FRENCH 'REASON OF STATE' FROM THE FALL OF LA ROCHELLE TO THE FRONDES

POLITICAL PRUDENCE IN THE WRITINGS OF HENRI DUC DE ROHAN AND GABRIEL NAUDÉ

Jesper Schaap

Cover illustration: 'Mazarin à Casal'
In Paul Lehugeur, *Histoire de France en cent tableaux* (Paris: A. Lahure, s.d. [1899]), 68r.
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Franse 'staatsraison' vanaf de val van La Rochelle tot de *Frondes*
Politieke prudentie in de geschriften van Henri duc de Rohan en Gabriel Naudé

THESIS

to obtain the degree of Doctor from the Erasmus University Rotterdam
by command of the rector magnificus

Prof.dr. R.C.M.E. Engels

and in accordance with the decision of the Doctorate Board.

The public defence shall be held on

Thursday 17 October 2019 at 11.30 hrs

by

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This research was funded by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO). The study is part of a larger research project *'Reason of state' or 'reason of princes'? The 'new monarchy and its opponents in France, Germany and the Netherlands, during the seventeenth century* (2011-2016). The research was supervised by prof. dr. R.C.F. von Friedeburg and comprised four projects of which the present study is one. Ingmar Vroomen examined the use of fatherland rhetoric in Dutch pamphlets (1618-1672) as a response to foreign threats and internal strife. Annemieke Romein studied the employment of fatherland-terminology in estate debates in Jülich and Hesse-Cassel between 1642 and 1655, and in Brittany France in the period 1648-1652. Marianne Klerk studied developments in understandings of 'reason of state' and 'interest' in the Low Countries during the second half of the seventeenth century, identifying the legacy of the Duc de Rohan's analysis.

vor den kunkelstuben jagen die löwen spinnen
und prinzen
ungeheuer aus salz und blumen
die spinnen jagen die prinzen
die prinzen gleiten die jagenden löwen in blumen
die spinnen jagen die spinnerinnen
die löwen sind ungeheuer
die spinnen sind aus salz
die prinzen sind blumen

in front of the spinning-rooms lions chase spiders
and princes
marvelous ones of salt and flowers
the spiders chase the princes
the princes chase the lions through the flowers
the spiders pursue the spinners
the lions are marvelous
the spiders are of salt
the princes are flowers

Hans/Jean Arp – *Die Wolkenpumpe* (1917)

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Acknowledgements

The completion of the book at hand is like a case of arrhythmia. At times the research and writing process accelerated in moments of euphoria, at others it resembled a faint thump. Never did it progress in a regular pace. One moment I almost felt like I was looking over the shoulders of a Rohan or Naudé, the next these historical figures or their distant age barely meant anything to me. Of course I could use these lines to describe how much I learned from doing a PhD, experiences aplenty. However, I would rather present to the reader of the several hundred pages laying in front of her (and perhaps remind myself of) the joy of historical enquiry and the quest for meaning.

The most beautiful of times in the research process I experienced while tracing trails of evidence. I could approach my explorations into the past almost like detective-work, whether in the archives in Paris or in the gigantic wealth of digitized early modern prints online. In some of these moments it all seemed to come together. I leaved through the exact editions that Naudé may have consulted during the writing of his books and could virtually see the manuscript of Rohan's *De l'Interest des Princes* pass from one hand to the next in the years between 1634 and 1637. What seems hard to conceive for a student commencing his or her history studies, is actually how much historical material remains unexplored. A historian may always stumble upon documents that shed new light on older interpretations of an event or a work. You can plan on finding them and return empty-handed. Yet you can also accidentally find side-paths that lead to thrilling new ideas and hypotheses. The two intermezzo chapters in this dissertation attest to the fact that you cannot always plot the research process. Hopefully they convey the great pleasure I felt in researching and writing them.

There are many people that deserve to be thanked for their contribution to my research and PhD experience. First up are my two supervisors. I want to express my gratitude to Robert von Friedeburg for giving me the opportunity to pursue my master thesis on Naudé into a PhD and for his encouragement and enthusiasm, especially in the later stages of my writing. I deeply thank Henk Nellen for the years of intensive supervision, his scrupulous reading of the many versions of my chapters, and for his unceasing belief in me and my research, even when I had a hard time believing in it myself.

Several other historians must be mentioned here. I greatly appreciated Frédéric Gabriel's enthusiasm for my research to Naudé, the stimulating conversations and the opportunity to share my thoughts on the *Mascurat* at the seminar of the *Parlement de Paris*. I am particularly indebted to Mark Greengrass, David Parrott and Jonathan Dewald for their contribution to my research through their feedback and thoughts on Rohan (and Naudé) at the symposium *Monarchy Transformed in Western Europe: its 'reason of state' and its opponents (1620s-1720s)* in Rotterdam.

I further thank Jim Collins for the enlightening tête-à-têtes during that same conference. Dirk Imhof (archivist Plantin-Moretus museum) and Marieke van Delft (specialist Old Prints KB) I thank for their assistance in my book-historical quest after the first edition of Naudé's *Considérations politiques*. Through his lecture on the *libertinage érudit* Wiep van Bunge inspired me to delve into the work of Gabriel Naudé and other seventeenth-century French intellectuals. I thank Wiep, Hein Klemann and Klaas van Berkel as members of the doctoral committee that gave its fiat to this thesis.

Then a shout out to my fellow travellers, the EUR History PhD's. Thank you all for bringing the fun into the PhD-experience. I specifically want to mention Laurie, Ingmar, Norah, and my room-mates in the last years of my PhD, Gijs and Wesley. Regina, with whom I enjoyed the many office-lectures of the research master Early Modern Intellectual History, also deserves to be thanked here. I especially want to express my deepest gratitude and love for Hilde and Marianne, my dearest *Schnurrbartjes*. There is no way of exaggerating how much our esprit de corps in the PhD maelstrom has meant to me; in fact, none of this would have been possible without you. It is a great relief to know that you as my paranymphs will have my back at the defence.

A PhD is a fickle trajectory. The characteristics of the work in combination with certain personality traits greatly impacted my life. With this in mind, I wish to acknowledge and express my gratitude to love lost and love gained.

Good friendship certainly is one of the finer things in life. It is the only wealth I can ever say to aspire and I do indeed feel myself a rich man in this regard. Even if at times it might have been hard to fully understand what I was doing, the companionship and support of my friends has kept me going. Juul, the all-nighter we pulled last year in the Ardennes to me captures our friendship at its best: the long deep conversations over 'a few' beers, the great music, and the shenanigans and crazy laughter. Bob, our friendship has brought us from kindergarten to fortnightly Feyenoord matches in De Kuip and somehow continues to deepen. Clau and Kaar, surely it's been a while since I last confused your names back in our schooldays at De Willem, but I continue to value our bond as much as I did then. San, Meghan, Daphna, Ben, Marieke, Arne, Stefan and Eline you must all be mentioned here as well. I am a proud member of the exclusive historical society 'History X': Darragh, Erik, Frank, thanks for all the peaceful and not so peaceful discussions, the many pub nights and weekend trips. The Berkeley boys: Spoelie, Guido, Laurent, Toto, JB and Nic, I always look forward to the next reunion, even more so almost ten years on. BVV43, great pool of talent, thanks for all the welcome distraction on and off the pitch; 'the Professor' now at last is to receive his title, even if it is only that of Doctor.

Lastly, there is no way to communicate my deep gratitude for the perpetual support of my family. Opa and Oma, Oma Hilletje, and the rest of the family, now I finally finished my 'little project' and am about to 'graduate'. Mientje, even though we are no longer the kids we once were,

tangled up in laughter on the bench on our front porch, you'll always be my funny little sis'. Your perseverance has been a real inspiration to me. Mams, thank you for your warmth, your love and your witticisms. The retreats at 'hotel' *Chez Maman* not only were indispensable to my wellbeing, my work also greatly benefitted from them. Pa, thanks for being the spark to my passion for history and your inexorable encouragement and support that kept it alive. It all began with our little 'adventure tracks' on family holidays in France, where we would hunt for archaeological discoveries of pre-historic man and visit all the beautiful castles, abbeys and museums. Even if 'adolescent-me' sometimes complained, without your historical interest and stories I would have never become the historian (and person) that I am today. It is a true bliss to have always known you amongst the most avid readers of my work. It is to you that I wish to dedicate this book.

The Transformation of the French Monarchy and the Rhetoric of Political Prudence

> "Ce n'est pas la justice qui fonde les royaumes, ni la vertu qui distribue les couronnes; le crime peut présider à l'origine des empires, l'imposture crée parfois de vastes religions, et une évidente iniquité fait souvent paraitre et disparaitre les États, comme si le mal était aussi nécessaire que le bien."[1]

The research presented in this PhD-thesis revolves around the question of the nature and function of *raison d'état* argumentation in the seventeenth-century French monarchy by focussing on and comparing the work of two major authors, Henri duc de Rohan (1579-1638) and Gabriel Naudé (1600-1653). The purpose of this study is to reinterpret early seventeenth-century French understandings of *raison d'état* and *interest*. How did authors employ this newly fashionable *topos* of political prudence in the context of a French monarchy ever on the brink of the breakdown of order? In contrast to broader studies of *raison d'état* by Etienne Thuau and William F. Church, this study provides an in-depth exploration of two highly significant French cases of this political discourse in the period between 1610 and 1661.[2] On the one hand, the thesis examines the political writings of Henri duc de Rohan and his famous *De l'Interest des princes et Estats de la Chrestienté* (1638) in particular. On the other hand, it treats of the writings of Gabriel Naudé, an erudite Parisian who wrote well-known reflections on contemporary political discourse such as the *Bibliographia politica* (1633) and *Considérations politiques sur les coups d'état* (16~~39~~[3]) but also more evidently polemical work like the *Marfore* (1620) and the *Mascurat* (1649 and 1650). These political publications of Rohan and Naudé are interpreted here as supporting, though never unambiguously and from different perspectives, an oftentimes *ad hoc* and haphazard politics of 'crisis-management'. These authors never presented an abstract and coherent theory that displays processes of modernisation and secularisation in seventeenth-century politics. Instead, their reflections were inherently practical and circumstantial. Their

[1] Giuseppe Ferrari, *Histoire de la raison d'État* (Paris: Michel Lévy frères, 1860), v.
[2] Etienne Thuau, *Raison d'état et pensée politique à l'époque de Richelieu* (Paris: Albin Michel, 2000); William F. Church, *Richelieu and Reason of State* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972).
[3] The place and date of publication is an issue of some historiographical debate, which shall be further elaborated upon in Intermezzo chapter II.

particular uses of the rhetoric of political prudence were responses to ever-imminent and immediate political problems, challenges and crises.[4]

Some would call it realism, others cynicism; taking critical distance is a common strategy for coping with crisis. All the wiser from his experiences in contemporary politics Giuseppe Ferrari, the author of the lines above, concluded that injustice, vice, crime and imposture were an inseparable part of political history. *Cosi va il mondo*, that's the way the world goes round, as the motto to his book *Histoire de la raison d'État* says. Historians familiar with the 'reason of state' *topos*, the ubiquitous early modern political catchphrase, could easily mistake the disenchanted words in the above citation for those of a seventeenth-century French author of the most audacious, 'Machiavellian' kind. It is for this exact reason that we might call the radical Italian federalist Ferrari (1811-1876) the last 'theorist' of *raison d'État*, while he otherwise should be considered the first modern historian of political thought.[5]

Ferrari made an attempt to retrieve the *doctrine mysterieuse* of 'reason of state', a kind of political black magic, he writes, that he unearthed from the most unexplored corners of mid-nineteenth century libraries.[6] As part of his greater philosophy of history, he sought to give *raison d'état* thinking pertinence, adapting it to the contemporary spirit of the mid-nineteenth century. In other words, he sought to put his historical work to use in the cause of the people by showing practical patterns in human behaviour in society.[7] Disillusioned by the fleeting hopes of a democratic revolution in France – where he spent most of his expatriate life teaching at universities – and his native Italy, Ferrari set himself to work on historical analyses in which he considered the precepts of 'reason of state' as expressions of universal laws of human nature.[8] It is the recent experiences of the newly found monarchy in Italy that may have reflected most prominently in the opening lines of the work. Echoing many among the authors he studied throughout the book, Ferrari sought to show *l'homme tel qu'il est*, to lay bare a grim truth about human nature.[9]

The peculiarity of Ferrari's *Histoire de la raison d'État* lies in its conception of history. According to Ferrari, *Raison d'État* thinking taught the rhythm of historical progress. Human

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[4] Whereas this study focusses on these particular early seventeenth-century French understandings of the *topos*, the work of my colleague in the NWO-project explores changes in the understandings of 'reason of state' and 'interest' through the reception of Rohan's work especially in the Low Countries. Marianne B. Klerk, "Reason of State and Predatory Monarchy in the Dutch Republic, 1638-1675: The Legacy of the Duc de Rohan" (PhD diss., Rotterdam, 2016).
[5] Sylvio Hermann De Francheschi, "L'histoire des idées politiques en France et en Italie. Parcours comparés d'une discipline (1920-1970)", *Revue française d'histoire des idées politiques* 31, no. 1 (2010): 6-7.
[6] Ferrari, *Histoire de la raison d'État*, v-vi.
[7] Gilda Manganaro-Favaretto, "Giuseppe Ferrari, le Risorgimento et la France", *Revue Française d'Histoire des Idées Politiques* 30, no. 2 (2009): 363. See also, Clara Lovett, *Giuseppe Ferrari and the Italian Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979).
[8] Manganaro-Favaretto, "Giuseppe Ferrari", 378.
[9] Ferrari, *Histoire de la raison d'État*, xi.

history, he thought, is a process that follows 125-year cycles with important changes every generation (31.5 years). This rhythm is controlled by politics, the force that brings the world in motion.[10] As he stated it, Ferrari shared with his readers an occult science that had been killed by modern media and outlawed by the French Revolution of 1789; universal considerations of justice towered over public affairs and had caused reason of state to fade.[11] Grounded in a historical survey ranging from antiquity to the nineteenth century, the Italian philosopher of history argued that "while the principle of justice ensures and preserves nothing but the eternal returns, and eternal failures, of revolution, the doctrine of reason of state makes it possible to see through this and every other false claim of universal principle made by the state throughout human history."[12] His motivation for the work was at least partly to retrieve the mythical moment in Italian history when a *Risorgimento* first seemed to become possible, i.e. the socio-political conditions of decline that prompted authors in early modern Italy to envision an independent and unitary Italian state. His history of 'reason of state' was a means to trace the roots of Italian patriotism and proto-nationalism.[13] The work was evidently the product of a man who was highly engaged in the political and socio-economic struggles of both countries he identified with. In a way, writing this history of *raison d'état* provided Ferrari the means to cope with his political disillusionment at the critical moment between the break of the revolutionary moment and his call to the newly established Italian Parliament just after the 1860 publication. As if it was a means to maintain the stability of his own political mind, a personal *raison d'état*.

In the above citation, – irrespective of the deeper semantic layers related to his revolutionary, confederalist and socialist preoccupations – Ferrari echoes the political cynicism abhorred, confronted and maintained by many Italian 'reason of state' authors of the sixteenth and early seventeenth century. However it equally recalls the reflections of two seventeenth-century French 'intellectual mediators' between Italy and France, Henri duc de Rohan and Gabriel Naudé. In fact, in a way not dissimilar to the case of Ferrari but ultimately the other way around, these two French authors commented on and intervened in French political affairs from a position of deep immersion in Italian diplomatic and political thought.

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[10] "La Raison d'État enseigne [...] les distances, les intervalles, les retours qui alternent les gouvernements, le rhythme (sic) qui les oblige, dans l'espace aussi bien que dans le temps, à se succéder d'une manière déterminée avec tels ou tels chefs. Le monde a toujours obéi à ces lois qu'il a toujours ignorées et que la politique italienne a entrevues sous la forme absurde du précepte." Ferrari, *Histoire de la raison d'État*, viii. On the 125-year cycles, see the book's last chapter that opens with the statement: "La perfection de la raison d'État serait d'éclairer le philosophe au point de le rendre prophète." Ferrari, *Histoire de la raison d'État*, 410-422; esp. 416-417. See also, Robert Bonnaud, "De Vico à Ferrari. Les grands chemins de l'histoire", in Joseph Ferrari, *Histoire de la raison d'État* (Paris: Editions Kimé, 1992 [1860]), vii-xiii.

[11] Ferrari, *Histoire de la raison d'État*, x, 369.

[12] Kevin McLaughlin, "On Poetic Reason of State: Benjamin, Baudelaire, and the Multitudes", *Partial Answers: Journal of Literature and the History of Ideas* 5:2 (June 2007): 252-253.

[13] De Francheschi, "L'histoire des idées politiques en France et en Italie", 6-7.

Seventeenth-century France: a monarchy transformed

After the infamous defeat of the Swedish armies at Nördlingen in 1634, Cardinal Richelieu, the French *premier ministre* in the reign of Louis XIII, was more or less forced to decide upon entering the fray of the Thirty Years' War and challenge the Habsburg alliance. Although the French government had long been supporting the forces of Habsburg enemies such as Sweden and the Dutch United Provinces, it took some time before Richelieu was convinced to engage in open warfare against Habsburg-Spain.[14] Open warfare against this grand dynasty was perceived as highly problematic given the disastrous series of armed conflicts that the French Crown fought over and on Italian soil against this 'natural enemy' in the period between the 1494 and the 1559. Financially, military as well as dynastically, the series of 'Italian wars' almost brought ruin upon the French Crown.[15]

Within a constellation of internal chaos and external warfare, political reforms and financial innovations a transformed France saw the light of day. The rivalry between the dynasties of Habsburg (Spain) and Valois / Bourbon (France) from the Italian wars in the 1490s onwards formed the kick-start of a European war- and arms race that led to new forms of early modern rule, i.e. dynastic rivalry transformed early modern monarchy. The insatiable need for financial means to maintain this war-race led to unparalleled levels of public debt and novel ways of financing warfare, which in turn created new groups with a vested interest in the government's affairs. Old and new elites had to reinvent their relations with the Crown. This transition of early modern rule met with fierce criticism from social groups who felt left out in the changing structures of power within these monarchies and others who opportunistically sought to rise in the social hierarchy. At the same time, however, political reforms endorsed by princes and their ministers were legitimated and justified in pamphlets and other quasi-public pieces by many publicists. Central in the debates in the transforming monarchy was the notion of *l'État* and in its wake came the political rhetoric of *raison d'état* and *intérêt*.[16]

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[14] Lucien Bély, *La France au XVIIe siècle: Puissance de l'État, contrôle de la société* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2009), 222-223.

[15] Lucien Bély, *La France moderne, 1498-1789* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2013), 91-98.

[16] Mark Greengrass, *Governing Passions: Peace and Reform in the French Kingdom, 1576-1585* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); James B. Collins, *La monarchie républicaine: État et société dans la France moderne* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2016); Robert von Friedeburg, "Response to introduction: "ideology", factions and foreign politics in early modern Europe", in David Onnekink, Gijs Rommelse (eds.), *Ideology and foreign policy in early modern Europe (1650-1750)* (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2011), 11-28; Idem, "How 'new' is the 'New Monarchy'? Clashes between princes and nobility in Europe's Iron Century", *Leidschrift* 27, no. 1 (2012): 17-30; idem, "Wars with books. From which point onward should we employ the term 'ideology' with respect to our sources?", in Karl Enenkel, Marc Laureys and Christoph Pieper (eds.), *Discourses of Power: Ideology and Politics in Neo-Latin Literature* (Hildesheim, Zürich and New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 2012), 299-326; idem, "State forms and state systems in modern Europe", *European History Online (EGO)* (2010). URL: http://www.ieg-ego.eu/friedeburgr-2010-en

In contrast to the historiographical tradition that in line with the sociological interpretations of Max Weber envisioned the seventeenth-century crises as steps in an on-going and more or less continuous process of state-building, and the growing armies and ever increasing taxes as signs of developments towards a bureaucratic state, recent revisionism has shown that the development was not as top-down, linear and progressive as was perceived before. What comes to the fore in current historiography of early modern rule is a European constellation of greater monarchies in transformation and smaller powers facing not so much novel but certainly more dramatic and pressing problems during the seventeenth century.[17] The early modern European arms and war-race took an enormous toll on the various dynastic agglomerates, as the British historian John Morrill has recently called the large, heterogeneous and inherently instable political entities.[18]

In recent contributions to this historiography, historians have distinguished a number of characteristic developments that helped transform the great early modern monarchies. A first typical feature contributing to this transformation is participation in an unprecedented arms and war race among the greater European powers that presented them with unparalleled costs. A second trait is formed by the new ways to finance these wars through financiers, venality of offices, tax farmers (like the French *intendants*) creating enormous debts for the dynasties. The monarchies basically were regimes haunted by debt, always on the verge of bankruptcy. A concomitant third characteristic is the rise of new 'financial' elites. The new situation created not only a race for offices and entrance in the clientage-networks of the royal regimes, but also resentment, revolt and outright rebellion among the old elites, the higher nobility, and bourgeois merchants who were all competing for a place in the new constellation. The result of these changes and challenges faced by early modern monarchies were much larger dynastic agglomerates, a new elite aristocracy with lands in much more than one single province and a financial and judicial elite with a vested interest in the regime. As one of these large dynastic agglomerates, the French monarchy could become very powerful vis-a-vis a highly differentiated and divided society, but not by its own means of power; it always needed cooperation of the elites. Lacking effective channels of communication, coercive power for action or any institutionalized means to solve problems, the frail equilibrium of monarchical rule could also collapse catastrophically within a matter of months. Here the fourth and last feature of the transformation

[17] For a more elaborate treatment of the historiographical debate, see Chapter I.

[18] The British historian John Morrill introduced the term 'dynastic agglomerate' to indicate the heterogeneous and instable nature of political entities in the early modern era both in the minds of people and in terms of physical boundaries. John Morrill, "Dynasties, Realms, Peoples and State Formation, 1500-1720", in Robert von Friedeburg and John Morrill (eds.), *Monarchy Transformed: Princes and Their Elites in Early Modern Western Europe* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 17-43; idem, '*Uneasy Lies the Head that Wears the Crown': Dynastic Crises in Tudor and Stewart Britain, 1504-1746* (Reading: University of Reading Press, 2005).

of monarchy comes in, that is the importance of 'opinion'. Royal governments and other supporters of the monarchy consciously reminded their opponents of the dangers of a collapse of monarchy should cooperation fail. The engagement of elites – new and old, political and learned – in the battle of opinions aided in the development of a new 'national' rhetoric that centred on *l'État.* This rhetoric, no matter whom employed it, aimed to mobilize estate assemblies and a broader public of readers in order to prevent such an ill-fated collapse of political order.[19]

Revisionist historiography of early modern rule has had great implications for how we look at the French 'absolute monarchy' in practice, yet a lot of historians still accept the existence of 'absolutist theory'.[20] But if new studies have established that there was no steady and intentional process of state-building, what remains of the political thought that historians traditionally thought to be its theoretical foundation? Did political theory contain a blue-print for legitimating 'absolutism' that was applied only imperfectly in political practice? Only recently historians have come to question what was always perceived as the theory that mirrored the practice. It may be true, as the American historian William Beik stated, that in historiography there still is "little dispute concerning the theory that the king had absolute authority, that is, authority unchecked by any institutional body. His reach was limited only by religion, conscience and the fundamental laws of the realm."[21] However, if political practice proves to have been rather different, does that not force us to look again at (aspects of) the theory? Related as it is to the political thought normally termed 'absolutist theory', the question remains how the terminology of political prudence should be interpreted in light of the new findings. In a similar vain to what the American historian Johann Sommerville has recently attempted in grounding 'absolutist theory' more firmly in the context of contemporary monarchical rule, new questions should be brought to bear to the rhetoric of political prudence, in particular the political council guided by the vogue terminology of *raison d'état* and *intérêt*.[22]

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[19] Robert von Friedeburg, "Response to introduction", 19-21; Robert von Friedeburg and John Morrill, "Introduction: Monarchy Transformed – Princes and Their Elites in Early Modern Western Europe", in Robert von Friedeburg and John Morrill (eds.), *Monarchy Transformed: Princes and Their Elites in Early Modern Western Europe* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 1-12.

[20] William Beik, the author of an important article reviewing revisionist historiography and responsible for coining the term by which the 'new consensus' is commonly known, 'absolutism as social collaboration', even states as much in the opening segment of the article. William Beik, "The Absolutism of Louis XIV as Social Collaboration", *Past & Present* 188, no. 1 (2005): 195–224; 195.

[21] Beik, "The Absolutism of Louis XIV", 195.

[22] In a recent article the American historian Johann Sommerville attempts to show that the so called theorists of absolutism "adopted views which accord better with the modern model of absolutism as social collaboration than with the older idea that absolutists aimed at autocratic centralization and bureaucratization." Johann P. Sommerville, "Early Modern Absolutism in Practice and Theory", in Cesare Cuttica and Glenn Burgess, *Monarchism and Absolutism in Early Modern Europe* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 117-130.

The rhetoric of political prudence

Different forms of political rhetoric proliferated in (semi-public) debates in seventeenth-century Europe. Political prudence was an important *topos* of political rhetoric, one including the family-resemblant terms of *raison d'état* and *interest*. Soon after its early sixteenth-century coinage, the terminology became fashionable beyond its original Italian political and diplomatic context. In the early seventeenth century it entered the atmosphere of a European-wide concern with warfare on an unprecedented scale. War was both background to, a cause of and at times resulted from a widening curiosity of a larger public in contemporary political affairs and the secrets of power. As the British historian Noel Malcolm recently pointed out, it is within this broader context of current affairs literature and political 'news' that we should view the rhetoric of political prudence.[23] In the first half of the century, in particular from 1618 onwards, there had been an upsurge in literature describing the politics and violent conflict in Europe. Public interest in this material with greatly varying truth value grew alongside it. News and information on the inner-workings of power spread in various forms, printed or in manuscript, in leaflets or in the transnational correspondence of scholars and ambassadors. In the form of rumours and songs it was also significantly part of an urban context of oral exchange. Although the terminology of political prudence at first may have been directed at *cognoscenti*, it nevertheless spread well beyond scholarly discussions or state councils.[24]

Many a genealogy of political prudence, commonly known as 'reason of state', has been written by historians.[25] This political discourse or "vocabulary of fashionable political cynicism" included

[23] Noel Malcolm, *Reason of State, Propaganda and the Thirty Years' War*: *An Unknown Translation by Thomas Hobbes* (Oxford and New York: Clarendon Press, 2007), 92-109.

[24] Cf. Malcolm, *Reason of State, Propaganda and the Thirty Years' War*, 92-109; Filippo de Vivo, "Paolo Sarpi and the Uses of Information in Seventeenth-Century Venice", in Joad Raymond (ed.), *News Networks in Seventeenth-Century Britain and Europe* (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2006), 35-49; Andrew Pettegree, *The Invention of News: How the World Came to Know About Itself* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014).

[25] A concise bibliography of *raison d'état*-historiography should include: Friedrich Meinecke, *Machiavellism, the doctrine of raison d'état and its place in modern history* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957); Etienne Thuau, *Raison d'état et pensée politique à l'époque de Richelieu* (Paris: Albin Michel, 2000 [1966]); William F. Church, *Richelieu and Reason of State* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972); Roman Schnur (ed.), *Staatsräson: Studien zur Geschichte eines politischen Begriffs* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1975); Peter Burke, "Tacitism, Scepticism, and Reason of State", in J.H. Burns, M. Goldie, *Cambridge History of Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 479-498; Richard Tuck, *Philosophy and Government, 1572-1651* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Yves-Charles Zarka (ed.), *Raison et déraison d'État: théoriciens et théories de la raison d'État aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1994); Noel Malcolm, *Reason of State, Propaganda, and the Thirty Years' War*; Harro Höpfl, "Orthodoxy and Reason of State", *History of Political Thought* 13, no. 2 (2002): 211-237; Horst Dreitzel, "Reason of State and the Crisis of Political Aristotelianism: an Essay on the Development of 17th century Political Philosophy", *History of European Ideas* 28 (2002): 163-187; Conal Condren, "Reason of State and Sovereignty in Early Modern England: A Question of Ideology?", *Parergon* 28 (2011): 5-27; idem, *Argument and Authority in Early Modern England* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Laurie Catteeuw, *Censures et raisons d'État. Une histoire de la modernité politique (XVIe – XVIIe siècle)* (Paris: Albin Michel, 2013).

the terminology of 'politics', 'reason of state', *arcana imperii* and 'interest' as well as near common place maxims *nescit regnare qui nescit dissimulare* (who does not know how to dissemble, does not know how to rule) and *necessitas non habet legem* (necessity has no law).[26] It is not my intention to reproduce all their findings here in detail, as this thesis concerns the seventeenth-century French context. The emergence and accommodation of the notion of *stato*, *État* and other derivatives, and in its rearguard the new notions of political prudence were closely related with the ruin of the unity of Latin Christianity as a result of the Reformation. The *respublica christiana* that increasingly proved irreparable brought a seemingly irreducible number of political communities along with it. In this new 'geopolitical' situation the old idea of a universal Christian society that gave meaning eroded and responsibility for the concord of faith and power transferred to the individual political entities, in spite of attempts of great powers to restore unity.[27] It was in Italy, one of the most fragmented areas of Europe, that a more cynical view of human nature, which due to Augustinian and Aristotelian precedents in itself was neither new nor heterodox, came to inform thinking about politics. Historians disagree whether the phrase 'reason of state' was already an established term of art when Francesco Guicciardini referred to *la ragione e uso degli state* in a 1520s manuscript that was only published fifty years later.[28] That Giovanni Della Casa saw no need to elaborate on a definition when he deployed the term in a (undelivered) speech of 1547 directed at the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V is generally taken as evidence that by the late 1540s 'reason of state' was widely recognized by Italian diplomatic and courtly elites as a term referring to the art of governing.[29]

It did not take too long for the fashionable terminology to reach other European polities, especially those troubled by denominational belligerence like France. The French reception at the court of Catherine de' Medici from the 1560s onwards has traditionally been conceived of as 'Machiavellian', or better in the footsteps of Guicciardini. Recent historiography has established, however, that deeply spiritual neo-platonic ideas laid the foundation for a religiously inspired first French encounter with *raison d'état*.[30] Especially in periods of confessional strife and political turmoil the terminology was used in a polemical context by many sides and among various factions. Either authors sought to justify a prince or government's actions or they criticized and

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[26] Höpfl, "Orthodoxy and Reason of State", 216-217; idem, "Reason of State", in Hendrik Lagerlund (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy* (Dordrecht et al.: Springer, 2011), 1113-1115.
[27] Marcel Gauchet, "L'État au miroir de la raison d'État: La France et la chrétienté", in Zarka (ed.), *Raison et déraison d'État,* 214.
[28] Höpfl, "Orthodoxy and reason of state", 214; Tuck, *Philosophy and Government,* 39.
[29] Höpfl, "Orthodoxy and reason of state", 214-215.
[30] Mark Greengrass, *Governing Passions: Peace and Reform in the French Kingdom, 1576-1585* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Denis Crouzet, *Le haut Coeur de Catherine de Médicis: une raison politique aux temps de la Saint-Barthélemy* (Paris: Albin Michel, 2005). I have not been able to consult the latter book, but its argument is discussed and elaborated upon in a review article by Luc Racaut. Luc Racaut, "Reason of state, religious passions, and the French Wars of Religion (Review Article)", *The Historical Journal* 52, no. 4 (2009): 1077-1078, 1082.

attacked persons close to and in the government or their policies. Historians have trouble finding evidence that the terminology was explicitly employed in court circles in the late 1560s and generally consider the Bartholomew's Day Massacre of 1572 as a turning point. However, examples of the appearance of the exact phrase *raison(s) d'Estat* in the pamphlet wars of the late 1580s and 1590s during the last and most violent phase of the religious civil wars suggest a wider reception had been established by that time.[31] Influential neo-stoic and sceptic thinkers as Michel de Montaigne, Justus Lipsius and Pierre Charron never used the exact phrase *raison d'état*, nor is it unambiguous – especially in the former's writing – whether they endorsed or rather criticised, satirized and undermined the precepts of Italian 'reason of state' authors. However, their discussions of the honest and expedient in government affairs (*Essais*, III.1) and political prudence (*Politica,* IV.14; *De la Sagesse*, III.2) proved to be used in support of differential political morality by authors of the early seventeenth century.[32]

The widespread use of the catchphrase in France only commenced full-fledged after the 1599 publication of Gabriel Chappuys' French translation of Giovanni Botero's *Della ragion di Stato*.[33] Although this French reception evidently preceded the era of Richelieu's ministry, the vocabulary of *raison d'état* has always been intimately connected with the cardinal-minister. Richelieu and the pamphleteers who supported him are generally considered to have appropriated the term and created a positive and specifically French adaptation of the terminology, while their opponents shared the fears of most Italian 'theorists' and mainly used it pejoratively. The terminology did not instantly fade away after the death of Richelieu. The troublesome period of internecine conflict of the *Frondes* is a case in point. In what has been called the *Fronde des mots*, pamphlets show elaborate use of the terms *interest (d'état), interest des princes, raison(s) d'état* and other connected terminology.[34] Whereas Cardinal-minister Mazarin's opponents used the

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[31] See Pierre Goulart's *Mémoires de la Ligue* for use of the term in Huguenot tracts arguing against Henry IV's conversion. A well-known example is the anonymous pamphlet [authored by Jean de Sponde, who later converted to Catholicism with the king he had always served, Henry of Navarre] *Advertissement au Roi, ou sont déduites les raisons d'État pour lesquelles il ne lui est pas bien seant de changer de Religion* (1589). This pamphlet was later included in the fifth volume of the *Mémoires de la Ligue* among pamphlets of the year 1593. In an article on French Machiavellism and anti-machiavellism, the American historian Edmond M. Beame cited another pamphlet of 1591, in which the phrase 'Raisons de l'Estat' is found. *Réponse à l'instance et proposition que plusieurs font, que pour avoir une Paix générale et bien établie en France, il faut que le Roi change de Religion et se range à celle de l'Eglise Romaine*, in *Mémoires de la Ligue*, IV (Amsterdam, 1758) esp. 678 and 688. Edmond M. Beame, "The Use and Abuse of Machiavelli: The Sixteenth-Century French Adaptation", *Journal of the History of Ideas* 43, no. 1 (1982): 47.

[32] For a discussion of Montaigne's views on 'reason of state', see Robert Collins, "Montaigne's Rejection of Reason of State in 'De l'Utile et l'honneste'", *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 23, no. 1 (1992): 71-94.

[33] Marie-Madeleine Fragonard, "L'établissement de la raison d'état et la Saint-Barthélemy", *Les Cahiers du Centre de Recherches Historiques* 20 (1998) consulted online 01 October 2018. DOI: 10.4000/ccrh.2535

[34] Christian Jouhaud, *Mazarinades: la Fronde des mots* (Paris: Aubier, 1985); Hubert Carrier, *Le Labyrinthe de l'État. Essai sur le débat politique en France au temps de la Fronde (1648-1653)* (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2004).

term in their verbal attacks known as *mazarinades* (e.g. *Raisons d'état contre le Ministre estranger*, 1649), it was also essential in the pieces defending the *premier ministre*.[35]

Many historians believe that the use of *raison d'Estat* in French political discourse declined strongly after the 1650s.[36] The phrase, however, was still rather pervasive in discourse of the learned by the end of the century and is present in learned lexicons such as Antoine Furetière's universal dictionary (published posthumously in 1690). Under his second definition of *Estat* as the "domination or manner by which one governs a nation", he straightforwardly adds the examples: "Ce Prince par cette alliance a fait un grand coup d'*Estat*. L'interest particulier cede à la raison d'*Estat*."[37] Four years later, the long-anticipated official *Dictionnaire* of the Académie Française also included various formulations of political prudence among its illustrations to the definition of *Estat*: "le bien, la felicité de l'estat. […] maximes d'estat. […] raison d'estat".[38] Perhaps the appearance of the associated terms in dictionaries attests of a standardization and a terminology no longer in vogue in political discourse. Either it had become gratuitous, or the government and political elites had discarded the term as political circumstances changed in France by the early 1660s.

The discourse of political prudence did not only appear in learned debates, nor was it the prerogative of political elites. Historians often illustrate the assumption that 'reason of state' was a highly fashionable catchphrase with the common-place refrain sung by Italian authors like Trajano Boccalini and Ludovico Zuccolo who deplored that "everybody was discussing *ragion di stato*".[39] These prevalent concerns with the proliferation of the terminology were also soon found in France. In the beginning of the seventeenth century, Antoine de Laval criticised how the new Italian *jargon* (*le jargon des nouvellants de Rome, de Venise*) of *raison d'état* is heard coming out of everyone's mouth while the papers contain little else (*les Gazettes ne parlent d'autre chose*). Laval thought the situation so dire that due to pernicious curiosity even the lowest of soldiers and artisans mingled in discussions of political affairs and gossiped about the intentions and actions

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[35] Célestin Moreau, *Bibliographie des Mazarinades,* Tome 3 (Paris: J. Renouard, 1851) 2. Moreau does not fail to mention that this pamphlet was discussed in the *Mascurat* (p. 208). As we shall see in Chapter V, Naudé counted this pamphlet among the better, well-argued pieces. An online query of a corpus of more than two thousand *mazarinades* digitized by the *Projet Mazarinade* (mazarinades.org/recherche) returned approximately two hundred individual pamphlets in which the family-resemblant vocabulary of political prudence was used.

[36] See for instance, Jacob Soll, "A Lipsian Legacy? Neo-Absolutism, Natural Law and the Decline of Reason of State in France 1660-1760", in Erik de *Bom*, Marijke Janssens, Toon Van Houdt and Jan Papy (eds.), *(Un)masking the Realities of Power: Justus Lipsius and the Dynamics of Political Writing in Early Modern Europe* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010), 307-324.

[37] Antoine Furetière, *Dictionnaire universel* (The Hague and Rotterdam: Arnout and Reinier Leers, 1690) no pagination, f. Eeeee 2.

[38] See the entry 'Estat' in the *Dictionnaire de l'Académie Française* (1694) digitized on the website of the artfl-project. URL: https://artflsrv03.uchicago.edu/philologic4/publicdicos/navigate/3/6897/

[39] Among the many authors to refer to these remarks, see Malcolm, *Reason of State, Propaganda and the Thirty Years' War*, 93; Gauchet, "L'État au miroir de la raison d'État", 195.

of their prince and those representing them. Not simple obedience but curiosity for the mechanisms of power had taken sway in people's heads. According to this author, everyone wanted to know how and why they are governed. What was worse, everybody deemed himself fit to say that something was done according to reasons or maxims of state.[40]

The use of the vocabulary of political prudence seems to have been widespread, but what exactly did it entail? Implied by the variety of authors, politicians and factions, not to mention a broader public, all using the term in different ways, *raison d'état* is highly elusive and enigmatic. Any attempt to define the terminology will probably be in vain, because soon after the phrase *ragion di stato* was coined it became a vogue term of the art of politics and as such it meant different things to different users. 'Reason of state', as the terminology is commonly known in modern debates, never became a well-defined concept in a theoretical framework tied to some theory of politics or the state.[41] As a provocative notion, it pointed towards a number of challenges in the business of politics and prompted an answer from those working within the confines of existing orthodoxies.[42] Many of the political questions counsellors, jurists, and scholastic philosophers had discussed ever since the receptions of Aristotle and Roman law from the twelfth and thirteenth century onwards, suddenly became subsumed under 'reason of state' by the "magnetic attraction of the term".[43] Issues debated by a small group of thinkers included the relationship between *honestum* and *utile*, *necessitas* and the existence of exceptional norms, the *bonum commune* that trumped the *bonum privatum*, the status of political prudence relative to the other traditional virtues, and requirements for maintaining civic order and the stability of the community.[44]

Although the circumstances informing these concerns changed significantly, the notions were not altogether new. As the German historian Horst Dreitzel recently put it, in the late-sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Western-Europe saw "a refocusing on and crystallising of a broad range of ideas around a newly emerged and highly fashionable catchword", albeit at variable pace and content in different regions and contexts.[45]

Before considering some of these aspects, however, let us first consider the linguistic

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[40] Antoine de Laval, *Desseins de professions nobles et publiques* (Paris: Abel l'Angelier, 1612), 338a. The section on politics and *raison d'état*, not included in the original treatise published in 1605, first appeared in the second edition of 1612. Also cited by Gauchet, "L'État au miroir de la raison d'État", 195-196. On Laval see, Church, *Richelieu and Reason of State*, 78-80.

[41] Höpfl, "Orthodoxy and Reason of State", 214; Dreitzel, "Reason of State and the Crisis of Political Aristotelianism", 168.

[42] Dreitzel, "Reason of State and the Crisis of Political Aristotelianism", 168.

[43] Dreitzel, "Reason of State and the Crisis of Political Aristotelianism", 168-170. See also: Gaines Post, "*Ratio publicae utilitatis, ratio status*, and "reason of state," 1100-1300", in Gaines Post, *Studies in Medieval Legal Thought: Public Law and the State 1100-1322* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 241-309.

[44] See Post, "*Ratio publicae utilitatis, ratio status*, and "reason of state"", 241-309.

[45] Horst Dreitzel, "Reason of State and the Crisis of Political Aristotelianism", 170. Also, Harro Höpfl, "Orthodoxy and Reason of State", 211-237.

innovation originating in the combination of the constituents of the phrase, *raison* and *état*, through which it allowed an amalgamation of meanings.[46] The French *raison* (as well as the Italian *ragion*) carried with it a broader semantic subtlety that might be obscured by transposing on it a simple notion of reason as rationality in our modern sense of the word.[47] In contemporary lexicons, *raison* referred to the faculty of the intellect distinguishing humans from animals. It is the faculty by which humans gain understanding, separate good from evil, discern right from wrong and communicate their insights in discourse. *Raison* meant good sense and right usage of the intellectual faculty and as such there was a normative aspect inherent in the word. Of course, *raison* could simply mean reasoning, argumentation, deliberation, discussion, reflection. It thus referred to all that is argued, said and provided in writing or speech to prove, confirm and persuade others of something, i.e. the products of such intellectual and discursive practices. Furthermore, *raison* as cause denoted a ground, motive, interest, justification, pretention, consideration or foundation for an action.[48] It could intimate true knowledge of the ends and means of human behaviour, and a method for action. As such the word might even carry the transferred meaning of justice. It was sometimes taken for a duty, a right, or equity, a certain equality or proportion among things.[49] Finally, contemporary dictionaries explain that among merchants *une raison* referred to an account book (*un livre de compte*), a report of quantity, in number or extent, or a certain sum.[50]

From its rise in the politically fragmented context of late fifteenth and early sixteenth century Italy the word 'state' most importantly referred to princes' circumstances.[51] The term ambiguously referred to communities and the individual persons (princes) who embodied these 'states'. Among the 'new princes' such as the Medici in Florence, *conservare lo stato* might refer to maintaining the condition of the prince as well as upholding the political regime. In this context

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[46] Höpfl, "Orthodoxy and Reason of State", 217-218.

[47] Cf. J.H. Hexter, *The Vision of Politics on the Eve of the Reformation* (London: Routledge, 1973), 168; David Martin Jones, "Aphorism and the Counsel of Prudence in Early Modern Statecraft: The Curious Case of Justus Lipsius", *Parergon* 28, no. 2 (2011): 80.

[48] The following meanings were included in Jean Nicot's *Thresor de la langue française* (1604), Pierre Richelet's *Dictionnaire François* (1680), Antoine Furetière's *Dictionnaire Universel* (1690) and *Le Dictionnaire de l'Académie française* (1694). These dictionaries are available online at gallica.bnf.fr, the first dictionary of the Académie française can also be consulted at the artfl-website *Dictionnaires d'autrefois*. Cf. Höpfl, "Orthodoxy and Reason of State", 217-218.

[49] Jones, "Aphorism and the Counsel of Prudence", 80. This is illustrated by e.g. Antoine de Laval, who used *droit* and *raison* interchangeable: "Je ne garde pas ici l'ordre ni les définitions des Jurisconsultes, ils les étendent pour traiter leur droit civil et municipal à plein fonds, autant infini, qu'infinies sont les actions et volontés des hommes avec les évènements. Je raccourcis les miennes pour montrer seulement que la raison du droit civil ne va pas le train du droit de nature: le coutumier du civil. Le droit et raison de guerre les brise tous: la raison du droit des gens amollit celui de la guerre: la raison de Police court par tout si ce n'est que cette raison d'État l'en empêche. Car cette raison sans raison, ce droit tortue passe sur le ventre à tous les autres, ou à la plupart." Laval, *Desseins de professions nobles et publiques*, 339a.

[50] The latter meaning if found in Pierre Richelet's *Dictionnaire François* (1680), Antoine Furetière's *Dictionnaire Universel* (1690) and *Le Dictionnaire de l'Académie française* (1694).

[51] For a more elaborate treatment of the rise of the vocabulary of *État* in France see the Chapter I.

the term was therefore used to stabilize the position of a new, illegitimate prince.[52] When the term *état* gained acceptance in France in the second half of the sixteenth century, apart from being used to refer to the social strata within a society – i.e. the three *états* of nobility, clergy, and bourgeoisie –, it also came to refer to the situation of the king.[53] In general, the word 'state' therefore denoted "a condition of things (as in *status reipublicae*); status, standing or estate; the *prince's* status, standing, position or office; the government or regime; or the commonwealth or polity, or its business, concerns or arrangements (as in the already familiar expression 'matters of state')."[54]

With authors like Niccolò Machiavelli and Francisco Guicciardini but especially the reception of their work from the late sixteenth century onwards major Christian assumptions on society and human behaviour and discourse in society gradually eroded.[55] Their cynical analysis of political life in a community as a dynamic struggle of interests proved to be as influential as it was deplored. Leading men and women – princes in particular – became rational agents with interests, always choosing to better their standing, their own situation. Although individuals would prefer to further their own cause, it clearly was best for the community as a whole when common interest ruled over those of individuals. The fittest to the task of discerning this common interest were the prince and his counsellors. More strongly than before, political council and rhetoric focussed on the means to the ends of political society instead of persuasion by reasoned speech and virtuous behaviour. Medieval, Thomist-Aristotelian moral philosophy concerned with Christian virtue made no distinction between actions on the various levels of communal life and required honest virtuous actions except in cases of utmost necessity (*necessitas*). Apart from these exceptional cases, lying, deception, and fraud were univocally condemned. In works like *Il Principe* and the *Discorsi*, Machiavelli showed a more cynical picture in which these condemned actions were common practise; in fact, the 'new prince' must always make use of both cunning and force. In calculations of expediency and (self) interest the actions of necessity became the norm.[56]

Although 'Machiavellianism' was virtually universally condemned, the Florentine's work was indispensable. In political discourse authors in the late sixteenth and seventeenth century therefore simply had to confront it. Especially after the Saint-Bartholomew's Day Massacre in 1572, Machiavelli was deemed responsible for the kind of political council that had caused the

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[52] Höpfl, "Orthodoxy and Reason of State", 215.
[53] Meinecke, *Machiavellism,* 1-22; Laurie Catteeuw, "L'inacceptable face aux nécessités politiques: les relations entre censures et raisons d'État à l'époque moderne", *Les Dossiers du Grihl* [online], Les dossiers de Jean-Pierre Cavaillé, Les limites de l'acceptable, uploaded 14 June 2013; Catteeuw, *Censures et raisons d'État*, 7-17.
[54] Höpfl, "Orthodoxy and Reason of State", 218.
[55] Von Friedeburg, "Wars with books", 302.
[56] Catteeuw, "L'inacceptable face aux nécessités politiques" [online].

violent death of thousands of French Huguenots. By the 1580s, 'Machiavellism' and 'Machiavellist' had become a pejorative designation for any political considerations indifferent to or contrasting religious precepts, morality and legal norms that the new catchphrase *raison d'état* was quick to absorb.[57]

Justus Lipsius' *Politica* and Botero's *Della ragione di stato*, both appearing in 1589, are two examples of important and influential political treatises in which the authors sought to come to grips with the ideas of and ascribed to Machiavelli. Lipsius, who was to exert a considerable influence on Pierre Charron, Gabriel Naudé, and French political thought in general[58], engaged with the ideas and reputation of Machiavelli in the context of his discussion of prudence. Lipsius took the Aristotelian maxim that at least a ruler must be half good to inform his examination of what he called *prudentia mixta*, prudence mixed with fraud. In the fourth book of his *Politica* Lipsius attested that sometimes it is necessary to mix prudence with a bit of fraud. Just as wine mixed with a little water does not cease to be wine, nor does 'watered down' prudence cease to be prudence. Mixed prudence remains virtuous, Lipsius contends in this clarifying analogy. He then defines fraud as "clever planning which departs from virtue or the laws, in the interest of the king and the kingdom" before distinguishing between a light, middle and grave form of *fraus*.[59] These forms, still farther departing from virtue, include distrust and dissimulation; bribery and deception; and perfidy and injustice. Lipsius condemns the third form of fraud, but this constraint might be deemed limited due to the ambiguity in the rest of the chapter.[60] According to Lipsius *prudentia mixta* was inescapable in facing the realities of political life and essential for good government.[61]

Giovanni Botero, the first to use the phrase *ragione di stato* in a book's title, confronted Machiavelli's ideas in his distinction between 'good' and 'bad' forms of reason of state. The work of this Italian Jesuit, who left the order to become a diplomat, popularized the term and established a tradition of 'theoretical' reflection on the practice of political prudence. He defined *ragione di stato* as: "State is a stable dominion over people, and Reason of State is knowledge of the means suitable for founding, conserving and augmenting a dominion established in this way. […] Although everything done with these ends in view is said to be done for Reason of State, nevertheless this term is used rather about things which cannot be reduced to ordinary and usual

[57] Höpfl, "Orthodoxy and Reason of State", 218-219.
[58] See for instance, Soll, "A Lipsian Legacy?", 307-323; Malcolm, *Reason of State, Propaganda, and the Thirty Years' War,* 101-102; Burke, "Tacitism, sceptisism, and reason of state", 491-497; Jan Waszink, "Introduction", in Justus Lipsius (J. Waszink, ed. and tr.), *Politica: six books of politics or political instruction* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 2004), 1-213, in particular 31-48.
[59] Lipsius (ed. Waszink), *Politica*, 512-3.
[60] Lipsius (ed. Waszink), *Politica*, 512-9.
[61] Catteeuw, "L'inacceptable face aux nécessités politiques" [online].

ragione."[62] Part of a more general moral discussion, Botero made a distinction between what was right and virtuous (*honestum*) and that which is useful (*utile*).[63] Due to his intimate relations with the Church of Rome as a former Jesuit, Botero deplored as bad *raison d'état* those 'Machiavellian' policies of secular government that, confronted with the religious troubles and conflicts caused by the Reformation, sought to take power in religious matters only to discard of religious prescriptions and mores.[64]

Most discussions of *raison d'état* were informed by the ambiguous relation between political action and the 'Law', incorporating divine law, natural law, positive law, and morality. Still theoretical expositions of this relationship are hard to find.[65] Because there were various different 'states' (princes, estates, and in the last place particular individuals like the *grand* nobles in France) with particular interests, there were different and conflicting forms of *raison d'état*. The extent of royal power was one important feature in 'wars with books' at times of conflicting interests. Actions informed by *raison d'état* usually reside in the grey area, where political behaviour either seeks the limits of the lawful, or (occasionally) effectively crosses boundaries set by the 'Law'. In a French context, looking through the prism of a Bodinian conception of sovereignty as legislative power, *raison d'état* can also be understood as creating law.[66] It could render the unacceptable acceptable, that is when the king challenged common legal practices, privileges, and laws.[67] The definition of *raison d'état* by Daniel de Priezac, a pamphleteer in the service of Richelieu, stressed this view: "reason of state, which is the superior and living law, directs, tempers, corrects and when it is necessary abrogates and annuls all other laws for a good that is more universal."[68]

A final element that we need to address is that the authors that employed the terminology of *raison d'état* are part of a transition from inquiries into the status of the ruler, to analyses of the

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[62] Cited in Höpfl, "Orthodoxy and Reason of State", 213.
[63] Malcolm, *Reason of State, Propaganda, and the Thirty Years' War,* 93.
[64] For an elaborate discussion of the relation between different forms of *raison d'état* and censorial practises see the recent study by Laurie Catteeuw, *Censures et raisons d'État. Une histoire de la modernité politique (XVIe-XVIIe siècle)* (Paris: Albin Michel, 2013). In this study Catteeuw contends that Botero's discussion of good *raison d'état* can best be understood as *raison d'Église*, furthering the cause of the Roman Catholic Church after the Council of Trent, and that it is closely related to its different forms of censorial practises.
[65] Höpfl, "Orthodoxy and Reason of State", 215.
[66] For a discussion of the relation between (the reception of) Bodin and 'reason of state', see the work of Luc Foisneau, who argues that "Bodin was not so much opposed to 'reason of state' as ignorant of it, and certainly as a means to justify the development of Spanish hegemony. '*Ragion di stato*' in Botero's eponymous work of 1589, has to be understood, indeed, as part of a widespread effort among publicists attached to the Spanish Crown to justify the identification of Spain with the cause of Catholicism." Luc Foisneau, "Sovereignty and Reason of State: Bodin, Botero, Richelieu and Hobbes", in Howell A. Lloyd (ed.), *The Reception of Bodin* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2013), 324-333, esp. 329-333.
[67] Catteeuw, "L'inacceptable face aux nécessités politiques" [online].
[68] Daniel de Priezac, *Discours politiques*, "Des secrets de la domination, ou de la Raison d'Estat" (first published in Paris, Rocollet, 1652), reference to the 1666 edition (Paris, Foucault, 1666) 209. Cited in Catteeuw, "L'inacceptable face au nécessités politiques".

status of his lands, territories and domains. This transition was primarily informed by the rise of empirical historical research.[69] The rhetorical discourse of political prudence was a form of practical reasoning, interpretations of history and experience that were anecdotal and casuistic. Many authors shared with Machiavelli and Guicciardini a distrust of scholastic 'science' and in their writing favoured the use of *sententiae* or aphorisms, exempla and maxims over scholastic demonstration.[70]

Friedrich Meinecke and the historiography of political prudence

Modern historiography of political prudence at the outset was intimately related to the conception of a philosophy of history. This is not only apparent in the work of Giuseppe Ferrari, briefly discussed in the opening paragraph above, but also in what is still the starting-point for any study of 'reason of state', Friedrich Meinecke's *Die Idee der Staatsräson in der neuern Geschichte* (1924). In these initial historiographical reflections upon *raison d'état,* authors tended to view this political thought as a lens through which they could see clearer the historical process itself.

Today it is more than ninety years ago that Meinecke, the "last great German historicist", published his seminal work.[71] In *Die Idee der Staatsräson*, the intellectual historian interpreted *raison d'état* as an idea that was a motive force in history and in the development of the modern state. He studied 'the idea' from a historicist point of view as the power concept moving history forward, unfolding and perfected in time. For him, *raison d'état* embodied the dynamic struggle between *Kratos* (power) and *Ethos* (morality) that was the engine of political history. The state was an organism that had always been present in human history, if only in kernel. The kernel was brought to flower by the driving force of *raison d'état.*[72] Meinecke – and through his influential analysis generations of historians – thus connected 'reason of state' with the rise of the modern state.

Thought-provoking as Meinecke's book might still be, in many ways it is manifestly outdated. Beside the author's historicism, it follows from his presentist preoccupation with the concerns of inter-war Germany that his interpretation should not be received uncritically. According to the German historian Michael Stolleis, *Die Idee der Staatsräson* was above all an effort to explain the outbreak and destruction of the Great War, the excesses of the idea of the *Machtsstaat* and

[69] Meinecke, *Machiavellism,* 19-22.
[70] Höpfl, "Orthodoxy and Reason of State", 219.
[71] Troy R.E. Paddock, "Rethinking Friedrich Meinecke's Historicism", *Rethinking History* 10, no. 1 (2006): 95-108.
[72] Meinecke, *Machiavellism,* 1-22; on Naudé 196-204; on Rohan 162-195.

ideological polarization of political debates.[73] Disheartened with the ability of philosophical systems to overcome the conflict between power and morality, Meinecke's work became an incessant quest to moralize power. As Stolleis remarks, the historicist reflected on the tragedy of modern history, while at the same time directing his gaze to the future, recommending the new democracy of the Weimar Republic as the sensible solution for the times.[74]

A veritable tradition of *raison d'état*-studies can be discerned in the historiography, discarding Meinecke's historicism but still perceiving *raison d'état* as part of the increasingly secularized or morally autonomous political thought reflective of seventeenth-century state-building processes, especially French absolutism. As one scholar recently put it, commencing "with Meinecke and up until the 1980s, the basic premise for understanding the politics of the first half of the seventeenth century was to associate absolutism and the advent of the secular State, the politics of which were no longer based on moral and religious considerations, but on reasons of State."[75] The French historian Etienne Thuau in his *Raison d'état et pensée politique à l'époque de Richelieu* (1966) is a significant case in point. Thuau implicitly criticized Meinecke for his historicism and idealism, and interpreted *raison d'état* as the central issue reflecting the struggle for absolutism in the period.[76] He described political thought in the Richelieu era as an increasingly polarized and violent ideological debate. The polarization and violence in the debate were caused by the rise of a new kind of statist (*étatiste*) politics and the unease it created in its predominantly *dévot* opponents, pushing moderate humanist voices to the background. In the end the statist group won out with its support of a secularized *raison d'état* politics. In this view, absolutist ideology and *raison d'état* were not a simple defence and illustration of the powers that were, thinkers of the Richelieu period, especially the *étastists*, advanced and enriched French political thought by secularizing it.[77] Thuau perceived of *raison d'état* thinking as a philosophy of repression that, akin to the Hegelian ruse of reason, was instrumental in the emancipation of politics and the progress of rationalism that in the end brought ruin upon the absolute monarchy. For the French historian of ideas, secularization of international politics and the French state as supported by the *étatists* had a mutually reinforcing relationship with rationalist progress in political thought.[78]

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[73] Michael Stolleis, "*L'idée de la raison d'État* de Friedrich Meinecke et la recherche actuelle", in Zarka (ed.), *Raison et déraison d'État*, 11-39.
[74] Stolleis, "*L'idée de la raison d'État* de Friedrich Meinecke", 36-37.
[75] Caroline Maillet-Rao, "Towards a New Reading of the Political Thought of the *Dévot* Faction: The Opposition to Cardinal Richelieu's Ministériat", *Religions* 4 (2013): 537.
[76] Thuau, *Raison d'état et pensée* politique, 9-11.
[77] Thuau, *Raison d'etat et pensée politique*, 411-414.
[78] On the ruses of raison d'État: "pour employer la langage de Hegel, on observe dans l'histoire des 'ruses de la raison'. Sécularisant d'une certaine façon l'idée des "desseins cachés" de la Providence, Hegel remarque que les individus, en poursuivant leur projet singulier, finissent par actualiser un projet total dont le sens est au-delà du sens visé par eux. […] La raison d'État, âme de l'État moderne, […] conduit [les étatistes] dans cette zone crépusculaire de la vie collective où la volonté de puissance se transforme en raison. Leurs écrits nous ont présenté ces étranges métamorphoses où la violence devient raison et la

In the English contextualist approach, *raison d'état* is treated as a 'genre', part of a wider current of 'new humanism' that represented a 'revolution of politics'.[79] The genre or language of 'reason of state' is understood as a modern ideology of secular politics. The Italian historian Maurizio Viroli has argued that this revolution consisted of the "triumph of the language of reason of state". Not too far removed from Meinecke's interpretation, this radical transformation in the discourse on politics between the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century is presented as resulting from a conflict between politics and fundamental Christian morals and norms. In the course of this transition the notion of politics was depleted of its firm grounding in divine law and consent, replacing it with the rule of force and government by coercion. The revolution embodied an ideological shift from politics as the "art of good government" focussed on "preserving a *res publica*, in the sense of a community of individuals living together in justice" to politics as 'reason of state' that referred to "the art of preserving a state, in the sense of a person's or group's power and control over public institutions".[80] As one scholar remarked disapprovingly, the "final victory of Reason of State" in different nuances of contextualist interpretations either is seen as the result of a violent battle of ideological positions or "as the conscious and progressive discovery of political reality, previously hidden from the West by the veil of Christian myth."[81]

Traditionally it has been argued that through political discourse about *raison d'état* an independent political realm was established with its own morality and rationality. In moving away from Christian morality it became the calculus of interests and expediency. Although this interpretation is still quite common, it does not go unchallenged. In fact, the secularization-thesis has been criticized ever since the pivotal work of the American historian William F. Church on Richelieu's 'reason of state'.[82]

Church's interpretation is not entirely at odds with traditional historiography, as he still perceives of the evolution of the notion of 'reason of state' as the intellectual equivalent of Cardinal Richelieu's state-building program.[83] For him, the rise of the terminology in France "roughly paralleled and was inspired by" the policies of the cardinal-minister.[84] However, in

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raison violence. […] En cherchant à pénétrer dans les secrets de la science royale, les étatistes se souciaient surtout de renforcer le Pouvoir. Mais l'État national de Richelieu […] faisait naître une société bourgeoise, formée d'une addition de citoyens. Ainsi, par une ruse suprême de la raison d'État, une entreprise de domination s'achevait en entreprise de libération." Thuau, *Raison d'État et pensée politique*, 418-419.

[79] Quentin Skinner and Peter Burke both consider 'reason of state' to be a *genre*, Richard Tuck described it as imbedded in 'new humanism', and for Maurizio Viroli the 'language of reason of state' was the result of a revolution of politics.

[80] Maurizio Viroli, *From Politics to Reason of State. The Acquisition and Transformation of the Language of Politics 1250–1600* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 2-3.

[81] Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 155.

[82] Church, *Richelieu and Reason of State* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972).

[83] Church, *Richelieu and Reason of State*, 6.

[84] Church, *Richelieu and Reason of State*, 5.

contrast to historians like Thuau or Viroli, Church characterized the political thought in the period from the 1620s until the early 1640s as a "fusion of politics and religion".[85] The cardinal was not responsible for the secularization of politics and the *raison d'état* he endorsed always involved compromise with Christian values. Church argues that Richelieu "believed himself to be a Christian statesman who was meeting the exigencies of politics with the best available means for the building of Christian France."[86] According to Church the modern, pragmatic and secularized conception of *raison d'état* was part of a subsequent evolution of the state and a broader process of secularization of European culture that was neither the cardinal's intent, nor an effect of his policies.[87] For all its merit, it becomes clear that in the book of the American historian the secularization thesis is merely pushed a couple of decades further into the seventeenth century and others than Richelieu and his publicists turn out to be accountable for any secularizing tendencies.

A more encompassing critique of the traditional view of *raison d'état*'s contribution to a modern and secular conceptualization of the political can be found in recent French historiography. The French historian Françoise Hildesheimer pointedly formulated this critique, when she contested that to use our contemporary standards and confine 'the state' to the secular domain is an anachronism. According to this Richelieu specialist, the common view reduces religion to the sacred and *l'État* to the profane and ignores the intimate relationship between power and the sacred in the early modern world.[88] Throughout the *Ancien Régime*, French royal power remained largely restricted by divine law and neatly fitted the conceptualization of sovereignty by which the pre-eminence of the king was based on his office of lieutenant of God on earth. The 'direct' link between God and the king was not solely a means of independence and superiority as against the Church of Rome, it also was the source of an intrinsic religiosity of the 'state'. As the anonymous author of a 1588 pamphlet formulated it: "L'État n'est pas dans la religion, mais la religion dans l'État".[89] Furthermore, in contemporary perceptions divine right not only instituted and protected the office of the king, it also obligated the king to "govern according to God's will and to ensure that justice reigned on Earth."[90] The French historian Marcel Gauchet argues that a simple opposition between the secular values of politics and religious values of salvation is superficial. These actually represented two forms of religion. When it became firmly established during the reign of Henri IV the term *l'État* never brought about a

[85] Church, *Richelieu and Reason of State*, 506.
[86] Church, *Richelieu and Reason of State*, 506.
[87] Church, *Richelieu and Reason of State*, 508-509.
[88] Françoise Hildesheimer, *Du Siècle d'or au Grand siècle, L'État en France et en Espagne, XVIe – XVIIe Siècle* (Paris: Flammarion, 2000), 83. Cited in Maillet-Rao, "Towards a New Reading of the Political Thought of the *Dévot* Faction", 537.
[89] Gauchet, "L'État au miroir de la raison d'État", 207-208.
[90] Caroline Maillet-Rao, "Towards a New Reading of the Political Thought of the *Dévot* Faction", 537.

simple secularized political point of view. Instead, the 'state' became a religious end in itself. *L'État* was an appeasing power, a religion of unification on earth.[91] In early modern France politics and religion therefore remained intrinsically linked. *Raison d'état* as legitimation of political action did not secularize politics. Even more so, historians now argue this particular political discourse could only function within the context of a 'resacralization' of the French monarchy.[92] For the partisans of *l'État*, there were two ways of serving God, the spiritual relation and political action for God in this world. *Raison d'état* represented another way to serve God, through the successful resolve of purely secular exigencies.[93]

Shortly after the beginning of the new millennium the work of intellectual historians like Harro Höpfl, Horst Dreitzel and Conal Condren brought about a revision of traditionally accepted views that interpreted *raison d'état* as a feature of seventeenth-century political thought by which the authors tried to establish moral autonomy in the field of politics, i.e. political autonomy. Instead these scholars see it as elusive vogue terminology, a fashionable and provocative catchword. For them the political discourse did not necessarily presuppose a theory of 'absolutism', but rather was a political rhetoric that could be used by factions with different interests.[94] Their thinking about the subject has important implications for the virtually universal historiographical interpretation of *raison d'état* as a modernizing ideology constitutive of political autonomy.

A common historiographical supposition is that Machiavelli inaugurated the modernity of politics by rigorously divorcing the domains of politics and ethics. The German historian Horst Dreitzel points out that this common assumption, so often related to the political discourse of 'reason of state', fails to take into account that moral choice is inevitable. In his interpretation "Machiavelli did not represent the sort of theory [historians] usually attribute to him, but understood politics and the principles of human social life in ethical terms."[95] Harro Höpfl concurs when he points to the lack of evidence of any author in the sixteenth or early seventeenth century who discussed the relationship between governing and morality in more depth than "gratuitous affirmations" of the incompatibility of politics and religion.[96] Although Machiavelli's responsibility for establishing political autonomy or the conceivability of a strict separation of politics and ethics in early modern times have been questioned, the idea that 'reason of state' thinking brought about this autonomy of politics proves a prevailing belief.

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[91] Gauchet, "L'État au miroir de la raison d'État", 207-208.
[92] Fanny Cosandey, "L'absolutisme: un concept irremplacé", in Lothar Schilling (ed.), *Absolutismus, ein unersetzliches Forschungskonzept / L'absolutisme, un concept irremplaçable?* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2008), 41, n. 36.
[93] Gauchet, "L'État au miroir de la raison d'État", 225.
[94] Höpfl, "Orthodoxy and Reason of State", 211-237; Condren, "Reason of State and Sovereignty", 5-27; idem, *Argument and Authority in Early Modern England* (Cambridge, New York, et al. 2006); Dreitzel, "Reason of state and the crisis of political Aristotelianism", 163-187.
[95] Dreitzel, "Reason of state and the crisis of political Aristotelianism", 186 n. 46.
[96] Höpfl, "Orthodoxy and Reason of State", 215.

The British historian of ideas Conal Condren probably pushes this revisionist critique furthest. In various publications he questions the idea of 'reason of state theory' or 'ideology' and even doubts the existence of political thought in early modern Europe in general. His research focuses on the presuppositions that informed early modern thinking and concludes that these mainly had to do with the different offices people held or were excluded from, that of father, clergyman, king, etcetera.[97] In relation to the terminology of 'reason of state' Condren argues that "notions of office-holding were extraordinarily accommodating" and that "the personae occupying any office, as a sanctioned realm of responsibility, might claim a 'reason' for it in order to justify questioned conduct." [98] Inherent in any office was a certain leeway that could be justified for its preservation. That contemporaries thought of and used the rhetoric of political prudence as a casuistry of office is made clear by the ordinary conduct with which the legitimated actions are contrasted. In extraordinary circumstances, like cases of emergency, it was permissible to deviate from the ordinary line of conduct.[99] Whenever people employed this vocabulary to justify questionable acts, they made use of this casuistry of practical ethics. The elusiveness of the functioning of 'reason of state' lay precisely in this origin in casuistry; it reflected casuistry's ambivalence.[100]

Furthermore, Condren contends that interpreting the fashionable terminology as ideology as many historians have done, is anachronistic. The problem with this long-standing interpretation is that it not only attempts to fit 'reason of state' in a modern post-Kantian ethical mould of universal applicability and validity, but also carries assumptions of the existence of a clearly defined political program to which certain groups were committed.[101] Finally, Condren dissects the misunderstanding that *raison d'état* and its equivalents presupposed a prior commitment to 'absolutist' or sovereignty theory. As the political discourse "exemplified a necessary prudential latitude, restricted, or confined only by the ends of whatever activity prudence served" it was "required by those holding ruling office because of that responsibility alone" and as such "appropriated to the prerogative of the office of the sovereign".[102] The political discourse and way of perceiving matters of state was not exclusive to the sovereign, but could be appropriated by the sovereign, his counsellors and authors supporting or legitimating government policy.[103]

The revisionist accounts of Condren, Dreitzel and Höpfl present the most potent critique to date of traditional views of political prudence, teaching the historian of early modern intellectual history caution in the application of modern lingo such as 'ideology' or any 'ism' to early modern political thought that is alien to the era. *Raison d'état* should therefore not be understood as a

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[97] Condren, *Argument and Authority in Early Modern England* (Cambridge, New York, et al. 2006).
[98] Condren, "Reason of State and Sovereignty", 13-14.
[99] Condren, *Argument and Authority*, 225; idem, "Reason of State and Sovereignty", 13-14.
[100] Condren, "Reason of State and Sovereignty", 15.
[101] Condren, "Reason of State and Sovereignty", 16.
[102] Condren, "Reason of State and Sovereignty", 18-19.
[103] Condren, "Reason of State and Sovereignty", 18-19.

coherent political theory, nor be seen as the executive part of some non-existent blue-print of state-building. Stated more positively, this intangible vogue terminology of political prudence was both a rhetorical tool for mobilization and encouragement in deeply polarized times as it was veritable way of perceiving the world and expressing matters in political discourse. The emerging dynastic agglomerates with their many divergent provinces, their elite aristocracy and their financial dealings were no longer easily describable within a framework prescribed by the Aristotelian politics and its focus on a single city-state. These transformations were by no means lost on contemporaries, who struggled to capture what was going on. To some extent, Imperial Rome could still provide a fitting example. However, once the new fashionable jargon of reason of state reached the politics of a kingdom like France, these new dimensions of politics also asked for a new framework of description.

Studies in the context of early modern political prudence have devoted a reasonable amount of attention to the political writings of Rohan and Naudé, scholarly work that can only be briefly reviewed here. To start with Rohan, Meinecke devoted the better part of a chapter to Rohan in his seminal study of 'reason of state'. He called Rohan a "soldier in the service of the idea" of *raison d'état* and tried to bring together his three *personae*: the Huguenot with particular religious convictions; the faction leader with aristocratic and dynastic ambition; and the author of an interest-treatise in line with Richelieu's perception of the state. Meinecke does this mainly by arguing that long before he devoted himself to the service of Richelieu's policy after 1629, Rohan had been convinced of and had proclaimed what the German historian called "the inexorable doctrine of State interests".[104] In the 1970s the American historian J.H.M. Salmon contested Meinecke's reconciliation of the three *personae* in an attempt to discuss the 'historical Rohan' on the basis of more extensive research of the duc's other political works, primarily his *Discours politiques* (1646).[105]

Etienne Thuau in his famous thesis on *raison d'état* tried to understand Rohan's work in the context of political thought in the Richelieu era. Thuau calls Rohan's *De l'Interest* "the masterpiece of a new genre of political literature".[106] For Thuau 'anatomies' of Europe, like that of Rohan, marked the end of the old Christian society of Europe and the rise of states in a state of permanent rivalry. The *res publica christiana* became an obsolete term and contemporaries of Richelieu renounced the idea that faith could provide the foundation to an 'international community'. Convinced that there was no other law than that of interest, these contemporaries considered these international rivalries as natural.[107]

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[104] Meinecke, *Machiavellism*, 146-195; 168.
[105] J. H. M. Salmon, *Renaissance and Revolt: essays in the intellectual and social history of early modern France* (Cambridge; New York 1987) 98-116.
[106] E. Thuau, *Raison d'état et pensée politique,* 312-314.
[107] Idem, 315.

Arguably the most far-reaching study of Rohan's work is to be found in Christian Lazzeri's introduction to the modern edition of *De l'Interest.* In this introduction the author studies the history of the terminology of interest from antiquity to the early seventeenth century, taking Rohan's book as a key moment in a long development of fusion of the notions of 'interest' and 'state'.[108] Lazzeri proposes a parallel reading of the history of these two notions in order to understand the working of early modern states and their procedures of legitimation. He tries to demonstrate that the legitimation of political action in sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe was not necessarily a discontinuity with custom and positive law, but rose from reflections on the interpretation of laws concerning the type of action exercised for the interest of the state and the expansion of its power. Lazzeri thinks that Rohan devised a notion of 'interest of state' that describes the principles of political action within a context of power distribution in Europe. Rohan tried to comprehend European power play with a rational analysis of geography, military and economic resources of a given individual state. The political interests become the driving force of state action. As power relations are variable and depend on rather contingent factors, Rohan seeks to identify the interests of a state at a given moment, incorporating coincidence and contingency in the rational analysis. For Lazzeri, Rohan's but partially developed method is an attempt to analyse the strategic political choices of princes in order to understand what states are, what they represent and what the logic behind their designs is.[109]

A more recent work is Jonathan Dewald's of the Rohan family. In this book, Dewald presents Rohan's political writing on 'self-interest' of the 1630s as continuous with earlier pamphlets that nevertheless offered a "coherent social philosophy, with radical implications".[110] According to the American historian of aristocracy, the duc displayed "a radically secular vision of political life" that trades religiosity, custom and morality for self-interest and rational calculation.[111] Rohan is innovative in his attempt to show that aspiration to improve one's station is both a neutral and universal fact of human life in society as well as a source of practical virtue. Religion and history offer little direction in this reality. Instead, it is reason that provides guidance to the actor in all circumstances. Violence, usurpation, in extreme cases even regicide could all well be rational action.[112]

The most recent study to date by Marianne Klerk assesses 'Rohan's legacy', mainly in the Low Countries of the second half of the seventeenth century. As part of a broader reconsideration of interest-terminology, she argues scholars as yet "have overlooked the satiric exaggeration and

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[108] C. Lazzeri, "Introduction", in H. de Rohan [ed. C. Lazzeri], *De l'intérêt des princes et des États de la chrétienté* (Paris 1995 [1646]), 1-156.
[109] Lazzeri, "Introduction", 129-152.
[110] Jonathan Dewald, *Status, Power and Identity in Early Modern France: The Rohan Family, 1550-1715* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2015), 77.
[111] Dewald, *Status, Power and Identity in Early Modern France*, 73.
[112] Dewald, *Status, Power and Identity in Early Modern France*, 77.

demonization" in Rohan's analysis of Spanish interests. Most importantly, Klerk's analysis shows that an element of satiric, moral critique made *De l'Interest* a seemingly objective, but actually potent propagandistic anti-Spanish war cry.[113]

Regarding Naudé's work three scholars in particular must be mentioned here, to begin with Louis Marin. Marin, a French philosopher and historian, in the late 1980s wrote an insightful and forceful introduction to a modern edition of Naudé's *Considérations politiques*, in which he made observations that still inform much of the current debate on the text.[114] Among these are the ideas on dissimulation in this particular work of Naudé, which focus on Naudé's awareness of the possible subversive consequences of his ideas. Either a tyrant could use these ideas of political prudence to perfect his tyranny, or these ideas could render the people too informed, thinking that they were in power to judge the actions of kings. Marin observes that Naudé's limited publication of a 'dozen copies', use of specific language and the creation of a sphere of intimacy and privacy within the text between the eminent patron and his secretary might just as well all be part of a strategy of dissimulation, transforming the work itself in a *coup d'état*, a political action of sorts that is only revealed by its effects.[115]

The French historian Jean-Pierre Cavaillé is probably one of the most productive modern scholars on the *libertinage érudit* including Gabriel Naudé.[116] Ever since the seminal study by René Pintard, who coined this historiographical concept, particularly French scholars have consistently considered Naudé one of the most prominent among the ranks of the learned French freethinkers. The term *libertinage érudit* gathers together a group of well-acquainted early seventeenth-century French thinkers by virtue of their supposed shared intellectual attitudes. They allegedly developed an autonomous morality and a critique of religion that opposed dogmatic theology and was related to a critique of the foundations of power.[117] Cavaillé has further explored the ideas of Pintard and Marin. He analyses the creation of a sphere of secrecy and initiation, especially in the manner of publication. He argues that Naudé makes as much use of the political prudence he prescribes his political actor by this strategy of limited (though in fact much larger) initial publication. The secrets of publication and the publication of secrets mutually support each other in this scheme of Naudé. In this way, the Parisian librarian is able to convey

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[113] Klerk, "Reason of State and Predatory Monarchy in the Dutch Republic", 19-52.

[114] Louis Marin, "Pour une théorie baroque de l'action politique", in Gabriel Naudé (Frédérique Marin and Marie-Odile Perulli, eds.), *Considérations politiques sur les coups d'État* (Paris: Editions de Paris, 1988), 7-67.

[115] Marin, "Pour une théorie baroque de l'action politique", 31-38, 49-53.

[116] See especially, Jean-Pierre Cavaillé, *Dis/simulations. Jules-César Vanini, François La Mothe Le Vayer, Gabriel Naudé, Louis Machon et Torquato Accetto, Religion, morale et politique au XVIIe siècle.* (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2002).

[117] In her work *Les Libertins érudits en France au XVIIe siècle* Françoise Charles-Daubert provides a useful schematic ordering of the interrelated themes of the *libertinage érudit* under these three headings. The very helpful accompanying table clearly shows how the various themes in the authors' works can be linked. Françoise Charles-Daubert, *Les Libertins érudits en France au XVIIe siècle* (Paris: PUF, 1998), 110-115.

ideas that otherwise would have been virtually impossible, let alone with his initials openly displayed on the title page.[118]

The latest contribution to the historiography on Naudé's political thought is the recent book on *raison d'état* by Laurie Catteeuw.[119] She approaches Naudé's work as the culmination of a long process during which the *arcana imperii*, the secrets of domination, are slowly appropriated by the people originally submitted to them. This is the process of the formation of a critical judgment on the part of the subjects and the emergence of a public opinion. As she puts it, Naudé's work underlines the convergence between the inefficiency of state censorship, the apparition of what Naudé himself calls the "nouveaux censeurs", i.e. writers of slanderous pamphlets, the activity of pamphleteering in general, the formation of the "esprit du lecteur" and the affirmation of a public opinion.[120]

This study adds an essential feature to the historiography of both 'reason of state' and the individual authors, i.e. the bibliographical embedding of the actual books in the politics of their time, taking the intentions of the authors more empirically into account. Furthermore, this monography stresses the intellectual-political dynamics in which Rohan and Naudé were involved rather than taking them as tokens for whatever – militant Calvinism, libertinism, atheism, secularisation or the rise of the modern state.

Methodological meditations

Since recent research has found 'reason of state' not to be a consistent theory, argument or even language, but rather points toward a fashionable terminology, the history of these political catchphrases can probably best be written discontinuously. This means that its many forms of appearance must be studied and interpreted in the specific circumstances and intellectual contexts in which they arose. In other words, its workings need to be investigated in concrete case studies that are not pretending to be a priori representative of a whole 'genre'. Rather than describing French 'reason of state' in broad brush strokes, this study provides a significantly more detailed interpretation that ties the biography of the authors, the influences of their formation and intellectual network, book history and argument together.

This PhD-thesis on Rohan and Naudé's use of the vogue terminology of political prudence is neither a *Begriffsgeschichte* nor a linguistic, contextualist analysis in the tradition of the

[118] Cavaillé, *Dis/simulations,* 231-240; Idem, Cavaillé, "Gabriel Naudé: Destinations et usages du texte politique", [online].
[119] Other recent works that deserve to be mentioned are: Isabelle Moreau, *"Guérir du sot". Les stratégies d'écriture des libertins à l'âge classique* (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2007); Sophie Gouverneur, *Prudence et subversion libertines. La critique de la raison d'État chez François de la Mothe Le Vayer, Gabriel Naudé et Samuel Sorbière* (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2005).
[120] Catteeuw, *Censures et raisons d'État*, 352.

Cambridge school *tout court*. Rather the present study aspires to go beyond discourse analysis – perceived as the "study of ideas by authors in dialogue with each other" – and includes a broad investigation of the diffusion of the French authors' work.[121] It tentatively attempts an approach that resembles what Jim Collins has fashioned his most recent work, a "socio-political history of political ideas". The major difference of course is that unlike the American historian recently turning to the history of ideas after years of archival research and practice as a social historian, I am trained as an intellectual historian and started with a handful of printed books.[122] As an intellectual historian, I endeavour to carefully situate the subjects of my research – Rohan and Naudé and their political writings – in their social, intellectual, political and material contexts. The method by which this operates consists of four parts. The analysis of our authors and their work passes from the study of their 'intellectual lives', via elaborations of the social and material conditions of composition and publication, to the study of the ideas in the context of the sources the authors engage with and the rhetorical presentation of the arguments. This culminates in a comparison of the authors and their work.

First, I studied the biography of the authors, which as we shall see in Naudé's case more than in that of the Duc de Rohan deserves a new, fresh look grounded in their social backgrounds. As 'intellectual lives' these biographical sketches include an appreciation of their education and learning, the authors they admired and the books they read, but should also incorporate a critical look at their ambitions.[123] I seek to practice intellectual biography in kind to what one scholar conceived as a "site of interaction between the sociocultural context and the production of the texts that make up intellectual history",[124] in this case Rohan's *De l'Interest des Princes et Estats de la Chrestienté* and Naudé's *Considérations politiques sur les coups d'Estat* and *Jugement de tout ce qui a esté imprimé contre le cardinal Mazarin*, better known as the *Mascurat*. The intellectual biography in itself cannot explain the conception and motivations behind political writings, but in exploring the ways how the authors and their context interact a plausible explanation can come to the fore.[125] I am aware that "the biographical referent" is not simply "something that must be scrutinized for clues that explain an author's work".[126] For me the sketches of Rohan and Naudé's

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[121] See Jacob Soll's plea for superseding the dichotomy between discourse and diffusion that seemingly separates the fields of intellectual history and the history of the book. Jacob Soll, "Intellectual History and History of the Book", in Richard Whatmore and Brian Young (eds.) *A Companion to Intellectual History* (Chichester: Wiley, 2016), 72-82.
[122] James B. Collins, *Republicanism and the State in France, 1360–1715* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
[123] Antoine Lilti, "Does Intellectual History Exist in France? The Chronicle of a Renaissance Foretold", Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn (eds.), *Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 66.
[124] Lilti, "Does Intellectual History Exist in France?", 61.
[125] Cf. Daniel R. Meister, "The biographical turn and the case for historical biography", *History Compass* 16 (2018): 5. https://doi.org/10.1111/hic3.12436
[126] Lilti, "Does Intellectual History Exist in France?", 66-67.

'intellectual lives' must be a consideration of the social condition, education, and (family and private) ambitions and interests of the author. As such it can provide a valuable step towards understanding their work.

A second significant aspect concerns situating Rohan and Naudé within the intellectual groups and networks to which these authors belonged. The social and intellectual links between the authors and contemporary thinkers and groups of learned men and women were of the utmost importance in the gestation of their ideas. Seeing the Huguenot duc and the Parisian *érudit* within a network of friends, correspondents, diplomatic contacts, informants, servants, clients and patrons allows us better to contextualize the views and ideas they presented in the works they composed, circulated and made ready for print, whether or not they supervised the editing process themselves. To present the reader with a complete theory of intellectual networks lies beyond the scope of this thesis, but two contentions from the American sociologist Randall Collins' thought-provoking *Sociology of Philosophies* seem to be particularly relevant for my aims. Critical of a traditional conception of intellectual history in which "ideas beget ideas" and are reified, Collins maintains that concepts and arguments as a body of ideas "are not thing-like at all, except insofar as we represent them in symbols written on materials such as paper, but are first of all communication", that is the product of human interaction.[127] For him thinking is "internalized communication", a process that exists only in light of communication, as a result or in preparation of it. He is weary of the sociological reduction of ideas to consequences of economic and political macro-structures, arguing they exist only among networks of individuals who share a body of concepts and arguments. It is the "inner structure of these intellectual networks which shapes ideas, by their patterns of vertical chains across the generations and their horizontal alliances and oppositions."[128] Furthermore, Collins argues against the idea of an "intellectual-hero" in which "individuals beget ideas". There is a serious flaw in approaching texts from the early modern period, or any other era for that matter, as products of individual genius, because it completely abstracts the individual from his or her social and intellectual context. Thinkers often are connected to intellectual groups, networks, partial to friendships and personal or positional rivalries. Collins therefore argues that ideas are rooted in social interactions and not in the individual.[129] This is not to suggest that belonging to a specific group, intellectual network or institution makes it possible to explain what an author meant and how the individual came to the ideas that he wrote down and circulated. Interactions within an intellectual network, however, could serve as the background for the genesis of ideas and the particular readings, references and

[127] Randall Collins, *The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change* (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 1998), 2.
[128] Collins, *The Sociology of Philosophies*, 2.
[129] Collins, *The Sociology of Philosophies*, 3-7.

choices an individual author made. Chapters Two and Four, respectively introducing Rohan and Naudé, shall provide a sketch of their 'intellectual lives' within the context of the intellectual groups and networks in which they participated.

This thesis' Intermezzo Chapters take such an oft-neglected book historical approach to Rohan and Naudé's main political writings. More specifically they lay bare a history of manuscript circulation and printed publication.[130] The third step in the methodological approach therefore concerns bibliographical context of a given work. As the British bibliographer D.F. McKenzie and after him the French historian Roger Chartier warned there is a great "difficulty in discerning stable meaning or authorial intention from a single printed text taken without a social, historical bibliographical context."[131] Bibliographical study is necessary to find clues or verification of the author's motivations and intended meaning of the text as well as the range of control s/he would have had over these two aspects in the final printed form. In this kind of research possibly available manuscripts, author's notes and additions, and modified editions should all be included. Inspiring studies by the French historian François Moureau and Australian literary historian Harold Love have made scholars aware of the prevailing importance of manuscript culture after the advent of the printing press. Even when printed works were widely available in the seventeenth century readers often relied on manuscripts. Among other purposes, manuscript circulation could allow a writer to 'test' ideas among an intended audience and procure an initial reception.[132] An obvious problem for historians is that so few manuscripts have reached us, as they were often destroyed in the printing process. When, on the other hand, multiple copies are preserved to this day in public or private archives this might attest of significant manuscript circulation. Such a cherished manuscript for Naudé's *Considérations politiques* may never be discovered, but Rohan's *De l'Interest des Princes* is a curious case.[133]

Turning from composition histories and initial manuscript circulation to the publication history of our authors' work, the Intermezzo Chapters show how bibliographical evidence can have important consequences for interpretations of the author's intention and the original meaning of a text. As both the American historian Jacob Soll and the Dutch classicist and historian Jan Waszink have argued practically simultaneously, the form of a text has implications for its

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[130] As we shall see in Intermezzo II recent work on Naudé's *Considérations politiques* does include important observations concerning the publication history of the work. However, I am positive that I have found further evidence that is incompatible with earlier hypotheses and formulated a new interpretation. In the case of Rohan an in depth study of the publication history is as yet lacking.
[131] Jacob Soll, "Intellectual History and History of the Book", 75.
[132] François Moureau, "La plume et le plomb", in François Moureau (ed.), *De bonne main: la communication manuscrit au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris and Oxford: Universitas, 1993), 5-16; Harold Love, "Scribal Publication in Seventeenth-Century England", *Transactions of the Cambridge Bibliographical Society* 9 (1987): 130-154, and Idem, *Scribal Publication in Seventeenth-Century England* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).
[133] See Intermezzo I.

meaning.[134] A fact that we now often tend to forget – and of which contemporaries of the early modern authors we study were well aware – is that the material aspects of a printed work, "influences the reception and interpretation of a work."[135] The book historical Intermezzo Chapters in the present study lay bare the influence the work of Soll and Waszink had on my research and thinking on the particularities of the diffusion of Rohan and Naudé's ideas. In short, book history has made me conscious of how "the meaning of texts depends on the material and editorial form in which they circulated and were read."[136]

Finally, the Intermezzo Chapters also include an overview of the initial reception of our authors' work. The writings of Rohan and Naudé knew a greater or smaller direct reception after (manuscript circulation and) publication in the context they addressed. Still we should be aware of how their work could acquire new meanings under different circumstances of time and place. As far as this can be reconstructed at all, our purposes here mostly end with the initial reception. The book historical approach is thus used to study the composition, circulation and publication, and initial reception of our authors' work.

Having considered the social, intellectual and bibliographical contexts of Rohan and Naudé's political writings, we turn to a close reading and analysis of the texts. The final step in our 'socio-political history of political ideas and rhetoric' consists of contextualizing the political thought of our two authors on an inter- and intratextual level, i.e. in relation to the sources they used and referred to either explicitly or implicitly, the debates in which they intervened as well as the rhetorical strategy the authors employed in presenting their ideas. In the analysis of Rohan and Naudé's main political writings, I seek to reveal what, as the British historian of ideas Quentin Skinner formulated it, the author 'was doing' and the linguistic and rhetorical context of this performative act.[137] It is not a genealogy of the ideas of our authors that is attempted. However, I do not want to falsely stress or imply that Rohan or Naudé's thinking displayed a discontinuity by not engaging with the sources that they have used, referred to and at times manipulated in the composition of their own work.[138] Recent historiography has rightly pointed to the importance of including what have been called 'paratexts' in the analysis of the texts. These paratexts include commentaries, dedications, forewords, introductions and liner notes that would help the

[134] Waszink, "Introduction", 5; Jacob Soll, *Publishing the Prince: History, Reading, and the Birth of Political Criticism* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 13-14.
[135] Soll, *Publishing the Prince*, 14.
[136] Lilti, "Does Intellectual History Exist in France?", 63.
[137] Quentin Skinner, *Visions of Politics. Volume I: Regarding Method* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 57-89; Richard Whatmore, "Quentin Skinner and the Relevance of Intellectual History", in Whatmore and Young (eds.) *A Companion to Intellectual History*, 99.
[138] Cf. Lilti, "Does Intellectual History Exist in France?", 61.

reader.[139] Furthermore, as the work of scholars like the American historian Ann Blair has emphasized, whenever possible it also merits to include translations or reference books – like compendia, collections of adages, etcetera – that the authors employed or compiled and wrote.[140]

Now, in taking this fourfold approach to our authors' use of the catchphrases of political prudence, I shall attempt to steer clear of the pitfalls of reductionism. We cannot reduce ideas and their expression to their historical socio-political contexts, nor does a purely conceptual, philosophical or linguistic contextualist explanation suffice. Intellectual biography cannot solely explain the motivations of an author in composing and publishing a work, nor does bibliographical study in itself say anything on these matters. It is in combining these perspectives that I hope to strengthen my interpretation of the authors and their work. My aim is, to paraphrase Jim Collins, to look at the use of the fashionable terminology of political prudence through the lens of the social, political, intellectual and material contexts in and through which they were expressed.[141]

Research outline and thesis

How come Rohan and Naudé, two authors from widely diverging social, confessional and intellectual backgrounds, could employ the family-resemblant terminology of political prudence to address the critical political affairs of the French kingdom? What exactly was their understanding of *raison d'état* and *intérêt*, and to what ends did they choose to engage with these political catchphrases? This research question and related sub questions shall be addressed in the following chapters.

Chapter I primarily sketches the historical context of early seventeenth-century France and provides a general overview of the political rhetoric that increasingly came to centre on the concept of *l'Estat* between 1610 and 1661. It perceives of French monarchical rule in this period primarily as an expression of crisis-management, a royal government using, extending and manipulating traditional political mechanisms to confront various longstanding problems and immediate crises. The notion of *État*, its reasons, justifications and interests, became the centre of political discourse employed by an increasing part of the French population.

Follows a triptych of chapters on the Huguenot *grand* Henri duc de Rohan, with a first intermezzo chapter serving as a hinge between two full chapters on the intellectual biography in social context and the analysis of the author's main political writings. Chapter II provides a

[139] See for instance, Jean-Pierre Cavaillé, "Gabriel Naudé: Destinations et usages du texte politique", *Les Cahiers du Centre de Recherches Historiques* 20 (1998), online, last consulted 11 December 2018. DOI: 10.4000/ccrh.2539; Soll, "Intellectual History and History of the Book", 75;
[140] Ann Blair, *Too Much to Know: Managing Scholarly Information before the Modern Age* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2010).
[141] Collins, *Republicanism and the State in France* (forthcoming),

biographical sketch of the French duc. At the same time it is a discussion of Rohan's position in French society, the *grand* ambitions coming with his status, and his intellectual background and milieu. Intermezzo I for the first time thoroughly investigates the composition, publication and early reception history of Rohan's main political treatise, *De l'Interest des Princes et Estats de la Chrestienté*. Chapter III then treats of the most important political writings of Rohan, most significantly his *De l'Interest des Princes et Estats*, analysing how the duc employed the rhetoric of political prudence, in his specific case the terminology of interest, and for what purpose.

Chapter IV is the first of the second triptych and introduces our second author, Gabriel Naudé. In this chapter with attention to the family background, ambitions and intellectual milieu of the learned Parisian, a tentative attempt is made to move away from the *libertinage érudit* paradigm that to my mind has weighed on the appreciation of his work in its historical context ever since the publication of René Pintard's highly influential study.[142] This interpretation of the Parisian of modest means considers the social and intellectual context of his patrons and the learned cabinets he gained access to as well as the intellectual debates and polemics he engaged in. Instead of a *libertin*, I perceive a learned man whose thinking was eclectic and did not shy away from the heterodox, but who in his idiosyncrasy was still a Gallican Catholic like the men in his milieu. Intermezzo II traces the complex publication history of the *Considérations politiques sur les coups d'estat* and the two editions of the *Mascurat*. This book-historical analysis, a bibliographical 'whodunit' of sorts, seeks to present the evidence sustaining the hypothesis that a well-known printer in Paris was responsible not only for the *Mascurat*, but that his house printed the *Considérations politiques* as well, and in far closer proximity to each other than the decade that is normally presumed if we trust the title-page of the latter work (Rome, 1639). As will become clear this publication history has great implications for the interpretation of the author's work and the background and ends of his argumentation. Chapter V then focuses on the practical application of Naudé's scholarly interests, political ideas and *raison d'état* argumentation within the context of a severe political crisis and total breakdown of order, that of the *Frondes*. These elements are put forward in his defence of Cardinal Mazarin in the curiously large book rebutting anti-mazarine pamphlets, the *Mascurat* (1649). Here as in chapter III we attempt a precise treatment of the questions concerning Naudé's usage of the rhetoric of *raison d'état* within the context of the ever changing circumstances of the *Frondes*.

Finally, Chapter VI presents the results of our comparison of the works of Rohan and Naudé. The chapter opens with an evaluation of the authors' intellectual lives and their style of writing and historical method. Furthermore the chapter explores major themes found in the work of many contemporary French authors concerned with current political affairs in the first half of the

[142] Pintard's *Le Libertinage érudit dans la première moitié du XVIIe siècle* was originally published in 1943.

seventeenth century. In a sense, therefore, it parallels the sketch of political praxis in the opening chapter of this thesis with the political reflections of Rohan and Naudé. It discusses their appraisal of the position of ministers and royal favourites, the war with Spain and Spanish enmity, and the relationship between *l'État* and the Church and the rhetoric of political prudence, religion and morality.

CHAPTER I

'Crisis-Management' in Early Modern France
Monarchical rule in the face of crisis, 1610-1661

Introduction

What characterized the history of the French monarchy in the seventeenth century? Generally historians of early modern France have presented it as a history of modernization. This traditional interpretation encompassed the trifold development of bureaucratization, centralization, and professionalization of the State into a narrative describing a process of state building that constructed the French 'absolute monarchy'. Historians, often informed by Weberian sociological theories, understood socio-political crises such as the civil wars of religion in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and the *Frondes* around 1650 either as instigators of change or incidental, rear-guard resistance in an otherwise continuous, linear, and steady process of state building. According to the traditional narrative a progressively modern impersonal state system gained more and more ground on the traditional elites at court and in the countryside. A new elite of government officials administrated the kingdom, supplanting local (legal and financial) traditions with increasingly centralized procedures. To sum up these traditional readings, seventeenth-century France would have seen the definitive establishment of a central government headed by an 'absolute monarch' and his imperious ministers, ruling a state with an increasingly standardized judicial system, directing a state bureaucracy, modernizing the army and royal finance, and executing a centralized government administration over a more or less fixed territory.

Historiography of the last three decades in the Anglo-Saxon world as well as in France, has greatly contributed to changing the way we think about early modern Western European rule and more specifically the government of the French realm, often perceived as the epitome of absolute monarchy.[1] Hardly a theatre of international relations between states, Europe in the early modern

[1] There is a vast body of literature on the concept of 'absolutism' and on the 'absolute monarchy' in seventeenth-century France. However, the concept of 'absolutism' was alien to this era and to apply this neologism to the functioning of the French monarchy would be dangerously close to treading into the pitfalls of anachronism. As the British historian Richard Bonney has shown the term 'absolutisme' did not enter French vocabulary prior to 1797, i.e. well into the Revolution. From that point the term only gradually spread until it was used by historians. As a concept it probably came into the equation among other 'isms' with the increasing influence of the emerging social sciences from the late nineteenth century onwards. By that time, historians made an attempt to construct chronological distinctions within the sub-discipline of modern history and link them to certain systematic cases of 'monarchy', as in 'confessional monarchy', 'absolute monarchy', and 'enlightened monarchy'. That said, the term 'pouvoir absolue' was used by contemporaries. The adjective 'absolute' was employed in its seventeenth-century French meaning of

age was essentially a society of princes and instead of the establishment of impersonal state systems historians constantly emphasize the highly personal nature of power.[2] A new broadening consensus perceives of the French 'absolute monarchy' as a governing system based upon social collaboration, negotiation and compromise between the king, his counsellors and ministers and the other important social forces in the realm. The significant socio-political actors consisted of the extended royal family, the princes of the blood, the *grands* and the local elites of the robe and the sword.[3] The 'size of officialdom' increased significantly during the long seventeenth century, but rather than a modern state bureaucracy, the financial, judicial and military officers were political stakeholders in the monarchical government. As an eminent French historian formulated it, the venality of offices constituted a form of public debt; venal officers were stakeholders and the royal government often depended on and was constrained by their interests.[4] Similarly, the role of the 'enforcers of absolutism', the intendants of the army and finances sent from Paris, has been nuanced. The political 'innovations' of the provincial and army intendants have therefore been downplayed by new insights. Other than efficient administrators or even loyal royal

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'independent' from the authority of the pope, the emperor, or any institutional body. The French monarchy was absolute in the sense that the king was instituted directly by God as his place-holder, lieutenant on earth, granting no power superior to the king but God alone. Only religion and the fundamental laws of the kingdom limited the power of the king. In modern French historiography there is a tendency to distinguish 'absolutism in theory', considered an indisputable fact, from 'absolutism in practice', which even at its apogee remained far from perfect. Lacking a valid alternative, many French historians still choose to employ the concept for the French monarchy, something which has become rather exceptional for their colleagues outside of France. In Anglo-Saxon historiography 'absolute monarchy' as a reality has increasingly been challenged and replaced with a model of collaboration and compromise. Consequently, in the least subtle of these critiques the concept has been denounced a myth. While 'absolutism' is still accepted as a contemporary theory of royal power or even anachronistically as an 'ideology', historians like J.P. Sommerville have started to question whether even the most celebrated 'theorists' like Cardin le Bret ever provided a blueprint for absolute rule. In this PhD-thesis the political thought of Henri duc de Rohan and Gabriel Naudé is studied in light of the insights from revisionist historiography of the socio-political history of France. In the main text, I shall refrain from using 'absolutism' and 'absolute monarchy' as much as possible. See, Richard Bonney, *L'absolutisme* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1989); Fanny Cosandey, "L'absolutisme: un concept irremplacé", in Lothar Schilling (ed.), *Absolutismus, ein unersetzliches Forschungskonzept / L'absolutisme, un concept irremplaçable?* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2008), 33-51; Fanny Cosandey and Robert Descimon, *L'absolutisme en France. Histoire et historiographie* (Paris: Le Seuil, 2002); James B. Collins, *The State in Early Modern France* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), xi-xxv; Monique Cottret, "Absolutisme", in Lucien Bély, *Dictionnaire de l'Ancien Régime* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2010), 8-9; W. Beik, "The Absolutism of Louis XIV as Social Collaboration", 195-224; Peter H. Wilson, *Absolutism in Central Europe* (London and New York: Routledge, 2000); Richard Bonney, *The Limits of Absolutism in Ancien Régime France* (Aldershot: Routledge, 1995); P.R. Campbell, "Absolute Monarchy", in William Doyle (ed.), *The Oxford handbook of the Ancien Régime* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 11-38.

[2] Lucien Bély, *La Société des princes. XVIe-XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: Fayard, 1999).

[3] Beik, "The Absolutism of Louis XIV as Social Collaboration", 195-224; Lucien Bély, "The New Monarchy in France, the Social Elites and the Society of Princes", in Robert von Friedeburg and John Morrill (eds.), *Monarchy Transformed: Princes and Their Elites in Early Modern Western Europe* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 164-180.

[4] Robert Descimon, "La vénalité des offices comme dette publique sous l'Ancien Régime français. Le bien commun au pays des intérêts privés", in J.-P. Grenier (ed.), *La dette publique dans l'histoire* (Paris: Institut de la gestion publique et du développement économique, 2006), 177-242.

servants, the intendants too proved to be part of a patronage system and driven by personal and family ambition towards financial gains and political power.[5]

Relations between the French Crown and the political elites were by no means simple, nor were the power structures by which government rule worked and ministers rose and sought to maintain power. Historians have drawn attention to the essential role of 'power-brokers', patronage and clientele-systems and the cultivation of friendship. Drawing on these insights we now conceive of the French monarchy as a compound power system consisting of structures, from patronage-networks to court organization, that intertwined, made it prone to conflict and disorder, but generally worked and proved impossible to reform. As a complex network of power relations French monarchical government was more than the power embodied by the king and enforced with the assistance of his ministers.[6]

This first chapter is about the gradual transformation of the 'New Monarchy' in France and the concomitant use of political vocabulary in the course of the seventeenth century.[7] This transformation not so much resulted from intentional, centrally directed practices of state building, as it was a gradual process of change as a result of political 'crisis-management' and traditional political maintenance.[8] Fault of a grand political blue-print for reform, government in the age of Louis XIII and Cardinal Richelieu, Louis XIV and Cardinal Mazarin consisted of oftentimes haphazard dealing with a long series of unresolved crises. Seemingly having overcome the disorder of the religious civil wars of the sixteenth century, crisis always loomed large well into the 1650s. A greater constellation of European warfare, French dynastic fragility, political instability, civil insurgency, confessional strife, financial insolvability and royal bankruptcy, those irresolvable problems ever brought France on the verge of a relapse into disorder. As a broader socio-political and intellectual context to the authors and their work studied in this PhD-thesis, this chapter's thematic focus is on the specific problems of the age that both Rohan and Naudé explicitly and implicitly addressed.

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[5] Beik, "The Absolutism of Louis XIV as Social Collaboration", 217.

[6] From the seminal work of Sharon Kettering onwards, historians of early modern France have greatly contributed to our knowledge about the systems of patronage and clientele that sustained government rule throughout the French kingdom. Sharon Kettering, *Patrons, Brokers and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

[7] This chapter is loosely based on the last three decades of historiography of early modern rule, the most recent developments of which are presented in the monograph by Robert von Friedeburg and John Morrill (eds.), *Monarchy Transformed: Princes and their Elites in Early Modern Western Europe* (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 2017). For the particular case of the 'New Monarchy' in France, see the chapters by Jim Collins, Lucien Bély, and Robert von Friedeburg.

[8] On the term 'political management', see Peter R. Campbell, "Absolute Monarchy in France", in W. Doyle (ed.), *Oxford Handbook of the Ancien Régime* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 11-37. Also, Collins, *The State*, xiv. Where Collins states that "(…) because the state was so personal, the political management skills of its leaders remained at a premium."

From *république* to *l'État*: the French monarchy and its elites

Before turning to the set of problems that the French monarchy faced in the critical period between 1610 and 1661, we need a broad understanding of the changing relations between the French Crown and its elites, as well as among the elites themselves, in the later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Such an understanding would incorporate both political vocabulary and political praxis. Due to an escalation of violence in the aftermath of the religious civil wars, the French monarchical system gradually transformed in the early seventeenth century. France witnessed the violent collapse of the *république*, a more consultative form of monarchy, and the rise from the debris of *l'État*. From that last decade of the sixteenth century onwards, *l'État* gradually replaced the *république*, a term whose meaning itself changed accordingly to become practically synonymous. Recent historiographical contributions by Mark Greengrass and Jim Collins have revealed a shift in the monarchy's political rhetoric helped redefine the relationship between the Crown and its elites from participation towards collaboration. [9]

In the 1560s and 1570s, during the first years of religious civil strife, political elites still strongly believed in their participation in the government of the French monarchy through the representative bodies. At various estate and aristocratic assemblies, the nobility pled for the establishment of a mixed monarchy. This would institutionalise the *république*, a commonwealth in which the royal government regularly convoked the general representative assembly.[10] The violence of the religious civil wars, finding its nadir in the political assassinations of the Guise brothers and the regicide of Henri III by Jacques Clement in the late 1580s, however, increasingly undermined whatever belief there remained in the monarchical commonwealth.[11]

The political vocabulary of the French monarchy changed considerably in the reign of Henri III, although remaining rather confused for several decades. The last Valois king and his counsellors deliberately chose to introduce a new phrase, *le bien du service du roi*, the good of service to the king, and emphasized in his communication with the realm's political elites that he wished their aid in reforming and preserving his state, *mon* [i.e. Henri III's] *Estat*. Henri III's use of the term *Estat* probably remained rather close to the signification of *status*, as in the state of

[9] In his most recent work Collins argues that the 'monarchical commonwealth' that functioned from the 1360s until the wars of religion gradually gave way to the state during the reign of the first Bourbon King, Henry IV. Collins, "Dynastic Instability", 116-126; idem, *The State in Early Modern France*, xi-xxv; idem, *Republicanism and the State in France, 1360-1715* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming); Mark Greengrass, *Governing Passions*, *Peace and Reform in the French Kingdom, 1576-1585* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

[10] James B. Collins, *From Tribes to Nation: the Making of France, 500-1799* (London, 2002), 266-270; Idem, "Dynastic Instability, the Emergence of the French Monarchical Commonwealth and the Coming of the Rhetoric of '*L'état*', 1360s to 1650s", in R.C.F. von Friedeburg and John Morrill (eds.), *Monarchy Transformed: Princes and their Elites in Early Modern Western Europe* (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 87-126; Idem, *Republicanism and the State in France, 1360-1715* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

[11] Greengrass, *Governing Passions*, 1-14.

the realm.[12] The king and his council effected this change in political terminology in a period when, just as earlier in the sixteenth century, French elites still universally employed the vocabulary of the *république*. Even in their broad calls for (moral) reform in France, they stressed the tripartite duty of protecting the king, the Crown and the *bien public*. While Catholic 'monarchomachs' in the last two decades of the century further developed theories first proposed by militant Huguenots in the 1570s and were debating justifications of resistance and tyrannicide, the king moved away from the commonwealth rhetoric and opted for a political vocabulary that revolved more strongly around the person of the king and his state.[13]

Henri III's administration often conterminously employed this vocabulary of *estat* and service to the king with *utilité publique*, thereby reintroducing a late medieval term in political vocabulary. Seeking to avoid the *république* rhetoric, a shift away from the 'good' of the public, so intimately tied to the *république*, towards the less encumbered term of utility seems understandable. The *bien publique* had strong philosophical connotations and morally appealed to the protection of the faith, a highly sensitive matter in the context of confessional strife.[14] Another formula that often appears in political communiqués from this era is *repos public*. Besides its obvious meaning of peace and public tranquillity, the phrase also referred to preservation of the social *status quo*. In a society in flux by confessional conflict, the emphasis on a need for public order and peace is not out of place, but historians have also pointed at the context of the large number of ennoblements in the late sixteenth century. At least from the traditional elite's vantage point the God-given social hierarchy was not something that should change excessively, many preferring limited social mobility. Towards their subjects, the royal government tried to confer that it always had this *repos public* in view, just as both the French nobility and their opponents emphasized the great need for social order and public peace.[15]

The advance of *Estat* and related terms did not mean that the problems disappeared, nor that the commonwealth vocabulary disappeared at once. Apart from social and confessional considerations, political rhetoric also had to circumvent the dynastic crisis that burdened the French monarchy ever since Henri III, without offspring himself, became the last Valois upon his

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[12] In his redrafted entry ' Estat' in the *Dictionnaire françois-latin* of 1573, Jean Nicot first gives the meaning "il vient de *Status*" after which he defines it broadly as "Estat, m. Signifie tout ce qui est dit par ces mots, disposition, ordre, succes, police, et cours, conduict et maniement des affaires, ainsi dit-on, Tel estoit ou est l'Estat du Royaume, status regni." This entry ended up unchanged in Nicot's posthumously published *Thresor de la langue Francoyse tant ancienne que moderne*, which together with other early French dictionaries can be consulted online at the website of the *Dictionnaires d'autrefois* of the artfl-project.
[13] Collins, "Dynastic Instability", 98-99; Greengrass, *Governing Passions*, 1-14, 367-372.
[14] Collins, *The State*, xxii.
[15] Collins, "Dynastic Instability", 100. See also the work of Arlette Jouanna to which Collins refers. Both in her book *Devoir de révolte* and in an earlier article Arlette Jouanna laid bare the use of the phrase *utilité publique* in the later sixteenth century both by the nobility itself and in polemic against the nobility. Arlette Jouanna, "Le Thème de l'utilité publique dans la polémique anti-nobiliaire en France dans la deuxième moitié du XVIe siècle", *Théorie et pratique politiques à la Renaissance* 34 (Paris: Vrin, 1977), 287-299.

brother's demise in 1584. Even the staunchest supporters of the Protestant Henri of Navarre as heir presumptive had to concede that the problem would not be fully resolved when he ascended the throne, as their candidate did not have any issue either. The political terminologies of *Estat* and *république* most clearly competed during Henri IV's war against the Ligue, although the competition proved to become the penultimate spasm of the commonwealth - the final ones arriving with the Estates General in 1614. On the side of the Catholic Ligue, the vocabulary of the *république* and *bien public* was a weapon in their fight against the 'heretical' pretentions to the throne of Henri of Navarre and in their attempt to elect a king in an Estates General in 1593. In these first years of the 1590s Henri, a Protestant prince fought for his rights to the throne. Confession aside, he had the strongest claim to be the rightful heir and backed up his pretentions with a forceful legal argumentation, more than ever based on the primogenital and patrimonial Salic Law 'fiction' that was first invented by fourteenth- and fifteenth-century lawyers.[16] From 1593 onwards, after converting to Catholicism and having finally reconquered the north and capital of the French dynastic agglomerate, Henri IV laboured to pacify and unite the realm as anointed king.[17]

During his eventually curtailed reign, the first Bourbon monarch succeeded in creating relative stability of the regime and restoring order in the French realm. Henri IV grounded his success in binding his foremost opponents among the *grand* nobles as well as the judicial elites in the cities to him with *bienfaits* – royal graces and benefits.[18] Perhaps even more importantly, from the ultimate phase of his reconquest of the realm onwards he banned all elite discussion on governmental affairs except when he consulted them. Henri deliberately avoided attempts to persuade his opponents in public debate. He principally rejected to allow the most eminent members of the realm to gather and refused to negotiate with the *grands*, accepting nothing less than obedience from everyone, even the elites.[19] Instead, the judicial elite helped the new king to adopt and further the political rhetoric of service to the king and *Estat* that his predecessor's administration had introduced. This vocabulary suited Henri IV, who required obedience and allegiance to his government.[20]

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[16] Herbert H. Rowen, *The King's State: Proprietary Dynasticism in Early Modern France* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1980); Collins, "Dynastic Instability", 101-116; see also the lemma's "loi salique" and "lois fondamentales" in Bély, *Dictionnaire de l'Ancien Régime*, 752-757.

[17] For the term 'dynastic agglomerate' see the Introduction above. At the time of Henry IV the kingdom of Navarre and the kingdom of France still were separate entities, merged only under the French Crown by Henry's son Louis XIII in 1620. Morrill, "Dynasties, Realms, Peoples and State Formation, 1500-1720", 17-43.

[18] Lucien Bély, *La France au XVIIe siècle. Puissance de l'État, contrôle de la société* (Paris, 2009); Collins, *The State in Early Modern France*, 29-35; S. Annette Finley-Croswhite, *Henry IV and the Towns: The Pursuit of Legitimacy in French Urban Society, 1589–1610* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

[19] Mark Greengrass, *Governing Passions*, 370-371.

[20] Collins, "Dynastic Instability", 116-126; idem, *The State in Early Modern France*, xi-xxv.

Seconded by his legal advisors Henri IV attempted to build a delicate unity around the legal notion of *l'Estat*, not the king's person nor the *république*. He was conscious that the image of his 'instable conscience' was hard to elude and not all were easily convinced that he lived up to the required Catholicity of the French Crown. As mentioned above, Liguist authors had appropriated the political discourse of the *république*, especially the *bien publique* and the conjoined protection of the Catholic faith, 'the honour of God'. Commencing his reign the 'heretical' king could therefore impossibly use this tainted terminology. After using it shortly, he chose to abandon Henri III's bulky term *le bien du service du roi*. Henri IV moved away from this phrase of service to the king and replaced it with the new expression *le bien de l'Estat*. In the beginning of the seventeenth century, the idiom of *l'Estat* became the norm for the government and its supporters as well as for its opponents. Furthermore, the first Bourbon monarch definitively stopped using *le bien publique* when he succeeded in restoring peace in and outside of France in 1598. Not only because the Catholic Ligue's use of the term contaminated the *bien public*, even more so as the perpetrators of the (attempted) regicides of Henri III and Henri IV also employed it in justification of their acts.[21]

Henri IV's terminology of the *le bien de l'Estat* did not last as legitimation of royal power either. Many among the French elites in the 1580s through the early 1630s thought the monarchy and French society was in chaos, or at least feared it would relapse into disorder. After two regicides and numerous verbal attacks on the person of the king, by the second decade of the seventeenth century the political elites had definitively adopted the vocabulary of *l'Estat* as a conception of the polity that could represent order and unity. In the 1620s *raison d'Estat* and other formulations of political prudence expressing the royal government's strong political management in the face of crisis and the legitimation of its policies, like *interest* gradually replaced *le bien de l'Estat*. This terminology of political prudence that we shall study in this PhD-thesis has always been intimately associated with Cardinal Richelieu and his publicists, but was in fact used by many in France between the 1620s and 1660s, the government as well as many among the deeply divided societal groups it ruled.

For all these developments in political terminology, '*État*' still denoted a wide variety of meanings in the 1630s. This polysemy of the term *État* was still quite common in the first half of the seventeenth century. The transition towards a more abstract conception of state well underway at the time when Jean Bodin wrote his *Six livres de la République*, but although this meaning increasingly became dominant, it was not universally received in France until the second half of the century. Around 1630 the political term *État* could designate the legal and political standing or condition of rulers. It was also used to refer to the political community and its

[21] Collins, "Dynastic Instability", 100-101.

corporal bodies, i.e. the orders in society and their assemblies. A third, still important meaning was that of status or condition of a realm. Furthermore, it could describe the power de facto exercised by rulers or the governing group, in other words the standing of a ruler connected to the presence of a particular form of government. Consequently, *État* could denote the prevalent political regime. Similarly, it referred to territoriality, i.e. the extent of the realm – the areas or territories and population over which power is exercised. In yet another sense, *État* was used to designate a distinctive apparatus of power, that is, the institutions of government and the means of control to preserve order within political communities. Finally, it came to refer to the sovereignty of the Crown, either in its traditional form of independence from a superior power (as derived from medieval corporate law) or in the new 'Bodinian' conception as independent, indivisible and perpetual, unifying the political community by subjection of the families to it.[22]

The transition of meaning can be illustrated by the entries of *Estat* in French dictionaries between 1573 and 1694. The entries show that in this period the new meaning of 'state' as the conduct and management of government affairs (*conduict et maniement des affaires*), gradually drew the older definition deriving from the Latin 'status' to the background.[23] In the course of this period, the term has acquired a recognizably 'modern' meaning incorporating the government, the political community and the territory it rules.[24] By mid-century the terms *république* and *Estat* had long been employed interchangeably and effectively became synonyms in use. The good of the citizens of the commonwealth transformed into the good of the state, signifying both the political community and the government administration ruling that gathering of people.[25] In seventeenth-century France, especially after the failure of the 1614 Estates General, the old *république* or the idea of a mixed monarchy has receded to the background and practically ceased to exist in political discourse. The traditional and new elites no longer were part of separate

[22] Collins, *Republicanism and the State in France, 1360–1715* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming); Quentin Skinner, *Visions of Politics. Volume 2: Renaissance Virtues* (Cambridge: Cambrige University Press, 2002), 368-413; Lazzeri, "Introduction", 103-111, 120-125; Howell A. Lloyd, *The State, France, and the Sixteenth Century* (London and Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1983).

[23] Here I somewhat amend the analysis by Jim Collins, as it can be shown that "Conduict et maniement des affaires" was first part of Jean Nicot's definition in the 1573 edition of the *Dictionnaire françois-latin* that was reprinted in 1606 under Nicot's name. Cf. Collins, "Dynastic Instability", 116-126; idem, *The State in Early Modern France*, xi-xxv. For the full definition, see footnote 12 of the current chapter.

[24] See the entry of 'Estat' in the augmented edition of Robert Estienne's *Dictionnaire françois-latin* (1573) edited by a Jacques Dupuy. Dupuy's was an early edition of Jean Nicot's work on the *Dictionnaire* that became the *Thresor*. The entry 'Estat' was reproduced in full with the sole addition of a definition of the plural 'Estats' in the posthumous first edition of Jean Nicot's *Thresor de la Langue Francoyse tant ancienne que moderne* (1606). Pierre Richelet's *Dictionnaire François* (1680) simply gives the definition of "empire, royaume" for 'État'. Antoine Furetière's *Dictionnaire Universel* (1690) defines it as "royaume, provinces ou estendue de pays qui sont sous une même domination; […] la domination ou la manière dont on se gouverne dans une nation [etc.]". The *Dictionnaire de l'Académie Française* (1694) "Gouvernement d'un peuple vivant sous la domination d'un Prince, ou en Republique; […] Se prend aussi pour le pays mesme qui est sous une mesme domination." All these French dictionaries are accessible online at Gallica.bnf.fr and all except Dupuy and Furetière are digitized on the website the artfl-project.

[25] Collins, *The State in Early Modern France*, xi-xxv; idem, "Dynastic Instability", 124-126.

political bodies like the estates, but had to work together with the royal government in the conduct of matters of state.[26]

From an extensive period of consultation during which the king and the rest of the political elite joined efforts gradually a 'new monarchy' emerged in France, referred to in political discourse as *l'Estat*.[27] This 'transformed monarchy' was no longer based on elite representation and consultation, including episodic public debate over policy. Instead, the Crown needed the cooperation of the elites and through the venality of offices and the *bienfaits du roi* facilitated their competition for a stake in policy-making and its implementation. Political elites could share power from within, through compromise and collaboration.[28] The royal court was the centre of the distribution of royal favour and access to the king and his ministers became increasingly vital for traditional and new elites alike to secure or advance their family's social and financial ambitions. Many among the traditional elites gravitated to the court, moving into grand *hôtels* in Paris from their provincial estates in order to compete with other aristocratic families and improve their prestige and resources. Cultivation of the king's favour was the surest way to acquire all sorts of position, from governorships to eminent military positions, church benefices and important diplomatic missions. New elites, engaged in the monarchy's affairs through their financial services or administrative offices, also depended on access to the circles of power at court.[29] Not everyone was and could be involved in drafting policy or decision-making that remained largely based in the royal council. Nevertheless, the government depended on the cooperation of the elites, whether the aristocratic army officers or members of the provincial *Parlements*, to execute new domestic and foreign policy or legislation.[30]

Dynastic fragility: the Bourbon line, anticipating a *dauphin* and insubordinate *grands*[31]

One of the major problems in the French kingdom of the later sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth century was not so much confessional as it was dynastic, a problem that is easily

[26] Collins, *The State*, xxii.
[27] Mark Greengrass traced (an important part of) this period of consultation in his stimulating study, *Governing Passions. Peace and Reform in the French Kingdom, 1576-1585*.
[28] Beik, "Absolutism of Louis XIV as Social Collaboration", 195-224.
[29] Lucien Bély, "The New Monarchy in France, the Social Elites and the Society of Princes", in Robert von Friedeburg and John Morrill (eds.), *Monarchy Transformed: Princes and Their Elites in Early Modern Western Europe* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 164-180; 171.
[30] Collins, "Dynastic Instability", 117-118.
[31] My thinking on dynasticism with its calculation in marriage-politics and the vulnerability of dynasties to chance is much indebted to John Morrill's coinage of the concept of 'dynastic agglomerate'. For the ideas and emphasis on the importance of the particular dynastic fragility and instability of the French monarchy in the period between the 1580s and 1638 I am heavily indebted to the work of James B. Collins and Guy Rowlands on early modern France. John Morrill, "Dynasties, Realms, Peoples and State Formation, 1500-1720", in Robert von Friedeburg and John Morrill (eds.), *Monarchy Transformed: Princes and Their Elites in Early Modern Western Europe* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 17-43; idem, '*Uneasy Lies the Head that Wears the Crown': Dynastic Crises in Tudor and Stewart Britain, 1504-1746*

obscured when we solely focus on the longevity of the Bourbon dynasty. The long reign of Louis XIV (1654-1715) and the stable Bourbon line that followed him portray a kind of necessity and dynastic stability that was never a reality nor experienced in the period between 1585 and 1661.[32]

When the last Valois heir to the throne, Henri III's brother, the Duc d'Anjou, died in June 1584, French royal succession became problematic. The king nor his brother had any offspring and in the midst of the wars of religion the heir presumptive to the throne, Henri of Navarre, of the cadet Bourbon branch of Saint Louis' descendants, was a Protestant. In 1585 the papal disqualification of both the king of Navarre and his homonymous infant nephew, the Prince de Condé, as Protestant heirs to the throne made the succession crisis imminent. Henri III's unfortunate political management of the government's conflicts revived the Catholic League, the Guise leadership of which proposed their own candidate to the royal succession, Charles 'X', the cardinal of Bourbon. With the fatal *faux pas* of condoning the death of the Guise brothers in December 1588, Henri had signed his own death sentence. Death came only half a year later in August 1589, when the Valois branch was violently cut short by the hands of Jacques Clement on the eve of the royal army's siege to retake Paris.

The 1590s then saw a French civil war of succession in which the belligerents, the legal heir Henri IV and his clients, and the Catholic League, fought over the precedence of one of two fundamental laws of the kingdom. Was it either Salic law, which ensured succession in the male line, or the recently decreed Catholicity of the French monarchy that was most important? While the outcome of the war was far from certain, as the king had to reconquer large parts of northern France and the city of Paris in particular, Henri IV's abjuration of his Protestant faith and his conversion to Catholicism in 1593 proved to be decisive. Now the greater part of the political elite could see both fundamental laws respected with Henri IV as king of France, a solution none of the League's candidates could ever have matched.[33]

While historians stress that Henri IV saw the need of a solid Bourbon dynasty and that this was one of the main 'projects' of his reign,[34] in reality there were many dangers to this objective, his own actions for one. Henri was a traditional warrior king, a *roi guerrier*, who commanded his armies on the battlefield, and thus made himself vulnerable to the dangers of the battlefield.[35]

(Reading: University of Reading Press, 2005); James B. Collins, "Dynastic Instability, the Emergence of the French Monarchical Commonwealth and the Coming of the Rhetoric of '*L'état*, 1360s to 1650s", in Von Friedeburg and Morrill (eds.), *Monarchy Transformed*, 87-126; idem, *The State in Early Modern France*, 1-2; Guy Rowlands, *The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV: Royal Service and Private Interest, 1661-1701* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1-25.

[32] Collins, "Dynastic Instability", 116-124; idem, *The State*, 1-2; Rowlands, *The Dynastic State*, 1-25.

[33] Collins, *From Tribes to Nation*, 254-255; idem, *The State in Early Modern France*, 1-2; and the lemma's 'loi salique' and 'lois fondamentales' in Bély, *Dictionnaire de l'Ancien Régime*, 752-757.

[34] Bély, *La France au XVIIe siècle*, 115-118.

[35] Collins, *The State in Early Modern France*, 1-2.

Also various attempts were made on his life, by opponents who believed that his conversion and adherence to the Catholic faith were insincere. In this sense, contingency and circumstances made the French monarchy dynastically fragile as long as there was no *dauphin*.

The birth of an heir to the throne in itself was not enough. In an age of high child mortality among kings and peasants alike, there was no guarantee that a *dauphin* was to survive into adulthood. Henri IV and his second wife Marie de' Medici eventually got three sons, two of whom, Louis (1601-1643) and Gaston (1608-1660), survived into adulthood. Prior to 1601, however, Henri's heir was his nephew Henri, Prince de Condé. Many disputed Condé's Bourbon descent; even the king himself presumed the blood of this *premier prince du sang* uncertain. This made the bellicose first years of Henri IV's reign dynastically unstable and it arguably still was at the time of his untimely demise.[36]

When the future Louis XIII was born in September 1601 as the first *dauphin* in over eighty years, the dynastic crisis seemed over. Nevertheless, there were two problems related to this presumption. First, Henri IV was still not safe from assassination attempts and never would be until Ravaillac finally succeeded in 1610. Furthermore, Louis was a sickly child, whose survival into adulthood was by no means a given.[37] This was in fact exemplified by the untimely demise of the second-born son Nicolas Henri (1607-1611), who for a short period between 1610 and 1611 was the heir to the throne if the minor King Louis would die.

Until the birth of the future Louis XIV in 1638, Louis 'Dieudonné', the problem of the absence of a royal heir to the throne, a *dauphin*, caused enormous dynastic fragility in the royal house of Bourbon. Gaston d'Orléans, being the only surviving brother to Louis XIII, was a valuable asset to the dynastic stability of the Bourbon monarchy, especially in light of his brother's poor health and failure to produce a dauphin. For the greater part of his life Gaston remained presumptive heir, a 'potential' monarch, until after the birth of two royal sons he acquiesced in never becoming king of France.[38] Prior to 1638, Louis XIII's poor health aggravated the intriguing opposition of some *grands*, often linked to his disgruntled brother. 'Monsieur' proved a political liability by clearly displaying deep disgruntlement with his subordinate role in political and military affairs. Richelieu's enemies inevitably drew Gaston into intrigues and conspiracies, as he seemed both instrumental in overthrowing the cardinal and was a potential monarch.[39]

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[36] Collins, *The State in Early Modern France*, 1; Bély, *La France au XVIIe siècle*, 115-117.
[37] Bély, *La France au XVIIe siècle*, 141-162.
[38] On the position of the 'second son' in the seventeenth-century French monarchy, see Jonathan Spangler, "Expected, then Passed Over: Second Sons in the French Monarchy of the Seventeenth Century", in Valerie Schutte (ed.) *Unexpected Heirs in Early Modern Europe: Potential Kings and Queens* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 179-203.
[39] Julian Swann, *Exile, Imprisonment, or Death: The Politics of Disgrace in Bourbon France, 1610-1789* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) 41; Spangler, "Second Sons", 179-203.

After Gaston d'Orléans, the Prince de Condé and later his son were next in line to the throne.[40] As *premier prince du sang* from the Bourbon-Condé branch of the extended royal family, Henri II de Bourbon (1588 – 1646) was the heir apparent, albeit an unlikely one, at least until the birth of Henri IV's three legitimate sons with Marie de' Medici, Louis, the dauphin, Nicolas and Gaston. Condé's life as that of his cousin Gaston shows that in the seventeenth century monarchy the highest ranking men could bring both trouble and on the other hand be important political allies. In 1610 Henri II returned from exile after the regicide of Henri IV, the king who had chased him out of France when he courted the prince's bride Charlotte de Montmorency. As adult male relative closest to the throne Condé expected a seat in the royal council, a position that Marie de' Medici was not willing to grant him. Thus commenced a short decade of political opposition to the queen regent and her government by the Prince and other disgruntled grand nobles, leading to his incarceration in the Bastille from 1616 to 1619. In the 1620s the former inspirer of noble revolt increasingly became a loyal collaborator of Louis XIII and his first minister, Cardinal Richelieu. This political alliance was mutually beneficial for the royal government and the House of Condé, although historians suggest the French regime and order in the monarchy was considerably destabilized by disproportionate royal favour for the Richelieu-Condé faction.[41]

The apparent inability of the royal couple, Louis XIII and Anne of Austria, to produce a male heir meant that Condé remained a potential monarch even longer. Until 1638 Henri II would have some claim to royalty in the event of the death of both Louis XIII, which was not improbable given his fragile health, and his brother Gaston d'Orléans. While neither of Henri IV's sons had male offspring prior to 1638, Condé and his wife had two sons, Louis II de Bourbon (1621 – 1686), duc d'Enghien and the future *Grand Condé*, and Armand de Bourbon, prince de Conti (1629-1666). With respect to the particulars of their decisions and the context in which they were made, the princes would follow a path similar from their father's from promising officers in the royal armies, to rebels, to close collaborators with the royal government. These considerations of the Condé as apparent heirs all only exist in the realm of potentials, but they underline the fragility of the main Bourbon line in the period discussed in this thesis. Nevertheless, in the event of a complete extinction of the ruling Bourbon branch, the likelihood of a new succession crisis and civil war might have been far greater than a Condé ascension.

By something close to a miracle, the estranged royal couple Louis XIII and Anne of Austria finally had two sons, with Philippe being born two years after the 'God-given' *dauphin* Louis.

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[40] On the House of Condé see, Caroline Bitsch, *Vie et carrière d'Henri II de Bourbon, prince de Condé (1588-1646). Exemple de comportement et d'idées politiques au début du XVIIe siècle* (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2008); Katia Béguin, *Les princes de Condé, rebelles, courtisans et mécènes dans la France du Grand Siècle* (Paris: Champ Vallon, 1999).

[41] C.T. Gregory, "The End of Richelieu: Noble conspiracy and Spanish treason in Louis XIII's France, 1636-1642" (PhD diss. Oriel College, Oxford, 2012), iv-v.

While the question always remained if they were to survive beyond infancy, the Bourbon dynasty in the early 1640s seemed rather safe from peril. However, the problem of dynastic fragility and instability only really started coming to an end in the second half of the seventeenth century, several years after Louis XIV's coronation in 1654. The young French king married the Spanish Infanta Maria-Theresa in 1660 and soon established his own line of succession with the birth of Louis Le Grand *Dauphin* in 1661.[42] Before that time, however, Louis XIV's brother Philippe, Duc d'Anjou then Orléans, the second son of Louis XIII and Anne of Austria and heir presumptive until 1661, came close to reign as king of France as his brother when his brother became gravely ill in the summer of 1658. As one historian recently noted, in the absence of a 'spare', Philippe d'Orléans in fact remained heir presumptive until the Great *Dauphin* had a son in 1682.[43] Although Philippe like his uncle and predecessor as Duc d'Orléans never ascended the throne, he proved a valuable asset to the Bourbon dynasty by having multiple issue.[44] Philippe's son and name-sake became known as *Le Régent*, governing the realm (1715-1723) for his uncle's great-grandson Louis XV. By that time, in the early eighteenth century, the French Bourbon dynasty was stable with various cadet branches, one even ruling the Spanish monarchy.

Political instability: minor kings, regencies and the government of the cardinal-ministers

In early seventeenth-century France the problem of dynastic instability was one of the causes of political instability. The absence of an adult king created a power vacuum in which regency governments tried to maintain control as against other interested parties. During the first half of the century, including the famous era of the cardinal-ministers, the French monarchy periodically suffered from political instability, especially in the regency periods between 1610-1617 and 1643-1654.

Governmental weakness of a royal minority

Royal minorities generally were troubled periods during which public order came under a considerable amount of pressure. In spite of the political precautions and the fundamental laws that ensured the Crown's continuity, periods of royal minority were times of great weakness for the monarchy. However, the monarchy nor the person of the king ever faced any real threat from these penchants for influence and limitations to royal power.[45]

The onset of a royal minority and the establishment of a regency presented two main difficulties. One aspect of the weakness was political; a royal minority opened a power vacuum

[42] Bély, *La France au XVIIe siècle*, 330-331; 558-561.
[43] Spangler, "Second Sons", 194.
[44] Spangler, "Second Sons", 188.
[45] Bély, *La France au XVIIe siècle*, 23.

and provided opportunities for the unleashed ambitions of the broader royal family and the elite aristocracy. The *premier prince du sang* in particular, heir presumptive in the unforeseen case that the minor king might die before he came of age, would attempt to exert more influence on the royal council. Royal peers deemed to have a natural right to power and would claim a seat in the royal council or present themselves more dominantly in council meetings. Their views and behaviour were not necessarily unwarranted. In 'traditional' practices of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the two roles of tutelage of the young king and regency of the realm were exercised separately. The queen mother or a female relative would provide for the king's rearing and education, while the closest adult male relative would govern with the aid of a council of great aristocrats. Only relatively recently had the practise shifted towards a situation in which the queen would execute both functions, as did Louise de Savoie in her husband François I's absence and the two Medici queens for their sons Charles IX and Louis XIII. There were, however, no further grounds to consider this dualist regency the established rule in the organisation of a regency.[46] A further practical political problem was that no matter how cautiously the monarch organised the regency government on the eve of his demise, once he had passed on the defunct king's will was easily overturned and his posthumous influence marginalized.[47]

A juridical difficulty of a royal minority further undermined the fragile situation. No legal text existed that could provide the foundation for the constitution of a regency. An ordonnance on the majority of kings of 1374 fixed the age at thirteen, but it did not prescribe procedures for particular arrangements ahead of this time. Furthermore, legal precedents were often contradictory, if only because regents, in conjunction with the Parisian *Parlement*, often overturned the provisions in royal testaments.[48] In the early seventeenth century, when the unsettling circumstances of royal minorities were especially poignant, jurists and historiographers such as Jacques Corbin, Cardin le Bret and Pierre Dupuy debated the nature of (female) regencies and authority of the regent, although these treatments often were vehicles of factional politics.[49]

Besides legally and jurisprudentially unclear, there was a 'constitutional' aspect to the problem in the sense that it touched the fundamental laws. One could argue that kings like Louis XIII in 1643 and Louis XIV in 1715 infringed upon fundamental laws of the kingdom when they instituted a regency council, appointed specific members and prescribed how it should function. Most significantly, the inalienability of the power of the king was part of this unwritten

[46] Gregory, "The End of Richelieu", 19-20; Harriet Lightman, "Political Power and the Queen of France: Pierre Dupuy's Treatise on Regency Governments", *Canadian Journal of History* XXI (1986): 299-312; 299.
[47] Bély, *La France au XVIIe siècle*, 23; Jean Barley, "Régence, régences" in Lucien Bély, *Dictionnaire de l'Ancien Régime*, 1065-1067.
[48] Barley, "Régence, régences", 1065-1067.
[49] Gregory, "The End of Richelieu", 20-22; Lightman, "Political Power and the Queen of France", 299-312.

constitution, a principle a dying monarch tread upon when he prepared a regency council. Anticipating death, these kings did not respect the royal prerogatives of their successors, who could not fully exercise their sovereign rights. Jurists could also argue that French fundamental law protected the Crown's continuity and that when he ascended the throne the young king inherently was of age.[50]

Two regency governments (1610-1617 and 1643-1651)

The first half of the seventeenth century in France saw two regencies. Although circumstances varied, both governments encountered similar problems.

The two regencies differed as to whether the court anticipated such a period of minority rule, long in the case of the young Louis XIV and not at all three decades before, when his predecessor came to the throne. When Henri IV died on 14 May 1610, this violent incident was surely unforeseen and no specific arrangements were in place in case of the king's demise. The king had however temporarily appointed his wife regent as he set off for war. Now the king had died, the only person who in name could challenge the queen mother's claim to the position of regent, Henri II de Bourbon, Prince de Condé, *premier prince du sang,* had chosen exile only months before. In the absence of Condé, Marie de' Medici seized the opportunity to let the *Parlement de Paris* declare the regency in her hands and hers alone. She benefited from the emotion over the death of Henri *Le Grand* and the general fear of seeing troubles – let alone, civil war – rearise over the royal succession. Confirmed in a *lit de justice* in the *Parlement* one day later, Marie could govern during the regency *avec toute-puissance et autorité*, even though Henri IV had never thought her fit for political matters. At first, political continuity prevailed in the royal council as many of the late king's counsellors stayed on. The balance changed, however, as Marie began to confide heavily on Concino Concini, the Florentine husband of the queen's lady in waiting Leonora Galigaï. The Florentine openly displayed hostility against the old ministers as well as the *grands*. Both he and Marie preferred a *rapprochement* with the Spanish Habsburgs over armed conflict.[51]

The regency of Marie de' Medici soon developed into a time of political crises. She and her counsellors tried to assure peace in the French realm while preserving the same in external affairs. In fear of upheaval, Marie began distributing large pensions to the high nobility. The queen regent, however, could not gain stable support among the *grands*. In favouring some, she angered others, who in irate voice expressed their resentment for not receiving the *bienfaits* of the government. Once the formerly full treasury was empty, the government no longer disposed of the means to calm the cries for influence, for honours, offices, and money.[52]

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[50] Bély, *La France au XVIIe siècle*, 23; Barley, 'Régence, régence', 1065-1067.
[51] Bély, *La France au XVIIe siècle*, 150.
[52] Bély, *La France au XVIIe siècle*, 141-162.

In foreign affairs, a *rapprochement* between the Bourbons and the Habsburgs could seemingly guarantee peace in Europe. Through Spanish ambassadors as well as the weight of the advice of the favourite Concini, the influence of an ultra-montane faction triumphed at court.[53] Negotiations, started in 1612, of a double 'Spanish marriage' between Louis XIII and Anne of Austria, the daughter of Philip III of Spain, and the Spanish heir to the throne, Philip, and Louis' sister Elisabeth de Bourbon confirmed these closer relations. These prospected marriages engendered forceful opposition in the French kingdom among those who considered Spain a permanent threat, if not a 'natural enemy'. Great Protestant nobles opposed this marital alliance, but prudently tried to calm their brothers of faith, among whom anxiety for stronger ties with the ardent defender of Catholicism in Europe spread quickly.

Among other *grands* opposition rose as well. They criticized Concini, who became Marshal of France in 1613, as a foreigner inflicting irreparable damage. A number of *grands*, headed by the Prince de Condé returned from exile, did not hesitate to take up arms as public protest. Aside from the suspension of the royal marriages, they demanded the convocation of the Estates General. Accepting to assemble the Estates in late 1614, the queen regent simultaneously attempted to strangle the coalition of opposition with a tour of the young king through the western provinces. Catherine de' Medici had used the strategy before in the first decade of the wars of religion. The objective of this *grand voyage* was to instil obedience, as was the declaration of Louis XIII's *majorité* on 27 September of the same year. Royal authority, however, depended too heavily on the quickly depleting treasury. Therefore, it could not be preserved for long.[54]

After the *échec* of the Estates General, opposition among the notables again gained sway. Condé quit court to show his disagreement with royal politics. The greatest Huguenot as well as Catholic nobles joined the Prince in rebellion. They made sure to present their struggle as an attack on the king's evil counsellors, never the king himself. The opposition of the notables could not prevent the celebration of Louis XIII's marriage at the royal court that resided in Bordeaux at the time (November 1615). The many pillages of the armies of the princes nevertheless forced the government to negotiate with the opposition. As Condé obtained everything he demanded, Concini felt threatened and resolved to make changes in the government. The *premier prince du sang* subsequently resumed his provocations, prompting his arrest in September 1616, which left him incarcerated until October 1619. Revolt in Paris seemed imminent and Henri de la Tour

[53] As the British historian Joseph Bergin has pointed out, however, this faction cannot be simply equated to the *dévots* nor considered as a stable political power block that was united in their views and opposed to the monarchical government from the 1610s into the 1630s and beyond. Joseph Bergin, *The Politics of Religion in Early Modern France* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2014), 86-111. On the ultra-montane opposition to government policy and the *dévots*, see the part on foreign policy in this chapter.

[54] Bély, *La France au XVIIe siècle*, 147-155; 'Régence, régences' in Bély, *Dictionnaire de l'Ancien Régime*, 1065-1067.

d'Auvergne, Duc de Bouillon, together with other *grands* declared himself behind the imprisoned prince and entered the fight with the royal armies.[55]

The real political rupture, which historians may have at least partly overstated due to their reliance on representations in royalist propaganda, came from the young king Louis XIII himself.[56] In 1617 at the age of sixteen, he felt isolated from his own government by his mother. Louis' irritation derived from the belittlement and humiliation he incurred from his mother and Concini. Opposition to the queen mother's favourite had been gaining strength and became increasingly outspoken since 1615. Furthermore, the king distrusted his wife, who was gathering Spanish courtiers around her. At the same time, the king himself leaned towards a new favourite, the Duc de Luynes.[57] Louis in the end made a decision to rid himself of the impertinent Florentine and assume full authority as king. On secret orders, he sent the king's guard to arrest Concini, which ended up executing him on the spot as he tried to defend himself. With the death of the Maréchal d'Ancre, the regency government under the favourite's strong influence ended. Louis removed his disgraced mother and her ministers from the royal council. Marie went into exile at Blois, as Concini's wife faced trial and death by decapitation. The Concini thus played the role of scapegoat; the former favourites were sacrificed in order to restore the relations between the king and his subjects.[58]

During the minority of Louis XIV between 1643 and 1651, political circumstances displayed similarities to that of his father. Like Marie de' Medici's, the regency government of Anne of Austria was ever vulnerable to opposition, intrigue and open resistance from the monarchy's elites. The difficult political situation that had long been boiling under the surface came into full display in the last months of Louis XIII's life. After Cardinal Richelieu's demise in early December 1642, enemies of the *premier ministre* thought change was forthcoming and that his *créatures* would soon leave the scene. The king, and the queen regent after his passing, allowed several exiles, most notably the king's brother Gaston, to return to the French court, all hopeful matters would soon become different. Instead of council reform, a "second Day of the Dupes" occurred.[59] Similar to assuring Richelieu's political survival twelve years previously, Louis XIII contrary to all

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[55] Bély, *La France au XVIIe siècle*, 158-160.

[56] Delphine Amstutz, Bernard Teyssandier, "1617, Louis XIII prend le pouvoir. Naissance d'un mythe?", *Dix-septième siècle* 3, no. 276 (2017): 395-398, as well as the other articles in this special edition *1617, le coup d'État de Louis XIII*; Helen Duccini, *Faire voir, faire croire: l'opinion publique sous Louis XIII* (Seyssel, Champ Vallon, 2003).

[57] See, Sharon Kettering, *Power and Reputation at the court of Louis XIII: The Career of Charles d'Albert, Duc de Luynes (1578-1621)* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008).

[58] Bély, *La France au XVIIe siècle*, 155-162. See also the 2017 issue of the journal *Dix-septième siècle* on Louis XIII's *coup d'état*.

[59] This is Françoise Hildesheimers' term for what conspired in the months after Richelieu's demise. Françoise Hildesheimer, *La double mort du roi Louis XIII* (Paris: Flammarion, 2011), 29-47.

expectations maintained his support of the sitting ministers in the royal council, among whom Cardinal Mazarin.[60]

While her husband's health deteriorated quickly, Queen Anne dreaded some grandee family clans would threaten the young heir to the throne. Feeling isolated and imagining the menace of armies headed by leading nobles, the queen resolved to protect her children from the hostile political environment by appointing the young Duc de Beaufort, François, as their guard. Encouraged by the queen's faith in his military courage and his fidelity, Beaufort, scion of Henri IV's illegitimate son César de Vendôme, increasingly came into conflict with Cardinal Mazarin. Events in the days after the king's passing caused tensions to rise further at court. The House of Condé regained much of its prestige with the military victory of this family's heir, the young Louis, duc d'Enghien, against the Spanish army at Rocroi. Lacking political skill, Beaufort made the mistake to alienate himself from the Condé and Orléans families, who could have become important allies against Mazarin. Seeing the queen's trust diminishing, the duc tried to regain influence and chase the cardinal from the government. Anne, however, increasingly confided in Mazarin, advised by her close confidants in the *dévot* milieu, most importantly the royal confessor Vincent de Paul, that Mazarin would have the means to prevail over factions at court and ultimately secure peace with Spain. At the same time, the cardinal strategically courted the friendship of former loyal servants of the queen. He even negotiated with Marie de Rohan, Duchesse de Chevreuse, partisan in many conspiracies and recently returned from exile. Yet the conditions to her friendship proved impossible. She proposed a radical political transformation that would ruin the Richelieu and Condé families, two families upon which the cardinal relied for support. When these efforts failed, what became known as the *cabale des importants* gathered around the Duc de Beaufort. Heavily influenced by Chevreuse this group of notables possibly became involved in a plot to assassinate the cardinal. Mazarin found out and had Beaufort imprisoned. He remained incarcerated at chateau de Vincennes until his escape in 1648, while others implicated in the conspiracy were required to leave court and Paris.[61]

In retrospect, these events might be seen as a prelude to the *Frondes.* The political situation in France after Louis XIII's demise never was stable until public order finally broke down altogether in the late 1640s. Governmental collapse was a gradual process that culminated in the unrest and civil wars between 1648 and 1653. The *Frondes* were a series of outbursts of discontent with the royal government and the person of Cardinal Mazarin in particular, within a longer period of oscillation between conflict and outright civil war from the beginning of the regency in 1643 to

[60] On the Day of the Dupes (*journée des Dupes*), 30 November 1630, see the next paragraph on the cardinal-ministers.

[61] Jean-Marie Constant, "Langue de bois et lutte pour le pouvoir: la cabale des Importants de 1643", Bernard Barbiche, Jean-Pierre Poussou and Alain Tallon (eds.), *Pouvoirs, contestations et comportements dans l'Europe moderne* (Paris, 2004), 631-644; Bély, *La France au XVIIe siècle*, 269-271.

the early 1660s. Not to say that it started in the capital and spread to the provinces, a dialectic and dynamic of protest and revolt between the different parts of France generated this breakdown of order. Instability and local conflicts in most of the French provinces predated 1648 and long undermined the government's power. Events in Paris did reinforce local quarrels and some, as in the Provence, outlasted the *Frondes*.[62]

On the Île de France and in the capital of the French realm, the *Frondes* were the culmination of socio-political grievances and tensions that were building up amongst parliamentarians, artisans, and the people of Paris for several decades but became all the more prominent since Mazarin rose to power after the deaths of Cardinal Richelieu and Louis XIII. The city and countryside almost succumbed under the pressure of the foreign wars the French government engaged in from the early 1630s. The *Parlement de Paris* - the judicial court – and other legal and financial bodies saw themselves marginalized to institutions of simple ratification. The regency government chose to proceed with the policies of the late king and his defunct minister. The war against Spain, started in 1635, prolonged. The armed conflict forced the queen regent and her cardinal-minister to employ a wide variety of financial expedients to avoid bankruptcy. Structural non-payment of taxes and opposition in the provinces already were the norm at this time, but from 1648 on the regency's policies met with opposition in the *Parlement* and an enduring struggle between the government and the judicial courts began.[63]

It was in these first months of 1648 that that opposition to the regency government first proved viable, commencing with the office-holders in the realm's legal and financial administration. An audacious and disastrous government measure that is illustrative of the dire situation and the haphazard financial expedients to resolve it, the *paulette* question unified and strengthened this opposition. Henri IV had created this office-tax in 1604 as an annual fee that guaranteed offices as private property. Agreements fixed the tax-rate for periods of nine years after which the government would renegotiate the sum and conditions with representatives of the *parlements* and other officers. In an attempt to combine austerity with higher revenues,

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[62] For a concise chapter on the Fronde, including a review of its historiography, see Lucien Bély, *La France au XVIIe siècle*, 298-318; and the lemma by Yves-Marie Bercé, "Fronde", in Lucien Bély (ed.), *Dictionnaire de l'Ancien Régime* (Paris, 2010), 573-576. The American historian James B. Collins draws attention to historians' focus on Paris and contends that the unrest and upheaval started in the provinces, in the French countryside, and spread to the capital via *parlement*-ties and kinship relations of elites. James B. Collins, *The State in Early Modern France*, 82-99. For a clear view of how patronage and clientele relations informed the events of the *Frondes*, Sharon Kettering, "Patronage and Politics during the Fronde", *French Historical Studies* 14, no. 3 (1986): 409-441. See also, Orest Ranum, *The Fronde: A French Revolution, 1648-1652* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993); Richard Bonney, *The Limits of Absolutism in Ancien Régime France* (Aldershot: Routledge, 1995); Hubert Méthivier, *La Fronde* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1984); Alanson Lloyd Moote, *The Revolt of the Judges: The Parlement of Paris and the Fronde, 1643-1652* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971); E.H. Kossmann, *La Fronde* (Leiden: Universitaire Pers, 1954); David J. Sturdy, *Richelieu and Mazarin: A Study in Statesmanship* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 107-126.

[63] Bély, *La France au XVIIe siècle*, 306-307; Collins, *The State in Early Modern France*, 82-90; esp. 87-88.

Mazarin offered a renewal of the *paulette* in an edict of April 1648. However, he presented it upon condition that all officers save for the *parlementaires* would give up four years of income from their offices.[64] A refusal to renew the *paulette*, the ultimate card the government could play, would mean that offices, no longer being a *de facto* form of property, reverted back to the Crown upon the demise or retirement of an office-holder, urging the family or others to repurchase it at a rate of the government's volition. When the latest nine-year cycle ended in December 1647, the regency government used the negotiations for the *paulette*'s renewal to find new means to support the war-effort. Perhaps it could secure a decisive military advantage that would lead to a favourable peace with Spain.[65]

What ensued, however, was that opposition to Mazarin and his policies solidified into a union of the courts, conjoining the *Parlement de Paris* and other courts that would normally have incompatible interests, in the *Chambre Saint-Louis* of the *Palais de Justice*. This union of the courts drew up a legal petition of 27 articles that effectively tried to curb government authority. In July 1648 the presented reform charter first led to the (promised) dismissal of Particelli d'Émery, the despised *surintendant des finances* appointed in the previous summer. Later the queen regent had to agree to the abolition of all *intendants* save for those in the frontier provinces.[66] As a counterpoise, the regency government seized a favourable moment to arrest the resistance leaders. Here the government made a mistake, because the incarceration of the popular Pierre Broussel and several other *parlementaires* incited the Parisian populace and sparked the Day of the Barricades. The riots in the capital forced the government to release these men. Tentative negotiations between the opposing parties restored a fragile order in the city, but it came at a cost for the regency. Concurrently with the signing of the Westphalian peace treaties, the French Crown had to concede to most of the judiciary's demands in the capital. In return for the ratification of the peace, the articles of the Chambre Saint-Louis gained the value of law by royal declaration in late October 1648. At that point, France shortly seemed to have been on the road to a monarchy with strong legal limitations.[67]

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[64] The revenue officers gained from their offices consisted partly of a fixed salary, the *gages* and *émoluments*, and were partly variable and proper to the specific office. Besides, certain legal, fiscal or honorary privileges pertained to the higher offices; in the best case it procured an officer ennoblement. See Mireille Jean, "Offices", in Bély, *Dictionnaire*, 920-923, referring among others to the work of R. Mousnier on institutions and venality of office.

[65] Bély, *La France au XVIIe siècle*, 307-308; Collins, *The State in Early Modern France*, 86-89; Sturdy, *Richelieu and Mazarin*, 105-108.

[66] Initially instituted by King Henry II, the 'intendants' and 'sur-' or 'superintendants' were commissaries sent by the crown to aid governors in the provinces as counsellors and ministers. Later, from the second half of the sixteenth century onwards, they came to operate more as executive commissaries. From the 1630s on, more weight came to lie on fiscal administration, they aided in the levying of direct and indirect taxes. Thus they came the face of financial expedients widely despised in the provinces. Michel Antoine, "Intendants", in Bély, *Dictionnaire de l'Ancien Régime*, 667-675.

[67] Bély, *La France au XVIIe siècle*, 309; Collins, *The State*, 82-90; Sturdy, *Richelieu and Mazarin,* 107-111; Yves-Marie Bercé, "Fronde", in Bély, *Dictionnaire de l'Ancien Régime*, 573-576.

