Firms and the State
An Examination of Corporate Political Activity and the Business-Government Interface
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Bedrijven en de Staat
Een onderzoek naar de politieke activiteiten van bedrijven en het raakvlak tussen het bedrijfsleven en de overheid

Thesis

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CHAPTER 1.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research Topic: Corporate Political Activity and the Business-Government Interface

Although the economic marketplace is commonly envisaged as the arena for competition, firms will often contend with considerable rivalry on its fringes. These so-called ‘nonmarket’ frontiers of the firm encompass the broad array of organizational interactions that are not mediated by private agreements or contracts (Baron, 1995). They are also where firms are likely to encounter most resistance to their economic objectives (Markman, Waldron & Panagopoulos, 2016).

Scholarly interest in how firms are influenced by, and attempt to influence, their nonmarket environment has largely developed along two parallel strands of research. The first, comprising the literature on strategic corporate social responsibility, focuses on corporate actions that aim to promote some social good while simultaneously enabling the organization to enhance its profits (Baron, 2001; McWilliams, Siegel, & Wright, 2006). The second strand, comprising the literature on Corporate Political Activity (CPA), focuses specifically on the business-government interface and examines the various ways in
which firms try to shape public policy, with the aim of protecting and advancing their economic interests (Getz, 1997). This dissertation focuses on this second strand of research and investigates how firms—represented by their managers and shareholders—perceive and attempt to manage their relationship with the state and its political representatives (henceforth, ‘politicians’).

Before delving into the various manifestations of CPA, it is important to first ask why firms would wish to expend resources into establishing and maintaining favorable relationships with the state. As the legitimate holder of legislative, executive, and judicial power, the state maintains the legal authority to develop, execute, and adjudicate over all matters of public policy. Politicians routinely draft, amend, decide upon, and implement legislation that has direct consequences for business. As such, politicians intent on favoring specific firms or industries may provide the latter with preferential access to state-controlled resources in the form of governmental subsidies, favorable taxation regimes, or lucrative public procurement contracts, for example (Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar, & Thesmar, 2018; Goldman, Rocholl, & So, 2013). Politicians can additionally provide favored firms with protection by stalling regulations that harm their interests (Lux, Crook & Leap, 2012), or by displaying leniency when those firms engage in wrongdoing (Correia, 2014). They can also help firms guard market share by fending off competition from current rivals (Capron & Chatain, 2008) and by raising barriers to market access for foreign entrants and radical disruptors (McWilliams, Van Fleet, & Cory, 2002). Even without tangibly shaping the development of policy, politicians can offer favored firms a window on the ‘inner workings of government’ that puts them at an advantage relative to their uninformed counterparts (Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Jr, 2008).

There is ample evidence that firms and their managers are aware of the potential value to be accrued from political activity. Around the world, firms have been shown to engage in various forms of CPA, ranging from lobbying and campaign contributions, to the hiring of politicians as members of the board (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). In 2012 alone, 3,587 firms in the US spent a total of $1.84 billion on lobbying public officials, with 372 firms spending more than $1 million each (Drutman, 2015). It is important to note that these lobbying expenditures are distinct from the campaign contributions that firms also make to federal candidates through their Political Action Committees or PACs, and which amounted
to an additional $170 million in 2012 (Center for Responsive Politics). That firms are prohibited from financing elected officials in other parts of the world, has not stifled the intensity of CPA there but has led instead to the rise of alternative strategies for attaining political influence. For example, the ‘revolving-door’ phenomenon, or the movement of individuals between positions in the public and private sectors, has been particularly prevalent in the EU. According to Transparency International, more than 30% of former Members of European Parliament and 50% of former EU Commissioners accepted employment in companies that had actively lobbied EU institutions before (Freund & Bendel, 2017).

The engagement of firms in political activity has not gone unnoticed, however. The notion of ‘money in politics’ is a topic that has and continues to generate significant societal interest, particularly around politically-sensitive periods such as elections or the formation of governments, when organized interest groups are eager to influence the ideological makeup of the incoming executive or legislature. Among academics, interest in the business-government interface has spanned a number of disciplines. Political scientists tend to view public policy outcomes as a function of interest group competition, which business -as a monolithic group- often dominates to the detriment of public interest and democratic process (Epstein, 1980; Salisbury, 1984). In industrial-organization economics, the primary focus has been on the inducements and challenges of collective political action given that policy outcomes are predominantly conceptualized at the industry-level (Esty & Caves, 1983; Olson, 1965; Stigler, 1971). Within the management literature, CPA is conventionally understood to be a strategic investment -or real option- that can supplement firms’ market capabilities (Baron, 1995; Oliver & Holzinger, 2008).

More concretely, scholarly work in the strategic management literature on CPA has tended to focus on three broad research areas. First, scholars have tried to unravel the factors that lead certain firms to engage in politics, as well as the extent to which they do so (Bonardi, Hillman, & Keim, 2005; Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004; Lux, Crook, & Woehr, 2011). One of the primary insights from this line of inquiry is that because political engagement does not constitute a core competence for the majority of firms around the world, firms that are especially dependent on government- i.e. those operating in highly regulated industries, or those who have governmental agencies as major customers– have
more to gain from maintaining favorable relations with the state, and are thus more likely to engage in CPA (Hillman et al., 2004; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In essence, this strand of research portrays CPA as a deliberate attempt by firms to strategically manage their dependence on government.

Recent research has suggested, however, that our understanding of the antecedents of CPA may benefit from further nuance. For example, recent meta-analyses have cast doubt on the effectiveness of CPA at influencing public policy in well-functioning democracies (Hadani, Bonardi, & Dahan, 2017), which begs the question why regulated firms would invest in CPA if their chances of success are modest at best? To quote Ansolabehere et al. (2003)’s response to economist Gordon’s Tullock puzzle regarding why firms in the US do not invest more in campaign contributions: “the question is not why there is so little money in politics, but rather why organized interests [i.e. firms] give at all”? Such findings have prompted scholars to begin considering additional factors that might drive CPA, like the political ideology of the firm’s top management (Chin, Hambrick, & Treviño, 2013), the inclination of the firm’s controlling owners to appropriate wealth (Sun, Hu, & Hillman, 2016), and the firm’s broader dependencies transcending the political domain (Hadani, Doh, & Schneider, 2016).

