

# **POLITICS OF DISASTER RISK GOVERNANCE IN INDONESIA AND MYANMAR**



**ANNISA GITA SRIKANDINI**

# **Politics of Disaster Risk Governance in Indonesia and Myanmar**

**A study into the dynamics of governance  
network on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)**

**Annisa Gita Srikandini**

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# Politics of Disaster Risk Governance in Indonesia and Myanmar

A study into the dynamics of governance network on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)

De politiek van *disaster risk governance* in Indonesië en Myanmar  
Een onderzoek naar de dynamiek van het governance-netwerk bij risicoreductie na rampen

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## Acronyms

AMCDRR	Asian Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BASARNAS	<i>Badan SAR Nasional</i> National Rescue Agency
BIG	<i>Badan Informasi Geospasial</i> Geospatial Information Agency
BNPB	<i>Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana</i> / Indonesian National Disaster
BMKG	<i>Badan Meteorologi, Klimatologi dan Geofisika</i> /Meteorological, Climatological and Geophysical Agency Management Authority
BPBD	<i>Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah</i> / Regional Disaster Management Authority
BPPT	<i>Badan Pengkajian dan Penerapan Teknologi</i> /Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology
DRG	Disaster Risk Governance
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DRR WG	Disaster Risk Reduction Working Group
GNDR	Global Network of Civil Society Organisations for Disaster Reduction
HFA	Hyogo Framework for Action
IABI	<i>Ikatan Ahli Bencana Indonesia</i> / Indonesian Expertise on Disaster Management
IDNDR	International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction
LAPAN	<i>Lembaga Antariksa Penerbangan Nasional</i> /National Institute for Aeronautics and Space
MCDRR	Myanmar Consortium for Disaster Risk Reduction
MPBI	<i>Masyarakat Peduli Bencana Indonesia</i> / Indonesian Civil Society for Disaster Management
MUSREMBANG	<i>Musyawarah Rencana Pembangunan</i> / Consultation Forum for Development Planning
MSWRR	Ministry of Social Welfare Relief and Resettlement
NDPC	National Disaster Preparedness Central Committee
NGO	Non-Government Organization
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PLANAS	<i>Platform Nasional</i> / National Platform
RRD	Relief Resettlement Department
RPJMN	<i>Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional</i> /National Mid-term Development Plan 2015–2019
SFA	Sendai Framework for Action
UNESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for the Asia and the Pacific
UNISDR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
WCDRR	World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction

## Abstract

Among other Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia and Myanmar have the highest levels of vulnerability (UNISDR, 2010). Based on the indicator of the average annual number of casualties per one million residents, both countries have a high level of susceptibility to disaster. This study of Indonesia and Myanmar was initially motivated by the intriguing question of what makes these countries vulnerable to disaster. Most particularly, this study focused on disaster risk governance (DRG).

For the last three decades, the global policies and meetings on disaster risk reduction (DRR) have consistently repeated the commitment to strengthening DRG. The concept of DRG has been used as a frame to explain structural arrangements and multifaceted interaction among actors working with the objective of reducing risk.

As the core infrastructure of DRR, DRG requires the strong engagement of multiple actors involved in DRR in a country. The international community has converged on the principle of 'inclusive DRR'. Referring to the work of Gaillard and Mercer (2012), inclusive DRR denotes 'the collaboration of a wide array of stakeholders operating across different scales' (Gaillard and Mercer, 2012: 95). To achieve inclusive DRR, the governance of disaster risk also needs to provide space to the multiplicity of actors who have a stake in DRR. Inspired by these works, this thesis studies pluricentric mechanisms to reduce disaster risk.

Despite the international convergence on the idea that DRG has to be inclusive, and should bring in public and private actors, crucially, the actual practice of DRG faces challenges. At the beginning of this PhD trajectory, there were already signs of growing frustrations that appeared to overshadow the spirit of inclusiveness. However, these misgivings were not yet underpinned by empirical research. The chief objective of this study was therefore to re-visit the debate based on empirical findings. This thesis sought to investigate the dynamics of DRG in the global arena, Indonesia and Myanmar by zooming into three dimensions: the institutional setting of the governance network (polity), the power relations among network actors (politics) and the advocacy politics (policy). The following questions guided the research:

- (1) How has inclusive DRR been developed at the global level?
- (2) How does the principle of inclusiveness on DRG work in practice in Indonesia and Myanmar?
  - a. What are the characteristics of the polity, policy and politics of DRG in Indonesia and Myanmar?
  - b. To what extent has the actual practice of inclusiveness been affected by the domestic political environment?
    - To what extent has decentralisation in Indonesia contributed to DRG?
    - To what extent has political transition in Myanmar influenced the dynamics of DRG?
- (3) How has the idea of an interactive structure for DRR governance networks played out in Indonesia and Myanmar?
  - What explains the different perceptions of risk among multiple actors involved in the process of interactive governance?
  - What are the actual challenges to the practice of inclusive DRR in DRG?
- (4) What are the lessons learned on interactive governance from the two case studies?

This research used qualitative methods for data collection, processing and analysis. The research design was further developed by including multiple qualitative methods of data collection within the case studies. Field research was conducted for 18 months, and a total of 129 people in Indonesia and 78 in Myanmar participated in this research through semi-structured interviews or focus group discussions. These participants included both government officials and non-state actors (representatives of international organisations and NGOs).

To organise the discussion, the thesis is divided into six chapters. After an introduction, chapter 2 traces the dynamics of global DRG to present the construction of inclusive DRR as a global framework. This chapter draws on the observation of two multi-stakeholder DRR events: the WCDRR in Japan in 2015 and the Asian Ministerial Conference on DRR in Thailand in 2014. In Chapter 3, the case of decentralised DRG in Indonesia is explored with the objective of examining how changes in the political system influence the practice and reality of DRG. Chapter 4 turns to Myanmar, analysing the dynamics of DRG in the setting of political change. In Chapter 5, the thesis focuses on the role of NGOs in DRR multi-stakeholder advocacy mechanisms in Indonesia and Myanmar. This chapter emphasises the process of agenda setting, power relations between state and non-state actors, and advocacy channels for the DRR agenda in both countries. The thesis ends with a concluding chapter that synthesises the outcomes of the four studies and provides answers to the research questions.

Throughout the research, the main findings of the study are as follows: (1) DRR practice has transformed from a top-down, state-centric and largely non-political issue into a more pluricentric governance network. It has become a global paradigm characterised by robust political commitment, a high level of participation of multiple actors and advocacy at a wide range of levels. (2) Political changes in Indonesia and Myanmar have significantly influenced the process of strengthening DRG in both countries. This change has stimulated the transformation of DRG towards a pluricentric approach and inspired the practice of inclusiveness by using multi-stakeholder initiatives in policy advocacy. (3) In practice, inclusive DRR in DRG has encountered implementation challenges: an organisational structure that is heavy on bureaucracy, poorly integrated work, coordination issues and an organisational ego. The advocacy arena for NGOs and other non-state actors is widening, but this space is also shrinking because the decision-making process has failed to develop a comprehensive plan for building a partnership and the government remains dominant in the agenda-setting process. (4) Differing perceptions among actors translate into different agendas on DRR. (5) In Indonesia and Myanmar, advocacy through alliances and consortiums is continuously developing: Improvements in capacity, resources and strategy to build a robust advocacy profile significantly strengthen credibility and bargaining position vis-à-vis the government, the effectiveness of advocacy is determined by both the network and the positional power of the network vis-à-vis the government, and the process of interactive governance requires actors on both sides (government and non-state actors) to play an active role.

All in all, the thesis finds that the massive endorsement and policy changes towards inclusive DRR seem to negatively impact the capacity to reduce disaster in an effective and efficient manner. By state and non-state actors alike, DRG is often seen as too complex, too competitive and ineffective.

Four recommendations coming from this study are follows: (1) A specific mechanism for coordination to facilitate the process of information and knowledge exchange within the government structure should be developed. This mechanism should entail periodic and regular reports by DRR-relevant government bodies to help the work across all sectors. In parallel, this

mechanism would also impact the dynamics of the governance network by offering more coordinated efforts to govern policy steering. Advocacy access, which is often hindered by heavily bureaucratic procedures, might also increase through an open coordination mechanism in the inter-ministerial arrangement. (2) In terms of resource issues, the current DRR global framework specifically highlights the agenda of regulatory and financial means as a way to empower local authorities. In attempting to achieve this goal, strong political willingness from member states is critical to improve the resource distribution from national to local governments. (3) A clear strategic advocacy agenda by non-state actors, as well as strong capacity in terms of resources and knowledge, would enable measurable action to empower these actors in negotiations with the government in the DRR governance network. (4) Governance network members should have a strong political willingness, a concrete strategic plan and robust resources.

## Samenvatting

### **De politiek van *disaster risk governance* in Indonesië en Myanmar: Een onderzoek naar de dynamiek van het governance-netwerk bij risicoreductie na rampen**

In vergelijking met andere Zuidoost-Aziatische landen zijn Indonesië en Myanmar het meest kwetsbaar voor rampen (UNISDR, 2010), afgaand op het gemiddeld jaarlijks aantal slachtoffers per miljoen inwoners. De aanleiding voor dit onderzoek naar de situatie in Indonesië en Myanmar was de intrigerende vraag waarom deze landen kwetsbaar zijn voor rampen. De focus van dit onderzoek ligt specifiek op governance van het risico bij rampen (disaster risk governance, DRG).

De laatste drie decennia is het belang van versterking van DRG wereldwijd steeds benadrukt in beleid en conferenties op het gebied van risicoreductie na rampen (disaster risk reduction, DRR). Het begrip DRG is gebruikt als kader ter verklaring van structurele maatregelen en de veelzijdige interacties tussen actoren die het risico beogen te verkleinen.

DRG vormt de centrale infrastructuur van DRR en vereist een sterke betrokkenheid van verschillende actoren die zich binnen een land bezighouden met DRR. De internationale gemeenschap huldigt het principe van ‘inclusieve DRR’. Inclusieve DRR betekent ‘de samenwerking van een brede groep stakeholders die op verschillende niveaus kunnen opereren’ (Gaillard en Mercer, 2012: 95). Om inclusieve DRR te bewerkstelligen moet de governance van het risico bij rampen ook ruimte bieden aan de veelheid van actoren die betrokken zijn bij DRR. Met dit eerdere werk als inspiratiebron gaat dit proefschrift over pluricentrische mechanismen om het risico na rampen te reduceren.

Ondanks de internationale instemming met het idee dat DRG ruimte moet bieden aan alle betrokkenen, en publieke en private actoren erbij moet betrekken, lukt dit in de praktijk helaas niet altijd. Aan het begin van dit promotieonderzoek waren er al tekenen van groeiende frustratie die de sfeer van inclusiviteit overschaduwden. Er was echter nog geen empirisch onderzoek gedaan naar deze pessimistische signalen. Het hoofddoel van dit onderzoek was daarom om het debat opnieuw te bekijken op basis van empirische gegevens. Dit proefschrift beschrijft de dynamiek van DRG in de wereld, Indonesië en Myanmar door te focussen op drie dimensies: de institutionele setting van het governance-netwerk (bestuursvorm), de machtsrelaties tussen actoren in het netwerk (politiek) en de politiek van belangenbehartiging (beleid). De onderzoeksvragen zijn:

- (1) Hoe is inclusieve DRR ontwikkeld op mondiaal niveau?
- (2) Hoe werkt het principe van inclusiviteit bij DRG in de praktijk in Indonesië en Myanmar?

- a. Wat zijn de kenmerken van de bestuursvorm, de politiek en het beleid van DRG in Indonesië en Myanmar?
- b. In welke mate is de binnenlandse politieke omgeving van invloed geweest op de daadwerkelijke praktijk van inclusiviteit?
  - In welke mate heeft decentralisatie in Indonesië bijgedragen aan DRG?
  - In welke mate heeft de politieke transitie in Myanmar de dynamiek van DRG beïnvloed?
- (3) Hoe heeft het idee van een interactieve structuur voor governance-netwerken voor DRR uitgepakt in Indonesië en Myanmar?
  - Hoe kunnen de verschillen in de perceptie van risico tussen verschillende actoren die betrokken zijn bij het proces van interactieve governance verklaard worden?
  - Wat zijn in de praktijk de werkelijke uitdagingen op het gebied van inclusieve DRR in de governance van het risico bij rampen?
- (4) Welke lessen over interactieve governance kunnen worden getrokken uit de twee casestudy's?

Bij dit onderzoek is gebruikgemaakt van kwalitatieve methoden voor dataverzameling, -verwerking en -analyse. De opzet van het onderzoek omvat meerdere kwalitatieve methoden van dataverzameling binnen de casestudy's. Gedurende 18 maanden is veldonderzoek verricht waaraan in Indonesië in totaal 129 mensen en in Myanmar 78 mensen deelnamen in de vorm van semigestructureerde interviews of focusgroepsdiscussies. Onder de respondenten waren zowel overheidsfunctionarissen als medewerkers van onafhankelijke organisaties (vertegenwoordigers van internationale organisaties en ngo's).

Om structuur aan te brengen in het betoog is dit proefschrift onderverdeeld in zes hoofdstukken. Na een inleidend hoofdstuk behandelt hoofdstuk 2 de dynamiek van mondiale DRG om de vorming van inclusieve DRR als een mondiaal kader te introduceren. Dit hoofdstuk is gebaseerd op de observatie van twee internationale DRR-conferenties waarin verschillende stakeholders vertegenwoordigd waren: de WCDRR (World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction) in Japan in 2015 en de Asian Ministerial Conference on DRR in Thailand in 2014. Hoofdstuk 3 bevat een verkenning van gedecentraliseerde DRG in Indonesië om te onderzoeken in hoeverre veranderingen in het politieke stelsel van invloed zijn op hoe DRG in de praktijk wordt gebracht. Hoofdstuk 4 gaat over de dynamiek van DRG tegen de achtergrond van de politieke verandering in Myanmar. Hoofdstuk 5 behandelt de rol van ngo's bij belangenbehartigingsmechanismen van DRR in Indonesië en Myanmar waarbij verschillende stakeholders betrokken zijn. In dit hoofdstuk wordt de nadruk gelegd op het proces van agendering, machtsverhoudingen tussen overheids- en niet-overheidsactoren en belangenbehartigingskanalen voor de DRR-agenda in beide landen. Het proefschrift eindigt met een afsluitend hoofdstuk dat de uitkomsten van de vier onderzoeken samenvoegt en antwoorden geeft op de onderzoeksvragen.

De belangrijkste uitkomsten van het onderzoek zijn: (1) DRR is in de praktijk omgevormd van een top-down, staatsgerichte en grotendeels niet-politieke kwestie tot een pluricentrischer governance-netwerk. Het is een mondiaal paradigma geworden dat wordt gekenmerkt door een krachtig politiek engagement, een hoge mate van participatie van verschillende actoren en belangenbehartiging op diverse niveaus. (2) Politieke veranderingen in Indonesië en Myanmar hebben het proces van versterking van DRG in beide landen wezenlijk beïnvloed. Deze verandering heeft een pluricentrische benadering van DRG gestimuleerd en heeft de praktijk van inclusiviteit bevorderd door middel van initiatieven van verschillende stakeholders op het gebied van beleidsbeïnvloeding. (3) In de praktijk waren er problemen bij de implementatie van inclusieve DRR in DRG in beide landen: een zeer bureaucratische organisatiestructuur, gebrekkige integratie van werkzaamheden, coördinatieproblemen en een organisatie-ego. De belangenbehartigingsarena van ngo's en andere niet-overheidsactoren wordt breder, maar tegelijkertijd smaller omdat het besluitvormingsproces geen allesomvattend plan voor het opbouwen van een samenwerkingsverband heeft opgeleverd en de overheid dominant blijft in het proces van agendering. (4) Uiteenlopende percepties van betrokken actoren vertalen zich in verschillende agenda's voor DRR. (5) In Indonesië en Myanmar ontwikkelt de belangenbehartiging zich voortdurend via allianties en consortia: verbeteringen in de capaciteit, middelen en strategie om een krachtig belangenbehartigingsprofiel op te bouwen versterken de geloofwaardigheid en onderhandelingspositie ten opzichte van de overheid aanzienlijk. De effectiviteit van belangenbehartiging wordt bepaald door zowel het netwerk als de positie die het netwerk inneemt ten opzichte van de overheid, en het proces van interactief bestuur vereist dat actoren aan beide zijden (overheids- en niet-overheidsactoren) een actieve rol spelen.

De conclusie van dit proefschrift is dat de massale steun voor inclusieve DRR en beleidsveranderingen in die richting een negatieve invloed lijken te hebben op het vermogen om de gevolgen van rampen effectief en efficiënt te beperken. Zowel overheids- als niet-overheidsactoren beschouwen DRG vaak als te complex, te concurrerend en ineffectief.

Dit onderzoek heeft geleid tot de volgende vier aanbevelingen: (1) Er moet een specifiek coördinatiemechanisme worden ontwikkeld om het proces van informatie- en kennisuitwisseling binnen de overheidsstructuur te vergemakkelijken. Dit mechanisme moet periodieke en regelmatige rapportages van voor DRR relevante overheidsinstanties omvatten om de werkzaamheden in alle sectoren te ondersteunen. Tegelijkertijd zou dit mechanisme ook de dynamiek van het governance-netwerk beïnvloeden door middel van beter gecoördineerde inspanningen voor beleidssturing. Belangenbehartiging, die vaak wordt belemmerd door zeer bureaucratische procedures, zou ook vergemakkelijkt kunnen worden door een open coördinatiemechanisme in het interministeriële stelsel. (2) Wat de middelen betreft, wijst het huidige mondiale kader van DRR specifiek op de agenda van regelgevingsmaatregelen en financiële middelen als manier om de lokale autoriteiten meer macht te geven. Een sterke politieke wil van lidstaten is onontbeerlijk om dit doel en een betere verdeling van middelen

tussen nationale en lokale overheden te bereiken. (3) Een duidelijke strategische agenda voor belangenbehartiging door niet-overheidsactoren en de beschikking over voldoende middelen en kennis zouden meetbare actie mogelijk maken om deze actoren een sterkere positie te geven in de onderhandelingen met de overheid binnen het DRR-governance-netwerk. (4) De leden van het governance-netwerk moeten een sterke politieke wil, een concreet strategisch plan en afdoende middelen hebben.

## Chapter 1 - Introduction

Asia has the highest number of disaster events in the world. Data from the Asian Disaster Reduction Centre show that 44.4% of the world's disaster events have occurred in Asia. This hazardous profile in Asia corresponds to 82% of the people killed, 94% of those affected and 88.7% of the total economic damage from disaster events worldwide (ADRC, 2011). Among other Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia and Myanmar have the highest levels of vulnerability, based on the indicator of the average annual number of casualties per one million residents (UNISDR, 2010). The enormous number of people killed in the 2004 tsunami mega-disaster and in cyclone Nargis in 2008 clearly showed both countries' high level of susceptibility to disaster.

This study of Indonesia and Myanmar was initially motivated by the intriguing question of what makes these countries vulnerable to disaster. More specifically, I was interested in understanding to what extent disaster risk reduction (DRR) has been integrated into the national plans of these countries' governments. Do these governments play their roles on DRR? These questions are seemingly relevant for the investigation of vulnerability in both countries. However, beyond these basic questions about policy, what seemed even more crucial is the investigation of the actual practice of disaster risk governance (DRG). As the core infrastructure for DRR action, DRG requires a strong engagement among multiple actors involved in DRR in a country. This principle of 'inclusive DRR' on DRG seemingly becomes the principle of DRR. It is believed by the global community that inclusive DRR is a crucial factor for DRG. This can be illustrated by the constant commitment on strengthening inclusive DRR throughout the past three decades.

However, even though the policy practice has consistently advocated the principle of inclusive DRR on DRG, study on the actual practice of this subject is relatively thin. While it is often suggested in the literature and in policy reports that inclusive DRR and effective DRG face challenges, not much is known about the daily practices, problems and experiences of state and non-state actors involved in DRR. Therefore, an in-depth study into the daily politics of inclusive DRR on DRG is highly relevant to investigate whether and how the principle is working to meet the goal of achieving effective DRR.

Before elaborating on the findings, it is useful to offer some background on the political context of DRR and DRG. This chapter traces the narrative of DRG at the global level by looking into the historical milestones of the principle of inclusive DRR on DRG and how it has been institutionalised at both the global and the national level. This study also elaborates the development of DRG as a subject in the academic world, introducing the key concepts related to it (i.e. interactive governance), before finally introducing two case studies of Indonesia and Myanmar to gain focused perspectives on the actual practice of inclusive DRR on DRG. Are Indonesia and Myanmar committed on the principle of inclusive DRR on DRG? If so, what is hampering the implementation of this principle in achieving effective DRR?

The importance of DRG as a crucial element for reducing risk comes from the narrative of the DRR movement at the global level. For the last three decades, the global community on DRR has consistently repeated their commitment to strengthening DRG. In academic and policy literature, DRR is defined as a means of 'preventing new and reducing existing disaster risk to strengthen resilience' (UNISDR, 2007). Beyond this definition, DRR has been understood as a 'conceptual framework to minimize vulnerabilities and disaster risks, to avoid (prevention) and to limit (mitigation and preparedness) the adverse impacts of hazards' (UNISDR, 2008). Every 10 to 15 years, DRR-related stakeholders, including governments, international organisations, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), academicians, the private sector, youth and disability

groups, have gathered to discuss the global priorities for action on DRR at the World Conference on DRR (WCDRR). This conference is an avenue for stakeholders to agree on the DRR global framework, a document signed and ratified by United Nations (UN) member states to guide DRR in terms of expected outcomes, principles, priorities for action and roles of the stakeholders. For decades, these member states and non-state agencies have agreed that strengthening DRG is a systematic action for reducing risk effectively and efficiently. To achieve inclusive DRR, the governance of disaster risk also needs to provide space for the multiplicity of actors who have a stake in DRR. This idea is translated by engaging multiple stakeholders in institutionalised platforms, in the form of national committees, national platforms or working groups. Inspired by these works, this thesis studies pluricentric mechanisms to reduce disaster risk.

Advocacy for the practice of inclusiveness has found wide global support. Since 1987, UN member states have been invited to established 'national committees', as a platform to assemble multiple actors working on DRR, including representatives of governments, international organisations, NGOs and the scientific community. This inclusive approach to DRG has been consistently adopted over the decades, as the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) has actively encouraged the establishment of national platforms as a manifestation of the multi-stakeholder spirit. For UNISDR, national platforms are a very good venue 'to provide and mobilize knowledge, skills and resources required for mainstreaming DRR into development policies, planning and programmes' (UNISDR, 2007). Data from UNISDR indicate that around 93 national platforms on DRR had developed worldwide as of 2016 (PreventionWeb, 2017).

Despite the international convergence on the idea that DRG has to be inclusive and should bring in public and private actors, crucially, the actual practice of DRG faces challenges. At the beginning of this PhD trajectory, there were already signs of growing frustrations that appeared to overshadow the spirit of inclusiveness. This situation leads to several intriguing questions about the process of inclusive DRR on DRG. For instance, how does the principle of inclusiveness work in practice? Has it lived up to its promise to achieve common objectives and resolve conflicts? To what extent are states willing to negotiate the power arrangements in their partnerships with non-state actors?

Looking beyond the consistent commitments and current challenges on inclusiveness, this thesis investigated the realities of the actual practice of inclusive DRR on DRG in Indonesia and Myanmar. This study framed the practice of inclusive DRR on DRG through the framework of interactive governance. As an academic concept, interactive governance aims to understand the complexity of processes in the work of plural actors who stand independently but act interdependently through shared goals in the decentred coordination. The research examined this complex dynamics through three dimensions: the institutional setting (polity), power relations (politics) and policy advocacy (policy). This introductory chapter discusses DRG as a complex arena where multiple actors negotiate to manage and govern DRR. The chapter begins by describing agenda setting on DRR in the global arena and showing how ideas have travelled from this arena to the national level through global framework arrangements. The chapter then elaborates on the concept of DRG, discussing its relevance to policy practice and academic debate. The chapter ends with a research outline that traces the main research focus, background setting for the case studies, conceptual frameworks, research questions and outline of the structure of the thesis.

The next section provides an introduction to the academic debate on DRR, a fundamental element of the infrastructure of DRG, to explain the main agenda for DRG. DRR is an idea and objective that inspires the development of the complex structure of DRG. The discussion of DRR

touches on the transformation of this notion from a phase to an approach, and from being hazard-oriented to working to counteract vulnerability and achieve resilience. This discussion later moves on to the adoption of DRR as a global collective agenda with a complete structure of political support, guiding principles and priorities for action.

### **1.1. DRR in academic debate**

In policy practice and academic discussions, DRR has generally come to be viewed as the main approach to disaster management. As a process, disaster management moves sequentially through preparation for, responding to and recovering from disaster. Traditional perceptions of DRR see the process of reducing risk as one of the phases of disaster management (preparation). However, this narrow perception has been shifted by the rise of the understanding of DRR as an approach rather than a phase. As an approach, DRR aims to transform the underlying risk factors throughout the entire cycle of disaster management. DRR is thus integrated throughout the phases of preparation, response, recovery, mitigation and development (Helmer and Hilhorst, 2007). This approach aims to lessen losses by reducing hazards, lowering the level of vulnerability and introducing adaptive capacity (Helmer and Hilhorst, 2007). These aims demonstrate that DRR should be understood as more than a phase: It is an approach that cuts across all the different phases of disaster response.

The concept of reducing risk first appeared in academic debate only in the 1970s. Disaster has long been associated with disaster response and military involvement in the recovery process. Approaches to DRR were initially dominated by hazard analysis. The hazard-oriented paradigm strongly connects disasters with natural hazards (Cannon, 2004: 14; Helmer and Hilhorst, 2007; Smith, 2013). In this approach, the underlying factors of disaster are seen as ‘physical occurrences’ (Hilhorst and Bankoff, 2004: 1), and details of the ‘frequency, seasonality, [and] geographical area of the hazards occurrence’ are the analytical domain of DRR (Earthmind, 2005). Geographers and anthropologists have strived to understand disaster beyond this somewhat traditional paradigm (Oliver Smith, 2013). Around the 1970s–1980s, intensive academic debate led to an alternative paradigm (Hagelsteen and Per Becker, 2012; Oliver Smith, 2013). The ‘vulnerability approach’, an analytical tool emphasising human capacity as the fundamental way to reduce risk, shifted the paradigm from being natural hazard-centred to being human-centred. Combining the two paradigms led to the ‘equation that Disaster = Hazard + Vulnerable People’ (Cannon, 2000: 45), indicating that there is a need to understand ‘the interaction of hazards and vulnerability’ rather than viewing these paradigms as completely separate (Cannon, 2000: 45). There is a robust connection between ‘risk and reasons for their vulnerability for hazards’ (Cannon, 1994: 14) and ‘human societies and their environment’ (Hilhorst and Bankoff, 2004: 1). Some have argued that disaster casualties and impacts are higher when there is poor disaster knowledge, marginalisation, lack of access to resources and insufficient means of protection (Hagelsteen and Per Becker, 2012). Scholars advocating this approach have argued that ‘vulnerability is the key to an understanding of risk’ (Hilhorst and Bankoff, 2004: 1) and therefore a core concept in disaster risk (Miller et al., 2010).

In the tradition of DRR study and practice, the concept of ‘vulnerability’ has been closely intertwined with the idea of ‘resilience’. Scholars have noted the commonalities and distinctions between the concepts of vulnerability and resilience in terms of the response to disaster. These two concepts are perceived as ‘related’ (Miller et al., 2010), but they can also be understood as ‘opposite sides of the same coin’ (Twigg, 2009: 8). The concepts share a focus on examining how systems respond to disaster (Miller et al., 2010), but they have different points of emphasis.

Resilience has been emphasised in work on complex ‘socio, ecological and geophysical’ systems with plural interfaces among agents, whereas vulnerability has been used to focus more on ‘actors’. The vulnerability approach focuses on ‘the underlying causes of vulnerability, the scale, main actors and possible opportunities for risk reduction’ (Miller et al., 2010: 5). Resilience derives from the Latin word ‘*resilio*’, meaning ‘to jump back’ (Comfort, Boin and Demchak, 2010). It refers to ‘the ability to resist disorder’ (Comfort, Boin and Demchak, 2010) through the capacity to ‘bounce back’, learn and adapt (adaptive capacity) (Miller et al., 2010). Correspondingly, the focus of resilience is on the long-term community trajectory of building capacity (Miller et al., 2010; Twigg, 2009) through ‘understanding the socio-political process and environmental linkages that underpin the foundations of vulnerability’ (Miller et al., 2010: 5–6).

While DRR has been widely discussed in relation to the themes of risk, vulnerability and resilience, another stream of scholars has strived to understand and give meaning to the growing global movement on DRR. Those following this approach have recognised the slow development and gradual acceptance of the idea of framing ‘disaster’ within the context of international relations. Many scholars have pointed out the lack of formal definitions of principles, metrics of success and strategy for the integration of the disaster agenda into diplomatic practice (Yim, Calkway, Fares and Ciottone, 2009). The concept of ‘disaster diplomacy’, which is commonly used as an analytical tool, has led to two interlinked, yet different, understandings of diplomatic practice.

The first of these understandings attempts to frame diplomatic practice on disaster management as a way to contribute to conflict resolution (Kelman, 2011), for instance around technical assistance on climate monitoring provided to Cuba by the United States (Glantz, 2007) or Greek–Turkish relations regarding earthquake response (Lindsay, 2007). The second understanding involves discussing disaster diplomacy within the overall framework of the disaster cycle (i.e. prevention, preparedness, response and rehabilitation) (Banerjee, 2008; Callaway, Stack and Burkle, 2012). Examples of this approach include access to negotiations about health care for vulnerable populations (Callaway, Stack and Burkle, 2012) and diplomatic activity by foreign countries regarding relief (Banarjee, 2008).

Within the context of diplomatic practice, other scholars define the meaning of the DRR global movement as beyond the concept of ‘disaster diplomacy.’ In this line of thinking, disaster in international relations corresponds to the global political arena, where conflicting interests among UN member countries are the dominant dynamics. Hannigan called this the ‘global policy field’ (Hannigan, 2012: 1), where the issue of disaster is actively articulated within the global arena. This has been shown by the engagement of multiple stakeholders in the DRR multilateral policy arena. Specifically, Hannigan defined nine DRR actors in the global arena: (1) national and local governments; (2) regional organisations; (3) international finance institutions; (4) UN disaster agencies; (5) NGOs; (6) multi-actor initiatives and partnerships; (7) scientific, technical and academic communities; (8) private actors; and (9) the mass media (Hannigan, 2012). In short, scholars working in this vein argue that DRR has been increasingly integrated in diplomatic practice in the domain of the global policy arena. This thesis builds upon academic work on disasters in international relations, which has shown not only the relevance of this topic for the global arena, but also the proliferation of actors and ideas in this area.


## 1.2. DRR in the global policy arena

For decades, the growing global attention directed towards disasters has pushed DRR into the spotlight. Data from the Disaster Database has shown that the number of disasters increased from the 1980s to 2010 (UNESCAP, 2010). In 2012, UNISDR reported that 4.4 billion people had been affected and a total of 1.3 million lives had been lost due to disaster events since 1992 (UNISDR, 2012). The immense impact of disaster has called for global collective action to develop and generate support for a systematic framework and strategy in a binding political agreement. Three international organisations (the World Bank, the UN and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]) have developed specific institutional mechanisms to address disaster challenges. The World Bank has framed itself as the ‘global leader in disaster risk management’ by establishing the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (World Bank, 2016). This is a partnership mechanism that the World Bank uses to assist countries with overarching issues linked to disaster risk management. UNISDR is the focal point in the UN system for the implementation of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, and OECD offers the framework of ‘disaster risk financing’ as a mode to assist member countries in achieving effective financing for disaster risk (OECD, 2017).

In the policy domain, over the decades, DRR has been transformed from a growing global concern into a structured and institutionalised system of governance and norms. This transformation process started when the first global framework on disaster management was developed 30 years ago in 1987 around the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR). This framework was adopted by UN member states in response to calamities caused by natural disasters around the world. The framework aimed to foster international cooperation among member countries through improving their capacity for mitigation, formulating guidelines and strategy, and developing methods to address the knowledge gap (United Nations, 1989). Following the adoption of this framework, the international community has consistently made efforts to renew the strategy and priorities for action on DRR. To date, four DRR global frameworks have been adopted by the international community: the IDNDR (1987), the Yokohama Strategy (1994), the Hyogo Framework for Action (2005) and the Sendai Framework for Action (2015). For the purpose of renewing this framework, the WCDRR is organised to negotiate and adopt a new global framework, taking into account the achievements, challenges and lessons learned from the previous international strategy.

These global frameworks on DRR have become a complex set of norms, rules, values and guidelines for governing DRR global action. Past work has defined global norms as ‘the shared expectations or standards of appropriate behaviour accepted by states and intergovernmental organizations that can be applied to states, intergovernmental organizations, and/or non-state actors of various kinds’ (Martinsson, 2011: 2; Rum, 2016; Zweegers and Groot, 2012: 3). This definition reveals three components of global norms. First, global norms consist of a complex set of standards or guidelines. Second, these norms are to be agreed upon by member states. Third, these norms have the power to be implemented in the member states. In the case of DRR, global norms are taking shape through the legal setting, where these norms are formulated and advocated through agreements, conventions, declarations, treaties and so forth (Martinsson, 2011: 2). Examining the preceding and current DRR global frameworks, this thesis argues that these frameworks have several things in common, as *Figure 1* illustrates.

Figure 1. DRR as structured and institutionalised governance



In sum, it is clear that DRR mainstreaming has been well advocated in the global policy context through the adoption of DRR global frameworks and priorities for action. The consistency of renewing and agreeing on the global frameworks indicates the member countries' strong political commitment to collectively address this issue at the global level. DRR has been transformed from a single phase in disaster management into a complex structured of global governance with a complex set of norms, principles, rules and guidelines. This has been institutionalised not only as a global framework, but also as a mechanism and instrument of organisation in many major international organisations.

### 1.3. Disaster risk governance

The phrase 'disaster risk governance' has been used extensively in policy practice. A definition of DRG by UNISDR can be given as an illustration of how DRG has been adopted in the global policy field. UNISDR refers to DRG as 'the system of institutions, mechanisms, policy and legal frameworks and other arrangements to guide, coordinate and oversee disaster risk reduction and related areas of policy' (UNISDR, 2007). This concept has been used as a frame to explain structural arrangements and multifaceted interaction among actors working with the objective of reducing risk. In academic work, this concept is treated as interchangeable with the idea of disaster governance. DRG aims to approach the complex dynamics of institutional settings, power relations and policy advocacy in the specific context of reducing risk.

Although DRG has been used specifically to discuss global policy frameworks, the exploration of this concept is relatively thin in the academic literature. The growing body of literature mostly refers to 'disaster governance' to explain the overreaching analysis of the entire structure of the phases of disaster management (preparedness, response, recovery and

rehabilitation). Consequently, a substantial number of well-written journal articles that touch on the theme of disaster governance actually speak about DRG.

Reviewing the literature, it becomes clear that the study of ‘disaster governance’ can be clustered into three predominant themes: structural arrangements, roles of institutions and the systemic approach. First, a group of scholars has dedicated their work to examining the structural arrangement of disaster governance through studying the configuration of actors within this complex setting (Enia, 2013; Gerber, 2007; Lassa, 2010; Lindsay, 2014; Seng, 2010). The work of these scholars has focused on the institutional setting of disaster governance to explain the roles of different DRR-related institutions in a country. An important concept to frame the arrangement of disaster governance is the idea of pluricentric networks. A ‘pluricentric network’ describes the complex arrangement of multiple actors who work independently but act collaboratively to achieve a common goal. The second major theme involves the role of institutions. Here, another group of scholars working on disaster governance have analysed the intertwining issues of mismanagement and vulnerability (Ahrens and Rudolph, 2006; Moe, 2010). This work shows the negative effects of bad governance as detrimental for disaster management, criticising the failure of commitment on sustainable development as an underlying risk factor for disaster (Ahrens and Rudolph, 2006). Studies on this theme have explored the ineffectiveness of DRG as a result of poorly integrated planning and problems with inter-sectoral coordination (Moe, 2010). Finally, the systemic approach to disaster governance (e.g. Cho, 2014; Niekerk, 2015; Tierney, 2012) aims to capture DRR in conjunction with other topics. This third theme involves discussion on the external dimensions that shape the arena of DRG, such as globalisation, international constellations, social disparities, population issues (Tierney, 2012), political systems (Cho, 2014) and DRR global frameworks (Niekerk, 2015).

## **1.4. Research outline**

### **1.4.1. Main research focus**

As was argued above, the principle of inclusiveness in DRR is the most general characteristic of DRG. Gaillard and Mercer (2012) hold that inclusiveness in DRR has three characteristics: (1) recognising that different forms of knowledge are valuable in addressing disaster risk; (2) acknowledging that actions at different scales, from the top down and from the bottom up, are necessary to reduce the risk of disaster in a sustainable manner; and (3) understanding that the two previous points require the collaboration of a wide array of stakeholders operating across different scales (Gaillard and Mercer, 2012: 95). Inspired by the operationalisation of inclusiveness in the third characteristic above, this thesis defines ‘inclusiveness’ as the process of using pluricentric mechanisms in reducing disaster risk. Through this kind of mechanism, multiple stakeholders work together to achieve common goals on DRR. The Sendai Framework for Action 2015–2030, the current DRR global plan of action, also uses the term ‘inclusiveness’. As part of the ‘Guiding Principles’, the framework explicitly states that ‘disaster risk reduction requires an all-of-society engagement and partnership’. It also requires empowerment and inclusive, accessible and non-discriminatory participation, paying special attention to people disproportionately affected by disasters, especially the poorest groups in society. Inclusiveness on DRR is strongly related to the involvement of all actors in collective action on DRR.

Advocacy on the principle of inclusiveness was introduced almost 30 years ago in the 1990s around the IDNDR. The four global frameworks on DRR have used different terminology to discuss initiatives on inclusive DRR. The IDNDR advocated ‘national committees’ as a mechanism to gather government and non-state actors to participate in reducing loss and

mitigating the disruptions caused by natural disasters (UNISDR, 2017). The Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World (1994) reframed this emphasis under the framework of ‘partnership’ to describe cooperation among stakeholders working together in the spirit of ‘common interests and shared responsibilities’ (UNISDR, 2017). Next, the Hyogo Framework for Action (2005) strengthened this idea by introducing the specific mechanism of ‘multi-stakeholder platforms’. UNISDR defines ‘multi-stakeholder platforms’ as mechanisms that serve to advocate for DRR through coordination, analysis and advice on areas of priority that require concerted action (Djalante, 2012). Finally, the Sendai Framework for DRR 2015–2030 incorporates the collaboration of various stakeholders within the framework of DRG. In policy practice, the Sendai Framework for Action (UNISDR, 2016) also adopted the agenda of strengthening DRG as one of the priorities for action.

Exploring this consistent and strong commitment, this thesis investigated the relevance of inclusiveness in the actual practice of DRG in Indonesia and Myanmar. For this purpose, the present research examined the dynamics of DRG through three dimensions: the institutional setting (polity), power relations (politics) and policy advocacy (policy). In policy practice, inclusiveness has been claimed as key for achieving effective DRR planning and implementation (UNISDR, 2013). The idea of inclusiveness has been adapted to mean either empowering and involving non-state actors or strengthening the commitment to embrace policy input from interest groups in DRR. This idea of inclusiveness encompasses different scales and levels. Referring to the work of Gerber (2007), there are two types of coordination in disaster management: vertical coordination between government organisations, and horizontal coordination among local governments and public–private organisations (Gerber, 2007). The grouping by Gerber represents the mechanism of disaster management developed by many countries. In the document of Sendai Framework for Action (SFA), one of the guiding principle for the framework explicitly stated that the ‘coordination mechanisms requires full engagement of all State institutions of an executive and legislative nature at national and local levels and a clear articulation of responsibilities across public and private stakeholders.’ This statement indicated the horizontal and vertical coordination on disaster management. In particular case, the Indonesian Law of Disaster Management Number 24 year 2007 also explicitly highlighted national and regional governments to bear responsibility on disaster management including Business and International Organizations to play its roles ‘severely, jointly, and/or together’ with working partners. Aside from the used of Gerber classification on the policy document, further explanation why it is highly relevant to frame the interaction among actors under ‘horizontal and vertical coordination’ is partly because the used of this classification on actual practice in the field. Those types of coordination are mostly used as a reference to pointing the interplay within government organizations and the cross-cutting interaction with the non-government organizations. Note that this coordination’s are exceedingly actualized in policy document, Law and practice, this thesis aimed to explore the practice of inclusiveness in the vertical and horizontal coordination.

