohesion rather than emancipation. Throughout the years this crystalized in a number of topics such as ‘livability’ on a neighborhood level and citizenship projects. These topics are primarily (co-) coordinated by the respective Minister or Alderman of Integration, and typically involve different levels (mostly local and national) of governance. While increasingly a primary aim of immigrant integration policies itself, social cohesion also touches upon topics such as segregation and housing policies, radicalization, interethnic contact and discrimination. Below, the policies will be discussed in more detail in their distinctive national and local context, illustrating different degrees of mainstreaming. However the chapter will start with a few remarks to contextualize the issue of immigrant integration in its contemporary problem, policy and political-context.

4.1 National case

4.1.1 Policy background

Problem framing: a socio-cultural gap

In terms of problem framing, especially since the early 2000's a social and cultural gap between immigrants and the native population was defined as the main problem trend beyond immigrant integration issues. It is stated that "a too large part of ethnic minorities are distanced from the Dutch society" (Tweede Kamer, 2004c). Although supposedly not as influential as the educational disadvantages or unemployment, high ‘segregation indices’ and concentration-areas in general are a said to hinder orientation towards the Dutch society and citizen-participation (Tweede Kamer, 2004b; 2005; Van der Laan 2005). Later on the lack of social integration is explicitly linked to criminality and nuisance (Minister WWI, 2007). Specifically in the Coalition period of 2007-2010

60 Large-city areas with a high concentration of minority groups. See: Tweede Kamer, 2004c.
(Balkenende III) this is high on the Agenda, coordinated by the Minister of Living, Neighborhoods and Integration.

Incidents such as the murder of writer and director Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam in 2004, and the arrest of the Hofstadgroep, a group of young radical Islamists "have put the social cohesion of the society to the test" (Tweede Kamer, 2006) leading to “doubt with regard to the feasibility of the immigrant-integration project” as written in the Annual Immigrant Integration Memorandum of 2005 (Tweede Kamer, 2005). In a safety monitor conducted between 2003 and 2005 it turned out that two-third of the population think immigrants integrate badly, and almost half of the population indicates that they think there are too many immigrants (Tweede Kamer, 2005), though the latter dropped to 40% in 2006. These incidents put the supposed lack of social cohesion on the agenda, addressing citizenship, bonding and interethnic contact as central themes in immigrant integration policies, intended to restore the social cohesion of society.

In subsequent years this feeling gets a religious connotation, as “the opinions on immigrants are increasingly affected by the Islam, terroristic attacks in the name of Islam, nationally and internationally, left its traces” as indicated by decreasing levels of support for the immigrant integration project and the belief that Muslims can contribute to Dutch culture⁶¹ (Minister WWI, 2007). Vice versa the negative opinions on Islam affected Turkish and Moroccan Muslims, of whom an increasing number thinks judgment on Islam in the Netherlands is too harsh. Approximately a quarter of the Turkish and Moroccan respondents would consider a Western and Islamic lifestyle to be incompatible (Minister WWI, 2007), indicating the polarization and increasing religious/Islamic framing that characterizes the debate.

**Policy context: policy retrenchment**

As in many other fields, immigrant integration policies throughout the last 10 years are characterized by shrinking budgets, resulting from the retreating government, far-reaching retrenchment and decentralization measures. With regard to social cohesion this is best visible in a strong decentralization development, as illustrated in housing- and neighborhood-policies where local parties and inhabitants are considered the primary actors: “The national government should not be a directing or determining player in this field” (Ministerie BZK, 2011).

As a ministry without portfolio, the policy responsibility for immigrant integration has shifted between departments under different ministries. An influence with regard to the topics addressed and the cooperation with the respective ministries or political constellation is notable throughout these years, with a respective emphasis on the link to immigration (2002-2007), housing policies (2007-2010), strong decentralizations (2010-2012) and a focus on employment (currently). Through time these topics have been coupled together under the co-ordination of the Ministry responsible for Immigrant Integration. However, driven by a strong move away from specific policies and developments of decentralization and deregulation in general, around 2011 housing policies in the context of anti-segregation measures have been separated from the immigrant integration agenda. In fact, the link between concentration, segregation and integration on the one hand, and the (un)desirability of this (ethnic) concentration in deprived areas on the other hand, are a continues

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⁶¹ Survey-results show that the number of people supporting the statement that Muslims can contribute to Dutch culture dropped from 45% to 34% (Minister van Wonen, Wijken en Integratie, 2007).
topic of debate where spatial planning and immigrant-integration policies meet, as illustrated by the policy developments below.

**Political context: politicization of social cohesion**
Lastly the field of immigrant integration is, as illustrated by incidents named above, a highly politicized field. The, politically driven, dissatisfaction with effectiveness of previous immigrant integration policy from the ’90s has since then dominated the discussions in this field. Policy measures from the 2000’s on are repeatedly framed as a ‘break’ with, and ‘alteration’ of these policies – placed in a general backlash against what was perceived as multiculturalism. This period also saw the rise of new populist parties such as Lijst Pim Fortuyn (founded in 2002) and the Partij voor de Vrijheid (founded in 2006). The parties have immigration and integration high on the agenda and do not eschew controversial statements to highlight these. Both parties briefly took part in the Coalition (respectively between 2002-2003 for LPF and the PVV in 2010 as part of a parliamentary support agreement), but have been very influential on the immigrant-integration debates outside these periods too (Scholten, 2013).

Important in the context of this section is that this politicization at the national level in the Netherlands clearly evolved much more around the topic of social cohesion than education. A paradox can be observed in that precisely in a period where the involvement of national government in social cohesion is characterized by retrenchment, social cohesion figures increasingly prominently in national political debate. This politicization of social cohesion was fed by a number of focus events, some of which were mentioned above, as well as by the rise of populist parties. This paradox can be clearly illustrated by the political controversy that emerged around the parliamentary investigative committee on integration policy, also named the ‘Blok- committee.’ In 2004 this committee observed that immigrant integration had been relatively successful, especially because of progress made in the educational sphere that was considered a key-sector for integration. Subsequently, this committee became itself object of fierce political controversy, as various political parties framed the integration process a success regardless of these educational successes but precisely because of the perceived problems in the area of social cohesion. This clearly shows that political judgment about integration, at the national level at least, was fed primarily by concerns about social cohesion.

**4.1.2 Policy content**
As mentioned above social cohesion increasingly forms one of the core aims of immigrant integration policies in general, marking a shift to socio-cultural integration. In the period under research here this relates more specifically to anti-segregation measures in housing policies and interethnic contact, focusing around terms such as ‘livability’ and living together primarily on a neighborhood level.

**From specific to generic housing policies**
Housing policies and spatial segregation programs have always been primarily a responsibility of the Ministry for Housing, but have through time often been addressed in an immigrant integration context too. This involves in particular ethnic concentration in certain deprived areas and its (alleged) influence on integration outcomes. Since the end of the 1980s, the policy area of housing is

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62 In the Coalition period of 2007-2010 this coincided with the Housing portfolio of Minister Vogelaar of Housing, Living and Integration under the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment.
characterized by major decentralizations and deregulations of government responsibilities to the open market (mid- and high range rental and owned-property) and housing co-operations (social-housing). This shift also indicated the end of specifically targeted housing policies for ethnic minorities, which before counted as a criterion for financial compensation for rent, or as a criterion for the assignment of social housing (see Tweede Kamer, 1983). Already from the 1990’s on housing policies are addressed primarily in generic, non-ethnic terms only, instead targeting by ‘objective’ labels such as income and family size (Tweede Kamer, 2004). Though no longer targeting by ethnicity, housing policies in the nineties were intended to promote a differentiation of city- and neighborhood demographics in a broader sense, which would remain the central objective of these policies in the coming decade (Tweede Kamer, 2004).

From 2002 on the ‘livability’ in concentration areas has been high on the agenda again, problematizing the influence of ethnic segregation on immigrant integration and the quality of life in deprived neighborhoods in general. The Coalition Government of Balkenende I phrased the intention to reduce the concentration of socially-economically deprived immigrants. Although the political discourse in this period put strong emphasis on the problematization of ethnic concentrations in specific urban zones, the policy measures were (carefully) formulated in generic ways. In particular, needs- or area-based replacement strategies were formulated that enabled the targeting of neighborhoods with ethnic concentrations, without explicitly problematizing ethnic concentrations. Following the advice of the Commission Blok as published in 2004 (see chapter 2), the coalition intended to improve the quality of life in the concentration-neighborhoods by a two-fold approach: a differentiation of the housing-stock in the cities and by opening up opportunities for housing/relocating vulnerable groups in suburban areas. On top of that, the ‘Wet Bijzondere Maatregelen Grootstedelijke Problematiek’, also known as the Rotterdam-Act as it was initiated from this city, was introduced on a national level in 2005. This Act can be applied under extraordinary circumstances of deprivation in certain city-areas, to take far-reaching provisions in order to improve the livability in these areas. The Act consists of a wide range of measures to improve livability and safety, but its most controversial measure intends to regulate the influx of the number of people with a low income in certain city-areas. This requirement makes the law so controversial since it threatens equal access to services as grounded in the constitution. Although a national law, this act has only been implemented in the city of Rotterdam, laying justice to the name ‘Rotterdam act’.

While The Rotterdam Act was originally raised as a measure to reduce the number of disadvantaged immigrants in these neighborhoods by the local party Liveable Rotterdam, there was no wider local or national support for these criteria and the policy was instead targeted in terms of income and employment, as the other housing policies from that time. The Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment briefly put the housing-situation of immigrants-specifically back on the agenda in a few years later.

63 See Nota Volkshuisvesting in de jaren negentig (1989) in Commission Blok report
64 Between 2000-2002 there was a remarkable shift in this regard where the government stated that ethnic or income concentration was not a problem as long as the social or cultural structure of a neighbourhood is not against one’s will or due to a lack of choice “Housing policies that automatically accommodate by type, or the opposite, stimulating differentiation is undesirable” (Mensen, Wensen, Wonen, 2000, p.18).
65 More on how the Act was drafted can be read in 4.2 Rotterdam
66 When 45% of the inhabitants can be qualified as low-income and 25% are regarded non-active the law is enforced. Newcomers to the region (e.g. a residence of less than six years) will be subject to income-requirements before they can settle in the respective neighbourhood.
publication (Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer 2005), claiming this had ‘gone silent’ with the move towards generic policies. Equally the State-Secretary refers to a report on the topic published by the Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau (Gijsberts and Dagevos 2005) when stating that "while not as influential as individual characteristics, the effect of housing-policies on immigrant-integration is meaningful. Therefore I am happy to apply housing policies to pay a contribution here" (Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer 2005b), though stressing the wider, generic context of these housing and neighborhood policies.

