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INSTITUTION BUILDING AND INDUSTRY EMERGENCE
ESSAYS ON ENTREPRENEURIAL COGNITION,
INSTITUTION BUILDING AND INDUSTRY EMERGENCE

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HET CREËREN VAN INSTITUTIES EN DE OPKOMST VAN INDUSTRIEËN

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Ich bin euch unendlich dankbar für die bedingungslose Liebe, die ihr mir geschenkt habt und die Möglichkeiten, die ihr mir gegeben habt, um meinen eigenen Weg zu gehen.

TO MY PARENTS
I am eternally grateful for the unconditional love and the opportunities that you have given me to find my own way.
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CHAPTER

1

Introduction
1.1 Overview and Relevance

Entrepreneurship is a key driver of economic development and growth (Acs & Varga, 2005; Audretsch & Keilbach, 2004; Galindo & Méndez, 2014; Van Stel, Carree, & Thurik, 2005), innovation (Acs & Audretsch, 2005; Ahlin, Drnovšek, & Hisrich, 2014; Baumol, 2002, 2010; Baron & Tang, 2011), and job creation (Decker, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, & Miranda, 2014; Fölster, 2000; Malchow-Møller, Schjerning, & Sørensen, 2011; Wong, Ho, & Autio, 2005). More than that, entrepreneurs create opportunities for new products, services, business models, as well as new markets in their entirety (Park, 2005; Sarasvathy, 2008; Trimi & Berbegal-Mirabent, 2012). Going beyond economic value creation, entrepreneurs are also often forces for social change (Zahra, Rawhouser, Bhawe, Neubaum, & Hayton, 2008) by addressing complex societal problems such as global environmental challenges (Cohen & Winn, 2007; Schaper, 2016) or poverty reduction (Seelos & Mair, 2005).

Due to the number of significant contributions entrepreneurship makes, governments are emphasizing the importance of entrepreneurship within their policy making (Hart, 2003; Lundstrom & Stevenson, 2005). To illustrate this point, take the European Union (EU) as an example. In their Entrepreneurship 2020 Action Plan they declared the “joint action to unleash Europe’s entrepreneurial potential, to remove existing obstacles and to revolutionize the culture of entrepreneurship in Europe” (p. 5) to build “the foundations for future growth and competitiveness that will be smart, sustainable and inclusive, and which would address our principal societal challenges” (EU Commission, 2013, p. 3). Furthermore, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) offers “analysis and guidance on entrepreneurship policies at the level of countries, regions and social groups” (OECD, 2019). Minniti (2008) concludes that policy makers should actively work on building institutions and establishing an environment that promotes entrepreneurship. This could be achieved through a number of initiatives ranging from financial support and credit offerings (Harrison, Mason, & Girling,
2004; Khoja & Lutafali, 2008; Li, 2002) and institutional adjustments to encourage higher rates of entrepreneurship such as favorable tax regulations (Bruce & Mohsin, 2006; Gentry & Hubbard, 2000), to policies that either stimulate internationalization and lower international trade barriers (De Clercq & Bosma, 2008; Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2002; Jones, 2007), or promoting local initiatives for entrepreneurship such as incubators, science parks or knowledge clusters (Jacobides, Knudsen, & Augier, 2006; Langley, Pals, & Ortt, 2005; Storey, 2003).

It becomes clear that entrepreneurship is essential not only to leading economies, but also a driver for positive change in the world. Nonetheless, research on entrepreneurship still shows that there are lacunae in our understanding. Most recently, Shepherd, Wennberg, Suddaby, and Wiklund (2019) summarized in a comprehensive review article the current state of entrepreneurship research and concluded that no unified theory of entrepreneurship exists. Rather, entrepreneurship encompasses a wide range of theories, inspired by established fields such as psychology, economics, sociology, and is trying to explain a number of outcomes and phenomena. The diversity in relevant questions that have been asked and continue to appear, signals the importance of the growing field of entrepreneurship. Shepherd and colleagues (p. 182) conclude that “[a]s social science scholars, we must observe and explain the world around us, and entrepreneurship scholars are changing along with the manifestations of the phenomena they wish to explain.” Coherent with the need for research to capture the multifaceted face of entrepreneurship, the studies in this dissertation answer three research questions, which are aimed at studying entrepreneurship and innovation at different levels. Table 1.1 provides a short summary of the dissertation studies.
Three different levels of analysis are considered in this dissertation: the micro level, in which the individual entrepreneur and his/her approach to decision making are central; the meso level, where the interactions between different stakeholders embedded in the entrepreneurial ecosystems form new institutions when industries emerge; and the macro level, which focuses on the whole population of innovative firms and their market outputs. Doing so is an attempt to capture the many facets of entrepreneurship. Various level of analyses require different approaches, concepts, and methods to study the research question ask at each level.

To start with, as outlined before, the multi-faceted, multi-level nature that is characteristic for entrepreneurship demands an approach that is inclusive of multiple disciplines acting in concert to understand the phenomenon to the fullest. Second, these level of analysis enact and demand different conceptual structures. While the focus lies on cognition and heuristics at the micro level, market and non-market strategic decision making comes into play at the meso level. At the macro level, institutions and other social structures such as national innovation systems are
concepts of interest. Eventually, adopting different approaches and concepts to the study of entrepreneurship also requires multiple methods to chart the terrain completely. At the micro level, psychological investigations into entrepreneurial decision making require individuals’ subjective assessment, while more sociological accounts of ongoing interactions between stakeholders and emerging institutional structures ask for qualitative, processual methods to be employed. Estimating the importance of certain institutions for global innovation systems, in turn, can best be investigated by drawing from quantitative data analysis to arrive at valid conclusions.

Thus, by thoroughly investigating entrepreneurship and innovation at different level of analysis, including various meaningful concepts and by employing distinct methods, I am able to arrive at relevant conclusions that have an impact on individual entrepreneurs (micro), entrepreneur-stakeholder interactions (meso), as well as national innovation systems (macro). Whether in this dissertation or in future research, existing opportunities reside across levels of analysis, through which numerous approaches, concepts, and methods of entrepreneurship and innovation get to interact.

1.2 Three Levels of Analysis in Entrepreneurship Research and Research Questions

To start with, I focus on the micro level and consider entrepreneurs’ decision-making logic and their impact on venture performance. Entrepreneurs can pursue different strategies to deal with the challenges that arise when starting a new venture (Frese, Geiger, & Dost, 2019; Mansoori & Lackéus, 2019; Tryba & Fletcher, 2019). Traditionally, entrepreneurs were believed to be following a logic of strategic business planning, referred to as causation (Sarasvathy, 2001). This decision-making logic emphasizes the prediction of an uncertain future (Ansoff, 1979; Mintzberg, 1978), using competitive analysis as a prediction tool (Porter, 1980),
focusing on profit maximization (Alvarez & Barney, 2007; Friedman, 1953), trying to avoid surprises (Ansoff, 1980; Dutton & Ottensmeyer, 1987) as well as employing goal setting and closely monitoring their achievement (Bird, 1989; Bourgeois, 1985). However, entrepreneurs can make use of a non-prediction-oriented decision-making framework to guide their subsequent actions that is referred to as effectuation (Sarasvathy, 2001). This decision-making logic describes a more adaptive and emergent way of dealing with uncertain environments. Entrepreneurs who apply effectuation principles make use of resources at their disposal to create something new; they calculate according to what they can afford to lose instead of what they think they can gain; they aspire to enter into partnerships and they let plans evolve along the way, inspired by new events and occurrences (Sarasvathy, 2008). Yet, a detailed systematic empirical analysis linking the decision-making logics entrepreneurs employ to firm performance, in which causation and effectuation are carefully conceptualized and operationalized, has thus far not been undertaken. This leads me to formulate the first research question of this dissertation.

**Research Question 1: How does an entrepreneurs’ decision-making logics influence the performance of his/her venture?**

Next, I focus on the meso level and examine dialectical processes involving both entrepreneurs and regulators, in which I capture their attempts to shape a newly arising industry. Contextual factors, such as rules, regulation, and interactions with stakeholders help shape entrepreneurial behaviors and opportunities (Lim, Morse, Mitchell, & Seawright, 2010; Minniti, 2008; Nelson, 2014). This is certainly true in mature industries, in which these practices have become established. Far less evidence exists on how industry-specific factors interact with entrepreneurial behaviors in emerging industries. Intuition suggests it is because rules and practices have not fully become institutionalized in such settings yet (e.g., Ruef & Patterson, 2009; Navis & Glynn, 2010), their grip on entrepreneurs is less tight than in mature
fields. Moreover, entrepreneurs are likely not simply rule followers in emerging contexts, but have a relatively greater influence on processes of rule selection, refinement, reinforcement, and proliferation. Yet, we know very little about the micro-momentary actions of entrepreneurs as they engage with regulatory and normative contexts in emerging fields, nor about the consequences of these actions for proto-institutional emergence. This leads me to formulate the second research question of this dissertation.

**Research Question 2: How do regulatory proto-institutions arise in technological innovation-intensive and behavioral change-prone organizational fields?**

Finally, I focus on the macro level and investigate institutional drivers of innovation. While it has been established that institutions are necessary to support entrepreneurship and innovation nationally (Acs, Desai & Hessels, 2008; Boettke & Coyne, 2009; Mazzucato, 2013; Spencer & Gómez, 2004), the focus has long been on public and private civil institutions. Although it is essential for a country’s innovativeness to have strong university systems, investment communities and R&D clusters, there still seems to be a gap in the institutional matrix (North, 1991) for many countries to produce frame-breaking innovations. Reasons include a lack of complementary assets (Teece, 1998; Tripsas, 1997), short-term focused investment horizons (Bertoni & Tykvová, 2015; Cumming, 2007), underinvestment in fundamental and precompetitive research (Feller, Ailes, & Roessner, 2002; Niosi, Saviotti, Bellon, & Crow, 1993), and the absent capacity of translating this research to market-ready products (Carayannis & Alexander, 2004; Woolf, 2008). Thus, with public and private civil institutions exhibiting shortcomings, another institution fostering innovation that has so far largely been overlooked by management researchers offers clarification, namely the military. This leads me to formulate the last research question of this dissertation.

**Research Question 3: How can the military support civil innovation institutions to develop market-ready products?**
1.3 Outline Dissertation Studies

In the following three chapters, I will present the three studies that together form the main body of my dissertation. They answer the research questions that are presented above. Next, I outline these three dissertation studies briefly.

1.3.1 Abstract Study 1: Get it Together! Synergistic Effects of Causal and Effectual Decision-Making Logics on Venture Performance

Entrepreneurs rely on different decision-making logics when starting new ventures, including causal and effectual reasoning. Literature states that both logics have their merits and different mechanisms are at work that can positively influence firm performance, but studies have not yet tested the synergistic potential of these two logics. In the first study in this dissertation, I propose that effectuation and causation are two decision-making logics that can be beneficial to venture performance when used in conjunction. This study’s results confirm this, but also show that the combined effect of effectuation and causation on firm performance is stronger than their individual effect. To arrive at these conclusions, I utilized survey data from almost 1,500 entrepreneurs residing in 25 countries. This study forms an important contribution to business planning literature and effectuation literature, as both streams of research seem to position themselves as opposites rather than compliments. However, I find that ventures benefit most from using these two entrepreneurial logics – planning-focused causation and action-oriented effectuation – in tandem.

1.3.2 Abstract Study 2: Proto-Institutional Emergence in Technology-Driven Contexts: Dialectic institutional Work in the Dutch Drone Industry

In technological innovation-intensive fields, the regulatory institutional structures that give rise to novel entrepreneurial opportunities while constraining other facets of entrepreneurial behavior are in constant flux. Previous studies have framed the
challenges facing entrepreneurs in mature organizational fields as avoiding the power of overbearing regulators long enough to establish the legitimacy of their ventures. However, in technological innovation-intensive fields, regulatory frameworks for evaluating new ventures are often still lacking, and regulators may choose to actively reach out to entrepreneurs to arrive at a better understanding of the radical technological change and high-frequency changes in entrepreneurial behavior that occur in these settings. To grasp how entrepreneurial opportunities and constraints come about in these settings, I conducted a qualitative processual study of the emergence of the Dutch remotely piloted aircraft systems (colloquially known as “drones”) industry between 2000 and 2018. I draw on qualitative data comprising 75 hours of fieldwork, archival data of more than 3,500 slides from 240 presentations as well as 27 in-depth interviews. This study’s findings show that regulatory proto-institutions in nascent industries tend to result from dialectic institutional work in the form of structured interactions between entrepreneurs and regulators. Specifically, I present a process model that reveals how new regulatory structures evolve in contexts where high levels of technological and behavioral change induce systemic uncertainty and enlarge the interdependence between entrepreneurs and regulators. I suggest that our process theory of proto-institutional emergence generalizes towards other technological innovation-intensive fields. Theoretically, these findings speak to the literatures on institutional work and proto-institutional emergence.

1.3.3 Abstract Study 3: Leviathan In A Lab Coat: How Military Initiatives Help Civil Innovation Institutions Produce Market-Ready Products

Innovation needs institutions to flourish. Traditionally, the focus has been either on public institutions, such as state governments, or on private institutions that specifically aim at stimulating civil innovation, such as Research and Development (R&D) clusters. However, research has shown that public and private institutions in the civil domain are not always capable of producing frame-braking innovation due
to a lack of complementary assets, short-term investment horizons, underinvestment in fundamental research, or limited ‘translational’ capacity for making fundamental innovations market-ready. I posit that there is another institution essential for innovation, which has been largely overlooked by management researchers but is able to compensate for prevalent institutional shortcomings: the military. I hypothesize that the military fosters innovation by facilitating military-driven technological and human capital spillovers, investing in high-risk innovation projects, as well as building capabilities and adjacent institutions (e.g., infrastructure). I test these hypotheses in the context of the global drone industry using data from 2006 to 2016. Drones have historically been used in military but nowadays are used for a great number of applications in many commercial industries. The sample consists of 1,341 civil drone systems that were created for commercial purposes by 473 producers in 52 countries. Survival analysis was employed to test the influence of military drone presence, military expenditure, and arms import on civil drone market-readiness. The results reveal that the military, as a previously overlooked institution, plays an integral role in civil innovation around the globe. Thus, although some public and private civil institutions help bring innovation to the market, the military is an even stronger driver for a country’s innovative strength in the civil sector. This study contributes to literature on institutions for innovation and the institutions-based view, and aims to inform policy makers’ decision-making in fostering innovation.

The three studies are summarized in Figure 1.1 to give an overview of the chapters included in the dissertation, the main topics and the level of analyses.
In conclusion, there are five key takeaways that can be gained from considering the three studies included in this dissertation:

1) Chapter 2 shows that it is not only vital for venture success that entrepreneurs are able to draw from different decision making logics, but to combine a causation-focused planning approach with a effectuation-driven action approach for achieving the best venture outcomes. This is important for literature on entrepreneurial decision making (Frese et al., 2019; Hauser, Eggers, & Güldenberg, 2019; Laskovaia, Marino, Shirokova, & Wales, 2018; McKelvie, Chandler, DeTienne & Johansson, 2019; Tryba & Fletcher, 2019).

2) Chapter 3 suggests that especially in newly emerging contexts, entrepreneurs are not acting in isolation. On their way towards building institutions, entrepreneurs engage in dialectic institutional work with regulators in an
interactive way, without either of them leading the process. This is important for literature on institutional work and emerging institutions (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009, 2011; Ozcan & Gurses, 2018; Zietsma & McKnight, 2009).

3) Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 offer important insights on entrepreneurial reasoning and action. While the logic that entrepreneurs employ have an impact on their venture’s success in rather mature industries, entrepreneurs engaging with regulators in emerging fields form the future context in which they (as well as coming generations of entrepreneurs) will need to act when rules and regulations have become institutionalized. This is important for literature on institutional entrepreneurship (Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Li, 2010; Lim et al., 2010; Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004; Watson, 2013).

4) Chapter 4 concludes that in terms of bringing innovation to the market, a country should not only rely on public and private civil institutions, but also consider the military as it forms a strong driver for national innovative strength in the civil sector. This is important for literature on the intersection between military and civil innovation (Hiatt, Carlos, & Sine, 2018; Honig, Lerner, & Raban, 2006; Koch-Bayram & Wernicke, 2018; Mazzucato, 2013; Ruttan, 2006).

5) Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 both focus on the drone industry and highlight the importance of institutions for entrepreneurship and innovation. Institutions play a vital role for entrepreneurs, even in situations where those very institutions still need to be build. On the other hand, some institutions with a long standing may have been overlooked in the past although their relevance for a country’s innovative capacity are indisputable. This is important for literature on institutions in entrepreneurship and innovation (Acs, Autio, & Szerb, 2014; Bradley & Klein, 2016; Filippetti & Archibugi, 2011; Henrekson & Sanandaji, 2011).
1.5 Declaration of Contribution

I declare my contribution to each of the chapters in this dissertation and acknowledge the contributions of other scholars that were involved.

**Chapter 1:** This chapter was solely prepared by myself and complemented with feedback from my doctoral dissertation supervisor Pursey Heugens.

**Chapter 2:** I was leading this project as it was my responsibility to carry out a thorough literature review, ground the hypotheses in existing theory, analyze the data, and draft the first version of the paper. I received feedback from my co-authors, subsequently submitted the manuscript, and dealt with revisions necessary towards publication. I also presented previous versions of the study at several academic conferences. This study was published in *Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice* in 2018 with me being the first author, Ingrid Verheul as second author, Katrin Burmeister-Lamp as third author and my doctoral dissertation advisor Pursey Heugens as fourth author.

**Chapter 3:** I carried out the majority of the work as it was my role in the project to outline the theory on which the research question was built, collect the data through fieldwork, interviews and archival search, analyze the data, as well as draft the paper, all supported with guiding comments from my doctoral dissertation advisor. I also presented previous versions of the study at several academic conferences. By the time the doctoral thesis was submitted, this study was under review at a leading management journal with me being the first author and my doctoral dissertation advisor Pursey Heugens as second author.

**Chapter 4:** I was responsible for constructing and cleaning the database that the study relied on. I reviewed the literature on this topic, carried out the analyses, and drafted the paper, all supported with guiding comments from my doctoral dissertation advisor. By the time of submission of this dissertation, this study was being prepared for submission to a leading management journal with me being the first author and my doctoral dissertation advisor Pursey Heugens as second author.
CHAPTER

2

Get It Together!
Synergistic Effects of Causal and Effectual Decision-Making Logics on Venture Performance

2.1 Introduction

To cope with the uncertainties associated with new venture creation, entrepreneurs can opt for different strategies. Planning and action have long been considered two fundamental, yet often contradictory, approaches in managing organizations. Mintzberg and Westley (2001), for example, distinguished between a rational (“think first”) and an action-oriented (“act first”) approach to decision making. Nevertheless, there has been quite some debate about the relative value of planning and action for successful entrepreneurship. In their recent meta-analysis, Brinckmann, Grichnik and Kapsa (2010) summarize the vivid debate about the importance of business planning for entrepreneurial performance. Alternatively, emphasizing the action element in entrepreneurship, different scholars have explored the importance of improvisation strategies for venture performance (Baker, Miner & Eesley, 2003; Hmieleski & Corbett, 2008). In a similar vein, Sarasvathy (2001) proposes that the future cannot be predicted by writing plans, and that experienced entrepreneurs therefore adopt an effectual (rather than a causal) approach, attempting to control the future by taking action. Finally, new pedagogical models emphasizing experiential learning are steadily replacing conventional planning-oriented methods of teaching entrepreneurship (Honig, 2004; Neck & Greene, 2011), and the question arises whether the combined pursuit of planning and action-oriented approaches may help aspiring entrepreneurs establish long-living ventures in the market.

Empirically, research linking planning and action to venture performance has yielded inconsistent results. First, meta-analytic evidence suggests that the frequently tested relationship between planning and performance is in fact highly contingent upon endogenous and exogenous factors (see Brinckmann et al., 2010). Second, while several scholars have linked the action-oriented effectuation approach to increased venture performance (see Perry, Chandler & Markova, 2012),

1 In addition to a third intuitive (“seeing first”) approach.
this finding deserves further empirical scrutiny. Building on the foundational work of Sarasvathy (2001, 2008), entrepreneurship scholars have studied the role of effectuation in a variety of contexts, including the Swedish mobile internet industry (Berglund, 2007), Norwegian tourism firms (Alsos & Clausen, 2014), Twitter users (Fischer & Reuber, 2011), and UK home-based online businesses (Daniel, Di Domenico & Sharma, 2014). Although the number of quantitative studies exploring the nature, antecedents, and consequences of employing an effectual strategy has grown in recent years (e.g., Appelhoff, Mauer, Collewaert & Brettel, 2016; Dew, Read, Sarasvathy & Wiltbank, 2015; Werhahn, Mauer, Flatten & Brettel, 2015), much of the extant empirical literature still relies on qualitative research methods (e.g., Akemu, Whiteman & Kennedy, 2016; Watson, 2013). As the state of effectuation research can no longer be classified as nascent (Perry et al., 2012), more deductive theory-testing studies are needed to explore the web of nomological relationships between effectuation and its antecedents and consequences, and to shed light on its relationship with alternative entrepreneurial approaches.

In the present study, we distinguish between two alternative decision-making logics for explaining venture performance: that is, predictive (causal) and controlling (effectual) logics. Whereas in practice entrepreneurs frequently use effectuation and causation in tandem (Sarasvathy, 2001, 2003), theory development and empirical evidence concerning potentially synergistic effects between these two approaches is currently still at an early stage. In addition to discussing the conceptual interrelations between effectual and causal decision making, and their linkages with performance, we therefore empirically examine their main and interactive effects on venture performance. Assuming that the interplay between the two logics is synergistic, we propose that entrepreneurs’ combined use of effectuation and causation will have a greater impact on venture performance than the sum of their two main (i.e., independent) effects. To test whether the adoption of effectuation and causation is conducive to venture performance (Berends, Jelinek,
Reymen & Stultiëns, 2014; Chandler, DeTienne, McKelvie & Mumford, 2011; Perry et al., 2012), we use an international dataset comprising 1,453 student entrepreneurs residing in 25 different countries.

We aspire to make three contributions with this paper. First, following the call by Perry et al. (2012) to clarify the relationship between effectuation and alternative entrepreneurial approaches, we aim to assess the relationship between effectuation and causation (generally regarded as the dominant alternative logic) both conceptually and empirically. Effectuation scholars have been criticized for incomplete theory building (Arend, Sarooghi & Burkemper, 2015, 2016), and there is a vivid, continued debate concerning the future development of the effectuation literature (Garud & Gehman, 2016; Gupta, Chiles & McMullen, 2016; Read, Sarasvathy, Dew & Wiltbank, 2016; Reuber, Fischer & Coviello, 2016). Further research contributing to the advancement of effectuation as a theory of entrepreneurship is therefore warranted.

Second, by measuring causation and effectuation independently (Wiltbank, Dew, Read & Sarasvathy, 2006), and testing for their main and interactive effects on venture performance, we are able to determine how the two logics contribute to explaining entrepreneurial outcomes. Several researchers have started to investigate the interplay between the two logics (e.g., Alsos & Clausen, 2014; Evald & Senderovitz, 2013; Maine, Soh & Dos Santos, 2015; Nummela, Saarenketo, Jokela & Loane, 2014; Reymen et al., 2015; Sitoh, Pan & Yu, 2014), but empirical evidence of their interactive effects on venture performance is still lacking. As Read et al. (2016, p. 531) highlight: “[e]ffectuation research needs to spell out in more detail […] useful ways to mix and match predictive and non-predictive strategies […].” We thus provide new insights into how causal and effectual logics interact and supply “evidence of relationships between effectuation and […] business planning” (Perry et al., 2012, p. 855). Our findings not only show that causation and effectuation both have positive main effects on venture performance, but also that
their combined use further enhances positive venture outcomes. In particular, entrepreneurs who experiment with available means while also engaging in planning activities tend to realize significantly better venture performance.

Third, we move the effectuation literature forward by developing a concise agenda for future quantitative research in this tradition, emphasizing the need for better measures (Arend et al., 2015; Perry et al., 2012); for disentangling the nomological web of effectuation’s antecedents and consequences (Harms & Schiele, 2012); and for distinguishing the concept from other entrepreneurial approaches like bricolage (Baker & Nelson, 2005), improvisation (Hmieleski & Corbett, 2008), and bootstrapping (Bhide, 1991).

2.2 Theory and Hypotheses

2.2.1 Effectuation and Causation

Effectuation is a decision-making framework that guides entrepreneurial action and behavior (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2008, p. 732). Instead of using planning and prediction-oriented techniques (i.e., causation) to increase the robustness of entrepreneurial ventures to contingencies, the focus lies on the use of control strategies such as exercising flexibility and experimentation to create new products and markets (Sarasvathy, 2001, 2008). As such, effectuation is a more proactive and emergent way of dealing with uncertain environments, applying logical reasoning as a means of exerting control over the environment. In contrast, causation involves the use of logical reasoning as a predictive instrument. Causation comprises elements of strategic planning as it aims at predicting an uncertain future (Ansoff, 1979; Mintzberg, 1978). As a decision-making logic, causation combines a strict goal orientation (Bird, 1989; Bourgeois, 1985) with a focus on profit-maximization (Friedman, 1953), competitive analysis (Porter, 1980), and avoiding surprises (Ansoff, 1980; Dutton & Ottensmeyer, 1987). In contrast, entrepreneurs who apply non-predictive control (effectuation) make use of other principles, which were first
documented by Sarasvathy (2001, 2008) and colleagues (e.g., Read & Sarasvathy, 2005; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005; Sarasvathy, Dew, Read & Wiltbank, 2008; Wiltbank et al., 2006). These principles include creating something new by starting with available resources (i.e., intellectual, human, and social capital), limiting losses to an affordable level, creating partnerships, and letting plans evolve along the way. The main differences between causal and effectual reasoning are summarized in Table 2.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Starting point for reasoning/action</th>
<th>Causal reasoning</th>
<th>Effectual reasoning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goal orientation: which means are needed to accomplish certain goals?</td>
<td>Clearly specified and given goals</td>
<td>Means orientation: which goals can be achieved with the available resources?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Risk predisposition                | Decision making on the basis of financial forecasting  
Maximizing expected returns  
High upfront resource commitments | Decision-making on the basis of what individuals are able and willing to risk (also non-financials)  
Determining affordable loss  
Limiting downside risk  
Lean business operations |                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| Attitude toward third parties      | Threat of competitors  
Careful selection of alliance partners  
Relationships are limited to what is considered necessary  
Contractual trust: extensive contracting to restrict opportunistic behavior | Parties can gain by working together  
Actively looking for partners  
Self-selected stakeholders  
Commitment-based trust: partners benefit from making (small) credible commitments to a joint course of action |                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| Environmental contingencies        | Contingencies are undesirable deviations from the plan | Contingencies offer new opportunities                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |

While early work on effectuation and causation was concerned primarily with describing these two decision-making logics (Sarasvathy 2001; Wiltbank et al., 2006), researchers have more recently started to examine the antecedents and consequences of effectuation (Harms & Schiele, 2012) and to ask questions about the appropriate dependent variable for this stream of research (McKelvie, DeTienne & Chandler, 2013). In the present study, we argue that effectuation and causation are connected to venture outcomes through different pathways.

2.2.2 Causation and Venture Performance

Whereas there are a large number of studies on the virtues of strategic planning in established companies (Miller & Cardinal, 1994; Schwenk & Shrader, 1993), studies focusing explicitly on causation as an entrepreneurial decision-making logic remain scarce. One of the few notable exceptions includes Kristinsson, Candi and Sæmundsson (2016), who explicitly include causation as a moderating decision-making logic in their study investigating the influence of founding team diversity on idea generation and innovation. Likewise, examining R&D performance in a corporate context, Brettel, Mauer, Engelen and Küpper (2012) found that the outcomes of intrapreneurial projects with a low level of innovation were improved when applying causal decision making. Finally, DeTienne, McKelvie and Chandler (2015) examined causation based decision making in the context of entrepreneurial exit strategies, where entrepreneurs used a causal approach to pursue financial harvest exit strategies.

Yet there is also a closely related, and more extensive, literature on the practice-based side of causation, which centers on the use of planning for achieving predetermined goals. In this literature, the value of business planning in relation to venture performance is heavily debated (Burke, Fraser & Greene, 2010; Chwolka & Raith, 2012; Delmar & Shane, 2003; Gruber, 2007; Honig & Samuelsson, 2014). Thus far, the overall evidence points to a positive relationship between planning and
venture performance. In their meta-analysis on this relationship in the context of small and medium-sized enterprises, Mayer-Haug, Read, Brinckmann, Dew and Grichnik (2013) show that planning activities and entrepreneurial planning skills are positively related to the growth, scale, and sales of these firms. Furthermore, Brinckmann et al.’s (2010) meta-analysis demonstrates that both a written business plan and planning as a process are beneficial for new venture performance, although the strength of the relationship depends on contextual factors like firm age and the cultural environment. In the field of strategic management too there is ample evidence that business planning positively influences venture performance in many instances (e.g., Capon, Farley & Hoenig, 1990; Capon, Farley & Hulbert, 1994; Miller & Cardinal, 1994).

Business planning might positively affect venture performance for different reasons. It guides action by setting objectives, the achievement of which is contingent upon pre-determined plans and thorough analyses. Delmar and Shane (2003), for example, see planning as an important precursor to action in new ventures, helping entrepreneurs in the decision-making process and allowing them to take steps toward goal achievement. Furthermore, a written business plan may enhance venture legitimacy, as entrepreneurs are able to use it to convey the feasibility and viability of their business concept to investors. Legitimacy is vital for new ventures, as it increases their chances of surviving the early stages of their life cycles by facilitating entrepreneurial resource acquisition (Delmar & Shane, 2004; Fisher, Kotha & Lahiri, 2016). Investing time and effort in writing a business plan also signals an entrepreneur’s commitment to the venture and may enhance learning by carefully thinking through all aspects of the firm; outlining structures and processes (Castrogiovanni, 1996); and collecting information on competitors, industry dynamics, and the marketplace (Frese & Gielnik, 2014). We therefore hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1: An entrepreneur's use of causal reasoning is positively related to venture performance.

2.2.3 Effectuation and Venture Performance

A small but impactful range of studies has related effectuation to performance. Based on the outcomes of 28 independent studies, and using proxies to capture adherence to effectuation principles\(^2\), Read, Song and Smit (2009) were among the first to report a positive and significant overall relationship between the use of effectuation and venture performance. In particular, positive links with performance were found for means-orientation, partnerships, and leveraging contingencies, but no significant relationship was found for affordable loss. Following Read et al.'s example, several studies have examined the link between effectuation (versus causation) and performance in different contexts. For example, Wiltbank, Read, Dew and Sarasvathy (2009) found that business angel investors focusing on control (effectuation) rather than on prediction (causation) in their investment portfolios experienced fewer failures without a reduction in the number of successes. Also, Brettel et al. (2012) show that effectuation is positively linked to process output and efficiency in highly innovative R&D projects. Furthermore, Sullivan Mort, Weerawardena and Liesch (2012) found that entrepreneurial marketing approaches relying on effectuation lead to superior performance within born global firms. Finally, in the context of the Chinese transitional economy, Cai, Guo, Rei and Liu (2016) provide additional support for the positive effect of effectuation on new venture performance.

Several scholars found evidence for effectuation as a moderator variable, including Mthanti and Urban (2014), who demonstrate that effectuation strengthens the relationship between entrepreneurial orientation and performance in high-tech

\(^2\) For instance, to measure the effectual principle of partnerships, studies were included that examined outside members of the board, number of alliances, overlap in partners’ goals, and reliance on external sources of technology.
firms. Likewise, Deligianni, Voudouris and Lioukas (2015) show that the effectual principles of experimentation, flexibility, and pre-commitments positively moderate the relationship between product diversification and new venture performance. As the available empirical evidence suggests that firms benefit from adopting an effectual approach in different contexts, we subsequently explore the underlying mechanisms that are at play by discussing the potential linkages between the separate principles of effectuation and venture performance.

2.2.3.1 Means-Driven Action
Means-driven action allows entrepreneurs to draw from and experiment with the resources at their disposal, including personal characteristics and traits, background knowledge, networks, and social contacts (Sarasvathy, 2001; Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 2001), often leading them to make adjustments to their original business idea. When employing effectual reasoning, entrepreneurs first imagine goals that are within their reach given their set of means, and then experiment with these means to find out what goal fits best (Sarasvathy, 2001, 2008). In other words, effectual entrepreneurs experiment with their means to select business opportunities that limit potential losses to an affordable level and attract committed partners. Means-driven entrepreneurs are therefore natural experimenters. As they start by considering all available resources and proceed to experiment creatively in a low-cost manner, we expect the ventures of means-driven entrepreneurs to perform better, as they are able to fluidly and efficiently adapt their business processes to evolving customer needs (Blank, 2013).

