TRANSFORMATIVE POLITICS IN ENVIRONMENTAL STRUGGLES:

A comparative analysis of the mining conflicts in Intag, Ecuador and Mount Ida, Turkey

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Transformatieve politiek in de strijd om het milieu:

een vergelijkende analyse van de mijnbouwconflicten in Intag, Ecuador en Mount Ida, Turkije

**to obtain the degree of Doctor from the
Erasmus University Rotterdam
by command of the Rector Magnificus**

Prof.dr. R.C.M.E. Engels

and in accordance with the decision of the Doctorate Board

The public defence shall be held on
Monday 8 October 2018 at 10.00 hrs

by

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Dedicated to my late aunt Gülser, the kindest person I have ever known

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
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Acronyms

AACRI	Associación Agroartesanal de Caficultores Rio Intag/ Agro-Artisanal Coffee Producers' Association of the Intag River
AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi/ Justice and Development Party
ALDEAH	Alternativas para un Desarrollo Ecológico, Autodeterminado y Humano/ Alternatives for an Ecological, Auto-determined and Humane Development
AUC	Asamblea de Unidad Cantonal/ Assembly for Cantonal Unity
CEDENMA	Comité Ecuatoriano para la Defensa de la Naturaleza y el Medio Ambiente / Ecuadorian Coordinating Committee for the Defence of Nature and the Environment
CEDHU	Comisión Ecuménica de Derechos Humanos/ Ecumenical Commission of Human Rights
CEPAL	Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe/ Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi/ Republican People's Party
CODEGAM	Consejo para el Desarrollo de García Moreno / The Council of Development of Garcia Moreno
CODELCO	Corporación Nacional de Cobre de Chile/ National Copper Corporation of Chile
CODIGEM	Corporación de Desarrollo e Investigación Geológica-Minero-Metalúrgica/ Corporation for the Geological-Mining-Metallurgical Development and Research

CONAIE	Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador/ Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador
DECOIN	Defensa y Conservación Ecológica de Intag/ Defence and Ecological Conservation of Intag
DPT	Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı/ State Planning Organization
EGEÇEP	Ege Çevre Platformu/ Aegean Environmental Platform
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
ENAMI EP	Empresa Nacional Minero del Ecuador/ Ecuador State Mining Company
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GÜMÇED	Güzel Edremit Körfezi Bekçileri/ Guards of the Beautiful Edremit Bay
INEC	Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos/ National Institute of Statistics and Census
INREDH	Fundación Regional de Asesoría en Derechos Humano/ The Regional Human Rights Advisory Foundation
MAGAP	Ministerio de Agricultura y Gandería/ Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock
MARÇEP	Marmara Çevre Platformu/ Marmara Environmental Platform
MHP	Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi/ Nationalist Action Party
MIES	Ministerio de Inclusión Económica y Social/ Ministry of Economic and Social Inclusion
MTA	Maden Tetkik ve Arama Genel Müdürlügü/ General Directorate of Mineral Research and Exploration
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OLCA	Observatorio Latinoamericano de Conflictos Ambientales/ Latin American Observatory of Environmental Conflicts
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
ÖDP	Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi/ Freedom and Solidarity Party

PRODECI	Pro Derechos Ciudadanos/ Pro Citizens' Rights
PRODEMINCA	El Proyecto de Asistencia Técnica para el Desarrollo Minero y Control Ambiental/ The Ecuadorian Mining Development and Environmental Control Technical Assistance Project
SENPLADES	Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo/ National Secretary of Planning and Development
TEMA	Türkiye Erozyonla Mücadele, Ağaçlandırma ve Doğal Varlıkları Koruma Vakfı/ Turkish Foundation for Fight Against Erosion and Reforestation
TMMOB	Türk Mühendis ve Mimar Odaları Birliği/ Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects
TSX	Toronto Stock Exchange
TK	Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu/ Turkish Statistical Institute
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNORCAC	Unión de Organizaciones Campesinas y Indígenas de Cotacachi/ Union of Farmer and Indigenous Organizations of Cotacachi

Acknowledgements

Many people contributed in different ways to the production of this dissertation. It is impossible to acknowledge each of them, or fully convey my gratitude to all. I can only do my best to honour their contributions through the way in which I conduct my life and do my work.

First and foremost, I am indebted to all the participants in my research in Ecuador and Turkey, for sharing their stories with me which made this study possible. They are the co-authors of this dissertation. I cannot possibly claim to have done full justice to the richness and complexity of their lives and struggles. I can only say that I have done my best to provide a sufficiently accurate and nuanced account of their struggles. I hope that I have not betrayed their trust and generosity. Although I cannot mention their names here for reasons of confidentiality, I am particularly grateful to two women identified by the pseudonyms María and Carolina, for introducing me to their community, for telling me about their lives and struggle, for answering my endless questions, and for taking such good care of me during my stay in Junín. I also want to thank Carlos Zorrilla for generously sharing his knowledge and experience with me. In Turkey, I am particularly indebted to my host family in Evciler village, for making the fieldwork in the village possible and for looking out for my well-being during my stay. I would also like to thank Süheyla Doğan, for always welcoming me, taking the time to talk to me on numerous occasions, and answering all my questions. I admire the spirit and determination of the people in Intag and Mount Ida who struggle to defend their rights, livelihoods and environment. I can only hope that this study contributes in some way to their struggle, and those of all peoples around the world who strive for justice and a better world.

Murat Arsel has been an incredible source of inspiration and support throughout the entire process. I am immensely grateful for his guidance, for his understanding and support for all my efforts to find my way, and for his patience. This dissertation has improved a lot thanks to his penetrating questions, constructive comments and thoughtful insights. Ben White has provided extremely valuable guidance in putting the whole PhD process, especially its challenges, into perspective. His warmth and humour in particular alleviated my concerns and got me through the most difficult personal moments. His comments on the initial chapters and the earlier versions of the dissertation have improved the final manuscript. I am profoundly grateful to him for being my promoter, and I would like to extend my apologies for not being able to finish this project before his retirement.

This dissertation would have not been possible without Fikret Adaman—an exceptional mentor, brilliant scholar, fierce critic, unwavering comrade and, above all, a dear friend. I cannot possibly thank him enough for his guidance, and his intellectual and emotional support. He has been involved from the earliest stages, as supervisor of my master's degree and as I was writing my PhD proposal, to the very end of it—reading and commenting on all the chapters, and even correcting my grammatical errors and punctuation. He has been, and still is, one of the most influential people in my life. I am grateful beyond words for his love, friendship and solidarity.

John Cameron has been extremely influential in my intellectual development throughout this process. He has helped me considerably in locating my work in the landscape of the social sciences, understanding what it means to produce knowledge, and in improving my fieldwork skills. He has also contributed to the production of this dissertation as my seminar discussant; his comments and suggestions have substantially improved my thinking and arguments. I have learnt a lot from him about being a researcher, and being a teacher—for his lectures also taught me what it means to be a

good teacher. I am deeply grateful for all the insightful and enjoyable conversations we have had. My appreciation of him as a scholar and as a human being cannot be captured in words.

Lorenzo Pellegrini, Roldan Muradian and Joan Martínez-Alier have all contributed substantially through their comments and suggestions. This dissertation would not be what it is without their contributions. I feel extremely fortunate to have benefited from the knowledge and experience of such remarkable scholars. I am indebted to them all. I am truly thankful to Jun Borras for accepting to be my promoter, and for his support during the final stages of the process.

I have been extremely fortunate to have incredible colleagues and friends who have contributed in so many ways not only to this research process, but also to my intellectual and personal development. I am particularly grateful to Begüm Özkaynak, who was one of the first people who inspired me to work on socio-environmental issues and has taught me a lot—not only about these issues, but also about what it means to be a good scholar. She has not only contributed to my academic work, joining me in the field, guiding me in writing my first article, sharing her knowledge and insights, and providing me opportunities to publish my work, she has also been a very dear friend whom I deeply respect and admire. I look forward to many more years of friendship and academic collaboration with her.

Bengi Akbulut has been another great source of inspiration in my work and life. An admirable critical scholar, invaluable colleague, inspiring woman and cherished friend, Bengi has contributed significantly to this dissertation through her insightful comments and suggestions, and to my intellectual development through her knowledge and analytical skills. I will always hold dear the time we spent together during my fieldwork in Ecuador, as I do all other moments we shared and conversations we had.

Martín Bermúdez has accompanied me as friend, colleague and partner throughout much of this process. He has supported me at every step of the way; sharing his knowledge and insights on Latin American politics, environment and culture, accompanying me during field research, encouraging and pushing me at moments when I felt lost, and providing a home—emotionally and literally—as I was writing the dissertation. I have grown in so many ways with him. I will always be immensely grateful for his presence in my life. Natalia Avila Angel, one of the most amazing women I have met in my life, has also been an incredible friend and colleague. She has accompanied me in my fieldwork in Ecuador and provided invaluable emotional

and intellectual support. I am very lucky to have her as a friend, and deeply treasure all the moments we have shared.

I could not possibly have got through this process without the support of my friends in Turkey, Beste Yaşarlar, Gamze Keskin and Müge Ersen Karabulut. Their unwavering belief in me made *me* possible. They listened to and helped me overcome my inner struggles, they provided a home, a space to work, and a lot of fun. They know how much I love and how grateful I am to them. I cannot imagine life without them. I am also incredibly grateful for the support, understanding and patience of my parents, Salihan and Ali Avcı, and my sister, Devrim Avcı. Words cannot express my love and admiration, and my gratitude to them. I can only hope to make them proud of me through my work and the way I live my life. I also owe a lot to Aysen Altuğ, my second mother, for her emotional support at some of the hardest moments of this process, for all the lovely conversations we had about so many things, for feeding and looking after me when I was not able to do so myself.

Many other friends and colleagues deserve mention. At ISS, I would like to extend my heartfelt gratitude to Zaman, Daniel, Lauren, María Gabriela, Sarah, Celeste, Mauro, Roselle, Sathya, Deniz, Consuelo, Alberto, Runa, Farzane, Ben, Alma and Kai, among others. Special thanks are due to Kai Tepavitak, María Gabriela Palacios and Daniela Andrade for acting as discussants and contributing to the development of the final manuscript. From Turkey, I want to thank Pınar, Irmak, Cem and Ceren. It has been a pleasure to share this journey with them. Finally, I am grateful to the PhD Programme Secretary Dita Dirks at the ISS for all her support at every stage of this process.

Abstract

This study analyses transformative politics in the context of local environmental struggles. It advances an understanding of local environmental struggles as a space that contains possibilities for the transformation of the political subjectivities of the social actors that participate in them, and sets out to examine the factors and processes that facilitate or hinder such transformation. The analysis is conducted through a comparison of two local struggles around large-scale mining developments, respectively in the Intag valley of Ecuador and the Mount Ida region of Turkey, which differ with respect to how transformative they have been.

To understand and explain the differences between the two struggles, the study draws on a Gramscian reading of state-society relations and social struggles. Deploying the Gramscian perspective, the analysis starts by examining the historical state-society relations within the context of which peasant subjectivities have been moulded. Following this, the actual dynamics of the struggles are examined, with an emphasis on the relationships between the peasants, local civil society and community organizations, and the local governments. The study employs a comparative approach as a methodological entry point to identify the processes within state-society relations, and the building of the struggles that shape the political subjectivities of those peasants participating in them.

The research is based on field studies conducted intermittently over ten months from October 2007 to July 2008 and continuously during three months from June to August 2012 in Mount Ida, and over eight months from September 2011 to April 2012 in Intag, with further occasional visits to the study areas. The methodology combines internal, in-depth analysis of each case with external analysis of patterns of similarities and differences, always in relation to the state-society relations within which each is embedded. In the field studies, qualitative research methods are used, combining interviews (44 in Intag and 68 in Mount Ida), group discussions, informal

talks, direct observation of daily life, and direct observation in meetings of communities and organizations.

Focusing on the contrasts between the two cases, it is argued that the peasants in Intag articulated a more critical understanding of the development-environment-justice nexus than those in Mount Ida. The study shows that in Intag, a vision of an alternative local development model based on ethical values such as dignity, community well-being and empowerment was constructed; new environmental subjectivities were nurtured; and rights-based notions of justice were cultivated. In Mount Ida, the dominant understanding of development as economic growth and material prosperity was reproduced and environmental and justice concerns were framed in a limited way; the former as the defence of the local environment from outsiders, the latter as the defence of particularistic material interests.

As the study endeavours to explain these differences, it first demonstrates how hegemonic discourses and practices of the state mould the subjectivities of social actors and constrain the possibilities for their transformation. With reference to the Mount Ida case, it is shown how, by instituting its presence in and regulating the everyday lives of social actors, and representing peasants' everyday experiences within the discourse of development, the state cultivates subjects who think about societal relations and their own lives in terms of a self-evidently legitimate and desirable process of development. The study posits that the recent process of state building in Ecuador and its emerging effects in Intag also support this argument regarding the importance of state hegemonic practices in (re)configuring subjectivities.

Second, the study illustrates how transformative political action is enabled by the creation of political spaces for collective reflection and action around alternative ways of organizing social and environmental relations. Through the Intag case, the study shows how a social struggle—one that has engendered concrete change in material practices and forms of sociality towards the establishment of more equal, just, democratic and sustainable social and environmental relations—has influenced peasants' conceptions of their lives and themselves, empowering them to assert their right to decide and construct the future of their lives and territories. It also discusses how the hegemonic practices of the state undermine those civil society spaces and efforts, thus constraining the critical subjectivities in making in those spaces.

The importance for transformative politics of creating political spaces that enable social actors to reflect and act upon their everyday lived experiences

is further corroborated by the experience of the struggle in Mount Ida. This study shows that in the absence of such political spaces, the peasants, for the most part, were unable to go beyond defending their particularistic interests. Thus it is argued that it is in the extent to which actors in the sphere of civil society can make a difference to their everyday experiences, and rework the meanings through which these are lived, that they can enact transformative politics.

Transformatieve politiek in de strijd om het milieu: Een vergelijkende analyse van de mijnbouwconflicten in Intag, Ecuador en Mount Ida, Turkije

Samenvatting

Dit onderzoek gaat over transformatieve politiek in lokale milieuconflicten. Lokale milieuconflicten worden opgevat als ruimtes die mogelijkheden bieden voor de transformatie van politieke subjectiviteiten van de sociale actoren die eraan deelnemen. Het onderzoek is gericht op de factoren en processen die een dergelijke transformatie faciliteren of hinderen. In het onderzoek worden twee lokale conflicten vergeleken. Hierbij gaat het om grootschalige mijnbouwontwikkeling in de Intag-vallei in Ecuador en de regio rond Mount Ida in Turkije. Deze twee conflicten verschillen in hoe transformatief ze zijn geweest.

Om de verschillen tussen de twee conflicten te kunnen begrijpen en verklaren wordt vanuit Gramsciaans perspectief gekeken naar de verhoudingen tussen staat en samenleving en naar de sociale strijd. Het onderzoek is gericht op de volgende aspecten: 1. de historisch gegroeide verhoudingen tussen staat en samenleving waarin de subjectiviteiten van de boeren zijn gevormd; en 2. de daadwerkelijke dynamiek van de strijd zelf. Daarbij gaat het om wat er precies is voorgevallen in de loop van deze conflicten, met de nadruk op de verhoudingen tussen de relevante actoren. In het onderzoek is een vergelijkende benadering gekozen. Die dient als methodologisch startpunt voor het identificeren van enerzijds de processen binnen de verhoudingen tussen staat en samenleving, en anderzijds de zich ontwikkelende strijd die de politieke subjectiviteiten van de boeren die eraan deelnemen vormgeeft.

Voor het onderzoek is tussen oktober 2007 en juli 2008 met tussenpozen veldonderzoek gedaan en er is van juni tot en met augustus drie maanden lang veldonderzoek gedaan op Mount Ida, en in een periode van ruim acht maanden (van september 2011 tot april 2012) in Intag. Daarnaast is het on-

derzoeksgebied ook nog een aantal keer apart bezocht. De methodologie betreft een combinatie van een interne, diepgaande analyse van elke casestudy met een externe analyse van patronen van overeenkomsten en verschillen, altijd in relatie tot de verhoudingen tussen de staat en samenleving waarin de casestudy's zijn ingebed. In de veldonderzoeken werd gebruikgemaakt van kwalitatieve onderzoeksmethoden. Hierbij ging het om een combinatie van interviews (44 in Intag en 68 op Mount Ida), groepsdiscussies, informele gesprekken, directe observatie van het dagelijks leven en directe observatie in bijeenkomsten van gemeenschappen en organisaties.

Uit een vergelijking tussen de twee casestudy's blijkt dat de boeren in Intag kritischere opvattingen hebben over ontwikkeling, milieu en rechtvaardigheid dan die in Mount Ida. In Intag ontstond een visie op een alternatief lokaal ontwikkelingsmodel, gebaseerd op ethische waarden zoals waardigheid, welzijn van de gemeenschap en gemeenschapsemancipatie. Hierin werden nieuwe milieu-subjectiviteiten en noties van rechtvaardigheid gekoesterd en gecultiveerd. In Mount Ida werd daarentegen de heersende opvatting van ontwikkeling als economische groei en materiële welvaart gereproduceerd. Zorgen om het milieu en om rechtvaardigheid werden slechts in enge zin opgevat als de bescherming van het lokale milieu tegen buitenstaanders, en als de verdediging van particularistische materiële belangen.

Om deze verschillen te verklaren wordt in dit onderzoek in de eerste plaats aangetoond hoe de hegemonie van de staat de subjectiviteiten van sociale actoren vormgeeft en de mogelijkheden voor transformatie beperkt. Uit de casestudy in Mount Ida blijkt hoe de staat door zijn aanwezigheid in en controle over het dagelijks leven van sociale actoren, en door het voeren van een discours van ontwikkeling, onderdanen cultiveert die maatschappelijke verhoudingen en hun eigen leven beschouwen in termen van een vanzelfsprekend legitiem en wenselijk ontwikkelingsproces. In dit proefschrift wordt betoogd dat het recente proces van staatsvorming in Ecuador en de effecten ervan die in Intag zichtbaar worden ook wijzen op de invloed van staatshegemonie op het (her)configureren van subjectiviteiten.

Ten tweede illustreert het onderzoek hoe transformatieve politieke actie mogelijk wordt gemaakt door het creëren van politieke ruimte voor collectieve reflectie en actie rond alternatieve manieren om sociale en ecologische relaties te organiseren. Uit de casestudy in Intag blijkt hoe een sociale strijd die concrete veranderingen heeft teweeggebracht in materiële praktijken en vormen van socialiteit met het oog op de totstandbrenging van gelijkwaardigere, rechtvaardigere, democratischere en duurzamere sociale en ecologische relaties, de boeren heeft beïnvloed in hun opvattingen over hun leven en

zichzelf. Hierdoor hebben ze de mogelijkheid gekregen om hun rechten te doen gelden; om te beslissen over de manier waarop ze de toekomst van hun leven en grondgebied vormgeven. Het onderzoek gaat ook in op hoe de staatshegemonie die ruimte en inspanningen van het maatschappelijk middenveld ondermijnt, en zo de kritische subjectiviteiten beperkt om die ruimte te creëren.

Dit proefschrift wijst op het belang van een transformatieve politiek van het creëren van politieke ruimte om na te denken over en te handelen op basis van de dagelijkse ervaringen van sociale actoren. Het conflict in Mount Ida vormt hiervan een bevestiging; in Mount Ida was deze politieke ruimte er nauwelijks. Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat de boeren daardoor weinig anders konden doen dan het verdedigen van hun particularistische belangen. Daarom is de conclusie van dit onderzoek dat de mate waarin actoren in het maatschappelijk middenveld een verschil kunnen maken in de alledaagse ervaringen en iets kunnen doen met wat die ervaringen voor hen betekenen, bepaalt of ze een transformatieve politiek kunnen bedrijven.

1 The Relevance of Transformative Politics: Setting the Research Agenda

This study analyses transformative politics in the context of local environmental struggles. It advances an understanding of local environmental struggles as a space that contains possibilities for the transformation of the political subjectivities of the social actors that participate in them, and sets out to examine the factors and processes that facilitate or hinder such transformation (Avcı 2017).[1] The study pursues this analysis by comparing two local struggles around large-scale mining developments, respectively in the Intag valley of Ecuador and the Mount Ida region of Turkey, which differ with respect to how transformative they have been.

Struggles over the environment are increasingly occupying a central place in the landscape of political struggle around the world. Be it around climate change at the global level; infrastructure projects, resource extraction and deforestation in the Amazon; industrial pollution in China; mining in Peru; oil extraction in Nigeria; industrial tree plantations in Indonesia; railway and airport expansion in Europe; urban transformation in Turkey; the construction of dams in India; laying oil pipelines in the United States, to name but a few,[2] environmental struggles are important in shaping social and environmental relations in contemporary societies. This study attempts to understand the role of such conflicts in changing these relations to become more egalitarian, just and sustainable by critically examining how and to what extent they enact transformative politics.

The topic of this study can be narrowed down as local environmental struggles around large-scale resource extraction projects in the global South.[3] Such struggles have been most extensively studied in the field of political ecology. Political ecology studies have investigated the reasons underlying these struggles, the claims, concerns and demands of different social actors, the discourses they use, the distinct types of environmentalism they uphold, the alliances they build, the strategies they employ, and

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the practices they engage in. I argue that as important as it is to account for the different dimensions of environmental struggle, of equal importance is to acknowledge their generative dimension. That is, how they open the space to construct new understandings and identities, and to critically analyse those understandings, discourses and social identities that are being constructed. It is thus important to ask about their transformative potential: whether, when and how these struggles challenge the meanings, discourses and identities that reproduce and legitimize unequal power relations, and construct alternative ones that are conducive to more egalitarian, just and sustainable social and environmental relations. Such critical scrutiny of environmental struggles would allow us to concretize what transformative politics entails, and to better understand the processes that facilitate or hinder such politics. In this study, I undertake a comparative analysis of two mining conflicts, the contrasting features of which provide a fertile ground to analyse these processes.

The first conflict takes place in the Intag valley of Ecuador, and the second in the Mount Ida region of Turkey. Both conflicts started as a result of plans to develop large-scale mining projects in rural territories: an open-pit copper mine in Intag, and several large-scale, cyanide-leaching gold mining projects in Mount Ida. These two conflicts emerged in the context of the global expansion of mining into new territories since the 1990s (Bridge 2004a). Although Ecuador and Turkey were not among the primary targets in the geographical expansion of mining, both liberalized their mining sector in an effort to attract foreign direct investment. As these efforts started to produce results, mainly in the form of explorations in different areas of the two countries, discontent over the social, environmental and economic impact of mining followed. The conflict over the development of a copper mine in Intag, which started in the mid-1990s, and the one in Mount Ida, over several large-scale, cyanide-leaching gold mining projects, which broke out in 2007, are the two cases in which the contention evolved into organized resistance.

Both in Intag and Mount Ida, peasants, local civil society actors and local governments mobilized to stop the mining projects. In both cases, local opposition movements were based in the defence of livelihoods, ways of life and local environment against the harmful impacts of mining. However, the two struggles differed significantly with respect to the discourses and practices that respective social actors used. In Intag, the

movement actors rejected mining because it represented a type of development that damages livelihoods, social relations and the environment. Opposing this model of development, they engaged in a project to construct an alternative local model, framing their efforts as a struggle to defend their communities' right to control their lives and territories. In the process, questions of what development means, what role the environment should play in local development, and who has the right to define the future of the valley were explicitly discussed. In Mount Ida, on the other hand, the social actors opposing gold mining emphasized that it would have negative impacts on the regional economy and spoil the environment, while it would be the foreign mining companies who would reap its benefits. The debate was mostly framed in the language of cost-benefit calculation; around how much economic value the region was already producing, and why it should not be sacrificed for the benefit of foreign companies. The movement thus remained focused on stopping the mining projects and defending the place against outsiders.

Building on these contrasts, I aim to unpack these differences and explain how they were produced. I probe into the political subjectivities, or the types of political agency, that were constructed and articulated in the two struggles. Although the two anti-mining struggles in Intag and Mount Ida involved not only peasants but also civil society actors and local governments, to narrow down the study, I focus on the subjectivities of the *peasants* who opposed and participated in the struggles against the mining projects. The research questions I ask are: what is it about their livelihoods and local environments that the peasants want to defend? Which arguments and discourses do they use to frame their concerns and demands? What are the values and logics that underlie these discourses? What kind of collective identities do they forge? How can we account for the differences between the two cases? What are the processes that produce these differences?

To address these questions, I draw on a Gramscian reading of state-society relations and social struggles. Deploying the Gramscian perspective, I pursue the analysis, first, by looking at the historical state-society relations which have moulded peasant subjectivities. Second, I examine the dynamics of the struggles, that is, what actually happened in the course of these struggles, with an emphasis on the relationships between the relevant movement actors. I employ a comparative approach as a methodological entry point to identify the processes within state-society

relations, and the building of the struggles that shape the political subjectivities of those peasants participating in them.

The research is based on field studies conducted intermittently over ten months from October 2007 to July 2008 and continuously for three full months from June to August 2012 in Mount Ida, and over eight months from September 2011 to April 2012 in Intag, with further occasional visits to the study areas. The methodology combines internal, in-depth analysis of each case with external analysis of patterns of similarities and differences, always in relation to the state-society relations within which they are embedded. In the field studies, qualitative research methods were used, combining interviews (44 in Intag and 68 in Mount Ida), group discussions, informal talks, direct observation of daily life, and direct observation in meetings of communities and organizations. The results of a survey conducted in Mount Ida in 2008 (as part of my master's thesis) also inform the analysis.

The rest of this introductory chapter is organized as follows: the first section provides a review of political ecology studies on local environmental conflicts to situate this study in the field, and explains why the study adopts a Gramscian theoretical perspective. The second section introduces the dimensions along which the study analyses transformative politics in Intag and Mount Ida, and summarizes the main arguments developed through the comparative analysis. The third section outlines the theoretical and substantive contributions of the study. The fourth section describes the methodology of the research, discussing both the epistemological foundations of the comparative approach and the methods employed in the field studies. Finally, the fifth section sets out the organization of the subsequent chapters.

1.1   Locating the Research: A Gramscian Contribution to Political Ecology

In the last three decades, environmental conflicts[4] have intensified all over the world, but especially in the developing counties of the South. There has been a corresponding increase in academic interest in the subject, particularly in the field of political ecology. In fact, the interest in and the analysis of such struggles have been constitutive of the field, and marked its development since its beginnings in the 1980s. Essentially, political ecology advocates an understanding of the interconnectedness

of environmental and social change, and their embeddedness in unequal power relations. The main driver of such change is identified as capitalism with its changing historical forms (i.e. colonization, globalization, neoliberalism), and the modernization projects and development models pursued by developing countries, simultaneously constrained, facilitated and shaped by dynamics of global capitalism. Environmental conflicts are conceived mainly as struggles of the subaltern groups who are dispossessed, marginalized and impoverished by the changes in access to resources and environmental degradation resulting from these processes. The conflicts triggered by large-scale development projects have been one of the main areas of research in the field. Several studies have analysed the changes (actual or anticipated) in the place-based environment and society relationships with the introduction of development projects, and the material and symbolic struggles over them, waged by unequally empowered actors with divergent interests, values, perceptions and knowledge regarding the environment (see e.g. Blaikie 1999, Bryant & Bailey 1997, Escobar 2006, Horowitz & Watts 2017, Martinez-Alier 2002, Martinez-Alier et al. 2016a, Peet & Watts 2004, Robbins 2004, Peet et al. 2011).

A central concern in these studies has been to understand why local communities resist such development projects on environmental grounds. The main argument in this regard has been that the struggles of local communities, mostly poor and marginalized, to defend the environment has a material basis. Guha and Martinez-Alier (1997) coined the term "environmentalism of the poor" to refer to such struggles as a form of environmentalism distinct from the environmental movements in the North which they considered to be based on quality of life concerns and post-materialist values (Inglehart 1990). They argued that, on the contrary, the environmental struggles in the developing countries of the South originate from "unequal ecological distribution". That is, "the social, spatial and temporal asymmetries or inequalities in the use by people of environmental resources and services, i.e. in the depletion of natural resources…and in the burdens of pollution" (Martinez-Alier 1995: 80).

This emphasis on the material basis of environmental struggles derives from a structural political economy approach, which identifies the pursuit of economic development as the source of structural contradictions that give rise to these struggles and portrays them as conflicts between the winners and the losers of development. However, although

structural contradictions produce the conditions for the existence of these struggles, it cannot be assumed that these contradictions automatically give rise to organized resistance or determine its particular content and framing (Baviskar 2003: 5051, Dwivedi 2001: 15-17). In that sense, "in structural approaches whereas the conflict is theorized, the responses are not" (Dwivedi 2001: 16). Many later studies have actually focused more on understanding these diverse responses, complementing and enriching the structural approaches to account for the contingent features, and complex and dynamic politics in these struggles.

In addition to the diversity among different environmental struggles, political ecology studies increasingly recognize the need to acknowledge "the complexity of local responses and attitudes" to development projects and to "'unpack' the term 'community'" (Bebbington et al. 2013: 4-5). Many studies have indeed demonstrated that local communities are not homogenous but are divided along the axes of class, race, gender, ethnicity, caste, religion and age. Different local groups have divergent concerns and expectations regarding the development projects in question, and the responses are not restricted to opposition and resistance but also include negotiation, acquiescence and support (Bebbington et al. 2013: 4-7, Horowitz 2011).[5] A further dimension of such complexity that has been addressed is that the positions, discourses and practices are not static but do indeed change as the struggles evolve, attesting to their dynamic nature (Urkidi & Walter 2011).

To be able to account for the diverse and complex responses in environmental struggles, and through the influence of post-structural social theory, political ecologists have engaged more thoroughly with the discursive dimensions of these struggles (Peet & Watts 2004). In line with the more general debates about the cultural politics in social movements, they have espoused the view that these struggles concern both control over material resources and construction of meanings (Alvarez et al. 1998). Peet and Watts (2004: 37) summarize the resulting view of environmental struggles as follows: "as well as being practical struggles over livelihood and survival, they [environmental struggles] contest the 'truths', imaginations, and discourses through which people think, speak about, and experience systems of livelihood". In this vein, Perreault and Valdivia (2010: 697) assert that in struggles over resources "political economy and cultural politics are inseparable", hence their analysis "must be attentive to the political economies that structure resource ac-

cess, as well as the process by which meanings and social identities are produced within the crucible of resource politics" (Perreault & Valdivia 2010: 691, see also Baviskar 2003).

These debates in political ecology have consolidated the view of environmental struggles as manifestations of "different *ways of understanding* development [and its relation to the environment], democracy and the desired society" (Bebbington & Humphreys Bebbington 2009: 119, emphasis added). This is appreciably a sound conception. However, I think there are two points that need to be considered openly to further the debate. First, even though these struggles contest particular understandings of development and certain uses of the environment, the notions of development and environment articulated are not *necessarily* more just or sustainable than those that are opposed. Political ecologists have paid much attention to the inequalities, injustices and the environmental costs that such development projects bring about. This is understandable and significant given that these projects often reinforce existing unequal power relations, affect local communities in negative ways—especially the most marginalized and vulnerable members—and result in environmental degradation. Yet, it is also important to problematize what is being defended and demanded. This requires critically examining whether these struggles challenge not only the immediate impacts of particular economic activities, but also the logic and values that underpin those activities and are used to legitimize them, and whether they build understandings that are supportive of alternative—i.e. more just and sustainable socio-environmental—relations. Second, it is necessary to emphasize that the understandings and identities manifested in environmental struggles are not fully constituted before the struggle. It is the very emergence of the struggle, of the need to defend a position, that creates the necessity and possibility of articulating these understandings and forging new collective identities. These are not created out of thin air, but in a specific historical context. Still, within this context, the struggle becomes a moment when different groups come together, elaborate the arguments to justify their positions, (re)define their collective identities, and develop strategies, tactics and actions to pursue their objectives. As Baviskar (2003: 5052) argues, environmental struggles involve "the difficult, creative work of constructing political identities, forging alliances and transcending differences". Through these processes, environmental struggles can be generative of new understandings and become spaces

for the transformation of political subjectivities. Acknowledging this potential, political ecology can then ask why and how in some cases this potential is realized more (or less) than in others.

In this study, I therefore urge political ecology to engage with both the possibilities for and constraints on transformative politics by rethinking environmental struggles as a potential space for the transformation of subjectivities and by critically examining the understandings articulated in environmental struggles in terms of how transformative they are. I intend to do both through the deployment of a Gramscian theoretical perspective. I use the Gramscian perspective because it opens up the question of transformative politics, and offers the theoretical basis to analyse such politics as being produced through the dialectics of power and resistance.

Essentially, what a Gramscian perspective provides is a particular conception of how power works by shaping people's understandings of the world and themselves, i.e. their subjectivity. The Gramscian concept of "hegemony" conceives this as a process taking place in the terrain of state-society relations in which the powerful tries to win the consent of the subordinated through ideological struggle and material concessions. Gramsci, in that sense, tells us that power is not only repressive but also productive; i.e. it is productive of people's conceptions of the world. As Gramsci suggests, if unequal power relations are principally maintained by establishing consent, and if transformative politics are about challenging, disrupting and changing unequal power relations, transformative politics therefore requires "a *dis*organization of consent, a disruption of hegemonic discourses and practices" (Carroll & Ratner 1994: 6). Social struggles can thus be thought of as moments when consent might be weakened, established ways of understanding the world and self might be questioned, and alternative ones might be constructed. It is by pointing out this potential of social struggle that the Gramscian perspective opens up the question of whether, when and how transformative politics is enacted or not in specific social struggles. In that sense, the Gramscian perspective permits formulating the question that this study focuses on.

Addressing this question from a Gramscian perspective involves, on the one hand, understanding the material and discursive processes that have historically shaped the political subjectivities of those social actors engaged in a struggle, and on the other hand, deciphering what happens in the struggle that intervenes or alters these processes so as to transform

the subjectivities. In other words, to analyse how political subjectivities are constructed and transformed it is necessary to examine the dialectic relationship between institutionalized power relations and the agency of social actors. With respect to the former, Gramsci urges us to consider the fundamental role of the state in the exercise of hegemony, hence in the formation of political subjectivities. With respect to the latter, he emphasizes praxis—the unity of reflection and action—in their transformation. This study explains the differences between two particular environmental struggles by looking at the differences in the state-society relations within which these struggles have historically been embedded—particularly the hegemonic practices of the respective states—and the differences in the organization and conduct of the struggles themselves.

As it aims to rethink environmental struggles through a Gramscian lens, this study aligns with the recent developing literature on Gramscian Political Ecologies (see e.g. Burke & Shear 2014, Ekers et al. 2009, Ekers et al. 2013). Ekers et al. (2009: 287) assert that these studies are motivated by the conviction "first, that struggles over nature and the environment are fundamental to contemporary political prospects; and second, that concepts and categories drawn from the work of Antonio Gramsci can be incredibly valuable resources in understanding these struggles and what they might achieve". This study aims to contribute to this field by putting these resources to use in a comparative analysis to account for not only the unique trajectories of two particular struggles, but also their differences.

1.2   Understanding Transformative Politics in Intag and Mount Ida

Although the Gramscian framework provides a sound theoretical foundation to conceive of transformative politics as a process to change dominant understandings and build alternative ones, it does not specify what understandings are at play in environmental struggles. How can we locate transformative politics specifically in local environmental struggles? In what ways are local environmental struggles able to construct critical political subjectivities?

Political ecology and environmental justice studies provide a number of insights into these questions, which will be discussed in Chapter 2. In this study, I use these insights to scrutinize the understandings articulat-

ed in Intag and Mount Ida to put forward what transformative politics in environmental struggles consist in. Drawing on a Gramscian theoretical framework, I identify the processes within the historical state-society relations and the building of the resistance that influence how and to what extent transformative politics is enacted. The comparative approach serves as an analytical tool in both of these tasks. It is embedded, so to speak, in the entire process of reflection and reasoning that went into the production of this study.

As for the initial task, I identify three interrelated dimensions in which social actors in environmental struggles can enact transformative politics. First, it is achieved by challenging the dominant understanding of development that prioritizes economic growth over social and ecological concerns, and developing notions of individual and communal well-being that places centre stage control over livelihoods, quality of social relations, and environmental health rather than material prosperity. Second, it is realized by encouraging social actors to rethink their own perceptions and uses of the environment, and what role the environment should play in the future of their territories. Third, it is achieved by framing the struggle in terms of social justice and rights in ways that cultivate critical understanding of the power relations that (re)produce environmental injustices; link their struggle to "broader visions of a more just society" (Kurtz 2003: 890); and help forge collective identities that go beyond the defence of particularistic interests to support more inclusive solidarities that transcend the local level. I refer to these three dimensions as the "development-environment-justice nexus".

In my accounts of struggles in Intag and Mount Ida (Chapters 5 and 6), I discuss in detail the subjectivity of the peasants opposing mining with reference to the understandings articulated along this nexus, and demonstrate how they differ. In a stylized manner, these differences consist in: First, in Intag, the peasants articulated the defence of their livelihoods against mining in terms of non-economic values, and in the name of an alternative local development model that is based on and further nurtures these values. In Mount Ida, however, the peasants framed their opposition to mining in the language of monetary cost-benefit calculation, as a matter of whether mining or agriculture produces more economic value. Second, in Intag new environmental subjectivities were constructed and new ways of using and managing the environment were instituted, while in Mount Ida, the defence of the environment was for-

mulated almost exclusively in terms of protecting it from mining and peasants' own uses of the environment were not questioned or discussed. Third, in Intag, in addition to distributional concerns, the justice framings incorporated rights-based notions, which allowed the peasants to construct their collective identity as communities with the right and power to shape the future of their lives and territories. In Mount Ida, on the other hand, justice framings focused on distributional inequalities, and the grievances against these inequalities remained predominantly confined to the local level, fuelling a particularistic defence of place and an exclusionary collective identity.

To account for these differences, which is the second task of this study, I focus on two factors: the role of the state in the historical processes that have configured life in Intag and Mount Ida, respectively, and how the movement actors have interacted with each other and conducted their struggle in the respective historical context in which they found themselves. As I delve into the two struggles in Chapters 5 and 6, I explain how these two factors operated in each case.

Turning first to Intag, the Ecuadorian state has historically been a distant institution for the people of Intag, not thoroughly directing the socio-economic changes at the local level, not much visible through its services and not having firm control over the cultural life of the communities. Hence, when mining arrived in the 1990s, a developmentalist vision had not taken hold in the valley, that is, the peasants did not understand their own lives as part of a national development process. When the mining conflict started, the movement actors, led by local civil society actors and the local government, initiated a process of change in which the ethical values found in the common sense[6] of the peasants were articulated with the separate but related political projects of alternative local development and participatory local governance. In pursuing these projects, civil society actors and the local government managed to establish close and democratic relations with the peasants. These relations forged long-term cooperation beyond the problem of mining and encouraged self-organization and collective action by the communities to be the agents of their own development. Here lay the transformative effect of the anti-mining struggle in Intag, for through these projects and relationships not only the principles of community well-being, human dignity, rights and sustainability were promoted, but more importantly, the political spaces for their enactment in practice were created. It was

through participation in these spaces, which engendered new forms of sociality and new practices, that the subjectivities of the peasants in Intag were transformed (Avcı 2017: 322-323).

In Mount Ida, on the other hand, the Turkish state instituted its presence in the everyday life of the peasants, and incorporated the region both materially and ideologically into its hegemonic project of national development. Although the mining conflict involved a clash between the local development vision of the state and the local population, the state's projection of development as an indisputable national goal, and its determination to pursue it through mechanisms of—in the parlance of Gramsci—both consent and coercion, compelled the peasants in the region to defend their livelihoods with reference to the state-sanctioned understanding of national development as economic growth. In contrast to Intag, in Mount Ida, neither civil society nor oppositional political actors offered an alternative language to that of economic development through which the peasants could articulate their livelihood concerns. Moreover, the relationship between these groups and the peasants was distant, hierarchical and focused almost entirely on stopping mining in the region. In the spaces where movement actors met there was not much of a dialogue that could possibly unsettle peasants' particularistic views, or allow these actors to build a common political project or collective identity. Hence, as the anti-mining struggle did not bring about change in the material practices of the peasants or foster new social relations, it did not lead to the kind of political transformation that happened in Intag (Avcı 2017: 322-323).

An important point that the study makes is that in terms of the construction of a state hegemony around the ideal of development, Ecuador has recently become more like Turkey, which changed the political dynamics in Intag. As has been historically the case in Turkey, the Ecuadorian state, ruled by the government of President Correa since 2007, has been establishing its hegemony through the articulation of a national developmentalist project, led and managed by the state. As this process materializes at the local level in Intag, it shifts the balance of power between the state and the anti-mining actors and undermines the political spaces that these actors have created, thus impairing the transformative process that has been underway in the valley (Avcı 2017).

Based on the analysis of the role of the state in the making of Intag and Mount Ida, how this role has recently been changing in Intag, and

the relationships among the resistance actors in the two regions and how they have conducted their struggle, the study puts forward two theoretical arguments. First, the state's power to shape the everyday lives of people, to promote and entrench a developmentalist ideology such that people experience their lives within the categories and discourses of that ideology (S. Hall 1996 [1986]: 26), and to pre-empt and repress resistance, is crucial in the making of subjectivities and in limiting the possibilities for their transformation (Avcı 2017: 323). The state's hegemonic practices shape subjectivities by institutionalizing particular social (material) relations, while at the same time stifling the efforts to build alternative relations. We can see more clearly how the former has operated in the formation of peasants' subjectivities in Mount Ida, while we can grasp better how the latter functions to undermine the alternative subjectivities in the making in Intag.

Second, transformative politics is activated in actual practice; therefore, creating political spaces to reflect and act upon the everyday lived experience of social actors is crucial to transform subjectivities. This argument is substantiated by the experience of Intag where, by engendering concrete changes in the material practices and forms of sociality, the anti-mining struggle has cultivated new subjectivities disposed to establish more equal, just and sustainable social and environmental relations. The argument is also corroborated by the experience of Mount Ida, where in the dearth of such political spaces the potential of the anti-mining struggle to transform subjectivities has hardly been realized.

1.3   Contributions of the Study

This study aims to advance political ecology studies on local environmental struggles by providing an analysis of these struggles through a Gramscian lens. Other scholars have argued for the value of a Gramscian framework to provide a sound theoretical basis for political ecology (see Burke & Shear 2014, D.S. Moore 2005, Ekers et al. 2009, Ekers et al. 2013, Karriem 2009, Mann 2009, Marston & Perreault 2017, Birkenholtz 2009). The present study contributes to this body of work on Gramscian Political Ecologies through a comparative analysis.

I consider the main contribution of this study to be the analytical perspective if offers, which argues for a conception of environmental struggles as a potential space from which to mount challenges to hegemony,

and put forward that the realization of this potential hinges on the dialectics of power and resistance as they play out in the sphere of state-society relations. With this conception, the study aims to deliver a critical analysis of environmental struggles and the transformative politics therein. Such an analysis enhances our understanding of environmental struggles in a number of ways. First, it helps us situate particular environmental struggles as part of and integral to social struggles to change the unequal power dynamics that configure state-society relations. As such, it enables us to conceive the significance of these struggles beyond the achievement of their immediate objectives.

Second, the Gramscian theoretical framework offers a more profound understanding of how power operates in environmental struggles. More specifically, it enables us to see how power works to shape the trajectories of these struggles not only by repressing the social actors involved, but also by permeating the subjectivities of these actors by both material and ideological means. Particularly in relation to the exercise of state power in these struggles, the state not only imposes certain projects through legal and coercive means, it also circumscribes oppositional politics by shaping experiences and expectations of development, and by setting the terms over which contestation over the environment takes place.

Third, the study emphasizes that interests and identities are not predetermined or fixed, but are constructed in praxis, hence the transformative potential of environmental struggles. The objective positioning of people in social and economic relations conditions but does not fully determine the subjectivities they articulate in the context of a social struggle. The Gramscian framework posits that these subjectivities are constructed at the intersection of historically established state-society relations, and what happens in and through the struggle—i.e. the relations between the actors involved, the political spaces they build, the discourses they elaborate and the practices in which they engage. Acknowledging the dynamic nature and openness of environmental struggles, together with the Gramscian understanding of how power operates as mentioned above, enriches our appreciation of the possibilities and limits of transformative political action in environmental struggles.

Fourth, the study appeals to the field of political ecology to be more candid about the possibility that what the local environmental struggles defend and demand might not be more egalitarian, just or sustainable,

and that these struggles may indeed foster exclusionary collective identi-
ties. This call is clearly not meant to discredit or belittle any struggle, but
to stress the value of a critical analysis to deepen our understanding of
the processes that mould the subjectivities of social actors, as they are
expressed in environmental struggles.

At a theoretical level, the study contributes more generally to Gram-
scian scholarship on transformative or counter-hegemonic politics (see
e.g. Amoore 2005, Burawoy 2003, Carroll and Ratner 1994, 2010; Chin
& Mittleman 1997, Morton 2002, Rupert 2005). It does so by grounding
the mostly abstract discussions in these studies through a comparative
analysis of two concrete cases. Moreover, the study emphasizes the im-
portance of the environment as a basis for building counter-hegemonic
politics. This point will be elaborated in more detail in Chapter 2. Suffice
it to say that environmental struggles, by virtue of having the potential to
challenge the drive for economic growth so central to capitalist accumu-
lation, and by facilitating alliances among diverse social actors, cross-
cutting class, national, ethnic, regional and gender identities, have the
potential to catalyse counter-hegemonic political action. Thinking of the
environment as potential ground for counter-hegemonic politics is im-
portant since, as Burawoy (2003: 230-231) argues, although Gramsci
provides a keen analysis of hegemony, he does not provide many clues as
to what might be the basis to mount struggles to undermine it. This
study shows that the environment can be just that.

There is an additional theoretical point relevant to environmental jus-
tice studies. As will be discussed in Chapter 2, these studies provide im-
portant insights as to how justice frames are constructed in local envi-
ronmental struggles, and emphasize the role of the alliances between
local communities and other civil society actors, and the institutional
context within which these struggles take place. However, apart from
few studies such as that of Williams and Mawdsley (2006) on environ-
mental justice in post-colonial India, and Mehta et al. (2014) on envi-
ronmental justice in peri-urban Cochabamba and Delhi, environmental
justice studies do not adequately consider the more complex ways power
operates, more specifically how the exercise of state power curbs the
construction of critical conceptions of justice, especially in the global
South, and how power permeates the relationship between local com-
munities and civil society actors. As much as this study builds upon this
literature to analyse the construction of critical justice frames in local en-

vironmental movements in the South, it adds to this literature by pointing out some of the factors that might hinder this process.

More specifically for Ecuador and Turkey, the study contributes to discussions around environmental politics, environment and development, and state-society relations in the two countries. Concerning Ecuador, the analysis of Intag adds to the recent studies about changing power relations between the state and social movements in Ecuador, particularly as the indigenous and environmental movements confront the extractivist policies of the left-wing government (see e.g. Arsel & Avila Angel 2012, Bebbington 2012b, Becker 2013, Dosh & Kligerman 2009, Escobar 2010, Gudynas 2010, Zibechi 2009). While these studies mostly focus on change at the macro level, the present study discusses how the process of re-establishing the state has materialized at the local level, as it demonstrates how the state is penetrating social and political life in Intag and influencing the trajectory of the anti-mining movement. Other recent analyses of different local mining conflicts in Ecuador from a political ecology perspective (Avcı & Fernández-Salvador 2016, Davidov 2013, 2014; van Teijlingen 2016, Velasquéz 2012) also engage with the question of how the state discourses and practices alter the political dynamics in local conflicts and "reorganize [at the local level] "the possibilities for collective political agency" (Velasquéz 2012: 5). While this study has much in common with those, as it traces the history of the Intag struggle from the 1990s to today, it puts into sharper focus how the state exercises its power to weaken a long-lasting and strong local resistance, limit the political agency of the main movement actors and stifle the spaces where alternative economic, social and environmental relations were being experimented with.

Second, the literature on Ecuadorian social movements has presented alternative development models, or alternatives to development, principally as a demand of the indigenous movement. This study demonstrates that such demands are also being raised by the mestizo[7] and black rural population. While the Intag struggle has been connected to the national indigenous movement through the local government and certain civil society actors, the project of alternative local development in Intag has been firmly linked to the livelihoods, values and aspirations of the black and mestizo settler population of the valley. The important point is that there are common aspects to the critiques to neoliberal and post-neoliberal extractivist development raised by the indigenous, black and

mestizo rural population, as well as to their visions of alternative development. In fact, it seems that local mining conflicts increasingly provide a fertile ground for building alliances and collective identities among different segments of the rural population. As Velasquéz (2012: 312) emphasizes, these are not on based on fixed cultural identities but on the shared struggle (in defence of territory, environment, life and water) against the extractivist development model pursued by the Ecuadorian government.

Third, the Gramscian perspective allows us to conceptualize the political project of the Correa government as a hegemonic project. A core argument of Gramsci is that consent and coercion are combined in the building of hegemony. And in fact, we observe how under the leadership of the Correa government, the Ecuadorian state has been establishing its claim to rule through securing consent by means both material (e.g. social policies, public employment, infrastructure investment) and ideological/symbolic (e.g. the discourses on reclaiming national sovereignty, delivering long-overdue development, sustainable mining—see e.g. Moore & Velasquéz 2012, Riofrancos 2010), while at the same time deploying its coercive power to repress those who challenge this project (e.g. delegitimizing his opponents, criminalizing protest, putting pressure on and even closing down NGOs—see e.g. ALDEAH 2013, Becker 2013, Zibechi 2009).

Used in a comparative analysis, the Gramscian perspective also enables us to understand the constitutive role of development as economic growth in hegemony building, and to draw parallels between Ecuador and Turkey in this regard. Conceiving development as such allows us to understand why, despite the significant differences in their orientation, the neoliberal government of Turkey and the post-neoliberal government of Ecuador do not differ much in terms of viewing resource extraction as indispensable to development, and in the ways in which they deal with dissent to extractivist projects (see also Bebbington 2012b). Moreover, this point highlights the importance of challenging development discourses and practices so as to transform state-society relations, and the potential of environmental struggles to raise such challenges.

Through the Turkish case, the study contributes to the recently growing body of literature on environmental politics in Turkey. Arsel (2012b: 72) argues that "despite its recent and continuing growth, scholarship on the environment in Turkey remains relatively underdeveloped". Hence,

this study can be considered as an attempt to strengthen this area of scholarship. A core argument in the previous studies in the field has been that the Turkish state's developmentalist hegemonic project, and its success in securing consent of large segments of the population to this project, have curbed the growth and radicalism of environmental movements, as well as sustainable development implementation in the country (see e.g. Adaman & Arsel 2005b, Akbulut 2011, 2012; Akbulut & Adaman 2013). The concrete mechanisms of how consent is established at the local level, and how this influences local environmental movements, however, have not been sufficiently analysed (except for Akbulut 2011, 2012). This study fills this gap by looking at how peasants' understandings of development in Mount Ida have historically been shaped, and how these understandings have permeated the subjectivities that the peasants articulated in the struggle. Substantiating the argument on the hegemony of developmentalism, the study demonstrates how, even when opposing a mining project considered harmful to local development, the peasants, as well as civil society and local government actors, in the Mount Ida struggle have reproduced the state-sanctioned notion of development as economic growth.

Beyond the limits imposed by the hegemony of the state and the developmentalist ideology, few scholars have also pointed out the inner dynamics of environmental movements as a reason for their relative weakness. Among those, Erensü (2013) emphasizes that local environmental struggles in Turkey mostly pursue a place-based politics that focus on stopping particular projects and do not envision what should follow once the project is stopped. Akbulut (2015: 237) stresses that local environmental resistances in Turkey haves remained disconnected, and have not been able to build stable alliances or a broader common political agenda. While the analysis of the Mount Ida case corroborates these findings, its comparison with Intag additionally shows that distant and hierarchical relations between the local communities and civil society actors, and the absence of political spaces for collective deliberation and action, are also crucial factors that diminish the strength of local movements and curtail their transformative potential.

1.4 Methodology of the Study

In this study, I proceed from an understanding of social struggles as political spaces that present possibilities for the transformation of political subjectivities of those social actors that participate in them. I conceptualize this transformation in terms of the construction of conceptions of the world and self-understandings that challenge the discourses and practices that work to maintain unequal power relations in society. In order to better understand the factors and processes that bear upon the construction (or not) of such conceptions and understandings, I employ a comparative approach using two contrasting cases. I use comparison as a form of analytical reasoning that helps specify the causal mechanisms and contextual elements that shape the social phenomena under investigation.

In fact, the same research question could be pursued through a single case study, or by comparing more than two cases, although for the latter the exigencies of doing an in-depth analysis of each case would limit the number of cases that could be handled within a single research. I chose to do a comparative analysis of the cases of Intag and Mount Ida because the markedly different discourses and practices of opposition to mining in the two struggles allowed me to construct them as contrasting cases, the juxtaposition of which help identify the factors that affect the realization or curtailment of the transformative potential of social struggles. The comparison is, thus, premised on the contrasts of the local cases themselves, not of the two countries in which the two struggles unfold.

The methodology of the study rests on the epistemological foundations of critical realism (R.A. Sayer 1992, 2000). To explain what that entails, I will briefly elaborate how comparative studies have been practiced in the fields of political science and sociology, mostly resting on a positivist epistemology. Then I will discuss how critical realism differs from this traditional approach, and how a comparative study based on a critical realist notion of causality offers an alternative *modus operandi* for a comparative analysis. Following this exposition, I will explain the case study design used for the in-depth analysis of each case, and discuss the limitations of the field research.

1.4.1   Comparative studies: positivist practice

Among comparative studies in the fields of political science and sociology, a distinction is commonly made between quantitative studies, mainly in the form of cross-national statistical analysis of a large number of cases, and qualitative ones that focus on one or a few cases and deal with them in greater detail (case studies and small-N comparisons). This research is located within the qualitative small-N comparisons that aim to provide substantial, historically-situated and causal explanations of the social phenomena under investigation. In small-N comparisons, cases are treated as complex configurations of causal conditions and contextual elements. The research design combines internal, in-depth analysis of each case with external analysis of patterns of similarities and differences. The analysis requires the researcher to move constantly back and forth between individual cases and comparison, on the one hand, and theory and cases, on the other. The comparative method relies on theory and conceptualization to construct the cases, and their similarities and differences. Therefore, the argumentation for the existence of a contrast or similarity is in itself a consequence of the comparative reasoning. The comparative analysis can thus be read as a process of establishing a dialogue between the cases through theory.

The comparative methodology is built upon John Stuart Mill's inductive reasoning, more specifically upon the comparative methods he proposes to analyse causal factors underlying empirical phenomena (Bergene 2007, Skocpol & Somers 1980, Wad 2001). In Mill's "Method of Agreement", the existence of a common causal factor is inferred by comparing two cases that exhibit a common empirical pattern (to be explained), where the cases are subject to the effect of the causal factor of interest but differ in every other relevant aspect. In contrast, in the "Method of Difference", the causal influence of hypothesized relationship is inferred by comparing cases that differ in terms of the empirical phenomenon and the relationship one is concerned with, but resemble in all other aspects. These methods' affinity with the logic of controlled experiment as practised in natural sciences is immediately apparent; they are social science substitutes for controlled experiment, so to say. The application of this logic to analyse social reality, however, is difficult for "[o]ften it is impossible to find exactly the historical cases that one needs for the logic of a certain comparison. And even when the cases are roughly appropriate, perfect controls for all potentially relevant variables can never be

achieved" (Skocpol 1979: 38-9). Moreover, the method still relies on theories and conceptualization in "constructing" cases and their similarities and differences. Hence, as Skocpol (1979: 39) aptly argues, "comparative historical analysis is no substitute for theory. Indeed, it can be applied only with the indispensable aid of theoretical concepts and hypotheses. For the comparative method alone cannot define the phenomenon to be studied".

The justifications for using comparative methodology and explanations of its merits provided by practitioners articulate a particular view of social science. In this view, the purpose of social science is to provide generalizations about causal relationships. It is grounded in positivist epistemology in so far it accepts the Humean notion of causality as regular succession, as constant conjunctions of events or state of affairs. It posits, therefore, that causality, expressed in the form "if A, then B", can only be inferred by establishing regularities (Steinmetz 2004). This, however, does not mean that comparative researchers have only tried to find event regularities in their studies. On the contrary, they have avoided empiricism and actually chosen to focus on fewer cases in the belief that this is necessary to uncover causal relationships, as it allows for richer theoretical reasoning, an interactive dialogue between theory and empirical events, and a holistic, in-depth understanding of cases. Hence, they practically do a study for each case as an integral part of their methodology and a precondition for good comparison. Yet, and this is why they do comparison, they rely on formal application of inductive logic to "systematize" analysis, attain analytical rigour, and overcome the flaw of case studies of not enabling falsification of theories (testing of alternative hypotheses). It seems that it is the controlled experiment logic of comparative studies that justifies its claims to scientificity over and above case studies.

1.4.2 Convergence and divergence: the critical realist position

The notion of causality as regular succession, however, has been challenged by critical realism. In fact, the rejection of the regularity notion of causality is the fundamental criticism of critical realism against positivist epistemology. The proposed alternative, "causality as a generative and contextual concept", thus forms the backbone of critical realist social science (Bergene 2007: 13). According to this alternative understanding, social objects, by virtue of their structures, "possess causal powers

which, when triggered or released, act as generative mechanisms to determine the actual phenomena of the world" (Lawson 1997: 21). The work of social scientists is therefore to "identify causal mechanisms and how they work, and discovering if they have been activated and under what conditions" (R.A. Sayer 2000: 14), which necessitates searching for necessary and sufficient conditions as well as properties of the social objects that enable them to do whatever it is that they do. The appropriate reasoning to infer causality is, then, retroduction and abduction, rather than deduction and induction. While retroduction works on the basis of the question of "what made this possible", to determine (contingent) necessity, abduction operates by way of a dialectic between "theoretical reinterpretation of cases or recontextualisation of theories, on the one hand, and theory refinement based on case studies" on the other—that is, through the interaction of conceptualization, observation and analysis (Bergene 2007: 16).

Few scholars have taken up the implications of critical realism in practice in comparative studies (Bergene 2007, Steinmetz 1998, 2004; Wad 2001). In line with the more general critical realist critique of positivist science, these scholars have rejected not only the regularity notion of causality implicated in Mill's methods, but also doing comparison solely at the level of events, which are "always and necessarily overdetermined by a plurality of conjuncturally interacting mechanisms" and therefore cannot be expected to be recurrent (Steinmetz 2004: 382-83). They agree that comparative method can still be of use and value if it is conducted or adjusted according to critical realist principles. Steinmetz (2004: 372-73), for instance, argues along these lines in the following way: "In defense of comparative analysis, I argue that comparisons operate along two dimensions, events and structures, corresponding to one of the main lines of ontological stratification of the social-real. This means that events incomparable at the phenomenal level still may be amenable to explanation in terms of a conjuncture of generative causal mechanisms". In a similar vein, Bergene (2007: 14), in relation to the issue of causality, maintains: "Starting from another conception of causality, comparative methods need not be about arriving at invariant associations. If atomism [in the sense of 'seeking contextless relations among variables' (ibid.:13)] is denied and the possibility of gaining insight into causal relations by examining one single case is maintained, comparative

method becomes a way of studying contingency and broadening the base from which to develop theory".

In terms of how a critical realist comparative methodology can operate, Bergene (2007) provides the most detailed discussion. She first criticizes the Millean method for being too rigorous, not allowing for contingent mechanisms and synergy between variables, oversimplifying reality—and thus not appropriate to the study of social phenomena. According to her, without relying on Millean methods researchers can benefit from systematic comparison in identifying structures and understanding the different ways they operate in different contexts. To realize these advantages, researchers, informed by theory, should select cases that can potentially shed light on the operation of causal mechanisms of interest. In the initiation of the research process and the selection of cases, the element of surprise, as introduced by the contrast of the cases to be studied, can be a good guide. For insights into how the analysis can proceed after case selection, Bergene turns to the methodological debates in the positivist camp. She argues that critical realists can combine the interpretation of the individual cases through theory, and the juxtaposition of cases in a research design that integrates internal analysis of each case with external comparative analysis among cases (Janoski & Hicks 1994). However, as mentioned before, the type of reasoning governing the research process will be abduction and retroduction, rather than induction as emphasized by positivism. The researcher therefore is to move constantly back and forth between, on the one hand, case studies and comparison, and theory and cases, on the other. Such movement involves reinterpretation of contexts in light of theory, recontextualization of theory, discovering new aspects of each case by comparing it to the other(s), and reformulating theory to account for the similarities and differences across cases in addition to the operation of causal mechanisms in each particular case. This research strategy, she suggests, can deliver substantial and contextualized explanations as well as help refine theory, thus meeting the critical realist criteria of valid and valuable knowledge.

Despite different epistemological claims they make, positivist practitioners of comparative methodology and critical realists nevertheless converge on four points: a realist ontology (in the sense that they are both willing to employ concepts to refer to structures not immediately observable, although the structure is understood differently—as existing

regularities in the former, and immanent powers in the latter); an interactive reasoning process between theory and cases; an acknowledgement of dependence of analysis on conceptualization and construction of cases as research objects; and an emphasis on the need for substantial, historically situated, causal explanations of social phenomena. In agreement with Gorski (2004), I would suggest that researchers in the positivist camp do rely on abduction and retroduction in practice, but they prefer to highlight the inductive logic to substantiate their claims to valid scientific knowledge.

It is this critical realist position that informs this research and guides the application of the comparative method. Hence, the comparison does not follow the logic of controlled experiment, but rests on linking theory and empirical events and establishing a dialogue between the two cases through theory. As I have argued, in a comparative study the construction of the cases, i.e. their similarities and differences as research objects, is crucial. This process is guided by the research objectives, and relies on theory and conceptualization. Borrowing from political ecology, I define the cases to be compared in this study as local environmental struggles.

1.4.3 Comparative perspective of the research

The local environmental struggles in Intag and Mount Ida developed within a common global context in that both resulted from the expansion of global mining investment into new rural territories in developing countries since the 1990s (Bridge 2004a).[8] As in many other miming conflicts, in both places the contention revolved primarily around the environmental impacts of mining, hence their characterization as environmental struggles. Moreover, in both countries, the justification of the mining projects by the government (notwithstanding the different approach to the relation between the state and markets of the government of Correa compared to the previous governments in Ecuador and those in Turkey), the mining companies and civil society actors in favour of mining development follows the same logic of the need to make rational and efficient use of natural resources for economic growth, and the possibility of achieving this without much harm to the environment through the proper application of modern science and technology. The selection of the two cases is premised on Intag and Mount Ida being two of the more prominent and long-running cases[9] among the conflicts that global expansion of mining has triggered worldwide, distinguished by the force-

ful mobilization of peasants in alliance with mostly local civil society actors and local governments, and their success, though not definitive, to stall or stop the projects.

As for the conceptualization of the contrast between the two cases, I frame their difference as a question of how and to what extent they have transformed the subjectivities of those peasants who participated in them. The comparison here is developed as an analysis of the two contrasting cases. However, this is not to suggest that I see the two cases as binary; rather, they are diverse. Among the diverse struggles, I study two of them by concentrating on, and trying to explain, their differences with respect to their transformative potential elaborated in relation to the peasants' understandings of development, environment and justice in the two cases. Actually, Intag can be said to stand out as an exceptional case among similar socio-environmental struggles for its success in stopping two attempts to develop the mining project, the range of alternative development projects that have been initiated, and the degree of articulation between civil society and local government efforts around territorial development and participatory local governance (as will be explained in the Chapter 4 and 5). This I consider an advantage for the purposes of this study, for it provides a stronger contrast with the Mount Ida case and has facilitated the identification of processes that enable transformative politics.

Since theoretically I consider local resistance movements as being embedded in the particular state-society relations within which they develop, the immediate answer to why the two cases differ is because the state-society relations in Ecuador and Turkey are different. More than being an answer, however, this statement begs the question of through which specific processes within the historical construction of the state-society relations the differences between the two cases of resistance have been produced. Moreover, continuity and change co-exist in any social formation, and national-level processes are necessarily and contingently mediated at the local level. Hence the importance of understanding how social actors enact change within the historical circumstances they find themselves in.

Viewed from the theoretical perspective adopted in this research, the recent changes at the state level, and in state-society relations in Ecuador, are quite significant, to say the least. The hegemonic project of Correa in fact aims to restructure these relations. This substantial alteration of the

political context, therefore, makes it possible and necessary to include an additional within-case comparison for the Intag case to analyse whether and how the ongoing restructuring of state-society relations has affected the local resistance, what opportunities and challenges this process have created, and how the relevant actors have responded to the new circumstances.

As I end this section, I would like to comment on two possible objections to this comparative study. The first is that I belong to the language community of the people in one case, while I am just a starter in the other. This presents a difficulty in terms of translation, of entering the world of meanings in another language (Steinmetz 2004: 385-387). As legitimate as this observation is, it does not preclude studying another linguistic community. It does point out that as researcher, I should acknowledge the limits and ambiguities of the knowledge I produce, and more so since my work involves interpretation and translation. Hence I should not seek closure in my claims. This is my position in this work.

Another criticism might be based on the social constructionist approach to the (re)production of meaning. The critical realist epistemology that informs my research suggests that social structures and practices are concept dependent, therefore meaningful. To explain them, social science needs to engage with meaning, with how actors conceive their social reality, and attempt to interpret meanings in their practical contexts (R.A. Sayer 2000: 10-29). The context dependence of meanings can be raised as a source of criticism against comparative studies on the lines that meanings might not be amenable to comparison. The defence from a critical realist perspective, I argue, would be to emphasize that precisely because they are produced in practical contexts, meanings can be made intelligible; and the social processes through which meanings are constructed can still be compared through careful and mindful conceptualization and contextualization.

1.4.4 Design of the case studies

As required by the comparative method, the methodology of the research combines internal, in-depth analysis of each case with external analysis of patterns of similarities and differences across cases. For the internal analysis, I treated each case as a meaningful whole in itself, and to study each I followed a case study design (Yin 2002) based on qualita-

tive methods. The case study methodology has been acknowledged for its usefulness in accounting for the complexity of the social realm, delivering thick descriptions of the cases, and furnishing the accounts with depth and richness (Yin 2002). It is particularly suited to the purposes of my research in that it strives to understand how social actors perceive their reality, i.e. "render other subjectivities intelligible" (I. Reed 2008: 116). I spent less time in Mount Ida since I had previously conducted a field study there for my MA research. I make use of the data I gathered at the time in the current research as well. The details of the field studies are provided in the Appendix.

Each case study combines three lines of analysis. The first is the historical-institutional analysis of the two countries and the two local places. The purpose of this analysis is to situate the two cases in their respective societal contexts. This requires comprehending the general context of state-society relations in the two countries, and focusing on the ways these relations unfolded and were experienced at the local level, and how they influenced the political subjectivities of the local actors. The second is the identification of the relevant actors and the reconstruction of the histories of the two conflicts, focusing on how the actors have organized and mobilized, and the forms of collective action they undertook. Third, there is the mapping of the positions of these actors regarding mining, and the examination of the reasons, arguments and ethical values that underlie these positions with a view to understanding their conceptions of development, environment and justice. Although various actors are referred to throughout the analysis, my main concern is the political subjectivities of the peasants opposing mining.