While the Commission Blok in its report linked spatial anti-segregation measures explicitly to integration, the Council for Social Development (Raad voor Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling, RMO) a year later published two reports in which they state that instead of ineffective spatial-measures in concentration-areas, the government should focus on bonding to create unity and overcome segregation in society (RMO, 2005; 2005b). While the government decided to continue the housing projects nonetheless, the government additionally opened a program for financial support to stimulate ‘local initiatives that stimulate interethnic interaction and contact’ (Tweede Kamer, 2006). This resonates with an earlier, though more generically targeted program, the ‘Broad Initiative Societal Bonding’ (Tweede Kamer, 2005c). This program was introduced as a response to the deregulation as announced by the central government, mobilizing new coalitions of citizens, the government and civil society in order to encourage bonding and cohesion. While phrased in more generic terms the program partly focused on the lack of contact between native and immigrant citizens. Other examples that intended to stimulate interethnic contact are the ‘Integration-Campaign’ (Tweede Kamer, 2005), ‘&-Campaign’ intended to demonstrate good examples of intercultural interaction and several sport initiatives (Tweede Kamer, 2006). 2005 marks an incremental transition to broader anti-segregation measures in neighborhoods, moving beyond spatial-planning with the campaign and programs aiming to stimulate contact and dialogue targeting social cohesion in a wider sense. While clearly moving away from specifically targeted policies since the nineties, around 2005 the government slowly moves towards the promotion of the plurality of society, stimulating interethnic contact and interaction. Policies can be observed to move towards interculturalism and mainstreaming.

Social and spatial policy measures from 2005 on

In a revision of the Housing Act in 2007 (Directoraat-Generaal Wonen, Wijken en Integratie [DG WWI], 2007) the Minister lists livability as a condition for interference in the spatial planning of neighborhoods. In an accompanying letter the Minister emphasizes that local governments should have some discretion in the allocation of housing on a neighborhood-level due the differences in livability and the housing-market in different areas and cities. However the Minister also notes that this selection should never be based on ethnicity (DG WWI, 2007). Social cohesion is increasingly phrased in local and neighborhood terms rather than ethnic terms, placing the work- and living-environment of people central in the policy design. “People should be addressed and challenged to work on integration in their direct work- and living-environment, participating in maintaining the liability of their neighborhood” (Tweede Kamer, 2006).

The well-known ‘Krachtwijken aanpak’ or ‘power-boroughs approach’ (Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer [VROM], 2007) of Minister Vogelaar forms a good example of this development. This large polycentric collaboration between the central government, housing co-operations and local governments, aims to improve the livability of a
selection of 40 deprived neighborhoods\textsuperscript{67} throughout the country by a combination of ‘spatial’ and ‘social’ policy measures in the neighborhoods, extending the mandate of spatial planning to the social dimension addressed in the RMO advise (2005). The program raises the fact that a large portion of the deprived areas is characterized by a ‘disproportionate number of non-Western allochthons’ (Ministerie VROM, 2007). Integration forms one of the five themes around which the policies are centered. Due to or despite the program’s wide -spatial and social- scope, heritage is not applied as a criterion for selecting the neighborhoods for the program, which is left open to a wider, generic, public.\textsuperscript{68} Apart from a few specifically targeted measures (e.g. focusing on civic-integration, sports activities for immigrant youth and microcredit for immigrant women) the policy-measures under integration are framed primarily in generic terms, aiming to improve shared interests and contact for example through sports and generic social cohesion activities. This discrepancy between raising policy issues specifically and addressing them generically illustrates the 'dilemma of recognition' (De Zwart, 2005, p.139), balancing the stigmatizing effects of specific and generic policies.

The ‘Power-Boroughs’ program was eventually ended early 2012, after a change of government and controversy around the financing of the program\textsuperscript{69}. From 2011 onwards, housing policies and spatial planning have no longer been addressed explicitly in the immigrant integration context. Instead the Minister of Internal Affairs states that “focus-areas will be covered under generic policies in the fields of learning, working and safety” (Ministerie BZK, 2011), emphasizing that local parties and inhabitants are the primary actors here (Tweede Kamer, 2012b). This should be understood in the context of major decentralizations in the social domain.

One issue that is mentioned in this context is the housing situation of migrants from the European Union, or EU labour migrants, or mobile- citizens. They are said to put a heavy burden on certain old city neighborhoods in Rotterdam and The Hague, due to poor housing-conditions and unfamiliarity with the language (Ministerie BZK, 2011; Minister van SZW, 2013). The government is skating on thin ice here as their legal status prohibits drafting discriminating measures or requirements for these EU-citizens. Nevertheless the housing- and situation of EU-migrants in general, remained a focus area.

Except from this new group, the strong narrowing down of the immigrant integration agenda since 2011 (see chapter 2) not only means an absence of housing and anti-segregation policies, but translates into an absence of interethnic contact all together. While formerly based on an exchange of norms and values, coping with diversity is now addressed in terms of the responsibility of the newcomer him- or herself, stressing the importance of the Dutch basic-values as a corner stone of civic integration courses and integration in general through citizenship-projects in schools (see chapter 3) and the so-called ‘participation declaration’ (Minister SZW, 2013c). While the individualization approach was previously applied to react to a diversification of the target groups

\textsuperscript{67} Of which five neighborhoods are located in Amsterdam and nine in Rotterdam.

\textsuperscript{68} After some controversy Minister Vogelaar was forced by the lower court to publish the list of criteria for the selection of the neighborhoods for the program. Neighborhoods were selected by social-economic deprivation (income, work and level of education); physical deprivation (small, old and cheap housing); social problems (residents opinion on dilapidation, demolishing of public services, nuisances of (direct) neighbours and fear of harassment or robbing); physical problems (residents opinion on housing situation, propensity to move, nuisance by noise, smell, dust, trash or traffic or unsafety due to traffic-situation).

\textsuperscript{69} Though 38 out of 40 neighborhoods were listed for continued partnership with the national government (Ministerie van Volkshuisvestiging, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer, 2013).
with a strong focus on its plurality (see chapter 2), this is now applied to an assimilationist frame focused on adaption. A new pilot of the ‘participation declaration’ illustrates its symbolic value. A selection of 16 municipalities sends immigrants who come to live in their city a ‘participation declaration’, addressing the rights and obligations of both third-country nationals and EU-migrants in the Netherlands. Since EU-citizens can not officially be targeted for integration courses the declaration is of symbolic value, enshrining that "immigrants are welcome but they should also realize in what a great country they have arrived. They should realize what the norms and values are we live with here. They should know them, respect them and be able to enforce them. They don’t live here with the norms of the country of origin. The declaration of participation is an expression of that" in the words of the Asscher, Minister of Social Affairs (Volkskrant, 2013, December 20).

4.1.3. Conclusion
This analysis of social cohesion policies reveals several trends, some of which fit in very well with the conceptualization of mainstreaming as developed in the context of this research project. Particularly the trend towards more generic policies and towards more decentralization fit the definition particularly well. Social cohesion policies, even those formulated at the national level, are primarily oriented at social cohesion at the neighborhood level, such as illustrated by the ‘power-boroughs approach.’ Also, they are framed generically, in terms of targeting livability, differentiation (also in terms of groups with different socio-economic status) and increasingly also safety.

However, we also observed that these social cohesion policies often involved distinct needs- as well as area-based replacement strategies. This should be seen as a response to the broader policy and political setting (described in 4.2.1) where ethnic concentration does continue to be problematized explicitly. By targeting issues of ‘livability’ or ‘safety’ and by targeting those areas with an overrepresentation of socio-economically deprived groups (such as in the Rotterdam act), policies often indirectly still target areas with ethnic concentrations as well.

What is manifest only very limitedly in the Dutch national setting is an explicit orientation on the plural character of society to promote interculturalisation, which is another dimension of mainstreaming. Although there were some measures to promote interethnic contact, this was clearly not a policy priority, in spite of the calls from the Dutch Council for Social Development to focus more on social bonding. In contrast, the recent initiative of a ‘participation declaration’ signal an emphasis on adaptation to certain values and norms rather than interculturalisation and recognition of diversity.
4.2 Rotterdam

Rotterdam is a highly diverse city, with a large cohort of young, second and third generation immigrants. This ‘fact of diversity’ forms the basic principle of the immigrant integration policies throughout time. A collective project of the Aldermen of Rotterdam and Amsterdam to compare and analyse the ‘state of integration’ reveals a high degree of segregation (though declining throughout the years) and low levels of connection of citizens to their city and their neighborhood in Rotterdam (Scheffer & Entzinger, 2012, p.20). These developments have triggered several policy measures such as citizenship-projects and far-reaching housing policies. Before looking into these developments further we start with a few lines on the problem, policy and political context of social cohesion policies in Rotterdam.

4.2.1 Policy background

Problems: concerns about livability
First of all, in terms of problem framing, the threat of declining social cohesion and advancing segregation is addressed as a high political priority in the Coalition Period of 2002-2006 (LeefbaarRotterdam, CDA and VVD). The Coalition Agreement reads:

"In the run up to the 2002 local elections the feeling amongst many citizens and counsellors had rose that the city had permitted to much change and variety in the preceding years, leading to social tension and distance between people. People felt as if Rotterdam was no longer their city, not feeling at home in their streets. ... This translated in the election turnout, which can be summarized in one sentence: things have to change, the cohesion has to be restored" (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2002).

The comparative ‘State of Integration’-study (Scheffer & Entzinger, 2012) of the cities of Rotterdam and Amsterdam shows that for the four biggest immigrant groups70 Amsterdam has significantly higher segregation indices71 than Rotterdam, while Rotterdam scores a little higher on ‘other categories’ of non-western immigrants, but scores remarkably higher for the segregation indices of the native population (Scheffer & Entzinger, 2012, p.119). In a follow-up letter, Aboutaleb, the mayor of Rotterdam, stresses that both Amsterdam and Rotterdam have become cities of migration. The native population of Rotterdam has declined stronger since 2000 than that of Amsterdam (B&W Rotterdam, 2012). Additionally the native population of both cities score poorly when it comes to contact with people outside their own group; only 62% of the native Rotterdam citizens ever has contact with people outside their own group against 76% for Amsterdam (B&W Rotterdam, 2012), indicating the lack of contact and cohesion amongst its citizens.

70 Surinamese, Antilleans, Turks and Moroccans
71 Divided along postal-code regions the segregation index (varying between 0 and 100) indicates the percentage of non-Western immigrants that has to move to a different neighbourhood in order to create a ‘proportional division’ of immigrants between the different areas. Proportional here means a division that is in line with the segment of immigrants in the city in total. A segregation index of 0 thus means that all non-Western immigrants are divided between neighbourhoods equally, while an index of 100 would mean all non-Western immigrants are concentrated in areas with no other inhabitants. The index is also applied to differentiate between different ethnic groups as in the example mentioned above. Retrieved august 1, 2014, from http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/_unique/_concept/default.htm?Languageswitch=on&Concept=Segregatie-index&PostingGuid={0DB772EF-68C5-4850-9399-4588135F8A23}
Rotterdam is known as a working class city, and its housing policies were directed at the fast growing working class, amongst whom many migrants. Since this decade policies have been directed at creating mixed neighborhoods (Engbersen, 2014, p.8). Since 2008 Rotterdam publishes an annual Social Index. Based on registrations and surveys the Index is intended to give insight in the quality of life in neighborhoods throughout Rotterdam. Remarkable is that overall the index climbed from 5.8 (‘vulnerable’) to 6.0 (just reaching the level of ‘socially sufficient’) between 2008 and 2009, but falls back down to 5.8 in 2010 and 5.5 in 2012. Notably the capacities (language, income, health) and social bonding (perceived bonding) drop down to level of vulnerability; and with regard to living-environment suitable housing and facilities dropping to barely sufficient (Social Index 2008; 2009; 2010; 2012); qualifying Rotterdam overall as socially vulnerable. The significant drop in quality of life between 2010 and 2012 is linked to the economic crisis, due to the fact that people can hardly make the ends meet and the falling levels of health. The number of so-called problem-neighborhoods has doubled in that same period from 6 to 13, on a total of 65 neighborhoods. The ‘problem-neighborhoods’ are located in the sub-districts of Charlois, Delfshaven and Feijenoord (Sociale Index, 2012, p.6-7).