2.2.3.2 Affordable Loss
Forecasting potential financial gains can be challenging, as the equation necessarily includes many unknown variables. Moreover, pursuing future returns requires high upfront resource commitments, making it difficult to keep operations lean and driving up the cost of potential early failure. While causation-oriented entrepreneurs frequently use approaches such as estimating net-present values to determine the
feasibility of their start-up (Campbell, 1992), effectual entrepreneurs turn this process around. Focusing on their affordable loss, defined as the amount of available resources they are willing and able to lose in the start-up process, they limit their downside risk (Sarasvathy, 2001, 2008). In addition to monetary resources, the resources under consideration may include time, personal relationships, reputation, and even health. Effectual-oriented entrepreneurs also form partnerships enabling them to find low-cost ways of reaching their customers, while remaining open to adjusting their course of action (Sarasvathy, 2008, p. 88). Operating with a focus on affordable loss may therefore improve venture performance (Dew, Read, Sarasvathy & Wiltbank, 2009). Specifically, entrepreneurs can improve venture performance when they put an upper bound on losses, thus limiting costs and increasing efficiency.

2.2.3.3 Partnerships
To fully exploit the means available to them, effectual entrepreneurs seek to create win-win situations in which intrinsically motivated outsiders voluntarily commit their resources to jointly build a successful firm (Sarasvathy, 2001, 2008). Such stakeholders are self-selected, commit to the extent that they want to contribute to the new venture, and may include people (e.g., customers, suppliers, technology enthusiasts) or organizations (e.g., financial institutions, universities; Sarasvathy, 2008). In working with partners who are willing to help shape future outcomes, uncertainty is reduced, as there is the opportunity for risk sharing (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). Effectual partnerships are built on the assumption that, in uncertain environments, “the only way for each party in the relationship to benefit is by making small (affordable-loss based) but credible commitments to a joint course of action even if each is unsure of the other’s trustworthiness down the road” (Sarasvathy & Dew, 2008, p. 728). Without a pre-determined goal to achieve, effectual entrepreneurs can draw on valuable resources that would otherwise not have been available (Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001; Barney, 1991). Shaping the
venture’s future through combined action may thus lead to better performance (Sarasvathy, 2008).

2.2.3.4 Leveraging Contingencies

By embracing the unexpected, that is, making good use of contingencies that arise when starting a new venture, effectual entrepreneurs remain flexible. Whether these contingencies are unanticipated events, accidental meetings, or the disclosure of new information, surprises are seen as opportunities. Unforeseen occurrences that may seem disadvantageous at first can be transformed to produce favorable outcomes (Sarasvathy, 2008). The ability to leverage contingencies can benefit effectual entrepreneurs who see unexpected events as (potential) new resources. Whereas positive surprises naturally work to an entrepreneur’s advantage, negative surprises can also be leveraged if the entrepreneur can adapt to the new circumstances faster or better than competitors (Harmeling, 2011). Read, Sarasvathy, Dew, Wiltbank and Ohlsson (2011, p. 144) refer to the “contingency path of novel outcomes”, implying that entrepreneurs who embrace contingencies may experience better venture performance. This adaptive behavior can be particularly advantageous when other companies are less flexible because they stick to their business plans more rigidly, and are therefore less able to learn or benefit from unforeseen incidents (Nadkarni & Narayanan, 2007; Worren, Moore & Cardona, 2002). We therefore posit the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: An entrepreneur’s use of effectual reasoning is positively related to venture performance.

2.2.4 Synergistic Effects of Effectuation and Causation

While some researchers see effectuation and causation as opposite ends of a dichotomized construct (Brettel et al., 2012), others stress that they should not be seen as two sides of a continuum (Perry et al., 2012). We follow the latter research tradition, in which the two logics are not regarded as opposites, but are seen as
orthogonal in nature. Sarasvathy (2001, p. 245) states that “both decision-making logics are integral parts of human reasoning and can occur simultaneously, overlapping and intertwining over different contexts of decisions and actions”, implying that causation and effectuation should not be seen as opposite poles. Similarly, Sarasvathy (p. 249) noted that “effectuation processes are not posited here as ‘better’ or ‘more efficient’ than causation processes in creating artifacts such as firms”. Although neither causation nor effectuation is thus considered a superior approach in the process of creating a new firm, performance outcomes may vary, depending upon how the two approaches are combined. Indeed, effectuation and causation can be seen as complementary logics, allowing entrepreneurs to cope with different contingencies throughout the life cycle of their ventures. The ability of effectuation processes to contribute to venture performance might therefore well be contingent upon the presence of at least a threshold level of causation processes, and the other way around. Moreover, depending on the level of uncertainty surrounding any given decision that needs to be made, either causation (in case of low uncertainty) or effectuation (in case of high uncertainty) would be preferable in that specific context. New venture founding involves a great number of decisions to be taken, with each decision comprising a different level of contextual uncertainty. We propose that causal reasoning is best used for decisions involving predictable outcomes, whereas effectual reasoning is best applied to unpredictable situations. Saliently, venture performance appears to benefit from the involvement of entrepreneurs who have both decision-making logics in their repertoires.

Although the combined use of effectuation and causation by entrepreneurs has attracted the interest of numerous researchers (e.g., Evald & Senderovitz, 2013; Maine et al., 2015; Nummela et al., 2014; Reymen et al., 2015; Sitoh et al., 2014), to our knowledge studies that empirically test for interactive effects of these two decision frameworks on venture performance are currently absent. Interestingly, Brinckmann et al. (2010) recommend the combined use of a dynamic practice of
planning (causal approach) and doing (effectual approach) for new and established small firms. They suggest that entrepreneurs can enhance their planning activities with the information gained from experience, thus letting plans evolve depending on feedback from the environment. This highlights the temporal aspect in the discussion of the effectuation-causation relationship, demonstrating that planning and execution can take place concurrently, sequentially, or recursively. Examining new product innovation processes in small firms, Berends et al. (2014) show that effectuation is mainly used in the early venture stages, while causation is emphasized in later stages. Although the aforementioned studies acknowledge the feasibility and desirability of employing causal and effectual decision-making logics, they do not empirically examine the implications for venture performance. In the remainder of this paper, we set out to determine how the combined use of causal and effectual logics can be beneficial to venture performance.

Our point of departure is that, within any new venture, specific business functions require different approaches. To the extent that members of the founding team have diverse backgrounds, they may differ in their proclivity toward either causal or effectual decision-making approaches, and problem-solving styles (Nummela et al., 2014). Such diversity may lead to mutual learning outcomes, improved creativity, and more innovativeness, which will benefit the firm (Chandler & Lyon, 2001; Horwitz & Horwitz, 2007; Maznevski, 1994). Timing is also important when considering the joint use of causation and effectuation (Reymen et al., 2015) and their combined contribution to venture performance. When entrepreneurs or entrepreneurial teams are able to switch from one decision logic to the other, depending on the uncertainty level surrounding the decision to be made, thus always selecting the decision making approach that fits the situation best, the new venture is likely to profit.

Business tasks can thus be approached using both logics in tandem (Sitoh et al., 2014). While using a causation-oriented approach to introduce general
structures and action plans, an entrepreneur can concurrently use an effectuation-oriented approach to explore a wider range of options within the broad boundaries set by prior planning efforts (Reymen et al., 2015). This allows the entrepreneur to enjoy the benefits of both approaches. In particular, designing business strategies based on long-term objectives may be combined with short-term experiments, such as making changes to product features (Frese, 2009). While the entrepreneur draws on the currently available means to shape the new venture along the way, the identification of future goals helps determine growth ambitions (Frese et al., 2007). This way, entrepreneurs are able to reap the benefits from both approaches, employing causation and effectuation concurrently to strengthen venture performance.

The same reasoning applies to financial decisions. When entrepreneurs make profitability forecasts to support growth decisions, current resources might only be committed to the process if the entrepreneurs can afford using (and losing) them. By considering upward potential alongside protection from downside loss, entrepreneurs can make better informed and more balanced decisions, which may positively impact venture performance.

Furthermore, the combined use of alliances and partnerships may also have synergistic effects. Effectual entrepreneurs work together with committed stakeholders to shape the future of their ventures, but causal planning mechanisms can provide these entrepreneurs with more focus in the process (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006). Agreements made with stakeholders reduce uncertainty about the future of the new venture, while at the same time resources and networks can be shared with alliance members (Teng, 2007). As a consequence, venture performance may increase as the pool of new resources and options widens.

Finally, the flexibility that effectual thinking promotes can be combined with the careful weighing of the costs and benefits associated with each option explored in the causal approach. The entrepreneur can take advantage of
opportunities that arise due to unexpected events while still focusing on a long-term goal (Zheng & Mai, 2013). Plans serve as a guideline that can be deviated from, while still providing an underlying structure, when new information creates awareness about and access to new opportunities. Furthermore, activities supporting the planning process, such as developing action plans that are not necessarily transformed into formal documents, may enhance the positive effect of goal setting on venture creation and outcomes (Gielnik & Frese, 2013). Hence, venture performance benefits from the mutually reinforcing effect that flexibility has in some areas and rigidity in others.

In conclusion, using causation and effectuation in tandem can lead to synergies, especially when the benefits of both decision-making logics are combined to strengthen venture performance. Thus, we hypothesize that a strict focus on either causation or effectuation will be less effective than a balanced use of both approaches, as it allows entrepreneurs to optimally cope with a wider range of contingencies when adjusting their decision-making to the level of contextual uncertainty surrounding that decision. Accordingly, we formulate the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 3:** An entrepreneur’s joint use of causal and effectual reasoning will have a positive interactive effect on venture performance.

Figure 2.1 summarizes the direct and interactive effects we propose causation and effectuation to have on venture performance.

![Figure 2.1 Proposed Effects of Causation and Effectuation on Venture Performance](image-url)
2.3 Methodology

2.3.1 Data and Sample

Our data were collected as part of the Global University Entrepreneurial Spirit Students’ Survey (GUESSS), an international research project coordinated by the Swiss Institute for Small Business and Entrepreneurship at the University of St. Gallen. The survey investigates entrepreneurial attitudes, intentions, and activities of students enrolled in institutions of higher education. The project is not limited to students following entrepreneurship programs or classes, and includes students at different education levels (i.e., graduate, undergraduate, doctoral) and from different programs (i.e., business and economics, natural sciences, social sciences). Country coordinators were appointed to contact and “recruit” universities, and participating universities subsequently use their own databases to invite students to participate via an email with a link to the online survey.3

We use the international GUESSS data collected between March and May 2011 from 489 universities in 26 countries, resulting in a data base of 93,265 respondents. In most countries, data were collected in two rounds (i.e., initial invitation and reminder), and the survey was translated into the local language. The 2011 GUESSS consists of different parts, including questions all respondents must answer about personal background, university context, career choice intentions and motives, and family background. Specific groups of respondents, that is, intentional founders, active entrepreneurs, and students whose parents have a family business, are subsequently asked to answer additional questions.4

Student entrepreneurs were identified with the following question: “Please indicate if, and how seriously, you have been thinking about founding your own

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3 For more background information on the GUESSS project, we would like to refer the reader to the website www.guesssurvey.org.
4 See Sieger, Fueglistaller, and Zellweger (2011) for more information on the GUESSS outcomes.
company.” Answer categories include: (1) Never, (2) Sketchily, (3) Repeatedly, (4) Relatively concrete, (5) I have made an explicit decision to found a company, (6) I have a concrete time plan when to do the different steps for founding, (7) I have already started with the realization, (8) I am already self-employed in a firm I founded myself, and (9) I have already founded more than one company, and am active in at least one of them. Participants answering (8) or (9) are classified as entrepreneurs. Being identified as an entrepreneur, the respondent was then asked questions about the founding process and characteristics and performance of the company. On average, 2.4% of all surveyed students in the different countries were self-employed.

Other researchers have used the GUESSS data for different purposes, for example to study family businesses (Zellweger, Richards, Sieger & Patel, 2016) or career choice intentions (Sieger & Monsen, 2015).

Our sample includes 2,207 student entrepreneurs from 25 countries\(^5\) who run their own venture while following a university education. About a fourth (23.7 %) of our sample consists of entrepreneurs who founded more than one venture in the past and thus can be considered serial entrepreneurs. The final sample, excluding missing data for the dependent, independent, and control variables, consists of 1,453 observations.

The average age of the entrepreneurs in the final sample is 31 years. Roughly two-thirds of the respondents are male (69%). The self-reported median annual sales in 2010 amounted to 12,539 Euro with an average of 447,934 Euro. However, only 26.4% of the respondents managed to generate more than 50,000 Euro in sales. Almost half of our sample did not employ any staff (49.1%), 15.4%

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\(^5\) These countries include: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Pakistan, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Although Japan participated in the study, this country did not report student entrepreneurs.
had one employee, 10.5% had two employees, and the remainder employed three or more people (25%). About one third (35.4%) of the ventures in our sample is younger than 2 years, and roughly another third (29.9%) is between 2 and 5 years old. The remainder (34.7%) are ventures of 5 years and older. Most firms operate in the service industry (51.8%), while agriculture, forestry, and fishing is least common (3%).

2.3.2 Measures

2.3.2.1 Venture Performance
The measurement of the dependent variable was adapted from Eddleston, Kellermanns and Sarathy (2008). Respondents were asked to rate the performance of their business since its establishment in comparison to their competitors on a 7-point Likert scale (1=worse, 4=equal, 7=better). Dess and Robinson (1984) suggest that subjective ratings of company performance are closely related to objective performance measures, and may be used when objective data are not available. We constructed an index of performance by taking an average of the results across three dimensions, namely development of sales, market share, and profit ($\alpha = .88$).

2.3.2.2 Causation and Effectuation
The measures for the independent variables were adapted from Chandler et al. (2011), who validated causation and effectuation measures with the help of exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, showing content validity, face validity, predictive validity, and construct validity. We follow the terminology used by Chandler et al., which differs slightly from that originally proposed by Sarasvathy (2001), but relates to a scale that has been validated for collecting survey data. See Table 2.2 for a comparison of terminologies.

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6 In their study, Eddleston et al. (2008) also refer to Love, Priem and Lumpkin (2002) as well as Venkatraman and Ramanujam (1987) who support this claim and conclude that subjective measures and objective measures of performance are strongly correlated.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall premise</th>
<th>Non-predictive control</th>
<th>“Effectuation [...] focuses on the controllable aspects of an unpredictable future. The logic for using effectuation processes is: To the extent that we can control the future, we do not need to predict it.” (p.252)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As originally conceptualized (Sarasvathy, 2001)</td>
<td>As operationalized for validated scale (Chandler et al., 2011)</td>
<td>--- ¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Starting point for reasoning/action</td>
<td>Means-driven action</td>
<td>“Only some means or tools are given; decision-making [...] help choose between possible effects that can be created with given means; given specific means, choice of effect is driven by characteristics of the actor and his or her ability to discover and use contingencies.” (p.251)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Experimentation</td>
<td>“a focus on short-term experiments to identify business opportunities in an unpredictable future” (p.377)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk predisposition</td>
<td>Focus on affordable loss</td>
<td>“Effectuation predetermines how much loss is affordable and focuses on experimenting with as many strategies as possible with the given limited means. The effectuator prefers options that create more options in the future over those that maximize returns in the present.” (p.252)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Affordable loss</td>
<td>“a focus on projects where the loss in a worst-case scenario is affordable” (p.377)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude towards third parties</td>
<td>Focus on partnerships</td>
<td>“Effectuation emphasizes strategic alliances and precommitments from stakeholders as a way to reduce and/or eliminate uncertainty and to erect entry barriers.” (p.252)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-commitments</td>
<td>“an emphasis on pre-commitments and strategic alliances to control an unpredictable future” (p.377)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental contingencies</td>
<td>Leverage contingencies</td>
<td>“Effectuation [...] would be better for exploiting contingencies that arose unexpectedly over time.” (p.252)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>“exploitation of environmental contingencies by remaining flexible” (p.377)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Not operationalized or included in research.

Table 2.2 Overview of Effectuation Principles
Respondents answered a series of questions about how they laid the foundation for their company by rating different founding strategies on a 7-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree). Our exploratory factor analysis yielded a one-factor solution for the causation items and a four-factor solution for the effectuation items. These latter four factors corresponded to the effectuation dimensions of experimentation, affordable loss, pre-commitment, and flexibility (see Table 2.3). We constructed the scale variables by calculating average scores for the items representing the underlying dimensions. Cronbach’s alpha was used to assess the internal consistency of the scales. Nunnally (1978) proposes a value of at least 0.7 for a reliable scale, a requirement that is satisfied in our study. The unidimensional construct of causation was measured using a 5-item scale ($\alpha = .90$). Effectuation was measured along its four dimensions: using a 3-item scale for experimentation ($\alpha = .76$), a 3-item scale for affordable loss ($\alpha = .87$), a 2-item scale for pre-commitment ($\alpha = .79$) and a 4-item scale for flexibility ($\alpha = .76$; see Table 2.4). We also constructed an aggregated effectuation measure that included all items ($\alpha = .88$).

---

7 It should be noted that one item from the GUESSS database has been deleted, namely a reverse-phrased question for the inverse of the item asking whether the product/service provided is essentially the same as originally conceptualized. Even after recoding the item to match the direction of the other questions in the scale, it turned out to be problematic ($\alpha = .66$). As this item is tautological and does not add value to the scale, it was removed.
### Table 2.3 Factor Analysis Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor Analysis Results</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I analyzed long run opportunities and selected what I thought would provide the best returns.</td>
<td>.751</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I designed and planned business strategies.</td>
<td></td>
<td>.845</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I organized and implemented control processes to make sure we meet objectives.</td>
<td></td>
<td>.805</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I researched and selected target markets and did meaningful competitive analysis.</td>
<td></td>
<td>.820</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I designed and planned production and marketing efforts.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.790</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I experimented with different products and/or business models.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The product/service that I now provide is substantially different than I first imagined.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I tried a number of different approaches until I found a business model that worked.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I was careful not to commit more resources than I could afford to lose.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.843</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I was careful not to risk more money than I was willing to lose with my initial idea.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.902</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>I was careful not to risk so much money that the company would be in real trouble financially if things did not work out.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I allowed the business to evolve as opportunities emerged.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.788</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I adapted what I was doing to the resources we had.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.700</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I was flexible and took advantage of opportunities as they arose.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.819</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I avoided courses of action that restricted our flexibility and adaptability.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.509</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I used a substantial number of agreements with customers, suppliers and other organizations and people to reduce the amount of uncertainty.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I used pre-commitments from customers and suppliers as often as possible.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.848</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Principal component analysis, varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization and 5 factors.
### Causation

I analysed long run opportunities and selected what I thought would provide the best returns.

I designed and planned business strategies.

I organized and implemented control processes to make sure we meet objectives.

I researched and selected target markets and did meaningful competitive analysis.

I designed and planned production and marketing efforts.

### Effectuation:

**Experimentation**

I experimented with different products and/or business models.

The product/service that I now provide is substantially different than I first imagined.

I tried a number of different approaches until I found a business model that worked.

---

**Affordable Loss**

I was careful not to commit more resources than I could afford to lose.

I was careful not to risk more money than I was willing to lose with my initial idea.

I was careful not to risk so much money that the company would be in real trouble financially if things did not work out.

---

**Pre-commitment**

I used a substantial number of agreements with customers, suppliers and other organizations and people to reduce the amount of uncertainty.

I used pre-commitments from customers and suppliers as often as possible.

---

**Flexibility**

I allowed the business to evolve as opportunities emerged.

I adapted what I was doing to the resources we had.

I was flexible and took advantage of opportunities as they arose.

I avoided courses of action that restricted our flexibility and adaptability.

---

1 Item deleted: The product/service that I now provide is essentially the same as originally conceptualized.

---

**Table 2.4 Causation and Effectuation Scale (adapted from Chandler et al., 2011)**

2.3.2.3 **Control Variables**

We control for several background characteristics of the entrepreneur that are likely to influence venture performance, including the entrepreneur’s age, gender, commitment, prior experience, and parental role models. The age of the entrepreneur may capture endowments of human capital, such as work and life...
experience (Cowling & Taylor, 2001; Gimeno, Folta, Cooper & Woo, 1997). The literature has furthermore reported gender differences in venture performance, suggesting that female entrepreneurs “underperform” as compared to male entrepreneurs, at least on financial metrics (e.g., Du Rietz & Henrekson, 2000; Fairlie & Robb, 2009). We also control for the degree of commitment, using a measure for the average number of weekly hours spent by the entrepreneur on company-related activities. We do so because we expect that entrepreneurs who put more time and effort into their ventures will experience better venture performance (Meyer, Stanley, Herscovitch & Topolnytsky, 2002).

We account for experience effects by including measures for relevant work experience, entrepreneurial experience, and parental role models. Research has shown that industry-specific knowledge and work experience are important for venture performance (e.g., Lee & Tsang, 2001; Van Praag, 2003). We captured work experience as the total number of years the entrepreneur had worked in related jobs before founding his or her firm. We also included a control variable capturing whether the entrepreneur had founded more than one venture in the past (0=no, 1=yes), thus possessing entrepreneurial experience. In addition, (prospective) entrepreneurs can learn about the “nuts and bolts” of venturing from the example set by entrepreneurial parents. Indeed, prior studies have found that being raised in an entrepreneurial household is positively associated with new venture success (e.g., Duchesneau & Gartner, 1990; Gimeno et al., 1997). We control for parental role modeling effects by including a variable indicating whether or not the student entrepreneur had at least one self-employed parent (0=none, 1=at least one).

In addition to individual-level factors, we include several firm-specific (dummy) variables that are commonly associated with firm outcomes. Firm age was measured as the time passed (in years) since the entrepreneur incurred the first expenses for his/her company. Firm size was measured in term of the firm’s current number of FTE employees. We also included dummy variables (0=no, 1=yes) to
control for industry effects. We used the U.S. Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) to group firms as follows: agriculture, forestry and fishing (SIC0); construction and manufacturing (SIC1/2/3); transportation and communications/information technology (SIC4); wholesale and retail trade (SIC5); finance, insurance and real estate (SIC6); and other (SIC9). We used businesses in services (SIC7/8) as our reference category.

Finally, to account for country-level cultural effects, we constructed country clusters based on geographical and cultural proximity (cf. Ronen & Shenkar, 1985). Dummy variables (0=no, 1=yes) were included for Northern Europe (Finland), Western Europe (Belgium, France, Great Britain, Ireland, Netherlands), Eastern Europe (Russia), Southern/Southeast Europe (Greece, Portugal, Romania), Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico), Africa (South Africa), and Asia (China, Singapore). Central Europe (Austria, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Switzerland) was used as reference category.

2.4 Results

2.4.1 Hypothesis Testing

We tested our hypotheses using hierarchical ordinary least squares estimations. With a variance inflation factor (VIF) not greater than 2 for the explanatory variables, there was no reason to suspect multicollinearity problems. While Neter, Wasserman and Kutner (1990) suggest a cut-off value of 10, we stuck to a more conservative threshold (Belsley, Kuh & Welsch, 1980; O’Brien, 2007). The low to moderate magnitude of the correlations reported in Table 2 also indicates that distortion of our results due to multicollinearity issues is not likely.

The descriptive statistics reported in Table 2.5 show that, on average, respondents reported equal or slightly higher performance as compared to their

---

8 Please note that the dummy variable for the independent cultural block (Pakistan), did not include any valid cases for analysis after the pairwise deletion of cases with missing values.
competitors (M = 4.28). Effectuation (M = 4.66) is used more often than causation (M = 4.28). A paired t-test reveals that this difference is statistically significant (p < .01). When we regressed venture performance on these two decision logics, however (Table 3, Model II), the effect of causation (t = 7.10) turned out to be almost twice as large as the effect of effectuation (t = 4.10). We furthermore find a strong positive correlation between effectuation and causation (r = .58, p < .01). In fact, the causation construct correlates more strongly with effectuation than with any other variable. This is an important precursor to a valid test of hypothesis 3, as it suggests that entrepreneurs indeed frequently use the two decision logics in tandem (r = .58; p < .01). The two constructs are thus not independent, and certainly not one another’s inverse. We will return to this finding in the discussion. For work experience and firm size, the standard deviation is relatively high compared to the mean score. This is because in both cases almost half of the sample reported to have no work experience (44.8 %) and no employees (49.1 %).

Our regression results can be found in Table 2.6. The first model includes only control variables. We added the independent variables causation and effectuation in the second model, the interaction term between effectuation and causation in the third model, and the individual effectuation dimensions (experimentation, affordable loss, pre-commitment, and flexibility) in the fourth model. Finally, the interaction terms between causation and the four effectuation dimensions were added in the fifth and last model.
### Table 2.5 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables and scales</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
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<th>3</th>
<th>3a</th>
<th>3b</th>
<th>3c</th>
<th>3d</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
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<td>.88</td>
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<td>.90</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Effectuation</td>
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<td>1.07</td>
<td>.88</td>
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<td>3a. Experimentation</td>
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<td>3b. Afforable loss</td>
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<td>.90</td>
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<tr>
<td>3c. Pre-commitment</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>.76</td>
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<td>3d. Flexibility</td>
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<td>5. Gender</td>
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<td>6. Commitment</td>
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<td>21.31</td>
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<td>7. Self-employed</td>
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<td>8. Work experience</td>
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<td>9. Entrepreneurial</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Firm age</td>
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<td>5.81</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Firm size</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>7.75</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Reliability of the measure in parentheses (Cronbach’s alpha).

* p<.05; ** p<.01.

a 0=Male, 1=Female; b Average hours worked/week; c 0=No, 1=At least one; d Total years of relevant work experience (assuming 50 weeks with 40 hours/week per year); e 0=No, 1=Yes; f Current number of FTE
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model I</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model II</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model III</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model IV</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model V</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Std. coeff.</td>
<td>t-value</td>
<td>Std. coeff.</td>
<td>t-value</td>
<td>Std. coeff.</td>
<td>t-value</td>
<td>Std. coeff.</td>
<td>t-value</td>
<td>Std. coeff.</td>
<td>t-value</td>
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<tr>
<td>Causation</td>
<td>.226***</td>
<td>7.095</td>
<td>.235***</td>
<td>7.393</td>
<td>.209***</td>
<td>6.463</td>
<td>.237***</td>
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<td>.117***</td>
<td>3.898</td>
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<td>Experimentation</td>
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<td>1.005</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.015</td>
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<tr>
<td>Affordable Loss</td>
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<td>-2.149</td>
<td>-.062*</td>
<td>-2.218</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pre-commitment</td>
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<td>4.267</td>
<td>.124***</td>
<td>4.227</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>.094**</td>
<td>3.131</td>
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<tr>
<td>Founder Age</td>
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<td>-4.128</td>
<td>-.118**</td>
<td>-3.152</td>
<td>-.109***</td>
<td>-2.911</td>
<td>-.105***</td>
<td>-2.833</td>
<td>-.098**</td>
<td>-2.637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>1.615</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>1.606</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>1.346</td>
<td>.041*</td>
<td>1.676</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>1.358</td>
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<td>Commitment</td>
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<td>.088***</td>
<td>3.391</td>
<td>.088***</td>
<td>3.393</td>
<td>.086***</td>
<td>3.334</td>
<td>.075**</td>
<td>2.884</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-employed Parents</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>1.280</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>.712</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.963</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>.788</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>.928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Experience</td>
<td>.093**</td>
<td>3.178</td>
<td>.058*</td>
<td>2.063</td>
<td>.057*</td>
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<td>.054**</td>
<td>1.957</td>
<td>.053</td>
<td>1.910</td>
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<td>Entrepreneurial Experience</td>
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<td>2.453</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td>1.484</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>1.621</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>1.313</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>1.368</td>
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<tr>
<td>Firm Age</td>
<td>.147***</td>
<td>4.312</td>
<td>.156***</td>
<td>4.784</td>
<td>.149***</td>
<td>4.573</td>
<td>.161***</td>
<td>4.996</td>
<td>.148***</td>
<td>4.553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causation x Effectuation</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causation x Experimentation</td>
<td>.079**</td>
<td>2.752</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causation x Affordable Loss</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td>.945</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causation x Pre-commitment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Causation x Flexibility</td>
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<td>-.498</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.6 Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses

Notes: IVs are mean-centered.
*** Significant at the 0.001-level (p < .001), ** Significant at the 0.01-level (p < .01), * Significant at the 0.05-level (p < .05).
The *F*-tests capturing the overall fit of the regression models to the underlying data are all statistically significant, as is the change in *F*-statistics between models. Our results support hypothesis 1, as causation significantly predicts venture performance (*β* = .23, *p* < .001; Model II). Causation remains the strongest predictor, even when the interaction term with the effectuation variable is included (*β* = .21, *p* < .001; Model IV). We also find support for hypothesis 2. Effectuation is positively related to venture performance (*β* = .12, *p* < .001; Model II). The mechanisms driving this relationship are affordable loss (*β* = -.06, *p* < .05; Model IV); pre-commitment (*β* = .13, *p* < .001; Model IV) and flexibility (*β* = .10, *p* < .001; Model IV). Whereas pre-commitment and flexibility are positively related to venture performance, affordable loss is negatively related to our dependent variable. Contrary to our expectations, we thus find that limiting downward risk hurts rather than helps venture performance. Finally, experimentation is not significantly related to venture performance (*β* = .03, *p* > .10; Model IV).

We find support for hypothesis 3, in that effectuation and causation can be seen as mutually reinforcing: the interactive effect of causation and effectuation on venture performance is positive (*β* = .09, *p* < .001; Model III & Figure 2.2). Moreover, the finding that the two logics are synergistic in nature (i.e., that the combination of effectuation and causation is stronger than the sum of its parts) is further strengthened by the fact that the sum of the effect sizes of the main effects equals 0.349 (Model II), while the effect sizes of the main effects plus that of the interaction term sum up to 0.438 (Model III).
Next, we examined the four interaction terms between causation and the disaggregated effectuation dimensions to single out the driving mechanisms behind our findings for Hypothesis 3. The combined use of causation and experimentation was positively associated with venture performance ($\beta = .08, p < .01$; Model V), while the other interaction terms did not yield statistically significant results (causation x affordable loss: $\beta = .03, p > .05$; causation x pre-commitment: $\beta = .03, p > .05$; causation x flexibility: $\beta = -.02, p > .05$; Model V). We return to these fine-grained findings in the Discussion section. See Table 2.7 for an overview of our hypotheses and a summary of our results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Proposed relationship</th>
<th>Degree of support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>An entrepreneur’s use of causal reasoning is positively related to venture performance.</td>
<td>Fully confirmed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>An entrepreneur’s use of effectual reasoning is positively related to venture performance.</td>
<td>Fully confirmed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Synergistic Effects of Causal and Effectual Decision-Making Logics

3 An entrepreneur’s joint use of causal and effectual reasoning will have a positive effect on venture performance. Fully confirmed; however, for the separate principles, only causation in conjunction with experimentation has a positive effect on venture performance.

Table 2.7 Summary of Results

2.4.2 Control Variables and Additional Analyses

For our control variables (Model I), we found a negative relationship between the entrepreneur’s age and venture performance ($\beta = -.16, p < .001$), indicating that younger entrepreneurs are more likely to have better performing firms. An entrepreneur’s commitment to the venture is positively related to performance ($\beta = .13, p < .001$). Founders who spend more time on their new businesses thus appear to harvest the fruits of their labor. Similarly, previous work experience ($\beta = .09, p < .01$) and entrepreneurial experience (i.e., having founded a venture before; $\beta = .06, p < .05$) are both positively associated with venture performance. Finally, firm age ($\beta = .15, p < .001$) as well as firm size ($\beta = .14, p < .001$) are positively related to performance. Being female ($\beta = .04, p > .05$) and having self-employed parents ($\beta = .03, p > .05$) are not significantly related to performance.

