The Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation and the NPT Extension

Michal Onderco

To cite this article: Michal Onderco (2019): The Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation and the NPT Extension, The International History Review, DOI: 10.1080/07075332.2019.1631204

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2019.1631204

© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

Published online: 23 Jun 2019.

Article views: 348

View related articles

View Crossmark data
The Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation and the NPT Extension

Michal Onderco

ABSTRACT
In this paper, I study the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN), which provided the prime platform for discussing matters of nuclear non-proliferation starting from the 1980s up until the late 1990s. Using newly available archival materials, as well as private papers from the group’s key participants, the paper illuminates the case of the PPNN as a specific platform for the creation and spread of non-proliferation knowledge. The paper also analyses methods for spreading such knowledge, and demonstrates how the group functioned from within.

KEYWORDS
Non-proliferation treaty; nuclear proliferation; transnational groups

Introduction
In 1995, the global non-proliferation regime was at a critical juncture. The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entered into force in 1970. As Article X.2 of the treaty specified, “twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods.” The conference, due to take place in spring 1995, was supposed to decide on the length of the extension. The length of the extension was the defining debate in the field of nuclear non-proliferation in the early 1990s; the discussions about it animated the debates from the late 1980s till 1995.

In 1986, Ben Sanders and John Simpson founded the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN), an organization that had a seemingly simple goal: making sure that the diplomats, who were to take part in the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC), could make an informed decision. For great powers, such as the United States and Russia, it is easy to ensure that the diplomats taking part in meetings such as NPT Review Conferences (RevCons) are well prepared, as they often specialize on a certain dossier for decades, sometimes for their whole careers. If needed, such diplomats are assisted by expert advisors who have in-depth knowledge of minute technical details. For smaller countries, such as Lithuania or Malaysia, however, this is much harder to ensure. Diplomats often deal with dossiers only for a short time, and frequently switch portfolios. While most countries, regardless of size, provide general diplomatic training to their diplomats, almost none provides training in specific expertise related to nuclear proliferation. Yet it is exactly the smaller and poorer countries that are most in need of it. While larger countries are able to send big delegations to international...
conferences, smaller and poorer countries might not be able to draw on large pools of experts and send them on extended trips to expensive conference venues, such as New York or Geneva.

The solution, proposed by the PPNN, was to create a platform where diplomats who enter the field could find a one-stop-shop of information about the NPT. During the years of its activity, the PPNN provided a platform for a core group of experts to meet regularly and discuss developments in nuclear politics, but more importantly, it provided a platform for diplomats from countries across the world to learn the ins and outs of the NPT, and meet their counterparts from other countries. Through conferences on four continents, the PPNN helped to inform but also provide a network for diplomats from dozens of countries. The fact that the story of the PPNN is little known even to experts in nuclear proliferation suggests both that the case study is worth studying, but more importantly that the role of such groups often happens “under the radar”.

The PPNN developed two main vehicles to spread information: publications and conferences. The publications included a quarterly Newsbrief, which was meant as a current affairs overview, and more occasional publications conceptualized more in-depth treatments of particular issues. Publications kept diplomats from over 117 countries abreast of the most recent developments in the world of nuclear non-proliferation. The conferences were organized both regionally (pre-1995) and internationally, making it possible for diplomats to interact with one another across the existing political lines. At the conferences, diplomats learned from leading experts about the technical details of nuclear politics and heard extensive presentations on the mechanisms of extension as well as on the NPT’s institutional background. The conferences provided a venue for the Conference President Jayantha Dhanapala to meet fellow diplomats, but also ascertain their views in more detail. As leaders of Russian, American, Dutch and British delegations to the 1995 NPT RevCon admitted in the critical oral history conference which took place in Rotterdam in 2018, the PPNN was not an occasion for negotiation, but rather a venue for training and meetings.

This paper seeks to make a threefold contribution: firstly, to illuminate the case of the PPNN as a specific platform for the creation and spread of non-proliferation knowledge in the 1980s and 1990s; secondly, to analyse the methods used by the PPNN to spread such knowledge; and thirdly, to demonstrate how such platforms work from within.

The paper falls between the area of the work on transnational activism and the role of grassroots networks in nuclear disarmament on one hand and the work on epistemic communities on the other. The PPNN was different from the grassroots movements since the participants in the group were not grassroots activists, yet it was similar in a sense that the group was transnational and united in the goal of spreading knowledge of the NPT. The group was also different from the paradigmatic epistemic communities, since participants in the PPNN were not interested in persuading others to choose a certain policy, but were primarily interested in the exchange of expertise.

In the study, I rely on four sources of data: (1) archival documents produced by the PPNN, moved mainly to the archives of the University of Southampton and accessible there (with additional documents retrieved from the private papers of Ben Sanders); (2) the archival documents about the PPNN, retrieved mainly from the archives of the Ford Foundation, which was an important funder of the PPNN, stored at the Rockefeller Archive Center in Sleepy Hollow, New York; (3) correspondence between members of the PPNN, acquired primarily from Sanders’s private papers and from the documents stored at the University of Southampton; and (4) oral history interviews with the group’s leaders as well as other participants in PPNN activities.

The remainder of the paper continues as follows. In the second section, I outline the foundation of the PPNN, with the Core Group as its heart. In the third section, I analyse the PPNN’s activities, mainly the publications and conferences. The fourth section examines the group’s transformation after the NPT’s indefinite extension. In the concluding section, I offer a tentative assessment of the group. As I argue, it is difficult to find indisputable evidence that the PPNN
changed the course of the history of the non-proliferation regime, but at least three ways can be charted in which the group paved the way to the NPT’s indefinite extension.

**Foundation of the PPNN**

The impetus for the foundation of the PPNN came from Ben Sanders, a Dutch diplomat and former IAEA official and UN diplomat, who served in senior roles in the secretariats of 1980 and 1985 NPT RevCons. During these two RevCons, he became concerned that nuclear non-proliferation matters were handled mainly by diplomats who had little substantive knowledge. Attendees of RevCons were mainly generalist diplomats accredited to Geneva and they didn’t know a damn – the smallest thing about the nuclear side.” The phenomenon Sanders witnessed was not new. As the former Dutch Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament Jaap Ramaker remembered, during his tenure in Geneva, the Soviet Ambassador Victor Israelyan used to complain “Every year, we have to start all over again because half of the diplomats are new.” Sanders’s experience and expertise (combined with the likely fear of boredom in retirement) prompted him to build a project to give diplomats substantive knowledge.