To realize the three objectives, I reviewed different types of documents, including academic resources, government plans and other official documents, reports and other written and visual material produced by civil society organizations, and media resources. In the interviews, group discussions and informal talks in the two study sites with different actors, I tried to understand the historical changes and the current context of the local material conditions (including questions on the economic activities, access to land, resource use patterns, poverty, infrastructure, consumption habits, inequality); relations among different groups (including the relations with civil society organizations and people's participation in them); relations of different groups with diverse state institu-

tions; changes in the local environment, and how local social actors assess and feel about these changes.

In my conversations and interviews with the peasants, I specifically enquired into how they situate themselves (individually, as communities, as citizens) within their regions and the historical changes that their regions and countries have undergone, and which collective identities they feel they belong to. I tried to discern what they value and want to protect about their lives and environment, what changes they would like to see in their region, and how they envision the future of their territories. I raised questions to understand how they engage with and perceive civil society organizations, local government and state actors, and which communal, civil society and political spaces that they participate in. I probed to find out which political processes they think affect their lives (i.e. national policies, local government actions, social movements), and how.

In the case of civil society and local government actors, I delved into their political views, their visions of the future of the two regions, their relationship with other actors of the struggle and with state actors. I tried particularly to comprehend their perceptions of the peasants, how they engaged with them, the strategies they used to mobilize them, and why they chose those strategies.

In relation to mining, I tried to ascertain how the relevant actors perceive mining, what they think will be the effects of mining and on whom, and how they respond to arguments of others (e.g. that mining will help local development). I asked about how they learned about the mining activities and their impacts, and their participation in the meetings, protests and other events in the course of the struggles. In addition to these interviews, group discussions and conversations, observation of the daily life and productive activities of the peasants, meetings (of civil society and grassroots organizations, and local governments), and following the protests were also an important part of the field studies.

To analyse the interview data and the field notes, I categorized the people I talked to in different groups (e.g. community members, community leaders, and representatives from local civil society—for the full list, see the Tables A1 and A3 in the Appendix). As much as how one designs the interviews, what one looks for in the data depends on the theoretical perspective and the objectives of the research, while remaining open to include new issues that the data presents. Therefore, as I

went over the interview and field notes, and listened to the recordings (not all the interviews were recorded, see the Appendix), based on the theoretical framework and research objectives, I identified the main themes in the talks. These include the good life, the environment (concerning the perceptions of community members of the local environment), social relations, mining (concerning what they see wrong with mining), and focused on the links between different themes as indicated by the interviewees (e.g. a healthy environment as constitutive of a good life). The arguments in the thesis are built by interpreting the results from this exercise in light of the theoretical framework laid out in the previous section. To substantiate the claims made in the study, I quote the parts of the interviews that I consider to represent the common patterns and/or most illuminating.

I reconstructed the histories of the two conflicts by combining data from the interviews, group discussions and daily conversations, the materials produced by the actors (mostly the civil society organizations) engaged in the struggles, news articles in various media and online blogs, and, for the Intag case, several videos and documentaries (openly supportive of the anti-mining struggle). The use of materials produced by those who are part of the struggles, or supportive of them, can be seen as introducing a "bias" to the factual accounts. As much as possible, I tried to crosscheck the information from different sources. Still, much of the material available on the conflicts is produced by those "interested parties", hence I had to rely on them. But more importantly, the research is not about establishing "facts", but in understanding how the social actors themselves make sense of and represent their own reality, and the materials these actors produce are useful precisely in this regard. As a final note, in the text, I have used pseudonyms for the interviewees. I have only explicitly mentioned the full names when the concerned individuals are publicly known.

1.4.5   Limitations of the field research

The most obvious limitation of the research in Intag is my level of Spanish.[10] At the time of the field study, I still had some trouble especially in speaking the language, and sometimes in understanding all that was said. In some interviews I was accompanied by Spanish-speaking friends.[11] I was also lucky to have some people speaking English in Intag. Moreover, my Spanish improved during my stay in Ecuador, and as I left most of

the interviews I did alone to the last couple of months, I had much less difficulty. I prepared a script to introduce myself and the research, along with my questions. Another thing that helped me was that as I proceeded with the research, I learned about the region, the people and what had happened during the conflict. This was important because the topics in the interviews had a context that I was getting to know, which made it easier for me to follow the flow of the conversation. At times, when I could not follow an idea or a word I would ask people to repeat or to explain it to me, which they kindly did. After leaving the interviews I took notes, and during the evening I reviewed them. If I felt that something was missing, I would seek clarification by asking another person, or the same person if I met him or her again. I also had the recordings to go over and reviewed the ideas I had at the time of the interview. Listening the interviews, I would sometimes think that I should have asked more follow-up questions during the interviews, but which I was not able to do. On the other hand, this situation with the language was somewhat of an icebreaker (I made people laugh with my funny pronunciations), and also eased the tension of being perceived as the educated one claiming to know it all (I consciously try to avoid this, but with my limited Spanish, I could not act as the knowledgeable one, even if I tried). Overall, I am satisfied with the result but my claims in the thesis should be evaluated in the light of my limited Spanish.

Another limitation in Intag is that I could not go to some of the parishes in the valley, although I initially attempted to do so. These were the parishes not much involved in the mining conflict, and as López Oropeza (2011) claims, where the organizational processes and alternative productive projects have not consolidated as much as they have done in the others. It would have been useful to examine the socio-economic and political dynamics in these parishes, to be able to compare them with the ones I managed to visit. In addition, I clearly could not possibly get to know all the communities, so I had to choose which to visit. In the selection of the communities to visit I had my research related reasons and justifications, but one important consideration was access. There were a couple of communities I was willing to visit, but I was unable to do so simply because they were remote, and I was not able to arrange transportation. It is a concern in rural studies that remote places are left out (Chambers 1981); I had no choice but to commit the same omission.

In the fieldwork in Mount Ida, the most uncomfortable thing was that I interviewed a significantly higher number of men than women. In the villages, I had fewer interviews with women because daily life is quite gender segregated and as a woman, I spent more time, hence had more casual talks, with women (especially during certain hours of the day, for instance before dinner and in the evening). In the case of institutional actors, the gender imbalance stems from the fact that those in charge in the institutions I included in the research were mostly men, and my targets were the institutions, not individuals. Another difficulty for me in Ida was that sometimes people were expecting me to know more about what was happening with mining in the region, and even more troubling, asking me what I would suggest them to do to stop the projects. I tried to answer their questions on the mining projects based on the information I had. As for the latter, I was evasive and circumvented the question because, as researcher, I was concerned about the ethics of telling people what they should do, and to be honest I also did not have an answer.

1.5   Organization of the study

The remainder of the study is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I elaborate on the Gramscian theoretical perspective that frames this study. I introduce the analytical handles I borrow from the political ecology and environmental justice literature which are used to analyse the particular trajectories of the Intag and Mount Ida struggles and to account for their differences. In the first part, I lay out the Gramscian theoretical foundations that inform my conceptualization of social struggles and transformative politics. In the second part, I discuss the debates in political ecology and environmental justice studies with reference to which I specify what transformative politics in local environmental struggles consist of, and how it is realized. In the third section, I explain the three dimensions along which I analyse transformative politics in Intag and Mount Ida.

Chapter 3 provides a summary of the political struggles around mining at the global scale, and a review of environmental politics in Ecuador and Turkey. I present an overview of the global expansion of mining since the 1990s, and the recent context of extractivism in Latin America. Following this, I discuss in more detail the environmental politics and

conflicts over mining in Ecuador and Turkey, respectively. The chapter concludes by highlighting the similarities and differences with respect to environmental politics between Ecuador and Turkey, emphasizing differences between the two countries with respect to the place of environmental struggles in the landscape of political contention, and the place of mining conflicts within environmental politics.

Chapter 4 aims to familiarize the reader with the two study sites, and provide a background for the ensuing discussion in the subsequent chapters by narrating in detail the history of the two conflicts. I take up the study cases of Intag and Mount Ida individually, and for each one I first provide a brief description of the socio-economic structure in the region, and then a chronological account of the mining conflict since its inception until mid-2016. By giving an account of the history of the two conflicts, I try to convey who the main actors of resistance were, their views on mining, and how they have organized and mobilized to stop the projects.

In Chapter 5 and 6, I conduct an in-depth analysis of the respective struggles in Intag and Mount Ida. In Chapter 5, I start with a historical review of state-society relations in Ecuador. I then unpack the notions of development, environment, justice and rights that the peasants of Intag articulated. Subsequently, I explain how the processes of popular education, civil society "thickening" and participatory local governance have shaped those notions. In the final section, I examine how the hegemonic project of the Correa government has changed the power relations in Intag and influenced the dynamics of anti-mining struggle.

Following a similar structure, Chapter 6 also starts with a historical review of the state-society relations in Turkey. I then discuss how the peasants' opposition to mining in Mount Ida has been based on the defence of their particularistic interests, and how they reproduced the hegemonic notions of development. I continue with an exposition of the positions and development understandings of the civil society and local government actors who led the mining opposition. I demonstrate how the type of relationships they forged with the peasants has reinforced the latter's particularistic positions, and together with the hegemonic discourses and practices of the state, limited the transformative potential of the struggle.

Following the in-depth analyses of the two case studies, in Chapter 7, I consider them jointly from a comparative perspective. I summarize the

differences between the understandings that the peasants in Intag and Mount Ida articulated at the nexus of development-environment-justice. I put forward the main arguments of the study concerning the factors that have constrained or facilitated the enactment of transformative politics in the two cases. I discuss how hegemonic discourses and practices of the state mould the subjectivities of social actors and constrain the possibilities for their transformation; and how transformative political action is enabled by the creation of political spaces for collective reflection and action around alternative ways of organizing social and environmental relations.

Chapter 8 concludes with a discussion of the main findings and arguments of the study. I recapitulate why building critical understandings at development-environment-justice nexus is crucial for the realization of the transformative potential of environmental struggles. I close by emphasizing that struggles that shape subjectivities are waged in the realm of everyday lived experience and practical consciousness. It is here, in the realm of everyday experience, that the possibilities and limits of environmental struggles lie.

Notes

[1] The article 'Mining conflicts and transformative politics: A comparison of Intag (Ecuador) and Mount Ida (Turkey) environmental struggles' by Avcı, D. (2017) is based on this doctoral research, and parts of that article are used throughout the present text, with the permission of the copyright holder.

[2] See e.g. the Environmental Justice Atlas, a map of environmental conflicts around the world: www.ejatlas.org

[3] The concepts of global South, Third World and developing countries are used interchangeably in this study. Although the historical origins of these concepts differ—and they are all problematic, to say the least—all of them are used in the literature to refer to the countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America which are deemed "less developed" than the Western European countries, the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, Russia and some former Eastern Bloc countries, such as the Czech Republic and Ukraine.

[4] It is true that struggles over the environment (i.e. access and control over resources) have existed throughout the history of capitalism. Yet, the construction of "the environment" as a particular discourse through which such struggles are waged is a more recent development. When I refer to environmental conflicts

here, I mean those struggles that are explicitly waged on the discursive terrain of 'the environment'.

5 Recent discussions in rural politics and "responses from below" to land grabs (R. Hall et al. 2015) emphasize the same point concerning the diversity of peasants' responses to land grabbing.

6 Throughout the text, I use "common sense" as understood by Gramsci, which I discuss in Chapter 2. The Gramscian notion of common sense is different from the customary English use of the term, which is defined in the Cambridge Dictionary as "the basic level of practical knowledge and judgement that we all need to help us live in a reasonable and safe way".

7 People of mixed Spanish and indigenous origin.

8 See Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion of this historical process.

9 Chapter 4 provides a detailed history of each conflict.

10 The communities where my research focused were mostly of mestizo peasants and some Afro-Ecuadorian peasants. For both groups Spanish is their first language. Only three of the interviewees were of Kichwa origin: the mayor Auki Tituaña, the president of the Cotacachi Cantonal Assembly at the time of the interview (April 18, 2012) who I refer to by the pseudonym Johana in the text, and a representative from the national indigenous organization CONAIE. They were all fluent in Spanish and the interviews were all conducted in Spanish.

11 Two of them are my friends from ISS, Natalia Avila and Martín Bermúdez. At ISS both of them worked on subjects related to (politics of) the environment and development in Ecuador and Colombia, respectively. Their knowledge of and insight into not only on the topic but also Ecuador and Latin America in general have been very valuable. In addition, Carolina Sampedro and my field supervisor Carlos Mena from Universidad San Francisco de Quito helped me in three of the interviews.

2 A Gramscian Conceptualization of Transformative Politics in Environmental Struggles

This study examines the differences in the forms of political agency and transformative politics that emerged in the local environmental struggles against mining in Intag and Mount Ida. In doing so, it aims to contribute to a better understanding of the processes that encourage or constrain the construction of critical political subjectivities, i.e. the enactment of transformative politics. To this end, it sets out to comparatively analyse the understandings of development and environment, collective identities, practices of resistance and forms of collective action in these two struggles. In this chapter, I elaborate on the Gramscian theoretical perspective which frames this study, and introduce the analytical handles that I borrow from the political ecology and environmental justice literature to analyse the particular trajectories of the Intag and Mount Ida struggles, and to account for their differences. In the first part of the Chapter, I lay out the theoretical foundations that inform my conceptualization of social struggles and transformative politics. In the second part, I discuss the debates in political ecology and environmental justice studies with reference to which I specify what transformative politics in local environmental struggles consist of, and how it is realized. In the third section, I explain how I utilized the theoretical discussions presented in the previous sections to analyse and compare the Intag and Mount Ida cases.

2.1 Understanding Social Struggles: The Gramscian Theoretical Perspective

My conception of social struggles,[1] including those over the environment, is based on a Gramscian understanding of the dialectics of power and resistance in the domain of state-society relations. Rather than rigid

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schemes of cause and effect, the Gramscian perspective offers a holistic analytical framework and conceptual categories to analyse how power is organized, maintained and challenged in particular historical contexts.[2] Although the framework I employ is based on Gramsci's own dispersed and rather difficult-to-interpret writings, I also draw selectively on more recent discussions and uses of his ideas by scholars working in various fields, including critical political economy, cultural studies and social movement research (see e.g. Carroll & Ratner 1994, Chin & Mittelman 1997, Fontana 2010, S. Hall 1996 [1986], Roseberry 1994, Rupert 2003).

Environment and society relations, however, have not been a central issue in Gramscian scholarship. Except for D.S. Moore's (1993) study on peasant resource struggles in eastern Zimbabwe (as well as his more recent writings, e.g. D.S. Moore 2005), it is only recently that Gramscian thought found its way into political ecology research. These studies analyse how nature is implicated in the construction of hegemony, examine the characteristics, forms and trajectories of struggles over the environment, and explore the radical potential of emerging alternative forms of relating to the environment (Akbulut 2012, Burke & Shear 2014, Ekers et al. 2009, Ekers et al. 2013, Karriem 2009). Despite defining my study as an explicitly Gramscian analysis, I draw on a larger body of work in political ecology that study conflicts over access to and use of resources as both material and discursive struggles (see e.g Bebbington 2012a, Bebbington et al. 2008a, Bridge 2004b, Bryant & Bailey 1997, Bury 2002, Dwivedi 2001, Escobar 2006, Li 2003, Peet & Watts 2004, Perreault 2006, Perreault & Valdivia 2010). Indeed, I consider my study as a contribution to this area of scholarship for I believe the Gramscian perspective can help us better account for the political dynamics of conflicts and struggles over the environment, and their diverse trajectories. In that sense, it is a response to the call of Ekers and Loftus (2008: 700) to "ground political ecology much more firmly in a nuanced political economy".

2.1.1 Hegemony and social struggle in the sphere of civil society

The importance and usefulness of a Gramscian analysis of local environmental conflict is that it provides a coherent theoretical framework that enables us to locate environmental struggle within the broader context of power relations and social struggle in particular societies. Gramsci (1971) is mainly interested in analysing the processes through which

power over social life is established and maintained in capitalist societies, and in understanding how it is contested and how revolutionary political action might be organized. Gramsci introduces the concept of hegemony to define a historically specific form of domination in capitalist societies. Hegemony functions by obtaining the consent of the subordinated through ideological struggles and material concessions, but is always backed by the potential application of force (Burawoy 2003: 214-217, Carroll & Ratner 1994: 5-6). The state plays a fundamental role in the exercise of hegemony as it articulates the multiple and conflicting interests of different social classes through alliances and compromises around a collective will, a "national-popular outlook". Through the construction of an effective national-popular outlook, the state represents itself as a neutral institution differentiated from society that embodies and pursues the general interest (Akbulut 2011: 45-47, S. Hall 1996 [1986]: 14-20, Jessop 2007: 9-11).

The hegemony of the ruling classes in a capitalist social formation is based not only on economic power but also, and crucially, on political, moral and intellectual leadership and persuasion. This leadership is achieved through ideological struggles in civil society—the institutional sphere of political parties, trade unions, mass education, media, religious organizations, interest groups and other voluntary associations (Burawoy 2003: 198-199). In contrast to the conceptions of civil society as separate from and opposed to the state, Gramsci views it as organically connected to the state, the latter being understood as political society comprised of the legislative, executive, judicial and security organs (Buttigieg 2005: 43). Political society and civil society jointly form the "integral" State: "State= political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion" (Gramsci 1971: 263).

Two points are worth emphasizing in order to better explain the Gramscian view of hegemony. First, although hegemony is established in civil society principally by obtaining consent, this process cannot be seen as occurring independently of coercion, particularly its subtler forms. (Roseberry 1994: 358). As Scott (1985: 246-247) powerfully argues, what we might think of consent on the part of the subaltern classes might rather be "pragmatic adaptation to reality" for fear of repression or what Marx termed the "dull compulsion of economic relations". More generally, the existence of a "complex unity of coercion and consent in situations of domination" (Roseberry 1994: 358) can be expected not only to

lead to active consent, understood as identification with the interests of the ruling classes, but to compliance, accommodation, adaptation, acquiescence, compromise, deference, cynicism, resignation and fear (Li 1999, Osorio Pérez 2015: 8-11, D. Sayer 1994: 373-376).

Second, hegemony should be understood not as an achieved state of complete domination, but as a dynamic and lived process that "has to be renewed, recreated, defended and modified. It is also continually resisted, limited, altered, challenged" (Williams 1977: 112). Hegemony is never complete, "the persistence of the residual forms of traditional culture and the emergence of newly produced cultural meanings, ideas and values provide forms of alternative or directly oppositional politics and culture" (Boonmathya 2003: 274). Civil society, then, is not only the site of construction of hegemony but also where hegemony is contested (Buttigieg 2005: 38). It is a terrain of struggle characterized by the existence of multiple and conflicting interests and social identities. It incorporates both the "immensely intricate, interdependent relations" between the various elements that constitute it and the state, as well as the "myriad connections and divergences", relations of conflict and co-operation among those elements themselves (Buttigieg 2005: 36).

A key concept that Gramsci uses to comprehend the struggles conducted on the terrain of civil society is "war of position". Gramsci (1971) introduces this concept as a revolutionary strategy distinct from a "war of movement", or a "frontal attack" to capture the state power. Since power in advanced capitalist societies is maintained through hegemonic processes in civil society by means of which the ruling classes acquire, maintain and reinforce their "positions", its transformation requires "a *dis*organization of consent, a disruption of hegemonic discourses and practices" (Carroll & Ratner 1994: 6), and building new conceptions of the world in that same sphere; only then a frontal attack on the state can be successful (Gramsci 1971: 238-239). Hence, the war of position is a revolutionary strategy to be applied in the realm of civil society (Buttigieg 1995 cited in K. Smith 2010: 41). Yet, the war of position should not be seen as restricted to this sphere; other interventions that shift the "balance of social forces", for instance in the economic realm, law and public policy should be considered as important elements in that regard (Carroll & Ratner 1994: 10 & 19). A particular insight of this concept, I believe, is that it confers historical significance and value to particular struggles that go beyond the achievement of their immediate goals. To the extent that

particular struggles challenge dominant meanings and values, and modify material practices, they can be seen as contributing to social transformation. The demands that surge from these struggles can actually be incorporated into hegemonic projects in order to maintain them. This, however, does not lessen their significance as they can still empower subaltern groups, and enable them to gain experience in organizing and mobilizing.

2.1.2 The making and transformation of subjects: ideology, consciousness and common sense in Gramsci

Gramscian theory's concern with ideological struggles and the role of consent in the maintenance of power relations points to the question of how individuals are "made". That is, how their understanding of the world and themselves is constructed, and how "social ideas arise", variously discussed by Gramscian scholars in terms of consciousness, ideology, subjectivity and common sense (see e.g. S. Hall 1996 [1986], Rupert 2003, D. Sayer 1994, K. Smith 2010, Williams 1977). To start with Gramsci (1971: 244) himself, who states: "man [sic] cannot be conceived of except as historically determined man—i.e. man who has developed, and who lives, in certain conditions, in a particular social complex or totality of social relations". This "totality of social relations" is shaped by the dialectics of power and resistance, hence can be seen as the hegemonic process itself. And it is in this process that consciousness or subjectivity is formed.

The key to understanding the construction of subjectivity is to conceive hegemony as a "whole lived social process" (Williams 1977: 109), and to insist that power fundamentally operates by shaping (but never wholly determining) everyday experience. Power, in this conception, is *both* repressive *and* productive (Pringle 2005: 259). It defines "the boundaries of the possible" and "enforces the terms on which things *must* be done at the most everyday of levels"; and it "produces and reproduces quite *material* forms of sociality" (D. Sayer 1994: 374). It is "*both centralized* in the coercive apparatuses of the state *and diffused* across other institutional sites such as the church, the family and the school" (Carroll & Ratner 1994: 6). It is inscribed in institutional forms, above all the state, which is "strategically selective" and "privileges some actors, identities, strategies, and spatial and temporal horizons" (Jessop 2001: 1223). The state's hegemonic practices, therefore, "define and create certain kinds of

subjects and identities while denying, ruling out other kinds of subjects and identities" (Roseberry 1994: 357).

Ideology, in this context, concerns how social relations imbued with power are "represented and construed" in language and discourse (S. Hall 1996 [1986]: 35). Ideology does not refer to articulated, coherent systems of ideas, beliefs and values that reflect the interests of a ruling class, descending on subordinate classes from above and driving them into a state of "false consciousness". Rather, it is "the practical as well as the theoretical knowledges which enable people to 'figure out' society, and within whose categories and discourses we 'live out' and 'experience' our objective positioning in social relations" (S. Hall 1996 [1986]: 26). It is, therefore, principally at the level of practical activity and consciousness that ideology operates. It is constitutive of subjectivities since "the ideological categories in use…position us in relation to the account of the process as depicted in the discourse", and each discourse "situates us as social actors or as member of a social group in a particular relation to the process and prescribes certain social identities for us" (S. Hall 1996 [1986]: 39).

What we can discern from the discussions of these scholars who elaborated Gramsci's ideas is that dominant or hegemonic ideas and meanings do not simply capture the consciousness of the masses but are rooted in the materiality of social relations, hence are established through concrete material practices.[3] At the same time, ideas are not simple reflections of material conditions, but are constitutive of how we experience and think about these conditions. Subjectivity, thus, is constructed at the intersection of a historically specific material and discursive operation of power.

The Gramscian understanding of hegemony on the one hand enables us to analyse how power works to shape subjectivities, but it also emphasizes the limitations, contradictions and ambiguities inherent in this process. There are several dimensions to this. At a fundamental level, capitalism is characterized by antagonistic social relations. That is, even though "the material interests cannot be taken as given independently of the discursive constitution of particular subject positions" (Jessop & Sum 2001: 97), the process of capital accumulation does create the material conditions for conflicts of interests, even though it does not determine their specific content. Moreover, to the extent that capital accumulation is a dynamic historical process, the institutional arrangements that

regulate its operation, and the discourses that function to legitimize its direction cannot remain fixed but have to be continuously renewed and reworked, and in the process create new tensions and grievances that become the substance of new struggles.

Second, the state as a set of institutions and political practices is not usually as coherent as implied by the abstract idea of "the State" (Abrams 1988 [1977], D. Sayer 1994). The state apparatus is permeated by heterogeneous actors with conflicting interests, values and knowledges, which are also reflected in the practices of its institutions (R. Hall et al. 2015: 475-477, Sharma & Gupta 2006: 11-18). Moreover, even if there is some degree of coherence in state's hegemonic projects, in practice their implementation is rife with many difficulties and uncertainties deriving from the complexity of the social and natural world that they aim to shape (Li 2003: 5121). Similarly, the ruling classes and elites are not a homogenous group either; they also have conflicting interests and values, often pursue different economic and political projects, seek alliances with various social groups, and advocate and push for different state policies (Akbulut 2011: 45).

Third, as Rupert (2003: 184) argues:

> Like all relations of social power, capitalist power relations are reciprocal, constituting a 'dialectic of power' subject to ongoing contestation, renegotiation and restructuring. They represent, in short, historically particular forms of social power. As such, class powers must be actualised in various concrete sites of social production where class is articulated with other socially meaningful identities resident and effective in those historical circumstances…This implies that in concrete contexts class cannot be effectively determining without itself being determined.[4]

Put differently, hegemony does not start or continue to be exercised in a historical and social vacuum to mould subjects, but is confronted with sedimented social relations, loyalties, ideologies, social mythologies and folklore that leave "an infinity of traces" in people's conception of the world (Gramsci 1971: 324). In other words, the social totality within which subjectivities are constructed consists of various social relations, including "family, location, religion, work and culture", as well as "relations along axes such as sexuality, gender, ethnicity, race, age and subcultures, or specific cultural interests or identification", such that people are "overdetermined by a number of causes" (K. Smith 2010: 47). Not only

do different logics and forms of power operate in each of these relations, including that of class, these intersect and interact in various ways to produce specific effects. To the extent that subjectivities "exercise and internalize multiple dimensions of power" they should be expected to be fragmented and contradictory (Nightingale 2011: 155).

Gramsci captures this complexity in the making of subjectivities through the concept "common sense". For Gramsci (1971: 419) the notion of common sense implies an uncritical way of thinking, a conception of the world that a person "absorbed" from the social and cultural environment in which she or he lives. Common sense is composed of a multitude of ideological elements taken from religion, folklore, science and social mythologies; it is "contradictory" "fragmentary", "incoherent", "disjointed" and "episodic". This is juxtaposed to "philosophy", as a consciously and critically worked out conception of the world, that is "systematic, coherent and critical" (ibid.: 323-327). Defined in this way, the concept has a rather negative connotation, and its relation to hegemonic processes, i.e. how these contradictory elements articulate with hegemonic ideas, concepts and categories, is not very clear. Yet, following more recent discussions, we can think of common sense as practical consciousness of the subaltern classes, formed, as I indicated above, at the intersection of various social relations, including but not restricted to class.

Through this formulation, we can link common sense more explicitly to the understanding of hegemony as lived social process, and discuss its constitution within the everyday experiences as "a contradictory thought-process and yet a meaningful [albeit partial] thought-process of the immediate reality", as well as a "creative thought-process" through which subaltern groups construct various forms of dissent (Patnaik 1988: PE-7 & PE-8). Since people's everyday lives are immersed in various institutions of civil society, common sense is connected to the ideological struggles in this sphere. Seen in this way, common sense can be conceptualized as the terrain on which ideological struggle most frequently and most intensely plays out (S. Hall 1996 [1986]: 42-43). Put the other way around, ideological struggles can be viewed "as practical engagements about shifts and modifications in 'common sense', or popular consciousness[5]" (Hunt 1990: 310). Arguably, the crucial importance of this conceptualization lies in its implications for transformative (or counter-hegemonic) political struggles. It identifies the reworking of common

sense, or practical consciousness, as the privileged, if not the most critical, objective of struggle. Moreover, it enables us to account for the "inherent ambiguities and ambivalence of subaltern resistance" (Chandra 2015: 564).

Transformative politics, therefore, entails "making explicit the tensions and contradictions within it [common sense] as well as the sociopolitical implications of these" (Rupert 2003: 185). This is principally the role of the organic intellectuals, understood in terms of their social function as "constructer, organizer, 'permanent persuader'" (Gramsci 1971: 142). The intellectual "must…combat a worker's [or more generally, subaltern groups'] common sense 'inherited from past and uncritically absorbed' that leads to 'moral and political passivity', and at the same time elaborate the kernel of good sense that workers share with one another, namely the 'practical transformation of the world'" (Burawoy 2003: 226). In this regard, we can understand the relationship between the subaltern classes and organic intellectuals that work to transform common sense as a "critical pedagogy" (Freire 1996 [1970], Rupert 2003: 186) that "facilitate[s] an intellectual formation within the agency itself" (Patnaik 1988: PE-3).

These discussions illustrate that social and political struggles are certainly about material interests, institutional practices and state policies, as much as these shape the material conditions of life. Significantly, they are also about construction and transformation of subjectivities, i.e. people's understanding of the world and themselves. They are waged over meanings, categories of thought, conceptions of the social, economic and political processes affecting people's lives, and over collective identities and solidarities that move people into action. It should be noted that (Avcı 2017: 317):

> The construction of subjectivity is a life-long process for any individual and, is overdetermined by the whole range of social relations in which the individual is embedded (K. Smith 2010: 47). And talking about transformation does not mean looking for a kind of replacement of one particular and coherent self-understanding fully dominated by hegemonic ideas to a completely new one embodying in every aspect a counterhegemonic consciousness. Subjectivities harbour contradictory ideas, values and perceptions (Chatterton & Pickerill 2010: 479); rationalizations of hegemony processes, as well as different forms of dissent (Patnaik 1988: PE-4). Hence the transformation is better seen as piecemeal

modifications in popular consciousness (Hunt 1990: 313-314). Moreover, what a counter-hegemonic consciousness entails is more than a matter of theoretical elaboration on the basis of which to assess what people say and do, but is emergent in actual social struggle, i.e. in praxis—"reflection and action upon the world in order to transform it" (Freire 1996 [1970]: 33).

It is this perspective of social struggles that motivates and informs my research. Based on this Gramscian framework, I argue that local socio-environmental struggles can be conceptualized as political spaces that present possibilities for the transformation of political subjectivities of the social actors participating in them. In that sense, I maintain a view of these struggles as *potentially* "generative of new forms of [collective] identity and political practice" (Featherstone 2013: 65). Struggles over environment may "destabilize socio-economic relations and cultural narratives" to open up "space for social and economic experimentation, new political alliances, new cultural narratives, and alternative social and socio-ecological relations" (Burke & Shear 2014: 129). That is, they may help construct "subjectivities through which alternative economic and social arrangements can be imagined and realized" (Kayatekin & Ruccio 1998: 87). My purpose in this study is to interrogate the factors and processes that facilitate or hinder such destabilization and (re)construction.

Before closing this section, I would like to note a final point. The Gramscian perspective strongly emphasizes historical specificity in the unfolding of all these processes I referred to. Conducting a comparative study that employs a Gramscian approach might be considered a contradiction in this regard. However, I would like to mention, first, that Gramsci's own analyses were deeply comparative as can most clearly be seen in his contrasts between the West (Europe) and the East (Russia), and between the north and south of Italy, as well as his discussions on Americanism and Fordism. Second, adopting a comparative approach does not negate the importance of historical specificity. On the contrary, it serves as means to probe into and enhance our understanding of the processes that produce specific political trajectories. I hope that the chapters that follow will convince the reader that I have remained faithful to this analytical use of comparison.

2.2   Contesting Development: Environment, Justice and Rights

Having laid down the theoretical foundations of the study, the question I turn to now is how we can trace transformative politics in environmental struggles over resource extraction in the global South. In posing this question, I intend to *operationalize*, so to speak, the Gramscian framework for the purposes of this study. If transformative politics disrupts hegemonic or dominant discourses that shape subjectivities in a manner which leads people to consent to or accommodate unequal power relations, then the answer to the question above would be to identify the hegemonic discourses environmental struggles confront and the types of critique they offer that foster critical consciousness. In what follows, I will first argue that the primary dominant discourse that environmental struggles in the South have to address is that of development. Next, I will discuss how environment-based challenges, critical justice frames and rights-based understandings can and are being used to realize transformative politics that can unsettle the dominant notion of development and question the unequal power relations that this notion helps to maintain.

2.2.1   The constitutive role of development discourse

From a Gramscian perspective, the significance of development in the countries of the global South is that it is the main discourse through which state-society relations, the terrain of hegemony building, of formation and transformation of political subjectivities, are configured in these countries (Ferguson 1994, Escobar 1995, Li 1999). The prominence of development as a discursive frame in the South is of course a historical construct. In his influential book, *Encountering Development*, Escobar (1995) demonstrates how in the post-World War II period "development" has become consolidated as the main discourse to talk about and act upon the social realities in the countries of the (non-Western) world defined as "underdeveloped" within the same discourse. Development has indicated a vision of a desirable society defined by industrialization, urbanization, agricultural modernization, increased living standards, liberal democracy and modern education and culture (Escobar 1995: 4, Thomas 2000: 775-76). It prescribes a wholesale transformation of the economic and social structure of the underdeveloped countries,

primarily through rapid and sustained economic growth. In fact, economic growth has become the essential and indispensable condition for development. The social and environmental disruptions generated by those actions undertaken to pursue the goal of economic growth are often deemed as the inevitable price to pay on the road to development (Akbulut et al. 2015: 741-742). Development thus came to mean that "tomorrow things will be better, or [and] that more is necessarily better" (Rist 2007: 485).

Development discourse has certainly been deployed to frame and legitimize the interventions of the "advanced" (Western industrialized) countries and the international institutions these nations control in those countries deemed "underdeveloped". It has also been adopted by the states in the latter countries as their main proclaimed purpose and the basis of their claim to rule. It has become "an area in which 'the state' can continuously restate its *raison d'être* and become instantiated in routine processes and events", thus providing a "discursive framework for conceptualizing and managing the relationships between 'the state' and citizens" (Li 1999: 296-97). Development, therefore, has come to play a central role in hegemonic processes. On the one hand, it has oriented the policies and practices of state institutions, and to the extent that it has been constructed as the "national interest", or the national-popular outlook in the Gramscian parlance, in the name of which the state enforces its rule, it has been used to legitimize those policies and practices. On the other hand, and as a result of the former, diverse societal actors, including the dominant groups, have advocated, negotiated and challenged these policies and practices, and have advanced their own interests and claims with reference to the same language.[6] For this reason, contests over the meanings and practices of development are central to hegemonic struggles—struggles to maintain or change the power relations in society—in the global South.

Before moving on, it is important to clarify two points. First, states should be understood as a social relation (Jessop 2007). More specifically, as Jessop (2007: 6) argues, "states [as distinct institutional ensembles] do not exist in majestic isolation overseeing the rest of their respective societies but are embedded in a wider political system (or systems), articulated with other institutional orders, and linked to different forms of civil society". Hence the discourses and practices that constitute the state are constructed through dialectical relations with other social forces and

institutional structures. The powers and capacities of the states, as well as their limitations and vulnerabilities thus depend on these relations. Second, the development discourses and practices, which are constitutive of the states in "developing countries", should be understood "in the context of the bigger historical picture of the evolution of capitalism including the working of colonial or post-colonial linkages between nation states" (Arsel & Dasgupta 2015: 649). This suggests that the developing country states are subject to and structurally constrained by the forces of global capitalist accumulation. Struggles over development, in this regard, are about how to integrate into, engage with or confront these forces.

2.2.2 Environment-based challenges to development

In the last three decades, the environment has increasingly become an explicit discursive terrain upon which contests over development are played out. The rise of "the environment" as a specific field of political struggle, of course, has to do with a number of factors. These include a particular global historical context of worsening ecological conditions worldwide; heightened concerns about the risks associated with technological and industrial growth (i.e. the "Risk Society", Beck 1992) the rise of environmental movements both in the global North and South; and the establishment and consolidation of the sustainable development discourse as the dominant framework within which development came to be addressed, initially internationally (i.e. in the United Nations), and then in development planning and policy at the national level. This historical context has positioned the environment as an issue that development discourses and practices need to address—hence a new issue through which these discourses and practices can be questioned and contested.

This study is about understanding the ways in which environmental struggles can challenge the dominant meanings and practices of development. I argue that the environment is of particular significance as an arena of struggle over development for three reasons. First, the biophysical world has a materiality that enables and constrains human social action (Bakker & Bridge 2006, Castree 2010: 1730-1731). In the context of capitalist accumulation (of which development processes of the South are a part), this translates into a (structurally) contradictory relationship between commodity production and ecological conditions, such that the

continuous expansion of commodity production undermines the ecological conditions on which production depends (Bridge 2000: 239-240; see also Altvater 1993, O'Connor 1988). Environmental struggles are rooted in these contradictions inherent to an expanding metabolism of commodity production (i.e. capitalist accumulation), which requires new and increasing quantities of resources (Martinez-Alier et al. 2016a, Muradian et al. 2012). Thus they carry the potential to make these contradictions explicit and question the imperative for economic growth, i.e. capital accumulation, inscribed into the workings of the capitalist economy. While particular institutional forms and social practices can stabilize these contradictions for some time (Bridge 2000: 250-251), environmental struggles can call into question these forms and practices, and support the search for alternatively structured economic activities that take into account ecological limits or "the ecological laws governing the transformation of matter" (Bridge 2000: 239), which, above all, requires displacing the primacy of economic growth as a societal goal that overrides social and environmental concerns.

Second, as Castree (2010: 1731) argues, "social actors of various kinds invest the non-human world with significance", and the different values social actors attribute to the environment cannot be reduced to its utility to satisfy needs. People value the environment also because it embodies their personal and social identities and provides opportunities for cognitive and spiritual enrichment (O'Neill et al. 2008). In fact, many local communities all around the developing world resist environmental destruction on the basis of its adverse impacts on cultural perceptions and practices of nature (Escobar 2006, Guha & Martinez-Alier 1997). These values can become the basis for challenging the notions of development that reduce human well-being to increasing material prosperity, and that treat these values as substitutable for material gain. They can promote the development of notions of individual and community well-being that foreground the quality of social relations and environmental health rather than material prosperity. Environmental struggles can potentially facilitate processes through which environmental values found in the "common sense" can be elaborated into critical political discourses that disrupt dominant understandings of development and promote alternative ones.

Third, environmental concerns provide an opportunity for new alliances among diverse social actors, cross-cutting class, national, ethnic,

regional and gender identities, and for linking their interests, values and knowledges in multiple and novel ways. More specifically, environmental struggles bring together local populations directly affected by environmental degradation and loss of access to resources and a diverse range of civil society actors representing, among others, the environment, human rights, women, indigenous people, social justice and in some cases even nationalist interests (that have integrated environmental concerns into their agendas). As these actors interact with each other and view social processes, more specifically development practices, through the lens of the environment, they are able to develop new understandings of how they are connected through environmental processes and social power relations that impinge upon them. If power rests in the materiality of social relations and, if as Featherstone (2005: 252-253) argues, solidarities "are productive of new political identities rather than just bringing together fixed ones", alliances can disrupt power relations by creating new forms of sociality and new collective identities. Alliances forged through environmental struggles can thus enable social actors to articulate in new ways their concerns at the nexus of development-environment-justice, and build new environmental identities around which to mobilize and demand social change.[7] Referring back to Gramsci, it can be argued that it is such connections and (re)articulations that make civil society the terrain upon which hegemony is contested.

Significantly, in relation to all three ways that I suggest the environment matters to transformative politics, there is the implication that this also entails that the social actors participating in environmental struggles question and possibly change their own uses and perceptions of the environment, or their environmental common sense, so to speak. That actors involved in local environmental struggles oppose certain economic activities because they harm the environment or that they hold certain values related to the environmental does not necessarily mean that they manage the environment in a just or sustainable manner. Still, the claim to be defending the environment itself can lead these social actors to reflect upon and modify their own environmental practices. Similarly, while resisting a certain future for the local environment—i.e. prescribed by the development project they oppose—social actors are likely to be encouraged to think what kind of future they want and what role the environment should play in the future of their territories. Moreover, through the alliances they build, social actors might acquire new envi-

ronmental knowledges, get to know and value their environment in new ways, which then can influence their environmental perceptions and practices. As it might be expected that different groups in these alliances have different concerns and values regarding the environment, the coming together of these groups for a common purpose can open up the space to deliberate on and develop ways of managing the environment that take into account or include those different concerns and values. The transformative capacity of environmental struggles at least partially concerns the question of whether these possibilities are realized. Understanding when and how they are realized or not would be an important task to better grasp the potentials and limits of transformative politics.

2.2.3 Environmental justice and rights as the basis of critical subjectivities

Arguably, the most salient critiques of policies, projects and practices undertaken in the name of development, or legitimized on the basis that they serve the objective of development, concern the questions of who wins and who loses from development and why, and who has the right and power to define development and how it is to be realized. Essentially, these questions are about social justice and the right to participate in decision making. The justice- and democracy-based challenges to development are of utmost importance because they call into question the power relations in society, and dispute the legitimacy of development discourses and practices. Asking who wins and who loses from development suggests that development, or at least certain things done in the name of it, does not serve the interests of all, but only particular interests. Asking why some win while others lose, opens the way to a critical understanding of the role of unequal power relations in the processes that create winners and losers. Asking who defines development, on the other hand, makes it possible to problematize particular definitions, and hints at the possibility of conceiving of different notions. Questioning who decides how development is to be accomplished challenges decision-making processes and shows that some voices are excluded and/or that the interests of some are not served by these decisions. These are questions that can "*dis*organize consent" (Carroll & Ratner 1994: 6), help politicize relations of subordination by framing them as a consequence of unequal power relations and mobilize people into action against injustice (Blomley 1994: 412).

It is true that these questions can be and have indeed been answered in multiple ways, and the answers may as well reflect and/or justify different forms and scales of injustice, misidentify the sources of injustice, provide partial explanations as to the operation of unequal power relations or partial solutions to the problems identified. They do not necessarily promote fundamental changes to the social, economic and political structures that create and sustain inequalities, or foster inclusive identities. The potential of social struggles to transform political subjectivities lies precisely in how the answers to these questions are formulated, whether and how these answers "'rework' or 'refashion' the elements which are constitutive of the prevailing hegemony" (Hunt 1990: 313) in ways that "destabilize [dominant] socio-economic relations and cultural narratives" (Burke & Shear 2014: 129) and allow "alternative economic and social arrangements [to] be imagined and realized" (Kayatekin & Ruccio 1998: 87).

Political ecology studies (see e.g. Ballard & Banks 2003, Bebbington 2012b, Bryant & Bailey 1997, Dwivedi 2001, Martinez-Alier 2002, Peet & Watts 2004, Peet et al. 2011, Urkidi & Walter 2011) have established that such questions concerning justice and democracy are indeed important in local environmental struggles. One of the central arguments of political ecology is that inequality in access to and use of resources, and in the distribution of the burdens of environmental pollution and degradation lies at the core of these struggles. In other words, these struggles are fundamentally a matter of distributional justice. Struggles arise because the costs of development projects fall on the local communities (or on certain groups within local communities, often the poor and the marginalized), while the largely economic benefits are reaped by private companies, in most cases multinationals, the state and local elites. However, political ecology studies do not sufficiently *problematize* how concerns about place-based impacts of particular projects are translated into the language of justice. It is as if political ecologists do not see a process that needs to be explained, as if the defence of livelihoods, ways of life, local environment—the main motivations of local environmental struggles— are by definition or naturally framed in the language of justice. Nor do they analyse critically the "normative content" (Foster 1998), and scales of the justice claims, or the inclusiveness of the collective identities those claims conjure into. As Mann (2009: 341) argues, "the ethical basis upon which…particular social conditions [are deemed] unjust" is an essential

component of social struggles, as it has political effects. Yet, it often seems that political ecologists consider it more important that local communities resist the state and corporations in their attempt to pursue extractive projects than that the logics and values that inform such resistance are more "progressive", i.e. supportive of more just and sustainable socio-environmental relations. I argue that explaining this process of translation is essential as it is precisely through this process that environmental struggles can develop critical understandings that move beyond the defence of place, and challenge unequal power relations and underpin rights claims and inclusive identities. Transformation of political subjectivities in environmental struggles occurs through this process of translation, hence the need to analyse it to understand transformative politics.

This issue has been explicitly addressed in the field of environmental justice studies. Environmental justice studies, a field that is closely related to political ecology, has similarly been concerned with the unequal distribution of environmental benefits and burdens, and the social struggles that this gives rise to. In fact, environmental justice, as a political discourse, as a movement and as an analytical framework, emerged in the US in the 1980s in the context of the rising struggles of communities of colour and the poor against the disproportionate siting of waste and industrial facilities in their neighbourhoods.[8] A principal argument of the environmental justice perspective is that "people of color and/or people of low income bear a disproportionate burden of pollution that is unfair and in need of change" (Kurtz 2003: 887-88, see also Walker 2009).

Proponents of the environmental justice approach, movements and scholars alike, frame local opposition to the so-called "locally unwanted land uses" (LULUs) as a question of justice. The political significance of this framing partially rests on its refutation of the criticisms of these movements as being motivated by not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) attitudes. This view posits that local communities object to projects that would have larger societal benefits to protect their narrow self-interests, and would not raise similar objections if these projects were to be undertaken somewhere else (della Porta & Piazza 2007: 866, Schively 2007: 257-257). Some scholars argue that initial movements against toxic waste dumping in the US had NIMBY characteristics in so far they were restricted to defending particular communities or places (see e.g. Kurtz 2003: 890, McGurty 2000: 376). However, as the local movements mul-

tiplied, they moved beyond challenging distributional outcomes to question "the processes through which distributional injustices are created and sustained" (Walker 2009: 625). Hence, it is argued, participants in these struggles do not simply defend their particularistic and given interests, but they articulate political subjectivities that encompass critical conceptions of the "underlying causes and dynamics of inequities at different scales" (Walker 2006: 657), and that are "informed by broader visions of a more just society" (Kurtz 2003: 890).

In his analysis of what justice means in environmental justice movements, Schlosberg (2004, 2007) convincingly asserts that the conceptions and discourses of justice that the movements use are not restricted to issues of distribution, but also incorporate claims over recognition and participation. Schlosberg builds on the work of Young (1990) and Fraser (1997) in justice theory to argue that an adequate understanding of justice requires the "examination of the *underlying* causes of maldistribution" (2007: 14, emphasis in original), and that "inequitable distribution, a lack of recognition and limited participation all work to produce injustice and claims for injustice" (Schlosberg 2004: 529). He maintains that environmental justice movements—in the US and globally—articulate "a broad, plural and inclusive discourse" (Schlosberg 2007: 7) that integrates claims and demands concerning all three dimensions of justice. These include "equity in the distribution of environmental risk [and benefits], recognition of the diversity of the participants and experiences in affected communities, and participation in the political processes which create and manage environmental policy [or affect the environment more generally]" (Schlosberg 2004: 517).

Concerning the question of how such justice frames are constructed, the most elaborate answers have come from political geographers working on environmental justice struggles. These scholars have conceptualized the process of construction of a justice frame as "politics of scale" that entails the broadening of the "scales of meaning", i.e. "the scales at which a problem is experienced and framed in political discourse" (Kurtz 2003: 891). In this conception, environmental justice struggles engage in politics of scale through which a problem experienced at the local level (e.g. pollution from a waste incinerator) is contested at broader scales at which the economic and political processes that give rise to it (e.g. the capitalist waste production) operate. Hence, scale is constitutive of the construction of social grievances as environmental injustice, as the latter

frames local outcomes (e.g. exposure and vulnerability to environmental risks of an incinerator) as unjust for being consequences of broader processes (i.e. economic inequality, political marginalization, cultural domination that shape the patterns of production and consumption, and decisions over waste disposal).

Among these scholars, David Harvey (1996) emphasizes that the way in which place-based concerns are linked to justice claims is also a question of the scales of collective identities or loyalties. Harvey considers place-based struggles, including many environmental justice movements, as forms of "militant particularisms". The concept of "militant particularisms" was introduced by the Marxist cultural theorist Raymond Williams to describe the "locally bounded [place-bound] socialist politics" (Featherstone 1998: 19) of the working class communities in Wales in the 20th century. Harvey (1996: 19-45) uses this concept to draw attention to the possibility that if not connected to more universal political imaginaries, place-based struggles can fall short of identifying their position in a broader system of unequal power relations which affect other groups in other places, and produce exclusionary identities. He argues that building progressive local movements requires moving from "one level of abstraction—attached to place—to another level of abstraction capable of reaching out across space" (1996: 33). This move, he suggests, is not easy or straightforward, as it "can threaten the common purposes and values that ground the militant particularism achieved in particular places" (1996: 33). Therefore, to properly appreciate the transformative processes in place-based struggles, it is important to be attentive to the scales of loyalties that are constructed, and to the way in which conflictual loyalties and values are negotiated.

In many struggles, justice frames are closely linked to rights-based discourses as local communities, in opposition to the injustices they face, assert their right to be heard and respected, to participate and to have control over their lives, livelihoods and environments. I believe that the construction of rights-based understandings is an important dimension of transformative politics. As Poma and Gravante (2015: 67) assert, it involves the "transformation of participants into political subjects who claim rights beyond the motivation that prompted them to engage in struggle in the first place". Rights discourses are sometimes questioned for their "individualism and liberal grounding" by some Leftists who are "skeptical of their emancipatory potential" (Blomley 1994: 407). Howev-

er, Blomley (1994) argues that depending on the social space in which they are used—i.e. the community setting or the court room—rights discourses can be a powerful mobilizing force, and can help redefine the naturalized power relations as oppressive and unjust (ibid.: 420). Similarly, Hunt (1990: 321) maintains that rights discourses are crucial in building counter-hegemonic politics since they require legitimation that goes beyond the defence of immediate interests of a group, and necessarily extends to other individuals and groups (i.e. they are by form universal). Hence, it can be argued that rights-based understandings have transformative potential as they are conducive to questioning the underlying processes that create injustice, and can foster inclusive identities as they invite ethical justifications that appeal to the rights of individuals and communities elsewhere who also suffer from injustice.

Turning to the explanations as to "how and why…small groups of citizens fighting against locally unwanted land uses translate their efforts into the language of environmental justice" (Towers 2000: 23), we observe that scholars emphasize three interrelated factors: the historical context of marginalization and political activism; the role of networking and alliance building with regional, national or international civil society actors, as well as other social (including local) movements; and opportunities and constraints of the institutional spaces (della Porta & Piazza 2007, Haarstad & Floysand 2007, McGurty 1997, Schlosberg 2007, Towers 2000, Urkidi & Walter 2011, Williams & Mawdsley 2006).

The historical context of marginalization of a particular local community delimits to a certain extent the grievances on which claims of injustice are built, while the history of political activism in a country or a region affects who local communities can build alliances with, and the political discourses in which they can embed their own concerns. For instance, the rise of an environmental justice frame in the US, and the charge of environmental racism as a foundational claim of that frame, is linked to the history of racism and civil rights movement (see e.g. Bickerstaff & Agyeman 2009, Foster 1998, McGurty 1997, Schlosberg 2007, Towers 2000). McGurty (1997: 302) argues, in this respect, that the environmental justice frame was born in the Warren County protests through the incorporation of environmental concerns into the civil rights agenda by the civil rights leaders, as well as that of the civil rights claims into the environmental cause by the white residents. Similarly, in their analysis of environmental justice movements against gold mining in Latin America,

Urkidi and Walter (2011: 685) emphasize the importance of these movements' "articulation with a long tradition of human rights and social justice activism in the region". Their discussion of the resistance against the Pascua-Lama project in Chile also demonstrates how indigenous communities "saw mining as the last step in the colonisation process that had been destroying their territory and cultural identity for centuries", and demanded respect for their territorial rights and cultural identities (Urkidi & Walter 2011: 688-689). That is, the historical injustice that the indigenous communities experienced as part of the colonization process shaped the framing of their grievances and demands in the context of a mining conflict.

The role of networks and alliances in the construction of justice-based claims and collective identities in local struggles has been emphasized by environmental justice scholars, as well as by social movement scholars. In this respect, della Porta and Piazza (2007: 868) maintain that "the evolution of frames on local conflict occurs through a process of networking that allows them [local residents] to overcome the discourse of risk for the community". Similarly, referring to the environmental justice movement in the US, Towers (2000: 25) argue that: "Networking caused grassroots environmentalists to recognize national patterns of distributional and structural injustice and radicalize their agenda to include environmental justice". Haarstad and Floysand (2007: 306), on the other hand, consider the strategic dimension of using broader discourses in the framing of local issues, and emphasize that to achieve their goals the local struggles need to transform their "[political] claims to accommodate hegemonic discourses [such as democracy] at new scales and in ways that enable communication within networks".

Based on these discussions, it can be argued that through networking and alliance building local actors acquire new frames through which they reconstruct their own experiences in relation to broader economic and political processes. Moreover, the connections with other social actors and movements enable local communities to identify concerns they have in common with other groups and the common processes affecting them. It gives them the opportunity to learn from each other's experiences and to build new solidarities and collective identities (see e.g. Featherstone 2005). At the same time, local communities are required to reframe their concerns in terms that appeal to non-local actors to be able to win allies and larger support for their cause. As Williams and

Mawdsley (2006: 667) caution, though, that can also mean toning down the social justice claims in contexts where potential allies do not embrace such claims. As this caveat also points out, both the allies and the discourses available to local actors depend on the particular historical and political context of specific regions and countries. Therefore, who the allies are, as well as their ideological positions and experiences in social struggles, together with the broader context of political contention, need to be taken into account to better understand the role of networks and alliances in local struggles.

With regard to the role of institutional spaces in the construction of justice- and rights-based discourses, studies emphasize the opportunities and constraints that local movements face as they engage with institutions and regulatory mechanisms that bear on the decisions that they contest. In terms of opportunities, local movements can have recourse to the legally established rights, for instance to be adequately informed and participate, such that they have the opportunity to voice how specific decisions violate their rights and demand that they be protected. On the other hand, by waging their struggle, local movement actors confront the structural constraints they face. Inscribed in the institutions of the state, these constraints are manifested in the state's privileging of private interests, its unwillingness to establish dialogue, the discriminatory ways in which state power is exercised (e.g. use of coercive power against local movement activists), the lack of or inadequate information sharing, the privileging of technical criteria, the lack of meaningful and binding participation, and cultural misrecognition (Foster 1998, McGurty 1997, 2000; Schlosberg 2007, Towers 2000: 25, Urkidi & Walter 2011: 691-692, Williams & Mawdsley 2006: 668). Local communities thus come to see how the decisions that will affect their lives are being imposed on them, which "reveals" to them power inequalities in operation.

These three factors—the historical context of marginalization and political activism, networks and alliances, and the characteristics of institutional spaces—are crucial in shaping the transformative processes in environmental struggles. From a Gramscian perspective, these factors can be seen as elements of state-society relations. In fact, the value of the analyses in the environmental justice literature for this study is that they help identify the factors that need to be examined to give an account of the diverse trajectories of the two environmental struggles the study analyses. It should be added here that, as indicated before, although po-

litical ecology studies does not explicitly address the framing processes in environmental struggles as a process of transformation, in the analyses of environmental struggles, these factors are referred to—i.e. the role of alliances, the construction of discourses across scales, environmental values and cultural perceptions of nature, histories of colonization, state institutional practices and discourses (see e.g. Bebbington et al. 2008b, Davidov 2013, 2014; Haarstad & Floysand 2007, Peet et al. 2011, Perreault 2006, Urkidi & Walter 2011, Velásquez 2012). While Gramsci constitutes the theoretical foundation of the study, political ecology and environmental justice studies provide the analytical handles to carry out the analysis with which this study is concerned.

2.3 Setting the Scene for Intag and Mount Ida: Transformative Politics at the Nexus of Development-Environment-Justice

This chapter identified three ways in which transformative politics is enacted in the context of local environmental struggles. First, by challenging the dominant notion of development that prioritizes economic growth over environmental and social concerns, and building notions of individual and communal well-being that foreground control over livelihoods, quality of social relations and environmental health rather than material prosperity; second, by encouraging social actors to scrutinize their perceptions and uses of the environment, and to reflect on the role the environment should play in the future of their territories; and third, by framing their struggle in terms of social justice and rights in a manner that cultivates a critical understanding of the power relations that (re)produce environmental injustices, and to support inclusive collective identities that go beyond the defence of particularistic interests. I refer to these three dimensions as the development-environment-justice nexus.

In my analysis of the Intag and Mount Ida struggles (Chapters 5 and 6, respectively) I will elaborate on the understandings of development, environment and justice, and the collective identities that have been articulated in the anti-mining struggles in Intag and Mount Ida. As I try to account for the particular understandings in each struggle, and their differences, I scrutinize the factors that have fostered or limited the potential of these struggles to enact transformative politics. However, two chapters precede those analyses. First, in Chapter 3, I review environ-

mental politics, including the mining conflicts, in Ecuador and Turkey to present the general contexts within which the Intag and Mount Ida struggles are situated. Then, in Chapter 4, I provide brief descriptions of the two study sites and chronological accounts of both struggles. The aim of the chapter is to set the empirical scene for the ensuing discussion by introducing the main actors of the resistances, their views on mining, and the main discourses of opposition, and explaining how they have organized and mobilized to stop the projects. It is in Chapter 5 and 6 that a detailed analysis of the struggles is presented. Taking as point of departure the fact that in both places, the opposition of peasants to mining has principally been based on their concerns over the impact of mining on their livelihoods and ways of life, I probe into the different understandings in Intag and Mount Ida at the nexus of development-environment-justice, and try to explain how and why these different understandings have come about.

More specifically, I examine, on the one hand, what the livelihoods and ways of life, and their relationship to the environment entail for those who defend them. I focus on the meanings of development embodied in the peasants' arguments regarding what they value about their lives and environment, their conceptions of a good life, how they envision the future of their territories, and how they perceive their own uses of and relationship to the local environment as crucial elements of their political subjectivities. On the other hand, I scrutinize the understandings of justice that inform their resistance, and the logic and values that permeate these understandings. I focus on how they conceive the broader processes that create the injustices, and the collective identities they forge on the basis of these conceptions. I consider how they want to be treated by the state and mining companies, what they resent about their actions, and how they position themselves with respect to the decision-making processes regarding the local environment and development.

For each case, I analyse the construction of the peasants' divergent understandings at the nexus of development-environment-justice in relation to their historical development experiences, and the concrete dynamics of the struggles themselves, specifically the interactions between the diverse opposition actors. I discuss both the local development processes and the interactions among the opposition actors, attending to the historical state-society relations in the two countries. In my discussion of state-society relations, I concentrate on the balance of social forces, i.e.

how they have been established historically, and its current configuration. I see this balance as shaped by the intersecting processes of capitalist accumulation, state formation and social struggles. These imply power-laden interactions among the state actors, class forces and social actors, who are defined not only by their class position, but also by other (multiple) collective identities, hence are differentiated along the axes of race, ethnicity, gender, age, region and religion. To account for the differences between the two cases, I focus, on the one hand, on the development experiences of peasants, to flesh out the concrete processes through which their everyday lives have been shaped in its material and ideological dimensions, both historically and in the context of the mining struggles. On the other hand, I examine the spaces of interaction among opposition actors, how they engaged with each other in these spaces, and practices of resistance they undertook to account for the specific ways in which the concerns of the peasants are linked to discourses on development, environment and justice.

I do not claim that the particular way the peasants defend their livelihoods against mining is shaped only by their own experience of development processes or that whatever understanding of justice can be constructed in any given context. The peasants do not choose the political terrain on which they wage their struggle, but find themselves on a terrain shaped by particular historical-structural processes and conjectural conditions. My aim, rather, is to elaborate on how the political subjectivities that are expressed in the mining struggle are constructed at the intersection of the processes of material change that they experienced; the discourses on development, environment and justice established within the larger state-society relations in which they are embedded; and the dynamics of the struggles against mining, particularly the processes of alliance building. I try to employ a dialectical and relational approach to explicate this "intersection". By doing so, I try to give a theoretical account of how certain ideas about development, environment and justice are established through concrete material practices, and how these ideas are constitutive of the ways these practices are construed.

Since the focus of the comparison in this study is on the differences between the subjectivities of the peasants *openly resisting* mining projects in Intag and Mount Ida, in the discussion of the cases, I concentrate on the positions of these peasants. In both Intag and Mount Ida, alongside outright opposition, more ambiguous/intermediary positions exist

among the local population that can appropriately be called acquiescence, accommodation or resignation, as well as explicit support for the projects. I will also touch upon these differences within the cases and try to explain them through the same analytical framework. However, my main objective is to highlight the contrasts between the subjectivities of the resisting peasants so as to identify the factors that constrain or strengthen the possibilities for transformative political action (with respect to three dimensions mentioned above).

Without a doubt, even when they firmly reject mining, peasants in both Intag and Mount Ida often express ambiguous and contradictory views. I acknowledge these as inherent to resistance, and as the result of its entanglement with, rather than simply opposition to, power (Chandra 2015). Such ambiguities and contradictions can be conceived as reflecting how power is implicated in resistance. They also indicate the existence of elements in "common sense" that controvert the dominant interpretations, and which can be elaborated into more critical conceptions.

To develop my arguments, I base my analysis on the literature on the state–society relations in the two countries; the historical and the current socio-economic processes in the two regions; the arguments and discourses that the peasants, civil society and local government actors used in the interviews, group discussions and daily conversations during the field research, and the alliances built and the collective actions undertaken in the two cases. In Chapters 5 and 6, I take up the two cases separately. In each chapter, I will first provide a historical review of the state and society relations in Ecuador and Turkey. I find this necessary primarily because I believe it is only in the context of these relations that one can understand the historical making of the two places, and the dynamics of the mining struggles, but also to make more intelligible my arguments and to convey the groundedness of my analysis. I will then discuss the ways in which the peasants in Intag and Mount Ida have defended their livelihoods and ways of life against the mining project. I try to discern the conceptions of development, environment and justice embedded in their arguments. I examine the processes through which these conceptions have been constructed, focusing on the peasants' material practices, communal relations, uses and perceptions of the environment, and their interactions with civil society actors, local governments, state institutions and mining companies in the context of the anti-mining

struggle. In Chapter 7, I present the main theoretical conclusions I derive from my comparative reading of the two cases.

Notes

[1] While there is merit in resource mobilization and political opportunity theories of social movements which have been employed to explain the emergence of social movements, I do not make use of these theoretical perspectives for they are based on a model of the rational individual, and their explanations are rather mechanical. For example, participation in social movements is treated principally as a matter of rational calculation and strategic action.

[2] Foucault is a key reference in discussions on how power operates, and there are debates about whether and how the work of Gramsci and Foucault might be brought together (see e.g. Ekers & Loftus 2008, Jessop 2007, Larner 2000). I will not go into this discussion here, but only state why I do not use Foucault. First, tthis study is about social struggles and transformative politics therein. Focusing primarily on how power is exercised, Foucault does not offer a language to make intelligible, to understand, how power is challenged or resisted. Second, Foucault's emphasis on the dispersed, capillary operation of power does not allow us to account for the strategic deployment of state power by means of hegemonic projects which, as I will show, is central to understanding the struggles in Intag and Mount Ida.

[3] This is referred to as a material account of ideology, see e.g. Ekers & Loftus (2008).

[4] While acknowledging that class identity is articulated along with other social identities, Rupert (2003: 184) still maintains the centrality of class, making the following clarification in continuation (with which I agree): "However, this is not to say, in some pluralist sense, that class is only one of a number of possible social identities all of which are equally contingent. Insofar as productive interaction with the natural world remains a necessary condition of all human social life, I would maintain that understanding of social power relations which abstract from the social organization of production must be radically incomplete".

[5] Following Lefebvre, Joseph and Nugent (1994:11; footnote 9) define popular consciousness as "politicized forms of knowledge and identity that are consensually recognized by subaltern groups during particular historical conjunctures".

[6] Arguably, let us note in passing the most formidable critique of development, particularly by the marginalized and impoverished people, has in fact been that it has failed to deliver its promise of improved material well-being for all.

7 The environment can also be included in right wing, conservative agendas, and exclusionary middle class and elitist attitudes (see e.g. Williams & Mawdsley 2006). This study does not touch upon such positions.

8 The protests against the health impacts of toxic waste in the Love Canal in Niagara County in New York in the late 1970s, and the protests against the construction of a hazardous waste landfill in Warren County in North Carolina in the early 1980s are two of the initial and most emblematic cases of environmental justice struggles in the US.

3 Environmental Politics and Mining Conflicts in Ecuador and Turkey

This chapter provides a summary of the political struggles around mining at the global scale, and a review of environmental politics in Ecuador and Turkey. In the first section, I provide a brief summary of the global expansion of mining since the 1990s, and the recent context of extractivism in Latin America. In the second section, I discuss in more detail the environmental politics and conflicts over mining in Ecuador and Turkey, respectively. The concluding section highlights the similarities and differences with respect to environmental politics between Ecuador and Turkey. Begin here.

3.1 The Global Politics of Mining

Since the 1990s global investment in mining, which was traditionally concentrated in few countries such as the US, Canada, Australia and South Africa, has expanded to include new geographies in the global South. This expansion resulted from the liberalization policies adopted by many states in the context of neoliberal globalization; and the regulatory, organizational and technological changes in the mining industry that accompanied these policies (Bridge 2004a). Although new mining investment in the 1990s targeted especially few developing countries (such as Peru, Chile and Indonesia) and few metals (such gold and copper), "more than 90 countries received mining-related investment during the period 1990-2001" (ibid.: 412). From 2004 onwards, this global shift in mining investment further consolidated as a result of the surge in the mineral prices (both oil and gas, and metals). As a consequence, profitability in the extractive sector soared. According to the information given in UNCTAD's World Investment Report 2007 on the extractive industries, profitability (measured as profits as percentage of revenues) in the sector increased from about 5% in 2002 to over 25% in 2006, while the

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industry with the closest level of profitability in 2006 was pharmaceuticals with 20% (UNCTAD 2007: 89-90).

This surge in mining investment has been associated with increasing global demand for minerals due to growth in emerging economies, above all China (Muradian et al. 2012, Özkaynak et al. 2012, UNCTAD 2007). To meet the material demand of the growing social metabolism, global mining investment has substantially increased—from 55 billion US dollars in 2000 (CEPAL 2013: 24) to 791 billion US dollars in 2013 (Larsson & Ericsson 2014: 26). Particularly in developing countries investment has substantially increased, as mining companies have become more aggressive in exploration and rushed to bring deposits into production. Although from 2011 onwards, investments have slightly slowed down due to declining prices (though they still remain high from a longer historical perspective), the industry keeps expanding. This expansion has been interpreted as part of a larger process of "incorporating new regions or commodities into the market system" (Martinez-Alier et al. 2010 cited in Özkaynak et al. 2012: 8). It is argued that the increasing demand for mineral resources coupled with a decline in the quality of reserves and the consequent increase in the scale of operations, led to intensified competition for alternative land use, hence to more social conflict (Muradian et al. 2012: 561-562).

Mining expansion has been particularly marked in Latin America, which has become the region with the highest share in global metal mining investment (around 30% since 2000), and with more 'very large-scale projects'[1] than any other region. Although all countries in the region have seen rising levels of investment, Chile, Brazil, Peru and Mexico have been the main destinations. By 2013 these four countries were among the top ten countries in the world with the highest levels of investment, concentrated in copper, gold, iron and nickel (Ericsson & Larsson 2013: 28-33, Larsson & Ericsson 2014: 26-31). As a result, the share of the region in world gold production increased from 10.3% in 1990 to 19.2% in 2010, and in copper (only mined, not including refined copper) its share in the same period rose from 24.9% to 45.2% (CEPAL 2013: 20). The growth of the mining industry is actually considered part of the more general expansion of extractive industries (oil, gas and minerals) in the region, and even more broadly of the expansion of natural resource extraction, including production of flex crops and commodities (palm oil, soya, sugarcane, corn), shrimp farming and timber (Borras et

al. 2012, Sinnott et al. 2010). As the share of commodities in the exports of the region has been increasing since the 1990s (Sinnott et al. 2010: 9), it is suggested that there is a worrying trend towards primary specialization (Muradian et al. 2012: 563) or "reprimarization" of the Latin American economies (CEPAL 2015: 6 & 43).

