From the City to the Desert

Analysing shantytown resettlement in Casablanca, Morocco, from residents' perspectives

Raffael Beier

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ISBN 978-90-6490-095-2

Ruhr-Universität Bochum
and
International Institute of Social Studies
of Erasmus University Rotterdam

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Analysing shantytown resettlement in Casablanca, Morocco, from residents' perspectives

Van de stad naar de woestijn

Hoe bewoners aankijken tegen hervestiging van sloppenwijken in Casablanca, Marokko

Thesis

to obtain the degree of PhD in International Development Studies from Ruhr University Bochum
and
the degree of Doctor from the Erasmus University Rotterdam
by command of the Rector Magnificus
Prof.dr. R.C.M.E. Engels
and in accordance with the decision of the Doctorate Board

The public defence shall be held on
Friday 5 April 2019 at 16.00 hrs

by

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List of Abbreviations

ADS	*Agence de Développement Social* (Social Development Agency)
AFD	*Agence Française de Développement* (French Development Cooperation Agency)
ANHI	*Agence Nationale de lutte contre l'Habitat Insalubre* (National Agency for the Fight Against Insalubrious Housing)
AS	*Accompagnement social* (social accompaniment)
AUC	*Agence Urbaine de Casablanca* (Urban Development Agency of Casablanca)
CBOs	Community-based organisations
CESCR	UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
CIAM	*Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne* (International Congresses of Modern Architecture)
CLAS	*Comité Local de l'Accompagnement Social* (Local Committee for Social Accompaniment)
DH	Moroccan Dirham
ENCG	*École Nationale de Commerce et de Gestion* (University for Economics and Business Administration)
FOGARIM	*Fonds de garantie des prêts au logement en faveur des population à revenus modestes et/ou non réguliers* (housing guarantee fund for people with low and/or irregular income)
FSH	*Fonds de Solidarité Habitat* (Housing Solidarity Fund)
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INDH	*Initiative Nationale pour le Développement Humain* (National Initiative for Human Development)
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MHUPV	*Ministère de l'Urbanisme, de l'Habitat et de la Politique de la Ville* (Ministry of Housing, Urban Planning, and City Policy)
MI	*Ministère de l'Intérieur* (Ministry of the Interior)
MOS	*Maîtrise d'Ouvrage Sociale* (social contracting)
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NIMAR	Netherlands Institute Morocco
ONE	*Office National d'Électricité* (National Electricity Office)
OFPPT	*Office National de la Formation Professionnelle et de la Promotion du Travail* (National Vocational Training Centre)
PARHIB	*Programme d'Action pour la Résorption de l'Habitat Insalubre et Bidonvilles* (Action Programme for the Elimination of Unsanitary Housing and Shantytowns)
RQs	Research Questions
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SQs	Sub-questions
UN	United Nations
VSB	*Villes Sans Bidonvilles* (Cities Without Shantytowns)
ZUN	*Zone d'Urbanisation Nouvelle* (New Urbanisation Zone; new town)

Glossary of Arabic and French Terms

Bacha	Representative of the Ministry of the Interior at the higher district level
Banlieue	French term for suburb, often meant to refer to high-rise suburbia, characterised by social housing
Bidonville	French term for shantytown; for more details see section 4.1
Cités	Social housing estates in France
Glissement	Dropout quota of targeted population groups within resettlement projects
Gouvernement d'alternance	Moroccan government headed by socialist prime minister Youssoufi between 1998 and 2002
Grands taxis	Shared taxis with normally six passenger seats operating on fixed routes
Habitat non réglementaire (or *habitat clandestin*)	Non-regulated (or informal) housing, that was originally built with durable materials like bricks
Hammam	Public bath
Karyan	Moroccan term for *bidonville*; literally derived from the French word *carrière* (quarry), the location of Casablanca's first *bidonvilles*.
Maisons en dur	Literally meaning solid houses; frequently used in the Moroccan context to refer to the 'formal' city or the opposite of *bidonvilles*.
Marchands ambulants	Mobile street vendors
Medina	Arabic old town
Moul chkara	Literally refers to an owner of a briefcase, which in Darija symbolically describes an investor or a person with money
Mouqef	Day labour market
Mqadem	Representative of the Ministry of the Interior at the block level
Muqataa	Lowest administrative building at the district level
Permis d'habitation	Letter certifying the habitability of a house and its construction according to formal building structures
Petits taxis	Individual taxis operating according to passenger demands within the jurisdiction of a particular city
Qa'ïd	Representative of the Ministry of the Interior at the lower district level
Quartier populaire	Traditional working-class neighbourhood
Recasement	A sites-and-services scheme, meaning the auto-construction of houses on a designated plot of land
Regroupement	Restructuring of *bidonvilles* during the French protectorate
Relogement	Resettlement of shantytown dwellers in apartments
Restructuration	In situ upgrading of shantytowns
Souq	Market
Tiers associé	French term referring to a third-party investor (see also *moul chkara*)
Treporteur	Moroccan term for a three-wheeler (tuk-tuk)
Trames sanitaires (or *trames d'Ecochard*)	Relatively similar to *recasement*; refers more specifically to the modular housing cells developed by Michel Ecochard in Casablanca
Wilaya	Governorate headed by the *wali*
Wali	Representative of the Ministry of the Interior at the regional level (*wilaya*)

Acknowledgements

This dissertation would not have been possible without the support of many different people in and outside academia. First and foremost, I am thankful to the former residents of Karyan Central, the people of Er-Rhamna, Karyan Capitain Montugué, and Karyan Bvd. Moulay Ismail that have opened their doors to three strangers and made them feel welcome. Had these people not opened their doors and had they not shared their very personal experiences, their fears, and their worries, I would not have been in the position to write these lines. I have never experienced such extraordinary hospitality ever before and I will never forget the biscuits, tea, and couscous, the tears and the laughter that have accompanied our talks.

Although I am indebted to all respondents, two persons stand out. From the first day we met, Younes and his family treated me as if I were a family member. The warm-hearted atmosphere in her house in Karyan Montugué greatly helped me to familiarise myself with the field. Without Younes, who introduced me to his friends from Karyan Central, it would have been much more difficult to choose my precise case study. I am also especially grateful to Bouchra, who introduced me to Er-Rhamna, and who tried to orient me and to find a certain structure in the middle of confusing alleys and cul-de-sacs. Without her, I would never have found my way out again. I would also like to thank Boubker Mazoz, Nourredine El-Khattaby, and Abdeljalil Bakkar who introduced me to Bouchra and Younes.

Moreover, my field research would never have worked out as it did without the tremendous support of my two translators, who were actually much more than simply translators or interviewers. Faiçal Marzaq and Zahrat Essawssane Bourhil became experts in the field, were always patient and open, and were able to ask the right follow-up questions at the right moment in time. They formed their own opinions, had critical minds, and although there were difficult moments in time, I could always trust in and rely on them. Although we were all happy, when the interviews were over, it also felt sad to leave you, my friends.

I am also very thankful for the support of my five supervisors, who, although having very different (disciplinary) backgrounds and expectations, have complemented each other in a very productive and fruitful way. Thanks to all of them as well as to the discussants of my seminars at the ISS for their helpful comments that have clearly improved my work. I am particular grateful to Erhard Berner who helped me a lot with his long experience in housing policies and theories and who made it easier for me to find my own approach. I am also very happy that Sylvia Bergh – because of her country experience – was interested in supervising my dissertation at the ISS and that she introduced me to the Netherlands Institute Morocco (NIMAR). Finally, without Wilhelm Löwenstein offering me the opportunity to do a PhD at the IEE at a moment in time, when I was clearly not expecting that at all, the entire project would not have happened.

In addition, I would like to thank Kathinka Melles and my family for supporting me throughout the entire process of my research. Thank you to Said A. for sharing his rich collection of documents about the resettlement of Karyan Central with me. Thanks to the NIMAR, which assisted me with the application for a research permit. Thank you to Amr Khafagy and Salam Alhaj Hasan for helping me with the translation of documents written in Arabic. Thank you to Torben Dedring for his amazing cartographic work and his patience with me. Thanks to all student assistants of the IEE and to Anja Zorob and Gabriele Bäcker for their support related to the joint PhD programme.

Abstract

Since the mid-1990s, the majority of the Moroccan population are living in cities – many of them in informal, self-built shantytowns called *bidonvilles*. After the suicide bombings in the city centre of Casablanca, carried out by *bidonville* dwellers in 2003, the Moroccan government re-enhanced its efforts to tackle the 'problem' of shantytowns by announcing the ambitious programme *Villes Sans Bidonvilles* (VSB, Cities Without Shantytowns). The VSB programme aims to eradicate all Moroccan shantytowns by relocating the dwellers to mostly peripheral, but serviced plots for auto-construction. Following the dominant modus operandi, two households from the *bidonville* together receive one plot of land in the new town. In more than 90% of the cases, they are unable to build the house themselves and transfer this duty to a private third party. The third-party investor builds a four-storey house on the plot and receives in return the two lower floors, while the two resettled households move respectively into one of the upper flats. This allows even poor residents to become owners of a new flat.

This PhD project looked at both process and outcome of resettlement from the perspective of affected people, analysing the specific resettlement project of the 90-year-old *bidonville* Karyan Central in Casablanca. Regarding the process, it asked how social dynamics, local actor constellations, and power structures shape resettlement implementation. Concerning the outcome, it analysed in how far the welfare of people affected by the VSB programme changes because of the resettlement. Methodologically, the PhD thesis compares in an analytical way current living situations in a non-affected *bidonville* and in a resettlement town. The empirical analysis is based on both quantitative and qualitative methods, largely building on a household survey (n=871) as well as on informal conversations, participant observation, document analysis, and interviews with relevant stakeholders. The main field research took place between December 2016 and April 2017. The household survey includes former inhabitants of Karyan Central that were resettled mostly between 2010 and 2011 to the new town Nouvelle Lahraouiyine and residents of the *bidonville* Er-Rhamna, which is similar in size, structure, and functions compared to the demolished Karyan Central.

The results show that satisfaction with the new housing situation depends on various factors beyond housing comfort and is largely shaped by individual needs and former housing pathways. Thus, some residents stressed that they were pushed from the city to the desert, referring to the loss of social networks, urbanity, and centrality. Other residents were appreciative of the move into new houses, hoping that the government would further invest in the development of the new town, which is already marked by multiple forms of neglect. The thesis emphasises that the VSB programme, which, although formally part of anti-poverty and urban inclusion policies, puts a primary focus on the clearance of the *bidonville*. Following a rather narrow interpretation of the right to adequate housing, the VSB programme overemphasises physical housing standards while ignoring aspects of socio-spatial integration. Moreover, various injustices, corruption, and opaque implementation practices have led to homelessness and psychological distress for a considerable number of people – even though affordability was not an issue.

Compte-rendu

Depuis les années 1990s la plupart des habitants du Maroc vivent dans les territoires urbains et quelques-uns ont choisi leurs domiciles dans les bidonvilles – des quartiers informels et auto-construits. Après un attentat suicide perpétré en 2003, commis par des bidonvillois dans le centre-ville de Casablanca, l'Etat marocain a renforcé ses efforts pour résoudre « le problème des bidonvilles », démarrant le programme national *Villes Sans Bidonvilles* (PVSB). L'objective principal du PVSB est l'éradication des bidonvilles dans toutes les villes marocaines en relogeant ses habitants dans des nouveaux lotissements dont la majorité se trouvent dans la périphérie des villes.

Suivant le mode opératoire principal, deux ménages d'un bidonville obtiennent ensemble un terrain à un prix subventionné pour y construire une maison R+3. Dans plus de 90 % des cas, les ménages ne peuvent pas financer la construction eux-mêmes et demandent alors à un tiers associé de construire le bâtiment à leur place. Comme contrepartie, le tiers associé devient propriétaire des deux étages en bas tandis que les deux ménages relogés vont chacun être propriétaire d'un des deux appartements dans les deux étages supérieurs. Si cette méthode spécifique de recasement fonctionne d'une façon idéale, même les ménages les plus démunis peuvent s'installer dans les nouveaux appartements sans rien avoir à payer.

Dans la perspective des habitants concernés, cette thèse de doctorat analyse le processus et les résultats du recasement du bidonville Carrières Centrales à Casablanca en mettant l'accent non seulement sur les habitants relogés mais aussi sur les habitants du bidonville Er-Rhamna qui existe encore. Concernant le processus, la thèse interroge sur les dynamiques sociales, les constellations des acteurs locaux et les structures de pouvoir et comment elles marquent la mise en œuvre du recasement. Concernant les résultats, la thèse pose la question relative à comment le bien-être et les façons de vivre des habitants relogés change à cause du recasement. Quant à l'approche méthodologique, l'auteur a opté pour une comparaison des conditions de vie actuelles sur un site de recasement et dans un bidonville non-affecté. L'analyse empirique est fondée sur un sondage des ménages (n =871) et des méthodes plutôt qualitatives tels que les interviews semi-structurés avec des tiers associés et des ménages non-relogés, l'analyse des documents, l'observation et des conversation plutôt informelles entre Décembre 2016 et Avril 2017. Le sondage s'est adressé aux ex-habitants des Carrières Centrales qui étaient recasés pour la plupart entre 2010 et 2011 à Nouvelle Lahraouiyine et aux habitants d'Er-Rhamna, un bidonville avec une taille, des fonctions et des structures comparables aux Carrières Centrales, maintenant démolies.

La thèse montre que la satisfaction générale avec la situation de logement des ménages relogés ne dépend pas uniquement au confort du nouvel appartement mais est aussi le résultat des demandes et expériences individuelles de logement. D'un côté il y a des habitants qui accuse d'avoir été forcés de déménager de la ville vers le désert où ils manquent notamment les réseaux de voisinage, urbanité et centralité. D'autre côté il y a des résidents qui sont contents des nouvelles maisons mais qui espèrent que l'Etat va continuer à développer la nouvelle ville, sachant qu'il manque des investissements publics. La thèse souligne que l'objectif principal du PVSB – même s'il s'inscrit dans des politiques de lutte contre la pauvreté et l'exclusion urbaine – est avant tout l'éradication rapide des bidonvilles, donnant une valeur secondaire au développement de l'habitat alternatif. En fait, le PVSB suivre une interprétation limitée du droit au logement en mettant l'accent sur la production quantitative des logements sans tenir compte des aspects d'intégration socio-spatiale. En outre, le manque de transparence, la corruption et des injustices dans la mise en œuvre

ont causé la perte des domiciles fixes, des souffrances psychiques et l'effondrement de quelques maisons – même si le système des tiers associés a facilité le financement des maisons de la part des habitants.

Zusammenfassung

Seit Mitte der 1990er lebt die Mehrheit der marokkanischen Bevölkerung in Städten - viele von ihnen in informellen, selbstgebauten Siedlungen, sogenannten *Bidonvilles*. Nachdem im Jahr 2003 einzelne Bewohner eines *Bidonville*s Selbstmordanschläge im Stadtzentrum von Casablanca verübten, verstärkte der marokkanische Staat seine Bemühungen das „Slum-Problem" zu bekämpfen und rief das nationale Programm *Villes Sans Bidonvilles* (VSB, Städte ohne *Bidonvilles*) ins Leben. Ziel des VSB-Programms ist die Beseitigung aller marokkanischen *Bidonvilles* durch die Umsiedlung der Bewohner in Neubausiedlungen, die zumeist am Stadtrand liegen.

Im üblichen Verfahren erhalten zwei *Bidonville*-Haushalte zusammen ein Grundstück in der neuen Siedlung, auf dem sie ein vierstöckiges Haus mit maximal vier Wohnungen bauen dürfen. In über neunzig Prozent der Fälle können sich die Haushalte aber nicht den Hausbau leisten und beauftragen stattdessen damit eine Drittperson (*tiers associé*), die im Gegenzug, nach Fertigstellung des Gebäudes, die zwei unteren Etagen erhält. Die beiden umgesiedelten Familien hingegen werden jeweils Eigentümer einer Wohnung in einer der zwei oberen Etagen. Dieses spezifische Umsiedlungsverfahren ermöglicht es im Idealfall auch armen Bewohnern ohne besondere Kosten Eigentümer einer neuen Wohnung zu werden.

Anhand des noch existierenden *Bidonville* Er-Rhamna und des bereits umgesiedelten und zerstörten *Bidonvilles* Karyan Central in Casablanca beleuchtet die PhD-Arbeit sowohl den Prozess als auch das Ergebnis der Umsiedlung aus der Perspektive der betroffenen Bewohner. Zunächst fragt die Arbeit, wie soziale Dynamiken, lokale Akteurskonstellationen und Machtverhältnisse den Umsiedlungsprozess beeinflussen und bestimmen. Darüber hinaus wird analysiert, wie und wie stark sich Lebensqualität und Lebensweisen der Betroffenen durch die Umsiedlung des VSB Programms verändern. Der Autor wählt dabei einen vergleichenden methodologischen Ansatz, der aktuelle Lebensbedingungen in der neuen Umsiedlungsstadt (Nouvelle Lahraouiyine) mit denen im *Bidonville* (Er-Rhamna) kontrastiert. Empirisch basiert die Arbeit sowohl auf einer quantitativen Haushaltsbefragung (n = 871) als auch auf verschiedenen qualitativen Methoden, wie zum Beispiel Interviews mit unterschiedlichen Stakeholdern, Dokumentenanalyse, teilnehmende Beobachtung und zahlreiche formlose Gespräche im Feld zwischen Dezember 2016 und April 2017. Die Erhebungen der Haushalte beinhalten zum einen ehemalige Bewohner von Karyan Central, die meist zwischen 2010 und 2011 nach Nouvelle Lahraouiyine umsiedelten, und zum anderen Bewohner des *Bidonvilles* Er-Rhamna, das in Struktur, Größe und Funktion ähnlich dem zerstörten Karyan Central ist.

Es zeigt sich, dass Zufriedenheit mit der neuen Wohnungssituation nicht allein vom Wohnkomfort, sondern ebenso von individuellen Bedürfnissen und Wohnerfahrungen abhängt. Auf der einen Seite beklagen sich Bewohner, von der Stadt in die Wüste umgesiedelt worden zu sein, und weisen insbesondere auf den Verlust von sozialen Netzwerken, Urbanität und Zentralität hin. Auf der anderen Seite befürworten Bewohner den Umzug in neue Häuser, wobei sie angesichts bereits deutlicher sichtbarer Formen von Verwahrlosung in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine hoffen, dass der Staat weiter in die Siedlungsentwicklung investiert. Die Arbeit stellt kritisch heraus, dass das VSB-Programm, obwohl offiziell Teil der Politik zur Armutsbekämpfung und städtischer Inklusion, verstärkten Fokus auf die Beseitigung der *bidonvilles* legt. Während Aspekte der sozialräumlichen Integration weitestgehend unbeachtet bleiben, liegt der Fokus des VSB-Programms auf der reinen, quantitativen Wohnraumschaffung was wiederum kaum der eigentlichen Intention des Rechts

auf angemessenen Wohnraums gerecht wird. Darüber hinaus haben verschiedene Ungerechtigkeiten, Korruption und undurchsichtige Umsiedlungskonditionen zu Wohnungslosigkeit, psychischen Erkrankungen und einstürzenden Häusern geführt – und dass obwohl der Umzug für nahezu alle bezahlbar war.

Samenvatting

Sinds het midden van de jaren negentig woont de meerderheid van de Marokkaanse bevolking in steden; veelal in niet-officiële, zelfgebouwde sloppenwijken die bidonvilles worden genoemd. Na de zelfmoordaanslagen in het centrum van Casablanca in 2003, die waren uitgevoerd door bidonvillebewoners, is de Marokkaanse overheid zich nog meer gaan inspannen om het 'probleem' van de sloppenwijken aan te pakken. Hiertoe werd het ambitieuze programma Villes Sans Bidonvilles (VSB; steden zonder sloppenwijken) in het leven geroepen. Het doel van het VSB-programma is om alle Marokkaanse sloppenwijken te slopen en de bewoners te verplaatsen naar grotendeels perifere, maar verzorgde percelen voor zelfbouw. De opzet is dat twee huishoudens uit de bidonville samen één perceel grond krijgen in de nieuwe stad. In meer dan 90% van de gevallen zijn deze huishoudens niet in staat om het huis zelf te bouwen en dragen ze deze taak over aan een particuliere derde partij. Deze investeerder bouwt een huis van vier verdiepingen op het perceel en ontvangt in ruil daarvoor de twee onderste verdiepingen, terwijl de twee hervestigde huishoudens zich elk in een van de bovenste appartementen vestigen. Zo kunnen zelfs arme inwoners eigenaar worden van een nieuwe woning.

Dit promotieonderzoek is gericht op het hervestigingsproject van de bidonville Karyan Central die 90 jaar geleden in Casablanca ontstond. Daarbij is zowel het proces als het resultaat van de hervestiging onderzocht vanuit het perspectief van de getroffenen. Wat betreft het proces is gekeken naar de wijze waarop de sociale dynamiek, de configuratie van lokale actoren en de machtsstructuren van invloed zijn op de implementatie van de hervestiging. Wat betreft het resultaat is onderzocht in hoeverre het welzijn van de doelgroep van het VSB-programma verandert als gevolg van de hervestiging. De methodologie van het proefschrift betreft een systematische vergelijking van de huidige leefomstandigheden in een ongemoeid gelaten bidonville en in een hervestigingsstad. Voor het empirisch onderzoek is gebruikgemaakt van zowel kwantitatieve als kwalitatieve methoden, waaronder een enquête onder huishoudens (n=871), informele gesprekken, participerende observatie, documentanalyse en interviews met relevante belanghebbenden. Het veldonderzoek vond grotendeels plaats tussen december 2016 en april 2017. De enquête is gehouden onder huishoudens bestaande uit voormalige inwoners van Karyan Central die voornamelijk tussen 2010 en 2011 werden hervestigd in de nieuwe stad Nouvelle Lahraouiyine en inwoners van de bidonville Er-Rhamna die qua grootte, structuur en kenmerken vergelijkbaar is met de afgebroken sloppenwijk Karyan Central.

Uit de resultaten blijkt dat de tevredenheid met de nieuwe huisvestingssituatie afhankelijk is van verschillende factoren die verder reiken dan het wooncomfort en dat de tevredenheid grotendeels wordt bepaald door individuele behoeften en eerdere huisvestingstrajecten. Zo benadrukten sommige bewoners dat ze van de stad naar de woestijn waren verdreven en dat ze hun sociale netwerk waren kwijtgeraakt en de stedelijke omgeving en centrale ligging misten. Andere bewoners waardeerden de verhuizing en hoopten dat dat de overheid verder zou investeren in de ontwikkeling van de nieuwe stad, waarin al diverse vormen van verwaarlozing zichtbaar zijn. In dit proefschrift wordt benadrukt dat het VSB-programma formeel weliswaar onderdeel is van het beleid om armoede te bestrijden en sociale insluiting in de stad te bevorderen, maar dat het in de eerste plaats bedoeld is om de bidonville te ontruimen. Vanuit een nogal beperkte interpretatie van het recht op adequate huisvesting wordt in het VSB-programma te veel de nadruk gelegd op fysieke huisvestingsnormen en wordt voorbijgegaan aan aspecten van sociaal-ruimtelijke integratie. Bovendien hebben verschillende vormen van onrechtvaardigheid, corruptie en ondoorzichtige uitvoeringspraktijken

bij een aanzienlijk aantal mensen geleid tot dakloosheid en psychisch leed, ook al was betaalbaarheid geen probleem.

Cartographic Overview



Figure 0-1: At the entry of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Author's picture, March 2017.

1 Introduction

Roughly a dozen kilometres from the city centre of Casablanca, in the southeast of Morocco's economic capital and largest metropolis, next to the cemetery of Al Ghofran, lies the satellite town Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Embedded in the country-wide programme *Villes Sans Bidonvilles* (VSB; Cities Without Shantytowns), it was erected as a resettlement destination for the inhabitants of one of the country's biggest and oldest shantytowns, Karyan Central, located in one of the city's most popular working-class neighbourhoods. Coming from Casablanca, one arrives at Nouvelle Lahraouiyine in front of a big advertisement board, on which the new town's leading developer Al Omrane has written in French, '*Le droit au logement … le droit au bonheur*' ('the right to housing … the right to happiness'). Considering the context of resettlement, the slogan builds on at least three implicit assumptions: First, resettled shantytown dwellers were deprived of their right to 'adequate' housing, which has been included in the Moroccan Constitution since 2011. Second, the new town enables shantytown dwellers to exert their right to housing. Third, moving into 'adequate' housing makes people happy or, in other words, more satisfied with their general living situation.

In principle, the slogan and its three assumptions mirror the objective and structure of this thesis, which aims to analyse the resettlement of shantytown dwellers in Casablanca from a people-centred perspective. Briefly spoken, the thesis questions Al Omrane's slogan by asking the following research questions:

- How do social dynamics, local actor constellations, and power structures shape the resettlement process in Casablanca? (RQ1)
- How and in how far does the welfare of people affected by the *Villes Sans Bidonvilles* programme change because of the resettlement? (RQ2)

In an attempt to find answers to these questions, the thesis first describes current living conditions of shantytown dwellers by using own empirical data. This part of the thesis is closing a crucial empirical gap, as household-level data on the socio-economic life as well as shelter conditions of shantytown dwellers is rare in general and almost completely absent or outdated in the case of Morocco. However, without this data, it is impossible to make statements about whether residents of *bidonvilles* are, in fact, in need of 'adequate' housing, as the VSB programme and Al Omrane's marketing slogan take for granted. Second, the thesis asks whether the applied resettlement implementation process is a suitable way of moving people into an externally defined form of 'adequate' housing, namely homeownership-based apartments. This refers to RQ1, which itself is of critical relevance for answering RQ2. I am convinced that the outcome of resettlement cannot be regarded separately from its process of implementation. Third, it analyses the impact of displacement on livelihoods and living practices of resettled shantytown dwellers, questioning whether moving into apartments in a new town is likely to increase people's welfare, in other words people's satisfaction with their general living situation. Hence, this part answers RQ2 and questions the second and third implicit assumptions of abovementioned marketing slogan of Al Omrane. Thereby, again, it is of critical importance to know about the various aspects of life in *bidonvilles* against which life in the resettlement town could be contrasted. Because of that, this thesis has an empirical focus on living conditions and practices in both still-existing *bidonvilles* and resettlement towns.

The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have stressed the question of access to adequate housing for all as one of today's most pressing development challenges. SDG11 aims to, "[b]y 2030,

ensure access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services and upgrade slums" (UN 2015, 21). Although the SDGs call for the upgrading of slums, in recent years, shantytown resettlement and large-scale housing projects have been on the rise (Buckley et al. 2016a, 2016b; Turok 2016). As a consequence of the proliferation of informal settlements and a related increase in dissatisfaction with past in situ upgrading and housing market reforms (Croese et al. 2016; Werlin 1999), many developing states have again applied a more active role in ensuring people's access to 'adequate' (UNHCR and UN-Habitat 2009) and 'affordable' housing (Bredenoord et al. 2014). Whether it is Brazil's Minha Casa Minha Vida programme, Ethiopia's Integrated Housing Development Programme, India's Rajiv Awas Yojana, or Morocco's VSB programme, the aim is to address the 'challenge of slums' (UN-Habitat 2003) through large-scale, country-wide programmes, often equipped with vast public funds. However, Buckley et al. (2016a, 2016b) warn that these new projects do not differ significantly from past approaches of the 1950s and 1960s, and are thus likely to repeat the same mistakes of earlier social housing projects in the context of growing informal settlements in Latin America and housing shortages in post-war Europe. Most of the new large-scale housing estates develop at the cities' margins, lack spatial integration and public investment, and are largely deprived of opportunities for human development.

First, it seems that the once popular and widely known work of Turner (1967, 1968, 1969), Mangin (1967), and Stokes (1962) on the integrative role and incremental development of informal settlements has – at least in practice – fallen into oblivion. Many states tend to ignore the progressive development of informal settlements, judging them on their visual impression, and consider them rather as a problem that has to be eradicated. Instead of focusing on solutions adapted to varying local contexts, governments tend to opt for standardised solutions such as resettlement, low-cost housing, and increasingly also forced evictions (Plessis 2005). In doing so, governments oversimplify the question of how to guarantee access to adequate housing for all, reducing it to a mere question of physical housing standards. Hence, they disregard the fact that housing is more than four walls and a roof, also reflecting individual choices about the dwelling environment. In other words, and following Turner (1968, 355), judging someone's form of housing by simply looking at its physical standards is inappropriate, because it is only one of several aspects shaping the crucial relationship between inhabitants and the dwelling environment. In fact, slogans like 'cities without slums' and country-wide programmes targeting the eradication of informal settlements – often drafted in the absence of any prior in-depth analysis of local contexts – are running the risk of falling exactly into this trap.

Second, the revival of resettlement as a dominant form of adequate housing policies also seems to reproduce concerns about impoverishment described by Cernea (1997, 1998, 2003) in his theory on population resettlement. Although Cernea is not explicitly focusing on resettlement in the context of affordable housing policies, his work shows how displacement may increase resettled residents' vulnerability to specific aspects of impoverishment – reaching among others from joblessness and homelessness to marginalisation and ruptures of the social fabric. Other scholars would add that in the case of shantytown resettlement, most vulnerable households are likely to drop out of the programme because of gentrification dynamics or affordability problems (cf. Berner 2016; Croese et al. 2016). Following Cernea (2003), governments' focus on resettlement is all too often limited to the clearance of the 'occupied' site (the shantytown). In contrast, the development of the resettlement site (the new town) is often rather a subordinate concern. Resettled people hence often suffer from neglected public services and (transport) infrastructure, facing serious challenges in accessing life-enhancing opportunities. Thus, in contrast to Al Omrane's slogan, seeing resettlement as a way to access 'better' housing and to reach better living conditions and a higher level of life

satisfaction, the theories of Turner and Cernea both warn that resettlement throws back displaced shantytown dwellers on their individual development paths.

Following this, a first research interest lies in the analysis of the VSB programme as an example of the new wave of large-scale affordable housing projects. Does the VSB programme repeat the same mistakes of past social housing projects as Buckley et al. (2016b) indicate? Are the pioneering works of Turner (1967, 1968, 1969), Stokes (1962), and Mangin (1967) still of relevance for understanding and explaining current housing programmes belonging to the new wave of large-scale housing projects? These are first research gaps to be addressed.

Indeed, the brief theoretical reflections put into question whether access to improved housing comfort through resettlement and displacement will automatically lead to better living conditions for shantytown dwellers. However, against all theoretical concerns, this basic assumption is a prominent part of governments' public justification of the renaissance of standardised social housing and shantytown resettlement programmes, of which Morocco's VSB programme is a classic example.

In Morocco, King Mohammed VI in 2004 launched the VSB programme, with the primary objective of eradicating all shantytowns in 85 towns and cities in Morocco. It is justified in the name of ensuring shantytown dwellers' right to adequate housing, fighting urban poverty and exclusion, and promoting human development – similar to Al Omrane's advertisement slogan in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. However, political motivations behind the establishment of the VSB programme are various. One such motivation is the resurgence of state control in shantytowns after some residents executed suicide attacks in the city centre of Casablanca in 2003. This event enhanced the stigmatisation of Moroccan shantytowns as a breeding ground for Islamist extremism and crime (cf. Zemni and Bogaert 2011) and, consequently, triggered the VSB programme following earlier logics of 'emergency urbanism' (Rachik 2002). Another reason is the modernist agenda of King Mohammed VI, who succeeded his father in 1999. Enhancing the international competitiveness of Morocco's cities through the construction of urban megaprojects and related forms of urban renewal has become a significant aspect of the political agenda of the new king (cf. Bogaert 2018). Shantytowns, as the stigmatised symbol of backwardness, and disorder have no place in his modernist national urban vision. Finally, the VSB programme is a tool for reclaiming and redeveloping relatively central urban land, occupied by shantytowns, in exchange for less profitable land at the urban periphery.

The VSB programme is a reference to the predecessor of the SDGs, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which initially adopted the slogan 'Cities Without Slums' from the Cities Alliance. Thus, the main focus is on the clearance of shantytowns, called *bidonvilles* in the Moroccan context. This reminds one of the work of Huchzermeyer (2011), who criticised the carelessly formulated 'Cities Without Slums' initiative for providing the wrong incentives. According to her, the MDGs have led to a revival of evictions in the name of development and, hence, have contributed only little to better living and housing conditions for the urban poor. Indeed, in the context of the VSB programme, in situ upgrading was quickly abandoned. Furthermore, authors such as Le Tellier (2010), in line with Cernea's concerns about population displacement, warn that the development of resettlement towns is rather a means to 'shantytown-free cities' and not a primary objective as such. In consequence, the places to which *bidonville* dwellers are moved materialise the worries of Buckley et al. (2016a, 2016b) concerning the renaissance of large, peripherally located new towns and housing estates (cf. Toutain 2013).

One nevertheless has to keep in mind that many residents of Casablanca's shantytowns are looking forward to moving out of the *bidonville* into what they call '*maisons en dur*.'[1] In fact, many of them are convinced that moving out of the *bidonville* would allow them to escape the stigma associated with and the hardship of the *bidonville*, and to move up the social ladder. In fact, first observations during a first, exploratory field trip in March 2015 suggested that *bidonville* residents criticise the conditions of resettlement, but hardly question the general idea of resettlement. For the majority of *bidonville* dwellers, the wish to move into *maisons en dur* has resulted in a positive attitude towards the VSB programme. However, this should not ignore the fact that the VSB programme and the resettlement of Karyan Central include forced evictions. However, most residents were willing to be resettled voluntarily.

Hence, a certain divergence is evident between the rather critical academic discourse on shantytown resettlement and the positive view of many *bidonville* dwellers in Casablanca of resettlement. In fact, few studies have closely taken into account attitudes and perspectives of shantytown dwellers themselves, or have focused mainly on involuntary resettlement. Most scholars have engaged either in politico-geographic approaches that analyse shantytown resettlement and displacement from a structural perspective at a macro level (cf. Bogaert 2018; Buckley et al. 2016a, 2016b; Huchzermeyer 2011; Patel et al. 2015), focused on land struggles and forced evictions (cf. Berner 1997; Durand-Lasserve 2006; Payne 2005; Plessis 2006), and have regarded resettlement and displacement as a direct consequence of the construction of large development projects such as dams, urban megaprojects and large-scale transport infrastructure (cf. Cernea and Guggenheim 1993; Mathur and Marsden 1998; Termiński 2015). However, few academic studies have engaged in the close analysis of the impacts of shantytown resettlement on displaced households at a micro level, focusing mainly on people's perspectives, experiences and resettlement-induced welfare changes. Following this, I emphasise the argument that it is crucial to analyse shantytown resettlement and affordable housing policies through the eyes of the affected people. This could help to mediate between macro-level critiques of large-scale housing projects, on the one hand, and the willingness of shantytown dwellers to accept resettlement as a solution to the stigma and the hardship of the *bidonville*, on the other. In other words, the question is whether in cases where most people tend to be willing to move, resettled people face the same risks of impoverishment. Are they aware of these risks, and do they accept them because they think that the move into socially respected housing would outweigh the potential challenges of displacement? This is the second research gap to be addressed by the research questions.

The third research interest of this thesis relates to the mode of implementation of resettlement. In the case of Karyan Central, as well as in other large resettlement projects in Casablanca, authorities reinvented existing sites-and-services schemes to address shortcomings of past resettlement approaches (cf. Toutain 2016; Zaki 2013). The perceived shortcomings mainly relate to problems of affordability within sites-and-services projects.[2] In these programmes, *bidonville* dwellers buy a plot of land in a designated area at a subsidised price and must afford the construction of a new house themselves. However, many vulnerable people were not able to afford the construction of an own house according to formal building standards and, hence, occupied building shells or constructed only makeshift houses. Others resold their plots and moved to another *bidonville* (cf. Le Tellier and Guérin 2009, 662). These affordability problems are not unique to Morocco. In fact, they have been observed in many sites-and-services and social housing projects (cf.

[1] The French term '*maisons en dur*' literally means 'solid houses' and is frequently used in the Moroccan context to refer to the opposite of *bidonvilles*, notwithstanding the fact that most houses in the *bidonvilles* are built from solid materials as well.
[2] In Morocco, the French term *recasement* is used to refer to sites-and-services projects.

Berner 2016; Croese et al. 2016; Linden 1986). In Morocco, the new approach builds on the help of third-party associates. Thus, two *bidonville* households together receive one subsidised plot at the resettlement site but, instead of building themselves, transfer the right to build to another private person able to afford the construction of a four-storey house. In exchange, the investor becomes the owner of the two lower floors, whereas each of the two resettled *bidonville* households move into one of the upper-floor apartments. This specific sites-and-services scheme should help to overcome affordability problems and also enable poor households to move to the new site. Furthermore, it should accelerate shantytown clearance and end the proliferation of *bidonvilles*. A few observers have noted that this so-called third-party approach is indeed functioning and has helped to facilitate resettlement in large cities such as Casablanca, notwithstanding some indicated shortcomings (Toutain 2013, 2016; Zaki 2013). However, still no research has analysed the limits and weaknesses as well as the processes related to this new approach in detail. This is the third research gap to be addressed.

Methodologically, this study follows a mixed methods approach. It builds on a representative household survey (n>800) of households that were relocated from Karyan Central to Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, as well as households of the *bidonville* Er-Rhamna. Thus, this study has opted for a comparison of current situations instead of asking resettled residents about their past life in the *bidonville*. To my knowledge, this comparative approach is unique to research on shantytown resettlement. In contrast to a before/after comparison, this methodological approach has the advantage that it avoids bias related to time as well as the glorification or over-dramatisation of resettled dwellers of their past living conditions in the *bidonville*. Most people moved to Nouvelle Lahraouiyine five to six years before the research took place; structural conditions could have changed in the meantime. Moreover, this approach allows for the generation of own empirical household data on living conditions and practices in *bidonvilles*. Such data has been largely absent in Morocco and is of crucial relevance for the quantitative analyses of this thesis. Comparing current situations allows for the first-hand and more holistic observation of living practices in *bidonvilles*, which then could be complemented and triangulated with resettled people's stories of Karyan Central. However, the weakness of the comparison of the current living situation is that it does not allow for a comparison of exactly the same people. Instead, it was necessary to choose a *bidonville* that resembles as much as possible the one demolished. Hence, I chose Er-Rhamna, a *bidonville* of comparable size and comparable socio-economic heterogeneity, with a similar proximity to industries, and located in an urban environment in the district of Sidi Moumen. Although Er-Rhamna is less centrally located and younger than Karyan Central, it allows for the analysis of typical living practices in a relatively big and consolidated *bidonville* and for a subsequent comparison to the situation of resettled people living in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine.

The survey collected quantifiable household data on, for example, expenditures, income, the use of public services, structural housing quality, and access to amenities. Furthermore, it collected demographic and socio-economic data on each household member, including modes of transport, the workplace, perceptions of social life, feelings of isolation, and feelings of security. People were also asked about their satisfaction with the general living situation and with specific aspects thereof (including public services, the house, social life). However, the questionnaire was not limited to quantifiable data, leaving space for comments and open questions. Whenever it was feasible, the interviewers tried to move beyond the structure of the questionnaire and to do more qualitative interviewing concerning specific aspects of the resettlement process as well as of the current life in the new town. In addition to these extended interviews, ethnographic methods such as informal conversations and observations were a major source of information. Between December 2016 and April 2017, I spent four months of field research in Casablanca and conducted the

interviews together with two interpreters who translated directly from Darija[3] to French. Moreover, the methodological approach included qualitative interviews with third-party investors as well as former residents of Karyan Central that had not (yet) moved. The interviews with the first group aimed to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the third-party approach, also from the perspective of the investors themselves. The latter interviews were in particular helpful in securing a better understanding of whether affordability problems could actually be solved through the third-party-approach and which other reasons accounted for the fact that not all residents had moved. Furthermore, these interviews, together with a collection of relevant documents such as contracts, letters, and newspaper articles, were helpful to analyse the shortcomings of resettlement implementation. Finally, data collection included a cartographic analysis and photography to further illustrate similarities and differences between life in shantytowns and life in a new town.

The thesis starts with a discussion of theories of low-income housing and traces the processes of the development of dominant affordable housing policies, mostly in developing countries. This theoretical discussion allows for an understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of different approaches, reaching from social housing to aided self-help and enabling policies targeting the regulatory framework of housing markets. It emphasises a holistic understanding of housing that goes far beyond the mere notion of four walls and a roof, also showing how political logics and justifications of policy interventions may work against a more comprehensive understanding of housing. Furthermore, the theoretical part of this thesis stresses the term 'resettlement', which is often rather used to refer to involuntary population displacement as a consequence of large development projects (e.g. dams) (cf. Asthana 1996). I argue that Cernea's theory on the impoverishment risks of resettlement is also useful for analysing partially voluntary population displacement in the context of affordable housing policies. The theoretical part of the thesis ends with a description of Morocco's historic approaches to affordable housing, which all have had a significant impact on the development of Karyan Central and Hay Mohammadi. Thereafter, I present the methodological approach in detail and show the strengths and limitations of the applied methods (chapter 3). I also discuss in detail why I have opted for the comparison of current situations of both *bidonville* dwellers and resettled residents instead of solely focusing on the latter group. Furthermore, I give insights into my field research experiences, which may also indicate some of the major problems with the implementation of resettlement in the case of Karyan Central.

The empirical part of the thesis starts with a brief analysis of the political planning structures behind the VSB programme. Hence, chapter 4 analyses the multiple and to some extent contradictory objectives of the VSB programme and deals with the existing literature on the political context as well as implementing mechanisms and shortcomings of the VSB programme in general. Finally, it presents the more specific local context of the case study, describing the historic development of Karyan Central and the new town Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Chapter 5 and chapter 6 present the empirical results of the study of Er-Rhamna and Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, both quantitatively and qualitatively. The first empirical chapter first provides the reader with a detailed description of the current situation in a *bidonville* – mostly referring to data from Er-Rhamna, but also carefully reflecting memories of resettled dwellers of Karyan Central. In the second part of this chapter, I focus mainly on the first research question, investigating the challenges, shortcomings, and conflicts within the resettlement process. Specific attention within this part is paid to the third-party approach and the difficulties in defining and reaching those eligible for an own plot in the new town. In the

[3] Darija is the Moroccan dialect of Arabic, spoken by all interviewed people.

second empirical chapter, I investigate the changes and continuities of living conditions and living practices of resettled residents in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. The aim is to answer the second research question and to identify the impact of displacement on the welfare of resettled shantytown residents.

2 Understanding Affordable Housing Policies

In his book on slums in Victorian London, Yelling (1986, 1) remarks that the word 'slum' "carries a condemnation of existing conditions and, implicitly at least, a call for action." Since European industrialisation, the implicit understanding of the term 'slum' as an undesired aspect of urbanisation has led to various political approaches with the aim of fighting the phenomenon of slums. But if there is any 'call for action', how does it appear and by whom should this action be carried out – by the state, by private developers, or by slum dwellers themselves?

In order to elaborate on this question and in order to prepare for the later analysis of the complex programme setting of the VSB programme, this chapter aims to present the theoretical background of slum policy. The chapter first provides an overview of the potential justifications of state (in)action as a consequence of the failure of formal markets, negative externalities of informal housing supply, or based on the recognition of the right to adequate housing. Thereafter, I present the spectrum of policy approaches, reaching from public housing supply to aided self-help and macro-economic policy adjustments (enabling housing markets to work). This overview follows general leading questions about the costs of public interventions and its potential redistributive function. The presentation of forms of government intervention ends with a critique of resettlement approaches that form a main part of the VSB programme.

2.1 Affordable Housing for All – A Call for Governmental Intervention?

The housing question has its roots in European industrialisation. In the mid-nineteenth century, Europe's cities experienced historically unprecedented fast and unplanned population and industrial growth. City planners were not able to adapt cities to these new, immense challenges. Besides chaotic land use patterns and a considerable urban sprawl, one of the major effects of fast and uncontrolled urbanisation was the appearance of a large shortage in adequate housing that mostly affected the urban poor, at that time called the working class. Working class quarters were characterised by overpopulation and a lack of infrastructure and services that resulted in unsanitary and hazardous living conditions. Although such neighbourhoods developed in almost all big European cities, they largely appeared in strongly industrialised areas such as the Ruhr area, Northeastern France, Lodz in Poland, and, of course, in the industrial parts of Great Britain. One of the first analysts of the housing shortage was Friedrich Engels (1970 [1872], 16f) who defined the problem in his essay on 'The Housing Question':

> What is meant today by housing shortage is the peculiar intensification of the bad housing conditions of the workers as a result of the sudden rush of population to the big cities; a colossal increase in rents, still greater congestion in the separate houses, and, for some, the impossibility of finding a place to live in at all.

According to Engels, the assemblage of urban shortcomings called the housing shortage was the indirect consequence of the capitalist mode of production. As capitalists needed to reinvest their surplus capital, the urban land market seemed to be one of the logical destinations. Industrialisation and the growing city population had raised the demand for urban land, which inevitably led to a price increase of land and housing, and made central urban areas a favourable site for land speculation. However, working class housing represented a much less profitable investment in comparison to commercial buildings and high-

end apartments. Consequently, the capitalisation of the city centre required a beautification of urban space that was necessary to attract solvent classes and to maximise investment returns. This logic heavily affected the working class. Investors pulled down their houses in order to widen streets or to replace them by investments that were more profitable.

> The expansion of the big modern cities gives the land in certain sections of them, particularly in those which are centrally situated, an artificial and often enormously increasing value; the buildings erected in these areas depress this value, instead of increasing it, because they no longer correspond to the changed circumstances … They are pulled down and in their stead shops, warehouses and public buildings are erected (Engels 1970 [1872], 18).

The result was an inadequate market supply of housing for the working class and the petty bourgeoisie. They either had to move to the urban peripheries and had to afford daily commutes to their places of work in the central areas, or they had to share their flats or subdivide them to be able to pay the rent and to find shelter in the city. This led to the above-described expressions of housing shortage. Certainly, the most known example of this early capitalist transformation of cities was Paris, where Napoléon's urban planner Haussmann replaced large working-class neighbourhoods by wide boulevards and classicist-style bourgeois housing (chapter 3.5, cf. Harvey 2003) Similar transformations occurred at that time in Vienna, Berlin, and in several British cities – and they continue to take place.

Berner (2016, 102) argues that "in today's 'big modern cities', almost all formal construction is still concentrated in high-end commercial and residential markets, with prevalent speculation and rent-seeking, high vacancy rates, and the occasional bursting of a bubble." Durand-Lasserve (2006) remarks that the current pace of urbanisation in many cities of the Global South has sharpened tensions on urban land markets, which further resulted in an increase of evictions and an increase of 'market-driven displacements'. As a result, the number of people living in shantytowns, squatter settlements, or makeshift shelters has been increasing, and approximately one-third of all urban dwellers in developing countries live in these forms of housing that might be called 'slums'. In sub-Saharan Africa, the region with the highest share of slum dwellers, this affects even every two persons out of three (UN-Habitat 2013, 151).

However, the question arises: Why have formal market mechanisms failed to satisfy the need for adequate housing of an increasing number of urban poor in the urban Global South? Market theory suggests that normal market mechanisms cause an increase of supply after an increase of demand for the same product. Concerning the situation on urban land markets, one would expect increasing building activities as a market reaction to intensified urbanisation and an influx of rural migrants. This is largely not the case, as basic assumptions of classic market theory do not apply to the housing market. Long-lasting legal processes, inflexible land use planning, and the limited availability of land result in a static supply, unable to adapt to shifts in demand. Further specificities such as the immobility of the goods, strong preferences for specific sites, and the strong role of the state in land distribution make clear that the housing market is one of the least efficient markets of all (cf. Baken and Linden 1993, 5). Thus, on land and housing markets, market failure is the norm. This is illustrated by the fact that in most metropolises of the Global South, the house price-to-income and house rent-to-income ratio, the simplest ways to approach housing affordability, are much higher than in developed countries, reflecting strong income inequalities in the respective countries (Majale et al. 2011, 24f). Formal low-income housing offers only very limited opportunities for private

investors, as demanders' maximum willingness to pay is smaller than the minimal compensation requirements of the firms that offer housing (cf. Satterthwaite 2009, 299). Hence, market failure is the outcome of affordability problems on both the demand and the supply side.

On the demand side, insecure income opportunities are among the major reasons for the low affordability of formal housing. In contrast to rising land prices, even real wages in the most prosperous metropolitan areas of developing countries have rather stagnated due to the continuously high influx of new migrants (Berner 2016, 103f; UN-Habitat 2003, 39). Meanwhile, the bulk of the urban population is informally employed – either inside or outside of the formal sector.[4] In South Asia, more than 80%, and in the Middle East and North Africa, still 45% of all non-agricultural employment is informal (Vanek et al. 2014, 1). The numbers are unlikely to decrease, as 85% of all new employment opportunities around the world occur in the unobserved economy[5] (UN-Habitat 2010a, 96). These trends date back to the 1980s, when the employment situation of many urban citizens in developing countries worsened because of the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) of leading international donor organisations. The SAPs reduced formal job opportunities not only in the (oversized) public sector, but also in private import-substitution industries with limited international competitiveness. Many such companies went bankrupt after the SAP had forced countries to cut trade barriers and to open up to the global market. Because of the loss of formal employment opportunities, in particular lower skilled or unskilled workers joined the unobserved economy, where they found new, but less secure, often temporary, and badly paying jobs. Underemployment has become much more visible in the streets of many urban slums (UN-Habitat 2003, 42ff; Davis 2006, 158ff).

On the supply side, inappropriate planning regulations, building standards, and administrative procedures constitute important barriers to affordable housing construction. Such regulatory frameworks, which often date back to colonial times and lack local adaptations, raise not only building costs, but also transaction and operational costs, and impede downmarket trends (cf. Payne 2002; Turner 1967).

> Insofar as such standards are enforceable, they price the great majority of would-be home builders out of the market, and ... they inhibit legitimate, inspected, taxable private investments in low-income housing, whether for rent or for sale (Turner 1972a, 149).

To illustrate this, I borrow some examples from Payne (2002). Planning regulations often keep low densities and floor area ratios, thereby preventing developers from building higher-density housing on the same site, which would be the simplest way to keep prices low even in the case of land shortage. In parallel, many small-scale developers are unable to afford the costs of high building norms and standards. Another example is land use restrictions that prohibit income-generating activities in residential areas, which makes them less attractive for low-income households that need to use their house as their workplace, too. Furthermore, endless administrative procedures lack transparency and increase opportunities for corruption, which raise transaction costs and prevent many private small-scale developers from entering the formal market (cf. Soto 2000). Additionally, inflexible regulatory frameworks do not allow for incremental building processes. While conventional planning requires large initial investments before housing is ready to be used, many of

[4] In this work, following Vanek et al. (2014, 5), I understand informal employment as "all employment arrangements that leave individuals without social protection through their work, whether or not the economic units they operate or work for are formal enterprises, informal enterprises or households." Thus, informal employment should not be confused with poverty, as informal business may generate higher income than formal employment. Furthermore, the applied definition of informal employment also includes illegal activities (e.g. drug selling).

[5] The unobserved economy is a subordinate term; it includes the illegal, shadow, and informal economy.

the urban poor in fact need a reverse planning logic that starts with land occupation and continues with incremental building and servicing activities (Berner 2002, 242; Bredenoord and Lindert 2014, 56; Turner 1967, 179). The results of these processes are well known: Constructors may squat on vacant land and build houses without permission, but with higher densities and at lower prices. Landowners may subdivide their plots and encourage informal building activities, or they may rent out backyard shacks. In fact, "inappropriate regulatory frameworks raise the cost of getting onto the legal housing ladder ... and even accelerate the growth of the unauthorised settlements they were intended to prevent" (Payne 2002, 249).

A second aspect that further contributes to the deficiency of the housing market is the fact that land access in many developing countries is a highly political issue, a manipulated negotiation process, and, finally, a matter of power (cf. Payne 2014; Baken and Linden 1993, 8ff). In many developing countries, a small group of elites – political, economic, administrative, or military[6] – either hold most of the land, or is at least able to control access to land. This makes the land market an oligopoly in which powerful suppliers are able to influence the market following their own interests. This not only increases opportunities for corruption, but elite groups also tend to use insider knowledge, rent seeking and patronage politics in order to maintain their powerful positions and socio-political status. Several well-known examples can be cited of politicians facilitating land access or land regulation in order to get people's votes for the upcoming elections (for the case of Morocco, cf. Zaki 2005, 100ff).

> Attempts to improve access to land by low-income groups clearly need to address the vested interests which seek to reinforce the status quo, and to confront existing legal and regulatory regimes that may work against their goals. ... The more power is concentrated in an elite, the greater its ability will be to inhibit change, or channel it in directions which do not threaten its interests (Payne 2014, 23).

Thus, it is evident that the land price is not the sole product of market mechanisms, but rather the result of a negotiation process constantly manipulated by all actors – not only by elites. In most metropolises of the urban south, urban land hardly remains vacant, and is occupied by squatters. Landowners willing to capitalise their occupied land need to keep in mind the operational costs of eviction. On the one hand, particularly long occupation periods can remarkably improve squatters' negotiation power and protect them from eviction (Berner 2002, 238ff). On the other hand, the same mechanisms may raise the attractiveness of occupied pieces of land: squatted land allows investors to buy it for much less than the market price. If they consequently conclude a favourable deal with the squatters regarding their eviction or compensation, they are able to resell the 'valorised' land at a much higher price. Thus, such developments may enable investors to generate higher profit margins compared to conventional developments, where vacant pieces of land are sold at market prices (Durand-Lasserve 2006, 211).

This leads to third problem related to fostering a formal market supply of affordable housing: the high level of speculation. Baken and Linden (1993, 6) state that "the price of land is determined just as for gold, by psychological factors rather than by its use value." During the last decades, land scarcity and land prices have increased in almost all metropolises of the global urban south. Combined with the abovementioned oligopolistic nature of land markets, this has enlarged the opportunities for land speculation and provoked a market curiosity; an increase in demand may provoke a decrease or stagnation of supply. Landowners tend to hold their pieces of land in reaction to an increase of land prices and prefer to wait for even higher increases and larger profits (Baken and Linden 1993, 6). Several examples show that large house and land

[6] Consider the case of Egypt, where all vacant land by law belongs to the military.

price increases motivate investors to turn towards high-end residential markets or to invest in commercial and office buildings. To make matters even worse, a considerable share of these buildings are nothing more than assets and remain empty either as a way to store capital or as an inheritance. Such investment strategies have largely accelerated the housing crisis in London (Glucksberg 2016). Such patterns do not only occur in the global urban north; in Egypt, about 30% of all housing units remain empty. This is partly attributed to allocation problems and inefficiencies within public housing programmes, but also relates to all forms of land speculation, including property owners that are afraid of renting out their flats at very low, controlled rent prices (Shawkat 2014; Fahmi and Sutton 2008).

A fourth aspect that contributes to the failure of the formal market is the location dilemma: The availability of affordable housing tends to be high where low-cost housing demand is low, and vice versa (Figure 2-1). Considering the abovementioned aspects, affordable housing is most likely to be realised where land prices are low. It is obvious that this is rather the case at more peripheral locations instead of the city centre, where land prices are skyrocketing. However, the highest demand for affordable adequate housing tends to be in central areas. Turner (1969, 509) noted, "Those who cannot afford to commute, or who must spend every free hour looking for jobs, must live very near their sources of employment." In this sense, the average low-income household is rather concerned with the adequate location of the dwelling than with its material standards. Choguill (1995, 407) continues this argument: "Since most jobs in the informal sector are found in the centre of the town, a peripheral location does little more than add to the cost of transport of the project participants and reduces the desirability of the projects for them." As the formal market under consideration of all building standards and planning regulations is unable to provide affordable shelter in central areas, people have no other choice but to search for housing alternatives on the informal market. Following Berner (2016, 104), "The result is the ubiquitous picture of the 'dual' or 'polarised city', the immediate spatial juxtaposition of abundance and misery, skyscrapers and shanties, citadels and ghettos." At the same time, new satellite cities, as they have appeared for example in Morocco and Egypt in order to provide low-cost housing and to relieve existing urban centres, have largely remained underoccupied because of their neglect of existing demands (cf. Stewart 1996).

Thus, the abovementioned aspects allow for the drawing of a first conclusion – that the failure of formal urban housing markets is "systemic, structural and inevitable" (Berner 2016, 104). To make it clear, the various detected market imperfections that accumulate in the failure of formal markets are not the outcome of irrational public and private behaviour, but in contrast result from individual rational logics (Baken and Linden 1993, 10). Therefore, it may be legitimate to call for political intervention, as the formal market shows structural allocation problems in order to serve the needs of the urban poor. This becomes even more obvious regarding the consequences of market failure, namely the spreading of all forms of informal settlements that provoke a range of negative externalities affecting urban economies and societies.

Households require a minimum degree of shelter. If the formal market is unable to supply affordable shelter options due to the abovementioned shortcomings on both the demand and supply side, households have no other option but to bypass the formal market and to search for informal alternatives. In contrast to formal housing markets, informal housing markets have shown to be much more effective in serving the urban poor's housing needs (cf. Linden 1994; Berner 2002; Bredenoord and Lindert 2010). Informal housing is anything but free of charge; however, regarding the low-cost housing supply, the informal market has four main advantages compared to its formal counterpart. First, informal builders are able to provide housing at much cheaper prices, as they ignore official building standards. They build with substandard materials such

as corrugated iron sheets, crude bricks, wooden boards, or plastic; furthermore, they realise much higher densities through limited street widths, the continuous subdivision of plots, or rooftop extensions. Second, self-builders or constructors further keep prices low as they provide a selectable continuum of services and infrastructure. According to individual household demands, this may range from access to a water source to a well-functioning Wi-Fi connection. Third, in order to provide housing close to central sources of employment, informal constructors shift to undesirable locations that are by nature unsuitable for formal market development or may suffer from cities' negative externalities (cf. UN-Habitat 2003, 69f). Such hazardous locations may be swampy riverbanks[7], polluted lands, mountain slopes (cf. Turner 1968, 361), or dumping grounds. Finally, the informal sector allows for more flexibility, starting with incremental construction and ending with the flexible supply of services and utilities described above. This instrumentality takes into account that "the average lower income family seeking a home in an urban environment wants secure land tenure, community facilities, an adequate dwelling, and utilities in that order" (Turner 1967, 179). This early observation underlines that low-income households unable to invest bigger sums of money to purchase a fully serviced home in accordance with all standards rather prefer to develop their homes in a progressive way. The reverse planning logic of Occupation-Building-Servicing-Planning (cf. Bredenoord and Lindert 2014, 57) best fits with the changing and uncertain financial capacities of most urban poor, thus constituting a major advantage of the informal market.



Figure 2-1: The location dilemma on the housing market. Own figure.

However, the logic of informal construction may produce negative externalities that affect the 'formal' city. Although slum dwellers themselves are likely to suffer the most from security, health, or environmental risks in slums, policy makers have always also been concerned with the shared or externalised costs of slum growth. This dates back to the European origins of slum growth:

> The big bourgeoisie is also very much interested in it [the housing question], if indirectly. Modern natural science has proved that the so-called 'poor districts' in which the workers are crowded together are the breeding places of all those epidemics, which from time to time afflict our towns. Cholera, typhus, typhoid fever, smallpox and other ravaging diseases spread their germs in the pestilential air and the poisoned water of these working-class quarters. In these districts, the germs hardly ever die out completely, and as soon as circumstances permit it they develop into epidemics and then

[7] The origins of the term 'slum' possibly refers to the word 'slump', referring to a marshy place, which might be explained by the location of early slums in basements and on muddy soils (Huchzermeyer 2011, 5; Gilbert 2007, 702).

> spread beyond their breeding places also into the more airy and healthy parts of the town inhabited by the capitalists (Engels 1970 [1872], 38).

Besides the wording, it seems there has been little change to what Engels described. Today, health and environmental externalities are still frequently part of discussions about informal settlements in developing countries. Many such settlements lack appropriate sewerage systems and waste management, as well as clean drinking water sources. The example below given by UN-Habitat (2003, XXX) in its report 'The Challenge of Slums' describes some of the consequences and bears a striking similarity to the almost 150-years-older quotation of Engels above.

> Overcrowding in the slum areas of Ahmedabad leads to high levels of waste, making these areas highly pollution prone. In addition, absence of an adequate sanitation network causes sewage to accumulate in open areas. … More than 30 per cent of the population does not have access to underground sewers for waste disposal. Often the drinking water facilities are not at a distance from the drainage sites. This, coupled with the location of slums near the city's industrial areas and their polluting units, compounds the health hazards faced by the slum dwellers. The indices of diseases caused by polluted air or water or both rise rapidly in the slum areas. On the whole, the quality of the local environment is very poor and the population is susceptible to water-borne diseases, malaria and other contagious diseases.

The list of potential environmental externalities is long: The lack of appropriate sanitary infrastructure contributes to the pollution of soils, and thus impacts food safety considering that (peri-)urban agriculture is a common phenomenon in many developing countries. Squatting on fertile soils that would best be suited for agricultural purposes may also negatively affect food security (cf. Davis 2006, 135f). Furthermore, the high densities of many informal settlements are likely to cause high damage in case of fire outbreaks. The illegal tapping of water or electricity supply systems can negatively affect groundwater quality or the electricity supply. Inappropriate locations not only aggravate traffic problems but, together with substandard constructions, also increase dwellers' vulnerability to natural risks such as mountain slides, earthquakes, or floods. Some settlements also appear in ecologically sensitive areas and may disturb fragile ecosystems (UN-Habitat 2003, 69; Ferguson 1996, 172f).

Externalities are not limited to the environment and health. Early interventions in the slums also appeared because of security concerns:

> Many of the established urban elites, viewing this growing ocean of apparently miserable humanity all around them, began, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, to become frightened: of crime, of disease, but above all, of uncontrollable masses in the hearts of their capitals that at any moment might rise in revolution (Doebele 1987, 9).

Slums have always been stigmatised as breeding places of crime and extremism (cf. Gilbert 2007). Constant repression or neglect by the state may increase neighbourhood stigmatisation, foster the marginalisation of its dwellers, and concentrate social problems that may spill over (UN-Habitat 2003, 71; Arnott 2009, 182). In the case of North Africa, security concerns have largely been the main drivers of interventions in informal settlements. Public policy was intensified in order to challenge the influence of Islamist movements as well as in reaction to terror attacks or social unrest such as the bread riots and, more recently, the Arab Spring (cf. Beier 2016; Rachik 2002; Bayat 2007).

In today's developing cities, many governments increasingly fear negative externalities of informal settlements concerning the tourism sector. For the case of Montego Bay, Jamaica, Ferguson (1996) noted that environmental externalities of informal settlements threaten sensitive natural assets that are often of enormous importance for the city's main economic basis, the tourism sector. In other cases, governments fear that pictures of neglected slums as well as their negative externalities will negatively affect the external image of the city. Although supporting evidence is missing, this has motivated governments in many South African and Brazilian cities, as well as in Seoul, to intervene in slums prior to internationally broadcasted events such as the Olympic Games or the FIFA World Cup (cf. Beier and Vilmondes Alves 2015). A different example shows the case of Casablanca, where authorities denied upgrading an informal settlement in situ because of its proximity to the international airport. "To project an image of prosperity and modernity to visitors, officials wanted to replace dilapidated army barracks and haphazard housing with more orderly vistas by relocating residents to apartments two kilometres from Ennakhil" (Arandel and Wetterberg 2013, 143).

The abovementioned diverse aspects of market and government failure have motivated many states to intervene in order to improve an affordable housing supply. However, it would be insufficient to leave out a last, very different and non-economic justification of state intervention, namely a human rights-based approach concerning the right to adequate housing. An increasing number of countries have included the right to adequate housing in their constitutions, and governments have referred to the right to adequate housing in order to justify their renewed interest in large-scale housing programmes (cf. Beier and Vilmondes Alves 2015). Therefore, before the detailed analysis of state interventions, I briefly elaborate on the development of international rights, conventions, and declarations regarding affordable housing.

The right to adequate housing is a basic human right that applies to everyone. It is part of the right to an adequate standard of living, whose recognition dates back to Article 11(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1966, which states that:

> The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right…

The ICESCR entered into force in 1976 as one of the nine core international human rights instruments in support of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. So far, 164 countries, including all North African countries, have signed the ICESCR. This first, very broad recognition of the right to adequate housing was followed by general comments of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) in order to clarify and specify the meaning of adequate housing in 1991 and 1997. CESCR's General Comment No. 4 (1991) primarily defines seven key aspects of the right to adequate housing, namely: legal security of tenure; the availability of services, materials, facilities and infrastructure; affordability; habitability; accessibility; location; and cultural adequacy. Furthermore, it highlights that governments "must give due priority to those social groups living in unfavourable conditions by giving them particular consideration." CESCR's General Comment No. 7 (1997) gives particular attention to forced evictions.

In 1996, 171 signatory parties declared their commitment to the Istanbul Declaration and the Habitat Agenda, both outcomes of the second Habitat conference in Istanbul. Guaranteeing 'adequate shelter for

all' is the first priority listed under 'commitments', as well as under the 'strategies of implementation' of the Habitat Agenda. The Habitat Agenda not only reaffirms the right to adequate housing as a central governmental concern that needs to be guaranteed under the full respect of all other human rights, but also emphasises its comprehensive understanding.

> Adequate shelter means more than a roof over one's head. It also means adequate privacy; adequate space; physical accessibility; adequate security; security of tenure; structural stability and durability; adequate lighting, heating and ventilation; adequate basic infrastructure, such as water-supply, sanitation and waste-management facilities; suitable environmental quality and health-related factors; and adequate and accessible location with regard to work and basic facilities: all of which should be available at an affordable cost. Adequacy should be determined together with the people concerned, bearing in mind the prospect for gradual development (Habitat Agenda, Paragraph 60).

Despite this considerable international attention paid to the right to adequate housing, housing and shelter have only been a peripheral part of the MDGs. The single MDG concerned with such issues aims to achieve a "significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers, by 2020." As Huchzermeyer (2011, 34ff) has noted, the MDGs have failed to stress the comprehensiveness of the right to adequate housing, and rather delivered to many governments simple justifications to demolish a large number of slums in the name of 'improvement'.

The failure of formal markets, negative externalities of informal market supply, and the recognition of the right to adequate housing as a basic human right form the framework for the justification of governmental strategies targeting an improved supply of adequate housing. According to Choguill (1995, 406), they range from the free delivery of public housing units to laissez-faire approaches that do not include more than just some sort of security of tenure (e.g. 'sites-without-services' projects). Both extremes show diametrically opposed intensities of governments' involvement in housing provision. Varying intensities of governmental interventions go back to different governmental perspectives on the housing question: "Governments' approaches to land and housing have oscillated between two extremes, viewing housing either as a human right, or as a commodity like any other" (Berner 2002, 230). This refers back to the wide spectrum of potential justifications and starting points of governmental intervention shown above. Moreover, different strategies reflect different political economies, reaching from market liberal policies that aim to reduce market imperfections to socialist perspectives that rather focus on the equal provision of adequate housing. All of these approaches cause different amounts and types of costs; they also mirror different views on the question whether housing policy should have a redistributive component. Finally, observers have stressed chronological pathways within international housing policies, mainly influenced by colonial powers as well as international organisations such as the World Bank.

2.2 Early Alternative Thoughts and the Construction of Public Housing

Against the background of increasing problems in working-class neighbourhoods, academic observers, governments, and city planners started developing ideas about how to solve housing crises. In Great Britain as well as in France, main drivers of the political debate on appropriate housing policies and urban planning were negative externalities associated with overcrowded 'unhealthy areas' (Garside 1988). Beside demolition practices that are discussed below, suggested political planning solutions first built on Ebenezer Howard's reform concept of a 'garden city' and later on Le Corbusier's plea for functionally segregated city

planning. With increasing social and financial pressure, through major adaptations and because of technological innovation, both urban utopias have paved the way for large-scale public housing construction in almost all European cities after the Second World War.

To start with, socialist reform thinking largely influenced a range of British town planners and architects to draft urban utopias based on what Engels called the abolition of the antithesis between town and country. The most prominent example is Ebenezer Howard's concept of the 'Garden City' that is a synthesis of several earlier utopias, combined with unique financial and planning pragmatism (Batchelor 1969, 184f). 'Garden cities' should merge the advantages of the city and the countryside, being self-sufficient, surrounded by a green belt, and publicly owned, the latter based on Howard's suggestion to afford construction and maintenance through a cooperative-like society that would be able to buy land and build the houses. These independent new 'cities' should provide space for residents of any kind of social classes without surpassing a maximum limit of 32,000 inhabitants (Batchelor 1969, 185; Heer 1985, 37ff). The 'garden city' idea quickly spread across Europe and to North America, while deviating more and more from the original principles of self-sufficiency and public landownership (Batchelor 1969, 199). In Great Britain, Howard's ideas majorly influenced the decision to promote suburbanisation (garden suburbs) and decentralisation instead of large scale slum clearance à la Haussmann (Garside 1988, 30; Bodenschatz and Harlander 2010, 307). For two reasons, this was thought to alleviate the conditions in inner-city slums: "Some who lived in slum areas would move out. ... Many who remained behind, might nevertheless benefit from the additional, better quality lodgings released by those moving out through the process of 'filtering up'" (Garside 1988, 27).

This strategy shows governments' predominant thinking about the housing question since the start of industrialisation to at least the Great War: Their belief in the self-regulatory processes of the market. "It was assumed by all governments that the demand for housing should be met by the private market and that individual families were responsible for solving their own housing needs" (Priemus 2012, 412). In many European countries, private entrepreneurs constructed low-income housing for their workers, either because of altruistic motivations or for economic reasons, and were concerned about the productivity of their workers (cf. Flood 2012). Until the end of the First World War, more direct governmental intervention in the form of public housing was rare; however, it occasionally happened in for example in France, Germany, Sweden, and Portugal. Thereafter, governmental housing construction increased remarkably, but soon, as a consequence of the Great Depression, it decreased again (Priemus 2012, 412f).

After the Second World War, social pressure and the housing shortage largely increased. In the United Kingdom, the early hope to achieve better housing conditions for the working class through a push for suburban urbanisation and the subsequent filtering-down process showed little success. It became more and more clear that formal markets failed to guarantee adequate housing for all. Because of that, the United Kingdom and most other European countries increasingly opted for off-market housing policies – most prominently public housing construction. After first priority was assigned to economic recovery, housing developed from a private good into a collective project – an essential part of the modern industrialised welfare state that provides everyone with access to the advantages of industrial wealth accumulation (Lévy-Vroelant et al. 2008, 41). Wassenberg (2012, 445) calls the three decades succeeding the end of the Second World War the "golden age for social housing."

Universal definitions of social or public housing do not exist, as most countries have developed rather specific systems. Nonetheless, the term 'social housing' in general applies to "housing aimed to provide homes for with a weak negotiating position on the housing market, such as low-income households, physically or mentally disabled, ethnic minorities, immigrants, and asylum seekers" (Priemus 2012, 410). Flood (2012, 401) adds that "public housing is by definition owned by the government, and its construction is normally financed from the public purse." Yet, in recent years, private capital has become much more important as many governments sold large parts of their housing stock to private companies. The essential feature of social housing, however, mostly remains to be various forms of public subsidies including housing allowances, subsidised construction and finance, as well as rent control (cf. Whitehead 2008). Thus, social housing always carries a redistributive component, using taxpayers' money to fill the gap between rent costs and rents paid. Therefore, social housing has always been a preferred option of leftist and socialist governments.

There are more reasons for the "golden age of public housing" besides the remarkable increase of housing shortages caused by the war as well as the influx of migrants. The public housing era was also the product of the new significance of urban planning, new Modernist planning ideologies, and technologies. One of the major promoters of Modernist architecture was Le Corbusier, a Swiss architect that called for a transformation of the dense and compact nineteenth-century city into a modern city adapted to the industrial society. In 1928, a group of avant-garde architects around Le Corbusier founded the International Congresses of Modern Architecture (CIAM) to promote Modernist architecture as a way to solve urban crises and to guarantee access to decent housing for the urban poor. In addition, it pushed for more *planned* development, emphasising the socio-political power of urban planning. CIAM's final document, 'Athens Charta', opposed low-density suburbanisation and, instead, promoted functional segregation within the city. The 'functional city' sought to separate workplaces from residences through the construction of spacious green belts and parks. In order to attain space for these developments, CIAM advocated the building of high-density apartment blocks (Mumford 1992, 392ff). Moreover, the character of modern architecture as well as technological progress allowed for cost-effective housing industries of scale that, according to CIAM, would be the only possibility to guarantee affordable housing for all. This pragmatic view of housing production became more and more detached from Le Corbusier and his initial emphasis of aesthetic Modernist architecture (Crasemann Collins and Swenarton 1987, 155f). This had also an impact on the 'garden city' concept. Initially thought of as a reformist concept combining rural and urban advantages with socialist ideas, the Modernist turn transformed the 'garden city' into an ideological blueprint for new town construction. Although Howard's ideas largely contributed to the promotion of new towns, many of them constructed after the Second World War in order to relieve existing urban centres instead failed to ensure important aspects such as self-sufficiency, limited growth, and, in particular, the cooperative idea (Heer 1985, 46ff; Merlin 1971, 248; Drakakis-Smith 1981, 131ff). In fact, during the implementation process of many large-scale social housing projects, the influence of both functionalist planning and 'garden city' ideals was mostly limited to the projects' peripheral 'green' location and mono-functional design (cf. Wassenberg 2012).

Besides the turn toward Modernist architecture and the broad recognition of state-led urban planning as a necessary tool to solve urban crises, the post-war rise of social housing was the result of a remarkable fall in production costs. On the one hand, this accounts for low interest rates and, on the other hand, for new construction technologies such as system building, prefabricated construction, and high-rise building techniques (cf. Flood 2012). Housing estates not only represented the building ideal of the Fordism era, but also

reflected an egalitarian welfare state utopia opposed to the class divide during the early years of industrialisation. The provision of social housing mainly targeted the social advancement of industrial workers (Wassenberg 2012, 445f). In socialist countries, social housing was the ultimate form of housing, offering a maximum of equality and a minimum of costs. In France, the construction of *villes nouvelles* (new towns) and large-scale housing estates, so-called *grands ensembles*, served the purpose of housing a vast number of mostly migrants that had not found adequate housing and that had erected shantytowns in almost all of the bigger French cities. During the post-war period, public authorities bulldozed these settlements and replaced them with social housing at the urban peripheries, where land prices were low (Lallaoui 1993, 47, 70).

However, during the 1970s, when housing shortages had mostly disappeared, the common positive perception of the new modern and spacious apartments changed into the dominant negative image, seeing them as "monotonous, uniform, dull, and small" (Wassenberg 2012, 447). This is mostly due to an increase of wealth and the diversification of housing demands, an increase of housing choices, and social transformations captured under the terms 'individualisation' and 'fragmentation'. When the middle class started to move out, it left living spaces for more vulnerable social classes. Meanwhile, growth rates slowed down, and public budgets increasingly came under pressure. Governments had to limit public financing of social housing and started to sell large parts of their housing stock either directly to the occupants (e.g. in Great Britain) or to large-scale private companies. This diminished the existing number of social housing units and strengthened the concentration of 'problematic populations' within the remaining housing stock. Thus, social housing had become the destination of a growing class of vulnerable people suffering from unemployment, social exclusion, and low skill levels. Additionally, the marginalisation of social housing has become a self-reinforcing process supported by high degrees of stigmatisation. Riots such as those in France in 2005 and in Stockholm in 2013 have reinforced political concerns about the development of these neighbourhoods. Therefore, the rehabilitation and even demolition of former Modernist housing estates have become a major aspect of European urban policy (cf. Wassenberg 2012; Morris 2012).

The development of new forms of urban planning and, in particular, social housing also reached the Global South, first through direct colonial influence and later either through local urban planners educated in the West, or the direct influence of western planning 'experts' and consultants. However, it took some time until social housing became a reality in the Global South. Colonial powers were initially rather concerned with building cities for themselves – complete new cities (e.g. Dodoma, Yaoundé) or extensions to existing city cores (e.g. Tunis, Algiers). Following strict policies of segregation, most colonial powers did not allow indigenous people to live in the colonial cities. In the French colonies of North Africa, Le Corbusier has had much direct influence on the development of colonial cities. Although he admired Islamic Mediterranean urban design and supported the restoration of *medinas* (old towns), Le Corbusier also advocated strict urban segregation between local people and Europeans. The separation of both types of urban planning – the narrowness and density of *medinas* versus the wide boulevards of European cities – would mean accepting cultural *differences*. Abu-Lughod (1980) later used the term 'urban apartheid' to describe similar colonial planning practices in Morocco. Indeed, as expressed by Le Corbusier's plans for Algiers, ensuring domination and control by the colonial authorities were essential parts of his colonial urbanism, too. The conservation of *medinas* also followed economic rationalities linked to tourism (Çelik 1992).