Shortly before retiring from his UN capacity, Sanders met John Simpson, at the time a senior lecturer at the University of Southampton. Simpson had recently gained a grant from the Ford Foundation for a project on North-South relations and nuclear (non-)proliferation. Sanders found in Simpson someone who shared interest in NPT matters and decided to work with him to found the PPNN, leveraging Simpson’s institutional base to assure funders of the Programme’s solid grounding.

The issue of the Treaty’s extension in 1995 was a key motivating factor, which both Sanders and Simpson confirmed in oral history interviews. At the end of Simpson’s earlier project mentioned in the previous paragraph, a year before founding the PPNN, he drafted a memo in which he argued that “the Treaty appears very fragile […] On balance, the probability appears to be that the Treaty will be extended for a 5-year period.” That theme returns in the applications for the funding, and was clearly tied to the need for spreading substantive knowledge about the NPT. In the application to the Ford Foundation, Sanders and Simpson outlined that “many of those attending the most recent conference were struck by the apparent lack of relevant information possessed by many of the participants.” Arguing that there was as yet no means of “assuring a continuity of knowledge,” Sanders and Simpson proposed a programme “designed to help provide those involved in the issue of non-proliferation […] with a source of authoritative information on the background and evolution of the non-proliferation system and the NPT and of manifold aspects of their implementation.”

Beyond this, however, the project had little substantive content. The initial programme proposal lists four goals: sustaining interest in the NPT; assisting newcomers in acquiring knowledge and exchanging views; encouraging research; and providing a “ready source of authoritative fact on the background, evolution, and implementation” of the NPT. The agenda was an expression of the belief, held by both Simpson and Sanders, that a non-proliferation regime is a cornerstone of global security, and the recognition that the NPT was the main game in town, without necessarily going into the specifics of how to maintain it.

The scope of the PPNN’s proposed activities required substantial financial backing. The initial budget for the first 4 years was estimated at $547,000, of which almost half was allocated to the salaries of Sanders and Simpson, as well as their secretarial support and material costs. From the start – and throughout – the PPNN was funded almost exclusively by private philanthropies; about one-third came from various funds connected to the Rockefeller family; additional substantive funding came from the W. Alton Jones Foundation, the Ford Foundation and the MacArthur Foundation.
Core Group

At the heart of PPNN’s efforts was the Core Group. It consisted of core participants (both academic experts and diplomats), who met biannually to discuss various topics related to nuclear non-proliferation. At the same time, the Core Group provided the subject experts and principal lecturers for the conferences for diplomats organized by the PPNN (these were, again, both experts and fellow diplomats). Explaining why the Core Group was crucial, Sanders wrote to Simpson:

“from them we must derive our political support, our respectability, and the major part of the information we must work with. They have political prestige and institutional stature and they are the central ‘nodes’ of our network. They should be the true ‘core’ of the exercise.”

At its foundation, the Core Group included 13 participants, the majority of whom were distinguished diplomats, among them, Jayantha Dhanapala (at the time the Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research [UNIDIR] and future President of the 1995 NPTREC); David Fischer (former Head of External Affairs at the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]); Mohamed Shaker (Egyptian diplomat, President of the 1985 NPT RevCon, and author of the seminal work on the NPT negotiations); and Roland Timerbaev (Soviet diplomat and the Soviet Union’s principal negotiator on the establishment of the NPT). From the academic side, Jozef Goldblat, Harald Müller, and Joseph Nye (due to his experience as Undersecretary of State for Nuclear Non-Proliferation in the Carter Administration) participated. This particular constellation of members representing different geographical areas but also career paths assured that all relevant points of view were represented. For example, the first meeting of the Core Group concluded that a representative of “Black Africa” as well as from Japan should join the group.

Almost all of the initial members of the group were Sanders’s friends from his earlier career. While the Core Group constellation did shift, such changes were not frequent in these early years and usually consisted of the replacement of someone who retired or was no longer interested with a similar individual. New members were carefully selected; nobody automatically became a member of the Core Group (e.g. ex officio), and at the same time, the opportunities for “application for membership” were extremely limited (it appears that only one person ever successfully “applied” for membership – Davidson Hepburn, the former Ambassador of the Bahamas to the UN). Even illustrious scholars and practitioners – such as Lawrence Scheinman – were turned down. In other situations, practitioners were turned down because they were seen as not fitting with the group. Miguel Marin Bosch, Mexico’s main point of contact on non-proliferation issues for decades, was not invited to one of the main PPNN meetings, despite the widespread relevance of his personal prominence and his country’s importance, because he was seen to be more interested in fighting political fights than discussing substantive issues.

Among those who joined at a later stage were Lewis Dunn, who joined after retiring from his government functions; and Oleg Grinevsky, a senior Soviet diplomat. After France joined the NPT, policy advisor Thérèse Delpech became a member; after China became a member, senior diplomat Fan Guoxiang joined as well. Importantly, while the members shared the idea that nuclear proliferation should be avoided, they varied in many aspects of NPT politics. For example, participants in the Core Group included both those who opposed the indefinite extension of the treaty (e.g. Dhanapala, Taylhardat, Shaker, and Timerbaev), but also those who worked towards that goal.

After the NPT’s indefinite extension, the Core Group was augmented with four new members – South African diplomat Peter Goosen (the principal architect of the Decision on Principles and Objectives adopted at the 1995 NPTREC), Australian diplomat Martine Letts, Sverre Lodgaard of the UNIDIR, and the Peruvian diplomat Enrique Roman Morey. In 1998, the Core Group was reconstructed once again. Three of the former members left (among them Jayantha Dhanapala, who assumed the position of UN Under-Secretary-General of Disarmament Affairs), but six new.
ones joined, from both Western (e.g. Rolf Ekéus) and non-aligned countries (e.g. Iftekhar Zaman and Raja Adnan). Furthermore, some of the original participants were replaced with others from the same countries. In this way, Camille Grand became the “French” participant, Mahmoud Karem became the “Egyptian” participant, and Grigory Berdennikov became the “Russian” representative. The replacement of old members with new ones from the same countries was in line with the idea that the most important countries should be represented in the group. Apart from Simpson and Sanders, Harald Müller was the only person who remained in the group from the foundation till its end.