These recent developments in the extractive industries in Latin America have attracted particular attention both in academic and political terms in the context of the "Left-turn" in most countries of the region. Against the background of more than two decades of neoliberal policies, in the 2000s left-leaning progressive governments came to power in Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Venezuela (in 1999), Ecuador and Bolivia. The latter three countries, i.e. the governments of Hugo Chavez, Rafael Correa and Evo Morales have positioned themselves most strongly against the neoliberal hegemony and the power of the US in the region, and have embarked on radical (at least in discourse) political projects which they named "Socialism of the 21st century". Despite their substantial differences, the progressive governments in the region have all criticized the primacy of the market and increased the role for the state in the organization of the economy, and have made poverty alleviation through increased social spending a priority (Grugel & Riggirozzi 2012, Gudynas 2009). These ongoing changes have been interpreted as a move to a post-neoliberal development model to construct a new "social consensus that is respectful of the demands of growth and business interests *and* sensitive to the challenges of poverty and citizenship" (Grugel & Riggirozzi 2012: 4).

Extractive industries have been at the centre of lively debates about post-neoliberalism, and how it reshapes the relations between the state, the economy, society and the environment (see e.g. Arsel 2012a, Bebbington 2009, 2012b; Escobar 2010, Gudynas 2009, Hogenboom & Jilberto 2009, Perrault & Valdivia 2010, Webber 2010). Among the contributors to these debates, some have focused more on the state-economy nexus, on implications of increasing control of the state over the extractive sectors (e.g. Hogenboom & Jilberto 2009). Others like Bebbington (2009, 2012a, 2012b), and Perrault and Valdivia (2010) have concentrated on the state-society nexus, i.e. on the changing relations between new left governments and a diverse range of societal actors who participate in "resource politics"; and the implications of these for the governance of the extractive industries. Others framed their discussion

in terms of the changing role of nature and natural resources in development and what these changes imply for moving beyond neoliberal environmental governance and for post-neoliberal development alternatives (e.g. Arsel 2012a, Gudynas 2009).

These scholars emphasize that despite the important political changes post-neoliberalism has brought about, extractive industries still play an important role in these economies, and are actually being further promoted by the progressive governments as the main pillar of their new development strategies, hence the characterization of these processes as "new-extractivism" (Acosta 2011, Gudynas 2009, Webber 2010). Arsel et al. (2016: 881) have argued that in this context, extractivism has become more than an economic policy and emphasize that "the current shape of extractivist development policy has taken over the logic of other state activities, reorienting policy objectives to further justify and advance the policy of extractivism".

These scholars agree in general that the governments of these countries have made important changes in the governance of the sector, increasing the state's control and share in the revenues, also to redistribute it through various social programmes. However, as Bebbington (2012b) argues, the post-neoliberal governments do not differ much from their neoliberal counterparts—not only in terms of their promotion of extractive industries but also in their response to the associated social conflicts. He observes, they "have all vilified activists, social movements and non-governmental organizations that question the wisdom of such policies and doubt the positive developmental effects of promoting the extractive sector" (ibid.: 1156). The principal reason underlying the attitudes of these governments regarding extraction is identified as (neo)-developmentalism, rooted in the continuing belief in the modernist ideas and ideals of progress, economic growth, structural transformation, efficient use of natural resources and technological control (see e.g. Arsel et al. 2016). Escobar (2010: 22), therefore, maintains that economic rationality is still dominant among the left governments of Latin America, and that "the premise of growth is questioned as an end but not as a means". It seems economic growth is still being prioritized in development planning and practice in the Latin American countries that have been turning left, more or less like in those countries that continue on the neoliberal track.

3.2   A Closer Look at Mineral Politics in Ecuador and Turkey

Like many other developing countries, Ecuador and Turkey started implementing neoliberal policies in the 1980s. As part of this process, mining sector was gradually liberalized to attract foreign direct investment. Although they were not among the primary targets in the global geographical expansion of mining, both have received new mining investment after 1980s. The surge in mining investment after 2004 was also reflected in both countries, since both received increased mining investment in this period.[2] And in both countries, mining projects triggered social conflicts around their expected impacts on the lives and livelihoods of local communities, and on the environment in the places where they were undertaken—with the conflicts in Intag and Mount Ida being among them.

3.2.1   Contention over mineral extraction in Ecuador

In contrast to many other Latin American countries, mining in Ecuador has historically been a marginal activity, characterized by artisanal and small-scale gold production mostly in the southern provinces (Velásquez 2012: 8-10). This is reflected in the low share of the mining industry in GDP, which has averaged 1.3% from 2002 to 2015.[3] The attempts to develop large-scale mining started with the passing of two laws in 1985 and 1991 to erect a new liberal administrative framework (for instance by easing procedures to issue permits, or securing the property rights of mining concessions). Yet the more significant effort came with the initiation in 1995 of the Ecuadorian Mining Development and Environmental Control Technical Assistance Project (*El Proyecto de Asistencia Técnica para el Desarrollo Minero y Control Ambiental* – PRODEMINCA) funded by the World Bank, and the UK and Swedish governments. The purpose of the project was to establish the legal, institutional and technical conditions to provide a secure environment for private sector participation in the sector, and to map the mineral resources of the country to guide private companies in their exploration activities (PRODEMINCA 1999). This project provided the background for the more substantial changes introduced by a new law in 2001. The mining law of 2001 eliminated government royalties, reduced the payments per hectare for surface rights, enabled approval of titles valid for thirty years, and streamlined the application and approval procedures.[4] With the latter changes in place,

the rise in metallic mineral prices after 2004 stimulated increased exploration expenditure of transnational (mostly Canadian) companies on projects which were geographically concentrated in the south of the country.

The intensification of company activities heightened the social tensions that had been accumulating for a long time, especially in the southern provinces of Azuay, Zamora Chinchipe and Morona Santiago (Chicaiza 2010, Warnaars 2010), involving peasant and indigenous communities, as well as small-scale miners who were concerned about being displaced to make way for large-scale mining. Hence, when Rafael Correa started his first presidential term in 2007, local conflicts around mining projects were already intense, and the local communities, together with human rights, environmentalist and indigenous organizations, were getting together and mobilizing to form a stronger opposition.

Correa's push for mining development and societal responses

After his election, Correa convened a Constitutional Assembly, which started working in November 2007 to draft the new constitution. The anti-mining groups (including local and national actors) tried to include a ban on large-scale mining in the constitution; an objective they could not realize. Instead, the Constitutional Assembly issued the Mining Mandate in April 2008. The mandate retracted thousands of mining concessions for various reasons, including the failure to carry out the proper community consultation, and being located in protected areas or close to sources of water. It also suspended all mining activities until a new mining law was enacted. These changes were welcomed by the social movements, yet with a degree of caution for it did not totally ban large-scale mining activities. There was also the harsh response from the government to the anti-mining protests in the south of the country in June 2007 (Cisneros 2011: 279-294, J. Moore 2007, Velásquez 2012: 76-82).

By the time the Mining Mandate was enacted, Correa had already started to publicly express his vision of socially and environmentally responsible mining (Dosh & Kligerman 2009, J. Moore 2007). It soon became clear that Correa considered mining as a new source of revenue to sustain his political project which depended on increased social spending to ensure the support of diverse constituencies for his government (Arsel 2012a; Hogenboom & Jilberto 2009). Similarly, the government committed to expand oil extraction and increased state control over the sector, and its share in oil revenues. The latter has been important not only in

economic terms for financing increased social spending, but has also featured centrally in the government's claim to recuperate national sovereignty (Davidov 2013). Correa also adopted a hard stance against those who oppose his plans. These measures have been interpreted as Correa undermining the radical environmental vision embraced in the constitution, as well as those principles that promoted participation in public decision making and the right to protest (ALDEAH 2013, Becker 2013).

In the midst of escalating tensions between the government and social movements, the new mining law was approved in January 2009. The national anti-mining movement actors claimed that the new law cleared the way for large-scale mining development (Zibechi 2009). With the new law in place, the government has even more zealously pursued the mining agenda. It has openly supported the development of gold and copper projects by transnational companies in the southern provinces of Zamora Chinchipe, Morona Santiago and Azuay; attended international mining fairs to attract more investment; and made an agreement with the Chilean state copper company CODELCO (the largest copper producer in the world) to conduct explorations to assess the prospects for copper mine development in the country.[5] At the same time, it auctioned new oil concessions in the southern Amazon, and even abandoned the Yasuni ITT Initiative to leave oil underground which it had before supported as a revolutionary proposal (Arsel & Avila Angel 2012). Instead, it permitted Petroamazonas, a subsidiary of the state oil company, to initiate drilling in the Yasuni ITT area. In this context, oil and mining extraction have become the main line of confrontation between the government and the radical social movements.

The indigenous movement (primarily CONAIE—*Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador*[6]), peasant, environmental and other leftist groups (mostly public sector unions) are critical of the government not only for its extractive projects and export-oriented development strategy. They also object to its authoritarian practices which weaken civil society organizations and their political participation, and delegitimize and criminalize social protest; its agrarian policies that favour large-scale production, and what they consider its clientelistic programmes to maintain popular support (Becker 2013). The Plurinational March for Life, Water and Dignity in March 2012, organized by CONAIE and supported by other social movement actors was one of the most important protests against the government in this period. The government tried to del-

egitimize the protest arguing that the social movements were playing into the hands of the right and trying to undermine his government. The criticisms and protests, however, could not prevent Correa's election for the third time in 2013. With a renewed mandate, Correa gained even more power and a stronger claim to legitimacy to move ahead with his plans to develop large-scale mining. In August 2015, the social movements again staged nationwide protests in which alongside the expansion of oil frontier and mining projects, they voiced their opposition to the proposed constitutional amendments that would allow indefinite re-election[7]; agrarian, water, education and labour policies; the Free Trade Agreement with the EU; and the repression of freedom of speech and protest. The government responded with even more repression to the demonstrations and road-blocks in different parts of the country (Daza & Santillana 2015).

The intensity of the current societal resistance to resource extraction[8] is inevitably linked to the rather ugly history of more than 40 years of oil exploitation in the Amazon region (the Oriente). For the indigenous peoples of the region, the exploitation of oil and the colonization of land (promoted by the agrarian reform laws of 1964 and 1973) that has accompanied it have resulted in human rights abuses, loss of territory, traditional ways of life and knowledges, and marginalization, detrimental health effects, soil and water contamination, and deforestation (Perreault 2001, Sawyer 2004). On top of that, the oil wealth, despite benefiting to a certain extent some sectors of society (mainly through financing infrastructure development and various state subsidies), has not led to the elimination of poverty, and has created a resource-dependent economy, subject to the control of transnational oil companies and vulnerable to the changing dynamics of global markets.

The indigenous and environmental movements in Ecuador have been long fighting against the social and environmental impacts of oil exploitation, "crude excesses" as Suzana Sawyer (2004) calls them. They have indeed made resource extraction a central problem in their critiques of development and the nation state (that denied territorial autonomy). Through their sustained and powerful activism the social movements managed to incorporate into the new constitution of 2008 some of their core demands. The new Constitution declares Ecuador a plurinational and intercultural state; it re-defines societal progress as the realization of

good living, or *sumak kawsay* (in Kichwa)[9]; and grants rights to Nature, or *Pachamama* (in Kichwa).

The anti-neoliberal and leftist discourse of Correa, and the inclusion of these principles in the constitution initially seemed to promise radical change in the economic, social and political structures of the country. However, as Correa advanced his political project of "refounding the state" and concretized the place of resource extraction in his post-neoliberal development strategy, such promises gave way to increasing discontent and conflict. It has become more difficult for social movements to oppose an institutionally and ideologically strengthened state led by a popular anti-neoliberal government that has framed its extractivist agenda in terms of the right of 'the nation' to develop, while accusing the opponents for putting their particularistic interests above those of 'the nation', and as being "infantile environmentalists" working together with rightist groups to destabilize his government (Becker 2013, Velásquez 2012). The changing state-society relations, thus, "have reorganized the possibilities of collective political agency" (Velásquez 2012: 5), obliging the social movements to reformulate their discourses and strategies to confront the government while retaining their legitimacy, strengthening their unity and expanding their popular support (Velásquez 2012).[10]

The mining conflict in Intag that started in the mid-1990s and continues until today needs to be situated in this historical and current context of environmental conflicts in Ecuador. The Intag resistance against a large-scale copper mine spans over two decades marked by neoliberalism, its demise through social movement activism, and the consequent turn to a state-led post-neoliberal development path. It is important to analyse the initiation, consolidation and the ongoing transformation of these processes to better understand environmental politics in Ecuador. Particularly, how environmental politics are shaped by and, in turn, shape the state-society relations; therefore the "nature and possibilities of democracy [and post-neoliberal development]" (Bebbington 2012b: 1154).

3.2.2 Environmental conflicts in Turkey: from mining to energy and construction

The development of the mining industry in Turkey dates back to the implementation of 'etatist' policies in the 1930s. These policies positioned

the state as the primary investor in productive sectors, and were adopted in the context of low private capital accumulation in that period to facilitate industrialization. As part of the industrialization efforts, three central institutions were established: the Petroleum and Gold Prospecting and Operation Agencies (1933), the General Directorate of Mineral Research and Exploration (MTA, 1935) and Etibank (1935), the public enterprise in charge of establishing mining operations. Thereafter, State Economic Enterprises were set up in key mineral sectors, such as coal, iron and steel and boron. The mining sector thus came to be centred around medium and large state enterprises, with small and medium-sized private enterprises located at the periphery (DPT 2007).

The structure of the industry started to change in 1980s as neoliberal policies aimed at reducing the role of the state in the economy started to be implemented. Since then, many state enterprises were privatized and public investment in the sector decreased. In 1985, a new mining law was enacted to establish the regulatory framework to attract domestic and foreign private investment. The law was amended in 2004, 2010 and 2015 to further facilitate mining operations. These changes were particularly important in securing mining concessions and safeguarding activities from interference from other regulations such as environmental laws.

The two country reports on Turkey in 2008 and 2012 published in Engineering and Mining Journal (E&MJ), a leading journal of the global mining industry, make positive mention of liberal mining laws and a business-friendly environment, and present Turkey as a country that has underexplored and underutilized its mineral resources, thus with significant opportunities for the future growth of the industry. Turkey's potential is considered high in industrial minerals, boron and natural stones like marble, and precious and base metals like gold, copper, nickel and chrome (E&MJ 2008, 2012). Although Turkey still receives much less investment compared to some other developing countries such as Peru, Chile or Philippines, foreign mining investment has been gradually increasing, especially from 2004 onwards (E&MJ 2012). The liberalization of the mining sector has not only attracted foreign companies though; there are also an increasing number of domestic firms active in the sector. Still, the share of the mining sector in GDP has remained small, increasing from 0.98% in 2001 to 1.5% in 2011, then dropping back to 1.3% in 2015.[11]

It was indeed the liberalization of the mining sector that gave rise to the most well-known and arguably the most significant environmental struggle in Turkey. The Bergama struggle against gold mining began shortly after the Australian company Eurogold arrived in 1989 in Bergama town (Pergamon) in the western province of Izmir. The Bergama resistance against gold mining lasted about 12 years until the mine finally started operating in 2001 as the first ever gold mine in the history of the republic. The Bergama movement initially started as a local resistance by the relatively well-off peasant communities and local elites to defend the rich agricultural production in the region and the local environment. However, by the mid-1990s, the local movement actors broadened the struggle to the national level by staging high-profile demonstrations, such as chaining themselves to the Bosphorus Bridge in Istanbul, and protesting in front of the old parliament building in the capital Ankara where the leader of the national independence war Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) had laid the foundations of the Republic. The movement managed to earn the support of many national and international NGOs, and the general public (see e.g. Arsel 2005b, 2012b, Bilgen-Reinart 2003, Çoban 2004). It not only unleashed a controversy about environmental and health impacts of gold mining, in particular of cyanide use, but also linked local environmental concerns to social justice, and expressed a growing discontent over neoliberal policies, shared by different sectors of the society being negatively affected by them (Arsel 2012b: 75).

Despite its strength, the movement could not stop the project. Arsel (2005b: 271-272, 2012b: 76) argues that this was partially due to the improvements that the mining company made in its production technology and safety measures, which allayed some of the public concerns over environmental and health impacts. But, the more important reason, he maintains, were the economic crises that ravaged the country at the turn of the century that impaired the capacity of the movement to maintain its stand against a project that promised considerable economic benefits. Beyond Bergama, the economic crises actually had more far-reaching consequences as they led to further entrenchment of neoliberal policies. As Arsel (2012b: 76) puts it: "In many ways, the neo-liberal project, which started in the 1980s, really reached full dominance in Turkey during the early years of the 21st century. Its powerful grip on Turkish society and polity has in turn stifled not only the further development of environmental politics but also the articulation of other critical standpoints".

AKP Times: Intensification of Ecological Damage and Environmental Conflicts

Since the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in Turkey in 2002, it has aggressively implemented a neoliberal growth strategy. The main pillars of this strategy have been the construction and energy sectors. As Akbulut and Adaman (2013: 15) observe: "This period [AKP governments] has seen an especially accelerated capitalization of the natural environment, including the privatization of lands previously under public ownership, and the expropriation and redistribution of property through 'legal' means such as urban transformation". As Turkey achieved high growth rates in this period (notwithstanding the slowdown in 2008 and 2009 due to the global economic crisis), the already high ecological and social costs of economic development have further intensified (Adaman et al. 2016, Adaman & Arsel 2005a, Akbulut & Adaman 2013). This growth strategy has for the most part maintained and reinforced the social consent to the historically entrenched ideology of modernization/ development via economic growth (Adaman et al. 2016, Akbulut & Adaman 2013).[12]

However, socio-environmental conflicts have also heightened due to the increasing encroachment of market forces; through energy investments facilitated by the liberalization of the energy sector in rural areas (particularly small hydro-power plant constructions which have mushroomed in the last decade, but also dams and coal power plants); through privatization of public spaces in urban areas, large-scale infrastructure projects (such as the construction of the third bridge across the Bosphorus), and urban gentrification and renewal projects (Adaman et al. 2016, Akbulut 2015, Akbulut & Adaman 2013, Cardoso 2018, Erensü 2013, Islar 2012).

For the most part, the environmental struggles in Turkey pursue a place-based politics that focuses on stopping the particular projects in question, and do not form stable broad-based alliances (Akbulut 2015: 237, Erensü 2013). However, recently there have been attempts to link the multiple local struggles against hydro power plants in rural areas—especially in the Black Sea region where the majority of these projects are located—around the defence of the right to water. Similarly in urban areas, above all in Istanbul where the urban transformation process has been most aggressive, different civil society organizations and activists have been increasingly connecting and collaborating to contest displace-

ments, evictions and enclosures associated with this process. In fact, it was these urban struggles that gave rise to the most influential social mobilizations in the 10 years of AKP government, now famous as the Gezi Park protests. The protests over the demolition of Gezi Park at the centre of Istanbul started at the end of May 2013 as another struggle against an urban transformation project. It rapidly, and rather unexpectedly, acquired a mass-movement character as extraordinarily diverse groups and movements aggrieved and disgruntled by the ruling AKP's policies and authoritarian rule joined the protests, and demonstrations spread across the entire country (Akbulut 2015).

Environmental issues were high on the Gezi Park protesters' agenda, and many actors from various local environmental struggles either were present in the park, or joined the protests in their regions. The Gezi Park protests have a particular significance for environmental politics in Turkey. It was arguably the first time that environmental issues enjoyed such political prominence (the moment of the Bergama struggle included), and that so many different struggles, often remaining isolated from each other, came together to voice their common concerns (see eg. Akbulut 2015, Özkaynak et al. 2015a).

According to Adaman et al. (2016: 292-293), various environmental struggles in Turkey recently started moving beyond opposing the immediate impacts of environmentally damaging economic activities to also question their systemic logic. It can be argued that the Gezi Park protests both reflected this ongoing change and further contributed to it, particularly by providing the space for the identification of and deliberation over the common processes of neoliberal restructuring of space that affect both the rural and the urban environment. This is not to suggest that the Gezi Park protests gave rise to a united environmental movement, but it has indeed "invigorated the political potential" of both the rural environmental struggles and "the urban struggles over the defense of public spaces and the right to housing" (Akbulut 2015: 237-238).

The struggle against gold mining in Mount Ida is one among the many environmental struggles in Turkey that the pursuit of the neoliberal growth strategy has occasioned in the more than 30 years of its implementation. That the historical landmark of environmental activism in the country was also a gold mining conflict (the Bergama movement) is crucial to understanding the rapid development of Mount Ida resistance and the broad-based regional and national support it garnered. However, it

occupies a distinct place and importance in the landscape of contemporary environmental politics, which has expanded and diversified with the rise of new struggles, has acquired greater political prominence and, significantly, has increased its radical potential to challenge the developmentalist ideology and its top-down implementation that have characterized the state-society relations in Turkey. The Mount Ida struggle, therefore, merits a deeper analysis to shed light on the processes that can limit or facilitate the construction and realization of this potential.

3.3   Positioning Environmental Politics and Mining Conflicts: Ecuador and Turkey in Comparative Perspective

In light of the discussions above, there are three important points to bear in mind in comparing the Intag and Mount Ida cases. First, in Ecuador and Turkey, the place of environmental struggles in the landscape of political contention, as well as the place of mining resistances within environmental politics are rather different. As the summaries in this chapter indicate, in Ecuador, environmental issues have occupied a central role in societal opposition to both the earlier neoliberal and the current postneoliberal development model. The fact that oil production has been the backbone of the national economy since the 1970s, accompanied by significant social and environmental impacts in the Amazon region, has certainly provided the objective conditions for this. However, it was the politicization of these impacts by the national indigenous and environmental movements that positioned environmental issues so strongly on the terrain of political struggles. Now that the government has made development of large-scale mining a central pillar of its political project, mining, alongside expansion of oil extraction, has become the main focus in the escalating confrontations between the government and these movements. Although the mining conflict in Intag started long before Correa came to power, it is now situated within this larger context in which previous local mining resistances are connected through a national anti-mining movement.

In Turkey, on the other hand, despite the significant environmental costs that rapid population growth, industrialization, urbanization, agricultural modernization and occupation of coastal areas have generated, environmental movements have mostly remained at the periphery of po-

litical struggles (Adaman & Arsel 2005a). As Arsel (2012b: 73-74) argues, although there have been some local struggles that could motivate broader societal engagement with environmental issues, "very few of these have achieved a level of societal salience that transcend their local, 'not-in-my-backyard' quality". Since one, and arguably the most influential, of these few cases was the Bergama movement, gold mining has acquired a special place in environmental politics in the country. However, although the current government continues with the policy of expanding gold mining, its role in the broader economic strategy of the government is not particularly decisive. As I have pointed out, currently, rather than mining, energy and construction sectors are the main sites of the intensifying environmental struggles. As such, the resistance in Mount Ida is part of the recent environmental struggles that are spread across a broader range of issues. It is important to note, though, that these struggles are not coalesced into a national movement; hence Mount Ida is still basically an isolated local resistance.

Second, while in Ecuador environmental challenges to development has been more radical, in Turkey they have been more directly about its neoliberal form. This observation holds not only for the environmental component of contestations over development, but also for the politics of development in the two countries in general. In Ecuador, social movements have managed to question the dominant meanings and practices of development, denouncing the multiple forms of injustice, violence, marginalization and exclusion that they have engendered; and have aimed to formulate alternative conceptions. The redefinition of societal progress as *sumak kawsay* (good living), which is a notion based in indigenous cosmovisions that rejects the separation of humans from nature and promotes a harmonious relationship between the two, and the recognition of rights of Nature in the constitution are the result of these efforts. I believe these demonstrate the profundity of the challenges to dominant understandings of development and environment in Ecuador.

In Turkey, however, developmentalism, which has formed the basis of the state-led modernization project (as I will discuss in Chapter 6), has remained almost completely undisputed. The social and political struggles have been primarily about "development alternatives", and not about "alternatives to development" (Arsel 2005a: 19). In this context, the subjugation of nature has been accepted as a necessary sacrifice to realize economic development. Environmental movements certainly

have protested against the unbridled degradation of the environment and demanded its protection and the state has actually responded to these concerns to a certain extent, for instance, by enacting environmental legislation (Adaman et al. 2016: 293-296). However, even though the demands for environmental protection are consistent with the goal of national progress, the state passes over these demands if the potential exists that protecting the environment can jeopardize the priority of economic growth.

My final point is not about the differences but the recent convergence between the two countries in terms of how the governments approach the mining issue and how they respond to social resistances around it. In both Ecuador and Turkey, despite the significant differences between their political ideologies and the weight of the mining sector in their economic strategies, both governments legitimize mining in terms of its economic benefits, and equally strongly claim that its environmental impacts can be adequately managed by technological means. The two governments are also similar in the ways that they deal with resistance; on the one hand, trying to delegitimize the opponents to mining as enemies of the national interest, playing into the hands of their political opponents, and serving the interests of "external" forces; and, on the other hand, using (or threatening to use) the coercive powers of the state to subdue resistance and pursue the mining projects.

Notes

[1] In 2013, the average project investment in Latin America was US$ 780 million, followed by US$ 740 million in North America, US$ 572 million in Oceania, US$ 563 million in Europe, US$ 549 million in Africa, and US$ 340 million in Asia (Larsson & Ericsson 2014: 28).

[2] See US Geological Survey Minerals Yearbook country reports from 1994 to 2014 for Ecuador and Turkey, available at: https://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/

[3] Based on the data provided on the website of the Agency for Regulation and Control of Mining as "Estadística Minera", www.controlminero.gob.ec (accessed January 30, 2017).

[4] US Geological Survey Minerals Yearbook-Ecuador 2004, available at: https://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/sa.html#ec

[5] In 2012, the government signed the first ever copper and gold exploitation contract for the Mirador project in Zamora Chinchipe with the company Ecuacorriente S.A., which was acquired by the Chinese conglomerate CRRC-Tongguan Investment in 2010. Although at the time the company representatives announced that the production was expected to start in 2014, this date has now been postponed to 2018 (*El Comercio.* March 4, 2015). On the other hand, in June 2013, the Canadian company Kinross Gold announced that it had suspended its Fruta del Norte project (Kinross, June 10, 2013) and then in October 2014 sold it to another Canadian company Fortress Minerals Corp (Kinross, October 21, 2014). In the mining fair of Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada held in Toronto on March 1-4, 2015, the Ministry of Strategic Sectors of Ecuador appealed for investments for 13 new mining blocs, and existing 19 private and 8 public projects (Agencia Pública de Noticias del Ecuador y Suramérica, March 3, 2015).

[6] The Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador is the largest indigenous organization in Ecuador, established in 1986. See Chapter 5 for more details.

[7] The proposal was later withdrawn.

[8] For a historical analysis of continuities and changes in various forms of environmental dispossession—related not only to oil extraction but also infrastructure development, commercial logging, agroindustry, industrial facilities and other economic activities—and resistances to such dispossession between 1980 and 2013, see Latorre et al. 2015.

[9] Kichwa is the native language of the highland indigenous group, the Kichwas, in Ecuador.

[10] Similar to the situation in Ecuador, social forces opposing extractivism have been marginalized by the "post-neoliberal" government of Evo Morales in Bolivia. For a discussion on mining expansion and the marginalization of post-extractivist forces in Bolivia, see Andreucci and Radhuber (2017).

[11] Data provided on the website of the General Directorate of Mineral Research and Exploration. See: http://www.mta.gov.tr/v3.0/bilgi-merkezi/maden-disticaret

[12] This point is explained in the discussion of state–society relations in Turkey in section 6.1 in Chapter 6.

The Mining Conflicts in Intag and Mount Ida: Contexts and Histories

This chapter aims to familiarize the reader with the two study sites, and provide background to the discussion in the subsequent chapters. As such, it is fairly descriptive. I take up the two cases individually, and for each, provide a brief description of the area, followed by the story of the mining conflict since its beginning—mid-1990s in Intag, and 2007 in Mount Ida—up to mid-2016.[1] Through these descriptions, I hope to give the reader a sense of the kind of places I am discussing. In the account of the two conflicts, I aim to convey who the main actors of resistances were, their views on mining, and how they have organized and mobilized to stop the projects.

4.1 Intag and its Long and Hard Battle against Mining

4.1.1 The Intag valley: a brief description

The valley of Intag is located in the west of the province of Imbabura on the northern part of Ecuadorian Andes (see Map 4.1). Covering an area of approximately 1,750 km², and at an altitude between 200 and 2,200 metres, it is delimited by the Andes in the east, the Toisán mountain range in the north and west, and the Guayllabamba river in the south. The valley owes its name to the main river that runs through it. The landscape of the valley is one of cloud forests, agricultural land and pastures. In the north, it borders the Cotacachi-Cayapas Ecological Reserve[2], and lies within its buffer zone. Intag is situated within two of the 34 biological hotspots[3] (Tropical Andes and the Chocó); and is also acknowledged as an important bird area of South America (DECOIN 2010, Corporación Toisán 2011).

Intag is comprised of seven rural parishes[4]: Apuela, Cuellaje, García Moreno, Peñaherrera, Plaza Gutiérrez, Vacas Galindo and Selva Alegre.

Map 4.1:
The Intag valley

The first six of these parishes belong to the Cotacachi canton[5], and form its sub-tropical zone (as different from the Andean part). The last parish, Selva Alegre[6], is part of the Otavalo canton. According to the 2010 census, the total population of the seven parishes of Intag is 13,102. Those who identify themselves as mestizo[7] make up the majority (86%) of the population, followed by Afro-descendants (8%) and indigenous (6%).[8] The ethnic composition is markedly different from the Andean part of Cotacachi, where 55% of the population identify themselves as indigenous (INEC 2010).[9] Intag was uninhabited for a long time after the decline of the indigenous culture of Yumbos around the 17th century, but it was colonized again from the 19th century onwards. López Oropeza (2011) argues that the most intensive immigration of *colonos* (settler peasants), mainly from the surrounding areas, occurred between 1901 and 1965, and it was during this period that the human settlements and population centres were consolidated. No wonder the relatively late colonization of the valley was the result of its geographical isolation and the resulting difficulty of access, connected to the surrounding villages with two main roads (one entering the valley from the east, the other from its south-western part). This isolation makes it relatively easier to talk about the valley in comparison to and distinct from the surrounding regions. However, within the valley, the communities and parishes are quite diverse in terms of their social, economic, political and environmental dynamics. While the pages that follow provide a more general description that emphasizes the more common characteristics, that life in the valley is much more diverse should not be lost sight of.

The geography of the valley is also critical to understanding the settlement patterns and the socio-economic dynamics. The mountain ranges on both sides of the Intag River are rugged and steep, and are cut with deep valleys and ravines. Flowing into the Intag and Guayllabamba rivers are other smaller rivers, waterfalls and waterways. Individual farms, communities of varying size and age, and parish centres are dispersed rather sparingly throughout the territory. Access among these via unpaved roads is rather difficult. Forests starting precisely at straight lines marking the borders of the fields attest to the transformation the valley has been undergoing as a result of colonization and deforestation.

The parish seats are the larger population centres in the valley. They all have a main plaza around which the local government office, the church, the health centre, and shops that sell agricultural inputs and farm

equipment and groceries, and some restaurants are distributed. The colleges are also located in parish centres, and students living in the communities need to travel to the centre to attend the college. Communities have smaller populations, although their size differs considerably, ranging from seven to a hundred families (López Oropeza 2011). The churches, primary schools and small shops mark the community centres. People usually identify themselves with the name of the community they belong to, and have most direct relations with their own and nearby communities. Communities usually have a *cabildo*, the governing body comprised of five people, which is in charge of managing communal works, called *minga*, for instance to fix the roads, and communicating people's needs to the parish government.

According to López Oropeza's (2011) study of Intag the cadastral records of the Cotacachi municipality show that for those land owners with less than 70 hectares of land, the average size of land holdings is 13.2 hectares. The figures from the survey administered to 250 households in the valley between November 2010 and January 2011 for the same study are somewhat different: 17% of the participants indicated that they do not own land, and the data from the rest of the sample show that the average size of land holdings is 10.3 hectares.[10] The survey also indicates that small and medium sized farms co-exist with large landholdings in the region: 64.9% of the landowning respondents have less than 10 hectares, while the remaining 35.1% have more than 10. The land holding size in García Moreno parish is markedly higher compared to other parishes—17 hectares on average for being the part of the valley with the most difficult access and colonized the latest.

The *colonos* of Intag are mainly engaged in small- and medium-scale agriculture, cattle farming and forestry (legal and illegal). In agriculture, most families produce both for the market and for their own use. Beans and corn are the main cash crops while others like yucca, plantains, onions, carrots and chicken are primarily for household consumption (López Oropeza 2011). In the last 20 years, the production of coffee, naranjilla[11] and tree tomato (tamarillo) has also gradually increased. Although their importance has decreased through time as the main activities of the earlier *hacienda*[12] production, some families continue growing sugar cane, which they process themselves to make *panela* (a block of raw brown sugar) to sell in the local markets; and fique (*cabuya*) to make ropes, baskets and bags from the fique fibre for household use. Cattle

farming has been expanding in the valley, especially since the 1990s, significantly altering Intag's landscape as new lands were cleared to raise cattle. The main mechanism for marketing the products is through intermediaries who collect and transport the products to the urban markets in Otovalo, Cotacachi and Quito. The intermediaries are usually people from outside the valley, especially from Otavalo and Quito, although some people from the valley are also involved.

Although the principal economic activity for families is to work their own land, they combine different agricultural and non-agricultural work, such as working as paid day labour or unpaid as part of reciprocal "lending hands" arrangements in agriculture; in small commerce, construction and in temporary jobs in urban centres or other rural areas. The possibilities for the landless peasants to sustain their families are to work in family farms, as day labourer or sharecropper, or to look after a farm whose owner does not live in Intag. Peasants generally have a modest life, and sometimes difficulties in meeting the needs of their families.

The communities of Junín and Chalguayaco Bajo, where the mining conflict first started, are part of the García Moreno parish. Garcia Moreno is the largest parish in the valley; covering almost half of the expanse of the valley, it has a population of 5,060 and is the only parish whose population has increased from 2001 to 2010 (the census years). Despite the difficulty of access, the colonizers initially started settling on the higher parts of the parish to escape the tropical diseases in the warmer parts. As the population increased over time, these *colonos* formed communities of various sizes, some relatively closer to the parish centre, some quite remote. Junín and Chalguayaco Bajo lie somewhere in between, about 20 km from the parish centre. In the lower parts there are communities with a higher share of Afro-descendants (13% of the parish population), which were previously working in the sugar cane haciendas in the region, and could only settle on land less preferred by the mestizo *colonos.*

In the last 20 years, and in close connection to the mining struggle, a number of local civil society organizations were established in Intag. At the same time, some international development and conservation NGOs started working in the valley. These organizations initiated several projects to develop new income-generating activities for the local population. These projects were usually aimed at improving and diversifying agricultural production through technical support and introduction of

agro-ecology techniques, and improving market access and ensuring better prices, mainly through cooperatives or fair trade initiatives. There have also been efforts to develop eco-tourism activities[13], seen simultaneously as a potential source of employment for the youth and as a means of preserving the environment. A professional development organization called PRODECI (The Foundation for the Rights of Citizens), the local branch of the Ecuadorian subsidiary of the Spanish development NGO *Ayuda en Acción*, has been working in Intag since 1997 and has undertaken many projects, including infrastructural work like building bridges, new economic activities like community eco-tourism and milk cooperative, and rights education projects on children and women. Among the local organizations, DECOIN (*Defensa* y *Conservación Ecológica de Intag*, Defence and Ecological Conservation of Intag), which has became the leader of the anti-mining struggle, spearheaded many other projects, like organic coffee production and sale, community-ecotourism, environmental education, community watershed protection. Nine of the local organizations[14], including DECOIN, united under the umbrella organization, *Corporacion Toisán*, to coordinate their efforts to promote "alternative territorial development".

The peasants have undoubtedly experienced the development of these organizational processes and projects in an uneven manner: some communities have been left out due to their geographical isolation, some people have more enthusiastically participated, and others have remained distant. In fact, such unevenness is reflected in almost all aspects of life in the valley, and results from the diversity in communal histories, peasant livelihoods and personal commitments. Amidst such diversity, though, one constant feature is the efforts of the people to improve their lives in such a beautiful yet challenging geographical setting.

4.1.2 Power to the grassroots: the copper mining conflict in Intag

It was not the first time the people of Intag valley took direct action to prevent large-scale copper mining in the region when, on December 5, 2006, they captured 56 armed men who claimed to have been hired by the mining company owning the concession at the time, and kept them in the community church for four days until the state authorities arrived to take them over. Nine years earlier, in 1997, they had burnt down the mining camp (at the time, of another company) without any harm to humans, and did it once again in 2005. Being only a part of the almost 20

years of struggle against mining, these events demonstrate the commitment of the residents of Intag to have control over what happens in their territories, and their lives.

Mining arrives at Intag

In Intag, mining exploration started in the early 1980s with the geological investigations of the General Directorate of Geology and Mines, and then through a project of technical assistance from Belgium, when the copper deposits in the region were discovered. In 1991, financed by the Japanese International Cooperation Agency under a cooperation agreement with the Ecuadorian state mining development corporation CODIGEM, the Metal Mining Agency of Japan intensified explorations. In 1993, the Japanese company Bishi Metals took over the project and identified 318 million tons of copper ore with a 0.7% concentration (Bebbington et al. 2008b, DECOIN 2010). Bishi Metals could only work for five years during the dry season and had to quit the project in 1997 due to the resistance of the local communities, after the aforementioned incident of camp burning took place (Bebbington et al. 2008b: 2893-2894, Cisneros 2011: 188-189, DECOIN 2010).

Several interviewees[15] recall how initially, some community members from Junín and Chalguayaco Alto worked for Bishi Metals, clearing paths and carrying tubes, machine parts and other materials to the mining camp. For instance, Maria, a middle-aged community leader and a firm opponent of mining, recounted:[16]

> I remember that some geologists started coming…it was maybe 1990, even before that…My dad used to say they were looking into the rivers, the streams, to look for gold. They used to stay at my parents' place, they used to pay something, went up to build a camp during the day, and came down to sleep…They used to come and go, they did not come to stay…My dad was content [as] the engineers used to say that they were going to build a road, that there would be a city here in Junín once the exploitation started…We did not know anything, so we were content that they were here…My husband used to work for them, he used to carry tubes up to the camp. In 1992 he died, and then my sons kept working for two, three years…Some people from Junín, from Chalguayaco Alto used to work. They [the company] also used to bring people from Magnolia [another community] and Plaza Gutierrez [a parish centre]…We were happy to have the work back then.

Talking about the period Bishi Metals was active in the area, community members emphasized that, at the time, they did not really know what the company was doing or how a mining project would affect them. They said that they were pleased with the employment opportunities that the company provided, and considered the Japanese company as 'good'. As Camilo, a middle-aged peasant from Junín recalled:[17]

> The Japanese actually behaved well… They used to pay us to show them around, to open paths… We [the community members] were blind at the time, we did not know what was coming…They used to flatter us with small things, collaborating for the school, the Christmas expenditures, I mean, small things, which they just gave to us.

However, as these community members from Junín and Chalguayaco Alto noted, this positive feeling soon faded, particularly after Bishi Metals contracted an Ecuadorian company to open paths. Camilo explained:

> We started to feel bad when the Japanese company brought in another Ecuadorian company to open paths…That company behaved badly with the people; it did not give good food, the work was very difficult.

They also mentioned that the sewage of the camp was released into the river passing through the community and that company workers from outside the region caused some disturbances, such as drinking in the community centre. The narratives of community members indicated that their problems with the companies stemmed from labour issues, which were aggravated due to what they considered to be disrespectful behaviour by company personnel.

At the time the discontent of the people was increasing, representatives from Ecuador's powerful "radical ecologist" organization *Acción Ecológica* and the local environmental organization DECOIN arrived to the community of Junín. *Acción Ecológica* was founded in 1986 by six biologists and communication workers. Its main objectives were to collect and publicize information about environmental problems and their impacts on marginalized communities, and to support communities to defend their collective and environmental rights.[18] *Acción Ecológica* learned about the activities of Bishi Metals from the Rainforest Action Network, a San Francisco-based environmental organization, which had been running a boycott of the Mitsubishi group since 1989 to protest against the

company's involvement in rainforest destruction (Bebbington et al. 2007).[19]

Initially, the representatives from *Acción Ecologíca* informed the then local priest, Geovanni Paz, and the owner of an ecological reserve, Carlos Zorrilla[20], about the mining activities in the valley. As adherent of liberation theology, since he started working in Intag in 1987, Geovanni Paz had been engaging in social work in the communities. He helped people organize to carry out public works such as building bridges, brought health supplies and gave health education, and delivered speeches during the masses on the importance of organization and collective work to improve community well-being. Carlos Zorrilla was a Cuban-American living in the US, who first visited Intag in 1975. In 1978 he came to settle there because he "did not like the lifestyle in the US", and established an ecological reserve of about 500 hectares in the sector Santa Rosa of the Plaza Gutiérrez parish.

Even before the mining conflict started, environmental issues were part of both Paz and Zorrilla's work in the valley. Specifically, both were working with youth groups to increase environmental awareness in the communities. Paz had started an agro-ecology project with the youth of the Peñaherrera parish and in 1993 Carlos Zorrilla had formed a group of "forest guards" to prevent the killing of the threatened spectacled bears in the reserve. Paz and Zorrilla established DECOIN in 1995, in the words of Father Paz, to "work on the environment, do something for the region in a more organized way". Together they identified environmental education and mining as the two main focus   areas   for the new organization. DECOIN has since become the main local organization leading the mining resistance in Intag.[21]

With support from *Acción Ecológica*, DECOIN held several meetings in the communities close to the mining concession, especially in Junín, to disseminate knowledge on the environmental and social impacts of mining, and as well as the legal rights of communities and responsibilities of the companies (Cisneros 2011: 195).[22] As Zorrilla[23] commented, the involvement of Paz, who was a "popular and well-respected" figure in Intag, was very helpful in gaining the trust of the people and organizing the resistance. A crucial development at the time was that DECOIN obtained the preliminary environmental impact assessment report of the project prepared by the Japanese International Cooperation Agency in 1996. The report stated the requirement of relocating about a hundred

families from four communities closest to the mining concessions and predicted substantial environmental impacts including deforestation, desertification, water contamination, loss of habitat and negative impacts on the Cotacachi-Cayapas Ecological Reserve (DECOIN 2010).

Concerning the dissemination of this information and how the communities received it, Zorrilla said: "We made a lot of visits to the communities to discuss and interpret the information so that they could understand what mining would bring…Disruption of community life was a big concern. And people felt they were being lied to. The company never mentioned any of these impacts". In addition to social impacts, the threat of relocation was particularly disturbing for many community members, even more so in an area where many people lacked legal title to their lands (Cisneros 2011: 194). Oscar, a 28 year-old member of the the community of Cerro Pelado, explained the main concerns of people as follows:[24]

> The first issue was the loss of land, the issue of property rights over the land. [After the meetings with DECOIN and *Acción Ecológica*] people thought 'they will take our lands, displace us from here'. And that was going to happen in four communities [according to the EIA study]. Hence, the concern was 'where are we going to go?'. Together with that was the environmental issue; contamination, sickness, social problems. 'That we don't want' people said.

The trip *Acción Ecológica* and DECOIN organized in 1997 to some mining sites in Peru, such as Cerro de Pasco, la Oroya and Ilo, was as influential as the circulation of the results of the EIA study. Maria from Junín who attended the trip reported:[25]

> In 1997, DECOIN had already come here several times, to hold meetings. DECOIN used to tell us that this [mining] will bring social and environmental impacts. At that moment people were not divided, we were not ambitious then…They told that DECOIN wanted to take some people to where there was an open-pit copper mine…We [community members] were at a reunion, they asked me to go. They were going to take some people from Intag, and they wanted someone from Junín. So I said, 'okay, I would go and get to know'…We went 13 people from Ecuador, also people from the Orient [the Ecuadorian Amazon]…There was another woman from Cerro Pelado [also threatened by relocation]…Like that, we went to see if it [mining] was good or bad. When we

were back, we had another meeting to talk to people about what we saw. It was ugly, a hole, I don't even remember how many metres, there were roads just there [in the pit] to get inside. I think they were saying about 200 metres deep…We decided that we would tell the Minister of Mining[26] that we would not allow mining here and that he had to come here [to Junín] to talk. The people had gathered here to receive them [the Minister and associates] and talk about whether to start mining operations or not. Since they did not want to come, we decided that we would go and bring down the things from up there, from the [mining] camp. We went [the next day, on the 12th of May] and took the camp.

Maria and Zorrilla both emphasized that the feedback given to communities by those who attended the trip was very influential in strengthening the opposition to mining. And their position was further consolidated due to the lack of response from authorities to the communities' demand to meet and discuss the issue. In response, peasants mostly from the communities threatened by relocation held a meeting on May 11 1997, and established the Committee for the Defence of Communities Affected by the Mining Project Junín-Cuellaje[27] (Cisneros 2011: 192). In the same meeting, they took the decision to burn the mining camp to stop the activities of the company. On May 12, around a hundred people from different communities[28] hiked up, took over the mining camp and asked the company caretaker to tell the company to come for a meeting. After waiting for a couple of days for a response from the company or authorities, which they never got, they first collected, inventorized and moved the company property, which included things like freezers, kitchen utensils and wires, to the community centre and then burned down the mining camp on the 15th of May.[29] The government tried to open a case against two community leaders and one from DECOIN on the charges of terrorism, but the case was dismissed by the courts after a year (Martinez-Alier 2001 cited in Cisneros 2011: 193).

Although, according to the testimonies of the people, the opposition to mining was strong in the communities where it was first organized, it certainly was not unanimous; there were also people who expected to benefit from mining. Cisneros (2011: 194) maintains that this was particularly the case in the parish centre of Garcia Moreno where the officials from the Ministry of Energy and Mines, present in the region for the PRODEMINCA project[30], promoted mining and its local developmental benefits. Conflicting perceptions and expectations about mining thus

formed among the different sectors of the local population, and fuelled social divisions which, as the mining conflict continued, became further entrenched.

After Bishimetals

The expulsion of the Japanese company marked an important success for the opposition movement, yet did not mean the abandonment of the efforts to build an anti-mining front in the valley. On the contrary, until the mining concessions was re-auctioned in 2002, DECOIN and *Acción Ecológica* continued to meet with community members to raise awareness about environmental protection, mining and its impacts, mining and environmental laws and regulations, and community rights established in the Constitution (e.g. the right to live in a healthy and balanced environment, and to be informed and consulted about projects that could affect them).[31] As Bebbington et al. (2007: 34-35) emphasize, at its inception, DECOIN was conceived as an organization focused on environmental education, and its continued work in this area throughout the years has played a crucial role in building and strengthening the anti-mining resistance movement.

To consolidate the resistance, DECOIN, with financial and technical support from international organizations, also started to promote community-based projects including organic coffee production, eco-tourism, women's handicraft production and agro-ecology as sustainable alternatives to mining. In fact, DECOIN considered the development of alternative income-generating activities as indispensable to building a strong and enduring resistance. To carry out these projects, DECOIN supported the establishment of new grassroots organizations such as coffee producers' and eco-tourism associations. It also spearheaded several community forest and watershed protection initiatives (D'Amico 2012a).

These efforts of DECOIN within the valley coincided with the initiation of the project of participatory local governance in Cotacachi, led by the mayor Auki Tituaña. This process significantly fostered grassroot organizing in the canton and created new institutional spaces for collective decision making. The organizations from Intag, especially DECOIN, participated actively in these spaces and managed to include environmental issues in the political agenda of the municipality (Bebbington et al. 2007: 33). The most important achievement resulting from this process was the enactment of the Ecological Ordinance[32] by the local govern-

ment in 2000, following the consensus reached by all parish governments of Intag to prohibit mining in the valley. The ordinance declared Cotacachi an ecological canton, prohibited environmentally degrading economic activities—including mining—and promoted sustainable ones, and encouraged community management and protection of forests and watersheds.[33] As discussed in Chapter 5, these processes transformed the anti-mining struggle into a political project of alternative territorial development. Arguably, this transformation has been the most significant and distinguishing characteristic of the Intag struggle.

DECOIN and *Acción Ecológica* campaigned to include broader institutional involvement. In 1999 DECOIN demanded that the World Bank inspect irregularities in the design and implementation of the PRODEMINCA project, and the possible impacts of information gathered for the project on communities, regional ecosystems and the Cotacachi-Cayapas Ecological Reserve.[34] The report prepared by the World Bank inspection panel pointed out that the project failed to sufficiently consider the potential impacts on protected areas and inadequately consulted communities. This process resulted in the signing of an agreement with the Ministry of Energy and Mines to set up mechanisms to oversee the proper use of the information obtained in the project (Cisneros 2011: 195-197). *Acción Ecológica*, on the other hand, through its contacts with international organizations such as Friends of the Earth and Rainforest Action Network, started to publicize and seek international support for the struggle.

Mining threat is back: Ascendant Copper brings trouble

In 2002 the Ministry of Energy and Mines auctioned again the mining concession in the Junin-Cuellaje area in Intag. The only individual bidder, Roque Bustamante, obtained the concessions called Golden 1 and Golden 2, and then sold them in 2004 to Ascendant Ecuador, a subsidiary of the Canadian Ascendant Copper Corporation.[35] The same year, the company acquired another concession called Magdalena. The Junín mining project included the three concessions covering a total area of 9,505 hectares in the parishes of Garcia Moreno and Peñaherrera (Cisneros 2011: 236, DECOIN 2010). The company arrived in Intag in April 2004 and its workers and guards settled in the community Chalguayaco Alto (CEDHU 2006).

As indicated above, by the time Ascendant arrived, thanks to the co-operation among the communities, grassroots and civil society organizations, and the local government, opposition to mining in Intag was strong. The opponents to mining therefore immediately responded to the new threat using various means, starting with the legal ones. For instance, even before Ascendant acquired the concessions, the mayor of Cotacachi Auki Tituaña had sued the Ministry of Energy and Mines in 2003 for violating the constitutional right of local communities to be consulted before the initiation of any activity that could affect the environment. Again in 2005, the mayor presented another case to the Administrative Court questioning the legality of the concessions granted to Bustamante, then sold to Ascendant. These cases, however, were not resolved in favour of the opponents (Cisneros 2011: 235-236). Likewise, soon after the arrival of Ascendant, two US law firms representing DECION, Leigh, Day & Co. and Heller Ehrman sent letters (dated 17 November 2004[36] and 13 April, 2005,[37] respectively) to the CEO of the parent company. The letters reminded the parent company that opposition to its presence in Junín region was "significant and vociferous", and communicated the accusations of the communities and members of DECOIN regarding the threats, violence and defaming against the opposition leaders perpetrated by company employees in the field and its supporters.

Despite the opposition of the communities, civil society organizations and local government, Ascendant Copper tried to establish itself in the valley.[38] To this end, the company started to buy land at inflated prices, but let the previous owners stay and work on their lands, and employed some peasants at higher than normal wages. Many community members interpreted these actions as a strategy to divide communities through, as people themselves put it, "buying people's conscience", "conquering people" and "stirring ambitions".[39] Moreover the company created and funded a community organization called The Council of Development of Garcia Moreno (CODEGAM for its Spanish acronym). The mining opponents accused the members of this organization, mostly men from the parish centre of Garcia Moreno, to be responsible for generating and deepening social divisions, and for instigating violence in the region.[40] The actions attributed to CODEGAM included a violent protest against the mayor of Cotacachi, raiding a public meeting in the parish centre of Garcia Moreno, and threatening and preventing mining opponents to

attend some meetings by blocking their way and even attacking them (DECOIN 2010). The organization also launched a campaign to create a new canton separate from Cotacachi to avoid the Ecological Ordinance and the powerful anti-mining mayor (Cisneros 2011: 238).[41]

In fact, 2005 and 2006 were tough times for Intag. The situation became increasingly tense and confrontational, and more than an environmental threat, the presence of the mining company became a threat to the peace in the valley. The mining opponents headed by community leaders and DECOIN blamed the company and its workers—from Intag and brought from outside—for launching a smear campaign against the opposition leaders, the numerous death threats they received, the occasional physical assaults to residents, and disruption of some public assemblies. They also claimed that the several lawsuits against the leaders, as well as the local newspaper *Periódico Intag*, opened by the company were based on false charges and intended to delegitimize them (CEDHU 2006: 29, DECOIN 2010).[42] There were further accusations of the company offering bribes to opposition leaders to change their "side" or to leave Intag.[43]

Not surprisingly, Ascendant denied all these accusations and made the very same claims against the opponents, calling them "extremists" who provoke violence, prevent people from expressing their support for mining and deprive them of the benefits mining development would bring to the region.[44] In various media, it promoted what the mining opponents considered as strategies to divide people as its "social programmes" proving its commitment to corporate social responsibility.[45] Among its social programmes, the company mentioned model farms for organic agriculture, medical attention, nutrition workshops, vaccination programmes for cattle, a soccer school and tree nurseries. It also made promises of more benefits for the region if the exploration were to advance, such as employment and training, local purchases, and infrastructural improvements.[46]

The claims of the mining opponents and the company about the position of the communities regarding the project were at odds with each other. On the one hand, Ascendant on its webpage announced that the majority of the communities and the parish government of Garcia Moreno were in favour of the project, and that CODEGAM represented the communities and the local governments in the area.[47] On the other

hand, presidents of the eight communities close to the mining site signed a petition[48] on March 7, 2005, declaring:

> The legitimate representatives of the communities that are potentially affected by the mining project called "JUNIN" manifest the following:
>
> 1. Our categorical opposition to the mining project denominated "JUNIN" and to the presence of the mining company Ascendant Exploration and all their employees and collaborators
>
> 2. That the Council for Parish Development of Garcia Moreno CODEGAM does not represent the aspirations and interests, let alone the decisions of our communities
>
> Therefore we do not recognize the above mentioned organization and we alert all public and private entities that any settlement of agreement reached by such entity will not be accepted by our communities.

Another petition called "In a single voice: No to Mining", was issued on March 27, 2005, and according to DECOIN was signed by 1100 people.[49]

These petitions were among the materials used by DECOIN in its initiatives at the international level to find support for the resistance and denounce the practices of Ascendant in the field that contradicted the information provided by the company. Thanks to these initiatives, a number of international NGOs and civil society networks such as Amnesty International, the German Rettet den Regenwald, Mining Watch Canada and UK-based Mines and Communities lent support to the anti-mining struggle and helped publicize it at a broader scale. An important and innovative action at the international level was the campaigns organized in Canada. At a time when Ascendant was preparing to get listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX), DECOIN, with support from Friends of the Earth Canada, Canadian Environmental Law Association and US-based Earthworks tried to convince the stock exchange not to list Ascendant and allow it to raise funds so as to continue its human rights violations.[50] When the TSX went ahead with the listing in November 2005, this time Friends of the Earth Canada and Mining Watch Canada launched a public campaign in May 2006 to warn investors of the abuses of the company and to ask them to refrain from investing in it.[51] In addition, in May 2005 DECOIN, also with the latter two organizations, lodged a formal complaint[52] with the Canadian National Contact Point for OECD Guidelines for Multinational Corporations, arguing that the company violated the OECD guidelines, as well as those of the Ca-

nadian government, yet later withdrew the complaint due to "total lack of willingness and transparency in the process carried out by Canadian authorities" (DECOIN 2010: np). The connections with international organizations strengthened the opposition in Intag, providing local actors information, financial and organizational resources, as well as visibility, legitimacy and access to broader institutional and political spaces, thus allowing them to "jump scales" (N. Smith 1996 cited in Perrault 2003). On the other hand, however, the experience with the OECD showed the limits of the international mechanisms that are supposedly developed to protect the rights of people against companies.

Alongside these efforts in the international arena, in Intag numerous meetings, assemblies and protests were organized (or attended) by mining opponents to assert their rejection of any mining activity in the valley.[53] Those who participated included community members, civil society organizations from within the valley and from the Andean part of Cotacachi,[54] the representatives from the parish and municipal governments, and representatives from the Canton Assembly.[55] The Inteños also took the struggle to the streets of the capital. On July 12, 2006, they first gathered in Cotacachi and then moved to Quito to stage a protest in front of the Ministry of Energy and Mines.

Moreover, the communities took measures to prevent company workers from accessing the mining site. For instance, they set up control points on the possible routes to the mining site, and utilized the local radio station and walkie-talkies to inform each other about the presence and activities of Ascendant's workers in different parts of the valley. They even captured and handed over to the police some company personnel that they claimed were entering the Junín community reserve illegally.[56] On December 10, 2005, community members—around 300 people from 15 communities according to DECOIN—once again torched the mining camp to express their determination to prevent mining activities in the valley.[57]

Confrontations and violence in the communities

During 2005 and 2006 violent confrontations between the opponents and the supporters of mining as well as company workers were frequent and became part of the daily life of some communities, above all Junín.[58] Paula from Junín told how tense the situation was:

> We were not able to do our daily work. The word came 'they [company workers and/or supporters] are coming', and we were leaving whatever we were doing and running to face them, up and down we were running. We the women as well…We could not sleep peacefully, day and night we were on guard.

Similarly, Manuel commented:

> Those days were crazy. We were like in a war, running from one place to the other with machetes to confront the mining people [los mineros] who also had machetes…They used to provoke us when we confronted them…I don't know how nobody got killed, but there were people injured, ours and them.

The Ecuadorian human rights organization CEDHU (*La Comisión Ecuménica de Derechos Humanos*, Ecumenical Commission of Human Rights), as well as human rights observers from the organization Intag Solidarity Network-US,[59] arrived in Intag to evidence and denounce the rising violence in the area. The events came to such a point that the police had to stay in the Junín community ecotourism facility for some 15 days to prevent further clashes. One of the most influential leaders of the opposition, Polibio Pérez, was even put under 24-hour police protection due to the threats to his security.

The appearance of armed security guards in 2006 around the region from the company Daimi Services, subcontracted by Ascendant to realize its public relations work, turned the face of the events more violent.[60] On several occasions, the community members confronted those guards who wanted to access the mining site. The most dramatic of these confrontations took place at the beginning of December. On December 1, some guards of the company arrived at the control point close to the Chalguayaco Alto community in three pickup trucks. They were again stopped where several people from the nearby communities had gathered. While the community members, the majority of them women, were having a row with some of the company personnel, one of them suddenly started spraying tear gas very close-up to the people. As they tried to run away, dispersing around, there were some shootings. Catalina from Chalguayaco Alto, who was among those arguing with the men at the front remembered the moment:

We started running away, but then somebody shouted 'they killed them', and then we all returned…I think that [that somebody got killed] made us furious. We all went back and stood there [in front of the chain].

Then the quarrel started again. One man who seemed like the one in charge asked, "Who is the leader here?", and the community replied, "We all are!". After a while, the men got back on their trucks and left. During the event one community member was shot in his leg.

Although that day the armed personnel left Junín, they did not give up on their attempts to reach the mining site. Through their communication network, community members learned that a group of people had started moving towards the mining area from another direction and figured out their location by following their trail. The influential community leader explained on the local radio that Junín was basically surrounded by armed men and that they called the police, but nobody was coming to help. So, on the 3rd of December, community members decided to capture the intruders themselves.

Groups of men from various communities, but particularly Junín, Barcelona and Cerro Pelado, coming from different directions met in the forest to advance towards the company personnel, communicating and coordinating through their walkie-talkies. The main organizer of the whole "operation", the community leader Polibio Pérez, gave a speech, worth quoting at length:

It is possible, almost a fact, that the company, its workers, the hit men they hired are going to start shooting. If they do so, they will aim at the air, you can be sure of this. So we cannot fall into their despair [of resorting to arms]: we keep our arms [hunting rifles] un-used. I'm asking, please, understanding and [good] judgement: with our weapons we will not win. [Pointing at everyone] This is our weapon, each of us, all who are here from all over the Intag zone. I can assure you we will see today the final result of our years-long struggle. And again, I ask you, let's not fall into that [of using arms], of our weapons we make the best use. If we came here armed, it is for the things that can happen. But our main weapon has always been the truth: demanding respect for the law and for our rights. And this is the weapon that will prevail, not those others. [So] we have to disarm them one by one, we have to do it one by one [others are accepting and marking his words here]. I´ll go in front taking all necessary precautions. So, if there is no doubt or question, let's move as orderly as possible.

When the community members arrived where the company personnel were located, they looked surprised. The community leader Polibio Pérez negotiated with them to give up their arms. Initially, they rejected his request but then they agreed. The community members, numbering more than 100, collected their arms, backpacks, sleeping bags and other devices, and together they all headed out to Junín. Of the estimated 120 employees of the company, 56 were captured that day and taken to the church of the Junín community. In Junín, they checked the identities of the intruders and discovered that some of them had ex-military IDs, hence their identification as paramilitaries. Although the communities notified the police immediately, again nobody came for several days. During those days, in front of the church, women from the nearby communities cooked for them. Polibio Pérez this time talked to those captured, actually explaining to them why what they were doing was wrong, that the communities did not want the company that hired them there and that they should not come back. He was practically "educating" them.

On the 6th of December the mayor of Cotacachi and the governor of the Imbabura province, together with a large group of people from Intag and Cotacachi (according to DECOIN about 300) attempted to go to Junín to officially take over the captured guards. However, on their way they were attacked by people who were thought to be the remaining guards of the company (of the approximately 120 guards believed to be company guards)—throwing rocks and Molotov cocktails, shooting wildly, burning things and blocking roads with trees—and had to turn back. It was only on the 9th of December that the mayor of Cotacachi and the Secretary of Environmental Protection from the Ministry of Energy and Mines could reach Junín in a helicopter, and it was on that day the secretary announced that the terms of reference required to start the environmental impact assessment (EIA) study of the company were not approved. The police who also finally made it to Junín took over the company guards amid booing of the community.

Despite this last-minute action, the community members expressed their discontent that the government or the relevant public institutions did not intervene adequately during the escalation of the conflict.[61] As Manuel put it in one conversation,[62] only the police, after clashes happened, and not even in all cases, showed up. The political instability that pervaded the country during 2005 and 2006 due to the removal of Presi-

dent Lucio Gutierrez in 2005, heightened social protests and new presidential elections might have contributed to the silence of the state. Yet, at a more fundamental level, the successive neoliberal governments of Ecuador welcomed foreign direct investment in the mining sector, and had actually taken measures to guarantee and ease their operations in thecountry. In the context of neoliberal capitalism, the state put the interests of the transnational corporations above the rights of local communities.

These events have undeniably been engraved in the collective memory of the communities, and not only demonstrated but also strengthened their resolve not to allow Ascendant to stay in Intag. The impertinence of the company to send armed guards to intimidate people, and their aggression were unacceptable to the communities; beyond the struggle to defend the environment, what was considered to be at stake was the security of Inteños [people living in Intag], as well as their dignity. The organization among the community members was as impressive as the leadership exhibited by Polibio Pérez. It clearly required great commitment and mutual trust to take the risk of facing armed people. Through their actions, the Inteños demonstrated that local communities are not passive or powerless against the incursions of neoliberal capitalism, but can and do act to defend their rights and livelihoods.

The decision of the government not to allow Ascendant to start the preparation of the EIA did not put an end to the presence of the company, which continued its attempts to reach the mining site. Although in March 2007, the company and the opponents signed an agreement through the mediation of government representatives to reduce the company's workforce from 159 to 48 people, the tensions continued.[63] Mining opponents had to wait until September 2007, when all the activities of the company were suspended by the new government for not abiding by the mining law (Mychalejko 2007). By the end of 2008, all concessions to the company in Intag were revoked as part of the process of review of oil and mining concessions in Ecuador, as required by the Mining Mandate issued by the Constitutional Assembly in April the same year (Mychalejko 2008).

A new challenge: ENAMI EP and CODELCO in Intag

As discussed in the previous chapter, the government of Rafael Correa adopted a strong policy of developing large-scale mining in Ecuador.

Although the government's mining agenda prioritized several projects in the south of the country,[64] the Intag region was not spared either. In fact, on May 11, 2010, Edgar Salazar Medina, allegedly a trafficker in mining concessions, obtained a personal title for a concession of 800 hectares named "Los Mandariyacus" for the project called El Palmar. This is not in the same area as the previous Junín concessions, but is located to the west, close to the El Paraiso community in the Garcia Moreno parish (see Map 4.1 above). The owner of the concession, as the mining opponents in Intag later found out, had an agreement with the Chilean state mining company CODELCO, which established that in case the initial explorations indicated the presence of copper, CODELCO would take over the project.[65] This deal seemed to be related to the agreement CODELCO had reached with the Ecuadorian government in June 2009 to collaborate in mining prospecting and exploration to determine potential areas of interest for the company to further develop.[66]

The owner of the concession initiated the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process in December 2010. The initial EIA report was submitted in June, and after a couple of rounds of corrections was approved on December 2011.[67] A Chile-based mining prospecting company called South American Management started explorations in January 2012 for a period of six months.[68] Whether the project would go ahead was to be decided on the basis of the evaluations of the collected samples.[69] At the end of April, CODELCO announced its withdrawal from the area. Having completed the exploration work, the company indicated that the analyses of samples up to that point were not very promising and that it might abandon the project.[70] For the exploration work carried out in this short period, around 30 people from the community of El Paraiso were employed. As Diego from the El Paraiso community remarked, this created some tension in the community for some members were unhappy about the mining activities.[71] Once again, intra-community conflicts developed as a result of mining, this time in a new community.

The civil society organizations and local parish governments opposing mining in Intag and Cotacachi were not surprised when they learned about the project Los Mandariyacus. They were aware of the government's push to develop large-scale mining in Ecuador, and Intag was one region where the existence of copper was already proven. To respond to the new project, the mining opponents, specifically *Consorcio Toisán*,[72] the parish government of Garcia Moreno and the Cantonal Assembly, rei-

nitiated their struggle around the deficiencies of the EIA process. In various media, letters to public institutions and in meetings, they expressed their concern that the EIA contained insufficient and incorrect information, that it had been rushed through without the necessary corrections, and that it was not shared with the public in the way defined by law.[73] One of the occasions during which they voiced these issues[74] was a public meeting to share project information organized by the environmental consultancy firm *Calidad Ambiental* in El Paraiso on March 26, 2011. Around 200 people attended the meeting at which, in addition to the consultancy firm, the representatives of the owner of the concession, the Ministry of the Environment and CODELCO, the president of the parish government of Garcia Moreno, the president of DECOIN and *Consorcio Toisán* were present. The news article[75] in the *Periódico Intag* about the meeting summarized the critiques of the president of Garcia Moreno as follows:

> In her intervention, the president of García Moreno indicated that the invitation for the meeting on 25th of March came to the parish government only on the 21st of the same month. She also pointed out that they received on the same date a summary of the EIA, of about 30 pages, while the full assessment needed to be sent to the parish government. She also said that not only El Paraíso but also other communities around needed to be well informed since they will equally be harmed by a mining project, above all the community of Magdalena, of which the water resource will be affected.