After a short entente in the last months of 1648, the conflict between the Parisian judiciary and the regency government quickly escalated into civil war on the Île de France in 1649. Forced to yield to popular anger, the government sought to regain authority and called a mercenary army to the capital headed by the victorious Louis II, Prince de Condé, just returning to France after a successful campaign against the city of Lens. During the festivities of the night of 5-6 January the royal family secretly left Paris for Saint-Germain, leaving the city convinced that Mazarin and Anne of Austria had 'kidnapped the young king'. Condé's royal forces subsequently blockaded the city. The *Parlement* quickly responded in declaring Mazarin a *perturbateur du repos public* and *ennemi du roi et de son Estat*. The Prince de Conti, Condé's brother who had left court before the encirclement of Paris, became head of the *frondeur* troops and several other aristocrats joined. Fights between *frondeurs* and royal soldiers broke out at the gates of Paris in early February, as the insurgents sought to break the siege and resupply the city. Condé's forces stood their ground and as they chased their opponents, the king's armies ravaged the south of the Île de France. The other triumphant general of the French armies, Marshal Turenne, lauded with victory in the German lands but disgruntled about the fate of his house De la Tour d'Auvergne, chose the side of the *frondeurs*. Soon, however, Turenne had to withdraw in exile because he was left without regiments as the officers in his armies made a deal with Mazarin. In the meantime, negotiations commenced at Rueil in early March between the regency government and the Parisian *frondeurs* to find a compromise. In Normandy and other provinces support for the *frondeurs* grew and *parlementaires* in Aix and Bordeaux declared solidarity with their Parisian colleagues on the eve of the declaration of the Peace of Rueil (1 April). The city of Paris had become the stage of a virulent pamphlet war, mostly directed at the cardinal-minister.[68] In the summer events seemed to have quietened down enough for the royal court to make its return into Paris.[69]

As the year 1649 drew to a close, the Prince de Condé started to assert more influence in the royal council. Relying on his rank as *prince du sang* and priding himself on his warrior prestige, he started causing trouble for the regency government. By the beginning of the New Year, Queen Anne and her *premier ministre* deemed it necessary to isolate Condé, whose opposition to them had gradually increased. Cardinal Mazarin prepared and executed a *coup* on 18 January 1650, arresting Condé, his brother Conti and their brother-in-law, the Duc de Longueville, in an attempt to undermine the Prince's prestige, destabilize his faction, and rally popular opinion against the 'city's assailant'. Although Paris quietly took notice of the bold arrest, supporters of the princes in the provinces did raise rebellion, encouraged by the Duchesse de Longueville, who had fled the

[68] See Chapter V below. Christian Jouhaud, *Mazarinades: la Fronde des mots* (Paris: Aubier, 1985); Hubert Carrier, *Le labyrinthe de l'État: essai sur le débat politique en France au temps de la Fronde (1648-1653)* (Paris: Champion, 2004).
[69] Bély, *La France au XVIIe siècle*, 309-310; Collins, *The State*, 82-90; Sturdy, *Richelieu and Mazarin,* 111-114; Bercé, "Fronde", in Bély, *Dictionnaire de l'Ancien Régime*, 573-576.

capital upon the arrest of her husband and brothers. Soon the young king Louis XIV accompanied his mother and Cardinal Mazarin in a tour of the provinces to pacify the country, emulating earlier tours of minor kings in 1565 and 1615. As the *Fronde* in Bordeaux started to become more radical with the rise of the so-called Ormée movement in early summer, the royal armies and the court steadily moved on from Normandy and Burgundy to Bordeaux and enter the city in October. Finding a compromise akin to the treaty negotiated at Rueil the year before, the belligerents signed a peace in Bordeaux and the court found its way back to the capital.[70]

In February 1651, the Condéan faction in the *Parlement* de Paris that had gained ground to the 'ancient' *frondeurs* and moderates since the previous year came to dominate the judicial court. Now a union of two *Frondes* ensued, unifying the princely faction and the *Parlement*. Although the cardinal attempted to control the situation, he became increasingly isolated and a heightening hatred in popular opinion made it difficult for the queen regent and other courtiers to support him. Several days after their release from the citadel of Havre on 13 February, Condé, Conti and Longueville went to Paris in triumph, while Mazarin left the country to find exile in Brühl, in the bishopric of Cologne. Having succeeded in removing the cardinal-minister from France, the union of the *Frondes* did not last long. Soon disputes arose between the princes and other aristocrats. As many in the Parisian *Parlement* preferred not to take sides, the ways of the *Frondes* diverged. Aristocratic assemblies gathering several thousands of nobles from the Île-de-France and neighbouring provinces to meet informally in Paris sought political reform through regular meetings of the Estates General. These men counted on the hesitant support of Gaston d'Orléans, who saw his influence in the royal council reinforced with Mazarin from the scene. The royal council gave in to the aristocracy's wish and convoked a general meeting of the realms orders to commence on 8 September in Tours. However, as the deputies arriving in Tours would find out, no preparations had been made whatsoever. Instead, the queen regent and various counsellors, who still corresponded with the exiled cardinal-minister, took the occasion of the proclamation of the majority of Louis XIV on 7 September in the *Parlement* to call off the Estates General at the very last moment. This decision passed without strong objections from the magistrates. The royal declaration of only days previously, perpetually banishing Cardinal Mazarin from France, therefore seems part of an attempt to present a strong major king to whom resistance would be out of question. Condé, who had left the capital to stop the advancing royal armies, later in the month reached Bordeaux, a city that supported the princes of the blood.[71]

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[70] Bély, *La France au XVIIe siècle*, 311; Collins, *The State*, 90-97; Sturdy, *Richelieu and Mazarin,* 114-116; Bercé, "Fronde", in Bély, *Dictionnaire de l'Ancien Régime*, 573-576.
[71] Bély, *La France au XVIIe siècle*, 311-312; Collins, *The State*, 90-97; Sturdy, *Richelieu and Mazarin*, 116-118; Bercé, "Fronde", in Bély, *Dictionnaire de l'Ancien Régime*, 573-576.

In the beginning of 1652, the conflict remained undecided and a decisive victory of the *frondeurs*, however heterogeneous their interests and political ambitions, over Mazarin seemed possible still, some thought even likely. The Condéan faction and partisans of the Duc d'Orléans competed for dominance in Paris, whereas in the city of Bordeaux and other parts of the Guyenne province supporters of the princes controlled the local courts and town halls. Conti, responsible for the government of this city and province, struggled with the more radical troublemakers of the Ormée movement, who equally pretended control. While the royal army marched for Guyenne in the spring to restore peace in the realm, the cardinal entered France at the head of a mercenary army. Condé at that point conducted military operations against the royal armies in the centre of the realm, succeeding to stall the royal forces in April. Soon after this small military success on the part of the princes, the balance started to shift. Ever supported by the personal confidence of the queen regent, Cardinal Mazarin reconvened with the royal court at Poitiers. In the meantime, commanders of the royal armies like Harcourt in Guyenne and Turenne in the Île-de-France made headway to counter Condéan forces. After several defeats, the Prince retreated into Paris in July, where his partisans laboured hard to impose a repressive regime. While the civil war raged on and the capital was under siege, Mazarin used the diverging interest of *frondeur* parties to open negotiations with an important part of the Parisian *Parlement*. Convincing these parlementarians to move to Pontoise as well as securing meetings of the court with important representatives of the Parisian merchants, Mazarin chose to go into exile for the second time, now remaining in Bouillon, ostensibly to be no obstacle to peace in the realm. The political tide and Parisian opinion now turned against Condé, who seemingly lacked any vision for political reform beyond his personal hostility towards Mazarin. The Prince had to flee the capital in mid-October in an attempt to reach the Spanish Netherlands. With Condé out of the way, King Louis XIV and his court could triumphantly re-enter Paris.[72]

In different parts of the realm the *Frondes* came to an end, albeit that the cardinal-minister was only able to return to Paris in February 1653. Royal armies and effective negotiations by supporters of the regency government had restored order in France, except for the city of Bordeaux where the Ormée rebelled on until it was finally supressed in July that year. In the aftermath of the *Frondes* opposition to Mazarin's ministry and to the haphazard expediencies of war-finance was not immediately broken. Supported by the king, who was finally crowned in June 1654, Mazarin and others in the royal council sought to regain confidence in their policies by targeting financiers whom they tried for suspected malversations. The government soon regained

[72] Bély, *La France au XVIIe siècle*, 313-314; Collins, *The State*, 90-97; Sturdy, *Richelieu and Mazarin*, 118-122; Bercé, "Fronde", in Bély, Dictionnaire de l'Ancien Régime, 573-576.

the loyalty of the aristocracy. Only Condé did not return to the fray until after the Peace of the Pyrenees of 1659 included a secret clause restoring him in his titles in France.[73]

Let us conclude this paragraph with a brief overview of the historiography on the *Frondes*. In a generalized manner since the rise of modern historical scholarship there have been two main strands of interpretation. In the nineteenth-century historiography of the *Frondes* these were expressed by royalist and liberal, constitutionalist historians. On the one hand royalist historians depicted the years between 1648 and 1653 as a period of anarchy in which only the office-holders could be taken seriously, whereas the nobles were only in it for themselves and their petty quarrels.[74] Their liberal colleagues on the other hand typified it as a *révolution manquée*, a failed revolution.[75]

After the Second World War, the Dutch historian Ernst H. Kossmann criticized both interpretations and attempted to formulate an alternative view containing thought-provoking intuitions that remain valid to this day. Kossmann argued that the *Parlement* of Paris was neither reactionary and traditionalist, nor revolutionary and constitutionalist. For him there was no question, the *frondeurs* defended contemporary 'absolute divine right monarchy'. The *parlementaires* had no trouble seeing their place within the monarchical system headed by a king whose sovereignty was indivisible and authority absolute. According to Kossmann the *Frondes* laid bare the nature of the 'supposedly absolute monarchy' that did not consist of a unification but rather of a neutralization of the dynamic whole of competing forces. During the *Frondes* the internal political and social friction inherent to the nature of the monarchy reigned free as the regency government was too weak to control the competition. The popular insurrections and civil wars were only a temporary breakdown of order and harmony between and within the different social groups in the realm mitigated by the Crown. The permanent unrest of the lower classes in the cities and in the countryside under Richelieu and later Mazarin did not cause but did make the *Frondes* possible. He concluded that the *Frondes* were a period of carelessness and exaggerations without meaning and without end. The period "did not add anything to history" and neither anticipated future revolutionary ideas and tendencies, nor revive old conceptions.[76]

Some twenty years later, the American historian A. Lloyd Moote countered what the Dutch historian himself acknowledged was a basically 'negative' interpretation of the *Frondes* by

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[73] Bély, *La France au XVIIe siècle*, 314; Collins, *The State*, 90-97; Bercé, "Fronde", in Bély, *Dictionnaire de l'Ancien Régime*, 573-576.

[74] Richard Bonney, "The French Civil War, 1649-1653", *European Studies Review* 8 (1978): 71-100, 76; Damien Tricoire, "La Fronde, un soulèvement areligieux au XVIIe siècle? De l'opposition "devote" sous Richelieu aux mazarinades de 1649", *XVIIe siècle* 248 (2012): 135-147; 135.

[75] These interpretations were and in a sense remain highly influential, especially the 'liberal' line of interpretation as is exemplified by the work of the French historian Louis Madelin (1931) as well as the American historian Orest Ranum's monograph of the period (1990).

[76] E.H. Kossmann, *La Fronde* (Leiden: Universitaire Pers Leiden, 1954), 1-29, 259-261; Tricoire, "La Fronde", 135-136; Méthivier, *La Fronde*, 16-17.

concluding that the accomplishments of 1648 could only gradually be abolished; the "revolt of the judges" resulted in a "mild victory-in-defeat" for the moderate opposition. In his view the *Parlement* of Paris played the central role and the capital was the central place of events; it was in Paris where the main developments took place and were decided. In general, the parlementary *Fronde* consisted of a moderate, constitutional movement of reform that sought a return to peacetime forms of government. It was never an attempted *coup d'état*, the judiciary did not seek to control the government, nor did members of the institution actively seek to participate in it. For Moote, the government of Louis XIV might have been more absolute if it were spared the *Frondes*.[77] This historian was then again himself criticized for unconsciously repeating nineteenth-century royalist interpretations concerning the nobility, while openly arguing that it was a *révolution manquée*.[78]

Practically contemporaneous with Kossmann's publication in the early 1950s a ferocious debate broke out between the Russian Marxist historian Boris Porsnev and the French Annales school historian Roland Mousnier. For Porsnev the *Frondes* were the long term result of a revolutionary movement that commenced under Louis XIII by the rural lower classes. Mousnier countered this view by demonstrating that the patronage relations were more important than class solidarities. For the French historian it was a 'reactionary revolution' or counter-revolution from above instead of a revolution of class from below. Disgruntled (political) elites revolted and mobilized their clients to nullify the despised political innovations of Cardinal Richelieu and his successor, while participation in the countryside remained marginal. Although the Marxist view may have been superseded, until relatively recently a lot of French historiography on the subject suffered from a rather teleological and moralistic 'étatiste' interpretation that favorably looked upon the presupposed development of the modern state under the first Bourbon kings, significantly aided by the cardinal-ministers in the process. Thence these historians tended to interpret the complex events of the *Frondes* as little more than rear-guard action and expressions of blatant private ambitions. The period of opposition was one of the evident failures in the progress of the history of the French state.[79]

More recently scholars have taken the motivations of the *frondeurs* more seriously and are more open to consider the possibility that the *grands* had legitimate ground for revolt.[80] To the *grands* and other nobles there was no thinkable alternative to the monarchy and the system itself therefore was never threatened. The landed and political elites did not want to return to a

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[77] A. Lloyd Moote, *The Revolt of the Judges*, 368-376; Bonney, "The French Civil War", 90-91.
[78] Bonney, "The French Civil War", 71-100, esp. 76.
[79] Méthivier, *La Fronde*, 11-16; Tricoire, "La Fronde", 136. Part of this debate can be consulted in the book by P.J. Coveney, *France in Crisis: 1620-1675* (London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press, 1977).
[80] Bonney, "The French Civil War", 76-89; Sharon Kettering, "Patronage and Politics during the Fronde", 438-441. This view also comes to the fore in Arlette Jouanna, *Devoir de révolte: la noblesse française et la gestation de l'État moderne, 11559-1661* (Paris: Fayard, 1989), 217-244.

traditional monarchy as it might have been in the early 1500s, but to peace-time government before 1630. The war against Spain had allowed and consolidated political and fiscal changes that disrupted the balance in the competition between great noble families and maintained the cardinal-ministers and their allies in a one-sided favour and disproportionate power.[81] The nobles entered a complex battle to fill the power vacuum and maintain the strength of the crown. In a way comparable to Mazarin and his allies, grandees like Condé, Conti, and Turenne fought for control of the provincial governorships.[82] The *Frondes* were a period of social unrest and civil war in which innumerable parties fought for just as many interests, often informed by traditional ties of patronage, kin- and friendship, and virtually always motivated a complex mixture of personal ambitions and genuine concern and support for the monarchy. Political alliances and 'party' allegiances were dynamic and unstable during the period, some *frondeurs* of 1649 became ardent supports of Cardinal Mazarin by 1652.[83] As Richard Bonney noted, a French civil war broke out in January 1649 and from that point onwards no "institution or group of individuals" controlled the events, leaving the outcome unsettled and unforeseen until late 1652.[84] The *Frondes* were the "most serious political crisis" of the seventeenth century in France, but never were a revolution.[85] 'Constitutional moments' like the royal declarations of October 1648 that confirmed the articles of the *Chambre Saint Louis* were no more than temporary expedients by a regency government that sought to regain political control. From October 1652 these measures were withdrawn and overturned, although the government did not deem it necessary to revoke all undesirable *Fronde*-legislation.[86] Once the tide had turned against the rebelling nobles in 1652 the government could retrieve its high level of expenditure to first defeat the aristocratic *frondeurs* in 1653 and resituate the war effort towards the Spanish Low Countries. The government of Louis XIV, now declared a major king, finally succeeded in turning noble opposition into collaboration, not by handing over any power in central government, but by finding a fragile balance that allowed for a 'regulated' competition for greater local political, economic and social power. If the Crown indeed was left stronger in domestic political terms after the *Frondes*, it was because the stakeholders of the French monarchy – from the office-holders to *financiers* to nobles and *grandees* – had more interest in cooperation than in resistance.

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[81] See Gregory, who calls the *ministériat*, the ministerial monopolisation of power, of Richelieu and Mazarin a disruptive experiment. Gregory, "The End of Richelieu", 6, 289.
[82] Bonney, "The French Civil War", 91-92; Collins, *The State*, 82-97; Guy Rowlands, "Review of Books. Mazarin: The Crisis of Absolutism in France, by Geofrey Treasure", *French History* 10:4 (1996): 500-501.
[83] Bonney, "The French Civil War", 75.
[84] Bonney, "The French Civil War", 91.
[85] Bonney, "The French Civil War", 90.
[86] Bonney, "The French Civil War", 75.

Two cardinal-ministers: Richelieu and Mazarin

In line with the more general revisionism in the historiography of early modern rule and the nascent absolute monarchy in France in the seventeenth century, the history of the two cardinal-ministries proved to have been far more complex than was long thought. Historical scholarship in recent years has laboured extensively to change our interpretations of the persons and governments of the two principal ministers of France, Armand-Jean du Plessis, Cardinal de Richelieu and Cardinal Giulio Mazarini. Traditionally presented as instrumental in a linear and progressive process of centralization and aggressive war politics preparing the ground for and culminating in the absolute monarchy during the personal government of Louis XIV, few historians would be inclined to interpret the history of the ministerial governments, 1624-1661, in this way exclusively. More recent work tends to contextualize the cardinal-ministers as noblemen of their age concerned with the consolidation and aggrandisement of the power and financial position of themselves and their families. Although both *premier ministres* directed the French war effort to the best of their strategic and political abilities and the crown's financial means, they nevertheless seem more peace-driven than was previously assumed, combining the sword and the word, the fighting with serious diplomacy. In both cases, albeit in slightly different ways, historians take their eminency as men of the church more seriously than before. An important question is whether the *ministériat* of the Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin, the way they monopolized power and patronage, constituted a stark discontinuity in French royal government.[87]

Current insights show a different face to Richelieu than the traditional view of the ruthless statesman, the war-monger and avid state-builder. Histories of the period rather portray him as a pragmatic cardinal-minister who employed a set of 'makeshift solutions' under the historiographically 'rehabilitated' strong monarch Louis XIII. Far from the legend in which he simply dominated a weak monarch, Richelieu had a difficult relationship with the king he served. If anything, Louis was capricious and jealous of his power.[88] The king saw the cardinal as the right man to assist him in formulating domestic and foreign policy, but never displayed any great affection for the man. Once established, the *premier ministre* therefore sought to maintain his power and stay in his master's graces, by showing his political prowess and working the

[87] Gregory, "The End of Richelieu", 6; Caroline Maillet-Rao, "Towards a New Reading of the Political Thought of the *Dévot* Faction: The Opposition to Cardinal Richelieu's Ministériat", *Religions* 4 (2013): 539-542; doi:10.3390/rel4040529.

[88] From Lloyd Moote to Hildesheimer, Louis XIII has resurfaced as a stronger and more self-willed king than was long thought. As Lloyd Moote has shown in his biography of *Louis XIII, the Just*, "Louis was a demanding and difficult master, and a king who was extremely conscious of his royal duty and who played a full part in politics during the so-called Richelieu years; there could be no question of an all-powerful minister doing simply as he pleased." A. Lloyd Moote, *Louis XIII, the Just* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: California University Press, 1989), 533; Hildesheimer, *Le double mort de Louis XIII;* Joseph Bergin, "Three faces of Richelieu: a historiographical essay", *French History* 23:4 (2009): 517-536.

mechanism of power at court and in the provinces. Extending traditional practices of rule, Richelieu governed by way of a patronage-network set up throughout the realm and the distribution of benefices that revolved largely around his person, as far as the king agreed. In an age when the nature of power was essentially personal, friendship, patronage and nepotism were necessary means in the struggle to maintain office and consolidate power.

The circumstances of Richelieu's ascendancy to power were unlikely. The du Plessis family did not stem from the highest echelons of the nobility. Armand-Jean was born to a minor provincial noble family with estates in the Loudun region in Poitou, among which was the plot of land whose name he would later appropriate. His father left a confused inheritance despite years of service in the household of King Henri III, a position he acquired through the important patronage and support of the Montpensier ducs. Richelieu shared the ethics of service to the monarchy with the second rate nobility he originated from and laboured his whole life to find a status on the same footing with high nobility. Among the practices he employed for self- and family-advancement in the social hierarchy were marriage alliances, patronage and private enrichment through the exploitation of public office. Instead of aiming to subordinate the *grands*, famously presented as one of the central tenets of ministerial government in the cardinal's *Testament Politique* and followed by many historians, Richelieu sought alliances with them. He and Louis XIII never deliberately sought to ruin the upper nobility, even though royal clemency in the face of opposition could only go so far. The limits to clemency depended on circumstances but in general contained allegations of *lèse-majesté* and conspiracy with an enemy of the French crown, as in the case of Henri II, duc de Montmorency in the aftermath of Gaston's rebellion in 1632.[89] One important alliance the cardinal had succeeded in forming already in the early 1620s, with the Condé family, actually came to profit from the demise of this wealthy duc. After the latter's decapitation for treason, the ancient family's titles, offices and wealth revolved into the hands of Henri II de Bourbon, who for instance as governor of Burgundy participated in royal power and further extended his own princely patronage network.[90] That Richelieu cooperated with and depended upon the high nobility did not mean, however, that whenever the opportunity arose for himself or a family-member to rise at the cost of another noble family he ceased to take it.[91]

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[89] Michel de Waele, "Conflit civil et relations interétatiques dans la France d'Ancien Régime: La Révolte de Gaston d'Orléans, 1631-1632", *French Historical Studies* 37:4 (2014): 565-598; idem, "Conflict Resolution under the First Bourbons", in A. Forrestal and Eric Nelson (eds.), *Politics and Religion in Early Bourbon France* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 132-153

[90] Caroline Bitsch, *Vie et carrière d'Henri II de Bourbon, prince de Condé (1588-1646). Exemple de comportement et d'idées politiques au début du XVIIe siècle* (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2008); Katia Béguin, *Les princes de Condé, rebelles, courtisans et mécènes dans la France du Grand Siècle* (Paris: Champ Vallon, 1999).

[91] Sturdy, *Richelieu and Mazarin*, 1-14; Françoise Hildesheimer, "Les scrupules de Richelieu", *Journal des Savants* 1 (2000): 99-122; C.T. Gregory, "The End of Richelieu".

The cardinal, who in the traditional representations was a hardened Machiavellian, increasingly seems to have been a genuine man of the Church.[92] Although he enjoyed the education of a nobleman and the concomitant military formation, family concerns made him pursue a study in theology. Armand-Jean entered the priesthood, a vocation he took seriously. His religious faith proved a guiding light throughout the whole of his political career. At a young age, the nomination of the bishopric of Luçon, in the family for several decades, passed on to him when his middle brother renounced the benefice for a secluded life. In Luçon he proved to be a Church reformer, taking action to stimulate both lay and clerical spirituality as well as writing polemical works. As a representative of the first estate at the Estates General of 1614-15, the bishop of Luçon impressed many assembly members and most importantly the queen mother, Marie de' Medici. It proved a first step into politics and after the Estates' dispersion in 1615 he briefly remained in Paris to cultivate relations with Marie and her main counsellor Concini. This eventually led to his appointment first as chaplain to the young Queen Anne of Austria and then *secretaire d'état*. Richelieu thanked his ascendency at the side of the king at least partly to his ecclesiastic office and it was through the king's graces that he received the cardinal's hat in 1622. After his initial disgrace alongside the queen mother during Louis XIII's *coup d'état* in 1617, he managed to return in the royal council and stay in the king's graces for two decades, albeit with increasing difficulty as their relationship deteriorated in later years.[93]

As two of the cardinal's recent biographers have argued, the first years of his ministry were never undisputed. In fact, the extensive period of trial and error lasted from the days he first entered the regency council of Marie de' Medici in 1612 until the queen mother's final disgrace in 1630, at the least.[94] The qualification of *principal* or *premier ministre* dates from the time when he re-entered the royal council in 1624, but taken at face value his power might seem to have been greater and more stable than it actually was.[95] Even after his 'victory' in the dramatic Day of the Dupes Richelieu could never be entirely certain of his position. Until the final year of his ministry, the cardinal had to fear attempts against his person and position of power, often supported by high placed adversaries like the king's brother, Gaston d'Orléans, or Queen Anne of Austria. To strengthen his position he encouraged friendships and favourites to Louis XIII that were favourable to him. Unfortunately for Richelieu, this practice would culminate into the last of the great complots, that of Henri Coiffier de Ruzé d'Effiat, marquis de Cinq-Mars.[96]

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[92] A view that has gained ever more ground since the seminal work of William F. Church. William F. Church, *Richelieu and Reason of State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972).
[93] Hildesheimer, "Les scrupules de Richelieu", 120-122.
[94] Françoise Hildesheimer, *Richelieu* (Paris: Flammarion, 2006); idem, "Richelieu cardinal-ministre", *Comptes rendus des séances de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres* 150-151 (2006): 365-383; Joseph Bergin, *The Rise of Richelieu* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1991).
[95] Bernard Barbiche, "Principal ministre", in Bély, *Dictionnaire de l'Ancien Régime*, 1020-1022.
[96] C.T. Gregory, "The End of Richelieu", 27-28, 49 sq.

Aside from family alliances, patronage relations and the courting of friendships to maintain and strengthen his position of power, other means were the control of information, the elaborate use of censorship and propaganda.[97] By means of strict censorship and an organized pro-governmental pamphleteering-machine, the cardinal and the *creatures* in his *Bureau de presse* attempted to suppress any publications opposing government policies. Employing the services of writers from the political elite, polemicists and hack-writers, this drove the main critical polemicists underground and out of France. The cardinal further relied on an "armoury of erudition", learned men that provided him with the information necessary to domestic and foreign policy-making. The information for instance consisted of diplomatic analyses, historical and legal justifications, and commercial and navigational counsel.[98]

Due to these propaganda efforts and at least partly the cardinal's own constructed legacy and legend, historians of early modern France have long accepted the image of Richelieu as a strong, disinterested mobile force of reformation of state institutions. He was conscious to the management of his reputation, but despite the forceful representations remaining of him in print and paint, the cardinal had a frail constitution and was often ill in bed. This occurred even at the most unfortunate times, during campaigns or as rivals plotted against him.[99]

A long persisting image of Cardinal Richelieu deriving from anti-ministerial sentiments and opposition to his government is that of a warmonger. Historical research rather shows a man who decided upon military means only in the last resort. Recent studies display a pragmatist who was convinced of the need to counter-balance the power of Habsburg Spain in Europe but only acted when the circumstances allowed (limited) intervention. The cardinal even stalled open military action against Spain for nearly a year after the king had first expressed his wish to enter the Thirty Years' War in August 1634.[100] A flawed military strategy in the end caused that France was drawn steadfastly into the conflicts in the German lands, until it openly declared war upon its Habsburg enemies in May 1635. As the British historian David Parrott argues, the haphazard shifting of military priorities and distrust of essential chess-pieces in the wargame, as well as a one-sided

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[97] Laurie Catteeuw, *Censures et Raisons d'État. Une histoire de la modernité politique (XVIe-XVIIe siècles)* (Paris: Albin Michel, 2013); Church, *Richelieu and Reason of State*; Thuau, *Raison d'État et pensée politique;* Jacob Soll, *The Information Master: Jean-Baptiste Colbert's Secret State Intelligence System* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2009).

[98] Erik Thomson, "Commerce, Law, and Erudite Culture: The Mechanics of Théodore Godefroy's Service to Cardinal Richelieu", *Journal of the History of Ideas* 68, no. 3 (2007): 410, 426. Thomson employs this term 'armoury of erudition' deriving from Bruno Neveu, "Les armes de l'érudition dans la guerre diplomatique au XVIIe siècle", in M. Fumaroli (ed.), *Les premiers siècles de la République européenne des Lettres: Actes du Colloque international, Paris, décembre 2001* (Paris: Alain Baudry, 2005), 407-425. See also, Jacob Soll, *The Information Master: Jean-Baptiste Colbert's Secret State Intelligence System* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2009).

[99] Gregory, "The End of Richelieu"; Sturdy, *Richelieu and Mazarin*, 65-81; Hildesheimer, *Richelieu*.

[100] Cornel Zwierlein, "The Thirty Years' War – A Religious War? Religion and Machiavellism at the Turning Point of 1635", in Olaf Asbach and Peter Schröder, *The Ashgate Research Companion to the Thirty Years' War* (Surry and Burlington: Ashgate, 2014), 231-244; 236.

focus on government control of the business of war in a time when this was virtually impossible, led to a "politics of military failure".[101] The war burden, financial and otherwise, soon led to protest and revolt, even years before France fully engaged in open warfare with the Spanish nemesis.[102]

Upon the death of the first principal minister in December 1642 signs were not entirely clear what would happen in the royal council.[103] At the French court the most perceptive had anticipated a regency ever since Louis XIII's illness in 1638 that coincided with his son's birth. Factions fought for supremacy and the queen and several *grands* tried to prevent Richelieu from becoming regent until the cardinal-minister died before his royal master.[104] Whoever became the most influential minister after the cardinal's demise, he had to deal with the legacy of Richelieu as well the other members of the *conseil d'enhaut*. Apart from a legacy of opposition to the powerful *premier ministre*, this would especially be the legacy of a costly war and desperate war-finance. A power vacuum opened up by the red eminence's demise and a dying king. In addition, an extensive list of anti-fiscal, anti-ministerial and anti-war riots in Paris and different provinces could premise further problems to a new minister.[105]

In the end, the naturalized Frenchman Jules Mazarin, born in Rome as Giulio Mazarini in 1602, succeeded Cardinal Richelieu as the dominant minister in the council with royal favour.[106] Nevertheless, the conventional narrative that one cardinal succeeded the other as all-powerful minister has proved deceiving. At first Richelieu and Louis XIII might not have envisaged him as the cardinal-minister's successor as *premier ministre*, but foremost as minister of foreign affairs

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[101] David Parrott, "France's War against Spain, 1635-1659: the Politics of Military Failure", in Enrique García Hernán and Davide Maffi (eds.), *Guerra y Sociedad en la Monarchia Hispánica: Politica, estrategia y cultura en la Europa moderna (1500-1700)* (Madrid: Laberinto, 2006), 31-48.

[102] Even before the open warfare against Spain the situation was so dire that it inspired revolt. See, Reynald Abad, "Une première Fronde au temps de Richelieu? L'émeute parisienne des 3-4 février 1631 et ses suites", *Dix-septième siècle* 281 (2003): 39-70. DOI: 10.3917/dss.031.0039 Consulted online 10-02-2018. Robert von Friedeburg, "The 'New Monarchy' as Despotic Beast: The Perspective of the Lesser Nobility in France and Germany, 1630s to 1650s", in Von Friedeburg and Morrill, *Monarchy Transformed*, 287-318.

[103] Hildesheimer, *La double mort du roi Louis XIII*, 13-47.

[104] Gregory, "The End of Richelieu", 17-55, 217-228; M. Laurain-Portemer, *Une tête à gouverner quatre empires. Etudes Mazarines* II (Paris: Nogent-Le-Rotrou, 1997), 178-185.

[105] Such a list would include the riots in Paris in 1631, and the Corbie panic of 1636. Outside the Île-de-France revolt and upheaval broke out in Dijon in 1630, in Bordeaux in 1635, the uprising of the Croquants in the Angoumois in 1636, spreading to the Perigord in 1637, and finally the insurrection of the Nu-pieds in Normandy in 1639. Only several months into Mazarin's ministry a new revolt could be added to the list, when in June 1643 the Croquants rose in Rouergue. Abad, "Une première Fronde au temps de Richelieu", 39-70; Gregory, "The End of Richelieu".

[106] The most thorough study to date into the biography and political career of Mazarin remains the impressive two-volume collection of a life's work of historical research by Madeleine Laurain-Portemer, *Études Mazarines,* I & II (1981 and 1997). Other recent studies include: Simone Bertière, *Mazarin. Le maître du jeu* (Paris: Fallois, 2007); George Dethan, *Mazarin, un homme de paix à l'âge baroque* (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1981); Claude Dulong, *Mazarin* (Paris: Perrin, 1999); Geoffrey Treasure, *Mazarin. The Crisis of Absolutism in France* (London: Routledge, 1995); David Sturdy, *Richelieu and Mazarin. A Study in Statesmanship* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

with plenipotentiary powers who was also responsible for determining the war-strategy. At the time of their passing, Mazarin remained preoccupied with French diplomatic relations and largely left dominance in domestic politics in the hands of other ministers. Furthermore, aside from the queen regent on whom the cardinal depended, two princes of the blood, Gaston d'Orléans and Louis de Bourbon, Prince de Condé, enjoyed precedence over him in the regency council. Paradoxically, it was therefore only at the onset of the *Frondes* and under the pressure of civil war that Mazarin would really come to act as *premier ministre*. Yet, Mazarin always remained dependent on the patronage and friendship of Anne of Austria, whose overall role in French government a French scholar recently established to have been not only greater than previously assumed but extended into the 1650s, even until the cardinal's demise in 1661.[107]

Not unlike his predecessor, Cardinal Mazarin rose to power from circumstances that did not necessarily prepare for a position of greatness and power. In contrast to Richelieu, however, the Roman-born *premier ministre* throughout his career at the French court had to fight for acceptance as a *parvenu* in public office.[108] Giulio Mazarini was born to a family of relatively modest means, but his mother was part of a family from the Tuscan nobility and his father enjoyed the support of important Roman patrons in the Colonna family. Later Mazarin obtained the patronage of Cardinal Barberini, nephew of Pope Urban VIII, which helped him to become a Roman diplomat. His skill in papal diplomatic service ultimately secured him a position at the French court in close proximity to the *premier ministre* he was to succeed. Once he gained this position of power, circumstances would make it even harder to maintain. As a foreigner in a regency government, Mazarin encountered more opposition than his predecessor Richelieu, at least more easily. In light of the general French xenophobia towards the Spanish or Italian-born, his Italian background proved the cardinal's main weakness, especially coming to the fore during the period of the *Frondes*.[109] Matters were complicated by the fact that the first decade of his ministry Mazarin served a queen regent and a minor king, while Richelieu did have the experience of sitting in a regency council but the larger part of his career he governed under an authoritative major king.[110]

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[107] Oliver Mallick, *"Spiritus intus agit": Die Patronagepolitik der Anna von Österreich 1643-1666. Inszenierungsstrategie, Hofhaltungspraxis, Freundschaftsrhetorik* (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2016), 207-330, esp. 287-296; Treasure, *Mazarin*, 37-82.
[108] Laurain-Portemer, *Etudes Mazarines* II, 101.
[109] Cf. the political xenophobia and hatred towards Concino Concini as analysed in Yann Rodier, "Les libelles et la fabrique de l'odieux (1615-1617): l'imaginaire de la haine publique et le coup dÉtat de Louis XIII", *Dix-septième siècle* 3, no. 276 (2017): 441-454. The same author wrote a PhD thesis on this subject in a broader period including the ministry of Cardinal Mazarin, which I have not been able to consult. Yann Rodier, "La Raison de l'odieux. Essai sur l'histoire d'une passion: la haine dans la France du premier XVIIe siècle (1610-1659)" (PhD diss., Université Paris-Sorbonne, 2012).
[110] Laurain-Portemer, *Etudes Mazarines* II, 131-135.

Although he became a cardinal in French service, Mazarin rather was and remained a Roman diplomat than a genuine man of the church. In contrast to Richelieu, he was never ordained a priest and only received minor orders in 1632.[111] By virtue of the Mazarin family's connections, Giulio had been able to attend the Jesuit school in Rome, where he displayed some brilliance. He pursued his studies with a legal education that he completed in Madrid. With the aid of his patrons, he first obtained a captaincy in the papal forces and then entered diplomatic service, becoming the secretary to the papal legate in Milan. In this office, he first visited Paris during the Mantuan Succession War. Intervening as papal legate on the territories pertaining to the Mantuan Duchy, Mazarin was just able to prevent hostilities between the opposing armies of the French and Spanish. [112] Having made a name for himself, the Pope sent Mazarin to the French court as extraordinary nuncio in 1634. From that time onwards, he maintained a correspondence with Richelieu and became part of the French faction at the papal court.[113] Mazarin proved himself loyal and soon became the head of the faction in Rome to the satisfaction of the French king, who suggested his candidacy for the cardinal's hat in 1638. When he came to France for permanent residence, Louis XIII naturalized Mazarin in 1639, thus enabling him to receive benefices and ecclesiastical pensions. The Pope only finally granted Mazarin a cardinalate in late 1641. Even more than his political skill, this title was of the utmost importance for his position at the centre of French power, rendering him comparable in rank to the princes of the blood.[114]

As his opponents never grew tired of pointing out, Mazarin lacked specific knowledge of France and its laws. Instead, he brought a 'Roman' approach to French politics, rather being a diplomat, a negotiator and *maitre de jeu*, who excelled in pragmatism, personal relations and the art of seduction.[115] From early on in his career, he sought to find peace among the Catholic powers in Europe. As cardinal-minister in the regency government of Anne of Austria, he promoted a general peace in the negotiations that started in Münster in 1644.[116] It remains a matter of debate whether Mazarin's failure to end the armed conflict with Spain during the Westphalian peace conferences between 1644 and 1648 constituted a *faux pas*. Through the prolongation of the war, the cardinal was at least partially responsible for the domestic troubles around 1650. Most historians would agree, however, that Mazarin was strongly committed to a favourable peace with Spain and only partly to save his own position at court, which he saw undermined by persisting warfare. At the same time, however, he directed French foreign policy to acquire as

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[111] Laurain-Portemer, *Etudes Mazarines* II, 399.
[112] Laurain-Portemer, *Etudes Mazarines* II, 379-398, 1051-1056; Treasure, *Mazarin*, 13-24
[113] Laurain-Portemer, *Etudes Mazarines* II, 516-534; Treasure, *Mazarin*, 25-32.
[114] Laurain-Portemer, *Etudes Mazarines* II, 23, 49, 607; Joseph Bergin, "Cardinal Mazarin and his benefices", *French History* 1, no. 1 (1987): 3-27; Treasure, *Mazarin*, 33-36.
[115] Laurain-Portemer, *Etudes Mazarines* II, 745-757; Simone Bertière, *Mazarin. Le maître du jeu* (Paris: Fallois, 2007).
[116] Laurain-Portemer, *Etudes Mazarines* II, 1056-1072.

much military gain as possible. Still seeking a total victory over Spain, Mazarin hoped this would include significant territorial gains in the Spanish Netherlands. Surviving the *Frondes*, Mazarin continued the war and diplomatic effort through which he ultimately was responsible for restoring peace in Europe. [117]

Unfamiliar with French internal affairs and finance as he might have been, Cardinal Mazarin succeeded in amassing an incomparable fortune of around forty million *livres*, one estimated even twice the size of Richelieu's. Mazarin delegated public financial matters to *surintendant des finances* Particelli d'Émery and after the latter's disgrace in 1648 to Nicolas Fouquet and Jean-Baptiste Colbert. At the same time, bankers like the Italians Thomas Cantarini and Vincent Cenami and the German Bartholomew Hervart were involved in the financing of war and safeguarding the cardinal's private treasury.[118] Prompted by the demands of incessant warfare on an unprecedented scale, even more than his predecessor the cardinal and his *créatures* outstretched the traditional system and practices of war finance, of extraordinary taxes and revenues to their very limits, often crossing precarious boundaries. Financial expedients became increasingly haphazard. Unsurprisingly, in the *mazarinade* pamphlets of the *Frondes* allegations of greed and financial malpractice feature as a main theme. Although the cardinal-minister seems to have had trouble disentangling the Crown's finances from his own, he also contributed from his private wealth when the royal treasury was depleted. He did always make sure he never suffered from his investments. During and in the aftermath of the *Frondes* Mazarin invested in tax farms that would greatly contribute to the incomparable wealth he bequeathed upon his demise in 1661.[119]

Apart from an immense private fortune, Cardinal Mazarin acquired important titles and benefices for himself and family members, especially in the years after the *Frondes*. Another way to consolidate his power and add lustre to the family name were the marriage alliances he arranged for his nephews and nieces. This private dynastic strategy became part of a public policy of political marriage alliances in the interest of the French Crown. Mazarin's marriage politics domestically extended the practices of his predecessor, aligning his family with the great aristocratic houses and thereby firmly establishing the Mancini and Martinozzi families in France. For instance the marriage of Anna Maria Martinozzi, daughter to the cardinal's eldest sister, with the Prince de Conti, served to foster family solidarity in a prince of the blood and more firmly ground a former rebel at court just after the *Frondes* in February 1654. More importantly, this

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[117] Geoffrey Parker, "Review Article: Der gescheiterte Frieden von Münster: Spaniens Ringen mit Frankreich auf dem Westfälischen Friedenskongress (1643–1649)/La paix des Pyrénées. Vingt-quatre ans de négociations entre la France et l'Espagne (1635–1659)/Mazarin's Quest: The Congress of Westphalia and the coming of the Fronde", *The International History Review*, 35, no. 2 (2013): 443-448, DOI: 10.1080/07075332.2013.781394

[118] Claude Dulong, *Mazarin et l'argent: banquiers et prête-noms* (Paris: École des chartes, 2002).

[119] Paul Sonnino, *The Man in the Iron Mask: A Historical Detective Story* (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016), 69-86.

strategic policy had a geopolitical component by which French interests competed with those of other princely houses on Italian and German soil. As arbitrator and facilitator of marriage alliances for various branches of the House of Savoy, the cardinal succeeded in reinforcing the relations between this duchy and the French kingdom. He also extended French influence into the German lands, notably by tying the Duke of Bavaria to France.[120] Although Mazarin took special pains to find suitors from important aristocratic families for his kin, he did have the political tact to prevent his godson Louis XIV from marrying his niece Marie Mancini, with whom the young king had fallen passionately in love.[121] Her marriage to the prince of Colonna, one of the greatest Roman aristocrats, though in part a way to remove her from the king's side, also constituted another strengthening of French influence in Rome and in Italy more generally.[122] As an extension of the political practices that secured him a gigantic family fortune, the cardinal's marriage politics was always informed by an amalgam of private considerations and political interests of the Crown.

Another significant aspect of the construction of Mazarin's prosperity and his consolidation of political prominence was cultural patronage.[123] Mazarin adhered to what has been referred to as a Roman model of ministerial *mécenat*, heavily influenced by his former Barberini patrons. Like the Barberini nephews whom he would receive in France in 1645 after their expulsion from Rome, Mazarin attempted to obfuscate the limits of his power by artificial display suggesting greatness.[124] The cardinal used art, music and learning to promote the power, legitimacy, and authority of his ministry and to construct a lasting legacy for himself and his family. Most importantly, the cardinal-minister was a patron of the arts and a *collectionneur*. Through the tireless labours of his librarian Gabriel Naudé, Mazarin built the largest private library in Europe, which he opened to a general public of scholars. This outstanding collection of books and manuscripts was dispersed during the *Frondes*, but reconstructed soon after the civil wars. Apart from the library, the cardinal's Parisian palace created by a renovation of the *Hôtel Tubeuf* contained a gallery of renowned paintings, statues and tapestries, as well as a collection of precious stones; objects that were not always acquired in conventional ways. In a final effort to embellish his legacy, Cardinal Mazarin bequeathed the money for the foundation of the *Collège de Quatre Nations*, also donating his library. This college for the education of youth from the four

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[120] Géraud Poumarède, "Mazarin, marieur de l'Europe. Stratégies familiales, enjeux dynastiques et géopolitique au milieu du XVIIe siècle", *Dix-septième siècle* 243, no. 2 (2009): 201-218.
[121] Claude Dulong, *Marie Mancini, la première passion de Louis XIV* (Paris: Perrin, 1993) referred to in Poumarède, "Mazarin, marieur de l'Europe", 201-218.
[122] Poumarède, "Mazarin, marieur de l'Europe", 217.
[123] David Parrott, "Art, Ceremony and Performance: Cardinal Mazarin and Cultural Patronage at the Court of Louis XIV", in M. Burden, J. Thorp (eds.), *Le Ballet de la Nuit* (Hillsdale, New York: Pendragon Press, 2009), 9-18.
[124] On the Barberini see Peter Rietbergen, *Power and Religion in Baroque Rome: Barberini Cultural Policies* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006).

provinces that the French armies had annexed during his ministry – Alsace, Flanders-Artois, Roussillon, and the region of Pinerolo – opened two decades after the cardinal's demise. Less known for his literary patronage than Richelieu, Mazarin did support scholars responsible for learned editions and editions of the *Imprimerie Royale*. Finally, he was responsible for the calculated introduction of art forms hitherto unknown in France such as opera. By fusion with the traditional court ballets, this musical form met less resistance. Music and ballets provided divertissement at court, but like the other aspects of his *mécenat* art was political as a way to display ministerial power and safeguard public peace.[125]

Although the cardinal-ministers remain somewhat controversial figures in current 'revisionist' historiography and there is still a rather broad range among historians of altogether positive or less favourable interpretations of their personalities and political merits, recent scholarship allows for a more nuanced view of the Richelieu-Mazarin era. Taking into account their whole careers – the lasting insecurities of their positions, the practices of governance, their blending of private and public interests – the cardinal-ministers can hardly be deemed responsible for a revolution in French government. Rather than deliberately seeking political innovation and creating a new 'absolutist' government system, Richelieu and Mazarin extended and manipulated traditional practices, whether it be war-finance, political patronage or self- and family-aggrandizement. In this way the *premier ministers* sought to consolidate their power and glory, while labouring for the glory of their king and the benefit of the French Crown.

Aristocratic revolt

In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, discontent among the French nobility seems to have been structural and was especially pronounced and actively pursued into revolt during times of weak monarchical authority. Armed resistance was the accepted means to express political opposition; in fact, it was common political practice. Aristocratic revolt, characterised by recourse to violence and often by international alliances, was the traditional way to press for policy or personnel change in the government in light of the absence of permanent institutional routes to voice disapproval. In the now common expression of the eminent French historian Arlette Jouanna, the discontented aristocrats submitted to a *devoir de revolte*, a duty they felt towards their families, their peers and the kingdom of France.[126] Rather than an act of treason performed against a gradually more absolute monarchy, aristocratic revolt was a political strategy to integrate their power within the contours of a transforming monarchy. Aristocratic

[125] David Parrott, "Art, Ceremony and Performance", 9-18; Laurain-Portemer, *Etudes Mazarines* II, 1021-1046.
[126] Arlette Jouanna, *Le devoir de révolte: La Noblesse française et la gestation de l'état moderne* (Paris: Fayard, 1989).

insurgency represented an attempt by the nobility to situate itself on a quasi-equal footing with royal authority in order to negotiate with it and have an advantageous position in these deliberations.[127]

The extended royal family, princes of the blood and elite aristocracy often were the centre of gravity for these noble uprisings. Factions formed around individual members of the court with competing political ideas and confessional stances, but 'parties' were never stable and could merge and dissolve as quickly as they came up. Besides target leaders for disgruntled nobles within the realm, members of the royal family as Marie de' Medici and Louis XIII's brother, Gaston, duc d'Orléans, posed proper allies for foreign powers seeking political influence in France. This was not completely the reserve of royal family, for Huguenot *grands* such as the Ducs de Bouillon, de Rohan and others had their own network of princes and aristocrats in the Calvinist world.[128] Apart from these few grandees and *princes étrangers*, however, most of the higher aristocracy in France lacked an international network and did not really partake in the 'society of princes'.[129] Still, foreign powers, especially Habsburg powers, often supported and subsidised armed aristocratic resistance in France and the French nobles were not ostensibly troubled by opening themselves to allegations of treason in seeking and receiving such assistance. As we have seen throughout this chapter, Marie de' Medici, Gaston d'Orléans, and the Princes de Condé, first Henri II de Bourbon, and later his son, Louis II were among the main figureheads of aristocratic revolt in the period 1610-1660.

The *grand* aristocrats also were a force of political opposition the royal government had to reckon with. This is not to present the old caricature of the French nobility as a rebellious horde that had to be subordinated and was ultimately domesticated by Louis XIV in the course of the seventeenth century. Discontented nobles often were justified, from their vantage-point at least, to protest with recourse to arms, for instance when royal favour tended to become unbalanced and other nobles were preferred for certain military or governmental offices they claimed for themselves or their clients. During the turbulent years of the 1610s and early 1620s revolt of the elite aristocracy arose for various reasons instigated by or revolving around the Prince de Condé, and the Ducs d'Épernon, de Boullion and de Rohan.[130] In the 1630s also many aristocrats were implicated in the armed opposition to Louis XIII and his first minister Richelieu fomented or supported by Marie and Gaston. Most of the time the king displayed clemency towards these

[127] Arlette Jouanna, *Le devoir de révolte,* 7-12; Bély, "The New Monarchy in France", 164-180; Michel de Waele, "Conflit civil et relations interétatiques dans la France d'Ancien Régime: La Révolte de Gaston d'Orléans, 1631-1632", *French Historical Studies* 37, no. 4 (2014): 565-598, esp. 568-570; Idem, "Conflict Resolution under the First Bourbons", 132-153, esp. 138-144.
[128] Peter Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy: A History of the Thirty Years' War* (London: Allen Lane, 2009), 375.
[129] Bély, "The New Monarchy in France", 178.
[130] On the revolts of Henri duc de Rohan, see Chapter II.

nobles, the dramatic fall of the Duc de Montmorency in 1632 rather was the exception that proves the rule.[131]

In the first decade of the personal rule of Louis XIV the political culture and aristocratic logic of revolt had gradually changed. Under this authoritative king who had secured his line of succession revolt no longer seemed the rational and cultural acceptable strategy for malcontent nobles to gain a good position to negotiate and come to an understanding with the king.[132] The problem of dynastic fragility and consequential monarchical instability was resolved when the situation was transformed into one in which the Crown and its elites recognized the mutual benefit of collaboration.[133]

Franco-Spanish relations: the fear of Habsburg encirclement

After the Italian wars (1494-1559) that ended dramatically for France, Franco-Spanish relations remained ever tense in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Until the final decades of the religious civil wars in France, the French king could not match the power of his Spanish equal. Rivalry between the ruling houses of France and Spain was political and military, as Spain in particular sought hegemony in the world. Dynastic relations between the houses of Habsburg and Valois then Bourbon were more complex and their contention resulted in frequent intermarriages between the royal families. The constellation of European warfare and Franco-Spanish rivalry and enmity in the early seventeenth century provide an important context to French authors' reflections on politics and political prudence. In France the balance between domestic reform and competition with the Habsburgs abroad was a recurring theme of political conflict; different factions competed for influence in the royal council. The French political crisis in 1629 and 1630 commonly known as the *grand orage* brought the power struggles at court to a dramatic conclusion. In the end it was Cardinal Richelieu's vision of foreign affairs that prevailed by Louis XIII's decision. The heated debate on questions of war, peace and reform were part of the political problems that caused authors to employ the terminology of *raison d'état* and *intérêt*.

Opposition to the ministerial government

In the face of ever imminent crisis power struggles in the courts were virtually perpetual and ubiquitous in the early seventeenth-century French monarchy. From the judicial courts like the Parisian *Parlement* to the royal court and up to the council of the king political alliances and factions crystallised and faded. In an age when the nature of political power was predominantly

[131] De Waele, "Conflict Resolution under the First Bourbons", 134-137, 148.
[132] Swann, *Politics of Disgrace in Bourbon France*, 37-70.
[133] Bély, *La France au XVIIe siècle*, 439.

personal, some elites rose to favour at the cost of others. In general this caused that the elites who lost out became dissatisfied. As the balance in the distribution of favour became particularly one-sided during the government of the Cardinal-ministers Richelieu and Mazarin disgruntlement grew and hostility developed that was at least partially personal. We must keep in mind that "both Richelieu and his successor, Mazarin, ruled through the manipulation and management of factional groups within the government and court elites."[134] However, several aristocrats and higher clergy opposed the imperious position of the *premiers ministres* within the royal council, as well as their governing style and policies. Those who were passed over in the competition for important offices and benefices, and saw their political outlook and ambitions frustrated displayed their discontent at court, in pamphlets or *in extremis* by armed resistance. Between the violent death of Henri IV and the first years of the personal government of his grandson Louis XIV a significant aspect of the power struggles consisted of sensitive political and religious considerations regarding domestic reform and foreign policy. Most important was the question whether to prioritize countermeasures against the aggrandizement of Habsburg Spain in Europe or instead to renew the unfinished business of the previous generation and choose domestic reform.

Perhaps the best known political struggle of early seventeenth-century France was that between the *dévots* and the *bons français* that escalated in the late 1620s. Following the seminal article of the French historian Georges Pagès, the political situation of the decade and the crisis that culminated in Richelieu's precarious political survival on the *journée des Dupes* of November 1630 has traditionally been interpreted as a clash between two irreconcilable political stances. Pagès considered the factional strife as a battle between two political perspectives headed by two men in the royal council, the *garde des sceaux* Michel de Marillac and Cardinal Richelieu, despite the idiosyncrasies of both men and their political thought.[135] This interpretation has often been followed as well as criticized by historians for seeing the *dévots* as defenders of traditional monarchy opposing the modernizing force of the absolutism represented by Richelieu.[136] The names derived from contemporary polemic, in which the *bons français* or *politiques* opposed the *dévots* or *bons catholiques*. Historians still perceive of the *bons francais* as the political descendants of the sixteenth-century *politiques* and the *dévots* are identified with the Catholic

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[134] David Parrott, *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 267.

[135] Georges Pagès, "Autour du "grand orage". Richelieu et Marillac: deux politiques", *Revue Historique* 179, no. 1 (1937): 63-97; Bergin, *The Politics of Religion in Early Modern France*, 89; Maillet-Rao, "Towards a New Reading of the Political Thought of the *Dévot* Faction", 536; idem, "Mathieu de Morgues and Michel de Marillac: the Dévots and Absolutism", *French History* 25, no. 3 (2011): 279-297.

[136] Maillet-Rao, "Towards a New Reading of the Political Thought of the *Dévot* Faction", 536. Although such an opposition between traditional and modern may in fact have been part of his broader interpretation of the era of Louis XIII and Richelieu, to my mind this does not necessarily follow from the material Georges Pagès presented in his article.

Ligue of the previous generation. These associations in some cases, like that of Marillac, were not fabricated, but they cannot be generalized. Nor does a background in the Ligue necessarily imply opposition to Richelieu's policies in the 1620s.[137] Contemporary polemical pamphlets referred to the *bons français* with a pejorative amalgam of names including Huguenots, libertines, atheists, Machiavellians, and in fact, *politiques*. The *dévots*' adversaries, on the other hand, played on fears of a return of the chaotic period of the religious wars and presented them as *catholiques zélés* who were overzealous, superstitious, ultramontane, and suffered a treacherous hispanophilia.[138] Recent contributions have criticized the original interpretation that presented – and to a large extent still presents – the *dévots* as reactionaries, partisans of an old idea of Christianity against the idea of the modern state and its rationality, and unconditional Hispanophiles.[139] Several scholars have recently argued that the political thought of the *dévot* faction in essence did not differ too much from Richelieu's position. According to one historian it was their respect for the absolute indivisible sovereignty of the French king that informed the condemnation of Richelieu by men like Marillac and Mathieu de Morgues. They and other *dévots* criticized Richelieu's *ministériat*, the "illegitimate influence of an all-powerful premier ministre over the government."[140]

A static, binary conceptualization of the political rivalry in the early years of Richelieu's ministry is certainly too absolute, as both 'parties' allowed for a wide variety of positions and by no means all *dévots* opposed Richelieu. Modern historians would rather follow the verdict of the American historian William F. Church, who argued that rather than two stable opposing parties with a shared political program the factions of the *dévots* and *bons français* taking shape from the early 1620s onwards were "loose, temporary associations of important persons in both church and state who held reasonably similar views concerning foreign and domestic affairs".[141] The stakes were high and mostly concerned questions of war and peace, domestic and abroad. Regarding foreign policy, the main question was how to deal with the Habsburgs in Spain and the Empire and with a pro-Spanish Holy See. Intricately linked to these issues abroad were domestic problems related to government reform and the confessional and political matters concerning the 'religion prétendue reformée'. Although they were the figures to which these factions gravitated, the British historian Joseph Bergin recently echoed Pagès in remarking that it is

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[137] Thuau, *Raison d'État et pensée politique,* 149; Church, *Richelieu and Reason of State*, 93; Bergin, *The Politics of Religion in Early Modern France*, 97-98. As one historian recently remarked, in retrospect it is difficult to find indication that during Louis XIII's lifetime anyone among the elite or the people of Paris would have wanted to recommence the experience of the Ligue. Tricoire, "La Fronde, un soulèvement areligieux au XVIIe siècle?", 135-147.
[138] Thuau, *Raison d'État et pensée politique,* 149; Church, *Richelieu and Reason of State*, 93.
[139] Tricoire, "La Fronde, un soulèvement areligieux au XVIIe siècle?", 138-141.
[140] Maillet-Rao, "Towards a New Reading of the Political Thought of the *Dévot* Faction", 279.
[141] Church, *Richelieu and Reason of State*, 93.

difficult to identify the pragmatism of Cardinal Richelieu solely with the *bons français* and the *dévots* with figureheads like Michel de Marillac or Marie de' Medici.[142] It is important to remember that Richelieu had a *dévot* background and up until their final rupture in 1628 had been the foremost among Marie's *creatures* in the royal council.[143]

Particularly among the robe elites and officers in the Parisian *Parlement* and the other legal and financial courts, a large number adhered to political perspectives that can be considered *bons français*. The legislative and administrative bodies were bulwarks of Gallican political thought that formed the foundation for these politicians' outlook in domestic and foreign political affairs. They pleaded sovereignty and independence from papal interference in French affairs; the French king was the ultimate authority in matters of the Church appointments and benefices. Alongside this Gallican stance there was a strong emphasis on a rights based approach to politics and international affairs, stemming from judicial-historical inquiries into the laws of the kingdom and its territories. In the early 1620s, many among the political elite favoured an antagonistic foreign policy vis-à-vis Spain and its interests in Europe, as far as circumstances and royal finances allowed. The expansion of Habsburg power threatened what many among the general French elite saw as the 'traditional' French role as arbiter. Spanish hegemony endangered Christendom and Louis XIII's intervention alone could restore order and balance. Alliances, nuptial and political, with Protestant powers abroad could be deemed feasible. *Bons français* neither had scruples with armed intervention in precarious situations like that of the Valtellina Catholics, regardless of the Pope's opinion in these matters. Generally, these men held moderate views as against the position of the Huguenots in French society, advocating persuasion and conversion rather than repression and a possible regression into religious violence. Good Frenchman preferred some compromise with the Huguenots to adhere to the terms that Henri IV had agreed to with the political leaders of the Huguenots in Nantes in 1598. The Huguenots still posed a threat, but the *bons français* even if they might have been no less zealous than their *dévot* counterparts gave priority to foreign intervention over a solution of the confessional problem.[144]

Although the politicians and men of the church associated with the devout faction shared many of the prepositions of French monarchical rule with their political rivals, their positions on politics and religion ultimately diverged and contrasted.[145] After 1625, the *dévots* were strongly represented at court and in the royal council, increasingly gravitating towards the queen mother's

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[142] Bergin, *The Politics of Religion in Early Modern France*, 89; Pagès, "Richelieu et Marillac: deux politiques", 64.
[143] Bergin, *The Politics of Religion in Early Modern France*, 89, 93-94; Maillet-Rao, "Towards a New Reading of the Political Thought of the *Dévot* Faction", 533-534.
[144] Church, *Richelieu and Reason of State*, 92-101; Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy*, 375-377.
[145] Thuau, *Raison d'État et pensée politique*, 13-32; esp. 15-16, 20-21; Bergin, *The Politics of Religion in Early Modern France*, 94-95; Maillet-Rao, "Towards a New Reading of the Political Thought of the *Dévot* Faction", 530-536.

circle as she herself sought to vindicate her position of power. Granted variations in specific views of individual men, *dévots* desired a more peaceful foreign policy maintaining an *entente* with the Habsburgs. What particularly distinguished the *dévots* from the *bons francais* was their fear of the domestic consequences Richelieu's foreign policy might have. The way the French Crown treated the religious minority of Protestants was important for its reputation among Catholic powers and Spain in particular. For the *dévots* France could only exercise the 'traditional' role of arbiter of Europe by an uncompromising stance against the Huguenots.[146] While some zealous Catholics might even have favoured cooperation with Spain to further the Catholic cause in Europe, the plea for peace was generally informed by concerns for internal affairs in France. In any case, however, that many *dévots* would have objected to anti-Habsburg foreign policy and hackle its rhetoric does not immediately render them unconditional Hispanophiles.[147] Domestically many of these courtiers and politicians favoured repression of the Huguenots, thwarting and taking back their political rights and rights of worship, and ultimately disposing of the loathed Edict of Nantes. This meant no toleration for heretics at home, no alliances with Protestants abroad, and a plea for peace in consideration of the financial and social consequences of the vast expenses of fighting a major war. This money could be spent to alleviate the suffering within the French realm, while the burden of a large conflict would only increase the dangers of popular insurrection.[148]

Before the rupture between Marie de' Medici and her former *créature* Richelieu began to be visible in 1628, the *catholiqués zélés* had aligned themselves with Richelieu's *catholicisme d'état*, a more moderate, prudent and pragmatic 'third way' between the less supple Gallican and ultramontane positions.[149] Still even the break in confidence may not cloud the fact that the cardinal himself had risen from a *dévot* background, included many *dévots* in his circle and continued to build a network of patronage and clientele, also among *dévots*. As Bergin has noted, there might have been more *dévots* ready to work with the government than there were that opposed Richelieu.[150] What is clear, is that however different their political outlook, the views of

[146] Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy*, 375.
[147] Bergin, *The Politics of Religion in Early Modern France*, 97.
[148] Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy*, 375-377.
[149] The term *catholicisme d'état* derives from the polemical pamphlet *Catholique d'Estat*, which is considered to have been a statement of Richelieu's views, that countered the critique of two ultramontane pamphlets criticizing French foreign policy by Adam Contzen, the *Admonitio* and *Mysteria politica* (1625). Sylvio Hermann de Franceschi, "La genèse française du catholicisme d'État et son aboutissement au début du ministériat de Richelieu: Les catholiques zélés à l'épreuve de l'affaire Santarelli et cloture de la controverse autour du pouvoir pontifical au temporal (1626-1627)", *Annuaire-Bulletin de la Société de l'histoire de France* (2001): 19-63; Church, *Richelieu and Reason of State*, 126-142.
[150] Bergin, *The Politics of Religion in Early Modern France*, 98.

dévots and *politiques* could still be reconciled in the years of the English marriage of the French king's sister Henrietta (1625)[151] and the Santarelli affair (1626-1627).[152]

Until the siege of La Rochelle, the two different political perspectives were still in accord, at least not conflicting. In the course of 1629 the alignment of the *dévots* with the policies of Louis XIII and Richelieu proved untenable. The king and his minister prioritized Charles de Nevers' call to aid in the Mantuan war of succession over the complete eradication of the Huguenots. The Huguenot rebellion led by Henri duc de Rohan in Languedoc then prompted the king to subject the last remains of the Protestant resistance.[153] Instead of annulling the highly unsatisfactory temporary solution of the Edict of Nantes, however, Louis XIII resolved to clemency and *oubliance* in line with earlier peace treaties.[154] The Huguenots lost their political rights, had to lay down their arms and take down their strongholds, and the leadership went into exile. Nevertheless, the Edict of Nîmes maintained the civic and religious privileges granted in 1598. What followed was an eighteen-month power struggle in the royal council over policy priorities known as the *grand orage*, during which the views of the *dévot* alliance and the cardinal-minister and his supporters diverged and became increasingly incompatible. On a personal level animosity grew as the partnership of Marie de Medici and Richelieu broke down and Michel de Marillac's ambitions to lead domestic reform steadfastly came to the fore. Beside these personal animosities, the aim to counter Spanish Habsburg aggrandizement polarized the political elites.[155]

When the cardinal-minister unexpectedly prevailed on the *journée des Dupes*, it was a setback for the *dévot* opposition to Richelieu as its leadership faced disgrace, incarceration and exile. However, 10-11 November 1630 might not have been the breaking point it is traditionally presented to be – as one faction disintegrated others formed. Furthermore, while the censorship and propaganda efforts of the cardinal were effective, it did not necessarily mean that there was

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[151] See Bergin, *The Politics of Religion in Early Modern France*, 95-96.

[152] A vehement controversy was provoked by the publication of a book by the Italian Jesuit Antonio Santarelli, who radically defended an ultramontane thesis that the Pope had the power to depose kings, subject them to punishment with his temporal powers, as well as in cases of necessity dispense subjects of obedience to their king. Gallicans lashed back at ultramontanes in France and the Parlement of Paris and the Sorbonne condemned the book, vindicating the laws of the realm, the authority of the king and the liberties of the Gallican Church. Conscious not to openly support the more radical gallicans in the Parlement and the Sorbonne, Cardinal Richelieu's diplomatic handling of the affair, urging for a more general condemnation of Santarelli's book, gave rise to the position of a *catholicisme d'état*. For more information on the Santarelli affair, see: Franceschi, "La genèse française du catholicisme d'État", 19-63; Church, *Richelieu and Reason of State*, 157-162.

[153] Chapter II on Henri de Rohan provides a more elaborate account of the Huguenot wars of the 1620s.

[154] De Waele, "Conflict Resolution under the First Bourbons", 134-138. On the political practice of *oubliance* see also, Andrea Frisch, "Caesarean Negotiations: Forgetting Henri IV's Past after the French Wars of Religion", in Isabel Karremann, Cornel Zwierlein, Inga Mai Groote (eds.), *Forgetting Faith?: Negotiating Confessional Conflict in Early Modern Europe* (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter GmbH & Co., 2012), 62-79.

[155] Pagès, "Richelieu et Marillac: deux politiques", 76-96; Bergin, *The Politics of Religion in Early Modern France*, 96-100; Church, *Richelieu and Reason of State*, 201-207.

a growing consensus of support for the government's policies and the war against Spain.[156] Historians like Giuliano Ferretti have noted how the antagonism in political perspectives between *dévots* and *politiques* gradually changed during the 1630s by the experiences of the war against Spain. One consequence of the war was a reconfiguration of the opposition into a larger front comprising of *dévots* and all those who became hostile to the prolonging of the war effort and the policies of the government to sustain it.[157] Political opposition to the government in the 1630s in fact consisted of a broad spectrum of social groups, from popular uprisings like the Croquants to the rebellion of the *grand* nobles directed from the 'free state' of Sedan, and even the continuing hostility of Queen Anne to the *premier ministre* which was neutralized but not necessarily ended after the Val-de-Grâce affair of 1636-1637.[158] As Richard Bonney noted practically "all the aristocratic conspiracies after the Day of Dupes [...] saw the establishment of peace between France and Spain as indispensable: peace had been prevented by the chief minister, whether Richelieu or Mazarin, who must therefore be ousted from power."[159] Bergin adds that just "one of the seven major attempts made to get rid of Richelieu between 1630 and 1642 involved *dévots*, and that was led by the king's own confessor in 1637", Nicolas Caussin.[160] The factional struggles and noble conspiracies were aggravated even when around the time of the birth of the *dauphin* in 1638 Louis XIII came down with a grave illness that gave prospects of minority rule and the installation of a regency government.[161]

It has even become clear that members of the political elites supporting, or even in the service of Cardinal Richelieu allowed themselves a more critical distance by 1640. The views of Gallican magistrates for instance, albeit that they never had been in complete concert with the cardinal's politics, seemed to diverge evermore. In the Cabinet Dupuy in Paris and other learned elite circles a critique of government policy came to the fore even before the fatal decision to execute François-Auguste de Thou in 1642 on the grounds of *lèse-majesté* in the wake of the Cinq-Mars conspiracy.[162] In fact, the opposition of the Dupuy brothers can only partially be explained from

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[156] Gregory, "The End of Richelieu", 113-117.

[157] Giuliano Ferretti, "Aveu, désaveu et représentations du ministère de Richelieu (1630-1648)", in Lucien Faggion, Laure Verdon (eds.), *Quête de soi, quête de vérité: Du Moyen Âge à l'époque moderne.* (Aix-en-Provence: Presses universitaires de Provence, 2007) 137-152 (New edition [online] consulted 15 August 2018). DOI: 10.4000/books.pup.7116; idem, "Autour de la bibliothèque du Roi: la littérature clandestine d'opposition sous la régence d'Anne d'Autriche", *Revue de la Saintonge et de l'Aunis* XXVI (2000): 45-52; *idem*, "Littérature clandestine et lutte politique. L'héritage de Richelieu au temps de Mazarin (1643-1661)", L. Bély (ed.), *L'Europe des traités de Westphalie. Esprit de la diplomatie et diplomatie de l'Esprit* (Paris, PUF, 2000), 469-485.

[158] This is not the place to go into this subject any further. For some interesting observations about aristocratic revolts and other forms of opposition against Richelieu see Gregory's dissertation, also for references to the relevant literature. Gregory, "The End of Richelieu", v, 22-28, 34-41.

[159] Bonney, "The French Civil War", 77.

[160] Bergin, *The Politics of Religion in Early Modern France*, 102-104.

[161] Gregory, "The End of Richelieu", 17-56.

[162] On the trial of De Thou and Cinq-Mars, and the Dupuys' response to it see, Jerôme Delatour, ""Les armes en main et les larmes aux yeux": le procès de Cinq-Mars et de Thou (1642)", in Yves-Marie Bercé (ed.) *Les*

the anger over the death of their family member. Pierre Dupuy's stance, for example became increasingly critical throughout the years from 1634 onwards. First he disapproved of the cardinal's handling of the affair surrounding Gaston d'Orléans' marriage with Marguerite de Lorraine, in opposition to which Dupuy had provided the Crown with a set of legal arguments. Later, in the aftermath of the publication of a treatise on Gallican liberties in 1638, Dupuy found fault with the government's failure to contain clerical anger and felt a lack of support from Richelieu. Also many in the Cabinet Dupuy resented the government's marginalisation of the role of the *Parlement*, which to some extent explains the opposition of many in this circle to the cardinal's predecessor later in the decade.[163] The rupture of the Dupuys and like-minded people in their circle with the ministerial government thus seems to have occurred around 1640 and have been aggravated by the De Thou execution.[164] In fact, although the men in the Cabinet Dupuy would generally be considered *bons français*, the vehement criticism of Richelieu's abuse of power from a legalistic point of view arising from this circle could seem rather close to the positions of Marillac and the pamphlets written on the cardinal's tyranny in the 1630s by De Morgues.[165]

Richelieu's demise inaugurated a period of relative freedom to criticize the government as the late cardinal's control of censorship and his propaganda-'machine' dissolved. Although a lot of the printed and manuscript pieces still circulated clandestinely, France in the early 1640s witnessed a recognizable upsurge in political literature celebrating the death of the 'tyrant', praising a retrieved freedom (of speech), and anxiously announcing the hopes of a wider public for political reform. Though a great part of these pieces are probably no longer extant, estimations give at least 1000 to 1500 pieces in the first years of Queen Anne's regency, between 1643 and 1648. The so-called *renaissance* of political affairs literature under the regency can be interpreted as a reaction against the strict control of public speech. In a sense, these anti-governmental pieces that one historian has fittingly though stutteringly called 'Richeliades', foreshadowed and mark a continuity with the anti-ministerial and anti-governmental literature of the *Frondes*. Their sheer number and variety of the output – in prose (memoirs, discourses, colloquies, pamphlets) and in verse (stanzas, sonnets, epitaphs, songs) – also indicates that a wider contemporary public had a keen interest for this kind of political expression.[166]

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procès politiques (xive-xviie siècles) (Rome: École française de Rome, 2007), 351-393; Giuliano Ferretti, "Les stratégies d'opposition dans l'académie Dupuy", in Armelle Lefebvre, *Comparaisons, raisons, raisons d'État* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2010), 108-132. Gregory has the most extensive and best contextualized analysis of the Cinq-Mars conspiracy I know of. Gregory, "The End of Richelieu", 235-ff.

[163] Giuliano Ferretti, "Les stratégies d'opposition dans l'académie Dupuy", 119.

[164] Ferretti, "Les stratégies d'opposition dans l'académie Dupuy", 121.

[165] Cf. the expositions of Pierre Dupuy's criticism of Richelieu (in Ferretti, "Les stratégies d'opposition dans l'académie Dupuy", 123-130) with those of Marillac and De Morgues (in Maillet-Rao, "Mathieu de Morgues and Michel de Marillac: the Dévots and Absolutism", 279-297).

[166] Ferretti, "Autour de la bibliothèque du Roi", 48-51.

When order broke down completely in the late 1640s, the different elites, peasantry and urban population in most – but not all – French provinces faced the regency government in a renewed political power struggle on matters of war and peace and the consequences of the ministerial war-state. The conflict became a battle fought in word and deed, in the *mazarinade* pamphlets and in armed resistance. Historians debate the extent to which the more than five thousand *mazarinades* published in the five years of the *Frondes* (1648-1653) were the expression of a genuine public opinion and constituted a veritable political debate. French historiography is dominated by the views of Hubert Carrier and Christian Jouhaud, who both made extensive study of the pamphlets.[167] Carrier thought the authors of the pamphlets that flooded the streets of Paris and other cities from 1648 onwards more or less successfully presented contemporary political thought to the readers. The issues that the French scholar discerned in the political debate included attitudes towards the king and the royal family, the monarchical regime, the power of the people, the nature and extent of royal authority, the 'constitutional problem' of a regency, the functioning of institutions – including the *ministériat*, the political role of the clergy, the *Parlement*, 'public service' in times of venality of office, the Estates General –, foreign policy and related economic, financial and fiscal problems. In the authors' dealing with these issues Carrier found three ideological currents fighting for prominence in the pamphlet literature in this turbulent period; a constitutional, aristocratic and absolutist current. This political debate was especially prominent in the first years of the *Frondes* between 1648 and 1650.[168] However, the French historian's schematic categorization of these strands of political thought as pertaining to the *Parlement*, the princes and the regency government respectively seems rather formalistic. As Kossmann already argued sixty years ago, the larger part of the pamphlets shared premises that are part of the 'absolutist' catalogue, using arguments supportive of contemporary monarchy.[169] Christian Jouhaud's seems to be the more useful approach. Granting that there were marginal texts promulgating at times radical political ideas, he refutes the interpretation of the *mazarinades* as part of a political debate or the existence of a public sphere. Jouhaud rather considers the pamphlets as political acts, propaganda tools designed to manipulate and mobilize various audiences and provoke political action.[170] Especially in the later phases of the conflict, after the incarceration of the princes in January 1650, several *bureaux de presse* gradually evolved around the heads of factions like the Prince de Condé, the Cardinal de Retz, and finally after some

[167] Hubert Carrier, *Le Labyrinthe d'État. Essai sur le débat politique en France au temps de la Fronde (1648-1653)* (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2004); Christian Jouhaud, *Mazarinades: La Fronde des mots* (Paris: Aubier, 1985).
[168] Carrier, *Le Labyrinthe d'État*, 7-21.
[169] Kossmann, *La Fronde*, 9-14.
[170] Christian Jouhaud, *Mazarinades: La Fronde des mots* (Paris: Aubier, 1985).

exhortation also around Cardinal Mazarin.[171] The viability of Jouhaud's approach might be compromised a little by the fact that even at that point still half of the published pieces did not emerge from one of the orchestrated propaganda efforts.[172] The difficulty, in my view, is the variety of audiences targeted by the authors of the *mazarinades*. In some pamphlets the political and legal rhetoric and arguments contained more or less theoretical conceptions of the nature of the monarchy, best government practice and the direction of French policy, but this cannot deny that the *mazarinades* were literature that incited political action. Far from undermining the seriousness of the *Frondes*, the pamphlets can in general be taken seriously as tools for political manipulation and mobilization.

Opposition to the royal government in the period 1624-1661 generally focussed on warfare against the Habsburg nemesis and the consequences the complete and open engagement in the Thirty Years' War and Franco-Spanish War might have or after 1635 demonstrably had on the internal situation of the French realm. Rather than being openly pro-Spanish, many opponents of the Richelieu and Mazarin ministries vied for peace and domestic reform. Those aristocrats who opened negotiations with Spain in their plans to remove the cardinals often included the rudiments of a peace treaty.

The Habsburg threat of encirclement and Richelieu's military strategy

In early seventeenth-century France many feared Spain and its ambitions in Europe. The particular threat of the southern neighbour was caused by the dynastic relations of the House of Habsburg, whose territories Richelieu warned might come to fully encircle the French realm. The nightmare scenario of an invasion by Habsburg armies in multiple of the frontier provinces at once was to be prevented at all cost.

Regarding French foreign policy under King Louis XIII and his *premier ministre* Richelieu consensus among historians seems to be broadening. Revaluation of external policy by various scholars has shown that there never was a systematic endeavour, let alone an intentional strategy to secularize 'international relations'. Neither the cardinal-minister nor the king he served envisioned conquest of vast territories, or had a geopolitical vision considering 'natural' frontiers of the French realm. Furthermore, Richelieu employed jurists as the Dupuy brothers and Théodore Godefroy to make sure that territorial gains ever were legitimated in juridical terms; conquest could only be justified on the basis of historical rights pertaining to the French Crown. Whenever it went beyond essentially defensive considerations, French belligerence was mainly

[171] Carrier, *Le Labyrinthe d'État*, 8-14; Idem, *La Presse de la Fronde (1648-1653): Les Mazarinades.* 2 volumes (Geneva: Droz, 1989/1991); Stéphane Haffemayer, "Mazarin, Information and Communication During the Fronde (1648–1653)", Media History 22, no. 3-4 (2016): 386-400, DOI: 10.1080/13688804.2016.1230010
[172] Carrier, *Le Labyrinthe d'État*, 14.

directed at acquiring and protecting gateways to neighbouring polities, for example to the Italian peninsula. In the end, the alleged 'war-monger' Richelieu laboured to achieve a sustainable, universal peace in Christendom that was safeguarded by an equilibrium among rivalling princes and other polities with diverging interests rather than traditional alliances.[173]

The British historian Peter Wilson distinguishes at least four means by which the *premier ministre* sought to confront Spanish hegemony in Europe. First, French diplomats fostered a network of alliances that would enable France to undermine Spanish domination in European affairs. Part of this method was propaganda that revolved around notions of the 'liberty of Italy' and 'German liberties'. Where a network of alliances proved difficult, attention shifted towards bilateral alliances with individual princes and states. Richelieu made sure that these diplomatic relations were nurtured and maintained discretely to avoid compromising French credibility as a Catholic power. Furthermore, he was only prepared to engage in conflicts that would not lead to a high involvement on the part of the French. In this manner, the French government offered subsidies, even recruits to the Dutch or the Swedes. A third option encompassed the proposal of protection, a method employed in particular with smaller powers such as the three independent bishoprics of Metz, Toul and Verdun, Swiss cantons, and Alsatian and minor Italian rulers. The French government would only decide upon military action in the last resort. Still, armed force was always accompanied by diplomacy. Conquest was limited and connected to protection. The main objective of the French war effort was directed at the consolidation of gateways to Italy.[174]

After all the preferred military strategy of Louis XIII and his first minister was fundamentally flawed. The extension of diplomacy by way of the sword had limited effect as the French government, and its Spanish antagonist for that matter, was not prepared to risk a major conflict. The adversary was not simply convinced by the display of military might, a 'knock-out' blow proved not as quickly delivered as hoped, a fact that was exacerbated by a general information deficiency with regard to the strengths and interests of the opposite party. War campaigns tended to escalate conflicts quickly, starting a vicious cycle that gradually became harder to resolve. The Franco-Spanish War saw relatively small-scale individual events, but with each incident animosity and disagreement grew alongside mistrust among the negotiating parties.[175]

Besides these strategical failings, structural weaknesses of the army and the navy complicated achievements in both foreign and domestic policy. The experience of the religious civil wars of the sixteenth century as well as those of the recent Huguenot rebellions of the 1620s by Henri duc de Rohan and his brother Benjamin duc de Soubise had caused a general distrust on the part of the royal government to allow French nobles to act as military enterprisers. Combined with his

[173] Bergin, "Three faces of Richelieu", 532; Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy*, 379-381.
[174] Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy*, 379-380, 554-559.
[175] Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy*, 379-381.

own pragmatic considerations to stay in power caused Richelieu to prefer top-down control of military command, even if it often resulted in failure. The British historian David Parrott has shown how the cardinal barely succeeded to keep satisfactory control over the army, mainly through careful management of the military command by keeping important posts staffed by relatives and allies. This worked during the short campaigns of the early 1630s, but after 1635 this system based on patronage and clientele relations no longer sufficed. The French war-effort was too limited contracted out and then only to foreign military contractors, never to French nobles.[176]

Due to the limitations of the age the government lacked oversight, information and means to direct a war-effort that was so centrally controlled as Louis XIII and his principal minister wanted. In view of the expanding scale of the war, however, the French government resolved in reinforcing the top-down approach. It rather selectively gave priority to specific army regiments and theatres of the war, often falling into the trap of favouritism. Richelieu and his subordinate ministers cast a suspicious eye on, and were often even monitoring, the activities of commanders who showed the least signs of independence, in particular with regards to single-handed initiative to finance their operations. Finally, the government exercised plain extortion, seeing if it could convince or coerce officers to support their armies from their own resources. This resulted in a "politics of military failure".[177]

From 'cold war' in Italy to open warfare with Spain and engagement in the Thirty Years' War

During the twenty-four years of incessant warfare with Spain after 1635, peace and armistice were sought at multiple times. Unable to conclude the conflict at the peace conferences at Münster held between 1644 and 1648, at which the conflict with the Holy Roman Emperor did come to an end, Franco-Spanish battles continued another eleven years after the end of the Thirty Years' War. It was only with the treaties of Paris of June 1659 and the Peace of the Pyrenees of November 1659 that the burdensome war came to an end.[178] Looking at the territorial gains the war was a success and Richelieu, but especially his successor Mazarin's persistence eventually paid off.

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[176] David Parrott, *Richelieu's Army: War, Government and Society in France, 1624-1642* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 287-299; idem, "Politics of Military Failure", 31-48; idem, *The Business of War*, 266-270; idem, "War, the *Grands* and the State in the France of Richelieu and Mazarin: autour du duc de Rohan" (Contribution to the symposium *Monarchy Transformed: raison d'état and its opponents, 1620-1760*, Rotterdam May 2016); Bergin, "Three faces of Richelieu: a historiographical essay", 532.

[177] David Parrott, "Politics of Military Failure", 31-48; idem, *Business of War*, 267-269; idem, "War, the *Grands* and the State in the France of Richelieu and Mazarin: autour du duc de Rohan" (Contribution to the symposium *Monarchy Transformed: raison d'état and its opponents, 1620-1760*, Rotterdam May 2016); Bergin, "Three faces of Richelieu: a historiographical essay", 532.

[178] Daniel Séré, "La réception en France de la paix des Pyrénées", in Heinz Duchhardt, *Der Pyrenäenfriede 1659: Vorgeschichte, Widerhall, Rezeptionsgeschichte* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2010), 59-72; idem, "Mazarin et la 'comédie de Lyon': au-delà de la légende", *Dix-septième siècle* 231, no. 2 (2006): 327-340.

However, in the process of the seemingly endless war there never was a guarantee that it would turn out this way.

For the purposes of this PhD-thesis, one particular front of the Franco-Spanish conflict should be viewed more closely, that is Northern Italy and especially the Alpine passes of the Valtellina. From a French perspective these mountain passes were important gates to Italy. They crossed the so called 'Spanish road', which was a military service artery that connected Habsburg territories from the Spanish Mediterranean coast through Genoa to Flanders. Troops, money, and supplies passed through parts of the informal empire, the various cities and provinces that Spain controlled or protected. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century Spain could use several routes through the Alps and into Franche-Comté, pursuing north across Lorraine and into Luxemburg on the way to Flanders. The peace treaty of Vervins (1598) and the French annexation of Bresse and the pays de Gex (1601) deprived the Spanish of a route of passage through the Alps as it closed off the passageway through the Franche-Comté and Lorraine. The only available routes through the Splügen Pass, the Engadin valley or the Valtellina were in the hands of the Rhetian Free States, a federation of three Swiss canton alliances. The Valtellina, a small valley providing the Stelvio or Umbrail passes, ensured the fastest route of all the Alpine passes. Deprived of an alternative, the occupation of the Valtellina could assure Spain of a hard needed military 'corridor', whereas for France Spanish control of the Valtellina essentially came down to encirclement.[179]

Since 1512 the Valtellina, a valley with a predominantly Catholic population, and the annexing counties of Chiavenna and Bormio fell under the control of the Grisons as the Rhetian federation of alliances was commonly known. The three alliances – the predominantly Catholic Grey League (Grisons) and the Protestant Holy House League and Ten Parish League – consisting of self-governing communes were loosely associated with the Swiss confederation. Not only did the majority of the population in the Grey League remain Catholic, in the Valtellina there was a Protestant minority of only 4000 people. Tensions resulted in confessional conflicts and revolts in Chiavenna and the Valtellina between 1572 and 1620.[180]

By the early seventeenth century, the Valtellina had become an important ground of conflict between Spain and France.[181] The armed conflict over the Valtellina long predated Cardinal Richelieu's return to the royal council in 1624, but let us go back only to the beginning of that decade. In 1620 the Grisons sent troops into the valley when the Catholic inhabitants revolted

[179] For further explanation of the geography, the strategic position of the Valtellina and the Spanish road with illustrative maps see Peter H. Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy: A New History of the Thirty Years' War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009) 151-161; Yves-Marie Bercé, "Rohan et la Valteline", in Lucien Bély (ed.), *L'Europe des traités de Westphalie. Esprit de la diplomatie et diplomatie de l'esprit* (Paris: PUF, 2000), 321-335; 324.
[180] Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy*, 157-161.
[181] Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy*, 381-384.

and massacred many of their Protestant compatriots. The Spanish governor of Milan, the Duke of Feria, took this pretext to intervene, oust the Grison forces and occupy the valley. He granted the Valtellines *de facto* independence under his protection. As the Spanish armies now blocked the passage between Venice and the allied Swiss cantons, France diplomatically supported the Valtellina Protestants and the Grey League against Spain. This resulted in a truce in 1621 that neutralised the valley by gradually replacing the Spanish armies with papal troops. In 1623, however, France together with Venice and Savoy still had to press in order for the application of the treaty. In the end this could only be resolved by recourse to arms. The new principal minister thus initiated a decade of indirect warfare in Italy. With Savoyard assistance the French made an attempt to frustrate the Spanish road at the southern end and attack the financial backing of the Spanish in Genoa. The surprise attack initially had fruitful results and the armies conquered the Valtellina. Soon the operation began to fall apart. The new Huguenot revolt the Crown faced in France as well as the lacking provisioned military support by the Dutch and English were the prime causes of this failure. The Treaty of Monzón (1626), finally acquired through Papal mediation, restored the *statu quo ante* by nominally reinstating Grison authority in the Valtellina. As the treaty only permitted Catholicism in the Valtellina it limited the control that the Grisons could exercise in the valley. This left the matter permanently settled.[182]

In late 1627 the cold war in Italy relocated to a different plain with the Mantuan succession crisis. Like the Jülich-Cleves war of succession in the early 1610s a local dynastic crisis attracted the attention of the greater powers in Europe and developed into an international conflict. The complexities of this particular sovereignty and territorial dispute go well beyond the scope of this thesis. For various reasons a conflict between Charles de Gonzague-Nevers, other Gonzaga claimants and the Duke of Savoy that might have been contained if not resolved, escalated. Spain, the Holy Roman Emperor, and France were drawn in by the weight of the stakes in northern Italy.[183]

After a direct Franco-Spanish confrontation had only just been evaded in 1630 near the fortress of Casale by Mazarin's white flag and France concluded a favourable peace at Cherasco, it took several years before Richelieu's attention was again drawn to Italy. Meanwhile the latest rebellion of the king's brother caused a shift in French foreign affairs towards Lorraine. The duchy

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[182] Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy*, 381-384; Church, *Richelieu and Reason of State*, 105-108.

[183] For a good overview of the problems that drew Spain and France into the conflict, see: David Parrott, "The Mantuan Succession, 1627-1631: A Sovereignty Dispute in Early Modern Europe", *English Historical Review* (February 1997): 20-65. Parrott mentions ill-defined rules for succession – indivisible or partible and negotiable, in the male line or open to the feminine line –, multiple competing family branches, a dispersed patrimony with unfriendly neighbouring polities – Mantua bordering the Venetian *terra firma* in the north-east of Italy and Monferrato in between Milan and Savoy –, a long history of failed agreements over dowries and territory, the traditionally accepted mediation and arbitration of the Emperor in this part of *Reichsitalien*, as well as rival factions at the courts of both the small and great powers involved.

of Lorraine and the Alsace were important to support the French allies fighting the Emperor and Spanish forces with troops and money. The Duc de Lorraine's culpability in Gaston d'Orléans' revolt of 1631, the marriage undesired by the Crown of 'Monsieur' with Marguerite de Lorraine, his sister, and Lorraine's leaning towards the Emperor gave the French government reasons to impose all the more stricter treaties. In the end French troops occupied the territory, thus drawing France ever closer towards outright intervention in the Thirty Years' War. Adverse events on the German battlefield in 1633-1634 and the extensive use Spain made of the Alpine passes to sustain their military intervention made the *premier ministre* realize that the Spanish road had to be closed. He was convinced the French needed the support of the Grisons and a successful blockade could only be lasting if the Protestant Rhetians regained control over the Catholic inhabitants of the Valtellina. Northern Italy therefore became one of the three fronts the French offensive was directed at after the declaration of war against Spain and the Empire.[184]

The war in the Valtellina commenced in 1635 with a series of successful French campaigns. The mountain victories of the French general Henri duc de Rohan did not last however. A variety of problems that shall be discussed more fully in a later chapter caused the mutiny of the Rhetians against their French allies. Instead the Grisons agreed upon an alliance with the Habsburgs: in return for a settlement of unpaid salaries the Rhetian forces would drive out the French of the Valtellina. Cornered and held inside a fortress the French duc was finally forced to retreat his forces from the valley. Once French armies had withdrawn Spanish allies controlled the Valtellina, nominally occupying the territory. By the end of the 1630s Spain again allowed the Rhetian federation formal control of the valley. In return it had to remain open to military transportation and the Catholicity of the Valtellina should not in any way be threatened. By then, however, the latter agreement already proved worthless as French armies now occupied and controlled Lorraine and the Alsace thereby cutting the Spanish road.[185]

After 1642 the overall strategic significance of Italy declined and belligerent activity became concentrated more on Spanish and later French soil or subordinate territories until the end of the Franco-Spanish war in 1659.[186] Without denying the complexity and different circumstances of the various revolts, the Catalan and Portuguese revolts more easily allowed France to hit Spain directly, as the *Frondes* did vice versa.

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[184] Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy*, 645-659.
[185] See Chapter II. J. A. Clarke, *Huguenot warrior: the life and times of Henri de Rohan, 1579-1638* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967), 197-210; A. Laugel, *Henry de Rohan, son rôle politique et militaire sous Louis XIII (1579-1638)* (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1889), 321-33, 337-348; S. Deyon and P. Deyon, *Henri de Rohan: Huguenot de plume et d'épée, 1579-1638* (Paris: Perrin, 2000), 162-181; Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, 117; Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy*, 645-647.
[186] Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy*, 650.

Conclusion

In the seventeenth century the French monarchy transformed and the relations of the Crown with its political elites gradually evolved from the idea of consultation and representation from outside of the governing system to collaboration from within. To be sure, this transformation did not include a ministerial revolution, nor did Cardinal Richelieu bring about a domestication of the aristocratic elites leaving the 'absolute monarchy' to be perfected by Louis XIV. Instead, this chapter has explored the diverse and longstanding problems that the French Crown and the realm it governed faced. It has shown how the experience of crisis and imminent anarchy informed the actions of the royal government. Dynastic fragility and the political instability of regency governments could not easily be resolved. Although perhaps less subject to contingency, it was no less complex to choose between domestic reform and foreign policy in light of a rapidly expanding European conflict and enduring Franco-Spanish rivalry. In these circumstances, French monarchical rule in the early seventeenth century can for a large part be interpreted as political 'crisis-management'. During an extended period of 'crisis-management' between the 1610 and 1661 traditional practices of government, royal justice, and finance were manipulated, extended and stretched to their very limits in order to stave off chaos and retrieve a long lost, perhaps fictional, political stability and tranquillity in the realm. In the course of the rise of the 'New Monarchy' of France political rhetoric in the seventeenth century came to revolve steadily around the term of *l'Estat*. The discourse of political prudence, including the terminology of *raison d'état* and *intérêt*, developed as a more or less straightforward answer to the inherently unstable political situation with two regicides, two regencies and the long anticipated birth of a *dauphin*. Apart from the more difficultly applicable fundamental laws of the kingdom, the political rhetoric could provide *l'Estat* with a rationality, continuity and stability that was not always experienced. The rhetoric of political prudence was part of a broader output of literature on political affairs that mobilized various audiences for political support and incited action. This included Richelieu's propaganda efforts as well as the pamphlets of the cardinal-minister's opponents, whether or not part of a more or less organized *bureau de presse* and coming from inside or outside the realm. This chapter has provided a sketch of the background against which the ambitions, behaviour, writings, and publication efforts of Henri duc de Rohan and Gabriel Naudé can generally be understood. It is to these men, their ambitions, *milieus* and their writings that we must now turn, to begin with the Duc de Rohan.

Henri duc de Rohan: Ambitious *Grand* in a Transforming Monarchy

"Roy je ne puis, duc je ne daigne, Rohan je suis."[1]

> "Pour moi, j'avoue franchement, que j'aimerais mieux être chassé de mon pays dans un autre, où l'espérance me resterait et aux miens de pouvoir parvenir à quelque chose de plus que je ne suis; que de demeurer dans le mien privé de cette espérance; ne trouvant rien de si dur, que d'ôter l'homme l'espérance, qui est celle qui en ce monde et pour les biens du monde, lui fait entreprendre toutes choses et qui pour les biens de l'autre vie, lui fournit de constance pour souffrir toutes choses. [...] Ce qui me fait conclure, qu'il ne faut jamais ôter à l'homme l'espérance de pouvoir obtenir une condition meilleure que celle qu'il possède, afin de ne le jeter dans le désespoir."[2]

Introduction

In the summer of 1645 the French court was in rumour. A young man arrived from the Low Countries claiming that he was the son and rightful heir of Henri II duc de Rohan. The ancient Huguenot leader had died without office on the German battlefields in 1638 leaving his titles of *duc et pair de France* and various estates to his daughter upon her coming of age. Marguerite de Béthune (1595-1660), widow of Henri de Rohan and mother of the young man calling himself Tancrède de Rohan (1630-1649), intervened for him at court and tried to lay claim to the Rohan-legacy. She asked the *Parlement de Paris* to annul the donation of the Rohan inheritance to her only living daughter Marguerite (1617-1684) effected in 1640. After various failed marriage

[1] This *cri d'armes*, often taken to be a family motto, resurfaced in various formulations in the Rohan family history, and can be translated as "King I cannot be, duke I do not deign to be, Rohan I am." Catherine de Parthenay (1554-1631), mother of Henri de Rohan, was deeply embarrassed and angered by the decision of Henri IV to bestow the title of *duc et pair* upon her son Henri in 1603, and used this motto to show her anger. The Rohans claimed descent from a former sovereign dynasty, namely from the male line of princes de Léon, princes of Brittany, and after Brittany had been annexed as a province under the French crown in 1532 the family purported to be of a higher status than that of a duke and peer of France, that of *princes étrangers*, second only to the royal family and *princes du sang*. A. Laugel, *Henry de Rohan, son rôle politique et militaire sous Louis XIII (1579-1638)* (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1889), 32.

[2] Henri de Rohan, *Le parfaict capitaine. Autrement, l'abregé des guerres de Gaule des commentaires de Cesar. avec quelques remarques sur icelles, suivy d'un Recueil l'Ordre de guerre des Anciens, ensemble d'un Traitté particulier de la Guerre* (Paris: Jean Houzé, 1636) end chapter XX, 270-271. "For my self I profess freely, that I had rather be driven out of my country into another, where I should have a hope for my self and mine to be able to attain to something more than now I am, than to remain in my own country to be deprived of that hope; finding nothing to be so hard as to take away hope from a man, which is that which in this world, and for the goods of this world, makes him undertake all things; and which for the goods of the other world furnishes him with constancy to suffer all things. […] Which makes me conclude, you should never take from a man the hope of being able to obtain a better condition than that which he possesses, that so he be not cast into despair." Henri duc de Rohan, *The Complete Captain, or, An Abbridgement of Cesars warres, with observations upon them; together with a collection of the order of the Militia of the Ancient; and A particular Treatise of modern war* (Cambridge: Roger Daniel, 1640), 182-183. (Modernized typesetting JS)

projects, for instance with Bernard von Saxen-Weimar and Louis de Bourbon, Comte de Soissons, Marguerite de Rohan had married Henri de Chabot. This is where the problem took root. Marguerite de Béthune, the mother dowager, not merely resented her daughter's choice of spouse because he was a Catholic. Above all, the problem was that Chabot was a protégé of the Duc d'Enghien, son of the family's longstanding adversary, the Prince de Condé. The conflict between mother and daughter resulted in affiliation proceedings that divided the French court into parties. The one supporting Tancrède as son of Henri de Rohan lost, as the other party was evidently the more powerful due to the intervention of King Louis XIV himself. Marguerite successfully claimed that Tancrède was an indiscretion of her mother with the Duc de Candale. The possession of the official titles of *duc et pair de France* and the estates eventually went to Chabot and his offspring with Marguerite de Rohan. The dispute was resolved but the rumours persisted, at least until Tancrède's untimely demise.[3] Fearlessly following in his 'father's' footsteps, he fought against the royal armies in the armed forces of the *Parlement* during the first phase of the *Frondes.* He was gravely wounded in a minor battle outside the walls of Paris and died in captivity in spring 1649.[4]

The history of Tancrède de Rohan illustrates the importance of the Rohan family, its titles and estates, its significance at the French court, its relationship to the French crown from the late 1640s onwards, and perhaps even the receding importance of its identification as a Huguenot family. The family's growing prominence at the French court in the second half of the seventeenth century was not a given and in many ways contrasted the protean relationship the family's most renowned member, Henri II duc de Rohan (1579-1638), had with the French Crown. But who were the Rohan?

The Rohan family was one of the greatest of the hundred and fifty great noble families (*grands*) in early modern France.[5] The foundation of the family's power lay in Brittany. The Rohan

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[3] Among the several pamphlets that mention Tancrède, Georges de Scudéry thus addressed Marguerite de Rohan: "OLYMPE, le pourray-ie dire / Sans exciter vostre couroux? / Ce grand Cœur que la France admire / Semble déposer contre vous. / L'inuincible ROHAN plus craind que le Tonnere / Vit finir ses jours à la Guerre, / Et TANCREDE a le mesme sort / Cette conformité qui le couure de gloire / Force presque chacun à croire, / Que la belle OLIMPE auoit tort. / Et que ce jeune MARS si digne de mémoire / Eut la Naissance Illustre, aussi bien que la mort" and adjoined an epitaphe for Tancrède: "ROHAN qui combatoit pour desliurer la France / Est mort dans la captiuité, / Son Nom luy fut à tort en viuant disputé, / Mais son Illustre mort a prouue sa naissance / Il est mort glorieux pour la cause d'autruy, / C'est pour le Parlement qu'il entra dans la lice / Il a tout fait pour la Iustice, / Et la Iustice rien pour luy." Scudéry, *Regrets de la mort glorieuse de monsieur de Tancrede de Rohan, a Madame de Rohan sa sœur* (Paris: A. Musnier, 1649), available on gallica.bnf.fr. A catalogue search on the website of the Mazarinades project (*Recherches internationales sur les Mazarinades*) gives 31 entries of the name 'Tancrède' in 10 different pamphlets. See: http://www.mazarinades.org/recherche/rechercher_affichage.php?url_suiv=6.1.17529.0.30.mazarinades

[4] Henri Griffet, *Histoire de Tancrède de Rohan, avec quelques autres pieces concernant l'Histoire de France et l'Histoire Romaine* (Liege: J.F. Bassompierre, 1767). Laugel, *Henry de Rohan*, 230, 369-380; Clarke, *Huguenot warrior*, 185.

[5] Much used denominators like *grands* are hardly ever defined. Here I follow the clear description provided by Guy Rowlands in the appendix to his work on the army at the time of Louis XIV. As used in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the term *grand* described the most important nobles in France, whose nature and power changed along with the dynastic agglomerate. Usually these high aristocrats possessed a vast

possessed large castles – besides the chateau of Blain, where Henri II de Rohan was born, the family possessed the chateaux of Rohan, Josselin, la Chèze, and la Roche Maurice. They had also accumulated vast other possessions and estates in Brittany as well as estates scattered outside of the formerly independent principality, in Poitou and Saintonge.[6] They carried various titles and were called either officially or professed to call themselves viscount (*vicomte*). From 1603 onwards the Rohan were called duc de Rohan, pair de France, with a number of added titles like, prince de Léon, comte de Porhoët, duc de Soubise, baron de Frontenay, et cetera. The family held several superior seigneurial jurisdictions, such as the principalities of Léon and Guémené, the county of Porhoët, and the baronies of Coat-Méal and La Roche Mochan. Among the important positions the family held were military leaderships and superior seigneurial courts in Brittany (Pontivy, Josselin). The Rohan family was also one of the families that dominated the Estates of Brittany, providing various presidencies of the Second Estate of Brittany. Henri II de Rohan would fulfil this position until the early 1620s, when he took up arms as Huguenot leader in the wars against Louis XIII. Besides these important regional and 'national' occupations, the Rohan family also prided itself for its prominent place in the society of princes, having connections to the ducs of Brittany, to the Scottish and English Stuarts, and to the family of Bourbon-Navarre, becoming the godparents of foreign princes – as in the case of Henri de Rohan, who became godfather to the later Charles I of England – and conducting marriage negotiations with families of foreign princes (e.g. Sweden and the Palatinate).[7]

Henri II de Rohan belonged to one of the greatest and most ancient noble families of France, a line that could be traced back to the eleventh century. Through their family connections the Rohan family came to adhere to the Reformation as one of the *grand* families that were to give the new faith its political strength in France. The family's affiliation with the Huguenots started with Henri's grandfather, René I de Rohan (1517-1552). René had been brought up at the Navarrean court after his father, an officer in the army of Francis I, had died at the infamous battle of Padua (1525). In 1534, through the guardianship of Marguerite de Navarre, he married Isabelle d'Albret, the daughter of Marguerite and the king of Navarre. At the Navarrean courts in Nérac and Pau, the Rohans probably first became acquainted with Reformed ideas. During the series of

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territorial base, sizable entourages, and could raise troops in significant numbers that at times were used against the royal government. Their position in French society was often associated with pomp, ostentation, and court intrigue. At least until the first half of the seventeenth century the term *grand* would include in itself the small top stratum of society carrying various titles such as *princes du sang, princes légitimés, princes étrangers, pairs de France, ducs* and also the upper ranges of the court nobility. Although personal relations with the king very much determined their influence, together these hundred and fifty families largely dominated provincial government and the military high command. Guy Rowlands, *The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV. Royal Service and Private Interest, 1661 to 1701* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 363-364.

[6] Deyon, *Henri de Rohan*, 21-22.

[7] James B. Collins, *Classes, estates, and order in Early Modern Brittany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 20-21, 65.

Religious Civil Wars that started in 1562, their third son, René II (1550-1586), rose as a capable commander of Protestant forces in Angoumois and Saintonge. He especially acclaimed fame for his defence of Lusignan for multiple months against a royal army in 1575. After René II inherited the Rohan patrimony his courtship of Catherine de Parthenay (1554-1631), a wealthy young widow of considerable beauty and intellect, finally succeeded. Their marriage in 1575 not only brought together two wealthy noble family lines with great possessions, but also the legacy of famed Huguenot warriors. Therefore their first son Henri, born in August 1579, became heir to one of the greatest Protestant aristocratic families (*noblesse d'epée*) in France.[8]

The figure of Henri II de Rohan has inspired authors ever since the duc's demise to write on the various aspects of his life. Multiple biographies have seen the light of day since the first *Histoire de Henry Duc de Rohan* was published in 1666, a book that is commonly attributed to Antoine Fauvelet du Toc, financial secretary to Louis XIV's brother Philippe d'Orléans.[9] This aristocratic 'model-life' dedicated to Rohan's grandson Louis painted an apologetic though remarkably well-balanced picture of the "peregrinations" of a man "born for extraordinary undertakings". For all his courage and prowess the duc would have succeeded in these endeavours, if only the times would have been more favourable to execute them.[10] Rohan's first biographer even describes the Huguenot wars as the "most beautiful time of the Duc de Rohan's life" in which he only sought to "procure a solid repose for his party".[11] The author concludes that although the duc was obligated to find his glory elsewhere than in France and his designs were often frustrated, Rohan nevertheless resolved in his "passion to sacrifice his life for glory and for

[8] Clarke, *Huguenot warrior*, 2-9; Deyon, *Henri de Rohan*, 21-22; Laugel, *Henry de Rohan*, 1-27. The miracle of Henri II de Rohan's birth as recorded by his first biographer: "Catherine de Parthenay, demeurée veuve l'an 1585 par le décès de René de Rohan son mary qui mourut d'Apoplexie, ne pensa plus qu'à élever ses enfants avec des soins dignes de sa vertu et de leur naissance et considéra dés ce temps là notre Henry comme l'espérance de sa Maison. Il lui était arrivé dans sa grossesse une chose qui lui faisait faire des réflexions particulières sur la personne de ce cher fils, c'est que ne s'étant reconnue grosse que fort peu avant qu'elle accouchât, les Médecins qui la croyaient hydropique, lui avoient fait prendre des remèdes capables de perdre tout autre enfant que celui-ci. Comme sa vie devait être attaquée de beaucoup de manières, elle le fut dés le ventre de sa mère et il eut encore cette gloire extraordinaire, que la fortune envieuse de sa grandeur future, ayant pris son avantage de l'attaquer dans un état où sa vertu ne lui pouvait faire aucune résistance, la nature fut assez vigoureuse pour la surmonter." [Antoine Fauvelet du Toc], *Histoire de Henry Duc de Rohan, pair de France* (Paris: Charles de Sercy, 1666), 9-10. (Modernised typesetting JS)

[9] [Fauvelet du Toc], *Histoire de Henry Duc de Rohan*. For a scholarly discussion of this *Histoire* see Marie-Claude Canova-Green, "Du voyage à l'exil. *L'Histoire de Henry duc de Rohan*", in Lucie Desjardins, Marie-Christine Pioffet and Roxanne Roy (eds.), *L'errance au XVIIe siècle* (Tübingen: Narr Francke Attempto, 2017), 57-70.

[10] [Fauvelet du Toc], *Histoire de Henry Duc de Rohan*, 244.

[11] [Fauvelet du Toc], *Histoire de Henry Duc de Rohan*, 44; 88.

the interests of his king and his fatherland."[12] During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, this life of Rohan was followed by several other biographical studies.[13]

Most notable among the nineteenth century biographies is the invaluable work by Auguste Laugel. Based on a wealth of source material he provides a minute description of Rohan's eventful political and military career, often laying bare motives for his actions.[14] After Laugel a number of biographies have approached Rohan's life from various angles. Georges Serr sought to embed the biography of Rohan in the context of the history of Protestantism in the first decades after Henri IV's demise. As a theologian Serr studied the duc's role among the Huguenots and placed his politico-military leadership within a divided 'party'.[15] The American historian John Alden Clarke portrayed Rohan as 'Huguenot warrior' for his role in the rebellions of the 1620s and paid scarce attention to Rohan's intellectual endeavours. Pierre and Solange Deyon aimed to paint a broader picture and seek a deeper understanding of Rohan both as a *Huguenot de plume et d'épée*, a Huguenot writer and military leader. Among other sources, they investigated the duc's speeches and his military-political writings that attest of his great oratory talents.[16] Although these biographers see no reason to doubt the sincerity and force of Rohan's Christian beliefs, their interpretation of his political thought essentially reproduces traditional views by Meinecke and Thuau. They read *De l'Interest des Princes* as a reflexion on the relations between 'states' that provides an "important illustration of the secularisation of political thought."[17]

A most valuable study of Henri de Rohan is included in Jonathan Dewald's book on the Rohan family. The American historian of aristocracy uses the case of the Rohan to study what was important for seventeenth-century aristocrats. A number of values competed for favour in Rohan's thought and actions. Dewald argues that Christianity, feudal lordship, and family pride played a minor role among these beliefs. Although Rohan's decisions were to some extent

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[12] [Fauvelet du Toc], *Histoire de Henry Duc de Rohan*, dedicatory letter to Louis I de Rohan-Chabot, duc de Rohan, no pagination.

[13] In the early nineteenth-century edition of Rohan's *Mémoires* Claude-Bernard Petitot (*Collection des Mémoires relatifs a l'histoire de France*, t. XVIII, Paris: Foucault, 1822) gives a number of authors among whom the "Abbé Pérau, the Baron of Zurlauben, Turpin", to which must at least be added Sainte-Beuve in his *Causeries de Lundi* 12 (Paris: Garnier, 1857); M.G. Schybergson, *Le duc de Rohan et la chute du parti protestant en France* (Paris: Librairie Sandoz, 1880); and Henry La Garde, *Le duc de Rohan et les protestants sous Louis XIII* (Paris: E. Plon, Nourrit et Cie, 1884).

[14] As the Duc d'Aumale's personal secretary, Laugel had a wide knowledge of the relevant archives of the Condé family at Chateau de Chantilly, where a lot of the material on the Rohan family had been preserved ever since the Prince de Condé had confiscated the estates of Rohan, including its papers, in 1627. I thank Mark Greengrass for this important note on the widely dispersed Rohan archives, which makes the efforts of students of Rohan's life and work particularly challenging. See also Frank Delteil, "Henri de Rohan", *Bulletin de la Société de l'Histoire du Protestantisme Français* 125 (1979): 122-131; 131.

[15] Georges Serr, *Henri de Rohan: Son rôle dans le parti protestant,* t. I, 1610-1616 (Aix-en-Provence, 1946) and idem, *Henri de Rohan: Son rôle dans le parti protestant,* t. II, 1617-1622*, Divers aspects de la Réforme au XVIe et XVIIe siècles* (1975): 289-631.

[16] Deyon, *Henri de Rohan*, 16.

[17] Deyon, *Henri de Rohan*, 17, 139-155.

informed by these values, personal ambition and political rationalism are more important in understanding his actions. To a large extent, Dewald therefore sees Rohan as "a modern individual", who was "proudly cosmopolitan as he moved about Europe."[18] The merit of Dewald's analysis lies in the way he embeds the case of Rohan in the recent historiographical characterisation of the relationship between the aristocracy and the French Crown as social collaboration. However, the American historian probably carries the argument a bit too far when he presents the duc's 'Machiavellian' outlook in terms of modernity, cosmopolitanism and secularism.

This chapter seeks to discover how best to understand the nature of Rohan's relationship to politics and the French monarchy, in his actions and his writings. It outlines the complex and contradictory phases of Rohan's career in light of the ambitions, values, and cultural expectations that come with the prominence of the Rohan dynasty in French society. It argues that we cannot explain Rohan's military and political leadership of the Huguenot opposition in the 1620s as opposition to a new Bourbon 'absolute' monarchy. Recent historiography has demonstrated how questionable such binary explanations are. The duc's case cannot be construed as the struggle of a traditional feudal lord, a 'Huguenot warrior' against a new bureaucratic state. Rather this chapter presents Rohan as an ambitious *grand* pressing his dynastic claims in a fiercely competitive environment for royal favour. Finally, this chapter situates the duc in an intellectual network among his peers and pays special attention to what we might call his 'cabinet'. In doing this, it lays the foundations for the analysis of *De l'Interest des Princes* in Chapter III.

Princely ambition

First let us look at the ambitions of Rohan; ambitions that can be identified within the context of his family, their dynastic ties, and his status as a *grand*. What did it mean for Rohan that he was born into a family of 'foreign princes' that envisioned itself the second most important noble family within the kingdom of France, immediately after the royal family and the princes of the blood? What were the appropriate ambitions for someone of such elevated status in French society?

A first aspect that would define the ambitions of a scion of the house of Rohan was that they perceived of themselves as *princes étrangers* from Brittany. The Rohan claimed descent from a former sovereign dynasty, namely from the male line of princes de Léon, princes of Brittany. After Brittany had been annexed and became a *pays d'état* of the French crown in 1532 the family purported to be of a higher status than that of a duc and peer of France, that of *princes étrangers*, second only to the extended royal family and *princes du sang*. The title was based on its proximity

[18] Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity*, 37-38.

to succession to the ancient thrones of Bretagne and Navarre. The family was connected to the royal family, the Bourbon. King Henri IV and Henri de Rohan shared the same great-grandparents, Catherine de Foix and Jean d'Albret. Navarre did not have the same legal fiction as 'Salic Law' that would regulate a male line of succession there. Should Henri IV have died before producing issue, which given his dangerous lifestyle and the multiple attempts on his life could not be ruled out so easily, this would make him the closest relative and heir to the throne in the Kingdom of Navarre. Although it was not very realistic, Rohan was therefore heir presumptive to the Kingdom of Navarre until the birth of the future Louis XIII in 1601. Nevertheless, kingship of Navarre never was very probable and with the formal incorporation of the kingdom of Navarre into the French dynastic agglomerate in 1620 a potential kingship fully ceased to exist.[19]

Rohan's assertion to be a foreign prince, had it be accorded, would have given him precedence at court. The important fact, however, is that it was not. The Rohan family's claim to a potential inheritance in Navarre was only sustained officially in 1650-1651, and significantly it was the Bourbon monarchy itself that validated this status. By that time the family's renowned military leader was already dead for a decade and the according of the title was inspired by the political situation of the time. Furthermore, this was probably done mainly for political reasons since Cardinal Mazarin sought the support of the Rohan-Chabot family at the height of the princely *Fronde*.[20] Fully and officially granted or not, Rohan's claim to the title *prince étranger* was important. As recent research has shown, status was at least as much constructed as it had a basis in reality.[21] The claimed status is well reflected in the family motto, cited above, that stated although the Rohan may not be king, they will not lower themselves to become duc.

Although the title did play some role in the family's presentational strategies, as long as it was not validated, Henri de Rohan could not use it to assert his claim for precedence at the French court. As a young aristocrat his position at court was predominantly dependent on the affection and favour of his *cousin* King Henri IV. Although his mother Catherine de Parthenay was furious with the decision, Henri de Rohan accepted the title of *duc et pair de France* that the French king granted him. It was this recently created dukedom that determined the family's precedence. Soon after the untimely death of Henri IV, the new *duc* would find himself well down the pecking order.

Finally, Rohan might have had the ambition to become an independent prince. Rohan not only proudly carried the titles of his ancestors, but also seems to have long envisioned an independent principality for himself. In 1629-1630, when he had difficulty in finding employment in Venice, Rohan even seems to have entertained the thought of buying the island of Cyprus from the

[19] Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity*, 17
[20] See the lemmata "ducs et pairs de France", "princes du sang" and "princes étrangers" in Lucien Bély, *Dictionnaire de l'Ancien Régime*, 448-450; 1018-1020.
[21] Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity*, 12-36.

Ottoman Sultan and become an independent prince on the island, possibly as a place of refuge for Protestants.[22] This search for an independent principality was principally the dream of an exiled Huguenot military contractor who had begun to despair that his French patrimony that had been confiscated in 1627 during the last Huguenot rebellion would not be recovered in full. The dream, however, never materialised.

Besides these 'dreams', the more practical ambitions were both political and military. As a nobleman from one of the most important Breton families Rohan often took part in the Estates of Brittany. In the Estates assembly Rohan would often take the presidency of the second Estate and got involved in quarrels over precedence with the Henri de La Trémoille. From 1608 onwards, after his marriage to the daughter of Sully, Henri II de Rohan, as baron of Léon, acquired a dominant position in the Breton estates assemblies and almost monopolized the presidency of the order of the nobility at the États de Bretagne – an assembly that had an important political role in the province and was a place for the nobility to have a voice in provincial politics. Even though he was more absent than present in Brittany, Rohan was the first president of the nobility at various estate assemblies.[23] In 1617, the king imposed that the presidency of the second estate in Brittany should be a revolving office, starting with La Trémoille in that year. Thus a longstanding conflict between Rohan and Henri de La Trémoille over the presidency of the estates was settled. Rohan presided again in 1618 and 1620. Finally, his participation and subsequent leadership in the Protestant rebellion caused him to be cleared from the scene of Breton politics.[24]

Apart from fulfilling his political duty, Rohan had a longstanding ambition for high military office, an office that would provide the *gloire* and honour due to a man of his standing. Paradoxical as it may seem, this desire was laid bare during the religious civil wars of the 1620s. In his negotiations with the royal government for a peace settlement in the Midi in 1625 Rohan expressed his wish to go into exile voluntarily in order to carry the king's banner abroad. After the Huguenot defeat in the third and last civil war, Rohan expressed similar ambitions during the negotiations in Alès (1629), only now there was no question that his exile would be voluntary let alone that he could take up arms again, even if it were in the service of King Louis XIII.

As an exile in Venice the duc was desperate and encountered difficulty in finding a suitable position as a general to the Republic. To stay busy, Rohan confined himself to studying and writing. As the dedications to the two main publications of the 1630s make clear, Rohan's ambitions to serve the French crown abroad were never greater. One project that he finished at

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[22] Jonathan Dewald, "Rohan's World: A Political Culture in Seventeenth-Century France", in Jörn Leonhard, Christian Wieland (eds.), *What Makes the Nobility Noble? Comparative Perspectives from the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Century* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2011), 164-177; Laugel, *Henry de Rohan*, 284-285.

[23] Rohan presided the estate assemblies of 1608, 1609, 1611, 1613, 1614, 1615 and 1616. See Collins, *Classes, Estates and Order in Early Modern Brittany*, 183-184.

[24] Collins, *Classes, Estates and Order in Early Modern Brittany*, 183-184.

the time was *Le Parfaict capitaine*, a treatise on military theory and practice that was finally published in 1636.[25] Given the dedication to Louis XIII and the main claim of the treatise that a strong kingdom prepares for war, the book might be seen in light of Rohan's quest for a return to royal favour. Together with his other book *De l'Interest des princes et estats de la Chrestienté*, which he dedicated and presented in manuscript to Cardinal Richelieu in August 1634, the work most likely intended to demonstrate the king and his *premier ministre* that the perfect captain for intervention in the European war was Rohan himself, whether it be in open battle in Germany or in the mountainous terrain of northern Italy and Switzerland.[26]

Rohan as *grand*: relation to the French Crown and government

As stated above, Rohan's relationship to politics and the royal government was complex and it changed according to the circumstances in the French monarchy. In a lamentation upon the death of Henri IV in 1610 Rohan himself divided his life in two parts, in this paragraph we survey different phases in his career and examine how his relation with the French Crown evolved.[27]

The king's cousin

The first phase in the military and political life of the Vicomte de Rohan showed the prospects of a great career as *cousin* and favourite of the recently ascended king Henri IV.[28] This promising career began when the king called upon Henri de Rohan in 1597 to join him in one of the last campaigns to restore unity in the French kingdom. The young aristocrat had only first seen military action the year before at the siege of Calais. While the other Protestant *grands* refused to join the recently converted king, Rohan heeded the call to reconquer the city of Amiens in 1597. Rohan fought alongside Henri IV, who observed the viscount's skills with favour.

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[25] Rohan, *Le parfaict capitaine*, dedication. See Appendix 1A.

[26] The full text of the dedication to "Monsieur le Cardinal de Richelieu" that was first published as a preface to the treatise in the edition of 1638, is found under Appendix 1B. Pierre Bonnet, "L'exil d'Henri de Rohan et le devoir d'écrire: recherche d'une légitimation, entre désir de réhabilitation et poursuite cryptée du combat", in Pascale Drouet, Yan Brailowsky, *Le bannissement et l'exil en Europe aux XVIe et XVIIe siècle* (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2010), 231-259.

[27] "I will now therefore divide my life into two parts, and call that part of it I have already past, *Happy*, since it was employed in the service of *Henry* the Great; and that which I have yet to come *unfortunate*, and spend it in Lamentations, Teares, Sighs and Complaints." Henri de Rohan (tr. George Bridges), *Divers Politique Discourses of the Duke of Rohan made at several times upon several Occasions* (London, 1660) 5. The following paragraphs are based on the existing (biographical) literature on Rohan: Clarke, *Huguenot Warrior*; Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity*; Deyon, *Henri de Rohan*; Fauvelet du Toc, *Histoire de Henry duc de Rohan*; Laugel, *Rohan*; Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*; Edouard Rott, "Rohan et Richelieu (1629-1638)", *Revue d'histoire diplomatique* 27 (1913): 161-204; idem, *Histoire de la representation diplomatique de la France aupres des Cantons Suisses, de leurs allies et de leur confédérés*, IV, 1-2 (Bern: Bentelli, 1909); J.H.M. Salmon, "Rohan and interest of state", in J.H.M. Salmon, *Renaissance and Revolt. Essays in the intellectual and social history of early modern France* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 98-118.

[28] Deyon, *Henri de Rohan*, 19-42; Clarke, *Huguenot Warrior*, 11-27; Laugel, *Henry de* Rohan, 27-42.

As heir apparent to the throne of Navarre, the king decided to keep his cousin close. Rohan came to reside at court, joined Henri IV on hunts, and participated in court ceremonies. At the turn of the century, Rohan took leave from court for a two-year *grand tour*. Bored with life at court and in order to further his education as a young aristocrat, he left Paris to visit cities across the Holy Roman Empire, Italy, the United Provinces, England and Scotland. Returning with a wealth of experience and newly acquired knowledge of Europe and its politics, Rohan not only reported of his voyage to his mother in writing but also verbatim et literatim to the king. Henri IV again kept him close, perhaps counting on his young cousin to try and appease the intriguing Protestant *grands*. To add more lustre to Rohan's name, Henri IV bestowed his cousin with the title of *duc et pair de France* in 1603. After various failed marriage projects – for instance with the sister of the Dutch *stadhouder* Maurice of Nassau, Charlotte Brabantina – the French king arranged a marriage with the daughter of his most trusted minister Maximilien de Béthune, Duc de Sully.

When his marriage to Marguerite de Béthune was concluded in February 1605, Rohan soon acquired his first official charge. The marriage and the dowry not only allowed the Rohan family to settle with their creditors the debts engendered by his grand tour, the king's gift of 20.000 *livres* also allowed Henri de Rohan to purchase his first office. That year he received the *brevet* of the office of Colonel General of the Swiss and Grison armies, one of the most prestigious regiments in the French army and one with substantial revenue. In absence of the Marshal de la Châtre he was even in command of the whole army.

Whereas his new wife seemed born for life at court, the young duc was an ill-suited courtier. On the closing of this year and into the next, Rohan gladly headed his Swiss regiment to participate in the expeditions of the royal armies to force the unruly Duc de Bouillon into submission. Once peace inside France was restored in April 1606, Rohan impatiently left the king's side for Flanders together with his brother Benjamin de Soubise to fight alongside the Prince of Orange. The Rohan brothers briefly served with Maurice of Nassau against the Spanish armies of the Archduke Albert. Diplomatic reports suggest that among other bellicose actions, Rohan helped relieve Bergen op Zoom. In fighting against Spanish armies he acted against the wishes of the French government. As if Rohan were only an apprentice he learned the art of war from one of the military masters of the age. After repeated complaints by the Spanish ambassador the French king had to summon the duc back to Paris. Henri IV 'disgraced' him for open acts of war against Spain, with whom France had only recently concluded a tangible peace. Angry about his disobedience but mainly for the sake of appearances, the king ordered Rohan to absent himself from the court and return to his estates.

Before long, however, Rohan was recalled to court and resumed his duties as courtier. There he again enjoyed the intimate confidence of Henri IV, happily seeing and supporting the king

prepare for war against the Habsburg Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. The conflict over the succession of Cleves-Jülich provided the ideal opportunity for French intervention. As colonel general to the Swiss armies Rohan served in the army of the Duc de Nevers that was to be joined by the king at the time of the murderous attack by Ravaillac. For a young aristocrat whose rise in the preceding decade had owed so much to the favour of the monarch, the death of Henri the 'Great' was explosive and suddenly made the near future utterly uncertain. It has been suggested that Rohan lost more than anyone in the French kingdom upon the demise of his royal relative.[29]

Royal minority: asserting grand authority and competing for favour

The second phase in Rohan's career encompassed the decade of the royal minority, which was a period of vehement *grand* competition. During this period of frail royal authority and associated troubles and uncertainty (ca. 1610-1620), Rohan's relationship with the Crown can be characterized as an alteration of loyalty to and conflict with the queen regent and the young king's government.[30]

After the assassination of Henri IV, Marie de' Medici was at first hesitant to change her late husband's policies. The troops that Henri IV had promised to support the Prince of Orange at the siege of Jülich were therefore provided. Rohan took part in this campaign as marshal of the camp, a post second only to that of the commanding officer, Marshal de la Châtre. Upon his return to France it was clear that nothing would be the same again. Shortly after the king's demise a power struggle raged at court, while anxiety and doubt reigned among the Huguenots. The queen regent tried to control the unstable situation and maintain her authority by buying the loyalty of the great nobles. Events now followed each other in brief succession. The military projects of Henri IV were put on hold; the Duc de Sully saw himself forced into retirement; the diplomatic relation with Madrid changed rapidly; the Spanish ambassador and the papal nuncio gained influence at court; and soon not only a defensive, but also a marriage alliance with Spain were discussed.

Rohan's political efforts soon came to focus on the Huguenot 'party'. Among the leading Protestant *grands*, like Bouillon, La Trémoille, Soubise, La Force and Châtillon, the king's death had also caused division and conflict, and bitter rivalry rose for party leadership. In 1611 Rohan joined his father-in-law in his power struggle with the opportunist Henri de la Tour d'Auvergne, Duc de Bouillon, for Huguenot leadership at the Assembly of Saumur. At this assembly as in the months before, Bouillon tried to win favour at court by incriminating Sully and becoming Marie's creature. Rohan showed himself a competent orator, when he vividly persuaded the deputies to support Sully by all means. Within the ranks of the Huguenots, however, division had already

[29] Clarke, *Huguenot Warrior*, 27.
[30] Deyon, *Henri de Rohan*, 45-60; Clarke, *Huguenot Warrior*, 28-69. See also Chapter I.

been sown; the militant Protestant *fermes* and opportunists flanked the moderate *prudents* on both sides. Rohan's rhetorical talent made him one of the arbitrators of the final decisions of the assembly. He reasoned that it was necessary to maintain Huguenot unity, in order not to compromise essential articles granted by the Edict of Nantes, such as admission to all offices and the preservation of the places of security. Nevertheless, Rohan soon showed himself a leader of the *fermes*, who were ready for potential military resistance.

The occasion for it already occurred the next year, 1612, when Rohan defied Marie de' Medici by protecting his governorship of Saint-Jean-d'Angély. The court tried to increase its influence in this citadel – one of the main Protestant strongholds in Western France – by appointing a mayor that was averse to Rohan. Because he refused to act according to the will of the regency government, the queen regent formally declared the duc a rebel and threatened prosecution for *lèse-majesté*. This comprised a suspension of his pensions and the payment of the garrisons in the strongholds he governed. After months of conflict Marie had to yield in the end of the year. Rohan acquired restitution of his pensions and his victory at Saint-Jean was granted. This meant a *de facto* recognition of the court of Rohan's leadership of the Huguenots.

Once reconciled with the queen regent, Rohan acted the humble servant for some time. In early 1614 he therefore refused the overtures of the Prince de Condé to join him in opposition to the pro-Habsburg policy of Marie de' Medici. The main reason for his refusal was his suspicion of the intentions of the princes because his enemy, Bouillon, was involved in their faction. However, as soon Marie wanted to employ him to levy a mercenary army as Colonel General of the Swiss to crush the rebellion, she began to mistrust him. She decided to pay for Rohan's office instead of forcing a resignation of what was traditionally a lifetime appointment. Dreading the lack of confidence the duc then decided to sell his charge to the loyal Marquis de Bassompierre. One year later, with circumstances changed after the failure of the Estates General of 1614, Rohan was pressured into joining the revolt of the princes intended to prevent the double Spanish marriage, which he did half-heartedly. The prime motivation, however, for this change in Rohan's actions was rather found in the regency's refusal to authorize the transfer of Sully's governorship of Poitou to his son-in-law.[31] When he recognized the inevitability of the queen regent's designs, Rohan treated for peace in early 1616, which accorded him the *brevet* of Sully's governorship.

Rohan then kept his word and supported Marie de' Medici when Condé retained his demands and again stirred revolt. Not only could he not prevent Condé's upcoming arrest, but he also refused to aid the rebellion of the *grands* directly afterwards. Instead Rohan headed a company that defended royal interests. In 1617, the year that Louis XIII took personal command of the government by overthrowing the regency of Marie de' Medici and her creature Concini, Rohan

[31] Fauvelet du Toc, *Histoire de Henry Duc de Rohan*, 32-34.

joined his co-religionist and governor of the Dauphiné, Marshal de Lesdiguières, in Piedmont to support his solo enterprise against Spanish influence in Savoy. The opportunities for great battles in Northern Italy at the time were scarce and he found none that would have allocated the honour and praise he wanted. Back in France Rohan tried to bring to bear his family influence in convincing the new royal favourite, Charles d'Alembert, Duc de Luynes, of reconciliation between the young king and his mother. His hopes, however, were idle. This new man, who was soon to marry Rohan's cousin, Marie de Montbazon, tried to win Rohan to his party, wishing him to use his 'friendship' with the queen regent to spy on her. Even though Luynes promised him every office he would have wished for, the duc refused the offer.

At the beginning of the year 1619 Marie de' Medici escaped from Blois with the help of the Duc d'Épernon and raised the standard of revolt. Rohan, who had remained loyal to the queen regent during her disgrace, prudently refused her overtures to join her. Somewhat irritated that she had chosen Épernon to carry out her designs, he coldly replied that the former regent better sought reconciliation with the king and retire in a safe place. The rebellion failed when Luynes sent Richelieu, who was soon to receive the cardinal's hat, to his former patron Marie de' Medici to negotiate a formal reconciliation. The former queen regent set up court at the chateau of Angers, which shortly became the centre of discontent for French *grands*. By the time Rohan and his brother, Benjamin de Soubise, finally decided to join her faction the cause already seemed lost. The young king had decided to march at the head of an army and appease the rebels. The defeat of the forces of Marie de' Medici came in August 1620 at the so-called 'drôlerie' of Ponts-de-Cé on the way to Angers.[32]

'Huguenot warrior'

The third phase in Rohan's political career comprises of his actions as 'Huguenot warrior' in the three subsequent civil wars in opposition to the Crown. In the 1620s Rohan acquired the military leadership of the Huguenots and openly fought against the government, even though his positions vis-à-vis the government did change with the years. However, Clarke's depiction of Rohan as 'Huguenot warrior' fails to take into account the complexity of the duc's role in the Huguenot movement in light of its structure and the political impasse in which it found itself. After 1610, the monarchy's rhetoric steadfastly constructed the myth of the Huguenots as a perilous, monolithic 'state within a state'. In contrast to the order and stability the monarchy provided, the Huguenot assemblies represented disobedience and the road to democracy, a republic, in other

[32] Clarke, *Huguenot Warrior*, 67-69; Laugel, *Rohan*, 86-92; Salmon, *Renaissance and Revolt*, 100.

words, chaos and anarchy.[33] In fact, the rhetorical construction was far removed from the division and vulnerability of the movement of which Rohan hesitantly took military leadership in the 1620s. However as it fought against the stereotypical image, the political wing of French Protestantism came to measure up to the fabrication. Rohan, as its figurehead, ended up embodying the opposition to the French monarchy that was trying to refashion itself. From the beginning of the hostilities, royal strategy increasingly isolated the duc. With its politics of affection and favour the court bought the loyalty of many among the major Calvinist aristocrats. In the end, the failure to find foreign support in the context of the first decade of the Thirty Years' War meant the downfall of the Huguenot movement. Despite his inexorable energy and strategic talents, Rohan came to experience political and military failure.

From 1617 onwards, royal policies increasingly came to focus on the political organisation of the Huguenot movement in Southern France. Distress among the Huguenots had been mounting steadily during the regency. With one such measure, the Edict of Restitution, Louis XIII sought to re-establish the practice of Catholicism and recover church property in Huguenot Béarn. The conflict that arose with local elites and city magistrates drove the king to the military annexation of the Navarrean principality of Béarn to France and occupation of its capital city, Pau. The magistrates of the alarmed Huguenot community of La Rochelle called for an assembly. As soon as the call for an assembly was heard, Louis XIII declared the gathering illegal and ordered its immediate separation. Hardly all heeded the Huguenot call. Many great noblemen had begun to desert the Huguenot party. Prominent ducs, like Bouillon, Lesdiguières, and Sully refused the invitation and advised against disobedience. Among the *grands* only Châtillon, La Force, La Trémoille, Rohan and his brother Soubise sent representatives to the political assembly at La Rochelle.

What ensued was a rebellion in the Midi that lasted from 1620 to 1622. When he saw his will being defied, Louis XIII marched south at the head of the royal army. The king decided to make the Huguenots surrender and proclaimed that the first siege would be laid on Saint-Jean d'Angély. As the king made clear, he considered Rohan and the rest of the Huguenot movement disobedient subjects, whose illicit assemblies in various towns sought to establish 'États populaires' and 'Republiques'.[34] In one of those cities, La Rochelle, the political assembly prepared for war. The port city that acted as the supreme authority of the Huguenot movement created eight circles of

[33] See Arthur L. Herman, "The Huguenot Republic and Antirepublicanism in Seventeenth-Century France", *Journal of the History of Ideas* 53, no. 2 (1992): 249-269; Bergin, *Politics and Religion in Early Modern France*, 227-251.

[34] See for instance, *Déclaration du Roy en faveur de ses subiets de la Religion pretenduë reformée, demeurant en son obeïssance, et contre ceux des villes de S. Iean d'Angely, la Rochelle & leurs adherans, lesquels sa Majesté declare rebelles & criminels de leze Majesté. Donné[e] à Nyort le 17. May, 1621 (*Lyon: Nicolas Iullieron et Claude Larjot 1621), 3-4. Cited in Andreas Nijenhuis-Bescher, "Les Provinces-Unies, une nouvelle Rome? Henri II de Rohan (1579-1638), République et Calvinisme", *Chrétiens et sociétés* 22 (2015) online.

Huguenot-territory that were to be preserved by a military governor. Rohan took an oath to uphold the general good of the Huguenot party and was assigned the military governorship of Upper Languedoc and Upper Guyenne. The eight governors were appointed to raise funds, to organize armies, to join battle, to appoint officers, and to levy taxes. Furthermore, the political assembly forbade them to negotiate or sign separate treaties. The resistance was concentrated in Southern France. For all the preparations made by the political assembly at La Rochelle, the royal army did not meet serious resistance until it reached Saint-Jean. This fortified Huguenot stronghold was to be defended by Soubise, who prepared the town and its population for a lengthy siege. However, soon after the royal army started the siege, it became clear that the bulwark was weak in supplies, both military and otherwise. In these circumstances the siege only lasted a month. Rohan's brother surrendered the city to the king in late June.

The submission of other *grands* fastened the process by which Rohan became commander-in-chief. Further south, in Montauban, he prepared for the next siege. However, just before the royal armies were at the gate, the duc left the city for Castres with a small garrison. He and his men then raised troops for Montauban's relieve in the small towns of the Cevennes. Rohan's march against the royal armies that lay around the city of Montauban turned the situation in favour of the Huguenots as the besiegers shrunk in number. With winter approaching and the odds now turned against him the Duc de Luynes, the royal favourite in charge of the siege, tried to convince Rohan to stop his assault on the royal armies. Luynes invoked their family bond – Luynes was married to Rohan's cousin – and promised financial compensation for his surrender. Rohan refused to acquiesce in the affective politics reigning at court. In this stalemate the siege was raised in November 1621.[35]

In springtime of the year 1622 Louis XIII renewed his military campaign against the Huguenots. The success of his earlier campaigns had left La Rochelle in isolation and the Rochelois sought to decrease their vulnerability from the sea. Benjamin de Rohan acquired the appointment to lead the Huguenot maritime forces and commanded in several major confrontations with the royal army in the marshes of Poitou. The initiative was with the royal troops who thwarted Soubise's attempts and could celebrate victory in April 1622. The Huguenots had to surrender Poitou and with it lost the resources and revenue of the entire province. The campaign of royal recovery was a steady success and the royal troops marched on to Montpellier, where Rohan was preparing the last resistance. On the way several towns soon and easily capitulated to royal authority. The king's armies arrived at the gates of Montpellier at the end of August and began the siege. The Huguenots had incurred vast losses of military and political power. With so many fortresses and valuable men among the aristocratic leadership lost, Rohan soon saw no other way

[35] Clarke, *Huguenot Warrior*, 70-93.

but to negotiate. Spanish offers of a financial subsidy could not persuade him to continue his war efforts. He decided to heed James I's advice and asked the consent of the political assembly at La Rochelle to negotiate a peace. When consent to negotiate arrived, peace was made soon. The siege and the first civil war came to an end with the Treaty of Montpellier signed on 19 October 1622.

The treaty virtually demolished the Huguenot military and political organization. While the royal government promised to continue to observe the Edict of Nantes, the Huguenots had to submit almost half of the fortified towns to the king. The *brevet* to the Edict of Nantes that guaranteed the garrisons of the other half of the Huguenot strongholds would expire in 1625 without renewal. The treaty also prohibited Protestant political assemblies and while colloquies were allowed these gatherings should be employed for discussion of ecclesiastical matters only.[36] The articles of the peace that concerned Rohan stipulated that he was to receive compensation for the loss of Poitou and Saint-Jean d'Angély. Instead he was named governor of Nimes and Uzès without garrison. Furthermore, the king awarded him two hundred thousand *livres* in cash, while he promised Rohan six hundred thousand more spread over a sixty-year period.[37]

The Huguenot movement was almost broken by Louis XIII's military campaigns of the early 1620s and it seemed a matter of time before the isolated port city of La Rochelle also had to submit to royal authority. Mainly due to political circumstances it would take another six to seven years before the resistance of La Rochelle and the Rohan brothers would be overpowered. Habsburg expansion in Northern Italy began to threaten France, while the Huguenots sought external aid to maintain their position against the king. The conflict between the king and the Rochelois over the deconstruction of Fort Louis, that was stipulated to be razed in the Peace of Montpellier, prompted the outbreak of the second Huguenot war in early 1625. Fort Louis, a newly constructed fortified royalist camp outside La Rochelle, together with the islands before the coast of La Rochelle left the Huguenot stronghold encircled, which heavily complicated communication with the world outside. Soubise, who had fled to London to raise English support for the Huguenots and who had simultaneously been flirting with Spain, then managed to invade the Île de Ré with a small fleet. He successfully attacked the royal fleet at the Battle of Blavet and occupied the Île de Oléron. This provided the Huguenot command with a stepping-stone for further foreign invasion.

Rohan reluctantly joined his brother in this new civil war. The renewed conflict came at a time when the government had resumed its Protestant alliances abroad and supported the Grisons in their opposition to Habsburg power in the Valtellina, Northern Italy. The duc was already negotiating with the court to acquire a role in the foreign conflict, when Soubise's actions forced

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[36] Clarke, *Huguenot Warrior*, 94-108; Mack P. Holt, *The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 186-187.
[37] Clarke, *Huguenot Warrior*, 107.

him to return to arms. Rohan quite unsuccessfully mobilised troops in Languedoc, while his brother convinced a more moderate government in La Rochelle to join the revolt. By the time the Rochelois were won over, however, the situation soon turned for the worse. A royal fleet headed by the Duc de Montmorency, admiral of France, affronted and recovered the Île de Ré and finally defeated the rebel fleets. Rohan did better in Languedoc, defending various fortified towns, but in the power politics of early 1626 he finally had to cave in and accept a peace. The Treaty of Paris of February 1626 was essentially the same as the peace of Montpellier. However, there was no doubt that La Rochelle would soon be under siege.[38]

The next year Huguenot resumed open rebellion to the crown when an English fleet headed by the Duke of Buckingham landed on the Île de Ré. Charles I had ordered Buckingham to aid the Huguenots in their struggle against the French king. Despite his marriage alliance with Louis XIII's sister Henrietta, the English king caved in to Puritan appeals to support their co-religionists. Rohan, though again initially hesitant to take up arms, continued rebellion in the Midi and his brother Soubise sought to convince the Rochelois. When a truce brought a quick ending to the foreign war against Spain, Louis XIII was finally able to break Huguenot resistance for good.

In august 1627, the siege of La Rochelle began, while the city itself would only sign a treaty with the English early September after having taken a long time to declare itself for war. The last major political stronghold of the Huguenots resisted the siege led by Cardinal Richelieu for fourteen months. The turning point came, when the English intervention ended after a series of unsuccessful sieges and attacks. La Rochelle surrendered unconditionally in November 1628, counting an insurmountable number of casualties mainly due to disease and starvation. The fall of La Rochelle stirred the Huguenot ranks and sowed even further division in an already vulnerable movement. Rohan desperately sought for allies to make his last stand. Hardly expecting help from England, Rohan's agents began negotiations with Spain to pursue the war. Meanwhile, Louis XIII led his forces from one city to the next. After the bloody siege of Privas and the siege of Alès, the duc finally yielded and negotiated the Peace of Alès. In this peace the Huguenots retained the liberties granted by the Edict of Nantes, but lost their territorial, political and military rights. A special article in the peace dealt with Henri de Rohan. Rohan, who had been declared guilty of treason and stripped of his titles and estates by the Parlement of Toulouse in October 1627, was restored in his ancestral titles and his confiscated estates were returned. He was awarded 100.000 *crowns* for repairs of the damage to his lands and houses. Finally, after having conducted the razing of all Protestant fortifications in the Midi, Rohan had to go into exile.[39]

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[38] Clarke, *Huguenot Warrior*, 109-135; Holt, *French Wars of Religion*, 187-190.
[39] Clarke, *Huguenot Warrior*, 136-179.

Venetian doldrums

A fourth phase in Rohan's career is made up of the exile in Venice (1629-1633). Together with his brother Soubise, Rohan had gambled the family's patrimony in the Huguenot cause and lost it all to the house, the Bourbon monarchy.[40] In this phase, having nothing left to lose, the exiled duc was looking to mend his fences with Louis XIII and Cardinal Richelieu. How could we describe Rohan's relationship with the French Crown after his final submission as leader of the Huguenot rebellion in the Peace of Alès of 1629?[41]

Once peace had been concluded, Rohan immediately tried to show good faith to the government by overseeing the razing of the fortifications he had built in the city of Anduze. When this post-war deconstruction was over, Rohan went into exile as stipulated in the peace treaty. After he made a formal demand at court, Louis XIII and his government agreed to his decision to move to Venice. There is no doubt that the duc had hopes to enter in the service of the Republic that had enthralled him on his *grand tour*. In fact, already in the early 1620s there was some correspondence on Venetian military office. As soon as he arrived in Venice in August 1629 Rohan tried to acquire a command suitable to his status and experience in the army of the Republic.

His petitions to the Venetian Senate were made in the context of the Mantuan succession crisis, for the defence of which France and Venice had concluded an alliance against the Emperor and the Duke of Savoy.[42] In the fall of 1629 the interference of the Spanish ambassador at Venice thwarted Rohan's appointment in the Republican army. Letters back and forth to Cardinal Richelieu and the assistance of the French ambassador to Venice, Claude de Mesme, Comte d'Avaux, initially led to nothing. In April 1630 Rohan again tried to apply for office with the Senate. However, in May a Franco-Venetian army that had attempted to relieve the siege of Mantua by an imperial army was defeated and the fall of Mantua and Casale appeared imminent. Venice decided upon arming itself against a possible Habsburg invasion and the Senate finally agreed to commission Rohan the highest military office. In June 1630 he signed a five-year contract as head of the Venetian Army. Rohan became stationed at Padua, charged with recruitment of officers and soldiers, supervision of their military training and the organization of supplies for his troops.

In spite of all his labour, the armies he raised at the time would not soon see battle. The city of Mantua fell to imperial troops. The French armies at Casale stood their ground and peace negotiations between Habsburg Spain and the Franco-Venetian alliance soon followed. This process was sped up by the problems presented to the Emperor by the victorious march of the Swedish king, Gustavus Adolphus, through the German lands. Hostilities in Italy having ceased,

[40] On Rohan's passion for gambling, see Dewald.
[41] Edouard Rott, "Rohan et Richelieu", 161-204; Clarke, *Huguenot Warrior*, 180-196; Deyon, *Rohan*, 122-127; Laugel, *Rohan*, 273-296.
[42] See Chapter I.

the fall and winter of 1630-1631 were not particularly eventful for Rohan. At Padua he spent his time reading and writing, as his letters of the time to his mother clearly show.[43] Rohan probably worked on his apologetic *Mémoires* in which he discussed his political and military endeavours of the last two decades as well as the *Parfaict capitaine* and *De l'Interest des Princes*.

The truce, negotiated by the Papal envoy, Giulio Mazarini – the later French *premier ministre*, Jules Mazarin –, finally became a definitive peace at Cherasco in April 1631. This treaty neutralized the Valtellina, where French-paid troops from the Grisons were stationed. Nevertheless, it was the confederation of Swiss cantons themselves that soon needed protection against a possible Habsburg attack.

Grand ambition and governmental distrust

In the fifth phase in his career, Rohan obtained his desired office of Lieutenant General to the French armies in the Grisons and ambassador to the Swiss cantons. This phase in his career can be characterized by recurring cycles of trust and distrust from the French government towards an overtly loyal but relentlessly ambitious Rohan.

In the early 1630s France finally decided to intervene in the European theatre of war. As the military effort soon outgrew Richelieu's cautious supervision of military command, this provided opportunities for men like Rohan, who hitherto did not enjoy the confidence of the *premier ministre.* The duc was one of the few competent generals the French royal council had at its disposal to counter the territorial ambitions of the Habsburgs.[44] Not only did he have the necessary experience as a general and negotiator, he also enjoyed the confidence and esteem of the Swiss Protestants. Rohan gladly accepted the commission and late in the year 1631 asked his formal leave from the Venetian Republic. After some obstruction by the Senate that was afraid that a Venetian officer stationed in that area would be construed as an act of war, Rohan went to the capital of the Grisons, Chur (or *Coire*), where he arrived in early December. There the Swiss magistrates elected Rohan to become general of the Grison armies. However, the official French representative Du Landé de Siqueville was at this time promoted ordinary ambassador and *marechal de camp*. This created a conflict of prominence from the start of Rohan's sojourn in the Swiss cantons. Du Landé was working against Rohan in his dealings with the French government as well as with the Grison government at Chur.[45]

Only just settled in Chur, Rohan at once drew up a strategic military plan for the reoccupation of the Valtellina that should be realised with the support of Venetian and Swiss armies. In order to affirm his authority, Rohan asked the court for the charge of *lieutenant général des armées de*

[43] See the letters from Rohan to Catherine de Parthenay in Laugel, *Henry de Rohan*, 385-407.
[44] For the lack of competent commanding officers, see Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, 76.
[45] Clarke, *Huguenot Warrior*, 187-191; Laugel, 299-300.

Sa Majesté. After much waiting Rohan was accorded this title in February 1632, as well as the title of *ambassadeur extraordinaire*. However, he was ordered to limit any military effort to the defence of 'Rhétie cisalpine' and only to endeavour military intervention beyond Splügen and Bernina in case of Spanish aggression near Chiavenna. The war against the Habsburgs was still a *guerre couverte* and for the French government Germany and Lorraine had priority in time as well as money. Rohan was ordered to build fortifications and attempt a reconciliation between the Grisons and the neighbouring Catholic Swiss cantons. During thirteen months, Rohan loyally executed contradictory orders, often caused by interventions of Du Landé, who spied on him. Maybe for fear of Rohan's correspondence with the Swedish king, who had asked the duc to close the Valtellina-pass to Spain, he received orders from court in December 1632 to disband his regiments in the Grisons. Rohan returned to Venice to wait on further instructions, which never came.[46]

Watching the Grisons by maintaining correspondence, Rohan saw that problems grew and were aggravated by Du Landé's actions. The duc soon decided to return to Switzerland unauthorized, which infuriated the French court. In March 1633 Louis XIII disgraced Rohan. The king retracted the duc's *brevet* of lieutenant general and his letters patent as extraordinary ambassador. The disgrace, however, went as quickly as it came, due to the Cardinal-Infant's preparations to lead a large army through the Valtellina. Rohan retrieved the charge of lieutenant general in August and was authorized by the royal council to close the pass at all costs. The order was soon recalled, because the government thought it best to settle the matter diplomatically in order to avoid open warfare with the Habsburgs.[47]

From late 1633 onwards, Rohan's requests for supplies and reinforcements fell on deaf ears. So did his warnings against Spanish efforts to foment division among the Swiss cantons that caused the Catholic cantons to choose their 'natural ally' Spain over France. Rohan saw that the problems for French foreign policy were imminent. Venice seemed less disposed than ever to cooperate in a Franco-Venetian alliance for the defence of Rhaetia, while the Grisons themselves were on the verge of rebellion. At the end of April 1634 a letter was dispatched ordering Rohan to the French court at Fontainebleau in order to consult the royal council on the military situation in the Valtellina. Anxious at first to get arrested, Rohan gained court in early June and was received well. However, even when he dined privately with Louis XIII, he never got to advise the king on the affairs in the Valtellina. The royal council did not see the danger, until the consequences became clear of a Spanish army from Milan crossing the Valtellina for the relieve

[46] Clarke, *Huguenot Warrior*, 189-192; Laugel, 299-301, 305-307.
[47] Clarke, *Huguenot Warrior*, 192-194; Laugel, 306-312.

of the imperial armies in Germany. After the Swedish defeat at the Battle of Nördlingen Rohan's advice was finally heeded and war with the Habsburgs declared.[48]

In 1635 Rohan's military expeditions accounted for much of the success of the French war-effort. After four great mountain victories – at Levigno, Mazzo, Val Fraela, and Morbegno – from June until November 1635 the duc gained complete control over the Valtellina. With insufficient means and inferior forces, he succeeded at securing the Valtellina against the Spanish troops and at the same time did not concede control over the valley to the Grisons.

However, as winter passed in early 1636 problems other than financial incapacity and meagre troops began to rise. While the court was stalling to approve the duc's plans for further invasions in Northern Italy, the Grison government renewed their sovereignty claims over the Valtellina as well as the recently conquered counties of Bormio and Chiavenna. Based on historical precedent the overtly Catholic population of the Valtellina did not concur and petitioned with Rohan. The duc projected a solution to the troubles of the valley and started negotiating a treaty with the Valtellina representation. His hopes for a lasting peace that would be ratified and guaranteed by the French king, however, took long to realise. Claude de Bullion, the *surintendant* of finances, advised Richelieu against Rohan's solution. Nonetheless, Rohan reached a delicate accord between the Valtellines and the Grisons. The treaty concluded at Chiavenna recognized Grison sovereignty in the aforementioned territories, but re-established the dominance of Catholicism in the valley. A financial compensation for their property should persuade Protestants to leave the valley. Yet French ratification was not easily accomplished, as multiple parties, among whom Père Joseph and Cardinal Richelieu, suspected Rohan of favouring the Protestant Grisons.[49]

These suspicions were not all that thwarted Rohan's war and diplomatic efforts among the Grisons and in the Valtellina. Already in 1632 rumours at court implicated Rohan with the conspiracy of Gaston d'Orléans and the Duc de Montmorency.[50] The duc himself was well aware of these suspicions and combatted them whenever they rose. When after his two successful summer campaigns at Livogno and Mazzo the Spanish court at Madrid tried to gain Rohan's allegiance in order to avoid a military solution in the Valtellina, Rohan immediately informed Richelieu. He imprisoned Louis Clausel, an agent of the exiled Marie de' Medici who approached him on behalf of Spain. This Clausel was the same man who had negotiated in Spain and Savoy on the duc's behalf in during the last religious civil wars. The cardinal sent a Parisian *maître de requêtes*, François Lasnier, to try the spy whose death sentence was written before the trial. Lasnier then remained in the Grisons as ambassador and *intendant* of the army. Like Du Landé

[48] Clarke, *Huguenot Warrior*, 194-196; Deyon, 159-162; Laugel, 312-316.
[49] Clarke, *Huguenot Warrior*, 197-203; Laugel, *Rohan*, 321-33; Deyon, 162-176; Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, 117.
[50] Laugel, *Rohan*, 301-302.

before him, this *intendant* would entertain a difficult relationship with Rohan. All duc's efforts and communications in spite, his attempts to raise the cardinal's mistrust never fully succeeded.[51]

In 1636 the situation in the Grisons changed for the worse. While Rohan was on military expedition with the Duke of Savoy, the confederate cantons and the Grison soldiers, who lacked pay, were preparing to rise against the duc. At the time the Spanish invasion of Northern France threatened Paris and the Valtellina had become a secondary priority for the French government. Rohan experienced this in terms of financial support, but also in his attempt to find a diplomatic resolution. The royal council stalled ratification of the treaty that Rohan had concluded with the Grisons over the Valtellina and insisted on amendments to several articles. Multiple times the duc tried to pressure Richelieu into action with regard to the ratification as well as to the financial troubles by offering his resignation. Then Rohan fell ill, when revolt was imminent in late 1636, leaving a lot of room to manoeuvre for the Spanish and Imperial agents that were stirring up the Grison government. Although he was able to reach a settlement about the year of pay owed to the Swiss regiments, Rohan could no longer succeed in satisfying the Grisons and prevent rebellion. In March 1637 the Grison revolt declared war to the French with the support of imperial troops. Rohan came too late to resolve the crisis. He was able to escape with 200 men and sought refuge in the Fort du Rhin. Soon Grison regiments and militia besieged the fortress and Rohan found himself isolated from his troops in the Valtellina. Then he saw no other way but to negotiate a solution, surrendering the valley and all the French-built forts to the Grisons. Until he disbanded his troops in the Valtellina, he would remain prisoner in the Fort du Rhin.[52]

Ancient rebel cut loose

The last phase in Rohan's career begins with his public disgrace after he failed to put down the Grison rebellion and ends with his tragic death caused by the wounds inflicted on the battlefield at Rheinfelden. There he fought as soldier in the forces of Bernard of Saxen-Weimar, a renowned military contractor fighting in the service of the French Crown. The relationship between the duc and the French Crown seemed irreversibly broken. The frail relation of service by a valuable officer of the Crown had turned into one of permanent distrust from the part of the government as against an anxious display of fidelity and growing concern for the preservation of his life and honour from the part of Rohan.

Looking back on the last year of his life, it could be argued that Rohan committed political suicide when he gave up the Valtellina and the fortresses that were built on his orders in the

[51] Clarke, *Huguenot Warrior*, 201; Deyon, *Rohan*, 168-169; Laugel, *Rohan*, 328-330; Rott, "Rohan et Richelieu (1629-1638)", 179, 182-184.
[52] Deyon, *Rohan*, 171-181; Clarke, *Huguenot Warrior*, 204-210; Laugel, *Rohan*, 337-348.

previous years.[53] He concluded a treaty with the military and political leaders of the Grisons that forced him to retrieve his French troops from the valley and march them back to France. When official communication from France finally came, it was clear that the duc's actions went against the explicit orders of the French court to maintain the Valtellina at all cost. Although these actions infuriated Richelieu, they hardly seem unforgivable in light of the duc's previous independent conduct and decision-making. In absence of clear and speedy dispatches from the royal council, the circumstances an officer of the Crown found himself in would often demand direct action. Furthermore, the king and the cardinal's war policies have recently been shown to be haphazard and *ad hoc*, which would often generate unworkable situations for generals in the field. The war-effort was characterized by contradictory instructions and a lack of financial support at pivotal moments.[54] Perhaps future events in the Franco-Spanish war could have changed circumstances in such a way that Rohan's services would again be invaluable and immediately required.