**Policies: linking housing and integration**

The City Executive Coalition of 2002-2006 (Leefbaar Rotterdam, CDA and VVD) and the current coalition (LeefbaarRotterdam, D66 and CDA) both have a separate portfolio putting immigrant integration high on the political agenda: respectively ‘Social Integration’ (Alderman Tak, CDA), and ‘Urban Development and Integration’ (Alderman Schneider, Leefbaar Rotterdam). Notable in this first period is the influence of Alderman of Infrastructure Pastors (LeefbaarRotterdam) on the Integration debate, as illustrated by a few incidents below (see politics).

In the intermediary period this policy area was rephrased in generic terms, replacing immigrant integration as a policy-field by city-citizenship under the respective portfolios of ‘Public Health, Well-being and Social Care’ (Alderman Kriens, PvdA, 2006-2010) and ‘Labour market, Higher Education, Innovation and Participation’ (Alderman Louwes, Lib-Dems/D66, 2010-2014).

While housing policies, like on the national level, are typically phrased in generic terms, between 2002-2006 the general situation of spatial and social segregation and deprivation is explicitly linked to immigrants. A local administrative memorandum states: “the influx of immigrants concerns people that in social-economic development, language, culture and religion are on a far distance from the Rotterdam-average .. this coincides with the high concentration of these groups in certain districts; e.g. segregation” (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2003: p.11), linking housing policies explicitly to immigrant integration policies in the Coalition period of 2002-2006. These two areas were decoupled in the subsequent coalition periods.

**Politics: politicization of integration**

Arguing against the former years of ‘casual and informal immigrant integration policies’ was “one of the strongest concerns of both Fortuyn and his party … the councilors of Leefbaar Rotterdam deliberately chose to make controversial arguments in order to ‘stimulate discussion’” (Uitermark & Duyvendak, 2008, p.1492-1493). This was evident from e.g. media controversies of Leefbaar Rotterdam councilors around the Islam-debates and controversies around the framing of the...

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72 Published only biennial since 2010.
73 The social index distinguishing between respectively strong/sufficient/vulnerable/problem/very weak neighbourhoods.
Rotterdam-Act. Repeatedly making “..the ethnic composition of the city [...] the starting-point for policy debates on its economic, cultural and social life” (Uitermark & Duyvendak, 2008, p.1493).

While segregation at a neighborhood-level became a policy-priority all over the country, an annual prognoses-publication of the Rotterdam Bureau of Statistics of future city-demographics, drove the debate in Rotterdam to the edge. In the publication it was estimated that in 2017 ethnic minorities would make up over 50% of the entire city-population, with numbers up to 85% in the sub-district of Charlois. In response to this ‘alarming’ report Alderman Pastors for infrastructure and housing of LeefbaarRotterdam argued for an ‘immigrant-stop’ (‘allochtonenstop’) or a ‘fence around Rotterdam’ preventing underprivileged immigrants to move into the city (NRC Handelsblad, 2003, September 12; Gemeente Rotterdam, 2003b). While outside his party Pastor’s proposal could not count on much political support, it did lead to the notion that the influx of ‘disadvantaged households’ had to be regulated (framing these in terms of income and employment rather than ethnicity) eventually leading to a proposal for the Wet Bijzondere Grootstedelijke Problematiek, or the Rotterdam-Act at the national level (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2003; see also chapter 4.1.2).

In 2005 a series of controversial public debates on the Islam and Integration were organized in Rotterdam. Initiated by the municipality the debates were intended to discuss the growth of Islam in the city amongst the inhabitants of Rotterdam. The debates were initially framed as an opportunity “to finally speak out and express out doubts and obligations” (NRC Handelsblad, 2005, January 12; 2005b, April 7). In an essay Alderman Pastors caused controversy by stating that “Western society and Islamic society differ fundamentally from each other” (Pastors in: Uitermark & Duyvendak, 2008, p.1492). Eventually however it were the parties that initially opposed the very idea of the debates that supported its outcomes most strongly, stressing the importance of tolerance and mutual interest, as well as plans to follow the debates up on a neighborhood-level. Later controversy arose again around the ‘Citizenship-Charter’ that was drafted as a result of the Islam and Integration-debates. While initially adopted without much controversy, the Charter became a hot-topic when Minister Verdonk of Migration and Integration praised the Charter, highlighting the second condition of the code that stated “We Rotterdammers, use Dutch as our shared language” (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2002). Picked up by the media the code was placed in an assimilationist frame, while, according to the responsible Alderman Geluk (CDA) quite on the contrary respect was the basis of the ‘RotterdamCode’ (Tops, 2007).

4.2.2 Policy content

Immigrant integration policies in Rotterdam over the past ten years are characterized by a mixture of specific and generic policies aimed at the social integration of immigrants. The policies are typically interwoven with different field of generic 'disadvantage-policies' (achterstandenbeleid), aiming at 'structural integration' through e.g. housing and labour-market policies (Gemeente Rotterdam 2003). Although throughout the years the emphasis on specifically targeted immigrant integration policies has shifted to a generic citizenship approach as will be elaborated below, specifically targeted subsidies and consultation-structures feature the policy context all along. Examples of these specifically targeted projects are the consulting of Turkish, Moroccan or Antillean organizations for language-classes and educational disadvantages (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2002), specific monitoring of Antillean- and Moroccan-Rotterdam citizens (De Boom, Van San, Weltevrede
Social cohesion on a neighborhood level
While (social) housing is not specifically part of the immigrant integration policies, neighborhoods and 'the street' are important parameters for integration and social cohesion. ".. based on the thought: our neighborhood, our street is what binds us together. We are all citizens of Rotterdam" (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2005). In the Integration Memorandum of the Coalition it is stated that "many citizens of Rotterdam perceive housing as an indicator of the level of social integration" (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2003c). Between 2002-2006 the general situation of spatial- and social segregation, as well as deprivation in Rotterdam is explicitly linked to immigrant-citizens, setting the stage for the local incentive that led to the Rotterdam Act.

In addition, the ‘People make the City’-program (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2002) focuses on social cohesion and active citizenship on a street-level, distinguishing between social and normative coherence. Meaning so much as contact and participation in the social network of the street and an emphasis on shared values, norms and behaviour (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2002-2006). Building on previous initiatives the overarching ‘People make the city’-program aims to increase the number of Opzoomer-streets and link these to the Stadsetiquette74 as well as introducing the social-contract approach with an explicit generic approach. As a Rotterdam policy officers recalls75:

“This initiated the transition to generic policies. The message was very clear, it is not about difference. We address everyone as a citizen of his or her street or neighborhood .. and that was absolutely not limited to migrant-neighborhoods”

City-citizenship
While the 2002-2006 period initially focused mainly on spatial policies (through income) to diversify and balance the population in certain areas, from 2006 on these social cohesion efforts focus more on 'bonding and participation' (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2006c): "It is not only about the physical encounter, but about creating actual connections and solidarity between the citizens of Rotterdam" (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2008b). Dialogue and debates fulfill a central role in this period. Following an advise from the International Advisory Board of Rotterdam the Coalition strives to make Rotterdam 'a leading Intercultural City': "The 160 different nationalities in Rotterdam are not a problem but should instead be seen as an opportunity that Rotterdam should make use of" (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2007c). While referred to in a number of policy documents, the term 'intercultural city' does not seem to resonate outside these documents let alone beyond this Coalition Period. However, one interpretation of the intercultural approach that is central to the Coalition Program the concept of 'City-Citizenship'. Focusing on the core values of taking pride in the city, reciprocity, identity, participation and ethics. City-Citizenship is intended to form a framework for all policies related to integration, participation, emancipation and citizenship. The program broadens the scope

74 ‘Opzoomeren’ originates from an initiative of the residents of the ‘Opzoomerstraat’ in the eighties when they joined together to renovate their street. Since 1994 an annual ‘Opzoomer’ campaign is organized to activate ‘Opzoomer’-streets all around Rotterdam as to stimulate residents-initiatives to improve the livability in the area. Currently the city counts 1800 ‘Opzoomer’-streets. Retrieved October 20, 2014, from http://www.opzoomermee.nl/overons.html#.VETZu1cudEg.

75 Interview with policy officer and program-manager department of activation and well-being, Rotterdam, 26th of June 2014.
of immigrant-integration policies to City-Citizenship as an important goal for all citizens of Rotterdam (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2007c).

While previously more specifically and centrally driven, the citizenship-frame as typical of the policies between 2006-2014 has an explicit generic and inclusive approach, targeting both immigrant and native-citizens: “bounded by the fact that they are all citizens of Rotterdam” (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2008b). While a first step towards generic policies and its framing was set here, several policy officers we spoke to claimed this shift only really took shape under the budgetary cuts of the new Coalition in 2010 when cutting all subsidies for mono-cultural organizations and projects. This suggests a correlation between budget cuts, retrenchment and mainstreaming.

**A financial push for mainstreaming?**

As part of retrenchment measures all social policies were revised, “there were too many things going on. There was an overlap between several programs and things were done simultaneously”76. The programs were replaced by more result-oriented approach in those neighborhoods that where behind in health, poverty, integration, participation, living, public space and nuisance (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2010c) and partly replaced by a focus on the areas of emancipation, discrimination and diversity (Burgemeester en Wethouders Rotterdam, 2011). While these organizations and initiatives were previously subsidized to overcome segregation (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2002b) it was now instead argued that equality, approached through generic policies, is the motor towards the solidarity and cohesion.

