Of the Conduct
of the Understanding
Of the Conduct
of the Understanding
by John Locke

Edited with General Introduction, Historical and
Philosophical Notes and Critical Apparatus
by Paul Schuurman

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Ter nagedachtenis aan mijn moeder
Voor mijn vader
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ABSTRACT

The present thesis gives an edition of John Locke’s Of the Conduct of the Understanding that is based, for the first time since 1706, on the original manuscripts, MS Locke e.1 and MS Locke c.28. The text has been provided with a text-critical apparatus and with historical and philosophical notes.

The editor’s General Introduction is divided into two parts. The first part, ‘Context’, discusses Locke’s analysis of the nature of error, the causes of error and the prevention and cure of error in the Conduct. His enquiry is placed in the context of his way of ideas as given in his Essay concerning Human Understanding. Locke’s two-stage way of ideas, his occupation with our mental faculties and with method form the interrelated main ingredients of his logic of ideas. There is a complicated relation of continuity and change between the content and the structure of this new logic on the one hand and the content and structure of works by both scholastic predecessors (Du Trieu, Smith, Sanderson) and representatives of the new philosophy (Descartes, Arnauld, Malebranche) on the other hand. Once this context is taken into account, the Conduct can be understood as a work that has a function within the structure of Locke’s informal logic of ideas that runs parallel to the function of the De sophisticis elenchis in the Aristotelian Organon.

The second part of the General Introduction, ‘Text’, gives a description of the relevant MSS, an overview of references to the Conduct in Locke’s correspondence, a history of the genesis of the Conduct until its first publication in 1706 in the Posthumous Works, an analysis of the evidence provided by the MSS on how the Conduct grew out of the Essay, and a statement of the principles that underlie the present edition.
ABBREVIATIONS OF TITLES
AND USE OF CALENDAR SYSTEMS

Editorial reference to passages in the Conduct is by the paragraph numbers as established in the present edition. Other works by Locke that are frequently cited, are abbreviated as follows:


For the abbreviations of all other (works comprising) editions of the Conduct see below, ‘Bibliography’, §1. Works by other authors are also given in abbreviated form; here are some of the most frequently cited abbreviations:
Abbreviations of Titles and Use of Calendar Systems


French and Latin designations for ‘Volume’, ‘Book’, ‘Part’, ‘Chapter’ and ‘Section’ are abbreviated with their English equivalent: ‘Vol.’, ‘Bk.’, ‘Pt.’, ‘Ch.’ and ‘Sect.’. Translations of Latin and French quotations are by the editor, unless stated otherwise.

Dates of letters contained in Locke’s correspondence are those provided by De Beer, who gives Old Style for letters written in Britain and both Old Style (first) and New Style (second) for letters produced in the Dutch Republic and France. This convention is also used in other cases. Years start on 1 January.
GENERAL INTRODUCTION

CONTEXT

John Locke continued to revise his Essay concerning Human Understanding from its first appearance in 1689 until his death in October 1704. Even while the Third Edition was being prepared in 1695, he was already corresponding with his Irish friend William Molyneux (1656-1698) about new additions. In his letter to Molyneux of 8 March 1695 he discusses the possibility of adding something on 'Enthusiasm' and on 'P. Malbranche’s [sic] opinion concerning seeing all things in God'.\(^1\) In the next letter, dated 26 April 1695, he announces his intention to add 'Enthusiasm' as a separate chapter, to drop the attack on Malebranche and to add some remarks concerning the 'Connexion of Ideas'.\(^2\) Locke expected the new additions concerning enthusiasm and the association ('connexion') of ideas to appear first in the Latin translation of the Essay that Molyneux was then trying to arrange. However, De intellectu humano did not appear until 1701 and the new chapters on enthusiasm and association would appear for the first time in the Fourth Edition of the Essay, which went to the press in 1699 (the Latin translation by Ezekiel Burridge would be a translation of this Fourth Edition). 'Of the Association of Ideas' formed Chapter xxxiii of Part II and 'Of Enthusiasm' Chapter xix of Part IV.

It was only in 1697, probably two years after he had started work on 'Enthusiasm' and 'Association', that Locke embarked on another projected addition to the Fourth Edition of the Essay, i.e. a chapter with the title 'Of the Conduct of the Understanding'. On 10 April of that year he wrote to Molyneux:

I have lately got a little leisure to think of some additions to my book, against the next edition, and within a few days have fallen upon a subject that I know not how far it will lead me. I have written several pages on it, but the matter, the farther I go, opens the more upon me, and I cannot yet get sight of any end of it. The title of the chapter will be Of the Conduct of the Understanding, which, if I shall pursue, as far as I imagine it will reach, and as it deserves, will, I conclude, make the largest chapter of my Essay.\(^3\)

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3 Corr. 2243, VI, p. 87.
On 15 May Molyneux, whose answer had been delayed because of the death of his brother-in-law, reacted with his usual enthusiasm to Locke’s latest project:

You never write to me, that you do not raise new expectations in my longing Mind of partaking your Thoughts on those Noble Subjects you are upon. Your Chapter concerning the Conduct of the Understanding must needs be very Sublime and Spacious.  

However, the Conduct was never finished and its author broke off mid-sentence in a paragraph that until now has remained unpublished. The Conduct was published by A. and J. Churchill in the Posthumous Works (= O-1706) in Trinity Term 1706. Using the abbreviation Conduct is convenient, but should not allow us to forget that at the moment of Locke’s death there was only an unfinished and unpublished piece of work. The text published in O-1706 was based on MS Locke e.1 and on MS Locke c.28. All subsequent editions are derived from O-1706. The present edition, for the first time since 1706, is based on the original MSS. Both MS e.1 and MS c.28 are now shelved in the Locke Room of the Bodleian Library. The latter MS covers only a small part of the Conduct. The copy text for the present edition is MS e.1, but this MS is collated with MS c.28. For more detailed information on these MSS and on the editorial principles see below in ‘Text’.

The century of Locke’s death saw a ready dissemination of the Conduct, together with his other works. This popularity was maintained during the entire nineteenth century, despite Locke’s allegedly diminished reputation in this period. From the nineteenth century onwards the Conduct has been regarded primarily as a work on education. In 1839 it was printed (in an abridged version) in one volume together with Some Thoughts concerning Education. This combination was repeated in c. 1881 and also in 1912 in an edition titled The Educational Writings of John Locke, by J. W. Adamson, who describes the Conduct as a short treatise that ‘was written to serve as a manual of self-instruction’. Likewise, in his 1966 edition of the Conduct, F. W. Garforth points to the many similarities between this work and Education. Most recently, in 1996, the Conduct appeared in one volume with Education in an edition by R. W. Grant and N. Tarcov, who describe these works as Locke’s ‘two most important writings on education’.

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4 Corr. 2262, VI, p. 123.
6 AS-1839 (for abbreviations of titles see Bibliography, §1).
7 AS-1881.
8 O-1912, p. 12.
In the following sections I shall discuss the central theme of the *Conduct*, error, and give due attention to the educational reflections that this theme occasioned. However, I shall argue that the *Conduct* was considered by its author and by its eighteenth-century readers to be as much a work on logic as on education. I shall contend that the *Conduct* must be understood in relation to the *Essay*, of which it was originally meant to be a part, and I shall assert that both works should be placed in a context that has its roots in Aristotelian textbooks on logic. The structural relation between the *Conduct* and the *Essay* and that of both works with the products of a changing logical tradition is a largely unstudied topic. A more detailed examination of this subject throws light on the nature of the *Conduct* itself, teaches something about its great parent work and finally leads to remarkable parallels between Locke’s work and his Aristotelian predecessors.

1. Locke’s later years

In September 1683 Locke left England for the Dutch Republic. He felt obliged to take the same course as his patron, Anthony Ashley Cooper, first Earl of Shaftesbury, who had run into political trouble with King Charles II and fled to the Netherlands in November 1682, where he had died in January of the next year. On 15 November 1684 Charles deprived Locke of his studentship at Christ Church, Oxford. On 16 February 1685 James II succeeded his brother on the throne. On 7/17 May of the same year his agent Bevil Skelton presented a list to the Dutch States General, asking for the extradition of 84 English and Scottish refugees. The last name on the list was Locke’s. However, his personal safety in the Netherlands was never seriously endangered. His involvement there in the political activities to topple James in favour of William of Orange has never been clarified but some of his noble friends in Holland took an active part in the various schemes and it is clear that he shared their hostility to the Stuart kings. The ensuing enterprise in 1688, helped by a favourable eastern ‘Protestant wind’, was a success and allowed Locke to put an end to his exile. He returned to England in February 1689, in the party that accompanied Mary Stuart, the Princess of Orange. She and her husband were crowned joint sovereigns of England in the same year.

Locke first stayed in London but made long visits to Oates, an Essex manor house where he was invited to stay permanently by Sir Francis Masham (1645-1722), husband of his old friend Damaris, Lady Masham (1659-1708). Locke’s health had started to decline and Oates proved to be more congenial to his

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asthmatic constitution than the air of London. From 1691 until his death in 1704, Oates was to be his chief place of residence. It was agreed that he should pay a pound a week for his and his servant’s keep and a shilling a week for his horse. Damaris Masham was the daughter of the Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth (1617-1688). In 1682/1683 she and Locke had formed a romantic attachment, which had included the writing of love letters under the names of ‘Philoclea’ and ‘Philander’. Maurice Cranston is not sure whether ‘Locke wished to be Damaris Cudworth’s husband as well as her loving admirer’. However this may be, by the time Locke returned from his Dutch exile Damaris had married. When Locke moved to Oates, he came into a house that was already well occupied. Sir Masham had sons and a daughter from his first marriage and a son by Damaris, Francis Cudworth Masham (1686-1731). Locke took an interest in the education of this child. Francis’ mother taught him Latin according to Locke’s method; the philosopher provided him with books, introduced the French tutor Pierre Coste (1668-1747) to him and at his death bequeathed him half his library. Francis may have been in Locke’s mind when he was giving advice to young gentlemen in the Conduct.

The Masham family made Oates a place of agreeable retirement where the ageing philosopher could receive his many friends and acquaintances. One of his oldest friends was the prosperous landowner Edward Clarke (c. 1650-c. 1710), whose wife Mary Jepp (d. 1706) was related to Locke. It was not until after the Glorious Revolution that Clarke came into public life. He entered the House of Commons for Taunton in 1690 and from 1694 until 1699 he was a Commissioner of Excise. In Parliament he vented many of Locke’s political and monetary opinions. His questions concerning the upbringing of his son Edward were at the root of Locke’s Some Thoughts concerning Education.

Another important relation in Locke’s later years was his second cousin Peter King (1669-1734), who was created Baron King of Ockham in 1725 and who served as Lord Chancellor from that year until 1733. King assisted Locke in his business affairs and his correspondence. He inherited the other half of Locke’s library together with his cousin’s manuscripts, including those of the Conduct. He was also entrusted with the execution of Locke’s last will and was the recipient

12 Cranston, John Locke, p. 342.
13 Ibid. p. 218.
16 Corr. 3376, VI, p. 294; Coste produced French translations of Some Thoughts concerning Education (1695), The Reasonableness of Christianity (1696) and the Essay (1700).
of a letter with instructions concerning the publications of the *Conduct* and some other unfinished works. King had a keen interest in theology and he wrote *An Enquiry into the Constitution, Discipline, Unity and Worship, of the Primitive Church* (1691) and *The History of the Apostles Creed* (1702). It was probably King who took care of the First Edition of the *Conduct* in 1706.\footnote{See below, ‘Text’, §3 [49].}

A more recent friend was Anthony Collins (1676-1729), a young Etonian with whom Locke had become acquainted as late as the Spring of 1703. Collins was to publish two tributes to Locke in 1708 and 1720. He became a deist and a freethinker and in the appendix to his *Scheme of Literal Prophecy considered* (1726) he would make a significant contribution to the development of modern biblical criticism with his arguments for the assertion that the Old Testament Book of Daniel is a forgery. Another intimate friend was the historian and political writer James Tyrell (1642-1718), with whom Locke shared much the same Whig views and with whom he had collaborated (in 1681-1683) in writing an (unfinished) pamphlet in defence of Nonconformity as opposed to religious conformity.\footnote{The pamphlet had been designed as an answer to the ‘Mischief of Separation’ (1680) and ‘The Unreasonableness of Separation’ (1681) by Edward Stillingfleet. See Corr. 343, I, p. 49, note, and Cranston, John Locke, pp. 193-194.}

Tyrell took care of some of Locke’s books during the latter’s Dutch exile. Other visitors at Oates were the Deist philosopher Anthony Ashley Cooper (1671-1713), third Earl of Shaftesbury, grandson of the first Earl and Locke’s former pupil, and Isaac Newton, with whom the philosopher liked to discuss such theological matters as their heterodox opinions concerning the Trinity. These meetings may have prompted the scientist to complain about his host’s loquacity.\footnote{Harrison/Laslett, p. 10.}

Until 1689 Locke was still a relatively unknown scholar with hardly anything in print. However, in that year appeared his *Epistola de tolerantia*, the *Two Treatises of Government* and *An Essay concerning Human Understanding* (a French summary had appeared a year before). The first two works were published anonymously, but the *Essay*, unlike any of his other major works, was published under his own name and brought him swift renown. After the Glorious Revolution Locke became one of the wise old men of the Whig party. In 1689 King William offered him the post of Ambassador to the Elector of Brandenburg, an offer that Locke declined to accept on account of his fear that the cold air of the country and the ‘warne drinking’ of its inhabitants might be contrary to his frail constitution.\footnote{Corr. 1116, III, pp. 573-576.} Another offer of high office by William in 1698, possibly that of Embassy Secretary in
Paris, was also turned down. However, in 1689 Locke had accepted the light function of Commissioner of Appeals and from 1696 until 1700, when health problems became an insurmountable barrier, he held the more substantial post of Commissioner at the Board of Trade.

In spite of his administrative duties and his bad health, Locke managed to maintain a high level of productivity during the last fifteen years of his life. He kept up a voluminous correspondence; two-thirds of the 3,648 numbered letters in De Beer’s edition (containing letters of Locke but also of his correspondents) were written after 1 January 1689. In 1690 he published *A Second Letter concerning Toleration*, and in 1692 the *Third Letter* appeared. The year 1691 saw the publication of *Some Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest and Raising the Value of Money*. In 1693 followed *Some Thoughts concerning Education*. In this period he also started to write additions for the Second Edition of the *Essay* (1694). Early criticism of the *Essay* by John Norris (1657-1711), an admirer of the philosophy of Malebranche, occasioned Locke to draft three replies: *JL Answer to Mr Norris’s Reflection, Remarks upon some of Mr Norris’s Books* and *An Examination of P. Malebranche’s Opinion of Seeing All Things in God*. Eventually Locke decided against including this polemical material in the *Essay* (the *Examination* would be published in O-1706). What he did include, though, was the problem named after William Molyneux. In 1695 appeared *The Reasonableness of Christianity* which, after attacks by the extreme Calvinist John Edwards (1637-1716), was followed by a *A Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity* (1695) and a *Second Vindication* (1697). In 1695 he also published his *Short Observations on a Printed Paper, Intituled, For encouraging the Coining Silver Money in England*, followed in the same year by *Further Considerations concerning Raising the Value of Money*. Finally, this year saw the publication of the Third Edition of the *Essay*, which did not contain substantial changes.

In the early Spring of 1697, recuperating at Oates from illness after a season filled with activities for the Board of Trade in London, Locke made a start with the *Conduct*. However, in this period he also had to fend off theological attacks on his *Essay* by Edward Stillingfleet (1635-1699), Bishop of Worcester. Locke acquitted himself of this task in three lengthy public letters, of which the first two were published in 1697 and the third in 1699. This last year also saw the Fourth Edition of the *Essay*, with the new chapters on ‘Association’ and on ‘Enthusiasm’. These items formed the last additions to the *Essay* that Locke was to publish. At about this time he may also have produced the *Elements of Natural Philosophy*.

22 Cf. *Conduct*, par. 79.
This elementary treatise on the contemporary state of knowledge in the various sciences was probably written for Francis Cudworth Masham and was clearly influenced by Newton. In 1702 he wrote a *Discourse of Miracles* (published in O-1706) and shortly before his death he started the *Fourth Letter on Toleration* (published in part in O-1706). In his last years Locke devoted his waning energy mainly to work on his voluminous *Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul*, which would be published posthumously in 1705-1707.

Locke’s public and polemical activities until 1700 and his steadily declining health may in large part account for the fact that the *Conduct* was never finished. In addition, it should not be forgotten that he never had been given to philosophy exclusively and that this discipline had always been in competition with other pursuits. Subject analysis of Locke’s final library tells us that only 269 of the 3,641 titles, a mere 7.4 per cent, consisted of books on what would nowadays be called philosophy. The nature of his other interests changed in the course of his life. In the earlier catalogue that he made of his books in Oxford in 1681 (comprising not more than 288 titles), 38.8 per cent were medical, 17.4 scientific and only 6.6 per cent theological; in the catalogue of his final library, medical and scientific titles had gone down to 11.1 and 6.6 per cent respectively, while the proportion of theological works had risen to 23.8 per cent. On 11 December 1694 he wrote to his Dutch friend, the Remonstrant theologian Philippus van Limborch (1633-1712), that he wanted to give his mind chiefly to theological studies, and in a letter of 11 September 1697 he informed William Molyneux that ‘having now wholly laid by the study of physic, I know not what comes out new, or worth reading, in that faculty’.

Locke had always been the kind of thinker that needs a sounding-board. It is well known that he first came to the subject matter of his *Essay* in the company of ‘five or six Friends meeting at my Chamber’ and he continued to organize similar gatherings during his Dutch exile. Molyneux was the main stimulus and recipient of Locke’s mature philosophical thought and what has remained of later...
General Introduction

letters suggests that no serious successor to this role appeared after the former’s death in 1698. On 15 June 1697 he had written to Molyneux:

My health, and business that I like as little as you do those you complain of, make me know what it is to want time. I often resolve not to trouble you any more with my complaints of the distance between us, and as often impertinently break that resolution. I never have any thoughts working in my head, or any new project start in my mind, but my wishes carry me immediately to you, and I desire to lay them before you. You may justly think this carries a pretty severe reflection on my country, or my self, that in it I have not a friend to communicate my thoughts with. I cannot much complain of want of friends to other purposes. But a man with whom one can freely seek truth, without any regard to old or new, fashionable or not fashionable, but truth merely for truth’s sake, is what is scarce to be found in an age, and such an one I take you to be.30

This effusion implies little appreciation of the intellectual endowments of his immediate surroundings, including his former ‘Philoclea’. King and Collins, whose acquaintance Locke made after having written this letter, may have been able to fill something of the vacuum that was left by the demise of Molyneux, but their interests were theological rather than philosophical. The same holds true for such important correspondents in his later years as Van Limborch and the Calvinist encyclopaedist and biblical scholar Jean le Clerc (1657-1736). Locke had started his adult life with a keen interest in medicine, physics and chemistry, and he died a theologian.31 The Conduct was his last sizable contribution to philosophy.32

2. Errors of the first and the second kind

In the introductory paragraphs to the Conduct, Locke stresses the importance of the understanding, its liability to errors of all kinds and the possibility of curing these errors:

… there are a great many natural defects in the understanding capable of amendment which are over looked and wholly neglected. And it is easy to perceive that men are guilty of a great many faults in the exercise and improvement of this facultie of the minde which hinders them in their progresse and keeps them in ignorance and error all their lives.33

30 Corr. 2277, VI, pp. 142-143.
31 Cf. Coste, ‘Lettre de Mr. Coste’, p. 49, on Locke’s last years at Oates: ‘Durant cet agréable séjour, il s’attachoit sur tout à l’étude de l’Ecriture Sainte; & n’employa presque à autre chose les derniéres années de sa vie.’
32 In 1700-1704 Locke also managed to make some alterations intended for the Fifth Edition of the Essay. However, these were not very substantial; cf. Nidditch, ‘Introduction’ to Essay, pp. xxxi-xxxii.
33 Conduct, par. 5.
He then proceeds in a very loose way to describe the nature and causes of these errors and to formulate remedies. At the start of paragraph 37 he suggests that in the previous pages he has given ‘the common and most general miscarriages which I thinke men should avoid or rectifie in a right conduct of their understandings’. In par. 38 he announces the intention of continuing more particularly with ‘several weaknesses or defects in the understanding’. This very broad division into general and particular errors is only roughly adhered to. Nevertheless, although its catalogue of errors, causes of error and remedies for error is rather bewildering in its lack of order, the Conduct has a clear function within the context of Locke’s work.

An important step towards a delineation of the function of the Conduct can be made once it is appreciated that most errors discussed by Locke fall into one of two major categories. In par. 98 Locke neatly sums up both types in a single clause:

… [1] the want of determined Ideas and [2] of Sagacity and exercise in finding out and laying in order intermediate Ideas …

This distinction should be placed in the larger framework of a parallel distinction in Locke’s ‘way of ideas’ as presented in the Essay. A discussion of this complicated topic can start with two words taken from the above quotation: ‘Ideas’ and ‘determined’. First, ‘idea(s)’ is the most frequently used noun in the Essay.34 Since the prime subject of the Essay is supposed to be the understanding,35 it might be asked why such excessive attention should be devoted to ideas. In the final paragraph of the Introduction Locke gives both an answer to this question and a definition of ‘idea’:

Thus much I thought necessary to say concerning the Occasion of this Enquiry into humane Understanding. But, before I proceed on to what I have thought on this Subject, I must here in the Entrance beg pardon of my Reader, for the frequent use of the Word Idea, which he will find in the following Treatise. It being the Term, which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the Object of the Understanding when a Man thinks, I have used it to express whatever is meant by Phantom, Notion, Species, or whatever it is, which the Mind can be employ’d about in thinking; and I could not avoid frequently using it.36

34 According to Malpas, ‘An Electronic Text of the Essay’, p. 81, the word Idea occurs 1,339 times and the word Ideas 2,343 times. The only words which exceed the combined 3,682 are: ‘a’, ‘and’, ‘be’, ’in’, ‘is’, ‘it’, ‘of’ and ‘to’.
35 Essay, Epistle to the Reader’, p. 6: ‘the Subject of this Treatise, the UNDERSTANDING’.
36 Essay, i.i.8: 47.
So, since the understanding has no other object but its ideas, any discussion of the former implies scrutiny of the latter as well: ‘Since the Mind, in all its Thoughts and Reasonings, hath no other immediate Object but its own Ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident, that our Knowledge is only conversant about them.’

Second, there is the word ‘determined’; it is related to the expression ‘clear and distinct’. In an addition to the ‘Epistle to the Reader’ that was included in the Fourth Edition of the Essay, Locke proposes to replace ‘clear and distinct’ by ‘determinate’ or ‘determined’. Yet ‘clear and distinct’ was allowed to remain a current expression in both the Essay and the Conduct. Clearness pertains to the relation between an idea and the object or objects from which it is taken. In the Essay Locke states that simple ideas are clear ‘when they are such as the Objects themselves, from whence they were taken, did or might, in a well-ordered Sensation or Perception, present them’. Complex ideas are clear in so far as the simple ideas of which they are composed are also clear. The opposite of a clear idea is an obscure idea. Obscurity of ideas can be caused by ‘dull Organs; or very slight and transient Impressions made by the Objects; or else a weakness in the Memory, not able to retain them as received’. Distinctness on the other hand, is a property of the relation between one idea and all other ideas. Locke defines a distinct idea by comparing it with a clear idea: ‘As a clear Idea is that whereof the Mind has such a full and evident perception, as it does receive from an outward Object operating duly on a well-disposed Organ, so a distinct idea is that wherein the Mind perceives a difference from all other …’ The opposite of a distinct idea is a confused idea: ‘and a confused Idea is such an one, as is not sufficiently distinguishable from another, from which it ought to be different’. Strictly speaking, confusion between different ideas is impossible:

For let any Idea be as it will, it can be no other but such as the Mind perceives it to be; and that very perception, sufficiently distinguishes it from all other Ideas, which cannot be other, i.e. different without being perceived to be so. No Idea therefore can be…

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39 However, for two instances of Locke actually replacing ‘clear and distinct’ by ‘determined’ see MS Locke e.1, p. 157 and p. 158 (Conduct, par. 65, text-critical notes). For the influence of Descartes on Locke’s use of ‘clear and distinct’, see below, §8.
40 Essay, II.xxix.: 363.
41 Essay, II.xxix.: 363.
42 Essay, II.xxix.: 364.
43 Essay, II.xxix.: 364.
be undistinguishable from another, from which it ought to be different, unless you would have it different from it self: for from all other, it is evidently different. However, we give names to our ideas and we should not forget that every idea, whether simple or complex, should have a precise name and every name should refer only to this idea and not to another idea. The problem is that human beings have great difficulty in adhering to this fundamental law and this opens wide scope for confusion: 'Now every Idea a man has, being visibly what it is, and distinct from all other Ideas but it self, that which makes it confused is, when it is such, that it may as well be called by another Name, as that which it is expressed by ...' So, confusion is not really a property of the relation between ideas, but rather of the relation between words on the one hand and ideas on the other.

The activity of 'discovering how far we have clear and distinct Ideas' forms the first stage in Locke's way of ideas. The second stage consists of the subsequent reasoning based on ideas that should all be clear and distinct. Reasoning becomes necessary when we look for the intermediate idea or ideas between the two ideas that we want to connect. Reasoning results in knowledge only after we have perceived the agreement or disagreement between each pair of adjacent ideas in the chain. Locke's most substantial discussion of reasoning is given in the context of his discussion of the three degrees of knowledge: intuitive, demonstrative and sensitive. Intuitive knowledge occurs when 'the Mind perceives the Agreement or Disagreement of two Ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention or any other'. However, if the mind is not capable of perceiving at once the agreement or disagreement of two ideas it must reason and this results in demonstrative knowledge:

... when the Mind cannot so bring its Ideas together, as by their immediate Comparison, and as it were Juxta-position, or application one to another, to perceive their Agreement or Disagreement, it is fain, by the Intervention of other Ideas (one or more, as it happens) to discover the Agreement or Disagreement, which it searches; and this is that which we call Reasoning.

Although clear and distinct ideas are necessary for the subsequent generation of knowledge, this is not a sufficient condition. In addition, if we want this process to be efficient, it is desirable that we do not 'dwell upon only particular Things'.

44 Essay, II.xxix.5: 364.
45 Essay, II.xxix.6: 364.
46 Essay, IV.iii.22: 533.
47 Essay, IV.ii.1: 530-531.
48 Essay, IV.ii.2: 532.
49 Essay, II.xxxii.6: 383.
Rather, we should make use of abstract ideas. Abstract ideas form the elements of the abstract principles that underpin scientific and moral knowledge. In the Conduct Locke dedicates glowing words of praise to principles:

There are fundamental truths that lie at the bottom as the basis upon which a great many others rest and in which they have their consistency; these are teeming truths rich in store with which they furnish the mind, and like the lights of heaven are not only beautiful and entertaining in themselves, but give light and evidence to other things that without them could not be seen or known.\textsuperscript{50}

However, abstract ideas are not formed at once; in the Essay it is pointed out that the mind has to bind its individual perceptions ‘… into Bundles, and rank them so into sorts, that what Knowledge it gets of any of them, it may thereby with assurance extend to all of that sort; and so advance by larger steps in that which is its great Business, Knowledge’.\textsuperscript{51} All this means that the relation between the two stages of the way of ideas is one of a complicated interaction. On the one hand the first stage provides the building bricks, consisting of abstract ideas that are clear and distinct, for the subsequent process of reasoning in the second stage. On the other hand, the clearness and distinctness and the abstractness of these elements is not given, but the result of previous polishing by reasoning.

Parallel to the two interrelated stages of the way of ideas run two kinds of equally related errors. An error of the first kind is to accept ideas that are obscure or confused as the basis of subsequent reasoning; an error of the second kind is a defect in reasoning itself. These are the two categories that were given above in the quotation from par. 98 of the Conduct:

… [1] the want of determined Ideas and [2] of Sagacity and exercise in finding out and laying in order intermediate Ideas …

In par. 10 Locke refers to a specific error of the first kind, consisting of ‘a custom of taking up with principles that are not self evident and very often not so much as true’. In so far as principles form the basis of subsequent reasonings, having wrong principles forms a serious error of the first kind; thus Locke writes in the Essay: ‘the way to improve our Knowledge, is not, I am sure, blindly, and with an implicit Faith, to receive and swallow Principles; but it is, I think, to get and fix in our minds clear, distinct, and complete ideas …’\textsuperscript{52} The error of not examining our principles looms large in the Conduct and has a prominent place amongst ‘the common and most general miscarriages which I think men should

\textsuperscript{50} Conduct, par. 84; cf. pars. 14 and 59.

\textsuperscript{51} Essay, II.xxxii.6: 386; cf. Conduct, par. 30: abstract ideas are ‘Framed by the understanding’.

\textsuperscript{52} Essay, IV.xii.6: 642.
avoid or rectifie in a right conduct of their understandings.\textsuperscript{53} When discussing this error, Locke gives special attention to Aristotelian schoolmen who waste the time of their pupils with ‘purely logical enquiries’\textsuperscript{54} and to the ‘zealous bigots’\textsuperscript{55} of the various religions; both fail to analyse the principles they build on. In the \textit{Essay} Locke clearly links this error to the theory of innate ideas. By telling their followers that the content of certain principles is innate, ‘Masters and Teachers’ try to dissuade their followers from inspecting these tenets.\textsuperscript{56} Another error of the first kind is not so much that of having wrong principles, but that of starting with one-sided principles: ‘that the principles from which we conclude the grounds upon which we bottom our reasoning are but a part some thing is left out which should goe into the reckoning to make it just and exact’.\textsuperscript{57} The case of erecting our opinions ‘upon one single view’, and the error of intellectual one-sidedness in general, is again used for a thinly veiled attack on Aristotelian logic.

Once we have taken the first hurdle of a prior examination of our principles, we have in our subsequent reasoning to take care of ‘observeing the connection of Ideas and following them in train’.\textsuperscript{58} Things go wrong at this stage when we reason either erroneously or not at all. On the whole Locke seems to be more afraid of errors of the first kind than of errors in reasoning itself. Once we have managed to get before us the basic material, clear and distinct ideas, we are not likely to make mistakes in any subsequent reasoning. Thus he writes in the \textit{Conduct}: ‘The faculty of Reasoning seldom or never deceives those who trust to it. its consequences from what it builds on are evident and certain but that, which it oftenest if not only misleads us in, is that the principles from which we conclude the grounds upon which we bottom our reasoning are but a part …’\textsuperscript{59} This point is also borne out by a passage in the \textit{Essay} where he gives five instances wherein reason may fail us: want of ideas, obscure and imperfect ideas, want of intermediate ideas, wrong principles and doubtful terms; with the exception of want of intermediate ideas, these are all clear instances of errors of the first kind.\textsuperscript{60} However, in the second stage hovers the ‘ill habit’ of not reasoning at all.\textsuperscript{61} So, we should be aware of error in both stages of the way of ideas, if only because errors

\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Conduct}, par. 37.
\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Conduct}, par. 84.
\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Conduct}, par. 67.
\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Conduct}, par. 98; also: pars. 24, 44 and 49.
\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Conduct}, par. 17.
\textsuperscript{59} \textit{Conduct}, par. 98.
\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Essay}, IV.xvii.9-13: 681-683.
\textsuperscript{61} \textit{Conduct}, par. 35.
of the first kind and of the second kind have a tendency to reinforce each other. Our reasonings have no use unless they are based on correct principles and it is by reasoning that we come to the clear and distinct ideas of which these principles should consist.

3. Causes of error

What leads us to error? Why is it that we take obscure, confused or one-sided principles and why do we fail to reason as we could and should? Locke discusses two general causes of error. Some errors arise because factors from outside impede the proper functioning of our understanding. Other errors are caused by defects in the understanding itself. The main extraneous cause of our errors is an ‘uneasiness of desire’, which usually takes the form of a passion, such as aversion, fear, anger, envy and shame. Passions tend to blind us by interposing themselves between us and the truth. Passions often determine our will, and when this happens, we are prone to error. However, our mind has the power to suspend the immediate execution and satisfaction of our passions and has the capacity to examine them closely before they are allowed to influence our judgements and actions. When this happens, we are free. So, our free will ultimately depends on the powers of our mind.

However, when Locke in the opening paragraph of the Conduct reduces the faculty of the will to that of the mind, he is primarily referring to a desirable situation. The rest of the Conduct is devoted to harsh reality. The desire that our opinions be true forms a great hindrance to our knowledge; our ‘natural tempers and passions’ influence our judgement; men ‘espouse opinions that best comport with their power, profit or credit’; their partiality prompts them to ‘a phantastical and wilde attributeing all knowledg to the Ancients alone or to the Modernes’; and passion is mentioned first when Locke gives several causes for the ‘transferring’ of thoughts. Transferring happens when our mind

63 Conduct, par. 67: ‘there is a correspondence in things and agreement and disagreement in Ideas discernable in very different degrees and there are eyes in men to see them if they please, only their eyes may be dimmed or dazeld and the discerning sight in them impaired or lost: Interest and passion dazels …’
64 Cf. Essay, IV.xx.12: 715: ‘Quod volumus, facilè credimus; what suits our Wishes, is forwardly believed, is, I suppose, what every one hath more than once experimented …’
65 Essay, II.xxi.47: 263.
66 Conduct, par. 54.
67 Conduct, par. 40.
68 Conduct, par. 41.
69 Conduct, par. 49.
is hindered in concentrating on the object we have chosen. One possible cause for this phenomenon is when ‘Love, or Anger Fear or Greif’ bring us ‘under the power of an enchantment’.70

Much of Locke’s attention for the passions as sources of error is in line with the preoccupations of other philosophers in the seventeenth century.71 Of more interest is his discussion of the causes of error that pertain not to our passions, but to defects in our understanding itself. Here the great problem is habit or custom. It is custom that causes a ‘takeing up with principles that are not self evident and very often not soe much as true’.72 The most interesting instance of the nefarious influence of ‘the empire of habit’ is that of the wrong association of ideas. Although Hobbes73 contributed at least as much to an associationist psychology as Locke, it was the latter who coined the term ‘association of ideas’ and it was he who would be most important for subsequent developments of the theme during the eighteenth century.74 Locke mentioned the concept first in MS e.1, in what was projected as an addition to the Fourth Edition of the Essay. As was noted above, work on this subject had probably started at about April 1695, when it was mentioned to Molyneux.75 The lines on ‘Association’ cover pp. 32-56 in MS e.1. However, Locke did not include all this material in the new chapter on ‘Association’ in the Essay (Bk. II, Ch. 33), but used only the part covered by pp. 32-52. It was only later that he decided to use the remaining part, covered by pp. 52-56, for the Conduct (pars. 76-79 of the present edition).76 In the part that was to belong to the Essay, Locke points out that besides natural correspondence and connection,

... there is an other Connexion of Ideas wholly owing to Chance or Custom; Ideas that in themselves are not at all of kin, come to be so united in some Mens Minds, that 'tis

70 Conduct, par. 88.
71 Cf. James, Passion and Action, pp. 157-182.
72 Conduct, par. 11.
75 This letter of 26 April 1695, Corr. 1887, V, p. 353, does not betray much awareness of Hobbes’s contribution to the subject: ‘I think I shall make some other additions to be put into your latin translation, and particularly concerning the Connexion of Ideas, which has not, that I know, been hitherto consider’d and has, I guess, a greater influence upon our minds, than is usually taken notice of.’
very hard to separate them, they always keep in company, and the one no sooner at any time comes into the Understanding but its Associate appears with it…

Similarly, in the *Conduct*-part he remarks that ‘Such unnatural connections become by custom as natural to the mind, as sun and light’. In the *Essay*-part on ‘Association’ he gives the following cause for the growth of unnatural connections:

Custom settles habits of Thinking in the Understanding, as well as of Determining in the Will, and of Motions in the Body; all which seems to be but Trains of Motion in the Animal Spirits, which once set a going continue on in the same steps they have been used to, which by often treading are worn into a smooth path, and the Motion in it becomes easy and as it were Natural.

Like many other seventeenth-century philosophers Locke used the ‘Trains of Motion in the Animal Spirits’ to give a mechanical explanation for psychological and physiological phenomena.

For Locke, wrong association of ideas is a very important cause of error. In the *Essay*-part of ‘Association’ he says ‘that, perhaps, there is not any one thing that deserves more to be looked after’ and in the *Conduct*-part he points out that it is ‘as frequent a cause of mistake and error in us as perhaps any thing else that can be named’. The particular danger for Locke in the wrong association of ideas is that it impedes the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our individual ideas. Another reason why he is so afraid of wrong association is that a man is prone to it in every state of mind, not only when he is ‘under the power of an unruly Passion’, but also ‘in the steady calm course of his life’, and since it is ‘a very hard thing to convince any one that things are not soe, and naturaly soe as they constantly appear to him’, it is an error difficult to eradicate. By corrupting the very basic material of our reasonings, the habit of wrong association is a powerful cause for errors of the first kind. Indeed, in the *Conduct* it is given as cause for the process by which ‘loose foundations become infallible principles’.

77 Essay, II.xxxiii.5: 395.
78 Conduct, par. 77.
79 Essay, II.xxxiii.6: 396.
81 Essay, II.xxxiii.9: 397 and Conduct, par. 76.
82 Essay, II.xxxiii.4: 395.
83 Conduct, par. 76.
84 Conduct, par. 77; cf. par. 78.
The general importance of habit as a cause of (moral) error is already prominent in Francis Bacon’s *De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum*. Furthermore, the force of habit and custom seems to have a special relevance for the second of the ‘Idols’ that are presented in the ‘Aphorisms’ to the *Novum Organum*:

The Idols of the Cave are the idols of the individual man. For every one (besides the errors common to human nature in general) has a cave or den of his own, which refracts and discolours the light of nature; owing either to his own proper and peculiar nature; or to his education and conversation with others; or to the reading of books, and the authority of those whom he esteems and admires; or to the differences of impressions, accordingly as they take place in a mind preoccupied and predisposed or in a mind indifferent and settled; or the like.

Although the precise extent of Bacon’s influence on Locke’s *Essay* in general remains to be assessed, there can be found clear instances in the *Conduct* where Locke seems to hark back to Bacon, not only in his discussion of habit as a cause of error, but also in his discussion of individual habits and of their remedy. Bacon is one of the few philosophers mentioned by name in the *Conduct*. It may not be a matter of coincidence that we see the clearest sign of Locke reading the *Novum Organum* appearing in 1690 at the earliest, which is after the completion of the *Essay* but well before work had started on the *Conduct*.

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87 Cf. Wood, ‘The Baconian Character of Locke’s “Essay”’, p. 82: ‘In sum, the evidence is compelling that Locke is a Baconian, and that the *Essay concerning Understanding* is fundamentally Baconian, whether directly or indirectly derivative’, with more wary remarks, e.g. Romanell, ‘The Scientific and Medical Genealogy in Locke’s “Historical, Plain Method”’, pp. 480-481 and Ayers, ‘Theories of Knowledge and Belief’, p. 1045.

88 *Conduct*, pars. 2-3.

89 Locke’s interleaved copy of Blount’s *Censura Celebriorum Authorum*, London, 1690 (Harrison/Laslett, nr. 358, p. 88), contains extracts from Book I, aphorisms 65 and 67 (Locke mistakenly gives the number ‘68’), 105 (all opposite p. 19, ‘Plato’) and 67 (again) and 98 (both opposite p. 22, ‘Aristoles’ [sic]); I thank Dr. J. R. Milton for bringing this information to my attention.
In the Conduct Locke notes that there are ‘a great many natural defects in the understanding capable of amendment’.\(^9^0\) His favourite remedy for error is mental exercise or practice. The relation between errors caused by habit or custom, and remedies consisting of practice, is one of *similia similibus curantur*. Wrong habits or customs are caused by the frequent repetition of ‘Trains of Motion in the Animal Spirits’ (see above, §3) and wrong repetitions must be prevented or cured by right repetitions provided by practice; ‘practise must setle the habit’.\(^9^1\) The important role of habit or custom as both cause and remedy for error is clearly present in the case of wrong association of ideas. This wrong custom must be prevented by gradual and repetitive training. Educators should ‘take heed as much as may be that in their [young pupil’s] tender years Ideas that have noe natural cohesion come not to be united in their heads and that this rule be often inculcated to them …’\(^9^2\) In Education Locke remarks that in this way ‘you may turn them as you please’.\(^9^3\) The mind is like the body; both can be raised to a higher pitch only by repeated actions.\(^9^4\) Since ‘we are of the ruminating kinde’,\(^9^5\) repetition corresponds well with our nature. Locke’s stress on the importance of practice, the analogy between mind and body and the gradual development of our mental capabilities was not new. These themes can also be found in the works of such recent precursors as, for instance, Francis Bacon\(^9^6\) or John Amos Comenius (1592-1670).\(^9^7\) However, Locke used these well-known topics within the frame of the two stages of his analysis of ideas. In the first stage we often fail

\(^9^0\) *Conduct*, par. 5.
\(^9^1\) *Conduct*, par. 8.
\(^9^2\) *Conduct*, par. 78.
\(^9^3\) Op. cit. §58, p. 117.
\(^9^4\) *Conduct*, pars. 7, 15 and 17.
\(^9^5\) *Conduct*, par. 45.
\(^9^6\) ‘Of Studies’, *Works*, VI, p. 497: ‘They [studies] perfect nature, and are perfected by experience: for natural abilities are like natural plants, that need proyning by study; and studies themselves do give forth directions too much at large, except they be bounded in by experience’; ibid. p. 498: ‘Nay there is no stond or impediment in the wit, but may be wrought out by fit studies: like as diseases of the body may have appropriate exercises’.
\(^9^7\) *Magna didactica*, p. 129: ‘…perduci ad soliditatem non posse eruditionem sine repetitionibus et exercitiiis quam cerebrerimis et quam dexterrime institutis’; and p. 162: ‘Exercitia hae continuanda sunt, donec habitum artis inducant. Nam *Solus et artifices qui facit, usus erit*. Quotation from Ovid, *Ars amatoria*, Bk. II, 675-676: ‘Adde, quod est illis operum prudentia maior, / Solus et artifices qui facit, usus adest’. ‘Add this, that they have greater acquaintance with their business, and they have experience, which alone give skill, upon their side …’, transl. J. H. Mozley.
to look into our own principles because this is 'a freedom which few men have
the notion of in them selves and fewer are allowed the practise of by others'.
Second, as to reasoning, it is practice that helps us 'in finding out and laying in
order intermediate Ideas'.

Since Locke in the Conduct presents not only an analysis of error but also
discusses ways to prevent and remedy errors, it is not surprising that his work
has come to be regarded as a work on education. Education, mental practice
included, pertains to our mental faculties. In a letter to Cary Mordaunt, Countess
of Peterborough, possibly written in September or October 1697, Locke gives the
following advice concerning the education of her son: 'When a man knows the
terms sees the method and has got an entrance into any of the sciences, twill
be time then to depend upon himself relye upon his own understanding and
exercise his own faculties which is the only way to improvement and mastery.'

A reasonably comprehensive description of mental faculties is given in the Essay,
Book II, Chapters ix-xi. In each instance Locke underlines the relation between
faculties and ideas. First, there is the faculty of (sensory) perception, which is
'the first Operation of all our intellectual Faculties'. Our capability of having
ideas at all is bound up closely with the faculty of perception: 'To ask, at what
time a Man has first any Ideas, is to ask, when he begins to perceive; having
Ideas, and Perception being the same thing.' A second faculty is that of the
retention of ideas; this task is performed either by actually contemplating ideas
or by storing them in our memory. Next, there is the faculty of discerning
and distinguishing between our ideas. Other mental faculties, by which the
mind operates 'about’ its ideas are those of comparing, composition, enlarging
and abstraction. More generally, when he compares it with the will, Locke
speaks about the faculty of understanding. This is the 'most elevated Faculty
of the Soul'. The understanding is at work in both phases of the way of ideas;
it takes our ideas apart until they are clear and distinct and it compares them
to generate knowledge. Thus, in the Conduct he states that 'great care should be
taken of the understanding to conduct it right in the search of knowledge and in the judgments it makes’. 108

The prominent place attached in the Conduct to practising our faculties, is connected with distinct views on the chief aim of education. Locke stresses the importance of raising pupils who take ‘the pains and trouble of thinking and examining for themselves’. 109 It is not enough to passively cram our heads with particular facts. This results in ‘nothing but history’. 110 Habit is a powerful source of error, and the aim of education is teaching pupils to make an optimal and free use of their mental faculties in all directions, rather than to produce specialists who are bound by the habits that were instilled by their masters.

The businesse of Education (…) is not as I thinke to make them [‘the yonge’] perfect in any one of the sciences but soe to open and dispose their mindes as may best make them capable of any, when they shall apply themselves to it. If men are for a long time accustomed only to one sort or method of thoughts, their mindes grow stif in it and doe not readily turne to an other. Tis therefor to give them this freedom that I thinke they should be made looke into all sorts of knowledg and exercise their understandings in soe wide a variety. But I doe not propose it as a variety and stock of knowledg but a varietie and freedom of thinkeing as an increase of the powers and activity of the minde, not as an enlargement of its possessions. 111

Locke’s educational programme can be seen as a plea for formal practice. This practice is formal in contradistinction to the material content of knowledge itself. Locke’s preference for education as ‘an increase of the powers and activity of the minde’ instead of education as ‘an enlargement of its possessions’ is exemplified in what he has to say about principles. As principles to be scrutinized he mentions material principles, such as the ‘principles in this or that science’ 112 or ‘principles of The Dogmatists, Methodists or Chymists’. 113 However, the aim of education is not that of replacing false material principles with true material principles. Rather, we must learn how to put principles to the test, and for this we must develop the general capacity of making a maximal and free use of our mental faculties, first of all our understanding: ‘This and this only is well principleing, and not the instilling a reverence and veneration for certain dogmas under the specious title of principles …’ 114 Our ‘natural reason’ is a ‘touch stone’, but it does

108 Conduct, par. 1.
109 Conduct, par. 98.
110 Conduct, par. 39.
111 Conduct, par. 44.
112 Conduct, par. 47.
113 Conduct, par. 68.
114 Conduct, par. 37.
not provide us with material principles; rather, it is a formal faculty that needs
training and guidance and that must be used to put these material principles to
the test.\textsuperscript{115}

Locke’s predilection for a formal practice of the faculties very well matched
the needs of the audience that he targeted with the \textit{Conduct}. The work was
not written for specialized scholars but for a general public of gentlemen, for ‘the
ingenuous part of man kind whose condition allows them leisure and letters’,\textsuperscript{116} or
more bluntly, for ‘men of little businesse and great leisure’.\textsuperscript{117} Locke’s pedagogical
advice in the \textit{Conduct} is in line with a tradition of courtly education in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The general aim was to produce individuals
who were fit to govern in peace and to serve in war. The members of the ruling
classes did not need specialized forms of learning and, as Locke was keen to point
out, they could do without scholastic training in particular.\textsuperscript{118} Rather, they were to
be trained with a mixture consisting of moral, religious, intellectual and physical
elements that were meant to further personal integrity, intellectual proficiency,
physical preparedness, and a civilized style of living.\textsuperscript{119} The services that Locke
had rendered to the Shaftesbury family had made him well acquainted with the
educational needs of the upper classes. The clearest connection between these
needs and the importance of a formal exercise of our faculties is made not in the
\textit{Conduct}, but in \textit{Education}:

\begin{quote}
The great Work of a \textit{Governour} is to fashion the Carriage, and form the Mind; to settle
in his Pupil good Habits, and the Principles of Vertue and Wisdom; to give him by
little and little a view of Mankind; and work him into a love and imitation of what is
Excellent and Praise-worthy; and in the Prosecution of it to give him Vigour, Activity,
and Industry. The Studies which he sets him upon, are but as it were the Exercises of
his Faculties, and Imployment of his Time, to keep him from Sauntering and Idleness,
to teach him Application, and accustom him to take Pains, and to give him some little
taste of what his own industry must perfect.\textsuperscript{120}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{115} \textit{Conduct}, par. 98.
\textsuperscript{116} \textit{Conduct}, par. 78.
\textsuperscript{117} \textit{Conduct}, par. 44.
\textsuperscript{118} Cf. Feingold, ‘The Humanities’, p. 239: ‘… he [Locke] shrewdly appropriated the language
employed by the humanists in their ideal of education only to strip it of the substantial
scholarly content they had invested in it’.
\textsuperscript{119} Cf. Locke, ‘Some Thoughts concerning Reading and Study’, p. 398: ‘he who would be
universally knowing must acquaint himself with the objects of all sciences. But this is not
necessary to a gentleman, whose proper calling is the service of his country, and so is
most properly concerned in moral and political knowledge’. See also Stephens, \textit{The Courtly
\textsuperscript{120} \textit{Education}, §94, p. 156; see also ibid. §134, p. 194: ‘That which every Gentleman (that takes
care of his Education) desires for his Son, besides the Estate he leaves him, is contain’d (I
Since the pedagogic advice given in the *Conduct* is destined for young gentlemen rather than for small children, Locke cannot limit himself to advice concerning the prevention of error. In addition, he feels obliged to tell something about the removal of errors that have accumulated in earlier years by wrong habits, instilled by a defective education. Once things have gone wrong in this respect, it is not easy to administer effective cures. However, when he concludes a discussion of the prevention of error he does try to suggest a cure: ‘This is for caution against this evil before it be thoroughly riveted by custom in the understanding, but he that would cure it when habit has established it, must nicely observe the very quick and almost imperceptible motions of the minde in its habitual actions.’

He refers here to the ‘Trains of Motion in the Animal Spirits’ that he regards as the mechanical causes for habitual errors. So, in cases where the damage is already done, the first requirement for cure is an appreciation of the workings of our own mind. This is indeed the central subject of the *Essay*, as is witnessed by the opening sentence of the first chapter: ‘Since it is the *Understanding* that sets Man above the rest of sensible Beings, and gives him all the Advantage and Dominion, which he has over them; it is certainly a Subject, even for its Nobleness, worth our Labor to enquire into.’ Locke promises many practical advantages from this study and its relevance for the central theme of the *Conduct*, that of error, is already very eloquently formulated in his early essay ‘Of Study’ (1677):

> It will be of no hindrance at all to our studies if we sometimes study ourselves, i.e. our own abilities and defects. There are peculiar endowments and natural fitnesses, as well as defects and weaknesses, almost in every man’s mind. When we have considered and made ourselves acquainted with them, we shall not only be the better enabled to find out remedies for the infirmities, but we shall know the better how to turn ourselves to those things which we are best fitted to deal with, and so to apply ourselves in the course of our studies as we may be able to make the greatest advantage.

In order to cure the errors of our understanding, we should study it; which poses the question by means of what method we should embark on this inquiry.

suppose) in these four Things: *Virtue, Wisdom, Breeding, and Learning*. Virtue, not learning, is accorded the first place; ibid. §135, p. 195: ‘I place *Virtue* as the first and most necessary of those Endowments, that belong to a Man or a Gentleman; as absolutely requisite to make him valued and beloved by others, acceptable or tolerable to himself’. Also: ibid. §147, p. 207 and ibid. §200, p. 255.

121 *Conduct*, par. 79.

122 *Essay*, l. i. i. 43.

The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw a substantial growth in the attention to methodological questions. One reason for this phenomenon was a growing discontent with the methods of scholastic philosophy, which were perceived to block further advances in learning. Another motive was provided by sceptical tendencies that had gained force from the sixteenth century onwards. This development not only drew attention to the errors of our mental faculties, but also contributed towards the development of new methods that were meant to stem the pyrrhonist tide. Method is a vital subject in the Essay. The subject continued to intrigue Locke after the appearance of the First Edition in 1689.

Method has a prominent place in 'Enthusiasm', in 'Association' and in the Conduct, which are all (projected) additions to the Essay. A connection between at least one of these additions and the subject of method is borne out by MS Locke c.28 fols. 115-116, 'Understanding A', dated c. 1694 by P. Long,124 in which a fragment titled 'Method' is preceded by the heading (not followed by any text) ‘Enthusiasm’.

In the Essay, Locke did not prescribe one single philosophical or scientific method, to be applied to all branches of knowledge. His point is rather that our method should depend on the kind of objects that we are dealing with. These objects are ideas.125 Two kinds of ideas are of special relevance here. Firstly, there are modes, 'such complex Ideas, which however compounded, contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves'.126 The absence of this supposition implies that there is no difference between the nominal essence and real essence of these ideas; we can have completely adequate ideas of an ellipse or a triangle. An important category of modes is formed by the abstract ideas of mathematics, and the method suited for the study of modes is that of Euclid's geometrical demonstration.127 Locke, in accordance with most of his contemporaries, is an admirer of this method and points out that it can also be used in ethics, provided we give precise definitions of basic concepts like 'property' or 'injustice'.128 There is no limit to our knowledge of the relations between these ideas.

Secondly, Locke remarks that we are less fortunate with regard to our ideas of substances. Substances can be material or spiritual and the last category can be subdivided into finite (human minds) and infinite (God). The problem with substances is that since we have no knowledge of their real essence, we are in

124 Long, A Summary Catalogue, p. 29.
125 Cf. Essay, IV.xii.7: 643.
126 Essay, II.xii.4: 165.
127 Essay, IV.xii.7: 643.
the dark about the necessary coexistence of the diverse qualities that follow from this essence. More particularly, our ignorance concerning matter springs from the fact that we have no knowledge of its micro-structure. We can obtain knowledge of particular qualities of material substances one by one, but we cannot ‘from a Discovery of their real Essences, grasp at a time whole Sheaves’.\textsuperscript{129} Corpuscular physics was freshly revived in Locke’s time and getting enthusiastic attention by mechanistic philosophers. Locke accepted the ‘corpuscularian Hypothesis’ as being more likely than other accounts of material substances.\textsuperscript{130} His collaboration in Oxford with Robert Boyle, whom he had first met in 1660, had given him first-hand knowledge of corpuscular theories. However, given the difficulties in observing corpuscles and in describing their mutual relations, atomism for Locke seems to figure more as a confirmation of our limited capabilities than as a promising prospect for future scientific research. This view may have caused him to neglect contemporary developments in microscopy.\textsuperscript{131} The method to be followed concerning material substances is that of experience and history of macro-objects, which have the advantage of being readily apprehended by our bare senses. This method will not yield general knowledge, but can nevertheless be of great practical use in our daily life:

This way of getting, and improving our Knowledge in Substances only by Experience and History, which is all that the weakness of our Faculties in this State of Mediocrity, which we are in in this World, can attain to, makes me suspect, that natural Philosophy is not capable of being made a Science. (…) Experiments and Historical Observations we may have, from which we may draw Advantages of Ease and Health, and thereby increase our stock of Conveniences for this Life: but beyond this, I fear our Talents reach not, nor are our Faculties, as I guess, able to advance.\textsuperscript{132}

When inquiring into human understanding, Locke’s preferred method is rather the one prescribed for material substances than the one associated with modes. In the introduction to the \textit{Essay}, he declares that he wants to consider our mental faculties according to a ‘Historical, plain Method’.\textsuperscript{133} This well-known phrase can be broken down into three main aspects.\textsuperscript{134} First, there is the importance of experience. In the case of material substances, as opposed to modes, ‘the want of \textit{Ideas} of their real \textit{Essences} sends us from our Thoughts to the things themselves, as


\textsuperscript{130} \textit{Essay}, IV.iii.16: 547 and \textit{Education}, §193, pp. 247-248.

\textsuperscript{131} Cf. Wilson, \textit{The Invisible World}, pp. 230-244.

\textsuperscript{132} \textit{Essay}, IV.xii.10: 645.

\textsuperscript{133} \textit{Essay}, I.3.2: 44.

\textsuperscript{134} For a somewhat different treatment of the subject cf. Romanell, “The Scientific and Medical Genealogy of Locke’s “Historical, Plain Method”, \textit{passim}. 
they exist’. In the same way, if we want to give a history of human knowledge, we must appeal to experience and observation, and ‘... examine Things as really they are, and not to conclude they are, as we fancy our selves, or have been taught by others to imagine’. In the early modern era, philosophers as diverse as Bacon, Digby, Comenius and Malebranche can frequently be seen to use expressions like ‘Things as really they are’ in contradistinction to ‘words’, which places these terms in an anti-Scholastic context that is also present in the following passage in *Education*, where Locke discusses traditional rhetoric and logic: ‘Truth is to be found and supported by a mature and due Consideration of Things themselves, and not by artificial Terms and Ways of Arguing ...’ However, Locke’s ‘progressive’ anti-scholastic predilection for things themselves instead of words goes hand in hand with his ‘conservative’ preference for readily observable macro-objects rather than the investigation of micro-objects. When he delimits ‘the discerning Faculties of a Man’ in the introduction to his *Essay* as the object of his investigation, he utters clear aversion to prying into the physical micro-structure of our mental faculties:

I shall not at present meddle with the Physical Consideration of the Mind; or trouble my self to examine, wherein its Essence consists, or by what Motions of our Spirits, or Alterations of our Bodies, we come to have any Sensation by our Organs, or any Ideas in our Understandings; and whether those Ideas do in their Formation, any, or all of them, depend on Matter, or no.

The objects of Locke’s *plain* historical method are those that are readily accessible to our experience. This is the case for both material macro-objects and for our mental faculties.

Second, Locke’s method is *historical*. Like other contemporaries, he uses the term ‘history’ in both a general and a particular way. The general way is consistent with the primary connotation of the Greek word ὑστοχος, meaning enquiry or

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135 *Essay*, IV.xii.9: 644.
138 *Two Treatises*, p. 2.
139 *Magna Didactica*, p. 154.
142 *Essay*, i.i.2: 43.
general introduction

investigation, or the report containing the results of such an enquiry.\(^{143}\) These meanings are present in his introductory statement of the aim of the *Essay*:

It shall suffice to my present Purpose, to consider the discerning Faculties of a Man, as they are employ’d about the Objects, which they have to do with: and I shall imagine I have not wholly misemploy’d my self in the Thoughts I shall have on this Occasion, if, in this Historical, plain Method, I can give any Account of the Ways, whereby our Understandings come to attain those Notions of Things we have, and can set down any Measures of the Certainty of our Knowledge, or the Grounds of those Perswasions, which are to be found amongst Men, so various, different and wholly contradictory ...