Early in the year 1637, however, the French government regarded the Duc de Rohan with severe suspicion, an impression that was aggravated by the enterprises of a number of parties at court. Rohan was hesitant to re-enter France after his mission in the Swiss cantons came to an unfortunate end. He decided to await further orders of the king in Geneva. The duc asked the royal government to grant him temporary retirement at Geneva until the situation in the Valtellina would allow him to travel to Venice in order to resume the office that he had suspended years before. It took a long time before the king finally conceded the request to return to Venice in December 1637. His six-month sojourn at Geneva fuelled suspicions that he had covertly conspired with the Grison rebels. Rumours ran around the court and parties like Condé, *surintendant* Bullion, and Père Joseph demanded his arrest. The latter even attempted to 'prove' Rohan's misconduct by tricking him into treasonous deeds. A plot was created that would implicate the duc as working in the service of the Spanish Infanta.[55]

Rohan withstood the ruses and kept stressing his loyalty to the king, but it did not help alleviate Richelieu's rage and suspicions. Always suspicious for plots Richelieu gave more credibility to rumours than to the tireless attempts of Marguerite de Béthune to persuade the *premier ministre* and the king of her husband's good intentions. Warnings soon reached Rohan from his wife at court informing him of secret demands for his arrest. Richelieu ordered Rohan to join the Duc de Longueville in the Franche-Comté. There Condé and the Sieur d'Etampes, *intendant* of the army stationed there, would join forces to apprehend him. Rohan, in correspondence with d'Etampes, did not refuse to join the army in the Franche-Comté. Rather he

[53] Clarke, *Huguenot Warrior*, 208-211.
[54] Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, 76, 117, 122-123.
[55] Clarke, *Huguenot Warrior*, 210-211; Laugel, *Rohan*, 351-355. Recent research by C.T. Gregory does shed some new light on these rumours and Rohan's willingness to once again raise the standard of revolt. Gregory, "The End of Richelieu", 52-53, 131-134.

took his time to watch the situation unfold at the French court, where Condé kept pleading against him. Several months went by until another agent of the king, the Sieur de Varennes, was sent to Geneva allegedly to tell the duc of the king's wishes. His real mission, however, was to convince the Genevan city government to end their hospitality. In January 1638 Rohan decided to leave his 'safe haven' Geneva upon the king's orders.[56]

Understanding the danger he was in, the duc avoided travelling through territories that were governed by the Prince de Condé. He crossed the Lake of Léman to the castle of Lenzburg where he met Bernard von Saxe-Weimar. Over the years, Rohan had corresponded with the Saxon duke and had met him several times during his exile from France. Bernard and his troops took concern for Rohan's safety and escorted him to Zurich. The military escort of Rohan and his subsequent stay in this city greatly unsettled the Grisons and neighbouring Catholic cantons. When the Zurich city council also turned its back against the wandering duc, Saxe-Weimar offered Rohan asylum in his military camp. Uncertain about the situation and his course of action, and still unwilling to implicate himself by his actions, Rohan reluctantly accepted the asylum and volunteered in the army of the Duke of Saxe-Weimar.[57]

During the last months of his life, Rohan provided Saxe-Weimar with counsel and prepared the troops for an upcoming battle at Rheinfelden. The battle that would begin on 28 February 1638 turned into a disaster for Bernard's forces. Rohan, part of a cavalry unit, lost most of his men and was twice taken prisoner and liberated as the military confrontation unfolded. From the last apprehension he had suffered two bullet wounds – at the shoulder and the foot – of which he was to recover at the secularised Abbey of Königsfelden. Initially the duc's recovery seemed promising and he started planning his return to Venice, as he had never intended to stay with the army of Bernard von Saxe-Weimar for long. A letter from Louis XIII, wishing Rohan a quick recuperation, permitted him to make his way to the Venetian Republic and acquire the necessary passports from the Spanish or Hungarian king. However, that journey would never come to pass, for the battle wounds caused complications of which Henri de Rohan expired on 13 April 1638. Perfunctory as the mourning of the French king and his *premier ministre* may have been, they expressed their grief at the passing of this ancient rebel and valuable officer of the Crown. On the battlefield with Protestant allies, Rohan died fighting the enemies of France.[58]

[56] Clarke, *Huguenot Warrior*, 211-214; Laugel, *Rohan*, 349-355.
[57] Clarke, *Huguenot Warrior*, 211-214; Deyon, *Rohan*, 182-184; Laugel, *Rohan*, 355-357.
[58] Clarke, *Huguenot Warrior*, 213; Deyon, *Rohan*, 184-186; Laugel, *Rohan*, 359-361.

Rohan as 'disarmed' intellectual armed with his books

Rohan wrote his main political works in his 'leisure' time in Venice. Not much is known about the genesis of his political thought of the 1630s. This paragraph focuses on two elements that served as foundations for his political reflections, his 'intellectual network' and his 'cabinet'. It reviews the peers, personal acquaintances and clients that influenced Rohan or aided to construct his views on the internal and external political affairs of France and European politics in general.

Henri de Rohan can be perceived as a minor prince in the European society of princes. Rohan's intellectual *milieu* consisted of both 'equals' – princes and diplomats – and highly learned clients. His correspondence attests of various connections to foreign princes and diplomats, many of whom were his co-religionists. In these relations not only Rohan's political ambitions, but also his political views came to the fore.

One of these relations is an early and enduring 'English connection'. On his *grand tour* in 1600-1601 Rohan resided at the English and Scottish courts and an affectionate bond as well as lasting correspondence originated there and then. From the early 1600s onwards, the duc exchanged letters with King James I (1566-1625) and, after James' demise, Rohan perpetuated this practice with his godchild Charles I (1600-1649). Other correspondents of the time include preeminent statesmen like secretary of state Lord Robert Cecil (1563-1612) and James Hay, Viscount of Doncaster (1580-1636). The latter was the extraordinary ambassador to James I, who unsuccessfully sought to obtain peace in France 1621-1622 and in 1622 became the Earl of Carlisle.[59] This part of his correspondence can be deemed largely as calls for support in the Protestant cause and a plea for more English intervention in the affairs of Europe.

The 'English connection' in Rohan's correspondence lasted into the 1630s. Among the Englishmen he was acquainted and exchanged letters with was Sir Isaac Wake (1580/1-1632), the English ambassador to Venice.[60] Wake's views on Northern Italian politics apparently were comparable to Rohan's.[61] It was this diplomat who forwarded the first of Rohan's "Discours d'Estat" to the English secretary of state Dudley Carlton, Viscount of Dorchester in the early 1630s. These two contemporary reflections on European affairs provide an important context for the conception of Rohan's *De l'Interest des Princes*.[62]

Besides this 'English connection', Rohan in the early 1630s also corresponded with Gustavus Adolphus, the King of Sweden. Less is known about the exact nature of the correspondence, but

[59] Hugh R. Trevor-Roper, *Europe's physician: the life of Sir Theodore de Mayerne, 1573-1655* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 47-48, 108-109; Laugel, *Rohan*, 125-126, 254-257.
[60] On Wake, see Vivienne Larminie, "Wake, Sir Isaac (1580/1-1632)", *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 2004). URL: http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/28407, accessed 10 Feb 2015.
[61] Larminie, "Wake", *ODNB*.
[62] These discourses shall be considered more elaborately in Intermezzo I and Chapter III. See Appendix 3 for a transcript of the discourses.

Rohan definitely sent some of his political writings to high standing Swedish politicians before publication.[63] Rohan was keen to show his admiration for the Swedish king's war efforts on the German battlefield. Furthermore, he intended to disperse his views of a European coalition of Protestant princes against the Spanish monarchy prone on conquest.

To a large extent, the early formation of Rohan's political views and his speeches and discourses of the 1610s should be considered in the context of the political wing of the Huguenot movement.[64] The politics of the Huguenot movement was publicly committed to a "general good". This *bien* was represented by the oaths that all members of the 'political assemblies' undertook at each of their meetings.[65] In the assemblies everything was highly structured and formalised as laid down in the Huguenot political 'constitution' of Mantes 1594. The aim was to prevent that individual ambitions or personal interests would endanger the "general good of the churches".[66] After 1598, the Edict of Nantes became the articulation of this *bien des églises* and therefore it should be upheld to the letter, every single article. The chief spokesman and "Huguenot Gallican" Philippe Duplessis-Mornay considered the "general good" of the Huguenots as coterminous with the general good of the French monarchy and of France. It was a common view among the Huguenot political leadership that Habsburg Spain sought to undermine the French monarchy, fomenting troubles and frustrating the position of the Huguenots in France.[67]

For many Henri IV came to personify the French answer to Spanish attempts to disrupt public order. For instance, Rohan's father-in-law, the Duc de Sully, wrote in his memoirs on Henri IV's plans to counter Habsburg hegemony. Although historiography has established that Sully's description of a 'Grand Dessein' – Henrician plans for a balanced power system in Europe – probably were an exaggeration, the idea of the need to counter Spanish power remained alive in the Huguenot movement.[68] As the king's favourite, Rohan would have been one of the few people with insight into the most private of statements about Henri IV's intended foreign policy. A lifelong devotee to Henri IV's memory, it is the connection between the 'good of the Churches', '*le bien d'État*' and an aggressive anti-Habsburg foreign policy that Rohan's political writings in the

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[63] Laugel, *Rohan*, 303-304; Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity*, 72-73.

[64] I am deeply grateful to Mark Greengrass who pointed me in this direction in his immensely helpful "Commentary" to my Rohan chapters at the symposium *Monarchy Transformed: raison d'état and its opponents, 1620-1760*, Rotterdam May 2016.

[65] See Arthur L. Herman, "Protestant Churches in a Catholic Kingdom: Political Assemblies in the Thought of Philippe Duplessis-Mornay", *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 21, no. 4 (1990): 543-557; idem, "The Huguenot Republic and Antirepublicanism", 249-269.

[66] In contrast to what historians since Friedrich Meinecke have generally argued, I think Rohan's posthumously published *political discourses* of the 1610s should be seen in this light. For all their concern with 'private interests' and 'public good', these discourses do not so much anticipate the duc's *De l'Interest des Princes* as they belong in this specific context of the Huguenot movement.

[67] See Herman, "Political Assemblies in the Thought of Duplessis-Mornay", 548.

[68] Mark Greengrass, *France in the Age of Henri IV* (London and New York: Longman, 1995), 248-250; Edmund Dickermann, "Conviction, Ambition and the Genesis of Sully's *Économies Royales*", *The Historical Journal* 30, no. 3 (1987): 513-521.

circumstances of the 1610s and 1620s constantly emphasize and upon which his apologetic *Mémoires* reflect.[69] He began his self-justificatory reflections with the death of 'Henri le Grand', because, as Rohan wrote, "during the minority of Louis XIII the regency changed the maxims of the French government and laid the foundations of the persecutions of the Huguenots. This did not only ruin the Huguenot movement, but is believed to lead to the subversion of Christendom and to give the House of Habsburg a universal monarchy over Europe."[70] The politics of royal favour at the court of Marie de' Medici had corrupted people into thinking that it would be in the interest of France to undermine the Huguenots' rights as stipulated by the Edict of Nantes. "The absolute rule of favourites is the ruin of a realm," Rohan cynically observed.[71]

Correspondence, conversations and encounters within the European society of princes and among his peers in the political wing of French Protestantism undoubtedly informed Rohan's understanding of French and European politics. While these relations were significant, especially in the context of the regency years and the Huguenot wars of the 1620s, other intellectual connections on more unequal footing may have been singularly important in the development of his political ideas. Jonathan Dewald recently emphasized in his study on the Rohan family that the profile of recruitment for Rohan's most intimate advisors seems to have consisted in a literary education, (violent) adventurism, and a mind that was receptive to heterodox ideas, sometimes even changing confessional allegiance.[72]

The clients focused on here provide intellectual connections that probably informed and inspired Rohan's political thought. Rohan surrounded himself mostly with well-educated men from Protestant patriciate circles.[73] First among these clients was Daniel Durant, sieur de la Haute-Fontaine (died in 1621). Durant, the son of a Parisian, Protestant financier, had received a humanist education and had dreamed of an appointment as university professor. When this dream failed to become reality, Durant briefly served Philip de Béthune, Sully's brother, and not long after got appointed as tutor to Henri and Benjamin de Rohan. The tutor became a lifelong

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[69] The narrative of Rohan's *Mémoires* [...] *sur les choses advenues en France depuis la mort de Henry le Grand, jusques à la paix faite avec les Reformez au mois de Juin 1629 1610-1629* is roughly structured following the meetings of the Huguenot political assemblies, from the 'general assemblies' 1611-1622 to the regional and local assemblies of the later 1620s that supported the duc's military, diplomatic and political efforts.

[70] "J'ai commencé ces Mémoires à la mort de Henry le Grand; parce que durant la minorité du roi son fils on a changé au gouvernement de la France les maximes du père, et jetté les fondements de la persécution des Reformés, lesquels n'ont pas seulement ruiné leurs affaires, mais ont cuidé entraîner la subversion de la Chrétienté, et donner la Monarchie d'Autriche." Henri de Rohan, *Mémoires du duc de Rohan, sur les choses advenues en France depuis la mort de Henry le Grand, jusques à la paix faite avec les Reformez au mois de Juin 1629* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1646), preface ***3r. Hereafter referred to as *Mémoires 1610-1629* to distinguish these from Rohan's *Mémoires sur la guerre de la Valteline*.

[71] "C'est la ruine d'un État que le règne absolu des favoris." Rohan, *Mémoires 1610-1629*, 85.

[72] Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity*, 185-187.

[73] Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity*, 184-188.

friend and soon acted as his principal advisor and agent.[74] Under the wings of his tutor, the young aristocrat had developed a taste for history, geography, mathematics and military science. Given their long friendly relationship, Durant's expertise guided Rohan's earliest intellectual development. Together with Théodore Turquet de Mayerne (1573-1655), Durant accompanied the young aristocrats Rohan and Soubise on their *grand tour*.[75] Mayerne, whose father Louis had been an idiosyncratic Huguenot political thinker, became the Rohan family's physician in 1599 and continued these services for forty years.[76] Durant and Mayerne taught Rohan the essentials of humanist civic curiosity, in which the geographical, political and military strengths and weaknesses of particular cities and countries were to be observed and compared. Rohan's *Voyage*, his account of the European tour, written as a young man, widely circulated and only published posthumously in 1646, reflected this education.[77] As it was mainly the work of an industrious student, the *Voyage* should not be interpreted to contain the seeds of Rohan's later reflections about Europe's geo-political realities.[78]

A connection that was important in the gestation of the duc's political ideas on the geopolitical situation in Europe and the Valtellina in particular was the 'friendship' of the Huguenot military leader and well-known satirist Théodore-Agrippa d'Aubigné (1552-1630), an old client of the Rohan family.[79] Their acquaintance was a result of Aubigné's service under René II de Rohan, Henri's father, in the armies of the King of Navarre in the 1585 during the War of the Three Henri's.[80] In 1617, the warrior-satirist sold Rohan two estates 100.000 livres worth, as the duc recorded in his *Mémoires*.[81] Most of the surviving correspondence between the two men,

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[74] Eugène Haag and Emile Haag, *La France protestante, ou Vies des protestants français qui se sont fait un nom dans l'histoire depuis les premiers temps de la réformation jusqu'à la reconnaissance du principe de la liberté des cultes par l'Assemblée nationale*, 4 (Paris: Cherbuliez, 1853), 496-497.
[75] Trevor-Roper, *Europe's physician,* 44-49, 108.
[76] On Louis Turquet de Mayerne (1533/4-1618), author of *La Monarchie Aristodémocratique*, see Mark Greengrass, "The Calvinist and the Chancelor: The Mental World of Louis Turquet de Mayerne", *Francia – Forschungen zur westeuropäischen Geschichte* 34, no. 2 (2007): 1-23.
[77] On the *Voyage* see Emma Pauncefort, "The Duc de Rohan's Voiage of 1600: Gallocentric travel to England in the formation of a French noble", Rosemary Sweet, Gerrit Verhoeven, and Sarah Goldsmith (eds.), *Beyond the Grand Tour: Northern Metropolises and Early Modern Travel Behaviour* (London: Routledge, 2017), 27-45.
[78] Henri de Rohan, *Voyage du duc de Rohan faict en l'an 1600, en Italie, Allemaigne, Pays-bas Uni, Angleterre, & Escosse* (Amsterdam: Elzevier, 1646); Deyon, *Henri de Rohan*, 24-39; Laugel, *Henry de Rohan*, 30-31. Laugel thinks this series of parallels between countries – Germany compared with Italy, France with England, Scotland with Bohemia, Venice with the Low Countries – recalls the parallel lives of Plutarch, which indeed might have been an inspiration giving Rohan's great admiration for this work already recorded by his first biographer, Fauvelet du Toc. Fauvelet du Toc, *Histoire de Henry Duc de Rohan,* 11-15.
[79] I recognize that given the hierarchical relations between Rohan and Aubigné it is difficult to speak of true friendship. On this point, see the considerations of Marie-Madeleine Fragonard. Marie-Madeleine Fragonard, "Aubigné, l'homme des réseaux", *Albineana* 25 (2013): 19-44, esp. 32.
[80] [Sarah Scott], *The Life of Theodore Agrippa d'Aubigné, containing a succinct account of the most remarkable occurrences during the civil wars of France in the reigns of Charles IX, Henry III, Henry IV, and in the minority of Lewis XIII* (London: Edward and Charles Dilly, 1772) 220, 229, 397-399.
[81] Rohan, *Mémoires 1610-1629*, 105; Clarke, *Rohan*, 67.

however, dates from after the years of the regency of Marie de' Medici. Particularly significant is the fact that Aubigné, who fled France and became an exile in Geneva in 1620, came to be a political informant to Rohan.[82] From 1622 onwards, the duc asked him for advice on the crisis in the Valtellina. By that time the valley had once again caught the eye of both France and Spain for military-strategic considerations, but it was also of strong interest to Protestant international politics. In a letter to Aubigné, Rohan had reportedly requested proper instruction in Grison and Valtellina politics, where his correspondent had contacts and travelled extensively.[83] Regarding this strategic valley, Aubigné and the duc also discussed the potential wish of the Venetian Republic to employ Rohan as general to the Valtellina.[84] Furthermore, Aubigné possibly wrote a "Raisonnement d'estat sur la guerre de la Valteline" for Rohan around 1623.[85] At least on the face of it, it follows from their correspondence that Rohan early on became a 'specialist' in the politics of the Grisons and the Valtellina partly through Aubigné's service.

Furthermore, Rohan gathered around him a number of heterodox thinkers, among whom were clients like Théophile Brachet, Jean Bouffard de Madiane, and Jacques Dupuy.[86] Dupuy, a man from a considerable Huguenot family in Montauban, was one of the city's consuls during the siege of this Protestant stronghold in the Huguenot Wars of the 1620s.[87] As consul he rallied support for Rohan in the city, and as the duc's client supported his policies in the many municipal conflicts over the war effort and the support of the cities in the Midi. The Montauban consul had ties to such radical irenic thinkers as La Millétiere, but even though Rohan probably was aware of their work, no direct connection can be established. After the conclusion of the Peace of Alès in 1629, Dupuy left the country in diffidence of the Peace, but later joined Rohan in his exile to Venice.[88] Dupuy's functions seem to have centred mainly on political and military organisation, but he may have been part of Rohan's Venetian 'cabinet' that would be instrumental to his political thought.

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[82] Here I further develop a thesis first proposed by Gilles Banderier. Gilles Banderier, "Agrippa d'Aubigné et la Valteline: un texte inédit", *Papers on French Seventeenth-Century Literature* 28, no. 55 (2001): 141-151.

[83] This request by Rohan is quoted in a letter from Aubigné (n. XXII) to the Venetian ambassador to Switzerland, Cavassa. Théodore-Agrippa d'Aubigné (E. Réaume and F. de Caussade, eds.), *Oeuvres complètes de Théodore Agrippa d'Aubigné.* Tome premier (Paris: Alphonse Lemerre, 1873), 237. "Deux jour savant la vostre, j'en receus une de M. de Rohan, par laquelle (comme se tenant assure de server la Serenissime Seigneurie), il m'usoit de ces mots: *Nous n'avons rien maintenant de si grande importence que de regarder aux passages de nos forces; nous nous sommes attendus à vous pour la recoignoissance de cel. Je vous prie de m'en instruire amplement*. A ces mots j'ay respondu par l'ayde de trois personnes confidentes et d'authorité parmi les Grisons […]."

[84] Letter (IV) from Aubigné to Rohan, Réaume, *Oeuvres completes* I, 292.

[85] Banderier, "Agrippa d'Aubigné et la Valteline", 144.

[86] For more information on Brachet and Bouffard de Madiane, see Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity*, 184-188.

[87] In the southern part of France, the so-called *pays d'Oc*, municipal government was organised according to the Roman model, with elected consuls that governed the city for a designated amount of time. Haag, *La France protestante*, 453.

[88] Haag, *La France protestante,* 453-455.

During Rohan's exile, Théodore Tronchin (1582-1657) was important in providing the duc access to the learned Protestant world. As a Calvinist theologian living in Geneva Rohan befriended Tronchin in the early years of his exile, apparently through the mediation of an earlier acquaintance and Calvinist theologian Jean Diodati.[89] During the duc's exile Tronchin took care of Rohan's library and forwarded books Rohan requested or that the theologian thought would be of interest to him.[90] Much of this literature was theological in nature and might not have influenced the duc's political thought directly. His library and correspondence with Tronchin persuade to consider that the apparent absence of strong Protestant convictions in Rohan's mature political writings and his aristocrat lifestyle, including his gambling habit, tell us little about the duc's most intimate religious beliefs. In the process of the sharpening of the duc's political thought, however, the Genevan Calvinist's influence may be deemed minor.

Rohan's Venetian 'cabinet' was crucial in this process and of singular importance in it was Benjamin Priolo (sometimes Prioleau; 1602-1667). Priolo was a native of Saint-Jean d'Angély, one of the Huguenot strongholds governed by Rohan that was besieged during the wars of the 1620s. Priolo was a wandering intellectual who travelled an interesting intellectual *parcours*. After a lay formation at Orthez and Montauban, he studied at Leiden under Daniel Heinsius and Gerhard Vossius. From there he first went to Basel and Geneva to study law. Later he went to Padua, where he was a student of the Italian natural philosopher Fortunio Liceti and Cesare Cremonini, the Aristotelian naturalist. Priolo was still at the University of Padua, when Rohan enlisted him in the early 1630s to become his secretary. With his notable literary and linguistic skill he first only served Rohan as his secretary, but soon Priolo became his trusted advisor and agent.[91] As the duc's agent, Priolo was indispensable to upholding diplomatic relations and relations with the French Crown.[92] Historians have argued that Priolo even also served as a 'ghost-writer' to Rohan. The hand of Priolo must have been most apparent in Rohan's *Mémoires sur la guerre de la Valteline* that dealt with the events from the Peace of Alès and the duc's exile in 1629 until his death in 1638.[93] However, it is not necessary to ascribe specific authorship of any of Rohan's works to Priolo in order to allow for his considerable influence in the duc's cabinet in their gestation and formulation. The content of their discussions comes down to speculation, but the connections his

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[89] See a letter from Rohan to Diodati, 3 February 1632, in Eugène de Budé (ed.), "La Réforme en Italie, Lettres d'Odet de La Noue, de Rohan et de Gassion", *Bulletin de la Société de l'Histoire du Protestantisme Français* 16 (1867): 23-24. Pierre Bayle, *Dictionnaire historique et critique: tome 4* (Amsterdam, 1730), 398-399.

[90] Stelling-Michaud, "Le Duc de Rohan et ses livres", 18-27.

[91] Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity*, 70-71, 188-192; idem, "Rohan's World", 169; Clarke, *Huguenot Warrior*, 185; Laugel, *Henry de Rohan*, 313; also see the article on Priolo in Pierre Bayle, *Dictionnaire historique et critique: tome 3* (Amsterdam, 1730), 813-817.

[92] See Rott, *Histoire de la representation diplomatique de la France*, IV-V.

[93] Sainte-Beuve, *Causeries du Lundi* 12, 344-345; also referred to in Laugel, *Rohan*, 313; and Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity*, 190.

'confident ami' provided the duc to the intellectual world of Padua undoubtedly reverberated in Rohan's thinking of the 1630s.

While the exact nature of Rohan's intellectual network and Venetian 'cabinet' and how these connections provided the foundations for Rohan's ideas on politics remains elusive, this enquiry gives some insight in the men he corresponded with or gathered around him. Apart from his humanist aristocratic education and his own reading, the connections to peers within the society of princes and to co-religionists in the 1610s and 1620s, but above all his 'cabinet' with clients like his 'intellectual secretary' Priolo aided Rohan in conceiving, developing and sharpening his main political writings of the 1630s that would secure him an intellectual legacy far into the seventeenth century.

Conclusion: Grand competition and transformations in the French monarchy

For all the biographical detail this chapter did not simply describe the agency of one of the political and military Huguenot 'heroes' of seventeenth-century France. The life of Henri de Rohan illustrates the difficult relationship between the high nobility and the French crown, a relationship of mutual dependency and conflicts of interest. Furthermore, the hard-won social collaboration between the Crown and the aristocracy meant that there was much social competition among the high nobility itself and with other fast-rising elites.

In the case of Rohan, this competition consisted in conflicts of precedence such as the 'battles' Rohan and La Trémoille fought in the first two decades of the seventeenth century over the presidency of the Second Estate at the Estates of Brittany. Other such conflicts arrived in the 1630s when conflicts of diplomatic prominence with Du Landé and Lasnier frustrated much of what Rohan sought to accomplish. The most insidious form of competition is to be found in the personal enmities and the court intrigues that were part of the lives of the high aristocracy in a French monarchy that was increasingly centred on the court with its politics of affection. Ever since Rohan kindly refused to prevent the arrest and imprisonment of Henri II de Bourbon-Condé in 1617, this Prince held a grudge for Rohan. In the 1620s Condé led armies against the Huguenot forces of Rohan and seized his estates and government of Poitou when the duc was declared guilty of *lèse-majesté*. After the Peace of Alès, when Rohan went into exile, the Prince never stopped thwarting the duc's designs and calling for his arrest until the latter's demise. Another personal enemy was the Protestant Duc de Bouillon. Rohan had marched against him alongside King Henri IV in 1605 and fought a perpetual conflict with this duc during the regency decade. Finally, courtiers and counsellors like Père Joseph and *surintendant* Bullion had various reasons to suspect Rohan and prosecute or at least frustrate him by spreading rumours and blacken the exiled duc with the royal government.

It is under the circumstances of the rivalry and confrontation between Habsburg Spain and Valois-Bourbon France that Henri II duc de Rohan developed his ideas and views on the European society of princes and the necessary position France has to take therein. This chapter argued that rather than taking the development of Rohan's political ideas from the death of his beloved King Henri IV in 1610 into the 1630s as a continuity, his political speeches, discourses and manifestos of the first two decades have to be seen first and foremost against the background of the duc's specific positioning in the fickle and protean political circumstances of the time. Later, Rohan developed his ideas of 'interest' as abstraction of the internal dynamic that varies in different regions and provinces and different periods in time and that directs policy in external affairs. In the context of his Venetian exile in the early 1630s, Rohan's ideas on the Habsburg-Bourbon rivalry culminated in his *De l'Interest des Princes et Estats de la Chrestienté*. It is in the vibrant intellectual climate of Venice and Padua and unmistakably after long discussions in his 'cabinet', that Rohan brought about full-fledged the intellectual jump from his *grand* reality to the novel perspective of the true 'interest' that "is forever sure".

Publishing in the Interest of a Prince: Publication history of Rohan's *De l'Interest des Princes*

An important aspect of intellectual history is the query for the motivations of the author in writing and publishing a specific work, whether it be a pamphlet or a political treatise. What were the motivations of the author in publishing his work and were they solely his or do we need to consider the motivations of a publisher? These motivations might tell us something more of the intellectual context of the published work. Did the author, for instance, intervene in a specific political debate of the time or were his motivations more mundane? In order to interpret the political writings of Henri de Rohan correctly in their own historical and intellectual context, we need to know more about their composition, publication, and reception.

Composition

Few details have reached us of the history of composition of Rohan's *De l'Interest des Princes et Estats de la Chrestienté*.[1] While not much is known, the common assumption among historians is that Rohan wrote the greater part of this political treatise while he resided at court in Paris in 1634 at Richelieu and Louis XIII's request. This view is based on the fact that the dedication to Richelieu – both in manuscript and later in the published version of the text – carries the place and date Paris, "1er aoûst 1634".[2] Small parts of the work were probably written soon after his Venetian days, sometime between 1631 and 1633. Clear textual evidence for this contention can be found in the second part of the book, for instance in the Discourse (VI) treating of the causes leading up to the war in Bohemia, that would be the start of the Thirty Years' War. The

[1] Christian Lazzeri provides an overview of the various accounts on the composition of *De l'Interest*. Christian Lazzeri, "Introduction", in *De l'intérêt des princes et états de la Chrétienté*, Henri de Rohan, ed. Christian Lazzeri (Paris: PUF, 1995), 153-155.

[2] As yet, little attention has been paid to the different manuscript versions of Rohan's treatise. At this moment, I have found fourteen manuscript versions of *De l'Interest des Princes et Estats de la Chrestienté*, most complete and some partials, preserved in various archives. Most are to be found at two locations of the Bibliothèque National de France in Paris (Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal and Département des Manuscrits). The manuscripts are contained in the following folders of the archives: BnF, MS Fr. 17481, fol. 166-191 with possible original corrections (Rohan's papers?); BnF, MS Fr. 17884, fol. 204-259, accessible online at gallica.bnf.fr; BnF, MS Fr. 19055, with the adjoined "Discours d'Estats faict(s) par monsieur le duc de Rohan, estant à Venise, 1631"; NAF 2082, fol. 299-348; Dupuy 248, fol. 1-56, available on microfiche; BnF, MS Fr. 5882, fol. 37-128; BnF, MS. Cinq cents de Colbert 49, fol. 56-126; BnF, MS. Fr. 5073, fol. 72-77 (extract); BnF, Arsenal, MS-3135. Recueil Conrart, p. 577-604 (pages numbered, not folios); BnF Arsenal, MS-4001, fol. 60-84; BnF Arsenal, MS-6829, fol. 22-27 (extract); Centre des Archives diplomatiques de La Courneuve, 53MD/407. France et divers États, 57; Bibliothèque de l'Institut de France (BIF), MS. 706, fol. 86-192; BIF, MS Godefroy, fol. 46-71 (extract).

composition of this historical discourse can be dated according to the statement that the war started fourteen years earlier. Given Rohan's messy chronology in the account that purports the view that the war started in 1619 with the election and acceptance of Frederic V, the Elector Palatine, as Bohemian king, the composition of this discourse can be dated sometime in 1633.[3] It is therefore plausible that certain parts of the composition were already well underway by the time Rohan arrived in Paris in 1634. Perhaps he had already finished most of the case studies of contemporary history that would form the second part of the book.[4]

Nevertheless we might conjecture that the duc was equally well advanced in his reflections of the European theatre of war shortly after the beginning of his exile in Venice (1629-1631). In 1631, the English ambassador to Venice, Sir Isaac Wake, sent a "Discourse of the Duke of Rohan on the affairs of Christendom" along with a letter to the chief minister of state in England, the Viscount of Dorchester.[5] These political reflections on the European state of affairs are closely related to a piece of evidence that the editor of the modern edition of *De l'Interest* recently added in his discussion of the work's composition. Christian Lazzeri points to a short text titled "Discours d'Estat fait à Venise par un seigneur français". This particular text was published in the sixteenth volume of the *Mercure François* in 1632, an annual publication of pieces dealing with European affairs the redaction of which was tightly connected to circles around the French *premier ministre*, Cardinal Richelieu. Although it was probably not the manuscript that was used in preparing the publication in the *Mercure François* a manuscript copy of the exact text under the heading "Discours d'Estats faict(s) par monsieur le duc de Rohan, estant à Venise, 1631" is preserved in the *Département des Archives* of the French national library (BnF).[6] This and yet another manuscript of the same discourse almost perfectly correspond to the content of the one the English ambassador to Venice sent to England. This proves not only that Rohan was the author of this pamphlet but also that it circulated widely in the year before it appeared in print.[7]

It appears that Rohan deliberately distributed manuscript copies of 1631 "Discours d'Estats" to (representatives of) various princes who he either sought to exhort into action or whose foreign policies he supported and lauded in the piece. Accordingly, he sent at least one manuscript

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[3] *Pace* Christian Lazzeri, who did notice Rohan's modified chronology but in his calculation retained the starting point of the war in 1618 to date the composition in 1632. Lazzeri, "Introduction", 153-155, 221; Meinecke, *Machiavellism*, 165.
[4] Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity*, 72-73.
[5] The National Archives, Kew, State Papers Foreign 78/89/115, folio 238: "Discourse of the Duke of Rohan on the affairs of Christendom".
[6] BnF MS Fr. 19055, fol. 59-64. This manuscript is included in a volume with Rohan's *De l'Interest des Princes*, both copied by Claude Martin, who dated the volume in 1636.
[7] At least three manuscript copies of this discourse remain extant in the archives today. In the *Département des manuscrits* of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France it can be found in the manuscript folders: BnF, MS Fr. 17481 and BnF, MS Fr. 19055. A third copy is the one stored in the National Archives in the United Kingdom: The National Archives, Kew, State Papers Foreign 78/89/115, folio 238 ff: "Discourse of the Duke of Rohan on the affairs of Christendom".

copy to Paris, had one forwarded to the English court through an intermediary, and plausibly also sent a copy of this discourse to the king of Sweden, for whom he had great admiration.[8] This was not the end of the matter, for in late 1632 the duc decided that he wanted to prepare the pamphlet for publication. In a letter written in September 1632 to his Genevan friend, Théodore Tronchin, he discussed a publication strategy.[9] That same year the copy sent to France ended up on the Parisian printing press that printed the *Mercure François*, but the duc might well have been unaware of these publication efforts when he wrote his friend about it.

It is certain that the story of Rohan's first attempt at publishing a piece on current European political affairs did not end there on the Parisian printing press that year. Apart from being included in the *Mercure*'s sixteenth volume, Rohan's friends in Geneva also prepared a separate printed edition of the pamphlet under the heading *Advis aux princes chrestiens, sur les affaires publiques presentes* in 1632. Yet another edition appeared in print that year carrying the extended title *Advis aux Princes Chrestiens, sur les desseins et entreprises des Espagnols, pour le sujet des affaires publiques de ce temps*.[10] Apart from small orthographical differences, these three printed editions do not diverge in terms of content.[11] Under the first, shorter heading it found its way into the anonymous volume *Mémoires des desseins de la Maison d'Austriche* printed by Pierre Aubert in 1633. The popularity of Rohan's pamphlet and others in this volume prompted a new and adapted edition as the *Mercure d'Estat* in 1635.[12]

In the text the 'gentleman from Venice' examines the strategies of European powers, paying special attention to the rivalry between Spain and France, from a perspective and line of thought comparable to that of *De l'Interest*. There is one important difference: Rohan does not use the terminology of interest.[13] The political discourse written by Rohan was an early exhortation addressed at the French government to actively counter Spanish aspirations for extension of

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[8] Although I have not seen the particular letter written in September 1632 to Tronchin that Jonathan Dewald mentions in his recent book on the Rohan family, I am positive that the discourse on the "state of European international politics" referred to in the Duc's correspondence is his "Discours d'Estat" of 1631. Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity*, 72-73.

[9] Ibidem.

[10] At least three editions of the discourse were printed in 1632, one in Paris, two in Geneva. An article by Gilles Banderier that in my view inaccurately attributed the printed text to Agrippa d'Aubigné mentions another edition that was probably also published the same year, this time bearing the title "Advis aux Princes Chrestiens sur les mouvements et entreprises du grand Turc" (s.l.n.d.). Gilles Banderier, "L'*Advis aux princes chrestiens*: un texte inédit d'Agrippa d'Aubigné", *Bulletin de la Société de l'Histoire du Protestantisme Français* 148 (2002) 309-335; especially 311.

[11] Banderier, "L'*Advis aux princes chrestiens*", 311-314.

[12] This second expanded edition of the volume was probably also published by Aubert. See printer's preface, "Le bon accueil fait à une partie de ces Discours leur a valu une seconde naissance, et un assortiment nouveau de quelques autres pieces de mesme nature." Anonymous, *Mercure d'Estat, ou Recueil de Divers Discours d'Estat* (s.n.l. [Geneva: Pierre Aubert?], 1635).

[13] Lazzeri, "Introduction", 154. Anonymous, "Discours d'Estat fait à Venise par un Seigneur François", in *Le Seiziesme Tome dv Mercure François, ou Suite de l'Histoire de nostre temps, sous le Regne du Tres-Chrestien Roy de France & de Nauarre Lovys XIII*, continuation de l'an 1629 (Paris, 1632), 1069-1079.

power in Europe. By exposing Spanish designs and praising the efforts of for instance the Swedish king, the text also urged smaller European powers to align their efforts with a power block led by France.

Rohan's first Venetian pamphlet on current European affairs immediately drew him into a small diatribe with a Catholic pro-Spanish publicist. In a Latin pamphlet *Ad principes catholicos, de praesenti reipublicae Statu* the author of the French piece is exposed as a heretic of high birth and standing. Besides this short *ad hominem* – that does not mention Rohan's name, either because the author did not know that he authored it or chose not to reveal it – the rebuttal basically inverts Rohan's argumentation. The Catholic publicist states that the French want to destroy the Empire and bring the Catholic German princes down with it.[14]

Rohan felt forced to reply and did this in another pamphlet addressed to "those who wish to preserve their liberty or acquire it" written in 1632.[15] It seems highly significant that in this pamphlet, the anonymous author did use the term interest in the way he would soon use it in *De l'Interest des Princes et Estats de la Chrestienté*. He shows that his adversary parallels the Houses of France and Austria, elevating the latter even above the Roman Empire. This is supposed to scare off the "Princes et Estats qui ont interest de s'opposer à sa grandeur."[16] Similarly, Rohan refers multiple times to certain 'maximes' of Habsburg rule, the foremost and most practiced of which is to seek to maintain its authority by fear alone. Although the polemic style and tone is less apparent in *De l'Interest*, the two pamphlets of 1631 and 1632 seem to indicate an evolution in the argument and used terminology pointing in the direction of the work he would present to the French *premier ministre* in August 1634.

During and shortly after his Venetian exile, Rohan thus followed the events in Europe with great interest. No doubt his reading and the discussions in his 'cabinet' further informed his views on the power play on this theatre of war. He probably conceived of *De l'Interest* at this time and worked on this treatise on European political affairs alongside the writing of his *Mémoires* and the military treatise that would become *Le Parfaict capitaine*, which followed from his inexorable reading of the commentaries of his bellicose hero Julius Cesar. The writing of these two works, the one apologetic (the *Mémoires*) and the other military-political (the *Parfaict capitaine*),

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[14] See, for instance, *Memoire d'Estat*, 72.

[15] Anonymous [Henri de Rohan], *A ceux qui veulent conserver leur Liberté, ou l'acquerir*. BnF, Ms. Fr. 17481: fol. 219-221. The pamphlet was first printed in the volume *Mémoires des desseins de la Maison d'Autriche* (Geneva: Pierre Aubert, 1633) 54-67. For the dating of the manuscript, see the small scholarly dispute between Gilles Banderier and Jean-Raymond Fanlo in the *Bulletin de la Société de l'Histoire du Protestantisme Français*. Banderier, "L'*Advis aux princes chrestiens*", 309-335; Jean-Raymond Fanlo, "L'*Advis aux princes sur les affaires publiques presentes* n'est pas d'Agrippa d'Aubigné (à propos d'un article recent paru dans le *Bulletin*)", *Bulletin de la Société de l'Histoire du Protestantisme Français* 150 (2004): 367-373; Gilles Banderier, "Réponse à M. Jean-Raymond Fanlo", *Bulletin de la Société de l'Histoire du Protestantisme Français* 150 (2004): 375-381.

[16] *Memoire d'Estat*, 97. See Appendix 3 for a transcription of the manuscript of both Rohan's discourses, both of which are compared with the printed text.

positively started in his Venetian days. The two pamphlets on European affairs seemingly attest of the gestation of Rohan's conception of the interests of different powers. In all likelihood, *De l'Interest* was therefore largely written or nearly finished at the time that Rohan re-joined the French court in 1634.

Publication

As yet, all we know about the publication history of Rohan's major political writings are some general facts. Rohan's *De l'Interest des Princes et Estats de la Chrestienté* was first published anonymously in 1637 in the twentieth volume of the *Mercure François*, without the dedication to Richelieu. This volume of the *Mercure* treated of the events of the year 1634. In 1638 a genuine book publication of the political treatise followed, albeit in a joined volume with Rohan's other major work, *Le Parfaict capitaine*. The next year, a separate edition would follow; a reprint that was to be one of many editions during the seventeenth century.[17] The publication history of *De l'Interest*, to paraphrase the British historian Noel Malcolm, is not of antiquarian interest alone, it might just tell us something more of Rohan's intentions with his major political writings.[18] All the more so since a recent study has established that Rohan was well aware of contemporary publication strategies and did not hesitate to deploy them.[19]

Though the sketch of the publication history presented above may be the general truth of the matter, it does not explain the particulars. To begin with, the substantial number of manuscript copies that were preserved until this day suggests that Rohan's treatise had quite a significant 'pre-history' before it appeared in print. In fact, *De l'Interest* had a considerable circulation in manuscript form well before the work was published in the *Mercure François* in 1637 and in volume with the *Parfaict capitaine* one year later. The number of at least fourteen surviving manuscript copies is high and so significant that we should ask whether there was a scribal publication. The differences in handwriting of the various manuscript suggest that copies were made by or in service of a specific reader, but circulation initiated by the author cannot be ruled out completely. That is, manuscript copies of *De l'Interest* would have circulated outside of the author's control, due to interest that rose in some reader circles in Paris. Furthermore, individuals could have made their own copy for further circulation. Still it makes sense, that Rohan himself or one of his agents would have had a hand in the transmission of his political treatise outside the small confines of intimates of the dedicatee, Cardinal Richelieu. As we know that scribal publication was an important medium of transmission in the seventeenth century and that there

[17] For a summary of the state of research on the publication history of Rohan's *De l'Interest des Princes* see, Lazzeri, "Introduction", 153-155.
[18] Noel Malcolm, "The Printing of the 'Bear': New Light on the Second Edition of Hobbes's Leviathan", in Idem, *Aspects of Hobbes* (Oxford 2002) 336-382.
[19] Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity*, 72-73.

was an important recognized social aspect to the circulation of manuscripts, this manuscript circulation of *De l'Interest* might have been part of Rohan's aim to regain his honour and to procure high military and political office. Circulation of the manuscript among court circles that would subscribe to the idea of French active intervention in the European wars of the 1630s might have won Rohan the necessary basis of support for such a promotion.[20]

As is commonly acknowledged and can be inferred from the dedication of *De l'Interest des Princes*, in printed form as in the manuscript, Rohan presented the treatise to Cardinal Richelieu on or shortly after 1 August 1634. Thence not much is known and historians as yet have paid little attention to the manuscripts of Rohan's famous book. However, based on the considerable number of manuscripts surviving to this day we are able to reconstruct an initial manuscript circulation. This proliferation of the work in handwritten form was both extensive and it long persisted, before and even after 1638, when the treatise became available in print. At least six complete manuscripts survive, all found in the archives of the Bibliothèque nationale de France in Paris. A further three incomplete or excerpted manuscripts can be found in these same archives.[21] Of these manuscripts at least three post-date the publication of *De l'Interest des Princes*. In fact, by the early 1650s multiple editions of the printed book had already appeared, but there were still people who copied it by hand.[22] As the surviving manuscripts were all written in a different hand this cannot attest of a deliberate scribal publication, however large the circulation must have been between 1634 and 1663.

In 1634, a "M[onseigneu]r de Loménie" – probably Hugues-Auguste, Comte de Brienne, a preeminent *secretaire d'État* – gave a manuscript copy of *De l'Interest des Princes* to Pierre Dupuy.[23] Given the wide interest in current affairs among the circle of friends and acquaintances of the Dupuy brothers the treatise by Rohan was prone to be discussed in the Cabinet Dupuy.

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[20] A comparison of the manuscripts (see footnote 2 in Intermezzo I) shows that the manuscript circulated probably mostly on the initiation of the reader, i.e. as none of the extant manuscripts that I have seen were written in the same hand they were most likely reader copies. However, this does not necessarily preclude that manuscripts copied by a specialist scribe circulated. The initiation for the manuscript circulation might well have been Rohan's and it could thus have been part of a larger publication strategy. On manuscript publication and circulation, see the seminal work of François Moureau and Harold Love on manuscript culture after the advent of the printing press. For instance, François Moureau, "La plume et le plomb", in François Moureau (ed.), *De bonne main: la communication manuscrit au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris and Oxford, 1993), 5-16; Harold Love, "Scribal Publication in Seventeenth Century", *Transactions of the Cambridge Bibliographical Society* 9 (1987): 130-154, and Idem, *The Culture and Commerce of Texts: Scribal Publication in Seventeenth-Century England* (Amberst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1998).

[21] I have located another five manuscript copies that I have not been able to see as yet, to be found at the Centre des Archives diplomatiques de La Courneuve, 53MD/407. France et divers États, 57; BnF, MS. Cinq cents de Colbert 49, fol. 56-126; BnF, MS. Fr. 5073, fol. 72-77 (extract); Bibliothèque de l'Institut de France (BIF), MS. 706, fol. 86-192; BIF, MS Godefroy, fol. 46-71 (extract).

[22] There are manuscript copies from 1648, 1652 and 1663. These dates derive from when they were collected in the volumes. In chronological order: BnF Arsenal, MS-4001; BnF Arsenal, MS-6829; BnF Département des Manuscrits, MS Fr. 5882.

[23] BnF, Dupuy 248, fol. 1 [Microfiche, A13].

Pierre Dupuy himself seems to have been quite taken in by the treatise. Although it cannot be stated with full certainty, the section on the "Maximes des Espagnols pour parvenir à la Monarchie" in his own diplomatic memoir "De la Puissance de la Maison d'Austriche en Allemagne, et en Italie" seems to bear the particular influence of Rohan's work.[24]

From the Cabinet Dupuy, it is possible trace the circulation of the manuscript further to other learned men in Paris. By 1636 the manuscript had definitively spread from circles of power to the circles of knowledge that intertwined in the brothers' learned Cabinet. In that year, Claude Martin, who worked at the Faculty of medicine at the University of Paris, copied the treatise to include it in his own library.[25] Both the political elite and the learned elite in Paris now had access to the duc's views on European affairs and his plea for French intervention in the Thirty Years' War, which by that time was a fact.

De l'Interest des Princes, however, was not a curiosity sought after by the learned, it acquired real political value among the political elite. For around the time that Martin fashioned his own copy, Rohan's work was included among the diplomatic and political memoirs that were to serve the ambassadors to the prospected, though never realised, peace conference at Cologne in 1637.[26] Besides Rohan's treatise, this collection also included diplomatic pieces by Théodore Godefroy and Pierre Dupuy as well as preceding peace treaties and other information that might be useful to diplomats negotiating a peace with Spain and the Empire. In fact, the manuscript "Instruction pour Mrs les Ambassadeurs de France, envoyéz à Cologne pour le Traitté de la Paix générale" of early 1637 explicitly refers to the diplomatic memoirs in this volume. At the end of this missive, the representatives are instructed to carefully study "all the pieces that may be needed to justify the rightfulness of the propositions that will be made by the ambassadors based on the king's claims".[27]

Although reference to pieces in the volume is made only in general terms, it is worth noting that the author of the instruction – plausibly Richelieu himself or his principal secretary Denys Charpentier – employs the exact terminology of 'interest' as used by the Duc de Rohan. This is true especially in the analysis of the objectives and motivations of the different parties that would be present at the peace conference. When it comes to the German lands for instance, the ambassadors should consider in general that "the *principal interest* that the king must have for

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[24] This memoir is included in a collection of diplomatic pieces, just before a manuscript copy of Rohan's. BnF. MS Fr. 17884 fol. 191-201; especially 198 sq.

[25] This private library was respected enough to be included in Louis Jacob's *Traicté des plus belles bibliotheques publiques et privees* (Paris: Rolet le Duc, 1644) 537.

[26] This volume, BnF. MS Fr. 17884, is available online on Gallica.bnf.fr.
URL: http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b9061263g/f1.item On the Cologne peace conference, see: Derek Croxton, *Westphalia: The Last Christian Peace* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 51-64.

[27] APW, I.1.3, p. 53. "La seconde [of two important instructions] est de se pourvoir soigneusement de toutes les pièces, dont on peut avoir besoin pour justiffier la justice des propositions qui seront faites par Mrs les Ambassadeurs sur les prétensions du Roy."

the wellbeing of Christianity (*le bien de la Chrestienté*) is that there would be a powerful league in Germany, including both Catholics and Protestants, that might thwart the House of Austria from having complete domination (*estre absolument Maistresse*) in those lands and to strike the arms of the Empire at whomever it pleases, following the appetite and passion of the Spaniards."[28] The ambassadors should further convince everyone that the French king has no territorial aspirations in Germany and Italy. Louis XIII "only desires an overall satisfactory peace. And if the Spanish do not wish to control themselves in peace by reason, one might oblige them to it by a good and powerful union, in which the king wishes only to enter to assist *without any interest* the princes, whether of Italy or Germany, and maintain the balance."[29] These and other examples in the communiqué seem to indicate that a Rohanesque type of interest analysis had become in common use in diplomatic circles and his work was one of the recommended reads to prepare for the peace conferences.

After this tentative reconstruction of the manuscript circulation and its significance, it is time to proceed to more detailed questions concerning the publication history of *De l'Interest* that have not been properly addressed before. Where and by whom was the work published, in what form and why? Were there large differences between the text that was printed in the *Mercure François* in support of the government's foreign policy, and the publication of the work in book format? To begin by answering the last question: if one compares the editions of *De l'Interest des Princes* that were published ever since the year of 1638 with the publication in the *Mercure François*, it becomes clear that no changes were made to the main body of the treatise.[30] Published among other 'anatomies of states' in the *Mercure François*, however, there was no place for the dedication to Cardinal Richelieu; here, only the two main parts of the treatise were included. The dedication to the *Premier ministre* would only surface in the edition printed in 1638, achieved in March 1638, just one month before the author's demise on April 12th.[31] It is important to notice that the first

[28] APW, I.1.3, p. 47. "Cependant ilz doivent dès cette heure considérer en général que le principal intérest que le Roy doibue avoir pour le bien de la Chrestienté est qu'il y ayt une ligue puissante en Allemagne, tant des Catholiques que des Protestans, qui puisse empescher la Maison d'Austriche d'y estre absolument Maistresse et porter les armes de l'Empire contre qui bon luy semblera, selon l'appétit et la passion des Espagnolz."

[29] APW, I.1.3, p. 52. "Pour cet effect ilz doibuent faire cognoistre à tous, soit Catholiques, soit Protestans, que Sa Majesté ne prétend rien en Alemagne ny en Italie, qu'elle désire seulement par tout une bonne Paix, et que, si les Espagnolz ne se veulent contenir en Paix par la considération de la raison, on puisse les y obliger par celle d'une bonne et puissante union, en laquelle le Roy ne veut entrer que pour assister sans aucun intérest les Princes, soit d'Italie, soit d'Alemagne, et maintenir la balance."

[30] Anonymous, "De l'Interest des Princes & Estats de la Chrestienté", in *Le Vingtiesme Tome dv Mercure François, ou Suite de l'Histoire de nostre temps, sous le Regne du Tres-Chrestien Roy de France & de Nauarre Lovys XIII*, continuation de l'an 1634 (Paris, 1637), 46-126.

[31] Around the time of publication Rohan still believed he would recover from the injuries inflicted on the battlefield at Rheinfelden. In one of his last letters the duc attests of this resilience. "Quant à mes blessures, elles sont peu de chose, et l'appareil que vous y apportez est plus grand que la playe." Henri de Rohan to the Government of Genève, Lauffenbourg 15 March 1638. Henri de Rohan, "Réponse du Duc Henri de Rohan

book publication of *De l'Interest* was published before the author's death and was thus not a posthumous publication as is often maintained.[32]

There are two editions of Rohan's *De l'Interest des princes et estats de la Chrestienté* that contend for the nomination of being the printed book's *editio princeps*. On the one hand, there is the edition that was printed in Paris in early 1638 by Pierre Margat, printer-bookseller who held shop at Rue Saint Jacques à la Pomme d'Or.[33] Since the previous year, Margat had shared the royal privilege to print Rohan's military treatise *Le Parfaict capitaine* with the bookseller Jean Houzé, who had first published this military treatise in 1636 under royal octroi.[34] In the Margat edition of 1638, *De l'Interest* was probably bound in a volume with an edition of the aforementioned military treatise that consisted of his commentaries on Julius Cesar's *De Bello Gallico* and reflections on the contemporary art of war. In this edition by Margat, the *Parfaict capitaine* was for the first time accompanied by a long preface describing Rohan's virtues as a general and an author(ity) on statesmanship. This extensive *laudatio*, that intriguingly declared that Rohan differed from those princes who fomented civil war in pursuit of their private interests, was presumably written by Jean de Silhon (1596-1667), a publicist who is often associated with the propaganda-network of Richelieu, the *Bureau des Presses*.[35] The 1638 volume also contains a foreword by Daniel Perreaux, a Huguenot lawyer in the Parisian *Parlement*, that was already included in the first edition of *Le Parfaict capitaine*.[36]

The other contender is the 1638 edition from the printshop of Augustin Courbé, a Parisian printer-bookseller who served the king's brother, Gaston d'Orléans, from 1630 until 1643.[37]

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au Petit-Conseil de la République de Genève, 1638", *Bulletin de la Société de l'Histoire du Protestantisme Français (1852-1865)* 13, no. 8-9 (1864): 223-224.

[32] *Pace* Friedrich Meinecke, who held that *De l'Interest* probably only appeared after Rohan's death (Meinecke, *Machiavellism*, 165); Christian Lazzeri, who says this publication, bound up in volume with *Le Parfaict capitaine,* appeared "à titre posthume". (Lazzeri, "Introduction", 1.); and Jonathan Dewald, who mentions 1639 as publication date. (Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity*, 70.)

[33] See Appendix 2 bibliographical entries 4a. and 4b. [1638]. The format (in-4°), the typography and pieces of textual decoration in *De l'Interest* (4a.) are the same as found in the edition of the *Parfaict capitaine* (4b.), which leads us to suspect that the two editions were printed in the same run or the one just after the other, and, from the very start, were meant to be sold in volume. Information about Pierre Margat is scarce, what is known is that he probably held shop in Paris from 1618 until 1649, the year that his son Pierre II, received the title of master. CERL Thesaurus, 'Margat, Pierre'.
URL: https://thesaurus.cerl.org/cgi-bin/record.pl?rid=cnp01400398

[34] See Appendix 2 bibliographical entry 1. [1636].

[35] "J'ajouterai seulement que quelque dessein qu'ait eu M. de Rohan de s'y embarquer, et de quelque vent qu'il y ait été poussé, ce n'a été ni l'inquiétude qui tourmente quelquefois les Grands, puis qu'il s'opposa de toutes ses forces aux Perturbateurs de la Paix". Rohan, *Le Parfaict capitaine*, Preface, no pagination, uu iij. Cf. Salmon, *Renaissance and Revolt*, 108.

[36] See Appendix 2 bibliographical entry 1. [1636].

[37] Augustin Courbé (ca. 1590-ca. 1670) was an apprentice with the master printer Jean Gesselin from 1613 onwards, until he received the master octroi in late 1623. From 1630 until 1643 he served Monseigneur, the Duke of Orléans, as printer-bookseller. He was bought out and succeeded by Thomas Jolly. In 1666 he apparently figured among the eldest people in the city of Paris. When his successor went bankrupt, Courbé's widow was an important creditor of Jolly. CERL Thesaurus, 'Courbé, Augustin'.

Printed under the household of Monsieur, the king's brother, the Courbé edition bears a printer's mark that displays the coats of arms of the royal house of France and Navarre underneath a crown, decorated with a wreath of laurel. In Courbé's edition *De l'Interest de Princes* was with certainty presented in a volume that also contained *Le Parfaict capitaine.*[38]

It is another aspect of the paratext in the Courbé edition of 1638 that can provide some more information on the publication history of *De l'Interest.* This information adds to the assumption that *De l'Interest* was first published in a collective volume with Rohan's military treatise. In contrast to the first edition of the *Parfaict capitaine* by Houzé (1636), which only referred to the author with the signature H.D.R. on the bottom of the letter of dedication[39], in Courbé's 1638 volume Henri de Rohan is mentioned by name as the books' author in both dedicatory letters.[40] Courbé's title page reports that the author had revised the text of *Le Parfaict capitaine* and that he added a treatise on the interest of princes and states. Like Margat, and Jean Houzé before him, Monsieur's printer-bookseller included a fitting and nicely illustrated frontispiece by Pierre Firens, to which we shall come back later. Furthermore, the Courbé edition contains a *privilège du roi* that slightly differs from the one accorded to the author of the *Parfaict capitaine* that is reproduced in the Margat edition.[41] The octroi, granted in April 1637, seems to have a wider applicability as it concerns the *Abbregé des guerres de Gaule des Commentaires de Cesar*, as the military treatise was also known, "and several other treatises". Thus the *privilège* might include other treatises like *De l'Interest*. As this was granted in the same year, this might point to a virtually simultaneous process of publication of *De l'Interest* in the *Mercure François* and the joined volume edition with *Le Parfaict capitaine* of both Margat and Courbé.

So far the story does not deviate too much from the general account of the publication history. It does, however, provide some additional detail and attempts to show that the process of publication of *De l'Interest* can be dated a bit earlier than was always presumed. This changes with the further editions. In 1639 a separate edition of *De l'Interest des Princes* was put on the 'European book-market'. Now, this separate edition of the work was not simply a reprint of the earlier edition, it was a 'pirate'-edition printed by the famous Elsevier press in Leiden in the Dutch Republic.[42] The title page does not display the name of the printer or the place of publication, but

[38] See Appendix 2, bibliographical entry n° 6 [1638].
[39] The royal octroi at the end of the book, however, did mention Rohan's initials together with the full range of his titles, N.T.C.C.H.D.R.P. de B.N. & E.D. & P. de F (Notre Très Cher Cousin [?] Henri de Rohan, Prince de Blain, N[avarre?] et E[?], Duc et Pair de France).
[40] The dedicatory letter of the *Parfaict capitaine* is addressed to King Louis XIII and signed "Vôtre très-humble, très-obeissant et très-fidelle sujet et serviteur, H. de Rohan", while the dedication of *De l'Interest des Princes* addresses Cardinal Richelieu and signed "Vostre tres-humble, tres-affectionné et obligé serviteur, H. de Rohan".
[41] Cf. Appendix 2, bibliographical entries n° 4a. [1638] and 5 [1638].
[42] At that time, the Leiden Elsevier press had already published a 'pirate'-edition of *Le Parfaict capitaine* the previous year (n° 3 [1638]). This edition was almost certainly conceived of without knowledge of the Margat and Courbé editions of Rohan's military treatise, for it lacks the preface by Jean de Silhon that was

it does show the familiar Elsevier printers' mark, the Sphere, and mentions that it is the latest edition and printed after the Paris edition. The edition is clearly counterfeit, not necessarily because the title-page preserves the printer's anonymity, but because it displays the exact formulation that the Elseviers used more often when they reprinted a work without authorization (here: *jouxte la copie imprimée* À PARIS). This publication strategy, which included printing the 'disclaimer' (*jouxte la copie imprimée*) almost imperceptibly and the city name in large capital letters, was used in order to let the (inexperienced) reader believe it was a reprint executed in Paris. On another occasion a member of the Elsevier press acknowledged that he had already printed *De l'Interest des Princes* when he "coincidently came across the work".[43]

In the 1639 edition – as well as its 1641 reprint that includes an additional table of contents – Balthasar and Abraham Elsevier printed *De l'Interest* separately from the military treatise, but with the dedicatory letter and Silhon's preface that was originally meant to accompany the *Parfaict capitaine*. Like its Parisian counterparts, the Leiden Elsevier press from 1639 onwards also bound Rohan's two major works of 'leisure' in volume in the reprints of the 1640s – 1641, 1643 and 1648.[44] In fact, the Leiden 'pirate'-edition seems to be the one widespread separate French-language edition of *De l'Interest* in the seventeenth century.[45]

Even though this may not, by far, be the most spectacular publication history of the seventeenth century, it does raise important questions about the intent of publishing *De l'Interest* as well as the publication's main agent.[46] Given the multiple manuscript versions still extant in several French archives it seems reasonable to assume that the political treatise already circulated considerably wide in manuscript form(s) well before the initial publication of *De l'Interest* in the *Mercure François*.[47] Since it is highly presumable, as has often been argued, that

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only added to these editions. The Elsevier edition of *Le Parfaict capitaine* would thus in all plausibility be a counterfeit of Jean Houzé's *editio princeps* of the text (n° 1. [1636]). See Appendix 2.

[43] The occasion is the publication of one of the imitations of *De l'Interest*, which actually engages with the original text. As we shall see in the paragraph on reception Rohan's book was soon often commented upon, paraphrased, and imitated. In this particular case the printer's preface states that it is in fact a treatise from the 1640s interlarded with passages from Rohan's work. The printer here probably refers to a version of the text that was rewritten to contain events that happened after the original author died. This text, which remained a manuscript but served as basis for the *Maximes des Princes et Estats souverains*, is titled *Traité succinct des vraies maximes des Princes et Estats de l'Europe* (BNF, MS Fr. 4253). Anonymous, *Maximes des Princes et Estats souverains* (Cologne [=Amsterdam], 1666) A2 [no page number]. See Appendix 2, bibliographical entries n° 40 [1665] and 41 [1666].

[44] Charles Pieters, *Annales de l'imprimerie des Elsevier, ou histoire de leur famille et de leurs éditions* (Gent: Annoot-Braeckman, 1858), 190-191. Alphone Willems, *Les Elzevier: histoire et annales typographiques* (Brussels: G.-A. Van Trigt, 1880), n° 483.

[45] Two other early separate editions of *De l'Interest* include the 1650 editions of the Parisian printers-bookseller Charles de Sarcy (n° 31 [1650]) and Jean-Baptiste Loyson (n° 32 [1650]). This excludes the Margat edition (n° 5 [1638]) that might also have been issued separately. As these editions seem extremely rare at present, their print-run was probably limited.

[46] Cf. Noel Malcolm, "The Printing of the 'Bear': New Light on the Second Edition of Hobbes's Leviathan", in Idem, *Aspects of Hobbes* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 336-382. See also Intermezzo II on the publication of Naudé's *Considérations politiques sur les coups d'Estat* and the *Mascurat*.

[47] See footnote 2 of the current chapter.

Rohan put a finishing touch to his interest analysis during his sojourn in Paris in 1634, when he painstakingly sought to convince the cardinal-minister to deploy him in an anti-Spanish offensive operation in the Valteline, a manuscript copy with the dedicatory letter might have served his goal of gaining high office. As Rohan, helped enormously by the disastrous developments for French allies on the battlefield, finally succeeded in acquiring his desired command of the French troops, one might wonder why the treatise saw the light of day in print in 1637-1638.

Depending on the process of publication at the *Mercure* and the level of ministerial interference, there seem to be at least three possible explanations. The anonymous publication of 1637 might have been an intentional publication effort by Rohan that had originated at the time of his 1634 Paris visit. It might also have been a plea in late 1636 and early 1637, perhaps executed by Rohan's agent Benjamin Priolo, for a return to the cardinal's graces and to re-employ him in order to recover the losses in the Valteline. Or it might even have been another feat of war-propaganda originating from the circles around the cardinal-minister himself. As to the initiative of the book publication that originated at roughly the same time an additional option should be considered. Henri de Rohan also might have wanted his treatise on current political affairs in Europe published to save face. In combination with the *Parfaict capitaine*, *De l'Interest* might serve Rohan's own cause, which was dire from late 1636 onwards. The treatises might render its readership more favourable towards him, and would show to posterity that he had not only foreseen the best course of action for the French government to take, but had always acted in service of the king and his state.

Reception

The printed edition of Rohan's *De l'Interest des Princes et Estats de la Chrestienté* was a great, European-wide success. It was reprinted seventeen times in the 1640s and published mostly in volume with the same author's military treatise, *Le Parfaict capitaine.*[48] Within two years of the book's publication translations started to appear in almost every European language.[49] Soon after its first appearance in Paris, Henry Hunt translated the work into English. Supposedly printed in Paris in 1640, *A Treatise of the Interest of the Princes and States of Christendome* quickly gained popularity in England. The success in England endured and in the late 1650s the title of the translation of Rohan's book still appeared among the 'most vendible' books in London.[50] Although

[48] See Appendix 2 presenting a bibliography of editions of Rohan's *De l'Interest* and the *Parfaict capitaine*.
[49] See the same Appendix. To only mention the first editions of these translations: English (12 [1640]), German (13 [1641]), Latin (23 [1644]), Italian (27 [1646]), Dutch (34 [1654]).
[50] *The Interest of Princes and States of Christendome* in-12° and *The compleat Captain. Or an abridgment of Cæsars warrs, with observations upon them, with the order of the militia of the antients, and a particular treatise of modern warre, written by the D. of Roan, late Generall* in-8° are two entries to be found in the catalogue of William London. William London, *A catalogue of the most vendible books* (London, 1658) leaflet X3 and Ee, left page [no pagination].

figures are unknown, the book seems to have been much sought after, for it was reprinted within the year, and again in 1663. A German translation with the title *Interesse der Potentaten und Stände* appeared in 1641 and was reprinted two times before 1650. The Latin translation *Trutina Statuum Europae, sive Principum Christiani Orbis Interesse* was published (and probably translated as well) by Justus Livius [Joost Lievens] in Leiden in 1644 and was reprinted four times. In 1665 a different Latin translation with annotation was produced, which was reprinted three times and mostly served a reading public in the Holy Roman Empire. An Italian translation also came on the market within a decade after Rohan's demise. *Dell'Interesse dei Prencipi e Satti della Christianità* (sic) was published, probably in a limited number of copies, in Orléans in 1646. Finally, a Dutch translation, *Den Interest der Princen ende Staten van Christenrijck*, was published in 1654 in Amsterdam. Altogether these editions add up to a total of over thirty editions of Rohan's main political treatise published in the seventeenth century, twenty-five before 1650 alone. Even in the early eighteenth century the treatise was still deemed worth publishing.[51] It seems hardly surprising, however, that – with the exception of the Italian translation with unknown destination – it was overwhelming in Protestant Europe that Rohan's *De l'Interest* gained a hearing.

Besides this wide dissemination of Rohan's work in the original French and in other European languages, the success of his analysis soon led to adaptations, revisions and imitations creating what has been called a 'genre' of interest of state treatises.[52] The first revision and emendation, the *Traité succinct des vraies maximes des Princes et Estats de l'Europe* of 1647, remained in manuscript, but was rewritten and published anonymously in 1665 as *Maximes des Princes et Estats souverains*.[53] This was reprinted one year later and published in volume with the *Interests et Maximes des Princes et Estats souverains*, a work that was equally inspired by Rohan's analysis of the interests of European powers, but which was more of a legal survey of precedents and legal claims of one state against another.[54] In the last decades of the seventeenth century another work gained some renown, the *Nouveaux Interests des Princes de l'Europe* (1685) written by Gatien Courtilz de Sandras (1644-1712). This book was part of a body of critical political literature printed in the Dutch Republic to evade censorship. Concerned with current affairs, Courtilz de Sandras' work displays a similar geopolitical analysis of European politics and conflicts, and criticizes monarchs for not acting in accordance with the interest of their state. In this way, he criticizes almost every European sovereign, for instance reproaching Louis XIV of France and

[51] See Appendix 2, bibliographical entry n° 52 [1725].
[52] See Appendix 2, entries 40 [1665] and 41 1666]. Cf. Pierre Bonnet, "La "Monarchie Universelle" de Louis XIV: une notion clé de la pensée politique, de Campanella à Montesquieu", *Littératures classiques* 2011/3 (N. 76) 133-146.
[53] BnF, MS Fr. 19487. Cf. Church, *Richelieu and Reason of State*, 354-355; Salmon, *Renaissance and revolt*, 108.
[54] Church, *Richelieu and Reason of State*, 354-355; Salmon, *Renaissance and revolt*, 108.

Jacob II of England for their religious policies. However, Courtilz also displays a taste for the wild rumours of the pamphlet literature. He sees a Europe of conflict due to incompatible interest of individual powers and warns for French designs toward universal monarchy.[55]

In a broader European context, work that was heavily influenced Rohan would resurface in England in the 1640s, applied by various factions to the troubles of the Civil War.[56] Rohan's political ideas already seem to have been taken seriously in England in 1631, when a preeminent English diplomat sent a copy of a "Discours of the Duke of Rohan on the affairs of Christendom" to the English chief minister of state.[57] Reception of his *De l'Interest* probably began in earnest when the work appeared in English translation in 1640. Rohan's work has been identified as being responsible for the popularizing of the term 'interest' in England, in particular in its specific form 'interest of England'. Numerous treatises on the 'interest of England' appeared in the context of the Civil War and after, some of which explicitly quoted Rohan or cited him as a source. The protean pamphleteer Marchamont Nedham introduced Rohan's arguments in the Civil War debates. Then in the service of King Charles I, Nedham directly displayed Rohan's influence and applied the duc's analysis of interest to the situation within the English realm in *The Case of the Kingdom stated* (1647). Professing 'objectivity', the Englishman writes,

> "[…] I state the interests of all indifferently, pointing out to each the way to advance and preserve their own party, and I shall commend to them what the Duke of Rohan saith of the states of Europe, that according as they follow their proper interests, they thrive or fail in success, so the parties now on foot in the kingdom must look to stand or fall upon the same ground."[58]

Nedham and many other authors surveyed the interests of different groups within the English realm and advised these 'parties' to find and secure a comprising 'union of interests'. It would be

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[55] The full title of the treatise by Courtilz de Sandras is, *Nouveaux Interets des Princes de l'Europe, Où l'on traite des maxims qu'ils doivent observer pour se maintenir dans leur États, et pour empécher qu'il ne se forme une Monarchie universelle* (Cologne chez Pierre Marteau [famous pseudonym, probably Amsterdam], 1685). Cf. Stéphane Haffemayer, "Politique Européenne et conduite de l'État chez Courtilz de Sandras (1644-1712)", in Pierre Bonnet (ed.), *Littérature de contestation: Pamphlets et polémiques du règne de Louis XIV aux Lumières* (Paris, 2011), 137-162.

[56] The secondary literature on this subject is quite extensive. See, the seminal work of Felix Raab and John Gunn. Felix Raab, *The English Face of Machiavelli* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964); J.A.W. Gunn, ""Interest will not lie": A Seventeenth-Century Political Maxim", *Journal of the History of Ideas* 29:4 (1968): 551-564, and Idem, *Politics and the Public Interest in the Seventeenth-Century* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969). More recent publications on the subject include: Ryan Walter, "Slingsby Bethel's Analysis of State Interests", *History of European Ideas* 41:4 (2015): 489-506.

[57] It seems that we are dealing with a (translation) of the "Discours d'Estats faict(s) par monsieur le duc de Rohan, estant à Venise, 1631". The National Archives, SP 78/89/115.

[58] Marchamont Nedham, *The Case of the Kingdom stated* (London, 1647) signature A2. Cited in J.A.W. Gunn, *Politics and the Public Interest*, 48.

best for the kingdom that different 'parties' follow proper and limited interests, for it was impossible that all could fully achieve their designs, which were mutually incompatible.[59]

In the Dutch Republic Rohan's work has an extensive reception history dating back to the 'pirate'-editions of *De l'Interest* of the 1640s and to the Dutch translation of 1654, but the Duc's legacy was mainly constituted in the period between the 1660s and 1680s. First it was used in political economic fashion in the work of for instance the De la Court brothers. Later the use of the terminology of interest turned against the aspirations of universal monarchy of Louis XIV by for instance Petrus Valkenier, despite the initial pro-French attire of the European interest analysis in Rohan's work. Rohan was silent on 'positive' instead of just 'negative' formulations of French foreign policy goals. The 'objectivity' of Rohan's decentralized perspective seems to have been used by these writers and turned on its head. Where it first attacked Spanish designs and promoted a belligerent French foreign policy, in the hands of Dutch authors the terminology was employed in an anti-French political rhetoric.[60]

Also in the Holy Roman Empire, Rohan's treatise seems to have had a long *Nachleben*. One late example is the anonymous author of *Der Veränderliche Staats-Mantel* (1683), who without further reference to Rohan opens his treatise with a rendering of Rohan's famous opening line, "Könige und Fürsten gebieten denen Unterthanen; das Interesse und Staats-Nutzen hingegen gebietet denen Fürsten."[61] In the German lands the reception of Rohan's treatise seems to be similar as in other parts of Europe, where authors used it as a model for their own particular analysis of political affairs. However, apart from this explicit reference to Rohan's famous dictum German treatises like the *Veränderliche Staats-Mantel* seem to have little to do with Rohan's legacy. By that time in the 1680s the influence of Samuel Pufendorf began to be felt.

In the French kingdom itself Rohan's political treatise figured among the works of Philip de Béthune and Jean de Silhon, who also used the terminology of interest. If *interest* was the preferred term for political analysis in France in the 1610s and 1620s and *raison d'état* that of the 1630s and early 1640s,[62] the use of the terminology did not instantly fade away after the death of Richelieu. Apart from publications from the time of Cardinal Richelieu's ministry, the *mazarinades* might also be an interesting corpus to look for such an analysis of 'internal affairs'. In fact, in the pamphlet wars of the *Frondes* several *mazarinades* show extensive use of the terms *intérêt d'état,*

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[59] Gunn, *Politics and the Public Interest,* 48.

[60] For an elaborate account of the reception of the language of interest and *raison d'état* in the Dutch Republic I wish to refer to the PhD-thesis of Marianne Klerk. Klerk, "Reason of State and Predatory Monarchy in the Dutch Republic".

[61] Anonymous, *Der Veränderliche Staats-Mantel: Worinnen Sonderlich des Römischen Reichs wie auch anderer Königreiche und Republiquen unterschiedenes und veränderliches Staats-Interesse deroselben gegenwärtiger Zustand und Mängel; ingleichen ihr* Scopus *oder Absehen so wohl zu Kriegs- als Friedens-Zeiten vorgestellet wird [et]c. Mit Angehengten vielen* Consultationibus Politicis*, welche zur Staats-Wissenschafft nöthig und dienlich* (s.l.: s.n., 1683), 3 (no page number).

[62] Salmon, *Renaissance and Revolt*, 102-103.

intérêt des princes, raison d'état and other related terminology. The terminology of interest is often encountered in a query of (a representative part of) of the corpus, as well as many of the terms that are associated with this terminology.[63]

Although the use of the vocabulary of interest in the *mazarinades* is extensive, few pieces analyse the conflicts of the *Frondes* as a battlefield of competing interests. A sophisticated emulation of Rohan's interest analysis applied to the conflict of the *Fronde* such as that of Marchamont Nedham during the English Civil War seems to have been absent in France. The anonymous pamphlet that intervenes in the service of the *Premier President* of the *Parlement de Paris*, Mathieu Molé (1584-1656), to promote him to the office of *Garde des Seaux*, however is such a *mazarinade*. Known for his conciliatory stance in the conflicts of the *Frondes*, Molé was granted this office in 1651 and executed the office of 'minister of justice' until his death. The author first establishes that the *Premier President* has always laboured in everyone's interest, the interest of the people, that of the *Parlement*, the Princes, and that of the king, and afterwards he pointedly observes that,

> "There are no wars but wars of interest. Neither vengeance, nor rage, and still less the rebellion leaders' love for the people brings dissension to states. There is only the fruit that those who quarrel hope to draw from wars wherein they involve the people who bring trouble and confusion to the state. The wise and loyal friend of the people will thus be he who - in harmonizing the interests of the little man and the *grands*, the leaders of the parties and that of the Prince (de Condé), and that of the *robe* nobility and the sword nobility – will restore unity and concord in the state and who will spare his fatherland all the blood that civil wars have traditionally spilled. It is this that Monsieur the First President has done." [64]

Pointing to the competing interests of powerful groups within the kingdom as the cause for conflict and civil war, the anonymous author holds a plea for a 'union of interest', in a similar vein

[63] A query registrates 1724 occurences of the word *intérêt* in a corpus of 2709 *mazarinades*. URL: http://www.mazarinades.org/recherche/rechercher_affichage.php?word=int%C3%A9r%C3%AAt&CONJUNCT=PHRASE&DISTANCE=2&PROXY=maximum&tradp=mixte&publisher=&author=&pubplace=&editor=&pubdate=&cat_moreau=&dgdivhead=&OUTPUT=conc, consulted on 18 August 2015. Similarly, the term *raison d'État* is found in 42 *mazarinades* in the corpus; *intérêt d'État* is found in 56 *mazarinades*; *necessités d'État* is found in at least 30 pamphlets; *maxime(s) d'État* in 29; *prudence politique* in 11; *secret(s) d'État* in 16; and *mystères d'État* in 6 of the corpus *mazarinades*.

[64] In the original French, this "Toutes les guerres ne sont que des guerres d'intérêt. Ce n'est pas la vengeance, ni la colère, qui amène la dissension dans les états, et encore moins l'amour que les chefs des révoltes ont pour les peuples. Il n'y a que le fruit que ceux qui brouillent, espèrent tirer des guerres où ils embarquent les peuples, qui apportent les troubles et les confusions d'État. Le sage et le fidèle ami des peuples sera donc celui qui, accordant les intérêts des petits et des grands, des chefs de partis et du Prince, de la robe et de l'épée, remettra l'union et la concorde dans l'État et qui épargnera à sa patrie tout le sang qu'ont coutume de répandre les guerres civiles: c'est ce qu'a fait Monsieur le premier Président […]." Anonyme, *Harangue prononcée le 9 Avril 1651 sur la promotion de Monsieur le Premier President à la charge de Garde des Seaux* (Paris 1651). Consulted on the site of the Mazarinade-project, 18 August 2015. URL: http://mazarinades.org/recherche/page_affichage.php?p.216.mazarinades.22634.22646

as did English authors around the same time. If the interests of all are in harmony, peace and unity shall be restored in the kingdom of France.

That Rohan's *De l'Interest* remained relevant in France at least until the 1660s can be affirmed by the fact that it was reprinted in Paris and Rouen and was otherwise available through the Elsevier 'pirate'-editions.[65] However, in manuscript form the treatise had apparently not lost its relevance either.[66] The legacy of Rohan's *De l'Interest* via the original French text – in its manuscript and printed form, the many translations, the imitations and emulations as well as the tracts that used it as an inspiration – thus can be deemed truly transnational, reaching many parts of early modern Europe.

[65] See Appendix 2.

[66] Research has shown that scribal publication after a publication in print was not uncommon and that it could well exist besides printed editions, however this seems to be a rather peculiar case. See footnote 22 in the current intermezzo chapter.



Fig. 1. Frontispiece to the second edition of *Le Parfaict capitaine*, in this edition titled *L'Abbregé des Guerres de Gaule des Commentaires de Cesar* (Paris, 1638). Engraving by Pierre Firens (1580-1638).

Picturing the interest of a prince

Now we have sorted out the intertwined publication history of Rohan's major political works and have argued that and why it is imperative to read these two treatises together, there is one as yet overlooked part of the picture that we need to present before we can proceed to the analysis of the work. It concerns the frontispiece that was originally presented as an illustration to the *editio princeps* of the *Parfaict capitaine* by Jean Houzé (1636), but that was preserved in the subsequent editions by Pierre Margat (1638) and Augustin Courbé (1638, 1640, and 1643) that were sanctioned by royal privilege. As we have seen the Courbé and Margat editions presented the *Parfaict capitaine* in volume adjoined to *De l'Interest*. Indeed, a small digression and closer look at the frontispiece will add force to the arguments presented in the section on the publication history of Rohan's main political writings. The frontispiece is an emblem that conveys a particular political message that should unmistakably have been recognized and perceived by the seventeenth-century reader.[67]

The frontispiece of the *Parfaict capitaine, autrement l'abrégé des guerres de Gaule* (Figure 1) is a gravure made by Pierre Firens (or Fierens, ca. 1580-1638).[68] Firens was an engraver and pictorial editor of Flemish origin, who worked and lived in Paris from the early 1600s onwards. In this specific gravure we see two godlike figures in full armament standing on a curved pedestal. In between these two figures that probably depict Herakles and Athena a very large Crown of the Kingdom of France rests on a shrine formed by two decorated pillars. The left pillar is decorated with small *fleur de lys* crowns and the right pillar with crowns that are likely to be of the kingdom of Navarre, recently incorporated in the French kingdom. In between a banner with the title of the treatise is draped. An assortment of battle gear lies at the feet of the Herakles figure on the left; a lance, a canon and cannonballs, a musket, a pole axe, as well as a drum and a trumpet. The picture on his shield seems to depict a mountain lion. The Athena figure on the right holds a staff and at her feet lie various instruments of practical wisdom; a globe, measuring instruments, the *fasces*, a trumpet, and two books. The shield that she is holding with her left hand is decorated with the head of a woman with snake hair, which can be no other than the mythical figure of Medusa. In the Greek myth the hero Herakles attached Medusa's head to a shield and presented it as a gift to Athena. The hero who became god carries a shield that depicts the Nemean lion that

[67] Laurence Grove, *Emblematics and seventeenth-century French literature: Descartes, Tristan, La Fontaine, and Perrault* (Charlottesville: Rookwood Press, 2000), 1-27.
[68] The frontispiece by Pierre Firens with an empty emblem below, i.e. without the printer-bookseller's address, can be found on the website of the *Bibliothèque numérique of the Bibliothèque de l'Ecole nationale des Chartes.*
URL: http://bibnum.enc.sorbonne.fr/omeka/estampes/128085088

he killed in his first heroic task. From the impenetrable fleece/pelt of the lion he made a cape, which here metaphorically seems to have become a shield.[69]

The frontispiece presents an iconographical wealth to display the author' and his subject's dignity, force, honour, science, and valour. At face value the picture seems to be a rather normal representation for a treatise on the art of war. However, the Latin dedication and the phrase on the front of the left and right ends of the pedestal could lead us to think otherwise. *Jovi phixio, nisi Jovi, nisi Junoni* and *Ut docet, facit et Marti et Musis*. The 'offering' is presented "To Jupiter Phixius, if not to Jupiter, if not to Juno." Phixius was an epithet of the god Zeus/Jupiter as the 'god of escape', i.e. the god that assisted fugitives and exiles.[70] From the context of the author's life it is immediately clear that God of the shrine is solicited to assist the author, Henri de Rohan, who was exiled after his surrender to Louis XIII at the Peace of Alès in 1629 and strictly speaking died an exile. The phrase at the gods' feet might be translated as, "He does as he teaches, for the art of war as well as for the sciences."

Although the drapery that closes the shrine is inscribed with the subheading of the treatise and not its main title, this frontispiece presents the author of the book as the 'perfect captain'. One may even be inclined to presume that the bellicose figure of Herakles is a portrait of Rohan! The facial expression as well as the goatee and the moustache are traits that look familiar, to say the least, if one compares them to portraits of Rohan. Rohan, who has gained important victories for the French in the mountains of Northern Italy and the Swiss cantons (hence the lion in the mountains on his shield?), stands armed to defend the French Crown. In this he is assisted by the goddess of wisdom, which inspired him to write and teach the art of 'modern' warfare as he has practiced it on the battlefield. He experienced the perils and difficulties of warfare (hence the Medusa head?) and now presents his practical wisdom to the king, Louis XIII, to whom the work is dedicated.

This representation of Rohan in the service of the French Crown most probably served to underline his loyalty to the government of Louis XIII and his first minister Cardinal Richelieu. Together the books – *Le Parfaict capitaine* and *De l'Interest* that in the first Parisian editions were always presented in volume – illustrated and depicted by this frontispiece reaffirmed Rohan's usefulness to the French war efforts by presenting his important insights in the way to fight

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[69] The figure of Hercules had an important place in contemporary political culture and although it was mostly related to his father, Louis XIII was also at times depicted as a Herculean hero. Corrado Vivanti, "Henry IV, the Gallic Hercules", *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 30 (1967): 176-197; Edmund H. Dickermann and Anita M. Walker, "The choice of Hercules: Henry IV as hero", *The Historical Journal* 39, no. 2 (June 1996): 315-337; Hélène Duccini, *Faire voir, faire croire* (Paris: Champ Vallon, 2003), for instance 336 and 367.

[70] Jan N. Bremmer, *Greek Religion and Culture, the Bible, and the Ancient Near East* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2008), 113-114; J. Schmidt, "Phixios", in A. Pauly and G. Wissowa (eds.), *Real-Encyclopaedie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* XX (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 1941), 1179.

modern wars and where and against whom to fight them. This was of the utmost importance for Rohan at a time when the distrust of the cardinal-minister and the public hatred displayed and encouraged by Henri II de Bourbon, Prince de Condé, had harmed his position and cost him his office as General to the Swiss cantons. In fact, this disdain had inspired in Rohan the fear of incarceration that had driven him to offer his services to Bernard of Saxe-Weimar.[71]

The argument might thus be restated that the publication and/or reissuing of Rohan's major political works were an effort to remind not only the royal government but also a wider public of readers that the duc had not only always had the insight that the true interest of France was to confront the Habsburg powers on the battlefield, but also that he had been and still was the 'perfect captain' to support the king in these European endeavours.

[71] See Chapter II above.

Rohan's Interests and *De l'Interest des Princes et Estats de la Chrestienté*

> "That Rhetorick which touches not the Interests of those we would perswade, hath seldome any operation upon them [...]."[1]
>
> "[T]o consider well the Interest of the Princes of this time, we need not remount very high, but only take the standing of the present affaires."[2]
>
> Henri de Rohan

Albeit somewhat marginal at times, Rohan's political treatise *De l'Interest des Princes et Estats de la Chrestienté* (1638) has had its place in various fields of study ever since the rise of the modern historiography at the end of the nineteenth century. In the field of international relations theory Henri duc de Rohan is hailed as the first author to have connected the older notion of counterpoise to the new term of 'interest', thereby formulating an influential balance of power analysis.[3] In the field of political economy and moral philosophy the duc has been named as one of the founders of a new paradigm of interest, which came to be opposed to the passions.[4] In the field of political theory, as well, he has been identified as a principal figure responsible for "the explosion of interest talk in politics" in the seventeenth century.[5] Finally, in the field of intellectual history the appraisal of his work has mostly been in light of his alleged Machiavellism and contemporary 'reason of state' literature ever since the seminal study of Friedrich Meinecke brought it to centre stage of seventeenth century power politics. As much as the treatise of Rohan has been studied, serious effort still remains to be made to understand the author and his work in their proper historical and intellectual context. Rohan's writings, composed by such a high standing member

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[1] Henri de Rohan (tr. George Bridges), *Divers Politique Discourses of the Duke of Rohan made at several times upon several Occasions* (London, 1660) 25. Original French: "L'Eloquence qui ne touche les interests de ceux qu'on veut persuader, a ordinairement peu d'effect envers eux." Henri de Rohan, *Discours politiques*, 51 (Discours V). This is the introductory statement to Rohan's fifth political discourse on the government of the Queen Regent, Marie de Medicis, and her favourite Concino Concini, Marechal d'Ancre, and the rebellion of the Princes in 1617.

[2] Henri de Rohan, *A Treatise of the Interest of the Princes and States of Christendome* (London, 1641) preface (no pagination).

[3] See for instance, Torbjørn L. Knutsen, *A History of International Relations Theory* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997) 110, 113; Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, 137-185.

[4] Albert O. Hirschman, *The passions and the interests. Political arguments for capitalism before its triumph* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

[5] Dean Mathiowetz, *Appeals to Interest. Language, Contestation, and the Shaping of Political Agency* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011), 86.

of the European society of princes, should be investigated in light of the contemporary transformations in early modern rule and the efforts of intellectuals – of varying station and aptitude – to analyse, comment on, criticize, and satirize these perceived changes and the flux of events in a period of perpetual warfare.

The broadest possible context of Rohan's political affairs commentary is that of the enormous increase in literature on current affairs that can be perceived in early seventeenth century Europe. The various books and pamphlets that flooded the European market signal a widespread political curiosity among an ill-defined readership, which can hardly have constituted a 'public opinion' but was considered significant by princes and political leaders. With the outbreak of the War in Bohemia in 1618 and the beginning of the Thirty Years' War, in which all significant European powers were soon invested, this current affairs literature came to flourish. Princes and their counsel recognized the power of 'opinion' in war politics. The secrets of international politics, motives and mischief of various princes and their counsellors, were laid bare by authors publishing allegedly high end correspondence and citing administrative and advisory documents, many of questionable veracity. Among this wide range of veracious, semi-fictional and fictional documents that were published in the early 1620s, several came to criticize policies of the French King Louis XIII and his minister Richelieu. For instance, from Bavaria the French government and Richelieu in particular received two particularly severe blows. The *Mysteria politica*[6] and the *Admonitio*[7], two pamphlets that were published in 1625, criticized the French for their support of Protestant powers in the conflict and tried to blacken and delegitimize the French.[8] The first pamphlet was a collection of eight confidential letters by "illustrious men" blaming French policy for supporting the Elector Palatine against the Bavarian Elector in the conflict over the Bohemian succession and for concluding a marriage alliance with the English (the 1625 marriage between Louis XIII's sister Henrietta Maria and the later Charles I). Furthermore, the injustice, impiety and senselessness of a possible war against Spain were established through religious arguments. The main arguments in the *Mysteria politica*, however, were political, defending the rights of the House of Habsburg in Europe. The *Admonitio*, on the other hand, attacked French foreign policy on religious grounds.[9]

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[6] *Mysteria politica: Epistolae arcanae virorum illustrium sibi mutuo confidentium lectu et consideratione dignae* (Neopoli, 1624).

[7] This treatise by the hand of the Jesuit and Bavarian counsellor Adam Contzen was translated from Latin into French and was published with the full title, *Avertissement d'un théologien à Louis XIII, roi très chrétien de France et de Navarre, par lequel il est démontré brièvement et fortement que la France, en même temps qu'elle concluait honteusement une alliance impie, est entrée dans une guerre injuste contre les catholiques, guerre fatale à notre sainte religion*. Noel Malcolm, *Reason of State, Propaganda and the Thirty Years' War*, 32.

[8] Malcolm, *Reason of State, Propaganda and the Thirty Years' War*, 30-34; Thuau, *Raison d'État et pensée politique*, 110-113.

[9] Thuau, *Raison d'État et pensée politique*, 110.

In the French context, Rohan's work equally fits among a whole range of books and pamphlets in the 1620s and 1630s in France debating French foreign policy. In essence, the question debated was as much one of rule and governmental practice as one of war and peace. Did France need to fight Spain and its European designs of 'universal monarchy' or would it be better served by peace with Spain and should an alliance be made and kept as long as possible? The two 'parties' holding the respective views in this debate in the 1620s were the 'bon français' and the 'dévots'. With Richelieu's 'victory' in the *journée des Dupes* (1630) the war-party of the *bon français* became leading in the royal government's foreign policies. In a way *De l'Interest* supports Richelieu in the power struggles that still dominated at court. Richelieu had shown by the submission of La Rochelle and his lucky survival at the Day of the Dupes that he was there to stay at the centre of the French government. Still there was an on-going conflict between the 'party' of the *bon francais* and the *dévots*. The latter was a faction whose main point of agreement was their hatred of the cardinal-minister and not necessarily their pro-Habsburg attitude. The fight was more about the degree in which he would dictate the government's most important policies, among which, the European affairs. Rohan's *De l'Interest des Princes et Estats de la Chrestienté* can be seen as an intervention in this debate on the side of the war-party, albeit a very particular intervention.[10]

The direct cause of writing for Rohan might have been the same as for the anonymous author of the *Discours des Princes et Estats de la Chrestienté* who wrote a very similar, though slightly less systematic treatise with a European perspective, that is the question of the Valtellina. In the years 1623-1624 the question of this strategically important passage from the Milanais towards Tyrol was immanent, the matters of northern Italy remaining unresolved and still very 'dangerous', Rohan took up the pen in the early 1630s during his Venetian exile to engage the French government into fighting there.[11] As Meinecke expressed it, both books lay bare "a wish to study Europe, before intervening in European affairs."[12]

After and above all, *De l'Interest* is a typically seventeenth-century circumstantial texts organized along practical lines and with propositions that are immediately applicable to the situation they treat of. Rohan showed little interest for theoretical constructions, precise

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[10] Perhaps the debate can be seen to have endured beyond the *Frondes* up until the Peace of the Pyrenees of 1659. Although the *dévots* lost out at the time of the Day of the Dupes and were 'censured' by the *raison d'état* pamphlet propaganda of the royal government of Richelieu, a religious, 'peace party' can be perceived beyond the ministry of Richelieu and among the *mazarinades*. Damien Tricoire, "La Fronde, un soulèvement areligieux au XVIIe siècle?", 135-147. Cf. the revision of the traditional view on the *devots* in: Caroline Maillet-Rao, "Towards a new reading of the Political Thought of the *Dévot* Faction", 529-549. Maillet-Rao identifies (p. 531) the seminal work of Étienne Thuau, *Raison d'État et pensée politique* (pp. 103-152), as one of the books that treats the *dévots* as a school of political thought, founded upon devotion, and diametrically opposed to the reason of state literature in support of the policies of Richelieu. See Chapter I.

[11] In the words of the anonymous author of the *Discours des Princes et Estats de la Chrestienté* (p. 301) the Valtellina was like "une galerie et un chemin aisé entre les Montagnes pour passer de l'une [l'Italie] à l'autre [l'Allemagne], c'est-à-dire, du Milanais au Comté de Tyrol."

[12] Meinecke, *Machiavellism*, 165.

conceptual definitions, and neatly closed argumentation. His work is a practical, empirical analysis of the foreign policies of different, individual, and historically determined interest of princes, republics or estates in Europe, which is systematically organized around the driving force of Habsburg-Bourbon conflict.[13]

This chapter analyses Rohan's main political treatise. Specific attention is paid to the particular function of the terminology of interest in the duc's war cry of the early 1630s.

Analysis: *De l'Interest des Princes et Estats de la Chrestienté*

Three elements are key in this analysis of Henri de Rohan's main political treatise, *De l'Interest des Princes*. First, this chapter examines Rohan's conception of interest within the wider context of the use of this terminology in political analysis. Secondly, it considers Rohan's conception of *État* and identify the political actors in his work. A third key element is the world that our author sketches in his work, the constellation of European powers, great and small. Here it is shown how the duc constructed his plea for a French intervention in the Thirty Years' War by juxtaposing French and Spanish interests.

Interest

An initial question concerns the origins of Rohan's conception of the 'interest of princes'. Venice and Padua are an important context for the gestation of duc's ideas, as he largely conceived the book in the first years of his exile. His travel-library makes it possible to reconstruct a part of Rohan's reading during his 'leisure time' in Venice. It seems probable that at least some of the ideas that he encountered in these books percolated into *De l'Interest des Princes*. The travel library contained works of 'political science', history, and geography and military science that were instrumental to his notions of contemporary political affairs.[14] Among these books, the work of Francesco Guicciardini and René de Lucinge might have been of special importance.[15] Their style of writing, notions of interest and especially descriptions of geographical situations in political considerations may have played an important part in the development of the duc's ideas. For instance, Lucinge considered it common knowledge that all princely actions stem from two principal causes: honour and profit. Therefore, the former French diplomat stated that his analysis was only concerned "with profit, which we might call interest."[16] Furthermore, Lucinge

[13] Christian Lazzeri, "Introduction", 132-133.
[14] Stelling-Michaud, "Le Duc de Rohan et ses livres", 18-27.
[15] The inventory contains a French translation of Guicciardini's *History of the Italian Wars*. A copy of Lucinge's *De la Naissance, durée et Chute des États* was also in Rohan's possession.
[16] "C'est chose reçue que toutes les actions des Princes s'émeuvent et s'ébranlent par deux principales causes, à savoir l'honneur et le profit. Que la considération de l'honneur s'égare le plus souvent, sous le

argued that the geographical form and situation of a realm was a pertinent factor to its conservation.[17]

The inventory of Rohan's travel-library in itself, however, does not prove anything. As long as the specific books that were in his collection cannot be retrieved and found to contain traits of his readership – perhaps annotations in his hand –, it is impossible to state with any certainty that Rohan read one book or the other. Furthermore, the list obviously was not exhaustive. It is plausible that other books passed through his hand, some maybe were read to the duc. Moreover, Rohan possibly discussed books in languages that he did not master with his secretary Priolo and others in 'cabinet'.

A particular source that goes unmentioned on the list, but may be presumed evident in light of the place of Rohan exile and his relations to the regime of the Republic of Venice, were the Venetian *relazioni.* The *Serenissime* had a long tradition of diplomatic literature, called *relazioni*, which served as an inventory of the power of the lands the ambassadors reported on, with an important part reserved for their 'interests'.[18] Intimately connected to a more empirical approach in (historical) political writing, these reports contained a treatment of geography, what could perhaps be called 'geopolitical' considerations that anticipate this important feature in Rohan's analysis.[19] The Venetian ambassadors' understanding of 'interest' stood at the beginning of the evolution of the term that would culminate into that of Rohan. They developed an understanding that made it possible to analyse the intentions and designs of princes and governments.[20]

The influence of the *relazioni* genre might have been direct. It is quite possible that his diplomatic connections pointed him towards reading these political treatises. However, it is also quite plausible that their influence on Rohan's work was indirect, through the work of other

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prétexte du bien de leurs affaires. Nous nous attacherons donc seulement au profit, que nous pouvons nommer intérêt." (modernised typesetting JS) René de Lucinge, *De la naissance, duree, et chevte des estats, ou sont traittees plusieurs notables questions, sur l'establissment des Empires & Monarchies* (Paris, 1588) 163-164.

[17] "[…] les États se rendent plus perdurables et se peuvent mieux conserver, lors qu'il sont par manière de dire, cousus, liés, et attachés ensemble, l'un servant d'entretenement et de conservation à l'autre. De là nous colligerons que les provinces, qui courbent leur assiette en forme ronde, sont plus fortes et plus gaillardes, que celle qui étendent leur situation en figure longue, comme par exemple on pourrait dire de la France, à comparaison de l'Italie […]. Il faut donc avouer qu'il est requis, pour la conservation des seigneuries, ou que leurs provinces se touchent et entretiennent l'une à l'autre, ou que leurs forces et puissance se puissent maintenir et continuer en État." Lucinge, *De la naissance, duree, et chevte des estats,* 54r-55v. Cf. Rohan, *Discours politiques*, 31-32.

[18] Romain Descendre, "Analyse géopolitique et diplomatie au XVIe siècle. La qualification de l'ennemi dans les *relazioni* des ambassadeurs vénitiens", *Astérion* 5 (2007; online), consulted 13 august 2015.

[19] Bonnet, "L'exil d'Henri de Rohan et le devoir d'écrire", 231-259; cf. Romain Descendre, "Une géopolitique pour la Contre-Réforme: les Relazioni universali de Giovanni Botero (1544-1617)", in Denis Fachard and Bruno Toppan (eds.), *Esprit, lettre(s) et expression de la Contre-Réforme en Italie à l'aube d'un monde nouveau* (Paris: Chemins de traverse, 2005), 47-59.

[20] Bonnet, "L'exil d'Henri de Rohan et le devoir d'écrire", 231-259; cf. Romain Descendre, "Une géopolitique pour la Contre-Réforme: les Relazioni universali de Giovanni Botero (1544-1617)", in Denis Fachard and Bruno Toppan (eds.), *Esprit, lettre(s) et expression de la Contre-Réforme en Italie à l'aube d'un monde nouveau* (Paris: Chemins de traverse, 2005), 47-59.

authors. Giovanni Botero's *Relazioni universali* (1596) may have been an important source, albeit that they were not available in a French translation. The duc's Italian might have been wanting, but he might have adopted the ideas and perspective through osmosis, perhaps discussing this and similar books in his 'cabinet'. Botero's "geopolitical work" extended the perspective of the *relazioni* towards an evaluation of the powers of Europe as a whole.[21] The broader perspective and emphasis on the political importance of geography in the writings of Lucinge, Botero, the Venetian ambassadors and other authors quite probably proved a significant influence for Rohan's conception of Christian Europe. Every single one of the polities whose true interest Rohan describes is first introduced geographically and strategically, which at least in part determinates their political outlook in European affairs.[22]

Another important source for the development of Rohan's understanding of the mechanics of power that he undoubtedly became acquainted with during his Venetian exile was the Italian *ragion di stato* literature. Rohan's definition of *interest* as having as its goal the growth or at least the conservation of the provinces ruled by a prince or polity approximates the definition of *ragion di stato* by Botero and other late sixteenth century Italian authors as Girolamo Frachetta and Federico Bonaventura.[23] The interchangeability of the terms *interest* and *raison d'état* by the 1630s was considered a fact. Nevertheless, a quick glance at the Latin translation of Rohan's book, the *Trutina Statuum Europæ, sive Principum Christiani Orbis Interesse* (Leiden, 1645) can illustrate it further. The translation provides the following opening lines, "Principes subditis suis imperant, ratio Status etiam Principibus."[24] Here Rohan's term interest is translated as 'reason of state'. The source for this fundamental statement of the determining force of interest over those who govern, that we shall turn to shortly, can be sought among the Italian authors of *ragion di stato*. For instance, in his *Della ragione di stato et della prudenza politica libri quatro* after summing up commonplaces like "Quod placuit Principi, legis habet vigorem", Bonaventura asks whether the prince is the possessor of that "prestigious treasure of reason of state". He then states, with the authority of Plutarch, that reason of state is "the Prince of the Prince and his true and proper law

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[21] Descendre, "Une géopolitique pour la Contre-Réforme", 49-50; idem, "Analyse géopolitique et diplomatie au XVIe siècle". Also Romain Descendre's book on Giovanni Botero, in particular the chapter on the geopolitical aspect of his works *Della ragione di stato* and *Relazioni*. Romain Descendre, *L'État du monde. Giovanni Botero entre raison d'État et géopolitique* (Geneva: Droz, 2009).

[22] Cf. the more extensive 'geopolitical' description in Rohan's own *Discourses politiques*, as well as: Anonymous, *Discours des Princes et Estats de la Chrestienté plus considerable à la France, selon leurs diverses qualitez et conditions*, first edition winter 1623/4, reprinted in *Le Mercure d'Estat ou Recueil de divers discours d'Estat* (1635), 293-400. Meinecke, *Machiavellism*, 166-169.

[23] Meinecke has already pointed towards the fact that authors like Boccalini and Bonaventure approached such phrasings. Meinecke points to these authors: "Boccalini already declared that interest was the tyrant of tyrants, and Bonaventura that *ragione di stato* ruled the ruler [...]", but unfortunately did not indicate clearly where these contentions can be retrieved. Meinecke, *Machiavellism*, 168.

[24] Henri de Rohan, *Trutina Statuum Europæ, sive Principum Christiani Orbis Interesse. Opus magni olim Galliæ Dvcis de Rohan Gallico idiomate conscriptum, nunc vero in Latinum recens translatum* (Leiden, 1645) 1. See Appendix 2, bibliographical entry n° 24 [1645] for further information.

(*il Principe del Principe, e la propria, e vera sua Legge*)."[25] Although the evidence is not conclusive, Rohan did not cite his references, remarks like Bonaventura's might have inspired Rohan's famous opening line "Les princes commandent aux peuples et l'intérêt commande aux princes."[26]

Finally, it is not at all impossible that the Paduan controversies about the mathematics behind motion in the physical universe informed Rohan's thinking. The intense discussions that Galileo Galilei left in his wake in 1610 after a decade of teaching and working at the University of Padua, reinvigorated in the 1630s at the time of Galileo's trial by the Inquisition. In Rohan's thinking, the ideas of motion in natural philosophy might have come to parallel the driving forces of the political universe. To him fundamental geo-political interests were the motive force in the dynamics of European politics. Rohan essentially describes a Europe in flux, using vocabulary that can be characterized as both cosmographical and mechanical. The Europe depicted by Rohan is a universe of constant change, of movement, of affection and collision. The lexicon Rohan uses to describe the power play in Europe includes both cosmographical vocabulary (*pôles, influences, revolutions, soleil*) as well as a mechanical vocabulary (*poids, contrepoids*, *grande machine*). Rohan's vocabulary, therefore, not only arguably parallels developments in contemporary science, but the author of *De l'Interest des Princes* also seems to explicitly hint at the debates.

Enclosing the famous preamble: Rohan's use of the terminology of interest and its function.

Friedrich Meinecke has argued that Rohan's deployment of the terminology of interest was consistent throughout the years. He wrote: "It was not as a neophyte that he [Rohan] entered the service of Richelieu's policy after 1629 and proclaimed the inexorable doctrine of State interests, but rather as one who had long been convinced of its truth."[27] Although Meinecke's

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[25] The original passage by Bonaventura reads as follows, "Il che però s'intende, come dichiara S. Thomaso, che in tanto la volonta del Principe si dice aver forza di legge, in quanto è regolata dalla retta ragione, e sarà ella cosi regolata. Quando il Principe sarà posseditore (possesore) di questo prezioso tesoro della Ragion di Stato? Di cui però di sopra si affermò con l'autorità di Plutarco, che ella è il Principe del Principe e la propria e vera sua Legge." Federico Bonaventura, *Della ragione di stato et della prudenza politica libri quatro* (Urbino: Allessandro Corvini, 1623) 586. This might be translated as, "That means, however, as Saint Thomas says, that occasionally the will of the Prince is said to have the force of law, in that it is controlled by right reason, and she shall thus be controlled. Will the Prince then be possessor of this precious treasure of Reason of State? Of which, however, it was stated above with the authority of Plutarch (p. 544), that she (Reason of State) is the Prince of the Prince and his true and proper Law." The reference to Plutarch comes from the *Moralia* X 'Ad principem ineruditum' section 3. Translated in Latin: *Quis ergo Principi Princeps erit? Lex omnium Rex mortalium, atque immortalium, ut ait Pindarus, non ea foris scripta in libris, aut lignis insculpta, sed viva in ipsius corde ratio, semper una habitans, atque excubans, et animum numquam esse principatus vacuum*. "Who, then, shall rule the ruler? The Law, the king of all, Both mortals and immortals, as Pindar says - not law written outside him in books or on wooden tablets or the like, but reason endowed with life within him, always abiding with him and watching over him and never leaving his soul without its leadership." Plutarch (tr. Harold North Fowler), *Moralia* 10 (Cambridge, MA., 1936).
URL: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3atext%3a2008.01.0325

[26] Rohan (ed. Lazzeri), *De l'intérêt des princes*, 161.

[27] Meinecke, *Machiavellism*, 187.

interpretations have been criticized, John Salmon pressed home the continuity argument stating that throughout his life Rohan was equally concerned with private interest and 'interest of state'. He concluded that there is a "consistent set of assumptions underlying his [Rohan's] political opinions".[28] Although we must allow for some continuity of concern with the threat of the Spanish monarchy, his political discourses must be seen in the context of (the legitimation of) his changing positions during the regency years and his military leadership of the Huguenots. As suggested in the previous chapter his concern with the 'general interest' in the 1620s was probably derived from the intense discussions at the Huguenot (general) assemblies. For instance, in a final call for aid to Charles I of England in March 1629 still uses the term, here 'the interest of the public cause', in this sense.[29] Therefore, apart from some thematic continuities, I think it better to interpret the work in the context of his 'leisure' writings of the early 1630s. *De l'Interest des Princes* therefore, should be interpreted together with the two pamphlets of 1631-1632, Rohan's "Discours d'Estat", *Le Parfaict capitaine*, the book with which it was published in volume, and his *Mémoires* and letters of the 1630s.

Rohan's intentions with his political treatise can hardly be termed theoretical and 'academic', even in the sense of the learned academies of Paris or the Venice of his exile. Although, he did not clearly define his conception of 'interest', the oft-cited preamble to *De l'Interest des Princes* does provide important clues towards the duc's understanding of the term. In the English rendering of the contemporary translator Henry Hunt the first part of this famous preamble reads as follows:

> "The Princes command the People, & the Interest commands the Princes. The knowledge of this Interest is much more raised above that of Princes actions, as they themselves are above the People. The Prince may deceive himself, his Counsell may be corrupted, but the Interest alone can never faile. According as it is well or ill understood, it maketh States to live or die. And as it alwaies aimeth at the augmentation, or at leastwise the conservation of a State, so likewise to get thither, it ought to varie according to the times. So that to consider well the Interest of the Princes of this time, we need not remount very high, but only take the standing of the present affaires."[30]

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[28] Salmon, *Renaissance and Revolt*, 107.

[29] See for instance, the letter Rohan sent from Nîmes to Charles I of England on 12 March 1629, after the fall of La Rochelle. Printed in: *Mercure François*, XV. 1629, 285-288; 285. "Et parce que le plus puissant moyen que Dieu leur aie suscité en la terre, est le secours que nos Eglises ont recu et qu'elles attendant de votre Majesté: l'Assemblée generale a desire que mes lettres, qui seules jusqu'à maintenant lui ont representé *l'interest de la cause publique*, fussent jointes aux tres-humbles supplications qu'ils lui presentent."

[30] Henri de Rohan, *A Treatise of the Interest of the Princes and States of Christendome* (London, 1641) preface (no pagination). "Les princes commandent aux peuples et l'intérêt commande aux princes. La connaissance de cet intérêt est d'autant plus relevée par-dessus celle des actions des princes qu'eux-mêmes le sont par-dessus les peuples. Le prince se peut tromper, son conseil peut être corrompu, mais l'intérêt seul ne peut jamais manquer. Selon qu'il est bien ou mal entendu, il fait vivre ou mourir les États. Et comme il a toujours pour but l'accroissement ou, pour le moins, la conservation, aussi pour parvenir faut-il qu'il se change selon le temps. De sorte que pour bien considérer l'intérêt des princes d'aujourd'hui, il n'est point besoin de remonter fort haut, mais seulement de prendre sur le pied des affaires présentes." Rohan (ed. Lazzeri), *De l'intérêt des princes*, 161-162.

From these prefatory lines we can infer various characteristics that Rohan assigns to his most significant piece of political terminology. First, 'the Interest' is abstract in the sense that it transcends the sphere of the actions and motives of political agents. Second, the term seems to provide an absolute standard or rule for political action, that can be rationally perceived and which in itself cannot be the cause of political failure. Third, it is a vital principle of political longevity, concerned with the preservation or extension of a polity. Fourth, 'the Interest' of a prince, a republic or estates is intimately related to historical time and may change accordingly.

If we try to identify what interest entails in the individual discourses of the two parts of *De l'Interest*, there seem to be at least two constituent factors, first and foremost, geography, and second, a selection of individuating principles. Rohan's survey of the different powers of Europe in the first part of his political treatise, in every single discourse departs from a consideration of the geographical characteristics, situation, and geopolitical position. Spain is a polity well situated "at the head of Europe, where the Ocean serves her for bounds, upon the entrance of the Mediterranean Sea, which separates the same from Affrick, having the Pyrenean mountains for barriers against France."[31] France, on the other hand, is "seated between the Alpes and the Pyrenean mountains, and flanked by two seas, seems to be invited by nature to oppose it self against the proceeding" of its powerful neighbour.[32] In similar vain, the powers of Italy, with specific and separate attention to the Holy See of Rome and Savoy, the German polities, the Swiss cantons, the United Provinces, and England are all first examined with short but significant remarks on their concrete geographical and strategic situation.[33]

Among these geopolitical considerations, Rohan is concerned with understanding what differentiates one power from the other. Although his remarks on what is specific for a polity are never part of a systematic survey, the individuating principles that Rohan discerns are of either demographic, financial, economic, military, infrastructural, political or religious and ecclesiastical nature. In this way, what distinguished the power of Spain in the Europe of his age was the strictness of its Catholic zeal, the dispersion of its territorial possessions, and the 'treasures' of the Spanish colonial possessions in the Americas and in the Far East. The vast argent resources of the 'Indies', West and East – among others the Philippines, named after Philip II, one of the main protagonists in *De l'Interest* – are not particularly mentioned as Rohan did in an earlier

[31] Rohan, *The Interest of the Princes*, I. 1. "L'Espagne est à la tête de l'Europe, où l'océan lui sert de bornes sur le seuil de la mer Méditerranée qui la sépare de l'Afrique, ayant les Pyrénées pour barrière contre la France." Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 163.
[32] Rohan, *The Interest of the Princes*, I. 17. "La France, posée entre les Alpes et les Pyrénées, et flanquée de deux mers, semble être invitée par la nature à s'opposer aux progrès de cette puissance voisine." Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 170.
[33] Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 174-185.

'political discourse'.[34] What individuates France in Rohan's eyes, besides its solid and unified territory apt for defence as well as attack, is its strong monarchical institution ensured by the Salic Law, its economic and military power, and the plurality of confessions instituted by the Edict of Nantes.[35] Rohan individuates the Dutch Republic by its political system of estates, maritime power, its permanent military mobilisation, and its 'homogenous' Protestant confession.[36] Furthermore, from Rohan's perspective, England distinguishes itself by its institutionalised and unified Protestant religion and its commercial and maritime power.[37] Thus we see that it is the geographical position and its exigencies, together with certain individuating principles that constitute and determine Rohan's conception of the true interest of the individual European polities.

For Rohan the interest of a polity derives from what distinguishes it from other polities. History, situation of the territory, the people, contact with others are all variables constituting the individual true interest. This fits the context of a growing consideration and awareness of a 'national' history, the basis of which was laid in the second half of the sixteenth century by the French jurist-historians who Rohan admired. It is particularly revealing to notice that Rohan's travel library contained most of the books by authors representing important transitions in historical writing of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. His library contained works of important historians of the Italian Renaissance as Niccolò Machiavelli, Francisco Guicciardini and Paulus Aemilius of Verona. It contained French Renaissance memorialists and historians as Philippe de Commynes and Claude de Seyssel. Eminent sixteenth century writers of French 'national' histories like Nicolas Vignier, Lancelot Voisin de la Popelinière, and Étienne Pasquier were also represented, as were contemporaries such as Pierre Mathieu and Pierre d'Avity.[38] Historians have identified these authors as pivotal in transformations in historical thought and

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[34] Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 163-164. That the resources from the 'Indies' in important manner constitute the interest of Spain can be illustrated by Rohan's own remark made some twenty years earlier in a 'political discourse', where he wrote that Spain "possesses a great chain [of (is)lands] in the eastern as well as in the western Indies from whence come its great treasures that gave birth to their ambition of the Christian monarchy (*il a une grande chaîne aux Indes tant orientales qu'occidentales, d'où lui viennent ses grands trésors et qui lui ont fait naître l'ambition de la monarchie chrétienne*)." Henri de Rohan, *Discours politiques*, 31-32.

[35]Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 170-173. In the Third Discourse (1612) of his *Discours politiques*, Rohan described France as a "great and powerful kingdom, abundant in all goods, populated by a good nobility, good soldiers, and good marines, equipped with good ports, round up as a whole, without being separated by any state, and situated such that it can help its friends. […] [The] power […] that depends on France is solid, united, and quick to defend itself as well as to attack." Rohan, *Discours politiques*, 29-30, 33.

[36] It should be clear that the duc probably does not refer to provincial sovereignty here. Rather, the term 'estates' indicates the natural persons of the estates running the provinces through the estate assemblies. The interest of the Dutch Republic is worked out extensively in the second part of *De l'Interest* and it is here that we find his references to the individuating principles of this polity. Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 181-182, but especially, 209-215.

[37] Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 183-185.

[38] Stelling-Michaud, "Le Duc de Rohan et ses livres", 18-27.

historical writing that came to emphasize differences in the origins, genealogies and circumstances of a polity, instead of a common historical grounding in Greek and Roman antiquity.[39]

Historians have identified a 'rehabilitation' and popularisation of 'interest' in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century that was at least partly a consequence of the use of the terminology by Rohan and other French authors in the 1620s and 1630s.[40] Rohan makes interest the rule of the actions of princes and governments, and accordingly renders actions informed by interest acceptable, indeed necessary. Hereby actions grounded on interest become the rational and ordinary situation for political action. This 'rehabilitation' and 'normalisation' is effectuated by two related moves, which were more a consequence of Rohan's rhetorical use of the terminology than any intention to revolutionize thinking about interest. Neither his background, his motivations for writing, nor his intended audience made the work fit among academic disputes and theoretical discussions. However, first, *De l'Interest* represented a move away from a grounding in normative debates on harmonizing what is honourable (*honestum*) and what is expedient (*utile*). The argument of necessity and extraordinary circumstances was transformed into the ordinary situation as interest became a determining force for political action. The individuating principles, especially the geographical strategic position of a polity, that informed the specific interests of say Spain or France simply demanded a course of action from their monarchs. Secondly, historians argue that the abstraction of the notion of 'interest' by Rohan makes it go beyond *raison d'état* as the focus is no longer on the nature and scope of princely action, but on the indisputable rule and end of princely politics.[41]

Certainly, Rohan abstracts the term of interest (*l'interest* or *the* Interest) in subjecting princes and 'states' to its command. Thereby he did raise 'interest' above the office of a prince or magistrate that already had its own leeway of legitimate political action.[42] Rohan's treatment of

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[39] Donald R. Kelley, *Foundations of modern historical scholarship: Language, Law, and History in the French Renaissance* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970); Chantal Grell, "History and Historians in France, from the Great Italian Wars to the Death of Louis XIV", in Daniel Woolf, José Rabasa, et al. (eds.), *The Oxford History of Historical Writing*. Volume 3: 1400-1800 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012),; idem, "Les historiographes en France, XVIe-XVIIIe siècles", in *Les historiographes en Europe* (Paris: PUPS, 2006), 127-156; Orest Ranum, *Artisans of Glory: Writers and Historical Thought in Seventeenth-Century France* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980); Jacob Soll, *Publishing the Prince: History, Reading, and the Birth of Political Criticism* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2005).

[40] Malcolm, *Reason of State, Propaganda and the Thirty Years' War*, 94-95; Lionel A. McKenzie, "Natural right and the emergence of the idea of interest in Early Modern political thought: Francesco Guicciardini and Jean de Silhon", *History of European Ideas* 2, no. 4 (1981): 277-298.

[41] For instance, Bonnet, "L'exil d'Henri de Rohan et le devoir d'écrire", 252.

[42] This suggestion of Conal Condren, elaborated upon by Ryan Walter, can be further explored. "Conal Condren has suggested that interest developed from and with the notion of office but, crucially, interest also 'allowed for forms of explanation independent of any ethics of office', and this trend contributed to the decline of office as a presupposition of early modern argument." Ryan Walter, "Slingsby Bethel's Analysis of State Interests", *History of European Ideas* 41, no. 4 (2015): 489-506, 495; Condren, *Argument and Authority*, 344; Jacob Soll, *Publishing the Prince*, 315.

'interest' seemingly goes beyond *raison d'état* proper, in the scope of his work and the use of interest as an 'objective' analytical tool to evaluate the contemporary situation in Europe.[43] Rohan himself attested in the opening lines of *De l'Interest des Princes*, knowledge of 'interest' goes beyond knowledge of the actions of princes, i.e. what mostly concerns authors using the terminology of *raison d'état*. Furthermore, Rohan's more abstract notion of 'interest' makes it possible to test princes' actions and governmental policy to the standard set by interest. Consequently, it offers space for critique on a (ideally) more or less 'objective' scale.

However true these observations in current historiography might be, they fail to recognize the fact that for the author himself the terms were still largely interchangeable. This becomes clear when we view *De l'Interest des Princes* in the context of Rohan's other writings and publications of the 1630s. Especially significant in this respect, is that in his *Mémoires sur la guerre de la Valteline* the author noticeably does not use 'interest' in his characteristic sense, but does apply the phrase *raison d'état*, multiple times! In one such passage the duc criticized those at the French court who advise to seek the glory of taking the title of defender of the Catholic cantons from Spain and avoid the blame of supporting 'heretics', while *raison d'état* commands that France supports the Protestants against the Habsburgs.[44] Also it seems striking that the other exile-writings barely contain Rohan's characteristic use of the terminology of 'interest'. Furthermore, where these publications do mention 'interest', only in very few instances its use approximates the specific function that the duc gives it in *De l'Interest des Princes*.[45] This might be explained by the diverging purposes and contexts of these specific other works and probably says little about Rohan's ideas on 'interest'.[46]

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[43] Cf. Meinecke, in a concluding passage on the anonymous *Discours des Princes et Estats de la Chrestienté*, recognizes that the author was familiar with the Italian literature of *ragione di stato*. "But he raised himself above it in his attitude to things by his treatment of Europe as a collective whole; and, so far as we can see, he was the first to attempt this." Meinecke, *Machiavellism*, 161. Recently Paul Bonnet remarked that Rohan's book represents a qualitative leap from the essentially 'national' *raison d'état* literature of the time, to which it is irrefutably connected. *De l'Interest* surpasses the *raison d'état* literature until that time in its decentralized 'inter-state' perspective of European affairs. Bonnet, "L'exil d'Henri de Rohan et le devoir d'écrire", 231-259.

[44] For instance when he writes: "Nonobstant tels et semblables offices rendus par Rohan en cette occasion, les cantons catholiques ne laissaient d'être aigris contre lui, ce qui lui nuisait même en la cour de France, où ayant à soutenir par *raison d'état* les protestants contre la maison d'Autriche, on prenait à tache de favoriser en toute sorte d'occasion les catholiques, pour ôter la gloire aux Espagnols d'être leurs défendeurs, et éviter le blâme d'appuyer les hérétiques." Henri de Rohan [ed. B.F.A.J.D. de la Tour-Châtillon de Zurlauben], *Mémoires et lettres de Henri duc de Rohan, sur la guerre de la Valteline.* Tome I (Genève, Paris: Vincent, 1758), 99. Other

[45] For instance, in his memoirs on the period between the death of Henry IV and the peace of Alès, Rohan uses the expression "l'interest des Espagnols". Here he uses the phrase in the context of Clausel's plea with the duc to get Spanish aid to continue the Huguenot war effort against the royal armies in what would be their last stand after the Fall of La Rochelle.

[46] Rohan's *Parfaict capitaine* contains no mentioning of the term 'interest', not even in the important chapters 18-20 that concern the "Attaque des États, selon leurs forces et situations", the "Défense des États, selon leurs forces et situations" and the "Moyens d'assurer une conquête".

Looking at publications that were written for similar purposes, the "Discours d'Estat", they tell a different story. As we saw in the previous intermezzo chapter, Rohan's second polemical pamphlet, *A ceux qui veulent conserver leur Liberté, ou l'acquerir*, contained both the terminology and an exhortation to counter Spanish force in Europe. In this "Discours d'Estat" the term 'interest' has a function that is akin to its role in *De l'Interest des Princes*, namely to insist to various princes and 'estates' that it is in their 'interest' to oppose Spain.[47] From this comparison with Rohan's other exile writings it follows that the duc did not specifically intend to supersede and transpose the terminology of *raison d'état* with his concept of 'interest'. Rather we might postulate that the specific conception of 'interest', so intimately connected to his Venetian exile, only fully came to fruition after Rohan's first intervention in the debate on current European affairs had drawn him into a nasty polemic with a Catholic apologist. Rohan's second pamphlet showed the trajectory; he needed to find a term that urged the princes and 'estates' of Europe, and the French king in particular, to counter the designs of Habsburg Spain, but that was at the same time abstract and seemingly 'objective' enough not to 'expose' the author as partisan.

Princes and 'states' in Rohan's *De l'Interest*: who are the actors?

Rohan's use of the concept of the 'state'

Rohan is often seen as the author who popularized the phrase 'interest of state'.[48] However, not one instance of the phrase 'interest of state' (*intérêt d'état*) is to be found in Rohan's book; 'interest(s) of the estate(s)' (*intérêt de l'état*) is only used in one particular reference to the 'estates' of the United Provinces. The duc does write about the 'interest of his/her state' (*intérêt de son état*) with reference to specific princes in a handful of cases. The historiographical confusion surrounding the phrase 'interest of (the) state' seems to derive from Friedrich Meinecke's analysis, presupposing the presence of the modern 'State' as a legal person in interest-analyses like Rohan's.[49] Still, the work of various historians has pointed out Rohan lived in an age of transition at the end of which a more modern concept of the 'state' as the 'seat of sovereignty' and an abstract political entity independent of both the ruler and the ruled, had gained ground and later acquired a central position in political discourse, philosophy and thought.[50] This merits a closer look at Rohan's use of the concept of '*État*', if only for its prominent place in the title of

[47] *Memoire d'Estat*, 97. See Intermezzo I above as well as Appendix 3 for the complete pamphlet.
[48] See for instance Salmon, *Renaissance and Revolt*, 98-105.
[49] Meinecke, *Machiavellism*, 166-170.
[50] See Chapter I. Collins, *Republicanism and the State in France, 1360–1715* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming); Quentin Skinner, *Visions of Politics. Volume 2: Renaissance Virtues* (Cambridge: Cambrige University Press, 2002), 368-413; Lazzeri, "Introduction", 103-111, 120-125; Howell A. Lloyd, *The State, France, and the Sixteenth Century* (London and Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1983).

his treatise. The question is what the concept of '*État*' refers to in the many instances that Rohan deploys the term in his political writings. We must, of course, again be careful to keep in mind that it was never Rohan's intention to give a theoretical exposition of the terminology of '*État*'. Furthermore, since he did not define his conception of 'state', it is at times difficult to designate his specific understanding of the term. In this survey of Rohan's use of the terminology of '*État*', associated terms, such as *république* and *puissance*, need to be investigated as well as they might tell us something more of the specific meaning of 'state' Rohan had in mind upon writing his treatise.

Rohan employed the term *état* in many of its contemporary designations, but an abstract notion of the state as a legal person was not yet present in his political treatise.[51] It directly follows from the fact that he had no concept of 'state' as acting legal person, that the phrase ascribed to the duc 'interest of states' could and was never used by Rohan. How then did he use the term '*État*'?

At some instances in *De l'Interest*, Rohan might have interchanged the terminology of '*État*' with the term 'power' (*puissance*). Here 'power' refers to the whole of a territory and its denizens, which might otherwise be termed 'state'.[52] However, when used in the context of foreign affairs and war politics, as it is in *De l'Interest* as well as in his earlier political writings, the political term 'puissance' also often denotes a (potential) hegemon, a great power with a significant sphere of influence among smaller powers depending on it. For instance, it is in this sense that Rohan contends that England shall "establish a third power in Christendom" if and when it followed its true interest.[53]

Another important contemporary political terminology of sovereignty (*souveraineté*) is found once in *De l'Interest* in the context of the conflict of the Republic of Venice with Pope Paul V. Although Rohan could well have been aware of the work by Jean Bodin on the subject, there are clear indications that he had read the *Six livres de la République*.[54] Nevertheless, the men in the duc's cabinet, especially Priolo, were undoubtedly aware of Bodin. That said, the term *souveraineté* seems to be employed by Rohan in a traditional form describing a political community that is free from interference in political matters by a superior power and that does not recognise such a political power.[55] In several other instances (*souverain*) is used as an adjective. For instance, in the discourse in the second part of the treatise on the Truce between

[51] For an overview of these designations, see Chapter I.
[52] See for instance its general descriptive application in the phrase "powers of Christendom (*puissances de la chrétienté*". Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 181.
[53] Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 185.
[54] No copy of Bodin's *Six livres de la République* (1576) is to be found on the inventory of Rohan's travel-library. Acquaintance with Bodin's conception of sovereignty could be indirect via other authors and/or via connections to French and Italian intellectuals.
[55] Lazzeri, "Introduction", 105-106.

Spain and the Dutch Republic, Rohan states that the Spaniards were forced to recognize the United Provinces as free and sovereign. The term sovereign (in the phrase *États libres et souverains*) here refers to a similar freedom from outside interference in political matters.[56]

In *De l'Interest* Rohan uses the term *république* in the sense that it had from the time of Machiavelli, denoting a political regime differentiated form 'the rule of one'. At a time when the terminology of 'state' had incorporated virtually all the attributes of *république* and in political discourse had almost fully replaced this political term, such usage of *république* had become common in France. At least one time, in treating of the Republic of Venice, Rohan might have used the term *république* in the sense that was interchangeable with the 'state' as the translation of Henry Hunt also seems to indicate. "Here is that which passed before the breach betwixt the *Pope* and the *Venetians*, wherein the *Venetians* exactly follow that which belonged to their interest. For their *State* (*république*) being founded rather by Peace, then by War, and being more considerable for Counsell then for Armes, they ought ever dexterously to avoid any rupture whatsoever."[57]

If we now look to the way Rohan uses the term *état* a variety of meanings becomes apparent. At the very beginning of the work, in his dedicatory letter to Cardinal Richelieu, Rohan uses the term 'state' in the sense of government and government policy. In fact, he uses a particular phrase that was used to denote critics of the French government at that time, *censeur d'état*.[58] "I believe", Rohan writes emphatically to Richelieu, "that you will not think that I have started writing this discourse with the intention of being a government critic (*censeur d'état*)."[59] Rohan was careful that his work, analysing the interests of European powers and evaluating cases from recent history in terms of a correct or incorrect understanding of the true interest, would not be received as a critique of current French government policy. Outright criticism would not be treated lightly and would only have frustrated Rohan's ambitions to lead an army in the Valtellina.

In the first part of *De l'Interest* discussing the interests of the various polities of Europe, Rohan often uses the term state in a traditional way of referring to the lands or territories over which the authority of a prince or political community extends. In the paragraph on the Duchy of Savoy this conception is clearly applied. Rohan, writes that the "*Estate* (L'État) of this *Prince* is in such manner situated, that to which side soever he turnes, he is of great importance to the parte he

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[56] Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 212.

[57] Rohan, *The Interest of The Princes*, II.54. "Voilà ce qui se passa devant la rupture entre le pape et les vénitiens: en quoi les vénitiens suivirent exactement ce qui était de leur intérêt car leur république étant fondée dans la paix que dans la guerre et étant plus considérable par le conseil que par les armes, ils doivent toujours par dextérité, éviter toute sorte de rupture." Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 204.

[58] 'Censeur' was commonly used in a pejorative sense, here: "someone who reproaches the actions of government". See the entry in *Le Dictionnaire de l'Académie Française* (1694) on the *dictionnaires d'autrefois* website. Cf. Catteeuw, *Censures et raison(s) d'État*, 327-355.

[59] "[...] je crois que vous ne jugerez pas que j'ai entrepris ce discours pour vouloir passer pour un censeur d'État." Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 160. See Appendix 1 for the full text of the dedication to Richelieu.

embraceth."[60] Henry Hunt, the translator of the political treatise here consistently uses *Estate* for *l'État*, thereby indicating this specific meaning of the word *état*. This can be seen, for instance, when Rohan is translated as stating that, "the Interest of his [Charles Emmanuel, the Duke of Savoy] *Estate* was, to side one while with *France*, another while with *Spaine*, according to the occurrences and good of his affaires, which was the sole *But* [*but* – as in, goal or end] of his designes, without thinking of *Treaties* made either with the one or the other."[61]

In the discourse analysing the interest of England a closely related but slightly different understanding of the term 'state' is found. Here it refers to the whole of the denizens of the territory belonging to a prince. "*Queene* Elizabeth (who by her prudent government hath equall'd the greatest *Kings* of *Christendome*) knowing well the disposition of her *State*, beleeved that the true interest thereof consisted, first in holding a firme union in it selfe, atchieving to smother the reliques of precedent factions, deeming (as it is most true) that *England is a mighty Animal, which can never dye except it kill it selfe*."[62] Rohan and Hunt consistently speak of the Interest of *his* or *her* State (*l'interest de son estat*), indicating that there is no distinction between the prince and the state.

In his discourse on the negotiations around and the conclusion of the Twelve Years' Truce between Spain and the Dutch Republic, Rohan uses the term 'state' in various ways. As was common, he consistently refers to the government of the Dutch Republic as 'the Estates (*les États*)'. "The hope given to the *States*, that in this Accord, the King of *Spaine* would acknowledge them for *free States*, made them give eare, whereupon followed a suspension of Arms for to treat more at large."[63] The designation of 'state' is here at least trifold. First, the term refers to the government and prevailing regime of the Dutch Republic. It also refers to the political community of the United Provinces, i.e. the orders, cities and other corporations and their assemblies. Thirdly, the term state is referring to the territory and population over which the power is exercised. In further discourses Rohan significantly calls the Dutch Republic 'the United Estates' (*les États-Unis*), a descriptive incorporating the three aforementioned meanings.

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[60] Rohan, *The Interest of the Princes*, I.37-38. Original French: "L'État de ce prince est tellement situé que de quelque côté qu'il se tourne, il peut apporter un grand poids au parti qu'il embrasse." Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 176-177.

[61] Rohan, *The Interest of the Princes*, I.37-38. "[...] l'intérêt de son État était de s'attacher tantôt avec la France, tantôt avec l'Espagne selon les occurrences et le bien de ses affaires, qui était le seul but de ses desseins, sans se soucier des traités faits ou avec l'un ou l'autre." Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 177.

[62] Rohan, *The Interest of the Princes*, I.54-55. "La reine Elizabeth, qui a égalé par son prudent gouvernement les plus grands rois de la chrétienté, reconnaissant la disposition de son État, crut que le vrai intérêt d'icelui consistait, premièrement, a le tenir bien uni en foi, achevant d'étouffer les reliques des précédentes factions, jugeant, comme il est très véritable, que l'Angleterre est un grand animal qui ne peut jamais mourir, s'il ne se tue lui-même. Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 183.

[63] Rohan, *The Interest of the Princes*, II.72. "L'espérance donnée aux États qu'en l'accord le roi d'Espagne les reconnaîtrait pour États libres les fit écouter, dont s'ensuivit une suspension d'armes pour en traiter à plein fonds." Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 210.

In this survey of *De l'Interest des Princes* a number of uses of the terminology of '*État*' have come to the fore, but the author had no 'modern' conception of 'state' acting as a legal person, separate from the ruler and the ruled alike. In some of his formulations Rohan seems to distinguish the person of the ruler from the state, as in realm. However, this 'state' is still an essentially passive political entity as it is more the object that suffers the consequences than the actor itself. The formulation of the famous opening lines of the political treatise are the clearest possible indication of the activity of the prince and the passivity of the state or the realm. "The *Prince* may deceive himselfe, his *Counsell* may be corrupted, but the Interest alone can never faile. According as it is well or ill understood, it maketh *States* to live or die."[64] It is the prince that acts but the consequences of his actions lie with the state, the power of the political community exercised over a territory and its population. The ruin of states comprises the loss of effective control over a territory and its population, caused by the actions of princes who either fail to perceive the right course of action or are misled by corrupt political counsel.

Actions of princes

In Rohan's interest-analysis it is not the abstract person of the state that acts on the stage of European power politics, but the various princes of various standing.[65] In his evaluations of prince's actions according to the rule of the true interest the main characters are first of all the great European princes such as the French kings Henri III, Henri IV, and Louis XIII, Philip II of Spain and his two predecessors by the same name, the English monarchs, Queen Elizabeth I and James I, the Holy Roman Emperors Ferdinand III, and the Popes of Rome, like Pope Paul V. Then there is a whole range of smaller European princes among whom we find the Swedish king Gustavus Adolphus, various German princes such as the Elector Palatine Frederic V, several aspiring princes like Henri I duc de Guise, Charles duc de Nevers, and other princes of note like Charles-Emmanuel of Savoy, William of Orange and his son Maurice. Lastly Rohan presents other great nobles, ministers and royal favourites as actors whose actions have an impact on European affairs. Among the latter we find the French royal favourite of the early 1620s, the Duc de Luynes, Villeroy, the Dutch state-pensionary Johan van Oldenbarneveldt, and Cardinal Richelieu. Although Rohan's ideas on interest may have had a wider applicability, ordinary people were of no concern for Rohan, as was common for a man of his stature. The assumptions about the nature of the people are present in Rohan's political writings from the political discourses of the 1620s to the *Parfaict capitaine*, *De l'Interest*, and his *Mémoires*, and were shared by many of his

[64] Rohan, *The Interest of the Princes*, I. preface (no pagination).
[65] John Salmon already remarked "It was the prince, not the state, that he [Rohan] had essentially in mind." Salmon, *Renaissance and Revolt*, 116.

contemporaries. However, it would go too far to call his conception of 'interest' a coherent secular social theory. [66]

If we look at the political rationality advised in *De l'Interest* that can be applied to (future) political actions, we find that this evaluative quality of Rohan's interest analysis does make room for a larger public to scrutinize princes' actions. Rohan had already attested in his dedicatory letter that to perceive the interest of princes and estates, superior rational qualities are necessary.[67] This approximates the contemporary *topos* of the exceptional intellectual and moral qualities attributed by various *raison d'état* authors to the sovereign (Louis XIII) and also at times to his counselor (Cardinal Richelieu), legitimating their supreme political authority. The difference being that Rohan not only shows in the famous introducing lines to the first part of *De l'Interest* that princes might misunderstand their true interests and that their counsel might be corrupted and thus led or leads astray from a polity's true interest, but in the second part of the treatise also gives concrete examples from recent history of the political errors made by princes like Henri III, the Duc de Guise, Henri IV, and of Philip II and Philip III. In Rohan's political thought perceiving and understanding the true interests of state is no longer a royal, or for that matter governmental, prerogative, but this high form of understanding depends fundamentally on rational capacities.[68]

In the second part of *De l'Interest* private interests are often encountered obstructing the 'true interest' of a given polity. In his examples from recent history Rohan presents princes who miscalculated their interest (Henri III), who let some passion get in the way of the realisation of the interest of their state (Philip II, Paul V), or who were misguided by wicked counsel (the young Louis XIII). Those criticized in Rohan's analysis are mostly the regents, ministers and royal favourites that bear a negative influence upon the policies of the European powers.[69] In this way Rohan shows that the French queen regent, Marie de' Medici, preferred her private interest to the interest of France.[70] In his discourse upon the War of Bohemia, the conflict with which the Thirty Years' War started, Rohan blames a young Louis XIII for his apprehension in intervening in the conflict, which was mainly the consequence of his following the private interest of the Duc de Luynes, the royal favourite, and not the interest of France that Louis' father had perceived so

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[66] Cf. Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity*, 73-78,

[67] "Il faut des lumières plus que naturelles, pour observer les mutations d'une chose si difficile à comprendre." Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 159.

[68] Salmon, *Renaissance and Revolt*, 108, 108 [footnote 46]; Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 159-160 [footnote 2].

[69] It is indeed intriguing as Salmon noted that Rohan passes silently over his own obstruction of the interest of France in the late 1620s, when an intervention of the French government in the succession crisis in Mantua and Montferrat was hindered and delayed by the Huguenot resistance of La Rochelle and the war in Languedoc.

[70] The critique of the policies of Marie de' Medici are found in the discourses IV and V.

well.[71] After recalling in the third discourse on the conflict between Venice and Pope Paul V the role of the French ambassador Villeroy, who for reasons of ambition to the cardinalship inclined at first to the side of the Pope, in arbitrating the matter, Rohan concludes: "So it is, that oftentimes a privat interest doth prejudice the publike. Happy are the States, wherein those that sit at the helm of government, have so noble a spirit as not to ayme at any other greatnesse then that which is inseparably conjoint with the glory of the Prince whom they serve."[72]

In two cases the author presents statesmen that end up successfully contributing to the interest of state while pursuing their private interest under the guise of the public interest. Rohan praises the Duc de Lesdiguières who with his invasion of Northern Italy in 1616 had "engaged France to embrace her true interest" "albeit that he followed his particular ends".[73] He also implicitly praises Cardinal Richelieu for heroically surviving the attacks of his enemies at the *Day of the Dupes.* "[A]nd after so many stormes past, one seemes upon the point to suffer shipwrack in the haven. There appeared his vertue against whom all these devises were contrived, for at length he got out of this Labyrinth by the clue of his honor (*par le fil de l'honneur*)."[74] Not only had the cardinal served his private interest in deferring his disgrace and fall from power, but in doing this he prevented that pro-Spanish forces in the counsel of the French king took the helm in dictating foreign affairs. What is good for the individual statesman and what is good for the state may thus at times become aligned.

In *De l'Interest* Rohan thus proposed to analyse the actions of princes, i.e. natural persons. Reflection upon political action is open to a wider audience and the consequences of these actions concern the inhabitants of realms. In the end, however, the actors on Rohan's stage are still mainly princes and not states acting as legal persons, nor ordinary individuals. For various reasons rulers fail to act according to true interest of the polity they rule, but never is the interest of the lands of a prince obstructed by the private interest of the prince. Indeed, as the transformation of the private interests during the rise of Henri IV discussed in the first discourse made crystal clear,

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[71] Rohan, *The Interest of the Princes*, II.113. "[...] l'intérêt du favori étant préféré à celui de l'État [...]." Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 223-224.

[72] Rohan, *The Interest of the Princes*, II.58. "C'est ainsi que souvent l'intérêt particulier préjudicie au public. Bienheureux les États dans lesquels, ceux qui sont assis au gouvernement, ont le courage si haut, qu'ils ne visent à autre grandeur qu'à celle qui est inséparablement conjointe avec la gloire du prince auquel ils servent." Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 206.

[73] Rohan, *The Interest of the Princes*, II.135. "[...] la principale louange en est due au maréchal de Lesdiguières, qui en toute cette guerre [the private intervention in Piedmont in 1616], bien qu'il suivit ses fins particulières, engagea la France à embrasser son vrai intérêt [...]." Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 233.

[74] Rohan, *The Interest of the Princes*, II.142-143. "L'Espagnol sème la division dans son [Louis XIII] Conseil, ce qui interrompt le cours heureux de tant d'actions héroïques et après tant d'orages, on se trouve comme sur le point de faire naufrage dans le port. Là parut la vertu de celui [Richelieu] contre lequel toutes ces machines étaient dressées, car enfin il sortit de ce labyrinthe par le fil de l'honneur." Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 235-236. Cf. the similar reference to the "grand orage" of the *journée des Dupes* in Rohan's "Advis aux Princes Chrestiens, Sur les affaires publiques presentes" in Appendix 3.

Rohan assumed the interest of a polity and the private interests of princes to be identical.[75] In *De l'Interest des Princes*, the duc makes clear that princes and other political actors have to realize that their interest is to a great extent determined by the concrete strategic and historic situation of their lands. It is this specific situation that determines that a king of France has a specific interest according to which he must rule, like the king of Spain or ruler of any other polity have their own particular situations and interests.

From bien publique to the interest of princes and their realms

In Chapter I we have seen how the political vocabulary *bien publique* was corrupted during the sixteenth-century civil wars of religion and displayed its last spasms by the time of the failure of the Estates General of 1614 and the rebellion of the princes. In a political discourse from the time of Condé's rebellion Rohan had declared the 'public good' dead for it was only a guise under which the *grands* pursued their private interests. Cynically he wrote that the "rhetoric that does not affect the interests of those people one wants to persuade, seldom has any effect."[76] The rhetoric of the *bien publique* is hollow if every great aristocrat uses it to further his own cause. Rohan showed himself sceptic about the political rhetoric of *bien publique*. He favoured a rhetoric that historians have called 'Machiavellian' or 'Tacitean'.[77] The duc stated that rhetoric should first and foremost consider the interests of the audience one wishes to persuade. In Rohan's political work of the 1630s, interest became the rule of all actions of political agents and is abstracted as something that can be both well understood and misperceived. This 'interest' deriving from the situation of the prince's realm presents a rule in policy that is raised above faction, but to which private interests may be aligned either by rhetorical framing, by fortuitous outcome, or by the circumstances. Action according to interest will succeed when this 'state' of the prince is maintained or expanded.

Rohan clearly distinguished his conception of 'interest' from both reason and the passions. As he sees it, passions and superstitions all too often obfuscated the view of the interest of the realm of a prince and the 'guiding light' of reason can apparently be too weak. In government affairs (*matieres d'Estat*), Rohan wrote in the preface to the second part of *De l'Interest des Princes*, "one

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[75] Rohan, *The Interest of the Princes*, II.21-25; Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 194-197. See also Salmon, *Renaissance and Revolt*, 114.

[76] Henri de Rohan (tr. George Bridges), *Divers Politique Discourses of the Duke of Rohan made at several times upon several Occasions* (London, 1660), 25. Original French: "L'Eloquence qui ne touche les interests de ceux qu'on veut persuader, a ordinairement peu d'effect envers eux." Henri de Rohan, *Discours politiques*, 51 (Discours V). See further Chapter II. Referred to in: J.A.W. Gunn, *Politics and the Public Interest in Seventeenth-Century England* (London, 1969) 36; Quentin Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes* (Cambridge et al., 1996) 428-429.

[77] Victoria Kahn, *Machiavellian Rhetoric: from the Counter-Reformation to Milton* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) 3-84; Marc Fumaroli, *L'Age de l'éloquence. Rhétorique et "res literaria" de la Renaissance au seuil de l'âge classique* (Genève: Droz, 2002).

ought not to suffer himself to be led by inordinate desires, which carry us oftentimes to undertake things beyond our strength, nor by violent passions which doe diversly trouble us, according as we are possessed therewith, nor by superstitious opinions, whereby ill-conceived scruples are ministred unto us, but rather our proper interest guided by reason alone, which ought to be the rule of our actions."[78] Whereas Rohan maintains that reason is a guide both in helping the prince to understand his true interest and in succeeding to attain these ends, his work at the same time implies that reason and interest can be in conflict. As the examples in the second part of *De l'Interest des Princes* shows princes often misperceive their interest and act rationally in defiance of their true interest.[79]

The European power constellation and 'Machiavellian' rule by conquest

Now we have seen Rohan's use of the terminology of interest and *État* in greater detail, let us turn to how these terms are applied in his political analysis. In this third part of our analysis of *De l'Interest des Princes* the rhetorical aspect of Rohan's writing is emphasized. The analysis of the first part of Rohan's work focuses on the one hand on the rhetorical construction of the image of enmity of Spain towards the rest of the European powers, underneath a seemingly 'disinterested' perspective on European affairs. On the other hand, the duc's rhetorical strategies allow him to frame his argument within a perspective that the royal government and Cardinal Richelieu in particular would have found agreeable. Wherever possible, themes in this account by Rohan shall be analysed alongside his other works, especially *Le Parfaict capitaine*, together with which *De l'Interest* was always printed.[80]

Rohan's conception of Europe: les deux pôles de la Chrestienté

Often called an 'anatomy of states' for the way he 'dissects' the political situations and interests, what Rohan provides the reader in *De l'Interest*, especially in the first book, is a 'cosmography' of the European power constellation.[81] Europe is the centre where the gravitating force (*influences*) of two poles, Spain and France, meets, leading to violent confrontations. Every political entity in Europe – from the principalities of Italy to those of Germany, from the Holy See to the *républiques* of Switzerland and the United Provinces – gravitates either towards Spain or to France. The

[78] Rohan, *The Interest of the Princes*, II. preface (no pagination). "[...] en matière d'État on ne doit se laisser conduire aux désirs déréglés qui nous emportent souvent à entreprendre des choses au-delà de nos forces, ni aux passions violentes qui nous agitent diversement selon qu'elles nous possèdent, ni aux opinions superstitieuses qui nous donnent des scrupules mal conçus, mais à notre propre intérêt, guidé par la seule raison qui doit être la règle de nos actions [...]." Rohan, Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 187.
[79] Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric*, 428-429.
[80] At least the Paris editions of the treatise were published in collective volumes alongside the *Parfaict capitaine*, however with separate paging. See above and Appendix 1.
[81] Cf. Bonnet, "L'exil d'Henri de Rohan et le devoir d'écrire", 253.

foreign affairs of all these different polities and, intimately related, internal political affairs revolve and change (*révolutions*) with the pushing and pulling of these forces. European affairs are thus dictated by the rivalry between the dynastic houses of Spain, the Habsburgs, and France, the Valois-Bourbon.[82] England is seen as a possible third power that might and, according to Rohan, should intervene in this bipolar division of Europe.[83]

It is important to notice that Rohan does not generally use the term 'Europe' for the collective of powers on the continent. What he means by 'Christendom' (*Chrestienté*), in the age of confessional strife that still persisted in the 1630s and being a Huguenot himself, can for obvious reasons not be the old *respublica christiana*, the spiritual and political unity of Europe under papal authority. In Rohan's account, 'Christendom' is rather a general descriptive term to describe the whole of the European powers. In this understanding of Europe, however, he excludes the Ottoman Empire with its vestiges of power on the European continent, as did the old concept of *respublica christiana*. Although it had lost its function as the term for the confessional and spiritual unity of Christian Europe, the term 'Christendom' provided Rohan the possibility to speak of a collective of powers interconnected in their internal and external political affairs.[84]

Within this revolving European constellation of powers, Rohan clearly recognized, internal political affairs are intimately connected to external affairs and vice versa. However, he did not

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[82] This way of presenting the political situation in Europe was not new for Rohan, he had done so earlier in the third of his *Discours politiques* (Paris, 1646) written in the middle of the second decade of the seventeenth century. "Mais tant plus nous nous éloignons de son règne [Henry IV], tant plus voyons-nous les affaires changées. L'Europe prend une tout autre face, laquelle était autrefois balancée par les deux puissances de France et Espagne. La première, ayant sans contredit tous les protestants en la protection, ou assurés pour elle et nous partissant avec la dernière le parti des catholiques romains. Puissances qui ne se peuvent souffrir, ni que les alliances de mariage ne peuvent unir par l'accroissement de l'un et diminution de l'autre. De plus, l'égalité de ces deux puissances maintiennent toutes les autres, lesquelles y ont grand intérêt et sans celles-ci seraient facilement surmontées, par celle des deux qui demeurerait supérieure." Cf. Anonymous, "Discours d'Estat fait à Venise par un Seigneur François", in *Le Seiziesme Tome dv Mercure François, ou Suite de l'Histoire de nostre temps, sous le Regne du Tres-Chrestien Roy de France & de Nauarre Lovys XIII*, continuation de l'an 1629 (Paris, 1632) 1070-1071. "Les deux grandes puissances qui tiennent en contrepoids les autres Princes de la Chrétienté, sont les Maisons de France et d'Autriche, car ce sont les seules qui peuvent d'autrui faire la guerre et l'entretenir tant qu'elles veulent, ne manquant pour cet effet d'hommes ni d'argent. La première a pour alliés fidèles, tous ceux qui redoutent la puissance de la seconde, et la seconde a ceux qui par crainte n'osent se déclarer contre elle, lesquels elle maintiendra tout autant de temps qu'elle conservera la réputation d'avoir toujours la paix et la guerre en la main." See also, Anonymous, *Discours des Princes et Estats de la Chrestienté*, 399. "Tous les Princes et États de la Chrétienté non sujets ou partisans d'Espagne ont de l'intérêt de lui former un contrepoids nécessaire et de soutenir ceux qui ont les armes au poing contre une Maison si formidable, pour les empêcher de succomber et de faire planche par leur ruine à la leur."

[83] Rohan was not the first to recognize that England could be the third power in Europe, interestingly the author of the *Discours des Princes et Estats de la Chrestienté* (p. 396-397) made the same observation a decade before Rohan. "Étant ce roi, à vrai dire, la troisième puissance de l'Europe, après ces deux de France et d'Espagne, qui s'y font tant valoir. Tous ceux aussi à qui le fait touche espèrent que sa Majesté Très-Chrétienne les relèvera avec la même main dont elle a su rétablir, en peu de temps et si heureusement, celles de son État."

[84] Cf. Meinecke, *Machiavellism*, 162. See also Mark Greengrass, *Christendom Destroyed: Europe 1517-1648* (London: Penguin Books, 2015), who studies the "eclipse of the older notion of 'Christendom' by 'Europe' in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, and the extraordinary changes that went with it".

formulate it as pointedly as his predecessor, the anonymous author of the *Discours des Princes et Estats de la Chrestienté*. This author wrote that the necessary particular knowledge of state affairs consisted in knowing, "in short, what the situation is within and without. There is always so necessary and infallible a relation between the one and the other in good and evil, that a state cannot be agitated or have suffered in itself the least disorder, or immediately the signs of it show far away and in the behaviour of foreign princes [*étrangers*] towards that state and its concerns."[85] In Rohan's treatise this intimate connection is mainly evident from his descriptions of current affairs in Europe, for instance in the way he describes the actions of Philip II of Spain at the time of the war of the three Henri's (Valois, Bourbon, and Guise) and the Catholic League.[86]

If anything in Rohan's political treatise can be deemed innovative, it is not only the application of an analysis of interests in a European wide perspective, also it is the seemingly decentred perspective and the interconnectedness and interrelatedness of both the interests of different entities in the European constellation of powers as well as domestic and foreign affairs.[87]

Exposing Spanish designs as 'Machiavellian' rule by conquest

In this bipolar European constellation of powers that Rohan sketches the Spanish monarchy is the main aggressor. As he maintains, Spain has the intention to establish a 'new monarchy'. Spain, Rohan writes, "finding itself augmented all at once, hath not been able to conceale the designe she had to make herselfe Mistresse, and cause the Sun of a new *Monarchie* to rise in the West".[88] Further on in the text, different phrases are used. Rohan simply uses the phrase *grand dessein*,[89]

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[85] Anonymous, *Discours des Princes et Estats de la Chrestienté*, 293-294. "Le meilleur conseil qui se puisse donner en matière d'État est celui qui est fondé sur la connaissance particulière de l'État même. Et cette connaissance gît principalement à savoir exactement et par le menu la disposition. C'est à dire, quel il est en soi, et quel au régard des autres. Comme il se gouverne, ou de quelle façon tout se passe entre le Prince et les sujets, et comme il se comporte avec les étrangers. Bref, quel il est au dedans et quel au dehors. Y ayant toujours une si nécessaire et infaillible correspondance de l'un à l'autre en bien ou mal, qu'un État ne peut être agité ou souffrit en soi le moindre désordre, que les marques n'en paraissent aussi tôt au loin, et aux déportements des étrangers avec lui, et ce qui le touche."

[86] Anonymous, *Discours des Princes et Estats de la Chrestienté*, 293-294. "Le meilleur conseil qui se puisse donner en matière d'État est celui qui est fondé sur la connaissance particulière de l'État même. Et cette connaissance gît principalement à savoir exactement et par le menu la disposition. C'est à dire, quel il est en soi, et quel au régard des autres. Comme il se gouverne, ou de quelle façon tout se passe entre le Prince et les sujets, et comme il se comporte avec les étrangers. Bref, quel il est au dedans et quel au dehors. Y ayant toujours une si nécessaire et infaillible correspondance de l'un à l'autre en bien ou mal, qu'un État ne peut être agité ou souffrit en soi le moindre désordre, que les marques n'en paraissent aussi tôt au loin, et aux déportements des étrangers avec lui, et ce qui le touche."

[87] Bonnet, "L'exil d'Henri de Rohan et le devoir d'écrire", 231-259.

[88] Rohan, *The Interest of the Princes*, preface. In the original French the following lines read as follows, "se trouvant accrue tout d'un coup, n'a pu cacher le dessein qu'elle avait de se rendre maîtresse et de faire lever le soleil d'une monarchie nouvelle". Henri de Rohan (ed. Christian Lazzeri), *De l'intérêt des princes et des États de la chrétienté* (Paris, 1995 [1646]) 162.

[89] Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 190.

"design towards the *Monarchie*"[90] or "design of the *Spanish Monarchie*"[91] and "design to the *Christian Monarchie*"[92]. What does Rohan mean in using this variety of phrases, especially when he writes 'new monarchy'?[93]

Rohan's description of the Spanish scheme towards the establishment of a 'new monarchy' is a clear expression of 'Machiavellian' political rhetoric.[94] It is clear that Rohan never cited his sources nor does he refer to them in any direct way. The main references that are to be found in the text are indirect and rhetorical in nature. It is the term 'new monarchy' that leads us on the path to this reference. The elaboration on the Spanish monarchy and its *interest* in terms of a 'new monarchy' is central to Rohan's rhetorical *procedé* in *De l'Interest,* a concern that leads to suspect a great influence of the Florentine statesman Niccolò Machiavelli on his work.

Given the political vocabulary in the translations of Machiavelli's *Il Principe* that Rohan held in his personal travel-library, the term 'new monarchy' may well have been a direct reference to the *nuovi principi* that are the main object of the infamous Florentine's book.[95] In the third chapter of *The Prince*, Machiavelli explains that his main concern in the book is with these *nuovi principi*. It is to these 'new princes' that his advice about effective government strategies to uphold their positions (*mantanere lo stato*) in territories that are either inherited or acquired by violence is

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[90] Rohan, *The Interest of The Princes*, I.19; Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 171. Original French: "dessein à la monarchie".

[91] Rohan, *The Interest of The Princes*, I.6; Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 165. Original French: "dessein de la Monarchie Espagnole".

