


CONTINUITY AND CHANGE: MIGRATION AND
DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA.
THE CASE OF BIHAR

Amrita Datta



© Amrita Datta 2019

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the author.

ISBN 978-90-6490-097-6

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE: MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA.

The case of Bihar

CONTINUÛTEIT EN VERANDERING: MIGRATIE EN
ONTWIKKELING IN INDIA.

DE CASUS VAN BIHAR

Thesis

to obtain the degree of Doctor from the
Erasmus University Rotterdam
by command of the Rector Magnificus

Prof.dr. R.C.M.E. Engels

and in accordance with the decision of the Doctorate Board


The public defence shall be held on
Wednesday 3 April 2019 at 16.00 hrs

by

Amrita Datta

born in New Delhi, India

International
Institute of
Social Studies

The logo of the International Institute of Social Studies, featuring the word 'Erasmus' in a stylized, cursive script.

Doctoral Committee

Doctoral dissertation supervisor

Professor dr. A.S. Bedi

Other Members

Professor dr. S.I. Rajan, Centre for Development Studies, India

Professor dr. S. Jodhka, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India

Dr. R.B.C. Huijsmans

Co-supervisor

Dr. A. de Haan, International Development Research Centre, Canada

This thesis is dedicated to migrant workers and their families



Contents

<i>List of Tables, Figures, Maps and Appendices</i>	x
<i>Acronyms</i>	xiii
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xv
<i>Abstract</i>	xvii
<i>Samenvatting</i>	xix
1 INTRODUCTION	1
Notes	7
2 SETTING THE CONTEXT: MIGRATION-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS AND THE CASE OF BIHAR	8
2.1 Introduction: migration and development	8
2.2 History matters	11
2.3 Liberalisation, globalisation, and the surge in migration	12
2.4 Theoretical and methodological perspectives	14
2.5 Data	16
2.5.1 Selection of villages, 1981	17
2.5.2 Selection of households, 1998-99 and 2009-11	18
2.5.3 Studying a village-city migration stream	18
2.5.4 Data constraints	19
2.5.5 Data and chapters	20
2.6 The context of Bihar	21
2.7 Bihar migration	24
2.8 In conclusion	28
Notes	29

3	STATE DISCOURSES ON RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION IN INDIA	32
3.1	Introduction	32
3.2	The migration question in India before Independence	33
3.3	Independent India and the industrialisation project	35
3.4	Green Revolution and the migration of labour	36
3.5	The post-liberalisation period	37
3.5.1	Urban-rural welfare linkages	37
3.5.2	Urbanisation-migration disconnect	38
3.5.3	Rural and urban development policies	38
3.5.4	Multiple actors in the federal state	40
3.6	Conclusion	43
	Notes	44
4	DETERMINANTS OF MIGRATION FROM RURAL BIHAR, 1998 - 2011	47
4.1	Introduction	47
4.2	Theoretical and empirical literature	47
4.3	Data	50
4.4	Patterns of migration	51
4.4.1	Migration increasing, becoming longer-term, continues to be male dominated	52
4.4.2	Remittances near universal, an important livelihood strategy	54
4.5	Empirical specification	54
4.6	Descriptive statistics: 1998 and 2011	60
4.6.1	Mean values of independent variables in 1998	60
4.6.2	Mean values of independent variables in 2011	62
4.7	Model results: 1998 and 2011	65
4.7.1	1998 model	65
4.7.2	2011 model, and comparisons with 1998 model	73
4.8	Conclusion	81
	Notes	81
5	MIGRATION, REMITTANCES AND CHANGING SOURCES OF INCOME IN RURAL BIHAR, 1999-2011	85
5.1	Introduction	85
5.2	Sources of income in 2011	85
5.2.1	Sources of income in migrant and non-migrant households	85

5.2.2 Sources of income across quintiles in migrant and non-migrant households	88
5.3 Change in income and its source, 1999 - 2011	97
5.4 Conclusion	101
Notes	101
6 THE IMPACTS OF MIGRATION IN RURAL BIHAR, 1999-2011	104
6.1 Introduction	104
6.2 Theoretical and empirical literature	105
6.2.1 Household as a unit of analysis	105
6.2.2 Longitudinal village-level studies in rural India	106
6.2.3 Evidence from panel studies	107
6.3 Data	107
6.4 Household typologies, and changes in income 1999-2011	114
6.5 Descriptive statistics	121
6.5.1 Variables used in the model	121
6.6 Model	124
6.6.1 Case A	125
6.6.2 Case B	127
6.7 Conclusion	129
Notes	130
7 STRANGERS IN THE CITY? YOUNG BIHARI MIGRANTS IN DELHI	134
7.1 Introduction	134
7.2 The data and context	135
7.3 Migration: source and destination	137
7.3.1 The source village: Mahisham	137
7.3.2 Destination Delhi	141
7.4 Changing motivations to migrate	142
7.5 Work in the city	144
7.5.1 Informality, norms, local and global linkages	144
7.5.2 Transitions from wage work to self-employment	146
7.6 Social networks: the paradox of village connections	146
7.7 Urban isolation	148
7.8 Rural-urban linkages	149
7.8.1 Why do migrants allow themselves to be exploited?	149

7.8.2 Household and gender dynamics	151
7.8.3 Consumption, aspirations and dowry	152
7.9 The future, and summing up	153
Notes	154
8 PRIDE AND SHAME? YOUNG PEOPLE’S EXPERIENCES OF RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION	158
8.1 Introduction	158
8.2 Internal migration in India and the case of Bihar	160
8.3 Emotions in young people’s migration	162
8.4 Method	163
8.5 Case studies	165
8.5.1 MG	165
8.5.2 JM	168
8.6 <i>Apna kaam</i> , and the emotions of migration	170
8.6.1 Pride and shame in <i>pardes</i>	171
8.7 Fieldwork, and emotions of doing research	171
8.8 Conclusion	173
Notes	174
9 CONCLUSION	176
Notes	180

List of Tables, Figures, Maps and Appendices

Table 4.1 Incidence of migration, 1998 and 2011 (%)	52
Table 4.2 Residential status by sex, 1998 and 2011, age 15-64 years (%)	53
Table 4.3 Distribution of married persons by sex and residential status (%)	53
Table 4.4 Summary of variables used in multivariate analysis	56
Table 4.5 Summary statistics – mean values of independent variables, 1998	61
Table 4.6 Summary statistics – mean values of independent variables, 2011	63
Table 4.7 Probability of individual migration - probit estimates, 1998	67
Table 4.8 Probability of individual migration - probit estimates, 2011	75
Table 5.1 Sources of income in migrant and non-migrant households in 2011 (Rupees)	87
Table 5.2 Distribution of income sources by income quintiles in migrant and non-migrant households in 2011 (%)	90
Table 5.3 Distribution of income sources by district in 2011 (%)	92
Table 5.4 Distribution of income sources by caste and community in 2011 (%)	94
Table 5.5 Mean annual income and its change by district, class, caste and land size ownership: 1999 and 2011 (Rupees)	98
Table 5.6 Distribution of income sources in non-migrant and migrant households: 1999 and 2011 (%)	99
Table 6.1 Recovery rate for panel households, 1999 to 2011, by caste and community	109
Table 6.2 Reasons for omission of 1999 household in 2011	110
Table 6.3 Select descriptive statistics, unrestricted panel	113
Table 6.4 Select descriptive statistics, restricted panel	114
Table 6.5 Household typologies – sample size and mean income growth 1999 – 2011, unrestricted panel	115

Table 6.6 Household typologies – sample size and mean income growth 1999 – 2011, restricted panel	116
Table 6.7 Share of total income by sources in panel households – 1999 and 2011 (%)	116
Table 6.8 Distribution of income for non-migrant households – 1999 and 2011 (%)	117
Table 6.9 Distribution of income for new migrant households – 1999 and 2011 (%)	118
Table 6.10 Distribution of income for erstwhile migrant households – 1999 and 2011 (%)	119
Table 6.11 Distribution of income for continuing migrant households – 1999 and 2011 (%)	120
Table 6.12 Mean difference using paired t-test by household typology: 1999 and 2011	122
Table 6.13 Model 1	127
Table 6.14 Model 2	128
Table 7.1 Migration pattern from Mahisham, 1999 and 2011 (%)	138
Table 7.2 Sources of income in Mahisham, 1999 and 2011 (%)	139
Table 7.3 Agriculture as a primary occupation (% of workers)	140
Figure 6.1 Household typologies by migrant status in 1999 and 2011	124
Map 2.1 The regions of Bihar	17
Appendix Table 2.1 The regions of Bihar	182
Appendix Table 4.1 Probability of individual migration - probit estimates, 1998 (unweighted data)	183
Appendix Table 4.2 Probability of individual migration - probit estimates, 2011 (unweighted data)	187
Appendix Table 5.1 Distribution of sample households by caste, class and landownership	191

Appendix Table 6.1 Descriptive statistics of panel and non-panel household
in 1999 192

Appendix Table 7.1 Socioeconomic characteristics and work histories of
migrant research participants 193



Acronyms

ANSISS – Anugrah Narayan Sinha Institute of Social Studies
BRGF – Backward Region Grant Fund
CPI-AL – Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Labourers
GOB – Government of Bihar
GOI – Government of India
GSDP – Gross State Domestic Product
ICRISAT – International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics
IHD – Institute for Human Development
IHDS – India Human Development Survey
IIHS – Indian Institute for Habitat Studies
IIPA – Indian Institute of Public Administration
ILO – International Labour Organization
IOM – International Organization for Migration
ISI – Import Substituting Industrialisation
LIC – Labour Investigation Committee
MGNREGA – Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
NABARD – National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development
NCEUS – National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganised Sector
NCL – National Commission on Labour
NCRL – National Commission on Rural Labour
NELM – New Economics of Labour Migration
NSSO – National Sample Survey Office
OBC – Other Backward Class

PURA – Providing Urban Amenities to Rural Areas

RCLI – Royal Commission on Labour in India

SC – Scheduled Caste

ST – Scheduled Tribe

UNESCO - United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNICEF - United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund

UPR – Usual Place of Residence



Acknowledgements

Working on this thesis has been a unique experience. I have had the good fortune of being associated with a longitudinal research project in rural Bihar. This work was based at the Institute for Human Development (IHD) in New Delhi and was led by Gerry Rodgers and Alakh Sharma. In 2009, I joined the research team at a time when they were launching resurveys in villages in rural Bihar that they had earlier studied in 1981-83 and 1998-2000. Working on this study was exhilarating, and I received unparalleled training on the job in conducting survey-based research. The data from these and earlier IHD surveys forms the core of this thesis, and I gratefully acknowledge IHD for letting me use this data.

At ISS, Arjun Bedi anchored this thesis. His encouragement and support through the course of this work was critical for its completion. Arjun gave space for the project to take its own course and helped it reach its final, more lucid form. His clear and incisive feedback has been invaluable. Arjun, I am thankful to you for placing your trust in me, and for your guidance, warmth and generosity. The thesis benefited from Arjan De Haan's wealth of knowledge and expertise on both Bihar and migration. Arjan's feedback has been insightful and thought provoking. It has been a privilege to work with both of them. Thanks are also due to Des Gasper, Andrew Fischer and Christina Sathyamala for helpful inputs at the dissertation design seminar stage of the thesis. The excellent administrative support of Grace Nartey-Addo and Dita Dirks is duly acknowledged.

Gerry Rodgers and Janine Rodgers provided unwavering support to this thesis. Working with them on the Bihar research project has been an intellectually stimulating and immensely rewarding experience. They have been a constant source of kindness and good humour. I am inspired by their work ethic and meticulousness, and cherish the times spent together. Early on, Janine nudged me to work on migration, and I am thankful to her for this.

At IHD, colleagues in the Bihar research team, Sunil Mishra, Vikas Dubey, Subodh Kumar, B.K.N. Singh and Ashwani Kumar provided support and

camaraderie. There were others who were concerned about the state of the thesis and provided cheerful encouragement, and support. My heartfelt gratitude to Sandip Sarkar, Tanuka Endow, Balwant Singh Mehta, Dev Nathan, Preet Rustagi and Sheila Bhalla for looking out for me.

Conferences where some of the earlier versions of the chapters were presented, gave an invaluable space for discussion and growth. In particular, I am grateful to A.R. Vasavi, Ajit Ghose, Ashwani Saith, Geert De Neve, Kabita Chakraborty, Priya Deshingkar, Priya Natarajan, Roy Huijsmans, S. Madheswaran, Shalini Grover, Shivani Satija, Sumit Mazumdar and Surinder Jodhka for their engagement and comments.

The Nehru Memorial Museum and Library in New Delhi provided excellent library support and an atmosphere that was conducive for thesis writing. The last leg of work on this thesis was done in the peaceful environs of FLAME University in Pune, where I am grateful to Santosh Kudtarkar, the Dean of the Faculty of Liberal Education for all his support.

Friends, near and far, kept it all together. To Sonali Bagai, Siddharth Kapila, Madhavi Misra, Aditi Banerjee, Parul Kumar, Shipra Saxena, Mariam Jafri, Chandni Tandon, Devika Das and Akhila Yechury. I am simply grateful that they exist. They also rubbed in that there is a life beyond the PhD, and that travelling is always a good idea.

My parents, Indu and KL Datta, for nurturing my curiosity, giving me the courage to disagree and hold my own. And for setting a high benchmark with their conscientiousness. From them, I unwittingly learned the art of being the argumentative Indian. On the whole, this held me (and the thesis) in good stead. My parents-in-law, Promod and Suresh Popli were bemused, yet in admiration of the thesis that consumed me. To them, I am grateful for the joviality they bring to everyday life.

This project would have not have been possible without Sumeet Popli's love and generosity. Popli stood by me like a rock with unlimited laughter, adventures, and more recently, a free childcare pass since our son Kabir was born in the middle of the thesis. To him I remain forever indebted.



Abstract

This thesis counters dominant academic and policy discourses of low internal migration in India. Drawing on long-term empirical data in a source region, the thesis finds evidence of high and increasing mobility from the eastern Indian state of Bihar in the period 1998 – 2011. This rise in the incidence of migration from rural Bihar is accompanied by a change in its determinants. Over time, individual factors have become more important in explaining migration. At the same time, there is evidence of increased propensity to migrate among the agricultural labouring class. The thesis suggests that these changing determinants of migration from rural Bihar may be understood as a response to rising labour demand in distant urban markets elsewhere in India.

The thesis finds that increasing migration has been accompanied by a change in the pattern of income in rural areas between 1999 and 2011. Remittances have become very important, particularly for those in the bottom income quintiles. The local non-farm sector also emerges important, but income from this sector remains concentrated in the upper income quintiles. Overall, there has been a decline in agriculture in the context of the growth of the rural non-farm sector, and the thesis provides evidence of this decoupling of agriculture from the ‘rural’.

These aforementioned changes have occurred in a context where migration continues to be male-dominated and circular. Most migrants eventually return to the village to retire, and permanent migration, of the kind that entails relocation of the entire household from the village to the city is very limited. Thus, in the context of this research, migration emerges as a source area household livelihood strategy, and the empirical complexity of migration in the thesis does not support dual sector migration and development models that suggest a linear transition of labour from rural to urban areas.

The thesis presents evidence of income enhancing effects of migration. Using household panel data, it finds that households that move from non-migration to migration (migration to non-migration) experience large and significant income gains (losses). Yet, based on research at destination, the thesis

finds that many migrants do not desire to migrate to work in urban labour markets. However, they ‘choose’ to do so in order to sustain rural material conditions that are structurally dependent on urban remittances. It finds that while young migrants are active agents in their own migration, they are also subject to vulnerabilities and exploitation. The thesis highlights that the subjective experiences of young migrants and views of their family members of their migration are different from perspectives of the market and state on the *same* migration.

The thesis speaks to diverse literatures, and ideas and debates in migration and development. Methodologically, the thesis combines quantitative and qualitative techniques in development research and finds both a convergence and divergence in results from different methods. This has implications for both research and policy. In particular, economic discourses may overstate the importance of income in migrant welfare and thus negate migrant experiences and subjectivities – a critical component of well-being. The thesis thus makes a case for the incorporation of migrant subjectivities and emotions for a more comprehensive and nuanced analysis of rural-urban migration in academic and policy discourses.



Samenvatting

De bevindingen in dit proefschrift weerspreken het dominante wetenschappelijke en beleidsdiscours over lage interne migratie in India. Uit empirisch langetermijnonderzoek in een herkomstregio blijkt dat er sprake was van een hoge en toenemende mobiliteit vanuit de Oost-Indiase staat Bihar in de periode 1998 – 2011. Deze toegenomen migratie vanuit het platteland van Bihar gaat gepaard met een verandering in de determinanten van de migratie. In de loop van de tijd zijn individuele factoren belangrijker geworden bij het verklaren van migratie. Tegelijkertijd zijn er aanwijzingen voor een toenemende neiging om te migreren onder de agrarische arbeidersklasse. Volgens dit proefschrift vormen deze veranderende determinanten van migratie vanuit het platteland van Bihar een antwoord op de stijgende vraag naar arbeid in verre stedelijke markten elders in India.

Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat de toenemende migratie gepaard ging met een verandering in het inkomenspatroon op het platteland tussen 1999 en 2011. Geldtransfers zijn zeer belangrijk geworden, met name voor degenen in het laagste inkomenskwaartiel. Ook de lokale niet-agrarische sector blijkt belangrijk, maar de inkomsten uit deze sector gaan nog steeds voornamelijk naar de hogere inkomenskwaartielen. In het algemeen is er sprake van een afname van de landbouw bij een groei van de niet-agrarische plattelandsector, en dit onderzoek bevestigt deze ontkoppeling van de landbouw en het 'platteland'.

Bovengenoemde veranderingen doen zich voor in een context waarin de migratie nog steeds door mannen wordt gedomineerd en circulair plaatsvindt. De meeste migranten keren uiteindelijk terug naar het dorp als ze met pensioen gaan, en permanente migratie, waarbij het hele huishouden van het dorp naar de stad verhuist, komt maar zeer weinig voor. In dit onderzoek blijkt migratie dus een strategie van huishoudens in de herkomstregio om in het levensonderhoud te voorzien. De complexiteit van migratie die blijkt uit het empirisch onderzoek in dit proefschrift wijst niet op duale-sectormigratie en

is niet in overeenstemming met ontwikkelingsmodellen die een lineaire overgang van arbeid van het platteland naar de stad suggereren.

Het proefschrift laat zien dat migratie een inkomensverhogend effect heeft. Uit panelonderzoek onder huishoudens blijkt dat huishoudens die van niet-migratie naar migratie overstappen, kunnen rekenen op een grote en substantiële inkomensgroei. Voor huishoudens die overstappen van migratie naar niet-migratie geldt het omgekeerde. Toch blijkt uit onderzoek op de plaats van bestemming dat veel migranten eigenlijk niet willen migreren om zich op de stedelijke arbeidsmarkten te begeven. Zij doen dit echter om materiële steun te geven aan de plattelandsgemeenschappen die structureel afhankelijk zijn van bedragen die worden overgemaakt vanuit de stad. Jonge migranten zijn weliswaar actief betrokken bij hun eigen migratie, maar ze zijn ook kwetsbaar voor uitbuiting. In het proefschrift wordt benadrukt dat de subjectieve ervaringen van jonge migranten en de opvattingen van hun gezinsleden over hun migratie verschillen van hoe er door de markt en de overheid wordt aangekeken tegen hetzelfde onderwerp.

Het proefschrift is relevant voor de rijk geschakeerde literatuur, ideeën en debatten over migratie en ontwikkeling. In methodologisch opzicht zijn in dit proefschrift kwantitatieve en kwalitatieve technieken uit het ontwikkelingsonderzoek toegepast. De resultaten die met verschillende methoden zijn verkregen komen deels overeen en zijn deels verschillend. Dit heeft implicaties voor zowel onderzoek als beleid. In het bijzonder leggen economische discoursen soms een te grote nadruk op het belang van inkomen voor het welzijn van migranten, waardoor subjectieve ervaringen van migranten – een essentiële component van welzijn – miskend worden. Dit proefschrift bevat dus een pleidooi voor het integreren van subjectieve ervaringen en emoties van migranten om te komen tot een veelomvattender en genuanceerder beeld van migratie van het platteland naar de stad in het wetenschappelijke en beleidsdiscours.

1

Introduction

There exists a dominant academic and policy discourse of low internal migration in India. Davis (1951) has attributed this to factors such as predominance of agriculture, early marriage, the joint family, and the caste system. More recently, Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016) have found that by providing mutual insurance to its members, sub-caste or *jati* networks restrict mobility, and thus play an important role in explaining low levels of permanent migration from rural areas. Official datasets such as the Census of India and National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) corroborate this low rural to urban migration, but on account of entirely different reasons.

The Census and NSSO are the two main sources of data on migration in India. Whilst the Census is primarily designed to capture the distribution of population, the NSSO focuses on labour market attributes. As a result, worker mobility is not a primary area of enquiry for either agency, both of which define migration differently. The Census uses two distinct criteria to define migration: first, migration by place of birth, and second, migration by place of last residence. In the former, when ‘a person is enumerated in Census at a place, i.e., village or town, different from her/his place of birth, she/he would be considered a migrant by place of birth’. In the latter case, ‘a person would be considered a migrant...if she/he had last resided at a place other than her/his place of enumeration’ (Census of India 2001). According to the NSSO, ‘a household member whose last usual place of residence (UPR) was different from the present place of enumeration was considered as a migrant member in a household’, the UPR of a person being the place where the person had stayed continuously for a period of six months or more (GOI 2010: 11). It is pertinent to note that the Census does not collect data on temporary and short-term migration, and the NSSO uses a cut-off point of 6 months to define short-term migration. This may not adequately capture seasonal and circular movements which are longer than six months. As a consequence,

there is an underlying bias towards long-term and permanent migration in data collection, and these agencies tend to miss out on a significant proportion of short-term and circular migration.

On the other hand, micro-studies often tend to focus on temporary and precarious migration streams and thus report much higher incidence of migration than the official datasets. It is of little surprise, therefore, that estimates of internal migrants in India vary widely and are fraught with methodological and other concerns. It is in this context that the Working Group on Migration advises that differences regarding the extent of migration need to be addressed carefully and institutionally if the issue of migration is to be addressed in an evidence-informed manner (GOI 2017a).

That said, in recent decades, there is increasing evidence of high levels of circular migration,¹ and micro-studies (Haberfeld, Menaria, Sahoo and Vyas 1999; Mosse, Gupta, Mehta, Shah and Reese 2002; Deshingkar and Farrington 2009; Coffey, Papp and Spears 2015; Dodd, Humphries, Patel, Majowicz and Dewey 2016), as well as large scale survey exercises such as the India Human Development Survey (Nayyar and Kim 2018) find that migration is increasingly becoming an important livelihood strategy among rural households. The increase in migration has also been somewhat captured in recently released results of the decennial Census, wherein the growth of labour migrants in the decade 2001 to 2011 rose to 4.5 per cent, up from 2.4 per cent in the previous decade. This ‘surge in labour mobility’ has been attributed to high growth and economic opportunities in urban areas (GOI 2017b). In fact, in the post reform period, urban growth has had rural spillovers, and brought significant gains in rural living standards (Datt and Ravallion 2010).

It is against this backdrop of increasing mobility and its rural-urban nexus that this thesis studies labour migration from the eastern Indian state of Bihar. The data used in this thesis draws on a long-term research programme on social and economic change in rural Bihar (see Rodgers, Datta, Rodgers, Mishra and Sharma 2013 and Rodgers, Mishra and Sharma 2016 for details). Bihar, has a long history of male outmigration (Yang 1979; De Haan 2002). However, recent decades have witnessed a rapid rise in the incidence of migration, and changes in its pattern; migration streams have become longer-term and over time migration destinations have predominantly shifted from rural to urban areas (Rodgers et al.

2013). Though rural Bihari workers are increasingly embedded in the distant urban economies elsewhere in India, their migration remains circular; migrant workers go out to work for long periods to eventually return to their villages. It clearly emerges from the long-term research on which this thesis is based that permanent migration of the kind that involves relocation of households from the village is very limited.² Other studies in Bihar corroborate this circularity of migration (Jha 2004; Rodgers and Rodgers 2011; Tsujita and Oda 2014).

It is in this context that the thesis uses survey data from a longitudinal study in rural Bihar to address three broad research questions.³ First, it asks what are the determinants of migration, and explores if these have changed between 1998 and 2011. Second, it studies the changing sources of income, and the role of migration and remittances therein between 1999 and 2011. Third, it examines if, over time, welfare outcomes of households that experience migration are different from those that don't. This quantitative research belongs to a small body of village-level studies of longitudinal change in the context of rural India (Badiani 2007; Mukopadhyay 2011; Dercon, Krishnan, Krutikova, Badiani and Rao 2012).

The thesis employs a sequential mixed-methods approach, whereby, qualitative data collection is undertaken to address some questions that emerged from the quantitative analysis. The perspective of migration from the aforementioned source area surveys is from a rural lens, and one of the limitations of this quantitative research thus is that the 'urban' picture of rural-urban migration is missing. The expansion of the research location to the city, and undertaking qualitative research with migrant workers at an urban destination enables a more nuanced account of their migration. The qualitative research, based on fieldwork in the city and the village focuses on the changing motivations to migrate, migrants' work in the city, their isolation, and the role of social networks. It then discusses rural-urban linkages – the intersecting community, household and gendered dynamics of this migration, and the role of remittances in changing rural consumptions and aspirations. Lastly, based on migrant narratives, it explores complex emotional experiences of young male rural migrants in the city of Delhi, India, and in doing so, contributes to emerging scholarship on the emotional geographies of migration that prioritise young people's perspectives. This qualitative research is an addition to the small number of such studies that exist on the region (De Haan 1996; Rogaly et al. 2002). The multi-sited and longitudinal aspects of this work make it possible to

present an in-depth account of a rural-urban migration stream in contemporary India.

The thesis speaks to diverse, and often disparate literatures on rural-urban migration. The first among these is the small body of village studies – the ICRISAT and Palanpur studies – that deal with longitudinal change in rural India (Badiani 2007; Himanshu and Stern 2011; Mukopadhyay 2011; Dercon et al. 2012). Second, it speaks to the economic literature on the determinants and impacts of migration (Taylor, Rozelle and De Brauw 2003; Sabates-Wheeler, Sabates and Castaldo 2008; Murrugarra and Herrera 2011; Lokshin, Bontch-Osmolovski and Glinskaya 2010), and within this, a sub-set of longitudinal studies that use panel methods to explore the impact of migration (Funkhouser 2006; Beegle, De Weerd and Dercon 2011). The third literature is that in sociology and human geography that locates everyday realities of migrant workers in the context of a global economy where migrants traverse rural and urban lives and livelihoods (Fan 2008; Rigg, Nguyen and Luong 2014). This literature is closely intertwined with the larger literature on rural mobilities in Asia that draws attention to the movement away from agriculture and farming in rural areas (Croll and Ping 1997; Rigg 2006). Fourth, within the discipline of human geography, the thesis speaks to emerging scholarship on the emotional geographies of migration (Svašek 2010; Boccagni and Baldassar 2015), with a particular focus on young people's perspectives (Dobson 2009; Punch 2007; Beazley 2015; Hoang et al. 2015). These four strands in the literature on rural-urban labour migration intersect with the broader migration and development literature that covers both internal and international migration. This migration and development literature also highlights the complex interplay between structure and agency (Skeldon 2008; De Haas 2010), and suggests that social processes, and their linkages with broader transformations should be at the forefront of migration studies (Rao and Woolcock 2007; De Haan 2006).

The key contribution of this thesis is empirical. The thesis is organised as follows: chapters 2 and 3 set the context for the empirical analysis in chapters 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. The thesis is article-based, and chapters 3 to 8 may be read as stand-alone pieces. Chapter 2, first, discusses the broad empirical and theoretical literature within which this thesis is located, and delineates the framework of mixed methods research, describing the quantitative and qualitative data used. Second, the chapter traces social and economic developments in Bihar and the history of Bihar migration, with

an emphasis on its changing patterns in recent decades to give a background to the geographical site of research.

Chapter 3 critically examines policy and programme documents of the Indian state to present state discourses on rural-urban migration in India since the 1930s. It emerges that while the migration question was an important policy question in pre-independent India, state policy became increasingly silent about rural-urban migration in the post-independence decades, and there emerged a fundamental contradiction in the state's discourse – that industrialisation was necessary for development, but migration was not desirable. In the post-liberalisation period, however, there has been a growing recognition that migrants are clearly important actors in an economic sense. Yet, there remains an underlying disconnect between urbanisation and migration in the state's discourse – while urbanisation is clearly desirable, often, the state's view on migration remains ambivalent. Rural and urban policies tend to be mutually exclusive, except both predominantly frame migration as a 'problem'. The chapter suggests that this rural-urban dialectic, and the diversity and segmentation of state-actors in a federal structure contributes to contradictory state narratives, and ultimately leads to the absence of a coherent discourse on rural-urban migration in India.

Chapter 4, based on two cross-sections of survey data of 1998 and 2011 sets out to examine if the individual, household, and village-level factors that explain migration have changed over time in the context of changing patterns of migration from rural Bihar. It finds that effects of individual factors such as age, sex and marital status in explaining migration have become stronger over time. It emerges that there has been a change in the pattern of migration by class, and there is evidence of increased propensity to migrate among the agricultural labouring class. On the whole, migration from rural Bihar has become more differentiated by education and caste, and there seems to be some shift towards pull factors, though push factors continue to remain important.

The empirical data points to a significant departure from dual sector migration and development models which suggest a linear transition of labour from rural to urban areas, and from subsistence to capitalist sectors. In our surveys in Bihar, migration is one of the many livelihood strategies adopted by rural households, and migratory movements are circular; migrants, through their working lives, traverse back and forth between rural and urban areas, and most migrants eventually return to their families to

retire in the village. It is in this context that chapter 5, based on household production and income data first presents the distribution of income sources in 2011, and then examines changes in income sources of rural households between 1999 and 2011. Survey results suggest that migration and remittances are important in rural household strategies in a context of agrarian change and livelihood diversification.

Chapter 6 uses household panel data to explore if, over time, welfare outcomes (proxied by income) of households that experience migration are different from those that don't. The advantage of using panel data is that it enables us to control for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity, something that is not possible with cross-section data that is used in most studies. The chapter uses a difference-in-differences model to estimate the effect of migration on welfare outcomes for four household typologies, based on their migration status in 1999 and 2011. Controlling for household and village variables, the chapter finds that new migrant households experienced large and significant income gains, while households that slipped into non-migration experienced relative income losses. These results lend support to the theories of the new economics of labour migration, that, migration is one of the many livelihood strategies used by rural households, and is associated with increased income in source households in rural areas. If that is the case, then why do more households not participate in migration? To explore this and some other questions that emerge from the quantitative research, chapters 7 and 8 present results from the qualitative research that explores the village-city nexus by prioritising migrants' own perspectives of their migration.

Chapter 7 is predominantly based on migrant narratives in the city, and it presents an account of migration in the context of rural change and growing linkages of rural labour with urban labour markets. It emerges that motivations to migrate are complex, and have changed over time. The chapter suggests that the same social networks that facilitate entry and employment in the city may impede prospects of better work. It finds that migration is powerfully shaped by intersecting community, household and gender dynamics, and while male migrants spend much of their lives in the city, they affirm their rural identity, and eventually see themselves returning to the village. The chapter argues that it is in this context of circularity of migration, and disassociation from, and disaffect of the city that migrants work in exploitative conditions in order to sustain rural material conditions that are structurally dependant on urban remittances.

Chapter 8 explores the complex emotional experiences of young male rural migrants in the city of Delhi, India. As in chapter 7, the analysis in this chapter is based on multi-sited fieldwork, and draws on a long-term study in Bihar. The chapter suggests that while young migrants are active agents in their own migration, they are also subject to specific vulnerabilities and exploitation. At the same time, they undertake challenging emotional labour in the city to create particular working identities that are both a source of pride and shame. It is argued that an insertion of emotions in the analysis of migration helps disentangling this dissonance between migrants' economic success and social rejection in the city. This research makes a case for the incorporation of emotions for a more comprehensive and nuanced analysis of young people's migration in academic and policy discourses.

Chapter 9 concludes with a specific focus on the implications of this thesis for research and policy.

Notes

¹ In the context of circular migration, the thesis draws from Jan Breman's research on seasonal and temporary migration in south Gujarat. Breman's seminal work is discussed in chapter 2.

² The source area data in rural Bihar shows that thirty-eight households, or about 4 per cent of panel households under study, of a total sample of 891 had permanently out-migrated from the village between 1998 and 2011. See chapter 6 for details.

³ The core data used in the thesis is from 891 households covered in 1998-99 and the same and successor households resurveyed in 2009-11 in 12 villages in 7 districts of Bihar. See section 2.5 for details.

2

Setting the Context: Migration-Development Nexus and the Case of Bihar

2.1 Introduction: migration and development

In recent decades, there has been a surge in academic and policy research on migration. This literature, commonly known as the ‘migration and development’ literature, covers both internal and international migration. However, herein, there is a dominant focus on international migration while scholarly work on internal migration remains both limited, and at the margins of the ‘migration and development’ literature. This is surprising, as quantitatively, internal migration is more important (King and Skeldon 2010). Globally, more than 250 million persons are international migrants (World Bank 2016), whereas internal migrants are estimated to be around 750 million. In addition, the total volume of remittances generated by internal migration is estimated to be more than that of international migration (McKay and Deshingkar 2014).

This thesis is on internal migration, and draws on the larger literature on international migration as both international and internal migration have more convergence than divergence, and are closely intertwined, both conceptually and theoretically (Hugo 2016). Empirically too, both types of migration are associated with common causes and consequences; they are driven by similar structural and demographic factors, and lead to similar outcomes and impacts (DeWind and Holdaway 2005; Adepoju 2006; Ratha, Mohapatra and Scheja 2011; Hickey and Yeoh 2016).

It also emerges from this literature that both internal and international migrants face similar issues at destination. There exists labour market segmentation between migrants and natives, and this is closely related to the nature of labour demand, where, jobs undertaken by migrants are often considered too menial to be done by locals (Piore 1979; Hugo 2016). The

othering of migrants extends beyond the occupational sphere, well into other domains of life. Migrants tend to reside in enclaves, and face challenges in social integration, including that of social and civic incorporation of second-generation migrants (DeWind and Holdaway 2005; Hugo 2016).

The thesis engages with diverse strands of the aforementioned migration and development literature. The first among these is the body of empirical literature that examines the economic impacts of migration. Studies herein have found that migration and remittances lead to increases in income and consumption (Haberfeld et al. 1999; Taylor et al. 2003), and contribute to poverty reduction in the source areas (Adams and Page 2005; Sabates-Wheeler et al. 2008; Lokshin et al. 2010; Murrugarra and Herrera 2011). Migrants' remittances have a large impact on educational expenditures (Quisumbing and McNiven 2010) and are directly linked with increase in school enrolment (Calero, Bedi and Sparrow 2008). This literature presents a body of micro-evidence on the development outcomes of remittances in source communities and thus posits that remittances contribute significantly to economic development.

A key contribution of this economic literature is that it establishes quantitatively the positive impacts of migration, particularly at the level of individuals and households in source communities. This literature goes hand in hand with parallel literatures in human geography and social anthropology that pay attention to migrants' subjectivities. While these two distinct literatures belong to different disciplines and policy spaces, they offer an interpretation of migration that is fundamentally different from earlier grand structural theorisations, such as modernisation and dependency.¹

The second strand of literature that this thesis draws on is a set of critiques that emerged from the aforementioned migration and development paradigm. Foremost among these is that the narrow economic focus of some migration and development studies leads to an oversight of social processes, and their linkages with broader transformations (De Haan 2006; Rao and Woolcock 2007). Scholars have argued that this 'privileging the economic' inhibits our understanding of the role of migration in broader social changes (Dannecker 2009).² This literature focuses on the developmental limits of remittances, acknowledging that while remittances can play a crucial role in development, particularly that of individuals and households, migration is no panacea for development (Taylor

1999; De Haas 2005; Phillips 2009). In particular, it questions the role of remittances in their effects on structural poverty and questions if migration is a catalyst of long-term economic development in source regions (Kapur 2003; Delgado Wise, Covarrubias and Puentes 2013).

Scholars in critical development studies question the linear positive relationship between migration and development, and argue that migration does not automatically lead to development; it is both a part of development, and an independent factor (De Haas 2005; Geiger and Pecoud 2013). It is argued that the economic migration and development framework described earlier may overlook the diversity of actors, their development visions, and invisibilise particular forms of migration (Dannecker 2009; Raghuram 2009). It is argued that the construction of the migration and development paradigm of bringing a triple-win – of being beneficial for source regions, destination regions, and migrants themselves, is naïve and simplistic. For, such migration is embedded in unequal power relations, an asymmetry between sending and receiving regions, and is decontextualised from the processes of globalisation and unequal development (Covarrubias and Puentes 2013; Delgado Wise et al. 2013; Geiger and Pecoud 2013).

Another theme that emerges in the migration and development literature is the complex interplay between structure and agency. Dependency and neomarxist theories paint migrants as victims of migration and development, negating migrants' agencies and overlooking migrants' subjectivities.³ As discussed earlier these grand theorisations lack empirical validity and they are unable to capture the diversity of migration experiences. However, discourses that hold migrants' agency alone for the development of source areas evade structural aspects of development (Skeldon 2008). Therefore, a simultaneous incorporation of structure and agency is important to understand diverse migration-development interactions (De Haas 2010). Migrants' own subjectivities, valuable in their own right, have not been paid enough attention in the migration and development literature (Rodriguez and Schwenken 2013). More specifically, migrants' development visions – notions of what development is and ought to be – are constantly evolving, changing and undergoing negotiations that may initiate broader processes of social transformation (Dannecker 2009).

2.2 History matters

At a first reading of this contemporary migration and development literature, it seems that the connection between migration and development is a novel phenomenon. However, for long, internal migration has been an important component of theoretical models of development. Ravenstein's laws of migration and Lee's subsequent push-pull framework of migration were both theorisations of within country migration (Ravenstein 1885; Lee 1966). Neoclassical macroeconomic models where wage and expected income differentials explained rural-urban migration (Todaro 1969; Harris and Todaro 1970) and new economics of labour migration where migration is viewed as a household decision (Stark and Bloom 1985) were both theorised in the context of labour mobility within the country.

Historically, in practice, ideas from modernisation theory have been embedded in national development projects in the Global South. Newly independent nation-states in the post-war era adopted ambitious industrialisation policies wherein large-scale rural-urban migration was an important prerequisite for the success of these national projects. In reality, however, these projects did not materialise as envisaged, and rural migrants were often absorbed in the urban informal sector in third world cities (Hickey 2016). The relationship between migration and development policy is old, and indeed many of today's seemingly 'new' ideas draw heavily on older development models, grounded in modernisation theory, which promoted rapid internal rural-to-urban migration (Geiger and Pecoud 2013; Hickey 2016).

A critical analysis of state policies and their historical roots in development ideas and theories is thus crucial for a better understanding of the limitations and potentials of migration in broader development and spatial transformations. The recent 'triple-win' perspective about 'migration and development' – that migration is beneficial for source regions, destination regions and migrants themselves, ignores these historical connections. In the context of this thesis, the research site of the eastern Indian state of Bihar has a long history of outmigration for work. Both economic and cultural factors explain this migration, as well as its patterns; we see in chapter 4 that the incidence of migration from rural areas has substantially increased, as have overall remittances (discussed in chapter 5). We find evidence that migration and remittances contribute significantly to gains in household income (chapter 6). At the same time, chapter 7 finds that

remittances are contingent upon migrants' work in the city, which is based on exploitative conditions. Yet, migrants 'choose to' engage in this work in order to sustain rural material conditions that have become structurally dependent on urban remittances. In doing so, they experience economic success, but social rejection in the city – simultaneous emotions of pride and shame. These diverse empirical evidences do not fit neatly in the triple-win migration and development framework. It also emerges that state perspectives on migration (discussed in chapter 3), are different from the perspectives of migrants and their families. State policies in both Bihar and India are characterised by a sedentary bias – an entrenched moral and normative judgment that rural people should remain in rural areas. This is contrary to the evidence that mobility has historically been embedded in the cultural ethos of its people, and has increased in response to labour demand in urban areas.

2.3 Liberalisation, globalisation, and the surge in migration

Historically, migration has been a process with a certain degree of continuity, but it has undergone transformation under neoliberal globalisation (Delgado Wise et al. 2013). Both international and internal migration are embedded in global capitalism, and globalisation has been an important force in both the expansion and contraction of economic opportunities that drive this migration (Deshingkar and Grimm 2005).

In India, economic liberalisation since the 1990s and the subsequent high growth regime has been accompanied by increasing inequalities between advanced and backward regions. Dreze and Sen (2013) argue that the growth process is so biased that it makes the country look like islands of California in a sea of sub-Saharan Africa. It is in this context that a vast majority of rural-urban migration in India, including much of the migration stream discussed in this thesis, may be located. While rural-urban migration may present new opportunities, it remains embedded in structural conditions of poverty in source regions. This is evident in Jan Breman's seminal work on seasonal and temporary circular migration in south Gujarat that emphasises on the 'footloose proletariat' - an enormous mass of men and women, adults and children, who possess little if any means of production of their own and who lead a circulatory existence in the lowest rungs of the labour system (Breman 1996: 243).⁴ This constrains the development potential of labour, and contributes to the curtailment of their

basic freedoms and human capabilities at destination (Phillips 2009; Dreze and Sen 2013).

At the same time, scholars have argued that the structural logic of global capitalism is not a sufficient explanation of why and how migration occurs; migrants' own agency is central to the political economy of their migration (Phillips 2009). However, views of migration that focus solely on migrants' own agency or welfare miss out on the multi-dimensional and multi-spatial aspects of migration, as well as the interrelations between migrants as social agents, and the local, regional, national and global contexts in which their migration is located (Delgado Wise and Covarrubias 2013).

This aforementioned perspective motivated this thesis and led me to deploy multiple methods and disciplines to better understand different aspects of contemporary labour migration from rural Bihar, and analyse how they may be linked with one another. Multi-sited fieldwork led to findings, meanings, and narratives that came together, time and again, yet diverged at other times. One such divergence was in the framing of migrants as heroes at origin and victims at destination. In the source region where conditions of structural poverty prevail, most migrants leave in search of better alternatives. As we see in chapter 7, almost all migrants send remittances to their families in the rural areas. This act of migration of young men to hitherto unknown destinations, their hard work and remittances that follow for the survival and sustenance of their rural households is perceived to be heroic by family members and communities in source regions.

At the same time, abuse and exploitation of migrant workers goes hand in hand with their economic advancement (Wickramasera 2008). This point is closely related with the earlier point about globalisation and labour demand that drives this migration. Using Dreze and Sen's analogy, there exists a vast supply of labour from the 'seas of sub Saharan Africa' to cater to the 'islands of California' in India. The large demand for cheap workers in developed nations and regions places migrants under conditions of increased vulnerability and high exploitation (Gabriel 2013). This explains the framing of migrants as victims that emerges from the fieldwork with Bihari migrant workers in Delhi, discussed in chapters 7 and 8.

2.4 Theoretical and methodological perspectives

This section discusses theoretical perspectives employed in the thesis, and elaborates upon the methods used, embedded in several disciplines. In the theoretical literature in economics, individual-level characteristics are important drivers of migration. Everett Lee refers to them as ‘personal factors’ in his seminal work on internal migration (Lee 1966). These also attain importance in neoclassical models where costs of migration from rural to urban sector are high, and migration is an ‘individual’ decision based on wage differentials and expected income differentials between source and destination areas (Todaro 1969; Harris and Todaro 1970).

Subsequent theorisations of the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) are a shift from neoclassical economics – the unit of analysis here moves from an atomised individual to a dynamic household, and migration is an income enhancing and risk sharing livelihood strategy adopted by the household (Stark and Bloom 1985; Stark and Lucas 1988). In this thesis, the empirical work on the determinants of migration in chapter 4 draws upon neoclassical and NELM theories, thus taking into account both individual and household level variables that may explain migration. In addition, we draw on models that hypothesise social networks as an important variable in the decisions related to migration.

NELM incorporates remittances, circular migration, and return migration in its framework; these had been beyond the scope of neoclassical theorisation.^{5 6} This inclusion of remittances – monetary transfers by migrants to their families in the source area; circular migration – migrants’ movements back and forth between source and destination areas; and, return migration – migrants’ eventual return to source areas, allow for the possibility of the study of different streams of migration (short-term and long-term, permanent and temporary). This theorisation is more attuned to the empirical context of migration from Bihar where much of the migration is male-dominated and circular, and most migrants eventually return to their families in rural areas.

While both neoclassical models and NELM have a distinct and differentiated understanding of migration and development, they co-exist within the disciplinary domain of economics. Empirical research, be it in the neoclassical or NELM framework, tends to emphasise on the positive aspects of migration, both at the level of individual, and at the level of the household, mediated by remittances. On the other hand, literature in the

disciplines of anthropology, sociology and human geography is more critical of the *same* migration as it tends to focus on structural, and non-pecuniary aspects of migration. Thus, there exist disciplinary overtones in the literature, with sociologists and anthropologists⁷ being on the pessimistic end of the spectrum, and economists (neoclassical or of the NELM school) being on the optimistic end (Portes 2007). In recent years, however, new literature in migration and development in economics is moving beyond the objective frame of remittances and income (Clemens, Ozden and Rapoport 2014) to incorporate subjective measures of well-being such as happiness, and the costs of migration (Cortes 2015; Stillman, Gibson, McKenzie and Rohorua 2015).

Diversity and disagreement exist in the migration literature, and there is no single coherent theory of migration. At the same time, there is sufficient empirical literature which supports the idea that migration-development interactions are diverse and cannot be generalised. De Haas argues that the recent ‘celebration’ of the positive aspects of migration undermines the structural constraints in general and the role of the state and other institutions in particular, in shaping favourable conditions for social and economic development. In this context, the current discourse on migration and development perhaps reflects a paradigm shift from dependency and state centricism, from grand structuralist and functionalism to neoliberal and neoclassical views, to more hybrid and pluralistic approaches (De Haas 2008).

Methodologically, this thesis is motivated by the aforementioned hybrid and pluralistic approaches, and draws from the disciplines of economics, sociology and human geography. Migration is treated as both a project in its own right, as well as part of the broader processes of social change. To this end, the thesis uses mixed methods in social science research to address its key research questions. As explained by Creswell,

A mixed methods design is useful to capture the best of both quantitative and qualitative approaches... researchers may first survey a large number of individuals, then follow up with a few of them to obtain their specific language and voices about the topic. In these situations, the advantages of collecting both closed ended quantitative data and open-ended qualitative data prove advantageous to best understand a research problem (Creswell 2003: 22).