A second group of CPA studies has pursued the highly elusive but important question of whether engaging in politics ultimately affects firm performance, and if so, in what direction? Within this area, findings are markedly mixed. Studies have thus far documented positive (Cooper, Gulen, & Ovtchinnikov, 2010; Fisman, 2001; Goldman, Rocholl, & So, 2009; Hillman, 2005; Kim, 2008), negative (Aggarwal, Meschke, & Wang, 2012; Boubakri, Cosset, & Saffar, 2008; Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2007; Siegel, 2007), and insignificant (Ansolabehere, Snyder, & Ueda, 2004; Faccio, 2006) effects of CPA on firm performance, irrespective of how performance is measured or operationalized. Although a host of arguments have been proposed to explain both the value-enhancing and value-destroying facets of CPA (e.g. Hadani & Schuler, 2013), it remains unclear what ultimately determines the net value that firms will accrue from engaging in politics given that the potential benefits and risks of CPA are likely to coexist at any point in time (Okmatovskiy, 2010). This ambiguity has prompted scholarly calls for further research into the contingent
consequences of CPA, though much of this work remains of a conceptual nature (e.g. Lawton, Mcguire, & Rajwani, 2013; Sun, Mellahi, & Wright, 2012).

A final strand of research focuses on the institutional context in which CPA takes place (Doh, Lawton & Rajwani, 2012). Institutions, or the ‘rules of the game’ that condition human relations and govern political and economic interactions, are designed to reduce the uncertainty associated with exchange (North, 1991). Yet, institutions vary in their degree of completeness and impartiality towards the actors that they are supposed to govern (White III, Boddewyn & Galang, 2015). As such, institutions differentially determine the degree to which firms can readily rely on political action to create market value, but also the extent to which this value will be subsequently appropriated (Dorobantu, Kaul, & Zelner, 2017).

Although many studies within this stream have pointed to the various structural characteristics of the political environment that influence the antecedents, strategies, and outcomes of CPA (e.g. Bonardi et al., 2005; Bonardi, Holburn, & Vanden Bergh, 2006; Choi, Jia, & Lu, 2014; Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2008; Kozhikode & Li, 2012), our understanding of the international variation of the business-government interface remains relatively limited however (Hillman & Keim, 1995). Specifically, because much of the extant literature has focused on single-country contexts, namely the US and China, there is a notable dearth of comparative studies on how specific political tactics are differentially employed across countries (e.g. Blumentritt, 2003; Hillman & Wan, 2005), and how these tactics differentially contribute to firm performance. An understanding of CPA that is detached from the institutional context is in turn problematic because it can lead scholars to inadvertently infect findings and theoretical lessons learnt with country-specific biases (Cui, Hu, Li & Meyer, 2018), or to adopt a generic view of the business-government interface across all countries at similar levels of institutional development (Jackson & Deeg, 2008) or with similar types of political regimes (Marquis & Raynard, 2015).

In this dissertation, I aim to contribute to all three aforementioned strands of CPA research by tackling the following overarching research question: How is the business-government interface differentially perceived and managed by firms and their stakeholders

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1 The shortage of comparative work in CPA may be attributable in large part to institutional restrictions that prohibit certain forms of CPA (such as campaign financing) in some countries but not others, thus limiting the scope for cross-country studies. Lax disclosure requirements additionally present researchers with data availability challenges in certain parts of the world. Unlike the US, for example, corporate disclosure of lobbying expenditures is currently voluntary when lobbying EU institutions.
across institutional contexts? In addressing this question, I seek to contribute, first, to a more comprehensive understanding of the antecedents of CPA. I do so by arguing and showing that the appointment of politicians on the board, an exemplary political strategy in the literature, can also serve as a strategic corporate response to external threats that do not emanate directly from the firm’s political environment. Second, I seek to forward a finer-grained, contingent view of CPA value. I do so by examining the conditions under which investors across 14 economically-developed countries expect firms to benefit from the appointment of politicians to the board, as well as the conditions that simultaneously cause them to be apprehensive of the risks associated with these political connections. In doing so, I demonstrate that the net value of this specific political strategy is contingent on attributes of the appointing firm as well as on the institutional context in which it takes place. Third, I advance a more nuanced understanding of the business-government interface in institutional environments wherein conventional forms of CPA may not be readily available for firms, as when an incumbent government is expected to depart imminently but the identity of the new regime is not yet known. Specifically, my final contribution lies in forwarding new insights on ‘interim governments’—that is, when an authoritarian status quo has clearly been rejected, but a democratic ‘new normal’ is yet to be established. While most of the extant literature on the business-government interface addresses conventional forms of government—i.e. democracies and autocracies—we know very little of how this interface evolves when the ‘rules of the game’ are temporarily suspended in the immediate aftermath of a revolution or coup.

Having provided a glimpse of how this dissertation fits within the broader body of research on CPA and the business-government interface, I now shift to the theoretical underpinnings of my research. In the next section, I briefly review the main theoretical perspectives used in the CPA literature, before highlighting how the three studies that make up this dissertation contribute to the advancement of theory in the field.

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2 Throughout this introductory chapter I refer to ‘Corporate Political Activity’ (CPA) and the ‘business-government interface’ interchangeably to account for the broad nature of the research agenda underlying this dissertation. There are of course differences between both terms. Whereas the business-government interface refers to the generic interactions and interdependencies between the private and public sectors (Hillman & Keim, 1995), CPA refers to the strategic manner in which firms deliberately attempt to manage these interactions (Getz, 1997). In essence however, both concepts are premised on the perception of the state as a primary stakeholder of the firm— that is, a critical provider of firm resources that also stands to be affected by firm behavior.
1.2 Theoretical Background

1.2.1 Corporate Political Activity

Corporate Political Activity (CPA) is formally defined as “any deliberate firm action intended to influence governmental policy or process” (Getz, 1997 p. 32). CPA is **strategic**, in that it is planned, enacted, and evaluated on the basis of “maximizing economic returns from the political environment” (Oliver & Holzinger, 2008, p. 496). CPA is also highly **versatile**; it takes different forms, targets different centers of political power, and strives for diverse outcomes that are loosely related to public policy (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). At times, firms may engage in CPA in response to the emergence of a policy issue that jeopardizes the viability of firm operations. At other times, firms proactively engage in CPA with the aim of establishing a continued exchange relationship with policymakers that serves as real option, to be resorted to at times of need. Firms may engage in CPA individually, often with the express aim of attaining firm-specific benefits that they would not be required to share among industry peers. Other times, when confronted with highly salient and polarizing issues, firms will pool their political efforts through an overarching industry or trade association to share costs and to reduce the reputational liability associated with taking an unpopular position. CPA strategies themselves may vary based on the resources that firms are willing to trade in return for favorable public policy. When policymakers lack informational resources to adopt a clear policy stance, firms may engage in active lobbying in an attempt to position the firm’s position as the desirable choice. On the other hand, when policymakers are in particular need of financial resources to fund their election campaigns or their post-politics careers, firms may make campaign contributions\(^3\) or invite these politicians to serve as directors on their boards. Finally, firms may avoid direct interactions with politicians altogether, targeting instead their voting constituents in order to sway public opinion towards industry- or firm-friendly policy.