[92] Rohan, *The Interest of The Princes*, II.25; Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 196. Original French: "Philippe, qui avait conçu le *dessein de la Monarchie chrétienne* et qui jugeait que le principal obstacle qu'il y rencontrerait serait la puissance de France, embrasse l'occasion qui s'offre à lui pour la ruiner [...]. Nulle autre considération ne le divertit de son propre dessein; il le tient toujours caché sous le voile de piété et de son grand zèle à la religion catholique."

[93] In the "Discours d'Estat fait à Venise", Rohan employs the term to denote the Spanish unlimited desire for conquest is described in terms of 'universal monarchy'. Although 'new monarchy' and 'universal monarchy' seem to have a parallel pejorative meaning and might have been employed as such, Rohan does not use the term 'monarchie universelle' in *De l'Interest*. Anonymous, "Discours d'Estat fait à Venise par un Seigneur François", in *Le Seiziesme Tome dv Mercure François, ou Suite de l'Histoire de nostre temps, sous le Regne du Tres-Chrestien Roy de France & de Navarre Lovys XIII*, continuation de l'an 1629 (Paris, 1632) 1071. "La première [la Maison de France] n'a dessein que de se maintenir, la seconde [la Maison d'Autriche] a celui de s'accroître. La première ne vient à la guerre, qu'aux extrémités et selon qu'elle y est forcée par la nécessité de sa conservation ou de celle de ses voisins, la seconde a toujours les armes à la main pour empiéter quelque chose sur autrui. La première tâche de maintenir en union ses voisins pour la faire subsister, la seconde d'y semer la division pour en profiter. La première justifie ses actions à la vue de tout le monde avant que de rien entreprendre hors de ses limites, la seconde se saisit de tout ce qu'elle peut, puis cherche des prétextes pour approprier ce qu'elle tient. Bref, la première se contente de maintenir ce qu'elle possède, et la seconde aspire à la Monarchie universelle."

[94] Cf. Maurizio Viroli, "Introduction", in Niccolò Machiavelli (tr. Peter Bondanella), *The Prince* (Oxford, 2005) vii-xxxix, especially xxii-xxx; Victoria Kahn, *Machiavellian Rhetoric: from the Counter-Reformation to Milton* (Princeton, 1994) 3-84.

[95] Rohan's library probably contained one of the following French translations of *Il Principe*. The first French translation of Machiavelli's *Prince* by Guillaume Cappel (published in 1553) seems to consistently use the term 'principauté nouvelle' and 'nouveau Prince'. The translation by Gaspard d'Auvergne, which also first appeared in print in 1553, speaks of 'Monarchies' that are either 'hereditaires' or 'nouvelles' (p. 619). The translation by Jacques Gohory, published in 1571, uses the same terminology as did Cappel, providing both the terms 'principauté nouvelle' and 'nouveau Prince' (p. 2).

directed.[96] The translation of *Il Principe* of which Rohan in all probability owned a copy opens with the statement that all monarchies are either heridaritary or new.

> "Tous les états et seigneuries, qui ont eu et ont domination sur les hommes, ont été et sont ou républiques ou monarchies. Or les monarchies se possèdent ou comme héréditaires (c'est à savoir desquelles ont été d'ancienneté possesseurs les ancêtres de celui qui en est aujourd'hui seigneur) ou bien sont nouvelles."[97]

Further on, Gaspard d'Auvergne translates Machiavelli's words as "[…] un nouveau Prince, venant à une nouvelle monarchie […]", a new prince, establishing a 'new monarchy'.[98] Could it be that Rohan encountered the phrase 'nouvelle monarchie' in D'Auvergne's translation and found in it an apt term to describe Spanish 'foreign policy' and the way it affected political affairs on a European level? The way he proceeded to describe the Spanish interest and how it was followed by the 'exemplary' king Philip II would render this plausible.

Rohan takes Philip II as the Spanish king who most clearly laboured to extend Habsburg power in Europe. The Spanish king established the design of a Europe in Spanish hands (*dessein à la monarchie chrétienne*) that, as Rohan argued, was followed to the day by his successors. Philip II understood that stable rule was not simply established by conquest and ruling posts, but by well-organised administration founded upon good maxims. "Because that these great *Conquerors* (who think only of vanqueshing; and extending their dominions, and not of founding Lawes for their subsistence) being not ordinarily succeeded by such as equall their courage, and the vanquished people having not yet lost the memorie of their libertie, or of their ancient *Lords*, are easily carried to any change, seeing themselves delivered from the fear of him that had subjected them."[99] Here Rohan seems to be almost paraphrasing the advice that Machiavelli gave the wise new prince in his third and fifth chapters of *Il Principe*.[100] Philip was such a *sage prince* and chose the rule most

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[96] Machiavelli, *The Prince*, 8-16.

[97] Nicollò Machiavelli, *Le Prince de Nicolas Macchiavelli secretaire et citoyen de Florence, traduit d'Italien en Françoys,* trans. Gaspard d'Auvergne (Paris: Hierosme de Marnef, 1572), 619. (modernised typesetting JS) For an interesting research project (*HyperMachiavel* of the University of Lyon) and initial results of a comparative study of the four sixteenth century French translations of Machiavelli's *Prince* applying techniques of the Digital Humanities see, Jean-Claude Zancarini, "'Uno piccolo dono': A Software Tool for Comparing the First Edition of Machiavelli's *The Prince* to Its Sixteenth Century French Translations", in Filippo Del Lucchese, Fabio Frosini, and Vittorio Morfino (eds.), *The Radical Machiavelli: Politics, Philosophy and Language* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2015), 39-55. On the project website, one can easily compare segments in the four translations to the Italian edition that served as their basis (Blado 1532). URL: hyperprince.ens-lyon.fr (consulted January 2016).

[98] Machiavelli (tr. D'Auvergne), *Le Prince de Nicolas Macchiavelli*, 744.

[99] Rohan, *The Interest of The Princes*, I.2-3. "Pour ce que ces grands conquérants qui ne songent qu'à vaincre et à étendre leur domination et non à fonder les lois de leur subsistance, n'étant pas ordinairement suivis de leurs semblables et les vaincus n'ayant pas encore perdu la mémoire de leur liberté ou de leurs anciens seigneurs, se portent facilement à quelque mutation se voyant affranchis de la crainte de celui qui les avait assujettis." Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 164.

[100] Machiavelli, *The Prince*, 8-11; 19-20.

suitable to his personality and sought to reach his ends by way of dissimulation. He seated his power in Spain and from there ruled with force and to keep the internal peace he engaged his armies in causing havoc in the rest of Europe. By paraphrasing Machiavelli's *Il Principe* and applying his advice to European political affairs, Rohan shows Philip II – and Habsburg princes in general – to have been the 'new prince' threatening to subject Europe as a whole and establishing his 'new monarchy'. As we shall see, not only the general description of the Spanish design of rule of Europe as a whole acquired by conquest and other means, the political maxims that are central to Rohan's account on the 'interest of Spain' are Machiavellian maxims applied on a European scale.

Looking back on recent events in European history Rohan showed Spain's true intentions now it was "augmented all at once". Although he does not elaborate upon it, we might conjecture that this reference to recent history in the preface to the first book of *De l'Interest* is the sudden, more or less contingent, at times violent, but definitely unprecedented expansion of the power of the Spanish monarchy from the 1480s onwards. First, there was the unification of the Spanish kingdoms on the Iberian Peninsula with the dynastic marriage of Ferdinand of Aragón and Isabelle of Castile, who then drove the kingdoms of Granada, Naples and Navarre into submission. Furthermore, under their name imperial rule was established in the New World. Dynastic fortune then united their imperium with that of the Holy Roman Emperor in the person of their grandson Charles V. Under his son Philip II, who had to leave the title of HRE to his uncle Ferdinand, the Iberian Peninsula was united in 1580 and territory was gained in Italy. This situation of reconquest and conquest was virtually unchanged at the time Rohan wrote. As recent historiography has confirmed, the political rule and governing strategies of the Spanish monarchy were essentially based on the idea and practice of conquest.[101]

Before turning to Rohan's description of the Spanish interest, which has clear rhetorical aspects building up the image of Spanish enmity, something utterly apparent must be noticed, its place in the structure of *De l'Interest*. The 'Spanish interest' is the first of seven discourses on European powers and their interests. In a purely numerical sense the descriptions of the interest of Spain and therefore the image of the enemy of peace in Europe is built up extensively. Ten pages *in quarto* are devoted to the description of Spanish design and the maxims of its interest, whereas the attention paid to the interest of other polities add up only to half of that number – varying from three to five *in quarto* pages. Furthermore, the negative light shed on Spain is mirrored in a positive way by France in countering the Spanish interest by its own means (maxims).

[101] José Javier Ibáñez, Gaetano Sabatini, "Monarchy as Conquest: Violence, Social Opportunity, and Political Stability in the Establishment of the Hispanic Monarchy", *The Journal of Modern History* 81 (2009): 501-536.

Let us now turn to these maxims of the Spanish interest. The use of maxims, or *sententiae*, in political writing was one of the prevailing rhetorical practices in Rohan's day. The practice of using these short sentences laying bare political knowledge was a consequence of the 'rediscovery' of the Roman historian Cornelius Tacitus.[102] Although the works of Tacitus do not appear among the books of his travel-library, the Italian authors that were inspired by the Roman historian's use of *sententiae*, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, were omnipresent.

Rohan uncovers four maxims that would incorporate the true interest of Spain, in the end adding a fifth. Each and every one of these maxims seems to be part of a 'Machiavellian' rhetorical *procédé*. The first maxim is based upon an 'instrumental' use of religion, that is, using religion as a pretext for attaining its foreign policy goals. As Machiavelli maintained, God is the friend of the new prince.[103] It is crucial to notice that under the heading of this maxim, Rohan's 'advice' puts forward actions for which the Spanish government had (allegedly) been responsible in recent history. On the one hand, to establish its design of a 'new monarchy', Spain should show great zeal for Catholicism to Catholic powers. The Pope should be made to understand that favouring Spanish grandeur could attain the ruin of the Protestants, which would affirm his authority and aggrandize his power. Similarly religion would be an important argument for protection of the Italian powers. With regard to France, Spain should labour to the ruin of this power by fomenting religious civil war, inciting the French king to eradicate the Protestants while encouraging and assisting these same Protestants in their fight against the royal armies and while moving the Catholics against the king as well.[104] As to its relations with the other powers of Europe, religious policy should also be a used with care. 'Protestant' England should be kept friendly, in view of its naval power that might harm Spain's new world treasures, while underneath that peace and friendship Spain could protect and recruit English Catholics.[105] The pretext of religion also serves Spain in preserving the Holy Roman Empire firm in Habsburg hands, presenting this House as the stronghold protecting Christianity against the Protestants as well as against the Ottomans. In the

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[102] See Introduction on political rhetoric in late Renaissance Europe.

[103] Machiavelli, *The Prince*, 87-88. See also chapters 11 to 15 of the first book in Machiavelli's *Discourses on Livy*. Numerous volumes have been written on Machiavelli's God and his critique of religion and although significant in many ways these debates do not concern us here. What is of more concerns to us is the fact that from the mid-sixteenth century onwards Machiavelli became infamous for advocating the 'instrumental' use of religion, the worship of God as a means in politics not as an end in itself.

[104] This is a direct reference to the role of the government of Philip II of Spain in the Wars of Religion in France and the League Wars of the 1580s and early 1590s in particular. Rohan treats of this in more detail in the first discourse in the second part of the book, 'On the Affair of the League'. The reference to aid for the Protestants fighting the French royal government is a delicate one, since it was widely reported that when in 1629 the Huguenots were in dire straits during the Huguenot Wars, men representing Rohan were negotiating a treaty of alliance with Philip IV of Spain. See, Chapter II.

[105] Rohan refers to the English exiles in Catholic seminaries in Flanders (Louvain and Douay) and Spain (Valladolid and Sevilla). Because of the involvement of the Spanish government, who financed them, these seminaries were known, due to war propaganda, and feared by the English government to be cradles of sedition. The English exiles thus were pawns in the game of Habsburg Spain.

Low Countries and the Swiss cantons religion could be used to foment division in order to conquer these smaller powers.[106] In short, the first maxim of the Spanish interest is to persecute the Protestants in order to increase its power and territory over their remains.[107]

The second maxim concerns the way to acquire the necessary intelligence from within every other European power. Ambassadors, monks and priests, and particular influential families could be bought off, but above all one should try to win over the principal ministers and counsellors of other princes, in order to prevent anti-Spanish designs and in any way to work to the other princes' ruin.

Thirdly, with regard to diplomatic negotiations and treaties, the maxim prescribes a simulated desire for peace while preparing for war in order to surprise others when their attention is lacking. Also Spain should present herself as arbiter in conflicts between smaller powers, in order to gain in reputation or in territory. Furthermore, the Catholic king should always try to mingle with the affairs of others, but keep others at bay regarding his own affairs, while it is most important that he frustrates French diplomacy in Italy. In the second part of *De l'Interest* this third maxim on negotiation is illustrated by the case of the Twelve Years' Truce between the United Provinces and Spain.[108]

The fourth political maxim requires permanent heavy armament. This way subjects could be kept obedient and any designs on the part of neighbouring powers can be prevented, also enemies could be surprised on the European theatre of war when they do not expect it and one could prevail in unexpected situations.

Finally, these maxims are all adjoined by adding a general maxim that in light of its grand designs prescribes Spain to be very concerned about its reputation and treat it with the utmost care. Reputation is here understood broadly by Rohan, as the opinion and estimation as well as the sentiments of other political entities.[109] Spanish reputation for great Catholic zeal not only cloaks its designs with a mantle of piety, but also inspires veneration amongst the people. The

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[106] Here Rohan alludes to the Arminian question in the Dutch Republic and the Valtellina question in the Swiss cantons. The Arminian question, which brought the Dutch Republic on the brink of civil war during the Truce years, is treated of in Discours IV of the second part. The Valtellina question is a returning subject, that comes to the fore in Discours VI and VII of the second part of *De l'Interest*. Rohan, *The Interest of the Princes*, I.4-9; Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 163-166.

[107] Rohan, *The Interest of the Princes*, I.19; Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 170.

[108] Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 209-215.

[109] In *The Prince* Machiavelli made similar observations on reputation. For instance in Chapter nineteen, "Of avoiding being despised and hated", where the Florentine maintains that "a prince […] must strive to make everyone recognize in his actions greatness, spirit, dignity, and strength. […] That prince who creates such an opinion of himself has a great reputation; and it is difficult to conspire against a man with such a reputation and difficult to attack him, provided that he is understood to be of great ability and revered by his subjects." Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) 63. This point was developed further by Giovanni Botero in the second edition of his *Della Ragione di Stato* (1598) and was central to the political thought of many French authors in the 1630s, among whom Cardinal Richelieu himself.

fear of Spanish intelligence makes other princes think twice before enterprising against her. Experience of contemporary history of Spain's prudence and dexterity in gaining advantageous treaties assures people and invites lesser powers to renew and tighten their alliance with Spain. Similarly its permanent state of armament inspires fear among her enemies, whereas other powers who depend on Spanish protection rest assured. Therefore, Rohan concludes, as the Spanish reputation consists in and is a consequence of these opinions and sentiments, Spanish interest is to manage and take good care of this (feigned) piety.[110]

By exposing the rule by dynastic accumulation and conquest of the Spanish monarchy, Rohan believes to frustrate Spanish success in European domination as it will lighten the fear and strengthen the efforts of the opposing parties. As he metaphorically described it, "This huge frame composed of so many parts, and as it were incumbred with its owne weight, moves by its secret springs, which loose their force even as they are discovered."[111] Henry Hunt here translated Rohan's *cette grande machine* literally as 'huge frame' or great machine. However, the contemporary French usage of the word *machine* suggests that Rohan played with the ambiguity inherent in the loanword and actually exposed the Spanish monarchy as a 'giant ruse'.[112]

A call to arms: France and the rest of Europe

As we get a better view of the rhetorical *procedé* that Rohan employs in *De l'Interest*, we better perceive what the text seeks to achieve. In fact, the treatise as a whole can be interpreted as one large exhortation, the rhetorical element that moves the audience by triggering indignation and otherwise gathers support by sustained praise. This is exactly how Rohan's political treatise works, it raises indignation by building up the image of enmity towards the conquest-driven Spanish royalty, while on the other hand it seeks to praise and urge on the French foreign policy of the early 1630s that slowly but steadily fought the Spanish hegemony in Europe. Among the smaller polities of Europe Rohan's treatise engenders support for the French efforts, emphasizing that it is France that can help them to pursue their true interest.

When it comes to the interest of France, Rohan formulated purely 'negative' maxims, that is, maxims that are concerned only with countering Spanish interest.[113] In lively metaphors, he describes that France is like a flood barrier against the stream of progress of the Spanish designs and can prevent the distribution of the means (soldiers, munitions, and money) to this end from

[110] Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 166-169.
[111] Rohan, *The Interest of the Princes*, I.15. Original French: "Cette grande machine composée de tant de parties et comme empêchée de son propre poids s'émeut par ces secrets ressorts qui perdent leur force à mesure qu'ils sont découverts." Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 169.
[112] Rohan even uses 'machines' in this exact meaning of 'ruses' in the last discourse concerning the attempts to remove Richelieu on the *journée des Dupes*. See footnote 73 of this chapter. On the 'day of the Dupes' see also Chapter I.
[113] Meinecke, *Machiavellism*, 173-174.

the head of the Spanish monarchy towards its limbs. Of course, Henri IV (*le Grand*) was the great prince who not only experienced and overcame Spanish trickery, but, most importantly, more clearly than any of his predecessors recognized and then established the true interest of France as countering all Spanish designs in Europe.

The maxims that Rohan formulates in light of the true interest of France meet the maxims of the Spanish interest on their own 'Machiavellian' terms. The first maxim of French interest is to unveil the true intentions underneath the cloak of Spanish zeal. First and foremost the French government must make clear to the Catholic powers of Europe the dangers of the overzealous Spanish designs. Most important of all, the pope must be convinced that his authority is best served when the power of Christian princes and states is in balance. The Protestant polities can rest assured that, although France has a different confession, it would rather see their conversion than their destruction. France will never fail to contribute its share for their conservation and will defend them against belligerents that want to disrupt or change anything in their states or regarding their liberties or privileges.[114]

The second maxim of the interest of France is to 'stay awake' and make sure it is equally well informed. It needs not to be hesitant to spend money on spies and pensioners in order to have intelligence on internal affairs of its neighbours. Depending on the situation France strengthens the weak, comforts the anxious, prevents hastened military engagement of the distracted, convinces the engaged to retire, but most of all the maxim prescribes that she frustrates Spanish intelligence in whatever way possible.

Related to this maxim Rohan mentions a third that prescribes to intervene in all negotiations in which Spain is invested. This holds true above all for the Italian provinces, where Spain wants to be the arbitrator and in which Spain would succeed were it not for France to have a gateway into Italy. France should maintain this gateway as long as she wishes to oppose Spanish grandeur and be considered as bastion of Christian liberty, i.e. a freedom to engage in European affairs without Spanish interference. Addressing contemporary stereotypes Rohan urges on phlegm in dealing with Spain; diplomats treating with Spain should be patient and sang-froid, avoiding the problematic French impatience, to prevent that the Spanish will profit from their common stalling and inertia.

Fourth is the maxim to oppose force with force, because neither persuasion, nor the *jus ad bellum* (*la justice des armes*) will dictate the law to those who are ready for battle. This has such urgency that France should cut every expenses that are less utile and always be sufficiently heavy armed to that end without having to rely on mercenaries, or money and munitions from abroad. If and when these maxims shall be well observed by the French government, French policy will

[114] Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 170-171.

weaken Spanish reputation. The reputation of France will grow accordingly and other European princes and states will find courage from such a counterbalancing power in European affairs.[115] Rohan illustrates this in the second part of the book, when he shows that France has set straight course to follow its true interest at the time of the Mantuan succession affair under Louis XIII and Cardinal Richelieu. France thus has to perpetually counterbalance the Spanish designs. "Whence I conclude, that the glory of the king, the greatnesse of his State, and the eminent reputation that he now enjoyeth, will continue as long as he shall remaine constant in this resolution."[116] In this way, Rohan explicitly exhorts the French government to intervene in the European conflict that we know as the Thirty Years' War.[117]

Conclusion

In this chapter we have seen the whole range of contexts of the previous chapters come together in an analysis of Henri de Rohan's argument in his major political treatise, *De l'Interest des Princes et Estats de la Chrestienté*. In the early 1630s, Rohan, as recent Protestant rebel and exile in Venice and Padua, set himself to writing about a field of competing powers on a European scale, a scale that he had marginally touched upon in earlier political discourses but that would now be treated more fully and systematically. The status of the continent in the second quarter of the seventeenth century was one of a Europe in crisis, a Europe at war. Small regional conflicts grew into wars with multiple invested belligerent powers. During these wars the power of the published word gained more and more recognition and was employed often to legitimise, discredit, unveil, destabilise et cetera, the (policies of the) various governments. In the early 1630s, France, one of the greatest powers in Europe – at least demographically, but also militarily and economically –, at the time was at the brink of entering the battlefield with a formal declaration of war. With dynastic crisis still imminent, as the marriage of King Louis XIII had still not produced any offspring, governmental crisis only just resolved shakily at the *journée des Dupes*, and financial and – at least the fear of – military crisis looming large, the decision to openly enter the European theatre of war was not taken lightly by the king and his ministers, among whom the *premier*

[115] Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 172-173.
[116] Rohan, *The Interest of the Princes*, II.146. "D'où je conclus que la gloire du roi, la grandeur de son État et la haute réputation dont il jouit dureront autant qu'il se tiendra ferme en cette résolution." Rohan, *De l'intérêt des princes*, 237.
[117] Anonymous, "Discours d'Estat fait à Venise par un Seigneur François", 1079. After adressing the various princes and states of Europe to follow their interest in countering the Habsburg design of universal monarchy, Rohan speaks directly to the French king: "Quant à vous grand roi Très-Chrétien, qui êtes l'appui de la liberté Chrétienne et le grand mobile qui fait mouvoir tous les autres, reconnaissez la facilité de ce dessein et la gloire qui vous y est réservée, pourvue que, comme vous l'avez entrepris avec justice, vous le poursuivez avez soin et constance. Dieu vous face la grâce de vous y conduire par la main et de vous prospérer en telle sorte que vous vous en rapportiez pour glorieux trophée ce titre de Magnifique libérateur de la Chrétienté."

ministre, Cardinal Richelieu. This same Richelieu would scarcely five years after the fall of La Rochelle become the dedicatee of a political treatise that exhorted him and his government to enter this theatre of war, by the hand of the ancient rebel, Rohan. This political treatise was one of the many pieces of writing on the current affairs in Europe that exhorted, supported, criticized or attacked the French government and its foreign policy. Within this bulk of current affairs literature Rohan's political treatise would be particularly successful in finding a readership – as its wide circulation in manuscript, the number of editions, translations and adaptations show. The treatise would also have a long legacy, particularly in the Northern Protestant parts of Europe – from England in the 1640s and 1650s to the Dutch Republic from the 1650s until at least the 1690s. What, however, was the function of the political terminology of *interest* in Rohan's political work?

For one, the circulation of the manuscript and the 1638 book publication of *De l'Interest des Princes*, significantly joined in publication with his military-political treatise *Le Parfaict Capitaine*, seems to have been a conscious effort on the part of those close to the duc, or perhaps Rohan himself, to re-establish his name and reputation as the eminent military-political leader. Rohan was the perfect captain to serve the interest of France, a reputation that had already endured a lot of cracks and butts at the time the decision was made to publish the two works together and reach a wider ill-defined public of readers.

Analysis of the ducs political writings from the 1610s till the 1630s does display some important continuities. Most important in this regard, is Rohan's understanding of Europe as a bipolar theatre of war and alliances depending on Spain, i.e. the House of Habsburg, and France. Structurally, Spanish designs are depicted with implicit reference to the maxims of the 'Machiavellian prince' as aspiring the conquest of Europe and the establishment of tyrannical rule over the continent. In his various writings the duc uses various monikers for this form of European wide Spanish hegemony, either simply *monarchie*, *nouvelle monarchie*, *monarchie chrestienne,* or *monarchie universelle.* In calling the aspired monarchy 'new' Rohan probably directly referred to the *principi nuovi* of Machiavelli, however he applied the term to a field of forces that by far superseded the Florentine's accounts of the small urban republics of early sixteenth century Italy, now extending to Europe as a whole. Rohan urges the French government to unveil, but above all counter Spanish designs. France must be a beacon guaranteeing 'liberty', maintaining alliances with the powers that fear Spanish conquest, subordination or mingling with their affairs, including, and perhaps, especially, the Protestants princes and polities. Where he aligned the interests of French Protestants with the interests of France in his earlier writings, in *De l'Interest des Princes* Rohan affiliated French interest with that of the Protestant powers of Europe. However, in this work he succeeded in doing this with more subtlety than in his pamphlet "Discours d'État" of the early 1630s that had unintentionally drawn the duc in a polemic.

In a significant way, Rohan's use of the terminology of 'interest' would only be fully elaborated in his later years. Where historians have underlined continuities before, we must underline the importance of Rohan's exile in Venice and Padua for 'sharpening' his ideas. One pivotal point in this regard was the acquaintance he made of Benjamin Priolo. Priolo, a weary intellectual with ready command of Latin, Greek, and Italian, first assisted Rohan solely as his secretary, but soon handled his finances and diplomatic relations. It is not necessary to make Priolo 'ghostwriter' to any of Rohan's exile writings to underline his importance in their conception. In the duc's 'cabinet', Priolo was indispensable in providing Rohan the language skills and the connections to the intellectual community of Venice and Padua. In his 'cabinet' the duc undoubtedly discussed current Italian thought and thereby refined his ideas on European political affairs.

De l'Interest was a political treatise that served to intervene in a debate over war in Europe and French engagement in the various conflicts. The work has a specific function and so does the main political terminology that Rohan uses. 'The Interest' that Rohan depicts as a seemingly objective rule for political affairs and compass to (foreign) policy in the famous preface to his *De l'Interest des Princes* appears, in the course of Rohan's analysis of the current affairs in the different polities in Europe, to function rather as a rhetorical device that serves to delegitimise Spanish policy and legitimise active French war politics in Europe on the basis of (an inversion of) the same principle – Machiavellian 'rule by conquest'. Nevertheless, Rohan does not dismiss Spain as the epitome of evil. Rather he displays that the Spanish monarchy employs all sorts of means for its interest. That Spain and other powers follow interest to Rohan is more or less neutral, at least not morally repellent. Rohan presents 'interest' as an analytical tool for piercing through European power relations and political designs of European powers. The 'decentralized', 'objective', and rationally calculable perspective allows the term to be used by a wider public than princes and their counsellors alone. In this way 'interest' seems to go beyond *raison d'état*, mainly due to the European wide perspective instead of a mere concern for internal affairs. However, for Rohan as for many contemporaries both loots from the tree of political prudence were essentially interchangeable. More importantly, 'interest' is raised above the prince. Rohan's analysis no longer concerned the prince's moral person, his or his minister's virtues and vices.

Overlooking Rohan's political writing and probable intentions we might conclude that his conception of *interest* opens up room for action, room for ambition, and room for evaluation. As a *grand*, among the highest-ranking noble families in the French monarchy, Rohan's ambition has always been to acquire high office in order to gain the *gloire* proper to his standing. His political writing as well as its main political terminology thus functions in the service of his own interest as well as in the interest of Cardinal Richelieu and the French government under Louis XIII at a pivotal moment just before the beginning of what would become an exhaustive and 'endless' Franco-Spanish war.

CHAPTER IV

Gabriel Naudé: Parisian *érudit* and Gallican Catholic

Since the later nineteenth century and culminating in the seminal work of René Pintard, Gabriel Naudé has been considered to be a *mécréant studieux*, a studious unbeliever.[1] Since the publication of this study, Naudé has been and remained a core figure in the tradition of studies following Pintard of what he called the *libertinage érudit*.[2] Pintard's verdict on Naudé is based on four main strains of 'evidence'.[3] He believed that Naudé's rationalism led to irreligion and that his friendships, his intellectual dwellings – most notoriously, Italy and the University of Padua – and his correspondence attest of this unbelief.

Although in recent years this radical reading has been slightly nuanced, Naudé is still seen as a true libertine.[4] This chapter offers an alternative intellectual context for (re-)analysing Naudé's

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[1] The early historiography of *libertinage* with its highly moralistic and finalistic judgments is studied in detail in an article by the prolific French historian of libertinism Jean-Pierre Cavaillé. Jean-Pierre Cavaillé, "Les libertins. L'envers du grand siècle", *Les Cahiers du Centre de Recherches Historiques*, 28-29 (2002) consulted online.

[2] Pintard, *Le libertinage érudit*; and the various studies in the 'libertinage'-tradition of French scholars like Jean-Pierre Cavaillé, Françoise Charles-Daubert, Isabelle Moreau, and Italian scholars like Tullio Gregory and Lorenzo Bianchi. For an example of the nineteenth-century works prefiguring Pintard's interpretation, see Jacques-François Denis, *Sceptiques ou Libertins de la première moitié du XVIIe siècle: Gassendi, Gabriel Naudé, Gui-Patin, La Mothe-Le Vayer, Cyrano de Bergerac* (Caen: Blanc-Hardel, 1884).

[3] As one scholar remarked, Pintard's "interpretation is no longer acceptable". Not only has the historiographical construct of the 'erudite libertine' been deconstructed and 'libertinage' demonstrated to have been mostly a 'product of apologists', a pejorative fabrication used by the enemies of freedom of thought. Also the French historian has been accused of bending the evidence, interpreting documents exclusively in line with his views. Jérôme Delatour, "Le Cabinet des frères Dupuy", *Revue d'histoire des facultés de droit et de la science juridique* 25-26 (2005): 186; Louise Godard de Donville, *Le libertin des origins à 1665: un produit des apologètes* (Paris, Seattle, Tübingen: Papers on French Seventeenth Century Literature, 1989). See also the recent scholarly forum "Faut-il en finir avec les libertins?" (2010) especially the contributions of Alain Mothu and Bérengère Parmentier. URL: http://dossiersgrihl.revues.org/261; Jean-Pierre Cavaillé, "Le "libertinage érudit": fertilité et limites d'une catégorie historiographique", *Les Dossiers du Grihl* [online, 2011] Last accessed 14 January 2019.

[4] Scholars have suggested that Pintard's depiction of Naudé and others as erudite libertines, and specifically Naudé as studious unbeliever, may have had more to do with the French historian's own particular convictions and the orthodoxies of his own time, the difficult circumstances of the late 1930s and early 1940s in which his studies came about and were published, and the mid-nineteenth-century nationalist and secularist tradition of Ernest Renan in which Pintard worked, than with the content of Naudé's writings or his personal beliefs. The first to question Pintard's idea of the *libertinage érudit* was Paul Oskar Kristeller in an article entitled "The Myth of Renaissance Atheism and the French tradition of Free Thought", *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 6, no. 3 (1968): 233-243. The same author also wrote an important article on Naudé. Paul Oskar Kristeller, "Between the Italian Renaissance and the French Enlightenment: Gabriel Naudé as an editor", *Renaissance Quaterly* (1979): 41-71. See also Henry Phillips, *Church and Culture in Seventeenth-century France* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 227-240; Silvia Berti, "At the roots of unbelief", 556-558; Margaret Osler, "When did Pierre Gassendi become a libertine?", in John Hedley Brooke and Ian Maclean (eds.), *Heterodoxy in Early Modern Science and Religion* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 190-191; Roger Zuber, "In memoriam. René Pintard (1903-

writings. His critical view of confessional religion should be studied against the background of contemporary French debates described by historians as Gallicanism and antiquarianism. First his relatively modest social status will be sketched to underline the necessity of patrons to secure his ambitions. Then we will look into the context of Naudé's antiquarianism, in particular his epistemology to outline his empirical practice of studying history. This practice is an essential part in understanding his view on politics, the French monarchy and the place of confessional religion within it. So contemporary Gallican arguments will be explained to place Naudé's political ideas in their proper context. This will bring us to the argument that Naudé was perhaps radical in his desire for knowledge, but first and foremost he was a product of his time. He was a true humanist and an outright critical thinker with an interest for heterodox sources, but still essentially a Gallican Catholic.

Naudé: ambitions and patrons

The Naudé family to whom the future *érudit* was born was a respectable family with connections to and living in the Parisian lower bourgeois world of artisans, merchants, and minor office-holders. The family and its members were dependent on the Parisian financial elite that itself stood in no direct relation to the high aristocracy status of Henri duc de Rohan, but was of the utmost importance for the French monarchy.

Gabriel Naudé was born "with the century" on 3 February 1600 in the Parisian parish of Saint-Gervais as the second son of Gilles Naudé and Marguerite Descamin.[5] The boy was born to a family of modest means. Naudé's father was a minor office-holder; he worked as a bailiff (*huissier*) at the *Bureau des finances* in Paris. His mother, who came from a family of bourgeois merchants, is known to have been completely illiterate. Gabriel Naudé had multiple siblings. His three sisters – Geneviève, Charlotte and Elisabeth – all married in the same lower bourgeois circles of minor office-holders, artisans and merchants. Of his three brothers – Gilles, Nicolas and Jacques – only Nicolas became a merchant; the others joined their father in the Parisian *Bureau des finances*.[6] Gilles, the elder brother, was a magistrate, a *conseiller du roi*, who served as tax collector to the

2002)", *Dix-septième siècle* 216, no. 3 (2002): 387-391; idem, "Libertinage et humanisme: une rencontre difficile", *Dix-septième siècle* 2, no. 127 (1980): 163-179.

[5] To use the phrase by Charles-August Sainte-Beuve. His article, "Gabriel Naudé", first published in *La Revue des Deux Mondes* (Tome 4) on 1 December 1843, was reproduced in the second volume of *Les Portraits littéraires*, pp. 467-512.

[6] Pintard suggests there might have been a fifth Naudé brother named Martial, who was also a *conseiller du roi* in the *Bureau des finances* working as *élu* and *contrôleur* of the *élection* of Blanc. Pintard, *Le Libertinage érudit*, 598.

diocese of Nevers residing in Paris.[7] The younger brother Jacques became a clerk in the Clerks office of the Bureau des finances.[8]

The family's financial situation, although it allowed Naudé to acquire a basic level of education, did not always suffice in the later years of his humanist education. Gabriel Naudé might have received a bursary from the colleges he attended, but on a number of occasions evidence shows that his financial means were not sufficient and that he was in need of some support.[9] However, the family had connections to the world of financiers through the work of his father and brothers as minor office-holders in the Parisian *bureau des finances*. This allowed Naudé to pursue his studies when he showed talents for learning. From his youth as a student at the colleges of the University of Paris into his later years, Naudé laboured under the wings of a *mecenas*. It could be argued that throughout his life, the ambitions of this erudite Parisian bibliophile consisted in a search for an office. Whether it be the ecclesiastical benefice promised by Cardinal di Bagno in the 1630s, the position at a university that never became more than a rumour, or an office close to those in power like Cardinal Mazarin or Queen Christina, these positions procured by a powerful patron would provide the necessary social stability for him to pursue his work of erudition with a certain level of independence.[10]

The patrons showed Naudé three different 'worlds' in the French royal system of government. The series of patrons that Naudé had throughout his life, first allowed him to pursue his studies and writing labours. Secondly, they enabled him to make a career as a librarian and bibliophile, and third, provided him some access and insight into the workings of power in different settings. Via his father, Gilles Naudé, and his first patron, Gabriel de Guénégaud, he would have gained some view of the financial administration of the French monarchy. Guénégaud, seigneur du Plessis-Belleville, was Naudé's godfather, an influent man that Naudé's father must have known

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[7] In his *Epigrammes* Naudé's friend, Guillaume Colletet (1596-1659), published a poem (1651) for his neighbour Gilles Naudé. "Frere d'un homme que j'honore, / Naudé, que mon cœur aime tant; / Toy, de qui l'esprit esclattant, / Sçait tout ce qu'un sçavant ignore; / Aimable voisin du Faubour, / Qui connois le peuple et la Cour, / Et n'es pas ce que tu dois estre; / Si mes souhaits estoient ouys, / Tu conduirois dessous ton Maistre, / La Barque de la Ville, et l'Estat de Louis." Guillaume Colletet, *Epigrammes du Sieur Colletet avec un discours de l'épigramme* (Paris: Jean Baptiste Loyson, 1653), 89.

[8] Estelle Bœuf, *La bibliothèque parisienne de Gabriel Naudé en 1630: les lectures d'un* libertin érudit (Genève: Droz, 2007), 23-24; Pintard, *Le libertinage érudit*, 598; J.A. Clarke, *Gabriel Naudé, 1600-1653* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1970), 3.

[9] Pintard, *Le libertinage érudit*, 156; Bœuf, *La bibliothèque parisienne de Gabriel Naudé*, 23-26. From the elder brother, Gilles, for instance, Naudé received support at least once during his studies. The relationship with this elder brother would remain strong enough during his life, assisting him in financial matters. For when Naudé departed from France for a longer period of time, as in 1631 when he moved to Italy and in 1652 when he joined the court of the Swedish Queen Christina, he left his brother Gilles in charge of his affairs. In order to finish his studies, in 1624 he also accepted the gift from his cousin and her husband of a fifth of the rights on a country-house with a vineyard and small garden.

[10] I owe this idea to Sylvie Taussig, "Gassendi, Naudé et La Mothe le Vayer", *Libertinage et philosophie au XVIIe siècle. 2 La Mothe le Vayer et Naudé* (Saint-Étienne: Publications de l'Université de Saint-Étienne, 1997): 63-74, esp. 70-71.

through his work as a financial officer. This robe nobleman from a family of financial officers had acquired the title of *conseiller du roi* and made a career as *tresorier de l'Epargne*, after serving several years as a tax collector (*receveur des finances*) in Soissons.[11] He gave the most enduring base of support in the Naudé's early life.[12]

Naudé's second patron Henri II de Mesmes (1585-1650) opened doors to the world of the Parisian judicial elite of the *Parlement*. In 1622, De Mesmes, *president à mortier* of the *Parlement de Paris*, hired Naudé to administrate the rich family library founded by De Mesmes' famous and eponymous grand-father.[13] Naudé became the librarian of a library that had long held the esteem of those in the legal profession and scholars for its great collection of manuscripts and printed books. The De Mesmes family library was one of the regular meeting places for the Parisian intellectual elite.[14] In the circles of *avocats* and other *parlementaires* Naudé would further find his place later in the 1620s when his history of the medical faculty of the University of Paris gained him the support of the influential Dupuy brothers and allowed him access to their Cabinet, as will be discussed below.[15]

After De Mesmes, Naudé served a decade (1630-1641) in Italy in the service of Cardinal Gianfrancesco Guidi di Bagno, former papal nuncio to Paris and aspiring Pope. After Di Bagno died, Naudé became librarian to Cardinal Antonio Barberini (1607-1671), one of the two cardinal-nephews. In the testament of his late patron that he had helped to establish, Naudé was rewarded for his decade long affection and dedication, but as beneficiary he had to stay close to the keepers

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[11] It is probable that Naudé received some support from his godfather Guénégaud during his formation in the humanities (1615-1619) and later when he pursued his studies at the Faculty of Medicine of University of Paris (1620-1628). The dedication of his second publication of 1623, the *Instruction à la France sur la vérité de l'histoire des Freres de la Roze-Croix*, to Du Plessis-Belleville seems to attest of this continuing support. See the dedicatory letter "A Messire Gabriel de Guenegault sieur dudit lieu, et du Plessis Belleville, Conseiller Secretaire du Roy en ses Conseils d'Estat et Finances" in Gabriel Naudé, *Instruction a la France sur la verité de l'histoire des Freres de la Roze-Croix* (Paris [François Julliot], 1623) no pagination. Bœuf, *La bibliothèque parisienne de Gabriel Naudé*, 23-25.

[12] As was common in the day Naudé received his name from his godfather, Gabriel de Guénégaud. As Naudé indicates in the dedicatory letter to his 1623 *Instruction a la France*: "C'est pourquoi j'aime mieux reconnaître et confesser ouvertement, qu'avec une infinité d'autres occasions, ces deux principales m'ont donné la hardiesse d'ajouter à l'Océan de vos perfections, ce petit ruisseau, coulant plutôt de la vive source de vos louanges, que non pas du devoir de mon affection. La première me persuadait facilement qu'*après m'avoir bienheuré de la félicité de vôtre nom*, vous ne le voudriez refuser à ce petit Discours […]" etc. Naudé, *Instruction a la France,* no pagination.

[13] On this library, see L. Jacob, *Traité des plus belles bibliothèques publiques et particulières qui ont été et qui sont à présent dans le monde* (Paris: Rolet Le Duc, 1644), 538-544; and, L. Delisle, *Le Cabinet des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Impériale* tome I (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1868), 397-400; As the American historian Jim Collins has shown various members of the De Mesmes family, and in 1610-1614 Henri II in particular, played a significant role in the conflicts between the French government and the Roman Catholic Church. Collins, *Republicanism and the State*, forthcoming.

[14] Jack A. Clarke, "Gabriel Naudé and the Foundations of the Scholarly Library", *The Library Quarterly: Information, Community, Policy*, 39, no. 4 (1969): 331-343; 332.

[15] Gabriel Naudé, *De antiquitate et dignitate Scholae Medicae Parisiensis panegyris* (Paris: Jean Moreau, 1628).

of the will, the Barberini.[16] By proximity of power and strong relations to the Barberini family of the sitting Pope Urban VIII, Naudé would have a gained experience and insight into the machinations of the Roman Catholic Church.[17]

In the 1640s Naudé would enter the highest circles of power in the French monarchy as librarian, secretary and counsellor in the service of the *premier ministre*, Cardinal Mazarin.[18] Together with Mazarin he started a project to establish the first public library in France. In the midst of the *Frondes*, the library was officially opened to the learned community by a 'royal donation' of 6 June 1650, even though it had already opened its doors unofficially since 1644.[19] The cardinal was not very generous towards his secretary and Naudé apparently complained more than once of his lack of liberality.[20] As head librarian presiding over the largest collection of books in the French kingdom open to the public, he earned a meagre yearly salary of only 200 *livres*. Naudé did live free of rent in the cardinal's residential palace, was often allowed to dine at his table, and always had a horse from the palace stables at his disposal. Furthermore, during his decade long service Mazarin bestowed two ecclesiastical benefices on Naudé: a canonry in Verdun and a priory in l'Artige in Limousin that yielded 1,200 *livres* in rents, both without a requirement of holy orders. Another annual pension of 600 francs that was already granted in the mid-1630s Naudé drew from his honorary title without duties as physician in ordinary to King Louis XIV. In 1649 the occasion of the *Frondes* and Mazarin's flight from the capital prompted him to move his lodgings to the abbey of Saint-Geneviève in Paris.[21]

After the dispersion of the library that he had established with such effort and such care, the ongoing conflict of the *Frondes* finally made Naudé decide no longer to stay in Paris and heed the call from the Swedish Queen Christina. Naudé had been exchanging letters with the librarians of the learned queen and had provided them with advice since 1647. In light of his failure to protect

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[16] Pintard, *Libertinage érudit*, 268.

[17] See Peter Rietbergen, *Power and Religion in Baroque Rome: Barberini Cultural Policies* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006), 403, showing Naudé to have been the first adviser in library matters to Francesco Barberini and later helping him with contacts to further the cardinal's book collection. An example is the priest, later bishop of Vaison, Giovanni Maria Suares, with whom Naudé corresponded and who became the first keeper of the Barberini library.

[18] The legend that Naudé served Cardinal Richelieu as his librarian upon his return to Paris until the cardinal's death in December 1642 has long been maintained, but this was finally disproved by Pintard. Pintard, *Libertinage érudit*, 622. However, Naudé did work for the cardinal-minister, albeit perhaps indirectly, when he took part in the establishment of the authorship and the editions of the Imitatio Christi. Richelieu, who wanted to publish a new edition by the newly founded Royal Press inquired Cardinal di Bagno about the authorship of the manuscripts in Rome. See Intermezzo II.

[19] Yann Sordet, "Le premier acte de "donation au public" de la bibliothèque de Mazarin (1650)", *Histoire et civilisation du livre – Revue internationale* 10 (2014): 93-111. The library-project and the context of the *Frondes* will be further elaborated upon in a later chapter.

[20] For instance reported by Guy Patin in several letters, although the dean of the medical faculty, who was a known adversary of the cardinal-minister, might have exaggerated Naudé's complaints.

[21] Clarke, "Gabriel Naudé and the Foundations of the Scholarly Library", 340; Alfred J. Franklin, *Histoire de la Bibliothèque Mazarine et du Palais de l'Institut* (Paris: H. Welter, 1901), 110.

the Bibliothèque Mazarine, he was now ready to accept the persistent invitations from Stockholm – especially after a series of letters in Christina's own hand from May 1652. To his friend Gassendi Naudé confessed that although he and other friends would probably be astonished that he decided to leave Paris and go to Stockholm, he could no longer stand that "everyone looked at him with disdain" for his continuing support of Mazarin.[22] He asked his patron for temporary leave on 9 June and on 21 July Naudé departed. Arriving at the Swedish court on 13 September, he soon took charge of the office of librarian reigning it as it were *cum absoluto imperio*. The queen's library – still under construction – on the one hand impressed the French bibliophile for its rich collection of manuscripts deriving from a number of sources among which the dispersed library of Cardinal Mazarin. On the other hand, he was not impressed with the work of his predecessors on the collection of printed volumes.[23]

At first, the confidence of the queen and the learned conversations she presided pleased Naudé. Although it had not been the reason for his moving to Stockholm, as he was still unaware of the sum at the time of his arrival, Naudé received a decent salary of 3000 silver *écus* for the administration of Christina's library.[24] Soon, however, his initial optimism gave way to increasing unease with the situation at the Swedish court, where the brutish French physician Bourdelot harassed his learned countrymen and the general atmosphere among the Swedish elite was turning more and more anti-French. Naudé reported that he could no longer stand the court atmosphere.[25] He tried to obtain letters by his ancient patron Mazarin recalling him to his service and asked the Swedish Queen for his *congé*. The first of June 1653 he decided to leave and flee the Swedish court in order to return to France.[26]

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[22] "Peut-être aurez-vous bien estonné d'apprendre la résolution que j'ai pris, et effectué tout ensemble, de venir à Stockholm, où je m'assure que si vous et Monsieur de la Motte le Vayer pouviez venir aussi facilement que moi, je ne tarderais guère à vous voir bientôt, puisque la Reine ne manquerait de vous y appeler. Mais comme je ne savais que faire à Paris où tout le monde me regardait de côté à cause ********** [du Mazarinisme] et qu'en même temps sa Majesté de Suède me pressait par lettres *de proprio pugno*, à la venir voir, je n'ai pas eu beaucoup de difficulté à m'y résoudre." Letter of Naudé to Gassendi, 19 October 1652. Pierre Gassendi, *Opera Omnia. Epistolae, quibus accesserunt clarissimorum quorumdam ad ipsum epistolae et responsa in quibus humaniorum, philosophicarum, et mathematicarum rerum complura luculenter admodum enucleantur atque explicantur. Tomus sextus* (Lyon: Laurent Annisson and Jean-Baptiste Devenet, 1658), 336-337. Although the seventeenth-century editors have truncated the sentence, Pintard was able to reconstruct it in full from a manuscript of the letter. Pintard, *Libertinage érudit*, 634.

[23] "Pour sa Bibliothèque de laquelle j'ai la conduite *cum absoluto imperio*, elle est tres riche en MSS. tout à cause de ceux de Monsieur Petau, que de Monsieur Gaulmin, de Monseigneur le Cardinal Mazarin, de ceux d'un nommé Stephanides, de Ravius, et d'autres. Mais pour les Imprimés, il faut avouer que l'on la pourra rendre beaucoup meilleure qu'elle n'est à présent par la seule faute de ceux qui en ont eu le soin auparavant moi." Naudé to Gassendi, 19 October 1652. Gassendi, *Opera Omnia* VI, 337.

[24] Pintard, *Libertinage érudit*, 636.

[25] Pintard, *Libertinage érudit,* 638. Pintard quotes a testimony by Naudé he could no longer "souffrir les désordres et les dissolutions de cette Cour, dans laquelle les Muses n'étaient plus honorées",

[26] Pintard, *Libertinage érudit*, 400-402.

The years of extensive travel for his work as librarian had been a heavy physical burden on the 53-year-old bibliophile.[27] While on his way back to Paris, Naudé died of a fever on 29 July 1653 in the city of Abbeville. He received the last sacraments and reportedly died *chrestiennement*. He was buried in the aisle of the Church of Saint-George before the Crucifix, where an epitaph by Louis Jacob was engraved in the marble floor.[28] In 1654, Cardinal Mazarin finally bought Naudé's complete private library from his family – sold by his brother Gilles – for 10,000 *livres*, even though it was reported to be worth much more.[29] Francois de la Poterie, who served as Naudé's assistant in the Bibliothèque Mazarine, succeeded him as head librarian; first temporarily, but in the end until long after the cardinal's death in 1661.[30] Poterie most possibly contributed to Naudé's posthumous reputation of an unbeliever as explained below.

Education

For a man of Naudé's family background education could provide some means of social mobility. The education of Naudé is particularly important because it shows us the institutions, the professors, and the learning that would lay the foundation for his later political and philosophical thinking. Gabriel Naudé received the most part of his education at the various colleges of the University of Paris and later pursued his studies in medicine at the medical faculty of Paris. Naudé

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[27] "Nous avons été tous contristés de la mort de Télamon [Naudé], que le mérite dans sa profession littéraire avait élevé si haut parmi nous, que sans doute au lieu de descendre comme beaucoup font, son plus court chemin a été d'aller au Ciel. Il est sorti de ce monde comme d'une prison, où les uns arrêtent longtemps et les autres peu, sans qu'on puisse bien déterminer de quel côté est l'avantage. En effet, a dit Eleus [François Luillier, *conseiller*], si ces noms de vie et de mort n'ont pas été bien imposés, comme quelques-uns l'ont voulu croire, nous commençons à mourir lorsque nous commençons à vivre et la vie est la maladie qui nous fait mourir, puisque sans elle nous ne mourrions jamais." What thus engendered in the Cabinet Dupuy upon Naudé's demise was a discussion on life and death and the treatment of the dead. Speaking for himself La Mothe Le Vayer was of the opinion that "[…] le plus important point de la vie est de la bien finir, à cause que *exitus acta probat*, ce qu'exprime gentiment un vers Italien, *la vita il fine, e'l di loda la sera.* Et laissant ce qui est le plus à considérer *per la Predica*, il est constant que notre bonne ou notre mauvaise réputation dépendent de cette conclusion, la Renommée ayant cela de commun avec l'Echo, que comme celui-ci ne prononce que les dernières paroles, elle ne considère et ne publie principalement que nos dernières actions." [François de la Mothe le Vayer], *Mémorial de quelques conférences avec des personnes studieuses* (Paris: Louis Billaine, 1669), 345-357. On the ascription of the name Eleus to Luillier, see: René Pintard, *La Mothe Le Vayer, Gassendi, Guy Patin: études de bibliographie et de critique suivies de textes inédits de Guy Patin* (Paris: Boivin, 1943), 18-19.

[28] This Church of Saint-George in Abbeville was demolished in 1793, after it was chosen by the Revolutionary government to be confiscated from the clergy. Jacques Sanson, *L'Histoire généalogique des Comtes de Pontieu et maieurs d'Abbeville … Depuis l'an mil cens quatre-vingt trois, iusques à l'année mil six cens cinquante-sept. Avec un Recueil des Hommes Illustres qui y ont pris naissance, ou y ont finy leur vie.* (Paris: François Clouzier, 1657), 865.

[29] Guy Patin to Charles Spon, 10 April and 1 May 1654, *Correspondance française de Guy Patin*, edited by Loïc Capron (Paris: Bibliothèque interuniversitaire de santé, 2015).
URL: http://www.biusante.parisdescartes.fr/patin/?do=pg&let=0348

[30] Alfred Franklin, *Histoire de la Bibliothèque Mazarine et du Palais de l'Institut* (Paris: H. Welter, 1901), 110-118. According to Franklin, La Poterie, although he did not always enjoy Mazarin's favour and their relationship was troubled at first, remained in office as head librarian of the Bibliothèque Mazarine until 1688.

enjoyed a humanist education and showed himself an eager student and voracious reader and copier of books that he could not (yet) afford.[31] His teachers and professors instilled in him a universal appetite for learning, an interest in learning so divers and possibly heterodox as the opinion of the tutors themselves. His college tutors included Claude Belurgey, Pierre Padet, and Jean Cecile Frey. Later in the medical faculty he studied with René Moreau and Jacques Mentel. After an extended period of studies, Naudé procured his *master* in 1628. Only in 1633 did he receive his doctorate in medicine from the University of Padua, the famous Italian university where he had studied briefly in 1626.

After Latin grammar school, where he must have shown the promise of learning, Naudé received his formation in the arts at various colleges of the University of Paris. First he frequented the Collège du Cardinal-Lemoine until 1616, the year in which he transferred to the Collège de Navarre.[32] This college might have been important given the fact that it was the bastion of the Gallican and royalist education that had also had a profound influence on the thinking of Cardinal Richelieu.[33] In the following year, Naudé also took some courses at the Collège de Montaigu. In the summer of 1618 he matriculated in the humanities, but further pursued his humanist studies at the Collège de Clermont. Only in 1620, with a trunk full of humanist learning, he started his studies of medicine, declining the theological career his family reportedly preferred. At the medical faculty of the University of Paris Naudé studied with Guy Patin under René Moreau and Jacques Mentel. Here he established lifelong friendships with Moreau and Guy Patin. In 1626, Naudé gained permission of his patron, Henri de Mesmes and left for Italy to finish his studies in medicine at the famous University of Padua. In 1628, he finally completed his medical studies in Paris and was asked – probably through the mediation of Moreau – to deliver the *paranymphe*.[34]

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[31] As his means were sparse, Naudé constituted his own library by copying manuscripts. Among the books he copied, the most important ones were Pierre Charron's *Sagesse*, the *Politics* and *Meteors* of Aristotle, and Cardano's *Sagesse*.

[32] Naudé makes reference to his studies at the College de Navarre under Pierre Cagné (1566-1619), professor in the humanities, in the collection of *Epigrammata*. In the dedication of the second book of the *Epigrammata* to his nephew, Cosme Naudé writes: "[…] tum vero ut tibi, literis humanioribus in eadem Regia Navarræ Schola, quæ mihi quondam ingenii cultum tribuit, incumbenti, animum exemplo meo facerem, ne te unquam, vel istius Scholæ celebritate, vel eius sapientissimi moderatoris Petri Cagnæi maxima solicitudine, indignum geras. Quamuis enim nihil me unquam præstitisse meminerim, quod operæ pretium existimari possit. Votum tamen non defuit; neque ignavia passus sum corrumpi fomitem illum laudis, et virtutis, quem animo meo, et ipsius loci Genius omnium aptissimus ad disciplinam, et Cagnæi labor, atque affectus in me vere paternus, indiderant." Gabriel Naudé, *Epigrammata* (Paris: Cramoisy, 1650), 35-36.

[33] In private conversation at the Rotterdam symposium "Monarchy transformed in Western Europe: its 'reason of state' and its opponents (1620s-1720s)", Jim Collins pointed out the importance of the Collège de Navarre and its rich history and tradition of Gallicanism.

[34] The *Dictionnaire de l'Academie Française* of 1694 (digitized in the ARTFL-database *Dictionnaires d'autrefois*) gives the definition: "Discours solennel qui se prononce à la fin de chaque licence, & qui contient l'éloge de chaque Licencié." Furetière described the 'paranymphe' as follows: "C'était autrefois celui qui conduisait par honneur l'épousée, qui assistait à ses noces. Maintenant il n'est en usage qu'en l'Université et se dit de la cérémonie qui se fait en Théologie en faveur des Licenciés, quand on les reçoit Docteurs. On y invite toutes les Compagnies Souveraines, le Châtelet et le Bureau de la Ville par des harangues Latines et

On 2 July, Naudé performed this laudatory speech at the graduation ceremony before his fellow students, the red and black *robes* of the sovereign courts (the *Parlement de Paris*, the *Chambre des Comptes* and the *Cours des Aides*) and of the Faculty of Medicine of the University of Paris. Apart from a laudation of the graduates, Naudé's *paranymphe – De antiquitate et dignitate Scholae Medicae Parisiensis panegyris* – consisted of an extensive history of the institution from which the students received their licence.[35] This history was soon published and highly praised. It was only several years later in 1633 that Naudé finally received his doctorate in medicine at the University of Padua during his stay in Italy as secretary to Cardinal di Bagno.

As was still common in Paris at the time Naudé's education stayed largely within the confines of scholastic Aristotelianism as interpreted by Albert le Grand and Aquinas. At the College de Navarre Naudé studied under Claude Belurgey, a professor of rhetoric, who also taught him geography and history, Greek poetry and the 'art of disputation'. If we are to give credit to the sensational judgements of Guy Patin, Belurgey would have been a pure sceptic, who publicly displayed his aversion of central tenets of the Christian faith.[36] Naudé further studied logic with Pierre Padet at Harcourt and metaphysics at Montaigu with Jean-Cécile Frey upon whom he made a particularly strong impression testified by their lasting friendship.[37]

Most professors whom Naudé admired such as Padet and Frey kept strictly to Aristotelian orthodoxy. Later when he studied at the University of Padua he came into contact with a different interpretation of Aristotelian philosophy, one more in line with the medieval commentaries of Averroes and Alexander of Aphrodisias. His teachers at the famous medical faculty Fortunio Liceti

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différentes qui se font en chaque Chambre auxquelles le Président répond en la même langue." Antoine Furetière, *Dictionnaire universel, contenant généralement tous les mots François tant vieux que modernes, et les termes de toutes les sciences et des arts, etc. Tome troisième* (The Hague: Arnout and Reinier Leers, 1690), 32.

[35] Apart from Naudé, nine other students received an encomium in this ceremony. Naudé, *De antiquitate et dignitate*, 81 ff.

[36] Patin writes the following on Claude Belurgey (or Belurger): "je me souviens lui avoir ouï dire qu'il avait autrefois eu pour maître un certain professeur de rhétorique au Collège de Navarre, nommé M. Belurger, natif de Flavigny en Bourgogne, qu'il prisait fort *et supra modum*. J'ai vu des gens qui ont autrefois connu ce maître de rhétorique, lesquels m'ont dit qu'il ne se souciait d'aucune religion; faisait un état extraordinaire de deux hommes de l'Antiquité, qui ont été Homère et Aristote; se moquait de la sainte Écriture, et surtout de Moïse et de tous les prophètes; haïssait les juifs et les moines; n'admettait aucun miracle, prophétie, vision ni révélation; se moquait du purgatoire, qu'il appelait *Chimæra bombinans in vacuo, et comedens secundas intentiones*. Il disait que les deux plus sots livres du monde étaient la *Genèse* et la *Vie des saints*, que le ciel empyrée était une pure fiction, *illi fabulæ erant Cœlum et Inferi*. Il faisait grand état d'un passage de Sénèque: *Quæ nobis inferos faciunt terribiles fabula est; luserunt istæ poetæ ut vanis nos agitarent terroribus, etc*. On lui demanda un jour, sur quelque mot qu'il avait lâché, de quelle religion il était, il répondit qu'il était de la religion des plus grands hommes de l'Antiquité, Homère, Aristote, Cicéron, Pline, Sénèque, duquel il faisait grand état pour un chorus qui est *in Troades*, qui commence par ces mots: *Verum est? an timidos fabula decipit, Umbras corporibus vivere conditis?* etc." Letter to Charles Spon, 17 October 1667, *Correspondance française de Guy Patin*, edited by Loïc Capron. URL: http://www.biusante.parisdescartes.fr/patin/?do=pg&let=0925

[37] See the *ex libri* studied by Estelle Bœuf as well as the epigrams by Frey's hand to Naudé's early publications of the *Instruction à la France* (1623) and the *Apologie* (1625).

and Cesare Cremonini, the latter of which Naudé held in very high esteem, were Peripatetics of the purest sort, interpreting Aristotle to the letter.[38] It might be said that Naudé never wandered off very far from the Aristotelianism of his education, especially the critical, exploring kind of his early Italian days.

Intellectual circles

Naudé's education, his learning and his publications, especially the publication of his *paranymphe*, established the young man's reputation among the learned community in Paris and in other parts of France. Soon he gained access to the diverse intellectual circles that he would frequent throughout his life. Not only were the various intellectual milieus in which he moved crucial in the generation and the discussion of his views, Naudé would also distinguish himself as an intellectual broker of sorts for many of his learned friends. It is well known that he played this role of intermediary between Italy and France in the 1630s, but there are some indications that he pursued this role in the countries of Northern Europe when he came in the service of Christina of Sweden.[39]

First, Naudé was tied to the Parisian medical circles through his friendship with René Moreau and Guy Patin. Having made acquaintance with these and other men of medicine, Naudé met and regularly corresponded with these friends in most of the periods of his life. Throughout his life, he always defended the classical and Galenic medical tradition and thus sided with the Parisian medical faculty against the novelties of followers of Paracelsus, the alchemists and iatrochemists, partisans of 'antimony'. True to his education, Hippocrates and Galenus retained their place as superior authorities. It is no coincidence that this orthodox medical vision is found in his 1628 *De antiquitate et dignitate scholae medicae Parisiensis*, but other published and unpublished writings, such as the *Quaestiones iatrophilologicae* and his manuscript "Institutiones Physiologiae", also attest of a fidelity to critical rationality combined with a respect for the Galenic tradition. Nevertheless, Naudé seems to have had a more profound knowledge and a more nuanced view of the hermetic tradition and alchemist medicine than his friend and later dean of the Parisian medical faculty, Guy Patin.[40] His knowledge of the medical science of his time seems to have been

[38] Bœuf, *La Bibliothèque Parisienne de Gabriel Naudé*, 50-51. Cf. Letter to René Moreau, 16 May 1627. Naudé, *Epistolae*, 67. "Cremoninus et Prevotius [Jean Prevost] optime docent et philosophantur, sed non multa scribunt, Licetus vero et Caimus [Zaccaria Caimo] multa scribunt sed non ita secure philosophantur et docent." Especially in the 1630s, Naudé was in close contact with Liceti.

[39] See the work of Sylvie Taussig on Gassendi that casts Naudé in such a role. Sylvie Taussig, "Gassendi, Naudé et La Mothe le Vayer", *Libertinage et philosophie au XVIIe siècle. 2 La Mothe le Vayer et Naudé* (Saint-Étienne: Publications de l'Université de Saint-Étienne, 1997): 63-74.

[40] The manuscript "Institutiones Physiologiae" is referred to in Bœuf, *Bibliothèque Naudé,* 427; and Bianchi, "Renaissance et Libertinage chez Gabriel Naudé", 79. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Fonds latin, 7004, *Diexodicae Institutiones Physiologiae, Diaetae sanorum, Pathologiae et Therapeutices generalis, collectae a* G. Naudaeo Parisino, Parisiis, anno Domini 1629 (284f). The *quaestiones iatrophilologicae* that all first

vast enough, but he only practiced the humanist and philologist aspect of medicine. He traced the classical medical tradition through the Arab medical philosophers and medieval thought to the Italian 'novatores' such as Cardano and the contemporary French physicians André du Laurens, René Moreau, and Guy de la Brosse.[41] Apart from the Parisian medical circles, during his studies and ten years' residence in Italy Naudé had also gathered a group of Italian friends and acquaintances in the medical world in Padua and in the Italian Academies of Rome to which he had access. The fact that he was regarded and esteemed also as a medical thinker is underlined by his correspondence with the Dutch physician Johan van Beverwijck, to whose *Quaestio* on man's life expectancy he responded in 1639.[42]

Another highly significant part of Naudé's intellectual milieu were the cabinets of the *avocats*. Important were the learned cabinets held in the library of Henri de Mesmes (cabinet *Mesmiana*) and Jean Descordes (cabinet *Cordesiana*) to which he gained access in the early 1620s, but above all the cabinet of the Dupuy brothers were he came later in the same decade. During the colloquies in these private libraries all matters scientific and politic were discussed. The meetings of the cabinet Dupuy were organised in the spirit of the discussions held in the library of Jacques-Auguste de Thou that was in the care of the Jacques and Pierre Dupuy.[43] Their leading motto was Alètheia and Parrhèsia, "unveiling of the truth and freedom of speech".[44] Gallican arguments

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appeared separately, were published in volume in 1647. Gabriel Naudé, *Penta Quaestionum Iatro-philologicarum. I. An magnum homini a venenis periculum? II. An vita hominum hodie quam olim brevior? II. An matutina studia vespertinis salubriora? IV. An liceat Medico fallere aegrotum? V. De fato & fatali vitae termino* (Genève: Samuel Chouet, 1647). See also, Lorenzo Bianchi, "Gabriel Naudé critique des alchimistes", in Jean-Claude Margolin, Sylvain Matton (eds.), *Alchimie et philosophie à la Renaissance* (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1993), 405-421.

[41] Bœuf, *Bibliothèque Naudé,* 30-42.

[42] On Van Beverwijck and his *Quaestio*, see: Henk Nellen, "De Vitae Termino: An Epistolary Survey by Johan van Beverwijck (1632-1639)", in Rhoda Schnur (ed.), *Acta Conventus Neo-Latini Hafniensis. Proceedings of the Eight International Congress of Neo-Latin Studies (Copenhagen 12 August to 17 August 1991)* (Binghamton, NY: Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies, 1994), 731-740.

[43] As was reported in the *Naudeana*, Naudé thought De Thou to have been the most excellent European historian of the last century. "De tous les Historiens qui nous ont écrit l'Histoire de quelque pays dans l'Europe depuis soixante ans, j'en tiens pour le chef et le meilleur de tous M. le Président de Thou: *qui horrida quadam sed foelici libertate,* a repris et décrié le vice en quelque ordre, quelque pays, quelque parti, et quelque personne en qui il s'est rencontré. C'est ce qui l'a fait aimer de tous les honnêtes gens, qui sont hors d'intérêt. Après M. de Thou le meilleur Historien est, ce me semble, *Famianus Strada* Jesuite; son Histoire est fort curieuse et fort réglée; je voudrais bien qu'il nous eut donné le second tome aussi beau que nous avons le premier: *in quo perficiendo viginti annos totos insumpsit.* C'est un fort bon homme et qui écrit d'un bon stile; c'est dommage qu'il soit Jesuit le pauvre homme. Gaspard Scioppius qui hait les Jesuites, dit que ce Livre est de mauvais Latin et en a fait un contre Strada qu'il intitula: *infamia Famiana Stradæ*. *Famianus Strada* m'a dit à moi, qu'il était très-difficile d'être parfait Historien, même impossible: que pour être bon Historien, il faudrait n'être ni d'ordre, ni de parti, ni d'aucun pays, ni d'aucune Religion, si faire se pouvait." Anonymous, *Naudeana* (1703), 107-108.

[44] Jérôme Delatour, "Le Cabinet des frères Dupuy", *Revue d'histoire des facultés de droit et de la science juridique* 25-26 (2005): 162.

proliferated in the discussions on politics and would have influenced Naudé's thinking.[45] While at first the brothers were sceptic of his merits, from 1628 onwards Naudé enjoyed the support of the Dupuys. He thus frequented the milieu of those protecting and representing the legacy of legal humanism.

Naudé as an "animated and walking study"[46]

In order to understand Naudé's political thought we should provide an outline of his 'philosophical project' – comprising an anthropology, an epistemology and a historical method. Naudé's thinking was shaped by the legal humanism and antiquarianism that he encountered first with his patron Henri de Mesmes and later among the kindred spirits in the Cabinet Dupuy. A vast portion of his work from the *Instruction à la France* until the *Mascurat* can be interpreted as historical criticism and source critique.

For instance, in an early work as the *Apologie*, Naudé applied this method of historical scrutiny to accusations of magic and sorcery. Naudé mirrored and captured the more rational, pragmatic, and 'tolerant' attitude of magistrates – of which the magistrates of the *Parlement de Paris* showed the earliest signs – toward accusations of magic and witchcraft.[47] These accusations rise, according to Naudé, from popular fictions, misunderstandings and histories that follow these fables without examining the true nature of the facts. In the *Apologie*, he proposes a reflection on the beliefs of the accused learned authors as well as on the ethics of judgment of the magistrate or the reader. It is the same epistemological conception that one still finds in the *Mascurat*. Naudé's *judicium* of the pamphlets flooding the market during the *Frondes* and attacking his patron Cardinal Mazarin is based on the same juridical-antiquarian method of proof.[48]

However, Naudé's 'philosophical project' should not be thought of in any way as being a consistent and coherent framework, but an eclectic rationalistic enterprise of 'demystification'. The books Naudé published display a constant endeavour for demystification of histories (whether popular stories or the works of historians) by laying bare the true or probable causes in order to combat the credulous and superstitious tendencies of the populace, itself mainly

[45] See also, Giuliano Ferretti, "Les stratégies d'opposition dans l'Académie Dupuy", in Armelle Lefebvre (dir.), *Comparaisons, raisons et raisons d'État, Le statut historiographique de la République des lettres dans la conceptualisation du politique (XVIe- XVIIe siècles)* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2010), 108-132.
[46] In his dedication "À Monsieur Naudé, chanoine en l'Église cathédrale de Verdun, et Bibliothequaire de Monseigneur l'Eminentissime Cardinal Mazarin" to his seven short treatises (*De l'Amitié; De l'Action et du Repos; De l'Humilité et de l'Orgueil; De la Santé et de la Maladie; De la Conversation et de la Solitude; Des Richesses et de la Pauvreté; De la Vieillesse*) La Mothe Le Vayer likened his friend Naudé to "une Étude animé et ambulatoire". François de la Mothe le Vayer, *Œuvres de François de la Mothe le Vayer, conseiller d'estat ordinaire*, Tome VIII (Paris: Louis Billaine, 1669), 107-109, esp. 108.
[47] Frédéric Gabriel, "Raison théologique, procédure légale et ordre politique (1625-1671): Jacques d'Autun *versus* Gabriel Naudé", in Bénédicte Boudou and Bruno Méniel (eds.), *Éthique et droit du Moyen Âge au siècle des Lumières* (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2012), 147-166; 149.
[48] See, Gabriel, "Raison théologique, procédure légale et ordre politique", 147-166.

caused by ignorance. Naudé's intellectual endeavours towards unveiling the original truth closely resembled to the intellectual project of De Thou and the Dupuy circle. However, the grounding of his thinking in Charronian scepticism seems to be specific for Naudé. Therefore a survey of the most important themes in Charron's philosophical work will clarify Naudé's anthropology, epistemology and historical method that we describe afterwards.

When Naudé attended the colleges of the historic University of Paris in his youth, he had become well versed in scepticism and had developed a keen interested in virtually any kind of knowledge, ranging from the histories and philosophy of the ancients to medicine and from Roman law to the different religions.[49] Of all writers he admired Michel Eyquem de Montaigne (1533–92) and Pierre Charron (1541-1603) most, both of whom became a model for his own style of writing and philosophising. He wrote most of his work in the vernacular, but as in the work of his heroes the text is interspersed with Latin and – typically for Naudé – Italian quotations. Scepticism equipped him with the instruments for a rationalist critique of whatever subject he decided to investigate. Even though natural philosophy and experimental science were gradually gaining ground all over Europe, Naudé's rationalist enterprise essentially remained that of a humanist who wanted to go back to the earliest sources and subject them to his historical scrutiny. The fact that Naudé essentially remained a man of books, however, does not mean that he rejected all developments in the 'new science' of the seventeenth century. To give an example, Naudé has been a great admirer of the first British experimental philosopher Francis Bacon and seems to have accepted the discoveries of Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo.[50]

Naudé's eclectic thinking and his critical rationalist spirit were informed by a particularly Charronian scepticism that provided him liberty of mind and independent judgment. Charron's *De la Sagesse* had more than a considerable impact in French learned circles of the early seventeenth century. Both the number of editions that his book on earthly wisdom went through and the amount of ferocious critique and strong praise it engendered during the first half of the seventeenth century can account for this impact. Whereas Catholic apologists like the Jesuit Père Garasse – and in a lesser degree, the Minim friar Père Mersenne – attacked the work for being the root of libertinism, atheism and irreligion, *érudits* like Naudé, Gassendi and La Mothe Le Vayer praised it as one of the greatest books ever written.[51] That Naudé was heavily indebted to Charron

[49] For a detailed description of Naudé's education see, Pintard, *Libertinage érudit*, 156-164.
[50] Tullio Gregory, *Genèse de la raison classique de Charron à Descartes* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2000), 70-71, 86; Jean-Pierre Cavaillé, *Dis/simulations. Jules-César Vanini, François La Mothe Le Vayer, Gabriel Naudé, Louis Machon et Torquato Accetto, Religion, morale et politique au XVIIe siècle.* (Paris: Champion, 2002), 72-79.
[51] For an analysis of the debate about Charron's main philosophical work, I would recommend Jean-Pierre Cavaillé, "Pierre Charron, "disciple" de Montaigne et "patriarche des prétendus esprits forts"", *Les Dossiers du Grihl* [Online], Les dossiers de Jean-Pierre Cavaillé, Libertinage, athéisme, irréligion. Essais et bibliographie. Uploaded 24 August 2009.

is not only easily acknowledged by the author himself, we will show that he also depended on *De la Sagesse* in less explicit terms.[52]

First let us turn to Charron's work itself. The practical philosophy that Charron seeks to provide in *De la Sagesse* has at least three important distinctive features: a particularly worldly practical philosophy; the idea of a 'liberty of mind'; and the distinction between the external and internal life of the sage or *esprit fort*. First of all, as becomes clear in the preface to the work (more elaborately stated in the second edition of 1604) Charron's philosophy is a practical philosophy that takes man as a starting point, not any metaphysical notion. It studies wisdom as the perfection of "l'homme comme homme".[53] In other words, Charron separates the realm of philosophy, which pertains to the human faculties and condition only, from the realm of theology, which is related to revealed religion and divine wisdom. Charron's goal is not necessarily to instruct and provide a manual on human wisdom, it is to present a few (non-dogmatic) guiding rules and reflections which prepare man to become a sage.

It is true, the concept of wisdom as Charron describes it does seem Stoic. Wisdom is the condition in which man lives according to nature, i.e. (God-given) reason. Reason helps man to steer clear from vice, error, passion, and other personal defaults, just as it keeps him away from the backward common people in public life.[54] Charron also retains the Aristotelian idea of wisdom implying excellence and perfection. Excellence in the use of man's essence, reason is the full blossoming of human nature – even though man's understanding might be limited, as is pointed out in book I of *De la Sagesse*. Human excellence is founded on man's recognition of the limits of the human faculties and the exercise of reason in trying to avoid error.[55] However, in the end it seems valuable to distinguish between the Stoic (and partly Aristotelian) nature of the *concept* of

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[52] See for instance, the following passage from his *Bibliographie politique*: "Au regard de Pierre Charron, je l'estime en cela plus sage que Socrate, que le premier avec une méthode tout à faict admirable, et avec une grande doctrine et un grand jugement, il a reduit en art les preceptes de la sagesse mesme. Il est vray que son Livre nous donne tout à la fois Aristote, Seneque, et Plutarque, et qu'il contient en soy quelque chose de plus divin, qu'avant luy n'ont eu tous les anciens et tous les modernes." Gabriel Naudé (tr. Challine), *La Bibliographie politique*, *contenant les livres et la methode necessaires à estudier la Politique* (Paris: Guillaume Pelé, 1642), 17.

[53] Charron, *De la Sagesse*, I, xlii.

[54] Idem, xlii-xliii. Here Charron defines wisdom as follows: "[…] cette sagesse humaine est une droitture, belle et noble composition de l'homme entier, en son dedans, son dehors, ses pensées, paroles, actions, et tous ses mouvemens; c'est l'excellence et perfection de l'homme comme homme, c'est à dire selon que porte et requiert la loy premiere fondamentale et naturelle de l'homme, ainsi que nous disons un ouvrage bien fait et excellent, quand il est bien complet de toutes ses pieces, et que toutes les regles de l'art y ont esté gardées: celuy est homme sage qui sait bien et excellement faire l'homme: c'est à dire, pour en donner une plus particuliere peinture, qui se cognoissant bien et l'humaine condition, se garde et preserve de tous vices, erreurs, passions, et defauts tant internes, siens et propres, qu'externes, communs et populaires; mainentant son esprit net, libre, franc, universel, considerant et jugeant de toutes choses, sans s'obliger ny jurer à aucune, visant tousjours et se reglant en toutes choses selon nature, c'est à dire la raison […]"

[55] J.R. Maia Neto, "Charron's Academic Sceptical Wisdom", in G. Paganini and J.R. Maia Neto, *Renaissance Scepticisms* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), 213-227.

wisdom and the sage in Charron and the *content* of his understanding of wisdom, which is rather sceptic.[56]

This leads us to the second important feature of Charron's practical philosophy, since the primary characteristic of his understanding of wisdom is the liberty of mind. The idea of liberty of mind is vividly discussed in the second chapter of the second book (II, 2) of *De la Sagesse*. Unsurprisingly, given the sceptical character of his understanding of wisdom, it is in this chapter in particular that the polemic against dogmatists and fanatics becomes clear. Just as elsewhere he targets popular credulity and superstition, but the main focus is on the dogmatic nature of much of his philosophical and theological adversaries. His concern here is to present liberty of mind as a moral attitude that supersedes all actions engendered by dogmatic rashness and fanaticism, which might get to hold sway over the crowds.

In this crucial chapter in Charron's work, he discusses three things conducive to liberty of mind and preserving it: rational inquiry (*juger de toutes choses*), suspension of judgment (*ne s'obliger à rien*), and a universal spirit, open to everything (*demeurer universel et ouvert à tout*).[57] The first, judging all things, consists in reasoning, weighing different views and opinions, and view, examine and attempt to penetrate the phenomena of the external world as much as possible.[58] Part of the liberty of mind is thus rational inquiry; a quest for truth rather than the conviction of ever encountering *the* truth. This element of rational inquiry leads to, as well as it is reinforced by, the second component of liberty of mind, not becoming obliged by anything, i.e. suspension of judgement. Suspension of judgment is a necessary condition for rational investigation of the world, because it renders man unbiased. On the other hand, the inquiry will cause the sage to retain suspended beliefs, due to its undermining nature fuelled by the examination of different positions and opinions. This is what has recently been called Charron's 'virtuous circle' in the sage's wisdom.[59] Charron discusses the fundamental state of doubt, the obscurity of the truth, and man's limited understanding, leaving intact only rational investigation, which leads to suspension of judgment and action on the basis of probability.[60] Socrates is presented as the model of the sage; from him Charron claims to have taken his motto "je ne sçay".[61] Charron thus affirms his ignorance, leading one to assume that he does not seem to be too worried about problems of logical consistency, as had been a problem in ancient times with the different solutions of

[56] See Maia Neto, "Charron's Academic Sceptical Wisdom", 216, particularly footnote 11.
[57] Charron, *De la Sagesse*, II, 2, 30-31.
[58] Idem, 31-32. "Par juger nous n'entendons pas resouldre, affirmer, determiner; cecy serait contraire au second qui est ne s'obliger à rien; mais c'est examiner, peser, balancer les raisons et contre-raisons de toutes parts, les poids et merites d'icelles, et ainsi quester la verité."
[59] Maia Neto, "Charron's Academic Sceptical Wisdom", 221.
[60] Charron, *De la Sagesse*, II, ii, 44-46.
[61] Idem, 49-50.

Academic and Pyrrhonian sceptics.[62] Probably he was more interested in providing an assured intellectual and moral position for his sage, in a direct appropriation to his own social and political context.

There is something peculiar to the third aspect of *liberté d'esprit* that Charron prescribes, universality. To gain a better understanding of this aspect a comparison can be made with the philosophy of René Descartes (1596-1650). As one scholar has pointedly remarked, universality in Charron is something utterly different from the universality of reason that Descartes would later uphold. This disparity consists in a consideration of everything, corresponding to a free spirit conscious of the plurality of minds, in Charron's work, and inquiry of anything, corresponding to the universal natural light of reason that is part and parcel of Descartes philosophy. Instead of universal consensus and in opposition to the Cartesian theses of natural light, Charron's statements work with the differences between men.[63]

The differences between men are multiple and the constant dichotomies between sages and credulous people that surface in Charron's text are illustrative. Already in the preface, but more elaborately in the first book of *De la Sagesse*, he had distinguished three sorts of people, *esprits foibles*, *esprits mediocres*, and *esprits forts*.[64] The weak spirits are born to serve and obey, while the mediocre minds are capable of understanding but are rash and dogmatic, because they look no further than their own surroundings and think that what they find there is a touch of truth. Aristotle is "the prince of these dogmatists".[65] What we have to add here in our discussion of the *esprits forts*, Charron's sages, is that they are necessarily few in number.[66]

To close our discussion of Charron we should now examine the third important feature of his practical philosophy, which is intimately related to the variety of minds just discussed: the distinction between the external and internal life of the sage or *esprit fort*. Charron contends that internally, in his private thoughts, the sage should keep himself to the most probable, most honest, useful, and convenient.[67] In public life, however, the sage is bound to conformity, but

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[62] P. Klein, "Skepticism", in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2013 Edition). In the dispute between Academic and Pyrrhonian sceptics, the former would be the 'dogmatic' sceptics denying knowledge of any kind, claiming that nobody knows or can know anything, while the Pyrrhonians would refrain from taking any position and would doubt that any knowledge is possible.

[63] André Pessel, "Naudé, le sujet dans son histoire", in Robert Damien and Yves-Charles Zarka, *Gabriel Naudé: La politique et les myths de l'histoire de France* Corpus revue de philosophie 35 (Paris: Centre d'Études d'Histoire de la Philosophie moderne et contemporaine, 1999), 30.

[64] Apart from this cognitive distinction among men, Charron also discusses another, geographical distinction of minds. See Charron, *De la Sagesse*, I, 14. For further discussion of the latter distinction in Charron, which proves to be an inspiration for Naudé, see: Pessel, "Naudé, le sujet dans son histoire", 29-33.

[65] Charron, *De la Sagesse*, II, 2, 47.

[66] Naudé himself often uses the Charronian sobriquets *esprit forts* and *esprit faibles* to distinguish the *déniasés* or undeceived minds from the superstitious crowds and the 'bad historians'.

[67] Idem, 33. "[…] car je veux qu'en actions externes et communes de la vie, et en tout ce qui est de l'usage ordinaire, l'on s'accorde et accommode avec le commun, nostre reigle ne touche point le dehors et le faire,

without ever becoming a slave of the common people. Charron argues that even though the common people might control the sage in all external features, his body, and even his language, neither they, nor anyone else – i.e. the fanatic dogmatists trying to suppress any views that are incompatible with their 'truth' – could hinder the liberty of mind to be exercised; wanting to do so would be the greatest tyranny that can be. The sage should guard his liberty of mind, actively as well as passively; he will maintain his freedom and will not endanger that of another.[68] Although the sage lives a public life in reverence of the law and does whatever custom and the country's ceremonies require of him, with himself he truthfully judges about existing things according to universal reason (universal in the sense that it inquires anything, not that it is common to everyone) and according to which he often condemns that which he does in the outside world.[69]

The philosophical position of Naudé, in itself not always stable and coherent, might be boiled down to a sort of naturalist eclecticism, a rational historical criticism that uses Charron's work and the philosophy of the Italian Renaissance as a critical and empirical heuristic instrument for his engagement in political, moral and religious debates.[70] Naudé's philosophical project is most fully worked out in his treatise on humanist education, *Syntagma de studio liberali*, written in 1632. As one of the proems, the opening distich by the astronomer and professor of theology from Urbino Jacopo (or Giacomo) Micalori (1570-1645), nicely put it, "Aristotle unveiled the hidden secrets of Wisdom. But this book leads you towards those of Naudé."[71]

In his *Syntagma de studio liberali* he prescribes the nephew of Cardinal Guidi di Bagno, to whom the work is dedicated, a critical attitude. This pedagogical treatise contains the fruit of his reflections on the art of finding the truth, finding the ways and the means to acquire knowledge that is not illusory. The concluding remarks propose a philosophical project, which by using reason in a sceptic and pragmatic way results in a Naudean kind of naturalist eclecticism that

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mais le dedans, le penser, et juger secret et interne, et encores en ce secret et interne, je consens que l'on adhere, et l'on se tienne à ce qui semble plus vray-semblable, plus honneste, plus utile, plus commode […]".

[68] Charron, *De la* Sagesse, II, 2, 37. "Qu'aura le sage et sacré par dessus le prophane, s'il faut encore qu'il aye son esprit, sa principale et heroïque piece, esclave du commun? le public et commun se doibt contenter que l'on se conforme à luy en toutes les apparences; qu'a-t-il affaire de mon dedans, de mes pensées et jugemens? Ils gouverneront tant qu'ils voudront ma main, ma langue, mais non pas mon esprit s'il leur plaist, il a un austre maistre. Empescher la liberté de l'esprit l'on ne sçauroit; le vouloir faire, c'est la plus grande tyrannie qui puisse estre, le sage s'en gardera bien activement et passivement, se maintiendra en sa liberté et ne troublera celle d'autruy."

[69] Idem, 38. "[Le sage] doit faire et se porter au dehors pour la reverence publique et n'offenser personne, selon que la loy, la coustume et ceremonie du pays porte et requiert: et au dedans juger au vray ce qui en est, selon la raison universelle, selon laquelle souvent il adviendra qu'il condamnera ce qu'au dehors il fait […]"

[70] Lorenzo Bianchi, "Renaissance et libertinage chez Gabriel Naudé", *Libertinage et philosophie au XVIIe siècle*. 2. *La Mothe Le Vayer et Naudé* (Saint-Etienne: Publications de l'université de Saint-Etienne, 1997), 78.

[71] "Abdita Aristoteles Sophiae penetralia pandit. Sed te Naudaei ducit ad ista Liber." Gabriel Naudé, *Syntagma de studio liberali* (Rimini: Giovanni Simbenio, 1633), 10.

unites the best from Aristotle, Plato, the Stoics and the Epicureans.

What should man as a thinking being strive for? According to Naudé the ideal is to acquire and maintain a *bona mens*, a well-directed spirit. There are, however, a great number of pitfalls that endanger those who try to attain such a spirit. First there is pedantry; Naudé argues that it is ridiculed and disdained by Ancients as well as modern authors like Montaigne and Charron, who exhort one to avoid this danger.[72] He further derides the vain scholasticism of commentators[73]; the various vulgar prejudices and false opinions of the people[74]; naivety, caused by too much immersion in Plato and the Stoics, dreamers and utopian authors[75]; the credulity of believing in the fables of poets, or in the imposture of magicians, astrologers, cabalists, masters of artificial memory, lullists, encyclopaedists, alchemists and false prophets[76]; and the servility towards heads of a philosophical school and the obstinacy to maintain opinions once admitted.[77] In sight of all these dangers, a humanist education must elevate a student towards a universal liberty of judgment and understanding. How then to attain this well-directed mind?

With a list of five 'principles' of judgment, so typical for this Parisian *érudit*, Naudé sketches a method to liberate the mind and securely wander the road to truth. In the concluding paragraphs to this text, Naudé proposes a philosophical project that, by using reason sceptically and pragmatically, leads to a kind of naturalist eclecticism, gathering and uniting the best from all the ancient philosophical 'schools'. First, Naudé maintained the truth is hidden at the bottom of the well, thereby indicating the difficulty by which the truth is found. It never just manifests itself

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[72] Gabriel Naudé (tr., ann. and comm. by Pascale Hummel), *Traité sur l'éducation humaniste* (1632-1633) (Paris: Éditions Classiques Garnier, 2009; [2nd edition, Rimini: Giovanni Simbenio, 1633]) 92-95.

[73] Naudé (ed. Hummel), *Traité sur l'éducation humaniste*, 126-127, 140-141. Cf. Naudé, *Addition à l'histoire de Louis XI* (Paris: François Targa, 1630), 151-152. "cette [...] Discipline, vulgairement nommée Scholastique, que l'on ne peut mieux représenter que par cette Scylla des Poëtes, assez belle et agréable de premier abord, et douée d'une face capable de charmer par sa beauté ceux qui l'envisagent avec trop d'affection, mais au reste *Candida succinctam latrantibus inguina monstris* [Virgil, *Eclogues*, LCL 63, pp. 66-67: "with howling monsters girt about her white waist"], qui ne sont autres que les Questions et Distinctions inutiles qui pullulent et fourmillent de cette nouvelle façon de philosopher." This passage is clearly inspired by Francis Bacon, whom Naudé mentions further on where he says that, "ils [Scholastic philosophers] n'eurent autre soin que d'imaginer toutes sortes de finesses et subtilitez pour faire preuve de leurs esprits et surmonter plus facilement leur compagnons en ces rencontres publiques. D'où le sage et judicieux Chancelier d'Angleterre Verulam a pris sujet de les comparer fort à propos aux araignes, par ce que *ex non magno materiae stamine sed maxima spiritus, quasi radii, agitatione, operosissimas illas telas, quae in libris eorum extant confecerunt*. Et il donne une raison excellente, *Etenim mens humana si agat in materiam, naturam rerum et opera Dei contemplando, pro modo materiae operatur, atque ab eadem determinatur; sin ipsa in se vertatur (tanquam aranea texens telam) tum demum interminata est, et parit certe telas quasdam doctrinae, tenuitate fili operisque admirabiles, sed quoad usum frivolas et inanes*." Idem, *Addition*, 156-157. This does not mean, however, that he completely rejects scholastic philosophy. In his *Advis* (1627) he cites among the "premiers et principaux autheurs vieux et modernes", "sainct Thomas, Occham, Durand, Pierre Lombart, Henry de Gand, Alexandre de Ales, Gilles de Rome, Albert le Grand, Aureolus, Burlée, Capreolus, Maior, Vasquez, Suarez, pour la Scholastique." Gabriel Naudé, *Advis pour dresser une bibliotheque* (Paris: François Targa, 1627), 44.

[74] Naudé (ed. Hummel), *Traité sur l'éducation humaniste*, 132-133.

[75] Idem, 136, 143-144.

[76] Idem, 136-137.

[77] Idem, 137-140.

before the eyes of man. And we must resist the thoughts and opinions of those who brag about its possession, since their opinions deceive.[78] The second principle is to understand that nothing in this world is stable, that the arts, kingdoms, the sciences, the sects, the skies, the earth and the seas tumble in a perpetual circle. We must therefore take nothing for granted and definitive, but ever correct and revise with a flexible imperturbability of mind that alone knows itself to be stable in the middle of the unfolding of things.[79] The third principle is to be aware that almost everything in descriptions of origins is legendary and mendacious, except of course those reported in Scripture.[80] The fourth point is to recognize that in the order of the mind as in the order of the body all things tend to surpass their natural state and to produce outgrowths and unhealthy swellings. And just as one purges the humours or cut away an abscess, it is important to clear the sciences of their purulent excesses.[81] Fifth and last precept to attain a *bona mens* is to guard and maintain an independent mind, exempt from all the constraints of opinion or passion as well as that of authority. Pick from all the great philosophers without binding oneself to any of them. Instead of yielding to and serving the opinion of one particular philosopher or school always judge freely as judge and arbiter.[82] He thus proposes a kind of eclecticism and metaphorically depicts the search for wisdom as walking on a market. Philosophers "themselves are the merchants and street vendors of wisdom. Therefore, if you find any convenience and utility in the discourses of Plato or Arcesilaus' suspension of judgment welcome it. If some nice fruit grows in the gardens of Epicure, pick it. If for some reason the Lyceum offers it better, take it. If Zeno's merchandise sells easier than that of Aristotle, turn towards his Portico."[83] Finally, what one should strive to attain is a courageous and heroic mind that is ready to believe in the evidence of reason alone.[84]

Naudé's historical method derived from this epistemology. His source criticism, as he laid it out in his *Apologie*, questioned the authority of a historian and his story on the basis of a number

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[78] Idem, 145-146.
[79] Idem, 146.
[80] Idem, 147.
[81] Idem, 148-151.
[82] Idem, 151.
[83] Idem, 151-152. "sunt autem illi ipsi mercatores, atque institores sapientiae; itaque si quid in Platonis sermonibus, aut Archesilea Epoche commodum tibi, et utile est, illud accipe; si quid boni in hortis Epicuri virescit, hoc collige; si quid melius Lycaeum profert quantum quomodo videtur assume; si magis sunt vendibiles Zenonis, quam Aristotelis merces, ad istius Porticum diverte." Naudé, *Syntagma de studio liberali*, 106-107.
[84] Naudé (ed. Hummel), *Traité sur l'éducation humaniste*, 153-154. "effingendus est animus ad exemplar heroicae fortitudinis, qui res omnes attento despiciat, intrepide exploret, acute discutiat; non Multitudini credens, quia non tam bene cum rebus humanis geritur, ut meliora pluribus placeant; non Prophetis, nisi qui signa dederint, quoniam pauci Spiritu Sancto agitantur: omnes ferme humore melancholico, fastu, vel intempestiva devotione; non Astrologis, quia tot iacula cum emittant, mirum non est aliquod tangere; non Alchymistis, quoniam ab iis drachmam petunt, quibus thesauros pollicentur; non Famae, qui tam ficti, pravique, tenax, quam nuncia veri describitur a Poetis, sed uni tantum evidentissimae, ac constantissimae Rationi." Naudé, *Syntagma de studio liberali* (Rimini: Giovanni Simbenio, 1633), 109-110.

of points. He recognizes that the most learned are not always the most sensible, for because of the bias of their humanity some tend to accept for truth what is highly doubtable. His method is therefore based on methodic doubt. First, Naudé points to the importance of transmission in the invention and generation of 'deceitful histories'. The historian must retrace the chronology of this transmission and seek to discover the origin of the story.[85] Then, the historian has to reflect on the condition of the author, the "party he belongs to and the time in which he writes". Furthermore, there is a degree of importance among testimonies. Well-placed eyewitnesses are more trustworthy than second hand testimony, therefore historical actors are better placed than the simple and the ignorant. However, not all actors are significant witnesses; the historian should prefer those witnesses who have both the power and the wisdom.[86] Also, the historian should be aware of the partisan and rhetorical function of history, unmask this function and lay bare the occasion and the interests behind the construction of the account.[87] Finally, the source criticism results in an awareness of the possible conflicting nature of all histories and the historian has to distinguish the true from the false.

The religious views of Gabriel Naudé

Finally, we must turn to an important theme in the historiography on Naudé: the suspicion of incredulity.[88] In more recent studies it is argued with regard to, for instance, the religious views of Naudé's close friend La Mothe le Vayer, that we cannot simply reduce his skepticism to covert atheism or irreligion.[89] The protestations of religious beliefs in the work of Pierre Gassendi,

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[85] "pour nous délivrer de toutes ces absurdités, il ne faut que considérer l'ordre de ceux qui écrivent ces belles imaginations et remonter des uns aux autres jusqu'à ce qu'on ait reconnu le premier auteur et peut-être l'unique de ceux qui nous les ont données; comme par exemple, il est très constant que tous nos vieux romans ont pris leur origine des chroniques de l'évêque Turpin; le conte de la papesse Jean d'un Marianus Scotus, la salutation de Trajan d'un Jean Lévite et l'opinion que Virgile était magicien du moine Helinandus". Naudé, *Apologie*, 15 ff. Pessel, "Le sujet dans son histoire", 42-43; Ruth Whelan, "Un travail d'Hercule: critique et histoire chez Gabriel Naudé", in Chantal Grell and Jean-Michel Dufays (eds.), *Pratiques et concepts de l'histoire en Europe, XVIe-XVIIe siècles* (Paris: Presses de l'Université de Paris Sorbonne, 1990), 65-66.

[86] "l'on a beaucoup plus d'assurance à ceux qui ont vu et mené les affaires qu'à des Moines et à des particuliers, à des hommes relevés et sublimes qu'à des simples et des ignorants." Naudé, *Apologie*, 17-18.

[87] "par-ce que tous les historiens, excepté ceux qui sont parfaitement héroïques, ne nous représentent jamais les choses pures mais les inclinent et les masquent selon le visage qu'ils leur veulent faire prendre et pour donner crédit à leur jugement, et y attirer les autres, prêtent de ce côté à la matière, l'allongeant et l'amplifiant, la biaisant et la déguisant, suivant qu'ils le jugent à propos. Ainsi nous voyons que les Gentils et les idolâtres ont dit beaucoup de choses contre les nouveaux Chrétiens, parce qu'ils les avaient en haine; que de même les partisans et quelques Empereurs ont dit mille vilénies contre les Papes; que les Anglais décrivent la pucelle d'Orléans comme une Sorcière et comme une Magicienne et que les hérétiques de ce temps maintiennent une infinité de fables contre l'honneur des souverains Pontifes et de l'Eglise." Naudé, *Apologie*, 18-19.

[88] Phillips, *Church and Culture in Seventeenth-century France*, 227-240; Silvia Berti, "At the roots of unbelief", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 56, no. 4 (1995): 556-558; Margaret Osler, "When did Pierre Gassendi become a libertine?", 190-191; Zuber, "In memoriam. René Pintard" 387-391; idem, "Libertinage et humanisme: une rencontre difficile", *Dix-septième siècle* 2, no. 127 (1980): 163-179.

[89] Richard H. Popkin, *The History of Scepticism. From Savonarola to Bayle* (Oxford and New York: Oxford

another of Naudé's close friends, are increasingly interpreted as sincere, which tends to exclude him from the category of libertine.[90] For that matter, statements about the suspected irreligion or atheism of the *libertins* fail to take into account the rather fluid orthodoxy in the first half of the seventeenth century. Although by the early seventeenth century the Reformation of the Catholic Church was well underway, orthodoxy was heavily debated in religious and ecclesiological matters and by no means rigid.[91] At that time the learned elite seemed to have more room for independent views, for French Catholic orthodoxy "was a concept in progress". It could be argued that strict enforcement of orthodox confession only really commenced after the ascension of Louis XIV to the throne, in the 1650s and 1660s with the Jansenist controversies, and maybe as late as the early 1680s with the codification of the Gallican articles of faith and the increasing repression of the Huguenots. As one French scholar recently remarked, "practical theology developed very slowly and did not entail a rigid orthodoxy until the end of the century."[92] This argument would apply just as much to the religious views of Naudé that could easily be described as Gallican Catholic with specific Naudean idiosyncrasies and independence of mind.

A great part of Pintard's case for the supposed irreligion of Gabriel Naudé is what we might call 'guilt by association'. Pintard alleged that Naudé frequented and was inspired by thinkers who in his view were irrefutably unbelievers or even atheists. When we consider the French historian's examples, for instance Naudé's association with Cesare Cremonini, the famous Paduan Aristotelian professor of philosophy with whom he studied in 1626-1627, we find that Pintard tends to argue for what serves his case and trace the footsteps mainly of Catholic apologists.[93]

University Press, 2003), 80-98. Paganini problematizes Popkin's concept of the *sceptique chrétienne*, stating that it leads to a too strict link between scepticism and fideism, the exact opposite of the argument of scepticism leading to atheism that he wished to criticize. Gianni Paganini, *Skepsis. Le débat des modernes sur le scepticisme. Montaigne, Le Vayer, Campanella, Hobbes, Descartes, Bayle* (Paris: Vrin, 2008). See also José R. Maia Neto's recent book *Academic Skepticism in Seventeenth-Century French Philosophy: The Charronian Legacy 1601-1662* (Dordrecht: Springer International Publishing, 2014), especially his chapter on "La Mothe le Vayer's Attack on Opinion and Superstition". La Mothe le Vayer is presented "neither as a skeptical apologist nor as a disguised libertine, as combatting superstition but not as irreligious", a follower of Charron in his Academic Skepticism.

[90] Osler, "When Did Pierre Gassendi Become a Libertine?", 169-192.

[91] The various debates and how those in power dealt with them is described clearly in all complexity by the British historian Joseph Bergin. Bergin has well captured the relation between the church and the monarchy under changing circumstances, showing that the Catholic Church in France was no monolith. Joseph Bergin, *The Politics of Religion in Early Modern France* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2014).

[92] The thought-provoking remark comes from Armogathe's review of Paganini's book *Skepsis*. Jean-Robert Armogathe, "(Review) Skepsis. Le débat des modernes sur le scepticisme. Montaigne, Le Vayer, Campanella, Hobbes, Descartes, Bayle", *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 48, no. 2 (2010): 242.

[93] Similar cases could be made for authors like Pietro Pomponazzi and Girolamo Cardano. The British historian Ian Maclean argues that both Pomponazzi and more importantly Cardano were sincere in their protestations of submission to the Roman Catholic Church. Ian Maclean, "Heterodoxy in Natural Philosophy and Medicine: Pietro Pomponazzi, Guglielmo Gratarolo, Girolamo Cardano", in John Brooke and Ian Maclean (eds.), *Heterodoxy in Early Modern Science and Religion* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 1-29.

As has become clear from recent studies of newly enclosed archival material of the Holy Office (the Inquisition) and the Congregation of the Index, Cremonini was one of the most thoroughly inquested authors and thinkers of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.[94] Historians note at least 80 different cases of inquiries into the man and his views. In the early 1590's, Cremonini famously came into conflict with members of the Jesuit order about pedagogy. The dispute escalated into a claim by the Jesuits that the idiosyncratic or Socratic private teaching, which had become more or less of a standard in the Venetian Republic in those years, inculcated despicable atheist views in the youths he taught. With the support of the Venetian Senate, Cremonini, who was the highest paid professor in Italy at the time, successfully defended himself stating that he only labored to interpret Aristotle correctly, that is, as a pagan philosopher, just as the University asked of him. In another investigation by the Inquisition, that of his *Disputation on the Heavens* with its insistence on the necessity of systematic reason, Cremonini was asked to bring his Aristotelianism in line with Christian doctrines. He refused by stating that philosophy and theology should be kept separate and that although he would not object if a theologian would correct his text, he would not do it. He was obliged to explain Aristotle's philosophical writing regardless of its conformity to truth or faith; philosophy was a method without guarantees of truth. Although the story of Cremonini as a notorious atheist has long persisted, recent scholarship on Cremonini seems to present a different picture of the man who supposedly secretly maintained the Aristotelian views that the soul was mortal and that the world was eternal. In one of the few recent monograph studies of the Paduan philosopher, the German historian Heinrich Kühn presents Cremonini as a philosopher who recognized the limitations of both natural philosophy and theology. Cremonini refused to bring Aristotle into conformity with orthodoxy, but was not a closet atheist.[95]

Religious beliefs in Naudé's letters

In his correspondence with his learned friends Naudé presented himself deeply religious and a devout Catholic. The French historian Jérôme Delatour found that Naudé is "sometimes more Catholic than the Pope" in the letters he exchanged with the Dupuy brothers.[96] For instance when he wrote Jacques Dupuy from Rome on all the discussions over the salvation of the pagans. Almost

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[94] See Ugo Baldini and Leen Spruit (eds.), *Catholic Church and Modern Science: Documents from the Archives of the Roman Congregations of the Holy Office and the Index.* Volume 1: *Sixteenth-Century Documents,* Tomes 1-4 (Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2009).

[95] Heinrich Kühn, *Venetischer Aristotelismus im Ende der aristotelischen Welt. Aspekte der Welt und des Denkens des Cesare Cremonini (1550-1631)* (Frankfurt am Main and New York: P. Lang, 1999); Edward Muir, *The Culture Wars of the Late Renaissance. Skeptics, Libertines, and Opera* (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 2007); Craig Martin, *Subverting Aristotle: Religion, History, and Philosophy in Early Modern Science* (John Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, 2014), esp. 117-120.

[96] Delatour, "Le Cabinet des frères Dupuy", 188.

enraged he wrote in one letter: "I foresee that this confusion among writers will soon lead to another, that is, that everyone may be redeemed in his own religion, just like the opinion that the Virgin Mother was conceived without original sin, which the Popes have started to endorse, makes the Italian preachers daily say thousands of extravagancies on the praise of the Virgin Mother."[97] As a critical spectator, Naudé clearly criticized the Pope and other Italian prelates of introducing oddities to the Catholic faith. These are grave problems to which he returns at various times in his correspondence with Dupuy. In May 1641 he discussed with Jacques Dupuy the superstitious belief in apparitions and possessions stating: "I do hope that numerous other honourable men will repel so many other fables and similar opinions. And, though I one day intend to defy all of these cases together, there is nevertheless the fable of the Bishops of Ravenna brought about by the Holy Spirit that descended on them in the form of a dove, that will merit to be treated apart. However, the place where I am prevents me from it, for what would they say if I demonstrated them that it was a wooden pigeon that "was sent out from a certain machine", as a symbol of the Holy Spirit that was believed to preside invisibly in this election?"[98] Here we find the rational critique for which Naudé is famous, but with clear orthodox or Gallican scorn for the historical evolution and inventions of the Roman Church. The general problem that comes to the fore is that Italians seem to have more faith in the Virgin and the Saints than in God.

The image of the Gallican Naudé appears also in his correspondence with Boulliau. In a letter to Ismael Boulliau dated 9 November 1641 Naudé gives an interesting insight in his fideist views when he positively evaluates Gassendi's critique of Descartes' work. In this letter he alludes to Descartes' *Discours de la Méthode* and the *Meditationes*, published some months before writing, which incorporated Gassendi's refutation among the objections of others. Naudé writes that he does not join Mersenne's expectations of this philosophy and supports his friend's 'solid' critique, because Gassendi's methods are more assured and well-founded. He especially likes that his friend is more careful and moderate in his philosophy and does not propose to acquire rational

[97] Letter from Naudé to Jacques Dupuy from 8 january 1639: "je prévois que ce désordre d'écrivains en amènera bientôt un autre, savoir que chacun peut être sauvé en sa religion, comme l'opinion que la Vierge a été conçue sans péché originel, et que les papes ont commencé d'appuyer, fait dire tous les jours mille extravagances aux prédicateurs d'ici sur les louanges de la Vierge [...]." Philip Wolfe (ed.), *Lettres de Gabriel Naudé à Jacques Dupuy* (Edmonton: Lealta/Alta press, 1982), 68. Cited in Delatour, "Le Cabinet des frères Dupuy", 188.

[98] Letter to Jacques Dupuy cited in Pintard, *Libertinage érudit*, 468-469. Wolfe (ed.), *Lettres de Gabriel Naudé à Jacques Dupuy*, 122. "J'espere que beaucoup d'autres galentz hommes feront bonne guerre à tant d'autres fables et opinions semblables, et, quoy que je me sois proposé de les combattre toutes ensemble quelque jour, il y a neantmoins celle des Evesques de Ravenne créés par le St Esprit qui descendait sur eux en forme de colombe, qui mériterait bien d'être traitée à part, mais le pays où je suis m'en empêche, car que ne diraient-ils point si je leur montrais que c'était un pigeon de bois qui *emittebatur ex machina quadam*, pour symbole du St Esprit que l'on croyait présider invisiblement à cette élection?"

knowledge of God and separate spirits (*sans en vouloir tirer la cognoissance de Dieu et des ames separées*), which according to Naudé we should rather expect and receive from Holy Scripture.[99]

In the same letter we find Naudé's judgment on the Jansenist quarrel – discussion of which was recently prohibited by the Congregation of the Holy Office. Naudé rejects and ridicules Jansenius' position as an imposture in comparing it with two works on falsified relics and testimonies from contemporaries of Jesus Christ. He anticipates the work by his friend La Mothe Le Vayer, *De la vertu des payens*, in which he expects the view of Jansenius on the virtue and salvation of the ancients aptly refuted. Although he does not deem the discussion worthy – in a letter to Jacques Dupuy we saw that Naudé complained about the uselessness of this discussion –, he professes more sympathy for the contrary view he reports to be held by Erasmus. Erasmus supposedly promised the French king Francois I conversations in heaven with the most valued and learned men of ancient times, Seneca and Cicero.[100] As Naudé had said before in his *Apologie*, it was futile to discuss whether an ancient philosopher like Socrates or Aristotle understood the Christian mysteries of faith as for instance the Trinity. What was significant was their virtuous walk of life and it was this, his friend La Mothe Le Vayer argued in his refutation of Jansenius' *Augustinus* dedicated to Cardinal Richelieu, that would possibly enable the virtuous pagans to receive the divine grace of salvation. For Naudé as for other humanists the existence of pagan virtue is part of God's benevolence and justice that would make their salvation possible.[101]

Naudé's correspondence of the 1640s shows a genuine interest in contemporary discussions of theology and Church history and especially values the authors attempting to supersede confessional strife. For instance, in a letter to Boulliau, Naudé proves himself very cognizant of the irenic treatises of Theophile Brachet de La Milletière and Hugo Grotius. He expresses his satisfaction with the fact that in their treatises – containing accounts on the succession of the popes and against the identification of the Pope and the Antichrist, respectively – as well as in his own epistolary exchanges with Daniel Heinsius and Johan van Beverwijck, learned Protestants appear to have a more moderate view of the Catholic Church and its institutions. He is happy that "heretics are no longer as spiteful and animated against the Holy See as they were in the beginning."[102] From Rome Naudé already told Boulliau earlier that he could not wait to receive

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[99] Gabriel Naudé to Ismael Boulliau, 'Lettre IV' dated 9 Novembre 1641. Henk J.M. Nellen and Philippe J. Wolfe, "Un échange épistolaire de la `République des Muses´. Onze lettres de Gabriel Naudé à Ismael Boulliau (1639-1645)", *Lias* 13 (1986): 266-267.

[100] Gabriel Naudé to Ismael Boulliau, 'Lettre IV' dated 9 Novembre 1641. Nellen and Wolfe, "Un échange épistolaire de la `République des Muses´", 267.

[101] See for instance, the discussion of Aristotle and his knowledge of the Trinity in Naudé, *Apologie* (Paris, 1625) 329-337. For the 1640s discussion of the salvation of the ancients and La Mothe Le Vayer's position, see among others, David Wetsel, *Pascal and Disbelief: Catechesis and Conversion in the Pensées* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1994), 229-231.

[102] "les heretiques ne sont plus si envenimez et animés contre le St. Siege comme ils estoient au commencement." Gabriel Naudé to Ismael Boulliau, 'Lettre III' dated 15 August 1640. Nellen and Wolfe, "Un échange épistolaire de la `République des Muses´", 259-260. It must be clear, however, that these

and read Gerard Vossius' *De theologia gentili* (1641). This work of Christian apologetics for religious peace contained an analysis of the pagan polytheist religions in order to argue that these ancient pagan religions, including their protagonists and ceremonies, were degenerative fictions derived from the original of all religions, the monotheistic religion of Moses. Also, if mainly for reasons of refuting it, he anticipates a work by Claude Saumaise that would only be published in 1645, *De primatu papae*. Naudé is aware of and rebuts the arguments Saumaise used to undermine the See of Rome, that is, the story of the legendary female pope Joan that broke the chronology of the Popes and, more importantly, the history of the Apostle Peter that must prove that the first Pope never set foot in Rome.[103]

Might the views that Naudé discusses in his letters with his learned friends be an expression of sympathy with irenic ideals of a minimal faith, of a return to the simplicity and uncorrupted nature of the Early Church?[104] When we look at his published work his biggest concern with contemporary Christian religion seems to be that dogmatic quarrels are averted and unity, peace and tranquillity are preserved. That is why in the *Considérations politiques sur les coups d'Estat* he writes that "la plus commune doctrine est tousiours la meilleure" when he is discussing the faults that have been made in confronting Luther in the early Reformation.[105]

Naudé's religious beliefs in the correspondence of contemporaries

Naudé's religious posture in the descriptions of others is that of a fairly irreproachable Catholic with a critical stance on some of its superfluities. In the correspondence of his learned friends, we primarily find statements on his beliefs that date from the period after his demise. We should be careful with these statements as they might show clear distortions and possible non-conformism will be more visible and up front. A clear example is the correspondence of Naudé's lifelong friend,

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sentiments are expressed in comparison with his fear that the consequences of astronomical speculations about other worlds will be graver than those caused by the "aged theological heresies". If found true this will introduce strange and dangerous changes. Still it reminds him, he writes, of the theory of the Antipodes by the Irish churchman Vergilius, bishop of Salzburg, which before long could not be maintained without risking the charge of heresy. Vergilius is said to have maintained and taught that the earth is round and that the other face of the earth was also inhabited. In 748 Pope Zachary inquired into this theory that would undermine both the idea of the line of descent of the human race from Adam and consequently the universality of original sin and Christ as the redeemer. Apparently this story was frequently referred to in epistolary exchanges of the 1630s and early 1640s. See, Nellen and Wolfe, "Un échange épistolaire de la `République des Muses´", 263 footnote 31. Interestingly, this remark – as well as other scholars referring to it in their letters – anticipates the discussion that will be revived with Isaac la Peyrere's *Pre-Adamitae*, a manuscript work of which Naudé is (among the) first to report the following year, in a letter to Cardinal Barberini. Many scholars have referred to this letter of 1641, see, for instance, Popkin, *History of Scepticism*, 359, who located it at the Barberini Library, The Vatican, Latin 6471, fol. 22v.

[103] See, Nellen and Wolfe, "Un échange épistolaire de la `République des Muses´", 265-266.

[104] See Henk J.M. Nellen, "Minimal Faith and Irenic Ideals in Seventeenth-Century Scholarly Circles. Hugo Grotius as a Guardian of Isaac Casaubon's Legacy", *Church History and Religious Culture* 94 (2014): 444-478.

[105] Gabriel Naudé, *Considérations politiques sur les coups d'Estat* (Rome, 1639), 130.

Guy Patin, who always depicted his friend as a near ascetic and morally upright character, but after his demise occasionally speculated about his religious beliefs. These speculations have become central in our understanding of Naudé, and if we look at the context of these statements, probably for the wrong reasons. We have to be critical in engaging with these letters that have always been approached as evidence for Naudé's libertine stance. At least during his lifetime there was no occasion to discuss Naudé's behaviour and religious beliefs, albeit that Patin's famous account of their 'philosophical debauch' and the bibliophile's abstinence has often been interpreted as such.[106] Another instance that has fuelled such interpretations is provided by the physician's description of his friend as "highly learned, good, wise, of independent mind (*déniaisé*) and cured from this century's silliness (*guéri de la sottise du siècle*), loyal and constant friend for 33 years."[107]

In the correspondence of Guy Patin after his friend's demise, Naudé is described as someone who is sceptic towards all forms of miracles and false prophesies, maintaining only the mysteries of the Christian faith. On 3 March 1656 he wrote to Spon that, "the waters of Sainte-Reine never did any miracles; since long I have been of the opinion of our late good friend M. Naudé, who said that in order not to be fooled, you should allow of neither predictions, nor mysteries, visions and miracles."[108] The same is expressed in a later letter to Spon of 28 October 1663: "I strongly agree with the opinion of late M. Naudé, who said that there were four things that you should beware of, in order not to be deceived, i.e. prophecies, miracles, revelations and apparitions. *Mundus omnis exercet histrioniam*, all the world is full of people who pretend to be soothsayers and who speculate about politics without knowing themselves who they will be tomorrow."[109] This Naudé,

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[106] "M. Naudé, bibliothécaire de M. le cardinal Mazarin, intime ami de M. Gassendi comme il est le mien, nous a engagés pour dimanche prochain à aller souper et coucher nous trois en sa maison de Gentilly, à la charge que nous ne serons que nous trois et que nous y ferons débauche, mais Dieu sait quelle débauche! M. Naudé ne boit naturellement que de l'eau et n'a jamais goûté vin. M. Gassendi est si délicat qu'il n'en oserait boire et s'imagine que son corps brûlerait s'il en avait bu. C'est pourquoi je puis dire de l'un et de l'autre ce vers d'Ovide, *Vina fugit, gaudetque meris abstemius undis* [He shuns the wine-cup and abstemiously enjoys pure water only]. Pour moi, je ne puis que jeter de la poudre sur l'écriture de ces deux grands hommes, j'en bois fort peu. Et néanmoins, ce sera une débauche, mais philosophique et peut-être quelque chose davantage. Pour être tous trois guéris du loup-garou et être délivrés du mal des scrupules, qui est le tyran des consciences; nous irons peut-être jusque fort près du sanctuaire. Je fis l'an passé ce voyage de Gentilly avec M. Naudé, moi seul avec lui, tête à tête. Il n'y avait point de témoins, aussi n'y en fallait-il point. Nous y parlâmes fort librement de tout, sans que personne en ait été scandalisé." Patin to André Falconet, 27 August 1648. Guy Patin [Loïc Capron (ed.)], *Correspondance française de Guy Patin* (Paris: Bibliothèque interuniversitaire de santé, 2015), online.

[107] Patin to André Falconet, 2 December 1650. Patin [Capron (ed.)], *Correspondance française de Guy Patin*.

[108] "les eaux de Sainte-Reine ne font point de miracles; il y a longtemps que je suis de l'avis de feu notre bon ami M. Naudé, qui disait que pour n'être trompé, il ne fallait admettre ni prédiction, ni mystère, ni vision, ni miracles." Patin to Charles Spon, 3 March 1656. Patin [Capron (ed.)], *Correspondance française de Guy Patin*.

[109] "Je suis fort de l'avis de feu M. Naudé, qui disait qu'il y avait quatre choses dont il se fallait garder, afin de n'être pas trompé, savoir: de prophéties, de miracles, de révélations et d'apparitions. *Mundus omnis exercet histrioniam*, toute la terre est pleine de gens qui se mêlent d'être devins et qui font les politiques spéculatifs sans savoir eux-mêmes ce qu'ils seront demain." Patin to Spon, 28 October 1663. Patin [Capron (ed.)], *Correspondance française de Guy Patin*.

critical and weary of too easy credence to miracles and wonder, does not seem to differ much of the author of the *Apologie* and the *Instruction à la France*. This has not so much to do with any irreligion or disbelief, but with a critical and empirical stance towards superstition, i.e. phenomena that were too easily accepted to be of supernatural origin.

Another aspect of Naudé's religious beliefs seems to come to the fore in Patin's description of his disapproval of confessional strife and religious controversy. Discussing an incident involving someone who was converted several times, Patin proposed the views of his old friend to the addressee of his letter, Andre Falconet. "Late M. Naudé said that one should persist in one's confession, that it is the sign of an ill-disposed mind to often change one's religion and that the whole thing is not worth the trouble."[110] A similar stance that opposed confessional quarrel appeared in a passage wherein Patin describes that Naudé had appropriated the Cremoninian maxim, *intus ut libet, foris ut moris est*. Patin explains that his friend mocked those who took the pains of theological speculation and religious controversy and "said that one should keep up good appearances without making commotion, as the Italians do, and in this situation take as devise: on the inside think as you please, publicly according to custom."[111]

The one specific discussion of Naudé's religious beliefs and moral character in Patin's letters is the discussion between Patin and Spon that was probably prompted by the occasion of the publication of the 1667 edition of Naudé's *Considérations politiques* by the Amsterdam printer Daniel Elzevier.[112] Patin warned Spon not to be astonished by the audacity of the book. This he ascribed to the Roman circumstances of his friend, who by praising his patron cardinal Di Bagno flattered the pope. According to the physician the work clearly showed that Naudé was afraid of the tyranny of the Inquisition, which, he reported from hearsay, had even threatened his friend. Follows one of the oft-cited passages on Naudé's religious affectations: "he had a great natural

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[110] The context of this passage the story is the following: Patin reports to Falconet of a "crazy man" who killed a priest during Holy Communion apparently trying to stab the "Host", having changed his religion from Catholic to Huguenot several times. "Défunt M. Naudé disait qu'il fallait demeurer comme l'on était et que c'était la marque d'un esprit mal tourné de changer si souvent de religion, que le tout ne valait pas la peine; *nota*, qu'il avait demeuré treize ans en Italie auprès du cardinal Bagni, et qu'il avait été intime ami de Cremonin, qui n'était point meilleur chrétien que Pomponace, que Machiavel, que Cardan et telles autres âmes moutonnières dont le pays abonde, j'entends l'Italie, où il y a bien plus de rusés et fins politiques que de bons chrétiens, excepté les jésuites et les moines, qui sont fort gens de bien, gens d'honneur et de probité, grands serviteurs de Dieu, gens de charité et de conscience, qui aiment et servent Dieu, et ne veulent que votre bien." Patin to André Falconet, 6 August 1670. Patin [Capron (ed.)], *Correspondance française de Guy Patin*.

[111] "Ce qui reste de la bibliothèque de M. Moreau se vend à la foire, j'entends les livres de philosophie, d'humanités et d'histoire; il avait fort peu de théologie et haïssait toute controverse de religion; même, je l'ai maintes fois vu se moquer de ceux qui s'en mettaient en peine. Je pense qu'il était de l'avis de M. Naudé qui se moquait des uns et des autres, et qui disait qu'il fallait faire, comme les Italiens, bonne mine sans bruit et prendre dans ce cas-là pour devise *Intus ut libet, foris ut moris est*." To Charles Spon, 16 and 26 February 1657. Patin [Capron (ed.)], *Correspondance française de Guy Patin*.

[112] In fact most concern with the work dates of the later seventeenth century, see Intermezzo II. See also the correspondence of Pierre Bayle; for instance, letter 105: Pierre Bayle to Jacob Bayle [Paris,] Sunday 21 July 1675. *Correspondance de Pierre Bayle* [online].

inclination towards not taking any party in matters of religion, having his mind full of political considerations, reflections and observations on the life of princes and the government of the world, and on the 'priestcraft' (*moinerie*, pejoratively as 'spirit of monks') in Europe today, so that he was rather more *politique* than G. [Gassendi?[113]]."[114] Further on in the letter, Naudé's disposition is described as "highly indifferent in the choice of religion." It was his anti-roman stance that led Patin to the statement, "I think that his profit and fortune were his religion, a doctrine that he had drawn and learned in the Roman curie."

What is often forgotten is that these statements are coloured by Patin's opposition to ultramontane Catholic power, which Naudé might have shared to some extent. Instead of his overall indifference to religion these descriptions of Naudé's views might illustrate aversion of confessional quarrel. To further typify what the tyranny of papal power means for authors working in its vicinity, Patin quotes the first lines of Grotius' epigram defending Casaubon's attack on the work of Cardinal Baronius. In this occasional poem the Dutch jurist warned for the various forces that worked in the constitution of 'such a Roman work' as Baronius had written, the *Annales Ecclesiasticae*; a certain servility, ambition, and a fear and censorship of the truth.[115] Patin hereby suggested that these factors had similarly played a role when Naudé wrote his *Considérations politiques sur les coups d'Estat*.

To counter the image of seeming absence of real piety and concern for confessional religion Patin extensively sketched the moral character of his friend. "I would say in short, I do not know who has been the better, either the student or the master [Belurgey], Rome or Paris, Cardinal di Bagno or his Latin secretary, Cardinal Mazarin or his librarian. Yet I persuade myself that both were little troubled by nor had scruples of conscience. Nevertheless, I would say to you that M. Naudé was a very wise, prudent and well-ordered man, who seemed to live in a certain natural fair-mindedness, who was a very good, even-tempered and loyal friend […]; he was not a swearer

[113] Here I follow the interpretation of Loïc Capron, who gives the letter G. instead of the 'c...' given in the nineteenth century edition by J.-H. Reveille-Parise. Given the fact that Patin more often abbreviated names by giving an initial only than that he obfuscated words in this way, I believe Capron's interpretation makes sense. However Cavaillé, who as many before him follows the nineteenth century edition, believes the c. should be interpreted as 'cagot' instead of 'croyant'. Jean-Pierre Cavaillé, "L'Italie déniaisée dans les *Naudeana* de Guy Patin", *Les Dossiers du Grihl* (2017) online. Nicot's *Thresor de la langue francoyse* (1606) gives the meaning 'hypocrite' for 'cagot' and Furétiere's *Dictionnaire de l'Académie* (1694) adds 'hypocrite, bigot'. See the lemmas for 'cagot' in *Dictionnaires d'autrefois*.

[114] Patin to Charles Spon, 17 October 1667. Patin [Capron (ed.)], *Correspondance française de Guy Patin*.

[115] "You who reads them, don't haste yourself in believing that the Annals of the learned Baronius are too servile and that one should approve of such a Roman work. They were the fruit of many nights, but under the command of Papal rule. The purple is not a light reward. Long since, the pontiffs would not suffer that one teaches the truth. (In the epigram placed at the beginning of Casaubon's *Exercitationes in Annales ecclesiasticis Baronii*.)" On the poem's origin, see Henk Nellen, *Hugo Grotius: A Lifelong Struggle for Peace in Church and State, 1583-1645* (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 153-154. For the text, translation and commentary, see M. van Oosterhout, "Hugo Grotius' occasional poetry 1609-1645" (PhD-diss., Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, 2009), 96-101.

nor a mocker, he was not a drunk, he ever only drank water and I never heard him lie deliberately. He strongly hated hypocrites, those who would have wanted to fool him once and even liars."[116]

Evidence suggests that traits of such an image of impiety had come forward in the years after the learned Parisian's demise. Several contemporary accounts point in the direction of François de la Poterie as a (or thé) source for the accusations of impiety against Naudé. Patin did not have a very favourable opinion of the man, calling him a dishonorable man (*un fripon*), a scoundrel, a person who deserved to be hanged (*un pendard*[117]) for blemishing the reputation of his recently deceased friend (*l'innocence de sa vie et de ses mœurs*).[118] In 1659, Boulliau, who was asked by Cardinal Mazarin to associate himself with La Poterie for the possible replacement of Naudé as head-librarian, wrote back to the *premier ministre* that he did not want to be associated with such a dishonest man. "I do not wish to believe, Monseigneur, that he would have been so rash as to accuse Mr Naudé in front of Your Eminence of actions that concern ~~morality and Religion~~ the integrity of his moral standards as markedly as the others, but I know he has spoken on it to many others, defaming him."[119] A possible explanation for the rise of these rumours on Naudé's piety is

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[116] "Pour les Considérations sur les coups d'État, je vous prie de ne vous étonner de rien. L'auteur était en un lieu où il flattait le pape en son patron le cardinal B. [Bagni], où il avait peur de l'Inquisition et de sa tyrannie, et de laquelle même, à ce qu'on m'a dit autrefois, il avait été menacé. De plus, il avait une grande pente naturelle à ne prendre aucun parti de religion, ayant l'esprit tout plein de considérations, réflexions et observations politiques, sur la vie des princes et sur le gouvernement du monde, et sur la moinerie aujourd'hui dans l'Europe, de sorte qu'il était bien plutôt politique que G. [Gassendi], sur quoi je pourrais vous dire de lui ce que Hugo Grotius a dit quelque part en l'honneur de Casaubon, qui écrivait contre le cardinal Baronius: *Annales Docti nimium servire Baronii / Qui legis, et Romæ quale probatur opus, / Credere ne propera: multo vigilata labore / Pagina; sed nutu sub Dominantis erat. / Auctoramentum non est leve, Purpura: pridem, / Pontifices verum non didicere pati. Etc.* (In epigr. præfixo Exercit. Casaub. in Annales eccl. Baronii). Tant que j'ai pu connaître cet auteur, il m'a semblé fort indifférent dans le choix de la religion, et avait appris cela à Rome tandis qu'il y a demeuré douze bonnes années [...] M. Naudé faisait grand état de Tacite et de Machiavel; et quoi qu'il en soit, je pense qu'il était de la religion de son profit et de sa fortune, doctrine qu'il avait puisée et apprise *in curia romana*, *quae non positionem sine lena*, etc. *Vide Pline, lib. 9. hist. cap. 7, quod est de Deo ubi de fortuna*. Mais ce discours m'ennuie. Je vous dirai en un mot, je ne sais qui a été le meilleur, ou l'écolier ou le maître, Rome ou Paris, le cardinal Bagni ou son secrétaire latin, le cardinal Mazarin ou son bibliothécaire. Je me persuade pourtant que tous deux n'étaient guère inquiétés ni chargés de scrupules de conscience; toutefois, je vous dirai que M. Naudé était un homme fort sage, fort prudent, fort réglé, qui semblait vivre dans une certaine équité naturelle, qui était fort bon ami, fort égal et fort légal, qui s'est toujours fort fié à moi, et à personne tant qu'à moi, si ce n'est peut-être à feu M. Moreau; point jureur ni moqueur, point ivrogne; il ne but jamais que de l'eau, je ne l'ai jamais entendu mentir à son escient. Il haïssait fort les hypocrites, et ceux qui l'auraient une fois voulu tromper et même les menteurs." Patin to Charles Spon, 17 October 1667. Patin [Capron (ed.)], *Correspondance française de Guy Patin*.

[117] See the entries in the *Dictionnaires d'autrefois*, for instance Furetiere's *Dictionnaire de l'Académie française* (1694) that gives synonyms as "vaurien, fripon, scélérat".

[118] "Il n'y a point encore de bibliothécaire désigné, c'est un nommé < La > Poterie, qui y servait sous feu M. Naudé, qui en fait la fonction, mais qui ne l'aura pas. C'est un fripon qui a rendu de très mauvais services à notre bon ami après sa mort ou au moins, qui y a tâché; mais l'innocence de sa vie et de ses mœurs l'a jusqu'à présent défendu très parfaitement de la calomnie de ce pendard que je ne connais point, mais peut-être qu'il y viendra." Patin to Charles Spon, 9 June 1654. Patin [Capron (ed.)], *Correspondance française de Guy Patin*.

[119] "Je ne veux pas croire, Monseig^{r}, qu'il ait été si hardi que d'accuser Mr Naudé auprès V^{re} Em^{ce} d'actions qui touchent ~~les mœurs et la Religion~~ la probité des mœurs aussi sensiblement que les autres, mais je sais qu'il en a parlé à plusieurs personnes en le diffamant." Letter Boulliau to Mazarin (no date, 1659) cited in Pintard, *Libertinage érudit*, 416.

connected to the *Considerations politiques sur les coups d'Estat*. Soon after his demise his secretary La Poterie probably found out about Naudé's authorship of the work – perhaps when he got his hands on Naudé's manuscript of this political treatise, a manuscript the author had long hesitated to publish – and was appalled by this audacious piece of writing. In the next chapter we will come back to this important issue connected to the publication history of this *raison d'état* treatise Naudé is famous for.[120]

The Naudé of the ana

If we are to give credit to the collection of *ana* that purportedly record private thoughts and conversations of Naudé, then maybe the erudite's religious views that come to the fore more closely resemble a kind of fideism, in an otherwise Gallican Catholicism. Perhaps he even entertained religious views put forward in contemporary debates on natural religion and the principle articles of faith including the eirenical efforts of Herbert of Cherbury, Hugo Grotius and Marin Mersenne.

In the *Naudeana*, the notes of private conversations described and recorded by Patin, Naudé seems to conform to a kind of fideism that has often been identified in *De la Sagesse* (II.5 p. 128) of Pierre Charron. "To find God in the disorder of the world today, we must have modesty and humility. We must submit our spirit to those sacred mysteries of the Christian religion, as the first Christians did in the past, *captivantes intellectum in obsequium fidei* [Corinthians 10:5], bringing judgment into captivity to the obedience of faith."[121] This submission to faith fits the separation of the philosophical query for the truth from faith in and acceptance of religious truth, which is simply to be believed. This separation can also be encountered in written works by Naudé such as the *Apologie* and *De Fato*. In line with this separation, the belief that Patin ascribed to Naudé was that Christian revelation is something mystical and outside of any speculation. The human spirit cannot fully attain or comprehend this mystical doctrine. To know these sublime matters, it is enough to believe; one does not have to study theology. In fact, even theologians should defer from speculation and remember the *sententia* taken from Virgil's *Aeneid*, "here I lay down the gauntlet and my art" (*hic caestus artemque repono*).[122]

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[120] See Intermezzo II.

[121] "Pour trouver Dieu dans le desordre qui est aujourd'huy dans le monde, il faut avoir de la modestie et de l'humilité; il faut se sousmettre l'esprit à ces sacrés misteres de la Religion chrestienne, comme faisoient autresfois les premiers chrestiens, *Captivantes intellectum in obsequium fidei*." *Naudeana*, Vienna manuscript, p. 4, cited in the article of Cavaillé. Cavaillé, "L'Italie déniaisée dans les *Naudeana* de Guy Patin", op. cit. In Charron the 'fideist' passage reads: "Il faut estre simple, obéissant et débonnaire pour être propre à recevoir religion, croire et se maintenir sous ses lois par révérence et obéissance, assujettir son jugement et se laisser mener et conduire à l'autorité publique, *captivantes intellectum ad obsequium fidei*."

[122] Cavaillé, "Italie déniasée dans les *Naudeana* de Guy Patin", footnote 19. Here Cavaillé cites from the Vienna manuscript of the *Naudeana*, p. 31. "Tout ce qu'on appelle doctrine revelée dans le Christianisme est une piece toute mystique et mise hors de toute speculation. L'esprit humain n'y peut pas atteindre ny

In many of Naudé's writings we find grave accusations against certain institutions of the Church, the Inquisition in particular. This is also found, albeit in a strong form, in the *Naudeana*. The religion of the Italians comes across as a system of appearances and pompous ceremony. The objective of the Church institutions seems rather to serve political and economic interests of church officials. Naudé's experiences close to Papal power seemed to have confirmed him in a Gallican conviction that the pontificate was an invention that only served political ambitions and private interests and had nothing to do with faith in God.[123]

Certain orders like the Jesuits and 'monks' in general are often the target of vigorous criticism.[124] As we have seen, Naudé mocked the Jesuits' fanaticism in early works such as the *Instruction à la France, the Apologie* and the *Bibliographia mystica*. In one such attack, the Naudé of the *Naudeana* is reported to have said that monks are merely auxiliary troops in the Church organization, wherein the bishops and curies are the ordinary troops. As the regular church administration is abundant, monks are useless and would better serve their king as good soldiers. 'Moinerie' is just an asylum for the lazy, a retreat for idle people who wish to live in the shadow of a crucifix doing nothing. As it is useless there should be made an end to the institution. A particular problem with the orders, one that Naudé keenly pointed out, is that they multiply the stories of miracles so that you no longer know what to believe. [125]

Based on his criticism he seems to propose a religion cleared from private interests. This just religion that despises corrupt clergy could be interpreted in line with contemporary Gallican calls for Catholic reform and a return to the values and the organization of the primitive church of early Christendom.[126] Abstaining as he advised and professed from doctrinal speculation, Naudé

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rien comprendre. C'est là que doivent dire les Docteurs *hic caestus artemque repono*. Et pour scavoir ces choses sublimes il n'est pas besoin d'estudier en Theologie, il ne faut que croire. J'ay seulement regret qu'il y ait tant de meschans au monde, veu que le fils de Dieu est venu pour les sauver, et neantmoins ils sont si determinez au mal, qu'il semble qu'ils ne le veulent pas estre et qu'ils ne veulent pas se servir du benefice de l'Incarnation et de la passion de J.C. Et la meschanceté de ces gens-là fait que J.C. qui estoit venu pour tout le monde n'a sauvé qu'une poignée de gens, qui sont les Catholiques, *quorum quamplurimi sunt peccatores*. Car sous le mot de Catholiques il y a bien encore des fourbes et des fripons, *multis iisque gravissimis onerati peccatis. caetera turba petit fundum*, tant tous les autres Chrestiens qui ne sont pas Catholiques comme lutheriens, Calvinistes &c. que les Turcs, les Juifs, les Payens et tous autres Infidelles." The quote *hic caestus artemque repono* is from Virgil, *Aeneid*, book V, line 485: LCL 63, 504-505.

[123] Cavaillé, "Italie déniasée dans les *Naudeana* de Guy Patin".

[124] Cavaillé, "Italie déniasée dans les *Naudeana* de Guy Patin".

[125] "Les Moynes se sont fourrez dans l'Eglise comme trouppes auxiliaires pour aider et secourir les ordinaires qui sont les Evesques et les Curez. Ces ordinaires abondent par tout, il ne faudroit donc plus de Moines, le Roy par ce moyen auroit grand nombre de bons soldats. La moinerie est un asile de paresseux, une retraite de faineans et de gens qui veulent vivre à l'ombre d'un crucifix sans rien faire. Il faudroit en estoufer la race et en noyer le dernier afin de n'en plus faire ". Vienna manuscript, p. 45 cited in Cavaillé, "Italie déniasée dans les *Naudeana* de Guy Patin", footnote 27. Also p. 40: "les Moynes ont tant multiplié les miracles sans necessité qu'on ne scait plus tantost lesquels croire. Je dirois volontiers des miracles d'aujourd'hui ce que le Cardinal Bessarion disoit des nouveaux Saints de son temps: *Pater Sancte, isti novi sancti faciunt me dubitare de antiquis* [Holy Father, these new saints make me doubt the ancient]. Cela est honteux à tous les gens de bien que la Religion Chrestienne soit pleine de tant de bourdes".

[126] Cavaillé, "Italie déniasée dans les *Naudeana* de Guy Patin", op. cit.

seemed to stress the importance of a natural kind of morality. We would be misguided if we attempted to find a coherent religious doctrine in his writings. What we do find in the *Naudeana* is a morality founded on a variation of the golden rule – *quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris* – as the first law of nature that should be the true guide for any honest man. This basic rule for human conduct, "do not do onto others, what you do not want to be done to you", is here not derived from Scripture but from the work of non-Christian, fideist, or *politique* authors.[127]

Naudé and the conversion of 'heretics'

In practice, Naudé had no problem to work for the Church. In 1642 Naudé became involved in the effort of the Dupuy brothers to convert their Protestant friends, the most famous example Hugo Grotius.[128] Pintard reports how, rendering service to Cardinal Barberini, Naudé joined efforts with the Papal Nuncio and the Jesuit Denis Petau early that year to convert Grotius.[129] Upon his return to Paris he paid at least two preliminary visits to the Swedish ambassador in his Parisian residence. In September, Naudé is charged with negotiating the conversion. Carrying Grotius' latest book, the *Via ad pacem ecclesiasticam*, on the visit, Naudé told the author that his response to Rivet would satisfy Catholics and expressed his wish that now that the highly learned diplomat had so closely approached the truth he would take the last step, that is, to convert and offer his diplomatic services as intermediary between the court of Rome and that of France. Grotius apparently told Naudé that his office of Swedish ambassador would not allow him to do such a thing, but acknowledging the weakness of an argument based on the function itself, underlined that it was favourable to his most dear project with which he had finally made headway, that of the reunion of the Church. Naudé reported to Barberini to have replied, "To reconcile, you say, to adapt? Yet, the Church should stay faithful to its ancient rites. Reunite? But unity, which is unattainable by private persons, would require the accordance of all the potentates of Europe and it would not be realised without leading to the destruction of true forms of Christianity. Scripture itself, does it not proclaim that there must be heretics? Accordance with diverse sects, which would imply a series of concessions, is a chimera that must be abandoned. The only wise option

[127] Anonymous, *Naudaeana et Patiniana, ou singularitez remarquables, prises des conversations de mess. Naudé et Patin. Seconde Edition revuë, corrigée et augmentée d'Additions au Naudaeana qui ne sont point dans l'Edition de Paris* (Amsterdam: François van der Plaats, 1703), 65-66. "La Loi de nature est la vraye regle d'un honnête homme, pourvû qu'îl en pratique ce premier point: *quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris.* Il y a quelques Livres qui conduisent un homme en cette vie: savoir: *Epistolae Senecae*, la Sagesse de Charron, *Vita Pomponii Attici*, les Essais de Montagne, les Dialogues Sceptiques de la Mothe le Vayer; *Epistolae Plinii*, Horace, Juvenal, *Officia Ciceronis*, *Marcus Antoninus Imperator et Philosophus*."

[128] Delatour, "Le Cabinet des frères Dupuy", 190; Pintard, *Le libertinage érudit*, 307-308; Nellen, *Hugo Grotius*, 649-652.

[129] Pintard interprets this as an occasion that Naudé used to court the Barberini. Pintard, *Le libertinage érudit*, 307.

is to get oneself into safety in a true and stable religion and quit working on projects of reconciliation any longer."[130]

Naudé thus argued that Grotius' desired reunion of the churches was an illusion and to render him more susceptive to the choice for the true religion assured him that leaving his office of Swedish ambassador would in no way be prejudicial to his interests. From Naudé's report it follows that Grotius was convinced that after peace had been restored in Europe the reunion of the churches would not drag along forever and his conversion would only make it more difficult. Honours and rewards did not tempt him, for after his mission in France he only wished to retire with his family. In a final attempt Naudé argued that it would be beneficial for his project to have the support of the Roman court. Grotius could for instance start by writing an anonymous pamphlet supported by Rome outlining detailed propositions for a project of unity. Grotius reportedly reproached him by saying that all his recommendations and propositions already featured in his books. The Swedish ambassador added that if his writings would not have the desired effect, he might think again about Naudé's offer.[131]

Naudé's irreligion: a late seventeenth century distortion?

From the evidence reviewed in this paragraph it seems to follow that the suspicion of Naudé's irreligion may not so much find its foundation in the learned bibliophile's writing, thinking or life. Rather, it probably stems from later seventeenth-century controversies. From the 1660s onwards, there was some contention around his work on magic and superstition, as well as his political interpretation of religion.[132]

It was not until the later seventeenth century, however, that Naudé was suspected to have been an irreligious author. By that time his work, like the *Naudeana* and the *Considérations politiques sur les coups d'Estat*, was mostly (re)printed in the Dutch Republic.[133] To reformulate a suggestion recently made by the British historian David Wootton, editions of the *Considérations politiques* might have been part of a strategy "to represent Catholics as cynical unbelievers."[134]

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[130] This is a fragment of a letter by Naudé to Holstenius and Barberini quoted (and translated into French from the original Italian) by René Pintard. "Concilier? Accomoder? L'Eglise cependant devait rester fidèle à tous ses anciens rites. Réunir? Mais l'union, irréalisable par personnes privées, exigerait l'entente de tous les potentats d'Europe, et elle ne saurait se faire sans entraîner la destruction des vraies formes du christianisme. L'Ecriture elle-même ne proclame-t-elle pas qu'il faut qu'il y ait des hérétiques? L'accord avec les diverses sectes, qui impliquerait une série de concessions successives, est une chimère, qu'il faut abandonner. Le seul parti sage est de se mettre en sûreté dans une religion vraie et stable, quitte à reprendre ensuite les projets de réunion.' Pintard, *Le libertinage érudit*, 307-308.
[131] Nellen, *Hugo Grotius*, 649-652.
[132] See, Gabriel, "Raison théologique, procédure légale et ordre politique", 147-166.
[133] See Appendix 4.
[134] David Wootton, "From Fortune to Feedback: Contingency and the Birth of Modern Political Science", in Ian Shapiro and Sonu Bedi (eds.), *Political Contingency: Studying the Unexpected, the Accidental, and the Unforeseen* (New York and London: New York University Press, 2009), 21-53, 46-49.

Suspicions of irreligion could at least quite easily be construed. The 'impostor-thesis' with which Naudé showed the political use of religion in the *Considérations politiques* could have serious, but arguably unintended, implications when for instance a Dutch Protestant republican applied it to the contemporary French monarchy and the Catholic Church.[135] Besides, it were exactly such isolated fragments from his work that were appended to the *Traité des trois imposteurs* that was uncovered around the turn of the century.[136] It is striking that in the *Naudaeana*, printed a decade before the *Traité* first came to light, we find a statement accredited to Naudé in which it becomes clear that he had allegedly had his eyes open to find the notorious treatise. In the *ana* entry, Naudé says he doubts the existence of such a treatise, at least he never encountered it either in print or in manuscript. He reportedly said: "I have never seen the book *de tribus Impostoribus* and believe it has never been printed. I also take everything that is told about it for a lie. […] And I do not believe that it has ever existed *in rerum natura*. Everything that is told about it has been taken from what Lipsius says in his *Monita* (1.4), where he says, *there are people who not only exhibit their irreligion by their walk of life, but also scandalously express their impiety in words; like that [Holy Roman] Emperor, Frederic II, who often attested that there have been notable impostors, who have seduced human kind.*'[137]

Reviewing all this material the interpretation of Naudé as a studious unbeliever, despite the labors of Pintard and his nineteenth century predecessors, seems to crumble. I would seriously consider the hypothesis that the learned Parisian's reputation has a lot to do with the anti-French, anti-Catholic sentiment in the Dutch Republic of the decades around 1700.[138] This hypothesis, however, merits a study on its own and that is more than can be presented here.

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[135] Maryanne Cline Horowitz, "Gabriel Naudé's *Apology for Great Men Suspected of Magic*: Variations in Editions from 1625 to 1715", in John Christian Laursen (ed.), *Histories of Heresy in Early Modern Europe: For, Against, and Beyond Persecution and Toleration* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 67.

[136] The fragments from Naudé's work are to be found in the 1719 edition of the *Traité*, chapters XI-XVI. Silvia Berti, "*L'Esprit de Spinosa:* ses origines et sa première edition dans leur context spinozien", in Silvia Berti, Françoise Charles-Daubert, and Richard H. Popkin (eds.), *Heterodoxy, Spinozism, and Free Thought in Early-Eighteenth-Century Europe*. Studies on the *Traité des trois imposteurs* (Dordrecht: Springer, 1996), 3-51.

[137] "Je n'ai jamais vu le Livre *de tribus Impostoribus*, et je crois qu'il n'a jamais été imprimé, et tiens pour mensonge tout ce qu'on en a dit: Quelques uns disent qu'il a été imprimé en Hongrie ou en Pologne. Postel a dit que l'Auteur de ce Livre étoit Arnaud de Villeneuve: d'autres l'ont attribué à Postel, comme le Docteur Ramus, et un certain Livre intitulé: *le Magot Genevois*, dont l'Auteur est selon M. Sponde page 57. le Ministre Bansillon; ou plûtôt le nommé Barnaud que Bansillon avoit retiré chez lui, quoique convaincu d'Arianisme. Florimond de Raymond a dit que Ramus le lisoit en se promenant dans la Cour du College de Beauvais, et moi je ne crois pas qu'il ait jamais existé *in rerum natura*. Tout ce qu'on en dit est tiré de ce qu'en dit Lipse *in monitis et exemplis politicis lib.* I. *cap.* 4. où il dit. *Sunt qui non solum vitâ impiÉtatem praeferunt, sed impudenter linguâ exprimunt: ut ille Fredericus Secundus Imperator cui saepe in ore, tres fuisse insignes impostores qui Genus Humanum seduxerunt.*" Anonymous, *Naudaeana* (1703), 129-130.

[138] Berti, "At the Roots of Unbelief", 555-575.

Conclusion: Gabriel Naudé, a Gallican Catholic of independent mind

Naudé was no simple defender of the Counter-reformation as some scholars have presented him, nor was he the 'studious unbeliever' that Pintard claimed him to be.[139] Aware of the danger of propounding a reductionist view, we could probably best consider him a Gallican fideist of an independent mind, a Catholic whose historical scrutiny and rational inquiry allowed him to steer clear from superstition and remove false views from a traditional French Catholic religion at a time when orthodoxy was still in progress.[140] We should rather analyse Naudé's religious views within the broader context of 'religious orthodoxy' in practical beliefs before the strict enforcement of confessional unity at the end of the seventeenth century under Louis XIV.[141] In the aspect of religion as well, Naudé should be regarded as a follower of Pierre Charron and a kindred mind with his friend Francois La Mothe Le Vayer.[142] Naudé's stance on religion seems to have been pragmatic and this attitude might well have been influenced by his experiences of the harsh debates of the 1620s in France and his residence close to Papal power in Italy. His religious views, as far as we are able to discern, were no doubt influenced by the Gallican critique of the Roman Church and its institutions. Also important were the various forms of Italian critique, deviance and religious dissidence. This range of positions of critical orthodoxy, derived from the humanist treatment of heterodox sources, were part of an elitist phenomenon that came from within the institutions of the Church and Counter- and Catholic reformation.[143]

Naudé figured as an independent thinker among this elite. He was a man of learning, a scholar interested in history, politics and above all ethics, not a man of theology. At various times he attested that apart from the Bible, he considered Charron's *De la Sagesse* the best guide of human

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[139] Popkin, *The History of Scepticism*, 80-98; Catherine Larrère, "Scepticisme et politique", *Revue de synthèse* 4, no. 2-3 (1998) 271-291.

[140] C.J. Betts, *Early Deism in France: From the So-Called 'Déistes' of Lyon (1564) to Voltaire's* Lettres philosophiques *(1734)* (The Hague, Boston, and Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984), 34, esp. footnote 4. Betts considers what Pintard called *libertinage érudit* as "free thought in the fideist tradition" and sees as the main characteristic of the representatives of this strand of thought identified by Pintard a fideistic conformism that might or might not conceal unorthodoxy of some kind. Of Naudé he interestingly claims that "Pintard portrays him [Naudé] as nothing more radical than a Catholic of independent mind."

[141] See Joseph Bergin, *Church, Society, and Religious Change in France, 1580-1730* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009); idem, *The Politics of Religion in Early Modern France*, op. cit.

[142] Maia Neto, *The Charronian Legacy 1601-1662*, 82-93.

[143] This phrase might be reminiscent of what Henry Phillips calls the "space of critical belief" in which many authors moved in France in the first half of the seventeenth century. Phillips, *Church and Culture in Seventeenth-Century France*, 227-240. On this "space of critical belief": "This group [the *libertins érudits*] did not on the whole exhibit its personal views openly and members created for themselves a space where they could discuss with like minds their hesitations about, and criticisms of, religious and, sometimes, political orthodoxy. In doing so, they satisfied their desire for an inner space of independent thought free from the constraints of institutions, free from intellectual authority." See also Cavaillé, "Italie déniasée dans les *Naudeana* de Guy Patin", op. cit.

conduct.[144] In his multiple *iudicia* – that of Socrates in the *Apologie*, of Cardano in the *Iudicium*, of Cardinal Mazarin in the *Mascurat*, and others – Naudé critically investigated the thinking and practices of his subject in order to provide a rational judgment of the ethics of these authors, or, in the last case, his patron Cardinal Mazarin.

[144] "Feu M. le Cardinal Bagni me demanda un jour quel étoit le meilleur de tous les Livres; je lui dis, qu'apres la Bible me sembloit, que c'était la Sagesse de Charron; il me marqua du regret de ne pas connoître ce Livre […]." Anonymous, *Naudaeana* (1703), 3-4.



CONSIDERATIONS
POLITIQVES
SVR LES
COVPS D'ESTAT.

Par G. N. P.

A ROME.

M. DC. XXXIX.

Fig. 1: The title-page of the 'Rome, 1639' edition of Gabriel Naudé's *Considérations politiques sur les coups d'état.*

The Secrets of Publication: Publication History of Naudé's *Considérations Politiques* and the *Mascurat*

Introduction

In this second intermezzo chapter the publication history of Naudé's 'theoretical' and more practical political writings on *raison d'état* will be explored. A bibliographical approach to the *Considérations politiques* and the *Mascurat* makes it possible to lay bare a history that has long remained even more obscure than that of Henri de Rohan's *De l'Interest des Princes*.

The *Considérations politiques*: a dissimulated publication

The publication history of Naudé's *Considérations politiques sur les coups d'état* is highly elusive. Yet it is only recently that historians have come to fully recognize this. Many scholars have long taken at face value the information provided on the title page and 'preface': the book was first published in Rome in 1639 and appeared in a mere twelve copies.[1] To be sure, there is no reason to doubt that the 'Rome, 1639' edition is the *editio princeps* and I do not want to begin doubting it now. The information provided by Naudé's friend and contemporary Father Louis Jacob, who collected *elogia* upon the Parisian bibliophile's demise and published them together with a bibliography of his works, leaves no reason to doubt that this edition was the first of twelve editions to be printed until the mid-eighteenth century.[2] This first edition of the *Considérations politiques* provides the author's initials (G.N.P. – Gabriel Naudé Parisien) on the title page and gives a place and date of publication (Rome, MDCXXXIX) – hence 'Rome, 1639' edition. (Fig. 1) However, the information on the title page is almost certainly feigned. Ever since the eighteenth century the Roman origin of the publication has been questioned. Many a bibliophile suspected that the book was printed in Paris instead of Rome, while at the same time accepting the date of publication.[3]

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[1] To give but a recent example of a study that does not sufficiently question the publication of the first edition, see Catteeuw, *Censures, et raisons d'État*, 249-253.
[2] See Appendix 4 Publication history Naudé.
[3] From Armand-Gaston Camus in the eighteenth century to the nineteenth-century debate between Charles Nodier, Charles Labitte and other French bibliographers the 'Rome, 1639' edition was held to be published in Paris, although this belief was never substantiated with proof. Later three great bibliographers of nineteenth-century France Antoine-Alexandre Barbier [*Dictionnaire des ouvrages anonymes*, I (Paris: Paul Daffis, 1872), 707], Joseph-Marie Quérard [*Superchéries littéraires dévoilées*, II (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 1964), 190] and Jacques-Charles Brunet [*Manuel du libraire*, IV (Paris: Firmin-Didot frères, 1863), 21] all accepted without further examination or explanation that the first edition was printed in Paris.

Remarkably, until recently little was done with the emblematic information on the title page. Yet, this is another element that undermines the Roman origin, and on the face of it would rule out a Parisian origin as well.[4] The printer's device on the title page – a hand descending from a cloud drawing with a twin compass decorated with lace containing the motto *Labore et Constantia* – seems to be no other than the 'golden compasses' of the Plantin Press.[5] Could the *Considérations politiques* have been printed in a Plantin office or was the printer's device also intended to disguise the place of publication? And if the work was printed in an *Officina Plantiniana*, then which and when?

First, let us presume that the printer's mark was feigned. Could it be possible that the rest of the information on the title page is true? In other words, are we able to identify a Roman printer that used a 'golden compasses' in the late 1630s? In fact, there was one, the Roman printer Ludovico Grignani (1586-1651).[6] Grignani used the mark in two editions of 1639 and 1641 (Fig. 2).[7] The interesting detail is that this printer was somehow related to the Barberini and Cardinal di Bagno, Naudé's patron. After the cardinal's demise in 1641 Grignani published Di Bagno's *Testament* as well as an *in quarto* elegy by his own hand, *Relatione delle Esequie fatte in S. Allessio al Cardinal di Bagno*. Grignani knew Naudé and this is not only supported by the Latin elegy Naudé wrote for his patron that the printer mentions in this *Relatione*. The Roman printer, for instance, published Leone Allacci's *Apes Urbanae* in 1633, the first work to mention Naudé's treatise on *coups d'état*, then referred to as a treatise on *arcana imperiorum* written the previous year.[8] More importantly, Grignani and Naudé collaborated in several projects in the first years of the 1640s. Grignani printed the inventory Naudé wrote of the churches in Di Bagno's bishopric of Rieti and in 1641 he also published Naudé's *Epigrammata in virorum literatorum imagines*.[9] However, the

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[4] See, Peter S. Donaldson, *Machiavelli and Mystery of State* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 160-165; Wootton, "From Fortune to Feedback", 46-49.

[5] It is the exact printer's device that was used once by Christopher Plantin (1586) and by his heirs upon multiple occasions; as far as the information on the *Arkyves* website is correct it was last used in Leiden by Franciscus II Raphelingius in 1614. URL: http://www.arkyves.org/view/dpd_0366/? Consulted 1 December 2016.

[6] A query for 'labore constantia' in the HPB-database returned only one Roman printer that used the motto 'labore et constantia', Ludovico Grignani. This led me to the identification of the 'compasses' printer's mark.

[7] The two editions by Grignani that contain a variant of the 'Golden compasses' device on the title-page are: Bartolomeo Tortoletti's, *Academia Pompeiana seu defensio magni Pompeii in administratione Belli Civilis* (Rome: Ludovico Grignani, 1639) and the printer's own *Relatione del solenni esequie fatte nella Chiesa di Sant'Alessio alla felice memoria dell'ementissimo Cardinale di Bagno dalla su Famiglia. Descritta da Ludovico Grignani* (Rome: Grignani, 1641). I have not seen the latter work and rely on the catalogue information from the Bibliothèque National de France and the Biblioteca nazionale centrale Vittorio Emanuele I in Rome described in the HPB-database. This contains the bibliographic note: "Marca (Mano che esce dalle nuvole tiene un compasso: Labore et constantia) sul front."