The composition assured some intellectual diversity in the group. The participants around the table were from countries with differing and often opposing views on numerous non-proliferation issues. The group focused much less on nuclear disarmament than on nuclear non-proliferation (though disarmament was discussed, especially in terms of bans on testing nuclear weapons, and US-Soviet [and later US-Russian] arms control initiatives). The group also did not feature any member who openly opposed non-proliferation.

The meetings of the Core Group, throughout the PPNN’s duration, focused on the discussion of substantive issues related to the latest developments of nuclear policy. While members frequently stood on the opposing sides of political struggles, the minutes of the meetings show little confrontation. This seems to fit the goal: to exchange views on the current substantive issues. For example, the first meeting of the Core Group after the launch of the second phase of the project, in 1991, featured a discussion about the procedural aspects of the 1995 NPTREC, a discussion of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, an exchange of views on the first meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers since the 1978 meeting of the London Club; a discussion on the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Southern Africa; consequences of the Persian Gulf War for nuclear non-proliferation; and a discussion about the consequences of the USSR’s collapse. Members often contributed with observations based on discussions within the government of their country, the news, or academic texts. In later years, members also discussed reports commissioned by the PPNN (more on publications below), or heard presentations from invited experts about ongoing research. By doing so, the group assured that its members remained well informed, but also that they knew the opinions of other governments and experts on the same substantive issues. Given that the members of the Core Group were usually diplomats with the capacity to influence policy (or at least speak to those who decided policy) in their home countries, this exchange enabled them to garner new information and learn about how their counterparts viewed contemporary developments.

Activities of the PPNN

The Core Group was; however, not the only one that benefitted from the PPNN – it was not even the primary target of the PPNN’s benefits. Its aim being to inform the diplomats who deal with non-proliferation in general, the PPNN used two main types of vehicles for its activities: publications and conferences. Both publications and conferences helped the PPNN to advance its goals of promoting the policy expertise of non-proliferation among diplomats, while also maintaining the dominant position in the provision of credible information.

Publications

The provision of “authoritative information” was one of the original key goals of the PPNN. The main vehicle for such provision were publications published by the PPNN, of which there were two types: the first was the newsletter, Newsbrief, sent out initially biannually, later quarterly; the other comprised more irregular PPNN publications such as Issue Briefs, Briefing Books, and Occasional Papers.
**Newsbrief**

The decision to publish *Newsbrief* was made during the first meeting of the Core Group in 1987. The purpose of *Newsbrief* was to report on the Core Group meetings (in an abridged version), to enhance the flow of information, and “[to act] as a clearing house for information, ideas, explanations, and analyses.”\(^{35}\) It is important to mention that initially, the primary target audience of *Newsbrief* were the members of the Core Group themselves. The goals of *Newsbrief* were to inform the members of the Core Group, and to consolidate information for them, in between the biannual meetings. In other words, *Newsbrief* was originally supposed to be an internally-directed document, meant to keep members of the Core Group up to date, and be a trusted source of verified, reliable information.

This internal focus, however, did not mean that the document was meant to be distributed only to the members of the group. Given the PPNN’s outward focus, and its goal to inform policy practitioners around the world, the decision was made at the second meeting of the Core Group to print out up to 1,000 copies of *Newsbrief* and request distribution lists from the IAEA, UNIDIR, and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for its further dissemination.\(^{36}\) This print run quickly proved too small, and by the time of the 1995 NPTREC, *Newsbrief* was being sent to 2,797 recipients in 117 countries.\(^{37}\)

*Newsbrief* itself was relatively lengthy – prior to the 1995 NPTREC, it reached up to 20 pages; although towards the end of the PPNN’s activities in the early 2000s, it was up to double that length. *Newsbrief* opened with an editorial note. A section on topical developments followed: a summary of news from all around the world, specifically regarding the international policy developments in all areas related to nuclear proliferation – from peaceful uses, to nuclear testing, issues of disarmament and arms control, and to weapons-related technological developments (similar to the overview of events found in the first pages of *The Economist*). The document also contained a brief report on the PPNN’s activities (but not the summaries of meetings; these were distributed as separate memos to the members of the Core Group only), an overview of recent publications in the field, and an extensive overview of recently issued documents (such as IAEA resolutions, important policy statements by the world’s leading statesmen, UN Security Council resolutions, outcome documents of important intergovernmental negotiations, etc.). A brief section with readers’ comments concluded the newsletter. These would bring attention to reports in various languages, or provide new reinterpretations of the facts stated in earlier versions of *Newsbrief*.

Strangely enough, despite being one of the PPNN’s main outreach activities, the publication of *Newsbrief* was a one-man show. Sanders spent a significant portion of his time collecting and systematizing information for *Newsbrief*. In doing so, he acted as both the gatekeeper but more importantly as a systematiser of new information. Yet despite being the product of one man, over time *Newsbrief* became a welcome and trusted document. With its broad distribution list, it reached many countries where keeping abreast of developments in nuclear politics might have been exceedingly difficult for diplomats working on NPT matters. Its main advantage was that it provided a single source of issue-relevant news for policy professionals working in the domain of nuclear non-proliferation. *Newsbrief* therefore became a source of expertise, since it provided a comprehensive periodical overview of the main developments in the field.\(^{38}\)

**Other publications**

In addition to *Newsbrief*, the PPNN aimed to also produce papers with more long-lasting relevance. In the early years, the PPNN published eight *Occasional Papers*, which focused predominantly on non-proliferation (although one of them focused on arms control verification\(^{39}\) and one on nuclear dynamics in Latin America\(^{40}\)). Later, the PPNN facilitated publication of *Issue Briefs* addressing major themes of global non-proliferation. Sanders and Simpson saw *Issue Briefs* as opportunities to shape ongoing debates in nuclear politics. For example, in 1989, Sanders wrote
a letter to Simpson complaining that Harald Müller and Wolfgang Kötter were dragging their feet about a paper commissioned from them by the PPNN. He argued that “waiting until next autumn means that we cannot use the paper in conjunction with the review conference. […] Do not let us forget that we are not talking about an academic paper but a peace [sic] of practical politics, treating an existing and urgent problem!” 41