A former policy officer summarizes the transition as follows: “It was a next step towards the citizenship policies. The incentive was given in 2006, the budgetary cuts formed the next step in this direction”.77 In another interview a NGO-officer stresses the importance of the financial reforms: “while the frame and discussion are not necessarily much sharper than in 2002, the actual reforms are now driven by the financial cuts, these are of a decisive importance here”.78 Initially the reform was very much focused on what was no longer done, rigidly discarding all targeted measures:

“When looking back I can conclude there was no effort to mainstream at that time. The efforts were very much focused on letting go of immigrant-integration policies but the responsibility for this field was not picked up on by other departments. ... It is not self-evident that for example the educational department takes this up”.79

The officer points out that the ‘State of Integration’ report, published on the cities of Rotterdam and Amsterdam, had put the issue of immigrant integration back on the agenda in the midst of the

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76 Interview with policy officer at the department of activation and well-being, Rotterdam, 9th of June 2014.
77 Interview with policy officer at the department of education, and former policy officer at department of Integration, Rotterdam, interviewed 4th of June 2014.
Effectively this meant that the wide range of (mono)cultural organizations mainly active in ‘frontline social work’ were cut back the budget by 70% for the 38 civil organizations supported by the municipality before. While cutting back the frontline work, the main principle was to preserve the knowledge that many organizations had developed throughout the years. This eventually led to four knowledge- and expertise centers based around women emancipation, gay-emancipation, anti-discrimination and diversity as empowerment [brede aanpak diversiteit], meant to inform and raise awareness on these topics in generic, governmental policies. This fits a shift in governance towards a smaller and more efficient government who takes the role of a facilitator, outsourcing or abolishing the first-line work (Burgemeester en Wethouders Rotterdam 2011; 2013).
78 Interview with NGO-staffmember knowledge-center diversity, Rotterdam, 16th of June 2014.
79 Interview with policy officer at the department of education, and former policy officer at department of Integration, Rotterdam, interviewed 4th of June 2014.
generic citizenship development. The report led to a contrary development, such as the ‘Mee(r) doen’ program; an ‘integration method’ directed at the citizens of Rotterdam (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2011f). While generic in principle the program additionally addresses (partly specifically targeted) immigrant integration projects. Policy officers we spoke to claim that this step internally led to a more active coordination between the departments on issues of immigrant integration.

4.2.3 Conclusion

This analysis of social cohesion policies in Rotterdam illustrates the shifting policies and its framing, from explicit and specific targeting of immigrants to a generic rephrasing in terms of inclusive city-citizenship. However, this rephrasing was so strongly focused on moving away from specific policies that the issue of integration was not touched upon at all anymore, completely disappearing of side in all policy-departments: illustrating the risk of decoupling (Van Breugel, Maan & Scholten, 2014, p.27). It is only recently that the theme of immigrant integration is back on the agenda with the awareness that this requires active coordination between departments. However how this will develop under the new Coalition is yet unclear. While former Alderman Louwes previously wrote that "contrary to what Leefbaar Rotterdam frontman claims, immigrant integration in its classic sense has long passed in Rotterdam.. Integration is not something to talk about, you just do it" (Louwes, 2014, January 28), in line with the generic citizenship-frame. On his turn her political opponent Eerdmans writes that Louwes claim that integration is over, is all wrong "if it is up to Leefbaar [Rotterdam] we get on with the integration policies that have been neglected by Louwes as soon as possible. It is of crucial importance to give 'New Dutch'[citizens] a solid basis in the Dutch culture and society, so that they can participate in our society the sooner" (Eerdmans, 2014, February 5). In the new Coalition Agreement, with Leefbaar Rotterdam as one of the Coalition parties, it is indeed stated that “To solve specific problems we chose target group policies and accustomed policy measures when these prove to be effective” (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2014, p.14). Whether this marks a new policy shift, moving away from the generic, and mainstreamed, citizenship policies remains to be seen.

The case analysis of Rotterdam reveals a similar trend from specific to generic policies as Amsterdam and the national level. Also, as in the other cases, clear replacement strategies were put in place. This involves both needs-based strategies, reflecting the more traditional Rotterdam focus on socio-economic deprivation such as in the sphere of housing, as area-based strategies, such as manifested in the Rotterdam act that was adopted in response to lobbying of the city of Rotterdam.

As far as an intercultural orientation is manifest in the Rotterdam approach, this is rather faint. The citizenship frame does seem to provide an anchor for bonding within the super-diverse population of Rotterdam, and the recent establishment of an expertise-center on diversity do suggest a positive recognition of diversity and its importance to the city. At the same time, our context analysis clearly shows that diversity remains a fiercely contested political issue in the Rotterdam political arena, in contradiction to Amsterdam.

At the same time, what stands out clearly from our fieldwork on Rotterdam is the role of budgetary constraints on the shift toward generic policies. Mainstreaming is in this sense often framed as a consequence of retrenchment of the more active (and sometimes group-specific) integration policies.
4.3 Amsterdam

Amsterdam was the first so-called ‘majority-minority’ city of the Netherlands, when in 2011 the migrant population outnumbered the native population, with 51% against 49% (Crul, 2013, p.1). Like in Rotterdam, the ‘fact of diversity’ has for a long time formed the basic principle of the immigrant integration policies. While generally characterized as politically stable with less populist influences than Rotterdam or the national level, the Amsterdam case is strongly influenced by the assassination of filmmaker and columnist Theo van Gogh, as will be elaborated amongst other developments in the policy background sketched below.

4.3.1 Policy background

Problem context: incidents and polarization

The debate on social cohesion in Amsterdam has been strongly influenced by the assassination of filmmaker and columnist Theo van Gogh on the streets of Amsterdam in November 2004 by a second-generation Moroccan-Dutch radicalized Muslim (see also Penninx, 2006). The religiously and politically motivated murder caused a ‘shockwave’, confronting the Netherlands with one of the first incidents of religion-related terrorism in a very long period. While not leading to direct violent polarization in Amsterdam80, the incident did raise levels of mutual mistrust and fear. This polarized tension in the city again comes to the fore when a seventeen-year-old Moroccan-Dutch boy died in traffic after being chased by the police. This boy’s death caused tension in the city-district of Slotervaart where the incident took place when the residents ‘turned against’ the police. Similarly tension rose between residents around incidents in the Diamant city-district. Indicating the tensions on the street and an increased feeling of division between the native and immigrant population (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2006b).

Divided social worlds are rising and the problem-accumulation in certain areas seems to coincide with a concentration of immigrants in certain areas, “contributing to the polarization between different ethnic groups” (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2005c, p.4). This division translates spatially as well, the Amsterdam municipality warns for a ‘potential split’ of the Amsterdam population (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2009c). Characterized by increasing differences in social-economic position Amsterdam seems to divide between areas ‘inside the A10 ringroad’ and the areas ‘outside’. In the districts of Nieuw-West and Zuidoost this social-economic disadvantage coincides with a concentration of non-Western allochthons (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2009c, p.35). Though overall, in 2011 all neighborhoods in Amsterdam scored moderate to positive on the national ‘livability-measure’ (Ossel, 2013, p.2).

Several studies indicate that social trust and social contacts between ethnic groups are declining. The political participation amongst immigrants is low, and has decreased since 1994 (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2006b, p.11). The municipality sees a big challenge in improving the connection, dedication to- and identification with the city of non-western allochthons and youngsters in general (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2013). 45% percent of the population of Amsterdam thinks negatively of Moroccans, a fourfold in comparison to attitudes toward other ethnic groups. While native citizens are upset about nuisance and misbehaviour, in their opinion caused by allochthons, 50% of

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80 The murder did lead to a series of violent repercussions throughout the rest of the country.
Morocans and Turks in Amsterdam on their turn say to have experienced discrimination based on their descent (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2006b, p.11).

In a grand revision of the Amsterdam immigrant integration policies the municipality mentions an ‘Islamization’ of issues of domestic violence, criminality and anti-Semitism, stating that “this wrongful analysis has no other result than polarization” (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2005c). With regard to radicalization a survey study of the IMES (Slootman & Tillie, 2006), following the murder of van Gogh, reports that 2% of the Muslims in Amsterdam is sensitive or susceptible for radicalization, taken from the fact that they combine an orthodox interpretation of the Islam with the belief that the Islam is under threat and that something must be done about it (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2007). The annual report of the General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands that year (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2006) observes an increase in Islamic radicalization, specifically under migrant-youth. Equally the Municipal Information-service on Radicalization (de Gemeentelijke Informatiehuishouding Radicalisering) noted a strong increase in reports of radicalization, mostly about Islamic radicalization and a few reports on right-wing radicalization too (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2007). While not framed as such as strongly as in Rotterdam or at the national level, Amsterdam policymaking is strongly informed and influenced by these incidents, indicating an ‘Islamization’ of issues of integration and radicalization, and its policy-responses.

Policies and Politics

In contrast to the strong political shifts that characterized Rotterdam politics, Amsterdam has known a fairly stable succession of PvdA-led Coalitions (Social Democrats), up to the recent local elections (2014), which were won by D66. Throughout the last ten years Amsterdam has always held a separate portfolio on immigrant integration, coinciding with portfolios such as social affairs, housing policies and diversity.

In a grand revision of its immigrant integration policies in 2005 the Coalition stated that “there are simply too many projects and programs going on. .. numerous projects have been started up, ideas pitched and debates initiated” (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2005c, p.11). The Revision remarks a mix of tolerance and political correctness on the one hand and as an antithesis an overcompensation of strong language and a harshening of the political debate and policies on the other. This has led to a harshening of the so-called problem-group par excellence; the Moroccan Youth, of whom a part explicitly does not (wish to) identify themselves with the Dutch society anymore, instead seeking resort in the radical Islam. “A sequence of incidents increasingly determines the relations. ... Amsterdam has continuously tried to pacify these hardened relations and prevent escalation” (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2005c, p.6). It is this role and a "facet-approach" that does justice to the complexity of the immigrant integration process and the diversity of the Amsterdam society (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2005c p.2+26) that defines Amsterdam Immigrant Integration policies. Apart from some small adjustments on this regard, the reorientation does not lead to major changes in Amsterdam immigrant integration policies.

The local immigrant integration policies of Amsterdam are subject to government retrenchment measures at the national level (see Vervolgnota ‘Werk in Uitvoering’ 2003) and a reduction of the GSB-means for integration, ‘old-comers’ and educational disadvantages policy (Jaarplan en
Begroting 2005). However in Amsterdam this did not lead to such comprehensive reorganization of the immigrant-integration (funding) system as in Rotterdam.

4.3.2 Policy content
As a ‘multicultural city’ (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2004d; 2008) Amsterdam is, and always has been characterized by diversity, this has formed a central and equally self-evident theme in Amsterdam policymaking. While still treating diversity as a separate topic in the Immigrant Integration Memorandum of 2003 and the revision thereof in 2005 (B&W, 2003; Gemeente Amsterdam, 2003; 2005c) this period marks the beginning of a transition towards mainstreaming. From the following Coalition Period on (the year of 2006 and beyond) topics such as immigrant integration, social cohesion and citizenship are treated generically in the respective program plans and Memorandums of different departments. Policies move away from a separate set of immigrant integration policies, instead forming a ‘facet approach’ active on all fields and levels of community care and public facilities. “Whether we call it integration policies or not, it is about equal access to scarce resources in the fields of living and livability, work and income, knowledge and schooling and health” (2005c). In addition new programs on radicalization and discrimination are coming up, later continued under the citizenship programs (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2004c; 2006b; 2007; 2008).

Specifically targeted policies
While increasingly generic in approach, throughout the years there are numerable specific policies recognizable too. Such as sport-stimulation programs ‘specially adjusted to ‘new’ Amsterdammers’ (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2003), the emancipation of female ‘oudkomers, or special civic-integration tracks for highly educated immigrants (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2004d). Special attention for immigrant women and their children (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2007c) or area-focused policies indirectly targeting certain income/ethnic groups (Ossel, 2013). However, as observed on a national level as well as in Rotterdam, in Amsterdam (political) support for specific policies is waning.