The thesis employs a sequential approach, whereby, quantitative data collected from large scale surveys in 1998-2000 and 2009-2011 is followed by qualitative data obtained from case studies and migrant narratives.⁸ In addition, state policy documents are critically examined to analyse state discourses on rural-urban migration. This ‘methodological pluralism’ enables the use of ‘different techniques to get access to different facets of the same social phenomenon’ (Olsen 2004: 6).

While quantitative data, overall, is appropriate in explaining the determinants and impact of migration in source areas, qualitative data helps in understanding village-level migration processes, and in particular migrant experiences at destination. Together, a combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques is a ‘pragmatic’ approach as it ‘opens the door to multiple methods, different worldviews, and different assumptions, as well as to different forms of data collection and analysis in the mixed methods study’ (Creswell 2003: 12).

2.5 Data

The data used in this thesis are part of a long-term study of social and economic change in rural Bihar. These data are a subset of data from surveys undertaken in 1998-2000 and 2009-11, archived under the Institute for Human Development Research Programme on Inclusive Development in Bihar. The data are rooted in earlier research undertaken in 1981-83 to study the working of the agrarian systems, the persistence of poverty, labour market institutions and demographic change (Prasad, Rodgers, Sharma, Gupta and Sharma 1988; Rodgers et al. 2016). Village and household level data were collected in 36 villages designed to be representative of rural Bihar. Of these 36 villages, 12 are core villages and have been resurveyed in 1998-2000 and 2009-11.⁹

Map 2.1
The regions of Bihar



2.5.1 Selection of villages, 1981

For diversity and representativeness, the research project in 1981 distinguished 6 regions of Bihar, based on a cluster analysis of the then 24 districts in the plains of Bihar. The following variables were used for clustering: population growth, population density, urbanisation, tenancy, cropping intensity, use of high-yielding varieties (HYV) of paddy, and tubewell cultivation (Rodgers et al. 2013).

Once the cluster regions were identified (see appendix table 2.1 for a description of the six regions), one district from each cluster was chosen with probability proportional to their population. These districts were:

Gaya, Gopalganj, Madhubani, Nalanda, Purnia and Rohtas. Within each district, three blocks were selected randomly. Within each block, villages were stratified into small and large villages; one large village and one small village was selected randomly from each block. So, in total, there were 6 villages in each district – 36 villages in all. Of these, two villages in each district were selected for detailed investigation (core villages). This thesis is based on data from these 12 core villages.¹⁰

2.5.2 Selection of households, 1998-99 and 2009-11

In 1998, a household census was undertaken in each of the 12 core villages that comprised 3,906 households. Thereafter, a stratified random sample of 891 households was drawn, with class being the key stratification factor.¹¹ In all, three rounds of household surveys were conducted during the period 1998-2000.¹² In the thesis, we use data from the first two rounds conducted in 1998-1999. Among other information, the surveys gathered information on income from various sources, migration of members, demographic and labour composition, caste, class and land ownership. Household-level data of the 891 households in 12 core villages is used in the analysis in chapters 5 and 6. In addition, individual-level data (n=3,003) of household members is used in chapter 4.

The next set of resurveys began in 2009, of households and communities in the same villages.¹³ Two rounds of data collection were undertaken from 2009 to 2011. For the purpose of the thesis, we use household data from 2011. Chapters 5 and 6 are based on a detailed income accounting exercise which was undertaken for the same and successor 903 households of the original sample of households covered in 1999, and chapter 4 uses individual-level data (n=3,415).

2.5.3 Studying a village-city migration stream

The qualitative research in this thesis studies a village-city migration stream. The rationale for studying migrants from a single village was to be able to undertake an analysis of the village-city nexus. The village selected was from a sampling frame of 12 villages which were studied at three points in time earlier (in 1981, 1998-99 and 2009-11), of which longitudinal household data was available for two points in time (1998-99 and 2009-11). The criteria of village selection were that it have overall high levels of out-migration and be characterised by diverse migration experiences. On the basis of these criteria, of the 12 sample villages, Mahisham village in

the district of Madhubani in North Bihar best fit the bill.¹⁴ In 2011, 78 per cent of the households in the village had at least one member that had migrated for work in the preceding year, and we gain insights from work in this village that may be relevant for other high migration villages.

Delhi was selected as a research destination because the Bihar-Delhi migration circuit is among the densest migration circuits in India. The net rural to urban inter-state migration from Bihar to Delhi between 2001 and 2011 is estimated to be the second largest such movement of migrants in the country (Indian Institute for Human Settlements 2012).¹⁵ Other studies as well as the IHD Bihar surveys find that the National Capital Region of Delhi is the most preferred destination for Bihari migrant labour; about a fourth of the total migrants from the state migrate for work here (Indian Institute of Public Administration 2010; Rodgers et al. 2013). They are engaged in a variety of occupations as wage workers and self-employed workers. Thus, this region provides a rich sample of migrant workers.

Fieldwork was undertaken in the village (Mahisham) and the city (Delhi) with 53 research participants – migrant workers in the city (10), their family members in the village (22), and key informants (21). The migrant research participants were drawn from a pool of households on whom comprehensive information is available from earlier surveys 1998-99 and 2009-11. It is thus possible to locate these case studies of rural-urban migrants in the rural household's trajectory over time, and read them in conjunction with the existing village data records and notes for 1998-99 and 2009-11. These longitudinal and bi-locational methodological components are particularly useful in constructing migration and livelihood histories of individuals and households. They also act as important validation tools and supplement the urban migrants' narratives.¹⁶

2.5.4 Data constraints

The surveys undertaken in the late 1990s, aimed to study social and economic change in rural Bihar since the early 1980s, and went back to the same 36 villages (see Sharma, Sarkar, Karan, Gayathri and Pushpendra 2001 and Institute for Human Development 2004, for details). However, it was not possible to cover the same households, because the data needed to permit individual identification had been lost (Rodgers et al. 2016). This brings us to the important methodological point of this research, that most longitudinal studies are not actually planned as such (Himanshu, Jha and

Rodgers 2016). Thus, resurvey exercises bring with them complex challenges in data management – in terms of consistencies in concepts and definitions across surveys, as well as in issues related to the collection, processing and analysis of data.¹⁷ That said, in the context of this research, the resurveys since 2009 focus on a wide range of issues such as changes in production, employment and income in the same households as 1998–99. For the construction of this household panel used in the thesis, an additional data collection exercise was undertaken in 2013 to better understand panel attrition between 1999 and 2011 (see chapter 6 for details). Furthermore, it was not possible to build an individual-level panel; the context of patrilocality implied that a substantial proportion of female respondents in the 1999 survey were no longer residents of the survey households in 2011, and new households residents were added through marriage in the years between the surveys. These data constraints explain the use of cross-section data in the individual-level analysis and that of panel data in household-level analysis in this thesis.

2.5.5 Data and chapters

The thesis is organised as follows. Post this chapter that sets the context of migration and development to the case of Bihar, chapter 3 discusses changing state discourses on rural-urban migration in India. This is based on a critical examination of relevant policy and programme documents of the Indian state spanning a period of more than eight decades since the early 1930s. It appears from this exercise that the state's perspectives of migration are fundamentally different from the evidence that is recorded in this thesis – both in terms of the pattern of migration that emerges from the quantitative research, and the experiences of migration that emerge from the qualitative research.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 use longitudinal survey data to address three broad research questions. First, in chapter 4, we explore the determinants of migration and if these have changed over time. This is done in a multivariate regression framework, using a probit specification on two cross-sections of data to examine if the determinants of individual migration have changed between 1998 and 2011. Second, in chapter 5, using household income data from 1999 and 2011, changes in the sources of income are analysed to understand the diversification of the Bihar economy, and the role of remittances therein. Third, in chapter 6, we estimate the income

impacts of migration; the technique of difference-in-differences estimation for panel data is used to examine, if, over time, welfare outcomes of households that experience migration are different from those that don't.

Chapters 7 and 8, based on qualitative research present an in-depth study of a migration stream from a village to an urban destination. Based on multi-sited fieldwork in the village and the city, long-term village-level data, case studies, and migrant narratives are used to explore the processes of migration in the context of rapid rural change and growing linkages of rural labour with urban labour markets. Chapter 7 focuses on the changing motivations to migrate, migrants' work in the city, the role of social networks, and their urban isolation. It explores rural-urban linkages from the lens of household and gender dynamics, and consumption, aspirations and dowry. Chapter 8 explores complex emotional experiences of young male rural migrants in Delhi. Predominantly based on migrant narratives, it draws upon everyday lived experiences of migrants to present an in-depth account of their migration journeys. In doing so, it captures gendered and familial emotions of migration, as well as young people's aspirations and anxieties, and contributes to emerging scholarship on the emotional geographies of migration. In addition to the qualitative data, Chapter 7 uses household and village-level survey data of 1999 and 2011, and chapters 7 and 8 are based on multi-sited fieldwork. These methodological features add the dimensions of time and space in the analysis of the migration stream under study, and the analysis in both chapters reveals the heterogeneity in migration-remittance-development interactions.

2.6 The context of Bihar

Bihar, with a population of 104.1 million is the third most populated state in India, after Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra (Census of India 2011). If Bihar were a country, it would be the twelfth most populous in the world, preceded by Egypt, Philippines and Ethiopia, and succeeded by Russia, Mexico, and Japan. It comprises 9 per cent of India's population and covers 3 per cent of its landmass, making it the most densely populated state in the country. Bihar's decadal growth of population in 2001–11 was 25.1 per cent — the highest in the country—as against 17.6 per cent for all-India. It is the least urbanised state in the country; just 11.3 per cent of its population lives in urban areas, and the increase in the rate of urbanisation has been very low—0.8 per cent between 2001 and 2011 (Census of India 2011). A disproportionate share of India's poor live in Bihar. Of Bihar's

total population, 34 per cent live below the poverty line (World Bank 2016).

Bihar's backwardness is a result of myriad factors – its colonial history characterised by the Permanent Settlement land tenure system that entrenched the *zamindari* system; state policies such as freight equalisation in the post-independence period (see below), and 'state incapacity by design' wherein in the 1990s and 2000s, the state was deliberately not governed for a decade and a half by the political regime in power (Matthew and Moore 2011). With the change in political regime in 2005, there was a 'resurgence' of Bihar, and a turnaround in its economy; yet, structural problems persist. In this section, we briefly discuss milestones in Bihar's social and economic development trajectory to better understand the context of outmigration from the state.

In the post-independence period despite its abolition, remnants of the *zamindari* system persisted. The failure in the implementation of land reforms ensured that the system still remained 'semi-feudal' – where, to a large extent, land, labour and credit markets were interlocked. The rural landowning 'semi-feudal' class consisting largely of upper castes – the Brahmins, Bhumihars, Rajputs and Kayasthas, along with a small section of Muslims and middle castes controlled social, economic, and political power in the state. This system was not only exploitative, but it also hampered the process of agrarian transformation in the state (Prasad et al. 1988; Prasad 1989).

The Freight Equalisation Policy (1952) constrained Bihar's ability to reap the benefits of its natural resource base of rich minerals such as coal and iron. This policy subsidised freight to ensure availability of basic industrial inputs at the same price throughout India. Therefore, due to already existing industry and infrastructure, advanced regions of northern and western India were able to promote the growth of industries whilst deprived regions such as Bihar that had a comparative advantage for industrialization suffered (Ghosh and Gupta 2009). Corbridge, Harriss and Jeffrey (2013) have called this suffering a version of resource curse in consequence. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Green Revolution bypassed the state as it was targeted at select agricultural regions in the country that had assured irrigation. Ironically, as agriculture at home remained backward and stagnant, Bihari labour traversed long distances to work in the agricultural fields of northwestern India where the Green Revolution brought material wealth and prosperity.¹⁸

Since the 1960s, the state experienced relative economic decline vis-à-vis the rest of India on account of widespread poverty, weak socio-economic infrastructure, and low investment (Rodgers et al. 2013). Bihar's 'semi-feudal' production relations contributed to the iniquitous and exploitative socioeconomic structure, which in turn reinforced semi-feudalism. One ramification of this was the rise of a militant peasant movement that was accompanied by caste and class tensions (Sharma 1995; Sharma 2005). From 1990 until 2005, the state witnessed a near collapse of the administrative law and order machinery under the rule of Laloo Prasad Yadav. Yadav's rise to power was sustained by an electoral coalition of poorer and historically oppressed groups that he mobilised on the basis of continual confrontation with the historically oppressive elite. In doing so, he knowingly undermined the capacity of the state apparatus, and there was a rise in corruption and weakening of state institutions (Matthew and Moore 2011). This was accompanied by the ascendancy of the middle castes – the Kurmis, Koeris and the Yadavs, as well as the Dalits and Muslims. The regime's emphasis on *izzat* – respect and dignity of the poor, translated into political empowerment without economic development in the state (Sharma 2005; Jha and Pushpendra 2014).

In 2005, Nitish Kumar became the Chief Minister, riding on the promise of law and order, economic growth and development (Jha and Pushpendra 2014). Under the new government, law and order was restored, political and economic confidence increased, and Bihar became among the fastest growing state economies in India. The state's transformation was labeled as the 'Bihar miracle' (Matthew and Moore 2011); after several decades of economic stagnation, Bihar's Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) grew astonishingly, at 12 per cent per annum between 2006 and 2013. Much of this growth was concentrated in the secondary and tertiary sectors of construction, transport, storage and communication, trade, hotels and restaurants, and banking and insurance. At the same time, a majority of workers in the state remained concentrated in the agricultural sector dominated by small and marginal landholdings. In 2012-13, the per capita income of Bihar was still the lowest for any state in the country at 41 per cent of the national average, despite advances in narrowing the Bihar-India gap in the last few years (GOB 2014).

The labour market in rural Bihar has changed significantly over the last 30 years. From a stagnant, semi-feudal environment in which much labour suffered from various degrees of bondage, it has moved towards a more

open, market driven system, in which labour migration to other parts of India has both reduced local relationships of dependency and provided new opportunities (Rodgers et al. 2013). According to official statistics, agriculture continues to be the primary employer of the population of Bihar; 62 per cent of its workers are employed in this sector (NSSO 2011). In recent years, against the backdrop of high economic growth in the state, the local non-farm sector has also grown in importance (Kumar and Sarkar 2012).

At the same time, there is high outmigration for work from Bihar's villages; Bihar's economy is often referred to as a remittance economy (Indian Institute of Public Administration 2010). Be it when Bihar was the basket case of development in the 1990s or its poster child under Nitish Kumar's rule since 2005, outmigration for work from the state persists, but its incidence has increased in recent years, particularly in the time period under the study. Bihari workers respond to labour demand elsewhere in India, and the standard of living has improved largely in Bihar with employment opportunities in other states (Tsujita, Oda and Ghosh 2010). The next section traces the history of migration from the state, and discusses changes in the pattern of migration over time.

2.7 Bihar migration

Bihar has a long history of migration. In the 1830s, a significant wave of migration began. Biharis were taken as indentured labour (*girmitya*) to sugarcane and rubber plantations in the British colonies of the Caribbean – Guyana, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and Fiji and Mauritius, and this migration lasted for almost a century. In the second half of the 19th century, there were two major migration streams from the state – to the tea gardens in Assam and to the urban labour markets in Calcutta, both of which were prominent for a century.

Historical accounts have challenged the conventional wisdom of immobility of India's rural population that we touched upon in Chapter 1. Anand Yang's analysis of migration from Saran district in Bihar reveals high rates of internal migration through the late 19th and early 20th century – about 10 per cent of the overall population.^{19 20} Using diverse historical sources, Yang (1979) finds that lower castes such as Tanti, Ahir, Kurmi,

Kahar, Kalwar, Bhar, Dusadh, Nonia, Bind and Chamar dominated out-migration from Saran in the early 20th Century.²¹ Much of this migration was seasonal, and linked with the agricultural calendar. Yang explains,

The “push” was felt particularly by persons of low economic and social status because “this class of population had little inducement to stay at home for agricultural wages are notoriously low, and [they] will be ready to go abroad in order to earn a fair wage.” Such opportunities existed eastwards “in the mills, factories, docks and coal mines, or on the roads and railways, or in harvesting the crops of other districts”. (Yang 1979: 48).

Chattopadhyaya (1987) argues that this eastward movement – the large volume of migration from Bihar to Bengal in the decade of 1891-1901 was on account of push factors – ‘indicative of Bihar’s tremendous economic push and of the struggle for existence of the Biharis’ (Chattopadhyaya 1987: 253). On the whole, these migrants belonged to all castes, were spread across the social hierarchy, and the sole objective of their migration was to earn a living, and save so as to be able to send remittances to family members in the village (Chattopadhyaya 1987). The ‘optimising peasant migrant’ balanced risks and uncertainty to undertake temporary movements to maximize his income (Yang 1979). Thus, it appears, that the early 20th Century peasant migration from Bihar, in terms of its linkages with the agricultural calendar, and responding to both local and distant opportunities has striking similarities with the livelihoods approach that gained traction in the 1980s and 1990s.

The stagnation of Bengal’s industrial economy in the 1930s, coupled with a lack of demand for workers in the tea gardens of Assam led to a decline in the eastward stream of migration from Bihar (Ghosh and Sharma 1995). In the late 1960s and 1970s, with the spread of the Green Revolution in northwestern India, there was a surge in the demand for agricultural labour. Bihar, mired in economic stagnation and poverty, saw a massive outflow of agricultural labourers to the states of Punjab and Haryana (Rodgers and Rodgers 2001; Sharma 2005). Over time, there was a spillover of this rural-rural migration stream into the neighbouring industrial towns and urban areas. The national capital region of Delhi too became a favoured destination among migrant workers. In 2009, 28 per cent of all migrant workers from Bihar worked in Delhi (Rodgers et al. 2013). Migrants moved into non-agricultural work such as rickshawpulling, building and construction work, carpentry, masonry and casual work in the informal sector (Karan 2003).

Thus, with the decline of Bengal, eastward streams of migration shifted to new areas of prosperity in north India. There were shifts in the pattern of migration too, from predominantly short-term flows, linked with the agricultural calendar, migration became relatively longer-term, and a majority of migrants were delinked from agricultural production, and the labour market in source villages (Datta 2016a). In recent years, migrants have started going to the southern Indian states of Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka (Rodgers et al. 2013). Labour demand in urban destinations in these states, along with demographic variations between source and destination regions drives this migration.

Caste intersects with migration in several ways. On the whole, migration spans across caste (De Haan 2002). At the same time, migration streams tend to be differentiated by caste, and caste networks help migrants access distant labour markets. Of the early 20th Century migration from Bihar, Chattopadhyaya (1987) notes,

Those who migrated from Bihar belonged to different social compartments, high and low, but caste or social hierarchy seemed to impose very little restriction on the occupations they followed on their migration into Bengal. Rather, all sorts of employments were welcomed by the migrants from Bihar... employments which would have been looked down upon in the neighbourhood of their village-homes. The Brahmin migrants, for instance, were found serving as peons, policemen, door-keepers, cooks and even as day-labourers (Chattopadhyaya, 1987: 278-9).

For upper castes, doing manual wage work in their home villages continues to be a taboo as it is against the ritual hierarchy of caste. Many people thus prefer to work outside to be able to undertake a variety of work and access diverse occupations (Karan 2003). At the same time, many lower castes are averse to work in the village on account of the history of feudal exploitation and subsequent caste tension, strife, and violence in Bihar.²² From their perspective, migration has provided a route to 'work with dignity and freedom' (Deshingkar, Kumar, Chobey and Kumar 2006), and increased migration may be an important agent of change in rural Bihar (Sharma 2005). However, this does not necessarily mean that villagers prefer to migrate than to stay in the village; based on fieldwork in north Bihar, Indrajit Roy argues that migrants indeed want to live in the village, if work that is in the domain of their dignity is available (Roy 2014).

Circularity has remained an enduring feature of migration from Bihar. On the whole, late 19th and early 20th century migrants to Bengal had no intention of settling in Bengal permanently (Chattopadhyaya 1987). Migrants remained tied to their land and families in source villages, and migration was a household strategy. Even when relatively permanent employment was offered at destination, migration from Bihar to Bengal remained circular (De Haan 1996). Permanent migration was not preferred as it was looked as property lost in the village; seasonal migration persisted, as seasonal migration was considered safe (Yang 1979). Interestingly, and not so surprisingly, Chattopadhyaya notes that those at the lowest rung of the social hierarchy in the village were more likely to choose permanent migration. This may be explained by their outcaste status that defined dirty and menial jobs reserved for them in the village, coupled with the lack of land and other assets that did not tie them to the source village. In fact, social and economic conditions in the destination regions appealed to the lower castes much more than their circumstances in the villages of origin. Chattopadhyaya explains,

Among the migrants, those most inclined towards permanent residence in Bengal were the sweepers and 'chamars' (dealers in hides) whose earnings and security of their jobs induced them to stay on in Bengal... (Chattopadhyaya 1987: 278).

This may be a contrast from current migration streams from Bihar where IHD surveys show that it is a minority among the upper castes and those at the top of the economic hierarchy who are most inclined and able to leave the village permanently.²³ Permanent migration from the village to the city is desired in a context where it offers better work and education opportunities. In particular, young people aspire to have a firm foothold in the city to access new opportunities in urban India. This is coveted even more in the context of decline of agriculture and lack of employment in rural areas. At the same time, permanent migration also requires substantial resources that only a few can afford. For temporary migrants, on the other hand, 'difficult work and working conditions during their stay outside progressively reduce their capacity and desire to undertake such journeys' (Ghosh and Sharma 1995).

On the whole, however, though migration streams have become longer-term, and rural workers are increasingly embedded in the urban

economy, their migration remains circular. The circularity of labour migration in Bihar needs to be emphasised. Men go out to work and ultimately return to their village. It has clearly emerged from successive revisits that over time, permanent migration of the kind that involves relocation of households from the village is very limited. Given that most of this migration is to urban labour markets across various locations in India, we have argued elsewhere that, since the rural areas bear the cost of the production, maintenance, and reproduction of the labour force, they are subsidising economic growth and development in the urban areas (Datta et al. 2014). This is manifested time and again, and most recently in the context of the sudden demonetisation of the Indian economy in November 2016. In the wake of demonetisation, there have been reports of disruption and contraction of economic activity in specific sectors, accompanied by job losses and migrants being pushed into precarious work, or migrant workers in urban areas having to return to their villages. (Sharma 2016; Naik, Kunduri and Parulkar 2017). This has been corroborated in my urban fieldwork site of Basai Darapur in Delhi where, in the weeks following demonetisation, there has been contraction of economic activity and exodus of migrant workers to their village in Mahisham, Bihar (Personal Communication, November 2016). Thus, the migrant's contact with the city can be long-term, yet ephemeral. He may have been working in the city for decades, yet this association can abruptly end on account of an external shock, resulting him to take recourse to his rural residence.

2.8 In conclusion

This chapter has discussed the broad empirical and theoretical literature within which this thesis is located, drawing on multiple strands of the 'migration and development' literature, rooted in the academic disciplines of economics, sociology and human geography. It has also drawn on the larger literature on international migration, as both internal and international migrations are closely intertwined, in terms of their drivers, outcomes and impacts. It has emphasised that both types of migration have expanded under contemporary globalisation, and in the case of India this needs to be located in the particular context of economic liberalisation since the 1990s.

The chapter has then delineated the framework of mixed methods research, describing the quantitative and qualitative data used in this thesis, and its association with a long-term research programme in rural Bihar.

Thereafter, the chapter traces social and economic developments in Bihar to give a background to the geographical site of research. Lastly, the chapter discusses the history of Bihar migration, with an emphasis on its changing patterns in recent decades. In sum, the chapter has attempted to set the context for the empirical research of this thesis on internal labour migration in India.

Notes

¹ Modernisation theories derive from neoclassical economic models that conceptualise development as the movement of surplus labour from 'subsistence' to 'capitalist' sectors (Lewis 1954) in a linear 'set of stages of growth' (Rostow 1959). Dependency theories, on the other hand, located migration in the wider structures of the global capitalist economy, shaped by the 'dependency' between the 'core' and 'periphery', between the 'metropolis' and 'satellites'. Migration here was thus considered an inevitable part of global capitalism that contributed to the 'development of underdevelopment' (Frank 1966; Wallerstein 1974, 1980 in De Haas 2008).

² This is also closely intertwined with the lack of interdisciplinarity within migration studies.

³ Subjectivities here refer to migrants' own experiences, ideas and attitudes. Migrants' subjectivities about their migration may be different from perspectives of the market and the state on the same migration.

⁴ Breman argues that footloose labour is pushed out of the agrarian labour market to depend on casual work, and their 'urban employment in the informal sector is marked by a cyclicity that is usually associated with an agrarian-rural economic lifestyle' (Breman 1996: 70).

⁵ In the NELM framework, Stark and Lucas (1988) attribute the importance of remittances in the development process to five factors, viz., the scale and pace of rural-urban migration, the magnitude of urban to rural remittances, its impact on the distribution of income, impact on resource constraints in the sending economies, particularly in the agricultural sector and impact on the next generation.

⁶ Interestingly, return migration was part of one of the earliest theorisations of migration; Ravenstein's fourth law of migration stated that 'each main current of migration produces a compensating counter-current' (Ravenstein 1885: 33).

⁷ For a review of the contributions of the discipline of geography, and its engagement with migration research, see King (2011).

⁸ On the other hand, a researcher may begin with a qualitative method, and follow it up a large sample based quantitative method (Creswell 2003).

⁹ The A. N. Sinha Institute of Social Studies and the International Labour Organisation undertook this research in the early 1980s [see Prasad et al (1988)]. For a detailed account and history of this longitudinal research in Bihar, see Rodgers, Mishra and Sharma (2016).

¹⁰ Villages closer to the cluster mean in each size group were selected as core villages.

¹¹ As in the surveys of 1981-83, the questionnaire for the census household survey in 12 core villages in 1998-99 was specifically designed to permit a class stratification of each village. Subsequent sampling was undertaken within each class stratum. Seven principal occupation groups in this class structure were agricultural labourers who do not cultivate, agricultural labourers who cultivate, poor middle peasants, middle peasants, big peasants, landlords and non-agricultural labourers.

¹² The data was collected by the Institute for Human Development, New Delhi, as part of research projects funded by ActionAid and the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development.

¹³ I was a part of the team that developed the research tools for the 2009-11 study, and have been involved in the data collection, data processing and its analysis.

¹⁴ Census statistics reveal that Madhubani district sends the maximum number of migrants from Bihar to Delhi. In fact, 1.95 per cent of all migrants in Delhi are from Madhubani (Census of India 2001).

¹⁵ The highest net rural to urban inter-state migration stream is from Uttar Pradesh to Delhi.

¹⁶ De Haan (1996), in his work on migrant workers in Kolkata has highlighted that the views of migrant workers in destination may well be different if studied from the rural side.

¹⁷ Some of these are discussed in chapter 6.

¹⁸ Capitalist agriculture reached only a small part in central Bihar that had a history of canal irrigation.

¹⁹ This is in contrast with official data sources such as colonial reports; Yang (1979) suggests that these sources underestimate seasonal migration.

²⁰ In the current study, for Bihar as a whole, the share of migrants in total population increased from 9.7 per cent in 1998 to 19.5 per cent in 2011.

²¹ He notes that the Bourdillon Report (1890) describes the migrants as 'the lower classes'.

²² In the late 1990s, Sharma (2005) notes the increase in commuters to nearby villages and towns. Many commuters were also seasonal migrants; they preferred to work outside the village to break away from the hardship of caste discrimination in the village.

²³ The surveys also reveal that the highest incidence of migration is among the most educated.

3

State Discourses on Rural-Urban Migration in India

3.1 Introduction

Policy and programme documents of the Indian state offer unique insights into the nature and pattern of the state's desired development path. With the exception of reports in the colonial period, state policy documents have accorded far less space to the phenomenon of rural-urban labour migration than one may expect. This silence on labour migration, given its fundamental role envisaged in the state's development project, is striking. Nevertheless several discourses on rural-urban migration emerge from the state's industrial, labour, rural and urban policies. These may converge, contradict, or be in conflict with one another. These perspectives, in turn, form and inform ideas and perceptions about migration.

This chapter examines state discourses on rural-urban migration spanning a period of more than eight decades since the early 1930s. Three sets of policy documents are critically analysed. First, two important colonial reports on labour throw light on state policy of labour migration in British India. Second, Five-Year Plan documents through which economic planning in India has been undertaken for six decades since 1951 have been studied. And, third, noteworthy government reports such as those of the National Commission on Labour (1969, 2002) and National Commission on Rural Labour (1991) are examined.

Section 3.2 explores the perspectives of the Royal Commission on Labour (1931) and the Labour Investigation Committee (1946) on rural-urban migration in India. This is followed by the newly independent state's view on such migration, related to its industrial development project in section 3.3. Thereafter, section 3.4 focuses on the Green Revolution and migration of labour. Subsequently, section 3.5 engages with several inter-

related themes that emerge from the state's discourse on rural–urban migration. It highlights the state's changing discourse in the post-liberalisation period, emphasising urban-rural welfare linkages, the urbanisation-migration disconnect, rural and urban development policies, and the role of the federal state in shaping the discourse on rural-urban migration. Section 3.6 concludes.

3.2 The migration question in India before Independence

The migration question was an important question in pre-independent India. Rural-urban migration was inextricably linked to the state's industrialisation project. A dominant discourse during this time was that the western historical experience of transfer of labour from the rural and agricultural to the urban and industrial sectors would play out in India. This section discusses the outlook and approach of the Royal Commission on Labour (1931), and the Labour Investigation Committee (1946) towards the migration question. While the two bodies differed in their perspectives, they addressed this fundamental issue of rural-urban migration upfront.

The Royal Commission on Labour in India (RCLI) was constituted under the chairmanship of John Henry Whitley to study the conditions of labour in industrial undertakings and plantations.¹ This Commission, popularly known as the Whitley Commission, noted that the industrial working class in the West was drawn mainly from persons brought up in towns, and partly those who abandoned the country for towns. In India, on the other hand, this class comprised of mainly migrants (RCLI 1931). This key difference explained the circularity of migration, that, in the minds of those who undertook it, migration from rural areas to the factories was not a permanent exodus, but a temporary transfer. Referring to a typical migrant worker, the Commission pointed out that:

The city, as such, has no attraction for him and, when he leaves the village, he has seldom an ambition beyond that of securing the necessities of life. Few industrial workers would remain in industry if they could secure sufficient food and clothing in the village; they are pushed, not pulled, to the city (RCLI 1931: 11).

Thus, the Commission argued that the industrial population not be divorced from the villages, and that the existing contact of the industrial population and the village be maintained and stimulated (RCLI 1931: 20).²

However, less than two decades later, the Labour Investigation Committee set up under the chairmanship of M.V. Rege took a different view.³ Contrary to the suggestion of the Whitley Commission, the Rege Committee felt that the village-nexus should not be positively encouraged so as to improve conditions of industrial towns, in particular related to social security of workers. It argued that the village, and the joint family and caste, were steadily deteriorating as economic supports of the workers. At this juncture, the workers were considered to be in a transitional stage in which they were gradually losing the support of the village and had not been able to secure a firm footing in the industrial areas. Thus, the Committee felt that to 'turn back the clock of time and either to prevent the worker from coming to the town or to force him back to the village would be a step in the wrong direction' (GOI 1946: 78). In principle, this viewpoint was compatible with the post-independence industrialisation discourse where there was a demand for industrial workers in India's stated industrialisation project. This viewpoint also echoed modernisation theory and conformed to dual sector models of development where development was seen as a linear movement from agriculture to industry (Lewis 1954). It was envisaged as the transition of a traditional society characterised by the primary sector to an industrial urban society in set stages of growth (Rostow 1959).

In this period, the agricultural character of the factory population was a subject of much deliberation, for its degree would determine the nature of the migration project. Ties to the land, to the farms, played an important role in workers' eventual return to the village upon retirement from the factory. The Whitley Commission noted that while the factory population was not divorced from land, as in the West, it could not be regarded as composed of a mass of agriculturists serving a short term in industry (RCLI 1931). On the other hand, the Rege Committee painstakingly argued that the bulk of factory workers were migrants who had little stake in agriculture, though they owned land (GOI 1946).⁴ This disconnect from agriculture was expected to facilitate and ease their transition to an industrial workforce.

3.3 Independent India and the industrialisation project

In the earlier section, we discussed that the colonial state addressed the important question of the industrialisation-migration-development nexus. This was a fundamental topic of inquiry of both the Whitley Commission and the Rege Committee.⁵ With time, however, the migration-industrialisation-development nexus gave way to the industrialisation-development nexus, and the policy discourse in newly independent India became increasingly silent about labour migration.

The focus, and the text on industrial development in the First Five Year Plan (1951-1956) was largely devoted to output related measures; the key input of (industrial) labour in general and migrant labour in particular was absent in chapters on labour and employment. In other related themes such as urbanisation and expansion of commerce, migrant labour, central to the state's industrialisation project, found no mention. The Second Plan (1956-61) furthered the state's industrial programme at the cost of agriculture.⁶ While it acknowledged that planned measures were required to transfer surplus labour from poorer areas for the execution of large-scale projects, Plan documents remained silent on the modalities of such transfer. Complications were expected to arise in the movement of large numbers of workers, and it was felt that 'bringing gainful work to the doors of people in distress may be a better way of dealing with their problems' (GOI 1956)⁷ Thus emerged a fundamental contradiction in the state's discourse in early plan documents – that industrialisation was necessary for development, but migration was not desirable.

This contradiction made way for another paradox. Given that rural-urban migration was inextricably linked with urbanisation, the discourse on urbanisation became entangled with difficulties related to migration. The perception that migration is a 'problem' emerges in the state's narrative time and again, as we will discuss in the course of this chapter. This is clearly pointed out in the Third Plan (1961-66), where, while urbanisation itself was considered an important aspect of the process of economic and social development, the Plan argued that urbanisation was,

closely connected with many other problems such as migration from villages to towns, levels of living in rural and urban areas, relative costs of providing economic and social services in towns of varying size, provision of housing

for different sections of the population, provision of facilities like water supply, sanitation, transport and power, pattern of economic development... (GOI 1961)⁸

The state's industrial project of Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) aimed at rapid industrialisation in heavy and basic industries, the costs of which would be borne by the public sector (Varshney 1995). This grand plan of industrial development was possible due to a squeeze on agriculture (Lipton 1977). However, by the end of the Second Plan, it was being argued that industrial emphasis ignored and even exacerbated rural poverty as land reforms and community development programme (including *panchayati raj*) fell short of their production possibilities and democratic transformation respectively (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987). A fundamental cause of the failure of the state's industrialisation project was its embeddedness in the grand theorisation of modernisation that did not take into account issues of both context, and agency. As elsewhere in the Global South, in response to centralised top-down modernisation projects, there emerged several other ideas and articulations of development. These, in turn, had a bearing on the nature and pattern of rural-urban migration in India.

3.4 Green Revolution and the migration of labour

The industrialisation project failed to significantly transfer labour from rural to urban areas, and the expected urban migration associated with large-scale industrial employment did not materialise. On the other hand, successive droughts in the mid-1960s triggered distress migration from the rural areas; migration from villages to towns in search of employment exacerbated during the drought period (GOI 1970).⁹ The drought of 1965-67 was a landmark in several ways. First, it changed the industrialisation-development narrative, and shifted the policy focus to agriculture.¹⁰ Second, technological innovation in agriculture, and the adoption of high yielding varieties of seeds with assured inputs of irrigation and chemical fertilisers culminated in the Green Revolution.

The Green Revolution induced large-scale migration of labour to northwestern India – in particular, to the states of Punjab and Haryana. In response to the Green Revolution, long-distance rural-rural migration emerged as an important stream of labour migration. In the context of this thesis, rural Bihar emerged as an important source region that supplied

agricultural labour to the northwestern states of Punjab and Haryana (Singh 1995). The Green Revolution contributed to pockets of high growth, and large-scale employment of migrant labour. The National Commission on Rural Labour (NCRL) estimated that 40 per cent of agricultural workers were migrants. The Commission also noted that these migrant agricultural workers lived and worked in precarious conditions, and their problems were severe; they had long hours of backbreaking work in the fields, they had no housing facilities, and mostly lived on the farms where they worked, and often, their payments were delayed and defaulted.¹¹ The Commission argued that agriculture of prosperous states like Punjab depends on migrant workers and therefore, they should legitimately mete out fair treatment, ensure fair housing, adequate wages and social security benefits for them (NCRL 1991; NCL 2002).¹²

3.5 The post-liberalisation period

3.5.1 Urban-rural welfare linkages

The economic reforms of 1991 were a watershed in India's economic policy and development paradigm. For the first time in post-Independent India, urban-rural linkages in consumption became evident in national statistics. In the pre-liberalisation period, rural growth alone had reduced poverty in rural areas. However, post-liberalisation, urban growth became a driver of rural poverty reduction (Datt and Ravallion 2009). At the same time, according to Census estimates, employment-related migration nearly doubled from 9.9 million to 18.7 million between the period 1981-1990 and 2001-2010 (Chandrasekhar, Naik and Roy 2017). These trends point towards an increasingly mobile workforce in the post-liberalisation period.

State documents in the period emphasise the importance of rural-urban linkages, and acknowledge that rural areas, rural workers and rural resources have contributed to urban growth and development, thus indicating the state's persistent urban bias. Take, for instance the following paragraph from the Ninth Five Year Plan (1997-2002):

The rural hinterland has played a critical role in sustaining urbanisation. This is reflected in the indicators of sources of primary inputs, competitively priced labour for urban economic activities, primary funds as reflected in comparative urban and rural credit-deposit ratios and markets for urban pockets.... effective urban strategies and programmes cannot be developed in isolation of those living in rural areas (GOI 1997).¹³

3.5.2 Urbanisation-migration disconnect

At the same time, there remained an underlying disconnect between urbanisation and migration in the state's discourse. While urbanisation was clearly desirable, often, the state's view on migration was ambivalent. Consider the following text from the chapter on urban development in the Tenth Five Year Plan (2002-07):

There is, in fact, evidence to show that urbanisation is likely to have been a key determinant of economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s, boosted by economic liberalisation. From this point of view, the moderate pace of urbanisation in the country has been a cause of disappointment. There is, however, no rural vs. urban conflict either in terms of national growth, or in development priorities (GOI 2002: 613).

There is a clear indication that urbanisation, and therefore migration has contributed to economic growth and development. This is consistent with the livelihood approach, wherein rural-urban migration is one among many livelihood strategies of rural households. This emphasis on the 'rural' household in livelihood approach is emblematic of a source area bias in the state's discourse on rural-urban migration. At the same time, the claim that there is no rural versus urban conflict is contrary to empirical evidence, as well as narratives that emerge in the state's discourse.

In recent years, there has been a growing recognition that migrants are clearly important actors in an economic sense, and there is an acknowledgment of the positive role of the rural worker in urban development (NCEUS 2007; GOI 2017b). Again, from the lens of the livelihood approach, the rural household undertakes migration as a livelihood strategy, in its struggle for survival and to improve its standard of living. In doing so, its members work in the urban economy and contribute to urban development. Yet rural migrant workers remain marginalised. Policy documents remain silent on the denial of migrants' social, economic and cultural rights, and there remain serious barriers to migrants' integration in the city (Bhagat 2011; Abbas and Varma 2014).

3.5.3 Rural and urban development policies

In India's post-liberalisation period, there has been a renewed emphasis on 'rural development', consistent with the global policy discourse of livelihood diversification (Ellis 2000; World Bank 2007). The state recognised

that agriculture and land-based activities will not provide adequate employment for those underemployed or unemployed in rural areas. The rural-urban divide emerges frequently in policy documents, and it has been argued in the Eighth Five Year Plan (1992-97) that:

Even allowing that some of them (rural workers) will be able to find adequately remunerative jobs on migration to urban areas, it is not only desirable but necessary that the rural economy gets diversified into non-agricultural activities to provide productive employment to the growing rural labour force and also to reduce the wide economic differences between rural and urban areas (GOI 1992).¹⁴

This suggests an inherent preference in state policy that rural people must remain in rural areas. In a context where India's industrial sector has been unable to absorb rural workforce, it is argued that it is necessary to create employment opportunities in the rural areas so as to reduce migration of unemployed rural youth to the cities in search of jobs (GOI 2002: 595).

In the state's urban development discourse, it is argued that 'the unending migration of the rural poor to urban areas may have a destabilising effect on urbanisation and its sustainability' (GOI 1997).¹⁵ There is a dominant policy discourse that migration puts severe stress on civic infrastructure (GOI 2002: 595), and migration is seen to have resulted in the rapid growth of urban slums (GOI 2002: 89). Therefore, a key goal of the state's urban development policies is to check migration of population to the metropolises (GOI 1992).¹⁶

The recurring theme that migration is a problem thus emerges in both, rural and urban policy discourses, and state policies clearly and explicitly aim to contain and curb migration. Though the Indian Constitution guarantees freedom of movement and mobility, there are negative connotations, and regressive undercurrents associated with rural-urban migration in state policies and documents. Take the Twelfth Five Year Plan for instance. Migrant labourers are clubbed in a working group of child labourers and bonded labourers. It appears that migrants are perceived as entities to be eliminated, with no agency of their own. In a similar vein, government programmes such as the Provision of Urban Amenities in Rural Areas (PURA) aim to prevent the migration of the working populations from the rural to the urban areas. Similarly, one of the key objectives of the MGNREGS (Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee

Scheme), as professed by the Central government, and adopted by state governments is to reduce outmigration from rural areas.

3.5.4 Multiple actors in the federal state¹⁷

Labour is a subject on the concurrent list of the Indian Constitution. This implies that both central and state governments can develop policies and enact legislations related to migrant labour. What is politically feasible, however, may depend primarily on the balance of forces between central and state governments (Weiner 1978). To better understand state perspectives on migration, it may be useful to examine views of various actors that comprise the federal state. At the disaggregated level, three such actors are:

- a. The provincial government of source states (migrant-sending states).
- b. The provincial government of destination states (migrant-receiving states).
- c. The central government.

The state's federal structure creates a vertical segmentation between the central and the provincial governments, and each one of these actors is likely to have a different outlook on migration. At times, they may contradict one another. At the same time, there is horizontal segmentation within the central government's rural and urban development ministries, and their policies and programmes tend to operate in silos. These perspectives are discussed further.

Migrant-sending states

Let us first take the case of a source government, say that of the migrant-sending state of Bihar, for instance. In recent years, contrary to empirical evidence, there is a sense that outmigration from the state (Bihar) is declining on account of high economic growth within the state. This is reflected not just in the political rhetoric, but also in official documents of the state. The Chief Minister of the state has explained,

The situation in Bihar has changed for better as there are abundance of job opportunities here due to ongoing development works....the people need not go outside to earn two square meals...¹⁸

The Labour Department of the Government of Bihar claims that migration from the state declined by 35 – 40 per cent between 2008 and 2012. The Department estimates that 1.5 to 2 million inter-state migrant labourers have returned to Bihar due to availability of work within the state (Gupta 2014). Other evidence for such contentions includes media reports that throw light on labour shortage at specific destinations, such as the paddy fields in Punjab and the diamond industry at Surat. However, it may be misleading to conclude that labour shortage at destination is the same as a decline in outmigration from source areas.¹⁹ In a similar vein, the political rhetoric assumes that economic development in source areas is necessarily associated with a reduction in migration.²⁰ However, various scientific micro-studies, including the one on which this thesis is based, as well as reports in the mass media have found that outmigration from Bihar is high, and continues to increase. The failure of the MGNREGA in Bihar discussed in chapter 5 suggests that migration trends are unlikely to have reversed. Yet, against the backdrop of high economic growth in the state in recent years, it is in the interest of this state actor – the provincial government of a source state to claim that migration has reduced on account of local development. This is mainly because, in source regions, outmigration is perceived as a failure of local and rural development policies.

Migrant-receiving states

What about the states at destination? The Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act, 1979, mandates the host state to protect migrant workers and safeguard their rights such as wage equality with local labourers, the provision of suitable residential accommodation and free medical facilities, protective clothing and suitable conditions of work. However, host governments are generally infamous for their hostility towards migrant workers.²¹ Too often, migrants cannot claim rights guaranteed by the Constitution and laws on account of the migrant-native divide which is embedded in the politics of internal migration in India (Abbas 2016). Additionally, there is little acknowledgement of the migrants' contribution to the local economy; it is absent in state policies and development discourse of the destination state. On the other hand, many host locations have witnessed anti-migrant sentiments, and migrants from Bihar have faced a backlash in destinations such as Maharashtra and Assam, among others. In Maharashtra for instance, in 2008, there was severe anti-Bihari backlash fuelled by local

‘sons of the soil’ political parties, and a prominent leader of one of these parties made statements such as,

A guest is welcomed if he adjusts himself to the host's house. But if he tries to change the host's house through *dadagiri* (bullying), we won't tolerate it. And no means no! (The Indian Express 2008).

Often, this backlash is rooted in ethnocentric movements (as in the case cited above), while, at other times, it is brought about the state and its agents. For instance, the former Chief Minister of Delhi, India's capital state, said in a public meeting, ‘...these people come to Delhi from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh but don't ever go back causing burden on Delhi's infrastructure’ (Sethi 2009).

In the context of the southern state of Kerala, Prasad-Aleyamma (2018) argues ID-based surveillance of migrant workers occurs through state repression. Similarly, in Tamil Nadu too, where Bihari migration is a relatively recent phenomenon, migrant profiling through creating a database of migrant workers, including their biometric identity is underway. Migrants are perceived to be a ‘law and order problem’, and views like the one below, by a police officer are common.

We have asked firms employing migrant labourers to submit their details. Our data collection would convey a strong message to them that if they are involved in any kind of anti social activities, they will be traced... (Karthick 2012).

Indeed, migrants are often linked with rising crime in the city, and the backlash is severe. For instance, in the 2013 case of a brutal sexual assault of a young woman in Delhi, the accused were Bihari men, and this had ramifications for other migrant Bihari workers. Migrants often live in fear; and a culture of fear is created and perpetuated by the dominant social and cultural agendas in host locations. These are manifested in various forms, through means physical or otherwise. The lines below were a part of a mass SMS that went viral in 2008, when anti-Bihari sentiment reached a high in Maharashtra. The first line (below) was the title of an editorial by a revered leader of a political party in its political mouthpiece; a classic example of how fear is created, and sustained:

Ek Bihari, Sau Bimari.
Ek Bihari, Sau Bimari. Do Bihari Ladai ki taiyari,
Teen Bihari train hamari aur paanch Bihari to sarkar hamaari.
 (The Times of India 2012)

[One Bihari, a hundred diseases.
One Bihari, a hundred diseases. Two Biharis, preparation for a battle,
Three Biharis, the train is ours, and five Biharis the government is ours]

Thus, while Article 19 of the Indian Constitution guarantees freedom of movement throughout the territory of India, and the freedom to reside in any part of the country to every citizen, living with these xenophobic vibes in host locations is an everyday reality for the Bihari migrant worker.