#### **1.4.2. Case studies: Indonesia and Myanmar**

The selection of Indonesia and Myanmar as the case study was driven by methodological justification and characteristic case argument. By definition, case study refers to a qualitative method in which the approach used ‘comprehensive examination’ to produce evidence by investigating ‘single observation or single phenomenon’ (Gerring, 2013). Case study is often performing ‘heterogeneous research design’ (Seawright & Gerring, 2008) to search for causal investigation (Gerring, 2013) and gain holistic in-depth knowledge (Tellis, 1997: 3). Referring

to the framework of ‘Cross-Case Methods of Case Selection and Analysis’ developed by Gerring (2008), there are seven methods of case selection on case study: (1) typical (2) diverse (3) extreme (4) deviant (5) influential (6) most similar (7) most different (Gerring, 2008). Each of the methods possesses different definition, technique, use and representativeness. In this context, the process of case selection for Indonesia and Myanmar mostly related to the ‘typical example of cross case relationship to confirm or disconfirm a given theory.’ It serves for a case to draw a distinctive similarity on some phenomenon (Gerring, 2008).

In regard to the characteristic of the case, Indonesia and Myanmar are ideal cases for capturing the interplay between DRG and the influence of the wider political environment on the dynamics of interactive governance. Several important shared characteristics make the two countries parallel cases. First, in both countries, major disasters (the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and cyclone Nargis in 2008) have induced policy transformation on disaster management. Second, Indonesia and Myanmar share similar political backgrounds: Indonesia experienced 32 years of military-type leadership prior to the 1998 political reform, whereas Myanmar experienced 38 years of full military command before the political transition in 2011. Literature on political changes describe political transition in a country as driven either by a shift from an old regime to a new regime (regime change) (Fleck and Kilby, 2006; Munck, 1996) or by the reformation of the political system (i.e. a shift from authoritarianism to democracy). These changes lead to policy transformations, governance shifts and changes in values. Given both countries’ political histories, it is compelling to study how the idea of inclusiveness in DRR has evolved within the respective shifting political settings. In its implementation, the practice of inclusive DRR is often hindered by many challenges driven by either endogenous or exogenous factors, for instance the dynamics of the political environment of DRG. Indonesia and Myanmar are two examples of how DRG develops in a country with historical political changes and extreme risks. Both countries have experienced a shift from a long period of authoritarian rule to a more democratic transitional process. This section provides a general overview of domestic politics in both countries, including an analysis of how political changes have influenced the political arena. The section also presents broad indications of how these political environments have influenced DRG.

#### **1.4.2.1. Indonesia**

For almost 32 years, Indonesia was ruled under a centralistic, military-type regime. Soeharto, the second Indonesian president, came to power after a bloody political transition in 1965. An attempted *coup d’etat* that was supposedly supported by the Indonesian Communist Party provided political momentum for Soeharto to gain the presidency. Under his administration, Indonesia was described as ‘the most centralist’ country in the world (Mietzner, 2014). The central government dominated almost all sectors, leaving the regional government to fill the role of the ‘policy executor of Jakarta’. The head of the regional administration was appointed by the central government, and local parliament was dominated by the ruling political party (*Golongan Karya*) (Morishita, 2008). In 1997, the Asian financial crisis hit Indonesia’s economy very hard. This had a spill-over effect, creating further multidimensional economic, social and political crises, which triggered demonstrations challenging Soeharto’s leadership. Soeharto’s administration was blamed for economic disparities between Java and other areas in the country, minority discrimination and corrupt bureaucracy. Massive protests by the student movement caused Soeharto to step down after 32 years of presidency. This political momentum, called ‘*Reformasi*’ (reform), marked the beginning of the transformation of the Indonesian political system. Decentralisation was one of the *Reformasi* agenda points.

The major power transfer from the central government to government at the local level came into force in 2001 (Mietzner, 2014). It was framed under the Decentralisation Law (No 22/1999, later revised by Law No 32/2004 regarding Regional Government) and Law No 25/1999 (later revised by Law No 33/2004 regarding the Fiscal Balance between Central Government and the Regions) (Hill, 2014; Ilmma and Wai-Poi, 2014). As a new paradigm and principle, decentralisation has restructured policy practice in all aspects of governance in Indonesia, including the institutional setting of disaster management. The process of policy reform regarding disaster management was inevitable after the major shock from the tsunami event in 2004. Policy transformation on disaster management came to fruition when the House of Representative (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*) passed a new bill relating to disaster management. Law No 24 in 2007 distributed the governance of disaster management between the central and regional levels. This new bill acted as a legal framework to regulate the decentralisation of DRG in Indonesia by establishing two specific bodies for disaster management: the Indonesian National Disaster Management Authority (*Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana*) at the national level and the Regional Disaster Management Authority (*Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah*) at the local level.

#### **1.4.2.2. Myanmar**

Compared with Indonesia, which was under a militarised regime until 1998, Myanmar's political and economic systems are still less open and flexible (Steinberg, 2001). Myanmar was once 'one of the wealthiest countries in Southeast Asia', owing to its rich national resources (Gravers and Ytzen, 2014). Compared with other countries in Southeast Asia, Myanmar slowly declined, eventually becoming the country with the highest percentage of its population living under the poverty line (25.2%) (ADB, 2016), the lowest life expectancy (World Bank, 2016) and the lowest rank on competitiveness (WEF, 2016). Military rule changed the country into an authoritarian, centralised and unitary hierarchy. The regime was the main player and ultimate power in all aspects of governance (Egreteau and Jagan, 2013). Furthermore, since 1962, the people of Burma have been intimidated by various forms of human rights abuses committed by the military junta.

An important milestone for political life in Burma was seen in 2003, when the seven stages of the 'Roadmap to Democracy' were introduced by the Prime Minister, Khin Nyut. This decision was made following a great deal of international pressure on Myanmar to respect democracy and civil rights. Following this pressure, the government released the 'Seven Steps to Democracy', committing to (1) reconvening the National Convention; (2) the step-by-step implementation of the process necessary to create a genuine and disciplined democratic state; (3) drafting a new constitution; (4) adapting the constitution through a national referendum; (5) holding free and fair elections; (6) convening *Huttaws* (House of Representatives) attended by *Huttaw* members, in accordance with the new constitution; and (7) building a modern, developed and democratic nation. The political changes seen in Myanmar can be seen as 'top-down transition with democratization coming from above' (Egreteau and Jagan, 2013: 340). Since the introduction of the 'Roadmap to Democracy', Myanmar has been implementing major political reforms. This began with the adoption of a new constitution (2008), a multi-party election (2010), the release of political prisoners (including Aung San Suu Kyi) (2010), the beginning of a new government regime under President Thein Sein (2011), a general election at the end of 2015 (Skidmore and Wilson, 2012) and a new civilian-led government.

In 2016, Htin Kyaw, from the winning political party, the National League for Democracy, was elected as Myanmar's first civilian president. Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the National

League for Democracy, was appointed as the State Counsellor and Union Minister for Foreign Affairs (BBC, 2016; Myanmar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017). This new government marked a ‘triple transition’ in the country: (1) from an authoritarian system to democratic governance; (2) from a central-directed economy to a market-oriented economy; and (3) from insurgent conflicts to peaceful reconciliation (World Bank, 2016).

The structure of DRG is relatively more complex in Myanmar than in Indonesia. The key bodies for DRR at the national and local levels are not directly linked by a line of authority or a bureaucratic structure. The government structure of Myanmar consists of five levels: (1) the Union Government (central level); (2) region and state governments (region level); (3) district level; (4) township level; and (5) village-tracts. The line of authority from the Union Government (the Relief and Recovery Department, the Ministry of Social Welfare—the focal ministry for disaster management) to lower levels of government administration only reaches the region level. Work on DRR at the lower level of district (township, village-tract and community levels) is the responsibility of the General Administrator in the Ministry of Home Affairs. Therefore, unlike in Indonesia, where DRR mainstreaming is institutionalised at the community level through the Regional Disaster Management Authority (*Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah*), in Myanmar, the Relief and Recovery Department—the focal point of DRR—has no power of authority beyond the district level. This situation has resulted from the construction of the legal framework on decentralisation, which mainly justifies the division of power down to the regional government. Different from Indonesia, which has a standalone legal framework on decentralisation, Myanmar’s 2008 constitution has moved the country further towards decentralisation through developing region- and state-elected assemblies (Gravers and Ytzen, 2014).

### **1.4.3. Conceptual frameworks**

#### **1.4.3.1. Interactive governance**

To understand the practice of inclusive DRR on DRG, this study applied the concept of interactive governance. ‘Governance’ is different from ‘government’. Whereas government is associated with the giving ‘authoritative expression to the state’ and is ‘usually thought to dictate to and control other state bodies [...]’ (Heywood, 2004: 77), governance denotes ‘interorganizational networks’ that ‘complement markets and hierarchies as governing structures’ (Rhodes, 1996: 652). The concept of governance is defined as ‘a complex set of values, norms, processes and institutions used by a society to manage its development and resolve conflict’ (Kohler-Koch, 2005). As a concept, governance has been discussed extensively in the context of self-organising networks (Rhodes, 1996); rules of collective decision making (Chottray and Stoker, 2009); and sets of values/norms, processes and institutions (Kohler-Koch, 2005). Governance is a new way of steering and governing by embracing non-state actors in the policy process (Ewalt et al., 2001; van Leeuwen and van Tatenhove, 2010; Peters and Pierre, 1998; Rhodes, 1996; Stoker, 1998). Governance aims to challenge the traditional policy process, where the state stands as the core entity. The concept brought an analytical breakthrough when ‘networks’ were revealed as an innovative alternative mechanism to promote a pluricentric approach (Rhodes, 1996). Networks are considered to be ‘self-organising’ when actors develop and regulate the interactions using rules of the game that are ‘negotiated and agreed’ by the participants (Rhodes, 1996). Governance scholars frequently use terms such as ‘coordination, cooperation, partnership, joint-working, alliance, collaboration, and network’ (Mardiah, Lovett and Evanty, 2017: 58).

Since the 1990s, the increasingly scientific research and practical context around the idea of governance has led this concept to be introduced in various models: ‘network governance’ (Peters and Pierre, 1998; Rhodes, 1996; Scholtz, 2008; Stokker, 1998), ‘good governance’ (Grindle, 2004), ‘adaptive governance’ (Djalante, 2012) and ‘interactive governance’ (Torfing et al., 2012). This thesis uses the concept of ‘interactive governance’ to give meaning and context to the collective action of DRR networks. Interactive governance has been defined as ‘the complex process through which a plurality of social and political actors with diverging interests interact in order to formulate, promote and achieve common objectives by means of mobilizing, exchanging, and deploying a range of ideas, rules and resources’ (Torfing et al., 2012: 2). This concept offers a more overarching scope by bringing in ideas of complex processes, common objectives and decentred coordination to the analysis. Meanwhile, other conceptualisations of governance are mostly focuses on the horizontal interaction among plural actors (network governance) Torfing et al., 2012: 14), the principles of accountability, transparency and equality (‘good governance’) (Grindle, 2004) and the multi-stakeholder platforms as the way to manage problems using flexible and adjustable governance systems.

Interactive governance also has the analytical advantage of providing a lens to analyse the complexity of collective action through DRR networks without neglecting the issues of coordination and control. This thesis consistently uses the phrase ‘governance network’ as a mechanism to operationalise the principle of inclusive DRR. Governance networks are one of the typical forms of arrangement of interactive governance, in addition to the forms of quasi-markets and partnerships (Torfing et al., 2012: 17). Governance networks emphasise the work of multiple actors who act autonomously but relate interdependently within the institutionalised framework of the policy-making process (Torfing et al., 2012).

Building upon the aforementioned points, this thesis adopted four governance concepts that are keys for understanding the argument and context. First, this thesis studied the **inclusiveness** approach to DRR policy steering. Second, the idea of **governance networks** was used extensively in framing collective action. Third, the study examined the **governing structure** of DRR at the global, national and local levels. Fourth, the dynamics of DRG were analysed by adapting the ‘**triangle of governance**’ tool to capture the dimension of polity, politics and policy.

#### 1.4.3.1. The politics of DRG: Key concepts

This thesis built upon the basic assumption that DRR has political meanings and implications. In actual practice, DRR has consistently adopted multi-stakeholder and network approaches. Actors, agendas and arenas are interconnected. This has shaped DRG into a multifaceted, political and competitive arena. To understand this arena, research for this thesis used a political lens to explore interests, positions and power relations among actors. Specifically, the ‘triangle of governance’ framework was used as the foundation in developing the concept of the ‘politics of DRG’.

This section presents the ‘politics of DRG’, beginning with the phrase’s etymology and moving towards the current use of the concept in the context of DRR and DRG. As a newly developed analytical tool, there are limited academic references on this phrase. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify the phrase through the etymology of its components to introduce the meaning in literal way. The first term, ‘politics’, derives from the Greek word ‘*politika*’, which means ‘affairs of the cities’. Through the centuries, ‘politics’ has been defined extensively, with a focus expanding from the classical model of government behaviour studies to the wider

spectrum of the public sphere (Palonen, 2011). Politics is no longer seen from the traditional perspective of the authoritarian realm; rather, politics is now more associated with ‘metaphoric space’ (Palonen, 2011). Politics revolves around the imaginary space of ‘arena’, where influence, interests and preferences are contested. The second term, ‘disaster’, originally came from the French word ‘*désastre*’ and the Italian word ‘*disastro*’ (Fekete, 2012: 68). The Greek word *disastro* means ‘bad star’. In policy practice, disaster is defined as ‘a serious disruption of the functioning of a community [...] leading to [...] human, material, economic and environmental losses and impacts’ (UNISDR, 2009). The term ‘risk’ comes from the Greek word ‘*rhiza*’, meaning the ‘root’ of a mountain or ‘basis’ (Fekete, 2012: 68). UNISDR defines ‘risk’ as ‘the combination of the probability of a hazardous event and its consequences which result from interaction(s) between natural or man-made hazard(s), vulnerability, exposure and capacity’ (Prevention Web, 2015: 27). Finally, the word ‘governance’ is derived from the Greek word ‘*kubernáo*’, meaning ‘to steer’. The idea of governance has changed the locus and focus of governing by promoting new actors and new levels in the decision-making process (locus) while also changing the rules of the game and the steering mechanism (focus) (van Leeuwen and van Tatenhove, 2010). This etymological elaboration shows that the politics of DRG is related to the metaphoric arena of competition over influence (*politics*) on reducing disaster risk (*disaster and risk*).

Although the explanation of the etymology of the ‘politics of DRG’ can give us the gist of its meaning, of course, several concerns about the use of the politics of DRG as analytical tool: How do we analyse the political dimension of DRG? What analytical tools should be used? This thesis adopted the framework of the ‘triangle of governance’ to structure the political dimension of DRG (see Figure 2). The triangle of governance has been used in different ways by various scholars. Most scholars and practitioners have viewed this framework as a ‘multi-dimensional simplex representing three respective shares of business, NGOs and states’ (Abbott and Snidal, 2006). However, inspired by the work of Treib et al. (2007) and van Leeuwen and van Tatenhove (2010), this thesis associated the ‘triangle of governance’ with policy, politics and polity. This comes from the fundamental credo of politics: polity, politics and policy (Mouffe, 2005). Van Leeuwen and van Tatenhove (2010: 590) refer to the triangle of governance as ‘policy making processes (policy), power balances (politics) and the institutional setting (polity)’.

This thesis applied van Leeuwen and van Tatenhove’s (2010) concept of the ‘triangle of governance’ to the context of DRG. Employing the ‘triangle of governance’ was not undertaken only to explain the dynamics of governance but also to comprehend three different dimensions of the governance arena.


First, DRG is a complex process of interactive governance through which diverse actors institute a common platform/network with shared goals and contested conflicts of interest. This dimension of the institutional setting (polity) is influential for the other two dimensions of the ‘triangle of governance’: policy and politics. Polity drives the flow of power games and policy steering (van Leeuwen and van Tatenhove, 2010). It brings in the rules of the game to govern the multifaceted interactions among actors that are often associated with tension, ego, inherent paradox, inequality and complex coordination (Saz-Carranza and Ospina, 2010; Moe, 2010).

Second, DRG is an arena of competition among actors with different interests, positions and preferences. In many settings, the interaction process on governance is a reflection of power relations (politics) (Brunnengraeber et al., 2006; van Leeuwen and van Tatenhove, 2010; Leroy and Arts, 2006; Rhodes, 1996; Stokker, 1998; Treib et al., 2007). DRG can be seen as a sort of

political ‘arena’ (De Haan and Long, 1997; Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010) where negotiation over rules including the agenda and policy direction are embedded within the networks (politics).

Third, these relations are aimed at steering the process of policy formulation and decision making (policy) (Hirst, 2000; van Leeuwen and van Tatenhove, 2010; Leroy and Arts, 2006; Rhodes, 1996; Treib et al., 2007). Referring to the basic concept of ‘interactive governance’, the interplay among multiple actors on governance is strongly related to the ‘steering and control of society through collective action’ (Torfing et al., 2012: 2). Through the dimension of policy steering, this thesis explored the complex process of advocacy by non-state actors in DRG. This required investigating the processes of agenda setting, the roles of non-state actors and the interface between state and non-state actors in the advocacy arena.

Figure 2. The politics of disaster risk governance in Indonesia and Myanmar



*Note:* Disaster risk governance (DRG) is ‘the system of institutions, mechanisms, policy and legal frameworks and other arrangements to guide, coordinate and oversee disaster risk reduction and related areas of policy’ (UNISDR, 2007)

#### 1.4.3.2. Research questions and objectives

This research aimed to critically assess how inclusive DRR on DRG has worked out in practice and to investigate to what extent the actual practice of inclusiveness has been affected by the domestic political environment. Referring to the work of Gaillard and Mercer (2012), inclusive DRR refers to ‘the collaboration of a wide array of stakeholders operating across different scales’ (Gaillard and Mercer, 2012: 95). This study used the concept of interactive governance to understand these collaborations of different stakeholders. In short, interactive governance refers to the complexity of processes in the work of plural actors, who stand ‘independently but act interdependently’ (Torfing et al., 2012 & Sorensen & Torfing, 2004). The word ‘independency’ refers to the autonomy of organization to represent their own mandate, mission and strategic goals in condition they bind to the shared goals of multi-stakeholders network (interdependency). Accordingly, despite the difference organizational mandate and structure, every organization is moving toward the same direction on the network. Within the complex interaction, it argues that the interactions among plural actors are political in three dimensions: the institutional setting (polity), power relations (politics) and policy advocacy (policy).

To fulfil these objectives, the following questions guided the research:

- (1) How has inclusive DRR been developed at the global level?
- (2) How does the principle of inclusiveness on DRG work in practice in Indonesia and Myanmar?
  - a. What are the characteristics of the polity, policy and politics of DRG in Indonesia and Myanmar?
  - b. To what extent has the actual practice of inclusiveness been affected by the domestic political environment?
    - To what extent has decentralisation in Indonesia contributed to DRG?
    - To what extent has political transition in Myanmar influenced the dynamics of DRG?
- (3) How has the idea of an interactive structure for DRR governance networks played out in Indonesia and Myanmar?
  - What explains the different perceptions of risk among multiple actors involved in the process of interactive governance?
  - What are the actual challenges to the practice of inclusive DRR in DRG?
- (4) What are the lessons learned on interactive governance from the two case studies?

#### **1.4.4. Research design and methods of data collection**

This research used qualitative methods for data collection, processing and analysis. Qualitative research aims to describe complex interactions between different stakeholders. It relies on the essence of experiences, meanings and perceptions to acquire knowledge (Kumar, 2005). The underpinning philosophy of qualitative research involves the process of answering questions such as ‘how x plays a role in causing y’ and ‘what the process is that connects x and y’ (Maxwell, 2005). Such causal explanations are intended to describe variation in a phenomenon, situation or issue (Kumar, 2005) to investigate the ‘causes of effects’ (Mahoney, 2010).

For this thesis, the main objective of the research was to investigate how the principle of inclusiveness in DRR works in practice in relation to government power in Indonesia and Myanmar. The aim of the thesis was to provide evidence on how political changes play a role in influencing the dynamics of DRG. In attempting to draw these causal connections, the analysis was undertaken through the framework of the ‘politics of DRG.’ This framework built upon the concept of the ‘triangle of governance’: polity, politics and policy. The main focus was on exploring the multifaceted interactions within the institutional setting (polity), patterns of power (politics) and the advocacy process (policy) within the wider context of political change.

To achieve the study objectives, the research used the case study method to gain holistic and in-depth knowledge (Tellis, 1997). Case studies are intended to bring in characteristics from specific selected contexts. In practical terms, it was beneficial to break down the extensive research field into more precise and ‘researchable’ settings (Maciel, 2015). Further, comparisons between cases allow for exploring rival explanations and causal relations, as well as contextualising differences (Lancaster and Montinola, 1997). The selection of Indonesia and Myanmar was intended to bring together two case studies within the framework of DRG. This should facilitate the identification of key patterns of DRG in the two countries, including an examination of the similarities and differences confronted in reality.

The research design was further developed by including multiple qualitative methods of data collection within the case studies (see *Figure 3*). Field research was conducted over 18 months, and a total of 129 people in Indonesia and 78 in Myanmar participated in this research through semi-structured interviews or focus group discussions. These participants included both

government officials and non-state actors (international organisation and NGO representatives). The following points provide more detail on the methods of data collection used in this research:

- Document review techniques were used to collect information on the basic conceptual framework of the politics of DRG, global frameworks on DRR, global norms, political changes and decentralisation. The work done here included but was not limited to the development of a review article to formulate and synthesise the analytical tool of the politics of DRG and the analysis of the following policy documents to gather data on Indonesia's and Myanmar's policy on DRR: the 'Association of Southeast Asian Nations Agreement on Disaster Emergency Response', 'the Indonesian Disaster Management Law (No 24/2007)', 'the Matrix on Input of Indonesian Alliance for the Revision of Disaster Management Law', 'the Myanmar Standing Position on Natural Disaster Management', 'the Strategic Framework of the Myanmar DRR Working Group' and 'the Situational Analysis of DRR in Myanmar'.
- Semi-structured interviews were used as an instrument to gain in-depth knowledge and information on DRG. This method of data collection covered exploration on the subject of actors' mapping, multifaceted interactions and the advocacy process. Specifically, the interview questions revolved around the topic of organisational roles in DRR, the interplay with other actors and perceptions of challenges to collaboration. The interviewees included government officials and non-state actors from both international organisations and NGOs. From the government side, several semi-structured interviews were conducted in Jakarta, Yangon and Nay Pyi Taw with mid-level bureaucrats from different ministries such as the Indonesian National Agency for Disaster Management (*Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana*), the Indonesian Regional Agency for Disaster Management (*Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah*), the Indonesian Ministry of National Development Planning, the Coordinating Ministry of Human Development and Culture, the Ministry of Social Welfare, the Ministry of Village, the Ministry of Forestry, the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Education, and the Myanmar Ministry of Social Welfare and Resettlement. Interviews were also conducted with government administrative workers at provincial, state, region, regency, district, village and township levels, at agencies such as the Indonesian Regional Agency for Disaster Management (*Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana*), the Myanmar Township Government, the Myanmar General Administration, and the Ministry of Home Affairs. In addition to government respondents, a series of semi-structured interviews was conducted with international organisations (UN Development Programme in Indonesia and Myanmar, UN Habitat in Myanmar), NGOs (Dompot Dhuafa, Muhamadiyah Disaster Management Center, Malteser Myanmar, World Vision Myanmar, ActionAid Myanmar, PLAN Myanmar, Oxfam Myanmar and nine local NGOs in Myanmar) and auxiliary organisations (The Red Cross in Indonesia and Myanmar).
- The research also included a qualitative impact study to observe the implementation of a DRR project at the community level by an alliance of NGOs. For this purpose, various community groups at the village level were interviewed to study community perspectives towards risk, the DRR project, NGOs and the roles of the government. Collecting


primary data from community members was important for investigating the relevance of the DRR programme conducted by the government and NGOs for the community. In Indonesia, the selected project for study and observation was the ‘DRR Integrated Approach Project’, which was conducted by an NGO alliance called Mitra. Mitra is an alliance of five international NGOs based in the Netherlands that work to reduce the impact of natural hazards on the livelihoods of vulnerable people in nine countries (Indonesia, the Philippines, India, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Mali, Guatemala and Nicaragua). In Myanmar, the selected project was ‘Myanmar for Resilience’. This consortium is a European-funded project consisting of six organisations aiming to increase resilience in coastal and urban communities by institutionalising an inclusive approach to DRR. The implementing agency and donor names are withheld in this thesis for reasons of confidentiality. In Indonesia, the targeted community respondents were representatives of the project groups. In total, approximately 99 community members participated in the research. In Myanmar, the interviews targeted women, youth and the elderly, in line with the principle of DRR inclusiveness. Thirty-six community members were interviewed in this part of the field research. Focus group discussions were organised at the community level to gain an overarching understanding of the community perspective on the implementation of the DRR project. At this level, five focus groups were conducted each in Indonesia and Myanmar. In total, approximately 51 respondents participated in these focus group discussions.

- Participant observation was also used to collect data, drawing on unstructured interviews, focus group discussions, minutes of meetings and observations from national and international conferences/workshops. As a method, participant observation provides room for exploration, allowing the researcher to experience the interaction and situation of the research subject. It is a way of ‘living in the situation’ (Kumar, 2011: 125). In Myanmar, the researcher engaged in a series of activities: monthly meetings of the DRR Working Group (September and October 2014); the ASEAN committee for Disaster Management Working Group on Recovery and the Consultation Workshop for ASEAN Guidelines on Recovery Planning (22 September 2014); and the International Day for Disaster Reduction in Yangon (11 October 2014). Participant observation was also conducted at government coordination meetings at the WCDRR (Japan, 14–18 March 2015) and Asian Ministerial Conference on DRR (Thailand, 22–26 June 2014), where the researcher was a member of the Indonesian delegation.
- At the national level, the researcher engaged in an internship programme at a UN agency in Myanmar. This agency was a key member of the DRR Working Group, the active DRR multi-stakeholder platform in Myanmar. The internship began from the practical need to gain access and permission to conduct the research for this thesis, which required the endorsement of an established organisation. After difficulties were encountered in conducting preliminary research in 2013, the decision was made to secure organisational support for this research. The aim was to gain access to the meetings and activities of two DRR governance networks in Myanmar—the DRR Working Group and the Myanmar Consortium for DRR. Because this required organisational support, an opportunity to engage with a project involving the government, international organisations and NGOs in Myanmar was sought. Having this organisational support provided access to the main

actors in the DRR Working Group and the Myanmar Consortium for DRR, including opportunities to observe discussions, meetings and informal conversations.

In confronting ethical issues in this research and maintaining an ethical code of conduct, the researcher protected the identity of the research participants and organisations by withholding their names and locations. Considering the potential for bias after engaging in the two qualitative impact studies of the projects of Mitra and Myanmar for Resilience, including the internship with one of the UN agencies working in Myanmar, the researcher also committed to upholding the principle of independence. Three steps were taken to reduce bias. First, a clear research design was developed to guide the direction of the research. Second, multiple perspectives and cross-cutting information on the research topics were actively sought by recruiting a wide range of participants with various backgrounds. Third, open-ended questions were used in the interviews to allow room for the exploration of unanticipated perspectives and topics—for instance, ‘What happened when cyclone Nargis struck the village?’ and ‘To what extent has the government engaged in collaborative work with non-state actors on DRR?’

Figure 3. Framework for the research methodology



#### 1.4.5. Organisation of the thesis

This thesis is developed through a series of steps. Overall, it flows through the presentation and analysis of four academic discussions: the politics of global DRG, decentralised DRG in Indonesia, DRG in transitional Myanmar and DRR advocacy platforms in Indonesia and Myanmar. The thesis ends with a concluding chapter that synthesises the outcomes of the four studies and provides answers to the research questions.

**Chapter 2** traces the dynamics of global DRG to present the construction of inclusive DRR as a global framework. This analysis was undertaken through the frameworks of interactive governance and the ‘triangle of governance’ (polity, politics and policy). This chapter draws on the observation of two multi-stakeholder DRR events: the WCDRR in Japan in 2015 and the Asian Ministerial Conference on DRR in Thailand in 2014. These two events were included in the case study to explain the reality of global DRG.

In **Chapter 3**, the case of decentralised DRG in Indonesia is explored with the objective of examining how changes in the political system influence the practice and reality of DRG. **Chapter 4** turns to Myanmar, analysing the dynamics of DRG in the setting of political change. In **Chapter 5**, the thesis focuses on the role of NGOs in DRR multi-stakeholder advocacy mechanisms in Indonesia and Myanmar. This chapter emphasises the process of agenda setting, power relations between state and non-state actors, and advocacy channels for the DRR agenda in both countries. **Chapter 6** provides the overall conclusions drawn from the preceding chapters of the thesis and analyses how the findings of this research might contribute to more effective DRG. This chapter also reflects on the initial problematic of this research—how, in reality, the principle of inclusiveness on DRR has to compete with the dominance of government power. Throughout the discussion in this chapter, topics for future research are suggested.

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## Chapter 2 - The Politics of Global Disaster Risk Governance

In the past 10 years, disaster risk governance has shifted from a top-down, state-centric issue to a more interactive governance, with strong political commitment. Disaster risk reduction (DRR) has become a global paradigm with high participation of diverse actors and advocacy carried out at a wide range of levels. The present study aimed to develop an approach to understanding the changing reality of global disaster risk governance. This chapter explains the complex, messy, competitive and political dynamics of global disaster risk governance and offers an analytical tool for understanding the interaction of DRR multi-stakeholder initiatives through examining the institutional setting, advocacy politics and power relations. The study is based on a literature review and in-depth participatory observation of two major DRR multi-stakeholder forums at the global (the World Conference on DRR 2015) and regional (Asian Ministerial Conference on DRR 2014) levels.

*Keywords:* Disaster risk reduction, regimes, governance, politics

Disaster risk reduction (DRR) is thought to be significantly more inclusive when the involvement of non-state actors grows in parallel with strong political commitment on this agenda. Over the last 50 years, DRR has passed through four historical phases in its transformation from a technical approach to a global movement (UNISDR, 2015). First, in the 1960s, severe natural disasters struck Iraq, Yugoslavia and several Central American countries, causing the United Nations (UN) to release a General Assembly resolution aiming to manage humanitarian assistance during natural disasters. This first initiative inspired the second phase, the institutionalisation of global assistance specific to natural disasters in the 1970s through the establishment of the UN Natural Disaster Relief Office. Then, from the early 1990s to 2000, the initiative to push DRR as a global framework developed as an expression of the strong political commitment of the UN member states to DRR. This initiative began with the adoption of two global frameworks—the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR, 1987) and the *Yokohama Strategy* (1994). As a continuation, in the fourth phase, the *Hyogo Framework for Action* (HFA, 2005) brought DRR into an even more comprehensive global framework, where multiple stakeholders actively participate in engaging cross-cutting DRR-related issues. In 2015, the World Conference on DRR (WCDRR) proved to be another important step in building momentum for the political commitment of multiple stakeholders on DRR; here, 187 countries, represented by 25 heads of state and 6500 delegates, agreed to work together to achieve DRR global priorities.

The interactive governance on DRR appears as a common method for achieving effective DRR planning and implementation (UNISDR, 2013; Warner et al., 2002). This approach has been adopted in various initiatives and at multiple levels as a new way of governing, introducing a pluricentric, bottom-up and network-oriented approach to DRR. Since the HFA, the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) has actively encouraged the establishment of national platforms as one manifestation of the multi-stakeholder spirit. These coordination initiatives through DRR national platforms range in scale from local to national level, with the idea and format being adapted at the sub-national level.

However, as DRR has incrementally moved towards this new approach, in-depth studies analysing the internal dynamics of the practice of disaster risk governance have remained lacking. Academic literature has predominantly discussed disaster governance as a way to

describe the complex set of structures and networks of the overarching phases of disaster management, namely preparedness, response and rehabilitation. DRR, which is often understood as one of the phases of disaster management, is often discussed and imbedded within the subject of disaster governance. In the academic literature, disaster governance predominantly examines three themes: the structural arrangement of disaster governance (Enia, 2013; Gerber, 2007; Lassa, 2010; Lindsay, 2014; Seng, 2010), the roles of institutions (Ahrens and Rudolph, 2006; Joachim, 2006; Moe, 2010) and the systemic approach to disaster governance (Cho, 2014; Niekerk, 2015; Tierney, 2012). The first theme focuses on the institutional setting of disaster risk governance, seeking to explain the involvement of different DRR-related institutions in a country, including the mechanisms of pluricentric networks. The second theme concerns the detrimental effect of bad governance on disaster management. Research on this theme has identified the failure to achieve commitment to sustainable development as the major underlying risk factor for disaster (Ahrens and Rudolph, 2006; Joachim, 2006). Scholars working on this theme have also studied how poorly integrated planning and inter-sectorial coordination problems have resulted in the ineffectiveness of disaster risk governance (Moe, 2010). Finally, the third theme involves the investigation of external dimensions shaping the arena of disaster risk governance, such as globalisation, international constellations, social disparities, population density (Tierney, 2012), political systems (Cho, 2014) and DRR global frameworks (Niekerk, 2015).

There is a gap in the existing academic work in terms of the dynamics of actors' interactions in the network practices of disaster risk governance. Addressing these internal dynamics is very important. This chapter argues that the absence of an analysis of these endogenous dynamics risks the generation of ill-advised academic recommendations on DRR. It is crucial to study the endogenous dynamics of governance because this kind of work can highlight the nature of interests and agenda setting among actors in the complex context of governance interaction. It can also help to explain the construction of discourses, negotiations over interests and power relations. Through exploring these internal dynamics, the present study aims to contribute to the growing body of literature on disaster governance.

This chapter seeks to investigate how the complex dynamics of disaster risk governance work in practice at the global level. To examine these internal dynamics, the chapter analyses three strands of disaster risk governance: the institutional setting (polity), power relations (politics) and advocacy politics (policy). The chapter analyses the dynamics of disaster risk governance in the global policy setting. DRR has developed beyond an approach and action on disaster management. It transformed into a global framework with a specific set-up of guidelines and priorities for action for governing the behaviour of countries to achieve common objectives on DRR. The agreement of 187 countries on the new global framework on DRR (*Sendai Framework* for 2015–2030) provided political momentum for global collective action on DRR. Although the framework has no binding power of enforcement regarding the target of reducing disaster risk, it can act as a reference, guideline and target for governments, but also for donors, international organisations (IOs) and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs).

The analysis presented in this chapter is based on a literature review and participatory observation at two major DRR conferences: the World Conference on DRR (WCDRR, Sendai, Japan, 14–18 March 2015) and the Asian Ministerial Conference on DRR (AMCDRR, Bangkok, Thailand, 22–26 June 2014). At both the WCDRR and the AMCDRR, I engaged in the public sessions. Moreover, at the AMCDRR, I had the opportunity to attend a high-level ministerial meeting as an observer.

Participatory observation is a qualitative technique that aims to understand the research object through observing actions (Maxwell, 2005). Compared with other qualitative techniques, participatory observation provides a means of understanding the wider engagement of actors within the arena of interaction. Participatory observation gathers empirical evidence to draw conclusions (Maxwell, 2005). The WCDRR and the AMCDRR were selected because they were highly political multi-stakeholder conferences on DRR at the global and regional levels. Both conferences involved states, NGOs, academics, the private sector and the community. The WCDRR aimed to discuss and negotiate the new DRR global framework, including the priorities for action for DRR 2015–2030. Prior to the world conference, the AMCDRR was organised as the regional consultative forum for multiple stakeholders in Asia Pacific to gather input, ideas and reflections on the new frameworks. At this meeting, I observed both the public session and high-level ministerial meeting in which governments, NGOs and private sector discussed, debated and formulated proposed recommendations for the upcoming DRR framework.

This chapter is divided into four parts—the first being this introduction. The next section discusses the architecture of disaster risk governance in the global policy setting. This section begins by tracing the past development of DRR in the global policy setting, describing the infrastructure of disaster risk governance and comparing the characteristics of disaster risk governance with two different disaster management cycles: response and reconstruction. This comparison systematically assesses the differences in governance of disaster management, helping to draw the overall picture of governance in global disaster management. The third section elaborates on the three dimensions of dynamics of the WCDRR and the AMCDRR: polity, policy and politics. The final section of the chapter considers the lessons learned from the practice of disaster risk governance at the global level.

## **2.1. Understanding the DRR global policy setting**

### **2.1.1. Historical setting**

Beginning in 1987, the international community has agreed to adopt four DRR frameworks: the IDNDR (1987), the *Yokohama Strategy* (1994), the HFA (2005) and the *Sendai Framework for DRR* (2015) (UNISDR, 2015). As the first global initiative on DRR, the IDNDR called for global collective action to reduce disaster risk by acknowledging the importance of DRR and the role of the scientific and technical approach in reducing disaster risk. To strengthen this global commitment, within a decade, the UN also released six General Assembly resolutions (UNISDR, 2015) as mechanical instruments to govern the framework of IDNDR. The aims of these resolutions included establishing international commitment to reducing the impact of natural disaster, especially in developing countries; calling for member countries to establish national secretariats for the IDNDR; and initiating the World Conference on Natural Disasters in Yokohama (UNISDR, 2015).

Unlike the IDNDR, which started by calling for member states' political commitment to global collective action on DRR, the *Yokohama Strategy* (1994) attempted to focus the commitment on a more specific action plan by encouraging the political commitment of member states to DRR through adopting regulations, policies and plans, including mobilising national resources for reducing disaster. Both the IDNDR and the *Yokohama Strategy* were state-centric and said little about the role of non-state actors (Hannigan, 2012).

In the HFA (2005), the involvement of multiple stakeholders was widely acknowledged. The framework established five priorities for reducing disaster risk from 2005 to 2015: ensuring DRR is a national and local priority; identifying, assessing and monitoring DRR and enhancing

disaster risk governance; using knowledge to build a culture of safety; reducing the underlying risk factors; and strengthening disaster preparedness for an effective response at all levels (Enia, 2013). At the end of the execution of the HFA, the framework was criticised for the ‘spotty progress of implementation’ (Enia, 2013: 213) and ‘a top-down, UN- and donor-driven process’ (Heijmans, 2012: 117).

Despite contextual and other differences, these frameworks consistently repeated three common global commitments on DRR: the importance of prevention measures as the most effective method of disaster management, the responsibility of countries to protect their people and the essential nature of global collective action in tackling these challenges. Although these global frameworks do not have power of enforcement, in practice, they have served as guidance for countries implementing DRR priorities for action. In their official AMCDRR statement, Brunei Darussalam and Nepal explicitly acknowledged the role of the HFA as the guiding principles behind the development of their national action plans on DRR (AMCDRR, 2014). The consistency of member states’ agreeing to the DRR agenda in international frameworks reflects their collective commitment to achieving global targets on DRR. Specifically, the *Sendai Framework* for 2015–2030 affirmed the priority of strengthening disaster risk governance at global level through active engagement in global, regional and sub-regional platforms to enhance partnership, assess the progress of implementation and share knowledge (Article 28.2).

At the global level, member states have appointed UNISDR as the focal point to ensure the implementation of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. Within this mandate, UNISDR facilitates dialogue and negotiation on issues related to DRR. The WCDRR is organised every 15 years to negotiate and adopt a new global framework, taking into account the achievements, challenges and lessons learned from the previous international strategy. In addition to UNISDR, a specific global-level multi-stakeholder platform was initiated as consultation forums for multiple stakeholders to discuss progress reports and exchange knowledge on the realisation of the global frameworks. This platform, the Global Platform for DRR, aims ‘to coalesce into one strong community involvement and engagement in DRR and Climate Change Adaptation’ (Global Platform for DRR, 2011). At the regional level, multi-stakeholder consultations are set up based on geographical proximity, resulting in Regional Platforms for DRR in Africa, the Americas, Europe, the Arab States, Asia and the Pacific.