\(^{144}\)

In addition, Locke uses the word ‘history’ in the more limited meaning of events happening in time, or the result of an inquiry into these events. The previous quotation suggests this meaning as well, but it is present more clearly in the following contention, made later on in Book II: ‘And thus I have given a short, and, I think, true *History of the first beginnings of Humane Knowledge*, whence the Mind has its first Objects, and by what steps it makes its Progress to the laying in, and storing up those *Ideas*, out of which is to be framed all the Knowledge it is capable of ...’\(^{145}\) The diachronic nature of the object of Locke’s enquiry is matched by the step-by-step method by which he tries to investigate it; the operations of our understanding are like material substances in that they cannot be grasped at a time by ‘whole Sheaves’.

Third, although Locke’s step-by-step history of our mental faculties has a limited scope of generalization, this is compensated by the fact that it can have great practical value in our daily life. Here we encounter another aspect of Locke’s pervasive polemic against the ‘useless Imagination of the Schools’.\(^{146}\) Also, there is again a parallel with material substances, of which we cannot have more than a narrowly circumscribed knowledge either, which however may give us great ‘Advantages of Ease and Health’. In a similar way it may be of great practical use to know the limits of our understanding: ‘If we can find out, how far the Understanding can extend its view; how far it has Faculties to attain Certainty; and in what Cases it can only judge and guess, we may learn to content our selves with what is attainable by us in this State.’\(^{147}\) The parallels between Locke’s method for the investigation of material substances and of mental substances


\(^{144}\) *Essay*, I.i.2: 43-44.

\(^{145}\) *Essay*, II.xii.13: 162.

\(^{146}\) *Essay*, IV.vi.8: 582.

\(^{147}\) *Essay*, I.i.4: 43.
are a reflection of his view that both form a part of one and the same nature, created by God. This ontological relation between nature and our natural faculties guarantees an epistemological fit between natural object and natural subject. Provided our understanding is properly trained, we are able both to perceive the natural connections between our ideas and to see the difference between natural and unnatural connections and associations. Whether this basic trust was justified is of course open to discussion, but it explains much of Locke’s impatience with philosophical scepticism, which he has been noted to treat ‘in a cavalier fashion’. He fails to see the practical point of scepticism in our present state:

That the certainty of Things existing in rerum Naturâ, when we have the testimony of our Senses for it, is not only as great as our frame can attain to, but as our Condition needs. For our Faculties being suited not to the full extent of Being, nor to a perfect, clear, comprehensive Knowledge of things free from all doubt and scruple; but to the preservation of us, in whom they are; and accommodated to the use of Life: they serve to our purpose well enough, if they will but give us certain notice of those Things, which are convenient or inconvenient to us.

The mental faculties that God has given us come ‘exceeding short of the vast Extent of Things’. The topic of the narrow cognitive limits which God has conferred on us in our ‘present state’ is stressed repeatedly in the Essay, especially in Book IV. However, God has given men ‘Light enough to lead them to the Knowledge of their Maker, and the sight of their own Duties’. In general, our natural faculties tell us what things are good and thus to be pursued and what things are bad and thus to be avoided, and this makes them suitable enough for our present state. Provided that they are guided by a historical method, our natural faculties can supply us with valuable knowledge about material substances or about these faculties themselves, and in so far as this is the case, sceptical doubts are largely irrelevant. Locke’s methodological interest was rooted more in a desire to further practical knowledge than in a wish to silence pyrrhonism.

Locke’s historical method is largely in accordance with the empirical tenets embraced by Bacon and the Royal Society. However, it may be possible to detect a more specific early influence that occurred well before he started work on even the

149 Essay, IV.xi.8: 634.
150 Essay, I.i.5: 43.
151 Essay, IV.iii.6: 539-543; ibid. IV.iii.22: 553; ibid. IV.iv.14: 570; ibid. IV.xi.8: 634-635; ibid. IV.xii.10: 645; ibid. IV.xiv.2: 652 and ibid. IV.xvi.4: 659-661; see also ‘Of Study’, p. 419.
152 Essay, I.i.5: 43.
first Draft of his Essay. In 1667 he left Oxford to join the household of Anthony Ashley Cooper (Earl of Shaftesbury in 1672) in London. An interesting aspect of Locke’s years in the capital was his friendship with Thomas Sydenham (1624-1689), the famous physician and author of the Methodus Curandi Febres Propriis Observationibus Superstructura (1666). Locke worked together with Sydenham, largely as a junior partner, on a practical and theoretical level. There are two manuscripts, both kept in the Public Record Office in London, that are a fruit of this co-operation. Anatomia, dated 1668, is in Locke’s handwriting, except for the opening sentence, which is in Sydenham’s hand. De arte medica, dated 1669, is entirely in Locke’s handwriting. These works can be used as indicators for the degree to which Locke was immersed in Sydenham’s medical methodology.

In De arte medica a method is defended that combines a maximum of patient, step-by-step observation of particular cases of illness with a minimum of theoretical constructions. Strong aversion is uttered against the ‘speculative theorems’ of scholastic philosophers, which are contrasted with ‘useful arts’ which have all ‘sprung from industry & observacion’. In the same vein, Anatomia stresses the importance of the ‘history & the advantage of a diligent observation of these diseases, of their beginning progresse & ways of cure’. While De arte medica is fairly middle-of-the-road in its anti-scholastic purport, the Anatomia is more remarkable in what it has to say about the limitations of anatomy. In this work it is maintained that ‘removing the pains & maladys of mankind’ is hampered by the fact that anatomy is not able to show us the causes of diseases. The reason why it fails to do this, is that ‘though we cut into the inside we see but the outside of things’. Anatomy considers organs on a macro-level, whereas the causes for diseases are situated on a micro-level, consisting of particles that are ‘too small & too subtile for the observation of our senses’. An anatomist who on a macro-level knows everything about the part of the body where a ‘virulent gonorrhæa’ can be found ‘is as far from knowing the cause of ye yellownesse or acrimony of the seed at that time as he that has never seen any more of a testicle,

153 PRO 30/24/47/2 fols. 31-8.
154 PRO 30/24/47/2 fols. 47-56.
155 On Anatomia and De arte medica cf. Walmsley, John Locke’s Natural Philosophy, pp. 110-122 and pp. 123-128 respectively.
156 Op. cit. fol. 32r. Quotations from Anatomia and De arte medica are taken from the transcription by Walmsley, John Locke’s Natural Philosophy, pp. 272-285 and pp. 286-295 respectively, reference is to the fol. nos. of the MSS.
157 Anatomia, fol. 31v.
159 Op. cit. fol. 34r.
than a dish lambstones fried & served up to a table'. So, most elements of the historical method that Locke used in writing the *Essay*, including a preference for the experience of 'things themselves' on a macro-level, accompanied with an acute sense of the limitations of this level, can be found already in the *Anatomia* and in *De arte medica*; and it has been noted that much of Locke’s subsequent influence followed from his application of this method of natural philosophy to the study of the human mind in the *Essay*.161

The methodological themes of *De arte medica* and of the *Anatomia* can be found already in the drafts for the *Essay*. Drafts A and B are both dated 1671, which is the year that Locke hit on the subject of the *Essay*. It is doubtful whether these documents contain Locke’s first thoughts on the matter, but they form the earliest extant material.162 The short Draft A does not yet contain a clear reference to Locke’s historical method, but in the longer Draft B, §2, there is the following passage:

It shall suffice to my present purpose to consider the discerning faculties of a man as they are imploied about the objects which they have to doe with & I shall have on this occasion if I can give any account of the ways whereby we come to atteine the knowledge of things & set downe any measures of the certainty of our knowledg or the grounds of those perswasions which are to be found amongst men soe various different & wholy contradictory …163

This passage was repeated almost literally in the introductory chapter to the *Essay* (see quotation above, second aspect of historical method). The only difference is that the passage in Draft B does not yet contain the phrase ‘Historical, plain Method’. However, in Draft C (written in 1685) we see appearing at the parallel place ‘historical plain method’.164

The subject of method in general occupies a central place in the *Conduct*. The problem of how to prevent and cure the errors of our understanding is of a methodological nature. However, our choice of method itself is as liable to the nefarious forces of habit and custom as anything else: ‘If men are for a long time accustomd only to one sort or method of thoughts, theyr mindes grow stif in it and doe not readily turne to an other.’165 Thus it is imperative that a
man should actively ‘seek out methods of improving his mind’. Locke uses the plural form when he speaks about ‘methods of enquiry’ and ‘methods of learning’. Indeed, the Conduct contains reiterations of the point made earlier in the Essay, i.e. that our method should depend on the kind of objects that we are dealing with: a man should ‘pursue his thoughts in that method which will be most agreeable to the nature of the thing’.

When Locke in the Conduct stresses the importance of experience of things themselves, his historical method again plays an important role: ‘For example were it my Business to understand physick would not the safer and readier way be to consult nature her self and informe my self in the history of diseases and their cures than espousing the principles of The Dogmatists, Methodists or Chymists engage in …’ Even more interesting is his use of the historical method in writing the Conduct itself. His approach here is very much in line with the prescriptions in Anatomia and De arte medica. We have noted Locke’s penchant in the Conduct for comparisons between our mind and our body (above, §4). The central theme of the Conduct, that of error, its causes and its remedies, is frequently expressed in terms analogical to that of bodily diseases and their cures:

There are several weaknesses or defects in the understanding either from the natural temper of the minde or ill habits taken up which hinder it in its progresse to knowledge. Of these there are as many possibly to be found if the minde were throughly studyd as there are diseases of the body, each wherof clogs and disables the understanding to some degree and therefor deserve to be looked after and cured.

More light on the importance of this frequently used analogy is thrown by Locke’s last letter to Peter King, dated 4 and 25 October 1704, where he informed his cousin about his wishes concerning MSS that contained unfinished work. Locke stresses that these papers amount to

very little more than extemporary views, layd down in suddain and imperfect draughts, which though intended to be revised and farther looked into afterwards, yet by the intervention of business, or preferable enquiries happend to be thrust aside and so lay neglected and sometimes quite forgotten.
One of these unfinished works was the *Conduct*, and on the first page of MS e.1 he had indeed written: ‘Mem: That these following discourses are to be writ out under their several heads into distinct Chapters, and then to be numbered and ranged according to their natural order.’ Now, what the ailing philosopher has to say on the *Conduct* in the farewell letter to his cousin, seems first of all to confirm the unfinished character of this work: ‘... what I have done in it is very far from a just treatise. All that I have done has been, as any miscarriage in that point has accidentially come into my minde, to set it downe, with those remedies for it that I could think of.’ However, Locke then continues: ‘This method though it makes not that hast to the end which one would wish, is yet perhaps the onely one can be followed in the case, it being here as in physick impossible for a physitian to describe a disease or seek remedies for it till he comes to meet with it.’

So, the disparate step-by-step discussion of errors and their cures in the *Conduct* is not just a symptom of haste and imperfection; it is at the same time an application of the historical method as formulated in the early medical manuscripts on a range of diseases — the disease in this case being not of a physical but of a mental nature.

We have noticed the paradigmatic role accorded to mathematics by Locke in relation to modes in the *Essay*. A final remark should be made on the methodological role accorded to this discipline in the *Conduct*, where he pays ample tribute to the importance of mathematics in the formal training of our mind. Mathematics settles in the minde ‘an habit of reasoning closely and in train’. It performs the task of teaching how to ‘reason well’, and in this respect it is a viable alternative to scholastic logic. This aim can be accomplished without it being necessary that men should try to become ‘deep mathematicians, but that having got the way of reasoning which that study necessarily brings the minde to they might be able to transfer it to other parts of knowldg …’ The importance that Locke ascribed to mathematics in the *Conduct* is thus of a predominantly didactic character. In this context Locke has little interest in the more technical

and set downe without method severall thoughts upon as they had at distinct times and on severell occasions come in my way and which I was now willing in this retreat to forme into a lesse confused and coherent discourse …

174 *Conduct*, par. 21.
175 *Conduct*, par. 17.
177 *Conduct*, par. 21; cf. par 17.
aspects of mathematics, and when he embarks on one of his many attacks against methodological one-sidedness, he does not forget to deride men who have 'soe used their heads to mathematical figures that giving a preference to the methods of that Science they introduce lines and diagrams into their study of divinity or politique enquirys as if noe thing could be known without them …' The evaluation of mathematics in the Conduet was summed up elegantly by Voltaire, who in his Lettres philosophiques would write about Locke: 'He had never been able to submit himself either to the drudgery of calculations or to the aridity of mathematical truths, which at first offer nothing to the mind that is appreciable; and no one proved better than he that one can have a geometrical mind without the help of geometry.' In the Conduet mathematics has the propaedeutic and formal function of exercising our mind; this implies repetition by pupils of what is already known, without adding much to the content of human knowledge.

In the Essay on the other hand, mathematics is not merely presented as a predominantly didactic instrument, but linked to a promising kind of new knowledge that is a goal in itself and that is exemplified by 'Mr. Newton', who 'in his never enough to be admired Book, has demonstrated several Propositions, which are so many new Truths, before unknown to the World, and are farther Advances in Mathematical Knowledge …' New knowledge is very much the result of the discovering, and finding out of proofs; and this means discovering intermediate ideas. Thus, from each of Newton's new propositions it can be said that it rests on 'that admirable Chain of intermediate Ideas, whereby he at first discovered it to be true'. When Locke stresses the success of mathematics in finding intermediate ideas, he especially mentions algebra.

Algebra is capable of finding the proofs that are exposed in a geometrical demonstration: 'Till Algebra, that great Instrument and Instance of Humane Sagacity, was discovered, Men, with Amazement, looked on several of the Demonstrations of ancient

178 Conduet, par. 49.
179 Op. cit. 'Treizième lettre. Sur M. Locke', p. 88: 'Il n'avait jamais pu se soumettre à la fatigue des calculs ni à la sécheresse des vérités mathématiques, qui ne présente d'abord rien de sensible à l'esprit; et personne n'a mieux prouvé que lui qu'on pouvait avoir l'esprit géomètre sans le secours de la géométrie.'
180 Cf. Educaton, §94, p. 156: 'For who expects, that under a Tutor a young Gentleman should be an accomplished Critick, Orator, or Logician? Go to the bottom of Metaphysicks, Natural Philoophy or Mathematicks?'
183 Essay, IV.i.9: 530.
184 Essay, IV.iii.18: 549 and IV.xii.15: 649.
Mathematiciens, and could scarce forbear to think the finding several of those
Proofs to be something more than humane.\textsuperscript{185} Locke is probably referring here
to Descartes’s new analytical geometry that, by reducing geometrical lines to
algebraical symbols, had opened up new vistas in the search for the intermediate
ideas that are required for mathematical proofs.\textsuperscript{186} However, in the \textit{Conduct} Locke
hardly discusses the discovery of intermediate ideas or the important role that
algebra can play in this process.\textsuperscript{187} Here he mentions mathematics in a context
that does not go much beyond ‘teaching it [Science] to others as far as it is
advanced’, while in the \textit{Essay} it is related to a ‘Method of raising any Science’.\textsuperscript{188}

6. \textit{An anti-scholastic logic of ideas}

Locke’s two stage analysis of ideas should be understood within the context of a
reaction against what he saw as the predominant features of scholastic logic. From
the late sixteenth century onwards syllogisms had held a place of eminence in the
study of valid inference.\textsuperscript{189} They formed the principle butt of Locke’s attacks on
Aristotelian ‘Masters of Logick’.\textsuperscript{190} As we have noted, the first stage of his way
of ideas implies a careful inspection of the clarity and distinctness of our ideas.
However, Locke’s problem with syllogisms is that they are used, and can be used
correctly, without this prior inspection. Syllogisms merely consist of words, and
for a syllogism to be correct, its words do not have to correspond with clear and
distinct ideas. This makes syllogisms eminently suited for senseless disputations.

As to the second stage: Locke is confident about the capability of our natural
faculties in tracing the natural connections between our ideas. His point about
syllogisms is that their order is not natural, but very artificial. This makes them
superfluous to say the least; God has provided mankind with ‘a Mind that can
reason without being instructed in Methods of Syllogizing: The Understanding
is not taught to reason by these Rules; it has a native Faculty to perceive the
Coherence, or Incoherence of its Ideas, and can range them right, without any
such perplexing Repetitions’.\textsuperscript{191} If syllogisms have any use at all in ‘the Schools’, it

\textsuperscript{185} \textit{Essay}, IV.xvii.11: 682.
\textsuperscript{186} See Descartes, \textit{La Géométrie}, AT VI, p. 371: ‘Mais souvent on n’a pas besoin de tracer ainsi
ces lignes sur le papier & il suffit de les designer par quelques lettres, chascune par vne seule.’
\textsuperscript{187} For a short remark on algebra in the \textit{Conduct}, see par. 25.
\textsuperscript{188} \textit{Essay}, IV.vii.4: 399.
\textsuperscript{189} Ashworth, ‘Traditional Logic’, p. 164.
\textsuperscript{190} \textit{Essay}, III.vi.32: 459. Locke’s most comprehensive discussion of syllogisms is in \textit{Essay}, IV.xvii.4-8: 670-681.
\textsuperscript{191} \textit{Essay}, IV.xvii.4: 671.
is that they allow their members ‘without Shame to deny the Agreement of Ideas, that do manifestly agree …’\textsuperscript{192} Also, syllogisms can be used for the exposition of existing knowledge, but are of no use for the generation of new knowledge. This is produced by the discovery of intermediary ideas, and we have seen him giving praise to the method used by mathematicians. The order of syllogisms is the product of a previous quest for intermediary ideas, not their source: ‘A man knows first, and then he is able to prove syllogistically. So that \textit{Syllogism} comes after Knowledge, and then a Man has little or no need for it.’\textsuperscript{193}

Locke’s distinction between errors of the first and the second kind, and the relevance of this distinction for the specific weaknesses of Aristotelian logicians, is graphically illustrated by his distinction between madness and foolishness. In the \textit{Essay} he points out that madmen are especially prone to errors of the first kind: ‘having joined together some \textit{Ideas} very wrongly, they mistake them for Truths; and they err as Men do, that argue from wrong Principles. For by the violence of their Imaginations, having taken their Fancies for Realities, they make right deductions from them’.\textsuperscript{194} Wrong association of ideas is a major cause of errors of the first kind, and wrong association is indeed described as a ‘sort of Madness’.\textsuperscript{195} On the other hand, idiots or ‘Naturals’ are easy victims to errors of the second kind, not in the sense that they reason wrongly but because they do not reason at all: ‘In fine, the defect in \textit{Naturals} seems to proceed from want of quickness, activity, and motion, in the intellectual Faculties, whereby they are deprived of Reason …’\textsuperscript{196} In King’s \textit{The Life of John Locke} there is a passage taken from Locke’s MSS on ‘Error’ that makes a similar distinction between errors of the first and the second kind by ascribing the first to madmen and the second to fools: ‘where a man argues right upon wrong notions or terms, he does like a madman; where he makes wrong consequences, he does like a fool …’\textsuperscript{197} On the same page, Locke again intimates that madness is a graver defect than foolishness. Here his motivation for this choice is clearly connected to his assault on scholastic logic: ‘For in the discursive faculty of the mind, I do not find that men are so apt to err; but it avails little that their syllogisms are right, if their terms be insignificant and obscure, or confused and indetermined, or that in their internal discourse deduction be regular, if their notions be wrong.’ Scholastic logicians

\textsuperscript{192} \textit{Essay}, IV.xvii.4: 675.  
\textsuperscript{193} \textit{Essay}, IV.xvii.6: 679.  
\textsuperscript{194} \textit{Essay}, II.xi.13: 161.  
\textsuperscript{195} \textit{Essay}, II.xxxiii.3: 395.  
\textsuperscript{196} \textit{Essay}, II.xi.13: 160-161.  
\textsuperscript{197} King, II. p. 175.
reason, sometimes even brilliantly, on notions and principles that they have not
looked into; this makes them comparable to madmen.

The purport of the Conduct is just as anti-scholastic as that of its parent work. In
the introductory paragraphs Locke launches an attack against Aristotelian logic
with a quotation from Bacon’s preface to the Instauratio Magna, in which the Lord
Chancellor complains that traditional logic ‘has served to confirm and establish
errors rather than to open a way to truth’.

Other parts of the Conduct contain variations on Locke’s disparaging introductory remarks: it is a mistake that a
‘few rules of Logick’ are of help against the neglect of our understanding and
the old logic tries to show ‘where in right reasoning consists’, without thereby
producing ‘a strict reasoner’.

Finally, there is the anti-scholastic contribution in the Conduct to Locke’s theory of ‘probability’. His enquiry into our understanding
comprises not only knowledge (which is always certain), but faith and opinion
(which is not certain) as well. One of the eminently important aspects of his 
Essay is that he gives a separate and respectable status to probable knowledge by
a detailed examination of ‘the Reasons and Degrees of Assent’.

In the fourth part of his Essay he tries to give precise criteria for the acceptability of various
degrees of probable knowledge. (Since according to Locke all knowledge is
certain, ‘probable knowledge’ is strictly speaking a contradiction in terms; his
own preferred expression is ‘probability’.)

One of Locke’s points in the Conduct is that when we enquire into probability it is not enough to analyse one argument
to its source. Instead, we will have to analyse and then to weigh different chains
of argument against each other. He stresses that the old logic does not provide
the instruments that are needed for such an analysis, so that on this subject

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198 Conduct, pars. 2 and 3.
199 Conduct, par. 5.
200 Conduct, par. 8.
201 Essay, I.1: 44. For Locke on ‘probable truths’ see also: ‘Miscellaneous Papers’ in King, II, p.
interplay between probabilistic notions developed in theological writings and in other fields,
as well as the importance of Locke’s writings for this interaction, cf. Shapiro, Probability and
Certainty, p. 268: ‘The ultimate spokesman of this generation was John Locke, who voiced
the shared concerns of scientists, theologians, historians, and lawyers. (...) For Englishmen,
the central intellectual phenomenon of the second half of the seventeenth century was the
peculiar interaction between efforts to establish a rational basis for an historically based,
nondogmatic, Protestant Christianity and comparable efforts to achieve a probabilistic basis
for the factual assertions of scientists, historians, and lawyers.’
203 Essay, IV.xvi.3: 655.
204 Conduct, pars. 21 and 22.
its adherents are led completely astray: ‘nor is it to be wonderd since the way of disputeing in the schools leads them quite away from it [truth] by insisting on one topical argument by the success of which the truth or falsehood of the question is to be determind …’ According to Locke, instead of comparing different chains of arguments, as should be done in the case of probable knowledge, scholastic logicians ignore the arguments that do not fit in with their pre-conceived theses.

The Essay not only contains a massive assault on scholastic logicians, it provides us with an alternative as well. The separate elements of this new logic have been discussed in the previous sections and can now be summarized. Firstly, there is his two stage way of ideas. In the first stage we must make sure that we start with clear and distinct ideas. The second stage consists of the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two clear and distinct ideas. In reasoning this activity is repeated, resulting in a chain of ideas that connects two ideas between which a connection was not at first perceived. We are naturally capable of perceiving the agreement or disagreement of ideas. For reasoning well, we do not need cumbersome syllogisms. Secondly, instead of focusing on the formalization of reasonings, the new logic concentrates on a prior inspection of the mental faculties. Ideas and faculties are closely connected. Thanks to our faculties we are furnished with ideas and capable of processing these ideas; and ideas are the objects which our faculties have ‘to do with’. Thirdly, there is a preoccupation with method that is intimately connected with both ideas and faculties. The problem of method comes down to the question of how we can best use our faculties in our pursuit of either certain or probable knowledge. The kind of method to be used depends on the kind of ideas that are presented to our mental faculties. In the case of modes the paradigmatic method is that of mathematics and in the case of ideas of material substances or of our own understanding, the preferred approach is the plain historical method of Sydenhamian medicine. The result is a logic that is less formal, that is more subject-oriented and that is focused more on epistemological and psychological questions than on what Locke in his Conduct described as the ‘Logic now in use’. His logic is a ‘logic of ideas’.

205 Conduct, par. 23.
206 Conduct, par. 2.
207 For the term ‘logic of ideas’, cf. Yolton, ‘Locke and the Seventeenth-Century Logic of Ideas’, passim. Cf. Buickerood, ‘The Natural History of the Understanding’, passim, who instead uses the term ‘facultive logic’, which is plausible, given the close connection between ideas and faculties. However, in Locke’s logic the accent is rather on the former than on the latter. For an example of what with more justice could be called a ‘facultative logic’ see below, §9, in my discussion of Malebranche.
The *Conduct* forms an integral part of Locke’s logic of ideas. It presents a discussion of the nature of the two kinds of error that are relevant to the two phases of his logic and gives causes for these errors and suggestions for prevention and remedy. Now that the *Conduct* is presented as part of Locke’s logic, we must come back to the undeniable presence of pedagogical aspects in this work. The new logic possessed some features that caused a blurring of the line by which it was separated from strictly pedagogical treatises. In its protest against the syllogistic subtleties of scholastic logicians it was informal to an aggressive degree. As a result it lost most of the technical characteristics that had set it apart from other disciplines. Moreover, Locke’s eminently practical outlook did not allow him to confine himself to an analysis of the nature and causes of errors. He felt obliged to continue with advice on how to prevent and cure them. He was not only interested in understanding the understanding but also in how to conduct it. This caused him to cover subjects in the *Conduct* that he had already treated more fully in his more exclusively pedagogical *Education*. However, in this respect the *Conduct* is not unique. In the *Essay* a similar reflex had made him cross the thin line between his new logic and pedagogy. When he describes the dangerous phenomenon of wrong association of ideas he continues with the exhortation ‘that those who have Children, or the charge of their Education, would think it worth their while diligently to watch, and carefully to prevent the undue Connexion of Ideas in the Minds of young People’. Most of Locke’s manifold pedagogical thoughts were not original. Classical authors, especially Aristotle, and later writers as Montaigne and Comenius, Englishmen such as Francis Bacon, George Puttenham (c. 1529-1590), Richard Mulcaster (c. 1530-1611), Samuel Hartlib (c. 1600-1662) and John Milton (1608-1674), as well as French authors who were Locke’s contemporaries, have all been suggested as sources of influence. However, in the *Essay* and the *Conduct*, much more than in *Education*, Locke’s educational views, whether original or not, are presented in the specific context of his logic of ideas. This logic was not developed *de novo*. In the next section Locke’s logic of ideas in general and the *Conduct* in particular will be placed in the even wider context of the content and structure of works by both Aristotelian and Cartesian predecessors.

208 *Essay*, II.xxxiii.8: 397.

Locke’s years as student and tutor in Oxford had offered him ample opportunity to become acquainted with Aristotelian logic. However, his repeatedly evoked spectre of the old logic (like that of innate ideas) is partly a caricature of his own making. At the beginning of the seventeenth century key disciplines in the Aristotelian tradition such as logic, physics and metaphysics, had already ceased to be the chief studies at Oxford (and at Cambridge as well). Nor was reading confined to commentators on Aristotle. Rather, the curriculum had acquired a distinctly humanistic tincture that showed especially in the attention given to language and literature. In the English Renaissance Thomas Elyot (c. 1490-1546), Roger Ascham (1515-1568) and Puttenham had given new actuality to the rhetorical works of Cicero and Quintilian.\footnote{On the role of rhetoric in Renaissance Britain, cf. Skinner, \textit{Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes}, pp. 19-211.} Logic was still an important element of the undergraduate curriculum at Oxford, but had to share this role with the other parts of the trivium (rhetoric and grammar) and also with moral philosophy, political philosophy, geometry and music. A large influx of upper-class students, who mostly felt no need to graduate, had prompted educators to include many subjects in the undergraduate curriculum. The inclusion of a wide range of topics in this programme had partly been made possible by a transformation in the grammar schools. These had started to produce students who were well versed in Latin and Greek and who had often already received a grounding in logic and rhetoric before they went up to Oxford or Cambridge.

Humanist attacks on the highly specialized and technical character of traditional logic were not only matched by a change in its relative weight vis-à-vis the other parts of the trivium, but also by changes in its perceived function. Its value for generating new truths from given truths was under increasing attack, especially in the freshly developing field of natural philosophy; this was the point of Bacon in his preface to the \textit{Instauratio Magna} in the passage quoted by Locke in the \textit{Conduct} (pars. 2-3). Bacon attacked traditional logic because it ‘comes very far short of the subtilty in the reall performances of nature’.\footnote{Cf. Tyacke, ‘Introduction’, to \textit{The History of the University of Oxford, Vol. IV}, p. 9: ‘that the attacks on logic by seventeenth-century contemporaries were largely confined to the realm of natural philosophy’.} However, in the same passage he still gives it a function ‘in civil affairs and the Arts which consisted in talke and opinion’. Whereas many scholastic philosophers had valued logic as a science that was capable of generating new knowledge, many scholars with a humanistic background tended to regard logic as an instrumental art that helped...
pupils in directing their minds and in organising knowledge they had already acquired by other means. Although logic thus gained a new relevance due to its perceived capability of forming the minds of the young, it had to share this role with mathematics. Given their role of propaedeutic studies which should foster the primary mental skills of young students, it is not surprising that both logic and mathematics were placed in the first years of the curriculum.212

This short sketch shows that the term ‘Aristotelian logic’ refers to a discipline that was rather more adaptable than Locke himself was prepared to acknowledge. His educational aims, especially that of a formal training of our mental faculties, were already announced by what by then was perceived as the function of logic in seventeenth-century Oxford: that of training the minds of young students. For most contemporaries of Locke (and also for many of his successors) there was no conflict between the contribution of traditional Aristotelian logic and that of the freshly reinvigorated discipline of mathematics towards this same instrumental goal. For example, although Thomas Sprat (1635-1713), founding member of the Royal Society, denied the usefulness of Aristotelian logic in the generation of new knowledge, he at the same time acknowledged that disputing, a favourite activity of traditional logicians, ‘is a very good instrument, to sharpen mens wits, and to make them versatil, and wary defenders of the Principles, which they already know …’213 If Locke showed more aggression here, this was because he wanted to supplant Aristotelian logic with his own logic.

The Bodleian Library MS Locke f.11, fols. 7v-57, gives us some information about the Peripatetic works on logic that Locke is likely to have been acquainted with. It is a small booklet with accounts of money received from and disbursed for his pupils from 1661 to 1666, when he was Tutor at Christ Church. Amongst items such as shoes, stockings, wood and chamber pots, Locke also entered the authors of the books that were bought for the students under his supervision. He gives three specific references to works on logic: ‘Du Trieu’s Logick’, ‘Sandersons Logick’ and ‘Smith’s Logic’.214 In addition he gives some names of authors that are known to have written works on logic, without mentioning, however, the title of these works: Martin Smiglecki (1564-1618),215 John Flavell (1596-1617).216

213 Sprat, History of the Royal-Society, p. 18.
214 MS Locke f.11, resp. fol. 8r, 10v and again 10v.
215 MS Locke f.11, fol. 8r and again fol. 10v. Smiglecius, Logica.
216 MS Locke f.11, fol. 10v. Flavel, Tractatus de demonstratione methodicus et polemicus.
Griffith Powell (1561-1620) and, most famous, Jacobus Zabarella (1532-1589).

My discussion will concentrate on Du Trieu, Sanderson and Smith; their works are mentioned by name and in addition these are works on logic in general, which is important if we want to gain insight in structural developments. The names entered by Locke in his booklet reflect the then common preponderance in Oxford of contemporary authors of textbooks over the works of mediaeval logicians or Aristotle’s *Organon* itself. The use of compendia was the consequence of the limited role of logic in an undergraduate curriculum that was filled with many other subjects. These compendia can be seen as answers, often quite apt, to changed curricular circumstances and their authors should not necessarily be considered ‘second-rate or worse.’

By the seventeenth century Aristotelian textbooks had become imbued with numerous mediaeval and some stoic elements. However, their basic content and structure was still largely in accordance with Aristotle’s logic itself. The order of his logical works as it has come down to posterity is probably based on editorial interventions by Andronicus of Rhodes (b. First Century BC), while the collective name *Organon* (‘instrument’ of science) has been used since about 200 AD. The first book of the *Organon* is the *Categories*, which treats of simple terms: subjects and predicates. In *De interpretatione* the core subject is that of the propositions which are formed by these terms. Propositions in their turn form the elements of syllogisms, which are treated in both *Analytics*. The *Analytica priora* gives a formal analysis of the structure of syllogisms in general. The *Analytica posteriora* is about the type of syllogisms that are used for a demonstration or scientific proof, and discusses themes related to the philosophy of science and to scientific method (e.g. the question of how we can find the first principles of the different sciences). The *Topica* is on dialectics, and deals with the practice of reasoning on probable rather than scientific or certain premises. Finally there is *De sophisticis elenchis*, which has the same theme as the *Conduct*, namely that of error. Sophistical arguments have the appearance of being good dialectical arguments, but in fact their premises or the deductions based on these premises are wrong. So, Aristotle’s logic is structured into three levels: terms (subjects and predicates),

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217 MS Locke f.11, fol. 10v. Powel, *Analysis lib. Aristotelis De sophisticis* and id., *Analysis analyticae priorum posteriorum sive librorum Aristotelis de Demonstratione*.
218 MS Locke f.11, fol. 11r (more on Zabarella below).
219 Milton, ‘The Scholastic Background to Locke’s Thought’, p. 31: ‘Most of the [scholastic] authors whom Locke read were second-rate or worse.’
propositions and syllogisms. Syllogisms can be demonstrative (certain), dialectical (probable) or sophistical (contentious).

Philippe du Trieu’s (1580-1645) *Manuductio ad logicam, sive dialectica, studiosœ iuventuti ad logicam preparanda* is a textbook that was wide-spread and that went through at least 44 editions.222 The Jesuit Du Trieu taught philosophy in the French town of Anzin (near Valenciennes). Locke owned a copy of the *Manuductio* himself.223 In addition, the Bodleian collection of Locke’s manuscripts contains a notebook that is partly filled with notes on the *Manuductio*. However, it is uncertain whether these notes are in Locke’s own hand.224 Du Trieu never forgets that he is writing for propaedeutic students and tries to give a simple introduction to logic.225 The structure of his work faithfully mirrors that of the *Organon*:226

I. De termino simplici
II. De enuntiatio
III. De syllogismo
IV. De locis

This division reflects the tripartite structure of Aristotle’s logic: term (*terminus*) — proposition (*enuntiatio*) — syllogism. The third treatise discusses demonstrative syllogisms and the fourth treats of dialectical and sophistical syllogisms. Du Trieu’s treatment of error follows the basic division made by Aristotle in *De sophisticis elenchis*,227 between refutations that depend on speech and refutations that are independent of speech. This holds true also for the subsequent subdivisions.228 However, all this does not imply that Du Trieu gives something like a direct summary of the *Organon*; his *Manuductio* is the product of a scholastic tradition in which, for example, his skipping methodological problems was not at all unusual.

The *Aditus ad logicam in usum eorum qui primò Academiam Salutant* (1613) by Samuel Smith (1587-1620) of Magdalen College, Oxford, presents a more

223 Harrison/Laslett, nr. 2982, p. 252.
228 *Manuductio*, Tract. IV, Pars Post., Ch. 1 ‘De fallaciis in dictione’, pp. 227-233, discusses ‘fallacia Æquivoocationis, Amphiboliae, Compositionis & Dispositionis, Accentus, Figure dictionis’; ibid. Ch. 2 ‘De fallaciis extra dictionem’, pp. 233-238, treats of ‘fallacia accidentis, Dicti secundùm quid & dicti simpliciter, Ignorationis elench, Consequentis, Pettitionis principij, Non cause ut causa, Plurium interrogationum ut virtus’. 
interesting case. Its division into three books (all without titles) is conventional enough: I. terms (voces simplices); II. propositions (voces complexæ); III. syllogisms (including demonstrative, topical and sophistic syllogisms). The discussion of sophisms is along the lines of the conventional distinction between fallacies within speech and fallacies that are independent of speech. However, the Aditus gives attention to a subject that is absent in the Manusuctio: that of method. The last part of Book III contains a brief section on order. The subject of order is presented as a natural sequel to that of syllogistic reasoning; both are a part of discourse, although they present different levels:

In the same way as syllogistic discourse teaches how to demonstrate one thing by means of another, discourse that is concerned with order shows how the definitions, divisions and other parts of any art or science are properly connected one with the other, so that some precede and others follow.

‘Order’ can also be called ‘method’; in Smith’s rendering both terms refer more to the arranging of existing knowledge than to the generation of new knowledge. He continues the above quotation:

This is commonly called order or method; indeed we use both names indiscriminately where things are thereby arranged in such a way that we become acquainted with them more easily.

The process of ordering can proceed in two different directions. The first is synthetical or compositive and goes from principles to conclusions. The second is analytical or resolutive and goes backward from conclusions to the principles from which these have been inferred. The subject of method with the logical text as its locus had been revived in the sixteenth century by Petrus Ramus (1515-1572) and Zabarella. Ramus had ended his Libri Scholarum dialecticarum with a book on method, which for him consisted mainly in a (dichotomous) ordering of existing bodies of knowledge; thus the book on method is called aptly ‘de Elenchis dispositionis’. However, in Zabarella’s De methodis libri quatuor we

229 Copy examined is from 1639.
find, in addition to a discussion of the disposition of entire bodies of existing knowledge, an examination of methods for finding and proving the answers for individual new problems by *methodus demonstrativa* and *methodus resolutiva*. Smith's concern for order shows the influence of Ramus and his distinction between compositive and resolutive that of Zabarella.

A second point of interest in the *Aditus* is that it provides us with an early glimpse of a subject-oriented understanding of this discipline. This is how Smith opens the first section of his third book:

In the first book we discussed simple terms and in the second book complex terms, where the former guide the first and the latter guide the second operation of the mind; what remains is the third part of logic, which guides the third operation of the mind and is called discourse.

However, not too much should be made of Smith’s division of logic into three acts of the mind. It did not change the established division of logic into terms, propositions and syllogisms. The possibility of building this division around our *intellectus operationes* had been discussed already in the sixteenth century by Zabarella in his *De natura logica*. In the case of Smith, the sporadic mentioning of this principle of organisation does not have any consequences for the traditional content of his Aristotelian logic.

Thirdly, the *Aditus* might be taken to pay an early tribute to what was to be another important theme in Locke’s logic of ideas, that of probable knowledge. Smith defines logic as ‘the science of discoursing probably and closely on any subject’. However, his reason for giving this definition is anything but forward looking. Logic is the art of disputation; and about things that are certain, there can be no disputes, so logic must be about things that can only be probable. Yet Smith does not seem to take this argument very seriously himself. When he starts his discussion of demonstrative reasoning in the second section of Book III,

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235 Op. cit. p. 92: ‘In primo libro de vocibus simplicibus, in secundo de complexis egimus, quatenus per illas prima, per has secunda mentis operatio dirigitur; restat jam tertia Logicae pars tertiam mentis operationem dirigens, quæ vocatur Discursus.’
he immediately points out that it has a necessary or apodictic — and thus not a probable — character.  

The *Logica Artis Compendium* (1615) by Robert Sanderson (1587–1663), Bishop of Lincoln (1660–1663), was the most popular textbook on logic in seventeenth-century England. Locke mentions Sanderson in a letter to W. Molyneux as someone who owed his mastery of Latin to repeated readings of Cicero. Locke owned a copy of the *Compendium* and also two other works by the same author. He had probably known Sanderson personally. The Bishop was an important source of influence on Locke's early *Essays on the Law of Nature* (written shortly after 1660). As is the case with Du Trieu and Smith, Sanderson's logic remains firmly within Peripatetic bounds, and in the first appendix the author gives generous praise to the medium that was to be mercilessly attacked by Locke: that of the disputation. The *Compendium* is organized according to the familiar tripartite division of terms–propositions–syllogisms:

I. De Simplicibus Terminis  
II. De Propositionibus  
III. De Discursu  

The last part comprises a discussion of demonstrative, topical and sophistical syllogisms. The discussion of the last category is again according to the Aristotelian division into fallacies that are dependent on speech and fallacies that are not. The third part ends with some cursory remarks on ‘Ordo seu Methodus’. Sanderson remarks that some authors assign to method a function that is distinct from ordering: that of inferring. However, for him (like Smith) this point is of little interest. According to Sanderson, method is a device for ordering rather than for generating new knowledge.

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240 Inspected copy is from 1618.  
241 Ashworth, ‘Introduction’ to Sanderson’s *Logica artis compendium*, p. xvi. Locke’s entry ‘Sandersons Logick’ is ambiguous, in so far as there circulated in England a text on logic by another Sanderson, whose first name was John: the *Institutionum dialecticarum libri quatuor* (1589). However, this book was less well known than the work by Robert Sanderson, and it does not have the word ‘logic’ in the title.  
243 *De juramenti promissorii obligatione prælectiones septem* and *De obligatione Conscientia*, nos. 2547 and 2548 in Harrison/Laslett, p. 225.  
Sanderson shows humanist influences in his definition of logic; it is not a science but an ‘instrumental art that guides our mind in becoming acquainted with everything intelligible’.\textsuperscript{247} Corresponding to this view of logic as an instrument in directing our minds is his likening of the three principal parts of logic to the three principal activities of the mind: the conception of simple terms; the composition and division of propositions; and argumentation and method, the instruments of discourse. However, as is the case with Smith, for Sanderson this appreciation of a psychological side of logic has no consequences for its conventional content nor for its equally conventional division into three parts. At least, this holds true for the main text of the \textit{Compendium}. The second appendix is more interesting, since its first chapter comes closer to an attention for the faculties of the mind in a logical context than anything that can be found in either Du Trieu or Smith. The title of this chapter is ‘De Quinque Habitibus mentis’, ‘On the five states of the mind’. Different disciplines require different mental states\textsuperscript{248} and it is important to have a knowledge of these states, of which there are five: knowledge of principles (\textit{intellectus principiorum}), pertaining to philosophical knowledge; science (\textit{scientia}); wisdom (\textit{sapientia}), all needed for forms of speculative knowledge; prudence (\textit{prudencia}); and art (\textit{ars}), both required for forms of practical knowledge. The first state is required for the knowledge of causes while the remaining four are required for the knowledge of different kinds of consequences.

Sanderson draws consequences from his explicit attention to mental states as a factor in the acquisition of knowledge that we have encountered already much more extensively in Locke’s logic of ideas. First, Sanderson points to the importance of repetitive exercise when he declares that mental states are qualities that must be acquired by ‘many actions’.\textsuperscript{249} Second, there is the acknowledgement that in this context errors are not to be sought in the reasonings of adversaries, but in the workings of our own mind. He points out that error itself is a mental state: ‘Error is a state by which the mind is inclined to assent without fear of sionum; atque \textit{Ordinem} disponere, \textit{Methodum} etiam infere: Nos \textit{ut} nobis integra discatur’.


\textsuperscript{248} Op. cit. ‘Appendix posterior’, pp. 89-90: ‘Nulla potest tractatio rite institui, nisi ad propriam suam \textit{Disciplinam} revocetur; nec \textit{Disciplinae} dextrè distinguì ab invicem, nisi prius constet ad quem habitum mentis quæque sit referenda.’

\textsuperscript{249} Op. cit. ‘Appendix posterior’, p. 90: ‘Est autem \textit{Habitus} mentis, qualitas actionibus acquisita, per quam intellectus proximè disponitur ad asentiendum alicui veritati infallibiliter.’
what is false’. Thus he seems to present an important argument for the use of a logic that examines our mental states. However, at the beginning of the chapter Sanderson declares that his remarks on mental states do not belong to logic proper. The chapter is part of an appendix that has been given the extremely noncommittal title of ‘Miscella’. In addition, it is telling that for his enumeration of five mental states he does not draw on Aristotle’s *Organon*, but on a passage in the *Ethica nicomachea*. Still, the fact remains that Sanderson includes this subject in a textbook on logic, if only in an appendix. He hopes that although this general subject does not belong to logic proper, it may be of use to young students. This may be an expression of his opinion concerning the instrumental function of logic as a general art that is supposed to direct and order the intellect. Sanderson was influenced by the trend of a growing attention to psychological and epistemological aspects within logic, but had not yet reached a verdict on the best place for these subjects within the frame of an Aristotelian textbook on logic.

To summarize, the logics of Du Trieu, Smith and Sanderson have a tripartite structure that reflects the main levels in Aristotle’s logic: those of terms, propositions and syllogisms. The content of their works remains largely conventional, but some elements, such as a casual treatment of methodological problems, a passing glance at probable knowledge and a limited interest in a more subject oriented logic, point to future developments. Finally, Sanderson’s treatment of mental states in an appendix entitled ‘Miscella’ calls attention to a problem that was to gain increasing relevance: that of the relation between traditional structure and novel content.


251 Op. cit. 6.3. 1139b14-18: ‘Αρξόμενοι οὖν ἄνωθεν περὶ αὐτῶν πάλιν λέγομεν. ἦστο δὴ οἷς ἄλληθεν ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ χαρακτήρι καὶ ἀπορία, πεντε τοῖς ἀρμόμοις ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶ τέχνη ἐπιστήμη φιλονομίας σοφία νοῦς· ὑπάρχει γὰρ καὶ δόξη ἐνδέχεται διαφεύγεσθαι’, ‘Let us begin, then, from the beginning, and discuss these states once more. Let it be assumed that the states by virtue of which the soul possesses truth by way of affirmation or denial are five in number, i.e. art, knowledge, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom, comprehension; for belief and opinion may be mistaken’, transl. Barnes, II, p. 1799.

The logical textbooks that Locke had first prescribed, and later came to vilify, foreshadow some elements of his informal logic. Moreover, these scholastic works provided both context and point of departure for subsequent structural changes. However, we must turn to Descartes as the most influential philosopher in developing each of the main characteristics of the content of the new logic. In her letter of 12 January 1705, containing biographical information about Locke that Jean le Clerc was to use for his 'Eloge', Damaris Masham wrote:

The first Books (as Mr Locke himself has told me) which gave him a relish of Philosophical Studies were those of Descartes. He was rejoiced in reading of these because tho' he very often differ'd in Opinion from this Writer, he yet found that what he said was very intelligible: from whence he was encourag'd to think That his not having understood others, had, possibly, not proceeded altogether from a defect in his Understanding.

Locke possessed the principal works of Descartes as well as an edition of his correspondence. During his stay in France he had made a detailed list of the Frenchman's works in his Journal (8 August 1677). On 7 March 1678, between two observations about a female patient suffering from 'a violent loosnesse', he even entered a more comprehensive 'Methode pour bien etudier la doctrine de Mr de Cartes', advising readers to start with the Discours de la méthode while also giving the works of some well-known Cartesian philosophers.

Locke was not only indebted to Descartes for much of the positive part of his logic, but also for the pars destruens. The privileged position of the syllogism had been under fierce attack ever since the Renaissance, and its most prominent critics before Locke had been Francis Bacon and Descartes. Locke's point that syllogisms are based merely on words and that the Aristotelians fail to check the correspondence between words and things, had already been made by Bacon. Furthermore, the assertion that the syllogism is first of all an expository device that does not add much in the way of finding new knowledge was already put forward by both Bacon and Descartes.


Next, we have seen Locke making the explicit charge of
the circular character of syllogisms; if they do not give rise to new knowledge, this
is because they are not the source but only the product of new knowledge. The
same complaint is made by Descartes in his *Regulae ad directionem ingenii* (of
which the very title prefigures *Of the Conduct of the Understanding*). Finally,
Locke echoes Descartes in his way of deriding the unnecessary artificial character
of syllogisms. However, this last point is explained best when we look at the
influence of Descartes on the positive side of Locke’s logic of ideas.

The trend towards a deeper interest in the epistemological and psychological
aspects of human cognition that had announced itself in some of the logical
textbooks that Locke had prescribed, was developed more forcefully in the novel
systems of decidedly anti-scholastic thinkers in the seventeenth century. In his
*Regulae* Descartes writes about the importance of surveying our instruments of
knowledge as an important step in the development of his new method. The
most important of these instruments is the intellect, to which are added
imagination, sense-perception and memory. In what has been dubbed his
‘facultative model’, the laws of logic are dictated by the laws of thought, rather
than the other way round. This orientation forms the background for Descartes’s
attack on the artificial character of Aristotelian logic. According to Descartes, the
main weakness of Aristotelian formal logic was its inability to reflect the natural
powers of our mental faculties, which left to themselves are quite able to make a
correct inference. This is thanks to what he called our *lumen naturale* or
*intuitus*, by which he did not understand

… the fluctuating testimony of the senses or the deceptive judgement of the imagination
as it boggles things together, but the conception of a clear and attentive mind, which is so
easy and distinct that there can be no room for doubt about what we are understanding.

pluspart de ses autres instructions servent plutost a expliquer a autruy les choses qu’on sçait,
on mesme, comme l’art de Lulle, a parler, sans iugement, de celles qu’on ignore, qu’a les
apprendre’.

verum concludat, nisi prius ejusdem materiam habuerint, id est, nisi eandem veritatem, quæ
in illo deductur, jam antè cognoverint’. The *Regulae* were not published in the Latin version
in which they were originally written until 1701, but during the time that Locke was working
on his *Essay*, its contents may very well have been available to him; manuscript copies are
known to have circulated in the Netherlands and France, a Dutch translation was published
in 1684 (Locke was able to read Dutch), and the Second Edition (and subsequent editions)
of the *Logique* of Port-Royal (1664) contained substantial passages based on this work. Cf.
236.

262 Gaukroger, *Cartesian Logic*, p. 130.
Alternatively, and this comes to the same thing, intuition is the indubitable conception of a clear and attentive mind which proceeds solely from the light of reason. Because it is simpler, it is more certain than deduction, though deduction, as we noted above, is not something a man can perform wrongly.

It is thanks to this *intuitus* that he knows that he exists, that he thinks and that a triangle is bound by just three sides and a sphere by a single surface. Locke has much the same confidence in our ‘native rustick Reason’. He seems to be echoing Descartes when he writes about intuition: ‘This part of Knowledge is irresistible, and like the bright Sun-shine, forces itself immediately to be perceived, as soon as ever the Mind turns its view that way; and leaves no room for Hesitation, Doubt, or Examination, but the Mind is presently filled with the clear Light of it.’ It is thanks to this natural ease by which the process of inference can be accomplished that errors of the second kind, concerning inference, are to be feared less than errors of the first kind, concerning the basis of inference, i.e. our ideas. The important place of intuition is an instance of the trend towards a more subject oriented logic. Instead of trying to convince others by discursive means, the goal of the logic of ideas was personal assurance.

The use of ‘idea’ in the seventeenth century, the key concept in the logic of ideas, can in most cases be traced back to its (re)introduction by Descartes. Rather than making a comprehensive comparison between the ways in which this term was used by Descartes and Locke, I shall focus on one vital aspect: that of clearness and distinctness. Descartes had stressed the importance of starting our reasonings with concepts that are analysed to such a degree that they are clear.

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263 Descartes, *Regulae*, Regula III, AT X, p. 368: *Per intuitum intelligo, non fluctuantem sensuum fidem, vel male componentis imaginatio veljudicium fallax; sed mentis purae & attentæ, tam facilem distinctumque conceptum, ut de eo, quod intelligimus, nulla prorsus dubitatione rellinquatur; seu, quod idem est, mentis purae et attentæ, non dubium conceptum, qui à solâ rationis luce nascitur, & ipsâmet deductione certior est, quia simplicior, quam tamen etiam ab homine malè fieri non posse suprà notavimus*, transl. CSM, I, p. 14.


266 *Essay*, IV.ii.1: 531.


268 Cf. Nuchelmans, *Logic in the Seventeenth Century*, p. 109. The use of ideas in a theory of language, as a third element together with words and things existing outside us, was by no means new. Many scholastic authors used a similar triad consisting of words, concepts and things. However, their opinions tended to diverge about the exact relation between these elements; cf. Ashworth, “‘Do Words Signify Ideas or ‘Things’?”, pp. 322-324. The triad of words, concepts and things is not mentioned in Du Trieu’s *Manuductio* and only very briefly in Smith’s *Aditus*, Bk. I, Ch. 2, p. 4 and Sanderson’s *Compendium*, Pt. I, Ch. 7, p. 22.
and distinct, and we have already addressed the same point in Locke’s philosophy (above, §2). However, Descartes and Locke give different thrusts to the criterion of clarity and distinctness. Descartes’s prime objective is to chase away the spectre of scepticism. Clear and distinct ideas have the vital function of bridging the gap between what we think and what exists outside our mind. Thus, at the start of the Third of his Meditationes Descartes thinks that he can ‘… lay it down as a general rule that whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true’. Clearness and distinctness is here doing a job that cannot be left to the senses. This point is made in the quoted definition of intuitus; instead of setting his stakes on ‘the fluctuating testimony of the senses’, Descartes confides in clear and distinct ideas that proceed ‘solely from the light of reason’.

Against this, Locke does not think that the clarity and distinctness of ideas can be used as a bridge to the existence of things, nor does he think that he needs such a link. For him this function is performed by the senses, and we have noted his testiness concerning scepticism about the relation between our ideas and their sensory cause (see above, §§5). When speaking about the intuition of clear and distinct ideas, Locke is primarily interested in another relation, that between an idea and another idea; knowledge consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. For Locke the relevance of intuition is not that it is a power that gives us knowledge about the existence of things. For him intuition is first of all a faculty that enables us to see that different ideas are not the same and that the same ideas are not different and thus ‘… that White is not Black, That a Circle is not a Triangle, That Three are more than Two, and equal to One and Two’. Thus, in so far as clarity pertains to the relation between ideas and things and distinctness to the relation between ideas (but see above, §2), it can be said that for Descartes the most relevant dimension of intuition is clarity while for Locke this is distinctness.

Another aspect of Locke’s logic of ideas is its preoccupation with method. Locke formulated, as noted earlier, two different methods, depending on the kind of ideas he surveyed: a demonstrative method very much inspired by mathematics for modes and his plain historical method coloured by his medical background for material and mental substances. Descartes also espoused two methods, also


depending on the objects under scrutiny. This may seem a surprising statement, given the emphasis that Descartes puts on the unity of all knowledge. In the preface to the French translation of his *Principia philosophiae* he makes the well-known comparison of his philosophic system with a tree, its roots forming his metaphysics, its trunk his general physics and its branches individual disciplines: medicine, mechanics and ethics.272

When speaking about his system as a whole, Descartes indeed stresses its mathematical certainty. When he gives his famous four methodical rules in the second part of his *Discours* he not only points out that they are modelled on the 'long chains of reasonings' of mathematicians, but also that these rules can provide us with certainty about 'all things that can fall under the knowledge of human beings'.273 The Cartesian vision is that of one science, a *mathesis universalis*, with one method.274 Within this general mathematical method, that was supposed to have use outside the field of mathematics itself, Descartes made the Zabarellian distinction between analytical and synthetical reasonings. In the Second Replies to the *Meditationes*, Descartes explains that we can proceed either synthetically, and start with general axioms from which we can deduce conclusions about particular truths, or analytically and start with particular problems until we have arrived at their constituent clear and distinct ideas.275 The first direction is most suited for the proof of truths that we have already obtained and was used most typically in traditional geometry. The second direction is especially apt for the discovery of new truths and used with great success in Descartes’s analytical algebra. Locke did not make an explicit distinction between analysis and synthesis, but he was well aware of the difference in using our reason in discovering proofs and in proving them (see above, §5).276

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272 Op. cit. AT IX-B, p. 14: ‘Ainsi toute la Philosophie est comme vn arbre, dont les racines sont la Metaphysique, le tronc est la Physique, & les branches qui sortent de ce tronc sont toutes les autres sciences, qui se reduisent à trois principales, à sçavoir la Medicine, la Mechanique & la Morale, j’entens la plus haute & la plus parfaite Morale, qui, presupposant vne entiere connoissance des autres sciences, est le dernier degré de la Sagesse.’

273 Op. cit. AT VI, p. 19: ‘Ces longues chaisnes de raisons, toutes simples & faciles, dont les Geometres ont coutume de se seruir, pour paruenir a leurs plus difficiles demonstrations, m’auoient donné occasion de m’imaginer que toutes les choses, qui peuvent tomber sous la connoissance des hommes, s’entresuisent en mesme façon …’


276 Cf. the difference between the first and the second degree of reasoning, made in *Essay*, IV.a.vii-3: 669.
Although Descartes boasts that his philosophy contains no explanation 'that is not mathematical and evident', the reality of his system belies the vision. There is a rift running right through the middle of the Cartesian system, and this has far-reaching methodological consequences. These can be appreciated by first having a closer look at Descartes's system as it was exposed in the *Principia philosophiæ* (1644). In Part I he starts with the Archimedean point of his *cogito*. The existence of his own spirit subsequently gives him assurances of the existence of God thanks to whom we know that we are not deceived in the truth of our clear and distinct ideas of immaterial things. From the metaphysical principles of the existence of an immutable God, Descartes then deduces in Part II the general principles of his mechanistic physics of matter in motion, comprising his three Laws of Nature and the statement that nature has a corpuscular structure. The exact way in which he deduces his Laws of Nature from God's immutability need not detain us here; the main point is that this deduction has an *a priori* character, in the sense that it goes from cause (metaphysical principle) to effect (physical principles) and that Descartes here completely omits sensory knowledge. Ideally, Descartes would like to continue this, according to him, certain deduction by deducing the explanation of 'other things' from his physical principles. However, here his project grinds to a halt; the reason for this is given most clearly not in the * Principia*, but in the *Discours*:

But I must also admit that the power of nature is so ample and so vast, and these principles so simple and so general, that I notice hardly any particular effect of which I do not know at once that it can be deduced from the principles in many different ways; and my greatest difficulty is usually to discover in which of these ways it depends on them. I know no other means to discover this than by seeking further observations whose outcomes vary according to which of these ways provides the correct explanation.