In addition, the social organizations of the valley organized or attended community meetings to mobilize people. For instance, on May 21, 2010, *Consorcio Toisán*, together with the parish governments of Peñaherrera, Garcia Moreno and Selva Alegre, and the Cotacachi Cantonal Assembly organized a local assembly (*Asamblea Zonal*) in which more than a thousand people participated.[76] As Jose Cueva, the president of *Consorcio Toisán*, remarked, the main idea for organizing this event was to create a space to discuss the issues that concerned the population and claim the right of people to have a say in the decisions that affect them.[77] During the day, different working groups dealt with diverse issues, such as health, education, youth, agriculture and food sovereignty, tourism, alternative energy, water, environmental justice and citizens' participation, and elaborated proposals on each of them. The rejection of mining was reiterated in a number of groups such as environmental justice, food

sovereignty and youth. Although the assembly decisions did not have any legal power, they were important for the opposition groups to demonstrate that many *Inteños* still preferred a future for the region that did not include mining. Moreover, the keynote speaker in the assembly was Alberto Acosta, the president of the Constitutional Assembly from November 2007 to June 2008 well known for his opposition to extractivist development model. In his talk, Acosta expressed his admiration and support for the Intag resistance, and emphasized the importance of putting into practice the principles of democratic participation and right to resistance included in the new constitution. He also stressed the importance of the protection of water resources and their equitable distribution, and the problems with pursuing a development model based on oil extraction and mining.[78]

Although several people from the communities closest to the new mining project, El Paraíso and Magdalena Bajo, had been involved in the anti-mining struggle, and the cooperative *Talleres del Gran Valle de los Manduriacos*—which embraced and contributed to the alternative development project of the anti-mining organizations—was located in Magdalena Bajo, the anti-mining organizations and leaders did not have strong links with these communities.[79] They thus needed to gain support there. One attempt they made for to this end was that the president of DECOIN at the time, the peasant leader Polibio Pérez, and a lawyer from the human rights organization CEDHU attended a community meeting in the Magdalena Bajo community on March 3, 2012.[80] The meeting was a regular one to discuss community matters, and the mining issue was fitted in. Some community members protested against this, saying that if they wanted to discuss the matter, the anti-mining organizations should organize a different meeting and invite people specifically for this rather than interfering with a community meeting. One middle-aged woman declared: "If this is a meeting about environmentalism (*ecologismo)*, I don't want to hear. This should be a meeting about people". Other members of the community, however, argued that the mining issue was a communal matter and had a place in the meeting. In the end, the representatives of the mining opposition had the chance to give their talks. They mainly provided information on the environmental and social impacts of mining, including those that had already been experienced in Intag, the right of the communities to be informed about and participate in the decision-making process, and how the ongoing EIA process has

not fully respected those rights. The meeting demonstrated that despite the success of the anti-mining organizations to create strong opposition to mining opposition in Intag, it was not uniform across the valley, and for these organizations there was still much work to be done.

The mining opponents in Intag believed that this new project was just the first step, even a cover up, to reactivate the mining project in Junín. [81] Time did not prove them wrong. The state mining company ENAMI EP and CODELCO came to an agreement in July 2012 to work in the previous Junín concessions.[82] The project for copper and molybdenum mining was renamed as *Llurimagua* and covers an area of 4,839 hectares. ENAMI EP started working in Intag since then. Initially, this consisted mainly of organizing community meetings to "socialize"[83] the project, starting in August 2012 and continuing throughout the next three years. The company started gathering information to obtain the required environmental licenses and prepare an environmental management plan for the exploration stage in September 2013.[84] In May 2014, the company began the drillings for the advanced exploration stage.[85] Finally, in December 2015, ENAMI EP and CODELCO signed an agreement to establish a joint company to develop the project with 51% participation of ENAMI EP and 49% of CODELCO.[86]

As part of the project development process, ENAMI EP has put great effort into earning support for the project. The numerous socialization meetings were indeed part of these efforts. In these meetings, representatives of ENAMI EP presented information about the mining policies of the government, the laws and regulations governing the sector, especially those about environmental protection, the progress being made in the project, the cooperation agreement with CODELCO, and how communities will benefit from the project and other relevant issues. [87] Various news articles and short videos on these meetings were publicized on the websites of the Ministry of Strategic Sectors and ENAMI EP. Community participation, environmentally responsible mining, environmental management plan, social responsibility, complying with the laws and regulations, working for the well-being of the communities were some of the phrases that were present in these articles. That the project had the support of community members was particularly emphasized, and the videos featured some community members indicating their acceptance of the project, as well as mentioning how they have been misinformed and misrepresented by some NGOs.

In addition to these meetings, the government used other strategies to strengthen support for the project. For instance, in his trip to Chile in October 2012, President Correa invited the president and vice-president of the parish government of Garcia Moreno, the president of Junín and one more Intag resident. The trip included a visit to the Gaby copper mine of CODELCO.[88] According to Zorrilla, this was a "strategy to buy political support to a destructive project".[89] Then, on February 16, 2014, the vice-president Jorge Glas Espinel, together with the Minister of Non-renewable Natural Resources, the Minister of Agriculture and the manager of ENAMI EP visited Intag. During this visit it was announced that Ecuador Estratégico, the public institution responsible from channelling the resources from resource extraction to local development, will invest US$ 5 million dollars to implement 21 projects in the region, such as construction of potable water systems, health centres and rural electrification.[90]

If the information provided by the public institutions involved in the project is to be taken as an indication, these strategies seem indeed to be working, as the project is welcomed by the majority of local residents. One development substantiating these claims was that in April 26, 2014, around 350 people from 35 communities in the area of impact of the project declared their support for it.[91] The support was made 'official' after two days through an act signed by the representatives of the 35 communities and the parish governments of Garcia Moreno and Peñaherrera, and the state institutions involved in the project (Ministry of Non-Renewable Resources, Ministry of Environment, ENAMI EP, Ecuador Estratégica and Secretary of Water).[92]

Clearly, these strategies are devised considering the history of opposition to mining in the region. It can be argued that they are aimed not only at earning support for and forestalling opposition to the project in Intag, but also to build consent for the government's mining agenda at national level. It seems that the government is trying hard to demonstrate to the local residents of Intag and the general public that it is fulfilling its promises of ensuring citizens' participation, acting in an environmentally and socially responsible manner, and providing benefits to the local communities.

In 2015 and 2016, however, there were complaints by the communities that the promises made were unfulfilled. For instance, some community members closed one road to the mining site that they expected to

be improved, but which, on the contrary, deteriorated due to the vehicles of ENAMI EP passing by daily.[93] And on May 27, 2016, around 300 people united in the Chalguayaco Alto community, among them those who oppose mining, and denounced the lack of progress in the projects that were promised by the vice-president.[94] Arguably the main and most vocal peasant leader of the opposition Polibio Pérez asserted in that meeting that "we have the obligation and the right to get together to demand one by one those offerings [the projects promised], because if it is not possible, if nothing was going to be done here, they should not have offered them…If, from today onwards [these projects] are not fulfilled one by one, these people, struggling, we will be the ones to get them out. But if they fulfil, they will continue in this territory, whether we like it or not".[95]

The response of the government was to organize a public assembly in Intag at the end of May to "attend the concerns" of the communities about these projects, and convened an assembly on July 13 in Quito of the "Committee to Monitor the Commitments of the *Llurimagua* project" in which the Minister of Strategic Sectors, the vice-Minister of Mining, the head of ENAMI EP, representatives from the ministries of education, health, transportation and public works, as well as representatives from the parish governments of Garcia Moreno and Peñaherrera and Intag's communities participated.[96] According to the news articles of the Coordinating Ministry of Strategic Sectors, the objective of the latter meeting was to "continue to strengthen the good relations between the parties". During the meeting, the Minister of Strategic Sectors "emphasized the government's commitment to develop the [mining] project with high social and environmental standards". In both meetings, the public authorities presented information on the projects that have been carried out or are in progress, and the status and schedule for those to be implemented. It seems that the government is putting great effort into maintaining the support for the project that it has built up in Intag.

Government pressure on the opponents

While ENAMI EP continued its work in the valley, the government increased its pressure on the opponents. For instance, in his weekly public speech[97] on December 7, 2013, Correa personally attacked Carlos Zorrilla, claiming that a document Zorrilla co-authored in 2009 entitled "Protecting Your Community Against Mining Companies and Other Extrac-

tive Industries: A Guide for Community Organizers" was inciting upris-
ing and violence. In the eight minutes of his speech he allocates to this
document, the president mentioned several times that Zorrilla is a for-
eigner and emphasized that the document was financed by external
sources (international civil society organizations). He denounced the ex-
ternal actors who were meddling with Ecuador and trying to destabilize
the government.

Two developments made clear that the government was determined
to use its coercive power to push for the project. First, on April 10, 2014,
the president of the Junín community, Javier Ramírez, a firm opponent
of mining, was detained for allegedly attacking the ENAMI EP person-
nel and was charged with rebellion, sabotage and terrorism while his
brother went on the run to evade detention. Ramírez remained in jail for
10 months while waiting his sentence, which ended up being 10 months
of prison. He was released the same day of his trial on February 10, 2015
for having completed it.[98] Upon his release, Ramírez declared that he
would keep resisting mining in Intag.[99] The civil society organizations of
Intag claimed that the detention of Javier was based on false accusations,
hence a political persecution aimed at criminalizing protest, and protest-
ed several times to ask for his release.[100] Several national environmental
and human rights organizations, such as CEDHU, Acci*ón Ecológica* and
The Regional Human Rights Advisory Foundation (INREDH); some
parliamentarians from the *Unidad Plurinacional de las Izquierdas*, a coalition
of leftist political and social movements led by the indigenous political
party *Pachakutik*; and international organizations and networks, such as
Rainforest Rescue and Amnesty International supported the case for the
freedom of Ramírez.[101]

Second, on May 8, 2014, about 200 police entered the valley suppos-
edly to protect the workers of ENAMI EP from the aggressions of the
mining opponents and to ensure that they could carry out their tasks.[102]
The police established themselves in several parts of the valley, with a
permanent camp set up in Junín, and carried out identity checks on the
roads. In Junín some community members started renting rooms to the
police and a group of 12 women organized to provide food for them.[103]
After this deployment of security forces, the human rights and environ-
mental organizations The Regional Human Rights Advisory Foundation
(INREDH), CEDHU, *Acción Ecológica*, and Ecuadorian Coordinating
Committee for the Defence of Nature and the Environment

(CEDENMA) formed a commission to monitor the situation in Intag. They wrote a report denouncing the "violence and coercion" in Intag and asking the Minister of Interior to lift the "de facto state of emergency in the community of Junín and other communities in the area of Intag".[104]As discussed in the next chapter, these pressures from the government certainly created an environment of fear and fuelled a growing sense among the local population that there is no way to confront the state and stop the project.[105]

Opposition on the defensive

To respond to the advances of ENAMI EP, the mining opponents mainly followed two strategies. First, they organized their own meetings and community assemblies to mobilize people and demonstrate that the majority of the communities still did not want mining in Intag. Second, they protested at the meetings organized by ENAMI EP, either by attending them and expressing their position there, or by preventing the company from holding the meetings. As for the former, for instance, DECOIN reported that in a meeting organized in Junín on April 6, 2013, 190 people from 16 communities participated. The meeting ended with a declaration acknowledging the importance of the historical struggle in the valley and asserting the rights of communities to defend their lives and their environment against the incursion of mining companies, private or public. The participants also came up with strategies to strengthen their resistance, such as forming a stable organization to represent them and to connect with national and international civil society actors and with communities in other parts of the world facing similar threats.[106]

The anti-mining organizations also reported how in the meetings of ENAMI EP the Inteños expressed their opposition to mining development and their discontent about the lack of transparency regarding the activities of both ENAMI EP and CODELCO in the area, and how they sometimes prevented company representatives to hold the meetings. For example, the blog entry on DECOIN's page on August 26, 2012 read:

> Last week the government was embarrassed big time when a group of 20 (twenty) employees of the National Mining Company visited a few towns to "socialize" the work the National Mining Company—ENAMI–-does, and talk a little bit (very little bit) about the Llurimagua mining project; formerly known as JUNIN mining project. Oh, they also came all the

way from Quito to enlighten Intag residents on the results of a survey carried out by ENAMI EP in June... Well, in every town the socialization went from bad to worse. It was worse in Junin where the people didn't even let the functionaries speak and told them they were not wanted, nor wanted to be seen in their communities ever again.

In the blog of *Coordinadora Zonal de Intag*, a network of the mining opponents in the valley, a video was posted showing the incident in Junín which was referred to in DECOIN's article. [107] In the 10-minute video, Polibio Pérez and few other community members argue with ENAMI EP employees amid the 30-40 people (those that can be seen) who stand and watch. At the end, the ENAMI EP employees are seen to get in their cars to leave.

Another entry on the same blog titled "*ENAMI EP y CODELCO no logran apoyo en Intag*" (ENAMI EP and CODELCO fail to find support in Intag), dated August 11, 2013, stated that the information provided by ENAMI EP and publicized through videos in which it is claimed that the communities were in favour of the project was a misrepresentation of the truth and manipulative. A short video included in the entry with the title "The truth about the socialization of the Llurimagua project—Intag" continues with the following text:

> In Intag, the socialization process of the mining project Llurimagua undertaken by ENAMI EP and CEDELCO [sic] is severely disputed. The communities, through the voice of their presidents, denounce the broadcasts of ENAMI EP to the public as they do not represent reality. Meetings with minimal participation are reported as well attended. Leaders against mining whose declarations are not made known. Essential questions that are not contested by the functionaries. Presentation of information that is incomplete and not confirmed.

Then the video goes on with six people, five of them presidents of their respective communities, blaming ENAMI EP for communicating false information about the position of the communities and not responding adequately to their questions, and then declaring that they do not want mining in Intag. The blog entry also includes a letter reiterating these points mentioned in the video signed by 11 community presidents and presidents of two community organizations.[108] Given that a key argument of the opposition groups against the mining project is that it is against the will of the local population while the government claims ex-

actly the opposite, both sides are struggling to prove their point. What these opposing claims and the evidence provided clearly show is the extent of the division over the mining issue in the region.

An additional line of defence of the mining opponents was that neither the Ecuadorian state nor the state corporation had the experience or capacity to adequately regulate or monitor mining activities.[109] With respect to the presence of CODELCO, it was argued that the corporation extracts copper in the Atacama Desert, the driest place on the earth, which contrasts sharply with the environmental conditions in Intag where it rains heavily more than half of the year. As for the government's discourse on the importance of mining extraction due to its contribution to the national interest and poverty alleviation, the opponents responded by emphasizing that in the case of oil, the governments at the time also claimed that even though there could be local impacts, all Ecuadorians would benefit. Yet, rather than improving the conditions of the poor, oil extraction served the interests of transnational oil companies.[110] Neither the claim of the government that it was radically different from the neoliberal governments of the past nor its social policies seemed to have convinced some opponents that this time things would be different.

One important difference from the previous phases of the mining struggle in Intag concerns the position of the Cotacachi local government. The mayor of Cotacachi from 2009 to 2014 was from the governing party, and even though he did not openly back the mining project, he did not reject it either. In February 2013, the municipality, in fact, gave the necessary permit requested by ENAMI EP to go ahead with the project.[111] Even more concerning for the mining opponents was what they perceived as the weakening of the participatory governance process[112], which, as discussed above, had been an important factor in the construction of a strong resistance in Intag. Moreover, rather than collaborating with the civil society actors in the valley, the local government started to work actively in Intag to advance the new policies and programmes of the central government.[113]

In the last local elections in February 2014, however, a new mayor, Jomar Cevallos, from a different political movement was elected. The profile of the mayor on the website of the municipality shows that he has been closely involved in the development of the participatory governance project in the canton from the beginning, as well as in the different

processes of capacity building, organizational strengthening, political education, and implementation of productive projects.[114] The new mayor seems committed to invigorate the participatory processes in the canton and is supportive of the resistance in Intag and the civil society organizations' alternative projects.[115]As he asserted in an interview, he is critical of the extractivist development model the government is pursuing.[116] In the same interview, the mayor said that he is of the opinion that the decision on mining should be taken on the basis of popular consultation. In fact, in the last cantonal assembly held on October 24-25, 2015, a resolution was adopted in the plenary session with 281 participants (including 38 men, and 52 women from Intag) to carry out the consultation.[117] Once more, it appears that the battle around mining in Intag is waged over the 'will of the people'.

On the national front, as mentioned above, mayor human rights and environmental organizations have lent support to the Intag resistance. There have been declarations of support from CONAIE for the Intag resistance, and some people from Intag joined the marches and protests organized by CONAIE in Quito.[118]Yet, these have remained rather sporadic and did not foster sustained joint action. *Acción Ecológica*, which was the organization that first mobilized people in Intag in 1990s, showed support more from a distance this time, rather than actively working in and with the communities and social organizations of the valley. As Gloria Chicazia from *Acción Ecológica* maintained, the pressures the organization was facing from the government obliged them to be much more careful in their actions.[119] A clear demonstration of the severity of the threats the organization faced was in March 2009, when the government revoked its legal status, but had to retreat in the face of strong reactions from national and international civil society. This can be said for all the social movement actors and organizations that oppose the government's extractive policies. As indicated in the previous chapter, they are all on the defensive, so to speak, and against the government, much like the mining opponents in Intag.

At the international level, similar to the efforts undertaken during the presence of Ascendant Copper, the local organizations and communities tried to communicate their concerns to both CODELCO and the Chilean public. For example, the organizations that are part of *Consorcio Toisán* wrote a letter to the president of Chile, delivered on November 8, 2012, summarizing the history of the conflict in Intag and explaining the rea-

sons why a large-scale mining project has met such strong resistance in the valley. They asked the president to do everything in his power to stop CODELCO from carrying out the project.[120] From the ranks of international civil society organizations, the Chilean NGO OLCA (Latin American Observatory of Environmental Conflicts—*Observatoria Latino-americano de Conflictos Ambientales*) lent support to the Intag organizations, helping them publicize their struggle in Chile. With support from OLCA in November 2014, a delegation from Intag, among them the mayor of Cotacachi, Jomar Cevallos, and the mother of the detained activist Javier Ramírez, visited Chile to denounce the activities of CODELCO. The delegation presented their case in the Commission for Human Rights of the Chamber of Deputies of Chile (the lower house of the bicameral Congress), the Minister of Mining, and the National Institute for Human Rights (a public institution). They also got together with CODELCO workers and communities affected by mining in the Valle de Acongagua region, and delivered a petition signed by 100,000 people against the *Llurimagua* project to CODELCO.[121] In addition to OLCA, Rainforest Rescue (Rettet den Regenwald) from Germany—which started a petition campaign in April 2013 named "Copper mine threatens spectacled bears" that called upon president Rafael Correa to give up on mining in such a precious ecosystem—Amnesty International; Mining Watch Canada; and Observatory of Mining Conflicts in Latin America, among others, lent support to the resistance in Intag.

To summarize, by August 2016, the mining conflict in Intag had reached a heightened state. The government had been deploying its powers to generate support for the project among the local population, and to discredit and weaken the opposition. It seems that the strategies of the government were effective, as more people were accepting the project, even if some did so reluctantly because they believed that the project could not be stopped anymore. Importantly, the local governments of the two parishes, Garcia Moreno and Peñaherrera, within which the mining concession is located were backing the project. The local government of the Cotacachi canton, which was in the hands of the governing party from 2009 to 2014 during which it did not play an active role in the conflict, was willing to promote the alternative development model that the mining opponents in Intag had been trying to pursue. At the same time, it also tried to adopt a more conciliatory approach and chose to participate in the decision-making processes of the project. The

leaders of the mining opposition, although still very much against the project, also claim a part in these processes. That is, they do not refrain from engaging with the state institutions, adopting the strategy of pressuring the government and ENAMI EP to fulfill their promises to benefit the local communities.

The project is still in its early phases of exploration, and as the head of the project announced in a video of ENAMI EP dating from 2015, these will take more time, at least six years he expects. Hence, despite all the advances of the government, it is not certain that the project will reach the exploitation state. In the meantime, the mining opponents in Intag will certainly be doing all they can to prevent it.

4.2   Mount Ida and Its Golden Nightmare

4.2.1   Mount Ida: a brief description

Mount Ida is part of the Biga Peninsula located at the northwest end of Asia Minor (see Map 4.2). Biga Peninsula is surrounded by the Marmara Sea in the north, and the Aegean Sea to the west and south, with the Dardanelles connecting the two seas. Mount Ida lies at the southern coast of the Biga Peninsula, stretching across an area of approximately 2,580 km^2 from east to west; overlooking Edremit Bay in the south, and the plains of Çanakkale and Balıkesir provinces in the north. The series of peaks, hills and valleys between them, the plains to the north and the coastal area in the south are considered to form a specific region, in geographical, socio-economic and cultural terms (İstanbul University Department of Forestry 2008). The mountain is also the habitat of a diverse range of flora and fauna, and lies along the bird migration routes. In recognition of its biological diversity, endemic species, rich water resources, cultural and archaeological significance, an area of 21,3000 hectares on the mountain was declared as the Mount Ida National Park in 1993.

Mount Ida region is a mixed geography of rural and urban areas, comprising several villages and small and big towns belonging to the districts of Bayramiç, Çan and Ayvacık in the Çanakkale province, and the Edremit district in the Balıkesir province.[122] Bayramiç and Çan are located on the northern side of the mountain, while Ayvacık and Edremit are in the south. These districts together cover an area of 3,744 km^2 and their

Map 4.2:
The Mount Ida region

total population is 238,210 (TÜİK 2012). Of this population, as of 2012, 51% lives in the district centres, while the rest is distributed between smaller towns and villages. The town centres are connected by well-paved main roads, while the villages are distributed around the territory and have access to the main roads through secondary roads, mostly paved, but not always well maintained.

In antiquity, Mount Ida was part of the Troas region and has been a sacred place[123] ever since. After the fall of Troy, the Greek tribes Dorians, Aeolians and Ionians seized Asia Minor, and founded several city states in the region. Subsequently, the region was ruled by Persians, Macedonians, and the Hellenistic Kingdom of Pergamon until it became part of the Roman Empire about the second century BC, and the Byzantine Empire thereafter. The settlement of the first Turkic populations in the area started in the 13th century and intensified in the 14th, when the Ottomans took control over the region. Two different cultural groups, *Yörük* (Sunni Muslims) and *Turkomen* (Alevi Muslims), have inhabited the region since (Hurley & Arı 2011: 1403). At the end of the 19th and during the 20th centuries, Muslim populations that migrated from Balkans have joined these groups, adding to the cultural richness of the region.

The rural landscape of Mount Ida is rather different on the northern and southern sides. In the north, it is a patchwork of farms and fruit orchards, villages of various sizes located on the mild slopes of the mountains, and in forests at higher altitudes. Mostly sheep, goats and a few cows dot the fields. Along the southern part of the mountains, however, the view changes significantly, especially along the coast. The coastal line is completely urbanized due to secondary or summerhouse development since the 1980s. On the hills, olive orchards dominate the landscape, expanding towards the previous grazing lands and forests on the hills (Hurley & Arı 2011: 1403). The villages on these hills have also witnessed tourism development, but in a less intensive and slightly different way than the coast where there are a small—yet growing—number of "boutique" hotels. In all villages, houses are concentrated in the village centres, with farms and orchards lying outside the centre.

In almost all villages there is a main square where the village government, *muhtarlık,* the mosque (except in some *Alevi* villages) and a coffee house (which is exclusively for men) are located. In larger villages there is a primary school, while in smaller ones, where there are not enough students, they go to a nearby larger village or town centre. Other facilities in

the villages, usually located at central places, are small shops selling food, household items, agricultural inputs and tools; agricultural cooperatives; sometimes restaurants and increasingly, Internet cafes. The governing body, *muhtarlık*, is responsible for defining the priorities of the village, organizing people to carry out the necessary communal works, and communicating the decisions of higher authorities to the villagers and ensuring the public order.

The most important economic activities in the rural areas are agriculture, animal husbandry and forestry. The relative weight of these activities, as well as the type of agricultural products in each village, depends on the location, elevation and access to irrigation. In the lower parts of the northern side, the villages that have access to irrigation are mainly engaged in fruit production, mostly apples but also peaches and cherries. As they produce high value-added fruits, these villages are the relatively better off. At the higher altitudes, and in the lower altitude villages without access to irrigation, grain production is the main activity. Animal husbandry is also more prominent in these villages. At the higher altitudes, forestry, controlled by the local branch of the state forestry department, is another source of income, though it has decreased in importance since the 1990s, as the forest cover diminished and the state established stricter controls on logging. Additionally, villagers collect herbs, chestnuts and mushrooms from the forest, some for household consumption, and some for sale in local markets. The villages in the south are predominantly engaged in olive production. Animal husbandry, forestry, fruit and vegetable production, as well as employment in the tourism sector and commerce contribute to the incomes of the villagers on this side.

Agricultural production in Ida is dominated by small- and medium-sized family farming. The available data at the provincial level on land ownership shows that in Çanakkale only 0.7% of the peasants do not own land. The average size of land holdings is 5.06 hectares, and 75% of them are between 1 and 10 hectares. In Balıkesir, on the other hand, the landless peasants make up 0.8% of the agricultural production units, the average farm size is 3.8 hectares, and 79% of them are between 1 to 10 hectares (TÜİK 2001). These figures indicate that landlessness is uncommon, and that land distribution is relatively equal.

Most people in agriculture work as unpaid family labour, although it is also common to work as temporary day labour. In the fruit- and olive-

producing villages, reciprocal labour exchange without cash payment is a common practice. These villages also employ workers from villages, making a significant contribution to the earnings of these families. The marketing of agricultural products is done mainly through intermediaries who either negotiate with individual families themselves, or have a local branch managed by some member of the village who does the initial buying. In the case of milk and olives, it is also possible to sell directly to a processing firm. Agricultural cooperatives also play a role in marketing.

Apart from their role in marketing the products, agricultural cooperatives are the principal peasant organizations in the region, differentiated according to their membership and governance structures, and their main activities as rural development, sale, credit and irrigation cooperatives. Despite such differences, their activities are not mutually exclusive; for instance, they can all provide cheap credit and inputs, and technical assistance to their members. The activities they engage in depend on the main products in the village in which they are established. For instance, in some forest villages, there are cooperatives that negotiate the amount and type of logging or tree-planting work with the state forestry department, and then distribute the work among its members. In the south, some cooperatives have established companies that produce olive oil.

In the rural areas many people combine agricultural and non-agricultural work such as small business and transport, but especially as wage labour in forestry, industry, quarrying and tourism. Mostly men have worked as wage labour in one or more of these sectors. Hence, most peasant families have or had access to wages and welfare benefits. It is also common to find people who worked in the towns and cities, both within and outside of the region, for some time to return to the village to take care of the family land, in particular after they have retired. All these point to the mobility between different economic activities, and urban and rural areas in Mount Ida. That is, they demonstrate how the socio-economic dynamics of the rural areas are closely integrated into that of the urban areas in the region. Such connections are further aided by their relative proximity and the easy access between them thanks to the road infrastructure and the availability of means of transportation.

The urban centres of the four districts that make up the Mount Ida region have the common characteristic of being administrative and trade centres. However, they exhibit some important differences. The relatively smaller Bayramiç and Ayvacık do not have much industry; there are a

number of food, olive oil and dairy producing enterprises. In Çan, on the other hand, there is a large ceramics factory in operation since 1957. In fact, it was the establishment of the factory that spurred the growth of the town as people from the surrounding rural areas migrated to work there. The majority of the town population has benefited from its existence in one way or another, not only as workers but also due to overall growth of the town's economy. Being located on the southern side of the mountain, Edremit is distinguished for its olive oil industry. The population of the touristic coastal towns increases significantly during the summer, although they also have permanent secondary house residents, especially retirees.

The majority of the permanent residents of these urban centres are originally from the surrounding villages. Their lives also move between the rural and urban areas. For example, some people living in the town centre go and help their families during the harvest time. Some others own houses both in the town and in the village, and live partially in both, or some family members remain in the village while others stay in the town for work or education. In addition to its permanent residents, urban centres provide access to services for the rural residents, such as more specialized health services in the hospitals.

The availability of infrastructure; access to health and education services, and to different employment opportunities and welfare benefits; the production of high-value added products in several villages, and the close links between the rural and urban areas all contribute to the well-being of the people in Ida. This, of course, does not mean that all people live equally comfortably, or that nobody experiences any hardship. Yet, the overall impression one gets in Ida is of a good, pleasant life in a beautiful environment which is supported by the sense of belonging and love for the place that so many people expressed.

4.2.2   The battle of civil Society: gold Mining conflict in Mount Ida

On April 5, 2008, the usual quiet at the main square of Çanakkale was disturbed by more than 10,000 people shouting "Çanakkale geçilmez!" ("They shall not pass Çanakkale!"). The nationally well-known slogan that refers to the Battle of Gallipoli during the First World War was being chanted against the mining companies engaged gold explorations in the region. The protest was the culmination of a process of mobilization

that was going on since the summer of 2007, in protest against the pro-
spect of large-scale gold mining in the Mount Ida region. The protesters
included those under the banners of local, regional and national envi-
ronmental and other NGOs, local government representatives, peasants
and other concerned citizens. They were voicing their concerns over the
possibility of foreign companies appropriating wealth to the detriment of
the local population who would be at the receiving end of the impacts of
mining on the local environment.

Unwelcome arrival of mining: swift and strong reactions

The first mining concessions for gold and other metallic minerals in Biga
Peninsula were granted on the northern side of Mount Ida in the late
1980s. During the 1990s, however, the companies that acquired the con-
cessions did not establish their presence in the area. Only the Turkish
subsidiary *Tüprag* of the Canadian mining company El Dorado Gold, in
agreement with the American Newmont Corporation, conducted some
prospecting and mapping and sampling studies in two project areas,
Kirazlı and *Ağı Dağı*, from 1987 to 1995.[124] A Canadian Company Teck
Cominco acquired the *Ağı Dağı* property in 1995, and conducted explo-
ration activities from 1996 to 1998. The project remained dormant until
2003. In 2004 Teck Cominco also obtained the *Kirazlı* property. From
2004 onwards, after the gold price started to increase and the Turkish
mining law was amended in 2004 (Law No. 5177) to further facilitate the
operation of mining companies, exploration in both project areas intensi-
fied. By 2007, *Kirazlı* and *Ağı Dağı*, jointly owned by the Canadian com-
panies Teck Cominco and its junior partner Fronteer, were the two most
advanced project areas, although more areas were under concession to
different national and international companies.[125]

These intermittent exploration activities in the north of the region,
however, did not meet with opposition for more than a decade. It was
with the arrival in the summer of 2007 of a new mining company, *Global
Madencilik*, in Bahçedere village on the southern side of the mountain
close to the small town (*belde*) of Küçükkuyu that a conflict erupted.
What triggered initial concerns was the contamination of the water sup-
ply of the village, which the villagers believed to be caused by explora-
tion work.[126] The news of contamination soon reached the residents of
Küçükkuyu. A number of retired professionals and public servants, ecol-
ogists who had settled in and around the town, and owners of tourism

facilities located nearby immediately got together to find ways to respond to what they perceived as a great threat to the environment and people of the Mount Ida.[127]

Their first priority was to gather information and publicize the issue. They set up an e-mail group to share information and established a local environmental group named Mount Ida Conservation Initiative. They notified the local media and local and national civil society organizations they had contacts with, such as Southern Marmara Environmental Foundation (GÜMÇED); Guards of the Beautiful Edremit Bay, *Buğday* Association for Supporting Ecological Living, Marmara Environmental Platform[128] (MARÇEP); Aegean Environmental Platform (EGEÇEP); and the Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (TMMOB).[129] They also sought support from journalists, advertisers, academics and other professionals from Istanbul and other metropolitan centres, especially those who owned houses in the region or were frequent visitors.[130] In addition, they started to have meetings in the villages to warn people about the threats that future gold mining activity in the region would pose to their lives and livelihoods. These meetings earned them the support of many peasants living in the villages close to Küçükkuyu, including Bahçedere.[131] Likewise, meetings were organized with civil society actors and local governments to build a broad-based resistance to mining in the region.[132] These initial efforts culminated in a panel held in the town of Küçükkuyu on the 6th of October, 2007, which was attended by more than 1,000 people. The panel ended with a declaration, signed by eight municipal and nine village governments, five local and regional environmental platforms, and 42 civil society organizations. The declaration criticized the mining law for enabling the plundering of national resources and for threatening the environment and human life, and called upon the government to revoke the mining concessions in the region and to refrain from issuing new ones, and asserted the commitment of the participants to struggle together to protect and defend Mount Ida against mining.[133]

The members of the local organizations from the southern part of the mountain (GÜMÇED, Guards of the Beautiful Edremit Bay and Mount Ida Conservation Initiative) are mostly "amenity migrants", predominantly retirees and second homeowners who choose to live in the Mount Ida region to enjoy the environmental qualities of beautiful landscapes, quiet and tranquil surroundings, and clean air and water. Some of them

are also engaged in economic activities in the olive industry, or in other small business (Hurley & Arı 2011: 1403-1404). Among these organizations, it was initially the Mount Ida Conservation Platform that assumed the leadership role, which brought together a more diverse set of social actors than those fitting to the general profile of amenity migrants, including for instance a few ecologists and peasants. As Hurley and Arı (2011: 1405-1407) argue, the possibility that what they came to, and invested in, to enjoy could be spoiled provided a strong motivation for these groups to get mobilized. In fact, in their arguments against mining, many of them strongly emphasized the unique environmental qualities of the region and the need to protect and preserve them. They claimed that Mount Ida's rich biodiversity, endemic species, clean air and water, as well as the cultural heritage it housed qualified it among the "first places on earth to be conserved".[134]

The olive-producing peasants living on the southern outskirts of Mount Ida joined the anti-mining resistance movement because they were worried that mining would cause soil and water contamination, which would harm olive production, or even if that did not happen that it would impact the sales, for consumers would not be willing to buy products of olive orchards located next to a gold mine. As Mehmet, an old male peasant from Bahcedere village said:[135]

> If it [the gold mine] will deprive us from our source of income and if it will contaminate our water, why would we want it to operate? Our water and olives will be poisoned... The gold underground is for 10 years only, what we have above the ground is of value for a hundred years to come.

Beyond the expected impact of mining on their income, the peasants also expressed concern about how mining would affect their daily lives. For instance, in the same meeting, another old peasant from Bahcedere, Bekir, expressed his uneasiness about the possible disturbances to their daily lives: "The mining site is very close to the village. There will be quakes because of blasting, dust and noise as well. Our homes will collapse".

The owners of tourism facilities were quite understandably worried about the potential negative impacts of large-scale gold mining on their business. Ahmet, the most vocal and powerful of them—not only in economic terms but also by virtue of his profession as a lawyer and his political and social connections—was the owner of the largest ecotour-

ism facility in the region, the establishment of which almost completely transformed Yeşilyurt, the village in which it is located. Almost all the beautiful houses of the village have been converted into boutique hotels, restaurants and shops selling a variety of local products such as artisanal olive oil, cosmetics made from olive oil and herbs, and crafts. Talking in one hall of his facility with its wide windows overlooking the green hills of Mount Ida covered in olive and pine trees, and the blue waters of Edremit Bay, the owner explained his reasons for opposition as follows:[136]

> Tourists come here to enjoy the beautiful landscapes, clean air and water, the healthy local products. Who would choose to come if what they see from this window is a huge hole in the ground, what they breathe is dust and what they hear is industrial noise and explosions rather than birdsong?

As his statement clearly demonstrates, the material interests of ecotourism business owners were an important factor in their opposition to mining. Yet, it was also the case that many of them chose to invest in their ecotourism business to be able to live in a pleasant environment and to provide an alternative to the more conventional "sea-sand-sun" mass tourism in the region.[137] In that sense, according to them, ecotourism was not only new business but also a new culture, therefore it should not be sacrificed for the sake of mining.[138]

Broadening the resistance

Paralleling the efforts on the southern side of the mountain was the establishment of the Çanakkale Environmental Platform by a group of people based in the city centre of Çanakkale, which is about 150 km away from the area. The platform united existing civil society organizations in the city, such as the local branches of Chamber of Agricultural Engineers, The Bar Association, the Turkish Medical Association, and Turkey's Education and Science Workers Union (Egitim-Sen), Çanakkale Women's Union and Çanakkale Environmental Foundation. In addition to these organizations, academics from the two universities in the region, Çanakkale 18 Mart University and Balıkesir University, got involved in the conflict, contributing with their expertise and providing scientific information that helped opposition groups advance stronger arguments against mining. These academics were present in many of the panels or-

ganized in the region, and made presentations on the geography, history, archeology and social structure of the region.[139] The majority of the members of these organizations, as well as the academics, were typically from the educated, professional urban middle classes. Rather than a concern about the direct impact of mining on their income or lives, what motivated them to engage in the struggle was a combination of environmental values, political beliefs, their perceptions regarding the character of the region, their priorities for its future development, and their resentment of the government's disregard for such priorities. A famous slogan of the resistance vividly expressed these views: "The gold of Mount Ida is olives, fruits, forests, clean air and water". Similarly, Mustafa, the spokesperson of the Çanakkale Environmental Platform explained:[140]

> Çanakkale and Balıkesir are agricultural zones, there is a lot of product variety, and thanks to the environmental conditions, you can harvest certain products even three times a year…Olives, apples, peaches, cherries, tomatoes, the Ezine cheese[141]…Some are being exported…Agriculture has continuity, gold mining will just be for ten to fifteen years, and will harm the agriculture, will deplete and contaminate the water…As long as there will be cyanide we are against this, we do not want cyanide anywhere in our region.

The conflict over mining thus involves an encounter between different and, according to opposition groups, incompatible approaches to local development. And not only mining, but also other energy and infrastructure projects are seen as a threat to the local development model promoted by civil society organizations for the region. As a member of the Çanakkale City Environmental Council, Evren emphasized:[142]

> Gold mining is unacceptable in this region, either from an economic, cultural, social or environmental perspective. But mining is just one issue, there are other threats to the environment, the thermic power plants, the bridge over the Çanakkale strait, the yacht marina…the Council is trying to engage with all these.

Local governments from Çanakkale and the Edremit Bay region of the Balıkesir province also shared this vision about the local development priorities of the region. That was one important reason why the municipalities of the region lent support to the opposition groups from the very beginning of the struggle. In November 2007, 17 municipal

governments from the two provinces formed the "Union of Mount Ida and Madra Mountain Municipalities" to work together as local governments for the protection of ecosystem health and balance in the region in collaboration the civil society actors.[143] More specifically, the Union aimed at coordinating efforts to protest against mining, and their main contribution was to provide financial support to the resistance groups, for instance, by paying for the organization of the protests and the transportation of people to demonstrations, as well as for the banners, posters and other material used for publicity campaigns. [144]

The party affiliations of the majority of the municipalities explain to a certain extent their immediate reaction. As almost all of them were from the opposition party CHP, it was easy for them to criticize the government for issuing permits for explorations. Moreover, most civil society organizations opposing mining were known to be hostile to the government, to different degrees and for different reasons, and in the polarized political environment of Turkey, that usually meant support, sometimes a bit half-heartedly, for CHP. In addition, in some towns, municipalities made an effort to improve civil society participation in municipal affairs. For instance, Çanakkale was one of the first cities to engage in the process of establishing participatory local governance structures in Turkey in the context of Local Agenda 21 of the Rio Summit, and have institutionalized civil society participation through the City Council. Hence, there were already connections, though not necessarily without any conflict, between the local governments and civil society actors.[145] Thanks to their shared political views, especially their opposition to the AKP government, and their cooperation in setting the development priorities of the region, the alliance between the local governments and civil society actors against mining was established rather easily, and provided stronger legitimacy to the opposition.

An important consequence of the engagement of local governments, and the more politicized civil society actors was the increasing emphasis on the foreign ownership of the mining projects as a reason to oppose them. Reflecting the nationalist left critique of the government on the basis of a deepening neoliberalism and favouring of interests of global capital over national interests, opposition actors in Ida increasingly framed the issue as the attempt of "imperialists" to exploit country's resources through environmentally devastating cyanide-leaching gold mining. Nermin, a middle-aged female representative from Mount Ida Con-

servation Initiative, who later became the secretary of the union of municipalities, clearly expressed this view:[146]

> I oppose gold mining because it is against our national interest. Mining should be done by the state in line with the input requirements of domestic industry. Foreign companies and their compradors will exploit our natural resources. The mining law enables this. In line with the neoliberal policies of the IMF and the World Bank, mining laws in developing countries have been altered to serve the interests of multinationals and developed countries.

Indeed, the Mining Law was specifically targeted in that it permitted foreign firms to operate in environmentally sensitive and historically and culturally significant locations, and was branded as the "plunder law". It was argued that Law No. 5177, Amendment to the Mining Law and Certain Other Laws, enacted in 2004, served the interest of foreign mining corporations as it incorporated demands of these firms to lift all barriers to mining, in particular those related to environmental regulations.[147] Therefore, opposing groups demanded that the law be modified to better serve the national interest and to protect the natural environment. As the Mining Law was amended during the office of the governing party AKP, for those groups who positioned themselves against AKP, the gold mining issue opened a new space for opposition politics. In the Çanakkale context, the government was said to betray those who died in Çanakkale in the Battle of Gallipoli during the First World War by issuing permits to "imperialists". In the words of the mayor of the Bayramiç town:[148]

> The government is after its own interests. Atatürk foresaw these things, he said days might come when those who govern sell out the country; they might be oblivious, go astray or commit treason.[149] Those who died in Çanakkale, will not they say after I die 'we fought with the imperialists, what did you do?'…My forefathers, will they not tell me that I did not fulfil my duty?

Local governments and civil society organizations from Çanakkale united under the Çanakkale Environmental Platform, and those from the south formed a broad-based alliance that led the struggle against mining. From October 2007 to April 2008, the resistance was at its peak. These mining opponents followed up and communicated the developments regarding the projects to the public via local and national media, and or-

ganized several panel discussions and meetings about mining. Although most of these events took place in the town and city centres, the opposition groups also visited several villages to conduct meetings to "enlighten" villagers about gold mining. All these efforts culminated in the aforementioned large protest in city centre of Çanakkale on April 5, 2008,[150] organized by the Mount Ida and Madra Mountain Environmental Platform. The call[151] for the protests announced:

> In our great meeting on April 5 at 13:00 in the Çanakkale Republic Square, by the side of the revered martyrs of The Gallipoli War, the symbol of the defence of the homeland, we will clamour with determination that we will defend our life and homeland against the transnational gold and silver monopolies and their native compradors.

About 10,000 people, not only from the region but also from İzmir, Istanbul and other cities, some brought there by the opposition party CHP or NGOs known for their hostility towards the government, participated in the protest. The mayor of Çanakkale city, as well as the mayors of several towns from Çanakkale and Balıkesir, gave speeches to a public covered in the red color of the national flag, telling them to stay united to stop the destruction of Mount Ida for the sake of the economic benefits of a handful of transnational companies.

Mount Ida on the national public agenda

Although the conflict at Mount Ida started locally, it did not remain so for long. In quite a short time, in October 2007, the ongoing mining activities in the region made it to the front page of popular national newspapers, which presented the issue as the destruction of a highly valuable natural environment, a national wealth. For instance, the headlines of two articles that appeared in the prominent national newspaper Milliyet, October 17 and 18, 2007 read: "Mount Ida has been riddled with holes!" and "Mount Ida carved day and night".[152] Several debates about the environmental and social impacts of large-scale gold mining followed in newspapers, on websites, national radio and television, in which academics, engineers, journalists and environmentalists participated. For example, one well-known journalist wrote several times about the issue in his column in the *Radikal* newspaper, arguing that Ida Mountain is a "natural and historic treasure" that faces a serious threat.[153] Similarly, on *Açık*

Radyo, a radio station broadcasting in Istanbul, several discussions with journalists and academics about the issue were held.[154]

Several factors contributed to the generation of such swift reactions. Availability of information about gold mining and the readiness of people to disseminate that information was the legacy of the Bergama resistance against gold mining during the 1990s. Moreover, as mentioned in the previous chapter, although the Bergama resistance did not succeed in preventing the mine from operating, it molded a negative public image of gold mining. Added to these was the wide appreciation of Mount Ida as an environmentally and culturally unique place, in particular among the middle classes and elites of nearby urban centres. Consequently, the debates mushroomed very quickly and readily found a receptive audience.

National environmental NGOs, such as the Turkish Foundation for the Fight against Erosion and Reforestation (TEMA) and BirdLife International's Partner in Turkey (*Doğa Derneği*), also lent support to the burgeoning resistance. For instance, *Doğa Derneği*, the *Buğday* Association for Supporting Ecological Living and the nature magazine *Atlas* organized a public tour to Mount Ida on October 27-29, 2007, to show their position against mining in the region, while TEMA carried the discussion to its bimonthly magazine, *Yeşiliz* (January-February, 2008). The most sustained contribution, however, came from the Chamber of Geological Engineers. One prominent member of the organization was present at numerous seminars and village meetings, sharing with participants his knowledge on technical aspects of mining and its environmental impacts.

At the regional level, MARÇEP and EGEÇEP showed strong solidarity. For instance, MARÇEP started a petition campaign addressed to the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources to stop the operations of mining companies in the region, while lawyers from EGEÇEP offered legal advice and, when necessary, took up the legal struggle. Moreover, several members of parliament from the opposition party of CHP and the far-right Nationalist Action Party (MHP) visited the region and brought the issue to parliament.[155] A leftist parliamentary from the Freedom and Solidarity Party (ÖDP) made a formal request that demanded an explanation from the government as to the justification for issuing permits in an environmentally valuable region, and to give an account of the manner in which the concerns of the local population were being addressed.[156]

Having earned broad support from the local population and numerous civil society organizations, and managing to publicize the issue at a national scale, the opposition groups succeeded in putting pressure on the government and the mining companies. The government temporarily suspended the permitting processes, resulting the companies suspending operations for a while.[157] During late 2008 and 2009 the conflict seemed to have subsided. The success was sweet but short-lived.

Responses from the government and the companies

The rapid and formidable reaction to the mining activities in the Mount Ida region forced both mining companies and the government to respond. As soon as reports about the mining explorations in the region started appearing in the national media in October 2007, the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, Hilmi Güler, and the Minister of Environment and Forestry at the time made several declarations to counter the criticisms. Hilmi Güler, for instance, emphasized on several occasions that exploration activities had minimal environmental impacts and did not involve the use of cyanide. He tried to reassure the public saying that companies would be required to carry out EIAs in the process of which the concerns of the local population would be taken into account, and that the state would not allow any activity that poses serious threats to human life and the environment.[158] He also claimed that the opposition actors were misinforming the people and that "external actors" trying to hinder Turkey's development were behind the opposition. He stated: "There are other mines in Turkey. But when the issue is gold, I think some foreign-linked groups who do not want to let our country's riches in gold get involved".[159] The Minister also attended a panel organized by the mining firms and their civil organization, the Foundation for the Development of Homeland Mining (*Yurt Madenciliğini Geliştirme Vakfı*), organized in Çanakkale on October 27, 2007.[160] People from the opposition groups were also present at the occasion to voice their concerns. On the same day, they demonstrated in the city centre and issued a press release expressing their demands. Pressurized by the opposition, Güler declared in the meeting that the mining law could be revised if necessary, and that no action would be taken without the consent of the local population.[161] The opposing parties, however, interpreted these statements more as a public relations strategy than a genuine acknowledgement of their concerns.[162] The Minister of Environment, on the

other hand, pointed out that the explorations were being carried out outside the National Park area and if there were any irregularities or environmental damage, the necessary steps according to the law would be taken.[163]

In October 2007, The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources sent a team of two people to investigate the mining activities in the region. They visited the exploration sites, but did not meet with the local authorities or the representatives of the opposition groups.[164] On July 12, 2008, newspapers made public some details of the report on gold mining prepared by the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources in November 2007. The report included information on companies, land coverage of exploration and operation permits, number of drillings and estimated reserves. It established that any mining activity within the National Park would be subject to the decision of the Council of Ministers and recommended that the mining activities in the region be monitored regularly. The report also acknowledged the concerns of the local population in relation to cyanide use and involvement of foreign companies, and suggested that to address these concerns "[c]ontrol mechanisms of all the involved state agencies should be enforced at every stage of mining operations and local population's support should be earned by enlightening people and establishing trust".[165]

The government also sought support from academics. After a meeting with officials from the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources on October 20, 2007, several academics from mining engineering department of various universities gave a press release arguing that the arguments around environmental impacts of gold mining that appeared in the media did not reflect the truth and mining of all mineral resources was indispensable for development. The press release read:[166]

> It is observed that recently attempts were made to create a negative public impression of the gold explorations in the Çanakkale region in particular and of mining activities in general. People without knowledge on the subject are making numerous unfounded claims…As the academics who attended the meeting, we emphasize that all types of mining activities are indispensable for the development of the country and share with the public that the recent claims in the media do not reflect the truth.

The mining companies and their organizations, tried to counter the charges against them by emphasizing that Turkey has to effectively uti-

lize its natural resources in the course of development. Their primary claim was that, in contrast to what the mining opponents claimed, the environmental effects of gold mining can adequately be managed by state-of-the-art technologies and that the opposing parties were intentionally exaggerating the environmental impacts. The companies stressed that all their activities were legal and under close surveillance of the state agencies. They demanded the debate on gold mining be conducted exclusively on scientific and technical terms, and that it not be contaminated by politics. They argued that the claims against cyanide-leaching gold mining were not based on scientific evidence and that the opposing parties were acting on their ideological orientations and distorting the truth. Some common tools used in their defence were examples of gold mines from around the world located close to urban settlements, or rehabilitated mine sites used to show that environmental impacts could be managed successfull. To allay charges of being agents of exploitation, the expected income from gold mining, employment generation, a decline in gold imports and an increase in local economic activity through the multiplier effect were highlighted. These arguments appeared in the booklet the Gold Miners Association prepared and distributed, as well as in the statements of company managers in the media and in the writings of journalists in favour of gold mining.[167]

These arguments and declarations of the government and mining companies proved to be rather futile and unconvincing as the opposition continued, and got even stronger. The solution of the government was to slow down the permitting processes, and of the mining companies to reduce the intensity of the explorations and concentrate on public relations in the villages.[168] Yet this situation proved to be temporary. The mining activities gained pace once again in 2010, and since then there have been considerable advances in many projects all over the Biga Peninsula.

The companies strike back: advances in the projects

In January 2010, the Canadian company Alamos purchased the *Ağı Dağı* and *Kirazlı* [169] gold properties. According to the information provided in the technical report of the company (Kappes, Cassiday & Associates 2012), the *Ağı Dağı* property covers an area of 10,525 hectares, while *Kirazlı* property has 1,540 hectares. Since their acquisition, Alamos brought the projects to the late-development stage and made progress in

the process of obtaining permits. The Ministry of Environment and Urbanization approved the EIAs for the two projects in 2014 and 2013, respectively. These were initially cancelled by court rulings, but both rulings were overturned in 2015, hence by August 2016 the company had the approval for an EIA.[170] The anticipated life of the projects are 5 years for *Kirazlı* and 7 years for *Ağı Dağı*, and the estimates for production are 15.4 tonnes of gold and 93.5 tonnes of silver, and 31.1 tonnes of gold and 59 tons of silver for the two projects, respectively. Both projects are planned as open pit (two pits in *Ağı Dağı*), heap-leaching operations, with each mine having its own heap leach facility. The company continues to explore other target areas within the concessions, and depending on the results can expand the projects (Kappes, Cassiday & Associates 2012). One important issue mentioned in the technical report of the company is that the mining operations in both areas will impact water supply (used for drinking, domestic and irrigation purposes) of several nearby villages[171] and part of the town centre of Çan, hence an alternative water supply needs to be provided. The company plans to construct a new reservoir close to the *Ağı Dağı* property that will supply drinking water for the communities and process water for mining operations in both projects, although no mention is made of how the water used in agriculture will be provided (Kappes, Cassiday & Associates 2012).

In addition to these two projects, there has been progress in some others. The company Fronteer gold was acquired in 2011 by one of the largest gold producing companies, the US-based Newmont Mining Corporation, and changed its name to Pilot Gold. Through its Turkish subsidiaries, Pilot Gold operates the two projects[172] *Halilağa* and *TV Tower*, located quite close to the projects owned by Alamos. The *Halilağa* concession covers 8,866 hectares and *TV Tower* covers 9,066 hectares[173] (JDS Energy & Mining Inc. 2015, SRK Consulting 2014). By August 2016, both projects are still at the exploration stages.[174] Additionally, a Turkish company called *TÜMAD* has been developing a gold mine in the Lapseki district. *TÜMAD* acquired the project in 2014, and started the construction works in July 2016. The company expects to start production at the mine in the last quarter of 2017. [175]

The projects of Alamos and Pilot Gold are not the only ones in the Biga Peninsula.[176] However, not much information is available on the others and it is not certain whether they will proceed or not. What is

clear is that the residents of Biga Peninsula, and specifically of the Mount Ida region, will be seeing more mining companies around for some time.

Mining companies and the peasants

In all these projects, mining companies have employed people from the villages closer to the mining sites. For instance, *Kuzey Truva Madencilik*, one of the Turkish subsidiaries of Alamos Gold, employs around a hundred people from Söğütalan, Karaköy and Kızılelma, the villages closest to the *Ağı Dağı* property.[177] As the village headman of Sogutalan, Murat, remarked:[178]

> It is mostly the younger men who work for the company, they work for eight or nine months, with social security, but not during the winter. They do drilling basically, placing and removing tubes from the machines…Those who work, yes, they want this [mining] to go on, they are benefiting in the end.

Moreover, companies have been investing in social responsibility programmes in these villages. For example, in Etili village, *Kuzey Truva Madencilik* has helped with the renovation of the mosque, donated waste bins with the company's name written on them, and distributed stationery for school children.[179] The peasants seemed content with the "help" that the companies have been providing. The headmen of the villages Söğütalan and Muratlar (where the company *Truva Bakır Maden İşletmeleri* is working) both said that so far, whenever they asked something for the village from the companies, they provided it.[180] Despite these positive views, peasants in these villages were still concerned about the water provision and the possibility of water contamination. In Muratlar, the village headman İbrahim indicated:[181]

> The water supply of the village is close to the mine site. And they told us that it had too much arsenic. Now they are looking, they told us they will bring us water from elsewhere. Let's see.

Likewise, in Söğütalan, Murat stated:

> They [the company] can extract the gold, but we don't want the tailings dam here, on top of the village…Our water became sticky a couple of times because of the drillings. They [the company] say our water isn't drinkable anyway, that they will build a reservoir. They should do it. But

one company comes and promises, and then leaves. They bring our wa-
ter, and then do what they want.

Not all people in these villages, however, were happy about the min-
ing activities. There were even some working for the companies who
would have preferred not have the projects.[182] The existence of peasants
who worked for the companies and/or who thought that mining would
benefit the local economy and those opposing mining created divisions
and tensions within and between villages. The arguments concerning
whether and to what extent mining would be harmful for the local
communities among the men during the discussions in the village coffee
houses in Muratlar, Asagi Sapcilar and Söğütalan demonstrated these di-
visions and tensions. In Muratlar, for instance, while supporters criti-
cized the opponents for playing into the hands of civil society actors or
political party members who act "ideologically" and use mining as a pre-
text to further their own political agendas, the opponents blamed the
supporters for sacrificing the well-being of the communities for their
own individual self-interest.

Nevertheless, those who worked for the company did not always
adopt a strong and coherent position. One middle-aged man from Asagi
Sapcilar, for instance, said: "I do work for the company but not willingly.
If I don't so, somebody else will". Some others even said that they
signed the petitions and attended the protests against mining in the re-
gion. According to a news article[183] dated January 30, 2012, in Muratlar
the villagers even decided to cut all their ties with the mining company,
and prevent it from entering the village. Still, by July 2012, these deci-
sions were clearly not being implemented. The common explanation of
these people was that they did not want mining, but since they had noth-
ing to do to stop it, they might as well try to benefit form it. It could be
argued that in these villages where the companies established themselves,
some peasants became, not so much supportive, but more accepting of
mining.

The divisions within the local communities and the continuing oppo-
sition to gold mining in the region became particularly clear when the
mining companies initiated the socialization process of their projects.
Between 2010 and 2012, the mining companies started to organize "pub-
lic participation meetings" in some villages close to the mining sites as
part of the EIA process which required them to inform the public about
the projects and to listen to their concerns in order to address them in

the EIA. However, in several villages, the meetings could not be organized due to the reaction of the villagers. In some villages, such as Karaköy or Kuşçayırı, people simply refused to attend. In others, for instance in Kızılelma, Muratlar and Söğütalan, villagers joined by others from surrounding villages, civil society organizations from the town centres and the city centre of Çanakkale, and local government representatives protested against the company, preventing them from giving their presentations.[184] In all these meetings, gendarmerie forces accompanied the company employees and the officials from the Ministry of Environment. In the case of Kızılelma, the gendarmerie even closed the routes to the village to prevent those who came from other parts to join the villagers.[185]

In the EIA meeting in Kirazlı, in which in addition to many civil society organizations, the Çanakkale PM from the opposition party CHP, the mayor of Çanakkale and the members of the Çanakkale municipal council were present, there were tensions between the security guards employed by the company and protesters. The security guards tried to prevent some people, for example, lawyers and environmentalists from Çanakkale and the members of the Kirazlı village council, from entering the meeting venue.[186] The presence of women in all these protests was especially strong, many of them being at the forefront of those facing the gendarmes. These protests, however, were not a significant obstacle for the mining companies; after making a note of "the villagers did not allow the meeting to take place" in the minutes, they could go ahead with the EIA process as usual.[187]

In one case, however, in the Şahinli village in the Lapseki district where the Turkish company *TÜMAD Madencilik* was developing a gold-silver mining project, on the day of the EIA meeting on December 24, 2014, some villagers together with the company personnel prevented the representatives of Çanakkale Environmental Platform to enter the meeting.[188] It seemed that the mining company working in that area managed to gain support of at least part of the local community and the divisions among the local population around the mining issue was more pronounced than what the anti-mining organizations accepted.

The advances in the projects, particularly in the EIA process despite the broad-based opposition showed once again the determination of the government to develop the precious metal production in the country. In addition to the gold mine in Bergama that started operating with support

from the previous coalition government between centre-left, centre-right and far-right parties, during the rule of the AKP government seven more gold mines started operating all over the country, the one in the province of Usak being the largest gold mine in Europe. The deployment of state security forces to "provide security" to the mining company personnel during the protests against the EIA meetings was a clear message that the government is ready to use force if and when necessary to realize these projects.[189] In fact, in a similar local environmental struggle against a coal power plant near a town on the Black Sea coast, the police used teargas against the group of peasants and urban residents of the town gathered to stop the drilling machines to enter the proposed plant site (Arsel et al. 2015: 378). Although this did not yet happen in Ida, the peasants and civil society actors did have sufficient reason to fear that it could.

The main concern that has motivated many villagers to participate in these protests has not changed since 2007-2008, it was still the will to defend their livelihoods, expressed increasingly in relation to the potential impacts of mining activities on water resources.[190] Many villagers, especially those engaged in irrigated farming, were afraid that mining would cause water scarcity and contamination. In the words of Derya, a young woman from Evciler village, working in her own apple orchard "[o]ur water is barely enough for our own apples. If they want so badly to do mining, they should go and do it somewhere where it's dry".[191]

These concerns proved not to be unfounded, as so often claimed by representatives of companies and the government. In March 2013, people of Karaköy located west of the *Ağı Dağı* project area saw the water in some creeks around the village flowing white. They immediately informed the gendarmerie and the local government who arrived in the village to take samples. The village government and the development cooperative made an official complaint to the local attorney. Some villagers wanted to march to the mining site, but were stopped by the gendarmerie. The inspection of water samples by the Provincial Directorate of the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization confirmed that the water was contaminated with chemical substances used in explorations, and the company was fined.[192]

A new chapter in the story of resistance

While by 2012 more peasants seemed to convince themselves of the futility of resistance, civil society organizations and most of the local governments still considered mining as an unacceptable threat and were willing to keep fighting. That was why, as mining activities in Mount Ida region paced up in 2010, they intensified their efforts. What triggered this was the revelation of new developments in the projects. On March 29, 2010, the local newspaper *Çanakkale Olay,* which had published extensively on the issue in 2007 and 2008, alerted the public that the chair of the Gold Miner's Association had announced that gold production in *Ağı Dağı* was expected to start in a couple of years.[193] The news article included information on the acquisition of two mining properties by Alamos Gold, and a short statement by the representatives of the new company on their commitment to corporate social responsibility and environmental sustainability. The next day, the reaction of the headman of the village Etili where the company's field office is located was reported.[194] The representative of the village was expressing his concern about the lack of information sharing, saying they had no idea about what was happening with the projects. The following day, it was the spokesperson of Çanakkale Environmental Platform protesting against the secrecy of the deal.[195] From then onwards, mining activities were once again on the local public agenda, and the opposition groups relaunched their anti-gold-mining campaign.

The members of the organizations leading the anti-mining resistance, the Mount Ida Conservation Initiative, which became a formal association in 2012 named Association for the Protection of the Natural and Cultural Wealth of Mount Ida, and Çanakkale Environmental Platform, with the support of local governments again took the lead in the struggle, organizing meetings and protests, inviting speakers and communicating with media. As it was the case previously, press conferences, seminars and panels about the mining threat in the region, the proposed changes in the mining law, and the law on protection of nature and biological diversity[196] were the main activities the opposition groups resorted to.

As mentioned above, these organizations also participated in the protests against the EIA meetings, arranging bus trips from the town and city centres to the villages.[197] They often visited these villages before the companies came to hold EIA meetings.[198] Similar to those in 2007 and 2008, these visits were to "inform the people" through the talks about

the harmful impacts of mining given by the members of these organizations and experts from universities or professional organizations. A professor at the Çanakkale 18 Mart University and a member of the Çanakkale Environmental Platform who were among those who gave several talks indicated: [199]

> We told people the truth: what is gold mining, what impacts it will have, what awaits us…We tell them so that they know what to ask [to the companies]. With the information we provide, people mobilize to defend their water, their environment.

These efforts to mobilize the people culminated in the protest organized by Çanakkale Environmental Platform under the name "Cyanide-peddling company, leave the homeland!" in the Etili village on June 3, 2012. On that day, around 2,000 people shouted once more that they did not want any gold mine in Mount Ida and even less any transnational mining companies interested in exploiting the wealth of the country.[200] Although the protests were seen as a success for bringing together diverse groups from the region, even the organizers themselves accepted that the participation of the peasants was weak.[201]

After the wave of EIA meetings in the region from 2010 to 2012, the civil society organizations kept on organizing panels and seminars in the town and city centres. For instance, during the International Troy Festival held on August 10-13, 2012, in the city centre of Çanakkale, there was a public exhibition on gold mining with posters on its social and environmental impacts and struggles against mining from all around the world. Moreover, two panels were organized in a public park on the issue, in which two academics from Çanakkale 18 Mart University, a doctor representing the Çanakkale branch of Turkish Doctors' Association, the spokesperson of Çanakkale Environmental Platform, and an influential journalist who frequently visits the region participated.[202] Although gold mining was the main issue in the debates in all these events, other environmental problems facing the people of Mount Ida, but also the larger Biga Peninsula, were addressed together. Among those problems the most pressing one, as threatening as gold mining according to environmentalists, was more than ten thermic power plants operating or being constructed all around the Peninsula. The perception of many participating in these meetings was that the whole region was "under siege", that the "life spaces were being invaded".

A common opinion voiced in the email groups, newspaper columns,[203] and in the meetings[204] was that to be able to defend the region against such environmentally destructive activities ties with the villagers should be strengthened and their support should be secured. The informative meetings in the villages were supposed to achieve this aim. Such was the meeting organized on World Water Day, on March 22 2013 by the Çanakkale Environmental Platform organized solely for women in the Evciler village. Around 250 women from *Evciler* and other villages from the region came together in this event and expressed their commitment to struggle against gold mining.[205] The organizations also tried new ways of relating to the peasants. For instance, they organized a *kermes* (kind of a fair or charity sale) in Evciler village in April 2014 where the peasants sold food and artisanal items to the visitors from the city.[206] Nonetheless, one journalist who had been covering the mining conflict in Mount Ida for the newspaper *Evrensel* extensively since it started was still making the same point regarding the need to better organize and mobilize the villagers in an interview he gave to the local newspaper *Çanakkale Olay* in August 2016.[207]

In addition to the continuing efforts at the local level, the anti-mining organizations in Mount Ida started taking legal action as the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization issued 'positive decisions' for EIAs despite the protests. In fact, such legal struggles around the EIA decisions occupy a central place in environmental conflicts in Turkey. In almost all controversial projects—energy, mining, infrastructure, urban transformation and others—where there is some civil society resistance, legal cases are presented detailing the errors and inadequacies of the EIAs. The injunctions against the EIAs, however, do not completely halt the projects. It is possible to improve and resubmit the EIA studies with the required additions. Yet, such court decisions often delay the projects and exact additional costs on the companies. The regulation governing the EIA process have been revised numerous times since it was first issued in 1993, and many civil society actors participating in the legal struggles around the EIA interpret those changes as a way to insulate the investments from the court decisions that halt or delay them.[208]In Mount Ida, the Çanakkale Bar Association, citizens presented legal cases against the EIA decisions of the Ministry in 2013. The Çanakkale Administrative Court annulled the EIA decisions concerning six projects in 2014.[209] However, the Ministry appealed the decisions, and at the same time the

companies made the required additions in the EIA studies, as a result of which four of these projects had positive EIA decisions by August 2016.[210]

In conclusion, by August 2016, several gold-silver-copper mining projects in the Mount Ida region were advancing, although production had not started yet. The civil society organizations and local governments who spearheaded the struggle in the region since the beginning in 2007 were still trying to mobilize the peasants and the urban residents of the region to put pressure on the government and companies to withdraw. They were also engaging in legal struggles to stop the projects. However, on both fronts they seemed to be in difficulty. Since 2010, the mining companies have managed to gain, if not support, at least acceptanc for the projects by part of the local population. While there are still many peasants opposing gold mining in the region, local communities are clearly divided. On the legal front, the opposition groups could only suspend the projects for a while, but were unable to stop them permanently. Whether any of these projects will in the end reach the production stage and when is still uncertain. Yet given that the companies already invested significantly, it is likely that they will try to pursue them further. What is certain is that, if not the peasants, the anti-mining organizations in Mount Ida will surely continue their struggle to stop that from happening.