To further corroborate our hypothesized results, we categorized our respondents into three groups, based on their relative scores on the effectuation and causation scales. Using the arithmetic mean of their scores on the 7-point Likert items underlying both scales, we defined the group “mainly effectual” entrepreneurs as those individuals who scored at least one and a half points higher on the effectuation than on the causation variable. Similarly, we defined the group of “mainly causal” entrepreneurs as those respondents who scored at least one and a half points higher on the causation than on the effectuation variable. The remaining individuals were assigned to the group of “balanced use” entrepreneurs by virtue of them reporting causation and effectuation scores that were less than one and a half points apart. For this analysis, due to less sample attrition, we had 1,999 responses
available. The majority of our respondents were in the “balanced use” category, namely 73.5%. The “mainly causal” category comprised 6.8% of the sample, while the “mainly effectual” category captured the remaining 19.7%. In a separate regression analysis in which we used the “balanced use” variable as our reference category, the ventures of the entrepreneurs in the “mainly effectual” category significantly underperformed the benchmark ($\beta = -0.12, p < .001$), whereas the “mainly causal” entrepreneurs were on par with it ($\beta = 0.01, p > .05$). Thus, entrepreneurs who regularly use effectual decision-making might be able to improve the performance of their ventures by increasing the degree in which they also use causal reasoning.

For reasons of brevity and readability, we chose not to include the results for our industry dummy variables and country cluster variables in Table 2.6. Both sets of variables furthermore yielded few significant results. The only industry dummy yielding a significant positive relationship with performance is SIC 6: finance, insurance and real estate ($\beta = 0.07, p < .05$). The two country clusters showing a positive and significant association with performance are Latin America ($\beta = 0.13, p < .001$) and Southern/Southeast Europe ($\beta = 0.06, p < .05$), whereas observations from the Northern European cluster were underperforming the reference category ($\beta = -0.06, p < .05$). We conclude that there are no major venture performance differences across the industries and regions represented in our data.

In our study, we relied on self-reported data for several reasons. First, obtaining independent and dependent variables from different sources was not possible, due to the international scope of the research. Second, our theoretical interest lies in entrepreneurial decision-making logics, data on which have to be obtained from research participants directly. Third, objective performance data were unavailable for most of the firms in our sample, as young and small ventures are typically not required to publicly report their financials. Due to this reliance on
self-reported data, we had to take steps to minimize the potential impact of common method bias.

In detecting and diagnosing the effects of common method variance, we followed procedures recently used by other authors whose work was published in *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice* (e.g., Lanivich, 2015; Patel & Conklin, 2012; Stevens, Moray & Bruneel, 2015). First, we believe that participants were unable to logically connect independent and dependent variables through a complex research design such as the interaction effects investigated in our study (Brockner, Siegel, Daly, Tyler & Martin, 1997; Chang, Van Witteloostuijn & Eden, 2010; Slater & Atuahene-Gima, 2004). Second, the recommendations by Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee and Podsakoff (2003) on procedural techniques for controlling for common method bias were carefully applied within the context of the GUESSS project. The international coordinating GUESSS team clearly communicated guidelines to be followed with regard to the protection of respondents’ anonymity, and a standardized invitation was sent out to the country coordinators and participating universities including a notification ensuring that all answers would be treated confidentially. In addition, entrepreneurs filled out the questionnaire online, and were not in direct contact with the researchers. Therefore, any socially desirable answers that could be inferred from the study context or the researchers themselves through personal contact were eliminated.

We tested for common method variance after the data were collected, although statistical *post hoc* analyses and controls for common method bias should be treated with caution (Conway & Lance, 2010). We used Harman’s (1967) single-factor test and performed an unrotated principal component factor analysis. Problems with common method variance are likely to be present when one single factor can be detected or when the majority of covariance can be explained by one factor (e.g., Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). The results of our analysis revealed several factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1, with the largest factor accounting for only
33.15% of the total variance. Although no single factor was found and while the largest factor did not account for the majority of the total variance, it is still possible for common method bias to be present. Hence, as Conway and Lance recommended, we also assessed construct validity to uncover the presence of method effects. As the maximum shared variance (MSV) was smaller than the average shared variance (ASV), our constructs all possessed discriminant validity. Also, the ASV was smaller than the average variance extracted (AVE) and the square root of the AVE was greater than the inter-construct correlations (Hair, Black, Babin & Anderson, 2010). There may not be convergent validity if the AVE is less than 0.5, which was the case for experimentation (AVE = 0.44), pre-commitment (AVE = 0.49), and flexibility (AVE = 0.44). However, these values are too close to the proposed threshold to be of major concern. In conclusion, we are confident that, given the outcome of our procedural precaution and statistical tests, common method bias should not be a major concern when interpreting our results.

2.5 Discussion

2.5.1 Implications

2.5.1.1 Assessing the Relationship Between Effectuation and Causation

An important first contribution of our study involves the exploration of the conceptual and empirical interrelationships between effectuation and causation. Acknowledging that the effectual approach is not inherently superior to causation, we responded to Sarasvathy’s (2001, p. 249) call to investigate the circumstances under which the use of effectuation and/or causation are conducive to venture performance. We found that effectuation is positively related to venture performance, in particular when the entrepreneur applies the effectual principles of pre-commitment and flexibility. While it seems intuitive that venture performance depends on the extent to which entrepreneurs are flexible, proactively pursue new opportunities, and adapt their businesses to a changing business environment, our
findings emphasize the importance of securing pre-commitments from third parties. It is vital for entrepreneurs to obtain commitments to their new venture from self-selected stakeholders.

To better understand the mechanisms behind the relationship between performance and the creation of pre-commitments, we draw on the notion of the skilled social actor put forward by Fligstein (1997, 2001). Skilled social actors are individuals who cooperate with others by relating to them on an empathetic level, enabling them to bring forward compelling reasons for continued cooperation. Working with stakeholders who self-commit to the new venture, the perspective of the skilled social actor is highly relevant to understand the essence of effectual entrepreneurship. In line with the concept of effectual entrepreneurship, Fligstein (2001, p. 113) argues that skilled actors of the effectual kind “do not have individual fixed interests but instead focus on the evolving collective ends. They keep their goals somewhat open ended, and they are prepared to take what the system will give.” Effectual entrepreneurs who successfully engage with others and succeed in securing pre-commitments may be regarded as having highly developed social skills. Whether the pre-commitments are from suppliers investing in the co-creation of the product or from customers engaged in promoting it, their ventures profit from this cooperation. In our study, we demonstrate that ventures relying on stakeholder pre-commitments perform better. In the future, additional research is needed to create a deeper understanding of the behavior of skilled social actors and of the role they play in the partnership principle of effectuation. For practitioners, our findings show that focusing on co-creation with stakeholders remains an essential part of their daily business operations. Not only should entrepreneurs look out for partnerships, they should also be aware of and attempt to embrace all kinds of unexpected outcomes that come from jointly shaping the future path of their ventures, and thus adopt the flexibility principle of effectuation. Such outcomes may include encounters with a product enthusiast who suggests pursuing a new target market, or negative reviews
in a major press outlet convincing the entrepreneur to work together with the critical
expert to redesign certain product features.

Furthermore, our findings show that the ventures of entrepreneurs who behave
in a less loss-averse fashion perform better. This negative effect of affordable loss
on venture performance, while surprising at first sight, is worth investigating in
more detail. Are ventures better off when entrepreneurs focus less on risking only
what they are willing to lose? While causal entrepreneurs focus on acquiring the
necessary means to achieve pre-determined goals, effectual entrepreneurs are
cautious not to commit more resources than they can bear to lose. This allows them
to fail cheap and offers them the opportunity for a rapid restart, which might be
beneficial to entrepreneurial learning or serial firm development, but which does not
necessarily lead to better venture performance. On the other hand, a substantive
literature points out that resource commitments are positively related to
performance (e.g., George, 2005; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003). The value of
applying the affordable loss principle therefore lies in loss avoidance and not in
increased performance, making a negative impact of affordable loss on venture
performance more plausible. For entrepreneurs who want to convince investors it is
important to keep in mind that, although applying the affordable loss principle might
be beneficial for starting a venture, at a later stage a more causal approach may be
preferred. Therefore, when seeking investments, the entrepreneur may also want to
rely (at least to some extent) on profit forecasts and deliberate sales planning. This
tactic does not only contribute to firm performance, but may also persuade investors
by signaling the willingness and ability to pursue firm growth future life-cycle
stages (Fisher et al., 2016).

Ultimately, we cannot disregard the beneficial effects of causation on venture
performance. Our findings are in line with the abundant literature pointing at the
advantages of new venture planning (e.g., Brinckmann et al., 2010; Burke et al.,
2010; Chwolka & Raith, 2012; Delmar & Shane, 2003; Gruber, 2007). But we
should not infer from these findings that causation is always the more effective entrepreneurial logic for safeguarding venture performance. While previous research has suggested that business planning has a largely positive effect on performance, it also acknowledges the boundary conditions beyond which these findings do not hold. For instance, Gruber (2007) stresses that, in highly dynamic environments, entrepreneurs can profit from planning activities combined with speeding up the planning task. We would welcome future studies explicating these boundary conditions further.

2.5.1.2 Linking Causation and Effectuation to Venture Performance

A second contribution of our work is the insight it provides into the underlying mechanisms linking effectuation and causation to venture performance. As shown empirically, the two constructs are positively correlated and therefore not independent. In fact, we demonstrate that the two logics are mutually reinforcing and contribute jointly to venture performance. Surprisingly, we find that only the effectual principle of experimentation significantly strengthens the relationship between causation and performance. In light of this finding, it may be interesting for entrepreneurs to consider applying a “planning effectuator” approach. Although this seems to be a contradiction in terms, an entrepreneur who designs business strategies for a new venture may still benefit from experimenting with the product offering and making use of the resources at hand (e.g., identity, knowledge, networks). While the effectual approach tends to target the product of the firm, the planning approach allows the entrepreneur to map the general direction in which the business is heading. From a practitioner perspective, entrepreneurs are advised to focus on effectuation while remaining committed to planning mechanisms. Financially healthy firms will continue to use planning, but combine this with an effectual approach. An example is an entrepreneur who may have a desired production schedule for the next year, while at the same time changing the key features of the product based on customer feedback.
2.5.1.3 Future Research Agenda

As a third and final contribution to advance the effectuation literature, we make a plea for focusing on three additional matters in future research. First, we emphasize the need to refine existing, validated measurement scales. Although a detailed discussion of methodological issues of existing scales is beyond the scope of our study, we would like to point out that future research would benefit from further refinement of the effectuation measures developed in the pioneering study by Chandler et al. (2011). They operationalized effectuation as “a formative second-order construct consisting of reflective first-order sub-components” (p. 382). In this conceptualization, effectuation is made up of several decision-making logics representing separate formative dimensions of the effectuation construct. The individual dimensions themselves (i.e., experimentation, affordable loss, pre-commitment, flexibility), however, are treated as reflective in nature (Perry et al., 2012, p. 852). In our view, future research would benefit from refining or expanding the reflective items that ultimately make up the effectuation construct. For instance, the items coding for affordable loss capture financial resources well, but there is still room to also include the other resources the entrepreneur commits to the founding process. For example, Daniel et al. (2014) recommend investigating social losses. In addition, we encourage researchers to closely examine dimensions in the causation construct. Although causation potentially consists of as many dimensions as effectuation, this is often neglected in prior research.

Second, more work is needed to disentangle the nomological web of antecedents and consequences of effectuation (Harms & Schiele, 2012). In addition to creating more clarity with regard to the construct itself, the concept of effectuation may be better positioned in its network of sources, manifestations, and interrelationships. For instance, next to examining the role of individual-level characteristics such as entrepreneurial self-efficacy (Engel, Dimitrova, Khapova, & Elfring, 2014) or identity (Alsos, Clausen, Hytti, & Solvoll, 2016) within the context
of effectuation research, future research could look at antecedents of effectuation at the team or firm level. Also, more research on each of the effectual principles is desirable. For example, while Dew, Sarasvathy, Read, and Wiltbank (2009) examined the affordable loss principle in more detail, other researchers could focus on an entrepreneurs’ ability of leveraging contingencies or skillful building of partnerships. Finally, and latching on to our findings concerning the negative relationship between adherence to the affordable loss principle and venture performance, there is a continued need for future studies reflecting on what the appropriate dependent variable for effectuation research ought to be (McKelvie et al., 2013).

Third, more research is needed to further distinguish the concept of effectuation from other entrepreneurial behaviors like bricolage (Baker & Nelson, 2005), improvisation (Hmieleski & Corbett, 2008), and bootstrapping (Bhide, 1991). Fisher (2012) made a first step in this direction by examining entrepreneurial bricolage in comparison with effectuation and causation. Similarly, Welter, Mauer and Wuebker (2016) discussed effectuation and bricolage in the opportunity creation framework, and in their case study Evers and O’Gorman (2011) examined effectuation and improvisation in the context of the internationalization process. Still, additional research is needed to further establish the distinctiveness of the effectuation concept. For example, to what extent is improvisation – the convergence of design and execution (Miner, Bassoff & Moorman, 2001) – an integral part of employing effectual logics? And how does bootstrapping, which relies on the use of limited resources, fit with the means-orientation of effectual entrepreneurs and connect with the affordable loss principle? Future work on the construct clarity of effectuation should address these questions head-on.

2.5.2 Limitations

As with all empirical work, we acknowledge that there are limitations present in our study. As we are working with cross-sectional data, causality cannot be inferred.
Although it is conceivable that entrepreneurs with better performing firms pursue more causal strategies, our data does not allow us to draw conclusions about the order of events. Due to the cross-sectional nature of our research design, we had to ask entrepreneurs about two different (temporal) instances in one questionnaire (i.e., asking them about the approach they chose at the time of venture founding, as well as about current venture performance). Other time-related issues may, however, be more prominent. While we assume the complementarity of the two approaches during the whole venturing process, the sequential use of causation and effectuation is not traceable within our data. That is, the “planning effectuator” might experiment in the early stages of the venture and gradually switch to a more causal approach in later stages. Additionally, recall bias can exist for the independent variables, although we believe that the magnitude of this bias will be limited, given that the ventures in our sample are, on average, five years old. The ability to accurately judge the use of a certain decision-making approach is not likely to depend on details that are difficult to remember after this period of time. Future research, however, should consider longitudinal research designs when linking causation and effectuation to venture performance. It would be advisable to follow founders from the inception of their new venture to later stages, when relevant short-term performance outcomes (e.g., first sale or reaching the break-even point) and long-term performance outcomes (e.g., hire of first employees or consecutive annual sales) can be measured. Questions about the venturing process can then be asked along the way to prevent recall bias.

Another limitation is related to the sample. Respondents come from many countries, and while we control for international differences by grouping them together in country clusters, unaccounted for cultural differences may still be present in our data. Multilevel modeling can account for the nested structure of the data, which is relevant when researchers are interested in explaining any discrepancies between entrepreneurs from different countries. Furthermore, because effectuation
is particularly relevant in environments in which uncertainty is high, it may be interesting to examine the link between country-specific characteristics, such as uncertainty avoidance, and the decision-making behavior of founders. In addition, the use of student samples in research is often criticized due to a purported lack of generalizability (Copeland, Francia & Strawser, 1973; Robinson, Huefner & Hunt, 1991). However, unlike other studies that focus on students with the intention of starting a business after they graduate (e.g., Krueger, Reilly & Carsrud, 2000; Souitaris, Zerbinati & Al-Laham, 2007; Zhao, Seibert & Hills, 2005), we examine student entrepreneurs that are already active. Politis, Winborg and Lindholm Dahlstrand (2011) have demonstrated that student entrepreneurs are comparable to expert entrepreneurs in terms of their reliance on effectual reasoning. Lastly, as addressed in the previous section, our sample does not account for discontinuation of ventures and survivor bias may be present. Therefore, our results apply to operational ventures only.

### 2.6 Conclusion

With the present study, we aim to advance our understanding of how the interplay of effectuation and causation influences venture performance. Both logics have a claim to success in their own right. As the entrepreneurship literature frequently points out, the adoption of an effectual decision-making logic can be promising for firm founders. However, we caution entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship scholars not to neglect the importance of a planning-oriented, causal approach. When combined with effectuation, causation is beneficial to venture performance. This relationship is driven by experimentation, that is, the ability of an entrepreneur to create opportunities and shape an unpredictable future using the means at hand, while applying the logic of causation and employing traditional business planning activities concurrently. These insights contribute to the existing literature, but also reinforce the call for continued advancement in effectuation research.
CHAPTER

3

Proto-Institutional Emergence in Technology-Driven Contexts: Dialectic Institutional Work in the Dutch Drone Industry

This chapter was prepared in collaboration with Pursey Heugens.
3.1 Introduction

How do regulatory proto-institutions arise in the type of innovation-intensive and behavioral change-prone organizational fields that are emblematic for technology-driven contexts? Prior research in institutional work on the creation of new institutional arrangements has predominantly focused on the relationship between agency and structure, gleaning inspiration from the literature on institutional entrepreneurship (Garud, Jain & Kumaraswamy, 2002; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Maguire, Hardy & Lawrence, 2004). Other authors have stressed that “institutional work insists on the need to consider the permanent recursive and dialectical interaction between agency and institutions” (Lawrence, Suddaby & Leca, 2011, p. 55), thus pointing to the interactive element of institutional work, albeit still focused on the agency-structure relationship. However, a complete picture of institutional emergence requires that we move beyond accounts of how heroic institutional entrepreneurs struggle with fully waxed institutional structures. Especially in the type of innovation-intensive and behaviorally fickle organizational fields that make up technology-driven contexts, our current theoretical understanding of institutional change does not suffice for grasping how multiple key stakeholders, especially entrepreneurs and regulators, shape and are shaped by emerging proto-institutions. In fact, Forbes and Kirsch (2011, p. 589) earlier claim that the study of emerging industries “remains relatively neglected by researchers” in the entrepreneurship domain still rings true today.

In such settings, the grip of proto-institutions – novel normative prescriptions that are not yet fully legitimated and diffused (Lawrence, Hardy & Phillips, 2002; Zietsma & McKnight, 2009) – on entrepreneurial behavior is looser than it is in mature fields. More specifically, because regulators are unable to fully oversee the new realities that emerge from entrepreneurial initiatives in such contexts and, concurrently, are eager to facilitate initiatives that hold the promise of economic development in areas otherwise characterized by low-growth equilibrium
conditions, technology entrepreneurs are given unprecedented freedom to participate in the creation of regulatory proto-institutions. In technology-driven contexts, entrepreneurial behavior itself has thus become an important source of industry regulation in the sense that the regulatory proto-institutional prescriptions entrepreneurs face have, at least in part, sprung forth from their own interactions with regulators. At present, however, we lack theoretical frameworks that capture how entrepreneur-regulator interactions give rise to regulatory proto-institutional emergence in technology-driven contexts. Our aim with this study is to develop a process-theoretical account of these dialectic interaction patterns between entrepreneurs and regulators, based on multiple complementary sources of longitudinal qualitative data. We thus set out to document the micro-momentary actions through which entrepreneurs shape their own regulatory contexts in interaction with regulators. These actions have a profound conditioning effect on the opportunity and constraint structures facing later-generation entrepreneurs.

Our study is set in an organizational field that is wholly representative of technology-driven contexts: the Dutch industry for businesses that produce, commercially operate, and/or deliver services for remotely-piloted aircraft systems (RPAS), colloquially referred to as “drones”. We rely on several sources of longitudinal qualitative data, including participation in industry events, analysis of archival data, field notes and personal observations, as well as twenty-seven semi-structured, in-depth interviews with industry participants. Our analyses show how the regulatory proto-institutions in this field have emerged in four consecutive evolutionary phases. Proto-institutional structures emerge in each phase as a joint entrepreneurial and regulatory response to challenges and opportunities experienced in prior phases. At the same time, new structures also give rise to institutional frictions\textsuperscript{9}, which continue to mount until they cause an institutional transition that

\textsuperscript{9} Institutional frictions arise when institutional arrangements become increasingly inapt at remedying the social or economic problems for which they were once designed, causing the actors embedded in and dependent upon these institutions to search for alternative solutions or develop costly workarounds.
sounds in a next evolutionary phase (Padgett & Powell, 2012; Schneiberg, 2006). Our results thus have a strong processual character, in that entrepreneur-regulator interactions occur in different phases of the proto-institutional emergence process, and play a central role in moving the emergence process along from one phase to the next.

Our study makes three contributions. First, by introducing the concept of dialectic institutional work, we go beyond the commonly researched interplay between agency and structure to illustrate how diverse entrepreneur-regulator interactions in technology-driven contexts contribute to proto-institutional emergence. We specifically build on Lawrence and associates (2011, p. 56), who state that “[e]xamining institutional work in the context of emergent institutional processes points to the actions of those who affect, or attempt to affect, institutional processes at both the general and the local levels.” Following these authors’ advice, we apply the institutional work lens to analyzing the emergence of proto-institutions in technology-driven contexts. This is in line with work by Ozcan and Gurses (2018, p. 1811) who point to the need “to consider the various contradictory and complementary institutional work done by the different actors involved in institutional processes (Delbridge and Edwards, 2008)”.

Second, by translating our findings into a clear framework, we also show how entrepreneurs and regulators create new proto-institutions in technological innovation-intensive fields. Specifically, we contribute to literature on institutional emergence (Padgett & Powell, 2012) by documenting the processes through which proto-institutions evolve. In doing so, we respond to a call by McMullen and Dimov (2013) for more process-oriented approaches in entrepreneurship studies and the “need for more studies to clarify how scholars, managers and policymakers can better understand and interact with emerging industries” (Forbes & Kirsch, 2011, p. 590). Thus, we

Such frictions derive from an incoherent configuration of elements within an institutional arrangement or from “duels” between competing arrangements (Yiu, Hoskisson, Bruton, & Lu, 2014).
advance our collective understanding and show that under conditions of radical technological change and frequent behavioral adaptations (Hitt, Keats & DeMarie, 1998; Verbeke, 2018), entrepreneurs and regulators face greater uncertainty and interdependence than in mature organizational fields, leading them to engage in dialectic institutional work. We expect that the resultant process of proto-institutional emergence we document will generalize towards other nascent fields facing technological innovation-intensive conditions, including blockchain-based cryptocurrencies, platform-based sharing economy firms, and decentralized renewable energy generation. In all these cases, entrepreneurship around innovation also engenders regulatory institutional change.

3.2 Literature Review

Entrepreneurs face uncertainty regarding the future of their ventures, not only due to the uncertain nature of the business itself, but also because of uncertainty in the business environment (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2010; Ozcan & Gurses, 2018). This is especially true in technological innovation-intensive fields, in which institutionally determined opportunity and constraint structures are still in flux. Whereas it used to take decades for industries to mature, following a fairly predictable pattern of industry evolution (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006; Klepper & Graddy, 1990), institutional emergence in technological innovation-intensive fields is more rapid and less predictable due to the impact of radical technological change and frequent behavioral adaptations of involved stakeholders (Verbeke, 2018). We therefore need new frameworks to help us understand how regulatory proto-institutional structures emerge in these novel contexts. The literatures on institutional work and proto-institutional emergence offer excellent points of departure for developing these new frameworks.
3.2.1 Institutional Work

Institutional work describes the “purposeful action of individuals and organizations aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions” whereby scholars of institutional work have been concerned with “understanding the role of actors in effecting, transforming and maintaining institutions and fields” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006, p. 215). Institutional work activities have previously been documented in the literatures on institutional entrepreneurship, institutional change, and deinstitutionalization (Lawrence, Suddaby & Leca, 2009). In theorizing the process of institutional creation, Lawrence and Suddaby (2006, p. 221) distinguish between three sets of practices. These start with “overtly political work in which actors reconstruct rules, property rights and boundaries that define access to material resources”, which they refer to as vesting, defining and advocacy work. The authors then point to work directed at changing norms as well as constructing identities and networks “in which actors’ belief systems are reconfigured”. Lastly, actions aimed at mimicry, theorizing, and educating involve “abstract categorizations in which the boundaries of meaning systems are altered”.

The focus in institutional work lies on the actions taken by individuals or organizations in relation to institutions, thus putting more emphasis on agency than early neo-institutional studies (DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 1997; Oliver, 1991). Whereas earlier studies in the neo-institutional tradition tended to focus on the impact of institutionalized norms on organizational structures, recent research puts more emphasis on agency – up to the extent that entrepreneurs are portrayed “as powerful, heroic figures able to drastically shape institutions” (Lawrence et al., 2009, p. 3). Indeed, institutional entrepreneurship can be seen as one stream of research within the institutional work framework (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006, p. 216). However, it has also been argued that the creation of new institutions requires more resources and mobilizing power than what can be mustered by even the most heroic of institutional entrepreneurs; the institutional work needed to create new
institutions inevitably has to draw on a broader collection of actors. These are not only institutional entrepreneurs, but also actors “whose role is supportive or facilitative of the entrepreneur’s endeavours” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006, p. 217; Leblebici, Salancik, Copay & King, 1991).

While the institutional entrepreneurship branch of the institutional work literature predominantly focuses on the entrepreneur as the most important actor in creating new ventures, markets, and organizational fields, the relationships between entrepreneurs and other stakeholders should thus not be disregarded. Lawrence et al. (2011, p. 54) stress that it were Berger and Luckmann (1966) who already pointed out that the creation of new institutions is “arising directly from reciprocal typifications that occur in the habitual interaction of individuals”. Consideration of these interactions and relationships is crucial for understanding the interpretative activities underlying the interactive institutional work processes leading to the creation of new proto-institutions. In technological innovation-intensive fields in particular, new opportunity and constraint structures tend to emerge out of the recursive interactions and relationships between entrepreneurs and regulators, with neither party being clearly in the lead of this process.

3.2.2 Proto-Institutions

Proto-institutions are “institutions in the making” (Lawrence et al., 2002, p. 283). They consist of practices, rules, and technologies that are not yet fully established, but have the potential to become conventional institutions once they are accepted and diffused throughout the field. Thus, they form “a particular set of institutional arrangements as a solution to some problem” (Zietsma & McKnight, 2009, p. 148), where this ‘problem’ often arises from novel practices, rules, and technologies that have no standardized or institutionalized way to be dealt with. Unsurprisingly, proto-institutions are more likely to be found in emergent fields and in technological innovation-intensive fields (Maguire et al., 2004).
Research on proto-institutions tends to focus on collaboration, co-creation, or partnerships to explain the processes that shape the emergence of future institutions. In their study of an NGO in Palestine, Lawrence and colleagues (2002) zoom in on interorganizational collaborations to explain the emergence of proto-institutions, while Boxenbaum (2004) classifies the emergence of diversity management as a new practice in the Danish context as a proto-institution. Zietsma and McKnight (2009) study the Canadian coastal forest industry and identify co-creation processes that occur when proto-institutions form. Webb, Kistruck, Ireland and Ketchen Jr. (2010) take a different approach when they conceptualize proto-institutions as network-level influences that help multinational enterprises overcome institutional-level obstacles. Helfen and Sydow (2013, p. 1079) define proto-institutions as “the institutional outcomes of negotiation work” (emphasis in original), and Hensel (2018, p. 225) investigated organizational responses to proto-institutions in an effort to show “how clashes of semi-edited and unedited accounts about the proto-institution affected its adoption and implementation.” With a slightly different focus, but related to proto-institutions, is the description of Marti and Mair (2009, pp. 109-111) of provisional institutions. These are instrumentally built institutions that serve a temporary interest (in the case of the authors: poverty alleviation) for a certain period of time. In comparison to proto-institutions as discussed previously, provisional institutions are created with the intention of being a transitional means to an end. The proto-institutions that we explore go beyond temporary structures, however, in that they spring from mutual interaction patterns involving multiple stakeholder groups, whose intent it is to let these institutions acquire a more permanent character.

In sum, different actors are involved in shaping the landscape by means of their active participation in emerging technological innovation-intensive and behaviorally fickle contexts. As new practices emerge and new rules form, regulatory proto-institutions are created as a pragmatic response to recurring
problems in areas like public safety and privacy. Exploring the institutional work involved in creating these “candidates for institutionalization, if only enough members of the field will adopt them” (Zietsma & McKnight, 2009, p. 148) in the context of technology-driven fields is vital. Therefore, the research question that our study addresses is: How do regulatory proto-institutions arise in the type of technological innovation-intensive and behavioral change-prone organizational fields?

3.3 Methods

To address our research question, we relied on qualitative data from multiple sources, which allowed us to build theory inductively on the basis of a continuous analysis of the data. We compared our ongoing analyses to new insights, while remaining open to new themes emerging directly from the data, thus following an iterative process of data collection and analysis (Reay & Jones, 2016). We continued our data collection and analysis efforts until theoretical saturation was reached – the point at which no or few new insights could be generated by including more data. This is the best suited methodology for engaging with the under-researched theme of proto-institutional emergence in technological innovation-intensive fields because we witnessed many ongoing developments as they took place. The processual nature of our research question, asking the ‘how’ type of question, allowed us to generate the type of deep insights that only qualitative data is able to provide (Barley, 1990; Langley, 1999).

3.3.1 Research Context: the Dutch RPAS Industry

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) defines RPAS as a “set of configurable elements consisting of a remotely-piloted aircraft, its associated remote pilot station(s), the required command and control links and any other system elements as may be required, at any point during flight operation” (ICAO
Circular 328, p. 12). Initially, RPAS were developed and tested for military purposes, with the first ‘drones’ being launched during World War I (Austin, 2011). However, conceptions of flying machines date back to about 2500 years ago, when engineers in ancient Greece were interested in building mechanical birds or when, in China, a wooden hawk was developed (Dalamagkidis, Valavanis & Piegl, 2012). In the recent past, RPAS have been used in military conflicts and war zones. They have been used in Afghanistan, for example, since 2001, for carrying out targeted kill missions (Gregory, 2011; McBride, 2009). Only recently have RPAS begun to be used for civil purposes (Braun, Friedewald & Valkenburg, 2015). The Dutch industry for commercial RPAS emerged from the leisure-driven market for model airplanes. At the beginning of the 21st century, aircraft systems became more affordable and available to a broader public. This process was facilitated by the rise of mass-market producers such as the Chinese DJI, with their flagship aircraft, a quadrocopter called the “Phantom” (The Economist, 2015).

The Dutch RPAS industry is an appealing setting in which to study the emergence of proto-institutions characteristic for technology-driven contexts for three reasons. First, entrepreneurial activity around the use of RPAS has increased over the past several years and technology in this area continues to develop quickly. Not only is flying an RPAS seen as an entertaining leisure activity, but many companies have formed around them, either as operators, producers, or in related services for RPAS users (such as consultancy, online applications, or training). On the one hand, this offers a wide range of opportunities for entrepreneurs. On the other, this development also has implications for the broader group of stakeholders in the industry, including policy makers and citizens whose physical safety and privacy may be threatened by the use of RPAS. Second, the global sales of

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10 Note that we will refer to RPAS (Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems) in the remainder of this paper. Others refer to UAV (Unmanned Aircraft Vehicle) or UAS (Unmanned Aircraft System) more broadly. Although “drones” colloquially capture a wide variety of unmanned aircraft, the term historically has a rather negative connotation.
commercial RPAS are estimated to yield 4.8 billion US Dollars (USD) in 2021, a remarkable increase from 608 million USD in 2014 (WinterGreen Research, 2015). In Europe alone, this industry is expected to generate 10 billion Euros annually by 2035 and over 15 billion Euros annually by 2050 (SESAR, 2016). This illustrates the relevance of our research setting, not only for the Netherlands, but also in terms of industry development internationally. Third, the field is currently in its formation phase and many developments – be they technological or regulatory – are still unfolding. Efforts have been made to draw up regulatory instruction guides along the way, such as a roadmap issued by the European RPAS Steering Group in 2013 and a ‘prototype’ regulation document put forward by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) in 2016. However, only in 2018, EASA was granted the EU-wide rule-making competency for all civil drones. In spite of these efforts, the actual implementation is yet to be done and harmonized rules applying to the international airspace (similarly to manned aviation) remain years away. As such, an established institutional framework is not yet in place and development in this industry is still ongoing.

3.3.2 Data Collection

Our study includes data derived from active participation in the field, archival data and interviews. This is in line with what Gioia, Corley and Hamilton (2013, p. 19) regard as “good qualitative research”; namely, drawing from several qualitative sources with an emphasis on field observation and archival data while at “the heart of these studies is the semi-structured interview”. We conducted our interviews and field research between February 2015 and June 2017 and performed archival research between February 2015 and October 2018. Our geographical focus is on

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11 It should be noted that before June 2018, only aircraft with a weight of more than 150 kg were bound to be regulated by EASA. Aircraft that are lighter were regulated by each country’s national aviation authorities. On top, ICAO aims to provide an international regulatory framework.
the Netherlands, but we also took Europe-wide and even worldwide developments into consideration to be able to draw the bigger picture.