Low-cost housing played almost no role during the early colonial era. However, as the low-cost workforce of indigenous people was needed in the cities' factories, governors tolerated the appearance of squatter

settlements offering low-cost housing to indigenous people, therefore keeping the labour costs at a minimum (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1988, 63ff). But 'tolerated' meant not installing infrastructural facilities that would have represented a silent recognition of the informal city (Davis 2006, 53). Instead, colonial powers controlled them with a strong hand and through restrictive policies while trying to avoid the emergence of a 'dangerous class' that would be likely to revolt (Zaki 2007, 308). By looking back, indeed, the origins of many independence movements (e.g. Morocco) lie in the densely populated squatter settlements. This fear of social unrest, perceived environmental and health risks, the accelerating rate of urbanisation, and a more and more disturbing housing shortage forced colonial powers to rethink the widespread neglect of squatters (Doebele 1987, 9; Harris and Giles 2003, 170). Thus, British and French colonialists carefully started to build low-cost public housing with the aim of socially stabilising developing countries and providing shelter to the local population living in spontaneous settlements (Harris and Giles 2003, 170f; Coquery-Vidrovitch 1988, 68ff). The CIAM not only provided the ideological background (Crasemann Collins and Swenarton 1987), but in some cases even directly influenced colonial urban planning approaches to affordable housing. For example, in Casablanca, former Corbusian associates suggested resettling *bidonville* dwellers into Modernist houses adapted to local architectural forms and cultural realities (Mumford 1992, 409).

At first, these social housing projects remained occasional incidences. During last years of the colonial era and the early years of independence, the common perception of slums had slowly shifted away from being the product of absolute segregation and colonial city planning to becoming regarded as a temporary but necessary phenomenon of modernisation and industrial growth that would eventually disappear through economic growth. Hence, governments rather followed laissez-faire approaches, and social housing only slowly scaled up. In contrast, many governments sought to decelerate urbanisation and restricted access to urban areas through either preventive migration controls or reactive forcible relocations of people living in unauthorised housing to rural areas (Drakakis-Smith 1981, 116ff). During the 1950s and 1960s, considerable social housing construction in developing countries only developed in Latin America, in small city-states such as Hong Kong and Singapore, or through socialist influence in the Middle East (Ward 2012; Drakakis-Smith 1981; Soliman 2012; Doebele 1987). In Latin America, they were merely a product of the ISI (import substituting industrialisation) programmes, mainly aimed at housing urban workers or linked to forced evictions of shantytown dwellers. Moreover, social housing construction showed considerable characteristics of Tokenism, concentrated on highly visible flagship projects (e.g. the construction of 85 *superbloques* in Caracas), or built according to expensive Western state-of-the-art design (e.g. the Havana del Este scheme in Cuba) (Ward 2012, 560; Drakakis-Smith 1981, 124ff). In the Middle East, social housing construction was a major product of socialist influence that spread from Nasser's Egypt to the rest of the region. It occurred in almost all countries from Morocco to Jordan and primarily addressed the middle- and low-income groups in industrial centres (Soliman 2012, 349). Later, in the 1970s, programmes also appeared in other developing countries such as Nigeria, Kenya, Malaysia, or Thailand (Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1989, 107).

In the Middle East, this practice largely disappeared in the late 1960s, when the war with Israel attracted most political attention and capital (Soliman 2012, 350). However, also in other developing countries, social housing never reached a sufficient scale to be considered a real alternative to unauthorised self-built housing. The major reason for that was the high amount of costs. As mentioned above, building standards often lacked necessary adaptations to local contexts, which made formal housing a costly business. The need to import many construction goods further raised the costs and prevented governments from building larger

numbers of units. In many cases, the difference between construction costs and the maximum rent poor households were able to pay was so large that governments had to redefine poverty lines in order to avoid exorbitantly high subsidies (Harris and Giles 2003, 174f; Drakakis-Smith 1981, 123ff; Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1989, 106ff). Hardoy and Satterthwaite (1989, 37) conclude, "Public housing projects are politically useful as tangible proof that the government is doing something but the impact on the problem is minimal and most of the limited allocation of funds end up benefitting the middle class."

In the few cases that housing provision reached the poor, social housing also faced severe criticism from the demand side (cf. Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1989, 110f). Certainly, the most-known critic was architect John F.C. Turner, who was against the idea of social housing due to being convinced that this was inappropriate to the housing needs of the urban poor. Turner (1968, 354) argued that the ineffectiveness of conventional public housing is "mainly due to ignorance of residential needs and priorities and to the consequent misunderstanding of the urban settlement process." Although peripheral public housing may have met building standards, it hardly considered people's needs and financial capacities. Many dwellers were unable to afford costs for the provided services and daily transportation from peripheral sites of social housing to their workplaces in inner-city areas. Turner (1969, 510) noted, "By dislocating the '*chômeur*'[8] –by divorcing him from his opportunities– or by loading the wage-earner with a mortgage, the conventional project acts more often as a barrier than as a vehicle for social change." The next section will further elaborate on Turner's critique and his suggestion for housing the urban poor.

However, before returning to Turner, it is worth mentioning that the idea of social housing has survived and has recently experienced some sort of renaissance. Since the mid-2000s, new large-scale public housing programmes have appeared in many developing countries (Beier and Vilmondes Alves 2015; Buckley et al. 2016b; Croese et al. 2016). Some examples are the 'My House, My Life' programme in Brazil, 'Breaking New Ground' in South Africa, new town projects in Angola, and, of course, the VSB programme in Morocco. Reasons for the revival of large-scale housing programmes are twofold. First, social housing has again become an attractive option to many governments, as standardised greenfield projects[9] are easy to plan and implement and visibly demonstrate public action. Croese et al. (2016, 241) interpret it as a turning away from the enabling principles that sought to reduce states' direct involvement in housing provision and which has contributed only little (or less visibly) to the construction of formal housing. Second, large-scale housing programmes seem to offer the chance to boost the national economy in a Keynesian way through considerable state investments (Turok 2016, 235). However, in contrast to early public housing projects, these new, rather supply- than demand-driven housing megaprojects are more directly influenced by private interests and private means of financing. Governments have often transferred construction and house promotion tasks to private developers and concentrate on the provision of subsidies, which, however, remain largely ineffective in facilitating access to formal housing among low- and middle-income groups (cf. Buckley et al. 2016a; Croese et al. 2016). As private developers gain more influence over planning processes – also because of potential clientelistic relationships with governments – large-scale housing policies are hardly integrated in broader urban development agendas. Most of the emerging housing programmes have a single focus on the provision of low-cost, standardised houses, also because leading actors prioritise large quantities instead of being concerned with the quality of the housing projects, in particular the spatial and socio-economic integration of the new neighbourhoods (Beier and Vilmondes Alves 2015; Croese et al.

[8] Unemployed person.
[9] Greenfield developments refer to new developments built from scratch on formerly unbuilt land.

2016; Turok 2016, 235). In fact, they concentrate on the construction of four walls and a roof, but hardly take into account that the idea of the right to adequate housing goes far beyond this narrow interpretation (UNHCR and UN-Habitat 2009). Based on these observations, many scholars fear that the new mass housing projects will simply repeat past mistakes of social housing, as analysed by Turner, Stokes, and Mangin already in the 1950s and 1960s. Buckley et al. (2016b, 207) again worry that "the approach undertaken will do very little to address the housing challenge," but rather will lead to the construction of underoccupied or even vacant 'ghost towns.' Pointing to the deconstruction of 'innovative' post-war housing estates in the United States and Europe, Buckley et al. (2016a, 120) further fear that social problems are shifted towards a different form of housing without adequately addressing past failures of post-war housing estates (cf. Wassenberg 2012). This critique is also prevalent in Morocco, where authors such as Le Tellier (2009a, 59) and Bogaert (2011, 724) report the fear that the VSB resettlement will imitate the French *banlieues* with all its problematic aspects.

2.3 The Idea of Aided Self-Help

Former colonial powers and international organisations soon recognised that massive public housing construction would be too costly to become an effective means to provide affordable housing to a large share of the population in developing countries. Consequently, international agencies started to promote aided self-help approaches that sought to provide external financial and technical assistance in order to enable households to build or improve their own houses. Approaches range from so-called sites-and-services to in situ support. While the latter comprises technical and financial upgrading without relocation, the first refers to land provision that intends to direct self-build activities to specific locations where it is easier to keep minimum standards and to provide services (Bredenoord and Lindert 2014, 56). Many developing countries already made first experiments with aided self-help during the 1950s and 1960s – in parallel to social housing projects (Harris and Giles 2003, 176ff). This 'mixed message' of early international housing policy is evident in the case of Morocco, especially in Casablanca. From the 1940s on, the French not only built public housing, but also offered empty serviced plots, so-called *trames sanitaires*, where new migrants were allowed to erect their own houses (Zaki 2007, 309).

Although governments already experimented with self-help, this strategy became most successful through the promotion thereof by leading academics, most prominently Turner (1968, 1967) and Mangin (1967). They were among the first to argue that slums should be seen as integral parts of cities and not as isolated urban 'aliens': "The basic problem of the slums is not how to eradicate them, but how to make them liveable" (Turner 1969, 526). This argument had developed steadily as a response to rising criticism of (peripheral) public housing programmes and slum clearance schemes. It was Stokes (1962) who first distinguished 'slums of hope', characterised by poor but improving conditions, and 'slums of despair', describing deteriorating settlements. Many authors used this concept by equating 'hope' to owner-built shantytowns and 'despair' to overcrowded inner-city slums as well as quickly deteriorating public housing. However, Stokes' concept saw the 'slum' as something beyond material standards, rather linked to socio-economic opportunities. This allowed him to conclude that "slum clearance – should it continue to produce the same sorts of results– may deter the elimination of slums. This is the paradox of today's efforts" (Stokes 1962, 194). Briefly spoken, this is the essence of early critiques of public housing on which Turner and Mangin based their plea for aided self-help approaches. Instead of imposing housing on people and sticking to external

building standards and habits, governments should recognise the importance of the dwelling environment, promote the self-build capacity of the urban poor, and tolerate incremental construction processes. "Thus, rather than being seen as a negative static condition, slums may undergo transformation over time" (Owusu et al. 2008, 189).

Turner (1968, 356) identified three major functions of the dwelling environment that are crucial drivers of individuals' housing decisions: location, tenure, and amenity. First, the urban poor who cannot afford long daily commutes need to settle in close proximity to their sources of income. Second, they search for security of tenure that holds even in situations of extreme economic uncertainty that does not allow regular payments for rent or credit. Third, households need shelter that protects them "from hostile elements – whether climatic or social" (Turner 1968, 356). Although these might be universal functions, every household acts as a utility maximiser and identifies its own priorities based on its specific needs and socio-economic limitations. Therefore, the individual decision in favour of a specific dwelling best reflects the needs of the household living in it. It is impossible to judge the usefulness of a dwelling solely by looking at the material standards and without taking into account the relationship between the inhabitant and the habitat (Turner 1977, 64). Turner (1972a, 154) concluded that housing cannot simply be imposed on people, but that people are the best judges of their own housing needs. Consequently, dwellers need to have control over the building process – the freedom to build.

Turner's idea of the freedom to build offered a new, people-centred perspective to the idea of self-help that had been promoted early on by international organisations mostly because of its cost efficiency as compared to public housing (Harris 2003, 253). In fact, Turner's almost anarchistic ideas about people's control over the building process delivered the ideological justification for the World Bank to promote the withdrawal of the state from active housing provision. Compared to social housing, the state's function in self-help approaches may be limited to its supportive and complementary role in order to provide land, services, infrastructure, or microfinance schemes (Davis 2006, 71f; Pugh 1995, 63f). By the early 1970s, the World Bank thus became the most influential advocate of self-help strategies not only because of Turner's influence, but largely because of the financial advantages of self-help approaches and their compatibility with governments' increasing need to save scarce resources (Ward 2012, 563). Behind the World Bank's promotion of self-help was the so-called affordability-cost recovery-replicability paradigm that predicted that housing could be made affordable without subsidies for public housing. With pilot projects, the Bank wanted to prove that affordability is achievable through innovative approaches. This would facilitate cost recovery by the beneficiaries, which, in short, would trigger more private investment (replicability) (Pugh 1995, 64; Mayo and Angel 1993, 54).

Before I present the two major types of aided self-help, namely sites-and-services and in situ upgrading, it is worth noting that, in fact, large parts of the cities in the developing world *are* self-built (Bredenoord and Lindert 2010, 281). However, the understanding of aided self-help must not be confused with laissez-faire approaches. Indeed, "builders usually need help" (Harris 2012, 304). This help may come from family members and friends, but "at some stage of the incremental building process most self-builders will also commission parts of the construction activities to informal building contractors or to craftsmen who are part of their social network" (Bredenoord and Lindert 2014, 56). Aided self-help, however, refers to practices in which external stakeholders such as the government or non-governmental organisations (NGOs) assist such processes of construction. "Assistance can take a variety of forms, including advice and training in management and construction, finance, and the provision of land and materials" (Harris 2012, 304). This

may happen in the form of preventive interventions before informal settlements do appear (sites-and-services), or in the form of ex-post housing interventions (in situ upgrading).

During the early 1970s, the World Bank started to push for projects called 'sites-and-services'. It is quite paradoxical that Turner's ideas about the 'freedom to build' have led to the promotion of sites-and-services schemes by the World Bank, because Turner's critique of people's limited control over the building process did not only refer to public housing, but included his earlier experience with state-aided schemes in Peru as well (Turner 1972b; Harris 2003). In fact, these early forms of aided self-help did not look much different from what was later promoted through the term 'sites-and-services'. In this sense, Harris (2003, 263) calls Turner "an unwitting, because unwilling, architect of sites-and-services." The paradox of Turner's influence mainly refers to the design of sites-and-services schemes. In principle, these programmes sought to replicate informal squatting and incremental development processes "through the provision of land, services and, in some cases, modifications of building standards … to allow for a bottom-up process of shelter development" (Mitlin 2012, 580). Moreover, the project officials granted land titles that either were leased or sold at moderately subsidised prices (Choguill 1995, 405). The World Bank thought this would allow for cost recovery or even moderate gains and subsequently would lead to high rates of 'replicability' (Mayo and Gross 1987, 304). From the perspective of the government, the advantage was to direct migration flows in advance, which would avoid negative external effects from informal squatter processes. Thus, sites-and-services offered the fortunate chance to combine the restoring of urban planning control with a reduction of public spending and Turner's claim for more self-building opportunities (cf. Linden 1986, 15ff).

Indeed, sites-and-services projects foster self-building; however, self-building does not equal Turner's 'freedom to build'. In practice, many sites-and-services schemes retain a high level of building standards. This is due to governments' fear of building formally planned settlements that do not look much different from the unwished informal settlements. Linden (1986, 58) notes, "Governments do not want to create the impression that they build slums." The result is a remaining high level of costs that increases either public spending or makes self-building and maintenance unaffordable to many low-income households. Thus, the threshold of access to the projects remains (too) high for the urban poor (cf. Harris 2003, 256; Choguill 1995, 406f; Payne 2002, 249; Linden 1986, 57ff; Mayo and Gross 1987, 316ff). Other major problems of sites-and-services relate to their location. Because of high land prices and the cost recovery target, many governments have preferred to allocate sites in peripheral locations. This has caused much reluctance from the demand side, as many problems related to peripheral locations once identified by Turner remain significant (cf. Linden 1986, 60; Choguill 1995, 407).

Thus, it seems logical that many plots in peripheral sites-and-services projects have remained vacant (Berner 2002, 232). Where governments have been willing to address these problems through the provision of more central plots of land, people better off than the intended target groups have taken over plots and houses. High pressure on the housing market and high land prices in central areas motivated many beneficiaries of subsidised plots to resell their housing property at market prices. Price increases that occurred in the short run after the official allocation of new building land and in the long run when former peripheral land became central further fostered such processes. In other cases, new property owners started to subdivide their plots in order to rent out parts of it. This conflicts with governments' building standards (e.g. densities, floor area ratios, etc.) and puts formal infrastructure such as water and electricity supply systems under pressure (Doebele 1987, 12f; Linden 1986, 60; Choguill 1995, 407). In this sense, sites-and-services fail to achieve the intended imitation of incremental building processes, as the development of market prices

does not follow the developmental sequences of squatter settlements. Berner (2016, 109) notes, "To start incremental development *after* the steep price increase through land conversion and servicing is an absurd undertaking" (original emphasis retained). Moreover, it has become much more difficult to find appropriate undeveloped sites due to increasing urbanisation rates (Werlin 1999, 1523).

From the perspective of the World Bank, sites-and-services schemes proved in many ways to be still too costly to reach cost recovery and replicability. Mayo and Gross (1987, 328) considered this problem mainly a question of subsidies. In many projects, subsidies remained high in order to make projects affordable for low-income households, without giving up most building standards and despite high land prices. This led to write-downs in land value, the selling of plots and houses below market prices, and artificially low interest rates. Finally, many sites-and-services projects were part of resettlement approaches, which were hardly different from earlier approaches to social housing. Still, people had to leave their places of residence and their established networks and were forced to move to sites away from their sources of livelihood (Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1989, 44). In summary, the sites-and-services approach did not succeed, as these projects did not remarkably lower the threshold of access to adequate housing for the urban poor. In Turner's words, they have instead continued to restrict individuals' 'freedom to build' and continued to *impose* housing *on* people.

The World Bank soon started to rethink its sites-and-services approach. The suggested solution in order to overcome the main shortcomings of sites-and-services was in situ upgrading. Obviously, this was not about an abandonment of the aided self-help approach, but concentrated on mitigating problems related mostly to cost recovery, land conversion, and location. Satterthwaite (2012, 206) gives a useful definition of upgrading:

> Upgrading is a term given to measures to improve the quality of housing and the provision of housing-related infrastructure and services to settlements that are considered to be … 'slums' or that developed illegally… The scope of the upgrading varies from some minor improvements – for instances, some communal water taps, paved roads, and street lighting – to comprehensive improvements to the housing and good-quality infrastructure … and services… Upgrading may also include the provision of legal tenure of the land to the occupants.

Although such approaches have appeared from the late 1960s onwards, their implementation was only accelerated through World Bank support and as a further development of sites-and-services (Ward 2012, 564). If sites-and-services had been a step in the right direction, trying to duplicate incremental building processes, upgrading presented a step further by legitimising 'illegally' constructed settlements (Satterthwaite 2012, 206f). In fact, upgrading seemed to accept the opinion of several authors who saw squatter settlements as a progressively developing part of modernisation processes. Through a continuous consolidation process based on economic growth and successful labour market integration, 'slums of hope' would integrate into the 'formal' city (Stokes 1962; cf. Mangin 1967; Turner 1968; Frankenhoff 1967). Upgrading strategies sought to accelerate such consolidation processes. According to Martin (1983, 53) upgrading carries the major advantage that it avoids resettlement, keeping the existing self-built housing stock, social and economic networks, as well as established community structures. From the perspective of the government, the push for upgrading mainly resulted from the hope to accelerate consolidation processes, to reduce external costs from already-existent informal settlements, and to reduce further public spending on housing (Ward 2012, 564; Werlin 1999, 1524).

Practice again showed mixed results. First, many upgrading schemes include resettlement as well, because they impose external standards on existing neighbourhoods. This means that buildings have to be demolished in order to allow, for example, street widening or the instalment of adequate infrastructure (cf. Le Tellier 2009a, 63). In other cases, in situ upgrading is even impossible due to the settlement's hazardous location (Werlin 1999, 1526). However, what is most striking is the fact that upgrading strategies have hardly succeeded to avoid market-related shortcomings of sites-and-services schemes. Upgrading has also increased land prices, which made such settlements much more attractive for better-off groups. Reselling and re-renting activities are still frequent and, especially in combination with formal security of tenure, are likely to provoke gentrification dynamics (Payne et al. 2009, 449; Berner 2016, 110f; Doebele 1987, 12f; Davis 2006, 82ff). Besides, informal communities continued to produce negative externalities such as environmental degradation, although upgrading took place. Furthermore, the financing of maintenance is difficult, as many households are either unable or unwilling to pay for services and infrastructure. If land tenure is part of upgrading processes, it is often problematic and conflictual to intervene in existing complex tenure systems, a major characteristic of many informal settlements (Werlin 1999, 1525ff; Martin 1983, 73ff). Additionally, many upgrading projects were unable to reach intended cost recovery as well, because it has been difficult to apply the 'user pays' principle linked to public services and maintenance (Werlin 1999, 1527ff). However, upgrading has certainly become the major tool of affordable housing policies in developing countries, although this might be the result of a lack of alternatives. Berner (2016, 110) concludes, "If neither governments nor the private sector can produce affordable housing, there is no other policy option than to improve the deficient outcomes of informal development." Therefore, more recently, many authors have sought to improve common approaches to upgrading, discussed in the next section.

Thus, aided self-help has a mixed legacy. Certainly, aided self-help presents a step forward, if one thinks of the modelling of incremental approaches within the sites-and-services approach and the recognition of certain informal settlements intended to be upgraded. However, there is a range of common points of critique. From a rather Marxist perspective, the importance of market-related constraints in both sites-and-services and upgrading projects is striking: Unlike classic public housing, where governments intended to bypass the market, aided self-help projects rather present an intervention *within* the framework of functional (informal) markets. As such, self-built housing is not simply a *home*, but remains a *commodity good*, which is likely to be traded on markets at rational exchange values (cf. Linden 1986, 62; Burgess 1978). Thus, such interventions are unlikely to "transcend capitalist relations of production and exchange … and to bring [housing] into the range of most low income groups, given a static or worsening inequality in the distribution of income" (Burgess 1985, 278). Therefore, Marxist critique has frequently blamed aided self-help strategies for allowing governments to keep minimum housing budgets instead of improving the living conditions of the poor (cf. Davis 2006, 70ff).

However, the World Bank highlighted different shortcomings of aided self-help projects. Because of limited cost recovery and replicability, aided self-help schemes have rarely been scaled up to become a real solution regarding the growing number of informal settlements. There were almost no incentives for strengthened private sector involvement, which could help to reach a larger number of the urban poor (Mayo and Angel 1993, 54f). The Bank concluded that the project-by-project approach is 'too narrow' and subsequently turned its attention to whole-sector development in housing and in the urban economy – the enabling approach (Pugh 1997, 96). Another factor pushing for changes in the Bank's lending practices was that a lack of housing finance remained a major constraint to many of the urban poor aiming to improve their homes (Jones and Datta 1999, 12f). There are other common points of critique within the two types

of aided self-help; poor administration, high degrees of bureaucracy, and limited governance capacities might be the most important to mention (cf. Linden 1986, 52ff). Inefficiencies in the public sector have provoked the debate on 'good governance' that has mainly affected the enabling approach discussed in the next chapter.

2.4 Enabling Housing Markets to Work

During the early 1980s, the World Bank shifted away from directly funding sites-and-services and slum upgrading projects. In order to address inadequate housing supply on a larger scale, the Bank started to prioritize the improvement of macroeconomic housing frameworks through the promotion of policy reform and institutional changes. Again, policy makers questioned the role of the state and the costs of governmental intervention on housing markets, and the focus shifted towards establishing better market performances and more private sector engagement. The target of this policy shift has become its name: *enabling housing markets to work*. Slum upgrading and sites-and-services have not disappeared, but may be revisited and embedded within broader enabling strategies and are no longer funded through direct loans of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Instead, the World Bank believed that the establishment of liberal macro-economic structures, 'good governance', as well as the promotion of housing finance systems would result in greater market efficiency and subsequently would lead to improved access to housing for the urban poor through some sort of 'trickling down' (cf. Baken and Linden 1993, 2f; Pugh 1995, 66). Mayo and Angel (1993, 51) describe the enabling approach in the following way:

> The Bank will advocate the reform of government policies, institutions, and regulations to enable housing markets to work more efficiently, moving away from the limited, project-based support of public agencies engaged in the production and financing of housing. Governments will be advised to abandon their earlier role as producers of housing and to adopt an enabling role of managing the housing sector as a whole. This fundamental shift is necessary if housing problems are to be addressed at a scale commensurate with their magnitude – at a scale adequate to improve substantially the housing conditions of the poor – and if the housing sector is to be managed as a major economic sector.

In practice, increased competition on the supply side and greater financial capacities on the demand side would provoke downmarket trends that subsequently benefit the urban poor. To reach these goals, the enabling approach sought to promote housing finance systems targeting the filling of the affordability gap. Moreover, the World Bank promoted the deregulation of housing and banking markets, pushing inter alia for lower building standards, tax reform, and flexible interest rates. Priority was assigned to effective property rights development (land titling), the enhancement of housing finance schemes, and the promotion of home ownership. Thereafter, public money or loans may be used to invest in infrastructure and to spur private engagement in housing, with priority assigned to home ownership and mortgage (micro-)finance – even for people with low revenues (e.g. Mayo and Angel 1993, 64ff; Baken and Linden 1993, 3; Ferguson et al. 2014, 41ff; Gruffydd Jones 2012, 775ff).

What were the reasons behind this policy shift? One important reason has been mentioned above – the limited success of sites-and-services and slum upgrading, in particular the fact that they did not reach the replicability target. The second reason was the fact that the financial situation of many developing countries had worsened and caused higher dependence on international lending institutions such as the World Bank

and the IMF. These organisations themselves were largely influenced by a political shift towards neoliberalism that took place in many developed countries during the 1980s. In order to fulfil the preconditions for funds, many developing countries saw no other choice but to adapt to the political dogmas of international organisations. They started to implement strict austerity policies (structural adjustments) that sought to restrict public interventions and to reduce public spending. These policies directly affected the housing sector: "The Bank will try to bring about structural policy changes through a 'policy dialogue' on the performance of urban land and housing markets, the role of the government and the like" (Baken and Linden 1993, 3). As mentioned above, the World Bank and the IMF increasingly criticised the 'hidden costs' (e.g. subsidies, land provision) of slum upgrading and sites-and-services schemes (Jones and Datta 1999, 13) as well as excessive state regulations, bad governance, and fixed interest rates (Pugh 1995, 66).

In comparison to the earlier role of Turner, it was the Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto who delivered academic legitimacy to World Bank's enabling ideologies in the late 1980s (Gruffydd Jones 2012, 776). Soto (2000, 1990) believed that slum dwellers are not poor per se. Instead, incompetent state systems drive people into informality, which impedes them from using their capital in a productive way. In fact, people in informal settlements would hold 'trillions of dead capital' that simply needs to be activated through land and property titling. The idea promised a simple and, in particular, cheap way to get rid of the problem of slums through the large-scale allocation of property rights and further restrictions to state interventions. From the World Bank's perspective, this sounded extremely promising, as it best complied with neoliberalism and the promoted austerity requirements (Satterthwaite 2009, 305; Davis 2006, 81).

However, Soto's ideas have been sharply criticised (e.g. Payne et al. 2009; A. Roy 2005, 152f; Davis 2006, 79ff). Although the importance of secure tenure is nowhere doubted, the reduction of complex problem structures to a mere question of housing titles is considered to oversimplify decisive aspects of low-income housing. Practice has shown that large-scale titling projects based on home ownership have not succeeded in increasing the wealth of the urban poor. Rather, they enforced disparities between the 'more' and the 'less' poor, between owners and renters, through means of re-selling or re-renting the land and by pushing out the most vulnerable dwellers. A. Roy (2005, 152) argues that a major shortcoming of Soto's idea is the fact that it simply implies the legalisation of wealth, but not its redistribution. According to her, the approach would ignore the heterogeneity of poor communities. Berner and Phillips (2005) criticise the further withdrawal of the state as a way to leave the urban poor alone with their shelter problem. Instead, self-help should always remain a complement to state interventions and not an alternative. Payne et al. (2009, 453) have criticised the fact that land titling has been favoured by many programme designers because it allows for its use as collateral in accessing formal credit. Indeed, property titling was considered to be a key condition to enable housing markets to work and to push for the 'financialisation' of slum upgrading (Gruffydd Jones 2012). In this way, formal security of tenure based on credit has rather reached insecurity of tenure through a further acceleration of gentrification processes and market-driven displacements of the urban poor. Most recently with the US subprime mortgage crisis in 2008, the sole focus on loan-financed property for the urban poor has faced increasing criticism by authors such as Arnott (2009, 175) and Payne et al. (2009, 443f). The credit risk may not only impair tenure security of the urban poor, but could also affect the housing market as a whole.

During the 1990s, the enabling approach opened up to reform thinking concerning the role of local governments, community participation, and innovative tenure systems. Although it had become generally accepted that the role of governments should not be about providing housing directly, but rather about correcting

market failures and enabling housing markets to work, observers were increasingly aware of the fact that a total retreat of the government would be counterproductive. The mere support of housing finance and macro-economic reforms alone did not stimulate sufficient private initiatives (Smets et al. 2014, 3). Several international organisations concluded that local governments should not be seen as the problem, but rather as part of the solution. Therefore, international organisations should emphasise the promotion of decentralisation and 'good governance'.

From the part of the World Bank, the Post-Washington Consensus in the late 1990s marked one important step towards the re-strengthening of the role of governments:

> The 'Post-Washington Consensus' […] recognized the important role of governments in regulatory economic policy. While the so-called 'first generation' of neoliberal reforms aimed to stabilize and liberalize the national economies of developing countries […], the 'second generation' of neoliberal reforms […] aimed at reforming and strengthening governing institutions (Bogaert 2013, 43).

Another important international event was the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Besides the widely recognised promotion of the term 'sustainability', the Rio Conference also acknowledged the central role of local governance through the idea of the Local Agenda 21 that brings together civil society, the private and the public sector at the municipal level. Governments and international donors should promote the inclusion of community-based organisations (CBOs) and NGOs in planning and implementation processes. With direct reference to housing, the Habitat Agenda and the Istanbul Declaration, proclaimed at the second Habitat Conference in Istanbul in 1996, follow these principles of 'good' and local governance, while strengthening the importance of the enabling approach:

> We adopt the enabling strategy and the principles of partnership and participation as the most democratic and effective approach for the realization of our commitments. Recognizing local authorities as our closest partners, […] we must, within the legal framework of each country, promote decentralization through democratic local authorities and work to strengthen their financial and institutional capacities in accordance with the conditions of countries, while ensuring their transparency, accountability and responsiveness to the needs of people, which are key requirements for Governments at all levels. We shall also increase our cooperation with parliamentarians, the private sector, labour unions and non-governmental and other civil society organizations with due respect for their autonomy (UNCHS 1996).

As shown above, the shift to local 'good governance' implies a stronger commitment to community participation. All abovementioned international agendas call for participation as a key principle of development projects. Related to housing, authors such as Payne (2002, 260), Muraya (2006, 127), and Choguill (1995, 411) argue that in order to enable housing markets to work for the poor, it is as important to know about local housing markets' particularities as to involve communities directly in the design of any slum upgrading project. In particular, this is the case in projects where the relocation of dwellers is unavoidable. The authors agree on the fact that the success of slum upgrading largely depends on planners' willingness to listen to people as a way of understanding local needs, capacities, and particularities. Meaningful community participation that is likely to enhance legitimacy and the acceptance of interventions even goes beyond 'listening to beneficiaries' to their inclusion in decision-making processes (Berner and Phillips 2005, 18).

Today, most donor organisations require the inclusion of a variety of stakeholder groups in order to grant funding. However, the actual extent of participation may differ considerably. At the one extreme, there might be what Arandel and Wetterberg (2013) call an 'authoritarian approach' that prioritises technical solutions and, at the maximum, includes the 'opportunistic' or 'obligatory participation' of some NGOs

(Milbert 2006, 313). At the opposite extreme, Arandel and Wetterberg (2013) describe the 'empowerment approach' as a way for communities to participate in all planning steps. Choguill (1995, 411ff), quite comparable to Turner's claim for more building autonomy, even advocates the promotion of more autonomous community development from below. Choguill (1995) warns that housing should not be seen as separate from the general development process: "Without a comprehensive approach which will lead to income generation and better jobs for the poor within the community, accomplishments within the housing urban development field are likely to continue to be disappointing." However, there are also limits to community participation and local governance. Milbert (2006, 311ff) for example worries about the financial difficulties of local governments and the emergence of clientelism and corruption in slum upgrading. From a practice perspective, Arandel and Wetterberg (2013, 146) emphasise that community empowerment is not only cost and time intensive, but that such projects also need to reflect on internal hierarchies and cleavages in communities as a challenge to success.

Most observers have welcomed the World Bank's reforms of the enabling approach, including the recognition of the importance of government interventions. Based on these reforms, many authors have developed further concepts to improve the performance of upgrading as well as sites-and-services schemes. Whereas early aided self-help approaches rather presented an 'ad-hoc' intervention in the housing market, newer approaches aim to understand dynamics of informal markets. Linden (1994) argues that it is necessary to bridge the divide between informal and formal land market systems because, in the past, informal systems have proved to be much more effective than any formal initiative in providing shelter to the urban poor. Consequently, Linden (1994) suggests that governmental initiatives should imitate the activities of informal developers. In particular, this means allowing for incremental, long-term developments that best fit with the flexible capacities and insecure livelihoods of many slum dwellers. In the same sense, Smets et al. (2014, 11) suggest an "incremental affordability approach, which entails the incremental financing of smaller, short-term loans, [that] should be applied alongside incremental building practices." Also Berner (2002, 242f) argues that it is necessary to learn from informal markets while calling for a "truly enabling approach" that is based on effective security of tenure.

It is widely accepted that security of tenure is the basic condition for any long-term investment in the dwelling environment from the side of the dwellers. Without adequate security of tenure, hardly any homeowner would invest in his/her own property or the dwelling environment. Moreover, studies have shown that security of tenure also impacts on participation in community development programmes and upgrading projects (cf. Siemonsen 2015). However, several authors such as Payne (2005), Durand-Lasserve and Royston (2002c), and Doebele (1987) criticise the ineffectiveness of many programmes targeting security of tenure, which mostly refers to the single focus on home ownership and *de jure* security of tenure. As shown above, conventional projects have rather benefited the middle classes and have not contributed to a decrease of slums. Durand-Lasserve and Royston (2002c, 251) even see a contradiction between 'ensuring access to land for all' and 'enabling the housing market to work'. For this reason, and opposed to Soto's plea for house ownership, many authors call for more innovative policies as a way of guaranteeing security of tenure for the urban poor against the background of scarce land resources and increasing land prices. Doebele (1987, 18f) argues in favour of community land ownership comparable to the land cooperatives in Ebenezer Howard's 'garden city'. Also Satterthwaite (2009, 303) advocates for collective leasing as a way to ensure individuals' mobility on the one and collective tenure security on the other hand. Gilbert (2016, 178) especially criticises the high number of unoccupied flats in many growing metropolises as well as missing governmental initiatives with the aim of stimulating private rental activities. Payne (2005, 137) finds that

> secure tenure can take a variety of forms, from a simple moratorium on relocations and evictions, to temporary occupation licences, communal or individual leases, community land trusts, communal ownership, customary tenure, etc. The duration of such tenure forms may be short in some cases, or almost permanent in others. They may provide the option of extension or upgrading to more formal tenure systems over time, or compensation for investments made.

Innovative tenure systems take into account that security of tenure is needed not only to improve existing slums, but also to avoid the appearance of new forms of unsanitary housing, as observed in many conventional titling projects. They acknowledge that conventional formal security of tenure based solely on home-ownership is not the urban poor's first priority. What they need first is a home close to their sources of living – whether this implies de jure or de facto security of tenure is of lesser priority. The urban poor's sources of livelihood tend to accumulate in central urban areas where land markets are under severe pressure. To ensure adequate protection from eviction, it is therefore necessary to go beyond conventional forms of land titling, including for example communal land ownership or temporary lease contracts. In fact, more variety in secure tenure combined with long-term, incremental planning designs acknowledge that housing cannot be seen as separate from the socio-economic realities of its dwellers. Therefore, Payne (2005, 137) believes that the key objective of secure tenure "should be to provide adequate security and maintain or increase access by the urban poor to locations where they can increase their incomes." To be clear, this is not about housing defined by building standards, but about housing as a means to progressive socio-economic (self-)development.

In summary, since the 2000s, the generally accepted best practice in terms of affordable housing policies is participatory upgrading based on enabling strategies, as promoted by UN-Habitat (2003, 132). Smets et al. (2014, 4) concretise that best practice sustainable urban and housing development strategies need to include three basic principles: multi-disciplinarity; partnership between the public, private, and civil sector; and the active involvement of inhabitants in decision-making processes as basic condition for sustainable solutions. They highlight the importance of comprehensive approaches that stretch beyond housing and infrastructure improvements towards capacity building, 'good governance', long-term project designs, and incremental affordability schemes. However, projects should always be adapted to the specific needs of particular targeted groups, as "uniform solutions do not exist" (Lindert et al. 2014, 401).

2.5 Resettlement Strategies

Resettlement practices have been part of almost all types of housing policies, including slum upgrading. Nonetheless, in development studies, the term 'population resettlement' has been applied mostly in the context of dam constructions or other large-scale development projects that imply population displacement. It has also occurred in the context of disaster prevention and climate change adaptation policies. In the context of affordable housing policies, the term resettlement is less frequently used (Hooper and Ortolano 2012, 278; Patel et al. 2015, 233). Related scholarly work discussed in the previous sections did focus on the effects of social housing and sites-and-services. However, it is worth using the term resettlement instead of 'adequate' or 'affordable' housing policies in the context of this work. The term 'resettlement' underlines that the VSB programme targets the relocation and displacement of entire communities as a primary objective. Although many inhabitants are looking forward to moving into apartments, the VSB resettlement projects include forced evictions as well. The relevance of using the term 'resettlement' is further emphasised

by the fact that in recent years, many authors have observed a renaissance of forced evictions and of mass social housing projects, including resettlement (cf. Buckley et al. 2016b; Cernea 2003; Croese et al. 2016; Plessis 2005; Spire et al. 2017).

Resettlement projects consist of the demolition of existing neighbourhoods as well as the eviction and displacements of dwellers to another place. However, a range of neighbouring concepts exist that might result in some confusion regarding the usage of the terms. Resettlement in the context of housing policies has two distinctive features: First, it requires the direct or indirect involvement of the state. Thus, resettlement practices are a subset of the broader concept of residential displacement, which may be the product of natural disasters or armed conflicts – without the involvement of the state. Second, resettlement always presupposes alternative shelter options. Hence, resettlement goes beyond forced eviction or slum clearance, as these concepts do not necessarily include alternative housing for relocated dwellers. Many clearances take place by simply demolishing people's homes and forcing them to return to their 'rural places of origin' (Smart 2012; Goetz 2012). In this context, de Wet (2008) speaks about 'disemplacement', meaning multiple and repeating forms of eviction and displacement as a result of people finding no place where they are able (and allowed) to sustain their livelihoods.

In contrast, resettlement is tied to complementary forms of affordable housing policies such as sites-and-services schemes, public housing, or even in situ upgrading that requires temporary alternative housing. However, resettlement may include forced evictions as well. Common to many resettlement strategies is top-down planning, either from private or public landowners (cf. Patel et al. 2015, 233). However, the degree of voluntariness varies and may range from forced evictions to voluntary, community-based agreements (UN-Habitat 2003, 131). De facto all resettlement operations are the product of negotiations characterised by heterogeneous actor interests and power. Even if actors argue that resettlement is a mere technical solution, it always carries a strong political rationale (Artur and Hilhorst 2014; Bankoff and Hilhorst 2009). Resettlement tends to be more likely in countries with a strong (authoritarian) government and a lack of adequate regulatory protection (Smart 2012, 14; Goetz 2012, 352). Resettlement strategies often address supposed negative externalities of informal modes of urban production (e.g. impacts on tourism, public health, or security), but also development projects, infrastructure construction, and the hosting of international events cause resettlements (cf. Asthana 1996; Goetz 2012; Plessis 2005; Termiński 2015, 124ff). It has also become a powerful political instrument in the context of climate change adaption and disaster prevention (cf. Artur and Hilhorst 2014; Karaman 2014).

Authors often refer to the urban transformation of Paris under Napoléon (Elloumi et al. 2011)as the origin of eviction and resettlement strategies with regards to low-income housing (cf. Harvey 2008; Davis 2006). In mid-nineteenth century Paris, urban blight and ongoing class struggles motivated numerous wealthier urban dwellers to move out of Paris' central quarters, leading to the creation of inner-city slums (Jordan 1995, 91ff). In December 1852, when Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte became the Emperor of the Second French Empire, he immediately used his new authoritarian power to start a vast urban renaissance programme that was directed by Baron Haussmann. Besides urban restructuring, the massive investments in the building sector and in Paris' urban infrastructure also sought to solve the economic crisis that affected the city at that time. The deprived situation of a rising number of unemployed workers had led to revolutionary protests through which the ruling elites were challenged. Haussmann's urban renaissance programme was a chance to provide them with jobs (Harvey 2008, 25).

Haussmann started reshaping the city through massive demolitions of central working class neighbourhoods, a new street layout, and the construction of broad boulevards flanked by new classicist, bourgeois quarters. He paid pivotal attention to building details such as building height or the uniform and aesthetic design of facades (Jordan 2004, 89). Beyond that, his radical transformative practices that later become famous under the term 'Haussmanniation' severely aggravated the housing situation of the urban poor. The demolitions and the beautification of central Paris led to a sharp increase in rent and land prices. In Haussmann's Paris, there was no longer place for affordable housing. Working-class households had to face the housing problem alone and had no other choice but to find housing at the periphery of the city, where a number of shantytowns emerged. His plans did not foresee any alternative housing, but tolerated informal constructions at the periphery (Harvey 2003, 193f; Jordan 2004, 100, 113).

Haussmann's concepts inspired several European city planners such as Hobrecht in Berlin or Cerdà in Barcelona (Bodenschatz and Harlander 2010, 300) and still continue to be tempting to urban planners in developing countries seeking simple solutions for their urban miseries (Davis 2006, 95ff). During the 1960s and 1970s, forced eviction of slum dwellers used to be common practice (Doebele 1987, 9). On the one hand, governments hoped that simple evictions would eliminate negative externalities of informal urbanisation and would have a deterrent effect on potential migrants. On the other hand, they also aimed to keep building land for profitable development projects. Similar to Haussmann's approach, such practices targeted the establishment or conservation of 'beautiful' (colonial) cities, home to a small group of elites. Additionally, they were only rarely tied to social housing programmes or other forms of alternative housing (Drakakis-Smith 1981, 120f; Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1989, 41ff).

Although other forms of social housing have appeared since then, forced evictions with or without alternative housing options have continued to take place throughout the entire world (for an overview, cf. Schechla 2014). Some observers even note a revival of forced evictions. Plessis (2006, 180f) writes, "In the context of globalisation, forced evictions have seemingly become an accepted part of the development process, in spite of the fact that they clearly constitute a human rights violation." The reasons have hardly changed. Justified in the name of development, forced evictions may target the beautification of the 'world-class' city, the realisation of more profitable developments on the same site, the removal of hazardous quarters, disaster prevention, or the demolition of neighbourhoods that might present a risk to the power of ruling elites (cf. Artur and Hilhorst 2014; Berner 2002, 230; Cernea 1988, 6; Karaman 2014; Olds et al. 2002; Plessis 2005; Termiński 2015, 83ff). Neo-Haussmannian projects such as the construction of the Royal Avenue in the *medina* of Casablanca (Berry-Chikhaoui 2010), the resettlement of informal settlements in South Africa and Brazil in the context of mega-events such as the FIFA World Cup (Huchzermeyer 2011), and the demolition of run-down council estates in the southern city centre of London (Lees 2014) are just some examples of an increasing number of displacements. In the context of North Africa, the growing influence of Islamism in informal neighbourhoods has largely provoked displacements. For the case of Cairo, Bayat (2007, 586) writes, "If the *ashwaiyyat*[10] were regarded as the fundamental locus of extremism and Islamism, then undoing them — that is, upgrading or destroying these entities — was expected to ameliorate the situation." As such, Bayat (2007, 586) discloses the simplistic logics behind state-led displacements, in which state actors are tempted to assume that the eradication of problematic (stigmatised)

[10] Egyptian form of informal settlements literally meaning 'random' settlements.

neighbourhoods would equal the eradication of social challenges. This has become a dominant leitmotif of resettlement strategies – not only in North Africa and the Middle East.

In the developing world, the reintroduction of the term 'slum' has also contributed to the re-increase of forced evictions (Arabindoo 2011; Gilbert 2007; Huchzermeyer 2014). In 1999, the UN as well as the World Bank launched their common initiative, Cities Alliance, calling for 'cities without slums' with the aim of improving the lives of slum dwellers. One year later, the aims of the campaign were incorporated into the MDGs and more precisely described in UN-Habitat's (2003) report 'The Challenge of Slums'. Although the favoured approach of UN-Habitat and the World Bank participatory upgrading, many governments used the carelessly formulated slogan 'cities without slums' and its implicit notion of achieving 'slum-free' cities as a way to justify large-scale demolitions of slums by their commitment to the MDGs (Arabindoo 2011; Huchzermeyer 2011, 9ff). Moreover, the aim to produce slum-free cities fits well within the context of global competitiveness and the aspiration for world-class cities, where in situ upgrading is becoming an exception. Reflecting on informal settlement policies in South Africa, Huchzermeyer (2010b, 26) remarks that "a competitive city is one that portrays modernity in its fullest sense and does not show signs of informality. It is hostile to environments that emerged informally, even if these can be legalised and serviced." Governments may fear that globally broadcasted pictures of poor housing conditions scare off potential tourists and investors. Consequently, slogans such as 'cities without slums' encouraged governments to promote national development success and modernity by pointing to the number of *eradicated* slums (see sections 4.1 and 4.2). This is especially evident when countries receive great international attention through hosting events such as the FIFA World Cup (Huchzermeyer 2011, 47ff).

Scholarly work on the consequences of resettlement often build on the conceptual work of Cernea (1988, 1993, 1997, 1998, 2003), who had developed and monitored the World Bank's resettlement guidelines over a considerable period of time. Cernea (1997, 1998) developed the risks and reconstruction model in order to determine the risks of impoverishment of resettled populations. He highlights the poverty risks of displacement and argues that "preventing impoverishment must be regarded as the central issue in development-induced population displacements and relocations" (Cernea 1998, 43). His model lists eight specific impoverishment risks of displacement:

- Landlessness (the loss of land as a productive asset, which is rather relevant in rural contexts);
- Joblessness (the loss of wage employment and customer bases);
- Homelessness (inadequate temporary accommodation and structurally bad-quality housing);
- Marginalisation (families sliding on a 'downward mobility' path);
- Increased morbidity and mortality (serious declines in health as a result of social stress, insecurity, psychological trauma, and relocation-related illnesses);
- Food insecurity (forced uprooting increases the risk that people will fall into chronic undernourishment);
- Loss of access to common property and services; and
- Social disarticulation (tearing the social fabric and existing patterns of social organisation) (Cernea 1997, 1998).

Based on this model as well as own empirical observations, Cernea (2003) further argues that classic economic compensation mechanisms have proved to be ineffective in preventing the impoverishment of displaced populations. Besides various reasons for frequent undercompensation, classic mechanisms do not

take into account the time dimension of resettlement. Therefore, Cernea (2003, 43) calls for complementary development-oriented investment resources that "enable the uprooted displacees to re-establish themselves productively and improve their livelihood." Thus, if resettlement is unavoidable, projects must be comprehensive, going beyond the mere question of housing or economic compensation. Schuh (1993, 59) argues "that the relocation project should not focus just on relocating people, but on establishing a new basis for development." This supports Cernea's key message, which is that mitigating and preventing the risks of impoverishment through displacement can only be achieved with strategies combining resettlement *with* development. In other words, resettlement predominantly focuses on the clearance of the site, whereas the development of resettlement sites, meaning comprehensive investment in new towns, is only of lower priority to the implementing authorities.

Cernea's model deals with involuntary resettlement only. It was developed in the context of large development projects (e.g. the construction of dams or transportation infrastructure), often located in poor rural areas, and has not explicitly dealt with the resettlement of informal settlement dwellers in an urban context (cf. Asthana 1996). In contrast to displacement as a consequence of infrastructure construction, the resettlement of shantytowns is often officially framed within policies seeking to ensure the right to adequate housing and, linked to that, explicitly fighting urban poverty and supporting human development (cf. Huchzermeyer 2010a). Similar to resettlement in the context of disaster prevention, resettlement in the context of adequate housing policies may not be entirely involuntary. Instead, some population groups are willing to accept resettlement voluntarily as a matter of social advancement and modernisation (cf. Artur and Hilhorst 2014). Nevertheless, scholars have empirically observed the above-listed impoverishment risks in shantytown resettlement as well (cf. Agbola and Jinadu 1997; de Camargo Cavalheiro and Abiko 2015; Diwakar and Peter 2016; Ghosh 2008; Hooper and Ortolano 2012; Islam and wa Mungai 2016; Patel et al. 2015; Spire et al. 2017; Toutain and Rachmuhl 2014; Uysal 2012). Other, related work that was not framed under the term 'resettlement', but analysed sites-and-services schemes and social housing projects that are not necessarily combined with concerted population resettlement, showed similar impoverishment risks (see sections 2.22.3). There are only few opposite results questioning Cernea's model. For example, Hooper and Ortolano (2012) could observe an increase in income amongst resettled male shantytown dwellers in Tanzania after forced eviction, however without explaining reasons for this change. Likewise, Toutain and Rachmuhl (2014) and Agbola and Jinadu (1997) could not identify a clear impact of resettlement on households' income and employment. Moreover, Tironi (2009), based on empirical work in Chile, has questioned whether resettlement leads to an erosion of social kinship among resettled communities.

Concerning the specificities of shantytown resettlement, different authors have stressed the significance of the location of the resettlement site. Directly referring to Cernea (1997), Patel et al. (2015, 239) write: "In the urban context, the key importance of land is its location with respect to opportunities for livelihoods, social networks, and amenities for health and education." The distance of the resettlement site to the previous location, its accessibility by (public) transport and, as a result of both, change in transportation expenditures significantly determine resettled dwellers' access to these urban opportunities and their satisfaction with resettlement (cf. Barter 2002, 282; Diwakar and Peter 2016, 103; Hooper and Ortolano 2012, 283f; Takeuchi et al. 2008). In fact, many of the above-listed impoverishment risks (e.g. joblessness, marginalisation, food insecurity, loss of access to services, broken social kinship) are at least partially a result of increased distance and increased transportation expenditures. This motivates Patel et al. (2015, 253) to call "relocation distance […] the most significant cause of post-displacement impoverishment" in the context

of shantytown resettlement. Other authors have stressed the importance of particularly socio-economic networks for both the restoration of livelihoods among shantytown dwellers working, for example, as petty traders, day labourers, or self-employed craftsmen (cf. Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1989, 62; Hooper and Ortolano 2012, 285), and for the establishment of a sense of community and belonging (cf. Diwakar and Peter 2016, 104; Patel et al. 2015, 249f). Moreover, a specific consequence of shantytown resettlement – different to the resettlement forms discussed by Cernea – is that resettlements sites remain unfinished, underoccupied or even abandoned, either due to affordability problems, or because residents decide not to move or to move out after only a short time (cf. Buckley et al. 2016a; Croese et al. 2016; Patel et al. 2015, 232).

Furthermore, if resettlement is tied to forced evictions, this tends to be physically and socially disruptive; it may even be traumatic and mentally stressful (cf. Amakihe 2017). Forced evictions include demolitions that not only destroy property and shelter, but also personal attachments and memories. Hardoy and Satterthwaite (1989, 62) quote a shack dweller, who said, "The value of my house: 26 years struggle". Plessis (2005, 124f) lists a range of damages related to forced evictions:

> Property is often damaged or destroyed; productive assets are lost or rendered useless; social networks are broken up; livelihood strategies are compromised; access to essential facilities and services is lost; and often violence, including rape, physical assault and murder, are used to force people to comply.

In order to prevent impoverishment, high vacancy rates, the use of force, and strong resistance against resettlement, some scholars have suggested enhancing citizen participation and people's inclusion in decision-making processes (cf. Abebe and Hesselberg 2015; Arandel and Wetterberg 2013; Asif 2000; Navez-Bouchanine 2002). However, authors such as Lizarralde and Massyn (2008) and De Feyter (2015) warn that citizen participation is unlikely to be the ultimate solution to achieve social justice in resettlement, as shantytown communities are heterogeneous, composed of members with individual and sometimes opposed interests. In the case of the Moroccan VSB resettlement programme, the government has tried to respond to the affordability challenge by introducing a new third-party investment scheme as well as citizen participation schemes (section 4.3).

The various impoverishment risks inherent to shantytown or slum resettlement in urban contexts underlie the very prominent and relatively old argument that resettlement only transfers social problems to other places without addressing the root causes of poverty as the main reason of the prevalence of slums. One of the first authors promoting this argument was Engels, who blamed Haussmann's approach for not presenting appropriate and sustainable solutions for the problem of insalubrious housing:

> The breeding places of disease, the infamous holes and cellars in which the capitalist mode of production confines our workers night after night, are not abolished; they are merely shifted elsewhere! The same economic necessity which produced them in the first place, produces them in the next place also (Engels 1970 [1872], 71).

Later, during the mid-twentieth century, when eviction turned to become the standard policy approach towards informal settlements, Stokes (1962, 194) warned, "If in any one generation there are the seeds of improvement of the next, slum clearance – should it continue to produce the same sorts of results – may deter the elimination of slums." More recently, Plessis (2006, 181) criticised resettlement, arguing that it does nothing but "shift developmental problems from one place to another [...] The end result is, all too often, perpetuation rather than elimination of poverty and slums." Based on the above-discussed empirical

evidence and the theoretical concept of Cernea, one may add that shantytown resettlement does not simply transfer 'problems', but that it is likely to enhance impoverishment even further.

The fundamental critique has led to a range of international agreements and declarations against forced evictions. In 1976, the first critique of illegal evictions was signed at the Vancouver Conference on Human Settlement (Habitat I). Also the World Bank refrained from the direct funding of involuntary resettlements (Cernea 1993). More recently, the United Nations's (UN) CESCR (1997) not only recognises the right to adequate housing, but also states in Paragraph 8 that "the State itself must refrain from forced evictions and ensure that the law is enforced against its agents or third parties who carry out forced evictions". Moreover, Paragraph 16 states that inevitable "evictions should not result in individuals being rendered homeless or vulnerable to the violation of other human rights." Also the World Bank's 'Operational Policy 4.12' acknowledges that "involuntary resettlement should be avoided where feasible, or minimized, exploring all viable alternative project designs" (World Bank 2004, 5). However, concerning the question in which cases resettlement is justifiable, these documents hardly provide adequate answers. Thus, governments have not stopped justifying resettlement with rhetoric about the 'greater good' (Patel et al. 2015, 232). As such, resettlement continues to be – or re-emerges – as a luring option to many governments preferring short-term solutions and results (Beier and Vilmondes Alves 2015; Buckley et al. 2016a, 2016b; Croese et al. 2016; Huchzermeyer 2010a; Turok 2016).

To conclude, resettlement policies are increasingly discussed in the context of policies targeting informal settlements. Because of the limited effects of enabling policies, many governments have again turned towards resettlement and forced evictions, as these strategies seem to guarantee more visible results – at least following a short-term perspective. What is most problematic is that governments are often more concerned with eradicating the perceived 'urban eyesores' (i.e. shantytowns) than with investing in the sustainability of resettlement sites. Following Cernea (1997, 1998), this failure is likely to increase impoverishment risks and the marginalisation of resettled population groups.

2.6 The Moroccan Experience of Affordable Housing Strategies

Moroccan public policy responses to *bidonvilles* are as old as the phenomenon itself, dating back to the early twentieth century. Although extreme forms of interventions have almost disappeared and although the Moroccan policy approaches have been influenced by the above-outlined international policy framework, there have been striking continuities within past and present approaches to affordable housing, as Zaki (2005) argues by referring to Rachik (2002):

> The applied public policies have always followed the same objective, namely the clearance or the eradication of *bidonvilles* … We stick to an 'urbanism of urgency' (Rachik, 2002), in which construction activities are mainly inspired by political and social pressures – pressing circumstances that urge the state to intervene immediately and massively (Zaki 2005, 82).

Hence, besides the abovementioned changes of international policies targeting the 'slum', national political events and social pressures have majorly shaped Morocco's political agenda towards the urban peripheries, characterised by rather short-term, reactional, and fragmented approaches (cf. Abouhani 2011). The typhus epidemics in the 1930s, the independence movement, the 'bread riots', as well as the terroristic incidents

in 2003 and 2007 have all shaped and fostered the perception of negative externalities produced by *bidonvilles*. In consequence, these incidents have all triggered remarkable changes of national urban policies and, thus, have shown its inherent (security) political dimension that Rachik (2002) had captured with his concept of an 'urbanism of urgency' ('*urbanisme de l'urgence*'). According to Rachik (2002, 9f), Moroccan urban policy at the city's periphery has been remarkably driven by protest and reactive, short-term appeasement strategies. Protest does not only present the only way for many marginalised groups to articulate their social demands, but, in return, it is also a way to justify intervention in so-called 'contentious' neighbourhoods. In recent years, Morocco's aspiration to have world-class cities has again "intensifie[d] the interplay of contention and control in urban development, because governments, increasingly concerned about their image in the world, tend to opt for immediate solutions in order to re-establish stability" (Beier 2018b, 225).

Morocco's *bidonvilles* were a product of colonisation. Due to hygiene concerns and the fear of potential uprisings against the colonial hegemony, the French rulers followed strict plans of spatial ethnic segregation – an "urban apartheid" (Abu-Lughod 1980). They kept the *medinas* untouched and built new European cities separate to them.

> To accommodate a European population that always remained in the minority, never exceeding one-third of the total, Prost [first colonial town planner in Morocco] blocked out an area ten times larger than the existing *medina* [here, Abu-Lughod refers to Rabat]. In marked contrast, he neglected to allocate any land at all in his initial plan to accommodate a Moroccan population that was destined to grow tenfold in the next few decades (Abu-Lughod 1980, 160).

Hence, housing shortages were the logic result of planning failures. Although many rural-urban migrants were urgently needed as cheap labourers in the cities' factories or in the construction sector, they had no legal place to live, except for the *medina*. Consequently, in the 1910s, the first *bidonvilles* appeared due to the absence of alternative forms of housing.

> The newcomers from the hinterland ... settled into any overlooked interstice, first overcrowding the more insalubrious quarters of the medina, but then beginning to overflow into isolated pockets (such as Douar Dabbagh and Douar Doum) [first *bidonvilles* in Rabat] on the periphery, as well (Abu-Lughod 1980, 172f).

Early approaches to *bidonvilles* followed a mixture of criminalisation and tolerance (Rachik 2002, 49ff; Zaki 2005, 82f). It was not the goal to eradicate *bidonvilles*. This would not have been possible, as the cheap workforce found in *bidonvilles* was indispensable. Instead, colonial authorities concentrated (regrouped) dispersed shacks outside the city at specific locations, where it was easier to control the so-called 'dangerous classes'. Rachik (2002, 53) illustrates this strategy when stating that the only solid building in a *bidonville* was the police station at its entrance. On the one hand, the so-called *regroupements* – an early version of later relocation strategies – included the demolition of shacks, where the construction of the new city needed more space or where they were simply too close. On the other hand, they tolerated auto-construction outside the city at peripheral places, which, nonetheless, still allowed the dwellers to commute to their workplaces in the factories. The contradictory dialectic of criminalisation/tolerance was even enhanced when *bidonvilles* were officially declared illegal in response to the 1937 typhus epidemic. Moroccan workers were kept in some kind of controlled double precariousness – outside the law and outside the city – while fully depending on public authorities' goodwill (which would mean nothing more than simply tolerance) (Zaki 2005, 83).

The political strategies only changed in the early 1950s, when violent uprisings in the *bidonvilles* – in particular in Karyan Central, Casablanca – sought to support the independence movement. The increased social pressure pushed the colonial authorities to draft housing strategies in order to appease the popular social classes mostly living in *bidonvilles*. Already in the 1940s, facing an increasing influx of rural-urban migrants and the rise of nationalist movements, authorities had experimented with social housing projects[11] through the *recasement*[12] of *bidonvilles* on pre-equipped sites called *trames sanitaires* (also named *trames d'Ecochard* after its French inventor). Thus, Morocco was a pioneer of sites-and-services schemes years before they had become popular through World Bank promotion (Zaki 2005, 84; Abu-Lughod 1980, 226f). However, these policies only intensified in 1952, coincidentally with the first violent eruptions of the Independence Movement. Rachik (2002, 64) notes, "On the eve of the Moroccan Independence, the mass housing production of the colonial authorities presented a desperate (and late) attempt to gain some kind of political legitimacy towards the nationalist movement and among popular classes." Thus, comparable to other developing countries, Morocco followed Northern pathways of social housing production, including functional architecture and industrialised forms of construction. "Quantity became the avowed goal for housing" (Abu-Lughod 1980, 226). However, the late colonial construction of ever more *trames sanitaires* did not result in a reduction of *bidonvilles* at all. As Abu-Lughod (1980, 231) notes, "The dream of rehousing the slum dwellers and destroying the offending *bidonville* was a foolish one."

After Morocco became independent in 1956, urban planning lost its political priority. Authorities simply followed colonial pathways, with an emphasis on social housing construction (Abu-Lughod 1980, 233f). However, state-subsidised housing rather benefited the middle classes, as it was simply too costly for lower-income households. *Bidonville* dwellers had no other choice but to stay in their settlements. Only occasional relocations took place using the late colonial model of *trames sanitaires* (with and without standardised and pre-fabricated housing options) (Zaki 2005, 84f; Rachik 2002, 73ff). During the 1970s, the approach changed to the preference for assisted upgrading. This shift was mainly because of the recommendations of the first Habitat conference that took place in Vancouver in 1976. Thereafter, international stakeholders such as the World Bank and USAID became involved in the financing of upgrading projects in several Moroccan cities (Benlahcen Tlemçani and Missamou 2000, 114f). However, it must be said that the 1960s and 1970s were rather characterised by sporadic urban experiments than by large-scale state intervention (Rachik 2002, 94ff).

This drastically changed after 1981, when violent riots against an increase of food prices refreshed the old stigma of the rebellious, 'dangerous classes' living in *bidonvilles*. In response, the government immediately dismissed the upgrading plans for the *bidonville* Ben M'sik and replaced them with a classic *recasement* approach. Later, the newly established National Agency for the Fight Against Insalubrious Housing[13] (ANHI) abandoned upgrading strategies in general (Benlahcen Tlemçani and Missamou 2000, 115). The *recasement* approach offered the government not only the advantage of planning the new settlement from scratch, avoiding dense random structures that may complicate security or even military intervention (Zaki

[11] One prominent example was the construction of the city Aïn Chock in Casablanca, targeting the relocation of people living in the *bidonville* Ben M'sik. However, it remained unsuccessful, as dwellers of Ben M'sik were largely unable to afford the housing units in Aïn Chock (Rachik 2002, 55f).
[12] *Recasement* describes the dominant form of resettlement in Morocco, which consists, first, of the clearance of the *bidonville* and, second, of the allocation of new, serviced lots to the relocated households. Comparable to sites-and-services schemes, households are allowed auto-construction on their new lots (Navez-Bouchanine 2003a, 64).
[13] Agence Nationale de lutte contre l'Habitat Insalubre

2005, 87), "Leading architects and urban planners [also] saw restructuring as a permanent bidonvillisation of the city centre which would have a negative effect on its future economic development" (Bogaert 2011, 716f). Thus, the 1981 riots marked a turning point and made shantytowns an urgent priority of urban planning.

Besides the abovementioned shift back to shantytown relocation, the government's reaction included a number of urban policies in order to address socio-spatial integration on the one hand and to strengthen central governmental control on the other. Concerning the former, this included an extension of transportation infrastructure as well as the acceleration of social housing production. The latter comprised amongst others a multiplication of commissariats and, most prominently, the administrative restructuration of Greater Casablanca (Rachik 2002, 90). The creation of *wilayas* (governorates) allowed for an increase of the Ministry of the Interior's influence on urban planning.

> The *wali* — head of the *wilaya* — and the prefectural governors are appointed by the King and act as his representatives within the city. They dispose of considerably more power and competences than the locally elected councils. The *wali* became responsible for the preservation of security and public order in the urban territory, accountable only to the Ministry of Interior (Bogaert 2011, 716).

In fact, since that time, it has been the Ministry of the Interior that actually governs the city (Bogaert 2011, 717). For example, it is through the *walis*, *qa'ïds* and *moqqadmins*[14] that the Ministry of the Interior supervises the execution of relocation projects within the VSB programme (World Bank 2006, 24f). Furthermore, the Ministry of the Interior is directly responsible for the National Initiative for Human Development (INDH) that is of high relevance in popular neighbourhoods (Bergh 2012, 416f). Additionally, it holds control over the Urban Development Agency of Casablanca (AUC), founded in 1984 (Bogaert 2011, 717). Hence, the transfer of major urban planning authorities to the Ministry of the Interior shows that security aspects in urban development have gained primary attention since 1981.

Until the turn of the millennium, government agencies carried out *recasement* projects in a rigorous, top-down way, limited to physical aspects of housing, while treating displaced households as mere "supernumeraries" (Navez-Bouchanine 2003a, 65). Inhabitants of so-called intra-muros[15] have particularly resisted these displacements, thus forcing authorities to negotiate with them and subsequently inspiring small experiments of citizen participation. Such practices accelerated in 1998, when the so-called *gouvernement d'alternance*, headed by socialist Prime Minister Youssoufi, came to power. On the eve of a new monarch, the *gouvernement d'alternance* was to end the 'years of lead', as the politics of repression that characterised the era of King Hassan II are called. Concerning the government's approach to *bidonvilles*, this led to an in-depth analysis of past approaches and, subsequently, to a stronger emphasis of the 'social' and a more comprehensive understanding of 'housing'. Hence, the housing question should no longer be dealt with in an isolated, physical manner, but in an integrated and inclusive way based on citizen participation. Through the so-called social contracting (MOS, *Maîtrise d'Ouvrage Sociale*), the reformers aimed to add aspects of

[14] *Qa'ïds* (second lowest level, '*arrondissement*') and *mqadmins* (lowest level, 'quartier'; sg. *mqadem*) are subordinate central authority representatives below the *wilaya* level.

[15] Intra-muros are older shantytowns whose construction mostly dates back to the years before 1960. Although originally established at the peripheries, ongoing urbanisation has transformed them into quite centrally located neighbourhoods. Most intra-muros have undergone some kind of consolidation and development process, however, without being officially legitimated and formally serviced.

education, health care, culture, and socio-economic integration to rather technically planned housing projects (Navez-Bouchanine 2002; Toutain 2011, 170ff).

However, the reforms faced severe implementation challenges. Authorities concerned with housing projects saw no responsibility and capacities to include social aspects within their approaches to mitigate housing shortage. They also feared that the inclusion of too many social aspects and long-lasting consultation processes would delay the implementation of projects even more (Navez-Bouchanine 2002, 292). The latter particularly conflicted with the urgent notion assigned to unsanitary housing by the new King, Mohammed VI. In 2002, he declared the fight for 'decent housing' to be one of four political priorities and described *bidonvilles* as a "source of frustration, exclusion, social deviation and extremism" (MHUPV 2013, 67f). Already in 2001, King Mohammed VI called for the final elimination of insalubrious housing (MHUPV 2013, 49f). Nonetheless, public authorities succeeded in merging the divergent political priorities into the Action Programme for the Elimination of Unsanitary Housing and Shantytowns (PARHIB), introduced by the end of 2001. The PARHIB preferred in situ solutions over resettlement; however, it did not push explicitly for the comprehensive inclusion of citizen participation (Le Tellier 2009c, 197f; Benjelloun 2003, 15; Navez-Bouchanine 2008, 368).

In 2002, due to the end of the *gouvernement d'alternance*, the notion of urgency re-emerged, and the call for large-scale interventions intensified once again. A former staff member of the Ministry of Housing remembered this change during an interview in Rabat in March 2015 (Beier and Vilmondes Alves 2015, 43):

> When the *gouvernement d'alternance* was over, a new government arrived. Hjira [the new minister of housing] rejected all critical reflections. For him, the only priority was social housing … We returned once again to an approach of urgency. We started treating housing in a physical, quantitative logic, focusing on the house as a product rather than on the dweller. What was the reason for that? Hjira said, 'I have a mandate for four years. After four years I will be judged based on numbers: How many units did I produce?' That is why he put emphasis on the quantity.

Thus, the governmental change equalled a shift back to higher-quantity solutions – coinciding with the priorities of King Mohammed VI. In his speech from August 2001, he underlined the necessity of quickly and finally eliminating insalubrious housing, considering it as a threat to the modernity and prosperous development of the country (MHUPV 2013, 49f). Hence, reform attempts fell short of the wish to eradicate as soon as possible all forms of unsanitary housing in order to follow different urban political targets such as 'modernisation' and a better positioning in the global interurban race (Navez-Bouchanine 2003a, 63).

The 2003 suicide bombings in Casablanca were the final trigger for the establishment of a new large-scale shantytown eradication programme. The fact that the attackers lived in Casablanca's shantytown Sidi Moumen remarkably influenced the public discourse on informal neighbourhoods. Zemni and Bogaert (2011, 409) note that "[t]he attacks not only stigmatised the slums as a breeding ground for radical Islamists, but also negatively affected the city's 'unique selling proposition' and its image as a reliable destination for investment." The attacks seemed to confirm the worries mentioned by King Mohammed VI in his speech from August 2001. Finally, the new *Villes Sans Bidonvilles* programme replaced the PARHIB, following the overall aim to ultimately eradicate all *bidonvilles* in Morocco. In contrast to the PARHIB, which favoured in situ restructuring, the VSB programme may be seen as a return to *recasement* operations (Le Tellier 2009c, 198). Although in situ upgrading has initially been part of the VSB programme, it was clear from the beginning that this was not the preferred option. In response to new attacks in 2006 and 2007, the

option of restructuring was completely abandoned (Zaki 2013, 45). In April 2011, in light of the unsatisfactory performance of the VSB programme in the region Casablanca-Settat, regional authorities started to intensify their resettlement efforts to counteract the formation of social movements, which, inspired by the Arab Spring, started to appear in some *bidonvilles* (Kaioua 2017, 51; Beier 2016, 18f, 2018b).

2.7 Some Implications from Theory

In this chapter, I have shown how market and policy failure have led to the persistence of the housing question as one of the most pressing issues of current international development. How to guarantee adequate and affordable housing for all has remained a complex question to which ultimate and general responses do not exist. This is the very basic summary of the preceding discussion of housing policies and theories. What results from that is the indispensable necessity to carefully consider and reflect upon complex local contexts for the design and analysis of housing policy interventions. In practice, however, recent housing policies have rather been marked by reduced complexity. While international organisations such as the World Bank and UN-Habitat are calling for enabling housing markets to work and for public support for incremental, people-led development processes, national governments have increasingly opted for large-scale, standardised solutions. A major reason for this recent trend is that high-quantity public housing or resettlement programmes render political action mostly visible, which is a crucial advantage for national governments struggling for political legitimacy at the sub-national, national, and international level. I have further shown that large-scale housing interventions and resettlement also follow Keynesian logics, security objectives, as well as claims for modernisation and westernised development. Thus, the motivations behind these policies do not differ much from the logics behind earlier, comparable interventions in the 1950s and 1960s.

The return of large-scale, standardised housing policy interventions, of which the VSB programme is an example, marks the necessity to highlight main implications from theory. The failure of global housing policies seeking to address the housing question in each part of the world through standardised and replicable approaches may also show that the meaning of housing is highly subjective, differing not only between countries and regions, but also between neighbours. Here, again, it is necessary to refer to Turner (1968, 355) who defined "housing in terms of the dwelling environment and not in terms of dwelling structures. This environmental definition […] recognizes that value lies in the relationship between man and environment, not simply in physical conditions." Thus, satisfaction with the housing situation does not depend solely on its physical conditions, but could only be assessed through the eyes of the inhabitant. If housing is understood in this sense, one has to agree on two main conclusions. First, housing is always heterogeneous and cannot be understood detached from its inhabitants. This calls for more empirical research that engages with housing prior to any policy intervention, which is an aspect that I take up again in section 4.5. Second, there is a clear difference between the notions of 'shelter' and 'home' that may both be associated with housing. This conceptual difference has been a recurrent aspect throughout the discussion of housing policies in this chapter. As such, I have repeatedly stressed that housing policies overemphasise shelter, in other words the physical functions of housing such as building materials and structures, but also tenure security and public services. They impose a certain pre-defined concept of housing on people without questioning their actual needs. In consequence, many public housing, sites-and-services, and also in situ upgrading projects have failed, as they have not addressed other issues beyond shelter only. The

consequences have been ghost towns, empty or unfinished sites with services, and the gentrification of many inner-city slums.

In fact, it is important to highlight – and this is another major outcome of this chapter – that inhabiting a shantytown is not the result of having no other choice. Instead, it is crucial to consider it as the result of individual choices made under given constraints. This is largely ignored within governmental housing policies that hardly leave choices open to the affected dweller. Instead, governments transmit pre-defined concepts of 'modernity' and 'development' related to housing without any local adaptations or reflections. This is in particular problematic in the case of old informal settlements that have developed over time. In a good example concerning Nima in Accra, Ghana, Owusu et al. (2008, 189) conclude: "Nima challenges the conventional definition of slums. […] Even though Nima may be described as overcrowded, polluted and socially deprived, it is still a viable urban neighbourhood." Thus, without romanticising life in shantytowns, it should be noted that for many inhabitants, these neighbourhoods are not an inadequate place to live. Instead, they may provide residents with access to jobs and other urban opportunities, social safety nets, and some sort of security. Contrary to an oversimplifying or even stigmatising outside perspective, many residents of (old) shantytowns feel at home and have identified with their house and their dwelling environment (cf. Berner 1997; Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1989, 62). Thus, looking at housing through the notion of 'home' allows for an understanding of the inherent disadvantages of standardised resettlement programmes: They tend to confuse 'housing' with shelter, pay too little attention to the resettled individuals, and do not allow for people to make 'choices', which is a natural element of every housing decision – also of shantytown dwellers.

These main aspects bridge the gap to the risks and reconstruction model of Cernea (1997), which lists eight different impoverishment risks that potentially result from resettlement. He further argues that it is not sufficient to restore people's original livelihoods, but that 'good' resettlement that wants to avoid impoverishment requires concerted investment in people's development prospects at the new sites. In the context of housing programmes, a main problem emerges with their definition. These programmes, even though they imply resettlement, are mostly not considered 'classic' resettlement programmes as in the context of dam constructions or disaster prevention. As I have argued above, this also holds true for most academic literature. Hence, many actors treat housing programmes not as a sort of involuntary resettlement, but as a sort of social policy that addresses the needs of people living in so-called inadequate housing. This makes it easier for governments to limit their focus on shelter aspects of housing only, also because, from an outside perspective, this seems to be the most pressing issue for the affected people. In fact, most housing programmes – and in particular those that are developed in a standardized way at a large scale – do not have the objective of restoring people's livelihoods at the new site. Unlike in the case of classic involuntary resettlement programmes, this is not even defined as a major problem. Governments wrongly assume that the provision of better shelter at another place simply adds value to people's existing livelihoods. In contrast, the discussion in this chapter has shown that different sub-aspects of housing such as shelter cannot be seen as detached elements. Instead, housing must be considered comprehensively – as a totality comprised of many different, coexisting, and interdependent aspects that together form a sort of 'home' in the eyes of the inhabitant. If this is ignored, rehoused people are very likely to face the same impoverishment risks as people affected by 'classic' resettlement programmes. This is even more the case if governments' prime concern is not the development of the new town, but the clearance of the land of the shantytown – an aspect I come back to in chapter 4.