In this light and driven by austerity measures Amsterdam, like Rotterdam, restructured its financial support for migrant self-organizations. The former programs were reformed to more generic programs for integration and participation (Subsidieverordening Integratie, Participatie en Sociale Cohesie, SIP), with an emphasis on ethnic-mixing and women- and gay-emancipation in 2004. In 2013 these were reformed again to a Citizenship and Diversity program, focusing additionally on discrimination and citizenship-initiatives. However, as one of the Amsterdam’ policy-officers remarks in an interview, Amsterdam is the only city that still hosts some financial-support for specific groups, to bridge the gap with other groups in society.

‘We Amsterdammers’
The assassination of Theo van Gogh on the 2nd of November 2004 startled the city, putting radicalization on the map. In immediate response to the killing the ‘We Amsterdammers’ Action Plan was developed in 2005 to combat terrorism in cooperation with the policy and the judiciary; countering radicalization, by opposing discrimination and exclusion; avoiding polarization and mobilizing positive powers. Combining repressive policies with preventative social cohesion programs, such as developing tools for early-identification of radicalization, ‘Day of the Dialogue’

81 Interview with head of the department citizenship and diversity and policy officer DMO, Amsterdam, 20th of June 2014.
and the 'Amsterdam intolerant for intolerance' campaign targeted at the hospitality industry, educational institutions, sports clubs, employers and parents (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2005d). The program does not fall under the regular immigrant integration department but instead a separate ‘Platform Amsterdam Together’ is developed under the direct responsibility of the mayor. While previously a self-evident theme, from this moment on diversity is increasingly considered as a ‘potential source of conflict’ (Gemente Amsterdam, 2006d, p.3-4). While diversity remains to be considered the "force behind an open city" (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2008), it is now linked explicitly to the (improvement of) social cohesion and participation.

In the sequel Memorandum ‘We Amsterdammers II’ it is concluded that “the so-called ‘We-feeling’ that should indicate the inclusion of all Amsterdammers (...) still requires sufficient direction and effort” (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2006b, p.8). An evaluation of the first program-period learns that while the more concrete radicalization and polarization are working relatively well, the third more abstract polarization branch seem harder to affect. "Bonding and bridging social capital is not something that can be initiated from the city hall but should arise from initiatives by the citizens themselves" (p.9). Remarkable here is that the program explicitly choses to approach cohesion in a dialectical -multicultural- way, focusing on bonding within groups on the one hand, and bridging between the different groups on the other hand: "People should feel safe and familiar in their own circle before reaching out to participate in society and politics. Bonding within ethnic groups therefore is an important condition for bonding between ethnic groups” (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2006b, p.11).

As a part of the We Amsterdammers program in 2007 a specific plan against radicalization was executed: the Amsterdam against radicalization program. After 2010 the citizenship and social cohesion theme were picked up in a new neighbourhood approach (Gemeente Amsterdam 2007) and in the policy on Citizenship and Diversity (the ‘citizenship campaign’) (Gemeente 2011b), although never explicitly linked as such. The Platform Amsterdam Together, that was developed specially for the ‘We Amsterdammers’ program, has merged with the Citizenship and Diversity department in 2010, who thereby becomes the primary responsible department on all diversity matters.

Moving to the neighborhood level
Housing policies and effective methods to deal with so-called 'problem-neighbourhoods' were considered the most important binding theme on the local immigrant-integration-agenda (see a.o. Gemeente Amsterdam, 2005c). Referring to the Rotterdam Act, the Amsterdam Coalition claimed that "radical solutions such as locking of neighborhoods for the less privileged are not on the agenda in Amsterdam, the municipality does strive for a social-economical mixing, but by building and restructuring only” (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2005c, p.20). From 2007 on this spatial planning focus shifts to a 'neighborhoods approach', intended as a "catalyst to intensify the existing approach and create more unity and focus there, from now on centered around the implementation on a neighborhood level" (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2007c, p.20). In line with the Coalition's central program-plan ‘People make Amsterdam’ (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2006d) 'citizenship-participation' becomes a central theme in the (partly mainstreamed) integration policies. Framed in terms of livability and safety, social cohesion policies are developed on a neighborhood level, in order to stimulate the integration and participation of “all who are left on the side-line, men and women,

82 Interview with policy officer at department of citizenship and diversity, Amsterdam 2nd of July 2014.

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young and old, native and immigrant citizens, they should all be motivated to participate” (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2007c, p.18), phrasing the social cohesion goals in more generic terms on a neighborhood-level.

In the following Coalition period (2010-2014) the Alderman of (e.g.) Diversity and Integration stated that “in Amsterdam we speak of citizenship”\(^83\) and explicitly ended immigrant integration policy as a separate policy domain. The goal is that citizens participate, respect each other and are open to diversity so we can live together in a pleasant way in Amsterdam. The municipality’s policies on women- and gay-emancipation, antidiscrimination, participation and courtesy are integral parts of citizenship (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2011b). The term ‘hyperdiversity’ pops up in this period too, addressing the fact that Amsterdam is a city of 183 nationalities, and that diversity should be understood in a wide sense, e.g. also including sexual diversity moving further away from the classic immigrant integration approach to diversity. In 2013 the citizenship-policy emphasis shifts more strongly to social- and policy- participation of citizens (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2013b). Declining the potential division of the native and immigrant population - coinciding with social-economic disadvantages - remains the main driving force behind housing policies in the following years (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2009c). The ‘Vision on Living’ as published in 2009 targets the (immigrant) middleclass to prevent them from leaving the city, broadening the policies measures from a differentiation of housing to a high quality of services (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2009c, p.45). The move to the neighborhood-level was also driven by developments of retrenchment and a decentralization of tasks from the national government to the municipalities. This led to new bottom-up approaches to work on the neighborhoods through neighborhood trusts and self-management from 2015 on (Ossel, 2013).

### 4.3.3 Conclusion

Similar to the national level and Rotterdam, the integration or citizenship policies of Amsterdam have been moving towards mainstreaming in the past ten years. In 2006 policy-responsibilities were redistributed to a ‘facet-approach’, active on all fields and levels of community care and public facilities to do justice to the complexity of integration and diversity. A move to more generic framing of these issues followed later, by replacing immigrant integration with citizenship policies in 2010. This is also reflected in the decline of cooperation with (single-ethnicity) migrant organisations, in fact very similar to Rotterdam.

However, there are several important differences between Amsterdam and Rotterdam as well as with the national level. First of all, Amsterdam seems to have continued specific policies longer than the other cases (similar to what we saw in the educational domain in chapter 3). For instance, the ‘We Amsterdamers’ campaign clearly reflected at least a strong awareness of the importance of migrant groups and processes of bonding within and bridging between groups. Also, some forms of cooperation with migrant groups are said to be continued. Possibly, this more incremental and more modest turn toward generic policies are a reflection of the absence of a sharp politicization as had been the case in Rotterdam and on the national level. In Amsterdam, it was rather the 2004 killing of Van Gogh that speeded up policy developments, but not in all respects favored the trend toward generic policies.

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\(^83\) Although initially introduced in 2004 (Gemeente Amsterdam 2004d).
Furthermore, Amsterdam appears to have developed a much more explicit orientation on diversity and culturalisation of the city, which has been much more modest in Rotterdam and on the national level. This reflects the fact that Amsterdam has become a super-diverse city, the first majority-minority city in the Netherlands.

4.4 Policy explanations

This section connects the findings on mainstreaming integration in social cohesion policies to the conceptualization and typology of mainstreaming that has been developed in the previous work package of the UPSTREAM project (Van Breugel, Maan & Scholten, 2014). We will discuss to what extent mainstreaming involves a move to a ‘whole society’ approach in terms of diversity, to what extent policies are targeting specific groups or the general population and the use and design of poly-centric modes of governance. Subsequently, in the following paragraph the overall question ‘what is mainstreamed and why’ will be addressed.

4.4.1 Connection to mainstreaming typology

With regard to policy targeting – one dimension of our typology – social cohesion policies are mainly phrased in generic terms. Rather than directly targeting ethnicity, for instance by focusing on inter-ethnic contact or on ‘ethnic concentration neighborhoods’, replacement strategies are now firmly in place that involve primarily area- and needs-based strategies. Social cohesion policies are now primarily targeted at the neighborhood level and framed in terms of mixing high- and low-income groups or in terms of addressing all people on a city level as city-citizens. Although all three cases have several examples of specifically targeted policies throughout the last ten years, these were rather exceptions than the standard, at least in terms of framing. On a national level, the ethnicity-targeted programs for housing policies have been abandoned, with policies now mainly framed in terms of income. Notable here however is the difference in defining problems, and the actual drafting of policies. Disadvantages in problem- or weak-neighborhoods are often, amongst other factors, raised in terms of ethnic concentration and integration. However subsequently there seems to be a reluctance to target the policies likewise, instead they are ‘kept open to a wider public’ such as in the ‘Power-Districts Approach’. Resonating the ‘dilemma of recognition’ typically linked to the assimilationist model of ‘denial’ “insist[ing] that, despite inequality between social or cultural groups, redistribution policies do not benefit any particular group” (De Zwart, 2005, p.139).

In Rotterdam the move to generic policies intensified in particular after 2006, when a new coalition was installed without Livable Rotterdam. Since then integration policies have strongly moved away from separate immigrant-integration policies, instead speaking of city-citizenship and thereby reducing all specifically targeted programs. This specific dimension of mainstreaming, as a move to generic policies, proved to work poorly as the policy responsibility for the topic was not distributed to other departments; rather, the responsibility for integration and the awareness of integration-related issues appeared to be fragmented and diluted. Later a comparative study on integration in Rotterdam and Amsterdam put immigrant integration back on the agenda here, eventually leading to more active coordination between departments on immigrant integration and the return of certain specific programs. At this local level we can thus recognize different levels and framings of mainstreaming. From a move towards generic framing of citizenship to the so-called ‘risk of decoupling’, where the issue of integration risked to disappear altogether. This illustrates the fact
that good coordination is required when mainstreaming immigrant integration policies across departments.

In Amsterdam the move towards more generic, citizenship, projects was strongly driven by the antiradicalization program as developed in response to the murder of Theo van Gogh which put the emphasis on social cohesion, commonality and identification on the map. The role of the former mayor Job Cohen was decisive in the development of this program. “He was the figurehead of the program, capable of bringing people together”\textsuperscript{84}, a good match with the strong emphasis on social cohesion, as actively disseminated by Job Cohen. While a facet-approach on integration was introduced in 2006 already, it was only in 2010 that a more generic citizenship-system was introduced. Notably a couple of years later than Rotterdam.

Our analysis does reveal a slight paradox in that whereas the policies now mostly involve area- and needs-based replacement strategies, policy and political discourses often do involve a more explicitly problematisation of ethnicity. This related in particular to ethnic concentration in specific neighborhoods and to lack of inter-ethnic contact. Our analysis clearly shows that this problematisation of ethnicity and interethnic contact was a key driving factor behind the mainstreaming of social cohesion policies in the studied period, especially in Rotterdam and on the national level. Furthermore, we found that budgetary constraints played an important role, with vanishing budgets for the specifically targeted policies of the past as a more objective motor behind the formulation of generic policies.