### **2.1.2. Disaster risk governance: Theoretical development**

The initiative to include DRR in high-level political frameworks marked the beginning of the analysis of DRR in international relations. A moderate amount of in-depth research seeking to capture the dynamics of disaster from an international relations perspective has been conducted (Hannigan, 2012). However, in practice, DRR has been transformed into concrete global frameworks with the political capacity to guide countries in terms of national action taken on DRR. DRR now consists of globally structured arrangements comprising a complex set of guidelines to govern states’ behaviour (DRR global frameworks), high-level political agreements among member states (the adoption of DRR frameworks) and an institutional body specifically tasked with coordinating DRR global collective action (UNISDR).

The present chapter analyses global collective action on DRR by framing it within international relations theory. Four waves of theoretical development characterise international relations studies of the discourse on the collective action of states in international politics. These waves have focused on inter-governmental organisation (first wave, 1970s), transnationalism (second wave, 1970s), regimes (early 1980s) and global governance (1990s) (Weiss and Ozgurein, 2008). The first wave frames collectivity among states as ‘inter-governmental

organisation', seeking to explain the multilateral relations among countries in international relations. During this period in the development of theory in international relations, state sovereignty was placed highly in inter-governmental relations.

The second wave was framed in response to the increasing role of non-state actors in international relations. Keohane and Nye introduced the phrase 'transnational activity' to explain the growing influence of international organisations in the 'multilateral context' (in Weiss and Ozgurein, 2008). This involved the active role played by IOs and NGOs.

Then, in the third wave, scholars shifted their attention to the idea of 'regimes' as a concept to understand a global set of ideas and structures governing the behaviour of states. Krasner defined regimes as a complex set of principles, norms, rules and procedures' (Krasner, 1982: 185), which function as mutual arrangements to facilitate cooperation and agreement among countries on a given issue (Krasner, 1982). This definition became subject to debate when Susan Strange, a well-known international relations scholar, criticised the concept of regimes as 'conceptually thin' and lacking in norms, rules and procedures (in Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996). Young reconstructed the definition, proposing a more versatile understanding of regimes as social institutions that guide interaction (Stokke, 2001). This facilitated the application of the concept of regimes to other domains.

In the fourth theoretical wave, the concept of 'global governance' was discussed as a counterargument to the traditional conception of 'realism' in international relations theory, which saw the state as the centre. Global governance emerged in response to the changing nature of international relations, where the entanglement of states, non-state actors and the private sector is apparent. The concept of global governance achieved 'near celebrity status' because of its high relevance to international phenomena occurring at the time (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 1). Most scholars defined global governance as 'a way of organizing international politics in a more inclusive and consensual manner' (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 2). In defining global governance, the Commission on Global Governance highlighted the idea of how 'individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs' in the 'process through which conflict or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken' (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 2).

We can see DRR as being subject to global governance processes. First, DRR has shifted to become a more inclusive arena, where non-state actors have actively engaged on DRR work. Global civil society on DRR was initiated to create a civil society platform across different countries. The establishment of the Global Network of Civil Society Organisations for Disaster Reduction (GNDR) in 2007 was a pivotal moment for DRR advocacy. GNDR became an umbrella for 850 organisations from 137 countries, articulating their voices on DRR (GNDR, 2015). Second, different from the concepts of 'inter-governmental organisations' and 'regimes', which placed the 'state' as the core focus of collective action, global governance promoted non-state actors as important in interactions in the global arena. Third, DRR is not associated only with the solid structural arrangements that characterise the concept of 'regime' (sets of rules and procedures); rather, DRR involves a network of actors and the 'rules of the game' governing their interactions. Therefore, here, disaster risk governance is taken up as a framework for analysing interactive governance and multifaceted interactions within DRR networks.

## **2.2. DRR, disaster response and disaster recovery: Comparative governance characteristics**

For the purpose of understanding the characteristics of disaster risk governance, this section identifies the comparative characteristics of disaster risk governance among other disaster management phases: emergency response and disaster recovery. In terms of structure and approach, disaster risk governance has distinct characteristics compared with the governance of disaster response and recovery. In disaster response, the predominant practices are mostly top-down and state-centric (Heijmans, 2012). In the aftermath of disaster, public expectation rises following serious loss and a scarcity of resources. The detrimental effects of disaster on basic needs quickly affects the psychology of the people (Olson and Gawronski, 2010). The shock of the aftermath has been referred to as ‘Maslowian Shock’, as people’s needs fulfilment on the hierarchy of human needs is reduced suddenly when disaster pushes the affected people back down to ‘the search for basic needs’ (Olson and Gawronski, 2010). People are vulnerable, and there is a high surge of demand for basic needs provision. The chaotic situation requires a high level of response in terms of action from the authorities. At this stage, people are anxious and attentive to relief operations, especially those of the government. Media coverage increases the tension by turning the event into a ‘24–7 mode’ news report (Olson and Gawronski, 2010). The high level of public pressure increases demands on the political system (Olson, 2000). In the political context of disaster, several questions are raised: What happened? Why were the losses so high and the responses inadequate? What will happen now with recovery and reconstruction? (Olson, 2000). In this context, governments need to be able to demonstrate their capability, capacity, credibility, correctness and anticipation (Gawronski, Hoberman and Olson, 2010).

In practice, alongside the surge response mechanism from the government, the UN has established a ‘cluster approach’ system to respond to humanitarian emergencies. This approach, promoted by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, divides the work into logistics (led by the World Food Programme); emergency telecommunications (led by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs); emergency shelter (led by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR); health (led by the World Health Organization); nutrition (led by UNICEF); water, sanitation and hygiene (led by UNICEF); early recovery (led by the UN Development Programme); camp coordination and camp management (led by UNHCR for conflict-generated internally displaced persons and by the International Organization for Migration for natural disasters); and protection (led by UNHCR).

Different from disaster response, the governance of disaster recovery is performed in a long-term setting and within a dense network. In the literature on recovery, the dynamics of governance in this phase have been described as ‘inter-organisational’ work requiring ‘institutional routines’ in relationships (Raju, 2013). Within this process of inter-sectoral coordination, governments play the important role of institutionalising and facilitating the mechanism of coordination (Raju, 2013; Raju and Niekerk, 2013).

Table 1. Characteristics of disaster risk governance within the cycle of disaster management

<b>Disaster Cycle</b>	<b>Objective</b>	<b>Approach</b>	<b>Features of the Dynamics</b>
Response	Provide basic needs	Top-down	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Multi-level actors</li> <li>▪ Dense network</li> <li>▪ Highly coordinated process</li> <li>▪ Short-term action/Surge response</li> <li>▪ High level of financial support</li> </ul>
Recovery	Restore livelihoods/ Re-establish the environment	Pluricentric	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Multi-level actors</li> <li>▪ Low-density network</li> <li>▪ Low level of coordination</li> <li>▪ Long-term planning</li> <li>▪ Medium level of financial support</li> </ul>
Reduction	Build capacity to reduce disaster risk	Pluricentric	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Multi-level actors</li> <li>▪ Dispersed network</li> <li>▪ Low level of coordination</li> <li>▪ Long-term planning</li> <li>▪ Low level of financial support</li> </ul>

### 2.3. Politics of disaster risk governance

The present chapter aimed to examine DRR global policy setting through a political lens. This approach takes as a starting point the argument that, as a structured arrangement of regimes, DRR negotiation has political meanings and implications. The research explored the endogenous dynamics of two multi-stakeholder conferences on DRR: the WCDRR and the AMCDRR. To capture the reality of these dynamics, this chapter introduces the ‘politics of disaster risk governance’ framework as an analytical tool for explaining the political meanings behind DRR negotiations.

The basic assumption of the ‘politics of disaster risk governance’ framework is that ‘politics’ should be understood beyond its traditional focus on the sovereignty of the state. Politics has expanded its focus from the classical model of government behaviour studies to include the wider public sphere (Mouffe, 2005; Palonen, 2011). Politics is no longer solely concerned with the state. Rather, politics can be examined everywhere (Artur and Hilhorst 2012; Kerkvliet, 2009). The focus of the classical model of politics on formal authority institutions created a distance from the public political realm (Kerkvliet, 2009; Palonen, 2011), seemingly ignoring the reality of complex interactions among people as part of the everyday practice of politics. However, politics should rigorously embrace the dynamics of both the formal and the informal practices of human interaction within any sphere of action. The non-classical idea of politics has incrementally developed to be understood through conventional politics, advocacy politics and everyday politics (Kerkvliet, 2009). Conventional politics covers the domain of authority in

organising resource allocation, whereas advocacy politics revolves around the idea of providing policy input by articulating proposed programmes and procedures (Kerkvliet, 2009). Everyday politics derives from the premise of ‘people embracing, complying with, adjusting, and contesting norms and rules regarding authority over, production of, or allocation of resources’ (Kerkvliet, 2009). Everyday politics is characterised by attention to the limited organisation of action, informal tools of interest articulation (low-profile and private behaviour), and interaction in daily life without realising ‘it’s political’ (Kerkvliet, 2009). Politics is not captured by the idea of a solid or arranged arena; instead, it is more associated with ‘metaphoric space’, ‘sphere’ and ‘activity’ (Palonen, 2011).

The politics of disaster risk governance framework explains the political context around the DRR arena through an examination of the institutional setting, power relations and policy advocacy. This builds on the ‘triangle of governance’, comprising policy, politics and polity (van Leeuwen and van Tatenhove, 2010; Treib et al., 2007). Scholars have used the triangle of governance in different ways. Most scholars and practitioners have approached this framework as interfaces with private sector, with respective shares of business, NGOs and states (Abbott and Snidal, 2006). As it is used in the present chapter, the triangle of governance is characterised by three interconnected aspects: ‘policy making processes [policy], power balances [politics] and the institutional setting [polity]’ (van Leeuwen and van Tatenhove, 2010), taken from the fundamental credo of politics: polity, policy and politics (Mouffe, 2005). Previous work on governance has given attention to these three dimensions, seeing power relations as an embedded part of networks (politics) (Brunnengraeber et al., 2006; van Leeuwen and van Tatenhove, 2010; Leroy and Arts, 2006; Rhodes, 1996; Stoker, 1998; Treib et al., 2007) that steers the process of policy formulation and decision making (policy) (Hirst, 2000; van Leeuwen and van Tatenhove, 2010; Leroy and Arts, 2006; Rhodes, 1996; Treib et al., 2007). The triangle of governance will be used here to analyse the politics of disaster risk governance to unveil the dynamics of politics, polity and policy.

### **2.3.1. Polity (the institutional setting)**

The institutional setting is used as a means to institutionalise actors’ commitment to cooperation (Hadfield, 2005). Here, actors are confined by formal rules and restrictions (Jutting, 2003). This drives the flow of power games and policy steering (van Leeuwen and van Tatenhove, 2010). The concept of institutional setting is also used as a framework to identify and analyse different dimensions within institutions, using the idea of a game arena (e.g. players, common objectives and structure), rules of the game (formal and informal rules, norms and enforcement) and the action situation (North, 1991; Ostrom, 2011; Saleth and Dinnar, 2004; Selznick, 1996).

In general, the institutional setting of disaster risk governance is based upon the principle of a multi-stakeholder approach. In the global policy setting, nine actors are actively engaged in disaster politics: (a) states (both national and local); (b) regional organisations; (c) international finance institutions; (d) UN disaster agencies; (e) NGOs; (f) multi-actor initiatives and partnerships; (g) scientific, technical and academic entities; (h) private actors and (i) the mass media (Hannigan, 2012). Taking a multi-stakeholder approach is a common pathway to achieving effective DRR planning and implementation (UNISDR, 2013; Warner et al., 2002). This method has been adopted in various initiatives and at multiple levels as a new way of governing by introducing a pluricentric, bottom-up and network-oriented approach to DRR.

The paradigm shift from a more top-down and state-centric approach to DRR to one that is more pluricentric was inspired by three conditions. First, DRR is a complex arena with a high

level of engagement of cross-cutting issues; in this context, dependence on the government would not be effective in reducing disaster risk. Second, the top-down approach has failed to achieve well-coordinated disaster management. Third, participation in reducing disaster risk is part of individuals' human rights (Warner, Waalewijn and Hilhorst, 2002).

The involvement of multiple stakeholders is seen as a network of governance, or what some scholars have called the interlink between public–private relations and multilevel governance (Kersbergen and Waarden, 2004; Klijn, 2007). As an arena, disaster risk governance is characterised by messy and competitive interactions, social and political proximity among members, the capacity to steer public goods, the possibility to pursue cooperation and compromise, interdependency and resources exchange (i.e. knowledge and information). Disaster risk governance is manifested through different forms of institutional set-up, including inter-ministerial coordination; national, regional and global platforms; and DRR village forums. In multi-stakeholder DRR forums, specific mechanisms are used to address divergences by introducing the format of multi-stakeholder panels.

At the WCDRR and the AMCDRR, these panels were promoted to gather representatives from stakeholder groups to discuss relevant topics at the conference. The AMCDRR plenary session on multi-stakeholder dialogue attempted to bring together representatives from NGOs, youth organisations, the private sector, disability groups, academicians and the media. In this panel, all stakeholders addressed their concerns and provided input towards the new global frameworks. The session was led by the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for DRR, *Margareta Wahlström*. *The complexity of interaction began to surface during the dialogue session, where different actors shared their thoughts, experiences and interests on the way forward after HFA. Although the session chair had provided specific questions to guide the discussion, the advocacy process was messy and disorganised. The plenary session became the arena where volunteer groups could articulate their voices in the regional forum. The interests voiced were not only driven by the specific post-HFA agenda, but also by the best practices and specific interests of different DRR stakeholders. It was observed that the denser the networks, the more challenging it is to manage them.*

*Within this complex example of multi-stakeholder dialogue, the willingness of actors to reach an agreement was crucial in determining the success of the dialogue.* In the closing ceremony of the AMCDRR, *Margareta Wahlström* conveyed the importance of a 'consensus spirit' as the driving force necessary to navigate the complexity of negotiations on DRR. Indeed, in past work, reaching consensus has been used as one indicator of the effectiveness of network governance (Agranof, 2001). *However, consensus can be difficult to achieve in multi-faceted interactions, where the actors have divergent interests and preferences. The question, then, is how the complexity of power relations can be understood within the arena.*

### **2.3.2. Power relations (politics)**

Power relations are the dominant feature of the dynamics of disaster risk governance. An analysis of power relations shows the capacity of stakeholders to influence other actors to behave in certain ways that benefit their interests. The game arena transforms into a battlefield over capacity to influence decision making, shape the political agenda and construct a sense of control (Heywood, 2004). In theory, the characteristics of power relations within governance include the interdependency of actors within networks, interactions to gain access to resources and to exchange resources, and the rules of the game, which are rooted in trust (Rhodes, 1996). Studies of power relations have often identified 'powerful actors' based upon their roles, responsibilities

and resources (Smith et al., 2014). However, in the context of networks, power relations should be examined through patterns of interests. This approach aims to identify the initial motives of the actors and the strategies they use to exercise influence within the complex dynamics of disaster governance.

Actors formulate their interests through ‘rationalities, capacities, practices, experiences, knowledge and capability’ (Long, 2001). Actors define, formulate and arrange their interests before entering the process of policy making (Mouffe, 2005). Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger (1996) identified three types of interests within the interaction of regimes: interest-based, knowledge-based and power-based theories.

#### **2.3.2.1. Interest-based theory**

This theory argues that, as it is a rational actor, the state’s behaviour is predominantly driven by specific interests. The present study found that most of the UN member countries openly acknowledged the importance of a DRR global framework and actively called for mutual cooperation on DRR. In the high-level ministerial meeting of the AMCDRR in 2014, Asia Pacific countries shared a common position on the importance of collaboration on DRR. Still, countries’ statements presented at multilateral conferences or in negotiations have political meanings beyond their normative sentences. The country statements made at the AMCDRR reveal that Asia Pacific countries addressed their priorities in different fashions: Some called for strengthening collaboration by emphasising the importance of information sharing (e.g. Australia, Iran and China), whereas a few countries stressed the issues of capacity building (e.g. Timor-Leste) and the investment in and financing of DRR (e.g. Nepal, Pakistan, Japan and Bangladesh) (AMCDRR, 2014). In this case, the interests from Asia Pacific countries on AMCDRR were revolved around:

- (1) Called for strengthening regional collaboration on disaster management to gain access on information by proposing idea of ‘information sharing’
- (2) Used the platform of regional collaboration to improve national capacity especially in the developing countries
- (3) Highlighted the crucial issue of DRR financing mostly articulated by developing countries

#### **2.3.2.2. Knowledge-based theory**

Knowledge-based theory highlights the importance of normative roles and beliefs in driving the nature of the state’s interests (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996). This theory builds on the foundation that the state moves collectively based on a consensus regarding the common problem and regime-specific topics. At the AMCDRR, some countries acknowledged the importance of knowledge exchange on DRR as a means to achieve resiliency. Following up on this premise, just under half of the Asia Pacific countries requested more collaboration on institutions and capacity building to strengthen DRR (Timor-Leste, Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, The Philippines, New Zealand) (AMCDRR, 2014).

#### **2.3.2.3. Power-based theory**

Power-based theory sees regime as a metaphoric space representing different power relations among countries. The infrastructure of regimes is supported by powerful actors with strong political and economic capacity (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996). This tradition argues

that the use of power helps to solve disputes or stalemates in cooperation. Krasner highlights the ability of powerful actors to determine and drive the direction of the regime towards their interests (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996). During the negotiation of the *Sendai Framework* for 2015–2030, countries struggled to achieve agreement on several issues, including the text about ‘international cooperation’. Both developed and developing countries debated the phrase ‘predictable and additional finance’, which implied that developed countries had the role of supporting long-term DRR financing, including providing technical support to poor countries (Trust, 2015). Developed countries responded to the draft by calling for ‘ownership’ for developing countries (Trust, 2015) through taking responsibility for strengthening and financing DRR. For developing countries, this text was crucial to ensure additional financial support for DRR. The GNDR criticised the weak political commitment from countries regarding the need of poor countries for financing DRR (GNDR, 2015). This competition between the interests of developed and developing countries illustrates the political struggle on DRR negotiation.

The negotiation at the WCDRR was extended because of deadlock among member states. ‘The negotiation machinery is not neutral, it is a fundamentally political mechanism’ (Wilkinson, 2015). The present research found a positive relation between high resource capacity and the power to determine the agenda of the negotiations. These processes were still predominantly driven by states and by the UN at the WCDRR and the AMCDRR. During the negotiation process, most of the dominant and vocal countries were the major contributors to financing DRR. For instance, in the last round, Japan, as the host country and one of the largest DRR donors, called on countries to compromise to move past the negotiation stalemate. Japan, which is actively engaged in disaster diplomacy (Hannigan, 2012), has achieved international support to host almost all world conferences on DRR, including those producing the global frameworks (the *Yokohama Strategy*, the HFA and the *Sendai Framework*). According to the Overseas Development Institute, in 2013, Japan contributed 20% of the global financing for DRR, making it the largest country donor to DRR (ODI, 2013).

### **2.3.3. Advocacy politics (policy)**

Advocacy is used as a means to penetrate and influence policy formulation. Advocacy revolves around the idea of providing policy input by ‘advocating alternative programs, procedures, and political systems’ while taking an open, direct and concerted approach (Kerkvliet, 2009: 227). The idea behind advocacy is to convince others to follow certain ideas and agendas. ‘Being convincing’ is another way to control others (Scott, 1985).

For this chapter, the concept of advocacy politics is explored through ‘disaster diplomacy’. In the context of DRR, the WCDRR and the AMCDRR are examples of disaster diplomacy, where countries and non-state actors gather to discuss future strategy on DRR. Disaster diplomacy has evolved to give expression to the idea that ‘grassroots movements can promote change’ (Yim and Burkle, 2012). Diplomacy is done ‘to address the other, express views to the other, and reach agreements with the other in which business is usually done through diplomatic agents’ (Berridge and James, 2001: 3). This is accomplished through the process of ‘lobbying, gleaning information and negotiation’ (Murray, 2006). Diplomacy is used as a tool to influence decision-making processes through two modalities: (1) the advocacy, self-promotion, policy implementation mode; and (2) the reflexive, self-inquisitive, questioning mode (Constantinou, 2013). Through this combination, diplomacy becomes ‘a game of persuasion, bargaining of interests (advocacy) and a room for philosophy and perpetual problematisation of interests (reflexive)’ (Constantinou, 2013: 142). In actual practice, diplomacy has expanded beyond its traditional focus on states and occurs beyond the context of communication among states. The

process of cross-boundary connections among different stakeholders can be viewed through the framework of multi-track diplomacy. This concept embraces the roles and functions of multiple actors in international relations. Multi-track diplomacy consists of nine tracks representing states; non-governmental actors; businesses; private citizens; academics, researchers and trainers; activists; religious actors; funders; and the media (Diamond and McDonald, 1996).

The negotiation of the draft of the *Sendai Framework* reflected a highly political agenda. During the negotiation process, non-state actors pushed the governments to accommodate their concerns about specific topics such as political commitment on financing DRR, support from developed to developing countries and technology transfer issues. The WCDRR is an avenue for networking and advocating where high-level political actors (i.e. states and UN agencies) meet non-state platforms to achieve their interests. How people approach and build relations are key points for understanding the advocacy process. Actors can use multiple channels in social negotiation, including formal and informal interaction, written statements, official processes and everyday gossip (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010). In the negotiation at the WCDRR, non-state actors such as GNDR and TearFund used their observer status to monitor the process of formal negotiation, sitting behind the negotiation table. Outside the negotiation room, an informal approach was taken in the convention hall, in the cafe and even in the restrooms.

The WCDRR has provided a fruitful platform for civil society to influence governments directly by performing what Smith et al. (2014) have called ‘network positional power’. This power comes from two sources: the capacity of actors to approach other actors’ resources (power-as-access) and the dependency among actors (power-as-control) (Smith et al., 2014). At the WCDRR, civil society used their access as observers in the formal negotiations. Governments acknowledged the importance of civil society in opening the dialogue and lobby. In preparing for the WCDRR, the government of Indonesia invited DRR civil society, such as the Indonesian National Platform (*Platform Nasional Indonesia*), the Indonesian Society for Disaster Management (*Masyarakat Peduli Bencana Indonesia*), NGOs and academicians, to a public hearing and consultation meeting. This initiative facilitated non-state actors to provide input to the government in formulating Indonesia’s position on the next DRR global framework (2015–2030). In Myanmar, the DRR Working Group—the most active DRR network in the country—assisted the government in developing the Myanmar HFA implementation report.

Although governmental and non-state actors actively engaged in preparing national positions on the HFA national progress report and the draft of the *Sendai Framework* during the preparation process for the WCDRR, state-to-state diplomacy dominated the negotiation process at the WCDRR. For five days, country representatives gathered at the negotiation table to discuss every clause of the *Sendai Framework for Action*. At this stage, civil society was present in the negotiation room as observers, and lobby and advocacy processes continued outside of the formal negotiations. However, states hold more positional power because non-state actors are highly dependent on the willingness of states to accommodate their interests at the negotiation table. Informal communication was the most used channel for social negotiation within the arena of the WCDRR. Outside the formal negotiations, multi-track diplomacy actors articulated their interests as resource persons and audiences in various high-level partnership dialogue panels and working sessions. Advocacy also took the form of promotion and exhibition in different platforms such the ignite stage and side events.

## 2.4. Conclusions

This chapter has shown that the dynamics of disaster risk governance are political, multifaceted and competitive. It has argued, first, that DRR should be understood as a complex structure of international regimes, where global norms, principles and rules guide the behaviour of actors at the regional, national and local levels, and, second, that the dynamics of disaster risk, as a political arena, should be explored through three political dimensions: the institutional setting (polity), advocacy politics (policy) and power relations (politics).

Throughout the study, the findings reveal that DRR has transformed into a more pluricentric network with strong political commitment and a wide range of advocacy initiatives. This changing new reality follows the long historical context of DRR over the last 50 years. In examining DRR network governance, this study has shown the highly political context of negotiation among actors in the process of exercising and articulating power through the three dimensions of the institutional setting (arena, rules of the game, action situation), power relations (motives of interests and strategies) and advocacy politics (agenda and channels).

Although disaster risk governance has displayed the characteristic of pluricentrism, in reality, states consistently emerge as the most powerful actors in these complex dynamics. This has been shown from the formulation of DRR policy document both at the regional and global level. Observation at the AMCDRR (2014) and WCDRR (2015) revealed that although the concept of governance promises the engagement of non-state actors in pluricentric networks; but in reality, the nature of DRG at the global and regional level remains highly political and involves state-centric domination. The wide range of multiple stakeholders in DRR is reduced in value if the room for manoeuvre to engage in political negotiation regarding the future of DRR remains limited.

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### Chapter 3 - Decentralised Disaster Risk Governance in Indonesia

In the disaster risk reduction (DRR) policy context, the idea of ‘empowering local authorities’ has consistently been encouraged, as their thorough understanding of the local context will supposedly make DRR more effective. In the current DRR global framework, the *Sendai Framework for Action 2015–2030*, which governs the global priority plan of action, the commitment to strongly advocating the full engagement of local-level social and political institutions has been stated explicitly. One of the modes for empowering local government is giving them more political power through decentralisation. This study is based on participatory fieldwork among Indonesian DRR policymakers and community advocacy groups. Analysing decentralised disaster risk governance in Indonesia, the study shows that the implementation of ‘decentralised DRR’ remains problematic, potentially hindering the ultimate goal of DRR to reduce risk in effective manner. This situation has been driven by the complexity of power sharing between the central and local governments, bureaucratic heaviness and bottom-up community advocacy. Tracing the practice of bureaucratic governance and community DRR capacity in Indonesia, this chapter poses two critical questions: (1) To what extent has decentralisation contributed to improving the practice of disaster risk governance? (2) What are the current challenges within the dynamics of the decentralisation of disaster risk governance? The findings show that changes related to the decentralisation process in the aspects of the institutional setting, power relations and advocacy politics of disaster risk governance in Indonesia have consistently created serious challenges for local authorities. This applies specifically to the issues of resource distribution, effective bureaucratic government and inclusive advocacy. In sum, the goal of empowering local authorities on DRR has been hindered significantly by the poor infrastructure of decentralisation.

*Keywords:* decentralisation, politics, disaster risk governance

Decentralisation is widely perceived as a booster of democratisation. With decentralisation, authorities supposedly move ‘closer’ to the population because of the creation of a type of governance that is directed more towards citizens (Hill, 2014: 1; Miller, 2013: 834; Winter 2012: 322). Decentralisation aims to empower both local government and ordinary citizens through advancing public service and actively engaging citizens (Miller and Bunner, 2013: 715; van Voorst, 2016: 5). It is associated with community-driven development, where decentralisation has the potential to improve (1) the design of contextually appropriate projects; (2) the targeting of beneficiaries and (3) the accountability to local residents (Dasgupta and Beard, 2007: 231).

In Indonesia, decentralisation has met with serious obstacles, and a great deal of research has highlighted the gap between the ideal objective and everyday practice. Miller (2013: 834) describes decentralisation in Indonesia as a process that is ‘neither smooth nor straightforward’. Heryanto & Hadiz argues that decentralization in Indonesia has ‘created great confusion on the ground’ (2005: 263) and significantly ‘rise the local practice of corruption, collusion and nepotism’ (Hadiz, 2003: 602). The formal procedure of decentralisation (i.e. elections and local institutions) is negatively related to local government’s performance, mainly because local administration suffers from a serious ‘lack of means or capacities’ (van Voorst, 2016: 5), mismanagement and corruption (Miller, 2013: 834). Ultimately, this has led to poor public service delivery (Lewis, 2017).

Disaster risk governance in Indonesia is a particularly interesting case for studying the critical juncture between decentralisation and governance. There are two reasons for this. First, in 1998, Indonesian political reforms introduced decentralisation as a new way of steering policy. Indonesia has experienced the ‘largest decentralisation in the world in terms of power, responsibilities and resources’ (Miller, 2013: 834), and decentralisation and democratisation have become distinguishing aspects of Indonesia’s reformed policymaking and advocacy channels across all sectors. This was emphasised in the 2004 Decentralisation Law (No 32), which states that decentralisation should foster the fulfilment of public welfare and democratisation at the local level. Disaster risk reduction (DRR) is among the sectors most heavily impacted by the development and implementation of decentralisation policies in Indonesia. The power shift from national to regency level has made provincial and regency governments entirely responsible for the implementation of the DRR strategic agenda. In specific, DRR is a means of ‘preventing new and reducing existing disaster risk to strengthen resilience’ (UNISDR, 2007). It is a ‘conceptual framework to minimize vulnerabilities and disaster risks, to avoid (prevention) and to limit (mitigation and preparedness) the adverse impacts of hazards’ (UNISDR, 2008).

Second, the growth of democratisation beginning in 1998 has led to the increasing influence of non-state actors and community initiatives. There are at least two indicators how democratization has changed the involvement of non-state actors: (1) freedom of speech is one of the pillars of political reform in Indonesia. The momentum of *Reformasi* has embarked the ‘freedom, free elections and the liberty to organize themselves’ (Bunte & Ufan, 2009). The freedom to gather and organize has inspired the development of civil society work on specific topic. In the context of DRR, Indonesian civil society actively engages in DRR through several multi-stakeholder platforms independent from the government: the National Platform (*Platform Nasional* [PLANAS]), Indonesian Civil Society for Disaster Management (*Masyarakat Peduli Bencana Indonesia* [MPBI]), Indonesian Expertise on Disaster Management (*Ikatan Ahli Bencana Indonesia* [IABI]), the University Forum (*Forum Universitas*), the Region DRR Forum (*Forum Peduli Bencana Daerah*). These organization and platform has actively shared their roles as a voice in DRR politics in Indonesia. PLANAS, MPBI actively engaged on policy discussion with the Indonesian Government for instance in the formulation of Integration of DRR on National Development Plan and Government position on World Conference on DRR 2015. (2) The increasing role of community on DRR. During the administration of Soeharto, there was no room for community to discuss the structural issue with the government (ADB, 2006). The main approach was mostly top-down from the central government. After the reform, the initiative to bring the community voice was institutionalized. For example, the formulation of development planning in the village level has facilitated community voice. It was reflected from the mechanism of Consultation Forum for Development Planning (*Musyawarah Rencana Pembangunan* [Musrembang]) at the village level. In DRR specific agenda, the Village DRR Forum (*Forum Peduli Bencana Desa*) also represent the role of community in DRR movement and planning.

In the context of these radical changes in the political structure, to what extent has the reality of DRR practice in Indonesia lived up to the expectations that decentralisation will lead to better and more democratic governance? This chapter explores how decentralised disaster risk governance in Indonesia has worked out in practice. Rather than studying governance and decentralisation from a normative policy perspective, the chapter highlights what happens in the daily reality of political life.

In attempting to illustrate how decentralised disaster risk governance is articulated and implemented in practice in Indonesia, this chapter examines this process in relation to three levels, or political ‘arenas’ (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010: 1120; Long, 2001: 2): the *national* policy level, based in Indonesia’s capital of Jakarta; policy coordination at the *regency* level and community advocacy at the *village* level. The chapter’s main argument revolves how decentralisation has shaped the changes in disaster risk governance in Indonesia at each of these three levels in terms of the institutional setting (polity), power relations (politics) and policy advocacy (policy).

Decentralisation in Indonesia has shifted the coordination of disaster management from national to provincial and regency levels (polity). This raises the question of how national and local (regency) levels perceive and experience the impacts of decentralisation policies. In the decentralised era, local government (at both provincial and regency levels) has become the frontline for DRR politics, but it is unknown to what extent local actors have developed their resources and capacities through interaction with the national government and non-state actors (politics). As one of the premises of decentralisation is ‘bringing authority closer to its citizens’, the present study investigates how this promise has worked in reality (policy).

The chapter is organised in five sections. First, I present the background of the case study and define the research questions. The second section discusses the conceptual framework, explaining why the concepts of decentralisation and the politics of disaster risk governance are useful for the present analysis. The next section summarises the research methods used. The fourth section presents the findings on the dynamics of disaster risk governance and considers the major issues at national, regency and community levels. It highlights problems related to resources, bureaucratic heaviness and state–non-state relations on policy advocacy. Although decentralisation has tended to raise expectations about the abilities and power of actors involved in DRR, these political actors’ possibilities have actually remained limited, and the roles played by government bodies diverge from the decentralisation policy ideal. The final section summarises the findings and lessons learned, and considers their value for understanding other political contexts.

### **3.1. Decentralisation of disaster risk governance in Indonesia**

The aim of this study was to explore the dynamics of disaster risk governance in the context of decentralisation in Indonesia. Decentralisation is an important part of the Indonesian political reforms that have taken place since 1998) (Erb, Sulistyanto and Faucher, 2005: 6), when massive student demonstrations in Jakarta pushed the second Indonesian president, Soeharto, to step down, ushering in an era known as *Reformasi*. During Soeharto’s three-decade administration (1966–1998), Indonesia was ruled under an authoritarian dictatorship (Blair, 2005: 78; Booth, 2014: 25; Hill, 2014: 2; Lewis, 2014: 135; Mietzner, 2014: 45). The central government held complete power, managing and regulating policies on the administrative, fiscal and political levels, making Indonesia ‘the most centralist’ country in the world (Mietzner, 2014: 46). This political environment fundamentally changed with the decentralisation agenda of the *Reformasi* process.

A major power transfer from the central government to the local level was realized in 2001 (Mietzner, 2014: 46). Since that time, decentralisation has shifted the authority of power from Jakarta to the local level in almost all aspects of governance.<sup>1</sup> Decentralisation is regarded as a

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<sup>1</sup> Five sectors are exceptions to this rule: foreign policy, defence, security, the judiciary, the national fiscal/monetary sector and religious affairs (Law No 32/2004, Article 10).

step towards democratisation in Indonesia. It has been part of a greater transformation towards democratisation through three distinct phases: the establishment of a democratic system, including the restructuring of state institutions (1998–2004); political stability and democracy (2004–2009); and the strengthening of democratic life (2009–present) (Setkab, 2013).

As a new paradigm, decentralisation has restructured policy practice in governance in Indonesia, including disaster management. The idea that reform was crucial for more effective disaster management became prominent after a tsunami created a major shock in 2004. This tragedy resulted in 115,229 casualties and left widespread destruction in the provinces of Aceh and North Sumatra (ReliefWeb, 2005). In the decade following the tsunami, Indonesia continued to suffer from massive natural disasters, including earthquakes in Jogjakarta (2006, 5,716 casualties) and West Sumatra (2010, 6,234 casualties). To many Indonesian policymakers and scholars, more effective DRR was clearly needed, and it was hoped and expected that decentralisation would contribute to that.

## **3.2. Concepts: Decentralization, Governance and Disaster Risk Governance in Indonesia**

The concepts of governance, decentralisation and disaster risk governance form the theoretical framework for this chapter. This framework facilitated the identification of indicators for effective decentralised disaster risk governance.

### **3.2.1. Decentralisation**

Falleti (2004) defines decentralisation as ‘a set of policy reforms aiming at transferring responsibilities, resources or authority from higher to lower levels of government’ (Erb, Sulistyanto and Faucher, 2005: 2). This process of power transfer gradually evolved from the ‘de-concentration’ and ‘delegation’ to ‘devolution’ (Pomeroy & Berkes, 2007 & Satria, Matsuda, 2004). Decentralisation is widely thought to encourage democratisation, resulting in a bottom-up approach to policy steering, and to facilitate improvements in public services (Miller, 2001: 835; Winters, 2012: 316) particularly in the process of ‘devolution. In addition, decentralisation is often presented as a solution to counter highly dominant centralistic government control by bringing the authorities closer to the citizens (Hill, 2014: 1). In this regard, government becomes more accountable, more effective and stronger (Hill, 2014: 2; Mietzner, 2014: 46; Schulze and Sjahrir, 2014: 186). Literature about decentralisation generally stresses the administrative, political and fiscal aspects of power redistribution. Taking this as a point of departure, the present study considers three analytical indicators: (a) shifting power in the context of the institutional setting (administrative); (b) an inclusive decision-making process (politics) and (c) decentralised budget management (fiscal). In this context, the national government devolved its power as a way to strengthen the local government (Hill, 2014). In this context, administrative aspect considered as delegation while political and fiscal transfer examined as ‘devolution’.

The process of decentralisation in Indonesia has created a political space at local (provincial/regency) levels by taking power away from central, national government bodies and giving it to local bodies. The local government structure in Indonesia consists of four levels: the province (*Provinsi*), regency/municipality (*Kabupaten/Kotamadya*), sub-regency (*Kecamatan*) and village administrative (*Kelurahan*) levels.

The Indonesian Decentralisation Law not only legalised the redistribution of power from central to provincial government control (Winters, 2012: 315); it also strengthened the role of the

local parliament by granting the power to supervise, monitor and even fire the governor and mayor (Erb, Sulistyanto and Faucher, 2005: 4). Under this law, all government bodies at the provincial level are responsible to the governor. The relations between government at the central and provincial levels lean more towards a 'coordination line' than a 'command line', meaning that the responsibility of the national government is mostly to provide policy guidelines, with limited authority in controlling the programme of the local government.

Within the framework of decentralisation, local bodies take on responsibility in three areas: (a) social service administration and other functions are transferred to lower levels (administrative decentralisation); (b) the engagement of citizens or their representatives in policy processes increases (political decentralisation); and (c) fiscal autonomy for lower levels of government increases (fiscal decentralisation) (Erb, Sulistyanto and Faucher, 2005: 2). Referring to these areas, political and fiscal decentralisation

Decentralisation in Indonesia has created complex interactions among stakeholders in disaster management. In addition to shifting the authority and power away from a centralistic mechanism, decentralisation generates a pluricentric network (multi-stakeholder platform). Interactions among stakeholders play out in wide-ranging interfaces among government and non-state actors at different policy levels. Yet, while the initiative on multi-stakeholders approach is generated, the political will and support from local government play a crucial role to create the political space for non-state actors on policy process.

### **3.2.2. Disaster risk governance**

As a concept, governance has been discussed extensively in the contexts of self-organising networks (Rhodes, 1996: 657); the rules of collective decision making (Chottray and Stoker, 2009: 3); and sets of values, norms, processes and institutions (Kohler-Koch, 2005: 5). Governance aims to steer the process of policy formulation and decision making (policy) (Leroy and Arts, 2006: 3; van Leeuwen and van Tatenhove, 2010: 590; Hirst, 2000: 13; Rhodes, 1996: 657; Treib, et al., 2007: 1).

Governance has four main characteristics (Rhodes, 1996). First, it is pluricentric rather than unicentric, thus involving the wide participation of state and non-state actors in policy steering. Second, multi-stakeholder networks play a major role in the decision-making process, indicating an inclusive policymaking process. Third, there is a shift in the focus of governing; the state is no longer the sole actor in the policy arena. Fourth, specific risks and uncertainties in the relations among actors result from the complexity of interactions with multiple actors. In this context of networks, actors and institutions interacting in a political arena, the 'rules of the game' are constantly contested, negotiated and agreed by the participants (Rhodes, 1996: 657–660). The arena of interaction is political, with highly involved competition and power relations (politics) (Brunnengraeber, et al., 2006: 4; van Leeuwen and van Tatenhove, 2010: 590; Leroy and Arts, 2006: 13; Rhodes, 1996: 659; Stokker, 1998: 18; Treib, et al., 2007: 1).

In their studies of governance, Treib et al. (2007) and van Leeuwen and van Tatenhove (2010) highlighted three predominant 'structured dimensions of governance', namely political institutes (polity), networks of power and influence (politics) and the decision-making process on policy steering (policy). These contexts of polity, politics and policy are explicitly integrated as characteristics of governance. The present study aimed to explore the politics of disaster risk governance by investigating the political context and practice of DRR in three political spheres: the institutional setting (polity), power relations (politics) and policy advocacy (policy).

### 3.2.3. Disaster risk governance in Indonesia

A disaster management policy was instigated in Indonesia well before the country's independence in 1998. The policy and governance of disaster management in Indonesia is typically classified into six phases: (1) 1930s–1945, war emergencies; (2) 1945–1960s, war and natural disaster; (3) 1960s–1990, ad hoc emergency response committees for natural disasters, government-centric; (4) 1990–2000, the National Coordinating Council for Disaster Management (*Badan Koordinasi Nasional [Bakornas]*); (5) 2001–2007, amendments to accommodate aid distribution for internally displaced persons; and (6) 2007–onwards, the Disaster Management Law 24/2007 (Lassa, 2010: 101–111). From these historical periods, there were three specific bodies on disaster management: *Bakornas* at the national level, under the Ministry of Social Welfare; *Satuan Koordinator Pelaksana* at the provincial level and *Satuan Pelaksana* at the region/city levels (Lassa, 2010: 117). From 2000 to 2007, the *Bakornas* coordination line shifted from the Ministry of Social Welfare to the Vice President's Office, following major catastrophes in Indonesia. However, these three bodies remained ineffective because their roles were not clearly described. The centralistic mechanism, leaning on Jakarta, caused overlap and bureaucratic burden.