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277 Letter to Plempius, 3 October 1637, AT I, p. 421: ‘nempè, quod eo philosophandi genere var, in quo nulla ratio est, quæ non sit mathematica & euidens …’


279 *Discours*, AT VI, pp. 64-65: ‘Mais il faut aussi que j’avouë, que la puissance de la Nature est si ample & si vaste, & que ces Principes sont si simples & si généraux, que je ne remarque quasi plus aucun effet particulier, que d’abord ie ne connoisse qu’il peut en estre deduit en plusieurs diverses façons, & que ma plus grande difficulté est d’ordinaire de trouver en laquelle de ces façons il en depend. Car a cela ie ne scay point d’autre expedient, que de chercher derechef quelques experiences, qui soient telles, que leur euement ne soit pas le mesme, si c’est en l’uyne de ses façons qu’on doit l’expliquer, que si c’est en l’autre’, transl. in CSM, I, p. 144. For the contrast between ideal and reality in Cartesian method cf. Rogers, ‘Descartes and the Method of English Science’, pp. 238-244.
Descartes’s physical principles are so wide that it is possible to deduce more than one explanation for each of the different physical phenomena. On this level of his physics, the ideal method of geometrical a priori demonstration has to be supplemented with a method that is a posteriori and that goes from effect to cause with the help of sensual experience. On this level of the explanation of the individual physical phenomena, treated in parts III and IV of the *Principia*, Descartes uses theoretical models, which consist of hypotheses about the corpuscular micro-structure of nature that are illustrated by mechanical analogies with objects on a visible macro-level. These models form part of a larger theory formed by his Laws of Nature and are presented not as certain knowledge but as merely plausible accounts of reality. On this level of the explanation of phenomena, Descartes makes extensive use of sensory experience. This at least is the method that he pretends to follow; in a letter to Huygens he even goes so far as saying that he has checked his physical explanations with as many ‘experiences’ as there are rules in his writings.

So, Locke’s interest in method, and the choice of two kinds of methods, depending on two main categories of objects, are present already in Descartes. Descartes’s ideal of a geometrical demonstration, which he thought he had brought into practice on the level of metaphysical and physical principles, is to a large extent the method that Locke propounded for the analysis of modes. Moreover, the importance of sensory experiences in Descartes’s ‘way of models’ is at the heart of Locke’s historical method. However, the resemblances stop here. Descartes wanted to use experiences as a means of testing the plausibility of the hypotheses of his physical models. With these hypotheses he tried to bridge the gap between the visible world and the invisible micro-structures of his corpuscular physics. Much of the polemic thrust in Locke’s historical method is directed exactly against such ventures into the invisible. They form the background of his dislike for hypotheses; in a letter to William Molyneux of 15 June 1697 he wrote: ‘I have always thought, that laying down, and building upon hypotheses, has been one of the great hindrances of natural knowledge …’ By insisting that we stick to the level of the immediately observable, Locke’s historical method remains

281 Letter of June 1645, AT IV, pp. 224-225: ‘Car i’admire que, nonobstant que i’aye demonstré, en particulier, presque autant d’experiences qu’il y a de lignes en mes écrits, & qu’ayant généralement rendu raison, dans mes Principes, de tous les Phainomènes de la nature, i’aye expliqué, par mesme moyen, toutes les experiences qui peuvent etre faites touchant les cors inanimes, & qu’au contraire on n’en ait jamais bien expliqué aucune par les principes de la Philosophie vulgaire, ceux qui la suivent ne laissent pas de m’obiecter le défaut d’experiences.’
282 *Corr*. 2277, VI, p. 144.
much more in line with the common sense character of Aristotelian philosophy than is the case with Descartes’s abstract physics of corpuscular matter in motion. Another difference is that in practice Descartes, and even more so his followers, emphasized his first method, while in practice Locke stressed his own second method.

The two methods of both Descartes and Locke reflect a bipartition of the two kinds of objects to which these methods were supposed to belong. Their divisions are however not the same. Descartes’s bipartition runs, remarkably enough, right through his physics. On one side of the line are the abstract principles of his physics and on the other side are his explanations for the different phenomena in nature. Locke’s division is more straightforward in the sense that the study of modes is confined to the field of mathematics and to ethics, i.e. disciplines that do not posit the existence of things outside us that correspond to the ideas we have of them, while on the other hand this correspondence is assumed for ideas of substances, which comprise the entire field of physics, without a distinction between principles and phenomena. For Descartes, there is no fundamental difference between the principles of physics and those of mathematics.283 For Locke on the other hand, physics is an object of empirical investigation while mathematics are not.

To sum up, it can be said that the main aspects of Locke’s logic of ideas share vital characteristics with Descartes’s philosophy. Of course, Locke used his analysis of our faculties and the way these faculties generated ideas, as an argument against forms of innate knowledge:

> For I imagine any one will easily grant, That it would be impertinent to suppose, the Ideas of Colours innate in a Creature, to whom God hath given Sight, and a Power to receive them by the Eyes from external Objects: and no less unreasonable would it be to attribute several Truths, to the Impressions of Nature, and innate Characters, when we may observe in our selves Faculties, fit to attain as easie and certain Knowledge of them, as if they were Originally imprinted on the mind.284

And Descartes and the Cartesians are generally taken to be the principle butt of this attack. Nevertheless, Locke shared with Descartes some fundamental preconceptions that formed a logic wide enough to accommodate either innate knowledge or empirical knowledge. These similarities include the central place...


284 Essay, i.ii.1: 48.
given to clear and distinct ideas, a subject-oriented approach that is focussed on our mental faculties, and the first of their two methods.

9. The structure of Cartesian logic: Arnauld and Malebranche

The main points in Descartes’s logic of ideas were never brought together under the name of ‘logic’ by the philosopher himself. He left that to his successors, to some of whom we will turn now. La logique ou l’art de penser (1662), better known as the Logique de Port-Royal, occupies in many ways an intermediary position between Locke and his Aristotelian predecessors. It was written by Antoine Arnauld (1612-1694) and some collaborators, including Pierre Nicole (1625-1695). During his second stay in France (1675-1679), Locke had read numerous French philosophers, including works by Arnauld and Nicole.285 Locke owned various editions of Nicole’s Essais de morale.286 Although this work, by its attention to the force of passions and habits covers partly the same ground as the Conduct, there is, typical enough in the case of Locke, little evidence for any direct borrowing by the Englishman. Locke nevertheless produced a partial translation of this work that he offered to Margaret, Countess of Shaftesbury, as ‘a new French production, in a dress of my own making’.287

In France Locke bought a copy of the Logique. In the list of Cartesian philosophers that he entered in his Journal on 7 March 1678 (see above, §8), he describes the Logique (in far from impeccable French) as ‘un ouvrage les plus accompli qui ait encore paru en ce genre’.288 ‘The Logique proved indeed to be a very successful work and it was frequently reprinted right from it first appearance in 1662. The author used these occasions to answer his critics by numerous additions and changes, generally resulting in a softening of the bolder statements in the First Edition.289 I use the edition of which Locke had a copy in his library, i.e. the Paris 1674 re-issue of the Fourth Edition of 1671.290 The Logique is divided into four parts:

I. Containing reflections on ideas, or the first action of the mind, which is called conceiving.
II. Containing reflections people have made about their judgements.

286 Harrison/Laslett, nr. 2085a, p. 195.
287 Nicole, Discours, p. xxiii.
288 Locke’s Journal of 1678, MS Locke f.3, p. 178: ‘L’Art de penser 12”.
289 MS Locke f.3, p. 52.
291 Harrison/Laslett, nr. 1803, p. 178.
The subject matter of the first three parts coincides roughly with each of the three parts of the logic as treated in Aristotelian textbooks. However, some significant developments can be detected. In the case of Smith and Sanderson, the three main levels of logic were compared to three acts of the mind, without any consequences for the content of the three corresponding books or parts. The Logique on the other hand, while maintaining the format and much of the content of an Aristotelian textbook, makes much larger strides towards a 'facultative' logic. The title of each of the four books points to an operation of the mind: conceiving, judging, reasoning and ordering. A novel orientation is already announced by the subtitle of the work itself: l'art de penser. Logic is not the science of syllogisms but an art meant to develop our mind by means of a better understanding of this faculty. The aim of logic should not consist in teaching us technical tricks, 'but in reflecting on what nature makes us do', i.e. on what we are already capable of without a prior immersion in Aristotelian logic. Mental activities can be executed as well, and sometimes even better, by those who have not learnt any rule of logic. The reflections that Arnauld proposes instead enable us, 'by the natural light of reason alone', to discover and understand errors and faults in our understanding.

The first activity of the mind is that of conceiving. The direct individual objects of this activity are not terms, but ideas. There is a revolutionary substitution of words by Cartesian ideas as the basic element of logic within the format of a logical textbook immediately at the start of Part I: 'As we can have no knowledge of what is outside us except by means of the ideas in us, the reflections we can make on our ideas are perhaps the most important part of logic, since they...'

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292 'I. Contenant les Reflexions sur les idées, ou sur la premiere action de l’esprit, qui s’appelle concevoir. II. Contenant les reflexions que les hommes on faites sur leur jugemens. III. Du Raisonnement. IV. De la Methode.' English translations of quotations from the Logique are taken from Jill Vance Buroker, whose translation of the Fifth Edition matches with the quotations presented here from the Fourth Edition.


are the foundation of everything else.\textsuperscript{296} Although Arnauld does not explicitly make clearness and distinctness a criterion of truth, he stresses the importance of having clear and distinct ideas and of knowing which are and which are not fulfilling this criterion.\textsuperscript{297} His prescription later on in the \textit{Logique} of establishing principles on clear and evident principles amounts to the first stage of a logic of ideas, while that of giving subsequent proofs that are orderly and based only upon these principles intimates the second stage.\textsuperscript{298} However, after the first part on ideas, Arnauld does not continue with a second part on the combinations of ideas. Rather, he continues with a conventional second part on propositions and an equally conventional third part on syllogisms. Since propositions were supposed to consist of terms and not of ideas, a second part on propositions does not form a plausible continuation. Arnauld does not show much awareness of this problem.\textsuperscript{299} Rather than giving a solution to the problem of the compatibility of ideas as the principal element of a newer logic and that of words as the central element in the older logic, he simply stops talking about ideas after the first paragraph of the second part and continues with words as the elements for propositions (and propositions as elements for syllogisms in the third part). This procedure confirms the transitory character of his \textit{Logique}.

Like Descartes and unlike Locke, Arnauld denies that all ideas can be directly or indirectly derived from the senses.\textsuperscript{300} For instance, our ideas of being and of thinking have a non-sensory origin.\textsuperscript{301} Arnauld targets the senses as a major, if not the only source of error.\textsuperscript{302} Error is indeed an important subject in the \textit{Logique}. In the first of the two introductory 'Discours', lack of attention, lack of application, and wrongly used words are listed among the causes of error.\textsuperscript{303} Arnauld, in accordance with the new logic of ideas, makes a distinction between errors of the first kind and errors of the second kind. As is the case with Locke, he thinks that errors of the first kind are the most serious: 'The majority of people's errors, as we have already said elsewhere, are caused rather by reasoning

\textsuperscript{296} Op. cit. Pt. I, p. 42: ‘Comme nous ne pouvons avoir aucune connaissance de ce qui est hors de nous, que par l’entremise des idées qui sont en nous, les réflexions que l’on peut faire sur nos idées, sont peut-être ce qu’il y a de plus important dans la Logique, parce que c’est le fondement de tout le reste’, transl. J. V. Buroker, p. 25.


\textsuperscript{298} Op. cit. Pt. IV, Ch. iii, p. 403.

\textsuperscript{299} Locke's solution for this problem would be to distinguish not only verbal but also mental propositions; see below, §10.

\textsuperscript{300} Cf. Arnauld's \textit{Des vrayes et des fausses idées}, Ch. xxvii, 'De l’origine des idées', pp. 298-316.


based on false principles, than by reasoning incorrectly from their principles.\textsuperscript{304} The most extensive discussion of error is given at the place where it was also discussed by Du Trieu, Smith and Sanderson: at the end of Part III. Chapter xviii is called 'Different ways of reasoning badly, which are called sophisms'\textsuperscript{305} and contains much that can be traced back to Aristotle’s \textit{De sophisticis elenchis}. However, Arnauld is not very interested in the subject and does not bother to discuss the full Aristotelian catalogue of sophistical errors, ‘… since some are so obvious that they are not worth mentioning’.\textsuperscript{306} Rather, he adds another long chapter, the last of Part III, where he concentrates not so much on the errors by which we try to fool others, as on faults by which we lead ourselves astray: ‘Fallacies committed in everyday life and in ordinary discourse’.\textsuperscript{307} Some of the errors that Arnauld gives here are of the kind that we have encountered already in the \textit{Conduct}, such as the role of our passions in causing our errors and the fatal influence of believing on force of authority (although Arnauld is careful to except the authority of the Catholic Church).\textsuperscript{308} As to the chapters in the third part that precede his discussion of error, Arnauld’s critique of Aristotelian syllogisms echoes Descartes and anticipates Locke: the old logic only proves what we have come to know by other means already.\textsuperscript{309} However, Arnauld’s critique is less one-sided than it had been in Descartes and would be in Locke. Syllogisms are given a positive role in the exercise of our mind and in forestalling errors that are made by inattentive minds.\textsuperscript{310}

The fourth part of the \textit{Logique} is on method. Whereas the topic of method was not discussed at all by Du Trieu and very summarily by Smith and Sanderson at the end or after the third part of their logic, it is deemed important enough by Arnauld to give it a separate part. Arnauld presents method as a natural sequel to the triad word/idea–proposition–syllogism. A syllogism forms one \textit{raisonnement}, and method is concerned with demonstration, which consists of various \textit{raisonnements}.

(a similar point had been made by Smith). The Port-Royal decision to include a fourth part on method is in line with a trend that is present in other seventeenth-century texts, in which the methodological tenets of Ramus and Zabarella can be found in various degrees.  

A similar pattern is also followed by Thomas Hobbes in the 'Logica' of his De Corpore (1655) and by Pierre Gassendi in his Institutio Logica in Quator Partes Distributa (1658).

Arnauld’s conception of method is heavily influenced by the paradigmatic role given to mathematics by Descartes and also by Blaise Pascal. Arnauld was well versed in mathematics and amongst his many publications there is a long treatise on geometry, Nouveaux éléments de géometrie, contentant des moyens de faire voir quelle lignes sont incommensurables, and a shorter essay on magic squares. However, in the Logique mathematics is given the more general instrumental role that it was to play in Locke’s Conduct. Arnauld quotes the four well-known methodical rules that were given in the second part of Descartes’s Discours, but stresses that analysis ‘consists more in judgment and mental skill than in particular rules’. The capacity of our mind should be developed by slowly accustoming it to mathematics and other things that are difficult.

Finally, another noteworthy feature in the part on method is the uncartesian attention to probability that governs the field of ‘human and contingent events’. In the case of probable propositions we cannot take recourse to geometrical methods. Rather we must carefully investigate the circumstances to which the propositions refer.
Arnauld's substitution of terms by ideas in Part I and his stress on the methodological value of mathematics in Part IV on the one hand and his largely conventional treatment of propositions in Part II and syllogisms in Part III on the other, give the Logique a hybrid character. If Arnauld can be called a Cartesian, this should not be done without caution. He himself might have liked to qualify this epithet; as the author of the Fourth Set of Objections against Descartes's Meditations de prima philosophia, he was one of the first to have pointed to a circular element in Descartes's proof of God. Nevertheless, it is clear that Arnauld's predilections went in the direction of the more novel elements of his logic. When comparing the fourth part of the Logique with the third part he states that it is more important to order our thoughts than to know the rules of syllogism. In the 'Premiers Discours' to the Logique he also gives a place of honour to the fourth part when he admits that in this part he has included subjects that he might have discussed in the second or third parts as well:

> But we did this on purpose because we thought it useful to see everything required for perfecting knowledge in one place, which is the main point of the work on method treated in Part IV. This is why we reserved the discussion of axioms and demonstrations for that section.

While Arnauld is so mild as to give here, in the Fourth Edition, only a practical reason for the weight given to the fourth part, his motivation for this predilection on the parallel place in the First Edition (which has only one 'Discours') had been more drastic and coloured by doubt about an essential structural feature of Aristotelian textbooks on logic:

> But we did this on purpose, as much because we thought it useful to see everything required for perfecting knowledge in one place, as because we thought that there would be many persons who can be satisfied with the first and last parts of this work, since there are few things in the other two parts that good sense could not supply, without having to make a special study of them.

321 Op. cit. Pt. IV, p. 377: 'que le tout est de bien arranger ses pensées, en se servant de celles qui sont claires & évidentes, pour penetrer dans ce qui paroisse plus caché'.
323 Op. cit. (edition von Freytag Löringhoff), 'Discours', p. 22: 'Mais on l’a fait à dessein, tant parce qu’on a jugé qu’il estoit utile de voir en vn mesme lieu tout ce qui estoit necessaire pour rendre vne science parfaite, que parce qu’on a cru qu’il auroit beaucoup de personnes qui se pouvoient contenter de la premiere & de la derniere parti de cet Ouvrage, y ayant
This is an ominous remark indeed. While Aristotelian logicians had structured their textbooks in at least three parts (terms–propositions–syllogisms), which could be followed by some remarks on method, we see Arnauld drawing here structural conclusions from the content of a new logic of ideas that consists of only two stages that consequently can be discussed in only two parts: one about individual ideas (Part I of his Logique) and another about raisonnements that are based on these ideas (Part IV).

A more undilutedly Cartesian specimen of the new logic of ideas is given in the Recherche de la vérité où l'on traite de la nature de l'esprit de l'homme et de l'usage qu'il en doit faire pour éviter l'erreur dans les sciences (1674-1675) by Père Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715). An entry in one of his notebooks indicates that Locke bought the two volumes of the Recherche in March 1676, but it is not until 1 March 1683 that some brief notes in his Journal on the teaching of mathematics give clear proof of his actual reading of the work. In the years that preceded the production of the Conduct, Locke had produced his critical Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion of Seeing All Things in God, which eventually he decided not to publish, ‘For I love not controversies, and have a personal kindness for the author’. However, there are no clear indications that during his years in France he ever met Malebranche. The Recherche gives a prominent place to our mental faculties, to the clarity and distinctness of ideas, to method in general and the importance of mathematics in particular. I shall focus on two remarkable and closely interconnected aspects of the Recherche that are relevant for the context of the Conduct: its discussion of error and its structure. Error and prevention of error is the core topic of the Recherche (see the full title), which opens with the following grand statement:

peu de choses dans les deux autres que le bon sens ne puisse suppleer, sans avoir besoin d'en faire une étude particulière’, transl. J. V. Buroker, p. 13, note c.
324 MS Locke f.14, p. 15. Later he bought other editions; see Harrison/Laslett, nos. 1875-1883a, pp. 182-183.
325 MS Locke f.8, p. 264.
327 Lough, Locke’s Travels in France, p. xxxix. See however a letter from Nicolas Toinard to Locke, 18/28 March 1688, Corr. 1031, III, p. 417: ‘Je n’oublieray pas à vous dire que l’un des exemplaires sera aussi donné au P. M.’
Error is the cause of men’s misery; it is the sinister principle that has produced the evil in the world; it generates and maintains in our soul all the evils that afflict us, and we may hope for sound and genuine happiness only by seriously laboring to avoid it.\textsuperscript{328}

The scope and sophistication of Malebranche’s subsequent taxonomy of error is unsurpassed by any other seventeenth-century text, including Bacon’s \textit{Novum organum} with its four \textit{idola mentis}. Malebranche’s analysis of error exemplifies the subject oriented approach of the new logic. For him the relevant dichotomy is not so much that between truth and falsity outside us, as that between truth and error in the workings of our own understanding.\textsuperscript{329}

When Malebranche gives his rules for the search of truth in the sixth and last book of the \textit{Recherche}, he hints at a two-stage analysis of error by stressing the importance of starting with clear and distinct ideas as the basis of subsequent reasonings.\textsuperscript{330} There can be no doubt about the central place of ideas in the \textit{Recherche}. The immediate object of our perception is not the sun, but our idea of the sun.\textsuperscript{331} However, the remarkable thing in Malebranche’s investigation into the causes and nature of error, is that it is not structured around ideas but around the faculties that provide us with these ideas. Our mental faculties can be divided into those of the understanding and those of the will. The faculty of the understanding can be subdivided into the faculties of the senses, of the imagination and of pure understanding. Perceptions of the pure understanding can be made without the mind forming corporeal images; thanks to this faculty we apprehend things that we cannot perceive with the faculty of imagination, such as spiritual beings or figures with thousand sides.\textsuperscript{332} Malebranche’s rationalism consists in the fact that according to him pure understanding can furnish us with ideas that are in no way, either directly or indirectly, dependent on our senses. The pure intellect does not function thanks to the mind’s union with the body, but because of its

\textsuperscript{328} Op. cit. Vol. I, Bk. I, Ch. i, p. 39: ‘L’erreur est la cause de la misere des hommes; c’est le mauvais principe qui a produit le mal dans le monde; c’est elle qui fait naître & qui entretient dans nôtre ame tous les maux qui nous affligent, et nous ne devons point esperer de bonheur solide & veritable, qu’en travaillant serieusement à l’éviter’, transl. Lennon/Olscamp, p. 1.


\textsuperscript{330} Op. cit. Vol. II, Bk. VI, Pt. II, Ch. i, p. 296: ‘que les principes les plus clairs & les plus simples sont les plus féconds’; ibid. ‘que nous ne devons raisonner que sur des choses dont nous avons des idées claires’

\textsuperscript{331} Op. cit. Vol. I, Bk. III, Pt. II, Ch. i, pp. 413-414: ‘& l’objet immédiat de nôtre esprit, lorsqu’il voit le Soleil par exemple, n’est pas le Soleil, mais quelque chose qui est intimement unie à nôtre âme; & c’est ce que j’appelle idée. Ainsi par ce mot \textit{idée}, je n’entends ici autre chose, que ce qui est l’objet immédiat, ou le plus proche de l’esprit, quand il apperçoit quelque objet, c’est-à-dire ce qui touche & modifie l’esprit de la perception qu’il a d’un objet’.

union with God; strictly speaking its ideas are not in our mind at all, but in God’s mind. The other main faculty, that of the will, consists of our inclinations and our passions. All the perceptions of all the faculties of our understanding form as many occasions for error, but the primary cause for every error lies in making a wrong use of our will by giving a precipitous consent to a wrong judgement.\footnote{Op. cit. Vol. I, Bk. I, Ch. v, p. 77, cf. Descartes, \textit{Meditations}, AT VII, p. 60.}

Given the close relationship between faculties and ideas, Malebranche’s attention to senses, imagination, pure understanding, inclinations and passions, does not amount to much more than a shift in accent in the logic of ideas in so far as matters of content are concerned. However, he dares to give huge structural consequences to his predilections. The \textit{Recherche} is the first of the works on logic we have encountered so far that is not built according to the basic structure of words/ideas–propositions–syllogisms–(method). Rather, the errors of the senses, imagination, pure understanding, inclinations and passions are accorded one book each (followed by a last book on method that is largely inspired by Descartes). Whereas Locke gives a vertical discussion, first of ideas and subsequently of reasoning that is based on these ideas, Malebranche presents a horizontal review of each of our mental faculties.

Can it still be maintained that the \textit{Recherche} is a work of logic at all once it is admitted that Malebranche completely brushes aside the traditional structure of logical text books? After all, he does not explicitly call his work a logic. Yet the main elements of the \textit{Recherche}, the attention to the errors of our faculties included, clearly belong to the new logic of ideas. We have seen that these elements were announced already in Peripatetic works on logic and were developed further by Arnauld in a work that was still called a ‘logic’. Malebranche takes the development one step further, by giving the new logic a structure that is in accordance with the novel emphasis on the mental faculties and that allows him to bypass the technical subject of propositions and syllogisms. We have already seen that the two latter subjects were not at the heart of Arnauld’s interests. Finally, in the sixth and last book of the \textit{Recherche}, Malebranche explicitly presents his Cartesian method as an alternative to ‘the ordinary sorts’ of scholastic logic:

\ldots the whole art of making the mind more extensive and more penetrating consists \ldots in using its powers and its capacity sparingly, and not using it inappropriately on matters unnecessary for the discovery of the truth it is seeking — and this is a point that should be well noted. This alone shows that the ordinary sorts of logic are more suited for diminishing rather than increasing the mind’s capacity, because clearly, if in the search after a given truth one wishes to use the rules these logics give us, the mind’s
capacity will be so divided up that it will have less capacity for carefully understanding the full extent of the subject under examination.\textsuperscript{334}

10. The structure of Locke's logic

Peripatetic works on logic were tenacious enough to dictate their structure to such outspoken enemies of Aristotelianism as Hobbes and Gassendi. However, friction between old structure and new content was inevitable. Given the central place of ideas and the mental faculties by which these were apprehended and manipulated, there were roughly two ways of giving structural consequences to the content of the new logic. One possibility was to build it around the faculties. An eminent example of this model was given by Malebranche, whose logic of the facilitates completely broke with the existing structure. Another strategy, slightly less radical, was intimated by Arnauld, when he pointed out in the First Edition of his \textit{Logique} that for most readers the novel first part on ideas and the fourth part on method will be more interesting than the second part on propositions and the third part on syllogisms. This approach, resulting in a two-level structure, was brought to a conclusion by Locke. When he embarks on his historical inquiry into the human understanding in the \textit{Essay}, he presents the following agenda:

\textit{First}, I shall enquire into the \textit{Original} of those \textit{Ideas}, Notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which a Man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his Mind; and the ways whereby the Understanding comes to be furnished with them. 

\textit{Secondly}, I shall endeavour to shew, what \textit{Knowledge} the Understanding hath by those \textit{Ideas}; and the Certainty, Evidence, and Extent of it. 

\textit{Thirdly}, I shall make some Enquiry into the Nature and Grounds of \textit{Faith}, or \textit{Opinion}; whereby I mean that Assent, which we give to any Proposition as true, of whose Truth yet we have no certain Knowledge: And here we shall have Occasion to examine the Reasons and Degrees of Assent.\textsuperscript{335}


\textsuperscript{335} \textit{Essay}, i.3: 44.
These essential points were already given in much the same words in Drafts B and C for the Essay and are present in a more implicit way in Draft A. The first point runs roughly parallel to the first stage of his logic of ideas. The second and the third points form the two main elements of the second stage: certain knowledge and probable knowledge. Indeed, this two-stage division is reflected in the basically bipartite structure of the Essay itself. If this fundamental point has not received much attention in secondary literature, this may be due to the simple fact that the Essay consists not of two but of four books:

I. Of Innate Notions  
II. Of Ideas  
III. Of Words  
IV. Of Knowledge and Opinion  

However, in Book II of the Essay Locke discusses all that is essential to stage one of his logic (by giving his analysis and taxonomy of separate ideas) and in Book IV he treats of the second stage (reasoning that is based on these ideas and that terminates in knowledge or opinion). These two stages imply a simplification compared with the more elaborate structure of the reasoning process as described in Aristotelian textbooks. Here we first start with terms, which at a second level are combined into propositions which on their turn are combined into syllogisms; it is only at this third level that we reason and are able to draw conclusions. Locke’s logic of ideas implies that in reasoning we can dispense with words, and also with propositions and syllogisms which consist of words. Reasoning is a process that is limited to ideas; ‘Illation or Inference’… consists in nothing but the Perception of the connexion there is between the Ideas, in each step of the deduction, whereby the Mind comes to see, either the certain Agreement or Disagreement of any two Ideas, as in Demonstration, in which it arrives

336 Draft B: §3, Drafts, I, pp. 102-103; Draft C: Bk. 1, Ch. 1, Sect. 3, fol. 3; Draft A abounds with discussions of the first point (on individual ideas); on the second and third point (knowledge and opinion) see esp. §32, Drafts, I, p. 62: ‘… I shall come now having (as I think) found out the bounds of humane knowledge, in the next place to consider the several degrees & grounds of Probablity & Assent. or Faith.’

at Knowledge; or their probable connexion, on which it gives or withholds its Assent, as in Opinion. 338

The separate levels of propositions and of syllogisms collapse into the second stage of the logic of ideas. If one were to take an Aristotelian work on logic, for instance Samuel Smith’s *Aditus ad logicam*, and replace its analysis of terms by that of ideas, omit the part on propositions entirely, and replace a discussion of demonstrative syllogisms and dialectical syllogisms by respectively an analysis of certain knowledge and probable knowledge based on ideas instead of words, one is left with a structure and content that correspond with Books II and IV of the *Essay*. The main difference concerns method, not only in content but also in structure. We have seen separate sections being assigned to this topic at the end of both Aristotelian and non-Aristotelian textbooks. In the *Essay* its main discussion is also at the end, that is to say, in Book IV; however, instead of dealing with one method at the very end of this book, Locke discusses his two methods at different places in Book IV in their separate contexts of certain and probable knowledge.

So much about Books II and IV; but what about Books I and III? Book I contains Locke’s polemic against innate ideas. In the discussion of Descartes (above, §8) I already observed that views pro or contra the innateness of ideas are strictly speaking not essential for the development of a logic of ideas. There is some evidence that Locke himself might have agreed with this view. First, in Draft A he had started right away with the positive side of his views on the origin of our ideas: ‘I imagin that all knowledg is founded on and ultimately derives its self from sense, or something analogous to it …’ 339 Not until the last sections of this draft does it occur to him to discuss some arguments of those who attack this view and who believe in innate ideas instead. 340 Only from Draft B onwards does he turn the tables on his adversaries by switching from a defence against innatist attacks to the offensive himself and by placing this attack at the start of his treatise. 341 Not until Draft C do we see the discussion of innate knowledge being accorded the separate position of Book I (even though this first book has not yet been given a title). There is more that points to a relatively ephemeral position of Book I in the structure of the *Essay*. Locke prepared an ‘Epitome’ of

338 *Essay*, IV.xvii.2: 669; cf. ‘Of Study’, p. 419: ‘Words without doubt are the great and almost only way of conveyance of one man’s thoughts to another man’s understanding; but when a man thinks, reasons, and discourses within himself, I see not what need he has of them’.
339 Drafts, I, §1, p. 1.
340 In *Drafts*, §43, I, pp. 74-78, he turns against the opinion that we have ‘certain Ideas or principles’ in general and in ibid. §44-45, pp. 78-82, he deals with the supposition that we have a positive, and thus an innate, idea of infinity in particular.
the Essay that would be translated into French by Jean le Clerc and published in 1688, shortly before the First Edition of the Essay itself.\(^\text{342}\) In this 'Epitome' Locke decided to skip Book I, declaring that it contained no more than a 'preliminary debate':

In the thoughts I have had concerning the understanding I have endeavoured to prove that the minde is at first rasa tabula. But that being only to remove the prejudice that lies in some mens mindes I thinke it best in this short view I designe here of my principles to passe by all that preliminary debate which makes the first book …\(^\text{343}\)

The Oxford scholar John Wynne (c. 1665-1743), who in 1696 published an abridgement of the Essay that was approved by Locke, suppressed the first book on similar grounds.\(^\text{344}\)

In Book III Locke’s principal target was scholastic rather than Cartesian. Some of the topics discussed here had been addressed in a disparate way already in Drafts A and B. It was only later that he decided to devote a separate book to words. He admits as much at the very end of Book II. Having discussed separate ideas (the first stage of his logic of ideas), he admits that the most logical next step would be to proceed at once with knowledge (the second stage of his logic):

This was that, which, in the first general view I had of this Subject, was all that I thought I should have to do: but upon a nearer approach, I find, that there is so close a connexion between Ideas and Words; and our abstract Ideas, and general Words, have so constant a relation one to another, that it is impossible to speak clearly and distinctly of our Knowledge, which all consists in Propositions, without considering, first, the Nature, Use, and Signification of Language; which therefore must be the business of the next Book.\(^\text{345}\)

The use of the term 'proposition' in this quotation in no way implies a priority of words over ideas. For Locke, propositions do not have to consist of words. A proposition consists of signs that are joined or separated. These signs can be words that form verbal propositions, or ideas that form mental propositions.\(^\text{346}\) What the quotation does imply, however, is that words should be carefully scrutinized and upon this task he embarks in Book III. His critical discussion of the instru-

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\(^{342}\) The French translation of the 'Epitome', 'Extrait d’un Livre Anglois que n’est pas encore publié, intitulé Essai Philosophique’, was first published as an article in the Bibliothèque Universelle & Historique and later in the same year published separately, Abrégé d’un ouvrage intitulé Essai philosophique. The dedication in the Essay to the Earl of Pembroke is still absent in both the 'Epitome' and the 'Extrait’, but is included in the Abrégé.

\(^{343}\) MS Locke c.28, fol. 53r. I thank Prof. G. A. J. Rogers for permission to use his transcription.

\(^{344}\) Wynne, An Abridgement, pp. iv-v.

\(^{345}\) Essay, II.Ixxxiii.19: 401.

\(^{346}\) Cf. Essay, IV.i.11: 574–579 and IV.i.12: 525.
ments that scholastic logicians forged out of words, i.e. verbal propositions and syllogisms, is subsequently continued in Book IV. Rather than detracting from the bipartite structure presented by Books II and IV, Books I and III are additions whose substantially polemical purport was meant to smooth the transition to Locke’s logic of ideas. Book III has proved to be of eminent importance for future developments in the philosophy of language. However, considered from the structural perspective of the shift from a tripartite Aristotelian logic towards a bipartite logic of ideas, this book is a mere side-show.

Now that the structure of the Essay has been defined more sharply, it is possible to be more precise about the place of the Conduct within this structure. Although the Conduct was conceived in 1697 as an additional chapter (No. xx) to Book IV of the Fourth Edition of the Essay, Locke at some moment changed his mind and ceased to consider it as part of the Essay. However, there is no reason to assume that this was because of radically changed views about the relation between the content of the two works. In the Conduct Locke certainly concentrates more on errors and on their remedies than he did elsewhere in the Essay, but as we shall soon see these topics had already been addressed in the latter work as well. Moreover, as has been shown previously, the kinds of error discussed in the Conduct fit in the logical context provided by the Essay. The reasons for not including the Conduct were probably of a practical nature. We are sure that it was not finished by the time the Fourth Edition of the Essay was issued in 1700, since it was not even finished when Locke died in 1704. The large size of the Conduct may also have counted against including it as a chapter in the Essay. This would not have been the only case in which practical deliberations influenced a decision on whether or not to incorporate a new passage in the Essay. So, there is no reason to assume that when Locke decided against including the Conduct in the Essay, he ceased to consider the former as part of his logic of ideas.

Locke ends each of the last three books of his Essay with a discussion of errors that are relevant to the subject at hand. In Book II, the last five chapters are devoted to errors of which we can be guilty in respect of individual ideas:

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348 See above, §9, on Locke’s decision not to publish the Examination of P. Malebranche’s Opinion.
349 Locke clearly sets apart this discussion of errors from the previous chapters of Book II, by starting Chapter xxix thus: ‘Having shewn the Original of our Ideas, and taken a view of their several sorts; considered the difference between the simple and the complex; and observed how the complex one are divided into those of Modes, Substances, and Relations, all which, I think, is necessary to be done by any one, who would acquaint himself throughly with the progress of the Mind, in its Apprehension and Knowledge of Things, it will, perhaps, be
xxix. Of Clear and Distinct, Obscure and Confused Ideas;
xxx. Of Real and Fantastical Ideas;
xxxi. Of Adequate and Inadequate Ideas;
xxxii. Of true and false Ideas;

and finally the new chapter, added in the Fourth Edition:

xxxiii. Of the Association of Ideas.

Book III ends with two chapter on errors concerning words and language in general:

ix. Of the Imperfection of Words;
x. Of the Abuse of Words;

followed by remedies:

xi. Of the Remedies of the foregoing Imperfections and Abuses.

The last chapter of Book IV contains Locke’s general ‘Division of the Sciences’, which however is immediately preceded by two chapters on aberrations that keep us from knowledge or from justified assent. The chapter

xix. Of Enthusiasm

was newly added in the Fourth Edition and part of it (without the chapter number it was to receive in the Essay) can be found in the same MS e.1 that also contains other additions for this edition (including ‘Association’ and the Conduct). ‘Of Enthusiasm’ is followed by

xx. Of wrong Assent, or Error,

which covers some of the ground that would also be discussed in the Conduct, however with special attention for ‘Wrong Measures of Probability’.

The inclusion of the Conduct as Chapter xx would have placed it at the end of Book IV, after the last chapter on error (and only before the last chapter on the Division of the Sciences), assuming that Locke had not yet discounted the inclusion of the other addition, on ‘Enthusiasm’, in the numbers of the chapters. Given the fact that the main subject of the Conduct is error, and given the fact that the chapters on error are placed at the end of each of the three last books, the projected place of the Conduct is plausible. However, why did Locke intend to place the Conduct at the end of Book IV and not at the end of another book? Since the oldest part of what would become the Conduct is probably on association,

thought I have dwelt long enough upon the examination of Ideas. I must, nevertheless, crave leave to offer some few other Considerations concerning them’, Essay, II.xxix.i: 362-363.
and since this part was originally a continuation of the part on association that became the last chapter of Book II of the Essay, the inclusion of the rest of the Conduct at the end of this book might seem a plausible possibility. However, the analysis of error in the Conduct is of a general character, it gives attention to aberrations that are relevant for both phases of Locke’s logic of ideas, and thus it cannot be confined to any one of the books of the Essay. His point in wanting to place the Conduct at the end of Book IV was not so much that it was of special importance to this particular book, as that he wanted to give it a place at the end of the Essay as a whole, thereby stressing the general character of the analysis of error in the Conduct. Since the Conduct covers the whole range of Locke’s logic, it was inevitable that sometimes there are overlapping passages between the Conduct and the Essay. Sometimes he stops embarking on a subject in the Conduct because he has treated it already in the Essay, as some of his references in the former work to the latter clearly indicate; this is done at least three times concerning the abuse of words, a subject which, after its extensive treatment in Book III of the Essay (including remedies) remains indeed largely untouched in the Conduct.

Apart from being plausible, the projected place of the Conduct in the Essay fits in with a long logical tradition. On the one hand, it should be admitted that there are fundamental differences between the content of the analysis of error in the Aristotelian Organon and in Locke’s logic of ideas. At the start of De sophisticis elenchis Aristotle announces his attention to treat ‘of arguments used in competitions and contests’. The context of the subsequent discussion of error is polemical itself; it is concerned with ‘fighting contentious persons’ and ‘how we are to prove that our opponent is saying something false and make him utter paradoxes’. It is difficult not to read these passages as early announcements of scholastic disputations. By contrast, Locke’s logic of ideas tried to turn disputants away from their presumed adversaries to their own faculties. He was not interested in analysing the fallacies by which others try to deceive us (and we might deceive others), but in the errors by which we fool ourselves. One of the constantly recurring expressions in the Conduct is that of ‘imposing on ourselves’. This is a very dangerous tendency; it is present all the time and we confront it with less criticism than attempts by others to fool us: ‘The disposition to put any cheat

350 Conduct, pars. 10, 30, 63.
354 Conduct, pars. 13, 36, 51, 59 and 80.
upon our selves works constantly and we are pleas'd with it but are impatient of being bantered or mislead by others."

On the other hand, however, a change in logical content is only one aspect of this story. Structure proved to be rather more resilient. We have already compared the place of knowledge and opinion in the structure of the Essay with that of demonstrative and dialectical syllogisms in an Aristotelian work on logic by for example Samuel Smith. We can now press the analogy further. When Smith ended his *Aditus* with a discussion of sophistical fallacies, he did so in accordance with a long logical tradition. There are clear indications that Aristotle considered his work on error, *De sophisticis elenchis*, if not as an appendix to his whole logical work, then at least as an appendage to his *Topics*. And whatever his own views may have been, *De sophisticis elenchis* would be transmitted to posterity as the final treatise of his *Organon*. In the same way as this final treatise gave an analysis of errors that are relevant for Aristotelian logic in general and dialectic in particular, it had been Locke's intention to place the *Conduct*, containing a discussion of the errors that are relevant for his logic of ideas, at the end of the *Essay*.

### 11. The appreciation of the Essay and the Conduct as texts on logic

We have seen Malebranche presenting his *Recherche de la vérité* as an alternative to scholastic works on logic, although he refrained from giving it the explicit name of 'logic'. Locke's *Essay* and *Conduct* provide us with a similar case. In the seventeenth century 'logic' was Aristotelian logic. In the *Essay*, Locke uses the word 'logic' or 'logician' most frequently in Bk. II, Ch. xvii 'Of Reason', and he uses it in the clearly pejorative context of his attack against Peripatetic logicians. Other places in the *Essay* contain similar references to 'Logick and Dispute' and 'logical Niceties, or curious empty Speculations'. This sequence is continued in the *Conduct* with 'a logical chicanner' and 'disputes on logical questions' that are equated with 'airy useless notions'. Clearly, for Locke the term 'logic' was poor in positive connotations. This may explain why he did not attach the

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356 Assuming this context, it is interesting to read in Hamblin, *Fallacies*, pp. 161-162, that Locke in his discussion of four sorts of arguments in general (*Essay*, IV.xvii.19-22: 685-687) and in his use of the term *argumentum ad hominem* in particular, is tributary to *De sophisticis elenchis*, 177b 33.
358 *Essay*, III.x.7: 494 (marginal heading).
360 *Conduct*, par. 99.
361 *Conduct*, par. 84.
name of ‘logic’ to what I have described as his ‘logic of ideas’, even although he did present it as an alternative to the works of Aristotelian logicians. However, a development can be traced in his views about what can be called by the name of ‘logic’. In the Essay, after stating that cultivating our ‘native rustick Reason’ is more likely to generate knowledge ‘than any scholastick Proceeding by the strict Rules of Mode and Figure’, he approvingly quotes from Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie by the theologian Richard Hooker (1553/1554-1600) about the importance of ‘the right helps of true Art and Learning’ and then continues:

I do not pretend to have found, or discovered here any of those right helps of Art, this great Man of deep Thought mentions: but this is plain, that Syllogism, and the Logick now in Use, which were as well known in his days, can be none of those he means. It is sufficient for me, if by a Discourse, perhaps, something out of the way, I am sure as to me wholly new, and unborrowed, I shall have given Occasion to others, to cast about for new Discoveries, and to seek in their own Thoughts, for those right Helps of Art, which will scarce be found, I fear, by those who servilely confine themselves to the Rules and Dictates of others.

In this passage Locke clearly presents his ‘Discourse’ as an alternative to Aristotelian logic. He speaks about ‘the Logick now in Use’, thus implicitly suggesting the conceivability of another logic, i.e. his logic of ideas.

Next, there is the last chapter of the Essay (Bk. IV, Ch. xxi) with Locke’s division of the sciences into άλγεια, πράγματική and σημειωματική, or the Doctrine of Signs’. None of the previous divisions of the sciences in his MSS contain the same taxonomy and there is some evidence to suggest that Locke came to envisage semiotics as logic only shortly before the first publication of the Essay in 1689, and that he attached the chapter containing this division only after the rest of the Essay was largely completed. Drafts A and B of the Essay do not contain any division of the sciences and we do not know about Draft C, since this contains only Books I and II. The interesting point in this late addition is that here Locke gives the only positive reference to logic in either the Essay or the Conduct:

The Consideration then of Ideas and Words, as the great Instruments of Knowledge, makes no despicable part of their Contemplation, who would take a view of humane Knowledge in the whole Extent of it. And, perhaps, if they were distinctly weighed, and duly considered, they would afford us another sort of Logick and Critick, than what we have been hitherto acquainted with.
This may very well be the point at which Locke starts to look upon his already fully developed way of ideas as a logic in its own right, that is to say: as a logic of ideas — so that here he has for the first time reason to use the word 'logic' in a positive rather than in a pejorative sense. However, consider the first sentence of the paragraph on σημειωτητή:

*Thirdly,* The Third Branch may be called σημειωτητή, or the Doctrine of Signs, the most usual whereof being Words, it is aptly enough termed also λογική, Logick; the business whereof, is to consider the Nature of Signs, the Mind makes use of for the understanding of Things, or conveying Knowledge to others.366

This might suggest that Locke here gives words a bigger place than is warranted in a logic of ideas. However, what he is doing in this quotation is merely referring to both the etymological and the conventional meaning (‘the most usual’) of logic. He then continues with a clear statement of the importance of ideas: ‘For since the Things, the Mind contemplates, are none of them, besides it self, present to the Understanding, 'tis necessary that something else, as a Sign or Representation of the thing it considers, should be present to it: And these are Ideas.’367 Only after this does Locke mention words, in the role of mere secondary signs, that is to say: signs of ideas.

Locke’s resolve in the *Conduct* to consider his way of ideas as a logic remained at least as strong as it had been in the *Essay.* In paragraph 2 we again read critical remarks about ‘The Logick now in use’, which this time however are accompanied by a quotation from Bacon’s ‘Præfatio’ to the *Instauratio Magna.* In paragraph 3 the Latin quotation is rendered in a translation of which the last sentence runs: ‘That it is absolutely necessary that a better and perfecter use and imployment of the minde and understanding should be introduced.’ Whereas the first paragraph of the *Conduct* is written on page 62 of the MS e.1, pars. 2 and 3 are written on pages 114-116. Locke must have attached considerable value to the quotation from Bacon that forms the content of these paragraphs, since he added the following remark to them: ‘NB what here immediately follows concerning Logic is to begin this chapter of the conduct of the understanding’ and this is indeed the place this fragment is given in both the later MS c.28 and in O-1706.368 Although the overall structure of Locke’s logic of ideas is not substantially Baconian, it has been noted that many individual points in the treatment of error in the *Conduct* betray the Lord Chancellor’s influence (above, §3). However, there may be more; after the preface to the *Instauratio,* from which Locke quotes in the *Conduct,* Bacon

366 *Essay,* IV.xxii.4: 720.
368 See also below, ‘Text’, §3 [37] and §6.
gives the plan of his work (‘Distributio operis’). This is what he remarks about his
inductive method in the preface to the Novum Organum, which was the second
part of the Instauratio Magna:

Having thus coasted past the ancient arts, the next point is to equip the intellect for
passing beyond. To the second part therefore belongs the doctrine concerning the better
and more perfect use of human reason in the inquisition of things, and the true helps
of the understanding: that thereby (as far as the condition of mortality and humanity
allows) the intellect may be raised and exalted, and made capable of overcoming the
difficulties and obscurities of nature.369

Bacon had not only introduced ‘a better and perfecter use and imployment of the
minde’ as an alternative for traditional texts on logic, he also held this alternative
to be a logic. The old Aristotelian Organon was to be replaced by a Novum
Organum. Locke’s quotation from the Instauratio can be taken as an indication
that he had come to consider the Essay and the Conduct as his way of realizing
this Baconian design.

Locke’s ‘way of ideas’ started its long and successful career as a new logic. Already
in the dedicatory letter of his Dioptrica Nova, published 1692, we see Molyneux
describing the Essay as the crowning achievement of a new approach that had
started with Arnauld and Malebranche, i.e. two philosophers that I have marked
out as Locke’s predecessors in the development of a new logic:

Logick has put on a Countenance clearly different from what it appeared in formerly: How
unlike is its shape in the Ars Cogitandi [= Arnauld’s Logique], Recherches de la Verite, &c.
from what it appears in Smigletius, [sic] and the Commentators of Aristotle? But to none
do we owe for a greater Advancement in this Part of Philosophy, than to the incomparable
Mr. Locke, Who, in his Essay concerning Humane Understanding, has rectified more
received Mistakes, and delivered more profound Truths, established on Experience and
Observation, for the Direction of Man’s mind in the Prosecution of Knowledge, (which I
think may be properly term’d Logick) than are to be met with in all the Volumes of the
Antients.370

Similarly, the clue that the Essay can be seen as a specimen of the third part
in Locke’s division of the sciences (logic), was not lost on John Wynne. When
he wrote on 31 January 1695 to Locke with the proposition of producing an

traiciendum instruimus. Destinatur itaque parti secundae, doctrina de meliore et perfectiore
usu rationis in rerum inquisitione, et de auxiliis veris intellectus: ut per hoc (quantum
conditio humanitatis ac mortalitatis patitur) exaltetur intellectus, et facultate amplificetur
abridgement of the *Essay*, he suggested that this could be used as a textbook ‘instead of those Trifling and Insignificant Books, which only serve to perplex and confound’. He then continues: ‘I do not see that there is Any Thing wanting In It to compleat The Third part In your Division of science.’

On 26 April of the same year Locke wrote to W. Molyneux about Wynne’s proposal (that was to be realized) in joyful surprise:

> The third edition of my Essay is already, or will be speedily in the press. But what perhaps will seem stranger, and possibly please you better, an abridgment is now making (if not already done) by one of the university of Oxford, for the use of young scholars, in the place of an ordinary system of logick.

Locke does not protest against calling the *Essay* a work of logic. What rather surprises him is that the proposal comes from Oxford, which he had learnt to perceive as a stronghold of Aristotelianism and where he had been deprived of his Christ Church studentship:

> From the acquaintance I had of the temper of that place, I did not expect to have it [the *Essay*] get much footing there.

Wynne’s favourable reaction proved to be more than a mere incident and his abridgement was to contribute substantially to the dissemination of the *Essay*.

In a letter to Locke (c. 17 April 1704) James Tyrell reported about a meeting of the ‘Heads of Houses’ of Oxford in November 1703, where the ‘great decay of Logical Exercises’ was attributed to the influence of Locke’s *Essay*, and the work of his admirer Jean le Clerc.

However, these deliberations could not impede the *Essay’s* popularity as a book on logic. In the dedication of the Second Edition of his French translation of the *Essay* (1729) Pierre Coste notes that in Oxford and Cambridge this work has taken the place of Aristotle ‘and his most famous

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373 *Corr.* 1887, V, p. 351.
374 Rogers, ‘Introduction’ (no page numbers) to Wynne, *An Abridgment of Mr Locke’s Essay*.
375 *Corr.* 3511, VIII, p. 269. Le Clerc’s *Logica sive ars ratiocinandi* (1692) is clearly influenced by Locke’s logic of ideas but has the familiar quadripartite structure of logical textbooks, although Le Clerc interchanged the third and fourth parts, resulting in a structure that consists of ideas–propositions–method–syllogisms. William Molyneux, in his letter to Locke from 22 December 1692, *Corr.* 1579, IV, p. 601, is sharply aware of the author’s debt to Locke’s *Essay*: ‘I have Lately seen Johannis Clerici Logica, Ontologia and Pneumatologia, in all which He has little Extraordinary but what he Borrows from you; and in the Alteration he gives them he robbs them of their Native Beautys …’
Indeed, both in Oxford and in other places, the *Essay* was incorporated in the curriculum as a work on logic, and often recommended as a follow up to courses in Aristotelian logic. Edward Bentham’s *An Introduction to Logick* (1773) contains a list of ‘Scriptores consulendi de Quæstionibus Logicis, tàm Veteres quàm Recentiores’ that includes both Aristotle and Locke. In 1802 there were college lectures at Cambridge for freshmen in *Locke and logic*.

The history of the reception of the *Conduct* in the century following Locke’s death is less well documented. In his *Historical Sketch of Logic* (1851) Robert Blakey informs us that the *Conduct* ‘has often been employed as a logical textbook in some of our English universities’. Similarly, in his *Eighteenth-Century British Logic and Rhetoric* W. S. Howell writes that ‘The Conduct of the Understanding and its parent work, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, were without question the most popular, the most widely read, the most frequently reprinted, and the most influential, of all books of the eighteenth century. Additional information about the influence of the *Conduct* in the eighteenth century can be gauged from the sober facts of its rich printing history. It went through numerous separate editions and was also printed together with the *Essay*, with other works and in editions of the complete works (see below, ‘Bibliography’, §1). The ‘Preface by the Editor’ to the 1777-edition of the *Works* contains the following remark (in which the *Conduct* is mistakenly described as ‘early’):

376 Locke, *Essai philosophique*, [p. viii]: ‘Enfin, ce qui met le comble à sa gloire, adopté en quelque maniètre à Oxford & à Cambridge, il y est lu & expliqué aux Jeunes gens comme le Livre le plus prope à leur former l’Esprit, à régler & étendre leurs Connoissances; de sorte que LOCKE tient à présent la place d’ARISTOTE & de ses plus célèbres Commentateurs, dans ces deux fameuses Universitez.’


380 Op. cit. pp. 281. The Oxford Christ Church Collection Book, 1699-1720, shelfmark li.b.1, containing reading lists that were given to individual students, gives ‘Locke’s Essays’ on fol. 2vb (1702/1703); ‘Lock’ on fol. 3rb (twice, 1702/1703) and on fol. 8th (1706/1707); ‘Lock’s Essay on Hum. Underst.’ on 13vb (twice, c. 1712); ‘3d book [of the Essay] of Lock’ on 171a (1714) and ‘Locks 1st book’ on 177b (also 1714), but does not (yet) mention the *Conduct*, although it covers the first fourteen years following the publication of O-1706. However, the Christ Church Collections of Nobleman, Gentlemen and Commoners, quoted in Bill, *Education at Christ Church Oxford*, p. 312, mentions the *Conduct* as an item on an undergraduate reading list for 1775. See also Yolton, ‘Schoolmen, Logic, Philosophy’, p. 570 and Ashworth, ‘Oxford’, p. 9.

Connected in some sort with the forementioned essay, and in their way equally valuable, are his tract on Education and the early Conduct of the Understanding, both very worthy, as we apprehend, of a more careful perusal than is commonly bestowed upon them, the latter more especially, which seems to be little known, and less attended to.  

The 'Advertisement' to the 1782 edition of the Conduct contains a similar statement: 'The following valuable Work of Mr. LOCKE's being very little known on account of it's scarcity, it has been thought advisable to print this cheap EDITION to promote it's circulation.' Neither quotation points to a very warm interest of the public in the Conduct. However, these remarks may very well reflect plain promotional intentions. The fact that the abundance of editions of Locke's Works and his Essay in the second half of the eighteenth century containing the Conduct did nothing to stop the issue of several separate editions of this work in the same period, point to its popularity. In his Advice to a Young Student, with a Method of Study of the first four years (1730), Daniel Waterland praises the Conduct as an introductory contribution to the 'true Art of Reasoning', as opposed to Aristotelian textbooks. The Conduct is included in 'A Table Of the several principal Writers of Logick' in Edward Bentham's Reflexions upon Logick (1740), written 'To the Youth Of Oriel College and Christ Church'. In 1753 an abstract of the Conduct 'For the Benefit of younger Scholars' was presented by a 'Mr Alexander Simm, late Schoolmaster at Bathgate'. In addition, it became well-known on the continent. Already in 1707 Jean le Clerc published an extensive summary in French of the Conduct and the other items included in O-1706. A complete French translation of this volume was published in 1710. The Conduct was also studied in Germany. Syrbius, a professor of philosophy at Jena, lectured on the French translation of 1710 as early as 1712. Johann Jacob Breitinger's 'IX. Discours' (written under the pseudonym 'Michael Angelo') in the first volume of his short-lived journal Discourse der Mahlern was manifestly influenced

383 C-1782, p. iii.
386 AS-1753, pp. 130-146.
387 AS-1707.
388 Tr(Fr)-1710.
389 Wundt, Die Philosophie and der Universität Jena, p. 78.
by the _Conduct_.\textsuperscript{390} A German translation appeared at Königsberg in 1755.\textsuperscript{391} The eighteenth century also saw a translation of the _Conduct_ in Italian.\textsuperscript{392}

More information about the eighteenth-century development of the logic of ideas in relation to Peripatetic logic in general, and about the influence of the _Conduct_ in particular, can be gained by an inspection of logical textbooks. I will briefly discuss one specimen that was used at Oxford.\textsuperscript{393} Isaac Watts (1674-1748), who is known to posterity chiefly as the father of English hymnody, also wrote a _Logick: or, The Right Use of Reason in the Enquiry after Truth_ (1725).\textsuperscript{394} This textbook proved to be very popular and was reprinted thirty times up to 1800.\textsuperscript{395} The general structure of the _Logick_ is conventional enough:

I. Of Perception and Ideas  
II. Of Judgment and Proposition  
III. Of Reasoning and Syllogism  
IV. Of Method

However, in the title of the first part the predominantly Lockean content of Watts’s logic is already shining through. In this part Watts gives a simplified version of Locke’s catalogue of ideas and analysis of language as given in Books II and III of the _Essay_ respectively. Selections from the subject matter of Book IV are discussed by Watts in parts II, III and IV. Watts’s discussion of method in Part IV is confined to remarks about the distinction between synthetic and analytic and to some rules ‘of true Method in the Pursuit or Communication of Knowledge’,\textsuperscript{396} that have a largely though not exclusively Cartesian character.

The _Logick_ bears all the marks of compromise. Watts very much admires Locke and compares ‘… the great Lord Bacon, Copernicus, Descartes, with the greater Sir Isaac Newton, Mr. Locke, and Mr. Boyle’.\textsuperscript{397} He follows Locke when he declares that ‘True Logick doth not require a long Detail of hard Words to amuse Mankind, and to puff up the Mind with empty Sounds, and a Pride of false Learning’. However, he then continues: ‘… yet some Distinctions and Terms of Art are necessary to range every Idea in its proper Class, and to keep our Thoughts from Confusion’.\textsuperscript{398} Watts does not choose; he gives both Locke’s logic

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{390} Op. cit. no page numbers; the ‘IX. Discours’ starts on quire I.
  \item \textsuperscript{391} Tr(Ger)-1755.
  \item \textsuperscript{392} Tr(It)-1776, Tr(It)-1790 and Tr(It)-1794.
  \item \textsuperscript{393} See Yolton, ‘Schoolmen, Logic and Philosophy’, _пасим_.
  \item \textsuperscript{394} I have consulted the Eighth Edition, 1745.
  \item \textsuperscript{395} Editor’s ‘Note’ to Duncan, _The Elements of Logick_, no page number.
  \item \textsuperscript{396} Op. cit. Pt. IV, Ch. ii, p. 349.
  \item \textsuperscript{397} Op. cit. Pt. II, Ch. iii, sect. 4, p. 225.
  \item \textsuperscript{398} Op. cit. ‘Dedication’, no page number.
\end{itemize}
of ideas (most of it in parts I and II, which make up the bulk of his treatise) and also a largely uncritical if not very substantial discussion of syllogisms in Part III. Whereas in the case of Arnauld we see a traditional structure being eroded from within by a freshly evolving new logic, the case of Watts’s *Logick* is rather that of an attempt to put the spirit of a by then fully developed new logic of ideas back into old Peripatetic bottles. In his letter of 22 December 1692 Molyneux had advised Locke to produce a work ‘by Way of Logick, something accommodated to the Usual Forms’, because ‘a Large Discourse in the way of a Logick would be much more taking in the Universities’. Although Locke had not protested against Wynne calling his *Essay* a work on logic, he very understandably did not like Molyneux’s suggestion of squeezing his work into a traditional structure. When he wrote back on 20 January 1693 he informed his friend about his aversion to the idea of ‘turning my Essay into a body of logick and metaphysicks, accomodated to the usual forms’. However, this kind of accommodation was exactly the underlying stratagem of Watts. In the introduction to his *The Improvement of the Mind* (1741), he refers to his *Logick* as a work ‘… wherein it was my constant Aim to assist the Reasoning Powers of every Rank and Order of Men, as well as to keep an Eye to the best Interest of the Schools and the Candidates of true Learning’.