Central government

What about the perspectives of the central government? First, as discussed in chapter 1, the official data collection machinery, such as the Census, i.e. the Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner and the National Sample Survey Office grossly underestimate migrant workers. It is these 'national statistics' that contribute to the invisibility of migrant workers. Second, there is horizontal segmentation within the central government's rural and urban development ministries, and their policies and programmes tend to operate in silos. This horizontal segmentation within the central government is both a cause and effect of the rural-urban dialectic in state policy, where the rural and urban tend to be mutually exclusive in policy imagination, formulation, implantation and evaluation.

In sum, migrant-sending and migrant-receiving states have divergent perspectives on rural-urban migration. The federal structure of the Indian state, and the vertical and horizontal segmentation of state actors contributes to contradictory state narratives, and ultimately leads to the absence of a coherent discourse on rural-urban migration.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has briefly discussed state discourses on rural-urban migration in India since the early 1930s. It emerged that while the migration question was an important policy question in pre-independent India, state policy became increasingly silent about rural-urban migration in the post-Independence decades, and there emerged a fundamental contradiction in the state's discourse – that industrialisation was necessary for economic growth and development, but migration was not desirable. Subsequently, the discourse on urbanisation became fraught with several problems. As the industrialisation project failed to significantly transfer labour from rural to urban areas, the expected rural-urban migration associated with

large-scale industrial employment did not materialise. Instead, the Green Revolution induced large-scale migration of labour to rural areas, which drew the state's attention to rural labour migration, in particular, their precarious work and living conditions.

In the post-liberalisation period, migration for work substantially increased, and there has been a growing recognition that migrants are clearly important actors in an economic sense. There has also been an acknowledgment of the positive role of the rural worker in urban development, but there remains an underlying disconnect between urbanisation and migration in the state's discourse – while urbanisation is clearly desirable, often, the state's view on migration was ambivalent. The recurring theme that rural-urban migration is a 'problem' is embedded in both rural and urban policy discourses; state policies thus aim to contain such migration. The rural and urban tend to be mutually exclusive in the state's imagination and policy. This rural-urban dialectic, along with the federal structure of the state, which leads to the vertical and horizontal segmentation of state actors contribute to contradictory state narratives, and ultimately lead to the absence of a coherent discourse on rural-urban migration.

Notes

¹ The key areas of inquiry of the Commission set up in 1929 were health, efficiency and standard of living of the workers, and the relations between employers and employed.

² Interestingly, the economic crisis of the 1930s led to contraction of employment in many industries. Workers' links with their villages meant that they were able to go back to their villages in times of crises, and this period witnessed an exodus of industrial workers to their rural origins. In the case of jute industry in Calcutta, De Haan (1996) finds that one of the ramifications of the crisis was that jobs became unionized, protected and scarce. This was contrary to the situation in the pre-crisis period, when labour was short in industries, and migration, a necessary solution.

³ In 1944, the Government of India appointed a Labour Investigation Committee 'to collect data relating inter alia to wages and earnings, employment, housing and social conditions of labour and in particular of industrial labour, in India' (GOI 1946: 14).

⁴ This conclusion was reached based on surveys undertaken in Delhi, Lahore, Jubbulpore, Karachi, Tinsukia and Dehri-on-Sone.

⁵ In fact, the very first chapter of the Royal Commission on Labour Report is titled 'Migration and the Factory Worker' (RCLI 1931).

⁶ The total plan outlay for agriculture saw a significant reduction during this period (Frankel 2005).

⁷ Chapter 5, Employment Aspects of the Plan.

⁸ Chapter 33, Housing and Urban and Rural Planning.

⁹ In my own fieldwork, I encountered a former attached labourer, SP, in the agrarian belt of south Bihar whose maiden migration experience was triggered by this drought and subsequent famine of 1966. Together with other villagers, SP migrated to Assam in search of work. He worked there for three months, and returned to the village when the situation improved, never to leave again. In his household, no migration took place for more than four decades in spite of the household having several able-bodied men [Datta et al (2012); Fieldwork diary, Chandkura village, February 2012].

¹⁰ Around this time, the first National Commission on Labour was set up in 1966 with the mandate to examine all aspects of labour problems. The Commission endorsed rural works programmes, laying an emphasis on labour-intensive schemes such as road building, minor irrigation, soil conservation, area development programmes, irrigation, flood control and rural electrification. This was expected to expand non-farm rural employment and absorb under-employed workers in the agricultural sector (NCL 1969).

¹¹ The Commission also noted that the Inter State Migrant Workmen Act was ineffective because the state labour departments were reluctant to cooperate with the originating states' labour departments. The Act was not enforced effectively and migrant workers were largely ignorant about their rights under the Act. In addition, the trade unions were not interested in the plight of migrant workers.

¹² The Sixth Five Year Plan discussed welfare activities and dormitory housing in destination areas for migrant workers, and recommended the constitution of Migrant Welfare Boards and Migrant Welfare Cells in all states – a pertinent recommendation which did not materialise as envisaged (GOI 1981). The sub-section, 3.5.4 on 'multiple actors in the federal state' discusses the failure of policies related to well-being of migrant workers in destination states.

¹³ Ninth Five Year Plan, Volume II, Chapter 3.7 Housing, Urban Development, Water Supply and Civic Amenities.

¹⁴ Eight Five Year Plan, Volume I, Chapter 6, Employment Perspective.

¹⁵ Ninth Five Year Plan, Volume II, Chapter 3.7 Housing, Urban Development, Water Supply and Civic Amenities.

¹⁶ Eight Five Year Plan, Volume II, Chapter 13, Urban Development.

¹⁷ This sub-section draws on arguments made in Datta (2016b).

¹⁸ Statement by Nitish Kumar, Chief Minister of Bihar on 29 June 2012.

<https://www.news18.com/news/politics/no-need-to-migrate-for-work-nitish-kumar-484939.html>

¹⁹ Research on which this thesis is based shows that over time migrant destinations have changed from rural to urban areas, particularly in the case of northwestern states such as Punjab and Haryana. Migrants prefer not to work in backbreaking agriculture and instead find employment in non-agricultural occupations (Rodgers et al. 2013; also see chapter 7).

²⁰ This is misleading as economic development and mobility often go hand in hand (Human Development Report 2009).

²¹ In recent years, many destination states have witnessed anti-migrant sentiments. For instance, in 2008, in Maharashtra, there was a severe backlash against migrants, particularly from the northern states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, fuelled by local ethnocentric movements.

4

Determinants of Migration from Rural Bihar, 1998 - 2011

4.1 Introduction

This chapter explores socio-economic factors associated with individual migration.¹ Using two cross-sections of data from surveys conducted in rural Bihar which covered 891 households in 1998, and the same (and successor) households (903) in 2011, it estimates the determinants of individual migration, and examines if these have changed over time. In doing so, the chapter also revisits conventional theories of migration in the context of a poor rural setting where migration is male-dominated and circular – most migrants eventually return to their families in rural areas.

The chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 briefly discusses relevant theoretical literature, and empirical literature on the determinants of rural-urban migration in India. Section 4.3 describes the data, and section 4.4 presents broad patterns of migration, i.e., its incidence and key characteristics in 1998 and 2011. Section 4.5 outlines the empirical specification for both 1998 and 2011. Section 4.6 presents descriptive statistics and section 4.7 discusses results of the 1998 and 2011 models. Section 4.8 concludes.

4.2 Theoretical and empirical literature

In the theoretical literature, individual-level characteristics are important drivers of migration. Everett Lee refers to these as ‘personal factors’ in his seminal work (Lee 1966), and these also attain importance in neoclassical models where costs of migration from rural to urban sector are high, and migration is an ‘individual’ decision based on wage differentials and expected income differentials between source and destination areas (Todaro

1969; Harris and Todaro 1970). Another set of variables that explain migration are household-level characteristics. The idea that migration is not an 'individual' but a family decision has been around for long in the literature (Connell et al. 1976; Mincer 1978), and this has become more prominent in the new economics of labour migration (NELM) theories, where migration is perceived not as an individual choice, but a household choice (Stark and Bloom 1985; Stark and Lucas 1988).

Unlike neoclassical models, NELM emphasises that it is not (potential) income differentials between source and destination areas, which drive migration, but, migration is an income enhancing and risk sharing livelihood strategy adopted by the rural household. Some theoretical models hypothesise social networks as crucial determinants in the decision related to migration. These may belong to the vector of household level or community level variables, depending on how they are defined (Massey 1990).

Empirical literature on migration in India presents a diverse and somewhat contradictory picture. Official sources such as the Census of India and National Sample Surveys conducted by the NSSO are biased towards long term and permanent migration. Results from studies based on such data find migration to be positively selective for education and socio-economic status (Parida and Madheswaran 2011; Dubey, Palmer-Jones and Sen 2006). On the other hand, micro-studies which concentrate on short-term and seasonal mobility find migration to be negatively selective for education and socio-economic status (Dodd et al. 2016; Mosse et al. 2002; Rogaly et al. 2002; Haberfeld et al. 1999).² The definition of a migrant,³ and in particular, duration of migration are likely to have a bearing on whether a person is considered a migrant or not, migrant characteristics, and the determinants of migration per se.

Empirical evidence in India shows that demographic characteristics and human capital variables such as age and education status are important determinants of individual migration. NSSO data shows that age is positive and significant in explaining migration (Parida and Madheswaran 2011). Younger individuals are more likely to migrate than older individuals, and men are more likely to migrate than women (Dodd et al. 2016).⁴ Recently married men are more likely to migrate than those who are not married (Parida and Madheswaran 2011).

As noted earlier, evidence on the effect of education status on the probability of migration in India is mixed. Studies that analyse country-level NSSO data find that those with little or no education are less likely to

migrate to urban areas and the tendency to migrate intensifies as levels of education increase (Parida and Madheswaran 2011; Dubey et al. 2006). However, evidence from western India suggests that higher levels of education within the household tend to lower the probability of a household to provide migrant labour (Haberfeld et al. 1999).

We have touched upon NELM theories where migration is an income enhancing and risk sharing livelihood strategy adopted by the household. Thus household-level characteristics such as the demographic composition and a household's participation in the labour force attain importance. For instance, the availability of labour within a household may be an important determinant of migration. In a study in west India, there is empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis; larger labour supply by the household is associated with being a migrant household (Haberfeld et al. 1999).⁵

Other household variables that may have an effect on the probability of migration are ownership of land and livestock. NSSO data shows that the probability of migration tends to be higher in households with larger land holdings (Parida and Madheswaran 2011).⁶ Another study finds that higher income from agriculture, including high livestock density lowers the probability that a household would provide migrant labour (Haberfeld et al. 1999). NSSO data also shows that some social groups have a higher propensity to migrate than others; upper castes are more likely to migrate compared to Other Backward Classes and economically and socially marginalised groups such as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Parida and Madheswaran 2011, Dubey et al. 2006). The IHDS data, on the other hand, finds no statistically significant association between social group and the decision to migrate at the household level (Nayyar and Kim 2018).

In the literature, social networks appear important for migration in several ways. In India, Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016) find evidence that rural caste networks restrict mobility as they provide mutual insurance to its members. In the context of this research, results of qualitative research in chapters 7 and 8 suggests that social networks are valuable in gaining information about, and access to, labour markets at destination.

Literature on determinants of migration in an eastern Indian context is scant.⁷ In this context, this chapter uses two cross sections of individual-level data from surveys conducted in 1998 of 891 and the same (and successor) 903 households in 2011 to examine if determinants of migration have changed over time. This contributes to existing literature in three

ways. First, it presents changes in the incidence of migration and characteristics of migrants from the same households covered both in 1998 and 2011 surveys using data that is representative of rural Bihar. Second, it studies, identical individual, household and village network variables that explain migration in 1998 and 2011, thus allowing us to examine changes in the relative importance of these variables over time. Third, the data allows us to introduce a migration history variable, and we are able to estimate effects of past migration on current migration.

4.3 Data

The chapter uses two datasets. These are a subset of the data archived at the Institute for Human Development, New Delhi under its Bihar Research Programme, and they are described in detail in section 2.5. The first dataset of our interest are obtained from the household census survey (round 1) undertaken in 1998. These data cover information about individual household members which includes their age, sex, marital status, education status, details of work and occupation, residential status and duration of migration, as well as information about the household related to its class, caste, land and asset ownership. For the purpose of this paper, we use information on 3,003 individuals in the age group of 15 to 64 years from these 891 households. This is the first dataset.

The second dataset that we use was collected during April to October 2011 from 903 households that were the same (or successor) households of the original sample of 891 households. Again, household data is detailed in socio-demographic information about individual members and other household data pertaining to caste, class, ownership of land and other assets, and we use identical variables across the two surveys (1998 and 2011) in our analysis. We use information on 3,415 individuals in the age group of 15-64 years from these 903 households.

Weights are used to obtain unbiased estimates for each village, and for the 12 village sample as a whole. The weight is calculated for each class within a village, and this compensates for different sampling fractions by class and in villages of different sizes in the original sample design in 1998-99. These weights have also been applied to the 2011 data, which consisted of the same households as in 1998-99 (although not all households were recovered). Weighting the data increases the influence of agricultural labour households and large villages. For the purpose of this chapter, we

use estimates based on weighted data. The regressions have also been run on the unweighted data, and these are reported in appendix tables 4.1 and 4.2 to this chapter. The results of unweighted data are largely similar to those of weighted data, but for some minor differences.⁸

The current study is based on information collected on both temporary and longer-term migration, as well as permanent migration. The dataset used is representative for rural Bihar, and captures households across the class and caste spectrum. We use alternative definitions of migration to better understand the nature of mobility. In the surveys the working definition of a household is a person or a group of persons who live in the same dwelling and eat food from a common kitchen. It also includes persons who are away from the village for work or other exigencies, but visited the village at least once in the year preceding the survey. This extended definition of the household allows us to include ‘migrants’ who share household resources when they are in the village and maintain a rural residence otherwise.⁹

Furthermore, migrants have been disaggregated into two categories: short-term migrants and long-term migrants, on the basis of the duration of their migration. A short-term migrant is defined as someone who is away from the village for a period of less than 8 months in a year; a long-term migrant is away for more than 8 months in a year. The use of an 8 month cut-off period in a year to distinguish between short-term and long-term migrant is to capture two rather different migration streams. In case of the former, migrants tend to participate in labour markets, both, within and outside the village, i.e. in both source and destination areas, while in case of the latter, they generally work only in destination areas. Data used for this study also shows that in the period between 1998 and 2011, permanent migration, in the sense of households moving out of the village was quite low. In the span of these 12 years, 38 of the 891 original sample households had permanently migrated.

4.4 Patterns of migration

This section presents an account of the pattern of migration in 1998 and 2011. We present the incidence of migration, residential status disaggregated by sex and marital status in 1998 and 2011. This is followed by a brief discussion on levels of income and remittances in survey households.¹⁰

4.4.1 Migration increasing, becoming longer-term, continues to be male dominated

Table 4.1 presents the incidence of migration by two measures – the first, of migration at the household level, and the second, of migration at the individual level. The former measure – percentage of households with at least one migrant member increased from 36 per cent in 1998 to 62.1 per cent in 2011, and the latter, the proportion of migrant workers to total workers increased from 20.5 per cent to 32.4 per cent in the same time period.¹¹ It is thus evident that migration has substantially increased between the two time periods.

Table 4.1
Incidence of migration, 1998 and 2011 (%)

	1998	2011
Households with at least one migrant member	36.0	62.1
Migrant workers to total workers (age 15-64 years)	20.5	32.4

Source: Household schedules, 1998 and 2011.

Table 4.2 presents the distribution of residents and migrants by sex in 1998 and 2011. As in table 4.1, it is evident here too, that over time, the proportion of migrants increased substantially. On the whole, migration has become more longer-term; the proportion of long-term male migrants more than doubled between the two waves. At the same time, female migration, which was very low in 1998, increased more than four fold. Simultaneously, the share of short-term migrants has marginally increased. These changes in the pattern of migration embedded in a macro-context discussed earlier in chapter 2 motivate us to examine if the factors that explain migration have changed with time.

Table 4.2
Residential status by sex, 1998 and 2011, age 15-64 years (%)

Residential Status	Male		Female		Total	
	1998	2011	1998	2011	1998	2011
Resident	73.2	52.6	96.8	92.6	84.6	71.7
Short-term migrant; away for 0-8 months in a year	15.7	20.5	1.5	0.9	8.9	11.2
Long-term migrant; Away for 8+ months year	11.1	26.9	1.6	6.6	6.6	17.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
					(n=3003)	(n=3415)

Source: Household schedules, 1998 and 2011.

Having said that, what has not changed is the highly skewed nature of migration by sex; migration continues to be male-dominated, though female migration rapidly increased from very low levels in the survey villages. On the whole, the male-dominated nature of migration leads to split families where men (husbands) migrate for work, and women (wives) stay back in the village.

Table 4.3
Distribution of married persons by sex and residential status (%)

Residential Status	Male		Female	
	1998	2011	1998	2011
Resident	73.4	51.3	97.0	92.3
Migrant	26.6	48.7	3.0	7.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Household schedules, 1998 and 2011.

Table 4.3 presents the distribution of married persons by residential status. It is evident that a substantial proportion of women and men live without their spouses in source and destination areas, respectively. It is also evident that this trend has intensified over time (table 4.3). Therefore, migration has led to a spatial division of households, and being part of

split families has become a way of life for a substantial proportion of men and women in households covered by the survey.

4.4.2 Remittances near universal, an important livelihood strategy

The data also show that migration is an important livelihood strategy of a majority of survey households, and poorer households tend to be more dependent on remittance income than other households.¹² Overall levels of income in survey households are quite low, and migrant households had a higher average annual income than non-migrant households, as is evident in other studies in India (Haberfeld et al. 1999). We will examine these issues in detail in chapters 5 and 6 which study remittances, income and impact of migration.¹³

4.5 Empirical specification

Following our discussion in section 4.2 on the theoretical literature and empirical evidence on the determinants of migration, this section estimates a model for migration from rural Bihar. Y is a dichotomous variable that captures the migration status of the individual ($Y=1$, migrant; $Y=0$, non-migrant).

Following an established literature, Y is treated as a function of the following independent variables:

- a. Individual level variables (I), excluding education
- b. Educational attainment (E)
- c. Household level variables (H)
- d. Village network variable (V)
- e. Household migration history variable (S)

$$Y = f [I, E, H, V, S]$$

$$Y_{ijv} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 I_{ijv} + \beta_2 E_{ijv} + \beta_3 H_{jv} + \beta_4 V_v + \beta_5 S_{jv} + \beta_6 E_{ijv} V_v + \epsilon_{ijv}$$

Where, I , E , H , V , S and the interaction between education (E) and village network (V) are vectors of variables and β_1 , β_2 , β_3 , β_4 , β_5 and β_6 are

coefficients and ϵ is the error term. Assuming that ϵ follows a normal distribution, the equation may be estimated as a probit model.

I is a vector of three individual level characteristics – age, sex and marital status, E is a series of dummy variables indicating if an individual is educated at that level or not, H , a vector of household level characteristics, V , indicates the village migration network, S is a migration history variable. A series of probit regressions were estimated to examine the effects of individual, household, network, and migration history on individual migration. Based on the aforementioned, various specifications of the model have been estimated for the years 1998 and 2011.

The dependent variable (Y) captures the migration of status individuals. To elaborate, a migrant is defined as a household member who has been away from the village for any duration of time in the year preceding the survey, but has made at least one trip to the village in the reference period of one year. In this manner, migrants share household resources when they are in the village and maintain a rural residence when they are away. This broad definition of a migrant enables us to capture the links migrants have with their place of origin, and more specifically, with the family members they leave behind. It also presents a perspective of migration from the source area; using this definition, we find that more than 90 per cent of households with migrant members receive remittances (see Chapters 5 and 6 for details), and migrants members of these households continue to have social and economic ties in the source areas.¹⁴

Table 4.4 summarises individual, household, network and migration history variables used in the model. Following cues in the literature, we use the following independent variables and treat them as individual-level variables. These are: (a) age, (b) sex, (c) marital status, and (d) education. These are a mix of continuous and discrete variables, as can be seen from their description (table 4.4). We have seen in section 4.2 the male and youth dominated nature of migration from source areas in the context of rural-urban migration in developing countries. It is thus intuitive that a high propensity of migration among young persons and males should emerge from the multivariate analysis. In case of the variable, marital status, being married may increase the probability of migration if there is economic pressure to provide for the family in the source region. On the other hand, marriage may reduce the probability of migration if it entails provision of care to other household members. Evidence of education on the probability of migration is mixed, and may be conditional upon the

definition of migration status and nature of migration stream. We saw in section 4.2 that official datasets that are biased towards long term and permanent migration reveal a positive selection (Dubey et al. 2006; Parida and Madheswaran 2011), while other datasets that focus on more precarious streams of migration find negative selection for education (Haberfeld et al. 1999; Coffey et al. 2015).

Table 4.4
Summary of variables used in multivariate analysis

<i>I. Dependent Variable: migration status of individual (1=migrant, 0, otherwise)</i>	
<i>II. Independent variables</i>	
<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
1. Individual level variables (I)	
1.1 Age	In years
1.2 Sex	1=male, 0= other
1.3 Marital status	1=married, 0=other
1.4 Education	
Illiterate	1=illiterate, 0=other
Below primary (reference group)	1=primary schooling not completed, 0=other
Primary	1=primary schooling completed, 0=other
Middle	1=middle schooling completed, 0=other
Secondary	1=secondary schooling completed, 0=other
Higher secondary	1=higher secondary schooling completed, 0=other
Degree or diploma	1=degree/diploma completed, 0=other
Postgraduate degree	1=postgraduate completed, 0=other
2. Household level variables (H)	
2.1 Class	
Agricultural labour	Households where one or more household members are engaged in agricultural work done for wages.
Peasant (reference group)	Households that cultivate land, irrespective of whether they own the land they cultivate.
Landlord	Households which are only engaged in supervision of agriculture (but household members do not cultivate themselves) and leasing out of land.*
Non Agricultural	Households that do no agricultural work.**
2.2 Caste	
Brahmin and Kayastha	1= Brahmin and Kayastha, 0=other

I. Dependent Variable: migration status of individual (1=migrant, 0, otherwise)**II. Independent variables**

Variable	Description
Bhumihar and Rajput	1= Bhumihar and Rajput, 0=other
Kurmi	1= Kurmi, 0=other
Yadav	1= Yadav, 0=other
Koeri	1= Koeri, 0=other
Other Backward II (reference group)	1= Other Backward Castes II, 0=other
Other Backward I	1= Other Backward Castes I, 0=other
Scheduled Caste and Tribe	1= Scheduled Caste and Tribe, 0=other
Upper Muslim***	1= Upper Muslims, 0=other
Lower Muslim***	1= Lower Muslims (upper caste), 0=other
2.3 Land (Operational)	
0 acres	1=household has no operational land, 0=other
0-1 acres	1=household has less than an acre of operational land, 0=other
1-5 acres (Reference Group)	1=household has 1-5 acres of operational land, 0=other
5+ acres	1=household has more than 5 acres of operational land, 0=other
2.4 Type of dwelling****	1=pucca or semi-pucca; 0=other (kuccha or thatched)
2.5 Livestock	1=owns livestock (draught or milch animal viz., ox, cow or buffalo). 0=household does not own livestock
2.6 Female worker in household	1=female worker in household, 0=no female worker in household
2.7 Young children in household	1=young children (age 0-6 years) in household, 0=no young children in household
3. Village network	
3.1 Network	Percentage of households with migrants in the village
4. Migration history (S)*****	
4.1 Migration history	1=household had a migrant member in 1998, 0= household did not have a migrant member in 1998.

Source: Household schedules, 1998 and 2011.

* Traditionally, leasing out (and leasing in) land is characteristic of economic relations of dominance and dependence. At the same time, the definition of the landlord class may include within its ambit some small peasant household that may be involved in petty leasing of land, and not be 'landlords' in the conventional sense of the term

** This may be a conservative definition as it does not include households in which individual members may be engaged in non-agricultural activities; their simultaneous association with agricultural work comes in the way of their inclusion in this class.

*** Caste here is a bit of a misnomer, for the upper muslim and lower muslim are actually community categories. For the sake of convenience we stick to the current nomenclature.

**** The definition is as follows: Thatched dwellings are made of straw and grass, with the support of bamboo or inferior wood. *Kaccha* dwellings include those which have walls made of mud, bamboo, or a combination of these, and the roof made of straw or grass. *Semi-pucca* dwellings are superior to *kaccha* dwellings, and have walls made of bricks and cement, but the roof is made of *khaprail* (poor quality tiles made by local potters) and bamboo. *Pucca* dwellings have walls and roof made of bricks and cement, and superior tiles are used.

*****Used only for 2011 model

The class categorisation in the paper merits further elaboration. This categorisation was used in the 1998 survey and continued in the 2011 survey. It is based on the economic system, more specifically, production relations in the village. Originally, there were seven principal classes, which have been clubbed into four, and a series of class dummies are introduced for the purpose of our analysis here (see definitions in table 4.4). It is hypothesised that individuals in the agricultural labour and peasant classes would have a lower propensity to migrate as these classes are principally associated with agricultural activities. What about the landlord class? Evidence of migration from landowning classes is mixed. We have seen in section 4.2 that the probability of migration from this class is high (Parida and Madheswaran 2011). The economic dominance of the landlord class may provide a wealth effect and fund migration. Alternatively, dominance in the village may deter migration whereby members of this class may have no plausible push to leave the village. Lastly, it is reasonable to hypothesise that individuals in the non agricultural class have a higher propensity of migration.

Caste, historically, has been the basis of social organisation and hierarchy in the village (and otherwise). The village, in turn, is a relatively closed economic unit. While the nature of caste may have changed over time, caste membership remains static; it is hereditary, and there is little movement of individuals from one caste to the other. At the top of the hierarchy is the upper caste; classified in two distinct categories, the Brahmins and Kayasthas in one category, and Rajputs and Bhumihars in another. It is the castes in the latter category that have historically had strong links with land and agriculture. Kurmis, Koeris and Yadavs are traditionally cultivating castes. They are a part of the official classification of OBC (Other

Backward Classes) II in Bihar. The nomenclature 'backward' in the context of 'OBC II' is a misnomer; some of the OBC II castes have socio-economic characteristics similar to those of the upper castes. Other OBC II (reference group) are part of the OBC (Other Backward Classes) II in Bihar. However, they are not as dominant in agriculture as the three aforementioned castes – the Kurmis, Koeries and Yadavs. OBC I are at the lower end of the caste hierarchy, and their social and economic profile is inferior to OBC II and close to the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs). The SCs (Dalits) comprise erstwhile untouchable castes, who along with STs (Adivasis) are historically disadvantaged and lowest in the caste hierarchy.¹⁵

In the literature, it is evident that chances of migration are relatively higher, both at the top and bottom of the caste hierarchy (Parida and Madheswaran 2011; Dubey et al. 2006). Studies that have used detailed data on caste are fairly limited, and few studies attempt a caste-disaggregated analysis. It is hypothesised here that traditionally cultivating castes have a lower propensity of migration, the artisan and service castes (Muslims and some castes in OBC I) have a higher propensity of migration.

Land is another variable that is linked to migration. It is a fixed factor in agricultural production, and in this context, the practice of agricultural operations may hold people back in the village and reduce the tendency to migrate.¹⁶ On the other hand, land ownership can have a wealth effect, and can offer collateral or cushion to facilitate migration. Our interest here is in the former, and for the purpose of this paper, we use operational land as a household variable. In the context of a rural society, livestock ownership generally complements agricultural cultivation. Maintenance of livestock is a labour intensive activity, and thus, it is hypothesised that if a household owns livestock, its members will have a low propensity of migration.

What about the presence of a female worker in the household? It can be hypothesised that the presence of a female worker in an agricultural household tending to cultivation will free male labour (particularly in the peasant classes) to migrate. On the other hand, households with migrant members may receive remittances, and therefore not require females to work (income effect). Similarly, it may be hypothesised that individuals in households with young children may have a lower propensity to migrate on account of care responsibilities in the source household. On the other hand, it may be posited that such household members may have a higher

propensity to migrate on account of the need of a greater income to support dependant members.

The role of migration networks has been touched upon in the literature. We proxy village migration rate for the network variable. This crude indicator is expected to be positively associated with the dependant variable, and it is hypothesised that individuals in high migration village will have a greater likelihood of migration. Furthermore, following cues from the literature, where there is evidence of negative self-selection in communities with stronger networks (McKenzie and Rapoport 2010), we are interested in finding if networks, when interacted with education groups, have an effect of the probability of migration.¹⁷

And lastly, past migration is expected to play a critical role in determining current migration from a household. It is expected that households with a past migration experience are more likely to have migrants. The household-level variables are identical in the models estimated with 1998 and 2011 data, except for the migration history variable that has been introduced only in the 2011 model. Results of the 2011 model specification with the migration history variable are discussed separately.

Thus, we compare results of identical specifications of 1998 and 2011 models to examine relative changes in the independent variables over time.

4.6 Descriptive statistics: 1998 and 2011

4.6.1 Mean values of independent variables in 1998

Table 4.5 presents individual and household characteristics of all individuals of age 15-64 years for the year 1998. It is evident that individual level variables vary considerably between migrants and non-migrants. Migrants, with a mean age of 29.6 years are on average about four years younger than non-migrants. Migrants are predominantly male; 90 per cent of the migrants are male as compared to 45 per cent of the non-migrants. Three-fourth of migrants as compared to four-fifth of non-migrants are married. Migrants are more educated than non-migrants. Among illiterates, the proportion of non-migrants is substantially higher than that of migrants. Therefore, it appears that some threshold level of education is a pre-requisite for migration.

Table 4.5
Summary statistics - mean values of independent variables, 1998

	<i>N=Migrants</i>	<i>N=Non-mi- grants</i>	<i>N=Full Sample</i>
	<i>505</i>	<i>2498</i>	<i>3003</i>
Individual-level variables			
Age (in years)	29.61	33.45	32.86
Sex (1=male)	0.9	0.45	0.52
Marital Status (1=married)	0.75	0.81	0.8
Education - Illiterate	0.37	0.62	0.58
Education - Below Primary	0.1	0.08	0.08
Education - Primary	0.05	0.06	0.06
Education - Middle	0.17	0.1	0.11
Education - Secondary	0.15	0.09	0.1
Education - Higher Secondary	0.09	0.03	0.04
Education - Degree/Diploma	0.05	0.02	0.02
Education - Postgraduate	0.02	0.01	0.01
Household-level variables			
Class - Agricultural Labour	0.43	0.56	0.54
Class - Peasant	0.3	0.3	0.3
Class - Landlord	0.17	0.08	0.1
Class - Non Agricultural	0.1	0.05	0.06
Caste - Brahmin and Kayastha	0.14	0.16	0.16
Caste - Bhumihaar and Rajput	0.17	0.1	0.11
Caste - Kurmi	0.02	0.03	0.03
Caste - Yadav	0.03	0.07	0.06
Caste - Koeri	0.04	0.03	0.03
Caste - Other Other Backward II	0.04	0.06	0.06
Caste - Other Backward I	0.21	0.21	0.21
Caste - Scheduled Caste and Tribe	0.22	0.24	0.24
Caste - Upper Muslim	0.02	0.02	0.02
Caste - Lower Muslim	0.11	0.07	0.08
Operational Land 0 acres	0.44	0.34	0.35
Operational Land 0-1 acres	0.23	0.18	0.19
Operational Land 1-5 acres	0.28	0.38	0.36

	<i>N=Migrants</i>	<i>N=Non-mi- grants</i>	<i>N=Full Sample</i>
	505	2498	3003
Operational Land - 5+ acres	0.06	0.1	0.09
Type of dwelling	0.35	0.28	0.29
Livestock in household	0.45	0.57	0.55
Female worker in household	0.56	0.69	0.67
Young children in household	0.62	0.63	0.63
Network variable			
Village migration rate	41.63	35.31	36.28

Household-level characteristics of migrants and non-migrants also appear to be distinctly different in 1998. Migrants are more in the landlord and non-agricultural classes, and less so in agricultural labour class. The differences are less marked by caste, but not by ownership of operational land (table 4.5). Among other noteworthy descriptives, 35 per cent migrants live in better quality (*pucca* or *semi-pucca*) dwelling as opposed to 28 per cent non-migrants. Migrants also belong to households that have a lower incidence of livestock ownership; 45 per cent of the migrants are from households that own livestock, as compared to 57 per cent in case of non-migrants. Households with migrants are less likely to have female worker.

On average, migrants are more likely to belong to villages with a higher migration rate, compared to non-migrants.

4.6.2 Mean values of independent variables in 2011

Table 4.6 presents mean values of individual and household level characteristics of migrants and non-migrants in age 15-64 years in 2011. Like in 1998, there are marked differences in individual characteristics of migrants and non-migrants, in case of some variables. The mean age of migrants is almost 30 years and that of non-migrants 34.7 years. Therefore, difference in mean age of migrants and non-migrants has increased between 1998 and 2011.

Table 4.6
Summary statistics - mean values of independent variables, 2011

	N=Migrants 961	N=Non-mi- grants 2452	N=Full Sam- ple 3415
Individual-level variables			
Age (in years)	30.0	34.7	33.4
Sex (1=male)	0.88	0.38	0.52
Marital Status (1=married)	0.75	0.77	0.76
Education - Illiterate	0.33	0.49	0.45
Education - Below Primary	0.1	0.08	0.08
Education - Primary	0.15	0.11	0.12
Education - Middle	0.11	0.12	0.12
Education - Secondary	0.14	0.1	0.11
Education - Higher Secondary	0.09	0.07	0.08
Education - Degree/Diploma	0.07	0.03	0.04
Education - Postgraduate	0.01	0	0.01
Household-level variables			
Class - Agricultural Labour	0.5	0.47	0.48
Class - Peasant	0.32	0.38	0.36
Class - Landlord	0.06	0.04	0.04
Class - Non Agricultural	0.12	0.1	0.11
Caste - Brahmin and Kayastha	0.15	0.16	0.16
Caste - Bhumihaar and Rajput	0.13	0.09	0.1
Caste - Kurmi	0.01	0.03	0.02
Caste - Yadav	0.06	0.07	0.07
Caste - Koeri	0.05	0.03	0.03
Caste - Other Other Backward II	0.03	0.05	0.04
Caste - Other Backward I	0.23	0.22	0.22
Caste - Scheduled Caste and Tribe	0.23	0.25	0.25
Caste - Upper Muslim	0.02	0.02	0.02
Caste - Lower Muslim	0.09	0.09	0.09
Operational Land 0 acres	0.47	0.38	0.4
Operational Land 0-1 acres	0.27	0.25	0.26
Operational Land 1-5 acres	0.21	0.32	0.29

	<i>N=Migrants</i> 961	<i>N=Non-mi-</i> <i>grants</i> 2452	<i>N=Full Sam-</i> <i>ple</i> 3415
Operational Land - 5+ acres	0.04	0.05	0.04
Type of dwelling	0.48	0.46	0.47
Livestock in household	0.46	0.54	0.51
Female worker in household	0.2	0.23	0.22
Young children in household	0.66	0.6	0.62
Network variable			
Village migration rate	64.87	61.69	62.59
Household Migration History Variable			
Household with migrant in 1998	0.51	0.38	0.42

Migrants, in 2011, again, are overwhelmingly male (88 per cent). As in 1998, migrants are more educated than non-migrants in 2011,¹⁸ though differences in educational status between migrants and non-migrants have narrowed in 2011 across almost all education classes.

As far as household characteristics of migrants and non-migrants are concerned, differences by caste, class and operational land ownership have narrowed over time. It is noteworthy that the size of the agricultural labour and landlord class has substantially declined overtime, and that of non agricultural and peasant classes has increased.

Differences in mean values of other household level characteristics of migrants and non-migrants such as type of dwelling and presence of female worker in household have also substantially reduced in 2011. Over time, it appears from the descriptive statistics that there is little difference in the household attributes of migrants and non-migrants. A notable exception remains in livestock ownership, which at 46 per cent is 8 percentage points lower in migrants' households compared to non-migrants' households; yet, in tandem with other changes, this difference has also considerably reduced between the two time points.

As in 1998, migrants are more likely to belong to villages with a higher migration rate, compared to non-migrants, but this variation has reduced in 2011.

A migration history variable is added to the 2011 model, and as expected, individuals from households with past migration are more likely

to be (current) migrants. Migrants in 2011 have a 51 per cent chance of belonging to a households with migrants in 1998. On the other hand, non-migrants in 2011 who have a lower (38 per cent) chance of belonging to households with migrants in 1998.

In sum, the mean age of migrants has more or less remained the same in 1998 and 2011, but the age difference between migrants and non-migrants has increased over time. Migrants continue to be overwhelmingly male in both time periods but there is marginal change – males among migrants have declined from 90 per cent to 88 per cent from 1998 to 2011. Overall, the proportion of illiterates among migrants has declined,¹⁹ along with that of middle school educated, while the proportion of primary school educated among migrants has increased sharply. The share of migrants has increased in the agricultural labouring, peasant and non-agricultural classes, while it declined in the landlord class.²⁰ Among caste, the most discernible increase in migration is among the Yadavs. On average, migration continued to be higher in *pucca* households and lower in households with livestock in both 1998 and 2011. Lastly, the proportion of migrants was higher in villages that had higher migration rates in both time periods, though these differences have narrowed down over time.

4.7 Model results: 1998 and 2011

4.7.1 1998 model

Seven model specifications are used (table 4.7). In the first specification, only individual variables are used. The first three variables, age, sex and marital status have a statistically significant effect on the probability of migration. Given that migration is concentrated in younger age-cohorts, it is not surprising that the probability of migration decreases as age increases. A male is 23 percentage points more likely to migrate as compared to a female and reflects the male-dominated feature of migration. Married persons are about 5 percentage points more likely to migrate than those who are not married. This can perhaps be explained by the greater economic burden faced by married persons to support their families. These effects remain stable across the various specifications. With regard to education, it is evident that illiterate persons are less likely to migrate in comparison to those who have not completed primary schooling (reference group) (specification 1). This is in line with the descriptive statistics. As we move up the education ladder, middle school onwards, there seems to

be positive educational selection of migrants, but this is not statistically significant. In the final specification, however, education dummies do not appear significant in explaining migration.

Table 4.7
Probability of individual migration - probit estimates, 1998

Variable	Marginal Effects						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Age	-0.00373*** (-6.60)	-0.00401*** (-7.06)	-0.00393*** (-6.93)	-0.00393*** (-6.96)	-0.00394*** (-7.00)	-0.00393*** (-6.99)	-0.00399*** (-7.08)
Sex	0.232*** (16.01)	0.242*** (16.44)	0.239*** (16.32)	0.235*** (16.13)	0.237*** (16.26)	0.236*** (16.20)	0.238*** (16.26)
Married	0.0481** (2.96)	0.0541*** (3.33)	0.0561*** (3.47)	0.0586*** (3.66)	0.0602*** (3.73)	0.0584*** (3.64)	0.0603*** (3.75)
Education - Illiterate	-0.0562** (-2.66)	-0.0441* (-2.10)	-0.0506* (-2.40)	-0.0587** (-2.80)	-0.0580** (-2.77)	-0.0588** (-2.81)	-0.0992 (-1.74)
Education - Primary	-0.0570 (-1.81)	-0.0738* (-2.35)	-0.0729* (-2.34)	-0.0718* (-2.32)	-0.0776* (-2.50)	-0.0812** (-2.63)	-0.0464 (-0.57)
Education - Middle	0.000903 (0.04)	-0.0103 (-0.42)	-0.00529 (-0.21)	-0.00174 (-0.07)	-0.00656 (-0.27)	-0.00767 (-0.31)	-0.0247 (-0.38)
Education - Secondary	0.00759 (0.30)	-0.0151 (-0.58)	-0.00987 (-0.38)	-0.00583 (-0.22)	-0.0109 (-0.42)	-0.00942 (-0.37)	-0.00286 (-0.04)
Education - Higher Secondary	0.0537 (1.73)	0.0251 (0.79)	0.0213 (0.68)	0.0331 (1.06)	0.0210 (0.66)	0.0240 (0.77)	0.0857 (0.98)
Education - Degree	0.0578 (1.63)	0.0195 (0.54)	0.0256 (0.71)	0.0369 (1.02)	0.0258 (0.71)	0.0289 (0.81)	0.172 (1.83)
Education - Postgraduate	0.0623 (1.83)	0.0468 (1.42)	0.0515 (1.51)	0.0616 (1.83)	0.0443 (1.34)	0.0593 (1.74)	0.0440 (1.34)

Variable	Marginal Effects						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Class - Agricultural Labour	(1.14)	(0.87)	(0.96)	(1.16)	(0.84)	(1.12)	(0.26)
		-0.0219	-0.0465*	-0.0925***	-0.0755***	-0.0779***	-0.0789***
		(-1.37)	(-2.45)	(-4.52)	(-3.56)	(-3.71)	(-3.75)
Class - Landlord		0.0799***	0.0799***	0.0369	0.0266	0.0252	0.0280
		(4.05)	(4.03)	(1.69)	(1.20)	(1.16)	(1.29)
Class - Non Agricultural		0.0862***	0.0810**	0.00802	0.00408	0.00360	0.00287
		(3.48)	(3.13)	(0.27)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.10)
Caste - Brahmin and Kayastha			-0.0000460	0.00940	-0.0102	-0.0130	-0.0127
			(-0.00)	(0.29)	(-0.30)	(-0.41)	(-0.39)
Caste - Bhumihar and Rajput			0.0758*	0.0865*	0.0551	0.0514	0.0555
			(2.18)	(2.51)	(1.53)	(1.55)	(1.67)
Caste - Kurmi			0.0274	0.0545	0.0539	0.0325	0.0304
			(0.58)	(1.15)	(1.14)	(0.74)	(0.69)
Caste - Yadav			-0.0163	0.0194	0.0312	0.0313	0.0368
			(-0.41)	(0.49)	(0.79)	(0.81)	(0.95)
Caste - Koeri			0.0414	0.0516	0.0515	0.0531	0.0552
			(0.92)	(1.15)	(1.15)	(1.26)	(1.31)
Caste - Other Backward I			0.0795*	0.0866**	0.0878**	0.0867**	0.0904**
			(2.54)	(2.82)	(2.86)	(2.98)	(3.09)
Caste - SC and ST			0.0783*	0.0724*	0.0683*	0.0630*	0.0646*
			(2.53)	(2.39)	(2.25)	(2.14)	(2.19)
Caste - Upper Muslim			0.0436	0.0531	0.0500	0.0674	0.0721

Variable	Marginal Effects						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Caste - Lower Muslim			(0.86)	(1.06)	(1.00)	(1.40)	(1.50)
			0.102**	0.0948**	0.0921**	0.0946**	0.0959**
			(2.98)	(2.81)	(2.72)	(2.90)	(2.92)
Operational Land 0 acres				0.0927**	0.0945**	0.102***	0.104***
				(5.13)	(4.76)	(5.22)	(5.32)
Operational Land 0-1 acres				0.0900***	0.0930***	0.0950***	0.0965***
				(5.05)	(5.08)	(5.32)	(5.40)
Operational Land - 5+ acres				-0.0269	-0.0350	-0.0281	-0.0281
				(-1.09)	(-1.41)	(-1.16)	(-1.16)
Type of Dwelling					0.0397*	0.0316*	0.0350*
					(2.34)	(1.99)	(2.20)
Livestock in household					-0.00477	-0.00213	-0.00395
					(-0.31)	(-0.14)	(-0.26)
Female Worker in household					-0.0406*	-0.0403*	-0.0387*
					(-2.30)	(-2.30)	(-2.19)
Young Children in HH					0.00180	0.000574	-0.000432
					(0.14)	(0.05)	(-0.03)
Network - Village Migration Rate						0.00336***	0.00317**
						(7.77)	(2.58)
Network*Education - Illiterate							0.000982
							(0.70)
Network*Education - Primary							-0.000937

Variable	Marginal Effects						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Network*Education - Middle							(-0.47) 0.000431 (0.27)
Network*Education - Secondary							-0.000215 (-0.12)
Network*Education - Higher Secondary							-0.00184 (-0.79)
Network*Education - Degree							-0.00443 (-1.68)
Network*Education - Postgraduate							0.000437 (0.09)
Village Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
N	3003	3003	3003	3003	3001	3001	3001
Pseudo R ²	0.218	0.2324	0.2444	0.2604	0.2644	0.2608	0.2636

Notes: t statistics in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

In the second specification, we add class to the model. Individual variables retain their explanatory power, and class significantly explains the probability of migration in two of the three categories; individuals in the landlord class and those in the non-agricultural class are, respectively, 8 and 9 percentage points, more likely to migrate with reference to the peasant class. As expected, and in tandem with the results from descriptive statistics, the sign of the coefficient of the agricultural labour class is negative, implying a lower probability of migration from this class, albeit this is not statistically significant. However, as we move across the various specifications, it seems clear that individuals in the agricultural labouring class are about 7 to 8 percentage points (specifications 5 to 7) less likely to migrate as compared to the peasant class.

In the third specification, we introduce caste into the model. Individual variables and class variables continue to remain important in their effect on the probability of migration. The reference caste here is Other Backward II; the probability of migration is higher by 8, 8 and 10 percentage points respectively for OBC I, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and Lower Muslims respectively. It is pertinent to note that these castes are at the lower end of the spectrum. The probability of migration is statistically significant in only one of the two upper caste categories, and interestingly in the one which is considered to be rooted in land and agriculture in the context of rural Bihar – the Bhumihars and Rajputs; individuals belonging to these castes are 8 percentage points more likely to migrate than the reference group of other OBC II. The probability of migration for individuals belonging to the cultivating castes – the Kurmis, Koeris and Yadavs is not statistically significant, and this is not surprising as these peasant castes are rooted in agriculture. The negative sign of the coefficient for the Yadav caste is noteworthy. Given their engagement in agricultural, as well as livestock activities, this is in line with the descriptive statistics (table 4.5).

In the fourth specification, when operational land is added to the model, the probability of migration is 9 percentage points more for individuals in households with no operational land, as well as for individuals in households with 0-1 acres of operational land. As hypothesised, this suggests that individuals in households that do not practice agriculture, or practice agriculture in small tracts of land are more likely to migrate.

The fifth specification controls for other household-level variables. There is a discernible effect of the type of dwelling (*pucca* or semi-*pucca*) on

the probability of migration. Households with *pucca* or semi-*pucca* dwelling are more likely to have migrants than households with thatched or *kuccha* dwellings.²¹ At the same time, households with female workers are less likely to have migrants. This may suggest some kind of an income effect.