Additionally, the PPNN published PPNN Briefing Books prior to the 1990 and 1995 NPTRECs – documents containing the most important information; combining original documents and analysis in an accessible form for diplomats taking part in the NPT RevCons. Prior to the 1990 NPT RevCon, about 350 copies of a two-volume Briefing Book were distributed to all important participants, including all heads of delegations, the conference secretariat, the IAEA, and participants of past events. Prior to the 1995 NPTREC, the number increased to 560 copies. Briefing Books were published from Southampton, mainly under the guidance of Simpson and his research collaborators.42

By collecting and distributing information, the PPNN acted as a clearing house on information. For example, in 1989, the PPNN commissioned a paper on peaceful nuclear explosions, which was presented at one of the PPNN conferences by an outside expert.43 A few weeks later, Sanders wrote to Simpson “[…] Core Group was virtually unanimous in their criticism of the [author’s] paper and several people said that without important substantive changes it would be unsuitable for publication by PPNN […] I am still totally opposed [to the publication] (emphases in original)”.44 The diversity of backgrounds and views within the Core Group provided a wide scope of expertise, and also provided at least some protection against group think.

The publications allowed the PPNN to increase its presence in international settings, including at the NPT RevCons, and thus augment the group’s ability to reach out to diplomats. In addition to distributing the Briefing Books to participants, the PPNN also circulated other materials, (including Issue Briefs and Newsbrief) produced by the Programme for participants, directly in the meeting rooms, and to the media during the conferences.45 Prior to the 1990 NPT RevCon (the first one during which the PPNN existed), the members of the Core Group even contemplated lobbying delegations to “actively seek to play a direct role in shaping the outcome”.46 Although PPNN did not ultimately act in this form, both Sanders and Simpson continued to provide information (and publications) to delegations during the conference.47 At the same time, numerous Core Group members would be included in (or even lead) their country’s delegations, which enabled them to use the expertise, and also the social connections, to their advantage.

**Conferences**

Publications were meant to complement the PPNN conferences, in which the PPNN aimed at improving the knowledge of diplomats taking part in the NPT Review Conferences. The first conferences took place prior to the 1990 NPT RevCon. The PPNN held separate conferences for diplomats from headquarters and from missions abroad (e.g. in Vienna and Geneva), in order to capture two separate audiences. The diplomats from the headquarters were seen as those who were more likely to take part in the RevCons themselves, but the diplomats accredited in Vienna and Geneva were seen as being more likely to handle the pressing issues of the moment.48 The PPNN’s first such conference (in 1989), organized again in Guernsey, was aimed at diplomats working in headquarters, and attracted 37 participants from four continents.49 The participants indeed covered the geographical span of the globe – there were participants from the Communist Bloc (the USSR, the DPRK, Yugoslavia, Romania and East Germany), the Western Bloc, as well as the non-aligned world (inter alia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Iran). Sixty-one countries were invited for the second conference (aimed at diplomats based in Geneva), but only 36 took part.50 These two conferences were primarily educational in purpose, and therefore were less about policy coordination, and more about spreading information, and “informing” the
diplomats. In addition to the activities aimed at building subject expertise, the conferences were generously padded with long breaks, lunches, cocktails, etc., in hopes that the diplomats would use that time to meet one another, network, and socialize.\(^{51}\)

The conference in Guernsey in May 1990 may serve as an illustration: the schedule included sessions on peaceful uses and nuclear supply (chaired by David Fischer), regional issues (including on WMD-free zones, chaired by Lewis Dunn), nuclear disarmament (chaired by Jayantha Dhanapala), and a plenary session chaired by Mohamed Shaker. Chairs of the sessions, as well as speakers, sometimes changed. For example, Harald Müller would speak most of the time about export controls, and Jayantha Dhanapala about disarmament, but experts such as Lewis Dunn would switch between different themes. The final conference was held for the heads of delegations shortly before the 1990 NPT RevCon, directly in Geneva – with a similar agenda, but condensed into one day.

**Conferences between 1990 and 1995**

The main bulk of the PPNN’s activities in spreading knowledge took place, however, prior to the 1995 NPTREC. The PPNN organized within this period two types of conferences – on one hand, regional conferences in all parts of the world (Europe, South Asia, Northeast Asia, Latin America); and on the other hand, larger conferences for diplomats from multiple world regions (these were organized at Chilworth Manor near Southampton (1993), the Pocantico Center in Tarrytown, NY (1994) and the Arden House in Harriman, NY (1995)). While the regional conferences were supposed to have a more regional focus, the themes they addressed were similar to the larger conferences. One of the important differences was that the larger conferences explicitly targeted the NPT’s extension (so they would, e.g. talk about disarmament issues and the extension of the NPT), whereas the regional conferences were more about the practical elements of the NPT.

The regional conferences took place in 1992 and 1993. The first one was the “New Europe and Nuclear Non-Proliferation” weekend seminar, organized near Frankfurt in May 1992, in cooperation with the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt.\(^{52}\) This workshop dealt with the situation in the former USSR, non-proliferation threats in Europe and outside, the technical issues related to safeguards and export controls, and Europe’s role in the NPT and its strengthening. Participation was very high and prominent – virtually every foreign ministry in Europe was represented; usually at the level of political directors or ministerial advisors.