The second dimension of our mainstreaming typology involves the presence or absence of a whole society approach that is based on a recognition of cultural pluralism or monism. Overall diversity of neighborhoods and society is considered a fact. However, our analysis does show that this recognition of diversity is more apparent at the local level than at the national level, which can be seen as a reflection of the (super-)diversity of these cities, whereas this goes less for the national level. While previously considered rather self-evident, it was Leefbaar Rotterdam that put diversity in the context of social cohesion on the agenda in Rotterdam. In Amsterdam a shift in this thinking was initiated by the assassination of Theo van Gogh, putting segregation, polarization and radicalization on the map. As summarized in the following words of the Amsterdam Program Agreement of 2006: “Diversity is the force behind an open city. But diversity also forms a potential source of conflict. Discrimination, feelings of detachment and radicalization threaten social stability and can lead to a divided city” (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2006d).

While the opinion on the desirability of mixed neighborhoods shifted briefly around 2000, since 2002 policies have been directed at diversity (in its widest sense, e.g. ethnicity, age, level of education and income) rather than at ethnicity at a neighborhood-level through housing and social policies. On a local level the pluralist notion of society is most evident in the citizenship programs, as initiated in 2006 in Rotterdam and 2004 and since 2011 in Amsterdam. “It is not only about the physical encounter, but about creating actual connections and solidarity between Rotterdammers” (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2008b). Dialogue and debates fulfill a central role in this period. In terms of mainstreaming the role of diversity and contact indicate the pluralist framing of generic policies. On the national level quite the contrary seems to happen, an increasing focus at the individual level and

\textsuperscript{84} Interview with a former program director of the ‘Wij Amsterdammers’-program, Haarlem, 20th of May 2014.
the responsibility to adapt to the host society indicates a move towards monism in policy-measures and its framing.

Thus it is clear that, similar to what we found in the educational domain, the shift towards generic policies in the Netherlands does not really correlate with an emerging ‘whole society’ approach in terms of diversity. Only the city of Amsterdam does seem to have an approach that is explicitly oriented at interculturalisation (although with a sometimes uneasy combination with ethnic problematisation in terms of anti-radicalisation). To a lesser extent Rotterdam addressed this under the generic citizenship frame of ‘we are all Rotterdammers.’ The national level and to some extent also Rotterdam (see the Rotterdam code) seem based on cultural monism rather than pluralism, involving to some extent a decision to ignore rather than recognize diversity.

Finally, with regard to polycentric governance as the final dimension of mainstreaming (Van Breugel, Maan & Scholten, 2014), processes of deconcentration and decentralization can clearly be identified in the case of social cohesion policies. The first entails a differentiation of policy responsibilities between different departments and stakeholders, where the latter indicates a distribution of policy responsibilities between different levels of governance. Especially the latter case of decentralization, stands out in the area of social cohesion. Housing policies have been characterized by major deregulations and decentralizations already since the 1990s, which was also the period that integration policy was indirectly connected to this via urban policies. Throughout the years under study for this report we can observe that this trend has continued further, in what can perhaps be phrased the second large housing-decentralization of 2011 (twenty years after its first major reform) as part of deregulation -and austerity- reforms in the social domain. Social cohesion policies in relation to migrant integration now primarily involve neighborhood policies.

This trend to decentralization of actual social cohesion policies in terms of housing and neighborhood policies, is somewhat at odds with the simultaneous politicization of social cohesion at the national level. There is a clear discrepancy between the emphasis on social cohesion in national political discourse and its role in actual national policies. In fact, with the exception of the ‘Power Boroughs Approach’ that has now already come to an end, national social cohesion policies have had to cope with austerity measures almost constantly throughout the period of this study. It can be concluded that, when looking at actual policies and budgets, the Netherlands does not so much have a real national social cohesion strategy, but has rather delegated this to the local level, where superdiverse cities like Amsterdam and Rotterdam have taken up the challenge of promoting social cohesion in specific and somewhat city-specific ways.

Poly-centric governance also involves deconcentration of policy responsibilities. This is also clearly present in the field of social cohesion, where on the national level as well as in Rotterdam in particular the responsibility for migrant integration in general and social cohesion in particular has been differentiated over various departments. To some extent this also applies to Amsterdam, although there migrant integration in relation to social cohesion resorts under a generic department of ‘diversity and citizenship’, rather than differentiating it across various departments. An important challenge in this respect, visible in particular in the Rotterdam case, is to preserve some form of policy coordination and problem awareness across departments. Without proper ‘horizontal’ coordination mechanisms between departments and stakeholders, the Rotterdam case shows that there can be a risk of policy dilution.
4.4.2 What is mainstreamed and why?

Now we have analysed how social cohesion policies on immigrant integration were (or were not) mainstreamed, the question remains of what drove these developments of mainstreaming. Our assumption that mainstreaming can be explained by the extent of diversity (also super-diversity) cannot be fully justified after our analysis of social cohesion policies. On the one hand, the turn from specific to generic policies took place at the national as well as the local level, regardless of the much more (or super-)diverse setting of Rotterdam and Amsterdam. Also, traces of more specifically targeted measures continued much longer in the first Dutch majority-minority city, Amsterdam, than in the others. On the other hand, it was clear that a more interculturalist ‘whole society’ approach emerged much more in Amsterdam and to some extent also in Rotterdam than at the national level. This would be fully in line with our expectation about policies in super-diverse local settings, though it does not help us understand the differences between Amsterdam and Rotterdam.

Our analysis does show that the political factor is important to mainstreaming in the field of social cohesion. In particular, we see that politicization at the national level and in Rotterdam was an important force behind the shift from specific to generic policies, abandoning group-specific measures. Particularly in Rotterdam we can see how the moves between specifically targeted immigrant integration policies and more generic citizen-approach are politically loaded and reactive. The political turn of Livable Rotterdam in 2002 can be considered a local ‘backlash against multiculturalism’ responding strongly to previous informal and multicultural policies. This was less so in Amsterdam where politicization was much more modest, even after the tragic killing of Van Gogh in 2004. At the same time, Amsterdam seems to have been able to develop an interculturalist ‘whole society’ approach much more easy and to keep integration policy coordination much more manifestly than the other cases, which also seems to be related to the lower degree of politicization. It should be observed in this context that politicization in these cases primarily involved the rise of populism, which has been clearly the case in national and Rotterdam politics, but not in Amsterdam’s politics. So we can conclude that whereas the rise of political populism contributed to abandoning of group-specific measures, it has hampered the replacement of such measures with an inclusive approach in terms of the scope and effectiveness of the policies. In fact at the national level the turn to generic policies is so strong that “in the current political climate there is no room for specific policies, even if it would be more efficient”°. Politicization here leads to a narrow interpretation of mainstreaming, leaving little to no room for questions of inclusivity.

On a national level the recent turn to generic policies and decentralization has to be situated in the context of general retrenchments in the social sector and a move towards ‘participatory society’ that form part of the reason to narrow down immigrant integration policies. Equally in Rotterdam retrenchment in the social sector proved to be a decisive step in the process of mainstreaming. However here, immigrant integration was already rephrased in generic citizenship-policies when retrenchment hit the field and thus proved to serve as a next step in the citizenship-frame. By some actors this was even believed to more decisive in applying the framework than the political framing that was initially set. Retrenchment and austerity measures as a consequence of the economic crisis do prove to be influential on mainstreaming, either as an initial push or next step in mainstreaming.

85 Interview with Policy-advisor at the Integration and Society-department at the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, The Hague, 26th of June 2014.
However, it was remarked that the move to generic policies in Rotterdam was strongly informed by what should no longer be done, mainly dismissing policies.
5 – Conclusions

This report focused on the policy rationale behind (or ‘the politics of’) mainstreaming immigrant integration in the Netherlands. Mainstreaming is understood in this project as a shift toward generic policies oriented at a pluralist society and toward poly-centric forms of governance (Van Breugel, Maan & Scholten, 2014). This understanding of mainstreaming guides our study in search of situations that match this definition, rather than those cases where mainstreaming may be mentioned explicitly but defined in very different ways. The key questions in this study were:

1. **What** forms of mainstreaming can be identified? To what extent are migrant integration policies mainstreamed, and to what extent are other policy strategies preferred?

2. **How** have these mainstreaming policies come about? What factors contributed or obstructed the mainstreaming of integration governance?

3. **Why** has (or has not) integration governance been mainstreamed? What explanations can be found for the mainstreaming of integration governance? How can differences between cases be explained?

5.1 **Types of mainstreaming in the Netherlands**

Our analysis shows that mainstreaming is not such a new phenomenon in Dutch integration policies as is sometimes suggested. In spite of Dutch policies being internationally renowned for their group-specific ‘multiculturalist’ approach, the issue of mainstreaming has been part of Dutch immigrant integration debates from the very beginning. Already in the 1980s, even though Dutch government then pursued many target group specific policies, the defining policy slogan was to have specific policies wherever required and generic policies wherever possible. Even in this period, when looking at policy budgets, emphasis was more on socio-economic participation of immigrants than on their socio-cultural emancipation as groups. Especially in the 1990s, the balance between generic and specific policies already clearly shifted toward the former. In that period, most integration measures focused on socio-economic participation of individual migrants as new citizens of Dutch society.

Besides the issue of how to target migrants, the other two dimensions of mainstreaming also apply more broadly to the development of Dutch policies over the past decades. On paper at least, the Ethnic Minorities Policy of the 1980s already would have involved a ‘whole society’ approach oriented at ‘mutual adaptation’ between migrants and the host society in full recognition of the multi-ethnic character of society (see Scholten 2013). However, it must be recognized that in practice the Ethnic Minorities Policy indeed concentrated primarily on the minority groups involved rather than at society at large (with notable exceptions such as Intercultural Education of the 1980s). Also in the 1980s and early 2000s, integration policy never really addressed society at large in practice.
The dimension of poly-centric governance does apply especially to the 1990s as well. Whereas the Ethnic Minorities Policy was clearly a state-centric led policy, the integration policy of the 1990s was deconcentrated to sector departments and also to some extent decentralized to local governments. The latter trend has continued throughout the 2000s, in spite of some centralizing tendencies in the context of the assimilationist turn. In fact, one of the paradoxes that this project observed is that precisely in the period that the politicization of immigrant integration at the national level was fiercer than ever before (the mid-2000s), the actual role of national government in this policy domain had been dispersed between departments and over different levels of government more than ever before.

What is new about recent developments in terms of ‘mainstreaming’ in Dutch integration governance is, according to our findings, especially the extent to which specific measures have made place for generic policies and the extent to which policy responsibilities have been differentiated or even ‘diluted.’ First of all, the analysis of both education policies and social cohesion policies, show a shift from specific measures to generic policy measures, resulting in a full abandoning of specific measures by the end of the 2000s. What is more, this applies to the national level as well as to Rotterdam and Amsterdam, albeit in somewhat different paces. In national education policies, specific measures such as special attention for so-called ‘black schools’, immigrant minority language instruction and target group specific funding regulations for primary schools were all discontinued. In national social cohesion policies, the shift to generic policies had already set in earlier during the 1990s, continuing in the 2000s in particular in relation to increased emphasis on neighborhood policies.