The sixth specification controls for village networks, proxied by the village migration rate. This variable has a statistically significant effect on the probability of migration. The positive sign of the network variable indicates that the probability of migration increases as the network variable, i.e. the village migration rate increases. However, the magnitude of this effect is very small. An interesting question that arises is if networks and education *together* explain migration. In the case of Mexican migration to the United States, McKenzie and Rapoport (2010), find positive or education-neutral selection in communities with weak migrant networks but negative self-selection in communities with stronger networks (McKenzie and Rapoport 2010). Following cues from this literature, in particular, we are interested in finding if stronger (weaker) networks increase (decrease) the possibility of migration in different education groups. It is evident from the descriptive statistics that the migration rate among illiterates in the sample is lower than average. In line with this, the correlation between education and migration is negative and statistically significant (-0.10**). At the same time, there is a positive correlation between the illiteracy and network variables suggesting that there may be positive selection when these variables interact. However, this does not hold in multivariate analysis, and it can be seen in the seventh specification that while (village migration) networks continue to be important, the network-education dummies of the model don't yield significant effect on the probability of migration for this, or any other education class.

In this final specification of the model (specification 7), individual-level variables retain their statistical significance and magnitude. The estimates indicate that a man is 24 percentage points more likely to migrate than a woman, and a married person is 6 percentage points more likely to migrate than an unmarried person. Among household-level variables, caste, class and operational land, emerge as important determinants of migration. An individual from the agricultural labour class is 8 percentage points less likely to migrate with reference to someone in the peasant class. By caste, migration continues to be significant in lower muslim, OBC I and SC/ST – the probability of migration increases by 10 percentage points for lower

muslims, 9 percentage points for OBC I, and 6 percentage points for individuals belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The explanatory power of the upper caste – Bhumihars and Rajputs is lost in this final specification of the model.

The marginal effect of operational land on the probability of migration is significant for two of the three land classes used in the model. Individuals from households with no operational land and those in households with 0 – 1 acres of land are both 10 percentage points more likely to migrate with reference to the group that owns land between 1 – 5 acres. The probability of migration is not significant (coefficient has negative sign) among those households with 5+ acres of land, thus lending some support to the hypothesis that there seems to be no wealth effect on the probability of migration arising from presence of operational land in the household. Individuals from *pucca* and *semi-pucca* households have a higher propensity of migration, and among other household-level variables, only the variable female worker in household holds ground. As expected, and in tandem with our hypothesis and results of descriptive statistics, individuals from households with livestock have a lower propensity to migrate than those in households without livestock, though this is not statistically significant. The presence of young children in the household does not have a statistically significant effect on the probability of migration. The effect of the network variable in explaining individual migration is positive and statistically significant.

Overall, thus, individual factors appear most important in explaining migration. This is a migration stream where young married men are most likely to migrate. While individual effects largely dominate, household factors are also important. Individuals in households located at the lower end of the caste (SC and ST, OBC I and lower muslim), and land (households with little or no operational land) spectrum are more likely to migrate. This suggests that the poor are more likely to migrate and push factors may have a role to play in this migration.

4.7.2 2011 model, and comparisons with 1998 model

The first seven specifications of this 2011 model (table 4.8) are identical to the 1998 model as discussed earlier. For the purpose of comparison over time, the discussion is based on the results of the seventh specification in both models. In the 2011 model, there is an additional eighth specification, in which a migration history variable, a household variable, has

been added. Apart from this, the variables used and the reference groups wherever applicable in the 2011 model are the same as the earlier 1998 model.

Table 4.8
Probability of individual migration - probit estimates, 2011

Variable	Marginal Effects							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Age	-0.00825*** (-13.61)	-0.00828*** (-13.58)	-0.00868*** (-14.36)	-0.00830*** (-13.65)	-0.00817*** (-13.28)	-0.00812*** (-13.22)	-0.00814*** (-13.27)	-0.00821*** (-13.45)
Sex	0.387*** (34.31)	0.386*** (33.66)	0.393*** (34.92)	0.390*** (34.77)	0.392*** (35.13)	0.391*** (35.02)	0.391*** (35.12)	0.392*** (35.59)
Married	0.168*** (9.13)	0.172*** (9.41)	0.175*** (9.64)	0.165*** (9.17)	0.155*** (8.32)	0.154*** (8.31)	0.154*** (8.33)	0.154*** (8.37)
Education - Illit.	-0.0487 (-1.92)	-0.0505* (-1.99)	-0.0464 (-1.85)	-0.0525* (-2.11)	-0.0561* (-2.26)	-0.0543* (-2.19)	0.375* (2.35)	0.310 (1.96)
Education - Primary	-0.0126 (-0.44)	-0.0104 (-0.36)	-0.0276 (-0.97)	-0.0201 (-0.71)	-0.0239 (-0.85)	-0.0242 (-0.86)	0.331 (1.86)	0.283 (1.60)
Education - Middle	-0.0864** (-2.95)	-0.0856** (-2.88)	-0.106*** (-3.60)	-0.0999*** (-3.41)	-0.103*** (-3.52)	-0.102*** (-3.48)	0.299 (1.67)	0.228 (1.28)
Education - Sec.	-0.0369 (-1.27)	-0.0330 (-1.12)	-0.0518 (-1.77)	-0.0481 (-1.65)	-0.0532 (-1.82)	-0.0523 (-1.80)	0.506** (2.85)	0.412* (2.33)
Education - H. Sec.	-0.0565 (-1.79)	-0.0500 (-1.55)	-0.0689* (-2.16)	-0.0605 (-1.90)	-0.0659* (-2.07)	-0.0607 (-1.91)	0.244 (1.27)	0.152 (0.79)
Education - Degree	0.0655 (1.79)	0.0626 (1.66)	0.0321 (0.85)	0.0365 (0.97)	0.0273 (0.73)	0.0382 (1.02)	0.624** (2.96)	0.503* (2.39)
Education - PG	0.0610	0.0610	0.0372	0.0433	0.0345	0.0333	0.480	0.357

Variable	Marginal Effects							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Class - Agri. Labour	(0.84)	(0.84)	(0.51)	(0.60)	(0.48)	(0.46)	(1.06)	(0.79)
		0.0400*	0.0775***	0.0518**	0.0448*	0.0491**	0.0505**	0.0486**
		(2.43)	(4.27)	(2.79)	(2.38)	(2.69)	(2.76)	(2.67)
Class - Landlord		0.0908**	0.0734*	0.0639*	0.0577	0.0500	0.0570	0.0543
		(2.80)	(2.25)	(1.97)	(1.77)	(1.54)	(1.74)	(1.67)
Class - Non Agri.		0.0745***	0.0848***	0.0406	0.0348	0.0384	0.0371	0.0296
		(3.31)	(3.76)	(1.71)	(1.45)	(1.63)	(1.57)	(1.26)
Caste - Brahmin & Kayastha			0.140***	0.153***	0.154***	0.147***	0.155***	0.132***
			(3.59)	(3.92)	(3.92)	(4.01)	(4.22)	(3.58)
Caste - Bhumihaar & Rajput			0.247***	0.239***	0.243***	0.214***	0.222***	0.192***
			(5.98)	(5.79)	(5.83)	(5.67)	(5.88)	(5.06)
Caste - Kurmi			0.00752	0.0127	0.00735	0.0257	0.0230	-0.000463
			(0.12)	(0.21)	(0.12)	(0.43)	(0.38)	(-0.01)
Caste - Yadav			0.0522	0.0846	0.0965*	0.0923*	0.104*	0.0888*
			(1.21)	(1.96)	(2.22)	(2.23)	(2.51)	(2.14)
Caste - Koeri			0.250***	0.239***	0.232***	0.225***	0.231***	0.197***
			(4.97)	(4.73)	(4.55)	(4.88)	(5.02)	(4.26)
Caste - OBC I			0.113**	0.111**	0.112**	0.0966**	0.103**	0.0764*
			(2.98)	(2.95)	(2.97)	(2.75)	(2.93)	(2.16)
Caste - SC & ST			0.0562	0.0462	0.0400	0.0280	0.0325	0.0169
			(1.51)	(1.25)	(1.08)	(0.79)	(0.91)	(0.48)

Variable	Marginal Effects							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Caste - Upper Muslim			0.0997 (1.72)	0.128* (2.21)	0.124* (2.15)	0.126* (2.22)	0.129* (2.28)	0.0961 (1.71)
Caste - Lower Muslim			0.0310 (0.75)	0.0143 (0.35)	0.0188 (0.46)	0.0164 (0.42)	0.0211 (0.54)	-0.0143 (-0.36)
Operational land 0 acres				0.111*** (6.01)	0.100*** (5.19)	0.101*** (5.28)	0.101*** (5.27)	0.0973*** (5.12)
Operational land 0-1 acres				0.0837*** (4.42)	0.0788*** (4.11)	0.0765*** (4.01)	0.0773*** (4.06)	0.0731*** (3.86)
Operational land - 5+ acres				0.0445 (1.30)	0.0435 (1.25)	0.0384 (1.12)	0.0355 (1.04)	0.0436 (1.28)
Type of dwelling				0.0135 (0.84)	0.0135 (0.84)	0.0193 (1.31)	0.0184 (1.24)	0.00910 (0.61)
Livestock in HH					-0.0426** (-2.92)	-0.0411** (-2.85)	-0.0426** (-2.95)	-0.0388** (-2.70)
Female worker in household					0.0306 (1.81)	0.0303 (1.82)	0.0294 (1.77)	0.0307 (1.85)
Young children in household					0.0320* (2.25)	0.0303* (2.14)	0.0291* (2.06)	0.0228 (1.62)
Network - Village Migration Rate						0.00479*** (7.31)	0.0110*** (4.96)	0.00953*** (4.33)
Network*Education - Illiterate							-0.006666**	-0.00573*

Variable	Marginal Effects							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Network*Education - Primary							(-2.74)	(-2.37)
							-0.00551*	-0.00478
Network*Education - Middle							(-2.00)	(-1.75)
							-0.00623*	-0.00526
Network*Education - Secondary							(-2.24)	(-1.91)
							-0.00876**	-0.00741**
Network*Education - Higher Secondary							(-3.19)	(-2.72)
							-0.00468	-0.00347
Network*Education - Degree							(-1.56)	(-1.17)
							-0.00929**	-0.00754*
Network*Education - Postgraduate							(-2.79)	(-2.27)
							-0.00700	-0.00532
Household Migration History Variable							(-0.97)	(-0.73)
							0.0778***	(5.79)
Village Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Pseudo R ²	0.2523	0.2566	0.275	0.2842	0.2883	0.2849	0.2881	0.2962
N	3415	3415	3415	3415	3415	3415	3415	3415

Notes: t statistics in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

As in the earlier model of 1998, the first three individual variables, age, sex and marital status continue to have a statistically significant effect on the probability of an individual migrating in 2011. These effects are stable across specifications, and in the final specification, the likelihood of a man migrating is 39 percentage points more than that of a woman, and a married individual is 15 percentage points more likely to migrate than an unmarried person. Over time, the sign of the coefficients for these important variables has stayed the same, and their magnitude has increased. Therefore, the effects of these individual variables on the probability of migration have become much stronger over time. Education did not seem to play a role in determining migration in 1998. However, in 2011, there is evidence of both positive and negative selection. In the final specification, both highly educated migrants (degree and above) and illiterates are more likely to migrate. Overall, these results lend support to the hypothesis that over time the role of individual-level variables in explaining migration has become more important.

In the second model specification we control for class. Here, at first, we see that all three class dummies (agricultural labour, peasants and landlords) have a significant effect on the probability of migration. However, these effects remain significant only for individuals in the agricultural labouring class in the final specification, where the chance of an individual in the agricultural labouring being a migrant with reference to individuals in the peasant class is higher by 5 percentage points. It is pertinent to note that in comparison with the 1998 model, the sign of the coefficient for agricultural labour class has changed (from negative to positive) in 2011. This positive sign indicates the changed dynamics in the pattern of migration by class.

Controlling for caste in the 2011 model we observe elements of both change and continuity. Unlike the 1998 model, both upper caste categories have a statistically significant effect on the probability of migration with the reference group, Other OBC II. These effects are stable across specifications, and in the final specification, individuals from Brahmins and Kayastha castes are 16 percentage points more likely to migrate, while those in Bhumihar and Rajputs castes are 22 percentage points more likely to migrate as compared to the reference group, Other OBC II. It is also interesting to note that the propensity of individuals to migrate from traditionally cultivating castes is high and statistically significant. Koeris are 23 percentage more likely to migrate, and Yadavs are 10 percentage more

likely to migrate than the reference group. This points towards an occupational diversification of households belonging to these castes as an outcome of migration. At the same time, at the lower end of the caste spectrum, as earlier, individuals of OBC I continue to be more likely to migrate.

When we control for operational land, it emerges that the probability of migration among individuals belonging to households without any land or having small tracts of land continues to be positive and significant. What is discernible is the change in the sign of the coefficient of the 5+ acres category of operational land from 1998 to 2011. It appears that such large tracts of operational land deterred migration of individuals from households in this class in 1998. However, in 2011, there is a change in the sign of the coefficient for the 5+ acres category, albeit statistically insignificant in both 1998 and 2011.

As in the 1998 model, overall, other household-level variables are unable to explain the phenomenon of migration in a decisive manner in 2011. The coefficient of the livestock variable had a negative sign even in 1998, though it is not statistically significant. In 2011, it is both negative and statistically significant, indicating that individuals from households that have livestock are less likely to migrate. The type of dwelling (housing quality) is no longer statistically significant in explaining the probability of migration. This is likely on account of an overall improvement in dwelling status of rural households over time. The effects of the presence of both young children and female worker in the household on the probability of migration remain small in both 1998 and 2011.

The sixth specification adds the network variable to the model. The network variable continues to be important in 2011, and statistically significant at 1 per cent level. The seventh specification controls for interaction terms between education and network, and while the network variable continues to have a significant effect on the probability of migration, some of the results of the interaction terms of network with education are counter-intuitive.

Last, we discuss specification 8 separately as it includes the migration history variable that is not used in 1998. It is estimated that individuals from households with past migration (i.e., with a migrant member in 1998) are about 8 per cent more likely to migrate in 2011. This result is intuitive and finds support in the literature on the subject.

4.8 Conclusion

This chapter, based on a longitudinal study in rural Bihar, has explored factors that explain individual migration using two cross sections of individual-level data collected from the same households in 1998 and 2011. It finds that effects of individual factors such as age, sex and marital status in explaining migration have become stronger over time. Yet, these individual factors may be nested in household dynamics. The near universality of remittances in migrant households suggests that decisions to migrate may be principally derived from household needs (à la theories of new economics of labour migration), but individual traits drive this migration. Thus, individual factors in the context of a poor rural setting dominated by long-term circular migration are different from those in conventional neoclassical models of migration where there is a linear and permanent transition of labour from rural to urban areas.

Migration from rural Bihar continues to be dominated by individuals at the lower end of the social and economic order but there is also some evidence of positive-selection in 2011. Unlike 1998, highly educated individuals and those belonging to upper castes are more likely to migrate in 2011. This suggests that pull factors are likely at play. At the same time, pull factors also attain some importance in the context of Bihar's linkages with India's new economy as an important source region that supplies labour to the rest of the country. The increased propensity to migrate in the illiterate and agricultural labour class in 2011 may be seen in response to increasing demand for casual labour in urban India. For instance, NSS data shows that between 2004-05 and 2011-12, casual male daily wages in urban areas increased at about 6 per cent per annum for India as a whole, and 9 per cent per annum for Delhi²² – the most popular destination for Bihar's migrants (Datta et al. 2014). On the whole, migration from rural Bihar has become more differentiated by education and caste, and there seems to be some shift towards pull factors, though push factors continue to remain important.

Notes

¹ Association does not necessarily imply causality as some of the determinants of migration may also be impacted by the same migration.

² Recent empirical work in India, with the exception of Nayyar and Kim (2018) has focused on temporary or seasonal migration that emphasises short-term migration streams.

³ See chapters 1 and 2 for a discussion on standard definitions of migration used in survey data.

⁴ It is useful here to refer to evidence from China where empirical work in a somewhat similar context of rural-urban migration in the 1990s suggests that being young and being male increased the likelihood of being a migrant, while being married had a negative effect on the probability of migration (Hare 1999).

⁵ Similarly, another study in China finds abundance of female labour at the household level positively correlated with migration (Hare 1999).

⁶ This is contrary to expectation (but is consistent with other characteristics of migration where migration is positively selected for education and socioeconomic status), and empirical evidence elsewhere. For instance, in Mexico, as the value of family landholdings increases, the probability of migration decreases (Mora and Taylor 2006).

⁷ There are hardly any studies that look at the role of past migration in current migration. Studies on rural-urban migration elsewhere show that individuals are more likely to migrate from households and villages with high accumulated migration experiences (Garip 2008), and that the ex-ante presence of an additional family member at an internal migration destination raises the probability of migration (Mora and Taylor 2006).

⁸ Overall, estimates based on unweighted data are similar in direction and magnitude for all variables in the 1998 and 2011 models. However, there are some minor differences in the significance levels for a few variables. In the 1998 model, illiterates and upper muslims (not significant in weighted data), are significant at 10 per cent in unweighted data. The variables, female worker in household and village migration are significant in the weighted data (both at 10 per cent), but not significant in unweighted data. In the 2011 model, the non-agricultural class is significant in the unweighted data.

⁹ This definition of migration is attuned to the empirical context of the study. It is also close to other empirically grounded work such as the Indian Human Development Survey, where labour migrants are defined as, ‘non-resident household members who are identified through household response to: “Does any woman in the household have a husband who lives outside the household?”’ (Nayyar and Kim, 2018: 6). However, in addition to male labour migrants, our study also collected information on female migration. We are also able to identify households that permanently migrated from source areas.

¹⁰ This discussion is brief here as the primary focus of this chapter is on the determinants of migration. Income and remittances are discussed in detail in chapters 5 and 6.

¹¹ Worker here refers to individuals in age group 15-64 years with a primary occupation with any of the following work statuses: employer, own account worker (self-employed), regular wage (salaried), attached wage labour, casual wage labour or unpaid family labour. Migrant workers are considered part of the source household and therefore included in total workers.

¹² At the same time, the incidence of migration is lowest in the bottom quintile, indicating, perhaps, that migration has costs which the poorest households may not be able to incur.

¹³ The second round of data collection in the 1998-2000 study included detailed information about work-related migration, income and remittances. This dataset is used chapters 5 and 6.

¹⁴ The definition of migration here is somewhat different from that adopted by large scale surveys such as the Census and National Sample Survey (NSS). Both the Census and NSS, based on a household member's 'last place of residence', use the concept of 'normal residence' to define a migrant. In the former, this includes members who stay for more than 6 months in a year, and in the latter, there is no time criterion. These definitions are quite restrictive, and would lead to the exclusion of many 'migrant' members from the households, which, for the purpose of our analysis such as this does not give an accurate picture.

¹⁵ The share of STs in Bihar's overall population is negligible, and therefore the number of STs is very small in the sample.

¹⁶ These effects are expected to vary across land size categories.

¹⁷ McKenzie and Rapoport (2010) find that among Mexican migrants to the United States, not only are community networks important in migration, but they are also associated with education levels. They find that in communities with weak migration networks, migrants tend to be selected from the upper-middle of the education distribution, whereas in communities with strong migration networks there is negative educational selection.

¹⁸ This is consistent with results of India Human Development Survey data for the state of Bihar in the same year (2011) wherein average years of schooling of non-residents (migrants) is higher than that of residents (Nayyar and Kim 2018).

¹⁹ This decline is lower than the decline in the share of illiterates in the full sample.

²⁰ It can be seen that the size of the landlord class substantially reduced between 1998 and 2011.

²¹ However, this could be endogenous as better dwellings may be because of migrant remittances.

²² This wage growth was negative between 1999-2000 and 2004-05.

5

Migration, Remittances and Changing Sources of Income in Rural Bihar, 1999-2011¹

5.1 Introduction

This chapter is centered around the increasingly important role of migration and remittances in the context of high mobility and de-agrarianisation of society in rural Bihar. It draws on long-term data collection and associated research that has been undertaken in rural Bihar over several decades.² For the purpose of our analysis here, household-level income data collected from 891 households in 1999, and the same and successor 904 households in 2011 is used. Appendix table 5.1 gives the caste and class composition of sample household. The data of interest here pertains to household-level variables such as income from various sources, migration of members, demographic and labour composition, caste, class and land ownership.

The chapter is divided in two parts. First, survey data is used to examine various sources of income viz., agriculture, non-agriculture, government programmes and remittances in households in 2011 in section 5.2. Second, broad changes in income sources from 1999 to 2011 by district, class, caste and land ownership are presented in section 5.3. Section 5.4 concludes.

5.2 Sources of income in 2011

5.2.1 Sources of income in migrant and non-migrant households

This section discusses broad sources of income in rural Bihar in 2011.³ A four-fold classification has been used, viz., i) income from agriculture, comprising net income from self-employment in agriculture and allied activities, net income from livestock and income from agricultural labour

(casual and contract), ii) income from non-agriculture, comprising income from self-employment, income from casual labour, including contract labour in non-agriculture, and income from salary, iii) income from casual labour in government programmes such as Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) and Backward Region Grant Fund (BRGF) and income from government transfers, and, iv) income from remittances.

Table 5.1
Sources of income in migrant and non-migrant households in 2011 (Rupees)

Source of income, amount in rupees and share in total income	Average Annual Income in Rupees						Share (%) in Total Income		
	Migrant Households		Non-Migrant Households		All households		Migrant Households	Non-Migrant Households	All households
	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation			
Net income from self-employment in agriculture and allied activities	4448	11191	7096	14591	5451	12645	11.0	20.6	14.3
Net income from livestock	2702	5312	3256	5225	2912	5284	6.7	9.4	7.6
Labour income in agriculture	1428	2252	1384	2471	1411	2336	3.5	4.0	3.7
Income from attached labour in agriculture	223	1473	156	1658	198	1545	0.6	0.5	0.5
Self-employment in non-agriculture	3326	28054	5711	14549	4230	23873	8.2	16.6	11.1
Labour income in non-agriculture	2592	6633	3947	9056	3106	7665	6.4	11.5	8.1
Income from salary, local	2959	21055	6456	29326	4284	24562	7.3	18.7	11.2
Income from casual labour in govt. programmes (BRGF, MGNREGA)	226	3496	162	642	202	2782	0.6	0.5	0.5
Income from government transfers	2489	6037	2084	4959	2335	5654	6.1	6.0	6.1
Income from remittances	17572	19387	0	0	10915	17494	43.4	0.0	28.6
Income from other sources	2524	11035	4215	15368	3165	12868	6.2	12.2	8.3
Total income	40489	50382	34468	42682	38208	47678	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Household schedule, 2011.

Table 5.1 presents the distribution of these income sources by migrant, non-migrant and all households.⁴ This disaggregation is useful to examine the relative importance of different income sources in these two types of households. Overall, agriculture accounts for a little over a quarter of total income (26.1 per cent). Surprisingly, agriculture is not the primary source of income in *both* migrant and non-migrant households,⁵ indicating that rural and agriculture are not synonymous with one another.

The maximum income accrues to non-agricultural sources; therein, all three components, viz., self-employment (36 per cent), income from salary (37 per cent) and income from labour (27 per cent) are important.⁶ Therefore, local non-agricultural income is higher than local agricultural income, indicating the relative importance of the non-farm sector vis-à-vis the farm sector in the economy of rural Bihar. This growth in the non-farm sector in rural areas points towards further decoupling of agriculture from the 'rural'.

But, it is remittances that dominate – one ramification of increasing migration from the state is high dependence on remittances. It is pertinent to note that a majority of households have migrant members, and income from remittances is a significant component of overall income in rural Bihar – 29 per cent for all the households, and 43 per cent in migrant households. Among the latter, dependence on remittance income is quite acute; 52 per cent of such households report that remittances comprise more than half of their total income. Having said that, the next section examines the distribution of these livelihood sources across income quintiles.

5.2.2 Sources of income across quintiles in migrant and non-migrant households

Income from agriculture

There is substantial variation in the sources of income across income quintiles (table 5.2). Let us first take the case of agricultural income. Overall, net income from self-employment in agriculture comprises *only* 14.3 per cent of the total income in rural Bihar. It does not vary much by income quintiles, ranging from 12.6 per cent (Q4) to 15.2 per cent (Q3). Income from livestock is about 8 per cent overall; its share is highest for the lowest quintile (9.9 per cent), and lowest for the highest quintile (6.4 per cent).⁷ Income from agricultural labour, including both casual and contract labour, is less than 4 per cent of total income; its share is highest among the

poorest quintile (14 per cent), and as expected, lowest among the highest quintile (0.5 per cent). Income from attached labour in agriculture, though insignificant at 0.5 per cent is reported by one per cent of total households. As seen in table 5.1, overall, the first three heads add up to about a quarter of total income. Total income from agriculture varies substantially across income quintiles (from 21.8 per cent in Q5 to 37.3 per cent in Q1); as we move up the income quintiles, there is a clear pattern – the share of agricultural income in total income reduces.⁸ It is interesting to note that among Yadavs, a caste traditionally engaged in agriculture and livestock rearing, 45 per cent of income comes from these sources. The data, in general also show that income from cultivation and livestock go hand in hand.

Table 5.2
Distribution of income sources by income quintiles in migrant and non-migrant households in 2011 (%)

Source of income and share in total income	Below 20 percent			20-40 percent			40-60 percent			60-80 percent			Top 20 percent		
	M HHs	NM HHs	Total	M HHs	NM HHs	Total	M HHs	NM HHs	Total	M HHs	NM HHs	Total	M HHs	NM HHs	Total
Net income from agriculture and allied activities	7.2	19.0	13.4	8.5	23.9	14	10.7	24.0	15.2	10.0	20.3	12.6	12.5	19.2	14.9
Net income from live-stock	4.3	15.1	9.9	6.1	12.6	8.4	8.0	12.8	9.6	6.9	10.9	7.9	6.5	6.2	6.4
Labour income in agriculture	7.8	19.5	14	7.9	6.6	7.4	6.7	5.3	6.2	4.5	3.3	4.2	0.5	0.5	0.5
Income from attached labour in agriculture	0.0	0.0	0	0.0	1.3	0.5	2.1	2.1	2.1	0.9	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	0
Self-employment in non-agriculture	0.3	3.1	1.7	2.2	14.6	6.6	1.4	13.1	5.3	4.4	23.6	9.3	14.8	18.0	16
Labour income in non-agriculture	12.4	22.2	17.5	7.5	19.0	11.6	6.0	21.8	11.3	12.0	14.4	12.6	2.5	3.7	2.9
Income from salary, local	0.0	2.5	1.3	0.6	7.2	3	0.1	6.8	2.4	2.0	7.8	3.4	15.0	31.6	21
Income from casual labour in govt. pro-	0.0	1.5	0.8	0.3	0.9	0.6	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	1.0	0.5	0.9	0.1	0.6

Source of income and share in total income	Below 20 percent			20-40 percent			40-60 percent			60-80 percent			Top 20 percent		
	M HHs	NM HHs	To-tal	M HHs	NM HHs	To-tal	M HHs	NM HHs	To-tal	M HHs	NM HHs	To-tal	M HHs	NM HHs	To-tal
Income from government transfers	3.6	9.1	6.5	5.3	9.6	6.9	6.8	7.7	7.1	10.2	11.7	10.6	4.0	2.3	3.4
Income from remittances	58.7	0.0	28	58.0	0.0	37.4	54.3	0.0	36	46.5	0.0	34.7	33.2	0.0	21.2
Income from other sources	5.6	8.0	6.9	3.6	4.4	3.9	3.6	6.2	4.5	2.4	6.9	3.5	10.0	18.4	13
Total income	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Note: M HH means migrant household and NM HH means non migrant household. Q1 is the lowest income quintile and Q5 is the highest income quintile.

Source: Household schedule, 2011.

In sum, the pattern of income indicates that the poor in rural Bihar are proportionately more dependent on agriculture, and the rich, disproportionately less so. However, a paradox emerges when the share of agriculture in total income is disaggregated at the district-level (table 5.3). This share is highest in the agriculturally advanced district (Rohtas – 44 per cent), as well as in the most backward district (Purnia – 29 per cent), though this may be due to very different reasons.⁹ Agricultural production in Rohtas is market oriented, while that in Purnia is subsistence-based; yet, for these two districts at two ends of the development spectrum, there seems to be convergence as far as the importance of agriculture in the local economy is concerned.

Table 5.3
Distribution of income sources by district in 2011 (%)

<i>Source of income and share in total income</i>	<i>Araria/ Purnia</i>	<i>Gaya</i>	<i>Gopal- ganj</i>	<i>Madhu bani</i>	<i>Na- landa</i>	<i>Rohtas</i>
Net income from agriculture and allied activities	18.8	3.8	9.6	10.0	9.9	26.8
Net income from livestock	5.0	11.9	8.5	6.2	6.6	13.2
Income from casual labour in agriculture	4.3	2.2	1.8	3.7	5.4	3.6
Income from attached labour in agriculture	1.2	0.3	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.4
Self-employment in non-agriculture	10.6	26.2	6.7	6.5	12.0	10.8
Casual labour in non-agriculture	4.7	2.5	3.6	15.1	12.1	9.0
Income from salary, local	12.5	5.7	9.7	12.7	17.6	6.6
Income from casual labour in govt. programmes	0.4	0.1	0.0	0.1	3.6	0.3
Income from government transfers	4.7	7.9	4.4	5.8	11.5	6.1
Income from remittances	25.6	26.6	50.7	37.2	13.9	14.0
Income from other sources	12.1	12.8	5.0	2.5	7.4	9.4
Total income	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Household schedule, 2011.

Income from local non-agriculture

In the context of a predominantly rural society like Bihar's it is surprising that income from local non-agriculture rather than that from agriculture is the most dominant source of income (30.4 per cent of total income). In households with no migrant members, this is as high as 46.8 per cent (table 5.1). Among these, the share of self-employment in non-agriculture overall is quite substantial (36 per cent of total non-agricultural income). Income from this source is characterised by small household-level enterprises or own account work. Given that Bihar has a very low industrial base, and there is little industrialisation in the state in recent times, the diverse non-agricultural sources of income in the local economy emerging from the survey merit further examination. Survey results related to nature and characteristics of non-agricultural work, location of this work, and capital and labour employed by such enterprises are briefly discussed here. About a fifth of all households in 2011 reported self-employment in non-agricultural enterprises. Much of this activity is in the tertiary sector; more than a third of these households report workers in sales (groceries, medicines, vegetables); another 11 per cent report finance and commission agents. About 9 per cent of the enterprises are engaged in a variety of repair services, and 8 per cent provide health and educational services. It is noteworthy that more than half of these enterprises operate out of no fixed premises, indicating the mobile nature of many of these service providers.¹⁰ The survey also reveals that a majority (61 per cent) of these enterprises operate throughout the 12 months of the year, and more than three-quarters operate for at least 8 months in the year. In other words, this reflects the perennial nature of demand for non-agricultural services in rural areas. It also emerges that more than three-quarters of these enterprises don't hire any labour and about a third don't have any fixed capital. This services oriented own account non-agricultural work has emerged as an important source of income in rural Bihar.

It is worthwhile to note that income from such enterprise is lowest for the bottom quintile (1.7 per cent) and highest for the top quintile (16 per cent) suggesting that such activities are able to generate higher income (table 5.2). At the same time, at the very top of the spectrum, enterprise activity is something that better-off households (are able to) engage in, as it is likely to have linkages with assets and capital. Specific castes are more entrepreneurial than others; with 26 per cent of total income, OBC II have

a significantly higher share of income accruing to non-agricultural enterprises in the rural areas (table 5.4).

Table 5.4
Distribution of income sources by caste and community in 2011 (%)

<i>Source of income and share in total income</i>	<i>Upper caste</i>	<i>OBC II</i>	<i>OBC I</i>	<i>SC and ST</i>	<i>Muslim</i>
Net income from agriculture and allied activities	22.8	13.2	13.7	5.6	8.7
Net income from livestock	7.9	10.8	6.9	6.5	3.6
Income from casual labour (including contract labour) in agriculture	0.2	1.4	6.1	8.4	4.4
Income from attached labour in agriculture	0.0	0.2	1.7	0.7	0.0
Self-employment in non-agriculture	8.9	26.0	9.4	4.0	5.3
Casual labour in non-agriculture (including contract labour)	0.4	3.9	10.3	17.4	17.3
Income from salary, local	16.5	12.8	7.2	7.4	7.4
Income from casual labour in govt. programmes	0.1	0.3	0.3	1.9	0.0
Income from government transfers	3.5	4.2	6.1	11.9	5.7
Income from remittances	26.4	19.2	32.6	32.9	37.6
Income from other sources	13.2	8.0	5.5	3.3	9.9
Total income	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Household schedule, 2011.

Income from non-agricultural labour is another important component of non-farm income in rural Bihar. It includes income from both casual and contract labour. Its importance is reflected in the fact that first, its share is almost twice as much as agricultural labour, and second, income from non-agricultural labour is higher than that from agricultural labour across all income quintiles. This shows the increasing importance of non-agricultural work, and the relative decline of agriculture in income generation in rural areas. At the same time, village-level wage data shows that non-agricultural work is far more remunerative and hence desirable than agricultural work.

The third head under non-farm income viz., income from (local) salary, though 11.2 per cent overall, is disproportionately represented in the top-most quintile (very few persons in other quintiles have a local salaried job in the first place). In fact, in the top most quintile, 21 per cent of all income comes from local salaried income (table 5.2). It is not surprising that households that have individuals with higher educational endowments are better able to access and exploit this more remunerative source of income.¹¹ For instance, among the education class, degree and above (male), 32.6 per cent of income accrues to salaried income, and it is even higher for households with females in the same education class (45.1 per cent). There is a clear caste pattern too – households belonging to upper and dominant caste groups have a higher than average share of income accruing to salary (table 5.4). Compared to male-headed households, female-headed households are likely to have almost twice as much a share in salaried income (10.6 per cent in male-headed households and 18.4 per cent in female-headed households).¹² It is evident that while social norms do not allow women to migrate for work, their participation in the local labour force is acceptable in professions such as health and education, where they are concentrated. In sum, in rural Bihar, the highest share of income accrues to the non-agricultural sector, and this is the largest sector in the state's economy in terms of income generation.

Income from government programmes and transfers

Income from government wage employment programmes such as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) and the Backward Region Grant Fund (BRGF) is extremely low; 0.5 per cent overall. These interventions have been limited, and contribute little to overall incomes in rural Bihar. At the same time, this income from casual wage in government programmes is substantially higher in the lowest quintile, particularly among non-migrant households. While this is a positive development, its rather negligible share in total income shows that such programmes have been unable to contribute to the process of income generation of the poor in Bihar. What is striking in this regard is the near absence of this income source in 6 of the 7 districts, and its disproportionate accrual in Nalanda district. This may be due to its proximity to the state capital, Patna.

In the context of government wage programmes, it is pertinent to discuss (this near absence of) MGNREGA in rural Bihar. One of the key

objectives of this flagship programme of the Government of India is to prevent migration from the rural areas. But in the case of Bihar, the penetration of the programme is very low,¹³ in a landscape of lack of employment opportunities in rural areas and high outmigration for work. Studies have found that there are large leakages amidst large unmet demand for work. In particular, failure of MGNREGA is attributed to poor administrative capacity to implement the scheme (Dutta, Murgai, Ravallion and Van de Walle 2014). Paradoxically, while the number of job cards issued has increased over the years, the number of households 'provided with employment' declined (by almost half) between 2010-11 and 2012-13.¹⁴

In comparison to income from government wage programmes, income from government transfer is considerably higher and broad based. This head of income from government transfer includes a wide range of benefits under several schemes. These include income from pensions (old age/widow/ handicapped), Indira Awas Yojana, Balika and Balak Poshak Yojana, Cycle Yojana, Kanya Suraksha Yojana, Janani Suraksha Yojana, and imputed value of benefits from the Public Distribution System and the Integrated Child Development Services. Overall, 6.1 per cent of the total income in the survey villages is from government transfers. The data indicate a positive targeting of government transfers; in female-headed households, the share of government transfers is more than twice that in male-headed households (11.3 per cent versus 5.7 per cent), and it is also high in Scheduled Caste households (11.9 per cent) and landless households (9.5 per cent).

Income from remittances

This brings us to the last, and perhaps the most important, source of income in rural Bihar. According to one estimate, 4.5 to 5 million migrant Bihari workers send remittances equivalent to about 5 per cent of the state's GDP (Indian Institute of Public Administration 2010). Based on their research in north Bihar, Rodgers and Rodgers (2011) estimate that remittances could amount to 4 to 7 per cent of the state's net domestic product. The use of remittances is dominated by consumption and subsistence needs, education of children, medical expenses and wedding expenditure (Karan, 2003; Indian Institute of Public Administration 2010).

Remittances are the real game changer in rural Bihar – the second most important source of income, after local non-agricultural income. Remit-

tances comprise 28.6 per cent of overall income, and 43.4 per cent of income among households with migrant members. Remittances here refer to that part of a migrant's income that is sent or brought back to the household located in the source region. Households in the lower quintiles, castes and classes have a disproportionately higher dependence on remittances than those in the better-off social categories. The share of remittances in total income is greater than average among Muslims, SCs and OBC I, and agricultural labour households; these caste and class groups are at the bottom end of the socio-economic hierarchy. In addition, in a substantial proportion of households, dependence on remittances is extremely high, and these are the only source of income. The model of migration is where men, predominantly young men, migrate to distant urban labour markets for the greater part of the year, and women, children and old people stay back in the village. Remittances are important across all income quintiles; the share of remittances in total income ranges from almost 60 per cent (in households with migrants) in the bottom two quintiles to 33 per cent (in households with migrants) in the top quintile (table 5.2). There is a disproportionately high dependence on remittances among Muslim households. There is also a clear regional pattern; north Bihar districts such as Gopalganj and Madhubani have a higher reliance on remittances than south Bihar districts (table 5.3).

5.3 Change in income and its source, 1999 - 2011

Income data on the same households in an earlier period (1999) allows us to examine changes in total income during the period 1999 to 2011, disaggregated by district, class, caste and land ownership size (table 5.5). Annual household income in rural Bihar increased by 1.8 times, in real terms, from 1999 to 2011.¹⁵ Average incomes continued to be substantially higher for those in the upper castes and classes. Income gains over time were highest for the Scheduled Castes and Muslims, landless, and non-agricultural households. It may be noted that these are the same categories of households that experienced highest increases in migration, and remittance incomes. Income gains were also higher than average in the poorer districts of Araria/Purnia, Gaya and Madhubani.

Table 5.5
Mean annual income and its change by district, class, caste and land size ownership: 1999 and 2011 (Rupees)

<i>Mean Annual Income in Rupees</i>	<i>1999</i>	<i>2011</i>	<i>Factor Change</i>
District			
Araria/Purnia	17390	36533	2.1
Gaya	19844	41629	2.1
Gopalganj	28868	51966	1.8
Madhubani	15590	32484	2.1
Nalanda	26920	36033	1.3
Rohtas	35797	48266	1.3
Class			
Agricultural Labour	14362	29817	2.1
Small and Medium Peasant	22415	41202	1.8
Large Peasant and Landlord	37254	60851	1.6
Non Agricultural	12743	35957	2.8
Caste			
Upper caste	31277	51858	1.7
OBC II	27009	48274	1.8
OBC I	14996	29351	2.0
SC and ST	15182	31597	2.1
Muslim	14811	31910	2.2
Landownership			
Landless	13078	29040	2.2
0.01 to 0.99 acres	17772	33894	1.9
1 to 2.49 acres	24750	43349	1.8
2.5 to 4.99 acres	34059	65750	1.9
5 acres or more	72057	140013	1.9
Total	20801	38208	1.8

Source: Household schedules, 1999 and 2011.

Table 5.6 presents changes in the distribution of income by its sources over time, disaggregated by migrant and non-migrant households. Overall, income from agriculture has drastically declined from 53 per cent in 1999

to 26.1 per cent in 2011.¹⁶ As expected, migrant households had a lower share in agricultural income (38.3 per cent) than non-migrants (66.5 per cent) in 1999. The aforementioned decline may be attributed to two inter-related developments in agriculture. First, the costs of cultivation have increased without a commensurate rise in income from cultivation. This has led to a situation where most peasants find that cultivation is becoming less and less remunerative over time. This is mirrored in the relatively lower increase in income of peasant households over time, vis-à-vis agricultural labouring and non-agricultural households (table 5.5). Second, in this period, agricultural activities have mechanised rapidly, and the number of working days in agriculture has substantially reduced. There has been a movement of workers away from agriculture; yet at the same time, there is the paradox of labour shortage in the peak season in agricultural activities.

Table 5.6
Distribution of income sources in non-migrant and migrant households: 1999 and 2011 (%)

Source of income and share in total income	1999			2011		
	Non-Migrant Households	Migrant Households	All households	Non-Migrant Households	Migrant Households	All Households
Net income from agriculture and allied activities	37.7	20.9	29.6	20.6	11	14.3
Net income from livestock	10.9	7.3	9.2	9.4	6.7	7.6
Casual labour in agriculture	14.4	9.3	12.0	4	3.5	3.7
Attached labour in agriculture	3.5	0.8	2.2	0.5	0.6	0.5
Self-employment in non-agriculture	11.4	5.1	8.4	16.6	8.2	11.1
Wage employment in non-agriculture	11.1	3.5	7.4	30.2	13.7	19.3
Govt transfers and casual labour in govt. programmes	-	-	-	6.5	6.7	6.6
Remittances	0	45.3	21.8	0	43.4	28.6

<i>Source of income and share in total income</i>	<i>1999</i>			<i>2011</i>		
	<i>Non-Migrant Households</i>	<i>Migrant Households</i>	<i>All households</i>	<i>Non-Migrant Households</i>	<i>Migrant Households</i>	<i>All Households</i>
Income from other sources	11	7.9	9.5	12.2	6.2	8.3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Household schedules, 1999 and 2011.

Simultaneously, there has been an increase in remittance income from 21.8 per cent to 28.6 per cent,¹⁷ as well as a substantial increase in non-agricultural local income from 15.8 per cent to 30.4 per cent from 1999 to 2011. We have already discussed diverse new sources of non-agricultural income in the rural economy. The declining share of agriculture in income (and employment) in the local economy is clear. It is also evident that households in the upper income quintiles have disproportionately been able to move out of agriculture, and the poor(er) households, particularly households which are exclusively dependent on agricultural activities for their livelihood, are stuck in the lower quintiles.¹⁸ At first, being able to move away from the local economy (migration) is a pathway to higher income, and a movement away from poverty.¹⁹ At the same time, income from local non-agricultural sources can be another option to escape poverty. However, this is much less accessible to the poor; the upper echelons in the rural society are better able to access this route.

It is noteworthy that several government programmes that were operational in 2011 did not exist in 1999. In 2011, income from government transfers and casual employment have appeared on the radar. In 1999, average annual income of female-headed households was about half that of male-headed households. They were more likely to be in casual labour in agriculture than male-headed households underlining their disadvantaged situation. By 2011, this was no longer the case; the income gap between male- and female-headed households narrowed substantially. The positive role of government transfers in raising the income of female-headed households is evident.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter has drawn on a longitudinal study conducted in rural Bihar, and presented a source area perspective of migration. Based on primary data collected in 12 villages in seven districts, it first discussed the overall distribution of income, disaggregated by migrant and non-migrant household, income quintile, district and caste in 2011. Thereafter, changes in the distribution of income sources disaggregated by district, class, caste and landownership between 1999 and 2011 are presented. Three broad patterns emerged from this work. First, overall, there was a decline in agricultural income in both migrant and non-migrant households, and a simultaneous increase in both non-agricultural and remittance income. Thus, the chapter has provided evidence of further decoupling of agriculture from the 'rural'. Second, income growth was higher for those at the bottom end of the social and economic ladder: the Scheduled Castes and Muslims, landless, and non-agricultural households. These categories of households also experienced highest increases in migration and remittance incomes.

Third, upper castes and classes continued to have substantially higher incomes, were better able to access non-agricultural work and enjoy the largest income gains from migration, in absolute terms. Ghosh and Gupta (2009) have argued that while economic growth may have caused an expansion of opportunities in Bihar, there is unequal development among different groups of people. This chapter provides further evidence to support this hypothesis. Amidst rapid advances in material condition, changes in the structure of the state's economy, and the composition of household income over time, structures of inequity persist in rural Bihar.

Notes

¹ An expanded version of this chapter has been published: Migration, Remittances and Changing Sources of Income in Rural Bihar (1999–2011), *Economic and Political Weekly*, 85-93.

² Please see section 2.5 for details.

³ Income figures of 2011 have been deflated using a state-specific price deflator – Consumer Price Index of Agricultural Labourers (CPI-AL) so that we are able to examine changes in real income between 1999 and 2011 in section 5.3.

⁴ Households with migrants have been referred to as migrant households, and households without migrants have been referred to as non-migrant households.

⁵ In migrant households, income from remittances appear most important, accounting for (43.4 per cent of total household income), while in non-migrant households it is income from non-agricultural sources (46.7 per cent of total income).

⁶ Income from labour is basically casual daily work, while income from salary is regular monthly paid work.

⁷ While the poorest tend to disproportionately engage in livestock cultivation and the highest income share from livestock accrues to this quintile, it may be noted that a substantial proportion of livestock is leased in (*posaiyya*) and is not owned by the poor.

⁸ In fact, households in the bottom quintile with no migrant members derive more than half (54 per cent) of their income from agricultural activities.

⁹ For a further disaggregated analysis of contrasting development paths of two of the 12 sample villages, see Datta et al (2014).

¹⁰ Of those enterprises that are located in fixed premises, about 60 per cent are within household premises, and about 20 per cent are outside.

¹¹ Lanjouw and Shariff (2004), using data from the India Human Development Survey find that education is strongly correlated with more remunerative non-farm activities.

¹² About 8 per cent of sample households are female-headed households.

¹³ On the whole, in the survey villages, only 11 per cent of all households reported MGNREGA work by male members, and 3 per cent by female members. The amount of work reported was also low. The average number of days worked amounted to only 14 for men and 11 for women among those reporting MGNREGA employment. This is far below the official target of 100 days employment guarantee (Rodgers et al. 2013).

¹⁴ From 2010-11 to 2012-13, the number of job cards issued increased from 13.05 million to 13.35 million. In the same time period, the number of households provided with employment, declined from 4.69 million to 2.47 million, as per government estimates (GOB 2014).

¹⁵ For a meaningful comparison with the 1999 data, income figures of 2011 have been deflated using a state-specific price deflator – Consumer Price Index of Agricultural Labourers (CPI-AL).

¹⁶ There has been a simultaneous decline in agricultural employment. In 1999, 74 per cent of workers reported agriculture as their principal occupation. In 2009-10, this declined to 44 per cent. See Rodgers et al (2013) for details.

¹⁷ The share of remittances in total income of migrant households has been fairly stable over time - 43 per cent in 2011 and 45 per cent in 1999 (table 5.6).