[8] Leone Allacci, *Apes Urbanae, sive de viris illustribus, qui ab anno MDCXXX. per totum MDCXXXII. Romae adfuerunt, ac Typis aliquid evulgarunt* (Rome: Ludovico Grignani, 1633), 114-118, especially 116.

[9] Gabriel Naudé, *Instauratio tabularii maioris templi Reatini facta iussu, & auspicijs eminentissimi & reuerendissimi domini Ioannis Francisci cardinalis a Balneo episcopi Reatini anno 1638* (Rome: Ludovico Grignani, 1640).

'golden compasses' were not the printer's device that Grignani would normally use, whether it be in the early 1630s or in the 1640s, nor was it the specific device we look for.[10] Finally, neither of the editions of Naudé's work contain the exact same printer's mark, nor do any of the decorative elements – the printer's mark or other ornaments – Grignani used in other late 1630 prints [Figure 2.] resemble the ones used in the first edition of the *Considérations politiques sur les coups d'état*. It may therefore be presumed that Grignani did not print Naudé's political treatise. As there were no other Roman printers that used these ornaments, Rome as place of publication would be almost certainly feigned.[11]

Fig. 2: The 'golden compasses' device used by Ludovico Grignani.

Identifying the printer's device as that of the Plantin press is one thing. If we take the mark to be genuine, problems of identification start to pile up from there. First of all, the work cannot not have been printed in Leiden as the office of the Plantin press run by Frans and Joost van Ravelingen (Raphelengius) had closed its doors at a time when Naudé was still a student in Paris. Still, the printer's mark used in the *Considérations politiques* is the exact same depiction of the compasses decorated with lace and apples often used by Frans II van Ravelingen in the first decades of the seventeenth century.[12] As the Leiden *Officina Plantiniana* had closed shop in 1619 and the official stamps returned to the Flemish capital of print, an Antwerp print run seems the most plausible.[13] Here, however, we encounter another problem. The Antwerp office run by Balthasar Moretus never seems to have used this specific depiction of the 'golden compasses' or

[10] Ludovico Grignani normally used a printer's device depicting a palm-tree surrounded by a swarm of bees.
[11] Note that the nineteenth-century bibliographers Nodier and Labitte both thought that the 'Rome, 1639' edition might have been a Parisian counterfeit edition of an as yet undiscovered Roman *editio princeps*. Charles Nodier, "Apologie pour Gabriel Naudé", in Charles Nodier, *Mélanges tirés d'une petite Bibliothèque, ou variétés littéraires et philosophiques* (Paris: Crapelet, 1829), 195-203, esp. 196-199; Ch. Labitte, "Écrivains précurseurs du siècle de Louis XIV. I. Gabriel Naudé", *Revue des Deux Mondes* 7, no. 4 (1836) : 447-477, esp. 464-465.
[12] See for instance the title page of the 1614 edition of Lucan's *Pharsalia* with Hugo Grotius' commentary. *M. Anneai Lucani Pharsalia: sive De Bello Civili Caesaris et Pompei libri x* (Leiden: ex Officiana Plantiniana Raphelengii, 1614). This edition can be consulted on Google Books.
[13] Leon Voet, *The Golden Compasses. The History of the House of Plantin-Moretus* (Amsterdam: Van Gendt and co., 1969-1972), 174.

other ornaments found in the *Considérations politiques*, let alone in the period between 1639 and the first mentioning of the 'Rome, 1639' edition in 1659.[14]

A third option that would confirm the long-held suspicion of a Parisian first edition is the lesser-known Plantin office on the Parisian Rue Saint-Jacques. This Parisian office of the Plantin press was started by Gilles Beys, husband to Christophe Plantin's daughter Magdalena. After Beys died in 1595, Magdalena soon remarried and her second husband Adrien Périer continued the shop until his own demise.[15] Périer used various depictions of the Plantin mark, including the exact printer's device used on the title page of the *Considérations politiques*.[16] It seems plausible that Périer's stamp was used on the title page of Naudé's treatise, because the printer's marks on either title pages show the same damage. At the upper side of the printer's device just off the middle a fissure is visible.[17] However, Périer could not have printed the *Considérations politiques.* Upon the conception of Naudé's work in the early 1630s Périer was deceased (before February 1629) and the Paris office of the Plantin press had been closed. Still, it is possible that it was through the legacy of Périer that the 'golden compasses' came to decorate the title page of the *Considérations politiques*. As part of a dissimulation strategy, to be sure.

If we take a step back from the publication history and look briefly at the composition and reception of Naudé's treatise on *coups d'état*, this might help in identifying the period the book was probably printed. A consensus exists among historians about the date of composition, 1631-1632. Whether or not upon request by his new patron Cardinal di Bagno, this political treatise was among the first works he conceived when he entered the service of the former papal nuncio to France in 1630. By 1632 Naudé had completed a manuscript treatise and had the material read in confidence. Both Naudé and his Roman friend Leone Allacci then mentioned a treatise on *arcana imperiorum* in their 1633 publications of the *Bibliographia Politica* and the *Apes Urbanae* respectively.[18]

The reception history of this political treatise that was to make Naudé infamous to future generations is less straightforward. The apparent lack of evidence of an early reception during

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[14] A survey of editions by Balthasar Moretus between 1639 and 1659 on Google books did not return any instance of the use of this specific printer's device, nor did the curator of Books and Archives at the Museum Plantin-Moretus, Dirk Imhof, with whom I corresponded know of any edition by Naudé printed in a Plantin office.

[15] On the Paris office of the Plantin Press on the Rue Saint-Jacques, first run by Gilles Beys and later by the second husband of Magdalena Plantin, Adrien Périer, see Voet, *The Golden Compasses*, 178-186.

[16] See for instance the printer's devise on the title-page of Louis Savot, *De Tetragoni Hippocratici significatione contra chymicos observatio* (Paris: ex Officina Plantiniana, apud Hadrianum Perier, 1609).

[17] The title page of the work by Savot in the former footnote already has the damage, but it is most clearly visible on the title page of Jean Savaron, *Traicté contre les duels. Avec l'Edict de Philippes le Bel, de l'an M.CCC.VI. non encores imprimé* (Paris: Adrien Périer, 1610). Two copies available on Google Books.

[18] Gabriel Naudé, *Bibliographia Politica* (Venice: Francesco Baba, 1633), 47; Allacci, *Apes Urbanae*, 116. See also Pintard, *Libertinage érudit*, 614-615.

Naudé's lifetime even led the British historian David Wootton to postulate a posthumous publication of the *Considérations politiques* between 1653 and 1659.[19] It is indeed striking that there probably has been little or no attestable reception of the work during Naudé's lifetime. In the learned correspondence of Parisian circles there seems to have been no reference to or debate about the publication of a work on *coups d'état* before Naudé's demise.[20] In fact, as yet we have no evidence that anyone in the learned community of Paris knew of the work's existence before the late 1650s. For all we know Louis Jacob was the first to signal the existence of the 'Rome, 1639' edition among Naudé's publications in the 1659 *Gabrielis Naudaei Tumulus*.[21]

As far as I can tell, there is only one trace of a possible (manuscript) circulation and it points to an early reception of the work among German men of letters. In a letter signed 30 November 1655 to Johann Conrad Dieterich, professor of history and librarian at the University of Giessen, the German nobleman Johann Christian von Boineburg, who was a great admirer of Naudé[22] as a bibliophile and as a writer on politics and military science, spoke of a "Manuscr. libellum Gall. Naudaei, des Coups d'Estat."[23] The letter indicates that by 1655 Boineburg was aware of the existence of the *Considérations politiques* and perhaps has seen a manuscript copy of the work. The fact that he referred to a French manuscript and gave part of the title 'coups d'estat' precludes that Boineburg inferred the existence of such a work from the information Naudé provided in the *Syntagma de studio militari* and the *Bibliographia politica*. In his correspondence with Dieterich, but also in his epistolary exchanges with Hermann Conring[24], another eminent German professor,

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[19] Wootton, "From Fortune to Feedback", 46-49.

[20] In none of the edited correspondences of friends and contemporaries one finds any such reference. Neither the Dupuy brothers, Nicolas Fabri de Peiresc, Jean-Jacques Bouchard, Fortin de la Hoguette, Hugo Grotius, nor Marin Mersenne referred to the work in the period between the 1630s and the 1650s.

[21] Louis Jacob, *Gabrielis Naudaei Tumulus, complectens elogia, epitaphia, carmina tum Latina, tum Gallica variorum Cl. Virorum* (Paris: Claude Cramoisy, 1659), 108.

[22] Boineburg even counted Naudé's *Advis pour dresser une bibliotheque* amongst the favourite books in his extensive private library. Boineburg to Dieterich, "G. Naudaei liber de instr. bibl. mihi in primis carus est, remitte igitur eum proxime." Johann Christian von Boineburg (ed. Rudolph Meelführer), *Epistolae ad Jo. Conradum Dietericum* (Nurnberg: W. Michaellis, J.A. Schwobach, M. Hagen, 1703), 246. See also, Kathrin Paasch, *Die Bibliothek des Johann Christian von Boineburg (1622-1672) Ein Beitrag zur Bibliotheksgeschichte des Polyhistorismus* (Berlin: Berliner Arbeiten zur Bibliothekswissenschaft, 16, 2005), 80.

[23] "Quanquam non omnia ex aequo praecellunt, quae tradit, plurima tamen inde bona sensa, vere pragmatica, erui possunt. Clapmari adde, Manuscr. libellum Gall. Naudaei, des Coups d'Estat. Etsi hoc argumentum de arcanis Imperiorum nondum sit satis accurate explicatum." Boineburg, *Epistolae*, 187. In the same context (p. 186) Boineburg gave the following positive judgment of Rohan's *De l'Interest*: "Rohanii stativa statuum Europae digna lectu et consideratu est".

[24] In his bibliographical work on the Wolfenbuttel library Herman Conring (1606-1681) praised the incomparable skills of his late friend and librarian of the Bibliotheque Mazarine, Gabriel Naudé. Especially Naudé's catalogue of Jean Descordes' library, that was to serve as the foundation for the cardinal's library in 1643, merits the German professors' high praise. "In hos usus vero omnino videtur publicatus Index Bibliothecae amplissimae Cordesianae, cura incomparabilis illius condendarum Bibliothecarum artificis, et desiderandae mihi semper memoriae amici, Gabrielis Naudaei: nisi malis editum magis in id, quo inveniret emptorem, cum ab obitu demum Cordesij sit excusus; quemadmodum et non multo post insigne quasi fundamentum jecit Mazarinianae Bibliothecae longe omnium in Gallijs instructissimae absolutissimaeque." Herman Conring, *De Bibliotheca Augusta, quae est in arce Wolfenbuttelensi ad illustr. et generosum Joannem*

Boineburg gives high praise of Naudé's work. He especially lauded the utility of the *Bibliographia Politica* and the *Syntagma de studio military* for the study of politics and military matters.[25] In 1660 Boineburg discussed contemporary French political thought with Conring and cited the abovementioned works by Naudé. Furthermore, he referred to a number of manuscripts by this author's hand, of which only a few were published.[26] This statement could suggests that by 1660 Boineburg not only knew of a manuscript treatise on *coups d'état*, but was also aware that such a book might have been printed. Perhaps he had learned about it from the bibliography that Louis Jacob provided with the *Naudaei Tumulus.* Even though this talk of a French manuscript does not tell us much about the publication date of the work, the German bibliophile's letter is the earliest reference to the work found to date.

Evidence of a readership was to come to the surface even later. Such a reference to the *Considérations politiques* is found in the *Recueil de Particularitez*, an *ana* of sorts by Paul Colomiès written in 1665.[27] Colomiès reported that he had learned from Louis Jacob that Naudé was the author of the book by that title and that instead of twelve more than a hundred copies were printed in 1639. He also started a curious rumour that the work was written upon commission, to which we shall come back later. In a letter by Guy Patin to Charles Spon of October 1667, the dean of the medical faculty of the University of Paris discussed the latter's concerns with the work.[28] Then a few years later Pierre Bayle spoke of the work in a letter to his brother Jacob.[29]

Christianum L. Bar. A Boineburg Epistola, quae simul de omni re Bibliothecaria disseritur (Helmstadt: Henning Müller, 1661), 13.

[25] Boineburg to Conring, 12 April 1660, the correspondence between Boineburg and Conring is collected in Johann Daniel Gruber, *Commercii epistolici Leibnitiani, ad omne genus eruditionis, praesertim vero ad illustrandam integri propemodum seculi historiam literariam apprime facientis*, Tomus prodromus, *qui totus est Boineburgicus* (Hannover and Gottingen: Schmidt brothers, 1745), 335-336.

[26] Boineburg to Conring, 12 April 1660. "In Gallia parem Politica studia hodie accurationem experiri, aut a quoquam excoli similibus meditamentis, profecto mihi ignotum est; etsi in talia, cum nuper istic forem, abunde inquisierim. Praeter suum Bodinum Galli ne nunc quidem habent, quem opponere aliorum in Civilis Rei pertractione praestantiae ac fiduciae possint. Nisi fors quis Silhonium Naudaeumque in contentionem advocare ausit. Quorum tamen cum hic, si syntagma de militari studio et *paucula Mscta hactenus inedita excipias, vel nihil vel per ediderit parum*; ille autem, iuxta cum reliquo vulgo Gallicano scripturiente, utcunque paullo exactius, sese intra modum singularium modo praeceptionum continuerit." (Italics JS) Gruber, *Commercii epistolici Leibnitiani, ad omne genus eruditionis*, 335-336.

[27] Paul Colomiès, *Recueil de Particularitez, fait l'an M.DC.LXV,* in *Pauli Colomesii Opuscula* (Paris: Sebastien Marbre-Cramoisy, 1668), 124-125.

[28] Patin to Charles Spon, 17 October 1667. Patin [Capron (ed.)], *Correspondance française de Guy Patin*, online.

[29] "Je tiens Mr de La Mothe Le Vayer et Mr Naudé pour les 2 savants de ce siècle qui avoient le plus de lecture et l'esprit le plus épuré des sentiments populaires, mais parce qu'ils font trop les esprits forts, ils nous débitent bien souvent des doctrines qui ont de périlleuses conséquences. Mr Naudé dans son Apologie des grands hommes [accusez] de magie, conclut presque à nier toute sorte de sorcelleries et cela irait bien loin qui le voudrait pousser. Dans un autre livre qu'il a fait, sur les coups d'état, il fait une longue liste de tous les fins politiques qui ont acquis du crédit par la persuasion qu'on avait qu'ils conféraient avec Dieu. Peu s'en faut qu'il ne mette notre Moïse à leur tête, et cela avec un adoucissement si mince en faveur de la foi, que les consciences timorées en crieraient volontiers au meurtre et au blasphème. Dans ce livre il établit les plus pernicieuses maximes de Machiavel, et il a raison de dire que tout le monde les condamne, mais que presque tous les souverains les pratiquent. Je vous assure que ce livre n'est guère chrétien, et Mr Naudé

Except for Colomiès' account, this evidence of the *Considérations*' reception coincides with the 1667 publication of the Elzevier edition – and therefore seemingly has less to do with the 'Rome, 1639' edition.[30] Probably the print run of the 1667 edition was considerably larger than the estimated 100 copies of the *editio princeps*, which augmented the work's dispersion.[31]

It seems plausible that the reception of the work only truly commenced with the 1667 edition of the *Considérations politiques*. Again evidence is mostly found in the German lands. The Elzevier edition must have prompted Christian von Ryssel (1621-1689), to render it more accessible to a German public.[32] It is clear that the 1667 edition was the model for the German translation.[33] The first translation of Naudé's treatise appeared one year after the Elzevier edition and the political treatise soon became a topic for refutation at German universities. Especially in Leipzig, where the translation was published, the book was discussed at the university. In one of his first lectures as professor of moral and political philosophy Otto Mencke refuted Naudé's political thought. The oration with the title *De Gabrielis Naudaei considerationibus politicis super arcana status*, *libro errorum Machiavellicorum plenissimo* was published in 1669.[34] Several years later, a doctoral thesis was defended by the title *Prudentia, inprimis politica vera, contra Gabrielem Naudaeum*.[35] In the early eighteenth century, another doctoral student graduated upon Naudé's political thought in Leipzig. This Friedrich Gladov translated the *Considérations politiques* into Latin, provided explanatory footnotes and, contrary to earlier evaluations, wrote a preface in which he

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a eu raison de mettre dans les premières pages ces vers de Lucrece *Illud in his rebus vereor ne forte rearis / Impia te rationis inire elementa, viamque / Endugredi sceleris*." Letter 105: Pierre Bayle to Jacob Bayle [Paris,] Sunday 21 July 1675. Bayle, *Correspondance de Pierre Bayle*, online. "One thing I fear in this matter, that in this your apprenticeship to philosophy you may perhaps see impiety, and the entering on a path of crime" LCL 181, 8-9.

[30] See Appendix 4 Publication history Naudé.

[31] Of the 1667 Elzevier edition a few dozen copies survive, while the number of 6 surviving copies of the 'Rome, 1639' edition corroborates with a print run of 100 copies. While there is no rule of thumb for calculating the number of copies an estimation of 500 – 1000 copies for the 1667 edition seems probable.

[32] The little information about Von Ryssel that can be found shows him to have been a translator and *Kammerrat* – leading member of the financial administration – at the Brandenburg court in Bayreuth. See Sigmund von Birken (Klaus Garber, Christoph Hendel, and Hartmut Laufhütte eds.), *Werke und Korrespondenz* Band 2/I: Texte (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2014), 859.

[33] Certainty that is provided by the preface to the reader in which the translator speaks of the Latin quotations in the original text and their French translations at the bottom of the page. In the 'Rome, 1639' edition no French translations to the Latin quotations are given; these were only added by the editor of the Elzevier edition in 1667. "In dem Frantzoisischen hat man die angezogenen Lateinischen Sprache in ihrer Ordnung gelassen und die Ubersetzung unten dran gehencket." *Gabriel Naudæens Politisches Bedencken über die Staats-streiche* (Leipzig: Schür-und Götzischen Erben, Johann Fritsch and Johann Köhler, 1668) "Dem Leser zur Nachricht" [no pagination].

[34] Otto Mencke, *De Gabrielis Naudaei considerationibus politicis super arcana status*, *libro errorum Machiavellicorum plenissimo* (Leipzig, 1669). I could not find this document, however it is mentioned by Johann Ezler (see next footnote) and more recently by A.H. Laeven. See, A.H. Laeven, *The "Acta eruditorum" under the editorship of Otto Mencke (1644-1707): the history of an international learned journal between 1682 and 1707* (Amsterdam: APA-Holland University Press, 1990), 233.

[35] Johann Gottlieb Ezler, *Prudentia, inprimis politica vera, contra Gabrielem Naudaeum.* Diss. sub praesidio Johannis Cypriani. (Leipzig: Christian Götzl, 1683).

defended Naudé's political argumentation.[36] An English translation by William King appeared in London around the same time as Gladov's Latin edition. Like the German translation, it is unmistakeably modelled upon the Elzevier edition, not the 'Rome, 1639' edition.[37] In France and the Dutch Republic of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century the reception of Naudé's work seems intimately related to the growing rumours on and eventual surfacing of the *Traité des Trois Imposteurs*.[38]

A reception of the work during the erudite bibliophile's lifetime seems to have been precluded by the author's own reservations to communicate the work to a wider public. It is true that whenever Naudé himself referred to the *Considérations politiques* in other works, he referred to a treatise in manuscript form. His earliest reference to the work is found in the *Bibliographia politica* (1633) wherein after discussing *raison d'état* authors as Clapmarius and Bonaventura, Naudé said that he "wrote a treatise [on these true secrets of the republic] last year that I am sure will not disagree with amateurs of political doctrine."[39] In the *Syntagma de studio militari* of 1637 he referred to a really weighty disquisition (*disceptatione certe gravissima*) on secrets of state (*imperiorum Arcanis*).[40] Finally, in an autograph letter to Mazarin written soon after Cardinal Richelieu's demise on 4 December 1642, Naudé told his new patron of a book on *coups d'état* by his hand that "once published will be far greater (*beaucoup plus gros*) than the Prince [by Balzac] or the Minister [by Silhon]."[41]

Interestingly, in this letter Naudé contradicts the story found in the preface to the *Considérations politiques* of the need for a limited print run of twelve copies to fulfil Cardinal di Bagno's wishes. As this foreword would have it the prelate disliked reading manuscripts.[42] This

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[36] Friedrich Gladov, *Gabrielis Naudæi Parisini Bibliographia politica et Arcana Status, cum notis et observationibus literario-criticis, quæ auctorem, partim illustrant, partim supplent, partim corrigunt. Præmissa Præfatione apologetica, in qua Naudæus à variis liberatur imputationibus* (Leipzig: Christoph Hüls, 1712).

[37] The "Preface of the Publisher to the Reader" is a verbatim translation of the preface that was only added by the editor of the Elzevier edition in 1667. See, Gabriel Naudé, *Political considerations upon refin'd politicks: and the master-strokes of state, as practis'd by the ancients and moderns. Written by Gabriel Naudé, and inscrib'd to the Cardinal Bagni. Translated into English by Dr. King* (London: H. Clements, 1711), 1-2.

[38] Berti, "*L'Esprit de Spinosa*", 3-51.

[39] "unusquisque tantum ex illo [Federico Bonaventura, Ludovico Settala, and Tito Corneo] sumere potest, quantum illi opus erit ad tutius et copiosius philosophandum de veris rerumpublicarum arcanis, de quibus et nos tractationem illam anno superiore accuravimus, quam aliquando politicae doctrinae studiosis haud ingratam fore iniucundamve confido." Naudé, *Bibliographia politica*, 47. From the 1641 edition of this text onwards *tractationem* 'treatise' becomes *contractionem*, which means so much as 'abridgment'. In the French translation that was published by Challine in close collaboration with Naudé, however, it is simply rendered 'traité'. Naudé, *Bibliographie politique*, 61.

[40] Gabriel Naudé, *Syntagma de studio militari* (Rome: Giaccomo Facciotti, 1637), 2.

[41] This autograph letter, still found in the BnF archives (BnF, Fr. 10222), was first published by Albert Franklin in 1870. Gabriel Naudé (ed. A. Franklin), *Mémoire confidentiel adressé à Mazarin par Gabriel Naudé après la mort de Richelieu* (Paris: L. Willem, 1870), 8.

[42] "Aussi n'est-ce pas pour rendre cét ouvrage public qu'il a esté mis sous la presse; elle n'a roulé que par le commandement, et pour la satisfaction de ce grand Prelat, qui n'a ses lectures agreables que dans la facilité des livres imprimez. Et qui pour cette cause a voulu tirer une douzaine d'exemplaires de celui-cy, au lieu

story is not problematic in itself. As Wootton remarked, this aversion could be explained by the status as well as the weak health of the cardinal. However, in the seventeenth century there were other more common answers to that problem than the solution of a limited print run. In the letter to Mazarin an answer is provided that would have been more probable in the context of the age.[43] In these political confessions Naudé related his new patron the event of presenting the manuscript to Di Bagno, saying that the cardinal took time on several occasions to have the *Considérations* read to him (*s'en faire lire*) in his residence in Castel Gandolfo. The work did not displease the cardinal but he was apparently astonished by the audacity of the work and for this reason Naudé abstained from publishing and circulating the work to the day the author addressed Mazarin. On his own report he only gave the manuscript to Jacques Bouchard, confident that this friend would not disperse the work further. It is with the commentary of Bouchard, Naudé described in December 1642, he still kept the manuscript.[44]

Peter S. Donaldson interpreted the letter to Mazarin as part of a construction that would place the responsibility for an edition of the *Considérations politiques* with the forgery on the title-page on Bouchard. According to the American historian, Naudé had the book printed at the Plantin press in the early forties and concocted the story he told Mazarin to deny responsibility.[45] Wootton believes the lack of evidence indicating a reception in the early 1640s would rather confirm the veracity of Naudé's report in the letter to Mazarin, which would mean that in 1642 the book existed only in manuscript and, Wootton suggests, would remain so until after the author's demise in July 1653.[46] I think, however, to have enough evidence that corresponds to a hypothesis of a publication sometime in the 1640s, possibly no earlier than 1648.

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des copies manuscrites qu'il en faudroit faire." Naudé, *Considérations politiques* (Rome, 1639) preface to the reader [no pagination].

[43] David Wootton reminds us that reading manuscripts were an "almost inescapable fact of life" in the seventeenth century. The most common way for the rich to avoid reading handwritten texts would rather be to have a manuscript read aloud than to order a small print run. David Wootton, "From Fortune to Feedback", 46-49.

[44] "Et l'ayant ensuite présenté à mon dit seigneur cardinal Bagni, lors que son divertissement il était à Castel Gandolfo, il eut bien la patience de s'en faire lire à diverses fois les principaux chapitres, qui ne lui déplurent pas. Mais d'autant qu'il s'étonna de la hardiesse, quoique réglée et fortement appuyée de la raison, avec laquelle je les avais traité, je n'ai point voulu depuis ce temps-là communiquer cette pièce, sinon à Mr Bouchard, homme très exact en ses jugements, lequel à cause de l'amitié particulière qu'il me portait, prit la peine de la lire toute entière et de m'en dire son avis, lequel je conserve avec ledit manuscrit, pour le placer quelque jour entre ceux de V.E." Naudé, *Mémoire confidentiel*, 10-12.

[45] Donaldson, *Machiavelli and Mystery of State*, 160-165.

[46] Wootton even goes so far as to argue that the *Considérations politiques* printed in the 1650s differed considerably from the original treatise written by Naudé and the work can therefore not be read as genuinely his. According to this scholar, an unknown editor probably from the Dutch Republic rewrote Naudé's manuscript. Wootton's argument is mainly based on the examples Naudé mentions in the letter – the *coups* of the Sicilian Vespers, of 1572, of the conversion of Henry IV, and the execution of Concini – that according to the scholar are not found in the edited text. I disagree, all these examples can be found in the work, albeit that none of them is as extensively worked out as the famous example of the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre.

Now let us return to the mid seventeenth-century Parisian world of print. We left our query on the Rue Saint-Jacques, the grand artery of the neighbourhood of printers and booksellers of the era in the vicinity of the University of Paris. We saw that upon the death of Adrien Périer his shop on this famous street at the 'Compas d'Or' that for thirty years had been loosely established as a Parisian *Officina Plantiniana* closed. As there were no longer any direct relations to the Plantin-Moretus press the official stamps might not have been returned to Antwerp as Frans van Ravelingen did when he liquidated the Leiden office.[47] The liquidation of Périer's bookshop was probably handled by Sebastien Cramoisy, "the king of the Rue Saint-Jacques", one of the most influential Parisian printers at the time, who had at least once mediated in a conflict to which Périer was one of the parties.[48] Could it be possible that Cramoisy had gotten hold of the Plantin device and printed the *Considérations* with that printer's mark on the title page sometime in the 1640s?

Prima facie, this seems improbable as Cramoisy is never known to have used the 'golden compass' device. And yet, as Naudé and Cramoisy collaborated multiple times in the 1640s, including in the publication of the *Mascurat*,[49] it would make sense to further our investigation with this printer. Just as the place and date, the Plantin printer's mark would then have been used to dissimulate the presses the work originated from. Furthermore, it can hardly be called a coincidence that the other ornaments used in the *Considérations politiques* are found in almost every single edition published by Cramoisy in the 1640s.[50] In fact, we soon stumble upon many publications to which some connection with Naudé can be made. For instance, if we look at the life of Nicolas Fabri de Peiresc as recounted by Pierre Gassendi and printed by Sebastien Cramoisy in 1641, this volume contains an ornament similar to the one heading the dedication to Cardinal di Bagno in the *Considérations politiques*. The same ornaments can be identified at the head of the letter Naudé wrote at the occasion of Pereisc's demise adjoined to Gassendi's *Vita* (Fig. 3). Yet

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[47] The only printer with strong business relations with the Plantin-Moretus house in Antwerp was Claude Sonnius. Sonnius seemingly moved into Périer's shop at the Compas d'Or. While Sonnius used one of the ornaments in the *Considérations politiques* – the line of roses – he never seems to have used Périer's stamp of the Plantin device.

[48] Henri-Jean Martin, *Livre, pouvoirs et société à Paris au XVIIe siècle (1598-1701). Tome I.* (Genève: Librairie Droz, 1984), 332-333.

[49] For the *Mascurat*, see below. Other works the Parisian printer and *érudit* collaborated on include: Adam Blackwood (ed. Gabriel Naudé), *Adami Blacvodaei ... Opera omnia* (Paris: Sébastien and Gabriel Cramoisy, 1644); Giovanni-Battista Doni (ed. Gabriel Naudé), *Dissertatio de utraque paenula* (Paris: Sébastien and Gabriel Cramoisy, 1644); Leone Allacci, *De Libris et rebus Ecclesiasticis Graecorum, dissertationes et observationes variae* (Paris: Sébastien and Gabriel Cramoisy, 1644-45-46); Gabriel Naudé, *Panegyricus dictus Urbano VIII. Ob beneficia ab ipso in Thom. Campanellam collata* (Paris: Sébastien and Gabriel Cramoisy, 1644); Jacques Goupyl (ed. Gabriel Naudé), *In epistolam divi Pauli ad Titum paraphrasis* (Paris: Sébastien and Gabriel Cramoisy, 1644); Girolamo Rorario, *Quod Animalia bruta ratione utantur melius homine* (Paris: Sébastien and Gabriel Cramoisy, 1648). All of these works Naudé edited and published with the help of Cramoisy contain (some of) the same ornaments.

[50] Results of the query 'Cramoisy' in the Heritage of the Printed Book database to identify Cramoisy prints from 1639 onwards.

another Cramoisy publication, a book by Leone Allacci dedicated to Naudé – and probably published through his intervention – has the third ornamental piece that is used in the *Considérations politiques* underneath the 'Table des Chapitres' (Fig. 4).[51] Furthermore, the fleurons – a line of roses – heading every new chapter of Naudé's political treatise is also often used in editions by the *Imprimerie royale*, which was directed by Sébastien Cramoisy from 1640 onwards (Fig. 5).[52] Finally, could it be happenstance that the last page of the *Mascurat* has the same 'triple rose' fleuron as found underneath what can be called the 'Printer's disclaimer' in the *Considérations politiques* (Fig. 6)?[53]

The connection to the Cramoisy printing business can be reinforced, for the Plantin printer's device was to resurface in the 1670s on presses with strong relations to the Cramoisy family. During his long career as a printer (1600-1669) Cramoisy did not oversee the printing process of all the works himself. He closely collaborated with Edme Martin, whose son Edme II was also to work for Cramoisy and married his niece, Marie-Thérèse Cramoisy.[54] Now it is in the editions of this niece, widowed in 1670, that our device re-emerged. The widow of Edme II Martin and her son Gabriel printed a number of works from 1671 onwards with this device on the title page.[55] These title pages all contain the 'Compas d'Or' mark for which Périer's stamp must have been

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[51] Allacci, *De libris et rebus ecclesiasticis Graecorum*, 106 and (imperfectly) 351.

[52] Martin, *Livre, pouvoirs et société*, I: 339-342, 467-471. The editions from the Imprimerie Royale / Typographia Regia that were printed in the 1640s and 1650s under the care of Cramoisy often contain this single line of roses. See for instance, the headings in the edition of Cardinal Richelieu's *Les principaux poincts de la foy catholique* (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1642); in the edition of *Novum Jesu Christi Testamentum, Vulgatae Editionis, Sixti V. Pont. Max. iussu recognitum, atque editum* (Paris: E Typographia Regia, Cramoisy, 1649); and in Philippe Labbé's *Notitia Dignitatum Imperii Romani* (Paris: E Typographia Regia, Cramoisy, 1651).

[53] Anonymous [G. Naudé], *Ivgement de tovt ce qvi a esté imprimé contre le Cardinal Mazarin, Depuis le sixiéme Ianuier, iusques à la Declaration du premier Auril mil six cens quarante-neuf* (s.l.d. [Paris, 1650]), 717 (= 492 in the first edition). Further references to this text will be like this: Naudé, *Mascurat*, p. All references will be made to the second edition of the *Mascurat*, but whenever the passages referred to are added in the second edition this will be shown by [= *absent on p.*]. Thereby I refer to the page numbers where I found the revisions in the second edition and in square brackets indicate the specific passage in the first edition in which the particular addition is absent. If one wants to consult the specific passage, see Appendix 5. On the left margin the page numbers in the first edition are given. Therefore, to easily find the place where revisions were made, look for the numbers indicated in italics between the square brackets in the footnotes to this chapter.

[54] On the Martin family and their work for Cramoisy, see Henri Jean Martin, *Livre, pouvoirs et société*, I: 374-475, 403-404, 413, 416, 468. See also the entries devoted to the different member of the Martin family on the website of CERL Thesaurus *accessing the record of Europe's printed heritage* at URL: https://thesaurus.cerl.org

[55] Cf. the title pages of these works printed by the widow of Edme II Martin and her eldest son Gabriel Martin, Jean de Launoy, *Remarques sur la dissertation, où l'on montre en quel temps, et pour quelles raisons l'Eglise universelle consentit à recevoir le Baptesme des heretiques; et par où l'on découvre ce qui a donné occasion aux Auteurs, qui ont traité de cette matiere, de s'estre égarez dans la recherche qu'ils ont faite du Concile plenier, qui termina suivant S. Augustin cette contestation* (1671); Jean de Launoy, *De vera notione plenarii apud Augustinum Concilii in causa Rebaptizantium, Dissertatio* (1676); Gilles Ménage, *Juris civilis amoenitates* (Paris: Gabriel Martin, 1677); Pierre Chiflet, *Bedae presbyteri et Fredegarii scholastici concordia ad senioris Dagoberti definiendam monarchiae periodum, atque ad primae totius Regum Francorum stirpis chronologiam stabiliendam* (1681).

used, the same as was employed in the printing process of the *Considérations politiques* for it displays the same fissure on the upper side of the device.[56] Edme II and his father do not seem to have used the mark, neither in Cramoisy nor their own independent editions, but it is well possible that the stamp was in the possession of someone associated to the Cramoisy printing business. Although absolute proof is scarcely found, this evidence seems to point in the direction of Sebastien Cramoisy as the printer-bookseller responsible, directly or indirectly through his associates, for the publication of Naudé's *Considérations politiques sur les coups d'Estat*.



A MONSEIGNEVR
L'EMINENTISSIME
CARDINAL DE BAGNI,
MON TRES-BON
ET TRES-HONORE' MAISTRE.

Non equidem hoc studeo, bullatis vt mihi nugis Pers. Sat.
Pagina turgescat, dare pondus idonea fumo,
Secreti loquimur, tibi nunc hortante Camœna,
Excutienda damus præcordia.

MONSEIGNEVR,
Puis que vous estes maintenant à Rome, ioüissant des honneurs qui seruent de recompense à vos merites, & viuant dans le repos que les fonctions publiques heureusement exercées en sept Gouuernements, vne Vice-Legation & deux Nonciatures vous y ont acquis : Ie n'ay pas crû pouuoir mieux employer le loisir duquel vostre bien-veillance & vostre bonté extraordinaire, m'y font pareillement ioüir, qu'en vous entre-

A

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GABRIELIS NAVDÆI
AD PETRVM GASSENDVM
DE PEIRESKII OBITV
EPISTOLA.

PROVOCATVS non semel obseruationibus Astronomicis, quarum per me copiam fieri voluisti celeberrimis hominibus Fortunio Liceto, & Scipioni Claromontio; ac literis tuis insuper ad officium mutuæ necessitudinis, quæ dudum inter nos arctissimè coaluit, sollicitatus; peramanter omninò te facere intellexi, qui me tamdiu silentio vsum fuisse, quæ tua est singularis humanitas, & beneuolentia, non molestè tulisti; latisque amori nostro, & singulari meo in te obsequio factum fuisse existimasti; si dum vrgebam Syntagma meum de *Studio Militari*, hoc interim spatio nihil ad tuas responsi dederim; nisi quòd amantissimo vtriusque nostrûm clarissimo PERESCIO frequenter significabam, me, cùm per otium liceret, talem habituram rationem eorum omnium, de quibus egisti mecum per literas, vt ne quidem de suauissimâ tuâ vrbanitate queri posses; quòd illa non similibus à me locis, ac salibus excepta fuerit, & facetiarum colludio, gratissimâque vicissitudine compensata. Sed, heu rerum vices, heu fata infanda, heu mors acerba, & infensa bonis omnibus, quæ gestienti lætitiæ intercessit: viro illo incomparabili, tunc cùm nihil minùs, quàm de eius occasu timebatur, è viuis sublato. Vbi enim crinitum sidus effulsit? vbi de cœlo intonuit? vbi terræ motus, & fragores

Fig. 3: Similar ornamentation in the *Considérations politiques* and the *Vita* of Pereisc (1641).



TABLE DES CHAPITRES.

OBIECTIONS *que l'on peut faire contre ce discours, auec les responses necessaires.* CHAPITRE I. Pag. 1
Quels sont proprement les Coups d'Estat, & de combien de sortes. CHAP. II. 31
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106 DE LIBR. ECCL. GRÆC. DISSERT. I.
Verumtamen cùm vetera immutat, integra obtruncat, perfecta immiscet, & de suo addit incompta atque insulta, neque cum Græcis ipsis communia, stomachum sapientibus mouit, & opus aliàs laudabile, dehonestauit.
Hi sunt Græcorum Ecclesiastici Libri, mi Naudæe, quos mihi imparato raptimque scribenti, & aliis negotiis vrgentioribus occupato, memoria suggessit. Fortè an alius quispiam excidit? Credo. Nullo id tamen fuerit illius Ecclesiæ damno, quæ præcipuos & alicuius considerationis numeratos iam habet. Si quid omissum est, id parui momenti, vel fuerit, vel in aliis, quidquid in eo continetur, insertum reperietur. Plura potuisse addi, qui in Græcorum ritibus omnino ieiunus non est, fatebitur. Hæc paucula tamen mihi visa sunt sufficere; & iam scis plures me abhinc annos in eosdem libros animaduersiones composuisse, reseruasséque mihi multo plura peculiaribus capitibus opportunius absoluenda. Vale, mi Naudæe, vale, & tui obsequentissimum ama.

Fig. 4: Similar ornamentation underneath the 'Table' of the *Considérations politiques* and Allacci's *De libris et rebus ecclesiasticis Graecorum dissertationes et observationes variae* (1644).

[56] See for instance the title page of Jean de Launoy's, *De vera notione plenarii apud Augustinum Concilii*. URL:https://books.google.nl/books?id=6l5MAAAAcAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=De+vera+notione+plenarii+apud+Augustinum+concilii+in+causa+rebaptizantium,+dissertatio.&hl=nl&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiMnZO7iJXSAhVBBcAKHZvpCgYQ6wEIHTAA#v=onepage&q&f=false



tenant des plus releuées Maximes de la Politique, & de ces grandes affaires d'Eſtat, en la conduite deſquelles V. E. a tellement fait remarquer ſa prudence, que les plus grands Genies qui gouuernent preſentement toute l'Europe, en ſont demeurez remplis d'étonnement, & n'ont iamais mieux reüſſi aux deliberations & entrepriſes les plus difficiles, que lors qu'ils les ont maniez ſuiuant les bons & genereux aduis qu'il vous a pleu de leur en donner, *Adeo*

Nil deſperandum Teucro duce, atque auſpice Teucro!

Obiections que l'on peut faire contre ce Diſcours, auec les Reponſes neceſſaires.

CHAPITRE I.

MAIS à grand peine, MONSEIGNEVR, ay-ie tracé les premieres lignes de ce Diſcours, que ie me treuue renfermé entre deux puiſſantes difficultez, capables à mon aduis d'empécher toute autre perſonne qui auroit moins de courage & d'affection que moy, de paſſer outre, & de glacer le ſang des plus échauffez à la recherche de ces Re-

HIERONYMI
IN EVANGELISTAS
AD DAMASVM.

PRÆFATIO.

NOVVM opus me facere cogis ex veteri; vt, poſt exemplaria ſcripturarum toto orbe diſperſa, quaſi quidam arbiter ſedeam; &, quia inter ſe variant, quæ ſint ea, quæ cum Græca conſentiant veritate, decernam. Pius labor, ſed periculoſa præſumptio, iudicare de cæteris, ipſum ab omnibus iudicandum: ſenis mutare linguam, & caneſcentem iam mundum ad initia retrahere paruulorum. Quis enim doctus pariter vel indoctus; cum in manus volumen aſſumpſerit, &, à ſaliua, quam ſemel imbibit, viderit diſcrepare quod lectitat, non ſtatim erumpat in vocem, me falſarium, me clamitans eſſe ſacrilegum, qui audeam aliquid, in veteribus libris, addere, mutare, corri-

Fig. 5: Fleurons heading the chapters of the *Considérations politiques* and in the Typographia Regia edition of the *Novum Jesu Christi Testamentum* (1649).



copies manuſcrites qu'il en faudroit faire. Ie ſçay bien que ce nombre eſt trop petit pour permettre que ce liure ſoit veu d'autant de perſonnes que le Prince de Balſac & le Miniſtre de Sillion. Mais comme les choſes qu'il traite ſont beaucoup plus importantes, il eſt auſſi fort à propos qu'elles ne ſoient pas ſi communes. Et en vn mot l'Autheur n'a eu autre but que la ſatisfaction de ſon Eminence, tant pour compoſer, que pour publier cét Ouurage.

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qu'il eſt ſi tard, ie croy que nous ferions mieux d'attendre à demain matin, & de ſouper où nous auons diſné; ſi tu le veux i'ay encore vn teſton à ton ſeruice, & tu m'obligeras extremement, ſinon ie ſuis ton ſeruiteur, & de bon het.

Publicè vtile eſt abſentes à quibuſcumque defendi. Nam & in capitalibus iudiciis defenſio datur; vbicumque igitur abſens quis defendi poteſt, ibi quemuis verba pro eo facientem, & innocentiam excuſantem, audire æquum eſt, & ordinarium admittere. L. ſeruum §. Publico. D. de Procuratoribus.

Cauſa cognita poſſunt multi abſolui, incognita nemo condemnari poteſt. Cicero pro Roſcio.

Fig. 6: The fleuron with the three roses underneath the 'disclaimer' in the *Considérations politiques* and on the last page of the *Mascurat*.

The question that remains, if we accept that Sebastien Cramoisy could have been involved in the printing and publication of Naudé's *Considérations politiques*, is when. Taking the erudite bibliophile's statement about his manuscript on *coups d'état* in the letter to Mazarin to be genuine, this would probably presuppose a publication in the period 1643–1644 or 1648–1652. In 1652 he left Paris for Sweden to become Queen Christina's librarian, while from late 1644 until the end of 1647 Naudé was labouring tirelessly and travelling extensively in search of books for the construction of the Bibliothèque Mazarine. Given the author's caution with the work, it seems less probable that it would have been published in his absence when he could not oversee the printing process. Publication during the *Frondes* (1648-1653) might similarly appear less probable. However, we must not forget that Naudé was able to write and publish the sizeable *Mascurat* as well as several pieces in his struggle to save the library. Besides, there is the plethora of treatises

written and edited in his conflict with the Benedictine monks over the authorship of the *Imitatio Christi*[57] in these years. Moreover, the manuscript of the *Considérations politiques* had long been completed. In fact, a post-1648 publication would seem all the more probable since upon closer look there is a strong typographical resemblance with Naudé's 1648 edition of Girolamo Rorario's *Quod Animalia bruta ratione utantur melius homine*, printed by Cramoisy (Fig. 7).[58]

While I believe that the 'Rome, 1639' edition was actually printed by Sebastien Cramoisy in Paris around 1648, more than the (circumstantial) evidence presented above I have not yet found.[59] It seems trivial, a simple *erratum* or an unsubstantiated claim at best, but Friedrich Gladov, who translated the *Considérations politiques* in Latin, in his apologetic preface referred to the *editio princeps* as printed in the year 1648.[60] Perhaps one day this claim will be substantiated further and my hypothesis corroborated.

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[57] Gabriel Naudé, *Causae Kempensis coniectio pro curia Romana* (Paris: Sebastien Cramoisy, 1651). Naudé wrote this extensive report of his query for the true author of the *Imitatio Christi*, which in his eyes was Thomas à Kempis, due to his renewed conflict with the Benedictine order. Besides the court procedure that he won, it was to be the final attempt to convince and silence the supporters of Jean Gersen as author. Other publications Naudé published and edited are: Gabriel Naudé, *Raisons peremptoires de maistre Gabriel Naudé, Demandeur en suppression d'iniures et calomnies, et defendeur en main-levée. Contre D. Placide Roussel, Robert Quatremaire, et François Valgrave, pour montrer que les IV mss. de Rome dont lesdits bénédictins se servent pour oster le livre de l'Imitation de Jesus-Christ à Thomas de Kempis, et le donner à un supposé Gersen, sont falsifiez, et qu'ils ne peuvent l'avoir esté, que par le nommé Constantin Cajetan, Religieux Benedictin, ou par quelque autre du mesme Ordre* (s.l., s.n., s.d.); Gabriel Naudé, *Velitatio prima Kempensis adversus Joannem de Launoy Constantiensem* (Paris: Edme Martin, 1651); George Heser, *Adversus pseudo-gersenistas praemonitio nova* (Paris: Sébastien and Gabriel Cramoisy, 1651) with dedication letter by Gabriel Naudé; Thomas Carre [Miles Pinkney], *Thomas de Kempis a seipso restitutus* (Paris: widow of H. Blageart, 1651) comparison between expressions and phrases from writings of Thomas à Kempis and similar extracts from *De Imitatione Christi* edited and with a letter to the reader by Naudé; and his prefaces to two short tracts by Michel Constantin and Jean Fronteau published in one volume as the *Argumenta duo nova* (Paris: Sébastien and Gabriel Cramoisy, 1651). On this quarrel, see Jean-Pierre Cavaillé, "'Une chose bien remarquable et importante à la République des Lettres': Gabriel Naudé et l'attribution frauduleuse de l' »Imitation de Jésus-Christ« à Jean Gersen", in *Comparaisons, raisons, raisons d'État. Le statut historiographique de la République des lettres dans la conceptualisation du politique XVIe- XVIIe siècles*, ed. Armelle Lefebvre (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2010), 146-177.

[58] Other editions of that year also contain most of the same ornaments. For instance, Philippe Briet's *Parallela geographiae veteris et novae* printed by Sebastien and Gabriel Cramoisy in 1648 contains all the same ornaments as the *Considérations politiques* apart from the 'line of roses'; this edition contains the 'butterfly', the 'mirrored fleurs de lys', and the 'triple rose'. The edition of Petau's *De lege et gratia libri duo* printed the same year 'at the sign of the two Storks', i.e. Cramoisy, contains all except the 'triple rose'.

[59] At this point, I cannot completely rule out a posthumous publication that Wootton postulated. Wootton, "From Fortune to Feedback", 46-49.

[60] "Properamus ergo a fata Libri, ne longe nimis excrescat nostra oratio. Gallice conscripsit *Naudaeus* sub titulo, *les Coups d'Estat a. 1648.* Cardinalique Eminentissimo de *Bagni* inscripsit. Sed exemplariorum paucitas statim raritatem causavit. Duodecim saltem impressa sunt Exemplaria. Hinc *Baro d'Boineburg in Epistola ad Conradum Dietericum a. 1666.* exarata libellum vocat Msctum Gallicum. Promerebatur tamen singularis materia ab auctore summa ἀκρίβεια pertractata, ut in multorum perveniret notitiam." Gladov, *Gabrielis Naudæi Parisini Bibliographia politica et Arcana Status*, 29.


aduersabantur, dum arma victricia Turcis inferri prohibebant, dum hæresibus fauebant, Turcis longè infestioribus. Turcæ siquidem in corpora sæuiunt, & corpora alioqui peritura: obstinatæ hęresis immortalibus animis nostris æternæ mortis laqueos nectunt. Ex Portu Naonis Calendis Martiis MD. XXXXVII.

12

Reuerendissimo, ac Illustrissimo Domino D. CHRISTOPHORO MADRVTIO Cardinali Episcopo, & Principi Tridentino ac Brixiensi.

ERAM, *Illustrissime Princeps, paucis antè diebus: vbi de Cæsare sermo habebatur, & fuit doctissimus alioqui vir, qui diceret nescire quo odore olens Christianum orbem ditionis suæ facere niteretur. haberet in se saltem quo cum Othonibus, aut Federico Ænobarbo conferri posset, monuit (fateor) mihi stomachum, dignum immortalitate Principem illis postponi: qui licèt insignes fuerint, si tamen in vnum omnes congerantur, huius magnitudini non sufficiant. itaque in mentem mihi venit animalia bruta sæpe ratione vti meliùs Homine, idque duobus libellis ostendi. quod quoniam ex aliorum contentione magis, quàm ipsum per sese cognosci, atque intelligi poterat: coactus Hominum, & Belluarum exempla contuli, in quibus recensendis nemo mihi priùs, quàm sibi succensuerit, memor haud ægrè ferre debere à me dicta quæ ipsum facere non puduerit. Tibi verò nominique tuo dicatos afferet Claudius filiorum meorum natu secundus: cùm quia in his auunculi tui, amantissimi mei, sit mentio: cui tu virtute ac dignitate successistitum quòd filiolos meos sic institui cupio, vt paternis vestigiis ambulantes, illius defuncti memoriam colant, tui viuentis seruitutem seruiant.*

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Fig. 7: Ornaments in Naudé's edition of Rorario's *Quod animalia bruta ratione utantur melius homine* (1648).

The question as to why the book would have been published in Paris by Cramoisy or associates in 1648 is even more difficult to answer. Such an answer could therefore be no more than hypothetical. In the second half of the seventeenth century rumours about the author and the origin of the *Considérations politiques* began to circulate in Paris. Apparently these rumours started with Louis Jacob, for it is to the Carmelite bibliographer that Colomiès referred when he reported them in 1665 (printed in 1668). First, the authorship of the anonymous treatise that appeared in '1639' was Naudé's. Also, the number of copies printed was more than hundred, instead of the dozen mentioned in the preface. Finally, upon Colomiès' account, Jacob told him that this book by Naudé had been commissioned by Particelli d'Émery, *surintendant des finances*, and that the dedication to Cardinal di Bagno only served as a diversion strategy.[61]

These rumours have never really been taken at face value. The eighteenth-century bibliographer Jean-Pierre Nicéron already questioned the story of composition on commission by d'Émery and so have many historians after him.[62] To be sure, while Colomiès presupposed otherwise, Di Bagno was still alive in 1639. Furthermore, this strategy would not be very effective in hiding the identity of the author, for it was widely known Naudé served this cardinal in the 1630s. Various sources, among whom Allacci and Naudé himself, confirm that Naudé had already composed the work in 1632-1633. The French historian René Pintard has shown that apart from a few emendations from around 1638 the printed treatise does indeed seem to be a text that was for the large part edited before 1633.[63] The identity of the dedicatee and commissioner of the text

[61] "J'ay appris du Père Jacob que le Livre intitulé *Considérations politiques sur les Coups d'Estat,* imprimé l'an 1639. in 4. estoit de Gabriel Naudé, qui le fit par le commandement de M. d'Emery Surintendant des Finances, et non pas par celui du Cardinal Bagny, qui était mort; à qui il parle néanmoins de temps en temps dans l'Ouvrage pour se mieux cacher. Il faut aussi remarquer qu'au lieu que dans la Préface au Lecteur, il est dit qu'il n'y a qu'une douzaine d'exemplaires de ce Livre, il y en a eu plus d'une centaine." Colomiès, *Recueil de Particularitez*, 124-125.

[62] Jean-Pierre Nicéron, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire des hommes illustres dans la république des lettres*. Tome IX (Paris: Briasson, 1729), 91.

[63] Pintard, *Libertinage érudit*, 614-615.

could nevertheless be successfully hidden by employing such a strategy. Likewise, the reported story might only refer to the print publication of the *Considérations politiques* as instigated by the wishes of Particelli d'Émery. This rumour then would mean that Naudé, who by all means was very careful with this manuscript, had spoken of or shown it to d'Émery when they crossed paths. However, no connections can be established between the men except that Particelli served the same master, Cardinal Mazarin.

What is more, similar rumours circulated in Jansenist circles. Apparently, whether it was informed by their anti-mazarine sentiment or not, there was suspicion that Naudé's book on *coups d'état* had been published upon Mazarin's demand.[64] Although it remains speculative, we cannot completely rule out instigation to print the work by someone in Mazarin's clientele or even by Mazarin himself.[65] The publication of this 'ultra-gallican' and pro-ministerial treatise would even make sense in the context of the growing tension from 1646 onwards between the French *premier ministre* and the defenders of the Gallican church on one side and the new pope in Rome and adherents of the anti-ministerial sentiment in France on the other.[66]

To conclude, based on a combination of typographical and ornamental evidence and the fate of the specific 'golden compass' device I propound the theory that the *editio princeps*, the 'Rome, 1639' edition, of Naudé's *Considérations politiques sur les coups d'Estat* was printed no earlier than 1648 by Sebastien Cramoisy and associates in Paris. Whether or not it was truly published upon the cardinal's order, the political arguments and *raison d'état* counsel provided in the work support a government as the regency government led by Mazarin. Even more than has been suggested before, this political treatise should therefore be read as a counterpart to Naudé's correspondence with Mazarin and his particular intervention in the conflicts of the *Frondes* with the *Mascurat*. It is to this grand project of refutation and political apology that we must turn now.

The *Mascurat* and its publication

Long before the pamphlet war of the *Frondes* began, Gabriel Naudé had written against and warned for the hazardous effects of libel and all other kinds of *festschriften* on public order. In

[64] The French historian Eugène Griselle reported a marginal note to the Emery rumour about the *Considérations politiques* in a collection of anonymous Jansenist *ana* (BNF ms. NAF 4333, fol. 225, v°): "faitte par le commandement du cardinal Mazarin. Naudé en est l'auteur." E. Griselle, "Silhouettes jansénistes et propos de littérature d'art et d'histoire au XVIIe siècle", *Revue d'histoire littéraire de la France* 26, no. 3 (1919): 428. On the relationship between Mazarin and the 'Jansenists', see: Bergin, *The Politics of Religion*, 181-205.

[65] André Dupin, who completed the *Bibliothèque de Droit* of Armand-Gaston Camus, argues that Naudé was advised by Mazarin to imitate Machiavelli in this work and thus commissioned it. Armand-Gaston Camus, *Lettres sur la profession d'avocat et Bibliothèque choisie des Livres de Droit, qu'il est le plus utile d'acquérir et de connaître.* Tome II (Quatrième Edition. Paris: Barnabée Warée, 1818), 59-60. I would hesitate to go further than speculating that Mazarin instigated the publication of the work that we know was already largely in existence in the early 1630s.

[66] To use the words of the French historian Frédéric Gabriel, see Chapter V below.

1620 he had strongly repudiated the pamphlets that attacked the royal favourite, the Duc de Luynes, in his *Marfore* and three years later in his *Instruction à la France* he unravelled the rumours and leaflets of the mysterious brotherhood of the *Rose Croix* to counter the danger of public disorder.[67] Years later, in the *Considérations politiques sur les coups d'Estat* he further demonstrated how political communication in the form of pamphlets and official and semi-official discourses could be both a virtue and a vice for the government of monarchies; they could generate obedience and fire up sedition and revolt.[68] In his political memoir addressed to Mazarin he had argued for the need for a strong policy of 'reputation management' by the pen and when the predicted opposition became incontrollable in the late 1640s Naudé resiliently and resolutely pointed to the merits of a *bureau de presse* in the example of the cardinal's predecessor.[69]

Always the bibliophile, Naudé started amassing the libellous pamphlets as they appeared by the dozen every day at the booksellers and pedlars on the Parisian Pont Neuf.[70] Weary as he generally was of upheaval, especially when it came to popular rebellion, Naudé was also fascinated by the storm of pamphlets. It quickly appeared to him that the pamphlets were of greatly varying kinds and styles, and that, from an impartial point of view, there was just as much variation in terms of quality. Some were simply spreading rumours and wild stories, while others were reasoned pieces arguing against the cardinal. For every sort of pamphlet there was a different audience, but what was striking to Naudé was the enormous impact these pamphlets had in the streets of Paris. If anything, all these pieces called for a rebuttal. From the start he thought it wise for the *premier ministre* and the regency government to actively seek ways to defend themselves. Like Cardinal Richelieu had done when his government came under attack in the 1620s, Mazarin had to establish a *bureau de presse* dedicated to the publication of such a great volume of pro-governmental pamphlets that it would so to speak 'satiate the market' allowing the government to regain control.[71] Recent research has revealed not so much Mazarin's long

[67] Gabriel Naudé, *Le Marfore, ou discours contre les libelles* (Paris: Louis Boulanger, 1620); idem, *Instruction à la France sur la vérité de l'Histoire des Frères de la Rose Croix*. (Paris: François Julliot, 1623).
[68] *Considérations politiques* 25-26; 174.
[69] See Naudé's *Mémoire confidentiel adressé à Mazarin* edited by A. Franklin and his letters to Mazarin in Wolfe (eds.), *Considerations politiques sur la Fronde*.
[70] In similar fashion he had been amassing encomiastic pieces. See Naudé's letters to Mazarin. In a letter of 2 September 1651 Naudé speaks of his plan to publish a collective volume of all kinds of encomiastic literature (*elogia,* poems, letters, etc.) that have been written for Mazarin through the years. Letter 17, 2 September 1651, Naudé to Mazarin. Kathrin Willis Wolfe and Philip J. Wolfe (eds.), *Considérations politiques sur la Fronde: la correspondance entre Gabriel Naudé et le Cardinal Mazarin* (Paris et al.: Papers on French Seventeenth Century Literature, 1991), 75.
[71] Jouhaud, *Mazarinades*, 21-27. See also the interesting chapter on Richelieu's censoring of the opposition in the stimulating book by Laurie Catteeuw on *raison d'état* that has recently appeared. Catteeuw, *Censures et raisons d'État*, 285-328.

assumed unwillingness to defend himself, as well as the difficult circumstances leading to a tardive response by the cardinal.[72]

The librarian and secretary to the *premier ministre*, however, was relatively quick to respond to the anti-Mazarin pamphlets with an extensive, highly learned, and rationally argued defence. Apart from his efforts to persuade Mazarin of the importance of a similar strategy of information control, Naudé decided, whether on request or on his own initiative, to write an erudite response to the *mazarinades* in the form of a dialogue between two *colporteurs* or pamphlet sellers. In the text many of the collected anti-Mazarin pamphlets were analysed and refuted, and Naudé made an attempt to provide substantiated proofs to vindicate Mazarin, for instance regarding the cardinal's descent. The voluminous book that was the result of Naudé's writing activities has generally become known under the name of the main protagonist in the dialogue, *Mascurat*.[73]

Although we lack specific evidence, it can reasonably be assumed that the author conceived of and composed the first edition of the dialogue in spring and summer 1649. Naudé's friend Guy Patin seems to have known of the project in early March, when he writes of a refutation project in general terms.[74] Precise time references in the text do not help us specify the time of composition for these are integrated in the context and setting of the dialogue, a meeting between two *colporteurs* on the day of the Declaration of the Peace of Rueil – 1 April 1649. After the first edition was published in summer 1649 the dialogue was heavily revised and augmented by Naudé in the period between late 1649 and early in the year 1650. As is clear from the original title, *Jugement de tout ce qui a esté imprimé contre le Cardinal Mazarin, depuis le sixième Janvier, jusques à la Declaration du premier Avril mil six cens quarante-neuf*, Naudé intended to give judgment on some 300 pamphlets that were published against the cardinal in the first three months of 1649. These two dates are, of course, not randomly chosen. They refer to important moments in, what in hindsight has been called the 'old' or 'parlementarian' *Fronde*. The 6th of January marks the flight of the young king and his court from Paris and the siege laid upon that

[72] See Haffemayer, "Mazarin, Information and Communication During the Fronde (1648–1653)", 386-400; idem, "Mazarin face à la Fronde des mazarinades, ou comment livrer la bataille de l'opinion en temps de révolte (1648-1653)", in Y. Sordet, P. Rebollar, S. Haffemayer (eds.), *Les Mazarinades. Nouvelles approches* (Genève: Librairie Droz, 2016), 257-274.

[73] Unless indicated otherwise whenever reference is made to the *Jugement* or *Mascurat* it is to the second enlarged edition of the text since this has become the 'standard' edition in historiography on the subject.

[74] "On imprime ici tant de fatras et de libelles à chaque jour contre le Mazarin et ceux de son parti, la plupart mauvais et chétifs, que Messieurs du Parlement ont déjà pour la deuxième fois donné arrêt contre cette effroyable quantité de libelles et ont défendu à toute sorte de gens d'en imprimer aucun sans permission de deux conseillers députés à cet effet; *sed mendicum et famelicum genus ratione non ducitur* [mais cela n'a pas mis à raison l'engeance mendiante et famélique]. Les colporteurs, crieurs de gazette et imprimeurs se garderont bien d'y obéir tant qu'ils trouveront des gens curieux de toutes ces nouveautés. On ramassera toutes les bonnes pièces, *abiectis et reiectis aliis deterioris notæ* [triées d'avec les autres plus mauvaises qui seront rejetées et écartées], desquelles on fera un volume in-4°, ou même in-f° si les bonnes vont à un tel nombre, comme il pourra arriver si le mauvais temps dure. Il y en a déjà environ 150, mais je ne crois point que le tiers en mérite l'impression." Patin to Charles Spon, 20 March 1649, Patin [Capron (ed.)] *Correspondance française de Guy Patin*, online.

same city by the troops of the victorious Prince de Condé. This not only started suffering for the people in Paris by the blockade, but also armed conflict in the south of the Île-de-France. On 1 April 1649 the Peace of Rueil/Saint-Germain, negotiated and signed by the protagonists at Rueil, was officially declared in the *Parlement*, thus marking the end of the 'old' *Fronde*.

Among the about 6.000 *mazarinades* that were to appear during the cardinal's ministry and the period of the *Frondes* in particular (1648-1653), Naudé's *Jugement de tout ce qui a esté imprimé contre le cardinal Mazarin* is evidently the odd-one out. For its size and apologetic content – roughly one-tenth of the *mazarinades* were defensive pieces (550), of which some 400 were official publications – the book can probably only be compared to Silhon's *Esclaircissement* and, less perfectly, to the manuscript *Les Crimes du Cardinal* that remained unpublished.[75] Next to other *mazarinades*, which were virtually all printed *in quarto* and counted no more than four and occasionally twenty pages, the *Mascurat* can hardly be called a pamphlet.[76] While the *Crimes du Cardinal* was a densely argued defence of the cardinal's governing practices under an intentionally distracting heading, the *Esclaircissement* and Naudé's *Jugement* were more straightforwardly defensive in nature. Contrary to the two other pieces, however, the dialogical form of the *Mascurat*, albeit leading in a pro-Mazarine direction, left the final decision more to the reader.

Compared to the *Considérations politiques*, the publication history of the *Mascurat* is not so enigmatic. Naudé's political apology of Cardinal Mazarin was published anonymously, without any reference to the author as had been the case in earlier publications. No date or place of publication can be found on the title-page either, but as has been argued before by the French scholar of the *mazarinades* and the Parisian printing press Hubert Carrier we clearly deal with a Cramoisy edition.[77] The typography and the *fleurons* on the final page strongly point in the direction of the presses of Sébastien Cramoisy, printer to the king, and his family. Furthermore, Naudé writes on several occasions to Mazarin with references that obviously suggest a direct relationship between editions of the *Mascurat* and the presses of Cramoisy.[78]

Two different editions of an initially already weighty work were published within one year, the first in August 1649 and the second probably in spring 1650. In a first limited edition of the

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[75] Jean de Silhon, *Esclaircissement de quelques difficultez touchant l'administration du Cardinal Mazarin* (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1650); Anonymous (Hugues de Lionne, Cardinal Jules Mazarin), *Les crimes du Cardinal*, in M. Laurain-Portemer, *Études mazarines 2. Une tête à gouverner quatre empires* (Paris; Nogent-le-Roi: Librairie des arts et métiers, 1997), 945-1002. For the figures, see Haffemayer, "Mazarin face à la Fronde des mazarinades", 257-274.
[76] Jouhaud, *Mazarinades,* 19-21.
[77] Carrier does not substantiate the claim further than urging it was Cramoisy who printed the work. Carrier, *La presse de la Fronde (1648-1653). II: Les hommes du livre*, 127-130, 192-197.
[78] See letters 15 and 17 in the *Considérations politiques sur la Fronde*.

text (250 copies) *in quarto* that was printed in late summer of 1649 by Cramoisy and dispersed among friends and confidants as well as Mazarin himself, it already counted 493 pages, including one page of *errata*. The limited print run might indicate something about the controversial nature of the publication, because it was common practice among scholars first to await their friends' reactions to a potentially controversial work before dispersing it among a wider public. Among the many examples we for instance find Grotius dispersing a limited print edition of his *Annotata ad Consultationem Cassandri* among a small group of friends and consulting them before the publication in 1641.[79] Given its strong link to the contemporary events and its aim to intervene in the public discussion about Cardinal Mazarin, the *Mascurat* soon after the first edition was published required an update to match the constant twists of events during the *Frondes*. The second edition of 1650 saw hundreds of pages added to the text and amounted to 717 pages plus one page of corrections. Given the fact that this edition is far less rare today than the first edition, it is assumed that the circulation of the second edition was much larger, say a normal press run of 1000 copies.[80]

In general the editing process of the *Mascurat* can be described in quantitative and qualitative terms. For what it is worth, let us start with a quantitative appreciation of the editing process. A conscientious comparison of editions shows that in the editing process between the publication of the first and the second edition of the *Mascurat* on a total of 291 edited passages there were 212 additions to the text, 99 alterations, and 18 omissions from the original text. Expressed in general terms of volume a total of 225 pages *in quarto* were added.[81] These revisions show a wide range of differences between the two editions, from single words to passages counting over thirty pages *in quarto*. Some of these revisions are clear expressions of Naudé's insatiable quest for erudition and bibliographical paraphernalia, for instance where he adds an extra quote or alters a passage that inadvertently gave an incomplete or incorrect bibliographical description. Other edited passages introduce a digression, for example on the invention of the printing press.[82] Still others even add a new twist to the argumentation, such as the crucial introduction of the *raison d'état* argument.[83]

In qualitative terms – to anticipate the analysis of the work in the next chapter –, it seems that there are more *Considérations politiques* to be found in the second edition of the *Mascurat*

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[79] Nellen, *Hugo Grotius*, 644.
[80] According to Hubert Carrier, "La première édition du *Mascurat*, tirée à deux cent cinquante exemplaires seulement, n'était pas [...] destinée à une diffusion commerciale normale; [...] Naudé n'a fait faire ce premier tirage que pour communiquer l'ouvrage à ses amis et relations et le présenter à son patron; c'est seulement si Mazarin l'approuve qu'il sera produit au grand jour: ce sera la seconde édition, certainement tirée à un plus grand nombre d'exemplaires, car elle est nettement moins rare que la première." Carrier, *La presse de la Fronde (1648-1653). II: Les hommes du livre*, 192-197, especially 197.
[81] See Appendix 5.
[82] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 174-179 [= *absent on 133*].
[83] See Chapter V below.

compared to the first. The aura of secrecy, the need for elaborate political vindication on the basis of a mythologised genealogy, a political interpretation of justice and prudence (and force) giving insight in a complex and troubling political reality, and, finally, the emphasis on political necessities and *raison d'état* seems to mirror Naudé's earlier and more theoretical work of political thought. The consequently more forceful narrative in the second edition might actually have been prompted by the vicissitudes of the *Frondes* in the period from the winter of 1649 until the spring of 1650 and the arrest and incarceration of the Prince of Condé, as we shall see in detail in the examination of the *raison d'état* argument in the next chapter. If anything, in the editing process the *Mascurat* gained weight - the arguments as well the book as a whole. Finally, to take the inverse approach to the comparison of the first and second edition and focus on the whole body of the text that was not revised, it seems that the legal arguments prohibiting the issue of slanderous pamphlets were hardly revised. This particular argument might thus have been thought either to be sufficiently persuasive or downplayed by the stressed importance of political necessity and *raison d'état* in the second edition, together with the insight of the difficulty of censoring these pamphlets by prohibition already present in the first edition.[84]

All the revisions and emendations in spite, this did not necessarily mean that Naudé saw the second edition as absolute or finished. In the next two years of the persisting conflicts of the *Frondes* the Parisian erudite suggested to not only translate the work in Latin and German, but also to publish the *Mascurat* in cheaper and more portable editions, to abrogate the work, and to use the material it contained for other defensive pieces. Conscious of the constantly changing circumstances during the conflict, the author was probably ready to update the work yet another time. This may be implied in his statement that a new edition would raise less suspicion because it was, given its title, so intimately connected to the time of the siege of Paris (January-March 1649).[85] Such a strategy would be necessary since at the time of writing in the summer of 1651 Condé's influence in the city of Paris was at its height. In these days censorship and persecution

[84] Cf. Catteeuw, *Censures et raisons d'État*, 332-338.

[85] In his letter of 19 August 1651 Naudé discusses his efforts to assemble a *bureau de presse* for Mazarin's cause and above all the difficulty in finding qualified authors. It is in this same letter that he exhorts Mazarin to ensure that Cramoisy gives free rein ("lascha la bride") to the *Mascurat* so that he can print cheaper and more portable editions. Also he suggests that Mazarin should reprint the work in Latin and French in Germany, where the cardinal remains in exile. Furthermore he denies any ambition, but brags about the book's worth. What is very useful is that everyone knows that it was written during the time of the siege of Paris (jan-mar 1649), this would render any new edition far less suspicious. Being convinced the late cardinal Richelieu would have done the same, he proposes as well to summarize, shorten and render it in all kinds of forms, for all kinds of audiences. "Et V.E. au nom de Dieu ne s'imagine pas que je dise cela pour l'advantage de l'autheur puisqu'en ce temps cy il doibt plus craindre qu'esperer de la publication d'un tel livre, mais parce que c'est une defense toute faicte et la plus belle et plus particuliere et plus agreable à lire qui ait jamais esté faicte pour personne. Joinct qu'ayant esté faicte dès le temps du siege comme un chascun sçait elle en sera bien moins soubçonnée. Il faudroit aussy l'abreger et la mettre en toute sorte de saulces, comme il est vraysemblable que le cardinal de Richelieu auroit faict en semblable occasion." Letter 15, 19 August 1651, Naudé to Mazarin. Wolfe (eds.), *Considerations politiques sur la Fronde*, 64.

of allegedly pro-mazarine works was heaviest. No matter these impediments, it is unclear whether Naudé had actually made attempts to publish other formats of or extracts from his voluminous work when he left Paris for good in July 1652. Probably not.

Not much is known about the book's reception. An oft-cited judgment is that of Naudé's lifelong friend Guy Patin, who appreciated the lengthy book more as a pleasurable read than that it succeeded in convincing him of the cardinal's integrity. It did not. Patin wrote this upon reading the first edition as one of five confidents of Naudé who proofread the work.[86] Others like the author of one *mazarinade* ridiculed Naudé's genealogy of Mazarin's family, one of the essential pillars to his defence of the cardinal.[87] There is no evidence that Naudé, whose identity as the author apparently was widely known at any moment in the ever-changing circumstances of the *Frondes*, encountered problems as a consequence of his authorship of the *Mascurat*. Still, the book's second edition was seized upon the *Parlement*'s order. It is unclear when exactly the judges decided upon suppressing this edition, but it was probably long before the *premier ministre* mentioned this suppression in a letter to Hugues de Lionne in June 1651.[88]

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[86] Patin to Spon, 3 September 1649. "Il y a ici un livre nouveau intitulé *Jugement de tout ce qui a été imprimé contre le cardinal Mazarin depuis le 6e de janvier jusqu'à la déclaration du 1er d'avril 1649*. Le livre est de 492 pages. L'auteur est un honnête homme de mes amis, mais mazarin, qui est un parti duquel je ne puis être ni ne serai jamais […]. Là-dedans sont introduits deux vendeurs de pièces mazarines (qui est une espèce de gens qui ont bien gagné leur vie pendant les trois mois de notre guerre), l'un desquels accuse le Mazarin, et l'autre le défend chaudement et plaisamment; et combien que le sujet me déplaise, la lecture du livre ne laisse pas de m'être fort agréable, *tum ratione aucthoris, amici suavissimi, tum ratione variæ doctrinæ et multiplicitis eruditionis quæ undiquaque pellicient* [tant à cause de l'auteur, mon ami le plus doux, qu'à cause du savoir varié et de l'érudition étendue qui y séduiront de toutes parts], avec grande quantité de belles et rares curiosités que vous aimerez bien." Patin [Capron (ed.)], *Correspondance française de Guy Patin*, online.

[87] Sandricourt, *L'Accouchée Espagnole avec le caquet des politiques: ou, La suite du Politique Lutin sur les maladies de l'Estat* (Paris, 1652).

[88] "Naudé me tesmoigne grande chaleur pour mes interests, et et ayant terminé sa querelle avec les Benedictins, il fera, tres-bien, autant de livres qu'on luy dira, dans lesquels il pourroit mettre diverses choses qui sont dans son grand livre qu'on a supprimé." Letter of 14 June 1651, Mazarin to Lionne. Adolphe Cheruel, *Lettres du cardinal Mazarin pendant son Ministère.* Tome IV (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1887), 281-282.

Naudé's Use of Raison d'État in the *Considérations politiques* and the *Mascurat*

> "It is in the public interest that absent persons should be defended by someone. And defences are also granted in capital cases. Therefore, whenever a party can be defended while absent, it is only just and considered customary that someone should be heard who will maintain his innocence, and speak in his favor." Ulpian, *On the Edict*.[1]

> "People may often be acquitted when their cases have been investigated: when they have not, it is impossible to convict." Cicero, *Against Verres*.[2]

To Naudé the events of the *Frondes* must hardly have come as a surprise. On the contrary, he predicted upheaval as early as 1642-1643.[3] Although it is probably slightly coloured with ambition and perhaps a personal desire to return to Rome, in his *mémoire confidentiel* to Mazarin Naudé had already warned that disintegration of order in the French monarchy might simply be inevitable in the foreseeable future. The cardinal would do best to perform a *coup d'état* in his life; he should return to Rome and aspire Papacy. Sooner or later, in high office like the one of *premier ministre* Mazarin's non-nativity would make him vulnerable to all sorts of attacks. Naudé lays bare the mechanisms working at court and in royal government. Its artificiality, its intrigues, and its dangers, he discusses it all. Interestingly, the repatriate French *érudit* promotes himself as a qualified counsellor, since he has written extensively on these matters in the *Considérations politiques sur les coups d'état*.[4]

In spite of the fact that this counsel fell on deaf ears, Mazarin did employ Naudé as his librarian and secretary. In this office the Parisian *érudit* built one of the greatest 'public' libraries at the time. During the years of the *Frondes* Naudé stayed loyal to his patron and tried to save this "new Parnassus" as long and as well as he could. However, when, in early 1652, his lifework was destroyed and the whole collection of the Bibliothèque Mazarine dispersed he left Paris for Sweden to serve Queen Christina. Until that time, in the *Fronde des mots*, the war of pamphlets

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[1] "Publice utile est absentes a quibuscumque defendi. Nam et in capitalibus iudiciis defensio datur; ubicunque igitur absens quis defendi potest, ibi quemvis verba pro eo facientem et innocentiam excusantem, audire aequum est, et ordinarium admittere." Naudé, *Mascurat*, 492 [= 717]. This quote from Naudé is a slightly altered version (giving "igitur absens quis defendi potest" for "itaque absens quis damnari potest) text from Ulpianus 9 On the Edict in *Digest* 3.3.33.2.

[2] "Causa cognita possunt multi absolvi, incognita nemo condemnari potest" Cicero, *In Verrem*, II.1. Cicero (tr. L.H.G. Greenwood), *The Verrine Orations, Volume I: Against Caecilius. Against Verres, Part 1; Part 2, Books 1-2.* Loeb Classical Library 221 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1928), 146-147.

[3] Naudé, *Mémoire confidentiel adressé à Mazarin*, 17-18.

[4] Naudé, *Mémoire confidentiel adressé à Mazarin*, 11.

complementary to the actual fighting, Naudé laboured to collect all these *mazarinades*. These verbal attacks on the person and policy of Mazarin and the government came to be known as *mazarinades* after the homonymous poem of Scarron (*La Mazarinade*, 1651). Whether on request or instigated by himself, Naudé started to pass his judgement on these leaflets in writing. As we saw above, in two phases this became the sizeable fictional dialogue entitled *Jugement de tout ce qui a esté imprimé contre le Cardinal Mazarin, Depuis le sixième Janvier, jusques à la Déclaration du premier Avril mil six cens quarante-neuf*, hereafter referred to as the *Mascurat*. Naudé ends this long dialogue with the two quotations given above. Evidently he felt obliged to defend his patron, implying that a thorough investigation of all the allegations against Mazarin was necessary.

For many reasons Gabriel Naudé's *Mascurat* is a peculiar book. However, due to its size, its seemingly multidirectional scope, and perhaps because it is so narrowly tied to a specific historical period and political conflict, the work has received little scholarly attention. It is true that the text apparently resists univocal interpretation. As is common for Naudé's writings, the dialogue covers a wide variety of subjects apart from the main issue, a political apology of Cardinal Mazarin.[5] Too many scholars, however, have followed the judgment of one of Naudé's twentieth century biographers, James Rice, who maintained that "any analysis of the *Mascurat* is bound to be futile."[6]

Nevertheless, the dialogue has received increasing scholarly attention in recent years, albeit mainly from literary scientists.[7] For instance, Isabelle Moreau has examined the *Mascurat* in her study of fictional frameworks in the writings of *libertin* authors. Moreau analyses the way this framework creates a basis for the reader's acceptation of the authors' ideas by virtue of their probability. She has studied the extent to which the *Mascurat* succeeds in convincing readers, particularly those among the parlementarian *frondeurs*, of the need of stability in the monarchy. Naudé's point is that order can best be achieved by accepting the *raison d'état* of the government's policies; though Mazarin's government may be far from perfect, it is the best available. Moreau provides a particularly compelling analysis of Naudé's use of 'Parlementarian language'. She

[5] Its many digressions concern the literary academies in Italy, learned women, the establishment of public libraries, the invention of printing, as well as alchemy, astrology, angels and demons, the art of cultivating memory, magic etc. For an indication of the diversity of the subjects, see the useful but inevitably imperfect 4-page 'Table des Matières' that was added by the French bibliographer, Barthélemy Mercier, abbé de Saint-Léger (1734-1799). The edition including this rare table ("imprimée par les soins de Méon, et tirée seulement à 12 exemplaires") is found in the *département Réserve des livres rares* of the Bibliothèque national de France (BnF) with the pressmark RES4-LB37-26. It is available in digitized form on Gallica.fr, the digital library of the BnF. URL: ark:/12148/btv1b8619662s

[6] James V. Rice, *Gabriel Naudé, 1600-1653* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1939), 36.

[7] A number of articles and chapters deal with the text in considerable detail and even a modern critical edition of the text seems to be in preparation. This modern critical edition will be part of the publication of the *Œuvres complètes de Gabriel Naudé*, under the direction of Frédéric Gabriel. Unfortunately, however, as personal contact with the leading editor has indicated for the moment the editorial and publication process has stalled. For the project see the website of the Institut d'Histoire de la Pensée Classique, URL: http://pensee-classique.ens-lyon.fr/spip.php?article76

shows that his rhetorical strategy was to defend the party of the court by mimicking the taste for erudition and oratory prose of Mazarin's Parlementarian adversaries.[8] In the end, however, she concludes that the aim of the text was not so much persuasive; it rather provided food for thought. Therefore, Naudé's *jugement* of the pamphlets of the *Frondes* was no "libelle contre les libelles".[9]

Laurie Catteeuw studied the political and, what she calls, pedagogical function of the *Mascurat*. On the one hand, she argues, Naudé recognizes that persecuting anti-Mazarin pamphlets would be impossible and unfeasible, and that the publication of a *raison d'état* counter offensive would make more sense. On the other hand, a central preoccupation of the *Mascurat* is the formation of the judgment of the reader. The book presents itself as a proper political discussion that is to instruct, undeceive, and 'emancipate' the minds of his readers from the public folly exemplified by the rumours, the pamphlets, and the straightforward rebellion in the streets of Paris.[10] Accordingly, Catteeuw concludes that "more than a pamphlet, the *Mascurat*, appears a prime example of the *paideia* of *raison d'état*", i.e. its aspect of formation and initiation.[11] Naudé not simply wants to respond to the slander against Cardinal Mazarin, but seeks to render its readers disillusioned with the truth-value of the libel. In Catteeuw's interpretation, the *Mascurat* therefore is a project of critical formation that aims to regain the obedience of those subjects who by their pamphleteering activity have become guilty of lèse-majesté.[12]

These recent interpretations hardly seem incompatible. They emphasize Naudé's clear insight in what the pamphlet war was causing in the streets of Paris, the 'educative' aspect of the *Mascurat*, the conflict between secrecy and publicity, and, one way or another, underline the significance of the *raison d'état* argument. Apart from their obvious merits, recent interpretations seem to focus too much on the literary and communicative aspects of the text.[13] Thereby scholars at least partially disconnect the *Mascurat* from the historical and political context it so clearly deals with and engages in. By questioning the persuasive intent of the text, particularly Moreau seems to make too little of Naudé's ceaseless efforts to diffuse the content of his large book. The *Mascurat* simply is too embedded in the political situation of the *Frondes* not to study it in parallel with the historical context and contemporary political thought.

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[8] Isabelle Moreau, *"Guérir du sot". Les stratégies d'écriture des libertins à l'âge classique* (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2007), 791.
[9] Moreau, *"Guérir du sot"*, 866-875.
[10] Catteeuw, *Censures et raisons d'État*, 343-345.
[11] Idem, 343.
[12] Idem, 343.
[13] The same might be said about two other recent contributions to the historiography of the *Mascurat*. Both Hartmut Stenzel and Stéphane Haffemayer approached the work within the scope of the debate on the emergence of a public sphere. See Hartmut Stenzel, "Apories de l'humanisme et raison d'état dans le *Mascurat* de Gabriel Naudé", *Les Cahiers du Centre de Recherches Historiques*, 20 (1998 [online]); Haffemayer, "Mazarin, Information and Communication during the Fronde", 386-400; idem, "Mazarin face à la Fronde des mazarinades", 257-274.

This chapter seeks to provide such an embedding in the full historical, political, bibliographical and intellectual context of the *Mascurat* and its argumentation. It argues that, through the dialogical form of the *Mascurat*, Naudé engages in a defence of Mazarin operating on three levels. Among these three levels it pays particular attention to the function of *raison d'état* argumentation. In light of the results from the book historical enquiry presented in the previous intermezzo chapter, the *Considérations politiques* and the *Mascurat* will be read in parallel, together with Naudé's correspondence during the *Frondes*. The first step in the argumentation, the *ad hominem*-level, is where the apologist meets the libellous pamphlets on their own terms. Here most of the accusations made in the *mazarinades* are refuted or critically reassessed. That is, Mascurat shows that any perceived wrongdoings or flaws on the cardinal's part actually look quite different once their true causes are laid bare.

The second level of argumentation is that of legal arguments. In the first place these are encountered on the occasions where the *Arrest* issued by the Parisian *Parlement* against Cardinal Mazarin on 8 January 1649 is discussed and rebutted as illegal. Later, the judges of the *Parlement* are met head on, as Mascurat discusses the *Arrest* of 1617 - against foreign statesmen on important positions in France - as limited to a specific case and period in French history, and irrelevant in the case of Mazarin (who was a naturalized French nobleman since 1639). In addressing the parlementarian *frondeurs*, government finance is also discussed. Although this does not seem to be part of legal argumentation, in relation to the presumed financial authority of the *Parlement* it is unmistakably judicial here. The dangers of revolt are also discussed in comparison with the civil war in England, which resulted in the decapitation of King Charles I in late January 1649 and the exclusion to the throne of the lawful heir, both denounced as gruesomely illegal. Finally, legal arguments are used to render libel illegal and thus the persons ordering, writing, and distributing *mazarinades* are made liable to this crime.

Third comes the level of 'absolutist' argumentation with the argument of *raison d'état* as its apogee, seemingly rendering all previous arguments obsolete. Apparently unsatisfied with the rebuttal as it is, a whole arsenal of common place arguments of authority is employed. In this way, 'royal authority' represented in the person of Cardinal Mazarin is finally defended 'positively', that is, in a way not negating the positions of the statesman's opponents. This kind of argumentation is used to exhort mainly the anti-mazarine parlementarian *frondeurs* to judge their own positions and finally stand down in complete and full obedience.

This chapter consists of two major parts. Before turning to the levels of argumentation in the *Mascurat*, it first pays closer to the *Mascurat* as a dialogue. It examines what rhetorical procédé and what methods Naudé used in this colloquy between Mascurat and Saint-Ange. Furthermore, the author's objective and the intended audience(s) must be explored. Once the main characteristics of the dialogue have been established, an analysis of the three levels of

argumentation will finally lead to the issue that is of particular interest to this thesis, Naudé's practical application of *raison d'état* argumentation in the multifaceted conflict of the *Frondes*.

Rhetorical procédé of the *Mascurat*: a political apology in a dialogue 'under the rose'

A political apology in dialogue form

There is a lot to be said about the form of the *Mascurat*, more than we are able to discuss here.[14] However, while the colloquial structure of the text might be related to the other *mazarinades*, the caveat should be added that at the end of the book Mascurat himself mentions Erasmus, Lucian, and Plato as models, which makes sense in the still essentially humanist environment in which Naudé operated.[15] Perhaps more interesting than these common place models and previously unexplored is the reference to the *Dialogue d'entre le Maheustre et le Manant*, which the author refers to explicitly as a quality polemical piece.[16] This was a fictional colloquy between a Catholic nobleman and partisan of the king, and a Parisian *ligueur* that dated from the time of Henri IV's conversion to Catholicism and the disputed king's war against the League.[17] A most striking resemblance with the *Mascurat* is found in the publication of several subsequent and different editions. In three successive editorial stages this dialogue transformed from a Leaguist publication underlining internal division in the League in December 1593, to a revised *politique* version of the text more favourable to Henri IV of January 1594 that deliberately sowed confusion with the first edition, and finally became an illustrated royalist placard later that same year.[18] What to make of this cross reference to such an elusive pamphlet from a different era of Parisian civil unrest, if anything? Especially if we consider the similar process of extensive revisions and

[14] For an elaborate discussion of the literary aspects of the *Mascurat* we would like to refer to the extensive work of Isabelle Moreau as well as that of Sophie Gouverneur. Moreau, *"Guérir du sot"*, 757-875; Sophie Gouverneur, *Prudence et subversion libertines. La critique de la raison d'État chez François de la Mothe Le Vayer, Gabriel Naudé et Samuel Sorbière* (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2005), 419-427; idem, "Le *Mascurat*: un exemple d'écriture libertine", *Libertinage et philosophie au XVIIe siècle. La Mothe Le Vayer et Naudé* (Saint-Etienne: Publications de l'Université de Saint-Etienne, 1997), 131-145.
[15] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 709-715 [= *absent on 490*].
[16] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 647 [= 452].
[17] Anonymous, *Dialogue d'entre le Maheustre et le Manant: contenant les raisons de leurs débats et questions en ces presens troubles au Royaume de France* (s.l. [Paris], 1593 and 1594). Mascurat's reference reads: "qui aurait observé qu'un Carabin *Maheutre*, c'est-à-dire du parti du roi de Navarre, et un pauvre *Manant* Ligueur, ont mieux discouru au milieu d'un champ, des secrètes intrigues et cabales de la Ligue, et des intérêts de ces deux partis, et qu'ils ont fait des Colloques si sérieux et si amples, que l'on n'a rien vu au jugement des mieux entendus en ces matières, qui fut de meilleure trempe." Naudé, *Mascurat*, 711-712 [= *absent on 490*].
[18] For an analysis of this dialogue and the different editions, see: Denise Turrel, "Les différentes versions du "dialogue" entre le Maheutre et le Manant, 1593-1594", in Yves-Marie Bercé, Gilbert Bodinier (eds.) *Combattre, Gouverner, Écrire: Études réunies en l'honneur de Jean Chagniot* (Paris: Economica, 2003), 783-796; and idem, *Le blanc de France. La construction des signes identitaires pendant les guerres de Religion (1562-1629)* (Geneve: Librairie Droz, 2005) esp. Ch. III, pp. 73-83.

additions to the second edition of the *Mascurat*, the reference seems at least to underline the changing weight of the argument. The reference itself is one of these additions![19]

The most important and unfortunately also the most difficult aspect of the dialogical form is the relationship between the positions taken by the author on the one hand and the text's interlocutors on the other. This relationship is virtually always distorted, i.e. one might only be able to reconstruct the author's opinion from the context of the work, like other publications and correspondence. In other words, this colloquial form enables the author to hide behind the personages he creates and still convey his meaning to his readers. In the *Mascurat* the same mechanism is at work. Before introducing the two personages in the text, we should note that within the fictional scheme of the text, strictly speaking, it would even be impossible for Naudé to be one of the two speakers. The author himself is mentioned on several occasions in the dialogue as a friend of the prime protagonist and an author of a number of important works.[20]

The characters of Mascurat and Sainct-Ange

This brings us to the dialogue's *mise en scène* and its interlocutors. The *Mascurat* begins with an early morning encounter between two well-acquainted *colporteurs* - peddlers of pamphlets - Mascurat and Sainct-Ange. They meet in the streets of Paris, close to the bookshop of Jean Petit and are both awaiting a new piece called the *Declaration de Paix*. The two *colporteurs* thus meet in the days after the Peace of Rueil was signed on 20 March 1649. The difference between the two characters immediately becomes clear when we learn that while both men are engaged in the business of selling of pamphlets to make a hard-earned living, Mascurat also writes and prints them himself. Mascurat's position of erudite defender of the Mazarin-case is soon established. Sainct-Ange on the other hand grants more credence to the libel against Mazarin. A discussion develops in which the latter is highly critical of Mascurat's plea but holds the subordinate position due to his ignorance in many of the matters discussed. Since it might take some time before the awaited pamphlet is distributed, they wait in a tavern where they can order some refreshments.[21] At their parting, late that evening, after a whole day of discussing the pamphlets with many digressions to other subjects, they leave empty-handed since the *Declaration* is still not finished, but all the more wiser. Sainct-Ange goes home better disposed towards the person and government of Cardinal Mazarin. As we read in the also fictional 'printer's preface' he is the one

[19] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 711-712 [= absent on *490*].
[20] Among these works cited by Mascurat are the *Apologie* [1625], *Addition sur l'histoire de Louis XI* [1626], and the *Iudicium* introducing the autobiography *De propria vita* by Cardano, which Naudé edited and published. Tellingly, the *Considérations politiques sur les coups d'état* ['1639'] is not mentioned among the writings of Naudé cited in the *Mascurat*. See Intermezzo II.
[21] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 5-13.

that recorded the conversation from memory and prepared it for a larger audience.[22] Thus, indeed, Mascurat seems to have succeeded "in correcting the false opinions Sainct-Ange had conceived of Cardinal Mazarin" and by having their conversation published Sainct-Ange heeded Mascurat's call to try to "enlighten many others and thus as much as possible serve the peace in France [*repos de la France*]."[23]

Whereas some scholars plea for a direct relationship between the personages and real persons[24], it might be better consider the characters as fictional and establish the possible provenance of their names through a close reading of the text. This, however, should not prevent from looking at the name's etymology first. Historians have often overlooked the account by Bernard de la Monnoye (1641-1728), who gave a highly plausible etymological explanation of the name of Naudé's prime protagonist in the glossary to his famous *Noei borguignon* (1720). According to the French philologist the name 'Mascurat' derived from the Bourguignon patois verb *macherai* that had entered the common French language as the now archaic verb *machurer*, to smear with black. Apparently printers would say that a sheet of paper was *machuré*, mackled or blurred, when it was not neatly printed. Printers would call their apprentices *machurats*, because they were prone to spoil the leaves they put under the press by smearing the ink. The name for the printer-*colporteur* in Naudé's dialogue in defence of Cardinal Mazarin seemingly alludes to this moniker for printer's apprentices.[25]

Mascurat is the character about whom we learn most in the text.[26] He explains that he had been in the service of Théophraste Renaudot (1586-1653), the famous founder of the *Gazette* in the 1630s, but that they had parted ways due to a disagreement about the consequences of publicity of certain *nouvelles*.[27] While Mascurat did not approve of the information that Renaudot

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[22] Idem, 3.

[23] Idem, 715. "de détromper [Sainct-Ange] des fausses opinions qu['il] avai[t] conceuës du Cardinal *Mazarin*" "désabuser beaucoup d'autres, et servir par ce moyen autant qu'il [lui] sera possible au repos de la France."

[24] For instance, one often encountered explanation that can be traced to the early eighteenth century and was taken for granted by Naudé's twentieth century biographers, Jack A. Clarke, is that the name of Mascurat was an imperfect anagram of Camusat [d. 1639], a Parisian printer with whom Naudé had been acquainted. Clarke, *Naudé*, 97.

[25] See the Glossary of the Bourguignon patois appended to Gui Barôzai [pseudonym of Bernard de la Monnoye], *Les noei borguignon* (Dijon: Abran Lyron de Modene, 1720), 263-264. In the *Dictionnaire de l'Académie Française* it was described as popular, vulgar language when it included the verb in editions from 1762 onwards. The meaning related to the language of printers was only added in the fifth edition of 1798.

[26] What we learn about Sainct-Ange is that he fled from Aix-en-Provence, where he was in the service of the printer Jean Roize, because he injured an officer of the Count of Alais with a gunshot on the *Jour de la Saint-Sebastien* (20 January) and feared arrest. Naudé, *Mascurat*, 5-6. Jean Roize was an Aixois printer, who from 1629 onwards is listed as printer to the University of Aix (in office until 1658). Roize is noted as printer collaborating with Eustache Roux' *Bureau d'adresse* in Aix that irregularly published editions of Renaudot's *Gazette* from 1633 onwards. See Gilles Feyel, *L'annonce et la nouvelle: la presse d'information en France sous l'Ancien Régime, 1630-1788* (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2000), 277, 476, 499.

[27] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 380 [= *289-290*]. Mascurat says to Sainct-Ange, "je te dirai la vérité: Monsieur Renaudot est fort bon homme et qui n'est pas fâché qu'on gagne sa vie avec lui, mais il ne pouvait souffrir que je

made available to the public, working in the latter's service has provided him with the connections that serve him well in defending Cardinal Mazarin. The break with Renaudot, however, is also a sign of his 'impartiality'; Mascurat has an 'independent' mind - *ma langue n'est point mercenaire* - and he is not in *service de plume* of Mazarin.[28]

The name of the main protagonist, Mascurat, a pseudonym well-known in learned circles of 1640s Paris, seems to have been a pun by Naudé directed at his friends, pro and contre Mazarin. The context this pseudonym originally arose in was the medical quarrel from 1641 onwards between Naudé's friend and anatomy professor at the Parisian faculty of medicine, Guy Patin, and Théophraste Renaudot. At first the conflict had been medical in nature as Patin defended the traditional view of medicine professed at the University against Renaudot's paracelsian beliefs. Patin went so far as to publicly condemn and vilify Renaudot and his views. Later their differences became political as Patin increasingly took the side of the parlementarian *Fronde* and condemned Renaudot and his *Gazette* as the mouthpiece of Mazarin's government. Meanwhile Renaudot defended himself against Patin's calumnies in a series of pamphlets written under the pseudonym of 'Maschurat'.[29] Therefore, when Naudé used it for his pro-mazarine character in the dialogue his learned friends undoubtedly understood the reference, just as they probably knew that it derived from the language of printers.

However, thinking of the pro-government protagonist as an extension of Naudé's own views, as the cardinal's librarian and client, is rendered difficult by his ironic, sceptic and sometimes out rightly mocking antagonist named Sainct-Ange. The connection between the name of the most revered of angels in seventeenth-century Catholic France, Gabriel, and the author of the *Mascurat* can hardly have been coincidental.[30] The name-game therefore rather seems to testify of a kind of dialectic that Naudé wanted to present in his dialogue. By way of this dialectic he nuanced his own position and in a way defended himself as by no means a simple *mazariniste*.

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blâmasse à tous moments *sa Gazette* et que je lui attribuasse une partie des maux qui nous ont tourmentés depuis quelque temps, car elle fait les peuples trop savant tant en leurs propres affaires, qu'en celles de leurs voisins".

[28] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 692. Isabelle Moreau nicely points out that this impartiality is both a strength and weakness in Mascurat's position. Whereas it enforces the historical evidence he provides, for instance in defending Mazarin's nobility, at the same time Mascurat evidently lacks authority as advocate of the cardinal's case. Isabelle Moreau, "Le *Mascurat* de Naudé: usages des fictions juridiques", in G. Goubier, B. Parmentier, and D. Martin (eds.), *Doute et imagination. Constructions du savoir de la Renaissance aux Lumières* (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2011), 332-333.

[29] On the quarrel between Patin and Renaudot, see Howard M. Solomon, *Public Welfare, Science and Propaganda in 17th-Century France: The Innovations of Theophraste Renaudot* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972), 178-189.

[30] Sophie Gouverneur first made a compelling argument for understanding the names of Mascurat and Saint-Ange thusly. However, my interpretation of the consequence of this 'name-game' differs from hers. Sophie Gouverneur, "Le *Mascurat*: un exemple d'écriture libertine", 134. Although less likely, the name Saint-Ange might also be inspired by the first *maître d'hôtel* of the queen regent, François Il Le Charron, baron de Saint-Ange (d. 1651), who used the name Saint-Ange after the barony he held.

Sub rosa: political news and the virtue of discretion

As is evident from the main character's criticism of Renaudot as well as from his other political writings from the *Marfore* in 1620 onwards, Naudé perceived a problematic relationship between publicity and secrecy in the politics of his age. Later on in the dialogue, Mascurat complains that information about disorder and rebellion elsewhere once rendered public may easily lead to internal upheaval and revolt in a city or a larger polity.[31] When we compare the two editions of the *Mascurat* it becomes clear that a large part of the rhetorical *procédé* of secrecy that creates a sphere of initiation is a feature added to the *Mascurat* upon editing the second edition. The mechanism by which we are seemingly overhearing the private conversations of these two *colporteurs* is the same Naudé used in the preface to the *Considérations politiques*. However this time the author does not offer his reflections on secrecy in weighty matters of state, royal government policy and court life in a book supposedly intended for but a few prince's cabinets. The *Mascurat* is presented as a published report of a private conversation between friends *sub rosa*, i.e. 'under the rose', an intimate space that allows them to discuss political affairs and to reflect on the need for secrecy in these weighty matters.

The *sub rosa* argument is introduced early in the second edition together with and in the context of a description by Mascurat of the various intrigues and vices that apparently reign at court: the slander, the backstabbing, etcetera. The argument is offered as a legitimation of this subject in their conversation, for Sainct-Ange expresses his worries that this is too weighty a subject for them to discuss.[32] Mascurat assures his friend that this is not a problem for two reasons. First, since they are speaking about these contemptible court-practices in general nobody could be offended, and, second and more importantly, because they are 'under the rose', i.e. they are in an enclosed space, a cabaret, that guarantees an atmosphere of 'privacy' and secrecy, in which they can speak freely as friends. Mascurat recounts an ancient fable wherein Cupid (*Dieu d'Amour*) gives Harpocrates (*Dieu du Silence*) a rose, a beautiful flower supposedly hitherto unseen, urging him not to disclose his mother Venus's indiscretions, her secret practices and conversations. Mascurat adds that in modern times the rose decorates the roofs of dining rooms and halls where friends and kinsmen have their feasts. The symbol assures that they can speak about whatever they want in full confidence that the matters discussed shall not leave the room.[33] What better place, then, for Naudé to stage his dialogue than a cabaret, a location for drinking, dining, and sharing the news so common in seventeenth-century France? This may indeed be a witticism referring to 'reason of state' authors such as Ludovico Zuccolo, who had

[31] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 380 [= *289-290*].
[32] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 86-88 [absent on *76*].
[33] Ibidem.

expressed their concerns about lower folk discussing these weighty political matters in places like cabarets.[34]

In fact, the added *sub rosa*-argument reveals the text's strategy of public secrecy. In the preface to his *Considérations politiques* Naudé had created a sphere of initiation by conveying that only twelve copies were printed since the weighty subject of the most secretive and violent actions of state, *coups d'état*, should not have a wide diffusion.[35] In similar fashion, the reader of the *Mascurat* is witness to a private conversation about the most pressing political affairs of the *Frondes* symbolically taking place in the confidential location *par excellence*, a cabaret. Between Naudé's two interlocutors 'anything' can be discussed openly, from the wildest accusations made against the cardinal to government actions based on *raison d'état*. Some qualifications, however, must still have restrained Naudé to truly speak openly and frankly; something of which the rhetorical *procédé* attests.

The sphere of initiation created by the *sub rosa* element, perhaps more than dissimulating possibly heterodox views, mirrored the intimacy and secrecy of what has recently been called the 'dignified retreat' found in the learned cabinets.[36] The private and friendly nature of the conversation of Mascurat and Sainct-Ange 'under the rose' might therefore be understood as a reference to the confidential deliberations and debates that Naudé enjoyed among his friends and acquaintances at the Cabinet Dupuy and in other Parisian congregations of the learned.

Paideia in the Mascurat: an ethics of the reader as judge of the mazarinades

In the *Mascurat* Naudé offers what might be called a reader's digest to the *mazarinades*. In professed impartial fashion he presents six criteria in the voice of Mascurat to weigh the worth of the pamphlets.[37] He does recognize that good pieces have originated on all sides of the political

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[34] See the lemma "cabaret" in the *Dictionnaire de l'Ancien Régime*, 189. Also the chapter on the 'marketplace and tavern' in Andrew Pettegree, *The Invention of News: How the World Came to Know About Itself* (London: Yale University Press, 2014), 117-138; esp. 128-134. Cf. the reference to Zuccolo in the Introduction Chapter.

[35] As noted earlier many scholars have written about this strategy in the *Considérations politiques*. See the works of Louis Marin, Peter Donaldson, and Jean-Pierre Cavaillé for a more elaborate analysis of this rhetorical *procédé*. Marin, "Pour une théorie baroque de l'action politique", 7-67; Donaldson, *Machiavelli and Mysteries of State*, 160-165; Cavaillé, "Gabriel Naudé: Destinations et usages du texte politique"; idem, *Dis/simulations. Jules-César Vanini, François La Mothe Le Vayer, Gabriel Naudé, Louis Machon et Torquato Accetto, Religion, morale et politique au XVIIe siècle.* (Paris: Champion, 2002).

[36] Robert A. Schneider, "Friends of Friends: Intellectual and Literary Sociability in the Age of Richelieu", in Lewis C. Seifert and Rebecca M. Wilkin (eds.), *Men and Women Making Friends in Early Modern France* (London and New York: Routledge, 2016), 135-160. See also the same author's interesting article, "Gallicans not Magistrates: The Dupuy Cabinet in the Age of Richelieu", Barbara B. Diefendorf (ed.), *Social Relations, Politics, and Power in Early Modern France: Robert Descimon and the Historian's Craft* (Kirksville: Truman State University Press, 2016), 237-259. Both articles are related to an as yet unpublished broader study of intellectual life in the Richelieu-era titled *Dignified Retreat: Writers and Intellectuals in the Age of Richelieu*. I thank Mark Greengrass for this reference.

[37] On the *paideia* aspect of the *Mascurat* see also Catteeuw, *Censures et raisons d'État*, 343-345.

divide of the *Frondes* and formulates six measures to test the quality of the goods on the market. This list of criteria is closely connected to his historical source critique that is most explicit in the *Apologie*.[38] The first of these standards of judgment surveys the nature of the source. Official sources with a public character are worth reading. These pieces mostly are the rational communication of some corporation or authority.[39] "The first criterion of a good piece", Mascurat proposes "is that it carries a public character like all the *actions* done by or in name of some corporation (*Communauté*) such as the *declarations, arrests, manifests, harangues, letters, remonstrances, regulations, histories, journals, relations, procès-verbaux, articles, transactions* or other similar treatises or writings. For it is from this kind of material that a writer construes the fabric of a good history."[40] A second sign of a good piece is that it exposes nothing that is not true. Third, a pamphlet can be considered good "when it is filled with sound testimonies and descends into detail and the particulars of which it treats".[41] Fourth, Naudé thinks moderation is an essential quality of a well written pamphlet. A fifth criterion is stylistic. The pamphlet should display a polite and pleasant style. The sixth and last characteristic for a piece well-writ is to be equally strong, overly filled with wisdom (*bon sens*) and judgment.[42] Although they disqualify a lot of the *mazarinades* for their tendentious content and lack of respect, these criteria do not exclude some of the most vigorous attacks on the cardinal and best-selling pieces that circulated in Paris. In fact, Naudé's main protagonist provides a list of the best pieces to date, even if they are the ones requiring the strongest rebuttal.[43]

Besides these six criteria, Mascurat offers further advice on the quality of pamphlets. Other conditions count, for instance the fact that certain pieces are best-sellers. Albeit difficult to predict the market's demand, Mazarin's apologist has to concede. Another important indicator are the exclamations of the *colporteurs* at times when there is nothing new to sell. The pamphlets sold in these low times apparently merit their renown. But to be among the first to recognize a new good piece, one might consider the authors' names whispered in relation to a pamphlet.[44] If the

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[38] See Chapter IV.
[39] Cf. Haffemayer, "Mazarin, Information and Communication during the Fronde", 386-400.
[40] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 199 [= *153*].
[41] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 199 [= *153*].
[42] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 200 [= *154*].
[43] This list includes even the most critical and speculative of pieces, such as the *Avis à la Reine sur sa Régence*, the *Lettre d'un Religieux,* the *Lettre du Chevalier Georges,* the *Manuel du bon Citoyen,* the *Sommaire de la doctrine curieuse* – that Sainct-Ange calls an abrogated version of the worst arguments of the *Francogallia* and *Vindiciae contra tyrannos* –, the *Theologien d'Estat*, and some twenty other *mazarinades*. Naudé, *Mascurat*, 199-209.
[44] Naudé's main protagonist gives a list of names including Saint-Germain (Mathieu de Morgues, sieur de, polemicist), François La Mothe le Vayer (writer, philosopher), Charles Ferramus (poet), Gilles Ménage (scholar), the Ogier brothers (Charles, writer and diplomat; François, writer and churchman), Didier Hérault (jurist,), David Blondel (historian, Protestant theologian), Jacques Sirmond (historian, Jesuit priest), Henri Justel (érudit, librarian), the Sainte-Marthe brothers (Louis and Scévole, both historiographers of the King), Guillaume Colletet (poet and critic), Daniel de Priézac (jurist, polemicist linked to Richelieu), Louis Chantereau Le Febvre (historian), Francois du Bosquet (magistrate, bishop of

anonymity of the libel complicates this strategy, then it may be indicative to know whose presses they originated from. Mascurat mentions Cramoisy, Martin, Rocollet, Petit, and the widow of Dupuis as printers and booksellers of merit. But whereas they all seem to have printed only (semi)official pieces, he remarks that the widow of Guillemot, Robert Sara, and Cardin Besogne have not printed the worst, while the widow of Antoine Coulon has printed some of the most violent and seditious.[45] Other advice would be that those pamphlets without a front-leaf, with a small and tightly pressed (*fort menue et pressée*) impression, and six or seven pages long are ordinarily the best. On the other hand bad quality printing mirrors bad writing. A bold and ugly character, an impression full of quadrats and spaces,[46] excessive line spacing, on poor quality paper, in small measures/forms, and with blank pages in front and back normally indicate a poor piece.[47]

Finally, the distinction between good and bad leaflets is based on the author's mind (*esprit*) alone. In a political debate, Mascurat grants every author the liberty to write their different points of view, following the interests of the faction to which he is attached. He asks nothing more than that all elaborate upon their views as they should (*à propos*), with understanding (*esprit*) and judgment. To distinguish right from wrong is almost impossible in important political matters, he argues, because passion and faction exercise their tyranny way more fiercely than in smaller affairs. And even in these matters one has already great difficulty to see this distinction. Granted that all have some preference and no one is truly impartial, this does not impair an author when he is capable to address the matter pointedly and with judgment.[48] Based upon these criteria Naudé guides the reader, providing an ethics of the audience to the *mazarinades*. Not only does he suggest how to read the pamphlets. With a quasi-historical method of source criticism the reader is shown how to form a veritable judgment on Cardinal Mazarin and his government.[49]

The intended audience of the Mascurat

So Naudé provides an ethics of the reader, but who is this reader? What is the intended audience of the *Mascurat*? Shifting our focus towards the addressees of this political apology, at least three categories might be distinguished. First, the dialogue indirectly addresses Cardinal Mazarin, criticizing him for thinking too lightly of these pamphlets, warning him of the power of the

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Lodève, gallican author), Pierre de Marca (historian, Archbishop of Paris), Marc-Antoine Dominici (historiographer of the King, polemicist), Marin Cureau de La Chambre (physician, philosopher), Charles Annibal Fabrot (jurisconsult). Saint-Ange objects that neither of these authors has written a *mazarinade*. Naudé, *Mascurat*, 201-202.

[45] On these printers see, Martin, *Livre, pouvoirs et société à Paris;* Carrier, *La Presse de la Fronde*.

[46] See the *OED* definition of 'quadrat': "In letterpress printing: a small block of metal, lower than the face of the type, inserted by a printer to fill up short lines, adjust spacing, etc."

[47] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 204.

[48] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 207-208.

[49] See also, Chapter IV.

printing press, and urging him to do more in his own defence.[50] Secondly, Naudé is addressing the learned community of Paris, some of whom, like his friend Guy Patin, were not unsympathetic to the *frondeurs'* case and even in outright opposition to Mazarin. He proposes a critical investigation of the pamphlets and tries to provide 'historical evidence' to undermine the rumours, slander, and more serious accusations made against the cardinal. The main aim here seems to be a call for the learned men to engage in the debate, so that a well-founded judgement may be passed on Cardinal Mazarin's actions. Thirdly, the *Mascurat* was destined for the diverse parties in the *Parlement de Paris*, exhorting them towards moderation, warning them of the dangers of their (il-)legal actions, and ultimately making them accept unrestricted royal authority even during a regency.[51] The *Mascurat* engages with *parlementaire* readers. Mascurat often attests of his utmost respect for the Parisian judiciary, this "Auguste Sénat" or "Compagnie".[52] At times he seems to show silent agreement, at others he even expresses sympathy for parts of their argumentation. Just the same, he remains critical of the way the *Parlement* uses its powers and how procedures of justice are employed during the conflicts of the *Frondes* between the *Parlement* and the government.

A possible fourth category of addressees is the 'wider public' that the *mazarinades* also address, but here we encounter the problem of the size of the *Mascurat*, its erudition, as well as Naudé's altogether negative appreciation of 'the people'. Whereas the small pamphlets allow for a 'public readership', the readership of a large volume like the *Mascurat* is obviously more 'private'. While most *mazarinades* might be read alone or read out loud to a number of people, might be easily passed on from one reader to the next, and might even be memorized, thus reaching even an illiterate public, this is more problematic for an erudite dialogue as the *Mascurat*. As one scholar has recently pointed out, another problem is the relative powerlessness of the rational and semi-official communication that Naudé endeavours as against the circulation of rumours and other 'irrational' types of communication suitable for the *mazarinades*.[53] Nonetheless, Naudé seems to have believed that either excerpts could be taken from the book and

[50] See Haffemayer, who argues that Naudé's correspondence and other writings are partly responsible for the image of Mazarin's reluctance to respond to the verbal attacks. Haffemayer, "Mazarin, Information and Communication during the Fronde", 386-400.
[51] See also Moreau, "Le *Mascurat* de Naudé: usages des fictions juridiques", 331-342.
[52] "Et je t'asseure, Sainct-Ange, mon ami, *sed tibi tantum et muro dixerim*, car je ne passe déjà que trop pour Parlementaire, dans l'esprit de quelques domestiques de son Eminence, qu'encore que je fusse fort content et satisfait pendant tous ces troubles de n'avoir quasi rien à craindre ni à espérer de quel côté qu'ils pussent tourner, j'étais néanmoins extrêmement fâché de voir cette Auguste Compagnie, à laquelle j'ai toujours porté beaucoup de respect, d'être insensiblement engagée à souffrir des violences, ou à les faire; c'est pourquoi pourvu que tu m'avoue que l'Arrêt contre le Cardinal en a été une des principales, nous serons bientôt d'accord." Naudé, *Mascurat*, 335-336.
[53] On this problem see, Haffemayer, "Mazarin face à la Fronde des mazarinades", 257-274; idem, "Mazarin, Information and Communication during the Fronde", 386-400.

be published or its many pieces of evidence could be used in new pamphlets to serve a wider audience.[54]

Juridico-political argumentation in Naudé's apology for Mazarin

By way of a comparison of the two editions of the *Mascurat* and an analysis of the (changes to the) argumentation it becomes clear that, notwithstanding the dialogical form of this work, Naudé is engaged in a political defence of Mazarin operating on three levels. First, we find a level of personal vindication against the innumerable verbal assaults the cardinal suffered, perhaps best called the *ad hominem* level of argumentation. A second level is one of juridico-fiscal arguments that we shall simply refer to as legal argumentation. Finally, the dialogue contains a third level of 'absolutist' argumentation, for lack of a better word, describing, nuancing and exemplifying the absolute legal authority of the king. It is in the context of a casuistic exercise on the extent of government authority that the terminology of *raison d'état* is introduced by the author.

Ad hominem argumentation

On the *ad hominem*-level of argumentation the apologist meets the libellous pamphlets on their own terms. This is where most of the accusations made in the *mazarinades* – that Cardinal Mazarin was a foreigner, a tyrant, war-crazed, culpable of political violence, corrupt, and a squanderer of royal finance, etc. – are refuted or critically reassessed. The author attempted to demonstrate that any perceived wrongdoings or flaws on the cardinal's part actually look quite different once their true causes are laid bare. In particular, much time is spent on trying to prove Mazarin's noble roots. The text of the *Mascurat* provides a genealogical account of the Mazarin family and, affiliated as it is with the Roman Mancini and Martinozzi families, traces the origins of its nobility back to the early Roman Empire. The dialogical dynamic, with Sainct-Ange constantly criticizing the plausibility and merits of such a genealogy, seems to point to the author's own position in the *Bibliographia politica* and the *Considérations politiques* in which a sceptical stance towards the descent of a government's ministers is taken. Naudé seems to have believed that ministers are valued more for their political merits than their descent. In the end, in the *Mascurat* as well the political merit of the cardinal is the decisive argument in countering the verbal attacks.

This first level of argumentation appears to have been far from perfect upon the publication of the first edition in late summer 1649 and was heavily revised and extended in the editing process that led to the publication of the second edition in spring 1650. Out of the many passages five deserve attention. First, including the most voluminous of additions, the genealogical argument to absolve Mazarin from all blackening of his name and reputation has received much labour in

[54] See above, Intermezzo II.

the editing process. Secondly, various comments and laudatory passages about Mazarin's patronage of the Arts and the establishing of the first French public library are added to the text. Thirdly, Mascurat elaborately reflects on Mazarin's financial resources, titles and privileges compared with his predecessors Cardinal Richelieu and the Duc de Sully. The fourth edited passage that we have to consider consists of the new emphasis on Mazarin's diplomatic skills that have favoured France and showed his early inclination to this kingdom ever since his involvement as a papal legate in the peace negotiations to end the War of the Mantuan Succession (1628-1631).[55] Finally, there is the added evaluation of Mazarin's capacities as *ministre d'état*, stressing the unsurpassed qualities of the cardinal.

Given the vast amount of space that is consecrated in the *Mascurat* to the refutation of accusations made in two *mazarinades* in particular[56] of Cardinal Mazarin's low birth rendering him unfit for high office and the slander about his nieces from the Mancini and Martinozzi families, this aspect must have been perceived by Naudé as one of the most prominent attacks on his patron and a notable cause of the insubordination of the *grands* as well as the tumult among the people of Paris. Already in the first edition of the book we find an elaborate description of roughly hundred pages (one-fifth of the total dialogue) of the cardinal's family in Rome and their links to several noble Roman families. We learn about his father, Pietro Mazarini's connection to the Colonna family and his first marriage to his patron's goddaughter Hortensia Buffalini, a noble family from Città di Castello, and the affiliation the marriages of the cardinal's sisters provided with such noble Roman families as the Mancini, Martinozzi, and Muti.[57] Mascurat clearly expresses the aim of his detailed genealogical discussion, i.e. in order to align the nobility of the uncle, Mazarin, with that of his nieces.[58] The marriages of Mazarin's sisters reflect the high standing of the Mazarin family in Rome. In this typically humanist enterprise,[59] Naudé presents Mascurat setting out to prove the nobility of the three related families. If quantity accounts for anything then the most significant claim definitely is that the Mancini family is descended from an ancient Roman consular family, for Naudé goes to great lengths to provide credible evidence and to fill the hiatuses in his nearly millennium-wide family narrative. Some fifty pages in quarto

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[55] See Chapter I above.

[56] The two pamphlets against which Naudé directs his arguments to prove Cardinal Mazarin's nobility are the *Lettre d'un Religieux, envoyée à Monseigneur le Prince de Condé, à S. Germain en Laye, contenant la verité de la vie et mœurs du Cardinal Mazarin: avec exhortation audit Seigneur Prince d'abandonner son party* (Paris: Rolin de la Haye and Arnould Cotinet, 1649) and the *Lettre du Chevalier Georges de Paris, à Monseigneur le Prince de Condé* (Paris: Nicolas Boisset, 1649).

[57] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 57-58 [*50-51*].

[58] "C'est afin de mieux accorder la Noblesse de l'Oncle, avec celles des Niepces." Naudé, *Mascurat*, 18 [*17*].

[59] Naudé himself refers to perhaps the most famous of the humanist genealogies, the heavily debated *Epistola de vetustate et splendore gentis Scaligerae et JC Scaligeri vita* (1594) by Joseph Justus Scaliger. Reference is also made to the disputed claims in this genealogy, that was heavily undermined by the work of Gaspar Schioppius, a Roman acquaintance of Naudé, who supposedly found '499 impostures' in Scaliger's genealogy. Naudé, *Mascurat*, 24; 28.

of material consisting of reports, placards, coats of arms, quotes from various histories and the work of ancient poets, and general discussion of the Mancini genealogy is added in the second edition.[60]

As mentioned above, the sceptical remarks of Sainct-Ange provide the dynamic to the dialogue, constantly prompting Mascurat to provide more credible testimonies, which in the second edition finally lead to a more or less well-rounded genealogy. Often the former ridicules the genealogical enterprise itself.[61] Probably the most noteworthy of his critical questions encourages Mascurat to respond that Mazarin's modesty prevents him from employing a notable author to justify his nobility and write his family history. Mazarin reportedly even threatened to send a 'flatterer' that offered this service to the Bastille. Apparently, as he is depicted in the *Mascurat*, the cardinal shares Juvenal's opinion, who wrote "What's the use of pedigrees? What's the advantage, Ponticus, of being valued by the length of your bloodline, of displaying the painted portraits of ancestors, Aemiliani standing tall in their chariots"?[62] This passage quoted from Juvenal openly questions the merit of tracing descent through a long line of ancestors of noble blood and of showing portraits of ancestors.[63] Still Mascurat eventually contends that the cardinal would be well advised to defend his ancestry and secure the services of reliable scholars in Rome to unearth the evidence of various titles and gather testimonies that would indisputably prove the nobility of the Mazarin family.[64] This might reasonably be interpreted as an exhortation towards the cardinal. Although Naudé might have had (private) reservations about genealogical proofs of ancestry – as indicated for example by the 'meritocratic' plea in the final chapter of the *Considérations politiques* on the qualities of secret counsellors and ministers, but most definitely in the *Bibliographia Politica.*[65] During the conflict of the *Frondes* he undeniably saw the worth of firmly grounded leadership, void of weaknesses in relation to the *grands* and other ministers of state. Furthermore, though perhaps to a lesser degree, it compelled the people to obedience.

To undermine the image of the cardinal's avarice, his greed and ostentation Mascurat provides a contrasting picture of liberality, giving evidence of Mazarin's patronage of the Arts and his contributions to the scholarly world by virtue of the illustrious *Bibliothèque Mazarine* that was so

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[60] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 98-120/384-403/629-641 [absent on *84/294/447*].
[61] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 107 [absent on *84*].
[62] "Stemmata quid faciunt? Quid prodest, Pontice, longo / Sanguine censeri, pictosque ostendere vultus / Maiorum, & stantes in curribus Aemilianos […]?" Juvenal, Persius. *Juvenal and Persius.* Edited and translated by Susanna Morton Braund. Loeb Classical Library 91 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004) 322-323.
[63] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 27 [*22*].
[64] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 113 [absent on *84*].
[65] See Naudé, *Considérations politiques*, 191-198. In the *Bibliographia politica* Naudé downgrades genealogies to the lowest rank among historical works, when he writes: "Les livres enfin qui contiennent le dernier rang en l'histoire, sont ceux des origines, et de la descente, soit des peuples, soit des races et des familles, lesquels on appelle généalogies." Naudé, *Bibliographie politique*, 157.

expertly established by Naudé.[66] As in many other periods in history, in the early modern age scholars were common to have a wealthy patron for protection and to acquire the leisure necessary for scholarly work, and if they had no patron they attempted to find one through dedications of their works. If anything patronage was a reciprocal phenomenon, because the esteem of the Arts and sciences would reflect on the patron. It is this double image of patronage that Naudé uses here to restore Mazarin's reputation. Apart from dedicatory poems he quotes, undoubtedly the most interesting is a work of Latin verse entitled the *Juliade* by the poet Pierre d'Aulberoche[67] that praises the cardinal for establishing a public library in Paris to rival the Bodleian library of Oxford and the Ambrosian library in Milan. The Mazarine library outshines them all, not in the least by hosting famous scholars such as the philosopher Pierre Gassendi, the French astronomer Ismaël Boulliau and the exiled Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius, and providing all the means by which they could study and write their works of great merit.[68]

A third part of the *ad hominem*-level of argumentation in the *Mascurat*, one that on first glance seems rather difficult to reconcile with the former, is concerned with the financial situation of Cardinal Mazarin. In defending the *premier ministre* of the charges of being a usurper of the royal finances Mascurat compares the cardinal's circumstances with those of his predecessors, Cardinal Richelieu under King Louis XIII and the Duc de Sully under Henri IV.[69] Compared to these precursors Mazarin is in great need of royal pensions according to the defender of his case. For whereas they had plenty of titles, plenty of offices, plenty of great charges, plenty of *gouvernements*, possessions, and land rents, and they could easily do without a royal pension for their subsistence, Mazarin is not in such a position.[70] To invigorate his plea, Mascurat examines the titles of Richelieu and Sully. It speaks in favour of the cardinal, he concludes, that after seven years of service as *premier ministre*, in which he had notable successes and became appreciated by the entire royal family, he still owned no lands, property, or *gouvernement*. The cardinal is even a million *livres* poorer compared to when he was charged with the office that recently nearly cost him his life.[71] The case that Mascurat presents is clear; in full-blown contrast with the ill-speaking stories in the *mazarinades* Mazarin comes across as a man of frugal means in need of royal support, a plea that seems just as much an exaggeration as the one it counters.[72] As a defence against recurring accusations of financial malversation it probably did not suffice, but given the

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[66] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 237-246 [extension of *185-190*]
[67] Pierre d'Auberoche, *Eminentissimo principi Julio cardinali Mazarino* … (Paris: Antoine Coulon, 1644).
[68] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 244-246 [absent on *190*].
[69] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 263-369 [absent on 204].
[70] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 264-265 [absent on 204]. See Chapter I.
[71] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 266-267 [absent on 204].
[72] It must be noted here that there is a consensus in current historiography that Mazarin did in fact amass a very substantial fortune and the worst cliché's about him were rather true at least in terms of his getting rich. Ironically, historical research suggests that he was able to gather the greatest part of his fortune from the haphazard war-financing deals he made during and shortly after the *Frondes*. See Chapter I.

perceived need of an apology on this front the *Mascurat* was a forerunner to the financial defence that was never printed at the time, the *Crimes du Cardinal* written by Hugues de Lionne.[73]

Of a different nature is the fourth element on this level of argumentation, which is concerned with Mazarin's diplomatic expertise that, according to Mascurat, has always favoured France. From early on Giulio Mazarini's diplomatic work revealed his inclination to the French kingdom, especially from the time when as a papal legate he was involved in the peace negotiations that sought to make an end to the War of the Mantuan Succession (1628-1631).[74] Indeed, modern historiography still ascribes an important role to the papal envoy in avoiding open warfare between French and Spanish troops, and presents accounts that sound similar to those presented by Mascurat. When these two troops stood head to head near Casale it was Mazarin that urged the Spanish, who outnumbered the French, not to attack and instead proceed with the peace negotiations and sign a treaty.[75] While Mascurat says that the sole glory in preventing this battle on which depended the liberty or servitude (*la liberté ou l'esclavage*) of Italy must be bestowed on Mazarin, modern historiography still maintains that in the Mantuan affair the name of Mazarin first became known to the world of European international affairs.[76] Most significant for Mascurat are Mazarin's personal merits to make himself agreeable with all those with whom he dealt. Therefore it does not matter how well he followed the orders of the Pope to prevent with all his might that the city of Casale would fall in Spanish hands or how large his specific inclination towards France may have been.[77] Here as elsewhere in the text it is the diplomatic prowess of Mazarin that not only should hold him in great esteem, but also renders him the most qualified to govern France. Again, this is a matter to which modern historians have drawn attention.[78] In

[73] See M. Laurain-Portemer, *Etudes mazarines: II. Une tête à gouverner quatre empires* (Paris: De Boccard, 1981).
[74] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 408-421 [absent on *297*].
[75] Cf. Bély, *La France au XVIIe siècle*, 204-206 and Pierre Goubert, *Mazarin* (Paris: Fayard, 1990). Mascurat's discussion of the affair is found in Naudé, *Mascurat*, 404-406; 409-421. As he reports it, the story is as follows, "Les armées étaient si proches à s'entrechoquer que la mousqueterie avait déjà commencé à jouer son jeu: Pendant cela le *Mazarin* sort de l'armée Espagnole, essuie quantité de mousquetades qu'on lui tirait de la notre, et avec un coup de chapeau, comme l'on fait en Norvège, apaisa la tempête! Il dit en suite que la Paix était conclue, fait avancer les Généraux des deux armées, leur déclare à cheval les conditions du Traité, et puis les fait embrasser, le tout avec une merveilleuse diligence et industrie." Naudé, *Mascurat*, 409-410 [absent on *297*]. It is not astounding that modern accounts so closely resemble Naudé's description of Mazarin's role in evading a collision of armies close to the city of Casale, the peace negotiations there, and the Peace of Cherasco that followed in 1631, since the latter already was a synthesis of the available reports and historical narratives of the day. Naudé refers to and quotes from Scipion Dupleix (*Histoire de Louis le Juste* [1637]), Charles Bernard (*Histoire du Roy Louys XIII* [1646]), Michel Baudier (*Histoire du Mareschal Toiras* [1644]), Pier Giovanni Capriata [*Della Istoria libri dodici* [1639]), Vittorio Siri (*Il Mercurio overo Historia de' correnti tempi* [1644]), and the *Mercure François* (volume sixteen [1632] and seventeen [1633]), a wealth of contemporary historiography.
[76] Bély, *La France au XVIIe siècle*, 205.
[77] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 416-417.
[78] Bély, *La France au XVIIe siècle*, 300.

hindsight Mazarin's greatest merit was his power of negotiation. Naudé used this quality to defend the cardinal's reputation, in the second edition ever more strongly than the first.

Finally, the *ad hominem*-level of argumentation concerns the allegations, so common in the *mazarinades*, having something to do with the fact that Mazarin is a non-native Frenchman. Again Sainct-Ange comes close to being the mouthpiece of these pamphlets as he contends that foreigners always know less of 'our affairs' than those who are nursed in it. Here it is not a question of the legal status of foreigners, a matter to which we shall soon return; it is a question of their reported ignorance of knowledge essential for certain offices. Follows a discussion in which Mascurat argues that ignorance of French jurisprudence or typically French eloquence does not render one incapable to further the interests of the French kingdom. As a matter of fact, these accusations of ignorance are slander. His legal education notwithstanding, Mazarin's capacities as *ministre d'état* do not consist in knowledge of the practice of Parisian laws or the trickery of the Bar, what Mascurat is stressing above all are the unsurpassed qualities of the cardinal as a statesman.[79]

Whether it is due to the 'firmly' attested nobility of his family, his patronage of the Arts, his strong dependence on the king, or his specific diplomatic skills, Cardinal Mazarin's personal reputation needs to be re-established and Naudé devotes a growing number of pages to his particular argument of vindication. It is not our purpose here to question the validity of these arguments, though the information in Chapter I may leave us to doubt some of them. Nevertheless, it seems notable and is probably non-coincidental that modern historians still value Mazarin for some of these qualities. That is, if one is willing to see through the obvious exaggerations and the mask of the dialogical *procédé*.

Legal arguments

The second level of argumentation is that of legal arguments. These arguments are used to (1.) rebut as illegal the *Arrest* issued by the Parisian *Parlement* against Cardinal Mazarin on 8 January 1649 after the king's flight from Paris; (2.) to deny any relevance to the *Arrest* of 1617 - against foreign statesmen on important positions in France – because it was limited to a specific case, that of Louis XIII's *coup d'état* against Concini, and therefore irrelevant in the case of Mazarin, who had been a naturalized French nobleman since 1639; (3.) to deny the *Parlement* its claimed financial authority; and, finally, (4.) to render libel illegal, by which persons ordering, writing, and distributing *mazarinades* are made liable to this crime.

As Naudé's main protagonist describes it, the Parlement's *Arrest* of 8 January 1649 that decried Cardinal Mazarin as *perturbateur du repos public* had been "tumultuary", "impossible to sustain",

[79] Naudé, Mascurat, 424-430 [absent on *300*].

"neither legitimate, nor valid".[80] Mascurat sets out to show that the queen regent and the king were right to annul the verdict, as was the *Parlement* in finally not insisting on its execution. He says that in the case of the *Arrest* the Parlement resembles "a dog that attacks a stone when it cannot touch the one who threw it at him". In fact, the queen regent, the Duc d'Orléans and the Prince de Condé all declared in *lettres expresses* that in the night of 6 January the king left the city of Paris that was subsequently blocked upon their counsel and advice. The cardinal, the minister of their choice, then became the object of the people's hatred.[81] He does not mean to incriminate even higher authorities than the *premier ministre*, Mascurat attests. Just as much as everyone, Naudé deplores what is called the "abduction of the king" (*l'enlèvement du roi*) as well as the siege of Paris, but he is sure these two actions were not undertaken on the insistence of the cardinal. If Mazarin consented to these actions then only because he was outvoted by a plurality of voices in the *Conseil d'enhaut*.[82] Ignorant of the true causes for the queen mother and her principal minister's decision to leave the capital with the king, the people of Paris directed their anger at the cardinal. Should the people have been aware, they would admire and benign the clemency of the queen, the moderation of Gaston d'Orléans, the great restraint of the Prince de Condé, and the mildness of Mazarin. For after having driven the city of Paris to the edge of the precipice by the blockade, the government has given the possibility to retreat, ensured the passage of provisions and the opening of peace conferences. Compared to the ruin of the Alsace in the Thirty Years' War,[83] Paris has suffered little and the queen regent never intended to treat the capital with the same rigueur. It was a fair beating, but one with truncheons of cotton and wool (*bâtons de laine et cotton*).[84]

A number of circumstances invalidate the 8 January Arrest. Mascurat does not so much want to say that it were unjust. The departure of the king, the interdiction of the four sovereign courts and the blockage of Paris do give it some appearance of legitimacy.[85] The illegitimacy of the verdict, however, is caused by a lacking legal procedure, the ordinary formalities for such a declaration were not observed by the judges of the *Parlement* and the whole thing was prepared

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[80] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 295; 331.
[81] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 297-298.
[82] Here I use Naudé's proper name because in the text this opinion, to which Mascurat agrees, is defended under his own name. Naudé, *Mascurat*, 132-133 [= *96*].
[83] Mascurat takes these German lands and the city of Philippsbourg as example of the ruin of the Thirty Years' War that he experienced first hand. This is an account based on Naudé's own experiences in traveling the German lands wrecked by warfare in search of books for the cardinal's library. Naudé was in Phillipsbourg in November 1646 as he reported from Basle in a letter to the French ambassador in Venice Grémonville dated 29 November 1646. He visited the city to buy some specific books for the Mazarine library from the library of the archbishop of Trier. As he recounts, this library, however, did not survive the vicissitudes of the war intact and Naudé returned without the sought books, but not emptyhanded as he bought some bulk of books. Wolfe, *Lettres de Naudé à Gremonville*, 45 (letter vii). Cf. Jill Bepler, "Vicissitudo Temporum: Book Collecting in the Thirty Years' War", *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 32:4 (2001) 953-968.
[84] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 300.
[85] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 328-329.

with great haste, "as it were in a Gallic tumult, perfunctorily, and by fear and impulse rather than by reason".[86] Only twelve of the numerous judges of the *Parlement* made an effort to proscribe the cardinal. Two days later, upon the refusal to hear the royal advocates and conscient of the news that the city had been blocked, the cardinal was haphazardly condemned and proscribed by the Assembled Chambers. Never had a legal case been less informed nor had there been any more contrary to the just procedures, Mascurat claims. The sole foundation of the verdict was Mazarin's undeserved notoriety. Undeserved, for neither had he ever been the queen's sole counsellor, nor was he ever as absolute under Anne's regency as Cardinal Richelieu had been under Louis XIII. Mazarin only held fourth place in the royal council's (*conseil d'enhaut*) deliberations. He is constrained to accord many things with the queen, the Duc d'Orléans, and the Prince out of respect and a wish not to offend their authority. Also the cardinal-minister is most disposed towards maintaining the authority of the king and the queen, and the rights of the Crown during this long minority rule, in the aftermath of a long and universal war, and among a people that had felt its pressure for thirty years before Mazarin ever started his ministry. Adding the intrigue and cabals of the cabinet and the court, the factions of disgruntled Princes and *Seigneurs*, Spanish intelligence, too severe reformations in the administration quasi without passing them through the *Parlement*, the fear of concluding a peace that would benefit the Spanish in light of the great advantage the French have over them on the battlefield, etcetera, these circumstances may well have acquitted the cardinal from the verdict passed on January 8, 1649.[87]

There are also other instances in the *Mascurat* where the legal tradition of the *Parlement*, as it was employed against the cardinal, is discussed and rebutted. One of these occasions is the discussion of a pamphlet entitled *Raisons d'Estat contre le ministre Estranger* that claimed that Mazarin would not be able to govern the affairs of France in the quality of a foreigner, a subject of the King of Spain even, and uses a parliamentarian *Arrest* of 1617 employed against the former royal favourite Concini to enforce this claim.[88] Mascurat vehemently rejects this claim, in fact men of standing (*les gens de bien*), good politicians (*les bons politiques*), and the disinterested, never discredited the quality of being a foreigner for a government office. This quality has only ever served as a pretext for the factitious, the envious, and the enemies of state (*ennemis de l'État*).[89] In order to account for the claim that foreigners have always served in the political affairs of France Mascurat quotes a passage from the famous *La Grande Monarchie de France* (1519) of Claude de Seyssel (ca. 1450-1520), former Bishop of Marseille and Roman ambassador to King

[86] "*tanquam in tumultu Gallico, tuburcinatim, et potius metu et impetu quam ratione*." Naudé, *Mascurat*, 329.
[87] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 329-331.
[88] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 350-353.
[89] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 351.

Louis XII.[90] Even though Sainct-Ange seems convinced by the authority of the passage, Mascurat wants to present real reasons and examples that can support the opinion of Seyssel and present them for the contenders of Mazarin to judge. First, Mascurat attests that Mazarin had an inclination towards France, because in fact the Spanish have asked him for his services when he was negotiating in Milan in the late 1620s but he refused. Furthermore, he asks, has anyone ever found it strange that kings, emperors or sovereign princes have chosen foreign physicians, have taken foreign wives, who might end up ruling in a regency, or employed foreign tutors for the princes? Similarly, "free peoples" even often choose strangers to rule over them, like the Polish who chose a French prince as their sovereign, who later became Henri III of France.[91]

It is clear from Mascurat's account that history and practical experience takes precedence over parlementarian 'theoretical' and legal considerations. In an interesting moment, after examples from Biblical and secular history, Mascurat directly addresses the *frondeurs*, saying, "do you see, gentlemen, who so easily condemn (*qui anathematisez si facilement*) foreign ministers, how ignorant you are of our Histories, and that if perchance you have studied the Bible more, you have not understood it well. And if I said to you, Sainct Ange, that there are well-proven lists of more than eighty foreigners who have all very loyally and very prudently handled the most important affairs of this kingdom. What would you say, what esteem would you have of these bringers of *Avis*, these porters of *Anathema*?"[92] If anything, the quality of foreigner renders the cardinal more capable of governing French affairs than natives, because of his disinterestedness as against their ambition and passionate interests.[93]

Later on in the dialogue Mascurat tries to prove that the *Arrêt* of 1617 that purportedly excluded foreigners from the government of France actually has no general legal status. Mascurat thinks it is just as much a popular fault in the realm of politics to believe that there was such an arrest, as is the idea of frogs falling from the sky in philosophy, the subject of their latest digression. The *Arrest* of 1617, reported from the work of the historian Jean-Baptiste Legrain, merely consists of a few lines inserted in the condemnation of Maréchal d'Ancre, Concino Concini, and his wife: "*la Cour a declaré & declare tous Estrangers incapables de tenir Offices, Benefices, honneurs, & dignitez, Gouvernemens, & Capitaineries en ce Royaume, suivant les Edicts & Ordonnances.*"[94] The *Arrest* only applies to a specific case in French history and is no law describing the office of *premier ministre*, Mascurat argues. What is more, Giulio Mazarini is no

[90] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 352-353 (= *absent on 271*). The passage is actually quoted from Johann Sleidan's Latin translation (*De republica Galliæ*, 1548. Book II, p. 54) of Claude de Seyssel's *La Grande Monarchie de France* (1519) IV partie, chapitre III. It features among the passages added to the text in the second edition. See Appendix 5.
[91] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 354-355.
[92] Idem, 369-370. Both *Avis* and *Anathema* were oft-encountered terms in the titles of *mazarinades*.
[93] Idem, 371-374.
[94] Idem, 434.

foreigner at all. People are always considered foreign until they have acquired a *lettre de naturalité*, making them naturalized Frenchman. Now Mascurat boasts it has been "almost twenty years" since the cardinal got his *lettre de naturalité* and took the name Jules Mazarin.[95] Finally, and most notably, Mascurat shows that by royal declaration, on his deathbed Louis XIII appointed Mazarin *Ministre de l'Estat* of the regency's council. After quoting these royal declarations, Mascurat rhetorically asks what further proof of the legitimacy of Mazarin's ministry needs to be provided, as the *Parlement* itself confirmed these declarations.[96] Thus we see that in respecting the common procedure of the legislative process, Naudé, through the personage of Mascurat, does not so much undermine the *Parlement*'s position in this process, but establishes the legitimacy of Mazarin's government on the basis of the *Parlement*'s authority.

Yet another set of legal arguments is used against the libellous pamphlets themselves. Mascurat uses three types of legal sources to render these pamphlets illegal, the Roman law tradition, 'municipal law' - here denoting the *Politiæ ac reipublicæ imperialis constitutio* of the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V -, and canon law. However, before looking at a selection of these passages we must note that Mascurat limits and nuances his position. Those pamphlets that were published since the kings' day (6 January) until the first conference of Rueil (4-11 March 1649) can be legitimated or at least excused by the law of war, *iure belli*. In this period the people of Paris, locked in the city and starved, had reason to be armed and to carry things to extremes.[97] Writing, publishing, and diffusing libellous pamphlets are at least excusable by the law of war, for the siege of Paris can be described in terms of war. This does not apply to the authors of other pamphlets written during the two peace conferences – the aforementioned conference at Rueil and the one at Saint-Germain (16-30 March) – with no other purpose than to hinder, break up, or delay the deliberations. Albeit they were pardoned before the courts of man (*in foro fori*) and part of the general absolution granted by the queen regent to the city of Paris, these hack writers shall nevertheless not be forgiven before God (*in foro poli*) because of their bad intentions to prolong the war, to set French people up against one another, to favour the factitious, and for having

[95] In fact Mazarin only received the papers of his naturalisation in 1639, which would rather make it ten than twenty years at the moment of the *Mascurat*'s publication.

[96] "Or après tous ces établissements si précis, ces déclarations et confirmations si solennelles, ces dernières paroles du plus grand Roy du monde, reçues et autorisées par le premier et plus auguste *Parlement* qui soit en France, et confirmées par une action et protestation si remarquable, y a-t'il quelque exception, ou rescision à faire, peut-on s'y opposer sous quelque prétexte que ce soit? mais les peut-on annuler et casser sans choquer la Justice, renverser les lois, mépriser l'autorité Royale, et détruire entièrement ce qu'il y a de plus saint et de plus vénérable dans la société humaine [...] [L]a Reyne étant en état et en plein pouvoir et autorité absolue de retrancher le Cardinal *Mazarin* du nombre des Ministres [...] [le Parlement] jugeait bien que cette élection du *Cardinal* au Ministériat était légitime, tant de son côté, puis qu'il n'avait aucune exclusion ou empêchement qui l'en pût priver, que de celui premièrement du Roy, et puis de la Reyne, qui pouvaient jeter les yeux, et appeler à cette charge qui bon leur semblait; aussi n'y apporta-t'il aucun empêchement [...]." Idem, 436-437.

[97] Idem, 656.

served themselves of so many ruses, deceptions, and impostures to attain their design.[98] The pamphlets written between the two peace conferences are thus less excusable; even though the queen regent had included them in her pardon to the city of Paris, the people involved with these pieces shall be held accountable by God.

Conscious that the storm of pamphlets is not over yet, Mascurat turns to all other pamphlets excluded in the former two categories. Once the Declaration of the Peace was published the legal situation changed. If authors of the *mazarinades* continued their ill-tempered blaming of the cardinal or the other ministers, if they could not withstand the desire to blacken their reputation, if they wanted to cry war or sedition, if they spoke ill of the sovereign or those in his vicinity, the magistrate shall be obliged to use the penalties and torture instituted by the laws to remedy these disorders.[99]

It is here that the three categories of laws really come into the fore.[100] In the Roman civil law tradition, presented here as a single body of legislation, the penalty for writing libellous pamphlets is capital punishment. For instance this becomes clear in the passage from the "Constitutions Decemvirales" or Law of the Twelve Tables (as reported in Cicero's *de Republica* IV): "though our Twelve Tables had prescribed the death penalty for very few crimes, among those so punished was the crime of anyone who brought ill repute or disgrace on another by chanting or composing verses aimed at him".[101] Here Cicero writes that, although very frugal in sanctioning capital punishment, the laws of the Twelve Tables included the offence of composing or publicly reciting verses of libel in order to cast dishonour and infamy on a fellow-citizen among the capital offences. Mascurat closes his statement on 'le droit Civil' with the observation that even people reading, requesting, or holding such pamphlets are accomplices to the misdeeds and punished accordingly.[102]

In 'municipal law', although to be decided on by each individual kingdom, similar laws against libel are to be found. Mascurat shows that Charles V's *Politiæ ac reipublicæ imperialis constitutio* (Augsburg, 1548) decreed anyone writing, vending, buying, and holding to be apprehended and

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[98] Idem, 656-657.

[99] Idem, 657. In their correspondence during the *Frondes* Naudé at one point rather irritatedly exhorts his patron Mazarin to set an example by putting authors and/or printers of the *mazarinades* on the wheel and killing them "more cruelly than Ravaillac". Letter 31, Naudé to Mazarin, 8 April 1652. Naudé (ed. Wolfe), *Considérations politiques sur la Fronde*, 128.

[100] Could it be coincidental that Naudé cites similar sources as Cardinal Richelieu had done in a manuscript mémoire on the legislation of libel of 1626? On this highly interesting political memoir see, Catteeuw, *Censures et raisons d'État*, 301-312.

[101] Idem, 658. Mascurat quotes this passage (originally found in Cicero, *de Republica* IV, 12) from Augustine's *de Civitate Dei* 1.9. "Nostræ contra duodecim tabulæ, cum perpaucas res capite sanxissent, in his hanc quoque sanciendam putauerunt, si quis occentauisset, siue Carmen condidisset, quod infamiam faceret, flagitiumque alteri."

[102] Idem, 659-660.

incarcerated.[103] Finally, Mascurat attest that whilst canon law is not as rigorous, in some interpretations it still demands the penalty of excommunication for those who speak ill of a churchman. This might not seem much of a remedy, confesses Mascurat, but it should inflict fear since it is the spiritual form of capital punishment.[104] Having thus established his 'legal argumentation' against libellous pamphlets - notwithstanding the fact that due to its complete absence one is left to wonder whether no French or Parisian legislation on the subject existed - Mascurat concludes with the advice that if the insolence and exuberance of these writers continues after the Declaration has been published and the Peace ratified, they should be prosecuted not so much like madmen, but as murderers, that is to say as pests of the state (*pestes de l'État*) and true *perturbateurs du repos public*. And that if they cannot be cut away like gangrenous limbs, because they are unknown to society at large, then these authors should be excommunicated from the congregation of the faithful and left to the devil.[105] In this final remark we observe that excommunication is presented as a solution to the problem of anonymity of the vast majority of the *mazarinades*. By excommunicating the anonymous authors and patrons of their libellous endeavours they are punished in their consciences, because in spite of the fact that they are unknown to society at large, God will know their 'identities' and will hold them accountable for the crime of destroying the tranquillity of the state.

Politics, religion and morality in Naudé's political thought

Before turning to the third level of argumentation and our analysis of the use and function of the terminology of *raison d'état* in the *Mascurat*, let us look at Naudé's understanding of this terminology in the 'theoretical' counterpart to his political apology of Cardinal Mazarin, the *Considérations politiques sur les coups d'Estat*. Here his treatment of the relationship between politics on the one hand, and religion and morality on the other comes into view.

Naudé's contribution to the literature on *raison d'état* that he conceded to be in vogue lay in a redistribution or redefinition of the gradations and the language of political cynicism used to

[103] Idem, 660. Naudé presents an excerpt from chapter 34 of Charles V's *Politiæ ac reipublicæ imperialis constitutio* (Augsburg, 1548) found on page 32. The whole passage reads: "Quin vbi eiusmodi aut similes libelli, scripturæ, picturæ fusiles & sculptiles, seu res fictiles impressæ, aliasve extarent, aut in futurum ederentur, publicarentur, circumferrentur, & venderentur, eæ auferantur a venditoribus, ac omnibus modis supprimantur: Nec quidem venditor tantummodo, sed & emptor, aliique penes quos eiusmodi libri famosi, aut picturæ, pasquilli, aliive tales scripti, picti, aut impressi reperiantur, in carcerem coniiciantur, & criminaliter, vel per quæstionem interrogentur, vnde & a quo tales libros, picturas, aut scripturas acceperint. Et si autor ipse aut alius quisquis fuerit, a quo captiuus eiusmodi scripta, picturas, aut libros acceperit, sub eodem magistratu habitaret aut commoraretur: illico idem quoque comprehendatur, & incarceretur: si vero sub alio magistratu habitaret, ei statim per illum magistratum vbi primus venditor, aut tentor talium scripturarum deprehensus fuerit, significetur ac iudicetur, & in eum tamdiu inquiretur, donec author ipse inueniatur, qui ex tunc vna cum illis circumferentibus, vendentibus, aliaque donantibus, via, vique iuris & iuxta qualitatem & conditionem causæ corripiatur ac puniatur."
[104] Idem, 661-663.
[105] Idem, 664-665.

describe political reality. His preoccupation was with the most extreme forms of political action tied up with the most extraordinary and absolute necessity. Based on a critique of first Lipsius, than Botero, and finally Clapmarius, Naudé developed a three-level order of political action in his *Considérations politiques* – the ordinary, the extraordinary, and the exceptional. In contrast to the books by Silhon and Balzac referred to in the book's preface, Naudé is not concerned with the virtues of the prince and his ministers or the system of government; his concern is the art of governing or political prudence.[106]

Strikingly Naudé defines prudence to be a moral and political virtue, "which has no other end than to find out the different Turns, the best and easiest Contrivances of managing and accomplishing that Design which a Man proposes".[107] One immediately notices that this definition practically incorporates no moral inhibition or qualification whatsoever. As one scholar recently put it, the reaction to the demands of necessity inherent in political action seems to decide about the moral quality of the action, even though the act itself might go against Christian ethics. Naudé completely reverses the relationship between morality and politics; the success rate of political action determines its moral quality.[108] What is more, when prudence is defined as a political virtue there seem to be no restrictions as to what sort of person should apply this virtue. Man in general uses it to further his ends. If it is true that Naudé's negative views on the common people do constrain this universality, that still overrides the traditional restricted view of its application by princes and their counsellors only.

Let us review Naudé's three-level critique of contemporary authors to arrive at his own exposition of political prudence used in the exceptional political action of the *coups d'état*. First he undermines Lipsius' treatment of *prudentia mixta* as incongruent with the political virtue of prudence and as a whole incorporates the Fleming's tripartite scale of fraud within his own category of ordinary political action. Naudé opens the second chapter of his *Considérations politiques* with a translation of Lipsius' general definition of prudence as found in the *Politica* I, vii: "a Choice and Trial of such things as are to be avoided or desired".[109] As one scholar remarked, this definition might have had the immediate merit for Naudé of escaping the restrictions to prudence within the strict borders of the Christian moral system.[110] After giving the general

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[106] Yves-Charles Zarka, "Raison d'État, maximes d'État et coups d'État chez Gabriel Naudé", in Yves-Charkes Zarka (ed.), *Raison et déraison d'État, théoriciens et théories de la raison d'État aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles* (Paris, 1994), 154.

[107] Naudé, (tr. Dr. King), *Political considerations*, 30. In the original French it says: "laquelle n'a autre but que de rechercher le divers biais, & les meilleures & plus faciles inventions de traitter, & faire réussir les affaires que l'homme se propose." Naudé, *Considérations politiques*, 33.

[108] Jean-Pierre Cavaillé, "Naudé, la prudence extraordinaire du coup d'État", *Comètes: Prudentia et Virtute, Des fins de la prudence dans la France des xvie et xviie siècles* (2006), online.

[109] Naudé, (tr. Dr. King), *Political considerations*, 29. Original French: "un choix et triage des choses qui sont à fuir, ou à desirer". Naudé, *Considerations politiques*, 31.

[110] Cavaillé, "Naudé, la prudence extraordinaire du coup d'État", op. cit.

Lipsian definition of prudence, Naudé goes on to describe the same author's concept of *prudentia mixta*. In the *Politica* (IV, xiii and xiv) Lipsius attested that sometimes it is necessary to mix prudence with a bit of fraud. He defined fraud as "clever planning which departs from virtue or the laws, in the interest of the king and the kingdom" before distinguishing between a light, middle and grave form of *fraus*.[111] These forms, departing ever further from virtue, include distrust and dissimulation; bribery and deception; and perfidy and injustice, respectively. Lipsius condemned the third form of fraud, but this constraint can be shown to be limited due to the ambiguity in the rest of the chapter. Naudé briefly discusses this part of Lipsius' "commonplace book" and gives several quotations used in this chapter to cautiously defend Machiavelli.[112] It is important to notice that for the Parisian the definition of fraud provided by Lipsius is essentially a definition of *prudence melée.* For Naudé the water comes with the wine. In the realm of politics there is virtually no room for pure prudence, it is always mixed with some degree of fraud. Therefore, Naudé claims that the Lipsian qualifications to prudence are useless and rejects *prudentia mixta* as a special category. Ordinary prudence keeps the beaten path, without exceeding the laws and customs at hand, and comprises of all the particulars that moral philosophers normally speak of when discussing this virtue, as well as including all three forms of *fraus* distinguished by Lipsius. Naudé "considers well the Necessity that Politicians have of" all these forms of fraud and recognizes that these ordinary forms of political prudence are practised on a daily basis, legitimately so, and not by princes only.[113]

To support his critique Naudé quotes Charron, who wrote that the justice, virtue and probity of a sovereign moves in a different sphere than that of private individuals, and "takes a larger and freer Compass from the Grandeur, Weightiness and Danger of his Burden".[114] He uses his intellectual godfather's distinction between the prudence of common people and prudence of politicians to show that in politics other norms count. Then he quotes the commonplace adage "to play the fox with the fox" and contends that herein consists the "paideia" of governing well.[115] What clearly seems to bother Naudé, especially in Lipsius is the moral scruple that continues to disturb the conscience of the political actor and which makes him conceive of his actions as inevitably impure. Immoral it certainly is in view of common morality, but politics cannot always

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[111] Justus Lipsius (ed. and tr. Jan Waszink), *Politica: six books of politics or political instruction* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 2004), 512-3.
[112] Cf. Waszink, "Introduction", in Lipsius (ed. Waszink), *Politica,* 98-102.
[113] Naudé, (tr. Dr. King), *Political considerations*, 31; Naudé, *Considérations politiques*, 34 [no number].
[114] Naudé, (tr. Dr. King), *Political considerations*, 31.
[115] It seems implausible to uphold the claim that this famous Latin dictum *cum vulpe junctum* (*pariter*) *vulpinarier* comes directly from chapter 13 of Lipsius' *Politica*. Of course, Naudé must have encountered it there, but he also read a translation of it in Charron, as well as he had undoubtedly seen it in Erasmus' *Adagia* I.ii.28. Also the analogy of "playing the fox with the fox" in itself is not a reference to Machiavelli, however Peter Donaldson makes it clear that in unison with the word 'paideia' this can be but a reference to Scioppius and thus Machiavelli. Donaldson, *Machiavelli and Mystery of State*, 166-167.

be in accordance with ordinary Christian ethics. For Naudé, as long as he pursues legitimate ends – the public wellbeing – the political actor is flawless.[116] Naudé explicitly criticizes Lipsius: "What Necessity therefore is there of setting up a particular Prudence by the Name of mixt, on which such Actions should depend (…) since they all come under the Head of Ordinary Prudence: and such Artifices are every Day taught by the Politicians, urg'd in their Arguments, enforc'd by their Ministers, and practis'd without any Suspicion of Injustice as being the principal Rules and Maxims for the well governing of States and Empires."[117] Even in its gravest forms Lipsian mixed prudence is ordinary, because deceit is nothing but ordinary to political prudence. What essentially happens here is that Charron unscrewed the hinges of the door that Naudé was to kick in. For instance, where Lipsius cautiously accepts that there might be occasions for killing without legal basis, a prudent statement found amongst tons of quotations from classical authors, Charron states it in plain French, although still somewhat careful and circuitous, after whom Naudé sets out to defend the murder of the thousands of Huguenots on St. Bartholomew's day 1572, treating them simply as a dangerous political faction. Naudé's approach of the matter, giving numerous historical examples, makes the contemplations of his predecessors more tangible and practical.

