ENTREPRENEURIAL MASS LITIGATION

Balancing the building blocks

COMMERCiëLE MOTIEVEN IN COLLECTIEVE ACTIES

Bouwstenen voor balans

Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam op gezag van de rector magnificus Prof.dr. R.C.M.E. Engels en volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties

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