¹⁸ There is also a clear caste pattern in the accrual of income sources. Among broad caste categorisations, the upper caste group of four castes – Brahmins, Kayasthas, Rajputs and Bhumihars - together have the highest average incomes.

¹⁹ Although migration is an exit strategy from poverty, yet the very poor cannot resort to it.

6

The Impacts of Migration in Rural Bihar, 1999-2011

6.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the effects of migration using household panel data in survey villages. It employs the technique of difference-in-differences estimation to examine, if, over time, welfare outcomes (proxied by income) of households that experience migration are different from those that don't. The advantage of using panel data is that it enables us to control for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity, something that is not possible with cross-section data that is used in most studies. Four household typologies are devised, based on household migration status in 1999 and 2011 for the difference-in-differences model that estimates the effect of migration on welfare outcomes. In doing so, we are also able to study the dynamics of change within each of the four distinct household typologies. This complements the aggregate analysis on the changing sources of income undertaken in chapter 5.

The chapter draws on three strands of interconnected, yet often disparate literatures; first, theoretical and empirical studies where there is an emphasis on the household as a unit of analysis (Stark and Bloom 1986; Stark and Lucas 1988; Taylor et al. 2003; Nayyar and Kim 2018); second, village-level studies of longitudinal change in the context of rural India (Badiani 2007; Mukopadhyay, 2011; Dercon et al. 2012); and, third, empirical studies that have used individual and household-level panel data to study the relationship between migration and welfare (Funkhouser 2006; Beegle et al. 2011).

The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 covers the relevant theoretical and empirical literature described above. Section 6.3 presents details of the data used in this paper and some methodological

issues related to the data that we use. Section 6.4 describes the four household typologies used in subsequent analysis, and the trajectories of changes in income disaggregated by these household typologies. Section 6.5 presents descriptive statistics of variables that are used in the difference-in-differences model presented in section 6.6. Section 6.7 concludes.

6.2 Theoretical and empirical literature

6.2.1 Household as a unit of analysis

The theoretical framework of the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM), in which the household is at the core of migration decisions and outcomes, provides a useful context to this chapter. NELM theorises migration as an income enhancing and risk sharing livelihood strategy adopted by the household that comprises interconnected individuals who make migration decisions.¹ Unlike earlier neoclassical economic models of migration (Lee 1966; Todaro 1969; Harris and Todaro 1970), there is a shift from 'individual independence' to 'mutual interdependence' (Stark and Lucas 1988) and migration is viewed not as an 'act of desperation or boundless optimism' of an individual, but a 'calculated strategy' of the household (Stark and Bloom 1985). Remittances are a *sine qua non* of migration in NELM approaches that consider rural-urban migration and urban-rural remittances as a self-enforcing cooperative contractual agreement based on the sharing of risks by households in sending areas. This is consistent with empirical evidence in this study and elsewhere, where the household mediates 'individual' migration and remittances.

NELM offers scope for both circular and return migration (Taylor 1999; De Haan 1999; Taylor et al. 2003). Empirical evidence shows that not all rural-urban migration is permanent; circular migration is a dominant mode of outmigration from rural areas, and migrants often return back to source areas (De Haan 1999; Hare 1999; Taylor et al. 2002; Mberu 2005).² This circularity of migration gives way to a bi-locational or a multi-locational household, where members are distributed at source and destination, in rural and urban locations.³ In the literature, such household structures have been aptly referred to as 'share families'⁴ 'link families'⁵ and 'broken families'⁶ that form quite stable units.⁷ A noteworthy feature that emerges in the literature is strong connections between the 'rural' and the 'urban' household by way of (re)visits and remittances.^{8 9} In the context of the 'household' in this research, circular migration of individual

members emerges as the most dominant form of migration; permanent migration, of the kind that entails relocation of the entire household from the village is very limited (Datta 2016a).

6.2.2 Longitudinal village-level studies in rural India

The increase in the incidence of migration discussed in earlier chapters is not peculiar to Bihar alone. Studies elsewhere in rural India too, highlight this trend; ICRISAT¹⁰ and Palanpur studies,¹¹ two major longitudinal studies in southern and northern India respectively, report that outmigration for work has substantially increased over time.

In Palanpur, in the period 1983 – 1993, about 21 per cent of the total households experienced migration; this number doubled to 42 per cent in the period, 1993-2008. As in the case of our study, outmigration of some members, while others remain behind was the dominant mode of migration in both the time periods (Mukopadhyay 2011).¹² In ICRISAT villages, migratory flows increased over time, and the nature of migration for individuals has moved from ‘predominantly permanent movements’ in the earlier surveys of 1975 – 84, to temporary movements, as a matter of occupational choice in 1992, and this trend continued in 2001-2 to 2004-5 (Badiani 2007).

How do migrants and non-migrants fare over time? The ICRISAT studies show that in the base year 1976-77, in terms of food consumption, migrants started off worse than non-migrants, but by 2004-05, their consumption levels were considerably higher (Dercon et al. 2012).¹³ In addition, household trajectories in terms of income and assets differ for migrant and non-migrant households. Badiani (2007) finds that in 1992, at the time of migration, households with and without migrants do not have substantial differences in assets and income, but, by 2002, these differences become substantial. Perceptions of their own well-being is equally important as other measures of welfare. Dercon et al (2012), find that migrants’ self-assessed welfare, paradoxically, is not in tandem with other indicators of welfare, such as food consumption.¹⁴

6.2.3 Evidence from panel studies

Empirical evidence in general shows that migration and remittances are associated with improved welfare outcomes, in terms of income and consumption in source households (Taylor et al. 2003¹⁵, Haberfeld et al. 1999¹⁶, Hoang et al. 2005¹⁷). These studies are mostly based on cross-section data that can at best study differences between migrant and non-migrant households at one point in time. Longitudinal studies, on the other hand, collect information over time, and can enable us to examine impacts; study household trajectories to examine dynamics of change. A major advantage of panel data is that it allows a researcher to control for time-invariant unobservable characteristics which may influence both income and the decision to migrate. For instance, it helps provide an estimate of the effect of migration on income after controlling for time-invariant unobservable traits such as motivation and risk-taking ability which may influence migration and income and thereby lead to misleading inferences on the relationship between migration and income. Differencing two years of panel data is a simple yet powerful way to control for such unobserved effects (Wooldridge 2002, 2009).¹⁸

In the literature, two noteworthy panel studies attribute improvements in welfare outcomes to migration. Beegle et al (2011), based on an empirical study in Tanzania estimate large individual consumption increases on account of migration; they report that the farther one moves from the source area, higher the increase in consumption (Beegle et al. 2011).¹⁹ Funkhouser (2006) using panel data (1998 – 2001) of the Living Standard Measurement Surveys for Nicaragua finds that households from which an emigrant left experienced a reduction in working members, and income, and also a reduction in poverty. This framework is particularly useful in the context of this chapter, where we examine if welfare outcomes of households which experience migration are different from those that don't.

6.3 Data

Two distinct datasets are used in this study. The first set of data primarily comes from the second of three rounds of household and community surveys conducted in the period 1998-2000. It covers 891 households in 12 core villages. The data of our interest here pertain to household-level

variables such as income from various sources,²⁰ migration of its members, demographic and labour composition, caste, class, land ownership, information on credit, and perceptions of change over time.

The second set of data is a subset of resurveys that began in 2009, of households and communities in the same 36 villages. Two rounds of data collection were undertaken from 2009 to 2011. For the purpose of the paper, we use data collected in the second round in 2011, when an income accounting exercise was undertaken for same and successor households of the original sample of 891 households covered in 1999. An important methodological feature of this study, thus, is that we have data of the same households before and after migration, or, after and before migration, in the case that households slipped into non-migration. The advantage of use of panel data over cross section data is that we are able to control for unobserved heterogeneity (Wooldridge 2002). In addition, all households are located in the same labour market, and have been administered the same questionnaire: McKenzie, Gibson and Stillman (2010) have argued that this can be expected to give more accurate estimates (McKenzie, Gibson and Stillman 2010).

A special follow up tracking survey was undertaken from January to March 2013 to obtain additional information on ‘missing’ households – households of the original sample of 1999 that were not covered in the 2011 survey. In particular, the 2013 tracking survey paid attention to household splits that may not have been recorded in 2011, and it also collected detailed information of households that had permanently migrated. The results of this (re)survey exercise helps us to better understand panel attrition between the two waves of 1999 and 2011.

We were able to trace 707 of the original 891 panel households in 2011. After accounting for households which disappeared over time (see table 6.2 for details), this means a recovery rate of 82 per cent of our original, which can be considered fairly high in panel studies (Alderman et al. 2001).²¹ Taking into account household splits and the formation of new households, a total of 860 households were recorded. Table 6.1 presents details of panel households by caste and community.

Table 6.1
Recovery rate for panel households, 1999 to 2011, by caste and community

<i>Caste/ community</i>	<i>No. of households in 1998-9</i>	<i>Households re-covered in 2011</i>	<i>Recovery rate</i>	<i>Total households in 2011</i>
Upper	251	206	0.82	243
OBC II	178	133	0.75	161
OBC I	163	144	0.88	179
SC+ST	200	155	0.78	196
Muslim	99	69	0.70	81
Total	891	707	0.79	860

Source: Household surveys, 1999 and 2011, Tracking survey, 2013.

It can be seen that the recovery rates were higher than average for OBC I and upper castes, and lower than average for muslim and OBC II households. At the same time, OBC I, and SC and ST households split at a pace higher than average and muslim households split at a pace less than the sample average.

Table 6.2 presents reasons for failure to cover missing households. This information was collected using a tracking survey in 2013 to better understand panel attrition. It can be seen that about half of the cases where households were missed were accidental; due to household members not being present in the village at the time of survey, or investigator error. Another 13 per cent of these households simply disappeared – due to death of all members, or when members joined another household. About a fifth of all missing households was attributed to permanent out-migration; in the panel of 891 households, 38 households had left the village. This works out to an annual permanent migration rate of less than 0.4 per cent from the survey villages, and is quite low. Another 4 households that otherwise resided in the village had migrated at the time of the survey. In about 13 per cent of the cases, a wrong household, or its offshoot was matched to the original 1999 household in 2011. Lastly, about 5 per cent of households could not be traced.

Table 6.2
Reasons for omission of 1999 household in 2011

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Household, or part of household accidentally omitted in 2011	86	46.7
Household disappeared due to death of all members	16	8.7
Household disappeared as remaining members joined another household	8	4.3
Household permanently outmigrated	38	20.7
Household outmigrated at the time of the survey in 2011	4	2.2
Household, or part of household surveyed in 2011 is wrong	23	12.5
Household could not be traced	9	4.9
Total	184	100

Source: Household surveys, 1999 and 2011, Tracking survey, 2011.

It is pertinent to note here that a household is not a static unit. This point becomes even more important in the context of a study of a longitudinal panel of households. In a period of about 12 years, it is expected that some households would have changed in structure and composition. In our sample, of the 707 households surveyed in 1999 and in 2011, in 595 cases, the core household structure remained unaltered, and there was no split in the original household. While some members, may have died, and others added by birth, the core structure of the household defined by the patrilineal male line remained intact. This takes into account addition of women by marriage to the household and exclusion of women who married out of the household.²² In the remaining 112 households, there were 82 cases of the original 1999 household splitting into 2 parts, 20 cases of the original household splitting into 3, nine cases of four splits and one case of five splits was recorded.

In this chapter, the household is our primary unit of analysis, and we examine changes in household income, which is our primary welfare outcome. But when households split, how can we accurately examine changes in its income over time? One way is to aggregate income of split households in 2011 to compare that with the original household. While this may seem appealing, it may not give us an accurate picture of change – split households that may have fared badly would show a different trajectory of change if clubbed together with its offshoot that may have done well over time. On the other hand, if we compare changes in income of

an ‘unsplit’ household in wave 1 to a split household in wave 2, we may underestimate gains in income, or even inaccurately estimate losses, in welfare when that might not be the case. Somewhat related, if we attribute income gains, only to individuals who earn that money as some studies do, that would not be accurate either. It would tend to overstate income gains to individuals if it does not take account of transfers (remittances) to source households.

It is important that for precise estimates and their interpretation we keep intact the integrity of household as a unit of analysis over time. Though the use of panel data is a powerful way to control for unobserved effects it has some limitations. For the purpose of our study, given how data is collected and organised, and change in household income between the two waves is the dependent variable, inclusion of split households in our analysis can lead to biased results. Therefore, we limit the econometric analysis to households that did not split over time.²³

Conventional definitions of a household often do not consider long-term migrants to be its members. Given the circularity of long-term migration and a key feature that family members of migrants stay behind in the village, our surveys capture source households’ connections with external labour markets mediated through migrant workers, and the remittances that they send.²⁴ Migrants mostly move to labour markets which offer higher wages. They are able to earn much more than they would in the village. Therefore, households with migrants tend to have higher incomes than households without migrants in both 1999 and 2011. Remittances are near universal in migrant households and form a considerable portion of overall household incomes. If these members are not included in the household, it will clearly lead to an underestimation of household income. It is pertinent to note here that we only include remittance income, and not full migrant incomes that they earn at destination, as part of household income.

As mentioned in chapter 4, in our surveys the working definition of a household is a person or a group of persons who live in the same dwelling and eat food from a common kitchen. It also includes persons who are away from the village for work or other exigencies, but visited the village at least once in the year preceding the survey. This extended definition of the household allows us to include ‘migrants’ who share household resources when they are in the village and maintain a rural residence otherwise. Some studies often use a cut-off point to define if someone lives in

a community or not. In the context of rural Bihar, and perhaps in other developing countries too, this can be highly misleading and lead to conclusions that rural residents have ‘permanently’ migrated, which may not be the case. We have already seen in table 6.2 how low the rate of permanent migration from the study area actually is.

A limitation of this dataset is that it tracks households only in the source areas. Scholars have noted that research limiting itself to only tracing households in original localities, and not at destination misses a crucial part of the analysis of mobility (Dercon and Shapiro 2007). However, given the geographically static nature of core households in rural Bihar and the low rate of permanent migration that is seen in Table 6.2, it is reasonable to assume that its effect will be small, if not negligible.

Another limitation, in the context of this chapter is that welfare measures such as consumption or income do not adequately capture well-being. Since the focus here is on monetary measures of welfare, other dimensions are ignored (Dercon and Shapiro 2007). Looking only at income effects may overstate the net gains of migration as it does not take into account important costs of migration, such as the health and emotional well-being of migrants and their family members (Deb and Seck 2009; Beegle et al. 2011).

Tables 6.3 and 6.4 present select descriptive statistics for the panel of 707 and 595 households respectively. It can be seen that in about a decade there were several changes in the economic situation and context of study households. To estimate real changes, income figures of 2011 have been deflated using a state-specific price deflator – Consumer Price Index of Agricultural Labourers (CPI-AL), General. The results show that average real household incomes approximately doubled, and this was accompanied by changes in the structure of income; the share of agricultural income declined while that of both local non-agricultural and remittance income increased substantially. There were gains in education, and an increase in the numbers of workers in the household. Not surprisingly, land ownership did not change very much.

Table 6.3
Select descriptive statistics, unrestricted panel

	1999		2011	
	Mean	Std. Devi- ation	Mean	Std. De- viation
Annual household income in rupees	24116	29185	45605	58068
Share of agricultural income to total in- come	0.53	0.39	0.30	0.29
Share of non agricultural income to total income	0.13	0.27	0.21	0.30
Share of remittance income to total in- come	0.25	0.33	0.33	0.34
Total number of primary workers in hh	1.9	1.2	2.1	1.2
Years of schooling of most educated hh member	6.7	4.7	8.3	3.9
Total land owned by household (in acres)	1.30	2.67	1.24	2.85
Share of non agricultural workers in total workers in the village (%)	10.1	2.4	14.5	3.5
Village migration rate (%)	37.5	16.3	63.1	14.4
Village literacy rate (%)	50.7	11.1	51.8	10.4
N	707	707	707	707

Source: Household surveys, 1999 and 2011.

These changes were reflected in the village economy; there was an increase in the share of non-agricultural workers in the village, as well as a massive increase in the incidence of outmigration. At the same time, village literacy rates remained relatively unchanged owing to the large number of illiterate individuals in the older age cohorts. The next section discusses changes in overall income and share of income accruing to different sources over time by household typologies.

Table 6.4
Select descriptive statistics, restricted panel

	1999		2011	
	Mean	Std. Devi- ation	Mean	Std. De- viation
Annual household income in rupees	22729	28804	47128	60879
Share of agricultural income to total in- come	0.52	0.39	0.30	0.29
Share of non agricultural income to total income	0.13	0.28	0.22	0.30
Share of remittance income to total in- come	0.24	0.34	0.32	0.34
Total number of primary workers in hh	1.7	1.1	2.1	1.3
Years of schooling of most educated hh member	6.6	4.7	8.5	3.8
Total land owned by household (in acres)	1.28	2.75	1.32	3.03
Share of non agricultural workers in total workers in the village (%)	10.2	2.5	14.6	3.5
Village migration rate (%)	37.8	16.5	63.3	14.5
Village literacy rate (%)	50.6	11.0	52.0	10.4
N	595	595	595	595

Source: Household surveys, 1999 and 2011.

6.4 Household typologies, and changes in income 1999-2011

This section discusses changes in overall income and share of income accruing to different sources over time. Four mutually exclusive household typologies are used here. First, **non-migrant households**, are households that do not have migrant members in either 1999 or 2011. It can be seen that income growth in these households between 1999 and 2011 is substantially lower than average income growth of all households (tables 6.5 and 6.6). Second, **new migrant households** are households that did not have migrant members in 1999, but do so in 2011. These households experienced fastest growing income among all households. We will see later that income from remittances accounts for the high rate of growth of income in these households.

Table 6.5
Household typologies - sample size and mean income growth 1999 - 2011,
unrestricted panel

Household Type	Sample size		Annual household income in rupees		
	Frequency	Percent	Mean In- come, 1999	Mean In- come, 2011	Rate of growth of in- come (%) (1999-2011)
Non migrants	186	26.3	23213	40511	75
New migrants	190	26.9	24348	55311	127
Erstwhile migrants	55	7.8	28518	45642	60
Continuing migrants	276	39	23754	42442	79
Total	707	100	24116	45605	89

Source: Household surveys, 1999 and 2011.

The third category, **erstwhile migrant households** are households that slipped from migration to non-migration between 1999 and 2011. These households experienced the smallest income gains among all households. The last category, **continuing migrating households** are those households that have migrants in both 1999 and 2011. The rate of growth of income of this household category is marginally lower than that of the full sample. Migration appears to have a premium in household income growth over time; households with migrants in wave 2 experienced higher income growth than households without migrants in wave 2. It can be seen in tables 6.5 and 6.6 that these trends are similar in both, the full panel (707), as well as that restricted to 'unsplit' households (595). In the rest of the section, we discuss results of the restricted panel of 595 households.

Table 6.6
Household typologies - sample size and mean income growth 1999 - 2011,
restricted panel

Household Type	Sample size		Annual household income in rupees		
	Frequency	Percent	Mean In- come, 1999	Mean In- come, 2011	Rate of growth of in- come (%) (1999-2011)
Non migrants	172	28.9	22585	41234	83
New migrants	155	26.1	21866	57337	162
Erstwhile migrants	45	7.6	28298	46544	64
Continuing migrants	223	37.5	22317	44696	100
Total	595	100	22729	47128	107

Source: Household surveys, 1999 and 2011.

Table 6.7
Share of total income by sources in panel households - 1999 and
2011 (%)

Source of Income	1999	2011
1. Net income from agriculture and allied activities	30.8	15.1
2. Net income from livestock	8.8	7.7
3. Casual labour in agriculture	8.7	2.5
4. Attached labour in agriculture	0.9	0.2
5. Self employment in non-agriculture	8.0	12.0
6. Wage employment in non-agriculture	10.2	19.2
7. Govt transfers and casual labour in govt programmes	0.0	5.9
8. Remittances	21.1	27.2
9. Other sources	11.5	10.3
10. Total income	100.0	100.0
N	595	595

Source: Household surveys, 1999 and 2011.

Table 6.7 presents the change in the share of various sources of income. There have been fundamental changes in the composition of income over time. The share of income from agriculture and allied activities halved; there was a marginal decline in net income from livestock; and a substantial decline in both casual and attached labour in agriculture. At the same time, non-agricultural incomes increased, that of wage employment increased more, vis-à-vis self-employment. Government transfers, which were conspicuous by their absence in 1999 comprised almost 6 per cent of overall incomes in panel households in 2011. The share of remittances in total income too increased by about the same rate, owing to the substantial increase in migration that occurred in the span of a little more than a decade.

Table 6.8
Distribution of income for non-migrant households - 1999 and 2011 (%)

Source of Income	Share of income (%)	
	1999	2011
1. Net income from agri and allied activities	36.3	22.6
2. Net income from livestock	10.5	9.5
3. Casual labour in agriculture	9.4	3.4
4. Attached labour in agriculture	1.2	0.0
5. Self employment in non-agriculture	8.4	16.3
6. Wage employment in non-agriculture	16.2	28.0
7. Govt transfers and casual labour in govt programmes	0.0	4.8
8. Remittances	0.0	0.0
9. Other sources	18.1	15.4
10. Total income	100.0	100.0
N	172	172

Source: Household surveys, 1999 and 2011.

There were substantial variations in the changing composition of income disaggregated by the four aforementioned household typologies, defined by the migrant status of household over time. In **non-migrants households**, the dominant source of income shifted from agriculture to

non-agriculture. On the other hand, income from non-agricultural sources almost doubled in this period (table 6.8).

Table 6.9
Distribution of income for new migrant households - 1999 and 2011 (%)

<i>Source of Income</i>	<i>Share of income (%)</i>	
	<i>1999</i>	<i>2011</i>
1. Net income from agriculture and allied activities	43.6	16.0
2. Net income from livestock	11.1	7.9
3. Casual labour in agriculture	12.7	2.1
4. Attached labour in agriculture	2.0	0.5
5. Self employment in non-agriculture	11.2	15.3
6. Wage employment in non-agriculture	11.8	14.9
7. Govt transfers and casual labour in govt programmes	0.0	6.2
8. Remittances	0.0	30.3
9. Other sources	7.6	6.8
10. Total income	100.0	100.0
N	155	155

Source: Household surveys, 1999 and 2011.

In **new migrant households**, share of income from agriculture declined even steeply between 1999 and 2011 (table 6.9). The decline is sharper in the case of casual income from agriculture, compared to self-employment in agriculture. This may be explained by the reality that when households which practice agriculture on own or leased in land experience migration, some workers/members of the household still stay back and work in agriculture. On the other hand, in the case of landless households, when workers migrate, income from casual labour in agriculture automatically ceases, and hence the decline is much more pronounced in the latter case. The decline in livestock income is far less so, indicating that household members such as women and children who stay behind continue to take care of animals. Simultaneously, these households accrue income from a new source – remittances. In new migrant households too,

it is pertinent to note the shift from agriculture to non-agriculture as the most important source of income (table 6.9).

Table 6.10
Distribution of income for erstwhile migrant households - 1999 and 2011
(%)

Source of Income	Share of income (%)	
	1999	2011
1. Net income from agriculture and allied activities	18.2	10.6
2. Net income from livestock	7.4	6.3
3. Casual labour in agriculture	6.5	2.5
4. Attached labour in agriculture	0.0	0.0
5. Self employment in non-agriculture	6.3	9.2
6. Wage employment in non-agriculture	7.1	48.6
7. Govt transfers and casual labour in govt programmes	0.0	9.1
8. Remittances	47.2	0.0
9. Other sources	7.5	13.6
10. Total income	100.0	100.0
N	45	45

Source: Household surveys, 1999 and 2011.

What about households that slipped into non-migration? In erstwhile migrant households, in 1999, income from remittances was the most dominant source of income. It contributed to about half of total income. In 2011, the share of remittances fell to zero, and there was a simultaneous increase in income from non-agricultural sources (both wage and self employment), and it is the most dominant source of income in 2011 (table 6.10). What is striking is that these households too experienced a decline the share of income from agriculture. In other words, the transition in the status of the household from migrant to non-migrant does not imply a

movement from non-agriculture back to agriculture. Quite to the contrary, these households, like others, experience a secular trend in decline in agricultural income from both self employment and casual labour.

Table 6.11
Distribution of income for continuing migrant households - 1999 and 2011
(%)

Source of Income	Share of income (%)	
	1999	2011
1. Net income from agriculture and allied activities	21.1	9.7
2. Net income from livestock	6.4	6.6
3. Casual labour in agriculture	6.0	2.1
4. Attached labour in agriculture	0.2	0.0
5. Self employment in non-agriculture	5.9	6.5
6. Wage employment in non-agriculture	5.2	10.5
7. Govt transfers and casual labour in govt programmes	0.0	5.8
8. Remittances	45.2	49.5
9. Other sources	10.0	9.2
10. Total income	100.0	100.0
N	223	223

Source: Household surveys, 1999 and 2011.

In **continuing migrant households**, remittances are the dominant source of income in both 1999 and 2011. The share of income from agriculture halved over time, reflecting, again, the decline in the importance of agriculture in rural Bihar. It can be seen in table 6.11 that income from non-agricultural sources increases too, but marginally in these households that have an excessive reliance on migrant income that has intensified over time.

The pattern of distribution of income of different categories of households lend them to the interpretation that there have been far reaching changes the rural economy in the short period of about a decade. Agriculture is no longer the core of the rural economy; its decline as a way of life is evident by a drastic reduction in its share of income. Simultaneously,

there has been an expansion in the local non-agricultural sector, but it is limited by increasing migration from the state. Rural households have a high dependence on remittance income, and this has only intensified over time.

6.5 Descriptive statistics

This section presents mean differences of key variables of the model used in section 6.6. We have seen in section 6.4 that new migrant households experienced highest income gains, and non-migrant household the least gains in nominal income. It can be seen that the decline in the share of agricultural income was significant in all household typologies, but that of erstwhile migrants (table 6.10). On the other hand, all households but new migrants experienced a significant increase in income from non-agricultural sources. The extent of decline in agriculture becomes striking when we see the drastic fall in the proportion of households that derive income only from agriculture. In 1999, this figure was already low at 28 per cent; by 2011, this declined to less than 2 per cent of all households (10 households in a sample of 595).²⁵ In the case of the latter, this can be explained by a significant increase in the share of income from remittances in 2011. It is interesting to note that, over time, income sources diversified for rural households. Households reporting any income from agriculture increased from 86 per cent to 87 per cent; from non-agriculture increased from 25 per cent to 46 per cent and remittances increased from 43 per cent to 58 per cent between 1999 and 2011.

6.5.1 Variables used in the model

The number of primary workers in a household increased significantly by 0.4 between the two waves (total number of household members increased from 5.7 to 7). Years of schooling of the highest educated person in the household increased by about 2 years, and the increase was highest in the case of new migrant households. Overall, there were no significant changes in land ownership between 1999 and 2011, but it is noteworthy that landownership declined among the non-migrant households (significant at 5 per cent).

Table 6.12
Mean difference using paired t-test by household typology: 1999 and 2011

	2011	1999	Mean difference
Annual household income in rupees			
Full sample	47128	22729	24399***
Non migrants	41234	22585	18649***
New migrants	57337	21866	35471***
Erstwhile migrants	46544	28298	18246***
Continuing migrants	44696	22317	22379***
Share of agricultural income to total income			
Full sample	0.3	0.52	-0.22***
Non migrants	0.45	0.68	-0.24***
New migrants	0.29	0.72	-0.43***
Erstwhile migrants	0.33	0.35	-0.02
Continuing migrants	0.19	0.3	-0.11***
Share of non agricultural income to total income			
Full sample	0.22	0.13	0.08***
Non migrants	0.36	0.21	0.15***
New migrants	0.17	0.18	-0.01
Erstwhile migrants	0.4	0.1	0.31***
Continuing migrants	0.1	0.05	0.04***
Share of remittance income to total income			
Full sample	0.32	0.24	0.07***
Non migrants	0	0	0***
New migrants	0.39	0	0.39***
Erstwhile migrants	0	0.48	-0.48***
Continuing migrants	0.57	0.55	0.02
Number of primary workers in household			
Full sample	2.1	1.7	0.4***
Non migrants	1.6	1.4	0.3***
New migrants	2.4	1.7	0.7***
Erstwhile migrants	1.7	1.8	-0.2
Continuing migrants	2.4	2	0.4***
Years of schooling of most educated household member			

	2011	1999	Mean difference
Full sample	8.5	6.6	1.9***
Non migrants	8.1	6.3	1.8***
New migrants	8.2	5.9	2.3***
Erstwhile migrants	8.6	8	0.6
Continuing migrants	8.9	7.1	1.9***
Total land owned by household			
Full sample	1.32	1.28	0.04
Non migrants	1.35	1.58	-0.23**
New migrants	1.7	1.52	0.18
Erstwhile migrants	1.3	1.09	0.21
Continuing migrants	1.04	0.93	0.11
Village migration rate			
Full sample	63.3	37.8	25.6***
Non migrants	57.5	31.4	26.0***
New migrants	63.2	35.5	27.8***
Erstwhile migrants	58.1	37.3	20.8***
Continuing migrants	69	44.3	24.7***
Share of non agricultural workers in total workers in the village			
Full sample	14.6	10.2	4.4***
Non migrants	14.8	9.9	4.9***
New migrants	14.9	10	4.9***
Erstwhile migrants	16.1	10.7	5.4***
Continuing migrants	13.8	10.4	3.4***
Village literacy rate			
Full sample	52	50.6	1.4***
Non migrants	52.8	53.1	-0.4
New migrants	53.9	51.6	2.4**
Erstwhile migrants	53.4	51.1	2.3
Continuing migrants	49.8	47.8	2.0**

*10 per cent, **5 per cent, ***1 per cent


While village-level variables such as migration rate and proportion of non-agricultural workers changed significantly for the full sample and all household typologies between 1999 and 2011, changes in the third village variable, village literacy rate were moderate and significant only for new migrant and continuing migrant households (at 5 per cent only).

6.6 Model

In the earlier section we tested for mean differences of key variables of all four household typologies based on their migrant status in 1999 and 2011. Now, we use difference-in-differences estimation to examine the effect of migration on household income, our outcome of interest.²⁶

We divide the total households in wave 1 (1999) into two mutually exclusive groups on the basis of their migrant status in the last one year. Case A comprises all households with no migrant members in 1999, and Case B includes all households with at least one migrant member in 1999. Figure 1 presents four possible outcomes based on migrant status in wave 2 (2011), viz., non-migrant households, new migrant households, continuing migrant households and erstwhile migrant households.

Figure 6.1
Household typologies by migrant status in 1999 and 2011



6.6.1 Case A

Case A comprises 327 households that did not have migrant members in the base year (1999). In 2011, 172 of these households continued to have no migrant members (non-migrant households), while the remaining 155 households became households with migrant members (new migrant households). Our aim is to examine the effect of migration on household income. To this end, the former group, i.e. households that continue to have no migrant members, is the control group, and the latter, i.e., households which have migrant member(s) in 2011, the treatment group.

The empirical specification is:

$$\log Y_i 1999 = \alpha_{1999} + \beta (H_i 1999) + \gamma (V_i 1999) + a_i + u_i 1999 \dots (1)$$

$$\log Y_i 2011 = \alpha_{2011} + \beta (H_i 2011) + \gamma (V_i 2011) + \delta M_i + a_i + u_i 2011 \dots (2)$$

In the left hand side of the equations (1) and (2), for each year (1999 and 2011), the dependent variable is the natural log of household income (Y) for the i -th household.

In the right hand side of the equation, α is the intercept in each time period, and H is a vector of household-level variables and V is a vector of village-level variables, and β and γ their corresponding coefficients. The household-level time-invariant unobserved effect (fixed effects) is denoted by ' a ', and it is assumed that ' a ' is correlated with the aforementioned independent variables. In both the equations, u_{it} is the time-varying error for the i -th household in the t -th time period ($t=2$; 1999 and 2011). In equation (2), an additional variable, M , a dummy variable is introduced.

Here, $M_i = 0$, if the household has no migrant member in 2011, and $M_i = 1$, if household has migrant member(s) in 2011.

Subtracting (1) from (2), the difference-in-differences equation is:

$$\log Y_i 2011 - \log Y_i 1999 = \alpha + \beta (\Delta H_i) + \gamma (\Delta V_i) + \theta M_i + \Delta u_i \dots (3)$$

The left hand side of the equation represents the change in log income between 1999 and 2011. In the right hand side, ΔH and ΔV give the change in the household and village variables between 1999 and 2011. The specification controls for household level unobserved heterogeneity (household level time-invariant unobserved effects have been ‘differenced’). The change in time-varying error is denoted by Δu for each i -th household. A key assumption is that the change in the time-varying error is uncorrelated with the change in the independent variables over time, i.e. Δu_i and ΔH_i , and, Δu_i and ΔV_i are uncorrelated. This is true if u_{it} is uncorrelated with the vector of independent variables in each time period.

The coefficient of interest here is θ , which is an estimate of the effect of migration on income growth and compares income growth in households that experienced migration, and households that did not. As shown in table 6.13, Model 1 - new migrant households have 46 per cent higher income than non-migrating households. When we control for household variables, this reduces to 36 per cent, and is significant at 1 per cent level. It can be seen that an increase in the number of workers has a positive effect on income; an additional worker in the household increases household income by 20 per cent. Increase in the years of schooling of the highest educated member in the household has a small but significant positive effect on household income. Change in landownership has no significant effect on income. This is perhaps because in a period of ten years, a vast majority of households did not experience substantial changes in landownership. Specification 3 controls for household and village level variables. It can be seen in specification 3 that changes in village-level variables are not good predictors of changes in household income. It is evident, however, in this final specification that new migrant households experience large and significant income gains over households that don’t migrate, which may be attributed to their migration status. An additional worker in the household also accounts for significant income gains, and increase in the years of schooling of the highest educated member in the household has a small but significant positive impact on income.

Table 6.13
Model 1

	<i>I</i>	<i>II</i>	<i>III</i>
DID estimator			
New migrant household	0.460***	0.358***	0.375***
Household variables			
Number of workers		0.202***	0.206***
Years of schooling of most educated person		0.035**	0.036**
Landownership		0.007	0.006
Village variables			
Migration rate (%)			-0.001
Non agricultural workers (%)			-0.014
Literacy rate (%)			-0.007
Constant	1.143***	1.029***	1.116***
R ²	0.052	0.120	0.131
Adjusted R ²	0.049	0.109	0.112
N	327	327	327

*10 per cent, **5 per cent, ***1 per cent

6.6.2 Case B

A similar exercise is undertaken for Case B, to estimate the effect of moving out of migration on change in income. Here, only those households that have one or more migrants in the base year (1999) are included. A successor household in 2011 takes one of the two forms – it may continue to have migrant member(s), or, it may not have any more migrant member(s) – household typologies, continuing migrant household and erstwhile migrant households, respectively. In our panel of 268 households in case B, 223 households belong to the former category of continuing migrant households, where the migrant status of the household remains intact can be considered the control group; another 45 households belong to the latter group of erstwhile migrant households, where the household slips into non-migration, and form the treatment group. Given the small sample size of the last category, these estimates are likely to be biased.

Equations 4 and 5 are similar to equations 1 and 2, respectively, and equation 6 is obtained by subtracting equation 4 from equation 5. As in

Model 1, we use difference-in-differences estimation to compare income growth of households that slipped into non-migration vis-à-vis income growth of those that continued to migrate.

$$\log Y_i 1999 = \alpha_{1999} + \beta (H_i 1999) + \gamma (V_i 1999) + a_i + u_i 1999 \dots (4)$$

$$\log Y_i 2011 = \alpha_{2011} + \beta (H_i 2011) + \gamma (V_i 2011) + \delta N_i + a_i + u_i 2011 \dots (5)$$

$$\log Y_i 2011 - \log Y_i 1999 = \alpha + \beta (\Delta H_i) + \gamma (\Delta V_i) + \delta N_i + \Delta u_i \dots (6)$$

The coefficient of interest here is δ , which is an estimate of the effect of change in migration status of a household on income. It can be seen that erstwhile migrant households have 44 per cent lower income than continuing migrant households (significant at 1 per cent). When we control for household-level variables, as in the earlier regressions, an additional worker in the household has a significant and positive impact on income (table 6.14).

Table 6.14
Model 2

	<i>I</i>	<i>II</i>	<i>III</i>
DID estimator			
Erstwhile migrant household	-0.442***	-0.305**	-0.279*
Household variables			
Number of workers		0.159***	0.162***
Years of schooling of most educated person		0.035**	0.033**
Landownership		-0.004	-0.002
Village variables			
Migration rate (%)			-0.003
Non agricultural workers (%)			-0.020
Literacy rate (%)			0.004

	<i>I</i>	<i>II</i>	<i>III</i>
Constant	1.321***	1.190***	1.331***
R ²	0.036	0.116	0.128
Adjusted R ²	0.033	0.103	0.105
N	268	268	268

*10 per cent, **5 per cent, ***1 per cent

The final specification controls for village-level variables, and we can see that erstwhile migrant households have 28 per cent lower income than continuing migrant households, on account of their migration status (significant, only at 10 per cent). An additional worker in the households accounts for 16 per cent increase in household income, and increase in a year of education of the highest educated member of the household contributes to 3 per cent increase in income. As in the earlier model, village level variables do a poor job of explaining changes in household income; this is not surprising and conforms to our hypothesis that migration, essentially, is a household-level decision, and household variables best explain changes in income dependent on migration status.

6.7 Conclusion

Together, regression results from models 1 and 2 reveal that changes in household migration status have a large and significant impact on household income. Using a difference-in-differences approach we estimated that new migrant households experienced a 38 per cent increase in income, while households that slipped into non-migration experienced a 28 per cent decline, controlling for other household and village variables.

The results also support theories of the new economics of labour migration. In the context of rural Bihar, it is the household that experiences welfare gains (losses), as it moves from non-migration to migration (migration to non-migration). We have seen in the descriptive statistics that remittances are the most dominant income source in two of the four household typologies. Remittances are sent to the rural household by migrants who have been migrating for long periods of time, but eventually return to the village. It is their eventual return, this circularity of migration that conforms with the premise of new economics of labour migration.

If the impact of migration of welfare is so clear, why isn't migration *even* more widespread in rural Bihar? There may be several reasons. Hoff and Sen (2005) have argued that that kinship (ties) hold people back in the origin areas.²⁷ In a similar vein, separation from families can lead to a decreased sense of subjective well-being (this is discussed in chapters 7 and 8), and may impede migration. In addition, given the 'male' nature of migration, and its 'youth' domination, sex and demographic composition of the household largely determines if its member(s) will migrate or not (touched upon in chapter 4). Many households may not have these windows of opportunities to exploit.

Notes

¹ The need to distinguish between individual/personal and household/family decisions that explain migration has been noted in earlier studies such as Mincer (1978).

² Goldstein's classification of outmigratory flows as return, repeat or temporary movements is useful to understand types of return migration [Goldstein (1984) in Mberu (2005)].

³ In an empirical study in Indonesia, Hugo (1982) finds that migrants are committed to bilocality, and have a foot in the village and a foot in the city, with no intentions to permanently relocate.

⁴ Epstein (1973) in De Haan (1997).

⁵ Connell et al. (1976).

⁶ Refers to a model of migration where women, children and the elderly stay behind in the village, while the men out-migrate to the city.

⁷ De Haan (1997).

⁸ De Haan (1999), in a study that engaged with migrant workers from eastern Uttar Pradesh and western Bihar in Calcutta, India, finds that migrants maintained links with the areas of origin, irrespective of whether they had 'seasonal' or 'permanent' jobs in the city. They saved and remitted money to their families in the villages and eventually returned back to their villages.

⁹ In China, in spite of the growing numbers of rural outmigrants to the city, the majority remain temporary migrants. The *liudong renkou* (floating population) maintain strong links with their communities through remittances, and eventually return.

¹⁰ The ICRISAT surveys were undertaken in 6 villages in central India (in the states of Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra) in 1975-84 to study 'village economies'. The household sample was stratified by 4 land holding sizes (small, medium, and large

landowners, and landless labourers; 10 in each strata in each village), and, was not a representative sample of each village. These villages were revisited in 2001-04; 186 of the original 214 households remained in the village, of which, 154 were surveyed. Subsequent surveys in 2005-06 were able to track most of the original households (Badiani 2007).

¹¹ Palanpur, a village in Moradabad district in Uttar Pradesh was surveyed first in 1957-58 and 1963-64 by the Agricultural Economics Research Centre at the University of Delhi, with a focus on cooperative initiatives; in 1974-75 by Christopher Bliss and Nicholas Stern, with a focus on the green revolution; and subsequent surveys have been undertaken in 1983-84, 1993, and 2008-10 covering all households (100, 143 and 231 in 1957-58, 1983-84 and 2008, respectively) in the village, to understand various aspects of the village economy and society (Himanshu and Stern 2011).

¹² In the period, 1983 – 1993, in 13 per cent of the households, some members had migrated, and in 8 per cent of the households, the entire household migrated out of the village. In the period 1993 – 2008, the figures were 28 per cent and 14 per cent respectively (Mukopadhyay 2011).

¹³ It is estimated that being a female migrant increases consumption by 24 per cent, while being a male migrant increases consumption by 34 per cent.

¹⁴ In the base year, migrants reported themselves to be considerably richer than non-migrants, but report themselves to be considerably poorer in 2005. The authors attribute this to a nostalgia bias, and the fact that the reference group that the migrants refer to in 2005 are perhaps outside the village.

¹⁵ Taylor et al (2003), in a study in Hebei and Liaoning provinces in China, find that remittances from migration contribute to the rural household's incomes. They estimate that each additional migrant amounts to a remittance of 396 yuans for the household. Migration increases household per capita income between 16 per cent and 43 per cent for those left behind.

¹⁶ Haberfeld et al (1999), in a study in Dungarpur district in Rajasthan, India, where seasonal migration is a livelihood and income enhancing strategy, estimate that remittances account for 60 per cent of the total household income in migrant households.

¹⁷ Hoang et al (2005), in a comparative study of two villages in the Red River Delta region in Vietnam find that remittances contribute to increased incomes and consumption smoothening.

¹⁸ In the case that only a migrant sample is available, a single difference estimator can compare post-migration income to pre-migration income and take the average difference as a mean impact of migration. In the case of a panel that includes both migrants and non-migrants, a double difference (difference-in-differences)

estimator can directly estimate gains from migration (McKenzie and Sassen 2007).

¹⁹ Beegle et al (2011), using panel data (1991 – 2004) for Kagera region in Tanzania find that the impacts of migrating out of the community are very significant. While the mean consumption per capita increased by 38 per cent for the full sample of individuals, disaggregating it by mobility patterns revealed striking differences; individuals who did not move out of the community, on an average, increased their consumption only by 17 per cent, vis-à-vis, those who moved to neighbouring communities (37 per cent), elsewhere in Kagera (56 per cent) and outside Kagera (161 per cent).

²⁰ Detailed income data using a one-year recall period was collected in both 1999 and 2011.

²¹ Alderman et al (2001) examine panel attrition in studies based on longitudinal household survey data in developing countries. They find that attrition rates in such studies ranged from 1.5 per cent to 23.2 per cent per annum. A majority of these studies had a short interval period that ranged from two to five years.

²² Patrilocality is the norm in rural Bihar. Daughters marry outside the household, and cease to be household members post marriage, while daughters in law join the household. The same strategy has been adopted in this paper.

²³ Descriptive statistics of panel (n=595) and non-panel households (n=296) in 1999 are quite similar (see appendix table 6.1) This suggests that panel attrition on account of household splits is not important.

²⁴ A similar approach is also adopted by recent survey exercises such as the India Human Development Survey, where migrants are considered ‘non-resident household members’ (Nayyar and Kim 2018).

²⁵ In 1999, 32 per cent of the sample households derived 90 per cent or more income from agriculture. By 2011, such households had reduced to 6 per cent of the total sample.

²⁶ As discussed in section 6.2.1, here, we take the household, and not the individual as the unit of analysis, because, the case of rural Bihar suggests that out-migration is a household strategy, where, some members of the household migrate for work (and send remittances to the household), while others remain in the village (Datta et al. 2014; Rodgers et al. 2013). This is in the framework of the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM), where, in the context of missing markets, outmigration from the rural areas is an income enhancing, and risk sharing livelihood strategy adopted by the household.

²⁷ Hoff and Sen (2005) argue that ‘collective conservatism’ holds back some members of a kin network from economic gains associated with migration.

Here, a kin group can take perverse actions to raise the costs of migration for individual members and hold them back in the poverty trap.

7

Strangers in the City? Young Bihari Migrants in Delhi

7.1 Introduction

Earlier chapters in this thesis have drawn on rural surveys, and tracked households in the source area of migration. Most studies in India examine rural-urban migration, either at source, or at destination.¹ These tend to be in silos, and there is little empirical research that covers source and destination sites to synthesise rural and urban perspectives. In chapters 4, 5 and 6 too, the perspective of migration was from a rural lens, and one of the limitations of this research was that the 'urban' picture of rural-urban migration was missing (Datta 2016a). The expansion of the research location to the city was thus of natural consequence for this research project. Research undertaken with migrant workers at destination enables me to present a more nuanced account of their migration.

Chapters 7 and 8 are based on qualitative research, and address questions that emerged from some of the survey results discussed in earlier chapters. Chapter 7 takes cue from and is motivated by a strand of emerging literature that locates everyday realities of migrant workers in the context of a global economy where migrants traverse rural and urban lives and livelihoods (Fan 2008; Rigg, Nguyen and Luong 2014). The chapter can be located in the larger literature on rural mobilities in Asia that draw attention to the movement away from agriculture and farming in rural areas (Croll and Ping 1997; Rigg 2006), and the increasing role of mobility in supporting rural households (Rigg 2007). This literature finds that migrants work in exploitative urban conditions so as to maximise returns for the left-behind household in the village (Fan 2008). Studies also point towards gendered negotiations and complexities of the 'left-behind' in rural-urban migration (Toyota, Yeoh and Nguyen 2007), particularly in the context of changing livelihoods and spatial arrangements brought about by

political and economic pressures and opportunities (Resurreccion and Khanh 2007).

7.2 The data and context

This chapter is largely based on qualitative research; I draw from detailed case study materials, interview recordings, and fieldwork in the city and the village with 53 research participants – migrant workers in the city (10), their family members in the village (22), and key informants (21). It also builds on my previous work in the study village Mahisham that, among other things, examined several aspects of out-migration in a rural setting (Datta and Gupta 2011; Datta et al. 2014). Research with migrant workers at destination enables me to present a more in-depth account of their migration. Fieldwork with migrant workers was carried out in the National Capital Region of Delhi between May and October 2014.² This was followed up by fieldwork with their family members and other key informants in Mahisham in November 2014. The entry point to the urban migrants was through earlier surveys in their rural households. Participants' consent was sought before the research process was started. Several modules were developed to conduct semi-structured in-depth interviews with research participants.