3 Research Design and Methodology

As mentioned in the introduction, this research project follows two main research questions (RQs) regarding the *recasement* of the *bidonville* Karyan Central. RQ1 looks more into the processes of resettlement, whereas RQ2 asks about the outcome of resettlement. In order to structure the answers to these research questions, they are divided into five sub-questions that deal with more specific aspects of the respective research question. RQ1 has three sub-questions. The first of these sub-questions (SQ1.1) emphasises the interactions of local communities and political stakeholders during the planning and implementation of resettlement: *How do local stakeholders negotiate resettlement conditions?* The second sub-question to RQ1 (SQ1.2) is focused on the particularities of *recasement* based on third party investment: *How does the resettlement system with third-party investors function?* Finally, the third sub-question of RQ1 (SQ1.3) focuses on the shortcomings, challenges, and conflicts that came up during the implementation process of resettlement: *Which kinds of conflict arise from the specific dynamics within the resettlement process?* With regards to the second research question focusing on changes in people's welfare because of resettlement, two sub-questions should further clarify and structure the answering process. As income is a broadly recognised factor within the concept of welfare, the first one (SQ2.1) deals with this subject, asking about the monetary effects of resettlement on income use and income generation: *How do household patterns of income generation and income use change because of relocation?* The second sub-question to RQ2 (SQ2.2) emphasises the non-monetary aspects of welfare that result from the physical characteristics of housing (housing comfort) and daily practices of social life: *In how far do living conditions of individual household members with respect to social practices and physical standards change because of resettlement?*

3.1 Justification of the Methodological Approach

In order to find adequate answers to the research questions, it is first necessary to discuss the epistemological rationale, or, to put it differently, to ask what kind of knowledge the research project seeks to generate. Textbooks about methodology in human geography order their content according to two epistemological theories: positivism or logical empiricism (the 'quantitative' paradigm) and constructivism (the 'qualitative' paradigm) (cf. Mattissek et al. 2013; Meier Kruker and Rauh 2005). Whereas the former approaches an 'objective reality', the latter denies its existence, suggesting instead the analysis of 'constructed' or 'subjective realities' (for an overview, see Creswell 2014). Positivist empirical studies follow a deductive approach in order to test hypotheses derived from existing general theories and based on the principle of falsification. As such, these kinds of empirical studies depend on numeric, quantifiable data mostly collected by using standardised questionnaires. Constructivist approaches follow a different rationale, focusing more on the interpretation and understanding of social contexts. Thus, these kinds of empirical studies do not generalise, but rather emphasise the contextual character of non-numerical, qualitative data.

Shakya (2009) mentions that, in the past, human geographers have preferred either one or the other methodological paradigm and have hardly mixed them. However, in more recent years, authors such as Mayring (2001) and Banister et al. (1994, 1) rather tend to see a continuum between the extremes of 'purely quantitative' and 'purely qualitative' approaches. Looking at research methods, it seems increasingly difficult to strictly separate quantitative and qualitative methods in practice: On the one hand, it is possible to collect qualitative data through structured questionnaires and, on the other hand, qualitative data might be analysed

using more or less quantitative tools of analysis (e.g. Mayring's (2000) content analysis). Whereas quantitative analyses tend to have the advantage of large-scale and generalizable results, qualitative research offers the opportunity to deepen the understanding of complex local settings. Hence, the fruitful combination of both practices of research offers a series of advantages for research in general and this research project in particular.

Therefore, the study starts from a mixed methods rationale and comprises both quantitative and qualitative elements. However, following a rather deductive approach of knowledge generation, the central part of the research project consists of a representative household survey based on standardised interviews with resettled households in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine and not-resettled households in the *bidonville* Er-Rhamna. The predominantly deductive nature of the research project results from the fact that a theory-based analysis of the Moroccan VSB programme based on the analysis of socio-economic household data is missing. Hence, the main interest is to look at the VSB programme, honoured as 'best practice' slum resettlement (UN-Habitat 2010b), in light of the theoretical discussion of affordable housing policies in general and resettlement in particular. Moreover, this research project aims to contribute to the discussion on whether the recent global trend towards new large-scale housing programmes reproduces the same shortcomings of earlier approaches in the 1950s and 1960s (cf. Buckley et al. 2016a, 2016b; Beier and Vilmondes Alves 2015). In this regard, the analysis of the third-party investor approach is promising, as it represents a relatively unique and innovative resettlement scheme based on previous experiences with sites-and-services. Various qualitative methods open to inductive reasoning will play a decisive role in understanding the processes behind this particular mode of resettlement and will enrich the analytical discussion. Thus, this study mainly argues from theory in order to contribute to the discussion on affordable housing policy in developing countries, in particular in the North African context.

Quantifiable household data was collected in order to produce more general results. This rather positivist reasoning is also due to the fact that most academic studies in the context of the VSB have rather applied qualitative research methods (Bogaert 2011, 2018; Le Tellier 2008, 2009a; Toutain 2016; Zaki 2005). A main interest is to complement these studies with more quantifiable household data. However, own qualitative data is indispensable for painting a complete picture of the resettlement operation of Karyan Central.

Therefore, the study builds on a mixed methods research design. Within the mixed methods approach, authors distinguish between several models that differ in the sequential use of methods (cf. Langdridge and Hagger-Johnson 2013, 521ff; Mayring 2001; Creswell 2014, 219ff). This research project may be considered an embedded mixed methods design that contains elements of a preparatory sequential model and a convergent parallel model (Figure 3-1). The first describes a mixed methods design in which qualitative data informs a later quantitative study. Related to this research project, this means that qualitative interviews with key stakeholders during a first field research period (pilot study) in March 2015 helped to design the household questionnaire for the main field research period in 2016/17.[16] The second refers to a model in which quantitative and qualitative methods are combined in parallel. In fact, information of the quantitative study often was the starting point for follow-up in-depth interviews with household members about specific

[16] The interviews within the first field research period were also part of another research project (Beier 2016, 2017, 2018a, 2018b; Beier and Vilmondes Alves 2015).

aspects that came up during the interview. The other way around, knowledge gained from a mix of qualitative methods (including observations, a document analysis, interviews) is indispensable for understanding major results of the quantitative study, in particular regarding the social aspects of resettlement.



Figure 3-1: The mixed methods model of this study. Own figure.

On the one hand, quantitative data was necessary to generate new socio-economic data about the respective communities and to estimate the extent to which the resettlement has affected resettled households. On the other hand, qualitative data is significant for interpreting the results, for understanding processes, and for generating more knowledge about household groups, which are underrepresented in resettlement research (i.e. former shantytown dwellers that did not move and third-party investors). I addressed the latter groups through specific questionnaires with more open questions and less structure. In addition, I attempted to conduct semi-structured qualitative interviews with key stakeholders such as (local) government officials and representatives of neighbourhood associations. These interviews were mostly realised during the preparatory first field research period in order to understand resettlement practices, major challenges within the resettlement process, and suitable case studies for my research. The mix of qualitative methods further included a review of newspaper articles, observations, photographic documentation, document collection and an analysis, as well as counts and mapping (i.e. shops, education facilities, etc.). The qualitative element may also help to detect and understand contextual aspects of the quantitative results. This is especially relevant for later conclusions and back references to theory. The combination of quantitative and qualitative results leads to an improved understanding of the factors that drive households' opinion of resettlement.

In the following section, I will derive assumptions from the theoretical and contextual embedding of the research and in relation to the research questions and sub-question mentioned previously. The assumptions help to narrow down the sub-questions and to give an idea of how and in which direction specific variables could function. However, finding answers to the overall research questions requires more action than just a test of hypotheses – also because the research entails important inductive elements as well. The assumptions should not be understood in a strictly positivist way, but more as a thematic orientation that may facilitate the structuring of data collection and data analysis (Mayring 2001). In this way, assumptions can also guide rather inductive knowledge generation processes with respect to the first research question that deals with the understanding of social dynamics, actor constellations, governance and power structures, as well as the third-party investor scheme.

3.2 Operationalisation

Following the research questions, the research project builds on two research pillars: First, it aims to understand the complexities of the implementation process of the *recasement* of Karyan Central and, second, it analyses impacts of the *recasement* on resettled households. This requires an emphasis on three different actor groups: (1) displaced *bidonville* dwellers living in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, (2) displaced *bidonville* dwellers that are not yet or no longer living in the new town, and (3) related stakeholders such as the third-party investors, neighbourhood associations, and local governments. Within the general methodological framework of the research project, this section aims to combine the results of the literature-based theoretical discussion with contextual limitations in order to suggest empirical methods to answer the research questions and sub-questions. As such, it intends to find compromises between conceptual and methodological demands as well as potential restrictions related to place, cost, time, security, and logistics that are part of every research project (cf. Shakya 2009, 159). This part also contains assumptions that should not be confused with hypotheses. I do not plan to test these assumptions in a positivist way; rather, they intend to give a better idea of issues to be addressed by the empirical analysis in chapters 5 and 6.

The first research question asks about the modus operandi of the resettlement, which will more likely be the subject of qualitative research methods. Its first sub-question (SQ1.1) asks: *How do local stakeholders negotiate resettlement conditions?* As discussed in section 4.3, many authors have criticised *accompagnement social* within the VSB programme as being limited only to citizen information and as having the mere objective to quickly clear the site of the *bidonville* and to convince people to move (Le Tellier 2010, 63; Le Tellier and Guérin 2009, 664; Bogaert 2011, 722). In the case of the *recasement* of Karyan Central, own experience from an explorative field research trip in March 2015 has rather supported this critique. This leads to the first assumptions:

A1) Transparency of information, citizen participation, and follow-up support do not exist within the *recasement* of Karyan Central (see section 5.2).

A2) Resettlement conditions are negotiated outside official schemes of *accompagnement social* through individual agreements, collective protest, and bribery (see section 5.2.2).

The second sub-question, SQ1.2, asks: *How does the resettlement system with third-party investors function?* Thus, it focuses on the decisive role of third-party investors within the *recasement* process of Karyan Central (see sections 4.3 and 5.2.3). Most households of Karyan Central were unable to afford the construction of their new houses in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine and depended on individual agreements with a *tiers associé* that builds the house in exchange for the ownership of the two lower floors. On the one hand, it is likely that most households would not have been able to move without the support of the *tiers associé*. On the other hand, the individual agreements and the lack of public mediation between the three parties have resulted in numerous conflicts and court cases concerning the construction process. The two assumptions below reflect this dichotomy:

A3) The third-party investor approach has ensured the moving of extremely vulnerable households into new apartments (see section 5.2.4).

A4) The third-party investor approach is one of the main sources of conflict within the *recasement* of Karyan Central (see section 5.2.5).

SQ1.3 emphasises further conflicts related to the implementation of the *recasement*: *Which kinds of conflict arise from the specific dynamics within the resettlement process?* Households may not be fundamentally opposed to the idea of moving to apartments, but are likely to be engaged in conflicts with either local authorities or third-party investors concerning the modalities of resettlement. Typically, they are concerned about the place of relocation, the costs of relocation, and especially the number of allocated plots (see sections 2.6 and 4.3). The general rule that each shack equals half a plot at the *recasement* site seems problematic, as often, more than one family live together in one shack. Other problems may result from the time gap between the official population census and the actual start of the resettlement. For example, people that married in between the conduct of the census and relocation have been facing difficulties to get an own plot. Some interviewed persons during the pilot study also mentioned that people tried to marry or to subdivide their flat only to get additional plots. Moreover, previously discussed evidence from different countries shows that large amounts of resettled people tend to resell their apartments and often move back close to their previous neighbourhoods – sometimes into new shantytowns in order to profit again (cf. Navez-Bouchanine 2012, 170; Toutain and Rachmuhl 2014, 28; Le Tellier and Guérin 2009, 662; Uysal 2012, 17; Payne 2005, 136f). These various aspects inform the following assumptions:

A5) Residents of Karyan Central have tried to maximise their profit from the VSB programme through marriages or subdivisions (see section 5.2.6).

A6) The last households of Karyan Central were not per se unwilling to move, but were unsatisfied with the conditions of resettlement (see sections 5.2.4, 5.2.5, and 5.2.6).

Whereas RQ1 deals with the process of implementation, RQ2 emphasises the various outcomes of resettlement, which requires the use of quantitative methods of empirical social research. Sub-question SQ2.1 asks: *How do household patterns of income generation and income use change because of relocation?* It is expected that *bidonville* households are a heterogeneous group with diverse patterns of income generation. This is even more the case in older, centrally located *bidonvilles* (World Bank 2006, 30). According to a report of the World Bank (2006, 29), most of the working-age population in Moroccan *bidonvilles* is officially unemployed, inactive, or only seasonally employed. However, this neglects the important role of informal economies. Furthermore, the report states, "Economic activities for both men and women include factory work, crafts work at home, seasonal work in the countryside, cleaning services, small-scale retail activities in the slum itself or elsewhere in the city via the use of transportable vending stalls" (World Bank 2006, 29). Thus, small-scale, self-employed, often informal work accounts for the major share of all economic activities. However, it is assumed that the displacement negatively affects such economic activities (see section 2.5). This leads to the following assumptions:

A7) The relocation provokes a decrease in per capita income (see section 6.4).

A8) Households spend more income on work-related transport because of the relocation to a more peripheral area (see section 6.5.1).

Regarding income use, it is not only important to focus on transport, but also on other expenditures including water, electricity, Internet, rent, education, health care, food, and credit. Of course, this requires asking about households' income from work, remittances, and rental income. This is important, as it can be assumed that the impacts of resettlement differ between different socio-economic groups within heterogeneous communities.

A9) Households spend less income on education, health care, and leisure activities because of increased housing and transport expenditures (see sections 6.5.3 and 6.6).

Income is not the only measurable aspect of people's welfare. The second sub-question SQ2.2 emphasises the housing conditions and practices of social life by asking: *In how far do living conditions of individual household members with respect to social practices and physical standards change because of resettlement?* This includes questions about the size of the new apartments, the number of residents per apartment, and the available amenities. Moreover, I ask questions concerning the relationship with neighbours, community solidarity, and perceived security. As many resettlement projects focus merely on physical housing standards and disregard social aspects (see chapter 2), I derive the following assumptions:

A10) Physical housing comfort has increased because of resettlement (see sections 6.1 and 6.2).

A11) Households on *recasement* sites perceive reduced security, feel more isolated, and perceive less community solidarity (see section 6.3).

Moreover, SQ2 accounts for a variety of strategies that households employ to cope with the new environment and, in particular, the increase of housing and transport expenditures. As households in the *bidonville* do not pay for water and electricity, some may be forced to economise on basic services due to the new expenditures after resettlement:

A12) Due to higher prices, households use less electricity, water, and the Internet in the new house compared to the consumption in the *bidonville* (see section 6.5.2).

3.3 The Quantitative Approach

As mentioned previously, the research project, in particular the second research question, largely builds on own primary household data. The data was collected through standardised interviews with members of 871 different households in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, Karyan Er-Rhamna, and two small *bidonvilles* in Hay Mohammadi. The PhD project applies a research design with comparison/treatment groups in order to analyse the effects of resettlement on resettled households. Because the resettlement of Karyan Central had started already in 2009, and because resettlement is only announced shortly before implementation, a follow-up survey of the same population before and after the resettlement was impossible. Another option would have been to ask resettled people about their situation prior to resettlement. However, relying entirely on people's memories five to six years after the resettlement may have caused problems, as their individual experiences with resettlement were likely to have affected their memories of Karyan Central. Thus, the strength of a comparison/treatment group approach is that it eliminates potential bias that results from time in both abovementioned alternatives. Moreover, collecting own household-level data on the current living conditions and practices of *bidonville* dwellers closes an important empirical gap. This data is used to challenge untested assumptions about *bidonville* populations (see section 4.5), which have largely influenced the design and implementation of the VSB programme. Hence, this data is a response to state authorities that have made far-reaching decisions regarding *bidonville* dwellers without any prior close engagement with residents' living environments. However, the major weakness of a comparison/treatment group approach is that it requires double randomisation (groups and respondents) to argue that significant differences between the two groups result exclusively from treatment. As I show below, this was impossible in practice. To

address this weakness, I stress the comparability of the comparison (*bidonville* communities) and treatment group (resettled communities) from a contextual and theory-based perspective in section 3.3.1. Thereafter, section 3.3.2 describes the sampling processes, and section 3.3.3 deals with the construction of the questionnaire, practices of data collection, and analysis.

3.3.1 The Matching of Groups

The quantitative element of the data collection follows the principle of 'matching' (Schnell et al. 2013, 213f). It is impossible to realise a randomised experimental research design, because the 'treatment' (resettlement) is unevenly distributed across space. Some communities have completely moved, and some are still waiting to move. Thus, I matched treatment (resettled communities) and comparison groups (not-resettled communities) according to a purposive sampling method. To derive conclusions out of the comparison of the treatment and comparison groups, the study has to consider two basic principles: First, the presumed cause must occur prior to the presumed effect. Second, the presumed cause must be the only reasonable explanation for changes in the outcome measure (Schnell et al. 2013, 224ff; Shakya 2009, 166). Concerning the first one, the moving of people from Karyan Central to Nouvelle Lahraouiyine started in 2010. At the time of the interviews, most households had lived in their new apartments for between four and six years. Despite very few exceptions of households that have moved only recently to their new homes, it is guaranteed that treatment effects have already occurred prior to the data collection. The second principle is more difficult to meet, as there might be more reasonable explanations than just the resettlement to explain differences between comparison and treatment groups. Because of that, I control influencing variables such as income, type of employment, age, and the duration of living in the *bidonville* and compare differences between similar socio-economic groups within the treatment and the comparison groups.

The treatment group consists of the resettled households living in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine who formerly resided in Karyan Central. In order to identify impacts of resettlement (treatment), I compare people's current situation in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine with the current situation of *bidonville* dwellers living under similar conditions to former Karyan Central (comparison group). From a strict methodological perspective, the comparison group should only differ from the treatment group with respect to the actual treatment (resettlement). In practice, this is hardly achievable. However, I approach this requirement by means of a list of criteria the comparison group should fulfil in order to reduce differences. These criteria result from the literature-based description of living conditions in Karyan Central and own observations during the pilot study. The comparison group should be a *bidonville*

(1) characterised by incremental auto-construction;
(2) with a similar number of inhabitants (approx. 6,000 to 7,000 households);
(3) with a similar historical development path over a similar period of time (approx. 90 years);
(4) located in proximity to industries and important markets;
(5) characterised by similar socio-economic structures; and
(6) still entirely existent.

The first selection requirement is the easiest to fulfil. All remaining *bidonvilles* in Casablanca have been characterised by incremental building structures that vary remarkably with respect to building quality – from simple makeshift structures to three-storey brick buildings (section 5.1.1). However, most construction and parcelling activities have taken place prior to the beginning of the VSB programme. At the time of the fieldwork, the development of remaining *bidonvilles* in Casablanca seemed to be rather frozen due to

increased supervision by local authorities and continuous rumours about resettlement and demolition. However, according to statements of former residents, this is not different from the repressive practices during the last years of Karyan Central.

The second selection criterion refers to the size of Karyan Central. Only the *bidonville* Er-Rhamna, located in Casablanca's neighbourhood Sidi Moumen and currently the largest *bidonville* in Morocco, has a similar number of households as former Karyan Central (approx. 6,000 to 7,000 households). The large size is extremely critical with respect to community cohesion, social life, and market functions. Similar to Karyan Central, Er-Rhamna is divided into several blocks, which divide themselves again into numerous smaller social entities. The large size ensures some distinct features of *bidonville* urbanity. On the one hand, anonymity is ensured, as it is impossible for residents to know each other personally or to orient themselves within the entire neighbourhood. On the other hand, residents depend on strong social ties within their smaller communities in order to practice mutual help with respect to electricity and water supply, wastewater management, and security (see section 5.1). The *bidonville* Er-Rhamna is the first comparison group.

However, no *bidonville* in Morocco fulfils all selection criteria listed above. Er-Rhamna does not comply with all requirements of the third selection criterion. It has only appeared in the 1960s, when migrants from Rhamna province near Marrakech bought some pieces of idle land next to a quarry in the northeast of Casablanca which was abandoned by the French. Thus, the neighbourhood Er-Rhamna has appeared much more recently than Karyan Central. However, its historical development has been characterised by similarities, such as colonial origins, initial political tolerance, remarkable growth during the 1980s, and an increase of repression and stigmatisation, especially after the 2003 suicide attacks (see section 2.6). Also, it is clear that Er-Rhamna does not have the same reputation as Karyan Central with respect to its role in the independence movement and its centrality as popular market hub. Market centrality is certainly the major difference between Er-Rhamna and Karyan Central. However, Er-Rhamna also offers a range of job opportunities within walking distance. There are several street markets and shops in the neighbouring districts Saada and Jawhara, as well as in Er-Rhamna itself. Moreover, Er-Rhamna is located within walking distance from the industrial zones of Ain Sebaa, Sidi Moumen, and Sidi Bernoussi. Hence, it partly fulfils the fourth criterion.

Because of its dwelling environment close to industries and markets, comparable incremental developments and physical structures, I argue that the socio-economic structure of Er-Rhamna bears striking similarities to former Karyan Central, hence fulfilling the fifth criterion. According to my survey data, the majority of the active population, both among the resettled population in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine and in Er-Rhamna, work as market and mobile traders, craft, factory or service workers (for a more detailed discussion, see section 5.1.6). However, in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, the share of traders is higher than in Er-Rhamna, which could be the result of former Karyan Central's central function as market hub and inexistent employment alternatives in Lahraouiyine. Other differences regarding people's occupations may be explained by the displacement as well (see chapter 6.4). The comparison of median monthly household incomes may give further evidence of similar socio-economic structures of the comparison group. The median monthly household income of interviewed people in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine (DH 3,000[17]) is very similar to the median

[17] One Moroccan Dirham (DH) equals approximately 0,09 Euro. The Moroccan industrial minimum wage is about DH 2,300 per month.

monthly household income in Er-Rhamna (DH 3,200). Moreover, the large variety of occupations and maximum monthly household incomes reaching up to more than DH 20,000 underline comparable heterogeneities within both communities. Because of the possible allocation of more than one plot per household in Karyan Central, the average size of households in Er-Rhamna (5.7 members per household) is higher than in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine (4.7). Finally, Er-Rhamna also fulfils the sixth criterion, as no resettlement practices had occurred in Er-Rhamna prior to the interviews.

Despite the relatively good comparability of Karyan Central and Er-Rhamna, I decided to consider another comparison group, located closer to the former Karyan Central. These smaller *bidonvilles* share with Karyan Central their long presence in Hay Mohammadi. Karyan Capitaine Montugué, situated some hundred metres away from Karyan Central between the railways and Boulevard Ibn Al Ouanane, appeared in the 1910s as well. The same holds true for some shacks on the other side of the railway, grouped under the name Karyan Boulevard Moulay Ismaïl. However, the eviction of shantytown dwellers in Hay Mohammadi is at an advanced stage. This means that it was not possible to include the second largest *bidonville* in Hay Mohammadi, Karyan Zaraba, because its demolition was ongoing when I arrived in December 2016. Also, Karyan Capitaine Montugué does not exist anymore. A few residents had already started moving some years ago and left their demolished homes. Then, in 2015, authorities demolished one entire part of the neighbourhood with bulldozers. In December 2016, interviews were only possible with the remaining approximately 50 households. In July 2017, public authorities also demolished the remaining parts of the neighbourhood and evicted people by force. Therefore, Karyan Capitaine Montugué does not fulfil the last criterion of the list, as resettlement had already started in the neighbourhood prior to the interviews. Nonetheless, I occasionally made use of some statements from dwellers of Karyan Capitaine Montugué and Karyan Boulevard Moulay Ismaïl (later jointly called small *bidonvilles* in Hay Mohammadi) throughout chapter 5. Furthermore, I used the data when discussing the increase in transport costs caused by displacement in section 6.5.1, because these *bidonvilles* were/are located much closer to former Karyan Central than Er-Rhamna.

3.3.2 Sampling Strategies

The study conducted a probability sampling following principles of random selection (cf. Guest 2014; Neuman 2011). In the case of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, simple random sampling was not possible because of the unknown number of houses and the impossibility to select, identify, and find them directly in the field. Thus, it was opted for cluster sampling using house blocks as clusters. As the different size of the blocks required weighted cluster sampling, the study conducted a probability-proportionate-to-size sampling (Neuman 2011, 262). In a first step, two researchers systematically counted all blocks and all houses within the blocks in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, based on a street map of Google Maps. They identified 159 blocks and counted 2,790 occupied houses in total. The number of houses within the blocks varied from between 4 and 52 in number. Due to the specific logic of the *recasement*, which moved two households from Karyan Central respectively to the second and the third floor of the new four-storey houses, the total number of ordinarily resettled households in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine cannot be more than 5,580. The actual number of resettled households in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine should be even smaller, as some households decided to move out after the resettlement, and some have not yet moved into their new flats due to unfinished construction or ongoing conflicts with local authorities and/or the third-party investors (see chapter 5.2.5). However, because of a possible later calculation of dropout quotas, the target population was not limited to *actually* resettled households only, including all households living on the two upper floors, hence comprising the

potentially resettled population of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine (N≈5,580). Thus, in a block of ten houses, the maximum number of interviews would have been twenty.

In a second step, I estimated the probabilistic sample size that would help to attain representative results for the totality of households resettled from Karyan Central to Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Following the recommendations of Guest (2014, 239) and based on a level of confidence of 95%, the suggested sample size would have been 360. To ensure an adequately sized sample also in case of discontinued interviews, unstated information or unusable data, it was decided on a sample size of n=400, which equals a sampling ratio (n/N) of 7.2%. In a third step, I randomly determined for each block the number of households to be interviewed using a lottery selection via Microsoft Excel. The weighted selection process guaranteed the same probability of selection for each household – whether located in a small or in a large block (Neuman 2011, 262).

The fourth step was to identify within each block the particular household to be interviewed. Unfortunately, it was not possible to conduct a simple random sampling below the block level due to several limitations regarding the identification of houses, the accessibility of respondents, and the gender of the research assistants. Identification of houses was difficult, as most of the houses did not have house numbers, which severely affected the possibility of distinguishing between the houses or selecting them beforehand. However, the most important challenge was to reach the target population on the second or third floor. Relying only on bells would have caused a severe self-selection bias, as not all houses have functioning bells. Additionally, many people were extremely reluctant to accept interview requests by intercom – especially in response to a male voice. Because it was rather uncommon for people to invite unknown (male) people into the house, accepting an interview request required them to make an additional effort to go down to the door in order to respond to the questions. Hence, the more effective option to address the respondents was to enter the house, to ascend the stairs, and to knock on the apartment doors inside the house. However, only the female research assistant could apply this strategy, because the male research assistant due to the possible presence of females inside is expected not to enter the house without permission and prior consent. Moreover, the self-selection bias also matters for this strategy, as the front door was not always left open. Thus, a third strategy was to address our interview requests to people on the streets or through windows. This was the only successful strategy to also access households living in houses without a functioning bell or open front door. The male research assistant was more comfortable with this strategy, as many people in the streets were young males of the same age. Thanks to having one male and one female research assistant, it was possible to combine all three access strategies within almost each block and, hence, to reduce the probability of self-selection. Thus, the female research assistant mostly used the open-door strategy by knocking on apartment doors, whereas the male research assistant mostly used the doorbell or tried to access people in the streets. A result was that the female research assistant predominantly talked to female respondents and the male research assistant rather communicated with male respondents. Of course, the applied approach does not fulfil the requirements of simple random sampling; however, the relatively large number of refused interview requests would have questioned random selection even without access problems. Due to time constraints and the above-described identification problems, it was not possible to come back several times to the same house if nobody was there. Nonetheless, the mix of access strategies has reduced self-selection bias.

In the case of the *bidonville* Er-Rhamna, the enormous density of the neighbourhood, its incrementally developed spatial structure, the absence of any adequate map or aerial picture, and the inaccessibility (or

inexistence) of basic information made it impossible to apply simple random sampling. During my first visits to Er-Rhamna, I got remarkable support from a local resident who showed me around and tried to find possible ways to start sampling. As such, she pointed me to the fact that several houses have house numbers. However, it was impossible to fully understand the house number system prior to the survey. Questions remained about the highest existing house number, the number of houses without numbers, and whether some house numbers exist more than once. In addition, there was uncertainty about the boundaries of the seven blocks within the neighbourhood. Public authorities were unable or unwilling to respond to a request for more information concerning the systematics behind the house numbers and the block system, the total number of houses, and the total number of residents. However, they stated that roughly 6,000 households lived in Er-Rhamna. Therefore, I decided to target the same sample size as in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine (n=400).

To cope with the unknown size of the population, own estimations and pragmatic actions were necessary. During the first two days of interviewing in Er-Rhamna, a local resident complemented the research group in order to facilitate orientation and to help us become familiarised with the neighbourhood. The initial talks with residents and visits to Er-Rhamna showed that often, more than one house carried the same house number, which is the result of parcelling (Figure 3-2). Thus, based on the expected number of households and a rough estimation of the average number of households per house number, I decided to approach always one household of each house number ending on ‘0’ (blocks with only even numbers) or ‘5’ (blocks with only odd numbers). This form of systematic sampling (cf. Guest 2014, 229; Neuman 2011, 252) with varying sampling intervals was the best possible option, as the randomised pre-selection of house numbers was impossible due to challenges of orientation as well as missing information about the existing house numbers and the boundaries of the blocks. Only the systematic street-by-street search for house numbers allowed us to orient ourselves within the neighbourhood and to understand the house number system. This systematic approach allowed us to identify house numbers also if they were either not written or not clearly visible on the door or wall. This was the case for roughly one-third of all houses. If all houses under the same selected house number were unoccupied, which was rarely the case, the number was left out. If no household member of a selected house was available or willing to respond, the interviewer asked a household member in the house with the next higher number. However, people’s general willingness to respond to the interview questions was higher than in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, also because of fewer access-related problems. Almost all households could be approached either by ringing the bell or knocking on the door. The largest block is Block 15, with even house numbers reaching to the number 1,152, plus an additional area without house numbers. The smallest block is Block 13, with house numbers reaching to the number 130.

The applied form of systematic sampling in Er-Rhamna reduced potential selection bias and fulfils basic requirements of probability sampling such as equal probability of selection. However, some limitations were unavoidable. First, in Block 15, a large zone exists without individual house numbers. These houses appeared relatively recently on former farmland. In this area, we tried to go through each street and cul-de-sac in order to ask at every tenth house. However, it was difficult to orient us without house numbers and to ensure the same selection probability as in the other parts of Er-Rhamna. Second, in Block 9, the only block with even and odd numbers, we completed all houses with numbers ending on ‘0’ and later started with numbers ending on ‘5’. However, due to both increased pressure from local authorities to leave the neighbourhood and the fact that we had already completed 400 interviews, we left out approximately 20 houses of Block 9 ending on ‘5’ (see chapter 3.5). Finally, the sample might be biased towards a slightly

lower representation of households living on the edge of the settlement, where parcelling occurred more recently and often resulted in a larger number of households per house number.

In addition to household interviews with inhabitants of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine and Er-Rhamna, I also conducted interviews with residents of two smaller *bidonvilles* in Hay Mohammadi, located in close proximity to the old Karyan Central. Because of the small number of households (altogether fewer than 80 households), it was possible to conduct a full census of the resident population (cf. Guest 2014, 225f).

Figure 3-2: The same house number on three doors in Er-Rhamna. Author's picture, March 2017.

3.3.3 Practices of Data Collection and Analysis

As mentioned above, primary household data was collected for this study mainly through structured questionnaires including closed and open questions, and numeric and non-numeric data. The construction of the questionnaire built on experience from previous surveys that collected socio-economic household data (Löwenstein et al. 2015; Shakya 2009) as well as the PARHIB evaluation (Toutain and Rachmuhl 2014). It was slightly adapted after a pre-test with ten households in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. In order to ensure comparability between the treatment and comparison groups, the questionnaire was the same for both groups. However, it included some additional questions for resettled households regarding the resettlement process. For parts of the questions, the unit of analysis is the entire household; however, other questions directly targeted all individual household members (e.g. on transport use or employment). Moreover, some questions were concerned with the individual perception of the particular interview partner (e.g. regarding neighbourhood cohesion, security, or satisfaction). We guaranteed complete anonymity to all interview partners prior to the interview. Throughout the thesis, pseudonyms are used for all interview partners mentioned by name (appendix A2).

The questionnaire (appendix A1) was divided into seven parts. The first part dealt with general information about the current residential status, relocated inhabitants' previous place of residence, and the resettlement process, including questions about temporary accommodation and the third-party investor. The second part included a useful question tool developed by Shakya (2009). It consisted of a grid asking for demographic and professional data of all household members that permanently live in the house. The interviewers used

this information in later parts of the questionnaire in order to facilitate the interview process. The third part was dedicated to the current housing conditions, used to gather information about the size and amenities of the flat, as well as the utilities expenses and use (water, electricity, wastewater management, etc.). The fourth part asked about household expenditures, including the use of transport of individual household members, education, food, and health-related expenses. The fifth part used Likert scales and dealt with the practices of social life and people's perceptions of security and spatial and social integration. Afterwards, the interviewer asked for the income of the household members who had previously mentioned being economically active, and added questions about rental income such as pensions and remittances. The last part of the questionnaire dealt with people's general satisfaction with their current housing situation. It included open questions about related advantages and disadvantages. Finally, I asked the interviewers to write down as many comments as possible in order to also pick up on unexpected aspects.

Regarding the income-related questions, the clear majority of interview partners had no problems reporting on their income. To ensure data reliability, the interviewer was requested to crosscheck the stated income with previously mentioned expenses and to ask follow-up questions if the monthly income was lower than monthly expenditures. In response, interview partners corrected statements about food expenditures or added an income source they had previously forgotten to mention. Statements about income were also compared to previous studies of the World Bank (2006) and to other people's income from similar work. For some people, however, it was difficult to determine their exact incomes, because they do not work regularly, or they do not earn a fixed salary. Especially petty traders and day labourers could only state ranges of income per day. To be able to estimate monthly incomes, they were asked to give average, minimum, and/or maximum daily incomes and to say how many days per week they work on average. In general, people could state their income in their preferred way. For example, income from seasonal work was sometimes given per year and was then converted into a monthly income.

Concerning the data collection process, the interviews in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine took place between mid-December 2016 and mid-February 2017.[18] In Er-Rhamna, interviews were conducted between mid-February and the end of March 2017. The interviews took place six days per week, always during the weekend and always between 10:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. Two local research assistants were trained to conduct the interviews in Darija, the Moroccan Arabic dialect, which all respondents could speak. They used the French version of the questionnaire and directly translated the questions during the interview situation. Both research assistants were continuously in contact with each other, sharing their interview experiences and discussing specific ways of asking and translating the questions in order to ensure comparability to the best extent possible. I also joined the interviewees to supervise the interview process. Moreover, I further discussed the interviews with them afterwards. Keeping a rather passive role during the interview, active influence was limited to follow-up questions in reaction to interviewers' notes on the questionnaire. The degree of personal intervention was adapted according to interviewees' willingness to talk and openness. The interviews were conducted with one member of the household, who was able to provide information about the household's expenses and income. The aim was to conduct interviews with female and male, younger and older persons in order to have a mix of respondents. Due to practical restrictions, this was, however, not ensured through specific within-household sampling. In total, 60% of the interviewed persons were females, and 40% were males (n=871). The higher share of females is attributed to the fact that women

[18] In June 2017, one of the translators conducted 21 additional interviews in six blocks that were overlooked during the main fieldwork period.

were more often at home during the day, particularly in Er-Rhamna. Also, age variety was achieved: 10.1% of the respondents were not older than 20 years, and 45.2% were between 20 and 40 years old. Thirty-four percent were in their 40s and 50s, and only 10.7% of all respondents were older than 60 (*n*=870).[19]

Almost all interviewed persons appreciated the presence and interest of a foreign researcher/student, but it was not always an explicit topic of the conversations. Often, passers-by were curious about the interview situation, asking us questions about the work or even joining the interview. This was sometimes problematic, as people tended to be more hesitant to provide information about income sources if other neighbours listened to their statements. If the interviewer was not alone, the other interviewer tried to divert the attention of these listeners to ensure an undisturbed interview. Furthermore, in some parts of Er-Rhamna, several curious children followed us from house to house until adults intervened. However, curious people were often also helpful in searching for selected house numbers in Er-Rhamna or in easing access to interview partners in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Moreover, residents often invited us to their houses to have breakfast, lunch, or tea together.

After the interviews, I crosschecked the data and discussed it with the interviewers to find out whether they had failed to write down some information or to identify possible mistakes in writing down information during the interview. These crosschecks also helped me to better understand blurred numeric data on income and expenditures, which was the consequence of respondents' tendency to provide ranges of income and expenditures instead of average or fixed numbers. In a few cases, we approached the respondents a second time for some clarifications. Afterwards, I entered the adjusted data into SPSS. Regression analyses and correlations were used to show significant differences between the comparison and treatment groups that resulted from the resettlement, hence supporting (or rejecting) the assumptions. I complemented these findings with qualitative data to increase causalities.

3.4 The Qualitative Approach

Qualitative research is concerned with the interpretation of complex natural problem settings. It assumes that reality is socially constructed and aims to understand the subjective meaning people have ascribed to their perceived world (cf. Creswell 2014, 185f; Merriam 2009, 7ff). Thus, qualitative research methods supported this work with the objective of obtaining more insights into the various complexities and subjectivities of resettlement practices in Casablanca's shantytowns. The use of a large variety of qualitative methods was particularly important because reliable published information on the *recasement* of Karyan Central is lacking. It also acknowledges the singularities that have characterised a dynamic resettlement process, which was continuously adapted through individual negotiations and subjective concerns. Furthermore, qualitative methods informed the quantitative household survey and were closely combined with quantitative methods during data collection. Therefore, a clear separation between the use of qualitative and quantitative research methods in this study is hardly possible. The way in which methods were used together acknowledges Mayring's (2001) call to underline linkages and similarities instead of highlighting differences between quantitative and qualitative methodologies.

[19] Differences in the *n*-value result from missing data, as people sometimes did not respond to each question.

In qualitative research, researchers often apply a variety of methods (Creswell 2014, 185). This study is no exception, using semi-structured interviews, a document analysis, and cartographic as well as ethnographic methods such as informal conversations and observation. Semi-structured interviews were a useful tool to gain knowledge about the perceptions of different stakeholders – besides resettled households and *bidonville* dwellers. This included the third-party investors as well as former dwellers of Karyan Central, who did not benefit from an own plot so far. Moreover, I conducted interviews with people that had moved out of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine after being resettled, as well as representatives of neighbourhood associations in Hay Mohammadi, Sidi Moumen and Karyan Central. Moreover, I used informal conversations to obtain more information on particular topics that came up during the household interviews, such as the quality of food (talks with a cook and restaurant owner in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine) or the decreasing house prices (talks with real estate agents). Conversations also helped in a more exploratory manner to better understand unclear and opaque contexts, for example the various (administrative) steps of the *recasement* (in-depth talks with various resettled households). It also shed light on or the construction of El Hamd, a second new town next to Nouvelle Lahraouyine which is intended for the resettlement of former dwellers of several smaller *bidonvilles* as well as people from Karyan Central who did not receive an own plot so far (talks with several people on site such as a food shop owner). One informal conversation was also possible with the main secretary of the *bacha* of Ain Sebaa and Hay Mohammadi, who shared a governmental perspective on the resettlement operation (see chapter 3.5).

Furthermore, the collection and analysis of documents related to the *recasement* of Karyan Central was helpful for understanding the specific processes of implementation. As no published information was available on the sequences of resettlement, the collection of documents from every step within the resettlement procedure was a good alternative, besides informal conversations and interviews. The documents include older and newer versions of the Contract of Association and Settlement between the Third-Party Associate and the Allottee (*contrat d'association et compromis entre le tiers associé et l'attributaire*), the certificate of plot allocation, and the confirmation of payment for the plot, the certificate of demolition of the shack, dwelling permits in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine and Er-Rhamna, and several letters of protest regarding individual problems of (non-)allocation. Interviewed household members in Er-Rhamna and Nouvelle Lahraouiyine provided all documents. Moreover, the research was further enriched by so-called participant observation, a method frequently used in ethnographic studies. The strength of observation is to learn about implicit and explicit aspects of daily life and the culture of a particular group of people. Participant observation is not only a tool of data collection, but could also be used to improve the interpretation of data (cf. Bryman 2016, 422ff; Musante 2014). Based on these features, it contributed to a better understanding of local practices regarding the use of transport and public services, security, and social interactions both in Er-Rhamna and in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Finally, cartographic methods helped to visualise differences in the spatial structure of both settlements. Mapping could also highlight shop vacancies and the availability of public services and markets in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine.

3.4.1 Interview Sampling Strategies

Unlike in quantitative research, probability sampling in qualitative research is useless because of the relatively small sample size. Instead, qualitative research applies non-probability sampling; hence, it cannot guarantee probabilistically representative results. However, using purposeful sampling could approach a theory-led representativeness by selecting respondents based on previously gained (theoretical) knowledge

and with a specific purpose in mind (cf. Guest 2014, 233f; Neuman 2011, 267f). The semi-structured interviews in this project purposefully targeted two specific stakeholder groups within the resettlement process: third-party investors, and former dwellers of Karyan Central that had not been living in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine during the time of field research. For both groups, a quantitative analysis using probability sampling would not have been possible because of difficulties in finding and accessing their members. Because of the lack of information on the relationship between third-party investors and allottees, the aim was also to follow a rather inductive approach by asking more open questions. To access the first group, the third-party investors, the researchers noted telephone numbers written on houses and empty shops throughout Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. The idea behind this was that these numbers would belong to so-called *moul chkara* who had built the houses and now wanted to sell their parts. In most of the cases, this assumption held true, so that we could contact about 30 *moul chkara* and were able to realize seven semi-structured interviews with very different third-party associates (Table 3.1).

Table 3.1: List of interviews with third-party investors.

Pseudonym	**Profession**	**Developed houses**	**Place of interview**	**Date of interview**
Abdelaziz	Building contractor	2	Sidi Moumen	2 Feb 2017
Abdeljalil	Taxi driver	10	Nouvelle Lahraouiyine	8 Feb 2017
Ahmed	Jewellery seller	2	Derb Sultan	6 Feb 2017
Mohammed	Owner of a jewellery shop	1	Derb Sultan	6 Feb 2017
Omar	Building contractor	2	Ain Sebaa	8 Feb 2017
Youssef	Building contractor	4	Hay Mohammadi	3 Feb 2017
Zakaria	Owner of a *patisserie*	2	Nouvelle Lahraouiyine	5 Feb 2017

More difficult was the search for households who had not been living in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine during the main field research period. This group includes households that were resettled to Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, but decided to move out again, and households that had not moved to Nouvelle Lahraouiyine for different reasons. The interviews mainly aimed to understand the reasons of migration and non-migration, which further informed the understanding of the weaknesses of the *recasement* operation. To find the latter households, the research assistants and I applied various strategies. We conducted field trips to the brownfield of former Karyan Central and asked people who had built new makeshift shacks next to it whether they were former residents of Karyan Central. In addition, we searched for people at El Hamd, the place where the last residents of Karyan Central will move. Moreover, we applied snowball sampling techniques whenever people mentioned someone who had not moved so far. In total, we conducted seven semi-structured interviews and one informal conversation with households who did not (yet) move to Nouvelle Lahraouiyine (Table 3.2).

Even more difficult was the search for people who decided to move out again, also because the number of migrants is low. We asked interviewees living on the third or fourth floor of the houses of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine and who did not live previously in Karyan Central whether they had a contact address of the person who sold them the flat. However, most of them had no contact information or did not buy or rent

the flat from the beneficiary. Moreover, sometimes the initial beneficiary lived elsewhere in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. We could only realise one interview (Table 3.2) – with a person who did move out. Hence, to obtain more information about the reasons for moving out, I also talked to a real estate agent.

Table 3.2: List of interviews with former residents of Karyan Central who have not been living in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine in a regular way.

Pseudonym	**Type**	**Place of interview**	**Date of interview**
Abdelhadi	Temporary accommodation (rent)	Hay Mohammadi	27 Mar 2017
Abdelkarim	Rental accommodation after departure from Nouv. Lahraouiyine	Belvédère	6 Feb 2017
Karim	Temporary accommodation (makeshift shack)	Hay Mohammadi	25 Jan 2017
Mohammed and Fatiha	Temporary accommodation (rent)	Sidi Moumen	28 Mar 2017
Saida	Temporary accommodation (family)	Hay Mohammadi	5 Feb 2017
Zubeir	Temporary accommodation (family)	Nouvelle Lahraouiyine	5 Feb 2017
Mohsin	Temporary accommodation (makeshift shack), *inf. conversation*	Hay Mohammadi	3 Feb 2017
Abdallah	Occupation of the shell of his own house	Nouvelle Lahraouiyine	28 Jan 2017
Mehdi	Temporary accommodation (occupation of empty shop)	Nouvelle Lahraouiyine	17 Dec 2016

3.4.2 Practices of Data Collection and Analysis

Two interview guides supported the interviews with representatives of the two abovementioned stakeholder groups. Interview guides are a characterising tool of problem-centred, semi-structured interviews, which should help to structure the interview situation (Mattissek et al. 2013, 158f). In this context, the interview guide was particularly important, as I had to rely on translators to conduct the qualitative interviews. The research assistant who functioned as translator, of course, had an idea of my research interest; however, she preferred a clear structure to be able to ask the right (follow-up) questions. This was indispensable because direct translation was not always practicable. As it was difficult to incite people to talk, interviewees were not to be interrupted for translation purposes once they had started talking freely. As people felt uncomfortable with being recorded, the research assistants also used the interview guide for documentation purposes during and immediately after the interview.

Regarding the former residents of Karyan Central who had not moved to Nouvelle Lahraouiyine in a regular way, the interview guide followed the basic structure of the household questionnaire. However, it contained more open and closed questions with respect to their current and past housing situation and the reasons why they did not move in a regular way. In most cases, the understanding of reasons and problems took time and required several additional follow-up questions. The basic structure of the questionnaire was kept because of two reasons: First, it was of interest to determine whether specific socio-economic groups were more likely to be excluded from the resettlement. Thus, socio-economic household data was needed. Second, experience from the household interviews showed that people often had difficulties answering open

questions and preferred a clear structure and rather closed questions. Although keeping to this clear structure, the aim was to construct a more or less open conversation, which was realised in most cases. The questions often reminded the respondent of a related problem that he/she had forgotten to mention at the beginning. Hence, together with the specific open questions and the structure of the household questionnaire, it was possible to sketch a full picture of the specific case.

The guide for the interviews with representatives of the third-party associates had an own structure. It was the result of a continuous collection of questions and uncertainties with regards to the resettlement procedure, which had occurred during the household interviews in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Hence, the objective of the semi-structured interviews with third-party investors was not only to better understand their role within the relocation process; in default of alternative ways of investigation, it aimed to obtain more insights into the general resettlement procedure and its administrative support. Thus, questions covered the discussion of all steps of the *recasement* process in which the third-party investor was involved. Moreover, they asked about the relation to the resettled households, their intentions to become a third-party investor, and the problems that occurred during the housing development. Furthermore, the interviews with third-party investors were a good avenue for getting greater insights of the housing prices in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine and the costs of the housing construction.

Semi-structured interviews with presidential representatives of two neighbourhood associations in Hay Mohammadi and Sidi Moumen, namely the *Association des Initiatives Urbaines Hay Mohammadi* and the association *Idmaj*, already took place during the first field research period in March 2015. These interviews were not only useful for preparing for the main field research and, further, to get access to gatekeepers in the respective *bidonvilles* (see section 3.5), they were also part of a previous research project (Beier 2016, 2017, 2018a, 2018b). They followed an own interview guide and were conducted in French by myself. I was also allowed to record and transcribe the interviews. A third interview with the president of the association *Chihab* (pseudonym Rachid) could be realised in March 2017 with the help of a translator. *Chihab* was the most significant neighbourhood association of Karyan Central. Initially in favour of the idea of resettlement, the president has become one of the most critical local voices within the *recasement* process. He kindly shared with me private documents and his own documentation of related newspaper articles. Finally, the aim was to conduct interviews with representatives of local governments involved in the resettlement. Despite several attempts to realise interviews, local decision makers were ultimately unwilling to share their perceptions on the resettlement (see section 3.5).

The application of other qualitative research methods was closely tied to the household survey. During the household survey, the research assistants and I tried to make use of every possibility to intensify the interview and to discuss people's experiences – about the resettlement, but also with respect to their daily life practices – beyond the mere structure of the questionnaire. These informal conversations that lasted for up to four hours further enriched the understanding of the *recasement* process and illustrated the specific challenges of living in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, Karyan Central, and Er-Rhamna. Often, the experience of interviewed persons was helpful to clarify uncertainties, which had occurred during previous interviews, for example with respect to the electricity supply and payment in *bidonvilles*. Research assistants and I constantly took field notes, either in a separate notebook or directly on the questionnaires. Whenever possible, I took pictures or asked for documents that could provide more evidence.

After the end of field research, all data was screened and systematically organised, which allowed for a thematically structured analysis. I integrated many comments of the respondents into the SPSS databank and linked notebook entries to the household questionnaires. Due to the systematic organisation of data material, it was possible to conduct the analysis according to the thematic structure in chapter 5 and 6. The experience of the respondents was used to highlight specific problems and challenges in an exemplary way. Thus, I tried to embed the specific stories into a wider analytical framework. The same was done for the findings of ethnographic methods and the content of the collected documents.

3.5 Main Challenges during Field Research

The field research was divided into two parts, which was necessary due to the specific mixed methods design that the research project applied (see chapter 3.1). A first field research period took place in March 2015, whereas the main field research period took place from December 2016 to April 2017. The objectives of the first field research period were to gain access to the field and to gain more knowledge about the actual practices of the VSB programme. This initial field research period was extremely helpful in order to identify differences between published information on the VSB and its implementation on the ground. Moreover, I came into contact with two neighbourhood associations in Hay Mohammadi and Sidi Moumen that helped me to connect to resettled people and the residents of *bidonville* communities. Thus, the decision to concentrate on the *recasement* of Karyan Central to Nouvelle Lahraouiyine was partly the result of coincidences in my way to get access to the field. Local gatekeepers provided me with implicit local knowledge, shared experiences, connected me with other relevant people, and later tried to support the survey whenever possible. Without gatekeepers, it would have been much more difficult to collect data from the respective communities.

The choice of the settlements was further impacted by the constant threat of demolitions. In December 2016, prior to the start of the survey, the authorities demolished the *bidonville* Zaraba in Hay Mohammadi, which could have been a suitable comparison group. Moreover, the dwellers of Karyan Capitaine Montugué were at risk of forced eviction at any given time, as happened in July 2017. Moreover, residents of Er-Rhamna several times reported rumours about the upcoming resettlement, which accordingly should have started in January 2017 and, later, in March 2017. Although the rumours in Er-Rhamna were not very credible, the permanent uncertainty about demolition, especially in Hay Mohammadi, impacted on the research. First, this meant increased pressure to finish with the comparison group interviews in *bidonvilles*. If the resettlement had started during the empirical data collection period, the data could not have been used. Second, *bidonville* dwellers' first impression was often that our survey would be part of the government's preparation for resettlement. Thus, prior to the interviews, the research assistants often had to clarify and insist that our survey would be scholarly work only. In case people still asked whether we could help them against perceived injustices of the resettlement, we had to deny them help. However, people mostly knew that we had no power to help them.

Prior to the main research period, the Netherlands Institute Morocco (NIMAR) assisted me with the application for a research permit. Without the research permit, household surveys would not have been possible. Especially in Er-Rhamna, local public authorities felt uncomfortable with the presence of a foreign researcher in a *bidonville* and continuously tried to impede the research, despite my obtaining a valid research permit. After the first two weeks in Er-Rhamna, one *mqadem*, who is the lowest representative of the Ministry of the Interior and comparable to a block supervisor, stopped a research assistant and I in the streets

of Er-Rhamna and asked me for my research permit. The letter, a copy of which he later confiscated, clearly states that the Ministry of the Interior had authorised the research activities and that it had informed all local authorities concerned by the research. Nonetheless, the *mqadem* insisted on another authorisation by his supervisor (the *qa'ïd*), although I had already talked to him before. Despite appointments, we did not meet the *qa'ïd* the following days. When the *mqadem* saw us the next time, he tried to send us out of the neighbourhood because of the still-outstanding appointment with the *qa'ïd*. According to what he said in front of residents, it would be too dangerous for a foreigner to walk inside a *bidonville* such as Er-Rhamna – not only because of the risk of being aggressed, but also because of the risk of getting infections because of unhealthy food and water. This typical dispraise of *bidonville* communities was surprising, as the *mqadem* himself is a resident of Er-Rhamna. Furthermore, he said that he would not care about my Moroccan research assistants, but about me as foreigner who would cause him problems with the embassy in the event that something happened. That Thursday, we could convince him to make copies of our passports and to allow us to continue our work at our own risk until the appointment with the *qa'ïd* the following Monday. The following Saturday he met us while we were conducting an interview on the streets inside Er-Rhamna and called for immediate support from other public employees. They escorted us out of the neighbourhood and immediately sent us to the *qa'ïd*. That day, the *qa'ïd* was concerned with a demonstration against the closing of a public market hall on the other side of Er-Rhamna and was not much interested in our issue. He just said: "Go and do your survey!" However, after several weeks, another *mqadem* contacted my research assistant, who was waiting outside the neighbourhood in a café. He asked her again what she was doing and told her to tell me that local state authorities were informed that I had taken pictures inside Er-Rhamna. Because of that, I was told not to enter the neighbourhood anymore. In case of disrespect, they would apply 'other methods.' Fortunately, we had almost finished fieldwork in Er-Rhamna and left the neighbourhood after one-and-a-half additional working days.

Another example that shows authorities' concerns about my research was the attempt to directly ask for an interview with local decision makers. The local committee at the prefecture of Ain Sebaa and Hay Mohammadi is the main implementing authority of the *recasement* of Karyan Central. The head of the local committee is the *bacha*, who takes all major decisions regarding the resettlement implementation. After waiting for some time at the prefecture, the *bacha* invited me into his office and asked me about the aim of my research and whether I had a research permit. He agreed on an interview the following Tuesday, but insisted on checking whether the prefecture had received a confirmation letter concerning my research permit from the Ministry of the Interior. When I returned to the prefecture on Tuesday, his secretary told me that he had not yet checked my research permit and that I should come back on the Friday. On the Friday, the same person told me that he could not find any confirmation letter of the Ministry of the Interior, and referred me to a friend of him at the *wilaya* of Casablanca-Settat, the highest level of territorial deconcentration. That Monday, I waited at the reception of the *wilaya*. After a while, the receptionist told me to leave, because the responsible person would not be there. I insisted on waiting longer, and after fifteen more minutes, he let me pass to meet him. The officer helped me search for the particular notifications during almost two hours and in more than eight offices. It was now clear that the prefecture of Ain Sebaa and Hay Mohammadi had been informed by letter of my research already at the end of October 2016. The next day, the secretary officer at the prefecture confirmed that he had received a fax with the confirmation letter of the *wilaya*. However, the *bacha* would not be there, and I was told to come back the next day. The next day, I waited for more than two hours in front of the office of the *bacha*. Then, he told me to come back the next day at 3:00 p.m. The next day at 3:00 p.m., the *bacha* was not in his in office. After half an hour of waiting, he

told me that he had a meeting at 4:00 p.m. and therefore could not answer my questions. According to him, it would be better to answer the questions in a written way, so he would have more time to think about the right answers. Having no other choice, I dictated the questions to his secretary, who ensured me that my issue would be assigned priority. Despite several empty promises by phone, I never received any response. Other experiences with public authorities at the *muqataa* of Sidi Moumen-Saada and Lahraouiyine bore similarities. However, the unsuccessful attempt to talk with the *bacha* of Ain Sebaa and Hay Mohammadi was also useful, because it offered me insights into the practices of public authorities to deal with people that were not yet resettled (see section 5.2.2). In addition, it was possible to have informal conversations with the secretary officer who shared with me the administration's point of view on the *recasement* of Karyan Central.

Starting with the next section, I slowly move toward the empirical parts of the thesis. Next, chapter 4 presents the VSB programme in detail, which includes the first aspects of the document analysis. It begins with a critical discussion of definitions and how their use reflects the primary political objective behind the VSB programme – the eradication of a specific form of housing, namely *bidonvilles*. Thereafter, section 4.2 emphasises the reasons why *bidonvilles* have become politically 'undesired'. It engages with the objectives and implicit assumptions behind the VSB programme. Then, in section 4.3, I discuss the different modes of implementation and support mechanisms within the VSB framework before looking more closely at the interventions in Casablanca, with a particular focus on Hay Mohammadi and Karyan Central (section 4.4). Consequently, the descriptive empirical material presented in section 5.1 puts into question the implicit assumptions behind the objectives and modes of implementation of the VSB programme. Moreover, it offers a basis for the discussion of the two research questions, to which the section 5.2 (RQ 1) and chapter 6 (RQ 2) refer.

4 Morocco's *Villes Sans Bidonvilles* Programme

The VSB programme has the overall goal of permanently eradicating all *bidonvilles* in 85 towns and cities in Morocco. Established in 2004, the programme aims to rehouse more than 350,000 households living in numerous *bidonvilles* all over the country (MHUPV 2012, 14). Through this rigorous resettlement approach, the Moroccan government aims to promote the right to adequate and affordable housing for all, which is in line with international agendas such as the MDGs and their successors, the SDGs. However, the VSB programme follows a plurality of objectives that I refer to in section 4.2 which at least partially stand in conflict with the goal of providing adequate housing for *bidonville* dwellers (see also section 4.1). Nonetheless, in 2010, UN-Habitat (2010b) honoured the VSB programme as "one of the world's most successful and comprehensive slum reduction and improvement programmes." This 'best practice' honour makes the VSB programme a case study of interest even beyond Morocco. This is also because most projects in large cities such as Casablanca are realised using a relatively unique sites-and-services approach, the third-party approach, that is based on the contribution of small-scale private investors (see section 4.3). Thus, the VSB programme might offer a certain level of policy innovation that could be useful for researchers and practitioners in the field of affordable housing policies in general. Therefore, this thesis closely analyses one particular third-party resettlement operation, which is that of Karyan Central, formerly one of the largest and oldest *bidonvilles* in Morocco (see section 4.4). However, before coming to this case study, this chapter discusses definitions and diverging meanings of 'slum' and '*bidonville*' (see section 4.1). This will lead to a discussion of the abovementioned potential policy contradictions inherent to the VSB programme (see section 4.2), presenting an indispensable foundation for the understanding of the following case study analysis.

4.1 Definitions Matter! What Does *Bidonville* Mean?

The name '*Villes Sans Bidonvilles*' (VSB) is commonly translated into English as 'Cities Without Slums' (UN-Habitat 2010b; Al Omrane 2010; Bogaert 2011, 712; Martin and Mathema 2008, V; World Bank 2010). This translation implies the relation to the 'Cities Without Slums' directive of the World Bank and UN-Habitat, first established by their joint organization the Cities Alliance in 2000 (Huchzermeyer 2011, 1; UN 2000). However, 'slum' and '*bidonville*' mean different things. This is important to consider, because different meanings lead to different policy directions and a different understanding of the intentions of the VSB programme.

Since its first application, the term 'slum' has always carried a negative connotation, although it lacked a commonly agreed-on definition and has changed in meaning over time. The first definition of the term 'slum' can be found in the Vocabulary of the Flash Language of 1812, according to which the word 'slum' is a non-physical synonym for 'racket' or 'criminal trade' (Davis 2006, 21). In the early days of the industrialisation of the Anglo-Saxon countries, the term 'slum' was assigned a physical meaning, referring to "poorest quality housing and the most unsanitary conditions" (UN-Habitat 2003, 9). At that time, the word 'slum' was derived from the word 'slump', "which was commonly used to refer to a 'marshy place'" (Huchzermeyer 2011, 5); this was due to the fact that slums were situated at the most undesirable locations, for example in basements or on muddy soils (Gilbert 2007, 702). These "unhealthy areas" (Britain's Housing Act of 1875, quoted in Garside 1988, 24) were not only perceived as dangerous to the people inhabiting

them, but also as potential sources of epidemics affecting the entire city (Gilbert 2007, 702). Furthermore, slums were considered "centres of crime" (Gilbert 2007, 702), hosting people with an "evil character" (Gilbert 2007, 702). These pejorative, stigmatising connotations of the term 'slum' led to the avoidance of the word – at least academically – since the beginning of the twentieth century (Gilbert 2007: 697, United Nations Human Settlements Programme 2003, 9).

However, at the end of the twentieth century, UN-Habitat and the World Bank reintroduced the word 'slum' – with all its stigmatising connotations – into the academic discourse through some trendsetting publications in the context of the Cities Alliance and the Millennium Development Goals debate (Gilbert 2007, 697; Fawaz 2013, 29). In the Cities Alliance Action Plan, the first of these publications, slums are explicitly described as "exposed to disease [and] crime", and inhabited by a "marginalized and largely disenfranchised" population (World Bank and UN-Habitat 2000, 1). The primary goal of the Cities Alliance's Action Plan is to improve the lives of 100 million slum dwellers by 2020. In 2000, the goal was included as Target 11[20] in the MDGs. This careless initial formulation of Target 11 has influenced the mode of political intervention (Arabindoo 2011; Huchzermeyer 2011). According to Huchzermeyer (2011, 34f), the slogan 'Cities Without Slums' has fit well with widely existing urban planning strategies to improve cities' global competitiveness and has fuelled efforts to achieve slum-free cities through forced evictions and simple resettlement. As such, the implicit notion of achieving slum-free cities has been confused with slum clearance and slum elimination, although the Cities Alliance called for slum upgrading as best practice. Thus, the modest goal of improving the living conditions of 100 million slum dwellers provoked a worsening of living conditions through the displacement of thousands of urban poor from inner-city areas to urban peripheries. Arabindoo (2011, 637) adds that these policies have not only been inadequate in addressing the needs of poor people living in slums, they have also falsely assumed that all slum dwellers are poor: "Not all slum dwellers are poor, and more importantly, a significant proportion of the urban poor do not reside in the slums."

In 2002, still in the context of the MDGs, international organisations adopted a more neutral definition of 'slum' recommended by a UN expert group as the operational definition of 'The Challenge of Slums' report (UN-Habitat 2003). It aimed to increase global the quantifiability and measurability of 'slums' through a list of poor housing quality standards. Following this, slums are "an area that combines, to various extents, the following characteristics: … inadequate access to safe water; inadequate access to sanitation and other infrastructure; poor structural quality of housing; overcrowding; insecure residential status" (UN-Habitat 2003, 12). Even if this definition avoids the hardly measurable social aspects, there is consensus about the fact that slums lack healthy vital conditions (Di Muzio 2008, 312). For its estimation of the global slum population, UN-Habitat (2003, 13) defined a slum dweller as subjected to at least one of the abovementioned characteristics, measured through specific quantifiable indicators. Following the UN's definition, the term 'slum' – synonymous with the term 'insalubrious housing' – mainly refers to housing of poor quality. Based on the quality criteria of this definition, various forms of housing – from refugee camps to hostels, deteriorated public housing, and squatter settlements – could be classified as slums. To distinguish between them, UN-Habitat (2003, 9) adopted Stokes' (1962) terms 'slums of hope' and 'slums of despair' and used these terms to relate to different development pathways of slums. Whereas 'slums of hope' are developing and consolidating in a progressive way, 'slums of despair' decline due to insufficient or absent

[20] Target 11 later became MDG Target 7-D.

investment under given structural conditions. However, the approach's disadvantage is that it is often impossible to describe linear pathways of development for entire slums, as they are often characterised by heterogeneous, more individual developments within the same neighbourhood (Owusu et al. 2008).

Whereas the term 'slum' predominantly refers to housing quality, other terms such as 'informal', 'squatter' or 'spontaneous' settlement synonymously refer to legal status as a key defining element. Thus, every settlement deprived of formal land or property titles (e.g. shantytowns) may be called 'informal' regardless of quality criteria. This means that hostels or deteriorated public housing estates – although they may fulfil the quality criteria of a slum – are not 'informal settlements'. In contrast, the term includes settlements of sound structural quality, but without formal land titles. Examples may be '*habitat non-réglementaire*' in Morocco or most '*ashwa'iyyat*' in Egypt. In both neighbourhoods, individual people or developers buy land from a landowner, but construct housing structures without building permits. They look very similar to formal neighbourhoods, but owners do not possess formal property titles (cf. Ameur and Naciri 1985; Sims 2010). Similar to slums, also informal settlements are often subjected to stigmatisation, especially if they look visibly different to the formal city (cf. Arabindoo 2011; Dovey and King 2011). In this sense, the 'informality' of these settlements is confused with 'abnormality' and 'anarchy' as a contrast to the physical and social 'order' of the 'ordinary' or 'formal' city (Lombard 2014, 36; Meth 2013, 539). The social stigma of abnormality may persist despite regularisation and consolidation processes and is also intentionally kept and used to justify clearance and resettlement policies (cf. Gilbert 2007; Lombard 2014, 36; Meth 2013, 539). This is even more problematic, as the differentiation between formal and informal legal status is – because of colonial legacies, corruption, and traditional land right systems – often less obvious than mainstream discourses about 'informal settlements' would assume (cf. A. Roy 2005). In contrast to the problematic black-and-white differentiation between formal and informal, Yiftachel (2009) introduced the term 'grey spaces' to refer to various degrees of formal recognition and tolerance that coexist as integral part of so-called 'urban informality'.

Throughout this work, the defining distinction between 'slums' or 'insalubrious housing' (referring to quality criteria) and 'informal settlements' (referring to legal status) is kept consistent. However, a third, more contextual category of terms may combine quality aspects and legal status in a specific geographic area. Terms differ between or even within countries, regions or cities. Some examples are '*favela*' (Brazil), '*gecekondu*' (Turkey), '*chawls*' (parts of India), '*kampung*' (Indonesia), '*colonias populares*' (Mexico), or '*gourbiville*' (Tunisia) (UN-Habitat 2003; Gilbert 2007, 699; Huchzermeyer 2011, 6; Lieberherr-Gardiol 2006, 279). To be able to use each term in an appropriate way requires context-specific definitions. Focusing on Morocco, I do this in the following section for the French term '*bidonville*' and the word '*karyan*', its counterpart in Darija.

The French term '*bidonville*' dates back to the era of the French protectorate in the 1920s in Casablanca (Cattedra 2006, 128). On the one hand, the colonial administration was unwilling to share urban space with and to provide housing to a growing number of Moroccan rural-urban migrants seeking job opportunities in the rapidly growing city. On the other hand, their cheap labour was crucial for colonial industries. This led to the construction of the first informal settlement in Casablanca. Related to its location in an ancient central quarry, it was called 'Karyan', a Moroccanisation of the French word for quarry (*carrière*) (MHUPV 2012, 11; Arrif 1999, 300; Baduel 2011, 103). The same settlement also got the name Bidonville, a reference to its building materials consisting of corrugated iron sheets and petrol tins (*bidons*) (Sieburg 1938, 206; Naciri 1980, 13). Until now, both expressions are common in Morocco. In the Maghreb, according to

Cattedra (2006, 128f), the term '*bidonville*' became detached from its particular origin and quickly became generalised as a synonym for similar settlements. In the 1960s, it was introduced into general French dictionaries which defined *bidonvilles* as "urban or suburban quarters constituted of shacks made out of recycled materials, in particular metals originating from old tins [...] hosting a rural population, [...] who does not find any regular work in the city" (Librairie Larousse 1960, 123 [own translation]). Like the English expression 'slum', the term '*bidonville*' has suffered from stigmatisation. *Bidonvilles* have been treated as sanitarian threats (Cattedra 2006, 131) and are even commonly described as if they were a disease themselves – an urban cancer (Zaki 2005, 55). Moreover, *bidonvilles* are seen as "prejudicial to development" (King Mohammed VI, quoted in Zaki 2005, 55), as the cities' wasteground (Zaki 2005, 52), or even "as a breeding ground for radical Islamists" (Bogaert 2011, 721) and as a "foyer of terrorists" (De La Varde 1955, quoted in Cattedra 2006, 143).

In the later decades of the twentieth century, the term '*bidonville*' according to Cattedra (2006, 135ff) has been detached from its semantic roots and from regional limitations. It has also been used to describe precarious housing conditions in the rest of the world, mostly in the Global South, but also in Europe after the Second World War (Lallaoui 1993). As such, '*bidonville*' has become the most commonly used French translation of the English term 'slum' (Naciri 1980, 13). However, recent definitions of the term '*bidonville*' in Morocco look relatively similar to the description of the ancient Bidonville in Casablanca. They have focused on physical aspects and especially building materials. In its report 'The Challenge of Slums', UN-Habitat (2003, 10) defines '*bidonvilles*' as "precarious settlements made out of iron sheets and tins (*bidons*)." The Moroccan Ministry of Housing, Urban Planning and City Policy (MHUPV 2012, 12) translates '*bidonville*' as 'shantytown' and published the following definition as a basis for the VSB programme: "A shantytown is a set of shacks serving as shelters built with an assortment of light reclaimed materials (iron sheets, wood, etc.) on land that is devoid of basic infrastructures (drain systems, drinking water adduction, power-network, etc.)."

Against the background of this definition, the concepts of 'slum' and '*bidonville*' differ in such an important way that the often-applied translation 'Cities Without Slums' for *'Villes Sans Bidonvilles'* is unsatisfactory and oversimplified. UN-Habitat (2010b) and the World Bank (2010, 55) contradict their own, internationally agreed-on definition of the term 'slum' by using this translation in their publications about the VSB programme. In her case study of Rabat-Salé, as part of the UN-Habitat report 'The Challenge of Slums', Navez-Bouchanine (2003b, 7) lists several types of housing, which all can be classified as 'slums'. *Bidonville* is only one part of it. The list also includes deteriorating old towns (*medinas*) and *habitat non-réglementaire* (also *habitat clandestin*), which is an informal settlement with a higher status, often constructed by a developer at one moment in time and constructed directly out of durable materials such as bricks and concrete (cf. Ameur and Naciri 1985; Iraki 2009). Similarly, Benlahcen Tlemçani and Missamou (2000, 112) have used the term '*habitat insalubre*' (insalubrious housing) to group analyses of housing conditions into *medinas*, *bidonvilles*, and *habitat non-réglementaire*. Consequently, '*bidonville*' represents only one type of 'insalubrious housing' or 'slum'. At least in the Moroccan case, similar to the translations of Navez-Bouchanine (2003b, 8) and the MHUPV (2012, 12), the term '*bidonville*' is therefore best translated as 'shantytown', which I apply consistently throughout this work. In this thesis, a '*bidonville*' or 'shantytown' is understood as a neighbourhood that has developed in the sense of Turner (1977) in an incremental way by auto-construction and mostly without formal land or property titles.

Coming back to the beginning and the translation of the VSB programme, following the abovementioned definitions, the programme *Villes Sans Bidonvilles* has the target of realising cities without shantytowns, but not of developing "slum-free cities", as is predicted by one of the main stakeholders, Al Omrane (2010, 3). In fact, the VSB programme is limited to the eradication of the *bidonville* that according to King Mohammed VI does not match with the idea of a modern Morocco, as discussed in the next section. Improving the conditions in all kinds of 'slums', including *medinas*, run-down public housing estates, overcrowded tenements, and *habitat non-réglementaire*, is not the objective of the VSB programme. Instead, some scholars working on the VSB programme fear that the programme simply moves people out of slowly progressing neighbourhoods – *bidonvilles* that share similarities with Stokes' (1962) idea of a slum of hope – into slowly deteriorating neighbourhoods that, in the sense of Stokes, are likely to develop into 'slums of despair' (Bogaert 2011, 724, 2013, 42; Toutain 2013, 103). To conclude, the translation of the French word '*bidonville*' into the English word 'slum' is inadequate in the context of the VSB programme.

4.2 The Programme's Plurality of Objectives

The VSB programme not only is a reference to the 'Cities without Slums' initiative of the Cities Alliance, it also is an example of how governments have (voluntarily) misinterpreted the initial target of achieving slum-free cities. In its report on the VSB programme, the Ministry of Housing, Urban Planning and City Policy (2012, 7) writes, "'high-performance' countries have achieved significant progress in the reduction of shantytowns and are clearly and resolutely committed to achieving the 7-D Goal of the *Millennium Development Goals*, as well as in the prevention of new shanty cores" (original emphasis retained). The sole focus on shantytowns and the prominent use of the word 'reduction' reflect Huchzermeyer's concerns about the misleading effects of the slogan 'Cities Without Slums' and the MDGs (Huchzermeyer 2011). Concerning the VSB programme, this impression is further enhanced by its preference for resettlement and displacement that is opposed to upgrading policies recommended by UN-Habitat, the Cities Alliance, and, later, the SDGs. Hence, there are severe doubts regarding whether the programme's primary focus is on improving the lives of (all) slum dwellers, as suggested by MDG Target 7-D, to which the MUPHV refers in its report on the VSB programme. Doubts also arise because the same report states the following primary objective: "The [VSB] program[me] aims at eradicating all shanties, which account for some 362,327 households […] in 85 cities and urban areas" (MHUPV 2012, 14). Moreover, programme authorities measure the programme's progress by simply stating the number of cities declared shanty-free and the number of people that were moved out of *bidonvilles* (cf. MHUPV 2011, 21f). It is noteworthy that UN-Habitat (2010b) itself honoured the VSB programme by referring primarily to its quantitative achievements of *reducing* the number of slum dwellers and without any remark on whether it has also *improved* people's situation. In this context, Navez-Bouchanine (2003a, 70) writes that authorities drive resettlement approaches mainly with the ambition of clearing the 'occupied' sites, whereas the improvement of dwellers' living conditions plays a subordinate role.

According to Bogaert (2018), the VSB programme is a crucial part of a political strategy to manifest a new 'globalised authoritarianism' – a form of hegemonic rule that is largely materialised in the form of neoliberal urban projects. Through the construction of urban megaprojects as well as socially framed programmes in deprived urban neighbourhoods (e.g. VSB, INDH), King Mohammed VI is implementing his own, hardly negotiated, top-down vision of a future, modern Morocco on the ground. The VSB programme shows how

the monarch is trying to reinvent the image of the monarchy as a progressively developing democracy and to reinforce his image as 'the king of the poor', while at the same trying to maintain central power in the royal palace. Hence, the VSB programme is the outcome of an authoritarian planning regime that implements a particular national urban vision of which *bidonvilles* are not a part – for at least four different political reasons discussed below.

Against this background, I argue that the overall goal of the VSB programme is not to improve the living conditions of all 'slum' dwellers, but to eradicate a for several reasons undesired form of housing, which is called '*bidonville*' or '*karyan*'. The reasons for this require a close discussion of the complex political reasoning and the aims of *bidonville* resettlement in twenty-first century Morocco. To do so, I distinguish four distinct, however, interrelated dimensions within the objectives of the VSB programme, which are 'social', 'worlding', 'security', and 'business'. Hence, the following analysis of this plurality of objectives further questions whether the VSB programme primarily focuses on people's demands for 'adequate' housing. Rather, it shows that Morocco's resettlement programme follows a rationale that is typical of current resettlement projects around the world (see section 2.5).

The social dimension

The origins of the VSB programme date back to the beginning of Mohammed VI's reign in 1999. The new king promised to break with the open repression under the reign of his father Hassan II and presented himself through mainstream media and speeches as a social reformer with a sympathetic ear for the needs of the poor. While clearly following a modernist vision of an economically strong and liberal Morocco, Mohammed VI repeatedly stressed the importance of socio-political reforms, integrating topics such as human rights, poverty alleviation, 'good governance' and citizen participation into his early agenda (Bogaert 2018, 6). Newly established institutions such as the 'Mohammed V Foundation for Solidarity' in 1999 and the 'Hassan II Fund for Economic and Social Development' in 2000 were intended to support the social agenda of the new monarch (Catusse 2005). Thereby, his ascension to power coincided, first, with reforms of the *gouvernment d'alternance* under socialist Prime Minister El Youssoufi (see section 2.6). The *gouvernment d'alternance* had already started a process of reflection concerning past approaches to *bidonvilles* and had started to develop project and policy schemes that were more sensitive to social aspects (cf. Navez-Bouchanine 2002, 2003a, 2008). Second, the period around the turn of the millennium was characterised by shifts on the international political agenda, with a more explicit focus on poverty alleviation and the adoption of the MDGs as its most recognised outcome (Hasan et al. 2005; A. Roy 2010, 74ff). Against this reformist background – some have called it "the reinvention of social policy" in Morocco (Bogaert 2018, 168; Catusse 2005) – ambitious programmes such as the VSB, launched in 2004, and the INDH, launched in 2005, were framed as 'social initiatives' primarily directed towards poverty alleviation and human development (cf. Martín 2006). However, they should also be seen as tools through which the monarchy is trying to secure and legitimise its own powerful position (cf. Bergh 2012; Bogaert 2018).