4.3   Intag and Mount Ida Conflicts: A Summary

To conclude this chapter, Table 4.1 below summarizes the information provided in the detailed accounts of the two cases. A few points should be noted. In this study, I do not address the way in which the materiality of resources and their geography (i.e. the biophysical characteristics of the environments where they are located) bear on the political dynamics in environmental struggles (see e.g. Bakker & Bridge 2006). However, the fact that the minerals involved and the production technologies in the two projects are different, and that the proposed projects are located in biophysically different regions is not inconsequential for the politics of resistance in the two cases. For instance, while gold is a precious metal used principally for jewellery, copper is a base metal with industrial applications (especially electrical wires). So, while calls for banning gold production—as there are in the European Union, for instance—can be

Table 4.1:
A summary of the mining conflicts in Intag and Mount Ida

	Intag	**Mount Ida**
Commodities	Copper, molybdenum	Gold, silver
Type of mining	Open-cast	Open-cast, heap leach (cyanide)
Companies	• Bishi Metals (1991-1997) • Ascendant Copper (later Copper Mesa, 2004-2007) • CODELCO & ENAMI EP (2012-present)	• Teck Cominco (1995-2006) • Teck Cominco & Fronteer (2006-2010) • Alamos Gold (2010-present)
Status of the Project(s)	Advanced exploration stage	Permitting (*Ağı Dağı*), Permitting & construction work commenced (*Kirazlı*)
Mobilizing Groups	• Peasants • Local civil society and community organizations (e.g. DECOIN, AACRI, *Coordinadora de Mujeres de Intag*, UNORCAC) • Local government (except between 2009-2014) and cantonal assembly • National civil society organizations (*Acción Ecológica*, CEDHU) • International organizations and networks (e.g. Mining Watch Canada, Rettet den Regenwald, Rainforest Action Network)	• Peasants • Citizens from regional urban centres • Local civil society organizations (e.g. Mount Ida Conservation Initiative, Çanakkale Environmental Platform, GÜMÇED) • Local governments • Scientists from local universities • Regional and national civil society organizations (e.g. EGEÇEP, Chamber of Geological Engineers, TEMA) • Local and national media
Forms of mobilization	• Protests & demonstrations • Blocking access to mining site • Developing income generating activities as alterna-	• Protests & demonstrations • Village meetings • Panels, seminars in regional urban centres

	Intag	Mount Ida
	tives to mining • Local organization building • Conservation projects • Environmental education campaigns • Local assemblies & government decisions • Lawsuits & court cases (e.g. legal challenges to EIA studies) • International campaigns • Alliance building with national and international organizations • Media activism (e.g. blogs, videos, documentaries)	• Local organization building (e.g. Mount Ida Conservation Initiative, Union of Municipalities) • Lawsuits & court cases (e.g. legal challenges to EIA studies) • Disrupting & preventing EIA public consultation meetings in villages • Alliance building with regional and national organizations • Media activism (e.g. blogs, newspaper columns, e-mail groups)
Vocabularies of resistance and slogans	• Protection of peasant livelihoods & way of life • Protection of biodiversity & water resources & forests • Alternative local/territorial development • Rights to participate in decision-making • Right to live in a healthy environment • Human rights • *No a la minería!* (No to mining!), *Intag libre de minería!* (Intag free of mining!), *Intag libre de contaminación!* (Intag free of contamination!), *Ascendant fuera de Intag* (Ascendant out of Intag), *CODELCO fuera de Intag* (CODELCO out of Intag)	• Protection of peasant livelihoods & way of life • Protection of water resources & endemic species & forests • Mining as a threat to local economic activities (agriculture, tourism, forestry) • Right to live in a healthy environment • Contribution of local economic activities to national development • Opposition to exploitation of national resources • *Kazdagi hayattir, hayat satilamaz!* (Mount Ida is life, life is not for sale!), *Kazdaginin ustu altindan* degerlidir!* (What is above Mount Ida is more valuable than what

	Intag	Mount Ida
		is beneath [gold]), *Altinci Filo** Kazdagindan defol!* (Gold seeking fleet get out of Mount Ida!)
Environmental and social impacts (observed and anticipated)	• Loss of livelihood & land dispossession • Loss of way of life & place attachment • Water and soil contamination • Negative health impacts Deforestation Biodiversity loss • Loss of landscape/ aesthetic degradation • Social divisions • Human rights abuses • Repression & criminalization of mining opponents	• Loss of livelihood and income & negative impact on existing local economic activities • Loss of way of life & place attachment • Water contamination and scarcity • Negative health impacts (especially due to cyanide use) • Loss of regional identity • Loss of landscape/ aesthetic degradation

*There is a twist in the language in this slogan. The Turkish translation for gold is "*altın*", the "*altından*" word in the slogan simultaneously means "from what is beneath" and "from gold".

** This slogan makes reference to a slogan in the protests in Istanbul against the arrival of the American Sixth Fleet at the Bosporus in 1969. The slogan symbolized the opposition of the leftists groups against what was considered American imperialism and was deployed in Mount Ida struggle to protest the involvement of foreign companies in the gold mining projects in the region. There is again a double meaning to the use of "*altın*" here: "*Altıncı*" means "the sixth" in Turkish, but it also reads as "gold seeking" or "for gold".

expected to be more socially acceptable, the need for copper for industrial use can be said to make it more difficult to pursue such a politics. It would be worthwhile to conduct more research to elaborate on this aspect.

Second, in both Intag and Mount Ida, resistances started at the exploration stage of the projects. While in Intag, the opponents managed to pressurize two companies to withdraw, in Mount Ida the projects were not abandoned, but only slowed down for a while. The success of the opponents in Intag (until CODELCO and ENAMI EP took over the

project) explains why, despite having started earlier (in the 1990s), the project in Intag is still at exploration stage, while the projects in Mount Ida (where limited exploration work was carried out in the 1990s, but work started intensively in 2004) are closer to reaching production stage. Still, as in both cases resistance began before the mines started operating, there is pressure on the companies to better manage their environmental impacts and social relations with the communities, and on the local governments to better regulate the mining activities. It is not uncommon for such struggles to lead to better environmental management and more community investment (see, for instance, Özkaynak et al. 2015b for an empirical analysis of 346 mining conflicts from around the world in terms of their outcomes—both successes and failures). This is not to suggest that these pracices eliminate the reasons for opposition, it illustrates that even though these resistances do not reach their aim of stopping the projects, they can certainly influence how mining is ultimately conducted.

The third point concerns the mobilizing groups. As I have discussed in the individual accounts of the cases, not all peasants, and in the case of Mount Ida all urban citizens oppose the proposed projects or participate actively in the struggles. The position of the local population is more diverse, and includes acquiescence, resignation and explicit support. While I touch upon this issue in my analysis, the main focus of this study, as indicated earlier, is the peasants' explicit resistance to mining. Related to this point, in focusing my attention on the peasants, I do not put aside the role of the other actors involved in the two struggles. In fact, as it will become clear in the following chapters, who these other actors are, what they do, and how they relate to the peasants is a crucial concern of this study. Another related point, as depicted in Table 4.1, one difference between the two cases with respect to the mobilizing actors is that in Intag several international organizations have supported the resistance, providing financial, organizational and human resources, visibility, and access to new political spaces (e.g. through the campaigning in Canada to stop Ascendant Copper being listed in the stock exchange). However, in Mount Ida, the local actors have not sought such international support, both because of their own preference, and because in Turkey involvement of international actors is very likely to lead to allegations from the government and mining supporters that "foreign ac-

tors trying to hamper the country's development" are behind the opposition.

As Table 4.1 shows, there are common elements between the two cases with respect to the forms of mobilization and vocabularies of resistance. These similarities are important in terms of conceptualizing the two struggles as comparable cases of local environmental struggles against expanding resource extraction, and, as Martinez-Alier et al. (2016b: 747) argue, even as parts of a "*global* movement for environmental justice". However, as the analysis in the following chapters will demonstrate, it is in the differences in the vocabularies of resistance (i.e. how the impacts are framed and contested) and forms of mobilization that the differences in the transformative processes in the two struggles lie. It is to this analysis that I now turn.

Notes

[1] The time of writing of the Chapter.

[2] Cotacachi-Cayapas is one of the 35 natural parks in Ecuador. It was first declared a national reserve in 1968. Located in the provinces of Imbabura and Esmeraldas, it covers an area of approximately 2,440 km². The park extends from close to sea level in Esmeraldas up to 4,949 meters at the peak of the Cotacachi volcano, thus hosts a diverse variety of fauna and flora, from subtropical cloud forests to páramos (high altitude wetlands found in parts of the Andes Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela). It is also part of the Chocó and Tropical Andes ecosystems.

[3] Biological hotspots are defined as regions with high levels of biodiversity and endemism that face severe threats to their preservation.

[4] Parishes are third-level administrative units below the provinces and cantons, and can be rural or urban. They are governed by *junta parroquial*, an elected body of five people. The central government is represented by what is called a political lieutenant. In Intag, they are made up of a parish centre (a small town centre), surrounded by smaller population centres called communities (can be thought of as villages or hamlets) and individual farms scattered around the territory.

[5] The second-level administrative unit in Ecuador. The mayor and the municipal council are the elected representatives, while the central government appoints the political chief.

[6] I have not included the parish of Selva Alegre in the research for a number of reasons: First, in Selva Alegre there is limestone mining and a large cement factory that's been operating since 1980, thus the issue of mining has a different character there and is entangled in different dynamics. Second, although the parish government has joined others to oppose mining, the residents of the parish do not seem to be actively participating in the mining conflict. Third, it is administratively part of the Otavalo canton, with the result that it has not been part of the participatory governance experiences in Cotacachi. As a consequence, the descriptions here apply to the other six parishes although some observations might also be true of Selva Alegre.

[7] People of mixed indigenous and European ancestry.

[8] Excluding Selva Alegre the percentages are: 87% mestizos, 9% Afrodescendants and 4% indigenous.

[9] In Otavalo, 58% of the people consider themselves indigenous.

[10] The difference can be explained by the lower level of legalization for the smaller producers.

[11] A fruit grown in Ecuador, Colombia (known as *lulo*), Panama and Costa Rica, mostly used to make juice.

[12] *Haciendas* are large estates that dominated agricultural production in the highlands region of Ecuador until the 1960s. The *hacienda* system was based on the exploitation of mostly Indian labour under a system of service tenure and debt peonage.

[13] Tourism is seen by many in the valley as being a key activity for a non-extractivist local development model. See Walter et al. (2016) for a multi-criteria evaluation of extractivist and non-extractivist scenarios for future development of Intag.

[14] The other organizations are: *Associación de Caficultores de Río Intag* (AACRI, Association of coffee producers of Intag river); *Corporación Talleres del Gran Valle de los Manduriacos* (Corporation Workshops of the Gran Valley of Manduriacos); *Coordinadora de Mujeres de Intag* (Coordinator of Women of Intag); *Red Ecoturismo Intag* (Ecotourism Network of Intag); *Asociación de cultivadores de granos* (CORPAIS, Grain Producers' Association); *Asociación de producción y acopio de leche* (INTAG-LECHE, Association of Milk Production and Collection); *Asociación de campesinos agroecológicos de Intag* (ACAI, Association of Agroecological Peasants of Intag); CORDESPRO-INTAG—*Cooperativa de crédito* (Credit Cooperative of Intag).

[15] Interviews from January to March 2012 with Maria (Junín, January 6); Catalina (Chalguayaco Alto, January 9); Manuel (Junín, January 10); Camila (Junín, February 24); Camilo (Junín, February 25); Felipe (Chalguayaco Alto, February 26);

Marcela (Junín, March 16). These are the people I refer to as 'community members in this section.

16 January 6, 2012, Junín.

17 February 25, 2012, Junín.

18 Interview with Gloria Chicazia from *Acción Ecologíca*, Quito, March 18, 2013. See also: http://www.accionecologica.org/iquienes-somos

19 The boycott ended in 1998.

20 I openly use the names of Geovanni Paz and Carlos Zorrilla because both are public figures, and their names are publicly associated with the opposition. The information on their background and work in Intag provided in this paragraph is based on the interviews with Geovanni Paz in Otavalo on February 18, 2012, and with Carlos Zorrilla in Apuela on April 15, 2012.

21 DECOIN was one of the winners of Equator Prize 2017.

22 Interviews with Carlos Zorrilla, Apuela, April 15, 2012; Diana (the president of DECOIN at the time of the interview), Cotacachi, February 28, 2012.

23 Interview with Carlos Zorrilla, Apuela, April 15, 2012.

24 February 21, 2012, Nangulví.

25 January 6, 2012, Junín.

26 The Minister of Mining at the time visited the region in 1997. According to the story of Maria, although she did not say in which part, the minister was in the valley on the Mother's Day, which was May 11.

27 The name of this grassroots organization was later changed to Council of Community Development.

28 Kuecker (2007: 94) mentions 87 people involved on the first day when people hiked up to the camp, and maintains that in the following couple of days around 200 people took part in taking down the material in the camp. In the history of the mining struggle written by Carlos Zorrilla and available in DECOIN's blog (DECOIN 2010), "hundreds of local residents from seven communities" are said to have participated in the event, although it is not clear if the number refers strictly to the burning of the camp. Cisneros (2011: 192-193) refers to "people from nine communities that would possibly be affected from the mining activities". A number of interviewees said that there were about 100 people.

29 Interviews in 2012 with Maria (Junín, January 6); Manuel (Junín, January 10); Camilo (Junín, February 25); Felipe (Chalguayaco Alto, February 26); Marcela (Junín, March 16). See also Kuecker 2007: 100-102.

30 The Ecuadorian Mining Development and Environmental Control Technical Assistance Project (El Proyecto de asistencia técnica para el Desarrollo Minero y

Control Ambiental – PRODEMINCA), mentioned in Chapter 2. The activities related to the project carried out in the region included information gathering to create geological maps of the area during 1998 and 1999, and a study to understand the perceptions of the local population regarding mining, conducted by a public institution, Centre for Planning and Social Studies (*el Centro de Planificación y Estudios Sociales*-CEPLAES. See the report CEPLAES-PRODEMINCA 2000).

[31] Interviews with Catalina, Chalguayaco Alto, January 9, 2012 and Polibio Pérez, Chalguayaco Bajo, March 27, 2013. See also Cisneros 2011: 195.

[32] Ordinance is the name given to the legislative decisions of the local governments in Ecuador.

[33] See the Ordinance at: www.rainforestinfo.org.au/projects/anja/ordinance.htm

[34] See the request for inspection sent to the World Bank by the representatives of DECOIN and the Association of Coffee Producers at (Accessed 7 November 2012): http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/PanelCases/20-Request%20for%20Inspection%20(English).pdf

[35] The company changed its name to Copper Mesa Mining Corporation in 2008.

[36] See the letter at (Accessed 8 November 2012): http://www.miningwatch.ca/letter-leigh-day-co

[37] See the letter at (Accessed 8 November 2012): http://www.miningwatch.ca/files/OECD_T_HellerEhrman LLP.pdf

[38] Many people compared Ascendant Copper negatively with Bishi Metals in this aspect. As Bishi Metals left after the community members burnt down the mining camp, people remarked that "they respected the community decision". Ascendant, however, was resented much more for trying much more aggressively to pursue the project instead of respecting their decision not to have mining in Intag.

[39] Interviews with Paula, Junín, December 25, 2011, and in 2012 with Maria, Junín, January 6; Catalina, Chalguayaco Alto, January 9; Oscar, Nangulví, February 21; Carolina, Junín, February 24; Camilo, Junín, February 25; Diana, Cotacachi, February 28. See also DECOIN (2010).

[40] Interview with Polibio Pérez, Chalguayaco Bajo, March 27, 2013. See also DECOIN (2010), Cisneros (2011: 238-39), and the documentary Under Rich Earth (2008).

[41] Ascendant CEO Gary Davis in a letter to Carlos Zorrilla, dated August 2, 2006) wrote that the company suspended its relations with CODEGAM in June 2005, and then completely broke the relations in February 2006. CODEGAM members are also said to express their willingness to join mining opponents in March 2006. See the letter at (Accessed 8 November 2012): http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ascendant-ltr-to-Zorrilla-2-Aug-2006.pdf

42 By 2008, all the cases brought by Ascendant against community leaders and the newspaper were dropped (DECOIN 2010).

43 Interviews with Diego, Nangulví, March 4, 2012 and Polibio Pérez, Chalguayaco Bajo, March 27, 2013.

44 Letter of Ascendant CEO Gary Davis to Business and Human Rights Resource Center dated November 6, 2006. See at (Accessed 8 November 2012): http://198.170.85.29/ Ascendant-response-Carlos-Zorrilla-6-Nov-2006.pdf

45 See the information that was available on Ascendant's webpage at: http://miningwatch.ca/sites/default/files/OECD_I_ACC_community.pdf

46 Letter of CEO, November 6, 2006 to Business and Human Rights Resource Center. See at (Accessed 8 November 2012): http://198.170.85.29/Ascendant-response-Carlos-Zorrilla-6-Nov-2006.pdf

47 The company claimed that 27 presidents of the 33 communities of the parish have agreed to give access to the company. See (Accessed 8 November 2012): http://miningwatch.ca/sites/default/files/OECD_I_ACC_community.pdf

48 See (Accessed 8 November 2012): http://miningwatch.ca/ sites/default/files/ OECD_L_8_Presidents_en.html. See the photo of the original letter in Spanish at: http://miningwatch.ca/sites/default/files/ OECD_L1_8_Presidentes.jpg

49 DECOIN (2005).

50 The letter from Earthworks to the TSX, March 11, 2005; Letter to the TSX by the Cotacachi Mayor Auki Tituaña, September 16, 2005. See the letters at (Accessed 8 November 2012): http://miningwatch.ca/news/2005/5/18/oecd-complaint-against-ascendant-copper-canadian-and-ecuadorian-organizations-allege; see also DECOIN (2007).

51 MiningWatch Canada. "'No means No to Ascendant Cooper in Ecuador' Campaign Launched: Communities call for Cancellation of Canadian Mining Company". May 3, 2006; Friends of the Earth International. "No means No to Ascendant Cooper in Ecuador". May 3, 2006. Cisneros (2011: 238) states that the value of the shares of the company fell around 40% at the time. The company, later named Copper Mesa, was delisted from the Toronto Stock Exchange in February 2010.

52 'OECD Complaint against Ascendant Copper: Canadian and Ecuadorian Organizations Allege Vancouver-based Ascendant Copper Breached International Corporate Responsibility Standards in Biodiversity Hotspot', 18 May. See the letter at (Accessed 13 March 2011):. http://miningwatch.ca/news/2005/5/18/oecd-complaint-against-ascendant-copper-canadian-and-ecuadorian-organizations-allege

53 In the blogs of DECOIN and *La Coordinadora Zonal de Intag* (a network of mining opponents), there are several entries about these meetings. Some of the meet-

ings took place: in Junín on February 5, 2005 (representatives from *Acción Ecológica* were also present in this meeting); in the parish centre of Cuellaje on May 28, 2005; in Chalguayaco Alto on March 12, 2006; in the parish centre of Garcia Moreno on May 8 and 20, 2006. These included not only the events organized by the opponents themselves, but also the socialization meetings called by Ascendant Copper where the mining opponents protested the company.

54 For instance the peasant-indigenous organization of the Canton, UNORCAC, the Federation of Neighborhoods of Cotacachi, and the Coordinator of Urban Youth of Cotacachi (*Periódico Intag* 2005: 3).

55 The central institution of the participatory local governance model uniting the organized sections of the whole Cotacachi.

56 *Periódico Intag* (2006b: 1-3).

57 CEDHU (2006: 36-39), DECOIN (2010), *Periódico Intag* (2006b), *Under Rich Earth* (2008).

58 Interviews with Paula, Junín, December 25, 2011; Carolina, Junín, February 24, 2012; Manuel, Junín, January 10, 2012.

59 The solidarity network was an initiative of students and alumni of DePauw University in the US, led by Professor Glen David Kuecker who started working in Ecuador in 2000, and conducted research in Intag as well. The network's main project was the international human rights observers programme. From February 2005 onwards, the network sent observers to Intag to "act in solidarity" with Intag communities in the face of escalation of violence in the region.

60 The events mentioned in this and the next five paragraphs are summarized based on CEDHU (2006), DECOIN (2010), *Periódico Intag* (2007); and the documentaries *Under Rich Earth* (2008) and *When Clouds Clear* (2008). The incidents on the 1st and 3rd of December were photographed and recorded by human rights observers and the scenes were depicted in the two documentaries. My account draws on the scenes in *Under Rich Earth* and what interviewees could recall.

61 *Periódico Intag* (2006a: 1-4).

62 A conversation we had on December 30, 2011 on the way to the waterfalls in the Junín community reserve. The waterfalls are the main attraction offered by the ecotourism facility in Junín. It was actually the Japanese who first discovered them. As people told me, they did not use to venture into the forest, hence did not know about the waterfalls until the Japanese started their work in the area.

63 *La Hora* (2007).

64 These projects include Fruta del Norte and Mirador in the Zamora Chinchipe province, San Carlos de Panantza in Morona Santiago, Quimsacocha and Río Blanco in Azuay.

65 *Periódico Intag* (2011: 6-7).

66 CODELCO (2011).

67 Resolution 1712 published in the supplement to the Official Registry No. 815, October 23, 2012. Available at: https://www.registroficial.gob.ec/index.php/registro-oficial-web/publicaciones/suplementos/item/5300-suplemento-al-registro-oficial-no-815.html

68 *El Norte* (2012).

69Conversation with the public relations manager of South American Management, Magdalena Alto, March 3, 2012.

70 *El Dinamo* (2012). According to the information on the Catalogue of Investments in Strategic Sectors 2015-2017 prepared by the Coordinating Ministry of Strategic Sectors, Edgar Salazar still holds the concession in the El Palmar-Los Manduriyacos Project. The same document includes another mining concession in the Intag zone among the mining blocs to auction, called Bloc 3B covering an area of 4,500 hectares. The Catalogue is available at: http://www.sectoresestrategicos.gob.ec/ catalogo-de-inversiones/

71 Conversation with Diego, El Paraiso, March 3, 2012.

72 By this time *Consorcio Toisán* has become one of the most active organizations in the valley, dealing with both local development issues and mining.

73 DECOIN (2012d).

74 Similar issues were raised in an extraordinary meeting held on February 9, 2012 in Cotacachi of the Municipal Council of Development and Management with representatives from the provincial department of the Ministry of Environment, the Cotacachi municipality, a professor of geology from the *Escuela Politécnica Nacional en Quito*, from *Consorio Toisán*, DECOIN and a few community members, and in a communal meeting in Magdalena Bajo, on March 3, 2012 in which representatives from CEDHU and DECOIN, and the anti-mining leader Polibio Pérez participated. I attended both meetings.

75 *Periódico Intag* (2011: 6).

76 *Periódico Intag* (2010: 13-15).

77 Interview with Jose Cueva, García Moreno, March 6, 2012.

78 The information in this paragraph comes from the booklet on the assembly titled 'Cuarta Asamblea Zonal de Intag: Hacia un buen vivir con identidad', published by *Consorcio Toisán* in July 2010. The booklet includes the talks given by Jose Cueva and Alberto Acosta during the assembly, and the resolutions of each working group.

79 Interview with Carlos Zorrilla, Apuela, April 15, 2012.

80 I attended the meeting.

81 Conversation with Jose Cueva, President of *ConsorcioToisán,* Cotacachi, February 9, 2012 and with Carlos Zorrilla, Apuela, September 25, 2011.

82 *Hoy* (2012).

83 This is a direct translation of the word *socializar*, which is used in Spanish to refer to the process of sharing of project information with the public.

84 Coordinating Ministry of Strategic Sectors (MICSE, 2013a).

85 MICSE (2014a). According to the information in the Catalogue of Investments in Strategic Sectors 2015-2017, the project is still at this stage, with an estimated 318 million tons of mineral resources. In the video "*Proyecto Llurimagua*", published in 2015, the head engineer of the project says that the geological investigations will take at least six years.

86 CODELCO (2015).

87 See e.g. ENAMI EP (2013a), MICSE (2013b), *El Telégrafo* (2013). See also the videos on youtube channel of ENAMI EP: ENAMI EP (2013b, 2013c, 2015) Other videos are also available at: https://www.youtube.com/user/Enamiep/featured

88 DECOIN (2012b), *El Comercio* (2012).

89 DECOIN (2012b).

90 Gobernación de Imbabura (Imbabura Provincial Government, 2014).

91 MICSE (2014c). Among the communities closest to the mining site, Junín and Cerro Pelado are not included among these 35 communities, while Chalguayaco Alto, Chalguayaco Bajo, Barcelona and El Triunfo are.

92 MICSE (2014b).

93 *La Hora* (2015).

94 *La Hora* (2016).

95 Quotes from Polibio Pérez cited in the news article referred in the previous note.

96 MICSE (2013a, 2013b).

97 Enlace Ciudadano 351, Zábiza-Pichincha, December 7, 2013. The full video of the speech is available on youtube. See Presidencia de la República del Ecuador (2013) The part Correa talks about Carlos Zorrilla and the document referred runs from 2:58:50 to 3:06:55.

98 *El Comercio* (2015).

99 *El Universo* (2015).

100 OLCA (2014c), EcuadorLibreRed (2014).

101 EcuadorLibreRed (2014), *La Hora* (2014), Rainforest Rescue (n.d.) 'Ecuador: No to mining in the rainforest. #LibertadparaJavierRamirez' (The petition to the President Correa), Amnesty International (2015). See also INREDH et al. (2014).

102 DECOIN (2014), *El Comercio* (2014), *Hoy* (2014).

103 DECOIN (2014), *El Universo* (2015), *Hoy* (2014).

104 INREDH et al. (2014, np).

105 Personal conversation with Carlos Zorrilla, The Hague, April 10, 2015, INREDH et al. (2014).

106 DECOIN (2013a).

107 Coordinadora Zonal de Intag (2012), DECOIN (2012c).

108 One of them is called the Union of the Communities of the Peñaherrera Parish, and the other Association Chalguayaco Alto. Precisely who these organizations represent is not clear. Moreover, some of the communities whose presidents signed this letter are included among the 35 communities that the government sources claim to support the project, and whose "representatives" joined the meeting in Quito in April 2014 where their support was made "official", as mentioned above.

109 Interview with Diana, the president of DECOIN at the time, Cotacachi, February 28, 2012.

110 Interview with Polibio Pérez, Chalguayaca Bajo, March 27, 2013.

111 DECOIN (2013b).

112 Interviews in 2012 with Jose Cueva, the president of Consorcio Toisán, Garcia Moreno, March 6; Natalia, the coordinator of the development NGO PRODECI in Intag, Cotacachi, March 29; and Johana, the president of the Cantonal Assembly at the time, Cotacachi, April 18.

113 This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

114 See his profile at: http://www.cotacachi.gob.ec/index.php/nuestra-municipalidad/alcalde

115 An important project that the municipality committed itself to support is the small-scale hydropower project HidroNangulví, which is part of the larger project Hidro Intag that the *Consorcio Toisán* has been trying to develop consisting of construction of eight such plants in Intag. See 'Central HidroEléctrica Nangulví Memoria Ejecutiva' (2015).

116 OLCA (2014a).

117 Asamblea de Unidad Cantonal Cotacachi, Sistema de Participación (2015).

118 One of my interviewees, Diego from the El Paraíso community joined the *Marcha por el agua, la vida y la dignidad* (The march for water, life and dignity) orga-

nized by CONAIE in March 2012. The march started on the 8th of March in the southern province of Zamora Chinchipe and finished with a demonstration in Quito on the 22nd. I attended this demonstration. In the same park where this demonstration was to be held in the afternoon, the government organized its own demonstration in the morning. Apart from Diego, a few people from Intag were present in Quito. I told Diego that day that I expected to see more people, he told me that "they [the anti-mining organizations] could not organize themselves well".

[119] Interview with Gloria Chicazia, Quito, March 18, 2013.

[120] DECOIN (2012a).

[121] Plan V (2014), OLCA (2014b, 2014c).

[122] The provinces are the first-level administrative units, divided into districts. Districts are made up of an urban centre, small towns called *belde* and the surrounding villages. The urban centres have an elected mayor and a municipal council working only in the urban area, as well as a local governorship, *kaymakamlık*, which represents the central government and has responsibilities for both urban and rural areas. *Belde*s are population centres larger than a village but smaller than the main urban centre of the districts. They are governed by an elected mayor and council. The villages are the smallest administrative units in the rural areas used to designate population centres with less than 2000 residents. They are governed by the village headman, *muhtar*, and a council of elders presided by the village headman. Both the village headman and the council of elders are almost always men, indicative of dominance of men in Turkish politics.

[123] Known as one of the homes of the famous gods of Greek mythology, Ida Mountain is one scene of Homer's *The Iliad*.

[124] Fronteer (2007).

[125] According to one list compiled by the civil society organizations based on the information received from the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, by January 2008, in Çanakkale province alone, there were already 34 concessions for gold, lead and zinc, iron and metallic minerals. See also *Milliyet* (2008).

[126] Group discussion in Bahcedere village, March 30, 2008.

[127] Conversation with Eren, Küçükkuyu, October 28, 2007, and interview with Nermin, Küçükkuyu, March 29, 2008. Both were members of the Mount Ida Conservation Initiative. See also the blog of the Mount Ida Conservation Initiative founded by these people at: http://kazdagikoruma.blogspot.com.tr

[128] Environmental Platforms are regionally based umbrella organizations that unite several institutionalized civil society organizations. They are not centrally structured, but act together to pursue regional environmental agendas (Adem 2005).

129 The Union is a national level umbrella organization comprised of 24 professional associations, called chambers, of different branches of engineering (electrical, civil, chemical etc.) and of architects and urban planners. As representatives of expert knowledge, these chambers usually participate in many issues that create public controversies related to their own professions, for example by presenting law suits against disputed urban transformation or energy projects. The chambers have local branches in many provinces.

130 Interviews with Mustafa, the spokesperson of the Çanakkale Environmental Platform, Çanakkale, March 25, 2008; and with Nermin (Mount Ida Conservation Initiative), Küçükkuyu, March 29, 2008

131 Mount Ida Conservation Initiative (2007a, 2007c).

132 Mount Ida Conservation Initiative (2007b).

133 Mount Ida Conservation Initiative (2007d).

134 Interview with Eren, Küçükkuyu, March 11, 2008.

135 Group discussion, March 30, 2008, Bahçedere.

136 March 29, 2008, Yeşilyurt.

137 Conversation with Kemal, Çamlıbel village, March 31, 2008.

138 Letter of the tourism business owners of Mount Ida to the President. September 13, 2007. Available at: http://www.kazdagikoruma.blogspot.com/2007_09_01_archive.html

139 I have attended the panels in Çanakkale city centre on November 24, 2007, and on August 12, 2012. I also obtained the presentations of some of these academics from themselves.

140 March 25, 2008, Çanakkale.

141 Ezine is one of the districts in the Çanakkale province. The cheese, similar to feta and known by the name Ezine, is mostly made of sheep milk and a nationally recognized variety. It is often sold under that name, not only regionally, but also nationally.

142 August 14, 2012, Çanakkale.

143 Mount Ida Conservation Initiative (2007e).

144 Interview with the mayor of Çanakkale, Çanakkale, March 25, 2008, email by the member of the executive committee of the Mount Ida and Mount Madra Environmental Platform to the kazdagikoruma e-mail group, April 9, 2008.

145 Interviews with the mayor of Çanakkale, Çanakkale, March 25, 2008.

146 March 29, 2008, Küçükkuyu. Nermin was also one of the founders and the president of the Association for the Protection of the Natural and Cultural

Wealth of Mount Ida, founded in 2012. By 2016, she maintained her role as the president.

[147] Ali Arif Cangı, Lawyer and member of EGEÇEP, "Altın Madenciliği ve Hukuksuzluk" (Gold Mining and Unlawfullness). November 2007. Ali Arif Cangı sent me his article directly by email.

[148] March 26, 2008, Bayramiç.

[149] He is referring to a famous speech by the founder of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, on the 10th celebration of the Republic.

[150] I attended the protest.

[151] I received a copy of the call through the Mount Ida Conservation e-mail group that I had subscribed to.

[152] *Milliyet* (2007a, 2007b).

[153] Haluk Şahin (2007a, 2007b, 2007c), among others.

[154] "On Social Costs of Gold Explorations in Ida Mountain", October 19, 2007; "Ida Mountain's Gold is above the Ground", October 23, 2007.

[155] *Çanakkale Olay* (2009), *Sabah* (2007), *Yeniçağ* (2007).

[156] *Bianet* (2007).

[157] Interviews with Mustafa, Çanakkale, August 12, 2012, and Nermin, Nusratlı village, July 13, 2014.

[158] See eg. *Radikal* (2007a, 2007b, 2007d, 2007g).

[159] *Radikal* (2007f). This claim revived a previous discussion about the alleged activities of "German Foundations" (Alman Vakıfları) aimed at preventing gold mining in Turkey. It was put forward in a book in relation to Bergama resistance, *Alman Vakıfları ve Bergama Dosyası* (German Foundations and the Bergama Brief by Necip Hablemitoğlu) published in 2001. In 2002, leaders of Bergama resistance were sued for being "legal German spies" on the basis of the charges in this book, but were acquitted.

[160] I arrived at the panel towards the end with a group of activists as part of the tour organized by *Doğa Derneği*, the *Buğday* Association for Supporting Ecological Living and the nature magazine *Atlas* on October 27-29, 2007.

[161] *Radikal* (2007c).

[162] Conversation with Eren, Çanakkale, October 27, 2007.

[163] *Radikal* (2007h).

[164] *Radikal* (2007f).

[165] *Milliyet* (2008).

[166] *Radikal* (2007e).

167 *Altın Madencileri Derneği* (Gold Miners' Association) (2007, 2008). During October and November 2007, one particular journalist, Ali Atif Bir wrote several articles in favour of gold mining in his column in the daily newspaper *Bugün*. See also Tartan (2008). The same arguments were made by the representatives of the mining sector in our interview and group discussion, specifically: Interview with Fronteer Exploration Manager, Ankara, April 14, 2008; group discussion with the Manager and Secretary of Teck Cominco, and the General Secretary of the Gold Miners Association, Ankara, July 3, 2008.

168 *Yapı* (2008); the e-mails to the group *kazdagikoruma* by Ayfer, the secretary of the Çanakkale Environmental Platform, on May 23 and 30, and July 13, 2008.

169 *Kuzey Biga Madencilik* and *Doğu Biga Madencilik*, Turkish subsidiaries of Alamos, respectively operate the *Ağı Dağı* and *Kirazlı* projects.

170 Alamos Gold (2015a, 2015b). The company has to get other permits (such as the forestry permit from the General Directorate of Forestry and Business Opening and Operation Permit from the governorship of Çanakkale).

171 The company mentions 20 villages on its website, while an official from the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization gave the number as 23 (Interview with the head of the Mining Investments branch of the EIA Department of the Ministry, Ankara, July 31, 2012).

172 The projects are both joint ventures with the Turkish subsidiary of Canadian Teck Resources Limited (the name Teck Cominco took after rebranding in 2008)

173 Within this area there was previously another project called *Kuşçayırı*, owned by Australian Chesser Resources. In September 2013, Pilot Gold acquired the license for this project from Chesser Resources and integrated it into the *TV Tower* project (SRK Consulting 2014).

174 In May 2012, the Ministry of Environment approved the EIA for the *Halilaga* project. According to the information provided in the technical report of the company for the project dated 2015 (JDS Energy & Mining Inc. 2015), the EIA was then annulled by the Çanakkale Administrative Court and a cumulative EIA study was required. The report mentions that the Ministry appealed the decision, but no further information is provided as to the result of this. The list of EIA decisions by the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization by September 5, 2016, only includes the initial EIA decision in 2012. Based on this information, it can be inferred that by September 2016, a final EIA decision is still pending.

175 See http://www.tumad.com.tr/tr/cevre-ve-sosyal.html

176 A response letter dated June 4, 2012 by then the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources to a formal request by the Balıkesir deputy of the opposition party states that there are 61 mining licenses in the Mount Ida region. The letter was sent to the kazdagikoruma email group on June 21, 2012. One of the projects for

which some information is available is the *Şahinli* gold-silver project in the Lapseki district of Çanakkale which was owned previously by the Australian Chesser Resouces. A Turkish company, *TÜMAD Madencilik*, purchased the license from Chesser Resources in 2014 (*Madencilik Türkiye* 2014). In the list of EIA decisions by the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization by September 5, 2016 includes a positive EIA decision for this project taken on August 14, 2015.

[177] Group discussion in the Söğütalan village, August 11, 2012.

[178] Group discussion, August 11, 2012, Söğütalan.

[179] Interview with Hüseyin, Etili, August 9, 2012.

[180] Interviews with Murat, Söğütalan, August 11, 2012; and İbrahim, Muratlar, July 8, 2012.

[181] July 8, 2012, Muratlar.

[182] Group discussions with men in the village coffee houses and conversations on the streets with women in Muratlar and Asagi Sapcilar, July 8, 2012; Söğütalan August 11, 2012.

[183] *Evrensel* (2012b).

[184] Karaköy: *Çanakkale Olay* (2010a); Kuşçayırı: *Sendika* (2011); Kızılelma: *Evrensel* (2012a); Söğütalan: *Çanakkale Olay,* (2011); Muratlar: *Evrensel* (2012c).

[185] *Evrensel* (2012a).

[186] *Çanakkale Içinde* (2012a).

[187] The EIA process (for all investments, not just for mining) requires the companies to conduct these "public participation meetings". However, in the event that they cannot be realized due to public protest, the companies are still considered to have fulfilled their obligations, and the EIA process is not halted (Interview with the head of the Mining Investments branch of the EIA Department of the Ministry, Ankara, July 31, 2012).

[188] *Milliyet* (2014).

[189] Interviews with Hüseyin, Etili, August 9, 2012; Zeynep, Kızılelma, August 11, 2012; conversation with Nermin, Nusratlı, July 13, 2014

[190] Group discussions in Söğütalan August 11, 2012 and Karaköy, August 10, 2012; interviews in 2012 with Sevim, Evciler, July 6, Serap, Evciler, July 10; Taner, Evciler, July 9; Osman, Evciler, July 13; Ezgi, Etili, August 9, 2012.

[191] Conversation with Derya, Evciler, July 7, 2012.

[192] *Çanakkale Olay* (2013), *Evrensel* (2013).

[193] *Çanakkale Olay* (2010d).

[194] *Çanakkale Olay* (2010c).

[195] *Çanakkale Olay* (2010b).

[196] Some examples of the panels include: the panel discussion organized on May 30, 2010 in the town Oren by the Mount Ida and Mount Madra Union of Municipalities to discuss the proposed changes in the mining law (the changes in the law were accepted by parliament on June 10, 2010); the panel organized by the Çanakkale environmental platform on January 15, 2011 in the Biga district on "Gold mining, the mining law and sustainable life"; and the panel "The new legal foundations for environmental destruction in our country and their possible consequences", organized by the Mount Ida and Mount Madra Union of Municipalities on January 29, 2011 in Altinoluk town to discuss the proposed changes in the law on the protection of nature and biological diversity. The civil society actors feared that some of these changes would relax the restrictions on mining and other activities in the protected areas, including the Kaz Daği (Mount Ida) National Park. (The proposed changes in the law have been subject to intense discussions. Several drafts of the law were presented and then withdrawn in the parliament. By August 2016, the changes were still pending.)

[197] In the e-mail group kazdagikoruma, the information about the dates of the EIA meetings, the arrangements to participate, and comments and news about how they went were circulated.

[198] Conversation with Nermin, Nusratlı, July 13, 2014.

[199] Interview with Evren, Çanakkale, August 14, 2012.

[200] *Hürriyet* (2012), *Çanakkale İçinde* (2012b).

[201] The Çanakkale Environmental Platform held a meeting of its member organizations on June 19, 2012 in Çanakkale, and the weak participation of the peasants was acknowledged there (the minutes of the meeting was sent to the email group kazdagikoruma by a member of the platform on June 20).

[202] I was in Çanakkale during those days. I visited the exhibition, and attended the panels.

[203] Atadinç (2012).

[204] For instance, in the regular meeting of the member organizations of the Çanakkale Environmental Platform on June 19, 2012 in Çanakkale, as well as in the panels during the Troy Festival, mentioned above.

[205] *Yeşil Gazete* (2013).

[206] Conversation with Gamze, Evciler, July 10, 2014.

[207] *Çanakkale Olay* (2016).

[208] Cangı (2014).

[209] *Çanakkale Olay* (2014). The six projects were: *Ağı Dağı*, *Çamyurt*, *Kirazlı*, *Halilağa*, *Kuşçayırı* (later integrated to the TV Tower project, as mentioned above),

and *Şahinli* projects. The *Çamyurt* project is actually integrated with the *Ağı Dağı* project and comprises only of an open pit mine, the ore from which is to be processed in the *Ağı Dağı* facility (according to the project design contained in the company technical report, Kappes, Cassiday & Associates 2012).

[210] The four projects are: *Ağı Dağı*, *Çamyurt*, *Kirazlı* projects of Alamos Gold, and the *Şahinli* project of *TÜMAD Madencilik*. See: Alamos Gold newsletters, Alamos Gold (2015a, 2015b), and the list of EIA decisions of the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization, September 5, 2016.

5 The Potentials of Environmental Struggle: Transformative Praxis in Intag

This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the Intag struggle.[1] It examines the processes of social change that the anti-mining resistance triggered in the region, and demonstrates how these processes have transformed the subjectivities of the peasants. The first section presents a brief review of historical state-society relations in Ecuador to provide a background for the ensuing discussion. The second section unpacks the notions of development, environment, and rights and justice that the peasants of Intag have articulated. The third section expounds upon the way in which the processes of popular education, civil society thickening and participatory local governance have shaped those notions. The fourth section examines how the hegemonic project of the Correa government has been changing the power relations in Intag and influencing the dynamics of anti-mining struggle.

5.1 State-Society Relations in Ecuador: A Review

The principal characteristic of state-society relations in Ecuador is that, for the large part of its history, the exercise of power has not been truly hegemonic. The main explanation for this can be found in the regional competition between the conservative highland and liberal coastal elites to take control over the central state machinery, which obstructed the political unification of the country, and led to alternating governments, civic unrest and military confrontations throughout the 19th and the early 20th centuries. The period 1934-1972 was marked by the populist politics of the five-time elected president Velasco Ibarra (de la Torre 1997), who launched extensive public work programmes in infrastructure and education. The economic prosperity created by the banana boom in the 1940s and 1950s helped Ibarra and other presidents of the era in their efforts to

develop the country and strengthen the state machinery. Still, the political struggles motivated by both economic interests and ideological conflicts, and intertwined with geographical and demographic differences, led to chronic political instability. This produced a fractured and weak state institutional structure in which central bureaucracy had insufficient capacity to implement policies and could not establish its control over either local power holders or its own local representatives. The problem of political instability was further aggravated by economic instability resulting from dependency on primary commodity exports (cacao and banana) and the associated boom and bust cycles. Since the dominant groups (the landed elite, clergy, bureaucracy, and the military) could not form stable alliances or governments to consolidate a hegemonic project coordinated through the central state apparatus roughly until the 1970s, power mostly remained exercised and thus experienced locally, especially in the rural areas (Clark & Becker 2007a).

Localized exercise of power and a fractured state structure inevitably shaped the content and form of struggles of subordinate groups against domination and exploitation. In the 19th and much of the 20th century, the resistance of peasants and Indians to abuse of power, intensive exploitation and precarious living conditions was mainly directed to local power holders—the landlords, clergy and local officials (Clark & Becker 2007b). The central state was not necessarily the focus of political struggles or the main opponent, and was sometimes even called upon to limit the power of the local elite (ibid.). Consequently, violent conflicts between the state and subordinate groups were not common, and even when it occurred, state violence generally was not as excessive as in many other Latin American countries (Gerlach 2003). The existence of a state relatively less willing and capable of using its coercive powers to repress dissent has played an important role in shaping the development of contentious politics in Ecuador.

In the 1960s and 1970s, two processes ushered in a series of socio-economic and political transformations that fundamentally changed state-society relations in the country. The first was the land reform process that was initiated, first by a law in 1964, and then further accelerated by a second law in 1973, both times under the rule of military governments (Zevallos L.1989). The land reform laws coincided with market pressures on agricultural production and localized peasant unrest to dissolve the hacienda system[2] dominant in the highlands. The reforms also

promoted colonization of new territories. The peasants and the Indian tenants of the haciendas, with the support of the leftists and progressive sections of the Church, got organized to negotiate with both landowners and government agencies to gain access to land, common resources, and other benefits of the reforms such as subsidized credits and technical assistance. The land reform resulted in a less concentrated ownership of land via the parallel processes of redistribution, colonization and commodification of land. While some former hacienda owners became capitalist farmers or entrepreneurs by investing in the urban economy (e.g. industry, construction, banking), the peasant sector underwent a differentiation and market integration process (Zamosc 1994, Zevallos L. 1989). Many researchers agree that the rural transformation in this period acted as catalyst for peasant political action in general. More significantly, however, it provided the basis for the rise and consolidation of the national indigenous movement in the late 1980s and the 1990s (Clark & Becker 2007a; Gerlach 2003; Korovkin 1997, 2001; Lucero 2006, 2007; Zamosc 1994).

The second process was the beginning of oil production in the Oriente (the Amazon region) in 1972. The oil boom, which came in a period of dramatically rising oil prices due to the OPEC oil crisis, generated unparalleled revenues that were directly controlled by the central military government. The military governments that remained in office between 1972 and 1979 used the oil revenues to subsidize taxes and consumption, provide agricultural support, improve infrastructure and social services, and supply incentives for national industry to incorporate both popular classes and economic elites into the political project of national developmentalism. Through oil production and land colonization, as well as by the infrastructure built for oil extraction, the Oriente, which had until then remained marginal to the Ecuadorian economy and politics, was integrated into the nation state (Sawyer 2004).

The national developmentalist project could only be sustained as long as oil prices remained high. As economic conditions started deteriorating, and the country returned to civilian rule, the new governments, as in many other developing countries, slowly adopted a neoliberal economic model—especially reflected in decreasing government subsidies, increasing taxes on consumption, and the promotion of foreign investment in the oil sector (Hey & Klak 1999). Although in the 1980s neoliberalism acquired "hegemonic status" in Ecuador, in the sense of a "stronger

convergence of thinking and action with regard to the economic policy among elites and state actors", its implementation was "characterized by fits and starts rather than smooth progression" (Hey & Klak 1999: 67-68). Still, the continuing conflicts between the elites, as expressed in party politics and interest group activity, curtailed the full implementation of the neoliberal agenda. However, it was the response of the popular classes that ultimately thwarted its realization. The 1990s and the early 2000s (until the election of Correa in 2007) were marked by popular struggles against neoliberalism. Although the struggle against neoliberalism brought together diverse rural and urban groups (Indians, peasants, public sector workers, urban poor, women, environmentalists, human rights activists and others), it was the indigenous movement that played the leading role.

The significance of the indigenous movement for the evolution of state-society relations in Ecuador cannot be overstated. The Ecuadorian indigenous movement was founded upon rural communal organizations that flourished during the socio-economic restructuring in 1960s and 1970s, and developed through the integration of local organizations to form regional- and national-level Indian federations (see e.g. Korovkin 2001; Lucero 2006, 2007; Zamosc 1994). After the establishment of the national organization CONAIE in 1986, and especially in the 1990s, the indigenous movement became increasingly active and assertive. Going beyond mediating between communities and state institutions, the indigenous movement formulated and advanced a broader political vision that combined class and identity issues and integrated economic, political and cultural demands. The movement engaged in multiple forms of political action, including national protests, long-distance marches, negotiation with and participation in state institutions, creating new political spaces for public deliberation and political socialization, electoral and party politics, taking positions in the government, and even taking control of the nation as part of a junta in January 2000 (Andolina 2003, Zamosc 2007). The latter two strategies actually proved to be counter-productive, as they led to divisions and conflicts within the movement, and caused it to lose some of its vigour. Still, the indigenous movement remained the protagonist of the societal changes of the era that came to an end with the election of Rafael Correa in 2006.

It can be argued that at its height the indigenous movement became a counter-hegemonic actor: it built alliances with other social movements,

civil society actors and popular classes. It translated the diverse concerns of these groups into a profound critique of capitalist, neoliberal development and the liberal nation state. At the same time it also promoted an alternative political agenda that incorporated demands for more inclusionary and ecologically sustainable forms of development, diverse economies, recognition of collective rights, differentiated citizenship (plurinationality), cultural diversity (interculturality), and democratic participation. These critiques and demands were knit together in the concept of *sumak kawsay*[3] (good living) which was included in the Constitution of 2008 as the objective of societal progress (Escobar 2010, Radcliffe 2012).

5.1.1 Correa's hegemonic project

A new figure in Ecuadorian politics, Rafael Correa came to power in 2007 owing to the support of the powerful social movements of the country. Harnessing the criticisms and demands of social movements and popular groups, during his first presidential campaign Correa expressed strong criticism of the power of the ruling elite, neoliberal economic policies, and the US domination in Latin America. Naming his political project as "Citizens' Revolution", he promised to rebuild the Ecuadorian state and economy to achieve economic and social justice, and to strengthen its sovereignty (de la Torre & Conaghan 2009). The first and foundational step in implementation of this project was the drafting of a new constitution with significant participation from civil society and social movement actors. The Constitution featured important changes, envisioning a plurinational state and an intercultural society, democratic participation in public decision making, and post-neoliberal socioeconomic arrangements, in particular through the redefinition of societal progress as good living (*sumak kawsay*) and the role of the state its achievement (Arsel & Avila Angel 2012). Great hope has been placed on the incorporation of the good living principle in the Constitution, as it has been interpreted as a "radically different social contract" that offered "an opportunity to collectively construct a new model of development" (Acosta 2008). Yet, it was the latter change that has proved to be more defining. Since he came to power, Correa took important steps in increasing the state's control over the economy in particular, but also over the country's political and social life in general.

The core of Correa's political project has been to reassert the state's

claim to represent the general interest, and its role "as the key actor in societal dynamics, be they economic, political, social or environmental" (Arsel & Avila Angel 2012: 204), with the promise of delivering long-due development to the Ecuadorian people. This project can be read as a process of state formation and hegemony building through the restructuring and strengthening of the institutional apparatus of the state; the implementation of redistributive policies; and increasing and legitimizing the state's penetration into the society through discursive and material practices, including various forms of coercion (Nicholls A. 2014).

The economic pillar of Correa's hegemonic project has been crucial to build consent and maintain social support for his government. Correa has considerably increased the share of the state in oil revenues by renegotiating with international companies and fortifying the state oil company Petroecuador, restructured the external debt, obtained sizeable credits from China, and improved tax collection. Through these means that bolstered state revenues, Correa managed to allocate substantial resources to infrastructure development and social programmes on health, education, housing, income support and micro-credit to sustain the support of the popular classes. These measures not only assisted the urban and rural poor, but as rising public investment and expenditure fostered economic growth it also benefited the business sector, especially in trade and construction, as well as the urban-middle classes through expanding public employment and increased consumption opportunities (Acosta 2012, Dávalos 2013).

On the political front, Correa set out to reorganize and strengthen the state apparatus. To this aim, the executive branch was strengthened to make it an "actor capable of fostering deep, radical changes in Ecuador's social, cultural, political and economic structures" (Nicholls A. 2014: 161). The National Secretary of Planning and Development (SENPLADES) was restructured and given the responsibility to formulate, coordinate and implement development policies. In the new institutional structure, however, technocratic governance was prioritized at the cost of collective participation. According to Nicholls A. (2014), central features of state formation under Correa were the institutionalization of a governmental logic of improvement through the establishment of specialized agencies that produce knowledge on the population and create fields of intervention to apply technical solutions to problems; the re-spatialization of the state to increase efficiency; and the reconfiguration

of spaces and forms of participation in decision making and planning. The institutional changes have been accompanied by political techniques of "permanent campaign" and "plebiscitary presidency" (Conaghan & de la Torre 2008), a populist style of governance centred on the charisma of the leader, and the use of public media to bolster the popularity of the government. The most notable tool in that regard has been the weekly radio and television programme *Enlace Ciudadano* (Citizen Link) broadcasting the President's public addresses in different parts of the country, during which he explains his policies and achievements, and criticizes and attacks his opponents (de la Torre & Ortiz Lemos 2015).

State-society relations in Ecuador have undergone further change as the government increased control over grassroots and civil society organizations, for instance, by obliging them to align their objectives with those of the national plans, thus weakening their autonomy, and their control over and participation in political spaces (Nicholls A. 2014, Ospina Peralta 2011). While the government has alienated and excluded more critical and oppositional groups, it has established closer relations with those endorsing his policies and promoted the establishment of new ones to consolidate the social basis of support for his project (see e.g. Álvarez Gonzáles et al. 2013). Many civil society and social movement leaders were also offered positions in the government and other state institutions and thus co-opted into the state machinery. The government has in addition resorted to coercive means as it has delegitimized, criminalized and repressed social protest, especially any directed at his extractivist policies, further curtailing the power and protagonism of civil society actors and social movements (ALDEAH 2013, Becker 2013). This changing context of state-society relations has created divisions within organizations and among former allied groups on the question of how to engage with the government without compromising their own political agendas, and/or how to oppose it without losing legitimacy and popular support (Becker 2013, Velásquez 2012). Overall, these ongoing changes revealed many tensions and contradictions of the "Citizens' Revolution", especially between its discourse and practice. They have, therefore, raised doubts and fuelled debates on the possibility of a state-led and controlled project to effect the alternative vision of development and the radical democratization of state-society relations envisioned in the concept of *sumak kawsay* (see e.g. Bebbington 2009, Escobar 2010, Webber 2010).

5.2   Defending Dignity, Claiming Rights: Framing the Anti-mining struggle in Intag

The Intag resistance is primarily a struggle of part of the local population who perceive mining as a threat to their livelihoods and ways of life, and their right to have control over their territories. In Ecuador such struggles have generally been associated with rural indigenous groups, especially with those living in the Amazon region and who have suffered significant impacts due to oil production and colonization since the late 1960s (Perrault 2001, Sawyer 2004). It is more recently with the intensification of conflicts over mining and water that non-indigenous rural populations and urban groups have joined indigenous actors in social struggles waged on the discursive terrain of the environment (Cisneros 2011, Velásquez 2012). Against this backdrop, the two-decade long struggle against mining in Intag, uniting mestizo, Afro-Ecuadorian and indigenous people of the valley, stands out as a distinct case that needs to be understood in its own historical context (Avcı 2017: 318). Here, we first start with the understanding of development, environment and justice the peasants in Intag articulated in the context of the mining conflict.

5.2.1   Being a settler peasant at a colonization frontier: the notions of good life

As I have discussed in Chapter 4, Intag has undergone a gradual process of colonization in the 20th century. This process involved the establishment of *haciendas* (large estates), and the colonization of land mostly by mestizo peasants but also, to a lesser extent, by indigenous people and Afro-descendants. The family and social ties based on place of origin were important in determining the pattern of colonization, and facilitating collaboration among people, which was a necessity for the *colonos* (settlers) to be able to survive and establish themselves in the territory. The *colonos* of Intag, therefore, did not have the type of historical and cultural ties to the land that are attributed to the indigenous communities; theirs was rather a relationship defined by individual and collective efforts to carve out a life in a relatively isolated region with little state presence (Kuecker 2007, López Oropeza 2011). This was also true for the communal relations that were gradually formed over time as the colonization process went ahead and new generations were born (López Oropeza 2011). More than ethnic identity or deep-rooted cultural values,

the basis of these communal relations was a solidarity moulded by reciprocal relations and the need to collaborate due to the conditions imposed by colonization (Avcı 2017: 318).

One of the oldest members of the community of Junín and one of the first settlers in that area, Roberto, told the story of colonization and how collective work was essential to the formation of communities as follows:[4]

> I was born in San José de Minas [in the neighbouring Pichincha province]. I came to work in a sugar cane hacienda in La Playa [a sector in another part of the valley] in 1948. I worked there for 13 years…I always had the idea of buying my own land…Señor Álvarez [a peasant who had settled in Junin area before, claiming large lands for himself] owed me some money, but instead of paying back, he gave me 37 hectares of land [in the Junín area]…Here was unknown land [*tierra ajena*]. Álvarez came here first and said from this creek to this stone is mine, so he gave me part of it…[When he first settled] it was all forests and mountains [*puro monte*[5]], you had to cut down the forest with machetes, it was very difficult…There were few people, we were just four families at the beginning…There we no roads, it took one day to walk to Garcia Moreno [the parish centre] to buy supplies…We used to do *mingas* [communal work] for each other, we needed to help each other…My neighbour was very collaborating.
>
> …
>
> Señor Maldonado [another one of the initial settlers] said let's build a school…We came together to talk about the school, six heads of families…We built it with straw, sugar cane straw. Señor Álvarez gave half a hectare, we covered the roof with straw…But it was not possible to have a teacher [they did not have the money to pay for a private teacher as it was the case in the hacienda where he was working before]… We went to the provincial council to send a public teacher, and for money to buy things [school material].

Many *colonos* in Intag, especially those one who lack legal title and those threatened by relocation, oppose mining because they fear they will lose their land (Cisneros 2011: 193-194). The risk of losing their land is crucial not only because their livelihood depends on land but also, and maybe even more so for some, because their relationship to the land has been constitutive of their personal and communal identities. That is also why for the opponents of mining the social divisions that the mining

conflict has created is of great concern, and a major source of resentment. In fact, in all the interviews and conversations, peasants mentioned these divisions as an important reason why they do not want mining in Intag, and often referred to them as "the hardest thing to bear" (*lo mas duro*).

In fact, the way in which the history of the valley was evaluated is an important factor dividing the opponents and supporters of mining (Avcı 2017: 318): for the opponents, it was something that gave value and meaning to their lives; for the supporters, it was something to be lamented. Mining was similarly interpreted in contrasting ways. For opponents it meant dispossession and loss; it felt unjust that mining should drive them off their land, and it was simply sad to see the divisions it created in their communities. For supporters it represented the promise of a better life. In her study on Intag, Buchanan (2013: 20) makes the same point. She argues that these groups have contrasting discourses not only about mining, but also about the social and ecological conditions in the valley. The *ecologistas* (ecologists, as the opponents often call themselves) emphasize the importance of protecting the local environment to maintain the well-being of communities, and reject mining for the damages it would bring to the good social relations and peaceful way of life in the valley, while the *mineros* (miners, meaning those in favour of mining) talk about poverty, lack of employment opportunities and insufficient social services, and argue that the valley needs the mining project.

Among the supporters, Andres,[6] a young land owner and an intermediary said: "We have been abandoned here, trying to survive by ourselves...We cannot say 'No' to mining when people need jobs to feed themselves". Another peasant, Daniel, who lived in the parish centre of Garcia Moreno argued:[7]

> People need to survive, to feed themselves. We cannot say 'No' to work. Mining will create a lot of employment, and the local economy will improve since there will be more people with money and more spending...The environmentalists say where these birds are going to live. Who cares? I am hungry here.

On the other hand, the opponents of mining claimed that those in favour were just "ambitious", and argued that those who already had resources, mules, trucks or money would be able to benefit, while those who were actually poor had only their labour power to offer. In the

words of Catalina from the Chalguayaco Alto Community:[8]

> What can our people do in mining? Just to work as *macheteros* [wielding the machete to clear paths] or *cargadores* [carrying things], as it happened before...We do not have the skills to have access to good jobs here...It is not a matter of poverty, it is about the ambition, the illusion to obtain more economic resources...It is only those people who have money that can make more money.

In contrast to pro-mining people, the mining opponents emphasized how highly they valued their life in Intag. For example Ricardo,[9] a middle-aged peasant who was the president of a production cooperative said: "We are rooted here and we are working for our communities...We don't want anyone to throw us out, we want to maintain our culture'. Similarly, 31 year-old Camila[10] asked:

> [In case mining goes ahead] where are we supposed to go, what are we supposed to do? Here we can go around freely, if we end up in the city we cannot do that. And in the city, if we cannot earn money, what are we going to eat? Here we produce what we eat, and even in hard times one can go to her neighbour, and they will give you at least some plantain.

This comparison between the rural and the urban life was also brought up by another young woman, Andrea. Andrea's family migrated to the Otavalo town when she was two years old. She lived there for 20 years before moving back to Intag two years ago (2012, at the time of the interview). When we met she was working for the local eco-tourism network. Talking about how her life changed, she commented:[11]

> We came back here to take care of the land my mum inherited. It was difficult to adopt at the beginning, but it improved…There I was locked in the house, I was addicted to TV. In the city you lose time with things that do not contribute you anything…Here I feel very good, I don't lack anything, rather a lot of things have improved… I am happy to raise my daughter in the countryside; she is more healthy here, stronger…she is eating healthy, she is not being contaminated with so many garbage on TV. She can play outside, play with animals… The thing is it is not about money, it is about social relations, to get involved with people…to construct, to build capacity to generate income to live with dignity…Wherever I go here, people are very generous, friendly, very polite… I started to fall in love with my land. I feel more accepted, more loved.

Here we have more dialogue, we are closer with my family, with my community, with the people.

A central notion that mining opponents often referred to when they were talking about what they value and protect about their lives in Intag was dignity or a dignified life (Avcı 2017: 318-319). Many of them acknowledged the diverse problems and needs of the region, such as the power of the intermediaries to set the prices for their products or the poor infrastructure. However, they clearly did not perceive themselves as poor people in need of whatever the state or the mining companies had to offer. In the words of Maria,[12] a 57 year-old woman who was one of the leaders of the struggle and manager of the community eco-tourism facility in Junín: "The miners said we would get out of poverty [*salir de pobreza*]. I am not interested in making a fortune, [I need money] only for health... We want to live in peace, not to have fights". Contrary to the views of supporters, most thought that they had a good life in Intag, and expressed their attachment to their peasant identity, voiced in the simple but powerful way by the arguably most influential peasant leader of the struggle Polibio:[13] "We are peasants and we want to continue as peasants". Being able to produce their own food to feed their families and rely on their neighbours when they are in need, not facing the threat of living in misery as it happens in urban areas, having control over their time, and not being at the mercy of bosses were mentioned over and over again as important features of their lives.

On the other hand, although many peasants articulated a strong sense of belonging in Intag, attachment to the peasant identity, and anxiety over being dispossessed and having to migrate to urban areas, they were also concerned about the viability of peasant livelihoods, the future of their children, and the emigration of the young population. These concerns went beyond the problem of the possible impacts of mining on the environment and livelihoods. Rather, it had to do with the declining fertility of land,[14] difficulties in accessing land for young people (particularly due to rising prices), labour becoming less available and more costly mainly due to youth out-migration, limited market access, new land taxes (introduced by the Correa government), and scant government support. Many peasants and civil society actors especially emphasized the problem of youth out-migration. They argued that young people were less interested in agriculture, and there were few alternative employment opportunities in the valley. They also stressed that education in the valley was

poor, and was such that, rather than encouraging young people to continue and improve agricultural production, it was actually motivating them to leave the land. Given these issues, it becomes understandable why in several interviews and talks, when I asked people whether their children would be continuing their struggle or what they would like them to do in the future, the response was often that it would be better for them to have a good education and work in the cities. It seemed that although the peasants highly valued their life in Intag, they faced real difficulties in maintaining and improving it in a way that they themselves desired, and the possibility of mining development in the valley was considered a further obstacle in that regard.

5.2.2 Emerging environmental subjectivities

The experience of colonization was also constitutive of Inteños' relationship with the environment (Avcı 2017: 319). Inteños traditionally regarded the forests as being hostile and dangerous, as something to clear out to make way for productive activities, and to use as construction material and fuel or to sell the wood. As much as a cultural conception, this was the material reality they faced as colonizers needing land to create a livelihood. Moreover, the land reforms required the *colonos* to demonstrate that they put the land they occupied to productive use to be able to gain legal titles.[15] In a related vein, neither the land, the forests, the animals nor the abundant water resources have special symbolic or religious value, such as being sites of folk tales or rituals, sacred places or beings. Yet, through the mining struggle, new environmental discourses on the importance of protecting the integrity of cloud forest ecosystem and its biological diversity have been introduced by the environmental organizations and taken up by the peasants. Environmental discourses came to be widely used to the extent that mining opponents often identified themselves as *ecológistas* (environmentalists).

The local priest of the valley in the 1990s, one of the founders of DECOIN and leaders of the struggle explained this change as follows:[16]

At the beginning it was very difficult. The local communities were all doing logging and we were telling them not to cut trees...But through the work of conscientization, people's attitudes started to change... DECOIN, *Acción Ecológica*, the women's organization, AACRI [the cof-

fee cooperative], they did workshops, talked to people…Now they care about biodiversity, conservation and so forth.

To give another example, Oscar, a young peasant and the coordinator of the eco-tourism network at the time of the interview, described how he became more interested in the local environment through the struggle:[17]

> My dad was the president of the community, he was against mining…He knew how to communicate, how to bring people together. He was a promoter, a motivator… Thanks to him, I also got engaged. I attended the workshops…I wanted to know more about the forests, the birds, what biodiversity we have, why they are important.

The extensive use of environmental discourses by peasants was arguably a strategic choice to support their cause, and has been particularly influential in attracting the attention and resources of international conservation organizations (Buchanan 2013: 21-22). The environmental qualities of the valley have also been promulgated to promote tourism activities. Such a strategic conception, however, was not the only dimension of the rise of environmental discourses in Intag. Many peasants framed their life as one of mutual respect and close connection with the environment, and often referred to living in a healthy and beautiful environment as something that made their peasant way of life worth defending. For instance, Clara, a young woman working as the secretary of one of the parish governments remarked:[18]

> We live in nature and we look after it. The bounty of nature is essential What characterizes Intag…having a pure environment, full of nature, a lot of biodiversity. First, these will be gone [due to mining], and without them there will be no tourism. People do not want to lose these.

It can be suggested that facing a significant threat to what they used to take for granted, the development of new economic activities based on the environmental qualities of the region, notably organic coffee production, and the appreciation of the local environment by external actors led the peasants to perceive, value and inhabit their environment in new ways. The emerging concerns over other environmental issues in the valley also reflected these changes. One example is the interest the communities have shown in collaborating with DECOIN to establish watershed reserves to guarantee safe water for their communities. For these pro-

jects, DECOIN helped communities to buy the lands around the water-sheds (whereby the communities acquired a collective title), and develop management plans to protect the watersheds, and organized workshops for water and biodiversity monitoring. The communities contributed by negotiating for the purchase of the land with the landowners in whose property the watersheds were located, providing labour to build the nec-essary infrastructure (installing fences and tubes), nurse and plant native trees around the watershed, and maintain reforested areas (D'Amico 2012a: 439-446). Environmental education programmes in schools and environmental awareness work in communities, where it is common to see posters, paintings and writings on the walls about the environment, have probably further contributed to this change.

In his study on the making of environmental subjects in Kumaon, In-dia, Agrawal (2005: 162) argues that the participation of local communi-ties in institutionalized governance of forest resources have helped crea-tion of "environmental subjects" for whom "the environment [has become] a conceptual category that organizes some of their thinking and a domain in conscious relation to which they perform some of their ac-tions". The advent of new environmental subjectivities in Intag validates this argument, and further suggests that participation in a political strug-gle and the engagement with different actors and knowledges that this enables, and experiencing changes in productive activities are also im-portant mechanisms in that regard.

Undeniably, not all peasants in Intag share such environmental con-cerns and values, whether they openly support mining, or have an am-biguous position, or are indifferent. Neither changing environmental values, nor implementation of small projects are by themselves enough to fundamentally alter environmental practices and use of resources at a broader scale (of the valley). In fact, as many people have commented, Intag valley is still being deforested to clear land for pasture or to sell the wood. For instance, Jose de Coux, a US citizen who has established an ecological reserve in the valley (in a part relatively far from the main area of the mining conflict) in 1989, said he was much more concerned about deforestation than mining, and actually criticized DECOIN and the anti-mining leaders for eschewing this problem in order not to lose the sup-port of peasants for the mining struggle. Additionally, the production of naranjilla and tamarillo (tree tomato) fruits, which requires intensive use of fertilizer and pesticides, has been increasing in the valley. And beyond

its environmental implications, as both Jose (the anti-mining agronomist) and Andres (the pro-mining intermediary) told me, the production, transportation and sale of these fruits were mostly under the control of the larger land-owners of the valley, the intermediaries and the investors from outside the valley. Their comments made clear that this expansion was influencing not only the environment but also the agrarian relations in some parts of Intag (i.e. changing land ownership and control, new sharecropping or contract-farming type of arrangements, rising land prices and land trafficking, and the transformation of peasants to rural workers).