A more effective era of decentralised disaster risk governance began after the Disaster Management Law (No 24) was enacted in 2007. Article 5 of this law mandates the central and regency governments to share responsibility and authority for disaster management. At the national level, the Indonesian National Agency for Disaster Management (*Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana [BNPB]*) was established to perform several duties such as providing guidance, direction, standards and requirements for disaster management (Article 12). BNPB is supervised directly by the president and can therefore be perceived as a ministry-level organ. Since the enactment of Law No 24, disaster management in Indonesia has had a strong legal basis, with the Regency Disaster Management Agency (*Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah [BPBD]*) as the main steering committee for disaster management at the provincial and regency/municipality levels. BPBD is thus legally tasked with taking responsibility for local-level disaster management (Article 18). Additionally, 22 other ministries and government bodies work on cross-cutting DRR-related issues, under the coordination of BNPB.

### 3.3. Research Methodology

To explore the complex dynamics of disaster risk governance in Indonesia, this study used multiple qualitative techniques: long-term fieldwork, in-depth interviews, participant observation, and literature and policy document analysis. The underpinning philosophy of qualitative research relies on the essence of experiences, meanings and perceptions to acquire knowledge (Kumar, 2005: 38). The aim is to describe the complex interactions among different stakeholders.

Data for this research were collected during seven months of fieldwork in Indonesia (May–August 2014, December 2014 and March–April 2015). To gather information about the perceptions and practices of actors involved in DRR, a series of interviews was conducted with a total of 129 participants, including 20 government officials (representatives from BNPB, two BPBDs, the State Ministry of National Development Planning [*Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional, BAPPENAS*], the Ministry of Home Affairs [MoHA] and the Ministry of Education [MoE], as well as the Assistant to the Regent in Kupang and the heads of six villages), 10 members of DRR civil society groups such as PLANAS and MPBI, and one person working for a UN agency with significant DRR experience in Indonesia. The other 99

respondents were community residents with experience with disasters and with any of the above agencies. Attempting to gain an in-depth understanding of government coordination, the author also conducted participatory observation at the Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (Japan, 14–18 March 2015), where I participated as a member of the Indonesian delegation.

Furthermore, to gather data relevant for understanding the politics of DRR at the regency and local levels, community advocacy was studied in a village in the province of Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT). Here, a qualitative impact study was conducted to observe the implementation of a DRR project by a nongovernmental organisation (NGO) alliance, Mitra. This case study was used to gain holistic and in-depth knowledge of the studied phenomena by focusing on particular issues and topics in a specific area (Tellis, 1997: 3). The qualitative impact study approach is typically used to gather data using sequentially applied qualitative data collection techniques, such as document review, interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs) and participant observation. Each of these techniques was used in the present study.

Mitra is an alliance of five international NGOs based in the Netherlands working to reduce the impact of natural hazards on the livelihoods of vulnerable people in nine countries, including Indonesia. Mitra's programme was designed to achieve three outcomes: (1) make communities resilient to climate change; (2) put in place budgeting and policy planning conducive to an integrated approach to DRR/climate change adaptation (CCA)/environment management and restoration (EMR) at local, national and international levels; and (3) enable partner NGOs/community-based organisations to apply DRR/CCA/EMR in assistance and advocacy (Mitra, 2013). Mitra developed its sui generis approach by integrating DRR/CCA/EMR as pathways to build resilient communities.

In Indonesia, Mitra selected the NTT province as a project site because of its high degree of vulnerability to natural hazards. According to BNPB, approximately 635 disaster events occurred in NTT from 1815 to 2014, ranking it sixth among Indonesian provinces in terms of the most disaster events (BNPB, 2014). Furthermore, in 2013, NTT was the third poorest province in Indonesia (Liputan 6, 2014). Approximately 20.24% of NTT's population (1,009,150 people) live below the poverty line (Liputan 6, 2014). Many factors contribute to the high level of poverty in NTT, including a low per capita income, high unemployment, an underdeveloped economic sector and low growth of the microeconomic sector (NTT, 2013). Of the 22 regencies in NTT, only nine have a per capita income above the Indonesian average (NTT, 2013). Mitra works in five regencies in NTT: Ende, Sikka, Lembata, Kabupaten Kupang and Timur Tengah Selatan, reaching approximately 37 villages.

This part of the study involved regency- and local-level research conducted over four months (June–August and December 2014), focusing on six villages. This work included participatory observation and interviews with 99 individuals working for Mitra at programme or project level. These individuals were the village administration in six Mitra-selected communities under the regency government in Sikka and Timor, as well as community group members. FGDs were also organised to study community perceptions of hazards mapping, resilience capacity and NGO DRR interventions.

In the presentation of findings from this part of the research, the names of the implementing agency and donor are withheld for reasons of confidentiality. The identities of individual participants and other organisations are also withheld. A fictitious name (Mitra) is used for the implementing agency. Considering the potential for bias after the extensive engagement through the qualitative impact study of Mitra's project, the principle of independence was upheld by (1)

developing a clearly written research design to guide the direction of the research; (2) inviting a wide range of respondents from various backgrounds to gain multiple perspectives and cross-cutting information on the research topics; and (3) asking open-ended questions in the interviews to allow room to explore unexpected ideas.

### **3.4. Findings**

This section summarises the main findings on decentralised disaster risk governance in Indonesia. As noted above, I draw on three indicators for decentralised disaster risk governance: (1) shifting power in the context of the institutional setting (administrative); (2) an inclusive decision-making process (politics) and (3) decentralised budget management (fiscal). This section examines these three indicators at the national, regency and community levels.

The findings reveal at least three important issues. First, decentralised disaster risk governance is articulated more strongly by the central government than by regency governments. Second, coordination among the government bodies responsible for DRR suffers from an extensively bureaucratic set-up. Third, the relations between state and non-state actors regarding DRR are asymmetrical, leading to limitations in influence in the decision-making process. Among the most prominent problems for decentralised disaster risk governance are financial incapacity, insufficient capacity of human resources, heavy bureaucracy and exclusivity in policymaking.

#### **3.4.1. Decentralised disaster risk governance in Indonesia: Resource problems**

##### **3.4.1.1. Financial capacity**

After the enactment of Law No 24/2007, Indonesia began an era of decentralised disaster risk governance. From 2010 to 2013, BPBDs were established in almost 90% of provinces and regions in Indonesia (*Indonesian National Progress Report on the Hyogo Framework for Action*, 2014). In the present organisational structure, BNPB and BPBD are connected by a ‘coordination line’ rather than a ‘command line’. The Head of BNPB addressed the independence of local government as one of the indicators for national resilience. Local government acts as the frontline in formulating local policy, he said, arranging resources and building community capacity. This idea was articulated by multiple staff members working at the national level. It echoes the idea of ‘empowering’ local government to govern disaster management without depending on a hierarchy with a top-down control mechanism. An MoHA middle-level officer emphasised that, as long as the provincial and regency levels can perform disaster management, the main responsibility of the central government is mostly to provide guidelines, assistance and capacity building:

Like children who first learn to walk, if they [the provincial/regency governments] fall, let it be; it’s part of the learning process. However, if they walk and stagger unsteadily, we [the central government] will be there to help them. (interview with a male MoHA officer, 1 November 2015)

In contrast, staff members of the regency body of BPBD spoke of ‘decentralised disaster risk governance’ in a negative tone. They mentioned the lack of budget, human resources and capacity as factors hampering their work in the region. For example, one of the heads of BPBD

claimed that ‘It’s better to work in a vertical structure with BNPB because the budget from the regency level is limited’.<sup>2</sup>

The same informant also explained that staff capacity had degraded because of decentralisation:

In bureaucracy, you will not get promoted if you’re not moving to a different office [function]; at minimum, you would be rotated to two different functions. Thus, on the previous DRR Day held in Bengkulu, we, all the heads of BPBD, wanted to have centralisation with BNPB. [Centralisation] would make the rotation of human resources rest on the responsibility of BNPB, and it would no longer be part of the authority of the Head of Regency. Here, we have often received new staff from different functions that have nothing to do with disaster management, for instance, the rotation of staff from the Department of Agriculture, so every year we received new staff who understand nothing. (interview with a male head of BPBD in NTT, 28 July 2014)

Similar complaints were made by several of this informant’s colleagues, and these were often related to the regency office’s financial situation. At the meeting of the Indonesian Delegation for the World Conference on DRR, a high-ranking BNPB officer stated that, for the five-year period 2015–2019, the central agency of BNPB received IDR 8.7 trillion (equal to EUR 580 million). This is extremely high compared with the budget of BPBD at the regency level in NTT (IDR 6.5 billion, equal to EUR 433,000). Although BNPB is allocated approximately IDR 1.2–2.4 billion yearly for each province, some BPBD personnel said that they never received the funding. A head of BPBD explained what happens in reality:

We received financial assistance from BNPB during a disaster response in the aftermath of a volcanic eruption; aside from that we don’t receive any. (interview with a male BPBD head in NTT, 28 July 2014)

Budget allocation from BNPB to BPBD is mostly utilised for institutional strengthening, capacity building, technical assistance, facilities and supporting accountability and management. In addition, the interview data suggest that the budget allocation for programme development and human resources is heavily unbalanced. As a consequence of decentralisation, the main financial resources for disaster management at the regency level come from regency governments. The BPBD budget is varied in different regencies, depending on the overall income of the regency. In one of the BPBDs in NTT, the yearly budget was approximately IDR 1.3 billion (equal to EUR 86,666). As shown in

*Table 2*, this annual budget is allocated for human resources, operational support and disaster management programmes covering DRR, response and rehabilitation. This budget accounts for about 0.16% of the overall budget for the region, which is significantly lower than the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction guidance of spending 1% of the total government budget on DRR (IISD, 2010).

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<sup>2</sup> Interview with a male BPBD head in NTT, 28 July 2014

Table 2. Budget allocation for BPBD Sikka for DRR, fiscal year 2015

Proportion of the total regency budget	A	I	SI	Disaster response	Rehabilitation	DRR-specific budget
0.16% IDR 1.3 billion (equal to EUR 86,666)	24.2%	6.15%	5.8%	14.4%	19.9%	32.9%

*Note:* BPBD: the Regency Disaster Management Agency (*Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah*); DRR: disaster risk reduction; A: administration (i.e. office expenses for telecommunications, electricity, water, honoraria, health insurance, meals and stationery); I: infrastructure (i.e. computers, services, gasoline, spare parts and maintenance); SI: service improvement (i.e. incentives for extra hours, business trips, meals and stationery); DRR budget: DRR information dissemination (i.e. business trips), DRR socialisation (i.e. business trips, accommodation, transportation, consultancy and meals), village DRR (i.e. business trips, accommodation, transportation, consultancy and meals), and DRR training (i.e. business trips, accommodation, transportation, consultancy and meals).

The limited budget allocation and the lack of capacity have led to poor comprehensive planning of DRR at the local level. From the budget document, BPBD formulated their DRR programme as follows: DRR public awareness raising, training, information sharing and resilient villages. For example, in one of the BPBD agencies in NTT, the main DRR programme focused on ‘community awareness raising’. Other programmes such as ‘safe schools’ and ‘community disaster management in the village’ were supported by NGOs. The majority of the participants in the present study rated the quality of programmes and activities as having ‘under-performed’ because of shortcomings caused by or related to financial issues in the agencies.

BPBD agencies in both Sikka and Kupang encountered significant challenges related to staff members’ lack of knowledge about disaster management, limited budgeting from the regency/provincial government for disaster management and weak political support. An interview with BNPB revealed that there is variation and unevenness in the capacity and competence of BPBD agencies across Indonesia’s 34 provinces.<sup>3</sup> Although some BPBDs were performing well in building disaster management regency-level plans, these agencies were in the minority. For instance, an interview with the head of a BPBD in NTT indicated that BPBD programmes and strategies for disaster management were predominantly ‘disaster response-based’, with insufficient development of DRR. Programmes are developed around ‘raising awareness of DRR in communities’ rather than actual response and prevention. This strengthened the general perception of NGOs in Sikka towards BPBD, whose functioning was often described as focusing only on their ‘everyday business’. These agencies were also accused lacking innovation on the DRR programme.

It became clear from the interviews that BPBD had insufficient funds to deliver services on DRR-specific agendas. This evidence strengthens the argument made by Lewis (2014), who concluded that local governments in Indonesia spend their budgets ‘in an inefficient and ineffective manner by spending far too much on administration and personnel’. Furthermore, the present analysis of the BPBD budget document (see Figure 1) showed that budget allocations for

<sup>3</sup> Interview with a male BNPB staff member, 22 November 2016

DRR are equal to the operations budget (e.g. staff expenses, business trips, accommodations, transportation, consultancy and meals). Poor capacity also leads to weak budget absorption at the local level. The national system obliges government bodies to return unspent funds to the Ministry of Finance at the end of fiscal year, and, because of the obstacles described here, the funds often came too late at the end of the fiscal year:

Most of the budget was returned to Jakarta [at the end of the fiscal year] because some BPBD [agencies] did not know how to use it and the budget came too late. (interview with a male BNPB staff member, 17 November 2014)

#### **3.4.1.2. Human resource capacity**

Decentralisation has created a political vacuum at the subnational level, where the governor and mayor possess authority to perform their administrative functions. It has given power to these individuals to formulate their development priorities, policies, budget and bureaucracy. This process, in practice, also entails the promotion and rotation of government officials within the administrative bodies, which hampers capacity building.

During an interview, a head of BPBD noted that BPBD is perceived as a new player in the bureaucracy arena at the regency level, and as ‘hardly powerful, unpopular and an outcast’. He also explained that BPBD suffers from high rotation among its officials, who have insufficient background competencies, resulting from the effect of local politics. With decentralisation, he said, the governor and mayor have the authority to perform bureaucratic shifts in structure.

The high rotation of officials hinders the sustainability of BPBD’s programme and is a detriment to the process of knowledge transfer within the organisation. This creates a spill-over effect onto policy and strategic action for BPBD at the local level.

Every time we trained BPBD staff, the government officers who came to Jakarta were new staff members. Decentralisation has a high and dynamic rotation for government officers. I spoke in front of the mayor at a meeting and asked whether the head of BPBD could be exempted from bureaucratic rotation. But they [the mayor] said, ‘it’s a decentralisation era; we [the mayor] are the ones who know who have the potential to lead [BPBD]’. (interview with a male BNPB staff member, 17 November 2014)

In response to this phenomenon, the MoHA, which is responsible for monitoring decentralisation in Indonesia, tried to guide the local secretary (*Sekretariat Daerah*)—the highest bureaucratic position under the governor/mayor—to be more involved in the bureaucratic rotation.

Bureaucratic rotation in BPBD is also our problem, but we can’t push more because it’s a decentralisation era. (interview with a male MoHA staff member, 1 November 2015)

In conclusion, based on the evidence gathered for this study, BPBD suffers from insufficient human resource capacity caused by a premature decentralisation process with strong local politics, resulting in government officials not being adequately qualified based on merit.

An interviewed representative of the national planning agency asserted that, ‘as new government institutions, BPBP needs tough, smart and brave people,’<sup>4</sup> but the present findings suggest that decentralisation is leading to the opposite situation.

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<sup>4</sup> Interview with a male BAPPENAS staff member, 2 November 2015


### 3.4.2. Bureaucracy-heavy organisation at the national level

This section considers the practice of disaster risk governance in the national policy arena. The national-level dynamics are characterised by misinterpretation, as well as the lack of clear leadership and coordination among the many bodies.

Intra-government coordination remains a major issue for disaster risk governance in Indonesia. Although decentralisation calls for a redistribution of power and sharing from the central government to local government and the constitution clearly defines the responsibilities of the national (BNPB) and local (BPBD) authorities, in actuality, Law № 24/2007 only establishes BNPB and BPBD as government bodies working on disaster management. The interviews and observations at staff meetings revealed that this law has led to misinterpretation among some ministry staff because it does not mention the roles other ministries play in DRR-related issues.

Approximately 22 ministries and government agencies work on DRR-related issues in Indonesia. In 2015, Indonesia's president, Joko Widodo, agreed to the *National Mid-term Development Plan 2015–2019* (*Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional* [RPJMN]). This plan addresses the government's development priorities over these five years. Disaster management is integrated in the plan under Priority № 7, the economic sector. Under the previous president, Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono, disaster agendas were embedded within the priority on the environment in the RPJMN. This change reflects a paradigm shift towards framing disaster as a threat to the national economy and development. The recent integration of the disaster agenda in the RPJMN has created opportunities for programmes relating to disaster risk governance in Indonesia, as ministries and government bodies can design programmes for cross-cutting DRR issues by referring to the RPJMN framework. Indeed, this plan has facilitated integrated programmes among the 22 DRR-related ministries and government agencies and reflected the government's strong political willingness to focus on disaster management as an important agenda point (see *Figure 4*). Consequently, after Law № 24/2007 came into force, DRR was developed as a programme and activities in various ministries, including the MoHA, the Ministry of Forestry and Environment, the Ministry of the National Development Plan, the Ministry of Social Affairs and the MoE.

Figure 4. Government structure for disaster management



(BAPPENAS, 2014)

*Note: BMKG: Badan Meteorologi, Klimatologi dan Geofisika (Meteorological, Climatological and Geophysical Agency); LAPAN: Lembaga Antariksa Penerbangan Nasional (National Institute for Aeronautics and Space); BPPT: Badan Pengkajian dan Penerapan Teknologi (Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology); BIG: Badan Informasi Geospasial (Geospatial Information Agency); BASARNAS: Badan SAR Nasional (National Rescue Agency)*

BNPB, a specific body assigned by law to coordinate disaster management activities in Indonesia (Article 13), is a relatively new player in this field. This agency was established in 2008 as the outcome of the institutional transformation of disaster management in Indonesia. In their attempt to coordinate multiple ministries and other bodies around disaster management, BNPB positions themselves as a ‘collaborator’ rather than a ‘coordinator’ (BNPB, male, 23 November 2013). The coordination of disaster management in Indonesia revolves around three ministries: BAPPENAS, BNPB and the Coordinating Ministry for Human Development and Culture. Officially, the roles of these three ministries are clear and distinct: BAPPENAS formulates and monitors RPJMN targets and programmes on DRR, BNPB coordinates cross-cutting disaster management issues, and the Coordinating Ministry for Human Development and Culture synergises the DRR programme across 10 ministries (BNPB; the Ministry of Religion; the MoE; the Ministry of Research and Higher Education; the Ministry of Health; the Ministry of Social Affairs; the Ministry of Villages, Under-developed and Special Regions; the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment and Child Protection; and the Ministry of Youth and Sports).

In practice, the inter-ministerial meetings were mostly conducted ad hoc around programmes or events, with no specific mechanism for regular coordination. For example, in 2014 several ministries trying to work together to integrate disaster management under the RPJMN, with BAPPENAS coordinating. BAPPENAS and BNPB were the two main facilitators of the RPJMN formulation process. In the initial stages, BAPPENAS started the process, using a technocratic approach. The related ministries then provided policy input for the draft of the plan. BNPB followed an academic approach, inviting 13 universities to analyse the policy draft (BAPPENAS, 2015). At the end of this process, BAPPENAS and BNPB organised a public hearing on the RPJMN, involving various DRR platforms in Indonesia. Completing the draft in this way took eight months. The draft was then proposed to the new president. Moreover, the process of information and knowledge exchange was not exactly smooth because most of the attending ministries were not represented by their key bureaucratic delegates at the inter-ministerial coordination meeting.

People who come to the meeting are not always the same. In some meetings, we need ‘key persons’ to do the decision making, but due to work commitments, they asked their staff to represent them. (interview with a male MoE staff member, 3 November 2015)

Throughout the process, the author observed that BAPPENAS and BNPB were invited by related ministries to develop their own DRR programme under the RPJMN framework. Interviews with government officials and a high-ranking UN employee in Indonesia in 2015 showed that DRR is often seen by government bodies as a stand-alone agenda that falls under BNPB’s mandate, and several informants said that DRR is generally framed as an irrelevant programme that only creates additional work and assignments for ministries. Another perceived problem with DRR is that it partially contradicts the ministries’ existing programmes. As the following interview extracts illustrate, BAPPENAS and BNPB employees generally have to convince other ministries about their critical role in disaster management:

Ministries have their own programmes, but they should also know that they involve disaster-related issues even in the pre-disaster phase [DRR]. We have this framework [the RPJMN] we share with them. We had between two or three meetings before I realised that they already have a DRR-related programme under a different name. Then started from there; we tried to incorporate the draft of the RPJMN into their working programme. (interview with a male BAPPENAS staff member, 2 November 2015)

Coordination is easy to say but difficult to implement. Each ministry has their own DRR movement, which sometimes is not synergised and integrated. This is something that we want to inventory under the National DRR Movement in 2016. We have three functions of coordination, synergy and control. We want to control the planning, which before was the domain of BAPPENAS and the Ministry of Finance. Now, all programmes are under our control before passing it to BAPPENAS. (interview with a male Coordinating Ministry of Human Development and Culture staff member, 4 November 2015)

Although some ministries had initiated DRR-related programmes and activities within their organisations, the perception of this agenda as ‘BNPB’s responsibility’ was much more commonly expressed by the participants in the present study. Coordination of the bureaucracy-heavy organisation at the national level appeared to be a real challenge for disaster risk governance in Indonesia. These findings are in line with the disaster studies literature, which often highlights the issue of ‘coordination’ as a constant difficulty in DRR (Raju, 2013).

### **3.4.3. Inclusive decision-making process**

As noted above, decentralisation is intended to transfer power to local administrative bodies to bring authority closer to the people. Decentralisation is therefore associated with improvements in public services and a bottom-up approach to advocacy. However, in practice, decentralisation often fails to deliver on these promises. The present study’s findings suggest that the bottom-up approach to advocacy faces significant challenges. This section presents the empirical evidence to support this argument.

#### **3.4.1. Advocacy at the national level**

Through several initiatives, civil society has actively grown as an actor involved in disaster risk governance in Indonesia. At the national level, various forums have been initiated, including PLANAS, MPBI, IABI and the Indonesian University Forum (*Forum Universitas Indonesia*). Each of these forums is different in nature and fills a separate niche. PLANAS was established as a multi-stakeholder forum for government, academia, NGOs, civil society and the private sector. MPBI works through individual-based expertise on DRR, aiming to improve MPBI members’ capacity and to promote community-based disaster risk management. IABI and the University Forum follow a scientific, academic approach at both national and local (provincial and regency) levels.

The interface between the government and civil society appears in activities such as the formulation of National Progress Report on the *Hyogo Framework for Action* (HFA), preparation meetings for international DRR negotiations (i.e. World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction) and public hearings on the RPJMN. In preparing for the World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, for instance, the first author observed representatives from the government, NGOs and civil society working together to formulate Indonesia’s standing position and to develop national interests for this conference.

During interviews and FGDs, both government and non-state actors acknowledged the important role of each party and affirmed the ‘good stage’ partnership.<sup>5</sup> Shared narratives echoed policy documents such as the Government Regulations on Disaster Management (No 21/2008), which states that ‘national action plans for disaster risk reduction [...], thoroughly organised and integrated in a forum that included elements of the government, non-government organisations, the general public and the private sector, were coordinated by BNPB.’

Although on paper (and in formal interviews with outsiders such as the first author), civil society–government advocacy channels appear to be relatively open, the present study found that, in practice, the relations between government and non-state actors remained asymmetrical. A high-ranking PLANAS officer explained this dynamic as follows:

BNPB is part of PLANAS; therefore, this national platform should be the highest [body] providing input over DRR, but sometimes [within the relations] there is a feeling that ‘I am the government’. Like a relationship between parents [the government] and children [non-state actors]. If we can’t follow what they [government] say, this causes anger and disappointment. If the government cannot embrace non-state actors in flexible way, we [Indonesia] cannot lead [in DRR]. (interview with a female PLANAS officer, 27 March 2015)

Regarding the partnership between the government and non-state actors through PLANAS, both parties appeared to work together only to ‘a limited level’ (interview with a female PLANAS staff member, 27 March 2015). Additionally, the government only involved PLANAS in the final stage of policy evaluations. Clearly, PLANAS was not fully involved in the formulation of DRR national planning and action through the RPJMN and the National Action Plan on DRR (*Rencana Aksi Nasional* [RAN]), which serve as the primary references for the national programme on DRR. One participant elaborated the engagement of PLANAS in policy evaluations as follows:

We want the position of PLANAS higher; this is a *forum* in which the government also sits as a member. We only evaluate [the implementation of] the *Hyogo Framework for Action*, without involving CSOs [civil society organisations] in the evaluation of the RPJMN and the RAN. I think this is unfair. Supposedly, we evaluate the RPJMN and the RAN and, from there, the HFA. From now on, PLANAS will concentrate on formulating yearly reports in which we discuss the evaluation of the RPJMN—whether the programme has been implemented up to local level. On RPJMN, there are details of budget, amounts of budget and ministries that are involved in the programme. We want to do this because we want to avoid only evaluating one institution. It can be sensitive. So far, it seems we only evaluate BNPB whereas we supposedly evaluate the whole [all ministries who engaged in the programme]. This going to be our resources for advocacy—the views from the frontline. (interview with a female PLANAS staff member, 27 March 2015)

Literature on governance highlights a strong role of non-state actors as the pluricentric pillar of governance. However, the reality in the field of DRR politics in Indonesia shows how the government controls access for PLANAS to be engaged in policy processes. For PLANAS, participation in policy processes is of key importance for advocacy efforts. This was illustrated by the interview with the PLANAS representative extracted above in the choice of the phrase ‘resources for advocacy’ to frame the importance of policy access. Specifically, PLANAS

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<sup>5</sup> Interview with a male BNPB staff member, 22 November 2013; interview with a female PLANAS staff member, 27 March 2015

demands greater access to policy formulation by consistently referring to the forum's niche as the avenue for all stakeholders, including the government, to discuss the DRR agenda. PLANAS thus attempts to frame the government as an insider in the platform, inviting them to revisit their position towards non-state actors. Instead of framing the interaction between these actors as 'government-to-non-state actors', the message from PLANAS framed the interaction with the government under one governance network for DRR. This perspective implies that positional power on policy steering would be relatively equal for the government and other actors in PLANAS.

#### **3.4.2. Advocacy at regency level**

Adopting the spirit of inclusiveness through engaging multi-stakeholder platforms on DRR, the prototype of PLANAS is increasingly being established at the province and regency levels in Indonesia. This emerging trend is a response to the institutional development of BPBD at the local level. This section focuses on the DRR Forum in NTT, exploring how this platform aims to bring state and non-state actors together.

The DRR Forum was established in 2010 as a platform for multi-stakeholder interactions on DRR. This forum brings together the regency government, NGOs, academics and civil society to discuss disaster management plans and programmes in Sikka regency. From 2012 to 2013, the forum actively engaged in disaster response following the eruption of Mount Rokatenda. This eruption caused five deaths and affected inhabitants in two other regencies in Sikka. During the emergency phase, directly after the eruption, institutions cooperated through the forum. However, after this joint response, no regular programme or activities have been organised by the forum.

When the DRR Forum was established, the head of BPBD was automatically also the head of the forum. Interviews with six employees working for three different NGOs revealed a good synergy between BPBD and DRR civil society in the regency. However, these interviews also revealed that, after the former head of BPBD was promoted to a different position, the forum became 'silent'. The interviewees suggested the reason for this silence was the poor engagement of the new head of BPBD on the issue. This finding supported the initial premise regarding human resource capacity and its relation to programme development for disaster management. The sustainability of the DRR Forum appears to depend on individual BPBD leaders. Recognising this problem, in 2014, NGOs initiated a revitalisation of the DRR Forum. One of the agenda points of this revitalisation was shifting the leadership of the forum from individuals working for BPBD to whole NGO bodies.

The current secretary of the DRR Forum explained in an interview why he believed that this leadership should shift. He offered two arguments, which were widely shared among other NGO members in the region. First, the participation of the local government in the forum was weak, and second, the DRR Forum needed to become more independent from the government to enable the forum to complete their monitoring function towards the government programme. By excluding the government from the forum, the NGOs had obtained more room to monitor and evaluate the government programme. This situation created tension between BPBD and the NGOs. The NGOs' initiative threatened to drive the regency government out of the decision-making arena, and the current head of BPBD felt that his institution was regarded as an outsider in the forum. He expressed discontent with the NGO activities:

The DRR Forum should be chaired by the head of BPBD [ex officio]. I never heard about the process of revitalisation. What I would suggest is to disband the existing forum and establish a new one with

BPBD as the leader. (interview with male head of BPBD, automatically also head of the DRR Forum, 23 October 2015)

As a result of this friction, the lines of communication between the government and NGOs were slowly blocked. Instead of communicating and reporting their work to BPBD, the NGOs as the driving force of the forum started to approach the vice regent directly. The secretary of the forum argued for the need to establish independence from BPBD:

We think BPBD has problems and issues in managing relocations in the Rokatenda region. As long as we have not finished our evaluation on this, we will only communicate with the vice regent. Through him, we would like to legalise this forum with a Regent's Decree. (interview with the male DRR Forum secretary, 24 October 2015)

This section has shown that the decentralisation of disaster risk governance in Indonesia has created a complex political arena at the provincial and regency levels. From the perspective of the institutional setting, the development of BPBD and the DRR Forum in Sikka reflects the idea of decentralisation of disaster management. It appears that decentralisation has facilitated local actors' active engagement in the political arena of disaster management, and the provincial and regency levels soon became where the game is played. Filling the niche of a multi-stakeholder forum, the strength of this platform essentially rests on the full representation of all parties in the forum. However, tension arose between BPBD and the other members of the DRR Forum, initially because of the poor engagement of a BPBD leader and because BPBD did not feel involved in the forum's development. This tension has grown over time and has been counter-productive to the development of DRR programmes and innovations. The strong position of each side towards the other reveals competitiveness and conflict over disaster risk governance.

### **3.4.3. Advocacy at the community level**

As was mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, decentralisation carries with it expectations of community-driven development, potentially improving the design of contextually appropriate projects, the targeting of beneficiaries and the accountability to local residents (Dasgupta and Beard, 2007: 231). Decentralisation supposedly facilitates the formulation of a development plan through widening stakeholders' participation and engaging in a bottom-up approach.

This section explores the community-level advocacy politics of DRR. The findings show that decentralisation has, indeed, led to active community participation with a bottom-up approach to development planning. The community has used this channel to pursue their interests through both formal and informal means. This section presents the impact of NGO interventions on community capacity. The section is divided into two parts: a description of the advocacy channel for decentralisation—the Consultation Forum for Development Planning (*Musyawah Rencana Pembangunan* [Musrembang]), and a summary of the role of Mitra in building community capacity through advocacy.

## ***Musrembang***

Community advocacy is a relatively new practice in Indonesia. Prior to the 1998 political reforms, no communication channels to discuss structural issues with the government had existed (ADB, 2006). Instead, there was an old structure of community organisations called the Community Resilience Group (*Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa*), but this structure was mostly ineffective because of ‘uncertainty of roles and weak coordination between local government and the community’ (ADB, 2006: 75). When democratisation began in 1998, new advocacy channels were opened for the community.

These channels, called *Musrembang*, are organised by the government yearly at five levels: national, provincial, regency, sub-regency and village. *Musrembang* aims to negotiate a development plan at every level by bringing multiple stakeholders together in a consultation forum. It aimed to generate a sense of ownership, promote democratic values and reduce local conflict (USAID, 2007). Through a bottom-up mechanism, *Musrembang* started from the village level then moved up to the sub-region, region, province and finally national level. *Musrembang* is now regarded by many Indonesian policymakers as the real mechanism for community advocacy politics. *Musrembang* is framed through legal frameworks to place public participation at its centre and address community welfare and public goods (Law No 32/2004) (USAID, 2007). It also displays the institutionalisation of a multi-stakeholder forum by synchronising top-down and bottom-up approaches (Law No 25/2004) (USAID, 2007). *Musrembang* reflected a political negotiation of ‘who gets what, when and how’. It is an actual arena to negotiate community interests and resources to ensure they are considered in the next development plan. Because of its strategic function, NGO interventions often target *Musrembang* as the forum for community advocacy.

The present study investigated the role of community groups in *Musrembang*, including Mitra’s assistance in strengthening community advocacy in this forum.

## **Intervention by Mitra**

As an alliance of five NGOs with strong expertise and experience in Indonesia, Mitra was able to implement a project that was complex, multifaceted and highly political. Working as an alliance was originally driven by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mitra’s main donor. Because of the role of ‘donor pressure’ in forming the alliance, it was seen as a ‘forced marriage’.<sup>6</sup> The alliance’s organisational set-up in Indonesia was complex because of the diversity of mandates and competencies of the 11 involved organisations (five country alliances and six local partners). In terms of project design, the integrated approach, strategies, building blocks and principles were set-up by the main Mitra organisations in the Netherlands. In each intervention country, the project design was contextualised for the national setting. However, the global vision and the richness of the local context were not always ‘connected as what we [Mitra Indonesia] should have done’.<sup>7</sup> The partners admitted that, when the project began, each organisation worked independently, without any joint strategy. Each country alliance member and their local partners interpreted the intervention strategies in a different way. Using their specific relief–development work expertise and experience, the alliance members and local partners defined and operationalised their project based on their separate mandates and

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<sup>6</sup> Interview with male the head of a Mitra partner, 22 November 2014

<sup>7</sup> Interview with a male Mitra alliance member, 6 July 2014

competencies. However, following the need and pressure to work as ‘One Mitra’ (the Mitra Indonesia motto), the process of collaboration started to open up.

The interviews and observations conducted for the present study showed support for Mitra’s intervention from the villages. Six heads of villages from the research sites appreciated Mitra’s contribution, claiming the project was ‘helping the work of the village administration and contributing to community livelihoods’. Specifically, the heads of villages even expected that this programme could be extended after 2015.

On the community side, the intervention appears to have helped to enhance livelihoods and raise awareness about environment problems:

We have been involved in many NGO projects in the past. But none of them approached the community as this project did. We work every day to feed ourselves. This project is not only helping us to protect our village from disaster, but also to help our livelihood. This is something that I like from this project. (interview with a male community leader, 6 July 2014)

Before Mitra came to our village, we already had mangroves. But back then, our mangroves were easily wiped out by the waves. The threat in our village is coming from the waves because we are located in an open space. Mitra gave us knowledge about how to plant mangroves in the open space. We use hybrid systems to catch the mud and protect from the waves. We hope Partners for Resilience can be continue in our village. But if they don’t, we are committed to keep working on this mangrove conservation. (interview with a male community leader, 13 July 2014)

Community members suggested that the programme strengthened their ability to articulate their agenda on environment issues to the government. They also revealed how the project helped to improve their bargaining position in advocating to the government:

We said to them [village administrator] that mangrove conservation is a public need. Therefore it has to be included in the village programme. (interview with a male community leader, 13 July 2014)

I learned how to approach the government from my field facilitator, and it helps to build my confidence. (interview with a male community leader, 25 October 2015)

The present research observed a range of advocacy channels, including the *Musrembang*. At the hamlet level, *Musrembang* started with inviting multiple community group representatives to present perspectives from their hamlets on development priorities. For example, in a coastal hamlet called *Darat Pantai*, one community group involved with Mitra, named *Kembang Bakau*, strived to integrate the mangrove conservation programme in the village development plan. This integration would mean that the mangrove project would be funded by the village administration. The programme also had the potential to be extended when this agenda was discussed at the higher level of the *Musrembang Desa* (Village *Musrembang*). During the process of negotiation, *Kembang Bakau* had to compete with farmer community groups seeking financial assistance to support agricultural development. At the forum, the head of *Kembang Bakau* argued that the conservation of coastal areas through planting mangrove is essential because the high risk of erosion potentially threatens the village population. Moreover, in an interview, the head of this community group confided that he attempted to approach other community groups, such as fisheries groups, to gain support for the mangrove conservation agenda. The village administration ultimately decided to incorporate the coastal protection programme into their development plan. As a consequence, *Kembang Bakau* continued to work on planting mangrove

in coastal areas, supported by the annual village funds (approximately IDR 2 million [EUR 133]). The same community group leader also lobbied a government officer at the regency level, using a personal approach to gain information about the government programme and pursue the possibility of integrating the work of *Kembang Bakau* into the programme:

I went to Maumere on my motorcycle [a one-hour journey from his village]. I brought fish catches. Here, in Flores, it is common to approach and lobby someone by ‘bringing fish’. We have an idiom here: The head of the fish will make people follow what you want. (interview with a male community leader, 25 October 2015)

In another Mitra village, *Renggarasi*, the community prioritised plant cultivation, particularly nutmeg. The economic value from nutmeg supported community livelihoods. In an attempt to prevail in the regency-level negotiation, the head of the village lobbied a member of legislature at this level (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah*, the Regency House of Representatives). As part of this politician’s constituency, *Renggarasi* played its bargaining position by requesting government assistance for the agriculture programme. The lobby succeeded, and the legislature bridged the communication between the village head and the regency-level government.

#### **3.4.4. Perceptions on risk**

Throughout the interviews with different government bodies at both national and local levels, it is appeared that each actor had a different paradigm and perception regarding DRR. These perceptions were mostly driven by the background of the organisational mandates, including the capacity and knowledge of actors on DRR.

Table 3. Different perceptions and agendas on DRR among government bodies

Ministry/local government body	DRR programmes
<b>BAPPENAS</b>	DRR as part of national development priority 3, including the following aspects: (a) Land-use approach (b) Disaster mitigation (c) DRR Governance
<b>Coordinating Ministry of Human Development</b>	DRR National Movement (Coordination, synergy and controlling the DRR programme among national government bodies)
<b>BNPB</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> DRR is no longer a stand-alone agenda on disaster management <input type="checkbox"/> Community-based approach through resilient villages <input type="checkbox"/> BPBD institutional strengthening
<b>Ministry of Home Affairs</b>	Capacity-building of local government
<b>Ministry of Social Affairs</b>	Community-based approach through <i>Desa Siaga</i> and TAGANA
<b>Ministry of Environment</b>	Risk assessment for climate change adaptation (advocacy through the spatial planning approach)
<b>Ministry of Forestry and Environment (Watershed Agency)</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> DAS planning and controlling to overcome disaster risk (high intensity of flood, landslides and drought) <input type="checkbox"/> Ensuring water quality and water security
<b>Ministry of Villages, Disadvantaged Regions and Transmigration</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> New paradigm: shifting from ‘developing the village’ to ‘village as development subject’ <input type="checkbox"/> Bringing authority to villages for better empowerment <input type="checkbox"/> Financing DRR through village funding (either hardware or software)
<b>Ministry of Education</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Hardware: ‘safe schools’
<b>BAPPEDA</b>	Spatial planning approach
<b>BPBD</b>	Raising awareness through socialisation, training
<b>Ministry of Forestry</b>	Changing community behaviour (promoting tree planting to reduce clear cutting)
<b>Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Affairs</b>	Regulation is important to govern the coordination among stakeholders
<b>Office of Village Administration</b>	Capacity-building of the village apparatus

*Note:* BAPPENAS: *Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional* (the Indonesian Ministry National Development Planning); BAPPEDA: *Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah* (the Indonesian Regional Body for Development Planning); BNPB: *Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana* (the National Agency for Disaster Management); BPBD: *Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah* (the Regional Agency for Disaster Management); DAS: *Daerah Aliran Sungai* (Watershed Management); DRR: disaster risk reduction; TAGANA: *Taruna Siaga Bencana* (Disaster Management Cadets)

Within the national government, the perceptions on DRR varied. Four ministries at the national level and one local government body (BAPPENAS/BAPPEDA; BNPB; the Ministry of Villages, Disadvantaged Regions and Transmigration; and the Ministry of Environment) positioned DRR as an approach acting as a driving force for any action in the disaster management cycle (preparedness, relief/emergency, rehabilitation). This perception translated into different agenda setting on DRR, such as land-use/spatial planning, institutional strengthening, the community-based approach through resilient villages, and integration on development planning. Two government bodies underlined the hardware component of infrastructure, such as safe schools (the Ministry of Education) and watershed planning (the Ministry of Forestry). Meanwhile, the Ministry of Social Affairs focused on community capacity through establishing ‘disaster preparedness villages’ and ‘village emergency response units’ as a way to reduce the level of vulnerability within the community. Paradoxically, community perceptions of risk were mixed and predominantly revolved around the vulnerability to hazards and human-caused disasters. The community positioned disaster as a consequence of the climate, such as droughts during a long, dry season or floods after heavy rainfall. However, community members also highlighted the issue of illegal logging as the cause of landslides and land clearing as a driving factor of wildfires. For NGOs, disaster is entangled with serious issues such as illegal logging, poverty, poor awareness regarding environmental conservation, and weak village regulation and law enforcement. Therefore, as an approach, DRR should be able to cover these underlying causes. This translated into livelihood programmes, agricultural training and advocacy on village regulation.