Workshops in Japan and in Sri Lanka (where India and Pakistan participated as well) attracted a similarly high-profile and broad participation. The workshop aimed at East Asia looked at the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, disposal of highly-enriched uranium, but also fuel storage, regional approaches to non-proliferation, and export control regimes; and was attended by representatives of 10 countries.\(^{53}\) The workshops in Sri Lanka, targeting South Asia, were slightly adjusted to ensure as wide a participation as possible – for example, to make sure that both Indian and Pakistani participants attended, the workshop topic was “non-proliferation” instead of the NPT, in which neither of the countries participated. Representatives from five regional countries took part in the workshop, in addition to the Core Group and the participants from international organizations and local think-tanks.\(^{54}\) A workshop in Caracas (Venezuela) aimed at participants from Latin America, therefore featured an extra session on Argentina, Brazil, and the ABACC, featuring Peruvian diplomat Enrique Roman Morey, Argentinian Julio Carasales, and David Fischer.\(^{55}\) Speakers in these meetings included members of the Core Group, which by then also included Czechoslovak expert Jiří Beránek, and Nigerian diplomat Oluyemi Adeniji.

Also noteworthy was the regional conference in Harare (Zimbabwe) in April 1993. The conference was the first event where South African officials met with other African countries to speak about the country’s nuclear past.\(^{56}\) One of the South African officials was Waldo Stumpf, the Chief Executive of the Atomic Energy Corporation of South Africa, and the official in charge of
the decommissioning of South Africa’s nuclear weapons. Stumpf’s brief intervention caused so much interest in South Africa’s nuclear programme that organizers included an extra session for Stumpf to do a presentation and answer questions from other participants. Participating UN officials opined that no organization other than PPNN (non-governmental, yet respected) could have brought the South Africans and the rest of Africa together for such discussions.

The conferences addressed the diplomats’ subject-specific knowledge and skills by providing information about technical aspects related to the treaty but also the most recent developments. They also provided institutional knowledge by bringing together information about lessons from nuclear-weapons-free zones or procedural information about upcoming conferences. But these conferences allowed diplomats to develop relations with one another. Apart from the meetings in Europe (where the rapprochement between former Cold War adversaries was well under way), the regional meetings featured interactions between diplomats from countries which were not always on positive terms. In Africa, this was seen in a rare interaction between South Africa’s former apartheid-era officials and diplomats from the rest of the continent; in South Asia this was seen in the interaction between Indian and Pakistani diplomats; in East Asia this was seen in the participation of Korean, Japanese, and Chinese diplomats; and in Latin America, there was a regional exchange about the only recently ended competition between Argentina and Brazil.

In addition to the regional conferences, larger conferences in 1993, 1994, and 1995 also prepared diplomats for the NPTREC and gave them the opportunity to discuss issues that were potentially the most conflictual. These conferences brought together diplomats from a larger number of countries across all of the world’s regions. In the last two conferences, the keynote lecture was given by the future president of the conference, Jayantha Dhanapala. The content included substantive questions of procedural issues related to the extension of the treaty; the question of review; the issue of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and regional issues. These conferences not only included numerous leading members of the national delegations to the 1995 NPTREC, but also the original drafters of the Treaty – George Bunn and Roland Timerbaev.

Senior officials from the UN, IAEA, and Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) participated as well. This gave speakers a convenient opportunity to talk to many senior officials at the same time. Dhanapala, for example, used his speech at the 1994 conference in Pocantico Hills as a test both to see how his ideas would be received and to parse out the position of the participating diplomats’ states. Last but not least, the PPNN organized nine informal lunches and three press briefings at the 1995 NPTREC to discuss progress at the conference among its members.

Each of these events allowed for the build-up of subject-specific expertise, but also allowed diplomats to discuss institutional developments – for example, procedural questions related to the extension conference. However, since the PPNN conferences also included discussion about possible scenarios for the conference (e.g. the discussion about whether the decision should be taken by a vote or by consensus), they contributed to the development of institutional expertise.

One of the ways to limit the extent to which politics entered the PPNN conference discussions was to have different speakers address individual topics. Panels at such conferences tended to be composed of participants (members of the Core Group and outside experts) from different countries, assuring that the information offered was not partial. For example, at the workshop in 1995, presentations on the extension of the Treaty were given by Sanders and George Bunn; presentations on security issues by Lewis Dunn, Jozef Goldblat and Oluyemi Adeniji; papers on peaceful uses of nuclear energy were given by Djali Ahimsa (from Indonesia), David Fisher and Jiri Beranek; and papers on regional issues by Mohamed Shaker, Yoshio Okawa (from Japan) and Roland Timerbaev.

If the discussions were biased, they were biased in that certain topics were discussed while others were not. For example, already in its title the project signalled that it considered non-proliferation as a virtuous goal, so there was never a discussion about the merits of non-proliferation. Similarly, anti-non-proliferation goals were not presented during the meetings. In a similar
vein, the organizers and participants all agreed that the NPT was a treaty worth preserving. Experts and diplomats from non-NPT members did not, generally, take part in the PPNN activities (with the exception of the South Asia seminar in 1993).66 As discussed above, the Core Group members differed on how long the extension should be, but both Sanders and Simpson believed that the NPT should have been extended in 1995. This was somewhat similar to the NPT membership in general, where there was no party arguing for termination of the treaty at the end of the 25-year period.67 Within these broad limitations, the content of the lectures was largely apolitical. However, the choice of topics clearly signalled that non-proliferation was a goal worth pursuing.

Reinvention: The PPNN Post-1995

Immediately after the 1995 NPTREC, the PPNN organized (or co-organized) three post-mortem events. The first one took place in June 1995 in Monterey, which was officially organized by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at Monterey Institute for International Studies (CNS), but at which many PPNN members were present.68 In October 1995, the PPNN then organized two back-to-back workshops in Chilworth Manor, which discussed nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, and the consequences of the NPT’s extension. These events were attended by both Core Group members and external experts.69

Since the PPNN’s original mission had been oriented towards the 1995 NPTREC, the indefinite extension in 1995 created a need for the organization to reinvent itself. The PPNN thus decided to focus the group’s future activities on the interpretation and facilitation of implementation of the decisions of the 1995 NPTREC, particularly related to the disarmament commitments included in the documents adopted at the conference – the Decision on the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, and the Decision on Strengthening the Review Process.70 The focus shifted slightly away from the initial “nuts-and-bolts” focus towards discussion of NPT politics. Sanders in his letter to the Ford Foundation identified, in particular, six “urgent actions”:

- consideration of procedural issues relevant to the implementation of the new review process; analysis of substantive issues and possible solutions; the briefing of policy-makers and diplomats […] dissemination of ideas and information […] provision of informal fora for officials to learn about each other’s positions […] early consideration of new disarmament ‘yardsticks’ 71

In principle, however, the PPNN’s activities remained the same in terms of both the format (publications and conferences) and approach (with the Core Group). The Core Group was, as discussed above, reconstructed in 1995 (slightly decreasing in size) and then in 1998 (expanding slightly), and its biannual meetings continued.