Secondly, Naudé dismisses Giovanni Botero's definition of *ragione di stato* – or what the French would call *maximes d'État* – due to its vagueness, since it covers all the dimensions of the political without distinction. The Parisian deems Botero's definition of *ragione di stato* as the "knowledge of measures proper for the Foundation, Preservation, and Increase of a Dominion" too broad.[118] The explication of "others", i.e. Scipione Ammirato, suits him better. Paraphrasing the Italian historian, Naudé defined *ragione di stato* or *maximes d'État* more specifically as *excessum iuris communis propter bonum commune*, that is to say, an "Encroaching upon common Right for the common Good".[119] Upon this definition the Parisian develops his idea of extraordinary political action. There is no law of nations, no civil or natural law according to which these *maximes* can be presumed lawful. Among the exempla of *maximes d'état* that Naudé provides are the conjugal

[116] Cavaillé, "Naudé, la prudence extraordinaire du coup d'État", op. cit.
[117] Naudé (tr. Dr. King), *Political considerations*, 33. Original French: "À quoi faire doncque établir une prudence particuliere et meslée, de laquelle ces actions dépendent particulierement, comme fait Juste Lipse, puisqu'elles se peuvent rapporter à l'ordinaire, et que telles ruses sont tous les jours enseignées par les Politiques, inserées dans leurs raisonnements, persuadées par les Ministres, et pratiquées sans aucun soupçon d'injustice, comme estant les principales regles et maximes pour bien policer et administrer les Estats et Empires." Naudé, *Considérations politiques*, 36.
[118] Naudé gives it in the Italian (slightly different from Botero's original): "la Ragione di stato, è notitia di mezzi atti, a fundare, conseruare, è ampliare, vn Dominio". Naudé, *Considerations politiques*, 59.
[119] In fact this definition was borrowed from the Italian of Scipione Ammirato and translated into Latin: "Ragion di stato altro non essere che contrauenzione di ragione ordinaria per rispetto di publico beneficio, ouero per rispetto di maggiore e piu universal ragione" Scipione Ammirato, *Discorsi sopra Cornelio Tacito* (Florence: Filippo Giunti, 1594), XII.i, 231.

politics of Claudius and Tiberius as mentioned by Tacitus in the *Annales*[120]; the breaking of leagues and 'balance of power' considerations as described by Livy[121]; the killing of prisoners of war; and 'national customs' such as the Salic law of succession in France.[122] Naudé presents the formalisation of the Salic Law in the 1580s as no more than an action by good and loyal Frenchmen (*bons et fideles François*) by means of which the integrity of the French kingdom was preserved and protected against the League and the invasion of the Spanish.[123] There is no legal or just basis for these "rigorous, severe, and difficult"[124] extraordinary political actions other than that they protect the governmental status quo from internal and external enemies.

Finally, by way of a critique of Arnoldus Clapmarius' (mis-)understanding of the secret nature of *arcana imperii* a third category of truly exceptional political action is distinguished, the *coups d'état*. The fault many writers on politics and Clapmarius in particular made according to Naudé lay in their desire to reduce these 'secrets of state' to general precepts, seeing them as no more than the diverse means, reasons and counsels of which princes serve themselves in order to maintain their authority and the governmental status quo (*l'état du public*) without transgressing common law or giving any suspicion of fraud or injustice.[125] Upon this presupposition Clapmarius divided the *arcana imperiorum* in two kinds. The first he called "secrets of Empire, or Republics", which he again subdivided into six different forms according to Aristotle's tripartite description of governmental systems and their degenerate forms.[126] For each type of government he gives certain means and reasons to rule by, so as to prevent becoming a different system or a degenerate form. The second kind are called "secrets of domination" that rulers are obliged to administer for the conservation of their authority, whether the government be monarchical, aristocratic or popular.[127]

However, Naudé critically assesses, calling these practices "secrets of state" is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of this exceptional form of political action. The words "secret" and "arcane" may never be attributed to precepts and maxims of a science that is common,

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[120] See Tacitus, *Annals* I.13.ii (LCL 312), 318-319. Naudé quotes the following maxim or *sententia* from Tacitus, "let the sovereign […] ensure that a princess of tried fecundity, still in the vigour of youth, should not transfer the glory of the Caesars into another family".

[121] Naudé refers to Livy, *History of Rome* XLII.46 (LCL 332), 428-429: "if they did not succeed with their entreaties, they must act to prevent authority and power over everything coming into the hands of a single people."

[122] Naudé cites what he calls the formal text of this law: "Francorum Regni successor masculus esto." Naudé, *Considérations politiques*, 64.

[123] Ibidem.

[124] The categories Naudé used to describe extraordinary prudence. Naudé, *Considérations politiques*, 33.

[125] Naudé, *Considérations politiques*, 37.

[126] Aristotle, *Politics* III and IV.

[127] Naudé here (ibidem) refers to the argumentation of Book 2, subdivision of *arcana imperii* in chapter I, further explanation and examples in the other chapters of this book, and Book 3, chapter I contains the subdivision of the *arcana dominationis*, from Clapmarius, *De arcanis imperiorum* (Bremen: Johann Wessel, 1605), 48-50; 97-99.

understood and practiced by anyone.[128] They only fit those actions that for some reason should neither be commonly known nor divulged. Having shown how Clapmarius and others have corrupted these words, he also argues these authors have deprived the *arcana imperiorum* of their nature by proposing general precepts and universal maxims founded upon justice and the law of sovereignty, who are consequently permitted and practiced every day, seen and known by everyone. These actions can therefore never qualify as *coups d'état*, which he defines, emphasizing their exceptional nature, as "Bold and extraordinary Actions, which Princes are constrain'd to execute when their Affairs are difficult and almost to be despair'd of, contrary to the common Right, without observing any Order or Form of Justice, but hazarding particular Interest for the good of the Publick."[129]

Two qualifications need to be borne in mind. On the one hand, *coups* are always (to be) kept concealed until after the fact. While the actions guided by *maximes d'état* are always preceded by formalities of legitimization, for example manifestos and declarations 'proving' them lawful, the *coups d'état* remain obscure and are only seen by their "equitable and just" effects. In analogies abundant in baroque symbolism the *coups* are presented as lightning struck before thunder is heard and prayers said before the church bell has rung.[130] The rationality or the legitimation of this extreme form of political action lays completely in the success and consequences of the actions. Naudé provides a list of notable political murders, such as that of the Count of St. Paul under Louis XI and Marshal de Biron under Henri IV, that qualify as *coups d'état*. On the other hand, even if the actions are preceded by the aforementioned formalities, when they profane religion or are of extraordinary nature and have immense consequences for the better or detriment of the state, Naudé still considers them *coups d'état*. It is clear from the examples he chooses – Romulus, Numa, Mohammed and others – that those political actions that involve religious trickery are the most important for Naudé – "ces ruses n'ont pas toujours été inutiles".[131]

This religious trickery can be seen most vividly in Naudé's discussion of what he calls the two "diminutive sorts of Politicks", the 'monastic' and the 'œconomic'. Naudé presents a kind of Aristotelian tripartition of government: *la monastique*, or the government of the self;

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[128] The etymology of *arcana* that Naudé dismisses is found in Clapmarius, *De arcanis imperiorum* I.iii.

[129] Naudé, (tr. Dr. King), *Political considerations*, 59. In the original French this definition is as follows: "des actions hardies & extraordinaires, que les Princes sont contraints d'exécuter aux affaires difficiles & comme désespérées, contre le droit commun, sans garder même aucun ordre ni forme de justice, hasardant l'intérêt du particulier, pour le bien du public." Naudé, *Considerations politiques*, 65.

[130] Naudé says that the goddess Laverne presides over these actions. He repeats the "good man's" prayer in Horace. "Fair Laverna, grant me to escape detection; grant me to pass as just and upright, shroud my sins in night, my lies in clouds!" Horace, *Epistles* I ll. 62-62 (LCL 194) 354-355.

[131] Naudé uses a double negation – "these Contrivances have not always been without their Use" – when commenting on a number of examples of imposture, both ancient and modern men feigning divinity or divine inspiration for political gain. He thus seems to point to the supreme importance of these ruses in political affairs. Naudé, *Considerations politiques*, 50; Naudé, (tr. Dr. King), *Political considerations*, 46. Cf. Cavaillé, "Naudé, la prudence extraordinaire du coup d'État", op. cit.

l'œconomique, or the government of the family; and *la politique*, or the government of peoples by one, few, or many.[132] Although in Naudé all forms are overtly political and focussed on (re-)presentation, let us first consider his description of politics. Political wisdom consists of three parts as well. First there is the general science of the establishment and preservation of states and empires, including not only the works of ancient authors such as Plato, Aristotle and Cicero, but also 'moderns' like the Italians Ammirato and Botero. Included in this first category are also certain notions, which Naudé contends are universally approved by everyone: divine providence, God as first and final cause of all things, the existence of heaven and hell, the idea that one should always defend his religion.

While in Naudé's discussion the 'oeconomic' is mainly concerned with family hierarchy and the reputation of a household, it is the 'monastic' that should make us pause for some consideration. Naudé stresses that there are "several Subtleties, Feints and Stratagems which many make daily use of to come at the height of their Pretensions"[133] and that the most important authors to have written about the government of the self are Charron, Girolamo Cardano (1501-1576) in his works *Proxeneta, de Utilitate capienda ex adversis* and *de Sapientia*, and Machiavelli in both his *Il Principe* and the *Discorsi*.[134]

Machiavelli is applied here primarily as a writer on the 'monastic', namely on the tricks and secret schemes by which "the most judicious" render their political affairs successful, while at the time the Florentine was often linked to 'bad reason of state'. Naudé clearly saw that Machiavelli's work concerned the issue of how to govern oneself, primarily in the context of the capture of an individual city-state. In his treatment of the 'monastic' Naudé removes the separation between ordinary individuals, of whom any political initiative can only be imprudent and illegitimate, and the legitimate princes and ministers acting for the public good and the salvation of the state. Machiavelli is the author that describes – many of Naudé's contemporaries would say, advises – the cunning of individuals who want to usurp power and tyrannical rulers who want to preserve or increase it to satisfy their own ambitions and private interests. These acts, which are absolutely reprehensible within the framework of doctrines of orthodoxy and 'good' reasons of state, fall within the general definition that Naudé gives of prudence.[135]

Although he stresses to keep to examples of the 'monastic', it is telling that Naudé primarily discusses 'religious policy' as the ultimate form of this specific kind of government. By its affiliation to the definition of the *coups d'état* we can see that feigning divinity or divine

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[132] Cf. Aristotle, *Politics*, I.
[133] Cavaillé makes a very reasonable argument for considering this as another of Naudé's definitions of prudence. Cavaillé, "Naudé, la prudence extraordinaire du coup d'État", op. cit.
[134] Naudé, (tr. Dr. King), *Political considerations*, 40; Naudé, *Considerations politiques*, 65.
[135] Cavaillé thinks this is largely in line with the way Machiavelli himself speaks of the 'prudence' of the best (*virtuosi*) political actors. Cavaillé, "Naudé, la prudence extraordinaire du coup d'État", op. cit.

inspiration, i.e. the use of religion as a political instrument in general, is the most important feature of statesmanship. What is exceptionally striking is the way Naudé presents this argument.

At the same time he seems to present his examples in an ironic and admiring fashion. The presentation of the practices of religious imposture under the guise of politics, across a variety of historical and mythological actors seems devoid of any moral condemnation. In fact, these 'monastic' impostures and secret ruses can be extremely useful in politics. There is no condemnation to be found, only undisguised admiration for these "elevated finesses and inventions".[136] In the examples the extraordinary prudence can thus be seen to be in no way a prerogative of the State or a virtue reserved to the sovereign alone. All lawmakers and new prophets, Naudé adds, have performed these and similar 'individual' coups.[137] Indeed it is obvious that the salvation of the state cannot be invoked to justify the coups perpetrated by the founders of states and religions, of which Naudé gives many examples in his book. These examples range from Numa Pompilius, to Mohammed and the unison of France by Clovis, the case in which Naudé follows the argumentation of Étienne Pasquier and other 'politiques'.[138]

In the *Mascurat* Naudé uses the terminology of *raison d'état*, the form of extraordinary political action, and not the more specific *coup d'état* he employed in the *Considérations politiques*. He is concerned with governmental practice of the regency government, instead of weighing the cardinal's resemblance to traditional ideas of ministerial virtues.[139] Now let us turn to the ultimate level of argumentation in the *Mascurat*, that of absolute royal authority and *raison d'état*.

Reason of state and the 'state-prisoners'-debate'

A third level of argumentation in the *Mascurat*, that of absolute royal authority and *raison d'état*, is our main focus in this chapter. When we compare the first and the second edition of the *Mascurat*, it becomes clear that in the second edition extra weight is laid on the argument of royal authority by a full elaboration of the *raison d'état*-argument. Here, 'state power' represented in the person of Cardinal Mazarin is defended in a way not necessarily negating the positions of the statesman's opponents. However, while *raison d'état*-argumentation is used to exhort readers to judge their own positions and finally stand down in complete and unconditional obedience, this kind of argumentation also makes itself vulnerable due to the paradoxes and 'Machiavellian'

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[136] Ibidem.

[137] "Si l'on considère quels ont été les commencements de toutes les monarchies, nous trouverons toujours qu'elles ont commencé par quelques-unes de ces inventions et supercheries, en faisant marcher la religion et les miracles en tête d'une longue suite de barbaries et de cruautés." Naudé, *Considérations politiques*, 84-85.

[138] Naudé, *Considérations politiques*, 95-98. See Donaldson, *Machiavelli and Mystery of State*, 149.

[139] In fact Cardinal Mazarin fits the generally merit based description of a good minister in Naudé's *Considérations politiques* and as we have seen above this is the basis of the defence of Mazarin's prowess to the office of *premier ministre*.

connotations of this political vocabulary. In fact, associations between Machiavelli and Mazarin were abundant in the *mazarinades*, the Florentine's name basically was a sobriquet that rendered the cardinal-minister and his policies more obnoxious.[140]

The term *raison d'état* appears five times in the course of seven added pages and every single time it is emphasized by the use of italics. Its appearance follows directly upon Mascurat's invocation of arguments for the 'absolute authority' of kings, a plea based on commonplace quotations from Roman law as well as from Jean Bodin. In the second edition an extra assortment of typically Naudéan examples of the 'common practice' of this absolute authority is presented, like the ordering by Charles IX of St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre (1572),[141] concocted with just a few trustees in his secret council.[142]

Mascurat says to Saint-Ange, the more ironic and sceptic protagonist in the dialogue:

> "if you would ask me how far the authority of a king in his realm reaches, and I would simply answer that it is absolute, that it is not subjected to any law, that the king can do whatever pleases him; would you not be far less persuaded of this truth, than if I were to add in confirmation that according to the oracle of the Laws [Ulpian] *the prince is exempt from the laws*? […] That it is confirmed by Saint Ambrose, *Surely, he [David] was the king, he was not held by any laws, since kings are free from the bonds resulting from crimes; for those who are*

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[140] On these associations, see for instance, Hubert Carrier, "Machiavel dans les pamphlets de la Fronde", in Giorgio Mirandola (ed.), *L'Italianisme en France au XVIIe siècle* (Torino: Società editrice internazionale, 1969), 39-46.

[141] In light of the current state of research, it should be clarified that the order by Charles IX and a number of close advisors might be seen as a preemptive strike directed at the major Huguenot leaders. The main reason probably was the king's fear of Protestant reprisals and failure of the delicate peace of St-Germain (1570) after an unsuccessful assassination attempt on the Huguenot Admiral Coligny. Once the order came to willing ears among militant Parisian Catholics, the initial elimination of the Protestant elite escalated into more or less spontaneous further mass killings. The ensuing mass murder spread across France and came to constitute the emerging image of the massacre. See Arlette Jouanna, *La Saint-Barthélemy. Les mystères d'un crime d'État* (Paris: Gallimard, 2007).

[142] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 699-701 [absent on *489-490*]. The examples given here are the Massacre at Thessalonica by the Emperor Theodosius I in 390 CE as described by Theodoret in his *Ecclesiastical History* (V.17 and 18); the arrest in 1356 and execution without any formal legal procedure of the Count of Harcourt and other members of the *dauphin*'s council by King Jean II over projects of partition of France initiated by the King of Navarre during the Hundred Years' War as described by Nicole Gilles in the *Chroniques et Annales de France*; Louis XI's solution of killing or otherwise removing high placed subjects who abandoned and betrayed him as described by Jacob de Meyere in his *Historia Flandriae*; Charles IX's ordering of St Bartholomew's Day Massacre; Henri IV's display of authority at the marriage of his Protestant sister Catherine de Bourbon with the Catholic Duc de Bar; and finally, Philip II of Spain's single handling and punishing of those that failed him in matters of state as described in the *Memoires* of Philippe Hurault, comte de Chiverny. The St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre is one of the most infamous examples of *coups d'état*, secretive and violent actions or interventions by the 'state', that Naudé defends (and only criticizes for a failure to be carried out in full) as necessary political actions in his *Considérations politiques sur les coups d'état*. Naudé was not the first to describe the murder of the Huguenots after the wedding of Henry of Navarre as a deliberate political action by the royal government of Charles IX to eliminate a political faction. See Naudé, *Considérations politiques*, 108-117. The image of a deliberate royal order, a strategy even to lure the Huguenots to Paris for a wedding, soon spread in diplomatic circles and was disseminated further by Camillo Capilupi. This papal courtier marvelled at the massacre in his book *Lo Stratagema di Carlo IX, re di Francia, contro gli Ugonotti, rebelli di Dio et suoi* (1572). From there this image was appropriated and dispersed mainly by Protestant authors. Jouanna, *La Saint-Barthélemy*, 6-7.

safe within the power of their authority are not summoned to punishment by any law.[143] That Gregory of Tours and Otto of Friesing agree on this point; the first in speaking to Chilperic, *If any of us, O king, desires to leave the path of justice, he can be corrected by you; but if you leave it, who shall rebuke you? We speak to you; but you listen only if you wish; and if you refuse to listen who will condemn you except Him who asserts that He is justice?*[144] And the second in his letter to the Emperor Frederick writes: *Only kings, who are superior to the law and reserved for God's examination, are not held by the laws of this world; thence the words of that king who was a prophet as well 'against thee, thee only, have I sinned'.*[145] […] And I also add that by the same Roman Laws *that which pleases the ruler has the force of law*. That Bodin[146] assures that *as to proceed against him by way of justice, the subject has no such jurisdiction over his prince: of whom depends all power and authority to command: and who may not only revoke all the power of his Magistrates; but even in whose presence the power and jurisdiction of all Magistrates, Corporations, Colleges, Estates, and Communities ceases*."[147]

Besides these three levels of argumentation in the *Mascurat*, a comparison of the two editions shows clearly that between the first edition of the summer of 1649 and the second edition of early

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[143] Several, but not all, of these commonplace citations are given by Hugo Grotius in his *De imperio summarum potestatum circa sacra*. The exact same references to St. Ambrose, Gregory of Tours and Otto of Friesing are found in Chapter 9,21 and are here given in the translation by Harm-Jan van Dam. Hugo Grotius [Harm-Jan van Dam ed.], *De imperio summarum potestatum circa sacra. Volume One* (Leiden, Boston and Koln: Brill, 2001) Chapter 9.21: p. 432-433. Naudé probably possessed the book in his private library or acquired for the library of Cardinal Mazarin a copy of the manuscript of Grotius' *De imperio* that was first published in 1647. See Harm-Jan van Dam's "Introduction", 54-55.

[144] Grotius, *De imperio*, 432-433.

[145] Idem, 432-433. These words by the Biblical King David are cited from Psalm 50:6-8.

[146] *République*, II.5 "For as to proceed against him by way of justice, the subiect hath no such iurisdiction ouer his Soueraigne prince: of whom dependeth all power and authoritie to command: and who may not onely reuoke all the power of his Magistrats; but euen in whose presence the power of all Magistrats, Corporations, Colleges, Estates, and Communities cease […]." Jean Bodin (tr. Richard Knolles), *Of the Lawes and Cvstomes of a Common-Wealth. Learnedly discovrsing of the power of Soveraignety and Majestracy, and of the Orders and degrees of Citizens, with the priviledges of Corporations and Colledges: and other things pertinent to Estates and Societies* (London: A.I., 1606) II.5, p. 222.

[147] "si tu me demandais jusques où s'étend l'autorité d'un Roi en son Royaume, et je te répondisse simplement qu'elle est absolue, qu'elle n'est sujette à aucune loi, qu'il peut faire ce que bon lui semble; ne serais tu pas beaucoup moins persuadé de cette vérité, que si je venais à ajouter en confirmation d'icelle, que suivant l'oracle des Lois [Ulpian], *Princeps legibus solutus est*; [...] qu'elle a été confirmée par S. Ambroise, *Rex utique erat (David) nullis ipse legibus tenebatur, quia liberi sunt Reges a vinculo delictorum, neque enim ullis ad poenam vocantur legibus, tuti imperii potestate:* que Gregoire de Tours et Otto Frisingensis s'accordent en ce point-là; le premier en parlant a Chilperic, *Si quis de nobis, o Rex, iustitiae tramites transcendere voluerit, a te corripi potest: si vero tu excesseris, quis te corripiet? loquimur enim tibi, sed si volueris, audis, si nolueris, quis te damnabit, nisi is qui se pronunciauit esse iustitiam?* et le second en l'Epitre à l'Empereur Federic [sic.], *Soli Reges utpote constituti supra leges, diuino examini reseruati, saeculi legibus non cohibentur, unde et illud tam Regis quam Prophetae, Tibi soli peccaui* […]. Et si j'ajoute encore que par les mêmes Lois Romaines, *Quod Principi placuit, legis habet vigorem*: [...] Que Bodin assure, *Quant à la voie de Justice, le Sujet n'a point de juridiction sur son Prince, duquel dépend toute puissance & autorité de commander, & qui peut non seulement révoquer tout le pouvoir de ses Magistrats*, *mais aussi en la présence duquel, cesse toute la puissance & juridiction de tous les Magistrats, Corps, Collèges, États*, *& Communautés.*" Naudé, *Mascurat*, 698-699.

1650 more weight has come to lay on the third level of argumentation.[148] By spring 1650, this 'absolutist' level of argumentation has become not only a *cento* passage of commonplace arguments taken from Roman law (and Bodin) on the absolute authority of kings in regard of the law as it was in the first edition, but now it also became an elaboration on *raison d'état* in light of a discussion on 'prisoners of state'.

From this *raison d'état*-argumentation added in the context of the taking of 'prisoners of state' the obvious question that rises is why this particular argument had to be employed? In other words, what made it necessary to have recourse to this kind of argumentation, on top of the arguments for absolute royal authority in legislative matters that had already been firmly established primarily by invoking Bodin and Roman law?

Granted, we might perceive of the *Mascurat* as a 'work in progress'.[149] Furthermore, there seemed to come no end to the stream of *mazarinades*, so the need for Naudé - and an eventual *bureau d'adresse* that he was to establish - to refute these pamphlets remained. However, the answer might also lie exactly in the context of its appearance, that of the question on 'prisoners of state'. One of the central issues during the beginning of the parlementarian *Fronde* in late summer 1648 was the law of arrest and the legal procedure of incarceration, guaranteeing a trial within a considerable time after imprisonment.

How did this proposed legal reform on 'prisoners of state' come about? In early January 1648 at a *lit de justice*, a sitting of the *Parlement* during which new measures were to gain the fiat of the judges, Omer Talon, the head of this institution, objected and petitioned the queen regent with its grievances. In the next couple of months Mazarin tried to enforce the government's policies by blackmailing members of the *Parlement*. The consequent union of the courts drew up a legal petition of 27 articles that effectively tried to curb government authority.[150] Article 19 dealt with 'prisoners of state' and in published pamphlet form it read as follows:

> "[The four sovereign courts of Paris wish] that no subject of the king whatever his quality or condition can be detained as prisoner longer than twenty-four hours without interrogation, according to the ordonnances, and shall be delivered to his ordinary judge, to the consequence that the head jailer and all others answer for it in their proper and private names [as private persons]. And [they wish] that those who from the present moment onwards are detained

[148] See Appendix 5.
[149] The first edition of 492 pages was the book as it was handed over to a small commission of examiners, who was to approve it for sale. In a letter to Charles Spon, Patin mentions a commission of five friends that were to examine the book, besides the cardinal who was to give his approval. He writes: "Tandis que le cardinal Mazarin le lit pour en donner la permission de le vendre, nous sommes cinq de ses amis qui avons aussi commission de l'examiner, dont MM. Dupuy font l'un, M. Talon, avocat général, l'autre. Je suis le troisième. Les deux autres ne m'ont pas été révélés, je saurai néanmoins tout à la fin." Patin to Spon, 3 September 1649. Patin [Capron (ed.)], *Correspondance française de Guy Patin*, online.
[150] See Chapter I.

> without any form or appearance of a process will be immediately set free and restored in the exercise of their offices, benefices and rights."[151]

In this article the judges can be seen proposing regulations to stop arbitrary detention of subjects of the king of France. The parlementarians professed concern with the people succumbing to tax-reprisals as well as those *grands* who were suspected of plots against the cardinal's life, but next to this there were strong corporate interests they were determined to protect. There definitely was a precedent of members of the sovereign courts arrested during the first years of the regency and even in 1648 supporters of the *Chambre Saint-Louis* had promptly been incarcerated. The judges petitioned that all 'prisoners of state' were to be released at once and tried to ensure the trial of all subjects within twenty-four hours of their arrest. If it succeeded, this guarantee of personal liberty, which might have preceded the *habeas corpus* recourse in law of English common law (1679), would take back some power encroached upon by the royal government.[152]

As a matter of fact, when these articles gained the value of law by royal declaration in late October 1648 France might be said to have been on the road to a limited monarchy.[153] In the fifteenth clause of this royal declaration, reported by Omer Talon in his *Mémoires*, the government made the following, be it vague, statement on political prisoners:

> "We [Louis XIV] want that our subjects whatever be their quality or condition shall in the future only be treated criminally according to the forms prescribed by the laws of our kingdom and ordinances and not by appointed commissioners and judges. And [we want] that the edict of King Louis XI of 11 October 1467 shall be guarded and observed to the letter and spirit; and in interpreting and executing this, that none of the officers of our sovereign - and other courts could be troubled and disturbed in the exercise and functioning of their office by *lettres de cachet* or otherwise, in whatever kind or manner, all conforming to the said ordinances and to their privileges."[154]

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[151] "Qu'aucun des sujets du Roi de quelques qualité et condition qu'il soit ne pourra être détenu prisonnier passé vingt-quatre heures, sans être interrogé, suivant les Ordonnances et rendu à son Juge naturel, à peine d'en répondre par le geôliers capitaines et tous autres en leurs propres et privés noms, et que ceux qui sont dès à présent détenus sans forme ni figure de procès, seront dès à présent mis en liberté, et en l'exercice de leur charges, gages & droits." Anonymous, *Iovrnal contenant tovt ce qui s'est fait & passé aux Assemblées des Compagnies Souueraines du Parlement de Paris, és années 1648. & 1649. iusques à present* (M. Colombel, J. Boüillerot; Paris, 1649) 17.

[152] Lloyd Moote, *The Revolt of the Judges,* 162-163; L. Bély (ed.), *Dictionnaire de l'Ancien Régime*, 573-575.

[153] Bély, *La France au XVIIe* siècle, 307-308.

[154] "Voulons [Louis XIV] aussi qu'aucuns de nos sujets de quelque qualité et condition qu'ils soient ne soient à l'avenir traités criminellement que selon les formes prescrites par les lois de notre royaume et ordonnances, et non par commissaires et juges choisis, et que l'ordonnance du Roi Louis XI, du 11 du mois d'octobre 1467, soit gardée et observée selon sa forme et teneur; et icelle interprétant et exécutant, qu'aucuns de nos officiers de nos cours souveraines et autres ne puissant être troublés ni inquiétés en l'exercice et fonctions de leurs charges par lettres de cachet, ou autrement, en quelque sorte ou manière que ce soit, le tout conformément auxdites ordonnances, et à leurs privilèges." Omer Talon (ed. Michaud and Poujoulat), *Mémoires* (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1839), 296.

This clause of the royal declaration repeated the government's right to detain subjects, with the provision that this right was restricted by 'past laws'. The parlementarians interpreted the ordinance of King Louis XI as a provision for trial within twenty-four hours of an arrest, while the royal government could argue that there was no explicit mention of such a provision in the royal declaration.[155]

However, as one of the most unexpected, radical and probably significant articles in the 27 articles of the *Chambre Saint-Louis*, this guarantee, one of the main concerns of the judges, was ratified by the regency in October 1648. The royal declaration of October 1648 notwithstanding, it did not mean that Mazarin and the royal government had any intention to simply let go of their power to imprison opponents, as the later course of *Frondes* would show.[156] With the discrepancy between the actions of royal government and ratified regulations, the conflict about this particular governmental issue persisted during the *Frondes* and this would provide an apparent reason for including *raison d'état* argumentation in a defence of the cardinal's royal government.

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[155] It is probably the "Lettres touchant l'inamovibilité des Offices royaux" published by Louis XI in Paris on 21 October 1467 that is referred to in the royal declaration of late October 1648. This royal decree that was used several times in remonstrances of the *Parlement* during the Ancien Régime can be found in the collection by Emmanuel Pastoret (ed.), *Ordonnances des Rois de France de la Troisième Race, recueillies par ordre chronologique. Dix-septième volume, contenant les Ordonnances rendues depuis le mois de Juillet 1467 jusqu'au mois de Mars 1473* (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1820), 25-27. "Loys, par la grace de Dieu, Roy de France, à tous ceulx qui ces presentes lectres verront, salut. Comme, depuis nostre avenement à la couronne, plusieurs mutations ayent esté faictes en noz offices, laquelle chose est en la pluspart advenue à la poursuite et subjection d'aucuns, et nous non advertiz duement; par quoy, ainsy que entendu avons et bien cognoissons estre vraysemblable, plusieurs de noz officiers, doubtant cheoir audict inconvenient de mutation et de destitution, n'ont pas tel zele et ferveur à nostre service qu'ilz auroient se n'estoit ladicte doubte; sçavoir faisons que nous, considerant que en noz officiers consiste, soubz nostre auctorité, la direction des faicts par lesquelz est policée et entretenue la chose publicque de nostre royaume, et que d'icelluy ilz sont les ministres essentiaulx, comme membres du corps dont nous sommes le chief; voulans extirper d'eulx icelle doubte et pourveoir à leur seureté en nostredict service, tellement qu'ilz ayent cause de y faire et perseverer ainsy qu'ilz doivent, statuons et ordonnons par ces presentes, que desormais nous ne donnerons aucun de noz offices, s'il n'est vaquant par mort ou par resignation faicte de bon gré et consentement du resignant, dont il apperra [apparoisse] duement, ou par forfaicture préalablement jugée et declairée judiciairement et selon les termes de justice, par juge compettant, et dont il apperra semblablement; et s'il advient que, par inadvertance, importunité de requerans ou autrement, nous facions le contraire, nous, des maintenant pour lors, le revocquons et adnullons, et voulons que aucunes lectres n'en soient faictes ne expediées, et si faictes estoient, que à icelles ne à quelxconques autres que l'on pourroit sur ce obtenir de nous, aucune foy ne soit adjoustée, ne que pour ce aucun soit destitué de son office ne inquiesté en icellui. Si donnons en mandement à nostre amé et féal chancellier, à noz amez et féaulx les gens de nostre parlement, les gens de noz comptes, tresoriers, maistres des requestes de nostre hostel, aux prevost de Paris, bailly de Vermandois, et à tous noz aultres justiciers et officiers ou à leurs lieuxtenans, presens et advenir, et à chascun d'eulx si comme à lui appartendra, que noz presens statut, ordonnance et voulenté, ilz entretiennent et gardent inviolablement, et les facent publier et enregistrer en leurs cours et auditoires, sans faire ne souffrir faire aucune chose au contraire, car ainsy nous plaist-il estre faict; au *vidimus* desquelles, faict soubz scel royal, voulons pleine foy estre adjoustée, comme à ce present original, auquel, en tesmoing de ce, nous avons fait mectre nostre scel. *Donné à Paris, le xxie jour d'Octobre, l'an de grace mil CCCC soixante et sept, et de nostre regne le septiesme*. Ainsy signé: *Par le Roy, le sire de la Forest, maistre Pierre Doriolle, Nicolas de Louviers, et autres presens.*"

[156] See Chapter I.

In light of the centrality of this debate on legal procedures from early on in the conflict, would it not have made sense to include this line of argumentation already in the first edition of the *Mascurat*? Given the fact that *raison d'état* argumentation belongs to the core of Naudé's political thought it is actually surprising not to find it in the first edition. If this was the edition that went to the censors, a possible explanation might be that Naudé strategically omitted it from his argumentation in the first edition.[157] The strength of such an argument might be pointed out to him by one of his friends, who were among the first to read the book, but this seems implausible as these friends themselves – Talon, the Dupuy brothers and Patin – were not particularly known for their support of Mazarin and Naudé's political thought was already immersed in it and.[158]

Taking into account all of Naudé's engagement with the events of the *Frondes*[159] and the fact that the *Mascurat* is so clearly involved in a debate with the authors of pamphlets and with the parlementarian *frondeurs*, it seems almost impossible to see the writing and editing process of the text apart from the direct historical context. Could not the events of the *Frondes* provide an elucidation of this crucial addition? What incident or which affairs made it so important to stress precisely this point of the absolute authority of the royal government at the time when Naudé was preparing the second edition in spring 1650? Considering what happened in the winter of 1649/1650, during which a new twist was added to the *Frondes*, I would hypothesize that it was the event of Condé's arrest and incarceration.

Ever since peace was restored at Rueil - 20 March 1649 - but in particular from late 1649 onwards a seemingly inevitable conflict rose between the Prince de Condé and the royal government. Condé, *premier prince du sang*, thought himself entitled to more power in light of his services to the Crown during the siege of Paris, while the queen regent seems to have developed a personal disliking of the Prince due to his perceived arrogance, ambition, but also his threatening title. In that winter, Condé - who became everyone's enemy, not only Mazarin's - constantly prevented the cardinal's plans to strengthen the position of the royal government in Paris.[160] This led to the Prince's sudden arrest on 18 January 1650, when he was attending court together with his brother, the Prince de Conti, and brother-in-law, the Duc de Longueville. This

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[157] The letter by Patin to Spon of 3 September 1649 cited above (footnote 86) makes this assumption quite plausible.

[158] Even though these men opposed the cardinal-minister to varying degrees, they certainly were not among the most militant *frondeurs.* Even in the case of Patin, historiography of recent years seems to present a more nuanced picture opposed to the traditional depiction of Patin as a staunch *frondeur.* See Jérôme Délatour, "Review: *Les lettres de Guy Patin à Charles Spon, janvier 1649-février 1655* by Laure Jestaz, *Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes* 164, no. 2 (2006): 618. Here Délatour refers to the introduction of the critical edition by Laure Jestaz (ed.), *Les lettres de Guy Patin à Charles Spon: janvier 1649-février 1655* (Paris: H. Champion, 2006). Ferretti, "Les stratégies d'opposition dans l'académie Dupuy", 108-132; Joel Cornette, *La mélancolie du pouvoir: Omer Talon et le procès de la raison d'état* (Paris: Fayard, 1998).

[159] Besides his work to establish a *Bureau d'addresse*, Naudé laboured incessantly to save his life's work, the Mazarine library from the vendors, writing multiple pamphlets and petitions.

[160] Kossmann, *La Fronde*, 148. See also Chapter I.

grand display of power or, as Naudé would call it, this *coup d'état* by Mazarin has been interpreted as a sign of weakness on the part of the royal government, but if anything it was an attempt to curb the growing influence of Condé in the Royal Council and regain the favour of the Parisians, who despised Condé for the siege of their city only a year before.[161]

However, debate soon ensued in Paris about the weak grounds for the arrest, especially after the Duchesse de Longueville petitioned for the release of the princes. Following the publication of her petition as a pamphlet, the 'prisoners of state'-debate gained renewed relevance in the *mazarinades*. The *Parlement de Paris* at first seemed to yield to the government's *raison d'état* and accepted the detention of the princes, but from April and at its height in the summer of 1650 also at this court the issue of 'prisoners of state' came back with a vengeance.[162] Would it therefore not be plausible that the discussion about 'prisoners of state' and the *raison d'état*-argumentation of Naudé came to the fore only in the second edition of the *Mascurat*, because of the renewed significance of this issue in light of the arrest and incarceration of the Prince de Condé and consorts?

Raison d'état, 'cette loy fondamentale de la souveraineté'

After this attempt to contextualize and tentatively explain why Naudé elaborated the *raison d'état*-argument only in the second edition, let us turn to what the discussion on 'prisoners of state' entailed in the *Mascurat*. This most prominent of all additions found in the second edition has been deservedly called the 'apotheosis' of pro-governmental argumentation proposed by Naudé's main protagonist Mascurat.[163]

It is on the third level of argumentation in the *Mascurat*, that Sainct-Ange objects to Mascurat that his defence of 'absolute royal authority' is an extreme position shared by very few people. In direct reference to the articles of the *Chambre Saint-Louis* he remarks that Mascurat's vision of royal authority is only all too far removed from those people who contend that everyone is entitled to a legal procedure after three days, or at least within three months after that person has been imprisoned. With regard to 'prisoners of state', Mascurat replies, the authority of the prince over state-prisoners should neither be so severely enforced as it has been in the lifetime of Louis XIII, nor so clemently applied as some want it to be at present. He pleads for moderation.[164]

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[161] Kossmann, *La Fronde*, 144-150; Bély (ed.), *Dictionnaire*, 573-575; Bély, *La France au XVIIe siècle*, 311-312.
[162] Lloyd Moote, *Revolt of the Judges*, 257-259; 277-278. A dated but extensive description of the debate is to be found in Saint-Aulaire's, *Histoire de la Fronde. Volume premier et second* (Brussels: Gregoir and Wouters, 1842) II. p. 5 ff.
[163] Stenzel, "Apories de l'humanisme et raison d'état dans le *Mascurat* de Gabriel Naudé", online.
[164] This plea for moderation is metaphorically referred to with the example of Phoebus' instruction of Phaeton on flying the chariot not too high nor too low but the middle way in Ovid's Metamorphoses.

However, this plea for moderation does not settle the affair of 'prisoners of state'. Mascurat argues that in light of "the necessities of the State and that of ours most of all" government critics and supporters alike "have to consider that there is no place on earth where the absolute prince is less exempt from common law than the kings in France".[165] Strictly speaking the king is not above the law. French kings are subject to the same procedures of justice as their subjects.[166] However, Mascurat stresses, there is a distinction between common civil law and that which concerns the law and the right of the state – *ce qui est du droict et de la* raison d'Estat.[167] Although kings never would want to do away with justice, cannot be exempted from the ordinary formalities, nor carry their authority to wild extremes, there are cases so confused, so difficult, so complicated, and of such immense consequence that it is impossible to resolve them in the ordinary way.[168] Here the main protagonist clearly invokes cases of necessity. In fact, he says, expediency demands that when it comes to the security of the state – in cases of rebellion, sedition or treason – kings are allowed to use their absolute authority to protect the Crown and their realm, and to imprison whomever they judge advantageous, without being obliged to account for it to anyone.[169] In this respect, the 'absolute authority' of the king is the norm.[170] One simply cannot pass over *raison d'état*, this fundamental law of sovereignty (*cette loi fondamentale de la souveraineté*), and consequently fall prey to other inconveniences that are more prejudicial to the people's wellbeing and the tranquillity of states and empires on the pretext that there have been abuses.[171]

In order to prove that depriving the sovereign of this royal prerogative would clear the way to revolts, insurrections, treason, and similar actions that are capable of bringing complete political disorder, Mascurat provides two examples from contemporary history illustrating his case. The first is a case of treason that was uncovered in 1604 during the reign of Henri IV and the second an example of one of the many twists during the *Frondes*.[172]

In 1604 during a diplomatic conflict with the Spaniards, a clerk in the staff of *secrétaire d'État*

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[165] "[…] l'autorité du Prince sur les Prisonniers d'État, ne doit être ni si rigoureusement exercée, qu'elle l'a été du vivant du feu Roy d'heureuse mémoire, ni tellement relâchée comme on veut qu'elle soit à présent […] C'est pourquoi afin de régler cette affaire suivant les nécessités de l'État, et du notre principalement, il faut considérer, qu'il n'y a lieu au monde où le Prince absolu soit moins dispensé du droit commun, que les Roys sont en France". Naudé, *Mascurat*, 701-702 [absent on *489-490*].
[166] Idem, 702 [absent on *489-490*]. "On les plaide, on les cite & ajourne, on les condamne à payer ce qu'ils doivent au tiers & au quart, à Pierre & à Guillaume, & l'on exerce contre eux toutes les procédures de Justice, desquelles on se pourrait servir contre les plus misérables & abandonnez de leur Royaume".
[167] Idem, 703 [absent on *489-490*].
[168] This description of the extraordinary clearly mirrors the one given in the *Considérations politiques*. Cf. Naudé, *Considérations politiques*, 20.
[169] "[…] les Roys se peuvent servir de leur autorité absolue, pour emprisonner ceux dont ils jugent à propos de s'assurer, sans que pour cela ils soient obligez d'en rendre compte à personne." Ibidem.
[170] Moreau, "Le *Mascurat* de Naudé", 336-337.
[171] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 708 [absent on *489-490*].
[172] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 703-704 [absent on *489-490*].

Villeroy, named Nicolas l'Hoste, who had access to the matters discussed in the secret council of the French king, was found selling French cipher codes to the Spaniards. With l'Hoste's aid, the Spanish government was able to read encrypted messages that they intercepted. To much surprise of the French spy in the Spanish council this enabled the Spanish to be particularly well informed about French intentions and strategies.[173] Mascurat points out that the delicacy of the matter prohibited the king to tread the ordinary ways and that therefore l'Hoste was secretly caught and put in the Bastille. The king had *raison d'état* on his side in refusing him a formal legal procedure.[174]

The second example deals with the case of Josias von Rantzau (1609-1650).[175] Rantzau had been in the service of the French Crown as a promising army officer since 1635 and under the government of Cardinal Mazarin became governor of Dunkirk and Marshal of France.[176] However, he was to press his luck too far and was imprisoned by the *premier ministre* in early 1649 for the suspected treason of attempting to sell his government of Dunkirk to the Spanish.[177] Mascurat observes that the same people who criticized the cardinal for favouring Rantzau in the first place, now suddenly changed their views and accused Mazarin of being violent and reproached him for having little affection and even less loyalty for an old friend. With these two examples Mascurat attempts to show that the king and his secret council rightfully follow what *raison d'état* prescribes and that these policies are permitted because their very goal is the wellbeing and tranquillity of the kingdom. And he adds, the people and many others, in this occasion have only to approve of the care and rulings of those who govern. Before anything else, those who govern, exercise this power for their merits.[178]

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[173] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 703-704 [absent on *489-490*]. On the l'Hoste affair, see Alain Hugon, "L'Affaire L'Hoste ou la tentation espagnole (1604)", *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 42, no. 3 (Paris: Société d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine, 1995): 355-375.

[174] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 703-704 [absent on *489-490*]. In reality, it seems that l'Hoste drowned as he fled in fear of incarceration and when his body was brought to Paris, it was torn apart by four horses. This 'real story' is reported in the *Mémoires d'Estat* of Nicolas de Neufville (1542-1617), seigneur de Villeroy, *conseiller d'état* under Charles IX, Henry III, Henry IV, and Louis XIII. Hugon, "L'Affaire L'Hoste", 355-375.

[175] Composition of this addition might be dated May 1649 as Naudé presents it as a remarkable example of *raison d'état* that has been at hand "since two months". Considering that it probably refers to the date of incarceration of Rantzau (27 February 1649), that would be late April – early May. However, we must be careful since it generally fits the timeframe in which the dialogue is set.

[176] On Josias, count of Rantzau, see Parrot, *Richelieu's Army*, 300-302. Rantzau was incarcerated at Vincennes on 27 February 1649. Finally, he was able to defend himself and prove his innocence. Consequently, he regained his liberty and was reinstated in his rights on 22 January 1650. Due to the oedema he contracted in prison, Rantzau was not to enjoy his liberty for long; the count died on 14 September that same year.

[177] Rantzau interestingly was also an agent of the cardinal through the intermittence of whom Naudé bought up books pillaged from libraries and convents in the German lands to include them in the library of Cardinal Mazarin. See Bepler, "Book Collecting in the Thirty Years' War", 953-968.

[178] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 704-707 [absent on *489-490*]. "Personne n'ignore et beaucoup même ont blâmé le Cardinal Mazarin, de ce qu'il portait si fort les intérêts de Monsieur de Rantzau: que de simple Maréchal de Camp qu'il était, il lui procura une Lieutenance générale: lui fit commander séparément des corps d'armée: le fit honorer du Baston de Maréchal de France, et du gouvernement de Dunkerque, avec des régiments de

Compared to the *Considérations politiques* the analysis of the phenomena of 'prisoners of state' in the *Mascurat* happens on the level of extraordinary prudence; instead of using the terminology of *coups d'état* he employs the more current term *raison d'état*. As Naudé already explained in his earlier work, in cases of 'prisoners of state' only the form might be said to be violated, but since the prince is master of the legal formalities he can also exempt himself from them when he judges it appropriate.[179] To support his view he provides a quotation from the Roman jurist Ulpian that in this context signifies that in cases of dangerous sedition, a faction or some other just cause it is permitted to punish first and afterwards write or follow the formalities of the legal procedure. Not in order to haste the punishment, but in order to prevent danger to social order.[180] In the *Mascurat* Naudé clearly follows Bodin, whom he quoted on absolute royal authority, in his description of sovereignty, even going so far as to call the exemption of following ordinary legal procedures in cases of necessity a fundamental law of sovereignty.

When he presented *raison d'état* and necessity in the *Mascurat* as fundamental law of sovereignty, Naudé did not further explain what he meant by this phrase. The explanation for this definition may be found in his earlier work on extraordinary administration in the *Bibliographia*

Cavalerie et Infanterie: lui fit obtenir de Sa Majesté plusieurs dons et pensions très-considérables: le soutint contre ceux qui le voulaient perdre après l'affaire de Tuttlingen: le remonta plusieurs fois d'équipage et lui fit une infinité d'autres services très considérables: quoi qu'au dire de ceux qui l'ont blâmé de ces bonnes actions, Monsieur de Rantzau fût estranger, quoi qu'il eut de fort mauvaises qualités, et qu'il fût capable de tout ruiner ce que l'on commettrait à sa direction. Mais ces Messieurs ont en fin changé de langage: car soudain que le Cardinal a donné les mains à la détention dudit sieur de Rantzau, on l'a accusé d'être violent, et on lui a reproché qu'il avait peu d'affection, et encore moins de fidélité pour son ami. Après quoi, Saint-Ange ne vois-tu pas l'injustice manifeste, et l'aveuglement entier de ces Censeurs? Et ne vois-tu pas au contraire, combien le zèle que le Cardinal a pour cette Couronne est grand, puisque lors qu'il est question de la servir, il ne considère ni ses ennemis, comme l'on a vu dans l'affaire du Cardinal Barberini, ni ses amis, comme l'on peut remarquer en cette dernière de Rantzau; les traités duquel avec l'Espagnol, par l'entremise du *Provincial des Recolects* de Gand, et du nommé *Grimié* Bourgmestre de Furnes, à dessein de leur remettre Dunkerque et toutes les places voisines entre les mains, moyennant quatre cents mille livres, ne furent pas si tôt pénétrez en Cour, que le Cardinal baissant la visière à l'amitié passée, donna tous les ordres nécessaires, non seulement pour rompre un coup de si grande importance; mais encore pour s'assurer comme il fit très-adroitement, de celui qui en était l'auteur: auquel si l'on ne fait pas le procès comme l'on a fait au Duc de Montmorency, au Maréchal de Biron, et à tant d'autres, qui étaient encore plus considérables qu'il n'est pas; je te répondrai que les Ministres à mon avis, n'ont pas toutes les preuves nécessaires pour le mettre en état, parce que le Bourgmestre de Furnes, à ce que m'a rapporté l'homme qui avait su le détail de cette affaire, aux premières Conférences de Ruel, n'est point revenu d'auprès les Chefs Espagnols, envers lesquels il avait déjà fait plusieurs voyages avec les lettres de créance de Monsieur de Rantzau, sous ombre de moyenner à son nom le rachat de quelques prisonniers; et aussi que ce Provincial des Recolects de Gand n'est point en état de servir à l'instruction de ce procès-là: Mais quoi que s'en soit, le Roy et son Conseil secret ont assez de connaissance de cette affaire, pour y procéder suivant ce que la *raison d'État* leur dit, et ce que le bien et repos du Royaume permettent que l'on en fasse. Et le peuple en cette occasion aussi bien qu'en beaucoup d'autres, n'a rien autre chose à faire sinon d'approuver tous les soins, et tous les règlements de ceux qui gouvernent, et qui vraisemblablement n'auraient pas été commis à de telles Charges, s'ils n'en étaient plus capables et s'ils ne s'en pouvaient acquitter mieux que beaucoup d'autres."

[179] Naudé, *Considérations politiques,* 124-125.

[180] Ulpian, *Digest* 28.3.6.9. *si forte latro manifestus, vel seditio praerupta, factioque cruenta, vel alia iusta causa moram non recipiant, non poenae festinatione, sed praeveniendi periculi causa, punire permittitur, deinde scribere.*

politica and the *Considérations politiques*. In the latter work, Naudé argued that this extraordinary form of political action is all the more necessary, or at least it may be more just, in the conservation of monarchies than in their establishment. "For before a state or realm was formed and raised, there was no necessity to establish it. Far from it, most often it has proceeded from chance, or was the effect of the power and ambition of some individual. However, once it is established and ruled, one is obligated to maintain it."[181] As fundamental law of sovereignty, *raison d'état* thus becomes the obligation for political conservation. Note that in Naudé's political reasoning the formerly morally unacceptable, yet casuistically and situationally permitted has become accepted as the ordinary situation of contemporary rule and the *excessum juris* is one of the foundations of public law. *Raison d'état* is morally indifferent, what is right is what preserves the governmental status quo. As ever Naudé's emphasis is on the defensive, not the offensive.[182]

That the concept is presented as fundamental law of sovereignty might, furthermore, be a consequence of Naudé's admiration for Federico Bonaventura, whose understanding of the matter he raised above that of all other contemporary authors in the *Bibliographia politica*. Bonaventura defined *ragion di stato* as the living law, superior to common positive laws and on equal footing with natural law. If we go back to the common places like *princeps legibus solutus est* and remember both his reference to and admiration for Bodin as displayed in the *Mascurat* and his other political work, we see that given the imminent need for conservation of their rule and the social order in their realm, princes "are the master of the laws to extend or mitigate, to confirm or abolish them, not as it may seem good to themselves, but as reason [here the 'right' of the state] and the public safety requires."[183] The *excessum juris* in Naudé's definition has always been interpreted as a derogation of the three bodies of law he mentions – positive law, natural law, and the law of nations – but in light of his admiration for the jurist-philosophers of Urbino and Angers it might also denote something beyond these bodies of law and therefore incompatible with them. For Naudé *raison d'état* is a fundamental law of sovereignty denoting the positive lawgiving power of the prince. In this sense, political necessity makes law.[184] In this period of seemingly perpetual civil disorder Naudé argues to allow the regency government the maximum room to manoeuvre.

Before allowing it to occur, Mascurat now sets about to parry any possible criticism of his

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[181] Naudé, *Political considerations,* 85. French original: "[…] ces coups d'état sont plus nécessaires pour la conservation et manutention des monarchies, que pour leur établissement; au moins seront-ils plus justes, puis que auparavant qu'un État soit formé et dressé, il n'y a nulle nécessité de l'établir, tant s'en faut, c'est le plus souvent un coup de hasard, ou l'effet de la puissance et ambition de quelque particulier, mais au contraire quand il est établi et policé, l'on est en suite obligé de le maintenir." Naudé, *Considérations politiques*, 94-95.
[182] See, his primary precaution to the performance of *coups d'état*. Naudé, *Political considerations*, 68-69.
[183] Naudé, *Political considerations*, 70.
[184] Catteeuw, *Censures et raisons d'État*, 327-362; idem, "L'inacceptable face aux nécessités politiques" [online].

views by pointing at ministers who abuse *raison d'état* to immure whoever they fancy. Arguing against the possible remark that it would be expedient to rectify abuses that were committed under similar pretexts during the reign of Louis XIII, Mascurat's reply implies that governmental reform and the trial of ministers are remedies proposed only by those who are part of the problem of instability and conflict in the country.[185] That is why, Mascurat insists, if the reign of the late king's successor, Louis XIV, is not tainted with this disease of ministerial abuse, there is no point in proposing and insisting on a remedy. A remedy applied at the right time helps, but it does great harm when administered at the wrong time. *Raison d'état* is a double-edged sword that can be used for better and for worse, but that in no way means that it should be discarded.[186] This refutation of any rectifications clearly points in the direction that in Naudé's treatment of *raison d'état* the extraordinary has become the ordinary.

Conclusion

It seems clear that in the last pages of the second edition of the *Mascurat*, Naudé conveys the strictest exhortation that, in the name of law, but most of all order, and to preserve the tranquillity of the state and security of the French people, parlementarians must stand down. Voluntary servitude is presented as the only possible solution. Naudé here attempts to convince his readers of the need for a higher logic, that of *raison d'état*, to which all others, whether it be the princes, other *grands,* the courts or the people, must yield – *à laquelle il faut que toutes les autres cedent*.[187] This is an appeal to political reality that limits the authority of the *Parlements* in the legislative and judicial domains in an irreversible way. Parlementarians are the guardians of common law and are requested to enforce them as well as to respect them. But common law must be able to yield to the superior logic of *raison d'état*.[188] Force reigning as justice is what Naudé calls *raison d'état* and this room for manoeuvring of the royal government is absolutely necessary for maintaining the tranquillity of the state and above all prevent further disorder. In the constellation of the European war and arms race with France and Spain as the two main belligerents, necessity has become the ordinary situation and allows the government to have recourse to taking and keeping political prisoners, to taking haphazard financial measures, and to taking all measures that are normally in the grey area beyond the limits of law, morality, and religion.

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[185] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 707-708 [absent on *489-490*]. Ovid's letter to Rufinus (*Ex Ponto* III.4) is cited to support this view: "Strong things have powers of their own, and need no Machaon (no physician); the sick man in his danger has recourse to the art of healing." LCL 151, p. 398-399.
[186] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 707-708 [absent on *489-490*].
[187] Idem, 704.
[188] Moreau, "Le *Mascurat* de Naudé", 337.

Rohan and Naudé Compared

> "I saw a recently published book, written on the basis of true experience, that for this reason easily outrivals all the others. It was the image of the Perfect Captain, wrought from the Commentaries of Julius Caesar[1] by the most powerful and wisest Duc Henri de Rohan, who now in the Valtellina as commander of the army under the Most Christian King does exactly the same as Guillaume du Bellay de Langey has done before, when he performed the same office[2] in the Turin Alps. Langey also published on military affairs in three books[3] that Mambrino Roseo subsequently translated in the Italian.[4] And nearly all peoples rendered it in their own tongues,[5] because of the greatest usefulness of these kind of books composed by the most experienced and distinguished Dukes from our and our fathers' memory. From the utility of their books these Dukes have gained so much honour and distinction that they are deservedly considered the most fortunate. Indeed Pliny the Younger rightly said (in a letter to Tacitus): 'The fortunate man, in my opinion, is he to whom the gods have granted the power either to do something which is worth recording or to write what is worth reading, and most fortunate of all is the man who can do both.'"[6]
>
> Gabriel Naudé, *Syntagma de studio militari*.[7]

Anticipating Friedrich Meinecke's judgement of the duc by some 300 years, Gabriel Naudé held Henri de Rohan in esteem as an author who as an experienced warrior-statesman published reflections on the business of war.[8] Comparing the *Parfaict capitaine* to the work of contemporary

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[1] Henri de Rohan, *Le parfaict capitaine, abregé des commentaires de César* (Paris: Jean Houzé, 1636).
[2] The office of commander of the French royal troops. Langey was lieutenant to Francois I in Piedmont, later governor of Turin. Rohan was general to the French armies in the Valtellina.
[3] Guillaume du Bellay, *Instructions sur le faict de la guerre, extraictes des liures de Polybe, Frontin, Vegece, Cornazan, Machiauelle, & plusieurs autres bons autheurs* (Paris: M. Vascosan, 1548).
[4] Guillaume du Bellay (tr. Mambrino Roseo), *Tre libri della disciplina militare tradotti nella lingua italiana. Opera molto notabile.* (Venice: Michele Tramezzino, 1550).
[5] English translation: Guillaume du Bellay (tr. Paul Ive), *Instruction for the warres Amply, learnedly, and politiquely, discoursing the method of militarie discipline.* (London: Thomas Orwin for Thomas Man and Toby Cooke, 1589); German translation: Guillaume du Bellay (tr. Ulrycus Budrym) *Kriegs Regiment wie ein tapfer Volk zum Krieg auffzubringen, ins Feld auszurüsten und anzuführen seye und wie sich ein Feld Oberster in allem fall zu verhalten habe, den Krieg glücklich zu führen und zu vollenden* (Mümpelgart: Peter Fischer, 1594).
[6] Pliny the Younger. *Letters, Volume I: Books 1-7.* Translated by Betty Radice. Loeb Classical Library 55. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969), 426-427.
[7] "Sed hi omnes ex ingenio locuti sunt; ab experientia vero librum recens editum vidi, qui caeteris omnibus facile obstruat, nempe imaginem perfecti Ducis, expressam ex Iulii Caesaris commentariis, a fortissimo, & sapientissimo Duce Errico Roano, qui nunc in Tellina valle sub Christianissimo Rege castrorum praefectus, idem omnino facit quod quondam in Alpibus Taurinis *Guilielmus Bellaius Langaeus* eodem munere defungens, fecerat, editis etiam tribus libris de re militari, quos postea Mambrinus Roseus Italica, & omnes ferme populi sua lingua reddiderunt, ob summam eiusmodi librorum, qui ab expertis & celeberrimis nostra, & patrum memoria Ducibus, compositi fuerunt, vtilitatem; & a qua istud etiam honoris & praemii retulerunt, vt merito beatissimi existimentur; si quidem recte dicebat Plinius Iunior *beatos puto, quibus Deorum munere datum est, aut facere scribenda, aut scribere legenda, beatissimos vero quibus vtrumque* (Lib. 6 Epist. 16.)." Naudé, *Syntagma de studio militari*, 535. Translation JS.
[8] Meinecke, *Machiavellism*, 162-163.

authors like Justus Lipsius who wrote extensively on the art of war and whose work the Parisian deemed not undeserving of praise, Naudé thought Rohan one of the best modern authors on warfare because he combined theory and practice.[9] Rohan would probably have prided himself with Naudé's judgment about his writings cited above, albeit that the *otium cum dignitate*, his writing retreat, was not altogether voluntary. This verdict joined the duc among the ranks of warrior-writers like Julius Caesar, undoubtedly the most famous example of this 'fortunate' combination of qualities and the author whose commentaries Rohan summarized and glossed. That an identification of the Roman and the French general might acquire a special meaning comes to the fore when we compare Henri de Rohan's style, method, and publication strategy with similar aspects of Gabriel Naudé's authorship.

Both authors central in this PhD-thesis have long been perceived as eminent contributors to the tradition of political prudence. Often they figure together on the same page in works on French 'reason of state'. One scholar even decided to subsequently write both author's biographies.[10] As contemporaries from different generations – Rohan was probably only slightly younger than Naudé's father –, these two Frenchmen wrote in the same context and employed the fashionable terminology of political prudence. Their work attests of this wider popularity given their diverging backgrounds among the old and new elites. Comparing these authors – a Protestant *grand* and a learned librarian-secretary with access to *robe* circles –, their work, and their ambitions allows us to shed light on the function of this terminology. Was there perhaps a connection between these two authors or a mutual influence?

Comparing these two French authors might seem a complicated endeavour. Not only do their backgrounds and convictions vary in important ways, but their political writings, at least on the face of it, also diverge. This starts with their specific applications of the terminology of political prudence. Interested in political affairs from early on in his writing career, Naudé treated elaborately of *raison d'état* in at least three of his printed works and is best known for his exposition of the related term *coups d'état*.[11] The Parisian *érudit*'s overall concern was with domestic political affairs; the conservation of a government once established, the order and stability within a polity and the wellbeing of the people. At first glance, here lies an apparent difference with the interest-analysis of the Duc de Rohan with its concern for foreign affairs,

[9] For an extensive discussion of the military writings of Rohan and Naudé and the intellectual context of early seventeenth-century military thought in which they appeared, see: Therese Schwager, *Militärtheorie im Späthumanismus: Kulturtransfer taktischer und strategischer theorien in den Niederlanden und Frankreich (1590-1660)* (Berlin and Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2012), 307-349; 435-437; 655-707.
[10] In a few years time Jack A. Clarke published his biography of Rohan (1966) and Naudé (1970).
[11] Besides the *Bibliographia politica, Considérations politiques*, and *Mascurat*, Naudé had probably already read widely in books on the subject of *raison d'état* in the 1620s, given the contents of his library. Bœuf, *La bibliothèque parisienne de Gabriel Naudé en 1630*, 65-70. He first mentioned the term in a published book in his *Addition sur l'histoire de Louis XI* (1630) in which he treated of the various writings of Botero.

which in modern eyes comes close to a geopolitical analysis of international relations. Upon closer look, however, the concern of both authors is the same, albeit with different emphasis.

Rohan's choice for the term *intérêt* instead of *raison d'état* seems to be not so much a difference of kind as a difference of degree. In fact, the duc paraphrased Italian definitions of *ragion di stato* in his explanatory preface.[12] In this exposition he presented implicitly what authors like Giovanni Botero and Philippe de Béthune had voiced explicitly before him, *raison d'état* and *intérêt* were interchangeable terms in the same vocabulary of political prudence.[13] It is within the terms of this common 'Italian' definition related to the establishment, conservation, or expansion of power that both Rohan and Naudé emphasized the interrelation of domestic and foreign affairs, and in a sense both from a defensive perspective. Rohan revealed that the Spanish interest relied on conquest; Spain would not cease until a 'new monarchy' over Europe had been established. The ways of Spain included fomenting civil wars to accomplish its design. In this way, Rohan showed the other princes and polities of Europe what was in their interest: preservation.[14] Naudé indicated how domestic strife brought the French monarchy on the edge of ruin, made it vulnerable to foreign enemies and to changes detrimental to the governmental system. In similar fashion, contemporary rebellion and (civil) war destroyed Europe. News about turmoil elsewhere, he pointed out, could have a pernicious effect on the situation in the French realm.[15]

As argued in previous chapters these analyses of contemporary politics by Henri duc de Rohan and Gabriel Naudé in terms of *raison d'état* and *intérêt* should be viewed against the background of the burgeoning interest in current affairs literature and the growing availability of 'news' and commentaries on politics in the early seventeenth century. Like the writings of other authors using the idiom of political prudence, the books of Rohan and Naudé are closely tied to and should be viewed within a broader historical and cultural context of the spreading of news and information. In the first half of the century, especially since the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War, there had been an upsurge in current affairs literature and the concomitant interest in these factual, semi-factual, or altogether fictional commentaries. News and information on *raison d'état* spread in print and in manuscript, in pamphlets and international correspondence of diplomats and scholars. It was part of an urban context of oral and 'choral' – i.e. in song – exchange. It figured

[12] See Chapter III.
[13] When Béthune wrote "en effet Raison d'estat n'est autre chose que raison d'interest" he was probably inspired by Botero's phrase "perche in conclusione, ragion di Stato è poco altro, che ragion d'interesse". In both authors the phrase appears in a chapter on neutrality. Philippe de Béthune, *Le Conseiller d'Estat ou Recueil des plus Grandes considerations servant au maniment des Affaires publiques* (Paris: Étienne Richer, 1633), 319; Giovanni Botero, *Aggiunte di Gio. Botero Benese alla sua ragion di stato* (Pavia: Viani, 1598), 34v. Above all this identification carried a disillusion with current diplomacy and politics.
[14] See Chapter III.
[15] See Chapter V.

in scholarly writing on politics as well as in daily practice, and played a seminal role in the behaviour of contemporary politicians.[16]

Rohan's diplomatic correspondence could attest of this fact. Furthermore, his *De l'Interest des Princes* might rightfully be seen as a French *grand*'s take on the Italian *avvisi*, the dispassionate ambassadors' reports and analyses of contemporary events.[17] In the case of Naudé, his correspondence is equally filled with discussions of current political affairs as with the preoccupations of a bibliophile. The *Mascurat* can even be interpreted as a prime example of this broader framework. As we have seen it was a dialogue set in one of the privileged places for the exchange of news in the early modern era, a *cabaret*. There, the two book merchants discuss French domestic and foreign affairs, refuting rumours and fictitious news and verifying their information by the reliability of the person who reports it.[18]

These French authors wrote in a context of European warfare. In discussing contemporary politics an analysis of the rivalry between Bourbon France and Habsburg Spain certainly had a place. In different social strata, among the old and new elites, the political idiom of *raison d'état* and *intérêt* was used in discussions of current political affairs. These debates not only concerned broader themes such as dynastic rivalry and the most important of the king's powers – the decisions of war and peace –, but also the appointment of advisors and ministers that helped him execute his powers, and the relationship between politics and morality. In this chapter these main themes, all intimately related to the idiom of political prudence and contiguous terminology, provide the common ground for a comparison between Rohan and Naudé and their political commentaries. Before that, however, this chapter opens with observations relating to the background of the authors and the style, method and publication strategy of their work.

Rohan and Naudé

From a socio-political point of view, Henri duc de Rohan and Gabriel Naudé could not have been more different. Incomparable were the men's social situations ever since the day of their birth. Born two decades apart, the context of their birth was already considerably dissimilar. Whereas the *vicomte* and later *duc* De Rohan was born in 1579 at the height of the Religious Civil Wars, Naudé was born in 1600 well after peace in the French kingdom and Paris, his birthplace, had been restored. The one was raised a Protestant prince, while the other was born in a family of modest means. Naudé would probably have followed in his father and brothers' footsteps in joining the lower echelons of the Parisian judiciary and royal finance if his intellectual capabilities

[16] Malcolm, *Reason of State, Propaganda, and the Thirty Years' War*, 92-109; De Vivo, "Paolo Sarpi and the Uses of Information in Seventeenth-Century Venice", 35-49; Pettegree, *The Invention of News*.
[17] See Chapter III.
[18] See Chapter V.

would not have attracted the attention of a wealthy patron. The young aristocrat, Rohan, made a *grand tour* of Europe together with his brother Soubise and a domestic staff including their tutor, Haute-Fontaine, and a physician, Mayerne. These *grands* were welcomed with all *égards* among their peers in Italy, the German lands, the Dutch Republic, England and Scotland. Naudé also travelled Italy and studied under renowned professors of medicine and philosophy at the University of Padua. This Paduan sojourn, however, was possible only due to the support of his patron Henri de Mesmes, one of the presidents of the *Parlement de Paris* in whose famous family-library he worked as an apprentice. The Rohan family possessed vast plots of land and estates, but their aristocrat way of life also indebted them with various creditors.[19] A small inheritance allowed Naudé to buy his small Gentilly estate and later he did draw some revenues from the offices – a canonry and a priory – he obtained, still he remained largely dependent on patronage his entire life.

As a result of the differences in social status, and convictions and religious beliefs, Henri de Rohan and Gabriel Naudé moved in different milieus. As great Protestant sword-noble Rohan was a sometime courtier, but most of all a warrior-statesman. In the latter role, Rohan dealt with local governments, had contacts among political elites, and as expatriate frequented a diplomatic milieu. Only in his Paduan days it seems more plausible that Rohan might have dwelled in more intellectual circles himself. Naudé on the other hand, since his student-days had immersed himself in the Parisian world of learning. Especially from the time that he was in the service of Président De Mesmes, Naudé frequented *robe* libraries and gradually gained access to the circles meeting in these cabinets of the learned. These circles remained his habitat even after he entered the service of the Cardinals Di Bagno in Rome and Mazarin in Paris. Due to the diverging milieus direct acquaintance between our two authors can be ruled out. Neither seem indirect relations possible through the mediation of the duc's secretary Benjamin Priolo, who later might have roamed partially the same Parisian intellectual circles as Naudé. There is no evidence of acquaintance or correspondence between the Parisian and Rohan's agent, though both did study philosophy at Padua with Cremonini around the same time.[20] If at all, contact is more likely to

[19] For an extensive discussion of the Rohan financial situation, see Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity*, 120-162; esp. 122-126, 148-151 and 160-162.

[20] In the highly critic contemporary biography that according to the editor of the work, Eugène Reveillaud, was written by Louis du Maurier, Priolo – tutor to the four sons of Benjamin Aubery du Maurier, among whom Louis – is mentioned to have arrived in Padua late 1624 and stayed there until about May 1626, returning their shortly in September 1626. Du Maurier also describes him as having been introduced to the Dupuy brothers in 1628. Anonymous [Louis du Maurier, according to ed. Eugène Reveillaud], "Véritables faits et gestes du seigneur Benjamin Prioleau", *Archives Historiques de la Saintonge et de l'Aunis* 38 (Paris: A. Picard, 1908): 423-486. On the authorship of the biography, 433-438. On Priolo's sojourn in Padua, 461-462; 467. On his introduction with the Dupuy brothers, 470. Naudé only arrived in Padua in September 1626.

have been established after Rohan's demise, in the early 1640s, when Priolo came in the service of Cardinal Mazarin.

In spite of the absence of a personal connection between the duc and the Parisian *érudit*, Rohan's name reached far. As one of the eminent figures of the French nobility, the Huguenot duc certainly had acquired a reputation during the Religious Civil Wars of the 1620s. A well-informed bibliophile with a taste for contemporary political affairs, Naudé evidently knew of the Huguenot general and had knowledge of his writings soon after they appeared in print – or circulated in manuscript. In January 1637, for instance, he learned of the publication of *Le Parfaict Capitaine* from his friend Peiresc and probably relatively soon after received a copy of the work from the Aixois antiquarian.[21] Sometime afterwards, as we have seen above, Naudé included a comment on the duc's work in his own *Syntagma de studio militari*.

The other way around, the situation was assumingly very different. While a few noblemen, as for instance Fortin de la Hoguette, moved in and kept up with the learned circles of Paris, Rohan seems to have kept in touch with the literary world only through the mediation of a Protestant theologian like Tronchin or his secretary Priolo. Although the evidence cannot be considered conclusive, none of Naudé's books figure in the catalogue of Rohan's travel library suggesting the work of the *érudit* had not (yet) come to the duc's attention.[22] Reasons aplenty, but most importantly the learned Latin treatises the Parisian wrote would have served Rohan little. Possibly the only work Naudé had published by the early 1630s that would have been relevant for the duc was the *Bibliographia politica* and perhaps the *Addition à l'histoire*. Furthermore, as we have postulated in a previous chapter,[23] Naudé's infamous work on political necessity and *coups d'état* was not published in Rome in 1639, and even if it were Rohan did not live to see the day. One can only surmise what Rohan must have thought when he would have read the *érudit*'s stupefying apology and critique of the effectivity of the decimation of the 'Huguenot faction' during St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre. In this book, the *Considérations politiques*, the duc goes unmentioned in a laudatory passage on Cardinal Richelieu's treatment of the Huguenot army captains during the last civil wars.[24]

Fairly unacquainted with each other's writings there was no mutual influence. Nevertheless, the two authors did share an important circumstance in the conception of their writings. This is the relevant parallel that both fully developed their political thought and composed their major

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[21] Nicolas Fabri de Peiresc to Gabriel Naudé, 8 January 1637 in Philip J. Wolfe (ed.), *Peiresc: lettres à Naudé* (1629-1637) (Paris et al.: Papers on French Seventeenth Century Literature, 1983), 102. "Il se parle d'un livre nouveau que nous n'avons pas encore veu icy de la façon de Monsieur le duc de Rohan soubz le tiltre du Parfaict Cappitaine qui est moullé sur l'histoire et les maximes de Jules Cesar. J'en ay envoyé querir deux exemplaires pour le faire passer les montz à vostre consideration principalement."
[22] Stelling-Michaud, "Le Duc de Rohan et ses livres", 18-27.
[23] See Intermezzo II.
[24] Naudé, *Considérations politiques*, 132.

writings on political prudence in Italy. For Rohan the Italian context was of the utmost importance. He was influenced heavily by his reading of Machiavelli and Guicciardini, but more significantly, he combined these Florentines' reflections with the outlook found in diplomatic literature, especially the *avvisi* of the Venetian ambassadors. With the aid of his 'cabinet' and especially his secretary Priolo, the duc probably also became aware of current Italian books on politics and prudence. Naudé, on the other hand immersed himself in the Italian debates on 'reason of state'. He especially displayed an interest in those authors from various (academic) backgrounds, who most fundamentally criticized Giovanni Botero's conception of *ragion di stato*. Among these authors were Bonaventura, Ludovico Zuccolo, and his Roman acquaintance, the former hardliner Catholic polemicist Kaspar Schoppe.[25] With the *Bibliographia politica* and, though somewhat belated, the *Considérations politiques*, Naudé brought the more recent Italian debate on *ragion di stato* of the 1620s to French political analysis – as Rohan had also done in some degree.

Style and historical method: Caesar and Tacitus

Stylistically these two authors were also worlds apart. In essence this difference in style and method can be explained by reference to the historian they considered their model; the Roman army general-historian Julius Caesar for Rohan and the Roman historian-statesman Cornelius Tacitus for Naudé. Through their reading and writing these two authors developed a historical method and prose style that was their own as much as it resembled and suited their status and milieu. Furthermore, while the writings of both authors can be seen in a broader context of political commentary, Naudé's work holds the middle between political commentary and 'academic' discourse, i.e. in the sense of the learned cabinets and academies of Rome and Paris. The figures of Caesar and Tacitus also relate to the way Rohan and Naudé tailored their writings to their audiences when they circulated and published their ideas.

History and political prudence

For Henri duc de Rohan, as for many other French aristocrats in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Julius Caesar was the model historian.[26] In the *Parfaict Capitaine*, Rohan presented Caesar as a model to emulate for Louis XIII as monarch of *la Belliqueuse Nation*. To him, the Roman was the greatest general that ever lived. As the duc formulated it, Caesar showed prudence in all

[25] On the influence of the work of Bonaventura and Zuccolo, see Catteeuw, *Censures et Raisons d'État*, 184-198. On Schoppe, see Gábor Almási, "Rehabilitating Machiavelli: Kaspar Schoppe with and against Rome", *History of European Ideas* 42, no. 8 (2016): 981-1004.
[26] Cf. Chantal Grell, "History and Historians in France, from the Great Italian Wars to the Death of Louis XIV", in Daniel Woolf, José Rabasa, et al. (eds.), *The Oxford History of Historical Writing*. Volume 3: 1400-1800 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 398-400.

his designs, "a marvellous carefulness (*diligence*) in his executions, and an admirable constancy towards the difficulties he encountered in the hardest of his affairs. If he sometimes displayed temerity, it was not often, and only to demonstrate his courage that was not inferior to that of Alexander the Great."[27] In Rohan's political writings this prudence epitomized by the warrior-statesman Caesar is based more on experience proper and "lumieres plus que naturelles" than knowledge of history. It is the experience and strategic intelligence of the warrior-statesman that allow the prince and his ministers, not to mention other political actors, to perceive the true interest of their polity and translate it into political action.

Despite an ostensibly sceptic attitude towards the validity and applicability of historical example in politics, there is plenty of history in his *De l'Interest des Princes*. Not only does contemporary history serve as a 'laboratory' in which he can prove that failing to recognize true interest for whatever reason leads to political disaster, his conception of interest also carries a trait of historical and geographical determinism. Rohan's conception and use of history here in an idiosyncratic manner reflects transitions in French historical writing of the preceding generation, a 'national' empirical turn. The duc's focus is on the particular, individual historical development of the different European polities he analyses. This constituted one of the variables informing the interests of princes and estates. This 'national rhetoric', however, also serves to align Rohan's personal interests with the true interests of the polity and to claim the office of the 'good Frenchman'. The empirical turn in Rohan's work is further exemplified by a style of reasoning and argumentation that does not use of arguments of authority: he makes no reference to any authors, classical or contemporary.

For Naudé, political prudence consisted in both historical knowledge and experience.[28] Historical knowledge, however, does not so much consist in acquaintance with battles and other events, as in the hidden causes behind them. The secret political counsel laid bare instructs the politician in his own judgment of the things that happen in the world. History as such provides the nourishment for politicians, advising them in the conduct of their affairs, forming their spirit both to guard themselves and to anticipate and ward off unfortunate incidents and all other sorts of occasions.[29]

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[27] See the dedication to Louis XIII, Appendix 1.

[28] See Chapter V. In the *Bibliographie politique* Naudé defined political prudence as "presque la seule vertu par qui les Républiques sont établies et augmentées. Cette prudence procède de la connaissance de plusieurs évènements lesquels ne peuvent être discernés que par l'histoire, ou par l'expérience, laquelle ne s'acquiert que par un long usage. Voilà pourquoi les hommes ne pouvant rien apprendre, ou que fort peu de chose par leur expérience propre, pour ce qu'étant enfermés à l'étroit dans les bornes d'une très-courte vie, ils en sont plutôt à bout, qu'ils n'ont peu voir de leurs yeux les divers replis et les périodes réciproques et inconstantes des choses humaines, cela est cause qu'il faut que l'histoire qui n'est bornée d'aucun temps ni d'aucune région, mais qui comprend et embrasse ce qui s'est fait en toutes les nations et en tous les siècles, instruise la prudence Politique et lui fournisse ce qu'elle ne pouvait pas acquérir d'elle-même." Naudé, *Bibliographie politique*, 146-147.

[29] Naudé, *Bibliographie politique*, 154-157.

Tacitus was the model historian for acquiring this political prudence. His writings, Naudé thought, prepared the counsellor to be a political sage or *esprit fort*. The 'retreat' of the sage is not away from the people in an a-political sense. Engaged in the business of politics, it is his liberty of judgment – free from popular passions and credulity – that elevates him high above the people. That the Roman historian figures as the model of the political *esprit fort* becomes visible in the imagery Naudé employed in the *Bibliographia Politica* and the *Considérations politiques*. In the first work, conceived almost simultaneously with the latter, he lauded Tacitus as the greatest authority in political prudence. Compared to all other historians, ancient and modern, who excelled in style and judgment, Tacitus is sitting on a high throne like an emperor overseeing what is happening on the historical stage. He has a keen eye to unravel and resolve any difficult situation pertaining to government.[30] The theatrical imagery of *deus ex machina* hinted at in the *Bibliographia Politica* later served as a metaphor for the *esprit fort* in the *Considérations politiques*. He exemplified the man fit for political action due to his mental *hardiesse* or fortitude. The model politician has "[…] a strong and fixed eye, and, as if he were placed upon some high tower, looks down upon the whole world, which appears to him as a theatre, ill regulated, and full of confusion, where some act comedies, and others tragedies, and where he may intervene; *tanquam deus aliquis ex machina*, like some divinity from a machine, as often as he pleases, or the variety of occasions shall persuade him to do it."[31] For Naudé, Tacitus is not so much the author of manuals of statecraft as he prepares the spirit of the able few for political action. Reading Tacitus provides the reader not only with examples and wisdom for governing well, but most importantly it generates the mind-set necessary not to become troubled, morally or otherwise, by political

[30] Naudé, *Bibliographie politique*, 153-155. The original passage in Latin reads: "[...] Quod idem de Cornelio Tacito dicerem si cum reliquis promiscue in Historici Theatri scena conspiceretur. At vero quoniam sedet ipse velut omnium Princeps ac Imperator in orchestra, aut potius sedem sibi fecit in Machina, ex qua cum stupore & admiratione politicas difficultates componit, virtutum suarum maiestate omne fastigium humanum excedens, certe consultius esse mihi persuadeo non hunc tenui sermone velut hominem, sed eloquenti silentio deitatis instar venerari; vnde si pueri olim Iuris Ciuilis studium auspicaturi Leges XII. tabularum tanquam Carmen necessarium ediscebant, cur non & Politici Reipublicæ Clauum gubernaturi huius auctoris scripta memoriæ penitus commendabunt, a quibus exempla simul atque oracula petant, ipsius Reipublicae bene feliciterque administrandæ?" Gabriel Naudé, *Bibliographia Politica* (Venice 1633) 107-8. After having written down these lines Naudé goes on to write about modern authors who have laid bare the 'secrets of government' and includes Machiavelli among these authors, although he criticizes the Florentine for profaning them. It is fascinating to see how in the French translation of 1642 (by Charles Challine) the name of Machiavelli is conveniently omitted. Compare the Latin edition (p. 108) with the French translation (p. 156).

[31] Naudé (tr. Dr. King), *Political considerations*, 24. In the original French the passage reads as follows: "[…] l'une des premières et plus nécessaires pièces, est de penser souvent à ce dire de Sénèque: *O quàm contempta res est Homo, nisi supra humana se erexerit*: C'est à dire, s'il n'envisage d'un œil ferme et assuré, et quasi comme étant sur le donjon de quelque haute tour, tout ce Monde, se le représentant comme un théâtre assez mal ordonné, et rempli de beaucoup de confusion, où les uns jouent des comédies, les autres des tragédies, et où il lui est permis d'intervenir *tanquam Deus aliquis ex machina*, toutefois et quantes qu'il en aura la volonté, ou que les diverses occasions lui pourront persuader de ce faire." Naudé, *Considérations politiques*, 20.

realities. It raises the political actor above the human stage, to a higher place where he is able to oversee the events and with a quick strike (*coup d'état*) set them to his advantage.

Naudé's work at once seems less systematic and more 'serious' as an example of historical research. The Parisian's reading and his claims can be traced through the references he provided in the main body of the text or the notes in the margins. As many humanists before him Naudé's conception of history is much indebted to a 'cyclical' conception of history as found in many ancient and modern authors, such as Polybius and Louis Le Roy reflecting on the rise, flourishing and fall of Empires.[32] His erudite critical method, however, owed more to the critical judgment developed as part of his studies in medicine, his admiration for the work of Charron, and the historical writing developed in late sixteenth-century France by the jurist-historians and antiquarians.[33] Naudé might be described as a critical and erudite 'historiographer' with a special liking of unorthodox classical authors within the omnivore eclectic diet of a bibliophile. Ultimately his concern was with historical truth and a great part of his work focused on a critique of sources and evidence, steering clear of false conjectures and 'superstition', i.e. popular credulity, correcting authoritative points of view, and – though very much aware of the political worth of historical myth – exhuming hidden causes behind political action.

Rhetorical style

Besides inspiring their thinking on history and its relation to politics, Caesar and Tacitus could be considered model-historians for the style of writing of the two seventeenth-century French authors. To commence with Rohan, his writing style was fitting to his social stature as a high aristocrat. The authority in his argumentation derived from his position and office, his experience and his own proper voice, not from quotations of esteemed authors. The duc developed his style ever since the early didactic exercise of comparing the various polities he visited along his *grand tour* of Europe. Later, he drafted pamphlets, speeches and diplomatic correspondence connected to his changing political circumstances in the two decades after the death of King Henri IV. Finally, in the 1630s, the duc recorded his *mémoires*, apologies, manifestoes, and treatises on warfare and European 'geopolitics' on paper. Especially significant in this context is that Rohan not only wrote a commentary on Caesar's work. He composed his own *Mémoires* deliberately in imitation of the *Gallic Wars* and even followed the third-person narrative. The choice for Caesar's writings does not surprise, for the Roman general-historian was one of the main models after whom the French nobility constructed their own historical writings, their *Mémoires*.[34]

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[32] See Chapter IV. Cf. D.E. Curtis, *Progress and Eternal Recurrence in the Work of Gabriel Naudé* (Hull: University of Hull Publications, 1967), esp. 35 sq.
[33] See Chapter IV.
[34] Chantal Grell, "History and Historians in France", 398-400.

It is telling that even Rohan's most humanist work, his reflections on Caesar's *Gallic Wars*, is not larded with citations. Rather than giving extensive quotations or distilling *sententiae* the duc summarized the Roman general's books and reflected on them in light of his proper experience, appending these reflections with his thoughts on modern warfare. As we have seen in the analysis of *De l'Interest des Princes*, this did not mean that his writing was not inspired directly by the words of other authors, translating and paraphrasing them without providing a reference.[35] His historical accounts of contemporary events in the second book of the political treatise were undoubtedly informed by his reading of the work of contemporary historians, even though it is a virtually impossible task to trace the accounts back to the contents of his library.

In general, Rohan's style of writing is plain, matter of fact, with sentences that follow the rhythm of speech. In *De l'Interest des Princes* the style might be said to resemble the tone of the diplomatic reports that found its way into contemporary newspapers, compilations of edited (semi-)official *mémoires* and government mouthpieces like the *Gazette* and the *Mercure François*.[36] In the twentieth volume of the *Mercure*, Rohan's treatise certainly did not find itself out of place. Not unlike Julius Caesar the warrior-statesman, Rohan the memoirist and commentator of European interest was a 'chronicler of his age', claiming impartiality but not shying away from strong judgments, except where his own actions were involved.[37]

Gabriel Naudé admired and emulated the meandering French style of Montaigne and Charron, but he did not write only in the vernacular. A large part of his correspondence and as well as several learned treatises were written in Latin. Although he varied between genres and forms, from political pamphlet to epistolary debates, from church inventory to fictional dialogue, and from theoretical treatises to his correspondence, the Parisian's style remained essentially the same. Whether he wrote in French or Latin, his prose is laced with quotations of varying length and *sententiae* in Greek, Latin, or Italian. From copying the works of his favourite authors in his student years for lack of money through to the writing of his own numerous works he developed his idiosyncratic 'Tacitist' version of the style that has been called the "rhetoric of citations".[38]

Naudé's admiration for Tacitus and the influence of his style of writing may be deemed apparent, even though the phenomenon of 'Tacitism' was never uniform in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century.[39] Never praised much for his elegant 'Ciceronian' style, the Parisian

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[35] See Chapter III.

[36] See the introduction by Christian Jouhaud to the digital facsimile collection of the *Mercure François* on the GRIHL website: http://mercurefrancois.ehess.fr/presentation.php

[37] Cf. Josiah Osgood, "The Pen and the Sword: Writing and Conquest in Caesar's Gaul", *Classical Antiquity* 28:2 (2009): 328-358.

[38] See, Fumaroli, *L'Age de l'éloquence*, 489-490.

[39] Aware of the historiography on 'Tacitism' I would like to steer clear from qualifications like 'red' and 'black' Tacitism. I only want to use the term to illustrate how Naudé's style resembled that of the Roman historian. See Jan Waszink, "Your Tacitism or mine? Modern and early-modern conceptions of Tacitus and Tacitism", *History of European Ideas* 36, no. 4 (2010): 375-385.

may have been among those authors who tried to emulate Tacitus' vague and suggestive Latin. This meant that authors applied the Roman's typical *brevitas* and used *sententiae*, short ambiguous statements that could be interpreted in either moralistic or amoral ways. Naudé also quoted extensively from Tacitus' works, either using the numerous *exempla* of political realism or building arguments around various *sententiae*. The Roman historian, however, never was exclusively favoured in Naudé's writing. But for him as for other early modern writers Tacitus' work provided a parallel for contemporary events with all its evocations of Roman depravity, factions and intrigues.

In the *Bibliographia politica* Naudé proposed that Tacitus should be venerated like a god, in eloquent silence (*eloquenti silentio deitatis instar venerari*).[40] This silence seems a perfect reference to the author's name, but more importantly to Tacitus' style and the Roman historian's ongoing notoriety due to his identification with Machiavelli. In the first half of the seventeenth century Tacitus was still highly controversial, except in small circles of erudite men. The ambiguity, suggestive- and vagueness of the writing is exactly what made the Roman historian so attractive for the weighty political affairs that Naudé discussed. He therefore seemed to have tried to emulate it. For instance, in phrases, Latin and French, reminiscent of the Tacitean 'silver' Latin style of writing, he displayed great ambiguity in his critique of Machiavelli. Was Naudé himself disgruntled with the Florentine's writings or was he simply mouthing universally voiced dissatisfaction?[41] When read as a critique these statements still remain vague. For what is it really that he is concerned with? Naudé blamed Machiavelli for something that he did just the same in his own work, i.e., laying bare the 'political considerations' behind secret and violent acts of government. Machiavelli's flaw, however, was that he speculated too much and proved too little – like the scholasticism of the Jesuits. Besides, he divulged the precepts of extraordinary government action far outside the cabinets of Princes, where they belonged. This pitfall Naudé himself only circumvented through a process of writing and publication that many scholars have considered a *coup d'état* in itself.[42]

Public, publication strategy and the importance of opinion

In the writings of both Rohan and Naudé there are implications of a broadening of the 'field of judgement' about political affairs. Of course, we must not forget that there are differences in the status of people that these authors deemed fit to provide such judgement. Moreover, there are

[40] Naudé, *Bibliographia politica*, 107-108. "Je croy qu'il sera plus à propos de s'en taire, et de le reverer comme l'on faict les Dieux, par un eloquent silence […]." Naudé, *Bibliographie politique*, 154-155.
[41] Naudé, *Considérations politiques*, 44-45; idem, *Bibliographie politique*, 155-157; idem, *Bibliographia politica*, 108-110.
[42] Donaldson, *Machiavelli and Mystery of State*, 160-165; Cavaillé, "Gabriel Naudé: Destinations et usages du texte politique"; idem, *Dis/simulations*, 237-240. See also, Intermezzo II.

strict limitations to the number of people Rohan and Naudé would include in this 'field of judgement'. Nevertheless, it seems hard to deny that through specific mechanisms – the 'objectivity' of a calculation of interest in the case of Rohan and 'secrecy' in the case of Naudé – these authors open the door for a broader public of readers to evaluate the actions that would normally be the prerogative of the prince and his most private counsel.

Apart from dedications to Louis XIII and Cardinal Richelieu, Rohan was never explicit about his intended audience. Still, it may reasonably be assumed that it was the political elite of diplomats, ministers, other government officials and his peers among the higher aristocracy. However, the *Mercure François* in which his work was first anonymously published was definitely dispersed wider than these small circles. Initially Naudé defined the public of political writing rather narrow as the prince, his entourage, ambassadors, their secretaries and literati. It is clear, however, from his choice of characters in the *Mascurat* that he had to accept and struggled with the reality of a growing ill-defined public of readers and other less literate audiences of political news.[43] It is unnecessary to minutely explain Naudé's oft-discussed anthropology of the 'many-headed beast', but his depreciation of the poor judgment of the common people was never an underestimation. He thought it a force to be reckoned with, one that could be "lead by the nose" by the government as well as by factions undermining order and stability. Hence his unremitting labour and petitions for an adequate reply to the *Fronde des mots*.

It is the ill-defined reader public with the powers of political prudence and a lucid and 'disabused' (*déniaisée*) mind that is able to judge of the political affairs in the cities and polities of Europe, and the course of action taken by governments. In this sense the writings of the authors we studied do not reflect the process of a nascent public sphere or public opinion, but they do fit the signalled increase of interest in current political affairs that periods of crisis ever since the rise of the printing press have laid bare. By the time of the seventeenth century, the open (civil) wars and latent conflicts – generated by a *mêlée* of social, political and religious factors – raging in Europe created a craving among readers for writings that could inform and maybe galvanize their political imaginations about what went on in reserved spaces of political decision-making.

It is to these readers that the writings of both Rohan and Naudé are directed in various ways. For Rohan, the (scribal) publication of his political musings probably was intended to create a space for his own rehabilitation and ambition as well as support for the idea behind the French war effort against the Habsburg powers in Europe. For Naudé, besides his interest in patronage and ambitions to further his own reputation and status, the publication of his political work had more 'pedagogical' intentions to both provide a practical guide to the mechanisms of power and

[43] Naudé, *Bibliographie politique*, 52-53; idem, *Bibliographia politica*, 40-41.

to show the dangers to stable monarchical rule caused by libel pamphlets, court parties and political indecision.

However, where Naudé had the prudence to create a sphere of initiation in his work on weighty political affairs that were not for the masses, Rohan seemed to miss this tact in his publication strategy to conform to a growing culture of discretion. Initially the *érudit* guarded his manuscript of audacious political advice for more than a decade, then he finally published his *Considérations politiques* with a preface that created an aura of secrecy, as he did several years later in the *Mascurat*. Of course, he wanted to disperse his apology for Mazarin as wide as possible, but always and only if it were adapted to the specific audience. *De l'Interest des Princes* circulated in manuscript form in 1634 and was then printed in 1637 in a volume of news and diplomatic reports from the year preceding the French intervention in the Thirty Years' War. In 1638 the treatise was finally published under Rohan's own name with probably more concern for his honour and reputation than with prudence not to share these weighty political considerations with a larger public. The presentation of the work as well as its plain, dispassionate, seemingly disinterested style of Rohan's vernacular French have nothing of the philosophical prudence that Naudé's writing has. In Naudé's work this can be seen to derive from the 'hermetic tradition' that found its way in his considerations of the true 'mysteries of state', but most importantly it fitted the discretion and sphere of intimacy that was expected in the Parisian circles of the learned. The *érudit*'s political considerations were not for all, a fact that in the duc's case can only be derived from the fact that he addresses princes and their counsellors. In a way, in the eyes of Naudé, Rohan made the same faux pas with his *De l'Interest des Princes* as Machiavelli in his *Il Principe*. He profaned or discussed in common terms the consecrated principles of political judgment. The duc had learned the language, but did not follow the code.

War with Spain, the 'natural enemy' of the French crown

The dynastic rivalry between the houses of Bourbon and Habsburg constituted the general political context in which the commentaries of Rohan and Naudé appeared. It may be argued that an important share of the political cynicism of contemporary French authors stemmed from diplomatic disillusion in dealing with the Spanish monarchy. Many in France were convinced, by way of news and reports from diplomatic circles, that it was a desire of the House of Habsburg to bring the rest of Europe to its knees. Disillusion and cynicism were expressed in disabused analysis and commentary on the European arms race and war politics.

In a previous chapter we saw how in *De l'Interest des Princes* Henri de Rohan in a purportedly indifferent analysis constructed an image of the Spanish monarchy as the pivotal example of

'Machiavellian' rule by conquest of his time.[44] The means to the Spanish designs discussed in the first part of his treatise were illustrated in the second part by contemporary historical examples. Rohan describes the Spanish interest and political action as ultimately intent on establishing a new (universal) monarchy – a concept bereft of the old spiritual sense, understood in a more neutral sense of war and conquest – over Europe. In Rohan's work the construction of this image of enmity is therefore part of a rhetorical *procédé* in an interventionist plea. Nevertheless, the Huguenot *grand* seems to analyse the situation of the powers of Europe rather neutrally. Not even Spain is depicted as immoral for seeking to aggrandize its power of the Christian world; this is merely what the Spanish interest prescribes. Whether used satirically or not, this depended also on the nature of the text and the intention for publication. Therefore *De l'Interest des Princes* both resembles and differs from Machiavelli's *Il Principe* in that it addresses a threat and exhorts to defensive action but does this in a far more neutral manner. On the face of it, the duc's work is far less ambiguous.[45]

Naudé did not use the 'Machiavellian' precepts and the idiom of *raison d'état* satirically, i.e. in order to caricaturize the adversary and construe an image of enmity. To him they were tools in the analysis of the workings of modern day politics. He laid bare the secret admiration many men of letters and most politicians of the day had for the Florentine's writings. Naudé considered 'Machiavellian' political analysis as befitting his day and age, used it rather neutrally, and thought of it not necessarily reproachable even if the Florentine's name remained the moniker for all that was despised in politics in Christian Europe.

After fifteen years of war against Spain, France suffocated under the war burden and was praying for peace. The *Frondes* partly were a cry for an end to the war that Rohan pleaded for in the early 1630s. In his political apology of Mazarin, Naudé presented a critical analysis of Spanish enmity, nuancing the way these representations come about. The depictions of the Spanish, deformed as demons or monsters found in various places in the city of Paris – a clear parallel to the defamation of 'the enemy of state' Mazarin in the *mazarinades* that decried him a Spaniard – were neither surprising nor realistic according to Mascurat, the cardinal's advocate in the dialogue. Vivid images of enmity like these were probably equally found in cities in Spain or places under Spanish yoke, but then with Frenchmen as a target for mockery and demonization. In other words, satirizing and caricaturing the opponent is proper to conflict and warfare.[46]

However, this more or less nuanced view of representations of the enemy did not prevent Naudé from discerning similar mechanisms at work as Rohan had two decades earlier, in this case blaming Spain for obstructing the peace process. In the *Mascurat* the lack of progress in the

[44] See Chapter III.
[45] Cf. Klerk, "Reason of State and Predatory Monarchy in the Dutch Republic", 19-52.
[46] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 188-189.

Westphalian peace negotiations is blamed on Spanish trickery. Thereby he expressed the general atmosphere of mistrust and reputation-management present in the talks between the envoys of France and Spain.[47] Based on the eye-witness testimony of a Mr Boulanger, secretary to the French diplomatic delegation at Munster, Naudé's prime protagonist unveils the extensive practices of dissimulation on the part of the Iberian ambassadors. Between the first and the second edition of the *Mascurat* speculation on "the secret of *Spanish Politics*"[48] in Munster is altered into a more detailed description of "the fraudulent ways used by the Spanish from start to finish" following Boulanger's report.[49]

The report in the *Mascurat* absolves Cardinal Mazarin of the allegation of stalling the peace process for personal gain. Although it is difficult to confirm the veracity of the descriptions of and statements about the Westphalian diplomacy, the man upon whose account they were constructed, Joseph Boulanger, actually was present at the peace deliberations.[50] The *premier ministre* did not intentionally delay an agreement to end the war, he simply could not accept what the Spanish were trying to accomplish with all kinds of schemes. A statement by the Duc de Longueville, the head of the French delegation who was not particularly friendly with the cardinal, is brought in to confirm that Mazarin did all in his power to obtain an advantageous peace for France. The testimony of Boulanger is thus verified by a parlementarian source, the *Parlement*'s inquiry of the Duc de Longueville. Just like the secretary to the French embassy the duc attested of a Spanish indisposition to conclude a peace with France.[51]

Rohan's five point description of the means to the interest of Spain – such as opening separate negotiations, bribing ambassadors, and reputation-management – almost identically found its way into Mascurat's representation of the behaviour of the Spanish delegation at Munster. Mazarin's advocate for instance describes how the Spanish diplomat Count of Peñaranda, first plenipotentiary to the king of Spain, and his subordinates at the peace deliberations first laboured to break the alliance between the United Provinces and France by offering them a favourable

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[47] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 586-597 [different on *400-408*]. Cf. Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy*, 709-749.
[48] Naudé, *Mascurat* (first edition, 1649), *401-402*.
[49] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 586.
[50] Joseph Boulanger (d. 1663). Boulanger's name and his office as notary, counsellor and first secretary to the French embassy led by the Duc de Longueville is found multiple times in the sources from the Westphalian peace conferences in the Acta Pacis Westphaliae [APW]. See for instance a letter from d'Avaux to Mazarin, Münster, 8 October 1646. Clivia Kelch-Rade and Anuschka Tischer (eds.), *Acta Pacis Westphalicae* II: Die französichen Korrespondenzen, Band 4, Dokument 191. URL: http://apw.digitale-sammlungen.de/Band/APW II B 4/Dokument/191
[51] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 590-591 [different on *400-408*]. When asked about this by parlementarians preparing remonstrances: "ce *Prince* leur respondit qu'ils pouuoient bien croire qu'il n'estoit pas amoureux des actions du *Cardinal*, & qu'ayant en son particulier grand suiet d'estre son ennemy, ce seroit auec plaisir qu'il leur fourniroit les moyens de le ruiner, mais que sa conscience, & son honneur luy estoient plus cheres que toute autre consideration, & qu'il estoit obligé de rendre ce tesmoignage à la verité, qu'il luy auoit tousiours paru par ses instructions, & par tous les ordres venus de la Cour, que non seulement le *Cardinal* auoit souhaitté passionnément la Paix: mais de plus, qu'il auoit fait de sa part tout ce qu'il auoit pû pour l'obtenir".

peace, in which they could retain conquests made by virtue of the alliance. Furthermore Mascurat presents the allegation that the support of the Dutch diplomats – Adriaan Pauw, head of the Dutch delegation, and Johan de Knuyt – was bought in order to conclude a separate peace treaty between Spain and the United Provinces instead of a general peace including all belligerents.[52] The sinew of the Spanish negotiation strategy thus consists in distancing allies, like Sweden and the Dutch Republic, from France. Seeing that Sweden resolutely kept to the "true interest of their affairs", Spain made an attempt to corrupt the Dutch and play at their desire for peace.[53]

At the same time Spain attacks the reputation of France by returning the accusation of a design towards universal monarchy, *Francia est orbivora* – France seeks to devour the world. According to Mascurat, Spain spreads this image of France by word and in print. In truth, however, Spain is herself secretly labouring with tons of ruses and infinite dissimulation to turn Europe on its head and realise Philip IV's claim of world domination.[54] Mascurat claims, just as Rohan showed on multiple occasions in *De l'Interest*, that all these secretive measures go alongside of the long standing Spanish design to let internal disorder weaken France so much that it provides the opportunity to ravage France, split up the realm, and destroy it entirely.[55]

Comparing the representations of Spanish enmity as presented by Rohan in the early 1630s and Naudé almost two decades later thus displays a striking similarity. In other words, Naudé's account of the Spanish deceit in the Westphalian peace negotiations in the *Mascurat* attests of the enduring relevance of Rohan's analysis in France fifteen years into the war the duc advised. These writings show the political cynicism of French diplomats and political elites finding its way to a larger public of readers. Naudé used the insights, not diverging too much from the actual political designs of the Spanish monarchy, to support the government view not to seek peace at all cost and thus persuade a war-trodden population of prolonging the war effort.

The authors here arguably made an important step in the development of the jargon of 'interest' or 'reason of state' 1630s to 1650s in France. As Noel Malcolm has shown in his analysis of the pamphlets directed against Frederick V, which Thomas Hobbes read and translated, 'interest analysis' in the early years of the Thirty Years' War has an important satirical component. This means that the original emphasis was on discredit; the pamphlets displayed what an idiotic, incompetent, ridiculous and on top of that immoral person Frederick really 'was'.[56] Now, it seems that Rohan and Naudé, each in their own way, move beyond such satirical dismissal, like Hobbes did when he read and presented the pamphlets as exemplary of how

[52] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 587-590.
[53] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 598.
[54] Mascurat speaks of the title *quatrimundiferenti Atlanti potentissimo*. Naudé, *Mascurat*, 593.
[55] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 596-597.
[56] Malcolm, *Reason of State, Propaganda, and the Thirty Years' War*, 48-57

politics really functioned.[57] To be sure, in their work Spain remains problematic and, as Marianne Klerk has shown, the rhetoric strategy to display this enmity might at least still be partly satirical.[58] However, in the analyses of these French authors Spain is not so much suspect because of some wrong moral core. Look at how Naudé lets his main protagonist, Mascurat, correct Saint-Ange's mockery of Spaniards. Rather the authors both show that the Spanish monarchy simply used, uses and will use all sorts of means for its interest. That powers follow interest, in itself, is quite neutral to Rohan, as it is to Naudé. If Spanish diplomats are thwarting the peace process, then France needs to continue the fight. What you need to do, you need to do. Therefore, it seems that the pens of the duc and the Parisian *érudit* move the idiom of political prudence further away from being morally inherently questionable. Combined with a more empirical historical approach, it becomes a legitimate level of analysis. Thereby, the authors also tentatively deviate from issues of the vices and virtues of main actors, whereas in earlier texts – including Botero, Clapmarius and many other authors in the rather academic 'Italian' *ragion di stato* debates - the issue remained, what is morally permissible and what unacceptable. This becomes clear upon a closer look at the rather matter of fact appraisal of Rohan and Naudé of a category among the main political actors, ministers and favourites.

Ministers and royal favourites

Even if perceptions of enmity may at times not have contrasted much with reality, responsibility for the most disputed policies, for a prolongation of the war and failure to conclude the yearned-after peace was often ascribed to ministers and favourites. A problem identified in much *raison d'état* literature is a common prevalence of private interests over stable rule, good government, and the interests of the realm. Besides the intriguing grand noble and the cabals of the courts, the royal favourite is a prominent figure in the current affairs literature. In the specific French context of dynastic fragility, royal minorities and the political instability of regency governments, the theme of opposition to the people in power is ever present.

Both Rohan and Naudé clearly perceived the instability of the regency governments; minority rule had obvious problems. In their political writings and memoirs they commented on the role played by ministers and royal favourites. These people in power were the target of various factions. Rohan mainly evaluated political counsel in relation to the true interest of a polity. Naudé explained that 'favourite' was mostly used as a pejorative term, but seems to have employed it rather neutrally himself.[59] For him politicians should be valued for their political prudence and

[57] Malcolm, *Reason of State,* 109-123.
[58] Klerk, "Reason of State and Predatory Monarchy in the Dutch Republic", 19-52.
[59] "Ces Ministres, et ces principaux Conseillers des Princes sont de deux sortes: car les uns sont tirés d'entre ceux à qui le Prince par une affection insensée et désordonnée, et pour ce qu'ils participent ensemble à quelques crimes, s'abandonne entièrement, se laissant en toutes choses conduire à leurs volontés, comme

merits as counsellor, not for specific traditional virtues to excel in, or noble blood. The examples from our authors' work discussed in this paragraph shall be limited to the French context.

Reflections on court factions and the position of the royal favourite were already part of Rohan's own '*grand* propaganda' in the 1610s. In the manifestoes written during these years and printed in the *Discours politiques*, Rohan critically and in purportedly disinterested fashion analysed the behaviour of the *grands* in relation to the regency government. He did not attack a favourite as the Maréchal d'Ancre, Concino Concini, directly because of his support of Marie de' Medici. Although he prudently deferred from publicly criticizing Concini, Rohan later commented on the Florentine, who possessed royal favour but was "hated by everyone, especially in Paris". According to the duc, the Maréchal from the start intendedly raised division among the higher nobility, by nourishing their envy and jealousy, so that they would not endanger his precarious position and made sure none of the factions at court would become superior.[60] After Estates General of 1614 and the Assembly of the Notables had failed to solve the regency's problems, Concini sought to put his *créatures* on high government posts, so as to side-line the *grands* and the old ministers in the *conseil*. In short, the superiority (*le règne absolu*) of favourites in government is the ruin of a realm (*la ruine d'un Estat*). Either these favourites change the government to their profit, they foster change by stirring the ambitious, or in the least give pretext to conflict and cause internal unrest.[61]

Gabriel Naudé came of age in these turbulent years after the political *échec* of 1614-15. Out of considerations of political stability, the Parisian *érudit*'s perspective always remained rather sympathetic towards ministers in office and those who enjoyed the favour of the king. He had most to say about factions at the different courts, royal and judiciary, and the intrigues of the higher nobility. Examples in his political writings range from the manipulation and stirring of the Parisian common folk by *Parlement* factions in 1615 – also addressed by Rohan in his political discourses – to the unnamed but clearly present factions of the Prince de Condé and other high aristocrats in the years of the *Frondes*.[62] This did not mean that Naudé was silent on the matter of self-interested royal favourites and despotic ministers, albeit, as will become clear, in retrospect only.

Naudé first made a name for himself as an author with the publication of the *Marfore* in 1620. As its full title made clear this was a short discourse against libel in which he defended the royal

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sont ceux que nos Français, et les Italiens, à cause de la grande faveur que le Prince leur porte communément, mais honteusement et malheureusement pour eux, appellent favoris. Et les autres sont ceux qui par les degrés des vertus, sont montés aux honneurs, et qui ne recherchent point d'autres prix de leurs labeurs, que la satisfaction d'avoir travaillé pour le bien de leur pays, et d'être en bonne estime parmi les honnêtes gens." Naudé, *Bibliographie* politique, 108-109.

[60] Rohan, *Mémoires 1610-1629*, 45-46, 55.

[61] Rohan, *Mémoires 1610-1629*, 81, 90.

[62] Naudé, *Considérations politiques*, 150-152; idem, *Mascurat*, e.g. 331.

favourite, Charles d'Albert duc de Luynes. At least in contemporary views, Luynes had been involved in the political murder of the Concini's in 1617. Afterwards, he became the first royal favourite of the personal government of Louis XIII.[63] Based on the concept of the sovereign's liberality to bestow favours and to raise and degrade whomever he pleased, Naudé defended the parvenu duc from the verbal attack in all kinds of pamphlets. These challenges to the royal favourite's position would ultimately result in undermining the sovereign's judgment and volition and therefore his authority. Naudé's main fear was a return to political instability of the years after Henri IV's demise, or worse, the Religious Civil Wars of the previous century. In this pamphlet rather than asking the magistrates of the *Parlement* to severely repress libel, he hoped that readers and writers alike would perceive the vices and irrationality of the leaflets, thereby weakening curiosity and demand.[64]

One man likely associated with some of the pamphlets against Luynes might have been Rohan, who as he attested in his *Mémoires* was not too keen on the favourite who presented himself as his *cousin* by marriage. Not long after the universally hated favourite, Concini, had violently been removed from the stage, he was succeeded by another man of lowly station, Rohan wrote. According to him, D'Albert neither had the rank and support in the realm nor the knowledge and experience required in political affairs, nevertheless he took up government with unsurpassed authority (*une absolue autorité*).[65] Soon he was promoted to the office of *Connétable de France* and his government was "so violent and unrestricted" that even his best friends turned into enemies. In the course of the first Huguenot war, Rohan later reflected, you do not see the king's intentions executed, but the treacheries and betrayal of this villainous spirit. Having risen to fortune by these means, Luynes continued to reign by persevering in his practices. That this shameless and cunning figure (*cette tablature*) was allowed in the king's council, was a mistake capable of destroying the whole realm.[66]

Luynes died before the end of the first war in which Rohan showed himself a Huguenot leader. The duc describes that two men held royal favour in rapid succession, first *sécrétaire d'état* Pierre Brûlart, then *surintendant des finances* Charles de la Vieuville. Both suffered the common vice of favourites; soon they started to think of their own grandeur, instead of that of their master.[67] As Vieuville had effected the disgrace of Brûlart and his father Sillery, so his favour proved equally short lived when he introduced Cardinal Richelieu to the royal council. There you see, Rohan noted, how these favourites 'loyally' make use of one another, i.e. only to topple them instead. His

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[63] Kettering, *Power and Reputation at the court of Louis XIII: The Career of Charles d'Albert, Duc de Luynes*, 63-88.
[64] G.N.P. [Gabriel Naudé, Parisien], *Le Marfore, ou discours contre les libelles*, Qua tanta insania, cives? (Paris: L. Boulenger, 1620).
[65] Rohan, *Mémoires 1610-1629*, 91; 96.
[66] Rohan, *Mémoires 1610-1629*, 114; 120.
[67] Rohan, *Mémoires 1610-1629*, 193.

opinion of the cardinal-minister, although similarly describing him as all-powerful (*tout puissant*), was not as adverse as that of most of the new favourite's predecessors. This was mainly because the cardinal followed the anti-Spanish project in foreign affairs started under Vieuville and achieved what the latter did only imperfectly – that is, supporting Protestant powers in Europe.[68] Regarding the role of Richelieu as his adversary in the conflicts that endangered internal stability in France in the 1620s, the duc displayed a prudent silence. He only remarked that the "sudden and unexpected" end to the second Huguenot war in 1626 could be attributed to the cardinal's desire to affirm and strengthen his position and authority in the tranquillity of peace.[69] Similar prudence vis-à-vis the cardinal is found in Rohan's later *Mémoires* on the wars in the Valtellina, wherein he never blamed the *premier ministre* for the setbacks he and his troops suffered, impediments that were at least partially caused by Richelieu's distrust of his general.[70] This can be explained by the motivation Rohan had for writing and circulating these and other writings in manuscript, namely to restore his reputation and (re)gain the support of the royal government.[71]

The absence of remarks on the *premier ministre*, who almost like in *De l'Interest des Princes* is never mentioned by name but features on virtually every page of the *Mémoires*, does not mean that Rohan further refrained from criticizing royal favourites. Prompted to a more general reflection upon the workings of the court and the actions of royal favourites by an account on the English favourite, the Duke of Buckingham, during the last of the Huguenot wars, Rohan contends that petty court foolery often causes great changes in kingdoms and that the greatest damage nearly always derives from the interests of favourites. They trample justice, overthrow the good social order and change all well-founded political maxims. In short, they deceive kings and their subjects in order to stay in power, to expand it or to avenge themselves.[72]

In the *Considérations politiques*, written in the 1630s, Naudé lauded Richelieu for his success in the campaigns against the Huguenots. The Parisian *érudit* reflected on the qualities of a minister and favourite that could be beneficial for the prince's government of a realm. Although it might not say anything about the perception of the strength or weakness of Louis XIII, Naudé

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[68] Rohan, *Mémoires 1610-1629*, 204-205.
[69] Idem, 257.
[70] Henri de Rohan [ed. B.F.A.J.D. de la Tour-Châtillon de Zurlauben], *Mémoires et lettres de Henri duc de Rohan, sur la guerre de la Valteline. 3 Tomes* (Genève, Paris: Vincent, 1758).
[71] The manuscript of the duc's *Mémoires* circulated well before their first publication in print in 1644. This is mentioned in an article by Solange Deyon, "Les non-dits d'un étrange procès: Tancrède de Rohan et ses juges (1645-1646)", *Bulletin de la Société de l'Histoire du Protestantisme Français* 136 (1990): 204. This statement, taken for common knowledge in Deyon's article, can be substantiated by contemporary letters like those of Hugo Grotius, who mentioned Rohan's *mémoires* in a letter (nr. 3407) to Oxenstierna of 2 January 1638. Furthermore, the large number of extant manuscript copies (fifteen) of these specific *Mémoires* in the BnF catalogue also attests of a wide dispersion of the manuscript.
[72] "Voilà comme quoi ces petites sottises de Cour sont souvent cause de grands mouvements dans les Royaumes, et les maux qui y arrivent proviennent presque tous des intérêts des Favoris, lesquels foulent aux pieds la Justice, renversent tout bon ordre, changent toutes bonnes maximes, bref se jouent de leurs maitres et de leurs États pour se maintenir, ou s'accroitre ou se venger." Rohan, *Mémoires 1610-1629*, 279.

counselled that in general a prince who deems himself strong, authoritative, judicious and capable enough to stand above his counsellors and confidents, should choose three or four in order to have a choice of possible solutions to an incident. A weak-spirited prince on the other hand would do better to appoint one sole counsellor he deems the most judicious. Louis XIII and his state as a whole (*tout son Estat*) received the fruits of "the wise government of Richelieu", a prime example of a single minister well-disposed according to the reciprocal duties of a master and his servant. Naudé praised such a minister, because he made sure the Prince's reputation (*crédit*) was preserved, his authority maintained, his person loved, and his commands executed.[73]

Naudé thus generally supported the ministers and royal favourites. This, however, might also for a large part have been prudently. Shortly after the cardinal-minister's demise in December 1642, Naudé seemed more frank when he told Mazarin that no matter his predecessor's political success, Richelieu was loved by few and hated by many.[74] In the *Mascurat*, the Parisian *érudit* allowed his main protagonist to criticize Cardinal Richelieu. He depicted him as violent and despotic in a comparison that is altogether favourable and apologetic for his patron Cardinal Mazarin. Mazarin is presented as the undeserved object of the hatred that many in France have conceived the preceding four decades against ministers and royal favourites like Concini, Luynes, and Richelieu, the true bloodsuckers of France (*les vraies sangsues de la France*).[75] Richelieu had been *Ministre absolu* under Louis XIII, meaning that he held the first place in the deliberations with the king and was held accountable by no minister, only by the king.[76] Mazarin on the other hand only possessed a limited power (*puissance bornée*)[77] and had no strong king to support him (*puissant Roi pour l'épauler*) like the Duc de Sully had in Henri IV or Cardinal Richelieu in Louis XIII.[78] And now the envious and disgruntled factions would suddenly depict Cardinal Richelieu as an angel and place Cardinal Mazarin *entre deux Diables*, while the first reigned despotic (*gouvernait despotiquement*) under the authority of an adult king (*Roi majeur*).[79] By despotic Naudé understood that the cardinal-minister made himself obeyed by force and not according to what the law prescribes.[80] The late cardinal had abused *raison d'état* in order to maintain his

[73] Naudé, *Considérations politiques*, 189-190.
[74] "Mais, Monseigneur, il faut que vous considériez ensuite que défunct Mr le cardinal de Richelieu, apres avoir fait toutes ces choses avec plus de lustre et de splendeur que personne ne fera jamais apres lui, est néanmoins mort en simple cardinal, aimé de peu et hai de beaucoup de personnes, à cause qu'il n'a rien achevé de son vivant au profict du Roy ou de la France, qu'il a extrêmement chargé le people, et qu'il s'est maintenu avec des rigueurs et violences du tout extraordinaires." Naudé, *Mémoire confidentiel*, 30-31.
[75] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 186 (= *140*).
[76] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 330 (= *258*); also, Idem, 503 (= *361*).
[77] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 505 (= 363).
[78] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 357 (= alt. *273*).
[79] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 564 (= *384*).
[80] "[…] Cardinal de Richelieu, lequel se faisait obeyr *ἐν χειρῶν νόμῳ*, *lege manuum, non praescripto legum* […]" Naudé, *Mascurat*, 439 (= *308*). Cf. the adagium *lex in manibus* in Erasmus' *Adagia*, IV.vii.50. Polybius, *The Histories*, V. LCL 138, 288-289.

position, serving himself too often of this argument for extreme measures as taking prisoners of state or violent and heinous executions.[81] As supreme plenipotentiary (*plénipotentiaire absolu*) of all French affairs supported by Louis XIII, Richelieu could give to and take away from whomever he pleased and could enrich his family and creatures and impoverish others. He could act by either reason or caprice, dispose of things according to his whims, and make and break as he wished.[82] A situation that would have been completely different if he had been *premier ministre* under the same challenging circumstances as Mazarin had to deal with since the king's demise.[83]

In Naudé's comparison between the governmental style of the two Cardinal-*ministres* Richelieu and Mazarin, the depiction of the defunct French cardinal is dark and despotic compared to his Italian-born successor. It is an image that Naudé would probably not have constructed during Richelieu's ministry, but not because of his often-alleged service or allegiance to Richelieu. Rather Naudé prudently supported Richelieu because he thought that undermining a first minister, who had been the king's choice, would have an adverse effect on royal authority.[84] During the *Frondes*, criticizing Richelieu could be an attempt to construe some sympathies for his patron among an anti-ministerial or more specifically anti-Richelieu environment as the Cabinet Dupuy and the *Parlement de Paris*. Perhaps it could also be that the execution of Jacques-Auguste de Thou in the aftermath of the Cinq Mars conspiracy in the final years of Richelieu's ministry had a similarly profound effect on Naudé's opinion of the cardinal-minister as it had on the Dupuy brothers, relatives of De Thou.[85] In any case, it is hard to pinpoint Naudé's true estimation of Cardinal Richelieu. Yet, for all his audacity and political cynicism, Naudé did always believe in moderation. It is there from that his criticism derived.

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[81] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 707; Naudé, *Mémoire confidentiel*, 54.
[82] Naudé, *Mascurat*, 504 (= alt. *361*).
[83] "Si le Cardinal de Richelieu se fut trouvé dans une Régence, travaillée de guerres étrangères, et de factions domestiques comme celle d'à présent, que n'aurait-on point dit de lui, mais que n'aurait-on point fait contre lui, s'il n'eut eu le pouvoir sous l'autorité d'un Roi si grand et si victorieux qu'était Louis Treizième, de se faire craindre et d'observer ce conseil de Salluste, *in hac colluvie morum, habendus metus, aut faciendus* [in this cesspit of morals, one must either frighten or be frightened], aussi bien que cet autre de Ciceron, *salutaris severitas vincit inanem speciem clementiae* [wholesome severity is better than an empty show of clemency]? Mais néanmoins quoique le Cardinal Mazarin ne puisse pas faire de même *sub Jove nondum barbato* [under a not yet bearded Jupiter] et que bien qu'il eût le pouvoir, il est trop bon et trop facile pour en avoir la volonté; il ne faut pas toutefois que la liberté qu'ont les méchants et les factieux de le calomnier, prejudicie à la favorable opinion que tous les hommes de bien doivent avoir de sa conduite." Naudé, *Mascurat*, 628-629 (= *437*). As is clear from the clause beginning the Sallust quotation that does not appear in the original, the two quotations derive from Justus Lipsius, *Politica*, IV.ix. See, Lipsius (ed. Waszink), *Politica*, 426-427. The other is a partial quotation from Juvenal, *Satires* VI. here referring to the minor King, Louis XIV.
[84] Richelieu is named as minister of "Louis le Juste et Triomphant" as an example of the maxim that those "ont toujours été estimés les plus sages entre les Princes, qui n'ont rien fait de leurs têtes, ni sans avis de quelque fidèle et assuré Ministre". Naudé, *Considérations politiques*, 185-186.
[85] Giuliano Ferretti, "Les stratégies d'opposition dans l'Académie Dupuy", 108-132.

Raison d'état, religion and morality

A final problem of *raison d'état* literature is the relation to religion and morality. Often Rohan and Naudé as well as other authors concerned with political prudence have been fitted into the modernization-logic of scholars. To interpret the efforts of early seventeenth-century authors using the idiom of *raison d'état* and *intérêt* as congruent with a thesis of political autonomy and secularization seems a distortion of the context in which the authors wrote and the presuppositions proper to the age.[86]

Our analysis of Rohan's argumentation in *De l'Interest* showed him according a place to religion in politics that can be described as secondary. Wherever religious issues or the denominations are concerned, Rohan gave priority to the political stakes at hand, showing religion to be either used as a means to political ends, as a 'political instrument', or as something that should not interfere with political affairs. Rohan's views have often been described as 'Machiavellian' and secular, and the extent of his Huguenot Protestant convictions have recently been questioned and estimated subdued by the values of an aristocrat.[87] This does not necessarily mean that he was not much interested in religious issues. We know that at the time of his military endeavours in the Swiss cantons and Northern Italy Rohan's Genevan friend Théodore Tronchin continued to send him the latest works on issues concerning the Protestant faith. This may serve as an indication of a continued interest in Protestant theology, his belief of the secondary place of religion in politics notwithstanding. For all that, whereas the interest-analysis in *De l'Interest* is presented as an 'objective' evaluation of political affairs, a more subjective layer may be perceived underneath that favours French political alliances with the Protestant powers in Europe. The concept of *intérêt* in Rohan's work seems raised above the office of the prince with its moral bandwidth and as such it might create problems or conflict with a system of Christian ethics. However, for the duc the power to make final political decisions in church matters, not articles of faith, resides with the sovereign and falls within the boundaries of the office of the prince or the estates. For instance, Rohan wrote in the context of the Arminian controversy in the Dutch Republic that theologians should not interfere with political power. As interest is the guiding light in political decision-making, true interest cannot properly go against religion. Maintaining a polity is maintaining the church.

It is true, as in other *raison d'état* writings, the state of the realm with Rohan has its own moral imperative. Religion recedes to the background and piety or religious zeal may be used to cloak political affairs, but that does not mean that religion or morality are absent. In fact, presenting *intérêt* as a higher logic allows Rohan exactly to quietly pass over the difficulties of his own

[86] Condren, *Argument and Authority in Early Modern England*, 219-229.
[87] See Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity in Early Modern France*, 37-38. Dewald paints a picture of stark contrast between Rohan's convictions and his actions.

situation as a recently retired Huguenot rebel. Rohan's silence on religious issues and his role in the French religious civil wars as a Huguenot general in *De l'Interest des Princes* is a case of 'forgetting religion', displaying a sensitivity to be found in many contemporary histories of the wars of religion.[88] The duc's forgetting seems to run parallel to the 'rhetoric of amnesia' found in the pacification edicts ending the various civil wars of religion from the *Edict of Saint-Germain* (1570) up to the *Edict of Fontainebleau* (1685) that revoked the *Edict of Nantes* (1598).[89] In this light Rohan seems to have taken to heart the "entière oubliance des choses passes" laid down in the *Edict of Grace* (1629) that restored the peace in the French realm after Rohan's last rebellion.[90] To be sure, his *oubliance* was not so much a question of faith – Rohan never abjured his Calvinist beliefs to return to favour – as of retrieved loyalty to the royal government, obedience underscored by this silence. Given his motives for writing *De l'Interest* and the intended audience to which Rohan dedicated and first presented the manuscript, Cardinal Richelieu and King Louis XIII, silence on the problematic issue of religion rather seems to have been a prudent omission than that it points towards either an idea of the autonomy of politics from religion or is proof of secularization.

Gabriel Naudé was not as prudent regarding matters of religion. Long has he been designated as one of the foremost of the *libertins érudits*, a Parisian group of thinkers as multifarious as unorthodox. Always careful enough to never explicitly attack the Catholic faith of the French Crown, his reflections on other religions would have radical implications. Difficult and unresolved as discussions on personal convictions of men like Naudé may be, a strong case can be made in favour of Gallican convictions, which subordinate religious issues to political decisions.[91] It is the Gallican circles that he roamed and he possibly held to Montaigne's approach to religion as a custom; conversion to another faith was a sign of inconstancy.[92] Fact is that Naudé was a man of letters whose primary interest lay with politics. His interest in religious matters only seems to have been scholarly. He dealt with the religious from an antiquarian perspective, as in the

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[88] The term is inspired by the recent work in the field of memory studies of Andrea Frisch and Cornel Zwierlein. Andrea Frisch, "Caesarean Negotiations: Forgetting Henri IV's Past after the French Wars of Religion", in Isabel Karremann, Cornel Zwierlein, and Inga Mai Groote (eds.), *Forgetting Faith? Negotiating Confessional Conflict in Early Modern Europe* (Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2012), 63-79; Cornel Zwierlein, "Forgotten Religions, Religions that Cause Forgetting", in *Idem*, 117-138.

[89] Andrea Frisch, "Forgetting Henri IV's Past after the French Wars of Religion", 63-64; idem, *Forgetting Differences: Tragedy, Historiography, and the French Wars of Religion* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), especially Chapter 3 "History without Passion: National Historiography in the Age of *Oubliance*".

[90] Extract from the text of the publication of the Peace of Alès cited in an exposition catalogue on the website of the local archives of the Cevennes.
URL:http://www.alescevennes.fr/resources/medias/services.mairie-agglomeration/archives.municipales/expositions/catalogues.d.expositions/catalogue-expo-la-paix-d-alais-ou-edit-de-grace-de-1629.pdf (consulted 07-09-2017).

[91] See Chapter IV.

[92] See the letter from Patin to André Falconet, 6 August 1670, cited above in Chapter IV footnote 110. Philippe Desan, *Montaigne: a life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 108-109.

authorship quarrel of the *Imitatio Christi* with the Benedictine monks.[93] As a bibliophile he included Scripture, Church Fathers and all 'heresies' alike in his specifically non-confessional and non-polemical, 'universal library'.[94] As a librarian he followed the accomplishments of thinkers and theologians seeking to resolve the religious conflicts.[95]

Naudé is perhaps best known for his political considerations on religions. In one of his books that gained most contemporary acclaim, the *Bibliographia politica*, Naudé treated knowledge of religion as part of the office of the politician because the salvation of the polity as a whole (*le salut* […] *de tout l'État*) depended on his counsel on these matters and the principal motives for war and peace arose from it. To put it in his own Aristotelian terms, religion belongs to the matter of politics (*causa materialis*), whereas political prudence constitutes its form (*causa formalis*). According to the Parisian, a man of politics should reflect on the means by which kings and princes throughout history endeavoured to establish some divine cult among the people subjected to them. Religion thus served as the cement of social order and obedience. Princes have supreme authority in matters of religion, they choose and found the church. Naudé describes a number universal tenets of faith of all known religious cults.[96]

In spite of common principles, Naudé noted, the diversity of religious rules and ceremonies in the world ever gave and gives rise to discord. In his day as ever before religious diversity caused wars and deadly conflicts by immoderate zeal and emulation of piety. Therefore Naudé purported, a comparison between the diverse religions is not conducive to peace; it would rather be prejudicial to true piety. To pacify the discord and to solve it in a manner convenient to the precepts and ordonnances of the Christian Religion, a politician must know the common principles of all religions together with the opinions and beliefs proper to each of them. Whenever it is necessary to establish or maintain the Catholic faith somewhere, this may be done by demonstrating the impertinences and absurdity of other cults. Naudé prescribes a number of authors that would instruct politicians sufficiently to provide careful and wise counsel on matters of religion and act on it. For this end, the Parisian recommends reading the French religious universalist Guillaume Postel's *De orbis terrae concordia*, the work of the Flemish irenicist theologian George Cassander, and the efforts of the Spanish anti-scholastic humanist theologian

[93] Cavaillé, "Gabriel Naudé et l'attribution frauduleuse de l'»Imitation de Jésus-Christ« à Jean Gersen", 146-177.
[94] Naudé, *Advis pour dresser une bibliotheque*, 56-61.
[95] See Chapter IV.
[96] "Il est vrai que du plus loin que l'on puisse avoir mémoire, tous les hommes ont toujours cru que les Dieux étaient les Seigneurs, et les modérateurs de toutes choses; que tout ce qui se fait dans le monde, s'y fait par leur autorité, par leur volonté, et par leur puissance; que les hommes ont reçu beaucoup de grâces et de bienfaits d'eux; qu'ils prennent garde quel est un chacun particulier, ce qu'il fait, ce qu'il commet, avec quel esprit, et de quelle piété il se porte à la Religion et à les honorer: enfin qu'ils font distinction en la distribution des récompenses et des peines, entre les bons et les méchants, les dévots et les impies." Naudé, *Bibliographie politique*, 62-63.

Melchior Cano, as well as several Church Fathers who wrote refutations of heresies and the Jewish religion.[97] As religious strife is contrary to peace in Europe and has caused many afflictions in the world, throwing cities and nations as a whole in manifest dangers, Naudé says, it has always been deemed necessary to oppose the expansion of heresy with all force – a theme developed in detail in Louis le Roy's *Des differens et troubles advenants entre les hommes par la diversité en la religion* (1562). To succeed in maintaining order and tranquillity it may be necessary to learn about the frauds, the spirit, the mores, the sentiments and the false maxims of heretics, ancient and modern.[98]

The image of Naudé defending the Gallican Church might seem odd to scholars familiar with the *libertinage*-thesis or the statements insincere. The theme of fraud and heresy present in the *Bibliographia politica* discussed above is part of an element in his writings that perhaps rendered the author most (in)famous, his exposition of the 'impostor-thesis'. In various works he illustrated his analysis of the use of religion as a political instrument with a number of examples. There is the exposition of the case of Numa Pompilius, the founder of both a Roman religion and of a body of law, the example of the foundation of Islam and the political rule of Mohammed, as well as modern examples. The various creeds of the world are described to be well-known inventions used by all legislators and politicians since the beginning of time and the history of men. Naudé even compared religion to a drug; the credulous masses were addicted to superstition and religion.[99] The 'impostor-thesis' could have wide-ranging consequences and it would have in the early eighteenth century when the *Traité des trois imposteurs* was 'unearthed'. Nevertheless, Naudé's point seems to have been more to show how the credulity of the people had been and could be used for the benefit of a ruler establishing his government rather than to imply that all religions are founded by impostors, including the Christian religion. However, as the American historian Maryanne Cline Horowitz attests, the "implications a seventeenth-century Protestant or Jewish reader might have drawn from this about either the French monarchy or the Roman papacy are far-reaching, possibly beyond Naudé's intent."[100] In any case, in the Parisian's political analyses religion and Christian morality had a subordinate place.

That does not mean, however, that confessional considerations are absent. In Naudé's political thought 'heresies' as the reformed creed of Luther, Calvin and others are not necessarily

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[97] Naudé, *Bibliographie politique*, 62-74; 72-74.
[98] Naudé, *Bibliographie politique*, 72-74.
[99] "Puis doncque que le naturel de la pluspart des Princes est de traitter de la Religion en charlatans, et de s'en server comme d'une drogue pour entretenir le credit et la reputation de leur theatre, on ne doit pas ce me semble blasmer un Politique, si pour venir à bout de quelque affaire importante, il a recours à la mesme industrie, bien qu'il soit plus honneste de dire le contraire […]." After this rather cynical passage Naudé immediately goes on to council prudence and moderation. Naudé, *Considérations politiques*, 179. Naudé, *Apologie*, chapter 11 on Numa.
[100] Cline Horowitz, "Naudé's *Apology*", 67.

problematic for their theological precepts, but for the possible danger to the stability of a polity that was the sole moral imperative of politics for the Parisian. For instance, he took the French Huguenots mainly for a faction that could be politically dangerous, as had been the case in the 1620s. Furthermore in his analysis of the state of the French realm just after the death of Richelieu, he warned his new patron Mazarin for a potential new rebellion of the Reformed faction as a result of their long suppression and their exclusion from important offices.[101] He seems to have been proved wrong as during the *Frondes* there was no true Huguenot dimension to the conflict, perhaps with the short lived exception of the late Duc de Rohan's wife and her son Tancrède. There simply were but a few Huguenot *grands* left in France. Many had converted to the faith of the Crown, others such as Rohan had long been dead.[102] Still, this fear might not have been completely unsubstantiated. There remained a Huguenot element in local revolts and apparently even some Calvinist aristocrats were still ready to conspire long after 1629. As one scholar recently observed, "Richelieu, and after him, Mazarin, were careful not to stir up religious strife that might stimulate the Huguenots to rebellion; both men seemed aware that armed insurrection remained a strong possibility, and had to tread carefully given the traditional alliance of the Huguenots with foreign Protestant powers."[103] Perhaps only after the conversion of Marshal Turenne, "the most influential surviving Protestant grandee", in the 1660s did this fear subside.[104]

It is interesting to see how from completely different backgrounds and out of varying exigencies our authors came to seemingly comparable conclusions concerning the practice of politics and its relation to religion. The idiom of political prudence and the related terminology of *raison d'état* and *intérêt* imposed no clear boundaries on the office of a statesman or a prince in view of morality and religion, although the imperatives of political power never gave a licence to abuse, bigotry, corruption and despotism. However, in interpreting the writings of Rohan and Naudé concepts like 'secularization', 'political autonomy', or 'libertine conservatism' for that matter, cloud more than they explain. Whatever impact *De l'Interest des Princes* or the *Considérations politiques* would have had on long term processes identified by these concepts, it could virtually only have been the unintended consequence of ideas and themes touched upon in these writings of Rohan and Naudé and furthered in the reception of the works. The origin of our authors' reputations might perhaps for a large part be sought in more northern, anti-French

[101] Naudé, *Mémoire confidentiel*, 36-49.
[102] The strong historiographical assumption of the complete destruction of the political force of the Huguenots after 1629 has hardly been questioned. For an exception to this rule, see Gregory, "The End of Richelieu", 131-134.
[103] See the conspiration plans of Rohan's brother Soubise directed from London in the early 1640s and Gregory, "The End of Richelieu", 52-53, 131-134, quoted passage on pp. 133-134. See also, Bergin, *Politics and Religion*, 227-251. Cf. Naudé, *Mémoire confidentiel*, 36-49.
[104] Bergin, *Politics and Religion*, 245.

regions in the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, where and when interest-analysis gained further currency and heterodoxy became oft-suspected, debated and condemned.[105]

Conclusion

Conscious of the pitfalls of repetition, the concluding remarks to this chapter can be but summary statements. The comparison of Rohan and Naudé showed how two unrelated authors from different social milieus, with diverging ambitions and educational histories engaged with the same vogue terminology of political prudence. Their specific treatises appeared in the context of and at the same time reflected on the burgeoning interest in politics and a deluge of news on current affairs in a Europe ridden with war and confessional conflict. Adapted to their specific circumstances and ambitions these two French authors employed a style and method that can be described in reference to a model historian; Caesar for Rohan and Tacitus for Naudé. With these Roman statesmen in mind they developed their particular conception of political prudence and its relation to history. For Rohan this was related to the ambitions, prowess and pride of a general, not weighed down by the heavy burden of past events but with a quick mind to perceive strategic opportunities. For Naudé political prudence was the wisdom of the political counsellor, who hardened by the exempla from the history of man was able to overlook the theatre of human conduct and let the drama play out to his advantage.

For the duc as well as for the Parisian *érudit* the European constellation of warfare and internal upheaval was a fact of life, it was the general context for their political reflections. Extraordinary political measures were not necessarily a subject of philosophical speculation but common practice in the cabinets of princes. Both could describe the art of politics practiced by princes, their ministers and other political actors in the early modern age in a purportedly neutral tone. Looking at the dynastic rivalry on the European continent between the Spanish Habsburgs and French Bourbons, they could but conclude that the 'Machiavellian' rule by conquest practised by Spain was simply how the politics of the bigger polities – we would say dynastic agglomerates – worked. The same held for internal turmoil, when conflicting factions undermined the stability of political life in a city or political realm. The situation taken for what it was, the only conclusion could be that political problems should be dealt with in similar terms, i.e. to confront the opposing power on his own terrain. Confessional considerations could not be the main priority when preservation of power and authority was concerned. The utility expressed by the neutral

[105] Cf. Cline Horowitz, "Gabriel Naudé's *Apology for Great Men Suspected of Magic*: Variations in Editions from 1625 to 1715", in John Christian Laursen (ed.), *Histories of Heresy in Early Modern Europe: For, Against, and Beyond Persecution and Toleration* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 67; John Christian Laursen, "Heretics in Self-Defence and Calls for Toleration", in Idem (ed.), *Histories of Heresy in Early Modern Europe*, 52-53; Berti, "*L'Esprit de Spinosa*", 3-51.

terminology of political prudence employed by the authors transcended moral and confessional considerations, but this never implied direct conflict with these rules.

'Crisis-Management' and Political Prudence in the Age of the Cardinal-Ministers

In light of historiographical currents of the last three decades, this study has aimed to reassess French 'reason of state' in the period between the Fall of La Rochelle (1628) and the *Frondes* (1648-1653). In an attempt to bridge the gap dividing the fields of political and intellectual history, this thesis commenced by connecting the recent revisionism of the broader socio-political context of the transformation of early modern rule, and in the French monarchy in particular, to transitions in political thought. Political historians have established that contrary to traditional explanations early modern warfare on an extraordinary scale did not make modern states. These long, grave and violent conflicts were part of a process that constituted fewer and larger dynastic agglomerates whose rulers did interfere more in the provinces furthest away from the court and the metropolis. Ever since the 1490s, armed conflict was largely spurred on by dynastic crises and competition between the rivalling royal houses of Habsburg and Valois-Bourbon. However, in their wake, the wars brought neither modern judicial and fiscal bureaucracy nor the long assumed disciplining of the aristocracy in the great monarchies. The main immediate consequences as well as long term transformations were the result of ad hoc and often haphazard measures to solve the dying financial needs of governments that incurred giant public debts. Through these makeshift solutions new and old elites rose that all had a considerable stake in the monarchy. Furthermore, elites competed for access to public offices and other signs of royal favour. The system of early modern rule known as absolute monarchy, new research has increasingly shown, actually was a complex power constellation of mutual dependence of the Crown and its elites, a system of social collaboration.

In this context 'opinion' became ever more important as the seventeenth century progressed and the French monarchy evolved more or less contingently under the pressures of war and debt. Historians now emphasize that the era saw a steadily growing awareness among the political elites that 'opinion' was among the most important features in the world of politics. As regimes could collapse in a matter of months when cooperation of the elites ended for whatever reason, it was pertinent to mobilize them and secure their support for the monarchy's cause.

The increasing relevance of 'opinion' is tied to the more general European development of the 'invention' and upsurge of the news and contemporary political affairs commentary. Authors like Rohan and Naudé rode the wave of this eventuation and critically assessed the implications of political news, rumours and opinions in the context of European warfare and the internal affairs of the French kingdom. As such their writing was both a symptom of and commentary on the

international and interconnected growth of the interest and consumption of news and information on current (political) affairs.

This broader framework of the transformation of monarchy, the increased relevance of 'opinion' and the great expansion of current affairs literature is related to transitions in contemporary political thought and the functioning of the rhetoric of political prudence. The period that began with Cardinal Richelieu's active appropriation of 'reason of state' for (personal and) propaganda purposes became the high tide of some crucial transitions in political discourse that have traditionally been associated with the rise of 'absolutist political theory' and absolute monarchy. Three general and intimately interrelated transitions unfolded in the period under scrutiny.

Firstly, the era saw the significant rise and development of the notion of *l'État*. As the American historian Jim Collins has recently shown, a transition can be discerned from the political vocabulary addressing the 'commonwealth' (*République/bien publique*) to 'the State' ('mon État', 'son État', 'l'État') as a more abstract denominator for government, which aided in redefining the relationship between the Crown and French elites from consultation and participation towards collaboration. Under the first Bourbon kings between the 1590s and 1630s, this transition culminated in the prominence of *l'État*. The 'good of the state' that referred to the political community as well as the government administration ruling it by then had replaced the good of the citizens of the commonwealth. The elites, old and new alike, could no longer claim to be part of a separate political body, but had to cooperate with the royal government. Nevertheless, confused usage of the terminology of *l'État* persisted long into the seventeenth century and many a pamphlet war was fought over the nature of the subject.

An associated transition is the second that traces a common European history with its medieval and Renaissance political vocabulary towards a growing 'national' rhetoric and a 'national' history. This is the factor of an individuating tendency after the disintegration of Christendom that was a result of the Reformation. In France, the contributions of the jurist-historians of the late sixteenth century were of seminal importance. In search of stability and supra-factional unity in times of Religious Civil War, these French authors traded a corpus of law and history that traced its roots to Greek and Roman antiquity for a continuous chronology of the French kings from the Franks until the Bourbons and medieval common law and the fundamental laws of the kingdom. In the period between the 1620s and 1650s the 'national' rhetoric under the banner of stability and unity of the kingdom was at stake in a lively debate in political pamphlets.

Third and last, there was the correlated transition from a 'traditional' argumentation of *necessitas*, i.e. the highly exceptional but casuistically accepted deviation from (divine) law, morality (Christian ethics), and religious prescripts, towards the situation of *raison d'état*. In the quasi-permanent circumstances of 'crisis-management', the extraordinary gradually became the

ordinary and necessity actually made law. Although the fashionable vocabulary of political prudence professed to render the debate on all matters political neutral and disinterested, it clearly had a propagandistic or otherwise partisan nature. The terminology of *raison d'état* and *intérêt* might be and was used by anyone and everyone to present their views on domestic political affairs and foreign policy; no matter how hard the government under Cardinal Richelieu might have tried to monopolize its use in the 1630s. In the end, the political rhetoric that initially largely supported an aggressive French foreign policy turned against the alleged French designs of 'universal monarchy' in the final decades of the seventeenth century.

The terminology of interest and 'reason of state' in France as elsewhere seems to have been fostered by, and played into the curiosity of an ill-defined public beyond the princely courts and government chambers and the cabinets of the learned elites. In the specific case of France, the terminology was strongly related to the government under Richelieu and his often haphazard crisis-management of French affairs. The cardinal both sought to secure his own position as to prevent the breakdown of order, a return of the chaos of the second half of the sixteenth century and the early decades of the seventeenth century after the demise of Henri IV. During the regency years of 1643-1652 and the *Frondes*, when order did collapse, the government had less influence in and control on the 'information market'. This made the new *premier ministre* Mazarin vulnerable to verbal attack. In this turbulent period, a battle of opinions and 'news' raged in which it was the interest of factions under the guise of the public good rather than *raison d'état* that was being defended. The terminology of political prudence did resurface in these years, but it was part of the power struggle and for the most part resembled a failing attempt to control the events that just unfolded and followed each at too great a pace. To legitimate Mazarin or the regency government's political action the terminology of political prudence was a blunt sword.

This study analysed and compared the application of this political idiom by two contemporary French authors from widely diverging milieus. In contrast to common historiographical practice that takes Rohan and Naudé as impersonations of militant Calvinism, *libertinage*, or the rise of the modern state, it rather stressed the intellectual-political dynamics affecting and motivating these authors. Both authors wrote in the same context of a European continent in flux due to an unparalleled scale of wars and civil strife, with domestic disarray always looming large in the French dynastic agglomerate. Rohan and Naudé examined the polities of Europe, the kingdom of France in particular, and the multifarious crises their governments and inhabitants faced. Their goal seemed to provide political commentary and create order and stability in the face of chaos. In their shot at current affairs commentaries, these authors employed the vogue terminology of political prudence. What does the study of these authors and their work entail for our understanding of the functioning of the political rhetoric of *raison d'état* and interest in early seventeenth century France?

French authors including Rohan and Naudé employed the idiom of political prudence neither as a theory, nor as an ideology. The French case therefore to a great extent corresponds to the findings of the latest historiographical contributions to the study of 'reason of state' by Condren, Dreitzel and Höpfl, whose insights departed from older ideas of Meinecke and Viroli. From a largely pejorative term in the rather small-scale and speculative political reasoning in Italy, the terminology of *raison d'état* and *intérêt* became a propaganda tool as well as factional political rhetoric in the French context from the 1620s onwards. Once knowledgeable commentators in France – or expatriate for whatever reason – applied it to France, the idiom underwent important further developments. In a way, Rohan and Naudé both were intellectual mediators in this transition. The Huguenot *grand* and Parisian *érudit* took much of their inspiration from the groundwork that authors from the various Italian city-states had done. However, by turning it to France, they left the humdrum stage of Italian speculation that pertained to the miscellany of little city-states and dependencies. Now authors applied the vogue terminology to the new-fangled dynastic agglomerates, the predominant powers in Europe and all their complexity.

In general, French authors used the idiom of political prudence as a mobilization tool with the intention to unify people and factions behind the monarchy or a particular policy. That is not to say that authors might not also engage with it as a means to frustrate the support to the government. It bolstered propagandistic, pragmatic, particularistic and factionalist goals. Apart from public motivations, however, the fashionable lingo served to tie the author's proper ambitions to current political affairs.

In the cases of Rohan and Naudé this amalgamation of considerations and motives clearly came to light. Rohan tied his battle cry of what he perceived as the main interest of France – i.e. to counter Spanish Habsburg designs in Europe and Northern Italy specifically – to the possibility of reinstatement in circumstances of exile. In writing his main analysis of current affairs, *De l'Interest des Princes*, Rohan sought a return to the king's graces and high military office in an area where he could fuse his own ambitions and confessional commitment with French interests and political-military strategy. Rohan's publication strategy, first exemplified by the 'Discours d'État' and a few years later with *De l'Interest*, shows that the duc not only hoped to get his ideas past the ears of Cardinal Richelieu and King Louis XIII, but plausibly also tried to reach diplomatic circles and other friendly princes. While Naudé's initial motivations to write his reflections on contemporary politics were learned ones, the publication of the *Considérations politiques* and the ongoing process of writing, editing and publishing the *Mascurat* in the context of the *Frondes* displayed a mixture of aspirations. Apart from genuine concern with the state of the French realm, his correspondence and private memoirs attest of his ambition to become a political counsellor to his patron Cardinal Mazarin. The total breakdown of order that he feared, foresaw and tried to counter provided the circumstances to intervene and show not only a specific analysis of the

problems and the solutions but also seek to exhibit political prowess. Naudé's prospected audience consisted of the learned elites who had strong connections to the world of magistrates and *avocats* in and outside the *Parlements*, the bulwarks of political opposition during the *Frondes*. Another intended readership included the cardinal himself and his confidants, who to Naudé's mind needed to be convinced of the dangers of 'opinion' and the necessity of a propaganda strategy to the cardinal's defence and the protection of the monarchy. Finally, the Parisian *érudit* sought to reach a broader public of *mazarinades*-consumers, readers and listeners. However, as his correspondence attests, Naudé was aware that material from the heavy volume like the *Mascurat* could only reach such a public in different and smaller forms of publication, perhaps as extracts.

Seeking to surpass Friedrich Meinecke's interpretation by whose standards 'reason of state' mirrored the rise of a system of modern states, the current study substantiates that early seventeenth-century authors like Rohan and Naudé did not deal with the modern notion of the 'state' as a legal person. To be sure, the application of political prudence did indicate a shift away from the person of the prince and his counsellor's virtues. This however was a transition not so much toward the modern state but the political praxis of those involved in government related to the status of the French realm, a transition triggered by the exigencies of the war and arms race with Habsburg Spain. As Rohan and Naudé appropriated the jargon of 'reason of state' in France, the new politics of the transforming monarchies moved into sharper focus, in particular given the crises of the Valois and Bourbon monarchies facing Habsburg Spain. The specifics of France as imposing certain politics on any ruler of France, rather than a rather generic 'reason of state' catalogue of actions good for most (Italian) cities played a more important role. Insofar, Rohan and Naudé began to pave the way for a more systematic analysis of the simply existing, this-worldly 'interests' of the emerging European power conglomerates. The idiom of political prudence provided the stability that a dynasty vulnerable to the powers of contingency otherwise could not.

What strikes as innovative is the perspective found in both Rohan and Naudé that Europe did not simply consist of a plurality of princes and dynasties, each with their own 'reason of state' in terms of an assemblage of various interests. As has been argued time and again since Meinecke, interest analyses of princes and principalities can already be found in the work of Niccolò Machiavelli and were developed subsequently in the 'Italian' tradition of *ragion di stato*. As has been intimated above, the new feature is an issue of scale and complexity; it is in the insight that some of the monarchs in Europe rule monarchies with specific power constellations of their own. For these early seventeenth-century French authors this whole make-up not only constituted a specific characteristic for each kingdom, but it also determined what a particular monarch must pursue in terms of policy and what means he has to that end. As such, the Duc de Rohan examined

the political motivations of the various princes and polities of Europe related to the lands and societies over which they ruled. His analysis approached the interests of different polities from a decentred European-wide perspective of interrelation, wherein the interest of smaller polities was largely determined by their gravitation towards or 'natural' opposition to one of the two poles of Christendom, Spain or France. Taking into account the specific situation of the French realm, Rohan concluded that the French king was obligated to fight Spain. Essentially similar, Naudé argued that once established political government is obligated to preserve and extend its power. In his analysis political prudence points to the necessity of political 'crisis-management' to preserve or accrue the power of the sovereign and the integrity of his realm, it became a 'fundamental law of sovereignty'. During the *Frondes* Naudé examined the intricately complicated domestic situation and the Spanish efforts to use the disorder to their benefit in the Franco-Spanish war. In this way he demonstrated how these specific circumstances determined that Cardinal Mazarin and the regency government simply could not seek peace at all cost and in fact were obligated to prolong the war effort.

This application of political prudence therefore was no fairly traditional and generic appraisal of princely and dynastic politics. French 'reason of state' as employed in the writings of Rohan and Naudé, recognized that the one king in France had specific interests that follow from being king of France as opposed to other rulers in Europe. The interests of the French monarch are neither personal and dynastic, nor are they the interest of 'France'. While France by the early seventeenth century was a legal unit, a heterogeneous patchwork of lands attached by charter to the Crown of France, 'France' had no interests of its own in any sense. However, being situated among other kingdoms in Europe and having a specific internal power dynamic, the situation of the French realm should compel the respective kings of France to run politics in this and not in any other way. This seems to imply a directionality and inherent 'morality'. Government political action was ever legitimate and just with this 'reason' that steered clear from the hydra of anarchy in sight. Applying the idiom of 'reason of state' to the policies of a royal government constituted a step away from simply personal relationships of power to the impact of war on society and the need to respond accordingly to keep the state of the monarchy and all of its land intact. The rhetoric of *raison d'état* was an argument of how to keep power relations stable under threat. By the 1620s, many in France had come to recognize that one of the important means towards this end was to influence opinion by publishing this kind of arguments. Each in their own way, Rohan and Naudé did exactly this.

Thus, where Friedrich Meinecke perceived the development of the idea of the modern state as a legal person, this thesis rather points in the direction of a transition concerning the terminology of 'interest' and defence of one's status, 'reason of state'. At the time of its Italian genesis and French reception, the idiom of political prudence was still slightly problematic in a moral sense.

Partly through the specific interventions of the authors studied here, arguments of *raison d'état* and *intérêt* became entirely legitimate considerations in the course of the later seventeenth century. By around 1700, it is perfectly reasonable and justifiable for authors to argue that 'Britain', 'France', 'Austria', 'Prussia', 'Russia' and so forth have distinct and characteristic interests that the monarchy ruling the realm to which this name refers should pursue. These interests and reasons of state are indifferent to morals or Christianity, and arms, troops and financial means must be committed to safeguarding them. On the way to this normalisation of interest and reason of state, the specific uses of Rohan and Naudé of the idiom of political prudence constitute a significant step. These authors rendered necessary violent pursuit of political goals with no inherent moral contents entirely legitimate, even the duty of a given monarchy. With the integrity of royal power and the realm in sight, it might be perfectly necessary to fight wars and kill enemies – whether the adversary was Christian or not – and even politically execute your own subjects. If the application of political prudence to the big dynastic agglomerates engendered 'secularisation', this was an unforeseen consequence of the fierce power struggle among the French and Spanish monarchies. The maelstrom of the European war- and arms race headed by the Houses of Habsburg and Valois-Bourbon required continuous pragmatic 'crisis-management' that affected the very real machinery of the Crown and percolated into the way authors thought about the political.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

Dedicatory letters to the political writings of the Duc de Rohan

A. Dedication of Le Parfaict Capitaine to Louis XIII.[1]

Au Roi.

Sire,

Je vous adresse les marques de mon oisiveté. Vous y verrez un abrégé des guerres de César, le plus grand Capitaine qui l'aie jamais faite, où vous remarquerez une conduite prudente en ses desseins, une diligence merveilleuse en ses exécutions et une constance admirable aux difficultés qu'il a rencontrées au plus fort de ses affaires. S'il a témoigné quelquefois de la témérité, ç'a été peu souvent et pour montrer seulement que son courage ne cédait à celui d'Alexandre le Grand. Vous êtes Sire, le Monarque de la Belliqueuse Nation, qu'il a eu tant de peine à subjuguer. Vous y êtes comme lui, tellement nourri dans les fatigues, qu'elles vous sont tournées en habitude et y êtes si heureux que vos actions sont aujourd'hui les plus riches ornements de l'Histoire. Vous êtes un grand Prince, sur lequel toute la Chrétienté a les yeux fichés comme sur le Restaurateur de sa liberté. Si Vous continuez vos généreux desseins, Vous en remporterez une gloire immortelle, et une renommée qui égalera celle des plus Grands Hommes de l'Antiquité. Mais la perfection de ce haut courage consiste en la persévérance. Considérez, Sire, qu'il s'est vu plusieurs Princes avoir eu des beaux commencements, qui, pour s'être laissez aller trop tôt au repos, ont perdu toute réputation. Pour ce que la gloire des Grands Personnages s'évanouit s'ils veulent demeurer sans action, semblables en cela à ceux qui nagent contre le fil de l'eau, lesquels reculent en arrière s'ils ne s'efforcent d'aller en avant. Vous y verrez aussi un Recueil de l'ordre de guerre des Anciens Grecs et Romains – vrai fondement de tout l'Art militaire –, car encore que l'invention de la poudre à Canon trouvée nouvellement aie apporté du changement à la manière de faire la guerre, néanmoins on en puisse toutes les bonnes maximes. Ce que je tâche de faire voir plus particulièrement par un petit traité de guerre que j'y ai ajouté, où je veux montrer que la diversité de nos armes à celles des Anciens, ne nous doit faire mépriser leurs ordres. Si j'agrée Sire, à Votre Majesté, j'obtiens ce que je désire. Et pour toute reconnaissance, je vous supplie très-humblement de ne me laisser inutile aux occasions qui s'offrent pour l'augmentation de votre gloire, afin que chacun reconnaisse dans l'exécution de vos commandements mon obéissance, dans vos emplois ma fidélité, et dans les actions de la guerre le peu de cas que je ferai toujours de ma vie pour le bien de votre service. Cependant je prierai Dieu,

Sire,

Qu'il bénisse votre Règne, le comble de longs jours, et votre sacrée Personne d'une félicité sans exemple,

Votre très-humble, très-obéissant & très-fidèle sujet & serviteur,
H.D.R.