### **3.5. Conclusions**

The popular idea that decentralisation brings authority ‘closer’ and directs it more towards the needs of its citizens is challenged by different realities in the field, as discussed in this chapter. The chapter has presented sceptical perceptions from the local government and observations made in the field that stand in contrast to the purely positive view of decentralisation was contrasted with

This chapter has shown, first, that decentralised disaster risk governance has been strongly promoted by the central government but is much less enthusiastically perceived by regency governments. Although local governments are framed as the frontline for disaster management, in practice, they work amidst complex challenges such as limited financial resources and insufficient knowledge and capacity. For example, the local disaster agencies (BPBD) often suffer from inadequate human resource capacity and insufficient budgets, with a high frequency of man-power rotation in the bureaucracy. DRR decentralisation policies have created huge disparities in capacity at central and local government level. Therefore, it is not surprising that local policy development for DRR has been described as inefficient and lacking in innovation. Policy innovation requires a strong environment, with competence, political support, financial resources and inclusive engagement of non-state actors. This is not currently the case in

Indonesia. An example of this can be seen in the decentralisation of disaster risk governance under the legal framework of the Disaster Management Law (No 24/2007). The constitution clearly states that local authorities are obligated to ensure disaster management policy results in rapid, appropriate, effective and efficient actions. However, in practice, the major power transfer from central to local government created further confusion and distrust at both levels.

Second, this chapter has shown that decentralised disaster risk governance in Indonesia remains in the procedural stage, with only moderate development of substantive processes of merit-based performance. Formally, Indonesia meets specific indicators for decentralisation (i.e. distribution of power and fiscal resources). Indonesia's decentralised disaster risk governance is regulated by a complex set of legal frameworks, institutional settings and power distribution mechanisms. However, the part of decentralisation emphasising service delivery improvements faces many hindrances. A number of classical problems regarding the current performance of BPBD, inter-ministerial coordination and asymmetrical relations between state and non-state actors reflect the most significant constraints to decentralised disaster risk governance.

A third major issue relates to CSOs' advocacy to articulate their interests and be involved in decision making. The advocacy arena for NGOs and other non-state actors is simultaneously widening and shrinking, as the decision-making process failed to develop through a comprehensive plan to build partnerships. Furthermore, aside from government channels, community groups used *Musrembang* advocacy channels to meet and articulate their interests to the government. The key reason for them to choose this alternative route was the local government's incapacity in terms of expertise and budget leading to their inability to respond directly to citizens' needs. These findings contradict the promise of decentralisation to bring government closer to its citizens. Overall, disaster risk governance in Indonesia is experiencing a premature decentralisation process, leading to further complexity in policy practice.

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## Chapter 4 - Disaster Risk Governance in Transitional Myanmar

Over the past decade, Myanmar has begun the process of a political, administrative and institutional transition from a centralistic military regime towards an inclusive democratic government. The commitment to initiate democratisation began with the ‘Road Map to Democracy’ (2003) process, when the country agreed to undertake the ‘Seven Step Programme for Myanmar’s Transition to a Democratic State’. This political milestone affirmed that Myanmar is heading towards a democratic trajectory. It also helped to open the country to international engagement in many fields, including humanitarian assistance. As a country known for complex humanitarian emergencies, Myanmar is highly dependent on international assistance. The political transition has been marked not only by the influx of foreign direct investment, but also by increased humanitarian assistance. An important question is how this transition influences humanitarian practices in the field. Among other issues related to humanitarian action, this chapter specifically discusses the influence of the political transition on disaster risk governance in Myanmar. The chapter analyses the institutional setting of disaster risk governance, the changing nature of state relations to non-state actors, the practice of advocacy strategy and the practice of democracy from below driven by participation in disaster risk reduction. Data were collected during a total of four months of qualitative research in Yangon and Nay Pyi Taw. It was found that the political transition has created a conducive environment for non-state actors to play a role in disaster risk reduction across Myanmar. Government behaviour has shifted from that of a closed-minded regime to be more inclusive in engaging UN agencies, the Red Cross and NGOs. The involvement of these multiple actors in disaster management has slightly shifted practice in the field by moving away from a uni-centric approach towards a more pluricentric governance network.

*Keywords:* disaster risk governance, network, politics, advocacy, institutional setting

Myanmar is an example of how natural disaster can be a window to policy change. In 2008, cyclone Nargis created momentum for the country to become more inclusive of the international community. The cyclone was the worst natural disaster in Myanmar’s history, claiming the lives of an estimated 138,000 people (UNDP, 2010). During the response phase, the government was criticised for its limited reaction to humanitarian issues. The military regime was described as ‘secretive’ and ‘xenophobic’ regarding international assistance (New York Times, 2009). However, after a great deal of international pressure and being approached by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Myanmar government gradually lifted its restrictions on international humanitarian assistance. ASEAN started its intervention two days after Nargis by distributing relief assistance (Srikandini, 2010: 37). This was continued with other foreign aid assistance on the fourth day post-disaster (BBC, 2008). Later, the Myanmar government also agreed to work in coordination with ASEAN and the United Nations (UN) under the framework of the Tripartite Core Group. Within this group, ASEAN took on the role of bridging the Myanmar government and UN agencies throughout the response and rehabilitation phases (Srikandini, 2010: 38).

The experience of Nargis brought lasting change to how the Myanmar government responds to disaster. This can be seen in how the government responded to the flood and landslide in 2015. In June 2015, severe floods and landslides resulted in the death of 125 people, and 1.7 million people were affected (Relief Web, 2015). Different from the previous response to Nargis,

from the beginning of the flood response, the Myanmar government openly appealed for international relief assistance. The Minister of Information and the President's spokesperson affirmed to the press, 'We are cooperating and inviting international assistance. We have started contacting possible donors and organizations' (Reuters, 2015).

Moreover, cyclone Nargis was a game changer in the policy arena of disaster risk reduction (DRR). Broadly speaking, DRR developed as a means of 'preventing new and reducing existing disaster risk to strengthen resilience' (UNISDR, 2007). Beyond this definition, DRR is also used as a 'conceptual framework to minimize vulnerabilities & disaster risks, to avoid (prevention) and to limit (mitigation and preparedness) the adverse impacts of hazards' (UNISDR, 2008). Cyclone Nargis not only shifted the government's position towards international relief assistance, but also created political momentum for policy change. Prior to Nargis, DRR was not a premium agenda item for the Myanmar government. In addition, Myanmar has also experienced extensive partnerships with different non-state actors. In 2010, around 170 organisations, including the UN, international NGOs and local NGOs, were working in Myanmar (Srikandini, 2010: 52). The number of local staff members employed in international aid agencies increased significantly after Nargis. In 2005, around 3,500 local staff members were employed by international aid organisations; by 2009, this number had increased to 10,000 (Pedersen, 2012: 276).

According to Birkland (2001), policy changes in the context of disaster were mostly driven by two factors: (1) major problems that required an extraordinary response and (2) the dynamics of the political realm (Birkmann et al., 2010: 640). Birkland argues that a major disaster draws the specific attention of the public and leads to change when 'there is a clear discourse championed by influential policy actors' (Birkman et al., 2010: 640). Myanmar's experience strongly demonstrates how the largest natural disaster in the country's history prompted changes in how disaster management is governed. As such, the present study attempted to investigate how the changes in disaster risk governance in Myanmar have come into practice.

The present chapter begins by arguing for the importance of the governance of disaster management. The underlying risk factors of a disaster are driven by the performance of governance (Ahrens & Rudolph, 2006: 208). In a disaster situation, when a community suffers from a state of high vulnerability and high potential hazard, questions about the state are often raised: Where is the state? Why has the government failed to protect their people? Ahrens and Rudolph (2006) argue that disasters often derive from bad governance and the resulting institutional failure. In public policy, bad governance resonates through the chain of 'unpreparedness, administrative incompetence, technical incapacity and political irresponsibility' (Hannigan, 2012: 6). Poor performance is often dominated by issues of inefficiency and low accountability, leading government programmes to fail to 'meet societal needs' (Farrington et al., 2003: 29). Disaster risk governance is a political action that requires a solid policy arrangement from the government (Hannigan, 2012: 6).

With this argument in mind, it is crucial to investigate the reality of disaster risk governance in Myanmar, including an analysis of the government's political willingness to protect its people from disaster. A report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) classified Myanmar a fragile country suffering from weaknesses in 'effective, accountable and inclusive' institutions (OECD, 2015: 13). This OECD report categorises the risk factor indicators of fragility into five areas: (1) violence; (2) access to justice for all; (3) effective, accountable and inclusive institutions; (4) economic inclusion and stability; and (5) capacities to prevent and adapt to social, economic and environmental shocks and disasters. The

report positions Myanmar as a fragile state and reflects the country's vulnerability in terms of the principles of good governance (OECD, 2015).

Clearly, Myanmar faces a real struggle to uphold its political commitments related to governance. This raises a number of questions: Does the government keep its promise to be democratised and accountable? What are the biggest challenges, in practice? Can non-state actors contribute to 'inclusiveness'? This chapter aims to contribute to answering these questions on governance by focusing on DRR during Myanmar's political transition. In attempting to reach this goal, the chapter focuses on the practice of disaster risk governance through a political lens. Specifically, the present study sought to answer three main questions: (1) How does the institutional setting of disaster risk governance work in practice in Myanmar? (2) To what extent does the political transition in Myanmar influence the dynamics of disaster risk governance? (3) How is the governance network evolving in Myanmar, with its strong history of strong government control? To answer these questions, this chapter is divided into five parts: First, the introduction describes the context, details the setting for the case and introduces the research questions in more depth. Second, the conceptual frameworks of democracy, governance and the politics of disaster risk governance are introduced. Third, I describe the research methodology used for this study. The fourth section presents the findings, which are elaborated in four areas: the institutional setting, power relations, policy advocacy and democracy from below. Finally, the fifth section presents the study's conclusions.

#### **4.1. Democracy, Governance and Networks**

In 2003, Myanmar's Prime Minister, Khin Nyut, introduced seven steps towards democracy, called the 'Roadmap to Democracy': (1) the reconvening of the National Convention; (2) the step-by-step implementation of the process necessary to create a genuine and disciplined democratic state; (3) the drafting of a new constitution; (4) adapting the constitution through national referendum; (5) holding free and fair elections; (6) convening of *Huttaws* attended by *Huttaw* members, in accordance with the new constitution; and (7) building a modern, developed and democratic nation. This document highlighted Myanmar's political action to transform their country into a democratic nation. Since this initial commitment to the 'Roadmap to Democracy', Myanmar has been implementing major political reforms. This began with the adoption of a new constitution (2008), the multi-party election (2010), the release of political prisoners (including Aung San Suu Kyi) (2010), a new government regime under President Thein Sein (2011) and the general election at the end of 2015 (Skidmore & Wilson, 2012: 4). As this process continues, the transition seems to have opened Pandora's box, as Myanmar must face serious issues caused by living under three decades of control by a centralistic and isolated regime. Issues such as economic development, fiscal priorities, absence of the rule of law, human rights abuses, media control, environmental degradation and the high risk of disaster (Skidmore & Wilson, 2012: 4; Myint-U, 2012: 26) are ongoing, alongside this transition process. In his inaugural speech in 2016, Myanmar's first non-military president affirmed his commitment to the values of governance and democracy:

Having been elected as president, I am supposed to be accountable to the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw [the parliament]. [...] It is that I have a responsibility to always keep my solemn oath that I have made earlier, and to pursue a constitution in accordance with democratic norms that will be suitable for our country. (Myanmar Times, 2016)

As such, the government seemingly offers a new perspective on steering the country by explicitly supporting accountability (governance) and democratic norms.

In practice, democracy and governance share the common ‘concerns and issues of cooperation and coordination’ (Holohan, 2005: 28). Democratisation attempts to bring in the fundamental freedom of expression, creating a space for non-state actors to be involved in policy setting and the development of a ‘conducive and accountable’ political environment (Vidal, 2009: 161). From a different perspective, the idea of good governance frames changes to governing by introducing pluricentric networks into the policy setting to encourage transparency and accountability. The governance perspective changes the locus and focus of governing by bringing new actors into the decision-making process (locus) and shifting the rules of the game and steering mechanism (focus) (van Leeuwen & van Tatenhove, 2010: 591).

Challenges to the practice of governance are ongoing; however, compared with other aspects of governance in Myanmar, the relationship between state and non-state actors involved in DRR is open, engaging and diverse. Disaster management has the distinctive characteristics of being a largely unpolitical issue that requires a great deal of attention and resources from the government and donors. In Myanmar, this issue highlights a national threat for the disaster-prone country, as it confronts many people with the real risk of danger.

In the peace-building and development setting of this fragile state, donors tend to promote development changes by encouraging an ‘inclusive governance process’ (Pedersen, 2012: 282). In the best-case scenario, this objective leads to approaches ranging from policy advocacy at all levels to participatory projects in the village community. Many international organisations (IOs) working in Myanmar, such as UNDP, strongly advocate the practice of democratic governance—for example, UNDP’s facilitation of the wider participation of citizens in decision-making processes (UNDP, 2013) and the World Bank’s promotion of the Myanmar National Community Driven Development Project in 2017 (World Bank, 2012).

Concerning DRR in the national arena, the Government of Myanmar has been working closely with the Disaster Risk Reduction Working Group (DRR WG), which aims to assist the government in achieving a ‘resilient country’ environment. Since its establishment after Nargis in 2008, the DRR WG has transformed into a multi-stakeholder network consisting of the government, IOs, international and local NGOs, academics and professionals. The DRR WG has been involved in policy consultations, providing technical support to the government on policy development and report preparation, including developing a draft note for Myanmar’s 2015 ‘Action Plan for DRR’.

The present chapter takes the concept of ‘governance network’ as the central framework of analysis. A network is ‘a set of actors (nodes) and ties (links) whose relationships have a patterned structure’ based on trust (Holohan, 2005: 28). Networks are commonly used to describe the intertwined nature and interaction among different actors such as the state and civil society organisations. The concept of ‘governance network’ is used to describe the ‘articulation of interdependent but operationally autonomous actors who interact through negotiations that take place within a relatively institutionalized framework and facilitate self-regulated policy-making’ (Torfing et al., 2012: 16). As a concept and practice, ‘governance networks’ take three typical forms: (1) networks driven by the need to share knowledge; (2) networks aiming to improve coordination and (3) networks seeking to manage problem-solving collaboration (Torfing et al., 2012: 17). The governance network has been widely viewed as an analytical tool to explain the complexity of actors’ interaction in an assembly with a pluricentric structure. This

concept specifically points to the complex process of interfaces, common goals among actors and inclusiveness in decision-making processes through negotiation (Torfing et al., 2012: 16).

In the context of disaster management, the idea of using networks as an analytical tool originated in 1970, when the complexity of actors was seen through the frame of the ‘international disaster relief system’ (Holohan, 2005: 28). In this system, public and private actors assemble in one governance system for disaster relief. The concept of ‘interactive governance’ is used to describe this process. Interactive governance is ‘the complex process through which a plurality of social and political actors with diverging interests interact in order to formulate, promote and achieve common objectives by means of mobilising, exchanging, and deploying a range of ideas, rules and resources’ (Torfing et al., 2012: 2). The concept of governance network is type of interactive governance used in the present study to examine the dynamics of disaster risk governance. This concept emphasises the work of multiple actors who act autonomously but relate interdependently within the ‘institutionalised framework’ of the policy-making process (Torfing et al., 2012: 16). Specifically, in the present study, disaster risk governance is seen as a framework to analyse the multi-stakeholder approach and the multifaceted interaction within DRR networks. It presents the network of actors including the complexity of interaction governed by the rules of the game. The concept of governance network underlines the idea of the changing nature of ‘governing’, from state-centric towards a pluricentric approach. These changes have also had implications for the sequence of the policy-making process (formulation, implementation and evaluation). The process of policy steering tends to become more inclusive through the involvement of non-state actors in the arena.

## **4.2. Methods**

A qualitative method provides a framework for understanding reality by giving meaning to particular phenomena and contexts. It was important to capture the political setting and context in Myanmar. In this pursuit, this study took a qualitative approach to data collection, processing and analysis. In general, qualitative research aims to describe the complex interaction among stakeholders. The underpinning philosophy of qualitative research stresses exploring the essence of experiences, meanings and perceptions to acquire knowledge (Kumar, 2005: 38).

This chapter draws on four months of field research conducted in Myanmar in December 2013 (preliminary research), September–November 2014, February 2015 and December 2015. The research was designed to study the dynamics of disaster risk governance at the national and local levels. The aim to capture the dynamics at multi-layered levels was originally driven by my enthusiasm for understanding the everyday realities and distinct perspectives among actors in Nay Pyi Taw, Yangon and Ayeyarwady Delta.

At the national level, the research was accomplished through my engagement in an internship programme at a UN agency in Myanmar. This agency is a key member of the DRR WG. The internship started from the practical need to gain access and permission to conduct research, which requires the endorsement of an established organisation. After difficulties encountered in conducting preliminary research in 2013, the decision was made to have organisational support for this research. In the preliminary phase, I found that the process of data collection was ineffective without organisational support, and the preliminary research did not provide the sense of experience of the dynamics of the governance network in Myanmar. This research was missing the regular participatory observation of the network interaction. Learning from this experience, I decided to change the field research strategy to gain in-depth understanding of the network dynamics. The aim was to gain access to the meetings and activities of two DRR

governance networks in Myanmar—the DRR WG and the Myanmar Consortium for Disaster Risk Reduction (MCDRR). This required organisational support, leading me to seek an opportunity to engage with a project involving the government, IOs and NGOs in Myanmar. Such an opportunity arose when I met a UN agency representative at the Asian Ministerial Conference on DRR in Bangkok in 2014. At this initial meeting, I shared my research objective and design in an informal meeting outside the event. The contact person, a high-ranking UN official in Myanmar, found commonalities between the research objective and the UN agency's objectives. The UN agency then agreed to include my research in their organisational programme under the framework of an internship. The internship facilitated both data gathering and research uptake: As an intern, I was asked to develop and deliver policy recommendations for improving disaster risk governance in Myanmar.

Several data collection methods were used during the internship:

- Desk study to collect basic information on the conceptual framework on the politics of disaster governance, everyday politics, democratisation and decentralisation;
- Review of articles to formulate and synthesise the analytical tool on the politics of disaster governance;
- In-depth interviews with 19 participants, including officials from the Government of Myanmar (Director General of Relief and Resettlement, Ministry of Social Welfare), a member of the Steering Committee, and members of the DRR WG, to gather data about DRR policy/strategy, interaction within disaster governance and organisational preferences/roles;
- Participant observation at the DRR WG's monthly meetings (September and October 2014), the ASEAN Committee for Disaster Management Working Group on Recovery and Consultation Workshop for ASEAN Guidelines on Recovery Planning (22 September 2014) and the International Day for Disaster Reduction (IDDR) in Yangon (11 October 2014); and
- Policy document analysis of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response, the Myanmar Standing Position on Natural Disaster Management, the Strategic Framework of the Myanmar DRR WG, the Situational Analysis of DRR in Myanmar.

Regarding research ethics and code of conduct, I protected the identity of the respondents and organisations by not explicitly stating their names. Considering the potential bias because of the UN agency internship engagement, I took several steps to uphold the principle of independence: (1) developing a clear research design to navigate the direction of the research; (2) actively seeking out multiple perspectives and cross-cutting information on the research topics by recruiting a wide range of respondents from various backgrounds and (3) using open-ended questions in the interviews to create room for exploration.

To capture the local dynamics on disaster risk governance, I also engaged in the Myanmar for Resilience (MR) project. The name of the implementing agency and donors are withheld for confidentiality reasons. This consortium is a European-funded project consisting of six organisations aiming to increase resilience in the coastal and urban communities of Myanmar by institutionalising an inclusive DRR approach. The initial contact with MR was established during the internship programme. Frequent meetings of the DRR WG helped me to study the MR project, leading to intensive communication with the MR contact person about the possibility of conducting a qualitative impact study on the project. The MR staff members perceived the importance of gaining academic feedback for their preliminary project evaluation from the qualitative impact study. MR agreed to facilitate the field research at the selected project sites. Over one month, I conducted three focus group discussions involving 36 participants at two

project sites in Ayeyarwady Division. A series of interviews was also conducted to gather information from MR consortium members at the national, division and community levels. At the village level, research for this study was conducted in two communities in Ayeyarwady Delta, an area that was heavily damaged by cyclone Nargis in 2008: Mangalar Thaung Tan Village and Aung Hlaing Village. Both villages suffered from severe damage during the cyclone Nargis, which claimed the lives of 27 community members from these villages. This cyclone, the worst natural disaster in Myanmar history, also damaged hundreds of boats, the main livelihood assets for these coastal communities. During the data collection, I acknowledged the challenges involved in seeking sensitive information, such as information on the experience of loss after Nargis, the role of the government and the livelihood context. To respect the community's loss from Nargis, I started with general question such as, 'Could you tell me what happened when Nargis hit the village?' I then continued with more sensitive questions after the respondents were comfortable sharing their stories more extensively and specifically. To navigate the question on the role of government, I used the same techniques, inviting the respondents to share their observations and feelings about their government.

### **4.3. Research Findings**

#### **4.3.1. Heavy Bureaucratic Set-up of DRR Government Structures**


Disaster management in Myanmar is ruled under specific legal frameworks that were formulated after Nargis. Here, DRR is governed by five sets of DRR rules and regulations: (1) the 2013 Disaster Management Law; (2) the 2012 Myanmar Environmental Conservation Law; (3) the 2012 Myanmar Action Plan for DRR; (4) the National Strategic Plan for the Advancement of Women, 2012–2021 and (5) the 2009 Standing Order on Natural Disaster Management. These legal frameworks are consistently used as references to formulate and guide the national policy plan for disaster management in the country. In the government structure, there are three dominant structures on the arena: (1) the national coordination structure of the National Disaster Preparedness Committee (NDPC); (2) the Ministry of Social Welfare Relief and Resettlement, especially the Relief and Resettlement Department (RRD) as the focal point for disaster management; and (3) the local government administration at the state/division, district, township and village levels.

In 2005, Myanmar established the NDPC as a response to the massive destruction caused by Tsunami Hindia in 2004. The NDPC is a manifestation of the central coordination of disaster management in Myanmar.<sup>8</sup> As the highest government committee responsible for addressing the work of disaster management in the country, the NDPC is responsible for formulating issues and guidelines, ensuring coordination between multiple stakeholders and evaluating disaster preparedness measures (Standing Order, 2009). The structure of the NDPC is bureaucratically heavy, covering 36 government bodies ranging from Union ministries, The Division of Peace and the Development Council at state/division level. Specially, the NDPC was tasked with inter-sectorial coordination. The NDPC has a working committee called the National Disaster Preparedness Management Working Committee, which comprises 10 subcommittees, each with approximately 10 members of ministries, mostly at the deputy-level, to ensure that 'effective implementation is laid down by the NDPC' (ADPC, 2009: 11). *Figure 5* elaborates the Myanmar Government Institutional Framework for Disaster Management at the national level.

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<sup>8</sup> Interview with an RRD staff member, 11 December 2013

Figure 5. The Myanmar government's Institutional Framework for Disaster Management at national level



(Source: Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre, 2009)

In a different structure, Myanmar also established Inter-Ministerial Disaster Management Coordination Committee, which aims to formulate recommendations, policies, issues and guidelines and involves non-state actors within its structure. Policy input and recommendations also come from the Advisory Committee for Natural Disaster Management (ACNDM). This committee brings together different actors from government bodies, universities and NGOs, as well as hazard specialists (Standing Order, 2009). Members of this committee are the specialists in DRR.

In implementing inter-ministerial coordination, information exchange processes became a real challenge. The coordination mechanisms among the ministries failed to fill the information gap with other related ministries. The Ministry of Social Welfare Relief and Resettlement, through the RRD, is a key government body tasked with disaster management (MSWRR, 2012).

The RRD plays coordinates the Relief and Rehabilitation subcommittee in the NDPC and serves as the chair for the inter-ministerial committee (Standing Order, 2009) and the national contact for ASEAN.<sup>9</sup> In terms of supervision, the RRD is obliged to report to the vice president every 3–6 months.<sup>10</sup> Other relevant ministries working intensely on DRR-related issues include the Ministry of Environment and Conservation of Forestry, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Construction, the Myanmar Safer Settlement and Urban Research. The issue of information exchange appeared on the inter-ministerial meeting agenda when, regarding a dam construction project, the RRD asserted that they had not been fully informed about the construction process although it was crucial for them to ensure the construction was not taking place in ‘disaster-prone areas’: ‘We lacked complete information on what and how they do it [the project]’.<sup>11</sup>

In addition to the government structure at the Union (national) level, a system of complex bureaucracy is also found at the region level. Myanmar has a centralistic government structure in which ministerial authority goes down directly to each sub-national department at the state/division level. DRR is engaged and regulated under the administration of the state/division, before moving further down to townships, wards and village districts at the local level (MSWRR, 2012). With this structure, the RRD has no direct authority beyond the district level (i.e. at the level of townships or village-tracts). The budget mechanism is also separated between Union and subnational level. In terms of organisational structure at the lower levels (township, ward and village tract), the subnational-level department bodies are responsible to the General Administration Department (GA) in the Ministry of Home Affairs. As for DRR, the Ministry of Social Welfare Relief and Resettlement has stressed that it should become ‘a system and procedures in the related departments at national, state/region, township, ward and village district levels’ (MSWRR, 2012). However, the reality on the ground is contradictory. Some states/divisions do not see DRR as a priority on their agendas because it might be less relevant for their context.<sup>12</sup> This lack of prioritisation of DRR in some regions creates a challenge for the national government.<sup>13</sup> In terms of structure, there is no linkage between the government at the Union level, on the one hand, and state, district or township levels, on the other. The RRD at the Union level has no direct coordination or structure connecting it with the RRD beyond the district level (townships, village-tracts). At the local level, the RRD is mainly responsible for the General Administrator Department of the Ministry of Home Affairs.

In a transition setting such as Myanmar, the change process is mostly felt in urban areas like Yangon. At the local level (district, township, village-tract), the status quo is predominantly maintained, and the agenda for change is not always translated smoothly to the implementation stage.

The top level of the government changes, but the middle level and the lower level is not [changing] as fast as the top level. (interview with a female UN agency programme coordinator, 17 October 2014)

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<sup>9</sup> Interview with an RRD staff member, 11 December 2013

<sup>10</sup> Interview with an RRD staff member, 11 December 2013

<sup>11</sup> Interview with an RRD staff member, 11 December 2013

<sup>12</sup> Interview with an RRD staff member, 11 December 2013; interview with an international NGO representative, 4 October 2014

<sup>13</sup> Interview with an RRD staff member, 11 December 2013

The middle–low bureaucratic staff have poor knowledge/capacity on disaster management and does not always understand the reality on the ground. (interview with a female UN agency staff member, 17 October 2014)

Evidence from the field confirmed the problem of heavy procedural bureaucracy in the structure of disaster management in Myanmar. First, the findings showed a top–down structure from the top level down through the hierarchical system of the Union level to the village tracts. The NDPC, the highest-level body in charge of disaster management, has heavy layers of bureaucracy. The structure consists of high-ranking official staff who provide general guidance and direction to the lower layer of the body. For execution, the NDPC adds a new layer, establishing a specific working group tasked with ensuring NDPC takes the right direction on the ground. In specific, the working group consists of ministerial bodies chaired by deputy-level officers. These ministerial bodies are grouped into 10 clusters, namely (1) information and education; (2) emergency communication; (3) search and rescue; (4) information loss and emergency assistance; (5) assessment of losses; (6) way clearing and transportation; (7) mitigation and establishing emergency shelter; (8) health; (9) rehabilitation and reconstruction; and (10) security. In practice, the working group itself suffers from poor coordination, which could hamper DRR policy implementation. This was revealed in the interview with RRD about the ‘missing information on the dam construction.’ In terms of policy, the coherency of disaster management policy is not fully supported by the bureaucratic structure. There is no direct line of authority between the RRD, the key government body tasked with disaster management, and the GA. The mother organisation of the GA (the Ministry of Home Affairs) is different from that of the RRD (the Ministry of Relief and Resettlement), which has led to different policy priorities in the two agencies.

Second, although the experience from Nargis has not led to reform of the bureaucratic governance structure of disaster management, the impact of Nargis has generally encouraged the proliferation ideas of inclusiveness. The government framed this new way of governing through ‘inclusive DRR’ as a process of ‘improvement of policy, knowledge and awareness, as well as the involvement in civil society and community’.<sup>14</sup> NGOs appreciated these changes:

In 2008 [before Nargis], there was no consultation; [the] military government was strict on the information to give and to disseminate. After Nargis, there is more civil society organisation involvement now; there is [a] law on disaster management. There is a lot of change now in the top level. (interview with a male international NGO representative, 4 October 2014)

The new practice of the governance network has exposed the government to a new way of governing. It is a daily experience among public decision-makers in Myanmar to receive massive numbers of requests to establish cooperation and partnership from IOs, NGOs and the private sector. The ongoing transition, consequently, pushes the government to conduct policy reform in almost all aspects. The government is occupied with this reform process, including new partnership arrangements from various initiatives. This situation often leads to long delays in the decision-making process.

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<sup>14</sup> Interview with an RRD staff member, 11 December 2013

Government departments in this transition period—they are very, very busy. And then, they are not that clear what is the direction, so there were many confusions. In the past, they needed to listen to only the supervisor, only the head of department. Now they have to listen to [the] media while they also have to listen to civil society also; then sometimes [they] take decisions very slowly. (interview with a female UN agency staff member, 17 October 2014)

[Working with the government] is like [a] double[-edged] sword; now they are open, but everybody now works with them. [There is a] lack of capacity to coordinate [and] the demand is really high, [but] the staffing, training people is the same quantity. They don't have a lot of capacity. They have to build the capacity. Because it's evolving with [a] different structure—working groups, different ministries. There are so many groups—how do they talk to each other and link to each other? It has been a challenge for the government and also for us. (interview with a male international NGO programme coordinator, 4 October 2014)

The above paragraphs have shown how the government's exposure to the new practice of inclusiveness also has an impact on other actors in the governance network. The delay of responses to the initiatives from non-state actors is only one of the impacts. There are also some implicit problems that endanger the commitment to the governance network. In the heavily bureaucratic government setting of Myanmar, some NGOs admitted that it is difficult to reach the highest levels of government. The interfaces between the government and NGOs predominantly happen at the ministerial level—in this case, at the RRD. The structure is highly political, making it difficult for non-state actors to approach from the outside. The highly bureaucratic command structure has also shaped the political culture of government officials who have lived under decades of authoritarian leadership. While the transfiguration to open and engaging practice is ongoing, the old bureaucratic culture, which mostly promoted a closed and command-driven hierarchy, continues to exist.

They [the government] were in the command system for many years, they were trained to listen [to the higher command]. It's really difficult to change the mind-set of the government department personnel [...] to have that interactive discussion, to have consultation, to find the consensus [...] In the past, they didn't talk to people and people didn't talk to government departments. People never think that if we interact with government departments they will respond [...] it's not easy to talk together, to find the way together. If we think that it will work, it is just a story. It would not work in this short period. We need some time to bridge through that situation. (interview with a female UN agency staff member, 17 October 2014)

In another interview, one respondent shared how the heritage of authoritarianism remains embedded in government culture:

The structure of the government system in the past is [consists of] the top ministry and their different department officers at different state region levels. Some departments are down to the community level, like [the] General Administrative Department [in the Ministry of Home Affairs] goes to the township level [...] Then in the past, the state region level, the township level, the district level, they report to the ministry [Union government] directly. So in the past, more strong power [was] with the ministry. But now it changed. They started to have that decentralisation. Six months ago [in early 2014] more power was given to the state region level. The department officers at the state region level, township level [and] district level have their immediate supervisors, which is more clear than the ministry. And then some budget [is] also now not with the ministry, but with the state region level. But there is feedback from [the] DRR Working Group at the state region level about difficulties

to engage with the RRD in their state or region. So there are two ways: One is organise themselves without the government [RRD], or [the] other way is to have RRD. In case they have to organise [on] their own—the chief ministers [Union level] and the government departments, they are watching all the civil society organisations [to see] how they work in some states and regions. [There is] more sensitivity in the border areas. Then they [the DRR WG at the state region level] want to organise such a kind of working meetings or coordination network; then, they have to contact to the RRD. Then the RRD needs to have approval from the Union government, the chief minister, but it didn't go very smoothly. Then sometimes the chief minister is very tough and then the RRD [at the state region level] will not get that approval, will not take responsibility. There is not enough trust building between the agencies [the DRR WG] and the RRD [at the state region level] again. Sometimes, the agencies share with us that the RRD is standing alone; sometimes they didn't get any information, they didn't get any collaboration. (interview with a UN agency staff member, 17 October 2014)

This illustrates a tendency that was mentioned in many interviews for the heavy bureaucratic structure to continuously demand a hierarchical and top-down decision-making process. Within this procedural structure, there are many potential pitfalls in achieving effective decision-making processes. Although there have been some changes introduced, the old practice of directing decision-making processes to higher authorities remains tangibly real. From the interview extracted above, it could also be sensed how the initiative to introduce a governance network on DRR at the local level, coming from non-state actors, can be sensitive for the government. However, despite this issue, the government readily acknowledged the important role of these non-state actors:

NGOs have a big impact; without them, we don't have that much money to use. For instance, MR gives training successfully. They are so helpful [...] We don't have regular meetings with them. There are no NGOs based in this township. If they want to come, I am here. (interview with a male Head of Township, 15 February 2015)

The perspective towards the NGOs are mixed: The work of NGOs is perceived as 'giving big impact and helpful', but there are remaining problems with distrust, as implied by the government's request for regular reports from NGOs. This condition is driven by the long period of authoritarianism during which the state was always the centre and sole regulator of the decision-making process.

After completing the development project, the local government really, really appreciated what the NGOs did for them. And they said in the opening ceremony, 'You are doing a good thing even though you are an NGO'. What kind of education did they get? It's very much in line what has been expressed in the news, that NGOs are a destructive element, that they are part of the third colonialists. They have been educated like that. (interview with a male international NGO representative, 30 September 2014)

This section has highlighted the role of government structure for disaster management in Myanmar, showing how the complex, bureaucratic structure leads to poor coordination and weak advocacy access. Evidence from the field revealed that the top-heavy structure of disaster management impacted the realities of networked governance in many different ways. First, the commitment of the state leaders to good governance was hindered by the latent issue of bureaucratic procedures. Second, although the ongoing political transition enforced the idea of

inclusiveness in the bureaucracy, in practice, the government structure remain closed, hierarchical and procedural. This makes advocacy extremely difficult.

#### **4.3.2. Government Dominance of the DRR Working Group: Asymmetrical Relations and Mutual Benefit**

In 2008, the collaboration among different stakeholders in Myanmar was institutionalised through the DRR WG. These actors include (1) auxiliary government bodies (e.g. Myanmar Red Cross); (2) IOs; (3) both international and local NGOs; (4) donor agencies (e.g. Japan International Cooperation Agency, Caritas Switzerland); (5) professional societies (e.g. Myanmar Engineering Society) and (6) academic organisations (e.g. Yangon Technological University, University of Yangon). The DRR WG platform is the venue and avenue to discuss, formulate and implement the DRR agenda. Although the government is one of the actors in this network, this working group is outside the government structure on disaster management. An earlier section of this chapter describes government bodies' work on disaster management, including through the ACNDM, where non-state actors also participate to provide recommendations to the government. The DRR WG is different from the ACNDM, whose members are individuals with expertise on DRR; membership in the DRR WG is organisation-based.

Interviews with 17 members of the DRR WG revealed different factors driving the engagement of organisations in the network. DRR WG members have at least four motivations for engaging in the network: (1) information and knowledge exchange; (2) joining in collective action/advocacy; (3) participating in a venue for networking and (4) pooling/exchanging resources. This premise has strongly affected the DRR WG. The high value of information exchange and networking has inspired some members of the DRR WG to work collectively on projects such as the Consortium on DRR Inclusiveness, funded by European Union, and the Consortium on Disaster Management Training Centre, funded by USAID.


Working together has more strategic advantages. Nobody can do many things which is not in your work plan. So, [based] on that, we have been very successful—i.e. getting the resources that we create. We are moving into more streamlined work. (interview with a male UN agency staff member, 2 October 2015)

As an interagency network, the DRR WG has been driven by a collective agenda initially propelled by the DRR WG strategic framework. The strategic framework focuses on the establishment of 'collective voice' by exchanging and combining expertise and resources from the network's diverse membership (DRR Working Group Strategic Framework 2013 – 2018, 2013). In their strategic document for 2013–2018, the dominant vision for this network involved empowering government policy, legal frameworks and capacities (outcomes 1, 2 and 6) (DRR Working Group Strategic Framework 2013–2018, 2013).

As the most active network on DRR in Myanmar, the DRR WG plays an important role in steering policy. Their contribution is arranged, managed and organised through an internal system. The working group has three bodies: the steering committee, the secretariat and the technical task force. The steering committee consists of 11 elected organisations: 3 UN agencies, 3 international NGOs, 3 local NGOs, the Red Cross and one other organisation. This committee's primary functions are promoting the strategic framework of the DRR WG, managing the secretariat and endorsing initiatives from members/outside based on the strategic framework. The working group also has an elected chair to host the secretariat. Further, there is

an operational body of the working group run by two full-time staff members. Since its establishment, UNDP has served as the chair of the working group. Lastly, the technical task force is responsible for providing technical support on particular activities of the working group.

Figure 6. Structure of the Disaster Risk Reduction Working Group



(Source: DRR Working Group Strategic Framework 2013–2018, 2013)

Since its establishment, the DRR WG has been involved in a series of policy consultations, providing technical support to the government on policy development and drafting reports such as a concept note for Myanmar's Action Plan for DRR (2015), recommendations for Myanmar's standing position at the World Conference on DRR (2015) and a concept note on the Standing Order on Disaster Management (2015). The DRR WG is also the knowledge hub for technical capacity-building; this role is seen in the development of a draft roadmap policy framework for the Inclusive Toolkit (2015) and the provision of technical support to the RRD for upgrading the curriculum of the Disaster Management Course for the township and the state/division levels and for the Township Disaster Management Planning Process. For public audiences, a series of DRR public campaigns were also initiated by the group. These included IDDR, ASEAN Day for Disaster Risk Reduction and the ASEAN Ministerial Conference on DRR (DRR WG, 2015; Situational Analysis of DRR in Myanmar, 2013).

The DRR WG claimed to be the 'government-led model of DRR Coordination' (DRR WG Myanmar, 2013). This explicitly placed the government in a central position in the network, which was reflected in the DRR WG strategic framework, where three of six outcomes for the

DRR WG were directed at meeting government needs (i.e. inclusive policy and legal framework on DRR [outcome 1]; increase government capacity at all levels [outcome 2]; and to provide the government with tools, experiences and capacities [outcome 3]. Since the DRR WG's establishment in 2008, the RRD has been actively involved in this network. Within the DRR WG's organisational structure, the government is the honorary chair of the network. However, after the RRD's office moved to Nay Pyi Taw (the new capital) in 2012, they were no longer fully present at the DRR WG meetings and discussions. Almost all of the DRR WG's organisational members are based in Yangon—the former Myanmar capital, located 320 km from Nay Pyi Taw. The partnership between RRD and DRR WG is now mostly directed by email and telephone, so this cooperation continues to be fully functioning.