Watts’s attempt to accommodate the new bipartite logic of ideas to the tripartite structure of an Aristotelian textbook was bound to show signs of strain. His strategy is based on Locke’s distinction between intuitive and demonstrative knowledge (see above, §2). Intuitive knowledge is based on the immediate comparison of two ideas, whereas demonstrative knowledge rests on the comparison of two ideas by means of one or more intermediate ideas. Watts squares propositions with intuitive knowledge, his point being that just as we directly compare two ideas in the activity of judging, we compare subject and predicate in a proposition. He then proceeds to syllogisms, which are identified with reasoning proper and compared to demonstrative knowledge, where we have ‘… to compare each of them [subject and predicate] with some third Idea, that by seeing how far they agree or disagree with it, we may be able to judge how far they agree or disagree among themselves’. Watts’s solution is disputable. With ‘judgment’ he refers to the direct and certain knowledge that is produced by intuition, whereas Locke

399 *Corr.* 1579, IV, pp. 601, 602.
400 *Corr.* 592, IV, p. 626.
in the *Essay* uses ‘judgment’ for indirect knowledge that is merely probable. However, the relevant point here is not so much whether Watts’s solution was right or wrong, but that it is a typical example of an attempt to accommodate Locke’s logic within the framework of an Aristotelian textbook. This attempt was also made in other eighteenth-century works, for instance in William Duncan’s *The Elements of Logick* (1748) and in Bentham’s *Reflections upon Logick* and *An Introduction to Logick.*

In addition to the general influence of Locke’s way of ideas, Watts’s Logick contains specific traces of the *Conduct.* This is perhaps the case in Part II, Chapter iii on ‘The Springs of False Judgment, or the Doctrine of Prejudices’ and more positively in Part III, Chapter iv, which gives ‘Some general Rules to direct our Reasoning’. In this chapter Watts uses a quotation from the *Conduct* (par. 17) to illustrate his point about the importance of a formal role for the ‘mathematical Sciences’ in education: ‘Something of these Sciences should be studied by every Man who pretends to learning and that (as Mr. Locke expresses it) not so much to make us Mathematicians, as to make us reasonable creatures.’ The following longer passage in the same chapter, where Watts highlights the importance of the two stages of the logic of ideas (‘conceiving clearly and reasoning right’), gives verbal quotations from the *Conduct,* par. 8:

> This Habit of conceiving clearly, and of judging justly, and of Reasoning well, is not to be attained merely by the Happiness of Constitution, the Brightness of Genius, the best natural Parts, or the best Collection of logical Precepts. It is Custom and Practice that must form and establish this Habit. We must apply ourselves to it till we perform all this readily, and without reflecting on Rules. A coherent Thinker, and a strict Reasoner is not to be made at once by a Set of Rules, any more than a good Painter or a Musician may be formed extempore by an excellent Lecture on Musick or Painting. It is of infinite Importance therefore in our younger Years to be taught both the Value and the Practice of conceiving clearly and reasoning right: For when we are grown up to the middle of Life, or past it, it is no Wonder that we should not learn good Reasoning, any more

403 Op. cit. 4.17.17: 685: ‘Judgement, is the thinking or taking two Ideas to agree, or disagree, by the intervention of one or more Ideas, whose certain Agreement, or Disagreement with them it does not perceive, but hath observed to be frequent and usual’.

404 Neither Duncan nor Bentham give much attention to error, and thus it is not surprising that their works do not show any substantial influence of the *Conduct.* Cf. Duncan, op. cit. Bk. III, Ch. V, sect. xii, p. 267: ‘… I hold it needless to enter upon a particular Consideration, of those several Species of false Reasoning, which Logicians distinguish by the Name of Sophisms. He that thoroughly understands the Form and Structure of a good Argument, will of himself readily discern every Deviation from it’ (cf. Arnauld’s similar lack of interest, above, §9); Bentham, *An Introduction to Logick,* Pt. III, Sect. IV, pp. 56-62, gives some limited attention to ‘Irregular Syllogisms and Fallacious reasoning’.

than that an ignorant Clown should not be able to learn fine Language, Dancing, or a courtly Behaviour, when his rustic Airs have grown up with him till the Age of Forty. 406

Interestingly, this final chapter of Part III of the Logick comes immediately after a chapter on ‘The Doctrine of Sophisms’. So, Watts repeats Arnauld’s procedure of adding a chapter on errors that are relevant to the new logic immediately after his discussion of errors that are relevant to Aristotelian logic, at the end of a third part on syllogisms. By quoting the Conduct at exactly this place, he seems to assume a parallel relationship between Conduct and Essay on the one hand and between De sophisticis elenchis and the Organon on the other.

12. Conclusion

Amongst many other things, Locke’s Essay provides an alternative for the logic presented in Aristotelian textbooks. There are indications that he considered his Essay to be offering a logic and there is unmistakable evidence that it was perceived as such by contemporaries and eighteenth-century readers. The objects of his logic are not words but ideas. The comparison of ideas results in either certain or probable knowledge. In Locke’s logic there is no use for the formalization of reasoning and it concentrates rather on a prior inspection of the mental faculties thanks to which we are furnished with ideas. He discusses method as a means of furnishing answers to the question of how we can best use our faculties in our pursuit of certain or probable knowledge. The kind of method to be used is determined by the kind of ideas that are presented to our mental faculties. Ideas, faculties and method are thus the interrelated main elements of Locke’s logic of ideas.

In the Conduct Locke discusses the errors that are relevant to his logic. Errors of the first kind pertain to the individual ideas that form the basis of subsequent reasoning. Errors of the second kind relate to aberrations in reasoning itself. According to Locke, Aristotelian logicians were especially liable to errors of the first kind, because they were blind to the need of obtaining clear and distinct ideas before starting with reasoning at all. Errors can have causes outside the understanding, such as our passions, or by defects in the understanding itself, such as wrong habits. A major example of the last category is the wrong association of ideas. Wrong habits can be prevented and cured by right habits, which must be installed by gradual and repetitive practice of our mental faculties. Instead of being filled with particular material principles, the faculty of the understanding should be taught to develop the general formal ability of inspecting these principles. The

Conduct is not primarily an educational treatise. It is well-stocked with didactic advice, but this is given in the context of prevention and cure of errors that are relevant for Locke’s logic of ideas.

The content of Locke’s logic, especially its stress on clear and distinct ideas, but also the place that is accorded to the mental faculties and methodological questions, shows distinctly Cartesian influences. However, some of these elements were already anticipated in the works of Aristotelian textbook writers. This background becomes even more important if one considers the structure rather than the content of the logic of ideas. The tripartite structure of the Aristotelian textbooks that Locke bought for his pupils at Oxford reflects the three basic levels of Aristotelian logic: words, propositions and syllogisms. The third part on syllogisms usually ended with a discussion of the errors that were relevant to this logic: sophistical syllogisms. By contrast, Descartes’s analysis of ideas gave rise to a logic that did not need three levels, but only two: that of separate ideas and that of the combination of ideas. He bequeathed to his successors the question of how to relate this essentially bipartite logic to the traditional tripartite structure of Aristotelian logic. Arnauld’s Logique, Malebranche’s Recherche and Locke’s Essay can be seen as different answers to this question. The urgency of this question depended in large part on how much these successors were bent on presenting something that would still be recognized and accepted by contemporaries as ‘logic’. The structure of Aristotelian logic is still very much present in Arnauld, it is completely neglected in Malebranche, and its influence can still be detected in the Essay. The function of the analysis of error as performed by the Conduct within the frame of Locke’s logic, is comparable to that of De sophisticis elenchis in Aristotelian logic. This comparable function is confirmed by a projected place of the Conduct within the general structure of Locke’s Essay that is mirrored by the place of De sophisticis elenchis in the Organon.
TEXT

The most important manuscript for the Conduct is MS Locke c.1. It is filled with projected additions to the Fourth Edition of the Essay, the largest of which is the Conduct. This part remained unfinished, but the MS also contains substantial parts on 'Enthusiasm' and 'Association' that were indeed published in the Fourth Edition of the Essay. MS e.1 can be said to form one unit in the limited sense of containing (projected) additions to this edition and also because of some material characteristics. Since this MS forms one unit, it will be described as such, although special attention will be given to the parts containing the Conduct. MS Locke c.28 on the other hand, is not a unit. It is a collection of different MSS on various philosophical and religious topics that were bound together and numbered only after the transference of the Lovelace Collection to the Bodleian Library. Only fols. 121-138 pertain to the Conduct and only this part of the MS will be described. It gives a partial copy of MS e.1.

Locke’s papers and letters plus the moiety of his library (3,000 books) that was inherited by Peter King remained in the latter’s family until 1942, when their last owner, the Earl of Lovelace, deposited most of the MSS and some of the books in the Bodleian Library, Oxford. In 1947 the Bodleian purchased this collection. Furthermore, a substantial part of Locke’s library in the King moiety, consisting of about 660 items (including some 20 bound manuscript volumes) was rediscovered in 1951 by Peter Laslett and purchased by Paul Mellon, who presented the material to the Bodleian. The MSS were ordered, bound and shelved together with the books in a separate room named after the philosopher. MSS e.1 and c.28 form part of this collection. Sometimes page numbers and folio numbers were added by the librarian, as was the case with MS e.1 (partly) and MS c.28 (completely).407

In what follows I shall give a description of the manuscripts and present an overview of entries in Locke’s correspondence that are related to the Conduct. I shall then continue with a history of the text of the Conduct until its posthumous publication in 1706 and discuss the relation between the Conduct and the Essay, the problem of the copy-text to be used for the present edition and the question of the order in which to present the material. Finally, I shall state the principles that underlie this edition. For the sake of easy reference, the elements of the description of the MSS, of the correspondence and of the history of the Conduct

407 For the history of Locke's MSS and books see Long, A Summary Catalogue, p. vii; id. 'The Mellon Donation', passim, Harrison/Laslett, pp. 54-61; and Laslett/Rogers, 'The Recovery of Locke's Library', passim.
will be given progressive numbers between [ ]. For the relation between the pages of MS e.1, the folios of MS c.28, the sections of the Conduct as given in O-1706, the relevant parts of the Essay and the paragraphs of the present edition, see Table 1, at the end of this chapter.

1. Description of the manuscripts

MS Locke e.1.

Pp. vi+272. Paper. Throughout the MS the main text is entered on the left-hand even-numbered pages, while the right-hand odd-numbered pages are reserved for corrections and additions.408

[1] Formula. π(-πi) A-N⁸ O-R⁸. Explanation of the formula:409 quires A up to and including N were given their respective signatures by Locke. The first quire has no signature. Since this quire is placed before a quire that is marked ‘A’, it is given the Greek letter ‘π’. Quires O-R received no signature either and are therefore given in italics. The superscripted numbers indicate the number of leaves of each quire. Quire π was originally 1 half sheet, divided with the longer side horizontal by three vertical folds in 4 equal sections, resulting in 4 leaves = 8 pages. However, the first leaf was lost (indicated by ‘-πi’ in the formula), leaving quire π with only 3 leaves = 6 pages, pp. i-vi (all page numbers in MS e.1 not entered by Locke himself are presented in italics); see Figure 1.

![Figure 1: quire π of MS Locke e.1](image)

The hypothesis concerning a missing first leaf in quire π is confirmed by the fact that the present length of π is about 3/4 the length of 1 half sheet, as deduced from the size of the quarter sheets that make up the remaining quires (see [6] below); by the place of the countermark (see [8] below); and by the fact that the present first page of the quire gives only the last part of an index to the Conduct (see [3] below). The original first leaf probably contained the first part of this index. Quires A-N and O-R (together 17 quires) each consist of 1 sheet that was divided, with the longer side horizontal, in 2 equal parts by 1 vertical fold, that was then divided again, with the longer side horizontal, in 2 equal parts by 1 vertical fold

408 For a comparable way of making additions to the Essay, see MS Locke c.28, fols. 117-118.
and that was finally divided again, with the shorter side horizontal, in 2 equal parts by 1 vertical fold, resulting in quires with 4 quarter sheets = 8 leaves = 16 pages each, with the following page numbers: 1 2-74 74² 76-83 83² 84 86-145 246 147-155 154²-155² 156-199 199² 200-203 205-208 209 210-239 240 241-252 153² 254 255 256-261 262-270 [=272 pp.]; number of p. 2 only partially legible; Locke miswrote 75 as 74, 84 as 83, 85 as 84, 146 as 246, 200 as 199, 201-204 as 200-203 and 253 as 153; page numbers corrected by Locke (wrong ⇒ right): 73² ⇒ 74; 81²-82 ⇒ 82-83; 204 ⇒ 205; 213 ⇒ 214; 127²-128² ⇒ 228-229; 130²-137² ⇒ 230-237; 152² ⇒ 252; 154² ⇒ 254; 156²-157² ⇒ 256-257. The Bodleian librarian added some missing page numbers in the MS: i, iii, v, 263, 265, 267 and 269. He also corrected most misnumberings left uncorrected by Locke himself: 74² ⇒ 75; 83² ⇒ 84; 84 ⇒ 85; 154-155 ⇒ 154²-155²; 154²-155² ⇒ 154b-155b; 199² ⇒ 200; 200-203 ⇒ 201-204. However, in the present edition all reference to MS e.1 is by means of Locke’s own page numbers (including miswritten page numbers) or by italicized page numbers used for pages that Locke did not number himself. Reference is made to corrected page numbers when the correction was made by Locke himself, but no reference is made to the corrected page numbers as given by the Bodleian librarian.

[2] Quires. Quire π has no signature; quires A-M have their signature at the top of the first and last page; quire N has ‘N’ at the top of the first page but not on the last page; quires O-R have no signature at all. On the first page of quire A and the last page of quires B-M, the signature is preceded by ‘Understanding’. In most cases ‘Understanding’ and the subsequent signature were entered together and before Locke had started entering the text itself. An exception to this rule can be found on the last page of quire A, p. 16, where ‘Understanding’ is entered at a distance from ‘A’, after the page had already been filled with text. The number of the first page of each quire is: π i; A i; B 17; C 33; D 49; E 65; F 81; G 97; H 113; I 129; K 145; L 159; M 175; N 191; O 207; P 223; Q 239; R 255.

[3] Contents. Page i, from top to foot: the last part of an index to the Conduct (the first part of this index was probably on a previous page that has been lost, see [1]), but p. i must already have been the first page of what is now called ‘MS e.1’ about as long as p. 270 has been its last page, since both pages are discoloured in a similar degree; instructions by Locke: ‘Mem: That these following discourses are to be writ out under their several heads into distinct Chapters, and then to be number’d and ranged according to their natural order’, followed by the stamp of the Bodleian librarian.

410 For a similar use of the word ‘Understanding’ for a quire that contains additions to the Essay, see MS Locke e.28, fol. 115-116.
Library; and finally 'MS Locke e.1' in the hand of the Bodleian librarian. Page iv: the Ciceronian motto: ‘Quid tam temerarium tamque indignum sapientis gravitate atque constantiâ, quam aut falsum sentire, aut quod non satis explorate perceptum sit et cognitum sine ullâ dubitatione defendere? Cic: de Nat: deorum l. i’ (see ill. 1). Page 1: a list of some subjects (most of them deleted) that Locke was to address in the Conduct and some loose remarks, anticipating the text of the Conduct (see again ill. 1). In addition, pages 1-31 contain substantial parts of Essay, IV.xix ‘Of Enthusiasm’ (deleted), this chapter was included in the Fourth Edition (and also in the Fifth Edition and subsequent editions) of the Essay. Pages 6-10 contain an addition to Essay, IV.iii ‘Of the Extant of Humane Knowledge’, section 6 (deleted), also included in the Fourth Edition. Pages 30-31: a list of scriptural passages. Pages 32-56: a piece on ‘Association’ (deleted); pp. 32-52 were included in the Fourth Edition of the Essay, II.xxxiii ‘Of the Association of Ideas’ (up to ‘… that follow’, §18, p. 401, line 9 in Nidditch’s edition), while the text on pp. 52-56 reappears later, as part of the Conduct, on pp. 210-216 in the same MS (however, this later version is probably not copied directly from the first version; see [9] below). Pages 56-62: a passage on ‘Reasoning’ (belonging to the Conduct and continued on pp. 248-261 of the same MS). On p. 62 starts ‘B: IV C: XX Of the Conduct of the understanding’ (see ill. 2). The rest of the MS, up to and including p. 261, is covered by the text of the Conduct, with the exception of p. 182, which gives an addition to Essay, IV.xii.3 and p. 184, which has an addition to Essay, III.vi.26 (both passages deleted); both passages were included in the Fourth Edition of the Essay. Page 8t contains a short list (deleted), similar to the one on p.1, of subjects that Locke was to address in the Conduct; and p. 270 ends with an entry in the Bodleian librarian’s hand: ‘vi+270 pages really 272 for 154, 155 are double’ and with again the stamp of the Bodleian Library. Deletion of the Essay passages does not imply their rejection but their transcription elsewhere.

[4] Marginal entries. All marginal entries in MS e.1 are in the left margin of the text. These entries fall into 5 categories. (1) General headers placed at the top of the margin. The pages containing the text of the Conduct, i.e. pp. 52-182/184-261 have the following general headers: ‘Association’ (pp. 32-56); ‘(Reasoning’ (p. 58); ‘Conduct’ (pp. 64-106, 110-182); ‘Fallacies’ (pp. 218-222); ‘Fundamental verities’ (pp. 226-228); ‘Bottoming’ (p. 230); ‘Transferring’ (p. 232). (2) Entries stating the content of one or more paragraphs (headwords), placed at the start of a new paragraph. From p. 208 onwards, headwords started in the margin are continued into the space reserved for the main text, while no more keywords are given. (3) Entries high-lighting a specific topic within a paragraph (keywords)
and whose place can be anywhere in the margin alongside the text. It is not always possible to distinguish with certainty between headwords and keywords (headwords/keywords of the Conduct as given in MS c.1 are listed in Table 2, at the end of this chapter). (4) Entries consisting of numbers that appear after some headwords/keywords: p. 56: Reasoning; p. 60: partial views; p. 62: Introduction 4 (‘4’ superimposed on ‘61’); p. 62: Parts 6; p. 64: Practise 9; p. 68: Habits 11; p. 78: Suffisance 19. (5) Entries consisting of a vertical line in the margin: pp. 56-64, 114-116 and 248-260; the line signals the transcription of the text from these pages to another document (see below [46]).

[5] Catchwords. Most pages ending with text that is continued on the next page have a catchword. In the few cases where they do not, there is no evidence of discontinuity in the text.

[6] Size. The 4 quarter sheets of each quire have the same size, but there is variation between the different quires themselves. The sizes that follow are in mm and not of the leaves but of the complete quarter sheets of the quires (the size given for π is of what has remained from what was probably one half sheet, see [i]): π 230×194; A 199×159; B 196×156; C 195×155; D 205×157; E 206×156; F 205×156; G 206×152; H 206×155; I 206×156; K 206×155; L 205×155; M 205×155; N 195×154; O 190×153; P 191×153; Q 199×154; R 201×154.

[7] Stitchings and pins. The MS was bound after transference to the Bodleian Library. However, traces of earlier stitching, in the form of small holes on the folds, have remained in the quires. The distance between these holes is roughly equal for all the quires, suggesting that they were all tied together. Quire π is again a special case. It has traces of previous stitching on one of its outer edges, viz. the right edge of p. iv = the left edge of p. v. The Bodleian librarian stitched it with the other quires with 1 of its 2 folds, viz. the fold separating pp. ii-iii on the inside and vi-i on the outside (see above, Figure 1). Finally, the leaves within each of the quires A-N show signs of being held together by a pin. 411

[8] Watermarks. The half sheet of quire π has no watermark, the countermark gives the initials ‘CS’. The watermark of the paper of quire A consists of a large medallion with the Seven Provinces’ lion, the countermark gives a combination of the letters ‘P’ and ‘L’. 412

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411 For a similar use of pins by Locke, see his Journal for 1690, MS Locke f.10, pp. 24-25.
412 Cf. Heawood, Watermarks, Nt. 3138.
The watermark in quires B-C shows the London coat-of-arms (a shield in four quarters with a sword in the first quarter), the countermark gives the initials 'EB'. The watermark in quires D-M shows a horn and baldric and the countermark gives again the combination of the letters 'P' and 'L' (somewhat smaller than the similar countermark on quire A). The watermark in quires N-O shows again a London coat-of-arms and the countermark gives the initials 'CS' (as quire π). The watermark in quires P-R shows a small sword and the countermark is an 'A'.

[9] Scribes. MS e.1 is for the most part written in Locke’s hand. His handwriting shows what may be signs of diminishing vigour towards the end of MS e.1; this seems to be the case at least for the last unfinished paragraph on ‘Custome’, p. 260. The text of the Conduct was not entered entirely by Locke alone. MS e.1 has some added and corrected page numbers and some other additions in the hand of the Bodleian librarian (see [i] and [3]). Moreover, there is the text on pp. 210-216, which largely repeats pp. 52-56, i.e. the part of Locke’s remarks on ‘Association’ that he had previously chosen not to include in the Fourth Edition of the Essay and that would be included in the Conduct. The text on pp. 210-216 is in the hand of Locke’s amanuensis William Shaw (see ill. 3; more on Shaw below, [39]). At least part of the text on pp. 210-216 must have been copied by Shaw from another source then pp. 52-56; the text on pp. 210-216 contains a full sentence that is absent from the text on pp. 52-56 (in the present edition this is the last sentence of paragraph 77).

[10] Corrections and additions. Larger additions are mostly entered either on the empty odd-numbered right-hand pages facing the even-numbered left-hand pages on which the ‘first version’ text had been entered, or on new even-numbered pages with a higher page-number. In the latter case Locke generally takes care to give clear internal references to page numbers, allowing us to follow the various jumps from one page to another. For example: the end of the paragraph on p. 145 of MS e.1 (par. 50 of the present edition) is followed by: ‘vid 2 p. 192’ (with ‘2’ written inside a square); the subsequent paragraph, on p. 192 (par. 51) is then preceded by: ‘v 2 p. 145’ (with ‘2’ again written inside a square). Most of the text in MS e.1 is entered in black ink. However, the occasional use of ink that now looks brown
(possibly caused by a chemical reaction in the paper) sets apart at least one layer of corrections and additions.\textsuperscript{413}

\[11\] \textit{Printed notices.} Long, \textit{A Summary Catalogue}, pp. 30-31; and Schankula, \textit{A Summary Catalogue}, pp. 33-34.

\textit{MS Locke c.28, fols. 121-138.}

Fols. 18. Paper.

\[12\] \textit{Formula.} \(\pi^2 \geq A^2 \geq B \geq C \geq D \geq E \geq F \geq G\); 18 leaves, fols. 121-138 (all folio numbers were added by the Bodleian librarian). Each quire consists of 1 half sheet divided, with the longer side horizontal, by 1 vertical fold in 2 equal leaves.

\[13\] \textit{Quires.} Quires A-C have their signature at the foot, left side, of the first page of each quire. Quires \(\pi\)-\(A\) and \(D\)-\(G\) have no signature. The folio number of the first leaf of each quire is: \(\pi\) 121; \(A\) 125; B 127; C 129; \(D\) 131; \(E\) 133; \(F\) 135; \(G\) 137.

\[14\] \textit{Contents and headings.} Fol. 121r, the first page of the first quire (quire \(\pi\)), starts with ‘Of the conduct of / the understanding / Ch: I / Introduction’ (see ill. 4); this chapter covers fols. 121r-123r and corresponds with MS e.1, pp. 62, 114-116, 62-64. Fol. 125t, the first page of quire A, is headed ‘Ch: / Of Reasoning’. This entry is repeated in the headers of fols. 125v-129v (both recto and verso). The impression is, at least on fols. 126r-129v, that ‘Of Reasoning’ is inserted later between ‘Ch:’ and the main text. This chapter covers fols. 125r-130r and corresponds with MS e.1, pp. 56-62, 248-261. After a gap, consisting of several leaves that are now lost, the text then resumes mid-sentence on the first page of quire \(D\) with the latter part of what in the present edition is par. 17 plus pars. 18-20. This part is covered by fols. 131r-132v and corresponds with MS e.1, pp. 82-88. The next chapter is headed ‘Ch: / Of Mathematicks’, covers fols. 132v-135v and corresponds with MS e.1, pp. 88-95. The last chapter is headed ‘Ch. / Of Religion’, covers fols. 135v-137r and corresponds with MS e.1, pp. 92-96.

\[15\] \textit{Marginal entries.} Fols. 121-132 have an inner margin but no outer margin. Fols. 133-138 have margins on both sides of the page. There are 4 kinds of marginal entries, all appearing in fols. 121-132 and none in fols. 133-138: (1) the number ‘1’ at the top of the margin of fol. 121r, the first page of quire \(\pi\); (2) the word ‘Conduct’ at the top of the margin of fol. 125r, the first page of quire A; (3) numbers in the

\textsuperscript{413} The main instances of use of this different ink are listed in the annotation to the text.
margin of fols. 121r-132v: fol. 121r has 62; fol. 121v 114; fol. 122v 62; fol. 125r 56 and 58; fol. 126r 60; fol. 126v 62 and 248; fol. 127r 250; fol. 127v 252; fol. 128r 254; fol. 128v 256; fol. 129r 258; fol. 129v 260; fol. 131r 84; fol. 132r 86; and fol. 132v has 88 at the end of the incomplete chapter on fols. 131r-132v and again 88 at the start of ‘Of Mathematics’; (4) other entries, such as an occasional expansion of an abbreviation (fol. 122v) and an addition (fol. 125r). The headwords and keywords in the margins of MS e.1 were not copied into MS c.28, unless they were used in the latter MS as the title of a chapter.

[16] Catchwords. All pages ending with text that is continued on the next page have catchwords.

[17] Size. Sizes given are in mm and not of the leaves but of the complete half sheets of which each quire is made up: π 309x198; 2π 311x197; A 311x199; B 310x197; C 309x197; D 320x205; E 320x207; F 311x192; G 314x189.

[18] Stitching. Quires π-2π and A-C have holes that suggest earlier stitching. These holes are not on the fold but 5-10 mm away from it, each hole perforating both leaves of the quire. The distance between the holes in these quires suggests that π-2π have been stitched together and that A-C have been stitched together, but that π-2π and A-C remained separate from each other. Quires π-2π and A-C may have been parts of separate notebooks. Quires D-F show no traces of earlier binding.

[19] Watermarks. The watermark of the paper of quires 2π and B shows a small sword and the countermark of quires π, A and C gives an ‘A’. It is likely that quires π-C all consist of the same paper. (The combination of a small sword as watermark and an ‘A’ as countermark was already noted in the last quires, P-R, of MS Locke e.1.) The countermark in quire D is a crown. The watermark in quire E gives an elaborate horn and baldric. Quire F has neither watermark nor countermark. The countermark in quire G gives the initials ‘IASH’. This means that quires D-G consist of at least two different sorts of paper.

[20] Scribes. Fols. 121-130, i.e. the chapters ‘Introduction’ and ‘Of Reasoning’, are largely in the hand of Locke’s amanuensis William Shaw (see [39] below). However, there are some exceptions. (1) The hand of Locke himself appears briefly on fol. 121r to set up the text of the Conduct for his scribe; ‘Of the conduct of l the understanding / Ch: I / Introduction / The last resort …’ is in Locke’s hand (see ill. 4). In the same way he had set up a new paragraph for Shaw on p. 210
in MS e.1 (see ill. 3). (2) On fol. 121v the following sentence appears immediately after the first introductory paragraph:

There is, its visible, great variety in mens understandings: And their natural constitutions put soe wide a difference between some men in this respect, that art and industry would never be able to master and their very natures seem to want a foundation to raise on it that which other men easily attain unto.

This sentence had also appeared after the first introductory paragraph of the Conduct in the version of MS e.1, p. 62. However, on fol. 121v of MS c.28 a foreign hand breaks in that deletes this sentence and then adds:

this is repeated again two leaves farther, where I think is its proper place. and it ought to be omitted here.414

This hand is neither Locke’s nor Shaw’s, rather, it belongs to Peter King (see [48] below). (3) Next, Locke made an addition on fol. 123r, at the end of chapter 1. After Shaw had copied the last sentence:

And it is easy to perceive that men are guilty of a great many faults in the exercise and improvement of this facultie of the minde which hinders them in their progresse and keeps them in ignorance and error all their lives

Locke added the following sentence that is absent from MS e.1:

Some of them I shall take notice of, and endeavour to point out proper remedies for in the following Chapters.415

(4) The title of the next chapter, on fol. 125r, ‘Of Reasoning’, is also in Locke’s hand. (5) In addition, Shaw’s transcription of the chapters ‘Introduction’ and ‘Of Reasoning’ has several minor additions and corrections by Locke and by King. For instance, Locke made some additions on fols. 125r, 125v and 126v, while King’s corrections can be found on fols. 125v, 126r and 126v. After fols. 121-130 follow fols. 131-138, which are in the hand of yet one other scribe, probably a scribe employed by King (see [48] below). However, a foreign hand breaks in shortly on fol. 132v to write the head of the chapter ‘Of Mathematicks’ and its first four lines (see ill. 5). The writer of these lines is again King. Folios 131-138 no longer show any trace of Locke’s hand. The scribe employed by King left open a space on fol. 131r, so that a word he could not decipher could be entered later, but this

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414 The place that Locke prescribes here is indeed the place that it has been given both in C-1706 and in the present edition; this place results once his instructions in MS e.1 pp. 113-114 concerning the introductory paragraphs on pp. 114-116 of the same MS are carried out (see below, §6).

415 In the present edition, this sentence is given in the collation of MS e.1 with MS c.28.
completion was never made. (6) Finally, all folio numbers in MS c.28 fols. 121-138 were added by the Bodleian librarian.

[21] Printed notices. Long, A Summary Catalogue, p. 29; and Schankula, A Summary Catalogue, p. 34.

2. The Conduct in Locke’s correspondence

The following passages constitute the main references to the Conduct in Locke’s correspondence, either by himself or by his correspondents. Some allusions are clear, others are more ambiguous. Some fragments were already presented above, but are given here again for the sake of completeness.

[22] Letter from Locke to William Molyneux, 10 April 1697, where he announces the start of work on the Conduct.

I have lately got a little leisure to think of some additions to my book, against the next edition, and within a few days have fallen upon a subject that I know not how far it will lead me. I have written several pages on it, but the matter, the farther I go, opens the more upon me, and I cannot yet get sight of any end of it. The title of the chapter will be Of the Conduct of the Understanding, which, if I shall pursue, as far as I imagine it will reach, and as it deserves, will, I conclude, make the largest chapter of my Essay.416

[23] Molyneux’s encouraging answer to this letter, 15 May 1697.

You never write to me, that you do not raise new expectations in my longing Mind of partaking your Thoughts on those Noble Subjects you are upon. Your Chapter concerning the Conduct of the Understanding must needs be very Sublime and Spacious.417

[24] Letter from Locke to William Molyneux, 11 September 1697, in which he complains that his polemic with Bishop Edward Stillingfleet distracts him from working on additions to Education and to the Essay.

Pray give my humble service to your brother, and let me know whether he hath any children, for then I shall think my self obliged to send him one of the next edition of my book of Education, which, my bookseller tells me, is out of print; and I had much rather be at leisure to make some additions to that, and my Essay of Humane Understanding, than be employed to defend my self against the groundless, and, as others think, trifling quarrel of the Bishop.418

[25] Letter from Locke to Philippus van Limborch, 29 October 1697, where the author states that he has written some additions for the Fourth Edition of the Essay ‘that are rather substantial’.

416 Corr. 2243, VI, p. 87.
418 Corr. 2310, VI, p. 190.
I had decided to make some additions and have already composed some that are rather substantial and that might have appeared in their proper place in the Fourth Edition that the publisher is preparing and I would readily have complied with your desire or that of any of your friends by inserting the proofs of God’s unity that present themselves to my mind. For I am inclined to believe that God’s unity can be demonstrated as evidently as his existence and that this can be based on proofs that will not leave any room for doubt. However, I like peace and there are people that are so much given to bickering and vain quarrels that I doubt whether I should provide them with new subjects for argument.

[26] Letter from Jean le Clerc to Locke, 11/21 October 1699, probably referring to the Conduct.

I have been told that you have produced another philosophical work, on the Conduct of the Understanding in the Search of Truth. If this is indeed the case you risk being somewhat importuned to publish it and finding me amongst those who will trouble you, for there is no book that the public is more in need of.

[27] Letter from Locke to Peter King, 11 December 1699, possibly making an allusion to the Conduct (the letter from King to which this is a reply is not in the Correspondence).

I received yours of the 6th and return you my thanks for it. I am sorry that Ideas are such perverse things and so troublesome to conducters. (…) Pray come as soon as you can, that we may have time to consider this grievance of Conducters or some thing else.

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419 Corr. 2340, VI, pp. 243-244: ‘J’avais résolu de faire quelques additions, dont j’ai déjà composé quelques unes qui sont assez amples, et qui auraient pu (paroître) en leur place dans la quatrième Edition que le Libraire se dispose à faire, Et j’aurais volontiers satisfait à votre désir ou au désir d’aucun de vos amis en y (insérant) les preuves de l’unité de Dieu qui se présentent à mon Esprit. Car je suis enclin à croire que l’Unité de Dieu peut être aussi évidemment démontrée que son existence; et qu’elle peut être établie sur de preuves qui ne laisseront aucun sujet d’en douter. Mais j’aime la Paix, et il y a des gens dans le monde qui aiment si fort les criaileries et les vaines contestations, que je doute, si je dois leur fournir de nouveaux sujets de dispute.’

420 Corr. 2624, VI, p. 704: ‘On m’a dit que vous aviez encore composé un autre Ouvrage de Philosophie de la manière de conduire son esprit dans la Recherche de la Verité. Si cela est, vous courrez risque de être un peu importuné de le publier, et de me voir dans le nombre de ces importuns. Il n’y a point de livres, dont le Public ait tant besoin que de ceux-là.’

421 Corr. 2649, VI, pp. 738-739.
[28] Letter from Pierre Guenellon (1650-1722) to Locke, 9/20 July 1700, probably referring to the Conduct. The letter was forwarded by Le Clerc on 1/12 October 1700.423

Mr. Le Clerc has told me that you are working on a new tract, the goal of which is the discovery of the diseases of the mind. In that case the public will have a new obligation towards you. How good it would be if you could cure men of their wrong ideas and by the use of method put them on the course of truth.424

[29] Again a letter from Guenellon to Locke, 31 December 1700/11 January 1701, addressing the same subject. No reaction by Locke has survived.

My friends who have read your Essay concerning Understanding often ask me, on what they have been made to hope for, if your reflections on the errors of the understanding will see light soon. The excellence of what you have published makes them expect that the public will be much obliged to you.425

[30] Letter from Peter King to Locke, 21 January 1704, in which he informs Locke about the latter’s apparent request concerning the transfer of some of his MSS from London to, probably, Oates. (King announces that this material will be taken along by Sir Francis Masham.)

I have opened your Standish, and found therein only One Key, which was the Key of your square deal box, in which I found the thick quarto of Pamphlets bound together in Parchment, Indors’d on the back, Unitarians, and also a manuscript concerning the Conduct of the Understanding — In the deal box there was a bag, wherein are several Keys, but there is not amongst them the Key of the large trunk, that stands in your chamber, so That I could not open that — Sir Francis [Masham] will be so kind to deliver you the above quarto and manuscript with the Observators you want …426

422 Guenellon, born in France, was one of the principal doctors of the St. Pieters Gasthuis in Amsterdam from 1684 to 1720. He and Locke had become acquainted in Paris around 1678 and met regularly again during the latter’s exile in the Dutch Republic. Cf. Corr. 831, II, p. 738, n. 2.


424 Corr. 2743, VII, p. 105: ‘Monsieur le Clerc m’a dit que vous travaillez a un nouvel ouvrage, pour decouvrir les maladies de l’esprit, c’est une nouvelle obligation que le public vous aura, quel bien ne sera ce pas, si vous pouvez guerir les hommes de leur fausses idees, et les mettre par methode dans le chemin de la verite!’

425 Corr. 2835, VII, pp. 212-213: ‘mes amis qui ont lu votre traité de l’entendement me demandent souvent, sur ce qu’on leur a fait esperer, si vos reflexions sur les erreurs de lentendement verront bien tost le jour, il jugent par l’excellence de ce que vous avez publicz, que le public vous en sera fort oblige.’

426 Corr. 3439, VIII, pp. 171-172. De Beer assumes that the MS is MS Locke e.t. The Observer was a newspaper.
[31] Letter from Locke, dated 4 and 25 October 1704, written shortly before his death on 28 October in the same year, with final instructions concerning his MSS to Peter King.

You will find amongst my papers several subjects proposed to my thoughts, which are very little more than extemporary views, laid down in sudden and imperfect draughts, which though intended to be revised and farther looked into afterwards, yet by the intervention of business, or preferable enquiries happen’d to be thrust aside and so lay neglected and sometimes quite forgotten. Some of them indeed light upon me at such a time of leisure and in such a temper of mind that I laid them not wholly by upon the first interruption, but took them in hand again as occasion served, and went on in pursuance of my first designe till I had satisfied my self in the enquiry I at first proposed. of this kind is

(…)

The Conduct of the understanding I have allways thought ever since it first came into my mind to be a subject very well worth consideration, though I know not how, it seems to me for any thing that I have met with to have been almost wholly neglected: what I have done in it is very far from a just treatise. All that I have done has been, as any miscarriage in that point has accidently come into my minde, to set it down, with those remedies for it that I could think of. This method though it makes not that hast to the end which one could wish, is yet perhaps the onely one can be followed in the case, it being here as in physick impossible for a physitian to describe a disease or seek remedies for it till he comes to meet with it. But those particulars that have occur’d to me and I have set down being as I guess sufficient to make men see some faults in the conduct of their understandings, and suspect there may be others you may also doe with as you think fit. For they may perhaps serve to excite others to enquire farther into it, and treat of it more fully than I have done. But the heads and chapters must be reduced into order.427

3. A short history of the Conduct, 1697-1706

[32] Locke’s letter to Molyneux from 10 April 1697 (see above, [22]), suggests this date minus ‘a few days’ as the start of work on the Conduct.

[33] Locke’s work on the Conduct was resumed on several occasions in the years from 1697 until his death in 1704. MS e.1 shows signs of different layers of corrections and additions (see [10]). In his final letter to King (see [31]) Locke ranged the Conduct amongst those projects that he had not laid ‘wholy by upon the first interruption’ but taken ‘in hand again as occasion served’. King’s letter to Locke of 21 January 1704 (see [30]), where the former announces the transfer by Francis Masham of ‘a manuscript concerning the Conduct of the Understanding’ from London to, presumably, Oates, may mark one such an occasion.

[34] The earliest major interruption of work on the Conduct was probably caused by Locke’s controversy with Stillingfleet (see above, Context, §1). Mr. Locke’s Reply to the Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of Worcester’s Answer to his Letter was finished 29 June 1697.428 On 11 September in the same year Locke complained to Molyneux that the ‘trifling quarrel of the Bishop’ kept him from work on additions to Education and the Essay (see [24]). This is not necessarily a reference to the Conduct. Other projected additions to the Fourth Edition of the Essay, apart from a chapter on the ‘Conduct’, were the chapters on ‘Association’ and on ‘Enthusiasm’ (MS e.1 contains substantial parts of these additions, see [3]). However, work on these subjects had probably started already at about April 1695 (see ‘Context’, first paragraph).

[35] The Conduct was not started in MS e.1. At least part of MS e.1 is a copy from another MS. The progressive series of numbers in the margin of pp. 56-78 of MS e.1 (see [4]) probably refer to the page numbers of an earlier MS that is now lost. The progression of the marginal numbers matches the progression in page numbers 56-78.

[36] MS e.1 was not originally one single note book. It consists of a collection of quires of unequal size (see [6]). These quires had been tied together already at some time before they were transferred to the Bodleian Library (see [7]). However, this was not yet the case when Locke started writing. If it had been, he would have had no reason to mark the first and the last page of most quires with their relevant signature. So, there is good reason to assume that at least not all the quires of MS e.1 were tied together when Locke started entering text on their pages. The leaves of each of the quires A-N were kept together by the provisional device of a pin (see [7]).

[37] Since MS e.1 was originally not a note book but a series of unbound quires, we should at least consider the possibility of Locke discussing different subjects of the Conduct on different quires at the same time, resulting in a non-chronological order of the text after the pages of MS e.1 had been bound together. However, this is not a likely possibility. Had this been the case, then:

1. It might be possible to find in the MS some additions appearing on pages with a lower number than that of the page to which they were added.
2. One would expect to see the start of new subjects on the first even-numbered page of some quires and a gap between such a new entry and the end of the text on the previous quire.

428 Yolton, John Locke a Descriptive Bibliography, nr. 249, p. 299.
Yet:

1. All additions as listed in Table 1 appear on pages with a higher number than that of the page to which they were added; most page numbers are in Locke's own hand (see [1]), and he took care to clearly mark the connection between original entries and later additions (see [10]).

2. The first even-numbered pages of all quires from B onwards simply continue the text of the last even-numbered page of the previous quire. No quire marks any break in the running sequence of the text. (An exception is quire H; its first even-numbered page, p. 114, starts with two introductory paragraphs to the Conduct, pars. 2 and 3 of the present edition. This entry ends on p. 116, leaving a blank space, after which the text of the next paragraph, par. 43, starts on p. 118. These introductory paragraphs stand isolated from what comes before and after. However, the text of the last even-numbered page of the previous quire G is continued — not on the first even-numbered page of quire H, but on the first odd-numbered page of quire H.)

To summarize: the impression is that Locke entered his text as if the quires of MS e.1 already formed a note-book, i.e. that he started writing on the first page of the first quire and ended on the last (written) page of the last quire, even although the final pattern was complicated by numerous corrections and additions.

[38] MS e.1 gives the text of the Conduct on pp. 52-261. However, there is one interruption: on p. 182 Locke enters a short addition to Essay IV.xii.3 and on p. 184 an addition to III.vi.26 (see [3]), after which he proceeds again with the Conduct. He gives page numbers and line numbers of the Third Edition to stipulate the intended place of these additions within the existing text of the Essay, and this is indeed exactly where they appear in print in the Fourth Edition. So, they were produced at the latest shortly before this edition went to the press, which according to Nidditch was in late June or July 1699. Assuming that Locke had already produced the text of the Conduct on pp. 52-182 by the time he had reached pp. 182-184 to produce these two small fragments (see [17]), it follows that the part of the Conduct comprised by pp. 52-182 of MS e.1 (127 odd-numbered pages out of a total of 206) must have been on paper by June/July 1699 at the latest.

[39] For a further attempt at dating MS e.1 we first need to substantiate the proposed identification of William Shaw as the scribe who copied the Conduct-part on 'Association' to pp. 210-216 of MS e.1 (see [9]). I already mentioned Shaw

also as the scribe who copied paragraphs of the *Conduct* from MS e.1 to fols. 121-130 of MS c.28 (see [20]). Although the handwritings on MS e.1 pp. 210-216 and on MS c.28 fols. 121-130 at first sight seem to differ from each other (compare ills. 3 and 4), there are good reasons for attributing both to Shaw. The solution starts with MS Locke f.34, which is a small account book that contains a series of entries in which Locke’s servants entered payments on behalf of their master. The first entries are by Sylvester Brownover. The entries from 6 July 1701 (fol. 69v) up to and including 9 August 1704 (fol. 87r) are first headed by ‘J: Locke’, but from 7 April 1703 onwards by ‘Wm Shaw’. The entries from fol. 69v onwards show a clear resemblance with the handwriting of the scribe who filled pp. 210-216 of MS e.1 (compare ill. 6 with ill. 3).431 Now, it can be proved that the entries on fol. 69v-70r and onwards in MS f.34 are by Shaw. Consider the entries on fol. 70r:

```
MR J: Locke C'
  1701 Jul. 7  By a Guinea lent me 1 1 6
     8  By M.: lent me 0 1 0
     9  By ditto 0 0 2
     Sep'  30  By money paid me 0 18 11½
```

The money that Locke lent to Shaw was not only noted down by Shaw, but also by Locke himself. MSS Locke c.1-2 consist of two ledgers, containing Locke’s accounts, 1671-1704. These accounts were ordered per person. MS c.1 contains the accounts for the period 1671-1702. Consider the following fragment from the entries booked under the name of William Shaw, p. 342 (see ill. 8):

```
William Shaw Dr
  1701 July  7 5  To Cash lent him 361 1 2 6
     Sept 30  21  To ditto 9 18 11½
```

So, an entry of the money received by Shaw from the creditor Locke is mirrored by an entry of the money given by Locke to the debtor Shaw (the sums of £1-1-6 and £0-1-0 that Shaw had entered separately were taken together by Locke and entered as £1-2-6). So much on the resemblances between the handwriting of the scribe in MS e.1 pp. 52-56 and in MS f.34 fols. 69v-70r, and on the attribution of this hand to Shaw. The handwriting in the subsequent pages of MS f.34 starts to change; it closely resembles the hand that filled MS c.28 fols. 121-130 (compare ill. 7 with ill. 4). The corresponding entries in Locke’s ledger confirm that these later entries in MS f.34 are still by Shaw. In addition, we have

431 The first entry on fol. 69v and the entries on fol. 70r are in the hand of Locke, who can be seen here initiating his new servant in the art of book-keeping.
a copy of a letter from Locke to Dr. Daniel Whitby, 17 September 1702,\textsuperscript{432} that resembles the handwriting in MS c.28 fols. 121-130 and that according to De Beer was by William Shaw (compare ill. 9 with ill. 4). To conclude: although the handwritings in MS e.1 pp. 210-216 and in MS c.28 fols. 121-130 differ from each other, they can both be safely attributed to William Shaw.\textsuperscript{433} In the early modern period it was not at all unusual for one scribe to use different scripts at different occasions.\textsuperscript{434} Shaw seems to use an 'every-day' script in MS e.1 pp. 210-216 and a neat English copperplate script in MS c.28 fols. 121-130. As a scribe Shaw is a very likely candidate. It is known that at the end of his life Locke intended to make use of his services in transcribing (part of) his \textit{Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul} even although the man must have been rather lazy.\textsuperscript{435} Yet Locke was to keep this servant until his death. In his last will (11 April 1704) he bequeathed to Shaw 'five pounds and all my wearing apparell if he shall be in my service at the time of my death'\textsuperscript{436} and the latter duly signed for having received both the money and the clothes on 1 November 1704.\textsuperscript{437}

[40] If William Shaw was the scribe of MS e.1 pp. 210-216, than the moment that this man went into Locke's service can be used for further dating of MS e.1. De Beer states that Shaw succeeded James Dorrington as Locke's servant in the Summer of 1701.\textsuperscript{438} Indeed, the first entry in Shaw's hand in MS f.34, the account book mentioned above (see [39]), is dated 6 July 1701 and the first entry in Locke's Journal relating to Shaw can be found on 7 July 1701: 'Lent Will £1-2-6\textsuperscript{439} (see [39] for this transaction in Locke's ledger). Also, the last mention

\textsuperscript{432} MS Locke c.24, fol. 288a, \textit{Corr.} 3188, VII, pp. 676-677.
\textsuperscript{433} The identification of Shaw as the scribe of MS c.28 fols. 121-130 is mine; however, credit for the identification of Shaw as the scribe of MS e.1 pp. 210-216 as well, and the subsequent use of Locke's ledgers to test (and confirm) both hypotheses goes to Prof. M. A. Stewart. In addition, Prof. C. Dekker was so kind as to submit both hypotheses to careful paleographical scrutiny; he could confirm that both hands belong to the same person.
\textsuperscript{434} Cf. Greetham, \textit{Textual Scholarship}, p. 172 and pp. 211-213.
\textsuperscript{435} Cf. Locke's farewell letter to P. King, 4 and 25 October 1704, \textit{Corr.} 3647, VIII, p. 416: 'If my Paraphrase and notes on the Ephesians are not wholly transcribed before I dye (as I fear they will not. For however earnestly I have pressed it again and again I have not been able to prevail with Will to dispatch the two first Chapters in three months) you must get it to be transcribed out of my filed papers after I am dead, that so it may be in a condition to be in a condition to be printed. \textit{Will} after all I think be the fitest to transcribe them because he can read my hand and knows my way of writing with the use of the references.'
\textsuperscript{436} \textit{Corr.} (no number) VIII, p. 424.
\textsuperscript{437} MS Locke c.35, fol. 6v.
\textsuperscript{438} \textit{Corr.} 3647, VIII, p. 417, n. 1.
\textsuperscript{439} MS f.10, p. 495.
made of Dorrington is 20 June 1701 in Locke’s ledger and 21 June of the same year in Locke’s Journal: 'paid James Dorrington £ 5-10-6'.

[41] Assuming again a chronological order within MS e.1 (see [37]), and further assuming that Shaw wrote MS e.1 pp. 210-216 (see [39]) and that this man went into Locke’s service in June/July 1701 (see [40]), it follows that the last part of MS e.1, starting with the paragraphs copied by Shaw on p. 210, was not written earlier than June/July 1701.

[42] If pp. 52-184 of MS e.1 were written June/July 1699 at the latest (see [38]) and pp. 210-261 in June/July 1701 at the earliest (see [41]), then there is a period of at least two years in which Locke did not write more than pp. 184-210. (He had been very busy as Commissioner for Trade; he handed over this function in May 1700, thus freeing time to spend his waning energies again more fully on scholarly pursuits.) The existence of a period of at least two years with hardly any work done on the Conduct, covered by pp. 184-210, is confirmed by four characteristics of MS e.1 that all either start or end in pp. 184-210. Firstly, quire M (pp. 175-190) is the last quire that has a signature on both its first and its last page, quire N (pp. 191-206) has only a signature on its first page and the remaining quires O-R have no signature at all (see [2]). Secondly, quire N is the last quire to show traces of having had a pen trough its leaves (see [7]). Thirdly, although the quires all vary in size, the length of the quarter sheets of quires N-R is considerably shorter than that of the previous quires (see [6]). Fourthly, from p. 208 onwards, headwords started in the margin are continued into the space reserved for the main text, while no more keywords are given (see [4] (2)).

[43] So far, the genesis of the text of the Conduct as contained by MS e.1 has been divided into three major periods: the text up to and including p. 184 was written in June/July 1699 at the latest; pp. 184-210 were written between June/July 1699 or later and June/July 1701 or later; and the last part, pp. 210-261, was written between June/July 1701 or later and Locke’s death in October 1704. This rough chronology is largely confirmed and further refined by the story that is told by the watermarks in the paper of the quires of MS e.1 (see [8]). The quires fall into 5 categories (assuming that quires π and N-O belong in the same category), each with a specific combination of one watermark and one countermark. Each of these 5 combinations has been traced back in letters and other dated MS material of Locke, thus enabling a tentative dating of the corresponding quires (results

\[\text{MS e.1, p}. \ 342.\]

\[\text{MS f.10, p}. \ 492.\]
cannot be more than tentative because it is not possible to determine the amount of time that passed between Locke’s purchase and his actual use of a sheet of paper). The results of this exercise are shown in Table 3, at the end of this chapter.

[44] MS e.1 was not stitched when Locke started work on it (see [36]), but it was stitched at some later moment (see [7]). The continuous way in which he entered some additions on the last even-numbered page on one quire and then proceeded with this same correction on the first odd-numbered page of the next quire, makes it likely that these quires were tied together by the time Locke started to make these relatively late additions. Clear examples of such additions can be found on pp. 64-65 (quires D/E), pp. 144-145 (quires I/K), pp. 158-159 (quires K/L) and pp. 254-255 (quires Q/R).

[45] The ‘working order’ of the Conduct in MS e.1 was not meant as a definitive order. On fols. 121-130 of MS c.28 Locke made a start with the task outlined by himself on page i of MS e.1 (see [3]): ‘Mem: That these following discourses are to be writ out under their several heads into distinct Chapters, and then to be numbered and ranged according to their natural order’. Folios 121-130 contain two chapters, ‘Introduction’ (numbered ‘I’) and ‘Of Reasoning’ (unnumbered), both consisting of paragraphs that can be found on different places in MS e.1 (see [14]). Each chapter was stitched separately (see [18]). Locke himself only wrote the first words of these chapters, while the rest of the work was done by William Shaw. However, Locke’s hand keeps appearing on fols. 121-130 in order to make some additions (see [20]).

[46] Folios 121-130 of MS c.28 are clearly copied from MS e.1; the numbers in the margins of fols. 121-130 (see [15]) correspond with the pages of the respective passages in MS e.1 (for a similar procedure see [35]). The pages in MS e.1 that were copied in MS c.28 are marked by a vertical line in the margin of MS e.1 (see [4] (3)).

[47] It is not clear when Locke started work on fols. 121-130 of MS c.28, but it must have been after practically all of MS e.1 had been written. One of the passages covered by fols. 121-130 of MS c.28 is on pp. 248-261 of MS e.1. The only thing that Locke was to write in MS e.1 after these pages was the unfinished last paragraph on ‘Custom’ on p. 260. If the manuscript sent from London to Oates in January 1704 (see [30]) was MS e.1, then Shaw’s partial transcription of this MS to fols. 121-130 of MS c.28 and Locke’s writing of ‘Custom’ in MS e.1 probably took place between this time and the latter’s death on 28 October 1704.
The next folios of MS c.28, fols. 131-138 (quires D-F), differ from the previous fols. 121-130 (quires \(\pi-2\pi\) and A-C) in various respects. Folios 131-138 no longer show any trace of Locke’s handwriting. Also, there are no signs of previous binding (see [18]). Finally, the size of the quires that contain fols. 131-138 is different from the previous quires (see [17]). Locke had probably started to work on fols. 121-130 only during the last six months of his life (see [47]). In his farewell letter to Peter King (see [31]) he confirmed that his instructions on the first page of MS e.1 (see [45]) still had to be carried out. The last sentence in this letter about the Conduct gains extra urgency by the fact that it was inserted later and in a different colour of ink than the rest of the letter: ‘But the heads and chapters must be reduced into order.’ Since Peter King was the recipient of these instructions, he is the most likely candidate for being their executor. After Locke’s death he took over responsibility for the transcription of MS e.1 to MS c.28. Whereas fols. 121-130 had still been produced under Locke’s own direction, King was responsible for the production of fols. 131-138; this explains the differences between fols. 121-130 and fols. 131-138. The task of transcribing the text of MS e.1 to MS c.28 fols. 131-138 was not carried out by King himself, but by a scribe in his service. However, King did set up the chapter ‘Of Mathematicks’ on fol. 132v for this scribe (as had been the habit of Locke himself). These few lines on fol. 132v show indeed a close resemblance with King’s hand, which can be found in various Locke MSS in the Bodleian Library (compare ill. 5 with ill. 10). Locke must have died even before he had been able to thoroughly check and correct Shaw’s transcription on fols. 121-130. This task was finished by King, which explains why these folios bear witness to interventions in the hands of both Locke and King.

King was probably the editor of the Conduct as it would appear for the first time in O-1706. The passage about the Conduct in Locke’s farewell letter to King (see [31]) was repeated almost verbatim in the ‘Advertisement to the Reader’ to O-1706:

*The Conduct of the Understanding be always thought to be a Subject very well worth Consideration. As any Mis-carrsages in that point accidentally came into his Mind, he used sometimes to set them down in Writing, with those remedies that he could then think of. This Method, tho’ it makes not that Haste to the End which one would wish, yet perhaps is the only one that can be followed in the Case. It being here, as in Physick, impossible for a Physician to describe a Disease, or seek Remedies for it, till he comes to meet with it. Such Particulars of this kind as occur’d to the Author at a time of Leisure, he, as is before said, sat down in Writing; intending, if he had lived, to have reduced them into Order and Method, and to have made a complete Treatise; whereas now it is only a Collection of casual Observations, sufficient to make Men see some Faults in the Conduct of their...*
Understanding, and suspect there may be more, and may perhaps serve to excite others to enquire farther into it, than the Author hath done. 442

Neither MS e.1 nor MS c.28 functioned as printer's copy for the Conduct in O-1706, but both were used as a source. MS e.1 is the main source, but O-1706 has a (slightly altered) passage that was added in Locke's hand on fol. 123r of MS c.28 (see [20] (3) and below, [51]), but that is absent in MS e.1. This suggests that MS c.28 was also used as a source.

Peter King did make a start with task of ordering and correcting the text of the Conduct. He corrected Shaw's work on fols. 121-130 of MS c.28 and he was responsible for the transcription by what was probably his own scribe on fols. 131-138 of the same MS (see [48]). However, it is clear that King did not finish his job. The elements of MS e.1 that were presented as the Conduct in O-1706 were not 'writ out … into distinct Chapters', nor were they ranged 'according to their natural order' (see [45]). King must have felt that this task went above his capacities. Locke's instructions, combined with such information as King could have gathered from marginal headwords and keywords (see [4]) and from the content of the rather loose remarks that make up the Conduct, did not provide him with the necessary information. Instead, he presented the parts of MS e.1 in roughly the same chronological order as they had been written down by Locke, without any additional ordering. He divided these parts into 45 rather arbitrary sections (whose headings were derived from the marginal headwords and keywords in MS e.1) and omitted the unfinished last paragraph on p. 260. There is even an example of King undoing a case of Locke's own ordering in MS c.28. Locke had ranged three parts of MS e.1, one on p. 62 (headword 'Introduction'), the next on pp. 114-116 and the last on pp. 62-64 (headword 'Parts') together in chapter 1, 'Introduction', of MS c.28, fols. 121r-123r. King decided to ignore this ordering and to go back to a more fragmented presentation. He presented the first two parts as '§ 1 Introduction' and the third as '§ 2 Parts'. 443 Since King failed to order Locke's 'discourses' into chapters, it is only fitting that his edition does not consist of chapters, but of sections. We have seen ([20] (3)) that at the end of chapter 1 in MS c.28, fol. 123r. Locke had added the following sentence: 'Some of them [errors] I shall take notice of and endeavour to point out proper remedies for in the following Chapters.' King decided to include this sentence in O-1706, but since he had not ordered the material of MS e.1 into chapters he

443 This fact confirms my assertion that MS c.28 did not function as printer's copy for C-1706.
duly substituted the word ‘Discourse’ for ‘Chapters’. He knew his task but he also understood that he had been unable to fulfil it.