\(^3\) Corporations and unions in the United States are generally prohibited from directly financing federal candidates. Nevertheless, firms can contribute to politicians and political parties indirectly through independent expenditure-only political committees (also known as SuperPACs), and/or via their managers and shareholders through Political Action Committees (PACs). At state-level, direct corporate contributions to candidates/parties are permissible in many states.
Within the management literature, scholars have conventionally relied on a subset of theories to probe the motivation of firms to engage in CPA, their choice of political strategies and tactics, as well as their ability to effectively implement CPA and reap its benefits (Table 1.1). The primary theoretical lens underlying the bulk of this research is resource dependence theory (RDT) (Hillman et al., 2004; Mellahi, Frynas, Sun, & Siegel, 2016). RDT is premised on the notion that firms’ reliance on external resources creates important sources of uncertainty that, if left unmanaged, can endanger firm performance and survival (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). According to this view, it is imperative that firms actively manage their dependence on external parties in order to enhance their autonomy, to buffer against environmental fluctuations, and to reduce the transaction costs associated with external exchange (Davis & Cobb, 2010).

In general, firms can remedy their external dependencies in two ways. First, they may attempt to align the interests of key resource providers with the firm’s own interests through absorption and co-optation. Alternatively, they may opt to reduce or eliminate this dependence altogether by internalizing the activities of the resource-controlling organization, or by diversifying the set of resource providers on whom the firm depends (Drees & Heugens, 2013). For example, a car manufacturer wary of its dependence on a sole supplier for its brakes may attempt to reduce the risks of this dependence by acquiring the brake supplier, by providing the supplier with an ownership stake in the firm, by manufacturing the brakes in-house, or by contracting with several brake suppliers simultaneously.

The core premise of RDT as applied to CPA research is that firms are dependent on the state for resources such as public policy and political legitimacy (Hillman, Withers & Collins, 2009). Because the state is neither absorbable nor easily replaceable, an RDT-based understanding of CPA posits that political engagement constitutes an effective mechanism through which firms build stronger connections with the state to buffer against resource volatility (i.e. mitigate the risk of unfavorable regulatory developments) and to advance firm interest (i.e. promote the development of firm-friendly policy). For similar reasons, RDT posits that greater dependence on government further incentivizes firms to engage in politics (Hillman, 2005). As insightful as a resource dependence theoretic understanding of CPA is however, some scholars have critiqued it for its relative inability
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<th>Example papers</th>
<th>Core assumptions</th>
<th>Key predictions</th>
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<tr>
<td>Political market theory</td>
<td>(Bonardi, Hillman &amp; Keim, 2005; Bonardi, Holburn &amp; Vanden Bergh, 2006)</td>
<td>The public policy process is a marketplace wherein demanders of policy (interest groups) engage in exchange-like relationships with suppliers of policy (politicians)</td>
<td>Firms compete with each other, as well as other interest groups for the resources that rival policymakers are willing to provide. Political markets differ in their attractiveness based on the nature of competition among both demanders and suppliers of policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional theory</td>
<td>(Marquis &amp; Raynard, 2015; Marquis &amp; Qian, 2014; Oliver, 1991)</td>
<td>Firm performance and survival hinge on whether key institutional actors view the firm as legitimate or not</td>
<td>Firms engage in CPA to attain and secure legitimacy from policymakers, and may be penalized if they do not adhere to prevailing institutional pressures and norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource dependence theory (RDT)</td>
<td>(Hillman, 2005; Hillman, Withers &amp; Collins, 2009; Hillman, Zardkoohi &amp; Bierman, 1999; Pfeffer &amp; Salancik, 1978)</td>
<td>Firm performance and survival hinges on the firm’s ability to maintain access to critical resources from outside parties and to buffer against environmental uncertainty</td>
<td>CPA is a means through which firms manage their dependence on government with a view to securing and/or stabilizing the flow of state-controlled resources. Firms facing greater governmental dependence are more likely to engage in CPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource-based view (RBV)</td>
<td>(Bonardi, 2011; Capron &amp; Chatain, 2008; Dahan, 2005; McWilliams, Van Fleet, &amp; Cory, 2002; Oliver &amp; Holzinger, 2008)</td>
<td>Firms’ strategic and performance differentials are attributable to their asymmetric possession of unique and valuable resource bundles and competencies</td>
<td>Firms are more likely to engage in CPA if they possess internal capabilities -such as prior political knowledge- that allow them to compete politically. At the same time, CPA itself may also lead to the protection of the firms’ existing resource base from loss or competitive erosion</td>
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<td>Theory</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Behavioral theory of the firm</strong></td>
<td>(Hadani &amp; Schuler, 2013; Drutman, 2015)</td>
<td>Managers face cognitive limitations and biases that hinder them from scanning, screening, and acting upon external information. The complexity and uncertainty of CPA leads to causal ambiguity between CPA efforts and policy outcomes. This hinders the kind of effective performance feedback loops that managers conventionally rely on to adjust their strategies accordingly, leading them to engage in significant ‘guesswork’ or to increasingly rely on the advice of outside experts.</td>
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<td><strong>Agency theory</strong></td>
<td>(Hadani &amp; Schuler, 2013; Hadani, 2012)</td>
<td>Managers have distinct objectives from their principals (shareholders). Managers may engage in CPA for self-serving purposes and ideologically-driven reasons rather than to maximize shareholder interest.</td>
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<td><strong>Social network and class unity theory</strong></td>
<td>(Doh, Lawton &amp; Rajwani, 2012; Mizruchi, 1992)</td>
<td>CPA is regarded as a means of building mostly-social and personal relationships with ‘policy elites’. Firms, through their owners and managers, that are more central to social networks are more likely to engage in CPA.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Transaction cost economics (TCE)</strong></td>
<td>(Henisz &amp; Williamson, 1999; Jia, 2018; Sawant, 2012)</td>
<td>Firms opt for organizational arrangements that most efficiently reduce transaction costs. Depending on uncertainty, transaction frequency, and asset specificity, firms may engage in CPA individually or as part of a coalition, and develop political capabilities in-house or outsource them to more specialized parties.</td>
<td></td>
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to account for the costs associated with CPA (Hadani & Schuler, 2013; Sun et al., 2016), or to convincingly explain why dependence on government does not guarantee the effectiveness of subsequent CPA efforts (Oliver & Holzinger, 2008). Other scholars have emphasized the need to complement RDT with insights from other theories in order to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of CPA (Hillman et al., 2009).