The PPNN began its post-1995 transformation by focusing on the Decision on the Strengthening the Review Process, and decided to aim its activities towards the 1997 Preparatory Committee conference ahead of the 2000 NPT RevCon, since this conference was the first one where the Decision on Strengthening the Review Process, adopted at the 1995 NPTREC, was supposed to be put into practice.72

The two meetings for diplomats prior to the 1997 Preparatory Committee meeting were held in the United States in October 1996 and March 1997.73 Approximately 40 diplomats took part in these meetings, and as in the past, the format remained the same, with various panels chaired by the PPNN Core Group members.74 These two meetings were also among the last ones organized by the PPNN alone. In 1997, the PPNN also started cooperating more closely with the CNS. Although they organized a joint event in Kyiv in September 1996,75 their first major event was the post-mortem of the 1997 Preparatory Committee organized in Monterey in April 1997.76 The subsequent meeting for diplomats taking part in the 1998 Preparatory Committee was already organized in cooperation with the CNS in Annecy at the end of February 1998.77 While the
format with various panels remained, the PPNN Core Group’s members no longer led the individual sessions. A conference for participants in the 1999 Preparatory Committee was organized (solely by the PPNN), and two conferences for the participants of the 2000 Review Conference were organized in cooperation with the CNS. In June 2000, the PPNN and the CNS then co-organized a postmortem conference of the 2000 Review Conference in Annecy. One important post-1995 change was that the PPNN group stopped organizing regional seminars, with the exception of one organized in November 1997 in Bangkok.

It soon became apparent though – as the Ford Foundation had predicted – that the group would wind down some of its activities after the 2000 NPT RevCon. In the late 1990s, the W. Alton Jones foundation completely ceased its philanthropic funding for international security. In 1999, the funding from sources related to the Rockefeller family also ended, partly because arms control was no longer considered a priority. “Funds were unusually short in the last round involving arms projects. So nothing was possible for PPNN,” wrote Wade Green (of Rockefeller Family & Associates) to Sanders. In the third and fourth issues of Newsbrief of 2000, Sanders hinted at financial troubles, mentioning applications for funding that had been submitted, and other ongoing efforts at securing funding. In March 2001, he wrote in Newsbrief that funding had not been secured. In April 2001, he also sent a letter out to the members of the Core Group that due to the lack of funding, the activities of the Programme would have to change; distribution of the publications would have to be more tailored to electronic means, and the Core Group would meet only one last time. While the Ford Foundation provided additional bridge funding to the PPNN, it was clear that the group’s end was near. The last meeting of the PPNN took place during the workshop organized in 2002 in Annecy, France, again in cooperation with the CNS.

While the PPNN has disappeared, a format emerged from it that can still be found, for example, in CNS activities that bear a strong resemblance to the PPNN. The MIIS also started developing its own nuclear transnational policy network in Central Asia, organizing conferences for diplomats from newly independent states in Central Asia with funding from the Ford Foundation and other foundations before the 1995 NPTREC. The project in Central Asia, although conceived independently, closely resembled the PPNN – many experts taking part in its events were affiliated with PPNN, and it even had its own “core group”. The CNS continues to organize annual conferences in Annecy till today; and has developed training programmes in both Monterey and the CNS’s offices in Vienna for new diplomats entering the field.

**Assessment and Conclusion**

Assessing whether the PPNN succeeded in its goals, and estimating the group’s impact, is difficult. There is no survey to rely upon, and measurable data is hard to come by. In a way, the impact of groups such as the PPNN is similar to measuring the effects of nuclear deterrence – scholars have numerous arguments, but measuring whether it is at play in any particular crisis is very hard.

It is similarly difficult to estimate the impact of the PPNN. The group was certainly distinguished by its broad membership (no other non-governmental group at the time had such a broad membership), longevity (similar groupings tend to work for a period of less than 15 years), regular nature of meetings, and high-profile nature of participation. This distinguished the PPNN from other groups that tend to meet less frequently, include participants from certain countries only (such as those focusing on the Middle East or US-Russian relations), or that focus explicitly on policy advocacy.

It is also impossible to say that without the PPNN the NPT would not have been extended. First of all, none of the NPT parties wanted the treaty to collapse, but more importantly, there
was significant pressure from the United States, the European Union and Russia on countries to support the indefinite extension of the treaty.

There were three fundamental ways in which the PPNN was by all accounts a significant player. Firstly, the group filled a gap in the spreading of expertise. Already before the Review Conference in 1990, the PPNN provided training to participants from Eastern European and developing countries, where diplomats attending the event were often the sole people responsible for the development of non-proliferation policy in their countries. When Sanders visited Tehran, he was thanked for training the Iranian nuclear diplomats and asked for copies of the most recent publications on non-proliferation beyond the ones published by the PPNN. The PPNN then made copies and sent them to Tehran. The PPNN then made copies and sent them to Tehran. Diplomats from more established countries were also appreciative: the UK’s Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament T.A.H. Solesby, for example, wrote that he was “sure this sort of preparatory informal seminar before a major conference is of real practical value.” Warren Donnelly, a nuclear non-proliferation expert from the Library of Congress, also wrote to Sanders, stating in 1990 that “the recent PPNN seminar for diplomats in Geneva went splendidly. […] the high quality of its organization and presentation entitle you both [i.e. Sanders and Simpson] to an enthusiastic ‘well done!’” The PPNN’s key role was also recognized by the funders: the Ford Foundation wrote in its internal memo after the NPTREC that PPNN was a “key actor” in the conference. In its post-1995 activities, the group focused less on spreading expertise regionally, but still provided an encompassing introduction for any newcomer to the field.