Indeed, governmental reports and documents of international organisations such as the World Bank (2006) and UN-Habitat (2011) have stressed the social dimension of the VSB programme. They portray the VSB programme as a political tool responding to the human right to adequate housing, which has been codified as part of the Moroccan Constitution in 2011 (Madani et al. 2012, 20). Furthermore, the MHUPV (2012, 14) calls the VSB a priority of "the Moroccan Government in the areas of social development, the fight against poverty, and the reduction of exclusion in urban areas." Likewise, the VSB's main developer Al

Omrane (2010, 1) calls itself "a major player in sustainable development and a key instrument of public authorities' strategy for decent housing, poverty reduction and urban inclusion," which "intervenes within a global vision of human development and social integration." Both reports refer to royal directives as a central reference of the VSB programme. In a speech in 2006, Mohammed VI (quoted in Al Omrane 2010, 1) stressed that "our ultimate goal is not only to have cities without slums, nor is it to replace the latter with blocks of concrete that are soulless and socially insensitive. Rather, we intend to transform our cities into environments that are conducive to good living conditions, conviviality and dignity […]." Hence, against the background of a new, reformist political climate, the framing of the VSB programme as a social development initiative has contributed to the narrative of the royal, therefore, 'good' programme that helps the 'excluded' urban poor to integrate through 'adequate' housing into society. According to Rachid, president of the community-based association Chihab in Karyan Central, this point of view was adopted by many *bidonville* residents convinced of the social benefits of the VSB programme.

However, there are at least two problems with the assumptions underlying the narrative of the VSB as a programme targeting social development and poverty alleviation. First, there is no theory supporting the simplistic assumption that the eradication of a certain form of housing (*bidonvilles*) by resettling its population to apartment houses promotes social development or reduces poverty. In fact, as discussed in chapter 2, spatial policies with a mere focus on shelter-related aspects of housing are rather likely to shift social problems from one place to another. Second, there is no convincing argument and empirical evidence that support the assumption that social problems are more concentrated in *bidonvilles* than in other disadvantaged neighbourhoods – in the overcrowded shared flats of the old working-class neighbourhoods, in the *medina*, or in *habitat non-réglementaire*. Bartoli (2011) is clear on that: "Nothing indicates that poverty is particularly urban and even less that it is concentrated in *bidonvilles*." In fact, an objective view of national census data and household data from a USAID study (Martin and Mathema 2008, 2; World Bank 2006, 29) shows that only a low share of *bidonville* dwellers have an income below the national poverty line (see also section 5.1.6). Bartoli (2011) argues that *bidonvilles* rather received primary political attention because they are visible and because policies directed towards them could themselves be visible signs of public action. This visibility – the visible difference to the ordinary, modern city – is certainly a crucial aspect within political reasoning to eradicate *bidonvilles* (Dovey and King 2011, 22f; Zaki 2005, 52f). Hence, in public discourse, they represent visible marks of poverty and exclusion.

Public authorities have acted without any structural analysis of the problems of *bidonvilles* and without any empirical evidence for the equation '*bidonville* = poverty = urban exclusion' (Zemni and Bogaert 2011, 411). Nevertheless, the *bidonville* carries the stigma of being an 'abnormal' part of the city – materialising all negative consequences of urbanisation (cf. Navez-Bouchanine 2012, 203; Arrif 1999, 299). Thus, the proclaimed objectives of the VSB programme, poverty alleviation, and the fight against urban exclusion are based on weak assumptions and are largely the result of stigmatisation. Indeed, as Zaki (2005, 106ff) shows based on a discourse analysis of public newspapers, *bidonvilles* are widely stigmatised as places of poverty, located outside the 'normal' Morocco at the margins of society. This stigmatisation has increased in the aftermath of the suicide bombing in 2003, when it developed into an equation of 'poverty = frustration = terrorism' (cf. Iraki 2006, 64; Navez-Bouchanine 2012, 212; Toutain 2011, 170; Zaki 2005, 107; Zemni and Bogaert 2011, 409). Hence, the VSB programme not only is reducing general social problems to just a question of housing, but also further builds on the stigmatising interdependencies of poverty, urban exclusion, and extremism that lack empirical evidence. This leads directly to the 'security dimension' of the VSB programme.

The security dimension

As mentioned in section 2.6, political action towards *bidonvilles* in Morocco has always been driven by security objectives following the logics of an 'urbanism of urgency'. According to Rachik (2002, 9f), social unrest in response to social discontent temporarily increases social pressure on the state and forces it to react in an urgent way aimed at the fast re-establishment of social peace. Hence, these 'periods of conflict' are the main 'creative source' of urban planning in *bidonvilles*, which have a long history as centres of social contestation, unrest, and riots (Essahel 2015). The temporary occurrence of riots and uprisings repositions the *bidonville* on the political agenda after periods of neglect and ignorance. However, urgent political responses tend to prioritise reactive, short-termed policies with the primary aim to eradicate the *sources* of discontent, but disregard the underlying *reasons* for discontent. Thus, typical urgent policies include demolitions and resettlement that fail to present more sustainable solutions fostering people's access to all kinds of urban opportunities (cf. Abouhani 2011, 232; Beier 2016, 4ff). This close entanglement of security motivations and urban planning is not a unique Moroccan phenomenon. For example, Goodfellow (2013) described the 'politics of noise' for the case of Kampala, Uganda, where marginalised population groups – deprived of any formal form of political participation – regularly took to the streets, which was followed by political repression, but also short-term concessions. Likewise, in Egypt and Tunisia, social unrest, riots, as well as the rising influence of Islamist thoughts have largely motivated political action towards informal settlements (cf. Beier 2018a).

In Morocco, the interdependencies of security targets and urban policies again became obvious in the aftermath of the 2003 suicide bombings in the city centre of Casablanca. The fact that the young attackers came from *bidonvilles* in Casablanca's neighbourhood Sidi Moumen mainly gave rise to two consequences. First, the stigmatisation of *bidonvilles* and its inhabitants increased. These settlements were then perceived even more "as breeding and recruiting grounds for the transnationally organised jihadi groups presumably linked to al-Qaeda" (Zemni and Bogaert 2011, 409), as a "shelter for criminals" (Arrif 1999, 313), or as a "space of social and moral deviation (if not neglect)" (Zaki 2005, 63). Also, Mohammed VI (quoted in MHUPV 2013, 68) called them "a source of frustration, exclusion, deviation, and extremism." Secondly, the attacks have led to a strengthened policy focus on marginalised areas, culminating in the launch of the VSB programme in 2004 (Bogaert 2011, 720; Iraki 2006, 64). It would certainly be too simplistic to argue that the 2003 attacks were the major reason for the VSB programme, but they were certainly a major trigger of political action and of a more repressive political rhetoric towards *bidonvilles* (Navez-Bouchanine 2012, 171).

At the forefront, Mohammed VI called for intensified action to eradicate all *bidonvilles* in Morocco. In 2003, in his first King's Speech (*Discours du Trône*) after the suicide attacks, he stated that the current situation of the *bidonvilles* "bears the risk to become uncontrollable and that our cities transform into homes of exclusion, ostracism, [and] hate" (quoted in MHUPV 2013, 75). Thus, one part of the political reasoning related to security, which is behind the concerted approach towards *bidonvilles*, was that moving its dwellers out of overt marginalisation into 'adequate' housing would help them to move up the social ladder and to become less receptive to extremist thoughts (cf. Zaki 2013, 39). Mohammed VI highlighted that decent housing played a crucial role for people's "moral stability" and for the reduction of social inequality and marginalisation. The elimination of insalubrious housing would then be a basic precondition, allowing people to live a "peaceful life" and for their children "to develop into good citizens of tomorrow" (quoted in MHUPV 2013, 123). Consequently, Bogaert (2011, 722) argues that the VSB programme is aimed at "the

(trans)formation of the slum dwellers into good citizens." Al Omrane (2010, 6) itself declares that the move into new houses and access to homeownership should induce a "new social behaviour." The envisioned behavioural change of former *bidonville* dwellers should move them away from the cultural 'abnormalities' of *bidonvilles* and enhance their integration into liberal market systems (Bogaert 2018, 240f).

However, there is also another security reasoning inherent to the idea of eradicating all *bidonvilles*. This is more directly related to the spatial characteristics of self-built housing. The extreme housing densities and narrow streets present a burden for territorial control. In large *bidonvilles* such as Er-Rhamna or Karyan Central, *mqadmins* fulfil primary control tasks through regular reporting to the next higher prefectural level, the *caïd*. They can also rely on a network of 'invisible' informants. However, access to *bidonvilles* for police forces is limited, which is perceived as a problem for controlling mass demonstrations and uprisings (Navez-Bouchanine 2012, 169). Therefore, moving people out of dense neighbourhoods may also allow for the police or even the military to intervene more easily (cf. Bogaert 2018, 213; Dalzell 2006). Moreover, as the analysis in chapters 5 and 6 will show, the move into apartments may also weaken people's sense of community solidarity as a major driver of collective action in *bidonvilles* (cf. Zaki 2010; Iraki 2006; Essahel 2015).

Besides, resettlement has also always carried a notion of punishment for 'deviant' urban population groups. Most *bidonville* residents prefer in situ upgrading instead of sites-and-services projects (*recasement*) or resettlement into subsidised apartments (World Bank 2006, 36). However, from the point of view of the state, in situ upgrading is an additional, costly[21] favour to *bidonville* dwellers that is quickly abandoned as a sanction of 'bad' behaviour. For example, in situ upgrading was widely abandoned after the bread riots had erupted in Casablanca's *bidonville* Ben M'Sik in 1981 (cf. Benlahcen Tlemçani and Missamou 2000, 115). Similarly, the VSB programme only included in situ solutions at the beginning and under the still-recent influence of the *gouvernement d'alternance*. After new suicide attacks in 2007, the in situ approach was completely abandoned in favour of resettlement solutions (Zaki 2013, 45).

Finally, it again has to be underlined that the launch of the VSB programme in the aftermath of the 2003 attacks only marked the climax of a political discourse increasingly concerned with the negative externalities of the *bidonville*. As a supposed 'breeding ground' of crime and extremism, it was blamed for affecting the image of the 'beautiful city' (Navez-Bouchanine 2012, 171) and the wellbeing of the 'good citizen' (Bogaert 2018, 240f). This leads to the next dimension of 'worlding', which is closely interlinked with topics such as 'global competitiveness' and 'modernisation'.

The 'worlding' dimension

Since the late 1980s, with the emergence of the "attention economy" (Franck 1998), the notion of global cities as hubs of international capital flows (Sassen 2001), and the recognition of cities as competitive engines of growth (Clarke Annez and Buckley 2009), the economic and strategic importance of cities has considerably increased. To raise international attention and to attract investors and tourists, city planners have responded with the 'festivalisation' of cities, the construction of urban megaprojects, and the hosting of international events (Häußermann and Siebel 1993; Hubbard and Hall 1998; Turok 2004). While these

[21] From the perspective of the state, in situ upgrading not only is costly because of the more complex nature of intervention, but also because the state waives claims to profitable central land.

‘western’ concepts have largely disregarded cities in the Global South (Robinson 2002), southern metropolises have developed their own dynamics that have converged with state-led modernisation and political strategies of post-colonial emancipation. Focusing mainly on Asian countries, A. Roy and Ong (2011) recognised that policy makers in emerging metropolises challenged their role as subalterns of globalisation, which concepts like the ‘global city’ had attributed to them. So-called ‘worlding cities’ continuously compete with each other, rank, and compare themselves on a global scale and, thus, challenge their own position of being in the world. Instead of focusing on the city’s quantifiable position in the world economy, the concept of ‘worlding’ looks at worldviews, individual perceptions, and pictures of the world (Radhakrishnan 2005; A. Roy 2014).

Thus, according to A. Roy and Ong (2011) ‘worlding’ refers to the act of being in the world, by influencing worldviews, individual perceptions, and pictures of the world. It refers to a subjective, often fictitious construction of ‘world-class’, which governments may influence by focusing on symbolically charged megaprojects or the hosting of international events. Cities are a prime destination for these investments and marketing labels such as ‘world-class’ or ‘international’ because of their increasing global economic significance and their visibility on global markets of attention (Paul 2004, 572; Franck 1998). Hence, ‘worlding’ has to be seen against the background of cities becoming global brands that compete with each other on global markets for (foreign) investment and tourists. Ong (2011, 2) argues that urban agglomerations “have become centres of enormous political investment, economic growth, and cultural vitality, and thus have become sites for instantiating their countries’ claims to global significance.” On the one hand, this emphasises the central planning interest of the state, which “seeks to rethink and remake the contemporary world rather than being simply passively ‘globalized’ by it” (Ong 2011, 10). On the other hand, ‘worlding’ practices have intensified comparisons and competition among cities about attributes of the presumptive ‘world-class’. This has led to an inexhaustible variety of urban superlatives and flagship projects (e.g. the highest tower, the largest mosque, or the most luxurious hotel) as well as to reproductions of and aspirations to existing forms of ‘world-class’ urbanism (for some examples cf. Almatarneh 2013; Barthel 2008; Graham 2018).

Although A. Roy and Ong (2011) mainly focus on Asian cities, ‘worlding’ dynamics are largely shaping Arab cities as well. Most significantly, Gulf countries have directly, through financial support and internationally operating construction companies, as well as indirectly, through pictures and images, influenced urbanisation in most large cities of the Arab world (cf. Barthel and Planel 2010; Haines 2011; Wippel et al. 2014). In Morocco, King Mohammed VI has transformed cities into prominent sites for the promotion of economic development, in particular through an image-led attraction of foreign direct investment (Zemni & Bogaert 2011: 406). According to him, urban megaprojects and the hosting of large sport events[22] should contribute to the aspired image of a modern ‘world-class’ city. Casablanca is a good example. Typical dynamics and processes of ‘worlding’ have driven the planning and implementation of the city’s megaprojects. Bogaert (2018, 2f) writes: “Urban spectacles such as Casablanca Marina will put Morocco’s cities back on the world map […]. The promotional video of Casablanca Marina starts with a picture of the globe where, one after the other, Dubai, London, New York, and Casablanca appear as flashes of light […]. Thanks to the new megaproject, Casablanca is going to be among the great cities of the globe.” Indeed,

[22] In 2013 and 2014, Morocco hosted the FIFA Club World Cup, and the country was one of two bidders to host the FIFA World Cup in 2026.

Casablanca Marina seems to be a typical project of the 'worlding city'. However, something seems to disturb – from the perspective of state authorities – Casablanca's aspired image of the modern, 'world-class' city. This is the *bidonville* – stigmatised as the backward urban eyesore that breeds crime and extremism.

Hence, Moroccan state authorities consider *bidonvilles* not only as a danger to security but, related to that, also as a threat to the progressive and modern development of the country or, more precisely, to the way in which progress, development, and modernisation are marketed and sold on global markets. *Bidonvilles* are perceived as a threat to state-led 'worlding' ambitions (cf. Dovey and King 2011, 24). This became obvious in a speech of Mohammed VI in 2001 (quoted in MHUPV 2013, 49):

> Insalubrious housing continues growing. This develop bears the risk of having the most perverse effects on the equilibrium of our social fabric and the purity of our environment. It also threatens our undertaken development efforts to ensure that our cities can attract productive investments. This is particularly relevant for the tourist sector, which is especially important for us. Architectural and urban beauty enhances the chances to attract investment in this sector.

This quotation carries at least two notions of the way in which the *bidonville* is perceived by state authorities to impede 'their' development efforts. First, the *bidonville* is seen as an unmodern, ugly part of the city affecting the beauty of the ordinary city. Pictures of the 'ugly' *bidonville* may spread an image of backwardness and underdevelopment which does not fit with the modernist visions of the country's ruling elites. Bogaert (2018, 2) writes: "Slums, obviously, do not fit the particular picture of modernity advertised by [urban megaprojects such as] Casablanca Marina." Following this 'worlding' logic, *bidonville*s are considered a burden within international competition. In a paper presented at an international conference on housing in Amsterdam, El Ansari (2013) argued that the VSB programme must pay particular attention to the big cities open to international economic competition. Their economic dynamism could not be guaranteed and sustained if *bidonvilles* and other forms of insalubrious housing persist. Thus, not only state authorities may see *bidonvilles* as urban eyesores that reduce the country's attractiveness and discourage (foreign) investors and tourists from investing in or visiting the country. Although there is no evidence that *bidonvilles* have a negative impact on foreign direct investments, it is not a surprise that many *bidonvilles* are hidden behind walls so that no visitor or potential investor can see them. A good example that illustrates this logic was also the decision of the palace against the in situ upgrading of the *bidonville* En-Nakhil in 2004. Although En-Nakhil did not occupy central urban land, the residents were resettled some kilometres away, because the location they inhabited was very visible from the international airport of Casablanca (Arandel and Wetterberg 2013).

The second notion relates more to the image of the *bidonville* as a historic source of social unrest, revolt, and contestation. From the perspective of the ruling elites, the rebellious potential of the *bidonvilles* bears the risk of disturbed social peace and affected political stability. Thus, eradicating the *bidonvilles* means safeguarding the modern and investment-friendly image that is symbolised and spread by new urban megaprojects and waterfronts that have been developed in Moroccan cities mainly since the end of the 1990s (cf. Barthel 2014; Barthel and Planel 2010; Berry-Chikhaoui 2010; Bogaert 2018; Mouloudi 2010). Under Mohammed VI, urban development has become an important political priority within national strategies to boost economic growth (cf. Baduel 2011, 56ff; Belguidoum et al. 2015, 13; Zemni and Bogaert 2011, 406). At the same time, the state started to brand a 'Moroccan exceptionalism', portraying and selling itself as a safe haven for investment and an exception of political stability and moderate Islam in a turbulent region threatened by religious terrorism (Abouzzohour and Tomé-Alonso 2018; Beier 2016, 22). According to this

logic, if *bidonvilles* are seen as breeding grounds for religious extremism, they challenge the idea of the Moroccan exceptionalism and, thus, become an 'urban urgency' calling for immediate intervention. In 2001, Mohammed VI (quoted in MHUPV 2013, 50) stated that: "In order to avoid that anarchic and non-regulated housing becomes a strain to our plans for development […] we urge our government to draft a […] national programme aiming at the eradication of insalubrious housing."

The business dimension

Since Victorian London, business and economic interests, as discussed in section 2.1, have always played a crucial role in motivations to resettle and/or evict slum dwellers (cf. Engels 1970 [1872]; Harvey 2008; Davis 2004; Durand-Lasserve 2006). Durand-Lasserve (2006, 207) introduced the term 'market-driven displacement' to describe "all situations where displacements are the direct or indirect consequences of a development aiming to make a more profitable use of the land." Concerning the direct consequences, informal settlements may physically block the realisation of urban renewal projects, beautification, infrastructure, or other kinds of development projects of 'public interest' on the same site (cf. Amakihe 2017; Durand-Lasserve 2006, 210f; Patel et al. 2015; Plessis 2005, 123f). Indirect consequences refers more to a price increase of (central) urban land (cf. Durand-Lasserve and Royston 2002b). This price increase may lead to gentrification dynamics inside settlements characterised by a landlord system based on high shares of rental accommodation (cf. Mwangi 1997), or as a consequence of tenure regulation and upgrading projects (cf. Werlin 1999). However, a price increase of central urban land also increases the interest of private investors to develop the land and generate profits, which consequently increases pressure on people occupying it. These planned private developments may also be justified in the name of 'development' and 'public interest' and have similar consequences (Durand-Lasserve 2006, 211).

Finally, resettlement can also follow the aim of enhancing the integration of informal settlement dwellers into formal (land) market systems. Durand-Lasserve (1998, 238) writes, "where tenure regularisation is emphasised it is primarily because illegal tenure is believed to hinder the operation of market forces." In the last two decades, international organisations such as the World Bank and UN-Habitat have pushed for the enhanced integration of 'slum' dwellers into housing markets and increasingly global systems of housing finance, leading to the "bankable slum" (Gruffydd Jones 2012). In a similar sense, A. Roy (2010, 53) calls the inclusion of slum dwellers into the formal market economy (e.g. through microcredit) a 'new frontier of capital accumulation'. Policies fostering market integration follow the ideas of Soto and housing market enabling strategies of the World Bank (see section 2.4). Soto (1990, 2000) argued that the exclusion of informal settlements from formal markets and, consequently, residents' insecurity of tenure and their limited access to credit are major factors that impede investment in productive assets and the generation of economic growth. In contrast, some scholars such as Huchzermeyer (2009, 62f) have argued that informal settlements – at least where slumlords do not play an important role – are characterised more by human needs-led development, as they are excluded from the formal processes of a distorted urban land market that underpin socio-economic processes that deepen inequality.

Morocco's VSB programme includes all three sub-aspects of the business dimension. As indicated above, direct and indirect market-driven evictions in the name of development and economic growth are closely intertwined with Morocco's 'worlding' ambitions (cf. Berry-Chikhaoui 2010; Mouloudi 2010). However, beyond notions of a general incompatibility of insalubrious housing, especially *bidonvilles*, and economic progress, individual project histories disclose particular business interests as well. Many *bidonvilles* that

have appeared in colonial times at the urban peripheries now, as a consequence of the spatial dynamics of urbanisation, are located in central urban areas and thus occupy strategic areas for urban renewal. In this context, Le Tellier (2010, 58) argues that the hidden agenda of *bidonville* clearance is the (re-)claiming of land that has increased in value. Most *recasement* projects framed as social initiatives were, in fact, driven by an urban development project and, hence, land speculation by public authorities. For example, in one of the first *bidonville* resettlements after the launch of the VSB programme in 2004, in Tangier, state authorities accelerated the speed of land clearance because they wanted to sell the land to a Saudi Arabian investor who was planning to build a tourist resort on the same site (Le Tellier 2008). In Casablanca, the clearance of Karyan Central was amongst other reasons motivated by urban renewal strategies, including the construction of a second tramway line, a park, and hotels on the former land of the *bidonville*.

Beyond direct business interests in land development, Zemni and Bogaert (2011, 411f) argue that the VSB programme is also targeting enhanced formal market integration of *bidonville* dwellers that may be linked to a redeployment of state power through privatisation and decentralisation (Bergh 2012). Indeed, for many dwellers, the move to the *bidonville* has been an escape from the pressure of the formal housing market, in particular from rental accommodation (see section 5.1.2). Landlord systems are largely absent in Morocco's *bidonvilles*. By means of resettlement, *bidonville* dwellers now (again) become actors on formal housing markets – homeowners that are able to sell their property according to exchange values, to rent it out, or to inhabit and maintain it. The access to homeownership within the VSB programme according to Al Omrane (2010, 6) is a crucial part of the 'behavioural change' that aims to move the *bidonville* dwellers away from 'traditional' forms of living. According to Bogaert (2018, 240f), the VSB programme aims to enable *bidonville* dwellers to become 'self-responsible' citizens that are fully integrated in the house market system, do not request or depend on social benefits (e.g. water connection free of charge), have a formal job, and buy goods on formal markets. Thus, the VSB's narrative of the 'urban exclusion' of *bidonville* dwellers is rather interpreted as 'market exclusion'. One aspect of it is the formal connection of households to water and electricity networks, which turns *bidonville* dwellers into customers of monopolistic private providers (Bogaert 2018, 232f). Another is the fight against informal markets and street vending. On the resettlement sites, public authorities have undertaken repeated efforts to fight the informal economy, for example by prohibiting the use of the own house for economic activities (Toutain and Rachmuhl 2014, 35). In Karyan Central, the resettlement included not only residents, but also the eviction of informal market traders who got the offer to move to a formal market stall in the new town. Furthermore, the VSB programme contains housing finance schemes that sought to enhance residents' integration into credit markets (cf. Le Tellier 2009c; Martin and Mathema 2008). This is part of the discussion in the next section on the instruments of implementation.

To conclude, the section has shown that the justification of the VSB programme as part of the fight against urban poverty and exclusion builds on weak assumptions lacking empirical evidence. Although it is not clear whether poverty is disproportionally concentrated in *bidonvilles*, whether *bidonville* dwellers are excluded from the urban society, and whether they are more susceptible to extremism than other parts of the population, the ultimate target is to eradicate *bidonvilles*. Looking at the various reasons behind this basic decision discloses a range of different objectives of the VSB programme. In fact, the VSB programme is about urban renewal and beautification, about clearing strategically important, central urban land, about strengthening territorial control, and about integrating slum dwellers into formal market systems. Hence, the next section deals with the tools that facilitate the implementation of the VSB programme in order to achieve its objectives.

4.3 Modes of Implementation

Although being a national programme designed by central state authorities, the implementation of the VSB programme takes place at the local level, in more than 80 cities and towns across the entire country, and in cooperation with local and regional government institutions. A stakeholder analysis conducted by the World Bank (2006) in 2005 found out that the main leading actors at the national level are the Ministry of Housing, Urban Planning, and City Policy (MHUPV) and the Ministry of the Interior (MI). Whereas the first is charged with spatial and technical planning, the latter supervises the timely implementation of resettlement through its regional and local representatives (*walis*, *bachas*, *caïds*). Municipalities have a restricted facilitating role (e.g. overseeing financial contributions, the provision of land and information, and administrative support), which is contractually fixed (MHUPV 2012, 18). Actual project implementation (e.g. the development of land, the construction of low-cost housing) is in most cases done by the semi-public housing company Al Omrane (UN-Habitat 2011, 18). However, the regional and local MI representatives are the most powerful driving forces behind implementation at the local level. For example, the *bacha* is usually the head of the local implementation committee and can decide on the conditions of resettlement and the attribution of plots to residents. However, their primary interest is on the rapid clearance of land, which the report of the World Bank (2006, 23) clearly mentions:

> The urgency that the King has instilled into the national slum upgrading program is palpable through their focus on technical issues and swift implementation. The social dimension of VSB is of little importance to them [MI representatives], and slum residents are perceived as being able to potentially frustrate the national objectives of slum eradication and of prevention of slum proliferation.

Thus, although the VSB programme is framed as a social initiative, the general implementation lacks stakeholders that have a sustained interest in social aspects and people's urban integration. A rather technical approach is not only the result of the 'urgency' of the VSB programme, but also because the Ministry for Family, Solidarity, Equality, and Social Development (MFSEDS) is not involved in the VSB programme. Furthermore, it is the result of the strong involvement of parastatal housing companies, in particular Al Omrane, which, by nature of a housing company, aims to minimise costs (e.g. through standardised construction, limited citizen participation) and maximise profit (e.g. through the additional sale of houses built on subsidised land at market prices) (Barthel and Zaki 2011, 211f; World Bank 2006, 23f; Toutain 2011, 179). Consequently, and in line with the argumentation at the beginning of section 4.2, J. Roy (2009, 96) has the impression that the alpha and omega of the VSB programme is to free Morocco's cities from *bidonvilles* and their "unspeakable inhabitants."

This impression is further enhanced by looking beyond the political implementation framework to the spatial dynamics of the VSB programme. To achieve the goal of *bidonville*-free Morocco, three modes of intervention are evident: in situ upgrading (*restructuration*), the provision of serviced plots for self-construction (sites-and-services; *recasement*), and the provision of new apartment units (*relogement*). After the abandonment of in situ upgrading in response to new suicide attacks in 2007 (Zaki 2013, 45), resettlement, meaning *relogement* and *recasement*, has remained the only option. These two approaches have in common that they move *bidonville* dwellers to new places at the cities' peripheries – often outside the jurisdiction of the city of origin. This is very visible in the case of Casablanca, where resettlement operations have enhanced the urban sprawl through the construction of a considerable number of satellite towns (*zones d'urbanisation nouvelle*, ZUN) with limited spatial integration (Figure 4-1). According to Chouiki (1997, 100ff), *recasement* projects in Casablanca have always been a favoured means for public authorities to get

rid of poor population groups inside the city. He considers it a form of social selection that fosters, based on housing, a "planned segregation at the urban peripheries."

Among both resettlement strategies, *relogement* is the least favoured option by *bidonville* dwellers, as it implies a relatively high financial contribution compared to the other modes of intervention (Kaioua 2017, 51f; World Bank 2006, 35ff). Residents are requested to afford a finished apartment at a subsidised price of about DH 120,000 (MHUPV 2012, 15). For a considerable number of residents, this sum is difficult to afford. Due to these problems of affordability and, consequently, the high resistance of *bidonville* dwellers to this mode of intervention, the provision of apartment units is rather an option for small *bidonvilles* (e.g. Capitaine Montugué in Hay Mohammadi) that have less power to oppose authorities' top-down decisions concerning resettlement.



Figure 4-1: A selection of resettlement projects in Casablanca since 2004. Data is based on literature research and own interviews with residents.

Hence, approximately 80% of all projects are implemented using *recasement* schemes (UN-Habitat 2011, 26). Residents tend to prefer *recasement* operations because of lower costs. However, *recasement* has shown deficiencies in the past, because the burden of the housing construction was moved to the resettled dwellers. Vulnerable households could not afford the construction of the houses, which led to high rates of *glissement* (dropout of targeted population groups). This results in a high number of unfinished and unoccupied buildings, vacant plots, and a high number of new residents that were not part of the project, but that bought the houses or plots from former *bidonville* dwellers. The dropped-out dwellers were likely to move back to other *bidonvilles* or into other forms of informal housing, which amongst other significant reasons such as political clientelism (e.g. local politicians turning a blind eye to building activities in exchange for

votes) led to the proliferation of undesired forms of housing (cf. Le Tellier 2010, 63; Le Tellier and Guérin 2009, 662; Navez-Bouchanine 2003a, 64, 2008, 362; Toutain and Rachmuhl 2014, 27ff).

Thus, to speed up the clearance of *bidonvilles* in the larger cities and to enable more vulnerable groups to move, state authorities have invented a new approach to finance the housing construction on the new site (Toutain 2016; Zaki 2013, 47ff). This approach includes the participation of a third-party investor, called *tiers associé* in French and *moul chkara*[23] by most stakeholders speaking Darija. Two households of the *bidonville* obtain one plot of 80 m^2 in the new town, suitable for the construction of an R+3 house (ground floor plus three storeys). Then, they search for a third party that finances the construction of the house on the subsidised plot of land in the new town. In return, the third party becomes the owner of the two lower floors of the new house, which in most cases is then resold at the market price. The third party also affords the subsidised price for the plot as well as resettled residents' temporary accommodation during the time of the construction. Despite similarities to the *antiparohi* system that largely facilitated the post-war construction of Athens (cf. Maloutas and Karadimitriou 2001), the third-party approach is new in the context of shantytown resettlement. It addresses a major disadvantage of other aided self-help projects: that of limited affordability (section 2.3). In similar programmes around the world, project authorities have tried to address affordability issues through the introduction of microcredit, construction-related subsidies, or the lowering of building standards – often with limited success. Thus, the involvement of small-scale private investors that finance housing construction in lieu of the resettled people may provide an innovative solution to affordability issues. A detailed analysis of the processes, dynamics, and limitations of the third-party approach forms part of section 5.2.3.

Concerning the financial coverage of the VSB programme, the general target is to "boost private investment and spur it to play a role in the realisation of social housing" (MHUPV 2012, 16). However, this is not possible without public incentives. In fact, funding starts with the massive provision of public land. More than 8,000 ha of public land has been made available to provide space for relocation purposes as well as for additional social housing projects (MHUPV 2012, 16; World Bank 2010, 21). However, one has to keep in mind that the state, in return, was able to reclaim much more valuable central urban land free of charge and without paying any compensation to its former residents. The public is transferred to the holding Al Omrane, which operates under the authority of the MHUPV; however, it acts as a financially autonomous limited company (Bogaert 2018, 214; Le Tellier 2009a, 57). Being the result of a consolidation of several public housing agencies, the Moroccan government cleared the debts of the new holding and recapitalised it by use of public money and a loan from the World Bank (Barthel and Zaki 2011, 206f). Al Omrane not only develops the land on the resettlement sites, but also functions as a direct promoter of housing units. It implements the majority of all resettlement projects and finances the projects through private house sales and the contribution of resettled dwellers and their third-party developers (Barthel and Zaki 2011, 211f). In fact, 65-70% of the overall costs of almost USD 2 billion of the VSB programme are covered by resettled residents themselves and their private investors (Toutain 2009, 215; World Bank 2010, 21). In contrast to resettlement operations, which are almost completely financed by private money, in situ upgrading required direct contributions of public funding (World Bank 2010, 21), which was certainly another reason for its quick abandonment. In addition, national authorities established a Housing Solidarity Fund (FSH, *Fonds*

[23] *Moul chkara* literally refers to an owner of a briefcase, which symbolically describes an investor or a person with money.

Solidarité Habitat), dedicated to promoting the fight against 'insalubrious housing' (including mainly the upgrading of *habitat non-réglementaire*), which is largely fed by a tax on cement (MHUPV 2012, 17).

Two additional instruments facilitate the project-based implementation of the VSB programme. First, the Moroccan government has established a new financing scheme, the housing guarantee fund FOGARIM. Through FOGARIM, people with low and uncertain revenues can receive credit covering up to 100% of the construction costs (Le Tellier 2009c, 207). At the same time, the requirements of FOGARIM are very low. A simple declaration of honour about the income of the applying household is enough for them to receive the loan (Toutain and Rachmuhl 2014, 35f). The state guarantees 70% of the amount of the credit (including interests) in the case of loan default. Nonetheless, the poorest parts of the shantytown dwellers with an income below DH 2,000 per month are still unable to apply to FOGARIM if one assumes that a household can spend maximally 25% of its income on credit costs (World Bank 2006, 40). To widen access of poor households to credit, microcredit has also been introduced, but to a lesser extent. However, many residents have remained hesitant to make use of bank credits due to a general, religiously motivated mistrust in commercial credit systems (Le Tellier 2009c, 207ff). Hence, the relevance of institutionalised credit has remained low, in particular if construction duties are forwarded to third-party investors. In the case of Karyan Central, only very few of the interviewed residents used bank credits, but where necessary preferred to rely on loans incurred by family members.

The second point, *accompagnement social* (AS, social accompaniment), is considered to be VSB's participative tool and is a remains of the period of reflection under the *gouvernment d'alternance* (Navez-Bouchanine 2008). In the words of Toutain (2011, 175), AS is ideally about "humanising" the clearance of *bidonvilles* and guaranteeing the highest possible level of transparency. However, it is not a way to involve affected dwellers in any decision-making process, but aims only at smooth implementation according to pre-defined project frameworks. Hence, AS is intended to facilitate the resettlement, to provide information and administrative support within the relocation process, to provide advice on the different financial propositions offered by the state or by banks, and to mediate between affected dwellers and the project authorities (cf. Bogaert 2018, 217f; Le Tellier 2009a, 56ff, 2009c, 200f; Toutain 2011, 173ff). The implementation of AS is among the duties of Al Omrane, which, however, is hardly interested in citizen participation, but more in the swift process of resettlement. According to Toutain (2011, 179), Al Omrane considers AS rather as an additional effort and as a source of problems, conflict, and mutual incomprehension. In fact, the realisation of AS is often outsourced by Al Omrane to either a public organisation called *Agence de développement social* (ADS), or to NGOs or private consultancy firms specialised in this field (e.g. Team Maroc). The individual approaches to and understandings of AS vary largely between these different actors, with ADS having the most comprehensive and cooperative concept. However, the time pressures of Al Omrane and public authorities are hardly compatible with the approach of ADS. This is further underlined by the fact that Al Omrane pays the AS contractors according to the number of 'finished' cases, which sets incentives for fast transactions, even leading to some cases of intimidation (Le Tellier 2009c, 204f). Toutain (2011, 179) draws a rather frustrating conclusion of AS, seeing it as "predominantly a means to appease and prevent mobilisations and protestations against resettlement." Similarly, Le Tellier (2010, 63) concludes that participation often remains an opportunistic response to international donors' requirements. AS is more about convincing and making people accept the pre-defined resettlement conditions than about engaging them through active participation. Concerning Karyan Central, the private agency Team Maroc is implementing AS exactly in this manner (see section 5.2.2).

4.4 *Villes Sans Bidonvilles* in Casablanca's Neighbourhood Hay Mohammadi

> During the French protectorate, the Carrières Centrales were an important centre of Moroccan resistance. Their inhabitants played a crucial role in the struggle for independence. After independence in 1956, King Mohammed V paid homage to people's loyalism when praying in the neighbourhood's eponymous mosque. Consequently, the name Hay Mohammadi was given to this place rich in history that has contributed to the shaping of the social and cultural landscape of Casablanca and Morocco.

These words are written in French and Arabic on a tourist sign at the tramway stop Ali Yataa in Hay Mohammadi, one of Casablanca's most famous working-class neighbourhoods. The inscription glorifies the residents of the *bidonville* Karyan Central (*Carrières Centrales*) for their fight against the French protectorate, but it ignores that the state finally cleared the site partially with force and against the will of its inhabitants in May 2016. Today, former inhabitants, overlooking the ruins of their previous homes with the prestigious mosque as the only remaining building in its middle, may perceive it as a painfully ironic reminder of the history of Karyan Central – glorified for its past, undesired for the future (Figure 4-2).

The *recasement* of Karyan Central, formerly one of the oldest, largest, and most prestigious *bidonvilles* in Morocco, serves as a case study for this thesis. Karyan Central has its origins in colonialism and industrialisation. Starting at the end of the 1910s, Casablanca's new industries and the growing harbour were in need of cheap labour and attracted 'indigenous' workers from all over Morocco. However, the colonial administration, following the colonial planning ideal of ethnic as well as class segregation, was unwilling to respond to the growing demand for housing by the Moroccan working class. Despite few exceptions of worker housing being built by larger companies such as Lafarge or Cosumar, workers had no other choice but to construct their houses themselves. In Casablanca, these auto-constructions happened in a more or less random way in close proximity to the harbour and the factories in the east of the city, partially in the remains of an abandoned quarry (*carrière*) (cf. Baduel 2011, 102; Cattedra 2006; Rachik 2002, 42ff). Initial buildings were of rural origin (e.g. tents) and were later followed by constructions made out of light industrial materials, such as corrugated iron sheets and petrol tins (*bidons*) (Initiative Urbaine 2011, 10ff).

Only in the late 1930s did authorities regroup several smaller *bidonvilles* to form a large, semi-structured assemblage, which was then called *Carrières Centrales*[24] (Zaki 2010, 46). Since then, Karyan Central has developed into an important market centre for Casablanca's growing working-class population. Around Karyan Central, the colonial planners started to experiment with new housing and re-housing schemes such as the *trames d'Ecochard* (cf. Rachik 2002, 73ff; Strava 2017, 332). These grid structures included small patios and modular housing cells that were developed and extended in height over time and according to demands by their inhabitants. These houses have characterised the architectural landscape of Casablanca's working-class neighbourhoods until today. Directly next to Karyan Central, planners also experimented with public housing inspired by the ideas of Le Corbusier (cf. Çelik 1992; Mumford 1992). Later, in the 1990s, authorities offered subsidised apartments in a new social housing estate called Hassan II to the inhabitants of Karyan Central. Hence, Hay Mohammadi, as it is known today, developed directly out of Karyan Central – largely shaped by various rehousing and upgrading projects. The *bidonville* always remained the heart of the neighbourhood and was itself incrementally improved and developed by its inhabitants over

[24] '*Carrières Centrales*' is a plural form, which is another hint of the assembled structure of the neighbourhood, composed out of several different, smaller *bidonvilles*.

time. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, almost all buildings had brick walls and were (informally) connected to the power and water grid. Just before the *recasement* project, Karyan Central was home to approximately 30,000 inhabitants.

Figure 4-2: The mosque is the last remaining building of Karyan Central. Author's picture, February 2017.

As initially mentioned, Karyan Central was one of the most important centres of unrest during the time of the independence movement (cf. Rachik 2002, 62; Strava 2017, 332). The neighbourhoods' revolutionary history has led to its countrywide reputation and is still an important factor of residents' attachment to Hay Mohammadi (Initiative Urbaine 2011). During my first interviews in March 2015, many inhabitants also referred to several well-known persons that had lived in Karyan Central (artists, sportspersons, politicians, etc.) to highlight the importance of *the* 'Karyan' or *the* 'Hay' (literally: district).[25] Karyan Central has always remained a centre of public contestation and unrest, also during the 'bread riots' in the early 1980s. However, uprisings in post-colonial Morocco were no longer seen as a courageous resistance, but more as a threat to public order and social peace. Thus, starting at the latest in the 1980s, the *concrete* Karyan Central has slowly become detached from its own, increasingly *abstract* history of glory. In the so-called Years of Lead under Hassan II, Hay Mohammadi suffered from severe state repression and hosted one of the country's infamous detention centres for political activists (Strava 2017, 333). Only by the end of the 1990s did the new king Mohammed VI foster the urban (re-)integration of Hay Mohammadi by abandoning the most visible means of state oppression. Since then, Hay Mohammadi has become part of Casablanca's urban renewal strategies, based on economic regeneration plans and 'worlding' aspirations (see section 4.2). The most prominent example is Casablanca's first tramway line, which has been passing through the neighbourhood since 2012 and has brought about the facelift upgrading of streets and buildings along its path. However, in the modern urban visions for Hay Mohammadi, Karyan Central has no place anymore. Hay Mohammadi and Karyan Central, for a long time one and the same neighbourhood with a common history and development, have now become two distinct terms, separated according to visible building structures and legal status into '*bidonville*' and '*maisons en dur*', respectively. Karyan Central's exceptional status as a centre of resistance against external rule now only exists on the touristic plaque of the tramway stop and in the idealised stories of the former freedom fighters. From the perspective of planning authorities,

[25] Many people use these short forms, as if Karyan Central or Hay Mohammadi were the only neighbourhoods in Casablanca.

Karyan Central has become an urban eyesore that – similar to all other *bidonvilles* – marks the 'useless Morocco' (*Maroc inutile*), representing an undesired backwardness and a threat to the modern development of the country (cf. Bogaert 2018, 86ff).

In 2009, local authorities started the *recasement* of Karyan Central within the framework of the VSB programme. It included the clearance of the site and the relocation of the 6,000 to 7,000 households to the *Zone d'Urbanisation Nouvelle* (ZUN) de Lahraouiyine[26] (Al Omrane 2012; Zaki 2013). Nouvelle Lahraouiyine is located outside Casablanca's jurisdiction, ten kilometres away from former Karyan Central, and belongs to the municipality of Médiouna, which is part of the *wilaya* Casablanca-Settat (Figure 4-1). It is located next to the cemetery Al Ghofran and in the south of one of the largest non-regulated settlements in Casablanca, which gave the name to the new town, and which some people now call Lahraouiyine-la-Vieille (Lahraouiyine Al-Qadima; Old Lahraouiyine; pejoratively also known as Chichane). The first dwellers moved to the new town by the end of 2010, and the last houses of Karyan Central were demolished by force on May 8, 2016. The *recasement* was realised based on the third-party approach. Hence, individual small-scale private developers constructed four-storey houses on plots of approximately 80 m² and according to the building guidelines defined by Al Omrane. Two households from Karyan Central share one house with a maximum of two other parties from other places that buy or rent their apartment directly from the associated third party (see section 4.3). The state charged Team Maroc, a private planning and engineering office, with the facilitation of AS. Following Le Tellier (2009c, 200) Team Maroc rather belongs to those actors with a limited AS approach, focusing mainly on the quick clearance of the site.

Despite the demolition of the last houses of Karyan Central in May 2016, not all inhabitants had moved to the new site by the beginning of 2017 (see section 5.2.6). Many of those households that resisted the resettlement for different reasons had to move into 'temporary' accommodation. To a certain extent, this is the consequence of limited space in the new town. Al Omrane (2012, 4) has allocated 3,000 plots in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine for the relocation of dwellers from Karyan Central. Therefore, the maximum number of households that can regularly move to Nouvelle Lahraouiyine is 6,000, although Al Omrane (2012, 5) mentions 7,000 households from Karyan Central having attribution rights. Because of that, authorities have started to distribute plot rights for another new town, called El Hamd, to the remaining former residents of Karyan Central. In April 2017, El Hamd was still under construction. It is located even further away from Hay Mohammadi, about two kilometres to the southeast of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine (Figure 4-1). Al Omrane is also the developer of El Hamd, which should further host inhabitants of a couple of different smaller *bidonvilles*, including Zaraba, demolished in December 2016 in Hay Mohammadi, as well as Derb Ghellef and Lhjajma, which were both located in very central neighbourhoods of Casablanca.

While the last residents await their move to Nouvelle Lahraouiyine or El Hamd, the urban renewal of Hay Mohammadi has accelerated. In October 2018, Casablanca's second tramway line would have started operating, passing through Hay Mohammadi as well. This line was under construction since 2016, built on top of the ruins of the western edges of former Karyan Central. This tramway project again is linked to beautification projects that not only include the upgrading of street infrastructure, but also the eviction of further street vendors from the street market at the former site of Karyan Central. Whereas some vendors have moved to Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, others have remained on the construction site, building up their semi-mobile stalls each day. Some of them hope to get a formal stall in the new market hall, which will be

[26] *Zone d'Urbanisation Nouvelle* is the formal Franco-Moroccan term for 'new town'. In the context of this work, I use the short term 'Nouvelle Lahraouiyine' as a synonym of the Arabic term 'Lahraouiyine Al-Jadida'.

constructed close by. In April 2017, large parts of the former site of Karyan Central were occupied by construction trailers of the company responsible for the construction of the new tramway. Other parts, as shown in Figure 4-2, have remained vacant. Public authorities communicated to the inhabitants of Karyan Central that in situ upgrading could not be realised because the clearance of the *bidonville* was part of a de-densification strategy in Hay Mohammadi, one of the most congested and densely populated districts of Casablanca. They asserted that they would build a public park on the same site, but conversations with an architect involved in the planning process, who wants to remain anonymous, reveal that local authorities also targeted the construction of hotels – the first ones in Hay Mohammadi. Thus, while state authorities 'got rid' of an undesired population group, the integration of Hay Mohammadi into broader urban renewal and touristic strategies of Casablanca had commenced.

4.5 Addressing the Empirical Gaps of the VSB Programme

Analysing definitions, objectives, and modes of implementation of the VSB programme has made obvious that the main purpose of this national programme is not to improve the livelihoods of poor urban residents living in slums. Instead, the primary objective is to eradicate a specific form of housing – *bidonvilles* – that state authorities, given the various reasons discussed in section 4.2, consider an undesired blight on Morocco's cities. Innovations in the mode of implementation – mainly the third-party approach – have to be seen against this background. The major driver of innovation is not a profound analysis of the impact of specific resettlement schemes on resettled dwellers, as was partly the case under the *gouvernement d'alternance* (section 2.6), but merely the wish to eradicate *bidonvilles* as quickly as possible. Thus, the political priority is clearing the land occupied by *bidonville* dwellers and not the development of new towns. This is important to emphasise before analysing the process of implementation, as it allows for an understanding of why authorities have opted for an opaque resettlement process and why they have misused AS schemes (section 5.2). Furthermore, the focus on clearing the site allows for an understanding of structural underinvestment in the new town, as described in section 6.1. Similar to the conceptual reflections of Cernea (2003), investment in the development of new towns is only of secondary priority for the implementing authorities (section 2.5).

The political justification of the priority given to the *eradication* (not improvement) of *bidonvilles* is largely the result of stigmatisation, as the chapter – in particular section 4.2 – has shown. From the perspective of the VSB programme authorities, *bidonville* dwellers are poor, rural migrants that are not integrated into urban society. According to them, they are not willing to pay for public services and do not pay taxes, as they work almost exclusively in the unobserved economy – either in the *bidonville* itself, or at surrounding street markets. Because of their structural urban exclusion, they are also prone to criminal behaviour and extremism, which presents a risk to ordinary urban citizens. However, all of these assumptions lack empirical evidence. There is no study that could confirm at least one of the abovementioned statements. The Moroccan government made no efforts to understand the heterogeneous livelihood dynamics, living conditions, and practices of *bidonville* dwellers prior to the design of the VSB programme. Instead, the quantitative and predefined logics of the VSB programme are again the result of yet another urbanism of urgency that prioritises ad hoc intervention instead of studying specific local contexts prior to political action. State authorities quickly decided that resettlement into standardised apartments is the best option for every *bidonville* dweller – without any needs-based assessment. Thus, *bidonville* communities are considered to be

homogenous, meaning that people are assumed to all have the same problems, which they supposedly all rate in the same way. This is not supported by empirical research, either. Considering also limited citizen participation, one has to emphasise that *bidonville* policies in Morocco are designed from an outside perspective (cf. Bartoli 2011; Zaki 2005; Zemni and Bogaert 2011).

The lack of empirical data leads to at least two fundamental problems. First, it is difficult to speak against or in favour of *bidonville* policies if one has no data about the needs of *bidonvilles* dwellers. Second, it is impossible to judge the success or failure of resettlement without knowing about the situation prior to resettlement. Therefore, it is of crucial importance to provide descriptive and representative empirical data about the life in *bidonvilles* as the basis of the analysis of the impacts of resettlement. Hence, with the following empirical chapter, I put into question the main assumptions about life in *bidonvilles* that have driven the conceptualisation and implementation of the VSB programme discussed in this chapter. I challenge the presupposition that *bidonville* communities are homogenous and that they all suffer from a similar set of problems. Instead, I argue that – similar to the ideas of Turner (1967) – inhabitants rate their living situations according to their very own and subjective relationship with their dwelling environment. Moreover, I provide empirical evidence that responds to my argument at the end of section 4.2, where I wrote that programme authorities confuse urban exclusion with market exclusion. Thus, with the following chapter, I aim to close an important empirical gap that allowed state authorities to justify ad hoc interventions in Morocco's *bidonvilles* based on external judgements and stigmatisation. It further presents the empirical foundation for the later analysis of the impact of resettlement on people's living situations (chapter 6).

5 Breaking Up Evolved Structures: Agents and Governance of Resettlement

This chapter starts with a description of livelihood and living practices of the inhabitants of Er-Rhamna, a *bidonville* of comparable size to Karyan Central, located in the district of Sidi Moumen in Casablanca. This description is necessary to understand the evolved structures of Casablanca's *bidonvilles* and the way in which the state has tried to freeze incremental development and to promote resettlement as the only policy option for *bidonville* dwellers. The discussion of the 'breaking up of evolved structures', the modes of implementation of *recasement*, and its conflicts are part of section 5.2 and follow RQ1, asking how social dynamics, local actor constellations, and power structures shape the resettlement process. However, the close description of *bidonville* living practices should also present a basis for the analysis of livelihoods and living practices in the new town after resettlement (chapter 6). Therefore, all aspects discussed in section 5.1will be part of the analysis in chapter 6.

5.1 Living in the *Bidonville*

Karyan Central was characterised by a strong heterogeneity of houses and people as a result of 90 years of steady development and the incremental consolidation of building structures. As a typical example of relatively old and large *bidonvilles* in Casablanca, prior to its demolition, the vast majority of houses consisted of bricks and cement. Almost all houses were connected to electricity and water networks. Wastewater management was organised collectively, and even Internet access partly existed. The dynamics of consolidation and development may become most visible by looking at the field notes of the German journalist Friedrich Sieburg, who visited Karyan Central during the 1930s:

> Bidonville [at that time the name of Karyan Central] designates a neighbourhood built out of metal sheets. […] Old corrugated iron sheets, scraps of roofing felt, and especially boxes and out-of-use canisters had built up these new shelters, which soon became a real city (Sieburg 1938, 206).

This description of makeshift building structures contrasts sharply with twenty-first century Er-Rhamna and Karyan Central. Because of that, I consider the development of Karyan Central and also Er-Rhamna as classic examples supporting the pioneering ideas of Turner (1977; Turner and Fichter 1972), Stokes (1962), Mangin (1967), and Frankenhoff (1967), who argued that so-called slums develop and improve over time as a result of people's integration into the city and its job market (see section 2.3). Therefore, the following sections will highlight the diverse aspects and struggles of incremental development – not only with regards to shelter conditions and utilities, but also with a focus on community solidarity and urban integration. From a methodological point of view, the reconstruction of the way of living in Karyan Central is based on a close analysis of current living conditions in the comparable neighbourhood Er-Rhamna. To increase data reliability, the situation in Er-Rhamna was continuously compared to memories of resettled inhabitants of Karyan Central.

5.1.1 Shelter Conditions

Although the vast majority of houses in Er-Rhamna consist of bricks and cement (sometimes with additional materials such as wood, plastics, or metal sheets), their quality with regards to the building structure largely

differs. Only less than one percent of the buildings in Er-Rhamna are built without bricks, being rather recent extensions at the neighbourhood's fringes. The diversity with respect to shelter quality, however, is the result of different roof materials and may also be attributed to the number of storeys, the number of house inhabitants per square metre, and the money invested in the interior design. Regarding the roof, most dwellers use corrugated iron sheets or metal sheets to protect them from the elements. Stones, car tyres, boards, and wooden beams are further used to stabilise the roof and to prevent damage caused by wind and rain. Only five percent of the households benefit from a more advanced, durable roof. The major problem of cheap makeshift materials used for the roof construction is the limited protection they offer. Seventy-five percent of the households suffer from regularly leaking roofs. Thus, they have to repair or renew them frequently by adding another layer of sheets, by exchanging the existing sheets, or by further sealing the roof with plastic film (Figure 5-1). Other households prefer not to invest in costly, but inefficient and hardly sustainable roof reparations and have become accustomed to a leaking roof. For example, one woman in Er-Rhamna mentioned that she has to set her alarm if it rains during night in order to get up to empty her collecting vessels in the kitchen. Other residents complained that they could not travel, because they would fear the flooding of their house if they were to leave the house for a longer period. A woman reported, "Once it rained and we were not at home. Our neighbours called us to tell us our house was flooded. I had to throw away everything. Clothes, food supplies, everything!" Beyond that, one of the major shortcomings of corrugated iron sheets is its temperature susceptibility. Many households complained about extremely high indoor temperatures, which frequently would reach up to more than 40 degrees Celsius during summer. In contrast, the inexistent insulation does not protect against the harsh climate, with temperatures that regularly fall below 10 degrees Celsius during the winter. Rarely, people have installed ceiling panels inside to better insulate their homes. Moreover, many inhabitants suffer from the noise produced by rain falling on the roof sheets or cats jumping and fighting during the night on the roofs.

Houses in Casablanca's *bidonvilles* also differ remarkably in size. The average house is 50 to 60 m² in size, with an average floor area per person of 11.8 m².[27] On average, each house has two or three rooms, excluding the kitchen and bathroom. On the one extreme, there are small single-room houses with floor areas of less than 10 m². On the other, roughly 10% of the houses in Er-Rhamna have 100 m² or more of habitable space – some with small gardens or courtyards. These 'big houses' often have two or three storeys and are considered high-end houses in the *bidonvilles*. Normally, they are the home of multi-family households with fifteen to twenty household members at the maximum. Twenty-seven percent of the houses in Er-Rhamna have two, and one percent even three storeys. By adding another floor, houses can be adapted to the growth of the family, which means that the upper floors have generally been built more recently. Finally, every small family may live in one room of the house. This shelter variability is a significant advantage of life in *bidonvilles*. This is illustrated by the example of Aicha[28] in Er-Rhamna, who bought a house from her current neighbours in 1996 – with DH 43,000 offered by her employer. In contrast to her previously rented flat in Sidi Moumen, where she did not even have running water and electricity, she could adapt the house in Er-Rhamna to her needs. To build a separate room for her mentally ill and disabled husband, she removed a door, elevated the roof, and constructed another room on top of her neighbours' roof (Figure 5-2). In general, most houses have been improved or were extended over time (cf. Navez-Bouchanine

[27] Only one-quarter of the interviewed persons in Er-Rhamna knew or could estimate the size of their house. In addition, 58 households estimated the size of their houses in the smaller *bidonvilles* in Hay Mohammadi.

[28] First names used in this study are pseudonyms, referring to a particular person that gave us insights stretching beyond the questions of the survey (appendix A2). All other persons are referred to according to their age or/and job.

2003b, 7, 2012; Fawaz 2009). For example, Bouchra and her husband, residents of Er-Rhamna, converted an old garage into a beautifully decorated apartment with two storeys after they were married. Hafida, inhabitant of Er-Rhamna, told us that her father initially bought a small wooden shack for only DH 40 when he arrived from the Sahara to Er-Rhamna in the 1970s. Over time, he improved the house, and whenever a new family member joined the house, they asked the *qa'ïd* for permission (and paid) to expand the house. As this was never a problem, the house nowadays accommodates three families with eleven persons in three rooms and on two floors. However, reinforced control and new restrictions have made building extensions and renovations much more difficult in recent years (see section 5.2.2).

Figure 5-1: Residents of Er-Rhamna use different materials for the construction, stabilisation, and insulation of roofs. Author's picture, December 2016.

The very small houses often have been the result of subdivisions. If a family member gets married, households frequently decided to add another storey or to subdivide the existing house, which consequently reduced the floor area per person. Another explanation for small houses is the relatively recent parcelling of former farmland. This happened for example in the 1990s, when a farm owner in the north of Er-Rhamna sold small pieces of land to newcomers. However, the most extreme cases may be explained by scarce financial resources and a negative life event causing the move into a very small single-room house. For example, in Karyan Capitaine Montugué, Mohammed did not know where to live after being released from prison. Hence, the family of his father offered him a separate room of approximately five square metres where he could stay. The dark and mouldy room without a window includes basic kitchen facilities, but excludes a bathroom. A similar case is Karim; the family of his late mother built him a small extension to their house in Karyan Central when he returned from prison without having alternative shelter options. For women, especially divorce seems to be a critical life event. For example, one woman with her daughter of seven years old had to move back to her mother's house of 15 m² in Karyan Boulevard Moulay Ismaïl, where they had to share a single couch to sleep on at night. In Er-Rhamna, a 61-year-old woman has been living with her terminally ill son in a room of 12 m², to which she has had to move after her divorce, unable

to afford anything else. In their narrow house, they can't even pass each other and in order to retain some minimum level of privacy, the son leaves at night and only returns in the early morning, wandering the streets at night. In addition to their daily livelihood challenges, people living in extremely small single-room houses and extensions may also risk being left out of the resettlement surveys (see section 5.2.6).

Figure 5-2: The interior of a house in Er-Rhamna with an elevated roof and stairs to the second floor behind the curtain on the right. Author's picture, February 2017.

Moreover, overcrowding is a serious issue in *bidonvilles*. In Er-Rhamna, approximately 37,000 inhabitants live on only 27 hectares of land, which equals a high population density of 137,000 persons per square kilometre[29]. As part of their operational definition of a 'slum', UN-Habitat (2003, 12) suggests two different ways to measure overcrowding: (1) less than 5 m² of living space per person, or (2) more than two persons per room. If based on the first measure, 12% of the households in Er-Rhamna and 19% of the households in the small *bidonvilles* in Hay Mohammadi suffer from severe overcrowding. However, if based on the second measure, overcrowding can be seen as having come to affect 43.5% of all households in Er-Rhamna and half of the households in the smaller *bidonvilles* in Hay Mohammadi. In some extreme cases, five to ten persons must share a single room and have to sleep next to each other on the floor, leaving no room for privacy. These extreme population densities are the consequence of population growth. As in other parts of Casablanca, the number of inhabitants increased in the 1980s, when people escaped from the droughts in the countryside. However, today's population growth may most likely be the result of family growth (through either birth or marriage). In consequence, people subdivided plots, built new extensions to their houses, and thus densified Er-Rhamna. One inhabitant of Er-Rhamna remembers that it was once possible to drive with small delivery trucks within the neighbourhood, which is nowadays impossible due to the narrowness of the streets.

[29] In comparison, Casablanca's most densely populated district Al Fida/Mers Sultan has a population density of 38,622 persons/km^2 according to the general census of 2014 (HCP-DRGC 2014, 5).

The extremely high population density in *bidonvilles* also affects physical housing comfort. Due to the lack of space between the houses, many rooms are only sparsely lighted. During the hot summer, the lack of sunny spots may be an advantage; however, during the rainy winter season, many houses suffer from dark rooms, indoor humidity, and consequently appearing mould. “We put some stucco under the ceiling, but it did not hold because of the rain and the humidity inside,” reported Zohra in Er-Rhamna. Humidity gets worse because many houses lack properly openable windows – for privacy or building-related reasons. Many dwellers stated the wish to have proper windows as among their reasons for having positive expectations regarding the resettlement. This is also the case for the fear of fires, which regularly occur in *bidonvilles*. Due to the high density, the flames may quickly reach and destroy a considerable number of houses, as was the case in Er-Rhamna several times only in 2016.

Despite these general concerns, the specific building-related housing comfort in *bidonvilles* shows great heterogeneity. Except for a few cases (see above), all houses have kitchen facilities and a basic indoor bathroom with toilet, but normally no shower. Fridges and televisions are standard amenities even for the poorest of households. However, interior and exterior designs vary considerably. On the one hand, there are houses with bare, unpainted inside walls and with only the minimum in terms of furniture. On the other hand, some bigger houses are equipped with high-quality furniture and finely decorated walls with stucco (Figure 5-3). In one of these houses in Er-Rhamna, an older woman was unhappy about the potential resettlement, as she had constructed and beautified her house with her own hands together with her husband over years and decades. Her daughters on the other hand were looking forward to a potential resettlement, pointing to the bad image of *bidonvilles* in general. It seems that the more people had invested in their houses, the more they were emotionally attached to them. Nostalgic memories of several families in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine supported this argument, in which their old houses in Karyan Central were described as better, more beautiful, and bigger than their current lodging.

Figure 5-3: A high-end house in the bidonville *Er-Rhamna. Author’s picture, March 2017.*

Further aspects of housing comfort may be attributed to the close dwelling environment and include a bad smell, mud, bad streets, inexistent streetlights, and vermin. In Er-Rhamna, the waste disposal system does not work properly. Most households throw their rubbish on the few garbage dumps and into open waste bins at the northern and southern edges of the neighbourhood. Despite the few regularly operating waste trucks, large parts of the waste remain uncollected or are used to feed the cattle (Figure 5-4). Beyond the bad visible appearance, this produces a severely bad smell in some areas of Er-Rhamna. For example, in the north of the neighbourhood close to a cattle farm (Figure 5-4), Ali said he would oppose the resettlement and would prefer to stay in his shack if only there were no bad smell. Other dwellers complained about the quality of the streets. In some parts of Er-Rhamna, only gravel paths exist, while other streets have deteriorated, although they were initially made out of concrete or asphalt (Figure 5-4). When it rains, some streets turn muddy or even become water channels themselves. One resident reported that he always took a second pair of shoes when it rains to be able to reach his workplace with clean and dry shoes.[30] Moreover, inexistent streetlights make it difficult, uncomfortable, and probably unsafe to walk during night within the neighbourhood. Some households also raised concerns about vermin, in particular rats. In one case, a man reported that the rats frequently get inside the house using underground corridors and pipes. Nothing would stop them from depleting the food supplies.

Figure 5-4: In one part of Er-Rhamna, residents feed the cattle with their own garbage. Author's picture, March 2017.

5.1.2 Security of Tenure

Another characteristic of *bidonvilles* is the lack of formal land titles and formal homeownership, which UN-Habitat (2003, 12) uses under the headline 'security of tenure' in its operational definition of slums. However, scholars have discussed the contentious issue of the extent to which land titles increase slum dwellers' security of tenure (for an overview cf. Durand-Lasserve and Royston 2002a). On the one extreme, Soto (2000) argues that people without formal land titles have to fear being evicted at any time and thus

[30] (Lallaoui 1993) reports similar stories in his book on the elimination of *bidonvilles* in France.

refrain from investment in immobile assets and small-scale businesses. Hence, he argues that the inexistence of formal land titles eventually leads to high insecurity of tenure among shantytown dwellers. Other authors such as Payne et al. (2009) or Berner (2000) have questioned this theory and warned that the careless issuing of land titles would not result in improved tenure security, but would rather reinforce gentrification dynamics and market-driven evictions, hence reducing people's effective security of tenure. Therefore, I underline that land titles and security of tenure are here considered distinct terms.

As in Karyan Er-Rhamna today, people in Karyan Central neither lived in rental accommodation, nor held formal land titles and proof of homeownership. However, based on the interviews in Er-Rhamna and people's memories of Karyan Central, I argue that people in most cases did not perceive insecurity of tenure. Of the 372 interviewed residents in Er-Rhamna, 91% do not fear being forcibly evicted within the next five years. One resettled former resident of Karyan Central even felt surprised when authorities announced the *recasement*, because she never would have expected to be obliged to leave: "They come to your house to tell you to leave. At first, you do not understand." Similarly, a resident in Er-Rhamna could not imagine being evicted: "No, that's impossible. Only my grandfather jokes about it."

For the majority of people in Er-Rhamna, living in a *bidonville* implies protection from rental accommodation, which they consider much more insecure than living in a *bidonville*. Rental accommodation does not offer much tenure security from the perspective of the residents, because rental contracts – if they exist at all in written form – are always time limited and require regular payments, which stand in sharp contrast to people's irregular income sources. Unlike de facto homeowners in *bidonvilles*, renters have to fear eviction in the case of income-related uncertainties or in the case of an arbitrary increase in the rent. Thus, moving into *bidonvilles* for many dwellers was comparable to an escape from 'recurrent displacements' (Watt 2018) as an inherent threat of rental housing. A large number of people living in Er-Rhamna have moved from rental accommodation in other parts of Casablanca to Er-Rhamna. Asked about the reasons for moving from rented flats into a *bidonville*, most people referred to expensive rents and the problem of regular payments. For example, one woman explained, "We used to live in Hay Hassani, but my father's job was far, and we did not always have the money for the rent." Another dweller told us that she had to move out of her apartment because her husband lost his job and they could not pay their rent anymore. In other cases, people decided to move out of rental apartments because their family became too large or because they felt uncomfortable living in a small room in a shared flat – a common low-income form of renting (see section 5.2.4). A young man reported, "We moved from Hay Fallah because rent was expensive and we were renting a flat together with our neighbours." In general, one of the most frequently reported advantages of living Er-Rhamna was that it is at least better than renting. This may partially be explained by dwellers' perceived security of tenure in *bidonvilles*.

There are at least five reasons that explain this perceived security of tenure in *bidonvilles*: First, some dwellers possess documents which they consider proof of their legitimate residency in the respective *bidonville*. Some long-term residents, for example, hold a so-called *papier jaune* (yellow paper), which certifies the payment of a small amount of money for the attribution of a formal house number in Karyan Er-Rhamna. In other cases, residents possess the *chahadat soukna* (residence certificate), which certifies their residency in a specific house with house number in Karyan Er-Rhamna. Based on these forms of de facto state tolerance and the history of land acquisition, many residents see themselves as de facto homeowners and legitimate residents with full rights. Typically, a 61-year old woman in Er-Rhamna said, "We are citizens and have our papers. They have no right to evict us." Following this logic, the state would not evict

them from *their own* houses without providing adequate alternatives, because that would formally acknowledge their residency. Even if people are aware that they do not have papers, they may perceive themselves as legitimate landowners and do not fear being evicted. Referring to their long-term residency, one resident pointed out: "We do not fear being evicted, although we have no papers. This land belongs to us!" Only very few residents stated that they feel insecure because they have no papers.

Second, the majority of dwellers in large *bidonvilles* trust that the state apparatus around King Mohammed VI would never evict them without the provision of alternatives. As Zaki (2010, 52) states in her article on the electrification of Karyan Central, residents widely perceive Mohammed VI as the 'king of the poor', seen as showing a great sensitivity towards the situation of *bidonville* dwellers. These perceptions are based on a royal speech in August 2001 in which Mohammed VI declared the fight against insalubrious housing and the construction of social housing to be national priorities (MHUPV 2013, 48ff). Related to this, many residents in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine consider the resettlement as a royal project and see the land of the new town as a direct offer by King Mohammed VI. Third, people believe in the power of collective resistance and think that the state is unwilling to threaten social peace through brutal evictions. The considerable size of the *bidonville* (more than 6,000 households in Er-Rhamna and Karyan Central) gives residents a feeling of power. Typical statements in this logic are, "An eviction would be impossible, there would be resistance," or "We can shout loudly, do not worry! The *bidonville* is huge!" Fourth, most *bidonville* dwellers are not opposed to resettlement as long as the state provides them with an acceptable alternative solution, which is subject to continuous negotiations (cf. Navez-Bouchanine 2012, 174ff). By implication, however, this means, as one resident in Er-Rhamna pointed out, that "you will not have any problems if you accept what the Makhzen will offer you."

Finally, one can describe a recent social contract between the state and the *bidonville* dwellers: The state will not evict the *bidonville* dwellers by force and without alternatives, and in return, the dwellers will not resist resettlement. However, this social contract seems to hold only in larger *bidonvilles*. In the case of smaller *bidonvilles*, the state's approach tends to be more repressive, because authorities do not have to fear large-scale resistance that would threaten wider social peace and stability. Amongst the inhabitants of the two surveyed small *bidonvilles* in Hay Mohammadi, only 40.3% did not fear being forcibly evicted within the next five years. Residents of Capitaine Montugué had already experienced the forced eviction and demolition of one part of their neighbourhood in June 2015 and of Zaraba in December 2016, and were awaiting their own eviction, which happened only in July 2017. Hence, security of tenure may also depend on the size of the *bidonville* and its potential for resistance (see also Berner 2002, 238f).

Even though most people in Er-Rhamna do not fear forced evictions, some residents have also described a certain powerlessness towards the state. Hence, these people think you cannot contradict the wish of the Makhzen to "implement a project" when it "thinks it could be profitable for them", or simply that it must be obeyed "if they say you have to leave." They perceive the state as an all-powerful actor whose decisions are unquestionable and indisputable. Only if you accept to move and if you accept the alternative housing options, you will not face any problems. This obedience may undermine the potential power of collective resistance in which many other residents believe concerning security of tenure. Hence, section 5.2.1 will further describe this phenomenon by showing in how far the authorities have succeeded in weakening community solidarity in order to be able to implement the *recasement* more smoothly. Moreover, section 5.2.2 aims to qualify the stated feeling of security of tenure. It describes in how far constant expectations of

resettlement have bred people's feeling of being safe from evictions, on the one hand, but have prevented most investments in immobile assets, on the other.

5.1.3 Public Services

In Casablanca's *bidonvilles*, most public services are available to a certain extent, either provided by the state or its private delegators (water, electricity, education, health care, and, to some extent, waste collection), supplied by informal systems (fixed telephone lines and Internet), or organised collectively (wastewater management, street infrastructure). In the following section, I present the particularities of each of these service provision processes, starting with electricity. In Karyan Er-Rhamna, each house is formally connected to the power grid managed by *La Lyonnaise des Eaux de Casablanca* (Lydec), a subsidiary of the French Suez company. Zaki (2010) and Navez-Bouchanine (2012, 179ff) have described the struggles and negotiations that have led to the electrification of *bidonvilles* as it applies to Karyan Central as well as to Karyan Er-Rhamna. *Bidonville* dwellers started to connect themselves to the power grid in the late 1980s – an action often supported by their elected local representatives. Initial state tolerance towards illegal electricity tapping ended when Lydec took over the management of the grid. Lydec pushed the state to allow for the legal connection of *bidonvilles* for three reasons: 1) due to the company's high losses because of illegal tapping; 2) due to disturbances of the power grid in the environment of *bidonvilles*; and 3) due to the risks of illegal connections for dwellers themselves and attacks against Lydec's employees, who tried to disconnect illegal connections (Zaki 2010, 50).

The result was an agreement between the state and Lydec on the 'provisional' connection of *bidonvilles*, which guaranteed a legal connection to the power grid, on the one hand, and retained the irregular character of *bidonvilles*, on the other. Hence, Lydec installed formal electricity metres for each household; however, it delegated the maintenance and control of the secondary network (between the block metre and individual metres) to block representatives. These representatives paid the bill of the block metre to Lydec and had to collect the individual contributions from the households. They financed themselves by adding additional charges to households' accounts (Zaki 2010, 58f; Navez-Bouchanine 2012, 181). However, households received no official accounts, which for example could have functioned as a proof of residency needed for obtaining an identity card. Moreover, the system collapsed because of a lack of trust between all parties. For example, households refused to pay because they could not verify the total amount to pay to Lydec and doubted what the representatives requested them to pay, or representatives did not forward the total amount to Lydec, thereby enriching themselves. After the announcement of resettlement projects in Karyan Central, people stopped paying their bills (Zaki 2010, 60ff). According to residents of Er-Rhamna, local politicians motivated the inhabitants of Er-Rhamna during the election campaign in 2009 to stop paying their electricity bills. Their argument was that other *bidonvilles* (and other blocks) had stopped paying as well, and that the non-payment would put pressure on the decision-makers to finalise the resettlement plans. In Er-Rhamna, only one percent of the households have continued to pay their electricity bills. Typing the number of their metre into an online system, they can check the amount due and pay it directly to Lydec. Asked about their motivation to pay, they responded that they fear that the future electricity supplier would ask them to pay a fine for their non-payments after resettlement. Indeed, many resettled residents in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine consider the disproportionally high price for the installation of electricity and water metres as a fine for their last years of non-payment (see section 6.5.2).

Hence, all households in Er-Rhamna are connected to the power grid. However, there are problems with the quality of supply. Indeed, there are reports about maintenance measures of Lydec and even about the

installation of new electricity metres and power distribution.[31] However, individual electricity connections are often makeshift constructions – the result of *bricolage* – and hardly ever installed in a safe way. Overuse and inappropriate insulation frequently produce short circuits, which may cause electricity cuts and even lead to fires – a relatively frequent incidence in *bidonvilles*. Several residents also reported that metal construction materials of the house would conduct electricity in the event of rain because of inappropriate insulation. Other residents mentioned electricity cuts in periods of high demand, for example during the broadcast of major football matches. Because of the uncertainty of continuous electricity supply, people for example refrain from keeping food supplies in their fridges. However, there was also a young female resident who rather enjoyed electricity cuts, because they allowed her to leave the house to chat with her other female neighbours.

Regarding water, the municipality installed fountains at various places within the Karyan Er-Rhamna (Figure 5-5) and provides water in the *bidonvilles*. Dwellers themselves do not have to pay anything for water. Beyond fixed fountains, the installation of own indoor water taps is one of the most common and basic incremental improvements in *bidonvilles*. Only 5.5% of the households in Er-Rhamna do not have in-house water taps and have to get water from the fountains. However, with respect to the quality and quantity of water, some inhabitants of Er-Rhamna mentioned concerns. Water cuts are frequent and in some areas, the water pressure is constantly low – in particular during the summer. One inhabitant reported, "You have to wait until 3am to get water inside the house." Other people mentioned water scarcities during periods of high demand – on weekends, during religious holidays, or in the morning. Several inhabitants installed water reserves on top of their houses to be less vulnerable to water cuts.

Figure 5-5: A communal fountain in Er-Rhamna. Author's picture, December 2016.

With respect to public infrastructure, most complaints of residents in Er-Rhamna relate to wastewater management. In fact, wastewater management is hardly public, but rather organised collectively for each street

[31] Some people told us that employees from Lydec together with a *mqadem* collected money from each household in a specific neighbourhood for the installation of a new electricity metre.

or small pocket, respectively. Households channel their own wastewater as well as rainwater into underground tanks and have to empty them once they are full. In this case, roughly ten to twenty households of a particular street would either empty the tanks themselves or would collect money from each household to employ a plumber. Depending on the quantity of rainfall, the size of the tank, and the altitude of the house, households have to do it from once per year to up to two to three times per month. Households' common contribution fees range between DH 20-30 per cleaning, but may exceptionally exceed DH 200 for more durable improvements. In one case, residents mentioned that the municipality supported the renewal of the wastewater system by sponsoring new pipes. Especially households located in the lower parts of Er-Rhamna suffer from wastewater-related problems. One inhabitant of a house located in a narrow and sloping cul-de-sac reported that she had to build a dam at the beginning of the cul-de-sac to prevent flooding. Similarly, many houses have constructed dams at the entry of their houses to keep the mix of rainwater and wastewater out. By building dams or constructing gullies (water channels) in the middle of the street, households try to channel water away from their homes, also to prevent a more frequent (costly) emptying of their own wastewater tanks. The open street gullies may also facilitate walking in the narrow streets during rain. Moreover, full underground tanks may explode if people miss a timely emptying, which can lead to high intensity wastewater flooding that may destroy streets or the interior of houses.

A few other services are also available in *bidonvilles*. Just as in formal neighbourhoods, Er-Rhamna has a postal service. Because of the inexistence of formal addresses and the ambiguity of house numbers, the postman, in case he does not know, uses the help of the residents to search for the addressee. Furthermore, access to the Internet is possible to a certain extent, although the state tries to impede its establishment as another way to prevent the further consolidation of the neighbourhood. It does not allow Internet providers to install fixed telephone connections in *bidonvilles* anymore, which are a technical precondition for an Internet connection. Nonetheless, some Internet cafés and houses already possess a connection and share it with their neighbours. Using such a shared connection from an Internet café several streets away, a young female resident started an own web business for cosmetics from her house in the middle of Er-Rhamna. Without formal access to the Internet, she was able to establish a remarkably successful online shop and works in close cooperation with international companies.