India's capital city of Delhi was selected as a research destination because the Bihar-Delhi migration circuit is among the densest migration circuits in India.³ The village selected was from a sampling frame of 12 villages which were studied at three points in time earlier (in 1981, 1998-9 and 2009-11), of which longitudinal household data was available for two points in time (1998-9 and 2009-11).⁴ Mahisham village was selected as it had overall high levels of out-migration and was characterised by diverse migration experiences. The migrant research participants have been drawn from a pool of households on whom comprehensive information is available from earlier surveys conducted by the Institute for Human Development (IHD) in 1998-99 and 2009-11. It is thus possible to locate these case studies of rural-urban migrants in the 'rural' household's trajectory over time, and read them in conjunction with the existing village data records and notes for 1998-99 and 2009-11. These longitudinal and bi-locational methodological components are particularly useful in constructing migration and livelihood histories of individuals and households. They also act as important validation tools and supplement the urban migrants'

narratives.⁵ While no claim is being made for representativeness of migrants and their families at the village or state-level, it may be noted that the migrant research participants belong to diverse socio-economic backgrounds (see appendix table 7.1 for details); they constitute a sub-sample of migrants from Mahisham to Delhi, and themes that emerge from this migration stream may be relevant for other high migration villages. Crouch and McKenzie (2006) highlight the importance of social context in research based on in-depth interviews. They argue that ‘when employed on empirically and theoretically well-trodden ground, interview-based investigations can, and do, extend their findings from the individual to the structural level’ (Crouch and McKenzie 2006: 490). The findings of this chapter, based on in-depth interviews with migrant research participants, may be interpreted in this framework and spirit of qualitative research.

Migrants were contacted by phone in Delhi, and if they agreed to be interviewed, an appointment was sought.⁶ All migrants I interviewed worked long hours and hardly had any time off. Thus, there were logistical difficulties in scheduling interviews and fieldwork stretched between May and October 2014. Phone numbers were obtained from key informants in the village where the migrant’s family was based. Before the interview, a household history sheet was constructed from existing data with details of demography, work, income, assets, debts and other details of the migrant and his household that had been earlier collected in the source location in 1998-9, 2009-10 and 2011. Interviews lasted from one to three hours, and in some cases, there was a follow-up telephonic interview. Most interviews were undertaken at the migrant’s residence, which in some cases was also his workplace. All interviews were recorded and I took detailed notes at each interview. In addition, in November 2014, I undertook fieldwork in Mahisham village, where I conducted semi-structured interviews with relatives, mostly wives, children and parents of migrants I had interviewed in Delhi. Furthermore, interviews with key informants of the village were undertaken. Together, these offer household, community and village level perspectives of migration in the source region and complement the urban fieldwork.

In the next sections, I present the source and destination of the migration stream under study, and discuss the changing motivations to migrate from the village. I then rely on migrant narratives to record their work and migration histories to understand, migrants’ work in the city, its location in the informal sector with local and global linkages; and, transitions from

wage employment to self-employment. The next sections highlight the twin role of social networks in accessing labour markets, and perpetuating ghettoisation that is closely related to migrants' isolation from the city. Thereafter, the chapter focuses on rural-urban linkages – the intersecting community, household and gendered dynamics of this migration, and the role of remittances in changing rural consumptions and aspirations. The final section offers possibilities of the future of this migration stream. This research is an addition to the small number of such studies that exist on the region (De Haan 1996; Rogaly et al. 2002). The multi-sited and longitudinal aspects of this work make it possible to present an in-depth account of a rural-urban migration stream in contemporary India.

7.3 Migration: source and destination

7.3.1 The source village: Mahisham

The source village Mahisham, home to the migrants that I studied in Delhi, is a classic case of a remote and underdeveloped village in Madhubani, one of Bihar's 38 districts. Located in northern Bihar, bordering Nepal, Madhubani is infamous for its recurring floods, which Mahisham too experiences at frequent intervals.

In 1981, Mahisham was reported as a 'typical backward village of north-east Bihar', where, '...due to excess labour supply, the total volume of employment available to wage workers (was) low in the village. A good number of them [about 100 during the lean season] (tried) to get work outside the village and in the block headquarters, but not all succeed(ed)' (Prasad et al. 1988). Consequently, in 1981-82, there were temporary migrants in 24 per cent of the households in Mahisham; they went as far as Punjab and Kolkata in search of work. Migration continued to increase, and by 1999 some 54 per cent of households had a migrant member. By 2011, this number increased to 78 per cent and outmigration for work had become a village norm. Migration continues to be male dominated, but there is also an increase in female migration over time. A key characteristic of migration is the predominance of youth in migration streams; about half of all migrants were in the 15-30 years age group.

Table 7.1
Migration pattern from Mahisham, 1999 and 2011 (%)

	1999	2011
Households with migrant(s)	54	78
Males among all migrants	97	83
Migrants among males (age 15-64)	41	58
Migrants among females (age 15-64)	1	10
Workers among male migrants (age 15-64)	98	91
Students among male migrants (age 15-64)	2	9
Male migrants migrating for 0-8 months in a year (age 15-64)	49	28
Male migrants migrating for 8+ months in a year (age 15-64)	51	72

Source: Household schedules, 2011 and 1999.

Note: Adapted from Table 2 in Datta et al (2014).

Migration from Mahisham needs to be located in developments over the last three decades; it emerges from the rural fieldwork that the destination of a majority of migrants has shifted from rural to urban areas, and the duration of migration has lengthened. Earlier modes of rural-rural migration to northwestern India through intermediaries and contractors to work in agriculture have shifted to current rural-urban migration through private individual contacts and networks. Progress in communications such as easier transport and widespread use of mobile phones has changed the character of migration.

Mahisham is a fairly big village, with 6,293 residents (Census of India 2011). The total area of the village is 374 hectares and the population density is 1,682 persons per sq. km.⁷ The literacy rate of men is 72 per cent, and that of women is 42 per cent (Census of India 2011). It is a multi-caste village, with Brahmins and Muslims being the dominant communities. While about 41 per cent of the households own land, and 50 per cent operate land, agriculture in Mahisham is more traditional and less commercial than in other areas in Bihar (Datta et al. 2014). About 60 per cent of the net sown area is under multiple crops. There is little diversification; paddy and wheat are the main crops grown, and a small area is under lentil cultivation.

Table 7.2
Sources of income in Mahisham, 1999 and 2011 (%)

	1999	2011
Agriculture and allied activities	11.9	8.4
Livestock	8.1	4.9
Casual labour in agriculture	18.1	4.9
Attached labour in agriculture	2.9	0.4
Self-employment in non-agriculture	10.2	7.8
Wage employment in non-agriculture	3.8	27.0
Government transfers and casual labour in government programmes	0.0	4.1
Remittances	37.7	39.6
Other sources	7.2	2.7
Total	100	100

Source: Household schedules, 2011 and 1999.

It can be seen in table 7.1 that migration significantly increased between 1999 and 2011. However, there was only a marginal increase in the share of remittances in village income (table 7.2). This is because the incremental migration between 1999 and 2011 was on account of an increase in migrants from the lower end of the social ladder – among Other Backward Class I and Scheduled Caste households. This has led to a shift in the balance of income in the village. In 1999, households with migrants had higher levels of income than households without migrants. By 2011, the situation had reversed, and levels of income were higher in households without migrants. As migration increased among poorer households, they moved away from agricultural labour in the village, and income from casual labour in agriculture drastically declined between 1999 and 2011. Overall, income from agriculture declined by more than half, from 41 per cent to 19 per cent of total income. Even in households without migrants, the share of agricultural income fell from about one half to one fifth of total income. This shift in income away from agriculture has been mostly on account of an increase in income from local non-agricultural sources. It is thus not surprising that the percentage of male workers reporting a non-agricultural primary occupation increased. The change was in a similar direction for women, albeit at a slower pace (table 7.3). This is because women were not able to exploit non-agricultural work opportunities via

migration as men did, and can be attributed to cultural restrictions on their mobility. This gendered pattern of migration is important in explaining the changing composition of work and income in Mahisham.

Table 7.3
Agriculture as a primary occupation (% of workers)

	1999	2011
Male workers with agriculture as a primary occupation	48.8	27.4
Female workers with agriculture as a primary occupation	94.8	65.2

Source: Household schedules, 1999 and 2011.

Note: These estimates are for workers in the age 15-64.

Apart from agriculture, the village continues to have limited but diverse non-agricultural and caste-based activities.⁸ In 2011, there were 100 fishermen, 40 barbers, 35 carpenters, 15 priests, 10 domestic workers, 7 *mochis*,⁹ 7 *dais*¹⁰ and 2 potters. There were other non-agricultural (non-caste based) home-based enterprises such as *bidi* making¹¹ (2), *papad* making¹² (5) and *bori* making¹³ (7). There were 14 grocery shops, two (cycle/ motorcycle, pumpset, radio, TV) repair shops, 6 *paan* shops¹⁴ and 4 tea stalls. In addition, there were 2 hawkers, 7 flour mills, 7 rice mills, 5 intermediary agents (who help villagers mediate government schemes to access benefits), 4 tailor shops, 15 traders and middlemen (in the business of shop-keeping and grain purchase), 10 commission agents, 15 money lenders and 3 Public Distribution System (PDS)¹⁵ shops. There were also non-agricultural wage workers in small scale activities outside the village: 25 drivers, 7 conductors, 25 coolies, 35 rickshaw pullers, 8 salesmen, 30 security guards, 10 tutors, 3 lawyers, 6 quack doctors, 180 construction labourers, 20 masons, 12 plumbers, 10 electricians, 7 welders, 3 garage mechanics, 80 brick-makers, 5 stone/ soil cutters, 10 poultry workers and 50 power loom workers. In addition, 11 males and 11 females worked in regular government jobs and 12 males and 2 females worked in regular jobs in the private sector.

While these local non-agricultural enterprises and workers were important (in 2011, they contributed to about 35 per cent of overall household income in Mahisham), they were concentrated among very few households located at the top of the social and economic hierarchy. The

change in the socioeconomic structure suggests that the local non-agricultural sector does not provide adequate opportunities for poorer households. What sustains a majority of village residents are remittances of migrants who work in distant labour markets, predominantly in urban India. Remittances contribute to more than half of total income in households with migrants, and migration is a village norm.¹⁶ This chapter is concerned with one migration circuit, that from Mahisham to a destination, 1,100 km northwest, that is, to India's capital city of Delhi.¹⁷

7.3.2 Destination Delhi

A city-state and bustling metropolis, with a population close to 20 million, Delhi is a hub of trade and commerce, and also the seat of India's federal administration. In 2012-13, Delhi had the highest per capita income among all states in India. In recent years, the city has recorded expanding employment opportunities and it draws migrants from across the country (Delhi Human Development Report 2013). The share of Bihari migrants in Delhi has steadily increased, and the main reason for migration is search for employment (Census of India 2001; Delhi Human Development Report 2013). From Mahisham, diverse groups of migrants go to Delhi for work. A male key informant in Mahisham who is in his fifties tells me, 'both, labour type and educated migrants go to Delhi. Delhi is preferred because it is close (*naẏdeek hai*)'.

It emerges from the literature that while migrant labour is attracted to the city for economic opportunities and the monetary income that it offers, they struggle to lay a foothold on the physical space in the city. Urbanisation in India has been exclusionary as the urban space has become increasingly unaffordable, especially for rural migrants, on account of lack of basic services and regular slum clearance (Kundu and Saraswati 2012). This also explains why men dominate among migrants and so few families migrate as a whole. Some decades earlier, until the 1980s, though Delhi was not friendly to the rural-urban migrant, it provided them recognition of a limited nature; it allowed them to live around places of their work (Baviskar 2003). Since the 1990s, there have been a spate of exclusionary urbanisation policies; 'Delhi's public spaces too have been transformed by a number of initiatives around the removal of "others" from the city' (Ahona Datta 2012: 750). Migrants constitute a category among the 'others', and this is part of the reason that many migrants are pushed out of

the core of Delhi, to its fringes. This otherness, for migrants, often implies that they are not considered part of the city's physical and social fabric.

7.4 Changing motivations to migrate

In the 1980s, migration from Mahisham was distress-related – triggered by floods and food scarcity in the lean agricultural season. Some migrants moved eastward to Kolkata, while others went to northwestern India, where the Green Revolution was underway, and there was heavy demand for labour, particularly in peak agricultural seasons. It was the poor who dominated these migration streams, and they left the village not just in search of work, but to be able to feed themselves. In the 1980s, poverty was widespread, food scarcity was a norm and skipping of meals a common practice in Mahisham. In recent years, households have two to three meals a day, and food scarcity, even in the lean agricultural seasons, is not heard of (Datta et al. 2012).

Since the early 1980s, income levels have increased manifold, and migration, undoubtedly, has facilitated transition out of poverty. Migration and the motivations to migrate have become more complex. Migration has become widespread and it now spans across castes and communities. There have been five interrelated developments at the micro- and macro-level, which help us understand the changing motivations to migrate. The first is that the act of migration is now a more conscious and calculated decision. It is a norm to go out to be able to earn a higher income and send remittances for the sustenance of the rural household. This was not always the case earlier, when migration was spontaneous, and many simply ran away from home; now, they plan and go. Older migrants who migrated several decades ago reported that the main purpose of leaving the village was to go out and earn money so as to fend for themselves, and not be a burden on their families. These patterns find resonance in Rogaly and Coppard's work in Puruliya district, in Bihar's neighbouring state of West Bengal, where they studied the changing meanings of seasonal migration, and succinctly summarised the change over time, 'they used to go to eat, now they go to earn' (Rogaly and Coppard 2003: 395).

The second development is that in current times, people migrate because agriculture alone does not sustain most rural households. Input costs have been rising and agricultural surplus has shrunk for most cultivators. Mechanisation of agricultural activities has led to higher capital input

costs. It has also led to a steep decline in total man-days of work, and this has drastically reduced employment opportunities for labourers in the village. In fact, in 2011, only 4 per cent of the households derived their income *solely* from agricultural activities in Mahisham. This was also the lived experience of **BM**. A 42 year old peasant migrant, **BM** had worked at a carpet factory in Bhadohi in Uttar Pradesh from 1989 to 2004. He was able to save money to buy some land in Mahisham, and in 2007, he decided to move back to the village with the intention of practicing full-time cultivation. He invested in agricultural inputs: a diesel pumpset, thresher, and three buffaloes. However, after five years of working on his family farm, he decided to withdraw from cultivation and started migrating again as he suffered losses in agriculture. He says:

It would have been better had I simply bought [grains for consumption] for the amount of money I invested in agriculture. There would have been no looking after [the farm], no staring at the sky [waiting for the rain], “no tension”.

BM feels that it is heartbreaking to work in agriculture (*kebeti mein dil toot jaata hai*). Now he prefers to migrate for work.

It repeatedly emerged from the interviews that economic compulsion (*majboori*) and lack of employment options in the village were the main reasons of migration. **MI**, a cycle cart-puller explained, ‘It is a problem that there is no work available in the village; that is why we have to come to the city to earn money... If I can get work in Bihar, I will stay there.’ This narrative is also found in Sharma’s research of Nepali migrant labour in Mumbai, where young able-bodied men felt the responsibility of earning money regularly and sending it back to the rural household for its smooth functioning (Sharma 2008).

Third, young people, and particularly those who are educated, are disinclined to work in agriculture. **JM**’s father explained, ‘Those among lower castes who are older and uneducated (are forced to) work in agriculture; those who are educated, aspire to go to Delhi (*jo padh likh gaya, usko Dilli dikhta hai*).’¹⁸ Indeed, this was the lived experience of eighteen year old **KM**, who belongs to a peasant household, and has been migrating since 2011 to work in a towel factory in Panipat, in Haryana. **KM** considers agricultural work to be dirty and backbreaking (*kaam ganda hai, mushkil hai*). As has been in other parts of the world (Croll and Ping 1997, for China)

and other parts of India (Jodhka 2012 for Haryana, and Anandhi, Jeyaranjan and Krishnan 2002 for Tamil Nadu), with increasing levels of education, working in agriculture is not desirable. Given that there is little remunerative non-agricultural work in the village and its vicinity, people from all social backgrounds aspire to have jobs outside the village and outside of agriculture. For lower castes in particular, an escape from work within the village is also an escape from the debilitating caste system, which continues to bear an imprint on social and economic life in the village.¹⁹

Another change has been that earlier migrants predominantly worked in the village when work was available, and ventured out when it wasn't. This is a major difference from current migrants from Mahisham (in Delhi). Almost all the migrants I interviewed migrate for work for long durations. They stay outside the village for almost the entire year and do not participate in the village labour market.²⁰

The fifth significant development has been outside the village. Since the 1990s, a time that coincides with the onset of economic reforms in the country, there has been a surge in the demand for casual and semi-skilled labour in India's urban centres. In the multivariate analysis of the determinants of migration undertaken in chapter 4, it is found that if an individual was young and male, he was far more likely to migrate in 2011 than he was in 1999. In other words, the pull factor from cities has become stronger.

These trends echo in the migrants' narratives. This is what **MJ** had to say:

Here [in the city], employment and work are available quickly. This place [Delhi] needs workers. In the village, there is less work and more men. If there is one job, ten people land up. So a worker's value is very low.

7.5 Work in the city

7.5.1 Informality, norms, local and global linkages

The nature and conditions of work of migrants I interviewed in Delhi can be located in similar research on migrant workers in the Global South (Fan 2008; Pattenden 2012; Picherit 2012; Rigg 2007). The case studies of migrants suggest some points of commonality, but other points of departure from the literature. Consistent with macro-statistics, migrants are generally absorbed by the informal sectors of the economy (Bhattacharya 1998; India Labour and Employment Report 2014), where working conditions

are precarious, and there is a near absence of social security. Economic activities of most of the migrant research participants can be located in Delhi's urban informal economy that has local and global linkages. There is a thriving labour market for semi-skilled and casual workers in the national capital Delhi and its adjoining regions. Migrants were employed in diverse sectors such as textiles, garments (piece-rate work), transport, manufacturing, household and small industry, and petty entrepreneurship. Most of this work was riding on India's expanding economy; yet, it remained at its fringes.

Every sector had its own working rules and norms, but one thing that was common among migrants I interviewed was that they were at the lowest rung of the ladder in each sector. A twelve-hour workday was the norm for wage workers, self-employed workers worked longer hours. In the case of the former, most worked an eight hour regular shift and put in about four hours overtime every day. Migrant wage workers earned a monthly salary ranging from 6–9000 rupees per month, and had a day off in a week. Apart from this, there was no paid leave, and none of the workers had a job contract or any benefits such as provident fund or gratuity. No one had any form of social protection such as health insurance, provided either by the employer or the state; nor was any worker a member of a labour organisation. Most workers earned less than the stipulated minimum wages. In *all* cases, work that migrants did or the conditions in which they worked bordered on illegality or were simply illegal. Often workers were not aware of this; they were ignorant about their entitlements in an environment of lax implementation of labour laws.²¹

Work is adequate in a normal sense, but migrants *expect* extra work; for them, eight hour workdays are not enough. They want to do more in order to maximise their income. However, this is sometimes not possible as there are idle seasons (in some industries such as fan-making which generally doesn't offer overtime work in the months from July to December), and idle days (in the case of piece-rate work in the garment sector at times when there are no orders, or in the lean season in winter). Particularly, in this sector, workers have to adjust to fluctuations in work orders. **MJ** said, 'We do not get this work regularly, but as soon as an order comes, we work day and night [and complete the order]. Then we sit idle.'²²

Most sectors in which migrants were employed have deep linkages with global markets, and migrants were acutely aware of these linkages. This is demonstrated in **MJ's** words: 'If the work that I do has to go to Dubai,

London, why do I have to do it from Delhi? Why can I not do it from Bihar?’

7.5.2 Transitions from wage work to self-employment

The literature points that migrant workers are able to access diverse occupations in the city, and earn a significantly higher income than what is possible in the rural areas (Seeborg, Jin and Zhu 2000). While there is some evidence of this in the case studies of migrants from Bihar, I do not find compelling evidence as Gupta and Mitra (2002) that migrants are able to move from low productivity to high productivity sectors, and access better paying jobs. On the other hand, in some of the case studies, transitions from wage work to self-employment have been striking, accompanied by monetary gains, as well as a feeling of pride and achievement. These experiences are further elaborated in chapter 8. Among migrants I interviewed, own account workers seemed to have flexibility in their working arrangements, but they tended to have long and erratic hours.

There was a preference towards own account work to wage work, though not everyone was able to start an enterprise or a business of his own. All self-employed migrant workers I interviewed had started with wage work in the city. Wage work was more prevalent, but it offered little upward mobility. On the other hand, transition from wage work to entrepreneurship required taking risks but had its rewards; own account workers had a sense of accomplishment for having made it on their own.

Take the case of **MI** who came to Delhi in 1995 at the age of 15. He first worked at a shoelace factory for 6 months. He did not like that work; it was dirty work (*kaam ganda tha*), he says. He decided to rent a cart to deliver electronic goods in a busy marketplace. He had no prior experience in cycling a goods cart but says, ‘one learns by seeing; I also learnt how to ride a cycle by observing people around me’. In January 2014, he finally bought his own cart. When asked if he preferred working in the factory or being self-employed, he unambiguously replied that he prefers his current work (in comparison to his stint at the shoelace factory); it is his own work, he finds it good (*yeh kaam accha laga; apna kaam hai*).

7.6 Social networks: the paradox of village connections

‘If there were no village connections, I would still be sitting at Nataraj Cinema’, said **MG** who ran away at the age of 13 and reached a landmark

(a cinema hall) that he had heard of in conversations of migrant workers when they visited the village. He knew, vaguely, that his fellow-villagers lived somewhere in its vicinity.

In the case of each migrant research participant of this study, the point of contact in the city was someone from the village. Not a single person came to Delhi without a pre-existing contact in the city. **JM**, who got a job in a travel firm on the reference of a fellow-villager felt, 'A contact from the village is very important, else, how will [we] get work? We won't even be allowed to enter the company.'

Social networks were thus very important in gaining information about, and access to, labour markets at destination. It is evident that migrants are heavily dependent on rural contacts, and not institutional mechanisms – state or non-state – to access urban labour markets. Older and experienced migrants feel obliged to help their fellow villagers and introduce them to potential employers, and this is how new migrants continue to be absorbed in the urban labour market.

MJ explained:

When a new person comes, the migrant who brings him takes the risk. If I bring a new person, I will make up for [lapses in] his work... if someone comes, I will make him work... if I get you [from the village, and you don't work], I will not throw you out, I will make you work... [Of the money that is earned], I will keep two paisas and give you two paisas... When [a] new [migrant] becomes [an] old [migrant], he will bring another new [migrant]... just like a train accelerates and picks up speed, this work also accelerates and picks up speed...

My findings are similar to other studies in the literature, which find that social networks play a crucial role in facilitating the movement of rural workers to the urban labour market. These networks, based on village and kinship ties provide information about and linkages to specific jobs at destination, and allow migrants to make a calculated move to the city (Mosse et al. 2002; Roberts 2002). At the same time, as more migrants come to work in the city through social networks, these networks may themselves play a role in further segmentation of the urban labour market, where migrants get pushed into particular jobs, sectors and occupations. A study of four Indian cities (one of which was Delhi) also finds that 'networks reduce the probability of upward mobility, as network extension leads to excess supplies of labour relative to demand' (Mitra 2010: 1). There is also

some semblance of this in the case studies, where migrants remained concentrated in certain types of jobs and occupations for years. When asked why they did not consider changing jobs, the most frequent reply was that they did not have information about (other) job opportunities, and were comfortable in working with their fellow villagers. They did not tread beyond familiar areas, and it appears that social networks are then self-perpetuating; the same networks that facilitated their employment in the city perhaps impede their prospects of better work.

7.7 Urban isolation

It emerged from migrants' narratives that they had limited interaction with the city. Their energies went into working hard, saving and remitting as much as they could to the rural household. Their social lives, separated from their families in the village, were marked by loneliness. Migrants had few outlets of leisure. On their weekly day off, most slept extra hours. This rest was important to be able to get back to another gruelling week of work; their schedule comprised working, eating, sleeping and then working again, and little else. **MJ**, speaking of an earlier job said, 'We would work all night on Saturdays. Then slept all day in our room on Sunday. What is the point of the holiday?'

There was a clear echo in the voices of the migrants I interviewed, of the evidence found in other studies in the literature that migrants face both systemic and structural exclusion in their efforts to access basic entitlements and services in the city, such as health, education and housing, among others.²³ For instance, rural migrants in China do not have access to public housing in the city, while those in India cannot access subsidised foodgrains. Migrants tend to have a low level of well-being in the city (Feng, Zuo and Ruan 2002; Mitra 2010). They are often blamed for the city's problems, such as crime, lack of availability of transport and employment, among others (Solinger 1999). State policies and the attitudes of local residents prevent their integration, and migrants remain 'invisible residents' in the city (Roberts 2002: 141).

All migrants I interviewed stayed in or around their workplace with friends, relatives, and fellow villagers. Their social world was constructed around a closely-knit circle of kith and kin; it was as if the village was socially reproduced in the urban sprawl where they lived. They rarely ventured out of this domain. New migrants were attracted to places where old

migrants were and this in some ways led to a ghettoisation of migrant spaces in the city. Ironically, for most migrants, Delhi's modernity and progress were located in its Metro rail and massive flyovers – spaces that they themselves rarely frequented.

7.8 Rural-urban linkages

7.8.1 Why do migrants allow themselves to be exploited?

While migrants were able to exploit economic opportunities offered by the city, it was evident that they worked in exploitative conditions.²⁴ An important question that thus emerged is why do rural migrants continue to (let themselves) get exploited in the city? The answer to this may lie in the dialectics of the village and the city, in the dialectics of migration itself. It is also connected with the motivations of migration, and the circularity of migration. All migrants I interviewed had internalised the feeling that they don't belong to the city. For them, the city is only a means of livelihood; what they get from the city is something that goes back to the village, so urban income is only a means to a better rural life, not an end in itself. It is this rural–urban circulation, and a belief that this circulation will eventually culminate in a final return to the village, that continues to motivate them to work for monetary gains in exploitative conditions and bear the ignominy that comes with their urban sojourn.²⁵

This finds resonance in similar studies in the literature. For instance, Rachel Murphy, in her work on rural-urban migration in China, argues that it is the 'economic acceptance' but 'social rejection' of the migrants that perhaps explains the circularity of rural-urban migration, and the ultimate return of most migrants back to the village (Murphy 2002: 42). Fan (2008) finds that, 'circular migration is no longer just a temporary solution but has become a long-term practice of many rural Chinese', and 'peasant migrants have... developed mobility and social strategies that help them deal with exclusion and discrimination they face in the city' (Fan 2008: 164).

This also needs to be read with our earlier discussion that migrants *preferred* to live in the village if they had a choice. **MM** explained, 'When I go to the village, I feel happy. When I come back [to the city] from the village, my heart weeps... but I have to come [back to the city]; there is economic compulsion... It is only when we come to the city that we can earn.'

All migrants I interviewed clearly articulated that they wanted to work in the village, albeit, not in agriculture. ‘If there was a factory in the village, then why should we stay here?’ asked **JV**. While peasant and labour migrants may have different reasons for this preference, their migrations are closely intertwined with one another. Earlier, agricultural labour was easily available in the village. Now peasants are not able to hire labour and complain of the ‘labour problem’, particularly in peak agricultural seasons. **BM**, a migrant peasant lamented that *labour humein loot leta hai* (‘labourers rob us, demand high wages’), ‘..they are no longer subservient, don’t listen and are downright hostile’. Labourers are averse to working in the fields of peasants and farmers. In particular, younger labourers want to be disassociated with agriculture (and have succeeded in doing so to some extent), for it entails supplying their labour to the landed class, and conforming to the caste hierarchy in the village. Earlier, social hierarchy in the village was directly linked with the economic hierarchy mediated by the caste system. Over time, this has changed as workers from Mahisham migrated in large numbers, and remittances changed the balance of income in the village. So, workers (continue to) resist working in the village, particularly in traditional occupations such as agriculture. They desire alternative work in the village, are willing to do the work that they do in the city in the village, but they want to live outside the shadow of domination of the higher castes. I would like to argue that migrant labourers practice some sort of an ‘economic rejection’, but they want social acceptance in the village. This resonates with the findings in Roy (2014); based on ethnographic fieldwork in north Bihar, Roy argues that migrants indeed want to live in the village, if work that is in the domain of their dignity is available.

For migrants, ties to the village were very important; no matter how long they had stayed in Delhi, they constantly affirmed their rural identity. The site of the city presented them with diverse and contradictory experiences. It allowed them to see and experience its modernity and its anonymity, yet at the same time, it made them negotiate an urban economic landscape which rested on exploitation and low wages that made possible a higher income and aspirations of a better life for them and their families. The dialectics of migration presented another paradox. While migration was perceived as a symbol of (economic) power in the village, it was its antithesis in the city, where migrants live on the margins.²⁶

Why do migrants expect so little from the city? Perhaps this is rooted in (their perception of) the transience of their own migrations. It is useful

to refer to Appadurai's argument that marginal groups in society (in this case, Bihari migrants in Delhi) have a limited 'capacity to aspire'. According to Appadurai, the capacity to aspire,

is not evenly distributed in any society... the relatively rich and powerful invariably have a more fully developed capacity to aspire... the better off you are (in terms of power, dignity, and material resources), the more likely you are to be conscious of the links between the more and less immediate objects of aspiration... (Appadurai 2004: 68).

However, while migrants lay low in the city and appeared passive, they were actively investing in the education of their children, and undertaking house renovation, construction of new houses; some migrants used surplus income to purchase land and invest in agriculture. In short, they were working hard to build a better future for themselves and their families by regularly returning to and retaining ties with the source village. Take the case of **JM**. In a short time **JM** paid off debts on two tracts of ancestral land. The first was mortgaged when his aunt was married in 1998, and the second, when his sister married recently. After these two weddings, his family had no land left. In about two years (2013-14), **JM** was able to release the family land from mortgage with profits from his business in Delhi.

7.8.2 Household and gender dynamics

Migrants were deeply aware that they cannot afford to have their families in the city. **BM** said, 'If my family came here, *sukh toh milega, par nuksaan boga* (I will be happy, but suffer losses'). How will I support them? You need to earn at least 20,000 rupees per month to support a family here. It is natural to miss your family, but I spend 300 rupees every month to talk to them 2-3 times a week. At the same time, most migrants feel that the village is a better place to be in than the city. For them, the city is only the urban sprawl they live in – congested and cramped. They stayed in constant touch with their families back in the village; and **MA**'s words echo most migrants' narratives, 'I remain worried, I have to send money, educate my children...'

The migration stream that we have discussed is highly skewed by sex. Its spatiality is mediated by gender; men migrate to the cities and women stay back in the village. In our interviews, all migrants felt that women should not migrate, and that they should live in the village. For instance,

MM said, ‘Why should women come here? What will they do here? Someone is needed in the village. If my wife also comes here, who will take care of the house in the village?’ Similarly, **JM** explained, ‘In our house, women don’t work; it is considered bad (*burā maama jāta hai*). It is not allowed. They are allowed only in schools, banks and government jobs – that’s it’. Such attitudes of disdain and disapproval by male migrants towards women who move and work are also noted by Prasad-Aleyamma (2009).

This strong disinclination of men towards female work and mobility can be located in patriarchal norms, and one of its key ramifications is that the family remains geographically dispersed. De Haan (1997) has argued that continuous circular migration is a consequence of rural family strategies; kinship relations and marriage opportunities draw labour migrants back to their communities time and again. Thus, migration as a strategy can be attributed to not just economic reasons, but also to social and cultural reasons, and kinship and family ties in the source areas perpetuate the circularity of migration.

7.8.3 Consumption, aspirations and dowry

Remittances from migrant income, apart from meeting subsistence needs, have led to increased cash flows in the village and made possible the consumption of a wide array of goods and services which were earlier beyond the reach of many families. Many households own gadgets ranging from mobile phones to motorcycles. While incomes have increased, aspirations have increased significantly. Future economic prospects of households depend not only on current incomes, but also on assets, and on the debt situation of households. An analysis of income data of 1999 and 2011 of the case study households reveal that household economic trajectories are constrained by debt; in 2011, households that were indebted in 1999 performed worse than households that were not. Loans were taken for two main reasons: for marriage of female members of the family and to meet health expenses of a sick household member. By 2011, *all* the households had either taken one or the other kind of loan, and some had taken both. It is also noteworthy that loans are taken from moneylenders, landlords or relatives in the village. None of the migrants I interviewed reported a loan in the city. ‘Who will give us a loan here (in Delhi)?’, asks **MA**.

Expenses on both health and marriages have substantially increased. Dowry in particular is a relatively recent phenomenon among lower castes. So, even if households and migrants are doing relatively well, these two

lifecycle events, apart from other idiosyncratic shocks, could push them back. Take the case of **MA**. Already in debt due to his wife's recent surgery, he is worried about the marriage of his daughter. He laments, 'Dowry has become most rampant; we have to ask people for money, take loan, maybe even sell our house. (No matter what), we have to give money (dowry), else there can be no marriage.'

Income from migration becomes crucial not just for everyday economic sustenance of families in the village, but also future life-cycle events. For instance, when I asked **BM** when he would return to the village for good, he whispers that he can afford such a luxury only when his sons are settled and daughter married; 'it is necessary to live here until I marry my daughter off' (*jab tak ladki ki shaadi nahin kar lenge tab tak pades mein rehna anivarya hai*), is his reply.

7.9 The future, and summing up

MJ says,

'I am unable to understand whether I should be here or there. I just keep on working. If there is work, I will keep working. If there is no work, I will see... Sooner or later I will have to go back to the village.'

Most migrants I interviewed were ambivalent about their future. Across the income spectrum, they reiterated that they would rather work in the village; incomes are much higher in the city, but so are expenses. Village life with their near and dear ones is preferred; the village is home.

These migrants were first generation migrants to the city. Their migration is marked by two distinct characteristics – first that they send back a fair proportion of their income²⁷ and most of the surplus they generate back to the village; second, that their families remain in the village. Unless there is shift in the aforementioned conditions, it is likely migrants would continue to straddle rural and urban spaces, and migration, including its circularity, will continue. However, the story of second-generation migrants may well be different. Aspirations for a better life mean that migrants are heavily investing in their children's education, and there are cases of some children studying in the city. This has spatial implications; if they are able to gain a firm foothold in the city, it will have ramifications on the nature of rural mobility from Bihar. But this transition is unlikely

in the near future. Such a transition is conditional upon the nature of urbanisation in Delhi, and local and urban development in Bihar.²⁸ Mahisham's migration experiences are likely to follow a trajectory of continuity, with marginal change in the near future. At the same time, as more and more people migrate from rural areas and migration experiences span from one generation to the next, with increasing capacities to aspire, for how long this migration can continue to be circular remains an open question.

This chapter has studied a stream of rural-urban migrants from eastern India to the country's national capital. Based on fieldwork in the city, supplemented by fieldwork in the village, the study finds that migration has become widespread, motivations to migrate have become more complex, and migration is powerfully shaped by intersecting community, household and gender dynamics. Rural-urban migration has become an important livelihood strategy in the context of decline of agriculture and lack of employment opportunities in the village, combined with an increase in demand for casual labour in the city. The chapter finds that migrants work in diverse sectors in the city's urban economy, and their work has local and global linkages. Own account employment is valued by migrants, and preferred over wage employment. Access to the latter is contingent upon social networks – a closely-knit circle of kith and kin from the village ensconced in the city. At the same time, the same social networks that facilitate entry and employment in the city may impede prospects of better work. Migrants remain isolated from the social fabric of the city. They work hard, and have few outlets of leisure. In this model of long-term male-dominated circular migration, separation from the family has become the norm, a way of life for millions of rural-urban migrants and their household members. While migrants had spent much of their lives in city, they affirm their rural identity, and eventually see themselves returning to the village where their families are located. The study argues that it is in this context of disassociation from and disaffect with the city, that migrants allow themselves to get economically exploited in order to sustain rural material conditions that have become structurally dependent on urban remittances.

Notes

¹ Pattenden (2012) and Picherit (2012) are notable exceptions that study rural-urban migration at both source and destination.

² From an earlier survey in 2009-10, I found that 43 sample migrants from Mahisham were in Delhi. With the help of my research assistant, I got in touch with their families in the village and sought their contact information. I was able to establish contact with 14 migrants, of which 10 agreed to be interviewed.

³ The net rural to urban inter-state migration from Bihar to Delhi between 2001 and 2011 is estimated to be the second largest such movement of migrants in the country (Indian Institute for Human Settlements 2012). The highest net rural to urban inter-state migration stream is from the more populous state of Uttar Pradesh to Delhi.

⁴ See IHD (2004) and Rodgers et al (2013) for details.

⁵ De Haan (1996), in his work on migrant workers in Kolkata has highlighted that the views of migrant workers in destination may well be different if studied from the rural side.

⁶ Ownership and usage of mobile phones has spread among households with migrants enabling them to keep in touch. In 2009, 82 per cent of households with migrants in Mahisham owned mobile phones.

⁷ This is higher than the population density of Bihar as a whole (1102 persons per square km, and much higher than that of all-India (382 persons per square km).

⁸ The information in this paragraph is from a village schedule that collected detailed community-level information on wages, occupation, availability and use of facilities, functioning of key government programmes, village organisations, conflict, migration, prices, village events, and the functioning of local political organisations.

⁹ Cobbler.

¹⁰ Traditional midwife.

¹¹ Tobacco wrapped in tendu leaves.

¹² Thin wafers made of lentils and sundried.

¹³ Chunks made of sundried lentil paste.

¹⁴ A shop where betel leaves with condiments and tobacco products are sold.

¹⁵ The PDS is a government programme through which basic foodgrains and commodities such as wheat, rice, sugar and kerosene are supplied at a subsidised rate.

¹⁶ Among many source households, dependence on remittances is acute. One research participant, **MM**'s wife stated as a matter of fact, 'when money comes (via remittance) every month, I am able to make ends meet; when there is no remittance, we go to the Brahmin (to borrow)'; (*mabeene mein paisa aata hai toh ghar chalta hai; paisa nahin aata toh brahman ke paas jaate hain*).

¹⁷ 29 per cent of Mahisham's migrant households send workers to Delhi. This is followed by Punjab at 24 per cent and Maharashtra at 15 per cent. Other states where migrants go include Uttar Pradesh (9 per cent), Haryana (5 per cent), Andhra Pradesh (5 per cent), West Bengal (4 per cent) and Gujarat (3 per cent). Source: IHD Household Schedule, 2009-10.

¹⁸ Interestingly, he observed that, 'those who work outside (migrants) are of no use to the village. (They) give money, construct houses, but will not work in the farm' (*Pardes jo log khat raha hai woh gaon ke kaam nahin aate. Paisa de raha hai, ghar bana raha hai, par khet mein nahin kaam karenge*).

¹⁹ In a similar vein, Picherit's research in Karnataka, India shows that for those at the bottom of the social hierarchy, rural-urban migration has transformed labour relations and contributed to social mobility in the village (Picherit 2012).

²⁰ This is the predominant mode of migration from Bihar [see Rodgers et al (2013) for details]. At the same time, in some communities and other sending areas, seasonal migration may be the more dominant stream (Rodgers and Rodgers 2011; Roy 2014).

²¹ The Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act, 1979 mandates not only minimum wages to migrant workers, but equal wages as local labourers, suitable residential accommodation and free medical facilities, and many other things which migrants I interviewed had never heard of.

²² Migrants in the piece-rate garment sector work and live together. Work is organised collectively in the sense that when an order comes, it is shared among the workers. When work (available) is more, they do more, when it is less, everyone does less. Being organised in a group enables them to procure (more) orders. It also minimises individual risks.

²³ The Indian state has a long checklist of identity documents (which have few benefits), but the document in itself is important for it gives identity to a subject of the state. They include the individual Voter ID card issued by the Election Commission of India, household Ration Card to access food entitlements from the PDS, and the latest – the Aadhar Card – a 12 digit individual identification number issued by the Unique Identification Authority of India on behalf of the Government of India to all residents in India. These documents are also considered a migrant's residence proof and are necessary to access basic services such as opening a bank account, getting a telephone connection, etc. Six of the ten migrant research participants had official identity cards of both the city and the village. This shows that a multi-locational life also needed them to have multiple 'official' identities, so that they could traverse the city and the village. For identity documents linked to the village are not valid in the city and those of the city don't work in the village, as policymakers construct the village and the city as binary entities. This point is particularly important as it begs for a system of identification which is portable so that

migrants are not harassed when they access services in the city. Moreover, several self-employed migrants I interviewed had spent considerable amount of money in bribes in procuring these documents to set up their small businesses.

²⁴ Other studies also note this. For instance, in the case of Mumbai, Mukherjee et al (2011) have highlighted that the transience associated with rural-urban migrants allow for their easy exploitation. Pattenden (2012) finds that labour circulation contributes to upward socioeconomic mobility of labouring rural Madigas, despite them working in hostile and exploitative urban conditions in Bangalore.

²⁵ To paraphrase an old adage of Joan Robinson, given their circumstances, migrants choose to be exploited by capital, rather than not be exploited at all (Robinson 1962: 46).

²⁶ **MM**, when asked if migrants have a higher status and command more respect than non-migrants in the village said, 'Yes, migration does bring respect (in the village). *Par dus din ki izzat hai* (the respect lasts only 10 days)', indicating a transience associated with higher status (and income) of a migrant, given that migration is circular and most migrants eventually return to the village.

²⁷ Nine of the 10 research participants regularly sent remittances. On an average, these amounted to about 40 per cent of their total income.

²⁸ Recent studies have pointed towards an intensification of exclusionary urbanisation policies. For details, see Kundu (2009) and Kundu and Saraswati (2012, 2016).

8

Pride and Shame? Young People's Experiences of Rural- Urban Migration¹

8.1 Introduction

This chapter explores complex emotional experiences of young male rural migrants in the city of Delhi, India. It uses a subset of data used in Chapter 7, and largely relies on migrant narratives of two research participants. The chapter speaks to the emerging scholarship on the emotional geographies of migration that prioritise young people's perspectives. This is in a context of rapid economic growth in contemporary India that has been accompanied by increased rural–urban migration of its young people. The eastern Indian state of Bihar is an important source region of this migration particularly in North India. It has witnessed an unprecedented outflow of young males, predominantly to work in distant urban destinations across the country (Indian Institute of Public Administration 2010; Rodgers et al. 2013). At the same time, women, children and the elderly tend to stay behind in rural areas, leading to multi-locational households with geographically dispersed members. Thus, for millions of young migrants, separation from family members has become a way of life and this is similar to other young people's life courses across Asia (see, for example, Asis 2006; Cortes 2015 in Philippines; Naafs 2018 in Indonesia). These new mobilities have brought about fundamental changes in rural lives and livelihoods in India.

There is growing research on internal migration in India, but most of this is limited to its economic aspects. The social costs of migration, the affective experiences of migrants and those left behind, and children and young people's lived experiences remain largely missing. Based on multi-sited fieldwork described in the previous chapter, this chapter contributes

to emerging scholarship on the emotional geographies of migration (Svašek 2010; Boccagni and Baldassar 2015).

The state, market and family mediate young people's migration in contemporary India. These institutions have varied social and cultural constructions of the youth. India's National Youth Policy frames young people as playing a 'crucial role in the progress and development of the nation' (GOI 2014: 81).² Indeed, young rural migrants participate in, and contribute to, a rapidly growing economy that centres around urban India. Since the 1990s, a time that coincides with the onset of state-led economic reforms, there has been a surge in demand for casual and semi-skilled labour in India's urban centres. The state and market present opportunities that enable migration of young people for this work. They do so, for example, by prioritising workers with limited family ties, so they can work long and hard without the *burden* of family. Limited education qualifications for jobs also encourage early school leaving with little consequence, particularly in rural areas. At the same time, they present conditions of work that are often harsh and exploitative. Young men, guided by family responsibility – a sense of filial piety and duty often *choose* to work in exploitative and ignominious urban conditions to improve material conditions of their rural households. However, migration decisions are not solely individual decisions; elders in the household play an important role in decisions related to the migration of its members. Young men practice family obedience and are expected to conform to family decisions related to its livelihood security and diversification. We can see that a young man's employment life course, thus, is a product of both his own desires and his family's aspirations of him.

In this chapter I largely draw on family case studies and migrant narratives of two young male migrants from a village in Bihar, who migrate to the same urban destination, the city of Delhi. I rely heavily on young people's lived experiences and their own perceptions of migration as I map their emotional negotiations as migrants in the city. I also contextualise young people's experiences by presenting data from fieldwork with their family members in the village. As mentioned in Chapter 7, the family case studies have a longitudinal element; they are drawn from households of which rich information is available from earlier surveys undertaken in 1998–1999 and 2009–2011. This allows a multi-locational and multi-generational perspective on the family dynamics of migration, and offers insights in the microcosm of migratory processes in India.

The chapter is organised as follows: I begin by presenting the context of internal migration in India, and the case of Bihar – the source site of the migration stream presented in the study. I engage with recent literature on emotions in young people's migration, focusing on gendered and familial emotions of migration, as well as young people's own aspirations and anxieties as experienced in both the city and in their rural village. Thereafter, I discuss research methods used for this study. Using family case studies and embedded narratives of young migrant workers, I show that one's own independent employment (*apna kaam*) is deeply valued in migrants' subjectivities, but it comes at the cost of purposeful social isolation. By focusing on young people's emotions I am able to disentangle the dissonance between migrants' economic success in Delhi, and their social rejection of the city. I then reflect upon the research process, and present an account of the emotions and affective dilemmas I encountered as a young female researcher whilst undertaking fieldwork with young men and their families in urban and rural sites. I conclude by making a case for the incorporation of emotions for a more comprehensive and nuanced analysis of young people's migration in academic and policy discourses.

8.2 Internal migration in India and the case of Bihar

The migration stream studied in this chapter is internal migration, i.e. it is within India; yet, as in many parts of Asia, this stream is embedded in a global paradigm that has witnessed increases in migration of children and young people in the backdrop of economic liberalisation and neoliberal policies (Editorial 2015: 255). Just as unskilled or low-skilled workers in the transnational migration regime in many parts of Asia are not permitted to bring along family members and are expected to return to their home countries/communities when their labour is no longer needed (Hoang et al. 2015: 273), the economic compulsions of many rural–urban migrants in India are such that most simply cannot afford to bring their families to the cities. Moreover, the migration terrain of most rural-to-urban migration in India is filled with emotional pulls by family to eventually return to the village. Thus, while there is no state or legal restriction on internal migration in India, the political economy of rural–urban migration and the exclusionary nature of urbanisation (Kundu and Saraswati 2012) leads to a protracted separation from family. This makes the normative act of migration a highly emotive event for both migrants and their family members.