4. The relation between the Conduct and the Essay

The *Conduct* was projected as an addition to the *Essay*. The title ‘Of the Conduct of the understanding’ in MS e.1 p. 62 is preceded by its planned chapter number in the *Essay*: ‘B:IV C:XX’. This heading was never deleted. Also, on pp. 113-114 Locke gives the following instructions about the desired place of two introductory paragraphs to the *Conduct* on pp. 114-116 (these instructions may have been added later, so we cannot be sure about their chronology in relation to the rest of the text): ‘NB what here immediately follows concerning Logic is to begin this Chapter of the conduct of the understanding’. The implication of this entry is that the *Conduct* is here still regarded as a chapter of the *Essay*. However, MS e.1 provides us with proof for a change of mind concerning the status of the *Conduct*. Occasionally, in the *Conduct* Locke refers back to the *Essay*. There are at least four clear cases in MS e.1 of corrections or additions that amount to changing an internal reference to the *Essay* into an external reference.\

444 By the time that these conversions were made, Locke must have decided that the *Conduct* would not be a part the *Essay*.

1) On p. 72 of MS e.1 (par. 10) Locke writes: ‘Those hindrances of our understandings in the pursuit of knowledge I have sufficiently enlarged upon in an other place so that noe thing more needs here to be said of those matters’. However, the MS shows that he first wrote ‘other parts of this treatise’ and only later changed this in ‘an other place so’.

2) On p. 98 of MS e.1 (par. 30) Locke briefly mentions the problem of the relation between words and ideas: ‘… what I have said in the 3d booke of my Essay will excuse me from any other answer to this question’. Initially he had written ‘this Essay’, and replaced ‘this’ only later by ‘my’.

3) On p. 148 of MS e.1 (par. 63) we read: ‘I have copiously enough spoken of the abuse of words in an other place …’ He first wrote ‘spoken in this tract’. Probably he then substituted ‘treatise’ for ‘tract’, then deleted ‘in this treatise’ and finally added ‘in an other place’.

4) The clearest indication for a parting of ways between *Essay* and *Conduct* is given by the paragraphs on ‘Association’ (pars. 76-79). We have already noted  

444 For what probably amounts to an internal reference to the *Essay* that was left unchanged, see par. 64: ‘this essay’. 
that Locke probably started work on some projected additions for the Fourth Edition of the *Essay* in about April 1695; that one of these projected additions was on 'Association', comprising pp. 32-56 of MS e.1; and that he only included the first part of this material in the Fourth Edition of the *Essay*, while the remaining part was to be included in the *Conduct* (see ‘Context’, §3).

It is now time to look into this matter with greater detail. Consider the following passage in MS e.1, pp. 50-52:

> when two things [52] in them selves disjoynd appear to the sight constantly united.
>
> if the eye sees those things rivited which are loose where will you begin to rectifie the mistakes that follow [*] from it. Tis a [**] hard thing to convince any one that things are not sōe. & naturāly sōe as they constantly appear to him

The part from p. 32 until * on p. 52 was included in Book II, Chapter xxxiii ‘Of the Association of Ideas’ in the Fourth Edition of the *Essay*. In this edition (and in subsequent editions), the text until * was continued with the following words (section 18), which cannot be found in MS e.1:

[*] in two Ideas, that they have been accustomed so to join in their Minds, as to substitute one for the other, and, as I am apt to think, often without perceiving it themselves.

Since the Fourth Edition went to the press in June/July 1699 (see [38]), it was at the latest by then that Locke decided not to include pp. 52-56 of MS e.1 on 'Association' in the new chapter for the *Essay*. It was only later that he decided to use this remaining material for the *Conduct*.445 By the time he ordered William Shaw to copy the remaining material on 'Association' to pp. 210-216 of MS e.1, it was June/July 1701 at the earliest (see [40]). It is certain that Shaw copied at least part of the text on pp. 210-216 from another source than pp. 52-56 (see [9]). However, it is likely that Shaw's unknown source was similar to pp. 32-56 of MS e.1, in that the *Conduct*-part on 'Association' was not yet set apart from the previous *Essay*-part on the same subject. This meant that Locke first had to provide an acceptable beginning for a new paragraph in the *Conduct*. He could not simply ask Shaw to start at (the place in the unknown source that was parallel to) ** on p. 52 in MS e.1. Something had to be entered before ** in order to produce a decent introductory sentence for what in the *Conduct* was to be the new subject on 'Association'. This is what Locke added in his own hand on pp. 208-210 of MS e.1:

445 That pp. 52-56 give a part of the *Conduct* seems to have escaped Long, *A Summary Catalogue*, although he remarks, p. 30: 'The draft [containing both the *Essay*-part and the *Conduct*-part] is longer than the printed version [containing only the *Essay*-part].'
Though I have in the 2d book of my Essay concerning humane understanding treated of the Association of Ideas yet having donne it there historically as giving a view of the understanding in this as well as its several other ways of operating rather than designeing there to enquire into the remedies ought to be applied to it, It will under this later consideration afford other matter of thought to those who have a minde to instruct them selves throughly in the right way of conducting their understandings and that the rather because this if I mistake not is as frequent a cause of mistake and error in us as perhaps [210] any thing else that can be named, and is a disease of the mind as hard to be cured as any. It being a very **

With these words he had set up a new paragraph for Shaw, who could now start at ** with copying the text from (the unknown source that ran parallel to) MS e.1 pp. 52-56 to pp. MS e.1 210-216. It is not clear why exactly Locke chose to include in the Conduct a part on ‘Association’ that he first had discarded as an addition to the Essay, but wrong association of ideas is certainly an important aspect of the central theme of the Conduct, i.e. that of errors relevant for his logic of ideas. Given the intimate connection between the Essay and the Conduct in general, and the Essay-part and the Conduct-part on ‘Association’ in particular, it is doubtful whether Locke’s characterization of these parts in the quotation above amounts to much more than a posterior rationalization. What is clear however, is that for all practical purposes he had started to regard the Conduct as a work separate from the Essay. All this provides detailed confirmation of John Yolton’s remark that ‘In some ways, the Conduct picks up from the Essay chapter on the association of ideas …’

5. Choice of copy-text

Either MS e.1 or MS c.28, fols. 121-138 can be chosen as copy-text for an edition of the Conduct. Another candidate, the text in O-1706 (used for all subsequent editions of the Conduct), must be discarded. It is a posthumous text that is based on these two sources. MS c.28 gives a copy of the draft version in MS e.1. However, MS c.28 covers only a small part of the text presented in MS e.1. I will chose MS e.1 pp. 52-182/184-261 as copy-text for the present edition of the Conduct. The Conduct-part on ‘Association’ demands special attention, since it appears twice in MS e.1. The first version on pp. 52-56 is in Locke’s own hand. The second version appears on pp. 210-216; it is in the hand of William Shaw, but contains corrections in the hand of Locke. Shaw’s copy follows in most cases the wording of Locke’s holograph, but is probably copied from another version that has been lost (see [9]). Shaw’s copy differs from Locke’s holograph in punctuation, orthography, and in some wordings. In addition, this copy has one sentence (at the end of par. 446 ‘Introduction’ to C-1996, p. vii.
77 in the present edition) that is absent from Locke’s holograph. Although Shaw’s copy is more recent than Locke’s holograph and although it contains corrections in Locke’s hand, the choice for this copy as copy-text would imply that Shaw’s orthography and punctuation would be given priority over Locke’s own writing on pp. 52-56. The fact that Locke did not bother to correct Shaw’s orthography and punctuation does not imply that he preferred his scribe’s idiosyncrasies to his own habits. However, Locke’s corrections indicate that he did check the wording of the text. I have therefore taken Locke’s holograph of as copy-text, but in the few cases of differences in wording I have opted in most cases for Shaw’s copy (in cases where substantive differences are likely to be due to scribal errors that Locke failed to correct, preference has been given to Locke’s holograph). The complete sentence that is present in Shaw’s copy but not in Locke’s holograph, is included in the present edition (it is also included in O-1706). Differences in wording between Locke’s holograph and Shaw’s copy are registered in the annotation.

6. The order of the text

I have concluded that, apart from additions and corrections on odd-numbered right-handed pages, the text of the Conduct on pp. 52-182, 184-261 of MS e.1 is in chronological order (see [37]); that this was not meant to be a definitive order; that Locke started ordering the material of MS e.1 on fols. 121-130 of MS c.28 (see [45]); and that King failed to complete this job (see [51]). A modern editor of the Conduct has two choices. He can either try to finish King’s job or present the parts of MS e.1 in the ‘working order’ in which they have come down to posterity. The former option presents us with grave difficulties. We are in no better position than King was, and I have noted that he did not have the necessary information to bring the job to a successful and unambiguous end (see [51]). I therefore choose for the second possibility, which is also the disposition to which King eventually fell back. Once this general choice is made, some particular problems still remain to be solved.

It is only on p. 62 of MS e.1 that we meet the starting paragraph of the Conduct, headed ‘Introduction’ by a marginal entry and preceded by ‘B:IV C: XX Of the Conduct of the understanding’. The text that follows from this point onwards contains the bulk of the Conduct and runs to the end on p. 260. I will call this ‘A’. However, before p. 62 there are already two Conduct-fragments. The question is what place should be assigned to these fragments relative to A. Pages 52-56 contain the Conduct-part on ‘Association’ (see above, §5). It is not difficult to give this a part an acceptable place. It reappears in a second version on pp. 210-216, where it is included in the running text of A. So, in the present edition
the Conduct-part on ‘Association’ will be given the place that corresponds with the place of pp. 210-216 relative to the previous and subsequent pages in A (this is also the place given to ‘Association’ in O-1706).

The second Conduct-fragment before p. 62 is an entry on ‘Reasoning’ (pp. 56-62). It is continued with a late addition on pp. 248-261. Pages 56-62 and pp. 248-261 make up what I will call ‘B’. The text on pp. 248-261 is clearly marked by Locke as a continuation of the first part of B on pp. 56-62. There can be no doubt about B being a part of the Conduct. The two subfragments, pp. 56-62 and pp. 248-261, were taken together by Locke and copied by Shaw as the chapter ‘Of Reasoning’ on fols. 125-130 of MS c.28. At the top of the margin of fol. 125r Locke himself wrote ‘Conduct’ (see [15]). However, the number of this chapter was repeatedly and conspicuously left open (see [14]). Apparently Locke had not yet made up his mind about its definitive place in a finished version of the Conduct. This leaves us with the problem of where to place B in relation to A. There are three options: B can be placed before, somewhere within, or after A. The obvious start of the Conduct is formed by its introduction as given in A, which eliminates the first possibility. King settled for the second alternative. He inserted B as §3 between §2 and §4 of his edition (where it has remained in all subsequent editions), i.e. between pars. 5 and 6 of the present edition. However, neither MS e.1 nor MS c.28 contain any justification for this solution. We can only guess here at King’s motives. So far as we know, ‘Of Reasoning’ (=B) is the only chapter in MS c.28 fols. 121-138 that was ordered by Locke himself, apart from the introductory chapter. This may have prompted King to place B immediately after this introductory chapter (i.e. after §1-2 in his own edition), thus starting his edition with the only two chapters that were arranged by Locke himself. However, it is clear that the place assigned by King to B is not only unmotivated but also destroys the connection between pars. 5 and 6 in A. Par. 5 ends with a remark about the errors that are caused by a lack of exercise of our mental faculties: ‘And it is easy to perceive that men are guilty of a great many faults in the exercise and improvement of this facultie of the mind which hinders them in their progresse and keep them in ignorauce and error all their lives.’ And par. 6 continues with the importance of exercising these faculties (‘powers’): ‘We are borne with faculties and powers capable almost of any thing such at least as would carry us farther then can be easily imagined. But tis only the exercise of those powers which gives us ability and skill in any thing and leads us towards perfection’. The MS material does not provide us with clear cues for another place of B within A. What remains is the third option: placing B after A.
An easier problem is that of the internal order of the introductory paragraphs. We have seen that p. 62 of MS e.1 gives a paragraph marked ‘Introduction’, but that there are also two introductory paragraphs on pp. 114-116 of the same MS, also marked ‘Introduction’ in the margin. These latter paragraphs are unconnected with the entries before and after them (see [37]). However, Locke himself had entered the following instructions concerning these introductory paragraphs on pp. 113-114: ‘NB what here immediately follows concerning Logic is to begin this Chapter of the conduct of the understanding’. Does this mean that the introductory paragraphs on pp. 114-116 should precede even the introductory paragraph on page 62, or should they be placed after this paragraph? When Locke asked Shaw to copy this material as the chapter called ‘Introduction’ on fols. 121-123 of MS c.28, he chose for the latter possibility. This order was also taken by King in O-1706 and it is the order for which I have opted as well.

Finally, in addition to the text comprising A and B, MS e.1 contains some secondary material pertaining to the Conduct (see [3]). This material is included as items C-K in an appendix to the main text. The Ciceronian motto on page iv of MS e.1, ‘Quid tam …’, cannot with certainty be regarded as the motto of the Conduct. However, it is included as such in the present edition (as it was also included in O-1706). Its subject is that of error, which very well fits the main theme of the Conduct.

The order of the present edition, with the exception of the place assigned to B, is the same as the one given by King in O-1706. However, since I have not ordered the material into chapters and since an ordering into sections, as practised by King, is bound to remain an arbitrary procedure, I have taken the successive paragraphs (as marked by Locke himself) as the basic unit for this edition (the well-established section numbers are also given, in the inner margin of the text). These paragraphs will be referred to by means of Arabic numbers. For the sake of easy reference the series of paragraph numbers that starts with the first paragraph of A, will be continued with the two paragraphs of B. The over-all result is a text that starts where it should, that continues in an order that is based on the evidence provided by the MSS and that does not assume more than the evidence warrants.

7. Editorial principles

This edition of the Conduct is annotated by three footnote apparatuses. The first apparatus gives text-critical notes with information on alterations, emendations,
and other characteristics of the copy text MS not covered in the edited text itself. In order to relieve the text from an abundance of superscript markings, the lines of the text are numbered in the margin, with the footnotes of this first apparatus keyed to the line numbers. The second apparatus, which elucidates the content of the Conduct, uses reference numbers in the text. The first and the second apparatus are given at the bottom of the main text. The third apparatus contains collations of the copy-text in MS e.1 with MS c.28 and is made up of endnotes that are keyed to the line numbers; this third apparatus is given in a separate section, ‘Collation of MS Locke e.1 with MS Locke e.28’. The ‘scribe’ is Locke himself or his amanuensis William Shaw.

(i) All additions in MS e.1 are marked between ` ´ in the relevant text-critical note:

a. Interlineated words or letters are marked between ` ´, followed by ‘il.’
b. Additions on another page (often this will be on the odd-numbered right-hand page opposite the relevant even-numbered left-hand page) are marked between ` ´, followed by ‘add.’, followed by the page(s) on which the addition is entered.
c. Additions that start on one page but that are continued on another page are marked between ` ´, followed by add., followed by ‘cont.’, followed by the page(s) on which the addition is continued. If the continued addition is an interlineation, then the text between ` ´ is followed by ‘il.’, followed by ‘cont.’, followed by the page(s) on which the interlineation is continued. The point where the addition leaves its original page and continues on the other page is marked by a '|' within the addition as it is presented in the text-critical note.
d. Marginal additions are marked between ` ´, followed either by ‘l.’ (=left) or by ‘r.’ (=right), followed by ‘marg.’

(2) Scribal deletions are marked by [ ] in the text-critical note.

(3) Scribal cancellation by superimposition of correction is included selectively and marked between [   ].

(4) Unfinished or conjectural lettering in the MS is indicated in the annotation by ‘subimposed’ dots: ‘.’.

(5) Indecipherable letters are registered in the annotation by subimposed dots that are not accompanied by letters, every dot roughly corresponding with one letter.
(6) Editorial insertions and corrections of mistakes are indicated by angle brackets in the text: ( ).

(7) Cases of editorial deletions in the text (which are rare), for instance where the scribe mistakenly repeats one or more words or where a period impedes a fluent reading of the text, are indicated between { } in the annotation.

(8) The sign for an editorially inserted stop, used to facilitate a fluent reading of the text, is a superscripted dot: .'

(9) Each paragraph in this edition is preceded by a number between brackets: ( ).

(10) The section numbers used by King in O-1706 are given in the inner margin, also between brackets. However, in King's edition there are two cases of misnumbered sections (numbers 13 and 38 were used twice). In later editions these errors have been corrected. I will give these corrected section numbers.

(11) All marginal headwords and keywords in the text of the Conduct of MS e.1 are presented in the outer margin, even where this implies repetitions (these headwords/keywords are listed in Table 2).

(12) Page numbers of MS e.1 are also entered in the outer margin. These numbers are given as they appear in the MS, misnumberings included (see above, §1 [1]). Page breaks in MS e.1 are marked by a | in the text of the present edition. The fact that the text of this MS was written on the even-numbered left-hand pages, while the odd-numbered right-hand pages were used for additions, calls for special attention. If an addition to a left-hand page is started or continued on the corresponding right-hand page and also ends on this same page, as is very frequently the case, this has not been separately marked in the margin by a change in page number (however, these cases of transition from one page to the opposite page are registered in the annotation, see above, point 1c). If an addition to a left-hand page spills over from the corresponding right-hand page to (an)other page(s), or if the addition is started or continued on any other page than on the corresponding right-hand page, then all page numbers of the addition are marked in the margin.

(13) Locke often uses cross-references when he gives an addition to a section on later pages in the MS (see above, §1 [10]). These cross-references will not be registered; jumps become immediately apparent from the page numbers given in the outer margin.
(14) The general header _Conduct_, used by Locke on most pages of MS e.1 (see above, §1 [4] (i)), has been used throughout in the header of text of the _Conduct_.

(15) Information concerning quires and marginal numbers has been given above (§1 [1] and [4]) and will not be included in the transcription.

(16) Pages ending with text that is continued on the next page in most cases have a catchword; these cases are not registered, but exceptions to this rule are noted.

(17) Locke’s lineation is neither retained nor recorded.

(18) Locke’s erratic word division is retained as far as possible.

(19) Line breaks are indicated by ‘-’ or ‘/’ in the annotation if a hyphen was used and by ‘/’ if no hyphen was used. Line breaks are only registered where this is relevant. For instance, since Locke wrote both ‘thereby’ and ‘there by’, it is relevant to enter ‘there/-by’. Furthermore, if the text in the present edition gives a hyphen to indicate a line break while no such break appeared in the original MS, the relevant word will be entered in the annotation without break.

(20) Locke’s abbreviations are expanded. I print _and_ for &, _the for y’s_, _that for y’s_, _which for w’s_, _what for w’s_, _again for ag’s_, _you for y’s_, _your for y’s_, _against for ag’s_, _part for p’s_, _account for acc’s_, _said for sd’s_, _-ment for -m’s_, _natural for naal_, _Lord for Ld_, _atque for atq and quod for q’d_. Exception: ambiguous abbreviations, listed in the annotation, are not expanded.

(21) Italics in the main text reflect cases of underlining by the scribe himself.

(22) The list of collations in the third apparatus only includes differences in actual wording between MS e.1 and MS c.28, but does not include differences in orthography, punctuation or other differences caused by minor errors of the scribes employed by Locke or King.448 The list also ignores the differences between MS e.1 and MS c.28 that were already noted above, §1 [15] and [20].

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TABLE 3

The watermarks in MS Locke e.1 compared with similar watermarks in Locke’s dated MSS

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<td>Large medallion with Seven Provinces’ lion</td>
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<td>MS c.28, fols. 115-116: ‘Understanding A’ (additions for the Essay); date given by Long: c. 1694.†</td>
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<td>1-31, 33-90, 58-74, 77-79, 98</td>
<td>Horn and baldric</td>
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<td>MS c.40, fols. 3-32: letters by Locke to P. King, 8 March 1698 - 11 February 1699. MS c.27, fols. 116-117: ‘Christianity 1695’ (notes for The reasonableness of Christianity).</td>
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* The numbers of all Conduct paragraphs contained by the relevant quire(s) are given, including paragraphs that are contained only partially by these quires. For the exact relation between page numbers and paragraph numbers see above, table 1.

† Long, A Summary Catalogue, p. 29; on MS c.28, fols. 115-116 see also above, ‘Context’, §5.
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<td>84-99</td>
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‡ Long, A Summary Catalogue, p. 28.
ILLUSTRATIONS

III. 1: the Ciceronian motto of the Conduct and some miscellaneous entries pertaining to the Conduct (MS Locke e.t. p. iv and p. 1).
Ill. 2: the beginning of the chapter ‘Of the Conduct of the understanding’ in MS Locke e.1, pp. 62-63.
Ill. 3: Shaw’s copy of the end of par. 76 and the beginning of par. 77 of the Conduct (MS Locke e.1, p. 210).
Ill. 4: the beginning of the chapter 'Of the Conduct of the understanding' in MS Locke c.28, fol. 12tr, copied from MS Locke c.1, p. 62 (see ill. 2).
ILLUSTRATIONS

III. 5: the end of par. 20 and the beginning of par. 21 of the Conduct in MS Locke c.28, fol. 132v, copied from MS Locke c.1, pp. 88, 90.
Ill. 6: fols. 69v–70r from an account book in which Locke’s servants entered payment on his behalf (MS Locke f.34).
Illustrations

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Ill. 7: fols. 78v-79r, again from MS Locke f.34.
Ill. 8: Locke’s ledger, MS Locke c.1 (covering the period 1671-1702), p. 342, giving the accounts that William Shaw had with him.
Ill. 9: first page of William Shaw's copy from Locke's letter to Dr. Daniel Whitby, 17 September 1702 (MS Locke c.24, fol. 284r, see Corr. 3188, VII, pp. 676-677).
III. 10: first page of a letter from Peter King to Locke, 16 August 1704 (MS Locke c.12, fol. 269v, Corr. 3614, VIII, pp. 379-380).
Of the Conduct of the Understanding

by John Locke
SIGNs AND ABBREVIATIONS

(For detailed explanations, see General Introduction, 'Text', §7.)

` `, scribal addition
[ ] scribal deletion
[ [ ] ] scribal cancellation by superimposition of correction
a . the sign 'a' is conjectural or written incompletely, and the next is indecipherable
( ) editorial insertion or substitution
{} editorial omission
/ editorial end-of-line marker
· editorial stop
| the point where one page ends and where the next begins
add. addition
il. interliniation
cont. continued
marg. margin
Quid tam temerarium tamque indignum sapientis gravitatem atque constantiam, quam aut falsum sentire, aut quod non satis exploratum sit et cognitum sine ullâ dubitatione defendere? Cic: de Nat: deorum l. 1.\textsuperscript{1,2}
Of the Conduct of the understanding

(§1) (1.) The last resort a man has recourse to in the conduct of himself is his understanding for though we distinguish the faculties of the minde and give the supreme command to the Will as to an agent yet the truth is the man which is the agent determins him self to this or that voluntary action upon some precedent knowldg or appearance of knowldg in the understanding, no man ever sets himself about any thing but upon some view or other, which serves him for a reason for what he does And whatso ever faculties he imploys the understanding with such light as it has well or ill informd constantly leads and by that light true or false all his operative powers are directed. The will it self how absolute and uncontrouleable so ever it may be thought never fails in its obedience to the dictates
of the understanding, temp. have their sacred images and we see what influence they have always had over a great part of mankind. But in truth the Ideas and images in mens mindes are the invisible powers that constantly governe them and to these they all universally pay a ready submission. It is therefore of the highest concernement that great care should be taken of the understanding to conduct it right in the search of knowledge and in the judgments it makes:

(2.) The Logick now in use has so long possessed the chair as the only art taught in the Schools for the direction of the mind in the study of the Arts and sciences that it would perhaps be thought an affection of Noveltie to suspect that rules that have served the learned world these two or three thousand years and which without any complaint of defects the learned have rested in are not sufficiente to guide the understanding. And I should not doubt but this attempt would be censured as vanity or presumption did not the Great Lord Verulams authority justify it. Who not servilely thinking learning could not be advanced beyond what it was because for many ages it had not been did not rest in the lazy approbation and applause of what was because it was; but enlarged his mind to what might be. In his preface to his Novum Organum concerning

1 of the [mind] understanding, 1 understanding, [and what ever complements may be made to those in the temples [tis] the images and Ideas in their minds [that as if these were] are the invisible powers [they] "that" (il) men really pay] Temples [8] have 2 had [in the world] over 3 mindes [.....] are 7 and 'in' (il) the 8 Preceded by a separate remark on pp. 233-244: NB what here immediately follows concerning Logic is to begin this Chapter 1 of the conduct of the understanding (see Gen. Introd.: 'Text', §6) 8 Chair [and] 'as' (il) 10-11 thought [vanity or presumption] an affection 11 to [thing the understanding] [think] 'suspect' (il) 12 years [were not sufficient to] and 13 of [their deficiency] 'defects' (il) 13 the[y] 'learned' (il) 13 in [sh] are 15 would ['quic(kdy)'] (il) be 18 in the [admiration of wh(at)] lazy

On understanding and will see Essay, II.xxi. 236: 'These Powers of the Mind, viz. of Perceiving, and of Preferring, are usually call'd by another Name: And the ordinary way of Speaking is, That the Understanding and Will are two Faculties of the mind ...'. On the will following the dictates of the understanding, see ibid. p. 237. Cf. the priority given by Locke to the understanding over the will with Descartes, e.g. Principia philosophia, I.xxxviii, AT VIII-I, p. 19: 'Quod autem in errores incidamus, defectus quidem est in nostrâ actione sive in usu libertatis, sed non in nostrâ naturâ ...' and Malebranche, e.g. Recherche, Vol. I, Bk. I, Ch. ii, Sect. ii, p. 50: 'Que les jugemens & les raisonnemens dépendent de la volonté.'
Logick he pronounces thus: *Qui summas Dialecticæ partes tribuerunt atque inde fidissima Scientiis praebentur verissime et optime viderunt intellectum humanum sibi permittum merito suspectum esse debere.* Verum infirmior omnino est malo medicina; nec ipsa mali expers. Si quidem Dialectica, quæ recepta est, licet ad civilia et artes, quæ in sermone et opinione positæ sunt, rectissime adhibeatur; naturæ tamen subtilitatem longo intervallo non attingit, et prensando, quod non capit, ad errores potius stabiliendos et quasi figendos, quam ad viam veritati aperiendam valuit.

They says he who attributed soe much to Logick perceived very well and truly that it was not safe to trust the understanding to it self without the guard of any rules. But the remedy reachd not the evil but became a part of it. For the Logick which tooke place though it might doe well enough in civil affairs and the Arts which consisted in talke and opinion, yet comes very far short of the subtilty in the reall performances of nature and catching at what it cannot reach has served to confirme and establish errors rather than to open a way to truth.

And therefor a little after he says. *That it is absolutely necessary that a better and perfecter use and imployment of the minde and understanding should be introduced.* Necessario requiritur ut melior et perfectior mentis et intellectus humani usus et adoperatio introducatur.

There is tis visible great variety in mens understandings. And their natural constitutions put soe wide a difference between some men in this respect that art and industry would never be able

6 Cf. Bacon, *Works*, I, 129. The preface is to the *Instauratio Magna*, of which the *Novum Organum* was designed to be a part. For Bacon on investigations that go beyond ‘civilia et artes, quæ in sermone et opinione positæ sunt’, see *Of the Advancement of Learning*, Bk. II, *Works*, III, 406: ‘For those whose conceits are seated in popular opinions, need only to prove or dispute; but those whose conceits are beyond popular opinions, have a double labour; the one to make themselves conceived, and the other to prove and demonstrate …’ While Bacon denies the old logic philosophical or scientific use, but concedes that it can render practical services, Locke in *Essay*, III.x.12: 456 more radically also denies the Peripatetic logic any use in ‘Humane Life and Society’. On the anti-scholastic purport of the *Conduct* see Gen. Introd.: ‘Context’, §6; on Aristotelian logicians see ibid. §7.
to master and their very natures seem to want a foundation to raise on it that which other men easily attain unto. Amongst men of equall education there is great inequality of parts. And the woods of America as well as the Schools of Athens produce men of severall abilities in the same kinde. 

(5.) Though this be so yet I imagin most men come very short of what they might attain unto in their severall degrees by a neglect of their understandings: A few rules of Logick are thought sufficient in this case for those who pretend to the highest improvement whereas I thinke there are a great many natural defects in the understanding capable of amendment which are over looked and wholly neglected. And it is easy to perceive that men are guilty of a great many faults in the exercise and improvement of this facultie of the minde which hinder them in their progresse and keep them in ignorance and error all their lives.

(6.) We are borne with faculties and powers capable almost of any thing such at least as would carry us farther then can be easily imagined. But tis only the exercise of those powers which gives us ability and skill in any thing and leads us towards perfection. A midle aged plough man will scarce ever be brought to the carriage and language of a Gentleman though his body be as well proportioned his joints as supple and his natural parts not any inferior. The legs of a dancing master and the fingers of a musitian fall as it were naturally

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7 Locke's *tabula-rasa* conception of the mind implied no denial of the 'different Inclinations, and particular Defaults' (*Education*, §217, p. 265) that can be found in children (or adults).

8 Cf. *Essay*, IV.iii.65-64: 'that Humane Knowledge, under the present Circumstances of our Beings and Constitutions may be carried much farther, than it hitherto has been, if Men would sincerely, and with freedom of Mind, employ all that Industry and Labour of Thought, in improving the means of discovering Truth, which they do for the colouring or support of Falshood, to maintain a System, Interest, or Party, they are once engaged in.'
without thought or pains into regular and admirable motions.\(^9\) bid
them change their parts and they will in vain endeavour to produce
like motions in the members not used to them and it will require
length of time and long practise to atteine but some degrees of a like
ability. what incredible and astonishing actions doe we finde rope
dancers and tumblers bring their bodys to. not but that sundry in
almost all manual arts are as wonderfull but I name those which the
world takes notice of for such because on that very account they give
money to see them. All these admired motions beyond the reach and
almost the conception of unpractised spectators are noething but the
mere effects of use and industry in men whose bodys have noething
peculiar in them from those of the amazed lookers on.\(^10\)

(7.) As it is in the body soe it is in the minde practise makes
it what it is, and most even of those excellencys which are looked
on as naturall endowments will be found when examined into more
narrowly to be the product of exercise and to be raised to that pit
ch only by repeated actions.\(^11\) Some men are remarked for pleasantnesse
in raylery others for apalogues and apposite diverting storys\; this is
apt to be taken for the effect of pure nature and that the rather because
it is not got by rules: and those who excelle \textit{[in either of them never
purposely set themselves to the study of it as an art to be learnt. But
yet it is true that at first some lucky hit which tooke with some body}

\(^2\) endeavours 6 sundry \(\text{[in]}\) in \(9–10\) these \(\text{[admired and unimitable by the}
unpractised] \text{[admired … spectators]}\) (\textit{add., p. }67) 18 \text{`apposite´ (il.) 20 \text{`got´}
(il.) 20 \text{No catchword. 20 in [it] `either of them´ (il.) 22 \text{`it is true that´ (il.)}
157.22–158.4 tooke [with the company brought [that way] them into a likeing of
it, made them afterwards forwards to offer at that way bend their thoughts to it
and insensibly \text{`without designe´ (il.) get a facility in it] `with | some body …
practise.’ (\textit{add. cont. on p. }69)}

\(^9\) Cf. \textit{Essay, II.xxxiii.6: 396}: ‘A Musician used to any Tune will find that let it
but once begin in his Head, the \textit{Idea}s of the several Notes of it will follow
one another orderly in his Understanding without any care or attention, as
regularly as his Fingers move over the Keys of the Organ to play out the Tune
he has begun, though his unattentive Thoughts be elsewhere a wandering.’

\(^10\) For Locke on exercise or practice, see Gen. Introd.: \`Context’, §4.

\(^11\) For comparisons between body and mind cf. \textit{Essay, II.xxi.12: 239}: ‘As it is in
the motions of the Body, so it is in the Thoughts of our Minds; where any
one is such, that we have power to take it up, or lay it by, according to the
preference of the Mind, there we are at liberty’; \textit{Education}, §1, p. 83; and \`Of Study’, p. 414. See also Gen. Introd.: \`Context’, §4.
and gained him commendation encouraged him to try again inclined his thoughts and endeavours that way till at last he insensibly got a facility in it without perceiving how, and that is attributed wholly to nature which was much more the effect of use and practise. I do not deny that natural disposition may often give the first rise to it but that never carries a man far without use and exercise and this practise alone that brings the powers of the mind as well as those of the body to their perfection. Many a good poetick vein is buried under a trade and never produces anything for want of improvement. We see the ways of discourse and reasoning are very different even concerning the same matter at Court and in the university. And he that will go but from Westminsterhall to the Exchange will finde a different genius and turne in their ways of talkeing and yet one cannot thinke that all whose lot fell in the city were borne with different parts from those who were brad at the university or Innes of court. To what purpose all this but to shew that the difference soe observable in mens understandings and parts doe not arise so much from their natural faculties as acquired habits. He would be laughed at that should go about | to make a fine dancer out of a country hedger at past fifty. And he will not have much better success who shall endeavour at that age to make a man reason well or speake handsomly who has never been used to it, though you should lay before him a collection of all the best precepts of Logick or Oratory. Noe body is made any thing by hearing of rules or laying them up in his memory, practise must settle the habit of doing without reflecting on the rule, and you may as well hope to make a good painter or musitian extempore by a lecture and instruction in the arts of musick and painting as a coherent thinker, or a strict reasoner by a set of rules shewing him where in right reasoning consists:

2 last [without perceiving how] he 7 those of the[ir] body 8 buried [in] ‘under’ (il.) 15 ‘who’ (il.) 18 their [nall] ‘naturall’ (add. p. 69; abbreviation expanded for copyist) 19 about (catchword not repeated on p. 70) 21 well [who has never been] or speake 27 musitian [by] extempore 27 lecture [of] ‘and’ (il.) 27–28 ‘in the arts of musick and painting’ (add. p. 71) 28–29 reasoner [about truth] [b] ‘by a set of rules … consists’ (add. p. 71)

Westminster Hall was the seat of the Law Courts and the Royal Exchange was London’s centre of trade.

(9.) This being so that the defects and weaknesses in mens understandings as well as other faculties comes from want of a right use of their owne mindes I am apt to thinke the fault is generaly mislaid upon nature and there is often a complaint of want of parts when the fault lies in want of a due improvement of them. we see men frequently dextrous and sharp enough in making a bargain who if you reason with them about matters of religion appear perfectly stupid.

(S§) (10.) I will not here in what relates to the right conduct and improvement of the understanding repeat again the getting clear and determined Ideas and the imploying our thoughts rather about them than about sounds put for them. Nor of setting the signification of words which we use with our selves in the search of truth or with others in discoursing about it. Those hindrances of our understandings in the pursuit of knowledg I have sufficiently enlarged upon in an other place so that noe thing more needs here to be said of those matters.

(S§) (11.) There is an other fault that stops or misleads men in their knowledg which I have also spoken some thing of but yet is necessary to mention here again that we may examin it to the bottom and see the root it springs from and that is a custom of taking up with principles that are not self evident and very often not soe much as true. Tis not unusual to see men rest their opinions upon foundations that have noe more certainty nor solidity than the propositions built on them and imbraced for their sake. Such foundations are these and the like

reason well, cf. par. 84 below; Education, §64, p. 120; ibid. §66, pp. 121-124; and ibid. §188, p. 240: ‘For I have seldom or never observed any one to get the Skill of reasoning well, or speaking handsomely by studying those Rules which pretend to teach it …’

15 See Essay, III.ix-xi: 473-524.
16 Cf. Essay, IV.xx.7-10: 711-713 on ‘Propositions that are not in themselves certain and evident, but doubtful and false, taken up for Principles.’ On principles, see Gen. Introd.: ‘Context’, §2.
viz. The founders or leaders of my party are good men and therefore their tenets are true: It is the opinion of a sect that is erroneous therefore it is false: It hath been long received in the world therefore it is true: or It is new and therefore false.

(12.) These and many the like which are by no means the measures of Truth and falsehood the generality of men make the standards by which they accustom their understanding to judge, and thus they falling into an habit of determining of truth and falsehood by such wrong measures this no wonder they should embrace error for certainty and be very positive in things they have no ground for.

(13.) There is not any who pretends to the least reason but when any of these his false maximes are brought to the test but must acknowledge them to be fallible and such as he will not allow in those that differ from him and yet after he is convinced of this you shall see him go on in the use of them and the very next occasion that offers argue again upon the same grounds. Would one not be ready to think that men are willing to impose upon themselves and mislead their own understanding of judging and thus (add., in ink, cont. on p. 74) of men that judge who conduct them by such wrong measures even after they see they cannot be relied on. But yet they will not appear so blamable as may be thought at first sight; for I think there are a great many that argue thus in earnest and do it not to impose on themselves or others, they are persuaded of what they say and think there is weight in it though in a like case they have been convinced there is none but men would be intolerable to them themselves and contemptible to others if they should embrace opinions without any ground and hold what they could give no manner of reason for. True or false solid or sandy the mind must have some foundation to rest itself upon and as I have remarked in an

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2 true: [that] [II]IIIt 3 false: [That] [II]IIIt 4 true: or [II]IIIt 4 false. [&c]
7 judging, by which 'And thus' (add., in diff. ink, cont. on p. 74) 8 of judging determining [by such wrong rules] of 9 wrong [rules] 'measures' (add. p. 74)
21 doe 'it' (il.) 23 in a[.] like 24–25 there is none at first ended this paragraph, followed by a new paragraph starting with [Men must have something to rely on] however, these words were deleted and replaced by the following il. that did not start a new paragraph 'but men would be intolerable to them' (il.) 25 No catchword.

17 On habit as a cause of error, see Gen. Introd.: 'Context', §3.
other place\textsuperscript{19} it noe sooner enterains any proposition but it presently hastens to some hypothesis to bottom it on till then it is unquiet and unsetled. soe much doe our owne very tempers dispose us to a right use of our understandings if we would follow as we should the inclinations of our nature.

(14.) In some matters of concernment especialy those of religion men are not permitted to be always wavering and uncertain, they must embrace and professe some tenents\textsuperscript{20} or other, and it would be a shame nay a contradiction to(\(o\)) heavy for any ones minde to lye constantly under for him to pretend seriously to be perswaded of the truth of any religion and yet not to be able to give any reason of ones beleif or to say any thing for his preference of this to any other opinion, and therefor they must make use of some principles or other and those can be noe other than such as they have and can manage and to say that they are not in earnest perswaded by them and doe not rest upon those they make use of is contrary to experience, and to allege that they are not mislead when we complain they are

(15.) If this be soe it will be urged why then doe they not rather make use of sure and unquestionable principles rather than rest on such grounds as may deceive them and will as is visible serve to

\textsuperscript{3} owne [natural] \textsuperscript{8} tenents[,]\textsuperscript{9–10} contradiction \textsuperscript{[not to be borne]} \textsuperscript{\(to(o)\)} heavy \textsuperscript{\(\text{for him} \to \text{(add. p. 77) \(\text{add. } \text{for } \text{[the ] } \text{`his'} \text{ (il. in diff. ink)} \text{13–17 } \text{and therefor they must make use } \text{… complain they are } \text{(add. cont. on p. 77) \text{16 upon } \text{[them] is to say they doe not reason } \text{\(\text{amisse}\)`} \text{those they make } \text{… complain they are } \text{(add. in diff. ink)} \text{18 it will } \text{`be'} \text{(il. in diff. ink) \text{19 unquestionable [found(ations)] principles}}\)

\textsuperscript{19} Cf. Essay, IV.xii.13: 648 on hypotheses: ‘that we should \textit{not take up any one too hastily}, (which the Mind, that would always penetrate into the Causes of Things, and have Principles to rest on, is very apt to do,) …’ See also Bacon, \textit{Novum Organum}, Bk. I, Aph. xlviii, \textit{Works}, I, pp. 166–167: ‘\textit{Gliscit intellectus humanus, neque consistere aut acquiescere potis est, sed ulterius petit; at frustra. (…) At majore cum perecipe intervenit hac impotentia mentis in inventione causarum: nam cum maxime universalia in natura positiva esse debeant, quemadmodum inveniuntur, neque sunt revera causabilia; tamen intellectus humanus, nescius acquiescere, adhuc appetit notiora.’

\textsuperscript{20} ‘tenent’ = tenet (\textit{OED})
support error as well as truth. To this I answer the reason why they
do not make use of better and surer principles is because they
can not: but this inability proceeds not from want of natural parts
(for these few who are to be excused) but for want of use and exercise. Few men are from their youth accustomed to
strict reasoning, and to trace the dependence of any truth in a long
train of consequences to its remote principles and to observe its
connexion. 21

And he that by frequent practise has not been used to
this employment of his understanding is no more wonder that he
should not when he is grown into years be able to bring his minde
to it that he should not be on a suddain able to grave or designe
dance on the ropes or write a good hand who has never practised
either of them.

(16.) Nay the most of men are soe wholly strangers to this that
they do not see much as perceive their want of it. they dispatch the
ordinary business of their callings by rote 22 as we say as they have
learnt it and if at any time they miss success they impute it to any thing
rather than want of thought or skil, that they conclude, (because they
know noe better) they have in perfection. or if there be any subject
that interest or phancy has recommended to their thoughts, their
reasoning about it is still after their own fashion. be it better or worse
it serves their turns and is the best they are acquainted with and
there for when they are lead by it into mistakes and their businesse

1 truth. [and] To 1–3 answer [because they cannot, not from want of] `they
do not make use | of better and surer principles´ il. cont. on p. 77; this first addition is
followed by a later addition (in diff. ink), consisting of two parts, the first part `the
reason why´ is an il. on p. 76, at a place before the first il., and `is because … want
of natural [p(arts)]´ is an add. on p. 77, at a place after the first il. 4 few [...] whose
4 No catchword. 9 `more´ (il.) 11 suddain [be] able 15–21 want of
it. [What is the chief businesse that takes up their thoughts [necessity d…….] they
reason about well enough to serve their turns after their fashion] `The businesse of
their [particular] `proper´ (il.) callings and [imploiments some particular subject
that interest phansy has engaged them in] may perhaps employ their thoughts: and
[they sometimes reason about some particular subiect that interest phansi has
engaged them in they at times reason about´ (add. p. 79)] `th|ey dispatch … own
fashion´ (add., in diff. ink, cont. on p. 79) 21 about `it´ (il.) 22 they [know]
`are acquainted with´ (il. in diff. ink)

21 Cf. Locke on demonstrative knowledge, which is `made out by a long train
of Proofs´, Essay, IV.ii.6: 533. See also Gen. Introd.: `Context´, §2.
22 `roat´ = rote (OED)
succeeds accordingly, they impute it to any crosse accident or default of others rather than to their owne want of understanding. That is what noe body discovers or complains of in him self. What so ever made his business miscary it was not want of right thought and judgment in him self: he sees noe such defect in himself But is satisfied that he carrys on his designes well enough by his owne reasoning or at least should have done had it not been for unlucky traverses not in his power. Thus being content with this short and imperfect use of his understand(ing) he never troubles him self to seek out methods of improving his mind and lives all his life without any notion of close reasoning | in a continued connection of a long train of consequences from sure foundations, such as is requisite for the makeing out and clearing most of the speculative truths most men owne to beleive and are most concernd in. not to mention here what I shall have occasion to insist on by and by more fully. viz that in many cases tis not one series of consequences will serve the turne

1 impute[d] 1 or [miscariage] ‘default’ (il. in diff. ink) 2–6 [That is what noe body] (deleted, together with next deletion, then undeleted by underdotting) [in himself ‘finds’ (il.) a want of. Everyone] ‘discovers or complains of in himself. What so ever made his business miscary it was not. want of [understanding] ‘right thought and judment in him self’ (il. in diff. ink) he sees noe such defect in himself. But is satisfied that he’ add. p. 79 followed by a deleted add. in diff. ink: ‘never [hæ] troubles himself about any methods of improving his mind and lives all his life without’ (add.) carries on 6 designes [pretty w(ell)] [pretty] well ‘enough’ (il.) 7 for [crosse trave(nes)] ‘unlucky’ 8 power. [and] ‘Thus’ (il. in diff. ink) 8–9 and [very] imperfect 9–10 understand(ing has never) ‘he never … life without’ (add. p. 79 in diff. ink) 11 No catchword. 11 continued [connection] [‘series’ (il. in diff. ink)] ‘connection’ (il. in diff. ink) 14–15 here [that I] what I 15 occasion to [mention] ‘insist on’ (il.) 16 one [(re)n] ‘series’ (il. in diff. ink)

24 Cf. Descartes, *Discours de la méthode*, Pt. I, AT VI, pp. 1-2: ‘Le bons sens est la chose du monde la mieux partagée: car chacun pense en estre si bien pourru, que ceux mesme qui sont les plus difficiles a contenter en toute autre chose, n’ont point coutume d’en desider plus qu’il en ont.’
25 ‘Speculative truths’ are the goal of the first category (natural philosophy) in Locke’s tripartite division of the sciences. This category embraces ‘The Knowledge of Things, as they are in their own proper Beings, their Constitutions, Properties, and Operations, whereby I mean not only Matter, and Body, but Spirits also, which have their proper Natures, Constitutions, and Operations as well as Bodies’, *Essay*, IV.xxi.2: 720.
26 See below, esp. pars. 21-23.
but many different and opposite deductions must be examined and laid to gather before a man can come to make a right judgment of the point in question. What then can be expected from men that neither see the want of any such kind of reasoning as this nor if they do know they how to set about it or could performe it. you may as well set a country man who scarce knows the figures and never cast up a sum of three particulars, to state a merchants long account and finde the true balance of it.

**Practise**

(17.) What then should be done in the case? I answer. we should always remember what I said above that the faculties of our soules are improved and made usefull to us just after the same manner that the powers of our bodys are, would you have a man write or paint dance | or fence well or performe any other manual operation dextrously and with ease, let him have never soo much vigor and activity, suppleness and addresse naturaly yet noe body expects this from him unless he has been used to it and has imployd time and pains in fashioning and formeing his hand or outward parts to those motions. Just soe it is in the minde: would you have a man reason well you must use him to it betimes exercise his minde in observeing the connection of Ideas and following them in train. Noe thing does this better than Mathematicks which therefor I thinke should be taught all those who have the time and oportunity, not soo much to make them mathematicians as to make them reasonable creatures. for though we all call our selves soo because we are borne to it if

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27 Cf. Essay, IV.xvii.17: 685: ‘Judgment, is the thinking or taking two Ideas to agree, or disagree, by the invention of one or more Ideas, whose certain Agreement, or Disagreement with them it does not perceive, but has observed to be frequent and usual.’

28 Par. 7.

29 On this ‘collateral’ use of mathematics, cf. Bacon, Of the Advancement of Learning, Bk. II, Works, III, p. 360: ‘So that as tennis is a game of no use in itself, but of great use in respect it maketh a quick eye and a body ready to put itself into all postures; so in the Mathematicks, that use which is collateral and intervenient is no less worthy than that which is principal and intended.’ See also Introduction: ‘Context’, §3.
we please, yet we may truly say nature gives us but the seeds of it; we are borne to be if we please rational creatures but tis use and exercise only that makes us soe, and we are indeed soe noe farther than industry and application has Caryed us. And therefore in ways of reasoning which men have not been used to he that will observe the conclusions they take up must be satisfied they are not at all rational.

(18.) This has been the lesse taken notice of because every one in his private affairs uses some sort of reasoning or other enough to denominate him reasonable. But the mistake is that he that is found reasonable in one thing is concluded to be soe in all and to th impr[ink or say other wise is thought soe unjust an affront and soe senselesse a censure that nobody ventures to doe it: It lookes like the degradation of a man below the dignity of his nature. It is true that he that reasons well in any one thing has a minde naturaly capable of reasoning well in others and to the same degree of strength and clearnesse and possibly much greater had his understanding been soe imploid. But tis as true that he who can reason well to day about one sort of matters cannot at all reason to day about others though perhaps a year hence he may. But wherever a mans rational faculty fails him and will not serve him to reason there we cannot say he is rational how capable soever he may be by time and exercise to become soe. Trie in men of low and mean education who have never elevated their thoughts above the spade and the plough nor lookd beyond the ordinary drudgery of a day-labourer. Take the thoughts of such an one, used for many years to one tract, out of that narrow

5 reasoning [they] ‘which men’ (il.) 7–8 one [uses reason enough] in his private affairs to denominate him reasonable uses 9–10 he that [is thought] ’pass[es for’ (il.)] ‘is found’ (il.) 10 in [a] one 10–24 all and [cancellation with the aim of making a connection with the next non-deleted add.] [concluded] [looked on as a degradation of his] [of] nature ‘and the highest affront’ (il.) to be tought otherwise. whereas if you take [those men] who(see) th[e]... thought or say ... day-labourer ‘Take’ (add. cont. on pp. 83, 84) 11 thought [is] soe unjust [and senselesse] an 13 [degr[ee]] degradation (catchword dation) 18 of [subject] matters 18 cannot [not] at 19 mans [reason] rational 19–20 faculty [will not] fails 22 soc. [Take] Trie 23 thoughts be(yond:) above 24 day-labourer 165,25–166.1 of [men] ‘such [an on] [ie] an one;’ (il.) used ... narrow compas(s)e [they] his ha[ve]... been all [their] ‘his’ (il.) li[fe] confirmed to you will finde [them] ‘him’ (il.)
compasse his has been all his life confined to. you will finde him noe more capable of reasoning than almost a perfect natural. Some one or two rules on which their conclusions immediately depend you will finde in most men have governd all their thoughts, these true or false have been the maximes they have been guided by. take these from them and they are perfectly at a losse: their compas and pole star are gon and their understanding is perfectly at a nonplus and therefor they either immediately returne to their old maximes again as the foundations of al truth to them not with standing all that can be said to shew their weaknesse; or if they give them up to your reasons, they with them give up all truth and further enquiry and thinke there is noe such thing as certainty. For if you would enlarge their thoughts and setle them upon more remote and surer principles they either cannot easily apprehend them; or if they can, know not what use to make of them, for long deductions from remote principles is what they have not been used to and can not manage.  

Practise (19.) What then can grown men never be improved or enlarged in their understandings? I say not soe. But this I | thinke I may say, that it will not be done without industry and application which will require more time and pains then grown men setled in their course of life will allow to it and therefor very seldom is done: and this very capacity of atteineing it by use and exercise only brings us back to that which I laid down before.  

Cf. Nicole, Discourses (Locke’s own partial translation of Nicole’s Essais), II. 43, pp. 69-70: ‘What does a Cannibal, Iroquois, Brazilian, Negro, Caffre, Greenlander, or Laplander, think on during his whole life? (…) Talk to them of God; heaven or hell; religion or morality; they understand not what you say, or forget it as soon as said. Their minds return presently into their old road, which is confined within that circle of gross objects, they have been used to.’ A ‘Caffre’ = a member of a South African race of blacks belonging to the great Bantu family (OED 4).
Americans are not all borne with worse Understandings than the Europeans though we see none of them have such reaches in the arts and sciences. And amongst the Children of a poor country man the lucky chance of education and getting into the world gives one infinitely the superiority in parts over the rest who continuing at home had continued also just of the same siz(e) with his brethren.

(20.) He that has to do with yonge scholars espetialy in Matthematicks may perceive how their mindes open by degrees and how it is exercise alone that opens them. Some times they will stick a long time at a part of a demonstration not for want of will or application but realy for want of perceiving the connection of two Ideas that to one whose understanding is more exercised is as visible as any thing can be. The same would be with a grown man begining to study Mathematricks, the understanding | for want of use often sticks in very plain way(s) and he himself that is soe puzzeld, when he comes to see the connection wonders what it was he stuck at in a case so plain.

(§7) (21.) I have mentioned mathematicks as a way to setle in the minde an habit of reasoning closely and in train’ not that I thinke it necessary that all men should be deep mathematicians, but that having got the way of reasoning which that study necessarily brings the minde to they might be able to transfer it to other parts of knowledg as they shall have occasion. For in all sorts of reasoning every single argument should be managed as a mathematical demonstration, the connection and dependence of Ideas should be followed till the minde is brought to the source on which it bottoms and observes the coherence all along, though in proofs of probability one such train is not enough to setle the judgment as in demonstrative knowledge.32

1 understanding’s’ (add. in diff. ink) 2 none [have] of them 5 ‘continuing’ (il.) 7 has [ever had] to 7–8 Mathematricks [can] may 8 and [th] how 9 stick [at] a 15–16 way(s) and [the man who sees that connection] ‘he himself [when he comes to] that is soe puzz|eld, when he comes to see the connection’ (il. cont. on p. 89) 21 bring’s’ (add. in diff. ink) 22 tran’s’t’er (add. in diff. ink) 25 ‘and dependence’ (il.) 25–26 till [they are brought] the minde 28 End of par. marked by vertical stroke.

32 Cf. Essay, IV.xv.1: 654: ‘As Demonstration is the shewing the Agreement, or Disagreement of two Ideas, by the intervention of one or more Proofs, which have a constant, immutable, and visible connexion one with another: so Probability is nothing but the appearance of such an Agreement, or Disagree-
Probability

(22.) Where a truth is made out by one demonstration there needs noe farther enquiry but in probabilitys where there wants demonstration to establish the truth beyond doubt, there tis not enough to trace one argument to its source and observe its strength and weaknesse but all the arguments after having been soe examind on both sides must be laid in ballance one against another and upon the whole the understanding determin its assent.

(23.) This is a way of reasoning the understanding should be accustomed to which is soe different from what the illiterate are used to that even learned men often times seeme to have very little or noe notion of it, nor is it to be wonderd since the way of disputeing in the schools leads them quite away from it by insisting on one topical argument by the successe of which the truth or falshood of the question is to be determind; and victory adjudgd to the opponent or defendant, which is all one as if one should ballance an account by one sum charged and discharged when there are an hundred others to be taken into consideration.

Counter-ballance

(24.) This therefor it would be well if mens mindes were ac-

26 24

ustomed to and that early that they might not erect their opinions upon one single view when soe many other are requisite to make up the account and must come into the reconning before a man can forme a right judgment. This would enlarge their mindes and give

1 [where th(e)] 'Where' (add. in the space that previously marked the indention of the new par.) a truth 2 there [wants] (deleted, then undeleted by underdotting) ['wants'] (il.) 3 'after ... examined' (add. p. 89) 4 This 'is' (il.) 9 No catchward. 9 what 'the' (il.) illiterate [men] are 10 even [logi(cians)] learned to 'often times' (il. in diff. of ink) 11 of it, [if we may judg by [their [arguings] [ways of] way where] [their ways of managing the cause of truth which they pretend either to propagate or defend wherein] nor is 16 sum [received] charged 18 therefor 'it' (il) would 19 not [fix] 'erect' (il.) 20–21 when [twenty other thinks are to be taken into consideration wherein to] 'soe many ... a man can' (add. p. 91)

ment, by the intervention of Proofs, whose connexion is not constant and immutable, or at least is not perceived to be so, but is, or appears for the most part to be so, and is enough to induce the Mind to judge the Proposition to be true, or false, rather than the contrary.'

33 In Topica II-VII Aristole gave a collection of argumentative rules. Each of these τότως, 'locations' or 'places', is a device for discovering premises from which to deduce a given conclusion. See also Gen. Introd.: 'Context', §6 and §7.
a due freedom to their understandings that they might not be lead
into error by presumption, lazynesse or precipitancy; for I thinke

noebody can approve such a conduct of the understanding as shall

mislead it from truth though it be never soe much in fashion to make

use of it'

(25.) To this perhaps it will be objected that to manage the
understanding as I propose would require every man to be a scholler
and to be furnished with all the | materials of knowledg and exercised
in all the ways of reasoning. To which I answer that it is a shame

for those that have time and the means to attein knowledg to want

any helps or assistance for the improvement of their understandings

that are | to be got and to such I would be thought here cheifly

to speake. Those me thinks who by the industry and parts of their
ancestors have been set free from a constant drudgery to their backs
and their bellys should bestow some of their spare time on their heads
and open their mindes by some trials and essays in all the sorts and

matters of reasoning. I have before mentiond Mathematicks where

in Algebra gives new helps and views to the Understanding: If I

8 and to `be' (il.) 8 the (catchword not repeated on p. 92) 11 im/provement
169.12–171.2. that are (a) [to be got] (b) [and to such I would be thought here]
(c) [cheifly to speake. But besides that what I here propose] (d) is not of that vast
extent as may be imagined (e) `and soo comes not within the objection` (f) `to be

got' (add. p. 93, deleted and then undeleted by underdotting) (g) `and to such I would

be thought here' (add. p. 93) (b) `cheifly to speake. Those me thinks ... repeat it'
add. p. 93, cont. on p. 95, followed by dot, followed by vertical stroke indicating end of
par., followed by first part of new par., number 26 in present edition: (k) `. As to men
whose fortunes and time is narrower what may su

ffi

ce them´ Locke first wrote a par.
ending with (a)-(b)-(c)-(d). He then mistakenly deleted (a), whereas he had intended
to delete (c). He deleted (c). He added (b)-(k) on pp. 93 and 93. He formulated (k) on p.
95 in such a way as to enable reading to be continued with (d), which had already been
entered on p. 92, and which was then supplemented with (e). He restored the mistaken
deletion of (a) on p. 92 with the addition of the same words (f) on p. 93. By now (b) was
an isolated undeleted phrase on p. 92, preceded by deleted (a) and followed by deleted
(c). On this place, i.e. on p. 92, (b) could not serve as connecting phrase between (f)
and (b), which are both on p. 93; so, Locke deleted (b) and repeated the same words (g)
on p. 93, placing (g) between (f) and (b) and thus producing the required connecting
phrase. However, in the process (f) was mistakenly deleted, so that he had to undelete
it by underdotting. The overall result is par. 25, ending with (f)-(g)-(b) and par. 26,
consisting of (k)-(d)-(e). 14 from [the] a constant 16 some [sort of] trials
16–17 and [ways of rea[oning]] matters

34 On algebra see Gen. Introd.: 'Context', §5.
propose these it is not as I said to make every man a through Mathematician or a deep Algebraist. But yet I think the study of them is of infinite use even to grown men, first by experimentally convincing them that to make any one reason well it is not enough to have parts wherewith he is satisfied and that serve him well enough in his ordinary course, a man in those studies will see that however good he may think his understanding yet in many things and those very visible it may fail him: this would take off that presumption that most men have of themselves in this part and they would not be so apt to think their minds wanted no help to enlarge them that there could be nothing added to the acuteness and penetration of their understandings. Secondly the Study of Mathematicks would show them the necessity there is in reasoning to separate all the distinct Ideas and see the habits that all those concerned in the present enquiry have to one another, and to lay by those which relate not to the proposition in hand and wholly to leave them out of the reckoning. This is that which in other subjects of enquiry besides Quantity is what is absolutely requisite to just reasoning, though in them it is not so easily observed, nor so carefully practiced. In those parts of knowledge where it is thought Demonstration hath no thing to do men reason as it were in the lump, and if upon a summary and confused view or upon a partial consideration, they can raise the appearance of a probability they usually rest content especially if it be in a dispute where every little straw is laid hold on, and every thing that can but be drawn in any way to give colour to the argument is advanced with ostentation. But that mind is not in a posture to find the truth that does not distinctly take all the parts a sunder and omitting what is not at all to the point draw a conclusion from the result of all the particulars which any way influence it. There is another no less useful habit to be got by an application to Mathematical demonstrations and that is of using the minde

3 them [are] 'is' (il. in diff. ink) 10 think [it beneath them un] their minds
13 'there is' (il.) 14 habits [they all have one to another] 'that all those concerned' (il.) 15 and [wholly] to lay 24 be [[o]]in [controversy] a dispute 26 But y[e] 27–28 parts [.,] 'a' (il. in diff. ink) sunder

35 See above, par. 21.
36 'through' = thorough (OED 2)
to a long train of consequences but having mentiond that already I shall not here again repeat it.  