Additionally, the network has very clearly been heading further in the direction of a 'government-led' platform. Although there is room for negotiation with the government,<sup>15</sup> the power relations between state and non-state actors were built on asymmetrical relations with mutual benefits. In interviews with government and international actors, relations between these actors were described as 'interdependent':

[The] DRR WG is a good venue to coordinate and pool resources. We would like to have other collaboration. [The] DRR WG is a platform for communication to the government [...] If you have project that you want to gain, the [the group] can provide technical input. For instance, we would like to develop [an] assessment management course. One NGO has USD 20,000 but they don't know how to spend it. The government said why don't we have this course; then we do this. [The] DRR WG facilitate it and announce it to the group and other people contribute to it. This course has been recognised by the government. (interview with a male international NGO representative, 4 October 2014)

The government works closely with the DRR WG to achieve the government's agenda setting, and the relationship between the government and the DRR WG members is crucial to achieve their organisational mandates.

However, the partnership initiative was predominantly undertaken to fill the government's needs (demand-driven).<sup>16</sup> This could be seen in the collaboration between the government and the DRR WG regarding the 2014 IDDR. IDDR is an annual event endorsed by United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction to be organised at the national level as a way to celebrate DRR in the country. For organisations working on DRR-related issue, IDDR become an event mostly to raise public awareness, including the dissemination and promotion of the DRR programme to wider audiences. For the DRR WG, IDDR is a definite agenda point on their yearly programme. In 2014, around two months prior to the event, the government send a request to the DRR WG asking for a financial contribution to the implementation of IDDR. For four years, the DRR WG has provided financial support for the event. The DRR WG members generally claimed that their contribution to the event was part of their campaign and awareness raising on IDDR. The request from the government was discussed in a weekly meeting of the DRR WG where the budget gap was presented. Support was required for items such as the venue cost, meals and publications.

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<sup>15</sup> Interview with a UN agency staff member, 2 October 2014

<sup>16</sup> Interview with a UN agency officer, 2 October 2014

We do get a lot of demands from them [the government] that are not written in the memorandum of understanding; then you have to respect that. (interview with a male UN agency officer, 2 October 2014)

The members of the DRR WG shared the responsibility for the event by providing financial support to fill the gap. Three of the five biggest donors for IDDR 2014 were UNDP, UN Habitat and Action Aid. Although UN agencies and NGOs committed to provide financial support to maintain good relations with the government, the government claimed the event as their programme, with minimum recognition of joint collaboration. However, in 2014, the DRR WG pushed the government to acknowledge the DRR WG's contribution by placing the network's logo alongside the government logo on the publications. After four years of this practice, the government acknowledged their joint collaboration with the network on the event.

#### **4.3.3. Advocacy Channels: Indirectness, Avoiding Blame, Backdoor Strategy**

In a centralistic political setting such as Myanmar, advocacy is a challenging process. For over three decades, the government created a political environment with no opposition and no civil society involvement in setting policy. The current transitional era is the first time the government has attempted 'to listen and receive external inputs'.<sup>17</sup> As one international NGO representative noted, 'For a very long time, they see NGOs as a destructive element'.<sup>18</sup>

With this background, non-state actors tend to approach the government indirectly.<sup>19</sup> Interviews with representatives from two UN agencies and six international NGOs similarly addressed the topic of current advocacy strategy:

The methodology—some are official and unofficial. Asians are Asians; we use subtle ways to communicate to the government. (interview with a male international NGO representative, 30 September 2014)

Non-state actors tend to use a backdoor, non-confrontational strategy (Ware, 2012). It is very important for non-state actors to frame the agenda in such a way that the government feels they are not being 'blame and shamed'.

In essence, there are two channels used by NGOs: a formal and an informal approach. Through formal channels, NGOs develop direct contact with the government, for instance through bilateral, trilateral or multilateral meetings. IOs and NGOs also make use of different venues to articulate their agendas:

- Platform-based advocacy (e.g. the DRR Working Group, the MCDRR, Humanitarian Coordination, and the UNESCO-led Disaster Preparedness and Response Education;
- Joint activities (e.g. IDDR); and
- Approaching the government in informal ways (e.g. discussing programmes/projects over the telephone).

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<sup>17</sup> Interview with a UN agency staff member, 17 October 2014

<sup>18</sup> Interview with an international NGO representative, 30 September 2014

<sup>19</sup> Interview with an international NGO representative, 30 September 2014

In a transition setting such as Myanmar, non-state actors cannot expect rapid change in the behaviour of the government. For decades, people in Myanmar were under authoritarian leadership, with the government at the heart of the system. Within this type of setting, direct advocacy, which is often associated with openness and parallel relations between state and non-state actors, could hinder the process of advocacy itself. An advocacy strategy with a more indirect, subtle and polite approach could ease the necessary relationship-building, allowing the preconditions for negotiation to develop.

#### **4.3.4. Power Relations in the DRR WG: The Strong Role of UN Agencies and the Development of Local NGOs**

This research found that UN agencies play a strong role in the DRR WG, considering their high levels of access to the government and their institutional resources. UNDP is the one of the government's main counterparts. As the chair of the DRR WG, UNDP has been very active in assisting the work of the RRD at both the national and regional (ASEAN) levels. To ease the coordination process, UNDP even has their own satellite office in the RRD office in Nay Pyi Taw. The relationship between UNDP and the RRD has become stronger both formally and informally. The communication process between these agencies is carried out in a close and friendly environment where coordination and decision making are often performed through telephone conversations. In one of the example, UNDP convinced the government (RRD) over the telephone to adopt the global message as their national theme for IDDR 2014. This phone call was made after two international NGOs encountered difficulties in convincing the government to accommodate the joint campaign on 'Elderly People for DRR.' The capacity of UNDP to change the position of the government over the telephone indicates that the government has a high level of trust towards UNDP. This trust has eased the UNDP-driven advocacy process.

Aside from its high level of access to the government, UNDP is also framed by the government and other DRR WG members as having a large pool of resources. In one of the DRR WG's monthly meetings, several organisations referred to UNDP as an 'organisation which has more money' (compared with NGOs).<sup>20</sup> This was confirmed in another example, when the government requested that UNDP provide financial support to strengthen the government in the area of DRR at a regional level. At the ASEAN level, together with Indonesia, Myanmar is the chair of the ASEAN Disaster Preparedness Committee Recovery Working Group.<sup>21</sup> UNDP assisted the government in this role to prepare a draft on regional recovery planning for ASEAN. During a trilateral meeting with ASEAN, the government of Indonesia and the government of Myanmar, RRD, representing the Myanmar government, casually asked UNDP Myanmar to financially support their role in the ASEAN Disaster Preparedness Committee. This direct request made in a high-level official meeting came without prior formal arrangement with UNDP, and the UNDP representative looked unprepared to respond to this request. This specific example showed how the government framed UNDP not only as their strategic partner but also as funding supporter, at both the national and the regional level.

In contrast to the strong roles of UN agencies in the DRR WG, the involvement of local NGOs is still emerging. At the time of the data collection, only 18 of 49 members of the DRR WG were local NGOs. This is equal to 36% of the members, whereas a higher percentage (64%) were international agencies (both UN agencies and NGOs). For local NGOs, the DRR WG is a

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<sup>20</sup> DRR WG meeting, 19 September 2014

<sup>21</sup> Participant observation, 22 September 2014

strategic platform to develop a partnership with UN agencies and international NGOs. Almost all local NGOs attested to the importance of participating in the DRR WG.

In the DRR WG, we can share experience and organise partnerships [...] We can improve our capacity and get knowledge from the DRR WG. (interview with a male local NGO representative, 7 December 2015)

The development of local NGOs for DRR began only after Nargis (Lall & Win, 2012). For over a decade, civil society in Myanmar had suffered from systematic repression of freedom of speech, but the momentum of the political transition and experience after Nargis changed the game. Local NGOs working specifically on disaster management started to emerge, following intensive exposure to international relief assistance after Nargis. The opportunities to partner with the DRR WG are extremely important for the development of local NGOs. The involvement in this group, with its strong and reputable member organisations, is strategic for local NGOs seeking to improve their capacity.

They have to make our people on the frontline. Otherwise, we are left behind from the war for more than 30 years. We are an isolated country, [and we] suffered from sanctions; therefore, education is very low. Compared with the neighbouring countries, we are very, very far left behind. I want to insist [to] them to take us to the frontline, to have a space, to have a chance, to build up our capacities. (interview with a male MCDRR member, 8 December 2015)

However, the engagement of the MCDRR in the DRR WG did not come without challenges. The language barrier has also become a factor limiting the participation of local NGOs.<sup>22</sup> All interaction in the DRR Working Group meetings (monthly meetings, task force meetings and steering committee meetings) are conducted in English.

Another challenge is the language problem. Even though they listen, even though they speak English, because of [the] Myanmar culture and education system, they don't speak up. Usually they do not speak up; they're silent. Myanmar culture is very much quiet; especially local NGOs are not confident enough that they can participate, but, now, those who regularly attend this one, they, I think, they also build their capacity; they become active. (interview with a male UN agency staff member, 17 October 2014)

This situation has been acknowledged as one of the key challenges in the DRR WG.<sup>23</sup> The 2014–2018 strategic framework of the DRR Working Group attempts to address the problem of local NGO participation by committing to empowering local organisations to take leading roles in the DRR sector (expected outcome 4) (DRR Working Group Strategic Framework 2013–2018, 2013). This will be achieved through several interim outcomes: (1) participation of local NGOs accounts for at least 50% of the total membership of the DRR WG, with evidence of active participation; (2) at least 70% of sub-national level DRR coordination networks are jointly led by local NGOs and local government; and (3) at least 70% of field-level DRR-related

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<sup>22</sup> Interview with a UN Agency officer, 2 October 2014; interview with an international NGO representative, 4 October 2014

<sup>23</sup> Interview with a UN agency staff member, 2 October 2014; interview with an international NGO representative, 4 October 2014

projects in Myanmar are implemented by local NGOs (Strategic Framework of the DRR Working Group, 2013).

The network has tried to shift the language to local Burmese; however, the involvement of local NGOs remains the same, whereas this has caused the participation of international NGOs to go down.<sup>24</sup> Members of the MCDRR have continued to advocate for the use of Burmese language in DRR WG meetings:

I want to insist that international organisations and national give space, more space to local NGOs. I don't mean just for [information] sharing; I mean for capacities, trainings, workshops, as well as giving a space to have a chance to speak at the frontline. (interview with a local NGO representative, 7 December 2015)

In addition, poor resource capacity of local NGOs also limited their level of participation in the DRR WG.

Local NGOs are busy; we have limited human resources, so we can't assign one person to come to [the] DRR WG. We can't pay for the salary of [a] DRR specialist. This specialist is rare for local NGOs. For international NGOs, they can pay USD 700–800; it's easy for them because they have money. Besides, [the] DRR WG meetings [are] mostly organised in the downtown area. With the traffic, I have to go there with money out of my own pocket. (interview with a male local NGO representative, 7 December 2015)

Hence, insufficient capacity to communicate in English, a lack of confidence, a different communication culture (trained by the commando and authoritarian system to be passive) and poor resource capacity are real challenges for local NGOs. These challenges made the involvement of local NGOs in the DRR WG rather passive and less influential than international agencies.

#### **4.3.5. Governance Network at the Local Level**

The growing government commitment to an inclusive environment at the national level creates hopes for a more participatory approach at the local level. In terms of the governance network, the triangle of cooperation between the government, IOs/NGOs and the community is clearly reflected in DRR projects endorsed by IOs and NGOs. As such, this section investigates the practice of partnership among these three actors, exploring to what extent the principle of inclusiveness is enacted in local practice on DRR.

For this purpose, this study focused on the intervention MR, which was introduced above. As a consortium project, MR is operated by six organisations in six different states in Myanmar. Three of the six consortium members are implementing partners (IPs), and the other three organisations are technical partners (TPs). The IPs organise and implement the project in the field, whereas TPs mainly provide additional knowledge support to the IPs. The project, funded by a European-based humanitarian donor, is implemented in five states/divisions in Myanmar: Ayeyarwady, Rakhine, Bago, Yangon and Sagaing. The present study followed the project in one state—Ayeyarwady Delta—where four consortium members worked together. The MR project aims to increase the resilience of coastal and urban communities by institutionalising an inclusive DRR approach (Myanmar for Resilience, 2014). The 'inclusive DRR approach' of this

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<sup>24</sup> Interview with a UN agency staff member, 17 October 2014

project refers to the engagement of women, disabled people, children and elderly people in the formulation and implementation of disaster management in their communities.

Research for this chapter was conducted in two villages: Mangalar Thaung Tan Village and Aung Hlaing Village. Both villages are located in the outer ring Ayeyarwady Delta, an area that was heavily damaged by cyclone Nargis in 2008. It took 7 hours by bus from Yangon to reach Labutta (the capital of Ayeyarwady Delta) and an additional 6 hours by boat to reach the studied villages. Mangalar Thaung Tan Village has 1,400 inhabitants, and Aung Hlaing Village has a population of 2,000. As a coastal area, the majority of these communities' livelihood comes from fishing and small-scale farming. During Nargis, approximately 27 people died in the village of Mangalar Thaung Tan. The storm also severely damaged boats, causing the livelihood of the community to reach a low point. When the cyclone hit the village, the community used their instincts to survive this severe disaster; most people ran to the hills to protect themselves from the cyclone. For days, inhabitants of the affected community members stayed in the forests until the rescue team from the government reached the villages.

In 2014, the MR project was initiated in both villages. This project was carried out by one of MR IPs, with the support of gender and children expertise from two TPs. The interventions in the community took different forms, including training, simulations and campaigns. Training on community-based DRR aims to increase the capacity of men, women, boys and girls in communities and institutions by raising awareness about preparing for the impact of hazards and managing disaster risks (Myanmar for Resilience, 2014). During this process of community-based DRR training, all elements of the community (i.e. men, women, children, elderly people and disabled people) participated in activities such as risk assessment, school-based DRR, children-based DRR and women's leadership for villages (Myanmar for Resilience, 2014).

Based on the observations and interview with 36 respondents in both villages, this research noted three insights. First, the community responded to the MR project positively by acknowledging the importance of DRR knowledge transfer as a new set of survival skills for disasters. In the initial phase of the project, it was revealed that the community relied on local knowledge to deal with disaster. This includes knowledge about early warning and disaster response, such as (1) surviving by running to a higher place when disaster strikes; (2) storing food to prepare for disaster; (3) considering seagulls flying towards the mainland to be a storm warning; (4) seagulls moving to the mainland as a sign for abnormal weather; (5) understanding sounds echoing from large cliffs as an indication of strong winds; (6) noticing ants moving to higher ground and (g) using a black joint on a frog bone to predict the beginning of the rain. The community relied heavily on basic survival skills, with minimum knowledge of disaster preparedness.

During Nargis, the water reached 3 feet. We ran to the coconut forest. But the water came through the forest. We stayed around one week in the forest. We only ate and drank coconuts. The government asked us to move to Labutta, but we said, 'we love our land; we will stay here even if we have to die for it'. (interview with a male community member, 15 February 2015)

After the intervention, the communities were able to identify a safe zone, perform first aid and prioritise vulnerable groups for rescue actions. The community also valued their new knowledge about early warning systems through the dissemination of information via radio and flags.

The experience and knowledge is extremely helpful. If the storm comes, we can reduce the loss of life more than before. This is all we can hope for; the training helps to save lives. As a fisherman, we were also trained on how to save our boat. (interview with a male community member, 15 February 2015)

Second, MR's 'Inclusive approach for DRR' has contributed to the social capital of the community. Throughout the project, the participation of representatives from all groups, including women, elderly people, children and disabled people, was the main requirement for all of the project activities. This practice was acknowledged as something uncommon for the community:

Having elderly people, women, children, youth and disabled people at the same forum is not a common practice in this village. (interview with a female community member, 15 February 2015)

The community responded positively to the new idea of 'inclusiveness'. Throughout the interviews and focus group discussions with the 36 respondents, almost all participants acknowledged the importance 'DRR inclusiveness' for improving the roles of community members. This approach brought the community together by bringing different elements of the community to the same forum. This included facilitating women, elderly people and disabled people to raise their voices.

Since we work together, the older people give us [youth] space to play a role, such as to inform [the] community to come to the training and to provide early warnings. I also a part of the Village Disaster Management Committee in the information subcommittee. (interview with a male community member, age 14, 15 February 2015)

We joined a training on Women's Leadership and Empowerment. Women can work together with men. Now we can work together on the same level with men. In our mind-set, man is superior; I feel small because we were dependent on our husbands. Now I have become more confident. (interview with a female community member, age 57, 15 February 2015)

This process contributes positively to building connectedness, institutionalising the inclusive approach through the Disaster Management Village Committees, establishing trust and facilitating reciprocity and exchange among community members. In communities with a long tradition of authoritarian control, having room for expression can indeed feel like a privilege. During the focus group discussions, I was surprised by the strong opinions and clear articulation from community members when they shared their feeling, positions and opinions. This voice could only appear when there is room for expression.

Lastly, this research indicates that there is poor engagement from the local government in the MR project, including weak support for the programme and budget from the Union level down to the state/district, township and village levels. In interviews, three MR field staff members shared their views on the minimum participation of the government:

The government only came when we invited them. Mostly, they come for a ceremonial event such as the event of DRR Day. They come for delivering [a] speech. (interview with a male member of the MR field staff, 16 February 2015)

From the government's point of view, the reporting process from the NGOs to the government is often problematic. This leaves the government uninformed about the work of the NGOs.

When NGOs come and work at the village/township level, the report [on the activity] often came late—like 3 months after the activities [...] Some organisations do not let us know; sometimes they neglect [...] If they come and give report to here [...] we can help, it [the activity] can work more [...] can be more successful. (interview with a male Head of Township, 15 February 2015)

This issue regarding NGOs' reporting brought up by the township government is identical to the position of the RRD at the Union level.

Every 4 months, we requested NGOs to send a report to us. Some NGOs send an uncompleted report. We need this report to check the budget control, in which 85% of their budget should go to the community. We have to check this commitment—whether every NGO reaches their budget. We also monitor their programme by coordinating with the region and township officials. (interview with a male RRD staff member, 11 December 2013)

Further, an interview with the Head of Township (an upper-level administrative position) revealed that there are no specific DRR programmes from the township to the village. The township mostly refers to hardware (e.g. shelters, water reservoirs) instead of software (e.g. capacity building), in terms of DRR.

We built five shelters so 1000 people can come in [when disaster strikes]. We also built a water reservoir. Last year [2014], the Vice President of Myanmar came to this township to raise awareness on disasters. We received logistic support [in preparation for disaster]. We have a Disaster Management Township Committee who we selected to sit in the function. (interview with a male Head of Township, 15 February 2015)

When I asked about the interaction of the township with the higher levels of administration (district/state/Union), the respondents stated as follow:

We come to the district level when they invite us for a training. We don't have specific budget on DRR; the budget is owned by the district level [upper administration]. If we need budget, we send them [a] letter. (interview with a male Head of Township, 15 February 2015)

Minimum coordination between the township and district was substantially weakened by the Myanmar's heavily bureaucratic structure. The Head of Township explained the bottom-up approach in the formulation of the disaster management agenda:

The development of the programme is bottom up. At the township level, they have to submit the work programme to the state government [regional level] and the head office [Union/national level]. We have the RRD sitting in every region/state. This office has to submit their programme to the ministries to ask for an advice. The ministries then send the programme to the respective government bodies [based on the relevancy] and to the President's office. For the budget, we allocated the budget through the RRD at the state [region] level. From there, it is distributed to the district and township levels. (interview with a male Head of Township, 15 February 2015)

However, interviews with a township government officer and NGOs revealed that, in actuality, programme development and financial resources are absent at the township level. All of the budget appears to be managed at the district level. This has strengthened the argument that local government, as the frontline for disaster management, often faces significant challenges coming from limited of resources, such as a ‘lack of money, expertise or authority’ (Hannigan, 2012: 24).

The present study’s field research in Ayeyarwady Delta contributes to understanding the governance network in practice at the local level. In reality, the governance network mostly involves the interfaces among three actors: the state, NGOs and community. The reality in the field leads to the conclusion that the governance network is weak at the local level. Although the community and NGOs have established close connections through this project, the state remains disengaged. Poor DRR policy, lacking financial support and problematic authority have led to weak partnership interfaces. As a result, opportunities to scale up the inclusive approach are minimal.

#### **4.4. Conclusions**

This chapter examined the dynamics of disaster risk governance in the transition setting of Myanmar. Empirical evidence showed how the ongoing transition at the national level has taken place in different forms. First, the government has shown a commitment to the new practice of inclusiveness. Second, the governance network concerning DRR has taken shape through the government’s engagement in partnerships with the multi-stakeholder network. Third, advocacy channels are open and being used by non-state actors to influence the government. Fourth, roles are emerging in the governance network for local NGOs within the dominance of the UN agencies. Finally, the participatory approach to DRR has encouraged democracy from below when community members raise their voices to reduce disaster risk.

Drawing upon empirical evidence, this chapter argues that the political transition has created a conducive environment for non-state actors to play a role in DRR across Myanmar. Government behaviour has shifted from that of a closed-minded regime to be more inclusive in engaging UN agencies, the Red Cross and NGOs. The involvement of these multiple actors in disaster management has slightly shifted practice in the field by moving away from a uni-centric approach towards a more pluricentric governance network. This is gradually generating a metaphoric space for non-state actors to articulate their policy-setting agendas. The active presence of the DRR WG and the participatory approach by NGOs at the community level provide clear evidence of this shift.

However, in the context of this shifting governance, the government remains dominant. This reality is shown by the strong roles played by the government in the DRR WG, where the government remains influential, dominant and a determining force in the DRR arena. The government has the power to determine the agenda of the partnership by using its power to access resources and control. The RRD receives financial, technical and knowledge assistance from the DRR WG. The power relations among the actors involved in disaster risk governance are asymmetrical, keeping the government at the heart of the arena. The norm of a ‘centralistic’ government is yet to be relegated to history, leading to the conclusion that, although the government espouses a commitment to the governance network, in practice, they want to maintain their controlling position. This reality is contradictory to the spirit of the governance network in terms of advocating open, engaging and parallel partnerships.

Finally, some critical points emerging from the field work also showed how the commitment and performance of the government has significantly influenced the governance network in practice in terms of DRR. The dynamics at the national and local levels contribute differently to this conclusion. At the national level, the heavily bureaucratic government and a high workload resulting from ongoing political changes have, to some extent, delayed the decision-making process. In this very structured setting, the predominant bureaucratic culture remains hierarchical and command-based. Meanwhile, at the local level, NGOs interventions in communities have promoted a new practice for decision making in the villages. After living under a government-controlled system and being educated in a command culture, community members have acknowledged that NGOs have created room for expression, allowing for all community members to articulate their voice; increased equality among community members in the villages; and, especially, contributed actively to the decision-making process at the village level. This reveals how the engagement of NGOs in the community has been strongly developed. In contrast, for different reasons ranging from poor resources (knowledge and budget) to government distrust of NGOs, the government is not fully involved in the governance network regarding DRR at the local level.

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## Chapter 5 - Disaster Risk Reduction Platforms as Advocacy Networks in Indonesia and Myanmar

Interactive governance has increasingly become common practice for disaster risk reduction (DRR). The idea behind this concept resonates with broader ideas about effective policy making, which have shifted from government-centred to also include non-state actors as crucial in the process. In many disaster-prone countries, platforms on DRR have developed to institutionalise the idea of interactive governance. Although recent academic work has offered interesting insights about the policy requisites for successful interactive governance, there is need for a field study that goes beyond a normative framework to explore the actual dynamics and interactions of multiple actors involved in DRR governance networks. This chapter aims to fill this gap by describing and analysing everyday realities of interactive governance through examining two different DRR platforms, one in Indonesia and one in Myanmar. The chapter focuses on the characteristics of the advocacy of the two DRR platforms: the Indonesian Alliance for the Revision of Disaster Management Law No 24/2007 and the Myanmar Consortium for DRR. Data were collected during six months of qualitative research in Jakarta, Nay Pyi Taw and Yangon. The findings showed that, in both countries, DRR platforms encountered significant internal hindrances related to the government's commitment to interactive governance. The effectiveness and success of the platforms were also influenced by the wider advocacy environment in the country. This chapter concludes that interactive governance on DRR is only fruitful in settings where the government fully plays its role as part of the process of interactive governance. Poor political willingness on the part of the government to acknowledge and engage in this process makes the practice of collective action less effective and less influential.

*Keywords:* interactive governance, governance network, agenda setting, advocacy, power relations

Disaster risk reduction (DRR) governance networks were initially introduced almost 30 years ago, when the 1990s were designated as the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR). Previously, when DRR became part of the policy agenda in the 1970s, the paradigm of DRR was predominantly based on a hazard-oriented approach (Smith, 2013: 2). This type of approach heavily stressed the state's capacity for disaster response through military operations (Oliver Smith, 2013: 2). In the 1970s, the United Nations (UN) Disaster Relief Office was developed to provide advice to governments in cases of disaster, without considering or mentioning the role of non-state actors. The dominance of the hazard paradigm gradually shifted towards a so-called 'vulnerability approach', which focused more on human capacity (Gaillard and Mercer, 2012: 94; Hagelsteen and Per Becker, 2012: 5). Following this shift, the involvement of non-state actors in DRR was increasingly acknowledged during the 1980s. UN Resolution Number 36/225 in 1981 recognised the role of the 'International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and appropriate voluntary organizations' in international relief systems (UN, 1981). This recognition significantly developed over the 1990s, when the IDNDR underlined the role of non-state actors, described as 'scientific and technology communities, humanitarian groups and investment institutions', in terms of active involvement in global action for DRR (UNISDR, 2007). The resolution on IDNDR called upon UN member states to establish 'national committees' as a mechanism to gather government and non-state actors to participate in reducing the loss and disruption caused by natural disasters (UNISDR, 2007). The discourse on this kind of network was later re-framed

in the *Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World* (1994). This framework described ‘partnerships’ in which state and non-state stakeholders would work together in the spirit of ‘common interest and shared responsibilities’ (UNISDR, 2007). The *Hyogo Framework for Action* (2005) strengthened this idea by introducing a specific mechanism called ‘multi-stakeholder platforms’ to frame collaboration between state and non-state actors on DRR. Most recently, the *Sendai Framework* for DRR 2015–2030 incorporated the collaboration of various stakeholders within the framework of ‘disaster risk governance’.

Throughout these historical milestones, the institutionalisation of governance networks on DRR has not merely been a response towards the growing involvement of non-state actors in DRR. Instead, the commitment to institutionalising this collaborative work was inspired by the need to elevate the effectiveness of DRR by including both state and non-state actors. The UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) defined ‘multi-stakeholder platforms’ as an advocacy mechanism for DRR geared towards coordination, analysis and advice on areas of priority needing concerted action (Djalante, 2012: 2924). This platform, which this chapter refers to as a ‘governance network’, was expected to contribute to more effective management (UNISDR, 2013; Warner et al 2002: 2). Specifically, the report of the *Hyogo Framework for Action* claimed that multi-stakeholder platforms would contribute significantly to ‘integrating DRR into sustainable development policies and supporting less developed countries in implementing the HFA [*Hyogo Framework for Action*]’ (Djalante, 2012: 2924). It was also believed that this and other governance networks could stimulate learning and innovation (Djalante 2012: 2932; Warner 2007: 4).

UNISDR data indicate that around 93 national platforms on DRR had been developed worldwide as of in 2016 (PreventionWeb, 2017). This number does not include the many DRR networks that have taken different forms outside national platforms, such as the Multi-stakeholder Forum for DRR, the National Committee for DRR and the DRR Working Group (DRR WG).

Alongside the importance that policymakers and practitioners have placed on governance networks on DRR, academic interest in this concept has also grown. Several scholars have explored the principle of governance networks to gain an overarching understanding of disaster management networks in Asia. For instance, Djalante (2012) studied adaptive governance and multi-stakeholder platforms in Indonesia using a multi-stakeholder approach; Raju and Niekerk (2013) discussed multi-organisational coordination for disaster recovery in India; and Chui, Feng and Jordan (2014) used the same lens to explore advocacy coalition frameworks in the context of Taiwan’s policy changes. These authors have all related the principle of governance network to a disaster-related context in Asia. Djalante (2012: 2923) advocated the concept of adaptive governance as an ‘alternative’ in governing disaster management and placed multi-stakeholder platforms at the heart of this approach, arguing that multi-stakeholder platforms offer a way to manage problems with flexible and adjustable governance systems. Djalante (2012: 2932) elaborated on the complex setting of the governance network on DRR from global to local level and argued that networks could stimulate learning and innovation within DRR policy—an argument that was also made earlier by Warner (2007). Raju referred to ‘coordination structures’ to describe the network arena of disaster recovery. He argued that effective DRR politics requires clarity on rules, a willingness to coordinate, strong leadership and deliberative command. Finally, Chui, Feng and Jordan (2014) addressed pluricentric advocacy within the groundwork of ‘advocacy coalition framework[s].’ Throughout their study, Chui et al. argued

that the success of advocacy through coalitions and alliances is mainly determined by the social engagement and common commitment among stakeholders to work on collective action.

This existing work has offered scholars of governance some interesting insight on the requirements for successful interactive governance. However, the academic literature on governance networks on DRR still lacks a specific study on the internal dynamics among actors in DRR governance networks. Rather than merely knowing which prerequisites would offer an ideal, normative situation for effective DRR governance, we need to understand more about how DRR platforms actually work in practice. DRR governance networks are characterised by the interplay among various actors who have different backgrounds but have agreed to work together within the same platform. As such, DRR governance networks have often been accused of being too competitive, complex and uncoordinated (Djalante 2012: 2925; Raju and Niekerk 2013: 92). However, previous work has levied these criticisms based on normative frameworks of effective interactive governance, without sufficiently explaining the interplay between the macro level of system dynamics and the characteristics of advocacy movements. Djalante (2012: 2938) offered a rich explanation of the interplay between various multi-stakeholder platforms, highlighting ‘participation, collaboration and learning/sharing space’ as key elements in disaster resilience. Meanwhile Raju and Niekerk (2013: 98) focused on the issue of coordinating inter-sectorial department functions to achieve ‘sustainable disaster recovery’. Later, Chui, Feng and Jordan (2014: 36) concluded that the success of an alliance’s advocacy framework is determined by ‘social capital on participatory engagement’. Moving beyond the institutional setting of collective action on DRR and including the challenges encountered in this initiative, this chapter seeks to elaborate the internal dynamics within the governance network, including the different interests and opinions among actors within the wider political system. The chapter contributes to the literature by offering insight into the daily practices, problems and events that take place in two DRR platforms. The chapter is based on research conducted over several periods of fieldwork in two governance networks in Indonesia and Myanmar. Throughout the fieldwork, the interactions and advocacy processes of these platforms were traced, and both state and non-state actors were interviewed about their perceptions and experiences.

Platforms in Indonesia and Myanmar were selected as the cases for this study for three main reasons. First, both countries are among the most at-risk for disaster, worldwide. The 2016 World Risk Index, which ranked 171 countries according to their vulnerability to natural disaster (Africa News, 2016), placed Indonesia and Myanmar among the top five Southeast Asian countries most prone to natural hazards.

Second, Indonesia and Myanmar offer clear examples of how natural disasters can serve as catalysts for policy transformation on disaster management. In both countries, the national governments became committed to introducing new policies, legal settings and institutional mechanisms following mega-disasters (the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia and cyclone Nargis in 2008 in Myanmar). Third, in both countries, these transformations have generated the development of a DRR governance network.

Beyond these commonalities, the two countries have distinct characteristics that complement each other. In Indonesia, the work of civil society on DRR has developed for over 13 years, beginning after the tsunami in Aceh offered momentum in 2004. In contrast, in Myanmar, the network of national nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) on DRR was only initiated in 2012. In the context of the wider political system, although Indonesia and Myanmar have both experienced political transitions from military-type regimes to more democratic governments,

the transition in Indonesia has brought significant changes in terms of freedom of expression and the distribution of power between central and local authorities.

Taking Indonesia and Myanmar as case studies, this chapter attempts to answer the following questions: How has the idea of interactive governance, structured by the DRR governance network, played out in Indonesia and Myanmar? What explains the internal dynamics of the networks in terms of the advocacy agenda and modes? What crosscutting findings resonate for both cases? To what extent do the ideas and expectations about the positive impacts of interactive governance ring true?

This chapter is structured into five sections. This first section has introduced the context of the cases. The second section briefly elaborates the concepts of interactive governance, power and advocacy, and explains how these concepts helped to trace the practice of DRR advocacy in this study. The concept of ‘interactive governance’ helps to explain the complex setting of DRR interaction, and the concepts of ‘power’ and ‘advocacy’ are useful for exploring the interaction dynamics occurring in the examined platforms. Finally, the concept of ‘system dynamics’ helps with picturing the advocacy process from the macro level. Next, the methodology used for data collection, analysis and processing is described in the third section. The fourth section presents the findings about how DRR advocacy in Indonesia and Myanmar developed after disasters and how this has resulted in specific DRR practices. Finally, the conclusion of the chapter connects the findings for the two cases with the literature on interactive governance.

## **5.1. Theoretical frameworks**

### **5.1.1. Interactive governance**

The concept of governance has been used extensively in academic and policy work. Governance is a new way of governing by embracing non-state actors in policy processes (Ewalt et al., 2001: 1; van Leeuwen and van Tatenhove, 2010: 590; Peters and Pierre, 1998: 224; Rhodes, 1996: 657; Stoker, 1998: 17). Governance challenges the traditional rules of political processes, which position the state as the core entity. In governance, the state is no longer acknowledged as the core power force; instead, a range of societal actors and their networks are considered to have power as well. A governance approach is pluricentric (Rhodes 1996: 657). Studying governance processes allows scholars to change the focus from state-led initiatives towards multi-actor involvement. This changes the locus and focus of governing by embracing new actors and new levels in the decision-making process (locus) and changing the rules of the game and steering mechanisms (focus) (van Leeuwen and van Tatenhove, 2010: 591).

This research used the concept of interactive governance to operationalise the principle of inclusive DRR. Gaillard and Mercer (2012) clarified the concept of ‘inclusive DRR’, defining ‘inclusiveness’ as a ‘a large array of stakeholders operating across different scales to collaborate’ (Gaillard and Mercer, 2012: 95). Adopting this definition, this chapter understands ‘inclusiveness’ as the process of working through pluricentric mechanisms to reduce disaster risk. This chapter discusses the complex process, common objectives and decentred nature of interaction in networks through the lens of interactive governance (Torfing et al., 2012: 14–15).

This chapter uses the lens of ‘governance network’ to analyse the practice of interactive governance. Governance network is one of the typical forms of arrangement for interactive governance (Torfing et al., 2012: 16). It emphasises the work of multiple actors who act autonomously but relate interdependently in the ‘institutionalised framework’ of the policy-making process (Torfing et al., 2012: 16).

### 5.1.2. Advocacy

The notion of advocacy politics revolves around the idea of providing policy input by ‘advocating alternative programs, procedures, and political systems’ (Kerkvliet, 2009: 232). It is ‘a game of persuasion and bargaining of interests’ (Constantinou, 2013: 148) to influence ‘actors, systems, structures and ideas’ (Edwards, 1993: 164). In the literature on advocacy, the concept of ‘influence’ is seen as a key aspect of the advocacy process, and this concept has been presented in various academic work (Almog-Bar and Schmid, 2014; Anderson, 2010; Barrett, van Wessel and Hilhorst, 2016; Ospina and Saz-Carranza, 2010; Stone, 2004; Teles and Schmitt, 2011). ‘Influence’ has been described as ‘affecting the decision through some form of external pressure’ (Heywood, 2004: 52). This process is regarded as deeply crucial for advocacy because it is expected to lead to the creation of change and transformation of ‘the legal, political and social conditions’ (Barrett, Wessel and Hilhorst, 2016: 9).

The practice of advocacy is often framed as an ‘open, direct and concerted’ approach (Kerkvliet, 2009: 232). Barrett, van Wessel and Hilhorst (2016) defined advocacy for development as aiming to create ‘sustainable changes in public and political contexts’ (Barrett, van Wessel and Hilhorst, 2016: 15). A theoretical review of advocacy highlights three effective advocacy modes: campaigns, high-level lobby and public strategies. Advocacy work is also performed in other various ways, such as ‘awareness raising, legal actions and public education, as well as building networks, relationships and capacity’ (Barrett, van Wessel and Hilhorst, 2016: 15).

In attempting to trace and analyse the advocacy process in two governance networks of DRR in Indonesia and Myanmar, the present study adopted the typology of advocacy activities developed by Barrett, van Wessel and Hilhorst (2016). This model includes 10 types of advocacy activities: (1) strategy development and planning; (2) relationship building and maintaining; (3) capacity building; (4) content development; (5) information-centred activities; (6) insider advocacy communication; (7) outsider advocacy communication; (8) participation in multi-stakeholder processes; (9) monitoring mechanisms; and (10) using legal and grievances mechanisms (Barrett, van Wessel and Hilhorst, 2016: 20–21). This chapter classifies the advocacy processes performed by both networks according to this typology.

In addition, the chapter also incorporates an analysis of the macro level of the political environment in the two examined countries. Advocacy outcomes are shaped by the internal aspects of the network and by the broader setting in which the network operates. In this context, whether a political system is democratic or authoritarian will tend to influence the dynamics of the advocacy movement—what advocates can and cannot do, how far their influence reaches, and the methods they can use to set their agenda and reach their goals. In the academic literature, the environment surrounding the advocacy process is known as ‘system dynamics’, referring to ‘dynamics in the government, the economy and international institutions’ as well as ‘developments like conflicts and natural disasters’ (Barrett, van Wessel and Hilhorst, 2016: 9). System dynamics can create room for manoeuvre or generate hurdles for advocacy, resulting in an uncertain process (Barrett, van Wessel and Hilhorst, 2016: 9). Taking this into account, it becomes clear that an analysis of advocacy processes in DRR governance networks would not be complete without a discussion of the system dynamics operating in the country.

## **5.2. Methodology**

This research used qualitative methods for data collection, processing and analysis. Qualitative research aims to describe complex interactions between different stakeholders. The underpinning philosophy of qualitative research relies on the essence of experiences, meanings and perceptions to acquire knowledge (Kumar, 2005: 38). Case studies, in particular, are used as a method to gain holistic and in-depth knowledge (Tellis, 1997: 3). Indonesia and Myanmar were selected for this study to bring together two cases on the same theoretical grounds. Considering both of these cases enabled the present study to generate comparative explanations, explore causal relations and contextualise distinctions (Lancaster and Montinola, 1997: 186).

Data on Indonesia were collected during four months of fieldwork in Jakarta (November–December 2015). Interviews were organised with nine government officials, one Indonesian national platform (*Platform Nasional*, PLANAS) and eight NGO staff members on the task force of the Alliance for Strengthening Disaster Management Law in Indonesia.

In Myanmar, field research was conducted in Nay Pyi Taw and Yangon over a four-month period, including a preliminary research trip in December 2013, three months of fieldwork from September to November 2014 and a short follow-up trip in February 2015. The research was designed to study the dynamics of the Myanmar Consortium for DRR (MCDRR). I interviewed 17 individuals working for nine national NGOs. I also engaged in an internship programme at a UN agency that was a member of the DRR WG, an active DRR multi-stakeholder platform working to develop and deliver policy recommendations to the agency. These recommendations were used to propose a plan of action to improve disaster risk governance in Myanmar.

The fieldwork was combined with analyses of policy documents, academic literature and political reports relevant for the themes of civil society, advocacy and DRR in Indonesia and Myanmar. The section below begins with a brief analysis of the history and development of civil society and advocacy networks in Indonesia and Myanmar, before presenting the findings from the fieldwork regarding the workings of networks.

## **5.3. Results and analysis**

### **5.3.1. Civil society in Indonesia and Myanmar**

#### **5.3.1.1. Indonesia**

The initial development of Indonesian civil society can be traced back to the 1920s (Cleary, 1997: 14). Large organisations associated with religious affiliations were established to serve the community in need, especially in the sectors of education and healthcare. Public social welfare organisations aimed to fill the gap between the objective of the government programme and the needs of the vulnerable population (Carey, 1997: 14). However, civil society in Indonesia entered a dark period when the country's second president, Soeharto, came to power in the mid-1960s. Significant limitations to advocacy access and severe suspicion from the government restricted the movement of civil society. Under the Soeharto administration, civil society had a challenging relationship with the government. Civil society was framed as 'potentially destabilising political forces and might mask political agitation' (Cleary, 1997: 14–15). The government later developed laws and regulations to limit civil society's room for manoeuvre, including Law No 8 about mass organisation in 1985, which established the role of the government as the advisor for the work of mass organisations (Hanapiah, 2001: 13).