### 3.3.2.1 Field Work

In addition to six industry conferences, one held by the American RPAS industry association with a focus on European developments (Unmanned Systems Europe), two held by the European RPAS industry associations (RPAS CivOps and RPAS Civil Policy), one European business-to-business conference (SkyTech), one European logistics conference (Unmanned Cargo Aircraft Conference) and one Dutch logistics conference (Airneth), we also attended meetings held by the Dutch RPAS industry association (DARPAS), as well as a public parliament meeting at the Dutch House of Representatives. Notes were taken during or after these meetings to supplement the more personal accounts of the interviewed informants. In general, we tried to immerse ourselves in the field in an ethnographic manner, using field notes to structure our primary data collection and field experiences. Forbes and Kirsch (2011) stress that a ‘real-time’ approach is particularly well suited to study the emergence of a new field. We spent about 75 hours at these conferences, workshops, and meetings. In addition, most interviews conducted with entrepreneurs were combined with a visit to the entrepreneurs’ firms, to get an impression of their work environment. Products were shown and informal conversations were held with the interviewees, as well as with the other employees who were present. The time spent at these entrepreneurs’ firms adds approximately 15 hours to the total time spent conducting fieldwork. Throughout the data collection period, we maintained our awareness of the risk of becoming too close to the data, as too much researcher involvement can lead to the blind adoption of the point of view of the study’s subjects. In an effort to avoid this, we followed Gioia and associates’ (2013) lead by having one author adopt an outsider perspective, i.e. abstaining from being involved in actual fieldwork and critically reflecting on all accounts by playing the devil’s advocate.
3.3.2.2 Archival Data

We also collected presentations that were given at industry gatherings. In total, we drew on 3,593 slides that made up 240 presentations held at eleven industry conferences, workshops or seminars, of which we attended six. Two videos that were shown during these meetings were also included. Regulators and government representatives are often invited to engage in conversation with industry stakeholders and, as such, these presentations are an important source of information on the perspective of regulators. For instance, new policy plans were communicated during these presentations and updates were given on progress made by governmental working groups. As presentations are widely used to communicate and exchange ideas, they are particularly well suited to use in our analysis. Please see Table 3.1 for a description of the archival data we used.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conference/Workshop</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Total No. of Presentations (Slides)</th>
<th>Of Which: Entrepreneurs/ Firm Representatives</th>
<th>Of Which: Regulators</th>
<th>Of Which: Other Stakeholders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUVSI Unmanned Systems Europe, Brussels (Belgium)</td>
<td>3 March 2015</td>
<td>18 (234)</td>
<td>4 (51)</td>
<td>11 (164)</td>
<td>3 (19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICAO’s First Global RPAS Symposium, Montreal (Canada)</td>
<td>23/24/25 March 2015</td>
<td>86 (1405)</td>
<td>14 (242)</td>
<td>48 (785)</td>
<td>24 (378)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skytech, London (United Kingdom)</td>
<td>24 April 2015</td>
<td>9 (186)</td>
<td>4 (72)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5 (114)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workshop on Drones by the Dutch Ministry, The Hague (Netherlands)</td>
<td>28 May 2015</td>
<td>7 (52)</td>
<td>2 (25)</td>
<td>4 (16)</td>
<td>1 (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPAS CivOps - The European Civil RPAS Operators’ Forum, Brussels (Belgium)</td>
<td>19/20 January 2016</td>
<td>28 (425) also two videos</td>
<td>9 (158)</td>
<td>10 (122)</td>
<td>9 (145)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUROCAE Workshop, Brussels (Belgium)</td>
<td>4 March 2016</td>
<td>10 (153)</td>
<td>1 (16)</td>
<td>3 (35)</td>
<td>6 (102)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd International Unmanned Cargo Aircraft Conference, Enschede (Netherlands)</td>
<td>26 May 2016</td>
<td>8 (153)</td>
<td>3 (63)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5 (90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EASA Workshop on Drones, Cologne (Germany)</td>
<td>20 June 2016</td>
<td>12 (141)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7 (89)</td>
<td>5 (52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Level Conference on Drones, Warsaw (Poland)</td>
<td>24 November 2016</td>
<td>30 (295)</td>
<td>7 (47)</td>
<td>13 (144)</td>
<td>10 (104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airmeth Seminar on UAVs, The Hague (Netherlands)</td>
<td>8 December 2016</td>
<td>3 (53)</td>
<td>2 (35)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Civil RPAS Policy, Regulatory &amp; Innovation Forum, Brussels (Belgium)</td>
<td>13/14 June 2017</td>
<td>29 (496)</td>
<td>9 (161)</td>
<td>8 (114)</td>
<td>12 (221)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>240 (3593)</td>
<td>55 (870)</td>
<td>104 (1469)</td>
<td>81 (1254)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 3.1 Overview Archival Data*
3.3.2.3 Interviews

We conducted a total of 27 semi-structured, in-depth interviews, of which 20 were held with Dutch entrepreneurs, four with representatives of regulatory bodies\textsuperscript{12} and three with other stakeholders (one being a commercial pilot working for a start-up RPAS manufacturer, one being the director of geo-information at an aerial mapping company using drones as a new tool in their business, and one being an employee of an intergovernmental economic institution dealing with RPAS-related topics). In doing so, we relied on a theoretical sampling approach. After the initial introduction provided by the chairman of the Dutch RPAS association, we approached several entrepreneurs for an interview. At the end of each interview, the interviewee was asked to refer us to other key players in the field, based on the categories and themes that emerged during the interview. Ultimately, by following up on our emerging theoretical ideas, we construed a sample that included various businesses, producers, operators and service providers, as well as entrepreneurs who had discontinued their venture. Please see Table 3.2 for a description of the sample.

\textsuperscript{12} We refer to representatives of regulatory bodies when describing individuals representing governmental authorities, such as national regulators, supervisory bodies, other European and Dutch legislative agencies or supra-national mandated workgroups. These are decision-makers shaping, implementing and monitoring the regulatory context (Elert, Henrekson & Wernberg, 2016).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent</th>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Firm Description</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R1</td>
<td>Service provider (non-flying)</td>
<td>Consultancy</td>
<td>Self-employed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>Manufacturer</td>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>Co-founder, CTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R3</td>
<td>Service provider (non-flying)</td>
<td>Consultancy, conference organization</td>
<td>Founder, CEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R4</td>
<td>Service provider (non-flying)</td>
<td>ICT solutions</td>
<td>Self-employed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R5</td>
<td>Manufacturer</td>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>CEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R6</td>
<td>Manufacturer, operator</td>
<td>R&amp;D, manufacturing</td>
<td>Co-founder, CEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R7</td>
<td>Operator</td>
<td>Inspection, search and rescue, mapping, remote sensing</td>
<td>Co-founder, marketing &amp; sales director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R8</td>
<td>Operator (firm discontinued)</td>
<td>Emergency response, law enforcement, security</td>
<td>Co-founder, COO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R9</td>
<td>Operator</td>
<td>Bird pest control</td>
<td>Co-founder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R10</td>
<td>Operator</td>
<td>Energy generation</td>
<td>Co-founder, director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R11</td>
<td>Operator (firm discontinued)</td>
<td>Aerial mapping, remote sensing</td>
<td>Founder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R12</td>
<td>Operator</td>
<td>Film and photography</td>
<td>Co-founder, managing director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R13</td>
<td>Manufacturer</td>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>Compliance officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R14</td>
<td>Operator</td>
<td>Inspection, security, mapping, aerial imagery</td>
<td>Co-founder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R15</td>
<td>Governmental institution</td>
<td>Governmental institution</td>
<td>Supervisory body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R16</td>
<td>Governmental institution</td>
<td>Governmental institution</td>
<td>Supervisory body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R17</td>
<td>Operator</td>
<td>Film, inspection</td>
<td>Founder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R18</td>
<td>Operator</td>
<td>Geodata</td>
<td>Director geoinformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R19</td>
<td>Manufacturer, operator</td>
<td>Medical supply, traffic management, IT solutions</td>
<td>Founder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R20</td>
<td>Manufacturer</td>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>Co-founder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R21</td>
<td>Intergovernmental economic institution</td>
<td>Intergovernmental economic institution</td>
<td>Economist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R22</td>
<td>Operator</td>
<td>Film and photography</td>
<td>Self-employed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R23</td>
<td>Operator</td>
<td>Film and photography</td>
<td>Self-employed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R24</td>
<td>Governmental institution</td>
<td>Governmental institution</td>
<td>Rule-making body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R25</td>
<td>Governmental institution</td>
<td>Governmental institution</td>
<td>Rule-making body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R26</td>
<td>Operator</td>
<td>Film &amp; photography, service platform, inspection</td>
<td>Co-founder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R27</td>
<td>Operator</td>
<td>Film &amp; photography, service platform, inspection</td>
<td>Co-founder</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 3.2 Interview Sample Overview*
All interviews were conducted in Dutch, with the exception of one interview held in English. The questions were open-ended and probing was used to give interviewees the space to express deep thoughts and elaborate on answers. These interviews were conversational, but we did make use of an interview protocol to ensure that certain key topics were covered in all conversation (see Table 3.3 and Table 3.4). As Gioia and colleagues (2013) suggest, all questions were focused on our research question but did not lead the respondents in any particular direction. We started out by asking the entrepreneurs about the process of starting their own business, the approach they took during their venturing endeavors, the current situation and problems they might be facing (both in the Netherlands and abroad), as well as their views on future developments. Regulators were asked about their work practices related to RPAS, their interaction with entrepreneurs, as well as their views on the current situation, problems they face in their work, and future developments both domestically and EU-wide. Interviews with other informants were used to obtain an alternative perspective and were treated as background information in an effort to understand multiple viewpoints on the issue at hand. These interviews also, in large part, followed the entrepreneurs’ interview protocol. Most interviews were conducted face-to-face (N=20) and where that was not possible, they were conducted over the telephone (N=7). We translated the interview quotes we used to illustrate our findings into English ourselves, but had the translation reviewed by an English native speaker conversant in Dutch.

All interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. In a single case (Respondent 21), the recording device did not work and an interview summary was written afterwards. On average, interviews lasted about 75 minutes. We obtained a total of 446 pages of transcripts (Arial, 11 pt., single line-spacing) from the almost 30 hours of interviews.
### Topic Area | Sample Questions
---|---
**Venture founding** | • How did you start your business?
• What kind of resources were important to use? How did you get them?

**Interactions with regulators** | • How important do you regard relationships with government institutions?
• Could you please describe the kind of interactions you have with regulators?

**Industry context** | • What does it mean to you to be an entrepreneur in the RPAS industry?
• How do you keep up with (regulatory) developments in the industry?

**Regulatory developments** | • Are you more focused on Dutch or European rules and regulations?
• Where does the industry stand in five years concerning rules and regulations?

*Table 3.3 Interview Protocol Entrepreneurs*

### Topic Area | Sample Questions
---|---
**Work practices** | • How did your work change since RPAS became more popular?
• Can you describe some of the problems you face in your work?

**Interaction with entrepreneurs** | • How does the interaction with entrepreneurs look like?
• How flexible are you in helping entrepreneurs?

**Industry context** | • What will be more important in the future, Dutch regulations or Europe-wide ones?
• What are your thoughts on illegal operations/flights?

**Regulatory developments** | • What are remaining, important questions that need to be answered in the future?
• What do you expect will change within the next five years?

*Table 3.4 Interview Protocol Regulators*
3.3.3 Data Analysis

We adopt an interpretivist epistemology in this study, consistent with the constructionist research stream, which posits that the social world is constructed through the actions of individuals acting upon it (Charmaz, 2014). In analyzing our qualitative data, we employed a pattern-inducing technique in which “researchers gather empirical textual data that range from interview to direct observation and often include personal experience, […] cluster text segments in meaningful categories that they believe reveal actor behaviors […] make sense out of the grouped data” (Reay & Jones, 2016, p. 449/450). We analyzed our data using NVivo 11. Archival data was first sorted into three categories – presentations by entrepreneurs, presentations by regulators, and presentations by other stakeholders – and were then analyzed. Presentations by other stakeholders include those given by universities, lawyers, industry associations, test sites, training and certifying agencies, research institutions and industry consortia, to name a few. Naturally, our own presentations were excluded from the analyses. During the first step, open coding, we stayed close to the participants’ vocabularies and sorted information into meaningful categories. Afterwards, we went through the codes and looked for connections between the direct information gathered from the first step in the analysis process. From this, broad themes emerged. Finally, we grouped themes together, which led to the overall constructs that are an important part of our process model, the diverse entrepreneur-regulator interactions. Table 3.5 displays the codes, broader themes and overall constructs.
### Entrepreneurs’ Perception: Rules apply/are followed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulatory Context as Enabling</th>
<th>Regulatory Context as Constraining</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regulation as precursors of competitive advantage</td>
<td>Rules as conduit for good regulatory relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Adherence to strict rules guarantees high quality operations (“if you can fly in NL, you can fly everywhere”)</td>
<td>- Feeling of ownership of rules, having a say in it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Knowledge of rules in manned aviation helps to understand how the system works and why rules are important</td>
<td>- To be taken seriously you need to play by the rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Difficult regulatory framework allows for specialisation, offer clear advantage</td>
<td>- Government is partner, not enemy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Difficult regulatory framework</td>
<td>- Regulations attempts lagging practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Difficult regulatory framework</td>
<td>- It is all about “politics”, unclear who decides and how</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Technology and market are ready and developed, only laws are not</td>
<td>- Regulators do not understand the needs of entrepreneurs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Regulators do not understand the needs of entrepreneurs</td>
<td>- Rules that apply to manned aviation are falsely translated to drones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Rules that apply to manned aviation are falsely translated to drones</td>
<td>- Regulations are unnecessarily limiting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Too many restrictions as to what is allowed, too much uncertainty</td>
<td>- Long and exhausting process as rules change continuously, frustrating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Better to go abroad, to other countries where more is allowed</td>
<td>- Government is partner, not enemy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Entrepreneurs’ Perception: Rules do not apply/are not followed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disregarding Regulatory Context</th>
<th>Exception in Regulatory Context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regulation has no direct effect</td>
<td>Regulation needs to be more nuanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Rules do not directly affect service provider, can adjust to changes</td>
<td>- Rules currently do not cover different applications, user groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Consequences for unlawful behavior are low/cheap</td>
<td>- Procedures do not match reality, so one should not obey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Taking risks without considering or being aware of consequences, e.g. crash into big crowd</td>
<td>- What is allowed for leisure users should also be allowed for commercial users</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- ‘Forced’ into illegal behavior (government too slow, rules too difficult)</td>
<td>- Rules for manned aviation are falsely translated to drones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Want to be responsible, but lack knowledge (“they don’t know enough”)</td>
<td>Regulations openly disregarded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Rules may not be followed, but this is also communicated to regulators</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(table continues on next page)
### Regulators’ Response: Facilitating

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co-Creation through Rule Selection</th>
<th>Co-Creation through Rule Refinement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regulatory change stems from learning</strong></td>
<td><strong>Regulation as starting point for discussion</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Learning and gaining experience is part of the process (“flexibility in the rules is essential”)</td>
<td>- New regulation for mini-drones was implemented to lower the threshold of operating according to rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- “Reflect state of the art: best practices based on best available evidence and analysis”</td>
<td>- Rules did not take producer/test sites into account, but will be adjusted to facilitate entrepreneurs’ needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- It is easier for professional firms that are known for safe operations to “get things done” their way</td>
<td>- It is easier for professional firms that are known for safe operations to “get things done” their way</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Regulators’ Response: Restricting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Compliance through Rule Reinforcement</th>
<th>Compliance through Rule Proliferation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regulation as given basis for operation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Regulation disobeyed unintentionally</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Rules apply to the majority of cases, need to be followed</td>
<td>- Lack of understanding of complex rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- “Operate within the bounds of existing legislation”</td>
<td>- Lack of awareness of current rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regulation due to newness of RPAS</strong></td>
<td>- Informing customer sufficiently so that illegal operator would not be chosen again</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Basis for all rule-making is aviation law and its principles need to be reinforced</td>
<td><strong>Regulation and monitoring increasing</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- RPAS will have to prove to be as safe as current manned vehicle operations</td>
<td>- “more specific rules” for RPAS that weren’t needed in manned aviation before</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Pressing charges, increasing monitoring by police</td>
</tr>
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</table>

*Table 3.5 Data Structure*
We then turned to Langley and colleagues (e.g. Langley, 1999; Langley & Abdallah, 2011; Langley, Smallman, Tsoukas & Van de Ven, 2013) and followed their methodological recommendations for process research. We teased out re-occurring interactions between regulators and entrepreneurs, and questioned their underlying beliefs and behavioral motivations. To validate these findings, we presented them to a variety of stakeholders at a conference where both entrepreneurs and regulators were present. Through discussion, we sought to understand whether the framework we saw emerging from the data matched the perceived reality of industry insiders. Our findings were positively received and confirmed. In the end, no comments were made that led to major changes of the regulator-entrepreneur interactions we found to be characteristic for our research setting. We also built a chronological timeline detailing more than 65 events and occurrences relating to the development of the RPAS industry in the Netherlands, the EU, and worldwide. We then employed temporal bracketing to meaningfully categorize these events (Langley, 1999). We looked for time spans that were internally homogeneous and externally heterogeneous. This allowed us to differentiate between four distinct evolutionary phases, which were included in the model we build. Finally, we placed the entrepreneur-regulator interactions we uncovered in the timeline of events. This allowed us to go beyond a purely synchronic illustration of interactions, which tends to “freeze time” (Barley, 1990, p. 223), and rather present a fully diachronic analysis of how regulator-entrepreneur interactions shape and are part of the process by which proto-institutions arise. As the resulting visual representation is rather stylized, we stress that in reality there is overlap between phases and interactions.

3.4 Findings

3.4.1 Overall Process of Proto-Institutional Emergence

The process by which regulatory proto-institutions in the Dutch RPAS industry emerge is best typified by cooperation between rule makers and
entrepreneurs, rather than by a top-down approach in which regulators dictate the terms. A Dutch regulator proudly described the Dutch approach as one that is “flexible” and built on “co-creation” (presentation at European Civil RPAS Policy, Regulatory & Innovation Forum, Brussels, 2017). At the EU level as well, the rules proposed by EASA are seen as “tentative and […] presented to generate a debate” as regulators “need feedback from industry now” (presentation at EASA Workshop on Drones in Cologne, 2016). The European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE), an organization that develops aviation industry standards, summarized the process as: “industry and regulator → working together” (presentation at High Level Conference on Drones in Warsaw, 2016). A representative of EUROCONTROL, the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, speaks of a “[p]ragmatic European approach” (presentation at AUVSI’s Unmanned Systems Europe in Brussels, 2015) when discussing current rule-making efforts. In a report on the safe use of RPAS, the European Parliament issued a statement in which it “considers that the industry, regulators, and commercial operators must come together to guarantee legal certainty” (European Commission, 2015). The need for a joint approach is thus recognized by a variety of parties, both domestically and at the EU level.

Our evidence shows that Dutch rule makers are aware of their knowledge gap, and actively approach industry stakeholders to find workable solutions. Rule makers had to rely on their “gut feeling” in the past (Respondent 25). As the minister of Infrastructure and Environment pointed out during a committee meeting, regulators may even need to make arbitrary decisions in order to elicit feedback from the entrepreneurs who will be subjected to the new regulations. She explained how the four kilogram weight limit was chosen for newly proposed regulations covering so-called ‘mini-drones’:

*I was wondering myself why four kilograms was chosen and not, for example, one kilogram. You can see a variety of weights in our neighboring countries, and there are hardly any rules for drones from one to seven*
kilograms. (...) Four kilos has been chosen as it is the middle of one and seven kilograms, and was intended as a starting point for discussion with the drone industry. Consultations with the industry have shown that a limit of one kilogram is acceptable for a drone where there are no demands of the pilot and that does not require separate examination. (...) We want to make rules that allow for innovations. (Dutch House of Representatives, 2015).

This quote illustrates the willingness of regulators to involve the people that will ultimately have to deal with the new regulations. Entrepreneurs welcome this openness and are happy to contribute to shaping the nascent regulatory context. One respondent, an entrepreneur with many years of industry experience and one who has started a number of firms, describes this process as follows:

We are simply trying to create a commercial company which meets all the requirements of the government and also cooperates. We’re also working with them, we work very well together with the government, and I have been allowed to advise both the Dutch government and European authorities concerning regulations. Purely because we know what we are talking about. If you’re sitting in a meeting with relevant European stakeholders, then I’m the only one who actually flies [a drone] and knows what he’s talking about. (Respondent 11).

Regulators, of course, have a different perspective on developments within the emerging industry than entrepreneurs do. Entrepreneurs not only have more extensive knowledge of the market, but can also draw on different formative past experiences. An interactive process thus enables rule makers, as well as entrepreneurs, to be freed from wrongful assumptions about the status quo. This is illustrated by a conversation one of the interviewed entrepreneurs had with an employee of the Environment and Transport Inspectorate, an agency of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment:

Sometimes a person [at that agency] who sits behind his desk has very different ideas. I've had this conversation many times, [they say]: ‘You are a commercial operator, so you always go one step further.’ I think that is very illogical. I put my business at stake, which means that I will never go as far as a hobbyist would. I am exercising much more caution. They had a
very different perception. They thought that there is a commercial interest behind it, there is money to be earned, so you take more risks. (…) We do not operate a 1,500 Euro system, we use systems that cost 20,000 or 30,000 Euro, so you won’t take any risks, because again, that is a risk to your business. You don’t do that, while they [the agency] had a very different belief, which was quite striking. (Respondent 7).

Other advisory bodies, like the Joint Authorities for Rulemaking of Unmanned Systems (JARUS), which includes representatives from 50 countries and contributes to the development of an RPAS regulatory framework for the safe integration of RPAS into airspace, include a separate stakeholder team into their structure. They recognize “[p]artnership as the key to success” and require “[b]road stakeholder involvement.” Thus, JARUS created a Stakeholder Consultation Body ensuring that industry stakeholders, such as manufacturers, industry associations, air navigation service providers, standardization bodies, operators and pilots are involved (presentation at EASA Workshop on Drones in Cologne, 2016; RPAS CivOps in Brussels, 2016). The same goes for other EU agencies, as an EASA representative states that they are “committed to work in cooperation with all stakeholders” (RPAS CivOps in Brussels, 2016). The Swiss Federal Office of Civil Aviation even believes that “a smart regulator (…) is part of the Drone Ecosystem [and] develops with the Ecosystem standard scenarios to reduce the authorisation effort and the administrative burden” (presentation at EASA Workshop on Drones in Cologne, 2016). Thus, the intention to develop the regulatory context together, even at the broader EU level, is inherent in the RPAS industry.

While the regulatory process is Europe is collaborative in nature, this does not mean that it is easier or faster than regulatory processes elsewhere. Entrepreneurs who hope to move forward as quickly as possible still tend to experience the process as tiresome. Respondent 5, for example, stated that “the rule making, how it goes with these agencies, I find it really tiring, extremely slow”.
Having presented our insights into the process, we now turn to the different phases that characterize proto-institutional emergence in the Dutch RPAS industry and the distinct entrepreneur-regulator interactions that gave rise to proto-institutional emergence during the study period.

3.4.2 Phases of Proto-Institutional Emergence Driven by Distinct Entrepreneur-Regulator Interactions

We distinguish between four phases of proto-institutional emergence in the RPAS industry between 2000 and 2018. Each phase spans two to five years, and includes seven to 28 events. Table 3.6 presents a detailed timeline of these events relevant for the Dutch, EU, and international context. We observe several cascading effects (Verbeke, 2018) through which international and EU-level developments influence Dutch regulatory developments and condition the activities of actors within the Netherlands. The separate phases represent a way to map the process of proto-institutional emergence. We illustrate which interactions between entrepreneurs and regulators give the impetus for proto-institutional emergence. We find that RPAS entrepreneurs share two fundamental beliefs about the nature of the regulatory environment. They either recognize the existence of rules they need to adhere to, or they perceive the rules as extant, but not applicable to themselves. Between RPAS regulators, we find two different beliefs about how best to create the regulatory context. They either hold a facilitating view of what the new regulatory context should entail, or have a more constraining take on the regulations to be established. Although we label certain regulators’ responses to entrepreneurial activities as constraining, rule makers were generally open to input from industry stakeholders (“EMPOWER Stakeholders” as demanded by ICAO; presentation at High Level Conference on Drones in Warsaw, 2016). Whereas regulations can be constraining, the regulatory process is highly collaborative, as illustrated in the previous section.
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<th>Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>January 2000</td>
<td>Founding of European industry association UVS(^i)</td>
<td>“Started in 1995, as EURO UVS (European Unmanned Vehicle Systems Association), this non-profit organisation […] changed its statute and its name to UVS International, in order to better reflect its global character and reach.”</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>UVS International, General Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 2001</td>
<td>EU funded workshop on UAVs</td>
<td>“…increase the awareness in the European community regarding the rationale and the benefits of potential civilian missions using UAV’s.”</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>UAV civilian application workshop: environment/communication/safety</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 2002</td>
<td>European Commission publishes aerospace policy framework</td>
<td>First recognition and mention of unmanned aircraft systems by the European Commission.</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>STAR 21, Strategic Aerospace Review for the 21st Century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2002</td>
<td>Joint JAA(^ii)/EUROCONTROL(^ii) Task Force on UAVs</td>
<td>“A joint Task-force is justified by the close relation between ATM [Air Traffic Management] issues and aircraft issues in the case of UAV. […] The need for regulatory work was identified both within JAA and EUROCONTROL.”</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Presentation “Joint JAA/EUROCONTROL Task-Force on UAVs” by Yves Morier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2003</td>
<td>EASA becomes operational</td>
<td>“Hitherto, certification was the responsibility of the [EU] Member States. In future, the Agency will issue certificates recognised EU-wide. […] Ultimately, the Agency will develop its know-how in all areas of aviation safety to help the EU establish common rules for […] the approval of aviation activities…”</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td><a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-03-1333_en.htm">http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-03-1333_en.htm</a> (accessed 24-09-2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2004</td>
<td>Joint JAA/EUROCONTROL Task Force publishes final report</td>
<td>“…address a development of a concept for the regulation of civil unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), with respect to safety, security, airworthiness (including continued airworthiness), operational approval, maintenance and licensing.”</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Final Report – A Concept for European Regulations for Civil Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)</td>
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\(^i\) Unmanned Vehicle Systems International  
\(^ii\) European Aviation Safety Agency  
\(^i\) Joint Aviation Authorities  
\(^ii\) European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation
### Phase 2: Regulatory Bricolage (2005-2010)

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<tr>
<td>January 2005</td>
<td>UAVnet/CAPECON®/USICO® publish action plan and strategic research agenda on UAV</td>
<td>“This proposal offers a unique opportunity to further unite and integrate Europe’s aeronautics capabilities and develop a research and technological infrastructure to benefit society.”</td>
<td>EU 25 Nations for an Aerospace Breakthrough, European Civil Unmanned Air Vehicle Roadmap</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>April 2005</td>
<td>ICAO® initiative to discuss RPAS activities</td>
<td>“The first official discussion on RPAs was held at the first meeting of the 169th Session of ICAO Council on 12 April 2005. The Air Navigation Commission was requested a discussion on UAV operations in civil airspace.”</td>
<td>Intl. ICAO Assembly, 38th Session, Legal Commission (A38-WP/262)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>November 2005</td>
<td>EASA publishes proposed policy for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) certification</td>
<td>“The purpose of this Advance-Notice of Proposed Amendment (A-NPA) is to propose a policy for the certification of UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) Systems (the Policy) and is a first step towards more comprehensive UAV regulation.”</td>
<td>EU Advance-Notice of Proposed Amendment No. 16/2005 (A-NPA-16-2005)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>December 2005</td>
<td>Publication of Rules for Model Airplanes (Regeling Modelvliegen)</td>
<td>“In this regulation, a model airplane means a small aircraft of which the total take-off mass does not exceed 25 kilograms.”</td>
<td>NL HDJZ/LUV/2005-2297</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 2006</td>
<td>First ICAO exploratory meeting on UAVs</td>
<td>“…to determine the potential role of ICAO in UAV regulatory development work. […] although there would eventually be a wide range of technical and performance specifications and standards, only a portion of those would need to become ICAO SARPs [Standards and Recommended Practices]. […] ICAO was not the most suitable body to lead the effort to develop such specifications. However, it was agreed that there was a need for harmonization of terms, strategies and principles with respect to the regulatory framework and that ICAO should act as a focal point.”</td>
<td>Intl. ICAO Cir 328, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)</td>
<td></td>
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7 Civilian UAV Thematic Network: Technologies, Applications, Certification (EU funded initiative)
8 Civil UAV Applications and Economic Effectivity of Potential Configuration Solutions (EU funded initiative)
9 UAV Safety Issues for Civil Operations (EU funded initiative)
10 International Civil Aviation Organization
11 European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment

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<tr>
<td>January 2007</td>
<td>Second ICAO informal meeting on UAVs that led to establishment of UASSG*</td>
<td>Decision by ICAO for “study group be formed to assist the Secretariat in developing a framework for regulatory development, guiding the SARPs development process within ICAO, and to support a safe, secure and efficient integration of UAS into non-segregated airspace.”</td>
<td>Intl.</td>
<td>ICAO UAS Study Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>February 2007</td>
<td>Establishment of SESAR® Joint Undertaking</td>
<td>“The aim of the Joint Undertaking is to ensure the modernisation of the European air traffic management system by federating research &amp; development efforts in the Community.”</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td><a href="https://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/esar/esar_undertaking_en">https://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/esar/esar_undertaking_en</a> (accessed 26-09-2018)</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 2007</td>
<td>Founding INOUI® Consortium</td>
<td>“The project INOUI focuses on the integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in non-segregated airspace. […] INOUI represents a holistic approach to UAS integration. Goal of INOUI is to provide a stepwise approach to enable the earliest possible use of UAS applications.”</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>UAS Integration, Proposal for the Integration of UAS into non-segregated Airspace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2007</td>
<td>EASA publishes Common Response Document on “Policy for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) certification”</td>
<td>Extensive 270 pages document with detailed responses from EASA to all comments received during the public consultation period between Nov. 2005 and Feb. 2006.</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>CRD to A-NPA-16-2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2008</td>
<td>European Commission publishes study analysing the current activities in the field of UAV</td>
<td>“Where are we today – the industrial/economical/political situation in Europe and the international interdependencies. […] What vision can be drawn for Europe in this technology domain and what needs to be done to make it happen.”</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Study analysing the current activities in the field of UAV (first and second element), ENTR/2007/065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2008</td>
<td>Establishment JARUS® (first meeting)</td>
<td>“JARUS’ first meeting took place […] and began with just a handful of member states.”</td>
<td>Intl.</td>
<td>JARUS press release</td>
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* Unmanned Aircraft System Study Group  
® Single European Sky ATM Research  
®® INnovative Operational UAV Integration  
®®® Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems  

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<tr>
<td>April 2008</td>
<td>UASSG becomes operational (first meeting)</td>
<td>&quot;…assembled to embark on legislative efforts toward international cooperation, the development of regulation and manuals, technical specifications and the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs).&quot;</td>
<td>Intl.</td>
<td>Unmanned Aircraft Systems Study Group (UASSG), First Meeting (UASSG/1-SD) ICAO Assembly, 38th Session, Legal Commission (A38-WP/262)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2009</td>
<td>EASA publishes general principles for type certification of UAS</td>
<td>&quot;This policy shall be used by the Agency’s staff when certificating UAS. […] The policy represents a first step in the development of comprehensive civil UAS regulation.&quot;</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Rulemaking Directorate Policy Statement, Airworthiness Certification of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), E.Y013-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2009</td>
<td>EC DG MOVE&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; first hearing on unmanned aircraft (&lt;150 kg)</td>
<td>&quot;To understand the current European Light UAS industrial base and the current Light UAS applications in Europe; to identify potential obstacles, enablers and best practices in Europe; to exchange directly with the European Light UAS community views and assess the future potential role of EC for the insertion of Light UAS.&quot;</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Hearing on Light Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2010</td>
<td>INOUI Consortium publishes final report</td>
<td>&quot;Main objective of the INOUI project was to provide a roadmap to the future of UAS in the context of the ever changing ATM [Air Traffic Management] environment.&quot;</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>INOUI Final Activity Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2010</td>
<td>European Commission &amp; European Defence Agency organize European High Level Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Conference</td>
<td>&quot;…where approximately 450 participants from around the world discussed issues such as how RPAS can support European policies, the different uses of RPAS, and the institutional and infrastructure aspects, which would have to be addressed to allow RPAS to fly in non-segregated airspace.&quot;</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>RPAS – The European Approach &amp; The Way Forward <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/event/conference-uas-unmanned-air-systems_en">https://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/event/conference-uas-unmanned-air-systems_en</a> (accessed 25-09-2018)</td>
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<sup>st</sup> The European Commission’s Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport

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<tr>
<td>March 2011</td>
<td>ICAO publishes formal report on unmanned aircrafts</td>
<td>“The goal of ICAO in addressing unmanned aviation is to provide the fundamental international regulatory framework through Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs), with supporting Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS) and guidance material, to underpin routine operation of UAS throughout the world in a safe, harmonized and seamless manner comparable to that of manned operations. This circular is the first step in reaching that goal.”</td>
<td>Intl.</td>
<td>ICAO Circular 328-AN/190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2011</td>
<td>European Commission launches UAS Panel (series of five workshops)</td>
<td>“…an imitative to explore the current competitive situation for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) globally and to identify the key challenges and obstacles which need to be addressed to assist the development and operation of the UAS sector in Europe.”</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Commission Unmanned Aircraft System Panel Process, Report on Workshop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2012</td>
<td>Establishment EUROCAE Working Group 93 on Light RPAS (WG-93)</td>
<td>“Develop standards and recommendations for guidance material for the safe operation of Light RPAS, sequenced in order of priority for the Light RPAS community, with output primarily directed towards regulator. […] Guided by regulators needs and approval oversight such as EASA, JARUS, NAAs [National Aviation Authorities].”</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Presentation “EUROCAE RPAS Activities” by unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2012</td>
<td>Establishment of ULTRA** Consortium</td>
<td>“To provide a comprehensive set of recommendations for the incremental insertion of civil Light RPAS (those with an operating mass of up to 150 kg) in the European airspace in the short-term (i.e. within 5 years from now); to provide specific recommendations for selected ‘Use Cases’ to be explored as ‘quick win’ business cases; highlight what needs to be done in order to unlock the full potential of the civil Light RPAS market in the long-term (i.e. 10-15 years from now).”</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td><a href="https://ultraconsortium.eu/about-us/">https://ultraconsortium.eu/about-us/</a> (accessed 26-09-2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2012</td>
<td>Establishment of European RPAS Steering Group</td>
<td>“…set up by the European Commission … on the future of RPAS in Europe. The European RPAS Steering Group received the mandate to establish a roadmap for the safe integration of civil RAS into the European aviation system, aiming at an initial RPAS integration by 2016.”</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td><a href="https://uvs-international.org/european-matters/european-rpas-roadmap-2013/">https://uvs-international.org/european-matters/european-rpas-roadmap-2013/</a> (accessed 25-09-2018)</td>
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** Unmanned Aerial Systems in European Airspace

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<tr>
<td>August 2012</td>
<td>EASA publishes proposed alignment of the European Common Rules of the Air</td>
<td>“the present NPA includes five major aspects: the certification of the remotely piloted aircraft system (RPAS), including the airworthiness of the remotely piloted aircraft (RPA); the certification of RPAS operators involved in commercial air transport and/or specialised operations (SPO); the licensing of remote pilots; provisions to facilitate the ‘special authorisation’ mandated by Article 8 of the Chicago Convention for international RPAS operations…”</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) 2012-10, Transposition of Amendment 43 to Annex 2 to the Chicago Convention on remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPASs) into common rules of the air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2012</td>
<td>European Commission publishes strategy working document</td>
<td>“To reap the full benefits of this new technology for growth and jobs, Europe should remove, in a coordinated way, the existing barriers and support the internal market for civil RPAS services.”</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Commission, Staff Working Document SWD(2012)259, Towards a European strategy for the development of civil applications of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2012</td>
<td>Founding of Dutch industry association DARPAS&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>“Dutch trade association for professional production and use of unmanned aircraft systems (also called drones, RPAS, UAS or UAV). […] The aim of the association is to represent the interests of members who are engaged in the research and development, production, use, services and applications of RPAS (drones) in the Netherlands.”</td>
<td>NL</td>
<td><a href="http://www.darpas.nl/">http://www.darpas.nl/</a> (accessed 25-09-2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2013</td>
<td>Revision of rules for model airplanes (Regeling Modelvliegen)</td>
<td>Changes allow to distinguish between recreational and professional use; include general prohibition of use unmanned aircraft up to 150 kg; include prohibition for commercial use model aircraft up to 25 kg (applying for an exemption is possible).</td>
<td>NL</td>
<td>Presentation “Drones, Ontwikkelingen regelgeving in Nederland” by Hanneke van Traa-Engelman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2013</td>
<td>European RPAS Steering Group publishes final report</td>
<td>“By presenting a clear way forward towards the integration of RPAS, the Roadmap is expected to facilitate the decisions to be taken by the different organisations involved, provide transparency and efficiency in the planning of different initiatives and support the coordination of the related activities in Europe. […] The complete document includes 3 annexes entitled: A Regulatory Approach; A Strategic Research Plan; A Study on the Societal Impact”</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Roadmap for the integration of civil Remotely-Piloted Aircraft Systems into the European Aviation System, Final report from the European RPAS Steering Group</td>
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<sup>a</sup> Dutch Association for Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems

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<tr>
<td>December 2013</td>
<td>ULTRA Consortium publishes final report</td>
<td>“Analyse current and past work relative to civil RPAS […] and propose a starting point for Light RPAS operations in the short-term. […] Develop a business model for civil Light RPAS applications. […] Perform an in-depth analysis on how to overcome the barriers and mistrust of (Light) RPAS by the general public. […] Foster the European innovation in terms of aviation automation and provide a path which facilitates access to market for European SMEs. […] Develop recommendations to support a sustainable civil Light RPAS market in the short-term and to highlight the actions needed in order to unlock the full potential of the (Light) RPAS market in the long-term.”</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>ULTRA, Unmanned Aerial Systems in European Airspace, Project Full Final Report  <a href="https://ultraconsortium.eu/about-us/">https://ultraconsortium.eu/about-us/</a> (accessed 26-09-2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2014</td>
<td>Dutch Ministry of Justice and Security makes action plan for unmanned vehicles</td>
<td>“The purpose of this research is to gain insight into the implications the use of drones has for legislation and policy. What are the expected possibilities and threats stemming from the use of drones, to what extent does the current legal framework offer room for these possibilities and provides measures against these threats […]”</td>
<td>NL</td>
<td>Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, attachment to Kamerstuk 30 806 (No. 21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2014</td>
<td>ICAO replaces UASSG with RPAS Panel</td>
<td>“…serve as the focal point and coordinator of all ICAO RPAS related work, with the aim of ensuring global interoperability and harmonization; develop an RPAS regulatory concept and associated guidance material to support and guide the regulatory process…”</td>
<td>Intl.</td>
<td>Presentation “ICAO RPAS Panel, Working Group 1 – Airworthiness” by Stephen George &amp; Bruno Moitre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2014</td>
<td>First Dutch lawsuit against journalist</td>
<td>Journalist was fined 500 Euro for making recordings in the vicinity of Rotterdam-The Hague Airport with his drone. According to the aviation police, the drone was a danger to the airports’ flight path.</td>
<td>NL</td>
<td><a href="https://nos.nl/artikel/2008469-eerste-drones-rechtszaak-tegen-journalist.html">https://nos.nl/artikel/2008469-eerste-drones-rechtszaak-tegen-journalist.html</a> (accessed 01-10-2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2015</td>
<td>Riga Declaration</td>
<td>“The European aviation community gathered in Riga to exchange views on how, and under which conditions, drones can help create promising new opportunities in Europe, offering sustainable jobs and new prospects for growth both for the manufacturing industry and for future users of drones in all sectors of society. […] Five essential principles for future EU focus: RPAS need to be treated as new types of aircraft with proportionate rules based on the risk of each operation; EU rules for the safe provision of RPAS services need to be developed to enable the industry to invest; Technology and standards need to be developed to enable full integration of RPAS into European airspace; Public acceptance is key to the growth of RPAS services; The operator of an RPAS shall be responsible for its use.”</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Riga Declaration on Remotely Piloted Aircraft (drone), &quot;Framing the Future of Aviation&quot; Report on the safe use of remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS), commonly known as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), in the field of civil aviation, A8-0261/2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 2015</td>
<td>ICAO publishes RPAS Manual</td>
<td>&quot;This manual addresses RPAS as one subset of UAS. RPAS are envisioned to be an equal partner in the civil aviation system, able to interact with air traffic control (ATC) and other aircraft on a real-time basis. The scope of ICAO provisions in the next 5 to 10 years is to facilitate integration of RPAS operating in accordance with instrument flight rules (IFR) in controlled airspace and at controlled aerodromes.&quot;</td>
<td>Intl.</td>
<td>ICAO, Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS), Doc 10019, AN/507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2015</td>
<td>EASA publishes concept of operations for drones</td>
<td>&quot;Considering the broad range of operations and types of drones, it is proposed to establish three categories of operations and their associated regulatory regime: Open, Specific and Certified. [...] Harmonisation of drones rules are a must which is recognised by all parties. This concept for a regulatory framework will be proposed to JARUS and ICAO as the European input thus contributing to global harmonisation.&quot;</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>EASA, Concept of Operations for Drones - A risk based approach to regulation of unmanned aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2015</td>
<td>EASA publishes policy initiative</td>
<td>&quot;...update Regulation (EC) No. 216/2008 (the EASA Basic Regulation) in order to make it best respond to changes in the aviation environment and subsequent challenges to its safety.&quot;</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>EASA Opinion No. 01/2015, European Commission policy initiative on aviation safety and a possible revision of Regulation (EC) No. 216/2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2015</td>
<td>Working Conference on Drones (Kabinetsstandpunt Drones)</td>
<td>&quot;...the Dutch Ministries of Safety &amp; Justice, Infrastructure &amp; Environment, and Economic Affairs, organised a working conference relative to a recently published joint report reflecting the cabinet’s view on RPAS. The purpose of this event was to comment the report, and with inputs of the attendees, prepare the way ahead. The event, which was attended by 150 Dutch policy makers and industry &amp; research representatives, [...] a few days prior to the first Dutch RPAS regulation coming into force.&quot;</td>
<td>NL</td>
<td>UVS International, Background &amp; Activities, 1998-2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2015</td>
<td>ISO® launches Technical Subcommittee 16 on UAS</td>
<td>&quot;Develops international standards in the field of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) including, but not limited to classification, design, manufacture, operation (including maintenance) and safety management of UAS operations.&quot;</td>
<td>Intl.</td>
<td>ISO/TC 20/SC 16, Unmanned aircraft systems</td>
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*® International Organization for Standardization
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<tr>
<td>July 2015</td>
<td>First publication of rules for commercial use of drones (Regeling op Afstand Bestuurde Luchtvaartuigen) and revision of rules for model airplanes (Regeling Modelvliegen)</td>
<td>Commercial use of drones does not require applying for an exemption anymore. However, rules are similar to recreational use and a RPAS Operator Certificate (ROC) is needed. The rules for the recreational use of drones were also tightened.</td>
<td>NL</td>
<td>Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, Letter “Nadere uitwerking kabinetsstandpunt drones”, 661936, August 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2015</td>
<td>EASA publishes introduction of a regulatory framework for the operation of drones (based on principles of Riga Declaration)</td>
<td>“It follows a risk- and performance-based approach; it is progressive- and operation-centric. It introduces three categories of operations as already proposed in the published EASA Concept of Operations for Drones: ‘Open’ category (low risk); […] ‘Specific operation’ category (medium risk); […] ‘Certified’ category (higher risk). […] This regulatory framework will encompass European rules for all drones in all weight classes.”</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Advance-Notice of Proposed Amendment, A-NPA 2015-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2015</td>
<td>European Parliament publishes report on safe drone use</td>
<td>“…supports the Commission’s intention to remove the 150kg threshold and to replace it with a coherent and comprehensive EU regulatory framework that would allow national competent authorities, qualified bodies or associations to assume validation and oversight activities; considers that the proportionality of the rules should be complemented by the necessary flexibility in processes and procedures.”</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Report on the safe use of remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS), commonly known as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), in the field of civil aviation, A8-0261/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2015</td>
<td>Establishment of DroneRules project</td>
<td>“…aims at building a comprehensive and high quality online presence in order to create THE reference web portal in the European Union (EU) (+ Norway and Switzerland) with the purpose of increasing awareness and facilitating understanding of the legal environment and constraints in relation with light RPAS operations (safety, privacy and data protection, insurance, etc.), and with a focus on non-commercial operators (incl. hobbyists).”</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>UVS International, Background &amp; Activities, 1998-2015, <a href="http://dronerules.eu/">http://dronerules.eu/</a> (accessed on 01-10-2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2015</td>
<td>General Consultation by the Dutch House of Representatives</td>
<td>The standing committee for Security and Justice, the standing committee for Economic Affairs and the standing committee for Infrastructure and the Environment consulted Minister of Security and Justice and Secretary of State of Infrastructure and Environment on drone issues.</td>
<td>NL</td>
<td>Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Algemeen Overleg, Kamerstuk 30 806 (No. 31), Onbemande vliegtuigen (UAV)</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 2015</td>
<td>JARUS establishes Stakeholders Consultation Body (SCB)</td>
<td>“…a self-governing association of aviation industry organizations, established to provide expertise and advice. [...] SCB representatives and alternates represent diverse and evolving Communities of Interest and represent all sectors of the aviation industry. The SCB acts as a forum of stakeholder interests to enable their views to be represented and discussed in an open and constructive manner to facilitate the establishment of balanced and consolidated JARUS deliverables.”</td>
<td>Intl.</td>
<td>UVS International, Background &amp; Activities, 1998-2015 <a href="http://jarus-rpas.org/stakeholders-consultation-body">http://jarus-rpas.org/stakeholders-consultation-body</a> (accessed on 01-10-2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2015</td>
<td>EASA publishes technical Opinion</td>
<td>“…27 concrete proposals for a regulatory framework and for low-risk operations of all unmanned aircraft irrespective of their maximum certified take-off mass…”</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>EASA Technical Opinion, Introduction of a regulatory framework for the operation of unmanned aircraft</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 2016</td>
<td>Publication of Mini Drone Regulation (Mini Drone Regeling)</td>
<td>Regulation to reduce the rules for RPAS of no more than 4 kg.</td>
<td>NL</td>
<td>Presentation “Drones, Ontwikkelingen regelgeving in Nederland” by Hanneke van Traa-Engelman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2016</td>
<td>EUROCAE creates Working Group 105 on Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) by merging Working Groups 73 &amp; 93</td>
<td>“The task of WG-105 is to develop the necessary standards to allow the safe integration of all types of UAS into all types of airspace under all conditions and for each type of operation…”</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>EUROCAE Broadcast, Edition 6/2017, Message from the Secretary General</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 2016</td>
<td>SESAR Joint Undertaking publishes drone demonstration project results</td>
<td>“Over ten years ago drones or remotely-piloted aircraft systems (RPAS) were not part of the SESAR Definition Phase as it was impossible to predict at that time the exponential growth of these unmanned aircraft. Over time, however, it became clear that if safe, non-segregated, unmanned operations were ever to become commonplace, it would be essential for the SESAR Joint Undertaking (JU) to adapt its research and innovation to developments in this field. It would also require the partnership to show leadership in the air traffic management (ATM) domain, taking advantage of the comprehensive SESAR membership to ensure a coordinated approach to European drone integration.”</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Demonstrating RPAS integration in the European aviation system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2016</td>
<td>SESAR Joint Undertaking publishes study on economic potential of EU drone market</td>
<td>“Stimulating economic benefits and job opportunities for Europe will require many urgent actions to address the remaining gaps in technology and regulation. […] To take a global leadership position, fast implementation of a comprehensive EU ‘drone package’ is required to establish a single drone market.”</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Drones Outlook Study, Unlocking the value for Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2017</td>
<td>EUROCONTROL publishes RPAS Air Traffic Management concept of operations</td>
<td>“…describes the operations of RPAS in European Airspace that are capable of meeting the requirements set per airspace classification including Very Low Level (VLL) operations. The CONOPS [Concept of Operations] is presented from an air traffic management (ATM) perspective…”</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>EUROCONTROL, RPAS ATM CONOPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2017</td>
<td>EASA publishes proposed operation of drones in the ‘open’ and ‘specific’ categories</td>
<td>“…the regulation of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) with a maximum take-off mass (MTOM) of less than 150 kg falls within the competence of the European Union (EU) Member States (MSs). This leads to a fragmented regulatory system hampering the development of a single EU market for UAS and cross-border UAS operations. A new proposed Basic Regulation […] aims to solve this issue, by extending the competence of the EU to regulate all UAS regardless of their MTOM. In view of the adoption of this new Regulation, the objective of this Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) 2017-05 is: to ensure an operation-centric, proportionate, risk- and performance-based regulatory framework for all UAS operations conducted in the open and specific category; to ensure a high and uniform level of safety for UAS; to foster the development of the UAS market; and to contribute to enhancing privacy, data protection, and security.”</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Notice of Proposed Amendment, NPA 2017-05 (A) &amp; (B)</td>
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<th>Event</th>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Source(s)</th>
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<tr>
<td>June 2017</td>
<td>Establishment EUSCG**xviii **</td>
<td>&quot;The EUSCG is a joint coordination and advisory group established to coordinate the UAS-related standardisation activities across Europe, essentially stemming from the EU regulations and EASA rulemaking initiatives. The EUSCG provides a link to bridge the European activities to those at international level.&quot;</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td><a href="https://www.eurocae.net/about-us/euscg/">https://www.eurocae.net/about-us/euscg/</a> (accessed 27-09-2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2017</td>
<td>ICAO publishes preliminary version RPAS concept of operations</td>
<td>&quot;This concept of operations (CONOPS) aims to describe the operational environment of manned and unmanned aircraft thereby ensuring a common understanding of the challenges and how the subset that are remotely piloted can be expected to be accommodated and ultimately integrated into the airspace for international instrument flight rules (IFR) operations.&quot;</td>
<td>Intl.</td>
<td>Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for International IFR Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2017</td>
<td>Helsinki Declaration</td>
<td>&quot;...called for clear and simple rules that keep the burden for citizens, operators and authorities as light as possible, and that lower the threshold for entering the EU drone services...&quot;</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Drones Helsinki Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2018</td>
<td>ACI*** Europe publishes position paper</td>
<td>&quot;Letting drones into European airports is a complex but feasible endeavour. Necessary adaptations would include ATC [Air Traffic Control] technology &amp; procedures, airport infrastructure &amp; technology and procedures, as well as operator technical &amp; operational profiles.&quot;</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>ACI Europe Position on Drone Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2018</td>
<td>EASA publishes first formal Opinion on safe operations for small drones in Europe (Outcome of A-NPA 2015-10)</td>
<td>&quot;The objective of this Opinion is to create a new regulatory framework that defines measures to mitigate the risk of operations in the ‘open’ category […] and ‘specific’ category. […] The proposed regulations will provide flexibility to Member States (MSs), mainly by allowing them to create zones within their territories where the use of UAS would be prohibited, limited or, in contrast, facilitated.&quot;</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>EASA, Opinion No. 01/2018, Introduction of a Regulatory Framework for the Operation of UAS in the “Open” &amp; “Specific” Categories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2018</td>
<td>SESAR Joint Undertaking publishes roadmap for drone integration into airspace</td>
<td>&quot;This proposed contribution to the update of the European ATM [Air Traffic Management] Master Plan is an important milestone on that path. It provides a bold vision for the safe integration of drones into all classes of airspace and an ambitious rollout plan, ensuring that the energy of our community is channeled towards clear priorities.&quot;</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>SESAR Joint Undertaking, European ATM Master Plan: Roadmap for the Safe Integration of Drones into all Classes of Airspace</td>
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**xviii European UAS Standards Coordination Group  
*** Airports Council International
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<th>Source(s)</th>
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<tr>
<td>March 2018</td>
<td>Hearing/roundtable discussion by Dutch House of Representatives</td>
<td>Organized by the standing committee for Infrastructure and Water Management to get information on the opportunities and problems of the use of drones by professionals and others.</td>
<td>NL</td>
<td><a href="https://www.tweedekamer.nl/debat_en_vergadering/commissievergaderingen/details?id=2018A00461">https://www.tweedekamer.nl/debat_en_vergadering/commissievergaderingen/details?id=2018A00461</a> (accessed 26-09-2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2018</td>
<td>International Transport Forum of the OECD** publishes report on drones in transportation</td>
<td>“This report investigates the role of drones as part of the future transport mix. It specifically addresses the issues policy makers face in engaging with the emerging private drone sector. [...] With the sector developing at a rapid pace, regulators will want to create frameworks for drone use that allow innovation while ensuring positive overall outcomes.”</td>
<td>Intl.</td>
<td>(Uncertain Skies? Drones in the World of Tomorrow)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2018</td>
<td>EU adopts new Basic Regulation for aviation</td>
<td>“…updated aviation safety rules, which include a revised mandate for the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the first ever EU-wide rules for civil drones of all sizes.”</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td><a href="https://www.uasvision.com/2018/07/03/europe-adopts-new-basic-regulation-for-aviation/">https://www.uasvision.com/2018/07/03/europe-adopts-new-basic-regulation-for-aviation/</a> (accessed 26-09-2018)</td>
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Please note: In this table, we stayed close to the original terminology used in the sources included. The terms UAV (Unmanned Aircraft Vehicle), UAS (Unmanned Aircraft System) and RPAS (Remotely Piloted Aircraft System) can be used interchangeably. We also refer to ‘drones’ as overarching term.

\*\* Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

Table 3.6 Timeline of Events RPAS Industry
In what follows, we outline the way in which interactions play out when entrepreneurs and regulators are faced with the joint task of creating an effective regulatory context (Table 3.7 presents an overview of these interactions), and illustrate how they shape certain phases in the process of proto-institutional emergence (Figure 3.1 provides a visual illustration of the model). Additionally, we highlight which proto-institutions had emerged at the point where the institutional frictions endemic to those proto-institutions sounded in a transitional moment proceeding from one evolutionary phase into the next. We also document the nature of these institutional frictions themselves (see Table 3.8).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception Entrepreneur</th>
<th>Enactment Entrepreneur</th>
<th>Response Regulator</th>
<th>Enactment Regulator</th>
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<tr>
<td>Rules Apply</td>
<td>Enabling</td>
<td>Constraining</td>
<td>Compliance through Rule Reinforcement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rules Apply</td>
<td>Constraining</td>
<td>Facilitating</td>
<td>Co-creation through Rule Selection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules Do Not Apply</td>
<td>Disregarding</td>
<td>Constraining</td>
<td>Compliance through Rule Proliferation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules Do Not Apply</td>
<td>Exception</td>
<td>Facilitating</td>
<td>Co-creation through Rule Refinement</td>
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Table 3.7 Entrepreneur-Regulator Interactions
Chapter 3

Phase 1 (2000-2004)
Recognizing Future Potential

Phase 2 (2005-2010)
Regulatory Bricolage

Phase 3 (2011-2015)
Focused Efforts

Phase 4 (2016-2018)
Working Towards Harmonization

As of June 2018: EU adopts first ever EU-wide rules for civil drones of all sizes

Figure 3.1 Process Model of Proto-Institutional Emergence
<table>
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<tr>
<td>Recognizing Future Potential</td>
<td>Entrepreneurs that disregard existing frameworks are faced with constraining responses by regulators (<em>Why Care about the Rules?</em>), while regulators enforce compliance from entrepreneurs that view current situation as enabling (<em>Playing by the Increasingly Clearer Rules</em>). RPAS emerged as a new civil market category, and became an object of interest for previously unconcerned governmental bodies and industry initiatives.</td>
<td>Increasingly, after the RPAS industry emerged as a cognitive category, the need to engage in concrete regulatory future actions was felt by all industry actors.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase 2 (2005-2010)</td>
<td>While interactions between entrepreneurs and regulators from the previous phase continue, both parties start engaging in co-creation activities: rule selection occurs when entrepreneurs are constraint in developing promising new business models (<em>Working on Better Regulation</em>), while regulators also make exceptions for other cases in which refinement is needed (<em>Changes in Regulation Needed</em>). Attempts on all levels, national to international, to propose policy guidance frameworks while entrepreneurial initiatives continue to grow.</td>
<td>Gradually, industry actors are faced with a plethora of disconnected regulation and recognize that further coordination and structuration is required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory Bricolage</td>
<td>While most interactions between entrepreneurs and regulators from the previous phase continue, interactions between rule-disregarding entrepreneurs that evoke constraining regulator responses (<em>Why Care about the Rules?</em>) phase out. Standardization efforts intensify as recommended practices, guidance material, suggested standards and certification structures emerge; rule-making bodies acknowledge and reference each other’s work. Two of the remaining interactions are slowly phasing out (<em>Working on Better Regulation; Changes in Regulation Needed</em>) as the development reaches harmonization, and agreement is reached broadly on all levels and between most stakeholders. Rule reinforcement by regulators and acceptance by entrepreneurs continue to be dominant until the end (<em>Playing by the Increasingly Clearer Rules</em>). Increasing clarity and common agreement on how RPAS should be understood, how they should be dealt with systematically, and how this should be reinforced appropriately and in a unified manner.</td>
<td>Progressively, although regulatory instructions are beginning to become more focused, industry actors experience the limitations of not having established binding and collective rules yet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 3 (2011-2015)</td>
<td>Focused Efforts</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Phased</td>
<td>Standardization efforts intensify as recommended practices, guidance material, suggested standards and certification structures emerge; rule-making bodies acknowledge and reference each other’s work. Two of the remaining interactions are slowly phasing out (<em>Working on Better Regulation; Changes in Regulation Needed</em>) as the development reaches harmonization, and agreement is reached broadly on all levels and between most stakeholders. Rule reinforcement by regulators and acceptance by entrepreneurs continue to be dominant until the end (<em>Playing by the Increasingly Clearer Rules</em>). Increasing clarity and common agreement on how RPAS should be understood, how they should be dealt with systematically, and how this should be reinforced appropriately and in a unified manner.</td>
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<td>Transition</td>
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*Table 3.8 Transitional Characteristics of Emerging Proto-Institutional Arrangements*
3.4.2.1 Phase 1 (2000 - 2004): Recognizing Future Potential

Before 2000, only limited activities were connected to RPAS. From the turn of the millennium onwards, however, several relevant events took place on a European scale, such as the foundation of the first European industry association for RPAS in 2000 (UVS International), and the organization of a first EU-funded awareness-raising workshop in 2001. In 2002, the establishment of the European Aviation Safety Agency, EASA, followed. In the same year, the European Commission recognized and mentioned RPAS for the first in the general strategic aerospace policy framework, and a taskforce was formed between the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) and European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL). EASA officially became operational in 2003, taking up its mandate for RPAS certification in Europe, initially for systems of more than 150 kilograms. In an attempt to develop an early concept of RPAS regulation, the JAA/EUROCONTROL task force published their final report in 2004.

Typical for this period is a type of entrepreneur-regulator interaction in which regulators seek to enforce compliance from entrepreneurs, while the latter see the regulatory environment as mostly enabling (Playing by the Increasingly Clearer Rules). This interaction creates a regulatory context in which regulators seek to set certain baseline rules, which are affirmed by entrepreneurs by adjusting their behavior to these rules. When reflecting on the circumstances in which RPAS businesses operate, we found a number of entrepreneurs who recognized that the rules in place apply to their businesses. According to Respondent 14, who worked for the Dutch police before starting his own firm, following the rules means that “you have to read [current rules] carefully and comply with them. It’s really as simple as that.” To the extent that regulations stemming from general aviation laws are already in place during this early phase of Recognizing Future Potential, entrepreneurs with a background in manned aviation seemed to profit from their in-depth knowledge in this area, allowing them to interpret these rules as enabling
structures. Respondent 13, with a background in manned aviation, remembered that “in the beginning, I had to read a lot to get an understanding about how it all works. For me it’s easy, because 90 percent of it is a copy of manned aviation [law]. That’s what I know already.”

In contrast to the belief that current rules apply to their company, another group of entrepreneurs operates on the belief that rules do not apply to them, which evoked a more restrictive regulatory response (*Why Care about the Rules?*). This interaction is built on a disregard of the given regulatory context, causing regulators to create new and more restrictive rules to constrain entrepreneurs portraying a careless attitude to extant regulatory frameworks. Some entrepreneurs knowingly disregarded the rules in place, especially during the early stages of the *Recognizing Future Potential* phase, when flying RPAS was not as common as in later phases, and when the consequences for non-compliance were usually limited. Effective policing was not in place at that time and it was often unclear what constituted illegal activities (personal communication). Especially entrepreneurs who are part of the RPAS industry, but do not operate unmanned aircraft themselves (e.g., they offer consultancy and related products/services), felt that rules do not apply to them and can thus safely be disregarded. As Respondent 1 put it, “my company is purely doing consultancy work. And interim project leadership for different kind of projects. I do not fly [a drone] myself.” These entrepreneurs are indifferent to many rules, as they do not directly facilitate or constrain their entrepreneurial activities. However, while rules do not apply to them directly, this does not mean that these entrepreneurs remain totally unaffected by regulations. Respondent 4 developed a mobile application that makes it possible for RPAS operators to register their upcoming flights, to see who is flying at a certain location, and to check whether they are currently operating in a no-fly zone. For that reason, he believed that the current rules do not apply to his firm and would not affect him greatly: “It is just the way that it will be and I will adjust my app [mobile phone application] accordingly.”
This group of entrepreneurs does not receive much attention from rule-makers, and does not necessarily seek to interact with them.

In sum, in this first phase the EU and related parties recognized that RPAS were an upcoming phenomenon in civil markets. Previously unconcerned governmental bodies and industry initiatives became aware of RPAS’ implications for general aviation operations. While entrepreneurs showed both rule following and rule avoiding behavior, regulators enforced compliance through rule proliferation and reinforcement. However, all actors increasingly experienced the institutional frictions stemming from lacking future-oriented regulatory actions, which contributed to the transition to the second phase.

3.4.2.2 Phase 2 (2005 - 2010): Regulatory Bricolage
RPAS activities were brought to international attention in 2005, when the Air Navigation Commission of ICAO requested their discussion. This was followed the next year with ICAO’s first exploratory meeting on the issue and a second meeting in 2007 that led to the establishment of a dedicated study group (UASSG) to look into the development of regulatory frameworks. UASSG became operational in 2008 and during the same year, JARUS was also put in place with the same objective. On European scale, a number of advisory documents were published in this phase. A consortium formed by UAVnet (Civilian UAV Thematic Network), CAPECON (Civil UAV Applications and Economic Effectivity of Potential Configuration Solutions) and USICO (UAV Safety Issues for Civil Operations) proposed a strategic agenda and action plan in 2005, while EASA proposed a RPAS certification policy. Two years later, the Agency published a response document covering 270 pages of comments and detailed responses to the earlier proposed certification policy draft. In 2008, the European Commission issued their first study analyzing current RPAS activities and detailing their future vision of the field. The same year, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union decided to grant EASA more competency in aviation rule-making (often referred to as Basic
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Regulation), which was followed by the publication of general RPAS type certification principles in 2009. Also, a number of new consortia and working groups emerged EU-wide, such as the EUROCAE working group on RPAS to develop certification and standards in 2006. The following year, SESAR (Single European Sky ATM Research) Joint Undertaking was formed to provide guidance to the European air traffic management system concerning RPAS integration issues. Also in 2007, the INOUI (INnovative Operational UAV Integration) Consortium was formed to focus on the integration of RPAS into airspace more generally, which was followed by the publication of the consortium’s final report in 2010. Next to the working groups and reports, personal exchanges were facilitated through the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Mobility Transport’s first hearing on RPAS in 2009, while the European Commission organized a RPAS conference together with the European Defence Agency in 2010. In the Netherlands, the first rules for model airplanes were published in 2005, aimed at regulating small unmanned aircraft with a weight of less than 25 kilograms. This was the first step taken by the Netherlands to regulate behaviors concerning RPAS.

With the number of initiatives on the increase and with additional rule-making attempts underway, another distinct entrepreneur-regulator interaction type emerged, with entrepreneurs acknowledging the existence and applicability of rules and regulations, but also perceiving these as being restrictive. To promote industry development, regulators responded by trying to make rules and regulations more facilitative (Working on Better Regulation). Specifically, regulators consulted with entrepreneurs to identify which rules worked and to eliminate the ones that did not, such as the ones perceived by entrepreneurs as unnecessarily restrictive. Both parties were thus working in concert to create better regulations. Respondent 17 runs a company that uses RPAS for aerial filming and photographing. He felt that “the rules are not even that clear, there are a number of them that are enormously binding and restricting.” Others agreed that the regulation “is very unclear at the moment in
the Netherlands and it is also [the country] where you are allowed the least in the commercial setting” (Respondent 27). These sentiments were widespread in this phase of Regulatory Bricolage, when the first RPAS-specific rules were published. When rule makers found that there was a large group of stakeholders who believed the current situation to be untenable, they showed their willingness to continue with a sub-set of rules and regulations that were more practical to use. While “legislation is a prerequisite that can be quite restrictive”, rule makers realized that “it also offers opportunities, so that with a collaboration between the government and the industry you have to see how at one point we can get innovation off the ground” (Respondent 24).