(26.) As to men whose fortunes and time is narrower what may suffice them | is not of that vast extent as may be imagined and soe comes not within the objection.

(27.) Noebody is under an obligation to know every thing: knowledg and science in generall is the businesse only of those who are at ease and leisure: Those who have particular callings ought to understand them and tis noe unreasonable proposal nor impossible to be compassed that they should thinke and reason right about what is their dayly imployment. This one cannot thinke them uncapable of without leveling them with the brutes and chargeing them with a stupidity below the rank of rational creatures.

§8) (28.) Besides his particular calling for the support of this life every one has a concerne in a future life which he is bound to looke after. This engages his thoughts in religion and here it mightily lyes him upon to Understand and reason right. Men therefor cannot be excused from understanding the words and frameing the general notions relating to religion right. The one day of seven besides other days of rest in the Christian world allows time enough for this (had they noe other idle hours) if they would but make use of these vacancys from their dayly labour and apply them selves to an improvement of knowledg with as much diligience as they often

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3 For the constitution of par. 26 see text-critical annotation to par. 25. 5 objection [Every man has his particular calling and noeb(ody)] (entered as first sentence of a new par. then deleted; cf. next par.) 7 science [is the businesse] in 8 Those who [are] have 8 'particular' (il.) 8 callings [may be] ought 9 unreasonable [demand] 'proposal' (il.) 12 with'out' (il.) leveling 14 Besides [this which] his 15 in [religion] a 17 right. [And here] [m][m]Men 'therefor' (il.) 19 of [all] seven 19–20 'besides ... world' (il.) 21–22 if they [would but] 'would ... labour and' (add. p. 98) 22 the[m][l][l][e] vacancys 22–23 selves to [this] 'an improvement of knowledg' (il.) 23 'often' (il.)

37 See above, par. 17.
38 Cf. Essay, I.i.6: 46: 'Our Business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our Conduct.'
39 'to lye upon' = to rest or be imposed as a burden, charge, obligation upon (OED 12.1)
doe to a great many other things that are uselesse, and had but those that would enter them according to their several capacitys in a right way to this knowledg: The original make of their mindes is like that of other men and they would be found not to want understanding fit to receive the knowledg of religion if they were a little incouragd and helpd in it as they should be: For there are instances of very meane people who have raised their mindes to a great sense and understanding of religion: And though these have not been soe frequent as could be wished yet they are enough to clear that condition of life from a necessity of grosse ignorance, and to shew that more might be brought to be rational creatures and Christians (for they can hardly be thought reayl to be soe who wearing the name know not soe much as the very principles of that religion) if due care were taken of them. For if I mistake not the pesantry lately\(^40\) in France (a rank of people under a much heavier pressure of want and poverty than the day labourers in England) of the Reformed religion understood it much better and could say more for it than those of an higer condition amongst us:

(29.) But if it shall be concluded that the meaner sort of people must give them selves up to a bruteish stupidity in the things of their nearest concernment | which I see noe reason for, this excuses not those of a freer fortune and education if they neglect their Understandings and take noe care to imploy them as they ought, and set them right in the knowldg of those things for which principaly they were given them. At least those whose plentiful fortunes allow them the opportunitys and helps of improvements are not soe few but that

1 other [uselesse] things ‘that are uselesse’ (il.) 1–5 had but [those that would a little instruct them] ‘those | that ‘would’ (il.) enter them [as they were capable] according … to this knowldg” (add. cont. on p. 95) [(deleted start of new par.) But if it shall be concluded that the meaner sort of people must give them selves up to a bruteish stupidity in the things of their greatest concernment which I see noe reason for] ‘The original make … knowledg of religion’ (add. p. 95) 7 have [d] raised 10 condition of [men] ‘life’ (il.) 10 ‘grosse’ (il.) 12 for [I can not thinke them] ‘they can hardly be thought’ (add. p. 95) 12 thought [them] realy 12 who [assuming] wearing 14 ‘lately’ (il.) 23 care[,] to [set the.] imploy

40 ‘lately’ i.e. in the time before the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, resulting in the emigration of around 300,000 Huguenots; a substantial part of these refugees fled to the Dutch Republic, where Locke was also staying at that time (1683–1689).
it might be hoped great advancements might be made in knowledge of all kindes especialy in that of the greatest concerne and largest views if men would make a right use of their faculties and study their own Understandings.

§ 30. Outward corporeal objects that constantly importune our Ideas sense and captivate our appetites faile not to fill our heads with lively and lasting Ideas of that kinde. here the minde needs not be set upon getting greater store: they offer themselves fast enough and are usually enterteined in such plenty and lodgd soe carefully that the minde wants room or attention for others that it has more use and need of. To fit the understanding therefor for such reasoning as I have been above speaking of care should be taken to fill it with moral and more abstract Ideas. For these not offering them selves to the senses but being to be Framed by the understanding | people are generally soe neglectfull of a faculty they are apt to thinke wants noe thing, that I fear most mens mindes are more un furnishd with such Ideas than is Imagined. They often use the words and how can they be suspected to want the Ideas? what I have said in the 3d booke of my Essay will excuse me from any other answer to this question. But to convince people of what moment it is to their understandings to be furnishd with such abstract Ideas steady and setled in it give me leave to aske how any one shall be able to know whether he be oblieged to be
Just, if he has not establishd Ideas in his minde of Obligation and of Justice since that knowledg consists in noething but the perceived agreement or disagreement of those Ideas and soe of all others the like which concern our lives and manners. And if men doe finde a difficulty to see the agreement or disagreement of two angles which lie before their eyes unalterable in a diagram, how utterly impossible will it be to perceive it in Ideas that have noe other sensible objects to represent them to the minde but sounds with which they have noe manner of conformity and therefor had need to be clearly setled in the minde them selves if we would make any clear judgment about them. This therefor is one of the first things the minde should be imploid about in the right conduct of the understanding, without which it is impossible it should be capable of reasoning right about those matters. But in these and all other Ideas care must be taken that they harbour noe inconsistencies and that they have a real existence where reall existence is supposed and are not mere Chimæras with a supposed existence.

Prejudices (31.) Every one is forward to complain of the prejudices that mislead other men or party as if | he were free and had none of his owne, This being objected on all sides tis agreed that it is a

1 has not [setled] ‘establishd’ (il.) 2 that [‘his’] knowledg 2 knowledg [‘of doing well or otherwise’ (add. cont. on p. 99)] consists 2–3 ‘nothing but’ (il.) the perceived agreement or disagreement of [‘his actions with’ (il.)] those 3–4 ‘and soe of all others … manners’ (add. cont. on p. 99) 8 but [a] sound’s 11 things the [und(standing)] minde 13 ‘right’ (il.) 14–17 ‘But in these and … existence.’ (add. cont. on p. 99) 15–16 existence [and are not mere Chimæras] where 17 Par. ends with diagonal stroke. 18 prejudices [of other mens minds …] that 19 if [‘he’ (l. marg.)]

43 Cf. the definition of knowledge in Essay, IV.i.2: 525: ‘Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas.’

44 Cf. Essay, II.xxxi.1: 372: ‘By real Ideas, I mean such as have a Foundation in Nature; such as have a Conformity with the real Being, and Existence of Things, or with their Archetypes. Fantastical or Chimerical, I call such as have no Foundation in Nature, nor have any Conformity with that reality of Being, to which they are tacitly refer’d, as to their Archetypes; and ibid. III.x.33: 508: ‘Only if I put in my Ideas of mixed Modes or Relations, any inconsistent Ideas together, I fill my Head also with Chimæras; since such Ideas, if well examined, cannot so much as exist in the Mind, much less any real Being, be ever denominated from them.’
fault and an hindrance to knowldg. what now is the cure? Noe other but this that every man should let alone others prejudices and examin his owne, Noe body is convinced of his by the accusation of an other, he recriminates by the same rule and is clear. The only way to remove this great cause of ignorance and error out of the world is for every one impartialy to examin him self: if others will not deale fairly with their owne minds does that make my errors truths? or ought it to make me in love with them and willing to impose on my self? If others love chataracts on their eyes should that hinder me from couching of mine as soon as I could? Every one declares against blindenesse, and yet who almost is not fond of that which dims his sight and keeps the clear light out of his mind which should lead him into truth and knowldg? False or doubtfull positions relyd upon as unquestionable maximes keep those in the darke from truth, who build on them: Such are usuaily the prejudices imbibed from education party reverence Fashion Interest etc: This is the mote which every one sees in his brothers eye, but never regards the beame in his owne. For who is there almost that is ever brought fairly to examin his owne principles, and see whether they are such as will beare the triall. But yet this should be one of the first things every one should set about and be scrupulous in, who would rightly conduct his understanding in the search of Truth and knowldg:

(32.) To those who are willing to get rid of this great hinderance of knowldg (for to such only I write) To those who would shake off this great and dangerous impostor prejudice who dresses up falshood in the likeness of Truth and soe dexterously hoodwinks mens minds

3–22 convinced of [it by being rebuked by others every one may by fairly examining himself, and the principles he goes on] ‘[if][his ] by the accusation … and knowldg’ (add. cont. on p. 102) 4 ‘an’ (il) other[s], 6 self’ [or] if 7 deale [im] fairly 8 them [?] and 12 dims [their] ’his’ (il) 12 sight [that] and 12 of [their mindes] his 14 positions [built] ’relyd’ (il) 14 as [un] ‘un’ questionable (il) 14 keep[s] [peop’le] those 15 truth, [and.’] ’who build on them’ (il) [These are] Such 15 usuaily the [principles] ’prejudices’ (il) 16 reverence [etc:] Fashion 18 ’almost’ (il) 21 be [very] scrupulous 23 Start of par. 32 is after par. 75, also on p. 203. 24 write [this] To 25 ’prejudice’ (il)

46 Matt. 7: 3.
as to keep them in the dark with a belief that they are more in
the light than any that do not see with their eyes. I shall offer this
one mark whereby prejudice may be known. He that is strongly
of any opinion must suppose (unless he be self condemned) that
his persuasion is built upon good grounds; and that his assent is
no greater than what the evidence of the truth he holds forces him
to and that they are arguments and not inclination or phantasy that
make him so confident and positive in his tenets. Now if after all
this profession he cannot bear any opposition to his opinion; if he
can not so much as give a patient hearing much less examine and
weigh the arguments on the other side, does he not plainly confess
tis prejudice governs him, and tis not the evidence of truth but some
lazy anticipation some beloved presumption that he desires to rest
indisturbed in. For if what he holds be as he gives out well fenced
with evidence and he sees it to be true what need he fear to put it to
the proof? If his opinion be settled upon a firm foundation, if the
arguments that support it and have obtained his assent be clear good
and convincing why should he be shie to have it tried whether they
be proof or not. He whose assent goes beyond his evidence owes this
excess of his adherence only to prejudice, and does in effect own it
when he refuses to hear what is offered against it, declaring thereby
that tis not evidence he seeks but the quiet enjoyment of the opinion
he is fond of, with a forward condemnation of all that may stand
in opposition to it, unheard and unexamined. Which is it but
Prejudice Qui æquum statuerit parte inaudita etiam si æquum
statuerit haud æquus fuerit. 47

1 with a [persuasion] ‘belief’ (il. 1–2) they are [in broad daylight and see better
than anybody] ‘more … eys’ (il. cont. on p. 205) 8 soe [positive and]
confident 18 convincing [what need he f(ear)] why 22 quiet [possession]
‘enjoyment’ (add. p. 209) 23 fond of, [which without trial and examination]
with 23 forward [of] ‘condemnation of’ (add. p. 209) 26 Vertical stroke marks
end of par.

47 Locke’s own copy of L. & M. Annae Senecæ Tragœdia, cum notis Th. Farnabii,
Amsterdam: I. Ianssonium, 1645 (Harrison/Laslett nr. 2653, p. 230) gives the
following version of these two lines (199, 200) from the Medea: ‘Qui statuit
aliquid parte inaudita altera, / æquum licet statuerit, haud æquus fuit’;
‘He who has judged aught, with the other side unheard, may have judged
righteously, but was himself ’unrighteous’, transl. F.J. Miller.
Conduct, pars. 33–35

(33.) He that would acquit himself in this case as a lover of truth not giving way to any preoccupation or bias that may mislead him must do two things that are not very common nor very easy.

(§11) (34.) First he must not be in love with any opinion, or wish it to be true till he knows it to be so and then he will not need to wish it. For noe thing that is false can deserve our good wishes, nor a desire that it should have the place and force of truth and yet noething is more frequent than this, Men are Fond of certain tenets upon noe other evidence but respect and custome, and thinke they must maintein them or all is gon though they have never examind the ground they stand on, nor have ever made them out to them selves or can make them out to others. We shoud contend earnestly for the truth but we shoud first be sure that it is truth, or else we fight against god who is the god of truth, and doe the worke of the Devill who is the father and propagator of lies and our zeale though never soe warme will not excuse us. For this is plainly prejudice.

(§12) (35.) Secondly he must doe that which he will finde himself very averse to as judging the thing unnecessary or him self uncapable of doing of it, He must trie whether his principles be certainly true or noe and how far he may safely relye upon them: This whether fewer have the heart or skill to doe I shall not determin: But this I am sure this is that which every one ought to doe who professes to love truth and would not imposse upon him self which is a surer way to be made a foole of than by being exposed to the Sophistrye of others. The disposition to put any cheat upon our selves works constantly and we are pleased with it but are impatient of being banterd or

1–3 He that would . . . must doe on p. 208 replaces the following passage on p. 100, although this passage has not been deleted: But here he must [avoid] ‘doe’ (il.) 2–3 mislead him [must as I have said] must 3 must [pt] doe 3 Vertical stroke marks end of par. 4 be [fond or] in 8 tenets [whose] upon 14 god [of truth] who 17–19 must ‘doe that which [he requires | of others viz] he will [either] finde . . . of it. He must’ (il. cont. on p. 101) 22 that [.....] which 24–25 foole of [than the Bantering [.....] (il.) of others for this works] ‘than being . . . constantly’ (add. cont. on p. 109) (constantly) 26 ‘banterd or’ (il.)

48 Cf. Deut. 32: 4: ‘He is the Rock, his work is perfect: for all his ways are judgment: a God of truth and without iniquity, just and right is he.’
49 Cf. John 8: 44: ‘When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own: for he is a liar, and the father of it.’
misdemean by others. The inability I here speak of is not any natural defect that makes men incapable of examining their own principles: To such, rules of conducting their understandings are uselesse, and that is the case of very few; The great number is of those whom the ill habit of never exerting their thoughts has disabled, The powers of their mindes are starved by disuse and have lost that reach and strength which nature fited them to receive from exercise. Those who are in a condition to learne the first rules of plaine Arithmatick and could be brought to cast up an ordinary sum are capable of this if they had but accustomd their mindes to reasoning. But they that have wholly neglected the exercise of their understandings in this way will be very far at first from being able to doe it and as unfit for it as one unpractised in figures to cast up a shop booke and perhaps thinke it as strange to be set about it. and yet it must nevertheless be confessed to be a wrong use of our understandings to build our tenets (in things where we are concerned to hold the truth) upon principles that may lead us into error. We take our principles at haphazard upon trust and without ever haveing examined them, and then beleive a whole systeme upon a presumption that they are true and solid, and what is all this but childish shamefull senslesse Credulity.

In these two things viz an equall indifferency for all truth I meane the receiveing it in the love of it as truth, but not loving it for any other reason before we know it to be true. And in the examination of our principles and not receiveing any for such nor building on them till we are fully convinced as rational creatures of their solidity truth and certainty, consists that freedom of the understanding which is necessary to a rational creature and without which it is not truly an Understanding: Tis conceit phansy extravagance any thing rather than understanding if it must be under the constraint of receiveing
and holding opinions by the authority of any thing but their owne not
phanied but perceived evidence: This was rightly called Imposition
and is of all other the worst and most dangerous sort of it. For |
we impose upon our selves which is the strongest imposition of all
others; And we impose upon our selves in that part which ought with
the greatest care to be kept free from all imposition. The world is apt
to cast great blame on those who have an indifferency for opinions
espetially in religion: I fear this is the foundation of great error and
worse consequences. To be indifferent which of two opinions is true
is the right temper of the minde that preserves it from being imposed
on and disposes it to examin with that indifferency till it has done its
best to finde the truth and this is the only direct and safe way to it.
But to be indifferent whether we imbrace falshood for truth or noe is
the great road to Error: Those who are not indifferent which opinion
is true are guilty of this. They suppose without examining | that what
they hold is true, and then thinke they ought to be zealous for it.
Those tis plain by their warmth and eagernesse are not indifferent for
their own opinions, but methinks are very indifferent whether they
be true or false since they cannot endure to have any doubts raised or
objections made against them, and tis visible they never have made
any them selves, and soo never having examind them know not, nor
are concerned as they should be to know whether they are true or
false:

(37.) These are the common and most general miscariages which
I thinke men should avoid or rectifie in a right conduct of their
understandings and should be particularly taken care of in education
the businesse whereof in respect of knowledg is not as I thinke to
perfect a learner in all or any one of the sciences but to give his minde
that freedom that disposition and those habits that may enable him
to attein | any part of knowledg he shall apply him self to or stand
in need of in the future course of his life. This and this only is
well principleing, and not the instilling a reverence and veneration

1 holding [any] opinions 3–23 ‘For | we impose … or false’ (add. cont. on
pp. 103, 107) 10 is the [true freedom] right 11 on and [lays on it] disposes
15 ‘They’ (il.) suppose [what] without 23 should [take care to rectifie] avoid
26 be [espetially] ‘particularly’ (il.) 26 care of [‘early’ (il)] in [the formeing of
their mindes] education 28 perfect [the scholer] a learner 28 in [any one] all
29 ‘freedom that’ (il.) 31 life [‘ &c’ (add. in l. marg.)] This
for certain dogmas under the specious title of principles which are
often so remote from that truth and evidence which belongs to
Principles that they ought to be rejected as false and erroneous, and
is often the cause to men so educated when they come abroad into
the world and finde they cannot maintein the principles soe taken
up and rested in, to cast of all principles and turne perfect scepticks
regardlesse of knowledg and virtue.

(38.) There are several weaknesses or defects in the understanding
either from the natural temper of the minde or ill habits taken up
which hinder it in its progresse to knowledg. Of these there are as
many possibly to be found if the minde were throughly studyd as
there are diseases of the body, each whereof clogs and disables the
understanding to some degree and therefor deserve to be looked after
and cured. I shall set down some few to excite men espetialy those
who make knowledg their businesse to looke into them selves and
observe whether they doe not indulge some weaknesse allow some
miscariage in the management of their intellectuall faculty which is
prejudicial to them in the search of truth.

Observation (39.) Particular matters of fact are the undoubted foundations
on which our civill and natural knowledg is built. The benefit the
understanding makes of them is to draw from them conclusions
which may be as standing rules of knowledg and consequently of
practise. The minde often makes not that benefit it should of the
information it receives from the accounts of Civil or natural historians
in being too forward or too slow in makeing observations on the
particular facts recorded | in them. There are those who are very
assiduous in reading, and yet doe not much advance their knowledg
by it. They are delighted with the storys that are told and perhaps
can tell them again for they make all they read noe thing but history

Reading 2 evidence [that] which 3–7 ', and is of[ten the cause ... virtue' (add. cont.
on. p. 187) 8 are [besides] several 10 'Of these' there are [perhaps] (deleted,
undele ted by underdotting, deleted again) as 11 possibly 'of these' to be found ... 
studyd' (add. p. 187) 12 w hi're of (il.) 14 men [to] espetialy 16 'indulge
some weaknesse' (id. cont. on p. 187) 23 practise. [He that] The 26 'very'
(id.) 27 reading [of history] [who 'and make all they read history to them but'
(id.)] 'and yet [doge ...'] (id.) doe not 29–30 tell [them again But] 'them again
... is, not' (add., p. 199) 180.30–181.1 themselves [noe] observations
observations from what they read they are very little improved by all 
that crowd of particulars that either passe through or lodg themselves 
in their understandings. They dream on in a constant course of 
reading and cramming themselves, but not digesting any thing it pro-
duces noe thing but a heap of cruditys. If their memories reteine well 
one may say they have the materials of knowledg, but like those for 
building they are of noe advantage, if there be noe other use made 
of them but to let them lie heaped up togetheer. Opposite to these 
there are others who loose the improvement they should make of 
matters of fact by a quite contrary conduct. They are apt to draw 
general conclusions and raise axioms from every particular they meet 
with. These make as little true benefit of history as the other nay 
being of forward and active spirits receive more harme by it: It being 
of worse consequence to steer ones thoughts by a wrong rule than 
to have none at all, error doeing to busy men much more harme 
then ignorance to the slow and slugish. Between these those seeme 
to doe best who takeing materiall and usefull hints sometimes from 
single matters of fact cary them in their mindes to be judgd of by 
what they shall finde in history to confirme or reverse these imper-
fect observations which may be establishd into rules fit to be relyd 
on when they are justified by a sufficient and wary induction of

1 from [them] 'what they read they' (il.) 2 that [clou.(d)] crowd 3–5 their understand[ings]''ings. They dream … heap of cruditys.' (add. cont. on p. 109) 4 digesting[,] [[it i][any] 'any' (il.) 4–5 it [[[p]was but] produces 5 retein [them] well 7 noe [use if they only] advantage 17 taking [us] materiall

50 Cf. Locke, 'Some Thoughts concerning Reading and Study', p. 398: 'But the next step towards the improvement of his understanding must be to observe the connection of these ideas in the propositions which those books hold forth and pretend to teach as truths; which till a man can judge whether they be truths or no his understanding is but little improved, and he does but think and talk after the books that he hath read without having any knowledge thereby. And thus men of much reading are greatly learned, and but little knowing'; and Malebranche, *Recherche*, Vol. I, Bk. II, Pt. II, Ch. iv, p. 285: 'Car il ne faut pas s’imaginer, que ceux qui vieillissent sur les Livres d’Aristote & de Platon, fussent beaucoup d’usage de leur esprit. (…) Ils ne sçavent que des Histoires & des faits, & non pas des vérités évidentes; & ce sont plutôt des Historiens, que de véritables Philosophes, des hommes qui ne pensent point, mais qui peuvent raconter les pensées des autres.'

51 The first clear sign of Locke’s reading of Bacon’s *Novum Organum* does not appear before 1690, which is after he wrote the *Essay* but before he started work.
particulars. He that makes noe such reflections on what he reads only loades his minde with a rapsodie of tales fit in winter nights for the enterteinment of others. And he that will improve every matter of fact into a maxime will abound in contrary observations that can be of noe other use but to perplex and pudder him if he compares them or else to misguide him if he gives himself up to the authority of that which for its novelty or for some other phansy best pleases him.

Bias (40.) Next to these we may place those who suffer their owne natural tempers and passions they are possessed with to influence their judgments espetialy of men and things that may any way relate to their present circumstances and interests. Truth is all simple all pure will bear noe mixture of any thing else with it. Tis rigid and inflexible to any bye interests and soe shoud the understanding be whose use and excellency lies in conforming it self to it. To thinke of every thing just as it is in it self is the proper businesse of the understanding. Though it be not that which men always impoy to it. This all men at first hearing allow is the right use every one should make of his understanding. Noe body will be at such an open defiance with common sense as to professe that we should not endeavour to know and thinke of things as they are in them selves, and yet there is noe thing more frequent than to doe the contrary and men are apt to excuse them selves and thinke they have reason to

on the Conduct (see Gen. Introd.: ‘Context’, §3). Given this background, it is not surprising that in the Conduct Locke uses the word ‘induction’, while this is completely is absent from the Essay. Cf. Locke’s ‘sufficient and wary induction of particulars’ with Bacon’s ‘Inductio legitima et vera’, Novum Organum, Bk. II, Aph. x, Works, I, p. 236.

52 ‘to pudder’ = obs. or dial. var. of to pother = to confuse (OED). 53 On passion as a cause of error, see Gen. Introd.: ‘Context’, §3. On ‘bias’, cf. Essay, I.xx.i.33: 268: ‘But the forbearance of a too hasty compliance with our desires, the moderation and restraint of our Passions, so that our Understandings may be free to examine, and reason unbiased give its judgment, being that, whereon a right direction of our conduct to true Happiness depends; ’tis in this we should employ our chief care and endeavours.’

54 We have ‘an Idea of the thing, as it is in it self’, when we have perceived its primary qualities; see Essay, I.viii.23: 140. See also Gen Introd.: ‘Context’, §5.
doe soe if they have but a pretence that it is for god or a good cause
| that is in effect for them selves their own perswasion or party, for
5 to those in their turns the several sects of men espetialy in matters of
6 religion entitle god and a good cause. But god requires not men to
7 wrong or misuse their faculties for him nor to lie to others or them
8 selves for his sake, which they purposely doe who will not suffer their
9 understandings to have right conceptions of the things proposed to
10 them and designedly restrain them selves from haveing just thoughts
11 of every thing as far as they are concerned to enquire.55 And as for
12 a good cause that needs not such ill helps. If it be good truth will
13 support it and it has noe need of fallacy or falshood.

(§15) 41. Very much of kin to this is the hunting after arguments
Arguments to make good one side of a question and wholly to neglect and
15 refuse those which favour the other side: what is this but willfully to
16 misguide the understanding and is soe far from giveing truth its due
17 value that it wholly debases it, espouse opinions that best comport
18 with their power, profit or credit and then seek argument to support
19 them. Truth light56 upon this way is of noe more availe to us than
20 error. For what is soe taken up by us may be false as well as true and
21 he has not done his duty who has thus stumbled upon truth in his
22 way to preferment:

(42.) There is an other but more innocent way of collecting
arguments very familiar amongst bookish men which is to furnish
25 them selves with the arguments they meet with pro and con in the
questions they study.57 This helps them not to judg right nor argue

4 religion [be] en’title (il.) 5 sake, [which they even of designe] ‘which
6 they purposely’ (il.) 16-18 ‘support them’ (add. l. marg.) [For]
7 Truth 18 Truth light [‘stumbled’] ‘light’ (il.) 19 ‘us may’ (il.) 20 ‘thus’
8 (il.) 20-21 ‘in’ (il.) [this way] ‘to preferment’ 23 amongst [studious]
9 ‘bookish’ (il.) 24-25 con in [any question they consider] the questions
10 183,25-184,24 ‘questions they … implicit knowledg.’ (Add. cont. on p. 113; since
11 this add. is on the first odd-numbered page of a new quire, H, this add., and probably
12 the whole par., was entered after the introductory pages (pars. 2-5 of the present edition)
13 that start on the first even-numbered page of this quire, i.e. p. 114. See also Gen. Introd.:
14 ‘Text’, §3 [57])

55 On religious sectarianism as a source of error, see also Essay, IV.xix: 697-706,
56 ‘to light upon’ = to chance upon (OED 10.d)
57 Cf. Locke, ‘Of Study’, p. 418: ‘This grand miscarriage in our studies draws
after it another of less consequence, which yet is very natural for bookish men
strongly but only to talk copiously on either side without being steady and settled in their own judgment. For such arguments gathered from other men's thoughts floating only in the memory are there ready indeed to supply copious talk without some appearance of reason but are far from helping us to judge right. Such variety of arguments only distract the understanding that relies on them unless it has gone farther than such a superficial way of examining. This is to quit truth for appearance only to serve our vanity. The sure and only way to get true knowledge is to form in our minds clear and settled notions of things with names annexed to those determined ideas. These we are to consider with their several relations and habits and not amuse ourselves with floating names and words of indeterminate signification which we can use in several senses to serve a turn. Tis in the perception of the habits and respects our ideas have one to another that real knowledge consists and when a man once perceives how far they agree or disagree one with another he will be able to judge of what other people say and will not need to be led by the arguments of others which are many of them no thing but plausible sophistry. This will teach him to state the question right and see where it turns, and thus he will stand upon his own legs and know by his own understanding. Whereas by collecting and learning arguments by heart he will be but a retainer to others, and when any one questions the foundations they are built upon he will be at a non plus and be fain to give up his implicit knowledge.\footnote{For 'implicit knowledge' cf. below, par. 56 on 'second hand or implicit knowledge'; par. 67, note 104; and Essay, I.iv.22: 99: 'some (and those the most)
(§16) Labour for labours sake is against nature the understanding as well as all the other facultys chooses always the shortest way to its end; would presently obtein the knowledg it is about and then set upon some new enquiry: But this whether lazynes or hast often misleads it and makes it content itself with improper ways of search and such as will not serve the turne. Sometimes it rests upon testimony where testimony, of right, has noe thing to doe because it is easier to beleive than to be scientifically instructed. Sometimes it contents itself with one argument and rests satisfied with that as if it were a demonstration where as the thing under proof is not capable of demonstration and therefore must be submitted to the trial of probabilities and all the material arguments pro and con be examined and brought to a Ballance. In some cases the minde is determined by probable topicks in enquiries where demonstration may be had, all those and several others which lazynes impatience custom and want of use and attention leade men into are misapplications of the understanding in the search of truth. In every question the nature and manner of the proof it is capable of should be first considerd to make our enquiry such as it should be. This would save a great deale of frequently misimploid pains and lead us sooner to that discovery and possession of truth we are capable of. The multiplying varietie of arguments especialy frivolous ones such as are all that are meerly verbal is not only lost labour, but cumbers the memory to noe purpose and serves only to hinder it from seiseing and holding of the truth in all those cases which are capable of demonstration. In such a way of proof the truth and certainty is seen and the minde fully possesses it self of it when in the other way of assent it only

1 nature' the [mind] understanding 5 self{.] 5 with [those ways of search] improper 7 where [of right] testimony, 'of right,' (il.) 13 Ballance. [Sometimes] In some 14 probable [conjectures] [though|ts] 1 'topicks' (il.) 'in enquiries' (il.) where [in] demonstration 16 'of' (il.)

taking things upon trust, misimply their power of Assent, by lazily enslaving their Minds, to the Dictates and Dominion of others, in Doctrines, which it is their duty carefully to examine; and not blindly, with an implicit faith, to swallow ...'; for a non-pejorative use of the term 'implicit Knowledge', cf. Essay, I.ii.22: 59-60.

hovers about it, is amused with uncertainty. In this superficial way
indeed the minde is capable of more varietie of plausible talke but
is not enlarged as it should be in its knowledg. Tis to this same
hast and impatien(c)e of the minde also that a not due tracing of
the arguments to their true foundation is owing, men see a little
presume a great deal and soe jump to the conclusion: this is a short
way to phansy and conceit and (if firmly imbraced) to opiniatrity:
But is certainly the farthest way about to knowledg: For he that will
know must by the connection of the proofs see the truth and the
ground it stands on and therefore if he has for hast skip over what he
should have examind he must begin and goe over all again or else he
will never come to knowledg.

Desultory
(44.) Another fault of as ill consequence as this which proceeds
also from lazynesse with a mixture of vanity, is the skipping from one
sort of knowledg to an other: Some mens tempers are quickly weary
of any one thing, constancy and assiduity is what they cannot bear,
the same study long continued in is as intolerable to them as the
appearing long in the same clothes or fashion is to a court Lady,
Others that they may seem universally knowing get a little smattering
in every thing: Both these may fill their heads with superficial notions
of things but are very much out of the way of atteineing truth or
knowledg. I doe not here speake against the taking a tast | of every
sort of knowledg. It is certainly very usefull and necessary to forme
the minde but then it must be done in a different way and to a
different end. Not for talke and vanity to fill the head with shreds of
all kinde that he who is possessed of such a frippery may be able to
match the discourses of all he shall meet with as if noe thing could
come amisse to him and his head was soe well a stored Magazin

Smattering
1–2 uncertainty: [1s] ‘Th[is]’ (add. cont. on p. 121]) ‘In this ‘superficial’ (il.) way
indeed the minde [the minde] is’ (add. p. 121) 2 capable [indeed] of 2 more
[superficial] varietie of [superficial] ‘plausible’ (il.) 3 not [at all] enlarged 3 its
[knowledg. To] ‘kno[w]ledg. Tis to’ (add. cont. on p. 121) 4–12 ‘impatien(c)]
e (letter between () obliterated by binding) of the minde … knowledg. (add. cont.
on p. 121) 6 soo [run to the conclusion] jump 8 about [if any at all to truth
kn(owledg)] to knowledg 10 therefor [must] if he 10 ‘for hast’ (il.) 11 begin
[all again] and 15 other [w] Some 20 these [fil(l)] may 22 taking [the]
‘a’ (il.) 25 with [patch(es)] shreds 26 ‘kinde | that he … be able’ (add. cont.
p. 123)

60 ‘opiniatrity’ = stubbornness (OED)
that nothing could be proposed which he was not master of and was readily furnish'd to entertain any one on. This is an excellency indeed and a great one too to have a real and true knowledge in all or most of the objects of contemplation. But this what the mind of one and the same man can hardly attain unto and the instances are so few of those who have in any measure approach'd towards it, that I know not whether they are to be proposed as examples in the ordinary conduct of the understanding. For a man to understand fully the business of his particular calling in the commonwealth and of Religion which is his calling as he is a man in the world is usually enough to take up his whole time, and there are few that inform them selves in these, which is every man's proper and peculiar business, so to the bottom as they should doe. But though this be soe and there are very few men that extend their thoughts towards universal knowledge, yet I doe not doubt but if the right way were taken and the methods of enquiry were order'd as they should be men of little business and great leisure might goe a great deal farther in it than is usually done. To return to the business in hand The end and use of a little insight into those parts of Knowledge which are not a man's proper business is to accustom our minds to all sorts of Ideas and the proper ways of examining their habits and relations. This gives the mind a freedom and the exercising the understanding in the several ways of enquiry and reasoning which the most skilful have made use of teaches the mind sagacity and waryness and a suppleness to apply itself more closely and dextrously to the bents and turns of the matter in all its researches. Besides this universal taste of all the sciences with an indifferencie before the mind is poss'd with any one in particular and grown into love and admiration of what is made its darling will prevent an other evil very commonly to be observ'd in those who have from the beginning been season'd only by one part of knowledge. Let a man be given up to the contemplation of one sort of knowledge and that will become every thing. The mind will take such a tincture from a familiarity with that object that every

2–3 indeed [in those who] 'and a great one too to' (il.)  3 have 'a' (il.)  4–5 'one and | the same' (il. cont. on p. 123)  9 'particular' (il.)  10 in this world.]  10–11 up [every man's] 'his whole' (il.)  16 were [better] 'rightly' (il.) ordered  187,23–188,15 dextrously [in all its researches. This is a variety of knowledge. And] 'to the bents and turns ... each of them' (il. cont. on p. 125)  27 indifferencie[s]
thing else how remote soever will be brought under the same view. A metaphysitian will bring plowing and gardening immediately to abstract notions; the history of nature shall signify no thing to him; an Alchymist on the contrary shall reduce Divinity to the maximes of his laboratory explain Morality by Sal Sulphur and Mercury, and allegorize the Scripture itself and the sacred mysteries thereof into the philosophers stone. And I heard once a man who had a more than ordinary excellency in musick seriously accommodate Moses seven days of the first week to the notes of Musick as if from thence had been taken the measure and method of the Creation. Tis of noe small consequence to keep the minde from such a possession, which I thinke is best done by giving it a fair and equall view of the whole intellectuall world, wherein it may see the order ranke and beauty of the whole, and give a just allowance to the distinct provinces of the several sciences in the due order and usefulness of each of them. If this be that which old men will not think necessary nor be easily brought to Tis fit at least that it should be practised in the breeding of the yonge. The businesse of Education as I have already observed is not as I thinke to make them perfect in any one of the sciences but soe to open and dispose their mindes as may best make them capable of any, when they shall apply themselves to it. If men are for a long time accustomed only to one sort or method of thoughts, their mindes grow stif in it and doe not readily turne to an other. Tis therefor to give them this freedom that I thinke they should be made looke into all sorts of knowledg and exercise their understandings in soe wide a variety. But I doe not propose it as a variety and stock of knowledg but a varietie and freedom of thinkeing as an increase


61 ‘Sal Sulphur and Mercury’: basic elements (the tria prima) in the (al)chemical theory of Paracelsus (=Philippus Aureolus Theophrastus Bombast von Hohenheim, 1493-1541) and his followers, see Debus, The Chemical Philosophy, Vol. I, pp. 78-84.

62 See above, par. 37.
of the powers and activity of the minde, not as an enlargement of its possessions.\footnote{Cf. Montaigne, ‘De l’institution des enfans’, in: \textit{Essais}, p. 182, on the importance of a governor who has ‘plutost la teste bien faicte que bien pleine’. On the importance of this kind of formal training see also Gen. Introd.: ‘Context’, §4.}

\(\text{§20} \) (45.) This is that which I thinke great Readers are apt to be mistaken in. Those who have read of every thing are thought to understand every thing too. But it is not alway soe. Reading furnishes the minde only with the materials of knowledg tis thinkeing makes what we read ours; we are of the ruminating kinde and tis not enough to cram our selves with a great load of collections unlesse we chew them over again they will not give us strength and nourishment.

There are indeed in some writers visible instances of deepe thought, close and accute reasoning and Ideas well pursued. The light these would give would be of great use if their readers would observe and immitate them. All the rest at best are but particulars fit to be turned into knowledg. but that can be done only by our owne meditation and examining the reach force and coherence of what is said and then as far as we apprehend and see the connection of Ideas soe far it is ours; without that it is but soe much loose matter floating in our brain; the memory may be stored but the judgment is little better and the stock of knowledg not increasd by being able to repeat what others have said or produce the arguments we have found in them. such a knowled\(\text{g}\) as this is but knowled\(\text{g}\) by hear say. And the ostentation of it is at best but talking by roat and very often upon weake and wrong principles. For all that is to be found in bookes is not built upon true foundations, not always rightly deduced from...
the principles it is pretended to be built on, such an examen as is requisite to discover that every reader's mind is not forward to make especially in those who have given them selves up to a party | and only hunt for what they can scrape together that may favour and support the tenets of it. Such men wilfully exclude them selves from truth and from all true benefit to be received by reading. Others of more indifferency often want attention and industry. The minde is backwards in itself to be at the pains to trace every argument to its original and to see upon what Basis it stands and how firmly. But yet it is this that gives so much the advantage to one man over another in reading. The minde should by severe rules be tied down to this at first uneasy task, use and exercise will give it facility, so that those who are accustomed to it readily as it were with one cast of the eye take a view of the argument and presently in most cases see where it bottoms. Those who have got this faculty one may say have got the true key of books and the clue to lead them through the mizmaze of variety of opinions and authors to truth and certainty. This yonge beginners should be enterd in and shewed the use of that they might profit by their reading. Those who are strangers to it will be apt to think it too great a clog in the way of mens studys and they will suspect they shall make but small progresse if in the books they read they must stand to examin and unravell every argument and follow it step by step up to its original. I answer This is a good objection and ought to weigh with those whose reading is designed for much talke and little knowledg and I have nothing to say to it. But I am here enquiring into the conduct of the understanding in its progress towards knowledg and to those who aime at that I may say that he who fairly and softly goes steadily forward in a course that points right
will sooner be at his journeys end, then he that runs after every one he meets though he gallop all day full speed.65

(46.) To which let me add, that this way of thinkeing on and profiting by what we read will be a clog and rub to any one only in the begining, when custome and exercise has made it familiar it will be dispatchd in most occasions without resting or interruption in the course of our reading, the motions and views of a minde exercised that way are wonderfully quick, and a man used to such sort of reflections sees as much at one glimps as would require a long discourse to lay before an other and make out in an entire and gradual deduction. Besides that when the first difficultys are over the delight and sensible advantage it brings mightily encourages and enlivens the minde in reading which without this is very improperly called Study.

(§21) (47.) As an help to this I thinke it may be proposed that for the saving the lazy progression of the thoughts to remote and first principles in every case the minde should provide it selfe several stages that is to say intermediate principles which it might have recourse to in the examining those positions that come in its way. These though they are not self evident principles yet if they have been made out from them by a wary and unquestionable deduction may be depended on as certain and infallible truths and serve as unquestionable truths to prove other points depending on them by a nearer and shorter view than remote and general maximes. These may serve as land markes to shew what lies in the direct way of truth or is quite besides it. And thus Mathematicians doe who doe not in every new problem run it back to the first axioms through all the whole train of intermediate propositions. Certain theorems that they have setled to themselves upon sure demonstration serve to resolve to them multitudes of propositions which depend on them and are as

3–4 and [improveing] profiting 4 be [only] a clog 4 to [us o(only)] any 6 in 9 sees [more] ‘as much’ (add. p. 131) 10 entire [deduction.] and 11–13 ‘Besides that when the first . . . Study’ (add. cont. on p. 131) 15 lazy [train of] progression 15 the [minde] thoughts 17 stages [and resting places] that 21–22 as [Criteriaions to judg of other points] ‘un|questionable . . . on them’ (add. cont on p. 133) 22 other [trut(his)] points 24 what [are] lies 26 back [to so(me) thr(ough)] to 27 propositions. [They] [The] Certain

65 Cf. Descartes, Discours de la méthode, AT VI, p. 2: ‘ceux qui ne marchent que fort lentement, peuvent avancer beacoup davantage, s’ils suivent tousjours le droit chemin, que ne sont ceux qui courent, & qui s’en esloignent’.
firmly made out from thence as if the minde went afresh over every link of the whole chain that ties them to first self evident principles. Only in other sciences great care is to be taken that they establish those intermediate principles with as much caution exactnesse and indifference as mathematicians use in the setting any of their great theorems: Where this is not done, but men take up their principles in this or that science upon credit inclination interest etc in hast without due examination and most unquestionable proof they lay a trap for themselves, and as much as in them lyes captivate their understandings to mistake falsehood and error.

Partiality

As there is a partiality to opinions which as we have already observed is apt to mislead the understanding soe there is often a partiality to studyes which is prejudicial also to knowledge and improvement. Those sciences which men are particularly versed in they are apt to value and extol as if that part of knowledge which every one has acquainted him self with were that alone which was worth the having and all the rest were idle and empty amusement, comparatively of noe use or importance. This is the effect of ignorance and not knowledge the being vainly puffed up with a flatulency arising from a weake and narrow comprehension. Tis not amisse that everyone should relish the science that he has made his peculiar study: A view of its beautys and a sense of its usefulnesse carys a man on with the more delight and warmth in the pursuit and improvement of it. But the contempt of all other knowledge as if it were noething in comparison of law or physick of Astronomie or Chymistrie or perhaps some yet meaner part of knowledge where in I have got some smattering or am something advanced, is not only the marke of a vain and little minde, but does this prejudice in the conduct of the understanding, that it coops it up within narrow bounds and hinders it from lookeing abroad into other provinces.
of the intellectual world more beautyfull possibly and more fruitfull
than that which it had till then labourd in, wherein it might finde
besides new knowldg ways or hints whereby it might be inabled the
better to cultivate its owne.67

§23 (49.) There is indeed one Science (as they are now destinguishd)
incomparably above all the rest where it is not by corruption narrowed
into a trade or faction for meane or ill ends and secular interests, I
meane Theologie, which conteining the knowledg of god and his
creatures, our duty to him and our fellow creatures and a view of our
present and future state is the comprehension of all other knowldg
directed to its true end i.e. the honour and veneration of the Creator
and the happynesse of man kinde: This is that noble study which is
every mans duty and every one that can be called a rational creature
is capable of. The workes of nature and the words of the Revelation
displai it to mANKINDE in Characters soe large and visible that those
who are not quite blind may in them read and see the first principles
and most necessary parts of it and from thence as they have time helps
and industry may be inabled to goe on to the more abstruse parts
of it and penetrate into those infinite depths filld with the treasures
of wisdome and knowldg. This is that Science which would truly
enlarge mens minds were it studyed or permitted to be studyed
every where with that freedom, love of truth and charity which it
teaches, and were not made contrary to its nature the occasion of
strife faction, malignity and narrow impositions. But I shall say noe
more here of this but that it is undoubtedly a wrong use of my

1 world [where by it might not only] more
2 labourd in, [but from whence it]
wherein 2–3 finde [ways and helps for the better cultivateing its owne.] "perhaps" besides new knowldg (add. p. 137) 3 be [help.] [in better] inabled 4 End of par. marked by vertical line. 5–6 destinguishd) [infini(tely)] incomparably
6 not [for] by 7 "or ill" (il.) 13 every [man that] one 20–21 "would" (il.)
truly enlarge(s) 21 mens [y!] (probably catchword but not repeated on next page)

67 Cf. Bacon, Novum Organum, Aph. I., liv, Works, I, p. 169: Adamant homines scientias et contemplationes particulares; aut quia authores et inventores se earum credunt; aut quia plurimum in illis operae posuerunt, isque maxime as-
sumeuerunt. Hujusmodi vero homines, si ad philosophiam et contemplationes
universales se contulerint, illas ex prioribus phantasis detorquent et cor-
rumpunt (…) Chymicorum autem genus, ex paucis experimentis formacis,
philosophiam constituerunt phantasticam et ad paucis spectantem."
understanding to make it the rule and measure of an other mans, a use which it is neither fit for nor capable of. This partiality where it is not permitted an authority to render all other studys insignificant or contemptible is often indulgd soe far as to be relied upon and made use of in other parts of knowledg to which it does not at all belong, and wherewith it has noe manner of affinity. Some men have soe used their heads to mathematical figures that giving a preference to the methods of that Science they introduce lines and diagrams into their study of divinity or politique enquirys as if noe thing could be known without them and others accustomd to retired speculations run natural philosophie into metaphysicall notions and the abstract generalities of Logique and how often may one meet with religion and morality treated of in the termes of the Laboratory and thought to be improved by the methods and notions of Chymistry. But he that will take care of the conduct of his understanding to direct it right to the knowledg of things must avoid these undue mixtures and not by a fondness for what he has found usefull and necessary in one, transfer it to an other science where it serves only to perplex and confound the understanding. It is a certain truth that res nolunt male administrari. tis noe less certain res nolunt male intelligi. Things them selves are to be considerd as they are in them selves and then they will shew us in what way they are to be understood. For to have right conceptions about them we must bring our understandings to the inflexible natures and unalterable relations of things and not endeavour to bring things to any preconceived notions of our own.

2–5 "This partiality where" (add. cont. on p. 139) "[where] it is ... of our own [There in an]" (add. pp. 201, 203, continuation of previous add.) 9 their [speculations ... in] "study of" (il) 10 others [used] accustomed to [abstract generalities] "retired speculations" (il) 12 with [the k] religion 13 treated of [treated of] 17 what [is] "he has found" (il) 20 "male intelligi" (il) 25 th[em]nings 194.26–196.11 "There is an other ... in them" (add. cont. on pp. 139, 141) 26 very [ordinary] commonly 27 that is a[n]

68 For a discussion of the application of mathematical method outside the narrow field of mathematics itself in the second half of the seventeenth century, cf. Arndt, Methodo scientifica pertractatum, esp. pp. 69–97.
69 "Things are unwilling to be badly managed."
70 "Things are unwilling to be badly understood."
is a phantastical and wilde attributeing all knowledg to the Ancients alone or to the Modernes.\textsuperscript{71} This raveing upon antiquity in matter of poetry Horace has wittily described and exposed in one of his Satyrs,\textsuperscript{72} The same sort of madness may be found in reference to all the other Sciences. Some will not admit an opinion not authorized by men of old who were then all Giants in knowledg, noe thing is to be put into the treasury of Truth or knowledg which has not the stamp of Greece or Rome upon it and since their days will scarce allow that men have been able to see thinke or write. Others with a like extravagancy contemn all that the ancients have left us, and being taken with the moderne inventions and discoveries lay by all that went before as if whatever is calld old must have the decay of time upon it, and truth too were lyable to mould and rottennesse. Men I thinke have been much what the same for natural indowments in all times, Fashon discipline and Education have put eminent differences in the ages of several countreys and made one generation much differ from an other in arts and sciences. But Truth is always the same, time alters it not nor is it the better or worse for being of ancient or modern tradition. Many were eminent in former ages of the world for their discovery and delivery of it but though the knowledg they have left us be | worth our study yet they exhausted not all its treasure. They


\textsuperscript{72} Reference is probably to Horace’s \textit{Epistola}, Bk. II, Ep. i.
left a great deale for the indistry and sagacity of after ages and soe shall we. That was once new to them which any one now receives with a veneration for its antiquity nor was it the worse for appearing as a novelty and that which is now imbraced for its newness will to posterity be old but not there by be lesse true or lesse genuin. There is noe occasion on this account to oppose the ancients and the modernes to one an other or to be squemish on either side. He that wisely conducts his minde in the pursuit of knowledg will gather what light and get what helps, he can from either of them from whom they are best to be had without adoring the errors or rejecting the truths which he may finde mingled in them.

(50.) Another partiality may be observed in some to vulgar in others to Haterodox tenets. Some are apt to conclude that what is the common opinion cannot but be true, so many mens eyes they thinke cannot but see right soe many mens understandings of all sorts cannot be deceived and therefor will not venture to looke beyond the received notions of the place and age nor have soe presumtious a thought as to be wiser than their neighbours: they are content to goe with the crowd and soe goe easily which they thinke is goeing right or at least serves them as well. But however vox populi vox dei has prevailed as a Maxime yet I doe not remember wherever god delivred his oracles by the multitude, or nature her truths by the heard. On the other side some flie all common opinions as either

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2 which [we] 'any one' (il.) 4 it(s) [novelty] 'newness' (il.) 5–6 genuin. [Knowedg is not to be valued by the hand it comes from but its evidence and usefulness.] There 7 'to one an other' (il.) 9 can ['indifferent(by)'] (il., deleted caret marker is after either of them) from 11 them. [all] 12 Par. 50 is a continuation of add. to par. 49 on pp. 159, 141. 13 others to [lesse received opinions] 'Haterodox tenets' (il.) 14 common [cannot but] opinion 15 true, so[me] 15 'of all sorts' (il.) 16–17 beyond the [vulgar] 'received notions of the place and age' (il.) 17 nor [be] have [a thoug(h)é] soe 18 than [all] their 20 however [the] vox 21 prevailed [by] as 23 'all' (il.)

73 For the history of the argument 'that what is the common opinion cannot but be true', see Schian, Untersuchungen über das 'argumentum e consensu omnium', passim.

74 'Vox populi vox dei', 'The voice of the people is the voice of God', possibly by Alcuin (c. 732-804) to Charlemagne. Locke uses this saying also to start the fifth essay, 'An lex naturæ cognosci potest ex hominum consensu?', of his Essays on the Law of Nature, p. 160.
false or frivolous. The title of many headed beast\textsuperscript{75} is a sufficient reason to them to conclude that noe truths of weight or consequence can be lodgd there vulgar opinions are suited to vulgar capacities and adapted to the ends of those that governe he that will know the truth of things must leave the common and beaten tract which none but weak and servile minde are satisfied to trudge along constantly in. Such nice palats relishe noe thing but strange notions quite out of the way, whatever is commonly received has the marke of the beast\textsuperscript{76} on it and they think it a lessening to them to hearken to it or receive it, their minde runs only after paradoxes these they seeke these they imbrace these alone they vent and soe, as they thinke, distinguish them selves from the vulgar. But common or uncommon are not the markes to distinguish truth or falsehood and therefor should not be any bias to us in our enquirys, we should not judg of things by mens opinions but of opinions by things. The multitude reason but ill and there for may be well suspected and cannot be relied on nor should be followed as a sure guide. But philosophers who have quitted the Orthodoxie of the communitie and the popular doctrines of their countrys have fallen into as extravagant and as absurd opinions as ever common reception countenanced. Twould be madnesse to refuse to breath the common air or quench ones thirst with water because the rabble use them to those purposes, and if there are conveniencys of life which common use reaches not tis noe reason to reject them because they are not grown into the ordinary fashion of the country and every villager doth not know them. Truth whether in or out of fashion is the measure of knowledg and the businesse of the Understanding whatsoever is besides that

\textsuperscript{2} 'to them' (il.) 4 governe [them] he 5 which [to keepe constantly in] none 7 Such [there for] 'nice palats' (il.) 7 relish[es]e 9 to [.] 'them' (il.) 10 'it' (il.) 11 'vent' (il.) 15 opinions [nor] 'but' (il.) 15 multitude [judg] 'reason' (il.) 17 'nor should be followed' (il.) 20 ever [possessed] common 21 'refuse to' (il.) 23–24 reaches not [they are not to be rejected] tis 24–25 into the [common] 'ordinary' (il.) 26 of [truth(h).] knowledg

\textsuperscript{75} Rev. 13: 1: 'And I stood upon the sand of the sea, and saw a beast rise up out of the sea, having seven heads and ten horns, and upon his horns ten crowns, and upon his heads the name of blasphemy.'

\textsuperscript{76} Rev. 13: 17: 'And that no man might buy or sell, save that he had the mark, or the name of the beast, or the number of his name.'
however authorized by consent or recommended by raretie is noe
thing but | ignorance or some thing worse.

(51.) Another sort of partiality there is whereby men impose upon
them selves and by it make their reading little usefull to them selves.
I mean the making use of the opinions of writers and laying stress
upon their authorities wherever they find them to favour their own
opinions.77

(52.) There is noe thing almost has donne more harme to men
dedicated to letters than the giving the name of Study to Reading
and making a man of great reading to be the same with a man of
great knowledg or at least to be a title of honour. All that can be
recorded in writing are | only facts or reasonings. Facts are of three
sorts

1. Meerly of Natural agent(s) observable in the ordinary operations
of bodys one upon an other whether in the visible course of things
left to themselves, or in experiments made by men applying agents
and patients to one an other after a peculiar and artificial manner.

2. Of voluntary agents more especialy the actions of men in Society
which makes civil and moral history.

3. Of Opinions.

(53.) In these three consists as it seems to me that which com-
monly has the name of learning. To which perhaps some may adde
a distinct head of Critical writings which indeed at bottom is noe
thing but matter of fact and resolves it self into this that such a man
or set of men used such a word or phrase in such a sense. i.e. that
they made such sounds the marks of such Ideas.

(54.) Under reasonings I comprehend all the discoverys of general
truths made by humane reason whether found by intuition demon-

3 Start of an add. comprising pars. 51-57. 5 'there is whereby' (add. p. 193)
4 selves 'and' (il.) by [and] it 5 opinions of [others] writers 9 than the
[calling] giving 11 to 'be' (il.) a 12 record[ed] ed' (il.) 15 'whether' (il.)
21 Par. 53 is preceded by the deleted first words of an abortive par.: [There is indeed]
22 of [of] 27 discoverys [made and set down] of 28 truths [whether] [bade] made

stration or probable deductions.\(^78\) And this is that which is if not alone knowledg (because the truth or probability of particular propositions may be known to) yet is as may be supposed most properly the business of those who pretend to improve their understandings and make themselves knowing by reading.\(^79\)

(55.) Books and reading are lookd upon to be the great helps of the understanding and instruments of knowledg, as it \(\text{must be allowed that they are. And yet I beg leave to question whether these doe not prove an hindrance to many and keep several bookish men from attaining to solid and true knowledg. This I think I may be permitted to say, that there is noe part where in the understanding needs a more carefull and wary conduct than in the use of books, without which they will prove rather innocent amusements than profitable imployments of our time, and bring but smal additions to our knowledg.}

(56.) There is not seldom to be found even amongst those who aim \(\text{(at)}\) knowledg who with an unwearied industry imploy their whole time in books, who scarce allow them selves time to eat or sleep but read and read, and read on but yet make noe great advances in reall knowledg, though there be noe defect in their intellectual faculties to which their little progress can be imputed. The mistake here is that it is usually supposd that by reading the authors knowledg

\(^1\) or \(\text{[probability,] probable}\)
\(^2\) which is \(\text{[properly cald knowledg viz the perception of the truth or falsehood probability or improbability] if \(\text{[not alone \ldots by reading]}\) (add. cont. on p. 191) \(\text{[as may be supposed]}\) (ibid. \(\text{[4 those who \ldots bookish men]}\) (add. p. 197) \(\text{[11 that \ldots profitable]\}}\)
\(^3\) \(\text{[aim \ldots (at) (also added in O-1706) 20 \ldots reall \ldots knowledg, [which]}\)
\(^4\) though

\(^78\) This division of general truths reflects the taxonomy given in the Essay: Book IV treats Of Knowledge and Opinion, and (general) knowledge is intuitive or demonstrative, ibid. IV.ii.1-2: 530-532.