This shift to generic policies also applies to the cases of Rotterdam and Amsterdam. In Rotterdam, this shift was even facilitated by its traditional focus on socio-economic participation and accelerated by political pressure to abandon group specific measures of any kind in both policy areas. The education policies of Rotterdam are characterized by tackling educational disadvantages predominantly with generic measures and aiming at ‘mixing’ black and white schools to increase inter-ethnic contact between pupils. Early childhood education and care is the biggest exception to the overall generic approach, since it is still targeting immigrants specifically. However, in Rotterdam the shift toward a generic approach was combined sometimes uneasily with a continued problematization of ethnicity in political discourse. This is perhaps illustrated most clearly by the Rotterdam Act, which was adopted upon direct request of this city, and originally intended to establish an ethnic threshold for specific neighborhoods, which was only later replaced by an income-related threshold. In Amsterdam the shift toward generic policies was more incremental and more modest. Amsterdam can be characterized by its dual approach to immigrant integration. Following the murder of Theo van Gogh, a move towards generic citizenship policies was initiated. However, like in the other cases, social cohesion and education policies in Amsterdam now are predominantly generic, with only very minor specific elements remaining in the context of a.o. the anti-radicalization policy and in collaborations with migrant organizations.

However, our research shows that in both areas, generic measures were often framed as needs- and area- based ‘replacement strategies’. Especially in policy discourse it is phrased explicitly that many of these generic measures are still to target an ethnic factor in educational issues and in social cohesion, but without stating this explicitly so. Instead, education policies focus, for instance, on educational level of parents and the location of the school as needs-based and area-based proxys for
ethnicity. In social cohesion policies, a similar strategy can be discerned, but than based on income-level and livability issues per neighborhood, very similar to the French Urban Priority Zones. For instance, the ‘power-boroughs approach’ or the special approach for the South of Rotterdam were explicitly legitimated within policy discourses with reference to ethnic relations.

What remains much less evident in the Dutch case is a ‘whole society’ approach in terms of diversity, which constitutes the second dimension of mainstreaming. In fact, developments such as the ‘participation declaration’ that has been launched at the national level and supported by Rotterdam in particular, suggests a continued focus on cultural monism rather than a recognition of pluralism. Only in Amsterdam did we find traces of an interculturalist orientation in education policies as well as social cohesion policies, although modest as well. In Rotterdam, besides the citizenship framing of ‘we are all Rotterdammers’ in policy discourse, there is a hardly an explicit recognition of superdiversity as was found in Amsterdam. On the national level, the approach to citizenship education does contain elements that may lead to stronger focus on interculturalisation in the future. However, as discussed in this research, the focus on for instance the ‘historical canon’ of Dutch history suggests a focus on monism rather than pluralism.

Furthermore, the Dutch case does first sight also clearly reveals the shift to poly-centric governance, as the third dimension of mainstreaming in the UPSTREAM project. Whereas minorities policy or integration policy had formed a clearly institutionalized policy domain in the 1980s and 1990s, during the 2000s it was incrementally de-institutionalized. Policy responsibilities were deconcentrated across different departments and to different stakeholders. Furthermore, in both areas, policy responsibilities have shifted to the local level in particular. Especially when it comes to the issue of migrant integration in relation to education and social cohesion, these policies have become primarily local policies, for instance in neighborhood policies in the efforts of local governments to coordinate collaborations between schools in terms of school transitions. At the national level there is no minister for integration anymore, and in Rotterdam responsibilities have been dispersed across departments as well. Only in Amsterdam did we see that integration remained a distinct responsibility of a department for diversity.

However, our research also shows that this deconcentration and decentralization did not always lead to effective coordination mechanisms for coping with this policy complexity. At the national level, shrinking budgets in combination with differentiation of policies across various departments give the impression of government retrenchment rather than poly-centric governance. To some extent, this also applies to the local cases, such as Rotterdam where mainstreaming was sometimes understood by actors as simply the ending of specific measures for budgetary reasons and the dispersion of policy responsibilities across departments. However, both Amsterdam and Rotterdam have developed practices for cooperating with various stakeholder, especially in the context of education policies. Also the establishment of expertise centers in both cities could, if further developed, play a key role in policy-centric integration governance in accordance to the model of mainstreaming.

What should be mentioned in the context of poly-centric integration governance in the Netherlands is the role of what can be described as ‘ethnic statistics.’ More than in most other countries that are included in this research project, the Netherlands can rely on an abundant availability of statistics on the socio-economic and to some extent even the socio-cultural position of migrants (measured as
Somewhat paradoxically, ethnic statistics clearly have played a role in the ‘targeting’ of mainstreamed policies; they provide a monitor of whether generic measures have disproportionate effects for specific groups, and whether generic policy changes are required to cope with specific problems. Furthermore, ethnic statistics (on the national level provided by the Social and Cultural Planning Office and the Central Planning Bureau) help create problem awareness and can be used as a poly-centric governance tool in order to mobilize responsible policy departments to take action if seen as needed. Our research shows that such ethnic statistics also play an important role at the local level, although especially in Rotterdam the availability of and use of ethnic statistics has declined rapidly over the last years. What may be surprising as well in an international context is that ethnic statistics in the Netherlands are relatively uncontested.

5.2 The process of mainstreaming integration governance

The analysis described in the previous section shows that when applying the UPSTREAM conceptualization to the Netherlands, we can conclude that mainstreaming is incomplete in the Netherlands. There is a shift to generic policies, but a whole society approach in terms of diversity has not been established yet and mechanisms for poly-centric governance are not yet in place. In this section we look at the factors that account for the process of how this (incomplete) mainstreaming of integration governance has come about in the Dutch case. Following the method of the UPSTREAM project, when determining what factors contributed or obstructed the mainstreaming of integration governance, the research focused on four main variables: actors, decision moments, frames and incidents.

First of all, what stands out from the Dutch case is the key role of politicization in the turn toward mainstreaming. This applies in particular to the national level and to the case of Rotterdam, whereas the degree of politicization in Amsterdam was clearly less than in the two other cases. Especially the shift toward generic policies and the abandoning of specific measures can be linked to influence of populism in national and Rotterdam policies in the early and mid 2000s. This shift was not reverted after executive turnover in both cases at the end of 2000s, as in fact the trend toward deconcentration and decentralization was continued. Noticeable especially at the local level is the importance of individual politicians; examples from Rotterdam are Alderman Geluk, who actively tried to implement the use of double waiting lists in schools to prevent segregation, and Alderman Pastors, who tried to implement the Rotterdam-act with a specific ethnic focus. At the same time, the absence of such politicization and the role of several important actors in Amsterdam, such as Alderman Asscher and Mayor Cohen, allowed Amsterdam to steer a somewhat different course, maintaining some specific measures and mainstreaming much more incrementally and modestly.

What appears very specific to the Dutch case is the role of ethnic statistics. Although contested in most other countries involved in UPSTREAM, in the Netherlands ethnic statistics are well institutionalized and frequently play an important role in the agenda setting of migrant-related issues (such as recently with regard to Polish workers). Somewhat paradoxically, it is the availability of ethnic data in the Netherlands that helps developing generic policies in such a manner that group specific issues are still targeted indirectly. However, especially the Rotterdam case shows that in the context of mainstreaming, attention for and availability of ethnic data is waning. This may lead to a
diminished awareness of migrant-related issues. Furthermore, we found in this research that the role of research and experts more in general on decision making related to mainstreaming appears rather limited; here, as mentioned above, the political context appears more decisive. For example, the advice of the Education Council to maintain ethnicity as indicator for the education funding system was rejected whereas the advice of the WRR to re-label Early Leavers as ‘overloaded’ students, instead of emphasizing other characteristics such as ethnicity, was adopted quickly. At the local level a general publication such as the citizen forecast of Rotterdam (2003) can result in the political claim for an immigrant stop. Whether (the results of) a research report fits within the current political frame on immigrant integration seems therefore an important question when assessing its influence on the mainstreaming of immigrant integration.

Another factor that stands out very clearly form the Dutch case is the role of austerity measures in the process of mainstreaming integration governance. Austerity measures and mainstreaming seem to be mutually reinforcing processes. Especially a shift from specific to generic policies is as much a cause as a consequence of shrinking budgets for specific integration policies. At the same time, this relation to austerity measures strengthens the earlier observation that in the Dutch case mainstreaming integration governance did not involve a more active generic approach in the sphere of interculturalisation. The national government reinforced its strive for generic policies by declaring that the budget for immigrant integration policies will be reduced to zero in 2015 (Ministerie BZK, 2011). Similarly, at the local level it was the abolishment of subsidies to mono-cultural organisations under pressure of diminishing municipal budgets that proved to be the decisive step in mainstreaming immigrant integration in Rotterdam. As such, it is very clear that in Dutch case mainstreaming is associated to government retrenchment from the area of integration, at the national as well as the local level.

In terms of framing integration issues in a way that would promote or discourage mainstreaming, there are several broader trends in society that play a role in integration governance as well. At the national level, mainstreaming and government retrenchment are influenced by the current trend towards the ‘participatory society’. The participatory society, emphasizing individual responsibilities for participation in society, covers many policy fields, but is recognizable in the frames regarding immigrant integration as well. In the last ten years the national government increasingly created an assimilationist focus towards immigration and integration. While we can recognize a short period (’05-’11) with more interculturalist notions, this interculturalist frame was accompanied by the harshening tone towards the magnitude of total immigration as well as the efforts made by immigrants to integrate in their host society. Mainstreaming immigrant integration fits within these frames by introducing generic policies, conveying the message that all citizen are equal, and emphasizing individual responsibilities.

At the local level we can recognize the emergence of the city-citizenship as an important frame conducive for the mainstreaming of immigrant integration. Contrary to immigrant integration policies, city-citizenship focuses on the main goal of participation by all citizen, both native and immigrant citizen, using generic and inclusive policies. Additionally, the policies aim at creating an open society with shared core values regarding diversity, reciprocity, identity and pride in the city. Eventually, all people should feel themselves connected to the city and their fellow citizens.
5.3 Explanations for mainstreaming integration governance

Based on Kingdon’s ‘families of processes’ (2003), the UPSTREAM project distinguishes three types of hypotheses to explain the reasons for mainstreaming. The hypotheses are differentiated between influences in the sphere of ‘problem recognition’, ‘policy proposal formation and refining’ and the ‘political stream’. In this section, we will address to what extent these hypotheses apply to the Dutch case.

In the sphere of problem recognition we expect the history of immigration, the degree of diversity and perceived integration problems to be of influence on the process of mainstreaming. Especially because of its relatively long migration history and high degree of diversity, the Netherlands may be (theoretically) seen as a likely case for mainstreaming. The Netherlands has been a country of immigration ever since the Second World War, with several migrant groups now already in their second, third or even fourth generation. Furthermore, the total size of the migrant population in the Netherlands is relatively large when compared to the other countries in this study. Especially when taking into account these second and third generations. In Rotterdam and Amsterdam, this population makes up up to, or even over 50% of the total city population (Scheffer & Entzinger, 2012; Crul 2013). Also, the number of different groups, in terms of ethnicity or country of origin, has broadened considerably.