It is in this spirit that I have set out to propose through this dissertation a more nuanced and finer grained conceptualization of CPA, beginning with the question of why firms actually engage in CPA, and ending with an examination of its consequences as perceived by the firm’s most important stakeholders: its (actual and potential) shareholders. To do so, I infuse the RDT-based understanding of CPA with research from other streams of literature. In the next section, I provide a brief overview of these streams and discuss how they relate to my overall research agenda.

1.2.2 The Corporate Governance Role of Boards of Directors

Among the plethora of strategies that firms can embrace to participate in politics, many firms around the world choose to appoint current or former politicians - including regulators, elected officials, senior civil servants - on their board of directors. In most developed and developing countries, firms face minimal restrictions on such appointments, making them a particularly useful political strategy to examine in a comparative setting (Faccio, 2006). In this dissertation, I focus exclusively on politician appointments as an exemplary CPA strategy that firms employ to establish a strong relationship with policymakers and to remedy their political dependencies (Hillman, 2005). However, because politicians serve as directors on the firm’s board, their appointment also has implications on the governance of the firm. An examination of the corporate governance literature is thus warranted.

Within the corporate governance literature, directors on the board are assumed to perform two distinct functions. First, directors monitor management on behalf of shareholders to ensure that the interests of the latter are being served (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Second, directors act as providers of valuable firm resources, which range from the provision of strategic counsel and advice to management, to the brokering of ties with important outside constituencies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). A sizeable body of corporate governance research has investigated the conditions under which directors are able and
willing to perform either or both functions simultaneously (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Director-centric research, for example, has identified directors’ human and social capital, identity, and moral and ideological compass as underlying causes of their differential capacity and intrinsic motivation to fulfill their duties (Gupta & Wowak, 2017; Hambrick, Misangyi, Park, 2015; Johnson, Schnatterly & Hill, 2013). Other research has established the firm’s dependencies as a strong predictor of which function(s) directors will focus on following their appointment (Zahra & Pearce, 1989).

In the context of politician-directors specifically, incorporating insights from the corporate governance literature can complement our resource dependence theoretic understanding of CPA in two ways. First, there are insights highlighting the need to broaden the RDT-based conceptualization of politician-directors as providers of exclusively political resources. Certo (2003) and others, for example, argue that the appointment of resource-rich or prestigious directors signals organizational legitimacy and quality to third parties, such as providers of capital (Houston, Jiang, Lin, & Ma, 2014). In other research, politician-directors have been identified as ‘stakeholder directors’—that is, individuals with strong ties to societal stakeholders (Hillman, Cannella & Paetzold, 2000; Hillman, Keim & Luce, 2001; Kassinis & Vafeas, 2002), suggesting that their appointment by the firm may at times be aimed at community-based, rather than governmental-based, pressures (Chesky, 2016). Second, because RDT emphasizes the resource-provisionary role of directors, other theoretical lenses such as agency theory may be more suitable for examining the ‘darker’ side of these appointments (Sun, Hu & Hillman, 2016). Thus, in this dissertation, I incorporate both perspectives to argue that politician appointments may (a) constitute generic dependence-management strategies aimed at securing relational capital from a broad set of stakeholders, and (b) generate non-negligible costs that may at times outweigh the potential benefits they produce.

1.2.3 A Behavioral Perspective on Investor Reactions

Establishing a causal relationship between political strategies and firm-relevant outcomes constitutes one of the major challenges in CPA research (Hillman et al., 2004). Defining the success of CPA based exclusively on the passage of firm-friendly policy outcomes is problematic because policymaking is inherently complex, and is affected by the actions of
competing and allied interest groups (Macher & Mayo, 2012). Similarly, capturing CPA value through conventional accounting-based indicators of firm performance may be confounded by the lag between CPA implementation and reported firm performance. Sometimes this lag is too long to enable clear causal inferences. At other times, it may be too short to meaningfully account for the longer-term impacts of political engagement (Lux et al., 2011).

In two of the studies in this dissertation, I evaluate the impact of CPA, as well as state behavior, from the perspective of firms’ actual and potential shareholders (i.e. investors). I do so through an event study methodology, which assumes that new information in the form of unanticipated corporate announcements or exogenous shocks in the firm’s political environment has economic consequences for firms, and that these consequences are swiftly incorporated by investors into the firm’s share price. The advantages of an event study approach are two-fold. First, as providers of capital and bearers of residual risk, investors have vested interest in firms and are significantly affected by developments that affect their performance (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Put simply, investor reactions are a suitable proxy for firm value because what is good for the firm’s bottom line is also good for investors. Second, investor reactions can be measured at any time, making them particularly well suited for gauging the net, expected consequences of salient events. Within the CPA literature, event studies have thus been used to measure the firm-specific consequences of having directors run for political office (Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Bierman, 1999), of engaging in ‘covert’ forms of CPA (Werner, 2017), of hosting visits for high-ranking government officials (Schuler, Shi, Hoskisson, & Chen, 2017), and of backing winning presidential candidates (Knight, 2006).