\(^79\) Cf. Essay, IV.ii.14: 536-537: These two, \(\text{(viz. Intuition and Demonstration, are the degrees of our Knowledge; whatever comes short of one of these, with what assurance soever embraced, is but Faith, or Opinion, but not Knowledge, at least in all general Truths. There is, indeed another Perception of the Mind, employ'd about the particular existence of finite Beings without us; which going beyond bare probability, and yet not reaching perfectly to either of the foregoing degrees of certainty, passes under the name of Knowledge.}
is transfused into the Readers understanding and soe it is, but not by bare reading but by reading and understanding what he writ, whereby I mean not barely comprehending what is affirmed or denied in each proposition, (though that great readers doe not always think them selves concerned precisely to doe) but to see and follow the train of his reasonings, observe the strength and clearness of their connection and examin upon what they bottom, without this a man may read the discourses of a very rational author writ in a language and in propositions that he very well understands and yet acquire noe one jot of his knowledg, which consisting only in the perceived certain or probable connection of the Ideas made use of in his reasonings, the readers knowledg is noe farther increased than he perceives that, soe much as he sees of this connection soe much he knows of the truth or probability of that authors opinions. All that he relyes on without this perception he takes upon trust upon the authors credit without any knowledg of it at all. This makes me not at all wonder to see some men soe abound in citations and build soe much upon authorities, it being the sole foundation on which they bottom most of their own tenets, soe that in effect they have but a second hand or implicit knowledg, i.e. are in the right if such an one from whom they borrowed it were in the right in that opinion which they took from him, which indeed is noe knowledg at all. Writers of this or former ages may be good witnesses of matters of fact which they deliver, which we may doe well to take upon their authoritie, but their credit can goe noe farther than this, it can not at all affect the truth and falshood of opinions, which have an other sort of trial by reason and proof which they themselves made use of to make themselves knowing and soe must others too that will partake in their knowledg. Indeed tis an advantage that they have been at the

2 bare reading [his sense in] but 2 what ‘he’ (il.) 5 see [the connection] ‘and | follow the train’ (add. cont. on p. 197) 8 author [in a lan(guage) wrt 13 ‘as’ (il.) 18 foundation [of] ‘on which they bottom’ (il.) 20 knowledg [which m. i.e. 24 deliver, [but] which 24 ‘doe well to’ (il.) 27 proof [and | not by vote and testimony’ (add. cont. on p. 199)] which

80 Cf. Locke’s Second Reply to the Bishop of Worcester, in: W-1965, IV, p. 371: ‘In matters of fact, I own we must govern ourselves by the testimonies of others; but in matters of speculation, to suppose on, as others have supposed before us, is supposed by many to be only a way to learned ignorance, which enables to talk much, and know but little.’
pains to finde out the proofs and lay them in that order that may shew the truth or probability of their conclusions, and for this we owe them great acknowledgments for saveing us the pains in searching out those proofs which they have collected for us and which possibly after all our pains we might not have found nor been able to have set them in soe good a light as that | which they left them us in. Upon this account we are mightily beholding to judicious writers of all ages for those discoverys and discourses they have left behind them for our instruction if we know how to make a right use of them; which is not to run them over in an hasty perusal and perhaps lodg their opinions or some remarkable passages in our mem'riy's. but to enter into their reasonings examin their proofs and then judg of the truth or falshood probability or improbability of what they advance, not by any opinion we have enterteined of the Author, but by the evidence he produces and the conviction he affords us drawn from things themselves. Knowing is seeing and if it be soe it is madnesse to perswade our selves that we doe soe by an other mans eyes let him use never soe many words to tell us that what he asserts is very visible, till we our selves see it with our own eyes, and perceive it by our own understandings: we are as much in the dark and as void of knowledg as before let us beleive any learned author as much as we will.

(57.) Euclid and Archimedes are allowed to be knowing, and to have demonstrated what they say. And yet whoever shall read over their writeings without perceiving the connection of their proofs, and seeing what they shew though he may understand all their words yet he is not the more knowing. He may beleive indeed but does not know what they | say. and soe is not advanced one jot in mathematical knowledg by all his reading of those approved Mathematicans. 81
The Eagerness and strong bent of the mind after knowledge if not warily regulated is often an hindrance to it. It still presses on to farther discoveries and new objects and catches at the variety of knowledge and therefore often stays not long enough on what is before it to look into it as it should for hast to pursue what is yet out of sight. He that rides post through a country may be able from that transient view to tell how in general the parts lie and may be able to give some loose description of here a mountain and there a plain here a morasse and there a river, woodland in one part and Savanas in another. Such superficial Ideas and observations as these he may collect in galloping over it. But the more useful observations of the Soyle plants, animals and inhabitants with their several sorts and properties must necessarily escape him and is seldom men ever discover rich mines without some digging. Nature commonly lodges her treasure and Jewells in rocky ground. If the matter be knotty and the sense lies deep the mind must stop and buckle to it and stick upon it with labour and thought and close contemplation. And not leave it till it has mastered the difficulty and got possession of truth. But here care must be taken to avoid the other extrem, A man must not stick at every useless nicety and expect mysteries of science in every trivial question or scruple that he may raise. He that will stand to pecke up


démonstrations d'Euclide, d'Archimedes, d'Appolonius, & de tous ceux qui ont écrit de la Géométrie: Ainsi ce n'est pas assez pour être savant Philosophe d'avoir lu Platon, Aristote, Descartes, & de savoir par mémoire tous leurs sentiments sur les questions de Philosophie.'

82 Cf. Malebranche, Recherche, Vol. II, Bk. VI, Pt. I, Ch. v, pp. 283–284: 'Car de même qu'il y a autant ou plus de sentiment dans la vue sensible d'un objet, que je tiens tout proche de mes yeux & que j'examine avec soin, que dans la vue d'une campagne entière, que je regarde avec négligence & sans attention; de sorte que la netteté du sentiment que j'ai de l'objet qui est tout proche de mes yeux, récompense l'étendue du sentiment confus que j'ai de plusieurs choses, que je vois sans attention dans une campagne: ainsi la vue que l'esprit a d'un seul objet, est quelque-fois si vive & si distincte, qu'elle renferme autant ou même plus de pensée, que la vue des rapports qui sont entre plusieurs choses.'

83 ‘to pecke up’ should probably be read here as: ‘to picke up’.
and examine every peble that comes in his way is as unlikely to
returne inrichd and laden with Jewels as the other that travelled full
speed. Truths are not the better nor the worse for their obviousnesse
or difficultie, but their value is to be measurd by their usefulnesse
and tendency. Insignificant observations should not take up any of
our minutes and those that inlarge our view and give light towards
farther and usefull discoverys should not be neglected though they
stop our course and spend some of our time in a fixed attention.

(59.) There is an other hast that does often and will mislead the
minde if it be left to its self and its own conduct. The understanding
is naturally forwards not only to enlarge its knowledg by variety
(which makes it skip over one to get speedily to another part of
knowledg,) but also eager to enlarge its views by running too fast into
general observations and conclusions without a due examination of
particulars enough whereon to found those general axioms. This
seems to enlarge their stock but tis of phansies not realities, such
Theories built upon narrow foundations stand but weakely and if
they fall not of themselves are at least very hardly to be supported
against the assaults of opposition. And thus men being to hasty to
erect to them selves general notions and ill grounded theories finde
them selves deceived in their stock of knowledg when they come to
examine their hastily assumed maximes themselves or to have them
attacked by others. General observations drawn from particulars are
the Jewels of knowledg comprehending great store in a little roome.
But they are therefoe to be made with the greater care and caution,

1–2 unlikely to [enrich himself with Jewe] returne speed. (Observations)
‘Truths’ (ili) 5–6 up [much] ‘any’ (ili) of our [time] ‘minutes’ (ili) 7 farther
7 neglected [what time] though 8 course [in a long] and 203–9–204.14 There
is an other … between them (add. pp. 145, 147; this add. was written around an
add. to p. 144 on p. 145 and around an add. to p. 146 on p. 147; these additions both
belong to par. 62; so, par. 59 postdates par. 62) 10 conduct. (It is not only we) The
13 also [.] eager 14 with ‘ou’ (he) ‘a due’ (ili) 16 realities, [and] such

ingreditur viam (priorem scilicet) intellectus sibi permittus, quam facit ex
ordine dialecticæ. Gestit enim mens exilire ad magis generalia, ut acquiescat;
et post parvam moram fastidit experienciam’, and ibid. Bk. I, Aph. xxv, Works,
I, p. 161: ‘Axiomata quæ in usu sunt ex tenui et manipulæ experienciae et pauciæ
particularibus, quæ ut plurimum occurunt, fluxere; et sunt fere ad mensuram
eorum facta et extensa …’
least if we take counterfeit for true our losse and shame be the greater when our stock comes to a severe scrutiny. One or two particulars may suggest hints of enquiry and they doe well who take those hints. But if they turne them into conclusions and make them presently general rules they are forward indeed but it is only to impose on themselves by propositions assumed for truths without sufficient warranty. To make noe observations is as has been already remarked to make the head a magazin of materials, which can hardly be called knowledg or at least tis but like a collection of Lumber not reduced to use or order. And he that makes every thing an observation has the same useless plenty and much more falsehood mixed with it. the extrems on both sides are to be avoided and he will be able to give the best account of his studys who keeps his understanding in the right mean between them. (60.) Whether it be a love of that which brings the first light and information to their minds and want of vigor and industrie to enquire, or else that men content them selves with any appearance of knowledg right or wrong which when they have once got they will hold fast this is visible that many men give them selves up to the first anticipations of their minds and are very tenacious of the opinions that first possesse them. They are often as fond of their first conceptions as of their first borne and will by noe means recede from the judgment they have once made or any conjecture or conceit, which they have once enterteind. This is a fault in the conduct of the understanding since this firmnesse or rather stifnesse of the minde is not from an adherence to truth but a submission to præjudice. Tis an unreasonable homage paid to prepossession whereby we shew a reverence not to (what we pretend to seeke), Truth; but what by hap hazard we chance to light on be it what it will. This is visibly a præpostrous use of our faculties and is a downright prostituteing of

8 ma'ga'izen (il) 10 order. And 18 knowledge [ri] right 18-19 'which when they have once | got they will hold fast' (il. cont. on p. 141) 19 up[to] 20-21 of the first opinions 21-22 possesse the [it][m] [minds and will not easily] 'They [seem] 'are often' (il) as ... means' (add. p. 142) 23 or [which ...] conceit, 24 enterteind. [This firmnesse of minde.] [‘by the ... people’ (il)] This is 27 Tis [a fondnesse] an 27 we [pay] 'shew' (il) 28 we [should seek] pretend 30 is a [kinde] downright

85 See above, pars. 39 and 45.
the minde to resignation it thus and put it under power of the first comers. This can never be allowd or ought to be followed as a right way to knowledg till the understanding (whose businesse it is to conforme it self to what it findes in the objects without) can by its owne opinionitry change that and make the unalterable nature of things comply with its owne hasty determinations which will never be. What ever we phansy things keep their course and their habitudes correspondencies and relations keep the same to one an other—

(§27) (61.) Contrary to these but by a like dangerous excess on the other side are those who always resign their judgment to the last man they heard or read. Truth never sinks into these mens minds nor gives any tincture to them but camelion like they take the colour of what is laid before them and as soon loose and resign it to the next that happens to come in their way.65 The order where in opinions are proposd to or received by us is noe rule of their rectitude nor ought to be a cause of their preference: First or last in this case is the effect of chance and not the measure of truth or falshood. This every one must confesse and therefor should in the pursuit of truth keep his minde free from the influence of any such accidents. A man may as reasonably draw cutts for his tenets and regulate his perswasion by the cast of a die, as take it up for its noveltie or retein it because it had his first assent and he was never of an other minde. well weighed reasons are to determin the judgment: those the minde should be always ready to hearken and submitt to; and by their testimony and suffrage entertein or reject any tenet indifferently whether it be a perfect stranger or an old acquaintance:

1 it [in the] `under´ (il.) 1—2 comers [and] `. This´ (add. p. 143) 4 to [the nature of things] `what it findes in the objects without´ (il.) 5 change [them and bring them to comply] that 5 the [nature] unalterable 6 comply [with its... hasty phansys of the brain.] with 6—8 `determinations … one an other´ (add. p. 143) 10 their [opinion] judgment 11 read. [These men `[never´ (il.)] the tincture of truth let into their mindes] Truth 12 like `they´ (il.) 13 loose [it by the intervention] `and´ (add.) resigne 14 in [things] `opinions´ (il.) 15 to [our mindes] or 17—18 one [sees] must 19 from [all] `the´ (il.) 20 draw [lots] `cuts´ (add. l. margin) 20 his [opinions] tenets 20 and [throu] regulate 21 up [or lay it downe] for 21 because [he has] it 22 had [its] his 23 judgment [for which the understanding ought always to be ready] those 24 and [receive or reject any proposi]tion tenet whether it be by

86 Cf. Education, §67, p. 126: `We are all a sort of Camelions, that still take a Tincture from things near us …'
Though the faculties of the minde are improved by exercise, yet they must not be put to a stresse beyond their strength. quid valeant humeri quid ferre recusent must be made the measure of every ones undertakeing who has a desire not only to performe well, but to keepe up the vigor of his faculties and not to bauke his understanding by what is too hard for it. The minde by being engaged in a taske beyond its strength like the body strained by lifting at a weight too heavy has often its force broken and thereby gets an unaptnesse or an aversion to any vigoroos attempt ever after. a sinew cracked seldom recovers its former strength, or at least the tenderness of the sprain remains a good while after and the memory of it longer and leaves a lasting caution in the man not to put the part quickly again to any robust imployment: soe it fares in the minde once jaded by an attempt above its power, it either is disabled for the future or else checks at any vigorous undertakeing ever after at least is very hardly brought to exert its force again on any subject that requires thought and meditation. The understanding should be brought to the difficult and knotty parts of knowledg that trie the strength of thought and a full bent of the minde by insensible degrees and in such a gradual proceeding noe thing is to hard for it. Nor let it be objected that such a slow progresse will never reach the extent of some sciences. It is not to be imagind how far constancy will carry a man, however it is better to walke slowly in a rugged way than to breake a leg and be a cripple. He that begins with the calf may carry the ox but he that will at first goe to take up an ox may doe disable his faculties by jading of it what is too hard for it. (add. cont. on p. 145; revision made across the division between quires I and K) 6 minde [being] taske [to hard it for 'it'] beyond its strength 'too heavy' [il.] has (deleted, then undeleted by underdotting) Page number 146 miswritten as 246. 8 often [its lo(1ce)j its 9 ever[y] 10 cracked[s] seldom 11 tenderness [and memory] of 11 remains [and hinders [it from] the part from being] a good while after (add. cont. on p. 247) 12 put [it] part (add. cont. on p. 147) 13 the [.] minde 14 its force 'power' [il.] 16 least 'is' [il.] 21 that [.] such 22 imagind 23 man. [but] however 24 with [.] the 25 ox [w(ill)] may


‘to bauke’ = to balk = to hinder (*OED* 1a).
himself as not to be able to lift a calf after that. When the minde by
insensible degrees has brought it self to attention and close thinkeing
it will be able to cope with difficultys and master them without
any prejudice to it self and then it may | goe on roundly, every abstruse probleme every intricate question will not baffle discouragement
or break it. But though putteing the minde unprepared upon an unusual stress that may discourage or damp it for the future ought to be avoided, yet this must not run it by an overgreat shiness of difficul(?)ties into a lazy sauntering about ordinary and obvious things
that demand noe thought or application, this debases and enarvates
the understanding makes it weake and unfit for labour. This is a sort
of hovering about the surface of thin(g)s without any insight into
them or penetration, and when the minde has been once habituated
to this lazy recumbency and satisfaction on the obvious surface of
things it is in danger to rest satisfied there and goe noe deeper since
it can not doe it without pains and digging. He that has for some time
accustomed himself to take up with what easily offers it self at first
view has reason to fear he shall never reconcile himself to the fatigue
of turning and tumbling things in his minde to discover their more
retired and more valuable secrets

(63.) Tis not strange that methods of learning which schollers
have been accustomed to in their begining and entrance upon the
sciences should influence them all their lives and be setled in their
mindes by an over ruling reverence espetialy if they be such as
universal use has established. Learners must at first be beleivers
and their masters rules haueing been once made axioms to them tis noe
wonder they should keepe that dignitie, and by the authoritie they
have once got mislead those who thinke it sufficient to excuse them
if they goe out of their way in a well beaten tract. I have copiously

1 When [a man] the 4 No catchword. 6 break it. [This though it be soe
yet care must be taken that the avoiding.] But 6 minde "[...] unprepared" (il.)
7 future [be to] ought 12 thin[k]||g/s 13–20 "and when the [the] | minde has
... valuable secrets" (add. cont. on p. 249) 15 once [lazily used to it will seldom
goe deeper] habituated 15 things [where it accustomed it self] it 18 shall [like
the fatigue] never 21 not [wonder(ful)] "strange" (il.) 24 "espetially" (il.)
27 dignitie, and [be in authoritie] by 28 who [have been] thinke 29 have
[ab] copiously
Words enough spoken of the abuse of words in an other place\textsuperscript{89} and therefor shall upon this reflection that the sciences are full of them warne those that would conduct their understandings right not to take any turne howso ever authorised by the language of the schools \textverticalline| to stand for any thing till they have an Idea of it. And A word may be of frequent use and great credit with several authors and be by them made use of as if it stood for some real being, but yet if he that reads cannot frame any distinct Idea of that being, it is certain to him a mere empty sound without a meaning, and he learns noe more by all that is said of it, or attributed to it, than if it were affirmed only of that bare empty sound. They who would advance in knowledg and not deceive and swell them selves with a little articulated air should lay down this as a fundamental rule, not to take words for things nor suppose that names in books signifie real entities in nature till they can frame clear and distinct Ideas of those Entities. It will not perhaps be allowed if I should set down \textit{substantial formes} and \textit{Intentional species} as such that may justly be suspected to be of this kind of insignificant termes.\textsuperscript{90} But this I am sure to one that can forme noe determined Ideas of what they stand for they signifie noe thing at all, and all that he thinks he knows about them is to him soe much knowledg about noe thing and amounts at most but to a learned ignorance.\textsuperscript{91} Tis not without all reason supposed that there are many such empty termes to be found in some learned writers to which they had recourse

\textsuperscript{1} spoken [in this [tract] `treatise` (il.) of the abuse of words `in an other place` (il.) \textverticalline| upon [the occasion] [the] `this` (il.) 5 of it. And [to conclude that if in several places of different authors where it occurs it has noe perceivable distinct meaning it will be fit to conclude there is noe such thing in nature as that sound pretends to stand for. It will perhaps `not` (add. \textit{r. margin}) be allowed if I should `for such` (il.) name `substantial` (il.) \textit{Formes}, [\textit{Sympathie} \textit{Intentional species} and a great many other `terms` (il.) currant in learned writers] [for such] \textit{A word} \textverticalline| may be \ldots from things` (add. \textit{cont. on p. 151}) 9 without `a` (il.) 11–12 deceive [them selves] and 13 take [names] words 15 allowed [that] if 16 should [me\textit{(tion)}] set 16 as [termes] `such` (il.) 19 and [to him] all 208.19–209.2 he [has learned about the] thinks [abo\textit{(ur)}] he 20 is [soe m\textit{(uch)}] to him noe 23 `some` (il.) 23 writers `to` (il.)

\textsuperscript{89} See above, par. 10, note 15.

\textsuperscript{90} \textit{Cf. Essay, III.x.14: 498}, where the error of taking words for things is illustrated in a similar anti-scholastic way by pointing to the terms `peripatetick Forms` and `intentional Species`.

\textsuperscript{91} See \textit{Nicholas of Cusa} (1401-1464), \textit{De docta ignorantia} (1440).
to etch out their Systems where understandings could not furnish them with conceptions from things. But yet I beleive the supposeing of some realities in nature answering those and the like words have much perplexed some and quite mislead others in the Study of nature. That which in any discourse signifies I know not what should be considered I know not when. Where men have any conceptions they can if they are never soe abstruse or abstracted explain them and the termes they use for them. For our Conceptions being noe thing but Ideas which are all made up of simple ones, If they cannot give us the Ideas their words stand for tis plain they have none. To what purpose can it be to hunt after his conceptions who has none or none distinct? He that knew not what he himself meant by a learned termes cannot make us know any thing by his use of it let us beat our heads about it never soe long. Whether we are able to comprehend all the operations of nature and the manners of them it matters not to enquire but this is certain that we can comprehend noe more of them than we can distinctly conceive and therefor to obtrude termes where we have noe distinct conceptions as if they did contain or rather conceal some thing is but an artifice of learned vanity to cover a defect in an hypothesis or our understandings. Words are not made to conceal but to declare and shew some thing. Where they are by those who pretend to instruct otherwise used they conceal indeed something but that that they conceal is noe thing but the ignorance error or sophistry of the talker for there is in truth noe thing else under them.

(§30) (64.) That there is constant succession and flux of Ideas in our minde I have observed in the former part of this essay and every one

2–3 supposeing [one of the] and the like (il.) 10 the it 10–11 none. [And it can never be worth while] 'To what purpose can it be' (add., p. 151) 12 'meant' (il.) 12–13 learned [.] terme 13 by [our] his (il.) 14 to [conceive] comprehend (il.) 17 distinctly [to] conceive 19 learned [ignorance] 'vanity' (il.) 21–22 they (are) 'are by those who pretend to instruct' (add., p. 153) 22–23 indeed [but it] something 23 is [in truth] noe 23–24 ignorance [or] error

92 See Essay, II.xxiii.2: 295; 'So that if any one will examine himself concerning his Notion of pure Substance in general, he will find he has no other Idea of it at all, but only a Supposition of he knows not what support of such Qualities, which are capable of producing simple Ideas in us …'
may take notice of it in himself. This I suppose may deserve some part of our care in the conduct of our understandings and I think it may be of great advantage if we can by use get that power over our mindes as to be able to direct that train of Ideas that soe since there will new ones perpetually come into our thoughts by a constant succession we may be able by choise soe to direct them that none may come in view but such as are pertinent to our present enquiry and in such order as may be most usefull to the discovery we are upon. Or at least if some foraigne and unsought Ideas will offer themselves that yet we might be able to reject them and keepe them from takeing off our minde from its present pursuit and hinder them from running away with our thoughts quite from the subject in hand. This is not I suspect soe easy to be done as perhaps may be imagined, and yet for ought I know this may be if not the cheif yet one of the great differences that carry some men in their reasoning soe far beyond others where they seeme to be naturally of equall parts. A proper and effectual remedie for this wandering of thought I would be glad to finde. He that shall propose such an one would doe great service to the studious and contemplative part of man kinde and perhaps help unthinkeing men to become thinkeing: I must acknowledg that hitherto I have discoverd noe other way to keepe our thoughts close to their businesse but the endeavouring as much as we can, and by frequent attention and application getting the habit of attention and application. He that will observe children will finde that even when they endeavour their uttermost they cannot keep their minds from stragling. The way to cure it I am satisfied is not angry chideing or beating for that presently fils their heads with all the Ideas that

5 into [the minde] our are [use(ful)] pertinent [and usefull] to 9 that[th] mind[en]e from [their] its 11 and [run away] hinder 11 keepe [them] (deleted, then undeleted by underdotting) ['i' (ild) 12-13 not I [imag]e] suspect 13 perhaps [I] may 13-14 yet [perhaps] for 15 'soe far' (ild) 16-17 'and effectual' (add. p. 155) 23 get'ing' (ild) 25 endeavour [the contrary] 'their ut' ternost they' (add. cont. on p. 155) cannot [be kept] 'keep' (ild) [from stragling]

93 Cf. Essay, II.vii.3: 131: ‘For if we look immediately into our selves, and reflect on what is observable there, we shall find our Ideas always, whilst we are awake, or have any thought, passing in train, one going, and another coming, without intermission.’ See also ibid. II.xiv ‘Of Duration, and its simple Modes’, pp. 181-196.

fear dread and confusion can offer to them. To bring back gently their wandering thoughts by leading them into the path and going before them in the train they should pursue, without any rebuke or soe much as taking notice (when it can be avoided) of their roving

I suppose would sooner reconcile and inure them to attention than all those rougher methods which more distract their thought and hindering the application they would promote introduce a contrary habit.  

(§31) (65.) Distinction and Division are (if I mistake not the import of the words) very different things the one being the perception of a difference that nature has placed in things the other our making a division where there is yet none. At least if I may be permitted to consider them in this sense I thinke I may say of them, that one of them is the most necessary and conducive to true knowledg that can be the other when too much made use of serves only to puzzell and confound the understanding. To observe every the least difference that is in things argues a quick and clear sight and this keepes the understanding steady and right in its way to knowledg. But though it be usefull to discerne every variety is to be found in nature, yet it is not convenient to consider every difference that is in things and divide them into distinct classes under every such difference this will run us if followed into particulars (for every individuall

1 fear [and] dread 1 'gently' (il.) 2—3 into the [track they should goe in] 'path [and [shewing them the way] [and going ... pursue,' (add. cont. on p. 155) 4 avoided 5 sooner [bring them] reconcile 6 all (catchword not repeated on p. 154) 7 promote [confirme th] introduce 11 other [\_] 'our' (il.) 12 where [nature has made] 'there is yet [\_]' (il.) 12—13 to [use] consider 15 'when too much made use of' (il.)

95 Cf. Education, §147, p. 208: 'gently correct, and weed out any Bad Inclinations, and settle in him good Habits'.

96 This sentence is rather confusing: Locke’s point seems to be that division concerns ‘the perception of a difference that nature has placed in things’, and distinction ‘our making a division where there is yet none’. Cf. Essay, III.x.12: 496 about artificial ‘curious Distinctions, and acute Niceties’, and Education, §195, p. 252: “it will be of great use to his [the tutor’s] Pupil to accustom him to distinguish well, that is, to have distinct Notions, where-ever the Mind can find any real difference, but as carefully to avoid distinctions in terms, where he has not distinct and different clear Idea’s’. See also Sanderson, Logica artis complementum, Pt. I, Ch. 18, p. 62: ‘Divisio est latioris in angustiora deductio. Quæ si sit Nominis, Distinctio; si Rei, Divisio magis propriè appellatur.’
has something that differs it from an other) and we shall be able to establish noe general truths or else at least shall be apt to perplex the minde about them. The collection of several things into several classes gives the minde more general and larger views, but we must take care to unite them only in that and soe far as they doe agree for soe far they may be united under one consideration. Entity it self that comprehends all things as general as it is may afford us clear and rational conceptions. If we would well weigh and keep in our mindes what it is we are considering that would best instruct us when we should or should not branch into farther distinctions which are to be taken only from a due contemplation of things to which there is noe thing more opposite than the art of verbal distinctions made at pleasure in learned and arbitrarily invented termes to be applyd at a venture without comprehending or conveying any distinct notions, and soe altogether fitted to artificial talke or empty noise in dispute without any clearing of difficulties, or advance in knowledg. What soever subject we examin and would get knowledg in, we should I thinke make as general and as large as it will bare, nor can there be any danger of this if the Idea of it be setled and determined, for if that be soe we shall easily distinguish it from any other Idea though comprehended under the same name. For it is to fence against the intanglement of equivocal words and the great art of Sophistry which lies in them that distinctions have been multiplied and their use thought soe necessary. But had every distinct abstract Idea a distinct knowne name there would be little need of these multiplied scholastick distinctions, though there would be never the lesse as much need still of the mindes observing the differences that are in things, and discriminateing them thereby one from an other. Tis not therefor the right way to knowledg to hunt after and fill the head with aboundance of artificial | and scholastick
distinctions where with learned mens writeing are often filled, and
we sometimes finde what they treat of soe divided and subdivided
that the minde of the most attentive reader looses the sight of it, as it
is more than probable the writer himself did. for in things crumbled
into dust tis in vain to affect or pretend order, or expect clearnesse.
To avoid confusion by too few or too many divisions is a great skill in
thinkeing as well as writeing which is but the copying our thoughts
but what are the boundarys of the meane between the two vitious
excesses on both hands I thinke is hard to set down in words, Clear
and distinct Ideas is all that I yet know able to regulate it. But as
to verbal distinctions received and applyd to common termes i.e.
equivocal words they are more properly I thinke the businesse of
Criticisme and dictionarys than of real knowledg and Philosophie
since they for the most part only explain the meaning of words and
give us their several significations. The dexterous management of
terms and being able to Fend and prove with them I know has and
does passe in the world for a great part of learning But it is learning
distinct from knowledg For knowledg consists only in perceiving
the habitues and relations of Ideas one to an other which is done
without words, the intervention of a sound helps noething to it, and
hence we see that there is least use of distinctions where there is
most knowledg I mean in Mathematics where men have determined
Ideas with known names to them and soe there being noe roome
for equivocations there is noe need of distinctions. In arguine the
opponent uses as comprehensive and equivocal terms as he can to
involve his adversary in the doubtfulness of his expressions this is
expected and therefor the answerer on his side makes it his play to
destinguish as much as he can and thinkes he can never doe it too
much, nor can he indeed in that way wherein victory may be had
without truth and without knowledg. This seems to me to be the
art of disputeing, use your words as captiously as you can in your

1–12 learned [mens writeings are often filled They] ’me|ns writeing … words they’ (add. cont. on p. 139; written across the division between quires K and L) 1 filled [with], and 3 of ’it’ (il.) 11 distinctions [affixed] received 13 knowledg and [the] Philosophie 14 ’for the most part’ (il.) only [give us] explain 17 learning [But where] But 22 we [fin(d)] see 22 have [clear and distinct] ’determined’ (il.) 23 Ideas [and] with 23 names [for] ’to’ (il.) 24 ’need’ (il.) 25 can [by] to 26 of [..] his 29 where ’in’ (il.)
argueing on one side, and apply distinctions as much as you can on the other side to every terme to nonplus your oponent soe that in this sort of scholarship there being noe bounds set to distinguishing some men have thought all accutenesse to have lain in it and therefor in all they have read or thought on their great businesse has been to amuse themselves with distinctions and multiply to themselves divisions at least more than the nature of the thing required. There seems to me as I said to be noe other rule for this but a due and right consideration of things as they are in them selves.97 He that has setled in his minde determined Ideas with names affixed to them will be able both to discerne their differences one from an other which is really distinguishing and where the penury of words affords not termes answering every distinct Idea will be able to apply proper distinguishing termes to the comprehensive and equivocal names he is forced to make use of. This is all the need I know of distinguishing termes and in such verbal distinctions each terme of the distinction joynd to that whose signification it distinguishes is but a new distinct name for a distinct Idea, where they are soe and men have clear and distinct conceptions that answer their verbal distinctions they are right and are pertinent as far as they serve to clear any thing in the subject under consideration. And this is that which seems to me the proper and only measure of distinctions and divisions, which he that will conduct his understanding right must not look for in the accutenesse of invention nor the authoritie of writers but will finde only in the consideration of things themselves whether they are lead into it by their owne meditations or the information of books.

(66.) An aptnesse to Jumble things together wherein can be found any likenesse is a fault in the understanding on the other side which will not faile to mislead it and by thus lumping of thing(s)

1 on[e] one 1 side and [distinguish as much] apply 1–2 `on the other side’ (il.) 4 lain `in it’ (il.) 5–6 has been to [mu(l)]tiplie to themselves distinctions and divisions amuse 7–8 `There [is] `seems’ (il.) to `me | as I said’ (add. cont. on p. 161) 10 minde [clear `and real’ (il.) Ideas] [true and clear] `determined’ (il.) 11 able [to [di(scern)] only to dis(erne)] both 11–12 differences [which] `one from another which’ (add. p. 161) 16 termes [which] and 16 verbal [....] distinctions 17 to that [which it] whose 17 new [....] `distinct’ (il.) 19 answer [them] their 23 must [finde not in the] not 27 Par. preceded by deleted words of a new par.: [A lumping of things togeather w(here)]

97 See above, pars. 49 and 56.
hinder the minde from distinct and accurate conceptions of them.\(^{98}\)

(§32) To which let me here add an other neare of kin to this at least in name and that is letting the minde upon the suggestion of any new notion run immediately after similies to make it the clearer to it self, which though it may be a good way and usefull in the explaining our thoughts to others yet it is by noe means a right method to settle true notions of any thing in our selves, because similes always faile in some part and come short of that exactnesse which our conceptions should have to things if we would thinke aright. This indeed makes men plausible talkers for those are always most acceptable in discourse, who have the way to let in their thoughts in to other men’s mindes with the greatest ease and facility, whether those thoughts are well formed and correspond with things matters not, few men care to be instructed but at an easy rate. They who in their discourse strike the phansy and take the hearers conceptions along with them as fast as their words flow, are the applauded talkers and goe for the only men of clear thoughts: noe thing contributes soe much to this as similes whereby men thinke they themselves understand better because they are the better understood.\(^{99}\) But it is one thing to think right and an other thing to know the right way to lay our thoughts before others with advantage and clearnesse be they right or wrong, well chosen similes metaphors and allegories with method and order doe.


\(^{99}\) Cf. *Essay*, IV.xix.9: 700 on enthusiasts: ‘This is the way of talking of these Men: they are sure, because they are sure: and their Perswasions are right, only because they are strong in them. For, when what they say is strip’d of the Metaphor of seeing and feeling, this is all it amounts to: and yet these Similes so impose on them, that they serve them for certainty in themselves, and demonstration to others.’
this the best of any thing, because being taken from objects already known and familiar to the understanding they are conceived as fast as spoken and the correspondence being concluded the thing they are brought to explain and elucidate is thought to be understood too. Thus phansy passes for knowledge, and what is prettily said is mistaken for solid. I say not this to decry | metaphor or with designe to take away that ornament of speech: my business here is not with Rhetoricians and Orators but with philosophers and lovers of truth to whom I would beg leave to give this one rule whereby to trie whether in the application of their thoughts to any thing for the improvement of their knowledge they doe in truth comprehend the matter before them really such as it is in itself. The way to discover this is to observe whether in the laying it before themselves or others they make use only of borrowed representations and Ideas forreigne to the thing which are applyd to it by way of accommodation as bearing some proportion or imagined likeness to the subject under consideration. Figured and metaphorical expressions doe well to illustrate more abstruse and unfamiliar Ideas which the minde is not yet throughly accustomed to, but then they must be made use of to illustrate Ideas that we already have, not to paint to us those which we yet have not. | such borrowed and allusive Ideas may follow real and solid truth to set it off when found but must by noe means be set in its place and taken for it: If all our search has yet reached noe farther than simile and metaphor we may assure our selves we rather phansy than know and are not yet penetrated into the inside and reality of the thing be it what it will. but content our selves with what our imaginations not things themselves furnishes us with.

In the whole conduct of the understanding there is noe thing of more moment than to know when and where and how
far to give assent and possibly there is nothing harder. Tis very
easily said and no body questions it. That giving and withholding
our assent and the degrees of it should be regulated by the evidence
which things carry with them and yet we see men are not the better for
this rule. Some firmly imbrace doctrines upon slight grounds some
upon no grounds and some contrary to appearance. Some admit of
certainty and are not to be moved in what they hold, others waver
in every thing and there want not those that reject all as uncertain.
What then shall a novice, an enquirer a stranger doe in the case? I
answer use his eyes, there is a correspondence in things and agreement
and disagreement in Ideas discernable in very different degrees and
there are eyes in men to see them if they please, only their eyes may
be dimned or dazled and the discerning sight in them impaired or
lost. Interest and passion dazels, the custome of arguing on any
side even against our persuasions dims the understanding and makes
it by degrees loose the facultie of discerning clearly between truth
and falsehood and soe of adhering to the right side. Tis not safe to
play with error and dresse it up to our selves or others in the shape
of it `this rule´ (il.) 9 shall a [traveller doe in the case] novice 9 enquirer
a [traveller doe in] stranger 10 is [an evidence in things] a correspondence
to—11 agreement [for] and disagreeinent [and] 11 `very´ (il.) 13 be [dazled or their
phants] dimned 13 [sight] (deleted, then undeleted by underdotting) [faculty´
(il.)] 14 custome 14—15 argue/[ing] in[g] on any side even’ (add. cont. on
p. 167)

100 Cf. Essay, IV.xv.3: 655: ‘Probability is likeliness to be true, the very notation
of the Word signifying such a Proposition, for which there be Arguments or
Proofs, to make it pass or be received for true. The entertainment the Mind
gives this sort of Propositions, is called Belief, Assent, or Opinion, which is the
admitting or receiving any Proposition for true, upon Arguments or Proofs
that are found to persuade us to receive it as true, without certain Knowledge
that it is so’ and ibid. IV.xvi.1: 657-658: ‘The grounds of Probability, we have
laid down in the foregoing Chapter, as they be the Foundations on which
our Assent is built; so are they also the measure whereby its several degrees are,
or ought to be regulated: only we are to take notice, that whatever grounds
of Probability there may be, they yet operate no farther on the Mind, which
searches after Truth, and endeavours to judge right, than they appear …’

& nos passions agissent encore tres-fortement sur nous: elles éblouissent notre
esprit par de fausses lueurs, & elles le couvrent, & le remplissent de ténèbres.’
of truth. The minde by degrees looses its natural relish of real solid truth is reconciled insensibly to any thing that can but be dressed up into any faint appearance of it. and if the phansy be allowed the place of the judgment at first in sport it after wards comes by use to usurp it, and what is recommended by this flatterer (that studys but to please) is received for good. There are soe many ways of fallacie, such arts of giving colours appearances and resemblances by this Court dresser the phansy, that he who is not very wary to admit noe thing but truth it self, very carefull not to make his minde subservient to any thing else cannot but be caught. He that has a minde to beleive has half assented already and he that by often arguine against his owne sense imposes falshoods on others is not far from beleiving himself. This takes away the great distance there is betwixt truth and falshood, it bring them almost to geather and makes it noe great odds in things that approach soe near which you take and when things are brought to that passe passion or interest etc easily and without being perceived, determin which shall be the right. I have said above that we should keep a perfect Indifferency for all opinions, not wish any of them true or trie to make them appear soo but being indifferent receive and imbrace them according as Evidence and that allone gives the attestation of truth. They that doe thus i.e. keep their mindes indiffernt to opinions to be determined only by evidence, will always finde the understanding has perception enough to distinguish between evidence or noe evidence, betwixt plain and doubtfull and if they neither give nor refuse their assent but by that

Indifferency

102 See above, par. 33.
measure, they will be safe in the opinions they have: which being perhaps but few this caution will have also this good in it that it will put them upon considering and teach them the necessity of examining more than they doe. without which the minde is but a receptacle of inconsistencies not the storehouse of truths. They that doe not keep up this indif[fer]ency in themselves for all but truth not supposed but evidenced to themselves, put coloured spectacles before their eyes and looke on things through false glasses and then thinke themselves excused in following the false appearances which they themselves put upon them. I doe not expect that by this way the assent should in every one be proportioned to the grounds and clearnesse where with every truth is capable to be made out, or that men should be perfectly kept from error. That is more than human nature can by any means be advanced to. I aime at noe such unattainable priviledg. I am only speaking of what they should doe who would deal fairely with their owne mindes and make a right use of their faculties in the pursuit of truth. We faile them a great deale more than they faile us. Tis mismanagement more than want of abilities that men have reason to complain of. and which they actually doe complain of in those that differ from them: he that by an indifferency for all but truth suffers not his assent to goe faster than his evidence nor beyond it will learne to examin and examin fairly instead of presumeing, and noe body will be at a losse or in any danger for want of imbraceing those truths which are necessary in his station and circumstances. In any other way but this all the world are borne to orthodoxie they imbibe at first the allowed opinions of their country and party and soe never questioning their truth not one of an hundred ever examines. They are applauded for presumeing they are in the right. He that considers is a foe to Orthodoxie because possibly he may deviate from some of the received doctrines there.
And thus men without any industry or acquisition of their own inherit local truths (for it is not the same every where) and are inured to assent without Evidence. This influences farther than is thought. For what one of an hundred of the zealous bigots in all party's ever examined the tenets he is soe stiff in? or ever thought it his business or duty soe to doe? It is suspected of Lukewarmnesse to suppose it necessary and a tendency to Apostacy to goe about it. And if a man can bring his minde once to be positive and feirce for positions whose evidence he has never once examined and that in matters of greatest concernement to him, what shall keepe him from this short and easy way of being in the right in cases of lesse moment? Thus we are taught to clothe our mindes as we doe our bodys after the fashion in vogue and tis accounted phantasticalnesse or some thing worse not to doe soe. This custome, (which who dares oppose?) makes the short sighted bigots and the warier scepticks as far as it prevails and those that breake from it are in danger of heresie. for takeing the whole world how much of it doth Truth and Orthodoxie possesse togeather. Though tis by the last alone (which has the good luck to be every where) error and heresye are judged of. For argument and Evidence signifie noe thing in the case. And excuse noe where but are sure to be borne down in all societies by the infallible Orthodoxy of the place. Whether this be the way to truth and right assent let the opinions that take place and prescribe in the several habitable parts of the Earth declare. I never saw any reason yet why truth might not

1–2 own \([men are borne to]\) (catchword \(men\) deleted as well) \(\text{\`inherit'}\) \(\text{(il.)}\)
5 stiff in \(\text{[\()\]}\)? 6 doe? \(\text{[suspected, of]}\) \(\text{\`It'}\) \(\text{is suspected of'}\) \(\text{(add. cont. on p. 172)}\)
Apostacy or at least Lukewarmnesse 8 for tenets \(\text{\`positions'}\) \(\text{(add. cont. on p. 171)}\)
12 are \(\text{[accus(omed)]}\) taught 12–13 fashon \(\text{[of the place or] in 17 world \(\text{\`together'}\) \(\text{(il.)}\)}\) how 18 tis \(\text{\`by'}\) \(\text{(il.)}\) 19 where \(\text{[by w\text{\`e\text{\`}}] error 20 And \[are\] excuse 20–22 \text{\`but [\ldots] are sure [to be borne downe [everywhere] \`in all societies'}\) \(\text{(il.)}\) by the infallible Orthodoxy of the place\(\text{\`(il. cont. on p. 171)\)\)}}\)

103 Cf. Essay, IV.xx.18: 719; ‘if any one should a little catechize the greatest part of the Partisans of most of the Sects in the World, he would not find, concerning those Matters they are so zealous for, that they have any Opinions of their own: much less would he have Reason to think, that they took them upon the Examination of Arguments, and Appearance of Probability’.
104 Cf. Locke, ‘Error’, in: King, II, p. 77: ‘As soon as it is perceived that he quits the implicit questioned, expected though disowned by the Church, his orthodoxy is presently questioned, and he is marked out for a heretic.’
be trusted to its own evidence. I am sure if that be not able to support it there is noe fence against error; and then Truth and falsehood are but names that stand for the same things. Evidence therefore is that by which alone every man is (and should be taught) to regulate his assent who is then and then only in the right way when he follows it.

(68.) Men deficient in knowledge are usually in one of these three states either wholly ignorant: or as doubting of some proposition they have either embraced formerly, or at present are inclined to: or lastly they do with assurance hold and profess without ever having examined and being convinced by well grounded arguments. The first of these are in the best state of the three by having their minds yet in their perfect freedom and indifference the likelier to pursue truth the better, having no bias yet clapt on to mislead them. For ignorance with an indifference for truth is nearer to it, than opinion with ungrounded inclination which is the great source of Error. And they are more in danger to go out of the way who are marching under the conduct of a guide that is an hundred to one will mislead them, than he that has not yet taken a step and is likelyer to be prevaild on to enquire after the right way. The last of the three sorts are in the worst condition of all. For if a man can be persuaded and fully assured of any thing for a truth without having examined, what is there that he may not embrace for truth? and if he has given himself up to believe a lie what means is there left to recover one who can be assured without examining? To the other two This I crave leave to say. That as he that is ignorant is in the best state of the two, so he should pursue truth in a method suitable to that state, i.e. by enquiring directly into the nature of the thing itself without minding the opinions of others or troubling himself with their questions or disputes about it but to see what he himself can sincerely searching after truth finde out. He that proceeds upon others
conduct, par. 68

principles in his enquiry into any sciences though he be resolved to examin them and judg of them freely, does yet at least put himself on that side and post himself in a party which he will not quit till he be beaten out. by which the minde is insensibly engaged to make what defence it can and soe is unawares biased. I doe not say but a man should embrace some opinion when he has examined, else he examines to noe purpose, But the surest and safest way is to have noe opinion at all till he has examined and that without any the least regard to the opinions or Systems of other men about it. For example were it my Business to understand physick would not the safer and readier way be to consult nature her self | and informe my self in the history of diseases and their cures than espouseing the principles of The Dogmatists, Methodists or Chymists engage in all the disputes concerning either of those systems and suppose it true till I have tried what they can say to beat me out of it. Or supposeing that Hippocrates or any other booke infallibly conteines the whole art of physick would not the direct way be to study read and consider that booke weigh and compare the parts of it to finde the truth rather than espouse the doctrines of any party who though they acknowledg his authority have already interpreted and wiredrawn all his text to their owne sense the tincture whereof when I have imbibed I am more in danger to misunderstand his true meaning than if I had come to him with a minde unprepossessed by doctors and commentators

1 principles in [any science] his way [till] is it. [Religion every mans business gives us.] For understand [Aristotles Philosophie aright, would it not be the natural and Genuin way to begin with reading what he himself writt] physick Chymists [exam(ine)] engage and [trye what] suppose it. [Esperi(ally)] Or infallibly (il) wire-/drawn when I have imbibed [and] I am | more (add. cont. on p. 177) therfore.

105 Locke here mentions three schools of medicine: the dogmatists were followers of Hippocrates (c. 460 BC—c. 377 BC); the Methodical School was possibly founded by Themison of Laodicea (fl. 1st century BC), who himself was a pupil of Asclepiades of Bithynia (124 BC—1st century BC); and the main inspirator of the chymists was Paracelsus (see above, par. 44, note 61. For more on dogmatists and methodists see Phillips, Greek Medicine, pp. 161-171; for chymists see Debus, The Chemical Philosophy, passim.
of my sect, whose reasonings interpretation and language which I have been used to will of course make all chime that way and make another and perhaps the genuine meaning of the author seem harsh straind and uncouth to me. For words having naturally none of their owne cary that signification to the hearer that he is used to put upon them what ever be the sense of him that uses them. This I thinke is visibly soe and if it be, he that begins to have any doubt of any of his tenets which he received without examination ought as much as he can to put himself wholly into this state of ignorance in reference to that question and throwing wholly by all his former notions and the opinions of others examin with a perfect indifferency the question in its source without an inclination to either side, or any regard to his or others unexamined opinions. This I thinke is noe easy thing to doe, But I am not enquiring the easy way to opinion but the right way to truth which they must follow who will deale fairly with their own understandings and their own soules.

 ($) The indifferency that I here propose will also enable them to state the Question right which they are in doubt about without which they can never come to a fair and clear decision of it.

 ($) Another fruit from this indifferency and the considering things in themselves abstract from our owne opinions and other mens notions and discourses on them will be that each man will pursue his thoughts in that method which will be most agreeable to the nature of the thing and to his apprehension of what it suggests to him. in which he ought to proceed with regularity and constancy untill he come to a well grounded resolution wherein he may acquiesce. If it

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1–6 my sect, [whose language [and] reasonings 'and interpretations' (il.) I having been used to will of course make that of the country appear to me more harsh straind and uncouth] ['or questions relating there unto' (il. cont. on p. 177)] 'whose reasonings ... uses them' (add. p. 177) 1 reasonings [language and] interpretation 1–2 'which' (il.) I have[ing] 5 signification [every one] 'to the hearer that he' (il.) 7 doubt [in] of 8 tenets [ought as in(uch)] which 12 side, [but that which to] or 13 others [opinions] unexamined 15 follow 15–16 their [un(derstandings)] own 17 propose [is that too that] will 'also' (il.) 20 indifferency [is the] and 20–21 considering [thin[ll][g]]gs things 22 that [we] each 23 that [sear(ch)] method

106 On the dependance of method on the kind of object under investigation, see Gen. Introd.: ‘Context’, §5.
be objected that this will require every man to be a scholar and to
quit all his other business and betake himself wholly to study. I
answer. I propose none more to any one than he has time for. Some
men's state and condition requires none great extent of knowledge.
The necessary provision for life swallows the greatest part of their
time. But one man's want of leisure is no excuse for the oscillancy
and ignorance of those who have time to spare. And every one has
enough to get as much knowledge as is required and expected of him,
and he that does not that is in love with ignorance and is accountable
for it:

Presumption

(71.) The variety of distempers in men's minds is as great as of
those in their bodies some are epidemic few scape them and every one
too if he would looke into himself would finde some defect of his par-
ticular Genius. There is scarce any one without some idiosyncrasy
that he suffers by. This man presumes upon his parts that they will
not faile him at time of need and soe thinks it superfluous labour
to make any provision before hand. His understanding is to him like
Fortunatus's purse¹⁰⁷ which is always to furnish him without ever
putting any thing into it before hand. And so he sits still satisfied,
without endeavouring to store his understanding with knowledge:
Tis the Spontaneous product of the country and what need of labour in
tillage? Such men may spread their native riches before the ignorant
But they were best not come to stress and trial with the skilful.
We are borne ignorant of everything. The superficies of things that
surround them make impressions on the negligent but no body
penetrates into the inside without labour attention and industry.
Stones and timber grow of themselves but yet there is noe uniforme
pile with symmetry and convenience to lodge in without toil and
pains. God has made the intellectual world harmonious and beau-
tiful without us but it will never come into our heads all at once.
We must bring it home piece meal and there set it up by our owne

¹ that (add. p. 179) 1 require ['th' (il) at 17 'is to him' (il) 18 Fortunatus's [p.] purse 18 which
'is' (il) 18 furnish(es) 20 to [furnish] 'store' (il) 22 tillage? ] Such
23 with the [kn.] skilfull 24–25 'that surround them' (il) 26–27 Industry
[Labo(ur)]. Stones 28 whith'out' (il) 31 home [peace] peice

¹⁰⁷ Fortunatus: a hero of mediaeval legend, derived from Eastern sources, who
possessed an inexhaustible purse or wishing-capability.
industry or else we shall have noe thing but darknesse and a Chaos within what ever order and light there be in things without us.

§39. On the other side there are others that depprese their owne mindes despond at the first difficulty and conclude that the getting an insight in any of the sciences or make(ing) any progresse in knowledg farther then serves their ordinary businesse is above their Capacities, These sit still because they thinke they have not legs to goe, as the others I last mentioned doe because they thinke they have winges to flie and can soare on high when they please. To these latter one may for answer apply the proverb Use legs and have legs. Noe body knows what strenght of parts he has till he has tried them. And of the understanding one may most truly say That its force is greater generaly than it thinks till it is put to it. viresque acquirit eundo.

§72. And therefor the proper remedie here is but to set the minde to worke and apply the thoughts vigorously to the businesse for it holds in the struggles of the minde as in those of warr dum putant se vincere vicere a perswasion that we shall overcome any di ffi cultys that we | meet with in the sciences seldom failes to carry us through them. Noe body knows the strength of his minde and the force of steady and regular application till he has tried. This is certain he that sets out upon weake legs, will not only goe farther but grow stronger too than one who with a vigerous constitution and firme limbs only sits still.

§73. Something of kin to this men may observe in them selves when the mind frights it self (as it often does) with any thing reflected on in grosse and transiently viewd confusedly and at a distance, Things thus offerd to the mind carry the shew of noe thing but 3 that [despond of their owne] depprese 4–5 the [lookeing into] `get|ing an insight in´ (add. cont. on p. 182) 5 in [knowledg] knowledg 14 [[[&]]A And therefor 15 businesse [for it holds] for 17 we [may w] [v] shall 22 and [athletic] `firme´ (il.) 24 may [often] observe 108 Virgil, Æneas, iv.175-176: ‘mobilitate viget vireseque acquirit eundo; / parva metu primo, mox sesse attollit in auras’, ‘Speed lends her strength, and she wins vigour as she goes; small at first through fear, soon she mounts up to heaven’, transl. H. Rushton Fairclough.

difficulty in them and are thought to be wrapd up in impenetrable obscurity, but the truth is these are noe thing but specters that the understanding raises to it self to flatter its own lazynesse, it sees noe thing distinctly in things remote and in an huddle and therefor concludes too faintly that there is noe thing more clear to be discoverd in them. Tis but to approach nearer and that mist of our own raiseing that inveloped them will remove and those that in that mist appeard hideous giants not to be grappled with will be found to be of the ordinary and naturall size and shape. Things that in a remote and confused view seem very obscure must be approached by gently and regular steps and what is most visible easy and obvious in them first considerd. reduce them into their distinct parts and then in their due order bring all that should be known concerning every one of those parts into plain and simple question and then what was thought obscure perplexed and too hard for our weak parts will lay itself open to the understanding in a fair view and let the minde into that which before it was awed with and kept at a distance from as wholly mysterious. I appeale to my readers experience whether this has never happend to him especially when busy on one thing he has occasionaly reflected on another. I aske him Whether he has never thus been scared with a suddain opinion of mighty difficulties which yet have vanished when he has seriously and methodicaly applied himself to the consideration of this seeming terrible subject and there has been noe other matter of astonishment left but that he amused himself with soe discourageing a prospect of his owne raiseing about a matter which in the handleing was found to have noe thing in it more strange nor intricate than several other things which he had long since and with ease masterd. This experience should teach us how to deale with such Bug bears an other time which should rather serve to excite our vigor than enervate our industry. The surest way for a learner in this as in all other cases is not to advance by

1 'to be' (il.) 6–7 raising [will disappear] 'that inveloped them will remove' (il.) 7–8 'in that mist' (il.) appeard 'in that mist' hideous' (il.) 9–12 shape. [Let them be taken into consideration by regular steps] 'Things that ... first considerd' (add. 187) 14–15 what [appeard] 'was thought' (il.) 15 and [mysterious] 'too hard for our weak parts' (il.) 17 'and kept at a distance from' (il.) 24 but [of wonder] that 25 soe [terrifying] discouargeing 26 handleing [had] was 29 with [the] 'such' (il.) 29 time [and] 'which should' (il.) 30 than [abate] enervate
jumps and large strides; let that which he sets himself to learn next be indeed the next i.e.: as nearly conjoynd with what he knows already as is possible; let it be distinct but not remote from it. Let it be new and what he did not know before, that the understanding may advance. but let it be as little at once as may be, that its advances may be clear and sure. All the ground that it gets this way it will hold. This distinct gradual growth in knowledg is firme and sure, it carys i(t)s own light with it in every step of its progression in an easy and orderly train than which there is noe thing of more use to the Understanding. And though this perhaps may seem a very slow and lingering way to knowledg yet I dare confidently affirm that whoever will trye it in himself or any one he will teach shall finde the advances greater in this method than they would in the same space of time (have) been in any other he could have taken. The greatest part of true knowledg lies in a distinct perception of things in them selves distinct. And some men give more clear light and knowledg by the bare distinct stateing of a question than others by talkeing of it in gross whole hours togethier. In this they who soe state a question doe noe more but seperate and disintangle the parts of it one from an other, and lay them when soe disintangled in their due order. This often without any more ado resolves the doubt and shews the minde where the truth lies. The agreement or disagreement of the Ideas in | question when they are once seperated and distinctly considerd is in many cases presently perceived and thereby clear and lasting knowledg gaind, where as things in gross taken up togethier and soe lyeing togethier in confusion can produce in the minde but a confused which in effect is noe knowledg or at least when it comes to be examined and made use of will prove little better than none; I therefor take the liberty to repeat here again what I have said else where\textsuperscript{110} That in learning any thing as little should be proposed before, [but let] that this [may] perhaps (also added in O-1765) 14–15 of a[ll] true 16 'clear' (il) 24 'thereby' (il) clear [knowledg] and 25–26 togethier [containing t] and

\textsuperscript{110} See pars. 58 and 62; see also Education, §180, p. 236: 'Give them first one simple Idea, and see that they take it right, and perfectly comprehend it before you go any farther, and then add some other simple Idea which lies next in your way to what you aim at, and so proceeding by gentle and insensible steps, Children without Confusion and Amazement, will have their Understanding opened, and their Thoughts extended farther, then could have been expected.'
at once to the mind as is possible and that being understood and fully mastered to proceed to the next adjoyning part yet unknown simple unperplexed proposition belonging to the matter in hand, and tending to the clearing what is principally designed.

Analogie

(75.) Analogie is of great use to the minde in many cases especialy in natural philosophy and that part of it chiefly which consists in happy and succesfull experiments. But here we must take care that we keep our selves within that wherein the analogie consists. For example The acid oyle of Vitriol is found to be good in such a case therefor the Spirit of Niter or Vinegar may be used in the like case. If the good effect of it be oweing wholy to the acidity of it the trial may be justified, but if there be some thing else besides the acidity in the oyle of vitriol which produces the good we desire in the case, we mistake that for analogie which is not, and suffer our understanding to be misguided by a wrong supposition of analogie where there is none.

Association

(76.) Though I have in the 2d book of My Essay concerning humane understanding treated of the Association of Ideas yet haveing donne it there historicaely as givin a view of the understanding in this as well as its several other ways of operatine rather than designeing there to enquire into the remedies ought to be applied to it. It will under this later consideration afford other matter of thought to those who have a minde to instruct them selves throughly in the right way of conducting their understandings and that the rather because this if I mistake not is as frequent a cause of mistake and error in us as perhaps | any thing else that can be named, and is a disease of the mind as hard to be cured as any. It being a very hard thing to convince any one that things are not soe, and natuarily soe as they constantly appear to him:

5 in [natural] many 6 philosophie 9 acid [spirit] oyle 11 `wholy´ (il.) 19 there [rather] historicaely 19 giving [an account of the way of operation] a view

111 Cf. Essay, IV.xvi.12: 665: ‘In things which Sense cannot discover, Analogie is the great Rule of Probability’ (header of section); ibid. IV.iii.29: 559-560; and ibid. IV.viii.30: 615.