Another environmental threat for the valley is the construction of a large dam at its western end where the Intag river joins the larger Guayllabamba river, which is contaminated along its course mainly by the industrial and residential wastewater of the capital city Quito, but also by agricultural runoff from the areas through which it flows. Some civil society activists were particularly concerned about the health impacts that the dam would create (for instance increasing malaria).[19] It can be argued that dealing with all these problems exceed the power of the anti-mining groups. Yet, what is crucial is that these groups did not isolate the mining issue from the larger environmental issues in the valley but tried to integrate them in their political agenda. I believe it is important to acknowledge that this has been a notable effort that, as I will show in my discussion on Mount Ida, is not always or necessarily undertaken in local environmental struggles.

5.2.3 Demanding justice, respect and rights: the ethics of mining opposition

The opposition to mining in Intag was principally based on the concerns over its negative impacts on peasants' livelihoods and community life. This can be interpreted as discontent over the distributional injustice or unequal ecological distribution (Martinez-Alier 2009), i.e. that mining companies would obtain riches through the extraction of copper, while the peasants would have to bear significant environmental and social costs. However, in terms of what motivated the resistance in Intag, as important as the distributional consequences of mining was the indignation the peasants felt at not being respected or taken into account; at being forced to accept a project that not only threatened to undermine their livelihoods and ways of life, but also about which they had not been

consulted, and to which they firmly and publicly objected. Their struggle was, therefore, a struggle to have their will—to live without mining in the valley—respected by both the mining companies and the state.

The peasants expressed multiple times and in different ways their resentment towards the mining companies and the state for not respecting them or their decision not to allow mining in the region. In fact, it seemed that the initial development of the opposition had much to do with how the workers of the Japanese company Bishi Metals, and an Ecuadorian company subcontracted by the former, treated the community members. For instance, Catalina, a 28 year-old woman living in Chalguayaco Alto, explained how the peasants started to oppose mining and took the decision to burn the mining camp of Bishi Metals in 1997 as follows:[20]

> With Mitsubishi [the parent company of Bishi Metals], my dad and my brother worked. My dad injured his spine, they used to carry heavy things, machine parts through tough roads…that happened to more people, problems with the spine…Actually, at the beginning they [the company] were treating them [the workers] well, paid well. But later on they asked them to work longer hours, stopped giving food. And when the workers asked for higher wages because the work was hard, they told them 'if you want to work for this wage, you work, if not, you can leave'. These were not the Japanese themselves, that was the company they hired to arrange the work here…At the time, as nobody knew of rights, of nothing, they were trying to maintain good relations with the company, to work more, work on Sundays…And then, the grassroots organization [*organización de base*], DECOIN was created. They started coming for the workshops, telling these and these are our rights…Once people started to learn about rights, also of mining, the consequences that we could have here, people started to oppose…Later, some community members went to Quito to talk to the authorities, to tell the minister to come over here. What I understand is that people went to tell them [the authorities] to come to deal with the issue. I guess people wanted to be treated well. But once they arrived they told them they would not come, that it was the Mother's day, that they were ignorant [for asking to come on that day]…they treated them very badly. Then people [from Junín] told them [the authorities] 'we will wait until this day [a couple of days later]'…People waited and waited, and nothing, and then they took the decision to take out everything and burn the camp…That was to tell them 'do not come back anymore'.

Catalina was only 13 years old at the time, and even though she said she went to the mining camp with other community members when they they set fire to the wooden cabin, she was telling the story as it was told to her. Actually, according to the testimony[21] of Maria, a 57 year-old woman from Junín, one of the leaders of the resistance, the story of people asking the ministry to come to the community to talk happened in Garcia Moreno, when the minister came to visit the zone. Yet, in time Catalina became one of the most vocal leaders of the resistance. Her emphasis on how learning about their rights while being treated with disrespect by the company and the authorities shaped the position of peasants towards mining exemplifies how the peasants themselves see their struggle. Of interest is not whether these events actually occurred as narrated; that they are narrated in this way tells something about what mattered to the peasants.

The second company that tried to develop the project, Ascendant Copper, was even more strongly resented. By the time Ascendant arrived Intag in 2004, the mining opposition had become broader and stronger. The initiatives to implement "alternative territorial development" were underway, and on the basis of the agreement reached through the participatory process in the Cantonal Assembly, the municipal government in Cotacachi had officially issued the Ecological Ordinance in 2000 which prohibited mining in the canton. Therefore, the communities that found themselves facing a mining threat again, were displeased as they had clearly expressed what they wanted for the future of the region. People felt disgruntled because Ascendant Copper tried to develop the project despite being well aware that the communities did not want it.

Even more unacceptable for the communities was how the company tried to manipulate people and force the project upon them. It did so on the one hand by creating divisions in the communities by offering benefits and discrediting the opposition leaders, and on the other hand, through coercive and violent means such as intimidation, threats, physical assault, and finally by sending armed guards. The explanation of the main community leader Polibio Pérez as to why the communities decided to burn the mining camp of Ascendant (December 10, 2005), as they did back in 1997 with Bishi Metals, and reported in the local newspaper *Periódico Intag*,[22] and expressed the indignation of the peasants:

Mr. Pérez explained that the decision to destroy the installations is the result of '18 months of aggression by the company'. He assured that de-

spite the denouncements of the communities 'never, neither the governor [of Imbabura province] nor the Ministry of Energy and Mines took us into account'. According to the community leader, the decision of the communities is to 'take [occupy] all the property [the installations of the company]' and to 'throw out Ascendant'.

Among the offenses of the company mentioned by Mr. Pérez are the purchase of farms by the company, the divisions in the communities since the arrival of the company almost two years ago, and the aggression and the threats suffered by the community leaders.

As the article indicates, as much as the actions of the company, the indifference of the state authorities to the situation in Intag was a source of resentment. In fact, several people mentioned that during the times when the communities had to confront the workers of the company or its supporters in the region, the authorities failed to intervene in time. For instance, during a hike[23] to the Junín community forest reserve, Manuel, who was our guide that day, told us about the many fights they had with the mining supporters, and stated that they were complaining with the police that it was because they were not there to protect them against the provocations of the supporters that those fights broke out.

By 2012, the understanding that mining was being forced upon the communities against their will, or without being asked whether they wanted it or not, was still being articulated in strong terms by the opponents. The arguments that Polibio Pérez presented in a community meeting on March 3, 2012, in Magdalena Bajo,[24] close to the Los Manduriyacos concession where exploration work was being carried out at the time, illustrates the continued significance being taken into account had for the mining opponents:

The Ministry approved the project [El Palmar project in the Los Manduriyacos concession], but why without your participation? How many times we asked them to come here and explain the things as they are... Some of you will agree [with the project], but the important thing is that they inform us correctly. Mining has good things and bad things. But it is when one is informed that one can take a decision, one says welcome or leave. This decision is yours to take...This can only happen when there is due information, due respect ...Here, there are people who know how to read and write, people who know how to listen...The problem is there is no due participation.

Similarly, in a meeting[25] of the Municipal Council of Development and Management held on February 9, 2012, in Cotacachi where representatives from *Consorio Toisán* and DECOIN, Cantonal Assembly, and a few community members met with representatives from the provincial department of the Ministry of Environment and the Cotacachi municipality to discuss the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process of the El Palmar project, the president of *Consorcio Toisán* questioned why the involvement of CODELCO in the project was hidden from the communities and why the communities did not know about the EIA process. He also expressed criticism about the fact that decisions taken at the local level were not taken into account, as was legally required, and that they were being overridden. The representative from Cantonal Assembly, for her part, asked whether the final EIA report was going to be shared with the communities before its approval so that people could make sure that their concerns were adequately addressed.

As mentioned in Chapter 4, CODELCO withdrew from the El Palmar project, but ENAMI EP and CODELCO reactivated the former Junín project, now named *Llurimagua*. It can be argued that it was precisely because of the insistence in Intag on the right to information and participation that ENAMI EP was much more careful than the previous companies in approaching the communities, organizing socialization meetings, setting up information points, and signing agreements with the communities and parish governments about the community development projects to be undertaken. In fact, as I tried to illustrate in Chapter 4, the question of whether the majority of the local population was against or in favour of the project and whether the participatory mechanisms were being implemented properly was the main line of battle between the state and the opposition groups in Intag. Both sides made conflicting claims and tried hard to prove their claims while discrediting those of the other side through the use of different media.

Rights-based discourses were used not only to question the actions of ENAMI EP in the region, but also to criticize Correa's government and its mining policy. In the words of Catalina:[26]

> I voted for him [Correa, when he was first elected in 2007]. Because, we, the environmentalists, all of us, when we first elected him, we all worked to support, doing forums, developing proposals, we worked a lot so that he could be elected. All the environmental organizations supported him…But, he later changed. Even before doing the Constitution. Be-

cause when it was being prepared we went with proposals[27] and there he [Correa] started…how to say…to say 'move away, move away, I'll see what I put [in the Constitution]'. Because of that Alberto Acosta resigned.[28] Still, the Constitution is not bad, it is good, on the issue of rights of Nature, our rights. The problem is it [the Constitution] is not fulfilled. For example, here, about the mining issue, in Intag it [mining] would not go if the Constitution was implemented, that of the rights of nature because here is where many springs are born…those [water sources] of Junín and Chalguayaco, they are born exactly where the copper is…But Correa wants mining, he, the Minister of Environment as well, say 'mining goes because it goes'.

Since the 1990s, social movements in Ecuador, particularly the indigenous movement, have made rights a key terrain of political struggle (Pallares 2007). The indigenous population of Cotacachi, the peasant-indigenous organization of the canton (UNORCAC—*Union de Organizaciones Campesionas Indígenas de Cotacachi*) and the indigenous leaders linked to CONAIE were more directly engaged with the national indigenous movement, and shared its demands for the creation of socio-economic, political and cultural conditions for the full exercise of rights (Ospina Peralta et al. 2006: 83). In Intag, it was in the context of the anti-mining struggle that the rights-based understandings and discourses have been introduced and appropriated. The notions of dignity and respect as elements of the peasants' common sense were articulated with a rights discourse. In this way, not being respected and taken into account, and being attacked (by Ascendant) for defending their territories could be framed as a violation of their right to be respected as human beings, as peasants who work hard to make a living, and as citizens who should have a say in decisions that affect their lives and territories. The injustice of mining thus was not only about the unequal distribution of its costs and benefits, but also about how its imposition denied the communities their right to recognition and participation (Schlosberg 2007).

5.3   Constructing a Transformative Struggle in Intag

The more salient feature of the struggle in Intag is that it was transformed into a broader process of social change (Avcı 2017: 319-320, Avcı & Fernández-Salvador 2016: 916). Three interrelated and mutually reinforcing processes have been crucial in this transformation: the prac-

tice of popular education, the implementation of community-based development projects, and the participatory local governance experience. These processes together created the political spaces for collective reflection and action around alternative local development, the cultivation of rights-based understandings of justice, and the creation of a collective identity of citizens defending their rights and constructing their own future. The political visions or ideological positions—partially constituted before engagement with the peasants of Intag, and evolving as they did so—of civil society and political actors who led these processes were important in the creation of these spaces and in the introduction of particular understandings of development, environment and justice. Yet the (re)appropriation of these understandings by the peasants was made possible by their enactment in practice, that is, in the practices of coming together, meeting different people, discussing, listening, negotiating differences, developing proposals, making decisions and carrying out specific projects. It is important to note here that, the peasants in Intag, unlike the indigenous rural population of the canton, and elsewhere in Ecuador, did not have a history of political organizing or activism (Pallares 2002). Hence, it can be argued that although previous local histories of political struggle often lays the groundwork for subsequent cycles of mobilization (Fox 2007, Urkidi & Walter 2011), the lack of precedents does not fully preclude building a strong local movement.

To demonstrate how the transformative processes worked in Intag, I will concentrate on the popular education efforts by the local priest, who was also one of the first leaders of the mining resistance, and by the local newspaper *Periódico Intag*. Following this, I will discuss the efforts by civil society actors to create and implement an alternative local development vision. Next, I will explain the experience of participatory local governance, and how it contributed to the strengthening of the alternative development vision and the formation of rights-bearing citizen subjects.

5.3.1 Education for social change

The type of educational practice within communities and social movements that aims to promote progressive social change and considers the people themselves as the main agents in this process, is known as "popular education" in Latin America (Kane 2010: 277). The main inspiration for the popular education movement that spread in the region in the 1970s and 1980s is Pablo Freire, the Brazilian educator and philosopher

who laid the foundations of "critical pedagogy", according to which education should work to liberate the oppressed, to cultivate critical consciousness so that the oppressed can "perceive the reality of oppression not as a closed world from which there is no exit, but as a limiting situation which they can transform" (Freire 1996 [1970]: 31). For Freire, such critical consciousness (1996 [1970]: 33) is acquired "through the praxis of this struggle [the struggle for liberation]", the praxis consisting of "reflection and action upon the world to transform it". Popular education, therefore, includes the purposive activities within social movements and in the context of community development that "try to influence the way other people interpret the world and to develop the skills to amend its meanings and realities" (Dykstra & Law 1994: 122).

Freire's approach to education in fact draws on a Gramscian understanding of philosophy of praxis and common sense as a key terrain of ideological struggle (Mayo 1999). If common sense refers to the conceptions of the world that people form through their own experiences, popular education as a practice to change these conceptions requires engaging, tackling, reorganizing and resignifying the already existent elements in the consciousness of the people. That is why popular education needs to "start where people are at", with the knowledge that they have "arising from their own particular experiences" (Kane 2010: 277 & 278). Education entails a process of ideological translation of the elements of the common sense—worldviews, beliefs, values, sentiments, practices, symbols—into larger political questions so as to challenge the social structures that maintain oppression (J.P. Reed 2013: 564-565). The educators in this practice can be seen as "organic intellectuals" as "constructor, organizer and 'permanent persuader' and not just a simple orator" (Gramsci 1971: 142). They are to establish dialogical relations with the subaltern groups to "work out and make coherent the principles and problems raised by the masses in their practical activity" (Gramsci 1971: 330).

Educative processes have been a central aspect of the social and political changes that have been going on since the 1990s in Intag. While many of the educational efforts were directly related to the anti-mining struggle, there were also others that different civil society actors embarked on to promote community development, as well as those that sprang from the participatory local governance process in Cotacachi. Popular education in Intag has, in fact, moved beyond those activities

specifically aimed at raising consciousness, disseminating information, building capacity and shaping leaders. It also formed an integral part of the whole range of activities that civil society actors and the local government undertook in their efforts to mobilize communities against mining, organize them to implement alternative development projects, and to encourage and facilitate their participation in decision making in organizations, community assemblies and local governance spaces. By discussing the role of popular education, I want to emphasize that the civil society actors and local government themselves considered education as a crucial part of their work, and integral to all their activities. For them, in addition to teaching certain skills, building capacity, raising consciousness about mining-related or other specific issues, education should be seen as a long-term process of "human formation" (*formar gente*), a process to transform people so that they can change their conceptions of the world and themselves, and acquire the skills and the power to shape their lives.[29]

Although diverse actors have engaged in educational practices as part of their work in Intag, I will discuss the examples of the local priest of the valley in the 1990s and the local newspaper *Periódico Intag* because I think these illustrate particularly well how popular education was carried out in Intag as a means for social change.

Integral liberation: Father Geovanni Paz

Many studies on rural transformation in the highlands of Ecuador since the 1960s, and the rise of the indigenous movement in the 1990s, point out the role of the progressive sectors of the Catholic Church in these processes (see e.g. Bebbington and Perreault 1999, Schaefer 2009, Yashar 1998, Zamosc 1994). Zamosc (1994: 54), for instance, argues that in the highlands these sectors promoted a "grass-roots based, self-managed model of development founded on the traditional organizational framework of the Indian community", and thus contributed to the formation of indigenous leaders. Yashar (1998: 37) maintains that in Ecuador (as well as in Mexico, Guatemala and Bolivia) through facilitating communication and interaction among rural communities, churches contributed to the construction and maintenance of rural networks, motivated community activism and educated community leaders. Likewise, Bebbington and Perreault (1999: 407) emphasize that church training on social justice and

leadership was influential in promoting rural indigenous mobilization in Ecuador.

In Intag, Father Geovanni Paz, who worked as the local priest in different parishes of the valley from 1989 to 1996, played a similar role.[30] As he explained, during his seven years in Intag, Father Geovanni worked to improve the conditions of life in the valley, to organize people to work together for the benefit of their communities, to raise consciousness about the social problems, inequality, justice and environment, and to mobilize them to defend their environment against mining.

Father Geovanni explained the principles that informed his work as a priest as follows:

> We [the Church] are concerned about the people, about the integral liberation of the individual…we seek equality, we have a social cause…issues like food, literacy, education, health…Liberation theology of Latin America starts from life itself, not from the desk…It is necessary to denounce injustice, how can we reach the kingdom of God if we do not accomplish justice, if we do not denounce injustice? We defend the people's cause.

Numerous stories that Father Geovanni told and the examples he gave about his work in Intag demonstrated how he put these principles in practice. Narrating his early times in the valley, he recalls:

> At the time Intag was not what it is today. There was no electricity, water provision, road, bridges or schools. We started to think what we needed to do in the zone…We started to learn about the needs of the communities…This community needs a school, the other a bridge, the other water…When one talks to people, listens to what people say, that is how you build solidarity.

As examples of his work in the valley, Father Geovanni mentioned the establishment of an "integral farm" involving the youth of the Peñaherrera parish, trainings on organic agriculture for the production of vegetables, courses on leadership, housing and sanitation projects, basic health workshops, and environmental education. He explained how he tried to raise consciousness about environmental protection even before the mining conflicts started, and how, once it did, he collaborated with Carlos Zorrilla to establish DECOIN to "search for more organized ways to defend the environment". He described how the idea of creating

Periódico Intag was born through deliberations in a workshop on leadership. He also recounted how he denounced the injustices in the valley, narrating how he confronted a *hacendado* (big land owner), who charged the peasants for passing through his land, and paid low wages to his workers; a school teacher, who used to leave school earlier than she should have; and the provincial health authorities for not doing anything about an epidemic in the Garcia Moreno parish. Above all, Father Geovanni described his efforts in Intag as "helping people to organize", "supporting the cause for organization", and a "constant work of conscientization[31]".

Forming leaders was a central aspect of Father Geovanni's efforts to promote organization and collective work among communities, and to this aim he conducted several workshops on leadership during his seven years of working in Intag. Even though he left Intag to live and work in Cuba in 1996, he kept on visiting the valley, and giving courses on leadership. The first issue of *Periódico Intag*, dating December 2000, reported about one of these courses and what the Father said about the leaders that Intag needed.[32] Among the qualities of a good leader, the Father included "to educate herself/himself to create a solidaristic community", "to have faith in oneself and others", "to be democratic and participative, and open to the opinion of others", "to work for the well-being of others", and "to be responsible, honest and hardworking". That is, for the Father, leaders were not those people who had better technical skills, represented the communities or took action on their behalf, but those who organized them and built solidarity. In this regard, his leadership education was geared towards encouraging and enabling people to take community development into their own hands.

The relationship that Father Geovanni established with the communities on the basis of his commitment to promote the causes of social justice, community organization and well-being, and care for the environment was important in shaping the ways peasants came to understand mining as a source of injustice, and mobilized to demand justice and respect for their right to define the future of their communities and lives. In his analysis of the mining resistance, Kuecker (2007: 100) emphasizes the same point, arguing that:

> His [Father Geovanni's] introduction of liberation theology was central to the environmental awakening throughout Intag. During the 1990s he organized communities for the resolution of problems arising from mar-

ginalization, and his efforts led to grassroots projects of environmental and economic diversification. Liberation theology laid the groundwork for grassroots resistance by educating community members to be leaders, to see themselves as humans with full rights as citizens, and to organize for the improvement of the community.

Several peasants indeed acknowledged the work of Father Geovanni in encouraging people to organize, and talked appreciatively of him. María from Junín, for instance, stated:[33]

> The Father used to come here often, still visits sometimes. He is a very nice person…He cares about people. When he promised something, he fulfilled…[He is] very dedicated…He taught us to be leaders, that we should organize…that we can all do it [be leaders].

Inform, educate, entertain and inspire: Periódico Intag

Periódico Intag was an independent, bi-monthly local newspaper that was published from December 2000 to January/February 2012. [34] An American woman, Mary Ellen Fieweger, writer, teacher and translator who had been working in Ecuador since 1976, and came to settle in Intag in 1996, spearheaded the creation of the newspaper to provide an independent medium of communication for the Inteños. According to Mary Ellen Fieweger, at its highest point between 2006 and 2008, 1,000 copies were printed, around 500-700 of which were sold locally, and an average five people read every single copy published.[35] The first issue of the newspaper described its aim: "to inform, educate, entertain and inspire the Inteños", and in its more than 11 years of publication, *Periódico Intag* certainly delivered on its promise.

The newspaper openly adopted an anti-mining stance, in favour of the alternative development vision of the mining opponents, and supportive of the organizational processes in the valley. It contained news about the mining projects or the resistance in Intag in almost every issue, and occasionally published articles by members of local organizations that opposed mining in which the reasons for opposing mining were explained. It also provided information about extractive projects, the impacts of these project, and the resistance against them both in other parts of Ecuador and elsewhere in the world. Local, national and global environmental issues occupied a central place in its pages. In fact, the newspaper became an important means of environmental education. Con-

cerning the local level, in addition to the environmental impacts of mining, the newspaper reported on issues such as soil degradation, access to and contamination of water, waste disposal, fires, deforestation, and negative impacts of fertilizers and pesticides. It also provided information on agro-ecological practices, conservation, watershed protection and reforestation projects, and environmental education campaigns of the local organizations. It published news and special reports discussing diverse (socio-)environmental issues such as global warming, food sovereignty, fair trade, biopiracy, organic farming, Earth Day, etc. A significant part of the newspaper was dedicated to information on the organizations in the valley—their history, aims, activities, projects, assemblies, as well as their successes, challenges and problems. The news articles were written by both the members of the newspaper and those of the local organizations. The articles often emphasized the importance of organization and collective work in promoting sustainable and inclusive development; the capacity of the communities to take responsibility for their own development; the roles and responsibilities of the leaders of the organizations, and the importance of ensuring the participation of members in the decision-making processes and activities; and of creating space for open debate and criticism within the organizations. If applicable, the articles explicitly mentioned that an organization was against mining and/or that it promoted specific income-generating activities as alternatives to mining.

News about the local governance processes in Cotacachi, meetings, workshops, events and capacity-building activities organized by the Cantonal Assembly, and the activities of the parish and municipal governments were also common subjects in the newspaper. Significantly, the newspaper published every year the resolutions of the annual assembly of the canton, the main institutional space of the participatory local governance model. These articles not only gave information about these activities, but also included views from different actors regarding their positive or negative aspects. In fact, the newspaper team considered it important to maintain a critical stance towards both the local governments and the civil society organizations.

The newspaper functioned as a means of political education also by informing the public about various laws and regulations, among them the municipal ordinance that declared Cotacachi an ecological canton, law of parish governments, the law against violence against women, and the Mining Mandate that was issued during the Constitutional Assembly

in April 2008. The newspaper also disseminated information on the candidates for the parish councils, municipal council and the mayorship, and for the presidential elections. There were also several articles about Correa and his promises after his first election, as well as developments taking place in the Constitutional Assembly and the proposals being debated.

The newspaper also published historical accounts of the parishes of Intag, how the region was colonized, how the first road was constructed, and life stories of and interviews with some community members. These stories usually talked appreciatively about the efforts of the *colonos* of Intag to establish themselves and build a life in the region, how they overcame the difficulties they encountered; for instance, how they struggled with the big land owners and the public institutions to get access to land, and the contributions of the people to the development of their communities, for example, through organizing themselves to build a school. The success stories of the students or individuals from Intag in different areas also dotted the pages of the newspaper. Moreover, the community members themselves contributed to the newspaper with stories, commentaries and poems. The newspaper invited these contributions in all its issues, and organized several workshops on journalism and writing to promote communities' engagement.

Overall, *Periódico Intag* was truly impressive as a local means of communication, and as a means of popular education to make the Inteños see themselves as citizens having the right and the responsibility to create their own future. It consistently and vigorously advocated social justice, democratic participation and ecological sustainability. It contributed to the social and political processes of change that Intag was undergoing by informing the local population about what was happening in the valley, the canton, the country and the world; educating them about all sorts of social, environmental, economic and political issues; promoting the organizational processes and efforts for alternative development in the valley; and allowing the communities to share their experiences and knowledge with each other. It helped ensure that the discussion on mining, alternative development, the environment and rights remain on the local public agenda throughout the anti-mining struggle. As such, it contributed to the creation of a territorial identity of Inteños (see also López Orpoeza 2011). As D'Amico also (2012a: 438) emphasizes: "*Periódico INTAG* articulates a sense of belonging and helps to shape shared values

and experiences in the collective struggle for social and environmental justice".

Significantly, the newspaper published several articles of news and analysis of environmental problems and struggles in other parts of Ecuador and the world. These articles covered, among others, struggles against industrial logging and shrimp farming in the Esmeraldas province of Ecuador, the mining struggle in Tambogrande in Peru, the Latin American Network of Women in Resistance against Mining (*Red Latinoamericana de Mujeres en Resistencia a la Minería*), as well as successful sustainable development initiatives, such as those in the Bolivar province of Ecuador. In this way, it helped position the struggle in Intag in a broader national and global context. These news and articles clearly had the aim of nurturing solidarity with other communities—from Ecuador and from around the world—who are facing threats similar to those posed by mining in Intag, and who are also struggling to defend their territories, communities and rights.

Commenting on the impact of the newspaper on the Inteños, its founder and editor Mary Ellen Fieweger said:[36] "People were delighted to see themselves, their stories in the newspaper. They felt like 'we are doing things worthy of being published in a newspaper'. It built self-esteem, a sense of self-worth".[37] Her comments were actually in line with those of Father Geovanni who also emphasized how seeing their struggle and themselves on the news, in videos, in documentaries, being appreciated by foreign visitors to the valley or the international organizations changed people's attitudes, making them "more willing to be protagonists".[38] The words of Andrea, the young coordinator of the Intag Ecotourism Network, well demonstrate the importance of the newspaper for the valley:[39]

> Imagine! People here have their own newspaper, they write themselves, they educate themselves…The ones who don't know how to read, their families, neighbours read to them…This is how capable, how committed the people of Intag are…It [the newspaper] is even better than the big ones!

In sum, the newspaper has certainly worked as a medium of popular education by encouraging the peasants to see themselves as active constructers of their own lives, and participating in the building of a more just and sustainable society—locally, nationally and globally.

5.3.2 Civil society thickening and the project of alternative local development

As indicated by environmental justice literature, civil society actors as allies of the local communities in environmental struggles play an important role in linking local concerns to broader questions. Williams and Mawdsley (2006: 667) argue in this respect that "[b]reaking out of a defence of purely local/communitarian issues depends in a large part on the quality of the interlocutors that are able to effect a jump of scales, tying issues of 'local' importance to wider debates and discourses". In Intag, such interlocutors indeed existed and fulfilled that function. Even though the "quality of interlocutors" explains how in the public discourses of the local struggles particular local concerns are linked to broader discourses, the questions of how the local communities themselves appropriate these discourses still remains. In Intag, a crucial factor has been the translation of the resistance to a specific mining project to a broader political project of alternative local development. This was largely made possible through the close engagement between the peasants and civil society actors in and through the expansion of rural development and conservation projects, and the process of grassroots organizing and politicization over rights that accompanied the implementation of such projects.

Since the 1990s, in Ecuador, as in many other developing countries, NGOs have become increasingly active in development efforts. This reflected the shift in mainstream development practice that came to be centered on the concepts of community participation, empowerment and co-responsibility (Molyneux 2008). Whether the work of NGOs has been co-opted to serve the neoliberal policy agenda of poverty reduction, of which the World Bank has been the main proponent, or whether it has contributed to articulating and pursuing alternative visions of development is a hotly debated question (Townsend et al. 2004). Townsend et al. (2004: 872 & 873) argue that although the former might be said for the majority of "compliant NGOs", "a minority of 'independent thinking' NGOs…are more closely concerned with and motivated by making a positive change" and "are making contributions, however small, to alternative visions of change." Many of the civil society organizations in Intag are better characterized as "independent" NGOs, as they strived for long-term collaboration and democratic engagement with peasants; articulated strong critiques of mainstream development models; promot-

ed grassroots organizing, and worked to empower the communities to take their development in their own hands; and demanded and exercised their rights as citizens.

Different civil society actors have been active in Intag since the 1990s. A first category is represented by the foreign and Ecuadorian middle-class professionals, activists and intellectuals who settled in Intag, and established local organizations like DECOIN, *Consorcio Toisán* and *Talleres de Gran Valle de Manduriacos* (hereafter *Talleres*), through which they implemented various development and conservation projects, and organized and sustained the anti-mining struggle.[40] A second category is Ecuadorian and foreign development NGOs such as PRODECI[41] and Fundación Brethren y Unida which have implemented community-based development projects in the valley. A third category comprises national civil society organizations such as *Acción Ecológica* and CEDHU, and international organizations like Rainforest Concern and Friends of Earth which have supported the anti-mining struggle through helping to mobilize local people, publicizing the struggle nationally and internationally, and providing financial and technical support to the local organizations.

In terms of the construction of a community-based, sustainable local development model in opposition to mining, the most important actors have been the local organizations and their leaders. Apart from those, PRODECI, although not directly positioning itself against mining, has also played a significant role through implementing numerous projects in collaboration with the local organizations, as well as parish and municipal governments during its almost 20 years of work in the valley. Among the local organizations, DECOIN has led the anti-mining struggle and spearheaded many of the sustainable development and conservation initiatives in the valley, such as the Agro-Artisanal Coffee Producers' Association of the Intag River (AACRI for its acronym in Spanish), Junín community eco-tourism project, and community watershed protection projects. *Consorcio Toisán* is an umbrella organization that unites nine local organizations, including DECOIN and *Talleres*. Apart from DECOIN, the other organizations are producers' associations or cooperatives, one credit cooperative, the tourism network of the valley,[42] and the network of several women's production associations (*Coordinadora de las Mujeres de Intag*—the Coordinator of Women of Intag). These associations were in fact established to run specific projects in different communities, mostly initiated through financial and technical support of the local organiza-

tions, PRODECI, and the international NGOs. The importance of *Consorcio Toisán* is that it linked different projects and communities and represented them together in different political spaces. Overall, the local organizations of Intag together with PRODECI can be thought of as forming a broad network united around the ideas of promoting community organizing, improving the well-being of communities, and encouraging sustainable resource use and care for the environment.

DECOIN has certainly had a leading role among the civil society actors in Intag. DECOIN started engaging with the peasants to inform them about the negative impacts of mining and to mobilize them against the project then being developed by the company Bishi Metals. However, from the beginning it defined its main mission as environmental education, and as necessary not only to stop the mining project but also to change the relationship of the peasants with the local environment so that the protection of the environment becomes a defining feature of what development means. For DECOIN, in addition to raising consciousness and informing people about environmental issues, this required developing sustainable income-generating activities that improved the well-being of communities while protecting the environment. As Carlos Zorrilla explained:

> Our mission is to help create environmental awareness, to help people understand the significance of environmental protection. This contrasts with the dominant paradigm [that puts] economic development first…It is necessary to change people's perceptions [on development]… Economically and environmentally sustainable activities, these are important because it [development] is not only about making money, but also protection of the environment, of the communities, about organizing people.

Since its establishment DECOIN has actually aimed not only to stop the mining project but for a longer and deeper process of transformation. Preventing the environmentally harmful mining activity was so crucial for the organization because it was deemed incompatible in every aspect with the local development vision it espoused—mining was deemed environmentally destructive, a reflection of the dominant notion of development that prioritized "making money", and creating dependency rather than promoting autonomy and self-determination of communities.

The president of Consorcio Toisán, José Cueva,[43] a young Ecuadorian agronomist who bought land and settled in Intag in 2000, expressed similar views, criticizing the dominant development models that were being imposed on rural communities through large-scale projects and the established agrarian structure that pressurizes peasants to continue unsustainable practices. He explained the structural problems in agriculture in the valley by highlighting patterns of land inequality in the region; the intensified use of land particularly for pasture that causes soil degradation; how peasants' inability to transport and market their products benefited intermediaries unevenly; how peasants who try to improve their production through new investments incur high costs of indebtedness; how the governments' rural extension services are devised to serve the interests of large agro-industrial firms rather than the producers; how the local productive organizations can only have limited effects due to insufficient resources and state support; and the abandonment of the rural aras by the young population. He argued that the large-scale projects that are being planned in the region—mining, large hydroelectric power plants, and a road to connect the highlands to the coast—"will create social exclusion, environmental degradation, health problems… basically make life impossible for the people [living close to these projects]". Concerning the desirable model of local development for Intag, he said:

> All the plans being made at the level of the canton and parishes are constructing little by little this vision of the future. It is based on the subject of integral management of the whole basin of Intag and Manduriacos. The idea is a management [that is] non-exclusionary, in which the entire population participates, a management that includes [everyone]. The management, the control over forests, over biodiversity, over water…to prevent further degradation of the environment. In general, a model that is not extractivist, rather, one that is based on the possibility of generating resources bottom up, from every farm, recuperating agriculture…neither mining, big hydroelectric, nor uncontrolled logging…not continuing with the model of abandoning the rural…changing the dependency of chemicals in agriculture.

Local organizations in Intag have worked to promote and ensure the active participation of the communities in the construction of such a local development model. This was in itself a process of transformation that required facilitating organization of communities, training leaders, building technical and managerial capacity, and education on rights. This

emphasis on active participation, on the one hand, contained a critique of the power relations in society through which decisions that benefit the interests of the powerful at the expense of the poor and marginalized are imposed on the latter. On the other hand, it reflected a concern about breaking out of the type of relations between communities and NGOs in which NGOs are the ones to make decisions and communities are the passive recipients. The words of Natalia, the coordinator of the team of PRODECI in Intag, expresses how establishing more horizontal relations with the communities has been a process of learning, for the NGO and the communities:

> In this path [of working in Intag], we had to revise some institutional practices. At the beginning, it was more like going and giving everything. Later this dynamic started to change, both [the NGO and the community] doing their share, doing things together. I think at this stage we are nearing co-participation, not only in the economic sense [committing resources for the projects], but also in the decision making…The people had no idea about rights, about citizenship. The organizations have been making progress, slowly but firmly…in development in a collective way. I think mining issues moved people…people used to think they [NGOs] were coming to give things away, not that it was their right to have those things…Step by step with them [the communities] we started saying this is not OK…we interpellate [challenge or question] each other, because we are equals, it is not the case that someone knows better, no, we are in equal conditions in participation, in decision making…it is not the case that the projects we manage are ours, they are from them. For instance, in the case of tourism, there had been initiatives of the people [before they started to support those initiatives], we talked to people about how we support, who can get organized, what policies we can have…what we need, what we can, who can assume [the responsibility]…A strong virtue of the people of Intag is that they are enterprising, honest, transparent. If they agree with something they show it, and if they do not agree they also say that.

Denis Laporta, a French activist who first came to Intag as a volunteer of *Ayuda en Acción* in 1997, and then settled there in 1998 to continue to work with the communities, was another one of the civil society leaders who contributed to the processes of social change in Intag. He explained his objectives and the work of the organization as follows:

Life brought me here, first in 1997 as a volunteer for *Ayuda en Acción*. I liked it a lot, bought land and settled in 1998. I studied business, and I wanted to make the world more just. I was not interested in the issue of mining or environment, I was concerned about the economy…I was thinking about initiatives so that people could stay in the rural areas…small enterprises that can grow, to commercialize the agricultural products…When I came, there was no light, no phone connection, totally isolated. A few big landholders dominated, people were living in hierarchical conditions…The economic boss was also the boss of social life…We first started working with the women with *luffa*,[44] the women were the more marginalized, they did not participate in community life, not much work for women…[their work was considered as] just helping the husband, their role in the family economy was not acknowledged, a very patriarchal view…There was also domination of the intermediaries, people depended on the decisions of the intermediaries—[the intermediaries said] 'this year I will buy this product', and people followed. The people were exploited [by the intermediaries], always in debt, they bought food, chemicals, the tools from them…The intermediaries had control over both the income and the expenses of people…So we said, we change this, create added value. This was how we started breaking the [existing] model, but softly, integrating women, small peasants…[to enable people] to commercialize without the intermediaries, to make their own, autonomous decisions…The organization became a tool for making claims on the territory, for building a territorial identity, for human formation, a field school [*escuela de campo*], for leadership…The people who joined the association became leaders in their communities…people who take responsibility, have their own criteria [to decide], who can talk in public, know how to build relations [among community members]…Thanks to those leaders, the activities diversified, each community work with their won products…[these are] important changes.

Ricardo, a peasant from the Magdalena Bajo community, was one of those leaders. He was the president of the *Talleres* at the time of the interview, and having educated himself to occupy a leadership position, he was also emphasizing the role of the organization in changing people's attitudes and encouraging them to take initiative in improving their lives through collective action. He argued:[45]

The *Talleres* is the first organization here [the Manduriacos section of Intag]. The idea was to develop activities that would benefit all, to say 'we need to do things for the benefit of the community'…To form [educate,

shape] people, that's what the organization is about…Mining wants to create subordinated people, working in an organization is much more difficult than working as an employee, people form expectations, they sometimes think if there is no [mining] company, there is no development…It [development] is not about that…The organization's most important achievement is that it has shaped people, in relation to productive capacities, the capacity to manage their own business, without anyone telling them what to do. In Cielo Verde [a community in the Manduriacos sector] they started the production and processing of tilapia, in El Paraiso, they process fibers. They are working independently. This is better for the organization that people lead their own activity, have their own criteria, their own profession.

Taking note of the attention of Denis Laporta on leadership, it should be emphasized that the formation of leaders—people who take responsibility and organize their communities—has been a key objective of the civil society actors working in Intag, among them Father Geovanni and the *Periódico Intag*. Indeed, many peasants—men and women—have assumed leadership positions in the local organizations, as well as in the mining struggle. The words of one of those leaders, Oscar, the young president of the eco-tourism network of the valley clearly illustrate how engaging in the anti-mining struggle and the organizational processes in the valley has transformed them:

When the conflict started we felt the necessity to get to know more people, to think not only about our families and our community, but also about what is happening in other communities. So we started to get to know each other, get involved…to be useful, to take responsibility…For me, more than studying, what has shaped me [my consciousness] was participating in community meetings, workshops, capacitations…That we had this problem [of mining] created the opportunity to organize ourselves, develop initiatives…it allowed us to say we have a lot to do here, that may be we can do things better, things more sustainable in time, not only for our own current benefit, but also for the future generations.

Significantly, these ideas of community organizing, collective action for local development and human formation that the civil society organizations have promoted have been politicized through rights-based discourses. Such discourses were extensively articulated in the various spaces that civil society actors and peasants got together—meetings, workshops, assemblies, capacity building activities. A news article on

Periódico Intag[46] about a meeting of the local organizations held on January 10-11, 2003, provides an example of the salience of these discourses in the organizational processes in Intag:

> The representatives of more than 50 organizations, foundations, artisan groups, producers and environmentalists analysed the organizational reality of the Intag zone by proposed alternatives for better coordination of the activities carried out by these entities.
>
> One of the main issues dealt with was how to identify ourselves as citizens, exercising our civil, political, economic and social rights, by fulfilling our responsibilities. Those who attended the workshop concluded that the citizens fulfil their duties when they participate in the decisions related to the elaboration and implementation of projects, and when they demand accountability from those who manage the [financial] resources for the works done. This demands free, democratic, conscious and active participation.

Another example is the mission statement of *La Coordinadora de Mujeres de Intag* the women's organization of the zone which was established in 2002 and unites 14 women's production groups from different parts of the valley. The statement declared that the objective of the organization was to "promote the organization and participation of women of Intag to search and develop together strategies that allow [us] to exercise our rights so that the society acknowledges us as protagonists of the development of the [Intag] zone and the canton".[47]

As I have argued before, peasants often framed the mining project as a violation of their right to decide their future. These examples demonstrate that the peasants considered their organizational processes and the projects that they have been implementing with the civil society actors as exercising of those rights. So for them, "rights" were not an abstract concept that they called upon to stop the mining project; it was embodied in their everyday collective practices.

To conclude, in the construction of a community-based vision of sustainable local development in opposition to mining extraction and the cultivation of a rights-based understanding of justice in Intag, the expansion of rural development and conservation projects and the associated growth of grassroots organizing throughout the valley, have been essential. These projects gave people more reason to reject mining, which was considered harmful to these initiatives. In this way, the projects strength-

ened the opposition to mining. Through these initiatives, peasants' concerns over their livelihood and those of the civil society actors over conservation of Intag's ecosystems were integrated into the question of what kind of local development was desired, suitable and feasible for the region. Moreover, as López Oropeza (2011) argues, these processes not only brought together particular communities and civil society actors, but also managed to a certain extent to link different communities that had previously been rather isolated from each other, and to create a territorial identity (see also Avcı & Fernández-Salvador 2016). At the same time, in these spaces of encounter the peasants' indignation over not being treated with respect and their common sense notion of dignity were (re)signified as a political problem of disrespect for and violation of their rights. As such, the concrete material changes in the productive activities, in the use and management of natural resources, and in the social relations that these processes brought about—and the particular discursive framing of those changes—combined to shape the subjectivities of the peasants who engaged in these processes. As the Gramscian perspective would have it, the subjectivities were produced through their actual enactment in practice.

It should, however, be noted that although the civil society actors managed to establish close and democratic relations with the peasants and aspired to long-term cooperation beyond the problem of mining, power inequalities and conflicts have still permeated these relations. There were certainly disparities between the peasants and the civil society leaders in terms of economic, social and cultural capital, the latter having the language skills, access to information and resources, and connections to transnational networks that allowed them to have more control over the decisions and hold leadership positions. During the 20 years of engagement, there have been disagreements and conflicts among the resistance groups. For instance, during my stay in Intag, DECOIN and the members of the EcoJunín Association were having a row about the clearing of the paths in the community forest reserve. Peasants complained that DECOIN was asking them to clear for more kilometres than what they had initially agreed on (DECOIN was paying the peasants a *diario*—daily wage). I asked María, the woman who managed the ecotourism facility, whether they often had such problems with the organizations and what they do about them. She replied:[48] "Yeah, from time to time, but we are friends, we sort it out. Don Carlos [Zorrilla] is a

good person, knows how to listen". It seemed that in the 20 years of their relationship, DECOIN and the peasants managed to establish trust with each other, and specific disagreements have been handled in a way that has not seriously damaged that trust.

Notwithstanding, the peasants sometimes felt disgruntled about the projects not bringing the economic benefits promised, or thought the civil society actors themselves benefited more from resources that were meant for the communities.[49] The civil society actors, for their part, complained that the peasants did not commit enough or were expecting too much of them.[50] Still, as the anti-mining struggle and the common initiatives were explicitly constructed around empowering the peasants to take their lives into their own hands and their right to participate, the alliances maintained a democratic ethos, and there has been room for discussion and negotiation to handle the disagreements. The larger problem, it seems, is the limits to the changes in the economic situation of the peasants that all those initiatives have brought about. I will return to this point after discussing the participatory local governance process in Cotacachi as the same kind of tension—a process of transformation that encounters limits in terms of the material improvements it achieves—emerged in that process as well.

5.3.3 The contributions of the participatory local governance experience

In the transformation of the anti-mining resistance in Intag into a broader political struggle over local development and rights, the political project to institutionalize participatory local governance in Cotacachi, which occurred concomitantly with the organizational processes in Intag and actually reinforced them, has been equally important (Avcı 2017: 319, Avcı & Fernández-Salvador 2017: 916). This process was initiated by the indigenous leader Auki Tituaña who was the mayor of the canton from 1996 to 2009. As he explained in our interview,[51] after studying economics in Cuba, and working for some years as a university professor, Auki Tituaña joined CONAIE, and was among the founders of the political party of the indigenous movement, *Pachakutik*. He was one of the first indigenous politicians who won in the 1996 local elections, and embarked on a transformatory political project.

Ospina Peralta et al. (2006: 27-30) argue that this experience needs to be understood as an integral part of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement built upon the demands of respect, democracy, development and social justice. The participatory local governance project in Cotacachi, they suggest, was principally aimed at "promot[ing] territorial development and a democratic territorial government" (ibid.: 27).

To put into practice this project of participatory governance, the mayor Auki Tituaña strongly promoted the building and strengthening of grassroots organizations (such as women, youth and neighbourhood), and their participation in municipal affairs. To this end, the Assembly for Cantonal Unity (AUC for its Spanish acronym) was established to bring together organized sections of the population and create an institutional space for collective decision making and planning. The main function of the AUC was to arrange annual assemblies in which the organized groups and citizens debated and adopt resolutions on issues concerning the population, such as health, education, women's rights, territorial development and security. The Assembly had a main permanent body called the Development and Management Committee that was comprised of representatives of the organizations of the canton and was responsible from coordinating their activities, as well as with the municipality to implement the resolutions made in the Assembly. The municipality, for its part, committed itself to plan its activities based on these resolutions, cooperate with civil society in their implementation, and foster accountability and transparency.

Auki Tituaña expounded the foundations and accomplishments of his project in the following way:

Working with CONAIE, and as a technician in development projects, I had the opportunity to learn about the reality of politics…Representative democracy has been corrupt, exclusive, not planned…We wanted to build a new democracy [based on] participation, co-responsibility, transparency, in favour of all groups, of gender equality, of the youth…People did not have faith, were used to receive [public] works from the government, without getting involved, without effort…there was pessimism among people. We have surpassed this kind of thinking, we put a lot of political energy…to revive [or awaken] people's self respect…My most successful vision was to build an organizational fabric…I said first we organize, then they [organizations] come to discuss, then we decide on the budget.

In terms of its actual achievements, the participatory local governance experience in Cotacachi has indeed built an organizational fabric and managed to institutionalize participation, and has improved infrastructure, health and education services in the canton. However, the economic results—concerning employment opportunities, level of income, access to irrigation to improve agricultural production—have been rather limited; notwithstanding the significant growth of the tourism sector and its multiplier effect in food, artisanal goods and leather clothing sectors (Ospina Peralta et al. 2006: 58-63). An important factor that underlay the success of the project was the financial resources from international organizations and development agencies that the mayor and the civil society organizations managed to procure, as well as those that flowed to the canton as it became recognized internationally (ibid.: 60).[52]

The idea of promoting an organized society that exercises its right to participate in decision-making processes and that works collectively to improve its socio-economic conditions resonated well with the organizational work already underway in Intag, and helped advance it further. In fact, the municipality and the organizations in Intag cooperated in various projects such as environmental and rights education, improvement of health services and promotion of tourism activities. Many peasants have acknowledged appreciatively the work of Auki Tituaña, not only for supporting the initiatives underway in the valley, but also for being the first mayor that really took them into account and paid attention to the valley. In the words of Manuel,[53] a community member from Junín, "What Auki offered, he fulfilled".

Likewise, the processes at the cantonal level reflected and contributed to the efforts of the organizations in Intag trying to address the mining conflict as a broader problem of different approaches to development. DECOIN and other groups from Intag (women, youth, coffee producers, parish governments, etc.) became very active in the AUC, especially in its Committee of Management of Environment and Natural Resources, and broadened the scope of the anti-mining struggle— supported by the mayor as well—to the cantonal level. As Johana,[54] the 29 year-old president of the Assembly in 2012, indicated, through the debates over mining in the annual assemblies, mining came to be seen not as a problem concerning only Intag, but all Cotacachi, and general awareness of its possible impacts and the importance of an environment free of contamination, of protecting the water, of sustainable initiatives

was created. Despite the existence of historical tensions between the indigenous people forming the majority in the Andean part of the canton and mestizos of Intag (Pallares 2002), indigenous people and organizations widely supported the anti-mining resistance. This was substantially facilitated by the class-based discourse of the main peasant and indigenous organization in the canton, UNORCAC, which historically focused more on rural inequality than on identity demands (Davidov 2013, Pallares 2002). This alliance significantly strengthened the anti-mining movement, and gave it a more legitimate voice (Avcı 2017: 319).

The most important achievement resulting from the participation of Inteños in AUC was the enactment of Ecological Ordinance[55] by the local government in 2000 following the consensus reached by all parish governments of Intag not to permit mining in the valley. The ordinance declared Cotacachi an ecological canton, prohibited environmentally degrading economic activities—including and particularly mining—while promoting sustainable ones, and encouraged community management and protection of forests and watersheds (D'Amico 2012a). This vision of the canton free of mining, which had already been articulated in the annual assemblies held since 1996, was reiterated in the subsequent ones, and was included in the Development and Land Use Plans of the canton. This ordinance is still in place by 2018 although its legal clout is overridden by the powers of the central government concerning "strategic projects"—projects like mining that are deemed to be in the national interest.

These two processes taking place simultaneously at the level of Intag and Cotacachi proved to be mutually reinforcing, and constructed the political spaces for collective deliberation and planning, as well as the organizational capacity for the elaboration and implementation of alternative development projects (Avcı 2017: 319). The vision of local development articulated in these spaces was multi-dimensional in nature, integrating economic, social, cultural and environmental issues (Ospina Peralta et al. 2006: 35-36). Notably, it incorporated the notion of a dignified life that the peasants of Intag highly valued, and indeed made the practice of participation an integral element of that notion. Most importantly, the participatory local governance process provided an additional institutional space for the exercise of rights for the Inteños, thus contributed to the cultivation of their subjectivities as rights-bearing citizens *and* communities.

The sustainable use of resources and an ethics of care for the environment were also constitutive of this emerging vision of local development. Although the indigenous movement in Cotacachi shared the concerns of the movement actors in Intag over access to resources and respect for the environment, it was the alliance between the two that led the former to endorse a more explicit emphasis on sustainability as a condition and goal of development and part of its political project. In the annual cantonal assemblies, environmental issues such as mining, deforestation, access to land and water, and agricultural practices have always been on the agenda. Through these debates, the assemblies have become a space for promoting environmental values, and linking environmental issues to social, economic and political processes affecting the canton. Similarly, as mentioned above, the projects implemented in Intag have all been framed as sustainable alternatives to environmentally destructive mining. Even though they were rather modest, involved only part of the population and were limited in their effects, these initiatives have been important for enacting new ways of relating to the environment. Both processes have also incorporated a gender dimension, bridging the aims of sustainable development and women's empowerment. In this respect, D'Amico (2012b) discusses how, through alternative projects and educational practices, many Inteñas have gained a degree of economic independence and security, changed their position in intra-household relationships, and started to participate actively in the political life of their communities.

Ospina Peralta et al. (2006: 40-41) hold that the participatory local governance experience in Cotacachi was the most successful one in Ecuador, especially in terms of its degree of institutionalization. Likewise, the anti-mining struggle in Intag has been an exceptional case, not only because it managed to force back two companies, but more importantly, for catalysing a transformative social process. The capacities and the commitment of the leaders and organizations have surely been important in this success, as well as the substantial financial resources they managed to secure to implement particular projects. However, the foundations of the success of both should better be looked for in their critical and radical approaches to development and participation. As Hickey and Mohan (2005: 237) argue:

> Participatory approaches are most likely to succeed: (i) where they are
> pursued as part of a wider radical political project; (ii) where they are

aimed specifically at securing citizenship rights and participation for marginal and subordinate groups; and (iii) when they seek to engage with development as an underlying process of social change rather than in the form of discrete technocratic interventions.

The success of the participatory local governance project in Cotacachi can indeed be attributed to fulfilling these conditions.

That being said, it is also important to acknowledge that both processes—organization building and local development efforts within the valley, and participatory local governance at the cantonal level—were rife with tensions and difficulties, and limited in terms of their success in ensuring participation of all, and reducing poverty and generating employment. Concerning the issue of participation at the level of the canton, Ospina Peralta et al. (2006: 44-45) argue that a significant part of the population, especially those who were not members of an organization, did not engage with these processes, and by 2005 the level of interest and participation in the process seemed to be decreasing. With respect to the tensions permeating the process, they maintain that tensions existed not only because the organizations had different and sometimes conflicting priorities, but also due to the existence of differences with respect to what communities demanded, what the leaders aspired to, and what different actors believed could be achieved within the given economic and political constraints, at least in the short run (ibid.: 36-38). They particularly emphasize that although the local actors shared a critique of the neoliberal development model, their position was rather ambiguous in terms of which economic alternatives were desirable and possible, how to engage with the market, and whether this signified an "anti-capitalist" position or required a more realistic or pragmatic adaptation to the system. With respect to the economic dimension, they point out that "the [structural] bases for a local territorial development are largely beyond the control of the actors that wanted to make it possible" (Ospina Peralta et al. 2006: 25). The conclusions of Bebbington et al. (2008a: 2884) about the effects of social movements on rural territorial development in Latin America demonstrate that these problems are indeed more general. As they put it: "[social] movements have had important effects on governance arrangements in particular territories, making them more participatory and inclusive. However, these changes have very rarely translated into greater economic inclusion and opportunity, nor changed the practices of dominant economic actors". Arguably, the limited economic

success of the social movements in Intag and Cotacachi made the peasants in Intag more susceptible to the developmentalist discourse of the current government (which I will be discussing below) such that as the promises of civil society actors to bring about change partially lost credibility, those of the government have become more attractive.

As in Cotacachi, not all people in Intag participated equally in civil society and political spaces, or benefited equally from the alternative development projects (Avcı 2017: 319). Particularly those initially supportive of mining, who were concentrated in the parish centre of Garcia Moreno and not facing the threat of relocation, experienced the conflict rather differently. On the one hand, they established connections with the mining companies and the officials from the Ministry of Mines, thus forming high expectations regarding economic benefits of mining (Cisneros 2011). Ascendant Copper was particularly influential in mobilizing support for the project, also in the communities closer the mining site. The company bought land at inflated prices while allowing people keep on living on the land; employed some people at higher than normal wages (for the region) to work in so-called model agroecology farms; encouraged and financed the establishment of a community organization called The Council of Development of Garcia Moreno; and carried out what it called social programmes. Among its social programmes, the company mentioned model farms for organic agriculture, medical attention, nutrition workshops, vaccination programmes for cattle, a soccer school and tree nurseries, although it seems that rather than a 'social programme', these activities are better decribed as ad hoc actions aimed at consolidating its presence. The company also made promises of more benefits for the region if the exploration were to advance, such as employment and training, local purchases, and infrastructural improvements.[56]

On the other hand, the openly anti-mining position of the local government and the local organizations alienated some people who considered mining as an opportunity to improve their economic conditions, or those who did not want to be identified as anti-mining. One manifestation of the fact that these people refrained from participating in these spaces was that in the annual assembly[57] of the AUC held in Cotacachi in November 2011, there were no voices articulating an explicitly pro-mining position, let alone one that even suggested a discussion on the issue. It seems that these people felt stigmatized and not welcome in these spaces, and perceived the alternative development projects as being

geared to those who openly position themselves against mining. For instance, a middle-aged male peasant from La Magdalena community, with whom I had a brief exchange at the community centre said, "I am neither in favour of mining nor against. I am not sure whether it will be good for us or not", and explained why he did not join the cooperative *Talleres* as "we are not welcome there, only the environmentalists join". This is not necessarily true, especially in the specific case of this cooperative that is focused more on generating alternative sources of income than directly fighting mining. And even if the reasons for him not to join the cooperative were different, his statement suggests that the divisions over mining permeate social and political life in Intag in different ways. Hence, it can be argued that the initiatives of the anti-mining alliance, despite their underlying principals of inclusion and participation, have contributed to the social polarization in the valley (López Oropeza 2011).

What I wanted to illustrate through my account of the Intag resistance is that for the Inteños, as for many Ecuadorians, the state has been rather a distant institution, not systematically directing the socio-economic changes at the local level, not much visible through its services, and not having firm control over the cultural life of communities (Avcı 2017: 322). Viewed against this background, it is understandable that that prior to the mining conflict the Inteños did not perceive or signify their everyday practices as a developmental process. It was the mining struggle that introduced this language, framing mining as a form of (mal)development that would benefit the transnational companies at the cost of the rights and livelihoods of local communities, and the health and integrity of the environment. As the struggle was forged into a process of change explicitly named as "alternative local/territorial development", which translated the livelihood concerns of the peasants into a political project based on an ethics of collective well-being, community participation and action, respect for rights and sustainability, development for many Inteños came to mean a humble local process of betterment of life through collective decision making and action aimed at living in dignity and peace, not a national endeavour to achieve ambitious goals or a means to pursue material wealth. In addition, in this process, 'the environment' was constructed as a new conceptual category (Agrawal 2005) relevant to their lives, and as a valuable feature of the valley worth defending and preserving (see also Davidov 2013).

Thus, the processes that the mining struggle and the participatory lo-cal governance project of Cotacachi unleashed in Intag can be viewed as the mutual constitution of new meanings and practices, as transformative praxis, that enabled the peasants to view their own lives beyond histori-cal isolation and marginalization, as an active construction carried out as a political struggle. For those who did engage in the struggle, and despite the limited economic success of the alternative development efforts, the mutually reinforcing processes of grassroots organization, participation in the political spaces for collective deliberation and decision making, and discursive and practical construction of alternative development have certainly had transformatory effects. It is thanks to this transfor-mation that time and time again the peasants asserted their right to have control over their lives and territories, as well as their capacity to shape their own future. In the words of Manuel, a middle-aged peasant from Junín, they are and want to be "protagonists" of their own lives.

5.4   Building State Hegemony: The Changing Balance of Forces in Intag

The current political context in Ecuador, with a popular government promoting mining and a strengthened state apparatus more willing and capable of pursuing the mining agenda, presents significant challenges for the anti-mining struggle in Intag (and other local resistance groups and the national anti-mining movement). Intag is currently being rede-fined as a "resource environment" to be exploited in the service of na-tional development (Davidov 2014). The demands of the local actors to have control over their territory are pitted against the claims of the state to have the right and the capacity to extract the mineral resources that belongs to the "nation" for the benefit of all Ecuadorians. The govern-ment now confidently presents itself as the guarantor of the sovereignty of the nation (Moore & Velásquez 2012) to refute one of the key argu-ments of the anti-mining movement, not only of Intag but also national-ly, that the mining project is an imposition of transnational companies, and that the Ecuadorian state is unable either to regulate their activities or to capture the rents. In Intag, this argument has lost even more au-thority since it is now the state mining company ENAMI EP (in partner-ship with CODELCO) that develops the project.

More importantly, as the government is now promising to deliver long-due development at the local level using the mining wealth, and trying to persuade people that mining will be done in a 'responsible' way, it is raising new expectations for a better life and trying to alleviate the concerns over environmental impacts. The words of 63 year-old Camilo from Junín, who was previously an active member of the resistance, illustrate how the government's efforts influence the peasants:[58]

> The miners [the previous companies] were saying that they would not do any harm, but we saw it with our own eyes [referring to the contamination of the Junín river by the sewage from the mining camp of Bishi Metals]…Now there are many guarantees not to contaminate, that everything will be legal... I trust the government but [still] I don't know how they are going to do it in these steep hills… the soil is not strong here…I guess there will be landslides".

It can be suggested that it has become more complicated to sustain the commitment to a slow and arduous process of autonomous local development against the promises of state-sponsored development through mining. Besides, the state's backing has definitely encouraged the mining supporters who were previously blamed for prioritizing their self-interest over community well-being to assert their position more strongly and with more moral authority (Avcı 2017: 323).

Discourse, however, is not the only tool of the government to consolidate its presence and build trust in the valley. For instance, it started to improve the main road to the valley, which was identified as the main necessity of the valley by almost all people I talked to. Moreover, different institutions, such as the Ministry of Agriculture (MAGAP), Ministry of Economic and Social Inclusion (MIES), have established local offices and started to implement several programmes, such as promotion of coffee production and support for nurseries. Commenting on these changes, the president of the parish government of Garcia Moreno said:[59]

> There are more resources from the central government now…MAGAP, MIES, the provincial directorate of environment…they do their own planning, they have their own programmes. They come to the parish government only to coordinate…The law says the local governments are autonomous financially, to manage their resources, it says we should be informed about whatever going on in the territory, but in practice these

are not completely fulfilled...we need to negotiate [with these institutions].

A further manifestation of the increasing state presence was the numerous vehicles displaying the new colorful symbols of the state institutions seen in the valley. I asked several people if this was the case before, and all commented that this started happening with Correa's government.

Another element in this process was the municipality. In 2009, the candidate of the *Allianza País* (Correa's party) won the elections in Cotacachi.[60] This meant that the anti-mining resistance lost one of its most important allies. The new mayor neither openly supported the mining project, nor opposed it. His declarations on the issue that appeared in the media were rather ambiguous, placing emphasis on the need to consult with the communities, to carry out an environmental impact study, to make sure that if it is done it benefits the people of Cotacachi. Even more concerning for the mining opponents in Intag and Cotacachi was what they perceived as the weakening of the participatory governance process. For instance, the young president of AUC Johana argued:[61]

> The mayorship is trying to undermine the Assembly with the discourse that it is the seat of [political] opposition, of the supporters of the ex-mayor...Political parties are trying to capture the participatory spaces...maintaining autonomy [of the AUC], this is important...The mayor says the laws have changed, that the assembly cannot work like before...[that] the planning council [of the municipality] is to make the decisions...The government cannot be the leader [*dirigente*], it is another actor like us...It dismisses the whole organizational process... weakening the organizations, fomenting individual participation...collective actors, organizations [are seen as] blocking doing things.

At the same time that the municipality was reconfiguring the participatory spaces in Cotacachi, it was also actively working in Intag to advance the new policies and programmes of the central government. I was told by Sebastian, an employee of the municipality I met in the parish centre of Apuela,[62] who said he was a "technical promoter", that the main objective of the municipality's work in Intag was to "promote the participation of the people, improve the flow of information between the communities and the municipality, divulge the state's projects and strengthen communal organizing". The main mechanism to accomplish

these aims was to legalize the communal councils and community water boards, and update their codes in accordance with the new laws. He also mentioned that they were trying to do "mapping", a "socio-economic diagnostic" to identify the needs of the people and what they were satisfied with, and to understand "what is happening with the land, water, agriculture, education and health" in the valley. He added:

> From the 1990s onwards there was a boom of NGOs here. There were more NGOs than the state, doing projects…They basically created work for themselves…The projects were not sustainable, they worked for a couple of years, then when the resources depleted, they failed…The communities first participated, but they did not really appropriate them [the projects]…The organizations spoke on behalf of all, [but] they had their own objectives.

An interesting comment he made was about the Hidro Intag project that the organization *Corporación Toisán* (the umbrella organization that united nine organizations in the valley) wanted to develop. The project proposed to construct eight small-scale hydro-power plants around the valley which would be managed by the communities and generate resources to be invested in other community projects. *Corporación Toisán* prepared technical and financial plans, and was searching for funds to start the construction. The president of the organization told me that they could not obtain funding because of lacking political support. Sebastian confirmed his claim saying, "they [the organization] do not have good relations with the government. And the government says 'if you don't agree with my projects, I don't help you either'". He added that the government itself was planning to build middle-scale hydro power plants in the valley, and mentioned the one already under construction (the one I referred to above).

One meeting I had the chance to attend in the Cotacachi municipality was an interesting and rather striking testimony to the ways in which the government was trying to consolidate its political project at the local level. On March 29, 2012, a professional-looking man, who only vaguely said he was working for the government when I asked, gave a talk to around 30 people, mostly employees of the local government of Cotacachi, but also those from the neighbouring canton of Otovalo and the provincial capital Ibarra. The topic of the talk was how to push forward the Citizens' Revolution. The speaker identified the political project of

Citizens' Revolution as an effort to "construct a new hegemony". His presentation was organized in ten sections, and included themes like the priorities and strategic objectives of the *Allianza País* movement; the main discussions within the movement, the identity and capacities of its members; how to articulate the political programme of the movement in the territory; the influence that the movement aims to have in the society; how to mobilize resources and organize; and who needs to do what and when to accomplish the objectives of the movement. Critical political thought; participation; democracy, ideological cohesion, organizational strength; forming critical subjects; praxis as unity of thought and action; leadership; auto-criticism; social transformation; forming cadres; communicating the movement's messages to people were some of the concepts and phrases that marked the speech.[63] Considering its audience, this talk was obviously an exercise in "forming cadres". To me, it showed that the characterization of the Citizens' Revolution as a hegemonic project was not just a scholarly affair; it was actually how its creators and leaders conceived the movement.

Another issue that this speaker mentioned was the dangers that the oppositional forces presented to the movement, threatening to destabilize it by "manipulating" and "instrumentalizing" the masses. These comments were very much in line with the president's multiple declarations on anti-mining activists, and more generally oppositional social movements. In fact, as I mentioned in Chapter 3, Correa has repeatedly attacked the anti-mining activists as terrorists, infantile environmentalists, allies of the Right and the global mining companies that feared competition from Ecuador; and actually declared them to be the "greatest threat to his political project" (Moore & Velásquez 2012: 122). In his weekly address (*Enlace Ciudadano*) on December 7, 2013, Correa personally attacked Carlos Zorrilla, the founder of DECOIN, emphasizing he was a foreigner and claiming that a document Zorrilla co-authored in 2009 entitled "Protecting Your Community Against Mining Companies and Other Extractive Industries: A Guide for Community Organizers" was inciting uprising and violence. This was not the only time Correa targeted Carlos Zorrilla. In his other public speeches he kept on bringing up his name and accusing him.

These discourses and practices of the government, the ministries and the municipality demonstrate that the strengthening of the state works in such a way that it undermines civil society spaces and debilitates opposi-

tional actors. That is, as the government increasingly penetrates the economic, social and political spheres at the local level, it simultaneously weakens the autonomy and the legitimacy of the civil society actors that have led the mining struggle, and erodes the political spaces of ideological elaboration, deliberation and decision making that these actors have constructed. In Gramscian parlance, the state is winning over new "trenches" against critical civil society actors in the "war of position". The government discourses and practices also harm the credibility and viability of the economic projects they have initiated or are willing to undertake. Moreover, as I indicated in the first section of this chapter, the government tries to reinforce its control over civil society organizations and activists through legal and coercive means. A clear example is the shutting down of the national environmental organization *Pachamama* in December 2013 for its alleged use of violence in a protest during an event for the auctioning of new oil concessions in Quito. This was a clear message to organizations opposing the government's extractive projects that the same could happen to them. Likewise, the legal cases against many activists and indigenous leaders on the charges of terrorism are a definite threat to others.