In addition, immobile public services such as schools and hospitals are located within walking distance of the site of former Karyan Central and Er-Rhamna and are accessible to the residents. Besides a number of primary and secondary schools, the close environment of Karyan Central and Karyan Er-Rhamna also provides possibilities for tertiary education that can be followed, for example at the National Vocational Training Centre (ONFPPT, *Office Nationale de la Formation Professionnelle et de la Promotion du Travail*) in Hay Mohammadi and the University for Economics and Business Administration (ENCG, *École Nationale de Commerce et de Gestion*) in Ain Sebaa (within walking distance of Er-Rhamna). However, recent public investment in the beautification of public spaces and facilities around Er-Rhamna has rather fostered feelings of abandonment among local residents. In particular, this relates to the renovation of a football pitch, which used to be the residence of a football club of Er-Rhamna. A female resident testified that after the renovation, the football pitch rather belongs to the people living in the apartment houses surrounding it. They demolished old pictures of the club and increased the fees to exclude former club members from Er-Rhamna. Similar narratives existed concerning the construction of a formal market hall (*souq*) in order to replace the informal market in the northeast of Er-Rhamna. Residents accused the local municipality of selling market stalls to more solvent external persons, although they had already sold to local traders before.

Nadia, a student who has been living all her life in Er-Rhamna, concluded with bitterness: “These new developments such as the *souq* or the football pitch – they are not for us!”

Finally, daily shopping facilities are widespread in *bidonvilles*. I already highlighted the significance of Karyan Central as a market hub of Casablanca (see section 4.4). Likewise, Er-Rhamna houses a variety of shops, businesses, and social facilities (Figure 5-6). This includes a large number of small grocery shops, three permanent markets, kindergartens, cafés and food stores, hairdressers, mechanic repair shops, public ovens, and various manufacturers such as shoemakers and tailors. Besides, local residents of Er-Rhamna have established five mosques only within the neighbourhood. In addition, Er-Rhamna is located within walking distance from further shopping facilities in Jawhara and Saada. Moreover, it is connected through shared taxis as well as public buses to commercial centres such as Hay Mohammadi, Derb Sultan, and the city centre. Finally, three-quarters (75.4%) of the interviewed residents do not feel isolated where they live.



Figure 5-6: Map of Er-Rhamna showing blocks, mosques, and markets. Cartography: Torben Dedring.

5.1.4 Social Life and Community Solidarity

A large body of academic literature emphasises alternative practices of community solidarity and mutual assistance in informal neighbourhoods around the world. Residents of these neighbourhoods have established strong trust-based social networks and alternative modes of spatial organisation that aim to improve liveability and reduce hardship (cf. Mangin 1967; Turner and Fichter 1972). While Tironi (2009, 980) for the case of Latin America underlines that practices of alternative organisation have developed out of the simple necessity to cope with the everyday, other authors such as Fawaz (2009, 832f) have stylised informal settlements as the embodiment of the right to the city, challenging dominant modes of spatial production. Similarly, Huchzermeyer (2009, 62) has called informal settlements in South Africa “the human face of South African cities.” According to her, South African informal settlements, in the absence of exploitive forms of slumlordism, are driven rather by human needs than by the rules and forces of formal property

markets. For the case of Colombo, Sri Lanka, Noe (2007, 115) also supports the argument that informal neighbourhoods show higher levels of reciprocity and social interaction, which, according to her, is partially the result of high densities in these neighbourhoods. The work of Arrif (1999) and Iraki (2006) indicate similar daily social life practices within Moroccan *bidonvilles*, highlighting mutual help and solidarity amongst neighbours and close community life within small neighbourhood pockets.

Indeed, social life in Er-Rhamna is characterised by intensive social interactions, relatively low degrees of anonymity and individuality, but high levels of community solidarity. Residents sometimes called it the atmosphere of a *quartier populaire*, where people would be less selfish, but would show more solidarity. Likewise, residents themselves put the sociability in *bidonvilles* in contrast to closed doors in apartment houses. To understand community solidarity and neighbourhood relations, first, it is important to know that among all interviewed people, the average time spent living in Er-Rhamna is 26.5 years, and that 33.2% of residents were born in the neighbourhood. Hence, they share similar histories and experiences and could establish trustful relations with their neighbours over time. Second, residents often possess large family networks in the same *bidonville*. A typical household in Er-Rhamna is composed of five to six people. Some households include more than 15 members of different generations living under one roof. In addition, many families have subdivided their houses over time, which implies that nowadays, family networks often extend to several different houses in close proximity to one another. Third, as mentioned in the previous section, people depend on one another concerning the maintenance of infrastructure and the provision of services. For example, on one day during the field research, the water supply in one part of Er-Rhamna had collapsed because of a broken pipe, and people had no drinking water in their houses. People immediately organised themselves, collected DH 20 from each household concerned, and repaired the pipes. However, solidarity stretches beyond community-led reparations of wastewater pipes or streets, also including the collective demand of basic rights and services. This may show the struggle for electricity supply (cf. Zaki 2010), but also more recent protests in favour of resettlement and in response to a large fire in Er-Rhamna. Thus, a central characteristic of social life in Er-Rhamna is that in almost every case, more than one household shares similar housing or service-related problems, which is partially the result of the extremely high population density (see section 5.1.1).

The sharing of similar experiences and the necessities of working together has fostered intensive and trustful relations among neighbours. In fact, Karyan Er-Rhamna consists of a multitude of small neighbourhoods (neighbourhood pockets), which in some cases even separate themselves physically from the environment through curtains or the spatial order of buildings. This supports a spatial organisation comparable to street structures in Arabic old towns with numerous cul-de-sacs, narrow and winded alleys, and consequently a relatively large number of shared, semi-public spaces. Social life – especially of women and children – to large a extent is manifested in these semi-public spaces. It is here where women prepare food, take care of children, or sit and chat. In some cases, neighbours go in and out of neighbours' houses as if they are family members. Both people in Er-Rhamna as well as resettled dwellers in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine describe social life in *bidonvilles* as warm-hearted and highlight the helpfulness of neighbours. People leave their children with their neighbours if they have to leave the house, share Friday's couscous with people who have difficulties to afford food, or (financially) support women when the husband passes away. Hafida, a single mother in Er-Rhamna, praised the sociability of her neighbourhood and gave us an example that one day a family prepared food for a wedding when the power went off. Many neighbours immediately offered their own fridges to store the food, thus saving the wedding. Another woman in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine described similar patterns in her old neighbourhood in Karyan Central: "We could travel and leave our children and

our keys with the neighbours. It was just like a family." She highlighted the phenomenon of 'open doors' – the fact that people in *bidonvilles* often leave their house doors open. Interviewees on both sites typically referred to it as a symbol of the distinct helpfulness and sociability among neighbours in *bidonvilles*, contrasting it with the closed doors in ordinary apartment buildings. The quantitative results support these initial impressions (Figure 5-7). It is striking to see that more than 90% of the people in Er-Rhamna agree that people help each other and that almost 80% feel they have trust in their neighbours. It is remarkable to see that despite the hardship of living conditions, almost two-thirds of the residents in Er-Rhamna love their neighbourhood.



Figure 5-7: Indicators of neighbourhood solidarity and social life in Er-Rhamna (in %) (n=*402).*

Intensive social networks also guarantee security. Leaving the house doors open is only possible because neighbours share trust, watch out for one another, and have established block-specific social control. In general, the majority of people (64.3%) feel secure in Er-Rhamna. Less than one-quarter of the inhabitants perceive feelings of insecurity. Typically, one older woman declared, "I have been living here for forty years, and nobody has ever stolen something from my house, even though I always leave my door open." If residents do not leave the door open, they often feel enough security to 'hide' the keys at a place right next to it. However, it is very difficult to assess to which extent security is not only *perceived* to be good. In fact, no degree of security is guaranteed by legitimised state institutions. The police enters the neighbourhood only on rare occasions. Thus, people depend on own, powerful alliances and networks to guarantee security – if necessary by force. One grocery shop owner, for example, told us that he feels secure only because he has a strong son who is highly respected in the neighbourhood. A woman in another block shared his perception when she argued that nothing would happen if you live in a street with strong neighbours.

Furthermore, self-organised security leaves space for illegal, but commonly tolerated practices. Hence, drug dealing and alcohol abuse are common in Er-Rhamna because of missing sanction mechanisms and the absence of the police. In particular, residents who live in proximity to places of drug dealing complain about youth who come to buy their drugs there, drink alcohol, fight, and frequently disturb people's sleep. A 37-year-old electrician reported, "Youth who do not live here assemble in our neighbourhood, disturb us, and make the place less secure." Although many local residents would agree, perceiving it as expressions of social disorder, they have limited possibilities to intervene. Some people also reported incidences of theft and violence. One day, we interviewed a 20-year-old man who had just come back from work and was robbed on his way through another block of Er-Rhamna to his home. Other persons mentioned the risk of

being aggressed during night and in Block 11, we were told about an incident of child abduction. However, a rather common narrative was that as long as people know you and as long as you are on your block, nothing will happen to you. Several times, people warned us against going to another block that they considered dangerous. However, once we were there, local residents had no different perspectives on security than those living on other blocks. Similarly, a 42-year-old night guard affirmed he felt safe, as people would only steal from persons they do not know.

Nonetheless, there are also more critical voices regarding the intensive social interactions amongst neighbours and its consequently high degree of social control. First, there are residents, in particular younger ones, who criticise the hypocrisy of and interference by (older) neighbours. A 25-year-old mother, who moved at the age of 16 to Er-Rhamna because of marriage, told us, "I only trust one neighbour of my age, because the older neighbours meddle in my affairs. Thus, I close my door in front of them." Similarly, two female students in Block 10 and a 21-year-old student in Block 15 reported that they feel uncomfortable with neighbours who regard them with mistrust and who are much too curious about their lives. Others simply mentioned that they feel personally isolated because they moved away from their families (mostly because of marriage) and do not feel well integrated in Er-Rhamna. Second, some neighbours critically pointed to violence and social disorder amongst neighbours. Because she is afraid of the frequent fights and the use of swearwords amongst neighbours, another 26-year-old woman does not allow her children to leave the house alone. Indeed, some mothers mentioned the fear that their children would learn the wrong lessons from their life on the streets of Er-Rhamna. Bouchra told us: "Close to our house, there is a drug selling place. If I allow my children to play outside, I fear that they will start taking drugs as well." Third, some problems among neighbours relate to construction. For example, a resident in a lower-lying area of Er-Rhamna complained that some neighbours would not be interested in installing a well-functioning sewerage system. Other dwellers complained about neighbours' constructions, which either obstructed a window or were built on their own wall.

5.1.5 Stigmatisation

Finally, yet importantly, stigmatisation has an extremely influential impact on social life and general satisfaction with living conditions in Er-Rhamna. Stigmatisation exists at several different levels and places and may invoke feelings of inferiority and even shame among the residents of Er-Rhamna. Othmane, a student who spent his entire life in Er-Rhamna, felt that *bidonville* residents constantly get the impression that they are second-class people. Indeed, discrimination and stigmatisation have always accompanied *bidonvilles* in Morocco. Newspaper articles, government documents, and royal speeches have framed the *bidonville* as an anarchic, abnormal, and ugly place with only limited degrees of civilisation (cf. Zaki 2005, 52ff). An example may be the definition given by the Ministry of Housing in its 2012 report on the VSB: "A shantytown is a set of shacks serving as shelters built with an assortment of light reclaimed materials (iron sheets, wood, etc.) on land that is devoid of basic infrastructures (drain systems, drinking water adduction, power-network, etc.)" (MHUPV 2012, 12). Although the conditions described in this quotation are ultimately wrong for *bidonvilles* in Casablanca, these writings have largely fostered *bidonvilles'* image of abnormality and underdevelopment in public, which has largely influenced public policy making (see section 2.64.1).

Moreover, the visible impression of *bidonvilles* – distinct from the rest of the urban built-up area (Figure 5-8) – has influenced narratives that deny the *bidonville* any status as part of the urban society, but rather frames it as an ugly 'rural alien' in the city. The stigma of the rural *bidonville* draws a picture of a backward and subordinate place where people do not share the same norms as 'ordinary' urban citizens. Explaining

this stigma, Zaki (2005, 67) writes, "The *bidonville* dwellers are those who do not know the etiquette, the way of being in the city, how to practice the city, how to behave, how to develop oneself in the city […], which makes them the undesired beings of the agglomeration[32]." Despite the questionable implication of a clear hierarchy and the distinction between the city and the countryside, the assumption that *bidonville* dwellers have all moved from the countryside to the city is misinformed. Rachik (2012) has questioned this assumption, arguing that instead of rural-urban migration having had taken place, intra-urban forces of displacement rather account for today's population growth in *bidonvilles*. Own data on life in Er-Rhamna supports this argument and speaks against the image of the 'rural' *bidonville*. Of the two-thirds of respondents who were not born in Er-Rhamna (*n*=243), 63% had moved from formal neighbourhoods of Casablanca to Er-Rhamna. The majority of these people escaped renting contracts, which force them to pay a regular amount of money despite very irregular sources of income (see section 5.1.2). Only 22.2% of the interviewed residents had moved directly from the countryside to Er-Rhamna.[33] Marriage, but also improved access to better education infrastructure such as schools, are among the common reasons for moving. Finally, only a very small minority of the residents of Er-Rhamna (<1%) work in the primary sector.

Figure 5-8: View of Er-Rhamna (front), with the formal neighbourhood Jawhara in the distance. Own picture, February 2017.

In addition, the criminalisation of the *bidonville* is also a common form of stigmatisation. Criminalising the *bidonville* dweller means describing him or her as a delinquent person or/and as a 'wrong poor' that only pretends to be poor to be able to profit from the state's housing benevolence (Zaki 2005, 62ff). Regarding delinquency, *bidonvilles* are framed "as breeding and recruiting grounds for the transnationally organised

[32] All quotations of Zaki (2005) were translated for this thesis from French into English.

[33] The remaining respondents had moved from the following places to Er-Rhamna: 8.6% from other *bidonvilles* in Casablanca, 4.1% from other cities in Morocco, 0.8% from foreign countries, and 0.8% from other parts of the *wilaya* Casablanca-Settat.

jihadi groups presumably linked to al-Qaeda" (Zemni and Bogaert 2011, 409), as "shelter for criminals" (Arrif 1999, 313), or as a "space of social and moral deviance" (Zaki 2005, 63). The 2003 suicide bombings in the city centre of Casablanca, carried out by residents of Karyan Thomas, a former *bidonville* close to Er-Rhamna, further enhanced stigmatisation and certainly pushed along the introduction of the VSB programme (Toutain 2011, 170; Bogaert 2011, 720). Concerning the notion of the 'profiteer' or the 'wrong poor', this phenomenon is largely exaggerated in public. Indeed, there are cases where people try to cheat to maximise profits from resettlement (e.g. through unnecessary subdivisions) (see section 5.2.6); however, these cases remain exceptions and often mirror deficiencies and corruption in a severely opaque planning and implementation process (see section 5.2.2). In contrast, the image of the 'sponger' appears relatively often in people's experiences of stigmatisation. For example, a 22-year-old female student in Er-Rhamna reported, "When I am at school [private university] and people ask me where I live, whenever I respond 'in a *bidonville*', they always ask, 'and your father can pay for your school?' That is extremely annoying!" Many of her young neighbours even prefer not to say that they live in a *bidonville* to avoid this situation.

Hence, residents' daily life experiences of stigmatisation are important to focus on, because they show how stigmatisation and discrimination translate into feelings of inferiority, marginalisation, or shame. These feelings in return largely influence people's expectations and aspirations towards resettlement and urban life. In other words, experiences with all kind of stigmatisation, discrimination, and humiliation transmit hegemonic norms and aspirations of 'modern' or 'decent' urban life, hence fostering a favourable attitude towards resettlement among *bidonville* residents (see section 5.2.1). Stigmatisation starts from birth. A 35-year-old family father who was born in Er-Rhamna complained that the registry office noted the word *koukh* as his address, which rather describes a basic form of rural shelter. Because of the clear rural connotation, he felt it was even more insulting than calling his home *baraka*, another common term to distinguish *bidonvilles* from the city's 'ordinary' houses (*maisons en dur*). Stigmatisation continues at school. Hafida mentioned: "The administration of the school close by told us that we had to wait for the other children to be registered, because this school is made for the inhabitants of *maisons en dur*. But we have lived here even before these houses!" It is at school where children have first-hand experiences with stigmas of being 'different' from those living in a *maison en dur*. "In our centre for vocational training, teachers treat us [pupils from *bidonvilles*] in a mean way, calling us thieves, etc.," reported Aziz. Besides different treatment by teachers, also the abovementioned, humiliating reaction of 'surprise' matters. Nadia explained: "You cannot say where you live. Then, you have to say that you live in a *bidonville* and then they look differently at you." Stigmatisation can even have impacts on a very personal level, as a 19-year-old student admitted: "A girl did not want to go out with me, just because I live in a *karyan*."

Indeed, a crucial aspect of stigmatisation is that people feel they could not invite anybody to their homes. Many residents mentioned they could or would not invite friends, either because they feel ashamed of living in a *bidonville*, or because friends would simply be too afraid to come. According to Hafida, also taxi drivers avoid Er-Rhamna: "If you say 'Sidi Moumen', they ask you where exactly you want to go. If you then say 'Er-Rhamna', they would not go there. So you say 'Saada' and you have to walk a bit." However, it remains the question whether Hafida always *tries* to say 'Er-Rhamna'. Certainly, many residents avoid using the word because of shame. An 18-year-old pupil admitted, "I do not have enough courage to invite my friends from school to learn together at my home." Another local woman told us she would not even dare to say 'Er-Rhamna' to the taxi driver because of the stigmatisation she has experienced since her early childhood and especially at school. Indeed, people's own denial of their place of residence may further enhance stigmatisation. To many people, the '*bidonville* dweller' never appears personally, but only through the

stylised pictures of speeches and newspapers. Who knows whether the taxi driver would have really reacted in a disparaging way? In some cases, residents complained about stigmatisation, but could not state any personal experience. However, it is clear that you need strong self-confidence to actively oppose stigmatisation. Othmane and his friend Hicham mentioned that they try to argue with people who treat them disparagingly and try to ask them specifically about what would be so bad about *bidonvilles*. "But, it is often difficult. If someone insults you because of your place of living, and you defend yourself, he always holds better cards. He can say: 'I have money, I can call the police and no one will trust you, if they hear where you come from'!"

After the end of their educational career, many young people in Er-Rhamna are afraid of not getting a job because of their place of residence. Ali, a 29-year-old boilersmith, and his brother mentioned that typically, employers would not trust *bidonville* dwellers. They would think that they are all unreliable and criminal. To have a better chance on the job market, he decided not to use his real address for his identity card, but instead registered the address of a relative living in a formal neighbourhood. Latifa, a young, socially engaged teacher living in Er-Rhamna, did the same: "After my bachelor, I applied everywhere but I did not even receive a response. Hence, I switched the address on my identity card, using the address of my aunt living in Ain Sebaa. Afterwards, several employers invited me. Of course, it does not prove anything, but come on." Hafida, but also the above-quoted boilersmith, mentioned that mistrust towards *bidonville* dwellers has increased since May 16, 2003, the day of the suicide attacks.

For many people, stigmatisation has become the major reason for their support of the resettlement plans (see section 5.2.1). Othmane concluded, "To escape stigmatisation, some people would even accept being resettled to the moon." Others, however, wonder about the reasons of stigmatisation, for example Mhamed, a 19-year-old high school student, who said, "I do not see any differences between the *bidonville* and the *maisons en dur*." Similarly, Nadia reported that the people who humiliate one because of one's place of residence have never been to a *bidonville*. In addition, two young men from Er-Rhamna who work as market traders in the *medina* answered that they see no difference between the *medina* and Er-Rhamna, except for the fact that life is better in the *bidonville*. Indeed, as Zaki (2005, 56) highlights, several sociologists, without underestimating the difficult living conditions in *bidonvilles*, have criticised catastrophist and dramatising fears, underlining that dwellers of the *medinas* would often suffer from much less favourable sanitary conditions than *bidonville* dwellers. To conclude, I emphasise that stigmatisation of *bidonvilles* in Morocco builds mainly on irrationalities and abstract fears that lack objective foundations. The abovementioned comparisons of *bidonvilles* and *medinas* – often branded as the classic Moroccan heritage city – nicely illustrate this.

5.1.6 Attempt of a Socio-Economic Characterisation

Reflecting on the sections above, I would like to conceptualise Er-Rhamna in the sense of Stokes as a place through which people foster their integration or re-integration into the urban society. Stokes (1962, 190) argues that people "come to the cities seeking improvement" and aim to integrate into the urban society mainly through the city's job market. Following this argument, I see the city – or broader, the urban society – as a resource of opportunities for 'improvement'. This may include access to better and more jobs, to higher education, to more social and cultural heterogeneity, and to better shelter. Hence, life in a *bidonville* offers a certain degree of social security that facilitates people's integration into the city, particularly if they suffer from insecure livelihoods. Therefore, to some extent *bidonvilles* are the 'embodiment of the right to city' (Fawaz 2009, 832f), where people produce a different, more resilient urban space that favours urban

integration outside the forces of the formal (property) market. Two cases from Er-Rhamna may further illustrate this conceptual perspective. There is the father of a 17-year-old girl who sent his daughter to the shack of her brother in Er-Rhamna at the age of 14 because in their rural area close to Settat, the school was too far away. Once per week, the father would bring a supply of food and would finance her private evening lessons – a widely inexistent service in the countryside. Similarly, a family of five persons told us that they bought a house of 20 m² in Er-Rhamna in 2010 when they arrived from the Sahara. Although we had not asked them for an interview, they invited us in and showed us with pride their new home in which they had subsequently invested a lot (e.g. by means of the construction of a second floor). The mother also highlighted that all three children would now be able to attend university, studying chemistry and economics.

These examples aptly illustrate Stokes's assumption about urban migrants 'seeking improvement'; in addition, they show typical pathways of *bidonville* dwellers that moved from the countryside to Er-Rhamna. However, as mentioned previously, most local dwellers had either come from another place in Casablanca to Er-Rhamna or had moved a long time ago from rural areas. Hence, integration pathways look different or are at a different stage than described by Stokes in 1962. People have integrated over years into the urban society, developed their own skills, and were hired by diverse employers or founded their own businesses. Several households have left Er-Rhamna and moved into formal neighbourhoods and there would be even more if there had not been continuous rumours about potential resettlement (see section 5.2.2). Others have preferred to stay and invested in the beautification and renovation of their houses as well as in their professional career. I am reminded of the abovementioned example of a young resident who established a successful web business. Asked about whether she had already thought of moving out of Er-Rhamna, she answered that she was too occupied to think about it. She affirmed that she would prefer to stay close to her family, living in a house on the opposite site of the alley. Yet another of numerous examples is the story of a formerly employed electrician who decided to found his own electrician company. Now, he earns enough money to support his mother, who lives elsewhere outside Er-Rhamna, with DH 500 per month. Thus, I assume that people constantly want to sustain or enhance their degree of integration into urban society. As suggested by Stokes, the job market may be a good indicator of urban integration.

Regarding the sources of income of *bidonville* dwellers in Morocco, the World Bank wrote: "Economic activities for both men and women include factory work, crafts work at home, seasonal work in the countryside, cleaning services, small-scale retail activities in the slum itself or elsewhere in the city via the use of transportable vending stalls" (World Bank 2006, 29). However, the example of Er-Rhamna suggests, first, that occupations of *bidonville* dwellers are much more diverse than noted by the World Bank. These include teaching activities or employment as qualified professionals, as well as businesses that are much more established than indicated by the World Bank (Figure 5-9). Exactly half of the working population in Er-Rhamna work as entrepreneurs (mostly as market traders or craft workers), while the other half are employed (mostly as factory workers, but also in various services sectors). Second, dwellers' income-generating activities take place at diverse locations in the entire metropolitan region and are by far not limited to the close environment of the *bidonville*.

Bidonvilles in Casablanca have developed in relation to the industrialisation of Morocco's economic capital under the French protectorate. The establishment of Casablanca's port as the main trade hub under the protectorate made the city attractive for production industries. Factories were erected along the northern coast from the neighbourhoods Roches Noires and Hay Mohammadi to Sidi Moumen and Sidi Bernoussi.

Thus, colonial segregation policies and industrial concentration in the northeast led to the location of *bidonvilles* such as Karyan Central in proximity to the factories. While retaining the 'beauty' of the elitist city, colonialists tolerated *bidonvilles* as its antithesis, seeing them as the home of the 'indigenous' industrial workers (cf. Rachik 2002, 44f). In 2017, factories are still an important generator of job opportunities for *bidonville* dwellers in Morocco's economic capital. Fifteen percent of the active population in Er-Rhamna works in the relatively nearby factories of the northeast, which include textile, beverages, and car factories (Figure 5-9). Most factory workers earn the Moroccan minimum wage of approximately DH 2,300 per month and often consider their work as insecure due to the usual short-term contracts. Nonetheless, more secure employment situations also exist in which the employer, for example, pays child benefits. In contrast, some dwellers work as day labourers in factories, hence going there each morning in order to search for jobs.



*Figure 5-9: Occupations of the active population in Er-Rhamna (*n=*621).*

Through a number of rehousing and regrouping projects during the protectorate and in the years afterwards, *bidonvilles* developed into important popular neighbourhoods. Large migration waves from the countryside fuelled this development and, because of inexistent access to the French city, these neighbourhoods – besides the *medina* – became major commercial centres for the native Moroccan population. One of the most remarkable market centres is Hay Mohammadi, which developed around and out of Karyan Central (see section 4.4). Hence, trade activities have historically been a typical occupation of *bidonville* dwellers. Even without being one of the major market centres of Casablanca, Er-Rhamna has a high number of sales workers (20.5% of the active population), which means mostly market traders (Figure 5-9). The main reason probably is that entrepreneurial trading activities, in particular petty trade on immobile informal markets and mobile trading by the use of handcarts, have relatively low entry barriers. Even without professional education, small-scale trade represents a relatively regular source of income. In Er-Rhamna, as in other, also formal, neighbourhoods, mobile means of selling are common. There are mobile traders who offer only eggs, other handcarts carry fish, and again other salespersons walk through the streets selling clothes or pots. However, it would be wrong to assume that people's trading activities would be limited mostly to

petty trade. Many traders have established fixed market stalls at one of the three markets of Er-Rhamna (Figure 5-10) or in various other neighbourhoods from the old town to Derb Sultan or Sidi Bernoussi; others have opened small grocery shops within Er-Rhamna. A small number even possess stalls in formal *souqs* or rent formal shops. Although almost all sales workers are self-employed, the phenomenon of 'survival entrepreneurs', as described by Berner et al. (2012), is not as striking in Casablanca's *bidonvilles* as in South Asian or Southeast Asian slums. Trade businesses are not predominantly a risk-minimising strategy, but often generate the households' main income. Furthermore, the number of small grocery shops in Er-Rhamna is not disproportionally high, and trade businesses are not predominantly run by households members with difficulties finding other income-generating activities (cf. Berner et al. 2012, 383f). Moreover, a range of other services such as cleaning, security, and delivery services have developed in relation to informal markets. Finally, income from trade varies largely according to the various ways of selling and the kind of goods, with sales yielding between less than DH 50 and more than DH 200 per working day.

Figure 5-10: One of Er-Rhamna's markets during the midday break. Author's picture, March 2017.

In addition, a significant number of Er-Rhamna's residents (10.3% of the active population) are engaged in '*bricolage*' – an elementary form of self-entrepreneurialism in which people do any kind of job they can find. In fact, *bricolage* shares similarities with the concept of 'survival entrepreneurism' (Berner et al. 2012), meaning that people become entrepreneurs because they cannot find alternative employment. They are entrepreneurs in order to 'survive' or 'to be a little less poor'. However, the specific environment of informal settlements, through its social networks and its incremental building structure, also offers many small-scale job opportunities – from basic construction work and recycling to painting, plumbing, and electric repairs. In addition, petty trade may sometimes fall into the category of '*bricolage*'. The words of Malika, a 54-year-old single mother and former resident of Karyan Central, aptly illustrate this kind of work: "At Hay Mohammadi, the youth had something to do; they could get along [*ils se débrouillait*]. They had small jobs here and there." *Bricolage* helps to maintain or improve the living conditions in informal settlements, but is not limited to the *bidonville* only. Hay Mohammadi has a day labour market (*mouqef*), which provides labour to employers from all over Casablanca. Likewise, recycling workers or shoeblacks use the entire city for their activities. Figure 5-9 lists *bricolage* according to the classification of the International Labour Organization (ILO) under 'elementary occupations'. Concerning income, *bricolage* is at

the bottom of occupations, yielding extremely insecure incomes that often do not exceed DH 1,500 per month.

It is difficult to draw a clear line between *bricolage* and craft work when it comes to *bidonville* dwellers. If respondents stated a precise occupation such as painter, technician, welder, plumber, or electrician, this occupation was incorporated into the category 'craft workers', although working conditions are often similar to those of *bricolage*. To get work, many of the abovementioned professionals (ILO classification 71 and 74) rely on social networks or wait for employment at the *mouqef*. However, other craft workers – mechanics, carpenters, metalworkers, tailors, bakers, and butchers (ILO classification 72 and 75) – either have their own small shops (mostly in Er-Rhamna, but also elsewhere) or work as employees. A large number of residents also work in the service sector (e.g. hairdressers, security guards, and waiters) or as transport workers (e.g. taxi and bus drivers). Whereas taxi drivers with an own car are amongst those with the highest incomes in Er-Rhamna (earning up to DH 12,000 per month), hairdressers' salaries hardly exceed DH 1,500 a month. Beyond that, residents with a higher professional status include people working in the administration of private companies, for example as human resource officers or secretaries. Others have specialised occupations, such as radiographers or graphic designers, and still 2.4% of Er-Rhamna's active population work as teachers in public or private schools (Figure 5-9).

Of course, the abovementioned activities are not exclusively carried out by men. Textile work (also in factories), hairdressing, food processing, but also trade are common activities among female residents, too. In addition, the rate of women engaged in higher-status professional jobs (e.g. teaching) is relatively high. Besides, typical activities of female residents include home-based sewing or domestic work (*femme de ménage*). Other elementary work of women takes place in the public *hammam*, where they for example take care of people's belongings. Nonetheless, the general picture shows a low employment rate of women. Only 21% of the active population in Er-Rhamna are females, which is below the national average.[34] In most cases, women's income only partially contributes to the household income. Only in 9.2% of the households are women the household's only members who generate income from work. Household income per capita for female-headed households does not differ significantly from other households in Er-Rhamna.[35]

Concerning income levels, the data shows that the average per capita income from labour among the active population of Er-Rhamna is almost identical to the Moroccan industrial minimum wage of DH 2,300 per month (median: DH 2,250 per month). This was calculated by the total household income from work, divided by the total number of working household members, and could function as a proxy of the status of the employment. Hence, industrial labour or basic craft work would be an average employment, while *bricolage* because of its lower returns would have a lower status and teaching or advanced entrepreneurship a higher status (Figure 5-11). Besides, total household incomes reach from zero (households that rely on savings or on non-monetary support from relatives) to a maximum of DH 27,000 per month (a household with several teachers and taxi drivers). The median total household income is DH 3,200 per month, and the median per capita household income is DH 625 month. Twenty-five percent of the households have a per capita income of more than or equal to DH 890 per month. To compare, the World Bank defines a city dweller in Morocco with a per capita income of below DH 389 per month as 'poor' (e-mail communication with the World Bank office in Rabat, August 30, 2017). Thus, without ignoring the fact that some *bidonville*

[34] According to the World Bank, 26.4% of Morocco's total labour force are females.
[35] Because of non-parametric data, I used a Mann-Whitney U test to test for significant differences in the total household income per household member between female-headed households and other households.

dwellers are extremely poor, the data clearly counters the government's implicit assumption that poverty is strongly concentrated in *bidonvilles* (section 4.2). For example, instead of receiving remittances to get by, some households of Er-Rhamna themselves financially support other family members that live elsewhere outside the *bidonville*. Thus, data is in support of Bartoli (2011), who doubted the government's proclaimed ambition to act in the name of the poor, because there is no evidence that the majority of *bidonville* dwellers could indeed be considered poor.



*Figure 5-11: Distribution of households' income from work divided by the number of active household members (per capita work income). Percentages on the ordinate (*n=*357).*

Concerning spatial patterns of labour, the data supports previous assumptions that workplaces are predominantly located near to the *bidonville*, but are not limited to the proximate environment only (Figure 5-12). Whereas 26.8% of the active population stated no fixed workplace, a considerable number of residents use their own home for income-generating activities (3.8%) or work in shops or elsewhere in Er-Rhamna (10.5%). In addition, workplaces of factory workers and market traders are most often located in Sidi Moumen and its neighbouring districts of Ain Sebaa and Sidi Bernoussi. Of those labourers who work at more or less fixed locations, 26.8% work outside these closed neighbourhoods. It is striking that *bidonville* dwellers search (and may find) employment in the entire metropolitan region. Thus, it is not surprising that 62% of the households in Er-Rhamna spend part of their income on work-related transport. Among these households, the median expenditures for work-related transport is DH 300 per month. Of course, mobile traders who sell from their own car suffer from the largest transport expenditures, whereas an employee who uses one bus or one shared taxi to go to work would pay between DH 250 and DH 300 a month.



Cartography: Torben Dedring

*Figure 5-12: Distribution of fixed workplaces of the active population in Er-Rhamna. Cartography: Torben Dedring (*n*=455).*

5.1.7 Section Summary

Section 5.1 has described shelter conditions, security of tenure, public services, social life, stigmatisation, and economic activities as the major aspects of livelihoods and living practices of *bidonville* dwellers in Casablanca, using mainly the example of Er-Rhamna. Although the section emphasised the heterogeneity of *bidonville* communities, I would like to make some general observations. The section shows that *bidonville* dwellers are most concerned with shelter quality and stigmatisation. The first mainly refers to inadequate roofing, limited space, and environmental deficiencies, notwithstanding that some residents are also aware of the flexibility of housing structures as a positive aspect of living in *bidonvilles*. The latter means that *bidonville* dwellers face stigmatisation on a daily basis – often in schools or other public institutions. Many people are ashamed of telling others that they live in a *bidonville* and would never invite guests to their home – a fact that often motivates people to agree on resettlement solutions, which will be shown in the next section.

In comparison to shelter and stigmatisation, residents are less concerned about security of tenure, which many do not frame as a problem mainly because they doubt that the state could evict them without providing them with appropriate alternatives. Public services are also fairly good. Almost all houses are connected to the power grid and have in-house access to running water. Rather, people are concerned about wastewater management and street pavements. For many residents, one of the biggest advantages of living in a *bidonville* is the close community life. What some people described as the ‘open door’ practice refers to a high degree of neighbourhood solidarity as well as jointly guaranteed security. However, some people also

stressed negative aspects of intense neighbourhood relationships, pushing people to follow a conformist lifestyle. Finally, most residents consider the location of the *bidonville* inside the city of Casablanca and close to a range of job opportunities as another major advantage of their current housing situation. Although people work all over the metropolitan area, most residents found a job within walking distance from home, which keeps transport expenditures at a relatively low level. Typical work includes trading, factory work, and small-scale craft work. However, the data clearly shows that by far not all households could be called poor. In fact, several households generate middle to even upper-middle incomes, especially if their members work as specialised professionals, public officers, or teachers.

In the next section, I show how state authorities have tried to freeze steady development in *bidonvilles* in order to facilitate a potential resettlement. Whereas this part, including people's attitudes towards and rumours about resettlement, still mostly focuses on Er-Rhamna, I thereafter go on to the processes of implementation concerning the *recasement* of Karyan Central. My discussion of the opaqueness and force within the implementation process and of the shortcomings and processes of the third-party scheme build on conversations with resettled residents from Karyan Central, third-party investors, and residents still living in temporary accommodation, as well as on related documents such as contracts and reports.

5.2 How to Get People to Move

How do state authorities[36] get people to move? Before I provide answers to this question, I would like to emphasise once again my conceptualisation of the *bidonville* as a place through which people foster their integration or re-integration into urban society (cf. Fawaz 2009; Stokes 1962; Turner and Fichter 1972). Stokes (1962, 196) argues that 'slums of hope' will disappear as migration slows down and as the demand for labour becomes more closely aligned to supply. However, he does not specify how one could *realise* whether a 'slum of hope' has disappeared or whether it has turned into a persisting 'slum of despair'. Evidence from Er-Rhamna suggests that reality is much more complex and heterogeneous. Some parts of Er-Rhamna have already developed into neighbourhoods that show hardly any difference to formal neighbourhoods such as the *medina*. I am reminded of Mhamed, who said, "I do not see any differences between *bidonvilles* and *maisons en dur*." In contrast, some younger parts of Er-Rhamna look less developed, but may provide opportunities for newcomers to integrate into urban society, similar to Stokes' idea of a 'slum of hope' (see section 5.1.5). Finally, other cases in Er-Rhamna rather fuel the impression of a persisting 'slum of despair' where people lack any hope of further socio-economic integration. Based on the empirical evidence (see section 5.1) and theoretical reflections (see chapter 2) presented in this thesis, I argue that Er-Rhamna would have the potential to develop into an 'ordinary', heterogeneous urban neighbourhood fully integrated into urban society.

However, there is no political interest in the idea of incremental development. On the contrary, institutional, political, and social forces have inhibited residents' integration efforts, for example through the enhancement of stigmatisation, the systematic spreading of rumours about resettlement, as well as the prohibition of practices of auto-construction and house selling. Why is this important to consider for the question of

[36] The term 'authorities' in this section refers to state authorities and will further be specified if and where possible. However, it would go too far beyond the scope of this thesis to define for each specific action the state authority (at the central, regional, or local level) that wields the most power. It has to be assumed that it is often a variety of pressures and dependencies at various state levels that result in a certain action.

how to make people move? By emphasising the differences between *maisons en dur* and *bidonvilles* and by freezing the *bidonvilles*' evolution process, state institutions have actively influenced people's attitudes towards resettlement and have prevented potential resistance, which consequently facilitates the clearance of land and the *recasement* process.

Thus, this chapter emphasises the procedural implementation of resettlement from Karyan Central to Nouvelle Lahraouiyine – starting with people's attitudes towards moving and leading to major sources of conflict within the implementation of resettlement. The central objective is to understand how the state succeeds in moving *bidonville* dwellers in a relatively short time from the existing structures into three-storey apartment houses at another location. The analysis builds on the thick description of living conditions and ways of life in Er-Rhamna, which, I argued previously, are comparable to the situation in Karyan Central at the beginning of the resettlement. However, in the chapter I will narratively move away from Er-Rhamna towards the reports, stories, and characteristics of the resettlement of Karyan Central. To start with, I explain residents' expectations of resettlement, their attitudes towards it, and the rumours that circulate in Er-Rhamna concerning a potential resettlement. Afterwards, I examine the lack of transparency regarding the actual resettlement scheme and the force applied to support its implementation. I explain the ideal way of resettlement and shed light on the role of third-party investors in constructing most of the apartment houses. Thereafter I focus on major sources of conflict within the process, which includes temporary accommodation, as well as conflicts between the resettled people and the third-party investors. Finally, the chapter sheds light on the phenomenon of *glissement*, analysing the reasons why some dwellers dropped out of the programme and did not move to the new site.

5.2.1 Residents' Attitudes towards Resettlement

Positive attitudes towards resettlement among inhabitants are crucial for the state's implementation of large-scale displacements. It is difficult and politically undesired to resettle a *bidonville* with 30,000 to 40,000 inhabitants against the will of the majority of the people. Hence, people's attitudes and expectations towards resettlement and a life in apartment houses are of high interest to authorities. In Er-Rhamna, 80.4% of the interview partners mentioned that they would like to move within the next five years. While 11.2% did not respond, only 8.4% of the dwellers were unwilling to move. Of course, the wish to move reflect people's dissatisfaction with their overall housing situation, which includes physical housing conditions, the availability of public services, as well as social factors. However, it is astonishing that only 47.4% mention that they are dissatisfied with their overall housing situation, whereas 24.4% are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, and 27.6% feel satisfied. Indeed, a correlation analysis of people's intention to move and their satisfaction with the overall housing situation shows a negative correlation. However, compared to the resettled inhabitants of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, the correlation between people's intention to move and their satisfaction with the overall housing situation is less strong in Er-Rhamna (Table 5.1).

An example may illustrate this discrepancy between people's wish to move and comparatively low levels of dissatisfaction with the general living conditions. One day, a young female orphan living alone in Er-Rhamna was helping us to find respondents in her neighbourhood and was listening to the responses of her neighbour. When she heard that the neighbour supported the resettlement, she took initiative: "Look! Your house is out of concrete, we have windows with wooden frames, and the house is even painted in blue. What else do you want?" Beside personal reasons, a reason to explain why overall satisfaction with the housing situation is not the single reason to support resettlement is stigmatisation. Daily experiences with stigmatisation have enhanced the wish to move out. Student Othmane made a point: "People in Er-Rhamna

are divided in their opinions of resettlement. Many want to stay, but the majority wants to leave. Many do not see the problems they will face. They would even accept it if they had to move to the moon. Discrimination is a huge problem. From birth, people here get told that they are second-class people." Indeed, many *bidonville* dwellers stated their hope that resettlement (moving into *maisons en dur*) would allow them to escape the stigmatisation connected to their habitat. For example, a young mother told us that she wanted to move, because she did not want her children to have the same negative experiences with stigmatisation as she had had. Another female student mentioned that she feared not getting any job because of her residency; she hoped the resettlement would come as soon as possible. Likewise, a 64-year-old mother had enough of being 'different': "I do not want to live in a *bidonville* anymore; I want to live like everybody else!" Thus, through the eyes of some residents, moving into *maisons en dur* would equal their desired recognition as 'ordinary' city dwellers.

Table 5.1: The correlation between people's satisfaction with their general housing situation and people's intention to move within the next five years in Karyan Er-Rhamna and Nouvelle Lahraouiyine.

Variable 1: People's intention to move within the next five years Variable 2: People's satisfaction with their general housing situation		
	Er-Rhamna (*n*=356)	Nouvelle Lahraouiyine (*n*=393)
Pearson correlation coefficient	-0,299***	-0,479***

*** Significant at the level of 0,001

However, there is also evidence for an opposite logic. This means a considerable number of dwellers perceive resettlement as a threat to their status as urban citizens, as it would move them further away from the city. The data shows that even though the majority would be willing to move out, only 41.5% of the interviewed residents in Er-Rhamna had a determined positive opinion about the VSB programme. One-quarter mentioned that they could not yet judge the programme, because they had only heard rumours about it. The other residents remained more sceptical or even negative, in particular concerning the location of the resettlement site as well as temporary accommodation. Many dwellers were worried about finding a job, in case they would have to move to a remote place. Typically, an employee of a security company mentioned, "At the moment I get up at 5:00 a.m., take the bus to Maarif at 5:30 a.m., and arrive at 6:30 a.m.. At 7:00 a.m., I am at my place. How should that work if I live in Chellalat or Lahraouiyine?" Beyond work-related concerns, people critically pointed to the loss of urban amenities. A 30-year-old plumber remarked, "They will move us further away from the city. I would find a job over there, but it would be so far to everything that exists in the city." Thus, as mentioned above, people fear losing their status as urban citizens. A 55-year-old employee mentioned, "We could get by in another urban neighbourhood, but it would be difficult for a rural area [*zone rurale*]." Others, such as a 48-year-old housewife, are more optimistic: "We would love to move, even if it is far away. In time, it will develop into a city. It is a bit comparable to the case here at the *karyan*. At the beginning, we were taking the taxi to the *hammam*, and there were not many economic activities neither."

The second aspect people were worrying about was temporary accommodation – the need to find accommodation between the demolition of the shack and the move into the new apartment. Some poorer dwellers stated concerns that they would not be able to afford rented accommodation, especially if the relocation

takes longer than expected. A woman of a single-headed household shared her worries: "After the demolition, I have to rent while waiting for the plot. When I have the plot, I still have to search long for a *moul chkara* to construct the house, and the construction itself takes even longer." Some residents referred to negative experiences of former residents of the demolished neighbouring *bidonville* Karyan Thomas. They reported stories of residents who had rented for more than three years and of some who were still waiting to move into their new flat. However, respondents acknowledged the fact that residents of Karyan Thomas did not to move far, but to the new town of Annassi at the other side of Sidi Moumen.

I may also recall critical voices on the intentions of policy makers behind the VSB programme. Nadia, for example, reflected on the abovementioned stigma that *bidonville* dwellers would not know how to 'behave' in the city. She was convinced that policy makers believe that people from *bidonvilles* could not live together with people from the city: "They [the authorities] not only want a *ville sans bidonvilles* [a city without shantytowns], they want a *ville sans bidonvillois* [a city without shantytown dwellers]." Ali thought that he probably would have to move far away only because of the terrorist attacks conducted by dwellers of Karyan Thomas. He compared the situation to Marseille: "I think the state wants to avoid a situation as in Marseille where they built social housing close to the city. This created problems. That is why the state tries to move us even further away from the city. They want to dislocate the problems."

Of course, these rather critical voices should not hide the abovementioned fact that positive attitudes towards resettlement dominate. For example, Nadia, despite her criticism, still was in favour of moving out, but preferred in situ solutions. Most likely, this is an attitude that most people would share. Consequently, I argue that despite a basic positive attitude towards resettlement among people in *bidonvilles*, their support for resettlement projects largely depend on the resettlement conditions. Exemplarily, a 28-year-old plasterer remarked that he would be in favour of the resettlement "if we were not forgotten over there, if we were not alone with our problems, [and] if there were economic activity." Beyond that, people's personal connection to the neighbourhood and their individual satisfaction largely influence their attitude towards resettlement. Because of that, attitudes even differ within the same household. For example, a 54-year-old mother in Er-Rhamna was concerned about resettlement and the demolition, as she felt emotionally attached to her self-built house: "If I am invited elsewhere, I only think about coming back to my home. This house has been my own work!" In contrast, her daughters wanted to move out, because they felt uncomfortable with social life in the neighbourhood and the bad image of *bidonvilles*. In another case, two cousins – born on the same day – had lived together in the same house in Er-Rhamna. The first never lived somewhere else, and the second moved in after the death of her mother. Whereas the first wanted to stay because of all her friends and the warm-hearted neighbourhood, the second supported the resettlement, particularly emphasising the difficult housing conditions. To conclude, these two examples may again highlight the complexities underlying people's individual attitudes towards resettlement.

5.2.2 Rumours, Opaqueness, and Force as Guiding Principles

This section moves away from people's perspectives on resettlement towards authorities' measures to influence people's willingness to move. Despite discrimination and stigmatisation, political refusal to support incremental development in *bidonvilles*, the spreading of rumours about resettlement, as well as repression have fostered a generally positive attitude of *bidonville* dwellers towards resettlement. Generating this positive attitude is crucial for political authorities in order to facilitate the relocation of *bidonville* dwellers to the resettlement sites. Prior to all other measures, authorities have fostered people's willingness to move through maintaining the temporary or provisional character of the *bidonville*. The denial of *bidonvilles*'

formal recognition includes previously described aspects such as the non-issuance of land titles, special arrangements for electricity, the refusal to connect *bidonvilles* with the telecommunications network, and institutional discrimination.

Since the establishment of the VSB programme following the 2003 suicide attacks, authorities further strengthened the repression of *bidonville* dwellers. Through further restrictions on building improvements and the prohibition of house-selling activities, authorities have frozen almost any kind of incremental development processes. As described in section 5.1.1 and similar to informal settlements in other countries (cf. Fawaz 2009; Barthel 2013), several residents have reported consolidation processes concerning the building structure in Er-Rhamna. Advocates of in situ upgrading have recommended supporting this kind of incremental consolidation and development process (see chapter 2; Turner and Fichter 1972; Turner 1977). However, in view of future resettlement operations, the Moroccan government has increased efforts to fight these developments. In 2001, King Mohammed VI was the first king to blame local politicians and state representatives for their role in the production and proliferation of informal urban space (MHUPV 2013, 49). This critique, together with the establishment of new resettlement programmes, led to strengthened control in *bidonvilles* in order to prevent people from adding floors or extending or subdividing their houses. Despite the preservation of the 'provisional' character of the *bidonville*, the main objectives are to keep the number of potential 'beneficiaries' of housing programmes at a constant level and to prevent the construction of new houses after the first house demolitions. Following this, authorities have applied three different measures: (1) restricting house constructions and extensions; (2) prohibiting house sales; and (3) spreading rumours about resettlement.

There are two major consequences of freezing self-managed and incremental development in *bidonvilles*: (1) Inhabitants cannot (or are unwilling to) improve their shelter conditions, which may lead to faster deterioration; and (2) ordinary moving activities no longer take place. Regarding the first aspect, several residents in both neighbourhoods mentioned interventions in construction activities by local state representatives. Saida, one of the last residents of Karyan Central who currently lives in temporary accommodation, recalled the story of a neighbour who rebuilt his off-house bathroom after its demolition by accident. The *mqadem* immediately intervened and destroyed the new bathroom 'shack'. In Er-Rhamna, residents also affirmed a construction ban, even though resettlement was no more than a rumour. A household with fourteen members suffering from a lack of space and bad physical housing conditions mentioned that they would have invested in new constructions if it were not forbidden. Hence, the construction ban has negatively affected their motivation to improve their shelter.

Nonetheless, as mentioned previously (see section 5.1.1), there are still few incidents of more recent constructions in Er-Rhamna, despite the formal construction ban. However, the number of new building activities remains low also for another reason: the constant spreading of rumours about resettlement. A 30-year-old woman living in Er-Rhamna, but working in the social accompaniment of resettled *bidonville* dwellers in the new town Er-Rahma, shared her impressions: "They tell us rumours about the resettlement so that dwellers do not build and do not repair and so that inhabitants use their houses as provisional dwelling. Only in the case of elections do they let us construct." Indeed, rumours about resettlement are omnipresent in Er-Rhamna. Only during my four months of field research, my interlocutors told me of two different resettlement locations (Chellalat and Sidi Hajjaj) and two different starting dates for resettlement, the first in January and, after January had passed, another in March. Several dwellers mentioned that there has never

been a time without rumours about resettlement; others said it started with the 2003 suicide attacks. Although people would not call it a lack of security of tenure (because they would probably not be evicted without alternative housing), the spreading of rumours about resettlement has a similar negative effect on investment. Bouchra, who renovated her house with great dedication, complained that several households had considerable savings, but would not invest in their dwellings, as they always have to expect being displaced tomorrow, thus losing their investment. Hence, the continuous awaiting of displacement and resettlement has fostered a reluctance among *bidonville* dwellers to invest in housing.

This passive expectation of resettlement is also among the reasons that provoked the second consequence of frozen consolidation processes mentioned above: the end of a normal moving fluctuation. A considerable number of households would have sufficient means to move to another neighbourhood and would be – in principle – willing to move, but they do not move due to the prospect of a housing benefit. For example, an eight-member household in Er-Rhamna with a taxi driver, a teacher, and three highly qualified professionals generate a combined monthly income of DH 21,500. Asked about why they had not moved, the son responded that they were willing to move, but that moving then – without benefiting from the programme – would be stupid. Others have moved, but have left their houses empty (or under the guard of neighbours) in order to remain eligible for the VSB programme. In one case, a woman mentioned that she and her daughters had returned in August 2016 to her house in Er-Rhamna after having spent seven years in Italy, where her husband was still working. She wanted to be present when the resettlement started. Similarly, in the small *bidonville* Capitaine Montugué, a family father used his former house as a barn in order not to give up his rights within the resettlement project. In addition, the prohibition of house sale has also contributed to a halt of house moves. A 52-year-old woman who moved from Zagora to Er-Rhamna thirteen years ago to take care of her mother mentioned that she would have sold the house and returned to the Sahara if it were not forbidden to sell her house.

Together with the construction and selling ban, the spreading of rumours has an indirect effect on residents' attitudes towards resettlement. By stopping the autonomous development and incremental improvement process, it preserves the 'provisional' character and increases dwellers' willingness to support resettlement. However, local authorities also use information spreading in a more direct way to influence people's attitudes towards resettlement. In the implementation plan for the resettlement of Karyan Central, the relevant agencies and authorities assigned a significant role to targeted information spreading. As part of the so-called *accompagnement social* (see section 4.3), information campaigning was intended to raise awareness among inhabitants about "the interest of the project, its advantages and its implementation, the modalities of the relocation, as well as the project's impact after its completion" (Al Omrane et al. 2009, 13). Furthermore, agents responsible for the *accompagnement social* were meant to "regroup households into homogenous groups ['according to their availability, their consent to the project, and their income sources, …' (Al Omrane et al. 2009, 14)] in order to facilitate the reception of messages to be distributed for a larger consent" (Al Omrane et al. 2009, 14). Intermediaries and local leaders within Karyan Central were to play a significant role in this regard. This targeted distribution of information should not be confused with transparency about the conditions of resettlement. Instead, similar to the findings of Le Tellier and Guérin (2009, 664), information (or rumour) spreading is used to persuade people to move and to make people accept the given conditions.

In fact, it seems that rumours circulating amongst the inhabitants of Er-Rhamna and Karyan Central prior and during the resettlement project follow the intention of convincing residents of the necessity to move

and to clear the land, on the one hand, and of the advantages of the new settlement, on the other hand. For example, a person selling refreshments and snacks at the construction site of El Hamd told us that local authorities spread the rumour amongst inhabitants of Karyan Central that it would be worth moving because they would build them a flourishing new city with the largest football stadium of North Africa. Interestingly, the same rumour appeared some weeks later in Er-Rhamna, where 17-year-old Hicham told us that they would have to move because authorities were planning to construct the largest football stadium in North Africa on the land of Er-Rhamna. These kinds of 'advertising' narratives of moving to something 'big' or clearing the land for something 'good' recurred several times and on different occasions. For example, after the first people had moved to Nouvelle Lahraouiyine in 2011 and 2012, rumours occurred about high and still-increasing real estate prices in the new town, and still in 2017, a civil servant told me that Nouvelle Lahraouiyine would develop into something 'spectacular' within the next five years. In fact, first house sales were heavily overrated, and prices dropped drastically a few months later. Likewise, authorities were eager to highlight Hay Mohammadi's urban problems related to congestion, population density, and the lack of green space. Because of that, the resettlement would be indispensable to improve urban conditions in Hay Mohammadi, as it would allow for reduced population densities and the construction of a public park on the same site. In 2018, the public park has yet to be materialised, and urban planners work on plans for additional hotel developments. Nonetheless, some resettled dwellers internalised this narrative, stressing, for example, that from an aesthetical point of view, they would love to see Casablanca without *bidonvilles*.

In contrast, reliable information concerning the conditions for the allocation of plots and the precise modes of resettlement often remained lacking or inaccessible. The participatory *accompagnement social*, as mentioned in the implementation report (Al Omrane et al. 2009), was clearly not visible on the ground. In contrast, the *Comité Local de l'Accompagnement Social* (CLAS, local committee for social accompaniment) was the name of the administration charged with the top-down and rather opaque implementation of the resettlement. It is composed of representatives of the prefecture, the municipality, and the Ministry of Housing, as well as of further unspecified associations and local authorities (Al Omrane et al. 2009, 16). The inaccessibility of reliable information facilitated the spreading of rumours, became a major reason for conflicts, and finally was the entry point for corruption and cheating from all sides.

As part of local authorities' strategy to include local leaders, Rachid, president of the association *Chihab*, was a witness of the opaque implementation process. His association initially supported the resettlement and tried to convince people to move out of Karyan Central. In 2017, he became sceptical about the resettlement project, mainly referring to its bad implementation. Rachid narrated, "Between November 2007 and 2009, the association always requested more information on the resettlement – about the criteria, the dates, etc. – but they simply said that the case was in the hands of the king." The reference to the king was intended to underline the significance of the project as well as its 'just' and 'good' implementation. Only by the end of 2009 did local authorities initiate a meeting with the building company Al Omrane, the planning office Team Maroc, and selected representatives of the inhabitants, amongst them Rachid. At this meeting, authorities presented the specific *recasement* scheme and the possibility of asking a third party to build the house (see section 5.2.3). However, the criteria for attribution remained opaque. There was no law or any other reliable document to which people could refer when they complained about the unjust attribution of plots. Instead, local authorities, in particular the *bacha*, adjusted the criteria in an arbitrary way – mostly with the aim of mitigating protest and ensuring the fast clearance of land.

Initial attribution was based on the 2004 census, meaning that each household behind a door received one semi-plot in the new town (Al Omrane et al. 2009, 17). This led to the situation that several large, intergenerational households received only one semi-plot equal to an apartment of approximately 70 m^2. Following residents' protest, this was changed, and authorities started to issue semi-plots to each married couple within a household. However, the 2004 census did not precisely mirror the situation in 2009. After further protests, authorities changed the terms of reference from the 2004 to the 2008 census, but, still, many residents complained about not having received the appropriate number of semi-plots. The major problem was that nobody knew what exactly would be the 'appropriate' number of plots. In fact, at no point in time was it clear who precisely was eligible for a semi-plot. Also, the 2009 implementation report remains extremely vague concerning the attribution eligibility of larger families, using cross-references that lose themselves in the course of the text (Al Omrane et al. 2009, 17f). In fact, there has always been space for bargaining and corruption, which largely depended on the residents' social status and financial resources (see section 5.2.6). Navez-Bouchanine (2012, 174) called it a 'carrot-and-stick tactic' that, with the aim of clearing the site without significant resistance, left limited space for individual negotiations. Rachid stated: "The allocation of plots was badly organised. Some big families got only one plot, while some smaller ones got more. If you wanted to have more plots, you had to pay bribes." A civil servant at the local administration office responsible for the *recasement*, himself a resettled former resident of Karyan Central, confirmed this kind of unjust enrichment by staff leading the process.

The uncertainty about criteria was a major reason for conflicts and injustices, but also allowed the authorities to 'manage' conflicts without creating too much noise. In fact, the inexistence of transparent criteria led to a comfortable bargaining position for the authorities. This was also the direct consequence of the omnipotent role of the CLAS within the *recasement* process. According to the implementation report (Al Omrane et al. 2009, 17f) and my own observations, it is the CLAS that determines the conditions for attribution and that decides alone in all cases of dispute.[37] Whenever the authorities felt that a decision would create too much resistance, they slightly adjusted the terms of attribution. Likewise, the *bacha*, head of the CLAS and the last authority in charge of the allocation of plots, would misuse his position not only for personal gain, but also to undermine protests. Independent of one another, several residents mentioned that they were asked to pay DH 20,000 to 60,000 for an additional semi-plot. Other residents with complaints about the allocation of plots were repeatedly asked to come back at another time to resolve the issue. As late as March 2017, each time I visited the *bacha*'s office, there was a long queue of people waiting to have their problems of attribution resolved. Fatiha for example told me that the *bacha* kept up her hopes up of receiving another semi-plot and ensured her that a solution would be found, if only she would 'behave well', meaning not protesting. In other cases, the *bacha* himself used means of force and extortion to keep the complaining residents quiet. Abdelhadi reported that the *bacha* once put a complaining resident in prison and told everyone else waiting that they were witnesses that the person had menaced him. If they denied being witnesses to this 'crime', they would not have their problems solved. I could observe a similar case through the open doors of the *bacha*'s office. The *bacha* shouted at a complaining former resident of Karyan Central and threatened him with his fist. Then he called the police to escort him from the office. When the other people who were waiting became aware of the situation, they immediately ran away. One woman even escaped to the bathroom, in which she locked herself.

[37] In the report it is written: "If they were not counted in 2004 due to absence or other verifiable motives, it is the committee [the CLAS] that decides on the fate of the uncounted households" (Al Omrane et al. 2009, 17).

In contrast, local authorities tried to gain the favour of local leaders such as Rachid. He told me that they offered him to choose his preferred plot of land in the new town, which was impossible for ordinary residents. In a similar case, reported by Mohammad, one of the last residents of Karyan Central, members of an Islamist organisation received individual semi-plots although they had married only in 2011. Hence, the opaque criteria also encouraged some residents to cheat. Rachid reported the story of a person who moved out of Karyan Central in 1992. When he heard about the resettlement plans, he transferred the apartment title to his daughter and moved back to his old shack in order to benefit from the resettlement. In another case, a dweller of Karyan Central separated the house to profit twice, although his son was living abroad.

After 2009, despite all conflicts concerning the allocation of plots, the resettlement made some progress, and first inhabitants destroyed their houses and moved out of Karyan Central. Several resettled dwellers mentioned that recent migrants were among the first to move out, but there is no clear evidence for that. What is clear is that community solidarity and social networks among neighbours started to weaken when the first residents moved out. Because of the significance of social networks and the shared provision of public services in *bidonvilles* (see section 5.1.4), this complicated the daily life of the remaining residents and weakened their sense of community. Hence, each inhabitant moving out of Karyan Central increased the pressure of the remaining ones to accept the resettlement conditions. During my first field research trip in 2015, which coincided with this period of transition, a president of another neighbourhood association illustrated the dilemma of the remaining residents:

> You find yourself in front of an isolated shack on a pile of stones and ruins, which firstly provokes problems with vermin. […] Secondly, the question of security arises. You have no neighbours around you anymore. You are isolated. There is no light, because even the light has been cut. In time, you start to worry, and then you go to the authorities to find a solution. That is what happens at the moment (Figure 5-13).

Figure 5-13: Karyan Central during the implementation process of the recasement. *Author's picture, March 2015.*

While the relocation of dwellers created some sort of indirect pressure on the remaining residents, authorities simultaneously increased direct pressure, which was applied in the form of intimidation, legal disputes,

increasing repression, and force. One of the last residents reported that authorities cut the water supply, and another woman even suspected the local authorities of setting fires to make people move. In the spring of 2014, local authorities went to court, accusing the remaining residents of the illegal occupation of land and the blocking of a royal project (information according to a letter of protest of Rachid dating to June 2014). In October 2015, the CLAS issued letters to the remaining residents, threatening them with eviction. A newspaper article in Al Ahdath Al-Maghrebiya quotes from these letters:

> As you refused to participate in the resettlement process of the Karyan Central residents, which started in May 2010, the Local Committee is warning you for the last time to quickly resettle and yield to the demolition. If not, your cases will be transferred to the Regional Committee in order to change the type of your benefit from a plot into an apartment.[38] […] In the case that the final court order will be issued against you, you will be denied from benefiting from the resettlement (Laqlach 2015, translated from Arabic).

Some days later, security forces entered the neighbourhood because of protests that erupted in response to court decisions, forcing 42 households that already had benefited from a semi-plot in Nouvelle Lahraoui-yine to leave and demolish their houses (Bahraoui 2015). On March 8, 2016, representatives of the CLAS arrived, together with a large number of different security forces and a couple of bulldozers, to demolish the 450 remaining houses and forcibly evict the inhabitants. Whereas some people received warning letters, others were surprised by the intervention of security forces and had no chance to rescue their belongings. For example, Zubeir reported that he went to the *bacha* on March 1, 2016, asking to resolve his resettlement affairs. He advised him to come back in two weeks, but seven days later, police and military forces supervised by various state authorities demolished his house unannounced. Some people tried to resist the forced eviction and were arrested – some because of a suicide attempt, others because of the supposed criticism of the king. Other dwellers were more reluctant to protest, because they were still hoping for a better solution. Fatiha, for example, remembered that the *bacha* tried to calm her son. Patting the back of her son, he promised, "Let the bulldozers go about their affairs. You will get your plot." In April 2017, they were still living in temporary accommodation, and she was still waiting and hoping for a semi-plot for her son.

5.2.3 The *Recasement* Scheme

The implemented resettlement strategy – described by the Franco-Moroccan term *recasement* – follows the basic logics of a sites-and-services project (see section 2.3). Thus, the authorities allocate plots of land to *bidonville* dwellers, who are themselves responsible for the construction of the house under pre-defined building standards. As mentioned in section 2.3, sites-and-services schemes have a number of possible shortcomings. Most significantly, they relate to the peripheral location of the plots, as well as to problems of affordability regarding the construction of the house in compliance with (high) building standards. For various reasons, Moroccan authorities did not address the problem of peripheral locations (see section 4.2). In contrast, they tried to find solutions to the problem of affordability. This was a dilemma, because, on the one hand, authorities wanted to clear the land completely, which implied that also extremely vulnerable people should be able to afford moving. On the other hand, giving the land for free was not an option, as they wanted to avoid a situation like in the 1980/90s, when many dwellers capitalised their plots and moved to other or new informal settlements (see chapter 3.6; Le Tellier and Guérin 2009, 662). These were the

[38] Residents prefer to get a plot of land instead of a subsidised apartment, because this is worth much more (see chapter 4.3).

major reasons for inventing a *recasement* scheme, based on the construction of third-party funders, as it was applied in the case of Karyan Central.

As mentioned in section 5.2.2, the first step of the *recasement* of Karyan Central was the conduct of the 2004 and 2008 censuses, which already took place prior to the official announcement of the project in 2009. Based on the surveys, authorities issued attribution papers stating the right to buy half a plot of land at the *recasement* site at a subsidised price of DH 20,000. However, each attribution paper only refers to one particular, mostly male household member, and not to all household members that would have to move. This led to various problems concerning the attribution of plots (see section 5.2.6), illustrated through the case of a divorced woman who lives with her two children in an own house in Er-Rhamna. Her ex-husband told the enumerators that he lived in her house, although he lives with his family elsewhere in Er-Rhamna. Because of that, she was worried that she would not get a plot in the case of resettlement, as the attribution paper would probably only mention the name of her ex-husband.

After having received the attribution paper, dwellers of Karyan Central had to ally with other attribution holders, because each family received only half a plot of land of approximately 40 m². Thereafter, following the ideal way of *recasement*, they then had to decide whether they would like to build the house themselves. Mostly because of financial reasons, this was only the case for 2.6% of the resettled families living in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine (n=382). All other parties searched for a *moul chkara* who could finance the construction of the house in exchange for the ownership of two lower floors of the new house (see section 4.3). As there was no institutionalised way of finding a *moul chkara*, inhabitants of Karyan Central employed basically three different search strategies. The first was to capitalise on personal contacts and to find either a friend or a family member to build the house. Other people hired a real estate agency to search for a *moul chkara* on their behalf, and some *tiers associés* also did it the other way around. Again others stated that they met their *moul chkara* 'by chance', for example in a café where some *tiers associés* were waiting to meet allottees during the resettlement process. Whereas most of the resettled dwellers had no difficulties in finding a *moul chkara*, this became more complicated in the course of the project, when rumours about conflicts between third-party investors and allottees arose (see section 5.2.5). Especially the last households of Karyan Central, who had to move to the more peripheral new town El Hamd, complained about difficulties finding a *moul chkara*.

Being *tiers associé* in a *recasement* project is not of interest to larger real estate companies or investors. On the one hand, each project requires a great amount of communication, individualised and uncommon paperwork, as well as specific arrangements with two different parties, for example concering the interior design of the flat. On the other hand, high transaction costs, uncertainty about the exact plot of land, as well as the multi-ownership of the house allow for only very limited profit margins, if they exist at all. Due to these reasons, and because of the relatively low amount of required capital, *tiers associés* rather were small-scale investors. Besides their normal occupations, they only invested in the construction of a small number of houses – often with an additional motivation beyond mere profit interests (Table 3.1). For example, Omar, son of an owner of a construction company, considered the *recasement* project in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine a good possibility to learn how to manage and implement an own construction project. Likewise, Abdelaziz, who works as a construction manager, wanted to test out the role of building owner in two cases. Furthermore, Ahmed was interested in buying real estate as a kind of social security, as he lived in rental accommodation. Friends recommended him to function as *moul chkara* in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, as this would be the cheapest way to afford own property. For other *tiers associés*, personal relations played a

more significant role. Mohammed for example wanted to support a friend, who wished to become *moul chkara*, but could not afford it on his own. Hence, they agreed that each of them would receive only one of the lower floors of the new house. Finally, Abdeljalil, a taxi owner from Hay Mohammadi, wanted to help some friends (of friends) and some family members who searched for someone to build their house. Like Mohammed, he referred to a religious motivation of doing something 'good' for poor people, which accordingly would bring them closer to God.

Nonetheless, it should be underscored that even though profit interests were not the only reason to participate in the *recasement*, they still significantly influenced the decision whether to remain functioning or not as a *moul chkara*. In the case of Youssef, a small-scale constructor from Hay Mohammadi, the wish to make a profitable business was even the principal reason to become a *moul chkara*. However, as I specify below, profit margins are very limited – if at all existent.

After having found a *moul chkara*, dwellers of Karyan Central signed a contract of association and compromise (*aqad chiraakat wa itifaaq*) with their third-party investor, which afterwards needed to be approved by Al Omrane. At the beginning of the resettlement, both parties went to a public writer to set up a rather basic one-page contract. Due to the large number of upcoming conflicts between *tiers associés* and allottees, notaries took over the work of the public writer, and contracts became much more detailed and formalised. In particular, *tiers associés* highlighted the importance of legally binding, clearly formulated and detailed contracts, because it is the only document in which their name appears and which specifies and limits the duties of the *moul chkara*. Whereas both parties could sign the contract before the demolition of the house, especially the notarial contracts were only signed after allottees issued the declaration of demolition to the *moul chkara*. Only the act of demolition finally ensured the attribution of a plot.

The contract of association and compromise lists the names of two allottees who – as representatives of their households – are mentioned on the attribution paper, and the *tiers associé*. It defines the responsibility of the *tiers associé* to pay the subsidised price of the plot (DH 40,000) and to pay for temporary accommodation for each of the two allottees up to a certain maximum (e.g. DH 10,000, respectively). Afterwards, the contract allots each flat plus a part of the roof to a particular party. Normally, the *moul chkara* gets the two lower floors, which may include a shop, depending on the exact location of the plot. However, the contractual partners were free to find individual solutions. For example, in the case of a woman who lost her legs, the *tiers associé* agreed to change flats so that she could live on the ground floor. Afterwards, the contract commits the allottee to support the *moul chkara* to formally register the plot of land (cost: DH 4,000). In a subsequent paragraph, the contract defines in a very detailed way the exterior as well as interior construction work, which, for example, specifies the colour and height of tiles. The contract also restricts the construction period to a maximum of normally eight months. It states that if the construction takes more time, the *moul chkara* is responsible for paying the additional costs of temporary accommodation. The contractual relationship between the three parties ends when both allottees sign the contract of discharge (*aqad ibra' adh-dhimma*) to which the contract of association and compromise commits the allottees if the house construction is well accomplished.

Consequently, if not yet done, the allottees have to demolish their houses and move into temporary accommodation. With the written attestation of demolition, they receive an invitation to take part in the lottery of plots, carried out by the local administration (*muqataa*). The lottery decides on the precise plot of land in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, which mentions the certificate of benefit (*chahadat al-istifaada*) that the allottees

receive after the lottery and after having paid for the plot. Hence, only through the lottery do allottees and their *tiers associés* find out the plot's exact location, whether the house will have a shop or a fourth apartment on the ground floor, and whether it will be a slightly bigger corner plot or not. Considering the low and decreasing real estate prices in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine after the first years of the resettlement, it was crucial for the *tiers associés* to get a plot with a shop, because only this would eventually allow them to make a profit. *Tiers associé* Abdelaziz compared the lottery to playing poker: "You do not know whether you will win." Due to the high significance of the lottery, many people found ways to reduce the chance of 'losing'. One dweller reported that inhabitants, in order to get a corner house or a house with shop, paid money to administration officers one day before the lottery. Then, the officer cooled the envelope with the name of the respective inhabitant overnight in the fridge. The next morning, the cooled envelopes were easy to identify in the lottery, and the paying inhabitant got his/her plot of choice. In other cases, inhabitants took part in the lottery without having a contract with a *moul chkara*. If they received a plot with a shop, they requested more money from the *moul chkara*. Furthermore, some *tiers associés* complained about allottees who requested extra money from the *moul chkara* when they got a shop, although they had signed a contract before. If the *moul chkara* did not pay, allottees refused the signing of the contract of discharge and prevented the *moul chkara* from selling his/her assets, for example by occupying them (see section 5.2.5). Some allottees also requested the *moul chkara* to pay for their signing of the contract of discharge.

After the construction of the house, the *moul chkara* asks the allottees to sign the contract of discharge, which relieves the *moul chkara* of his/her duties and terminates the contractual relationship between all three parties. However, the various house parties still depend on each other when requesting the *permis d'habitation*, which certifies the habitability of the house and which formally allows people to inhabit their property (cost: approx. DH 8,000). Furthermore, several residents and constructors mentioned it as a precondition for the installation of electricity metres. This document is also a precondition for formally registering the property at a notary (*at-tajsil wa at-tahafidh*), which all property owners of the house have to do together, and which costs between DH 13,000 and 16,000. Only with the notarial registration of the property do all parties become legal property owners and can they formally sell their apartment. According to my own survey and an interview with a real estate agent in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, only a very small minority of the inhabitants of the new town possess formal property titles, which reduces the exchange value of the apartments in the case of a resale. In addition, the installation of water and electricity metres costs money as well. Dwellers in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine reported that service providers[39] asked them to pay a fine because of their previous non-payment in the *bidonville* (see section 6.5.2).

The specific *recasement* scheme based on the construction of the house by *tiers associés* enables even very vulnerable people to move out of the *bidonville* into a new – however, unregistered – apartment without paying anything except the electricity fine. In fact, for many resettled inhabitants of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, this was the major positive aspect of the VSB *recasement*. In contrast, for the *tiers associés*, the investment was hardly profitable due to the various obligations and the relatively low and rather decreasing house prices in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. The total cost of the construction of the house, built in compliance with all building regulations and including all paper fees, amounts to DH 600,000 to 700,000. According to a real estate agent and own data from *tiers associés* and non-resettled inhabitants of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, apartment prices in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine range from between DH 250,000 and 320,000, depending on

[39] In Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, the *Office Nationale d'Électricité* (ONE) supplies households with electricity, whereas Lydec functions as water supplier.

the progress of the interior construction works. This equals a price decrease by 10-30%, compared to the apartment prices in the first years of establishment of the new town (DH 360,000 to 370,000). According to the real estate agent, the drop in prices is mainly because of emerging stories about the low quality of public services, rising conflicts, and insecurity – very similar to the former stigmatisation of the *bidonville*. Thus, if the house is constructed in an appropriate way, it is almost impossible to make profit if the house contains no shop on the ground floor, which explains why *tiers associés* were eager to get a plot with a shop. Owners request a purchasing price of DH 600,000 for a shop. However, due to the low demand and oversupply of shops, it remains very difficult to find people willing to pay DH 600,000 for a shop. Many shops, but also apartments remain empty, as their owners are not willing to accept the current low prices. In addition, renting seems not to be an option, because most *tiers associés* want to get rid of their property and they fear that they cannot get back their property if they wish to do so.

Because of the limited profit margins, some *tiers associés* have cheated in the construction process by economising on construction materials. Two *tiers associés* mentioned that they paid only DH 450,000 to 500,000 for the construction of the house, which according to other developers is impossible if one respects all building regulations. Youssef admitted that whenever an allottee asked to pay additional money for a signature or to change the interior design, "the *moul chkara* deducted [the money] from the costs of the construction material and at the end, the house is not built in a solid way." This means, for example, the construction of thinner walls or a reduction in the amount of cement. He followed up on that, saying that it had no implications for the acquisition of the *permis d'habitation*, as one could bribe the responsible architect. Indeed, the low quality of the houses has caused cracks in many house walls and has even led to the collapse of a couple of recently built houses in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine (Sakit 2013).

5.2.4 Temporary Accommodation

Temporary accommodation refers to the period following the demolition of the old house and before the moving into the new apartment in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Authorities obliged the inhabitants of Karyan Central to demolish their houses even before the final allocation of plots through the lottery. The main reason was to ensure that no person would continue occupying the house, as was the case in previous *recasement* projects (Le Tellier 2009a, 62f). In addition, the policy eventually follows the quite common stigmatisation of *bidonville* dwellers as fraudsters and profiteers who move from one *bidonville* to another to benefit from resettlement projects (cf. Zaki 2005, 65). The data on temporary accommodation of resettled dwellers of Karyan Central, however, shows that only seven moved into other *bidonvilles* in Casablanca. Instead, most of the inhabitants, relying on personal networks, found temporary accommodation in Hay Mohammadi (47.4%) or other 'formal' neighbourhoods of Casablanca (38.7%). In 72.6% of the cases, dwellers rented their temporary accommodation, and in 23.6% of the cases, they stayed with other family members living outside Karyan Central.