At the same time, labour migration from rural to urban areas has negative connotations in policy circles that attribute such migration to the failure of rural development, and views migrants as passive victims. As discussed in chapter 3, in the state's development discourse, young people's migration tends to be associated with increasing crime at urban destinations and degradation of urban habitat, while in the source regions, it is linked with agrarian crises and decline of the rural (GOI: 2013). Overall, in both source and destination, policy preoccupations are predominantly related to structural issues, and migrants' own subjectivities³ remain strikingly unexplored.

The focal point of this research is Mahisham, a remote village located in Madhubani district, in the north-eastern Indian state of Bihar. Mahisham is a multi-caste village where Brahmins and Muslims are dominant. Brahmins are one of the upper castes in Bihar, while Muslims are much lower in the ascribed social hierarchy. Migration, however, offers significant upward mobility for communities at the unfavourable end of the social spectrum.

Mahisham has always been a 'high migration' village (Datta et al. 2014). In 1999, 54 per cent of families had migrant members. By 2011, this increased to 78 per cent, and outmigration for work has become a village norm. A key characteristic of migration is the predominance of youth in migration streams; about half of all male migrants were in the 15–30 years age group. Given its magnitude, rural–urban youth migration is not just an example of one's life course in rural India, it is the life course pattern that is now structurally embedded in a deagrarianising economy and society. At the same time, while migration has become longer-term,⁴ it remains circular; most migrants leave in their adolescent years, and eventually return to the village after spending their working lives in the city. Migrants remain emotionally connected to and invested in their families in the village through communication by mobile phones, which have become ubiquitous, as well as regular visits and remittances. Family discourses of obligation and return to home also represent emotional ties crafted from childhood to retain a sense of belonging to the rural.

The Indian capital of Delhi is a popular destination of migration for workers from Mahisham. A metropolis with a population close to 20 million, Delhi has experienced rapid growth and development, and offers work and livelihood opportunities for migrants in the secondary and tertiary sectors of its economy (GOI 2008).

8.3 Emotions in young people's migration

Research in migration studies is largely devoid of emotions and affective realities of the migration process. However, there is now an emerging strand of literature that focuses on emotions to provide 'an important corrective and critique' of the dominance of economic paradigms (Boc-cagni and Baldassar 2015: 74). Herein, this chapter contributes to recent scholarship on gendered and familial emotions in migration (Raffaetà 2015; Vermot 2015). The intersecting institutions of patriarchy and the market govern household division of labour; who does what is embedded in notions of masculinity and femininity, and in turn leads to the gendered nature of migration. At the level of the family, filial piety and duty are crucial in understanding the emotions of migration in rural Bihar. What I aim to capture is the construction of a *good* son who migrates to the big city for work, and does so to *take care* of his family. This requires an immense amount of emotional negotiation for young men. This negotiation is usually articulated through their relationship with parents and elders in the rural village as a provider, but also as a boy who *will* come back to the village eventually, and guide his own son to migrate at the appropriate time.

By focusing on young people's perspectives, this chapter makes a contribution within migration studies where children and young people's voices have largely been missing (Dobson 2009: 356), although more recent work in the area are filling in gaps in knowledge about young people's experiences (Punch 2007; Beazley 2015; Hoang, Lam, Yeoh and Graham 2015). More specifically, it contributes to scholarship on young people's aspirations – an important turn in migration studies of late. It emerges from this research that boys are managing their own desire for success and communal aspirations of income sharing, but also a return home. Young people grow up with so much pressure to achieve both individual and communal aspirations as they witness material benefits from remittances, and associate migration with prestige and status. These new cultures of migration mean that children are socialised early on into actively desiring migrant identities (Beazley 2015: 302).

Closely intertwined with aspirations is anxiety. Young migrants carry the burden of not just family expectations, but also their own expectations. Discourses of masculinity and normative male breadwinner expectations are further entwined in young people's conception of self, and lead to

heightened emotions and anxieties. Related to this, a dominant theme in migration literature is how children and young people are 'sources of anxiety for adults' (Dobson 2009: 357). However, it emerges from this research that adults too can cause anxiety in children and young people, particularly in the context of multi-locational households. In a study of schooling of left-behind children in China, Murphy (2014: 29) finds that the labour of children in schools and the labour of parents in cities are intertwined; both children and parents carry out obligation towards each other, while coping with emotional difficulties on account of protracted physical separation. I show how the intersecting anxieties and aspirations related to education that emerge from the research site where superior educational outcomes are viewed as a pathway for higher incomes and a better life.

Migratory experiences pave way for what Gidwani and Sivaramakrishnan (2003) refer to as 'rural cosmopolitanism' (2003: 239). While transnational migration dominates the migration studies literature in themes of modernity and cosmopolitanism, Gidwani and Sivaramakrishnan (2003) argue that cosmopolitanism operates at various scales. Through the case of a circular migrant, they argue that 'cosmopolitan is a person who disrupts conventional spatial divisions and produces newly salient spaces of work, pleasure, habitation and politics' (2003: 339). Within the context of this research, these may be manifested in newly acquired Western clothes and mannerisms, or a sense of confidence that comes from the adventure of migratory experiences, of traversing the world outside of the village (Datta 2016a: 398). I show how this pride and confidence as male breadwinners sustains male youth's commitment to employment in the city, especially in the face of crippling loneliness and urban disconnection.

8.4 Method

As mentioned earlier, this chapter uses a subset of the data used in Chapter 7. I draw from detailed case study materials, migrant narratives and semi-structured interviews, and observations based on fieldwork in the city and the village with two young migrant workers, MG, 29 years and JM, 23 years, and their family members, respectively.⁵ MG's age makes him at the cusp of 'youth' as per India's National Youth Policy. Importantly in the construction of youth in rural Bihar is the imperative of a good boy to work to take care of his family, and thus migration to urban India for work is a cultural marker of the youth period. MG first migrated to Delhi when

he was a child and traversed wage work for more than a decade, before successfully establishing a business. JM, migrated in his late teenage years as his family experienced relative economic decline like many smaller land-owning Brahmin families in Mahisham, gradually selling off their land and increasingly relying on non-agricultural income from outside the village, leading to divergence between the status (caste) hierarchy and the economic hierarchy in the village. In this context, JM's migration is to be seen as not just to make ends meet, but also to maintain the status hierarchy of his household in the village. MG's migration, on the other hand, is not determined by community status, but is in response to lack of employment options at source and appropriate labour demand at destination. A key ramification of MG's migration is a clear upward economic mobility of his rural household.

The use of case study and narrative methods value young people's own perceptions of their migration. These subjective experiences are critical in the study of emotions. Migrant narratives focus on childhood memories of migrants' journeys of migration; motivations to migrate; feelings about work and life in the city; connections with family members in the village; and, aspirations for the future. In interviews with family members, participants focus on what meanings mothers, fathers, wives and children attach to the primary research participant's migration, and mechanisms they adopt to deal with prolonged separation that comes with this migration.

The two case studies and embedded migrant narratives present migration trajectories of members of two dominant social groups in the village – Brahmins and Muslims. MG belongs to the latter – a socioeconomically deprived community where the average age of first migration is low. MG's migration as a young child came at the cost of his education, and his age made him particularly vulnerable in hostile urban conditions. JM's migration, on the other hand, was a calculated decision taken at an older age. Thus, despite the poor economic status of his family, JM's upper caste privilege enabled him not only to migrate at a mature age, but also to defer his migration. As part of youth life cycle, MG's narrative points that there are appropriate ages to migrate, and not. These are tied to a combination of factors that include education of individuals and the economic condition of their households. In other words, timing in the youth cycle, and the emotional maturity to migrate, are important determinants of the returns of migration. This also echoes in MG's mother's narrative where there is a sense of guilt – that it was beyond her control her son could not

study, and had to leave at a young age. In MG's narrative, there is also a clear shifting of hopes and aspirations towards his children.⁶ By tracing MG and JM's journeys from the village to the city as a child and youth, respectively, I elaborate upon how they negotiate their way through the city, and, slowly and steadily establish their identity at work through hard work and determination. At the same time, the case studies show how they are desperately lonely, and emotionally disconnected from the city. Both MG and JM are the primary earners of their multi-generational households, and their urban incomes are the backbone of their rural households. While their family members take pride in their accomplishments, they lament about the pain entailed by prolonged separation, and remain resigned to being part of a household divided by time and space – an everyday reality lived by millions of rural households with migrants in the city.

8.5 Case studies

8.5.1 MG

When I first came to Delhi, I was only 13 years old.

I had told my parents a couple of times that I did not want to study further. As our financial situation was not good, I wanted to run away, migrate. I asked my father for some money to go to Delhi, but he said that there was no need to go anywhere. However, I did not listen to him, and along with a friend, I ran away from home. I had the mind of a child and did not understand the consequences of my actions, for which I am still suffering.

My friend and I took the train to Delhi, and reached Nataraj Cinema – a landmark we knew from migrants' conversations in the village. A fellow-villager helped us find work in a factory. The work was hard. In the beginning, some days were bad some days were good. Yet, I remained tensed; I terribly missed my mother – I used to hug the wall and cry. Now, living away from the village – living in Delhi – has become a habit.

After working in the city for a year and a half, my friend and I finally went home (to the village). When it was time to go back to Delhi, it felt dreadful. Upon our return, we started working in another factory, and thereafter I changed several jobs. I was running after money; it was my ambition to earn as much as possible, and I was willing to do any kind of work. In 2005, my younger brother arrived from the village to Delhi, and

soon, all of my four brothers were in the city. I had told each one of them not to come. It is my fault that they are all here. Had I been wise, none of them would have gone astray and followed me; they could have stayed back in the village. Had we migrated later in our lives, when we would have been more educated, it would have been good. But we were able to do nothing of that sort – we ran away and came to the city when we were children.

There is a time to migrate (to come to the city). I came earlier. I lost out. But I cannot let my children lose. They have to study hard and succeed. I am devoted to (provide for) my children's education. I will spend whatever I have to spend, I don't want any leisure, any pleasure, I am willing to sacrifice and work hard for my children's education.

Education is very important; it has several benefits. First, you gain knowledge, and your understanding of the world changes. Second, a higher education helps you earn more. In a business like mine, you understand how much money is coming and going; it enables you to keep accounts. I dropped out in class 7. For all practical purposes, I am uneducated; you may as well call me a fool. Had I passed my matriculation examination, I could have had the chance to work in a Company. Now there is no such option. I am neither here nor there; I am stuck.

I run a water trolley business with the help of my brothers and some relatives. I have 7 water trolleys across the city on contract from the Municipality. The water season in Delhi peaks in summer and lasts 5–6 months. Together, two relatives and us five brothers manage a trolley each and sell water at designated points in West Delhi. I fill water in all the trolleys from 4 to 6 am, and we are out on the road all day selling water. This is our routine every day. There is no holiday, no free time to play or roam around.

But this work is better than wage work. This is my own work (*apna kaam*). I have freedom in this work. I work according to my own will, and not to the whim of some employer.

In the past, our family has worked on other people's farms to survive. Our economic condition is much better now. We have leased in some land for agriculture, and more recently, I have bought some land. Though I have taken loans for this, unlike earlier, these loans are an investment for a better future. We (the brothers) spend 2–3 months in the village every year. There is no work. One person is enough to tend to our small farm.

I don't like Delhi. The people here have no manners, no respect for us. Have you heard the language they use with their mothers and sisters? I shudder at the thought. I wouldn't want my wife and children to come here. Should my wife wish to work, she should remain in the village, where there is work in agriculture. The environment in the city is topsy-turvy (*ulta-pulta*); working in a factory here means that she would have to work with male strangers. I wouldn't approve of that. When a man comes to the city, he is driven by compulsion, desperation and helplessness (*majboori*). He comes when he finds no work in the village. But what can a person with *majboori* do? If there was work like this in the village, even if it paid less, I would prefer to stay there. My parents are in the village, as is my wife, my children. Every time I leave the village, I cry. If I had a choice, forget about coming to Delhi, I would not even like to see the face of the city.

In the village, I meet MG's family. His parents live with three daughters-in-law and seven grandchildren. MG's father has never migrated for work. He cultivates wheat and paddy in leased in land and tends to livestock. He used to work as an agricultural labour earlier; not anymore. Back in those days when MG had left for the first time, 'there were a lot of difficulties. Wages were very low, work was limited. We ate only one meal a day. Things are alright now. We eat well, and wear good clothes', says MG's father.

MG's mother too works in the family's leased in farm. She also takes care of the house and cares for grandchildren. She has visited Delhi twice. 'I did not like Delhi, I felt suffocated there, she tells me of her time in Delhi. But what will my sons do? They have to stay there. If they don't earn, what will they (we) eat?' She talks to MG everyday. She laments that he could not study. 'At that time, our economic condition was very bad. He had to migrate'.

I also meet MG's brother who lives in the city, and is visiting the village. While away, he speaks to his wife and children everyday and feels that 'it is better for the children to be in the village. When everyone lives together in the village, we don't have to worry in the city; there is no tension'.

8.5.2 JM

In 2006, I passed my intermediate examinations in the village. I wanted to come to Delhi for higher education, but my family didn't have the resources to send me. As I belonged to a farmer's (*kisan*) family, lack of money was my biggest hurdle. I was forced to remain in the village for another two years. I started out late, it took me a while to establish myself.

I came to Delhi with a fellow-villager who helped me get a job as a data entry operator in a travel firm. A few months into the job, money started trickling in, and I enrolled in a distance education bachelor's degree. I attended tuition during the day, worked at night, and slept in between when I found time. I purposefully chose to work in the night shift, so that I could study during the day. The initial years in the city were difficult; I remitted to my family whatever remained of my earnings after deducting expenses related to rent, education, and food.

After I graduated, I was promoted at work, and my salary increased significantly. My new role enabled me to travel extensively across the country – a novel experience that I enjoyed very much. At the same time, I realised that a salaried job would not take me far; to move ahead in life, I decided to start my own business.⁷ I was confident of my business idea as it was related to the transport sector, where I had learnt the tricks of the trade.

In January 2013, I quit my job, invested all my savings, and registered my company, Koshi Cargo Services that provides movers and packers, and local and international cargo services. While there were some initial hurdles, it is necessary to take risks to be successful in life (*risk lena se life banta hai*). Today, I have two laptops and have hired two staff members. My day begins by checking orders online, preparing quotations, negotiating deals, and executing orders. I am immersed my work. I have long hours, and no holidays. Yet, this is better than salaried work because this is *apna kaam*. The more I nurture it, the better it will do. This is good (*yeh accha hai*), but it is a lot of work (*par kaam bahut hai*).

I earn well. I have improved the economic condition of my family in the village by freeing a plot of land which was mortgaged long ago, contributing to my sister's wedding expenses, and financing house renovation. Yes, my business is doing well. But, I was forced to learn it all due to *majboori*. I was able to start a business because of my passion. I have no plans of staying in the city. Life is very busy here; people do not have time

for one another. Delhi is a foreign land (*pardes*); it feels alien (*paraya*). Once I have earned some more money, I will return to the village.

We are Brahmins, landlords. Despite having everything (rank status, land), we have nothing. There is *majboori*; we are forced to migrate to earn money. It feels awful to leave one's own village to work in a faraway, *paraya* land. When I first left the village, I was scared. I was habitual of travelling in a bullock cart; the express train to Delhi felt surreal, frightening. The journey to the city is pathetic; the trains are overcrowded, and migrants are herded like cattle.

Every young person there (in the village, in Bihar) thinks I (they) have to go to Delhi, to Punjab. There are no opportunities in the village; we have no option but to come to the city. By god's grace, no one should have to leave the village. Migration is very bad – it is the worst kind of hell. It is terrible to be (a migrant) in the city. The person who experiences this understands its (my) suffering. In retrospect, the first 17–18 years of my life that I spent in the village – I consider them to be the *golden time* of my life.

JM's parents live in the village in a mud hut with thatched roof. There is no toilet or regular electricity connection. There is a flat screen television and gas stove that have been recently acquired through remittances sent by JM. JM's mother has never been to Delhi. She rarely ventures out of her home; restricted mobility of women in the upper castes is a norm in the village, and *pardah* is prevalent in the Brahmin community.

Her domestic duties keep her busy. 'I never get free from work at home, how can I go' she asks. Of course, 'I feel like meeting my son, but I cannot imagine leaving home', she says. She laments that 'every mother wants her child to stay with her. But it is important (for him) to earn, else, how will we eat?' JM visits the village several times in a year. 'When he comes home, I am overjoyed; when he leaves, I weep.' She says that it takes her a while to get back to normal after JM leaves each time. 'JM is better off in Delhi, she whispers. There are many facilities, there are advantages, there is development (*vikas*).'

JM's father is a peasant who cultivates on his own, and also hires in labour. Together, on 1.5 acres of own land and 0.6 acres of leased in land, he grows vegetables, paddy, wheat and lentils. He is passionate about farming, and proud of his vegetable farm that requires intensive work. He

tells me that earnings from agriculture help him make ends meet but remittances are necessary to sustain the household.

The father and son are in constant touch over mobile phone to discuss matters related to their work and home. When I ask him where he would prefer his son to stay, in Delhi, or in the village, he replies, ‘there is no development here; no proper water or electricity. In Delhi, the facilities are good. For now, it is good for him to be there ... (But) I would want him to be by my side when I grow older, especially in times of need. If he is close to me then, I would be in peace’.

8.6 *Apna kaam*, and the emotions of migration

It emerges from migrant narratives that *apna kaam* is critical in the identity formation of male youth migrants to the city. Independent working is deeply integral to emotions of pride, and feelings of success. It is driven by *majboori*, but sustained through pride, passion and confidence. These emotions drive young people to work hard and cultivate relationships to build their businesses, and such emotional strength is key to being a good boy. But in prioritising *apna kaam*, young people purposefully develop little emotional connection to the city. We see in both MG and JM’s narratives that the community aspiration of return migration is grafted onto young men’s own aspirations. Boys must return to the village as men. To work in a place with little emotional connection, however, takes an incredible amount of determination. We see both participants use normative and gendered discourses to affirm their emotional resolve. Thus the city becomes a *bad* place – where women go out to work and have high levels of mobility. Male youth migration allows their women to be protected and remain in the village. Male youth migration keeps children in the village to learn the right values and be disciplined. Thus one’s emotions of migration are intertwined with a sense of gendered and cultural responsibility, and hinges on return to the rural village. These are calculated steps to keep them emotionally connected to the village, and emotionally distant from the city.

Another way male youth withhold from forming longitudinal connections with the city is through denying certain forms of emotional pleasure. I have discussed in chapter 7 that rural migrants remain isolated in the Delhi. Their energies are concentrated in working long hours so as to be able to maximise their income, and send remittances to support their rural

families, about whom they remain anxious and often, worried. There is little time or scope for leisure – a game of cricket, a visit to the cinema, a trip to the mall – all these are mostly shunned. The simple idea of having fun is not engaged with; this is purposeful to the process of emotional wall building, and to not get emotionally attached to a place where young people *cannot* stay because of communal aspirations of circular migration. Young migrant men do this type of emotional wall building day in and day out, in order to make their eventual return to the village easier. It is exhausting emotional labour which characterises youth migration in many rural–urban scenarios in India.

8.6.1 Pride and shame in *pardes*

In JM's narrative, there emerges a clear paradox of success in his professional life as a migrant, yet unsettledness about his place in the city. While he values his accomplishments in Delhi, he is wary of what it may hold for him in future. His calculated emotional disconnect from the city needs to be located in his worldview, where he perceives urban mores to be a threat to his rural values and way of life in the village – one that he is both nostalgic about, and proud of. This simultaneous pride in one's work, yet shame, isolation and rejection in social and cultural life in the city echoes in MG's narrative too. MG craves respect that the hostile urban environment does not offer.

In the initial years, young people struggle to make sense of the dissonance between success in their economic lives and *shame* and a desire to retreat to the village in their social and cultural lives. An insertion of emotions to the analysis contributes to the understanding of the paradox of why despite economic success in the city, migrants *prefer* the village. Young rural migrants are acutely aware of their second-grade urban citizenship magnified by their inability to bring their families and settle in the city. Their migration encounters are embedded in macro processes of exclusionary urbanisation that in turn play a role in their social isolation and shame in *pardes*.

8.7 Fieldwork, and emotions of doing research

The voices of male youth showcase how migration represents purposeful emotional labour; but emotional labour also occurs in the research when the lens is shifted to the researcher. This section responds to Gaskell

(2008) and Punch's (2012) call for an acknowledgment of researcher emotions as a 'vital part of the youth research process' (2008: 169) as 'emotional, practical and personal challenges of fieldwork remain complex and often unresolved yet ... still relatively rarely discussed in methodological accounts' (2012: 86–87).

Having been part of a long-term study in the source area, I realised doing fieldwork in rural areas was qualitatively different from that in urban areas. As someone who had previously done fieldwork in a rural setting, I was struck by the challenges of urban fieldwork. In the village, tracing and finding the research participant is rarely a problem. Everyone knows everyone, and familiarity generally tends to breed trust. It is a context where research participants are at home, they are *insiders* and the researcher is an outsider. On the other hand, in the city, migrants consider themselves as outsiders, and I as an urban female educated researcher with high mobility, was an insider. Male youth kept to their work, routine, and each other. As a researcher, it was frustrating for me that in spite of all my village connections, it took such a long time to establish contact and build a rapport with the participants in the city before I could conduct interviews with them. I learnt that trust was such an important issue in the urban context, something that I totally took for granted in the village. That migrants were very busy, often working 12 hours every day, made it difficult to schedule interviews, sometimes for weeks together. To the contrary, rural participants of the study were accessible, available, and the slow pace of rural life provided an atmosphere conducive to observing, interviewing, probing, and conducting research – something that I had taken for granted.

As a resident of the same city where the migrants worked, I was constantly and consciously aware of how little they knew of the city where they lived, and how limited their engagement with the city was. Being a second-generation migrant in the same city made me reflect upon my positionality, and how different my family's migration experiences were compared to theirs. It made me deeply aware of my own class privilege and positionality, and often made me feel uncomfortable.

My familiarity with the research participants' rural lives constantly brought the village in our conversations. While they shared their feelings of pride related to their village life, I could sense their shame about their poor living conditions in the city. That I had access to their *rural* and *urban* lives, their *pride* and *shame* created both trust, and some discomfort. In the city, their work conditions were poor, and they lived in cramped spaces.

Young men were preoccupied in their work, and tended to remain unkempt and wore shabby clothes. However, their actions when they visit the village offer a contrasting picture. It is evident that they make an effort on their appearances – they are cleanly shaven, and dressed up in their best (western) clothes and accessories when they visit the village. This image of a *city person* that the migrant projects of himself in the village is a powerful message he sends about the success of his urban sojourn. In this, he conceals some of the realities of his harsh city life.

My previous training as a social worker made me hardy as a fieldworker, and I was comfortable with the physical demands of fieldwork – walking long distances, being out in the sun all day, having to do without a toilet at times. However, I was acutely aware of how the participants were not directly benefiting from my research. As a social worker earlier, my contributions to the community were tangible; as a researcher, this was not the case and this knowledge made me feel incredibly guilty.

I had interviewed migrants at one site, and their family members at another. At times, this led to a situation where I learnt of intimate details that family members had kept from one another. For instance, in MG's case, his father confidently told me that since he was the head of the household, all remittances were sent to him. However, I did know through conversations with MG and his wife that he remitted money to her separately to meet her personal consumption. Similarly, in JM's case, his parents told me that after his marriage, his wife would be expected to live in the village. JM had confided in me that he wanted her to move to the city, and had even made arrangements towards her accommodation. As a researcher, as much as I was curious to know more about these arrangements, and wanted to *probe* further, I decided to be empathic to the context, remain silent to respect the trust of participants for more ethically sensitive research. This analysis of my own emotional negotiations in the field helps me to better understand young men's own emotional complexities with their work, as we both participate in a delicate management of doing emotional work as neoliberal subjects in a globalising India.

8.8 Conclusion

This research, based on multi-sited and multi-generational fieldwork demonstrates that young people work actively towards fulfilling the desires of their own lives, while balancing the aspirations of their family. Young

migrant men work towards their career goals, and negotiate a balance fulfilling their needs and desires, while following the social norm of deference to family elders.⁸

In this chapter, I highlight the dialectics of young people's migration encounter in the city, where they simultaneously traverse emotions of *pride* and *shame*. Young migrants value *apna kaam* and are proud of their struggles and accomplishments related to establishing their work in the city. At the same time, they experience loneliness, as well as social rejection and shame in hostile urban conditions. The insertion of emotions in the analysis of migration helps in disentangling the aforementioned dissonance between the *economic lives* and *social and cultural lives* of young migrants in the city. Through the family case studies and migrant narratives presented in this chapter, I hope to have demonstrated that turning to emotions allows for a more nuanced and comprehensive analysis of migration, and thus made a case for the inclusion of emotions in academic discourses on migration. Lastly, I wish to highlight that the subjective experiences of young migrants and views of their family members of their migration are different from perspectives of the market and state on migration. In particular, the dominance of economic discourses in migration policymaking have the danger of overstating the importance of income in migrant welfare and negating migrant experiences and subjectivities – a critical component of well-being. Given that most policies related to migration are primarily concerned with migrant safety and well-being, an incorporation of emotions is imperative in addressing questions related to how best to improve the lives of migrants – the supposed beneficiaries of these policies.

Notes

¹ A version of this chapter has been published: Pride and Shame in the City: Young People's Experiences of Rural–Urban Migration in India, *Children's Geographies*, 16(6), 654–665.

² Persons in the age 15–29 years are included in the definition of youth in India's National Youth Policy, 2014. At the same time, it is acknowledged that 'youth is a more fluid category than a fixed age-group' (GOI 2014: 9). One of the objectives of this lofty national development project is to 'create a productive workforce that can make a sustainable contribution to India's economic development' (2014: 20). It is noteworthy that this policy categorises migrants among 'youth at risk and marginalised youth who require special attention' (2014: 66). This clichéd label holds

little ground the case of Bihari migrants in Delhi, who tend to have better economic and social indicators, and in particular, a higher income compared to residents (Institute for Human Development 2013).

³ Subjectivities here refer to migrants' own experiences, ideas and attitudes.

⁴ Migration from Mahisham is predominantly to distant labour markets across urban India. Earlier streams of short-term migration to agricultural work in rural northwestern India have declined.

⁵ Please see appendix table 7.1 for socioeconomic characteristics and work histories of MG and JM.

⁶ This is also seen in the transnational migration literature, for instance, in Raffaetà's work on Ecuadorian immigrants in Italy (2015: 120).

⁷ 'Had I not been educated, I wouldn't have been able to start my own business', JM asserted.

⁸ The context is cultural here. This behaviour can be located in Asia's entrenched reverence of family values and cultural traditions, which are principally concerned with maintaining family and social harmony rather than endorsing individualism (Ennew, n.d. in Editorial 2015: 259).

9

Conclusion

This thesis studied rural-urban migration from Bihar, India.

Drawing on long-term research on social and economic changes in rural Bihar, the thesis first presented a source area perspective on the determinants of migration, followed by an analysis of the sources of rural income in 2011, its changes between 1999 and 2011, and finally assessed the impacts of migration. The empirical evidence presented in chapter 4, based on longitudinal data collected in 1998 and 2011, points towards changing determinants of individual-level migration. Individual factors such as age, sex and marital status have become more important in explaining migration over time. At the same time, there is a change in the pattern of migration by class. In particular, the increased propensity to migrate in the agricultural labour class may be seen as a response to increasing demand for casual labour in urban India. Migration from rural Bihar continues to be dominated by individuals at the lower end of the social and economic order but there is also some evidence of positive-selection in 2011. Unlike 1998, highly educated individuals and those belonging to upper castes are more likely to migrate in 2011. There is also an increased propensity to migrate among cultivating castes. This points towards an occupational diversification of households belonging to these castes as an outcome of migration. On the whole, the chapter suggests that migration from rural Bihar had become more differentiated by education and caste, and there seemed to be some shift towards pull factors, though push factors continued to remain important.

The source area perspective of migration illustrated a picture of increasing outmigration for work from rural Bihar. Chapter 5 showed that there have been major changes in the pattern of migration as well as the composition of income between 1999 and 2011. The decline of agricultural income, and the simultaneous increase in non-farm and remittance incomes pointed towards livelihood diversification in rural areas. Income

from remittances rose in importance, particularly for those at the lower end of the social and economic hierarchy as rural migrants participated in distant urban labour markets, and became increasingly delinked from village production. However, migration remained male and youth-dominated.¹ Most migrants eventually returned to the village to retire, and permanent migration, of the kind that entailed relocation of the entire household from the village to the city was very limited. Thus, in the context of this research, migration emerges as a source area household livelihood strategy, and the empirical complexity of migration in this thesis does not support dual sector migration and development models that suggest a linear transition of labour from rural to urban areas.

Chapter 6 examined the effects of migration. Using household panel data, it found that between 1999 and 2011, households that moved from non-migration to migration (migration to non-migration) experienced large and significant income gains (losses). The empirical evidence, however, also shows that many migrant workers do not desire to migrate leaving their families behind in the village. Why is this so? Despite large income gains from migration, why may rural residents not wish to migrate for work? Chapters 7 and 8, based on qualitative research in the city and the village, integrated source and destination area perspectives, and attempted to address this somewhat perplexing question. Chapter 7 underscores migrants' subjectivities and presented an account of migration in the context of rural change and growing linkages of rural labour with urban labour markets. It emerged that the motivations to migrate are complex, and have changed over time in a context of the changing village and city.² Rural migrants respond to the thriving demand for labour in urban centres, against the backdrop of significant structural changes with de-industrialisation in larger cities and the shift towards the tertiary sector (Bhowmick et al. 2011). The chapter finds that migrants work in diverse sectors in the city's urban economy, and their work has local and global linkages. Access to employment is contingent upon social networks – a closely-knit circle of kith and kin from the village ensconced in the city. At the same time, the same social networks that facilitate entry and employment in the city may impede prospects of better work. It emerged from this research that migrants work in exploitative conditions in order to sustain rural material conditions that have become structurally dependent on urban remittances. While migrants' work is embedded in the urban economy, they remain socially isolated in urban areas. Despite having

spent much of their lives in the city, male migrants eventually see themselves returning to their families in the village. This model of long-term circular migration is a fundamental feature of rural-urban migration in contemporary India.

Chapter 8 then explored complex emotional experiences of young male rural migrants to better understand their migration in the city. Using family case studies and embedded narratives of young migrant workers, it showed that one's own independent employment (*apna kaam*) is deeply valued in migrants' subjectivities, but it comes at the cost of purposeful social isolation. By focusing on young people's emotions, it is possible to disentangle the dissonance between migrants' economic success in Delhi, and their social rejection of the city. The latter, in turn, explains why many migrants don't wish to live in the city, and would rather live in the village if appropriate employment opportunities were available there.

The aforementioned empirical findings are in a historical and national context where rural-urban migration has contributed to the state's development project in India. As discussed in chapter 3, rural migrants have been part of the industrial workforce in the early years of industrialisation, the agricultural workforce in the Green Revolution belt, and the construction and services sectors that underwent a rapid expansion in the post-liberalisation period. Yet, state discourses on development have a 'sedentary bias' – development policies are aimed at people achieving a better quality of life at 'home', suggesting that rural people should remain in rural areas (Bakewell 2008). Thus, labour migration from rural to urban areas has negative connotations in the state's development discourse. For instance, rural development programmes such as Mahatma Gandhi National Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) and Providing Urban Amenities to Rural Areas (PURA) aim to keep rural people in rural areas (GOI 2013). In such a context, outmigration from rural areas is thus typically attributed to the failure of rural development policy. In addition, the rural and urban tend to be mutually exclusive in the state's imagination and policy. For instance, the ministries of rural and urban development have policies and programmes that are conceived and executed in silos. This rural-urban dialectic and the vertical and horizontal segmentation of state actors contributes to contradictory state narratives, and ultimately leads to the absence of a coherent discourse on rural-urban migration. As a consequence, there is no single ministry that deals with labour migration, and there is no official migration policy in India. This absence contributes to a

policy vacuum on a wide range of issues such as poor conditions of work of migrant workers, their lack of access to social security schemes, and inability to claim rights guaranteed by the Constitution and laws on account of the migrant-native divide (Abbas 2016).

Yet, migration is a central part of processes of social change everywhere; it should be analysed, not primarily as a cause or result of social transformation, but as an integral part of it (Castles 2017). Indeed, as Indian villages are increasingly integrated into national production systems and labour markets (Datta et al. 2014), new policy architectures are required to deal with the complexities of rural-urban migration in both source and destination areas. In general, population distribution policies tend to be formulated without adequate knowledge of the causes and consequences of migration, and little is known if such policies are just or appropriate. Therefore, it is imperative that migration policies be informed by empirical evidence. In addition, migration policies need to be in tandem with general development policies of the state (Oberai 1983).

As discussed in chapter 1, the state's official data collection machinery largely underestimates the extent of migration in the country. If state actors negate the very existence of migrants, their vulnerabilities are further accentuated. The paradox of the state is its denial of migration on the one hand, and the need to manage it on the other. It is in this paradox that migrants traverse the state; they survive in the interstices of the state and its policies. Against this backdrop, there is a need to give visibility to migration and migrant workers. A strong policy focus on migrants' rights and a decent work agenda is urgently required. The only legislation, the Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act,³ needs an overhaul, and laws for the protection of migrant workers need to be implemented in both letter and spirit. And this can only happen if mobility is accepted as a means of human development, and migrant rights a part of the state's development agenda.

Finally, I attempt to synthesise the state policy discourses and what emerged from the empirical evidence: first, it is evident that the state's approach towards migration is fundamentally opposite to the nature of its development process. While the state aims to contain, curb and reduce migration, its service-oriented economy demands cheap labour from rural areas and this demand for labour has only increased over time. Second, historically, there has been an urban bias in the state's development strategy. That most migrant workers return to the village after their working lives suggests that it is the rural areas that bear the cost of the production

and reproduction of this labour, thereby subsidising India's urban development. Third, migrants live in the margins of the city; there is little acknowledgment of their contribution to the economy.⁴ To the contrary, they are often blamed for social problems in destination states. There is evidence of backlash towards labour from poor regions in prosperous regions; time and again, sons of soil movements rear their ugly head, and xenophobic tendencies persist towards migrant workers in clear violation of constitutional guarantees and the law of the land.

Fourth, policy discourses paint migrants to be passive victims. Empirical evidence presented in this thesis highlighted that migration can be beneficial. Despite discrimination and exploitation in the labour market, migrants exercise their agency and make informed decisions about their work and life. Fifth, migration can therefore be hugely beneficial in economic terms, but there is an enormous social cost of migration that finds little mention in the policy discourse. This is the separation family members endure from each other, so as to be able to reap the benefits of the additional incomes that migration provides. Finally, the state views its citizens to be static, located in either rural or urban areas. This research demonstrated that migrant workers traverse urban and rural spaces, industrial and agricultural work, and therefore, there is an urgent need to incorporate multiple spatialities in state development policies, including portability of benefits associated with various government programmes.

Notes

¹ Female migration increased too, but from very low levels in 1998 (this is discussed in chapter 4).

² As discussed in chapter 7, in the 1980s, migration from Mahisham was dominated by distress factors such as food scarcity and subsequent hunger. More than three decades later, migration has become more of a calculated decision, wherein households weigh in risks and benefits of the migration of its members. This is a context where agriculture supports far fewer rural households than it did in the past, and young people are disinclined to work in agriculture in the village.

³ The Inter-State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1979 is the sole piece of legislation for the protection of migrant workers employed outside their native states. It mandates equal wages as local workers, allowances for displacement and home journey, appropriate residential

accommodation and free medical facilities, among other benefits for migrant workers. One of the shortcomings of this Act is that it is applicable only to establishments and contractors that employ five or more interstate migrant workers. Therefore, if a worker voluntarily migrates, s/he is not covered under the ambit of this Act. There is little or no compliance of the Act; few contractors take out licenses and very few enterprises employing interstate migrant workers are registered under the Act (IOM 2008). In addition, state labour departments are reluctant to cooperate with labour departments of the origin state, and in general migrant workers are ignorant about the Act. Trade unions have also neglected the plight of migrant workers (NCL 2002: Part B). In a context where many workers voluntarily migrate, this Act begs for an amendment that brings under its purview all migrants and not only those who migrate via contractors.

⁴ This is the paradox of the (Bihari) migrant – (s)he is a symbol of resilience within the state, but a symbol of hostility outside.

Appendices

Appendix Table 2.1
The regions of Bihar

<i>Typology</i>	<i>Region</i>	<i>Characteristics (districts)</i>
A.	Centre-South	A more urbanized area with more advanced agriculture (Begusarai, Nalanda, Patna).
B.	West and South-West	An area with high levels of canal irrigation and cropping intensity, and low population density (Aurangabad, Bhojpur, Rohtas, West Champaran).
C.	North-West	An area with advanced agriculture and high population density but low urbanization (Gopalganj, Saran, Siwan, Vaishali).
D.	South and South-East	A less advanced region, with some degree of urbanization (Bhagalpur, Gaya, Munger, Muzaffarpur, Nawada); only Muzaffarpur does not fit the regional pattern.
E.	Centre-North	An area, also quite backward, with higher population density and less urbanization than region D (East Champaran, Madhubani, Samastipur, Sitamarhi).
F.	North-East	Less advanced agriculture and high tenancy (Darbhanga, Katihar, Purnia, Saharsa).

Source: Adapted from Rodgers et al. 2013, pp. 10-11

Appendix Table 4.1
Probability of individual migration - probit estimates, 1998 (unweighted data)

Variable	Marginal Effects						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Age	0.00298*** (-5.20)	0.00330*** (-5.74)	0.00319*** (-5.58)	0.00313*** (-5.51)	0.00314*** (-5.53)	0.00308*** (-5.45)	0.00312*** (-5.53)
Sex	0.224*** (15.46)	0.236*** (16.03)	0.232*** (15.81)	0.223*** (15.35)	0.226*** (15.51)	0.225*** (15.48)	0.226*** (15.54)
Married	0.0484** (2.94)	0.0542*** (3.31)	0.0541*** (3.32)	0.0542*** (3.36)	0.0532** (3.26)	0.0509** (3.13)	0.0527** (3.24)
Education - Illiterate	-0.0774*** (-3.45)	-0.0634** (-2.83)	-0.0762*** (-3.37)	-0.0837*** (-3.74)	-0.0801*** (-3.57)	-0.0806*** (-3.60)	-0.154* (-2.54)
Education - Primary	-0.0426 (-1.38)	-0.0638* (-2.08)	-0.0653* (-2.15)	-0.0673* (-2.23)	-0.0709* (-2.35)	-0.0724* (-2.42)	-0.0711 (-0.92)
Education - Middle	0.00503 (0.20)	-0.00668 (-0.26)	-0.00374 (-0.15)	0.00168 (0.07)	-0.00238 (-0.09)	-0.00213 (-0.08)	-0.0974 (-1.46)
Education - Secondary	0.0113 (0.44)	-0.0115 (-0.44)	-0.00909 (-0.35)	0.0000712 (0.00)	-0.00319 (-0.12)	-0.000264 (-0.01)	-0.0245 (-0.37)
Education - Higher Secondary	0.0366 (1.19)	0.00893 (0.29)	0.00176 (0.06)	0.0218 (0.71)	0.0128 (0.41)	0.0150 (0.49)	0.0418 (0.50)
Education - Degree	0.0417 (1.23)	0.00468 (0.14)	0.00975 (0.28)	0.0350 (1.02)	0.0258 (0.75)	0.0290 (0.86)	0.135 (1.57)
Education - Postgraduate	0.0280	0.0161	0.0148	0.0339	0.0213	0.0323	0.0160

Variable	Marginal Effects						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Class - Agricultural Labour	(0.49)	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.62)	(0.39)	(0.60)	(0.09)
		-0.0212	-0.0585**	-0.115***	-0.101***	-0.107***	-0.107***
		(-1.22)	(-2.98)	(-5.37)	(-4.55)	(-4.91)	(-4.91)
Class - Landlord		0.0822***	0.0837***	0.0276	0.0187	0.0161	0.0169
		(4.83)	(4.88)	(1.38)	(0.92)	(0.81)	(0.85)
Class - Non Agricultural		0.103***	0.0892***	-0.00449	-0.0109	-0.0154	-0.0181
		(5.21)	(4.30)	(-0.17)	(-0.42)	(-0.59)	(-0.70)
Caste - Brahmin and Kayastha			0.00346	0.0117	0.000178	-0.00450	-0.00513
			(0.11)	(0.38)	(0.01)	(-0.16)	(-0.18)
Caste - Bhumihar and Rajput			0.0572	0.0653*	0.0449	0.0484	0.0513
			(1.72)	(1.99)	(1.32)	(1.60)	(1.69)
Caste - Kurmi			0.00381	0.0243	0.0271	0.0160	0.0144
			(0.08)	(0.54)	(0.61)	(0.39)	(0.35)
Caste - Yadav			-0.0255	0.00298	0.0160	0.0140	0.0200
			(-0.62)	(0.07)	(0.39)	(0.35)	(0.50)
Caste - Koerij			0.0650	0.0700	0.0682	0.0711	0.0693
			(1.58)	(1.71)	(1.66)	(1.87)	(1.81)
Caste - Other Backward I			0.0855**	0.0942**	0.0963**	0.0947***	0.0953***
			(2.81)	(3.15)	(3.22)	(3.39)	(3.39)
Caste - Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe			0.101***	0.0960**	0.0888**	0.0843**	0.0853**
			(3.34)	(3.21)	(2.97)	(2.94)	(2.97)
Caste - Upper Muslim			0.0760	0.0883	0.0813	0.0893*	0.0925*
			(1.59)	(1.86)	(1.72)	(1.98)	(2.05)

Variable	Marginal Effects						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Caste - Lower Muslim			0.110** (3.23)	0.107** (3.22)	0.102** (3.07)	0.103** (3.23)	0.105*** (3.30)
Operational Land 0 acres				0.114*** (5.85)	0.108*** (5.20)	0.117*** (5.78)	0.121*** (5.94)
Operational Land 0-1 acres				0.0864*** (4.46)	0.0872*** (4.41)	0.0914*** (4.69)	0.0912*** (4.68)
Operational Land - 5+ acres				-0.0283 (-1.17)	-0.0356 (-1.46)	-0.0312 (-1.31)	-0.0303 (-1.27)
Type of Dwelling				0.0345* (2.13)	0.0345* (2.13)	0.0315* (2.09)	0.0347* (2.29)
Livestock in HH					-0.0187 (-1.20)	-0.0192 (-1.26)	-0.0224 (-1.46)
Female Worker in HH					-0.0284 (-1.68)	-0.0249 (-1.50)	-0.0222 (-1.33)
Young Children in HH					0.0142 (1.08)	0.0128 (0.99)	0.0112 (0.86)
Network - Village Migration Rate						0.00301*** (6.83)	0.00198 (1.50)
Network*Education - Illiterate							0.00189 (1.26)
Network*Education - Primary							0.0000414 (-0.02)

Variable	Marginal Effects						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Network*Education - Middle							0.00248 (1.50)
Network*Education - Secondary							0.000642 (0.38)
Network*Education - Higher Secondary							-0.000834 (-0.38)
Network*Education - Degree							-0.00337 (-1.43)
Network*Education - Postgraduate							0.000370 (0.07)
Village Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
N	3003	3003	3003	3003	3001	3001	3001
Pseudo R ²	0.2025	0.2238	0.2373	0.2543	0.2574	0.2551	0.2591

Notes: t statistics in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 4.2
Probability of individual migration - probit estimates, 2011 (unweighted data)

Variable	Marginal Effects							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Age	-0.00787*** (-12.59)	0.00793*** (-12.61)	0.00830*** (-13.27)	0.00804*** (-12.85)	-0.00790*** (-12.49)	-0.00785*** (-12.39)	0.00786*** (-12.43)	-0.00804*** (-12.76)
Sex	0.356*** (30.15)	0.356*** (29.68)	0.362*** (30.55)	0.359*** (30.45)	0.361*** (30.69)	0.360*** (30.52)	0.360*** (30.58)	0.363*** (31.16)
Married	0.152*** (8.38)	0.157*** (8.66)	0.162*** (9.02)	0.156*** (8.71)	0.145*** (7.84)	0.145*** (7.82)	0.146*** (7.87)	0.149*** (8.12)
Education - Illiterate	-0.0381 (-1.40)	-0.0368 (-1.34)	-0.0389 (-1.44)	-0.0423 (-1.57)	-0.0445 (-1.66)	-0.0412 (-1.54)	0.276 (1.66)	0.222 (1.35)
Education - Primary	0.0250 (0.83)	0.0261 (0.87)	0.00670 (0.23)	0.0125 (0.42)	0.00849 (0.29)	0.0101 (0.34)	0.281 (1.53)	0.244 (1.35)
Education - Middle	-0.0267 (-0.89)	-0.0258 (-0.85)	-0.0442 (-1.48)	-0.0376 (-1.26)	-0.0403 (-1.35)	-0.0387 (-1.30)	0.148 (0.83)	0.0787 (0.44)
Education - Secondary	-0.00846 (-0.29)	-0.00479 (-0.16)	-0.0205 (-0.69)	-0.0179 (-0.60)	-0.0227 (-0.76)	-0.0206 (-0.69)	0.401* (2.26)	0.317 (1.80)
Education - Higher Secondary	-0.0247 (-0.78)	-0.0161 (-0.49)	-0.0321 (-0.99)	-0.0252 (-0.78)	-0.0301 (-0.93)	-0.0244 (-0.76)	0.243 (1.28)	0.151 (0.80)
Education - Degree	0.0999** (2.84)	0.0986** (2.72)	0.0697 (1.93)	0.0725* (2.01)	0.0632 (1.75)	0.0753* (2.09)	0.570** (2.80)	0.446* (2.20)
Education - Postgraduate	0.0931	0.0927	0.0736	0.0797	0.0673	0.0654	0.464	0.352

Variable	Marginal Effects							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Class - Agricultural Labour	(1.45)	(1.44)	(1.14)	(1.24)	(1.05)	(1.02)	(1.22)	(0.93)
		0.0364*	0.0631***	0.0434*	0.0394*	0.0445*	0.0478*	0.0478*
		(2.13)	(3.36)	(2.27)	(2.03)	(2.35)	(2.52)	(2.54)
Class - Landlord		0.0645*	0.0499	0.0393	0.0328	0.0265	0.0330	0.0333
		(2.32)	(1.78)	(1.41)	(1.17)	(0.95)	(1.18)	(1.20)
Class - Non Agricultural		0.0892***	0.0975***	0.0597**	0.0538*	0.0610**	0.0603**	0.0478*
		(4.29)	(4.68)	(2.70)	(2.41)	(2.77)	(2.74)	(2.18)
Caste - Brahmin and Kayastha			0.157***	0.167***	0.170***	0.162***	0.166***	0.131***
			(4.25)	(4.53)	(4.57)	(4.79)	(4.91)	(3.85)
Caste - Bhumihar and Rajput			0.265***	0.257***	0.260***	0.232***	0.237***	0.200***
			(6.70)	(6.51)	(6.53)	(6.63)	(6.77)	(5.68)
Caste - Kurmi			0.0487	0.0557	0.0519	0.0646	0.0570	0.0234
			(0.85)	(0.97)	(0.90)	(1.17)	(1.03)	(0.42)
Caste - Yadav			0.0419	0.0764	0.0888*	0.0934*	0.0985*	0.0757
			(0.97)	(1.76)	(2.04)	(2.28)	(2.40)	(1.85)
Caste - Koeri			0.261***	0.254***	0.249***	0.238***	0.238***	0.186***
			(5.42)	(5.25)	(5.12)	(5.59)	(5.60)	(4.35)
Caste - Other Backward I			0.143***	0.144***	0.145***	0.127***	0.129***	0.0884**
			(3.88)	(3.92)	(3.95)	(3.78)	(3.85)	(2.60)
Caste - SC& ST			0.109**	0.0998**	0.0934*	0.0813*	0.0820*	0.0525
			(2.98)	(2.74)	(2.56)	(2.38)	(2.40)	(1.53)
Caste - Upper Muslim			0.142**	0.162**	0.166**	0.169**	0.168**	0.120*
			(2.70)	(3.08)	(3.15)	(3.25)	(3.23)	(2.31)

Variable	Marginal Effects							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Caste - Lower Muslim			0.0582 (1.41)	0.0464 (1.13)	0.0492 (1.19)	0.0468 (1.20)	0.0483 (1.23)	0.00192 (0.05)
Operational Land 0 acres				0.104*** (5.54)	0.0970*** (4.93)	0.0965*** (5.00)	0.0955*** (4.93)	0.0913*** (4.75)
Operational Land 0-1 acres				0.0841*** (4.46)	0.0810*** (4.25)	0.0783*** (4.12)	0.0778*** (4.10)	0.0725*** (3.84)
Operational Land - 5+ acres				0.0699* (2.27)	0.0683* (2.20)	0.0630* (2.05)	0.0600 (1.94)	0.0633* (2.07)
Type of Dwelling					0.0222 (1.39)	0.0249 (1.68)	0.0240 (1.61)	0.0129 (0.86)
Livestock in HH					-0.0398** (-2.69)	-0.0390** (-2.68)	-0.0415** (-2.85)	-0.0379** (-2.62)
Female worker in HH					0.0259 (1.50)	0.0251 (1.47)	0.0250 (1.47)	0.0250 (1.48)
Young children in HH					0.0313* (2.16)	0.0297* (2.04)	0.0287* (1.98)	0.0230 (1.60)
Network - Village Migration Rate						0.00480*** (7.43)	0.00933*** (4.11)	0.00791*** (3.52)
Network*Education - Illiterate							-0.00491 (-1.94)	-0.00418 (-1.67)
Network*Education - Primary							-0.00418 (-1.49)	-0.00372 (-1.35)
Network*Education - Middle							-0.00285	-0.00198

Variable	Marginal Effects							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Network*Education - Secondary							(-1.04)	(-0.73)
							-0.00659*	-0.00548*
Network*Education - Higher Secondary							(-2.42)	(-2.03)
							-0.00411	-0.00293
Network*Education - Degree							(-1.40)	(-1.01)
							-0.00784*	-0.00605
Network*Education - Postgraduate							(-2.46)	(-1.91)
							-0.00625	-0.00474
Household Migration History Variable							(-1.04)	(-0.79)
							0.0900***	(6.61)
Village Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Pseudo R ²	0.2252	0.2303	0.2507	0.2589	0.2626	0.2579	0.2603	0.2707
N	3415	3415	3415	3415	3415	3415	3415	3415

Notes: t statistics in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 5.1
Distribution of sample households by caste, class and landownership

	<i>Number of households</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Caste		
Upper caste	254	28.1
OBC II	163	18
OBC I	188	20.8
SC and ST	210	23.2
Muslim	89	9.8
Total	904	100
Class		
Agricultural Labour	397	43.9
Small and Medium Peasant	167	18.5
Large Peasant and Landlord	203	22.5
Non Agricultural	137	15.2
Total	904	100
Landownership		
Landless	348	38.5
0.01 to 0.99 acres	311	34.4
1 to 2.49 acres	134	14.8
2.5 to 4.99 acres	67	7.4
5 acres or more	44	4.9
Total	904	100

Source: Household survey, 2011.