Fear of state coercion profoundly troubles the peasants in Intag as well. Many peasants that previously stood up against the mining companies expressed their concern about the threat of coercion. Paula, a young woman from Junín, for instance, stated: "Correa sent the military in the south [referring to the intervention of the police and military in the confrontations over mining in Morona Santiago and Azuay during June and July 2007]...The previous presidents did not care, they just let us fight…I am scared now…What Correa says is going to happen, happens…if people do not accept, he just goes. He can send the military here as well". There is indeed a growing feeling among the peasants that given the government's determination to pursue the mining project, and its readiness to use coercion, there is no way to resist anymore. In fact, the government did not wait long to do what the communities feared, detaining and charging with rebellion, sabotage and terrorism the president of Junín, and sending police to establish its control in the valley. All these effects of the government's discourses and practices in Intag demonstrate how the process of state hegemony building operates by cultivating new subjectivities aligned with the state ideology, while constraining the emerging critical subjectivities.

The future of the mining project and the struggle in Intag is uncertain. However, it is clear that, much like what is happening on the national front, the balance of social forces in Intag has been shifting, and certainly not in favour of the anti-mining groups. In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that as the government insists on imposing its development vision on Intag, supposedly for the benefit of all Ecuadorians, it actually impairs the actual efforts and future possibilities for envisioning, experimenting with and learning from alternative development notions and models that could potentially contribute to the establishment of just, democratic and sustainable social and environmental relations.

Notes

[1] Summarized versions of the arguments presented in this chapter appears in Avcı (2017: 318-320) and in Avcı and Fernández-Salvador (2016: 915-917).

[2] *Haciendas* are large estates that dominated agricultural production in the highlands region until the 1960s. The *hacienda* system was based on the exploitation of Indian labour under a system of service tenure and debt peonage.

[3] For detailed discussions of the meaning of *sumak kawsay* or *buen vivir*, see e.g. Acosta 2008, Gudynas 2011, Radcliffe 2012, Walsh 2010.

[4] Junín, February 23, 2012.

[5] *Puro monte* is an expression used by peasant settlers to refer to uncolonized land. It suggests an unproductive or useless landscape, and bringing down the forest to open agricultural land is what a settler does, and implies a positive change.

[6] On the way from Junín to Garcia Moreno, March 17, 2012.

[7] Garcia Moreno, March 26, 2013.

[8] Chalguayaco Alto, January 9, 2012.

[9] Magdalena Bajo, April 13, 2012.

[10] Junín, February 24, 2012.

[11] Nangulví, March 4, 2012.

[12] Junín, January 6, 2012.

[13] Chalguayaco Bajo, March 27, 2013.

[14] José, who is an agronomis living in the valley argued that this was related to the characteristics of the soil, and the use of inappropriate farming methods (García Moreno, March 6, 2012).

15 Interview with Carlos Zorrilla, Apuela, April 15, 2012.

16 Otovalo, February 18, 2012.

17 Nangulví, February 21, 2012.

18 Peñaherrera, April 16, 2012.

19 Interview with Jóse Cueva, the president of Consorcio Toisán, García Moreno, March 6, 2012.

20 Chalguayaco Alto, January 9, 2012.

21 Interview with Maria, Junín, January 6, 2012. In Chapter 3, her version of the event was quoted.

22 *Periódico Intag* 40. "Comunidades dicen 'basta' al quemar propiedad minera". February-March 2006: 1-3.

23 The hike from ecotourism facility of Junín to the community reserve, December 30, 2011.

24 I attended the meeting and recorded the speech.

25 I attended the meeting.

26 Chalguayaco Alto, January 9, 2012.

27 While the new Constitution was being drafted in 2008, public consultations were held throughout Ecuador, and proposals were either sent or delivered directly to the Constitutional Assembly in the city of Monte Cristo.

28 Alberto Acosta was the president of the Constitutional Assembly from November 2007 to June 2008, but he resigned due to his disagreements with Correa, particularly over the issue of including a ban on large-scale mining in the Constitution.

29 Interviews with Father Geovanni Paz (February 18, 2012, Otavalo); Auki Tituaña (February 28, 2012, Cotacachi); Jóse Cueva (March 6, 2012, García Moreno); Mary Ellen Fieweger (March 7, 2012, Apuela); Natalia (the Intag director of the NGO PRODECI, March 29, 2012, Cotacachi); Carlos Zorrilla (April 15, 2012, Apuela); Johana (the president of the Cantonal Assembly, April 18, 2012, Cotacachi).

30 The information on his work in Intag, and the quotes are from the interview with him, Otavalo, February 18, 2012.

31 Conscientization is, in fact, a Freirean concept, referring to the development of critical consciousness in people.

32 *Periódico Intag* 1. "Taller de Liderazgo", December 2000: 7.

33 Interview with María, Junín, January 6, 2012.

34 To make it more accessible to the people of Intag, the newspaper was always sold at a low price that was not enough to cover the costs. Therefore the newspaper team had continuously to look for funds (from civil society organizations and individual supporters). Due to the increasing difficulties the team had in acquiring funds they decided to close the newspaper. They then started a radio programme called "Intag: La Radio Revista" in March 2013, continuing their important work through a different medium (Interview with Mary Ellen Fieweger, Apuela, March 7, 2012).

35 She was referring to the data obtained through a survey conducted for the study of López Oropeza (2011) on the historical construction of territorial identity in Intag. The newspaper was sold from its office in the centre of Apuela Parish, various shops in the parish centres in the valley, the offices of other local organizations, and in the urban centre of Cotacachi and Otavalo cantons. (Otavalo is a famous tourist town in Ecuador. In the town centre, there is a shop called *Casa de Intag* that sells the products of different organizations, at the time also the newspaper, and which functions as a tourism office to promote Intag.) The newspaper was also distributed to other readers in Ecuador and abroad, mostly to those individuals who provided financial support for the newspaper and those who supported the resistance in Intag.

36 Apuela, March 7, 2012.

37 Interview with Mary Ellen Fieweger, Apuela, March 7, 2012.

38 Interview with Geovanni Paz, Otavalo, February 18, 2012.

39 Nangulví, March 4, 2012.

40 The local priest Geovanni Paz and the founder of *Periódico Intag*, Mary Ellen Fieweger are among these actors. Since, I have discussed their role in the processes of social change in Intag, here I am talking about other people. However, the work of Father Paz and Mary Ellen Fieweger has been complementary to those of others. Additionally, *Talleres*, a production and sales cooperative, has not been at the forefront of the anti-mining struggle, but still involved for a member of *Consorcio Toisán*, and for considering mining incompatible with the type of development vision it embraces (Interview with the founder of *Talleres*, Denis Laporta, Magdalena Bajo, April 14, 2012).

41 PRODECI was initially a local (provincial) branch of Spanish development NGO *Ayuda en Acción* that has been working in the valley since 1997. It became a separate organization called PRODECI (*Pro Derechos Ciudadanos*-Pro Citizens' Rights) in 2004.

42 The network comprises of 11 organizations, including AACRI, *Talleres*, and some of the women's associations, which are also part of the Coordinator of

Women of Intag, and youth groups who offer touristic services like rafting, biking and trekking.

[43] Garcia Moreno, March 3, 2012.

[44] A plant used to produce fibres.

[45] Magdalena Bajo, April 13, 2012

[46] *Periódico Intag* 14. "Se forma un comité de entidades inteñas". February-March 2002: 2.

[47] *Periódico Intag* 15. "Las mujeres de Intag se organizan". April-May 2003: 6.

[48] Conversation with Maria, Junín, December 28, 2011.

[49] Interviews with Maria (Junín, January 6, 2012); Natalia (Cotacachi, March 29, 2012).

[50] Interviews Ricardo (Magdalena Bajo, April 13, 2012); Natalia (Cotacachi, March 29, 2012).

[51] Cotacachi, February 28, 2012.

[52] Cotacachi won in 2000 the Dubai International Award for Best Practices to Improve the Living Environment, given by the Dubai Municipality and UN-Habitat and the UNESCO Cities for Peace Prize in 2002.

[53] Junín, January 10, 2012.

[54] Cotacachi, April 18, 2012.

[55] Ordinance is the name given to the legislative decisions of the local governments in Ecuador.

[56] See the copy of the company webpage at:

<http://miningwatch.ca/sites/default/files/OECD_I_ACC_community.pdf>

[57] I attended the assembly.

[58] February 25, 2012, Junín.

[59] March 3, 2012, Magdalena Bajo.

[60] The new mayor of Cotacachi elected in 2014 seems to be closer to anti-mining movement, and willing to vitalize the participatory local governance project.

[61] April 18, 2012, Cotacachi.

[62] February 21, 2012.

[63] Although the speaker did not pronounced the name, Gramsci was clearly in the room.

6 The Limits of Environmental Struggle: State Hegemony and the Particularistic Defence of Place in Mount Ida

This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the Mount Ida struggle in Mount Ida.[1] It discusses how the peasants' opposition to mining in Mount Ida has been based on the defence of their particularistic interests. It demonstrates how hegemonic understandings permeate the subjectivities of the peasants, as well as of their allies, and how this limits the transformative potential of the social struggle in which they are engaged. The first section provides a brief review of historical state-society relations in Turkey as backdrop to the ensuing discussion. The second section analyses the notions of development, environment and justice that the peasants of Mount Ida have articulated. The third section explains the civil society and local government actors' understandings of development, and discusses how the type of relationships they built with the peasants has reinforced the latter's particularistic positions.Begin here.

6.1   State-Society relations in Turkey: A historical review

Since its establishment in 1923 following the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, state-society relations in Turkey have been fundamentally shaped by the state-led project of modernization. This project was initiated by the Ottoman bureaucratic and military elite who, after leading the national independence war (1919-1922), took upon themselves the responsibility to build a modern nation state to "catch up with the West". The main pillars of this modernization project were development of a capitalist national economy and building of a unitary, secular national identity (Keyman 2005). In this formulation, development understood as economic growth was considered to be a precondition for progress and prioritized as a policy goal. Society was deemed to be an organic

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whole in which individuals and occupation groups were to complement the activities of each other while the state retained the power and legitimacy to decide the direction and purpose of these activities (Adaman & Arsel 2005a, Yalman 2002). As Akbulut and Adaman (2013) argue, this growth-oriented modernization constituted the basis of the state's claim to rule and direct the economic and social transformation of Turkish society. Despite the changes in state-society relations, and the different political orientations of the governments that have ruled the country since then, the primacy of the idea of development as economic growth still dominates both policy making and social imagery (Adaman et al. 2016, Arsel 2005a).

The state's "social revolution from above" to restructure society was based on the alliance between the military and bureaucratic elite, and the commercial bourgeoisie and landed classes, which was expanded to include the nascent industrial capitalist class created by state-led industrialization (Öncü 2003: 314). Yalman (2002: 26 & 30) maintains that these groups were urged to form a "historic bloc" to pursue a hegemonic project in which the main strategy was the creation of a national economy whereby the state assumed the leading role in facilitating and coordinating capital accumulation, and "was vested with the task of leading the individuals to a higher level of consciousness" to create an organic society. To this end, economic development strategies based on protectionism and public investment were combined with legal and administrative restructuring, and educational and cultural reforms, while the expression of either class-based interests or religious and ethnic identities were restricted and repressed. The top-down implementation of this hegemonic project, the denial of the possibility of autonomous political organization to the subordinated groups, and the use of coercion to contain any dissent constituted an authoritarian form of the state (Yalman 2002).

1950 marked a significant turning point in the history of the republic as the single-party regime came to an end when the Democrat Party won the first multiparty elections and remained in power until the military intervention in 1960. Democrat Party was established by the nascent commercial and industrial bourgeoisie together with landowners and local notables who were already part of the ruling coalition of the early republican period, but occupied a secondary position compared to the bureaucratic elite (Öncü 2003). With its liberal and anti-elitist discourse, emphasis on agricultural growth and softer attitude towards religion, the

party managed to garner support mainly from the peripheral rural areas. Despite these changes, it retained the authoritarianism and paternalism of the previous period, as well as the organic vision of society (Yalman 2002). The rather significant change in this period was the increasing importance of clientelism as a way of gaining and sustaining support of the subordinated groups for the political project of the ruling bloc. In fact, from 1950s onwards, patron-client networks have been consolidated as the predominant form of access to the state for the subordinate groups, as well as of containing any emergent dissent (Akbulut 2011). The rule of the Democrat Party ended with the first military coup of the Republic in May 1960, which was justified by the alleged dictatorial tendencies of the party. Öncü (2003) interprets the coup as the siding of the military with the industrial bourgeoisie who were discontented with the control of the landowning classes of decision making within the Democrat Party, and were willing to establish a more democratic legislative process.

After the first military coup in 1960, the expansion of political freedoms for the subordinated classes (particularly the working class) through adoption of the new constitution of 1961 and the initiation of a new development strategy of planned import substituting industrialization (ISI) started a process of change in state-society relations. In this period, rising employment in the industrial sector (both private and public), accelerated urbanization, agricultural modernization, improvements in infrastructure and social services (education, health, social security), increasing availability of mass consumption goods (especially in the fast-growing urban centres), redistributive policies, and the struggles of the working classes combined to improve the living conditions of the masses (Boratav 2004). The increase in state economic enterprises throughout the country in both industrial and agricultural sectors was particularly important for the penetration of the state into society and building consent (Keyder 1989). Yet, it did not prevent the intensification of class conflict. While in the 1960s and 1970s, under the leadership of labour unions (such as the Confederation of Labour Unions of Turkey, and the more radical Confederation of Revolutionary Labour Unions) and political parties (in particular, The Worker's Party), the working classes mobilized in relatively high numbers and became increasingly militant, peasant political action remained weak. This is due to its containment through a combination of clientelistic relations and agricultural support policies, and the scarce attention paid by the urban left movements to form alli-

ances with the large pool of small peasants, still representing the majority of the population (declining from 68% in 1960 to 56% in 1980) at the time (Akbulut 2011, Çulhaoğlu 2002).

It can be argued that the significance of this period in the history of Turkish politics is the changes in the balance of class forces it created, both within the propertied classes, and between the bourgeoisie and working class. With respect to the former, Öncü (2003) maintains that ISI mostly benefited large capitalists (mainly from Istanbul), while eroding the wealth and status of the petty bourgeoisie composed of small merchants, landowners and artisans (of peripheral provinces), and that party politics of the time reflected the economic and ideological conflicts among the powerful. Yalman (2002) emphasizes the latter cleavage, and argues that the Turkish bourgeoisie could not come to terms with the challenges to its hegemony by the strengthening working classes. The intensification of both types of conflict signified the inability of the bourgeoisie to lead society, led to a "general crisis of the state", and prompted the military to intervene once again in 1971. In the ensuing period of deteriorating economic conditions and civil strife, repressive measures, in particular against the radical left movement, were adopted to contain the conflicts. And when these attempts failed, the military staged another coup in 1980.

The military coup of 1980 marked the beginning of the neoliberal restructuring of state-society relations, which entailed "putting an end to class-based politics" and "constructing a new class hegemony under an authoritarian form of the state by means of an ideology which extolled the market" (Yalman 2002: 41&46). In this period, with the shift to an export-led growth strategy that foresaw a new mode of integration into the capitalist world economy, the economy was gradually and selectively liberalized, and the primacy of markets in the organization of production and distribution was consolidated. Although the adoption of neoliberal policies anticipated the reduction of the active role of the state as investor, producer and welfare provider, it did not diminish the intervention of the state in the economy but rather changed its direction towards the extension and consolidation of the market logic (Adaman et al. 2016).

In the aftermath of the military coup the institutionalization of an authoritarian political regime with the adoption of the new Constitution in 1982 was complemented with de-politicization, and promotion of an individualist and consumerist culture, thus establishing a socio-political

structure of authoritarian individualism (Yalman 2002). The liquidation of the left movement by the military coup, the existence of an authoritarian regime, and societal changes associated with neoliberal restructuring (e.g. precarious and insecure employment, economic and social marginalization in peripheries of urban centres, individualism and consumerism) explain to a large extent why resistance to neoliberalism remained weak and sporadic despite the rising macroeconomic instability (as evidenced by recurrent economic crises), deteriorating material conditions of the masses, and deepening economic inequalities.

The viability of the authoritarian regime was gradually undermined in the 1990s due to both domestic and external pressures. On the domestic front, a significant development was the rise of identity politics, most notably with the resurgence of political Islam and the rise of the Kurdish movement[2] that challenged the established secular and unitary conception of the nation state (Keyman 2005). Concomitantly, civil society organizations engaged in diverse issues including human rights, gender, corruption, transparency, accountability and the environment started increasing in number, and articulating demands for democratization (Çaylak 2008). Although the state opened the political space for civil society activism, it acted highly selectively in its engagement with civil society actors, responding to certain demands while denying legitimacy and access to the political sphere to others (Paker et al. 2013) External pressures for democratization, on the other hand, came primarily from the European Union of which Turkey has been trying to become a part. In fact, Turkey has made significant changes in its legislation to comply with the European standards, though the implementation has lagged behind significantly (Özbudun 2007).

6.1.1 The rise of the Justice and Development Party

Following a decade of political and economic instability that culminated in the deep economic crisis of 2001, the elections in November 2002 brought the Justice and Development Party (AKP—*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*) to power. Rooted in the political Islam movement, but striving for the centre of Turkish politics, the AKP articulated a neoliberal economic and political discourse that managed to garner broad electoral support cutting across class (Keyman & Öniş 2007). The initial years of AKP rule were marked by rapid economic growth and significant advances in political reforms necessitated by the EU accession process

which led to the opening of accession negotiations in 2005. In the absence of a powerful opposition, and despite the economic downturn associated with the 2008-2009 global crisis, the party consolidated its power in subsequent local and parliamentary elections.

Many scholars agree that during the AKP governments the neoliberal hegemony in Turkey has been consolidated, both in economic and ideological terms. Pursuing the neoliberal growth agenda more aggressively and effectively than previous governments, the AKP "utilized its [the state's] executive, legislative and coercive functions to abolish the barriers to capital accumulation regardless of the social, economic and environmental costs" (Tansel 2015: 573). The particularity of the hegemonic project of AKP has been identified as the re-interpretation of Islamic and conservative values in a market-friendly way (i.e. mobilization of a 'protestant ethic'), and its spatial character, referring particularly to the role of the construction sector as the motor of economic growth and its promotion as the materialization of the ideals of development, progress and modernization (Akbulut & Adaman 2013, Çavuşoğlu & Strutz 2014).

The AKP has managed to gain the consent of large sections of the population to its hegemonic project by supporting certain sections of society in particular ways. He supported the bourgeoisie, especially small and medium-sized businesses, through public-private partnerships and the allocation of highly rewarding tenders, and by facilitating investment in construction and energy companies. By extending existing patronage networks and restructuring the welfare system the AKP managed to secure the allegiance of urban and rural poor, and it benefited the lower-middle classes through increasing housing property and consumption opportunities. Equally important was its mobilization of an "anti-state" discourse (i.e. against the tutelage of the civil-military bureaucracy) and claims to democratize the state-society relations that have earned it the support of diverse groups in the early years of its rule, including many liberals and leftists. In its early years, AKP has indeed made significant changes in this respect, including curbing of the power and legitimacy of the military to intervene in politics; the vindication and promotion of public expression of Islamic and conservative values; the recognition of the Kurdish identity and the promises to end the decades-long armed conflict between the Kurdish guerrillas and the state (e.g. Adaman et al. 2017, Akça et al. 2013, Buğra & Savaşkan 2014, Tansel 2015, Tuğal 2012).

Notwithstanding these changes, as the party consolidated its hold on power, it became increasingly authoritarian, repressing with legal and coercive means any opposition, particularly the leftists, and the leaders of the Kurdish movement[3], but also environmental movements—local and national (e.g. Gezi Park, anti-mining movement in the Artvin province). Therefore, critical scholars argue that the AKP has created a neoliberal authoritarian or authoritarian populist regime, as it "imposes the plebiscitary democracy as a unique legitimate way to represent general will" while delegitimizing and prosecuting any opposition as an attempt to destabilize the government, and ruthlessly using police to repress social protests (Akça et al. 2013, Yıldızcan & Özpınar, n.d.). Recently, there seems to be growing discontent from diverse groups against the social and ecological costs of the neoliberal growth agenda and the increasing authoritarianism of the AKP, most clearly expressed during the Gezi Park protests that spread across the country. As Adaman et al. (2017: 1) emphasize, although "the socially-conservative and pious posture" of the AKP engendered discontent among certain groups over "the role of religion and the future of socio-cultural modernization", "its particular brand of crony neoliberalism and the manifestation of these relationships in the energy and the construction sectors, which have been the main engines of growth, did most to unite disparate social and economic classes to challenge the AKP's rule". Whether these groups can articulate an alternative political agenda remains to be seen. Yet, what is clear is that the state-society relations in Turkey are still strongly shaped by the primacy of economic growth and its identification with progress, and the authoritarian form of the state.[4]

6.2 "The Gold of Mount Ida is above the Ground": Framing the Defence of Mount Ida

After the ground-breaking environmental movement of Bergama (see Chapter 3), the Mount Ida conflict became the second most publicized local resistance against gold mining in Turkey. As much as the negative public image of gold mining that the Bergama movement had produced, the popularity of the Mount Ida region as a valuable environment and the distinct social make-up of the region accounted for the rapid and forceful development of the resistance. Coinciding with the intensification of local environmental movements in other parts of the country, the Mount Ida resistance shares many similarities with these struggles, but is

also distinguished by the extent of the opposition from a diverse set of local actors. To understand the reasons and dynamics of this resistance, it is necessary to analyse the historical changes that the region has undergone, how these have been experienced by the peasants and shaped the engagement of civil society actors in the struggle, all in the specific context of the state-society relations in Turkey. We begin with an overview of the rural development processes as experienced in Mount Ida.

6.2.1 Rural development, peasants' distributional concerns and the power of the development discourse

Mount Ida has historically been a place of diversified rural livelihoods: The different cultural groups (*Yörüks*, Türkomans, and Balkan immigrants) inhabiting the region have variously combined small- and medium-scale agricultural production (especially olive and fruits), animal husbandry (especially goats), and forestry to secure their livelihoods. Before the 1950s, these livelihoods were primarily organized around subsistence production and local markets. From the 1950s onwards, the state-led agricultural modernization and the rationalization of resource use (i.e. forest management) have become the main drivers of rural and environmental transformation in the region.

As I described before (Chapter 4), the Mount Ida region is a mixed geography of rural and urban areas. The current rural landscape of Mount Ida is a patchwork of farms and orchards, grazing lands, forests on the hills, and villages of various sizes located on the mild slopes and the plains (Hurley & Arı 2011). Small and medium-sized towns dot this larger landscape. An important point I would like to make is that, compared to Intag, the Turkish state—as a (capitalist) social relation, institutional apparatus and idea—has been much more present and decisive in the formation of this landscape of Mount Ida. This is not to suggest that the local people do not matter; they are the ones, in the end, who realized this transformation through their actions and who have put their mark on it. The intention rather is to emphasize the difference between Intag and Mount Ida in terms of the presence and influence of the state in shaping the economic, social and cultural change (roughly in last 50-60 years) in these places.

Agricultural modernization was an important part of the developmental efforts of the Turkish state. Agricultural support policies started to be

implemented as early as 1930, but especially expanded from 1950 onwards. The agrarian structure in Turkey has historically been dominated by small- and medium-scale production. Since the establishment of the Republic, policy makers opted for the maintenance of this structure to incorporate the large masses of rural population into the national economy and ensure their allegiance. With the switch to a multi-party system in 1946, securing the votes of the rural population, which comprised the majority of the population, became an even stronger imperative. To this end, as well as to increase agricultural production and regulate agricultural markets, the state provided price support, subsidized inputs and credits (especially through the state-owned Agriculture Bank—*Ziraat Bankasi*), and technical assistance, and established an extensive network of institutions to execute these policies. The state also took the initiative in promoting and supervising the organization of rural interests in a corporatist framework through the establishment of various sales and credit cooperatives, and regional and national associations. These organizations were the main mechanism through which the agricultural policies reached rural producers, and linked them strongly to the state apparatus. In addition to these, the state also pioneered infrastructure development, especially in transportation and irrigation, and in line with the overall industrialization drive, established several state economic enterprises throughout the country engaged in processing of agricultural products (see e.g. Akşin 2014, Güven 2009, Keyder 1989).

In the Mount Ida region, these policies had several important effects: In the south, most visibly, olive production and olive oil industry expanded. Fruit production also grew throughout the region, especially benefiting from the state-built irrigation systems. Vineyards were also present and growing in the region, and the grapes were mainly sold to a state owned cognac factory established in 1962 in the city centre of Çanakkale. Other agricultural products (like wheat, corn, vegetables), and animal husbandry also benefited from agricultural support policies. Overall, the agricultural production in the region thrived, and was commercialized and integrated into the national markets. In the forestry sector, the state organized the production under the control of the local branches of state forestry department, and in many places, cooperatives were organized in forest villages—as they are locally referred to—to distribute the forestry work among the villagers.

The shift to a neoliberal policy framework in the 1980s slowly changed the role of the state in the economy. In this period, while the state's redistributive functions were being weakened, agricultural subsidies were maintained until the 1990s, when they started to decrease gradually and selectively (Akşin 2014). In Mount Ida, neoliberalization had mixed effects: on the one hand, decreasing subsidies, especially for inputs, affected the peasants' incomes. The villages that were primarily engaged in grain production and animal husbandry were hit harder by these policies, and some have been getting smaller as the young population has been abandoning agricultural production to work in urban centres. The cognac factory was first privatized in 2003, and then closed in 2007, harming the grape producers. On the other hand, the opening of export markets for agricultural products and the enlargement of local and regional markets thanks to tourism development on the coast created new opportunities for the fruit and vegetable producers. The tourism sector also contributed to the generation of new employment opportunities in the construction, services and trade sectors. As Hurley and Arı (2011: 1403) describe, "that same process of urbanization has resulted in conversion of former olive groves to residential spaces…while agriculture on lower-elevation land in the region has expanded, with some of this devoted to fruit orchards and vegetable fields. Olive growers have expanded olive production up the slopes of the mountains into grazing lands and formerly 'wild' oak and pine forests". In addition, in the 1990s, the state established stricter controls over forestry, and created a National Park in 1993, which restricted villagers' access to forests (for instance forbidding entrance to the park area without permission, or the grazing of goats) and its diverse resources. These restrictions also had negative cultural impacts as for both the Turkomen and Yörüks the mountain holds religious value, and is home to several sacred places and religious activities (Arı & Soykan 2006).

The socio-economic changes in the Evciler village (see Map 4.2) where I stayed the longest during my field study, demonstrate how these processes unfolded on a smaller scale. Evciler is a relatively large village (with a population of 1,564 people) and the biggest apple producer in the region. The apple production in the village started in the 1960s with the initiative of a peasant, Hafız Dayı, who the villagers described as a "wise, visionary man", and continued expanding afterwards. As the 61 year-old

Osman who was the village headman (*muhtar*) between 1977-1989 and 1994-1999 told:[5]

> My brother was the president of the cooperative in those years (1977-1989), we together worked to bring the apples…to open the trout farm [that belongs to the cooperative]. We first got apple saplings free from the Provincial Agriculture Department to distribute to the peasants. Some that were reluctant before to get into the apple production started to ask for more; there were even conflicts [to get more saplings]…We did not have enough members in the cooperative to ask for a credit to build the cold storage. We tried to convince them to join; and when we could not, we even signed for them…We put the peasants to open irrigation channels; some were escaping from the work, so I asked the gendarmerie to control the entrance and the exit of the village.

The story of Osman highlights that the peasants were not passively receiving state benefits, but were working actively to access them. At the time of my field study, the Evciler cooperative was mediating the access to state support to invest in more efficient irrigation systems (drip irrigation).

Evciler thus came to be the well-off village it is today. Many peasants own tractors, vehicles to spray pesticide, cars and motorbikes. Almost all of the houses are large, made of cement, and well-furnished, with TVs, washing machines and dish washers, and some with computers with access to internet. The district centre of Bayramiç is easily accessible through a paved road, as well as the other nearby urban centres and the city centre of Çanakkale. The peasants often go to these centres to shop, go to hospitals, run some errands such as going to the bank, or dealing with some bureaucratic and business matters, visit relatives and friends, pass leisure time, and travel to the coastal towns to have shorter or longer vacations.

At the time of the field study, in Evciler, as in many other fruit producing villages, opposition to mining was quite strong. The peasants in the villages worried most about the impact of mining on the quantity and quality of water resources. The arguments of the peasants against mining were strikingly similar, emphasizing concerns over their livelihoods. For instance, the president of the Evciler cooperative, Taner, maintained:[6]

> We already experience water shortage during the summer, and irrigated land is expanding. The mine will deplete and poison our scarce water re-

sources...The quality of our products will decrease, nobody will buy our fruits...We can live without gold, but not without water, so why should we risk losing it?

It is important to note that although the president of the cooperative, and the members with whom I talked were firmly against mining, the cooperative itself did not articulate a clear position regarding mining during the struggle, or engage in efforts to mobilize its members. In Taner's view this was not necessary, as the members were already opposing mining and protesting.

There was a distributional dimension to the arguments of the peasants, most commonly expressed as a comparison between the interests of foreign companies who would benefit from mining and those of the local population who would bear its costs. In the words of Sevim, a middle-aged woman working in her family's orchard:[7]

Who will the gold make rich? The miners. And then they will leave us without water, or with poisoned water…We are working hard to make a living, these orchards are everything we have…We won't let them spoil our lives.

Bekir, an old male peasant from Bahcedere village expressed a similar view:[8]

They [the mining companies] will dry these olive orchards, and then leave. I will still have to pay money for everything. It is not that they will give me money, I will have to pay…Don't mess with my life.

These peasants' arguments almost always included a claim that the value of agricultural production in the region was higher than the value of gold that would be produced, and while the gold would last about 10 to 15 years (projected lifespan of the projects), agriculture would be for centuries (Avcı 2017: 321). They thus reasoned that Mount Ida was not the place to do mining. As a young male peasant from Evciler, Halil, said:[9]

What we earn from fruits is enough for us. We don't need the few jobs the mine will create, we produce value added here...They [the mining companies] go and do it somewhere else, but not here on our mountain.

In addition to explaining the main reason behind the peasants' opposition, these arguments were used to refute the justifications given by the

state authorities and the companies for gold mining, i.e. as necessary and beneficial for the country's development. They suggested that the problem was not that Turkey could benefit from gold mining, but that in the particular case of Mount Ida the values that would be sacrificed were just too high to justify the projects. Hence, even though a concern for distributional injustice was evoked, not only was the discourse on the desirability of national development and the primacy of the economic growth to achieve development reproduced, but the opposition also openly maintained a not in my backyard position. Urkidi and Walter (2011: 684) point out that focusing on distributional outcomes at the local level can impair environmental justice on a broader scale. In Mount Ida, the articulation of the opposition as a particularistic defence of peasants' own interests, and the ease with which many peasants repeated the idea that the companies should just go and extract gold elsewhere, indeed confirm this tension (Avcı 2017: 321).

The words of Gamze, a young woman and my host in the Evciler village, were the most brazen expression of the particularistic understanding prevalent in Ida:[10] "Why we would want gold mining here? We have lands, we have work, we earn well. They [the mining companies] should go and do it where the Kurds[11] are". It is beyond the scope of this study to explain the full significance of her reference to Kurds. But it reminds us that the construction of an environmental justice frame is itself a political process that requires confronting and negotiating multiple dimensions of identities. As Gamze's expression shows, in Mount Ida, the concern of the peasants over environmental justice was by and large restricted to the defence of their immediate interests, and such understanding was coupled with an exclusionary collective identity.

The peasants' self-interested position also manifested itself in relation to their gold consumption. In Turkey, gold is extensively used as a store of value and is culturally highly valued. For instance, when a couple gets married, their families, relatives and friends often give gold as a gift. In fact, in one wedding I had the chance to attend in Evciler village, the bride wore several gold necklaces, and had gold bracelets up to her elbows on both her arms. One day,[12] my host Gamze joined a group of women and myself after returning with her husband from the town centre of Bayramiç with a new gold bracelet, and proudly showed it to her friends. I asked them whether they all bought gold, and all said yes. Then I questioned whether it did not seem to them contradictory to buy gold

while also fighting against gold mining. Gamze replied: "We like it Duygu, what can we do? Anyway, even if we did not buy, they will keep on extracting…They can extract in dry places'. I am not suggesting that the fact that the peasants themselves consume gold renders their resistance less relevant or genuine, or that I would expect people to change their traditions easily. What I want to point out instead is how the peasants refused to think beyond their immediate material interests or consider the impacts of gold mining beyond Mount Ida.

6.2.2 Peasants' attachment to the local environment

Sometimes, however, arguments of the peasants deriving from health concerns, place-based attachment to the environment and the peasant way of life subverted the dominant economic reasoning. Peasants often described their lives as pleasant, calm and comfortable. They talked proudly of their environment, grateful of its healthiness, productivity and beauty, and expressed a sense of responsibility to protect it (Avcı 2017: 321). Fatma, a 34 years-old woman from Evciler, for instance commented[13]:

> There is no place like our mountain, the clean air, the crystalline water, everywhere is green…Whatever we plant, the soil gives…our food is abundant, tasty. The cheese, the yogurt, the tomato paste we make, the taste is incomparable to those they sell in the markets.

The quality of local food was actually a common topic in many conversations, not only with the women who are the ones who prepare the food at home, but also in those with the men.

The connections of the peasants with the forests were also strong. In Mount Ida, peasants collect herbs, chestnuts and mushrooms from the forest, some for household consumption, and some for sale in local markets, as well as branches and pine cones to use for heating. Previously, people used to graze their goats in the forest as well, but this has now been prohibited by the state. To indicate how much they valued and cared about the forests, Osman stated:[14] "When there were fires here, we all went to help, old and young, women and men. Those are our trees".

Likewise, as I indicated above, the local environment was also imbued with cultural and religious values, expressed in folk tales, in cultural gatherings, in community celebrations, and gave meaning to communal his-

tories and life experiences. As Ayse an elderly woman from Evciler re-marked:[15]

> I was born here, my ancestors lived and died here, they are buried in this mountain…How am I to just leave them [her ancestors] here? How would they rest in peace if the miners dig up the earth?

Beyond their economic concerns, the peasants' attachment to the local environment indeed seemed to be an important reason why they saw mining as unacceptable.

Yet, these strong feelings appeared to lie outside the domain of productive activities. The fruit-producing peasants were highly dependent on intensive use of fertilizers and pesticides. When I asked Ayhan, a middle-aged man, whether this did not trouble him, he replied:[16]

> Of course, they are harmful, they are chemicals…We are the ones getting poisoned most, spraying those pesticides. But we have to. If we do not spray, then the insects ruin the trees…And the intermediaries do not want to buy or they pay less when they see stains on the apples…We have no choice, we do it putting ourselves at risk.

Indeed, the peasants were very much aware of these problems. For example, once, when I wanted to pick an apple from a tree to eat while accompanying a group of peasants in the apple orchard, a woman told me to not to pick from that tree because it was recently sprayed. It can be argued that, despite such awareness, the economic pressures to maintain productivity and be able to market their product dominated the decisions of the peasants.

In a similar vein, peasants did not seem to think of their own everyday attitudes as environmentally relevant. The most conspicuous illustration of this was the littered streets of the villages, and the piles of waste by the roadsides and in the pits in the forested areas where the waste is disposed. Having noticed the broken beer bottles around the hilltops (where some men go to enjoy the view while drinking), I raised the topic with a group of middle-aged men, and asked why people did not just bring back the bottles to put them in a garbage bin rather than just throwing them around (although they nevertheless end up in the open pits in the forests). The answer that Ahmet, a 42 year-old male peasant, gave was rather awkward:[17] "When you throw them onto the rocks, they make a nice sound". I mention these issues not to criticize the peasants

for not caring about the environment. Rather, I want to illustrate how the peasants' environmental concerns remained restricted to the mining problem and isolated from their own practices.

Not all peasants in Ida opposed mining. In some villages where agricultural activities had been in decline, and in those closer to the mining projects and where the companies have invested in community relations, some peasants were in favour of mining. The most common justification for this position was that they needed the jobs. For example, Salih, a middle-aged peasant who was working in for one of the companies, explained himself as follows:[18]

> We work in the day and eat in the evening. That's how we live. We do what we need to do to sustain ourselves…It is not like somebody came and provided an alternative source of income and we rejected it in favor of mining. Working in the mine is our only option right now. Of course I would prefer something that I can do all my life, but there is no such opportunity… I cannot think of what will happen after 15 years, but I have to feed my family now…First the stomach gets full, then we protect.

Some others were more blunt about what they expected from mining. Hasan, an elderly man in the Sogutalan village—the village closest to the most advanced project in the region—asserted:[19]

> People want to live more freely as they see the modern age… Life was harder before, now it is also our right to live more comfortably, more luxuriously.

Some of these peasants actually said that they did not so much want gold mining, but rather just went along with it, some claiming that they even joined the anti-mining protests.[20] Still, some of the very same people worked for the companies, and talked fondly of their social responsibility projects. They often gave a rather opportunistic justification for this. In the words of İbrahim, the headman of the Muratlar village located close to a project site:[21]

> Even if we do not want mining, there is nothing to do; they got all the permits from the state, so mining will be done here anyway… The mining company came here and asked if we would work for them, and said if you say no, we would bring workers from outside. If this [mining] is go-

ing to happen anyway, at least we get something, rather than other people, better we get the jobs.

It is important to note that the Turkish state has historically used coercion to impose its policies and repress dissent, and the fact that gendarmerie forces were sent to accompany the mining companies in the village meetings held to communicate the Environmental Impact Assessment reports illustrates that the threat of coercion in Mount Ida was real. But even in the absence of coercion, the power of the state to enforce the projects affected the peasants' position, was used by peasants as a justification for compliance and/or as a factor that induced acquiescence and pre-empted resistance. For instance, Zeynep, a middle-aged woman running a small shop in the centre of the Kızılelma village, claimed:[22]

> These guys [the mining companies] are very rich, they are powerful like the state. Here we cannot do anything to stop this. They [the companies] fixed everything from Ankara. The district governor is on their side, the security forces are on their side. We are the least important…If we do not negotiate to benefit, what will happen is that they will put one gendarmerie at the entrance of the village, one at the exit, and just do it…When there was a fire in the mine site, they [the authorities] just covered it up. If we did that, they would have put us in prison.

A discussion I had with a group of men in Söğütalan shed further light on why and how some peasants came to accept mining in Mount Ida. The village headman Murat explained the economic situation of the village as follows:[23]

> The village now lives by animal breeding, before it was grain. The animals, though, you cannot earn money from that…Forestry is done for a couple of years, then for ten years there is no more work…Before, people used to work in the quarries, but as they finished, people were left unemployed…Mining companies provided employment, people need to earn money.

Murat added: "We do not actually want the mine to open, but we said if it is going to be opened, at least they give us what we asked for". He was referring to the list of 22 demands that the village council prepared and presented to the company. Their demands included that the company gives priority to the villagers for employment, provides training for

the workers, arranges health check-ups every six months for the workers and every year for the rest of the villagers, supports the education of successful students from the village, deposits ten per thousand of the gold produced in the village's account (not in cash but in gold), and applies chemical decomposition to the cyanide-laden tailings before leaving it to natural decomposition in the tailings dam. This demonstrates that the opposition discourses about the impacts of mining actually empowered the peasants that favoured mining, and they were not passively accepting whatever the companies offered but was willing and able to take strong initiative to protect and secure more benefits for their community.

When I asked these peasants whether they were not concerned about the environmental and health impacts, their responses indicated a certain degree of distrust of the civil society organizations making these claims. Yet, this did not necessarily mean that they trusted the claims of the companies that the environmental impacts would be adequately managed, either. Selim, a middle-aged man from another village, Asagi Sapcilar, who was working for one of the companies, made this clear when he said:[24] "Whoever says it will not have any negative effect is lying". More importantly, however, was what their responses revealed about their perception of the state and development. The same man who acknowledged the risk of environmental impacts then flatly added: "It will be harmful for us, but will benefit the country". Cemil, another elderly man in Sogutalan, on the other hand, maintained:[25]

> These so-called environmentalists are against any project, they do not want mining, dams, bridges...Why nuclear power plants are being constructed? They must be necessary, otherwise why the state would want to do this?

Expressing a similar view, Seyhan, a middle-aged woman contended:[26]

> Does the state not care about us at all or what? The state certainly has considered what is good and bad, otherwise they would not let mining happen.

In the light of these expressions, it can be suggested that the reasons for supporting mining was not so different from those for opposing it: both stemmed mainly from peasants' concerns about their income. Nor was their understandings of what development meant inherently in con-

flict. The difference between the two groups lay more in how they believed they benefited or were excluded from development, and how mining would change that. Similarly, as discussed in the next section, the perception of the state expressed by the supporters as representing and protecting the interests of the people, and working for the development of the country was not decidedly or fundamentally dismissed or challenged by the opposition actors, the peasants or others.

6.3   Organizing the Resistance: The Role of Civil Society and Local Government Actors

As I have indicated in Chapter 4, although there was widespread opposition to mining among the peasants, it was the civil society organizations and the local governments that led the struggle in Mount Ida. It is, therefore, important to discuss their positions and arguments, and how they engaged with the peasants, not only because it was largely they who shaped the public debate, but also because they influenced the peasants' position and the ways in which they defended their livelihoods.

6.3.1   The positions of the civil society and local government actors

The civil society actors in Mount Ida that have been at the forefront of the anti-mining struggle included the environmental organizations from the southern part of the region established by the urban professional middle classes, mostly retirees, who settled in Mount Ida, so-called amenity migrants (Hurley & Arı 2011), or second home owners; ecologists who also settled in the region, some of whom established ecological farms; civil society organizations from the city centre of Çanakkale—such as the Chamber of Agricultural Engineers, the Chamber of Doctors and Bar Association, the local branch of Turkey's Education and Science Workers Union (Egitim-Sen)—that came together under the banner of Çanakkale Environmental Platform, academics from the two public universities in the Çanakkale and Balıkesir provinces, and several owners of tourism facilities in the region. As much as these civil society actors, local governments of the Çanakkale city and of a number of towns[27] in the region, mostly in the hands of the main opposition party CHP, spearheaded the struggle. The civil society actors and local governments acted in alliance for the most part, and formed umbrella organizations such as

"The Madra Mountain and Ida Mountain Environmental Platform".[28] The regional Marmara and Aegean Environmental Platforms, the National Chamber of Geological Engineers, and several national environmental organizations also supported the local actors. Some members of these organizations attended as speakers the meetings that the local organizations organized. Moreover, the local and national media largely presented the case in a way that was supportive of the resistance.

Two issues were central to the arguments of the local actors who led the struggle: the first concerns the impacts that mining would have on the agricultural, industrial (food-processing) and tourism activities in the region. They characterized Mount Ida as a region which even though not prosperous has developed in a manner that provided its residents a good quality of life. Although the state presented mining as a means to local development, these actors considered it a threat to the socio-economic, as well as environmental and cultural features that defined the region and sustained a good quality of life. They further claimed that the costs of gold mining would be much higher than the benefits that would accrue to society; and that the mining companies would reap the benefits of the project while the burdens would be borne by the local community. The project was seen as neither economically rational nor compatible with public interest. The following words of the mayor of Zeytinli, one of the smaller towns in the southern part of the region, exemplify this approach:[29]

> If gold mining were to be done in deserted areas and benefits outweighed costs, then we could have accepted the harm...Olive, agriculture, tourism, forests. Here we have to give up all these for nothing... If gold mining would produce enough economic value to save the country we could sacrifice this land for its sake. But this is not the case, so why should we accept this?

Second, they argued that mining would cause grave and irreversible harm to the unique environmental and cultural character of the region. They strongly emphasized the region's rich biodiversity, endemic species, clean air and water, as well as its cultural heritage. In the words of Eren, a member of a local organization, these qualified Mount Ida as among the "first places to be conserved on earth".[30] The mayor of Çanakkale articulated this position in the most passionate way as follows:[31]

Ecological balance [of Mount Ida] has to be protected; once disturbed, you cannot bring back what is lost. It is not a matter of planting trees, Ida Mountain is not just a forest, it is a historical and ecological whole. You can substitute gold with other products but to reproduce this ecosystem you need to be God.

Among the civil society actors, there were many professionals and academics from the local and other universities who provided the scientific arguments that were often cited in the debate. In the numerous panels, seminars, village meetings organized, professionals and academics held presentations about the geographical and ecosystem properties of Mount Ida, its historical, cultural and archeological importance, as well as the technical, legal and economic aspects of mining. These arguments were intended to provide the objective scientific justifications for opposing mining and conserving the local environment. Striking is that al-though in the interviews these actors sometimes mentioned the environmental problems caused by agricultural practices, urbanization, tourism and the olive industry, these issues were absent from their public discussions. As Hurley and Arı (2011: 1404) argue, "the emphasis is on the role of *outsiders* in *spoiling* the environment" (first emphasis added, the latter in the original).

The claim to act on the "scientific" truths was remarkably prevalent among these actors, being assigned legitimacy over political or ethical reasons for opposing mining. As one geography professor said, "we are following science and logic, we take these as our guiding principles and move accordingly".[32] Blaming the mining companies and the state agencies for not giving correct information on mining and its environmental impacts, these actors suggested that the decision on gold mining should be based on "scientific truths". The mayor of Çanakkale, for instance, claimed:[33]

I proposed that we hold a meeting. Let experts from both sides get together and discuss. I invited them several times: 'come, so we can openly discuss'. Nobody replied.

It was exactly the same the other way around as the mining companies and the state agencies accused the same opposition actors for providing biased knowledge and for ignoring scientific facts. The insistence on telling the "scientific truth" was certainly a way to delegitimize the claims of opposing parties of the conflict and to blame each other

for acting on different interests and motives. Yet, more significantly, it reflected the modernist approach—i.e. that scientific knowledge is "objective" and should be the basis of decisions in a modern society—that so resolutely shaped the understanding of development in the country, that it had the power to shape public perception.

A specific aspect of the discourse of the majority of the civil society actors and local governments was that while discussing mining and its local impacts, they framed these more strongly as a matter of national development. In their more politicized discourses, they linked the mining policies and projects to the neoliberal policies, and represented gold mining as an imposition of the interests of foreign companies. For instance, the president of the Chamber of Geological Engineers, who acted as an expert on mining in many panels and seminars organized by the resistance groups, argued:[34]

> Since the 1970s mining technologies have changed as lower-grade ores started to be exploited. This requires the companies to keep the costs lower…Mining companies turned to developing countries, mining policies, regulations were changed…[in Turkey] they are exempt from taxes, they benefit from investment incentives, they pay almost nothing as royalty…They do not report correctly their income, they create externalities…Mining was previously under state control, it created employment. Then they started privatizing, 60,000-70,000 people [of the previous 130,000 public employees] lost their jobs…The state has become almost completely unable to produce the minerals necessary for the country's industry…This [mining] cannot be left to the free market. There should be Etibank [the state owned mining company], there should be an integrated approach [to mining and industry]…If externalities are tolerable, gold mining can be done without degrading the environment. However, this is only be possible if it is done by the state. You cannot force mining companies to do everything you want, but the state considers public interest and can behave accordingly...The aim of development should be utilizing the resources domestically. [That it is not done] is a political, ideological choice…They [the government] overthrew the institutional infrastructure that could make Turkey an industry and technology country.

These arguments expressed a particular vision of national development and the role that the state should play in its realization. This historical reference of this vision was the development strategy of planned im-

port substituting industrialization implemented in the 1960s in which public enterprises had a major role in industrial sectors. The state, in this understanding, can and should pursue national development in the collective interest of its people, but is currently captured by global (imperialist) forces and their local allies. Therefore, the adherents to this understanding demanded that the state recuperate its power to direct the development process, and defend the public good against private interests.

In Turkey, such a view is most commonly associated with a centre-left political position, currently represented by the main opposition party Republican People's Party (CHP). Its support base is to a large extent comprised typically of the educated, professional, secular, urban middle-classes. Indeed, the majority of the members of the civil society organizations in Mount Ida belonged to this social group and shared its political ideology. Similarly, almost all of the local governments in Mount Ida were from CHP. Hence, for both actors, their opposition to mining included a more general criticism of the government for allowing the foreign companies to exploit the nation's resources instead of using them for the development of the country.

The nationalist conception of development and the perception of the state that accompanied it were also mirrored in peasants' understandings. For example, Zeynep, who had previously argued that the villagers had no power to stop mining, hence had to accept it, stated:[35]

> The gold will not remain in the hands of the state…If they are going to do it [mining], the gold should at least go to the state.

Similarly, İsmail, a middle-aged man from Karaköy who said he was not against mining, declared:[36] "[if] a Turkish company comes [to extract the gold], the income goes to the state, and Turkey grows". These are not isolated or exceptional views. As Adaman et al. (2016) argue in their analysis of the burgeoning environmental struggles against privately-owned small-scale hydro-power projects, as much as to defend their livelihoods, the peasants in these struggles oppose these projects because they perceive them as the appropriation of public resources by private enterprises. They point out that although the construction of dams by the state had similar and even greater impacts on local communities, the legitimization of these projects as serving the development of the country and the collective interest of the nation rendered their impacts ac-

ceptable and tolerable, and pre-empted resistance. They suggest that in the case of private hydro-plants where such consent mechanisms are absent, "local communities resist these projects not only because they will affect their livelihoods and living spaces, but also because the initiatives that (will) cause these impacts are developed by the private capital within commodification (marketization) processes and for private gain" (Adaman et al. 2016: 307).

The national developmentalist discourse surely played a role in linking the local mining conflict to broader political debates and challenging the decisions that could compromise environmental health and integrity for private gain. Notwithstanding, it also embodied certain contradictions. For example, in our interview[37] with Mustafa, the spokesperson of the Çanakkale Environmental Platform explained that the two main issues the organization was focusing on were the mining projects and the thermic power plants being planned in several parts of the province. His emphasis was on the environmental destruction both would cause in the region. However, at one moment while he was talking about the thermic plants he mentioned that the coal to operate the plants would be imported, and declared:

> We have our own lignite, we should use that somehow, in ways that damage the environment least…If we are going to get poisoned, let at least be with our own coal.

Likewise, the peasants' perceptions of the state were rife with contradictions. To illustrate, Levent, a tomato-producing peasant and the president of the Chamber of Agriculture of Çanakkale, early in the interview said:[38] "If the gold were to stay with the state, then there would be no problem", but later on made remarks such as "the state always sides the rich", and "the state tries to fool the people". The Gramscian understanding of transformative politics would suggest that these kinds of contradictions in the common sense of the peasants are precisely the points ripe for intervention for cultivating critical subjectivities. That is, "the kernel of good sense" that needs be expanded on in order to effect change in the way people understand the society and their place in it. Such interventions and elaboration is indeed what defines the role of organic intellectuals in Gramsci's framework. In the case of Mount Ida, those who led the struggle did not, for the most part, undertake such an attempt.

On balance, although the actors leading the struggle in Mount Ida managed to open a debate about local development alternatives and position environmental concerns as an important dimension of this debate, they did not articulate a thorough criticism of the historically established development ideology. They did raise questions about the distribution of costs and benefits of the neoliberal development model, yet they discussed both principally with reference to a 'genuine' national development model for which economic growth was still indispensable but would be pursued by a well-intentioned state that would at the same time protect the environment through the proper use of science and technology. That is, their focus was more on how development should be achieved (i.e. which sectors should be prioritized, how the environmental impacts should be managed), by whom (i.e. the state), and in whose benefit (i.e. the nation)—and much less about what development meant, who defined it, or whether there could be ecological or social limits to its realization.

It can be argued that these actors' defence of the local economic activities on the basis of the economic (monetary) value that they generate matched the peasants' focus on mining as a threat to their income. In my discussion of the peasants' positions, I tried to point out how these were related to the ways their lives and livelihoods were shaped through the development processes (especially agricultural modernization) and discourses in which the state played an important role. I argued that this accounted for their emphasis on protecting their material interests and the justifications they gave for their resistance in terms of the contribution of their production to the national economy. I would now like to add that the civil society actors or the local governments did not either offer a critical understanding that could help the peasants conceive of and frame their livelihood concerns in a language different from that of cost-benefit calculations or economic development. Thus, the desirability of national development, and that their livelihoods were part of a national developmentalist project was and remained the common sense of the peasants. That the development ideology was not challenged even in the context of an environmental struggle, some of which around the world have articulated powerful critiques and alternative conceptions of development, confirms the observation on how deeply this ideology has been entrenched in the social imaginary of Turkey (Akbulut & Adaman 2013, Arsel 2005a). More generally, it points out how powerful the develop-

mentalist ideology can be in shaping the terrain of political struggle, and how difficult it can be for these struggles to surpass and confront this ideology.

6.3.2 The distant allies: the relationship between peasants, civil society actors, and local governments

Another way in which the particular notion of development that civil society actors and local governments subscribe to have curtailed the possibilities for transformative action has been through its influence on these actors' engagement with the peasants. As I have emphasized, although these actors criticized the particular decisions of the government over mining, they still positioned the state as the main agent of development. In several interviews they expressed in different ways the view that development was something that the state does. For instance, talking about the future of the Mount Ida region, the mayor of Çanakkale argued:[39]

> The National Park should be expanded, and activities that can be compatible with that status should be incentivized. Like eco-tourism. It is the state that needs to plan this, to develop the projects: [the state] should guide [direct] the peasants, should convince them that this is better.

While the idea of the state as the central actor that needs to direct social progress was prevalent, civil society and local government actors considered the peasants as passive, reactive and even gullible: passive for failing to demand either a better life or make a claim to their rights; reactive for only acting when their material interests are threatened, and gullible for buying into the false promises of the companies.[40] Reflecting the elitist approach of making a distinction between the ignorant peasants and the educated professionals defending the public interest—also linked to the rural-urban divide grounded in a traditional/modern dualism (Erensü 2013: 54), they saw their role largely as one of "enlightening the villagers". Accordingly, to mobilize the peasants, they were mostly content with organizing meetings in villages and town centres to disseminate information, typically technical, about mining and its impacts to show them the "truth" about mining, and providing transportation for the peasants to attend protests. The spaces of encounter between the peasants and civil society and local government actors, therefore, were re-

stricted to a few meetings in the villages and a number of protests where there was not much of scope for debate or deliberation.

The lack of confidence in and disregard for the peasants' agency of civil society and local government actors was mirrored in the distance and suspicion the peasants displayed towards these actors as well. Although many of the peasants I talked to attended the "information meetings" conducted in their villages, when talking about these actors, they simply identified them as "the environmentalists", but had difficulty in naming the organizations. Many thought that the motivation of these actors was primarily political (in the pejorative sense), that their opposition to mining was based on their opposition to the government. For instance, Taner, the head of the agricultural sales cooperative of Evciler village, said:[41] "CHP [the main opposition party] acts as the bearer of the struggle. If you make the issue a political tool, you lose people. We should be able to say 'whatever our political position, we reject [mining]'". The peasants did not feel sufficiently supported either. In the words of Seyhan, a middle-aged woman from the Sogutalan village:[42] "They tell us what to do, to throw stones [metaphorically speaking], yet they do not stand by our side. They come and talk, and then leave".

Compared to the Intag case, it is clear that the relations among the peasants and the civil society and local government actors were rather weak in Mount Ida. Solidarity among the peasants was not strong either, as demonstrated by the following words of Taner, the same person who argued that the resistance to mining should transcend political divisions:[43]

> Some other villages are not as sensitive as us [Evciler village]. And if they do not fight for their interests, I cannot do anything for them, they need to fight for themselves. I will not spoil my relations with the government for the sake of Muratlar [another village close to a mining project].

The anti-mining struggle in Mount Ida was, therefore, built on a weak, issue-based alliance based on coinciding interests, not on a strong collective identity. One central argument of the environmental justice literature has been that the alliances between local communities and civil society actors enable construction of new collective identities that transcend the defence of particularistic interests. Yet, that would require establishing solidarities that not only bring together fixed interests (Featherstone 2005: 252), but lead to the negotiation of different subject

positions or identities, as well as deliberation over visions for the future. The Mount Ida experience shows that distant, hierarchical and issue-based relations between different actors do not provide space for constructing such solidarities.

Under these circumstances, although environmental impacts of mining were the main topic of debate in Mount Ida, neither the peasants' agricultural practices nor other problems affecting the local environment were consistently addressed in the mining struggle. Correspondingly, the cultural values and the place attachment that the peasants expressed were not compellingly incorporated into the civil society discourses on the significance of the local environment. As such, the protection of the environment was principally framed as the protection of its particular qualities from 'outsiders' (see also Hurley and Arı 2011). That mining was taken up in isolation certainly had to do with the fact that raising other environmental issues would implicate in different ways the peasants, the amenity migrants and the tourism industry, who claimed to be mobilizing to protect the local environment, in its degradation. As the discourses and the practices of the movement actors in Intag demonstrated, it could be possible to tackle these issues while also resisting external intervention, but it would require political ingenuity to formulate the problems and the strategies to deal with them. In Mount Ida, such initiative seemed to be absent. At a more fundamental level, however, it can be claimed that this negligence or elusion to consider the broader environmental problems in the region reflected the acquiescence of different social classes in environmental degradation in the country in return for development benefits, i.e. their consent to the dominant notions and practices of development.

Analysing a similar environmental struggle against mining in the Artvin province on the Black Sea coast of Turkey, Erensü (2013) maintains that the local environmental movements in Turkey usually choose to ground their struggle in the defence of "the local" against specific projects. He claims that the movement actors choose this strategy because they believe that this is the only way to overcome divisions and build alliances among diverse actors—urban and rural population, civil society organizations, political parties, local businesses and local governments. He emphasizes that although constructing such place-based collective identities indeed strengthens the local movements, it also restricts their potential to formulate broader political critiques; to reach across space to

identify the common processes that affect different places; to share experiences with other local movements; and to build a vision of what is to follow after the defined aim of stopping those projects is achieved. The limitations of the anti-mining resistance in Mount Ida, which largely remained a place-based and partial defence of the local environment can, therefore, be linked to the relative weakness of environmental movements in Turkey to articulate different environmental problems into a comprehensive critique or political agenda for sustainability and environmental justice, and to galvanize a wider societal engagement with environmental issues. This is no easy task, obviously; neither the hostility of the state towards justice-based politics, nor the historical weakness of peasant political organization, nor the general apathy of other social and political movements and political parties to environmental issues create an enabling environment. Still, not all is bleak. As Adaman et al. (2016: 307-310) argue, in other environmental struggles across the country more critical languages and perspectives seem to be emerging, and these might potentially contribute to the strengthening of the dissident voices in Mount Ida.

6.3.3 Dissident voices

It is worth emphasizing, however, that there were more critical voices both among the peasants and civil society actors, but they were somewhat marginal and marginalized. Levent, the president of the Chamber of Agriculture of Çanakkale, was one of few peasants who cited ethical considerations as a reason for his opposition to mining:[44]

> The cyanide will seep into the water, the water for irrigation, the water for drinking. The milk of animals feeding on the grasses, the cheese we sell will get spoiled…It will get into everything that we produce…I cannot accept [or swallow] selling poisoned products to people, the children will be eating them.

Another person who offered a broader perspective on the mining issue was Hüseyin. Hüseyin lived in one of the larger villages in the region where he was working in the ceramics factory located in the village but he was also producing vegetables on his farm. He was engaged in leftist political movements in the 1970s, and his views reflected this background:[45]

> This [mining] project is the result of an insatiable hunger for profit, an attempt to destroy living spaces…It is a dirty game…The dirty industries are being relocated to underdeveloped countries. They are telling people that first we industrialize, that if there are jobs, nothing else matters…We are bit by bit losing whatever is valuable to life. Why create such environmental destruction for a few to make profit?...We have a responsibility towards where we live. What will become of us as we lose the things that make this place what it is? We have to struggle to defend our values.

Another argument that incorporated a more critical position towards the state related to the restrictions on access to and use of the forests the state imposed after the establishment of the National Park (Avcı 2017: 321). A number of peasants denounced it as unjust that the state authorities that limit their access to the mountain in the name of conservation were now promoting mining for the benefit of foreign companies. Hatice, an elderly woman claimed:[46]

> When the forestry department catches us cutting a few branches or collecting a handful of herbs they scold and fine us. But when it comes to the miners they are just ready to sell the full mountain...Sure, we are not worth anything, what matters is that they [the companies and the state authorities] fill their pockets.

As I mentioned above, it appears that there were elements within the common sense of the peasants that could be elaborated into a more profound critique of the hegemony of the state. However, these elements were not expanded or consistently incorporated into the main political discourses of the resistance in which cost-benefit analyses and the notion of national development remained dominant.

Among the civil society actors, a small number of ecologists and left-leaning activists articulated more comprehensive critiques, explicitly referring to the capitalist system as the source of environmental and social problems. For the ecologists who espoused a more radical type of environmentalism based on a fundamental critique of society's relationship with the nature in a capitalist system, mining represented the logic of endless accumulation the system is grounded in.

This was the case for Eren, an ecologist who had moved to Mount Ida from Istanbul leaving behind the "ills of modern urban life"—consumption frenzy, individualism, poor social relations organized

around self-interest—to realize a dream of living a simple life in harmony with nature, immersing himself in the local culture, and establishing ties of friendship and solidarity with the peasants. Eren had established an ecological farm near the Küçükkuyu town, called *İmece Evi*[47] where he and his family and friends practiced organic farming, produced their own energy and lived a simple life style using as little consumption goods as possible. They organized *potlaç* (potluck) dinners, a feast where people shared food, inviting both the peasants and other residents of the area; and hosted visitors who wanted to learn about ecol-ogical living by participating in the activities of *İmece Evi*. He argued:[48]

> I am against development, against the idea that nature is there to be used for human's benefit, against the fierce depletion of world's resources, against the continuation of policies that promote consumption…I struggle for peace, ecology, democracy, to build alternative ways of living.

There are other similar types of ecological farms in the Mount Ida region, such as the Ecological Living Centre of the *Buğday* Association, and the *Yeniköy* Ecological Farm. These are initiatives established by activists from urban centres, though, and not by the peasants. Still, these activists tried to engage more closely with the peasants around issues that did not directly concern mining, but linked to their livelihoods and agricultural and environmental practices. An important example of these efforts was the "seed barter festivals" organized in the town of Bayramiç (every year since 2011) that brought together the peasants, a number of agricultural cooperatives, civil society organizations and activists from around the country. The debates at these events included the increasing power of the transnational companies over seeds and agriculture, the rights of peasants to have control over their own practices, the importance of local food cultures, organic agriculture, and alternative marketing channels. Another example was the establishment of a village cooperative, led by the middle-aged woman activist Nermin, to sell food items produced by the women of the village.

These activists were also critical of the nationalist perspective that dominated the struggle. For instance, Onur, an activist lawyer working for the regional environmental platform EGEÇEP that has been engaged in legal battles in similar conflicts asserted:[49]

> Gold mining is a threat to lives of human beings and other living things. Maintenance of living spaces is at risk... The right to live in a healthy en-

vironment is universal and should be defended for all plac-
es…What does it matter if the state royalty is 50% when human life is in
danger? Are we going to stay silent if national firms do the mining? Of
course we should protect our land, but are we not going to defend envi-
ronmental rights in other places?

Another person who framed the mining problem in terms of rights
and linked it with democracy was the mayor of Güre, one of the smaller
towns in the Southern part of the region. He argued:[50]

It is our duty to protect our environment. It is because there is no de-
mocracy that the state can act with such impunity…The state is depriv-
ing us of our right to life.

In the course of the mining conflict, some tensions arose between
these more radical sections of civil society and those who ended up lead-
ing the struggle. The tension was particularly about the kind of organiza-
tional structures to build and how to frame the struggle. The former
group of people were primarily those who established the Mount Ida
Conservation Initiative in 2007 when the conflict first arose. As Nermin,
one of the founders of the Initiative, stated:[51]

At the beginning, we had a less hierarchical way of working. We said in
our meetings we want to have debate, everyone to talk, we just had facili-
tators, not specific speakers. We did not want to elect a president, vice-
president…We said let's integrate the peasants, the tourism sector, the
olive oil producers…Let's build a country-wide network, let's discuss the
mining law. But the Platform [Madra Mountain and Ida Mountain Envi-
ronmental Platform integrating civil society actors and local govern-
ments] had a different approach. They said no to gold mining, they
chose representatives.

Although Nermin criticized those who chose to build a more hierar-
chical organizational structure and continued her efforts to build more
long-lasting, collaborative relations with the peasants—for instance,
through the village cooperative mentioned above—she did not refrain
from engaging with those other groups. In fact, she acted as the secretary
of the Platform for some years. This should not be seen as a contradic-
tion, it was more a pragmatic approach to the situation in which she
found herself, a way to maintain the alliances among these different
groups who still had the common purpose of stopping the mining pro-

jects. Moreover, the more radical ecologists and leftists did not have the financial and organizational resources, the connections to local and national media, or the links to diverse social and political networks, including the regional economic powers such as the olive and tourism industries that those groups organized under the Madra Mountain and Ida Mountain Environmental Platform, as well as the Çanakkale Environmental Platform had. Under these circumstances, the discourses and actions of the mining opposition were dominated by these more powerful groups, while the more critical elements of civil society had, for the most part, to tone down their more fundamental criticisms, and could not change the hierarchical organizational practices of the other civil society actors. This is in fact a more general characteristic of civil society in Turkey. As Çaylak (2008) argues, many civil society organizations in Turkey, established by the relatively well-off and educated, do not fare well in terms of democratic politics. They usually espouse a technocratic language, do not engage much with grassroots actors and their lived experiences, and they do not tolerate opposition within their own organizational structures or from other social actors. This pattern largely repeated itself in Mount Ida (Avcı 2017: 324).

Whether such initiatives will flourish and whether they can cultivate alternative understandings and practices of development and environment remains to be seen. Their existence does show that at least some civil society actors active in the region have a broader vision of social transformation and environmental sustainability, and the peasants could potentially relate to such visions. Moreover, compared to the case of Intag, which has a history of two decades, the struggle in Mount Ida is much younger. That it remained rather conservative thus far (in the sense of being primarily about conserving the existing activities and social relations) does not preclude future changes in a more transformative direction (Avcı 2017: 322). This will certainly not be easy. As I tried to demonstrate in this account, the power of the state in Turkey to shape development experiences and to promote a developmentalist ideology has not only functioned in a manner that confines the political subjectivities of the peasants to a self-interested, defensive act, but also shaped civil society actors' conceptions, limiting their criticisms to the 'how' rather than the 'why' of development. Moreover, compared to the the experience of Intag where in the process of establishing alternative social and environmental relations new subjectivities were cultivated, in Mount

Ida, due to the distant, issue-based and hierarchical relations among the peasants and civil society and local government actors, the space to build such relations was limited. As much as the hegemony of the state, this situation is responsible for the curtailment of the transformative potential of the struggle in Mount Ida, and thus in need of change for the Mount Ida struggle to overcome its current limits.

Notes

[1] A summarized version of the arguments presented in this chapter appears in Avcı (2017: 320-322).

[2] Kurds are the ethnic group in Turkey comprising about 18% of the population. The left-wing Kurdish organization Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK in its Kurdish acronym) has been waging an armed struggle against the state since 1980s to demand recognition of their cultural/identity rights. The AKP initiated talks with the PKK to reach a peaceful settlement to the conflict, but the process has failed. From 2014, the conflict has further intensified, and at the time of writing (mid-2016) arguably a peace deal seems more distant than ever.

[3] The government put an end to the peace process with the Kurdish guerillas, and as the confrontations between the guerillas and the security forces intensified in August 2015 and expanded to urban areas, the government ordered the harshest attack on the town and cities where the Kurdish movement was strongest.