The advocacy environment drastically changed with the momentum of political reform in 1998. In Indonesian history, 1998 is a stepping stone for Indonesian democracy. The year marked the start of Indonesian political reform (*Reformasi*), when massive student demonstrations pushed Soeharto to step down from his 32-year presidency. This was the beginning of the reform process in Indonesian politics, including a drive for freedom of expression. The *Reformasi* inspired the amendment of Indonesia's constitution, especially regarding Article No 28 on the freedom to unite and gather and express one's voice through both oral and written communication (Hanapiah, 2001: 13). The government also positioned itself as a 'partner' in achieving development goals, acknowledging the role of civil society to keep the government in check (Hanapiah, 2001: 14)

This new era has inspired the growth of civil society in almost all sectors, including law enforcement, healthcare, the environment and disaster management. In the specific context of DRR, the 2004 tsunami spurred major developments in the disaster management agenda, including the development of a specific body to address disaster management, the Indonesian National Agency for Disaster Management (*Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana*, BNPB), and the emergence of civil society engagement on disaster management. Indonesia currently enjoys the active engagement of civil society in disaster management advocacy, where various multi-stakeholder platforms were established independently in the years following the tsunami (i.e. PLANAS, Indonesian Civil Society for Disaster Management [*Masyarakat Peduli Bencana Indonesia*, MPBI], Indonesian Expertise on Disaster Management [*Ikatan Ahli Bencana Indonesia*, IABI], the University Forum [*Forum Universitas*], the Regional DRR Forum [*Forum Peduli Bencana Daerah*], and the Village DRR Forum [*Forum Peduli Bencana Desa*]).

Given the above developments, it can be concluded that the advocacy environment in Indonesia tends to work to the advantage of the civil society movement. First, a clear legal framework in Indonesia's constitution guarantees the legality of activities related to freedom of expression or freedom to unite and gather. Second, the government has politically acknowledged both the existence of civil society and the role of this movement to keep the government in check. Third, civil society in Indonesia has developed rapidly since 1998 in multiple sectors, such as the environment, law enforcement and DRR. As a new force in Indonesian democracy, civil society, often working as alliances of NGOs, aims to influence the decision-making process, including acting as a pressure group to have an impact on law making. To shed light on this process, below, this chapter examines as a case the work of an alliance to push for revision to Indonesian Disaster Management Law No 24 in 2007.

#### **5.3.1.2. Myanmar**

The civil society movement in Myanmar has a long tradition and history. Prior to the country's independence in 1948, civil society in Myanmar began with religious organisations aiming to provide social services to the community (ADB, 2015; Petrie and South, 2014: 87). The emergence of these organisations, often called '*Sangha*', marked the beginning of the civil society sector in the country. *Sangha* and other forms of civil society organisations developed on a large scale until 1962 (ADB, 2015). In 1962, a 'dark era' for civil society in Myanmar began, as the government rigidly controlled the activities of the movement. This situation lasted until 2010, when the breakthrough of political changes included the roadmap to democracy, the adoption of a new constitution and the semi-authoritarian regime's creation of more space for civil society. Since then, civil society, which 'does not exist in Burmese terminology' (Steinberg, 2001: 101), has developed its role in advocacy. In a publication brief, the Asian Development Bank classified civil society in Myanmar into three categories: community-based organisations,

local NGOs and international NGOs. The community-based organisations developed at the village level and work extensively on social activities with a non-profit orientation. Local and international NGOs have formal and systematic organisational set-ups and are registered with the government (ADB, 2015).

In the DRR context, the government now works closely with an active multi-stakeholder platform, the DRR WG. In contrast to the Indonesian case, the DRR WG in Myanmar is predominantly driven by international organisations/NGOs. The DRR WG is a multi-stakeholder network consisting of 49 members, including UN agencies, international and local NGOs and independent consultants. This network plays an active role in DRR advocacy in the country. In addition to the DRR WG, MCDRR was established as a platform of national NGOs working on DRR in 2012. MCDRR is a local consortium that focuses on DRR and climate change, with the purpose of supporting local organisations in ‘coordinating, networking and information sharing related to DRR at all levels’ (MCDRR, 2015).

Myanmar’s political transition towards being a more substantially democratic country seems to have opened ‘Pandora’s Box’, as Myanmar must face serious issues resulting from spending three decades under a controlling, centralistic and isolated regime. Issues related to economic development, fiscal priorities, the absence of the rule of law, human rights abuses, media control, environmental degradation and the high-risk of disaster (Gravers and Ytzen, 2014: 1; Myint-U, 2012: 26; Skidmore and Wilson, 2012: 13) have to be confronted alongside the transition process. In fact, despite the ongoing reform, the country still has many characteristics of ‘an authoritarian, “top-down” society’, including a ‘lack of transparency’ (Skidmore and Wilson, 2012: 10–11).

The political changes in Myanmar were expected to lift the restriction on freedom of expression. In line with this expectation, the administration of Than Shein (2011–2015) gradually released political prisoners and created space for expression for civil society. Aung San Su Kyi, the leader of the National League for Democracy, the winning party, stated that the era of ‘punishment for speaking out’ had ended (The Guardian, 2017). In a great deal of academic literature, civil society in Myanmar was projected to play a significant role by creating a bottom-up approach to the political transition and building an arena where people’s voices could be heard (Petrie and South, 2014: 87; Steinberg, 2001: 101).

However, despite these high expectations, the reality on the ground showed a very different outcome. Human Rights Watch addressed the architecture of the law in Myanmar, reporting on continued threats to freedom of expression (Reuters, 2016). One of the controversial laws banning freedom of speech is the Peaceful Assembly Law, which is often used to justify taking action against protesters and demonstrators (Reuters, 2016). Although this law was amended by parliament in 2014, it maintained the article on the ‘sentence of demonstrators and protesters’ (ADB, 2015). This also includes an article on the government’s right to deny permission to demonstrations potentially affecting ‘the country, race or religious relations, human dignity, or moral principles’ (ADB, 2015). The position of Aung San Suu Kyi on this subject was later questioned when, under her administration, the government imprisoned 38 people, including Myo Yan Naung Thein, the secretary of the ruling party’s central research committee, for criticising the Chief of Military for the intervention made in Rakhine (Asian Correspondent, 2016).

Clearly, the political changes in Myanmar have not completely removed the limitations on the civil society movement. The disincentives regulation—including the arrest of high-ranking government officials for criticising military action—is a negative precedent for the freedom of

expression. This has further confirmed the strong power of the military in today's transitional Myanmar.

This raises questions regarding how civil society plays their role on DRR in this changing political environment. To what extent does DRR civil society define their movement in the midst of the pro-active roles of the UN and international NGOs in Myanmar? How do these dynamics compare with the Indonesian situation? After elaborating on the Indonesian case in the next section, this chapter presents the analysis of the role of MCDRR as the manifestation of emerging civil society in Myanmar.

### **5.3.2. Indonesia: Alliance for the Revision of the Disaster Management Law**

For the Indonesian case, the analysis of DRR civil society focuses on the advocacy efforts of the Alliance for the Revision of Disaster Management Law No 24/2007 (hereafter referred to as the alliance). Law No 24/2007 was enacted by the Indonesian House of Representatives (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*) to protect the lives and livelihoods of Indonesian people from severe disaster outbreaks. This law created the architecture of the disaster management system in Indonesia by regulating the authority, responsibilities, institutions and partnerships within the system. The initiative to pursue legislative advocacy was driven by the alliance's severe criticism of the weakness of the law. An interview with a staff member of one of the NGO alliance members revealed this weakness:

Law Number 24/2007 was not communicated well to the local level. The component of capacity was not included in the definition of disaster [...] and if we look closer, there is a perception that the law belongs to BNPB; it made others feel that they do not own the law. Since the start, we already knew that there are problems. The fundamental problem was that the development of this law was undertaken by the technocrat. (interview with a male NGO staff member, 1 November 2015)

MPBI, as the initiator of the alliance, began the advocacy campaign by raising the issue to parliament in 2012. PLANAS, the national multi-stakeholder platform, decided to join this initiative as a way to engage with a wider element of stakeholders in their advocacy work. In practice, the alliance organised themselves into several task forces aiming to deeply improve the substance of the law. From interviews and an analysis of policy documents, it became clear that, in the initial stages of this advocacy, the alliance formed five working groups with the aim of gaining in-depth understanding of the developing problems, solutions and recommendations for the proposed legal revision. These five working groups covered issues of the institutional setting, partnerships, public participation, financing and accountability. Each of the working groups formulated input for a report that served as the foundation for lobbying parliament.

To gain an understanding of the main reasons behind the advocacy process of the alliance, seven interviews were conducted with individuals working in seven different organisations that were members of the alliance. These organisations were the main players in the movement across many contexts: the organisations in charge of the task forces (the Indonesian Red Cross [*Palang Merah Indonesia*], PLANAS, and Dompet Dhuafa), the initiator of the revision (MPBI), a representative of the NGOs Consortium (Humanitarian Forum Indonesia), a mass organisation representative (Muhammadiyah Disaster Management Center) and an academic organisation representative (IABI). Four of these seven respondents worked for multi-stakeholder organisations:

▪ PLANAS	Government–public–private platform
▪ MPBI	Professional-based
▪ IABI	Academic
▪ Humanitarian Forum Indonesia	NGO consortium

This section summarises these respondents’ concerns with the law, as well as their attempts to have the law revised. From the interviews with staff members, it appeared that there were at least four key issues related to the demanded changes. The first involved the institutional setting of disaster management. Second was the definition and context of disaster. The third issue was emergency response status, and the fourth issue identified was public participation. The following paragraphs elaborate the rationale behind the desired revision of the law.

First, the agenda of ‘institutional strengthening’ was strongly expressed by the alliance as one of the problems with the law. The law only governed the institution setting and authority mandate within the disaster management system. In Article 5, the law mandated the central and regional governments to share responsibility and authority for disaster management. At the national level, BNPB was established to perform several duties such as providing guidance, direction, standards and requirements for disaster management (Article 12). BNPB was to be supervised directly by the president, as an organisation equal in level to the ministries. At the provincial and regional/municipality levels, the law tasked the Regional Disaster Management Authority (*Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah*, BPBD) with taking responsibility for disaster management at the local level (Article 18). Almost all of the respondents expressed the agenda of ‘institutional strengthening’ as crucial for revising the law. The organisational structure established by the law meant that BNPB and BPBD were connected only by a ‘coordination line’ instead of a ‘command line’. Contradictory to the initial aim of achieving effective DRR through decentralisation, in practice, tensions between BNPB and BPBD were often a challenge. The issues of BNPB’s roles, the lacking authority line between BNPB and BPBD and a ‘super body’ council of disaster management seemed to be the critical concerns for the alliance.

BPBD representatives spoke of ‘decentralised disaster risk governance’ in a negative tone, citing the lack of budget, human resources and capacity as factors hampering their work in the region. However, the government had different interests in terms of the revision initiative. Interviews with high-level officers from two government bodies (BNPB and the Coordinating Ministry on Human Development and Culture) revealed that neither of these bodies strongly expressed the ‘institutional setting’ agenda as major problems to be addressed. Law № 24/2007 only established BNPB and BPBD as government bodies to work specifically for disaster management; the roles of other ministries involved was not clarified. As such, the law created misinterpretation among the ministries regarding DRR-related issues.

Civil society proposes the establishment of a Disaster Management Council under the coordination of the president or vice president. That would mean that BNPB is dismissed of its organisational function, which is coordination. Coordination should lie with other parties with more political power. (interview with a male NGO staff member, 1 November 2015)

An interview with a high-level officer representing BNPB in the discussion of the revision to this law revealed a common position coming from the government, although this was mostly expressed in indirect and subtle ways:

Ideally, the Disaster Management Council is chaired by the vice president or president so it can be powerful; it would move the ministries. It's impossible for us [BNPB], who have the same level [as the ministries], to coordinate other ministries. Ministers are responsible to the president, and not to us, so the assignment supposedly comes from the president and not from us. These difficulties [with coordination] are becoming a psychological burden for us. (interview with a male high-level BNPB officer, 2 November 2015)

Second, the alliance criticised the definition of 'disaster' conveyed in Law No 24/2007. In the Indonesian Law on Disaster Management, the concept of 'disaster' is understood much more through a hazard lens than as vulnerability-caused. This definition focuses narrowly on the aspect of 'events' and 'impacts', with limited discussion of the causes of disaster (hazard-based only). The alliance aimed to expand this definition by incorporating the components of 'capacity' and 'community' into the frame. The alliance often referred to the UNISDR definition of disaster as the benchmark for developing an understanding of the comprehensive meaning and context of disaster. UNISDR promotes three elements in their definition: (1) Disaster events are specifically framed as 'serious disruptions'; (2) the causes of disaster are driven by hazards, exposure, vulnerability and capacity; and (3) the impacts of disaster include human, material and environmental effects (UNISDR, 2007). The alliance projected a strong and resilient village as the baseline for empowering community capacity:

Like the construction of a house, the foundation of the house should be stronger than the other elements above it. We would like to build a resilient nation through resilient villages. (interview with a male representative of an organisational alliance member, 3 November 2015)

A third criticism of the law related to issues of the incoherency of DRR-related legal frameworks in Indonesia. At one of the observed panels held at the national event on DRR Day 2015, a member of the alliance claimed that Indonesia is a 'country with one of the most comprehensive DRR-related laws in the world'<sup>25</sup> but that each law was developed as a standalone legal framework, with insufficient coherence with the other laws. This alliance member was referring to the fact that there are four major DRR-related laws in Indonesia (see *Table 4*):

- (1) Disaster Management Law No 24/2007;
- (2) Environment Law No 32/2009;
- (3) Spatial Planning Law No 26/2007; and
- (4) Local Government Law No 23/2014

As this alliance member suggested, these four laws lack coherence; in fact, they often go against each other. For instance, Environment Law No 32/2009 scarcely mentions DRR as a modality for the development of the National Plan on Environmental Protection and Management (*Rencana Perlindungan dan Pengelolaan Lingkungan Hidup*). Disaster mitigation was incorporated in Spatial Planning Law No 26/2007, but priority action on management for disaster-prone areas was missing from the law. This meant that it was still difficult to implement. As a final example, Local Government Law No 23/2014 expresses no commitment to address DRR mainstreaming in local administration. This goes against the mandate of the Law No

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<sup>25</sup> Interview with a male representative of an organisational alliance member, 4 November 2016

24/2007, which states that, during periods without disaster, disaster management should include disaster management planning, DRR, prevention, integration into development planning, disaster risk analysis, spatial structure planning, education and training, and technical standard requirements (Article 35).

Table 4. DRR-related legal frameworks

Environment Law № 32/2009	Missing DRR agenda on Environment Law
Spatial Planning Law № 26/2007	Poor synergy on the issue of disaster management for disaster-prone areas
Local Government Law № 23/2014	Insufficient attention to DRR mainstreaming for local government

The fourth commonly heard criticism of the law expressed by the informants is related to the declaration of emergency status. In many cases of major disaster events in Indonesia, the debate on the declaration of emergency status arises, with policymakers arguing both against and for making this declaration. There are various reasons why this issue was mentioned as a serious problem requiring revision of the law. First, declaring emergency status determines the structural command in terms of the ‘organisation in charge’ of disaster response. In a situation when a major disaster occurs and the scale of casualties is high, the government tends to declare the situation a ‘national disaster.’ As a consequence, BNPB is put in charge as the central command on the emergency response and rehabilitation. This status enables the government to access the so-called ‘on-call budget’ with the minimum procedures in the process of making the request, conducting procurement without open tender, and mobilising human resources and equipment to support local governments. An alliance member reflected on the debate on emergency status in a jokingly manner: ‘In a normal situation, we want decentralisation [on disaster management], but during an emergency, we want centralisation’.<sup>26</sup> This opinion was widely shared by other civil society representatives. For these respondents, disaster management should place local government at the frontline.

We have to be grateful that we have the strong BNPB, but with the power of BNPB, which tends to be centralised, the capacity of the provincial and regency levels is reducing, so when disaster strikes, they ask to declare a national emergency [...] Ideally, [we] have to be strong at the bottom level [...] That would be an asset [...] Volunteers have to be in the bottom, not at the top level [...] We want to have a strong foundation [...] and with the metaphor of a house, the foundation of a house is always placed at the bottom. (interview with a male representative of an organisational alliance member, 3 November 2015)

During the inception period of this initiative to revise the Law on Disaster Management, the government decided to remain outside the discussion and leave the alliance to lead the process. A high-level BNPB officer used the word ‘guarding’ to describe the government’s role in the

<sup>26</sup> Statement made by a male alliance member on Indonesian DRR Day, 26 October 2015

process. The government would only become engaged when the House of Representatives invited them for a hearing upon the approval of the initiative by the National Legislation Programme (*Program Legislatif Nasional*, PROLEGNAS). PROLEGNAS is the parliamentary instrument to determine the priority of drafting legislation. However, interviews with high-level BNPB and Coordinating Ministry on Human Development and Culture staff revealed the position of the government towards the law. The government's priorities were slightly different from the agenda of the alliance. The government acknowledged that the law needed to be enhanced because it was developed hastily.<sup>27</sup> As key concerns for the revision of the law, the government underscored the issues of the definition of disaster, financing DRR and decentralisation. On the point of the definition of disaster, the government sought to integrate the component of 'community capacity':

The definition of disaster in the existing law is hard to understand. The component of 'community' is gone [from the clausal definition]. Our vision is a resilient community. From the existing law, it seems the potential to empower the community is gone, and all the responsibility rests on the central government. This existing clausal [definition] does not teach the community and local government to be responsible when disaster happens [...] In this decentralised era, they [the local government] have to take responsibility, not ask us [the central government]; we would not be able to do it. (interview with a male high-level BNPB officer, 2 November 2015)

This interview supports the idea that the central government articulates decentralisation relatively strongly, compared with the local government. This idea was also supported by the government's concerns about financing DRR and emergency status. Specifically, BNPB demanded that local government take responsibility and will seriously consider their request to declare national emergency status. Consequently, after this status is declared, the command and resource mobilisation will be taken over by the central government. As for the financing of DRR, the government sought further partnerships with non-state actors so that the main source for DRR funding would not be the National Budget (*Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Nasional*) alone.

From the interviews with representatives of the alliance and different government bodies, it appeared that the two sets of actors have different frameworks. Although both types of actors commonly agreed to embrace community capacity and local actors as the frontline on DRR, the perceptions driving this agenda were distinct. The alliance was highly concerned with the issues of institutional strengthening, community capacity and resource mobilisation as a way to build resilient villages from below, whereas the government framed this agenda within the context of responsibility sharing among central government, local government and community. The alliance saw disaster in terms of 'capacity', whereas the government used the word 'responsibility'. This difference in 'seeing' would determine the subsequent action taken by each actor (Bankoff and Hilhorst, 2009: 2). For instance, in their strategic plan for 2015–2019, BNPB positioned improving local capacity (in this context, the local government) (point 1.1) above the goal of enhancing community capacity (point 1.2) (BNPB, 2015). Four of BNPB's six strategy priorities for achieving their vision of resilient communities were related to governance issues on disaster management, such as surge capacity (point 2), logistic governance (point 4), capacity of service

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<sup>27</sup> Interview with a male high-level officer of the Coordinating Ministry on Human Development and Culture, 4 November 2015

and work performance (point 5) and accountability (point 6). Meanwhile, the improvement of community capacity and local institutions resonated highly with the work of the alliance.

For the purpose of achieving the optimum goal of advocacy and thus solving, or at least lessening the five concerns mentioned above, the alliance identified three different channels of advocacy: media exposure, public campaigning and lobby. By using these three advocacy strategies, the alliance members hoped to reach diverse audiences. Regarding media exposure, the alliance used different media platforms, such as mass media, online platforms and the ‘disaster channel’ (the Indonesian news portal for DRR initiated by PLANAS, TEMPO [a well-known Indonesian newspaper] and the Indonesian Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology [*Badan Pengkajian dan Penerapan Teknologi*]). Through these platforms, the alliance shared press releases and published their agenda for public discussion to raise public awareness on this topic.

In terms of public campaigning, the alliance organised a public forum to share and discuss their list of problems, as well as their recommendations for the legislative revision. In 2015, the alliance even organised a special panel on ‘Strengthening Disaster Management Law No 24/2007’ at the 2015 DRR Day event held by BNPB in Solo, Central Java. On the panel were members of MPBI, *Palang Merah Indonesia*, the International Federation of the Red Cross and representatives from the private sector.

The third advocacy strategy used by different members of the alliance was lobby to ensure a profound connection to parliament. The process of lobbying parliament and the senate was crucially important to target Law No 24/2007 as part of the PROLEGNAS. The integration of the revision of this law into the PROLEGNAS was crucial for this advocacy process because the House of Representatives would only discuss legislation listed on the PROLEGNAS. A staff member of the Muhammadiyah Disaster Management Center—one of the largest Muslim mass organisations in Indonesia—expressed in an interview how a personal approach is enormously beneficial to the lobby of parliament:

One of the positive sides of being a mass organisation is we have strong political power. The Chair of Commission VIII [BNPB’s partner in the parliament] comes from Muhammadiyah. He used to be the head of Youth Muhammadiyah [*Pemuda Muhammadiyah*], and we also have contact with a member of the Indonesian House of Regional Representatives [*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah*, DPD]. He is a member of the legal drafting commission in the DPD. I have arranged an appointment with him to decide when we [the alliance] can have a meeting with DPD. (interview with a male representative of an organisational alliance member, 4 November 2015)

### **5.3.3. The Myanmar Consortium for DRR: Emerging national NGOs**

The development of MCDRR began in 2012 as an initiative to organise local NGOs for DRR. On their website, MCDRR defined themselves as ‘a consortium for local people on DRR distinct to other DRR networks’ (MCDRR, 2015). The consortium further framed themselves as ‘a local consortium focused on DRR and Climate Change with the purpose to support local organisations in coordinating, networking and information sharing related to DRR at all levels’ (MCDRR, 2015). The word ‘local’ seemingly became a modality for MCDRR to position themselves among the various actors on DRR in Myanmar. It was strongly implied in many MCDRR documents, for instance, the ‘Strategic Plan of MCDRR 2015–2030’, where they framed themselves as the ‘copious voice of local people, a consortium distinct from other DRR efforts in the country’ (MCDRR, 2015).

Slightly different from the approach taken in Indonesia, for the case of Myanmar, this study did not follow any specific advocacy activities conducted by MCDRR because there was no particular ongoing advocacy process being implemented by this organisation during the research period. Therefore, this section emphasises the general characteristics of MCDRR as a DRR platform in Myanmar.

The field research showed that MCDRR's advocacy work had six characteristics. First and most interestingly, the consortium membership was dominated by NGOs with fewer than 10 years of experience. In 2015, there were 25 local NGOs registered as members of MCDRR (MCDRR, 2015). Of these organisations, it appeared that approximately 68% were established after cyclone Nargis. This shows how MCDRR became a vehicle for emerging NGOs' work on DRR.

Civil society organisations here are just at the initial stage—the infant stage, like a toddler stage. We didn't have any chance to form a group. It was forbidden. You could not gather more than five persons in town. This happened for many years. Then the civil society organisation started, so they are not that mature; they don't know their role. (interview with a male MCDRR member, 16 December 2015)

Second, the interplay between different DRR national platforms in Myanmar has taken shape the dynamics of interactive governance in the country. As an emerging national platform with relatively inexperienced organisational members, MCDRR worked collaboratively with the DRR WG, a long-standing and active DRR platform. Developed in 2008 as a response to Nargis, the group consists of multiple actors including international organisations (UN agencies), international NGOs, professionals and academics. Almost all of the members of MCDRR are also associated with the DRR WG. The lead organisation of MCDRR is also in charge of the DRR WG's Task Force for Local NGO Strengthening. The DRR WG is more connected with the government than is MCDRR, as the DRR WG has worked as a strategic partner of the government since its establishment. On many occasions, the government has requested the DRR WG to jointly develop a policy paper (i.e. a monitoring report for the *Hyogo Framework for Action*, preparation for the *Sendai Framework for Action*). The DRR WG has also organised joint campaigns and activities (i.e. the International Day for DRR, training, workshops) and provided financial support for government programmes (i.e. the International Day for DRR). The DRR WG is influential at many levels mainly because of the role of its members—reputable organisations with strong funding resources, highly trained and skilled staff members, and extensive international networks. These characteristics give the DRR WG positional power vis-à-vis the government. Because of its strong power, the DRR WG's work has influenced the discourse and agenda-setting on DRR in Myanmar. This can be seen in sharp contrast to MCDRR, which has to struggle with constant challenges such as insufficient capacity to communicate in English, a lack of confidence, a different communication culture (trained by command-structure to be passive) and poor resource capacity (Srikandini, forthcoming).

Third, the government and MCDRR shared the common goal of creating resilient communities. They agreed to invest in the improvement of community capacity through community-based DRR. However, the two actors had different points of emphasis for achieving this goal. An interview with a high-ranking officer in the Department of Relief and Resettlement (RRD) revealed that the government highlighted the importance of training to build community capacity:

We conduct the training for CBDRR. We choose the area. The elders of the village and the community leader will join the CBDRR programme. We use simulation [and] group work. We use the simulation exercise for flood and cyclone. We contact the union ministries, development agencies, UN agencies [and] international NGOs. (interview with a male high-ranking RRD officer, 11 December 2013)

MCDRR's vision to achieve the outcome that 'all communities and cities in Myanmar are resilient to and overcome climate and other hazards' (MCDRR, 2015) was broken down into their organisational objectives, which were mostly policy-oriented. MCDRR's five-year plan included four objectives: One of these objectives promoted disaster management and climate change policy (objective 3), and another advanced mainstreaming DRR in development policies and practices (objective 4) (MCDRR, 2015). The other two objectives concerned organisation building (objective 1) and partnership outreach (objective 2) (MCDRR, 2015).

Fourth, the interviews made it clear that 2015 was a stepping stone for MCDRR to increase their role in the advocacy process. MCDRR members framed 2012–2015 as a 'low-profile' stage for the organisation.<sup>28</sup> During this period, MCDRR's activities mostly involved organising and participating in a series of meeting, workshops and survey assessments on DRR. This has gradually moved into engaging in active advocacy to the government.

For about three years, MCDRR was not well known, but in 2015, we [MCDRR] became known by other networks. (interview with a male MCDRR member, 17 December 2015)

The breaking point in 2015 began with the formulation of MCDRR's strategic plan document. The workshop process to develop this document was supported by two international organisations: the European Union and World Vision International (MCDRR, 2015). The document describes the vision, mission, principles and key areas of the work of consortium. In navigating their actions, MCDRR stands on three key themes of vision and mission: (1) resilient communities and cities; (2) capacity building, coordination, collaboration, sharing and learning; and (3) overcoming climate change and other hazards (MCDRR, 2015). MCDRR's advocacy agenda was not mentioned specifically in the document. Advocacy is new for MCDRR. The consortium even noted this issue as part of the 'threats' in their analysis: 'There is no representation for advocacy for new comers' (MCDRR, 2015). However, in interviews, members of the consortium asserted that MCDRR is valuable as a vehicle for advocacy:

If you really want to have successful advocacy, the better approach is through the network. Advocacy by a single organisation to the government is not strong, but by the network it becomes approachable. Because today, the agenda is political; we influence parliament. (interview with a male NGO staff member, 19 November 2015)

Fifth, MCDRR's advocacy predominantly aims to influence the policy process rather than legislation. In March 2015, MCDRR participated in the development of the 'National Framework for Community Disaster Resilience' along with other DRR multi-stakeholder platform, such as the DRR WG. This national framework aimed to provide a 'coherent approach and recommendations for action' to achieve 'people-centred, inclusive, and sustainable socioeconomic development' in Myanmar (PreventionWeb, 2017). MCDRR also participated consistently in the International Day for DRR, held annually by the government and the DRR

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<sup>28</sup> Interview with a male MCDRR member, 17 December 2015)

WG. In an interview, a member of the consortium described the DRR advocacy process in Myanmar as follows:

Raising awareness and advocacy become important because there are unclear procedures in the law making: Are they going to publish the draft and seek consultation? Even before publishing the draft, the government asks for public consultation. They give us a few days to ask for this [input]. Civil society has to ask the government first about the draft; then they would share. Civil society organisations have to go to Nay Pyi Taw to improve the draft. The procedures are not that clear. If there is some public attention [to the bill], they ask for civil society organisations' advice, but some bills are not yet transparent. (interview with a male MCDRR member, 16 December 2015)

Sixth, as the above interview extract already shows, a good relationship with the government is crucial for opening access to the policy-making process. MCDRR acknowledged the need to make an initial move to start the discussion on policy steering. In transitional settings like Myanmar, governments that were trained to control and monitor NGOs and civil society organisations (CSOs) for decades often remain suspicious of the work of these groups. This problem is reflected in the following extract from an interview with a high-level official of the RRD, a government body for disaster management, illustrating the degree of mistrust of non-state actors:

The NGOs have to submit a report to us. Some of them send incomplete reports to us. We would like to check how they spend their budget. 85% of the budget should go to the community. We have to check this commitment—whether they reach this percentage. We also monitor their programme by coordinating with the region and township levels. (interview with a male high-level RRD official, 11 December 2013)

In addition, CSOs were often accused of being too political or even politicised. In an interview with an activist from the National Democratic Institute Myanmar (a non-profit organisation supporting democratic institutions), he stated that, in a politically fast-changing environment like Myanmar, CSOs have to conduct 'good analysis with solid evidence' on their movement to avoid accusations of politicisation:

There is a tendency for politicisation because CSOs were born from a social movement, and this [development of CSOs] is an uprising now. So, for CSOs doing advocacy work, they should have more and better information and good analysis. If they want to do advocacy, they have to come up with solid evidence for why they like or dislike [something] about the government policy. Only then the advocacy will be efficient. Otherwise, CSOs can be blamed: 'You have been politicised; you are too political'. (interview with a male activist from the National Democratic Institute Myanmar, 18 November 2015)

To achieve effective advocacy, almost all of the interviewed NGO employees were convinced that advocacy should be carried out with a more indirect, subtle and polite approach, because they believed this would ease the relationships and trust building (see also Srikandini, forthcoming). The following interview extract, for example, indicates that, in meetings with government officials, MCDRR members tried to be polite:

To approach to the government is not that challenging. The only thing is, how do you look at your face in the mirror? If you smile, you get a smile. If you make an ugly face, then you get an ugly face. I think it's the same philosophy. (interview with a male MCDRR member, 16 December 2015)

In other words, only by acting politely and articulating their views in subtle way, could MCDRR members expect to get a positive and effective response from the government. After being dominant and central under military rule, the government is in the process of changing to one that listens and embraces external input. This change will take some time, as the relations between the government and the people have been absent for many decades.<sup>29</sup> The strategy of not being direct could also mean providing input without 'blaming and shaming' the government.<sup>30</sup> Interviews with staff members working for UN agencies and international NGOs revealed some of the challenges involved in working with the government. Five key challenges are summarised as follows:

- (1) Lack of human resource capacity: The willingness of top-level government staff members to embrace policy input from external actors was often hampered at the execution/implementation level by middle–low bureaucratic staff members because of their lack of knowledge on disaster management.
- (2) High demand from the government for UN agencies and international NGOs to provide additional resources (i.e. financial support to assist with government programmes)
- (3) Lack of understanding of union-level government regarding the reality on the ground
- (4) Coordination problems in inter-ministerial work on DRR crosscutting issues
- (5) Geographical distance between Nay Pyi Taw and Yangon is a challenge for the coordination between government and NGOs (in terms of time and cost; one hour by flight or six hour by car)

#### **5.3.4. Indonesia and Myanmar: A comparison**

The previous sections have traced the advocacy activities carried out by two DRR governance networks in Indonesia and Myanmar. This section will identify the crosscutting findings for the advocacy work of the Indonesian alliance and the Myanmar consortium.

The first overlapping theme that emerged from the analysis of the data from the two cases concerns the fact that, although the actors had different positions and interests, they were able to cooperate because they had a common goal within the network. For the Indonesian alliance, the goal of revising the Disaster Management Law was strongly articulated by the different members of the network. Their advocacy goal was clearly developed and rationalised through their criticisms of the law. The alliance assigned working groups to discuss specific topics such as public participation, institutional strengthening and partnership. Each working group studied critical points and gaps surrounding these issues. Meanwhile, for the Myanmar consortium, 'locality' became the modality for their advocacy work. This was articulated in their organisational purpose to 'support local organisations in coordinating, networking and information sharing related to DRR at all levels'. Their involvement in the development of the 'National Framework for Community Disaster Resilience' along with the DRR WG also aimed to bring the voice of national NGOs into the advocacy arena. In the complex setting of governance networks, a well-defined collective goal is crucial to achieve sustainability of this

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<sup>29</sup> Interview with a female UN agency staff member, 17 October 2014

<sup>30</sup> Interview with a male international NGO staff member, 30 September 2014

multifaceted work. This finding supports the premise that a ‘goal-directed’ network (Ospina and Saz-Carranza, 2010: 417) with ‘a unifying vision’ is better able to articulate their work (Provan and Kenis, 2008: 231).

Second, in both Indonesia and Myanmar, the members of the alliance and consortium highly valued the importance of the ‘governance network’ as a strategic way to achieve the advocacy goal. One respondent from the consortium in Myanmar even stated that conducting advocacy through a governance network determined the success of the advocacy effort with the government. Third, as a way of articulating their interests, both networks used various advocacy modes to gain media exposure, organise public campaigns, lobby and meet with government representatives.

The cases of Indonesia and Myanmar also presented distinctive characteristics. In Indonesia, the members of the network were already active and had more than 10 years of experience working on DRR in Indonesia. In contrast, in Myanmar, the active involvement of the non-state actor platform was more recent.

Although they shared concerns regarding government legislation and policy practice, the Indonesian alliance’s advocacy work was mainly legislative advocacy. Almog-Bar and Schmid (2014) define legislative advocacy as the process of influencing legislation and law making (Almog-Bar and Schmid, 2014: 22). In Myanmar, the work of the consortium predominantly revolved around policy advocacy through influencing discourse and agenda-setting on policy development. In terms of the typology of advocacy activities cited earlier in the chapter, both networks commonly used content development, insider communication and participation in multi-stakeholder processes. The advocacy was carried out through delivering legislative and policy input in their dialogue with their governments. However, the cases differed in that the Myanmar consortium had no specific strategy development or planning. The Indonesian Alliance for the Revision of the Disaster Management Law formulated a document explaining the rationale behind revising the law and listing problems with the existing law. The alliance also developed a research paper to support the argument for advocacy, including the practicalities of the advocacy trajectory. During the data collection for this study at the end of 2015, the consortium in Myanmar was in the process of developing a strategic plan of action.

In terms of arena, the work of the DRR platform in Indonesia was predominantly governed by national NGOs with minimum involvement from international staff and consultants. In contrast, interactions among DRR actors in Myanmar were characterised by high levels of engagement of international organisations/NGOs. In practice, the monthly meetings of the DRR WG were conducted in English because most attendants were foreigners.

In terms of advocacy channels, the strategies used by the two platforms led to different characteristics in their work. Adopting the argument of Almog-Bar and Schmid (2014) on ‘advocacy tactics’, the advocacy by the Indonesian alliance can be considered ‘aggressive’ because of its use of the tactics of ‘lobbying for a bill or policy, testifying in hearings, releasing research reports, and encouraging members to write or call policy-makers’ (Almog-Bar and Schmid, 2014: 21). As for Myanmar, the advocacy was ‘less aggressive’ because they emphasised ‘meetings and socializing with government’ as their tactics (Almog-Bar and Schmid, 2014: 21).

In theory, the process of interactive governance reflects the interaction among plural actors who stand independently but act interdependently on a complex decision making. To gain the benefit from this process, each actors should engaged and aware on their role within the network. From the aspect of institutional-setting (polity), the governments positioning themselves as part

of the DRR network. In Indonesia, the government is the main actor on PLANAS while in Myanmar, the government is the Honorary Chair on DRR Working Group. However, their involvement on DRR specific network simply has no direct correlation with their degree of engagement. From the series of data collection, it proven that both government plays limited role on the process of interactive governance. In Indonesia, the government engaged in the discussion of the revision of the Law but left the initiative to the alliance, meanwhile in Myanmar, the consortium mostly had to make requests to the government to provide input on policy-making processes. Such paradox raise important question about the political willingness of the government to engaged on interactive governance. This research examined that the government wanted to keep their positional power as independent actor on the process of interactive governance. The government holds the power to determine the access for non-state actors to engage on policy process. This created asymmetrical relations between government and non-state actors within the process of interactive governance. The norm that interactive governance would only benefit when the government actively engaged on the process, in practice, they want to maintain their controlling position.

Table 5. Advocacy work of the DRR governance networks in Indonesia and Myanmar

	<b>Indonesia</b> Indonesian Alliance for the Revision of the Disaster Management Law	<b>Myanmar</b> Myanmar Consortium for DRR
Network membership	Nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and the Red Cross; more than 10 years of experience	National NGOs with less than 10 years of experience
Advocacy activities	Legislative advocacy	Policy advocacy
Type of advocacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strategy development and planning</li> <li>• Content development</li> <li>• Insider advocacy communication</li> <li>• Participation in multi-stakeholder processes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Content development</li> <li>• Insider advocacy communication</li> <li>• Participation in multi-stakeholder processes</li> </ul>
Advocacy channels	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Media exposure</li> <li>• Public Campaigning</li> <li>• Lobby (Aggressive advocacy)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Meetings</li> <li>• Public Campaigning (Less aggressive advocacy)</li> </ul>
Government relations	Government engaged in the discussion of the revision but left the initiative to the alliance	Poor initiative from the government—The consortium mostly had to make requests to provide input on policy-making processes
System dynamics	Supported regulation: Freedom of expression guaranteed by the constitution  Constructive position from the government	Weak regulation to support freedom of expression  A level of distrust of civil society

## 5.4. Conclusions

This chapter has analysed important advocacy practices in two DRR advocacy platforms in Indonesia and Myanmar. As was stated at the beginning of the chapter, although there have been

normative studies of ‘interactive’ governance on DRR, not much is yet known about the actual dynamics and practices within participating platforms and organisations. This chapter has attempted to contribute to the academic understanding of interactive governance by sharing analyses of observations and interviews with state and non-state actors involved in this process.

Looking at both case studies, this paper draws three conclusions about DRR advocacy platforms. First, in terms of the arena (the institutional setting), the present study found that the members of the alliance and consortium generally claimed that a ‘governance network’, such as the ones they were involved in, is indeed an effective and efficient vehicle for advocacy. However, my analysis also showed that advocacy through an alliance or consortium is continuously developing, leaving much room for improvement in areas such as developing capacity and expertise to improve the process of insider advocacy communication with the government. In other words, the capacity, resources and strategy to build the advocacy profile are crucial for developing credibility and building a bargaining position vis-à-vis the government. Empirical evidence from both cases has demonstrated the value of a credible advocacy profile for creating a balanced position with the government. In the Indonesian case, the alliance used documents such as academic papers to justify their collective action to revise the law. In Myanmar, a clear advocacy strategy along with strong analysis of public issues were important to overcome government suspicion of the politicisation of civil society.

Second, in the case of Indonesia, the advocacy process influenced the legislation process when civil society aimed to change the game through revising a law. Meanwhile, in Myanmar, MCDRR mostly worked on policy advocacy, where the baseline of the work is to provide policy recommendations to the government.

Third, the success of advocacy is not determined only by the network but also very much depends on the positional power of the network vis-à-vis the government. Both Indonesia and Myanmar have experienced political changes from authoritarian regimes to relatively democratic settings. The system dynamics in both countries determined the advocacy work of the alliance and consortium. In Indonesia, freedom of expression is guaranteed by the constitution. The government has also acknowledged the role of civil society in policy steering. Here, BNPB left the alliance to take the initiative in the revision of the law. This situation created ‘political space’, a metaphorical arena for articulating interests and opinions to decision makers. Meanwhile, in Myanmar, the issue of distrust from the government toward civil society overshadowed freedom of expression. Regulations remained discriminative, and freedoms to express oneself and to make demands of the political system were restricted. Here, the government also controlled access to policy steering by determining whether there was a need for public hearings on the process of policy formulation. This made the involvement of civil society in policy steering relatively passive and less influential.