(77.) By this one easy and unheeded miscarriage of the understanding sandie and loose foundations | become infallible principles and will not suffer them selves to be touchd or questiond. Such unnatural connections become by custom as natural to the minde, as sun and light, fire and warmth goe togeather and soe seem to carry with them as natural an evidence as self evident truths themselves. And where then shall one with hopes of success begin the cure? Many men firmly embrace falshood for truth not only because they never thought otherwise but also because thus blinded as they have been from the beginning they never could think otherwise, at least without a vigor of minde able to contest the empire of habit, and looke into its own principles, a freedom which few men have the notion of in them selves and fewer are allowed the practise of by others. It being the great art and businesse of the teachers and Guides in most sects to suppress as much as they can this fundamentall duty which every man owes him self and is the first steady step towards right and truth in the whole train of his actions and opinions. | This would give one reason to suspect that such teachers are conscious to them selves of the falshood or weaknesse of the Tenets they professe | since they will not suffer the grounds where on they are built to be examined, when as those who seek truth only and desire to own and

2 become infallible principles … Text from this point on p. 210 of MS c.1 onwards was copied by William Shaw (see ill. 3) and runs up to and including p. 216 (par. 79 of the present edition). This text has corrections in Locke’s hand. There is an earlier version of this text, entirely in Locke’s own hand, on pp. 52-56 of the same MS. At least part of Shaw’s copy is not directly from Locke’s text on pp. 52-56, but from yet another version that is now lost. The copy-text for pars. 77-79 is on pp. 52-56. However, the last sentence of par. 77 is absent in Locke’s holograph and has been taken from Shaw’s copy. Also, in the case of substantive differences (i.e. differences in wording), preference is in most cases given to Shaw’s copy over Locke’s holograph. Cases of substantive differences between Locke’s holograph and Shaw’s copy are registered in this annotation, below. See also Gen. Introd.: ‘Text’, §5. 2 become [princip.] infallible 4 become [as] by 4 natural ‘to’ (add.) ‘[...’ (il.)] the 5 ‘goe’ togeather’ (add. cont. on p. 53) 5 to [have] carry 7 cure Locke’s holograph; Shaw’s copy, p. 210, gives: cures 8 ‘firmly’ (il.) 11 to [to] contest 13 of by Shaw’s copy, p. 210; Locke’s holograph gives: of it by 14 art and [businesse] ‘bus[inesse of the teachers and Guides’ (add. cont. on p. 53) 15 most Shaw’s copy, p. 210; Locke’s holograph gives: all erroneous 15 ‘as much as they can this’ (il.) 15–16 duty [which every] which [is y’] every 16 ‘steady’ (il.) 229,17–230.6 This would … and allow (Shaw’s copy, fails in Locke’s holograph) 20 No catchword. 21 ‘examined’ (probably inserted in space that at first was left blank)
propagate noe thing else freely expose their principles to the test, are
pleased to have them examined, give men leave to reject them if they
can and if there be any thing weak and unsound in them are willing
to have it detected that they them selves as well as others may not lay
any stress upon any received proposition beyond what the evidence
of its truth will warrant and allow.

(78.) There is I know a great talke amongst | all sorts of people
of principleing their children and Schollers well, which at last when
lookd into amounts to noe more but makeing them imbibe their
teachers notions and tenets by an implicit faith, and firmly to adhere
to them whither true or false. What colours may be given to this or of
what use it may be when practised upon the vulgar destined to labour
and given up to the service of their bellys, I will not here enquire. But
as to the ingenuous part of man kinde whose condition allows them
leisure and letters and enquiry after truth, I can see noe other right
way of principleing them but to take heed as much as may be that in
their tender years Ideas that have noe natural cohesion come not to
be united in their heads and that this rule be often inculcated to them
to be their guide in the whole course of their lives and studys viz That
they never suffer any Ideas to be joynd in their understandings in
any other or stronger combination than what their own nature and
correspondence give them. And that they often examin those that
they finde linked togeather in their minds: whether this assoation
of Ideas be from the visible agreement that is in the Ideas them selves
or from the habitual and prevaileing custom of the minde joyning
them thus togeather in thinking:

(79.) This is for caution against this evil | before it be throughly
rivited by custom in the understanding, but he that would cure it
when habit has establishd it, must nicely observe the very quick and

1 else [truly] ‘freely’ (add. p. 213, in Locke’s hand) 3 ‘and’ (add. in Locke’s hand)
3 ‘unsound’ (add. in Locke’s hand) 4 dete’c’d (il. in Locke’s hand) 5 ‘stress’
(il. in Locke’s hand) 5–6 ‘received proposition | beyond … and allow’ (add.
cont. on p. 213, in Locke’s hand) 7 Th|is|ere ‘is’ (il.) 7 talke Locke’s holograph;
Shaw’s copy, p. 212, gives: faulte 9–10 their [notions] teachers 11 may be
given to this Shaw’s copy, p. 212; Locke’s holograph gives: this may bear 12 vulgar
[designed] destined 17 years [that] Ideas [are not unite(d)] that 20–21 in [a
stronger combi(nation)] any 24 from [owne(o)] the 24–25 in th|]le ‘Ideas
them selves’ (add. p. 55) Ideas them selves or from [their owne custom of joyning
them togeather in thinking] the 28 in the [minde] ‘understanding’ (il.)
almost imperceptible motions of the minde in its habitual actions.\textsuperscript{113} what I have said in an other place about the change of the Ideas of sense into those of judgment may be a proof of this.\textsuperscript{114} let any one not skild in painting be told when he sees bottles and tobaco pipes and other things soe painted, as they are in some places shown that he does not see protuberancys and you will not convince him but by the touch he will not beleive that by an instantaneous legerdemain of his own thoughts one Idea is substituted for the other. How frequent instances may one meet with of this in the arguings of the learned who not seldom, in two Ideas that they have been accustomed to joyn in their mindes, substitute one for the other and I am apt to think often without perceiving it them selves. This whilst they are under the deceit of it makes them uncapeable of conviction. And they applaud themselves as zealous Champions for truth when indeed they are contending for Error. And the confusion of two different Ideas which a customary connection of them in their mindes hath made to them almost one fills their heads with false views and their reasonings with false consequencies.

\textsuperscript{115} (§42) Right understanding consists in the discovery and adher-ence to truth and that in the perception of the visible or probable agreement or disagreement of Ideas as they are affirmed or denyd one of an other. From whence it is evident that the right use and conduct of the understanding whose business is puerly truth and noe thing else, is that the mind should be kept in a perfect indif-

\textsuperscript{113} For this mechanical explanation for the acquisition of habits and customs in general, see Gen. Introd.: 'Context', §3.

\textsuperscript{114} A reference to 'Molyneux's problem'; see Essay, II.ix.8-10: 'Ideas of Sensation often changed by the Judgment' (marginal heading).

\textsuperscript{115} For a comparison of Locke's discussion of fallacies with the same subject in Aristotelian works on logic, see Gen. Introd.: 'Context', §10.
ferency not inclineing to either side any farther than evidence setles it by knowldg or the overbalance of Probability gives it the turn of assent and beleif: But yet it is very hard to meet with any discourse where in one may not perceive the author not only maintain (for that is reasonable and fit) but inclined and biased to one side of the question with marks of a desire that that should be true. If it be asked me how Authors who have such a bias and lean to it may be discovered. I answer by observeing how in their writeings or argueings they are often lead by their inclinations to change the Ideas of the question either by changeing the termes or by addeing and joyning others to them, where by the Ideas under consideration are soe varied as to be more serviceable to their purpose and to be thereby brought to an easier and nearer agreement or more visible and remoter disagreement one with an other. This is plain and direct Sophistry. But I am far from thinking that wherever it is found, it is made | use of with designe to deceive and mislead the readers. It is visible that mens prejudices and inclinations by this way impose often upon them selves. And their affection for truth under their prepossession in favour of one side is the very thing that leads them from it. Inclination suggests and slides into their discourse favourable termes which introduce favourable Ideas till at last by this means that is concluded clear and evident thus dressed up which taken in its native state by makeing use of none but precise determind Ideas would find noe admittance at all. The puting those glosses on what they affirme, these as they are thought handsome easy and gracefull explications of what they are discourseing on is soe much the Character of what is called and esteemd writeing well that it is very hard to think that authors will ever be perswaded to leave what serves soe well to propagate their opinions and procure them selves credit in the world, for a more jejune and drie way of writeing by

1 evidence [or the greater probability determins] ‘settles’ (id.) 2–3 knowldg or [gains assent and beleif] ‘the greater probability’ (il.) ‘the | overbalance … beleif’ (add. cont. on p. 217) 3 to [read] meet 7–8 how [this shall be known] ‘Authors … discovered.’ (add. p. 217) 9 ‘are’ (il.) 10 question [[and][either] 14 other. [I ... am far from think(ing)] This 15–16 found, it ‘is’ (il) 16 to [mis(lead)] deceive 17 mens [prepossessions] ‘prejudices’ (add. p. 219) 18 their [zeale] ‘affection’ (il) 19 side [misleads] ‘is the very thing that leads’ (add. p. 219) 23 but [the] precise 24 Ideas [in question] would 25 ‘as they are thought’ (il) 25 ‘easy’ (il.) 29 ‘selves’ (il.)
keeping to the same terms precisely annexed to the same Ideas, a
sower and blunt stiffness tolerable in mathematicians only, who force their way and make truth prevail by irresistible demonstration:

(81.) But yet if Authors can not be prevailed with to quit the looser though more insinuating ways of writing if they will not think fit to keep close to truth and instruction by unvaried terms and plain unsophisticated arguments, yet it concerns readers not to be imposed on by fallacies and the prevailing ways of insinuation. To do this the surest and most effectual remedy: is to fix in the minde the clear and distinct Ideas of the question | stripped of words and soe likewise in the train of argumentation to take up the authors Ideas neglecting his words observing how they connect or separate those in the question. He that does this will be able to cast off all that is superfluous: He will see what is pertinent what coherent, what is direct to, what slides by the question. This will readily shew him all the forain Ideas in the discourse and where they were brought in, and though they perhaps dazled the writer yet he will perceive that they give no light nor strength to his reasonings.

(82.) This though it be the shortest and easiest way of reading books with profit and keeping ones self from being mislead by great names or plausible discourses, yet it being hard and tedious to those who have not accustomed them selves to it, it is not to be expected that every one (amongst those few who really pursue truth) should this way guard his understanding from being imposed on by the wilfull or at least undesigned Sophistrie which creeps into most of the books of argument. They that write against their conviction or that next to them are resolv’d to maintain the tenents of a party they are engaged in can not be supposed to reject any arms that may help to defend their cause and therefor such should be read with the greatest caution. And they who write for opinions they are sincerely
perswaded of, and believe to be true, think they may so far allow themselves to indulge their laudable affection to truth as to permit their esteem of it to give it the best colours and set it off with the best expressions and dress they can there by to gain it the easiest entrance in to the minds of their readers and fix it deepest there.

(83.) One of those being the state of mind we may justly suppose most writers to be in this fit their readers who apply to them for instruction should not lay by that caution which becomes a sincere pursuit of truth and should make them always watchful against what ever might conceal or misrepresent it. If they have not the skil of representing to them selves the authors sense by pure Ideas separted from sounds and thereby divested of the false lights and deceitfull ornaments of speech this yet they should doe, they should keep the precise question steadily in their minds carry it along with them through the whole discourse and suffer not the least alteration in the termes either by addition substraction or substituteing any other.

This every one can doe who has a mind to it. And he that has not a mind to it, tis plain makes his understanding only the warehouse of other mens lumber I mean false and unconcludeing reasonings rather than a repository of truth for his own use which will prove substantiall and stand him in stead when he has occasion for it. And whether such an one deals fairly by his own mind and conducts his own understanding right I leave to his own understanding to judge.

(84.) The mind of man being very narrow and soe slow in making acquaintance with things and taking in new truths that noe one man is capable in a much longer life than ours to know all truths, it becomes our prudence in our search after knowledge to employ our thoughts about fundamental and material questions carefully avoiding those that are trifleing and not suffering our selves to be diverted from our main even purpose by those that are merely

§ 43
incidental. How much of many yonge mens time is thrown away in purely logical enquirys I need not mention. This is noe better than if a man who was to be a painter should spend all his time in examining the threads of the several clothes he is to paint upon, and counting the hairs of each pencil and brush he intends to use in the laying on of his colours: Nay it is much worse than for a yonge painter to spend his apprenticeship in such useless niceties for he at the end of all his pains to noe purpose finds that it is not painting, nor any help to it, and soe is realy to noe purpose whereas men designed for scholars have often their heads soe fild and warmed with disputes on logical questions that they take those airy useless notions for real and substantial knowldg, and think their understanding soe well furnishd with science that they need not looke any farther into the nature of things, or descend to the mechanical drudgery of experiment and enquiry. This is soe obvious a mismanagement of the understanding and that in the professed way to knowldg that it could not be passed by, to which might be joynd abundance of questions and the way of handleing of them in the schools, what faults in particular of this kind every man is or may be guilty of would be infinite to enumerate. It suffices to have shewn that superficial and slight discoveries and observations that contein noe thing of moment in them selves, nor serve as clues to lead us into farther knowldg should be lightly passed by and never thought worth our searching after. There are fundamental truths that lie at the bottom as the bassis upon which a great many others rest and in which they have their consistency, these are teeming truths rich in store with which they furnish the mind, and like the lights of heaven are not only beautiful and enterteining in them selves, but give light and evidence to other things that without them could not be seen or known. Such is that admirable discovery of M’ Newton that all bodys gravitate to one an other which may be counted as the basis of natural philosophie, which of what use it is to the understanding of the great frame of our solar Systeme he has to the astonishment of the learned world shewn, and how much farther it would guid us in other things if
Conduct, pars. 84—85

rightly pursued is not yet known. Our Saviour's great rule that we should love our neighbour as our selves116 is such a fundamental truth for the regulating humane society that I think by that alone one might without difficulty determin all the cases and doubts in Social morality.117 These and such as these are the truths we should endeavour to finde out and stere our minds with, which leads me to an other thing in the conduct of the understanding that is noe lesse necessary viz

Bottoming

(85.) To accustom our selves in any question proposed to examin and find out upon what it bottoms. Most of the difficulties that come in our way when well considerd and traced lead us to some proposition which known to be true clears the doubt and gives an easy solution of the question, whilst topical and superficial arguments of which there is store to be found on both sides filling the head with varietie of thoughts and the mouth with copious discourse serve only to amuse the understanding and entertein company without commeing to the bottom of the question the only place of rest and stability for an inquisitive minde whose tendency is only to truth and knowledge. For example if it be demanded whether the grand Signior can lawfully take what he will from any of his people this question can not be resolved without commeing to a certainty whether all men are naturally equal for upon that it turns and that truth well

3 truth [in morality] for 3 regulating [all,] humane 10 out [.] upon 12 true [resolves] clears 22 are [born equal whether all are _____] naturally

116 Newton's Principia mathematica was published in 1687; the review of this work in the Bibliothèque universelle & historique, 8 (March 1688), pp. 436-450, was probably by Locke; see Axtell, 'Locke's Review of the Principia', passim and Rogers, 'Locke's Essay and Newton's Principia', p. 228, note 34.


118 Cf. Essay, IV.iv.7: 565: 'that moral Knowledge is as capable of real Certainty, as Mathematics. For Certainty being but the Perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement of our Idea; and Demonstration nothing but the Perception of such Agreement, by the Intervention of other Ideas, or Medium, our moral Ideas, as well as mathematical, being Archetypes themselves, and so adequate, and complete Ideas, all the Agreement, or Disagreement, which we shall find in them, will produce real Knowledge, as well as in mathematical Figures.' See also Gen. Introd.: 'Context', §5.

119 Cf. the second of the Two Treatises, §138, p. 360: 'The Supream Power cannot take from any Man any part of his Property without his own consent.'
settled in the understanding and caried in the minde through the
various debates concerning the various rights of men in societie will
go a great way in putting an end to them and shewing on which
side the truth is.

(§45) (86.) There is scarce any thing more for the improvement of
knowledg for the ease of life and the dispatch of business, than for a
man to be able to dispose of his own thoughts and there is scarce any
thing harder in the whole conduct of the understanding than to get
a full mastery over it. The mind in a waking man has always some
object that it applys it self to which when we are lazy or unconcerned
we can easily change and at pleasure transfer our thoughts to an
other and from thence to a third which has no relation to either
of the former. Hence men forwardly conclude and frequently say
noe thing is so free as thought and it were well it were so. But the
contrary will be found true in several instances, and there are many
cases wherein there is noe thing more resty and ungovernable than
our thoughts. They will not be directed what objects to pursue nor
be taken off from those they have once fixd on, but run away with a
man in pursuit of those Ideas they have in view let him doe what he
can.120

(87.) I will not here mention again what I have above taken
notice of how hard it is to get the mind narrowed by a custome
of 30 or 40 years standing to a scanty collection of obvious and
common Ideas to enlarg it self to a more copious stock, and grow
into an acquaintance with those that would afford more aboundant
matter of usefull contemplation tis not of this I am here speaking.
The inconveneience I would here represent and find a remedy for

1 in the [minde] understanding 2 'men' (il. in diff. ink) 9 it. [il.] The
15 contrary [is] will 15 in [...] several 25 more [copous] 'aboundant' (il.)
26 contemplation 26–27 sp[e'][']aking. (il.) [That which] The 27 I [am
here] would

120 Cf. Essay, II.xxi.12: 239: 'As it is in the motions of the Body, so it is in the
Thoughts of our Minds; where any one is such, that we have power to take
it up, or lay it by, according to the preference of the Mind, there we are at
liberty. (...) But yet some Idea to the Mind, like some Motions to the Body,
are such, as in certain circumstances it cannot avoid, nor obtain their absence
by the utmost effort it can use'; and Education, §75, p. 136 on the importance
of the mind getting 'an habitual Dominion over it self'.

121 See par. 8.
is the difficulty there is sometimes to transfer our minds from one
subject to an other in cases where the Ideas are equaly familiar to us

(88.) Matters that are recommended to our thoughts by any of
our passions take possession of our minds with a kind of authority
and will not be kept out or dislodged, but as if the passion that rules
were for the time the Sherif of the place and came with all the posse,
the understanding is ceised and taken with the object it introduces as
if it had a legal right to be alone considerd there.\textsuperscript{122} There is scarce any
body I think of so calm a temper who hath not sometime found this
tyran on his understanding, and sufferd under the inconvenience
of it. who is there almost whose mind at some time or other Love,
or Anger Fear or Greif has not soe fastend to some clog that it could
not turn if self to any other object: I call it a clog for it hangs upon
the minde so as to hinder its vigor and | activity in the pursue
of other contemplations, and advances it self little or not at all in
the knowledg of the thing which it so closely huggs and constantly
pores on: Men thus possessed are sometimes as if they were so in the
worst sense, and lay under the power of an inchantment. They see
not what passess before their eyes; hear not the audible discourse of
the company; And when by any strong application to them they are
roused a little they are like men brought to themselves from some
remote region whereas in truth they come noe farther than their
secret cabinet within where they have been wholly taken up with the
puppet which is for that time appointed for their enterteinment.
The shame that such dumps cause to wellbred people when it carries
them away from the company where they should bear a part in
the conversation is a sufficient argument that it is a fault in the
conduct of our understanding not to have that power over it as
to make use of it to those puposes and on those occasions where
in we have need of its assistance. The mind should be always free
4 possession[s] 5 if [any] the 9–10 this [inconvenience] tyrann 11 almost
[that] `whose mind’ (\textit{add. p. 233}) 11 other [the] Love, 12 Anger [or] Fear
13 to [any] any 13 object: [..] 1 13 for it [only] hangs 14 minde [’so’ as
as to’ (\textit{add. cont. on p. 233})] [hinder its pursue of other things fit to be consider] so
as 15 advances [but] it 17 are [some times] [are so] sometimes 20 ‘when’
(il) 22 ‘than’ (il) 25 when [they] it

\textsuperscript{122} \textit{Cf. Essay, II.xxii.12:} 239-240: ‘sometimes a boisterous Passion hurries our
Thoughts, as a Hurricane does our Bodies, without leaving us the liberty of
thinking on other things, which we would rather chuse’.
and ready to turn it self to the variety of objects that occur and allow them as much consideration as shall for that time be thought fit. To be ingrossed so by one object as not to be prevailed on to leave it for an other that we judge fitter for our contemplation is to make it of noe use to us. Did this state of mind remain always so | every one would without scruple give it the name of perfect madness. And while it does last at what ever intervals it returns such a rotation of thoughts about the same object no more carries us forwards to wards the attainment of knowledg, than getting upon a milhorse whilst he jogs on in his circular tract would carry a man a journey.

(89.) I grant some thing must be allowed to legitimate passions and to natural inclinations. Every man besides occasional affections has beloved studys and those the mind will more closely stick to. But yet it is best that it should be always at liberty and under the free disposal of the man to act how and upon what he directs: This we should endeavour to obtain unless we would be content with such a flaw in our understandings, that some times we should be as it were without it for it is very little better than so in cases where we cannot make use of it to those purposes we would and which stand in present need of it.

(90.) But before fit remedies can be thought on for this disease we must know the several causes of it and thereby regulate the cure if we will hope to labour with success.

(91.) One we have already instanced in where of all men that reflect have so general a knowledg and so often an experience in themselves that noe body doubts of it. A prevaileing passion so pins down our thoughts to the object and concerne of it | That a man passionately in love can not bring himself to think of his ordinary affairs, nor a kind mother drooping under the loss of a child is not able to bear a part as she was wont in the discourse of the company or conversation of her friends.

3 'so' (add.) 5 Did [it] 'this state of mind' (id.) 8 thoughts [upon] about 8 more [goes] 'carries us' (id.) 12 occasional [passions] affections 15 directs-Th[e]is[e] 19 purposes [it] we 25 general a [a] 29 'is' (id.) 30 bear [and] 'a' (id.) 35 End of par. indicated by vertical stroke.

123 For the topic of madness and foolishness in Locke’s analysis of error see Gen. Introd.: ‘Context’, §6.
124 See par. 40.
(92.) But though passion be the most obvious and general yet it
is not the onely cause that binds up the understanding and confines
it for the time to one object from which it will not be taken off.
Besides this we may often find that the understanding when it has
a while imploid it self upon a subject which either chance or some
slight accident offerd to it without the interest or recommendation
of any passion, workes it self into a warmth and by degrees gets into
a career wherein like a bowle down at hill it increases its motion by
going and will not be stopd or diverted, though when the heat is
over it sees all this earneste application was about a trifle not worth
a thought and all the pains imploid about it lost labour.

(93.) There is a third sort if I mistake not yet lower than this. Tis
a sort of Childishness if I may soe say of the understanding where in
dureing the fit it plays with and dandles some insignificant puppet
to noe end nor with any designe at all, and yet cannot easily be

240 got off from it. Thus some trivial sentence or a scrap of poetry will
sometimes | get into mens heads and make such a chimeing there
that there is no stilling of it, no peace to be obteind nor attention
to any thing else, but this impertinent guest will take up the mind
and possess the thoughts in spight of all endeavours to get rid of it.
Whether every one hath experimented in them selves this trouble
some intrusion of some frisking Ideas which thus importune the
understanding and hinder it from being better imploid I know not.
But persons of very good parts and those more than one I have heard
speake and complain of it in them selves. The reason I have to make
this doubt is from what I have known in a case some thing of kin to
this though much odder, and that is of a sort of visions that some
people have lieing quiet but perfectly awake in the darke or with
their eyes shut, It is a great variety of faces most commonly very odde
ones that appear to them in train one after an other so that haveing
had just the sight of one it immediately passes away to give place to
an other that the same instant succeeds and has as quick an exit as its
leader and soe they march on in a constant succession nor can any one
of them by any endeavour be stopd or retaind beyond the instant of its appearance but is thrust out by its follower which will have its turne. Concerning this phantas(tical) phenomenon I have talked with several people where of some have been perfectly acquainted with it and others have been soe wholly strangers to it; that they could hardly be brought to conceive or beleive it. I knew a Lady of excellent parts who had got past thirty without haveing ever had the least notice of any such thing. She was so great a stranger to it that when she heard me and an other talkeing of it could scarce forbear thinking we bantered her. But some time after drinking a large dose of dilute Tea (as she was orderd by a physitian) going to bed she told us at next meeting that she had now experimented what our discourse had much a doe to perswade her of. she had seen a great variety of faces in a long train succeeding one an other as we had discribed. they were all strangers and intruders, such as she had noe acquaintance with before nor sought after then and as they came of them selves they went too, none of them staid a moment nor could be detein(ed) by all the endeavours she could use, but went on in their solemn procession just appeard and then vanished. This odd phenomenon seems to have a mechanical cause and to depend upon the matter and motion of the bloud or animal spirits.

(94.) When the Phansy is bound by passion I know noe way to set the mind free and at liberty to prosecute what thoughts the man would make choise of but to allay the present passion or counter-ballance it with an other which is an art to be got by Study and acquaintance with the passions.

(95.) Those who find them selves apt to be carried away with the spontaneous current of their own thoughts not excited by any passion or interest must be very wary and carefull in all the instances of it

1 ‘of them´ (il.) 2 but [makes] is 3 turne [Those] Concerning 6 could [scarce] ‘hardly’ (il.) 7 had [been married the better part of twenty years] got 8 was [a] ‘so’ (il.) great ‘a’ (il.) 12 what [we] our 13 seen [an in] a 15 all [intruders] strangers 20 to [be from] have 23 and [set it] at 24 but ‘to’ (il.) allay[ing] 24–25 counterballance[ing] 29 interest [hast] must

125 T. Forster, Original Letters of John Locke, p. lxxv, thinks this paragraph may be autobiographical and adds: ‘It is probable that most literary men, and persons of sedentary and studious habits, are subject to these phantoms.’ On ‘animal spirits’ cf. above, par. 79, note 113.
to stop it and never humer their minds in being thus triflingly busy. Men know the value of their corporal liberty and therefore suffer not willingly fetters and chains to be put upon them. To have the mind captivated is for the time certainly the greater evil of the two, and deserves our utmost care and endeavours to preserve the freedom of our better part. And in this case our pains will not be lost. Striving and struggling will prevail if we constantly in all such occasions make use of it. We must never indulge these trivial attentions of thought. As soon as we find the mind makes it self a business of noe thing, we should immediately disturb and check it, introduce new and more serious considerations and not leave till we have beaten it off from the pursuit it was upon. This at first, if we have let the contrary practise grow to an habit, will perhaps be difficult, But constant endeavours will by degrees prevail and at last make it easy. And when a man is pretty well advanced and can command his mind off at pleasure from incidental and undesigned pursuits it may not be amiss for him to goe on farther and make attempts upon meditations of greater moment, that at the last he may have a full power over his own mind and be soe fully master of his own thoughts as to be able to transfer them from one subject to an other with the same ease that he can lay by any thing he has in his hand and take some thing else that he has a mind to in the room of it. This liberty of mind is of great use both in business and study and he that has got it will have noe small advantage of ease and dispatch in all that is the chosen and usefull imployment of his understanding.

(96.) The 3d and last way which I mentiond the mind to be sometimes taken up with I mean the chimeing of some particular words or sentence in the memory and as it were makeing a noise in the head and the like seldom happens but when the mind is lazy or very loosly and negligently imploid. It were better indeed be without such impertinent and useless repetitions, any obvious Idea when it is roveing causlesly at a venture being of more use and apter to suggest something worth consideration, than the insignificant buz of purely empty sounds. But since the rouseing of the mind and setting the

1 and [g., the ...] never 3 then[.,], [[t]]'To 6 part, [to] And 7 'such' (il.) 8 thought[s]- 13–14 endeavours will [at] by 24 all [that] that 24–25 chosen [business] 'and usefull imployment' (il.) 29 'and the like' (il.) 31 useless [repetitions] repetitions 31 Idea[s] 32 roveing [at a v(enterprise)] causlesly
understanding on work with some degrees of vigor does for the
most part presently set it free from these idle companions, it may
not be amiss when ever we find our selves troubled with them to
make use of soe profitable a remedie that is always at hand:

(97.) Custome haveing that influence upon our senses as to make
that which at first was indifferent or perhaps even nauntious to become
in time pleasant and agreeable as we see in the Raguois, parfumes and
Musick of several nations: The palates of men are soe differently set
by the diet and cookery they have been used to, that they eat that
with delight and gusto which one not accustomed to can hardly bring
him self to tast and would sooner fast than make a meale of.126 By
the same dominion of Custome actions that were at first very hard
and uneasy to us become

1 with [any sort] `so|me degrees' (add. cont. on p. 247) 1 `does' (il.) 9 and
[c90k] cookery 10 accustomed 10 13 MS e.t ends here.

126 Cf. Essay, 'Epistle to the Reader', p. 8: 'We have our Understandings no less
different than our Palates; and he that thinks the same Truth shall be equally
relished by every one in the same dress, may as well hope to feast every one with the
same sort of Cookery...' and Locke in letter to W. Molyneux, 10 January 1698,
Corr. 2376, VI, pp. 294-295: 'If I could think that discourses and arguments
to the understanding were like the several sorts of cates to different palates
and stomachs, some nauseous and destructive to one, which are pleasant and
restorative to another; I should no more think of books and study, and should
think my time better imploy'd at push-pin than in reading or writing. But I
am convinced of the contrary …'
Besides the want of determined Ideas and of Sagacity and 
exercise in finding out and laying in intermediate Ideas\textsuperscript{127} There are 
three miscarriages that men are guilty of in reference to their Reason, 
whereby this faculty is hindered in them from that service it might 
doe and was designed for: And he that reflects upon the Actions and 
discourses of mankind will finde their defects in this kind very 
frequent and very observable.

1\textsuperscript{(o)} The first is of those who seldom reason at all but doe and thinke 
according to the example of others whether parents neighbours min-
ister or who else they are pleased to make choice of to have an 
implicit faith in for the saveing of them selves the pains and trouble 
of thinkeing and examining for themselves.

2\textsuperscript{°} The second is of those who put passion in the place of reason 
and being resolvd that shall governe their actions and arguments 
neither use their owne nor hearken to other peoples reason any 
farther then it suits their humer interest or party, and these one may 
oberse commonly content them selves with words which have noe 
distinct Ideas to them though in other matters that they come with 
an unbiassed indi
ff
erency to, they want not abilities to talke and hear

\textsuperscript{127} Cf. Essay, IV.ii.3: 532: 'A quickness in the Mind to find out these intermediate 
Ideas, (that shall discover the Agreement or Disagreement of any other,) and 
to apply them right, is, I suppose, that which is called Sagacity' and ibid. 
IV.xvii.2: 668-669.
reason where they have no secret inclination that hinders them from being untractable to it.

3° The third sort is of those who readily and sincerely follow reason but for want of having that which one may call *large sound round about sense* have not a full view of all that relates to the question and may be of moment to decide it. We are all short sighted and very often see but one side of a matter. Our views are not extended to all that has a connection with it. From this defect I think no man is free. We see but in part and we know but in part and therefore this wonder we conclude not right from our partial views. This might instruct the proudest esteeemer of his own parts how useful it is to talk and consult with others even such as came short of him in capacity quicknesse and penetration for since no one sees all and we generally have different prospects of the same thing according to our different as I may say positions to it tis not incongruous to think nor beneath any man to trie whether another may not have notions of things which have escaped him and which his reason would make use of if they came into his minde. The faculty of Reasoning seldom or never deceives those who trust to it. Its consequences from what it builds on are evident and certain but that, which it oftenest if not only misleads us in, is that the principles from which we conclude the grounds upon which we bottom our reasoning are but a part some thing is left out which should go into the reckoning to make it just and exact. Here we may imagine a vast and almost infinite advantage that angels and separate spirits may have over us. Who in their several degrees of elevation above us may be indowed with more comprehensive faculties and some of them perhaps have perfect and exact views of all finite beings that come under their consideration (and) can as it were in the twinkling of an eye collect together all their scattered and almost boundless relations. A

4 May [cl.] call 10 from [p(artial)] our 14 generally [take d(ifferent)] have 15 'as I may say' [il.] 16 man 'to' [il.] 24 imagin [and] a 25 angels and [separate] [several degrees of] separate 27 with [larger] more

128 Cf. I Cor. 13:12: 'For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known.'

129 *Cf. Essay, II.x.9:* 154 on the amazing memory of Pascal: 'For this of Mr. Pascal was still with the narrowness, that humane Minds are confin'd to here, of having great variety of Ideas only by succession, not all at once; Whereas
minde soe furnishd what reason has it to acquiesce in the certainty of its conclusions? In this | we may see the reason why some men of study and thought that reason right and are lovers of truth doe make noe great advances in their discoverys of it, Error and truth are uncertainly blended in their minds; their decisions are lame and defective; and they are very often mistaken in their judgments. The reason where of is. They converse but with one sort of men they read but one sort of books. They will not come in the hearing but of one sort of notions. The truth is They canton out to them selves a little Goshen in the intellectual world where light shines and as they conclude day blesses them but the rest of that vast expansum they give up to night and darkness and so avoid coming near it. They have a pretty trafick with known correspondents in some little creek within that they confine themselves and are dexterous managers enough of the wares and products of that Corner with which they content themselves but will not venture out into the great Ocean of knowledge to survey the riches that nature hath stored other parts with noe less genuine, noe less solid, no less usefull than what has fallen to their lot in the admired plenty and sufficiency of their own little spot which to them contains whatsoever is good in the universe. Those who live thus mued up within their owne contracted terretorys and will not looke abroad beyond the boundarys that chance conceit or lazyness has set to their enquirys but live separate from the notions discourses and attainments of the rest of mankind may not amiss be represented by the Inhabitants of the Marian Islands which

247.2–250.20 'In this | we may ... understandings.' (add. cont. on p. 248; this add. is continued by the next par.) 2 'some' (il.) 4 advances [of] in 8–9 'They will not come | in ... The truth is' (sl. cont. on p. 249) 14 creek [..... excel] within 19 their [contracted Systeme] own 23 their [notions ..] 'enquirys' (add. cont. on p. 251) 23–24 notions [..nimg(nings)] discourses

the several degrees of Angels may probably have larger views, and some of them be endowed with capacities able to retain together, and constantly set before them, as in one Picture, all their past knowledge at once; see also ibid. IV.xvii.14: 683.

130 Gen. 47: 27: 'And Israel dwelt in the land of Egypt, in the country of Goshen; and they had possessions therein, and grew, and multiplied exceedingly.'

131 Archipelago in the Pacific Ocean, 2,400 km east of the Philippines, discovered in 1521 by Ferdinand Magellan, named initially 'Ladrones Islands', but not colonized until 1668 by Jesuit missionaries, who changed its name to honour Mariana of Austria, then regent of Spain.
being separate by a large tract of sea from all communion with the
habitable parts of the earth thought themselves the onely people
of the world and though the straitness of the conveniencys of life
amongst them had never reachd so far as to the use of fire till the
Spaniards not many years since in their voyages from Acapulco to
Manilia brought it amongst them, yet in the want and ignorance of
almost all things they looked upon themselves even after that the
Spaniards had brought amongst them the notice of variety of nations
abounding in sciences arts and conveniencys of life of which they
knew no thing they looked upon themselves | I say as the happyest
and wisest people of the universe. But for all that noe body I think
will imagin them deep naturalists or Solid metaphysitians' noe body
will deem the quickest sighted amongst them to have very enlarged
views in Ethicks or politiques' Nor can any one allow the most
capable amongst them to be advanced so far in his understanding
as to have any other knowledg but of the few little things of his
and the neigbouring Islands with in his commerce but far enough
from that comprehensive enlargement of mind which adorns a soule
devoted to truth assisted with letters and a free consideration of the
several views and sentiments of thinking men of all sides. Let not
men therefore that would have a sight of what every one pretends
to be desireous to have a sight of truth in its full extent narrow and
blind their own prospect. Let not men think there is noe truth but in
the Sciences that they study or the books that they read. To prejudg
other mens notions before we have looked into them is not to shew
their darkness but to put out our own eys. 

Trie all things hold fast that which is good: is a divine rule coming from the father of light and
truth, and tis hard to know what other way men can come at truth to
lay hold of it if they doe not dig and search for it as for gold and hid

1 separate [Fr(som)] by 3 of [this earl] [w/orld] the world 8 them the
[news] 'notice' (il) 8 of [other] nations 9 life o[r][f] 15 advanced [I]so
[any competent] far 17 'in' (il) 18 enla' gement (il) 18 which [becomes]
'adorns' (il) 19–20 truth [which he makes it his business sincerely ['sincerely'
(il)]) in love with it and [sincerely] diligently seeking after it 'assisted with ... all
sides' (add. p. 233) 22 'truth in its full extent' (il) 29 'dig and' (il) 29 for
it (t.io) 28

132 I Thess. 5: 21: 'Prove all things; hold fast that which is good.'
treasure, but he that does so must turn much earth and rubish before he gets the pure mettle. Sand and pebbles and dross usually lye blended with it, but the gold is never the less gold and will enrich the man that imploys his pains to seek and separate it. Neither is there any danger he should be deceived by the mixture. Every man carys about him a touch stone if he will make use of it, to distinguish substantial gold from superficial glitterings; truth from appearances. And indeed the use and benefit of this touch stone which is natural reason is spoiled and lost onely, by assumed prejudices overweening presumption and narrowing our minds. The want of exerciseing it in the full extent of things intelligible is that which weakens and extinguishes this noble faculty in us. Trace it and see whether it be not soe. The day labourer in a country village has commonly but a small pittance of knowledge because his Ideas and notions have been confined to the narrow bounds of a poor conversation and imployment. The low mechanique of a country town does some what out doe him. Porters and coblers of great Cittys surpass them. A country Gent who leaveing Latin and learning in the university removes thence to his mansion house and associates with neighbours of the same strain who relish no thing but hunting and a bottle, with these alone he spends his time, with these alone he converses and can away with no company whose discourse goes beyond what claret and dissoluteness inspires. Such a patriot formed in this happy way of improvement cannot fail as we see to give notable decisions upon the bench at quarter sessions, and emine(n)t proofs of his skil in politiques, when the strength of his purse and party have advanced him to a more conspicuous station to such a one truly an ordinary Coffee house gleaner of the Citty is an arrant States man and as much

1 must [remove turn 2 and (catchword, not repeated on p. 254) 3 lye [mixed] blended (id) 6 it, [the right] to distinguish 13 in [the] 'a' (id) country ['village usually' (il. no care)] [has] 'village has | commonly' (il. cont. on p. 255) 14 knowledge [for] because 19–24 removes [to the Societys whose business is hunting and a bottle, and can away with noe company whose discourse goes beyond what Clareet and intemperance inspire ['such an one' (il)] gives.] 'thence to his | mansion house … to give' (il. cont. on p. 255) 21 alone [they] he spends [their] 'his' (id) 22 goes [beyon(d)] beyond 27 such 2[n] | one 249.28–250.1 much [exceeds] 'superior too' (il)

133 Cf. Prov. 2: 3–5.
superior too as a man conversant about Whitehall\textsuperscript{134} and the Court is to an ordinary shop keeper\textsuperscript{135} To carry this a little farther Here is one muffled up in the zeale and infallibility of his own sect and will not touch a booke or enter debate with a person that will question any of those things which to him are Sacred Another surveys our differences in religion with an equitable and fair indifferency and so finds probably that none of them are in every thing unexceptionable, These divisions and systemes were made by men and carry the marke of fallible on them and in those whom he differs from and till he open his eyes had a general prejudice against he meets with more to be said for a great many things than before he was aware of or could have imagined. Which of these two now is most likely to judg right in our religious controversies and to be most stored with truth the marke all pretend to aime at? All these men that I have instanced in thus unequally furnishd with truth and advanced in knowldg I suppose of equal natural parts all the oddes between them has been the different Scope that has been given to their understandings to range in, for the gathering up of information and furnishing their heads with Ideas notions and observations wheron to imploy their minds and forme their understandings.

(99.) It will possibly be objected. Who is sufficient for all this? I answer more than can be imagined. Every one knows what his proper business is and what according to the Character he makes of him self the world may justly expect of him, and to answer that he will find he will have time and opertunity enough to furnish him self if he will not deprive him self by a narrowness of Spirit, of those helps that are at hand. I doe not say to be a good Geographer that a man should visit every mountain river promontory and creeke upon the face of the Earth view the buildings and survey the land every where as if he

\textsuperscript{134} ‘Whitehall’: street in Westminster, London, seat of principal government offices and, in Locke’s time, of the English court.

were going to make a purchase. But yet every one must allow that he shall know a country better that makes often salleys into it and traverses it up and down, than he that like a mill horse goes still round in the same tract or keeps within the narrow bounds of a feild or two that delight him. He that will enquire out the best books in every science and informe himself of the most material authers of the several sects in Philosophie and religion will not find it an infinite worke to acquaint himself with the sentiments of mankind concerning the most weighty and comprehensive subjects. Let him exercise the freedom of his reason and understanding in such a latitude as this and his mind will be strengthened, his capacity inlarged his facultys improved. And the light which the remote and scatterd parts of truth will give to one another will so assist his judgment that he will seldom be widely out or miss giving proof of a clear head and a comprehensive knowledg. At least this is the onely way I know to give the understanding its due improvement to the full extent of its capacity, and to distinguish the two most different things I know in the world a logical chicanner from a man of reason. Onely he that would thus give the mind its flight, and send abroad his enquirys into all parts after truth must be sure to setle in his head determined Ideas of all that he imploys his thoughts about, and never fail to judg himself and judg unbiassedly of all that he receives from others either in their writeings or discourses. Reverence or prejudice must not be sufferd to give beauty or deformity to any of their opinions.
APPENDIX

The following parts of MS e.1 clearly pertain to the Conduct although they do not strictly belong to the text itself. Deleted entries are given between [ ].

C

Page i starts with the last entries of a list to the contents of MS e.1, every entry on a new line. The preceding leaf is now lost (see Gen. Introd.: ‘Text’, §1[1]). All entries, except the last, are followed by numbers. These numbers correspond with the pages of MS e.1.

Analogie 203
Fallacies 222
Fundamental questions 222
Bottoming 228

Transplanting 230
Reasoning right in narrow and in large views 248

Custome

D

Instructions concerning the Conduct, entered at the middle of p. i.

Mem: That these following discourses are to be writ out under their several heads into distinct Chapters, and then to be numberd and ranged according to their natural order

5 Bottoming [1]128
E

E-I were all entered on p. 1 of MS e.1 (see ill. 1). They are given here as separate items because they may have been entered at different times and because their mutual connexion is tenuous. The one word forming E may have been intended as header.

Misconduct

F

A partially deleted list with subjects that Locke was going to address in the Conduct.

[Jading the minde by things too difficult, or deposeing it by a confinement to things too easy, or stoping at the first difficulty or lazily siting still]¹³⁶

Hunting after similes¹³⁷

[Makeing too much haste with conclusion and not goeing by gradual steps]¹³⁸

[Learning of arguments]¹³⁹

[Allowing too much to first impressions]¹⁴⁰

[some take all some reject all popular opinions]¹⁴¹

[some wholly assert novelty others antiquitie]¹⁴²

G

G-I also contain subjects that Locke was going to address in the Conduct.

Thinking of things transciently and in gros we fright our selves with supposed difficulties which vanish where we come to examine things by their distinct parts¹⁴³

¹¹ wholly assert

¹³⁶ See par. 62.
¹³⁷ See par. 66.
¹³⁸ See pars. 43 and 59.
¹³⁹ See par. 42.
¹⁴⁰ See par. 60.
¹⁴¹ See par. 50.
¹⁴² See par. 49.
¹⁴³ See par. 74.
To read books for arguments: The right way to knowledge and improvement is to settle determin’d Ideas in our minds and then to observe and finde out their relations and habitudes in the knowldg of self evident propositions: all men that are rational creatures are equall, the difference of men in their parts is a sagacity to finde out the intermediate Ideas that shew the agreement or disagreement of others. And the difference of men in knowldg is the actualy having discovered the agreement or disagreement of more Ideas.\[144\]

The mind often frights it self with things seen in grosse in confusion and at a distance and soe forbears application which coming to be viewd nearer and by parts would be as easy as other things that are masterd.\[145\]

Page 81, the first page of a new quire, contains a deleted list similar to F. [Variety of Ideas and those abstract especially]\[146\]
Freedom of minde for truth\[147\]
Examin our own principles: which we demand of others\[148\]
Observations too soon or too seldom made\[149\]
Stoping at difficulties\[150\]
Concludeing too soon\[151\]
Running to similies\[152\]
To sit still lazy is noe conduct at al\[153\]}

\[144\] See pars. 42 and 98.
\[145\] See par. 74.
\[146\] See pars. 30 and 65.
\[147\] See pars. 36, 37, 44, 49, 68, 77 and 99.
\[148\] See pars. 11, 13, 15, 31, 35, 36, 45 and 47.
\[149\] See pars. 39, 39, 60 and 61.
\[150\] See par. 62.
\[151\] See pars. 43, 58 and 59.
\[152\] See par. 66.
\[153\] See pars. 43, 44, 45 and 62.
COLLATION OF MS LOCKE E.1
WITH MS LOCKE C.28

Each entry starts with two numbers, followed by one or more words, followed by the lemma-symbol ‘›’, followed again by one or more words. The numbers refer to the page number and line number in the present edition. The word(s) to the left of the lemma-symbol form the version as it is presented in the present edition, based on MS e.1, while the entry to the right of this symbol gives the variant as given by MS c.28.

Collation of MS e.1, pp. 62, 114-116, 62-64 (pars. 1-5) with MS c.28, fols. 121r-123r

p. 155, l. 1: Dialectica] Dialectica
p. 156, l. 14: hinder] hinders
p. 156, l. 14: keep] keeps
p. 156, l. 15: Addition in Locke's hand in MS c.28 fol. 123r, not in MS e.1: Some of them I shall take notice of, and endeavour to point out proper remedies for in the following Chapters. (see Gen. Introd.: 'Text', §1 [20] (3))

Collation of MS e.1, pp. 80-96 (par. 17, second half, and pars. 18-29) with MS c.28, fols. 131r-137r

p. 164, l. 14: ease, let him … start of collation
p. 164, l. 22: the time] time
p. 164, l. 24: for though] in MS c.28 a space is left open at this place (see above, Gen. Introd.: Text, §1, [20] (3))

p. 165, l. 19: year] years
p. 166, l. 1: compasse his] compasse he
p. 166, l. 7-8: and therefor they] they
p. 166, l. 10: your] their
p. 167, l. 15: he himself that] that
p. 167, l. 16: connection] connection himself
p. 167, l. 17: MS c.28 continues with a deleted sentence: [I have mentiond mathematicks as a way to setle in the minde an habit of reasoning closely and in train, not that I thinke it necessary that all men should be deep Mathematicians.] (this sentence is repeated at the start of the next par., which is also the place where it can be found in MS e.1)

p. 167, l. 25: and dependence] [of] dependence
p. 170, l. 18: is what is] is
p. 170, l. 24: be in a] be a
p. 170, l. 30: by an] by
p. 171, l. 3: fortunes and time is] fortunes are
p. 172, l. 1: things that] that
p. 172, l. 6: are] be
p. 173, l. 2: in that of] of that in

Collation of MS e.1, pp. 56-62, 248-260 (pars. 98 and 99) with MS c.28, fols. 125 r-130r

p. 246, l. 12: talk and] talke or
p. 246, l. 24: we] one
p. 247, l. 11: expansum] expansion (Locke’s hand)
p. 251, l. 15: way] may
BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. EDITIONS OF THE CONDUCT

This section contains separate editions of the Conduct (C),\(^1\) editions of the Conduct together with the Essay (E), of the Conduct with other works, either by Locke or by other authors (O), of the Conduct in editions of Locke's works (W), of abridgements, abstracts or selections from the Conduct (AS), and of translations that consist of or comprise the Conduct (Tr). Each entry is given an identification code consisting of the abbreviation for the category to which it belongs, followed by the year in which it appeared; for instance 'C-1754' means: a separate edition of the Conduct that appeared in 1754. No claim to completeness is made. Information was extracted primarily from Jean Yolton's monumental John Locke. A Descriptive Bibliography (largely confined to titles that appeared before 1801) and from John C. Attig's The Works of John Locke (for titles not covered by Yolton). Reference to entries in these bibliographies is by 'Yolton' or 'Attig', followed by the number given by these authors to the relevant title. Attig does not always specify the exact relation between a given title and a previous title from which it is somehow derived, in which case it is not clear whether he is referring to a new edition, a reprint or a reissue. In these cases the new edition/reprint/reissue is given a note with a noncommittal 'As', followed by the earlier edition/reprint/reissue from which it is derived. For instance, the existence of a relation between C-1833 and C-1832 is established by a note to C-1833, saying 'As C-1832'. Copies that I have been able to inspect are marked with a * after the year of appearance. The library signatures of inspected copies that appeared before 1901 are given between [ ]; BOD = Bodleian Library Oxford and UBU = Universiteitsbibliotheek Utrecht.

Separate editions of the Conduct

C-1741

C-1754

\(^1\) Includes issues of the Conduct with other works in one volume, in cases where the Conduct and the other work each have their own title page and sequence of page numbers, e.g. C-1825.
C-1762

C-1763

C-1782

C-1794

C-1800

C-1801

C-1802

C-1807

C-1812

C-1823

C-1825
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C-1828

C-1828(a)

C-1828(b)

C-1832

C-1833

C-1835

C-1836

C-1837

C-1839

C-1847

C-1849
EDITIONS OF THE ‘CONDUCT’

C-1851

C-1859

C-1881

C-1882(a)

C-1882(b)

C-1882(c)

C-1885

C-1890

C-1891

C-1892

C-1891(a)

C-1891(b)
Editions of the ‘Conduct’

C-1966

C-1996

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E-1793

E-1795(a)

E-1795(b)

E-1796

E-1798

E-1801

E-1803
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E-1818

E-1819(a)

E-1819(b)

E-1819(c)

E-1823

E-1824(a)

E-1824(b)

E-1825

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E:1828(b)  

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E:1852  
Editions of the ‘Conduct’

E-1853
An Essay concerning Human Understanding; and, A treatise on the Conduct of the Understanding by John Locke, Gent.; complete in one volume, with the author’s last additions and corrections. Philadelphia: Troutman & Hayes, 1853. Ref. Attig 260. Note. Reprint of E-184-.

E-1854

E-1856

E-1857

E-1858

E-1859

E-1864

E-1865

Editions of the Conduct together with other works by Locke or by other authors

O-1796
EDITIONS OF THE ‘CONDUCT’

O-1781(a)

O-1781(b)

O-18-

O-1802
Philosophical Beauties selected from the Works of John Locke, Esq.; containing The Conduct of the Understanding, Elements of Natural Philosophy, The Studies Necessary for a Gentleman, an A Discourse on Miracles; with several other Subjects treated on by this Great Philosopher; to which is prefixed some account of his life. London: T. Hurst, 1802. Ref: Attig 862.

O-1813

O-1818

O-1820

O-1822

O-1823

O-1823(a)

O-1825(b)

O-1825(c)

O-1828(a)
Philosophical Beauties selected from the Works of John Locke, Esq.; containing The Conduct of the Understanding, Elements of Natural Philosophy, The Studies Necessary for a Gentleman, and A Discourse on Miracles; with several other Subjects treated on by this Great Philosopher; to which is prefixed some account of his life. New York: Langdon, 1828. Ref. Attig 863.

O-1828(b)

O-1829(a)

O-1829(b)
Philosophical Beauties selected from the Works of John Locke, Esq.; containing The Conduct of the Understanding, Elements of Natural Philosophy, The Studies Necessary for a Gentleman, and A discourse on Miracles; with several other Subjects treated on by this Great Philosopher; to which is prefixed some account of his life. New York: S. & D.A Forbes, 1829. Ref. Attig 865 (Attig: unverified). Note. As O-1828(a).

O-1830

O-1837(a)

O-1837(b)
EDITIONS OF THE ‘CONDUCT’

O-1838(a)

O-1838(b)

O-1840

O-1841

O-1844(a)

O-1844(b)
Philosophical Beauties selected form the Works of John Locke, Esq.; containing The Conduct of the Understanding, Elements of Natural Philosophy, The Studies Necessary for a Gentleman, and A Discourse on Miracles; with several other subjects treated on by this great philosopher; to which is prefixed some account of his life. Cooperstown, [New York]: H. & E. Phinney, 1844. Ref. Attig 863. Note. As O-1828(a).

O-1862

O-1874

O-1912

O-1922


EDITIONS OF THE ‘CONDUCT’

271

*O-1996*

Some Thoughts concerning Education and Of the Conduct of the Understanding, eds. Ruth W. Grant and Nathan Tarcov. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996.

The Conduct in editions of Locke’s Works

W-1714


W-1722


W-1727(a)


W-1727(b)


W-1740


W-1751


W-1759


W-1768(a)


W-1768(b)


W-1777

EDITIONS OF THE ‘CONDUCT’

W-1794

W-1801

W-1812

W-1823

W-1824

W-1826

W-1843

W-1854(a)

W-1854(b)

W-1872

W-1882
EDITIONS OF THE ‘CONDUCT’

W-1892

W-1963

Abridgements, abstracts or selections containing the Conduct

AS-1706

AS-1707

AS-1708

AS-1753

AS-1825

AS-1831(a)

AS-1831(b)

AS-1839
The Conduct of the Understanding also Some Thoughts concerning Education by John Locke. With a Memoir of the Author and his Writings. Edinburgh: W. and R. Chambers, 1839.* Con-
Editions of the 'Conduct'

duct: pp. 7-27. [BOD 3974 d.971] Ref. Attig 762. Note. Abridgment with other works by various other authors.

AS-1851

AS-1881

AS-1897

AS-1900

AS-1921

AS-1926

AS-1939

AS-1946

AS-1952

AS-1964(a)

AS-1964(b)
Editions of the ‘Conduct’ 275

AS-1965

Translations that consist of or comprise the Conduct

Tr(Du)-1979

Tr(Fr)-1710
Œuvres diverses de Monsieur Jean Locke. Rotterdam: Fritsch and Böhm, 1710. Ref. Yolton 372. Note. Modelled after O-1706 but printing the first French translation of the ‘toleration’ letter from the Latin edition (instead of the incomplete fourth letter), and omitting the ‘Examination of P. Malebranche’s Opinion’. According to Yolton 372, the editor is probably Jean Frédéric Bernard, who is also the publisher of Tr-1732(Fr.). Divided into 40 sections, instead of the 45 sections in O-1706.

Tr(Fr)-1732

Tr(Fr)-1821

Tr(Fr)-1775

Tr(Ger)-1755

Tr(Ger)-1857
editions of the 'conduct'

Tr(Ger)-1883

Tr(Ger)-1920

Tr(Ger)-1996

Tr(It)-1776
Guida dell'intelletto nella ricerca della verità. Opera postuma di Gio. Locke da Francesco Soave C.R.S. Prof. di Fil. Mor. nel R. Ginnasio di Brera. Milano: G. Motta, 1776.* [BOD Vet. f5 c.133] Ref. Yolton 310. Note. Text is not divided into 45 sections, as in O-1706 and in most subsequent editions, but into 39 'articoli' that follow largely the division into 40 sections in Tr(Fr)-1710.

Tr(It)-1790

Tr(It)-1794

Tr(It)-1801

Tr(It)-1807
EDITIONS OF THE ‘CONDUCT’

Tr(It)-1926

Tr(It)-1979

Tr(Jap)-1998

Tr(Pol)-1955

Tr(Rus)-1960

Tr(Sp)-1827
2. MANUSCRIPTS

Amsterdam University Library, MS R.K. J 57a. Letter by Damaris Cudworth Masham to J. le Clerc, 12 January 1705.


—, PRO 30/24722, fols. 31-38. Thomas Sydenham / John Locke, Anatomia.

Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Locke c.1-2. Ledgers containing Locke’s accounts, 1671-1704.


—, MS Locke c.27, fols. 92-93. ‘Observations on a discourse concerning natural and revealed Religion [A Discourse of Natural and Revealed Religion in Several Essays (1691)] by S[tephen] N[ye] [c. 1695].

—, MS Locke c.27, fols. 94-120. Notes made by Locke for the Reasonableness of Christianity (1693), including (fol. 94) three addenda inserted in the second edition of 1696.

—, MS Locke c.27, fols. 138-141. ‘Revelation. Its several ways under the old Testament [c. 1696], quotations written out by Locke.

—, MS Locke c.27, fols. 162-177. ‘Resurrectio et quæ sequuntur’, by Locke [c. 1699].

—, MS Locke c.27, fols. 215-216. ‘Christianæ Religionis Synopsis [1702]’, by Locke.


—, MS Locke c.28, fols. 52-69 and 76-82. ‘Epitome’ of Locke’s manuscript of the Essay in the hand of S. Brownover with a few corrections and additions by Locke.

—, MS Locke c.28, fols. 115-118. Additions by Locke for the Essay [c. 1694].

—, MS Locke c.28, fols. 121-138. Partial copy of the Conduct, copied from MS Locke c.1.

—, MS Locke c.35. Acknowledgements of receipts by persons to whom Locke had bequeathed money or property.

—, MS Locke c.40. Letters from Locke to Peter King, 1698-1704.

—, MS Locke c.41. Drafts for additions to the Essay, including the Conduct.


—, MS Locke f.3. Journal, 1677.

—, MS Locke f.3. Journal, 1678.


—, MS Locke f.10. Journal, 1689-1704.

—, MS Locke f.11, fols. 70-75. Account book that includes accounts of money received from and disbursed for Locke’s pupils at Christ Church, 1661-1666.


—, MS Locke f.33. An early notebook containing entries in an unidentified hand.

—, MS Locke f.34. Three small account books, one of which is: (C) fol. 69 ff.: Account book of William Shaw.

Oxford, Christ Church, Christ Church Collection Book (1699-1720), shelfmark li.h.1. Reading lists for individual students.
3. PRIMARY LITERATURE

Arnauld, Antoine, *Des vraies et des fausses idées, contre ce qu'enseigne l'auteur de La Recherche de la Vérité*. Cologne: N. Schouten, 1683.
—, *La Logique ou l’Art de Penser. Contenant, Outre les Regles communes, plusieurs observations nouvelles, propres à former le jugement [=La Logique de Port-Royal].* Paris: En la Boutique de Ch. Savreux, Chez G. des Prez, 1674.

Digby, Sir Kenelm, *Two Treatises* in the one of which, the *Nature of Bodies*; in the other, the *Nature of Man’s Soule; is looked into: in Way of Discovery of the Immortality of Reasonable Souls*. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1970 (repr. of Paris: G. Blaizot, 1644).


Michael Angelo [=Johann Jakob Breitinger], ‘IX. Discours’, in: Johann Jakob Bodmer and Johann Breitinger, Die Discourse der Mahlern. Vier Teile in einem Band. Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1969 (repr. of Die Discourse der Mahlern 1 (1721) [no page numbers]).


—, *Analysis Lib. Aristotelis De sophisticis Elenchis, in qua singula capita per quesitiones & responsiones perspicuè & dilucidè exponuntur*. Oxford: J. Barnesius, 1598.


—, *Tragœdiæ, cum notis Th. Farnabii*. Amsterdam: I. Ianssonium, 1645.


*Smith, Samuel, Aditus ad logicam in usum eorum qui primò Academiam Salutant*. Oxford: G. Turner, 1639.


*Waterland, Daniel, Advice to a Young Student with a Method of Study for the Four First Years*. London: J. Crownfield, 1730.


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4. SECONDARY LITERATURE

Axtell, James L., 'Locke, Newton and the Elements of Natural Philosophy', *Pædagogica Europæa* (1965) 235-244.


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