[4] In July 2016, sectors of the military close to the Gülen movement—a religious social movement that gained influence in the various state institutions, particularly in police and judiciary, and was a former ally of the AKP before they started falling apart roughly from 2011 onwards—attempted to stage a coup, which in the end failed. Many commentators argue that the AKP has become even more authoritarian since then.

[5] Evciler, July 13, 2012.

[6] Evciler, July 9, 2012.

[7] Evciler, July 6, 2012.

[8] Bahcedere, March 30, 2008.

[9] Evciler, March 31, 2008.

[10] Evciler, July 10, 2012.

[11] Her reference to Kurds can be read as an expression of the societal divisions that the State's response to Kurdish struggle for cultural rights, combining denial

of "the Kurdish problem", propagating chauvinistic nationalism, and violence has produced.

12 Evciler, July 6, 2012.

13 Evciler, July 7, 2012.

14 Evciler, April 19, 2008.

15 Evciler, July 6, 2012.

16 Evciler, July 10, 2012.

17 Evciler, July 12, 2012.

18 Kızılelma, March 27, 2008.

19 Söğütalan, August 11, 2012.

20 Group discussions in Aşağı Şapçılar, July 8, 2012 and Söğütalan, August 11, 2012.

21 Muratlar, July 8, 2012.

22 Kızılelma, August 11, 2012.

23 Söğütalan, August 11, 2012.

24 Asagi Sapcilar, July 8, 2012.

25 Söğütalan, August 10, 2012.

26 Söğütalan, August 10, 2012.

27 There is a union of municipalities that include more towns. In the struggle, the most active ones were that of Çanakkale, Çan (until the mayor changed in 2010), Bayramiç, Zeytinli, Güre, Küçükkuyu.

28 Madra Mountain is located to the south of the Mount Ida region proper, designating the geographical area to the north of Edremit Bay. The environmental platform included municipalities from the Edremit bay region and chose this name to include all the municipalities to the north and south of the Edremit Bay. In terms of the socio-economic make-up of the population and the party affiliations of the mayors, the south of the Edremit Bay is much like the north.

29 Zeytinli, April 1, 2008.

30 Küçükkuyu, March 11, 2008.

31 Çanakkale, March 25, 2008.

32 Panel on gold mining during the Troy Festival, Çanakkale, August 12, 2012.

33 Çanakkale, August 14, 2012.

34 İstanbul, March 20, 2008.

35 Kızılelma, August 11, 2012.

36 Karaköy, August 10, 2012.

[37] Çanakkale, August 12, 2012.

[38] Çanakkale, March 24, 2008.

[39] Çanakkale, August 14, 2012.

[40] Mayor of Bayramiç, Bayramiç, March 26, 2008; Bayramiç Vice-mayor, Bayramiç, July 11, 2012; Çanakkale Environmental Platform spokesperson, Çanakkale, August 12, 2012.

[41] Evciler, July 9, 2012.

[42] Söğütalan, August 10, 2012.

[43] Evciler, July 9, 2012.

[44] Çanakkale, March 24, 2008.

[45] Etili, August 9, 2012.

[46] Evciler, July 5, 2012.

[47] *İmece* is the practice of collective work among the peasants, similar to the *minga* in Ecuador, yet this traditional practice has been losing its importance. In 2012, the farm was moved to another rural area in the İzmir province.

[48] Küçükkuyu, March 11, 2008.

[49] İzmir, April 3, 2008.

[50] Güre, April 1, 2008.

[51] Küçükkuyu, March 29, 2008.

7 Transformative Politics at the Nexus of Development-Environment-Justice

Social struggles are fundamentally about transforming the way in which people view the world and themselves, i.e. their subjectivities. If subjectivities are at least partly the product of the material processes and discursive constructions within which people's lives are embedded, then transformative social struggles are about intervening in these processes and constructions with a view to reworking subjectivities. In the Gramscian parlance, social struggles are "war[s] of position" aimed at shifting the "balance of social forces" on the material and ideological terrains, i.e. various social actors working to gain more power to shape the practices and meanings that configure people's subjectivities.

In the previous two chapters I have examined specific dimensions of the subjectivities of the peasants opposing mining in Intag and Mount Ida—those concerning their understandings of development, environment and justice, and the collective identities these understandings embodied and/or nurtured. I have explained how the understandings in each case were built with reference to the material and ideological processes that historically shaped the peasants' lives; and the dynamics of the anti-mining struggles (the ideology of civil society and local government actors, and their relationship with the peasants, and the practices these groups—peasants, civil society and local governments—engaged in within the context of the respective struggles). In doing so, I have tried to demonstrate how the balance of social forces in the material and ideological terrains differed between Intag and Mount Ida. In the case of Intag, I have also discussed how this balance was changing due to the recent process of strengthening the state under the government of Correa. In this chapter, I will summarize the differences between the understandings of development, environment and justice, and collective identities that the peasants in Intag and Mount Ida have articulated in the context of the anti-mining struggles that they have been engaged in, and point

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out the factors that have constrained or facilitated the construction of critical understandings, i.e. the enactment of transformative politics.

By the construction of critical understandings and transformative politics I specifically refer to:

a. challenging the dominant understanding of development that prioritizes economic growth over social and ecological concerns, and building notions of individual and communal well-being that prioritize control over livelihoods, quality of social relations, and environmental health rather than material prosperity;

b. encouraging social actors to rethink their own perceptions and uses of the environment, and what role the environment should play in the future of their territories;

c. framing their struggle in terms of social justice and rights in ways that cultivate critical understanding of the power relations that (re)produce environmental injustices, link their struggle to "broader visions of a more just society" (Kurtz 2003: 890), and help forge collective identities that move beyond the defence of particularistic interests to support more inclusive solidarities that transcend the local level.

Transformative politics at the nexus of development-environment-justice, thus concerns making explicit the contradictions and tensions that exist between the dominant logic of economic growth and the ecological conditions and ethical principles that this logic undermines, and establishing social and environmental relations that "subordinate economic objectives to ecological criteria, human dignity, social justice and the collective wellbeing of the people" (Escobar 2010: 23). I should emphasize that the specification of transformative politics with respect to these three dimensions is the result of the dialogue that this study has tried to establish between theoretical discussions and empirical cases. In that sense, the conclusions of the study regarding the differences between the Intag and the Mount Ida cases are embedded in this definition.

7.1   Challenging the Primacy of Material Prosperity and Growth, Changing Environmental Subjectivities

Whether the subjectivities of the peasants who oppose mining in Intag and Mount Ida harbour elements that challenge the dominant view of development that prioritizes increasing material wealth over and above

social and environmental concerns is a question that relates to what the peasants value about their lives—their economic activities, their social relations and their environment—and want to defend against mining. In Intag, in their expression of their views about why they do not want mining, the peasants strongly emphasized leading a dignified life and having good social relations with their communities. For them, mining meant being dispossessed from the land on which they have established themselves through their own efforts and reciprocal relations with their neighbours, and which provides the basis for a dignified life. This implies being able to produce their own food to feed their families and being able to rely on their neighbours when they are in need, not facing the threat of living in misery as it happens in urban areas, having control over their time, and not being at the mercy of bosses.

In contrast, the peasants in Mount Ida insisted that through its environmental impacts, especially on the quantity and quality of water resources, mining would damage the agricultural production and sales, and lead to decreasing incomes. They reasoned that the economic value of the gold that would be extracted would be less than the value of agricultural production in the region. In terms of being concerned about their livelihoods, peasants in Intag and Mount Ida had similar reasons to oppose mining. However, while the peasants in Intag articulated these concerns in terms of non-economic values, the peasants in Mount Ida framed them in the language of monetary cost-benefit calculation concerning the contribution of gold or agricultural production to the regional and national economy.

To account for this difference, it is necessary to consider the historical processes that have configured life in Intag and Mount Ida respectively (Avcı 2017: 322). A significant difference between the two places in this respect is the role that the Ecuadorian and the Turkish states have played in the everyday lives and experiences of the peasants. Historically, the Ecuadorian state, characterized by a fractured and weak institutional structure, depending on an unstable economy based on commodity exports, and governing a society divided along class and ethnic lines, has not been able to establish a strong hegemony (see e.g. Clark & Becker 2007b, Gerlach 2003, Radcliffe 1996). For the Inteños, as for many Ecuadorians, the state has been rather a distant institution, not systematically directing the socio-economic changes at the local level, not much visible through its services, and not having firm control over the cultural life

of communities. In contrast, the Turkish state has built its hegemony on the basis of the ideal of modernization through economic development and pursued it through ideological leadership, centralized and paternalistic governance, and material concessions that have improved the living standards of even the most impoverished classes (see e.g. Akbulut & Adaman 2013, Keyder 1989, Yalman 2002). In Ida, this process materialized through the improvements in the well-being of the population with the implementation of agricultural modernization policies, rationalization of natural resource use, and provision of public services—firmly establishing the presence of the state in the everyday lives of the rural population.

In Intag, therefore, a developmentalist vision had not taken hold when mining arrived in the 1990s. This is not to suggest that the Inteños had no expectations of improving their material conditions, but their everyday activities were not signified as part of a national developmental process. The historical weakness of the Ecuadorian state accounts for why a developmentalist ideology has not become a defining feature of the peasants' subjectivities in Intag. However, by itself, it does not explain how they came to construct alternative understandings. This, I believe, was achieved through the efforts of civil society actors (the local priest, the newspaper *Periódico Intag*, DECOIN, and other organizations) and local government actors—connected to the indigenous movement and led by the mayor Auki Tituaña—to translate the ethical values found in the common sense of the peasants into a political project of alternative local development. These actors performed the role of the "organic intellectuals", tasked with "facilitat[ing] an intellectual formation within the agency [of the peasants] itself" (Patnaik 1988: PE-3).

In the context of the mining struggle, these actors gained positions in the material and ideological terrain by introducing and promoting new practices (economic activities, environmental practices, social organizing, collective deliberation and decision making) that were explicitly based on the ethics of community well-being, human dignity, rights and sustainability. By engaging in these practices, the peasants enacted these ethical values in their everyday lives. Therefore, for many Inteños, development came to mean a humble local process of betterment of life conditions in which the communities are the main agents exercising their rights and power to shape their own lives, rather than a state-led national endeavor to achieve ambitious goals.

Moreover, in this process, new environmental subjectivities (Agrawal 2005) emerged, as "the environment" was constructed as a new conceptual category relevant to their lives, an integral part of their peasant way of life, and a valuable characteristic of the valley worth defending and preserving (see also Davidov 2013). Furthermore, the collectively constructed alternative local development project explicitly integrated an environmental dimension such that the protection of the environment was not only considered a matter of resisting environmentally destructive mining, but also a broader concern to be taken into account in local development efforts. As Agrawal (2005: 162-163) demonstrated in his study on environmentality in India, participating in institutions of environmental governance changes the way people view their relationship to the environment. Indeed, the new environmental subjectivities in Intag were constructed and performed in practice through changing farming practices (e.g. agroecology, organic coffee production), community forest and watershed conservation, and eco-tourism projects; hence they became integrated into everyday experiences of peasants.

Certainly, the power of the peasants and their allies to institute and consolidate these practices, and—as a corollary—the social relations that underpin them, has been constrained by the historical-structural conditions of the country and the region (concerning not least land and income inequality, market relations, social and political marginalization, and poor services). Hence, the role of these practices, and the meanings attributed to them, should be thought of in terms of how they have potentialized new subjectivities, rather than whether they have managed to fully constitute them.

In Mount Ida, on the other hand, the state has been the main actor shaping the peasants' experience and understanding of development and environment (Avcı 2017: 322). Particularly from the 1950s onwards, state-directed economic growth brought employment opportunities in different activities in both the rural and urban economy, and enabled people to have higher incomes and more consumption possibilities. The state has also directed the changes in natural resources use with a view to their rational utilization in the service of "development". Yet, this process has never been too intensive or too intrusive to significantly disrupt social life or to cause sudden or severe environmental damage to fuel major discontent. Hence, Mount Ida came to be characterized as a region that may not be economically prosperous, but as one that has de-

veloped in a way that provides its residents a good quality of life. Although the state now presents mining as a means to local development, peasants and their allies consider it a threat to the socio-economic and environmental features that define the region and sustain that good quality of life. Despite this clash in local development visions, the state's view of development as an indisputable national goal, and its determination and power to pursue it through legal and coercive means, have obliged the mining opponents to provide a corresponding justification comparing the contribution of the current economic activities in the region to the national economy with the alleged benefits of mining. As such, they have remained within the confines of the dominant discourse on the primacy of economic growth. In contrast to Intag, in Mount Ida, the civil society and oppositional political actors did not offer an alternative language to that of economic development through which the peasants could articulate their livelihood concerns. Ultimately, this had to do with how the state-led national development ideology permeated the subjectivities of those actors as well, and limited their capacity to politicize the elements within the common sense of the peasants that could challenge the economic logic underlying the state discourses on development.

The focus in Mount Ida on the comparison of economic benefit of mining versus other economic activities has also deterred reflection on peasants' own environmental practices, or on the other environmental problems of the region such as rapid urbanization of the coastal areas and tourism development that mainly resulted from the migration of urban middle classes to the region—the same social group that forms the backbone of regional environmental civil society. The peasants did articulate a sense of attachment to the local environment, yet the defence of the environment has been conceived almost exclusively in terms of its protection from "outsiders" (see also Hurley & Arı 2011: 1404). In the absence of deliberation among the mining opponents about the future development of the region beyond not allowing mining, the issue of how the environment should be governed has been left unaddressed.

In terms of the construction of a state hegemony around the ideal of development, it can be argued that Ecuador is in fact becoming more like Turkey (Avcı 2017: 322-323). Since he came to power in 2007, President Rafael Correa embarked on a project of "refounding the state", based on the state's claim to represent the general interest and its role "as the key actor in societal dynamics, be they economic, political, social or

environmental" (Arsel & Avila Angel 2012: 204). Correa has made mining a central pillar of his developmentalist agenda, allegedly indispensable to fight poverty and inequality, and delegitimized, criminalized and repressed social resistance against it (Becker 2013, Dosh & Kligerman 2009, Zibechi 2009).

Developmentalism has long been identified as a central feature of the history of modern Turkey and the basis of the Turkish state's claim to rule (see e.g. Adaman & Arsel 2005a, Akbulut 2011, Harris 2008). Observing the current processes in both countries, it seems that despite the significant differences between its neoliberal (in Turkey) and post-neoliberal (in Ecuador) forms, it is indeed fundamental to the construction and maintenance of state hegemony, particularly as it pertains to governance of the environment (Arsel et al. 2014, Escobar 2010, Radcliffe 2012). The developmentalist ideology, both in its neoliberal and post-neoliberal variants, continues to prioritize economic growth, despite discursively acknowledging (and appropriating) and, to a certain extent, addressing in practice environmental and social concerns. This is made clear by the way in which in both countries mining is principally legitimized in terms of the economic resources it will generate, while being supported by the promises of proper environmental management (of impacts) and inclusion of social concerns (to be dealt with through local employment, community development projects, improvement of social services, etc.). The two states do not differ much in terms of how they deal with social resistance, deploying their coercive powers (or threatening to do so) to silence and repress those who stand in the way of their political and economic projects.

This new context in Ecuador has been changing the dynamics at the local level in Intag. The popularity of Correa and his great promise of delivering long-due development and social justice seem to influence the position of some mining opponents, if not its core group. As the Ecuadorian state has started to exert more control over the material conditions and cultural life in the valley, it has become more complicated to sustain the commitment to a slow and arduous process of autonomous local development against the promises of state-sponsored development through mining. Besides, the state's backing has definitely encouraged the mining supporters who were previously blamed for prioritizing their self-interest over community well-being to assert their position more strongly and with more moral authority. There is also a growing senti-

ment that, given the government's determination to pursue the project, there is no way to resist anymore. This impression is also quite prevalent in Mount Ida as well, and leads, if not to consent, to acquiescence and resignation.

A central argument of this study is that the state's power to shape everyday experiences, to signify these experiences as part of a national development project, and to pre-empt and repress resistance is essential in the making of subjectivities, and constrain the possibilities for their transformation. The state's hegemonic practices shape subjectivities by institutionalizing particular social (material) relations and, at the same time, suffocate efforts to establish different kinds of economies and stifle the spaces where alternative values can take root. We can see more clearly how the former has operated in the formation of the peasants' subjectivities in Mount Ida, while we can grasp better how the latter works to undermine the emerging alternative subjectivities in Intag. Moreover, we can discern how coercion operates in defining the limits of what is possible (Rupert 2003) by the way in which both in Intag and Mount Ida the negation of the possibility of resisting the state is draining people's will to struggle.

7.2   Cultivating Critical Notions of Justice and Rights, Fomenting Inclusive Collective Identities

A crucial difference between the subjectivities articulated in the struggles in Intag and Mount Ida concerns the way in which environmental injustice was framed (Schlosberg 2007), and the collective identities that this framing fomented (Avcı 2017: 323-324). In both Intag and Mount Ida, inequality in the distribution of environmental costs and benefits of mining, i.e. that mining would benefit the companies while its environmental impacts would fall on the local communities, was at the core of the conflicts. The difference between the two cases lies in whether the grievance over distributional injustice was linked to other dimensions of justice concerning recognition and participation (Schlosberg 2007), and related to this, in the definition of a "we" for whom justice is being demanded, and on what basis.

Since the beginning of the struggle in Intag, in addition to the fear of dispossession, the way in which the companies and state authorities treated people—according to many with disrespect—was an important

source of grievance that contained a kernel of ethical concern beyond material interests. As the anti-mining resistance transformed into a struggle to construct an alternative and autonomous model of local development through the self-organization and action of people, the peasants and their allies started demanding recognition and respect not only for their decision to reject mining, but also for their decision and efforts to build a different future. This demand to have their will respected was articulated within a rights discourse, and the communities came to perceive the mining project as a violation of their rights. Catalina,[1] one of the young leaders of the resistance, expressed this change in the clearest way as "with this struggle we learned we have rights".

More importantly, in Intag, social and political spaces have been created in which rights—to land and livelihood, a healthy environment, participate in shaping the future of the territory, to be respected as knowledgeable and active citizens—have in fact been practised. In getting together, discussing and making decisions in meetings of local organizations and in communal, parish, zonal (at the level of Intag) and municipal assemblies, in engaging in new productive activities, be it planting coffee and selling it through the coffee cooperative, harvesting aloe vera plants and processing them to produce cosmetic items, managing tourism facilities or reforesting watersheds with native trees, many Inteños enacted their collective identity as communities with the right and the power to actively construct their own future. Therefore, for many Inteños, rights have become more than an abstract or formal concept alluded to in order to stop a specific project; they have become a "lived practice" in different areas of their everyday lives (Blackwell 2012: 719-20). It should be noted that it was principally *collective*, not individual, rights that have been asserted in Intag, and that formed the basis of the collective identity that has been cultivated through the struggle.

Agrawal's (2005) argument on formation of environmental subjects can be broadened here to argue that people's actions are constitutive of their subjectivities. As Agrawal (2005) also acknowledges, the social context of institutionalized structures and asymmetrical power relations within which people are embedded are important in shaping their self-understanding. Still, practices have a transformative role in changing historically constituted subjectivities and in the production of new meanings. In Intag, this transformation involved the development of a consciousness of an organized society making decisions through collective

deliberation, identifying common problems and solutions, defining a common vision of a desired society, learning from each other, thinking beyond their personal interest, and taking into account others' views.

Undeniably, this process has been fraught with difficulties, ambiguities and conflicts. Not everyone had equal access to those spaces, nor were they equally committed to taking responsibility. There have been disparities between the civil society actors and the peasants in terms of their access to and control over information and resources, and influence in decision-making spaces. And there have been disagreements both between the civil society actors and peasants, and among the peasants themselves, over the priorities of the communities, the particular decisions of the organizations regarding the projects that they manage, who needed to or did contribute, and how much, and whether some benefited more than others. Moreover, the economic improvements that the local development project brought about have been limited, understandably so given the structural constraints facing all the social actors involved, as well as their restricted resources. These limitations have negatively affected the interest and commitment in participatory processes (Ospina Peralta 2006 et al.: 44-45), and have arguably made people more receptive to the promises of the Correa government to deliver development, all the more so as the government has indeed improved the living conditions for many in Ecuador through its redistributive policies. Despite all these, the lesson from the Intag struggle remains: transformative politics is activated in actual practice, therefore it is important to create the social and political spaces in which new practices can be introduced and take hold.

The experience of the mining struggle in Mount Ida substantiates this conclusion, but from the other way around. Similar to Intag, the idea that powerful companies are trying to pursue their interests at the cost of the well-being of the local population lay at the heart of peasants' opposition to mining in Mount Ida. However, grievance against such injustice has been confined to the local level. By and large, the peasants had a NIMBY attitude, as many of them seemed not to have much trouble with the idea of shifting the costs they wanted to avoid to other people in other places with the justification that those people should stand up for themselves. As quoted above, the words of Gamze, a young woman and a vocal opponent of mining, were the most brazen expression of the particularistic understanding prevalent in Ida: "Why would we want gold

mining here? We have lands, we have work, we earn well. They [the mining companies] should go and do it where the Kurds are". It is beyond the scope of this study to explain the full significance of her reference to Kurds. It does illustrate that the mining resistance in Mount Ida essentially amounted to a particularistic defence of the peasants' immediate material interests, and that it was in fact based in an exclusionary collective identity.

The arguments of the civil society and local government actors that foreground the specific qualities of the region—its high agricultural production, tourism activities, ecosystem properties—as the main reason not to allow mining in the region reinforced this place-based focus. These actors did raise questions concerning the appropriation of resources by foreign mining companies and posited it as detrimental to the country's development. Moreover, unlike the peasants, they considered mining by foreign companies as unacceptable in other parts of Turkey, and were sympathetic to other existing anti-mining resistance movements in the country. Still, as in so many local environmental struggles in Turkey (see e.g. Adaman et al. 2016, Akbulut 2015, Erensü 2013), to unite the peasants and other sectors of the local population, they articulated a *place-based* politics centred on the defence of Mount Ida against mining. I do not suggest that this has necessarily been an exclusionary, not-in-my-backyard position. However, it has not lent itself to a renegotiation of existing interests and identities; rather, it has tried to bring together fixed interests for the sole purpose of stopping the mining projects.

As the Intag experience demonstrates, the creation of new collective identities requires political spaces where different actors can deliberate about common concerns and future visions, and enact those emerging identities. In the course of the mining struggle in Mount Ida, such spaces were barely created, either by the peasants themselves or by the initiative of the civil society actors who led the mining struggle. As in the rest of the country, the rural population in the Mount Ida region does not have much experience of autonomous political organizing. The agricultural and forestry cooperatives, which are the main rural organizations in the region, are linked to the state through clientelistic relations, not engaging in political activism but mostly focusing on securing economic benefits for their members through better prices or by accessing the various agricultural support mechanisms (e.g. support for investment in new irriga-

tion methods, cheaper inputs) provided by the state. This has not changed during the mining struggle, and indeed these organizations did not play an active role in the struggle. On the other hand, the civil society and local government actors, as I have argued above, have mostly focused on the short-term goal of stopping the mining projects rather than laying the foundation for a longer-term process of social change, as has been the case in Intag. An important difference between the two cases indeed lies in this point. In Intag, the aim of civil society and local government actors was to help empower the communities so that they could exercise their agency in shaping local development processes, whereas in Mount Ida, their aim was to show the communities "the truth" about mining so that they would understand that it is not in their interest and hence stand up to it. As such, the relationship they built with the peasants has remained one-dimensional, distant and hierarchical, where they positioned themselves as the knowing subjects "enlightening" the peasants. The presence of civil society and local government actors has not brought about any change in the everyday experiences of the peasants, or in the ways they signify those experiences. Under these circumstances, the political space that the resistance to mining has opened up has not been capitalized on to imagine or realize new social, economic and political relations.

The relationships among the civil society and local government actors in Mount Ida were not very democratic either. There was no scope to express opposition within the organizations that led the mining struggle, and those who did were marginalized. The people who were forced to tone down their criticisms or alternative views were actually those few ecologists and leftists who, at the beginning of the conflict, tried to build organizational structures that would facilitate more discussion and participation, rather than relying on the more common practice among existing civil society organizations of leaving the decisions to the few representatives. These were also the people who made an effort to engage more closely with the livelihood concerns of the peasants and promote alternative agricultural practices or economic activities. As they were unable to get sufficient support to further these efforts, or to experiment with alternative organizational arrangements, their influence in the struggle remained limited. The hierarchical and exclusionary relations that characterized the functioning of civil society and local government actors

therefore further curbed the potential of transformative politics in Mount Ida.

Notes

[1] Interview with Catalina, Chalguayaco Alto, January 9, 2012.

8   Conclusion

This study performed a comparative analysis of transformative politics in two local environmental struggles against large-scale mining in Ecuador and Turkey. Starting from a conception of environmental struggles as spaces that offer possibilities for the transformation of the political subjectivities of those social actors participating in them, it inquired into the processes that facilitate or hinder such transformation. It sought to shed light on whether, when and how these struggles construct critical subjectivities—i.e. subjectivities that challenge the meanings, discourses and practices that reproduce and legitimize unequal power relations, and that are supportive of more egalitarian, just and sustainable social and environmental relations.

In the study, I engaged with these questions from a Gramscian theoretical perspective and through the use of a comparative approach. The Gramscian framework allowed me to conceptualize local environmental movements as struggles that take place on the terrain of state-society relations, and analyse how they are shaped by dialectics of power and resistance as they play out on that terrain. It also provided the basis to conceive transformative politics in terms of construction of critical political subjectivities, as defined above. The methodological approach, developed on the basis of critical realist epistemology, was put to use by accentuating and focusing on the differences between the two study cases in order to distil the causal mechanisms at work in the construction and transformation of political subjectivities. By employing a Gramscian perspective in a comparative manner, I elucidated how the subjectivities of the peasants in Intag (Ecuador) and Mount Ida (Turkey) differed. As I endeavoured to explain these differences, I tried to demonstrate, on the one hand, how hegemonic discourses and practices of the state mould the subjectivities of social actors and constrain the possibilities for their transformation; and, on the other hand, how transformative political ac-

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tion is enabled by the creation of political spaces for collective reflection and action around alternative ways of organizing social and environmental relations.

The proposal that environmental struggles represent a potential platform from which to mount challenges to hegemony and the argument that the realization of this potential hinges on the (always changing) balance of social forces in the sphere of state-society relations are the main contributions that this study provided in its quest for a better understanding of environmental struggles. Taking this point further, I identified specific dimensions of political subjectivities in which environmental struggles can and do (or not) unsettle hegemony and effect transformation. I arrived at these dimension by establishing a dialogue between the Gramscian approach to social struggles, the debates in the political ecology and environmental justice literature, and the empirical cases. As a result of this dialogue, I explored transformative politics with respect to the understandings at the nexus of development-environment-justice that the peasants who opposed mining in Intag and Mount Ida articulated.

As I framed the question of transformative politics as such, I tried to make three points. First, "development" as a discourse through which the state legitimizes its claim to rule, and as a practice that prioritizes economic growth over social and environmental concerns, is central to hegemony building in the global South. Significantly, it shapes social actors' subjectivities by cultivating a particular notion of the good life, defined by (increasing) material prosperity. It is, therefore, essential for environmental struggles to construct alternative notions of individual and communal well-being that foreground control over livelihoods, quality of social relations and environmental health rather than material prosperity. Political ecology studies established that such notions indeed underlie the resistance of local communities to environmentally degrading activities. What is crucial for transformative politics is that these notions are explicitly positioned against the dominant understandings of development, as building blocks of alternative ways of organizing social life and society's relations to the environment.

Second, I highlighted why the environment is a crucial area of social struggle from which to challenge developmental hegemony. I argued that, being rooted in the structural contradictions inherent to an expanding metabolism of commodity production (i.e. economic growth, Bridge

2000), environmental struggles are more conducive to dispute the growth imperative, i.e. the desirability and necessity of growth for societal progress. Moreover, as many political ecology studies have shown, there seems to be something about people's relationship to the environment, the values they attribute to the environment, that resists being reduced to an instrumental relation, being sacrificed for material gain. I thus argued that environmental struggles can build on such environmental values to unsettle dominant discourses and practices of development. I also pointed out that environmental struggles bring together diverse social actors, cutting across class, national, ethnic, regional and gender identities. As these actors interact with each other and examine social processes, and more specifically development practices, through the lens of the environment, new understandings can be developed concerning how they are connected through environmental processes and social power relations that impinge on them. The alliances such critical examination may forge can also encourage actors to reflect upon and possibly change their own environmental practices to become more sustainable. I argued, therefore, that the solidarities built in environmental struggles might potentially disrupt power relations by creating new forms of sociality and new collective identities, and that they might promote more sustainable environmental practices.

Third, building on the environmental justice literature, I suggested that the way in which social justice concerns are framed in environmental struggles is crucial to their transformative potential. While the unequal distribution of environmental costs and benefits lie at the core of these struggles, I stressed that these can be contested in ways that reinforce particularistic interests and foment exclusionary collective identities (Harvey 1996). They can also be formulated in ways that question the underlying processes that create and sustain environmental injustice (Kurtz 2003, Walker 2006), and that link up demands for equal access to resources and the fair distribution of environmental burdens with demands for recognition of diverse environmental values and participation in environmental decision making (Schlosberg 2007). The articulation of justice concerns in such a critical and broad manner necessarily involves ethical justifications that go beyond economic reasoning, and can ground solidarity among those who suffer from injustice. Here, I argue, lies the potential of critical justice framings to disrupt hegemony, by laying bare

the power inequalities that underpin it, and mobilizing people into taking action against it.

It is in light of the three sets of arguments summarized above that I compared the anti-mining struggles in Intag and Mount Ida. I framed the difference between the cases as a question of to what extent and how the two struggles have transformed the subjectivities of those peasants who participated in them along the three dimensions of development, environment and justice. I employed a comparative methodology based on the critical realist epistemology in order to discern the processes that enable or limit transformative politics. To facilitate the identification of the causal mechanisms at work, I developed the comparison as an analysis of two contrasting cases.

Focusing on the contrasts between the two cases, I argued that the peasants in Intag articulated a more critical understanding of the development-environment-justice nexus than those in Mount Ida. I demonstrated that in Intag, a vision of an alternative local development model based on ethical values such as dignity, community well-being and community empowerment was built; new environmental subjectivities were nurtured; and rights-based notions of justice were cultivated. In Mount Ida, the dominant understanding of development as economic growth and material prosperity was reproduced, and environmental and justice concerns were framed in a limited way, the former as the defence of the local environment from outsiders, and the latter as the defence of particularistic material interests.

I should emphasize that, for the purposes of comparison, I highlighted the contrasts between the two cases, focusing on the success of the environmental struggle in Intag in fostering transformative processes, while emphasizing the limitations of the Mount Ida struggle in this regard. Undoubtedly, this methodological choice has its own limitations. Although I tried to point out the limits of the processes of change the social actors faced in Intag, and the dissident voices in Mount Ida, I overemphasized the contrasts between the cases at the expense of paying sufficient attention to the heterogeneity and complexity within each case. My aim was not to exalt the struggle in Intag, or to belittle the one in Mount Ida. This choice was intended to help me sharpen my reasoning and to provide a more focused analysis. Still, this is a limitation of the study. I hope that it makes good enough a contribution to vindicate the methodological choice I have made, and that it encourages further re-

search into the complex dynamics of transformative politics in individual environmental struggles.

To explain the differences between the two struggles—differences as farmed in the manner described above—I examined two interconnected processes. First, the material and discursive processes within state-society relations that have historically shaped the political subjectivities of the peasants; and second, what happened during these struggles that affected, or altered, these processes. In relation to the latter, I paid particular attention to the relations between the peasants and civil society and local government actors, and how they jointly organized and conducted their anti-mining struggle.

The comparative analysis thus pursued was based on, and gave further credence to, the Gramscian understanding of hegemony and the social struggles to challenge it as being concerned with the formation and transformation of subjectivities. The Gramscian perspective posits that struggles to shape subjectivities operate in the realm of everyday lived experience and practical consciousness, i.e. common sense. In this study, this argument was fleshed out through a concrete analysis of the subjectivities articulated, and the processes through which they have been constructed in Intag and Mount Ida.

On the one hand, on the basis of the Mount Ida case, I demonstrated how, by regulating and instituting its presence in the everyday lives of social actors, and representing peasants' everyday experiences within the discourse of development, the state cultivates subjects who think about societal relations and their own lives in terms of a self-evidently legitimate and desirable process of development. I argue that examining the production of developmental subjects through state hegemonic practices —the use of consent and coercion to pursue a developmentalist project— is key to explaining the limitations of not only the Mount Ida struggle, but also other local environmental movements in Turkey. The recent process of state building in Ecuador and its emerging effects in Intag also support this argument on the importance of state hegemonic practices in (re)configuring subjectivities. In fact, as Velásquez (2012) and van Teijlingen (2016) also demonstrate respectively for the mining conflicts over the Quimsacocha project in Azuay province and the Mirador project in Zamora province, one cannot fully understand the current politics of mining in Ecuador without taking into account the develop-

ment discourses and practices of the Ecuadorian state and how these engender new subjectivities and collective identities.

On the other hand, through the Intag case, I showed how a social struggle engendered concrete changes in material practices and forms of sociality towards the establishment of more equal, just, democratic and sustainable social and environmental relations. I illustrated how this experience influenced the peasants' conception of their lives and themselves, empowering them to assert their rights to decide and construct the future of their lives and territories. I also discussed the way in which the hegemonic practices of the state undermine those civil society spaces and efforts, thus constraining the critical subjectivities in the making in those spaces.

The role of such changes in strengthening opposition movements against mining in Ecuador can also be gauged from the case of fragmented and weaker resistance to the Mirador project among the Shuar indigenous people in Zamora province. Avcı and Fernández-Salvador (2016) argue that an important reason why the Shuar, who live in the area of impact of the project, could not build a strong resistance to mining is that their lives have been shaped by the territorial and social fragmentation that they have been subject to, particularly since colonization of Amazon in the 1960s. Exacerbated by the internal conflicts within the Shuar's political organizations, this fragmentation prevented them to articulate their identity-based claims on the territory to a common political vision or project (Avcı & Fernández-Salvador 2016: 920). It is this context, the authors argue, that explains why many Shuar look to mining as the way to improve their lives, to develop their communities.

The importance of political spaces that enable social actors to reflect and act on their everyday lived experiences for transformative politics is further corroborated by the experience of the struggle in Mount Ida. Although the peasants in Mount Ida were adamant about protecting their livelihoods, the absence of such political spaces appeared to be a major obstacle to their moving beyond defending their particularistic interests. Therefore, it is in the extent to which actors in the sphere of civil society can make a difference to the everyday experiences, and rework the meanings through which these are lived, that they can cultivate subjectivities that are conducive to more equal, just and sustainable social and environmental relations. It is in praxis, the unity of action and reflection, that the seeds of transformation germinate, and that, I believe, is a

lesson that social actors in Mount Ida can learn from the experience of Intag.

Epilogue

In April 2017, Lenin Moreno, vice-president under Rafael Correa from 2007 to 2013, was elected as the new president of Ecuador. Despite once being an ally of Correa, and winning the election as the candidate of *Alianza País*, since he took office, Moreno has made clear that he will not be governing under the shadow of the ex-president. In fact, Moreno has chosen to consolidate his power by distancing himself from Correa, particularly from his authoritarian style of governance, by initiating dialogues with the sectors of society most attacked by Correa—principally CONAIE and the media, and by initiating a fight against corruption in which some high-ranking officials[1] close to Correa are implicated (Labarthe & Saint-Upéry 2017). Moreno also moved to hold a referendum on February 4, 2018, for amendments to the Constitution. The proposed seven amendments, including the elimination of indefinite re-election (including for non-consecutive terms, thus preventing Correa from "coming back"); the prohibition of mining in protected areas, intangible zones (protected areas for uncontacted tribes) and urban areas; and the reduction of the area of oil exploitation in the Yasuni National Park in the Amazon were all approved by the electorate. Moreover, Moreno has granted amnesty to some indigenous and environmentalist activists prosecuted by the previous government.

Although the new president seems to be willing to allow more space for opposition and dialogue, and has made concessions to the environmental and indigenous movements struggling against the expansion of resource extraction, what change these will bring for the local mining conflicts is still not clear. Since October 2016, Ecuador has started awarding new mining concessions, which, according to a report[2] prepared for the Rainforest Information Centre of Australia, resulted in more than 2.4 million hectares of land being made available for new mining concessions (both registered and in-process) in 2017 only. In 2018,

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the Minister of Mining announced[3] that Ecuador was expecting more than 1 billion dollar of foreign investment in 2018 that will make "mining activity fundamental to the growth of Ecuadorian economy in 2018". Some of this new mining investment has found its way into Intag as well. News from 2017 reported that BHP Billiton acquired five concessions in the region,[4] and the state company ENAMI EP was granted new concessions near the *Llurimagua* project area[5].

In 2017, ENAMI EP and CODELCO continued advanced exploration work in the *Llurimagua* project. The website of ENAMI EP posted on its website several news articles on the various community development, infrastructure and capacity-building projects being implemented in Intag, demonstrating the companies' efforts to gain further support from the local population and consolidate their presence in the valley. As the project goes on, the mining opponents keep on fighting, denouncing the environmental impacts that exploration activities have already caused, such as contamination of rivers, cutting of trees, and deterioration of paths.[6] Meanwhile, the local government of Cotacachi, which, since it came to power in 2014, has reinvigorated the participatory processes in the canton, has taken more strongly the leadership role in the anti-mining struggle. For instance, based on the decisions made in the last three annual cantonal assemblies (2014, 2015 and 2016), in June 2017, the Municipal Council voted for a resolution, to ask the national government to "stop granting new mining concessions in Intag, stop the existing mining activities in the region, respect the autonomy of the local government, to carry out a popular consultation in the canton on the issue of mining, and work to promote environmentally friendly economic activities in the region".[7] Whether the new president, calling for more dialogue, will listen to and uphold these demands is yet to be seen. What is clear is that the struggle of the mining opponents in Intag to have their right to decide their own future respected continues.

In contrast to Ecuador, the political environment in Turkey has become even more authoritarian since the government declared a state of emergency following the coup attempt in July 2016. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan further consolidated his power as the constitutional amendment to shift from a parliamentary to a presidential system was approved in a referendum in April 2017.[8] Under these circumstances, although not completely silenced, oppositional social forces—social movements, political parties, civil society organizations, journalists, aca-

demics—are facing increasing repression, or are threatened by it. Environmental struggles are certainly among those social forces, still trying to defend local environments against mining, thermic power plants, nuclear power plants, hydropower plants, urban transformation, road construction and other projects.

The development of mining projects for gold[9] and other minerals in Mount Ida continued in 2017; so did the efforts of the local communities, civil society organizations and the local governments to stop these projects. In some villages, villagers protested against the EIA meetings, local civil society actors organized protest events and filed several court cases[10] against irregularities in the EIA processes, and the local media kept on reporting on mining activities in the region and the reactions to these activities.

Arguably more interesting for promoting the transformative potential of the Mount Ida struggle, some local activists have been reflecting about the limits of the strategies used so far—focusing on stopping the projects, preventing the EIA meetings in villages, using legal means—and have been suggesting and pursuing alternative ones. The Association for the Protection of Natural and Cultural Wealth of Mount Ida has been spearheading such efforts. For instance, while still participating in the protests against the EAI meetings in villages, in June 2017, the Association attended an EIA screening meeting for a gold mining project at the Ministry of Environment to directly raise the concerns of the opponents with the Screening Committee. Although it is difficult to say how much impact the arguments of the representatives of the Association had, the Committee indeed suspended the EIA process due to the inadequacy of the EIA dossier presented by the company.[11] Moreover, the president of the Association has been emphasizing the need to consider the environmental threats facing the region in a more holistic manner, to start engaging with the peasants before mining or other projects arrive, and to collaborate with them to promote environmentally responsible local development efforts.[12] It is yet to be seen if such this advice will be followed. Still, it is important that at least some of the social actors in Mount Ida are pushing to broaden the perspective and diversify the strategies of the anti-mining resistance, seemingly in ways that echo those of the Intag struggle.

Not only in Mount Ida, but environmental organizations and activists in other parts of the country also seem to increasingly seek ways to move

beyond the confines of place-bound struggles, and to confront an ever more authoritarian government that continues to promote economic growth at all costs. These were, in fact, the issues that were debated by 43 local and regional environmental organizations from different parts of the country, among them The Association for the Protection of Natural and Cultural Wealth of Mount Ida, which came together in the Bergama town[13] in November 2017.[14] The main conclusion that the participants reached in their debates was the need to find ways of organizing that would unite the various struggles in thought and in action. Whether such unity can and will be established, especially in a context of consolidating authoritarian neoliberalism, is highly uncertain. Yet, if and when it is established, it can be expected to foster the transformative potential of local environmental struggles, in Mount Ida and in other places.

Thinking about the future of Intag and Mount Ida, it can be anticipated that the struggle in Intag will revolve around the question of the possibilities for democratic participation in decisions over local resource use, and for pursuing development models that can deliver the promise of "good living" in the context of an economy dependent on resource extraction. The Mount Ida struggle, on the other hand, will hold lessons for understanding the possibilities and limits of challenging neoliberal developmentalism under authoritarian rule (Adaman et al. 2017). As such, both struggles will certainly continue to raise important questions concerning the relationship between development, environment and democracy in different contexts of state-society relations.

Notes

[1] The highest-ranking person in these corruption investigations was then Vice-President Jorge Glas. In the 2017 elections, Moreno ran with Glas as vice-presidential candidate, who was a close ally of Correa and served as his vice-president from 2013 to 2017. Moreno stripped Glas of his powers in August 2017 after Glas accused him of "betraying the Citizen's Revolution". Then, in October 2017, Glas was taken into preventive custody for his alleged links to the corruption scheme involving the Brazilian construction company Odebrecht. In December 2017, Glas was sentenced to six years in jail for taking US$13.5 million in bribes (*BBC,* December 13, 2017).

[2] Vandegrift et al. (2017).

[3] Ministerio de Minería (2017)

[4] Yes to Life, No to Mining (2017)

[5] *La Hora* (2017)

[6] See the presentation prepared by DECOIN (2016) named "Dragons in The Eden".

[7] Municipio de Cotacachi (2017).

[8] Although the new system of government will come into effect after the elections to be held in 2019, Erdogan has complete control over the executive and the legislative through his control over AKP—the majority and governing party in the parliament—as well as over the judiciary, thus practically ruling the country alone.

[9] By the end of 2017, the project in Lapseki district of Çanakkale owned by the Turkish company *TÜMAD* was ready to start production. In *Kirazlı* project, Alamos Gold has begun road and power line construction, and site clearing while waiting to acquire the business operation permit from the Çanakkale Governorship (Alamos 2017a). The company also continues to work on *Ağı Dağı* and *Çamyurt* projects (Alamos 2017b).

[10] According to the information given by a representative from the Çanakkale Bar Association, reported in the local newspaper *Aynalı Pazar* (2016), 15 court cases were opened against mining activities between 2008 and 2014, while between 2014 and 2016, 28 cases were filed. The same news article reported seven court rulings in favor of mining opponents. Such rulings, however, do not ensure the cancellation of the projects, hence cannot be taken as definitive successes for the anti-mining struggle.

[11] *Yeşil Gazete* (2017).

[12] *Birgün* (2017).

[13] The town where the historic gold-mining resistance took place. See Chapter 3 for the importance of the Bergama resistance for the environmental movement in Turkey.

[14] *Evrensel* (2017)

Appendix

Field activities in Ecuador

I stayed in Ecuador for eight months from September 2011 to April 2012 for the field study. For the first two months I stayed in Quito. During this time, I mostly spent my time in the libraries of the universities to review the resources in Spanish that I did not have access to previously from the Netherlands to help me form a better understanding of the study site. As they were in Spanish, it proved to be rather time consuming for me to read them. These resources included:

- Academic sources and government, international institutions and NGO reports on the geographical, socio-economic and political context in Ecuador, the Imbabura province (where Intag belongs), Cotacachi and Intag (a master thesis on territorial identity construction in Intag has especially been very useful);

- Academic sources on the rural structure and relations, and more generally political economy of Ecuador, especially the debates on the recent changes with the election of Correa;

- Academic, government and NGO resources on mining sector and environmental conflicts (including mining) in Ecuador, and in Latin America.

Later on during the field research I acquired more documents and other material from the local government and the local organizations in Intag, which included, among others, the following:

- Plans and documents from the local government such as The Cotacachi canton Development and Land Use Plan 2010-2014, Cotacachi Sustainable Economic Development Plan 2011-2016;

- Resolutions of the Annual Cantonal Assembly;

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- Reports, web and other resources by local organizations in Intag such as Sustainable Land Use Management Programme in Intag, and plans to develop community-managed, small-scale hydropower plants by *Consorcio Toisán*; information booklets and articles on mining by DECOIN; the blogs of DECOIN (which records the mining related developments regularly) and the Coordinator of the Intag Zone;

- The full archive of 75 issues of *Periódico Intag* (a particularly valuable source documenting what happened in the valley and the comments of the local population) from December 2000 to February 2012.

In September, I went to Intag for the first time to observe the local conditions so as to plan my activities better and to introduce myself to some of the leaders of the local NGOs and the newspaper, as well as to some key members of the community of Junín where I planned to stay (since this is the community that has been at the forefront of the mining struggle). From the very beginning, to be able to establish a rapport with the organizations, leaders and community members, I had to be clear that I was supportive of their struggle. Although this made it difficult to talk to the people who were in favour of mining, claiming a "neutral position" was impossible in the local context, and also, I believe, unethical, for indeed my solidarity lay with those who were struggling against mining.

During November, I stayed in Cotacachi to observe the annual cantonal assembly. I also reviewed the resources on the canton available in the canton assembly's office and the town library. I also revisited Intag, specifically the local NGOs and the community of Junín. During this visit, I had one interview with one of the members of the local newspaper team and talked about the recent developments regarding mining with the leader of DECOIN, Carlos Zorrilla. In the visits to the community, I had some informal talks about the daily activities in the community and the ecotourism business with the women working in the community ecotourism facility where I was staying, the local guide that took us to a walk in the community ecological reserve, and tried to establish some familiarity with other community members by spending time at the community centre (which is about 20-minute walk from the ecotourism facility).

At the time, I felt that the members of the organizations were a bit tired of being questioned about mining. Since the start of the conflict, there scholars, journalists, activists and tourists, both from Ecuador and abroad, visited Intag and naturally also contacted the leaders of the local organizations, the same people I was talking to. So I decided not to ask them the questions about the conflict whose answers were available on their blogs,

the local newspaper, in their documents and other sources. That implied that I had to know what was already available so that they did not have to repeat themselves. Nevertheless, in my interviews with them later on, one way or another, some of the same topics came up, but I believe I at least managed to give them the impression that the conflict itself was not the only thing that I was interested in. In other words, that I wanted to learn more about the life in the valley and that I did come prepared for the interviews. Except for the founder of the newspaper, who was most fed up with all the questioning, I did not have negative reactions.

The uneasiness of being known for the conflict was apparent in some community members as well, for instance, in the expressions like, "we are not only anti-mining, we also have a normal life here". So I decided to approach them (as I was already planning) more carefully, not immediately asking them about mining, but more about their lives, their productive activities, the valley, their relations with their communities, with the organizations in the valley etc. In fact, in many of the casual talks during my stay there, I did not touch upon the mining issue, not just on purpose to avoid offending them, but also because the conversations were about something else, which in the end was interesting to me, and part of the data gathering process. Still, while I was introducing myself, and explaining why I was there, I could not avoid telling them that what brought me there was the mining conflict, and that I was also interested in learning about their views on the issue. That I did not get any negative reactions can be seen as proof that I more or less managed to find a balance.

The following five months, I spent most of my time in the valley, but I moved in and out, between Intag, Cotacachi, Otavalo and Quito as I tried to arrange interviews with different actors, to attend some specific events, and due to some other practical matters. For my work in the valley, I had to balance breadth and depth. In the valley, the communities and parish centres are scattered, and transportation is a bit difficult. Hence, it was not easy to move between communities for logistical reasons. But more than that, it was not possible to try to introduce myself to several communities, establish a working relationship and gain their consent and trust to join them in their daily activities. Therefore, I decided to stay longer in the community of Junín for several reasons. As I explained in Chapter 4, Junín is one of the communities closest to the mining site and threatened by relocation. It is also the community where the resistance was first organized, and over time, the resistance came to be identified with them. Junín residents, together with some member of the nearby community of Chalguayaco, were the ones who were always at the centre of the conflict. Moreover, civil society organ-

izations were very active there. These organizations helped the local community start the ecotourism business which became a facility that hosts the people engaged in the struggle: activists, human rights observers, scholars, film makers, members of international organizations, etc. I have indeed become one of these people. Junín, therefore is quite exceptional for its strong identification with the conflict, and the fame it earned not only in Ecuador but also in international anti-mining scene, hence it cannot be seen as a community representative of the valley in terms of its relation with mining. My choice for staying there thus introduces an element of bias to the research. I am not claiming to represent the valley in my arguments, what informed my choice of Junín was indeed its position in the mining struggle since what I am interested in is to understand how the struggle influenced and changed the people at the heart of it. That the anti-mining struggle has become a constitutive element in the communal identity is actually a theoretically relevant observation since it attests to the strong solidarity established among community members that has helped individuals to maintain their commitment to a long-lasting and tiring process.

I went to Junín several times during the field study period. The longest I stayed was four weeks in December 2011 and January 2012, again in the ecotourism facility. During this time I had interviews, spent time in the community centre, joined community meetings and celebrations, visited farms (which included short and long walks) and the community reserve for the second time with another guide. My key informant, and the person who introduced me to the community, was the 57-year-old woman who not on paper but in practice manages the ecotourism facility and is an influential and well-respected leader. Staying in the ecotourism facility was a very good opportunity to meet with the women from the communities of Junín and Chalguayaco Alto since different women came to work there every day. The best moment to talk to men was during the Ecuavolley (a version of volleyball played in Ecuador, with slightly different rules) matches in the community centre in the afternoons.

Apart from my stay in Junín, I visited several other communities and parish centres in Intag. Most of the time I stayed in another ecotourism facility (Nangulvi) close to the Apuela parish, but is a project belonging to the communities of Peñaherrera parish. It is located somewhere in the middle of the road passing through the valley, hence it was a convenient place for my mobility. I also stayed for a couple of nights in the communities of El Paraiso, close to where at the time the mining activities were going on, Chontal and Magdalena Bajo. I did not visit all the parish centres; I have only been to Apuela, where most of the local organizations are located,

Garcia Moreno and Peñaherrera, which are the parishes within the boundaries of which the mining project is located and where the mining struggle was organized and waged. Although part of Intag, I kept Selva Alegre out of the research from the beginning for a number of reasons. First, in Selva Alegre there is limestone mining and a large cement factory that has been operating since 1980. The issue of mining has a different face there and is entangled in different dynamics. Second, although the parish government has joined with others to oppose mining, the residents of the parish do not seem to be actively participating in the mining conflict. Third, it is administratively part of the Otavalo canton, hence has not been part of participatory governance experiences in Cotacachi. From the very beginning, I decided to leave Selva Alegre out. This was not the case for the parishes of Cuellaje, Plaza Gutierrez and Vacas Galindo. Yet, as I moved ahead with the field study, I realized that they were not much linked to the conflict, although there were some people who were individually involved. Considering the efforts to make contacts and the logistics, and in light of the focus of the research, I decided not to push to extend the research to these parishes. I only met a couple of people from the communities belonging to these parishes, and I asked about these parishes in my interviews with the members of the local civil society organizations. They are marginally included in the research as part of Intag, but this is indeed one limitation of the research, i.e. that I did not directly engage with the people and the socio-economic and political processes in these parishes.

I went back to Intag for one week in March 2013. More than learning what had happened since I left (which of course was a topic in conversations), my motivations was to somehow show people that I did not just want to "extract" information and never come back (as with some other visitors), that I cared about their struggle, and that I was willing to at least visit them—even if I could not do anything concrete to help them in their struggle (apart from publicizing the conflict a bit more). I think people were glad to see me, especially in Junín. Even one of the most important leaders who had avoided my requests for an interview (not directly rejecting, but somehow avoiding) the previous year finally agreed to meet me. I also had the chance to visit the *Los Cedros* Ecological Reserve and had an interview with its manager, another one of the foreigners who settled in the valley and was engaging in conservation and in community projects.

During all the time I spent in the valley, even more than formal interviews, direct observations of life in the valley, people's interactions with each other in daily life and in different meetings and casual talks have generated a great deal of data. I kept field notes and a journal to record my ob-

servations, feelings, ideas and questions, the information provided during these talks, and sometimes the phrases and the sentences people used that struck me for different reasons. Four friends and colleagues of mine[1] joined me at different moments of my work in Intag. The exchange of ideas with them, their observations, questions and suggestions have been a great contribution for my study.

In Ecuador, I conducted a total of 44 formal interviews. In 20 of them I had a native Spanish speaker[2] helping me, 5 of them were in English and 19 of them I had alone in Spanish. I recorded and took notes in 23 of them, and only took notes in 21. I combined these with the notes of my friends during 17 interviews. The categorization of the interviewees is presented in Table A1:

Table A1:
Interviews in Ecudor

Actors	Total	Women	Men	Details
Community members	15	5[3]	10	From different communities, mostly Junín and Chalguayaco Alto
Community leaders	6	3	3	From different communities
Representatives from local civil society	12	5	7	DECOIN, *Periodico Intag*, *Consorcio Toisán*, PRODECI, *Talleres de Gran Valle*, CASA Inter-Americana, *Los Cedros*, ex-local priest
Local governments	4	2	2	The coordinator of the Cotacachi municipality in Intag, the ex-mayor Auki Tituaña, Parish governments of Garcia Moreno and Peñaherrera
Representatives from national civil society	5	2	3	*Ayuda en Acción*, *Acción Ecologica*, CONAIE, a freelance journalist, academic from Institute of Higher National Studies

State institutions	2		2	National Subsecretariat of Mining Development (Ministry of Non-renewable Resources), Subsecretariat of Social Dialogue (National Secretariat of Peoples, Social Movements and Citizens' Participation)
Total	44	17	27	

I also had the chance to observe the events presented in Table A2 below. In addition to these meetings, I joined a group of young workers from the Cotacachi municipality doing a survey for a project for old people in the valley, which gave me the chance to visit more people and have a better idea of the life of old people in the valley. I also found myself in an informal meeting of a young couple known for their anti-mining position in their community with the public relations manager of the company South American Management (which was coordinating the exploration activities close to the El Paraiso community at the time, and discussed in the section on the conflict in Intag). This was quite an interesting occasion for it brought to light the contradictions and ambiguities in the peasants' relation with mining. I also joined an informal meeting to listen to the two anti-mining leaders talking about their struggle to a group of university students from the US who were visiting Intag in relation to a course. This was a good occasion to see how the leaders narrated their story to visitors, and how it differed from the way in which they told it to me.

Table A2:
Events and Meetings in Ecudor

Event	Details	Date and Place	Participants
Annual Assembly of Cotacachi	Annual meeting as part of the participatory local governance process	November 19 and 20, 2011. Cotacachi	Civil society and grassroots organizations of the canton, citizens, local government representatives
Winter Solstice Celebration	Indigenous ceremony	December 21, 2011	Community members from Intag, indigenous com-

Event	Details	Date and Place	Participants
		Wariman farm, Intag	munity members from Cotacachi and Otavalo, the indigenous mayor Auki Tituaña
Annual meeting of the Junín Ecotourism Association	Election of new president, secretary and treasurer	December 25, 2011 Junín Cabañas (the facility)	Partners of the Association
Planning meeting of the Intag Ecotourism Network (REI)	Planning of the activities to attract tourists and to improve service quality Explanation of the activities, income and expenses of the network	January 11, 2012 Ecotourism facility Nangulví	Ecotourism facilities in the valley associated with REI, PRODECI, AACRI, *Consorcio Toisán*, Intag Tour (tourism operator owned by REI and *Consorcio Toisán*)
Meeting of Cotacachi Assembly's Council of Management and Development	Meeting on the recent developments on the mining project, called by the organizations from Intag and the Council	February 9, 2012 Cotacachi	A geology professor from *Escuela Politécnica Nacional*, representatives from Ibarra department of the Ministry of Environment, representative representatives from Cotacachi municipality, representatives of DECOIN and *Consorcio Toisán*, community leaders from Intag

Event	Details	Date and Place	Participants
Community meeting	Regular meeting of the community of Magdalena Bajo. At the beginning, explanations from civil society organizations on recent development in mining rpoject	March 3, 2012 Magdalena Bajo	Community members, the *cabildo* (governing body) of the community), DECOIN, anti-mining community leader, a lawyer from CEDHU (Human rights organization in Quito)
March for life	The national protest organized by CONAIE against mining, and in defence of life	March 22, 2012 Quito	CONAIE, social movements, trade unions, student and women's organizations, citizens
The School of Political Formation of *Allianza Pais* (the governing party)	Political education on principles of the Citizens' Revolution, its aims and methods, on how to disseminate those among the public	March 29, 2012 Cotacachi	One facilitator from the central party organizations, local members of AP, municipality workers from Cotacachi and Otavalo, the mayor of Cotacachi (from AP)
Planning meeting of bean producers associated with *Talleres de Gran Valle*	Information of the amount and type of beans the cooperative needs (decided according to the agreements with buyers such as supermarkets and fair trade networks), and the prices, peasants declaring how much of which type they would like to produce	April 14, 2012	The representatives of the cooperative (community members and peasants themselves), peasants working with the cooperative to sell their beans

Field Activities in Turkey

I spent three months from June to August 2012 to do the field study in Mount Ida. I spent less time in Mount Ida because, as I have mentioned before, I had done a field study there during my master's research. I had also visited the region with Fikret Adaman, my colleague and my current field supervisor in Turkey, once to share the results of my study in Evciler village and with the ecologists and amenity migrants in Küçükkuyu town, and once in relation to another research project on solid waste management in Turkey (to get an idea of what happens in rural areas). The data I collected at the time of my master's research (documents, interviews, focus group discussions and a survey of 738 people), my familiarity with the region (its geography, socio-economic structure, local politics) and the fact that I knew some people to contact made my work there easier and less time consuming. Although the research objectives of my current research are different, they are related and complementary to those of the previous research. For the previous research, I also considered the discourses of the local actors for and against mining, the process of mobilization and the relations between the opposition actors. I reviewed the data with the new questions and the comparative perspective of the research in mind. I also conducted new interviews and group discussions, and I did more direct observation staying in the villages, which I had not done before.

The documents and other sources I collected on the region since 2007 included:

- Official plans and documents regarding the region such as regional development plan, provincial agriculture master plan, and documents from local departments of relevant ministries, the governorships and the local governments;

- Academic resources on the regional geographical, socio-economic and political context, proceedings of symposiums organized on Mount Ida region, in the district of Bayramiç, on the rural issues in Çanakkale;

- Articles and press releases by the local organizations found in newspapers, on websites and blogs of the organizations;

- News articles from local and national media;

- Technical reports and newsletters from the mining companies.

I started my work in Mount Ida region in June 2012 in the city centre of Çanakkale. I had my first interviews with the semi-autonomous regional development agency[4] which had drafted a regional development plan with

the participation of local governments, local departments of central government institutions, civil society organizations (mostly business organizations, but also a number of peasants' organizations) and academics from the local universities. Since the local development vision was strongly emphasized by the local governments and the civil society organizations involved in the struggle against mining, it was important to understand the values, perceptions and assumptions underlying this vision. This was a topic in my later interviews with the latter actors as well. I also wanted to interrogate how the process through which the plan was prepared functioned, since I thought that it would give me some idea about the relationships between the actors involved. Then I moved to the districts where the mining projects are located and their rural areas.

As in the case of Intag, I had to choose between going to more villages and staying longer in one to be able to observe the dynamics of daily life more closely. As I found it more useful in terms of my research objectives, and to be consistent in my approach, I opted for the second. Initially, to stay longer, I thought about the few villages closest to the *Ağı Dağı* project area. However, after making daily visits to these and some other villages in the region, I decided to stay in the Evciler village, some 25 km to the southwest of the project area. I chose Evciler because the opposition to mining in this fruit-producing village was particularly pronounced and I was concerned about probing into the opposition discourses more; and being one of the largest and the better-off villages in the area I thought there could be people who played leadership roles in the struggle. In Evciler, I stayed for two weeks with a family that I met during my previous research. My key informants were two of my hosts: a 61-year-old male head of the family, who was the village headman for 19 years at different time periods and helped me a lot in understanding the history of the village, and his 32-year-old daughter-in-law, who was respected among her family and friends for studying outside and being knowledgeable, and who introduced me to many women, which helped me to establish good relations with them. During my stay, I had interviews with men and women peasants and the two cooperatives (one of peasants, one semi-public), joined the peasants in their work in their apple orchards, spent time in the village tea houses, and accompanied them in other daily activities. One interesting occasion was a wedding, which was impressive for the amount of gold jewellery given as gift to the bride. This was not only interesting to me to see in a village opposed to gold mining but also created an opportunity for me to ask women about their use of gold. As field material, I kept a journal to record the events of the day and some notes on the people I met, and took field notes

including my observations, feelings and reflections, as well as some quotes as I remembered them.

This was the longest I stayed in a village, but to be able to understand the relation to mining of the people in the villages closest to the *Ağı Dağı* mining site, I visited three of them, Söğütalan (4 times), Kızılelma (3 times) and Karaköy (3 times), several times, without staying in any of them. I also had daily visits to three other villages close to the *Halilağa* project area, and the bigger Etili village where the field office of the company Alamos gold the company that owns *Ağı Dağı* and *Kirazlı,*⁵ was located. I was staying in the town centre of Çan and using the bus service to the villages or arranging private transportation to go. During my visits, I had both individual interviews, and group discussions where 3-7 people were present. In these group discussions I was starting with a certain number of people and the bulk of the conversation was going on with those people. But from time to time there were others joining, sometimes just listening and sometimes intervening. In these circumstances, I could not get the personal details of all the people talking, and there were moments where more than one person was talking and I had difficulty in following and noting who was saying what. I wasn't recording these discussions, so my notes are rather sketchy. For my analysis, I reviewed the notes of the discussions, but I relied more on the notes I took right after the meetings. This situation was most common in the conversations I had in the village teahouses with the men, but also happened in other locations (in front of houses) and with the women.

In addition to my work in the villages in this period, I had interviews with local civil society organizations and local governments in towns and city centres, and one interview with the local forestry department. I also managed to meet the ex-mayor of the Çan district, and now an MP from the opposition party CHP, while he was visiting the city. I also went to the capital city Ankara to talk to people from the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization that is responsible from coordinating the EIA process. I went there to have interviews, but I was invited to some screening meetings (part of the EIA process) of other mining projects happening at the time. Attending these meetings gave me the opportunity to understand better how this process works, observe the relations between the mining companies and the state institutions, and get a better idea of what the participation of local communities in the process meant to the bureaucrats.

Previously, during my master's research, I conducted 37 formal interviews, 3 focus groups discussions (2 with villagers and 1 with mining sector representatives) and a survey administered to 738 people in the region. This

time, I had 31 formal interviews. With four people I talked both times: the mayor of Çanakkale, the ex-mayor of Çan and current MP, as I mentioned, the president of the development cooperative in the Evciler village, and one bureaucrat from the Ministry of Environment. The low number of women among the interviewees is the result of the dominance of males in state institutions, local governments and civil society organizations. I made the distinction between community members and leaders for Intag, but in Mount Ida no such strong communal leaders emerged during the struggle. People did not feel comfortable being recorded, so I did not record the interviews, but took notes. The details of the interviews are provided in Table A3:

Table A3:
Interviews in Turkey

Actors	Total	Women	Men	Details
Community members	18	8	10	From different villages
Representatives from local civil society	17	3	14	Çanakkale Environmental Platform, Mount Ida Conservation Initiative (from 2012 Association for the Protection of the Natural and Cultural Wealth of Mount Ida), Çanakkale Chamber of Agriculture, Bayramiç Environmental Movement, Çanakkale Local Agenda 21 and City Council
Semi-autonomous organizations	3	2	1	Regional development agency, Agricultural credit cooperative
Local governments	7	1	6	Mayors and vice-mayors of the towns in the region (Çanakkale, Bayramiç, Çan, Zeytinli, Güre), Department of environmental affairs of Çanakkale municipality

Actors	Total	Women	Men	Details
Representatives from regional and national civil society, academics	7	-	7	Aegean Environmental Platform, Chamber of Geological Engineers, academics from public health, geography, environmental science, agriculture departments, one journalist
State institutions	10	1	9	Governors of the province and districts (Çanakkale, Çan, Bayramiç, Ayvacık), Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, local directorate of forestry and environment
Politician	1		1	Ex-mayor of Çan, MP from CHP (included as mayor in the row above)
Mining companies	3	1	2	Koza Gold, *Tüprag*, Fronteer
Total	64	16	48	

Unlike Intag, there were no community meetings in Mount Ida that I could observe. The events I had the chance to attend since my first field study are as follows:

- A public tour to Mount Ida, organized by *Doğa Derneği*, the *Buğday* Association for Supporting Ecological Living and the nature magazine *Atlas*, on October 27-29, 2007 (the group attended the panel of Foundation for Development of Mining held on October 27 in the city centre of Çanakkale as the first stop in the trip);

- A panel in Çanakkale city centre in which academics from the local universities made presentations, November 25, 2007;

- A gathering of the ecologists in an ecotourism facility near the town of Küçükkuyu, April 2008;

- The protest in the city centre of Çanakkale on April 5, 2008;

- Two panels in a park in the city centre of Çanakkale during the annual Troia festival in which two academics from Çanakkale 18 Mart Universi-

ty, a doctor representing the Çanakkale branch of Turkish Doctors' Association, the spokesperson of Çanakkale Environmental Platform, and an influential journalist who frequently visits the region participated, August 12 and 13, 2012;

- A meeting of the Environment Work Group of the City Council of Çanakkale (an institution established as part of Local Agenda 21 process), August 14, 2012;

- Three EIA screening meetings of different mining projects (one of coal in the southern province of Adana, two of the company operating the first gold mine of Turkey in Bergama—one of them their operations in Balikesir province and the other in Eskisehir province), August 2 and August 24, 2012.

Notes

[1] Two of them are my friends from ISS, Natalia Avila and Martín Bermúdez. At ISS both of them worked on subjects related to the (politics of) environment and development in Ecuador and Colombia, respectively. Their knowledge and insights not only on the topic, but also on Ecuador, or Latin America have been invaluable. They also helped me by acting as translators in some of the interviews. The other two are from Turkey: Fikret Adaman, who is my field supervisor in Turkey, and was part of my supervisory team during my master's research in Mount Ida; and Bengi Akbulut who is a friend and a colleague working on political economy of development and environment in Turkey, whose questions on Intag helped me to formulate my own ideas and see what I was missing. I am grateful to all.

[2] In addition to my friends Natalia and Martín, Carolina Sampedro and my field supervisor Carlos Mena from Universidad San Francisco de Quito helped me in three of the interviews.

[3] I had the chance to talk with the women coming to work in the ecotourism facility of both Junín and Nangulvi, but these are better described as informal conversations than formal interviews.

[4] The development agency is responsible from the provinces of Çanakkale and Balıkesir. I had interviews with the people in the office in Çanakkale.

[5] The field study did not include the villages around the *Kirazlı* project, or the villages around the gold mining project developed by *TÜMAD* in the Lapseki district.

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