This study’s analysis of the everyday practices of advocacy revealed that governments are not always fully engaged in the process of interactive governance. This suggests that advocacy through governance networks requires a strong common agenda because, without this, the work of collective action will be constantly hindered. Interactive governance on DRR is only fruitful in specific settings where the government fully plays its role as part of the process of interactive governance. In these dynamics, how governments position themselves towards external policy input, including granting non-state actors access to policy-making processes, determines to a great extent the outcomes and shape of the advocacy work. This exogenous factor of the political environment is crucial in developing the advocacy setting for DRR governance networks.

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## Chapter 6 - Conclusion

Disaster risk governance (DRG) has become a prominent focal point of the disaster risk reduction (DRR) agenda. DRG has a strong influence in determining the direction of the DRR movement at the global, national and local levels. The growing interest in this subject has manifested both in a number of academic discussions and in policy documents. Many scholars have developed work around the subject of DRG and related issues (see Chapters 1 and 2). Existing academic work on this topic can be categorised into three areas: (1) the structural arrangement of disaster governance (Enia, 2013; Gerber, 2007; Lassa, 2010; Lindsay, 2014; Seng, 2010); (2) the intertwined nature of mismanagement and vulnerability risk (Ahrens and Rudolph, 2006; Moe, 2010); and (3) the combination of DRR with topics such as globalisation, international constellations, social disparities, population issues (Tierney, 2012), political systems (Cho, 2014) and DRR global frameworks (Niekerk, 2015). In policy practice, DRG has received strong political support, and global frameworks on DRR have consistently stressed the need to strengthen DRG in order to achieve effective and efficient DRR (see Chapters 1 and 2).

Advocacy on strengthening DRG is seen in many forms, including promoting inclusive mechanisms on DRR by involving both public and private actors in policy steering. This thesis uses the work of Gaillard and Mercer (2012: 95) to frame ‘inclusiveness’. Inclusiveness on DRR has three dimensions: (1) recognising that different forms of knowledge are valuable in addressing disaster risk; (2) acknowledging that actions at different scales (from the top down and from the bottom up) are necessary to reduce the risk of disaster in a sustainable manner; and (3) understanding that the two previous points require the collaboration of a large array of stakeholders operating across different scales (Gaillard and Mercer, 2012: 95). Inspired by this third dimension of inclusiveness (Gaillard and Mercer, 2012: 95), this thesis understood ‘inclusiveness’ as the process of applying a pluricentric mechanism to reducing disaster risk. The pluricentric approach has recently become one of the most common paradigms used to explain alternative policy steering beyond the traditional state actor. This new paradigm has challenged the predominant role of the state in the policy realm by bringing the wide involvement of non-state actors into the arena.

The increasing focus on DRG has cast a great deal of attention on the practice of open and engaging coordination among all relevant stakeholders. However, crucially, the actual practice of DRG faces challenges. The study found that many decision makers and scholars shared the same concerns about the complexity and competitive nature of the arena of DRG (see Chapters 2 and 3). It appears that, in practice, inclusiveness has ultimately remained unrealised, calling the idea and advocacy on this principle into question. Decision makers and scholars who participated in the present study agreed that the implementation of inclusiveness is complex because of problems associated with coordination, heavy bureaucracy, tension, trust and resources.

The chief objective of this study was to revisit the concept of ‘inclusive DRR’ using insights from the field. This thesis selected two countries, Indonesia and Myanmar, as case studies for examining inclusive DRR. The experience from both countries enabled learning about the actual practice of governance networks on DRR and about the everyday realities in the field. For this purpose, an analysis of the ‘DRR governance network’ was the point of departure for the study. ‘Governance network’ describes the interaction between actors who act autonomously but connect interdependently within a network. This is translated into different forms of organisational structure, including national committees, partnerships, multi-stakeholder

mechanisms, national platforms and working groups. This arena of interaction was at the heart of the present study, which was governed by three main research questions:

- (1) How has inclusive DRR been developed at the global level?
- (2) How does the principle of inclusiveness on DRG work in practice in Indonesia and Myanmar?
  - 2.1. What are the characteristics of the polity, policy and politics of DRG in Indonesia and Myanmar?
  - 2.2. To what extent has the actual practice of inclusiveness been affected by the domestic political environment?
    - To what extent has decentralisation in Indonesia contributed to DRG?
    - To what extent has political transition in Myanmar influenced the dynamics of DRG?
- (3) How has the idea of an interactive structure for DRR governance networks played out in Indonesia and Myanmar?
  - 3.1. What explains the different perceptions of risk among multiple actors involved in the process of interactive governance?
  - 3.2. What are the actual challenges to the practice of inclusive DRR in DRG?
- (4) What are the lessons learned on interactive governance from the two case studies?

Indonesia and Myanmar are good cases to capture the interplay between DRG and the influence of the wider political environment on the dynamics of DRG, considering the extreme risks, policy transformations in disaster management and common political history found in the two countries.

This chapter highlights the findings presented throughout the thesis and discusses the course of future challenges in this field. The next section summarises the answers to the three research questions. In the third section, analytical insights from the research are presented along with recommendations for how to move forward. Finally, the thesis closes with an assessment of the latest developments in the field of DRG and suggestions for a successful research agenda, moving forward.

## **6.1. Answering the research questions**

To study the practice of inclusiveness, this thesis focused especially upon the political aspects of DRR governance networks. The thesis introduced the political dimension of inclusive DRR on DRG to address the metaphoric space of influence within policy steering in DRG. This concept was motivated by the intertwined elements of the triangle of governance: polity, politics and policy. The ‘politics of DRG’ was used with the aim of understanding different dimensions of the governance arena through exploring the context of the institutional setting (polity) in terms of both horizontal coordination (among government structures) and vertical coordination (between state and non-state actors); power relations (politics); and policy advocacy (policy). This approach helped in the overarching analysis of the structural arena of governance by facilitating the investigation of the negotiation of influence on policy steering. The questions listed in the previous section, which are related to this aspect of the governance networks in Indonesia and Myanmar in the global setting, oriented the development of the research. This

section summarises the meanings and interpretations drawn from the empirical findings presented in this thesis to answer each of the research questions.

#### **6.1.1. How has inclusive DRR been developed at the global level?**

At the global level, DRR practice has transformed from a top-down, state-centric and largely non-political issue into a more pluricentric governance network. DRR has become a global paradigm characterised by robust political commitment, a high level of participation of multiple actors and advocacy at a wide range of levels. This process began when the first global framework on disaster management was introduced 30 years ago in 1987. Following this initial framework for the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, the international community has consistently gathered to renew the strategy and priorities for action on DRR. To date, five DRR global frameworks have been adopted by the international community.

The process of formulating these DRR global frameworks has largely embraced the principle of inclusive DRR. Through the conferences organised to establish these frameworks, DRR-related actors have participated in the discussion, debate and negotiation (see Chapter 1). Although these frameworks were agreed and signed by the United Nations member states, the policy input structure was inclusive and engaging. At the World Conference on DRR (WCDRR) in 2015 and the Asian Ministerial Conference on DRR (AMCDRR) in 2014, the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, as the main organiser of both conferences, attempted to consolidate voices from all DRR actors through the mechanism of multi-stakeholder panels. On these panels, representatives from all stakeholder groups including governments, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), youth, the private sector, disability groups, academicians and the media came together to discuss relevant topics and generate policy recommendations. Specifically, the 2014 AMCDRR plenary session on multi-stakeholder dialogue attempted to gather and formulate input for the development of the Hyogo Framework for Action 2, later called the Sendai Framework for Action (SFA) 2015–2030. Following previous DRR global frameworks, SFA consistently governs the behaviour of actors in the pluricentric DRR global governance network. DRR-relevant actors mostly see their work to reduce risk as a way to contribute to the achievement of the priorities for action in the global frameworks for DRR. The frameworks elaborated the common goals and strategies used as guidelines for reducing disaster risk. These frameworks thus encompass the complex set of norms, rules, values and guidelines for governing DRR global action.

In addition, the power relations (politics) surrounding policy formulation in the global arena reflect the use of power among DRR actors. To investigate this topic, the present study observed the negotiation process in high-level panels at the WCDRR and the AMCDRR. Observation of the high-level panel meetings at the 2014 AMCDRR revealed that states have diverse motives for collaborating on the DRR movement. At this meeting, each country composed their political statement in a normative way, explicitly stating their commitment to accelerating cooperation. The message moved into a more specific agenda when each country highlighted their focus in the cooperation on DRR. The present findings showed that the member states communicated their DRR agendas in different fashions, concluding that at least three motives drove the process of negotiation at the AMCDRR: interest-based, knowledge-based and power-based motives.

Interest-based motives were mainly driven by the need to gain additional value from the cooperation. Governments sought to influence other member states by investing further in the resources (financing DRR) and by inviting other states to engage in information sharing. Both developing and developed countries were clearly positioned in the interest-based category. For developing countries, regional/global collaboration on DRR was important for gaining further

external assistance from developed countries and international organisations through DRR mainstreaming. For developed countries, the agenda on capacity development and information and knowledge sharing was important for sustaining their influence on DRR in developing countries. For knowledge-based motives, the key point of the policy statement involved the idea of disseminating and strengthening capacity. Here, collaboration was perceived as the arena for knowledge exchange. Finally, power-based motives revolved around the capacity of member states to drive the global agenda on DRR. Countries with a high level of financial and capacity resources had more influence in the negotiation process. In the WCDRR negotiation process, most of the countries that dominated the agenda setting and direction at the negotiation table were major donors to DRR financing. For instance, near the end of the conference, Japan, the host of the WCDRR, pushed other member countries to work in the spirit of compromise to move away from the negotiation stalemate. Japan even prepared a specific proposal in case the negotiation on the next DRR global framework was deadlocked. This move from Japan reflects the country's positional power in terms of DRR: Japan is the biggest donor for DRR in the world, and the country has gained wide international support to host almost all of the world conferences on DRR, with its cities' names commemorated in the global frameworks: the Yokohama Strategy, the Hyogo Framework for Action and the Sendai Framework.

Finally, the advocacy process on DRR in the global setting takes place through a wide range of channels. During the WCDRR process, non-state actors aimed to influence governments in various ways, using formal, informal, direct and subtle channels. In terms of the formal approach, NGO and civil society representatives engaged in multi-stakeholder panel meetings to state their ideas and agendas, and the Global Network of Civil Society Organisations for DRR and Tearfund acted as 'observers', sitting behind the negotiation table to monitor the process of formal negotiation among countries. Meanwhile, outside the negotiation room, the informal approach was used in the convention hall, in the cafe and even in the restrooms (see Chapter 2).

#### **6.1.2. How does the principle of inclusiveness on DRG work in practice in Indonesia and Myanmar?**

Indonesia and Myanmar share a common background, in terms of both their political context and their high level of vulnerability. First, both countries experienced shifts in their political systems from military-type authoritarian regimes to systems of more democratic rule. Second, in Indonesia, the 1998 political reform (*Reformasi*) inspired political changes from centralistic to decentralist government, and Myanmar has taken sequential steps towards democratisation (i.e. political commitment to the *Road Map to Democracy*, elections and the release of political prisoners). Third, major disasters in both countries provide windows on policy change on disaster management. Fourth, these political changes and the momentum of major disasters have influenced the dynamics of DRG alongside the promotion of the new value of inclusiveness in the arena. Drawing on the presentation of findings and analysis regarding the dynamics of DRG in Indonesia and Myanmar (Chapters 3, 4 and 5), this sub-section highlights the major characteristics of DRG in both countries to answer three sub-questions listed under the second main research question.

### **6.1.3. What are the characteristics of the polity, policy and politics of DRG in Indonesia and Myanmar?**

#### **6.1.3.1. A heavily bureaucratic set-up on DRR (polity)**

##### **Vertical coordination**

DRG in Indonesia and Myanmar has several common characteristics in terms of the vertical coordination of DRR. In both cases, the bureaucratic governmental structure is highly organised and procedural. In Indonesia, the structure consists of 22 related ministries and bodies. In Myanmar, the bureaucratic layers are massive, consisting of many levels of political bodies and bureaucratic officers. Second, inter-ministerial coordination has become the most pronounced problem for inter-governmental bodies. In Indonesia, although some related ministries have integrated DRR into their organisational programmes and activities, the perception that DRR is the responsibility of the Indonesian National Agency for Disaster Management (*Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana*, BNPB) was often voiced by the interviewees. As a newly developed ministerial-level agency, BNPB attempted to position itself as a ‘collaborator’ instead of a ‘coordinator’.

In Myanmar, at the inter-ministerial level, information exchange and coordination were considered weak, leading to misinformation on policy implementation in inter-ministerial work. Third, both countries are characterised by tension between the central/national government and the local government. In the case of Indonesia, decentralisation was framed strongly by the central government, whereas local government representatives discussed this topic in a negative tone. The Regional Disaster Management Agency (*Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah*, BPBD) tended to support direct authority, considering access to increased resources from the national budget. In Myanmar, there is an indirect line of authority between the government structures at the union (national) level and at the state, district and township levels. The Relief and Resettlement Department (RRD) at the union level has no direct authority in terms of the coordination or structure of RRD at the local level. Meanwhile, RRD at the local level has direct authority over the General Administration Department of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Furthermore, there is weak support on programme and budget from the union level to the state, district, township and village levels. The budget from the union level only reaches the district level.

##### **Horizontal coordination: Governance network platforms (polity)**

In both cases, DRR governance networks were found to exist in different institutional forms. In Indonesia, the institutionalisation of DRR followed a pluricentric approach through the work of the National Platform (*Platform Nasional*, PLANAS). This platform is a multi-stakeholder forum for DRR in Indonesia in which the government is one of the members. The role and mandate of PLANAS are governed through the ‘Government Regulations on Disaster Management’ (No 21/2008), which mentions that the ‘national action plans for DRR [...], thoroughly organised and integrated into a forum that includes elements of the government, nongovernment organisations, the general public and the private sector, were coordinated by BNPB’. In Myanmar, the government works closely with an active multi-stakeholder platform called the DRR Working Group (DRR WG). This working group consists of 49 member organisations including the United Nations, international and local NGOs and independent consultants. The DRR WG has played an active role in DRR advocacy, including contributing to

the development and capacity building of local NGOs. At the time of this research, approximately 18 local NGOs were involved in the working group, marking its commitment to the development of non-state actors in the country.

#### **6.1.3.2. Asymmetrical relations between state and non-state actors (politics)**

In both Indonesia and Myanmar, the advocacy arenas for NGOs and other non-state actors are simultaneously widening and shrinking. In the interviews conducted for this study, government and non-state actors in both countries acknowledged the important role of each party by affirming the ‘good stage’ of their partnership. However, beyond this statement, in both cases, the findings indicate that the relationship is headed in an asymmetrical direction. Representatives of PLANAS revealed that, in partnerships, both parties work together to ‘a limited level’. The government engages PLANAS only at the final stage of policy evaluations, and the members of the network demand a more comprehensive engagement. In other words, the government determines and controls access to policy steering. In Myanmar, the government upholds its influence over the working group by driving the agenda of the governance network. In their organisational profile, the DRR WG positions itself as a ‘government-led model of DRR coordination’. However, in practice, the partnership initiative is often driven by the need to fulfil the government’s needs (demand-driven). This practice contradicts the basic idea of a governance network, where the complex process of interactive governance should achieve common goals within the network.

The empirical findings from Indonesia and Myanmar lead to the conclusion that the state has a pivotal role in the DRR governance network. The government exercises its power by positioning itself as the ‘manager of policy interaction, the governance of governance’ (Torfing et al., 2012: 122). In academic literature, this dynamic can be framed within the concept of ‘meta-governance’, which describes ‘deliberate attempts to facilitate, manage and direct more or less self-regulating process of interactive governance without reverting to traditional statist styles of government in terms of bureaucratic rule making and imperative command’ (Torfing et al., 2012: 122). In Indonesia and Myanmar, the governments were found to give direction to the governance network by (1) determining network members’ access to policy steering and (2) influencing the agenda of the network.

#### **6.1.3.3. Policy advocacy (policy)**

Governance networks have been acknowledged as strategic vehicles for DRR advocacy in Indonesia and Myanmar, consistently helping to accelerate non-state actors’ policy input to the government by facilitating information and knowledge exchange. Governance networks were also found to accelerate the process of agenda setting on advocacy, create various channels to influence the government, and strengthen advocacy alliances. In Indonesia, DRR advocacy has gone beyond policy-based advocacy. The initiative through the Indonesian Alliance on the Revision of Disaster Management Law № 24 in 2007 demonstrates the development of the advocacy movement towards legislative change. In contrast, in the context of Myanmar, the advocacy process strongly revolves around policy consultation and technical support.

Despite these distinct advocacy types, both cases show the richness of advocacy activities. First, the use of multiple channels of advocacy has extended the viability of reaching diverse audiences. The DRR advocacy networks in both Indonesia and Myanmar have engaged in direct and formal advocacy processes, which mostly revolve around bilateral, trilateral and multilateral meetings, hearings and consultations. Second, for the purpose of reaching the public, different activities are undertaken, including media exposure, public campaigns and lobby. Finally,

particularly in a context with a strong history of authoritarianism such as that seen in Myanmar, actors tend to use a backdoor, non-confrontational approach in executing their advocacy strategies (Ware, 2012). It is crucial and strategic for non-state actors to frame the agenda in such a way that the government feels they are not being ‘blamed and shamed’.

*Table 6* gives an overview of the dynamics of DRG in Indonesia and Myanmar. As the table shows, there are many similarities in DRG within the local parameters. However, a major difference is found in the role of the international community. Whereas key players are almost entirely Indonesian experts in the Indonesian case, in Myanmar, the international community plays a major role in DRG.

Table 6. Dynamics of Disaster Risk Governance in Indonesia and Myanmar: A Comparison

Subject	Indonesia	Myanmar
Commitment to DRR mainstreaming	Policy transformation on disaster management after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami  Disaster management adopted into law (Disaster Management Law № 24) in 2007	Policy transformation on disaster management after cyclone Nargis in 2008.  Myanmar Action Plan on DRR 2009–2015
Experience	Exposed to disaster management since the response and rehabilitation phases in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami in Aceh. An estimated 300 international NGOs worked during these phases (ReliefWeb, 2005), with more than USD 1 billion in humanitarian aid (The Guardian, 2014)	Exposed to disaster management since the response and rehabilitation phases in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis in 2008. An estimated 170 organisations worked during these phases (Srikandini, 2010), with more than USD 607 million in humanitarian aid (UN OCHA, 2009)
Legal document	Enacted by Disaster Management Law № 24/2007	Myanmar Action Plan on DRR 2009–2015
Bureaucratic set-up	22 related ministries work on the issue of disaster management	10 ministries comprise a sub-committee of the National Disaster Preparedness Committee, and a total of 36 ministries work on DRR-related issues

Line of authority from central to local government regarding work on DRR	Line of authority from the RRD (Ministry of Social Welfare) regarding work on DRR reaches only the district level	The work on DRR at local (both provincial and regional) levels is the responsibility of BPBD, reaching down to the community level
Budget for disaster management	For 2015–2019, BNPB receives IDR 8.7 trillion (equal to USD 653 million for five years, or USD 116 million/year)	Estimated annual budget for disaster management of USD 100 million
National capacity	DRR mainstreaming driven by national capacity	Assistance from UN and International NGOs on DRR mainstreaming
Engagement with international organisations/NGOs	Meetings and workshops are dominated by national DRR specialists	31 of 49 members of the DRR WG are international organisations or NGOs. DRR WG meetings are dominated by international DRR specialists
Multi-stakeholder platforms	Various active multi-stakeholder platforms: National Platform ( <i>Platform Nasional</i> ), the Indonesian Society for Disaster Management ( <i>Masyarakat Penanggulangan Bencana Indonesia</i> ), Indonesia Experts for Disaster Management ( <i>Ikatan Ahli Bencana Indonesia</i> )	The DRR WG and the Myanmar Consortium for DRR are the active multi-stakeholder platforms on DRR
Funding for multi-stakeholder platforms	Funding relies heavily on collaboration with the government  Minimal funding support from internal member organisations	Strong funding support from internal member organisations

*Note:* BNPB: *Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana* (National Agency for Disaster Management); BPBD: *Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah* (Regional Agency for Disaster Management); DRR: disaster risk reduction; DRR WG: Disaster Risk Reduction Working Group; NGOs: nongovernmental organisations; RRD: Relief and Resettlement Department; UN: United Nations; UN OCHA: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

#### **6.1.4. To what extent has the actual practice of inclusiveness been affected by the domestic political environment?**

Political changes in Indonesia and Myanmar have significantly influenced the process of strengthening DRG in both countries. This change has stimulated the transformation of DRG towards a pluricentric approach and inspired the practice of inclusiveness by using multi-stakeholder initiatives in policy advocacy.

##### **6.1.4.1. To what extent has decentralisation in Indonesia contributed to DRG?**

Decentralisation is a key agenda point for political reform in Indonesia. In the new system, decentralisation has created a political emphasis at the local level and justified the development of local institutions, including in the context of disaster management. DRR negotiations have shifted from Jakarta to the regency level. Additionally, the democratisation that began with political reforms in 1998 has facilitated the growing development of initiatives from non-state actors and from the community. The engagement of civil society in advocacy politics in Indonesia has taken shape through various multi-stakeholder platforms. These platforms were established independently from government. Specifically, decentralisation has justified the power sharing between two disaster management bodies: BNPB at the national level and BPBD at the provincial and regency levels. In other words, as a consequence of the decentralisation of DRG, the lines of authority between BNPB and BPBD are more about ‘coordination’ than ‘authority’. BPBD reports to the governor of the province, and the operational budget for the institution comes from the provincial/regency budget.

##### **6.1.4.2. To what extent has political transition in Myanmar influenced the dynamics of DRG?**

The commitment to initiating democratisation began with the process of the *Road Map to Democracy* (2003), when the country agreed to undertake a seven-step programme for Myanmar’s transition to a democratic state. This political milestone reflects the direction of Myanmar’s democratic trajectory, and this transitional process has helped Myanmar to be open to various aspects of international engagement, including humanitarian assistance. The political transition has stimulated a conducive environment for non-state actors to play a role in DRR across the country. The government’s behaviour has shifted from that of a closed-minded regime to be more inclusive in terms of engaging United Nations agencies, the Red Cross and NGOs. Involving multiple actors in disaster management has caused a slight shift from a monocentric approach towards a more pluricentric governance network. This has facilitated the growth of metaphoric space for non-state actors to articulate their agendas on policy setting. The active presence of the DRR WG and the participatory approach taken by NGOs at the community level provide clear evidence supporting this conclusion.

#### **6.1.5. How has the idea of an interactive governance structure for DRR governance networks played out in Indonesia and Myanmar?**

The interface between government and civil society is seen in activities such as the formulation of the National Progress Report on the Hyogo Framework for Action, preparation meetings for international DRR negotiations (i.e. at the WCDRR) and public hearings on the *Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional* (the National Mid-Term Development Plan). Within these interactions, civil society provides policy input and feedback to the government. For instance, in preparation for the WCDRR, representatives from the government, NGOs and civil society worked together to discuss Indonesia’s national interests and to

formulate the standing position for this conference. Meanwhile, turning to the larger picture, the DRR WG engaged in four areas of advocacy: strengthening DRR institutions, community-based disaster preparedness and mitigation, building DRR knowledge and institutions, and mainstreaming DRR in development sectors. This working group has been involved in a series of policy consultations, providing technical support to the government for policy development, as well as reports including a concept note on Myanmar's Action Plan for DRR (2015), recommendations for Myanmar's standing position at the WCDRR (2015) and a concept note on the Standing Order on Disaster Management (2015).

#### **6.1.5.1. What explains the different perceptions of risk among multiple actors involved in the process of interactive governance?**

Previous studies have shown that the different interpretations actors use to give meaning to disaster and risk affect the subsequent actions they take (Bankoff, Cannon, Kruger, Schipper, 2015: 7; Bankoff and Hilhorst, 2009: 2). Starting from this argument, this thesis investigated the multiple perceptions of actors on risk in the complex interactions involved in interactive governance.

First, in Indonesia, the present study revealed different points of emphasis on DRR for government officials (at national and local levels) and the community. Within the national government, perceptions about DRR were diverse. Four ministries at the national level and one local government body: *Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional* (the Indonesian Ministry of National Development Planning), *Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah* (the Indonesian Regional Body for Development Planning); BNPB (the National Agency for Disaster Management); the Ministry of Villages, Underdeveloped Regions and Transmigration; and the Ministry of Environment) perceived DRR as an approach to be adopted throughout the disaster management cycle, including preparedness, relief/emergency and rehabilitation. Differing perceptions translated into different agendas on DRR concerning issues such as land use and spatial planning, institutional strengthening, community-based approaches to resilience in villages and the integration of the development plan. Two government bodies stressed the component of infrastructure, including safe schools (the Ministry of Education) and watershed planning (the Ministry of Forestry). The Ministry of Social Affairs focused on building community capacity through establishing 'disaster preparedness villages' and 'village emergency response units' as a way to reduce the level of vulnerability within the community. In contrast, the community perception of risk revolved around vulnerability and human-caused disasters. Community members perceived disaster as a consequence of the climate (e.g. drought in a long dry season or flooding after heavy rainfall), but they also highlighted issues such as illegal logging causing landslides and land clearing driving wildfires. For NGOs, disasters had complex entanglements with issues such as illegal logging, poverty, poor awareness of environmental conservation, and weak village regulations and law enforcement, and they believed that DRR should be able to take on these underlying causes. This was later translated into livelihood programmes, agricultural training and advocacy on village regulations. Although the comprehensive approach to DRR enabled inclusion, it also meant that each actor could aim to make his or her own concerns central, and this risked leading to a fragmentation of DRR.

In Myanmar, the government and Myanmar Consortium for DRR (MCDRR) shared a common goal: a resilient community. They agreed to prioritise the improvement of community capacity through community-based DRR. However, these two actors had different points of emphasis for how to achieve this goal. An interview with a high-ranking officer in the RRD demonstrated the government's concern with the importance of training to build community

capacity. Meanwhile, MCDRR's vision of 'all communities and cities in Myanmar [being] resilient to and [overcoming] climate and other hazards' (MCDRR, 2015) is broken down into their organisational objectives, which are mostly policy-oriented. To achieve this vision, the consortium has four objectives in their five-year plan. One of these objectives promotes disaster management and climate change policy, and another stresses mainstreaming DRR in development policies and practices (MCDRR, 2015). The other two objectives are more concerned with organisation building and partnership outreach (MCDRR, 2015).

#### **6.1.5.2. What are the actual challenges to the practice of inclusive DRR in DRG?**

Decentralised DRG in Indonesia has encountered implementation challenges. An organisational structure that is heavy on bureaucracy has added complexity to the DRR governance system in Indonesia. Resulting problems include poorly integrated work, coordination issues and an organisational ego. The advocacy arena for NGOs and other non-state actors is widening, but this space is also shrinking because the decision-making process has failed to develop a comprehensive plan for building a partnership. The present study concludes that the decentralisation process in Indonesia relies heavily on the development of local institutions, with moderate development in terms of institutional strengthening.

In Myanmar, political transition has been less significant in influencing government bureaucracy in the institutional setting. In the context of DRG, government regulation operates through a multi-layered, organisational and heavily top-down approach that extends to the local level. This structure has created poor inter-ministerial coordination, as well as a power gap between government at national and local levels. In addition, the power relations among actors involved in DRG are asymmetrical: The government remains dominant in terms of influence over agenda setting. Horizontal and vertical coordination are major issues in Indonesia and Myanmar. Vertical coordination was more complex because the ambitions of decentralisation were not matched with institutional capacity at lower levels of governance. In Myanmar, the most striking aspect came when the government sought to continue to impose itself while seemingly adopting the language of inclusive DRR that was favoured by the international community.

#### **6.1.6. What are the lessons learned on interactive governance from the two case studies?**

In Indonesia and Myanmar, the actors involved in DRG generally claim that the governance network is an effective and efficient channel for advocacy. However, the present study found that advocacy through alliances or consortiums is continuously developing. First, improvements in capacity, resources and strategy to build a robust advocacy profile significantly strengthen credibility and bargaining position vis-à-vis the government. Data from this study indicate that a credible advocacy profile can create balance in relation to the government. In the Indonesian case, the alliance used documents such as academic papers to justify their collective action for legislative revision, and a clear advocacy strategy and strong research on public issues were suggested to overcome government suspicion regarding the politicisation of civil society in Myanmar.

Second, the effectiveness of advocacy is determined by both the network and the positional power of the network vis-à-vis the government. Both Indonesia and Myanmar have experienced political changes from authoritarian regimes to relatively democratic settings. That being said, the nature of these changes has influenced the nuance of the advocacy work of alliances and consortiums in these countries. In Indonesia, the basic constitution guarantees space for civil society to express and articulate their views. The government has also acknowledged the role of

civil society in policy steering, most clearly by explicitly stating the role of PLANAS in a government regulation. In contrast, in Myanmar, there is no law protecting civil society's freedom of expression, leaving space for the government to suppress any critique or protest.

Third, as a complex interaction of state and non-state actors, the process of interactive governance requires actors on both sides to play an active role. In Indonesia and Myanmar, the governments often fail to engage fully in interactive governance. This can be seen in the asymmetrical power structure in the relationships between state and non-state actors. The government has a strong influence on agenda setting and is dominant in determining non-state actors' access to policy formulation. These findings suggest that a robust collective goal is required to achieve an interactive governance of DRR that is constructive and productive.

## **6.2. Overall assessment of DRG**

This thesis aimed to shed light on the actual practice of governance networks involved in DRR politics and to draw a critical note from the everyday reality in the field. The study found that DRR has undergone a transformation through two waves of change. First, DRR has transformed from a policy agenda into well-structured global governance, with strong political support and well-established norms, principles and guidelines. Second, the governance of DRR has shifted away from a monocentric approach that positioned the state as the single player, becoming a more pluricentric governance network (see Chapter 2).

Learning from the insights generated by the field research, perhaps the most important question about the future of DRG is how to tackle the classical challenges to the governance network on DRR. This includes heavily bureaucratic procedures, resource issues and government dominance of policy steering (see Chapters 3, 4 and 5). These pitfalls in the practice of governance networks on DRR were also raised in the SFA as part of a section on a 'lesson learned, a gap identified and future challenges'.

Several challenges will need to be confronted as part of the future development of DRG. First, the growing frustration caused by heavily bureaucratic procedures has multiple significant effects on the work of the governance network on DRR (Chapters 4 and 5). This has contributed to the delay of the decision-making process, limitations to non-state actors' advocacy access to the government and problems with coordination, especially in the inter-ministerial process (Chapters 3, 4 and 5). The SFA hardly addresses issues of government structure in its strategic priority for action on strengthening DRG. The global framework only mentions 'the need for clear vision, plans, competence, guidance and coordination within and across sectors'. To some degree, this means that any action to improve the issue of the heavily bureaucratic nature of these processes will rely on the political willingness of governments. In this context, a key ministerial/agency body for disaster management should develop a specific mechanism for coordination to facilitate the process of information and knowledge exchange within the government structure. This mechanism should entail periodic and regular reports by DRR-relevant government bodies to help the work across all sectors. In parallel, this mechanism would also impact the dynamics of the governance network by offering more coordinated efforts to govern policy steering. Advocacy access, which is often hindered by heavily bureaucratic procedures, might also increase through an open coordination mechanism in the inter-ministerial arrangement.

Second, in terms of resource issues (see Chapters 3 and 4), the SFA specifically highlights the agenda of regulatory and financial means as a way to empower local authorities. In attempting to achieve this goal, strong political willingness from member states is critical to

improve the resource distribution from national to local governments. The agenda of resource distribution might require a clear and measurable plan and budget developed by the local government. Aside from financial resources, consistent planning to strengthen the capacity of human resources in the local government is also an imperative agenda item.

Third, the dominant role of governments in governance networks on DRR (see Chapters 3, 4 and 5) is driven by the need to direct and guide the work of these networks. This pivotal position in interactive governance also reflects the SFA's framing of the initiative on DRR governance networks. One of the SFA's priorities for action underlines the need to strengthen 'government coordination forums' made up of DRR-relevant stakeholders. From this perceptive, governments are seemingly positioned at the heart of these governance networks, playing the role of coordinator, but the spirit of interactive governance entails mutual dependency and parallel positions among its members. It is crucial to improve the positional power of non-state actors without undermining the preference of the government to govern the network. As such, a clear strategic advocacy agenda by non-state actors, as well as strong capacity in terms of resources and knowledge, would enable measurable action to empower these actors in negotiations with the government in the DRR governance network.

Finally, it is important to note that inclusive DRR through governance networks is not likely to prevail solely through the establishment of specific multi-stakeholder mechanisms. Rather, the commitment to moving towards the ideal of interactive governance is far more important. Interactive governance requires solid collective action to navigate the complex process of interaction in order to achieve common objectives. Attempting to achieve this demands that governance network members have a strong political willingness, a concrete strategic plan and robust resources. Considering the growing interest and political support, it can be expected that interactive governance through governance networks will continue to become the future practice for institutionalising multi-stakeholder initiatives on DRR.

### **6.3. Future development of DRG**

Over the next decade, presumably, we will witness consistent endorsement and advocacy on strengthening DRG, in which governance networks on DRR will increasingly be the ideal in terms of policy steering. At least until 2030, the commitment to uphold this approach has the political consensus of the United Nations member states. The SFA establishes seven global targets, one of which strongly calls for the strengthening of DRG. Specifically, the desired outcome is to 'substantially increase the number of countries with national and local DRR strategies by 2020'. In attempting to achieve this target, the priority for action on strengthening DRG is a dominant feature of the current and future DRR movement. This includes promoting the coherency of laws and regulations, strengthening government coordination forums, and empowering local authorities through regulatory and financial means. To understand this important development, robust research on the endogenous dynamics of DRR governance networks is crucial. Research of this type will contribute not only to the empowerment of DRG, but also to supporting the achievement of the SFA overall. However, despite the findings of this thesis, a great deal of work remains to be done to advance the current understanding of governance networks on DRR.

First, this thesis had limited opportunities to investigate the power relations between the state and DRR global agencies. As mentioned in Chapter 2, DRR has transformed into a global structure of governance, and the question of how states position themselves in terms of the global strategic guidelines seeking to govern their behaviour is intriguing and of critical concern. Do

states continue to exercise their power to keep their dominance in the global arena, as was observed in practice in the cases of Indonesia and Myanmar?

Second, further research to develop robust policy recommendations for strengthening the work of DRR governance networks is also important to bridge academic work and policy practice. Among the urgent topics that have not been covered in this thesis is the political mapping of DRR global governance networks. This would describe the trends and practices of DRR interactive governance from the perspective of member states and non-state actors.

Third, there are theoretical challenges to advancing the research on DRR interactive governance, and research on this topic remains under-theorised. Despite the extensive work by scholars on the governance-related topic of DRR, there is a lack of work specifically on the dynamics of DRR governance networks. In future academic work on DRR governance, the in-depth study of interaction within governance networks should be given more attention.

## References Chapter 6

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# Curriculum Vitae

## Annisa Gita Srikandini

### EDUCATION


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- 2009 – 2010 **Groningen University, The Netherlands**  
Master of Arts, Major on Humanitarian Action  
**Uppsala University, Sweden**  
Master of Theology, Major on Humanitarian and Religion
- 2004 – 2007 **Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia**  
Bachelor of Political Sciences, Major on International Relations

### PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

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- 2008 – Current **Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia**  
Public University  
*Lecturer, Department of International Relations*
- Lectured subject on International Relations, Humanitarian Studies and Disaster Studies for Undergraduate and Graduate Students of International Relations and Global Humanitarian Diplomacy in average of 14 courses/ year
  - Developed and managed partnership and strategic partners for research activities with multiple stakeholders such as: Government (i.e. Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Regional Organizations (i.e. ASEAN, The Delegation of the European Union for Indonesia and Brunei Darussalam), International Organizations (i.e. International Federation of the Red Cross) and Universities (i.e. Osaka University, Queensland University)
  - Initiated, launched and lead projects implementation for two most-valuable research clusters (Humanitarian Action and European Studies) in the Department of International Relations with total value about US\$ 110.000
  - Produced extensive research on subject of Humanitarian and Disaster Studies in Indonesia with number of publications: 2 national journal articles, 19 international proceedings and 1 monograph.
  - Prepared, developed and presented 2 policy papers for Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on subject of 'Indonesian Market Expansion to Eastern Europe', 'Indonesian – European Union Partnership Cooperation Agreement'
  - Conducted brainstorming, team collaboration in due diligence, negotiation, and deal management for operational activities in 2 clusters of Humanitarian Action and European Studies
  - Prepared management report for both internal and external stakeholders on collaborative research and academic project
  - Managed, mentored, and oversaw 5 junior researches across multiple projects



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## **ADDITIONAL INFORMATION**

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### **Internship and Consultancy Works**

- 2015 - Netherlands Red Cross in Indonesia with project title: Advocacy in Decentralized Disaster Risk Governance in Indonesia (October – December 2015)
- 2014 - United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Myanmar. Pillar II Environment, Climate Change, Energy and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Programme (September – November 2014)
- 2010 - United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) Surge Capacity Section, Geneva, Switzerland (August - October 2010)

### **Article and Book Authorships**

- 2017 - Published Article on KOMPAS, Indonesian leading national newspaper, 'Indonesian Humanitarian Diplomacy in Myanmar'
- 2013 - Book Co-Authorship with David Camroux on The Palgrave Handbook on European Union – Asia Relations. Chapter: EU – Indonesia Cooperation.
- 2011 - Book Author for 'Humanitarian Action and Responsibility to Protect in Myanmar: Political Willingness of Myanmar toward Responsibility to Protect after Cyclone Nargis', published by Institute of International Studies, Gadjah Mada University

### **Scholarships**

- 2013 - NUFFIC Fellowship Programme (NFP), Ministry of Education, The Netherlands
- 2009 - Erasmus Mundus Scholarship, European Union (EU)

# Transcript Training and Supervision Plan

To whom it may concern

Herewith we confirm that Annisa Gita Srikandini, 10-11-1985, has successfully followed the following learning activities:

Name of the learning activity	Department/Institute	Year	ECTS*
<b>A) Project related competences</b>			
Institutions, Recovery, Resilience, RDS 52306	WUR	2013	6
Intensive Introduction Course to Qualitative Research	UVA	2013	6
Governance, Trust and Policy Change, PAP 30806	WUR	2013	6
Writing Research Proposal	WUR	2013	6
<b>B) General research related competences</b>			
Introduction course	WASS	2013	1
Scientific Writing	Wageningen in'to Languages	2014	1.8
'Economic Resilience: Building Strategy for Post-Disaster Development in Indonesia'	International Conference on Indonesian Development, ISS, Den Haag	2013	1
'Politics of Disaster in Indonesia: How Democracy Contribute to Resilient Community'	World Conference on Humanitarian Studies, Istanbul, Turkey	2013	1
PhD peer consultation – a powerful tool to tackle PhD challenge	WGS	2015	1.5
'Disaster Risk Governance in Transition Myanmar'	International Conference on Climate Change, Ecology, and Conservation, Beijing, China	2016	1
'Decentralized Disaster Risk Governance in Indonesia'	Asian Conference on Human Security, APISA, Taichung, Taiwan	2016	1
'Politics of Disaster Risk Governance'	Conference on Aceh and Indian Ocean Studies, CAIOS, Banda Aceh, Indonesia	2016	1
'Politics of Disaster Risk Governance in Indonesia and Myanmar'	Wageningen Indonesian Scientific Expose, Wageningen	2016	0.5
'Non-Traditional Security in Indonesia and Myanmar: Advocacy Networks on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)'	Peace and Conflict Resolution Conference, Bangkok, Thailand	2016	1
'Building Resilience from Below: Study on Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction (CBDRR) in Indonesia and Myanmar'	8 <sup>th</sup> Rural Research and Planning Group Conference, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia	2017	1
<b>Total</b>			<b>35.8</b>

\*One credit according to ECTS is on average equivalent to 28 hours of study load

With kind regards,

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Wageningen UR (Wageningen University, Van Hall Larenstein University of Applied Sciences and various research institutes) is specialised in the domain of healthy food and living environment.



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