Secondly, by hosting regional seminars prior to the 1995 NPTREC that highlighted the importance of the Treaty, the PPNN encouraged participation in the conference and provided opportunities for networking among diplomats who would otherwise not have had the chance to meet. One of the main concerns among diplomats leading up to the 1995 NPTREC was the lack of attendance and the lack of attention given to the process by smaller countries, especially those favouring indefinite extension; the fear was that these countries would simply skip the conference. By raising the profile and drawing attention to the conference, the PPNN helped to create an environment where diplomats afforded more attention to the Treaty. A number of smaller countries who did not attend the 1990 NPT RevCon then decided to attend the 1995 NPTREC and participated in a PPNN regional meeting beforehand. Nepal, Panama, and Mauritius were among such countries. It is difficult to attribute causality to the participation in a PPNN meeting, especially since such countries were targeted by démarches by the US and the EU. However, it is not difficult to imagine that such conferences highlighted the relevance of the treaty’s extension to the diplomats from smaller countries that might otherwise not have paid attention to it. Furthermore, the bringing together of diplomats from dozens of countries gave them time and space to interact with each other. For instance, at the first of the larger conferences in 1993 at Chilworth Manor, Canadian diplomat Sven Jurschewsky met South African diplomat Peter Goosen, and struck up a discussion about the possibility of cooperating on ensuring the NPT’s indefinite extension. At least Jurchewsky later argued that this was a deliberate and premeditated step, which was enabled by their joint participation in the meeting. The PPNN continued to play this facilitating role even after the NPT’s indefinite extension.

Last but not least, the PPNN provided the President of the 1995 NPTREC, Jayantha Dhanapala, with both expertise and social contacts, and thus helped him to prepare for stewardship of the conference. For Dhanapala, the PPNN was doubly important. Thanks to the group, he was able to meet and befriend leading diplomats from many countries, acquire up-to-date knowledge and become a “household” name for diplomats and experts alike. This was not a trivial matter – once Sri Lanka started promoting Dhanapala as a candidate, some countries within the Western group considered him “not a sufficiently high-level candidate”, and Susan Burk, who was heading the unit handling the NPT extension at the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, told her Dutch and British colleagues that “neither Dhanapala nor Sri Lanka meet [the] requirement” to nominate a conference president. Secondly, however, he was able to test the waters to see
what other countries intended vis-à-vis the 1995 NPTREC. As he later confided during an oral history interview, the Sri Lankan government was not in a position to pay for his travel to the world’s capitals to meet dignitaries and ask for their views. In the 21st century, it is not uncommon for the incoming NPT RevCon President to visit 70, or even more, countries ahead of the conference, but Dhanapala was unable to do so. The participation in the PPNN therefore allowed them to come to him, and he was thus able to gauge their governments’ views. During the conference itself, Dhanapala was able to consult with his PPNN friends. As he stated during an oral history interview, “the group that was in the [PPNN] were also friends who had expert knowledge of the subject, and so there was always expertise available to me through those circles.”

Sanders also served as Dhanapala’s informal and formal advisor during the conference, and was involved in the drafting of the formula that ultimately extended the NPT indefinitely.

These three points highlight why the PPNN’s story is worth studying in the 21st century: the group’s working methods were appreciated; the meetings created opportunities for interaction; and the conference’s president benefitted from the network personally. In this way, the PPNN laid down the groundwork for the NPT’s extension.

Notes

3. See, for example, the memoirs of diplomats such as Thomas Graham or Roland Timerbaev: Thomas Graham, Disarmament Sketches: Three Decades of Arms Control and International Law (Seattle: Institute for Global and Regional Security Studies: University of Washington Press, 2002); Roland Timerbaev, Rasskazy o Bylom: Vospominanii o Peregovorakh po Nerasprostraneniiu i Razoruzheniiu i o Mnogom Drugom[Stories of the past: Memoirs about negotiations on non-proliferation and disarmament and much else] (Moscow: Rosspen, 2007).
5. During one of the presentations of this paper, a distinguished academic with a long career in studying nuclear weapons exclaimed, “Who were these people that I never heard of? I’ve been in this business for four decades, but never heard of this group!”
9. It is important to note that Sanders’s papers are not accessible to the general public.
12. See Ramaker’s remarks in Onderco and Nuti, Extending the NPT, p.113.
14. The main take-aways from Simpson’s project can be found in John Simpson (ed.), Nuclear Non-Proliferation: An Agenda for the 1990s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
16. Although only Sanders said that he had a clear preference for the indefinite extension. See Simpson, An Oral History with John Simpson; Sanders, An Oral History with Ben Sanders.

17. ‘Sarnia Symposium on the international nuclear non-proliferation regime in the 1990s’, University of Southampton Archives, MS424 A3079/1/1/1 (1986), p. 6.


19. It may be useful to recall that while NPT Preparatory Committees existed, they usually took place only in the year preceding the Review Conferences, dealt with purely procedural issues, and were attended by but a handful of countries. See, e.g., Final Documents of the NPT Review Conferences in 1975, 1980, and 1985.


21. The project continued to have little substantive content. This was sharply criticized in a peer assessment of the subsequent grant application by the then-director of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Johan Jørgen Holst. See, Johan Jorgen Holst, ‘Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation. Ford Foundation Inter-Office Memorandum to Enid C.B. Schoettle, dated 14 May 1990’, Reel 7448, Ford Foundation Grants – U to Z, Rockefeller Archive Center (1990).


24. Some governments provided small amounts of financial support towards the end of its activities; and two industrial groups (the Japan Atomic Energy Relations Organization and the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum) provided some funding for particular events.


26. It should be noted that the PPNN’s Core Group had no relation to the concept of ‘core group’ as developed by H. M. Collins and Robert Evans, The Third Wave of Science Studies: Studies of Expertise and Experience, Social Studies of Science, 32/2 (2002), 235–96. I simply adopt PPNN’s nomenclature here.


29. Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, ‘First Meeting of PPNN Core Group, 12–14th June 1987’, University of Southampton Special Collections; box MS 424/1/1/3 (1987a).

30. Scheinman became a member later during the mid-1990s, in the late 1980s, he was initially turned down because his participation would have led to a numerical imbalance between the American and Soviet participants. When he was not invited to the Core Group meetings, Scheinman wrote a very angry memo to Sanders, in which he called the decision to omit him “unconscionable” Lawrence Scheinman, ‘Letter to Ben Sanders (2 March 1988)’, Private archive of Ben Sanders (1988).