While entrepreneurs continued to adhere to rules that they perceived as applicable to their businesses (Playing by the Increasingly Clearer Rules), rules still had to be made more accessible, especially during the early phase of Regulatory Bricolage when little was communicated in a tailored way to the general public. This required a mutual willingness to invest extra effort into understanding the current situation, reading through legislative texts and/or getting involved with other industry stakeholders and regulatory institutions. However, this group of entrepreneurs also saw the extant rules as enabling, making it possible for their businesses to sustain and enhance their operations. The owner of an aerial inspection company elucidated this point:

To us, current regulation is a fact. We have to deal with it. We have very limited influence on it. We may be able to change a few things about the conditions in the Netherlands, but we don’t have any influence at all on what’s happening in England or Germany. (…) Many people say: the regulations need to be better. But it’s all very clear. Those rules are still as clear as they can be. (…) This week I was asked to sign a petition against the new regulations. I replied: no, because I am pleased with the new rules, which really annoyed some people. (Respondent 12).

We also observed ongoing interactions between rule-disregarding entrepreneurs and constraining regulators in this phase (Why Care about the Rules?).
Reflecting on the state in the Netherlands, Respondent 19 (who also manufactures his own RPAS) remained convinced that “if you want to create an operational [RPAS] system here, you will need to do things that are not allowed”. Respondent 22 agreed with this perspective and stated that after the first regulations came into place in the Netherlands, he continued to operate “illegally” to be able to keep his air photography business alive:

...legislation changed in such a way that nothing was allowed anymore and then I just carried on. I can’t just apply for unemployment benefits like: ‘yes, I am not allowed to fly anymore’, so you just continue. I mean, I have no alternative.

Regulators responded to this kind of behavior by seeking to constrain it. They aimed to prevent illegal activities and stressed, as one Dutch rule-maker clearly stated, “law enforcement on illegal operations” (presentation at European Civil RPAS Policy, Regulatory & Innovation Forum, Brussels, 2017). Regulators also needed to create rules to reduce grey areas. For example, additional rules were created that needed to be “efficient [for the police] to control the use of drones”, as a member of the European Commission claimed (presentation at EUROCAE Workshop in Brussels, 2016). As the police became better educated on the use of drones and the accompanying regulations, they were able to spot illegal behavior more easily and to fine the perpetrators. Nonetheless, this did not prevent all entrepreneurs from engaging in illegal activity. Respondent 23, an entrepreneur in the film and photography sector, made it clear that “if the penalty is only 350 Euro, I will take the risk of being fined; I’m still making the shot. Because if I get 10 shots and they only get me one time, well, so what?” Thus, for some, the risk of being caught and fined seemed out of balance in relation to the disproportionate potential upside of continuing to carry out illegal flights. Based on these “rather negative” (Respondent 16) experiences, regulators learned and created additional rules in an effort to prevent illegal activities from taking place.
Towards the end of this phase, it became obvious that there were many entrepreneurs who believed that their company did not need to adhere to current regulations, because their firm represented an exception or special case that needed to be dealt with separately. Regulators met this demand with a collaborative approach, as they understood that exceptions were necessary for some cases in which refinement was needed (*Changes in Regulation Needed*). This type of interaction was built on the acknowledgement that there were exceptions that went beyond the given regulatory context, for which regulators needed to redefine rules to facilitate entrepreneurial actions that could not be executed in adherence to current regulations. Thus, changes in regulations were needed for certain RPAS uses.

In sum, during this second phase RPAS activities occurred on both the international and Dutch scenes, and regulatory development at the EU level intensified. Attempts were made on all levels to propose policy guidance frameworks while entrepreneurial initiatives continued to grow. However, all of these efforts seemed uncoordinated, and although parties did acknowledge the work of others, arriving at common frameworks proved to be cumbersome. Many parties drew on different pieces of information and produced a range of proposals and frameworks. While interactions between entrepreneurs and regulators were frequent, all parties involved experienced the institutional friction of not yet having consolidated the plethora of disconnected regulations, which sounded in the transition to the next phase.

### 3.4.2.3 Phase 3 (2011-2015): Focused Efforts

In 2011, ICAO published a formal report on RPAS that became an important reference document for international RPAS regulatory developments. Then, in 2014, ICAO replaced the RPAS working group UASSG with a panel that was given the task to explicitly focus on supporting the regulatory process. One year later, ICAO published a RPAS Manual including more technical details on airspace integration and management. Supporting these international efforts, also in 2015, the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) set up a subcommittee aimed at developing standards around RPAS. In its efforts to consider not only the national rule-making authorities, but also industry stakeholders, JARUS launched its Stakeholders Consultation Body in the same year to solicit feedback from the RPAS field as a whole. The European Commission organized a series of five workshops in 2011 to grasp what the challenges in the development of the European RPAS industry were. In 2012, the European Commission published a strategy document and created the European RPAS Steering group with the goal of drawing up a roadmap for RPAS integration by 2016, which was published the next year. Next to its existing RPAS working group, EUROCAE formed an additional working group in 2012, which only focused on smaller/lighter RPAS. The Unmanned Aerial Systems in European Airspace (ULTRA) consortium formed in the same year and presented their final report in 2013. Others also continued their work: EASA proposed an alignment of the European Common Rules of the Air in 2012, published a concept of operations for RPAS in 2015, along with a policy initiative to update its Basic Regulation of 2008. EASA also introduced a regulatory framework for RPAS operations the same year, and followed up with concrete proposals by the end of 2015. This regulatory framework mentioned three categories in which RPAS might be regulated in the future, based on their risk. In order to clearly map European regulatory developments, the DroneRules project was established in 2015. With a website as its main outlet, current rules of each EU country were made publicly accessible to foster awareness, clarity, and understanding. Another important European event of 2015 was the Riga Declaration, which was the result of an RPAS conference. The document talked about five principles on which the EU would focus its future efforts to stimulate the development of the RPAS industry. Half a year later, the European Parliament published a report supporting the removal of the existing 150 kilograms limit for EU-wide regulations. By the end of 2015, the European Commission adopted a new, comprehensive strategy for the European aviation sector. In the Netherlands, the Dutch industry association for RPAS was
founded in 2012. The previously issued rules for model airplanes were revised in 2013 to distinguish between leisure use and professional use. They also included the general prohibition to use unmanned aircraft up to 150 kilograms, but with the possibility to apply for an exemption when flying RPAS for commercial use. In 2015, rules for model airplanes were revised again with the publication of the first set of rules for commercial RPAS. Although commercial operators were not required to apply for an exemption anymore, other certificates were needed. In 2014, the Dutch Ministry of Justice and Security drew up an action plan for RPAS regulation. In the same year, the first lawsuit involving RPAS occurred as a Dutch journalist was fined for using his RPAS too close to an airport without permission. The Dutch Ministries of Safety and Justice, Infrastructure and Environment, and Economic Affairs collectively organized a conference in 2015 and issued a report expressing their views on RPAS afterwards. This was followed by a general consultation in the Dutch House of Representatives, which discussed RPAS-related issues.

During this phase, disregarding entrepreneurial behavior that was met with constraining regulatory responses (*Why Care about the Rules?*) slowly phased out. Especially in the Netherlands, the lawsuit against the journalist who flew his RPAS without permission during the phase of *Focused Efforts* represented a milestone in this regard. Ultimately, regulators sought to find “a good balance”, as “you will always have drone operators that fly illegally” (Respondent 25). As the regulatory context was still in its infancy, the first set of regulations was created to “allow people to start flying drones” (Respondent 24) and rule-makers were aware that they would subsequently need to add more rules. A Dutch rule maker who was involved in this process recalled that, after the initial publication of new regulations, “we immediately published a future plan, immediately after the regulations: this is where we want to go, that’s what we refer to as our policy intentions.”
Entrepreneurs who valued existing regulatory frameworks continued to interact with the regulators seeking to enforce them (*Playing by the Increasingly Clearer Rules*). Interestingly, some entrepreneurs even expressed that their customers asked more of them in terms of safe and secure operations than what current rules demanded at that point in time (personal communication). In such cases, entrepreneurs spoke of “[s]mart customers [d]emanding much more than regulation requires” (presentation at AUVSI’s Unmanned Systems Europe in Brussels, 2015). Thus, in addition to complying with regulations, the market itself occasionally required more from some RPAS firms.

During this phase regulatory frameworks were frequently refined, and co-creation activities between entrepreneurs and regulators continued. Rule selection processes were initiated when entrepreneurs felt constrained in their development of new business models (*Working on Better Regulation*). According to one entrepreneur: “legislation has quite been a problem, quite often you couldn’t do things, you weren’t allowed to do things or a new law was being put in place” (Respondent 6). New RPAS applications often did not fit extant regulatory frameworks, testifying to the fact that “[t]echnology has always preceded regulation” (presentation at ICAO’s First Global RPAS Symposium in Montreal, 2015). While the industry was still forming and proto-institutions were still in flux, regulations were subject to virtually continuous change. So much so even that Respondent 8 expressed his concern that “at a certain moment, there will be more and more rules, and more…” There was a desire for the government to “talk more openly with industry players, like us, to introduce legislation that is more structured and not make all sorts of sudden changes” (Respondent 6).

During this phase, many entrepreneurs requested to be treated as an exception to the rules, as many new business models did not fit the extant regulation (*Changes in Regulation Needed*). Especially when entrepreneurs were able to demonstrate that their operations were safe, regulators showed their willingness to
refine existing rules to permit useful RPAS applications. As a Dutch policymaker stated: “Of course we also try to look ahead. And it’s important that you do so together. Otherwise, we won’t get there!” (Respondent 24). For example, Respondent 9 founded a company aiming to operate RPAS at airports for the purpose of pest control, as many airports face challenges with birds damaging aircrafts when aircrafts and birds collide. The issue here was that airports are no-fly zones for RPAS, while they would obviously benefit from the entrepreneur being exempted from the rules. This entrepreneur realized that the application of RPAS that he envisioned “is so specific that we need to keep on talking [with regulatory bodies]” to arrive at a workable solution. Such solutions should not make compromises with regard to safety, but they should also enable useful innovations. Many productive interactions between entrepreneurs and regulators were observed during this phase of *Focused Efforts*, during which Dutch rule-making activities intensified. Respondent 16, who worked at a governmental institution, stated that “if you want to do something that deviates from the rules, that’s always possible if you can show that you’ll be able to do it in a safe manner.” In general, this group of entrepreneurs was aware that their input into the refinement of rules was essential for creating a future context that would be workable for them. Respondent 2, a producer of RPAS, stated that “[w]e have good contact with those who make the laws and regulations, and we are all on the same page. They also know that they need to change it to make sure that we can fly.” He continued to stress that “a good dialogue with the authorities is very important”. When presenting our findings on the types of entrepreneur-regulator interactions at an industry conference, we received feedback from an entrepreneur telling us that he was “exactly that special case” we had just talked about (personal communication). In response, during his presentation, he asked rule makers to put more effort into allowing operations for the greater good of society (as his firm uses RPAS to deliver humanitarian aid and disaster relief).
In sum, during this third phase even more regulatory activities accumulated in a short time span. Attempts were made to bundle efforts and focus on achieving the common goal – rule-making for a safe and secure integration of RPAS into the Dutch economy and into Dutch airspace – together. This resulted in collective standardization efforts, with recommended practices, guidance material, suggested standards and certification structures emerging in which rule-making bodies acknowledged and referenced each other’s work. While interactions involving disregarding entrepreneurs who evoked rule proliferation by regulators became less prevalent, all other interaction types were still present during this phase. But even though the efforts of all actors became more focused on creating a common policy framework, they still experienced the institutional friction of not yet having established collectively binding rules, which greatly contributed to the transition to the next phase.

3.4.2.4 Phase 4 (2016 - 2018): Working Towards Harmonization

Internationally, the last phase was less eventful as European developments seemed to come to a common conclusion. ICAO published a preliminary concept of operation for RPAS in 2017 and the OECD released a report in which RPAS were discussed as part of the transportation mix for the first time. In the EU, SESAR Joint Undertaking published two studies in 2016: one on RPAS demonstration projects and one on the economic potential of RPAS for Europe. Also, EUROCAE merged its two separate working groups together to develop standards for all types of RPAS. The European UAS Standards Coordination Group (EUSCG) was formed in 2017 to work on RPAS standardization activities. The same year, EUROCONTROL published a concept of operation for integrating RPAS into air traffic management and the Airports Council International (ACI) followed a year later with a position paper on this issue. In 2018, SESAR Joint Undertaking published a roadmap for RPAS integration also considering issues concerning air traffic management. The year concluded with the Helsinki Declaration, which included a plea for light rules.
and simple regulation and was published as a result of yet another European RPAS conference. EASA further refined the proposed categories for RPAS in 2017 and published its proposed regulations in early 2018, before the EU adopted the new Basic Regulation for aviation in the summer of 2018. As of that point, EASA was granted the mandate for rule-making regarding RPAS of all kinds, regardless of their weight. With the publication of a regulation aimed at RPAS of no more than four kilograms, the Netherlands made their last attempted in 2016 to introduce interim regulations, while the foreshadowing of EU-wide rules was already clear. In 2018, the Dutch House of Representatives organized a hearing and discussion session in which the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management sought more insights into the use of RPAS, their opportunities and challenges.

While some rules continued to constrain entrepreneurs in exploiting opportunities, regulators were still willing to facilitate entrepreneurship through rule selection (Working on Better Regulation). For example, with the introduction of new regulations covering RPAS up to four kilograms during the phase of Working Towards Harmonization, in July 2016 a conscious decision was made to reduce the administrative burden for entrepreneurs. Whereas certain new rules came into effect, less useful ones were suspended. One example is “abolishing the obligation to report to the mayor” (Respondent 24) when RPAS flights are executed. Also, RPAS operators were no longer required to have an operations handbook or a medical certificate, nor did they need to file a NOTAM, which is a notice about the upcoming flight with relevant information (Staatscourant, 2016). Respondent 25, a Dutch policymaker, explained that this was the case because “we wanted to look much more at the positive side. So, there was a real impetus to work, in particular, on being more stimulating”. Upon realizing that certain rules were seen as constraining, regulators responded with facilitation in the form of selective rule suspension. This type of interaction slowly began to phase out when actors realized that the RPAS industry would soon be covered by EU-wide regulation, trumping national
legislation. “The EASA proposed to regulate all drones at the EU level” (presentation at the 3rd International Unmanned Cargo Aircraft Conference in Enschede, 2016), which was set in motion in 2012 (presentation at RPAS CivOps in Brussels, 2016). This meant that a number of Dutch national rules were to disappear. All EU member states and industries were invited to deliver insights for “best practices in the field of civil aviation [to be adopted] based on best available evidence and analysis” (presentation at RPAS CivOps in Brussels, 2016).

Eventually, Playing by the Increasingly Clearer Rules became the dominant type of interaction between entrepreneurs and regulators. For instance, a Dutch representative and member of the European Commission, stated that “enforcement of legislation is essential for the successful integration of drones into European airspace” (video shown at the RPAS CivOps in Brussels, 2016). To achieve this, EASA called for “compatible standards to support enforcement” (presentation at EASA Workshop on Drones in Cologne, 2016). But such standards require a joint effort, in which “gradual implementation of legislation and technology standards [go] along with the real needs of the industry” (presentation at the High Level Conference on Drones in Warsaw, 2016). In general, regulators expressed contentment with entrepreneurs and other industry parties that adhered to the current rules (personal communication). Rule reinforcement mostly acquired a confirmatory function, as commonly accepted regulations continued to exist. This became increasingly important as the process of proto-institutional emergence moved along to reach the end of the Working Towards Harmonization phase. The regulators’ response was constraining, in that rules that were seen as workable by both parties gradually set the boundaries for future operations. However, in the event that entrepreneurs do not follow rules, “we have enforcers, we have the police and the Inspectorate and both have the responsibility to reinforce [the rules]”, as a Dutch rule maker put it (Respondent 24).
In a similar vein, regulators continued to assume a facilitating role in responding to situations in which current regulations did not accommodate special cases. Further rule refinement was needed, as the “widened range of operations requires more regulatory flexibility to keep rules proportionate”, as a member of the European Commission clearly articulated (presentation at EUROCAE Workshop in Brussels, 2016). In this emerging industry, “one size does not fit all” (presentation at High Level Conference on Drones in Warsaw, 2016). As such, Respondent 21, an employee of an intergovernmental organization with an advisory function, concluded:

*Current rules may be fine for 99% of the existing firms in the industry, but nevertheless, there is still the 1% that is doing good work, but doesn’t fit within regulations. In that case, governments should make exceptions, for example, flying at airports. Many won’t be allowed and won’t need to fly there, but, for example, for cargo purposes it may be necessary.*

In sum, in this fourth phase national and international stakeholders understood that the common European framework for RPAS rule-making was almost in place. Workshops and meetings were mostly organized with the intent to inform, not to regulate. Publications by stakeholder groups during that time focused on issues beyond the regulatory process, such as technology, infrastructure, or standards. All actors worked on arriving at a common agreement on how RPAS were to be understood, how they should be dealt with systematically, and how this should be reinforced appropriately and in a unified manner. The ending point of our analysis marks June 2018, when the EU adopted a common European regulation for all civil RPAS, regardless of their size or weight. This is an appropriate point in time, from which on the RPAS industry in the Netherlands is covered by EU-wide rules.
3.5 Discussion

3.5.1 Dialectic Institutional Work

Much of what we currently know about how institutions are created is derived from studies carried out in relatively mature settings, whose findings may not apply to technological innovation-intensive fields. Specifically, we feel that the logic of compliance, according to which entrepreneurs are considered to be institutionalized actors (somewhat devoid of agency) in a top-down regulated field, does not apply in emerging fields in which the core technological innovations are still imperfectly understood by society and in which institutionalized yardsticks for establishing legitimacy have not yet emerged. While more recent work recognized the importance of institutional entrepreneurs in the creation or disruption of institutions, we argue that this view lacks a fine-grained interactional understanding as entrepreneurs are often portrayed as heroic individuals who act in opposition to other stakeholders. Instead, a more interactive and dialectic vision is necessary, in which entrepreneurs are seen as the co-creators of their institutional surroundings and in which regulators frequently develop legal frameworks in consultation with pioneering entrepreneurs and in reaction to inexorable changes in such technological innovation-intensive and behaviorally fickle fields. Thus, the process of proto-institutional emergence that can be observed in these contexts closely resembles a dialectic approach\(^{13}\) in which entrepreneurs and regulators work together in shaping the institutions of the future. Thus, both parties engage in *dialectic institutional work*.

Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) provide insights into institutional creation work and identify practices that focus on rules, namely advocacy work, i.e. “the

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\(^{13}\) We follow Zeitz (1980, p. 73) in our definition to refer to dialectics as “the basic logic of social interaction”. Although we do not apply techniques of dialectical analysis in our study, we propose that the processes we document can themselves be seen as dialectic, thereby following Benson (1977, p. 3) who claims that the “dialectical view is fundamentally committed to the concept of process”.

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mobilization of political and regulatory support” (p. 221), defining work, i.e. “construction of rule systems that confer status or identity, define boundaries of membership or create status hierarchies” (p. 222) and vesting work, i.e. “the creation of rule structures that confer property rights” (p. 222). These activities are especially important in the creation of proto-institutions as the authors conclude that there is a “far greater potential for rules-based work to lead to the *de novo* construction of new institutions” (p. 228, emphasis in original). We find that this is also applicable for proto-institutional emergence in technological innovation-intensive fields as entrepreneurial action often precedes regulatory response. New entrepreneurial initiatives cannot be fitted into existing regulatory frameworks by mere extension of earlier frameworks, such as the body of regulations and conduct established in manned aviation. In the early beginnings of institutions, we especially observe advocacy work. Consequently, proto-institutions evolve processually driven by dialectic institutional work between two (or more) actors that contribute to structural emergence. Our contribution lies in shifting the focus from the agency-structure relationship to considering the actors’ interactions more detailed by arguing that it is not only one group of actor that contributes to, challenges or creates structure.

3.5.2 Contributions

3.5.2.1 Institutional Work

Lawrence et al. (2011, p. 55) highlight that the “concept of institutional work insists on the need to consider the permanent recursive and dialectical interaction between agency and institutions” and existing studies in institutional work examined the relationship between agency and structure (Battilana, & D’Aunno, 2009; Canning & O’Dwyer, 2016). However, going beyond interactions between agency and structure, the micro-foundational processes by which actors come to shape structure, is also a product of interaction between these very actors. This has been largely overlooked by scholars focusing on institutional work processes. By introducing dialectic institutional work, we aim to shift the focus towards the interaction and
processes that occur between actors while engaging in the creation of new institutions. Thus, we take the discussion in institutional work literature one step further by not only shifting the “gaze away from the ‘organizational field’ and large-scale social transformations, and attend more closely to the relationship between institutions and the actors who populate them” (Lawrence et al., 2011, p. 57), but also to the relationship between actors themselves. Interestingly, Ozcan and Gurses (2018, p. 1793) point out that existing “institutional work has largely considered state actors as indistinguishable and static, and focused on reinforcing existing policies for institutional maintenance purposes”. Our findings show, however, that the interaction dynamics are more nuanced and regulators do not form one monolithic body. We thus confirm the authors’ findings and conclude that not only in regulatory category emergence, but also in proto-institutional emergence in technological innovation-intensive fields, the acts of regulators need to be considered more nuanced.

To our best knowledge, Hargrave and Van de Ven (2009) are the only scholars that attempted to introduce dialectics to the study of institutional work. However, in studying the interactions between institutional actors, the authors focus on “change [that] emerges from interactions between proponents of current institutional arrangements and parties espousing contradictory arrangements” with “new arrangements that […] are then challenged by proponents of alternative arrangements as the dialectical process recycles” (p. 122). This approach seems most suitable for institutional change as it assumes some degree of existing institutional arrangements, but profits from refinement when applied to institutional emergence. In settings of proto-institutional emergence where established views that need to be challenged are missing, our study provides insights into the process of dialectic institutional work by actors that are jointly engage in the creation of proto-institutions.
Eventually, Lawrence and Suddaby (2006, p. 249) urge scholars that only through studying the emergence of institutions using institutional work “theorists can avoid the subjective illusion of institutional outcomes and begin to unpack the relational and interactive moments of institutional production.” We believe that with our study, we were able to follow this call and illustrate the interactions in the Dutch RPAS industry that drive proto-institutional emergence. This brings us to the contributions we make to literature on proto-institutional emergence.

3.5.2.2 Proto-Institutional Emergence

While Hargrave and Van de Ven (2006) conceptually lay out institutional innovation and change as a dialectic process within established organizational fields, our research adds to studies of new institutions by explicating the diverse entrepreneur-regulator interactions in this environment. Importantly, these actors within a newly forming, technological innovation-intensive field are actively involved in shaping proto-institutions that may or may not prevail in the future. As such, we followed the call by Bruton, Ahlstrom and Li (2010, p. 434) for researchers to consider the “institutional-individual mindset” connections that impact behavior and supply additional evidence of entrepreneurial behavior situated in its various contexts (Ucbasaran, Westhead & Wright, 2001; Zahra, Wright & Abdelgawad, 2014). We show that entrepreneurs are not only exogenous “rule-takers”, but also influence the creation of the context they operate in as endogenous “rule-makers”. Regulatory efforts occur in response to behavior espoused by entrepreneurs who partially, but actively share their future visions of the emerging institution with regulators, such that regulatory interventions do not only occur in isolation in a top-down manner (Bylund & McCaffrey, 2017). Regulations are not unlike entrepreneurial opportunities; they are socially construed as regulators observe and interpret how new organizational fields emerge while entrepreneurs aim to influence their efforts. Thus, we contribute to research on proto-institutional emergence by offering a deeper understanding of the dynamics that underlie the activities of
different actors in an emerging context exemplary for technological innovation-intensive fields. Eventually, the socially constructed reality in which entrepreneurs and regulators operate, exists and is redefined by their actions. Our study responds to the call by Douhan and Henrekson (2007, p. 22) who caution scholars not to be “restricted to analyzing how institutions affect the level and type of entrepreneurial activity”, but instead to also “consider how entrepreneurial activities affect institutions”. The shared construction of reality by all stakeholders involved in proto-institutional emergence extends beyond the assumption that regulators shape institutions in a one-sided manner. In our research, we have had the unique opportunity to reveal the dialectic institutional work that can shape future, taken-for-granted institutions even during the unstable, proto-institutional stage.

3.5.3 Limitations and Directions for Future Research

As we chose a specific organizational field in which to conduct our research, boundary conditions apply to our study, which simultaneously resemble fruitful directions for future research. First, since the Dutch RPAS industry is a context in which new technologies fuel the development of the field, interactions between entrepreneurs and regulators in less technology-driven fields may be different. For example, risks associated with system failures and crashes weigh heavily in the RPAS context, whereas these technology-related challenges are not as relevant in other fields. Future research may, therefore, look at organizational fields that do not form around technologies, but other products and services instead. Second, the Dutch RPAS industry is primarily a case of technology-enabled entrepreneurship rather than a case of technological development and diffusion. This entails opportunities for researchers with a particular interest in the regulation of new technologies. We believe that a comparative conceptual exploration of negotiation work (Helfen & Sydow, 2013) and dialectic institutional work would be a particularly interesting exercise, to assess which concept has the greatest explanatory power in such settings. Third, a salient feature of our research setting is
that a vast number of stakeholders in the RPAS industry has a background in or is familiar with manned aviation. This prior knowledge and familiarization with practices, conventions and codes in the manned aviation field may have impacted these actors’ approach to interacting in the newly emerging field we studied. This offers interesting opportunities for researchers to more closely examine the influence of prior knowledge of or prior affiliation with a related industry on the formation of new institutions. Fourth, an interesting question is whether dialectic institutional work is conducive to the development of what Acemoglu and associates (2005, 2012) call ‘inclusive institutions’. In their analysis, which contrasts such arrangements with ‘extractive institutions’ captured by political and economic elites, inclusive institutions are a main driver of equality and economic development because they enfranchise the human capital of otherwise disenfranchised non-elite actors. A speculative but interesting thesis to explore in future research is whether dialectic institutional work, which is by definition an open process that draws on the inputs of numerous entrepreneurs acting in concert with regulators, could be a process that is uniquely prone to producing inclusive institutions. It would appear that the involvement of multiple entrepreneurs in the process of proto-institutional emergence would ensure the continued openness of the resultant institutional structures towards future entrepreneurial initiatives and general enfranchisement of future generations of entrepreneurs. To sum up, we have illustrated interactions between stakeholders by means of a model that we believe accurately represents all that was observed in the emerging field we studied. However, because the complexity of processes in the social world may exceed what we were able to capture in our model, our study should be seen as a first step in this direction.

3.6 Conclusion

In this study, we asked: How do regulatory proto-institutions arise in the type of technological innovation-intensive and behavioral change-prone organizational fields? We conclude that the interactions between two types of central actors,
namely entrepreneurs and regulators, give a strong impetus to proto-institutional emergence. In particular, proto-institutions arise in technological innovation-intensive fields out of dialectic institutional work involving both of these parties, without either of them leading the process. This is illustrated in our process model, which we also expect to apply in some form in other nascent fields, including blockchain-based cryptocurrencies, platform-based sharing economy firms, and decentralized renewable energy generation. We therefore invite future researchers interested in these fields to scrutinize the settings for the effects of dialectic institutional work on proto-institutional emergence.
CHAPTER 4

Leviathan in a Lab Coat: How Military Initiatives Help Civil Innovation Institutions Produce Market-Ready Products

This chapter was prepared in collaboration with Pursey Heugens.
4.1 Introduction

An insight that has recently been established is that entrepreneurship and innovation need institutions to flourish (Acs, Desai & Hessels, 2008; Batjargal et al., 2013; Boettke & Coyne, 2009; Bruton, Ahlstrom & Li, 2010; Mazzucato, 2013; Spencer & Gómez, 2004). Feldman and Massard (2012), for instance, studied institutional factors in the geography of innovation as important innovation enhancers, which support knowledge spillovers, regional specialization, innovation clusters or university-industry knowledge transfers. Nooteboom (2000, p. 916) already established that “[l]inkages between firms can enhance both the diffusion and the generation of innovations”. In doing so, Rasiah (2017) argues, governments play an essential role in providing institutional arrangements that allow for innovation to take place by bringing together various stakeholders, which resolves coordination and social capital exchange problems. However, if these networks become too tight and exclusive, they can form a liability by creating inertia that hinders future innovation (Nooteboom, 2000). Also, institutions are necessary for encouraging social entrepreneurship (Dorado & Ventresca, 2013), and varying institutions among countries are the reason for different rate and types of entrepreneurship (Sambharya & Musteen, 2014; Stenholm, Acs & Wuebker, 2013; Urbano & Alvarez, 2014).

Traditionally, however, the focus has been on public and private civil institutions such as university systems, investment communities and facilities, and R&D clusters that are thought to contribute to a country’s innovativeness. For instance, many policy initiatives that aim at stimulating innovation focus on supporting (small) firms in the private sector, and promote entrepreneurship among new start-ups (Baron & Tang, 2011; Marvel & Lumpkin, 2007; Mintrom, 1997; Wong, Ho & Autio, 2005). While these are valuable insights that could be generated into public and private civil institutions and their impact on country-level innovativeness, this is only a piece of the puzzle. This is because the institutional
matrix (North, 1991) necessary for producing frame-breaking innovations tends to be incomplete in many contexts. For example, many attempts to produce private sector innovations fail because these initiatives: (a) lack complementary assets (Teece, 1998; Tripsas, 1997); (b) suffer from short-term investment horizons (Bertoni & Tykvová, 2015; Cumming, 2007); (c) underinvest in fundamental and precompetitive research (Feller, Ailes & Roessner, 2002; Niosi, Saviotti, Bellon & Crow, 1993), and (d) lack the ‘translational’ capacity to help products stemming from fundamental and precompetitive research become market-ready (Carayannis & Alexander, 2004; Woolf, 2008). Radical innovation is fueled by technological breakthroughs as much as specialized human capital. Intellectual property is needed as well as dedicated financing, which is not always supported by public and private institutions in the civilian domain. In addition, private sector innovators are often reluctant to take risks when it comes to pioneering, radical innovations (Mazzucato, 2013). There is a certain capital commitment involved that these institutions are unwilling or unable to sponsor, as chances for success are difficult to access in very early stages and for very new technologies. In these cases, regulatory interventions and political authority are needed that private sector firms, even the ones focused on innovations, are unable or unwilling to provide. The time-horizon for (recovering) these investments may also be longer. Eventually, a country’s innovativeness also depends on capacities that are built around the new innovation as well as adjacent institutions that are present to support them. While public and private civil institutions face difficulties in these areas, we posit that there is another

14 These gaps in the institutional matrix are not unlike institutional voids, as they are often referred to in the literature. However, the term institutional void is often used to refer to emerging economies with omissions in basic institutions providing healthcare, schooling, and justice. The type of gaps we refer to, however, also exist in many fully developed economies, which therefore differ greatly in their ability to take the lead in producing frame-breaking innovations. We therefore refrain from using the term institutional void, in order to avoid confusion between missing generic institutions (i.e., ‘classic’ institutional voids) and incomplete institutions for innovation.
institution essential for innovation, which has thus far been overlooked by research but is able to compensate for existing institutional shortcomings: the military.

We use a sample of 1,341 civil drone systems that were created by 473 producers residing in 52 countries to examine the global drone industry from 2006 to 2016. These are drones that were developed with a commercial purpose and that do not constitute exclusively military systems. In particular, we employ survival analysis and test the influence of military drone presence, military expenditure, and arms import on civil drone market readiness. Our results show that common state institutions are not always sufficient in supporting national innovation, and researchers previously oftentimes overlooked the role that military institutions play for civil innovation around the globe. Our hypotheses are supported and we can confirm that through facilitating military-driven technological and human capital spillovers, investing in high-risk innovation projects, as well as building capabilities and adjacent institutions, the military contributes to increased chances for civil drone market readiness. It means that, although some private and public civil institutions help in bringing innovation to the market, the military is an undervalued, yet strong predictor for a country’s innovative strengths in the civil sector.