Underlying event studies are important assumptions regarding the manner in which investors interpret and react to specific events. While the latter has predominantly been the focus of finance scholars (e.g. Malkiel & Fama, 1970), management and sociology scholars have been more interested in the cognitive processes underlying investor interpretations of new information (Oler, Harrison, & Allen, 2008; Zajac & Westphal, 2004). A promising perspective that I rely on in this dissertation is the ‘behavioral perspective of investor reactions’ (Schijven & Hitt, 2012). According to this view, investors face information asymmetries that prevent them from ascertaining the private incentives of actors whose
decisions can ultimately affect their investments. As such, investors will subsequently seek signals -i.e. crude, but publicly available pieces of information- that help them mitigate these informational asymmetries. I apply this behavioral perspective in two ways. First, I show that because investors cannot trust management’s valuation of the added value of CPA ex ante (e.g. Aggarwal et al., 2012; Hadani 2012; Hadani et al., 2017), they will resort to supplementary information pertaining to the firm and its institutional context to derive an independent judgement of this value. I similarly extend this framework to the level of the national government to show that signals can also help investors remedy information asymmetries vis-à-vis the incumbent regime in situations where the credibility of the latter is questionable. Second, in line with signaling theory (Spence, 1974), I show that management themselves can also utilize signals to remedy the informational asymmetries between them and important stakeholders, with the aim of eliciting positive stakeholder evaluations of the firm. Specifically, I show that certain forms of CPA may be used by management to signal their awareness of the community’s grievances against the firm, and that they are actively working on remedying these concerns.

1.2.4 Political Uncertainty
There has been considerable interest among management scholars in the consequences of political uncertainty on firms (García-Canal & Guillén, 2008; Henisz & Delios, 2001, 2004; Holburn & Zelner, 2010, Kobrin, 1979), as well as how firms and their stakeholders will subsequently respond to such uncertainty (Oetzel & Getz, 2012). Firms face political uncertainty because their interests are not always aligned with those of the state, implying an ever-present risk of unfavorable regulations being introduced and existing ones amended. Policymaking, moreover, is an inherently complex and opaque process such that third parties are not always able to fully anticipate specific policy developments (Hadani et al., 2017; Hart, 2004). In the context of less developed countries with weak legal institutions, political uncertainty additionally manifests itself in the form of low policy credibility since unconstrained regimes can readily and unilaterally rescind their earlier commitments to the detriment of firms with existing investments (Delios & Henisz, 2003). Firms operating in such countries additionally contend with the real possibility of predatory state behavior, such as expropriation and forced divestment (Kobrin, 1980).
The notion of political uncertainty is closely related to the study of CPA because the asymmetric power of the state over business is ultimately what drives firms to actively seek to manage their dependence on government. In that regard, relational forms of CPA have been shown to provide firms with insider information and influence over the development of public policy, thus enabling them to partly mitigate the political uncertainty that they face (Wellman, 2017). There are circumstances, however, where CPA is a less feasible or less attractive option for firms. For instance, because developing formal and informal ties with policymakers is costly and time-consuming, firms may hesitate to adopt relational CPA when the regime is unlikely to remain in power for long (e.g. Blanes i Vidal, Draca, & Fons-Rosen, 2012). Because relational CPA is associated with corruption in emerging economies (Lawton et al., 2013), firms domiciled or operating there could also refrain from CPA to guard their reputational capital from negative stakeholder evaluations (Darendeli & Hill, 2016), or to avoid political retribution if a new regime were to abruptly displace the current one (Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Siegel, 2007). Under these conditions, it is not clear what firms can do to mitigate political uncertainty, and particularly, how else they can tap into valuable political knowledge that is privately held by select members of the ruling regime.

In this dissertation, I study the underexplored context of interim governments in emerging economies; a context wherein firms and their stakeholders face asymmetric information regarding the interim government’s actual intention to follow through with a process of democratic transition in the aftermath of authoritarian regime overthrow. Because the potential derailing of democratization amplifies the political uncertainty that firms face, I look into how investors attempt to infer the regime’s private political objectives in the absence of conventional forms of CPA.

1.3 Dissertation Overview

To address the overarching research question of this dissertation, I conducted three empirical studies broadly related to how the business-government interface is differentially perceived by firms and their stakeholders in two substantially different institutional contexts: across 14 OECD Members States at relatively high levels of political and economic development, and in the interim period in Egypt that succeeded the overthrow of its authoritarian Head of
State, Hosni Mubarak. Below, I provide an overview of each study in terms of its (a) central topic, (b) outcome, (c) theoretical lens of relevance, (d) research method, (e) unit of analysis, (f) sample, and (g) data source(s) used. I conclude with a table that summarizes the research gaps in the literature that are addressed by each study and the main contributions made.

1.3.1 Study One: “Politician Appointments as Strategic Responses to Community-Based Legitimacy Threats”

The first study of this dissertation moves beyond the generic understanding of CPA in the literature wherein firms engage in politics only in response to threats stemming directly from their political environment. Instead, the study advances a complementary understanding of the antecedents of CPA by drawing on politicians’ roles as ‘community leaders’ to position their appointment to the firm as a way to defuse the discontent from secondary stakeholders who lack institutionalized access to firm decision-making. Using a unique, hand-compiled dataset of all director appointments in the largest 1,063 firms in 14 developed economies from 2001 to 2010, the study finds that firms are likely to appoint politicians to the board when faced with community-based legitimacy threats, but not in response to shareholder-, customer-, or employee-based threats. Politician appointments as strategic responses to community-based legitimacy threats are even more likely when the government is a major customer of the firm. Overall, the results of this study contribute to the resource dependence-theoretic understanding of corporate political activities specifically, and to the organizational legitimacy literature more generally.

Table 1.2. Theoretical and Methodological Underpinnings of Study One

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>CPA as a strategic response to community-based discontent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Appointment of politicians to the board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical lenses</td>
<td>Resource dependence theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stakeholder theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Varieties of Capitalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method</td>
<td>Panel data analysis (Mixed-effects Poisson regression)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit of analysis</td>
<td>Firm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>4,439 firm-year observations for 1,063 firms across 14 OECD Member States (2001-2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data sources</td>
<td>Author-compiled dataset on the political background of board members, derived from a variety of sources including BoardEx, annual reports, and governmental websites; Asset4; Datastream</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1.3.2 Study Two: “Board of Thrones? Unraveling Investor Reactions to Politician Appointments”