[1] Henri de Rohan, *Le parfaict capitaine. Autrement, l'abregé des guerres de Gaule des commentaires de Cesar. avec quelques remarques sur icelles, suivy d'un Recueil l'Ordre de guerre des Anciens, ensemble d'un Traitté particulier de la Guerre* (Paris, 1636). This dedication is found in all subsequent editions of the *Parfaict capitaine*. See Appendix 2 for the editions of this text.

B. Dedication of De l'Interest des Princes et Estats de la Chrestienté to Cardinal Richelieu.

À Monsieur le Cardinal de Richelieu

Monsieur,

Il n'y a rien de si difficile que de savoir régner, et ceux qui ont été les plus entendus en ce métier, ont confessé en mourant qu'ils y étaient apprentifs. La raison vient de ce qu'on ne peut établir une règle immuable dans le gouvernement des États. Ce qui cause la révolution des affaires de ce monde, cause aussi le changement des maximes fondamentales, pour bien régner. C'est pourquoi, ceux qui en ces matières se guident plus par les exemples du passé que par les raisons présentes, font par nécessité des manquements notables. Aussi, n'appartient-il pas à tous, de juger le vrai intérêt d'un État, et le savoir suivre. Il faut des lumières plus que naturelles, pour observer les mutations d'une chose si difficile à comprendre. Quant à moi, Monsieur, qui, pour n'être point oisif dans l'oisiveté même, me suis mêlé d'écrire ici de l'intérêt des princes de la chrétienté, je crois que vous ne jugerez pas que j'ai entrepris ce discours pour vouloir passer pour un censeur d'État. Je confesse bien que voyant tous les jours tant de révolutions étrangères devant mes yeux, je n'ai pu me tenir d'en faire quelque considération pour mon contentement particulier. Or, Monsieur, je ne veux pas seulement vous rendre compte de tout ce que j'ai fait, mais même de ce que j'ai fait quand je ne faisais rien. Je vous apporte donc ici ce qui m'est venu en pensée sur un si beau sujet. Le seul titre vous incitera de passer plus avant. Vous jugerez bien qu'on ne peut parler de l'intérêt des princes de ce temps sans fairè un vif portrait de ce que vous avez fait jusques à présent pour la grandeur de cette couronne. Vous vous verrez donc dans peu de lignes représenté tout entier: en tout ce traité, il ne sera parlé que de vous, bien qu'il n'en soit jamais parlé. Votre modestie et ma franchise ne me permettent pas de m'exprimer en autre façon, tenant que les louanges ordinaires font tort à ceux desquels les actions parlent si clair. Ce n'est pas aussi par là que je me veux rendre digne de vos bonnes grâces. Mais bien par des services proportionnés aux obligations que vous avez acquises sur moi, qui serai toute ma vie,

Monsieur,

Votre très humble, très affectionné et obligé serviteur,

H. de Rohan.

APPENDIX 2

Publication history of Le Parfaict capitaine and De l'Interest des princes[1]

1636

1. Le parfaict capitaine, autrement, L'abregé des guerres de Gaule des commentaires de Cesar: avec quelqves remarques sur icelles, suiuy d'vn recueil de l'ordre de guerre des anciens, ensemble d'vn traitté particulier de la guerre, *A Paris, chez Iean Houzé au Palais, en la gallerie des prisonniers, à la Renommée, 1636*, in-4°.
Further information: Editio princeps. Colophon on p. 390, 'De l'imprimerie de Louis Sevestre, rue du Meurier, proche S. Nicolas du Chardonnet'; on p. [393], 'Achevé d'imprimer pour la première fois le 4. septembre 1636.' This edition contains a frontispiece by Pierre Fierens (Figure 1). The paratext also includes a foreword by Daniel Perreaux, a lawyer of the *Parlement de Paris*, but does not yet include the extensive preface that was probably written by Jean de Silhon. Silhon's preface is adjoined to virtually all subsequent editions of both *Le Parfaict capitaine* as well as *De l'Interest des princes*.

1637

2. 'De l'Interest des Princes & Estats de la Chrestienté', in *Le Vingtiesme Tome dv Mercure François, ou Suite de l'Histoire de nostre temps, sous le Regne du Tres-Chrestien Roy de France & de Nauarre Lovys XIII, continuation de l'an 1634*.
Publisher-bookseller: Estienne Richer, Paris. Further information: In this twentieth volume of the *Mercure François* Rohan's treatise *De l'Interest des princes* was printed anonymously. *De l'Interest* is found on pages 46-126. Here, the treatise is presented without the paratext of the *editio princeps* of *De l'Interest des princes* (1638), i.e. without the dedicatory letter to Richelieu, Silhon's preface, and Perreaux's foreword.

1638

3. Le parfaict Capitaine, autrement l'abrégé des guerres de la Gaule des Commentaires de César par le Duc de Rohan, *Dernière edition, jouxte la copie imprimée à Paris*, in-12°.
Printer-bookseller: S.n., s.l. [Balthasar and Abraham Elsevier, Leiden]. Further information: 'Pirate'-edition. The 'pirate' edition is clearly a counterfeit edition of the 1636 edition of *Le Parfaict capitaine* for it contains Perreaux's foreword, but lacks the preface by Silhon (cf. 1636). It was thus conceived without knowledge of the second edition of *Le Parfaict capitaine* 4 [1638]. Willems, n° 469.

4. Abbregé des guerres de Gaule des commentaires de César. Avec quelques remarques sur icelles, suiuy d'vn Recueil de l'Ordre de guerre des Anciens, ensemble d'vn Traité particulier de la Guerre, *A Paris, chez Pierre Margat, 1638*, in-4°.
Printer-bookseller: Pierre Margat, Paris (rue S. Jacques, à la Pomme d'Or, prés S. Severin). Further information: Second edition. Including an *Extraict du Privilège du Roi* that was provided on 20 April 1637 and permitted the publication of the above-mentoined title. Underneath it is stated that, 'L'Auteur dudit Livre a choisi Pierre Marga[t], Marchand Libraire à Paris, pour l'imprimer et vendre, conformément aux clauses du Privilège ci-dessus (Privilège du Roi), duquel il lui a fait cession et transport, portant pouvoir d'associer avec lui en ladite impression qui bon lui semblera. En vertu de quoi ledit Marga[t] par acte du 23. jour de Février 1638. a associé avec lui Jean Houzé, aussi Marchand Libraire à Paris, pour jouir en commun du contenu audit Privilège, suivant la cession qui lui en a été faite. Et ledit accord passé entre eux par devant le Caron, et Demas, notaires au Châtelet de Paris. Achevé d'imprimer le 4. Mars 1638.' This edition (as well as its reprint 10 [1640]) also contains the frontispiece by Pierre Fierens (Fig. 1) with the

[1] This publication history of Henri de Rohan's two main political works draws upon the bibliographical information derived from: the Heritage of the Printed Book Database established by the Consortium of European Research Libraries [CERL] URL: cerl.org/resources/hpb/main; Charles Pieters, *Annales de l'imprimerie des Elzevier* (Ghent, 1858) 190-191; Alphonse Willems, *Les Elzevier: histoire et annales typographiques* (Brussels et al., 1880). The numbers of the bibliographical entries in Willems are given when applicable.

'banner' *Abbregé des Guerres de Gaule*. Perreaux's foreword and Silhon's preface are included, the latter for the first time (cf. 1636).

5. De l'Interest des princes et estats de la chrestienté. A Monsieur le Cardinal de Richelieu, *A Paris, chez Pierre Margat*, in-4°.
Printer-bookseller: Pierre Margat, Paris (rue S. Jacques, à la Pomme d'Or, prés S. Severin). Further information: This presumably is the *editio princeps* of *De l'Interest des Princes.* The typography and pieces of textual decoration are the same as found in the edition of the *Abbregé* cited above, which leads us to suspect the two editions were printed in the same run or the one just after the other, and, from the very start, were meant to be sold in a joint volume.

6. Le parfait capitaine, autrement l'abregé des guerres de Gaule des commentaires de Cesar. Avec quelques remarques sur icelles; suivy d'un Recueil de l'ordre de guerre des Anciens: ensemble d'un Traicté particulier de la guerre. Reveu par l'autheur, & augmenté d'un traicté: De l'interest des Princes, & Estats de la Chrestienté, *A Paris, chez Augustin Courbé, M.DC.XXXVIII,* in-4°. 2 parts in 1 volume.
Printer-bookseller: Augustin Courbé, Paris (Libraire et imprimeur de Monsieur Frere du Roy, dans la petite Salle du Palais, à la Palme). Further information: Third edition of the *Parfaict capitaine*, second edition of *De l'Interest des Princes*. The *Extraict du Privilège du Roi* is a copy of the one accorded to Margat augmenting the title of the book to which it is granted to *Abbregé des guerres de Gaule des Commentaires de Cesar, avec plusieurs Remarques, et divers autres Traictez*. Thus the *privilège* included other treatises like *De l'Interest des princes*. Courbé also changed the underscript, into 'L'Autheur dudit Livre a choisi Jean Houzé, et Augustin Courbé, Marchands Libraires à Paris, pour l'imprimer et vendre, conformément aux clauses du Privilège ci-dessus, duquel il leur a fait cession et transport.'

1639

7. De l'Interest des princes et estats de la chrestienté. A Monsieur le Cardinal de Richelieu, *Dernière edition, jouxte la copie imprimée à Paris*, *S.n., M.DC.XXXIX*, in-12°.
Printer-bookseller: S.n., s.l. [Balthasar and Abraham Elsevier, Leiden]. Further information: This 'pirate' edition (as well as its 1641 reprint) presents the text of *De l'Interest* separate from the *Parfaict capitaine*. The edition represents one of the few instances that *De l'Interest* is published separately from the *Parfaict capitaine*. Only 31 and 32 [1650] can positively be deemed separate editions of this text in French. 5 [1638] might have been a separate edition, but seems to have been intended to be sold in volume. Willems, n° 482.

8. Le parfait capitaine. Autrement l'abregé des guerres des commentaires de César. Augmenteé d'un traicté de l'interest des princes et estats de la Chrestienté. *Dernière edition, jouxte la copie imprimée à Paris*, *S.n., M.DC.XXXIX*, in-12°. 2 parts in 1 volume.
Printer-bookseller: S.n., s.l. [Balthasar and Abraham Elsevier, Leiden]. Further information: Second Elsevier 'pirate'-edition adjoining both treatises in one volume. This edition (as well as the reprints of 1641, 1643, and 1648; the 1642 and 1692 editions appear to have been reissues) presents the text of *De l'Interest* and the *Parfaict capitaine* in volume, but with separate pagination. Willems, n° 483.

1640

9. Le parfaict capitaine, autrement l'abbregé des guerres de Gaule des commentaires de Cesar. Avec quelques remarques sur icelles, suivi d'un Recueil de l'Ordre de Guerre des Anciens. Ensemble d'un Traicté particulier de la Guerre. Troisiesme et derniere Edition, augmentée d'un Traicté: De l'Interest des Princes, et Estats de la Chrestienté par Monsieur le Duc de Rohan. *A Paris, chez Augustin Courbé, libraire et imprimeur de monsieur frere du Roy, dans la petite Salle du Palas, à la Palme, 1640,* in-8°. 2 parts in 1 volume.
Printer-bookseller: Augustin Courbé, Paris. Further information: Third edition of the *Parfaict capitaine*, second edition of *De l'Interest*. This year Courbé produced an octavo edition (9 [1639]), while the printer Jean Houzé produced an in-quarto (10 [1639]).

10. Le parfaict capitaine, autrement l'abbregé des guerres de Gaule des commentaires de Cesar. Avec quelques remarques sur icelles, suivi d'un Recueil de l'Ordre de Guerre des Anciens.

Ensemble d'un Traicté particulier de la Guerre. Troisiesme et derniere Edition, augmentée d'un Traicté: De l'Interest des Princes, et Estats de la Chrestienté par Monsieur le Duc de Rohan, *A Paris, chez Jean Houzé, au Palais, en la Gallerie des Prisonniers, à la Renommée, 1640*, in-4°. 2 parts in 1 volume.
Printer-bookseller: Jean Houzé, Paris. Further information: Third edition of the *Parfaict capitaine*, second edition of *De l'Interest*. This edition contains the same frontispiece as 4 [1638], however without printer's address.

11. The complete captain, or, An abbridgement of Cesars warres, with observations upon them: together with a collection of the order of the militia of the ancients; and a particular Treatise of modern war written by the late great generall the Duke of Rohan; englished by J.C., *Cambridge, Printed by Roger Daniel, printer to the Universitie and are to be sold at the* Angel *in Popes-head-alley, London*, in-8°.
Further information: first (English) translation of *Le Parfaict capitaine* by the hand of John Cruso (ca. 1595-1655).

12. A treatise of the interest of the princes and states of Christendome. Written in French by the most noble and illustrious Prince, the Duke of Rohan. Translated into English by H. H. *Printed at Paris, 1640*, in-4°[?].
Printer-bookseller: S.n., Paris. Further information: first (English) translation of *De l'Interest* by Henry Hunt [Imprimatur. Tho. Broun, Prid. Id. Jul.].

1641

13. Interesse der Potentaten und Stände: oder Unpassionirter Discurs, worinnen der fürnemensten Potentaten und Stände der Christenheit wares Interesse, Wolfahrt und Auffnemmen dieser Zeit bestehe. Sampt angehengten etlichen historischen Exempeln so sich innerhalb 50. Jahren in der Christenheit begeben: Darinnen gezeiget wird wie ein und anderer Standt sein recht Interesse beobachtet oder versaumet unnd was darauß erfolget. Ausz dem Frantzösischen in das Teutsche vbergesetzet, *s.n., s.l.*, in-4°.
Further information: German translation of *De l'Interest*, translator unknown.

14. A treatise of the interest of the princes and states of Christendome. Written in French by the most noble and illustrious Prince, the Duke of Rohan. Translated into English by H. H., *London, Printed by Ric. Hodgkinsonne., 1641*. in-12°.
Further information: second edition of the English translation by Henry Hunt.

15. De l'Interest des princes et estats de la chrestienté. A Monsieur le Cardinal de Richelieu. *Dernière edition, jouxte la copie imprimée à Paris, 1641*, in 12°.
Printer-bookseller: S.n., s.l. [Balthasar and Abraham Elsevier, Leiden]. Further information: Second separate 'pirate'-edition. 'Dernière edition, jouxte la copie imprimée à Paris'. This edition also presents the text of *De l'Interest* separate from the *Parfaict capitaine*.

16. Le parfait capitaine. Autrement l'abregé des guerres des commentaires de César. Augmenteé d'un traicté de l'interest des princes et estats de la Chrestienté, *Dernière edition, jouxte la copie imprimée à Paris, 1642*, in-12°. 2 parts in 1 volume.
Printer-bookseller: S.n., s.l. [Balthasar and Abraham Elsevier, Leiden]. Further information: Third Elsevier 'pirate'-edition of both treatises in volume. 'Dernière edition, jouxte la copie imprimée à Paris'. Willems, 524.

1642

17. Le parfait capitaine. Autrement l'abregé des guerres des commentaires de César. Augmenteé d'un traicté de l'interest des princes et estats de la Chrestienté, *Dernière edition, jouxte la copie imprimée à Paris, 1642*, in-12°. 2 parts in 1 volume.

Further information: Reissue of 16 [1641] the Elsevier 'pirate' edition of the volume containing both treatises.

18. Le Parfaict Capitaine, Oder Kriegs-Reglen, deß perfecten Capitains uber den Julium Cæsar, ersten Römischen Kayser…, *Cölln, 1642*, in-8°.
Printer-bookseller: Andreas Binghen, Cologne. Further information: German translation of *Le Parfaict capitain* by Bernhard Rottendorf.

1643

19. Le parfait capitaine. Autrement l'abregé des guerres des commentaires de César. Augmenteé d'un traicté de l'interest des princes et estats de la Chrestienté, *Jouxte la copie imprimée a Paris, M.DC.XXXXVIII*, in-12°.
Further information: Third edition of the Elsevier 'pirate' edition of both treatises in volume.

20. Le parfaict capitaine,: autrement l'abregé des guerres de Gaule des commentaires de Cesar. Avec quelques remarques sur icelles. Quatriesme & derniere edition augmentée d'un traicté: De l'interest des princes, & estats de la Chrestienté, *A Paris, chez Iean Houzé, 1643*, in-4°. 3 parts in 1 volume.
Printer-bookseller: Jean Houzé, Paris. Further information: to this fourth volume edition of the *Parfaict capitaine* and *De l'Interest* a third apologetical treatise by Rohan is added, titled, 'Véritable recit de ce qui s'est passé au soulevement des Grisons pour la restitution de la Valteline, Comtez de Chiavenna & de Bormio.'

21. Interesse der Potentaten und Stände: oder Unpassionirter Discurs, worinnen der fürnemensten Potentaten und Stände der Christenheit wares Interesse, Wolfahrt und Auffnemmen dieser Zeit bestehe. Sampt angehengten etlichen historischen Exempeln so sich innerhalb 50. Jahren in der Christenheit begeben: Darinnen gezeiget wird wie ein und anderer Standt sein recht Interesse beobachtet oder versaumet unnd was darauß erfolget. Ausz dem Frantzösischen in das Teutsche vbergesetzet, *s.l., 1643*, in-4°.
Further information: this edition of the German translation of *De l'Interest* is probably a reissue of 13 [1641].

22. Erfahrner Capitäin, Oder Lustige Kriegs-Practick: Auß dem Frantzösischen ins Teutsche ubersetzet, *Rinteln an der Weser, Druckts und verlegts Peter Lucius, Im Jahr 1643*, in-12°.
Printer-bookseller: Peter Lucius, Rinteln an der Weser. Further information: German translation of *Le Parfaict capitaine* by anonymous translator. Translation differs from 18 [1642].

1644

23. Trvtina statvvm Europæ, sive Principvm Christiani orbis interesse. Opus magni olim Galliæ Ducis de Rohan Gallico idiomate conscriptum, nunc verò in latinum recens translatum, *Lugduni Batavorum, apud Iustum Livium, MDDXLIV*, in-12°.
Printer-bookseller: Justus Livius, Leiden. Further information: Latin translation of *De l'Interest des Princes* with a dedication to Rutgerus Hermannides ('Circumspecto ac pererudito iuveni-viro, D. Rutgero Hermannides, S.') and an integral translation of the preface (ascribed to Jean Silhon) that was originally joined to the *Parfaict capitaine*.

1645

24. Trutina statuum Europae, sive Principum christiani orbis interesse: opus magni olim Galliae ducis de Rohan, gallico idiomate conscriptum, nunc vero in latinum recens translatum, *Lugduni Batavorum, apud Justum Livium, 1645*, in-12°.
Further information: Second edition of the 1644 Latin translation of *De l'Interest*. This is probably a reissue of the text, although one catalogue entry mentions an in-8°, in which case this hypothesis should be challenged.

25. Interesse Der Potentaten und Stände Europae: Welche ratione status so wol deß Friedens als Kriegs die vornembste Potentaten bey 50. Jahr hero gegen einander gesucht und gehabt; Sampt etlichen newen Politischen Discursen deren zwischen der Cron Spanien und Franckreich In Kriegs und Friedenszeiten unter sich innerlichen naturlichen angebornen gehabten und noch habenden eygenschafften und Antipathien ...; Jetzo mit Newen Discursen und Interesse gemehrt biß diese zeit continuirt und in drey Theil verfertiget, *s.n., s.l., 1645*, in-12°.
Further information: edition of the German translation of *De l'Interest* with a third part added to the text by one Doctor Carlen Garcias titled 'Antipathia oder Grundwiederwertigkeit der Frantzosen und Spanier'.

26. Le Parfaict Capitaine Oder Kurtzer Außzug und Kriegs-Regeln uber die Commentaria Iulii Caesaris, ersten Römischen Keysers: Worauß klärlich zuersehen was in Kriegs expeditionen Belägerungen Feldtschlachten Surprisen, Und andern derogleichen occasionen einem Vollkommenen Feldt-Obristen zu wissen obliege; Auß dem Frantzösischen ins Teutsch ubergesetzt, *Cölln, Binghen, 1645*, in-12°.
Further information: Second edition of the German translation of *Le Parfaict capitaine*, after 21 [1643].

1646

27. Dell'interesse dei prencipi e satti (!) della christianità. Tradotta dal francese nell'idioma italiano. All' Illustrissimo Signor Giacomo Malaspina, Marchese di Liciana, *In Orliens, per Ioakim Necthorri, 1646*, in-16°.
Publisher-bookseller: Joakim Necthorri, Orléans [probably a pseudonym]. Further information: Italian translation of *De l'Interest*.

28. Memoires du duc de Rohan, sur les choses advenues en France depuis la mort de Henry le Grand, jusques à la paix faite avec les Reformez au mois de juin 1629 ... Ensemble un Traicté de l'interest des Princes, *s.n., s.l.*, format unknown.[2]
Further information: *De l'Interest des Princes* is here presented in volume with Rohan's *Mémoires* as well as his *Discours politiques.* This would be the volume described by Christian Lazzeri in his 'Introduction' (p. 154) to *De l'Interest,* which he used for his modern edition of the text. As he describes it ("Derniere edition", "jouxte la copie imprimée"), however, this seems to be not an edition by a Parisian printer, but an Elsevier edition of these texts. The problem here is that the (Amsterdam) Elsevier press did not issue an edition of *De l'Interest* in 1646, but did print Rohan's *Mémoires*, the *Veritable discours*, and the *Discours politiques* bound in volume, while the same press of Louis Elsevier also separately printed Rohan's account of his grand tour, the *Voyage*, that year. I presume there are two plausible options as to how this volume saw the light of day. Either the volume used by Lazzeri that joined *Le Parfaict capitaine* and *De l'Interest* with the bound volume of the three treatises that was published by the Amsterdam Elsevier press, is a large volume that was bound at some later date. If, however, it was sold as a volume, it probably concerns a pirate edition of the 1646 Elsevier volume adjoining pirate editions or reissues of *De l'Interest* and the *Parfaict capitaine*. Cf. Willems, 1016 and 1044.

1648

29. Le parfait capitaine. Autrement l'abregé des guerres des commentaires de César. Augmenteé d'un traicté de l'interest des princes et estats de la Chrestienté, *Jouxte la copie imprimée a Paris, M.DC.XXXXVIII*, in-12°.
Further information: Fourth edition of the Elsevier 'pirate' edition, after [19] 1643.

[2] A bibliographical entry of the volume can be found in the Heritage of the Printed Book Database of the CERL. However, this volume does not include the *Parfaict capitaine*, which leaves the question open. URL: http://gso.gbv.de.access.authkb.kb.nl/DB=1.77/SET=2/TTL=163/SHW?FRST=164

1649

30. Trvtina statvvm Europæ, sive Principvm Christiani orbis interesse. Opus magni olim Galliæ Ducis de Rohan Gallico idiomate conscriptum, nunc verò in latinum recens translatum. *Lugduni Batavorum, ex officina D. Lopes, 1649*, in-12°.
Printer-bookseller: David Lopez de Haro, Leiden. Further information: Reissue of the 1645 Latin edition of the text executed by a different printer (Justus Livius).

1650

31. De l'interest des princes et estats de la Chrestienté. Par Monsieur le duc de Rohan*, A Paris, Chez Charles de Sarcy, au Palais, à la Bonne Foy Couronée., M.DC.L.*, in-12°.
Printer-bookseller: Charles de Sercy, Paris ['au Palais']. Further information: this edition as described in the catalogue of the Bibliotheque Nationale de France (location: Rez de Jardin) neither contains the dedication to Richelieu nor the preface by Silhon.

32. De l'interest des princes et estats de la Chrestienté. Par Monsieur le duc de Rohan. *Paris, Loyson, 1650,* in-8°.
Printer-bookseller: Jean-Baptiste Loyson [?], Paris. Further information: this edition found in the Wolfenbuttel catalogue is different from 31 [1650] both in format and printer.

1652

33. Discursos militares escritos por el duque de Roan traduzidos por el maestro de campo don Francisco Deça dedicados al ... conde de Fuensaldaña, *En Amberers, en la emprenta Plantiniana, 1652*, in-4°.
Printer-bookseller: Balthasar Moretus (Plantin press), Antwerp. Further information: Spanish translation of *Le Parfaict capitain* by Francisco Deza.

1654

34. Den Interest der Princen ende Staten van Christenrijck. In 't Fransoys beschreven door den Hertog van Rohan, *t'Amsterdam, Gedruckt voor de Autheur, Anno 1654*, in-12°.
Publisher-bookseller: S.n., Amsterdam. Further information: Dutch translation of De l'Interest des Princes by an unknown translator.

1656

35. Trvtina statvvm Europæ, sive Principvm Christiani orbis interesse. Opus magni olim Galliæ Ducis de Rohan Gallico idiomate conscriptum, nunc verò in latinum recens translatum, *Lubecae, Hinderlingus, 1656*, in-4°.
Publisher-bookseller: Jakob Hinderling, Lübeck. Further information: this is the same Latin edition of the text as 1644, 1645, and 1649 executed by a different printer.

1658

36. Le Parfait Capitaine, Avtrement L'Abregé Des Gverres Des Commentaires de Cesar: Augmenté d'vn Traicté, De L'Interest Des Princes, & Estats de la Chrestienté; Auec la Preface à Monsieur le Cardinal Duc de Richelieu. *Paris, N. Le Gras, 1658,* in-12°.
Publisher-bookseller: Nicholas le Gras, Paris ['au troisiesme Pilier de la grande Salle du Palais, à la Couronne']. Further information: (cheaper) edition of the Parisian bound volume of *Le Parfaict Capitaine* and *De l'Interest*.

1660

37. Idea del perfetto capitano overo discorsi historici, politici, e militari sopra il perfetto Capitano di H. D. R., *Messina, Cavallo, 1660*, unknown format.
Publisher-bookseller: Giovanni Cavallo, Messina. Further information: Italian translation with commentary of Rohan's *Le Parfaict capitaine* by the hand of Maiolino Conte Bisaccioni.

38. Trvtina statvvm Europæ, sive Principvm Christiani orbis interesse. Opus magni olim Galliæ Ducis de Rohan Gallico idiomate conscriptum, nunc verò in latinum recens translatum, *Helmestadi Vogelius, 1660*, in-12°.
Publisher-bookseller: Martinus Vogelius and Johann Georg Taegerus, Helmstadt. Further information: this is the same Latin edition of the text as [22] 1644, [29] 1649, and [34] 1656 executed by a different printer.

1663

39. A treatise of the interest of the princes and states of Christendome. Written in French by the most Noble and Illustrious Prince, The Duke of Rohan, Englished by H.H., *London, Printed by Ric. Hodgkinsonne, and are to be sold by Henry Herringman at the New Exchange, 1663*. Unknown format.
Further information: reprint of the English translation of *De l'Interest* by Henry Hunt, after 14 [1641].

1665

40. Ducis de Rohan trutina statuum Europae dilucidis annotationibus e praestantissimis seculi historicis et politicis aucta et illustrata ac pro compendio notitiae status hodierni per Germaniam imperiumque ejus in lucem edita a Josua Arndio, *Gustrovi Literis Scheippelianis, 1665*, in-8°.
Publisher-bookseller: Christian Scheippel, Güstrow. Further information: Latin translation different from the Hermannides translation with commentary of *De l'Interest des Princes*.

41. Maximes des princes et estats souverains. *A Cologne, 1665*, in-12°.
Publisher-bookseller: S.n., Cologne [Daniel Elsevier, Amsterdam?]. Further-information: continuation by an anonymous author of Rohan's *De l'Interest des princes* that reproduces certain parts of the original treatise in an altogether new considerations of territory claims over one another by various powers in the world. Gatien Courtilz de Sandras (1644-1712) is often held to be the author of the treatise, but whereas his authorship of the *Nouveaux interest des princes et estats de l'Europe* (1678) is not in doubt, this earlier treatise does not seem to have been the basis to that later piece of *imitatio*. The 1665 edition of the *Maximes des princes* probably was a trial print run, as it is an incomplete version of the second part of the 1666 edition.

1666

42. Interets et maximes des princes et Estats souverains. Seconde édition. *A Cologne, chez Jean du Païs*, 1670. – Maximes des Princes et Estats souverains. *A Cologne*, 1655. 2 parts in 1 volume, in-12°.
Publisher-bookseller: Jean du Païs, Cologne [well-known pseudonym of the Elsevier press: Daniel Elsevier, Amsterdam]. Further information: treatise in two parts, often confused to be by Rohan himself, but which was an entirely different work interlarded with pieces of the original text of *De l'Interest* by Rohan. The attributed author is the same as 41 [1665], but this might be doubted. The first part of the book is a historical survey of the world defining interest as claims that powers have over one another, while the second part is the complete and corrected version of 41 [1665]. Publication is often attributed to Laurent Maurry, Rouen, who indeed did print an edtion of this text in the same year, however this was a pirate edition. Willems, n° 1371.

1667

43. Le Parfait capitaine, autrement l'Abrégé des guerres des "Commentaires" de César. Augmenté d'un traité de l'Interest des princes et estats de la chrestienté avec la préface à Monseigneur le cardinal de Richelieu, *A Rouen, et se vend à Paris: par la Compagnie des libraires du Palais, 1667,* in-12°. 2 parts in 1 volume.
Printer-bookseller: s.n. [Laurent Maurry?], Rouen. Further information: edition of the Parisian volume of *Le Parfaict Capitaine* and *De l'Interest* by another printer.

1668

44. Staats Grund-Regeln. Hoher Potentaten und Republicken. In welchen nebens vielen Discursen und Anmerckungen: Des Herrn von Rohan zu befinden. Wie alle Könige. Fürsten und Herrschafften ihr Maxime jederzeit in acht genommen auch offt auß den Augen gestellet haben, *s.n., s.l.*, in-12°.
Furter information: German translation of 40, the 1666 edition of the *Interets et maximes des princes et Estats souverains*.

45. Trutina Statuum Europae, olim Scripta ab Illustissimo Duce de Rohan, nunc in gratiam studiosae juventutis, dilucidis annotationibus, e praestantissimis seculi historicis et politicis aucta et illustrata ac pro compendio notitiae status hodierni per Germaniam Imperiumque ejus in lucem edita a Josua Arndio; Accessit Vita Alberti Wallensteinii, ex Italico in Latinum translata, *Apud Joachimum Wildium, 1668*, in-8°.
Publisher-bookseller: Joachim Wilde, Rostock. Further information: Second edition of the Latin translation of *De l'Interest* with the commentary by Josua Arnd, after 40 [1665] bound in one volume with a Latin translation of an Italian biography of Albert Wallenstein.

1670

46. Interets et maximes des princes et Estats souverains. Seconde édition. *A Cologne, chez Jean du Païs*, 1670. – Maximes des Princes et Estats souverains. *A Cologne*, *1670*. 2 parts in 1 volume, in-12°.
Printer-bookseller: Daniel Elsevier, Amsterdam. Further information: second edition of *Interets et maximes des princes et estats souverains*, after 1666. The 1673 and 1676 editions of this text were probably reissues or pirate editions. Willems, n° 1432.

1673

47. Le Parfaict Capitaine: Oder Kurtzer Außzug, und Kriegs-Regeln über de Commentaria Julii Caesaris ... worauß zu ersehen was in Kriegs-Expeditionen, Belägerungen ... einem vollkommenem Feld-Obristen zu wissen obliege. Auß dem Frantzösischen ins Teutsche übersetzt. Gorlitz, Leipzig, in-12°.
Printer-bookseller: printed by Johann Erich Hahnen, Gorlitz; sold by Johann Adam Kästner, Leipzig. Further information: German translation of *Le Parfaict capitaine,* after 18 [1642].

1683

48. Interets et maximes des princes et estats souverains, *A Cologne, Chez Jaques le Jeune, 1683*, in-12°.
Printer-bookseller: Elsevier, Amsterdam. Third and corrected edition of *Interets et maximes des princes et estats souverains*, after 41 [1666] and 46 [1670]. Reissues of this edition were made in 1684 and 1686.

1692

49. Le parfait capitaine. Autrement l'abregé des guerres des commentaires de César. Augmenteé d'un traicté de l'interest des princes et estats de la Chrestienté, *Jouxte la copie imprimée a Paris, M.DC.LXXXXII.*, in-12°.
Printer-bookseller: Elsevier, Leiden. Further information: fifth edition of the Elsevier 'pirate' edition of the bound volume of Le Parfaict capitaine and De l'Interest des princes, after 29 [1648].

1694

50. The compleat captain, or, An abridgement of Julius Caesar's Commentaries: with political remarks on his wars with the Gauls, Brittains, Spaniards, Affricans, Alexandrians, and the civil wars, *S. Briscoe, London, 1694*, in-8°.
Printer-bookseller: S. Briscoe, London. Further information: second edition of the English translation of Le Parfaict capitaine by John Cruso, 11 [1640].

1708

51. The Duke of Rohan's manual: or, a guide for all degrees of officers, from a subaltern to a captain-general. Containing the whole art of war, and military discipline of the Ancients and Moderns … To which is prefixt an abridgment of Cæsar's Commentaries, with political remarks upon our present wars, and the enterprizes of the Greeks and Romans. Translated by a gentleman in the army, *London, printed for S. B. [Sam. Briscoe] and sold by B. Bragge, 1708,* in-8°[?].
Further information: reprint (or reissue) of the English translation of the *Parfaict capitaine* with a different title page, after 50 [1694] and 11 [1640].

1725

52. Ducis de Rohan trutina statuum Europae dilucidis annotationibus e praestantissimis seculi historicis et politicis aucta et illustrata ac pro compendio notitiae status hodierni per Germaniam imperiumque ejus in lucem edita a Josua Arndio. Accessit Vita et Historia Alberti Wallensteinii, Ducis Friedlandiæ, *S.n. Francofurti et Lipsiæ, M.DCC.XXV.*, in-8° [?].
Publisher-bookseller: S.n., Frankfurt and Leipzig. Further information: Third edition of the Latin translation of *De l'Interest* with the commentary by Josua Arnd, after 40 [1665] and 45 [1668].

1730

53. Der Vollkommene Capitain Oder Auszug derer Kriege über Des ersten Röm. Käysers Julii Cæsaris merckwürdigste Begebenheiten: Auf Ihro Königl. Majestät in Pohlen und Churfürstl. Durchl. zu Sachsen Ordre 1729. gedrucket, Und nach solchem Exemplar aus dem Frantzösischen anietzo ins Deutsche übersetzet, *Joh. Sam. Heinsius, Leipzig, 1729*, in-8°.
Printer-bookseller: Johann Samuel Heinsius, Leipzig. Further information: since the page count of this German edition of *Le Parfaict capitaine* is only 112 pages in-8°, it probably only contains Rohan's commentaries on Julius Caesar's *De Bello Gallico*.

1745

54. Le Parfait capitaine, ou Abrégé des guerres des Commentaires de César, avec des remarques historiques et critiques sur icelles, par H. d. R., *A la Haye, chez Frederic-Henri Scheurleer, M.DCC.XLV.*, in-12°.
Publisher-bookseller: Frederic-Henri Scheurleer, Den Haag. Further information: in that same year, Scheurleer also added *Le Parfaict capitaine* as a third volume to his in-8° edition of *L'Art de la Guerre* by Charles Sévin de Quincy that also contained a treatise on artillery by the Marshal de Vauban.

1757

55. Le parfait capitaine ou abrégé des guerres des commentaires de César, s.l., in-8°.
Printer-bookseller: S.n., s.l. [L. d'Authville?, Metz].

1763

56. Le parfait Capitaine, ou abrege des guerres des commentaires de Cesar: avec des remarques historiques et critiques sur icelle. Amsterdam. Format: unknown.
Publisher-bookseller: S.n., Amsterdam.

APPENDIX 3

Rohan's Venetian Discours d'Estat[1]

A. 'Advis aux Princes Chrestiens, Sur les affaires publiques presentes'[2]

'Discours d'Estat fait à Venise par un Seigneur François'[3]
'Discourse wrytten by the Duke of Rohan, concerning the generall affaires of Christendome'[4]

1631

Les orages qui ont agité ma patrie, et occupé le plus vigoureux de mon aage, ont esté des causes suffisantes pour divertir mes pensées de tout autre object, que celuy de me garentir d'un naufrage: maintenant que j'ay trouvé mon repos dans le milieu des ondes, que ma condition (pour sa mediocrité) est exempte de haine et d'envie, que je suis recueilli d'une République, où tout homme de bien reçoit contentement, et où on peut avec liberté declarer ses pensées. Je me suis resolu de representer ici les mienes sur les affaires publiques, afin que cha{s}que Prince {re}cognoisse quelle est sa condition, et qu'est ce qu'il doit craindre ou esperer.

Les deux grandes puissances qui tiennent en contre-poids les autres Princes de la Chrestienté, sont les Maisons de France et d'Austriche: car ce sont les seules qui peuvent {sans secours} dautruy faire la guerre et l'entretenir tant qu'elles veulent, ne manquan<{t}[s]> pour cet effet d'hommes ni d'argent. La premiere a ses forces unies, et se trouve posée entre l'Allemagne, l'Italie, l'Espagne et l'Angleterre: tellement qu'elle peut attaquer ou secourir puissamment lequel de ses voisins elle voudra: La seconde a ses Estats divisés, qui luy ostent le moyen {de pouvoir} attaquer ou secourir ses voisins que foiblement. La premiere n'est de si grande estendue <{ni}> [ne] composée de si puissantes nations que la seconde: mais c'est un estat hereditaire de longue main, qui n'est disputé de personne, accoustumé à l'obeissance et aux loix anciennes du Royaume: Dans la seconde il s'y trouve de{s} nouvelles usurpations, et des peuples las du joug et de la servitude. La premiere a pour alliés fidelles, tous ceux qui redoutent la puissance de la seconde, et la seconde a ceux qui par crainte n'osent se declarer contre elle, lesquels elle maintiendra tout autant de temps qu'elle conservera la reputation d'avoir tousjours la paix et la guerre en [la] <{sa}> main. La premiere n'a dessein que de se maintenir; la seconde a celuy de s'accroistre. La premiere ne vient à la guerre, qu'aux extremités, et selon qu'elle y est forcée par la necessité de sa conservation ou de celle de ses voisins: la seconde a tousjours les armes à la main pour empiéter quelque chose sur <{l'}>autruy. La premier tasche de maintenir en union ses voisins pour <{les}> [la] faire subsister: la seconde <[d'y]> {à} semer {les} <de [la]> division{s} pour {[en]} <y> profiter. La premier justifie ses actions à la veue de tout le monde avant que de rien entreprendre hors <[de]> ses limites; la seconde se saisit de tout ce qu'elle peut, puis cherche des pretextes pour s'approprier ce qu'elle tient. <[Bref]> La premiere se contente de maintenir ce qu'elle possede, et la seconde aspire à la Monarchie Universelle.

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[1] Differences between the manuscript version and the printed versions of the text are indicated by brackets, the text between {…} is found in the manuscript but not in the printed versions, while vice-versa the words or phrases between […] are found in the *Mercure François* but not in the manuscript. The words between <...> are found in the other printed edition of the pamphlet as *Advis aux Princes Chrestiens*.

[2] Anonymous, *Advis aux Princes Chrestiens. Sur les affaires publiques presentes* (s.n.l.d.).

[3] Anonymous, "Discours d'Estat fait à Venise par un Seigneur François", in *Le Seiziesme Tome dv Mercure François, ou Suite de l'Histoire de nostre temps, sous le Regne du Tres-Chrestien Roy de France & de Nauarre Lovys XIII*, continuation de l'an 1629 (Paris: Etienne Richer, 1632), 1069-1079.

[4] This title is the one that was written (by Sir Isaac Wake?) on the enveloppe containing the discourse. The National Archives, Kew, State Papers Foreign 78/89/115, folio 238: 'Discourse of the Duke of Rohan on the affairs of Christendom'.

Or comme leurs desseins sont differents, aussi leur procedures ont esté fort diverses. Car {la} durant la jeunesse du Roy Regnant <en France> on a voulu conserver la paix au dedans de l'Estat par la profusion des finances, et au dehors en achetant l'amitié de la Maison d'Austriche <[aux despens des alliez de celle de France, et c'estoient [les] <des> maximes de ce temps là, que de maintenir la grandeur de la branche d'Austriche]> en Allemagne, comme un moyen subtil de diviser toute la Maison, et {[par là]} l'affoiblir <par là: et> de conserver l'Empire {de}dans ladite Maison, comme <{le}> [ce] seul remede d'empescher la progres du Turc dans la Chrestienté, et de procurer la ruine des Princes protestan{t}s en Allemagne pour avancer la Religion Catholique Romaine.

Au contraire, la Maison d'Autriche, qui a son dessein formé <{dés}> [de si] long-temps, qui ne l'abandonne jamais, et qui fait toutes choses licites et illicites pour le faire reussir, entretient <[de]>dans tous les Estats de la Chrestienté ses partisans; n'espargn<{ant}>[e] aucun argent pour corrompre les Ministres des autres Princes, suscite la division par tout, la fomente où elle est, et ne perd aucune occasion de s'avantager où elle peut. Or pour ce que le plus grand obstacle qu'elle rencontre en son chemin, est la Maison de France, c'est contre elle qu'elle fait ses plus grands efforts; les divisions de la Ligue qu'elle a fomentées a un si haut poinct, que pour <[la diviser]> {l'appuyer}, elle en a perdu les Pays-Bas, le tesmoignent assez. Depuis ce temps-là, elle n'a obmis aucune occasion d'y semer des divisions: mais en aucun temps elle ne s'est monstrée si dangereuse, que quand elle a fait profession{s} d'amitié avec elle{s}, ç'a esté lors que pour entretenir cette bonne union, on l'a laissée affermir dans l'Empire, comme luy estant hereditaire, et asservir l'Allemagne, et peu s'en est fallu qu'elle n'aye empieté les Estats du Duc de Mantoue, ayant fait de plus grands et [plus] dangereux progres en dix ou douze années d'amitié avec la France, que durant toutes les plus fortes guerres qu'elle a eu à desmesler avec elle. Enfin elle a levé <{le}> [ce] masque en cette derniere guerre: un chacun s'est desabusé; on a fait quelques efforts pour secourir le Duc de Mantoue; on a redonné vigueur aux Princes Allemands: et ces premiers coups d'essay ont fait voir que le mal n'est encore incurable, pourvue qu'on y pourvoye à temps, et qu'on ne se lasse non plus <{d'agir}> pour conserver sa liberté, qu'elle <ne faict> pour asservir les autres. Ce n'est pas tout d'avoir bien commencé qui ne persevere, et vaudroit mieux n'avoir point monstré cette resistance, que de ne la continuer pas: Car l'apprehension qu'elle aura eue de voir ses desseins ruinés, la rendra plus active à les poursuivre: Et si apres quelque resistance la perte de ceux qu'on aura en fin abandonnés, s'en ensuit, elle ostera le courage à tous les autres Princes, et leur persuadera, que c'est en vain qu'on s'oppose à cette puissance. Si la tentative des Allemands sur le Royaume de Boheme eust esté soustenue par la France, elle estoit capable d'abaisser ceste superbe Maison: Mais leur abandonnement les a precipités en servitude. L'effort qu'on a fait pour conserver au Duc de Mantoue ses Estats, ne romp<{t}> le dessein de la Maison d'Austriche contre l'Italie, ni ne luy en oste l'esperance; si on luy a rompu la mesure pour ce coup, elle ne s'en preparera que [pour] mieux <{pour}> recommencer son saut: car tandis qu'elle aura cette advantage sur les autres Estats d'attaquer qui elle voudra, et que son pis aller sera de donner la Paix pour attendre un temps plus favorable. Il faut <{qu'}>en fin [qu']elle vienne à bout de son dessein; pour ce que les autres Estats reunis contre elle, ne sont tousjours en mesme disposition de s'accorder entre-eux, pour se maintenir: et arrive à toute heure tant de changemens et revolutions au Gouvernement d'iceux, que c'est une merveille de les voir aujourd'huy en mesme[s] sentimen<{t}>[s] pour leur conservation. Ne laissez donc point perdre cette conjoncture d'affaires; faites vostre profit des fautes passées, et ne vivez plus au jour la journée: Mais formez un dessein entre vous, et soyez constant à le poursuivre. Vous voyez d'où vient vostre mal, portez y le remede; cherchez-le jusques à la racine, afin de l'esteindre: et que le travail ni la despence ne vous rebute {[point]}, car il vaut mieux faire un bon effort pour guerir tout à fait, que de vous amuser <[à]> de<[s]> cures palliatives qui ne font qu'alonger la maladie du patient, et ne le guerissent pas.

Puis que le dessein de la Maison d'Austriche est d'asservir les autres Princes, que celuy de la maison de France soit de conserver leur liberté; Et puis que celle-là tasche de s'accroistre aux despen{d}s de tout le monde, que cette-ci par un <{contrepied}> [contrepoix] procure l'accroissement de ses amis.

Pour fonder ce dessein dans la justice et possibilité, [et] pour le faire reussir seurement, il ne faut entreprendre que sur les usurpations de <{ladite}> [cette] Maison, et non sur son patrimoine ancien: car c'est là où on la trouvera foible, et où {un} chacun se portera ardemment tant pour se liberer du mal, que pour se procurer du bien. Chacun scait à quel titre la Maison d'Austriche tient les Estats qu'elle possede en Italie, et comme l'Empire est Electif, et sous quelle dure servitude les Allemands se trouvent injustement reduits; <{ce}> [et] sont ces deux grandes nations qu'il faut mettre en liberté.

Pour l'Allemagne, il se voit maintenant que le parti des Protestants a plus manqué de bonne conduite que de puissance, et que cette grande persecution qu'il souffre, l'a plus animé qu'affoibli; les hommes, les bonnes villes et l'argent luy ont resté encores, il ne falloit que luy remettre le cœur au ventre, et avoir un bon conducteur. Dieu <[le]> luy {en} a suscité {un}, à sçavoir le Roy de Suede: s'il est assisté de l'Estat des Pays-Bas par diversion, des soldats d'Angleterre, et de l'argent de France, il y a apparence d'une grande restauration {[et revolution] <d'affaires en ce pays-là}>.

Quant à l'Italie, il est aisé à voir que si la France ne la secourt, il faut qu'elle succombe: car le Roy d'Espagne en tient desja la moitié, et le reste est divisé en divers Estats, dont la plus-part despendent de luy. Il faut donc, ou que la France y possede quelque chose, ou qu'on en chasse les Espagnols. Si elle y prend pied, c'est bien pour empescher <{la}> [sa] servitude, mais non pas pour en oster la guerre: si bien que le plus seur est d'en faire sortir les estrangers, et de departir ce qu'ils y tiennent aux Princes Italiens. A quoy tous condescendront volontiers, pour l'utilité qu'ils en recevront, et par ce moyen se rendront à jamais irreconciliables des Espagnols. Ce qui se rencontrera d'autant plus facile à executer, que l'Allemagne se trouvant en mesme temps occupée en ses guerres, le Roy d'Espagne n'en pourra tirer des soldats, sans l'assistance desquels il ne peut subsister en Italie; car pour les Suisses, ils sont trop amoureux de leur liberté, et sçavent <[trop bien]> les pretentions de la Maison d'Austriche sur eux, pour favoriser leur grandeur, quand ils verront qu'on s'y prendra comme il faut pour l'abaisser: Au contraire, {[je tiens]} <il tient> que cette nation sera une des principales forces qu'on aye pour delivrer le Duché de Milan de la servitude où il est.

Voila les vrays et seurs moyens de mettre la Chrestienté en repos, sans quoy il {ne} <[n'y]> faut attendre que ruine et subversion d'Estats. Mais ce n'est pas tout de les proposer {[ni]} <et> de les agreer: il faut mettre la main à l'œuvre tandis que l'occasion s'offre, et se munir d'une constance et resolution si forte, qu'on n'abandonne jamais ce dessein. Car quand bien <{l'}>on ne pourra pour divers accidens qui peuvent survenir le poursuivre partout egalement, pourveu que la Maison de France le prenne à cœur comme la Maison d'Austriche fait le sien, et en face sa principale affaire, elle en viendra en fin à bout.

Vous donc Princes et Estats Italiens, qui estes sous une dure servitude, ou en apprehension d'y tomber, qui voyez l'orage gronder sur vos testes, esvertuez-vous. Que le Pape ne se persuade pas que la reverence de la Religion arreste le desir de dominer; Que les Venitiens se [re]souviennent que l'amour qu'ils ont de conserver leur liberté, les rend criminels de celuy qui la leur veut oster; et que tous ceux qui favorisent par amitié ou par [contrainte] <{crainte la Maison d'Autriche}>, apprennent ici, que pour estre les derniers asservis, ils ne seront les mieux traictés.

Vous Princes Electeurs de l'Empire, monstrez maintenant si vous l'estes {[encor}e] d'effet comme de nom, ne laissez escouler l'occasion qui se presente à vous. Vous {y} avez esprouvé que vostre division a causé vostre ruine, et que la neutralité n'en a exempté aucun d'{oppression} <[apprehension]>. Reunnissez-vous, opposez-vous à cette tyrannie qui vous accable; voyez vos anciens {allies} <[amis]> qui vous tendent les mains. Aidez-vous à vous mesmes, si vous voulez qu'on vous secoure. <He!> Quoy? seroit-il possible que cette brave et genereuse nation, qui a acquis l'Empire, et s'en est conservé la liberté de l'election, laisse aujourd'huy perdre <{cette}> [sa] prerogative? Non, il ne se peut, et je {croiray} <[croy]> plustost voir le Danube et le Rhin sans eau{x}, que l'Allemagne sans liberté. Donc animez{[-vous, et avec vous tous les autres Princes, Villes, et Peuples d'Allemagne, joignez]}-vous tous avec ceux qui vous assistent, et resolvez-vous de <jamais> ne [jamais] quitter les armes que vous n'ayez remis la liberté Electorale: Apres quoy, pour la maintenir en sa vigueur, vous devez <[observer]> religieusement {observer} deux choses: la premiere, de ne <[de]>signer jamais d'Empereur durant celuy qui est vivant, afin que son

authorité ne prejudicie à la liberté de l'election: et la seconde, de faire une loy fondamentale, qu'on n'eslira jamais deux Empereurs de suite d'une mesme Maison, pour eviter l'abus ou vous estes tombés maintenant, et que les grandes Maisons participent à leur tour à l'honneur de l'Empire.

Vous Roy {tres-glorieux} des Goths et des Vandales, <tres vaillant et tres glorieux,> que Dieu a fait naistre pour le restablissement de la liberté Germanique, qui faites voir qu'un homme en vaut cent mille, et que cent mille n'en valent [pas] un: poursuivez vostre pointe, ne vous lassez point, car le prix est au bout <{de la course}>.

Vous Grand Breton, Roy d'une si belliqueuse nation, obligé au restablissement de vostre beau-frere, qui devez maintenant recognoistre les tromperies Espagnoles, ne souffrez plus long temps qu'on se moque de vous, la Justice vous y oblige, le temps vous y convie, et la juste indignation vous y doit porter avec ceste resolution de faire repentir ceux qui ont voulu abuser de vostre bonté.

Et vous braves voleurs de l'Océan, qui avez osé ficher le clou {[à]} <en> la fortune Espagnole, et qui par vos heureuses victoires avez fait voir à tout le monde que cette nation n'est pas invincible, continuez vos progres, profitez du temps, et {y} aidez {[à]} autruy en vous bien faisant.

Quant à vous, Grand Roy Tres-Chrestien, qui estes l'appuy de la liberté Chrestienne, <[et]> le grand mobile qui fait mouvoir tous les autres, recognoissez la facilité de ce dessein, et la gloire qui vous y est reservée, pourveu que, comme vous l'avez entrepris avec justice <{et courage}>, vous le poursuiviez avec soin et constance. Dieu vous fasse la grace de vous y conduire par la main, et de vous faire prosperer en telle sorte que vous en {remportiez} [rapportiez] pour glorieux trophée ce titre [de] Magnifique <{de}> Liberateur de la Chrestienté.

B. 'A ceux qui veulent conserver leur Liberté, ou l'acquerir'[5]

1632

(Response to a pamplet in Latin *Ad Principes Catholicos, de praesenti reipublicae Statu*, translated into French with the title and clearly partial added subtitle 'Aux princes Catholiques, sur l'Estat present des affaires publiques, En response du discours pour induire les Princes Chrestiens à se liberer de la Tyrannie de la Maison d'Austriche' that attacked Rohan's earlier 'Advis aux Princes Chrestiens'/'Discours d'Estat' published seperately and in the sixteenth volume of the *Mercure François* of 1632).[6]

C'est l'ordinaire des mauvais joueurs, de se fascher quand ils perdent: et la colere, qui est une passion vicieuse de l'ame, oste le jugement, et produit des eslans mal reglez, et des paroles inconsiderées. Ce qui est arrivé à l'Autheur d'un discours addressé aux princes Catholiques sur l'Estat present des affaires publiques, en response d'un autre qui admonnestoit[7] les Princes Chrestiens à se liberer du joug de la maison d'Autriche: où d'abord il tesmoigne son peu de jugement, opposant le tiltre de Catholique à celuy de Chrestien, comme si l'un estoit contraire[8] à l'autre. Mais sans nous amuser là, examinons sa response.

Dés l'entrée il descharge sa premiere colere[9] sur celui qu'il juge avoir escrit en faveur de la France, l'accuse d'heresie et d'imposer beaucoup de faussetez en son discours. Au premier, il faudroit un meillieur Theologien que lui pour le convaincre: Et au second, les raisons alleguées de part et d'autres en jugeront.

Il fait un parallele des deux maisons, de France et d'Autriche, où il extenue tant qu'il peut la puissance de la premiere, et esleve celle de la seconde avec des tiltres si relevez, qu'à son dire l'Empire Romain ne lui fut jamais esgal; pensant par là effrayer les Princes et Estats qui ont interest de s'opposer à sa grandeur. En quoi il fait grand tort <à> l'Empereur et au Roy d'Espagne. Car il advouë contre son intention (veu l'Estat presént des affaires) que la France est mieux gouvernée que l'Empire ni que l'Espagne, et que nostre Prince surpasse les siens en vertu autant qu'il les publie les surpasser en puissance.

Il suit, et tasche de monstrer que la pluspart de ce que possede la Maison de France est usurpation, et que ce que tient celle d'Austriche est à bon et juste tiltre. Neantmoins il y a plus de douze cens ans que la maison de France estoit aussi grande qu'à present, et qu'au lieu d'usurper sur l'autrui, elle a tousjours esté le soustiens de l'Empire d'Occident, l'Azyle des Papes durant leur persecutions, et la liberatrice de l'Italie et de l'Allemagne aux inondations des peuples qui les ont affligées[10] plusieurs siecles. Au contraire celle d'Austriche (ou pour mieux dire de Hapspurg) ne s'est eslevée que par les usurpations qu'elle a faites[11] sur ces voisins. Chose si claire et si recente,

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[5] BnF, Ms. Fr. 17481: fol. 219-221. Interpunction of the manuscript differs from the printed edition in the *Mémoires des desseins de la Maison d'Autriche* (Geneva: Pierre Aubert, 1633) 54-67. The interpunction of the printed edition is followed here. Important orthographical differences are indicated in footnotes, unimportant typographical differences 'lui' for 'luy' and 'celui' for 'celuy' are given in the modern spelling without further reference. Additions in the printed text are indicated by brackets <...>. For reasons of clarity the letters 'i' and 'u' are changed into 'j' and 'v', and sometimes the necessary accents are added.

[6] These three pamphlets were printed collectively in volume with two other texts ['Raisons de la derniere resolution faite en la Valteline, contre la Tyrannie des Grisons et heretiques' and a response 'Au tres-puissant Roy Catholique d'Espagne D. Philippe III.'] by Pierre Aubert in Geneva in 1633. Anonymous, *Mémoires des desseins de la maison d'Autriche* (Geneva: Pierre Aubert, 1633). A second edition of the volume, this time titled *Mercure d'Estat* with additional pamphlets and the original Latin response to Rohan's initial pamphlet was probably also published by Aubert. See printer's preface, 'Le bon accueil fait à une partie de ces Discours leur a valu une seconde naissance, et un assortiment nouveau de quelques autres pieces de mesme nature.' Anonymous, *Mercure d'Estat, ou Recueil de Divers Discours d'Estat* (s.n.l. [Geneva: Pierre Aubert?], 1635).

[7] Ms *admonestait*

[8] Ms *contrere*

[9] Ms *Cholere*

[10] Ms *affligez*

[11] Ms *faitte*

qu'il ne faut pas estre grand historien pour prouver celle des Royaumes de Navarre, de Portugal, de Naples, de Sicile, de Sardaigne, du Duché de Milan, des places dans la Toscane, et de plusieurs villes Imperiales dans l'Allemagne; ni grand homme d'Estat, pour monstrer combien elle est dangereuse en la continuation de sa possession de l'Empire, puis qu'au lieu de le maintenir en sa splendeur, elle va le[12] en diminuant incessamment pour s'accroistre.

Il passe outre et tasche de monstrer que cette maison a eu pitié de celle de France, en contraignant Henri IV. de se faire Catholique, et ne voulant se servir de ses advantages contre le minorité de Louys XIII. Est-il possible que cet Autheur croye que la mémoire de la Ligue esmeue par Philippe II. contre Henri III. et Henri IV. fomentée et entretenue par des si excessives despenses, soit perdue? Que l'on ne se ressouvienne plus des efforts qu'il fit pour empescher que <le Pape> Clement VIII. ne recognust[13] Henri IV. pour bon Catholique? Et que l'on ignore encore que l'Alliance que Philippe III. a faite avec la France, n'a esté que pour l'endormir afin de lui permettre[14] plus facilement la continuation de ces usurpations? Il se persuade que nous soyons aussi peu sensibles qu'il se declare malicieux, quand il dit effrontément que l'assassinat de ce grand Roy, qui estoit l'ornement des Princes de son siecle, a esté un coup du ciel: et que son fils, à qui la Chrestienté est obligée jusqu'à[15] present de la liberté qu'elle possede, en doit attendre autant. Et l'on souffre telles licences! Et il se trouve encore des Princes qui laissent telles personnes sans chastiment[16]! Nous ne devons jamais sortir du respect deu aux grands Rois, que Dieu a establi sur ces peuples pour les conduire. Et les Princes ne doivent permettre qu'on parle irreveremment de leurs semblables. Car quand le respect est perdu pour les uns, il est difficile qu'il se garde pour les autres. Cela soit dit contre l'impudence de cet Autheur, d'avoir osé blasphemer contre la Majesté de deux si grands Monarques.

Des particulieres calomnies de nos Rois il vient à celle de toute la nation Françoise: et ne trouvant pas de quoi la blasmer presentement,[17] il va fouiller dans les vieilles histoires, et ramener les siecles passez[18] pour prouver par les massacre de vespres Siciliennes que nostre domination est insupportable à cause de nos insolences et cruautez.[19] Juge le Lecteur s'il manque de bons exemples en ceste matiere, puis qu'il se sert de l'action la plus noire et perfide qui ait esté commise il y a long temps dans l'Europe, et si indigne du nom Chrestien. Je m'estonne que celui qui veut maintenir le gouvernement de la maison d'Austriche si juste, si sainct, et si Catholique, et les Espagnols si parfaits, accuse les autres de cruauté, comme si c'estoit un vice parmi eux. Si j'estois homme qui voulusse recriminer, je n'irois point deterrer les histoires anciennes pour faire voir leur inclination à ce vice. J'exhorterois[20] seulement un chacun à la lecture de celle de l'Amerique, et des Indes faite par un Evesque Espagnol de Nation, où on y void[21] plus de cruautez exercées par les Espagnols durant un demi siecle, qu'il ne s'en est jamais commis au monde depuis qu'il est créé. Par eux les Isles ont esté desertées: par eux les grandes Provinces ont esté depeuplés: et ils ont plus fait mourir de millions d'ames que tous les plus cruels Empereurs de l'Antiquité de milliers. Est-ce ainsi qu'on reduit les peuples à la foi, que de les massacrer pour avoir leurs argent? n'est-ce point plustost remplir l'enfer de ces ames miserables, que d'en peupler le paradis? Par un mesme zele la maison d'Austriche n'en a fait gueres moins en Allemagne, s'estant vantée d'avoir plus fait de Catholiques par ses violences, que Sainct Paul par ses predications. Et sous[22] ce beau pretexte de pieté on a veu despouiller de leurs Estats plusieurs grands Princes pour en revestir les siens, et ses Capitaines; et exercer toute sorte de barbarie et

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[12] Ms *va le* crossed out and changed into *le va*.
[13] Ms *recogneut*
[14] Ms *permetre*
[15] Ms *jusques à*
[16] Ms *chastiement*
[17] Ms *pour le present*
[18] Ms *passés*
[19] Ms *cruautés*
[20] Ms *Je exhorterais*
[21] Ms *voit*
[22] Ms *soubs*

de cruauté contre ceux dont la plus grande heresie estoit, de ne se vouloir pas sousmettre[23] a son joug. Mais quand on a veu qu'elle a attaqué le Duc de Mantoue, grand Catholique, et par des troupes en partie protestantes, lesquelles ont plus ruiné d'Eglises et de monasteres qu'elles n'ont pris de villes, et de chasteaux, ç'a esté lors qu'un chacun s'est desabusé: et que plusieurs Princes et Estats Catholiques se sont resveillez[24] pour s'opposer à une si injuste usurpation. Et aussi l'Autheur de son Apologie s'est bien gardé de parler de cet affaire, pource qu'elle est sans excuse. Car comme cette saincte maison a de nouvelles maximes de Theologie pour en profiter, aussi a-elle inventé de nouvelles loix, afin de s'emparer avec facilité des estats d'autrui; à sçavoir de vouloir deposseder les vrais heritiers d'un estat, avant que de pouvoir juger à qui y il appartient. Comme si de bonnes garnisons dans Mantoue et Cazal estoyent necessaires pour examiner les droits du Duc de Mantoue. La maxime qu'il veut encor persuader aux Princes d'Italie pour y conserver la paix n'est pas moins bonne, qui est, que l'Espagnol y soit si puissant, et les passages tellement clos à leurs amis, qu'il puisse quand il voudra les opprimer impunément. C'est pourquoi ne pouvant supporter que les François se meslent des affaires d'Italie, il essaye de les rendre suspects à ceux qui ne peuvent conserver leur liberté sans leur assistance.

Il a une autre grande jalousie, de voir le Roy de Suede dans l'Allemagne: ne pouvant souffrir qu'on le nomme Liberateur de ceste nation: comme si un Prince qui a desja remis dans ses Estats le Prince de Pomeranie, les Ducs de Mekelburg, l'Electeur de Brandebourg, le Landgrave de Hessen, le Duc de Wirtemberg, le Palatin, et une partie des siens, et delivré d'oppression plusieurs villes Ansiatiques et Imperiales, lesquelles publient tenir leur liberté de la faveur de ses armes, ne lui peuvent pas à bon droict acquerir ce nom là.

Ce n'est pas tout, car la maison d'Austriche, pour maintenir sa puissance, n'a point craint de hazarder les Estats Catholiques d'Allemagne: lesquels, s'ils eussent creu aux salutaires Conseils du Roi Tres-Chrestien, ils eussent esté conservez,[25] et on verroit plus de tranquillité par toute la Chrestienté qu'il n'y en a. Mais c'est la coustume de ceste maison, de sacrifier[26] à son ambition toutes choses sacrées et profanes. Aussi sont bien trompez ceux qui croyent qu'elle serve à l'advancements de la Religion Catholique. C'est elle qui sous[27] ce masque de devotion trompe les ignorans qui ont du zele, et les fait servir à ses desseins.

Reste de respondre au complaintes[28] qu'il fait du mauvais Estat de la France, et du mal-entendu qui est entre le Roy Tres Chrestien, la Royne sa mere, et le Duc d'Orleans son frere; comme si celui qui prend à prix fait de mesdire de nos Princes et de nostre nation, pouvoit[29] avoir de la compassion pour nous: mais plustost ne veut pas par cette hypocrisie[30] aigrir les parties et les rendre irreconciliables. Et qui cercheroit bien la source de ceste mes-intelligence, la trouveroit dans les plus secrets conseils d'Espagne. C'est où elle a esté conceue: c'est par ses ministres qu'elle a esté fomentée: c'est par ses armes et son argent qu'elle se maintient, n'ayant point une plus grande esperance de resource qu'en la des-union de la maison de France. C'est pourquoi ils n'espargneront[31] ni artifice ni moyens pour l'entretenir. Mais j'espere que quand le despit aura donné lieu à la raison, la Royne mere et le Duc d'Orleans detesteront les Conseils et Conseillers qui les portent à leur propre ruine, et se rejoignans à leur Chef seront les plus aspres à se venger de ceux qui ont voulu dissiper la maison par sa des-union.

Quant à l'exhortation que l'Autheur fait aux Princes Catholiques pour les esmouvoir à contribuer leurs forces et moyens aux maintien de la maison d'Austriche, je ne veux dire autre chose, sinon que je le conseille volontiers à ceux qui aiment la servitude, et qui voudront esprouver la plus dure et arrogante domination qui s'exerce non seulement parmi les Chrestiens,

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[23] Ms *soubsmettre*
[24] Ms *resveillés*
[25] Ms *conservés*
[26] Ms *saccrifier*
[27] Ms *soubs*
[28] Ms *compliment*
[29] Ms *peut*
[30] Ms *hypochrisie*
[31] Ms *il n'espargnera*

mais qui l'encherit[32] par dessus les Turcs. J'en prends a tesmoin[33] ceux qui la souffrent et qui ne l'osent dire. Et si on veut seulement considerer les exemples funestes de tant de grands Capitaines qui ont eslevé cette maison où elle est par leur signalez services, <et erigé tant de glorieux trophees à sa grandeur;> on jugera assez qu'il n'y a service plus ingrat que le sien. Si Consalve, le Duc d'Albe, Dom Jouan d'Austriche, le Duc de Parme, le Marquis Spinola; et plusieurs autres vivoyent, que ne diroient-ils point sur cette matiere? Et le Comte Henry de Bergue, lequel apres de si longs services on veut recompenser comme les autres en le ruinant si on pouvoit, de biens, d'honneur et de vie, que n'en peut-il dire? A ceux donc qui ne feront leur profit de tels exemples, et qui se sousmettront[34] a elle sera bien deue[35] la punition de leur lascheté. Mais les Princes et Estats qui veulent maintenir la liberté que leur predecesseurs leur ont laissée, doivent[36] d'un commune main travailler à abbattre la tyrannie de ceste orgueilleuse maison. Toute la Chrestienté souspire apres cela, le souhaite avec passion, et l'execution n'en a esté retardée jusqu'à present que par la crainte de n'en venir pas à bout, et d'attirer seulement sa haine. Car elle a maintenu jusqu'à present par ses rodomontades ceste reputation qu'elle faisoit la guerre et la paix où elle vouloit, et quand il lui plaisoit. Maintenant que son dessain est bien recognu,[37] que son hypocrisie touschant la Religion est descouverte, et que les heureuses victoires du Roy Tres-Chrestien au recouvrement des Estats du Duc de Mantoue, les progrez[38] du Roy de Suede en Allemagne en faveur des Princes oppressez, et les exploits advantageux des Estats du Pais bas, font recognoistre sa foiblesse, et qu'elle n'est espouvantable qu'aux peuples qui se sousmettent[39] à elle, en les escorchant jusques aux os, <et> exerceant[40] contr'eux des rigueurs et cruautez insupportables.[41] Il ne faut point <plus> remettre la partie à une autrefois. Vous[42] donc Neapolitains, qui vivez sous un air si delicieux et sous une usurpation si violente, je vous somme de prendre courage pour vous descharger de ce joug. Et vous Milannois,[43] qui dans la paix generale d'Italie, souffrez toutes les incommoditez de la guerre sans la faire, et qui estes <surchargez de logemens de gens de guerre, et accablez de> sur charges intollerables, deschargez vous pour une bonne fois de ceste tyrannie. Et vous peuples Flamands,[44] amateurs de vostre liberté sur tous autres, qui depuis plus de soixante ans avez souffert la cruauté Espagnole,[45] (comme mesme s'est vanté le Duc d'Albe, d'avoir en six ans de son gouvernement fait mourir 18.[46] mille ames de vostre patrie par les mains d'un infame bourreau) et qui estes contrains[47] de faire la guerre pour affermir vostre servitude, et appesantir vostre joug, prenez courage; joignez vous à ceux qui vous tendent les bras, et servez vous de l'occasion favorable qui s'offre à vous pour vous mettre en repos et liberté. Car si vous la laissez escouler, outre qu'elle ne se rencontrera jamais pareille, sçachez que la seule apprehension que vos dominateurs en auront eue les obligera à vous traitter plus rigoureusement que jamais. A quoi ils ne forceront leur inclination, pource que la maxime que la maison d'Austriche a tousjours pratiquée est, de vouloir maintenir son authorité par la seule crainte; estant la voye de la douceur, trop esloignée[48] de son naturel; et croyant chose indigne de sa grandeur qu'en l'obeissance qu'on lui rend, la bonne volonté y contribue quelque chose.

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[32] Ms *l'encherist*
[33] Ms *tesmoings*
[34] Ms *soubsmetront*
[35] Ms *deub*
[36] Ms *doibvent*
[37] Ms *recogneu*
[38] Ms *progrés*
[39] Ms *soubsmettent*
[40] Ms *exerçans*
[41] Ms *insuportables*
[42] In the manuscript this is the start of a new paragraph.
[43] Ms *Milanois*
[44] Ms *flamans*
[45] Ms *Espagnolle*
[46] Ms *dixhuit*
[47] Ms *contraints*
[48] Ms gives *esloignée* as replacement for ~~obligée~~

Pour la fin j'exhorte tous Rois, Princes, Republiques, Ecclesiastiques, Noblesse, et Peuples, qui desirent conserver ou acquerir leur[49] repos, de n'abandonner point l'œuvre commencée, et à ce coup s'affranchir de tant de calamitez[50] qu'ils souffrent, afin que ceux que Dieu a eslevez[51] à la conduite de ses peuples, s'en acquittent comme ils doivent, et qu'ils vivent sous leurs justes gouvernemens[52] en paix et tranquillité.

[49] Ms *le*
[50] Ms *calamités*
[51] Ms *Esleus*
[52] Ms *leur juste gouvernement*

APPENDIX 4

Publication history. Editions of Gabriel Naudé's political writings.

1620

1. *Le Marfore, ou Discours contre les Libelles.* Paris: Louis Boulanger, in-8º.

1623

2. *Instruction à la France sur la vérité de l'Histoire des Frères de la Rose Croix*. Paris: François Julliot, in-8º.

1624

3. *Instruction à la France sur la vérité de l'Histoire des Frères de la Rose Croix*. Paris: Pierre Chevalier, in-4º.

Second edition. Printed and published in volume with Claude Malingre, *La Continuation de l'Histoire du Progrés de l'Heresie*.

1625

4. *Apologie pour tous les grands personnages qui ont esté faussement soupçonnez de Magie*. Paris: François Targa, in-8º.

1626

5. *Bibliotheca mystica, clarissimi viri Ludovici Servini, sex aliis longe ditioribus, scilicet Arnaldi, Paschasii, Martellerii, Turgotti et Tarini, in antecessum præmissa*. S.n., s.l., in-4º.

1627

6. *Advis pour dresser une Bibliotheque Presenté à Monseigneur le President de Mesme*. Paris: François Targa, in-8º.

1628

7. *De antiquitate et dignitate Scholae medicae Parisiensis Panegyris, cum Orationibus encomiasticis ad IX Iatragonistas laureâ Medicâ donandos*. Paris: Jean Moreau, in-8º.

1630

8. *Addition à l'histoire de Louys XI, contenant plusieurs recherches curieuses sur diverses matieres*. Paris: François Targa, in-8º.

1633

9. *Gabrielis Naudaei Paris. Bibliographia politica Ad Nobiliss. & Eruditiss. Virum Iacobum Gaffarellum D. Aegidij Priorem, & Prothonotarium Apostolicum. Superiorum Permissu*. Venice: Francesco Baba, in-12°.

1639

10. *Considérations politiques sur les coups d'estat*. Rome: s.n., in-4°.

The *editio princeps* of the *Considérations politiques* provides the author's initials (G.N.P.) on the title page and almost certainly gives a feigned place and date of publication. A number of reasons lead us to postulate a publication of the *Considérations politiques* around 1648 in Paris by Sébastien Cramoisy or associates.

1641

11. *Gabrielis Naudaei Parisiens. Bibliographia Politica: in qua plerique omnes ad Civilem Prudentiam Scriptores quà recensentur, quà dijudicantur. Opusculum elegans: nun primùm in Gormania editum Cum Accessorio non dissimilis argumenti. e Muséo Augusti Buchneri*. Wittenberg: Balthasar Mevius, in-12°.

This German reprint 'from the collection of August Buchner' contains a new dedication 'Serenissimi ac Potentissimi Principis ac Domini, DN. Johannis Georgii, S.Rom.Imp.Archimarschali atque Septemviri Electoris &c. Illustrissimae ac maximae spei Filio, DN. Mauritio, Duci Saxoniae, Juliae, Cliviae, Montium: Landgravio Thuringiae, Marchioni Misniae & utriusque Lusatiae: Comiti Marchae & Ravensburgi: Dynastae Ravenstenij &c. Amori ac Delicio Patriae: Augustus Buchnerus Aeternitati Domus ejus, tum incomparabili Ipsius Indoli perperuo devotus'. This edition also has an additional preface to the reader 'Amice Lector' and an 'Index Rerum maxime notabilium, itemque Auctorum, qui recensentur: quos ex Cognominibus suis laudavimus.'

1642

12. *La Bibliographie Politique du Sieur Naudé, contenant les livres et la méthode necessaires à estudier la politique avec une lettre de M. Grotius et une autre du sieur Haniel sur le mesme sujet, le tout traduit du Latin en François.* Paris: widow of Guillaume Pele, in-8°.

French translation by Charles Challine dedicated to Mr. de la Grange Jugenay.

13. *Gabrielis Naudaei Parisiens. Bibliographia Politica: in qua plerique omnes ad Civilem Prudentiam Scriptores quà recensentur, quà dijudicantur. Accessit Hugonis Grotii epistola de studio politico*. Leiden: Johannes Maire, in-24°.

1649

14. *Jugement de tout ce qui a été imprimé contre le cardinal Mazarin, depuis le sixième janvier jusques à la déclaration du premier avril mil six cent quarante-neuf.* s.l., s.n.. s.d. [Paris: Sébastien Cramoisy, August 1649], 492 p. in-4°.

First edition of the work that is also known by the name of the dialogue's main protagonist, *Mascurat*.

1650

15. *Jugement de tout ce qui a été imprimé contre le cardinal Mazarin, depuis le sixième janvier jusques à la déclaration du premier avril mil six cent quarante-neuf.* s.l., s.n.. s.d. [Paris: Sébastien Cramoisy, 1650], 718 p. in-4o.
Second extensively revised edition of Naudé's *Mascurat* that was printed by Cramoisy in the spring of 1650.

1651

16. *Aujourd'huy, 14 février 1651... [Relation de la visite et saisie de la bibliothèque du cardinal Mazarin. Procès-verbal de remise des clefs de la bibliothèque du Palais Mazarin à M. Tubeuf, président en la chambre des comptes, créancier du cardinal, dressé par Gabriel Naudé].* S.l., s.n., s.d., 4 p. in-4o.

1652

17. *Advis à Nosseigneurs de Parlement sur la vente de la bibliothèque de Mr. le Card. Mazarin.* S.l., s.n., s.d., 4 p. in-4o.

18. *News from France, or, A description of the Library of Cardinall Mazarini, before it was utterly ruined: Sent in a letter from Monsieur G. Naudæus, keeper of the publick library.* London: Thomas Garthwait, 6 p. in-?

1653

19. *Apologie pour tous les grands personnages qui ont esté faussement soupçonnez de Magie*. The Hague: Adriaen Vlacq, 615pp. in-8o.

1657

20. *The History of Magick, by way of Apology for all the Wise Men who have unjustly been reputed Magicians, from the Creation to the present Age. Written in French by G. Naudaeus late library-keeper to Cardinal Mazarin*. *English*ed *by J. Davies*. London: Printed for J. Streater, in-8o.

1667

21. *Considérations politiques sur les coups d'estat.* s.l., s.n. [Amsterdam: Daniel Elzevier], in-12o.
This edition *sur la copie de Rome* of the *Considérations politiques* bears 'the Sphere', the printer's mark of the Elzevier press. It gives the full name of the author as 'Gabriel Naudé, Parisien'. Printer's preface: 'Au lecteur. Ce livre n'ayant esté composé que pour la satisfaction d'un particulier, on n'en fit imprimer que 12 exemplaires, qui n'ont paru que dans fort peu de Cabinets où ils ont toujours tenu le premier rang entre les pieces curieuses; mais comme le hazard m'en a donné une copie, j'ay cru que je n'obligerois pas peu le public en luy donnant un thresor qui n'estoit possedé que de fort peu de personnes; cela joint au merite de l'auteur et à celuy de l'ouvrage, à qui on faisoit tort de ne les pas faire connoistre, m'ont obligé à le mettre sous la presse, et à inserer à la fin de chaque page la traduction Françoise des citations Greques, Latines et Italiennes qui sont dans le corps du livre, afin de faire connoistre le merite de l'œuvre à plus de personnes,

et donner au livre la seule perfection qui sembloit y manquer; ceux qui le liront admireront ce Traité et me sçauront bon gré de leur avoir fait part d'un piece si rare. Adieu.'

1668

22. *Gabriel Naudæens Politisches Bedencken über die Staats-streiche.* Leipzig: Schür-und Götzischen Erben, Johann Fritsch and Johann Köhler, in-12º.

    Aus dem Frantzösischen übergesetzt durch den Beschirmeten [pseudonym of Christian von Ryssel]. German translation of the *Considérations politiques*.

1669

23. *Apologie pour tous les grands hommes, qui ont ésté accusez de Magie.* Paris: François Eschart, Jacques Cotin, and Augustin Besongne, in-12º.

1673

24. *Science des Princes, ou Considérations politiques sur les coups d'État. Avecque les Reflexions Historiques, Morales, Chrétiennes, et Politiques de L.D.M.C.S.D.S.E.D.M.* [Louis Du May]. S.l., s.n. [Strasbourg, unknown printer], in-8º.
    Third edition of the *Considérations politiques* with annotation, commentary, and summary per chapter by Louis De May, counselor-secretary of the Duke of Bavaria.

1678

25. *Gabriel Naudæens Politisches Bedencken über die Staats-streiche.* Leipzig: Schür-und Götzischen Erben, Johann Fritsch and Johann Köhler, in-12º.
    Second edition of the German translation of Naudé's *Considérations politiques*.

1679

26. *Considérations politiques sur les coups d'estat.* s.l., s.n. [Amsterdam: Daniel Elzevier], in-12º.
    Second Elzevier edition.

27. *Apologie pour tous les grands personnages qui ont esté faussement soupçonnez de Magie*. The Hague: Adriaen Vlacq, 361 pp. in-8º.

1683

28. *Bibliographia militaris ad illustrissimum juvenem Ludovicum ex Comitibus Guideis a Balneo*.

1692

29. *Bibliographia politica. In qua plerique omnes ad civilem prudentiam scriptores qua recensentur, qua dijudicantur.* Rotterdam: Pieter van der Slaart, in-4º.

30. *Syntagma de studio liberali*. Rotterdam: Pieter van der Slaart, in-4º.

Edition of Naudé's *Bibliographia Politica* and *Syntagma de studio liberali* in the volume collected by Thomas Crenius [or Crusius] entitled *Consilia et methodi aureae studiorum optime instituendorum praescripta studiosae juventuti à maximis in re litteraria viris J. Fortio Ringelbergio, D. Erasmo Rotterodamo, L. Vive, J. Caselio, J. Sturmio, C. Scioppio, húncque inlustrante ac examinante Ol. Borrichio, L. Aretino, G. Naudaeo, H. Grotio & G.J. Vossio, cujus accedunt Opuscula de cognitione sui, & imitatione, item Introductio in chronologiam, ac Francisci Junii Paraenesis; quae Th. Crenius collegit, recensuit, emendavit* 496-572 and 573-638.

1699

31. *Bibliographia militaris ad illustrissimum juvenem Ludovicum ex Comitibus Guideis a Balneo*. Leiden: A. de Swarte and H. Teeringh, in-4°.

This *Bibliographia militaris* by Gabriel Naudé (after the 1683 edition) is a slight reworking of a chapter (book II, chapter 4, paragraphs 1 to 13) on the combination of learning and experience in military science from his *Syntagma de studio militaris* (1637) is contained (pp. 470 [473] – 535) among other works in Thomas Crenius [or Crusius]' *De eruditione comparanda: in humanioribus, vita, studio politico, cognitione auctorum ecclesisticorum, historicorum, politicorum ac militarium, item peregrinatione tractatus. Joach. Camerarii, Johann Fungeri, Arnoldi Clamparii, Christoph Coleri, John. Caselii, Ignatii Hannielis, Aegidii á Lancken, Joh. Andr. Bosii, Gabr. Naudaei, Lucae Antonii Thomasoni, nobilis Veneti, anonymi cujusdam, Heinrici Ranzovii, cum epistola qvadam ejus inedita hactenus, Joh. Henr. Alstedii, Matthiae Bernegerri, Justi Lipsii & Georg Richteri; qvos Thomas Crenius conligit, recensuit, emendavit, in incisa sive commata distinxit, & notis suis, ac locis auctorum, ubi e re fuit, additis, accuratôqve indice auxit.*

1703

32. *Gabrielis Naudæi Parisiensis dissertatio de instruenda bibliotheca, ad Illustrissimum Dominum Præsidem De Mesme.* Helmstedt: G.W. Hammius, in-4°.

Latin translation by P.I.L.M. of Naudé's *Advis pour dresser une bibliotheque* (1627) comprised in *De bibliothecis nova accessio collectioni maderianae adjuncta a J.A.S.D.* [Johann Andreas Schmidt] pp. 71-134.

1711

33. *Political considerations upon refin'd politicks: and the master-strokes of state, as practis'd by the ancients and moderns. Written by Gabriel Naudé, and inscrib'd to the Cardinal Bagni. Translated into English by Dr. King*. London: printed for H. Clements, in-

English translation of the *Considérations politiques* by William King (1663-1712).

1712

34. *Considérations politiques sur les coups d'estat.* s.l., s.n. (The Hague: Henri van Bulderen?), in-12°.

Edition of unknown origin *suivant la copie de Rome*. Printer's mark is similar to that of Henri van Bulderen, showing a decorated monogram letter 'V' with an abstract interlace.[1]

[1] See the *Arkyves* website's page on the printer's devices used by Henri van Bulderen, who held shop in The Hague from 1683-1713. URL: http://www.arkyves.org/view/bspr_895/ Consulted 1 December 2016.

35. *Apologie pour tous les grands hommes soupçonnez de Magie*. Amsterdam: Pierre Humbert, Jean Frederic Bernard, 470 pp. in-8°.

'Derniere edition où l'on a ajoûté quelques remarques.'

36. *Gabrielis Naudæi Parisini Bibliographia politica et Arcana Status, cum notis et observationibus literario-criticis, quæ auctorem, partim illustrant, partim supplent, partim corrigunt. Præmissa Præfatione apologetica, in qua Naudæus à variis liberatur imputationibus.* Leipzig: Christoph Hüls, in-8°.

Annotated edition with apologetic preface by Friedrich Gladov of the *Bibliographia politica* and first Latin translation of the *Considérations politiques sur les coups d'estat*. *Cura Lupi Fecialis* (Wolfgang Hieronymus Herold)

1713

37. *Supplément aux mémoires de messire Philippe de Comines, seigneur d'Argenton: contenant l'addition à l'histoire du Roy Louis XI, avec plusieurs pièces, lettres, mémoires, recherches & remarques critiques & historiques sur le même sujet & diverses autres matières curieuses*. Brussels: François Foppens, in-8°.

Part of a three volume edition of Commines' famous *Mémoires* incorporating Naudé's *Addition à l'histoire de Louys XI, contenant plusieurs recherches curieuses sur diverses matieres* that was conceived as a counterpart to Commines' work.

1739

38. *Reflexions historiques et politiques sur les Moyens dont les plus grands Princes et habiles Ministres se sont servis pour gouverner et augmenter leurs états avec les Qualités qu'un Ministre doit avoir, de quelle Condition il faut qu'il soit: et ce qu'un Prince est oblige d'observer envers lui.* Leiden: Jean and Herman Verbeek, in-8°.

Slightly emended edition of the *Considérations politiques* by an anynomous author.

1740

39. *Monumenta typographica, quae artis hujus praestantissimae originem, laudem et abusum posteris produnt, instaurata studio et labore Jo. Christiani Wolfii in gymnasio Hamburgensi professoris publici. Pars prima.* Hamburg: Christian Herold, in-8°.

History of typography containing a Latin translation of Naudé's chapter on the history and introduction of the printing press in France from the *Addition à l'histoire de Louis XI* (Chapter VII). The chapter *Ex Gabr. Naudæi Additamentis ad Historiam Ludovici XI* (pp. 486-536) was translated by Matthias Stegerus.

1744

40. *Considérations politiques sur les coups d'estat.* Cologne [printed in the Netherlands?], s.n., in-12º.

1747

41. *Mémoires de messire Philippe de Comines, seigneur d'Argenton, où l'on trouve l'histoire des rois de France Louis XI. & Charles VIII. Nouvelle édition, revûe sur plusieurs manuscrits du tems, enrichie de notes & de figures, avec un recueil de traités, lettres, contrats & instructions, utiles pour l'histoire, & nécessaires pour l'étude du droit public & du droit des gens. Par Messieurs Godefroy. Augmentée par M. l'abbé Lenglet du Fresnoy. Tome IV.* London and Paris: Jacques Rollin, in-4º.

    This four volume edition of Commines' famous *Mémoires* incorporates the full work Naudé wrote in reaction to this book, the *Addition à l'histoire de Louys XI, contenant plusieurs recherches curieuses sur diverses matieres*.

1752

42. *Science des Princes, ou Considérations politiques sur les coups d'État. Avecque les Reflexions Historiques, Morales, Chrétiennes, et Politiques de L.D.M.C.S.D.S.E.D.M.* [Louis Du May]. S.l., s.n. [Paris, Marie-Jacques Barrois], in-12º.

1787

43. *Ueber den Zauberglauben und andere Schwärmereien; oder Vertheidigung berühmter Männer, die von ihren Zeitgenossen für Zauberer gehalten worden. Aus dem Französischen. Nebst einigen Beiträgen aus neuern Zeiten*. Leipzig: Johann Friedrich Weygand, in-8º.

APPENDIX 5

A comparison of the first and second edition of the *Mascurat*

This appendix to the main thesis presents the data of my comparison between the first and second edition of Naudé's *Mascurat*. It describes the omissions, alterations, and additions made to the body of the text in the editing process towards the second edition. The comparison follows the pagination of the first edition, giving, first, the page number of the edited passage on the left margin, then stating the nature of the revision, and finally presenting the passage as it was in the first edition and what it became in the second. As much as possible it seeks to provide well-rounded sentences of the passages in order to have a sufficient understanding of their context without having to consult the two editions themselves. An analysis of these textual differences is part of Chapter V of this PhD-thesis.

Comparison of the first (circa August 1649) and second edition (circa Spring 1650) of the *Mascurat* by Gabriel Naudé (following the pagination of the first edition)

p. 3 omission [om.]: '[…] *ie l'ay fait prier par nos amis communs, de les vouloir coucher par écrit, autant que sa mémoire beaucoup debilitée par son aage luy pourroit permettre.* […]' **becomes** (p.3) '[…] *ie l'ay fait prier par nos amis communs, de les vouloir coucher par écrit, autant que sa memoire luy pourroit permettre*. […]'

p. 3 alteration [alt.]: '[…] *ie suis tres-asseuré que la lecture ne t'en déplaira pas, & que tu seras également satisfait de la composition de Mascurat, & de mon impression*.' **becomes** (p. 3) '[…] *ie suis tres-asseuré que la lecture ne t'en déplaira pas, & que tu seras également satisfait de l'ingenuité de* Mascurat, *& de mon impression*.'

p. 8 addition [add.]: 'M. Certes tu aurois bien dequoy t'estonner dauantage, si tu connoissois les Autheurs de la plus grand part des libelles, qui ont paru depuis la veille des Roys; car ie te puis asseurer que neuf ou dix personnes, dont la plus sçauante ne pourroit pas decliner son nom, en ont fait plus de deux ou trois cens: […]' **becomes** (p. 8) 'M. Tu en oublie deux, qui valoient mieux que ton Badius, sçavoir Geofroy Tory, & Estienne Dolet, quoy que Iules Scaliger par ie ne sçay quelle haine ait dit du dernier. Mais certes tu aurois bien dequoy t'estonner dauantage, si tu connoissois les Autheurs de la plus grand part des libelles, qui ont paru depuis la veille des Rois; car ie te puis asseurer que neuf ou dix personnes, dont la plus sçauante ne pourroit pas decliner son nom, en ont fait plus de trois cens: […]'

p. 8 alt.: '[…] & ie te puis fournir bon garent, que les *admirables sentimens d'vne Villageoise à Monsieur le* Prince, sont la cinq ou sixiéme des pieces, qu'vne simple seruante de Libraire, aprés auoir bien escuré ses pots, & laué ses escuelles, nous a données en cette occasion.' **becomes** (pp. 8-9) '[…] & ie te puis fournir bon garent, que les *admirables sentimens d'vne Villageoise à Monsieur le* Prince, sont la quatre ou cinquiéme des pieces, qu'vne simple seruante de Libraire, aprés auoir bien escuré ses pots, & laué ses escuelles, nous a données en cette occasion.'

p. 13 add.: 'S. Cette raison à mon aduis n'est pas conuincante, car ie me suis laissé dire, que tel auoit dedié de gros Liures à ce Cardinal, qui a depuis la déroute du mesme, composé *la Parabole, le Mouchard*, & beaucoup d'autres pieces contre luy.' **becomes** (p. 13) ' S. Cette raison à mon aduis n'est pas conuincante, car ie me suis laissé dire, que tel auoit dedié de gros Liures à ce *Cardinal*,

qui a deuance la déroute du mesme par l'Advis contre le Ministre Estranger, & depuis encore, composé *la Parabole, le Mouchard*, & beaucoup d'autres pieces contre luy.'

p. 13 alt.: 'M. Cela peut bien estre, sans neantmoins porter preiudice à l'vn ny à l'autre, car Balsac n'aura pas voulu payer d'ingratitude, celuy qui faisoit tous les ans acquitter vne pension de quinze cens livres; […]' **becomes** (pp. 13-14) ' M. Cela peut bien estre, sans neantmoins porter preiudice à l'vn ny à l'autre, car *Balsac* n'aura pas voulu payer d'ingratitude, celuy qui faisoit tous les ans acquitter vne pension de deux mille livres; […]'

p. 16 alt. + add.: 'M. Tu parles aussi serieusement de ces Bourdes, comme tu ferois des opinions contraires de Scot & de Sainct Thomas, ou d'Aristote & de Platon.' **becomes** (pp. 16-17) 'Tu le dois plustost croire que penser, puis qu'il en est de mesme de toutes ces bourdes, que de ces differentes drogues, que certaine femme dans Ausone donna à son mary pour ne pas faillir à l'empoisonner, car une seule le pouvoit tuer, ou luy bien faire du mal, ou au contraire plusieurs en se servant d'antidote les unes aux autres, le sauverent: *Dividat haec si quis, faciunt discreta venenum, antidotum sumet, qui sociata bibet.* (Epigr.10) Et ie m'estonne, Saint-Ange, de ce que tu commence à parler aussi serieusement de ces diverses opinions, que tu pourrois faire de celles de *Scot*, & de *Sainct Thomas*, ou d'*Aristote*, & de *Platon*.'

p. 19 add.: '[…] un homme de chambre […]' **becomes** (p. 19) '[…] un vieil homme de chambre […]'

p. 20 alt. + add.: '[…] i'ay sceu certainement, qu'il estoit né à Rome, qu'il y avoit fait toutes ses estudes, & la Philosophie mesme, dans le College Romain où il alloit soir & matin suivy de son Precepteur, & d'un Estaffier; qu'aprés cela, il avoit accompagné le fils, auiourd'huy Cardinal, du Connestable Colomne, en Espagne, où il le quitta six mois aprés, parce qu'il ne se pouvoit pas accomoder à l'humeur de la nation: & que depuis ce temps là, il avoit tousiours esté dans les emplois honorables, tant à la Valtelline, qu'en Piedmont, iusques à l'année mil six cens vingt-huict, qu'il commença de negotier pour la France.' **becomes** (pp. 20-24) '[…] i'ay sceu de ce mesme homme de Chambre, qui en pouuoit parler asseurement, puis qu'il l'auoit cognue dés la bauette, qu'il estoit né à Rome, qu'il commença d'y estudier à l'aage de quatre ans, qu'il composoit en Latin regulierement à six, & que dés lors il commença d'aller au College Romain sans chapeau & sans manteau, & suiuy de son Precepteur, comme c'est la coustume du pays; qu'il y estudia l'espace de dix ans, & en demeura quatre en Troisiéme, Seconde, & Premiere, parce qu'il estoit trop petit pour monter en humanité, où il fut vne année, & eut deux Maistres, le P. *Pietra Santa*, & le P. *Titiano*, & passant de cette Classe à la Rhetorique, il y estudia la premiere année sous les RR. PP. *Famiano Strada*, & *Tarquinio Galluci*, & la seconde sous le P. *Alessandro Donato*, & le P. *Vincenzo Guinigi*, comme aussi sous le P. Felice, qui enseignoit pour lors la Langue Grecque: qu'aprés cela il donna les autres trois années à la Philosophie & Mathematique sous les PP. *Tarquato de Cuppis*, & *Christoforo Grienberperio*, pendant lequelles années il soustint des Theses en Logique & Physique, auec des applaudissemens extraordinaires, qui furent encore redoublez lors qu'il defendit publiquement, & contre les meilleurs esprits de Rome le Cardinal *Altieri*, *Virginio Cæsarini*, *Boccabella*, *Ciampoli*, & vn certain *Gianotti*, qui furent les premiers en lice, les opinions de son Maistre, sur cette tant renommée Comete de l'année six cens dix-huict: que ayant acheué la Philosophie, il donna quelque temps au Droict, & apprit en mesme temps à monter à cheual, & à faire tous les autres exercices qui estoient bienseants à vn ieune homme de sa qualité. En suite de quoy il fut en compagnie du Cardinal *Colonne* estudier à *Alcala de Henares*, où il demeura dix-huict mois à ses propres cousts & despens: fit des actes publiques, aprit la langue, & dautant qu'il ne se pouuoit accomoder à l'humeur des Espagnols, & aussi que ses affaires domestiques auoient aucunement besoin de sa presence, il s'en reuint à Rome, où il prit l'espée: & outre les *Colonnes*, chez qui son pere luy auoit donnée entrée dés sa plus tendre ieunesse, il fit encore amitié tres-particuliere avec les Seigneurs *Frangipani*, *Capizucchi*, & *Nari*, qui ont esté depuis ce temps-là aussi bien que le sieur *Paulo Macarani*, ses meilleurs & plus fidels amis: il noüa encore amitié auec le Cardinal *de la Valette*, & commença par cette occasion, & dés ce temps-là, de mettre son application à seruir la France. Ce mesme *Camerier* adioustoit de plus, que le Pape Gregoire XV. estant mort, & Vrbain VIII. qui luy succeda, estant resolu d'enuoyer des troupes en Valteline, *il Signor Mazarini*, comme on l'appelloit en ce temps-là, fut conseillé de s'offrir au Pape, qui l'aggrea auec plaisir & satisfaction particuliere, parce que comme il possedoit la langue Espagnolle en perfection, outre la Compagnie de trois cens hommes qui luy donna dans le Regiment du

Seigneur *Sachetti*, il faisoit encore estat de s'en seruir dans les negotiations auec le Duc de Feria: C'est pourqouy aprés ce que sa Saincteté en ordonna à *Torquato Conti*, qui estoit General, le Cardinal *Magalotti* principal Ministre, le recommanda aussi particulierement au dit General, & au Frere du *Sachetti*, qui auoit la direction des Finances de la negotiation: & de fait quoy qu'il n'eust encore que 21. an, il fut enuoyé par deux fois en Alexandrie de la Paille, pour traitter auec le Duc de Feria, & pendant que sa Compagnie fut en Valteline destinée à la garde du General *Torquato*, il negotia aussi fort souuent auec le Mareschal d'*Estrée*, qui y estoit lors employé pour la Couronne de France. Aprés quoy sur ce que sa dite Compagnie eut ordre de loger dans le Milanois, il eut aussi occasion de demeurer à Milan, où, comme il estoit fort amy de *Picolomini*, maintenant Archeueque de Sienne, il fit grande liaison auec son frere, qui estoit lors Maior de Caualerie dans le Regiment de *Papenhein*, lequel luy persuada de prendre vne Compagnie de Cuirasses dans le mesme Regiment, dautant que la guerre de la Valteline estoit finie, & que d'ailleurs il n'y auoit gueres de reputation, n'y d'aduancement à esperer dans les armées du Pape: Mais comme ses parens sceurent à Rome qu'il auoit pris ce party-là, ils employerent l'authorité du Cardinal *Sachetti*, pour l'en retirer, & pour le ietter en d'autres charges, & emplois moins fascheux & plus honorables; ce qui fut cause de son retour à Rome, où s'estant remis dans les estudes, il se rendit en peu de temps, mais auec beaucoup de labeur, & d'assiduité, assez capable, tant en droict *Ciuil*, que *Canon*, pour prendre ses degrez en l'vn & en l'autre, comme il fit dans le College public de la *Sapience*, en compagnie de *Matteo Sachetti*; Dequoy si ces Messieurs qui le crayonnent maintenant à leur mode, ne me veulent croire, ou plustost ce tesmoin oculaire de qui ie l'ay sceu, ils peuuent au moyen de leurs amis & correspondants, faire chercher dans les Registres dudit College, pour voir s'ils seront chargez du Doctorat de ces deux personnes assez remarquables; car puis que l'on a bien trouué celuy de ce Phenix des Sçavans J*ules Scaliger* dans les Archiues du *Bo* à Padoüe, où il passa Docteur en Medicine, nonobstant toutes les diligences qu'il auoit faites, pour empescher que cette descouuerte ne preiudiciast à la supposée Noblesse de sa famille, il ne peut pas y auoir de difficulté à trouuer celuy du *Cardinal*, puis qu'il s'en vante, & que luy ou les siens mettront tousiours le doigt dessus, à ceux qui en voudront prendre la peine. Or sur ces entrefaites, le Duc de Mantoüe estant mort, & les Espagnols commençant tout de bon à broüiller l'Italie; cela donna lieu à la Legation du Cardinal *Barberin*, pendant laquelle comme il falloit entretenir diuerses negotiations chez les Princes interessez, celle de *Mantoüe* estant escheuë au Seigneur *Iules*, il s'y employa auec vne entiere approbation de sa Saincteté, comme aussi en plusieurs autres esquelles il continua iusques à l'année mil six cens vingt-huict, qu'il commença de negotier pour la France.'

p. 22 add.: '[…] vn certain Prestre d'Auignon nommé Bonet […]' **becomes** (p. 26) '[…] vn certain Prestre d'Auignon nommé *Thomas Bonnet* […]'

p. 24 add.: '[…] comme disoit fort à propos le Poëte Menander dans Stobée.' **becomes** (pp. 28-29) '[...] comme disoit fort à propos le Poëte Menander dans Stobée. Et tant s'en faut qu'elles ayent esté si preiudiciables au *Cardinal* que beaucoup s'imaginent, qu'au contraire, si tost qu'on les eut veuës à Rome, où dix mille personnes cognoissent sa Maison & sa personne, cela fut cause qu'on detesta publiquement la malice, ou l'ignorance grossiere & honteuse de ces deux Escriuains, & que l'on negligea de voir toutes les autres que les Factieux de ce pays-cy prenoient grand soin d'y enuoyer.'

p. 25: add.: 'Et en effect, les Colomnes sont ainsi appellez, d'vn petit bourg de ce nom là, d'où ils sont sortis; les Barberins viennent pareillement […]' **becomes** (p. 30) 'Et en effect, les Colonnes sont ainsi appellez, d'vn petit bourg de ce nom là, proche de Rome, d'où Volateran Liure 22. de son Anthropologie veut qu'ils soient sortis, aussi bien que les *Sauelli ex oppido Sabello*; les *Barberins* viennent pareillement […]'

p. 26 add.: '[…] Henry de Gand, & vn nombre presque infiny d'autres […]' **becomes** (p. 31) '[…] Henry de *Gand*, Raphael *Volateran*, Beatus *Rhenanus*, Iehan *Sleidan*, André *Alciat*, Hierosme *Cardan*, Ioachimus *Rheticus*, & vn nombre presque infiny d'autres […]'

p. 37. add.: '[…] Si celles des *Grimaldi* de Genes, des *Comti Guidi* de Toscane, des *Vrsins* de Rome, des *Beuilaqua* de Ferrare, des *Castiglioni* de Milan, des *Tassis* de Flandre, des *Melo* d'Espagne, des *Fouleres* d'Alemagne, en auoient souffert de pareilles, on n'auroit pas eu lieu de composer de si gros liures sur chacune d'icelles: […]' **becomes** (p. 42) '[…] Si celles des *Grimaldi*, & des *Doria*

de Genes; des *Comti Guidi*, & des *Vbaldini* de Florence; des *Cesi*, & des *Vrsini* de Rome; des *Castelli* & *Monaldeschi* de l'Estat Ecclesiastique; des *Beuilaqua* de Ferrare; des *Cancellieri* de Pistoye; des *Balugoli* de Modene; des *Rossi* de Parme, des *Zeni* & *Contareni* de Venise? des *Castiglioni*, & *Borromei* de Milan; des *Genari*, des *Mara*, des *Cantelmi* de Naples; des *Tassis* de Flandre; des *Melo*, des *Vera* & de los *Girones* d'Espagne; des *Fouleres* & des *Ranzau* d'Allemagne , en auoient souffert de pareilles, on n'auroit pas eu lieu de composer de si gros liures sur chacune d'icelles: [...]'

p. 37 alt.: '[...] *le vieil Bernardin* m'en dit trois iours auparauant le Blocus de Paris est vray, il a recue des memoires de la ville de Naples, qui iustifient suffisamment la descente de ses Ancestres depuis plus de deux cens ans, & comme ils ont tousiours esté de la faction Françoise, & mesmement employez dans les principales charges des armées que nous auions en ce pays-là.' **becomes** (p. 43) '[...] *le vieil Bernardin* m'en dit il y a enuiron quinze iours ou trois semaines, est vray, il y a maintenant vn certain Moine en Sicile qui pretend auoir des pieces suffisantes pour iustifier la descente de ses Ancestres depuis plus de trois cens ans, & comme ils ont tousiours esté de la faction Françoise, & mesmement employez dans les principales charges des armées que nous auions en ce pays-là.'

p. 39 alt.: '[...] Macerata, où i'ay trauaillé quelque temps, à Lorette, certain Marchand François m'asseura, d'auoir ouy dire [...]' **becomes** (p. 45) '[...] Macerata, où i'ay trauaillé quelque temps, à Lorette, en compagnie d'vn Marchand François, il m'asseura, d'auoir ouy dire [...]'

p. 41 add.: '[...] au sieur Naudé, & finalement à tous ceux [...]' **becomes** (p. 46) '[...] au sieur *Naudé*, & auparauant eux encore à *Antonius Gallonius*, & à *Ioan. Baptista Castaldus*: & finalement à tous ceux [...]'

p. 43 add.: '[...] auec de pareilles armes, & cela estãt ie [...]' **becomes** (p. 49) '[...] auec de pareilles armes, veu que suiuant la regle du Droit, *Nihil est tam naturale, quam eo genere quidque dissoluere, quo colligatum est?* & cela estant ie [...]'

p. 43 alt.: '[...] sont tout farcis, *spumat plenis vindemia labris*. I'ay doncque pris [...]' **becomes** (p. 49) '[...] sont tout farcis, *dum habent animum*, comme disoit Plaute, *falsiloquum, falsificum, falsiiurium*. I'ay doncque pris [...]'

p. 44 add.: '[...] du sieur Pietro & comme il estoit le plus âgé [...]' **becomes** (p. 50) '[...] du sieur Pietro: ie sçay aussi asseurément, que ce fut la seule cause qui empescha Clement VIII. de le nommer au Cardinalat, comme il auoit eu dessein de faire, pour moderer vn peu la trop grande authorité d'vn des principaux Superieurs de cette Compagnie: or comme il estoit le plus âgé [...]'

p. 44-45 alt.: '[...] que l'on y lisoit les traductiõs Françoises, faites par deux differents interpretes, & imprimées tant *in Quarto*, que *in Octauo* des Predications Italiennes sur le *Miserere*, & sur le *Gloria Patri* du Pere Iules Mazarin, lequel auoit des talens si aduantageux pour la Chaire, que ceux qui n'ont peu entendre ces Sermons, ont esté bien aises de les lire, & mesme de les faire traduire en Latin, pour les rendre communs à tout le monde; [...]' **becomes** (pp. 50-51) '[...] que l'on y lisoit neuf ou dix gros volumes *in quarto*, de ses Predications Italiennes tant sur le *Sermon de nostre Seigneur in monte* que sur le *Colosse Babylonien*, & sur le *Miserere* & *Gloria Patri*, faites par ledit Pere *Iules Mazarin*, lequel auoit des talens si aduantageux pour la Chaire, que ceux qui n'ont peu entendre ses Sermons, ont esté bien aises de les lire, & mesme de les faire traduire en François par deux differens Interpretes, comme aussi en Latin: esquelles deux Langues ils ont desia esté imprimez tant de fois, & en si diuerses façons, qu'ils sont maintenant communs à tout le monde: [...]'

p. 45 add.: '[...] *Praepositus administrauit*. Reuenons maintenant au sieur Pierre, [...]' **becomes** (p. 51) '[...] *Praepositus administrauit*, A quoy ie puis encore adiouster pour l'auoir appris à Rome de certains Iesuites mes amis, qui le pouuoient bien sçauoir, qu'il auoit fait plusieurs voyages, & traité fort heureusement beaucoup d'affaires importantes auec les Ducs de Parme, de Modene, & d'Vrbain: & qu'il estoit tellement estimé & consideré à Rome, qu'il ne se passoit guere de iours sans qu'il receut quelque visite de deux & trois Cardinaux, soit qu'ils luy desirassent parler ensemble, ou separement. Reuenons maintenant au Sieur *Pietro*, [...]'

p. 45 alt.: '[...] de l'Estat Ecclesiastique, que de la dépendance du Connestable Colomne, lequel luy donna en suite la qualité de premier Gentilhomme de sa Maison, sans l'obliger neantmoins à quitter le Palais qu'il tenoit dans Rome pour venir demeurer au sien: & en cette qualité, il fut tousiours employé aux affaires les plus honorables, & les plus importantes, tant dudit Connestable, que de sa femme la *Signora N. Tomacelli*, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 51-52) '[...] de l'Estat Ecclesiastique: en suite de quoy il s'insinua si bien aux bonnes graces, & en la familiarité & amitié intime du Connestable Colonne, qu'en cette qualité là, il fut tousiours employé aux affaires les plus honorables, & les plus importantes, tant dudit Connestable, que de sa femme la *Signora Lucretia Tomacelli*, [...]'

p. 46 add.: '[...] present sa seconde femme.' **becomes** (p. 52) '[...] present sa seconde femme. Et en effet personne ne peut dire, que tous les Papes, Cardinaux, & autres Seigneurs de Rome, ne l'ayent tousiours consideré comme vn Gentilhomme de qualité, de merite, & accomply en toutes ses parties, ce que le Cheualier Georges ayant ignoré, ou dissimulé, ie te laisse à penser ce que l'on peut attendre de luy & de ses autres Genealogies, puis qu'il les fait auec si peu de diligence, ou auec tant de passion.'

p. 48 alt. + add.: '[...] que les nostres, à cause qu'ils ne cognoissoient point d'enfer ny de diables, aussi au lieu de nos Sorcieres qui ne font rien que du mal, rien que des saletez & ordures, ils auoiét ces belles Deesses, que quelques Autheurs Latins appellent *Albas Dominas*, qui ne faisoient ordinairement que du bien & des choses belles & honestes, telles qu'estoient cette *Lamia*, & la Nymphe *Egerie*, sur lesquelles on a depuis mouslé & patroné la Fée *Morgue*, *Alcine* Dame du lac d'Auallon, la Fata *Manto*, dont parle Arioste; & toutes ces autres Fées que les Romans tant François qu'Anglois, feignent se trouuer ordinairement à la natiuité des ieunes Princes & Caualiers, pour les instruire de leur bonne ou mauuaise fortune, ou plustost de leur destinée, comme si elles estoient les Ambassadrices & interpretes de la volonté des Dieux enuers les hommes.' **becomes** (p. 55) '[...] que les nostres, ny leur Enfer & Furies si terribles & mal-faisantes que nos diables; aussi au lieu de nos Sorcieres qui ne font rien que du mal, rien que des saletez & ordures, ils auoient ces belles Deesses, que quelques Autheurs Latins appellent *Albas Dominas*, qui ne faisoient ordinairement que du bien & des choses belles & honnestes, telles qu'estoient cette *Lamia*, & la Nymphe *Egerie*, sur lesquelles on a depuis moulé & patroné la Fée *Morgue*, *Alcine* Dame du lac d'Auallon, la Fata *Manto*, dont parle Arioste, & toutes ces autres Fees que les Romans tant François qu'Anglois, feignent se trouuer ordinairement à la natiuité des ieunes Princes & Caualiers, pour les instruire de leur bonne ou mauuaise fortune, ou plustost de leur destinée, comme faisoient anciennement les trois Parques, tesmoin ce beau passage d'*Hyginus, Cùm esset natus Meleager, subito in regia apparuerunt Parcae, Clotho, Lachesis, Atropos, cui fata ita cecinerunt, Clotho dixit eum generosum futurum, Lachesis fortem, Atropos titionem ardentem respexit in foco, & ait, tandiu hic viuit, quamdiu hic titio consumptus non fuerit* (cap. 171 & 174). Ce qui monstre bien que la fable de nos Fées d'auiourd'huy a succedé à celle des Parques des anciens, & qu'elles sont aussi bien les vnes que les autres Ambassadrices & Interpretes des volontez celestes enuers les hommes.'

p. 52 add.: '[...] de folie & d'imposture, pour faire voir au monde, quel a esté le Cardinal en toutes les principales actions de sa vie.' **becomes** (p. 59) '[...] de folie & d'imposture, pour confirmer ce que nous auons dit cy-dessus du Cardinal, & pour faire voir au monde, *non in speculo vel ænigmate*, quel il a esté en toutes les principales actions de sa vie.'

p. 52 alt. + add.: '[...] premieres & plus considerables, escoute ce qu'en dit de toutes les deux le R.P. *Siluester Pietra Santa* Iesuite viuant & escriuant à Rome, en la Preface du troisiesme volume des prerogatiues que la Religion Chrestienne a sur toutes les autres, par le moyen des miracles, *Non frustra fuit*, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 59-60) '[...] premieres & plus considerables, on pourroit à vn besoin auoir recours aux Cardinaux *Colonne* & *Alsieri* qui ont esté ses Compagnons d'estude, & aux *RR. PP. Torquato de Cuppis, Vincenzo Guinisi, Siluestro Pietra Santa, Famiano Strada* qui ont esté ses Maistres, & qui comme ie croy *nondum ad plures abierunt*, comme aussi au Mareschal d'*Estrée* qui l'a cognu dés qu'il estoit en Valteline, & à vne infinité d'autres personnes qui l'ont veu à Rome & ailleurs, pour sçauoir si la deposition que m'en a faite autresfois cét ancien Valet de Chambre de son *Pere* est veritable ou non. Mais puis que toy ny moy, n'auons ny le pouuoir ny la volonté de prendre tant de peine, escoute au moins patiemment les tesmoignages

imprimez que i'ay recueillis pour la confirmer. Voila doncque comme le R.P. *Siluestro Pietra Santa* Iesuite, en la Preface du troisiéme volume des prerogatiues que la Religion Chrestienne a sur toutes les autres, par le moyen des miracles, nous donne le sien, *Non frustra fuit*, […]'

p. 52-53 alt. + add.: '[…] & des Theses qu'il soustint en Physique sous le Pere N. Conti, auec vne telle foule de ceux que la nouueauté des opinions de Galilei qu'il defendoit, y faisoit venir, que de long temps auparauant il n'y en auoit point eu de semblables.' **becomes** (p. 60) '[…] & des Theses qu'il soustint en Metaphysique sous le P. *Torquato de Cuppis*, auec vne telle foule de ceux que la nouueauté des opinions de Galilei qu'il impugnoit, y faisoit venir, que de long temps auparauant il n'y en auoit point eu de semblables.'

p. 53 alt.: '[…] des estudes du Cardinal est tres-veritable, […]' **becomes** (p. 61) '[…] des estudes du *Cardinal* est tres-legitime, […]'

p. 57 alt.: '[…] car il est assez commun à Rome, […]' **becomes** (p. 65) '[…] car il est assez commun en cette Cour là, […]'

p. 58 add.: '[…] C'est en la mesme ville; où Sixte V. qui n'estoit pas moins honneste homme […]' **becomes** (p. 66) '[…] C'est en la mesme ville où *Cortesius* dit que *Nicolao Capuano Senatori*, c'est à dire *Cardinali, coctilitia Taberna obiecta fuit à Francisco Condolmiero*, où l'on pouuoit encore faire le mesme reproche au defunct Cardinal *Agostino Oregio*, s'il n'estoit comme dit Ausone *pulchrius multo parari, quam creari nobilem*: Et en effect, c'est en cette mesme ville où *Sixte V.* qui n'estoit pas moins honneste homme […]'

p. 59 add.: '[…] que l'on appelle auiourd'huy Cardinal *Montalto*, mais neantmoins il y a beaucoup d'exemples dans le Ciacconius […]' **becomes** (p. 67) '[…] que l'on appelle auiourd'huy Cardinal *Montalto*; & que l'Empereur & le Roy de Pologne faisoient pareillement de grandes instances pour deux Italiens, sçauoir le premier pour le Marquis de *Grana* Montferrin, qui estoit Ambassadeur en Espagne, & le dernier pour Monseigneur *Visconti*: Et en effect il y a beaucoup d'exemples dans le *Ciacconius*, […]'

p. 59 add.: '[…] demandent de bonne grace. En fin ce braue Iurisconsulte […]' **becomes** (p. 67) '[…] demandent de bonne grace, tesmoin celle du Cardinal *Bonzi* Florentin, que Paul V. fit Cardinal à la requeste de Marie de Medicis, de laquelle il estoit premier Aumosnier; & il ne seroit pas question de beaucoup feüilleter les Histoires, pour en produire assez d'autres exemples. Enfin ce braue Iurisconsulte […]'

p. 60 add.: '[…] grandes affaires de son Royaume, en luy mettant le Chapeau rouge sur la teste, […]' **becomes** (p. 69) '[...] grandes affaires de son Royaume, en le nommant son premier Plenipotentiaire à l'Assemblée de Munster, qui venoit d'estre arrestée; en luy mettant le Chapeau rouge sur la teste, [...]'

p. 60 alt.: '[...] & en le nommant par cette Declaration [...]' **becomes** (p. 69) '[...] & en l'establissant par cette Declaration [...]'

p. 64 add.: '[...] trois petites Harengeres. / M. Cela viendra en temps & lieu, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 73-74) '[...] trois petites Harengeres. / M. I'ay au moins iustifié la noblesse du *Cardinal* vn peu mieux que n'a fait toute l'antiquité celle de ce grand Ministre & Fauory de l'Empereur Auguste, *M. Vipsanius Agrippa*, car bien que Seneque (Lib.2, cont. 12) ait dit de luy en ses controuerses, *Tanta autem sub diuo Augusto libertas fuit, vt præpotenti tunc M Agrippæ fuerint qui ignobilitatem exprobrarent*. & que certain Aduocat en plaidant contre luy, l'eut picqué au vif par ces paroles, *M. Agrippam & quod medium est, voulant dire, Vipsanium*, lequel nom Agrippa supprimoit le plus qu'il luy estoit possible, *celandæ ignobilitatis sua causa*, comme remarque *Leuinus Torrentius* sur Horace (Ode VI, lib. I), où il dit aussi que le nom de *Mæcenas* nous est inconneu par la mesme cause, *quamuis enim Etruscam nobilitatem iactare potuit*, & que Horace par flatterie ou autrement luy eust donné du / *Mæcenas atauis edite Regibus, / Romæ tamen hominum opinione, ignobilis habebatur* (Ode I lib. I): personne dis-ie n'a iustifié le contraire, comme i'ay fait du *Cardinal*: & pour ce qui est des *Niepces*, cela viendra en temps & lieu, [...]'

p. 65 add.: '[...] vaillant comme son espée, & que toute la Maison des Colonnes aimoit, & carressoit extraordinairement.' **becomes** (p. 74) '[...] vaillant comme son espée, grand duelliste, duquel on pouuoit dire sans flaterie le vers que *Nonius* rapporte *ex Lucilio*, / -- *optimûm longè / Post homines natos gladiator qui fuit unus*. / & que toute la Maison des Colonnes aimoit, & carressoit extraordinairement.'

p. 71 add. 'M. Ie te puis neantmoins asseurer que ladite Damoiselle de Gournay estoit tres-sage, & tres-chaste, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 80-81) 'M. Ie te puis neantmoins asseurer pour ce que est de ladite Damoiselle de Gournay, que comme elle est appellée par Baudius, qui suit en cela le iugement de Lipse, / *Patrima nympha, sæculi ac morum decus, / Monstrumque purum labis & probro carens*: / elle estoit aussi tres-sage, & tres-chaste; [...]'

p. 72 add.: '[...] sur tous les hommes doctes. Ainsi quoy que *Adilbergha* fille de Didier Roy des Lombards, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 81-82) '[...] sur tous les hommes doctes. Ainsi quoy que Claudian ait eu subiet de dire en parlant de *Serena* femme de Stilicon, / *Pierius labor, & veterum tibi carmina vatum / Ludus erant; quos Smyrna dedit, quos Mantua libros / Percurrens, damnas Helenam, nec parcis Elisæ.* / Quoy que *Adilbergha* fille de Didier Roy des Lombards, [...]'

p. 72 alt.: '[...] d'Accurse estoient bonnes, lors que les femmes sçauantes estoient aussi rares comme des monstres & des cometes, [...]' **becomes** (p. 82) '[...] d'Accurse estoient bonnes, lors qu'il se voyoit aussi peu de femmes sçauantes que de monstres & cometes, [...]'

p. 75 alt.: '[...] a iamais eu la pensée, & que s'il est vray que le defunct Magalotti s'en soit venté, ce n'a esté que par vne des fanfaronnades qui luy estoient ordinaires, [...]' **becomes** (p. 85) '[...] a iamais eu la pensée, & que s'il est vray comme disent tant de libelles, & celuy du *Chevalier Georges* principalement, que le defunct sieur *Magalotti*, l'ait dit à ses amis, ce n'aura esté que par vne des fanfaronnades qui luy estoient ordinaires, [...]'

p. 75 add.: '[...] voulu faire? rien moins; il racontoit des actions de sa vie [...]' **becomes** (p. 85) '[...] voulu faire? rien moins; il estoit trop bien né pour s'abandonner à vne telle resolution; il racontoit des actions de sa vie [...]'

p. 75 add.: '[...] comme il estoit bon soldat, [...]' **becomes** (p. 85) '[...] comme il estoit bon & vaillant soldat, [...]'

p. 75 add.: '[...] fait leur cour, quand ils ont dit vne infinité de contes, de mensonges, & de baliuernes, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 85-86) '[...] fait leur cour, quand ils ont mesdit de quelqu'vn de leurs amis, quand ils ont fait d'vne mousche vn elephant, quãd ils ont forgé quelque conte plaisant & ridicule, quand ils ont fait rire la compagnie par quelque mot, & bref quand ils ont dit vne infinité de contes, de mensonges, & de baliuernes, [...]'

p. 76 add.: '[...] *sint omnibus omnes*. / S. Il ne te reste plus qu'à parler [...]' **becomes** (pp. 86-88) '[...] *sint omnibus omnes*. / Aussi ay-ie coustume de comparer la Cour à cette ville de *Crotone*, des façons de faire & coustumes de laquelle vn bon paysan voulant informer Eumolpus & ses compagnons dans Petrone, voila de quelle façon & en quels termes il leur en parloit, *O mi hospites, si negotiatores estis*, c'est à dire, si vous estes gens modestes, & serieux, qui alliez rondement en besogne, qui ne cherchiez qu'vn gain honeste & moderé, qui ne faciez point les muguets, les marjolets, les enfarinez, les fanfarons, qui soyez ennemis de toutes sortes de griuelées, qui ne vouliez pas apauurir le Roy ny le public pour vous enrichir, *Mutate propositum, aliudque vitæ præsidium quærite; sin autem vrbanioris vitæ homines, sustinetis semper mentiri, recta ad lucrum curritis: in hac enim vrbe non litterarum studia celebrantur, non eloquentia locum habet, non frugalitas sanctique mores laudibus ad fructum perueniunt: sed quoscunque homines in hac vrbe videritis, scitote in duas partes esse diuisos, nam aut captantur, aut captant.* / S. Parbleu voila la Cour bien accommodée, ie ne pense pas que le *Sarisberiensis*, en son gros volume *de nugis Curialium*, en ait iamais dit dauantage. / M. Deux choses, *Sainct-Ange*, me donnent la hardiesse d'en parler de la sorte: la premiere, que l'on peut sans offenser personne, crier contre les vices, & les blasmer en general, ce qui est appellé dans Martial, / *Parcere personis, dicere de vitiis*. (Lib.10, epig. 33) / la seconde, que nous sommes icy *sub Rosa*, c'est à dire, en vn lieu duquel quand on est sorty, il ne se faut plus souuenir de tout ce que l'on y a dit

ou fait. / S. Voila qui va bien, mais pourquoy veux-tu que la Rose soit le symbole de ce silence? / M. La fable ancienne ou moderne, dit que le Dieu d'Amour fit present au Dieu du Silence Harpocrate, d'vne belle fleur de rose, lors que personne n'en auoit encore veu, & qu'elle estoit toute nouuelle, afin qu'il ne descouurit point les secrettes pratiques & conuersations de Venus sa mere, & que l'on a pris de là occasion de pendre vne rose és chambres, où les amis & parens se festinent & se resiouyssent, afin que sous l'asseurance que cette rose leur donne, que leurs discours ne seront point esuentez, ils puissent dire tout ce que bon leur semble. Ce que l'Epigramme raporté par Guill. Stuckius exprime encore beaucoup mieux que ie ne viens de faire, c'est pourquoy ie te le veux maintenant reciter. / *Est rosa flos Veneris, cuius quo furta laterent, / Harpocrati, matris dona dicauit Amor. / Inde rosam mensis Hospes suspendit amicis, / Conuiua vt sub ea dicta tacenda sciat.* / S. I'ay plus d'obligation à la Cour que ie ne pensois pas, puisque sans elle tu n'aurois pas songé à me dire tant de belles & de curieuses remarques. Mais puis qu'il ne reste plus qu'à parler [...]'

p. 78 alt.: '[...] *Gregoire Nazianzene de Sainct Basile*, & de tous ces autres liures qui sortent tous les iours sous ces nom empruntez, [...]' **becomes** (p. 90) '[...] *Gregoire Nazianzene de Sainct Basile*, & de ce prodigieux nombre de liures, qui sortent tous les iours sous ces noms empruntez, [...]'

p. 81-82 alt. + add.: '[...] la famille des *Mancini*, (qui n'a rien de commun auec celle des *Manzini*, quoy que tres-considerable en la ville de Bologne) encore bien qu'elle se soit estenduë en beaucoup de villes d'Italie, ç'a neantmoins tousiours esté auec des titres d'honneur, proportionez non seulement aux merites des particuliers, mais aussi à la noblesse & à l'antiquité de toute leur Maison. Car le docte & laborieux Abbe Ferdinandus Vghellus met pour XXXII. Euesque d'Oruiete, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 93-95) '[...] la famille des *Mancini*, il te faut premierement aduertir, qu'elle n'a rien de commun auec celle des *Manzini*, quoy que tres-considerable en la ville de Bologne, non plus qu'auec celle des *Mazinij* de Rauenne, comme la differente escriture du surnom le donne assez à cognoistre. Et quoy qu'il y ait beaucoup de familles de ce mesme nom de *Mancini* en diuerses villes d'Italie, elles sont toutesfois entierement distinguées des *Mancini* de Rome, puis que leurs armes n'ont rien de commun, suiuant lesquelles neantmoins on a coustume de iuger de la liaison & correspondence que les familles ont ensemble, *Audi bone Vadiane*, luy disoit Eckius (In Epist. Philologic. epist. 34.), *familiam tuam gentilem prædicas Von watt appellatam, sed antequam tuam reciperem elegiam exegiticam, Norinbergæ fui, vbi sunt Ciues quidam optimi, & celebres, Summates apud eos reputati. Hi tibi sunt cognomines, an ea sit familia explorabo per insignia*. Et en effect ie n'ay point sceu iusques à cette heure, que ces diuerses familles de *Mancini* eussent mesme quelque affinité les vnes auec les autres. C'est pourquoy ie n'auois que faire de te les specifier maintenant, si ce n'estoit pour te monstrer, que le nom des *Mancini*, en quelque lieu qu'on le trouue, n'a iamais esté reduit au point de bassesse, où il a pleu au *Cheualier Georges*, & à ce bon *Religieux* son Suffragant, de le mettre ces iours passez. Car si nous exeptons vn certain *Baptista Mancini*, duquel le Cardinal d'Ossat dit auoir receu des lettres, ie ne sçay si en qualité de Courrier ou autrement, à peine trouuera-t'on des personnes de ce nom là mentionnez dans les Histoires, ausquelles on puisse rien reprocher pour ce qui est de leur noblesse; Et qu'ainsi ne soit Mathieu Goussancourt en son Martyrologe des Cheualiers de Hierusalem, parle d'vn *Camillo Mancini d'Italie Cheualier de Malte*, mort esclaue l'an 1570. quasi au mesme temps qu'il y auoit vn autre *Camillo Mancini* à Rome, duquel ie n'obstineray point que ce premier fut parent, puis que Goussancourt ne nous ayant dit de quel lieu il estoit, ce n'est pas à moy à faire de determiner, sans preuue ou raison, s'il estoit de Rome, plustost que de quelque autre ville. Ainsi Cyprian Manente faisant mention en son Histoire des quarante Gentilshommes ou *Caualieri d'Oruieto* (lib. 2 p. 89), qui combatirent *in Anzidonia* contre autant de Caualiers Sienois, desquels ils remporterent vne belle & signalée victoire, il nomme entre autres vn *Tibaldo Mancini* qui estoit de leur compagnée. Ainsi le docte & laborieux Abbé Fernandus Vghellus met pour XXXII. Euesque d'Oruiete (Italiae Sacrae tom.1), [...]'

p. 82 alt.: 'Enfin ie trouue encore des branches de cette famille des Mancini à Monte Pulsiano, dont certain *Iacobus Mancinus Politianus* estoit Professeur d'humanité à Pise en l'année 1604. & vn nommé *Lælius* explique auiourd'huy le Droict Canon à Padoüe auec vn applaudissement vniuersel de toute l'Italie.' **becomes** (p. 96) 'Enfin ie trouue encore qu'vn *Giulio Mancini* de ladite ville de Siene, fut premier Medecin du Pape Vrbain VIII. comme le tesmoigne Ianus Nicius en ses eloges, & qu'il y a pareillemet des *Mancini* à Monte Pulsiano, veu que certain *Iacobus*

Mancinus Politianus estoit Professeur d'humanité à Pise en l'année 1604. & qu'vn nommé *Lælius* explique auiourd'huy le Droict Canon à Padoüe auec vn applaudissement vniuersel de toute l'Italie.'

p. 83 alt. + add.: 'S. Voilà desia vn declin de noblesse, car si tu penses eschapper auec vn *cedant arma togæ*, [...]' **becomes** (p. 96) 'S. Pour tes Euesques & Cauaillers, passe, mais certes pour ces Humanistes, Medecins, & Legistes, ie ne sçaurois comprendre comme tu les veux annoblir, car si tu penses eschapper auec vn *cedant arma togæ*, [...]'

p. 83 add.: '[...] *Picolomini* de Sienne, les *Contareni, Foscareni, Lauredani* de Venise, les *Vettori*, & *Doni* de Florence, [...]' **becomes** (p. 97) '[...] *Picolomini* de Sienne, les *Contareni, Foscareni, Lauredani, Delphini, Tailliapetre, Moroceni* de Venise, les *Vettori*, & *Doni* de Florence, [...]'

p. 84 add.: '[...] tous mes bouquins, les vrais noms d'*Ambrosius Calepinus*, d'*Antonius Nebrissensis*, de *Petrus Marsus*, d'*Antonius Minturnus*, d'*Andreas Alciatus*, [...]' **becomes** (p. 98) '[...] tous mes bouquins, les vrays noms de *Robert de Sorbonne*, de *Petrus de Apono*, de *Gentilis de Fulgineo*, de *Petrus de Aliaco*, de *Nicolaus de Clemangis*, d'*Ambrosius Calepinus*, d'*Antonius Nebrissensis*, de *Petrus Marsus*, d'*Antonius Minturnus*, d'*Andreas Alciatus*, [...]'

p. 84: om. + alt. + add.: '[...] & que tel mesme pense sçauoir celuy de ce grand homme de Roterdam, en le qualifiant *Desiderius Erasmus*, qui n'y est pas moins trompé qu'aux precedens, veu que son nom de baptesme estoit *Gerardus Gerardi*, & qui sçait que les *Mancini de Rome*, desquels seuls ie pretens maintenant de parler, n'ayent souffert vn changement semblable, sinon à cause de la patrie, au moins par la disgrace de quelque celebre Gaucher, qui aura esté en leur famille, comme il est arriué aux *Mancinelli* de la ville de Veletre, suiuant mesme ce qu'en dit Antonius Mancinellus *in vitæ suæ Sylua / Iam tibi cognomen dederit quæ causæ docebo, / Cum dederit primus ante palumbus Auis; / Dum Stephanus puer esset Auus, læuoque lacerto / Fortior, accepit quod tibi nomen inest.* / Et en cela les Italiens sont plus hardis que les François, puis que les Gauchers & Sceuoles n'ont point encore passé parmy eux, pour surnoms de familles. Or il faut remarquer à propos de ces changemens, que celle des *Mancini*, estoit anciennement appellée des *Luci*, & portoit comme elle fait encore auiourd'huy, en ses armes deux poissons de ce nom là, suiuant que l'a remarqué Gauges de Gozze au discours des armes qui parlent, *Luci Romani hora detti Mancini portano due lucci*; car pour le P. Syluestre Pietra Santa, il s'est contenté simplement de blasonner leurs armes. Mais quoy qu'il en soit, ie trouue des memoires de la famille Romaine *dei Signori Mancini* dés l'année 1447. par lesquels il est expressement porté, qu'elle venoit d'vne autre fort ancienne & celebre nommée dei Luci & en effect Georgius Fabricius *in sua Roma*, & Laurentius Schraderius *in monumentis Italiæ*, rapportent tous deux separément l'vn de l'autre, vne Epitaphe conceuë sous ces deux noms de *Luci & Mancini*, qu'ils disent auoir copiée en l'Eglise *de Santa Maria in ara Cæli*, en ces propres termes: L. MANCINI. / *Lucia stirps claris olim* [...]' **becomes** (pp. 98-120) '[...] & que tel mesme pense sçauoir celuy de ce grand homme de Roterdam, en le qualifiant *Desiderius Erasmus*, qui n'y est pas moins trompé qu'aux precedens, veu que son nom de baptesme estoit *Gerardus Gerardi*. / S. Qui sçait que tous ces *Mancini* n'ayent souffert vn changement semblable, sinon à cause de la patrie, au moins par la disgrace de quelque celebre Gaucher, qui aura esté en leur famille, car *Mancino*, si ie ne me trompe bien fort, est autant que *Gaucher* en François. / M. Si tu veux excepter les *Mancini* de Rome, ie t'acorderay facilement pour les autres que ce que tu dis pourroit bien estre, car il y a quatre ou cinq cens ans que les fiefs, les sobriquets comme de *Castracani, Frangipani, Salinbeni*, les noms des charges & offices, & des villes ou bourgades, d'où chacun prenoit naissance, empieterent si fort sur les surnoms, que beaucoup mesme sont d'opinion, qu'il n'y en auoit point du tout, auparauant ce temps-là; Dequoy ie ne puis tomber d'accord auec eux, puis que les noms & surnoms, ont tousiours esté en vsage, comme l'on peut prouuer par vne infinité d'exemples, sans mettre en ligne de compte les *Boeces* & les *Fortunatus* qui viuoient neantmoins au mesme temps, que ces Messieurs vouloient que les surnoms fussent abolis. Pour moy ie pense qu'il en estoit comme de nos Religieux d'apresent, puis que les nouueaux noms qu'ils prennent dans leur Conuent, ne veulent pas dire, qu'ils n'en eussent point auparauant que d'y entrer: I'adiouste que sans les surnoms, il auroit esté impossible de bien continuer tant de belles & anciennes Genealogies ou Histoires de familles. Mais neantmoins il est certain, que beaucoup de ceux que nous auons auiourd'huy, viennent de quelqu'vne de ces causes, comme il est arriué aux *Mancinelli* de la ville de Veletre, suiuant mesme ce qu'en dit Antonius Mancinellus *in vitæ*

suæ Sylua. / Iam tibi cognomen dederit quæ causæ docebo, / Cum dederit primus ante palumbus Auis; / Dum Stephanus puer esset Auus, læuoque lacerto / Fortior, accepit quod tibi nomen inest. / S. Si cela est, quelle raison as-tu d'exempter les *Mancini* de Rome de cette regle, à laquelle tu veux bien sousmetre tous les autres. / M. Parce que ie suis d'opinion que les *Mancini*, desquels seuls ie veux parler, & qui n'ont rien de commun auec tous les precedents, viennent d'vne famille consulaire de l'ancienne Rome, de laquelle ils ont gardé le surnon inuiolablement iusques à cette heure, & ont renouuelé bien souuent les noms, & celuy de *Lucius* principalement, comme l'on peut iustifier par des preuues assez considerables. / S. Mort non pas de ma vie voila debuté de bien haut, i'aimerois autant le / *Quis genus Æneadum? quis Troiæ nesciat vrbem? / Virtutesque, virosque?* / du bon homme Virgile (Æneid. I), n'as-tu point de honte, *Mascurat*, à l'aage que tu as, aprés auoir tant veu & leu de choses, aprés auoir tant de fois tesmoigné que tu ne crois pas legerement, que tu n'és pas homme à te repaistre de bourdes, & coccigruës, à te laisser surprendre, ou à vouloir tromper les autres aprés dis-ie toutes ces actions de galant-homme, est-il possible que tu en fasse vne (pardonne-moy si i'appelle toutes choses par leurs noms) d'vn sot & d'vne beste, en voulant donner vne origine à tes *Mancini*, qui ne sera pas estimée moins absurde, que celles de tant d'autres familles, desquelles on se mocque tous les iours à bouche ouuerte. / M. Tout ce que tu dis ne me surprend point, / *Omnia percepi, atque animo mecum ante peregi*. (Vergilius - Aeneid VI, 105) / car ie sçauois bien que cette proposition t'effaroucheroit d'autant plus, qu'elle est nouuelle, & directement contraire à tout ce que le monde s'est persuadé de la bassesse de ces *Mancini*, aprés auoir leu ce qu'en a dit si effrontément le Cheualier George: mais ie t'asseure toutesfois qu'elle n'a rien du Fanfaron, qu'elle ne tient rien des songes de *Goropius*, des orgines de *Postel*, des fables d'*Annius de Viterbe*, des resueries d'*Inghiramus*, ny des impostures de *Ciccarellus*; escoute moy seulement auec attention, prens garde à ce que ie diray, suis moy pas à pas, & quand i'auray desduit mes raisons, si tu ne les trouue legitimes, ie n'auray nulle peine à me desdire, ny à me retracter de cette mienne proposition, puis que Sainct Augustin n'en a point eu à faire vn volume entier de ses retractations, & qu'auparauant luy le diuin Hippocrate reconneut publiquement sa faute, touchant les sutures du crane humain, *A suturis capitis*, dit Celse (lib.18 c.4), *se deceptum Hippocrates memoriæ tradit, more scilicet magnorum ingeniorum, & fiduciam magnarum rerum habentium: nam leuia ingenia, quia nihil habent, nihil sibi detrahunt, magno ingenio, magnaque nihilominus habituro, conuenit simplex veri erroris confessio*. Venons doncque au fait. Ceux qui sont bien versez dans l'Histoire ne peuuent pas ignorer qu'il y auoit à Rome la Race, *siue gens* HOSTILIA, & qu'elle y estoit tres-ancienne, puis qu'elle prenoit son origine de l'vn des cent Senateurs, qui furent premierement esleus par Romulus pour gouuerner la ville de Rome, *Familiæ vero,* dit Pighius (Tomo I. Annal. Roman. p.15.), *nobilissimæ quæ ab his primis Senatoribus promanarunt, patriciæ maiorum gentium appellatæ sunt, è quibus istas fuisse comperio*: HOSTILIA, POTITIA, PINARIA, / FABIA, HORATIA, ANTONIA, / QVINTILIA, ROMILIA, TARPEIA, / Et quoy que Fuluius Vrsinus (In Famil. Rom. p.111) establisse l'origine de cette race, *ab Hosto quodam Hostilio Medullino, qui Romulo regnante Romanum ciuitatem adeptus est*, & duquel Pline a dit (lib.2 c.4), que *Romulus frondea coronauit Hostum Hostilium, quod Fidenam primus irrupisset. Auus hic Tullij Hostilij Regis fuit*: il ne laisse pas en cela de s'accorder auec Pighius & les autres autheurs pour ce qui est de son antiquité, & ils reconnoissent tous deux, que cette Race fut par aprés diuisée en plusieurs branches ou Familles, dont celle des *Mancini* en estoit vne, *eius Gentis*, ce sont les paroles de Fuluius Vrsinus, *Familiæ reperiuntur in monumentis Capitolinis, Tulli Regis, &* Mancinorum, *apud Liuium libro XXVII. Tubulorum, & Catonum, Sasernæ pater & filius, qui de agricultura scripserunt nominantur à Varrone in libris de re rustica:* Et pour le Pighius, voila ce qu'il en dit in Indice*, Hostilia gens Consularis, cognomento Cato,* Mancinus*, Tubulus, adiecit Panuinius & Saserna*. Or quoy que Pighius se face fort de l'authorité de Panuinius, & que ie puisse aussi confirmer tout ce mien discours par tous les autheurs qui ont traitté des Antiquitez de Rome, ie m'abstiendray neantmoins de les produire, afin de te moins embroüiller. Et puis qu'il n'est pas maintenant question de toutes les autres branches, ie m'arresteray seulement à celle des *Mancini*, de laquelle voila ce que i'ay peu recueillir des Annales Romaines de Stephanus Vinandus Pighius, qui a fait vn recueil fort ample de tous ceux qui en auoient escrit auparauant luy. Il dit doncque, que l'an DIII. de la fondation de Rome *A. Hostilius* MANCINVS *auus* A. Mancini *Consularis, vt notant Fasti Capitolini*, fut esleu *inter Quæstores prouinciales*, & que son fils *L. Hostilius A*. F. MANCINVS, *Pater A. Mancini Consularis*, eut vne mesme charge en l'année DXXXIV. aprés quoy il adiouste, *Hic L. Mancinus biennio post, vt Liuius refert, Præfectus Equitibus sociis sub Fabio Dictatore, dum Annibalis castra in agro Falerno temere expolarat, a Numidis cum quadringentis militibus occisus est*. En suite

dequoy il met en DLXVII. *A. Hostilius* MANCINVS fils de ce L. qui fut deffait par Annibal, & suiuant le cours des années, il marque toutes les dignitez qu'il exerça, iusques à celle de Preteur, de laquelle il fut pourueu l'an DLXXIII. & de Consul qu'il exerça l'an DXXCIII. auec approbation de tout le monde, comme T. Liue l'a tesmoigné au 44. de son Histoire, & cette du mesme encore que *reperiuntur denarij, cum Castoris & Pollucis geminorum fratrum symbolis pulcherrimis*. Aprés ceux-là suiuent *C. Hostilius* MANCINVS *Quæstor Prouincialis* en l'an DCIII. & Tribun du Peuple en DCVII. & son frere *L. Hostilius* MANCINVS qui fut Consul en DCVIII. Mais le malheur de ce premier fut si grand, qu'outre presque tous les Historiens Romains Ciceron, Valere Maxime, Plutarque, Iulius Obsequens, Pline, Sainct Augustin, & plusieurs autres, ne l'ont pas aussi oublié dans leurs liures. Car ayant tenté hardiment la surprise de Carthage en DCVI. lors qu'il estoit *Prætor Africanus*, bien qu'il n'en vint pas à bout, & que mesme sans le secours de Scipion il couroit risque de s'y perdre, auec ceux qui le suiuoient, cela neantmoins luy acquit tellement la faueur du peuple, qu'il fut declaré Consul en DCXVI. & enuoyé en Espagne, où trouuant vne armée plus foible, plus lasche, & plus mal disciplinée qu'il ne pensoit, & estant d'ailleurs si fort pressé par ceux de Numance, qu'il ne sçauoit de quel costé se tourner, il fut contraint de faire vne paix auec eux, de laquelle ayant esté desaduoüé par le Peuple Romain, qui la consideroit comme honteuse & deshonneste, *Mancini* fut r'appellé, & son procés estant instruit, nonobstant qu'il monstra fort bien, que la faute venoit de Pomponius, & des autres Chefs qui l'auoient precedé, *Patres tamen, comme dit Appian (De bellis Hispaniæ), eum Numantinis dedendum censuere, adductum igitur in Hispaniam Furius Numantinis nudum dedit, a quibus minime receptus est*. C'est pourquoy *Mancinus* estant de retour, il demanda de pouuoir iouyr *iure postliminij*, & d'estre rehabilité à toutes ses charges & dignitez, ce qui luy fut contesté au commencement, par vn certian *P. Rutilius* Tribun du Peuple, mais sur ce qu'il fit de nouueau cognoistre son innocence, *Lex postea lata est*, comme dit le Iurisconsulte Pomponius (Titulo de Legationibus), *vt esset Ciuis Romanus, & præturam quoque gessisse dicitur*, laquelle Pighius met en l'année DCXIX. & tant s'en faut qu'il tint cét accident à deshonneur, *quod voluit ob rei memoriam sibi statuam, eodem quo deditus fuit habitu statuere*, comme remarque Pighius aprés Pline. / S. Le *Cardinal* par la mesme raison, pourroit faire des trophées & augmenter sa Bibliotheque desia si nombreuse, à ce que l'on dit, des huict ou neuf cens libelles qu'on a imprimez contre luy ces iours passez, mais Dieu sçait si sa conscience luy permettra de le faire. / M. Ie ne doute point pour moy que ce ne soit son intention, puis que *Naudé*, qui n'est pas sorty de Paris pendant les troubles, afin, comme ie croy, de conseruer ladite Bibliotheque, a esté fort soigneux de les recueillir. Au reste pour ce qui est de sa conscience, il n'est pas encore temps d'en parler, acheuons plustost ce qui est de sa famille, ou pour mieux dire, de celle des *Mancini*, de laquelle ie t'ay donné des preuues authentiques iusques à l'année de la fondation de Rome six cens dix-neuf, qui est enuiron le 135. auparauant la Natiuité de nostre Seigneur, depuis lequel temps, ie t'aduouë qu'autant que ie puis auoir connoissance des Histoires, il n'y est plus parlé desdits *Mancini*, soit que les guerres ciuiles, & le changement de la Republique en Empire, qui succederent incontinent aprés, leurs eussent esté contraires, ou que leur memoire soit enseuelie dans les diuers replis des siecles, *carent quia vate sacro*. Mais neantmoins, il n'est pas croiable qu'vne si grande famille n'ait eu ses descendans comme les autres, & qu'ils n'ayent peu se conseruer dans la mesme ville de Rome long temps aprés la Natiuité de Iesus-Christ, ce qu'estant accordé, comme il n'y a gueres d'apparence de me le refuser, puis que l'on peut voir par les Archiues de beaucoup de villes, comme plusieurs familles mediocres s'y conseruent des cinq & six cens années, & passent tousious de pere en fils, & qu'il n'est pas iusques à vn pauure homme mechanique qui ne dise dans Terence (In Phormione.) / *Progeniem nostram vsque ab auo, autque atauo proferens*. / Ie me seruiray en suite de l'asseurance que i'ay autant qu'on la peut auoir tres-certaine, que les *Mancini*, qui sont maintenant à Rome, & desquels il est auiourd'huy question, peuuent iustifier leur genealogie depuis huict cens ans, sans aucune interruption, pour attacher par ce moyen, & en attendant qu'il m'en soit venu quelque autre plus legitime, les ancestres, c'est à dire, *patrem, auum, proauum, abauum, atauum, tritauum*, & pourquoy non aussi *maiores* du premier & plus ancien de nos *Mancini* modernes, auec les descendans ou *minores* de ce dernier *Mancini* Consulaire, pour les faire rencontrer & ioindre les vns auec les autres, au milieu de cet interstice de temps, où il semble que la memoire des vns & des autres soit perduë: pour moy qui ne suis point, comme tu disois tantost, des plus faciles à croire beaucoup de choses, ie t'aduouë de n'auoir aucune difficulté à me persuader celle-là: car les *Mancini* d'auiourd'huy ne sont-ils pas dans Rome où estoient ces anciens? n'ont-ils pas les mesmes noms & surnoms? ne sont-ils pas nobles aussi bien qu'eux? & pourquoy doncque ne veux-tu pas que les descendans de ceux-là ayent pû seruir d'ancestres à ceux-cy? / S. Pourquoy

ventre sainct-Gri? ie ne mettray gueres à te le dire, parce que les Armes ne sont pas semblables, parce que ces preuues de huict cens ans sont impossibles, parce que le *Hiatus* est trop grand, parce que la chose est sans exemple, & en vn mot parce que toute cette histoire est ridicule. / M. Ce que tu dis, *Sainct-Ange*, l'est bien dauantage, quand ce ne seroit qu'à cause du presupposé que tu fais, que les anciens *Mancini* auoient des Armes: car c'est contredire sans preuues, à l'opinion de tous ceux qui veulent que ces Armes de famille, soit vne inuention moderne, & de laquelle on ne se seruoit point il y a huict ou neuf cens ans. Mais quand tu leur aurois prouué le contraire, en vertu de ce passage assez formel du liure des Nombres, *Locutus est Dominus cum Moyse & Aarone, dicens, singuli iuxta vexillum suum, & sub signis domus patrum suorum castra ponant*. Où prendrois-tu les Armes des anciens *Mancini*, pour voir si elles s'accordent auec les deux Brochets de nos modernes? car encore que le R.P. Siluestro Pietra Santa *in tesseris Gentilitiis*, ne leur donne point de nom, quand aprés auoir dit, *Pisces duo argentei ac reptiles, in cœsia scuti pagina, sunt* ESTANGEORVM *in Gallia*; il adiouste immediatement, *totidem erecti argenteique, in eiusdem coloris valuulo, sunt Romæ* MANCINORVM. Neantmoins Gauges de Gozze au liure qu'il a fait pour la noblesse & antiquité des Armes qui parlent, dit que ce sont deux Brochets, *Luci Romani hora detti Mancini, portano due lucci*. A quoy s'accordent aussi les peintures & sculptures tres anciennes desdites Armes que l'on void en plusieurs lieux de Rome comme, aussi la tradition de tous ceux de ladite famille: & pour moy i'estime que du temps que les familles commencerent de prendre ces Armes particulieres, qui les distinguent les vnes des autres, les *Mancini* firent election de ces deux Brochets, à l'imitation des *Colonnes*, & des *Vrsini*, qui portent de leur nom, pour faire allusion à ce nom de *Lucius*, lequel estoit si commun dans leur Maison, que du temps qu'on n'exprimoit gueres les surnoms, ils estoient plustost appellez *Luci*, que *Mancini* de leur surnom: car de croire comme fait Gauges de Gozze, que la famille des *Luci* & des *Mancini* ayent esté autresfois separée, c'est dequoy il n'y a ny preuues ny apparence. Voila doncque pour ce qui est de la premiere obiection. Venons maintenant à la seconde, que tu fondois sur la difficulté qu'auront les *Mancini* à nous donner des preuues si anciennes de leur noblesse, que ie t'ay dit qu'ils pouuoient faire. An quoy puis qu'il te faut aussi respondre, ie te prie, *Sainct-Ange*, de considerer, que si ie puis establir la noblesse des *Mancini* par des preuues authentiques de quatre cens ans, sans auoir iamais feuilleté leurs pancartes, estudié leurs titres, receu des memoires, ny mesme pratiqué familierement auec aucun de leur famille, qui m'en ait peu informer: mais seulement pour auoir pris la peine de chercher ce que mes liures ou ceux de mes amis en disent: à plus forte raison quand eux-mesmes y voudront mettre la main, ou qu'ils voudront implorer le secours de tant de personnes, qui sont autant versez en ces matieres à Rome, qu'en quelque autre lieu que ce puisse estre, à plus forte raison dis-ie pourront-ils porter leurs memoires plus loin de quatre ou cinq cens ans que ie n'ay pû faire à la haste, & dans l'empressement où nous auons esté depuis trois mois. Maintenant pour ce qui est des exemples d'autres familles particulieres, qui ayent pris leur origine d'aussi loin que celle des *Mancini*, ie t'en pourrois quasi donner autant qu'il y a d'Histoires de familles imprimées, veu qu'il y en a fort peu qui ne disent aussi hardiment qu'Vlysse & Aiax dans Ouide (13 Metam.), / ---*nostri quoque sanguinis auctor.* / *Iuppiter est, totidemque gradus distamus ab illo:* / *Nam mihi Laërtes pater est, Arcesius illi,* / *Juppiter huic, neque in his quisquam damnatus & exul.* / Aussi peut-on voir par ce que dit Francesco de Pietri en son Histoire de Naples, *delle famiglia Napoletane d'origine Romana*, que cette descendance n'est pas si extrauagante, ny si extraordinaire, que l'on se pourra peut-estre imaginer. Mais pour ne parler que de celles qui sont de ma cognoissance & qui me semblent auoir le plus solidement prouué leurs origines, Vincenzo Carrari *nell historia dei Rossi Parmegiani* imprimée à Rauenne 1583. fait descendre lesdits *Rossi*, de ces anciens *Roscij* de la ville de Rome, & employe à cet effet toutes les inscriptions, & tous les passages des Historiens, esquels il est fait mention *Gentis Rosciæ,* iusques mesmes à ne pas oublier ce ieune *Roscius*, sur lequel Quintus Lutatius Catulus fit ces beaux vers admirez de tout le monde, & raportez par Ciceron en son premier liure de la nature des Dieux, / *Constiteram, exorientem Auroram forte salutans,* / *Cum subito a leua Roscius exoritur,* / *Pace mihi liceat cælestes dicere vestra,* / *Mortalis visus, pulchrior esse Deo.* / Ainsi la famille *Zeno* qui est vne des plus considerables de Venise, remonte pour trouuer son origine, iusques à la race où *Gens Fannia*, laquelle s'estant diuisée en diuerses familles des *Herulei, Straboni, Minturnesi, Sertoriani, Cepioni, Trasea, Zenoni*, le Comte Iacques Zabarelle au liure qu'il a fait de ladite famille des *Zeno Venitiens*, employe librement tous ces *Zenoni* de Rome, pour iustifier qu'ils ont esté les Ancestres des *Zeno* de Venise. Quoy plus *gli Gennari* de Naples, n'ont-ils pas monstré dans le liure que il Signor Felice Gennaro a dressé de leur famille, qu'elle vient absolument de cette Ancienne Consulaire *Ianuaria*, & que les *M. A. Ianuarius, Vulpia Ianuarius, Scantia Ianuaria,*