This underestimated set of institutions for innovation – military institutions – remains a blind spot in many innovation studies. Nevertheless, the military is an important source of innovation that is often overlooked by management scholars, although the implications of military innovation for civil product development are widely used in daily life: the Internet was originally developed by a specialized American defense agency (Abbate, 1999), and even Silicon Valley is a product of efforts from the defense sector to support it (Leslie, 2000). Another example is the iPhone that draws from countless military innovations (from cellular technology and GPS to artificial intelligence), and successfully deployed them in their product (Mazzucato, 2013). This serves as a great example in which a number of dispersed innovations from the military can be integrated on the basis of political authority
rather than on the basis of consent (demand/supply matching) in free markets. Next to these spillovers, the military has the ability to invest in uncertain, long-term, possibly high-risk innovation projects, and military institutions also build capabilities and adjacent institutions (e.g., infrastructure) next to developing new products that others can profit from.

This study’s contributions are twofold. To start with, we explicate the specific mechanisms through which military initiatives augment and enhance common public and private innovation institutions. Concretely, we specify three specific pathways through which military structures contribute to helping civil products to market-readiness. To our best knowledge, this study belongs to the first ones that systematically examine civil product development driven by military innovation in a global context. With this, we seek to contribute to the discussion on institutions for innovation, where little attention is paid to concrete institutions (such as the military) to enhance innovation. While existing research has a strong system-theoretical emphasis on economic explanations for generic institutional quality, we urge management scholars to engage in the discussion to determine which specific institutions are needed for innovation to flourish.

We also provide an account for the differential ability of national governments – even advanced ones – to produce breakthrough innovations. The civil innovative potential of countries differs drastically across the globe, and our study offers a novel (complementary) explanation for this observation; the extent to which countries complement common public and private sector innovation investments with matching support for military products and technology. In short, we show that the military-civilian symbiosis is an often overlooked driver of the innovation capacity of countries. This has implication for policy-makers, who may wish to not only consider but also support possible innovation outcomes that can arise from successfully leveraging military products and technology in the civil domain.
4.2 Theory and Hypotheses

4.2.1 Institutions for Innovation

It has long been a central tenet in institutional economics that there is an intimate relationship between generic institutional quality and (economic development through) innovation (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2005; Kuznets, 1973; North, 1991). The idea here is that political, economic, and legal institutions differentially facilitate, incentivize, and protect innovation-based economic growth initiatives. Institutions enable innovation by putting in place the necessary facilitative conditions for it, including accessible, high quality school systems, technical universities, and labor and capital markets. Institutions also incentivize innovation, for example by establishing tax facilities offering tax breaks for innovative companies, reducing the taxation of innovator-entrepreneurs. In addition, institutions can protect innovation by offering innovators access to functioning courts, establishing a strong intellectual property rights regime, and actively policing transgressors of those rights.

Although researchers stress that these National Systems of Innovations (NSI) are “an institutional conception par excellence” (Filippetti & Archibugi, 2011, p. 179, emphasis in original), this concept is prominently discussed in the innovation economics literature. There, the influences of the institutional context on the economic agent or organization, and their determinants for a countries’ innovation capacity are discussed (Freeman, 1995; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993). The concept has been split into sub-parts and researcher studied not only on the level of national innovation systems, but also regional (Asheim & Gertler, 2005; Cooke, Uranga & Etxebarria, 1997; Feldman, 2014) or sectorial (Breschi & Malerba, 1997; Malerba, 2002) systems of innovation. Others even proposed the need for national systems of entrepreneurship (Acs, Autio & Szerb, 2014).
Thus, in addition to the need for a high-quality matrix of background institutions, scholars in management have long pointed to the need for more specific institutions behind innovation. The belief here is that more specific institutions are necessary to facilitate the emergence of innovation in each organizational field, since the configuration of actors, ideas, and technologies is unique to each field in particular. The literature on innovation, institutions, and organizations describes two principal routes for the emergence of such dedicated institutions in specific organizational fields. First, the organizations constituting an organizational field collectively often form innovation communities (Leonard-Barton, 1995; Lynn, Reddy & Aram, 1996; Saxenian, 1990). In such communities – virtual or co-located – dedicated de-facto institutions like highly specialized labor forces, supplier networks, technological standards, and dominant designs tend to emerge through both spontaneous and concerted efforts. In other words, new institutions for innovation often emerge endogenously from the interactions between organizations that are co-constitutive of organizational fields. Second, organizations embedded in fields also often make generic (extra-field) institutions specific by using them as resources or inputs into field-specific organizational processes and routines (Coriat & Weinstein, 2002; Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; Nelson, 2002). This transformative process makes dedicated institutions out of general ones by reinterpreting, reusing, and reinventing existing institutions. The process is often observed in relation to technological standards, open source initiatives, and platform technologies. In short, field-specific institutions for innovation tend to come into being either through specific, intra-field, endogenous processes or generic, extra-field, exogenous processes.

4.2.2 Importance of the Military for Innovation

One of the public areas in which many countries invest large amounts is the military and defense industry. For instance, it has been shown that the state had major influence on the development of the commercial aircraft industry, as this was driven
by military research, development, and production (Ruttan, 2006). Ruttan (2006, p.7) also shows that in the US, technologies that sprung forth from the military industry became essential parts of a number of industries that would not be as advanced as they are today, notably “(1) interchangeable parts and mass production, (2) military and commercial aircraft, (3) nuclear energy and electric power, (4) computers and semiconductors, (5) the Internet, and (6) the space industries.”

In an early study exploring cooperation between rival firms in the aerospace and defense industry, Dussauge and Garrette (1995) found that alliances are responsible for a great proportion of all partnerships in the manufacturing, and the aerospace and defense industry in particular. In a similar vein, Hislop (2000) examined how UK military equipment manufacturer responded to declining demand after the Cold War, and found that internal restructuring, diversification and joint ventures were the result. Azulay, Lerner and Tishler (2002) studied intrapreneurial efforts to enhance conversion of military technologies for civil applications in an Israeli defense firm. While management encouragement let to more proposals by the employees, they continued to focus on military applications and not civilian ones. The authors conclude that this results from barriers that employees of defense organizations perceive in converting military applications to the civil market. Also managers in high positions seemed to inhibit this conversion. Honig, Lerner and Raban (2006) also focused on the Israeli defense industry, but studied linkages between the military system and start-ups. In particular, the authors found that start-ups with linkages to the defense industry could better access capital as their military ties signaled favorable performance. This could be confirmed by the authors as firms that acted as military supplier indeed showed better performance. Only recently has there been some interest in institutional influence from the military on management. Koch-Bayram and Wernicke (2018) show that CEOs with military background were less likely to be involved in making false claims on their firm’s financial statements and opportunistic stock option backdating. The authors focused on CEO
characteristics obtained through their military experience, that is, law obedience and close adherence to regulations. Hiatt, Carlos and Sine (2018) showed that new ventures with ties to the military in underdeveloped, and developing countries increased their survival rates, mostly because of the supporting resources provided by the military, especially security-related ones.

Although some previous studies seem to indicate that the military impacts private sector firms in various ways, we lack insights into the mechanisms of institutional support that can be leveraged from the military to the civil sector. While research on high-level, public institutions as well as private sector institutions offers some insights, they only seem to account for part of the innovative capabilities of a country. Only a limited number of studies exist that look at the influence of military institutions’ spillover into other domains, and research on their impact on innovativeness is essentially absent. Thus, we ask: how can the military support civil innovation institutions to develop market-ready products?

4.2.3 Military Spillovers

To start with, we argue that the military is capable of facilitating military-driven human capital spillovers (Acosta, Coronado, & Marín, 2011; Feldman, 1999; Lerner, 1992; Niosi & Zhugu, 2005). We define human capital spillovers as instances in which knowledge workers leave military organizations and embed their knowledge in civil settings to be exploited in complementary firms or products. Through these spillovers in human capital, technology spillovers occurs as well as a result.

The military creates a labor pool of skilled workers that possess knowhow on drone system development, but when they change jobs and are employed in commercially operating firms, these workers are able to leverage their knowledge in new settings (Honig et al., 2006). Human capital spillover can result from personnel leaving the military and either bringing their skills into private sector companies, or starting their own firm (McDonald, 2013). These newly founded
firms could also be spin-offs that result from the military selling part of their operations and thus, making it available on the market. In doing so, human capital built in the military will transfer to and be available in the private sector. Furthermore, ex-military personnel might also work with or for military suppliers, which in turn, feed back into the military system and facilitate future developments in the military itself. As a result, military-driven technological spillovers occur. Facilitated through the expert knowledge of former military employees, certain system parts or technologies from the military find their way back to be applied to civil products (Acosta et al., 2011; Eliasson, 2011).

An illustrative case is discussed in Mazzucato (2013) in great detail, namely Apple’s iPhone. The author illustrates that many technologies that are deployed in their smartphone stem from advancements in the military, often in cooperation with universities and research institution, but also private sector firms. For instance, the iPhone’s artificial intelligence aided assistant SIRI was originally developed for military personnel, and the multi-touch screen sprung forth from a research fellowship program initiated by the U.S. National Science Foundation and Central Intelligence Agency. For military drones, it can either be a certain technology, such as GPS that is leveraged, or the whole drone system that is not only utilized for military purposes, but also applied by supplying firms to the civil sector. Thus, some example exists in which technology developed for and used by the military finds its way into civil products (for another impactful example, please see the development of Internet as discussed in Abbate, 1999). Also novel applications of the technology are possible and, as Goel and Saunoris (2018, p. 363) suggest, “knowledge spillovers from defense products might enable entrepreneurship in the civilian sector via new products or civilian applications. Knowledge embedded in sophisticated military technologies can yield useful ideas for civilian applications.” Thus, with an increasing share of military drone systems in a country, we can also expect to see products from the military to be deployed in the civil setting. Lastly,
not all firms that develop (parts for) military drones need to be purely military firms themselves. Some companies participate in tenders for the military, but are serving the civil market as well. Knowledge that is gained during military projects is then taken into consideration for civil product development (Baum & McGahan, 2009). It also occurs that civil actors cooperate with military parties to jointly develop much needed technology (Cowan & Foray, 1995; Molas-Gallart, 1997; Te Kulve & Smit, 2003).

In summary, human capital spillover effects enable military drone development to also contribute to enhanced developments of civil systems. With a greater share of military drone systems in a country, a higher density of knowledge and innovation from military drone development is present, which in turn can be used in civil systems. The mechanisms through which this happens are spillovers in human capital from the military, which lead to technological advancements in civil products. Thus, a high share of military systems in a country either being developed or already on the market indicates a strong emphasis on knowledge around military drone technology. Through spillover effects, the enhanced technology and innovation in this domain can be utilized in civil drones.

Hypothesis 1: The higher the share of military drones developed in a country, the shorter it will take civil drone systems that are developed in that country to reach market readiness.

4.2.4 High-Risk State Investments

While spillovers from knowledge around products developed by the military play a vital role, we argue that it only represents one mechanism through which civil innovation can be fostered. In addition, we posit that the military’s capability to invest in high-risk project represents another mechanism that is responsible for enhanced developments of civil systems. We define high-risk investments as
investments that have uncertain outcomes, a long investment horizon, leave room for experimentation and failure (Mazzucato, 2013).

These fundamental investments need to be given for radical innovation to occur. Civil institutions – private firms and even public ones – are often reluctant to engage in these projects themselves due to their limited risk propensity. However, if a government is dedicating funds to their military, especially for cutting-edge technology and research projects with uncertain outcomes, the investments made can be expected to end up, at least in part, in R&D and technology development within the military. Among other R&D activities, it will affect the advancement of military products (Balfoussias & Stavrinos, 1996; Mowery, 1992; Palme, 1982; Yildirim & Öcal, 2016). These innovations can then be sources by other public and private parties. Mazzucato (2013, p. 31) concludes that following the military’s heavy investments in early Internet development project, “venture capital arrived 15–20 years after the most important investments were made” by the US Department of Defense.

Another way in which governments invest in risky projects is through directly funding private or public firms in undertaking project that they would not have carried out without military funding. Caterpillar serves as an excellent example of a company that is profiting from governmental support through their military spending not only to strengthen its defense section of the business, but at the same time to support their other business unites. The company’s core is focused on machinery and engines, which are purchased by corporates as well as governments, notably with the US Government being its largest customer (Reuters, 2019; National Mining Association, 2019). Starting around World War I, its early tractors were used to carry equipment and artillery used at the battlefront and served to inspire the UK tank development (HOLT CAT, 2019), till today where Caterpillar equipment can be found in almost all US military missions one way or another (National Mining Association, 2019). From its early start in the 20th century, Caterpillar was
able to profit from governmental defense expenditure and only recently secured a contract of 663 million US Dollar (USD) to produce equipment for the US Defense Logistics Agency (National Mining Association, 2019). As a special kind of customer, the US military provides investments through contracts awarded for customized fleet equipment tailored to the State’s needs (Army Technology, 2019). By doing so, investments are made for developments in the company’s existing knowledge and technology base to satisfy the State’s needs. Caterpillar might not allocate these funds internally when such projects are viewed as too risky and without immediate return. On the long run, however, innovation that results from these initially State-funded.

Thus, the military has the unique ability to be able to invest in high-risk projects that may or may not turn out to produce successful innovation (Abbate, 1999; Leslie, 2000; Mazzucato, 2013). Different from private sector firms, or even public bodies supported by general state funding, the military has more freedom to use funds for projects without quick and easy-to-reach targets and in experimenting with innovation, and is able to invest in projects that may be doomed too risky by others (Block, 2008). Often fueled by the determination of achieving a superior position compared to other countries when it comes to warfare, the willingness to engage in risky projects rises as the possibility for higher returns (thus, greater innovation and more military advancement) increases.

*Hypothesis 2: The higher the military expenditure of a country, the shorter it will take civil drone systems that are developed in that country to reach market readiness.*

### 4.2.5 Capacity and Adjacent Institution Building

Lastly, indirect spillover effects may occur when governments compensate for their own shortcoming by refraining from complete military drone development themselves. Rather, they obtain necessary technologies and goods through imports.
However, this does not always lead to only military arms and technology itself being imported, but also to compensation orders for their own, national industry. In turn, these firms are able to build capabilities in these areas. With this opportunity, also other necessary arrangements are made, for example in infrastructure, which leads to newly emerging institutions in support of the capability-building activities. This is what we define as capability and adjacent institutions building.

Many countries, especially within the European Union, operate according to the *juste retour* principle, which is often referred to as a “principle of fair industrial return” (Burgess & Antill, 2017, p. 112). Orders for military weapons that are awarded to foreign firms should be compensated or matched by the same amount awarded to national producers (Mamadouh & Van Der Wusten, 2011). As an example, we turn to the procurement and development of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II, often referred to as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). This aircraft was developed and funded by a large number of international partners, categorized according to their financial commitment, delivery obligations, possibilities for technology transfer and sub-contracting. Among the top contributors, next to the United States taking the lead, were the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey. For them, as Vucetic and Nossal (2013, p.8) summarize, “the initial attractiveness of the F-35 program lay in its promise to keep the partners firmly located within US-led industrial and high-tech networks, while providing partners with relatively cheap access to latest-generation stealth technology.” While these partners initially contributed to the JSF program, governments planned to recover initial investments by awarding contracts to industry firms, which then produced the actual systems (Van De Vijver & Vos, 2007). Although the ever increasing costs of the program are often discussed (Byers & Webb, 2011; Institute for Defense Analyses, 2010), Van De Vijver and Vos (2006) estimated for the Netherlands alone that the JSF program contributed to 120 million USD in spillover to the Dutch economy as a whole, and 1.1 billion USD in spin offs within the Dutch aerospace
industry. This happens either by firms creating technologies that can be applied to the military project in question, but also leveraged into other industries (spillover), or by firms working together and forming collaborations (spin-offs). Additionally, these companies may gain better reputation or additional contracts as a result of their engagement in the JSF program (Bisschop, Koopmans, Lieszout, Prins & Volkerink, 2012). Van de Vijver and Vos (2007, p. 513) even constitute that the “F-35 programme provides Dutch industry with the opportunity to participate in the development of a military fighter for the first time in its history.” The Netherlands committed to buying more than 85 aircrafts in total. Thus far, in the Netherlands alone, there are 37 high-tech suppliers involved in the JSF program (Global Security, 2018). These programs are, through stimulating arms import, “securing a competitive industrial infrastructure and cutting-edge research and development capability for its aerospace sector and the wider ‘knowledge economy’ that surrounds it” (Scott-Smith & Smeets, 2013, p. 67).

Thus, the procurement of military weapons, heavy machinery, and aircrafts leads to a mediating infrastructure being established in which not only military arms and technology itself are imported, but also gains for local firms are achieved. The knowledge and knowhow acquired by these firms can then be utilized in related, non-military products as well, such as civil drone systems. There are, however, also other forms of capability development to be gained; while some partners were engaged in building to specification, especially for lower-tiered partners, where generic capabilities could be developed, others could benefit from co-developmental orders. These are particularly important as they result in a broader innovation pipeline for the firms, which can also be leveraged in other products, such as civil drone systems, and are not restricted to military deployment only. Eventually, capabilities and adjacent institutions emerge that are supporting innovation beyond military applications.
Hypothesis 3: The higher the military arms import of a country, the shorter it will take civil drone systems that are developed in that country to reach market readiness.

4.3 Methods

4.3.1 Research Context and Data

Remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS), or drones as they are commonly referred to, have a history of being used in the military, usually with a negative connotation. Missile strikes by drones received media publicity during the beginning of the century when the US employed them in Afghanistan (Gregory, 2011; McBride, 2009). Nonetheless, they are nowadays not only a preferred toy, but used for a great number of applications in many commercial industries. To name a few examples, drones are used for protection against wildlife poaching in Africa, they replace people in dangerous working environments such as oil pipe investigation, but also deliver medical supply in difficult-to-reach areas or are used by farmers for efficient crop monitoring. In Europe alone, total drone fleet size is estimated to reach 3,000 systems in the military sector by 2050, while 415,000 systems are employed for government and commercial purposes and 7 million are used for leisure purposes (SESAR, 2016). The United States aims at a fleet size of around 14,000 military systems by 2035, and another 70,000 systems for state agency use, while commercial and leisure systems should reach around 175,000 systems (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2013). It is clear that drones in the civil sector already form an integral part in many industries, albeit having a long-standing history in the military.

Our research context forms the global drone industry from 2006 to 2016. In these 11 years, 2,537 drone systems that were created by 741 producers in 59
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countries\textsuperscript{15} were counted. A breakdown of the drone systems developed or market ready in these countries can be found in Table 4.1. In order to prevent information overload, yet illustrate changes within and differences between countries, we selected three time periods: the start of the observation period in 2006, the midpoint which marks 2011, and the end of the observation period in 2016.

Globally, big differences exist between countries in the total amount of drones (in all kind of development stages and for all kind of usages). In 2006, the United States could count 218 drone systems; more than four times as much as runner-up Israel. However, the majority of countries (73\%) were holding five or less drones by that time, while only 22\% did so in 2016. Also in 2011 and 2016, the United States remains leading the list of total drone systems, and shows the biggest overall growth in drone systems throughout the observation period gaining 266 new systems between 2006 and 2016. China was able to increase their drone amount in more than tenfold from 19 systems in 2006 to 217 systems in 2016. Notably, drones in Brazil grew from just 1 system to 33 systems during the same period. Reversely, Croatia and Tunisia could not show for any drones in 2016 anymore, while starting out with 3 and 2 systems in 2006, respectively.

Considering military drones only, China gained 53 systems during the observation period. Again, the largest producer of military drones remains the United States with 138 military systems in 2006, 221 military systems in 2011, and 146 military systems in 2016. 18 countries remained with no military drones recorded in their country in 2016, a slight decrease from 2006 in which 24 country did not engage in developing or commercializing drones in any way. France and the United Kingdom downsized during our observation period going from 27 and 23 military systems to 9 and 14 military systems, respectively. In terms of drones that were developed or on the market for commercial/civil application, however, France

\textsuperscript{15} Taiwan was already excluded due to a high amount of data systematically missing.
increased their numbers massively from 1 drone system in 2006 to 77 drone systems in 2016. Interestingly, overall commercial/civil drone presence was rather small at the beginning of the observation period compared to the amount of military drones: only the United States and Japan had more than five commercial drones in their country by 2006 (14 and 7 systems, respectively). By 2016, however, one-third of all countries had more than five civil systems in development or available on the market. The situation is similar for hybrid drones, i.e. drones that were developed with the purpose of serving both, the military and the civil market, and shows an even steeper growth. While only 71 hybrid systems were available in 19 countries in 2006, 531 hybrid systems can be counted in 39 countries in 2016. It comes as no surprise that the United States also heads the list of most hybrid drones in 2006 (28 systems), 2011 (70 systems), and 2016 (139 systems). It is remarkable, however, that China went from no hybrid drones at the beginning to 60 hybrid systems by the end of the observation period.

For further analysis, we employ a sample of drones that are produced for civil use, including drone systems that are hybrid, i.e. intended for both civil and military use, thus leaving out all drones that were developed purely for military purposes or for any other use (e.g. research). Our sample then comprises 1,341 drone systems that were created by 473 producers residing in 52 countries. This eventually led to 5,735 drone-year observations. This data was collected by the industry association Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (UVS International) and published annually in the RPAS Yearbook with all unmanned aircraft systems globally recorded.

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16 Although Ecuador, Estonia, Romania, Serbia, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates and Vietnam engaged in drone system development, none of these countries engaged in civil or hybrid drone development and thus, were excluded from the sample.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Amount of Drones</th>
<th>Thereof: Military Drones</th>
<th>Thereof: Commercial/Civil Drones</th>
<th>Thereof: Hybrid Drones</th>
<th>Total Amount of Drones</th>
<th>Thereof: Military Drones</th>
<th>Thereof: Commercial/Civil Drones</th>
<th>Thereof: Hybrid Drones</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
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*Please note:* Military, commercial/civil and hybrid drones may not add up to represent the total amount of drone systems as other uses are excluded from the table (e.g. drones for research purposes).

*Table 4.1 Descriptive Information on Drone Systems (Selected Years, All Countries)*
4.3.2. Measures

4.3.2.1 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable measures civil product market readiness in the drone industry and is a binary variable indicating whether a drone system is market ready in the given year and country. This data comes from UVS International’s RPAS Yearbook in which all unmanned aircraft systems globally as well as their development status are recorded. We classify market readiness of a drone system by selecting products that were either ordered/entering service, in inventory and/or in service as well as fully developed. Products that were not market ready were either available as proof-of-concept/demonstrator, in continued development or ordered as test/demo system.

4.3.2.2 Independent Variables

We test our hypothesis by including military variables. A countries’ share of military drone systems, its military expenditure as well as its arms import were included.

Military Drones (% of Total): We use data from UVS International’s RPAS Yearbook in which all unmanned aircraft systems globally are recorded as well as their usage. We then calculated the percentage of military drones by adding up the number of drone systems for military use and dividing it by all available individual systems in a given country and year.

Military Expenditure (% of GDP): We use data from the World Bank, which comprises a weighted average of data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and their own yearbook on Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. This data was complete for almost all of the target country-year variables. Missing values were taken directly from the SIPRI database.

Arms Import (log.): We use data from the World Bank, which comprises information from SIPRI’s Arms Transfers Program that captures trend indicator
values expressed in US Dollar (at constant 1990 prices). This data included heavy military weapons such as aircraft, missiles and ships, but excluded small and light weapons such as support equipment or technology transfers. We then calculated the natural logarithm as this data was highly skewed. While this data was complete for 91.2% of the country-year variables, the remaining values were imputed later on.

4.3.2.3 Controls

First, we include control variables related to a country’s economic performance and size, its political constraints and government quality as well as incoming/outgoing foreign direct investments.

**GDP (log.):** We account for countries’ wealth by including its gross domestic product (GDP) in the baseline model. Although research has shown that countries with higher GDP do not necessarily have higher rates of entrepreneurship (e.g., Uhlaner & Thurik, 2007; Wennekers, Van Stel, Thurik & Reynolds, 2005), this is likely due to higher levels of necessity-driven entrepreneurship instead of innovative entrepreneurship in low GDP nations. We thus include GDP to capture more prosperous countries’ means to support the development of innovative products. We use data from the World Bank for a country’s GDP in current US Dollar, which includes World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) national accounts data. We then calculated the natural logarithm as this data was highly skewed.

**Government Spending (% of GDP):** Government expenditure indicates the size of a countries’ government. It can be expected that larger countries with more government expenditure are also the ones that are able to contribute more to their counties’ innovative climate, as resources are available for the benefit of its citizens, public goods and state investments (Dakhli & De Clercq, 2004; Furman, Porter & Stern, 2002). We use data from the World Bank’s TCdata360 in which general government total expenditure as percentage of GDP is recorded. This data comes from the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook and was almost
complete. Information for Iran and South Korea was missing and taken directly from data provided by the Heritage Foundation (Iran) and OECD (South Korea).

**Political Constraints & Quality of Government:** Countries with better governmental institutions show higher rates of entrepreneurship and innovation (Estrin, Korosteleva & Mickiewicz, 2013; Rodríguez-Pose & Di Cataldo, 2014). As the different countries in the sample have different levels of political constraints and governmental quality, it is expected that this will also have an effect on the support these institutions have for entrepreneurship and innovation and will, thus, be contributing to market readiness of drones. For measuring political constraints, we used data from Witold Henisz, who developed the political constraints index. This index measures a country’s feasibility of policy change by using information on the extent to which government policy change results from a preference shift of any political actor in that country. Scores range from 0 to 1 with higher scores indicating more political constraint (thus less feasibility of change) and lower scores indicating less political constraints (thus more feasibility of change). For measuring the quality of government, we use data from the PRS Group, who publishes the International Country Risk Guide, in which information on government corruption, law and order as well as bureaucracy quality are assessed. Each of these three variables receive a score, is then averaged and scaled with 0 representing the lowest quality of government and 1 representing the highest quality of government.

**FDI Inflow & FDI Outflow (% of GDP):** Finally, incoming FDI is seen as an important source of new technologies and know-how through skilled labor that are brought into the country. It has also been claimed that incoming FDI has a demonstration effect on local R&D where local technologies are inspired by foreign input or reverse engineering is employed (Cheung & Ping, 2004; Marcin, 2008). Thus, positive innovation spillovers from foreign countries can be expected if FDI inflow is high. Outgoing FDI is associated with the ability to leverage technology more broadly without being restricted to the home country (Keller, 2010). Thus,
outward FDI is thought to enhance export activities, which in turn generates demand for these products in the home country (Lipsey, 2004). We thus expect countries with high FDI outflow to show higher number of drones that are ready to be used not only in its home country but potentially also to be exported. We used data from the World Bank for a country’s foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP, which are the net inflows/net outflows of investment to obtain a voting stock of 10% or more of another company, thereby demonstrating a lasting management interest. These investment inflows/outflows are then divided by the country’s GDP. The World Bank supplements its own accounts with data from the International Monetary Fund, namely from their International Financial Statistics and Balance of Payments databases, as well as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and other official national sources. This data was almost complete. For FDI Inflow (FDI Outflow), we were left with one (two) missing country-year values, which were imputed later on.

Next, we considered control variables that are more specific to the context we are studying. These are R&D expenditure carried out by private parties and by governmental bodies, the density of newly founded businesses as well as the total number of drone systems that can be found in the country.

**Private/Public R&D Expenditure (% of R&D Spending):** David, Hall and Toole (2000) conclude after reviewing an exhaustive body of literature on private and public R&D spending that results remain ambiguous as to whether public R&D spending is complementary to private expenditure or whether a substitution effect occurs. Nonetheless, research generally indicates that higher R&D expenditure is associated with greater innovation on country level (Bilbao-Osorio & Rodríguez-Pose, 2004; Furman, Porter & Stern, 2002) and thus, we expect R&D spending – from private as well as public sources – to affect innovation in a country positively. For private R&D expenditure, we used data from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS.Stat) to determine the share of R&D expenditure that is coming from...
the business enterprise sector, while we also use data from UIS.Stat for public R&D expenditure to determine the share of R&D expenditure that is coming from the government sector.

*New Business Entry Density:* The foundation of new businesses and high numbers of entrepreneurial entry into the economy are viewed as determinants of a flourishing and innovative economies (Autio & Fu, 2015), up to the point where some authors state that “[e]ntrepreneurial activity and new firm formation are unquestionably considered to be engines of economic growth and innovation” (Giannetti & Simonov, 2004, p. 271). We use data from the World Bank’s Doing Business project, which provides the number of newly registered corporations (regardless of their size) per 1,000 people of working age. While this data was complete for 69.5% of the country-year variables, the remaining values were imputed later on.

*Total Drone Systems:* We posit that the total number of drone systems that can be found in a country (regardless of their development stage) have an influence on the market readiness of this countries’ drone systems. Thus, with more drones in a country, the number of drones that reach market readiness increases as a function of increased technological knowledge and higher drone specific skills. We use data from UVS International’s RPAS Yearbook in which all unmanned aircraft systems globally are recorded. We then calculated the total number of drone systems by adding up all available individual systems in a given country and year.

### 4.3.4 Data Preparation

We spent a considerable amount of time in collecting, cleaning and constructing the database that we needed for testing the hypotheses. To start with, data from UVS International’s RPAS Yearbook was publically available, however only in a sort of scanned PDF format. All information thus had to be manually transferred into a database. Several checks on data completeness and consistency needed to be
performed afterwards on the more than 14,000 drone systems-year observations. We mostly went through our database line-by-line to check if the information was identical to the original source. We also got help from a research assistant to perform an additional check manually. Eventually, different ways of name spelling needed to be harmonized as each drone system and each drone producer received a unique identifier.

Next to information on product level concerning drone systems globally, we collected information on institutional variables for all countries. Taiwan was excluded from all analyses as data was systematically missing. As we could not assume that this data was missing completely at random, Taiwan has been excluded from further analyses.

Data that was missing and could not be obtained from another data source was imputed by means of multivariate imputation using chained equations (MICE) with 50 imputations and 500 iterations, which is also known as the fully conditional specification method (e.g. Van Buren, 2007). The use of this method is recommended in studies containing longitudinal data (De Silva et al., 2017). Eventually, 19% missing values needed to be imputed for the variables Private R&D Expenditure and Public R&D Expenditure, 30.5% for New Business Entry Density and 8.8% for Arms Import. Consequently, all following analyses were carried out with the imputed datasets.

4.3.5 Data Analysis

We employ survival analysis to test our hypotheses. This approach allows us to take the time until an event occurs into consideration, in this case the moment when a drone system becomes market ready. We use Cox proportional hazard regression modelling which utilizes the unique characteristics of the data such as censoring (Cox, 1972). It helps us to handle right censoring that occurs in the data (i.e. instances in which a drone system starts the development process within the
observation period of the study, but does not reach market readiness within this time), as it accounts for this data until the end of the observation period (Allison, 2004). In our sample, observations for 590 drone systems are right-censored. For some drone systems, left censoring occurs as we cannot identify the starting point of development of the system if it was before 2006, but observe the instance that the system reaches market readiness within our observation period. An additional 64 drone systems were excluded as they already reached market readiness before we could observe them (before or in 2006). Out of the 5,735 drone system-year observations, we were left with 3,185 drone system-year observations. These include 1,341 drone systems experiencing 865 market readiness events, and 1,129 total analysis times at risk and under observation. In case of coinciding market readiness events, the Efron method was used to handle these ties (Allison, 2014). Also, we employed robust estimators for standard errors clustered by drone system.

4.4. Results

4.4.1 Hypotheses Testing

In Table 4.2, descriptive statistics and correlation statistics are reported. Correlations between the main variables that we use for testing our hypotheses are moderate to low, with correlations well below 0.4. In two instances, however, military expenditure correlates moderately with the total amount of drone systems (0.59) and the total share of military drones (0.6). This means that countries with higher military spending also have more drone systems, as well as higher shares of military systems among the total. For the remaining control variables, the strongest correlation can be found between FDI inflow and FDI outflow (0.88), GDP and total amount of drone systems (0.79), private and public R&D expenditure (-0.77), as well as governmental quality and political constraints (0.7).