In the second study, I shift my empirical focus to the consequences of CPA as measured by investor reactions to the appointment of politicians onto corporate boards. In response to the mixed findings in the literature regarding the value that firms accrue from establishing ties with politicians, this study adopts a multi-level, contingency approach that incorporates both resource dependence and agency theory to forward a more comprehensive and finer-grained understanding of politician appointment value. Specifically, the study argues and shows that investors perceive politician appointments as both value-enhancing and value-destroying, but that under certain conditions the potential dependence-management benefits of politician appointments are expected to outweigh their agency costs, and vice versa. Using event study methodology on the appointment of 349 politicians to the boards of 1,063 firms across 14 OECD countries from 2002 to 2010, the main findings of this study are that: (a) investors react positively to the appointment of politicians to financially-dependent but not politically-dependent firms, (b) the degree of corruption in the country in which the appointment takes place amplifies both the dependence management-based benefits and the agency costs that politician appointments are expected to generate, (c) investors are largely indifferent to politician-specific attributes such as ideology, incumbency, nationality and jurisdictional level, when assessing the resource-provisionary capacity of appointed politicians and the agency risks that they pose.
Table 1.3 Theoretical and Methodological Underpinnings of Study Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Perceived consequences of CPA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Investor reactions to the appointment of politicians to the board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical lenses</td>
<td>Resource dependence theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Behavioral perspective on investor reactions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method</td>
<td>Event study with cumulative abnormal returns as dependent variable of multivariate regression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit of analysis</td>
<td>Politician-appointment events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>349 politician appointment events among 1,063 firms in 14 OECD Member States (2002-2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data sources</td>
<td>Author-compiled dataset on the political background of board members, derived from a variety of sources including BoardEx, annual reports, and governmental websites; Lexis-Nexis; Datastream</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.3.3 Study Three: “Towards a Democratic New Normal? Investor Reactions to Interim-Government Dominance During Spells of Political Violence”

Departing from the developed economy context of the previous two studies, the final study of this dissertation zooms in on the interim period in Egypt during the highly turbulent Arab Spring. Interim periods are a cornerstone of political transitions: they succeed the collapse of an authoritarian regime but precede the establishment of an alternative democratic political order. Although interim governments have frequently featured in developing countries since the Second World War, the existing literatures on business-government relations and political uncertainty have thus far largely overlooked them, focusing instead on more conventional forms of government such as democracies and autocracies. During interim periods, firms and their investors face a significant information asymmetry vis-à-vis the national government since they cannot ascertain the regime’s private commitment to democratization. Though investors will seek to remedy their information asymmetry, conventional forms of relational CPA are unlikely to be considered an attractive option in this context given the supposedly temporary tenure of interim regimes. Drawing on the
behavioral perspective of investor reactions, this study argues and shows that investors will resort instead to the degree of force used by the interim government against non-governmental actors during spells of political violence as an informational signal by which they can infer the government’s private political objectives. The study finds that higher governmental use of force against civilians in the interim period increases the political uncertainty that investors face but that firm-level attributes -namely, the firm’s foreign footprint and ownership concentration- can mitigate the adverse impact of this uncertainty. Altogether, the results of this study contribute to a better understanding of how investors perceive and respond to the political uncertainty that the behavior of specific forms of government can produce.

Table 1.4 Theoretical and Methodological Underpinnings of Study Three

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Political uncertainty under interim governments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Investor reactions to spells of political violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical lenses</td>
<td>Political uncertainty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Behavioral perspective on investor reactions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method</td>
<td>Event study with cumulative abnormal returns as dependent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>variable of multivariate regression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit of analysis</td>
<td>Spells of political violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>94 spells of political violence in post-Mubarak Egypt (2011-2015); 6,908 firm-spell observations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data sources</td>
<td>Newspaper articles, Datastream</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An important caveat regarding the following three chapters, is that each study was envisioned and written independently for the purpose of journal publication. As such, these studies may best be understood as stand-alone research articles that individually contribute to the overarching theme of this dissertation, as explicated below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Gaps in Prior Studies</th>
<th>Main Contributions of Study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. CPA as a strategic response to community-based discontent (Chapter 2)</td>
<td>- Antecedents of CPA that transcend the firm’s political environment &lt;br&gt; - The managerial implications of politicians as ‘stakeholder-directors’</td>
<td>- Advancing the strategic function of politician appointments as responses to legitimacy threats that emanate from the broader public &lt;br&gt; - Highlighting the differential impact of the state on firms, based on its role as regulator vs. major customer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Investor reactions to politician appointments (Chapter 3)</td>
<td>- The perceived value of politician appointments, beyond political dependence-management &lt;br&gt; - The perceived consequences of political overembeddedness &lt;br&gt; - The moderating effect of the institutional environment on the perceived benefits and costs of politician appointments</td>
<td>- Documenting the prevalence of politician appointments in the world’s most developed economies &lt;br&gt; - Forwarding a multilevel, contingency-based approach to CPA value that incorporates RDT and agency theory, as well as the institutional context of the firm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Political uncertainty under interim governments (Chapter 4)</td>
<td>- The perceived business consequences of operating under interim governments &lt;br&gt; - State behavior during violent conflict as a driver of political uncertainty</td>
<td>- Identifying a new source of political uncertainty for investors: uncertainty stemming from an interim government’s perceived unwillingness to fulfil its democratic mandate &lt;br&gt; - Demonstrating that violence has informational value: investors do not assess the consequences of violent conflict based solely on severity, but also by the regime’s show of force &lt;br&gt; - Uncovering firm-level attributes that determine organizational vulnerability to the adverse effects of political uncertainty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.4 Declaration of Contribution

In this section, I (henceforth, ‘the author’) declare my contributions to the chapters of this dissertation and gratefully acknowledge the contribution of my supervisory team (promoter: Prof Dr. Hans van Oosterhout; daily supervisor: Dr. Marc van Essen) and co-authors, where relevant. Chapter 1, the introductory chapter of this dissertation, was completed entirely by the author, with feedback from his promoter. The majority of the work outlined in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 was completed by the author—namely, the identification of the research gap and the underlying research question, literature review, data collection and analysis, and the writing of the manuscript. The author’s promoter and daily supervisor provided theoretical and methodological guidance for all three chapters, and the author’s promoter contributed to the writing of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. The author would finally like to acknowledge the contribution of Prof. Dr. Arjen Slangen to the framing and writing of Chapter 4.

Presently, Chapter 2 is being prepared for submission to a top management journal. The author is the first author, the promoter second, and the daily supervisor third. Chapter 3 is currently under review at a top management journal. The author is the first author, the promoter second, and the daily supervisor third. Chapter 4 is currently under review at a top management journal. The author is the first author, Dr. Slangen second, the daily supervisor third, and the promoter fourth.
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The Economist. 2017. 'Markets Worry More About Political Turmoil Than Autocracy'. *The Economist*.