Three major problems related to temporary accommodation can be distinguished: (1) finding and financing the accommodation; (2) living quality; and (3) protracted temporariness due to a prolonged period of construction. The first problem does not necessarily appear considering the specific *recasement* scheme with third-party developers, who should pay for the temporary accommodation of the allottees. The contract of association and compromise obliges the *tiers associé* to pay a predefined lump sum for the accommodation of the allottees during the period of construction. A typical lump sum of DH 10,000 may equal the average monthly rental amount for a flat of 50 m² in Hay Mohammadi over the course of six to eight months, which

is a standard construction period fixed in the contract. However, house owners in Hay Mohammadi increased rent prices to benefit from the increase in demand at the beginning of the *recasement*. This was especially problematic for forcibly evicted dwellers who were unable to choose the moment of moving out and for those dwellers willing to build the houses by themselves. Thus, in particular larger families had difficulties finding adequate accommodation and had to split up. If it was impossible to find or to pay for accommodation for all, households often relied on family networks. An 18-year-old woman in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine reported: "Together with my brothers, we missed one year of school, because we had problems with the person who built the house. He did not give us the money for the rent, and that's why we've had to move to the countryside." Likewise, a woman who built the house together with the neighbours moved into the '*baraka*' (shack) of her sister in the informal settlement Chichane (the old part of Lahraouiyine). However, some forcibly evicted people with an unclear status of attribution could not find any accommodation. For example, Mehdi, his wife, and five children, two of them with a fatal disease, occupied an empty shop in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine because they could not afford any other accommodation. A few other people constructed makeshift shelters next to the old site of Karyan Central. In February 2017, authorities evicted them by force for a second time (see section 5.2.6).

The second problem, resulting directly from the problem of finding adequate short-term accommodation, is the low living quality of temporary accommodation. In many cases, people could only secure a room in a shared apartment, in which the entire household had to live. This relates to the notion of *tranquillité*, which many people referred to when talking about rental accommodation. For example, Rachida described: "If you rent, you rent a room with a shared bathroom, because everything else is so expensive that you cannot even consider it. Then, shared bathrooms mean harassment, not feeling comfortable, and always being covered up if you need to go there. Finally, you do not live in peace and calm (*tu n'es pas tranquille*)." Another woman complained that she does not have her own kitchen and that she has to cook on the floor in front of her room door. In a similar way, Rachid described his two years in two different rented flats: "Psychologically, you do not feel well if you rent." After the demolition of his house, he shared an apartment with an alcoholic. Later, he moved into a furnished apartment, where the house owner kept his keys and dropped in regularly to look after his belongings, which he had left in the apartment.

Problems with finding adequate temporary accommodation made the third problem even worse. Although standard periods of construction, as fixed in the contract of association and compromise, are six to eight months, the average duration of temporary accommodation was thirteen-and-a-half months. More than 14% of the interviewed resettled dwellers could only move into their new apartments two or more years after the demolition of their house in Karyan Central. This still excludes a large, but not precisely known number of households that by the time of fieldwork could not (yet) move (see section 5.2.6). The prolonged time of construction becomes a larger problem if the *moul chkara* does not pay the additional costs, which was often the case. Again, it was often the family who helped in this kind of situation. For example, other family members helped by paying the rent, or the affected household could move to other accommodation belonging to a family member. If the *moul chkara* stopped building the house, the situation could become extremely protracted. There are several unfinished houses in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, which nonetheless are partially occupied by allottees that have no other option than to live in the building shell of their apartment (see section 5.2.5). Self-constructing households could face a similar situation if they have problems in affording accommodation as well as the construction of the house at the same time (cf. Le Tellier 2009a, 65). One example is Abdallah, who used to work as a caterer in Hay Mohammadi and who decided to build the house by himself: "We got only one plot, but we are three families – my mother, my brother, and I –

and we want to use the shop ourselves." However, the inherited savings were not sufficient, as the business as caterer did not work in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. After two years of rented accommodation, he, together with his wife, his two young children, and his mother had to move into the building shell in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. After an additional two years, in January 2017, the house still had only a concrete floor, no windows or doors, and lacked the two upper floors.

5.2.5 Allottees and Third-Party Investors in Conflict

The relationship between allottees and third-party investors is one of the major reasons for conflict within the *recasement* process. According to Rachid, the president of *Chihab*, only in 2011 and 2012, 800 court cases resulted from this largely unregulated relationship. As mentioned in section 5.2.3, the most important document defining the relationship between third-party investors and allottees is the contract of association and compromise that was initially drafted by a public writer and approved by Al Omrane. Due to the large number of conflicts that occurred in relation to this contract, notaries took over the role of the public writer, and the contract became much more detailed. However, both sides – allottees and *tiers associés* – reported a lack of public regulation that could help structure and formalise this relationship. This is of particular significance, as a well-organised relationship between allottees and third parties seems to be a core condition for the functioning of the *recasement*.

From the perspective of the people, besides problems related to temporary accommodation, one of the biggest risks of the *recasement* is an unreliable *moul chkara* who does not feel committed to his contractual obligations. Several resettled dwellers reported that their *moul chkara* had not finished the construction of the house. Data on the housing quality shows that 10% of the people who did not build houses by themselves live in a house that is not completed, which may be an indicator of problems between the *tiers associé* and the allottee. This number only includes cases in which people had to move into the unfinished home because of the inavailability of other affordable housing options. In such cases, the respective household had no other option than to move into the building shell, where they would live for several years without windows, with only makeshift access to electricity and water, and on the bare floor (Figure 5-14). The second associated party in this case was able to afford rental accommodation in Hay Mohammadi and also took the *moul chkara* to court to force her to continue with the construction. Although they won the case, the *moul chkara* did not resume the house's construction, but tried to delay the court proceedings. In response, the second party started their own efforts to continue with the construction. However, still, the household head, who is more than 60 years of age, is severely traumatised because of the stressful and depressing housing situation.

In another house in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, a 43-year-old mother reported similar psychological stress suffered from six years of living on the third-floor apartment of an unfinished house. Also in this case, the *moul chkara* did not finish the construction, but tried to get rid of his obligations by selling the house. The family refused to sign the discharge and protested against the sale of the house. In response, the *moul chkara* accused the family of the illegal occupation of the first floor. The consequent police investigations could not confirm this accusation and, finally, her husband went to court against the *moul chkara* himself. All these events largely affected the health conditions of the household members, who were unable to afford adequate medical care due to very limited financial resources. The two cases above make clear that households with more financial capital are more likely to cope with deviations from the ordinary pathway of *recasement*.

There is also the case of a disabled woman who has no legs, who lives together with her husband and her son in the shell of her apartment on the ground floor. Three months after the start of the construction, they could not reach the *moul chkara* anymore and realised that he wanted to finish the upper floors first in order to sell his own property, without finishing the construction of the entire house. In response, the woman and her family protested in front of the house, but could not prevent the *moul chkara* from selling the unfinished upper floors. According to them, the *moul chkara* even tried to sell the lower floors without having any property rights. That was the reason why the family decided to occupy the building shell on the ground floor. With their extremely limited financial resources and some help from the neighbours, they have continued with very basic constructions in their apartment. At last they could pressure the *moul chkara* to install a house door, as they suffered from people who entered the house in order to drink alcohol on the unoccupied upper floors. However, the *tiers associé* remains almost inaccessible via telephone. When they tried to search him at his domicile, he hit the woman with his car. While violence is not in all cases an attribute of this relationship between *tiers associés* and allottees, there are other, reported cases of violence. For example, Khaoula told us about attempted extortion by the *moul chkara*, who refused to install the electricity metre unless he received sexual 'services' in return. As the woman refused, the *moul chkara* tried to evict her and her family from the house.

Figure 5-14: An occupied, but unfinished home in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Author's picture, January 2017.

Beyond these types of urgent conflicts, some allottees will face problems in the long run, which could be attributed to inadequate constructions by their third-party investors. Almost half of the finished and occupied buildings in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine already five to six years after their completion show signs of structural damage. In one case, Abdellah, a 49-year-old family father, showed us marks produced by water damage and by rainwater dripping through the ceiling. In addition, there were several large cracks in the walls of his apartment in which he has been living in for six years. The low building quality of the houses

will require continuous investment in the building structure, also because many houses were not built according to official building standards, thus risking collapse (see section 5.2.3). However, a considerable number of the new property owners lack the financial capital to do so. In the particular case above, the family father regretted the signing of the discharge, which took away responsibility from the *moul chkara*, also because an architect certified the lawful construction of house by issuing the *permis d'habitation*.

Also, the third-party investors consider the relationship between allottees and *tiers associés* as a major source of conflict and stress, although they highlight other aspects and sketch a different picture of the relationship. Interviewed *tiers associés* have pointed to three major points of conflict with the resettled dwellers: (1) excessive demands; (2) requested bribes; and (3) a lack of reliability and support.

Concerning the first, all but one of the seven interviewed third-party investors complained about the 'excessive' demands of the allottees regarding the interior design of their apartments. Some resettled dwellers requested costly extra features, such as one person who asked third-party investor Abdelaziz to install a water tap that could be turned on via a touchless sensor. The case went to court, where the lawful construction was approved, and the court obliged the household to sign the discharge even without the requested tap. Other dwellers quickly changed their mind about specific interior designs and wanted the *moul chkara* to redo the constructions. For example, one household requested third-party investor Youssef to exchange the floor tiles, although they themselves had selected them. Likewise, Abdeljalil had to change the painting of a wall three times in total because the family was no longer satisfied with the colour after they saw it on the wall. Another household asked him to exchange the tap five years after the completion of the house. In that case, he was happy that the family had signed the discharge, because in this way, they could not hold him accountable. However, to prevent exaggerated demands, newer versions of the contract of association and compromise include a detailed list of interior design features that both sides agreed on. However, beyond questions about the interior design, Abdelaziz mentioned that some households would not accept building regulations: "They ask you to do some illegal constructions (e.g. a wall, which is against the law), and they do not understand that it is not possible."

The second major problem is that some resettled dwellers try to maximise their benefits by forcing the *moul chkara* to pay bribes, using various means of pressure. Amongst them, the most common is the refusal to sign the discharge, which would resolve the contractual obligations of the *moul chkara* and which would oblige the household to pay for the installation of an electricity metre. Abdeljalil, for example, paid between DH 5,000 and 10,000 to the households to make them sign the discharge, and they also requested him to pay them if he wanted to sell his property. Preventing the *moul chkara* from selling the shop or the apartment is another means of pressure. Youssef experienced that allottees tried to prevent some paid construction workers from doing their job in order to prevent him from selling his property. In another case, he paid DH 100,000 to the allottees, as he feared they would "cause problems" and would discourage the potential buyer of the shop. Abdelaziz confirms that some allottees, after having received a plot with a shop, would believe that the *moul chkara* had stolen their property and would request extra money – normally between DH 20,000 and 60,000, according to his information.

Finally, third-party investors reported a lack of reliability, trust, and institutional support within the unique building relationship. Abdelaziz recounted his own experience: "The attribution holder told me that he had only a young daughter. However, during the constructions, a man came to the apartment and told me that he wanted to look after his new home. […] He said he was the son of the attribution holder. Apparently,

the father was afraid that I would refuse to build the house if he told me that he has more than one child." Experiences like this, together with exaggerated demands, incidents of blackmailing, and accusations provoked mistrust between all parties, which was further enhanced by a lack of institutional reliability. Several *tiers associés* had the impression that they would be only a necessary means to facilitate the moving of *bidonville* dwellers. Ahmed complained, "The programme [the VSB *recasement*] is too much concerned with the attribution holders. It is them who should be lucky in the end. They do not care about the *moul chkara* at all!" Indeed, many *tiers associés* mentioned that they simply accepted most extra requests of the allottees to avoid problems at the end, for example concerning the signing of the discharge. A representative for many other *tiers associés*, Youssef would have expected more institutional support and would have loved to see Al Omrane mediating between allottees and third-party investors. He was convinced that direct contact between allottees and third-party investors should be reduced to a minimum to avoid problems.

Of course, there are also examples of better relationships. An exceptionally positive example is the case of a former day labourer who told us that his *moul chkara* bought him a *tréporteur* (the Moroccan term for a transport three-wheeler) to be able to earn an income in the new town. In addition, the *moul chkara* left him the shop on the ground floor as a free parking space for his new *tréporteur*. However, also more conflictual relationships did not necessarily end in court or in violence. There are examples where all parties could find pragmatic solutions in the case that the *moul chkara* was unable to continue with the construction because of financial constraints. In one such a case, two allottees belonging to the same family agreed with the *moul chkara* that he would keep the shop, but leave them the apartment on the first floor to compensate for his inability to complete the construction. Hence, the daughter told us that the family passed the additional flat to her divorced aunt, who did not get a plot. Consequently, three nuclear households of the same family now live in three apartments in the same house, planning to complete the building on their own. So far, they share water with their neighbours and are informally connected to the power grid, as they have not yet paid the money for the installation of the metres. Also third-party investor Ahmed mentioned such a case. He ran out of money and could not finish the construction within the time limit stipulated in the contract. In addition, the allottees requested money for the shop on the ground floor. Because of that, he agreed to leave them the apartment on the first floor while keeping the shop.

Other agreements concern the request for special interior designs. Several households accepted to pay for the completion of the interior constructions themselves. The resettled family of Naima, for example, agreed with the *moul chkara* that they would pay the difference between the costs for the basic interior elements the *moul chkara* would have installed and the quality features demanded by Naima's family. The rationale behind the agreement was also their fear that the *tiers associé* had no sufficient financial means to finish the construction, as he already did not pay the amount for the rent of the temporary accommodation. These case-specific solutions however are always agreed on bilaterally and without formalised institutional support. This may cause problems if one party does not feel committed to the agreement. In one case, the *moul chkara* did not have enough financial means to finish the construction. Thus, he suggested that the attribution holder sign the contract of discharge although the house had not been yet completed. The signed discharge would consequently allow him to sell his own apartment and to earn the money needed to finish the construction. However, at the time of the interview, the *moul chkara* did not yet resume the construction.

Finally, the time-consuming negotiations, the conflictual relationship, and the limited profit opportunities largely discouraged third-party investors from further investments in the new *recasement* project El Hamd, the prospected new town for the last residents of Karyan Central (see section 4.4). It shows that the power

balance between allottees and third-party investors had shifted in the course of the programme in favour of the latter. At the beginning of the *recasement*, attribution holders found themselves in a powerful position where they could choose between many interested third-party investors who were convinced of the investment opportunities in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. According to Naima, this was the reason why many resettled dwellers started to request money for signing the discharge or to demand exaggerated interior design features. With increasing rumours about the problems in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine and falling real estate prices, the power balance started to shift. Later, it became extremely difficult for attribution holders to find a *moul chkara* for the new town El Hamd – especially for those people who did not get a plot with a shop. Third-party investors do not cover their costs for temporary accommodation, and neither pay for the plot, nor for the land registration. An interviewed real estate agent in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine confirmed that – besides slightly elevated building costs – it is mainly because of the bad experiences in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine that people have troubles finding a third-party investor in El Hamd.

Although the third-party system has offered the significant advantage that even most vulnerable households can afford to move into a new apartment, the relationship between third-party investors and allottees is one of the major sources of conflict within the *recasement* of Karyan Central. The relatively unregulated and for many reasons fragile relationship has suffered from unreliability on both sides, which has led to severe consequences such as unfinished or inappropriate constructions. However, these conflicts only appeared after households accepted the resettlement conditions. The next section focuses on other conflicts within the *recasement* that occur even before, and which mostly concern the attribution of plots and the (in)appropriate identification of *bidonville* residents eligible to a plot in the new town.

5.2.6 Difficulties in Reaching the Target Group

This section deals with problems of the *recasement* programme in reaching the target group, the residents of the *bidonville* Karyan Central. In Morocco, this phenomenon is known under the term *glissement*, which in a broader sense means the occupation of plots and apartments by people not belonging to the target group (Le Tellier and Guérin 2009, 662). Earlier *recasement* projects in Morocco were characterised by relatively high rates of *glissement*, which largely inspired the innovation of the third-party approach (Navez-Bouchanine 2012, 170; Toutain 2013, 2016). One may distinguish between two forms: *glissement* from below, and *glissement* from above (Toutain and Rachmuhl 2014, 29). The latter refers to people who prefer to resell their apartments after resettlement and has largely contributed to the stigmatisation of the *bidonville* dweller as a profiteer who would move back to a *bidonville* only in order to benefit multiple times (Zaki 2005, 62ff; Navez-Bouchanine 2012, 170; Toutain and Rachmuhl 2014, 21). In contrast, the first includes those people unable to finance the construction of their new home and therefore either remain in protracted temporary housing (including the occupation of unfinished houses) or resell their subsidised plots (Toutain 2013, 104). However, beyond this classic form of *glissement* from below, problems with reaching the target group occur even before and as a direct consequence of the lack of transparency in the process of plot allocation (Toutain and Rachmuhl 2014, 27). In their evaluation of nine *recasement* projects in the framework of the PARHIB, financed by the French development cooperation agency AFD, Toutain and Rachmuhl (2014, 21) have discovered *glissement* rates of 10-20%. However, the authors state that their methodological approach – comparing the names of the people living on the new sites with those on the attribution lists – cannot account for *glissement* that takes place prior to the resettlement. Hence, the given rate excludes *bidonville* residents unconsidered in the official census, as well as non-residents who pretended to live in Karyan Central in order to benefit from the programme.

Indeed, the comprehensive quantitative measuring of *glissement* is largely impossible, as it would require a long-term in situ observation starting even before the actual announcement of the resettlement. To understand why people were not able to move to Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, I argue that it is crucial to focus on the problems in reaching the target group prior to the *recasement*, which has rarely been done due to methodological constraints (cf. Toutain and Rachmuhl 2014, 27). Therefore, I mostly concentrate on the thick description of cases that could be grouped under the last category of *glissement* from below – residents that face problems with the inadequate or unjust allocation of plots. As I will show below, these were the major reasons why some residents of Karyan Central refused to move to Nouvelle Lahraouiyine until they were forcibly evicted in March 2016.

However, before writing about this group of people, I start with a short analysis of the classic types of *glissement* for the *recasement* project of Karyan Central, using my own household data. An indicator of *glissement* from above may be the rate of non-attribution holders living on the third or fourth floors of the new houses in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. According to the household survey, in 39 cases (9.7%), the original attribution holder did not live in the apartment. This indicates a *glissement* rate clearly below average compared to the results of Toutain and Rachmuhl (2014, 21, 93). However, the number does not equal the exact rate of *glissement* from above, as it includes two cases where people agreed to change flats inside the same house. Moreover, the number includes cases that indicate corruption and cheating within the allocation process. This refers to former *bidonville* residents that received more than one flat and who sold or rented out their additional flats. Excluding these cases, the rate of *glissement* from above is equal to 8.5%.

To get an impression of people's motivations to resell or rent out their apartments, it is useful to look at the reasons why residents of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine intend to move out again. More than one-third of the resettled dwellers plan to leave Nouvelle Lahraouiyine within the next five years. The intended reselling of houses displays ordinary moving motivations, which shows that the stigmatising profiteer image of *bidonville* dwellers cannot be supported. Despite personal motives such as a new job at another place, a planned marriage, problems with the neighbours, or the wish to have more private space or to live alone, it is mainly because of dissatisfaction with the living conditions in and the location of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine that people intend to move. Many additional comments create the impression that the rate of *glissement* from above is only low because of the fall in real estate prices in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. At the time of the survey, many residents were afraid that the purchasing price of their apartment in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine would not be sufficiently high for them to be able to afford adequate accommodation elsewhere. Hence, most people willing to move await an increase in house prices, which is, however, unlikely to happen soon, considering decreasing real estate prices in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Others have started saving money to afford another flat. In contrast, Abdelkarim, a public servant who used to live in Karyan Central, did not want to wait, as he was severely concerned about the security of his children in the new town. Because of that, he decided to rent out his apartment of 75 m² in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine for DH 1,000 per month until he would receive a good purchase offer. With his wife and five of his children, he moved into an apartment of 50 m² in an older building in Hay Mohammadi, paying a rental sum of DH 1,250 per month.

In addition to the low rates of *glissement* from above, classic forms of *glissement* from below, as described for earlier *recasement* projects (cf. Navez-Bouchanine 2012, 170), do not play a relevant role in the *recasement* of Karyan Central, as all dwellers had potential access to a *tiers associé* who would afford the construction of the house. One exception may be the above-described case of Abdallah who wanted to build the house for his family himself and who lives in the building shell of his house in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine

because the family ran out of money. Other cases of occupied shells would not belong to traditional forms of *glissement* from below, but rather refer to conflicts with third-party investors (see section 5.2.5).

Although classic types of *glissement* only play a minor role, still, a considerable number of former residents of Karyan Central have not (yet) moved to a new town. In March 2016, authorities forcibly evicted approximately 500 remaining households from their homes in Karyan Central who refused to move. These people still live in diverse forms of temporary accommodation and are most likely to move to the smaller and more peripheral new town El Hamd. According to concordant statements of representatives of neighbourhood associations, resettled residents, and dwellers who were among the evicted households, these households had problems related to the unjust allocation of plots and the opaque census practice (see section 5.2.2). According to Rachid, all evicted families were requesting additional plots. Whereas he could understand a large number of them, Rachid also complained about people who just wanted to benefit multiple times – without any reason. In fact, it was not always easy to identify the reasons behind the inadequate attribution of plots. In some cases, we got the impression that enumerators simply forgot to count households. In others, it was difficult to understand why a respective household felt treated unfairly. From the interviews with respective residents, one may distinguish three major problems behind a perceived unjust allocation of plots: (1) large, multi-generational households; (2) absence during the census; and (3) family conflicts.

The first problem refers to large households consisting of several unmarried members as well as couples that only got married after the census of 2008. The fact that household compositions changed in a dynamic way conflicted with authorities' use of old census data as the basic and static reference for the allocation of semi-plots (see section 5.2.2). In Karyan Central, multi-nuclear households often lived under one roof in big houses of more than 100 m² and with at least two floors and a high number of rooms. Now they had to move into apartments with fixed layouts, not adapted to the specific household constellations. Typical examples may be the multi-generational households of Fatiha and Zubeir, who each used to live in large two-storey houses in Karyan Central. Fatiha's son Mohammed married another resident of Karyan Central only after the census, in April 2009. Since 2009, when Fatiha received only one semi-plot for all nine household members, they have waited and hoped for another semi-plot for Mohammed, knowing that some neighbours got an additional semi-plot, although they were married in 2011. So far, Fatiha does not want to proceed with the resettlement, because she was told that if she accepted the attribution, authorities would close the file and Mohammed would definitely not benefit from an own semi-plot. In April 2017, Fatiha, Mohammed, and three other household members were renting an apartment in Sidi Moumen (DH 1,700 per month), while Mohammed's wife, together with their young children, had moved to the countryside due to the lack of space.

Also Zubeir married after 2008, and his small family was not considered for an own semi-plot. All twelve household members together received two semi-plots. Evicted in March 2016, Zubeir now lives with his family in the apartment of his sister in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, while she moved into the apartment above belonging to her parents-in-law. In contrast to these examples, Mehdi complained that only married couples would be considered for larger (or more) plots. Together with his wife, he has five unmarried children – the oldest 43 years old. He was not willing to leave Karyan Central, because he could not understand why he got only one semi-plot of 40 m² for seven people, and was still hoping to get more land. Mehdi also showed us a letter from October 1989 confirming the payment of DH 20,000 for a subsidised apartment as part of an earlier resettlement project. For almost thirty years he has regularly asked the local administration for

the apartment – with no success. Since the evictions in 2016, he has been living with all family members in a vacant shop in the south of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine.

Second, absence during the census was also a reason for conflict. During the interviews in Er-Rhamna and the smaller *bidonvilles* in Hay Mohammadi, residents repeatedly asked us whether we were doing an official census. Nobody wanted to miss the census, which would serve as a reference point for the attribution of plots in the case of a potential resettlement (see section 5.2.2). Being absent during the census was always considered a severe problem. Younes reported that he was in prison during the time of the census and he and his wife were not counted separately. He complained about the "unfair" programme, because everyone would have known that he was living in Karyan Central and that he was married. They had invited the entire neighbourhood – including the *mqadem* – to the wedding ceremony. However, during the time of the census, he was only married in a traditional, non-legal way due to the fact that his wife was underage. When Younes returned from prison and his wife had reached the legal age, he wanted to fix the papers of the civil marriage, but attribution had already taken place, and it was too late to request an own semi-plot. That is why they moved together with their two young children into a small additional room in the new apartment in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine belonging to Younes's family. While his wife is suffering from a lack of privacy and is thinking about building a shack elsewhere, Younes confessed: "My only dream is to have an own home for my family."

Also Karim was not at home when the enumerators counted the residents of Karyan Central. Typical for *bidonvilles*, Karyan Central was also a place where people suffering from negative life events could find shelter and refuge.[40] However, the story of Karim shows that these people may face more difficulties with attribution, especially if they lack sufficient family support. Being an illegitimate child of his mother, who died when he was six, Karim spent most of his youth in the house of his grandmother in Karyan Central – together with three uncles and his half-brother. After a short time living together with his violent father and after troubles with his uncles, he decided to move out and to travel through Morocco. During this time, he was arrested several times and spent some years in prison. Afterwards, he returned to Karyan Central, where his grandmother offered him a small, separate shack next to her house. Nevertheless, Karim did not receive an own semi-plot, because he missed the census and the uncles did not mention him. His grandmother died soon after the *recasement* had started and the uncles were not willing to share their single apartment with him. Left alone without any shelter options, he constructed a makeshift shelter out of plastic and wooden sheets directly next to the building site of the tramway that occupies parts of the former site of Karyan Central. Soon after we interviewed him in his makeshift home, the *qa'ïd* evicted him and ordered the demolition of the shack.

This example already leads to the third major reason why people did not move, which is due to family conflicts. In the case of Karim, it is clear that family conflicts have exacerbated his situation. Often, there are additional problems that lead to an unsatisfactory attribution of plots, but if family networks do not function, these dwellers face even more severe problems in finding accommodation after their eviction. Similar to Karim, Mohsin was living in a shack next to the former site of Karyan Central. Mohsin did not benefit from an own semi-plot, as he was married a few months after the census in 2008. He stayed in his

[40] Interviews with residents in Karyan Capitaine Montugué and Er-Rhamna showed, for example, that some people moved into *bidonvilles* after divorce, after their return from prison, or because of a severe illness. The flexible housing structure allowed residents to subdivide small rooms or to build small housing extensions in order to host these people. Most of them looked with distrust at a potential resettlement due to an unsettled situation concerning attribution.

old house until the evictions in 2016 and finally received one semi-plot for El Hamd together with his unmarried sisters, with whom he is in conflict and who do not want to live with him. Deprived of alternatives, they have had to search for a third-party investor to build the house, which was difficult and more costly in El Hamd (see section 5.2.5). Mohsin and his sisters, who lived in another makeshift construction close to former Karyan Central, have to pay for accommodation and the plot themselves, but they lack the money and do not trust each other. In February 2017, Mohsin was divorced again and had to pack up his things in Hay Mohammadi because the *qa'ïd* wanted to demolish his makeshift construction. He said he could move to a friend of him living in an apartment in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine.

Moreover, attribution could also trigger or enhance family conflicts. In Karyan Central, a 76-year-old woman had subdivided the house so that her son could live with her grandson – the son's nephew – in a separate part. When the son got married, he requested his nephew to move back to his grandmother. However, the authorities only allocated one semi-plot to the entire household – with her grandson being the attribution holder. In Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, the woman's daughter and mother of her grandson constructed the house together with another attribution holder. The woman and her grandson could move into one apartment, but the son and the other associated party, both living in the same house, went to court in order to evict her from the apartment. The grandson won the case, but the family conflict within the house will probably continue.

These examples illustrate how difficult it is to reach the target population or even to find equal and just criteria to define the target population. Although there are numerous reasons for criticising the mode of implementation by local authorities, one has to acknowledge the difficulty of achieving a just allocation of plots to a well-defined target group. This task was even more difficult considering some attempts to cheat by some of the residents, which refers to assumption A5. It was impossible to grasp a quantitative impression of this phenomenon, but various observers mentioned diverse incidents. The most commonly reported observation was about an increase in weddings in reaction to the announcement of resettlement. Although there is no quantitative data supporting this assumption, it is likely that in some cases, the prospect of getting an additional plot through resettlement was a major motivation behind a wedding. One *bricolage* worker in Er-Rhamna for example remarked: "They [authorities] told us that married couples would benefit from an own plot. Thus, lots of young people got married. Their children have grown up now, but we still have not moved." One person in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine even claimed that a few dwellers got divorced in order to benefit twice, which was, however, doubted by other residents. Nevertheless, there are examples where people wanted to profit multiple times from subsequent resettlement projects (see also section 5.2.2). In Karyan Capitaine Montugué, we met a person who had transformed his house into a stable with the only aim to preserve his claim for another subsidised apartment. The same person already got an apartment in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, although years before the *recasement* he had given the house in Karyan Central to a close family member and had moved out of the neighbourhood. In again another case, the apartment owner mentioned that he bought the flat for DH 330,000 from an attribution holder that has been living abroad for long time. When this person moved abroad, his parents in Karyan Central kept the partition of the shack in order to get two apartments. Hence, cheating and corruption were prevalent in almost all aspects of the *recasement* project and have severely affected the identification of the intended target group and the fair allocation of plots. The experiences with opaque allocation practices and these kinds of examples of corruption and cheating have largely shaped feelings of inequality and unfairness, especially among those residents who did not benefit from an 'adequate' number of plot rights.

5.2.7 Section Summary

Before moving on to the resettlement site, analysing the impact of resettlement on people's livelihoods and living practices in the following chapter, I would like to briefly summarise and highlight the most important aspects of the resettlement process this section has dealt with. At first, the *recasement* of *bidonvilles* in Casablanca is different from most resettlement projects discussed by Cernea (see section 2.5), because the majority of residents are willing to move, hoping to move up the social ladder. In support of assumption A6, even many of the last remaining households of Karyan Central were not resisting the resettlement in general. They rather appealed against the conditions of resettlement. However, this on average rather positive attitude towards resettlement is the consequence of long-term policy strategies fighting the autonomous development of *bidonvilles*. These include the constant renewal of rumours about an upcoming resettlement that discourages people from investment in their houses, as well as more direct means of control and building restrictions. Supporting assumptions A1 and A2, authorities directly profited from opaque attribution criteria and related individual negotiation and bargaining practices, using them not only to enrich themselves, but also as a way to mitigate conflict and to undermine collective resistance. At the same time, it was also possible to document incidents of cheating from the side of the residents. However, it seemed to be less structural than initially assumed (A5) based on earlier interviews with leaders of local neighbourhood associations and governmental statements. Besides rumours and opaqueness, authorities occasionally also used force to make people move – culminating in the forced eviction on May 8, 2016.

These strategies, together with the heterogeneity of *bidonville* communities, personal attitudes, and housing pathways, caused a range of different injustices within the process of *recasement*. Before the displacement, these mainly referred to corruption concerning the attribution of plots, the demolition of high-standard houses, and problems related to temporary accommodation. Because of inappropriate attribution criteria, some people could not move at all. During and after the move, conflicts mainly occurred as a result of the fragile relationship between third-party investors and allottees, supporting assumption A4. The drop in real estate prices in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine has even weakened this crucial actor relationship, as it reduced profit margins of *tiers associés*. In consequence, unfinished or inappropriate constructions have caused severe cases of homelessness and deteriorated living conditions. Furthermore, process-related shortcomings already indicate that policy attention was focused majorly on the clearance of the site and not on the development of the new town. These shortcomings of the *recasement* process affect displaced former *bidonville* residents until today and, hence, are fundamental for understanding the following analysis of the resettlement outcome in chapter 6. Another major aspect to consider for chapter 6 is that, despite all shortcomings, the third-party approach enabled also the most vulnerable households to become owners of a new apartment. Thus, opposed to many other affordable housing policies (see chapter 2), there is no structural dropout of poor population groups, which supports assumption A3.

6 Changing Livelihoods Through Resettlement

After having discussed the initial situation, daily life and livelihood practices in a large *bidonville* (>35,000 inhabitants) in Casablanca, the demolition of evolved structures, and the consequent *recasement* process, including its major procedural shortcomings, the study now turns to focus on the actual situation in the new town after people's displacement. Hence, this chapter follows RQ2: How and in how far does the welfare of people affected by the *Villes Sans Bidonvilles* programme change because of the resettlement?

By the time of the interviews in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine that took place from December 2016 to February 2017, most former *bidonville* dwellers living in the new town had moved into the new apartments five to six years prior (69.7%). Hence, the situation analysed in the following sections deals with the situation after an initial period of adaptation and modification, which acknowledges critical voices concerned with a premature judgement of new towns. During the early days of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, the new town suffered from severe scarcities of infrastructure and services provision, according to several newspaper articles and own interviews (cf. Barkaoui 2012; Laaouam 2014; Khatib 2013). In 2011, new residents depended on improvised and costly means of motorised transport or had to walk a few kilometres to Sidi Othmane in order to reach a taxi that could bring them to their workplaces. Only in 2013 could CBOs convince taxi syndicates to serve Nouvelle Lahraouiyine and to link it with Hay Mohammadi, but most drivers nevertheless refused to go to the new town during the evening and at night due to severe security concerns. Large parts of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine lacked streetlights, formal markets took several years to open, and many dwellers had to wait for years to be connected to formal power and water grids.

In December 2016, when I started my interviews, the situation had stabilised. Of course, as I explain in detail below, significant deficiencies related to the quality and quantity of infrastructure were still prevalent, but service networks and the transport system had improved. Shared taxis (*grands taxis*) were regularly connecting Nouvelle Lahraouiyine with Hay Mohammadi and operated during the night as well. Thus, six years after the first dwellers had moved to Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, a first process of urban regeneration had taken place, to a large extent fostered by residents' collective action (e.g. sit-ins in front of the respective local administrations) and the active engagement of CBOs.

Prior to a close analysis of the situation in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine and the impact of resettlement on people's livelihoods and living practices, I start with major themes that emerged from the interviews' open questions (Figure 6-1; Figure 6-2). Interviewed inhabitants were asked about the major advantages and disadvantages of living in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. The mentioned themes provide a first impression of the relevant topics to be analysed and are discussed in more detail in the following parts of chapter 5.

Figure 6-1 shows that people's positive associations with Nouvelle Lahraouiyine mostly relate to the calm character of the new town as well as the quality and cleanliness of the new houses. A considerable number of residents appreciate classic advantages of a suburban location. Compared to their previous home in the centre of Hay Mohammadi, one of the busiest neighbourhoods of Casablanca, 124 of the 401 interviewed dwellers explicitly mentioned the calmness of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine as a positive aspect. Several residents feel that the air is less polluted and fresher and appreciate the location of the new town close to "nature". What is also clear is that many resettled former *bidonville* dwellers are happy about the quality of the new house – for at least three major reasons (see section 6.2). The first refers to improved shelter. A considerable number of residents feel less vulnerable due to better-quality roofs and walls that protect them from fires,

rain, and extreme temperatures. Second, more than 70 dwellers pointed to the size of the apartment, which gives them more living space than before. Third, many inhabitants especially like the fact that they now live in what they call a “decent” or “respectful” house. Moreover, many residents feel that they live in a cleaner environment than before. While many women in Er-Rhamna complained that they would not see a difference after cleaning, numerous residents in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine are happy about a cleaner home and the nice interior design.



*Figure 6-1: Stated advantages of life in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine (*n*=401), highlighted proportional to the number of mentions (including all advantages with more than ten mentions).*

While stated advantages of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine most significantly relate to the house, the new town as such, in particular its peripheral location and its lack of urban assets, is perceived rather critically by former *bidonville* dwellers (Figure 6-2). The feeling of isolation is the most significant disadvantage, which was mentioned by half of all interviewed persons. Of course, this is largely the consequence of the peripheral location of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine and its limited accessibility. The frequent mentions of “bad transport” are an indicator that the inefficient and unreliable public transport system is likely to feed feelings of marginality and isolation (see section 6.5.1). Beyond accessibility, residents have complained about the erosion of previous social networks that has weakened community trust and resulted in social isolation as well. In addition, a weakened sense of community seems to be at the heart of another major disadvantage, which is insecurity (see section 6.3). Besides, perceived marginality refers to various deficiencies of (urban) infrastructure in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Most importantly, this includes the lack of adequate health services, limited and more expensive markets, bad schools, muddy streets, and the limited number of leisure opportunities (see sections 6.1 and 7.5.3). Many people mentioned feeling bored and that they would have nothing to do in the new town. Of course, this reflects also the lack of jobs or clients making the life of the new dwellers more difficult (see section 6.4). A conclusion concerning the disadvantages comes from some residents themselves. When they were reflecting on the move from Karyan Central, they claimed that they were pushed from the urban centre to a rural area, lacking a magnitude of urban assets. While these “missing” assets may vary significantly from one household to another, they all refer to a loss of urbanity that seems to be the core problem of the *recasement* to Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. I will refer back to this several times during the following analyses.

*Figure 6-2: Stated disadvantages of life in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine (*n*=401), highlighted proportional to the number of mentions (including all disadvantages with more than ten mentions).*

The stated advantages and disadvantages of living in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine look very similar to the experience in European post-war new towns and housing estates such as the *cités* in French suburbs (*banlieues*) or the German *Großwohnsiedlungen* (cf. Wassenberg 2004; Toutain 2013). Indeed, authors such as Bogaert (2011, 724) and Le Tellier (2009a, 59) fear that Morocco repeats the same mistakes of French post-war urban policies, replacing *bidonvilles* with non-integrated *villes bidons*[41] that will host the socio-urban problems of tomorrow (cf. Bareis and Bojadžijev 2012; Lallaoui 1993). This prospect sets the frame of the analysis in this chapter, which describes and analyses the actual living conditions and practices in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine by comparing them – at one point in time – to the actual situation in the *bidonville* Er-Rhamna. As explained in chapter 3, this allows for the drawing of conclusions on the impact of displacement and resettlement on *bidonville* dwellers in Casablanca. Linking it back to the assumptions presented in section 3.2, the first sections of this chapter deal with spatial structures, infrastructure, and physical housing standards in the new town. Based on that, I consequently discuss how these structures have affected the social life of its inhabitants. Thereafter, I look at changes in patterns of income generation before the next sections present findings on changing patterns of income use. This section includes a detailed analysis of residents' transport use and expenses, as well as public utilities and services. Finally, the last sections bring together various aspects dealt with during the entire chapter and attempt a more comprehensive analysis of the *re-casement* project of Karyan Central.

6.1 Spatial Structures and Infrastructure of the New Town

Nouvelle Lahraouiyine is located outside the jurisdiction of the city of Casablanca, ten kilometres away from former Karyan Central and belonging to the municipality of Médiouna (see section 4.4). Designed as a classic greenfield development, Al Omrane was in charge of the development of the new town on provided

[41] Replacing the term '*bidonvilles'* (literally: tin cities) with the term '*villes bidons'* (literally: cities in the form of tins) is a wordplay that was initially used in the late 1960s in France to criticise the deficiencies of low-cost public housing estates (Jolis 2012).

public land. The main responsibility was the construction of basic infrastructure, including sanitation, streets, and some public buildings such as primary and secondary schools, formal markets, as well as public baths (*hammam*) and ovens (Figure 6-3). Mosques were mainly financed through private donations. Al Omrane (2012, 4) cites a total amount of DH 130 million for the construction of basic infrastructure that almost equals the total contribution of third-party investors and *bidonville* dwellers, which amounts to DH 120 million (3,000 *recasement* plots at a price of DH 40,000 each). Furthermore, Al Omrane was responsible for defining the architectural design, building standards, and the layout of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. The new town consists of 3,000 plots for three-storey houses (grey space in Figure 6-3) targeted at the *recasement* of *bidonville* dwellers. Moreover, the land development plan includes two hundred 300 m² plots for five-storey houses, which Al Omrane is allowed to sell at market prices to private developers. This building land can be found along the major street stretching from the north to the south of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. In March 2018, these sites were still brownfields due to the absence of any building activities.



Figure 6-3: Street layout, block structure, and public services in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Data from February 2017. Cartography: Torben Dedring.

The layout of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine breaks completely with the spatial structures in *bidonvilles* prior to the *recasement*, as described in the sections 5.1.1and 5.1.4. A relatively regular street grid divides the new town into blocks, with the bordering houses having commercial spaces on the ground floor (Figure 6-3). Most striking is the reduced spatial density, compared to the characteristic spatial proximities of the *bidonville*, notwithstanding the higher average number of house floors and the population density of approximately 50,000 inhabitants per square kilometre, which is still high in comparison to other neighbourhoods

of Casablanca.[42] First, the low spatial densities are the result of oversized as well as underused and unnecessary streets (Figure 6-3). Three two-lane axes cross Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, although fewer than 25% of the resettled dwellers own a motorised vehicle and although taxis and buses only serve the northern parts of the new town. Wide streets certainly fulfil a security function as well. For the authorities, the planned structures with wide streets are much better to police than the narrow alleys of the *bidonville* (Dalzell 2006; Bogaert 2018, 213). A few residents even mentioned this aspect themselves, such as Younes: "For the state, the programme is good to gain more control and to be able to better observe the people." Second, the high number of brownfields create further spatial distances (Figure 6-3; Figure 6-4). Brownfields include the undeveloped plots of Al Omrane as well as spacious, but underused, paved or unpaved courtyards that lack any kind of green space or architectural concept and that exist in the middle of almost each housing block. Most of them are used as parking lots. According to Al Omrane's own real estate promotion campaign, some of the latter brownfields were initially intended for the construction of public services infrastructure, including two '*centres de vie*' (centres of community life), a polyclinic, as well as office spaces (Al Omrane n.y.). None of them were existent six years after the first inhabitants had moved to Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Instead, some brownfields turned into places of alternative use, becoming sites of informal markets (Figure 6-3, field in brown colour), parking spaces, open dumps, or meadowlands for people's livestock (Figure 6-4).

Figure 6-4: Spatial distances and the alternative use of brownfields in the centre of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Author's picture, December 2016.

[42] Nouvelle Lahraouiyine has a total size of one square kilometre and is home to roughly 50,000 inhabitants. The latter figure is an estimation based on the household data and the structured counting of houses. In order to compare, HCP-DRGC (2014) lists population densities of other neighbourhoods in Casablanca (see also chapter 6.1.1).

In addition to spatial distances, another characteristic feature of the spatial structure of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine is the obvious neglect of infrastructure. Figure 6-2 has shown that infrastructural deficiencies are a major concern of the residents of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. The impression of neglect may be partly attributable to the high number of undeveloped brownfields, but also refers to some of the installed infrastructure that has visibly deteriorated within only six years and was never finished in an adequate way. Street infrastructure is a good example – whereas some blocks have good quality streets, some major streets are ridden with potholes, and again other blocks do not have paved streets at all (Figure 6-5). This holds true for most sidewalks as well, as it was not the duty of Al Omrane, but of individual homeowners to pave footpaths. In fact, many complained about the bad shape of streets and sidewalks and the omnipresence of mud, dust, and dirt outside the house – despite comments about improved cleanliness (Figure 6-2). Of course, streets were hardly in good shape in the *bidonville* as well, but, concerning the quality of infrastructure, residents had expected improvements that were more visible. Amina reported that the *bidonville* lacked infrastructure and that it was nice not to live in a *bidonville* anymore, but the new situation was not really better. Indeed, better infrastructure has not featured prominently among the stated advantages of life in the new town (Figure 6-1) – despite existing infrastructural deficiencies in *bidonvilles* (see section 5.1.3).

Figure 6-5: Infrastructural deficiencies in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Author's picture, January 2017.

The state of the streets is worse during the rainy winter season, when problems of wastewater management become obvious when regarding rainwater puddles and blocked streets (Figure 6-6). In blocked sewers, dammed-up rainwater mixes with waste and sewerage, consequently provoking a bad smell that was reported by some dwellers and frequently observed during the field research. Laila, a 41-year-old resident, complained: "If it rains, the toilets stink like wastewater, because there are problems with sanitation." Like the previous situation in the *bidonville*, Nouvelle Lahraouiyine is not connected to the city's sewerage network. Instead, wastewater flows into an underground reservoir that resembles the sewerage holes in Karyan Central or Er-Rhamna. However, what is clearly different to the situation in *bidonvilles* is that residents are no longer actively shaping and maintaining basic infrastructure. They have become passive recipients of services provided (or not) by public authorities or its private concessioners. Whereas *bidonville* residents had to (or could) pave streets or clear sewerage reservoirs on their own, they now have no other option but

to wait for the intervention of public authorities – sometimes by increasing pressure by means of sit-ins or other forms of protest. Hence, residents' agency has changed from their being (co-)providers to mere demanders of collective infrastructure.

Figure 6-6: Dammed-up water blocks a street at the southern edge of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Author's picture, December 2016.

For some public services, such as education, health care, and other social services, residents' agency has hardly changed. As mentioned earlier, Al Omrane has established a few public institutions providing public services. This includes primary and secondary schools, public baths and ovens, two sports fields, youth as well as women's centres. Whereas some social centres have already closed, other significant public services – all existent in proximity to their previous location in Hay Mohammadi – are completely lacking. First and foremost, this relates to health services; numerous residents have complained about the absence of a hospital. Despite two health centres being mentioned in the building plan of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, they have not yet been realised. Hence, considering the insufficiencies of the transport system (see chapter 6.5.1), reaching a hospital is difficult and costly – especially for disabled, ill, or old people. Other than that, the number of police officers[43] working in the Lahraouiyine area has not changed – despite the arrival of 50,000 additional residents. Many people complained that they would only control cars at the country road in the west of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, but would ignore theft and violence in the neighbourhood (see chapter 6.3). Furthermore, many residents have reported they would not know what to do in the new town due to the lack of available leisure activities and distractions (Figure 6-2). There is only one small park in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, which is a garden of the mosque located in the south of the settlement. Apart from that, the new town has two small sports fields with concrete ground and one small playground close to the taxi stop. During the afternoon and early evening, the playground is regularly overcrowded, becoming a meeting point for mothers and their small children. Other leisure infrastructure is missing. One day at around 11:00 a.m., we asked for an interview with a young man we had unintentionally awakened by ringing the bell. When he opened the door, he felt embarrassed by having woken up late in the morning and added in an

[43] A dozen police officers work in the neighbourhood according to statements of different respondents in February 2017.

apologetic way that he slept late because he just did not know what to do with himself. He reported that since he was living in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, he was doing fewer (economic) activities and would simply stay at home longer, sleeping and watching television. While having "nothing to do" was a very common expression, in contrast, a few rather active residents remarked that activities could be accessed, if only people had greater internal motivation to become involved in these activities.

Regarding the lack of spatial densities and deficient, inexistent infrastructure in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, some people feel pushed from the urban centre to a rural area. Some have compared their new home with a symbolic double-sense with the desert – a deserted place without activities, located further away from the city and the sea in the direction of Morocco's desert hinterland. Exemplarily, a young man, even though happy with the new house, complained, "It is isolated: no hospital, no market. It is like the countryside. You do not have anything to do!" Indeed, more than 90% of the resettled inhabitants of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine[44] reported a strong or very strong feeling of isolation, whereas most residents of the *bidonville* Er-Rhamna – even located at a less central location in Casablanca than Karyan Central – did not feel isolated (75%). Besides being the outcome of changing practices of social life (see section 6.3), isolation is the direct consequence of the push out of the densely populated urban environment of Hay Mohammadi to a new town that is badly connected to the city (see section 6.5.1) and that has fewer urban amenities and functions.

Indeed, many dwellers mentioned being "obliged to live in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine" and described a feeling of uprootedness due to the loss of their home, which for them remains Hay Mohammadi. Younes, who had problems with the attribution of plots, even considered himself a refugee in his own country. In general, the lack of urbanity, to which these residents refer, clearly has to do with issues of accessibility of and proximity to a variety of urban functions. More specifically, many inhabitants were missing Hay Mohammadi's enormous and crowded (street) market with its large variety of goods sold at competitive prices, while others rather pointed to the lack of industries in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Twenty-two-year-old Naima put it like this, "If you want to buy or do something, you have to travel!" Indeed, many people used each opportunity to spend time outside Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. One 20-year-old student said: "Luckily, I can go to the university every day!" Other young males regularly use bus Line 55 to the city centre – without having a precise travel objective. For them, bus Line 55 as such has become a sort of distraction where they play with the stigma of the dangerous, marginalised youth that do not pay bus fees, jump through the window, and smoke inside the bus (see section 6.5.1). Others spend their days in Hay Mohammadi, where they meet with friends or search for casual work. In the evening, long queues appear in front of the *grands taxis* back to Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. As mentioned earlier, many dwellers reported that they hoped to be able to move back one day (see section 5.2.6).

However, there are other residents – in line with the official opinion of public authorities – that are convinced that Nouvelle Lahraouiyine would improve within the next years, notwithstanding the current infrastructural shortcomings and challenges. I will return to this argument at the end of chapter 6, but at this point it is relevant to point to the conclusion of the respective residents. They call for greater state intervention and public investment in infrastructure, including transport, in order to improve living conditions. In

[44] Starting with section 7.1 and only if the contrary is not explicitly mentioned, data on Nouvelle Lahraouiyine exclusively refers to resettled residents from Karyan Central (n=362). Thus, of the 401 interviews in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, 39 cases are excluded – those where allottees had already moved out or had never moved in (see section 6.2.6).

this sense, a typical answer was that the idea was nice, but that it required more effort to plan for the well-being of the residents in the new town – meaning primarily better infrastructure. Hence, similar to the voices complaining about a lack of state regulation of the relationship between *tiers associés* and allottees, again inhabitants identify the absence of the state as a major reason for deficiencies within the *recasement* project. This does not mean that the security apparatus of the state (*qa'ïd*, *mqadem*, and informants) is not present in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, but that the state has been widely absent in its role as a provider of public services and functioning infrastructure. However, good infrastructure and functioning public services play an important role in creating people's sense of urban inclusion (or exclusion).

6.2 New Buildings: More Comfort, Less Stigma?

For many inhabitants of the new town, the new housing comfort and shelter quality are the most significant advantages of their move from Karyan Central to Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Figure 6-1 already visualised that former *bidonville* dwellers generally appreciate better shelter conditions in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. They do not suffer from leaking roofs anymore, benefit from better insulation, and are less vulnerable to fires. For example, a 50-year-old woman said that she now felt much more comfortable, also because her new home was cleaner. Another resident remarked that, from an aesthetic perspective, clearing shantytowns would be good for the city, as the new town would look much nicer. Apart from that, several residents mentioned that they would now live in a respectable or decent house that would allow them to live like "ordinary citizens". Using the notion of *maisons en dur* (see sections 5.1.5 and 6.2), these people refer to the hope of leaving the stigma of the *bidonville* behind when moving into ordinary apartment houses with a regular address. Figure 6-7 shows that three-quarters of the resettled residents in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine are 'satisfied' or 'very much satisfied' with their apartment, despite the building failures briefly described at the end of section 5.2.3. Contrasting this result with the larger heterogeneity of responses to the same question in the *bidonville* Er-Rhamna shows that average satisfaction with housing comfort has increased because of the *recasement*. However, sticking to average values would hide serious dissatisfaction with housing quality that exists at the same time. Therefore, in the following section I focus in more detail on three basic criteria of housing comfort, which are size, interior design and amenities, as well as building quality. Finally, I discuss security of tenure and whether the move into *maisons en dur* is likely to reduce the stigmatisation of former *bidonville* dwellers.

I begin with the size of the apartments. According to the implementation report (Al Omrane et al. 2009), *bidonville* dwellers should get equally sized plots of 80 m^2, which include sidewalks as well the stairs inside the house. Hence, the actual living space inside the apartments is smaller, lying at between 70 and 75 m^2. Further, there are corner houses with slightly more space. All apartments not only are almost of the same size, they also have the same number of rooms – three rooms including a living room, plus one kitchen and one bathroom. The roof is jointly shared by all house parties. In a few cases, the constructor had ignored building regulations and added a fourth room. In the case of Younes, who had to share the same flat with his parents, his brother and his sister-in-law, the family built the house and added a fourth, separate room. Because of that, the family of Younes could live in an own small room, in addition to two other rooms and a shared living room. This example may illustrate potential problems of one-size-fits-all solutions against the background of heterogeneous household compositions. Whereas five percent of the apartments are occupied by only one or two persons, four percent of the apartments accommodate seven or more inhabitants.

On average, each inhabitant has 18.2 m^2 of living space, which is 54% higher than in Er-Rhamna. Likewise, the average number of persons per room is significantly lower in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine (1.6 persons/room) than in Er-Rhamna (2.3 persons/room). Considering UN-Habitat's threshold levels for serious overcrowding as a basic element of its definition of a slum (UN-Habitat 2003, 12)[45], the *recasement* has almost entirely resolved the issue of serious overcrowding. Whereas in Er-Rhamna 43% of the households are affected by serious overcrowding, this is the case for only 5% of the households in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. These numbers support assumption A10 and coincide with the findings displayed in Figure 6-1, showing that people consider the size of the apartment as a major advantage of the *recasement*.



Figure 6-7: Stated satisfaction with the home in Er-Rhamna and Nouvelle Lahraouiyine A Mann-Whitney U test showed a statistically significant difference between the two groups (p<0,001) (appendix A3).

However, general satisfaction with the size of the apartments should not hide the fact that overcrowding still plays a role, even more because a considerable number of households with many household members have not yet moved to the new town because they still hope to receive an additional plot (see section 5.2.6). Indeed, serious overcrowding in most cases is the direct consequence of opaque and insufficiently defined rules and regulations of attribution (see section 5.2.2). One extreme example was an apartment with fourteen occupants. Probably because of only one married couple, the household was assigned a single plot. According to them, they would have had to bribe the *mqadem* with approximately DH 20,000 in order to receive a second one. In the morning, when we were conducting interviews, we could observe that due to the lack of space, several household members were sleeping close to one another on the floor inside the living room. As most of the household members provide wedding services – a seasonal activity that mostly takes place in summer – they face problems regarding the regular payment of rent. Hence, when some household members tried to rent an apartment elsewhere, they had to move out after six months, as they could not afford to pay the monthly rent. In another apartment, we observed a similar situation, where a household of fifteen members was assigned only one single plot because one couple got married after the census and another one during the census. Due to the lack of space, the brother of respondent Souad moved out in order to live with the family of his wife. Rania, the wife of Younes, finds herself in a similar situation and describes a certain uncomfortability of living together with the family of his spouse: "Family members of my husband go in and out. They consider the house as the home of the entire family, because it was built

[45] Either less than five square metres per person or more than two persons per room (see section 5.1.1).

by my husband's father. We have no privacy. When I want to watch a movie on television, I feel ashamed. It is shared living space." She said that sometimes when they have guests, they have to use the kitchen to host them: "This never happened in Karyan Central! We had a house out of bricks with three floors and two bathrooms." Hence, there are households that lost living space, which has clearly resulted in a negative individual assessment of resettlement.

Notwithstanding that overcrowding has become less relevant in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, the issue will come up again in a couple of years due to inflexible housing structures. Whereas the incremental way of the construction in *bidonvilles* allows for the flexible adaptation of the house according to changing housing needs, the size of the apartments cannot be changed. Hence, people cannot add a new floor or subdivide the home if a person gets married. In Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, one can already observe a few attempts to build wooden shacks on top of the roof, which was also the idea of an interviewed family in response to a lack of space inside the apartment. However, another 36-year-old woman reported that new shacks would continuously appear on the roofs, but that authorities immediately intervened to destroy them.

The second aspect of housing comfort includes the interior design and amenities. Several residents mentioned the nice and clean interior of their home as a positive aspect of the *recasement* (Figure 6-1). This becomes more evident when considering the importance of the detailed list of interior design features within the contract of association and the compromise between the *moul chkara* and the allottees (see section 5.2.5). Most former *bidonville* dwellers now have more design elements in their home, such as stucco, decorative wall paintings, wall tiles, and mosaics. Some inhabitants have invested in further decoration and amenities beyond the contractually fixed interior constructed by the *moul chkara.* As such, one 48-year-old woman reported that although the flat was well constructed, they invested DH 3,000 in new furniture and decoration "to make it even nicer." In contrast, other apartments show a visible contrast between the rather high decorative standard, financed by the third-party investor, and the limited amount of furniture, illustrating the difficulties of some households to afford new furniture (Figure 6-8). In fact, a costly and well-equipped interior clearly influenced people's self-esteem and should underline their new social status as a citizen living in an apartment *en dur*. Fatima, for example, was obviously proud of her new house, which her family had constructed together with her new neighbours. After interviewing her for one hour in front of the house door, Fatima invited us into her apartment to have lunch, proudly showing off her new interior, which was clearly supposed to represent the family's wealth. The interior included amongst others a big chandelier, a couple of carpets, beautiful and colourful stucco elements, and a nicely crafted divan. The eleven family members were living on the two upper floors and saw the two apartments rather as a single two-storey house, therefore always keeping the apartment doors open. Fatima was happy with her new situation: "We were more vulnerable in Karyan Central. Here, there are fewer risks than before; it is decent and safe."

Regarding the amenities of the flat, data shows that almost every household possesses basic equipment – a television, a fridge, and a cooker – which is no different to the *bidonville*. More than 80% of the households have a washing machine, but fewer than 20% own a personal computer, and 9% use an own microwave. Interesting to see is that these percentages are clearly lower than in Er-Rhamna, where more than 90% have a washing machine, almost 30% a personal computer, and 14% a microwave. This could be the consequence of the reduced average size of the households. If members of one larger household in the *bidonville* move into more than one apartment in the new town, previously shared amenities have to be split. Hence, either one of the new, smaller households affords, for example, a new washing machine or a new computer, or if

they cannot afford it, they continue to share these amenities although they do not live in the same house anymore. Things are different when it comes to amenities installed and financed by the *tiers associé*. While only 13% of the households in Er-Rhamna have a geyser, it is installed in more than 40% of the apartments in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, even though some residents stick to previous practices of heating up water using a cooker. One resident said that the *moul chkara* installed the geyser, but he would hardly use it, as he had never used one before. Moreover, fixed telephone connections, which are needed for Internet access, are now legal, whereas in the *bidonville*, telecommunication companies are not allowed to provide fixed connections. At least 6% of the households living on the upper floors of apartments in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine have a new fixed telephone connection, paying about DH 200 per month.

Figure 6-8: Inside an apartment in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Author's picture, March 2017.

Concerning the third aspect of physical housing comfort, general building quality of the house, one can observe large differences. Whereas Amina mentioned that it feels good not to live in a *bidonville* anymore, to have good bathrooms, and to have no rainwater inside the house, another resident remarked that some shacks in the *bidonville* were built in a better way than the houses in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. One resident said that she never would have dreamt of having such a good house, while another resident reported becoming depressed when thinking about the large cracks in the wall and the unfinished apartment below hers. Hence, these differences mirror two distinct aspects: First, people have experienced very different housing situations before and expect different comfort levels (see section 5.1.1). Indeed, the heterogeneous housing quality in *bidonvilles* implies that some households have lost housing comfort when moving to Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. For example, one woman explained that she had a house with two floors in Karyan Central, but in the new flat there are not enough rooms for the seven household members. When her son returns from his job in Italy once a year for a visit, him and his wife move out and book a room elsewhere due to the lack of space. Second, building quality of the new houses varies as well, largely depending either on the households' financial capacities (if they built the house themselves) or on the reliability and conscientiousness of the *moul chkara* (see section 5.2.5).

However, despite people's rather positive impressions of the new houses (Figure 6-7), they tend to be built with low quality standards to keep costs to a minimum, which is of course the direct consequence of limited

profit margins for private housing developers. In some cases, they even led to botched-up construction work and consequent house collapses (see section 5.2.3). Five to six years after most of the people had moved to Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, 11% of the houses still were not yet finished (Figure 6-5), and almost 40% of them already showed visible damage such as cracks in the walls, broken-off parts of the roof, or water stains (Figure 6-9). A 21-year-old seamstress was convinced: "Some shacks in Karyan Central like ours were better built. Here, there is humidity everywhere and we constantly have to fix the plumbing!" While in most cases, the visible structural damages are certainly the result of inadequate construction work, in others, inhabitants themselves have contributed to the deterioration of the houses. For example, one older couple, happy with their new apartment, used to boil water on charcoal in the bathroom. Having no window or ventilation system in the bathroom, the consequence was a strong smell of humidity and the occurrence of mould. Apart from that, some older residents did not suffer from construction deficiencies, but from the inevitable use of stairs in order to reach their apartment on the upper floors. Others also complained about missing lights and humidity inside the house – although this was similar in many parts of the *bidonville* as well.

Figure 6-9: Visible damage outside a six-year-old house in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Author's picture, January 2017.

Beyond physical housing comfort, the resettlement promised *bidonville* residents that they would become homeowners with full security of tenure and formal property titles. The lack thereof is the least common denominator of all definitions of 'informal settlements' and its local terms such as *favelas*, *bidonvilles*, or *gecekundu* (see section 4.1). A large number of scholars have emphasised the crucial role of security of tenure for successful, affordable housing policies (Berner 2016, cf.; Durand-Lasserve and Royston 2002b; Payne 2014; Payne et al. 2009; Satterthwaite 2009). Soto (2000) has even called the lack of formal property titles the main factor hindering economic growth and prosperity in informal settlements. In contrast, A. Roy (2005) argues that urban informality has rather become the norm than the exception of urbanisation in the Global South – from squatting to gated communities violating building regulations. Hence, whether land use gets contested is more a matter of power(lessness) and the product of political negotiations than being solely tied to the question of formal land titles. Moreover, market-based displacement and gentrification have increasingly gained relevance, questioning the role that property titles play for people's 'security of tenure' (cf. Durand-Lasserve 2006; Werlin 1999). In Morocco, this is obvious when regarding the differences within and between the political approaches towards *bidonvilles* (cf. Le Tellier 2008) and *habitat*

non-réglementaire (cf. Belarbi 2015). While residents of well-located *bidonvilles* are displaced to very different places far away (examples from Casablanca are amongst others Karyan Central, Bachkou, and Lahjajma), residents of peripherally located *bidonvilles* are often resettled to places in the same area (e.g. Rahma and Nakhil). In contrast, *habitat non-réglementaire*, even though appearing more recently than the old *bidonvilles*, has been mostly upgraded on site, also because residents have successfully mobilised against other strategies (cf. Iraki 2009).

Thus, against the background of flexible interpretations of undesired 'informality', it may be no surprise that *bidonville* residents have often considered land titles as a less important aspect of their housing situation (see section 5.1.2). Rather, it is the ability to socially mobilise against or in favour of resettlement and to informally and collectively negotiate the conditions of resettlement that provide a certain security of tenure. For many *bidonville* residents, living alone in formal rental accommodation was much less secure than having a place of residence in a large *bidonville*. When people moved to Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, they were happy about their new homeownership, not necessarily because of their previous 'informal' residency in a *bidonville*, but because it was considered a much more secure option than rented accommodation. Hence, besides problems of affordability, the little relevance resettled residents ascribe to formal property titles may explain why most of the new house owners in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine do not have full property titles. Formal property ownership includes the *permis d'habitation* as well as the registration at a notary (*at-tajsil wa at-tahafidh*), which allows for the formal reselling of the property (see section 5.2.3). Residents possessing both documents were a rare exception in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, and a real estate agent complained that the lack of property titles would only allow for 'informal' market sales at a lower price level. Moreover, conflicts with the other house parties hinder the realisation of full formal ownership. Therefore, 'informality' has remained after resettlement, although most people are not aware of this. This limited awareness among residents is mirrored by the response of a 25-year-old unemployed resident to the question whether she fears being evicted again: "No, because everybody knows that we got these flats." In contrast, only few residents were afraid that someone could evict them because of missing papers. Thus, one may argue that instead of moving into formal property ownership, most people have simply moved from an undesired form of residential 'informality' to an accepted or at least currently tolerated one.

Besides physical housing comfort and security of tenure, residents associated *maisons en dur* with upward social mobility. People in Er-Rhamna often stated their hope that moving out of the *bidonville* into *maisons en dur* would make an ultimate end to the stigmatisation from which they suffered. As one resident put it, they wished "to live like everybody else" and, hence, expected to become ordinary citizens who do not have to be embarrassed when talking about the place where they reside (see section 5.1.5). Indeed, some residents in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine mentioned advantages of living in the new town that reflect these expectations (Figure 6-1). They stressed the decent and respectful character of the house, which would equal social advancement and, hence, be a further recognition of their 'ordinary' citizenship. As such, some inhabitants emphasised that they now had a 'house' (*dar*), while using the word 'shack' (*baraka*) with its negative connotations to refer to their previous home in Karyan Central. With a similar notion of upward mobility, a young mother who moved to Karyan Central after her wedding stated that she is happy that her children are growing up in a nice house with a good roof. This mirrors statements of some dwellers in Er-Rhamna, who wished for their children to have a better life than themselves outside the stigmatised *bidonville*.

However, it is questionable to which extent, if at all, stigmatisation disappears because of resettlement. Even if prejudices of the *karyan* or *bidonville* disappear, people seem to be confronted with the notion of the 'ghetto', symbol of a conflictual and abandoned part of the city. It seems that stigma is less tied with the physical character of houses than people expected (or wished). In fact, many people to whom I spoke in other neighbourhoods of Casablanca stressed that Nouvelle Lahraouiyine is a dangerous part of the city and implicitly warned me against going there. This was interesting to see, since the neighbourhood had existed only for about seven years. However, the name 'Lahraouiyine', which most people use to refer to the new town, also refers to an older, informally constructed neighbourhood (*habitat non-réglementaire*) close by. This neighbourhood already carries the stigma of a forgotten place, being synonymous with violence, poverty, and conflict, which reflects the quarter's nickname 'Chichane' (Darija for the Russian province Chechnya) (Belarbi 2015). Because of the ambiguity of the name Lahraouiyine, this stigma concerns the inhabitants of the new town as well, notwithstanding that several new town residents themselves blame the 'Chichanis' for being responsible for theft and robbery in 'their' new town.

However, stigmatisation impacts the dwellers of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine even beyond the specific ambiguities of the name – relatively similar to people's experiences with stigmatisation in Er-Rhamna (see section 5.1.5). In Er-Rhamna, many inhabitants mentioned that it was embarrassing to say that one lives in a *bidonville*. Likewise, a 19-year-old student felt uncomfortable writing on Facebook that she lives in Lahraouiyine, although she was appreciating the new house and the less polluted, natural environment of the new town. Khadija mentioned that because of the bad infrastructure, residents still get dirty shoes if it rains – normally rather a stigma of *bidonville* dwellers (cf. Lallaoui 1993). Apart from that, residents faced discrimination when searching for a work. Twenty-two-year-old Brahim was rejected when applying for a job at a telecommunications agency in Maarif, as the owner felt that Nouvelle Lahraouiyine was too far away and he could not rely on him in case he needed someone to work immediately. Indeed, transport in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine is unreliable, but this is also the case for other places in Casablanca that are not connected to the tramway network. However, the unreliability of transport may be more explicit regarding people's loss of centrality and the lack of coexisting alternative transport options. Also, public transport itself contributes to the stigmatisation of the new town, as new towns are not served by Casablanca's official bus concessioner, but by a company that lacks money to invest in its bus fleet (see also section 6.5.1). Hence, the visual degradation of the buses serving the new towns visualises to certain extent the public neglect of these areas. Transport deficiencies also reduce the comfortability of accessing Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Whereas in Er-Rhamna many people mentioned that they would not dare to invite people to their 'shack', still some residents in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine mentioned that friends and family would not visit them. A 16-year-old girl complained that her friends do not come, because they found it to be so far away. Finally, a real estate agent complained about a fall in house prices, which, according to him, was partially the result of the bad image and the numerous "social problems" in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Hence, also in their new *maisons en dur*, inhabitants of the new town are witnessing the first signs of negative stigmatisation. Although people may leave behind their stigma as *bidonville* dwellers, they are likely to be affected by a new, but similar stigmatisation of the 'ghetto' or the French *banlieues*. Again, this is reminiscent of people warning of a 'banlieuesation' of Moroccan cities (Bogaert 2011, 724; Le Tellier 2009a, 59).

6.3 New Social Structures

Spatial structures and physical characteristics of the house shape people's social life and especially their interactions and relationships with neighbours. This is obvious in *bidonvilles* but also in *medinas*, where spatial densities, the prevalence of semi-private space, and collectively organised and maintained infrastructure have created small neighbourhood pockets characterised by intensive social life and solidarity networks (see section 5.1.4). Life in a new town built from scratch looks different. In Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, former *bidonville* dwellers find themselves behind apartment doors on the second or third floor inside their new houses. Furthermore, larger and wider streets have replaced the small alleys and semi-private spaces as typical features of Arab cities. Thus, to some extent, the move from Karyan Central to Nouvelle Lahraouiyine is reminiscent of Georg Simmel's influential 1903 essay 'The Metropolis and Mental Life' (Simmel 2002) in which he contrasts the "habituated regularity" of the small town with the "intensification of emotional life due to the swift and continuous shift of external and internal stimuli" in the metropolis (Simmel 2002, 11). Whereas the steady equilibrium of unbroken customs in the small town leads to a social life based on established emotional and personal relationships, the metropolitan citizen behaves in a rational, indifferent, and reserved way that Simmel considers a form of protection against the discontinuities and fluctuations of the metropolis. Wirth (1938) developed Simmel's arguments further, also emphasising the superficial, anonymous, and transitory character of urban-social relations. However, Wirth (1938, 12) clarified: "This is not to say that the urban inhabitants have fewer acquaintances than rural inhabitants, for the reverse may actually be true; it means rather that in relation to the number of people whom they see and with whom they rub elbows in the course of daily life, they know a smaller proportion, and of these they have less intensive knowledge."

The ideas of Wirth and Simmel precisely capture some of the changes in social life that *bidonville* dwellers face when moving to a new town, notwithstanding the significant differences concerning the spatial and temporal contexts. The dwellers of Karyan Central certainly did not move from a small town into a metropolis, but rather have left the 'big city'. Nonetheless, the social structures of the *bidonville*, described in section 5.1.4, resemble Simmel's ideas about social life in small towns. Inside the *bidonville*, and even more within its small neighbourhood pockets and amongst women who spend more time at home, people do know each other, have developed an understanding of each other's characteristics, and have interacted within a 'habituated regularity'. An example may be the habit of owners of small grocery stores in *bidonvilles* to give credit to people residing in their close neighbourhood. Or, as a former resident of Karyan Central put it, "It was easy to find something to eat in Karyan Central!" In contrast, social life in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine shares similarities with Simmel's ideas of reservation, rationality, and anonymity as major characteristics of 'mental life' in the metropolis. Although Karyan Central was much more central, the 'modern' building and spatial structures of the (peripheral) new town seem to impose respectful attitudes on resettled dwellers. Although for many the new settlements feel 'less urban', social life has clearly 'urbanised' in the notion of Simmel (1903) and Wirth (1938). As I further explain in detail in the following section, the causes are mainly the loss of proximities inside the neighbourhood, the location of apartments on the upper floors, the breaking up of established social structures, and the influx of new inhabitants from different neighbourhoods.

Indeed, for many people, social life in the new town feels less personal, less emotional, and less warm-hearted than in the *bidonville*. In particular women that stay at home suffer from the loss of sociability, as neighbours used to be their primary social network in the *bidonville*. Now, neighbours are dispersed and

their social networks eroded, which often results in a feeling of loneliness. Women in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine significantly more often reported a negative perception of their social environment than men[46] (Pearson coefficient of 0.176**). Khadija, a 42-year-old housewife living in a self-built house in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, illustrated these shifts in social life:

> In Karyan Central, the doors were always open. If the house got dirty, the neighbours came and helped without my saying a word, and if I baked some biscuits, I shared them with everybody. If we wanted to travel, we could leave the children with the neighbours and the keys inside the house. We helped each other with everything. In contrast, here, as we are dispersed, everyone is behind their closed door, and we do not even know if you are sick anymore, if you are hungry, or if you need something. Even worse, some look at you with the 'evil eye', waiting that you get sick or that you get problems, just to be amused.

Khadija's statement refers to Simmel's argument that people in the city hardly know each other in such a personal way that is characteristic of the slower and more habitual life in small towns. Another 24-year-old call centre agent described this as a loss of traditions of living together and a break with 'old' practices of socialising. "We only helped one another at the beginning, when we still had the attitude of *bidonville* dwellers", remarked a 29-year-old petty trader. Hence, reservation and indifference may arise, as people have less knowledge of a smaller proportion of persons in their direct environment. Despite some people overglorifying social life back in Karyan Central, this also becomes visible by looking at the juxtaposed responses of inhabitants of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine and Er-Rhamna to questions concerning community cohesion and solidarity. Figure 6-10 shows the percentages of agreement ('I agree' plus 'I fully agree') of interviewed inhabitants of the respective neighbourhoods. It shows that for each positively formulated statement about neighbourhood cohesion, the rate of agreement is lower in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, which holds most drastically in the case of mutual help and shared respect amongst neighbours and residents. Furthermore, even if people mostly trust one another, they rarely talk to one another. This may be an indicator of Simmel's articulation of indifference, which is highlighted by Fatna as well: "There is no socialising with the neighbours beyond 'the norm'." Moreover, this empirical evidence stands in direct opposition to the findings of Tironi (2009), who argued, using the example of Chile, that the resettlement of people from central, incrementally developed neighbourhoods (*poblaciones*) into subsidised apartment houses would not lead to weakened community cohesion.

Figure 6-10 illustrates that the move into apartment houses has reduced the intensity of social interactions amongst neighbours, which supports assumption A11 and which refers back to Khadija's statement and several other wistful comments about the 'warm-hearted' social life in Karyan Central, with some people even describing the community as one big 'family'. At first, this change can be attributed to what residents described as 'closed doors' in order to contrast, both in a symbolic and pragmatic way, the habit of 'open doors' in *bidonvilles* (see section 5.1.4). Opposed to 'open doors', the reduced accessibility of apartment doors on the upper floors – whether they are closed or not – reduces unintended and spontaneous interactions among neighbours to a minimum. Instead, meeting friends, family, and neighbours now more often requires a certain intention. According to a 44-year-old woman, it was, for example, common practice in her neighbourhood in Karyan Central to go in and out of the houses as if they were your own. Now, with new neighbours, longer distances, and less semi-public space, this has totally changed. Similarly, another

[46] Being female reduces the perception of neighbourhood cohesion by 0.176 (Pearson coefficient, $p < 0.01$). Neighbourhood cohesion is the sum of all Likert scores (from 1 to 5) reported to the four first questions in Figure 6-10.

woman said that the *bidonvilles* were good to live in, because neighbours were so close to each other. As the observations in Er-Rhamna have shown, much of the social life in *bidonvilles* takes place in the streets in front of the houses, where women chat, prepare food together, or help each other with daily housework. The familiarity of this kind of spontaneous encounters has disappeared, notwithstanding some quarters in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine where people spend time in front of their houses and meet each other randomly in the streets, and despite the existence of some few social spaces such as the playground where women can meet.



Figure 6-10: Level of agreement to questions about neighbourhood cohesion amongst inhabitants of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine and Er-Rhamna. All values are percentages. Differences between Er-Rhamna and Nouvelle Lahraouiyine are all statistically significant at the level of $p \leq 0{,}001$, based on a Mann-Whitney U test (appendix A3).

Besides reduced accessibility and proximity, a further reason for the loss of social cohesion and neighbourhood trust in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine is that residents that used to live in close proximity to each other found themselves dispersed across the entire new town – if they had moved at all. This is already obvious in Khadija's statement above, but is also mirrored by statements of mistrust and mutual accusations among new neighbours. In fact, the mix of neighbours – the outcome of the lottery of plots as well as the moving in of people from other regions and neighbourhoods to the apartments on the lower floors – equals a reset of social life. In this regard, the new neighbours inside the same house play an important role, as they could either facilitate or largely affect people's acclimatisation to the new situation in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Answering the question whether she likes her neighbourhood, 21-year-old Hanane told us that she has started to familiarise herself with the new environment. "Fortunately," she said, "I have a nice neighbour in the house." In contrast, another resident had problems with her neighbours concerning the shared space on the roof and was consequently dreaming of a house just for her own family – without neighbours. Others complained about neighbours that do not clean the stairs or that meddle in their affairs. Concerning the reason for these kind of relatively frequent neighbourhood conflicts, some people referred directly to the mixture of formerly coherent neighbourhood pockets of Karyan Central. Furthermore, there was mistrust among people coming from different areas. Some residents blamed the *bidonville* dwellers for their, according to them, low level of education, while others mentioned that only neighbours coming from the *bidonville* would be friendly and warm-hearted. In fact, people hardly described a sense of community. Whereas life in Karyan Central, despite its separation into different neighbourhood pockets, was compared to living as a 'big family', Nouvelle Lahraouiyine seems to be the opposite – divided into many sub-groups

that suspect each other. Related to that, some people missed measures facilitating social integration in the new town. Indeed, means of *accompagnement social* have – if they existed at all – solely concentrated on facilitating the clearance of the land.