In Table 4.3, descriptive information about the dependent and independent variables are presented, for years 2006, 2011 and 2016 as it was with Table 4.1.
### Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations

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<th>Variable</th>
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<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
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<th>10</th>
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<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
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<td>1. GDP (log.)</td>
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<td>1.48</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Government Spending (% of GDP)</td>
<td>41.39</td>
<td>9.94</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Political Constraints</td>
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<td>0.2095</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td>0.003</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Quality of Government</td>
<td>0.7351</td>
<td>0.1859</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.696</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5. FDI Inflow (% of GDP)</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>5.29</td>
<td>-0.148</td>
<td>-0.087</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>–</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. FDI Outflow (% of GDP)</td>
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<td>5.63</td>
<td>-0.107</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>0.877</td>
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<td>7. Private R&amp;D Expenditure% (of R&amp;D Spending)</td>
<td>52.98</td>
<td>14.03</td>
<td>0.577</td>
<td>-0.114</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.423</td>
<td>-0.070</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Public R&amp;D Expenditure% (of R&amp;D Spending)</td>
<td>34.92</td>
<td>13.78</td>
<td>-0.310</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>-0.219</td>
<td>-0.605</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>-0.771</td>
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<td>9. New Business Entry Densityc</td>
<td>4.21</td>
<td>3.87</td>
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<td>-0.196</td>
<td>0.001</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Total Drone Systems</td>
<td>128.98</td>
<td>151.51</td>
<td>0.793</td>
<td>-0.231</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td>0.198</td>
<td>-0.124</td>
<td>-0.119</td>
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<td>11. Military Drones (% of Total)</td>
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<td>0.190</td>
<td>-0.205</td>
<td>-0.234</td>
<td>-0.234</td>
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<td>-0.144</td>
<td>0.289</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Military Expenditure (% of GDP)</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>0.333</td>
<td>-0.161</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>-0.153</td>
<td>-0.084</td>
<td>-0.125</td>
<td>-0.146</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>0.589</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. Arms Importd(log.)</td>
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<td>1.91</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>-0.220</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>-0.121</td>
<td>0.244</td>
<td>0.257</td>
<td>0.045</td>
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Unless otherwise noted, N = 5,735

*a* N = 4,644

*b* N = 4,637

*c* N = 3,984

*d* N = 5,228
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Market Readiness</th>
<th>Military Drones (% of Total)</th>
<th>Military Expenditure (% of GDP)</th>
<th>Arms Export (m. US Dollar)</th>
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<td>1.79</td>
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*Note: Data continues on next page.*
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
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<td>Singapore</td>
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<td>South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>240</td>
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</table>

Table 4.3 Descriptive Information on Drone Systems (Selected Years, Sample)
The largest country holding market ready drones are the United States with 79 products in 2006 growing to 240 products in 2016. More than half of all countries included in the sample did not have a single market ready product in 2006 (28 countries out of 52 countries), and only seven countries had five or more drones market ready that same year. In 2016, however, only eight countries that were not successful in bringing civil drone systems to market remained. Interestingly, Japan is the only country that reduced the number of market ready products during the observation period from ten drones in 2006 to nine drones in 2016. While a quarter of all countries exclusively had military drones in 2006, only one country (Jordan) made use exclusively of military drones in 2016. Five countries (Argentina, Chile, Finland, Greece and Indonesia) were able to grow from no military drones in 2006 to half or more of all drones present in their country being used for military purposes only. On the contrary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Ukraine, Portugal and Sweden found themselves with a reduction in their country’s share of military drones by 75% or more. Israel and Jordan were the only countries with military expenditures of more than 5% of their countries’ GDP in 2006 (with 7.43% and 4.66% respectively) and in 2011 (5.88% and 5.53% respectively); Russia caught up with their military expenditure in 2016 reaching 5.4% of their country’s GDP. Nonetheless, also in 2016, Israel remained the country with the highest percentage of GDP spent on their military, namely 5.66%. At the beginning of the observation period, China was the largest arms importing country and spent almost 3 billion USD on importing arms, followed by South Korea (1.65 billion USD) and India (1.52 billion USD), while India is heading the list with imported arms valued at 3.67 billion USD in 2011 and 2.55 billion USD in 2016. At the same time, China shows the steepest decrease in arms import cutting their spending down by two-thirds to 993 million USD in 2016. Interestingly, Russia shows the highest magnitude when increasing arms import valued at 4 million USD in 2006 to 169 million USD in 2016 and Chile’s spending on arms import decreased from 1.1 billion USD in 2006 to 39 million USD in 2016.
In Table 4.4, the Cox proportional hazards model regression results are reported by showing the regression coefficients and robust standard errors as well as the hazard ratios. Model I includes the general control variables, Model II includes additional, more context specific control variables and Model III-VI include the full model with the three variables for hypotheses testing added.

In Model I, we test the influence of a number of generic state variables on the market readiness of civil drones. *FDI Outflow* is a predictor of market readiness (0.033; \( p < 0.001 \)), which indicates our assumption that export in the home country is stimulated might hold. Also, *Political Constraints* (0.664; \( p < 0.01 \)) and *Quality of Government* (0.787; \( p < 0.01 \)) are relevant predictors of market readiness. We can thus confirm that countries with better governmental institutions are able to leverage their innovation efforts so that they can support civil drone systems for reaching market readiness. Surprisingly, *Government Spending* (-0.009; \( p < 0.05 \)) has a somewhat weaker, but negative effect on market readiness. Therefore, we cannot claim that larger countries are able to help civil drone systems to market readiness as the size of the country may become a liability for firms. This could be because coordination and distribution efforts of government resources increase with its size, thus making it more difficult to reach the “right” firm at the “right” time.
### Table 4.4 Cox Regression Analyses Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model I</th>
<th>Model II</th>
<th>Model III</th>
<th>Model IV</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Coeff.</td>
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<td>HR</td>
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<td>(0.067)</td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
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<td>(0.005)</td>
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<td>Political Constraints</td>
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<td>(0.402)</td>
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<td>(0.440)</td>
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<td>Quality of Government</td>
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<td>FDI Inflow</td>
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<td>1.003</td>
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<td>1.018</td>
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<td>1.016</td>
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<td>(0.012)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.998</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
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<td>(0.001)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Drones (H1)</td>
<td>1.962</td>
<td>7.114</td>
<td>0.244</td>
<td>1.276</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>1.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.279)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Expenditure (H2)</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms Import (H3)</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>0.116</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.185</td>
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<td>3.185</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Time at risk = 11,129; n (drone systems) = 1,341; n (events) = 865

a Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown with robust standard errors in parentheses. b Hazard ratio. † p <.10 | * p < .05 | ** p < .01 | *** p < .001
In Model II, we add more specific variables to control for context-related outcomes. Of those, only *New Business Entry Density* (-0.034; $p < 0.001$) predicts market readiness of civil drone systems, but negatively. This means that a higher density of newly found businesses is not beneficial to civil drone systems becoming market ready. We explain these findings because bringing a product to market requires a certain amount of time, especially in a technology-intense context. Only firms that persist are likely to be the ones that commercialize their products. Generally speaking, a crowded start-up environment may be perceived as unattractive to enter. Therefore, more start-ups in the marketplace do not help, but rather hinder innovation efforts when it comes to civil drone market readiness. Compared to the previous model, the effect of *Government Spending* (-0.020; $p < 0.001$), *Political Constraints* (1.694; $p < 0.001$) and *Quality of Government* (1.741; $p < 0.001$) becomes stronger, and the predictive power of *FDI Outflow* (0.016; $p > 0.1$) disappears in the presence of more context-specific control variables. However, *GDP* (0.160; $p < 0.01$) positively contributes to market readiness of drone systems when context-specific controls are regarded. We explain this by positing that wealthier countries are able to enhance drone systems’ market readiness when also other predictors in this regard are considered.

In Model III-V, we test hypothesis H1-H3 and present the full regression model in Model VI. Results show that all hypotheses can be confirmed. In Model III, we test the first hypothesis. Hypothesis 1 predicts that civil drone systems that are developed in a country with a high share of military drones will reach market readiness quicker. *Military Drones* (1.962; $p < 0.001$) has a positive and significant effect on civil drone market readiness. Holding all other covariates consistent, a one per cent point increase in *Military Drones* (as a percentage of total drone systems) leads to a 611.4% increase in the hazard of reaching market readiness. Compared to the previous model, we see that in the presence of *Military Drones, Drone Systems Total* (-0.002; $p < 0.05$) shows a significant, negative result. The mere number of
drones in a country, as *Drone Systems Total* suggests, is not contributing to more systems reaching market readiness, and the negative results suggests that it may even hinder it. Compared to the previous model and in the presence of *Military Drones*, the effect of *Government Spending* (-0.011; *p* < 0.01) on civil drone readiness becomes weaker. *FDI Outflow* (0.027; *p* < 0.10) gains in strength and becomes slightly significant as predictor. Also in the presence of *Military Drones*, *Public R&D Expenditure* (0.018; *p* < 0.05) becomes a significant predictor. We can explain the positive influence of governmental R&D spending by suggesting that the investments from the government in R&D will eventually benefit civil drone producers so that more systems become market ready. However, *Private R&D Expenditure* does not show an effect on civil drone market readiness in any of the models we present.

In Model IV, we test the second hypothesis. Hypothesis 2 predicts that civil drone systems that are developed in a country with high military spending will reach market readiness quicker. *Military Expenditure* (0.244; *p* < 0.001) has a positive and significant effect on civil drone market readiness. Holding all other covariates consistent, a one per cent point increase in *Military Expenditure* (as a percentage of GDP) leads to a 27.6% increase in the hazard of reaching market readiness. Compared to the previous model, we see that in the presence of *Military Expenditure*, *Drone Systems Total* (-0.002; *p* < 0.001) gains in strengths as a strongly significant, but again negative predictor. Our findings indicate once more that when more drone systems for all kinds of usages are present in a country, this hinders civil drone market readiness. Also *Government Spending* (-0.021; *p* < 0.001) becomes slightly more significant.

In Model V, we test the third hypothesis. Hypothesis 3 predicts that civil drone systems that are developed in a country with large military arms import will reach market readiness quicker. *Arms Import* (0.051; *p* < 0.05) has a positive and significant effect on civil drone market readiness. Holding all other covariates
consistent, a one-unit increase in Arms Import (as the log. of US Dollar) leads to a 5.3% increase in the hazard of reaching market readiness. Compared to the previous model, we note that Drone Systems Total loses its explanatory power as predictor of civil drone market readiness as does Public R&D Expenditure (0.010; p > 0.1) and FDI Outflow (0.016; p > 0.1). GDP becomes somewhat weaker (0.151; p > 0.05).

Model VI then presents the full regression model. Military Drones (1.685; p > 0.001) remains the strongest predictor of civil drone market readiness with a one per cent point increase in Military Drones (as a percentage of total drone systems) leading to a 439.1% increase in the hazard of reaching market readiness. Also significantly contributing to civil drone market readiness are Military Expenditure (0.112; p > 0.05) and Arms Import (0.068; p > 0.01), whereby a one per cent point increase in Military Expenditure (as a percentage of GDP) leads to a 11.8% increase in the hazard of reaching market readiness and a one per cent point increase in Arms Import (as the log. of US Dollar) leads to a 7.1% increase in the hazard of reaching market readiness.

4.4.2 Robustness Checks

We performed several robustness checks to verify that the chosen model fits our data best. To start with, we re-estimated our model with a slightly stricter measure of market readiness by considering only products as market ready if they are in inventory and/or in service as well as fully developed. This reduced the market readiness outcome measure from 3,349 to 3,301 drone-year observations, but results were not remarkably different.

Furthermore, we also used different measures for estimating governmental quality, size and military expenditure. We used Regulatory Quality provided by the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators to measure the ability of a countries’ government for comprehensive and encouraging regulations. When
replacing *Quality of Government* with *Regulatory Quality*, the magnitude and direction of results was comparable. We then used the natural logarithm of the number of residents of a country as another measure of the size of a country. This data was taken from the World Bank. When replacing *Government Spending* with measuring the country’s population, we also receive results that are comparable to our initial model in magnitude, direction and significance. Additionally, we used a measure of *Military Expenditure* as percentage of total government spending instead of GDP. This measure also showed comparable regression results with even more significant results for some variables.

To test for an alternative explanation, we approximate knowledge that was accumulated through failed products by including the total number of failed products in a given year and country (see Table 4.5). We thereby offer an organizational learning explanation, where authors find that failure contribute to learning (Argote, 2012; Baum & Dahlin, 2007; Eggers, 2012; Haunschild & Sullivan 2002; Levitt & March, 1988; Madsen & Desai, 2010). We see in Model VII (Table 4), in the absence of military explanatory variables, failed product knowledge present in a country also is a significant predictor of drone market readiness (0.011; \( p < 0.001 \)), although with a rather small hazard ratio of 1.011. This means that one more failed drone and the associated learning experience results in a 1.1% increase in the hazard of reaching market readiness, which is rather low compared to the outcomes of H1-H3. While we find support for a learning mechanism that contributes to civil drone market readiness, we encourage future research to examine this mechanism in more detail.

We also tested the robustness of our results with alternative, parametric models similar to Jensen and Kim (2015), as they are assumed to better handle left-censoring (e.g., Allison, 2010; Gupta & Kundu, 1999; Thompson, Voit & Scott, 2000): the exponential, Weibull, Gompertz, loglogistic and lognormal survival distribution, with the exponential model showing the worst fit and the Gompertz
model showing the best fit. As the results hold, we choose to report the best interpretable, most informative model as seen in Table 4.2. This is because the Cox proportional hazards model does not assume a predetermined hazard shape, which fits our study best as we are not interested in estimating the baseline rate for market readiness (Cleves, Gould, Gutierrez & Marchenko, 2008).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil Drone Market Readiness</th>
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<tr>
<td>Model VII</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coeff.(^a)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
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<td>Government Spending</td>
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<td>Political Constraints</td>
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<td>Quality of Government</td>
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<td>FDI Inflow</td>
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<td>FDI Outflow</td>
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<tr>
<td>Private R&amp;D Expenditure</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public R&amp;D Expenditure</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Business Entry Density</td>
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<tr>
<td>Drone Systems Total</td>
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<tr>
<td>Failed Products</td>
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<td>F</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average RVI</td>
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<td>Largest FMI</td>
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<td>N</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Time at risk = 11,129; n (drone systems) = 1,341; n (events) = 865
\(^a\) Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown with robust standard errors in parentheses. \(^b\) Hazard ratio. \(^\dagger\) p < .10 | \(*\) p < .05 | ** p < .01 | *** p < .001

Table 4.5 Robustness Check: Cox Regression Analyses Results with Failure Data

4.5 Discussion

4.5.1. Implications

The most promising avenue to enable market-readiness for innovative products in the civil domain is through military institutions. As we show in the case of the global
drone industry, particularly important are a high share of military drones among all systems that can be found in that country, but also increased military expenditure and investments in arms import. Interestingly, we note that even if a country has a high number of overall drone systems (and thereby accumulated drone-related knowledge and technologies), the mere high number of products is not important: it is rather the share of drones that were born out of military applications that fuels market-readiness of systems on the civil market. This points to the relevance of a supporting institution that has great influence on civil innovation, but is often overlooked in this context, namely the military.

Research on innovation systems has a long tradition in the literature on National Systems of Innovation (NSI) with its roots in economics (Freeman, 1995; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993). While the systems perspective has let scholars to draw important conclusions, for instance about countries’ competitiveness (Duranton, Martin, Mayer & Mayneris, 2010; Porter, 1990) or the geography of innovation (Feldman, 1994; Feldman & Massard, 2012), we would like to shift the focus from the discussions in innovation economics – although taking institutions more seriously nowadays – to more specific, innovation-related institutions. Edquist (2001) criticized that from the conventional NSI view, the state is disregarded. Nonetheless, as other researchers pointed out, the state plays an important role in setting up innovation policy, providing investments or necessary education structures (Abbate, 1999; Mazzucato, 2013; Ruttan, 2006). Therefore, by extending the classical economical NSI view and adding insights on institutions for innovation relevant for management scholars and policy makers, we show that not only public and private civil institutions influence innovativeness, but especially military institutions are a key component for successfully helping products to market-readiness. Eventually, we may look at institutions for innovation holistically rather than single efforts driven by either the private or public sector. While early studies in economics showed that the concept of NSI proved to be valuable for explaining
economic growth decades ago (Freeman, 1995; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993), we find that there are still institutions that are overlooked and undervalued in their contribution to innovation nowadays. In the past, policy initiatives did not seem to take appropriate steps to facilitate NSI properly as this concept may be too broad, capturing only generic institutional structures. We add to existing research by stressing one type of institution particularly relevant for innovation – the military – and show that a more differentiated view is needed by considering military institutions for innovation as an important contributor to civil technology and product development.

This study’s contribution is twofold. First, management scholars started to consider the unique advantages that strong military institutions may bring to either firms (Dussauge & Garrette, 1995; Hiatt et al., 2018; Hislop, 2000; Honig et al., 2006; Koch-Bayram & Wernicke, 2018). Yet, evidence regarding military institutions’ benefits for a country’s innovativeness is sparse (Azulay et al., 2002). This study, however, offers insights into the mechanisms of institutional support that can be leveraged from the military to the civil sector, namely through human capital spillover effects, governments’ ability to encourage experimentation by investing in long-term projects with uncertain outcomes, as well as capability building. To start with, our study shows that innovative products reaching market-readiness in the civil domain can be explained through the share of military product available in that country – not by considering the complete corpus of products in that country. On the contrary, even if a country has many innovative products in all kinds of development stages and for all kinds of usage, it hinders rather than supports market-readiness; it is much more the share of products that were born out of military applications that fuels market readiness of systems on the market. This implies that between civilian firms, technological and human capital spillovers are not contributing to more successful products (and may even hinder it), but rather that spillovers from the military are the crucial factor. In line with existing studies
on technology and human capital spillovers in the military and defense industries (Acosta et al., 2011; Lerner, 1992; Niosi & Zhegu, 2005), we show that the civilian sector can profit from existing military knowledge and skills to enhance related civil products’ market-readiness. With more military products being developed or market ready in a certain country, that country can utilize a higher density of knowledge and innovation from the military, which in turn can be used in civil systems. Furthermore, the military has the ability to provide investments in technology and related projects that other public or private institutions are reluctant to make. While previous research tends to focus on the effect of military spending on the economy as a whole or R&D efforts in particular (Balfoussias & Stavrinos, 1996; Mowery, 1992; Yildirim & Öcal, 2016), we explicate the mechanism through which this occurs, namely invest in high-risk projects that may or may not turn out to produce successful innovation (Abbate, 1999; Leslie, 2000; Mazzucato, 2013). Surprisingly, it is neither private R&D spending nor public R&D spending that contributes to products reaching market readiness. Private R&D spending has no impact at all, which Goel and Saunoris (2018, p. 364) explain by drawing on research by Markusen, Hall, Campbell and Deitrick (1991) as well as Stephan, Uhlaner and Stride (2015), and state that “defense spending, especially defense-related R&D, is continual as opposed to private R&D which can be cyclical”. Thus, without continuity, successful innovation outcomes are difficult to achieve. While the state can make certain investments on a regular and ongoing basis, the private sector might not be able to do so. Therefore, relying too much on the private sector to fuel innovation seems to be a misleading approach. Nonetheless, the contribution of public R&D spending to producing civil market ready products is small compared to the impact that military spending has. Eventually, the military supports civil product innovation by building capabilities and adjacent infrastructure that arise when countries obtain necessary technologies and innovative products through arms import. The mechanism through which arms import fosters civil innovation is driven not necessarily through the products and technologies themselves, but especially
through indirect gains arising from them. Compensation orders (Burgess & Antill, 2017; Mamadouh & Van Der Wusten, 2011) are one example through which capabilities are built and adjacent infrastructural arrangements arise in the importing country itself. Local firms, especially private ones that participate in co-development with military firms, can then utilize these capabilities and infrastructure in subsequent product development for the civil domain.

The second contribution that this study makes is by illustrating the differential ability of developed as much as developing countries to foster innovation. The potential for countries worldwide to draw from military innovation and successfully translating them to the civil domain differs significantly. We offer a novel explanation by positing that successful civil innovation depends on the extent to which countries are able to complement common public and private institutions with matching support for military products and technology. The institutional matrix (North, 1991) seems to be incomplete in many contexts when it comes to fostering innovation. Literature shows that the private sector often fails to produce innovations as initiatives are (a) lacking complementary assets (Teece, 1998; Tripsas, 1997); (b) suffering from short-term investment horizons (Bertoni & Tykvová, 2015; Cumming, 2007); (c) underinvesting in fundamental and precompetitive research (Feller, Ailes & Roessner, 2002; Niosi, Saviotti, Bellon & Crow, 1993), and (d) missing the ‘translational’ capacity to help products stemming from fundamental and precompetitive research become market-ready (Carayannis & Alexander, 2004; Woolf, 2008). Military institutions, however, are able to offset these shortcomings and improve the quality of the institutional matrix. As our research shows, the military is a source of human capital spillover into the civil domain, can invest in high-risk innovation projects, and builds capabilities and adjacent institutions. Thus, policy makers around the globe need to take the military-civilian symbiosis seriously as we have shown it to be an often overlooked driver of
their country’s innovation capacity to support successfully leveraging military products and technology in the civil domain.

4.5.2 Limitations

We acknowledge that this study faces certain limitations that should be regarded when interpreting and discussing the results. To start with, we focused on one particular product in the defense industry, namely drones. However, there are many other products and technologies in the commercial sector that were likely to have also benefitted from military expenditure and adjacent institutions, for instance airplanes, bulldozers, nanotechnology, or Artificial Intelligence. Nonetheless, this offers a great opportunity for other researcher to take on in the future. Next, there may be issues related to the very nature of our research context. As it is usually the case with high-profile government projects, some of the initiatives we discuss are of course shrouded in secrecy, such that we can only measure our processes of interest somewhat indirectly. Still, the fact that we find so many interesting effects suggests that there is a lot more going on behind the scenes. Other researcher may be able in retrospect to examine processes that are not covered by secret government missions (anymore) and thus, can shed more light on the nature of the mechanisms in future work.

Finally, methodological issues should be pointed our as data we use is left-censored and left-truncated due to the start of our observation window in 2006. Left-censored data describes instances in which the event took place before the observation period. In our dataset, 64 drone system-year observations reached market readiness before or in 2006 and thus, were excluded. As this is a small set of observations (64 observations compared to 5,735 total observations), we have no reason to believe that there are any other unobserved events that we missed. Left-truncation occurs when the starting point of the drone system being developed is unknown (i.e. before 2006), and the systems enters at a later stage of development. To circumvent biased results and interpretations, we closely examined the data for
the first year of observation. Only 124 out of the 5,735 drone-year observations were present in our dataset in 2006, which is merely 2% of the total. Out of those, 60 systems were to be found in a pre-market readiness category, whereas 64 systems entered market ready. As these systems only represent a very small number of the total, this leads us to believe that left-censoring and left-truncation cannot have a distorting effect on the outcome.

4.6 Conclusion

Although the influence of public and private institutions for innovation has caught the interest of researcher, in many instances, truly frame-breaking innovation cannot be ascribed to those institutions. We draw the attention of management scholars to an institution they previously did not sufficiently regard, which is the military. Tested with a sample of 1,341 civil drone systems by 473 producers in 52 countries from 2006 to 2016, we can conclude that the military fosters innovation through facilitating military-driven technological and human capital spillovers, investing in high-risk innovation projects, as well as building capabilities and adjacent institutions (e.g., infrastructure). While public and private civil institutions can help bringing innovation to the market, the military is an even stronger driver for a country’s innovative strength in the civil sector. Our findings can be generalized to other contexts in which countries’ military institutions facilitate essential technology developments in the civil sphere. As it is the case with the rise of the Internet (born out of a military innovation) or popular mass technology such as the iPhone (utilizing a great number of inventions from the military sector), our examination of the global drone industry contributes to a better understanding of the importance of the military as an essential institution for innovation, which is generalizable to other settings in which military institutions support civil innovation.
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Entrepreneurship fosters innovation. It is a key driver of economic development, growth and job creation, while also creating opportunities for new products, services, business models, as well as for new markets to be developed. Entrepreneurship is essential not only to leading economies, but also a driver for positive change in the world. In order to capture the multifaceted face of entrepreneurship, the three studies in this dissertation answer three research questions, which are aimed at studying entrepreneurship and innovation at different levels.

To start with, I focus on the micro level and consider how entrepreneurs’ decision-making logics impact venture performance. I find that ventures benefit most when an entrepreneur is using two entrepreneurial logics – planning-focused causation and action-oriented effectuation – in tandem. Next, I focus on the meso level and examine how regulatory proto-institutions arise in technological innovation-intensive and behavioral change-prone organizational fields. I find that regulatory proto-institutions in nascent industries tend to result from dialectic institutional work in the form of structured interactions between entrepreneurs and regulators. New regulatory structures evolve in contexts where high levels of technological and behavioral change induce systemic uncertainty and enlarge the interdependence between entrepreneurs and regulators. Lastly, I focus on the macro level and investigate how the military supports civil innovation institutions to develop market-ready products. I find that the military, as a previously overlooked institution, plays an integral role in civil innovation around the globe. Although some public and private institutions help bring innovation to the market, the military is an even stronger driver for a country’s innovative strength in the civil sector.

By thoroughly investigating entrepreneurship and innovation at different level of analysis, including the use of different concepts and distinct methods, I am able to arrive at relevant conclusions that have an impact on individual entrepreneurs (micro), entrepreneur-stakeholder interactions (meso), as well as national innovation systems (macro). Whether in this dissertation or in future research, existing opportunities reside across levels of analysis, through which numerous approaches, concepts, and methods of entrepreneurship and innovation get to interact.
Samenvatting  
(Summary in Dutch)

Ondernemerschap stimuleert innovatie. Het is een belangrijke motor voor economische ontwikkeling, groei en het creëren van banen, en schept tegelijkertijd ook kansen voor nieuwe producten, diensten, bedrijfsmodellen en zelfs voor de ontwikkeling van nieuwe markten. Ondernemerschap is niet alleen essentieel voor toonaangevende economieën, maar ook een kracht voor positieve verandering in de wereld. Om het veelzijdige gezicht van ondernemerschap te vatten, beantwoorden de drie studies in dit proefschrift drie onderzoeksvragen, die gericht zijn op het bestuderen van ondernemerschap en innovatie op verschillende niveaus.


Door grondig onderzoek naar ondernemerschap en innovatie op verschillende niveaus van analyse te doen, inclusief het gebruik van afzonderlijke maar complementaire concepten en methoden, ben ik in staat om tot relevante conclusies te komen die een impact hebben op individuele ondernemers (micro), interacties tussen ondernemers en belanghebbenden (meso), en nationale innovatiesystemen (macro). Kansen voor vervolgonderzoek liggen op verschillende niveaus van analyse, waardoor een veelheid aan benaderingen, concepten en methoden van ondernemerschap en innovatie met elkaar in wisselwerking kunnen treden.


Durch das Erforschen von Unternehmertum und Innovation auf verschiedenen Analyseebenen, einschließlich der Verwendung diverser Konzepte und unterschiedlicher Methoden, kann ich relevante Schlussfolgerungen ziehen, die Einfluss haben auf Gründer (Mikro), die Interaktion zwischen Unternehmern und Gesetzgebern (Meso), sowie nationale Innovationssysteme (Makro). Möglichkeiten für zukünftige Forschung bieten sich auf verschiedenen Analyseebenen, auf denen eine Vielzahl von gründungsrelevanten und innovationsbezogenen Ansätzen, Konzepten und Methoden kombiniert eingesetzt werden können.
About the Author

Katrin M. Smolka was born in Hamburg, Germany. She holds a Bachelor’s degree in Tourism Management (cum laude) from NHTV Breda (now: Breda University of Applied Sciences), the Netherlands, and a Master’s degree in Entrepreneurship and New Business Venturing from Rotterdam School of Management (RSM), Erasmus University, the Netherlands. After graduation, she joined the Department of Strategic Management and Entrepreneurship at RSM as lecturer and researcher. During that time, Katrin started working on her PhD dissertation to investigate ways in which entrepreneurs deal with uncertainty, how institutions emerge and what stimulates innovation, especially in environments driven by technological change. In doing so, she mainly focused on a new and emerging industry, namely the industry for remotely piloted aircraft systems (commonly known as drones). Katrin also spent three months on a research visit at Kühne Logistics University, Germany.

Katrin’s research interests cover entrepreneurial decision-making under uncertainty, cognition and start-up behavior as well as industry emergence, institutional work and innovation more broadly. Her research output was presented at several scientific conferences in the field, for example at the Babson College Entrepreneurship Research Conference (BCERC), the Academy of Management (AOM) Annual Meeting or the Organization Science Winter Conference. Katrin was also invited to present her research at industry conferences. The first study of her dissertation is published in *Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice*, one of the leading journals in the field of entrepreneurship.

In her work as lecturer, Katrin was given the opportunity to gain valuable experiences in the classroom, through managing, coordinating and teaching large-scale courses. She taught in both the Dutch and the international BSc Business Administration program. In particular, she was responsible for the course Strategic Business Plan where more than 1,200 students annually developed a business strategy for a real-life small or medium sized company. Next to classes in strategic management, Katrin contributed to a variety of entrepreneurship courses. Additionally, she supervised several master theses and bachelor internships.

Besides research and teaching, Katrin was actively engaged in committee work aimed at monitoring and improving the quality of RSM’s Bachelor programs. She annually organized and hosted the Strategic Business Plan Awards, a business plan competition for first-year students at RSM, and was part of the local organizing team of the European Group for Organizational Studies’ (EGOS) flagship conference in 2014.

Katrin currently works as Assistant Professor in the Entrepreneurship and Innovation Group at Warwick Business School, University of Warwick (UK).
Portfolio

PUBLICATIONS (PEER REVIEWED)

Journal Article

Book Chapter

NON-DISSERTATION WORKING PAPERS
The Effectiveness of Entrepreneurship Education (with T.H.J. Geradts & A. Rauch).
Insights into Entrepreneurial Narratives from the DotCom Era and Blockchain (with A. Windawi).

CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

2019:
- Babson College Entrepreneurship Research Conference, Babson Park (US)
- Industry Studies Conference, Nashville (US)

2018:
- Technology, Innovation und Entrepreneurship Conference 2018, Hamburg (GER)
- EURAM 2018, Reykjavik (IS)
- 2018 Effectuation Conference, Charlottesville (US)
- Organization Science Winter Conference, Park City (US)

2017:
- Academy of Management Annual Meeting, Atlanta (US)
- Entrepreneurship Research: Past, Present & Future, Paris (FR)
- Leuphana Conference on Entrepreneurship, Lüneburg (GER)
2016:
- Airneth Unmanned Aircraft Systems Seminar of the Netherlands Institute for Transport Policy Analysis, The Hague (NL)
- 10th Research Seminar of the Dutch Academy of Research in Entrepreneurship, Amsterdam (NL)
- G-Forum, 20th Annual Interdisciplinary Entrepreneurship Conference, Leipzig (GER)
- 4th Effectuation Research and Teaching Conference, Bodø (NO)
- Unmanned Cargo Aircraft Conference, Enschede (NL)

2015:
- Academy of Management Annual Meeting, Vancouver (CA)

2014:
- 3rd Effectuation Research and Teaching Conference, Enschede (NL)
- G-Forum, 18th Annual Interdisciplinary Entrepreneurship Conference, Oldenburg (GER)
- Babson College Entrepreneurship Research Conference, London (CA)

2013:
- Babson College Entrepreneurship Research Conference, Lyon (FR)
- 2nd Effectuation Research and Teaching Conference, Lyon (FR)

DOCTORAL CONSORTIA, STIPENDS, GRANTS AND AWARDS

2019:
- Global Faculty Development Program at Wharton, University of Pennsylvania, three-day workshop, fully funded

2018:
- Academy of Management Annual Meeting, Doctoral Consortium of the OMT Division

2017:
- Academy of Management Annual Meeting, Doctoral Consortium of the TIM Division
- IX Medici Summer School themed “The Organization of Innovation and Entrepreneurship” at MIT, Sloan School of Management, one-week programme, fully funded
- Travel endowment of the Erasmus Trustfonds for attending the 2017 Academy of Management Annual Meeting, awarded with a €500 grant
• Best Paper Award by the International Small Business Journal (3rd place) of the Entrepreneurship Research: Past, Present & Future conference at Paris School of Business
• Entrepreneurship Research: Past, Present & Future at Paris School of Business, Doctoral Consortium (group of William Gartner)
• Leuphana Conference on Entrepreneurship, Doctoral Writing Workshop (group of Per Davidsson)

2016:
• G-Forum, 20th Annual Interdisciplinary Entrepreneurship Conference, Doctoral Consortium
• Babson College Entrepreneurship Research Conference, Doctoral Consortium (20% acceptance rate), awarded with $1125 stipend

2015:
• Academy of Management Annual Meeting, Doctoral Consortium of the Entrepreneurship Division, awarded with $750 stipend
• Travel endowment of the Erasmus Trustfonds for attending the 2015 Academy of Management Annual Meeting, awarded with a €500 grant
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Dissertations in the last four years


Szatmari, B., *We are (all) the champions: The effect of status in the implementation of innovations*, Promotors: Prof. J.C.M van den Ende & Dr D. Deichmann, EPS-2016-401-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/94633