In their pursuit of competitive advantage, firms will sometimes resort to the political domain in search of opportunities to advance and secure their economic interests. While academic interest in the business-government interface has seen remarkable growth in recent years, there remain important gaps in the existing body of knowledge as to why, when, and how firms will engage with the government in different institutional contexts. In this dissertation, I supplement the extant resource-dependence understanding of business-government relations with other theoretical lenses to answer the following questions: (1) what are the antecedents of corporate political activity (CPA) that transcend the firm’s direct political dependencies? (2) what are the firm- and country-specific conditions that jointly determine the expected benefits and costs of CPA? and (3) how do firms and their stakeholders cope with political uncertainty in circumstances wherein conventional forms of CPA are not readily available?

In two studies of this dissertation I focus on one particular type of CPA: the appointment of current and former politicians on firms’ boards of directors. Using 14 OECD Member States as my empirical context, I find, first, that politician appointments are prevalent even among the world’s most economically-developed economies. Nonetheless, important differences do exist across these countries in terms of the expected firm-value to be derived from CPA. Specifically, I find that the degree of perceived corruption in a country increases both the benefits to the firm of being politically connected, but also the agency-based risks of being too politically connected. Second, I find that prior studies may have inadvertently overlooked the broader implications of politician appointments by conceptualizing CPA as a dependence-management strategy that is exclusive to the firm’s political environment. Specifically, findings of this dissertation suggest that CPA can additionally be employed to help firms attain and secure relational capital from a broader set of non-political stakeholders, including financiers and members of the public.

In the final study, I examine a substantively different context—namely, the transitional period that succeeds the collapse of an authoritarian regime in a developing country, but precedes the establishment of a democratic alternative. In doing so, the study sheds light on a form of government that has thus far gone unexamined in the literature on the business-government interface: interim governments. Combining a behavioral view of investor reactions with insights from the political science literature on civil conflict, I forward a new perspective on how investors remedy the information asymmetry that exists between them and interim governments, without necessarily having to resort to CPA. Importantly, the study identifies a new source of political uncertainty that governments in institutionally less-developed countries can pose to firms and their stakeholders.

Taken together, the findings of this dissertation demonstrate promising opportunities for multi-level, inter-theoretic, and inter-disciplinary research on CPA and the business-government interface. In today’s increasingly politicized business environment, research of this kind is ever more important for business and society alike.
SAMENVATTING (DUTCH SUMMARY)

In hun streven naar een concurrentievoordeel nemen bedrijven met enige regelmaat hun toevlucht tot het politieke domein, op zoek naar mogelijkheden om hun economische belangen te bevorderen en veilig te stellen. Hoewel de academische interesse in het raakvlak tussen bedrijven en de overheid de afgelopen jaren opmerkelijk is gegroeid, blijven er belangrijke hiatenaan de bestaande kennis over waarom, wanneer en hoe bedrijven en de overheid in verschillende institutionele contexten met elkaar om zullen omgaan. In dit proefschrift vul ik de bestaande resource-afhankelijkheidscategorie van zakelijke relaties tussen bedrijven en overheid aan met andere theoretische invalshoeken om de volgende vragen te beantwoorden: (1) wat zijn de antecedenten van bedrijfspolitieke activiteit (‘Corporate Political Activity’, hierna afgekort als CPA) die de directe politieke afhankelijkheden van de onderneming overstijgen? (2) wat zijn de bedrijfs- en land specifieke voorwaarden die gezamenlijk de verwachte voordelen en risico’s van CPA bepalen? en (3) hoe kunnen bedrijven en hun stakeholders omgaan met politieke onzekerheid in omstandigheden waarin conventionele vormen van CPA niet direct beschikbaar zijn?

In twee studies van dit proefschrift richt ik me op een bepaald type CPA: de benoeming van huidige en voormalige politici in de raden van bestuur van bedrijven. Als ik de 14 OESO-lidstaten als mijn empirische context beschouw, constateer ik ten eerste dat politieke benoemingen voorkomen in zelfs de meest economisch ontwikkelde economieën van de wereld. Desalniettemin bestaan er in deze landen belangrijke verschillen wat betreft de verwachte waarde voor het bedrijf die uit de CPA voortkomen. Concreet laten de resultaten van mijn onderzoek zien dat de mate van waargenomen corruptie in een land de voordelen voor bedrijven om politiek verbonden te zijn vergroot, maar ook als risico heeft te politiek verbonden te zijn.

Ten tweede merk ik op dat eerdere studies onopzettelijk de bredere implicaties van afspraken met politici over het hoofd hebben gezien door CPA te conceptualiseren als een strategie voor afhankelijkheidsmanagement die exclusief is voor de politieke omgeving van het bedrijf. Specifiek suggereren de bevindingen van dit proefschrift dat CPA bovendien kan worden gebruikt om bedrijven te helpen bij het bereiken en veiligstellen van relationeel kapitaal van een bredere verzameling niet-politieke belanghebbenden, waaronder investeerders en het algemeen publiek.

In de laatste studie onderzoek ik een inhoudelijk andere context - namelijk de overgangsperiode die volgt op de afzetting van een autoritair regime in een ontwikkelingsland, en voorafgaat aan de oprichting van een democratisch alternatief. Hiermee werpt de studie een licht op een vorm van bestuur die tot nu toe niet is onderzocht in de literatuur over de relatie tussen bedrijfsleven en overheid: interim-regeringen. Door een gedragsmatige kijk op reacties van beleggers te combineren met inzichten uit de politieke-wetenschappelijke literatuur over burgerconflicten, bied ik een nieuw perspectief op hoe beleggers de informatie-asymmetrie tussen hen en interim-regeringen verhelpen,
zonder noodzakelijkerwijs hun toevlucht te nemen tot CPA. Belangrijk is dat de studie een
nieuwe bron van politieke onzekerheid identificeert die overheden in minder ontwikkelde
landen kunnen vormen voor bedrijven en hun aandeelhouders.