The mixture of neighbours and the break of established social structures have negatively impacted social cohesion and neighbourhood trust. Another statistic emphasises further consequences of the change in social life: inhabitants' feeling of security. Figure 6-11 shows that people in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine feel significantly more unsafe than the residents of Er-Rhamna, a *bidonville* with established social structures and self-organised security (see section 5.1.4). Due to the lack of statistics about delinquency and crime in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine and Er-Rhamna, it is difficult to say whether security has really worsened. However, even if statistics existed, it is the perception of security that shapes residents' feelings of security and consequently their assessment of the new overall housing situation. It is also an enhancing mechanism of social isolation, as it is one reason for people not to leave their doors open anymore. Nonetheless, there are also signs indicating a worsened security situation. Relatively often, residents reported stories about people that were aggressed, robbed, kidnapped, and even killed. Because of the insecurity and the lack of streetlights in some areas, several people said that they avoided leaving the house at night. In one case, 24-year-old Saida complained: "In Hay Mohammadi, my father allowed us to leave the house, because everybody knew us. Here, he does not do so. Every fifteen minutes, there is a fight in the streets." However, I heard some similar stories in Er-Rhamna, and it can be assumed that crimes occurred in Karyan Central as well. Nevertheless, especially during the first years after resettlement, crime seemed to be more present in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine (cf. Barkaoui 2012; Khatib 2013; Laaouam 2014), also because of the inaction of local police forces that seem unable (or unwilling) to fill the void of broken networks of social control.



Figure 6-11: The feeling of security among dwellers in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine and Er-Rhamna. A Mann-Whitney U test showed a statistically significant difference between the two groups at the level of $p < 0{,}001$ (appendix A3).

Beyond serious crime, drug selling could be frequently observed in both neighbourhoods, and there are indicators that petty theft has increased. A first explanation may be that eroded neighbourhood cohesion and the loss of spatial densities have complicated practices of neighbourhood watching as they existed previously. According to some residents and own observations, thieves also use the numerous unfinished houses as lairs. Thus, many people complained about people that steal clothes from the hardly controllable roofs or that entered the house via the roof during night. Because of that, one resident, still spending most of his time in Hay Mohammadi, even reported that after doing the washing, he carries the clothes to Hay

Mohammadi in order to dry them there. People's speculation about the origin of the thieves shows that they suspect people they did not know before. For example, a 26-year-old woman reported: "They have stolen a bedsheet from the roof […] I know who it was. That is someone who lived at Karyan Central, but far away from us. It was not our neighbour." Other residents suspected people particularly from 'Chichane': "The thieves are not from Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, because we almost knew everyone among former inhabitants of Karyan Central." In contrast to the somehow closed cosmos and familiarity of the *bidonville's* narrow alleys, there are more 'unknown' people in the streets of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine due to the spatial distances of the new town and the mix of neighbours. The examples show that in return and in line with Simmel's arguments, people tend to react with reservation, but also with mistrust. This has a negative impact on people's sense of community and consequently their feelings of security.

However, people also used another line of argument to explain increased delinquency, related more to the boredom of people living in the new town and the lack of jobs, especially for youth. In section 5.1.6, I already quoted the words of Malika, who described the former situation of youth like this: "At Hay Mohammadi, the youth had something to do; they could get along [*ils se débrouillait*]. They had small jobs here and there." Then she went on, contrasting it with the current situation in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine: "Here, they did not find anything to do. Thus, they take drugs, fight, and steal." Another woman agreed with her: "The 16- to 18-year-olds are not in school anymore. They take drugs and, hence, start to steal. There is even no place where they would be occupied, where they could work or spend free time." These perspectives are interesting, because several former residents confirmed that drug selling – similar to Er-Rhamna – was taking place in Karyan Central as well. One woman even felt that now, as the youth is more dispersed, they would less often become delinquent. However, for many in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, the situation is probably more frustrating, assuming that – similar to the expectations of residents in Er-Rhamna – people were hoping to leave drug delinquency behind when moving out of the *bidonville*. In this sense, a 66-year-old pensioner referred to the origins of the VSB programme, the extremist attacks in Casablanca's city centre: "They [the state authorities] said the youth of the *bidonvilles* are dangerous, but it is like this they become dangerous: no infrastructure, no transport, and no work. The young men have nothing to do. If it continues like this, it is here where terrorism will rise again."

After this rather negative picture of social cohesion and residents' feeling of insecurity, it is important to highlight that there are also more positive examples of neighbourhood cohesion that is about to develop in some areas. In fact, a different interpretation of Figure 6-10 would indicate rather a polarisation of the neighbourhood, divided according to people that have become accustomed to the new environment and others that have not. As mentioned above, a good relationship with the neighbours inside the same house plays an important role in this regard. For example, one woman said that she could leave her children with the neighbours if she has to leave the house, and vice versa. Likewise, another person mentioned: "Sometimes, we all leave the house and the neighbours take care of my grandmother." This was exactly the contrary to statements where people complained that this was no longer possible. Concerning practices of mutual help, one could further observe neighbours helping each other with shared water or electricity connections, and there are a few examples of material and financial help among neighbours as well. One female resident also talked of improvised practices to clean the streets run by women of a particular block. Moreover, there are also people that enjoy the new liberties outside the habituated social structures and social control mechanisms of the *bidonville*. Fatna, a 34-year-old mother, remarked: "We were like a big family, the inhabitants of Karyan Central. Now, everyone is independent. For me, that is better." This statement

not only reflects Simmel's writing about greater individual freedom in cities, it also mirrors some complaints of dwellers in Er-Rhamna about neighbour-driven social control.

However, to conclude this section, it must be noted that less than half of the inhabitants of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine like their neighbourhood, which is almost twenty percentage points less than in the *bidonville* Er-Rhamna – despite lower shelter quality and improvised infrastructure (Figure 6-10). As I will argue in section 6.7 in more detail, the loss of community cohesion and changing practices of social interaction seem to have had an important impact on people's wellbeing in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Based on new spatial structures (see section 6.1) and new building structures (see section 6.2), people spend more time inside their houses, while interacting less frequently and with reduced emotional intensity with their community. Hence, from a social perspective, the move from Karyan Central to Nouvelle Lahraouiyine bears striking similarities to Simmel's main argument concerning rising indifference, reservation, and rationality within people's social interactions when moving from small towns into a metropolis. In this case, however, people are experiencing this change in social life, although they are moving out of the metropolis. Hence, it seems that the given spatial and building structures are setting the frame of social life. In the self-built and incrementally developed setting of an old central informal settlement, this leads to small-town-like social interactions, whereas the 'modern' apartment houses produce, in the sense of Simmel, a metropolitan attitude among residents – although they are located at the periphery of the metropolis. Thus, based on sections 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3, I argue that people on the one hand lose urbanity as the more peripheral new town offers only limited urban infrastructure. On the other, from a Simmel-based socio-psychological point of view, dwellers behave in a more 'urban' way, which is, however, often not in their interest. Thus, although most people appreciate increased housing comfort, many complain about a loss of community and a lack of infrastructure. Beyond that, many residents have complained about limited job opportunities in the new town, which is definitely a significant aspect of people's wellbeing. Hence, the next section concentrates on shifting patterns of income generation as a result of displacement.

6.4 Changing Patterns of Income Generation

It is not new to research on resettlement that authors have emphasised problems related to income generation of resettled inhabitants (see chapter 5.2.1). Turner (1968, 1969) for example stressed that for people with a very low income, it is most important to live close to their workplaces (mostly located close to the city centre), as they cannot afford transport. However, most new towns that should host resettled populations develop far away from people's sources of income, which, in return, reduces their attractiveness and enhances processes of marginalisation (cf. Berner 2016; Choguill 1995; Linden 1986, 60). Moreover, these dormitory towns hardly offer alternative opportunities for income generation due to their one-sided focus on low-cost housing production (cf. Turok 2016; Beier and Vilmondes Alves 2015; Buckley et al. 2016a). Concerning the *recasement* of Morocco's *bidonvilles*, authors have pointed to similar concerns, however, mostly without empirical evidence regarding people's income-generating activities (cf. Bogaert 2011, 724; Le Tellier 2009b). Indeed, there are many residents in the new town that have complained about the lack of jobs in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine and the problems of finding a source of income (Figure 6-2). For example, Khadija reported: "Many young men that have not stolen before now start aggressing and stealing here due to the lack of work."

In contrast, a civil servant working at the local administration responsible for the *recasement* stated that most residents in Karyan Central were street vendors (*marchands ambulants*) that could find a new job in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine thanks to the high number of shops and formal market stalls created through the VSB programme. In fact, the *recasement* of Karyan Central goes hand in hand with the means to fight informal trading activities. In Hay Mohammadi, authorities seek to transform the neighbourhood's characteristic street market into a formal market hall, and in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, authorities have evicted street vendors multiple times (see below). The civil servant was convinced that resettlement would – in the long run – also change people's mentality, meaning that they would then not stick to informal markets anymore. According to him, people needed some time to adapt to the new environment and would then start new, formal businesses. Findings of Toutain (2013, 100ff) partially support this point of view. He could not confirm falling employment rates among relocated *bidonville* dwellers in several resettlement projects in Morocco, but showed that people had adapted with new income-generating practices to their new environment.

Concerning the *recasement* of Karyan Central, there are fundamental problems with the underlying assumptions of both perspectives. Regarding the first perspective warning of a pauperisation of resettled people and increasing rates of unemployment, one has to keep in mind that *bidonville* dwellers are not all poor. Hence, several mentioned concerns hold true only for a minority of vulnerable households, which is discussed further in the following section dealing with changing expenditures. Moreover, many people have kept their jobs because the new town is proximate enough to allow for commuting. In addition, many residents of Karyan Central had commuted even before the resettlement. Regarding the second perspective, it is wrong to assume that the majority of dwellers in Karyan Central have worked as street vendors. Section 5.1.6 has sketched a picture of the heterogeneous economic activities of people in Er-Rhamna. Based on the general comparability of the two *bidonvilles* (see section 3.3.1) and also based on comments of resettled dwellers, this is suggested for Karyan Central as well. Moreover, alternative (formal) sources of income tend to be scarce and have higher entrance barriers than those in the unobserved economy. Nonetheless, as I will analyse in detail in the following section, there are significant changes in income generation among resettled dwellers in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. However, these changes are much more complex and heterogeneous than one could assume based on the abovementioned statements.

Starting again with the arguments in the literature about displacement and resettlement, one may assume that employment rates and per capita income are falling through resettlement (assumption A7). This is due to three main reasons: First, some jobs have disappeared because of the demolition of Karyan Central (small neighbourhood shops, housing-related craft work, etc.). Second, the new neighbourhood is a dormitory town and does not offer sufficient job opportunities. Third, some jobs are no longer profitable because of higher transport expenditures (falling disposable income). This assumption gets supported by residents' frequent complaints about a lack of jobs in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine (Figure 6-2). However, the household survey data on Nouvelle Lahraouiyine shows that the median household income is similar to that in the comparison *bidonville* Er-Rhamna (Table 6.1).

Because of the lower average number of household members, this implies a higher per capita income in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine than in Er-Rhamna (statistically significant at the level of $p < 0.05$) (Table 6.1). Hence, the data suggests that resettled dwellers have either kept their job or, if necessary, have succeeded in finding an equally paying job after resettlement. This is further supported by the employment rate in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine (29.2% of all residents are active), which is at a similar level as in Er-Rhamna

(27.5%).[47] An alternative explanation would be that people in Karyan Central have earned a higher income than in Er-Rhamna even before resettlement. This might be explained by the significance of the market place Hay Mohammadi, where a high share of former residents of Karyan Central have been working for decades (see also Figure 6-12). These established street vendors have generated relatively high returns when compared to the entire survey population. As such, per capita income from work (income from work divided by the number of working household members) is slightly higher among resettled residents in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine (Table 6.1). Thus, the situation seems almost paradoxical. If residents in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine were able to keep their old or find a new job, why did so many people complain about a lack of jobs in the new town? Why did no-one complain about a lack of jobs in Er-Rhamna, although per capita income is lower and the employment rate at the same level?

Table 6.1: Comparison of data on income in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine and Er-Rhamna.

	Karyan Er-Rhamna	**Nouvelle Lahraouiyine**	
	Median (DH/month)	*Median (DH/month)*	*Mann-Whitney U (p-value)*
Total household income	3,200 *(n=381, σ=2,993.2)*	3,000 *(n=324, σ=2,840)*	0.499
Household income per capita	625 *(n=381, σ=662.1)*	700 *(n=324, σ=704.9)*	0.023
Household income from work divided by the number of active household members	2,250 *(n=355, σ=1,182.3)*	2,300 *(n=308, σ=1,806.2)*	0.041

To understand the supposed paradox and the contradiction to assumptions derived from the literature, one has to look at changes in the occupational patterns of resettled dwellers. The *recasement* implies remarkable changes in the availability of jobs or at least in the type of available jobs. Figure 6-12 illustrates that occupations of interviewed inhabitants of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine are in a similar way heterogeneous as compared to those of *bidonville* dwellers in Er-Rhamna, but it also shows five statistically significant differences that can at least partially be explained by the impact of resettlement. However, before going into detail concerning the reasons for and consequences of these shifts in occupational patterns, I shortly describe the types of jobs listed among the categories of Figure 6-12, which are based on ILO classifications (see also section 5.1.6).

About 10% of the working population in both neighbourhoods work as employed professionals (including teachers, health care workers, or technicians) or as public servants. A larger part of the working population are involved in commercial activities – almost entirely as entrepreneurs. This could range from petty trade such as cigarette or tissue selling at one extreme to formal shop owners at the other. However, the latter is rather an exception. Most people do some sort of street vending, which may include traders that sell potatoes from their own pickup or fish from their cart; most frequently merchants have a fixed place at a (street) market – mostly in Hay Mohammadi or in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. On the one hand, self-employed street

[47] Whereas in Er-Rhamna 20.8% of the active population are women, this is only the case for 19.1% of the working population in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Using a Chi-squared test, this is a statistically insignificant difference.

vending is a job with low entry barriers that helps to secure a basic livelihood. On the other, some street vendors – especially those with a fixed place at the market of Hay Mohammadi – generate incomes that rank them among the top earners of the neighbourhoods. Thus, it would be wrong to argue that self-entrepreneurial street vending is the mere consequence of missed job opportunities in the observed economy.



Figure 6-12: Occupations among the active population of Er-Rhamna and Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. The figure marks all significant differences in the occupation patterns between the two groups ($p < 0.05$) based on a Chi-squared test.

In contrast to commercial activities, factory and service workers are mostly employed. Service work includes a large group of people working as security guards; others are hairdressers or cooks. Residents consider particularly factory and protective service work as insecure, as most people have only short-term contracts or even go to the factories on a daily basis looking for work. Few factory employees also had more secure jobs, for example as specialised technicians, but they are grouped under the category 'other professionals'. The group of craft workers is again a relatively heterogeneous one, ranging from owners of small electricity companies to employed mechanics or carpenters and entrepreneurs such as painters, television technicians, and plumbers. As mentioned in more detail in section 5.1.6, the transition to day labour as part of elementary work is fluent. However, if people said they were doing *bricolage*, this often meant they were more flexible and less specialised. Despite day labour, elementary occupations also include cleaning agents and household helps as well as refuse and non-specialised construction work. Finally, transport workers may include employed bus or tramway drivers, but mostly taxi drivers with an own, jointly owned, or rented taxi. Taxi drivers with an own car belong to the group of residents with the highest income and have relatively secure jobs.

In total, one half of the residents in both neighbourhoods are entrepreneurs, and the other half work as employees. However, it is necessary to emphasise in this context that people's perception of job security is hardly dependent on whether or not they work in the observed economy. Whereas grocery shop owners in Er-Rhamna considered their jobs as secure, despite rumours about eviction and resettlement, employed factory workers and security guards, although being formally employed, found their jobs relatively insecure, and are afraid of being fired at any moment in time. The specificities of the various occupations are important to consider if analysing the five significant differences in occupational patterns illustrated in

Figure 6-12. These, I argue, display shifts that are caused by resettlement. First, some income sources have disappeared because of the demolished structures of Karyan Central (e.g. construction-related casual work, day labour). Second, many job opportunities are now further away than before the resettlement, leading to higher transport expenditures and lower disposable income (e.g. factory work). Third, the new town itself has also created new jobs such as private personal services for the new inhabitants (e.g. food services and hairdressing). In the following section, I analyse the reasons for and consequences of the shifts in occupational patterns and link them to the initially mentioned paradox of a perceived lack of jobs.

The first reason for shifts in occupational patterns is the demolition of Karyan Central. Incrementally developed self-built settlements do not only offer a variety of jobs from small neighbourhood shops to small-scale, building-related craft work, they also provide inhabitants with networks necessary to access entry-level jobs (cf. Berner et al. 2012; Gilbert and Gugler 1992, 88; Turok and Borel-Saladin 2018, 771). Thus, destroying these neighbourhoods also destroys productive assets as well as opportunities and networks required for economic activities (cf. Plessis 2005, 124f; Islam and wa Mungai 2016, 502). Whereas auto-construction and community-led maintenance of basic infrastructure in *bidonvilles* requires a large number of, for example, electricians, plumbers, or painters, these craft workers are hardly needed in the new town. Thus, because of the changes in building structures, the number of housing-related craft workers has dropped significantly (Figure 6-12). The demolition of Karyan Central has also had an impact on people working in elementary occupations. Their number has dropped significantly, which is mostly explained by the decrease in day labour. Whereas only 4% of the active population amongst resettled dwellers in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine work as day labourers, in Er-Rhamna their share amongst the active population is at 10%. Another indicator is the number of persons with non-fixed workplaces, a typical characteristic of housing-related craft work and day labour, that is low among resettled dwellers in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine (14%) compared to Er-Rhamna (21%). Many residents of Er-Rhamna as well as former dwellers of Karyan Central mentioned that opportunities for day labour were prevalent in these neighbourhoods and largely based on word of mouth (see section 5.1.6). In contrast, Mehdi, head of a household dependent on casual labour, remarked: “There [Hay Mohammadi], it was easier to find day labour. Here [Nouvelle Lahraouiyine], it does not really work.” Thus, the urban and social environment necessary for finding day labour (including building-related craft work) is to some extent lost.

Hence, the lack of easily available and accessible casual work opportunities could be considered a major reason why people frequently complained about a lack of jobs. However, this does not mean that people are unable to find an alternative source of income, but rather that the way, the time, and the accessibility of places to find a job have changed. For example, many residents in *bidonvilles* are used to start working if they require additional money, always knowing that is possible to quickly find a job if the need is there. Deprived of the ubiquitous availability of casual labour, residents in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine are forced to search for jobs with more intention and for a longer time. An impression of this change is the case of Jamila, who was one of the persons complaining about a lack of jobs. Prior to resettlement, she used to work together with her husband as a guard in Hay Mohammadi. She told us: “I just found a job [as cleaner in Lahraouiyine] after I had searched for a long time.” When asked for how long she had searched, she responded that she found a job after fifteen days of searching. Thus, a lack of jobs does not necessarily mean that people cannot find a source of income, but from residents’ perspectives, it has become more complicated to find one – in particular in the close environment, thus, without additional transport expenditures.

The more complicated job search also means that people are more vulnerable to longer periods of unemployment, which may be even more problematic because of weakened solidarity networks and the lower average number of active household members per household as a consequence of the reduced household size. For example, Laila was looking for a job after her daughter had lost hers in a bakery: "I walked through the entire Lahraouiyine searching for a job, but I could not find anything." Luckily, in her case, solidarity networks functioned. Together with two of her children, she now depends on the material and financial support of one of their neighbours in the house, and of her eldest daughter who lives elsewhere. In fact, especially for women, it has become more difficult not only to find, but also to *do* work. The first may relate to the reduced attractiveness of low-paid work that is located away from home (see below). The latter is because of reduced flexibility. Except for the limited work opportunities for women in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, they also have to spend a longer time away from home and, hence, have to organise childcare, which can become a problem in the case that neighbourhood solidarity has weakened.

The second change in employment patterns refers to what many scholars – from Turner (1968, 1969) to Buckley et al. (2016a, 124f) – have emphasised: resettlement projects dislocate workers from their sources of income. Almost exclusively constructed at the peripheries of urban centres, residents of new towns are forced to spend more money on transport – if transport exists at all – to reach their workplaces that are mostly located in central parts of the city (see chapter 2). This leads to a larger difference between income and disposable income than before. Hence, some jobs have become less attractive because of the displacement. Although transport expenditures are discussed in section 6.5.1 in more detail, it is necessary at this point to highlight some consequences of the peripheral location of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine concerning the accessibility of jobs. In the arguments of the preceding paragraph, it was already implicit that people complaining about a lack of jobs predominantly mean a lack of jobs *in* Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. As such, Abdellah remarked: "I want to sell [my apartment in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine] because there is no work. If I find a house worse than this but close to work, I will leave." This mirrors exactly what Turner wrote about the relevance of the dwelling environment and the heterogeneity of housing preferences. Zubeir, one of the last residents of Karyan Central, added that one of the advantages of Karyan Central was that it was close to jobs in the city centre, in the harbour, and in the factories of Aïn Sebaa. Whereas 26% of the resettled inhabitants of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine have a job in the new town, still half of them have their workplace in Hay Mohammadi or one of the other surrounding neighbourhoods mentioned by Zubeir (Figure 6-13).

However, some jobs with relatively limited returns and located in these neighbourhoods have become less attractive because of decreasing disposable income (for more detail see section 6.5.1). This holds particularly true for factory work of which most workplaces are located in Aïn Sebaa, once easily accessible by transport or by walking from Karyan Central. Figure 6-12 shows that compared to Er-Rhamna, factory work is significantly less represented among resettled residents living in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. It is likely that many workers gave up their jobs in the factories because of the resettlement. Moreover, increased transport expenditures are another reason for the decline in elementary occupations amongst people in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Of course, as the *mouqef* of Hay Mohammadi still exists, not all casual work opportunities have disappeared with the demolition of Karyan Central. However, the risk of not getting a job, but being forced to pay transport in any case has reduced the attractiveness of the *mouqef*. In contrast, people with more secure jobs with higher returns are not thinking about giving up their activities, as they are able to afford transport. This holds true for people with stable jobs in the city centre or elsewhere in the city, as well as for many established market vendors in Hay Mohammadi. Developed in direct relation to Karyan Central, the street market of Hay Mohammadi still takes place each day around the ruins of the former

bidonville. As mentioned previously, this market is one of the biggest and most famous markets of Casablanca that attracts customers from all over the city. Hence, street vendors there can generate above-average incomes. More than half of the resettled inhabitants of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine that still work in Hay Mohammadi are street vendors or other salespersons.



Cartography: Torben Dedring

*Figure 6-13: Distribution of fixed workplaces of the economically active resettled residents living in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Cartography: Torben Dedring (*n*=421).*

The third shift in occupational patterns relates to the jobs that have replaced the old ones. If there is less casual work, and if factory work becomes less attractive, people have to search for alternatives in order to create a livelihood. As the data at the beginning of this section suggests, most people were successful over time in finding new jobs in case it was necessary. Hence, the question remains what kind of work they have found. Indeed, part of resettlement is not only a destruction of jobs in the old neighbourhood, but also the creation of new jobs in the new town. It was the explicit hope of public authorities responsible for resettlement that moving *bidonville* dwellers to the new town would equally imply a reduction of informal employment. To support this transition, urban planners included in their plans for Nouvelle Lahraouiyine two market halls, as well as a large number of shops on the ground floor of the three-storey houses. Indeed, 26% of the resettled former residents of Karyan Central have found work in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, but contrary to the hope of authorities, by far not all of them are formally employed. However, the building of the new town for up to 50,000 inhabitants has created a certain demand for basic personal services, commerce, and small-scale craft work that needs to be satisfied. These are the sectors in which most of the people that have lost or given up their job because of resettlement have found alternative employment. Of the 119 resettled dwellers that work in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, almost 40% have found (or created) a job as salesperson (incl. street vendors), whereas 19% work in personal services (e.g. hairdressers, *hammam* service workers, and waiters), and 16% percent in food processing or garment craft work. Likewise, Figure

6-12 suggests that people have mostly found an alternative job in the service sector, as the share of people working in this sector is significantly higher in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine (13.6%) than in Er-Rhamna (6.8%). Beside personal services in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, this also includes a high number of residents working in protective services throughout the entire city. Furthermore, food processing and garment work (included in craft work) are almost equally represented among residents in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine and Er-Rhamna. This category includes tailors that work from home and, hence, are able to move with their workplace. In addition, bakers or butchers are part of the occupations that supply a basic demand in the new town.

Figure 6-12 further shows that the share of people doing commercial activities is higher amongst resettled residents living in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine than amongst residents of Er-Rhamna. However, one has to be careful in arguing that the high number of street vendors is a mere effect of resettlement. In fact, it is likely that the share of sales workers in the former *bidonville* Karyan Central was generally higher compared to Er-Rhamna due to its proximity to the market of Hay Mohammadi. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, sales work is the most frequent occupation amongst resettled residents in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. First, former shop owners in Karyan Central have opened new businesses in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine – formally and informally. This is also the consequence of authorities' initiative to actively resettle shop owners of Karyan Central, allocating them stalls in the new market halls of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. However, several market traders, especially those that did not live personally in Karyan Central, refused to leave their clients in Hay Mohammadi, hoping to get a stall in the market hall of Hay Mohammadi after its renovation. Second, for several residents who lost their previous job opportunities (e.g. as day labourers), street vending represents an alternative with very limited entry barriers. For some petty traders, it might even be the only possibility to earn a living. As mentioned previously, the lower average number of households has created a situation in which more people have to search for work. In case they cannot find one, they become entrepreneurs out of necessity – so-called survival entrepreneurs (Berner et al. 2012) most often engaged in petty trade.

Considering this, the expectation of authorities that resettlement would foster a decline of unobserved businesses is unrealistic. Although roughly one-quarter of the residents of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine work in the new town itself, Figure 6-14 illustrates a dramatic shop vacancy rate, which in most blocks exceeds 80%. First, this is the result of a general oversupply, which by far exceeds the demand for commercial space. A new town cannot offer enough employment for the majority of its residents only by producing consumer goods for its own population. The objective of public authorities to establish self-sufficient new towns is only possible with productive industries that reach customers beyond local supply. These industries are largely absent in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Second, high vacancy rates are also partly the result of insufficient financial resources that make it impossible for many street vendors to buy or lease a salesroom – in particular for petty traders that generate a minimum livelihood by selling cigarettes or tissues. Moreover, average returns from sales work in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine are lower than in Hay Mohammadi due to the limited number of customers. This was also a reason why many merchants did not want to move to the new town. For example, a caterer mentioned that this kind of work would not work in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, because there are not enough clients. For the same reasons, and because of the inflexibilities of the new home, a female resident that draws henna mentioned that it was much easier for her to work in Hay Mohammadi. Finally, also local customers prefer informal markets, as they tend to offer goods at a lower price level. Moreover, resettled residents have been used to street markets for their entire lives and are not willing to change their consumption habits.



Figure 6-14: Shop vacancy rates at the block level in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Cartography: Torben Dedring.

Authorities have repeatedly fought against the emergence of new informal markets in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. However, the ambitions to ban all informal income opportunities from the new town do not only conflict with people dependent on practices of minimum livelihood creation, they also oppose the interests of a majority of the resettled dwellers, as Khadija described: "There was a market next to the mosque, but two years ago the King gave his order to remove it. Thus, there are only the vegetable shops next door, but they are expensive, and the *souq* further up, but it is far for me with my joint disease." In fact, many women in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine complained about a lack of markets and high food prices (see section 6.6). During the time of field research, only one informal market, the one Khadija was mentioning, existed on a brownfield in the south of the new town (Figure 6-3; Figure 6-15). This market appeared in February 2015, soon after the dissolution of the market at the mosque, and was tolerated by the authorities until September 2017. However, aerial pictures show that immediately after its eviction, a new informal market appeared some metres up the hill, next to the main street crossing Nouvelle Lahraouiyine from north to south.

Thus, this section has shown that occupational patterns amongst former residents of Karyan Central have changed because of resettlement but, in contrast to literature-based assumptions, the employment rate and per capita income have not fallen. Nonetheless, still many people feel that it has become more difficult to find a job. First, the demolition of building structures and socio-economic networks of Karyan Central has led to a loss in casual work opportunities close to home. This has also complicated female employment and has pushed many people to become 'survival entrepreneurs' out of the necessity to earn a living. Second, basic services and sales work are preferred job alternatives, driven by the creation of a new local consumption demand in the new town. Third, due to dislocation from former sources of employment, related higher transport costs, and a larger gap between generated income and disposable income, day labour and factory work have become less attractive to resettled residents. Hence, the following section focuses on shifts in expenditures and disposable income caused by resettlement, including a more detailed discussion of changing transport patterns that some of the findings in this section have already implicated.

Figure 6-15: An informal market on a brownfield in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Author's picture, December 2016.

6.5 Changes in Households' Fixed Expenditures

Within the discussion of impacts of resettlement on income, income generation is only one aspect to be considered. Even more important from people's perspectives are changes in disposable income. Disposable income is the total household income minus fixed expenditures the household must afford such as work-related transport and public services costs. According to the assumptions in chapter 2, increased fixed expenditures related to the new housing situation have reduced the disposable income that the household uses to afford consumption goods – from food to education and health (see chapter 0). Thus, this section deals with an analysis of households' changes in fixed expenditures that are directly caused by resettlement and the displacement from Hay Mohammadi. These new fixed expenditures include work-related transport expenditures, as well as new running expenditures of the house.

6.5.1 Use of Transport

Accessibility and connectivity are key principles that should guide resettlement strategies according to international standards (Cernea 1993, 24f). Scholars in the field of transport geography have repeatedly stressed the significance of affordable (public) transport for (poor) people to fulfil basic needs and to access life-enhancing opportunities (cf. Lucas 2012; Özkazanç and Özdemir Sönmez 2017) or, in other words, for governments to counter exclusion and to enable people's realisation of their right to the city (cf. Coggin and Pieterse 2015; Attoh 2012). However, many governments prefer to develop new towns that should become self-sufficient and independent of the core city. Thus, they purposefully detach them from existing urban centres, hoping to alleviate growing urban congestion in the metropolitan core; the cases of Egypt and Morocco are typical examples (see also chapter 2 and 4.2). Because of these objectives and problems in mobilising land, the majority of affordable housing projects of the recent decades have emerged at the urban peripheries (cf. Buckley et al. 2016a). However, deprived of a range of urban functions beyond hous-

ing, these new towns in most cases continue to predominantly depend on the core city, which makes connectivity – in particular affordable (public) transport – even more important (cf. Turok 2016). Nouvelle Lahraouiyine is a classic example (see section 6.1). Nevertheless, as public transport is not only increasing household expenditures, but also supposedly opposing the idea of a self-sufficient new town, it is a hardly integrated, often neglected part of resettlement strategies that is, therefore, likely to increase social exclusion rather than to alleviate it (cf. Figueroa Martínez et al. 2018; Beier and Vilmondes Alves 2015).

The low priority assigned to public transport in the context of the VSB programme becomes obvious when looking at three simple aspects. First, the overall goal of the VSB programme is not the resettlement of the population, but the clearance of existing shantytowns (see sections 4.1 and 4.2). Hence, the planning and servicing of new towns are mere tools to achieve the goal of 'slum-free' cities within a short amount of time (see also section 6.1). Second, in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, improvements in public transport only occurred after collective protesting and the lobbying of neighbourhood associations (see the introduction to chapter 6). Third, as I will explain hereafter in more detail, public transport provision in Casablanca's new towns is unreliable and neglected by public authorities. This stands in sharp contrast to remarkable investments in public transport in other parts of the city. Thus, within the resettlement of Karyan Central, issues of public transport have been of lower priority to state authorities, notwithstanding its crucial role in creating sustainable livelihoods for resettled populations. Figure 6-16 shows that the share of people in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine that can walk to their workplace is significantly smaller than in Er-Rhamna, where every third person walks to work. Beyond work, dependence on transport becomes obvious in the symbolic words of a 40-year-old woman: "Here, it is like an island – you have to take a boat to go somewhere and take other transport." The term 'island' highlights the disadvantages of the new town's isolated location, and the term 'boat' the significance of transport as an enabling tool of people's right to the city. Thus, the tense constellation of actor interests – with authorities being hesitant to improve transport connectivity while residents are dependent on it – explains that issues of public transport are the second most frequently mentioned disadvantage of life in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine (Figure 6-2).



*Figure 6-16: Use of transport for working purposes amongst all residents of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine.. 'No transport' means that people either work at home or start their work directly from home (*n*=543). The figure lists all p-values below 0.05 based on a Chi-square test.*

Before discussing quantitative results concerning transport expenditures, I begin with a description of the transport modes available to the inhabitants of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. There are basically three basic modes of transport that should be distinguished: Public transport (shared taxis and buses); individual motorised and non-motorised transport (cars, motorcycles, three-wheelers, and bicycles); and private collective transport (company transport and car sharing). Figure 6-16 shows that public transport accounts for most of the work-related transport trajectories amongst all residents of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine (52%), which is significantly higher than in Er-Rhamna. It is followed by individual motorised transport (19%) and walking (20%). Thus, these findings emphasise the importance of public transport, as fewer than one-quarter of the resettled residents own a motorised transport vehicle.

However, public transport is largely neglected by state authorities. As mentioned in the introduction to chapter 6, shared taxis only started operating in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine two years after the moving of most inhabitants. These *grands taxis* are typically old limousines into which four people squeeze, with two in the back and two next to the driver in the front. Some new vans have appeared recently. These taxis only operate if they have enough passengers, and only between a single taxi stand in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine (Figure 6-3) and Hay Mohammadi at the fixed price of DH 6. Individual taxis (*petits taxis*) are not allowed to access the new town due its location outside Casablanca's borders. The nature of this shared taxi service implies several shortcomings to residents. First, long distances to the taxi stand in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine are a problem for disabled and old persons, and during the night in general. Several residents mentioned that they are afraid of being robbed on their way from the taxi stand if they come back late. Second, people have to pay a remarkably higher price to afford a shared taxi alone – for example if they want to go to the hospital. Third, during peak hours in the evening, long queues emerge in front of the taxi stand in Hay Mohammadi. People willing to go back to Nouvelle Lahraouiyine either have to wait long or have to accept a higher price (DH 10). Fourth, similar consequences may occur during off-peak hours, when passengers either have to wait for the taxi to be filled, or have to pay more to compensate the driver for the empty seats.

Compared to buses, for many residents, *grands taxis* still represent a safe and relatively reliable means of transport. Casablanca's public bus concessioner M'dina Bus does not offer its service in the new town. The gap is filled by one of the previous concessioners, Lux Transport, which continues to operate in a 'grey space' (Yiftachel 2009) – without concession, but tolerated (Xu and Manibog 2016, 20f). Deprived of any public support, the bus fleet is largely neglected, with buses lacking windows, doors, and seats. In February 2017, three lines of Lux Transport connected Nouvelle Lahraouiyine with, for example, the city centre, Maarif, and Derb Soultan. However, the bus service is unreliable, operating without a schedule. During peak hours, crowded buses may pass the stops. For example, a 32-year-old street vendor complained that his brother always came late to his university classes due to bus problems. Furthermore, many residents were hesitant and warned against taking the bus, remarking that it was uncomfortable and even unsafe. Residents not only complained about youth drinking alcohol and smoking inside the bus, but also about incidents of robbery and aggression. For example, Rania complained that prior to the resettlement, she only had to use a single bus to go to the city centre. Now, she takes the taxi to Hay Mohammadi and then changes to the bus or the tram. This was surprising, because there is still a bus line directly connecting Nouvelle Lahraouiyine with the city centre, but Rania did not even think about using the 'dangerous' buses of Lux Transport. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, many young people use the bus as a liberal social space where hardly anybody can control or restrict them. Hence, the bus ride itself becomes a form of distraction or even thrill seeking, as youths climb onto the rooftop or jump through the window. Finally, the deteriorated buses

carry the stigma of the neglected and dangerous new towns of the city, embodying a sense of second-class citizenship even more.

Coming to transport expenditures, it is necessary to underline that more people than before depend on transport in order reach their workplaces, which is in support of assumption A8. Whereas in Er-Rhamna 38% of the households do not have to rely on paid motorised transport to generate revenues, this is only the case for 28% of the resettled households in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Hence, more workers have to pay transport money to generate an income. Among resettled residents in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, the median work-related transport expenditures of each working household member are DH 280 per month, which is more than twice that in Er-Rhamna (DH 130 per month) and more than four times higher than in the small *bidonvilles* near to the former site of Karyan Central (DH 65 per month). Dividing the expenditures of work-related transport by households' average income from work per working household member shows that workers in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine use the median share of 11.5% of their work income to afford transport. The median is significantly higher than amongst workers in Er-Rhamna, where it is 8.2%. The situation of the most vulnerable households[48] is even worse. In Er-Rhamna, 44% of these households (n=89) do not use any transport to generate income, whereas this is only possible for 27% of the poorest households in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine (n=71). Therefore, the median per capita expenditures for work-related transport amongst workers belonging to the poorest households in the new town is DH 250 per month, being only slightly lower than the general median stated above. In contrast, in Er-Rhamna, the respective median value is DH 60 per month, which is significantly lower than the median of all workers stated above.[49]

Furthermore, the data shows that the increase of indispensable transport expenditures is not only the consequence of more people being forced to use work-related transport more often; transport from the more peripheral Nouvelle Lahraouiyine in general is more expensive. A proxy for this is to look only at households that spend money on transport for work. The median value that each worker in these households spends on work-related transport is DH 225 per month in Er-Rhamna and DH 310 per month in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine ($p < 0.001$, Mann-Whitney U test). On the one hand, this is because transport to/from Nouvelle Lahraouiyine is more expensive than in other parts of Casablanca. The fare for a shared taxi from/to Nouvelle Lahraouiyine is DH 1 higher than the regular tariff in other parts of Casablanca, which totals DH 60 per month considering one return per day. Likewise, the bus to Nouvelle Lahraouiyine costs DH 0.5 more than the common bus fare of M'dina Bus within Casablanca. On the other hand, more people than before have to use two means of transport in each direction, which further accounts for the higher median in the new town.

Moreover, some socio-economic groups are more affected than others. Amongst the most disadvantaged are the factory workers. For them, transport expenditures have doubled, as they now use at least one means of transport more than before. Considering an average income of factory workers of DH 2,300 per month and average transport expenditures of DH 619 per month (two shared taxis in each direction), this means that factory workers now must spend roughly one-quarter of their income only on transport. This is an important reason for the shift away from factory work. The statement of a 25-year-old former textile factory worker illustrates this even more: "I have had enough of searching for an insecure job [in one of the textile

[48] Households with a per capita income of below DH 475 per month, hence belonging to the lowest quartile within the entire data set.

[49] All reported monetary and income-related differences in this paragraph are statistically significant at the level of $p \leq 0.001$ based on a Mann-Whitney U test.

factories in Ain Sebaa or Hay Mohammadi]. Even if I find a job, I spend half of the money only for transport and lunch away from home." Indeed, many people incur additional lunch expenditures, as they were used to eating at home when they had no need to commute to work.

Looking at the total transport expenditures of the entire household, the data clearly supports the assumption that the relocation has increased residents' transport expenditures. Resettled households in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine spend a median of DH 384 per month on all kinds of transport, which is 49% more than households in Er-Rhamna (DH 258 per month). This means that people in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine use 12%[50] of their total income only for transport, which is clearly higher than in Er-Rhamna, where households spend 6.9% of their income on transport.[51] Whereas only one-fifth of the households in Er-Rhamna travel for purposes other than work or education, half of the resettled households stated that they spend money on transport for example in order to reach the hospital, to spend their free time elsewhere in the city, or to go shopping. Furthermore, the increase in total transport expenditures stands in conflict with the official targets of the VSB programme, which are to fight against urban poverty and urban exclusion (see section 4.2). In fact, households with a low per capita income suffer more from an increase in transport expenditures than other households. In Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, they spend 14.4% of their income on transport, whereas households belonging to the highest per capita income quartile use 10.3% of their income for transport only. In addition, the displacement is likely to increase the gap between these groups, as the median share of transport expenditures on income amongst the poorest households in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine is 80% higher than of the same group in Er-Rhamna (with 8% of the total income spent on transport). In contrast, amongst households belonging to the highest income group in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, the same share is only 54% higher than in Er-Rhamna. This is still valid, although people belonging to a lower income group spend less money on other transport than for work and education.

Beside these general trends, it is interesting to look beyond average values only. Figure 6-17 shows that not only the median share of transport expenditures on the total household income is higher in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine than in Er-Rhamna. In fact, also extreme values are higher. One-quarter of all households in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine that afford regular transport spend more than one-fifth of the total household income on transport, and 13 interviewed households in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine spend more than one-third of their income on transport only. In contrast, the latter holds true for only three out of 400 interviewed households in Er-Rhamna. A number of residents stated that they are sometimes unable to afford transport and would refuse to pay for the bus. This is even more relevant for young men without an income that search for activities outside of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. One group of youth to whom we talked reported that they would go to the city centre each day to spend some time there, always using the same bus Line 55, but without paying the fare.

To conclude, the section has supported initial assumptions that the *recasement* of dwellers from Karyan Central to Nouvelle Lahraouiyine increases transport expenditures as well as dependence on transport. In Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, residents have to spend more of their income on transport than people in Er-Rhamna. They more often rely on paid motorised transport to generate income, and average transport prices are higher as well. Still, the section has been rather conservative about the effect of displacement on

[50] Due to non-normally distributed data (a relatively high number of people spending no money on transport on a regular basis), all percentages in this paragraph are median values.
[51] Both mentioned differences between Er-Rhamna and Nouvelle Lahraouiyine are statistically significant based on a Mann-Whitney U test ($p < 0.001$).

transport. Real effects might be even higher, assuming that people in Karyan Central, due to the even more central location, spent less money on transport than residents of Er-Rhamna. The low transport expenses of residents of the smaller *bidonvilles* in Hay Mohammadi supports this. However, also in Karyan Central – similar to Er-Rhamna – people went to work at different places in the city and, hence, also spent money on transport. In fact, for some, transport expenditures did not change at all. This leads to the next conclusion of this section: If people complained about transport, it was not only about expenditures, but to a similar extent about unreliability, uncomfortableness, insecurity, lost time, and bad organisation related to transport. These more comprehensive transport inefficiencies make transport dependence even more problematic for new town residents.



Figure 6-17: Boxplots of households' total transport expenditures as share of the total household income for Nouvelle Lahraouiyine and Er-Rhamna (Er-Rhamna: n=*303, Nouvelle Lahraouiyine:* n=*279; only including households with regular transport expenditures).*

6.5.2 Use of Public Services

Beyond transport expenditures, the new housing situation has also caused new expenditures related to the provision of water and electricity. Before the *recasement*, a large majority of *bidonville* dwellers did not pay for electricity and water supply. Whereas water provision through municipal wells had always been free of charge, residents were liable to pay for electricity provision by the private company Lydec – at least for a short time period until a few years before the start of the resettlement. However, despite the functional service provision in *bidonvilles*, it was always deemed 'informal' by public authorities (see section 5.1.3). Hence, the resettlement is also about a formalisation of services provision and has created a large number of new 'formal' customers for suppliers of electricity and water. In Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, Lydec is providing water access to households, whereas the ONE is responsible for households' electricity supply.

However, not all households in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine have formal access to water and electricity. In fact, the connection to service grids was frequently part of conflicts between third-party investors and allottees. In many cases, conflicts emerged around the question of responsibility concerning the costs of the installation of electricity and water metres. Several residents reported that Lydec asked them to pay a fine for their non-payment during their time in the *bidonville*, which are included in the costs for the installation of the water metre and vary from between DH 6,000 and 7,000 per house.[52] Affordability problems on both sides, unclear responsibilities, as well as conflicts between *tiers associés* and allottees were major reasons why

[52] A few families also mentioned that Lydec alone requested them to pay DH 5,000 to 6,000.

people were unable to formally connect either to water or to power networks. Naima provided valuable insights to understand the problem:

> As we did not pay for water in Karyan Central, Lydec asked us to pay a lump sum of DH 2,500 per family when we requested the installation of the water metre. For some people, the *moul chkara* paid the charge, but others were forced to pay it themselves. We asked our *moul chkara* to pay for it, and he said we should wait. That is why we started to take water from the neighbours in the meantime.

However, it can be doubted whether Lydec has asked residents to pay a fine for their non-payment of water, as the company did not provide water in the *bidonville*. Instead, Lydec rather used its role as water provider in the new town as a way to receive compensation for the last years prior to resettlement, in which residents did not pay their electricity bills anymore (see section 5.1.3). Certainly, the high price for the installation of the water metre is a main reason why some people have not formally connected to the water network. Concerning the power supply, the installation of the electricity metre requires the *permis d'habitation* that formally certifies the habitability of the house (see section 5.2.3). In case of an unfinished construction – often the consequence of problems related to the relationship with the *moul chkara* – the issuing of the *permis d'habitation* was delayed. Thus, people could not get formal access to the power grid. In total, 3% of the interviewed households did not have formal access to the water network, and 10% were not formally connected to the power grid. Instead, households either connected themselves informally to power distributors or, mostly in the case of water, shared the connection with their neighbours (Figure 6-18). Nohaila, a young inhabitant of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, illustrates these informal adaptations:

> The *moul chkara* did not finish the house and did not install the metres. We share water with the neighbours in the house next to us. Before, we used to take water from the hairdresser's shop where my sister works. She paid a bit for us. However, it was tiring to carry the water containers up to the third floor every day.

Figure 6-18: Informal connections to the power grid in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Author's picture, January 2017.

The formalisation and simultaneous privatisation of water and electricity connections have created new expenditures for resettled former *bidonville* dwellers. Amongst resettled households that are formally connected to the power grid in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine (*n*=319), the average monthly expenditures for electricity are DH 117. In the case of water, formally connected, resettled households (*n*=349) pay on average DH

68 per month to Lydec. These are new expenditures for the entire group of resettled households. Further running expenditures of the house include gas, which households use to cook with, as well as telecommunications. In addition, households no longer have to pay small and irregular contributions for wastewater management, as was the case in *bidonvilles* (see section 5.1.3). Gas expenditures did not change because of resettlement, being at the average level of DH 71 per month. Formal access to telecommunication networks was not allowed in *bidonvilles*, but is now available to the residents of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Providers offer connections to wireless networks at a price of DH 200 per month, which is used by 6% of the resettled households. Hence, in case of Internet access, most households continue to rely on mobile networks, accessing the Internet on their personal mobile phones. Hence, for the majority of households, water and electricity are the only new running expenditures. Subtracting DH 10 per month not incurred for wastewater management, while adding water and electricity expenditures, equals an average increase in housing-related running expenditures of DH 175 per month per household.

To a certain extent, the increase in expenditures has affected people's consumption behaviour. For example, one woman in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine reported that they would economise on water and electricity as much as possible. In Karyan Central, they did not do so, because it was for free. At least for the use of television networks, collected household data can support this change in consumption: Whereas in the *bidonville*, the majority of households stated that they would not turn off their television during the day, new town dwellers were more aware of the costs of electricity consumption and watched less television on average. This is at least partially in support of assumption A12.

The fine for the installation of water metres, the problems related to getting formally connected, and, of course, the new running expenditures, are main reasons why still 44% of the resettled inhabitants of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine are not (or not at all) satisfied with the provision of public services. This is almost exactly the same level of dissatisfaction as amongst residents of *bidonville* Er-Rhamna (41%). Related to that, some residents, for example Khaoula, also criticised the quality of services: "The water here is expensive and it is even polluted!" Others reported power and also water cuts. Residents mentioned that ONE cuts electricity for the entire neighbourhood or at least for the house if some households would not pay their bill on time. One person mentioned that he had to use candles for two days because there was no electricity. Furthermore, as mentioned in section 6.1, people also complained about inefficiencies of waste collection as well as wastewater management, and about the bad shape of street infrastructure. In total, only about one-third of the resettled inhabitants were satisfied or fully satisfied with public services, which is significantly lower than among residents of Er-Rhamna (44%). Hence, it is possible to argue that for the majority of new town dwellers, the provision of public services has not improved, if not worsened, compared to their previous housing situation in the *bidonville*.

6.5.3 Changes in Disposable Income

The two preceding sections have predominantly dealt with households' fixed expenditures, which include the running costs of the house (water, electricity, gas, wastewater) as well as earning-related expenditures (work-related transport) (Table 6.2). Changes in fixed expenditures, as described in sections 6.5.1 and 6.5.2, are directly caused by resettlement and the new housing situation. These fixed running expenditures can hardly be economised on by households, notwithstanding some observations of the more careful use of electricity (see section 6.5.2). If households want to use basic public services and if they have to take transport to earn an income, they are forced to pay. Only thereafter can households afford other so-called

variable expenditures such as education services, health care, food, leisure activities, and clothing, which here are called variable expenditures.

Table 6.2: Differences in households' fixed expenditures and disposable income between Nouvelle Lahraouiyine and Er-Rhamna.

	Karyan Er-Rhamna *Median (DH/month)*	**Nouvelle Lahraouiyine** *Median (DH/month)*	*Difference in %*	*Mann-Whitney U (p-value)*
Electricity expenditures	0 *(n=403, σ=9.6)*	100 *(n=356, σ=56.1)*	n/a	0.000
Water expenditures	0 *(n=403, σ=0.3)*	60 *(n=358, σ=42.0)*	n/a	0.000
Gas expenditures	80 *(n=394, σ=40.0)*	70 *(n=335, σ=41.8)*	- 12.5	0.000
Waste water expenditures	6 *(n=368, σ=14.8)*	0 *(n=359, σ=0.0)*	- 100.0	0.000
Work-related transport expenditures	215 *(n=400, σ=327.3)*	310 *(n=357, σ=455.7)*	+ 44.2	0.000
Total fixed expenditures	**305** *(n=361, σ=336.7)*	**540** *(n=330, σ=469.1)*	**+ 77.0**	0.000
Total fixed expenditures (incl. all transport costs)	343 *(n=361, σ=354.6)*	635.5 *(n=330, σ=513.1)*	+ 85.3	0.000
Total disposable income	**2,905** *(n=342, σ=2733.9)*	**2,574** *(n=295, σ=2539.2)*	**- 11.4**	0.014
Total disposable income (incl. all transport costs)	2,853 *(n=342, σ=2711.6)*	2,435 *(n=295, σ=2528.6)*	- 14.7	0.005
Disposable income per capita	562.9 *(n=342, σ=662.7)*	582.2 *(n=295, σ=581.1)*	(+ 3.4)	0.752
Disposable income per capita (incl. all transport costs)	551.7 *(n=342, σ=646.9)*	564.8 *(n=295, σ=581.6)*	(+ 2.4)	0.902
Disposable income per capita of households with an per-capita income below 475 DH (incl. all transport costs)	**315.8** *(n=90, σ=75.5)*	**276** *(n=69, σ=77.0)*	**- 12.6**	0.001

Related to that, in section 3.2 I have assumed that residents in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine spend less income on these more flexible consumption goods (assumption A9). Hence, the first precondition of this assumption is an increase in fixed running expenditures. Table 6.2 shows that the median of households' fixed expenditures in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine is 77% higher than in Er-Rhamna if considering only work-related transport costs. If considering all transport costs (including education-, health- and leisure-related transport), the dif-

ference is even higher (85.3%). The second precondition of the abovementioned assumption is that disposable income after the subtraction of fixed expenditures is lower because of resettlement. Table 6.2 shows that households' total disposable income amongst resettled residents in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine (DH 2,574 per month) is significantly lower than in Er-Rhamna (DH 2,905 per month). However, due to the lower average number of household members in the new town, per capita disposable income is statistically the same in both neighbourhoods. Nonetheless, if focusing only on households belonging to the lowest quartile in per capita income (below DH 475 per month per capita), the assumption that people have less income available for the consumption of food, clothing, education, health care, and leisure holds true. The median per capita disposable income amongst the poorest households in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine is DH 276 per month, which is 12.6% less than in Er-Rhamna (DH 315.8 per month). Thus, based on the main assumption of general comparability between Er-Rhamna and Karyan Central, the resettlement has not only increased fixed expenditures of all households, it also had a negative impact on the per capita disposable income of the economically most vulnerable households. Furthermore, households' total disposable income has fallen by more than 10%. In the following section, I discuss in how far these changes in disposable income have impacted households' consumption patterns, focusing on education, health care, and food consumption.

6.6 Variable Expenditures: Education, Health, and Food Consumption

Considering a falling total disposable household income and a falling per capita disposable income amongst the most vulnerable resettled households, what is the impact on households' consumption patterns when it comes to education, health care, and food? In addition to a potential negative effect of a reduction of disposable income, one also has to consider the potential impact of additional transaction costs (e.g. transport) to access certain services such as health care or education. Thus, this section looks at assumption A9, which assumes that households spend less of their income on education, health care, and leisure because of a reduced disposable income related to increased housing and transport expenditures.

Starting with education, one may assume a disproportionate drop in education-related expenditures, as higher education is usually assumed to be a superior good with an elasticity equal to or higher than one. The results of a t-test support the abovementioned assumption and show that on average, households in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine spend significantly less money on education than households in Er-Rhamna ($t(507) = -2.75$, $p < 0.01$). The difference remains significant if total education expenditures are divided by the number of household members going either to school, to university, or to a vocational training institution. These average per capita education expenditures equal DH 85 per month in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine and DH 158 per month in Er-Rhamna ($t(593) = -4.09$, $p < 0{,}001$). These educational expenditures include school fees that are either close to zero in the case of public schools or higher in the case of private schools – largely depending on the grade of school. Furthermore, the expenditures include related material expenses (e.g. books), as well as expenses for additional private lessons. Whereas transport costs for private high or primary school education is included in the school fees, all other transport related to education is not included in the abovementioned values. As there are no differences in public school fees as well as material expenses between Er-Rhamna and Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, the difference in average education expenditures between the two groups allows for the conclusion that fewer households in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine use private education or private lessons. Despite the existence of at least one small private primary school in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, this is mostly because of the limited offer of private education in the new town. If

households decide to send their children to private schools outside Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, they have to afford additional transport expenditures. Hence, the financial threshold to access private education is higher. Moreover, some private schools refuse to provide transport services to/from Nouvelle Lahraouiyine.

Beyond a decline in users of private education, it is even more worrying that households less frequently allow their children to enrol in institutions offering tertiary education – either universities or vocational training centres, both private and public. Whereas in Er-Rhamna, 25% of the youth aged between 16 and 25 (n=422) are enrolled at a tertiary education institution, this only the case for 16% of the youth amongst resettled households in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine (n=366). At first glance, this difference is surprising, as access to public universities is almost free of charge in Morocco. However, one has to consider additional transaction costs, mainly related to transport, which further reduce households' disposable income. Comparable to Er-Rhamna, Karyan Central was located within walking distance to vocational training centres as well as colleges. In contrast, for residents of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, tertiary education is only accessible by transport, requiring additional expenditures of at least DH 100 per month for a student bus ticket. Hence, if one adds educational transport expenditures to the abovementioned education expenditures, the difference in average education expenditures per household member using educational services between Er-Rhamna (DH 137 per month) and Nouvelle Lahraouiyine (DH 99 per month) remains significant (NL: $t(547) = -2.12$, $p < 0.05$). This means that several households decide not to send their children either to university or to vocational training centres, as they cannot afford school fees *plus* transport. In some other cases, relatives living outside Nouvelle Lahraouiyine have taken over the expenditures for tertiary education, while again other households have incurred debts. Some parents may also feel uncomfortable sending their children to institutions far away, depending on unsafe transport services. Souad for example declared: "My parents did not let me go to the faculties, because it is so far away. I want to go there next year. Let us see how this will work."

Thus, the *recasement* from Karyan Central to Nouvelle Lahraouiyine complicates resettled residents' access to educational opportunities. In addition to a decrease in available income amongst poorer households, the peripheral location of the new town requires additional transport expenditures to access private education as well as institutions of higher education and vocational training. In addition, many residents complained about the quality of public schools in the new town, reporting long absences of teachers as well as overcrowded classrooms. First, these findings support the argument of Lucas (2012) stressing the significant role of transport for people to access life-enhancing opportunities. Second, it reminds one of the classic concerns of Turner (1968, 1969) and Stokes (1962) about resettlement being a threat to people's urban integration and social escalation. Concerning education, it is possible to argue that the *recasement* of Karyan Central, opposed to its official target of *fighting* urban exclusion, instead has *fostered* urban exclusion by limiting educational choices and impeding residents' access to private and higher education opportunities.

The next aspect to focus on is health care. In Morocco, in the event of illness, citizens that cannot afford private health care services either go to hospitals or to health care centres (*centres de santé*), where they may receive basic medication free of charge. However, operations and more specialised medications are to be afforded by citizens themselves in the event that they have no insurance, which holds true for almost all small-scale entrepreneurs and irregularly employed persons, and, hence, for most of the interviewed households. However, health care infrastructure in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine is severely underdeveloped, as promises of the developer Al Omrane about the establishment of a health care centre have not (yet) turned into

action. As at April 2018, there is only one small medical office in the northern part of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, which, according to some residents, does not provide medicines to all inhabitants without charge. This stands in sharp contrast to the general health care system in the *wilaya* Casablanca-Settat, which has one of the best-developed health care facilities compared to all other regions in Morocco (SEM 2015). Against this background, the limited access to health care in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine shows another dimension of dynamics of intra-urban marginalisation. While many residents complained either about the inexistence of hospitals and health care centres in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine or about the fact that they are far away and difficult to access, others also mentioned that there is no ambulance (Figure 6-2). This is a completely new situation for the former inhabitants of Karyan Central, as their previous homes were within walking distance of the public hospital of Hay Mohammadi.

Health-related expenses of interviewed residents in Er-Rhamna (DH 144 per month) are on average higher than the expenses of the interviewed resettled residents in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine (DH 113 per month), but a t-test could not prove the significance of this difference. Hence, statistically, the assumption that people spend less money on health care because of resettlement cannot be supported. However, due to the irregularity and unpredictability of households' health-related expenditures, it was difficult to assess them by means of the survey. Therefore, one may look beyond quantitative data to get a more comprehensive picture of people's health care expenditures. In fact, it is possible to distinguish at least four channels through which resettlement is likely to impact health care of resettled residents, which, however, only becomes observable in the unforeseeable case of emergency. The first channel relates to direct traumatic experiences with resettlement, including both forced eviction from Karyan Central as well as serious conflicts with the *moul chkara*. Several residents mentioned that they had become mentally ill because of the resettlement. The second channel concerns the limited health care infrastructure in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine as it is described above. The third channel is the increase of transaction costs in accessing health care, which is mainly related to residents' dependency on paid forms of motorized transport to reach hospitals. These are even higher if the person is forced to afford a taxi *corsa* (a shared taxi for individual use) to reach the hospital. The fourth channel is even more difficult to assess, but could have the most serious impact. Because of resettlement, poor households in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine have less available income and, consequently, can save less money to afford health care in situations of emergency.

Finally, these channels of impact become clearer when focusing on findings based on data of a more qualitative nature. For example, a 43-year-old wife of a petty trader who inhabits an unfinished apartment with large bricks in the wall reported that she became sick because of the stress related to the conflicts with the *moul chkara* and her living conditions in the building shell. As she could not afford medicine in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine and could not get medicine in the hospital of Hay Mohammadi because they gave them exclusively to local residents, she had to go to Tit Mellil, which is even more difficult (and more expensive) to reach by public transport. Therefore, she could only get medicines if she were able to afford transport. Another 38-year-old resident, employed as a factory worker in Aïn Sebaa, stated a monthly income of DH 2,400 and reported that he would get into debt if a person became sick. Affording medical care is even more problematic if the only bread-earner of a household gets sick. In one case, a woman who used to work as an irregularly employed seamstress injured her leg in an accident in the streets and had to use all her savings to afford the necessary medicine. As she could not work anymore, she ran out of money after a certain while and was no longer able to afford the medication, which then aggravated the situation of her leg. Of course, these kinds of stories also occurred in the *bidonville*, but in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, because of the reduced per capita net income, a lack of alternative job opportunities that are easy to access in case of an

urgent need for money (see section 6.4), and weakened solidarity networks (see section 6.3), the resettlement is likely to reduce the resilience of poor resettled households to the consequences of sickness and accidents.

Concerning food, one would assume that the negative impact of reduced disposable income on food consumption is less strong, as income elasticity for basic food is usually lower than one. Indeed, a correlation shows that a decrease of per capita net income by one leads to a decrease of per capita food expenses that is smaller than 1 (-0.18, $p < 0.001$). As the per capita income among poor households in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine has been reduced because of resettlement, the households have to reduce their food expenses as well. However, a t-test did not state a significant mean difference of per capita food expenditures among interviewed residents in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine and Er-Rhamna. Nonetheless, there is evidence that residents suffer from higher food prices in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, which I report below. Hence, if residents get less food for the same amount of money, it is likely that equal monthly per capita food expenditures of residents in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine and Er-Rhamna mean that people in the new town consume less or lower-quality food. However, data quality could also be a problem, as many people mentioned largely fluctuating food expenditures depending on their irregular income.

Many residents in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine reported a higher price level as well as worse food quality and limited variety in supply compared to the market of Hay Mohammadi (Figure 6-2). As mentioned in section 6.4, many people missed a market comparable to that of Hay Mohammadi and were not used – or not willing to get used – to buying (more expensive) food in regular shops instead of buying it on street markets. Indeed, the market in Hay Mohammadi offers the advantage of several traders offering the same products right next to each other, which makes it easier to compare prices as well as quality. In contrast, the existing market halls in the new town were to a large extent empty – similar to the majority of regular shops on the houses' ground floors (Figure 6-14). "Life is expensive here!" was a typical statement related to food expenditures. One reason for this could be that traders have to afford higher transport costs to bring their goods to Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Indeed, a quantitative comparison of a standard basket of eight different sorts of fruits and vegetables on the same day showed that per-kilogram prices on the single street market in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine were on average DH 1 (15%) higher than on the market of Hay Mohammadi. In contrast, the comparison could not show any clear price difference in the case of meat and basic food such as couscous, sugar, oil, tea, and flour. However, this brief comparison only captured one moment in time and could not take into account potential differences in quality. Furthermore, another reason for the above-mentioned impression refers to people's increased dependence on formal markets and shops, which is because of the small size of the single street market in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. At formal markets and shops, traders usually offer goods at higher prices because of additional costs such as tax and rental payments. Also this has contributed to the general feeling of an expensive living environment. Thus, several people have continued to buy their food at the market of Hay Mohammadi or go there at least once a week to do shopping and to chat with friends – mostly on a Sunday. Malika said: "If I go to the market of Hay Mohammadi – even with transport costs – it is still less expensive and of better quality than buying the food here in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine." However, there were also voices indicating a general increase in food prices – also in Hay Mohammadi. Moreover, some people mentioned that the market in Hay Mohammadi has suffered from the clearance of Karyan Central, which, together with the construction of the second tramway line, has severely affected the number of daily customers.

Hence, this section has shown that especially poor people are affected by an increase in fixed expenditures (transport to work and public services) and a related fall in disposable income caused by resettlement. As a consequence, these people can spend less money on more variable consumption goods such as quality education, health care, and food. The more sector-specific discussions could show that households have reduced expenses for education, basically because of increased transaction costs and the limited offer of private education. This has resulted in a decrease in the share of young people using tertiary education and vocational training opportunities. Concerning food and health care, t-test analyses could not support the initial assumptions that households in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine spend less income on these goods because of resettlement. However, the section has discussed additional data material supporting the assumption that the reduction in disposable income caused by resettlement has potentially affected the quality of food consumption and health care. The next section will go further, combining the individual sections in chapter 7, targeting a more comprehensive assessment of the *recasement* of Karyan Central.

6.7 Overarching Findings: Increased Housing Comfort vs. Social Isolation

Resettlement is a drastic and largely disruptive urban planning intervention that affects almost all aspects of life – from housing to work and social interactions. If resettlement is understood as a single intervention that affects people's life in a holistic way, it is impossible to draw conclusions based on detached analyses of individual dimensions only. Hence, after the rather separate, topic-specific discussions of the previous sections, it is now time to bring them together and to assume a more comprehensive point of view. The aim is to analyse in how far individual aspects affect one another and to distinguish the most significant factors of resettlement shaping (dis-)satisfaction amongst the resettled dwellers. Thus, this section looks at interdependencies between the various aspects discussed previously and forms the basis for the conclusions in the subsequent, final chapter. Doing so, this section refers back to Cernea's risks and reconstruction model that mentions a range of possible aspects affecting residents' satisfaction with resettlement (e.g. social disarticulation, homelessness, joblessness, etc.) (see section 2.5). Furthermore, it reflects on the various reasons why housing policies may fail in developing countries as discussed in the other sections of chapter 2 (e.g. peripheral location, inadequate socio-spatial integration, bad public services, etc.). This section starts with an overview of people's own perspectives on their personal resettlement experience and then moves further by analysing factors influencing general satisfaction with the new overall housing situation.

For many resettled residents themselves, it was difficult to come up with an overall judgement of the *recasement* from Karyan Central. In fact, the majority of interviewed people were largely undecided concerning their opinion about the VSB programme; however, a tendency towards a more positive view of the programme was evident (Figure 6-19). Residents often started their attempts of a general conclusion with an appreciation of the house or the general idea of providing 'adequate' housing to *bidonville* dwellers before raising concerns about various aspects of resettlement such as the location, weakened social networks, or the lack of jobs. This kind of weighing up of very different aspects of the *recasement* becomes best visible in some illustrative statements of dislocated dwellers. For example, Hanane had no decisive answer to whether she liked the VSB programme or not: "It is good to clear the *bidonvilles*, but they put us here, where we have no transport and total insecurity." Likewise, Jamila was generally positive about the VSB programme but was aware of the advantages of her previous life: "Karyan Central was dirty, but the plus was that we had work and that food was not expensive." These two statements alone already point to

at least five different aspects of resettlement that need to be taken into consideration for an overall assessment.

Beyond the indecisiveness of the majority of dwellers, Figure 6-19 also sketches a picture of strong, polarised opinions about the *recasement* project. The number of resettled residents in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine that are completely dissatisfied with resettlement is very similar to the number of inhabitants that are fully satisfied. For example, there was a 45-year-old woman who felt that the situation in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine was worse than in the *bidonville*, while just few metres away, a 56-year-old woman was convinced of the opposite, meaning that people were more vulnerable and less secure in Karyan Central. Whereas Saida blamed the authorities of having destroyed a monument like Karyan Central in order to move people next to the cemetery of Al Ghofran, her neighbour was happy not to live in a *bidonvill*e any longer, where people got sick because of the bad infrastructure. Also, during the entire one-hour interview with Fatima, who was visibly happy with her new self-built house, her neighbour waited, pushing us to interview him as well, as he felt that he had to stress a different perspective, highlighting the ongoing marginalisation of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Thus, this polarised picture – the coexistence of strongly opposed opinions – again highlights the enormous heterogeneity of biographies and living conditions in Karyan Central (see section 5.1) as well as the huge variation in personal experiences with resettlement (see section 5.2).



Figure 6-19: Satisfaction with the VSB programme and the general housing situation among the resettled dwellers of Karyan Central living in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine.

Despite individual biographies and different pathways into the new home that shape opinions about resettlement, the balanced conclusions of interviewed residents allow for the derivation of at least three general statements about the manner of the *recasement* of Karyan Central to which a large majority of resettled dwellers would possibly agree. First, there is a lack of public investment in the new town. Second, residents would have preferred in situ solutions. Third, implementation suffered from inexistent citizen participation and hardly transparent decision-making structures. Regarding the first, people often had a generally positive attitude towards the VSB programme (see section 5.2.1), but criticised the infrastructural deficiencies of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine (see section 6.1), which according to many would have been easy to avoid or could be changed quickly. Thus, they judged the programme in a rather positive way, but hoped for more public investment in the near future to advance the living conditions in the new town: “The VSB programme is good, but a lot still needs to be done in Lahraouiyine, especially in terms of creating more jobs,” said a 57-

year-old household help. Some were optimistic, like a 28-year-old resident who worked as an aluminium worker in Lalla Meryem: "Now, it looks deserted, but it will develop in the future." Others that were more pessimistic about the future of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine were also more negative about the VSB programme in general, for example Abdellah, who was looking forward to selling his apartment: "[Nouvelle Lahraouiyine] will become a nice place to live in for our children, but we will be dead!"

The second aspect, a preference for in situ solutions, is considered by many residents as the easiest way to combine the advantages of the new town (e.g. homeownership and housing comfort) with the advantages of the *bidonville*, in particular its location in the heart of the 'urban' neighbourhood Hay Mohammadi. In a typical way, Najat criticised the fact that they were pushed to an isolated place like Nouvelle Lahraouiyine: "If we had the possibility to build similar houses in Hay Mohammadi, this would have been much better." Whereas the large majority would potentially agree to that, there were some resettled dwellers that were convinced that *only* in situ solutions could be of real benefit to *bidonville* dwellers used to an urban environment with markets, higher education facilities, hospitals, and good job opportunities. Beyond that, several residents had clear opinions about the motivations behind authorities' denial of in situ upgrading. The reasons they mentioned looked very similar to what I discussed in section 2.5 based on academic literature. Some referred to security aspects, pointing to the suicide attack that triggered the VSB programme, but also mentioned the difficulty for the state to control densely populated neighbourhoods with evolved structures. Others related to rather aesthetic aspects of urban development that would be the major drivers behind the state's primary focus on the demolition of existing *bidonvilles*, instead of investing in more comprehensive urban planning solutions. As such, a 47-year-old waiter working in Hay Mohammadi felt uprooted: "They do not think about the people, but only about the beauty of the city!" A 30-year-old technician working in a factory in Aïn Sebaa had the same impression that authorities were not interested in people's wellbeing, but only in the upgrading of Hay Mohammadi – with the construction of the second tramway line, the new market hall, and the plans to build a public park. Finally, a 58-year-old wife of an employed security guard was also stressing economic motivations behind the clearance of Karyan Central: "The VSB programme is good for them [state authorities], as they keep the much more profitable land."

The third aspect, the opaque and unjust process of implementation, was a major concern to many. In fact, much potential to achieve better results – one may think especially about the innovative approach with third-party investors[53] – was lost because of the inadequate implementation of the *recasement* project. To a certain extent, people's complaints about bad implementation relate back to the previously mentioned aspects of a lack of infrastructure and a dislocation from places people were used to. As such, a 20-year-old resident working as an employed welder in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine remarked: "It is like being in jail! It is far away from everything, transport is a problem, and there are always fights on the streets. They [authorities] did not think about the relocation before they started implementing it!" A 28-year-old resident, doing promotion activities at the beach in Ain Diab, shared this opinion: "It is not well thought out. There is no idea about how to integrate people here." This already leads to the notion of a lack of citizen participation, which was especially marked by dwellers that had the impression that authorities did not care about people's wellbeing. A 34-year-old female resident, for example, told us that it would have been better to do this kind of survey prior to the resettlement project, which she considered to be unfair because of the

[53] Some residents explicitly mentioned that they liked the specific sites-and-services approach with the help of third-party investors, as it would enable them to move into new, own property almost free of charge. For some, it was the only positive aspect of resettlement.

lack of choice and programme authorities' being ignorant of people's opinions. Indeed, various injustices related to the opaque and corrupt implementation process were a major shortcoming according to many residents – not only for those that were directly affected (see section 5.2.2). For example, a 22-year employee of a print shop in Maarif stated: "The VSB programme is unfair, because they [authorities] gave plots to people that do not deserve plots, while leaving out others that were eligible." Finally, people affected by forced evictions, being angered about the brutal and often-unexpected demolition of their previous homes, reported the most negative opinions related to implementation. For them, it was clear that authorities had kicked them out of their hometown, leaving them with no other choice but to move to the 'rural' and isolated Nouvelle Lahraouiyine.

The three general aspects derived from people's own assessments of the VSB programme refer to the way in which the *recasement* of Karyan Central was designed, processed, and implemented. Besides personal experiences with resettlement and heterogeneous living conditions in the *bidonvilles*, Figure 6-19 shows that the assessment of the VSB programme is strongly correlated with people's satisfaction with the current general housing situation. If people's assessment of the VSB programme took the process of implementation into consideration (see section 5.2), the degree of satisfaction with the general housing situation rather refers to the outcome of resettlement, being residents' self-assessment of their current living situation in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. At the end of the interview, before asking the question about general satisfaction, the interviewer reminded the interviewed person to reflect on his/her current situation in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine in a comprehensive way – including all relevant aspects such as housing comfort, public services, social life, work, and living costs. Thus, merging the main findings of the preceding sections in this chapter gives an idea of the way in which individual dimensions of the new livelihoods of resettled dwellers influence their overall satisfaction with the current living situation in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine – as a proxy of people's satisfaction with the *outcome* of resettlement. To get an idea of the degree of (dis)satisfaction with the resettlement outcome, one could have a look at the number of people that are willing to move out within the next five years, which is almost one-third of all interviewed persons (see section 5.2.6). However, this result can only give an estimation of the level of dissatisfaction, but not of the individual variables influencing (dis)satisfaction.

Therefore, in the following section, I develop a multiple regression model that includes relevant variables explaining residents' satisfaction with the current housing situation. The first model contains a dummy variable of the respective settlement in order to find out whether there is a significant difference in residents' satisfaction with the general housing situation between the two neighbourhoods Er-Rhamna and Nouvelle Lahraouiyine which would consequently require further analysis. The model builds on the theoretical reflections in chapter 2 and the descriptive empirical findings presented in chapter 5, as well as on the dimension-specific findings discussed in the preceding sections of this chapter. Based on that, I estimate the following linear equation using ordinary least squares (OLS):

$$S_i = \alpha + \beta_1 T_i + \beta_2 H_i + \beta_3 P_i + \beta_4 N_i + \beta_6 I_i + \beta_7 A_i + \epsilon_i \qquad \text{(I)}$$

S_i is the dependent variable of the model, being the satisfaction of interviewed residents with the general housing situation in either Nouvelle Lahraouiyine or Er-Rhamna. Figure 6-19 offers a descriptive perspective of S_i in the case of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. It has to be noted that S_i does not contain numeric data, but builds on a five-point Likert scale. If considering this data as ordinal, ordinal linear regression (OLR) would

be appropriate instead of OLS regression (cf. Carifio and Perla 2007; Jamieson 2004; Knapp 1990). However, there has been remarkable controversy about the question whether Likert scale data is limited to ordinal data only. In line with authors such as Carifio and Perla (2007) and Norman (2010), I consider the collected Likert scale data as continuous interval data reaching from '1' (total dissatisfaction) to '5' (full satisfaction). This would allow for the application of an OLS regression model, which offers a much better interpretability compared to OLR. Already during the interviews, interviewers emphasised the intersubjective comparability of the data, which is a basic precondition for interpreting Likert scales as continuous. For example, interviewers before noting the respective Likert value checked back with additional questions related to whether interviewed persons were sure about their reported degree of (dis)satisfaction. Beyond that, while being aware of the general limitations of Likert scales, I will not overemphasise the precise values of the coefficients of the OLS regression model. As such, I will not dive into a detailed interpretation of each small distinction between the coefficients. Rather, I concentrate on discussing major differences in the relevance of specific variables by using effect sizes as well. Thus, I am aiming to interpret potential changes in the relevance of independent variables between the different OLS models applied. Nonetheless, to further support my argument, I ran an OLR regression with the same variables (appendix A3). The results of the OLR model do not show remarkable differences to the results of the OLS model that I present below. This further strengthens the applicability of the OLS regression model. The OLS equation – with the constant α and the error term ϵ_i – contains six different independent variables ($T_i, H_i, P_i, N_i, I_i, A_i$) with β_n as the respective standard coefficient.