This changing problem situation, characterized increasingly by ‘superdiversity’, provides a most-likely setting for mainstreaming, especially at the local level. In this super-diverse context, specific policies would be infeasible due to the large number of groups and the hyphenation over generations, and diversity would be so central to society that some form of ‘whole society’ policy aimed at interculturalisation would be required. At the national level we see this particularly in a move away from group-based targeting. In 2004 it was decided that the differentiation within minority-groups makes group based policies senseless. The frames emphasises, in the spirit of the multicultural backlash of the early 2000’s, that integration is an issue of everyone. Despite this frame, many national policies remain targeting separate groups. An ever present heritage of the multicultural years of the previous decades. It is only in 2011 that almost all of these specific policies are done away with, though this is then done in an individualised frame of cultural adaption. At the local level this developed slightly different as group-based policies soon proved to be impossible to implement on the increasingly diverse population. For example the increasing diversity of Dutch school population, with more than half of the children of immigrant origin in the bigger cities, complicates the implementation of group-based policies so much that mainstreaming was considered an ‘inevitable’ next step. The question of integration and group based policies almost automatically turns into a generic question of citizenship of the entire city or school population, as evident in the citizenship frames as developed in Rotterdam since 2006, and Amsterdam since 2010.

However, the Dutch case only seems to fit this ‘problem hypotheses’ as explanation for mainstreaming, partially. First of all, mainstreaming applies just as much (or even more) to the national level as to the local level in the Netherlands, which would not fit the superdiversity hypothesis. Secondly, there is very little evidence of interculturalisation or the emergence of a ‘whole society’ approach in the Netherlands, except from Amsterdam (to some extent). As such, the change in problem definition that would be associated with mainstreaming, from immigration as a temporary and ad-hoc phenomenon to a permanent phenomenon of such significance that it affects
societal institutions at large, is not (yet) completed in the Dutch case. Third, and this may also be an explanation for the ‘incomplete mainstreaming’ in the Netherlands, migration-related issues in the Netherlands still tend to be framed in group specific terms.

Since the multi-cultural backlash in the early 2000's the national integration-debate is characterised by a strong problem framing focused on issues of social-cultural integration and adaptation, as group-specific problems. Thus while policies are increasingly framed in generic terms, it is still very common in the Netherlands to make a specific connection between groups and specific problems (see also Van Ostaijen & Scholten, 2014).

Besides the problem setting, UPSTREAM hypothesizes that the policy and political context play an important role in accounting for mainstreaming integration governance. More experience with specific policies is expected to decrease the chance of mainstreaming because this would lead to a tradition and habit of specifically targeted policies. While specific policies themselves indeed obstruct mainstreaming, the tradition of specific policies in the Netherlands seems to have fuelled a move to mainstreaming, as a next step in integration policies. In fact, mainstreaming appears strongly motivated by the ‘multiculturalism backlash’ that has been particularly strong in the Netherlands, denouncing the group specific multiculturalist approach as undemocratic and counterproductive. At the local level we see that Amsterdam has a stronger tradition of specific policies than Rotterdam, this might indeed explain why Amsterdam started mainstreaming later than Rotterdam. In Rotterdam on the other hand we see mainstreaming strongly responding to a previous period of specific policies and political populism in the field of immigrant integration. While experience with specific policies shows to be of influence on mainstreaming, it does not explain the different outcomes of mainstreaming, with varying attention for diversity-policies. Other influences such politicization and retrenchment must be taken into account here too. Thus we can conclude that only when strongly departing from its experience with specific policies this might lead to mainstreaming, in terms of generic policies. On the other hand the Amsterdam transition proves to be more inclusive than the national policies, or early mainstreamed policies in Rotterdam.

Besides the influence of experience with specific policies, we expect the economic crisis and government retrenchment to increase the chance of mainstreaming immigrant integration policies. In the Netherlands mainstreaming indeed seems to take place in the context of retrenchment. Combined with a politicized setting the declining budgets seem to stimulate a move towards generic policies. A justification of specific and 'beneficial' policies proves hard to maintain under these circumstances. Particularly in the case of Rotterdam the influence of retrenchment, leading to a revision of the budget and subsidiary-relations, proved to be of decisive influence on the process of mainstreaming. Under the influence of the budgetary revisions, the generic frame of city-citizenship was actually affected and taken to a next step, definitely departing from the last remainders of its specific policies. The Amsterdam case on the other hand illustrates how declining budgets make it more difficult to address civic-integration goals in the field of education, threatening the inclusive character of this generic field.

Conclusively, we (surprisingly) did not found any links between mainstreaming integration governance and experiences with mainstreaming in other policy fields. While in theory often linked to the concept of gender mainstreaming, this link to immigrant integration mainstreaming was not
recognisable in the policy documents and developments and thus proves to be of no influence on the process of mainstreaming in immigrant integration policies.

Finally, the UPSTREAM project has drafted several hypotheses on the role of the broader (than integration) political context on mainstreaming integration governance. We have drafted three hypotheses on the influence of politicization, populism and individualisation on the process of mainstreaming. We expect that political and media attention for integration issues increases the chance of mainstreaming immigrant integration policies; when highly exposed to media attention and public scrutiny, it may be more difficult to sustain specific policies aimed specific target groups. While immigrant integration has always been a hotly debated topic, this reached its highest peak in the early 2000's. This period was characterised by several national and international incidents that contested the perceived levels of integration and led to a heavy politicization of immigrant integration. The turnout of the new anti-immigration parties such as Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF), Leefbaar Rotterdam (LR) and Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) are illustrative of this. The politicization and mediatisation of the issue led to move away from specifically targeted measures, which were framed as 'beneficial' and 'ineffective'. Even when specific measures are deemed more efficient they will not stand a chance in this political climate, making it very difficult to adjust policies to the needs of a diverse society. This seems to be most influential at the national level. All cases show that a decrease of political and media attention allows for more room to target diversity, or respond to problems or groups specifically. Thus while politicization might lead to the first steps of mainstreaming, decreasing political and media attention subsequently can create room for more inclusive policies. As the 'second phase' of mainstreaming in Rotterdam around 2012 shows, when immigrant integration problems were once again addressed on the political agenda, albeit this time in a less politicized context.

Building on this, populism around the immigrant-integration debate is expected to increase the chance of mainstreaming likewise. The populist turn at the national level and in Rotterdam effectively put immigrant integration and social cohesion on the agenda. While leading to a generic frame of social cohesion as an integration goal in itself, this was done by overtly targeting migrants to adapt culturally and socially. The opposite of mainstreaming. The Amsterdam case might shine a light on this. While immigrant integration policies in this city too were politicized, this did not lead to a turnout of populist parties. This might explain why Amsterdam held onto its specific policies longer, and at the same time explain its more inclusive education policies as a result of less populist influence than the other cases. While populism might put immigrant integration on the political agenda in the context of social cohesion, it is opposed to mainstreaming as it leads to specific policies aimed at a monist perception of cultural adaptation.

Finally, increased individualisation increases the chance of mainstreaming. While moving away from specifically targeted policies for longer, since 2011 this is placed explicitly in an individualist frame under the header ‘future over descent’. While moving beyond group policies, the frame emphasizes the individual responsibility to integrate. The local level also moved beyond group policies, applying a frame of (city-) citizenship, emphasizing the collectivity of the city-identity and its (potential) inclusive character. While the move away from specific policies is essential in mainstreaming, the individualisation seems to be more influential for the assimilationist frame at the national level than at the local level were a citizenship-frame prevails.
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Appendix I - interviews

National

Head of the Integration and Society-department at the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, interviewed 28th of May 2014.

Policy-advisor at the Integration and Society-department at the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, interviewed 26th of June 2014.

Policy officers Forum (knowledge-center for multicultural affairs), interviewed 27th of June 2014

Coordinator migrant organization, interviewed 30th of June 2014.

Program-manager at the Integration and Society-department at the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, interviewed 30th of June 2014.

Policy officer at the Integration and Society-department at the Ministry of Social Affairs, interviewed 11th of July 2014.

Amsterdam

Former program director of the ‘Wij Amsterdammers’-program, interviewed 20th of May 2014

Head of the department citizenship and diversity, interviewed 20th of June 2014.

Policy officer DMO, interviewed 20th of June 2014.

Policy officer at department of citizenship and diversity, interviewed 2nd of July 2014.

Rotterdam

Policy officer at the department of education, and formerly policy officer at department of Integration, interviewed 4th of June 2014

Policy officer at the department of activation and well-being, interviewed 9th of June 2014

Policy officer at the department of activation and well-being, interviewed 11th of June 2014

NGO-staff knowledge-center diversity, interviewed 16th of June 2014

Policy officer and program-manager at the department of activation and well-being, interviewed 26th of June 2014

Advisor EU-affairs, interviewed 1st of July 2014
Appendix II - Overview of ministries involved with immigrant integration, social cohesion and education

Table 1: Ministries responsible for immigrant integration and social cohesion policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cabinet</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Ministers</th>
<th>Ministry (without portfolio)</th>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th>Coalition partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rutte II</td>
<td>2012-heden</td>
<td>Lodewijk Asscher (PvdA)</td>
<td>Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment</td>
<td>VVD, PvdA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rutte I</td>
<td>2010-2012</td>
<td>Gerd Leers (CDA)</td>
<td>Ministry for Immigration, Integration and Asylum</td>
<td>Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations</td>
<td>VVD, CDA, gedoogsteun PVV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkenende IV</td>
<td>2007-2010</td>
<td>Ella Vogelaar (PvdA); Eberhard van der Laan (PvdA); Eimert Middelkoop(CU)</td>
<td>Ministry for Living, Neighbourhoods and Integration</td>
<td>Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment</td>
<td>CDA, PvdA, CU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkenende III</td>
<td>2006-2007</td>
<td>Rita Verdonk (VVD)</td>
<td>Ministry for Integration, the Protection of Juveniles, Prevention and Social Rehabilitation</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>CDA, VVD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkenende II</td>
<td>2003-2006</td>
<td>Rita Verdonk (VVD)</td>
<td>Ministry for Migration and Integration</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>CDA, VVD, D66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkenende I</td>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>Hillbrand Nawijn (LPF)</td>
<td>Ministry for Migration and Integration</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>CDA, LPF, VVD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Overview of Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, 2002-present

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cabinet</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Minister</th>
<th>Coalition Partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>kabinet-Rutte II</td>
<td>2012 - Present</td>
<td>Jet Bussemaker (PvdA)</td>
<td>VVD, PvdA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kabinet-Rutte I</td>
<td>2010 - 2012</td>
<td>Marja van Bijsterveldt (CDA)</td>
<td>VVD, CDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kabinet-Balkenende IV</td>
<td>2007 - 2010</td>
<td>Ronald Plasterk / André Rouvoet (PvdA, CU)</td>
<td>CDA, PvdA, Christenunie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kabinet-Balkenende III</td>
<td>2006 - 2007</td>
<td>Maria van der Hoeven (CDA)</td>
<td>CDA, VVD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kabinet-Balkenende II</td>
<td>2003 - 2006</td>
<td>Maria van der Hoeven (CDA)</td>
<td>CDA, VVD, D66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kabinet-Balkenende I</td>
<td>2002 - 2003</td>
<td>Maria van der Hoeven (CDA)</td>
<td>CDA, LPF, VVD</td>
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