Samengevat tonen de bevindingen van dit proefschrift veelbelovende
mogelijkheden voor multi-level, inter-theoretisch en interdisciplinair onderzoek naar CPA
en de interface tussen bedrijfsleven en overheid. In de steeds meer gепolitiseerde
bedrijfsomgeving van vandaag de dag is dit soort onderzoek steeds belangrijker voor zowel
het bedrijfsleven als de samenleving in het algemeen.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Omar El Nayal (1988) obtained his M.Phil. degree in Business Research, and his M.Sc. degree in Hospitality Management from the Rotterdam School of Management (RSM), Erasmus University, The Netherlands. After completing his B.A in Finance at the American University in Cairo, he worked as an economist at the Ministry of Finance of Egypt, and as the Business Development Manager of a local tour operator based in Cairo. He started his PhD trajectory in September 2014 at the Department of Strategic Management and Entrepreneurship of RSM, working under the guidance of Prof. dr. Hans van Oosterhout and Dr. Marc van Essen. As part of his PhD trajectory, he spent two months as a visiting scholar at the University of South Carolina and the University of Southern California.

Omar’s general research interest centers around firms’ nonmarket strategies across different institutional contexts. He focuses in particular on the business-government interface, and the various ways in which firms attempt to influence politics with a view to advancing and securing their economic interests. He has expertise in event study methods, multi-level analysis, and panel data analysis. Besides research, Omar is passionate about teaching and strives to bring new and interactive teaching methods to the classroom.

Omar is currently a visiting scholar at RSM. In February 2019, he will join the Católica-Lisbon School of Business and Economics in Portugal as Assistant Professor of Strategy.
PORTFOLIO

Working Papers

Papers under review:

El Nayal, O., van Oosterhout, J. & van Essen, M. “Board of Thrones? Unraveling Investor Reactions to Politician Appointments”


Other working papers:

“Politician Appointments as Strategic Responses to Community-Based Legitimacy Threats” (with Hans van Oosterhout and Marc van Essen)

“Outsourcing Politics: Shareholder Activism and the Make-or-Buy Decision of Corporate Lobbying” (with Hans van Oosterhout)

“The Effect of Target CEO Equity Risk Bearing on Acquisition Premium Decisions” (with Mirko Benischke and Grigorij Ljubownikow)

“When the Going Gets Tough the Tough Get Connected: Enhancing Firm Political Connections During Times of Economic Crisis” (with Nan Jia and Maurice Murphy)

“Political connections, IPR Protection and the Global Innovation Patterns of Multinational Enterprises” (with Joao Albino-Pimentel, Marc van Essen, and Hans van Oosterhout)

“The Politicized Workplace: Unraveling the Determinants of Campaign Contributions by Employees”

“Corporate Political Activity under Authoritarian Regimes”

Research visits

Two research visits to the Darla Moore School of Business (University of South Carolina) in Columbia, South Carolina, to collaborate with Dr. Marc van Essen on the three studies of this dissertation (2017 & 2018)

Research visit to USC Marshall School of Business (University of Southern California) in Los Angeles, California, to collaborate with Dr. Nan Jia (2018)
Teaching and supervising activities

**Lecturer**
Corporate Political Strategies and Nonmarket Competition (2016-2018)
M.Sc. in Strategic Management
Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University

**Co-lecturer**
Corporate Governance (2015 & 2016)
Master in International Management
Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University

**Guest lecturer**
Executive International M.Sc. in Corporate Communication
Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University

Corporate Governance (2017)
M.Sc. in International Business
Darla Moore School of Business, University of South Carolina

Doing Business in Europe (2017)
B.A. in International Business
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MBA
Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University

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Crisis Simulation Summit (2016-2018; 8 editions to date)
M.Sc., M.I.M and MBA programs
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**Supervisor**
Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University

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**Academic presentations:**

Paper: “Politician Appointments as Strategic Responses to Community-Based Legitimacy Threats”

General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research, Oslo, Norway (2017)

Academy of Management Annual Meeting, Atlanta, USA (2017)
Nano-conference on Corporate Governance, Rotterdam School of Management, The Netherlands (2017)

Paper: “Board of Thrones? Unraveling investor reactions to politician appointments”

Invited Presentation, Católica Lisbon School of Business and Economics, Portugal (2017)

Invited Presentation, Copenhagen Business School, Denmark (2017)

Invited Presentation, HEC Paris, France (2017)

General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research, Prague, Czech Republic (2016)

Academy of Management Annual Meeting, Vancouver, Canada (2015)


Other consortia and symposia attended:


China Research Day, University of Southern California, United States (2018)

SIM Division Doctoral Consortium, Academy of Management Annual Meeting, Atlanta, United States (2017)


Strategy and the Business Environment Conference, University of Rochester, New York, United States (2016)

InterEuro Research Consortium on Lobbying, Center for European Policy Studies, Brussels, Belgium (2014)

PhD and M.Phil. courses

Advanced Panel Data Econometrics
Behavioral Decision Theory
Behavioral Foundations
Corporate Developments
Corporate Governance
Economic Foundations
Economics of Entrepreneurship
Executive Compensation and Other Managerial Incentives
Foundations of International Business
Innovation Management
Management Foundations
Mediation and Moderation
Meta-Analysis: Beyond Data Synthesis
Necessary Condition Analysis: Theory and Practice
Philosophy of Science
Presentation Skills
Publishing Strategy
Python Programming for Social Scientists
Research Methodology and Measurement
Research Proposal Writing
Scientific Integrity
Social Networks and Market Competition
Statistical Methods
Strategic Management Consulting
Strategy & Entrepreneurship Research Clinic
The Strategy Process
Treatment Effects Analysis
Web-Based and Mobile Survey Research

Languages

Arabic (native)
English (fluent)
Dutch (intermediate)
The ERIM PhD Series

The ERIM PhD Series contains PhD dissertations in the field of Research in Management defended at Erasmus University Rotterdam and supervised by senior researchers affiliated to the Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM). All dissertations in the ERIM PhD Series are available in full text through the ERIM Electronic Series Portal: http://repub.eur.nl/pub. ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management (RSM) and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at the Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR).

Dissertations in the last four years


Duyvesteyn, J.G. *Empirical Studies on Sovereign Fixed Income Markets*,


Lu, Y., *Data-Driven Decision Making in Auction Markets*,


Szatmari, B., *We are (all) the champions: The effect of status in the implementation of innovations*, Promotors: Prof. J.C.M & Dr D. Deichmann, EPS-2016-401-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/94633


Wessels, C., *Flexible Working Practices: How Employees Can Reap the Benefits for*