Of course, physical housing comfort is likely to be an important determinant of people's satisfaction with the general housing situation. The model includes people's satisfaction with their house (H_i), measured on a Likert scale reaching from '1' (not at all satisfied) to '5' (completely satisfied). If people were happy with the house they live in – including the perceived quality of the building structure, living space, and amenities – I assume that this positively influences their overall satisfaction, also because it was the most significant advantage mentioned by resettled households (Figure 6-1). It should be emphasised that H_i is an independent determinant of S_i. While interviewers asked for H_i directly after a couple of questions related to shelter quality and amenities of the house, they only asked for S_i at the very end of the interview. Furthermore, the interviewers highlighted that S_i would mean an overall assessment of their current living situation, including a variety of aspects related to community life to the place of the new town, which is clearly different from H_i. Section 6.2 discussed relevant sub-dimensions of housing comfort in the case of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, whereas section 5.1.1 did the same for Er-Rhamna. Related to that, the general availability of as well as quality and quantity of supply of public services are other relevant aspects that should be taken into consideration as determinants of general satisfaction with the current housing situation. The model includes them through the variable P_i that represents people's satisfaction with public services based on a Likert scale similar to the one for H_i. Relevant aspects affecting people's satisfaction with public services were discussed in sections 6.1 and 6.5.2 for Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, as well as in section 5.1.3 for Er-Rhamna. P_i is assumed to have a positive impact on S_i.

Furthermore, T_i are households' total transport costs. Total transport costs are assumed to have a negative impact on peoples' satisfaction in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, as transport has been a major factor of criticism amongst resettled dwellers (Figure 6-2). Hence, people that spend more money on transport are more dependent on transport and, hence, suffer more from the various transport deficiencies discussed in section 6.5.1. It is further assumed that the negative effect of total transport costs is smaller for Er-Rhamna, where

residents feel less dependent on transport because of the neighbourhood's more central location in proximity to markets and industries (see section 3.3.1). T_i should not be confused with I_i that represents people's feeling of being isolated. Although both variables relate to the (peripheral) location of the new town and the *bidonville*, they are not significantly correlated, as they grasp different aspects of it. People's feeling of isolation (I_i), measured on a Likert scale reaching from '1' (not feeling isolated at all) to '5' (feeling very isolated), refers to perceptions of social and spatial marginality (see section 6.1). Amongst resettled residents living in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, 'being isolated' was the most frequently mentioned disadvantage of the resettlement and, hence, is expected to have a negative effect on people's satisfaction with the general housing situation.

In addition, the model accounts for aspects related to the social life of inhabitants. As discussed in section 6.3, social life and community interaction in the new town are very different from the intensive intra-neighbourhood relationships characterising the *bidonvilles* (see section 5.1.4). Thus, N_i represents neighbourhood cohesion, which is composed of four different dimensions – regular communication with neighbours, trust in neighbours, mutual help amongst neighbours, and mutual respect amongst residents – all measured by Likert scales reaching from '1' (very low) to '5' (very high). As many people in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine have complained about a loss of social networks, N_i is assumed to have a positive impact on overall satisfaction. The effect is likely to be stronger amongst resettled residents in the new town than amongst dwellers in Er-Rhamna, as residents seemed to become aware of the advantages of strong community cohesion only after they had disappeared or at least were weakened because of resettlement. Finally, A_i is a dummy variable with the value '1' for residents of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine and '0' for residents of Er-Rhamna.

Some aspects discussed in the preceding sections of this chapter were not included in the model for various reasons. One could have expected to include income in the model, because several authors have argued that resettlement is likely to reduce income or that poor households face more difficulties in affording the moving into the new apartments. However, the discussion in section 6.4 has indicated that income does not play a general role concerning the satisfaction of resettled inhabitants.[54] First, through the third-party approach, also most vulnerable households were able to move into new apartments, which is a clear improvement compared to other resettlement schemes of which these households often drop out (see chapter 2). Second, section 6.4 showed that there is no general impact of resettlement on income and the employment rate. The resettlement, however, impacted people's patterns of income generation. This factor is part of the variable 'total transport costs' (T_i) that includes the aspect 'accessibility of workplaces' as discussed in section 6.4. As transport costs are on average higher among factory workers and if total transport costs show the assumed negative effect on people's general satisfaction, this may be another indication that factory workers evaluate the resettlement less positively than other occupational groups. Furthermore, a high T_i indicates a reduction in disposable income, which negatively affects households' consumption and welfare (section 6.5.3).

Besides, it would have been interesting to get an idea of the impact of (reduced) stigmatisation on people's satisfaction with resettlement but, unfortunately, there is no precise data and no useful proxy available to include it in the model. Also, the fear of being evicted – a crucial aspect in the argumentation of Soto (2000) – was not included due to its relatively little relevance for people's life in large Moroccan *bidonvilles* (see

[54] A correlation between households' available income and people's general satisfaction with the current housing situation also showed no significant result.

section 5.1.2). Finally, the regression model does not account for individual experiences with resettlement, as the aim is to compare between both resident groups (Nouvelle Lahraouiyine and Er-Rhamna). However, aspects related to the process of implementation were already mentioned above when quoting residents' statements about the VSB programme. Moreover, some independent variables indirectly refer to process-related aspects as well. For example, problems with the *moul chkara* may result in an unfinished house, which leads to dissatisfaction with the house and a low H_i value. Likewise, satisfaction with public services (P_i) includes people's critique of insufficient public investment in infrastructure in the new town.

Table 6.3 presents the results of the OLS regression by stating standard coefficients β as well as effect sizes (Cohen's f^2) heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors for each independent variable. The significance levels are also based on the heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. What we can see from model I is that the variables seem to support the initial assumptions. Housing satisfaction, satisfaction with public services, and neighbourhood cohesion have a positive impact on general satisfaction with the living situation. Transport costs and the feeling of isolation have a negative impact. What is most interesting about model I is that the area dummy variable (A_i) has a significant impact, meaning that both groups (*bidonville* dwellers and new town residents) differ significantly. Hence, the regression shows that resettlement has a significant impact on people's satisfaction with their general living situation. On average, people in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine are more satisfied with their current living situation than people in Er-Rhamna. However, arguing that this an indicator of the success of the VSB *recasement* would oversimplify the picture, also because the effect size value of A_i is relatively modest. In fact, what is more interesting to look at is how and in how far the *recasement* has changed the relevance of the various independent determinants of satisfaction with the general housing situation. Thus, in a second step, the same model is run separately for both neighbourhoods to compare the effect sizes of the independent variables between both groups.

Table 6.3: Results of an OLS model concerning the determinants of residents' satisfaction with the general housing situation (model I).

	standard coefficients	*effect sizes*	*standard errors* +
Total transport costs	-0.08**	0.014	0.000
Satisfaction with the house	0.446***	0.282	0.037
Satisfaction with public services	0.256***	0.105	0.034
Neighbourhood cohesion	0.217***	0.068	0.012
Feeling of isolation	-0.16***	0.016	0.031
Dummy Nouvelle Lahraouiyine	0.252***	0.038	0.126
** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$	corr. $R^2 = 0.503$, n = 729 + heteroscedasticity-robust		

Running the same model for both groups and interpreting the differences in the effect sizes of the independent variables allows for the drawing of further conclusions on the impacts of displacement and resettlement on the livelihoods of former *bidonville* dwellers. Thus, in line with the general methodological approach presented in chapter 3, the aim is to compare influencing factors of satisfaction with housing situations in

a *bidonville* (Er-Rhamna) and in a new town (Nouvelle Lahraouiyine) at almost the same moment in time. For this purpose, I have dropped the dummy A_i from model I. Furthermore, in a first step, I only concentrate on the independent variables 'satisfaction with the house' (H_i) and 'satisfaction with public services (P_i), which I call 'physical functions' of housing and resettlement. They refer to the shelter functions of housing as opposed to a more comprehensive understanding of a house as a home, which include much more the individual relationships with the house as well as social and economic factors. Although it is usually agreed on that adequate housing comprises more than just shelter and basic services, physical functions are far too often the single focus of policies targeting affordable and adequate housing, which was shown in chapter 2. Despite general theoretical agreement on the comprehensiveness of the housing question, also the new wave of large-scale housing projects tend to focus merely on the quantity of housing construction and basic services only (cf. Buckley et al. 2016a; Turok 2016). Thus, the second OLS model takes into consideration governments' predominant focus on physical housing aspects and has the following equation:

$$S_i = \alpha + \beta_2 H_i + \beta_3 P_i + \epsilon_i \qquad \text{(II a/b)}$$

In the next step, all other independent variables included in model I are added, except for the dummy A_i. Furthermore, the following third model includes the dummy variable B_i with the value '1' if the interviewed resettled resident was born in Karyan Central or, in the case of Er-Rhamna, if the interviewed person was born in the same neighbourhood. Because the dummy is not the same for both groups of interviewed people, it would not have made sense to include B_i in model I, as this would have complicated the interpretation. However, it is important to include B_i now, because people that apparently had stronger roots in what they called 'urban' Karyan Central (or Hay Mohammadi) seemed to have more problems in adapting to the new situation in the more 'rural' Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Hence, B_i functions as a proxy of people's rootedness in the *bidonville*. The third model – the full model – has the following equation:

$$S_i = \alpha + \beta_1 T_i + \beta_2 H_i + \beta_3 P_i + \beta_4 N_i + \beta_6 I_i + \beta_7 B_i + \epsilon_i \qquad \text{(III a/b)}$$

However, due to initial problems with data on people's place of birth, the *n* of the full model is relatively low in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine if $B_i$is included (*n*=245). Thus, a fourth model only for Nouvelle Lahraouiyine drops B_i to reach a higher *n*, similar to that of model III b (Er-Rhamna):

$$S_i = \alpha + \beta_1 T_i + \beta_2 H_i + \beta_3 P_i + \beta_4 N_i + \beta_6 I_i + \epsilon_i \qquad \text{(IV a)}$$

Table 6.4 presents the results of the OLS regressions by stating standard coefficients β as well as effect sizes (Cohen's f^2) for each independent variable based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. The results of model (II a) and (II b) show in both neighbourhoods a medium to strong effect of the independent variables H_i and P_i on people's satisfaction with the general housing situation. However, more interesting is to look at the explained variance of model II. In the case of Er-Rhamna, the 'physical housing functions' model already explains more than half of the variance (corr. $R^2 = 0.522$), which is not much less than the full model III b (corr. $R^2 = 0.549$). In contrast, in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, residents' satisfaction with the 'physical functions' of housing only explain one-third of the variance. Interpreting these differences in the corrected R^2 shows that resettled residents are more aware of the significance of social and economic functions and effects of housing and resettlement (T_i, N_i, B_i, I_i) than *bidonville* dwellers. Hence, residents in Er-Rhamna tend to merely focus on the one big problem, which, according to them, is shelter quality and the informal, sometimes inadequate provision of basic services. The majority – not much different from government's perspective – is convinced that a move into new decent houses ('*en dur*') solves most related

problems and outweighs a potential loss of the 'small' advantages of living in a *bidonville*, for example the strong sense of trust in the neighbourhood. Hence, the majority of current *bidonville* dwellers seem to agree with public authorities' mere focus on physical functions of housing in their resettlement policies (see also section 5.2.1). This is further illustrated by Zohra, who commented on rumours about a potential resettlement: "We have heard good stories from some people that have moved. All we need is some basic services, schools, and markets." Although all of this is available in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, the results of the full model do not support the idea that a mere focus on better shelter and basic services is sufficient for satisfactory, adequate housing policies. Adequate housing means more than four walls and roof; it is more related to the notion of 'home'.

Table 6.4: Determinants of residents' satisfaction with the general housing situation in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine and Er-Rhamna. Results of an OLS regression model.

	Nouvelle Lahraouiyine						Karyan Er-Rhamna			
	(II a)		*(III a)*		*(IV a)*		*(II b)*		*(III b)*	
	standard coefficients	*effect sizes*	*standard coefficients*	*effect sizes*	*standard coefficients*	*effect sizes*	*standard coefficients*	*effect sizes*	*standard coefficients*	*effect sizes*
Total transport costs			-0.136*	0.032	-0.111*	0.024			-0.028	0.000
Satisfaction with the house	0.423***	0.239	0.330***	0.173	0.367***	0.206	0.488***	0.431	0.447***	0.370
Satisfaction with public services	0.283***	0.101	0.205**	0.075	0.182***	0.052	0.382***	0.266	0.336***	0.180
Neighbourhood cohesion			0.257***	0.098	0.281***	0.115			0.126*	0.027
Born in Karyan Central, respectively in Er-Rhamna			-0.197***	0.020					-0.093*	0.020
Feeling of isolation			-0,134**	0.020	-0.148***	0.028			-0.088*	0.011
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001	corr. $R^2 = 0.330$, n = 343		corr. $R^2 = 0.438$, n = 245		corr. $R^2 = 0.427$, n = 337		corr. $R^2 = 0.522$, n = 395		corr. $R^2 = 0.549$, n = 372	

The results of the full model (III a; III b; IV a) show that each independent variable contributes significantly and in the assumed way to the estimation of the dependent variable – except for total transport costs that are not significant in the case of Er-Rhamna. The significance of six different independent variables shows that adequate housing means more than just four walls and a roof. However, in both neighbourhoods, satisfaction with the house (physical housing comfort) still has the strongest effect on residents' overall satisfaction with the housing situation. However, in the case of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, adding the socio-economic functions of housing (T_i, N_i, B_i, I_i) has considerably increased the share of variance explained by the model, from 33% to 44%. In contrast, in Er-Rhamna, socio-economic functions of housing only explain an additional 3% of variance compared to model II b. In Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, neighbourhood cohesion with an effect size of around 0.1 is the second most relevant independent variable of the full model (III a; IV a). Thus, if resettled residents rate their neighbourhood cohesion by one standard deviation more positively, their satisfaction with the general housing situation increases by 0.257 or 0.281, depending on the model applied. This effect is much lower in Er-Rhamna, where satisfaction would increase only half as strongly. This supports the assumption that most resettled *bidonville* dwellers realise only after the move into the apartments of the new town that this is changing their daily social interactions. As described in section 6.3, many people longed for life in the *bidonville* when reflecting on the relatively anonymous and indifferent interpersonal relationships within the community of the new town. If mutual help amongst neighbours was

normal in the *bidonville*, it has now become a more seldom but therefore more esteemed aspect of social life and general wellbeing. This further supports earlier reflection on the role of good neighbourhood relationships within the same apartment house in people's overall satisfaction with resettlement (see section 6.3).

Beside increased awareness of the importance of neighbourhood cohesion and other social aspects of housing, it is also of interest to look at the variable 'born in Karyan Central' and 'born in Er-Rhamna', notwithstanding its relatively modest effect in both models. Although they both negatively influence general satisfaction, they in fact show opposite effects. In Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, 'born in Karyan Central' shows that people that were raised in Karyan Central have a higher emotional attachment to Hay Mohammadi, being more used to its urban environment and being more familiar with its community. Hence, these people, as was mentioned several times throughout this chapter, regret the resettlement more often and have problems in adapting to the new town than people who moved into Karyan Central at a later stage. In contrast, people who were born and raised in in Er-Rhamna are less satisfied with their current housing situation. As mentioned in section 5.2.2, they have often lived their entire lives expecting resettlement while suffering from pervasive stigmatisation throughout their lives. Many of them hoped for the resettlement to start as soon as possible. However, there are two possibilities to explain the supposedly opposed effects of the 'born' variable. The first is that people have changed their mind after having moved, now being more aware of the advantages of the *bidonville* than before the move. It may also be the case that residents in Karyan Central have suffered less from stigmatisation than dwellers in Er-Rhamna, because they have historically been more integrated in Hay Mohammadi. The second option is that for many people that have moved rather recently to Er-Rhamna, the move into the *bidonville* represented a way forward in life – escaping the lack of opportunities in the countryside or the pressure of rented accommodation (see section 5.1.2 and 5.1.6). Hence, these people are more satisfied with the *bidonville* than people who cannot compare the life in *bidonvilles* with other forms of accommodation, as they have never lived elsewhere. The same reasons may also explain why people that were not born in Karyan Central tend to be happier in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. For people that have primarily moved to *bidonvilles* to escape rental accommodation, getting own property may represent an additional notion of social advancement. Several residents that have lived for long in Karyan Central mentioned that residents that arrived relatively recently have been among the first that were willing to move.

Finally, also the independent variables 'total transport costs' and 'social isolation' impact people's satisfaction with the general housing situation in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine in a negative way. Total transport costs are not relevant for people's satisfaction in Er-Rhamna. Concerning the 'feeling of isolation', it is necessary to keep in mind that the large majority of people in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine felt isolated, whereas in contrast, most people in Er-Rhamna did not feel isolated. Thus, despite relatively similar effect sizes, the negative effect is more relevant to Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, as it concerns more people than in Er-Rhamna.

To conclude chapter 6, many residents are undecided in their opinion about the resettlement, balancing positive aspects such as an increase in physical housing comfort and, for example, negative aspects related to the implementation. Concerning this, residents have reported their preference for in situ solutions, criticised injustices and opaqueness, and further complained about a lack of public investment in the new town. Concerning the resettlement outcome, roughly one-third of the resettled new town dwellers are willing or planning to move out within the next five years, which could be interpreted as a way to measure the degree of overall dissatisfaction with the housing situation. Regarding the reasons of (dis)satisfaction, an OLS

model could show that physical housing comfort has the strongest impact on people's satisfaction with the new general housing situation. However, the effect is less strong than in Er-Rhamna. Thus, in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, 'soft factors' of housing satisfaction, for example neighbourhood cohesion, play a more important role in explaining satisfaction with the general housing situation than among residents in Er-Rhamna. In the following, final chapter the most important empirical findings of this dissertation are discussed and placed in the context of the relevant literature related to affordable housing policies in general (see chapter 2) and to the VSB programme in specific (see chapter 0).

7 Conclusion

"*Le droit au logement … le droit au bonheur*" (the right to housing … the right to happiness) – this simple slogan of Al Omrane, the main housing developer within Morocco's VSB programme, written on a billboard at the entrance to the resettlement new town Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, has opened up the analytical discussion of this thesis. Putting a question mark at the end of the slogan, the introduction has challenged the slogan's implicit link between better housing comfort and people's increased satisfaction with the general living situation (happiness). Would it not be too simplistic to assume that the simple move from a shantytown into the apartments of a new town would increase people's happiness with their living situation? Both theories on affordable housing policies as well as first macro-level studies on the VSB programme have expressed the doubts of scholars about whether programmes focusing predominantly on shelter aspects of housing will be adequate to improve living conditions of shantytown dwellers in a comprehensive way. None of them question whether physical housing comfort is indeed an important factor of people's satisfaction with their living situation; the question is rather how and to what extent physical housing standards are relevant – besides other factors such as access to jobs, social life, and location. Thus, the simple slogan of Al Omrane has been a structural and binding element throughout the chapters of this thesis – from theory to the empirical results. In a similar sense, it should now help within the conclusion to discuss the main findings of the empirical chapters against the contextual and theoretical background.

This PhD thesis dealt with the resettlement of the inhabitants of Karyan Central, a centrally located, 90-year-old, relatively large and consolidated shantytown in Casablanca. Using an innovative sites-and-services scheme based on the investment of small-scale private investors (third-party associates), the government moved people to the new town Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, located about ten kilometres away, outside the jurisdiction of Casablanca's economic capital. Following a mixed-methods approach largely based on a representative household survey (n=871), observations, and qualitative interviews, the thesis addressed three main research gaps.

- First, it analysed Morocco's VSB programme, considered a representative of the new wave of large-scale housing programmes (cf. Beier and Vilmondes Alves 2015; Buckley et al. 2016a, 2016b; Croese et al. 2016; Turok 2016) throughout the developing world, asking in how far these new projects have learned from past mistakes in social housing projects.
- Second, it provided an analysis of resettlement based on people's own perspectives, hence taking into account that – in contrast to 'classic' involuntary resettlement (cf. Cernea and Guggenheim 1993) – the majority of the population was willing to move in order to escape the stigma and hardship of the shantytown. It was of particular interest to investigate whether people were aware of impoverishment risks (cf. Cernea 1997, 1998) and the limitations of affordable housing projects (cf. Berner 2002; Bredenoord and Lindert 2014; Turner 1967, 1968), and whether resettled people themselves see the move into the new town as an opportunity or rather as a constraint.
- Third, the thesis critically assessed the third-party approach as an innovation in the field of affordable housing, assessing in how far it could help to improve living conditions of the poorest shantytown dwellers, who often drop out of housing programmes (cf. Berner 2016; Durand-Lasserve 2006; Payne et al. 2009; Werlin 1999).

To address these research gaps, the thesis followed two research questions. The first asked about the processes of resettlement implementation: *How do social dynamics, local actor constellations, and power structures shape the resettlement process?* The second focused more on the outcome of resettlement: *How does the welfare of people affected by the VSB programme change because of the resettlement?* The discussion of empirical results and answers to these research questions are structured under four major findings related to the research interests and to the research questions. Whereas the first two major findings mostly refer to RQ1, its sub-questions 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3, and its assumptions (A1-A6), the two other major findings address RQ2 and its related sub-questions (2.1, 2.2) and assumptions (A7-A12). However, the interrelation and interdependencies of the findings should be explicitly stressed. Although a major finding might refer to one particular research question more explicitly than to another, they cannot be detached from each other. Moreover, I concentrate only on the major findings that are most important to consider against the background of existing research gaps. Thus, I will not answer assumptions step-by-step and in a positivist way. Throughout chapter 6 and in section 5.2.7, I have referred back to each assumption mentioned in section 3.2. Here, instead, the major findings should help to move a step further, hence drawing a more comprehensive picture of the resettlement of Karyan Central, which then, in a second step, allows for the derivation of conclusions related to both the theoretical and the contextual background.

Major finding 1 – Positive attitudes towards resettlement are the result of political (in)action

- *SQ 1.1: How do local stakeholders negotiate resettlement conditions?*
- *SQ 1.3: Which kinds of conflict arise from the specific dynamics within the resettlement process?*

The implementation of the *recasement* of Karyan Central was largely facilitated by a positive attitude of residents towards moving out of the *bidonville* and moving in '*maisons en dur*'. Indeed, most residents accepted the resettlement conditions and moved 'voluntarily', whereas the 500 remaining households were forcibly evicted in May 2016. However, the wish to move out, which fuelled acceptance of resettlement conditions, was only the result of intentional political inaction and was further enhanced through corruption and rumour-spreading (see section 5.2.2).

Karyan Central had existed for more than 90 years as the centre of the working-class neighbourhood Hay Mohammadi, and the origins of Er-Rhamna in Sidi Moumen date back to the 1960s. Both neighbourhoods have undergone transformation and consolidation processes. At first, this means the incremental development of building structures in the sense of Turner (1977). Brick houses, sometimes with more than one floor and stucco decorations, have gradually replaced tents and makeshift constructions. Almost all houses in Er-Rhamna have individual connections to the water and power grids. However, roofs are still predominantly made out of corrugated iron, which is the most remarkable disadvantage of shelter in *bidonvilles* (section 5.1.1). Second, consolidation comprises residents' integration into the urban job market in the sense of Stokes (1962). Although the emergence of both *bidonvilles* is closely connected to industrialisation, occupations amongst residents are diverse and spread all over the city – reaching from mobile street vendors in the *bidonville* itself to employed professionals in Maarif, one of the wealthier inner-city districts of Casablanca. For many residents, the shantytown has presented a secure habitat (in contrast to rental accommodation) from which they integrated into the urban fabric and which provided them with social safety nets they were missing elsewhere. Thus, evidence of section 5.1 is strongly in support of theories seeing shantytowns as facilitators of urban integration processes and, despite heterogeneity, speaks against fears about shantytowns as poverty traps (cf. Turok and Borel-Saladin 2018).

Against the integrative function of shantytowns, state authorities in the early 2000s strengthened efforts to fight consolidation processes after a long period of tolerance. Despite more control and building restrictions, rumours have been an effective means of freezing consolidation processes. Because of the frequent rumours about a 'soon'-occurring resettlement, residents have become reluctant to invest in their houses on the long term. Moreover, many residents that would in general be willing and able to move out do not, as they do not want to give up their claims to a house or plot. Thus, the development of the settlement is on hold while the majority of residents simply await resettlement. This has further aggravated the living conditions and, hence, the wish to move out. At the same time, public stigmatisation of *bidonville* dwellers – with state authorities amongst the leading actors – has increased and has enhanced people's wish to move out. Presenting resettlement as the only way to move up the social ladder has not only promoted a specific notion of what 'adequate' housing is, it has also negated the acceptability of *bidonvilles* (Meth 2013, 539). In addition, past policies have indeed tolerated consolidation processes, but did not go further to support or formally recognise consolidation (cf. Zaki 2010). Thus, positive attitudes towards resettlement are also the result of policies that have acted against incremental improvements within the neighbourhood and that have fuelled stigmatisation.

Residents' positive attitudes towards resettlement were crucial for the authorities, whose main aim was to clear the *bidonville* in a short time. Therefore, they have further influenced people's opinions during the implementation process by the use of corruption, rumours, and opaque planning processes. If people in general were willing to move, many contested the resettlement conditions, meaning the criteria according to which authorities attributed the plots in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. At no point in time were these criteria accessible and transparent, which led to conflicts, but also reinforced the powerful position of local programme authorities (section 5.2.2). Authorities changed the criteria in reaction to protest and adapted them flexibly through individual bargaining and corruption. For example, if people wanted to have an additional or a better plot, authorities in some cases offered them the possibility in exchange for extra money. In the same way, authorities tried to corrupt community leaders and other special target groups, from which they hoped they could influence other people to accept resettlement conditions as well. In contrast, authorities threatened residents saying that if they protested, they would lose their claims to a plot. In addition to these bargaining processes, people were lured to the new site by false promises, including, for example, rumours about high real estate values, the construction of a new football stadium, or the modern standards of the new town. The opaque implementation process has been beneficial for a few local authorities and might have reduced collective resistance, but at the same time has caused inequalities, injustices, and mistrust within the community. Finally, resettlement implementation included the forced eviction of the roughly 500 remaining households. The overall satisfaction of resettled residents (in particular those that did not receive an appropriate number of plots or that suffered from problems with the third-party investor) with the *recasement* would have been much higher if implementation had been transparent and just. Instead, implementation was a major source of frustration, anger, and distress (sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.5).

Major finding 2 – The third-party approach has enabled vulnerable people to move, but has caused homelessness at the same time

- *SQ 1.2: How does the resettlement system with third-party investors function?*
- *SQ 1.3: Which kinds of conflict arise from the specific dynamics within the resettlement process?*

Affordability is one of the main difficulties of adequate housing policies targeting the urban poor (cf. Baken and Linden 1993; Payne 2002; Smets et al. 2014). In many programmes, the most vulnerable households drop out, as they cannot afford subsidised accommodation. In fact, many subsidies fail to have a positive impact at all (cf. Buckley et al. 2016a; Croese et al. 2016; Gilbert 2004; Tipple 2015). In the case of Casablanca's large *bidonvilles*, the VSB programme has sought to solve affordability problems through an innovative sites-and-services scheme that is new in the context of shantytown resettlement. The so-called third-party approach means that two *bidonville* households get one plot together and transfer the construction duties to a third party (*tiers associé*) that uses the opportunity to realise own real estate property at a very low cost due to the subsidised plot of land. The third party pays the land, administrative charges, and temporary accommodation for both resettled households and in return receives the two lower floors of the four-storey building. The two *bidonville* households become homeowners without any costs of respectively one apartment on the upper floors – at least in the ideal case (cf. Toutain 2016). From the perspective of the government, the innovative third-party approach has fulfilled its purposes, which were to weaken the resistance of residents due to the low costs and – related to this – to reduce dropout quotas of most vulnerable households and to hasten the clearance of the site. Likewise, for many households with low and irregular revenues, the third-party approach was a blessing, because they did not need credit and neither had to afford the construction, nor the price of a subsidised apartment. Thus, the modalities of the third-party approach have largely fostered people's willingness to move.

Although the third-party approach has solved affordability issues, it has caused severe problems with similar or even worse results for the affected people. Where in past resettlement approaches especially poor households had difficulties to move, facing the risk of ending up homeless or in extremely unfortunate living conditions, now the same risks are spread more or less randomly amongst all *bidonville* residents. This is due to the fact that the risk of ending up in distress is now caused by different mechanisms than by mere affordability concerns. Whether the scheme functions in the intended way largely depends on the relationship between the *tiers associé* and the allottees, the financial capacities of the *tiers associé*, and real estate price developments (see section 5.2.5). Toutain (2016, 142) estimated that one-third of all households are affected by problems relating to the third-party scheme, writing that this is only "a small part of the households concerned" and that it raised "discontent and a sense of insecurity" amongst all stakeholders. Although I would agree with the number of affected households, my data strongly speaks against downplaying these shortcomings. It is not only about a blocking of the programme or mere feelings of discontent – *bidonville* residents have been faced with homelessness, severe distress, and even the threat of death due to botched-up constructions and the related incidents of collapsing houses. More than 10% of the resettled households live in houses that have not been finished by the third-party investor. Moreover, hundreds of court cases are the result of inappropriate contracts, a lack of public mediation between allottees and third-party funders, and uninhibited profit maximisation on both sides. Moreover, the fact that resettled residents automatically move to the upper floors of the apartment houses has further contributed to a weakening of social ties among neighbours, which have previously been a strong basis of community solidarity in the *bidonvilles*.

Major finding 3 – Resettlement carries multiple risks of impoverishment, even if people move voluntarily and even if affordability criteria is met for all

- *SQ 1.3: Which kinds of conflicts arise from the specific dynamics within the resettlement process?*

- *SQ 2.1: How do household patterns of income generation and income use change because of relocation?*
- *SQ 2.2: In how far do living conditions of individual household members with respect to social practices and physical standards change because of resettlement?*

Analysing the impacts of resettlement on people's welfare and, hence, explaining satisfaction with resettlement is complex. Cernea (1998) argued that resettlement disproportionally often affects poor households and that it carries multiple risks of impoverishment for affected population groups that extend beyond material losses. Turner (1967) has similarly argued that people that are moved from a centrally located shantytown to peripheral public housing will suffer from additional expenditures (e.g. mortgage payments, service charges, or transport) that are a burden especially to poor urban dwellers. More recently, several authors have given primary attention to affordability as a key factor within housing projects targeting the elimination of insalubrious housing (Smets et al. 2014; Buckley et al. 2016a; Tipple 2015; Arnott 2009). Interestingly, the empirical data on the resettlement of Karyan Central shows that residents' satisfaction with resettlement is not merely dependent on the income of resettled households. For example, several of the most impoverished households in Karyan Central were happy with the resettlement because they had lived under difficult conditions in the *bidonville* and had now become owners of a new flat without paying anything. Thus, despite a general reduction of available income because of an increase in fixed expenditures caused by displacement, it would be inappropriate to argue that mostly poor inhabitants are unsatisfied with resettlement. Against the background of a resettlement scheme without major affordability concerns, satisfaction with resettlement is explained through various factors – including monetary and non-monetary impacts of displacement. The model in section 6.7 lists seven aspects that significantly impact resettled people's general satisfaction with the housing situation in the new town Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Satisfaction with the new house, satisfaction with public services in the new town, and good neighbourhood cohesion all have a positive impact. Feelings of isolation, being born in the *bidonville* of origin, and high transport expenditures instead have a negative impact. In other words, and in support of the arguments above, seeing affordability of housing projects as the crucial factor for solving the 'challenge of slums' (UN-Habitat 2003) is inappropriate as long as other factors concerning the socio-economic and spatial integration of affected dwellers remain unaddressed.

Related to that, the data presented throughout chapter 6 shows that there are different population groups that suffer more from resettlement than others. A first group that is disproportionally affected by the negative aspects of displacement to Nouvelle Lahraouiyine are people with a high attachment to Hay Mohammadi and Karyan Central; this not only refers to people born in Hay Mohammadi. High emotional attachment could also be related to the quality of the house. People with a large and well-developed family home in Karyan Central often complained about resettlement because of a loss of habitable space or physical housing comfort, or because some household members were not guaranteed the right to a semi-plot. High attachment to Hay Mohammadi could also relate to good neighbourhood cohesion, which made it more difficult to adapt to the new social realities in the new town considering the likely loss of previous social networks. Moreover, people that liked the central location of Hay Mohammadi tended to suffer more from the move to the peripheries because of the lack of activities in the new town.

A second group includes residents that were affected by the consequences of an opaque and unjust implementation of *recasement*. Disproportionally often, these were members of larger, multigenerational house-

holds that contested the number of plots allocated to them. However, also more vulnerable individual persons such as widows, divorced wives, and victims of inner-family conflicts may be affected. Several people belonging to these groups were forcibly evicted from Karyan Central, could not (yet) move to a new flat, or had even become homeless. A third group – also related to implementation – suffered from the shortcomings of the third-party approach. As described above, some *tiers associés* did not finish the house, which forced resettled residents to occupy the building shell or to live in an inadequately constructed dwelling that may risk collapsing.

A fourth group relates more to persons with specific occupational activities that have become less attractive or less demanded because of resettlement. This includes factory workers earning a minimum wage. The available income of these workers has disproportionally decreased because of new transport expenses required to reach their workplaces in proximity to their former home. Other occupational groups such as day labourers, *bricoleurs*, and small-scale house-related craft workers have lost their previous income sources through displacement and the demolition of Karyan Central. They had to search for other jobs and most of them were able to secure one. However, a feeling that it has become more complicated to find a reliable income source is dominant amongst resettled dwellers that have lost their jobs or have changed their occupation.

To sum up the third major finding, resettlement in this particular case has not affected people via the income channel alone. Of course, expenditures, including transport, water, electricity, and food have increased, and the data indicates that for some poor households, increased expenditures have led to reduced consumption and to even more serious consequences such as the ceasing of medical treatment. However, most dwellers were able to afford it, notwithstanding that some households have become less resilient to shocks such as unemployment or illness of the main income earner of the household. To highlight that it would be too simplistic to reduce the effects of resettlement to an increase in expenditures for resettled households, the example of transport can be illustrative. On the one hand, transport costs have increased on average. On the other hand, many resettled dwellers could afford the increase or have afforded comparable transport costs even before resettlement. Nonetheless, transport was a major reason for complaints amongst dwellers living in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. Beside expenditures, this mostly relates to unreliable, limited, and insecure transport services, as well as long distances between people's homes and the stops – in particular if people live in the south of the new town. Thus, besides its contribution to monetary impoverishment, transport in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine contributes to a feeling of being marginalised and pushed out of the city.

Thus, the example of transport highlights that resettlement carries multiple risks of impoverishment that are not adequately addressed if focusing on income only. Reflecting on the multiple risks of impoverishment that Cernea (1997, 1998, 2003) lists in his theoretical model, the case of Karyan Central shows that even if affordability issues are addressed, risks remain for resettled dwellers. The empirics indicate that 'joblessness', 'food insecurity', and 'increased morbidity and mortality' as a result of increasing expenditures may play a role in some cases. Moreover, 'homelessness' as a result of shortcomings of the third-party approach and as a result of opaque implementation practices is relevant. However, for most of the households, the *recasement* of Karyan Central has significantly fostered other forms of impoverishment such as 'marginalisation', 'social disarticulation', and 'loss of access to common property and services'. Concerning marginalisation, I would prefer to stress the psychological notion that Cernea (1998, 51) only touches upon. Whereas *bidonville* dwellers were stigmatised and, hence, marginalised, moving them to the peripheries has hardly improved the situation. A considerable number of residents feel that they are pushed

out of the city and left alone with their problems at the urban margins. As described in section 6.2, there are indicators that the stigma of the *bidonville* is transforming into a stigma of the ghetto or '*banlieue*' (cf. Bogaert 2011, 724; Le Tellier 2009a, 59). This refers to the 'loss of access to common property and services', which is mirrored by transport deficiencies as well as unfinished or deteriorated infrastructure. Streetlights do not function in some part of the new town, some streets have remained unpaved, the public bus concessioner does not serve Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, and access to higher education is limited. Finally, a large part of the residents suffered from the erosion of previous social networks, a reduction of practices of mutual help, and a loss of sociability, which Cernea calls 'social disarticulation' (see section 6.3). Resettled residents tended to underestimate the role of close social ties and trust in the neighbourhood and started to miss them after having moved. These results indicated that resettlement still is disruptive, even if most residents are willing to move and even if affordability is guaranteed. Following Cernea (1993), this research concludes that resettlement should be the last option and should only take place if it is unavoidable, for example if the location of a particular shantytowns is unsuitable for in situ upgrading or redevelopment.

Major finding 4 – Housing project developers as well as shantytown dwellers tend to overemphasise physical housing standards

- *SQ 2.2: In how far do living conditions of individual household members with respect to social practices and physical standards change because of the resettlement?*

Turner (1967) already highlighted that housing is more than just shelter and that its functions can only be fully understood by focusing on the notion of 'home', analysing the subjective relationship between inhabitants and *their* dwelling environment. Turner, but also Mangin and Stokes were the first scholars criticising approaches that sought to eliminate shantytowns either through the provision of social housing or plots for auto-construction (sites-and-services) (see sections 2.2 and 2.3). In their opinion, these projects limited the question of how to provide access to affordable and adequate housing to a mere question of physical housing standards. By judging shantytowns only in relation to shelter and by moving people to peripherally located, neglected, and non-integrated apartment houses far away of people's sources of income, governments would disregard the multi-functional role of housing as a home, which goes far beyond shelter.

Section 4.2 demonstrated that the decision to eradicate all shantytowns, framed under the fight against urban exclusion and poverty, is a political one. It ignores that centrally located and old shantytowns are neither at the bottom of the Moroccan housing spectrum, nor the home of the most vulnerable urban poor. The descriptions of section 5.1 highlighted that many shantytown dwellers moved to the *bidonvilles* to escape tenure insecurity and discomfort in rental accommodation. Moreover, *bidonvilles* are heterogeneous neighbourhoods, hosting extreme poverty, but also higher-qualified professionals living in beautiful and solid houses. Nonetheless, the Moroccan government has not been interested in analysing the role of *bidonvilles* and supporting their incremental consolidation processes and their integration into the urban fabric following the ideas of Stokes (1962) or Turner (1969). In fact, the decision to eradicate a specific form of politically undesired housing was largely based on wrong assumptions, stigmatisation, and the 'bad' visual external appearance of shantytowns (section 4.2). Consistent with concerns of Turok (2016), priority attention is assigned to shelter functions of housing and not to urban integration and social development. According to the VSB programme authorities, *bidonville* dwellers – no matter under which conditions they have lived before – benefit from the move into a socially respected, standard-sized apartment. In contrast, the empirical results in chapter 6 provide evidence that location, social life, accessibility, previous housing comfort, and

personal attachment with the dwelling environment are significant factors of housing satisfaction, which challenge a narrow focus on shelter. The inadequate and inaccessible location, public underinvestment, and the anonymous spatial structures of Nouvelle Lahraouiyine were mentioned as some of the most significant disadvantages of the new town, very similar to the well-known deficiencies of past social housing projects (Buckley et al. 2016b; Turner 1968).

However, also shantytown dwellers themselves tend to overemphasise housing comfort and shelter quality. Similar to the government, whose primary concern is to clear the *bidonville*, the primary wish of the *bidonville* inhabitants is to move *out*. Many of them believe that the destination of resettlement is of secondary importance if they are able to move into new apartments and to escape bad shelter quality and related stigmatisation. As discussed in section 5.2.1, many residents tend to attach far-reaching expectations to the move into new apartments. Notwithstanding some well-balanced and reflected statements, most residents tend to oversee potential advantages of *bidonvilles* and to believe that problems such as drug addiction, social and physical disorder, and stigmatisation will disappear if they move *out*. These impressions were further enhanced by the fact that housing comfort is the most important influencing factor of satisfaction with the general housing situation amongst people in Er-Rhamna. In contrast, influencing factors of general housing satisfaction are much more diverse amongst resettled dwellers in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine (section 6.7). In Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, indeed, resettled residents are on average more satisfied with their housing comfort and shelter quality than in Er-Rhamna. However, opinions are polarised, as there are a number of extremely dissatisfied households due to a project-induced reduction of living space or even homelessness. Even more polarised are resettled people's opinions about the *recasement*, which have often remained inconclusive. Acknowledging the fact that most residents have been able to move into a better shelter, almost all people at the same time feel isolated because of the loss of social networks as well as the peripheral and marginalised location. Several residents felt that they were pushed from the city to desert, deprived of their access to urban opportunities. This again supports the theories of Turner and Stokes, but is also in line with the more recent critique that housing programmes merely focus on the quantitative construction of housing, thereby ignoring its multifunctional nature (cf. Beier and Vilmondes Alves 2015; Buckley et al. 2016a; Croese et al. 2016; Huchzermeyer 2010a; Patel et al. 2015; Turok 2016).

Implications for theory – the significance of choice, mass dreams, and stigma

It is time to finally return to the beginning and Al Omrane's advertising slogan "the right to housing … the right to happiness." The empirics of this thesis have clearly stated that housing quality plays an important role in people's satisfaction with their living conditions. However, this thesis is in strong support of Turner (1968), arguing that the complex and often subjective functions of housing could only be fully understood by analysing the relationship between inhabitants and their dwelling environment. There is no universal link between different forms or standards of housing and people's happiness. Instead, inhabitants tend to rate their housing situation according to their own individual demands – explicitly as well as implicitly. Consequently, standardised resettlement projects are highly inadequate to improve the situation of shantytown dwellers in a just and sustainable way. The case of Karyan Central has made that obvious. For one resident, the programme destroyed the three-storey family home in which he grew up and in which he had lived with his family for his entire life. For another, the programme was a blessing that allowed the family to escape the hardship of an overcrowded *bidonville* into which they had moved only because of lacking alternatives. Whereas one poor household in the *bidonville* could end up physically distressed and homeless, his neighbour could answer that the *recasement* made his dreams of a decent house come true.

What results from this is that it is necessary to move away from criticising or advancing universal housing policy approaches that seek to present general 'solutions' to the housing question. Successful housing policies have to move away from considering the slum as a homogenous entity that just requires better shelter. Instead, housing policies should focus more on people's subjectivities and an understanding of housing as 'homes', with naturally heterogeneous meanings. Before coming back to this, it is important to reconsider theories of the 'slum'.

In a recent, state-of-the-art article, Turok and Borel-Saladin (2018) have distinguished two coexisting, but contradicting theoretical opinions concerning slums – slums as pathways out of poverty, and slums as poverty traps (cul-de-sacs). Without explicitly referring to it, this is reminiscent of Stokes' (1962) notional distinction between 'slums of hope' and 'slums of despair'. The authors call for further research on how different characteristics of informal settlements such as tenure security, form of shelter, location, and the quality of public services contribute to either the one or the other direction of development (Turok and Borel-Saladin 2018, 785). What is problematic about this conceptualisation is that the authors miss the opportunity to challenge generalist and classic perspectives treating the slum as a homogenous entity that is first of all the product of rural-urban migration. First, my findings suggest that rural-urban migration alone – in particular in older informal neighbourhoods – is insufficient to explain why people choose to live in shantytowns. Considering the importance of households' intra-urban moving activities, the theory should acknowledge that shantytowns (or parts of it) may not be located at the bottom of the housing quality spectrum. A real conceptual step forward from the groundbreaking theories of the 1960s (cf. Frankenhoff 1967; Mangin 1967; Stokes 1962; Turner 1967, 1968, 1969) requires taking into account the changing realities of multiple and complex housing biographies, challenging the simple predominance of rural-urban migration. In line with A. Roy (2011b), I argue that this would further speak against oversimplified or even apocalyptic notions of the 'slum' as a habitat representing poverty and hardship (cf. Davis 2006).

Second, if one agrees with Turok and Borel-Saladin (2018) that there are two coexisting and contradictory theoretical perspectives, one may go further, questioning the usefulness of a clearly inhomogenous unit of analysis, which is the 'slum'. The findings of this study and the misinformed policy assumptions behind the VSB programme show that it is necessary to move beyond settlement categories towards a people-based analysis that acknowledges heterogeneity and subjectivity of housing qualities and development pathways. As such, Stokes' (1962) *A Theory of Slums* is a prime example, as it emphasises capacities and attitudes of individual people, as well as structural barriers that may impede people's integration into the city's job market. This theoretical perspective still presents a welcome alternative to classic conceptualisations and policy recommendations that are primarily concerned with neighbourhood structures such as building standards, tenure security, or the quality of public services. Focusing only on physical characteristics always poses the risk of implicitly assuming a wrong homogeneity of problems. With reference to Stokes (1962), Owusu et al. (2008, 189) stressed the coexistence of hope and despair in informal settlements. Concerning Nima in Accra, Ghana, they argue that instead of imposing a particular vision of housing modernity on people – for example, through resettlement into apartment houses – attention should be paid to improving socio-economic conditions – in particular infrastructure and education – in order to scale up hope in these neighbourhoods. Linked to that, A. Roy (2011b, 226) has recently called for new concepts that move away from "apocalyptic and dystopian narratives of the megacity, [seeking] to resurrect the subaltern space of the slum as that of a vibrant and entrepreneurial urbanism."

Thus, it is crucial to consider heterogeneity and subjectivity as natural elements of more people-centred theories of the slum that consider the notion of home instead of looking merely at shelter. Consequently, this also implies moving away from merely criticising the conditions of housing policies without questioning their generalist approach (amongst others subsidies for social housing, cf. Buckley et al. 2016b; affordability, cf. Bredenoord et al. 2014; tenure security, cf. Payne et al. 2009; building standards, cf. Payne 2002). It is necessary to go further, questioning the general success of policies that deny any choice to inhabitants of so-called slums. As housing decisions always imply choices under given constraints and are based on individual and heterogeneous preferences, single solutions cannot be considered appropriate. The example of the innovative third-party approach shows that it is too simple to argue that it is only about the conditions that render a certain housing project more or less affordable to supposedly poor people. Instead, the problem is the standardised nature of large-scale housing projects that deny any kind of choice to the people, while pretending to treat each household in the same way. However, technically equal treatment (one household = one plot) does not imply equal treatment from a social justice perspective. This has been most clear from the interviews with the inhabitants. Thus, if governments decide to organise housing projects for shantytown dwellers, they need to consider people's individual demands that inevitably require multiple policy options. There is hardly any housing programme in which affected dwellers can choose between different options, taking into account different constraints and preferences of inhabitants. Force by no means can be part of such options. However, the first step should always be to ask whether a large-scale housing policy intervention is needed at all. This is a crucial question that, however, is often overlooked by politicians and academics that call for interventions without analysing local contexts and local demands.

I may go back to a quotation from the beginning of chapter 2, in which Yelling (1986, 1) remarks that the word 'slum' "carries a condemnation of existing conditions and, implicitly at least, a call for action." This common, but dangerous oversimplification was further contested in the debate about the MDG targets and indicators and the initiative 'Cities Without Slums' – mainly by Huchzermeyer (2011), Gilbert (2007), and Arabindoo (2011). The resettlement of Karyan Central builds on exactly this 'condemnation' of the slum. There are two main reasons that have fuelled general acceptance of resettlement amongst inhabitants as well as the initial political decision to offer no other choice apart from displacement: First, the predominance of a linear, modernist, and western understanding of 'development', and, second, the related stigmatisation of supposedly unmodern forms of housing. Large-scale housing programmes have to be seen as an expression of a modernist and western-based understanding of development and the notion that a modern city should inevitably be without informalities (cf. Huchzermeyer 2011; A. Roy 2005). On the one hand, this is the result of a significant impact of foreign, mostly western capital and influence within the planning and implementation of housing programmes (Buckley et al. 2016a, 121). On the other hand, it refers to the notion of 'worlding' as a mass dream (A. Roy 2011a). According to A. Roy, citizens of developing countries have incorporated a particular, globalised vision of modern development to which they tend to aspire – 'modern' housing may be a part of it. Housing theories need to take a closer look at particular development and worldviews as important influencing variables of housing policies and aspirations.

Moreover, stigmatisation – both institutionalised and as part of residents' daily life experiences – has further influenced residents to believe in resettlement as the only way out of their situation in the *bidonville*. For many people in Er-Rhamna – even for many that were in principle satisfied with other aspects of housing – resettlement was symbolising the hope to escape stigma, hence, to be recognised as 'ordinary' residents living like anyone else and not regarded as second-class persons. After resettlement, people started to realise the advantages of living in centrally located, incrementally developed, and consolidated shantytowns. Thus,

with reference to Stokes (1962) and Turok and Borel-Saladin (2018), stigmatisation should be more explicitly considered as a structural barrier that impedes development pathways as well as symbolic and institutional urban integration of residents of informal settlements. Housing studies focusing on informal settlements and related polices should be more aware of stigmatisation and rumours (De Feyter 2015), also as a political agency that may serve governments to implement a certain, pre-defined development vision related to housing. Instead of improving the conditions of disruptive and generalist housing policies (e.g. the third-party approach and social accompaniment), housing theory needs to engage more critically with the question whether (or to which extent) housing programmes that implement and impose a certain pre-defined notion of development are appropriate to provide people with 'adequate' housing. In line with other authors such as AlSayyad (2004), A. Roy (2011b), and Robinson (2002), who call for more southern urban theory, I emphasise the need for more creative and, at the same time, people-centred conceptual approaches to housing that build more strongly on ideas from the Global South. This has to go much beyond procedural innovation that remains limited to the improvement of classic approaches, such as the third-party approach in the context of Karyan Central. Such approaches necessarily have to start from a neutral and open-minded position that rejects any implicit 'call for action' (Yelling 1986, 1) that results from an external, superficial, generalising, and stigmatising judgment of the 'slum'.

A final point I would like to emphasise is the need to combine work that aims to inform housing policies in the Global South much more closely with conceptual work on involuntary resettlement that has emerged in the context of large development projects or disaster prevention (cf. Artur and Hilhorst 2014; Asthana 1996; Cernea 1997, 2003). It is an urgent necessity to move away from the belief that ensuring access to adequate housing for all is first of all a matter of increasing affordability or improving formal security of tenure (cf. Huchzermeyer 2010a; Payne et al. 2009). In the case of Karyan Central, affordability criteria were mostly met, but still, the programme has been strongly disruptive. Housing studies need to acknowledge more explicitly that better shelter and formal tenure security do not automatically lead to better living conditions. Shelter as well as security of tenure cannot be treated as detached elements of housing, disregarding other important aspects of housing such as community cohesion and access to jobs, education, and health care. Considering Turner (1968) and the significance of subjective values of housing, I argue that one has to move away from concepts that merely ask how to improve access to formal shelter. Instead, research that deals with the new wave of large-scale housing programmes – even if in many programmes residents are willing to move – should more explicitly make use of concepts dealing with involuntary 'resettlement' (cf. Patel et al. 2015). These approaches such as the 'risks and reconstruction model' of Cernea (1997) may help to emphasise the comprehensiveness of any kind of displacement and its related multiple risks of impoverishment.

A contextual prospect - from bidonvilles *to* villes bidons*?*

The thesis has shown that housing programmes such as the VSB programme that focus on standardised solutions fail to analyse local contexts and thus build on wrong assumptions about the living conditions and practices of *bidonville* dwellers. In Casablanca, the dwellers of *bidonvilles* are neither all poor, nor all deprived of the 'right to adequate housing', nor all excluded from urban life and the job market. Authorities have ignored these facts when judging the quality and functions of *bidonvilles* from an external perspective. Instead of fostering the development of existing neighbourhoods that have incrementally been improved over generations, the VSB programme imposes – in some cases by force – a pre-defined, 'western' form of housing that denies residents almost any possibility of choice or chance to articulate housing preferences.

Elite ‘worlding’ aspirations as well as security and business motivations have been guiding principles, instead of authorities engaging more closely with living conditions and practices of affected *bidonville* dwellers. Even in cases where residents appreciated the move into a ‘better’ house, they found themselves undecided in their opinion about the VSB programme – caught between the quality of the house on the one and the loss of solidarity networks, centrality, and urbanity on the other hand. Against this background, I strongly criticise UN-Habitat’s (2010b) honouring of the VSB programme as “one of the world’s most successful and comprehensive slum reduction and improvement programmes.”

Daring a view towards the future, I emphasise two notable statements of resettled residents themselves that came up at different moments during field research – interestingly both in the *bidonville* Er-Rhamna as well as in the new town Nouvelle Lahraouiyine. First, some residents stressed in a symbolic way that they were pushed from the city to the desert. After five to six years in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, these residents felt socio-spatially marginalised and deprived of previously existing urban opportunities. Their expectations concerning the resettlement were not fulfilled, and they were starting to miss and crave social life in the *bidonville* as well as the vibrant urban environment of Hay Mohammadi. Many of these residents hope to be able to move back to Hay Mohammadi (or in rare cases even back to another *bidonville*) one day. This rather pessimistic perspective reflects concerns of Turner (1967, 1968, 1969), Stokes (1962), but also more recently Buckley et al. (2016b), who have criticised large-scale housing projects for their negative effects on urban inclusion. It also reminds of Plessis (2006), who argued that resettlement simply shifts developmental problems from one place to another. Following the theories and opinions of these authors, many residents would agree that upgrading existing houses in the *bidonvilles* or, at least, replacing them in situ with new houses, would have been a better idea.

Second, other residents preferred to stress a different symbolic comparison, arguing that, similar to the early days of the *bidonville*, they are forced to start from zero again. This statement clearly underlines that many people felt integrated into the urban society and that they had developed Karyan Central during their residency (cf. Navez-Bouchanine 2012, 171). On the one hand, this puts into question the general necessity of a housing project targeting *bidonville* dwellers – knowing that there are people living under much more vulnerable conditions for example in shared flats, in garages, or in empty shops. On the other hand, it is a less pessimistic note on the situation in Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, as these people still believe that the neighbourhood will further develop in the future. Some people argue that the state just needs to invest a bit more in infrastructure and services to fix the situation; others were convinced they could develop the area as they did with the *bidonville* in the past. This perspective is more in line with the concept of Cernea (2003), who criticised classic compensation payments of being limited most often to the mere restoration of livelihoods, which would not adequately address all risks of impoverishment. He continues that besides compensation (in the case of the VSB programme this might be the new apartment), resettlement would require concerted investment to boost people’s development on the new site. Concerning Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, however, there are no indications that public authorities are planning to increase investment in the near future. Some public buildings in the new town have deteriorated and have become vacant, real estate prices are falling, and the new town has remained excluded from Casablanca’s official public transport planning.

To conclude, I would like to make a final reference to another statement to which I have frequently referred to throughout this thesis and which has not only occurred in literature, but was also mentioned by residents themselves: the move from *bidonvilles* to *villes bidons* (see section 6.1), or, in other words, the fear that Morocco is reproducing the same mistakes of French post-war social housing projects (cf. Bogaert 2011,

724; Le Tellier 2009a, 59). There are several reasons why I would agree to this comparison. The *recasement* of Karyan Central had the primary objective of clearing the site and not helping people to realise adequate housing according to their needs and demands. In line with Cernea's main argument that the development of the new town is often a neglected part of resettlement, the unpaved streets and the neglect of public buses serving the new town are only the most visible signs of severe public underinvestment. Moreover, the *re-casement* has hardly addressed poverty, but has resulted in a decrease of available income, a weakening of neighbourhood trust, and an increase in perceived insecurity and marginalisation. Thus, although the aim was to fight urban exclusion, the single focus on shantytown clearance and one-size-fits-all solutions has rather had the opposite effect. About 8% of the resettled dwellers have already left Nouvelle Lahraouiyine, and roughly one-third of the remaining resettled residents are willing to move out in the next five years. Most of them simply await an increase in real estate prices to capitalise their new apartment and to move to a more central neighbourhood – a scenario which is more likely for better-off households. Thus, whereas in the majority of social housing or shantytown resettlement projects, the urban poor could not move be-cause they could not afford subsidised apartments or running expenditures, in the case of Nouvelle Lah-raouiyine, they lack the capacities to move out again, trapped in a deserted new town.

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Appendix

A1 The household survey

RUHR UNIVERSITÄT BOCHUM **RUB**

Université de la Ruhr, Bochum, Allemagne, Novembre 2016

Enquêteur_trice : _____ Numéro de l'enquête : _____

Numéro du lot : _____ Date : _____

Merci beaucoup d'avoir accepté(e) d'offrir votre temps précieux pour répondre à cette enquête de ménage qui ne durera qu'environ 30 minutes. Cette enquête est strictement faite pour des raisons académiques. Je vous assure que nous traitons tout ce que vous dites d'une façon confidentielle absolue.

Prénom de la personne interviewée : _____ sexe : ☐ m ☐ f

Depuis combien d'années habitez-vous dans cette maison ? _____

Où est-ce que vous avez habité avant ? _____ Combien d'années ? _____

Quel est votre statut d'occupation ? ☐ Propriétaire (avec papiers de la maison)

☐ Locataire_trice ☐ Logé(e) gratuit(e) (en occupant une maison) ☐ Associé(e) tiers

QUESTION POUR LES SITES DE RECASEMENT :

Êtes-vous attributaire (dans le cadre du PVSB) ? ☐ oui ☐ non

Sinon, lien avec l'attributaire : _____ Où habite l'attributaire ? _____

Comment avez-vous trouvé la personne qui a construit votre maison ? Qui a aidé ?

Combien de temps s'est passé entre la destruction de votre ancienne maison en bidonville et votre arrivée à la nouvelle ? _____

Où est-ce que vous avez habité pendant ce temps ? _____

A) Composition et caractéristique socio-économique du ménage

(seulement membres permanents du ménage!)

ID	Nom ou lien avec la personne interviewée (mari/femme, fils/fille, père/mère …)	Sexe (m/f)	Age (ans)	Travail ? (oui/non)	Profession exercée ? Profession stable ?	Lieu de travail
1	Personne interviewée					
2						
3						
4						
5						
6						
7						
8						
9						

B) Conditions de logement

1. Etat de la maison (*à remplir par l'enquêteur_trice*) :

Site de recasement : ☐ Achevée sans vices ☐ Achevée avec vices ☐ Pas encore achevée

Bidonville : ☐ Briques ☐ Tôles ondulés ☐ Plastiques ☐ Bois ☐ D'autres : _____

Toits fonctionnels ? oui / non _____

2. Caractéristique du logement :

Mètres carrés : _____ Nombre de salles : _____ Nombre de niveaux : _____

Equipement	nombre	Nombre d'heures utilisé par jour	Equipement	nombre	Nombre d'heures utilisé par jour
Télévision			Réfrigérateur		xx
Machine à laver			Chauffe-eau		
Ordinateur			Four & cuisinière *(Nombre des cartouches à gaz)*		
Téléphone			Congélateur		xx
Portable			Micro-ondes		

Êtes-vous satisfait de votre logement ?
Oui, totalement 5 ---- 4 ---- 3 ---- 2 ---- 1 Non, pas du tout

3. Services publiques et coûts courants :

	Oui/ non	Quelle sorte de connexion ?	Coût mensuel ou annuel
Eau potable			
Electricité			
Assainissement			
Connexion internet			
Loyer / coûts pour la maison			

Souffrez-vous des coupures temporaires ? ☐ oui, de _____ ☐ non

Êtes-vous satisfait de la provision des services publiques ?
Oui, totalement 5 ---- 4 ---- 3 ---- 2 ---- 1 Non, pas du tout

QUESTION POUR LES SITES DE RECASEMENT :

Avez-vous payé pour le lot / la construction de la maison / l'achat de l'appart. ? ☐ oui ☐ non

Si oui, combien avez-vous payé ? _____

Comment avez-vous financé la somme ? _____

Payez-vous régulièrement un crédit ? ☐ oui ☐ non Si oui, combien par mois ? _____

C) Dépenses du ménage

1. Mobilité

Comment se déplacent-ils, les membres de votre ménage ?

ID (page 1)	Quel moyen de transport ? (1 = taxi rouge, 2 = taxi blanc, 3 = bus, 4 = minibus, 5 = tram, 6 = bicyclette, 7 = mobylette, 8 = voiture privée, 9 = auto stop)	Combien de fois par semaine ?	Pour quelle(s) raison(s) ? (1 = travail, 2 = marché, 3 = enseignement, 4 = loisir)	Coût hebdomadaire ? (DH)

2. Autres dépenses

Combien d'argent dépensez-vous par an pour des raisons d'éducation (*total*) ? _____ DH

Quel type d'école fréquentent vos enfants ?

(1= école publique, 2 = école privée, 3 = école religieuse, 4 = université, 5 = centre de formation professionnelle)

ID (voir page 1) _____ type d'école ? _____ montant ? _____ DH / _____

ID (voir page 1) _____ type d'école ? _____ montant ? _____ DH / _____

ID (voir page 1) _____ type d'école ? _____ montant ? _____ DH / _____

ID (voir page 1) _____ type d'école ? _____ montant ? _____ DH / _____

Combien d'argent dépensez-vous **par semaine** pour se nourrir ? _____ DH

Combien d'argent dépensez-vous par mois pour des raisons sanitaires ? _____ DH

Combien d'argent dépensez-vous par mois pour des raisons de loisir ? _____ DH

D) Vie sociale

	Non, pas du tout				Oui, totalement
Je fais confiance à mes voisins	1	2	3	4	5
Je parle souvent à mes voisins	1	2	3	4	5
Dans notre quartier on s'aide	1	2	3	4	5
La sécurité dans notre quartier est mauvaise	1	2	3	4	5
Ici, il n'y a rien à faire	1	2	3	4	5
Ici, nous sommes isolés	1	2	3	4	5
Ici, tout le monde se respecte	1	2	3	4	5
J'aime mon quartier	1	2	3	4	5

Participez-vous aux activités associatives dans votre quartier ? ☐ oui ☐ non

Si oui, quelle(s) association(s) ? _____

E) Revenu du ménage

1. Votre ménage a-t-il généré un revenu stable pendant les douze derniers mois ? ☐ non ☐ oui

Revenu total pendant les 12 derniers mois : environ _____ DH

Alternative : Revenu moyen mensuel : environ _____ DH

2. S'il vous plaît, donneriez les sources différentes qui ont composé votre revenu annuel.

Revenu de travail saisonnière _____ (voir page 1, profession exercée) _____ DH

Revenu de petit commerce _____ (voir page 1, profession exercée) _____ DH

Revenu de travail salarié _____ (voir page 1, profession exercée) _____ DH

Revenu d'autres travaux _____ (voir page 1, profession exercée) _____ DH

Soutien familial _____ DH

Aide sociale / retraite _____ DH

3. Est-ce qu'il y a des membres du ménage qui vivent ailleurs et qui soutiennent votre ménage financièrement ? ☐ non ☐ oui -> *si oui, contrôle « soutien familial »*

F) Satisfaction générale du ménage

1. En général, êtes-vous satisfait de votre situation de logement ?

Non, pas du tout 1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 oui, totalement

2. Que pensez-vous du recasement dans le cadre du PVSB ?

C'est mauvais 1---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ----- 5 c'est super

3. Est-ce que vous souhaitez de déménager dans les cinq prochaines années ? ☐ non ☐ oui

Si oui, pourquoi ? _____

4. Est-ce que vous craignez d'être expulsé dans les cinq prochaines années ? ☐ non ☐ oui

Si oui, pourquoi ? _____

5. Quels sont les avantages les plus importants de votre situation de logement actuel ?

6. Quels sont les désavantages les plus importants de votre situation de logement actuel ?

Merci beaucoup pour votre temps !

A2 List of interview partners with pseudonyms

Pseudonym	Sex	Age	Professional status	Place	Date of interview
Abdellah	m	49	Street vendor	NL	16 January 2017
Aicha	f	50	Cleaning lady	ER	19 February 2017
Ali	m	29	Boiler smith	ER	25 February 2017
Amina	f	25	Saleswoman	NL	24 June 2017
Aziz	m	21	Vocational training student	ER	21 February 2017
Bouchra	f	28	Housewife	ER	6 March 2017
Brahim	m	22	Unemployed	NL	29 January 2017
Fatima	f	56	Housewife	NL	17 January 2017
Fatna	f	34	Housewife	NL	19 January 2017
Hafida	f	35	Single mother	ER	6 March 2017
Hanane	f	21	Intern / vocational training	NL	1 February 2017
Hicham	m	17	High school student	ER	14 March 2017
Jamila	f	47	Household help	NL	21 January 2017
Khadija	f	42	Housewife	NL	25 January 2017
Khaoula	f	39	Housewife	NL	29 December 2016
Laila	f	41	Searching (previously: saleswoman)	NL	20 January 2017
Latifa	f	30	Teacher	ER	5 March 2017
Malika	f	54	Retired single mother	NL	19 January 2017
Mhamed	m	19	High-school student	ER	16 February 2017
Mohammed	m	50	Tea seller, bricolage	CM	15 December 2016
Nadia	f	28	Student, seasonal work as interviewer	ER	19 February 2017
Naima	f	22	Student	NL	15 January 2017
Najat	f	48	Housewife	NL	28 December 2016
Nohaila	f	17	High school student	NL	31 January 2017
Othmane	m	21	Student and private tutor	ER	14 March 2017
Rachid	m	--	Journalist, president of Chihab	NL	16 March 2017
Rachida	f	48	Cleaning lady	ER	1 March 2017
Rania	f	25	Housewife, wife of Younes	NL	30 January 2017
Saida	f	24	No current occupation	NL	17 January 2017
Souad	f	20	Wants to study at the university	NL	30 January 2017

Younes	m	44	Sandwich maker	NL	30 January 2017
Zohra	f	67	Housewife	ER	15 March 2017

NL = Nouvelle Lahraouiyine

ER= Er-Rhamna

CM = Karyan Capitaine Montugué

A3 Statistical Annex

- Mann-Whitney U test, concerning figure 6.7

Test Statistics[a]

	Are you satisfied with your house/apartment?
Mann-Whitney U	36669,000
Wilcoxon W	117672,000
Z	-11,769
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	,000

a. Grouping Variable: Gruppe NL/Rhamna

- Mann-Whitney U test, concerning figure 6.10

Test Statistics[a]

	Je fais confiance à mes voisins	Je parle souvent avec mes voisins	Dans notre quartier on s'aide	Ici, nous sommes isolés	Ici, tout le monde se respecte	J'aime mon quartier
Mann-Whitney U	62958,000	46774,500	30673,000	12947,500	48358,000	56107,500
Wilcoxon W	128299,000	112115,500	95653,000	93950,500	112619,000	120368,500
Z	-3,387	-9,030	-14,388	-20,816	-8,181	-5,450
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	,001	,000	,000	,000	,000	,000

a. Grouping Variable: Gruppe NL/Rhamna

- Mann-Withney U test concerning figure 6.11

Test Statistics[a]

	La sécurité dans notre quartier est mauvaise
Mann-Whitney U	36160,000
Wilcoxon W	117566,000
Z	-12,224
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	,000

a. Grouping Variable: Gruppe NL/Rhamna

- Mann-Whitney U test concerning footnotes 47-49 (low-income dwellers on the right).

Comparison for all households:

Test Statistics[a]

	Work-related transport costs per worker in each HH	Work-related transport costs per individual work-related re-turns
Mann-Whitney U	47314,500	57557,500
Wilcoxon W	115579,500	133023,500
Z	-6,952	-3,293
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,001

a. Grouping Variable: Gruppe NL/Rhamna

Comparison for low-income households only:

Test Statistics[a]

	Work-related trans-port costs per worker in each HH
Mann-Whitney U	2156,500
Wilcoxon W	6161,500
Z	-3,531
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	,000

a. Grouping Variable: Gruppe NL/Rhamna

Comparison for households with work-related transport costs only:

Test Statistics[a]

	Work-related transport costs per worker in each HH
Mann-Whitney U	21750,500
Wilcoxon W	52378,500
Z	-7,362
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	,000

a. Grouping Variable: Gruppe NL/Rhamna

Total transport costs:

Test Statistics[a]

	Total transport costs per corrected total household income	Total transport costs
Mann-Whitney U	41847,000	53488,500
Wilcoxon W	115767,000	133688,500
Z	-7,367	-5,978
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000

a. Grouping Variable: Gruppe NL/Rhamna

- Ordinal Linear Regression (OLR) with the variables of OLS model I (section 6.7)

For statistical reasons, the variable N_i was transformed into a aggregated index (social – transformed) with four different ordinal values ranging from ‘1’ (low neighbour cohesion) to ‘4’ (high neighbourhood cohesion).

Case Processing Summary

		N	Marginal Percentage
Satisfaction with the general housing situation	not at all satisfied	150	24,3%
	not satisfied	104	16,9%
	intermediate	154	25,0%
	satisfied	166	26,9%

	very much satisfied	43	7,0%
social - transformed 1	1,00	45	7,3%
	2,00	84	13,6%
	3,00	219	35,5%
	4,00	269	43,6%
born_neu	,00	318	51,5%
	1,00	299	48,5%
Ici, nous sommes isolés	No, I do not agree at all	218	35,3%
	No, I do not agree	76	12,3%
	It depends	31	5,0%
	Yes, I agree	46	7,5%
	Yes, I fully agree	246	39,9%
Are you satisfied with the public services?	not at all satisfied	187	30,3%
	not satisfied	94	15,2%
	intermediate	117	19,0%
	satisfied	201	32,6%
	very much satisfied	18	2,9%
Are you satisfied with your house/apartment?	not at all satisfied	76	12,3%
	not satisfied	103	16,7%
	intermediate	151	24,5%
	satisfied	218	35,3%
	very much satisfied	69	11,2%
Gruppe NL/Rhamna	,00	372	60,3%
	1,00	245	39,7%
Valid		617	100,0%
Missing		148	
Total		765	

Model Fitting Information

Model	-2 Log Likelihood	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Intercept Only	1841,018			
Final	1374,294	466,724	18	,000

Link function: Probit.

Goodness-of-Fit

	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Pearson	2764,268	2258	,000

Deviance	1344,217	2258	1,000

Link function: Probit.

Pseudo R-Square

Cox and Snell	,531
Nagelkerke	,557
McFadden	,247

Link function: Probit.

OLR – Parameter Estimates

		Estimate	Std. Error	Wald	df	Sig.
Threshold	[satisf_ghs = 1]	-3,540	,324	119,147	1	,000
	[satisf_ghs = 2]	-2,755	,317	75,769	1	,000
	[satisf_ghs = 3]	-1,757	,309	32,212	1	,000
	[satisf_ghs = 4]	-,275	,304	,815	1	,367
Location	costt_total	,000	,000	6,891	1	,009
	[social_tf1=1,00]	-,809	,209	15,061	1	,000
	[social_tf1=2,00]	-,715	,162	19,459	1	,000
	[social_tf1=3,00]	-,367	,107	11,823	1	,001
	[social_tf1=4,00]	0[a]	.	.	0	.
	[born_neu=,00]	,475	,100	22,415	1	,000
	[born_neu=1,00]	0[a]	.	.	0	.
	[s_isol=1]	,743	,181	16,811	1	,000
	[s_isol=2]	,736	,204	12,952	1	,000
	[s_isol=3]	,325	,242	1,806	1	,179
	[s_isol=4]	,615	,191	10,315	1	,001
	[s_isol=5]	0[a]	.	.	0	.
	[satisf_serv=1]	-1,604	,289	30,721	1	,000
	[satisf_serv=2]	-1,067	,300	12,625	1	,000
	[satisf_serv=3]	-,676	,294	5,296	1	,021
	[satisf_serv=4]	-,699	,286	5,967	1	,015
	[satisf_serv=5]	0[a]	.	.	0	.
	[satisf_home=1]	-2,648	,249	112,881	1	,000
	[satisf_home=2]	-1,685	,190	78,897	1	,000

[satisf_home=3]	-1,191	,173	47,359	1	,000
[satisf_home=4]	-,575	,158	13,169	1	,000
[satisf_home=5]	0[a]	.	.	0	.
[place=,00]	-1,050	,183	32,951	1	,000
[place=1,00]	0[a]	.	.	0	.

- Test statistics of OLS model I with results given in Table 6.3

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,712[a]	,507	,503	,901

a. Predictors: (Constant), Gruppe NL/Rhamna, Are you satisfied with the public services?, Total transport costs, social, Are you satisfied with your house/apartment?, Ici, nous sommes isolés

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	604,693	6	100,782	124,039	,000[b]
	Residual	587,438	723	,813		
	Total	1192,132	729			

a. Dependent Variable: Satisfaction with the general housing situation

b. Predictors: (Constant), Gruppe NL/Rhamna, Are you satisfied with the public services?, Total transport costs, social, Are you satisfied with your house/apartment?, Ici, nous sommes isolés

Model		Standardized Co-efficients	Collinearity Statistics	
		Beta	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)			
	Total transport costs	-,080	,938	1,066
	Are you satisfied with your house/apartment?	,446	,702	1,425
	Are you satisfied with the pub-lic services?	,256	,782	1,278
	social	,217	,754	1,327
	Ici, nous sommes isolés	-,160	,377	2,654
	Gruppe NL/Rhamna	,252	,305	3,278

- Test statistics of OLS model IIIa with results given in Table 6.4

Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,672[a]	,451	,438	,966	1,884

a. Predictors: (Constant), Ici, nous sommes isolés, born_neu, Are you satisfied with your house/apartment?, Total transport costs, social, Are you satisfied with the public services?

b. Dependent Variable: Satisfaction with the general housing situation

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	182,834	6	30,472	32,649	,000[b]
	Residual	222,130	238	,933		
	Total	404,963	244			

a. Dependent Variable: Satisfaction with the general housing situation

b. Predictors: (Constant), Ici, nous sommes isolés, born_neu, Are you satisfied with your house/apartment?, Total transport costs, social, Are you satisfied with the public services?

Model		Standardized Coefficients	Collinearity Statistics	
		Beta	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)			
	Total transport costs	-,136	,955	1,047
	Are you satisfied with your house/apartment?	,330	,865	1,156
	Are you satisfied with the public services?	,205	,797	1,255
	social	,257	,849	1,178
	born_neu	-,197	,982	1,018
	Ici, nous sommes isolés	-,134	,981	1,019

- Test statistics of OLS model IIIb with results given in Table 6.4

Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,746[a]	,556	,549	,834	1,702

a. Predictors: (Constant), Ici, nous sommes isolés, Total transport costs, born_neu, social, Are you satisfied with your house/apartment?, Are you satisfied with the public services?

b. Dependent Variable: Satisfaction with the general housing situation

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	318,363	6	53,060	76,232	,000[b]
	Residual	254,054	365	,696		
	Total	572,417	371			

a. Dependent Variable: Satisfaction with the general housing situation

b. Predictors: (Constant), Ici, nous sommes isolés, Total transport costs, born_neu, social, Are you satisfied with your house/apartment?, Are you satisfied with the public services?

Model		Standardized Coefficients	Collinearity Statistics	
		Beta	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)			
	Total transport costs	-,028	,967	1,034
	Are you satisfied with your house/apartment?	,447	,823	1,215
	Are you satisfied with the public services?	,336	,731	1,367
	social	,126	,941	1,062
	born_neu	-,093	,988	1,012
	Ici, nous sommes isolés	-,088	,816	1,226

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that my thesis entitled **"From the City to the Desert.**

Analysing shantytown resettlement in Casablanca, Morocco, from residents' perspectives", has not been submitted for a degree qualification to any other university outside the agreement between the Ruhr-Universität Bochum and the International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam.

18 January 2019, Bochum

Raffael Beier

Curriculum Vitae

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Current positions

Since 08/2014	**Research Fellow**, Institute of Development Research and Development Policy, Ruhr University Bochum, Germany, and **Visiting Lecturer**, University of the Western Cape, Cape Town, South Africa

Education

Since 03/2016	**Joint-PhD candidate in International Development Studies** at the International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands, and at the Institute of Development Research and Development Policy, Ruhr University Bochum
10/2012 - 09/2015	**M.Sc. in Urban and Regional Development Management**, Department of Geography, Ruhr University Bochum and Université Joseph Fourier, Grenoble, France
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Awarded Scholarships

Since 12/2014	International Realization Budget of Ruhr University Research School PLUS, funded by Germany's Excellence Initiative (grant number: DFG GSC 98/3)
2012-2013	Study scholarship "Deutschlandstipendium" of RUB Alumni Foundation
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Selected Academic Publications

2018	UN-Habitat, the New Urban Agenda and Urban Refugees – A State of the Art. *Z'Flucht* 2(1), 128-142 (together with J. Fritzsche-El Shewy)
2018	Towards a New Perspective on the Role of the City in Social Movements. Urban Policy after the 'Arab Spring'. *City* 22(2), 220-235
2018	Social Movements as Drivers of Urban Policy: The Case of the Arab Uprisings in North Africa. In: *Urbane Widerstände – Urban Resistance*, edited by Aline Schoch and Reto Bürgin. Peter Lang: Bern, 63-78.
2017	Refugees and the City: UN-Habitat's New Urban Agenda. *Forced Migration Review* 55, 29-30 (together with J. Fritzsche)
2016	*Shifting Urban Policies in North Africa after the "Arab Spring" - Urgent Reaction or Real Changes*. Diskussionspapiere Volkswirtschaft des Vorderen Orients, 113. Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag.

Professional Memberships

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