Appendix Table 6.1
Descriptive statistics of panel and non-panel household in 1999

	<i>Panel Households</i>		<i>Non Panel Households</i>	
	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Deviation</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Deviation</i>
Total income	22729	28804	24247	25915
Share of agricultural income to total income	0.52	0.39	0.50	0.39
Share of non agricultural income to total income	0.13	0.28	0.11	0.24
Share of remittance income to total income	0.24	0.34	0.23	0.31
Total number of primary workers in hh	1.72	1.06	2.20	1.45
Years of schooling of most educated hh member	6.62	4.69	6.42	5.06
Total land owned by household (in acres)	1.28	2.75	1.35	3.28
Share of non agricultural workers in total workers in the village (%)	10.18	2.47	10.12	2.57
Village migration rate (%)	37.76	16.47	37.20	15.80
Village literacy rate (%)	50.59	11.05	50.46	11.00
N	595	595	296	296

Source: Household surveys, 1999 and 2011.

Appendix Table 7.1
Socioeconomic characteristics and work histories of migrant research participants

S. No	Name	Age	Caste/ Community of household	Class of household (wage employment)	Religion	Educational attainment	Marital status	Migration and work details
1	MJ	40	Lower Muslim	Nonagricultural (wage employment) household	Muslim	Class 4	Married	1992-1993: Wage worker in power loom factory in Mumbai (returned to village after 1 year) 2000 - Piece rate garment worker (stitching) Away for about 11 months in a year
2	MG	29	Lower Muslim	Agricultural labour household	Muslim	Class 7	Married	1999-2007: Wage worker in fan and gearbox factories in Delhi 2007: Failed attempt at own business (water cart) 2005-Own account worker (water cart business) Away for about 11 months in a year
3	JM	23	Brahmin	Peasant household	Hindu	Bachelor in Computer Administration (BCA)	Unmarried	2008-2010: Data entry operator in courier company (night shift); enrolled in BCA (correspondence) 2011: Graduated in BCA 2011-2013: Transport executive in courier company 2013-Own account worker (heads Koshi Cargo Services) Away for about 11 months in a year

S. No	Name	Age	Caste/ Community of household	Class of household	Religion	Educational attainment	Marital status	Migration and work details
4	JV	39	Brahmin	Non Agricultural (wage employment) household	Hindu	Class 8	Married	1992-1996: Worked as peon for Indian (Bihari) diplomat in Laos and Cambodia 1997-1998: Back in Mahisham 1999: Wage worker in cloth factory 1999- Own account worker; runs his own paan shop Away for about 11 months in a year
5	MA	45	Lower Muslim	Agricultural labour household	Muslim	Illiterate	Married	1985-99: Wage worker in a fan factory 1999- Wage worker in another fan factory. Away for about 11 months in a year
6	MM	39	Lower Muslim	Non agricultural (wage employment) household	Muslim	Class 6	Married	1990-91: Wage worker in a fan factory 1992 - Wage worker in another fan factory Away for about 11 months in a year
7	MI	34	Lower Muslim	Peasant household	Muslim	Illiterate	Married	1995- Wage worker in a shoelace factory (6 months) 1996-2014- Rented cart puller in an electronics goods market 2014- Own cart puller in electronics goods market Away for about 11 months in a year

S. No	Name	Age	Caste/ Community of household	Class of household	Religion	Educational attainment	Marital status	Migration and work details
8	BM	42	OBC I	Peasant household	Hindu	Class 9	Married	1984: Domestic worker in a residence in Delhi (1.5 months) 1989-2004: Piece-rate worker in a carpet factory in Bhadohi, Uttar Pradesh 2005-2010: Self employed in agriculture in family farm in Mahisham 2011- Wage worker in a carpet factory in Panipat, Haryana. <i>Away for 9 months in a year</i>
9	KM	18	OBC I	Peasant household	Hindu	Class 7	Unmarried	2011- Wage worker in a towel factory in Panipat. <i>Away for 9 months in a year</i>
10	AJ	40	Lower Muslim	Agricultural labour household	Muslim	Class 7	Married	Migrating since (2000)-wage worker in a pin factory <i>Away for 11 months in a year</i>

Source: Author's fieldwork.



References

- Abbas, R. (2016) 'Internal Migration and Citizenship in India', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 42(1): 150-168.
- Abbas, R. and D. Varma (2014) 'Internal Labor Migration in India Raises Integration Challenges for Migrants'. (Migration Information Source). Washington D.C.: Migration Policy Institute.
- Adams, R.H. and J. Page (2005) 'Do International Migration and Remittances Reduce Poverty in Developing Countries?', *World Development* 33(10): 1645-1669.
- Adepoju, A. (2006) 'Internal and International Migration within Africa', in P. Kok, J. Gelderblom, O. Oucho and J. Van Zyl (eds) *Migration in South and Southern Africa: Dynamics and Determinants*, pp. 26-46. Cape Town: Human Science Research Council Press.
- Anandhi, S., J. Jeyaranjan and R. Krishnan (2002) 'Work, Caste and Competing Masculinities: Notes from a Tamil Village', *Economic and Political Weekly* 37(43): 4397-4406.
- Appadurai, A. (2004) 'The Capacity to Aspire', in V. Rao and M. Walton (eds) *Culture and Public Action*, pp. 59-84. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Asis, M.M.B. (2006) 'Living with Migration', *Asian Population Studies* 2(1): 45-67.
- Badiani, R. (2007) 'Temporary and Permanent Migration in Six Villages in the Semi-Arid Tropics', No. Research Bulletin No. 22. Patancheru: International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics.
- Badiani, R., S. Dercon, P. Krishnan and K.P.C. Rao (2007) 'Changes in Living Standards in Villages in India, 1975-2004: Revisiting the ICRISAT

- Village Level Studies'. (CPRC Working Paper No. 85). Oxford: Chronic Poverty Research Centre, Department of International Development and University of Oxford.
- Bakewell, O. (2008) 'Keeping them in their Place': The Ambivalent Relationship between Development and Migration in Africa', *Third World Quarterly* 29(7): 1341-1358.
- Baviskar, A. (2003) 'Between Violence and Desire: Space, Power, and Identity in the Making of Metropolitan Delhi', *International Social Science Journal* 55(175): 89-98.
- Beazley, H. (2015) 'Multiple Identities, Multiple Realities: Children Who Migrate Independently for Work in Southeast Asia', *Children's Geographies* 13(3): 296-309.
- Beegle, K., J. De Weerd and S. Dercon (2011) 'Migration and Economic Mobility in Tanzania: Evidence from a Tracking Survey', *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 93(3): 1010-1033.
- Bhagat, R.B. (2011) 'Migrants'(Denied) Right to the City', in S.T. Lama-Rewal, M.H. Zerah and V. Dupont (eds) *Urban Policies and the Right to the City in India: Rights, Responsibilities and Citizenship*, New Delhi: UNESCO and Centre de Sciences Humaines.
- Bhattacharya, P. (1998) 'The Informal Sector and Rural-to-Urban Migration: Some Indian Evidence', *Economic and Political Weekly* 33(21): 1255-1262.
- Bhowmick, S., M.H. Zerah and B. Chaudhuri (2011) 'Urban Livelihoods: The City Versus the Informal Economy', in S.T. Lama-Rewal, M.H. Zerah and V. Dupont (eds) *Urban Policies and the Right to the City in India: Rights, Responsibilities and Citizenship*, New Delhi: UNESCO and Centre de Sciences Humaines.
- Boccagni, P. and L. Baldassar (2015) 'Emotions on the Move: Mapping the Emergent Field of Emotion and Migration', *Emotion, Space and Society* 16: 73-30.
- Breman, J. (1996) *Footloose Labour: Working in India's Informal Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Calero, C., A.S. Bedi and R. Sparrow (2009) 'Remittances, Liquidity Constraints and Human Capital Investments in Ecuador', *World Development* 37(6): 1143-1154.

- Castles, S. (2017) *Migration, Citizenship and Identity: Selected Essays*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Census of India (2011) *Census of India*. New Delhi: Government of India, Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner.
- Census of India (2001) *Census of India*. New Delhi: Government of India, Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner.
- Chandrasekhar, S., M. Naik and S.N. Roy (2017) 'On the Importance of Triangulating Datasets to Examine Indians on the Move', WP-2017-020. Mumbai: Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research.
- Chattopadhyaya, H. (1987) *Internal Migration in India: A Case Study of Bengal*. Calcutta: K.P. Bagchi.
- Clemens, M.A., Ç. Özden and H. Rapoport (2014) 'Migration and Development Research is Moving Far Beyond Remittances', *World Development* 64: 121-124.
- Coffey, D., J. Papp and D. Spears (2015) 'Short-Term Labor Migration from Rural North India: Evidence from New Survey Data', *Population Research and Policy Review* 34(3): 361-380.
- Connell, J., B. Dasgupta, R. Laishley and M. Lipton (1976) *Migration from Rural Areas: The Evidence from Village Studies*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Corbridge, S., J. Harriss and C. Jeffrey (2013) *India Today: Economy, Politics and Society*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Cortes, P. (2015) 'The Feminization of International Migration and its Effects on the Children Left Behind: Evidence from the Philippines', *World Development* 65: 62-78.
- Creswell, J. (2003) *Research Design, Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Croll, E.J. and H. Ping (1997) 'Migration for and Against Agriculture in Eight Chinese Villages', *The China Quarterly* (149): 128-146.
- Crouch, M. and H. McKenzie (2006) 'The Logic of Small Samples in Interview-Based Qualitative Research', *Social Science Information* 45(4): 483-499.
- Dannecker, P. (2009) 'Migrant Visions of Development: A Gendered Approach', *Population, Space and Place* 15(2): 119-132.

- Datt, G. and M. Ravallion (2009) 'Has India's Economic Growth Become More Pro-Poor in the Wake of Economic Reforms?', Policy Research Working Paper No. WPS 5103. Washington D.C.: World Bank.
- Datta, A. (2016a) 'Migration from Rural Bihar: Insights from a Longitudinal Study (1981– 2011)', in Himanshu, P. Jha and G. Rodgers (eds) *The Changing Village in India: Insights from Longitudinal Research*, pp. 380-400. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Datta, A. (2016b) 'Migration from Contemporary Bihar', in D. Mishra (ed.) *Internal Migration in Contemporary India*, pp. 204-221. New Delhi: Sage Publications.
- Datta, A. (2016c) 'Migration, Remittances and Changing Sources of Income in Rural Bihar (1999-2011): Some Findings from a Longitudinal Study', *Economic and Political Weekly* 51(31): 85-93.
- Datta, A. [Ahona] (2012) "'Mongrel City": Cosmopolitan Neighbourliness in a Delhi Squatter Settlement', *Antipode* 44(3): 745-763.
- Datta, A. and R. Gupta (2011) 'A Report of a Time-use Survey in Two Villages'. New Delhi: Institute for Human Development.
- Datta, A. and S.K. Mishra (2011) 'Glimpses of Women's Lives in Rural Bihar: Impact of Male Migration', *Indian Journal of Labour Economics* 54(3): 457-477.
- Datta, A., G. Rodgers, J. Rodgers and B.K.N. Singh (2012) 'A Tale of Two Villages: Contrasts in Development in Bihar'. (Working Paper No. 5, IHD Working Paper Series). New Delhi: Institute for Human Development.
- Datta, A., G. Rodgers, J. Rodgers and B.K.N. Singh (2014) 'Contrasts in Development in Bihar: A Tale of Two Villages', *Journal of Development Studies* 50(9): 1197-1208.
- Davis, K. (1951) *The Population of India and Pakistan*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- De Haan, A. (2006) 'Migration in the Development Studies Literature: Has it Come Out of its Marginality?', Research Paper No. 19. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER.
- De Haan, A. (2002) 'Migration and Livelihoods in Historical Perspective: A Case Study of Bihar, India', *Journal of Development Studies* 38(5): 115-142.

De Haan, A. (1999) 'Livelihoods and Poverty: The Role of Migration - A Critical Review of the Migration Literature', *Journal of Development Studies* 36(2): 1-47.

De Haan, A. (1997) 'Migration as Family Strategy: Rural-Urban Labor Migration in India during the Twentieth Century', *The History of the Family* 2(4): 481-505.

De Haan, A., (1996) *Unsettled Settlers. Migrant Workers and Industrial Capitalism in Calcutta*. Calcutta: K.P. Bagchi.

De Haas, H. (2010) 'Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective', *International Migration Review* 44(1): 227-264.

De Haas, H. (2008) 'Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective'. Oxford: International Migration Institute, James Martin 21st Century School, University of Oxford.

De Haas, H. (2005) 'International Migration, Remittances and Development: Myths and Facts', *Third World Quarterly* 26(8): 1269-1284.

Deb, P. and P. Seck (2009) 'Internal Migration, Selection Bias and Human Development: Evidence from Indonesia and Mexico'. (Human Development Research Paper 31). New York: United Nations Development Programme.

Delhi Human Development Report (2013) *Delhi Human Development Report: Improving Lives, Promoting Inclusion*. New Delhi: Institute for Human Development and Academic Foundation.

Delgado Wise, R. and H.M. Covarrubias (2009) 'Understanding the Relationship between Migration and Development: Toward a New Theoretical Approach', *Social Analysis* 53(3): 85-105.

Delgado Wise, R., H.M. Covarrubias and R. Puentes (2013) 'Reframing the Debate on Migration, Development and Human Rights', *Population, Space and Place* 19(4): 430-443.

Dercon, S., P. Krishnan, S. Krutikova, R. Badiani and K.P.C. Rao (2012) 'Changes in Living Standards in Villages in India 1975-2006: Revisiting ICRISAT Village Level Studies'.

Dercon, S. and J.S. Shapiro (2007) 'Moving on, Staying Behind, Getting Lost: Lessons on Poverty, Mobility from Longitudinal Data', in D. Narayan and P. Petesch (eds) *Moving Out of Poverty: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives on Mobility*. pp. 77-126. Washington D.C.: Palgrave MacMillan and The World Bank.

- Deshingkar, P. and S. Akter (2009) 'Migration and Human Development in India', Human Development Research Paper 2009/13. New York: United Nations Development Programme.
- Deshingkar, P. and E. Anderson (2004) 'People on the Move: New Policies Challenges for Increasingly Mobile Populations', Natural Resource Perspectives, Number 92. London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Deshingkar, P. and J. Farrington (2009) Circular Migration and Multi-Locational Livelihoods Strategies in Rural India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Deshingkar, P. and S. Grimm (2005) Internal Migration and Development: A Global Perspective. Geneva: International Organization for Migration.
- Deshingkar, P., S. Kumar, H.K. Chobey and D. Kumar (2006) 'The Role of Migration and Remittances in Promoting Livelihoods in Bihar'. London: Overseas Development Institute.
- DeWind, J. and J. Holdaway (2005) 'Internal and International Migration in Economic Development', Fourth Coordination Meeting on International Migration. New York: United Nations.
- Dobson, M.E. (2009) 'Unpacking Children in Migration Research', Children's Geographies 7(3): 355-360.
- Dodd, W., S. Humphries, K. Patel, S. Majowicz and C. Dewey (2016) 'Determinants of Temporary Labour Migration in Southern India', Asian Population Studies 12(3): 294-311.
- Drèze, J. and A. Sen (2013) An Uncertain Glory: India and its Contradictions. London: Allen Lane.
- Dubey, A., R. Palmer-Jones and K. Sen (2006) 'Surplus Labour, Social Structure and Rural to Urban Migration: Evidence from Indian Data', European Journal of Development Research 18(1): 86-104.
- Dutta, P., R. Murgai, M. Ravallion and D. Van de Walle (2014) Right to Work?: Assessing India's Employment Guarantee Scheme in Bihar. World Bank Publications.
- Editorial (2015) 'Asian Children and Transnational Migration', Children's Geographies 13(3): 255-262.
- Ellis, F. (2000) Rural Livelihoods and Diversity in Developing Countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fan, C.C. (2008) *China on the Move: Migration, the State, and the Household*. London and New York: Routledge.

Feng, W., X. Zuo and D. Ruan (2002) 'Rural Migrants in Shanghai: Living Under the Shadow of Socialism', *International Migration Review* 36(2): 520-545.

Frank, A.G. (1970) 'The Development of Underdevelopment', in R.I. Rhodes (ed.) *Imperialism and Development: A Reader*, pp. 4-17. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Frankel, F. (2005) *India's Political Economy 1947-2004*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Funkhouser, E. (2006) 'the Effect of Emigration on the Labor Market Outcomes of Sender Households: A Longitudinal Approach using Data from Nicaragua', *Well Being and Social Policy* 2(2): 5-25.

Gabriel, C. (2013) 'NAFTA, Skilled Migration, and Continental Nursing Markets', *Population, Space and Place* 19(4): 389-403.

Garip, F. (2008) 'Social Capital and Migration: How do Similar Resources Lead to Divergent Outcomes?', *Demography* 45(3): pp. 591-617.

Gaskell, C. (2008) 'Isolation and Distress? (Re)Thinking the Place of Emotions in Youth Research', *Children's Geographies* 6(2): 169-181.

Geiger, M. and A. Pécoud (2013) 'Migration, Development and the 'Migration and Development Nexus'', *Population, Space and Place* 19: 369-374.

Ghosh, P.P. and S. Gupta (2009) *Economic Growth and Human Development in Bihar*. Patna: Asian Development Research Institute.

Gidwani, V. and K. Sivaramakrishnan (2003) 'Circular Migration and Rural Cosmopolitanism in India', *Contributions to Indian Sociology* 37(1-2): 339-367.

GOB (2014) 'Economic Survey of Bihar (2013-14)'. Patna: Government of Bihar, Finance Department.

GOI (2017b) 'Economic Survey 2016-17'. New Delhi: Government of India, Ministry of Finance Department of Economic Affairs Economic Division.

Available at: <http://indiabudget.nic.in/es2016-17/echapter.pdf>

GOI (2017a) 'Report of the Working Group on Migration'. New Delhi: Government of India, Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation.

GOI (2013) Twelfth Five Year Plan (2012–2017), Volume III. New Delhi: Government of India, Planning Commission.

Available at: http://planningcommission.gov.in/plans/planrel/12thplan/pdf/12fyp_vol3.pdf

GOI (2010) 'Migration in India 2007-2008, NSS Report no. 533'. New Delhi: Government of India, National Sample Survey Office, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation.

Available at: http://mospi.nic.in/sites/default/files/publication_reports/533_final.pdf

GOI (2008) 'A Study on Counter-Magnet Areas to Delhi and National Capital Region'. New Delhi: Ministry of Urban Development.

GOI (2002) Tenth Five Year Plan, Volume II. New Delhi: Government of India, Planning Commission.

Available at: http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/10th/volume2/10th_vol2.pdf

GOI (1997) Ninth Five Year Plan, Volume II. New Delhi: Government of India, Planning Commission.

Available at: <http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/9th/vol2/welcome.html>

GOI (1992) Eighth Five Year Plan, Volumes I & II. New Delhi: Government of India, Planning Commission.

Available at: <http://planningcommission.gov.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/8th/vol1/8vol1.html> and <http://planningcommission.gov.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/8th/vol2/8vol2.html>

GOI (1981) Sixth Five Year Plan. New Delhi: Government of India, Planning Commission.

Available at: <http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/6th/welcome.html>

GOI (1970) Fourth Five Year Plan. New Delhi: Government of India, Planning Commission.

Available at: <http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/plan-rel/fiveyr/4th/welcome.html>

GOI (1961) Third Five Year Plan. New Delhi: Government of India, Planning Commission.

Available at: <http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/plan-rel/fiveyr/3rd/welcome.html>

GOI (1956) Second Five Year Plan. New Delhi: Government of India, Planning Commission.

Available at: <http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/plan-rel/fiveyr/2nd/welcome.html>

GOI (1946) Labour Investigation Committee: Main Report. Delhi: Government of India.

Gupta, A. (2014) 'Destination Bihar', Down to Earth. New Delhi: Centre for Science and Environment.

Gupta, I. and A. Mitra (2002) 'Rural Migrants and Labour Segmentation: Micro-Level Evidence from Delhi Slums', *Economic and Political Weekly* 37(2): 163-168.

Haberfeld, Y., R.K. Menaria, B.B. Sahoo and R.N. Vyas (1999) 'Seasonal Migration of Rural Labor in India', *Population Research and Policy Review* 18(5): 473-489.

Hare, D. (1999) 'Push' Versus 'Pull' Factors in Migration Outflows and Returns: Determinants of Migration Status and Spell Duration among China's Rural Population', *Journal of Development Studies* 35(3): 45-72.

Harris, J.R. and M.P. Todaro (1970) 'Migration, Unemployment and Development: A Two-Sector Analysis', *American Economic Review* 60(1): 126-142.

Hickey, M. (2016) 'Modernisation, Migration, and Mobilisation: Relinking Internal and International Migrations in the 'Migration and Development Nexus'', *Population, Space and Place* 22(7): 681-692.

Hickey, M. and B.S. Yeoh (2016) 'Crossing Borders and Traversing Boundaries: Closing the 'Gap' between Internal and International Migration in Asia', *Population, Space and Place* 22(7): 642-650.

Himanshu, P. Lanjouw, A. Mukhopadhyay and R. Murgai (2011) 'Non-Farm Diversification and Rural Poverty Decline: A Perspective from Indian Sample Survey and Village Study Data'. (Working Paper, 44). London: Asia Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science.

- Himanshu and N. Stern (2011) 'India and an Indian Village: 50 Years of Economic Development in Palanpur', Asia Research Centre Working Paper 43. London: Asia Research Centre (ARC) London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Hoang, L.A., T. Lam, B.S.A. Yeoh and E. Graham (2015) 'Transnational Migration, Changing Care Arrangements and Left-Behind Children's Responses in South-East Asia', *Children's Geographies* 13(3): 263-277.
- Hoang, X.T., N.A. Dang and C. Tacoli (2005) 'Livelihood Diversification and Rural-Urban Linkages in Vietnam's Red River Delta', Working Paper 11. London: International Institute of Environment and Development.
- Hoff, K. and A. Sen (2005) 'The Kin System as a Poverty Trap?'. (Policy Research Working Paper No. 3575). Washington D.C.: World Bank.
- Hugo, G. (2016) 'Internal and International Migration in East and Southeast Asia: Exploring the Linkages', *Population, Space and Place* 22(7): 651-668.
- Hugo, G.J. (1982) 'Circular Migration in Indonesia', *Population and Development Review* 8(1): 59-83.
- Human Development Report (2009) *Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development*. New York: United Nations Development Programme.
- India Labour and Employment Report (2014) *India Labour and Employment Report 2014*. New Delhi: Institute for Human Development and Academic Foundation.
- Indian Institute for Human Settlements (2012) 'Urban India 2011: Evidence'. Bengaluru: Indian Institute for Human Settlements.
- Indian Institute of Public Administration (2010) 'A Study of Bihari Migrant Labourers: Incidence, Causes and Remedies'. New Delhi: Sponsored by the Department of Labour Resources, Government of Bihar.
- Institute for Human Development (2004) 'Dynamics of Poverty, Employment and Human Development in Bihar'. New Delhi: Institute for Human Development.
- IOM (2008) 'Migration, Development and Poverty Reduction in South Asia'. Geneva: International Organisation for Migration.
- Jha, M. and Pushpendra (eds) (2014) *Traversing Bihar: The Politics of Development and Social Justice*. New Delhi: Orient Blackswan.

Jha, P. (2004) 'Continuity and Change: Some Observations on the Landscape of Agricultural Labourers in North Bihar, India', *Journal of Agrarian Change* 4(4): 509-531.

Jodhka, S.S. (2012) 'Agrarian Changes in the Times of (Neo-Liberal) 'Crises'', *Economic and Political Weekly* 47(26): 5-13.

Kapur, D. 'Remittances: The New Development Mantra?'. Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

Karan, A. (2003) 'Migration from Rural Bihar', in G. Iyer (ed.) *Migrant Labour and Human Rights in India*, pp. 102-139. New Delhi: Kanishka.

Karthick, S. (2012) 'Tamil Nadu Begins Enumeration of Migrant Labourers' *The Times of India*, 3 March.

Available at:

http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-03-03/chennai/31119210_1_migrant-labourers-labour-department-migrant-workers

King, R. and R. Skeldon (2010) 'Mind the Gap!': Integrating Approaches to Internal and International Migration', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36: 1619-1646.

Kumar, P. and S. Sarkar (2012) *Economic Reforms and Small Farms: Implications for Production, Marketing and Employment*. New Delhi: Academic Foundation and Institute for Human Development.

Kundu, A. (2009) 'Exclusionary Urbanisation in Asia: A Macro Overview', *Economic and Political Weekly* 44(48): 48-58.

Kundu, A. and L.R. Saraswati (2016) 'Changing Patterns of Migration in India: A Perspective on Urban Exclusion', in M.J. White (ed.) *International Handbook of Migration and Population Distribution*, pp. 311-332. Springer.

Kundu, A. and L.R. Saraswati (2012) 'Migration and Exclusionary Urbanisation in India', *Economic and Political Weekly* 47(26-27): 219-227.

Lanjouw, P. and A. Shariff (2004) 'Rural Non-Farm Employment in India: Access, Incomes and Poverty Impact', *Economic and Political Weekly* 39(40): 4429-4446.

Lee, E.S. (1966) 'A Theory of Migration', *Demography* 3(1): 47.

Lewis, W.A. (1954) 'Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour', *The Manchester school* 22(2): 139-191.

- Lipton, M. (1977) *Why Poor People Stay Poor: A Study of Urban Bias in World Development*. London: Temple Smith.
- Lokshin, M., M. Bontch-Osmolovski and Glinskaya (2010) 'Work-Related Migration and Poverty Reduction in Nepal', *Review of Development Economics* 14(2): 323-332.
- Massey, D.S. (1990) 'Social Structure, Household Strategies, and the Cumulative Causation of Migration', *Population Index* 56(1): 3-26.
- Mathew, S. and M. Moore (2011) 'State Incapacity by Design: Understanding the Bihar Story', *IDS Working Papers*, 2011(366). Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.
- Mberu, B. (2005) 'Who Moves and Who Stays?: Rural Out-Migration in Nigeria', *Journal of Population Research* 22(2): 141-161.
- McKay, A. and P. Deshingkar (2014) 'Internal Remittances and Poverty: Further Evidence from Africa and Asia', *Migrating out of Poverty Working Paper*, 12. Brighton: University of Sussex.
- McKenzie, D., J. Gibson and S. Stillman (2010) 'How Important is Selection? Experimental Versus Non-Experimental Measures of the Income Gains from Migration', *Journal of the European Economic Association* 8: 913-945.
- McKenzie, D. and H. Rapoport (2010) 'Self-Selection Patterns in Mexico-US Migration: The Role of Migration Networks', *Review of Economics and Statistics* 92(4): 811-821.
- McKenzie, D. and M.J. Sasin (2007) 'Migration, Remittances and Human Capital: Conceptual and Empirical Challenges'. Policy Research Working Paper No. 4272. Washington D.C.: World Bank.
- Mincer, J. (1978) 'Family Migration Decisions', *Journal of Political Economy* 86(5): 749-773.
- Mitra, A. (2010) 'Migration, Livelihood and Well-being: Evidence from Indian City Slums', *Urban Studies* 47(7): 1371-1390.
- Mora, J. and J.E. Taylor (2006) 'Determinants of Migration, Destination, and Sector Choice: Disentangling Individual, Household, and Community Effects', in C. Özden and M. Schiff (eds) *International Migration, Remittances, and the Brain Drain*, Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Mosse, D., S. Gupta, M. Mehta, V. Shah, J. Rees and KRIBP Project Team (2002) 'Brokered Livelihoods: Debt, Labour Migration and Development in Tribal Western India', *Journal of Development Studies* 38(5): 59-88.

Mukherjee, P., B.G.D. Paul and J.I. Pathan (2011) 'Migrant Workers in Informal Sector: A Probe into Working Conditions'. (ATLMRI Discussion Paper Series (Discussion Paper 9). Mumbai: Tata Institute of Social Sciences.

Mukopadhyay, A. (2011) 'Stepping Out of Palanpur: Employment Outside Palanpur', Working Paper, 46. London: Asia Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science.

Munshi, K. and M. Rosenzweig (2016) 'Networks and Misallocation: Insurance, Migration, and the Rural-Urban Wage Gap', *American Economic Review* 106(1): 46-98.

Murphy, R. (2014) 'Study and School in the Lives of Children in Migrant Families: A View from Rural Jiangxi, China', *Development and Change* 45(1): 29-51.

Murphy, R. (2002) *How Migrant Labor is Changing Rural China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Murrugarra, E. and C. Herrera (2011) 'Migration Choices, Inequality of Opportunities and Poverty Reduction in Nicaragua', in J. Larrison, E. Murrugarra and M.J. Sasin (eds) *Migration and Poverty: Towards Better Opportunities for the Poor*, Washington D.C.: World Bank.

Naafs, S. (2018) 'Youth Aspirations and Employment in Provincial Indonesia: A View from the Lower Middle Classes', *Children's Geographies* 15(1): 53-65.

Naik, M., Kunduri, E. and Parulkar, A. (2017) 'The Government must Compensate for the Demonetisation Setback to Migrants' Mobility' *The Hindustan Times*, January 16.

Nayyar, G. and K.Y. Kim (2018) 'India's Internal Labor Migration Paradox : The Statistical and the Real', Policy Research Working Paper No. 8356. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

NCEUS (2007) 'Report on Conditions of Work and Promotion of Livelihoods in the Unorganized Sector'. New Delhi: Government of India, National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector.

NCL (2002) *Report of the National Commission on Labour*. New Delhi: Government of India, Ministry of Labour and Employment, National Commission on Labour.

- NCL (1969) Report of the National Commission on Labour. New Delhi: Government of India, Ministry of Labour and Employment and Rehabilitation, National Commission on Labour.
- NCRL (1991) Report of the National Commission on Rural Labour. New Delhi: Government of India, Ministry of Labour, National Commission on Rural Labour.
- NSSO (2011) Employment and Unemployment Situation in India, 66th Round (2009–10). New Delhi: Government of India, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, National Statistical Organisation, National Sample Survey Office.
- Oberai, A.S. (1983) 'State Policies and Internal Migration in Asia', London: Croom Helm.
- Olsen, W. (2004) 'Triangulation in Social Research: Qualitative and Quantitative Methods can really be Mixed', *Developments in Sociology* 20: 103-118.
- Parida, J.K. and S. Madheswaran (2011) 'Determinants of Migration and Remittance in India: Empirical Evidence', *Indian Journal of Labour Economics* 54(3): 561-578.
- Pattenden, J. (2012) 'Migrating between Rural Raichur and Boomtown Bangalore: Class Relations and the Circulation of Labour in South India', *Global Labour Journal* 3(1): 163-190.
- Phillips, N. (2009) 'Migration as Development Strategy? the New Political Economy of Dispossession and Inequality in the Americas', *Review of International Political Economy* 16(2): 231-259.
- Picherit, D. (2012) 'Migrant Labourers' Struggles between Village and Urban Migration Sites: Labour Standards, Rural Development and Politics in South India', *Global Labour Journal* 3(1): 143-162.
- Piore, M. (1979) *Birds of Passage: Migrant Labour in Industrial Societies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Portes, A. (2007) 'Migration, Development, and Segmented Assimilation: A Conceptual Review of the Evidence', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 610(1): 73-97.
- Prasad, P.H. (1989) *Lopsided Growth: Political Economy of Indian Development*. Bombay: Oxford University Press.

- Prasad, P.H., G.B. Rodgers, S. Gupta, A.N. Sharma and B. Sharma (1988) *The Dynamics of Employment and Poverty in Bihar*. Patna: A.N. Sinha Institute of Social Studies.
- Prasad-Aleyamma, M. (2018) 'Cards and Carriers: Migration, Identification and Surveillance in Kerala, South India', *Contemporary South Asia* 26(2): 191-205.
- Punch, S. (2012) 'Hidden Struggles of Fieldwork: Exploring the Role and use of Field Diaries', *Emotion, Space and Society* 5(2): 95-112.
- Punch, S. (2007) 'Negotiating Migrant Identities: Young People in Bolivia and Argentina', *Children's Geographies* 5(1-2): 95-112.
- Quisumbing, A. and S. McNiven (2010) 'Moving Forward, Looking Back: The Impact of Migration and Remittances on Assets, Consumption, and Credit Constraints in the Rural Philippines', *Journal of Development Studies* 46(1): 91-113.
- Raffaetà, R. (2015) 'Hope Emplaced. What Happens to Hope After Arrival: The Case of Ecuadorian Families Living in Italy', *Emotion, Space and Society* 16: 116-122.
- Raghuram, P. (2009) 'Which Migration, what Development? Unsettling the Edifice of Migration and Development', *Population, Space and Place* 15: 103-117.
- Rao, V. and M. Woolcock (2007) 'The Disciplinary Monopoly in Development Research at the World Bank', *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations* 13(4): 479-484.
- Ratha, D., S. Mohapatra and I. Scheja (2011) 'Impact of Migration on Social and Economic Development: A Review of Evidence and Emerging Issues', No. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5558. Washington D.C.: World Bank.
- Ravenstein, E.G. (1885) 'The Laws of Migration', *Journal of the Statistical Society of London* 48(2): 167-235.
- RCLI (1931) *Report of the Royal Commission on Labour in India*. . Calcutta: Government of India, Central Publication Branch.
- Resurreccion, B.P. and H.T. Van Khanh (2007) 'Able to Come and Go: Reproducing Gender in Female Rural–Urban Migration in the Red River Delta', *Population, Space and Place* 13(3): 211-224.
- Rigg, J. (2007) *An Everyday Geography of the Global South*. Oxon: Routledge.

- Rigg, J. (2006) 'Land, Farming, Livelihoods, and Poverty: Rethinking the Links in the Rural South', *World Development* 34(1): 180-202.
- Rigg, J., T.A. Nguyen and H.T.T. Luong (2014) 'The Texture of Livelihoods: Migration and Making a Living in Hanoi', *Journal of Development Studies* 50(3): 368-382.
- Roberts, K.D. (2002) 'Rural Migrants in Urban China: Willing Workers, Invisible Residents', *Asia Pacific Business Review* 8(4): 141-158.
- Robinson, J. (1962) *Economic Philosophy*. London: C.A. Watts.
- Rodgers, G., A. Datta, J. Rodgers, S.K. Mishra and A.N. Sharma (2013) *The Challenge of Inclusive Development in Rural Bihar*. New Delhi: Institute for Human Development and Manak Publications.
- Rodgers, G., S.K. Mishra and A.N. Sharma (2016) 'Four Decades of Village Studies and Surveys in Bihar', in Himanshu, P. Jha and G. Rodgers (eds) *The Changing Village in India: Insights from Longitudinal Research*, pp. 119-154. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Rodgers, G. and J. Rodgers (2011) 'Inclusive Development? Migration, Governance and Social Change in Rural Bihar', *Economic and Political Weekly* 46(23): 43-50.
- Rodgers, G. and J. Rodgers (2001) 'A Leap Across Time: When Semi-Feudalism Met the Market in Rural Purnia', *Economic and Political Weekly* 36(22): 1976-1983.
- Rodriguez, R.M. and H. Schwenken (2013) 'Becoming a Migrant at Home: Subjectivation Processes in Migrant-Sending Countries Prior to Departure', *Population, Space and Place* 19(4): 375-388.
- Rogaly, B. and D. Coppard (2003) '“They used to Go to Eat, Now they Go to Earn”: The Changing Meanings of Seasonal Migration from Puruliya District in West Bengal, India', *Journal of Agrarian Change* 3(3): 395-433.
- Rogaly, B., D. Coppard, A. Safique, K. Rana, A. Sengupta and J. Biswas (2002) 'Seasonal Migration and Welfare/Illfare in Eastern India: A Social Analysis', *Journal of Development Studies* 38(5): 89-114.
- Rostow, W.W. (1959) 'The Stages of Economic Growth', *Economic History Review* 12(1): 1-16.
- Roy, I. (2014) 'Reserve Labor, Unreserved Politics: Dignified Encroachments Under India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Act', *Journal of Peasant Studies* 41(4): 517-545.

- Rudolph, L.I. and S.H. Rudolph (1987) *In Pursuit of Lakshmi, the Political Economy of the Indian State*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Sabates-Wheeler, R., R. Sabates and A. Castaldo (2008) 'Tackling Poverty-Migration Linkages: Evidence from Ghana and Egypt', *Social Indicators Research* 87(2): 307-328.
- Seeborg, M.C., Z. Jin and Y. Zhu (2000) 'The New Rural-Urban Labor Mobility in China: Causes and Implications', *The Journal of Socio-Economics* 29(1): 39-56.
- Sethi, S. (2009) 'The Crisis of Identity Proofs' *The Business Standard*, 14 November.
- Available at:
<http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/-crisisidentity-proofs/376415/>
- Sharma, A. (2016) '15 Lakh Migrant Labourers Affected by Demonetisation in Ludhiana' *The Hindustan Times*, November 11.
- Sharma, A.N., S. Sarkar, A.K. Karan, V. Gayathri and Pushpendra (2001) 'Poverty and Livelihoods in Rural Bihar.', No. Report of project sponsored by ActionAid. New Delhi: Institute for Human Development.
- Sharma, A.N. (1995) 'Political Economy of Poverty in Bihar', *Economic and Political Weekly* 30(41-42): 2587-2602.
- Sharma, A.N. (2005) 'Agrarian Relations and Socio-Economic Change in Bihar', *Economic and Political Weekly* 40(10): 960-972.
- Sharma, J.R. (2008) 'Practices of Male Labor Migration from the Hills of Nepal to India in Development Discourses: Which Pathology?', *Gender, Technology and Development* 12(3): 303-323.
- Singh, M. (1995) *Uneven Development in Agriculture and Labour Migration: A Case of Bihar and Punjab*. Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study.
- Skeldon, R. (2008) 'International Migration as a Tool in Development Policy: A Passing Phase?', *Population and Development Review* 34(1): 1-18.
- Solinger, D.J. (1999) *Contesting Citizenship in Urban China: Peasant Migrants, the State, and the Logic of the Market*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Stark, O. and D. Bloom (1985) 'The New Economics of Labour Migration', *The American Economic Review* 75(2): 173-178.

- Stark, O. and R.E.B. Lucas (1988) 'Migration, Remittances, and the Family', *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 36(3): 465-481.
- Stillman, S., J. Gibson, D. McKenzie and H. Rohorua (2015) 'Miserable Migrants? Natural Experiment Evidence on International Migration and Objective and Subjective Well-being', *World Development* 65: 79-93.
- Svašek, M. (2010) 'On the Move: Emotions and Human Mobility', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36(6): 865-880.
- Svašek, M. (2010) 'On the Move: Emotions and Human Mobility', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36(6): 865-880.
- Taylor, E.J. (1999) 'The New Economics of Labour Migration and the Role of Remittances in the Migration Process', *International Migration* 37(1): 63-88.
- Taylor, E.J., S. Rozelle and A. De Brauw (2003) 'Migration and Incomes in Source Communities: A New Economics of Migration Perspective from China', *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 52(1): 75-101.
- The Indian Express (2008) 'Do Political Movements Need to Obey the Law?' 23 February, 2008.
- Available at:
<http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/-do-political-movements-need-to-obey-the-law--what-about-advani-rath-yatra-modi-s-godhra-outrage--/276169/0>
- The Times of India (2012) 'Tale of the Tiger', November 21.
- Todaro, M.P. (1969) 'A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Unemployment in Less-Developed Countries', *American Economic Review* 59: 138-148.
- Toyota, M., B.S.A. Yeoh and L. Nguyen (2007) 'Bringing the 'Left Behind' Back into View in Asia: A Framework for Understanding the 'Migration-Left Behind Nexus', *Population, Space and Place* 13(3): 157-161.
- Tsujita, Y. and H. Oda (2014) 'Caste, Land and Migration: Analysis of a Village Survey in an Underdeveloped State in India', in Y. Tsujita (ed.) *Inclusive Growth and Development in India*, pp. 96-116. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Tsujita, Y., H. Oda and P. Ghosh (2010) 'Development and Intra-State Disparities in Bihar', *Economic and Political Weekly* 45(50): 13-15.

UNESCO-UNICEF (2012) 'Workshop Compendium: UNESCO-UNICEF National Workshop on Internal Migration and Human Development in India, 6-7 December 2011', Volume 2: Workshop Papers. New Delhi: UNESCO and UNICEF.

Varshney, A. (1998) *Democracy, Development, and the Countryside: Urban-Rural Struggles in India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Vermot, C. (2015) 'Guilt: A Gendered Bond within the Transnational Family', *Emotion, Space and Society* 16: 138-146.

Weiner, M. (1978) *Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Wickramasekara, P. (2008) 'Globalisation, International Labour Migration and the Rights of Migrant Workers', *Third World Quarterly* 29(7): 1247-1264.

Wooldridge, J.M. (2009) *Econometrics. (India Edition)* Cengage Learning.

Wooldridge, J.M. (2002) *Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

World Bank (2016) 'Bihar: Poverty, Growth and Inequality'. World Bank Group.

Available at: <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/781181467989480762/Bihar-Poverty-growth-and-inequality>

World Bank (2016) 'Migration and Development: A Role for the World Bank Group'. Washington D.C.: World Bank.

World Bank (2007) *World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development*. Washington D.C.: World Bank.

Yang, A.A. (1979) 'Peasants on the Move: A Study of Internal Migration in India', *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 10(1): 37-58.

Curriculum Vitae Amrita Datta

Amrita completed her doctoral dissertation in Development Studies at the International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam (2019). Prior to this, she obtained an M.Phil in Development Studies from the University of Cambridge (2008), an M.A. in Social Work from the Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai (2005), and a B.A. (Honours) in Economics from the Lady Shriram College for Women, University of Delhi (2003).

Amrita's research interests are in the areas of rural-urban migration, gender and development, and village and longitudinal studies. Her research has been published in several edited volumes and journals such as the *Journal of Development Studies*, *Children's Geographies*, *Economic and Political Weekly* and the *Indian Journal of Labour Economics*. Amrita's teaching interests and pedagogy are closely intertwined with her research – in the broad areas of agrarian change and rural-urban migration, development theory and policy, and gender and development.

In the past, Amrita has worked at the Institute for Human Development, New Delhi on a long-term research programme in rural Bihar. Amrita currently teaches courses in public policy and development at FLAME University, Pune, India. In April 2019, she will move to the Department of Liberal Arts at the Indian Institute of Technology, Hyderabad as an Assistant Professor of Development Studies.

Amrita can be contacted at datta.amrita@gmail.com