31. The source of this information is a private letter sent to Sanders by one of the Core Group members. The name is withheld at the request of the author of the letter.


35. Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, ‘First Meeting of PPNN Core Group, 12–14th June 1987’, p.2.
38. This is demonstrated by the ever-increasing print run of Newsbrief, and also by occasional notes sent by diplomats. For example, in 1990, Sanders visited Tehran, where he was asked by the government-related institute to send “everything we [had] so far produced”. See, Ben Sanders, ‘Letter to Darryl Howlett (2 August 1990), Private archive of Ben Sanders (1990a).
43. I withhold the name here to protect this author’s identity. The paper was published one year later elsewhere.
44. Sanders, ‘Letter to John Simpson (6 December 1989)’. There are at least two other similar situations when the PPNN rejected commissioned papers due to poor quality.
45. Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, ‘The Role of the Core Group at the Fourth Review Conference (PPNN/CG3/8)’, University of Southampton Archives, MS424 A3079/1/1/5 f2 (1988).
46. Ibid.
49. The PPNN usually covered the travel costs for these participants, especially for those from Eastern Europe and developing countries. See, the list in Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, ‘May 1989 Conference – Guernsey’, Private archive of Ben Sanders (1989).
57. Simpson, An Oral History with John Simpson. John Simpson took notes of the presentations, which was then reported in Annex A of Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, ‘Africa and Nuclear Non-Proliferation. A PPNN Workshop for Senior Government Officials’. As far as I know, the document was not


60. E.g., Grigory Berdennikov for Russia, Nabil Elaraby for Egypt, Isaac Ayewah for Nigeria [chair of Main Committee I], Thomas Graham Jr for the US, Sven Jurschewsky for Canada, Tadeusz Sztrulak for Poland [chair of the drafting committee], Sir Michael Weston for the UK, and Peter Goosen from South Africa.


63. Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Newsbrief (Second Quarter 1995), ed. Ben Sanders (Southampton: Mountbatten Centre for International Studies (University of Southampton), 1995a), p.19


65. For another study on how ignoring certain topics by expert bureaucrats politicizes the nonproliferation regime, see Anna Maria Weichselbraun, ’Constituting the International Nuclear Order: Bureaucratic Objectivity at the IAEA (Unpublished PhD dissertation)’, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 2016).


67. See, the work of Barbara Koremenos, who theorizes this as a sign of social learning within the NPT setting.


72. Ibid.


74. Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Newsbrief (Fourth Quarter 1996), ed. Ben Sanders (Southampton: Mountbatten Centre for International Studies (University of Southampton), 1996a); Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Newsbrief (First Quarter 1997), ed. Ben Sanders (Southampton: Mountbatten Centre for International Studies (University of Southampton), 1997b).

75. Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Newsbrief (Third Quarter 1996), ed. Ben Sanders (Southampton: Mountbatten Centre for International Studies (University of Southampton), 1996c).

76. Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Newsbrief (Second Quarter 1997), ed. Ben Sanders (Southampton: Mountbatten Centre for International Studies (University of Southampton), 1997a).

77. Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Newsbrief (First Quarter 1998), ed. Ben Sanders (Southampton: Mountbatten Centre for International Studies (University of Southampton), 1998b).
78. Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, *Newsbrief* (First Quarter 1999), ed. Ben Sanders (Southampton: Mountbatten Centre for International Studies (University of Southampton), 1999b); Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, *Newsbrief* (Second Quarter 1999), ed. Ben Sanders (Southampton: Mountbatten Centre for International Studies (University of Southampton), 1999a).
89. Koremenos, ‘Loosening the Ties that Bind: A Learning Model of Agreement Flexibility’.
91. See, a copy of Solesby’s letter attached to the final report; see, Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, ‘Report on Second PPN Conference for Diplomats, Guernsey, 11–14 May 1990’.
94. See, for example, the discussion within the European Council, ‘Projet d’orientations pour une action commune en matiere de nonproliferation nucleaire (ST 7577 1994)’, *Digital Archive Cold War History Project* (<https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/175913>), accessed October 10 2018.
95. This was also one of the motivations for why the United States was adamant on moving the conference from Geneva to New York, where more countries were diplomatically present. See, the discussion in Rebecca Davis Gibbons, *American Hegemony and the Politics of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime* (*Unpublished PhD Dissertation*) (Washington DC: Georgetown University, 2016).
98. When Dhanapala announced his interest in being the conference president, Sanders wrote to Simpson that he was “running rather diffidently”. See, Sanders, ‘Memorandum to John Simpson (22 April 1993)’. 


100. The main criterion was commitment to the indefinite extension, however, all three agreed that there was little they could do to influence this. See ‘NPT 95 – Meeting between US, UK, and Netherlands’, Department of State FOIA Virtual Reading Room <https://foia.state.gov/searchapp/DOCUMENTS/1-FY2013/M-2008-02837/DOC_0C17925309/C17925309.pdf>, accessed April 3 2019.

102. Ibid.
103. See remarks by Harald Müller and Jaap Ramaker in Onderco and Nuti, Extending the NPT

Acknowledgements

I am thankful to Ben Sanders for making his private archives available for study. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 2018 International Studies Association Annual Conference in San Francisco, and at seminars at Erasmus University Rotterdam, College of William and Mary, and the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. I am thankful to the attendees of these meetings, in particular Bart Bernstein, David Holloway, Anne Herrington, and Jeff Knopf for their insightful comments. In addition, the International History Review’s reviewers and editor Alan Dobson, as well as Campbell Craig, Harald Müller, Leopoldo Nuti, Scott Sagan, and Anna Weichselbraun provided very useful feedback on earlier versions of the paper.

Notes on contributor

Michal Onderco is Assistant Professor of International Relations at Erasmus University Rotterdam and in 2018–2019 was a Junior Faculty Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. His research interests include the politics of multilateral non-proliferation diplomacy, informal processes in international politics, and domestic sources of foreign policy.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding

Funding for the field research for this paper was provided by the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.