Iulia Ianuaria, L. Filenus Ianuarius, Q. Annius, Coelius, Antonius Vibbius, & Aurelius Ianuarij, doiuent tous estre censez pour les premiers chefs, & autheurs de cette maison. Or de vouloir, *Sainct-Ange*, que toutes ces familles soient exemptes de cet *hiatus*, de ce grand espace remply de vuide, qui te choque si fort en celle des *Mancini*, c'est proprement, au iugement de Sansouin & des mieux versez en cette matiere, demander l'impossible, à cause des guerres ciuiles, des inondations Gothiques, & de l'estrange Barbarie, lesquelles sur le declin de l'Empire ont bouluersé toute l'Europe. Et en effect Vincenzo Carrari ne fait point scrupule d'attacher ces anciens *Rossi* auec les modernes, nonobstant le sault qu'il luy faut faire depuis l'an CC. auparauant la Natiuité de Iesus-Christ, que la Ville de Parme deuint Coloni du Peuple Romain, & que les *Roscij* commencerent, comme il est à croire, à s'y habituer, iusques à l'an 1030. aprés ladite Natiuité, que les Histoires commencent à parler d'vn certain Rolando *Rossi dal quale descende poi continuamente, la serie de gli huomini di quella famiglia*; imagine-toy doncque que la pluspart des familles anciennes, n'ont pû éviter de semblables accidents, puis qu'ils prouenoient tous de semblables causes. Aprés quoy si tu continuës de sindiquer la Genealogie des *Mancini*, ie la defendray auec les mesmes armes que le sieur Felice Gennaro a faict la sienne; *Pero sento gia opponere da curiosi, & Fiscali, come si proua, che questa famiglia venga da quelli che sono nominati, in cosi antiche inscrittioni: Alli quali non si puo rispondere altro, sol che vadino essi ricercando in che parte del mondo, ò d'Italia, siano altri Gennari de la nobilita, & antichita di questi, di chi hoggi scriuiamo, che ritrouandosi, potrà dubitarsi, si quelli, o questi hanno ritenuto come ritengono la successione della famiglia, e cognomi delli sudetti March' Antonij, Cœlij, Critonij, Añii Vibij, Aurelij, Flauij, & altri marmi antichi sudetti, dei quali pure se ne veggono molti, che fin hoggi, si conseruano da centinara danni in Napoli, nelle case, e poderi di questi Genari della presente eta; con hauere anco continuati I nomi nella loro famiglia, segno manifesto della descendenza & perpetuatione di detto cognome in detta famiglia.* Or si ces *Gennari* des Naples, *Zeno* de Venise, *Rossi* de Parme, déduisent tous l'origine de leurs familles des *Ianuarij, Zenoni,* & *Roscij* de Rome, nonobstant la diuersité des lieux, & la difference mesme des noms, quoy que fort peu remarquables, pourquoy ne voudra-t'on pas que les *Mancini*, qui n'ont aucune de ces deux difficultez, puis qu'ils ont tousiours demeuré dans Rome, & qu'ils ons retenu lettre pour lettre, le mesme surnom, & quelqu'vns encore des noms, & desquels aussi le *Hiatus* sera dans quelque temps beaucoup plus petit, & moins considerable, que de ces trois precedentes; pourquoy dis-ie, ne voudra-t'on pas qu'ils soient descendus de ces *Mancini, / Olim qui magnis legionibus imperitarunt*, (Horat. lib.1 Satyr. 6) / & qui ont esté honorez des plus belles charges de la Republique Romaine: y auroit-il de la iustice, à croire comme nou auons fait iusques à cette heure, que cette illustre famille des *Borromées*, soit venuë des anciens *Vitelli*, par le moyen de certains *Vitalliani*, lesquels estans passez de Rome en Allemagne, furent appellez par sobriquet *Buon-Romani*, d'où en suite l'on fit le nom de *Bon-romeo*, & finalement celuy de *Borromeo*, & à ne vouloir pas se persuader, que les *Mancini* d'auiourd'huy accompagnez de toutes les raisons ia déduites, puissent remonter iusques aux anciens, par vn chemin bien plus facile, & moins raboteux, que celuy au moyen duquel les *Borromei* sont descendus des *Vitelli* de l'ancienne Rome. A te dire vray *Sainct-Ange,* comme il m'est-il tres-difficile de ne point voir ce qui est, & de ne point appuyer ce qui me semble raisonnable, / *Nam neque decipitur ratio, nec decipit vnquam.* (Manil. lib.2) / Tu sçais que i'ay cy-deuant loüé le *Cardinal,* de ce qu'il auoit rebuté quelques flateurs, qui luy vouloient persuader que les *Mazarins* venoient de certains Consuls Romains *Geganij Macerini*, parce que ny ce nom de *Macerini*, que quelques autheurs leur donnent, ny celuy de *Macrini*, comme les appelle Tite Liue, n'auoient nulle conformité auec le sien, & ainsi que le lieu & toutes les autres circonstances en estoient totalement esloignées; Mais il me semble maintenant, que le mesme negligeroit ses propres interests, s'il ne faisoit trauailler à Rome, pour mettre au net les titres & les raisons de la plus belle noblesse, qu'homme du monde puisse auoir. / S. Ie ne m'estonne plus de ce que le *Cardinal* faict venir icy tant de statuës, & de ce qu'il recherche si curieusement tous ces Marmouzets, tous ces vieux Magots de l'antiquité, qui ne sont plus bons qu'à faire de la chaux, à reparer des breches, ou à casser des noix, & broyer de la moustarde, puis que c'est vn bon moyen de nous faire voir les parens de ses *Niepces*, qui autrement seroient inuisibles. / M. Tout ce que tu viens de dire monstre bien que tu es plus lourd, & plus stupide, que ces belles statuës, dont tu as si mal parlé, que tu deurois en lauer ta bouche, / *Nullo quippe alio vincis discrimine, quam quod, / Illis marmoreum caput est, tua viuit imago.* / Toutes ces statuës que le *Cardinal* a fait venir de Rome, sont maintenant les merueilles de la France, mais comme il faut auoir le goust des bonnes choses pour les cognoistre, aussi n'est-ce pas ton faict, d'admirer ces belles reliques de l'antiquité. Pour moy qui ay obserué à Rome que le *Laocoon* de Beluedere, l'*Hercules* & le *Taureau* de Farnese, le *M. Aurele* du Capitole,

y attirent plus d'Estrangers, que les Pardons de nostre S Pere. / S. (Excepte au moins l'année auec du grand Iubilé.) / M. & qui ay veu aussi auec quel soin, on y recueille tous les moindres fragmens de ces pierres precieuses, tous ces / *Curios iam dimidios, humerosque minorem* / *Coruinum, & Galbam auriculis nasoque carentem,* / ie n'entre iamais dans cette superbe Gallerie des statuës, que ie n'estime l'opinion du Poëte Marulus tres-veritable, qui *affirmabat multo fortunationem eum sibi videri lapidem, ex quo sit Apollo Quirinalis factus, quam hi qui in fragmentorum aut cementorum genere versari soleant:* que ie n'admire aussi les soins, la peine, & la Fortune, si tu veux, qu'a eu le *Cardinal*, à trouuer tant de belles pieces ou totalement saines & entieres, ou si bien restaurées, refaites & restablies, qu'à moins d'estre bon antiquaire, on ne les sçauroit connoistre. Au reste quoy que ces parens-là des Niepces du *Cardinal*, soient tres-honnorables, & que la statuë du Consul *Mancini* soit peut-estre dans ladite Gallerie, si tu veux neantmoins connoistre quelques autres de leurs alliances plus modernes, ie te nommeray le Pape qui siege auiourd'huy, sous le nom d'*Innocent X*. puis qu'il aduouë publiquement que la famille des *Panfili* est alliée de celle des *Mancini*, & qu'en cette qualité il a mis leurs Armes dans son nouueau Palais de la Place Nauone, & ne fait mesme aucune action, où soit par necessité, ou par bien-séance, on doiue appeller les parens, que la *Signoria Olympia,* toute grande Dame qu'elle soit, ne prenne la peine d'aller chez les *Mancini,* pour leur en communiquer. Ie pourois aussi nommer les *Scotti,* les *Capocci*, les *Capranica,* les *Frangipani*, & comme il me semble, les *Colonnes,* toutes familles principales de Rome, & auec lesquelles i'ay tousiours ouy dire que les *Mancini* auoient coustume d'aparenter: mais crainte que l'appellatif ne te fasse oublier le principal; ioint aussi que peut-estre n'es-tu pas si satisfait de la liaison, & connexité que i'ay voulu establir entre les *Mancini* anciens & modernes, que tu n'attende auec impatience les preuues asseurées, comme il y a plus de quatre cens ans, que l'on a mis ceux-cy entre les principaux Seigneurs de la ville de Rome, ie te les veux maintenant donner, afin au moins que tu puisse voir, comme les *Mancini* sont esgaux en cela à la pluspart des meilleures maisons d'Italie, qui auroient bien de la peine à tirer leur noblesse de plus haut. / S. Tu ne pouuois pas à moins d'estre vn excellent Magicien, / *Et cum Striabus semper vixisse Deabus,* / mieux deuiner ce qui estoit de mon intention, car ie defere si peu a cette noblesse de marbre, & surannée *des Mancini*, que i'aime bien mieux voir de quelles preuues tu pretens te seruir pour establir la moderne. / M. Tu en feras ce qui te plaira, puis que le croire est vne action libre, & à laquelle personne ne peut ny ne doit estre forcé. Pour moy, encore que ie sois persuadé, que les *Mancini* ne sont pas moins aduantagez de ce costé-là, que beaucoup d'autres familles, ausquelles on ne conteste point cette antiquité, parce qu'elles sont moins enuiées, que toute sorte d'establissement est difficile, & que le peuple ordinairement / --- *nisi quæ terris semota, suisque* / *Temporibus, defuncta videt, fastidit & odit.* / Ie suis tres-content que chacun demeure en son opinion, & puis que les preuues d'vne noblesse de quatre cens ans sont aussi bonnes que si elles estoient de quatre mille, pour refuter les sottises enragées du *Cheualier Georges*, ce me sera assez de produire ces premieres. / S. Venons doncque au fait ie te prie, car il nous reste encore vne longue carriere, & *& vastum maris æquor arandum*. / M. Le Iurisconsulte Napolitain Francesco de Pietri, de l'authorité du quel ie me suis desia seruy, rapporte tant au liure *della Famiglia di Gennaro*, en la lettre qu'il escrit à Felice de Gennaro, qu'en son Histoire de Naples imprimée l'an 1634. liure 2 (p.134) en traitant *de la sopra detta Famiglia Gennara*, que certains Gentilshommes de cette famille-là passerent de Rome à Naples, en compagnée de quelques autres des principales noblesses de Rome, desquels puis qu'il nous importe de bien specifier les noms, i'aime mieux te donner le propre texte de cet autheur, que la version que l'on en pourroit faire, *Che la casa Ianuaria Romana viuesse in questi tempi, e peruenisse in Napoli con altre famiglie Romane. Veggonsi sotto il Regno dell Imperatore Federico Ré di Napoli negli anni 1239. Luca & Andrea di Gennero Romani, trattar negotij in questa Citta, insieme con Frangipani, Cenci, Muti,* MANCINI*, Leoni, Pierleoni, Conti, & altri nobil Romani.* Et dautant qu'on pourroit luy demander le garand de cette proposition, il cite en marge, *L'archiuio dell Zecca, nell vnico libro dell Jmperadore Federigo folio 13. & oltre.* comme vn lieu, & vn instrument public, où l'on peut auoir recours en cas de besoin, & par consequent tu peux voir, *Sainct Ange*, qu'il y a quatre cens ans & plus que les *Mancini* sont qualifiez par actes publics Gentils-hommes Romains, *nobili Romani*, & mis au nombre des meilleures, & des plus nobles familles qui ayent esté, ou soient encore dans la ville de Rome. Et tu peux encore inferer de ce beau tesmoignage de la noblesse des *Mancini,* que ceux don't il est parlé en iceluy n'estans pas sortis de terre en vne seule nuict, comme autant de potirons: il falloit necessairement que beaucoup d'autres les eussent precedez, & qu'ainsi l'antiqiuté de cette famille est extremement remarquable. / S. Si ce passage-là est vray & bien allegué, on ne peut pas nier qu'il ne soit tres-aduantageux pour les

Mancini, & que la consequence que tu en tire ne soit tres veritable. / M. Ces liures-là de la famille *des Gennaro*, & de l'Histoire de *Napoli*, ne sont pas si rares que la *Sicilia del Paruta, l'Antonius Augustinus de nominibus propriis Pandectarum,* le *Calculator*, le *Pomponace,* la *Philosophie d'Auicenne,* le *Postel de orbis terræ concordia,* la *Sagesse de Charon de 1601.* ou *la Bible de Sixte:* il n'y a gueres de bonne Bibliotheque en cette ville, où on ne les puisse trouuer, & si le *Cheualier Georges* en veut passer son enuie, il le pourra faire chez Monsieur le Chancelier, chez Monsieur le President de Mesmes, aux Minimes, à S. Germain, & en tout cas chez le Cardinal *Mazarin*, où elles sont asseurément, pourueu neantmoins qu'il change vne autre fois de nom, car d'y vouloir entrer sous celuy du *Cheualier Georges*, il ne seroit pas seant à *Naudé* de luy permettre. / S. Si nous auions assez de temps tu me ferois vn plaisir signalé de nommer les autres liures que tu estimes les plus rares, mais il faut remettre cette matiere à quelque autre desieuner que nous ferons ensemble. / M. Si cette cognoissance te pouuoit profiter, i'aurois bien-tost satisfait à ce que tu desires, mais apprens de moy, *Sainct Ange,* que iamais Libraire ne s'est enrichy qu'à vendre des liures communs, parce qu'en effet ils sont les meilleurs, & comme tels on les r'imprime si souuent qu'il n'ont garde de deuenir rares; Ce n'est pas toutesfois que dans le grand nombre des liures qui sont imprimez, il n'y en ait quelqu'vns qui ne sont pas moins bons que rares, mais la pluspart neantmoins de ceux qui se vendent le plus cher, ne sont pas de cette qualité là. / S. Ie te remercie de cét aduis duquel ie me seruiray en temps & lieu, mais pour retourner à nos *Mancini* quels memoires en as-tu trouuez depuis ce temps-là. / M. Si i'auois les papier qui sont à Rome chez lesdits *Mancini* ie te donnerois leur Genealogie si bien aiustée qu'il n'y auroit rien à redire, mais puis que cela n'est pas, il se faut contenter de ce que mes liures m'en fourniront quasi à bastons rompus. Et en effect Georgius Fabricius *in sua Roma* (p. 245), & Laurentius Schraderus *in monumentis Italiæ* (p.148), rapportent tous deux separément l'vn de l'autre, l'Epitaphe d'vn *Lucius Mancinus,* qu'ils asseurent auoir copiée en l'Eglise *de Santa Maria in ara Cæli;* quoy qu'ils ayent oublié de dire ce que i'ay appris dans Rome par vne tradition fort commune en ce païs-là, sçavoir que la premiere, & la plus ancienne Chapelle de cette Eglise, est de la fondation des *Mancini*, & qu'au mesme lieu, il y en a aussi vne de la fondation des *Bufalini*, en laquelle le tableau de l'autel, est de la main de ce fameux peintre *Pietro Perugino*, qui viuoit il y a plus de cent cinquante ans: mais quoy qu'il en soit l'Epitaphe rapporté par ces deux autheurs est tres-considerable, puis qu'il est de l'an 1447. / L. MANCINI. / *Lucia stirps claris olim* [...]'

p. 86 alt.: 'Ces mesmes autheurs en rapportant les Epitaphes copiées par eux dans l'Eglise *de gli Apostoli*, ou de *Sant Apostolo* en place Colonne, n'ont pas oublié celle d'vn autre *Lucius Mancinus* qui mourut en 1514. & que ie te rapporteray aussi fidelement comme la precedente.' **becomes** (p. 121) 'Ces mesmes autheurs rapportent encore entre les inscriptions funebres copiées par eux dans l'Eglise *de gli Apostoli*, ou de *Sant Apostolo* en place Colonne, celle d'vn autre *Lucius Mancinus* qui mourut en 1514. & que ie te reciteray aussi fidellement comme la precedente.'

p. 86 alt.: 'L'on veoit encore ce nom de *Lucius* auoir esté conserué dans la famille des *Mancini*, iusques à l'an 1536. par l'Epitaphe d'vn *Iulianus Lucius Mancinus*, que les susdits autheurs ont obserué en l'Eglise *d'Ara Cæli*, quoy que Schraderus l'ait vn peu plus fidelement copié que Fabrice, qui s'est arresté aux quatre vers Latins, encore qu'ils soient bien moins considerables que la Prose.' **becomes** (p. 121) 'Aprés quoy il faut retourner à *l'Ara Cæli* pour y voir l'Epitaphe d'vn *Iulianus Lucius Mancinus* d'enuiron l'an 1536. que les susdits autheurs ont pareillement inseré dans leurs liures, quoy que Schraderus l'ait vn peu plus fidellement copiée que Fabrice, qui s'est arresté aux quatre vers Latins, encore qu'ils soient bien moins considerables que la Prose.'

p. 88 add.: '[...] car il n'y a difference de l'vne à l'autre [...]' **becomes** (p. 123) '[...] car il n'y a nulle difference de l'vne à l'autre [...]'

p. 88 add.: '[...] Capranica, & du Cardinal de ce nom là, où au contraire celle de *Cadranica* m'est entierement incognuë [...]' **becomes** (p. 123) '[...] *Capranica*, & du Cardinal de ce nom là, auec laquele i'ay tousiours ouy dire, que celle des *Mancini* s'estoit alliée plusieurs fois; où au contraire celle de *Cadranica* m'est entierement icognuë [...]'

p. 88 alt. + add.: '[...] *Capranica*, aura apparenté auec celle des *Mancini*. / S. Tu deurois aussi adiouster des *Luci*, puis que ces trois Epitaphes les font tousiours marcher de compagnie. / M. Ie croy pour moy, que les *Mancini* n'auoient ce nom, que comme donataires de quelque homme riche

de cette famille *dei Luci*, à la charge qu'ils en porteroient le nom & les armes, lesquelles en effect ils conseruent encores à present; mais pour le nom ils en font comme bon leur semble, & i'ay mesme des tesmoignages tres-asseurez comme long-temps auparauant les dattes de ces deux dernieres Epitaphes, il y auoit des *Mancini* qui marchoient seuls, & qui reseruoient ce surnom de *Luci*, pour des Contracts & Epitaphes. Tel estoit vn *Dominicus Mancinus*, qui viuoit à Paris l'an 1488. où il fit imprimer deux Poëmes Latins de sa façon, l'vn *de Passione Domini*, & l'autre *de quattuor virtutibus*, qui fut si fauorablement receu de tout le monde, qu'on l'a r'imprimé depuis ce temps-là [...]' **becomes** (pp. 123-125) '[...] *Capranica*, aura apparenté auec celle des *Mancini*. / S. Il est vray que ces trois Epitaphes là ne sont pas à negliger, puis qu'il y a bien de l'apparence que les dates au moins en sont certaines. / M. Aussi est-ce tout le fruict que l'on doit esperer de semblables inscriptions, car lors qu'elles sont farcies de si grand nombre de titres, on n'y adiouste point de foy, & l'on a recours au prouerbe, Menteur comme vne Epitaphe. C'est pourquoy ceux-là font mieux, qui reseruent toutes ces loüanges pour les Oraisons Funebres, pro *Epicediis*, pro *Næniis*, & autres compositions semblables. / S. Oblige-moy doncque de me dire la difference qu'il y a *inter Epicedium, Nænias, & Epitaphium,* puis qu'il semble que tu y en veüilles mettre. / M. Elle y estoit auparauant que toy & moy fussions nez, tesmoing ce passage du Prince des lettrez Iules Scaliger, qui dit en sa poëtique, ouurage à mon aduis le plus accomply que ait paru depuis deux cens ans. *Quæ ad rogum dicerentur erant Næniæ, quæ ad tumulum Epitaphia; quæ in exequiis, quum iusta persoluerentur, Epicedia.* / S. Cela va bien, mais comme beaucoup de personnes, ne sont pas de la qualité pour auoir de ces Epitaphes ou *Epicedia* aprés leur mort, comment feront-ils sçauoir, ce qu'ils ont fait de leur viuant, si ce n'est par le moyen des Epitaphes. / M. Ie te respondray en vn mot, qu'il importe fort peu de le sçauoir. / S. Et moy i'appliqueray ce que tu viens de dire aux *Mancini*, puis que tu ne me monstres point d'oraisons funebres qui ayent esté faites à leur mort. / M. Encore que ie ne les aye pas veuës, ce n'est pas à dire qu'il n'y en ait point. C'est pourquoy ie m'en rapporte aux productions que les *Mancini* eux-mesmes en pourront faire; attendant quoy ie me seruiray de mes petites remarques, pour te monstrer que leur Maison n'a pas esté incognuë à beaucoup d'Historiens, ny destituée de personnes illustres ou d'autres choses remarquables. Et en effect ie trouue qu'vn *Dominicus Mancinus* (duquel certain curieux de Rome nommé Ferrante Caroli m'a souuent monstré le portrait) viuoit à Paris l'an 1488. où il fit imprimer deux Poëmes Latins de sa façon, l'vn *de Passione Domini*, & l'autre *de quatuor virtutibus*, qui fut si fauorablement receu de tout le monde, qu'on l'a r'imprimé depuis ce temps là [...]'

p. 91 add.: '[...] aussi celebre & en pareil estat qu'elle estoit il y a plus de six vingts ans passez, suiuant les memoires que nous auons produits, il ne faut que veoir de quelle façon en parle Pompilio Totti, [...]' **becomes** (p. 127) '[...] aussi celebre & en pareil estat qu'elle estoit non seulement il y a plus de cent quarante ans passez, suiuant les memoires que nous en auons produits, mais du temps mesme de Martin V. qui siegeoit en 1418. comme les Armes dudit Pape, que les *Mancini*, à cause, comme ie croy, de l'alliance qu'ils auoient en ce temps-là auec *la Casa Colonna*, firent entailler au lieu le plus eminent de ladite maison, le tesmoignent assez. Pour dis-ie connoistre que cette maison est encore aussi celebre qu'elle estoit en ce temps-là, il ne faut que voir de quelle façon en parle Pompilio Totti, [...]'

p. 98 om. + alt.: '[...] Quartiers de la ville de Rome, laquelle charge n'est pas si peu considerable, qu'outre plusieurs profits & distributions particulieres de cire, gands, espices, vin, & confitures, elle ne tire tous les ans de la Chambre Apostolique [...]' **becomes** (p. 134) '[...] Quartiers de la ville de Rome, laquelle charge n'est pas si peu considerable, qu'elle ne soit exercée bien souuent par la principale Noblesse de Rome, qu'elle ne tire tous les ans de la Chambre Apostolique [...]'

p. 99 add.: '[...] Antonius Mizaldus, lesquelles il y a long-temps qu'il a dessein de recueillir ensemble, & d'en faire vn volume *in folio* / PAVLVS MANCINVS [...]' **becomes** (p. 135) '[...] *Antonius Mizaldus*, lesquelles il y a long-temps qu'il a dessein de recueillir emsemble, & d'en faire vn volume *in folio*: encore que ce ne soit pas mon aduis, parce que ce Mizaldus estoit vn homme / *Quælibet a quouis mendacia credere promptus* / PAVLVS MANCINVS [...]'

p. 100 add.: '[...] *in matrimonio habentem prospexisset*. / S. Ie voudrois que [...]' **becomes** (pp. 137-138) '[...] *in matrimonio habentem prospexisset*. / Voila doncque, *Saint-Ange*, quel estoit le sieur *Paulo Mancini*, grand-Pere de ces trois petites harengeres, & afin que tu sçaches aussi quelle estoit cette *Victoria Capotia* leur grand'mere, ie te diray, quoy que son nom la fasse assez cognoistre,

qu'elle estoit d'vne des plus nobles familles de Rome, & de l'antiquité de laquelle, si quelqu'vn estoit si ignorant que d'en douter, il ne faudroit que le renuoyer au cinquiesme liure de l'Histoire de Guicciardin, où il verra, aussi bien que dans Paul Ioue, liure second de la vie de Gonsalue de Cordoüa, surnommé le grand Capitaine, qu'entre les treize Caualiers Italiens qu combatirent si glorieusement pour l'honneur de leur nation contre autant de François pendant les guerres de Naples de l'an 1503. ceux qui furent porter le démenty à Monsieur de la *Motte* de ce qu'il auoit dit publiquement contre l'honneur des Italiens, & qui combatirent valeureusement auec les vnze autres, estoient vn *Jean Brachalonio*, & vn *Iean Capocci, duos Ianos*, dit Ioue en parlant de Prosper Colonne. *Romani sanguinis equites Brachalonium atque* Capocciam, *sciscitatum misit, an vera essent, quæ à* Motta *in conuiuio prolata dicerentur,* &c. En suite dequoy l'on peut prouuer par les escritures mesmes des procés que le sieur *Paulo Mancini* a intentez & gaignez effectiuement contre certaines personnes, qui en adioustant ou ostant quelques lettres à leur nom, le vouloient renre semblable à celuy des *Capocci*, & s'inserer par ce moyen là en leur famille, combien ledit sieur *Mancini* estoit curieux de se conseruer le caractere d'vne vraye noblesse, qui consiste à ne point forligner, ou comme nous disons en France de Gentilhomme, *quasi gentilis homo a gentilibus seu gentilitiis stemmatis* (ad Senec. 3. de benef. cap. 28), puis que stemmata suiuant l'explication de Lipse, *erant minores & rotundæ imagines quæ ad latera (maioris) adsitæ genus illius maternum, aut propinquum notabant.* / S. Ie voudrois que [...]'

p. 104 add.: '[...] D'où Scipion de Gramond qui estoit present à cette ceremonie, prit occasion de composer ces vers, [...]' **becomes** (p. 142) '[...] D'où *Scipion de Grammond*, qui estoit present à cette ceremonie, & qui mourut quelque temps aprés à Venise, prit occasion de composer ces vers, [...]'

p. 105 alt.+ add.: '[...] & outre ce elle peut encore se vanter, d'auoir eu pour directeurs les trois plus estimez subiects d'Italie, [...]' **becomes** (p. 143) '[...] & de plus elle peut encore se vanter, d'auoir eu pour promoteur vn *Gaspard Siluianus*, lequel outre ce qu'il estoit fils de cet Hippolite, qui nous a donné ce beau & docte liure de l'Histoire des Poissons, auec les figures si bien faites, & le discours si elegant, que *Gabriel Phaernus* eut bonne raison de l'honorer de ce distique, / *Picturam spectes, non sane scripta requiras, / Scripta legas, pictis nil opus esse putes.* / Outre dis-ie cet aduantage, il auoit encore celuy d'estre aimé & estimé de tous les honnestes gens qui estoient à Rome, tesmoin ce qu'en a dit *Ianus Niceus* en son eloge, *Neque alterius cuiusquam opera usus est Paulus Mancinus, ad Academiam* Humoristarum *congregandam, nisi illius, nam quo erat apud omnes eruditos viros amore & gratia, non fuit illi magnopere elaborandum, quo vnumquemque illorum, in eum cœtum attraheret.* Et c'est aussi à cause de ce grand nombre d'amis qu'il auoit, que *Alessandro Tassoni*, lors qu'il introduit dans cet excelent Poëme Burlesque *de la Sechia rapita*, qui fut imprimé à Paris en 1622. vn certain Cauaillier *Titta*, qui vouloit faire sçauoir à toute la ville de Rome, l'aduantage qu'il auoit remporté *sopra il Comte di Culagna*, en vn combat de seul à seul, il dit que le Courrier en fut soudain expedié à *Gasparo Saluiani*: / *Spedi il Corriero a Gaspar Saluiani / Decan de l'Academia de Mancini, / Che ne desse l'auiso a i Frangipani / Signor de Nemi, e a due fratelli Vrsini, / E a diuersi altri Caualiere Romani, / Conti, Crescenti, Muti, e Cesarini, / E ne scrisse anco a Monsignor Falconio, / E a lo Strozzi, e al Prior di Sant' Antonio.* / Mais si l'autheur & le Promoteur de cette Academie, ont esté signalez, les trois Directeurs qu'elle a eu en diuers temps, n'ont pasa esté moins remarquables: & ie puis dire auec verité qu'ils ont esté les trois plus estimez suiets d'Italie, [...]'

p. 107 add.: 'Cette mesme Academie honora encore le sieur *Girolamo Aleandri*, à cause de son excellent merite, [...]' **becomes** (p. 146) 'Cette mesme Academie honora encore de mon temps Monsignor *Augustino Mascardi* Camerier d'honneur du Pape Vrbain VIII. & celuy *a ponto* duquel ie t'ay parlé cy-dessus, d'vne Oraison funebre, comme elle auoit fait peu d'années auparauant le sieur *Girolamo Aleandri*, à cause de son excellent merite, [...]'

p. 111 add.: '[...] les clefs de toutes ces Satyres modernes, ne seruent de rien, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 150-151) '[...] les clefs de toutes ces Satyres modernes, comme de l'*Euphormion, Alitophili Lacryma, Virtus vindicata, Laruina, Cras credo hodie nihil, Sardi venales, Respublica Solipsorum*, & autres semblables, ne seruent de rien, [...]'

p. 113 add.: '[...] comme par exemple de Buchanan & de Sarbisius (Sarbieuius), ie m'asseure qu'ils auoüeront eux-mesmes, [...]' **becomes** (p. 152) '[...] comme par exemple de *Buchanan* & de

Sarbieuius, & de *Nicolas de Bourbon*, ie dis le dernier & de Bar-sur-aube *Baralbulanus*, pour le distinguer de son grand oncle appelé communément *Vandoperanus*, parce qu'il estoit de Vandeuure en Champagne, ie m'asseure qu'ils auoüeront eux-mesmes, [...]'

p. 115 add.: '[...] afin de te faire iuger si le Cheualier Georges pouuoit ignorer, à qui le sieur *Pietro Mazarini* Boutonnier & Banqueroutier, comme il dit plustost par malice que par ignorance, auoit marié ses filles.' **becomes** (p. 155) '[...] afin de te faire iuger si le *Cheualier Georges* pouuoit ignorer, à qui le sieur *Pietro Mazarini* Boutonnier & Banqueroutier, comme il dit par vne pure malice & non par ignorance ou mauuaise intention, auoit marié ses filles.'

p. 118 add.: '[...] Bonnet fit en des Anagrammes de trois paroles sur le Cardinal Mazarin, [...]' **becomes** (p. 157) '[...] *Bonnet* fit en des Anagrammes de trois paroles, dont l'vne estoit Latine, l'autre Grecque & la troisiesme Hebraïque, sur le Cardinal *Mazarin*, [...]'

p. 125 add.: '[...] imprimez à Fano l'an 1516. & vn autre qui a fait depuis peu la mesme guerre sous le titre de *Faneide* en vers Italiens, [...]' **becomes** (p. 165) '[...] imprimez à Fano l'an 1516. & vn autre qui a fait depuis peu l'histoire de la mesme guerre sous le titre de *Faneide* en vers Italiens, [...]'

p. 130 add.: '[...] que Philippe Beroalde en a meslé quelques-vnes parmy ses opuscules; & que entre les oraisons de nostre *Antonius Constantius*, [...]' **becomes** (p. 169) '[...] que Philippe *Beroalde* en a meslé quelques-vnes parmy ses opuscules, comme fit aussi peu de temps aprés *M. Antonius Majoragius*; & que entre les oraisons de nostre *Antonius Constantius*, [...]'

p. 131 alt. + add.: '[...] que nous auons desia monstré par des preuues infallibles, que celles des *Mancini* & des *Martinozzi* se peuuent à bon droict vanter de plus de deux cens ans de noblesse. / S. Pour moy, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 170-171) '[...] que nous auons desia monstré par des preuues infaillibles, que celle de *Mancini* se peut à bon droit vanter de plus de quatre cens ans de noblesse, & celle des *Martinozzi* de deux cens. Voire mesme ie pourrois adiouster que ces derniers ont eu des Cheualiers de Malte ou de Rhodes en leur Maison, il y a plus de trois cens ans, mais dautant que mes Bouquins n'en disent mot, il faut attendre que les preuues en soient venuës d'autre part, pour aduancer cette proposition-là, qui n'est pas des moins considerables pour iustifier leur noblesse. / S. Pour moy, [...]'

p. 132 alt. + add.: '[...] d'Allemagne, où l'impression fut trouuée il y a enuiron cent quatre-vingts dix ans, puis que *Iean Fust* nous donna en 1461. le *Durandus de ritibus Ecclesiæ*, & la Bible en 1462. qui sont les premiers liures imprimez, que l'on ait iamais veu en Europe, [...]' **becomes** (p. 172) '[...] d'Allemagne, où l'impression fut trouuée il y a enuiron cent quatre-vingts dix ans, puis *Iean Fust* nous donna en 1459. le *Durantus de ritibus Ecclesiæ*, le *Catholicon Ianuensis*, qui estoit le Calepin de ce temps-là en 1460. & la *Bible* en 1462. qui sont les trois premiers liures imprimez, que l'on ait iusques à cette heure veu en Europe: [...]'

p. 133 add.: '[...] par toutes les bonnes villes. / S. I'ay grand peur que la famille des *Muti* ne soit bien morfondue, car il y a long-temps que nous la faisons attendre.' **becomes** (pp. 174-179) '[...] par toutes les bonnes villes. / S. Quelles raisons pourrois-tu apporter de cette probabilité en faueur de *Iean Fust* ou *Faustus*, veu que la pluspart des autheurs donne cette inuention à *Guttembergh*, les autres à *Mentel*, quelques vns à vn certain *Laurens Ioannes*, de Harlem, & que ton *Faust* ou *Fust* en a le moins pour soy. / M. Quand le Iesuite *Scherer* voulut descouurir la fable de la Papesse *Ieanne*, il n'opposa que dix ou douze raisons à toutes les preuues & authoritez que l'on aduançoit pour l'establir, quoy qu'elles fussent presque sans nombre, & il n'en fallut qu'vne à Monsignor *Contitolo* pour renuerser les deux ou trois cens tesmoignages que l'*Olmo* & il *Frangipani* auoient produit de la retraitte que fit *Alexandre III*. à Venise pour euiter la persecution de l'Empereur Federic. Et pour moy ie pense qu'il ne faut pour mettre *Iean Fust* en possession du droit qui luy appartient d'estre inuenteur de l'Imprimerie, que produire les premiers liures qui ont esté imprimez, puis qu'ils sont tous de son impression. Car il y a bien de l'apparence que si d'autres eussent eu meilleure part que luy en l'inuention d'vne chose si belle, si admirable, & si necessaire, ils ne luy auroient pas permis de se l'attribuer à luy seul, & à son gendre *Pierre Schoifer*, comme il a fait quasi en tous les liures qui sont sortis de sa presse, sans que personne ait ozé faire de mesme, ou le contredire. Et puis que Salmuth en son addition au

chapitre de *Typographia* de Pancirole, n'apporte que quatre de ces témoignages, & que Monsieur Bernard de Malinckrot l'vn des doctes Polygraphes qui soient auiourd'huy en Allemagne, se vante à bon droit, d'y en auoir adiousté trois, ie te veux bien aduertir que i'en ay remarqué six autres, desquels ie ne diray maintenant que les dattes, puis que les inscriptions en sont trop longues, pour en auoir chargé ma memoire, & aussi que les ayant communiquées à Naudé, il m'a promis de les inserer dans son *Addition à l'Histoire de Louys XI*. lors qu'on l'a r'imprimera, & de dire qu'il les tient de moy. Or entre ces nouuelles epigraphes, la premiere est celle du *Catholicon* de l'an 1460. que le R.P. Romualde, dont tu parlois tantost, m'a monstré dans la Bibliotheque des Feüillans de cette ville, & quoy que les noms de *Faust* ny de son gendre n'y soient pas exprimez, il est constant neantmoins, que c'estoient eux qui l'auoient imprimé, reserué cela tout est semblable aux autres inscriptions rapportées par Salmuth, & Malinckrot; la seconde est de la *Bible* de 1462. dont les exemplaires se trouuent à Saincte Croix de la Bretonnerie, aux Carmes de la Place Maubert, & chez Monsieur de Harlay, & dont l'inscription a desia esté rapportée par Naudé en l'*Addition* susdite: la troisiéme est d'autres *Bibles* toutes pareilles de 1472. que l'on peut voir chez le Cardinal *Mazarin*: la quatriéme du *S. Augustin de la Cité de Dieu*, auec les Commentaires de Thomas Valois de 1473. que i'ay veu chez le sieur Claude Garasse de Pridiane: la cinquiesme du *Mercure Trismegiste de potestate & sapientia Dei*, in 4°. (car tous les autres nommez cy-dessus sont in folio) de 1503. que le mesme Garasse m'a monstré, aussi bien que la sixiéme, qui est le *Tite Liue* de 1518. auquel bien qu'il y ait quelque difference, elle est neantmoins plus aduantageuse à *Iean Fust* que toutes les precedentes inscriptions, qui le publient autheur & inuenteur de l'Impression; car ce n'est plus luy, ny son gendre, ny ses petits fils *Iean* & *Juo Scheffer* qui parlent, & en effet il n'y a sur la fin dudit *Tite Liue* que ces mots *Moguntiæ in ædibus Joannis Scheffer mense Nouembri anno M.D.XVIII*. Mais au commencement il y a vn Priuilege que l'Empereur *Maximilian* donne audit *Scheffer*, que l'on ne puisse contrefaire ledit *Tite Liue* de dix ans, ny tous les autres liures que le susdit Scheffer imprimera, de six, sous peine de confiscation, & ce en reconnoissance, que son oncle *Iean Fust* auoir trouué l'inuention d'imprimer: *Cum sicut docti & moniti sumus fide dignorum testimonio*, car ie me souuiens fort bien de ces paroles, *ingeniosum Chalcographiæ, authore auo tuo, inuentum, felicibus incrementis in vniuersum orbem promanauerit, &c*. ce Priuilege est en date de 1518. & souscrit de *Iac. Spiegel*: Aprés quoy on trouue au feüillet suiuant vne epistre d'*Erasme*, dans laquelle il parle premierement des obligations que l'on a à ceux qui ont trouué l'Imprimerie, & puis il adiouste, *quorum princeps fuisse fertur, totius aui memoria celebrandus Ioannes Faust auus eius, cui Liuium hunc &c. debemus*. Et puis que comme dit Quintilian en ses Declamations (312), *non satis videri potest probatum, quod duo sciunt*, adioustons-y pour troisiéme tesmoin vn *Nicolaus Carbachius*, dans l'aduertissement qu'il a mis sur la fin dudit liure, & dans lequel il dit toutes les mesmes choses, que le Priuilege Imperial, & la lettre d'Erasme. Aprés quoy si tu mets les six témoignages que ie te viens de rapporter, auec les sept cottez par le sieur Malinckrot, tu auras treize occasions bien remarquables, esquelles *Jean Faust* & les siens, ont publié à tout le monde, que l'Imprimerie estoit née dans leur Maison, sans que iamais Guttemberg ny autre s'y soit opposé; ce qui me fait croire, qu'ils ne faisoient en cela tort à personne, puis que suiuant le dire de ie ne sçay quel Poëte, / *Qui velit ingenio cedere rarus erit.* / & que nonobstant cela personne ne s'est plaint de leur procedé. Or si tu adioustes à ces preuues essentielles, qu'il est encore à naistre qui puisse dire auoir veu des liures imprimez par *Guttemberg*, ou par *Mantel*, auparauant ou au mesme temps que ceux de *Iean Fust*; Que tout ce que l'on dit des autres inuenteurs de l'Imprimerie, n'est fondé que sur des rapports, des coniectures, des vray-semblances, des authoritez forcées, des ialousies de villes les vnes contre les autres: Que tous ceux qui donnent cette inuention à d'autres qu'à *Fust*, s'embroüillent, se contredisent, se suiuent l'vn l'autre, font des ignorances grossieres, & le plus souuent / *Delphinum syluis appingunt Fluctibus Aprum.* (Horat. ad Pisones) / Et finalement que Salmuth en son addition sur le Chap. *de Typographia* de Pancirole, cite vn instrument public, par lequel il appert, que Fust aprés auoir trouué l'Imprimerie, & d'aprés en auoir long-temps soustenu luy seul la despence, associa auec luy *Guttemberg*, pour contribuer à vne partie de tant de frais qu'il luy falloit faire, à cause principalement du parchemin, sur lequel il tiroit la plus-part de ses liures. Aprés, dis-ie, toutes ces preuues si legales, si peu forcées, si conuaincantes, & asseurées pour *Iean Fust*, ie ne sçay pas comme il est possible qu'on le veuille *tanquam septuagenarium de ponte deiicere*, pour en mettre d'autres à sa place. Car s'ils ont recours aux tesmoins, outre qu'ils s'accordent fort mal les vns auec les autres, & que peut-estre ne sont-ils pas en si grand nombre que l'on s'imagine, ie leur diray en tout cas auec Arcadius, *Non ad multitudinem respici oportere, sed ad sinceram testimoniorum fidem*: & s'ils veulent establir leur opinion sur

l'experience, comme c'est en effet le meilleur & le plus asseuré moyen de terminer le differend dont il est question, qu'ils m'en donnent de meilleures que les miennes, que celle de Salmuth & de Malinckrot, & non seulement ie quitte la partie, *sed agello cedo Paterno*. / S. Ie croy certainement, que *modus agri tui non magnus est*, aussi bien que celuy d'*Horace*, c'est pourquoy tu fais fort bien d'vser de ce petit diminutif-là. Mais en conscience, *Mascurat*, ne songe tu point en plaidant pour la famille de ce *Iean Fust*, qui ne t'en sçaura iamais de gré, que celle des *Muti* doit estre maintenant bien morfonduë, puis qu'il y a si long-temps que nous la faisons attendre.'

p.134-135 alt.: '[...] d'vn personnage trop aymé & estimé des François, pour ne leur estre pas agreable, c'est le premier de nos sages *Michel de Montagnes*, lequel confesse ingenuement d'auoir esté fait Citoien Romain par vn *Alexandre Muti*, [...]' **becomes** (p. 180) '[...] d'vn personnage trop aymé & estimé des François, pour ne leur estre pas agreable; c'est l'vn des nos sages, / *Montanus ille, cuius augustum viget / In ore Famæ nomen*, (Baudius lib.2 Iambic.) / lequel confesse ingenuëment d'auoir esté fait Citoyen Romain par vn *Alexandre Muti*, [...]'

p. 136 om.: 'Oüy, mais diras-tu, Montagne pouuoit bien prendre ce titre, sans en rapporter comme il fait les Lettres toutes entieres; [...]' **becomes** (p. 181) 'Oüy, mais diras-tu, *Montagne* pouuoit bien prendre ce titre, sans en rapporter les Lettres toutes entieres; [...]'

p. 136 add.: '[...] il faut bien dire quelque chose pour couurir la vanité de nos deux Compatriotes, & de Montagne principalement.' **becomes** (p. 182) '[...] il faut bien dire quelque chose pour couurir la vanité de nos deux Compatriotes, & de *Montagne* principalement, *vt si / Egregio inspersos mireris corpore næuos*.'

p. 151 add.: 'Tu ne tiens rien si ie ne veux, mon enfant, car Horace a bien dit en parlant de Cerbere qui n'a que trois testes, [...]' **becomes** (p. 197) 'Tu ne tiens rien si ie ne veux, mon enfant, car le vers que tu viens de citer, quoy qu'il soit du mesme Iuuenal, doit estre entendu d'vne ville de Thebes, qui estoit *in Ægypto*, & non pas de celle qui estoit *in Bocotia*, 7 qui n'auoit effectiuement que sept portes: & puis quand cette distinction de Lubinus, qui passe neantmoins pour le meilleur Interprete de Iuuenal, ne seroit point veritable: Horace a bien dit en parlant de Cerbere qui n'a que trois testes, [...]'

p. 151 alt.: '[...] *iudicium Romæ*. Mais i'aime mieux aduoüer [...]' **becomes** (p. 197) '[...] *iudicium Romæ*. Mais en tout cas i'aimerois mieux aduoüer [...]'

p. 157 add.: '[...] tu dois au moins preualoir de celle des Libraires ou Imprimeurs que les debitent; car si *Cramoisy*, ou *Vitray*, ou *Martin*, ou *Rocolet* en impriment quelques-vns, il y a bien de l'apparence qu'ils viendront de bonne main, [...]' **becomes** (p. 203) '[...] tu dois au moins te preualoir de celle des Libraires ou Imprimeurs qui les debitent; car si *Cramoisy*, ou *Vitray*, ou *Martin*, ou *Rocolet*, ou *Petit*, ou la *vefue du Puy* en impriment quelques-vns, il y a bien de l'apparence qu'ils viendront de bonne main, [...]'

p. 157 alt. + add.: 'Voila bien debuté, puis que ces quatre Marchands-là n'en ont imprimé aucun, excepté des *Arrests*, ou quelques *Ordonnances de Police*.' **becomes** (p. 203) 'Voila bien debuté, puis que ces six Machands-là n'en ont imprimé aucun, excepté des *Arrests du Parlement*, & quelques *Declarations*, ou *Ordonnances de Police*.'

p. 158 add.: 'Cet aduis là n'est pas à negliger, crainte de faire ma neufuaine dans la boëtte aux cailloux.' **becomes** (p. 204) 'Cét aduis là n'est pas à negliger, crainte de faire ma neufuaine dans la tour de Montgommery, à la sonnette, ou dans la boëtte aux cailloux, qui sont les trois plus beaux appartemens de la Conciergerie, & du petit, & grand Chastelet.'

p. 160 om.: '[...] faire de bons liures de tous les deux costez, encore bien que contradictiores les vns aux autres.' **becomes** (p. 206) '[...] faire de bons liures de tous les deux costez, encore que contradictoires les vns aux autres.'

p. 160 add.: '[...] la rigueur du stile de semblables pieces, à cause des Eloges qu'elle donnoit à Messieurs les Princes, & Ministres; & que le Roy parloit en icelle, auec trop de soumission [...]' **becomes** (pp. 206-207) '[...] la rigueur du stile de semblables pieces, à cause de Eloges qu'elle donnoit à

son Altesse Royale, à Monsieur le Prince, & aux Ministres; & que le Roy parloit en icelle auec trop de soumission [...]'

p. 162 om.: '[...] ou à mieux dire pour bien faites, encore bien qu'elles ne contiennent rien [...]' **becomes** (p. 208) '[...] ou à mieux dire pour bien faites, encore qu'elles ne contiennent rien [...]'

p. 167 add.: '[...] puis que chacun l'auoüe, & que l'on disoit bien autrefois d'Homere, [...]' **becomes** (p. 213) '[...] puis que chacun l'auoüe, & que l'on disoit bien autrefois en preferant Virgile à Homere, [...]'

p. 167 add. + alt.: '[...] bien entendu tout ce que tu as dit iusques à ce *nescio quid maius*, il est vray que tu parles comme vn liure, & que tu dis de tres-belles choses, & si ie dors en les escoutant, c'est que mon esprit qui est aigu comme la fesse d'vne Nonain ne trouue pas où s'attacher facilement.' **becomes** (pp. 213-214) '[...] bien entendu tout ce que tu as dit iusques à ce *nescio quid maius*, pour moy ie me serois contenté de dire auec Alcimus, ou Petrone, / *Si potuit nasci quem tu sequereris, Homere*, / *Nascetur qui te possit, Homere sequi.* / Il est vray neantmoins que tu parles comme vn liure, & que tu dis de tres-belles choses, & si ie dors en les escoutant, c'est que mon esprit qui est aigu comme les tetons d'vne Nourrisse ne trouue pas où s'attacher facilement.'

p. 168 alt.: '[...] ne t'auoir point esueillé puis que tu es si sale.' **becomes** (p. 214) '[...] ne t'auoir point esueillé puis que tu es si mal embouché.'

p.168-169 add.: '[...] & ie t'auoüe de ne les auoir iamais leües chez Monsieur *Brigadier*, qui a pris vn soin particulier de recueillir cette sorte de liures, comme du *Moustier* faisoit les Romans, [...]' **becomes** (p. 215) '[...] & ie t'auoüe de n'auoir iamais leu *le mystere du vieil Testament* ioüé à Paris; celuy *de la Passion* representé moult triomphantement à Angers; *les Actes des Apostres* que l'on s'estouffoit pour voir en cette ville dans l'Hostel de Flandre l'an 1541. *la vengeance de nostre Seigneur*, *l'homme pecheur* ioüé à Tours, *l'homme iuste & mondain, la grande diablerie*, & semblables pieces que Monsieur *Brigadier* a pris vn soin particulier de recueillir, comme du *Moustier* faisoit les Romans, [...]'

p. 169 add.: 'Voila qui est bien, tu peux maintenant reuenir au stile Burlesque des Italiens.' **becomes** (p. 215) 'Voila qui est bien, si tu en auois sceu dauantage ie croy que tu ne l'aurois pas oublié, tu peux maintenant reuenir au style Burlesque des Italiens.'

p. 169 add.: '[...] & depuis encore par vn nommé *Giouan Battista Lalli*, qui a peut-estre donné suiet par son *Eneide trauestita* au petit Scaron, [...]' **becomes** (p. 216) '[...] & depuis encore par *Alessandro Tassoni*, en son tres ingenieux & tres-agreable & recreatif Poëme de *la Sechia rapita*: & par vn nommé *Giouan Battista Lalli*, qui a peut-estre donné suiet par son *Eneide trauestita* au petit Scaron, [...]'

p. 169 alt. '[...] vn Gentilhomme Vicentin qui s'appelloit *Camillo Scrofa*, duquel nous auons des Poësies Latines publiées soubs le mesme nom *del Glottoscrisio*.' **becomes** (p. 216) '[...] vn Gentilhomme Vincentin, appellé *Camillo Scrofa*, duquel nous auons des Poësies Latines sous le mesme nom *del Glottoscrisio Petro Fidentio Patauij* 1552.'

p. 170 add.: 'Et la cinquiesme se peut obseruer en diuerses compositions de langues vulgaires, corrompuës ou plustost rustiques, & populaires, de chaque ville & pays, [...]' **becomes** (p. 217) 'La cinquiéme est *la Furbesca*, de laquelle nous auons vn petit dictionaire & les compositions d'vn tal *Broccardo*, si faciles & si gentilles qu'il monstre bien d'y auoir eu du Genie, & de les auoir faites *senza crucio d'Apolline*: Et la sixiéme se peut obseruer en diuerses compositions de langues vulgaires, corrompuës ou plustost rustiques, & populaires, de chaque ville & pays, [...]'

p. 170 add.: '[...] *le Comedie del Ruzzante* escrites en Rustique Padoüan, [...]' **becomes** (p. 217) '[...] *le Comedie & orationi del Ruzzante*, comme aussi le rime di *Magagno Menon & Begotto* escrites en Rustique Padoüan, [...]'

p. 171 add.: '[...] ont pris plaisir de composer quelques choses en ce langage corrompu des artisans & paysans de chacune de leurs villes.' **becomes** (p. 218) '[...] ont pris plaisir de composer quelque choses en ce langage corrompu des artisans & paysans de chacune de leurs villes, comme ie pourrois facilement t'en donner des preuues, en faisant l'inuentaire de tous les liures que i'ay partie obseruez, & partie aussi recueillis en icelles, si le sieur *Nicolo Villani* homme de sçavoir extraordinaire ne m'auoit soulagé de cette peine, par le recueil tres-exact qu'il en a fait luy-mesme au liure *della Poesia Giocosa* qu'il nous a donné soubs le nom supposé de l'*Academico Aldeano*.'

p. 171 add.: 'M. Tu peux aussi en auoir veu en Poiteuin, en Gascon, en Breton Bretonnant, & en autres langues aussi particulieres; voire mesme ie te cõfesseray ingenuement, qu'entre les plus agreables & ingenieux liurets que l'on ait fait contre le Cardinal, l'on peut mettre auec raison *les trois parties de la Conference entre deux paysans de Sainct Oüen & de Montmorancy*; [...]' **becomes** (pp. 218-219) 'M. Tu pouuois aussi auoir veu *le Ramelet moundi de tres Floretos*, imprimé à Toulouse 1638. *lou Gentilome Gascoun per Guillem Ader* publié dans la mesme ville en 1610. & cét *Ader* si ne me trompe, est vn Medecin qui nous a donné vn liure de *Ægrotis in Euangelio*, il y a aussi la *Pastorale de Ianin* par I. Milet en vers Grenoblois 1642. les *Recoumandations d'Augé Gailliard*, Poëte de Rabastans en Albigez al Rey, &c. *La Gente Poiteuin-rie amprimi a Poeters* 1613. & depuis augmentée 1646. *la Rebantration fate au Roay pre Gabria le bon veillard sur le abus & man-uresations de beacop de geonts qui sant espampry pre tout pouys a Poeters* 1615. i'ay veu encore le *Guemen don poure Labory de Breissy su la pau che la de la garra*, en rime Bressande, par Bernardin Vchard, auec l'explication Françoise des mots Bressans, ce qui fait que ledit liuret, n'est pas moins necessaire que plaisant. Et aprés tout, l'on peut voir dans Marot l'epistre *du biau Fy de Pazy* auec la response de la Dame, où le vulgaire *Badaudage & Parisien* est fort bien representé: voire mesme ie te confesseray ingenuëment, qu'entre les plus agreables & ingenieux liurets que l'on ait fait contre le *Cardinal*, l'on peut mettre auec raison *les trois parties de la Conference entre deux paysans de Sainct Oüen & de Monmoran-rancy*; [...]'

p. 172 add.: '[...] ou d'vne façon haute & releuée, comme a fait le *Marino* dans son Poëme de l'*Adone* chez les Italiens; ou d'vne mediocre & temperée, comme a fait chez les mesmes le *Tasso* en sa *Hierusalemme liberata*; ou d'vne basse, facile, & populaire, telle qu'est celle de l'*Arioste*; & cela estant, comme le stile Burlesque n'est rien que cette derniere façon de s'expliquer reduite à sa lie, & au plus bas estage où l'on puisse le raualer, non seulement par les paroles, mais aussi par les figures, prouerbes & comparaisons ridicules, desquelles neantmoins on se sert pour expliquer quelque chose bien releuée, comme *Lalli* & *Scaron* ont fait l'Eneide, *Caporal* la vie de Mecenas, & ie ne sçay quel profane depuis trois iours *la Passion de nostre Seigneur*; il est facile de conclure en suitte, que toutes les langues ne sont pas moins capables du stile Burlesque, que les deux precendentes. [...]' **becomes** (pp. 220-221) '[...] ou d'vne façon haute & releuée, comme ont fait *Lucain*, *Stace*, *Silius Italicus*, & *il Marino* dans son Poëme de l'*Adone* chez les Latins & Italiens: ou d'vne mediocre & temperée telle qu'est celle de *Virgile*, & du *Tasso* en sa *Hierusalemme liberata*: ou d'vne basse & populaire comme est celle d'*Ouide* & de l'*Arioste*; & cela estant, comme le stile Burlesque n'est rien que cette derniere façon de s'expliquer reduite à sa lie, & au plus bas estage où l'on puisse le raualer, non seulement par les paroles, mais aussi par les figures, prouerbes & comparaisons ridicules, desquelles neantmoins on se sert pour expliquer quelque chose bien releuée, comme *Lalli* & *Scaron* on fait l'Eneide, *Caporal* la vie de Mecenas, *Francesco Negri*, *la Hierusalemme del Tasso*, & ie ne sçay quel profane depuis trois iours la *Passion de nostre Seigneur*; il est facile de conclure en suite, que toutes les langues ne sont pas moins capables du stile Burlesque, que les deux precedentes. [...]'

p. 174 om.: 'Pour moy, encore bien que ie ne sçache point tant de Latin, i'ay neantmoins leu aussi bien que toy, les Crepuscules de Plutarque, i'ay pareillement entendu parler d'Athene, comme d'vne des plus belles villes de la Grece, & pour Philelphe i'ay veu ce me semble, dans les histoires prodigieuses de Belleforest, qu'il estoit paillard comme vn moineau, parce qu'il auoit trois grosses coüilles, mais neantmoins ie n'affecte pas comme toy de tout citer, puis que cela tient vn peu trop du Barbon de Balsac.' **becomes** (p. 222) 'Pour moy, encore bien que ie ne sçache point tant de Latin, i'ay leu neantmoins aussi bien que toy, les Crepuscules de Plutarque, i'ay pareillement entendu parler d'Athene, comme d'vne des plus belles villes de la Grece, & pour Philelphe i'ay veu, ce me semble, dans les histoires prodigieuses de Belleforest, qu'il estoit

paillard comme vn moineau, mais neantmoins ie n'affecte pas comme toy de tout citer, puis que cela tient vn peu trop du *Barbon* de Balsac.'

p.174-175 alt. + om. + add.: 'De la façon que tu traittes ces Autheurs, tu feras fort bien de n'en parler que le moins qu'il te sera possible; au reste si tu auois sceu le mot Grec *τριόρχης* qui est si commun chez les Medecins, tu n'aurois pas parlé d'vne chose assez deshonneste si à découuert, & tu deuois plustost citer Cœlius Rhodiginus que Belleforest, puis qu'il est le premier qui ait esuenté cette histoire, *Francisco Philelpho*, dit-il, *tres fuisse testes proditum scio*, & dautant que la famille de ces celebres *Coleoni de Bergamo* en porte autant dans ses Armes, beaucoup veulent que ce soit pour la ressemblance que quelqu'vn de ses ancestres auoit eu auec ledit Philephe; tu as pareillement tort de me menacer du Barbon de Balsac, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 222-223) 'De la façon que tu traites ces Autheurs, tu feras fort bien de n'en parler que le moins qu'il te sera possible; au reste tu deuois plustost citer Cœlius Rhodiginus que Belleforest, puis qu'il ioint la cause auec l'effet, & qu'il est le premier à mon aduis, qui ait esuenté cette histoire, *Francisco Philelpho*, dit-il, *tres fuisse testes proditum scio*, & dautant que la famille de ces celebres *Coleoni de Bergamo* en porte autant dans ses Armes, beaucoup veulent que ce soit pour la ressemblance que quelqu'vn de ses ancestres auoient eu auec ledit Philelphe, qui estoit comme disent les Medecins en vn seul mot *τριόρχης*, ainsi que quelques autres ont esté appellée *Sedigiti*, à cause d'vn sixiesme doigt. Tu as pareillement tort de me menacer du *Barbon* de Balsac, [...]'

p. 175 alt. + add.: '[...] auoient long-temps auparauant luy, & auec beaucoup moins d'affectation exprimé le charactere du Pedantisme. Mais pour reprendre le fil de nostre discours, [...]' **becomes** (p. 223) '[...] auoient long-temps auparauant luy, fort bien exprimé le charactere du Pedantisme, duquel les Autheurs anciens disoient, *Scholasticorum natio madens pingui*: Et en effet le bon homme Hierocles faisoit passer toutes sortes de bestises les plus grossieres sous le nom de *quidam Scholasticus*, comme nous auons fait en France sous celuy de Monsieur *Gaulard*. Mais pour reprendre le fil de nostre discours, [...]'

p. 176 add.: '[...] *Morlanensis de contemptu mundi*, de tout ce que nous auons en vers rimez & *Leonins*, & peu s'en faut que ie n'adiouste des *Satyres de Philelphe*, tant elles sons basses, rampantes & mal faites, contre l'ordinaire de cet Autheur, qui a esté vne des plus brillantes lumieres de son siecle.' **becomes** (p. 224) '[...] *Morlanensis de contemptu mundi, de vita Scholastica*, *de Asino Brunello, qui optauit caudam sibi fieri longiorem*, du *Grobianus de Grobiano*, du *Facetus*, de *Parabolæ Alani*, & des autres autheurs imprimez auec ces deux-là, comme aussi de tout ce que nous auons en vers rimez, & *Leonins* des predications de *Menot*, de *Barlette*, de *Maillard*, *de vita Pilati*, *de visione Tundale*, & peu s'en faut que ie n'adiouste des *Satyres de Philelphe*, tant elles sont basses, rampantes & mal faites, contre l'ordinaire de cet Autheur, qui a esté vne des plus brillantes lumieres de son siecle.'

p.176-177 add.: '[...] le premier neantmoins a plus de cinq ou six cens ans sur la teste, & n'a pas esté mesprisé par Roger Bacon, ny par Robert Holcot, non pas mesme par ce docte Critique d'Angleterre Iean Selden, car ils le citent tous aussi bien que Lilius Giraldus & Alde Manuce, quoy que ce dernier tesmoigne bien de ne l'auoir pas veu, puis que de quatre de ses Chapitres, il en fait quatre liures ou traittez differents; il a neantmoins esté imprimé deux fois, la premiere separément & sans nom de ville, ny d'Imprimeur l'an 1534. & la seconde *inter Ouidij erotica & amatoria opuscula* publiez à Francfort l'an 1610. auec vne Preface qui n'est pas à mespriser. Et pour ce qui est de la pluspart des autres, ils ont esté leus & expliquez dans les Escholes, par vn *Guillelmus Rameseius Sagiensis*, & autres anonymes, du temps que Maistre Iean des Espaules, pour parler à ta mode, n'en auoit pas encore chassé le *Græcisimus*, ny l'*Alexander de Villa Dei*.' **becomes** (pp. 224-226) '[...] le premier neantmoins a plus de cinq ou six cens ans sur la teste, & n'a pas esté mesprisé par *Robert Holcot*, qui en rapporte plusieurs vers en son Commentaire sur la Sapience, leçon 60. de la vieille edition de Venise, & 61. de celle de Basle, où il en parle en cette sorte: *An sit liber Ouidij, Deus nouit, quamuis à Leone Protonotario Sacri Palatij Vastasij Principis, referatur liber ille extractus de sepulchro Ouidij, vnde testamentum Ouidij nuncupatur; dicit enim quod inuentus fuit in cœmiterio Publico, in quodam sepulchro, in suburbano Dioscori Ciuitatis, quæ est caput Regni Colchorum; & quia ibi non erat copia Latinorum, eo quod Armenici linguam Latinam non intelligunt, Rex Colchorum misit illum librum Constantinopolim, vbi erat copia Lationorum. Refert etiam quod inter antiquorum sepulchra, vnum inuentum est, in quo epigramma fuit scriptum litteris Armenicis, cuius inscriptio sic sonabat, Hic iacet Ouidius*

ingeniosissimus Poëtarum, obiit autem anno Christi XVIII. sicut refert Guillelmus de Euange in Chronico suo, tertio anno, vnde constat quod si veraciter liber suus erat, fuit pulcherrima prophetia de Christo. / S. Ie m'estonne que tu aye voulu prendre la peine de charger tes extraits d'vne si sotte resuerie. / M. I'aduoüë que tu as raison de la baptiser de la sorte, mais toutesfois puis que l'Autheur qui la rapporte, mourut il y a iustement cette année 300. ans; que ce grand critique d'Angleterre *Jean Selden*, aprés auoir cité ce liure *de vetula*, renuoye ses lecteurs au iugement qu'en a fait ledit *Holcot*, en la leçon 21. au lieu qu'il deuoit dire 60. ou 61. sur la Sapience: Et de plus, puis qu'vn homme curieux ne doit rien negliger, soit vray ou faux, de ce dont en le refutant ou en l'approuuant il peut faire monstre en sa polymathie, tu ne dois pas trouuer mauuais l'extrait que i'en ay fait pour seruir à la mienne: ie croy en tout cas que ce narré t'aura plus diuerty, que des lieux communs sur la iustice, la pauureté, l'auarice, ou autres titres semblables, si i'auois esté si sot que d'en faire prouision. Mais enfin outre ces tesmoignages, il me semble encore d'auoir leu ceux de Roger *Bacon*, de Lilius *Giraldus*, de Gerardus *Vossius*, & d'Alde *Manuce* sur ce mesme liure, faussement attribué à Ouide, quoy que ce dernier tesmoigne bien de ne l'auoir par veu, puis que de quatre de ses Chapitres, il en fait quatre liures ou traittez differens; il a neantmoins esté imprimé deux fois, la premiere separément & sans nom de ville, ny d'Imprimeur l'an 1534. & la seconde *inter Ouidij erotica & amatoria opuscula* publiez à Francfort l'an 1610. auec vne Preface qui n'est pas à mespriser. Et pour ce que est du *Pamphilus*, & de la pluspart des autres, ils ont esté leus & expliquez dans les Escholes, par vn certain *Guillelmus Rameseius Sagiensis*, & autres anonymes, du temps que Maistre Iean des Espaules, pour parler à ta mode, n'en auoit pas encore chassé le *Græcismus*, ny l'*Alexander de Villa Dei*.'

p. 177 add.: 'Martial se plaind qu'vn Sauetier contre lequel il fait vn Epigramme, estoit beaucoup plus riche que luy, vn autre a dit que *Sola pruinsos horret facundia pannis* / bref c'est vne coustume [...]' **becomes** (p. 227) 'Martial se plaint qu'vn Sauetier contre lequel il fait vne Epigramme, estoit beaucoup plus riche que luy, & blasme ses parens de l'auoir enuoyé au College au lieu de luy faire apprendre quelque bon mestier, / *At me litterulas stulti docuere parentes.* / vn autre a dit que / *Sola pruinsos horret facundia pannis.* / bref c'est vne coustume [...]'

p. 182 om.: '[...] cette sorte de Poësie: car encore bien que nou ayons [...]' **becomes** (p. 232) '[...] cette sorte de Poësie: car encore que nous ayons [...]'

p. 182 add.: '[...] datte posterieure à la premiere edition de la Macaronée que ledit Folengius publia soubs le nom de Merlin Coccaie; aussi luy sont-elles de beaucoup inferieures, [...]' **becomes** (p. 232) '[...] datte posterieure à la premiere edition de la *Macaronée* que ledit *Folengius* publia soubs le nom de *Merlin Coccaie* auparauant l'année 1520. aussi luy sont-elles de beaucoup inferieures, [...]'

p. 183 alt.: '[...] outre la Philosophie, de laquelle il disputa publiquement soubs le Pere *Conti* Iesuite, & auec les applaudissemens que ie t'ay desia dit; [...]' **becomes** (p. 233) '[...] outre la Philosophie, de laquelle il disputa publiquement soubs le Pere *Torquato de Cupis* Iesuite, & auec les applaudissemens que ie t'ay desia dit; [...]'

p. 184 add.: '[...] *que i'en pourrois reciter vne bonne partie par cœur.* / S. Si cela est, Mascurat, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 234-235) '[...] *que i'en pourrois reciter vne bonne partie par cœur*. Aprés quoy ie te donne à penser, s'il n'a pas de grandes inclinations pour l'estude, & si Monsieur Chapelain n'a pas eu raison de dire en parlant aux Muses dans cette belle Ode qu'il a donnée à son Eminence. / *Vous murmurez, ô saincte Bande, / De n'oüir point parmy mes sons, / Celebrer l'vn de ces grands dons, / Qui rendent sa gloire plus grande. / Cét amour vehement auec le laict succé, / Que son genereux sein nourrit pour vos mysteres, / Et vous ne croyez pas qu'il me soit inconnu, / Puis que iusques à vous, en ces lieux solitaires, / De cent lieux differens le bruit en est venu. / Non, belles Nymphes esplorées, / Les peines dont ce grand Heros / Sent, pour vous troubler son repos, / De moy ne sont pas ignorées. / Ie sçay le vifs embrasemens / Les transports amoureux, & les saincts mouuemens, / Que vos diuins concerts excitent dans son ame; / Ie sçay qu'il vous honnore, & qu'il languit pour vous, / Et que si son loisir respondoit à sa flamme, / Il feroit de vos chants son plaisir le plus doux.* / S. Si cela est, *Mascurat*, [...]'

p. 184 add.: 'M. Te voila bien changé depuis deux heures, que tu luy voulois porter la *Milliade* iusque dans sa Chambre.' **becomes** (p. 235) 'M. Il ne faut pas estre grand Philosophe pour cognoistre

que tout ce que l'on dit contre le Cardinal *conuitium est non accusatio, nullum est enim fundamentum horum criminum, nulla sedes, voces sunt contumeliosæ, temere ab irato accusatore, nullo auctore emissæ*. Mais te voila bien changé depuis deux heures, que tu luy voulois porter la *Milliade* iusques dans sa Chambre.'

p. 185 add.: '[...] que le Cardinal n'a iamais fait de bien aux hommes de lettres, & neantmoins *Balsac* & *Corneille* l'ont remercié publiquement [...]' **becomes** (p. 236) '[...] que le *Cardinal* n'a iamais fait de bien aux hommes de Lettres, & neantmoins *Balsac*, *Corneille*, & l'vnique Horace de ce temps *Madelenet*, l'ont remercié publiquement [...]'

p. 185 add.: '[...] *Qui ne m'a pas cousté seulement vn souhait.* / Mais crainte que tu ne me serues d'vn *vel duo vel* [...]' **becomes** (p. 236) '[...] *Qui ne m'a pas cousté seulement vn souhait.* / Et le dernier de ce que son Eminence employoit tous les ans sa faueur & ses recommandations pour luy en faire acquiter deux de cinq cens escus chacune. / *Interea, vir summe, tui meminisse clientis, / Absentémque velis solito de more tueri, / Et precor, & spero, lectâ hac tibi postmodò chartá, / Facturum quodcumque meis erit vtile rebus.* / Mais crainte que tu ne me serue d'vn *vel duo vel* [...]'

p. 185 add.: '[...] d'vne pension de six cens: Messieurs *de la Motte* & *Colletet* peuuent-ils nier d'auoir receu quelques tesmoignages de l'estime qu'il fait de leurs excellentes compositions; Monsieur *Auberi* qui [...]' **becomes** (p. 237) '[...] d'vne pension de six cens: Monsieur *de la Motte* peut-il nier d'auoir receu quelques tesmoignages de l'estime qu'il fait de ses excellentes compositions: Cette Epigramme de Monsieur *Colletet* ne marque-t'elle pas le temps auquel il auoit coustume de moissonner les graces que le Cardinal luy faisoit, / *O IVLES mon grand Cardinal*, / *Ministre qui n'as point d'égal*, / *Mecene qu'Apollon me donne*, / *Grace à tes bienfaits éclatans*, / *Ie deuance le cours des ans; / Puis que sans attendre l'Automne*, / *Ie fay ma recolte au Printemps*. / Monsieur *Auberi* qui [...]'

p. 186 add.: '[...] le R.P. *Louys Iacob* qui nous donne tous les ans la Bibliographie Parisienne; le sieur *Abraham Ecchellensis* Maronite, le R.P. *Faure*, le P. *Iean Maria del Monaco*, pourront-ils se plaindre que le Cardinal ait negligé de recognoistre tant de belles qualitez qu'ils font paroistre en leurs liures. Mais quoy, y a-t'il rien plus aduantageux pour son Eminence, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 237-238) '[...] le R.P. *Louys Iacob* qui nous donne tous les ans la Bibliographie Parisienne; le sieur *Abraham Ecchellensis* Maronite, le R.P. *Faure*, le P. *Iean Maria del Monaco*, le sieur *de Laurens d'Auignon* pourront-ils se plaindre que le *Cardinal* ait negligé de recognoistre tant de belles qualitez qu'il font paroistre en leurs liures. Et lors que Monsieur *Gomberuille* luy fit sçauoir par ce beau Sonnet, qu'on l'auoit mis du nombre des aisez, ne s'employa-t'il pas pour le deliurer de cette taxe, / *Noble & viuant portrait de l'antique Fabrice, / IVLES tout plein de cœur, de prudence, & de foy, / Prens plaisir à la gloire: & fais que i'accomplisse / Ce que tes grands trauaux se promettent de moy. // Tu sçais que l'aduenir exerce vne iustice, / Qui traite également le Berger & le Roy*. / *Crains que ce fier Censeur, si tu ne m'es propice / En voyant mes escris ne parles ainsi de toy. // IVLES qui d'vn enfant fit le maistre du monde / Lassé de triumpher sur la terre & sur l'onde / Rendit le siecle d'or aux peuples baptisez. // Jl est vray qu'vne tache obscurcit sa memoire*, / *C'est, qu'il a peu souffrir, qu'au mespris de sa gloire*, / *On ait mis Gomberuille au nombre des Aisez.* // Mais quoy, y a-t'il rien de plus aduantageux pour son Eminence, [...]'

p. 186 add.: '[...] *Tortoletti*, l'vn des meilleurs & des plus renommez Poëtes & Orateurs qui soit à Rome, les offres qu'il a fait faire au sieur *Leone Allatio*, le plus docte homme qui soit en Italie, pour le faire venir en France; [...]' **becomes** (p. 239) '[...] *Tortoletti*, l'vn des meilleurs & des plus renommez Poëtes & Orateurs qui soit à Rome, qu'au Caualier *Francesco Gualdi* Gentilhomme de Rimini, tres-bien versé en toutes sortes d'antiquitez, & principalement en celles de ladite ville de Rome. Adiouste aussi les offres qu'il a fait faire au sieur *Leone Allatio* le plus docte personnage qui soit en Italie, pour le faire venir en France; [...]'

p. 187 add.: '[...] au sieur *Lotti*, qui a la faculté d'excellement improuiser en Latin, les presens qu'il fit il y a deux ans au sieur *Antonio Abbate* [...]' **becomes** (pp. 239-240) '[...] au sieur *Giouanne Lotti* qui a maintenant la faculté d'excellement improuiser en Latin, comme auoient eu auparauant luy *Syluius Antonianus* que Clement VIII. fit Cardinal, *Camillus Quernus* surnommé par Leon X. *Archipoëta*, & du temps de Iules II. *B. Vgolinus, Iacobus Corsus*, & *Bernardus Accoltus* que le

Protonotaire Paulus *Cortesius* met entre les plus agreables diuertissemens qui fussent à Rome de ce temps-là. N'oublie pas aussi les presens qu'il fit il y a deux ans au sieur *Antonio Abbate* [...]'

p. 187 alt. + om. + add.: '[...] & finalement toutes les gratifications & recognoissances qu'il est accoustumé de faire par l'entremise de l'Abbé Mondin, & du sieur Naudé à tous les Estrangers qui luy dedient des liures, & desquels à vn besoin l'on pourroit produire les lettres de remerciement.' **becomes** (p. 240) '[...] & finalement toutes les gratifications & recognoissances qu'il a coustume de faire par l'entremise du sieur *Naudé* à tous les Estrangers qui luy dedient des liures, & desquels à vn besoin l'on pourroit produire les lettres de remerciement: comme aussi les aumosnes, & liberalitez qu'il exerce tous les iours par le moyen de son Maistre de Chambre, de son Confesseur, & de ses Aumosniers enuers tous ceux qui luy témoignent auoir besoin de son assistance. Et puis conclus asseurément [...]'

p. 188 add.: '[...] Car autrement l'on auroit sceu ([...].) Qu'il donnoit tous les ans cinq cens francs au College *de Nauarre* pour la distribution des prix d'Humanité: Qu'il a fait imprimer à ses despens *plusieurs liures* pour le seruice des Seminaires, & de ceux qui vont restablir la foy en Angleterre: L'on sçauroit que sans luy, la grande Bible de Monsieur le Iay ne seroit encore acheuée; que sans luy l'Autheur des *Tessaræ Gentilitiæ* n'auroit pas eu le moyen de nous donner son liure qui contient plus de cinq mille escussons en taille douce, [...]' **becomes** (p. 241) '[...] Car autrement l'on auroit sceu ([...].) Qu'il donnoit tous les ans cinq cens francs au College *de Nauarre* pour la distribution des prix d'Humanité, / *Tuque NAVARRA, caput variis redimita corollis*, / *Plaude manu, iactaque sonos ad sydera; dumque* / *MAZARINVS largo Pimplæos ditat alumnos* / *Munere, pange sacri meritos HEROIS honores*. / comme il est porté dans le remerciement que ledit College en a fait. L'on sçauroit qu'il a fait imprimer à ses despens *plusieurs liures* pour le seruice des Seminaires, & de ceux qui vont restablir la foy en Angleterre: L'on sçauroit que sans luy, la grande Bible de Monsieur le Iay ne seroit encore acheuée: que sans luy le *R.P. Tarquinio Gallutio* n'auroit pas eu la satisfaction de voir ses deux Tomes in folio de Commentaires sur les Morales d'Aristote imprimez chez Cramoisy: Que sans luy l'Autheur des *Tesseræ Gentilitiæ*, n'auroit pas eu le moyen de nous donner son liure, qui contient plus de cinq mille escussons en taille douce, [...]'

p. 189 add.: '[...] & le Bibliothequaire auec ses seruiteurs, seront obligez de donner aux Estudians tous les liures qu'ils pourront demander, en telle langue ou science que ce soit, & de les reprendre & remettre à leurs places quand ils en auront fait, en leur baillant les autres dont ils auront besoin. Ce qui, te dire vray, sera la plus belle institution qui ait iamais esté en France, & la plus aduantageuse pour le progrez des sciences & des Lettres. / S. Ie ne m'imagine pas pour moy, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 242-243) '[...] & le Bibliothequaire auec ses seruiteurs, seront obligez de donner aux Estudians tous les liures qu'ils pourront demander, en telle langue ou science que ce soit, & de les reprendre & remettre à leurs places quand ils en auront fait, en leur baillant les autres dont ils auront besoin. Ce qui a donné suiet à cet excellent Poëte Latin Gabriel Madelenet de dire en l'Epistre qu'il escriuit au Cardinal, & que i'ay copiée sur son manuscrit il y a plus d'vn an: / *Quando tot humani ingenij monumenta, nouóque* / *Quod ritu moliris opus, digna atria Musis* / *Hospitibus cernam? magno genus omne coemptis* / *Vndique codicibus, studioso euoluere cuiuis* / *Quod pronum & facile est, sacros siue profanos* / *Consulat Authores.* / comme aussi au sieur H. Picou d'en parler *stylo poëtico*, c'est à dire, auec vn peu d'hyperbole, en augmentant le nombre des liures, dequoy ie t'ay bien voulu aduertir, crainte que tu n'epilogue à ton ordinaire sur vn *zero* de plus ou de moins, / *Autant que cet Empire aux armes est puissant,* / *Les estudes par toy le rendent florissant.* / *Chez toy cent mille Autheurs estallent leur science,* / *Dont tu fais assembler les plus riches thresors,* / *Illustre monument de ta magnificence,* / *Qui comme des viuans a soin mesme des morts!* / Et à te dire vray, *S. Ange*, cette institution sera la plus belle qui ait iamais esté en France, la plus aduantageuse pour le progrez des sciences & des Lettres, & la mieux seante au Cardinal puis que suiuant l'opinion de Paulus Cortesius, *Magnæ laudi Senatori* (id est, Cardinali) *datur, cum est omnibus exploratum palam, tantum eum librorum domi habere conquisitum, quantum sit ad publicam vtilitatem satis, eamque copiam non esse inuida tenacitate clausam, sed cuiusque generis hominum vtilitati patere semper, in clarissimaque Italiæ versari luce, quæ sit vel opitulatrix egentium, vel inuitatrix blanda locupletum.* / S. Ie ne m'imagine pas pour moy, [...]'

p. 190 add.: '[...] *Scyllæque biformes*. / M. L'on a pourueu à toutes ces difficultez par vne entrée particuliere, qui sera dans la ruë de la porte de Richelieu, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 244-246) '[...] Scyllæque biformes. / M. Quand ie t'aurois accordé, que les Suisses & Portiers des grandes Maisons sont tels que tu les viens de crayonner, quand ils seroient mesme des *Cerberes*, puis que les hommes de Lettres ressemblent à ces de *Orphées*, qui les sçauent charmer, il ne faut pas craindre que l'entrée du Palais de son *Eminence*, ne soit tousiours ouuerte à tous ceux qui voudront aller à la Bibliotheque. Et qu'ainsi ne soit ie me souuiens d'y auoir veu, quand on l'ouuroit tous les Ieudis, plus de quatre-vingts ou cent personnes, qui y estudioient toutes ensemble; & que les autres iours, elle estoit ordinairement frequentée de beaucoup de personnes de merite, qui ne se plaignoient point qu'on leur refusast la porte, ny du Palais, ny de la Bibliotheque, dequoy il ne me sera pas difficile de te donner des preuues, puis que ie me souuiens de certains vers Latins tirez de la *Iuliade* de Monsieur *d'Aulberoche*, dans lesquels il nommoit vne partie de ceux qui y pratiquoient le plus souuent: / *Principis inuisunt Parnassia tecta sacrati,* / *Æternos meritus studiis* GASSENDVS *honores.* / AVBERTVS *doctrina ingens, laurísque reuinctus.* / *Aoniis, &* SIRMVNDVS *facundia laudem* / *Cui peperit summam, & sceptrum donauit Apollo.* / *Nec te prætereamm* LONÆE*, Nauarrice Doctor,* / *Acris iudicij firmíque examine vero,* / *Qui rebus lucem æthereamm diffundis, & altum* / *Ceu iubar expandis radios,* BVLIALDE*, mereris* / *Æterum nomen, Mundi & systema perenni* / *Ad cœlum te laude vehit,* COLETETTE *decora* / *Hospes Calliope cuius sub viscera regnat,* / *Pieridésque simul reliquæ, Phœbea frequentas* / *Hæc tecta. Ascræas pariter qui continet artes* / *Eximie præses* BOISSÆVS*. Equésque peritus* / VVLSONVS*, cuius collecta insignia quondam* / *Vltima posteritas auidè leget. Hic quoque mentis* / *Pandit opes doctæ* AVBRICVS*, cui Purpura debet* / *Romana, & comi grata est sub pectore virtus.* / *Huc etiam* LODOICE*, venis, non parua sororum* / *Gloria. Carmeli qui partes Ordinis ornas,* / *Et Gallum instauras Parnassum ingentibus ausis.* / CHANTRÆVS*que* FABER *doctissimus,* HVGO*que magnus* / GROTIVS*, Orator Suecorum, & montis alumnus* / *Aonij, totas cui Phœbus tradidit arces,* / *Hic* ABLANCVRIVS *Taciti lux maxima, rari* / *Exhibet ingenij vires.* MORÆVS *in arte* / *Insignis Medica, & Musarum plenus amore,* / *Sæpe sacra illarum Gazas scrutatur in æde.* / Voila doncque, *Sainct-Ange*, plus d'vne douzaine de Gentils-hommes, qui sont tous prés de déposer comme les Suisses du *Cardinal* ne sont point si reuesches, ny si peu courtois à tous ceux qui veulent voir la *Bibliotheque*, comme tu t'imagine; Mais neantmoins, parce que des Gens de lettre, nourris dans des Colleges, *in vmbra*, parmy les morts, se rebuttent facilement du moindre bruit & tracas des viuants: On a remedié à toutes les difficultez & apprehensions qu'ils pourroient auoir, par vne entrée particuliere qui sera dans la ruë de la porte de Richelieu, [...]'

p. 190 add.: '[...] *iuuenem commendet amicæ*. / M. Il souuient tousiours à Robin de sa fluste; [...]' **becomes** (p. 247) '[...] *iuuenem commendet amicæ.* / M. Tu ne me deurois pas parler de la sorte, puis que ie suis dans l'exception que donne Horace, / --- *fuge suspicari* / *Cuius octauum trepidauit ætas* / *Claudere lustrum.* (Ode 4. lib. 2) / Mais quoy il souuient tousiours à Robin de sa fluste, [...]'

p. 192 add.: 'M. Pardonnes moy si ie te dis que les Antiquaires, & Humanistes, qui sont les premiers Iuges & Controlleurs de semblables pieces, l'entendront mieux que toy. Le nom de *Mere*, Sainct-Ange, est si aduantageux pour signifier vne bonté extraordinaire, vne affection particuliere, & les soins tres-pressants que l'on prend de quelque chose, [...]' **becomes** (p. 249) 'M. Pardonnes moy si ie te dis que les Antiquaires, & Humanistes, qui sont les premiers Iuges & Controlleurs de semblables pieces, l'entendront mieux que toy; & nous voyons en effet que Monseigneur *Giouanne Filippo Tomasini* Euesque de Citta noua, le R.P. *Famiano Strada*, & les sieurs *Octauio Ferrari* & *Giouanne Rodio* qui sont les quatre plus delicates plumes d'Italie, aprés auoir esté priez par *Naudé* qui leur auoit enuoyé cette inscription, de la changer & diuersifier comme ils iugeroient à propos, n'ont fait aucune difficulté, quoy qu'ils trauaillassent separément, & sans rien sçauoir les vns des autres, d'employer cét Epithete és belles inscriptions qu'ils ont enuoyées à son Eminence, & que l'on imprimera quelque iour en teste du Catalogue de cette merueilleuse *Bibliotheque*. Mais puis que tu cherches plustost l'explication que l'approbaton de ces deux mots. Ie te diray, *Sainct-Ange*, que celuy de *Mere*, est si aduantageux pour signifier vne bonté extraordinaire, vne affectation particuliere, & les soins tres-pressants que l'on prend de quelque chose, [...]'

p. 194 alt.: '[...] soit pour le gouuernement particulier qu'elle a eu des affaires de Catalogne, [...]' **becomes** (p. 252) '[...] soit pour le soins particuliers qu'elle a pris des affaires de Catalogne, [...]'

p. 199 alt. + add.: '[...] Mais Dieu soit loüé, qu'au moins n'ont-ils pû cacher ny estouffer la franchise auec laquelle il a cedé les titres de ses meilleures Abbayes, ou engagé les reuenus d'icelles, aussi bien que ses prouisions, appointemens, & ses meubles mesmes les plus precieux, lors qu'il a crû de le deuoir faire pour auantager les affaires du Roy. / S. Ventre sainct Gri [...]' **becomes** (pp. 256-258) '[...] Mais Dieu soit loüé, qu'au moins n'ont-ils pû cacher ny estouffer la franchise auec laquelle il a cedé ses meilleures Abbayes de Corbie & de Royaumont, aux Cardinaux Pamphile & Grimaldi, pour ne rien dire des moindres, ausquels il n'est pas plus attaché quand l'occasion se presente d'en gratifier quelqu'vn, non plus certes qu'il ne fait point de difficulté d'engager les reuenus d'icelles, aussi bien que ses prouisions, appointemens, ses meubles mesmes les plus precieux, & tout ce qu'il a pû tirer de ses amis, lors qu'il a creu de le deuoir faire pour auantager les affaires du Roy. Et à ce propos il me souuient d'auoir appris du sieur Bernardin, que le Cardinal respondit vn iour à beaucoup de Seigneurs qui luy déconseilloient de se despouiller de la sorte, puis que tout son bien, & tout son credit, quand il en auroit dix fois dauantage, n'estoient pas capables de soustenir l'Estat; qu'il donneroit volontiers, non seulement tout ce qu'il auoit de bien au monde, mais encore sa vie, pourueu que ce Royaume, qui luy auoit esté recommandé auec tant de soin par le Roy defunt, & qu'il aimoit plus que son bien & sa propre vie, en souffrit vne heure plus tard. A ton aduis, Sainct-Ange, cette parole n'est-elle pas tout à fait heroïque, & semblable à celle de ce vieil Horace, lors qu'il disoit de son fils sur la fausse relation qu'on luy auoit donné de sa fuite, / N'eust-il que d'vn moment reculé sa deffaite, / Rome eust esté du moins vn peu plus tard suiette: / Et cela me fait esperer, que l'on pourra dire quelque iour du Cardinal, à cause de ce grand zele, & de ce desapropriement plus que Monachal qu'il a pour la France: ce que le mesme Horace disoit de ses deux autres fils, qui ne combatirent pas plus valeureusement pour leur pays natal, que le Cardinal fait pour vn, où il est estranger, & ce qui est plus considerable, fort mal reconneu des signalez seruices qu'il luy rend, / Ce bonheur a suiuy leur courage inuaincu / Qu'ils ont veu Rome libre autant qu'ils ont vescu. / S. Ventre-sainct-Gry [...]'

p. 199 add.: '[...] il faut bien que ceux qui t'ont rapporté toutes ces baliuernes, t'ayent pris pour vn Polaque ou pour vn Moscouite.' **becomes** (p. 258) '[...] il faut bien que ceux qui t'ont rapporté toutes ces liberalitez, tous ces desapropriemens & toutes ces baliuernes du *Cardinal*, t'ayent pris pour vn Polaque ou pour vn Moscouite.'

p. 199 alt.: '[...] n'est rien qu'vns pure resuerie, introduite à cause du transport de l'argent que l'on a fait de France en Italie, tant pour entretenir nos alliances auec les Ducs de *Parme*, & [...]' **becomes** (p. 258) '[...] n'est rien qu'vne pure resuerie, introduite à cause de l'argent que l'on a fait passer de France en Italie, tant pour entretenir nos alliances auec les Ducs de *Parme*, & [...]'

p. 200 alt.: '[...] Et neantmoins l'on sçauoit fort bien que le *Mareschal d'Ancre* auoit deux cens mille liures à Florence, & trente mille escus à Rome sur la Fabrique de S. Pierre, [...]' **becomes** (p. 259) '[...] Et neantmoins l'on sçauoit fort bien que le *Mareschal d'Ancre* auoit deux cens mille liures *al Banco di San Georgio* de Gennes, & trente mil escus à Rome sur la Fabrique de S. Pierre, [...]'

p. 203 alt.: '[...] que la ville de Constantinople ne fut prise par le Turc en 1451. ou 52. que par la faute du Patriarche & des Chanoines de saincte Sophie, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 261-262) '[...] que la ville de Constantinople ne fut prise par le Turc en 1453. que par la faute du Patriarche & des Chanoines de saincte Sophie, [...]'

p. 203 alt.: 'C'est pourqouy il en faut reuenir au dire de Seneque, *Tenue est profecto mendacium, pellucet si diligenter inspexeris*; il en est de mesme en celuy-là; Et ie croy aussi que Nosseigneurs du Parlement en sont tout à fait desabusez, [...]' **becomes** (p. 262) 'C'est pourquoy il en faut reuenir au dire de Saint Cyprian: *Hæc vere dementia est cogitare, nec scire, quod mendacian non diu fallant*. puis qu'il en est de mesme en celuy-là; Et ie croy aussi que Nosseigneurs du Parlement en sont tout à desabusez, [...]'

p. 204 add.: '[...] comme esloignée de toute verité. / S. Tu en dis beaucoup pour n'estre pas Mouchard du bonnet rouge, si tu preschois de la sorte au milieu de la Gréue, on ne tarderoit gueres à te faire entrer l'eau de la Seine dans tes souliers, par le collet de ta chemise.' **becomes** (pp. 263-

269) '[...] comme esloignée de toute verité. / S. Il faut dire de toy comme l'on faisoit de Cognefestu, qui se tuoit à ne rien faire, car aprés auoir bien sué & enhanné, à monstrer que le *Cardinal* n'a point d'argent, tu ne conclus pas pourtant qu'il n'ait vne infinité de choses, qui valent mieux que de l'argent, & desquelles il en pourra faire quand il voudra; que n'as-tu dit tout d'vn coup qu'il estoit si pauure, & si necessiteux, que Monsieur *Tubeuf* feroit bien de le mettre à l'aumosne de Sainct Eustache? pour moy i'aurois aussi-tost creu l'vn que l'autre. / M. Ie pourrois bien dire sans me rendre ridicule en le raualant si bas, qu'au moins deuroit-il estre à l'aumosne du *Roy*, car à bien prendre la vraye signification de ce mot *ἐλεημοσύνη est misericordia siue affectus ipse misericordiæ*, & parce que le nom de la cause passe souuent à l'effet qu'elle produit, de là vient, *Sainct-Ange*, que le nom d'Aumosne est donné aux gratifications que l'on a coustume de faire, à ceux que l'on cognoist en auoir besoin. C'est pourquoy ie ne sçay si Casaubon & les autres critiques modernes, ont eu raison de changer ces paroles de Spartianus in Caracalla *non lentus in eleemosynam,* qu'on peut lire dans le MS. de la Bibliotheque Royale, en ces autres *non lentus in clementiam*: Mais quoy qu'il en soit Polydore Virgile, qui a des plus contribué à la renaissance des bonnes lettres, n'a pas laissé de dire en parlant de l'aumosne, *Sed hanc, non vno humanitatis vel liberalitatis genere metiri licet, quodcumque enim charitatis officium in alterum præstatur, id eleemosyna est*. Et c'est en ce sens là que ie puis dire serieusement que le *Cardinal* a besoin de l'aumosne, ou si tu veux des gratifications Royales: ce que l'on ne pourroit pas dire des autres Ministres qui l'ont precedé, puis qu'ils auoient tant de titres, tant d'offices, tant de grandes charges, tant de Gouuernemens, de possessions, de rentes foncieres, de bien solides, immeubles, & permanents, qu'ils pouuoient facilement se passer d'autres gratifications à titre de subsistance, & lesquelles toutesfois ils ont peut-estre moins negligées, que ne fait le Cardinal *Mazarin*. Certes quand ie considere ces titres du Cardinal de Richelieu, *Armand Jean du Plessis Cardinal, Duc de Richelieu & de Fronsac, Pair de France, Abbé & General des Ordres de Clugny, de Cisteaux, de Premonstré, &c. premier Ministre d'Estat, Grand-Maistre de l'Artillerie, Chef & Sur-Intendant de la nauigation & commerce de France, Gouuerneur de Bretagne, des Places du Haure, de Broüage, d'Oleron, l'Isle de Ré, &c.* & que ie fais pareillement reflexion sur celles de Monsieur de Sully, *de Conseiller du Roy en tous ses Conseils, de Superintendant de ses Finances, Fortifications, Bastimens, Ouurages publics, Ports, Haures, Canaux, nauigations de Riuieres: de Grand-Maistre de l'Artillerie, & Grand-Voyer de France; de Gouuerneur, & Capitaine de deux cens hommes d'armes soubs le titre de la Reyne, haut & bas Poictou, Chastelraudois, & Ludunois, Chasteau de la Bastille à Paris, Mante, & Iargeau.* Quand ie considere aussi que ce dernier, quoy qu'il veüille passer pour le plus desinteressé Ministre qui ait iamais esté, confesse luy-mesme d'auoir accreu son bien de *quinze à seize mille liures* de rente, qu'l pouuoit auoir tant de son costé, que de celuy de sa femme, iusques à *deux cens deux milles deux cens liures* de reuenu asseuré, à luy & aux siens: Et que par aprés ie cherche quels sont les titres, les offices, les charges, les dignitez, & Gouuernemens du Cardinal *Mazarin*, que i'examine en quoy consiste son reuenu, & iusques à quelle somme il monte; que ie fais perquisition des terres qu'il possede, des Seigneuries qu'il a achetées, des rentes qu'il a constituées, il m'arriue la mesme chose qu'à Enée, lors que pensant voir le corps de sa femme *Creüsa*, il trouua que ce ce n'estoit qu'vn ombre, / *Ter conatus ibi collo dare brachia circum*, / *Ter frustra comprensa manus effugit imago*. / Et si ses layettes ne sont pleines d'autres choses que des Lettres & Prouisions de ses Offices, ou des Contracts & autres pieces iustificatiues de son bien, ou comme dit l'Italien *del suo valsente*, ie croy qu'on ne peut faillir de les comparer à la Maison de cét Euclion de Plaute *quæ inaneis plena erat & araneis*. Car en effet ie suis encore à apprendre, qu'il possede vn poulce de terre, qu'il ait aucuns biens stables (puis que tant s'en faut que sa maison soit à luy, qu'il en doit cinq années de loyer à Monsieur Tubeuf) qu'il soit Gouuerneur de Prouince, qu'il ait aucune dignité permanente, ou qu'on l'ait gratifié de ces offices dont, outre la perception des gages ordinaires, il puisse encore tirer vne bonne recompense, en les cedant à quelque autre, comme en auoit fait Monsieur de Sully, qui tira *trois cens mille liures* pour la demission de sa charge des Finances, & de la Bastille; *soixante mille* pour celle de la Compagnie de la Reyne mere: *cinquante mille* pour celle de Sur-Intendant des bastimens: *deux cens mille* pour le Gouuernement de Poictou: *cent cinquante mille* pour la charge de Grand-Voyer: & *deux cens cinquante mille* pour recompense, ou plustost courretage de beaucoup de Benefices donnez à sa recommandation. En suite dequoy peut-on ne pas admirer la conduite & la retenuë du *Cardinal*, lequel aprés sept ans de seruice rendu en qualité de premier Ministre, au Roy & à la France, auec des succés remarquables & extraordinaires, & aussi auec l'agréement & entiere satisfaction de la Reyne & de toute la Maison Royale, se trouue non seulement sans Terres, sans Places, sans Charges, ou Gouuernemens, mais encore plus pauure d'vn million de liures qu'il n'estoit lors qu'il fut estably

en cette premiere place qui luy a pensé depuis peu couster la vie. / S. C'estoit pour l'acheuer de peindre en cramoisy, ie croy pour moy qu'il se seroit fort peu soucié d'aller au Royaume des Taupes, pour voir s'il n'y retrouueroit point le Thresor qu'à ton dire il auoit desia perdu: Mais s'il te falloit prouuer qu'il en ait iamais eu vn de tant de mille liures comment t'y prendrois-tu? / M. I'aurois bien moins de peine qu'à prendre la Lune auec les dents, car les liures du sieur *Cantarini* qui sont encore en nature, peuuent témoigner en Iustice, & par tout où l'on voudra, que le *Cardinal* estoit riche de deux cens mille escus, auparauant que l'on eust songé à le faire premier Ministre; & que maintenant au lieu d'auoir augmenté ladite somme, par les bienfaits qu'il a receus de la Reyne, il se trouue engagé au mesme *Cantarini* de quatre cens mille liures, sans auoir quasi aucun moyen de s'acquitter, puis que sa Garderobe a esté bien nettoyée; & que tout ce qu'il en a pû sauuer estoit desia engagé, pour secourir les affaires du Roy; comme ç'a tousiours esté sa coustume, de prendre dans sa bource, ou dans celle de ses amis, ce qui est necessaire pour le haster, lors principalement que les longueurs & formalitez des Finances, les pouuoient ruiner, s'il n'y donnoit ordre par son bon & beau *mesnage*. / S. Ie voy bien que tu veux équiuoquer sur la double signification de ce mot de *mesnage*, & qu'en te seruant de la plus mechanique, tu pretends de monstrer que le *Cardinal* engage tous les iours sa vaisselle d'argent, ses tapisseries, ses tableaux, & en vn mot tout ce qu'il a de meilleur & de plus precieux, pour le seruice du Roy. Mais si cela est, *Mascurat*, pourquoy au lieu de luy donner tant de maledictions ne luy coupe-t'on sa robe comme l'on fit au P. Dominique *à Jesu Maria* aprés la bataille de Prague, ou au *General des Capucins* lors qu'il passa il y a deux ou trois ans en cette ville: car il faut qu'il soit plus homme de bien que ces deux bons Religieux là n'estoient. / M. Tu pense te mocquer, *Sainct-Ange*, mais ie te diray toutefois, sans comparer le *Cardinal* auec personne, que si tu considere la pluspart de ses actions, & celle-là entre autres de s'apauurir en seruant le Roy, au lieu & en la façon qu'il le sert, c'est vn vray miracle, *Miraculum enim voco*, disoit Sainct Augustin, *quicquid arduum aut insolitum supra spem vel facultatem mirantis apparet*; & qu'y a-t'il de plus extraordinaire en France, & à la Cour principalement, que de voir vn premier Ministre, ne prendre rien pour soy, ne rien donner aux siens, voire mesme exposer tous les iours & engager le peu qu'il a pour le seruice de Sa Maiesté. Certes ny le bon Monsieur *de Luynes* qui prit la charge de Connestable, mit trois Duchez en sa Maison, eut les meilleurs Gouuernemens du Royaume; maria le siens aux plus grandes familles; ny Mr *de Sully*, ou le Cardinal *de Richelieu*, des facultez & aduantages desquels nou auons desia parlé, n'en faisoient pas de mesme. Et parce que les Peuples sont entierement persuadez de cette conuoitise des principaux Ministres, & qu'ils ne voyent pas de pouuoir accuser le *Cardinal* d'vne semblable, parce qu'en effet il ne leur en donne aucun suiet, en ne possedant ny charges, ny gouuernemens: cela leur fait croire qu'il doit auoir des millions de reserue, pour s'en seruir és occassions que bon luy semblera. En quoy tu peux bien voir, *Sainct-Ange*, s'ils ont raison, puis que ie t'ay desia prouué par des argumens inuincibles, que le Cardinal est plus pauure que *Iob*, & que les incommoditez que souffre sa maison faute d'argent, ne sont pas croyables à ceux mesmes qui les voyent, & qui sçauent fort bien qu'elles ne sont ny fardées, ny feintes ny affectées. / S. Tu en dis beaucoup pour n'estre pas Mouchard du *bonnet rouge*, si tu preschois de la sorte au milieu de la Gréue, on ne tarderoit gueres à te faire entrer l'eau de la Seine dans tes souliers, par le collet de ta chemise.'

p. 207 add. '[...] *Namque ascoltabam quæ parlabantur ab illis*, / & tu peux croire qu'ils en contoient de belles. / S. Si tout ce que tu as dit en vient, [...]' **becomes** (p. 272) '[...] *Namque ascoltabam quæ parlabantur ab illis*. / & tu peux croire qu'ils en contoient de belles: car il est de cette maison-là comme beaucoup d'autres semblables, où l'on n'obserue pas le precepte que donne le Cardinal *Hugo* en ses commentaires sur le 22. de la Genese, / *Pectoris arcanum non est committere sanum / Rimis seruorum, quia fictile pectus eorum.* / S. Si tout ce que tu as dit en vient, [...]'

p. 211 add.: '[...] Mais la description du tumulte arriué entre les vignerons du village de Ruel, & les Archers de Paris, faite par Monsieur *Frey*, est à mon aduis la meilleure Macaronique qui soit en nostre langue.' **becomes** (p. 277) '[...] Mais la description du tumulte arriué entre les vignerons du village de Ruel, & les Archers de Paris, faite par Monsieur *Frey*, & intitulée *Recitus veritabilis super terribili esmeuta Paisanorum de Ruellio*, est à mon aduis vne des meilleures pieces Macaroniques qui soit en nostre langue.'

p. 211 alt.: '[...] sans neantmoins y auoir remarqué cette piece dont tu fais tant d'estat.' **becomes** (p. 277) '[...] sans neantmoins y auoir remarqué cette composition dont tu fais tant d'estat.'

p. 211-212 add.: 'C'est qu'on la garde pour le troisiesme volume, que Monsieur Balesdan mettra bien tost sous la presse, & qu'il a destiné à toutes les galanteries de ce grand Philosophe. / S. I'ay ouy dire à Menard, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 277-279) 'C'est qu'on la garde pour le troisiéme volume, que Monsieur *Balesdan* mettra bien-tost sous la presse, & qu'il a destiné à toutes les galanteries de ce Philosophe; mais cependant, puis qu'à parler comme fait Perse lors qu'il dit / *Nec Gluto sorbere Saluiam Mercurialem*. (Satyr.5) / l'eau t'en est desia venuë à la bouche, & que i'ay sceu autresfois ce Macaronisme par cœur, ie veux voir pour te gratifier si ie me souuiendray bien encore des dix ou douze premier vers, & de quelques autres que i'estime les meilleurs de cette piece, à la charge toutesfois que tu me fauoriseras aussi bien des dents, en leur faisant prendre vn peu de tréue que des aureilles, en les disposant à me bien escouter, car à dire vray tu manges comme vn chancre, / *Archeros pistoliferos, furiamque Manantum* / *Et grandem esmeutam, quæ inopinum facta Ruella est.* / *Toxinumque alto troublantem corda clochero* / *Totius populi, quodque est miserabile dictu,* / *Troublantem paruos incinctæ in ventre parentis,* / *At Prestres omnes, hardito carmine dicam.* / *Musæ nudipedes seu vos ad littora Chattou* / *Gardetis vaccas, seu desieunetis in agris,* / *Seu potius vos nocturno brandone Lenæi,* / *Bouthonare iuuet vites, grappasque volare* / *Dicate cur animis tantæ vigneronibus iræ.* / Il dit aussi dans le milieu de la piece, / *Villa in Parisia braua est compagnia fratrum* / *Papilloniadum, docta escrimare scienter* / *Poignardis, hallebardis, spadisque duabus*, / *Artherosque inter longe celeberrima totos.* / Mais ce qu'il adiouste incontinent aprés est rauissant, & peut dans son Burlesque fort bien representer l'heureuse description que fait Virgile au septiesme de l'Eneide du commencement de la guerre en Italie des Troyens contre les Latins à cause du cerf domestique blessé par le ieune Ascanius, / *Ex templo esmeutæ signum Toxinus ab alta* / *Turre strepens, rauco cassatæ murmure clochæ*, / *Tin tan tin iterans, don don don donque sonabat.* / *Ex templo effroiati animi, quiuis maisone relicta* / *Indomiti accurrunt, magno simul omne tumultu* / *Troublatur querulo vulgus, Ieunessaque sæuit* / *Effera, grisonique senes, pleurosaque femma,* / *Et trepidæ matres, embrassauere puellos* / *Multa reprochantes ægris, grossisque parolis.* / S. I'ay oüy dire à Menard, [...]'

p. 212 add.: '[...] ie ne voudrois pas qu'il nous fist attendre aussi long-temps aprés celles de ce Monsieur Frey, puis qu'elles sont si plaisantes.' **becomes** (p. 279) '[...] ie ne voudrois pas qu'il nous fist attendre aussi long-temps aprés celles de ce Monsieur *Frey*, puis qu'elles sont si plaisantes & si agreables.'

p. 212 add.: '[...] & en general de toute la Poësie figurée, / *Turpe est difficiles habere nugas,* / *Et stultus labor est ineptiarum.* / S. Tu n'aurois doncque garde d'approuuer les Anagrammes de *Billion*, & du sieur *Douet*.' **becomes** (pp. 279-280) '[...] & en general de toute la Poësie figurée, quand on en veut faire mestier & marchandise, / *Turpe est difficiles habere nugas,* / *Et stultus labor est ineptiarum.* / C'est pourquoy ie fus l'autre iour fort surpris, de voir vne Elegie toute Macaronique de quarente-quatre vers, composée par *Antonius de Arena*, à la loüange du President d'*Aupede*, & imprimée au deuant des Arrest & appointemens faits l'an 1542. par la Cour de Parlement de Prouence, à la requeste des Gens du Roy, &c. Car si l'on disoit autrefois que les institutes auec les glosses du bon-homme Accurse ressembloient à vne robe de Pourpre bordée, sauf ton respect, de merde, que ne pourroit-on pas dire de ces vers Macaroniques employez sur des matieres & en des occasions si serieuses. / S. Tu n'aurois doncque garde d'approuuer les Anagrammes de *Billion* & du sieur *Douet*.'

p. 215 add.: '[...] à cause des horribles saletez que ces deux pieces vomissent contre le precepte *nil dictu fœdum*, pour la cinquiesme il faut mettre si i'en suis crû, l'*Interprete des escrits du temps*, [...]' **becomes** (p. 283) '[...] à cause des horribles saletez que ces deux pieces vomissent contre le precepte *nil dictu fœdum*; la *Lettre Burlesque au Marquis de la Boulaye* passera pour la cinquiéme, & pour la sixiéme il faut mettre si i'en suis crû, l'*Interprete des escrits du temps*, [...]'

p. 219 add.: '[...] Car auparauant que le plus âgé de tous ces Messieurs que tu viens de nommer, fust né, il y auoit plus de vingt ans, que Cardan deuoit estre mort & pourry, si d'auanture son corps n'a esté aussi long-temps soubs terre que celuy de *Facius Cardanus* son pere, sans se corrompre. / S. Il y aura doncque mis sans doute *Charron*, *Montagne*, & *Bodin*.' **becomes** (p. 287) '[...] Car auparauant que le plus âgé de tous ces Messieurs que tu viens de nommer, fust né, il y auoit plus de vingt ans, que Cardan deuoit estre mort & pourry, si d'auenture son corps n'a esté aussi long-temps soubs terre que celuy de *Facius Cardanus* son pere, sans se corrompre. Cela me fait

souuenir de *Linus*, quand il commandoit dans le Poete *Alexis*, à son disciple Hercules, de lire les œuures d'Orphée, d'Hesiode, de Cherilus, d'Homere, d'Epicharme, quoy que pas vn d'iceux ne soit venu au monde que long temps aprés ledit Hercules. / S. Il y aura doncque mis sans doute *Charon, Montagne*, & *Bodin*.'

p. 225 add.: '[...] que les pauures ayent achepté aux despens des riches tous les meubles du Cardinal Mazarin, mais quand cela seroit, pourquoy se masquer si l'action n'est point honteuse? pourquoy cacher son nom si le peut dire legitimement? [...]' **becomes** (p. 293) '[...] que les pauures ayent acheté aux despens des riches tous les meubles du Cardinal *Mazarin*, *adeo vt de tam magna naue ne tabulam quidem naufragus habeat*, comme dit Petrone: Mais quand cela seroit, pourquoy se masquer si l'action n'est point honteuse? pourquoy cacher son nom si on le peut dire legitimement? [...]'

p. 226 add.: '[...] *Cælati biberat quo callidus emptor Olynthi.* / Il consideroit aussi que tous ces meubles n'ayant esté assemblez par luy, [...]' **becomes** (p. 295) '[...] *Cælati biberat quo callidus emptor Olinthi.* / Bien loin de s'offenser de cette perte iusque au point que beaucoup de ses ennemis desiroient passionnément qu'il fit, afin de rendre l'accord plus difficile, & de porter toutes les affaires à vne derniere extremité. Il consideroit aussi que tous ces meubles n'ayant esté assemblez par luy, [...]'

p. 229 alt.: '[...] Et en effet la Reyne & Messieurs les Princes ayant declaré par lettres expresses, que c'estoit de leur conseil & aduis que le Roy sortoit de Paris, & bloquoit la ville, il n'y a toutesfois eu que le Ministre de leurs volontez, qui ait seruy d'obiet à la haine, que le peuple auoit assez raisonnablement conceuë, contre les autheurs d'vne resolution qui luy estoit si preiudiciable.' **becomes** (pp. 297-298) '[...] Et en effet la Reyne, Monsieur le Duc d'Orleans & Monsieur le Prince ayant declaré par lettres expresses, que c'estoit de leur conseil & aduis que le Roy sortoit de Paris, & bloquoit la ville, il n'y a toutesfois eu que le Ministre de leurs volontez, qui ait seruy d'obiet à la haine, que le peuple auoit assez raisonnablement conceuë contre les autheurs d'vne resolution qui luy estoit si preiudiciable.'

p. 229 alt.: 'Ie parle de ce qu'a fait le Peuple pendant qu'il a esté dans l'ignorance des causes qu'ont eu la Reyne & les Princes, de faire sortir le Roy hors de Paris; [...]' **becomes** (p. 298) 'Ie parle de ce qu'a fait le Peuple pendant qu'il a esté dans l'ignorance des causes qu'ont eu la Reyne & ses principaux Ministres que i'ay desia nommez, de faire sortir le Roy hors de Paris; [...]'

p. 229 alt.: '[...] & il admirera & benira en suitte la clemence de la Reyne, la moderation des Princes, & la douceur de Monsieur le Cardinal, puis que aprés nous auoir traisnez, [...]' **becomes** (p. 298) '[...] & il admirera & benira en suitte la clemence de la Reyne, la moderation de son Altesse Royale, la grande retenuë de Monsieur le Prince, & la douceur du *Cardinal*, puis que aprés nous auoir traisnez, [...]'

p. 234 add.: '[...] L'on m'auoit dit que tel Curé, tel Baillif de villages, tel Païsan auoient esté chastrez, esaurillez, baillonez par les Polaques, lesquels i'ay sceu depuis la Conference, se porter tres-bien, & n'auoir rien souffert de semblable; combien de villages nous a-t'on dit auoir esté bruslez, qui n'ont pas veu seulement l'ennemy? combien de maisons auoient elles esté deualisées, abbatuës, ruinées, ausquelles les proprietaires n'ont rien trouué que des fenestres ou quelque porte de manque; Mais ce n'est pas d'auiourd'huy seulement que les esprits broüillons, seditieux, enragez contres des puissances Souueraines, ont pratiqué de semblables stratagemes.' **becomes** (pp. 303-304) '[...] L'on m'auoit dit que tel Curé, tel Baillif de villages, tel Païsan auoient esté chastrez, esaurillez, baillonez par les Polaques, lesquels i'ay sceu depuis la Conference, se porter tres-bien, & n'auoir rien souffert de semblable; combien de villages nous a-t'on dit auoir esté bruslez, qui n'ont pas veu seulement l'ennemy? combien de maisons auoient elles esté deualisées, abbatuës, ruinées, ausquelles les proprietaires n'ont rien trouué que des fenestres ou quelque porte de manque: Y a-t'il de l'apparence que Monsieur le *Duc d'Orleans* qui sçait, & qui cognoist bien le respect & l'affection que les Parisiens luy portent, les eut voulu traitter d'vne façon si irreconciable? voudroit on que Monsieur le *Prince* aprés auoir exposé tant de fois sa vie pour la gloire de cét Empire, se pût resoudre à ruiner la capitale, comme certains bout-feux disent tous les iours qu'il a voulu faire. Mais ce n'est pas

d'auiourd'huy seulement que les esprits broüillons, seditieux, enragez contre des puissances Souueraines, ont pratiqué de semblables stratagemes.'

p. 244 add.: '[...] mais parce que ces choses sont de faict, & que les raisons ne persuadent pas si fort que les experiences, il en a fallu trouuer où il n'y en auoit point, afin de surprendre plus facilement les esprits foibles de ceux qui croyent facilement ce qu'ils desirent, [...]' **becomes** (p. 313) '[...] mais parce que ces choses sont de faict, & que les raisons ne persuadent pas si fort que les experiences, il en a fallu trouuer & forger où il n'y en auoit point, afin de mieux surprendre plus facilement les esprits foibles de ceux qui croyent facilement ce qu'ils desirent, [...]'

p. 245 add.: '[...] *Demite carminibus venesicisque fidem*. / Restent doncque les Sorciers, desquels les pretendus transports soit *alla noce di Beneuento* comme ils disent en Italie, [...]' **becomes** (p. 314) '[...] *Demite carminibus venesicisque fidem.* / Et ce docte & sage Empereur Marc Antonin ne mettoit pas sans raison entre les principaux aduantages de son education, que le Philosophe Diognetus luy auoit appris de bonne heure à ne point croire toutes ces fadaises, *A Diogneto*, dit-il, *didici, studium in res inanes non conferre, fidem ab-rogare iis quæ de incantationibus dæmonumque profligationibus, ac id genus aliis rebus præstigiatores & impostores referunt.* Restent donc les Sorciers, desquels les pretendus transports soit *alla noce di Beneuento*, comme ils disent en Italie, [...]'

p. 246 alt.: '[...] & des agreables campagnes de *Piedmont* où il y a si grande quantité de Sorciers, que le mesme Poëte s'en est seruy pour exprimer des quantitez innombrables, [...]' **becomes** (p. 315) '[...] & des agreables campagnes de *Piedmont* où il y a si grande nombre de Sorciers, que le mesme Poëte s'en est seruy pour exprimer des quantitez innombrables, [...]'

p. 249 add.: '[...] *intempesta noctis silentio pertranspire,* &c. de façon que voila au moins la realité de ce pretendu transport deuenuë imaginaire, au iugement mesme de S. Augustin, *in libro de spiritu & litera cap*. 28. [...]' **becomes** (pp. 318-319) '*[...] intempesta noctis silentio pertranspire, eiusque iussionibus velut Dominæ obedire, & certis noctibus ad eius seruitium euocari. Sed vtinam hæ solæ in sua perfidia periissent, & non multos secum in infidelitatis interitum pertraxissent: nam innumera multitudo hac falsa opinione decepta, hæc vera esse credit, & credenda a recta fide deuiat, & in errore Paganorum reuoluitur, cum aliquid diuinitatis aut numinis, extra vnum Deum arbitratur. Quapropter Sacerdotes per Ecclesias sibi commissas populo omni instantia prædicare debent vt nouerint hæc omnimode esse falsa & non a diuino, sed a maligno spiritu talia phantasmata mentibus fidelium irrogari.* De façon que voila au moins la realité de ce pretendu transport deuenuë imaginaire, au iugement mesme de S. Augustin, *in libro de spiritu & litera cap*. 28. [...]'

p. 253 add.: '[...] & que l'on peut appeller pareillement *Tapantio*. / S. Me voicy aux termes de la Glosse d'Orleans, [...]' **becomes** (p. 323) '[...] & que l'on peut appeller pareillement *Tapantio*, ou *Pandectæ, a verbo πανδέχομαι quod est omnia complector*, puis que ie fourre dedans toutes sortes de remarques. / S. Me voicy aux termes de la Glosse d'Orleans, [...]'

p. 253 alt.: 'Des trois noms que tu donnes à ta vaquette ou repertoire, ie n'ay que faite de l'Italien ny du Grec, mais pour le Latin qui m'est tout à fait nouueau, ie seray aise de sçauoir où tu l'as pesché.' **becomes** (p. 323) 'Des quatre noms que tu donne à ta *vaquette* ou repertoire, ie n'ay que faire de l'Italien ny des autres, mais pour celuy de *Tapantio*, qui m'est tout à fait nouueau, ie seray bien aise de sçauoir où tu l'as pesché.'

p. 254 add.: '[...] FORV CVM CALICE ET TAPANTIONE / S. Ton procedé est admirable, [...]' **becomes** (p. 324) '[...] FORV CVM CALICE ET TAPANTIONE / Il est vray toutefois que où Petrone a dit en parlant de cette *Acté*, qui gouuernoit Neron à sa mode, *Trimalcionis Tapanta est*, beaucoup de Critiques maintiennent qu'il seroit plus à propos de mettre *Tapantio*, ce que ie m'asseure ils auroient encore plustost fait s'ils eussent eu connoissance de l'inscription que ie te viens de reciter: mais neantmoins le *Tapanta* de Petrone ne laisse pas d'estre bon, & il seroit à souhaitter que par tout où le sens des Autheurs est clair & net, Messieurs les Critiques ne s'efforçassent point de le rendre encore meilleur ou plus intelligible, puis qu'au moyen de cela ils ne

corrigeroient pas si souuent qu'ils font *Magnificat* à Matines. / S. Ton procedé est admirable, [...]'

p. 257 add.: '[...] comme il est expressément porté dans son Breuiaire. / M. Cette beueuë des Iuges est assez ordinaire, quoy que tres-dangereuse, comme nous auons desia remarqué és exemples rapportez cy-dessus; mais d'autant que l'Arrest du 8. Ianuier est encore plus considerable que tous les precedens, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 327-328) '[...] comme il est expressément porté dans son Breuiaire. / M. Cela monstre bien, que tous les Iuges n'ont pas leu ce qui arriua au Cardinal *Paulo Aresio* lors qu'il n'estoit encore que Criminatiste à Naples, car sur ce qu'vn homme qu'il auoit condamné à mort soustient iusques au dernier souspir, qu'il mouroit innocent, & que les gehennes & tourmens l'auoient forcé d'auoüer des crimes, ausquels il n'auoit iamais songé: il voulut experimenter si ce que ce pauure miserable auoit dit estoit vray-semblable, & à cét effet, estant entré dans son escurie lors qu'il n'y auoit personne, il tua sa mule à coups de poignard, puis ayant commandé froidement qu'on la bridast, comme on luy eut rapporté qu'elle estoit morte, il fit emprisonner, & quelque temps aprés tourmenter celuy qui en auoit soin, lequel pressé, confessa que cette mule estoit vne meschante beste, qu'il ne la bridoit pas vne fois qu'elle ne le mordit, & que patience luy estant enfin eschappée, il luy auoit donné d'vn poignard dans les trippes: Ce que voyant le Seigneur *Aresio* il demeura encore plus estonné qu'vn fondeur de cloches, & aprés auoir donné dequoy viure à ce seruiteur innocent, il quitta la iudicature & prit l'habit de Theatin, soubs lequel il vescut si religieusement que Pie V. luy donna le bonnet rouge, comme à celuy qui pouuoit faire honneur au College des Cardinaux, par sa bonne vie & doctrine. Et ainsi tu peux voir, *Sainct-Ange*, qu'il arriue souuent, *vt / Iusani sapiens nomen ferat, æquus iniqui.* / & que cette beueuë des Iuges, quoy que tres-dangereuse, leur est assez ordinaire; comme nous auons desia remarqué és exemples rapportez cy-dessus; mais à cause que l'*Arrest du 8e. Ianuier* est encore plus considerable que tous les precedents, [...]'

p. 258 add.: '[...] & iamais aucun ne fut plus contraire aux iustes procedures que ce grand homme de bien Iuuenal y vouloit estre obseruées: / *Pone crucem seruo, meruit quo nomine seruus / Supplicium? quis testis adest? quis detulit? audi, / Nulla vnquam de morte hominis cunctatio longa est.* (Satyr. 6)/ Mais dira-t'on, il ne falloit point d'autres preuues, & d'autres formalitez, que la notorieté euidente, pour condamner le Cardinal comme pertubateur du repos public; [...]' **becomes** (pp. 329-330) '[...] & iamais aucun ne fut plus contraire aux iustes procedures que ces grands hommes de bien Iuuenal & Horace y vouloient estre obseruées: le premier en nous aduertissant de ne rien faire que par les formes ordinaires, / *Pone crucem seruo, meruit quo crimine seruus / Supplicium? quis testis adest? quis detulit? audi, / Nulla vnquam de morte hominis cunctatio longa est.* (Satyr. 6) / Et l'autre en establissant la proportion requise entre la peine & la faute, *adsit*, dit-il, / *Regula peccatis quæ pœnas irroget æquas, / Nec scutica dignum horribili sectere flagello.* / Mais dira-t'on, il ne falloit point d'autres preuues, & d'autres formalitez, que la notorieté euidente, pour condamner le *Cardinal* comme pertubateur du repos public; [...]'

p. 258 alt.: '[...] qu'il est souuent contraint d'accorder beaucoup de choses à la Reyne par respect, aux deux Princes pour ne choquer leur authorité, & aux autres Ministres à cause de la pluralité de leurs suffrages: [...]' **becomes** (p. 330) '[...] qu'il est souuent contraint d'accorder beaucoup de choses à la Reyne par respect, au Duc, & au Prince pour ne choquer leur authorité, & aux autres Ministres à cause de la pluralité de leurs suffrages: [...]'

p. 260 add.: '[...] *Praua, cubantia, prona, supina, atque absona tecta*. / S. Tu passes beaucoup de choses bien importantes assez legerement. / M. C'est parce que les affaires dont ie viens de parler, ressemblent aux mysteres de la Deesse Isis en Phocide, lesquels on n'osoit regarder curieusement, crainte de perdre la veuë: [...]' **becomes** (pp. 332-339) '[...] *Praua, cubantia, prona, supina, atque absona tecta.* / Mais posons le cas que cette notorieté y fust entiere, deuoit-on pour cela, ou pouuoit-on en conscience exposer vn *Cardinal* à la boucherie? & s'il n'est pas permis à Rome de tirer du sang aux personnes de cette qualité là, voire mesme dans leurs plus grandes maladies, sans la permission du Pape, comme le remarque *Iacobatius*, aprés Ostiensis & beaucoup d'autres, *Vnde si Cardinalis infirmetur, non minuitur ei sanguis sine Papæ licentia speciali, vt dicit Ostiensis, &c.* quelle apparence y auoit-il, de l'abandonner au zele indiscret de ceux qui l'auroient voulu esgorger? Certes ie ne veux point maintenant t'ennuyer par le recit que ie te pourrois faire des grands priuileges qui accompagnent, ie ne diray pas la dignité, puis

que celle des Euesques est plus considerable dans l'Eglise, mais l'office qu'ont les *Cardinaux*, d'administrer conniointement auec le Pape, duquel ils sont censez membres, & parties essentielles, toute la republique Chrestienne: Ie t'aduertiray seulement que les deux plus renommez Canonistes que nous ayons, s'accordent en ce point là, que *excepto Summo Pontifice, nullus est maior gradus quam Cardinalium*, dequoy Iacobatius rend cette raison, *quia sunt vnum corpus cum Pontifice, & quia vniuersæ Ecclesiæ consulunt, non solum Romanæ*: En suite dequoy le Iesuite *Platus* a fort bien dit aprés le Pape *Eugene IV. cum Cardinales a nemine nisi a summo Pontifice iudicentur, ipsi tamen simul cum Pontifice, omnes Ecclesiæ gradus diiudicant*; Et par là, *Sainct-Ange*, tu peux bien connoistre, que le *Cardinal*, quoy qu'il eust esté coupable de ce dont on l'accusoit, ne pouuoit estre condamné par le *Parlement*, puis qu'il n'y a que le Pape seul, qui puisse condamner ou proscrire ceux qu'il a vne fois admis à son sacré College. Et en effet tu peux voir dans la seconde partie de l'histoire des Cardinaux de Mr. *Aubery*, combien *Louys XI.* se trouua empesché, lors qu'apres auoir descouuert les trahisons du Cardinal *Balue* contre son Estat, il fut question de luy faire son procés: *Car aussi tost que ledit Cardinal, & l'Euesque de Verdun eurent esté arrestez, le Roy qui craignoit que la nouueauté d'vne chose qui ne s'estoit point encore veuë en France, n'alterest excessiuement les esprits de la Cour de Rome, deputa deux des plus celebres personnages du* Parlement *vers le Pape, pour iustifier son procedé, & deliberer auec sa Saincteté, comme quoy il deuoit se comporter dans ce rencontre*. Ie ne te diray point toutes les allées & venuës qui furent faites sur ce suiet là puis qu'elles ont esté fort bien deduites par ce fidel & diligent Historien. Tant y a que les longueurs ou formalitez de la Cour de Rome n'ayant pas pleu au Roy, il se contenta de tenir ce *Cardinal* en prison dix ou onze ans, iusques à ce que *Julian de la Rouuere* Legat en France, fit instance au nom du Pape *Sixte IV*. à sa Maiesté de le vouloir mettre en liberté: Mais neantmoins c'est vne chose assez remarquable que *Louys XI*. ait deputé deux Messieurs du *Parlement* au Pape, pour conuenir auec luy des moyens que l'on pouuoit tenir pour faire le procés à vn *Cardinal* atteint & conuaincu du crime de leze-Maiesté; & qu'en ce temps-cy le *Parlement* ait fait de son chef, & si tumultuairement le procés à vn autre *Cardinal*, que le Roy & toute la Maison Royalle declaroient innocent. Pour moy, si l'on ne pallie cette precipitation auec vn *silent leges inter arma*, ie ne sçay pas quelle autre excuse legitime on luy pourroit donner. Mais ce qui est plus estrange, c'est que le Pape mesme ne pouuant faire le procés ou deposer vn Cardinal Prestre, *nisi quatuor & sexaginta testibus auditis*, ou s'il est Diacre, *nisi septem & viginti*, comme il est expressément rapporté par S. Thomas *in secunda secundæ*, question 70. article 2. on a toutefois donné cet *Arrest* si terrible & sanglant contre le *Cardinal*, sans en auoir entendu aucun: aussi m'a-t'on dit de bonne part, que beaucoup de ces Messieurs en auoient eu de furieux remords de conscience; & ie m'asseure bien que si iamais pareille affaire se presente, il n'y aura pas tant de *Senatores Pedanei* qu'il s'en trouua cette fois-là. / S. Sçay-tu, *Mascurat*, que ces beaux discours que tu viens de faire, me font souuenir d'vn endroit de Iuuenal, où il dit, qu'il y a grand plaisir à se rencontrer sur les haures, & en certaines places & reduits, / --- *gaudent vbi vertice raso* / *Garrula securi narrare pericula Nautæ.* (Satyr. 12) / parce qu'on leur entend faire les plus beaux contes du monde, il n'est pas iusques au moindre Matelot qui n'eust, si on l'en veut croire, mieux gouuerné le vaisseau pendant la tempeste, que ne faisoit le maistre Pilote. Or pardonne-moy si ie te dis que tu en fais de mesme, car il t'est bien facile maintenant que tout le bruit est appaisé, de dire qu'il n'en falloit pas tant faire: mais si tu eusse esté l'vn des membres de ces quatre Compagnies qu'on vouloit exiler, peut-estre n'aurois-tu pas traité le *Cardinal* plus doucement. / M. I'aduouë que tu as raison, & que s'il y a du plaisir à entendre parler des tempestes que l'on a essuiées, il y en a encore dauantage à ne s'y estre point trouué. C'est pourquoy Lucrece disoit fort bien, / *Suaue mari magno turbantibus æquora ventis,* / *E terra magnum alterius spectare laborem*; / *Non quia vexari quemquam est iucunda voluptas,* / *Sed quibus ipse malis careas, quia cernere suaue est.* (Initio lib. 27?) / Et ie t'asseure, *Sainct-Ange*, mon amy, *sed tibi tantum & muro dixerim*, car ie ne passe desia que trop pour *Parlementaire*, dans l'esprit de quelques domestiques de son *Eminence*, qu'encore que ie fusse fort content & satisfait pendant tous ces troubles de n'auoir quasi rien à craindre ny à esperer de quel costé qu'ils pussent tourner, i'estois neantmoins extremement fasché de voir cette Auguste Compagnie, à laquelle i'ay tousiours porté beaucoup de respect, s'estre insensiblement engagée à souffrir des violences, ou à les faire; c'est pourquoy pourueu que tu m'aduouë que *l'Arrest* contre le *Cardinal* en a esté vne des principales, nous serons bien tost d'accord. / S. Tant de violence que tu voudras, mais toutesfois s'il se fust trouué quelqu'vn qui eust voulu mettre cet *Arrest* en execution, peut-estre qu'il auroit passé pour tres-iuste: car qui est mort a toûiours tort. / M. Il ne m'est iamais tombé en phantaisie, qu'il y eut des personnes assez despourueuës de sens, d'humanité & de iugement, pour porter cette affaire au

point que tu viens de dire, car outre la difficulté qu'il y a d'oster la vie à vn Ministre approuué du Roy & de la Reyne, & qui d'ailleurs se fait bien garder, sans laisser la sienne au mesme endroit, ou sans la perdre sur vn eschafaut & en belle compagnée; l'action de soy-mesme est si noire, si horrible, & si criminelle, que Henry III. tout Roy qu'il estoit, fut deux iours entiers à chercher quelques pauures, miserables desesperez, qui voulussent entreprendre sur la personne du *Cardinal de Guise*, quoy qu'il fust desnué de toute assistence. De plus, c'est que les peines tant temporelles que spirituelles estant comme inseparablement iontes & annexées à ces violences extraordinaires, *adeo quidem vt sacris canonibus sanctitum sit, eos qui in Cardinalem manus iniecerint violentas, aut fugarint, aut insequuti fuerint, seu ad hoc dederint consilium, vel fauorem, criminis læsæ Maiestatis reos, maximis & multiplicibus pœnis esse plectendos, si ipsi Apostolici throni violauerint maiestatem*, comme dit le Pape Eugene IV. dans Iacobatius, il s'est aussi rencontré heureusement, que aucun ne s'est iamais rendu executeur de ces dernieres violences à qui l'on n'ait peu dire auec verité, / *Turno tempus erit, magno cum optauerit emptum / Jntactum Pallanta, & cum spolia ista, diemque Oderit.* (Æneid. 10) / à cause du chastiment qui a tousiours suiuy cette action par vne fin miserable & desastreuse de ceux qui l'auoient commise. Ainsi voyons-nous dans Monsieur *Aubery*, que *François Marie Duc d'Vrbin*, ayant mis la main sur le Cardinal *Alidosio*, ny sa qualité de Duc, ny celle d'estre nepueu du Pape Iules II. ne l'empescherent pas d'estre excommunié & priué de ses Estats, iusques à ce que son oncle estant atteint d'vne violente & dangereuse maladie, il le receut en grace: mais non-obstant cela, le mesme parricide luy fut encore imputé par *Leon X.* qui prit de là occasion de le despoüiller de son Duché. Ainsi pouuons-nous obseruer dans l'Histoire de Hongrie escrite par *Fumée*, que le *Moine Georges Cardinal de Transiluanie*, ayant esté assassiné par l'ordre exprés de Ferdinand Roy de Hongrie, *tous ceux qui se trouuerent à sa mort, tomberent en de grandes infortunes, car le Marquis Sforce bien tost aprés fut mis en route, & prins par les Turcs, qui luy firent endurer de grands tourmens: le Capitaine Monin eut la teste trenchée à Sainct-Germain en Piedmont: Marc Antoine Ferraro l'an 1557. fut decapité par le commandement du Cardinal de Trente en Alexandrie: vn autre fut écartelé en Prouence par les François: le Cheualier Campeggio fut l'an 1562. en presence de l'Empereur Ferdinand creué par vn sanglier en Boëme, & la Transiluanie ne demeura gueres sous l'obeyssance de sa Maiesté.* I'adiousterois encore combien la mort violente du *Cardinal de Guise*, fut mal entenduë à Rome, & quelle ruine elle apporta à celuy qui en auoit esté l'autheur, si nos Histoires de France n'en estoient toutes pleines, ou que ces trois exemples, outre lesquels ie ne sçay si l'on en pourroit trouuer d'autres, ne fussent que trop valables pour confirmer aussi bien la verité de ces vers d'Horace; / *Raro antecedentem scelestum*, / *Deseruit pede pœna claudo.* (Ode 2. lib. 3). / que de cette sentence d'Herodote (lib.2), *Magnorum iniuriarum à Principibus illatarum magnæ solent esse vltiones.* Et pour monstrer pareillement que iamais personne n'a entrepris sur des *Cardinaux*, soit pour satisfaire à ses passions desordonnées, ou pour executer les *Arrests* fulminez contre eux par des puissances temporelles, & desquelles ils n'estoient point iusticiables, qui n'ait tost ou tard porté les peines de sa temerité. Aprés quoy si tu te veux persuader que *l'Arrest du Parlement* estoit capable de perdre le *Cardinal*, tout protegé qu'il estoit par des premieres puissances de cet Empire, & qu'il se fust à la fin trouué quelque fol ou desesperé, qui sans se soucier des loix & des canons, ny de tout le mal qui luy en pourroit arriuer, l'auroit mis à execution: c'est ce que ie ne puis pas te ceder si facilement, & ie croy mesme que le *Parlement* ne l'auroit iamais donné, s'il n'eut esté incité, seduit, & poussé, sans que ie te veüille dire, ny quand, ny pourquoy, ny comment, *tanquam neruis alienis mobile lignum*. / S. Tu passe beaucoup de choses bien importantes assez legerement, & tu ressemble en cela au Soleil de Mars, duquel les Medecins disent qu'il se faut donner de garde soigneusement, *quia mouet, sed non resoluit.* / M. C'est parce que les affaires dont ie viens de parler, ressemblent aux mysteres de la Deesse Isis en Phocide, lesquels on n'osoit regarder curieusement, crainte de perdre la veuë: [...]'

p. 266 add.: '[...] Et si tu me demandes maintenant ce qu'il m'en semble, ie te diray ingenuëment, qu'il est impossible de cognoistre quelle est la Religion des Turcs soit pour la foy, ou les ceremonies, par la seule lecture de l'Alcoran; tout de mesme, sans comparaison toutes-fois, qu'vn homme qui n'auroit leu que le Nouueau Testament, ne pourroit iamais cognoistre le détail de la Religion Catholique, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 345-346) '[...] Et si tu me demandes maintenant ce qu'il m'en semble, ie te diray ingenuëment que ce n'est pas d'auiourd'huy que l'on est curieux en France, de sçauoir ce que dit l'*Alcoran*, puis que Belleforest se plaint en son Histoire des neuf Charles, que pendant le regne du dernier, *l'Alcoran de Mahomet estoit recherché auec plus d'instance chez les Libraires de ce Royaume, que les bons liures des Saincts Docteurs, ou que la S. Escriture mesme*:

Et nonobstant cela, nous ne voyons point que personne en France ait iamais esté le moins du monde soupçonné du Mahometisme, dautant que ce n'est pas l'ordinaire de disputer sur les principes, qu'il faut plustost supposer & croire: mais bien sur tout ce qui en est deduit, & dequoy chacun pense estre obligé en conscience d'auoir le plus d'éclaircissement qu'il luy est possible: ioint aussi qu'il est hors le pouuoir d'vn homme tant habile qu'il soit, de cognoistre quelle est la Religion des Turcs soit pour la foy, ou les ceremonies, par la seule lecture de *l'Alcoran*; tout de mesme, sans comparaison toutesfois, qu'vn homme qui n'auroit leu que le *Nouueau Testament*, ne pourroit iamais cognoistre le détail de la Religion Catholique, [...]'

p. 267 add.: '[...] comme ie dauberay sur la fripperie du Cardinal. / M. Dix si tu veux, fussent-ils plus longs que ceux du Pentamerre de *Rutilius*, qui est le seul en toute l'Antiquité composé de deux paroles, / *Bellerofonteis sollicitudinibus*: ou que ceux d'Aristophanes, & de l'Epigramme Grec que Scaliger a traduit en semblables paroles Latines, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 346-347) '[...] comme ie dauberay sur la fripperie du Cardinal. / M. Vne douzaine si tu veux, fussent-ils plus longs que ceux du Pentamerre de *Rutilius*, qui est le seul en toute l'Antiquité composé de deux paroles, / *Bellerofonteis sollicitudinibus*: ou que ceux d'Aristophanes de dix-huict ou vingt syllabes, & de l'Epigramme Grec que Scaliger a traduit en semblables paroles Latines, [...]'

p. 267 alt.: '[...] mirent nostre boutique quasi sans dessus dessous, [...]' **becomes** (p. 347) '[...] mirent nostre boutique quasi ç'en dessus dessous, [...]'

p. 271 add.: '[...] Et en effect cette qualité d'Estranger n'a iamais esté rebutée és occasions du gouuernement, ny par les gens de bien, ny par les bons Politiques, ny par les desinteressez, quoy qu'elle ait tousiours seruy de pretexte aux factieux, aux enuieux, & aux ennemis de l'Estat, ou de la personne sur laquelle il n'y auoit rien autre chose à redire. Et qu'ainsi ne soit, a-t'on iamais trouué estrange, qu'vn Roy, vn Empereur, vn Prince Souuerain, qui sont des personnes si necessaires à leurs peuples, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 351-354) '[...] Et en effet cette qualité d'*Estranger* n'a iamais esté rebutée és occasions du gouuernement, ny par les gens de bien, ny par les bons Politiques, ny par les desinteressez, quoy qu'elle ait tousiours seruy de pretexte aux factieux, aux enuieux, & aux ennemis de l'Estat, ou de la personne sur laquelle il n'y auoit rien autre chose à redire. Et qu'ainsi ne soit, voyons vn peu ce qu'en a dit non quelque Pedant crotté, non quelque Theologien plus versé és disputes de Sorbonne qu'aux affaires d'Estat, non quelque soldat mieux timbre d'escusson que de ceruelle: mais ce grand homme en Loix, en Theologie, & en Politique, *Claude Seissel* Euesque de Marseille, & Ambassadeur pour *Louis XII*. à Rome, pendant le Pontificat du Pape *Leon X*. car nous pouuons apprendre de luy, ou plustost de cet excellent liure qu'il nous a donné, *de la façon qu'il faut gouuerner & policer le Royaume de France*, quel estat l'on y doit faire des *Estrangers*, par quels moyens on les y doit faire venir, & en quelles affaires on les doit employer: ce que i'aurois bien desiré te faire dire par l'Autheur mesme, mais puis que ie n'ay veu que la traduction Latine de son dit liure, faite par *Sleidan*, tu ne trouueras pas mauuais que ie me serue d'vn si bon Interprete. *Jn primis autem elaborandum est, vt qui sunt in eius familia viri præstantes consilio & virtute,* (il parle de la façon de matter, & de contrecarrer vn Prince, ou Roy voisin, lors qu'il se fait trop puissant) *ad nostras traducantur partes. Quod quidem nemo facilius quam Galliæ Rex efficere potest, propter omnis generis Præfecturas, & munera publica, quorum infinitus est numerus: ideoque fit vt exteri, postea quam copias, & emolumenta Galliæ semel experti sunt, inuitissimi redeant ad suos. Imo non semel compertum est, illos quum pro virtute ac merito honeste & liberaliter essent a nobis habiti, non minorem nobis fidem præstitisse, quam nostræ originis atque lingæ homines. Beneficiis enim nostris & humanitate capti, agros & possessiones quas domi habent, sæpe relinquunt, & nobis sese totos tradunt, & perspecta eorum virtute, grauissimas aliquando præfecturas a Regibus obtinent, & prouinciis finibusque tuendis præponuntur, & præclare de Republica sæpe meriti sunt: ac docere possim quibus temporibus illi, quum suam operam nobis detulissent, repudiati, maximis incommodis Galliam affecerint. Hoc autem non eo pertinet, vt existimem ab initio statim illis fidendum, aut nullam rem maioris momenti committendam esse: verum vt beneuole recipiantur, & vbi suæ virtutis ac probitatis fidem fecerint, ornentur & augeantur.* / S. Il faut aduoüer que voila vn puissant Aduocat pour le *Cardinal*, car ce passage est formel, & tellement bien circonstancié, qu'il semble n'auoir esté fait que pour fermer la bouche à tout ce que non la raison, mais la passion & l'aueuglement fait dire auiourd'huy contre le *Ministre Estranger*. / M. Tu serois bien peu iudicieux si tu ne preferois l'authorité d'vn homme consommé dans les plus grandes affaires de cette Monarchie, à l'indiscret babil de certaines personnes, qui n'ont pas si tost

appris trois ou quatre sentences de Seneque ou de la Bible, qu'elles s'estiment plus capables de gouuerner des Royaumes, que ceux qui n'ont iamais fait autre chose, & qui ne laissent pas d'y estre bien empeschez. Aussi leur pourroit-on dire, comme l'on fit autrefois dans Rome, *Vbi Consul loquitur, conticescat Ædilus*: Mais i'aime mieux neantmoins traitter auec eux *pleno iure*, & leur proposer des raisons & exemples qui peuuent à mon aduis appuyer puissamment cette opinion de *Seissel* & ruiner par consequent celle qu'ils soustiennent auec si peu d'apparence. Car tant s'en faut que *Seissel* soit d'aduis qu'il faille oster les charges & l'administration des affaires aux Estrangers considerables, lors qu'ils se viennent d'eux mesmes habituer en France, & qu'ils les acquierent par leurs merites & grands seruices; Qu'il conseille mesme lors qu'ils n'y viennent pas par inclination, de les y faire venir par interest, afin de ruer, comme l'on dit, d'vne pierre deux coups, *& vna fidelia duos parites dealbare*, en priuant les autres Princes nos voisins, du seruice qu'ils en pourroient receuoir, pour l'approprier à nous mesmes. Et en effet les Espagnols firent bien tout ce qu'ils peurent, pendant que le *Seignor Giulio* negocioit à Milan, au nom de sa Saincteté, pour l'engager, en luy promettant des Offices tres-honnorables, & des appointemens tres-aduantageux, au seruice de la Couronne d'Espagne, lesquels neantmoins il refusa aussi franchement, comme il se donna, & destina, & deuoüa, s'il faut ainsi dire quelque temps aprés par vne pure inclination qu'il auoit pour la France, à auoir soin de ses interests. Mais pour ne point venir au particulier, & à l'hypothese auparauant que d'auoir estably la these & le general, a-t'on iamais trouué estrange, qu'vn Roy, vn Empereur, vn Prince Souuerain, qui sont des personnes si necessaires à leurs peuples, [...]'

p. 272 add.: '[...] la France par exemple des Espagnoles, des Allemandes, des Italiennes, des Lorraines, quoy que par l'ordre estably dans le Royaume, elles puissent auoir droict de le gouuerner & d'y exercer des Regences? trouue-t'on aussi à redire, que la Cour de nos Roys soit aussi bien composée de Princes estrangers que de naturels, soit legitimes ou bastards, & que ces premiers y obtiennent quelquefois plus d'authorité que les autres? [...]' **becomes** (p. 355) '[...] la France par exemple des Espagnoles, des Allemandes, des Italiennes, des Lorraines, quoy que par l'ordre estably dans le Royaume, elles puissent auoir droit de le gouuerner & d'y exercer des Regences? s'est-on formalisé qu'on ait donné des Precepteurs estrangers aux Enfans de France, comme l'estoit Benedictus Theocrenus natif de Genes, & qui mourut Euesque de Grace, de ceux de François premier? trouue-t'on aussi à redire, que la Cour de nos Roys soit aussi bien composée de Princes estrangers que de naturels, soit legitimes ou bastards, & que ces premiers y obtiennent quelquefois plus d'authorité que les autres? [...]'

p. 272 add.: '[...] & les *Romains* mesme des Empereurs tantost d'Espagne, tantost de Thrace, d'Afrique, d'Arabie, Hongrie, Dalmatie, Narbonne, Genes, Milan, & de quelque autre ville & pays que ce pût estre: [...]' **becomes** (p. 355) '[...] & les *Romains* mesmes des Empereurs tantost d'Espagne, comme estoient les *Traians*, les *Adrians*, les *Theodoses*, les *Arcadius*, les *Honorius*, qui ont fait dire à Claudian (De laudib. Serenæ), / *Sola nouum Latiis vectigal Iberia rebus* / *Contulit Augustos*. / tantost aussi de Thrace, d'Afrique, d'Arabie, Hongrie, Dalmatie, Narbonne, Genes, Milan, & de quelque autre ville & pays que ce pût estre: [...]'

p. 273 add.: '[...] ny de plus de cinquante lieuës aux enuirons: si Paschal, Kirchner, & presque tous ceux qui ont traitté de Legato, n'excluent point les estrangers des Ambassades, quoy que ce soit vn employ ialoux, & des plus importants qui soit en vn Royaume ou Republique; [...]' **becomes** (p. 356) '[...] ny de plus de cinquante lieuës aux enuirons; si à Rome les principaux offices de la *Datarie*, sont quasi tous remplis de Flamands & de Liegeois, nonobstant qu'ils puissent iournellement fauoriser leurs compatriotes en la collation & expedition des Benefices au preiudice des Italiens. Si en Turquie ceux qui gouuernent les prouinces & commandent les armées ne sont pas nez suiets du Grand Turc; Si *Paschal*, *Kirchner*, & presque tous ceux qui ont traité de Legato, n'excluent point les estrangers des Ambassades, quoy que ce soit vn employ des plus ialoux, & des plus importants qui soit en vn Royaume ou Republique; [...]'

p. 273 alt.: '[...] mais pour le pauure *Ministre*, s'il ne trouue vn puissant Roy pour l'espauler, comme fit Henry IV. Monsieur de Sully contre les menaces du Comte de Soissons, & Louys XIII. le Cardinal de Richelieu, [...]' **becomes** (p. 357) '[...] mais pour le pauure *Ministre*, s'il ne trouue vn puissant Roy pour l'espauler, comme fit Henry IV. Monsieur *de Sully* contre les menaces de Monsieur d'Espernon, & Louys XIII. le *Cardinal de Richelieu*, [...]'

p. 274 add.: '[...] & auec cela ils concluent que l'Arrest de 1617. doit auoir lieu contre le Cardinal, & qu'il le faut chasser comme autheur des guerres, des maux & desordres de toute la France. Mais ie vous prie bonnes gens qui allez si viste en besogne, ne sçauez-vous pas bien le dire d'Aristote, *qui aduertit ad pauca facile iudicat?*' **becomes** (p. 358) '[...] & auec cela ils concluent que *l'Arrest de* 1617. doit auoir lieu contre le *Cardinal*, & qu'il le faut chasser comme autheur des guerres, des maux & desordres de toute la France. Certes il me souuient d'auoir leu dans Arnobe & dans Tertullian, que les Chrestiens estoient anciennement accusez par les Payens, d'estre cause de tous les fleaux que Dieu enuoyoit aux hommes, *Si Nilus exundauit in arua, si suspenduntur nubila, si cælum stupet*, on ne s'en prenoit qu'à cette nouuelle secte, & la chose passa si auant, que S. Augustin prit occasion de composer ces beaux liures de la Cité de Dieu, pour deliurer les Chrestiens de cette calomnie. Et pourquoy ne dirons-nous pas le mesme auiourd'huy du *Cardinal Mazarin*, puis qu'au dire de ces Messieurs, encore qu'il n'y ait que cinq ou six ans qu'il est dans le Ministere, c'est neantmoins luy qui est cause de tous les desordres qui sont en France, voire mesme de ceux qui l'affligent depuis la mort de Henry IV. quoy qu'auec aussi peu de raison qu'en auoit le lyon, de reprocher à l'agneau dans la premiere fable de Phædrus, qu'il luy faisoit boire l'eau trouble. Mais ie vous prie bonnes gens qui allez si viste en besogne, ne sçauez-vous pas bien le dire d'Aristote, *qui aduertit ad pauca facile iudicat?*'

p. 274 alt.: '[...] de fol Iuge briefue sentence. / M. Et si l'aduis du Sage est si veritable, si important, si necessaire, si vous le voulez faire obseruer si precisement, pourqouy n'vsez-vous pas de pareille deference enuers le Prophete Zacharie, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 358-359) '[...] de fol Iuge briéue sentence. / M. Tu l'y peux donner telle explication qu'il te plaira, mais pour venir au faict si l'aduis de Salomon est si veritable, si important, si necessaire, si vous le voulez faire obseruer si precisément, pourquoy n'vsez-vous pas de pareille deference enuers le Prophete Zacharie, [...]'

p. 277 add.: '[...] *Aloisio Gritti* Venitien vne partie de la Turquie, soubs Solyman: *Pontus de la Garde* simple Gentilhomme François, la Suede: & de nostre temps le Marquis *Spinola* Geneuois, n'a-t'il pas tres-fidelement, & tres-courageusement seruy le Roy d'Espagne? Certes toutes les Histoires ne sont pleines que de semblables exemples. [...]' **becomes** (p. 362) '[...] *Aloisio Gritti* Venitien, vne partie de la Turquie soubs Solyman, *Pontus de la Gardie* simple Gentilhomme François, la Suede: certain *Callimachus* natif de Genes, comme veut le Protenotaire Cortesius, ou d'vne petite ville de l'Estat Ecclesiastique, appellée Santo Gemini, comme l'asseurent tous les autres, la Pologne: & de nostre temps le Marquis *Spinola* Geneuois, n'a-t'il pas tres-fidelement, & tres-courageusement seruy le Roy d'Espagne? Cette grande Maison de *Medina Cæli* ne prend-elle pas son origine de Bernard de Bearn bastard de la Maison de Foix, qui fut si fort en faueur soubs Henry II. Roy de Castille, qu'il luy fit espouser sa niepce, & rendit par ce moyen la succession capable de la Royauté: Les Comtes d'*Aguillard*, la Maison de *Vellasco* dont le chef est Connestable de Castille, ne sont-elles pas d'origine Françoise? N'a-t'on pas veu des Comtes de *Mongommery* François, aussi facilement admis aux principales charges & dignitez d'Angleterre que s'ils eussent esté naturels de ce pays-là? Certes toutes les Histoires ne sont pleines que de semblables exemples. [...]'

p. 278 add.: '[...] Et ce noms illustres dans nos Histoires des *Vrsins*, des *Triuulses*, des *Strozzi*, des *Biragues*, des *Gondi*, des *Dornanes*, des *Stuarts*, *Bassompierre* & *Chombert*, ne sont-ils pas originaires d'Italie, de Corsegue, d'Angleterre, d'Allemagne? [...]' **becomes** (p. 363) '[...] Et ce noms illustres dans nos Histoires des *Vrsins*, de *Triuulses*, des *Strozzi*, des *Biragues*, des *Gondi*, des *Delbenes*, des *Bonzi*, des *Dornanes*, des *Stuarts*, *Bassompierre*, & *Chombert*, ne sont-ils pas originaires d'Italie, de Corsegue, d'Angleterre, d'Allemagne? [...]'

p. 278 add.: '[...] au subiect de quelques plaintes que faisoit Monsieur le Prince contre les Estrangers de ce temps-là, & que ie l'ay copié tout entiere dans mon petit repertoire, il ne tiendra qu'à toy si tu veux d'en faire la lecture.' **becomes** (p. 363) '[...] au suiet de quelques plaintes que faisoit Monsieur le Prince contre les Estrangers de ce temps-là, comme aussi par l'autheur du Discours intitulé, *La Defense de la France contre l'enuie*, qui a esté inseré par le bon-homme *Richer* au troisiéme volume de ses Mercures, & que i'ay copié ces deux plaidoyers dans mon repertoire, il ne tiendra qu'à toy si tu veux d'en faire la lecture.'

p. 278 add.: '[...] parce que tout le reste estoit griffonné d'vne estrange sorte, me voila auiourd'huy preconisé de la mesme façon par toy, qui veux couurir ton ignorance en accusant la mienne; [...]' **becomes** (pp. 363-364) '[...] parce que tout le reste estoit griffonné d'vne estrange sorte. Nancelius en disoit autant de l'escriture de Ramus, & vn certain quidam demandoit chez le Prince de nos Poëtes Comiques. / *An obsecro Hercle, habent quoque Gallinæ manus / Nam has quidem Gallina scripsit.* / Me voila donc auiourd'huy preconisé de la mesme façon par toy, qui veux couurir ton ignorance en accusant la mienne; [...]'

p. 282 add.: '[...] *Et Messire* Alfonce Corse dict Dornano, *fut aussi Mareschal de France soubs l'inuincible Henry le Grand IV. du nom, lequel il seruit tres-fidelement.* Vous voyez doncque par là, Messieurs, qui *anathematisez* si facilement les Ministres Estrangers, combien vous estes ignorans dans nos Histoires, & que si d'auanture vous auez plus estudié la Bible, vous ne l'auez pas toutesfois bien entenduë. [...]' **becomes** (pp. 367-369) '[...] *Et Messire* Alfonse Corse dit Dornano, *fut aussi Mareschal de France sous l'inuincible Henry le Grand quatriesme du nom, lequel il seruit tres-fidelement.* Voila donc comme *le Grain* parle de tous les Estrangers indifferemment: ce que n'a pas fait l'Autheur du Discours cy-dessus mentionné, qui s'est tenu precisément aux Italiens, parce qu'il plaidoit lors pour vn principal Ministre de leur nation, auquel on obiectoit tant d'autres choses, qu'il eut esté bien difficile de s'estendre beaucoup sur chacune en particulier. *On met pourtant leur fidelité en doute, & veut-on que pour l'amour d'eux les Estrangers soient incapables d'auoir des charges en France, comme si ce Royaume auoit passé vn seul regne de ses Roys, sans se seruir d'Estrangers, & particulierement d'Jtaliens, dont la pluspart ont eu de l'inclination à sa bonne Fortune. Rien ne seruit tant aux secondes entreprises de la Maison d'Aniou en Italie, que l'assistance du* Marquis de Crotone, *du* Prince de Tarente, *d'*Antoine Callere, *& de* Iacque Picinin, *qui refuserent tous les aduantages qui leurs furent offerts du costé du Pape, & du Roy d'Arragon, pour courir à leur ruine, au seruice de* Iean d'Aniou Duc de Calabre. Iacques Galliot *Italien s'estant donné au seruice de* Louys XI. *apres la mort de* Charles *dernier Duc de Bourgogne, qu'il auoit fidelement seruy, fut honnoré de belles charges en ses armées, & rendit de si vtiles seruices, que sa memoire est encore estimée en ceux qui sont descendus de luy. Le* Cardinal de la Rouere *du titre Sainct Pierre in Vincula*, François de Sainct Seuerin *Comte de Gaiaz*, Rodolphe de Gonzague, & François Marquis de Mantouë, *honnorez de grandes charges en l'armée de* Charles huictiesme, *luy firent plus rendre de places, que toutes ses troupes n'en eussent peu forcer*. Iean Iacques Triuulce *facilita la reprise de Milan à Louys douziesme, y fut aprés Vice-Roy, & Lieutenant general en tout le Duché.* Cesar Fregose *fut Lieutenant general de François premier en Piedmont, y tint les forces de l'Empereur en balance, iusques à la perte de Pauie, & lors encore* Theodore Triuulce *autre Chef Italien, estoit Gouuerneur de Milan. Quand Henry second renouuela les desseins d'Italie, le plus confident seruiteur qu'il eut fut* Pierre Strozzi, *il le fit son Lieutenant general en Toscane, & depuis encore Mareschal de France l'an* 1556. *en laquelle charge il rendit tant de seruices, que les plus grands Capitaines François le pleurerent au siege de Thionuille, où il fut tué d'vne harquebusade tandis que le Duc de Guise luy tenoit la main sur l'espaule, & consultoit auec luy, des moyens d'expugner cette place. Personne ne peut nier les vtiles seruices du* Mareschal de Retz, *qui par ses charges & ses actions a donné le premier lustre à cette grande Maison de Gondy sous Charles IX. Et nostre grand Henry ne croyoit point faire de tort à ses autres Chefs de guerre, quand il disoit que le* Mareschal d'Ornano *estoit l'vn de ses plus vaillants & plus vtiles seruiteurs. Voila des Jtaliens employez, honnorablement reconneus, & tres-fidelement enuieillis au seruice de nos Roys depuis huict ou neuf vingts ans, le temps est assez long pour inferer vne possession immemoriale des bienfaits de la France, ou pour le moins pour empescher leurs enuieux de les en estimer indignes, si ce n'estoit vne coustume receuë au cabinet des Princes, de calomnier les Estrangers, & d'empescher par ce moyen les seruices qu'ils peuuent rendre*. Vous voyez donc par là, Messieurs, qui *anathematisez* si facilement les Ministres Estrangers, combien vous estes ignorans dans nos Histoires, & que si d'auanture vous auez plus estudié la Bible, vous ne l'auez pas toutefois bien entenduë. [...]'

p. 282 alt. + add.: '[...] car ie ne iuge pas volontiers de plus sçauant que moy. / M. Tu fais iustement comme ce *Iabolenus Priscus* de Pline le Ieune, lequel se trouuant aux Declamations serieuses de *Passienus Paulus* Cheualier Romain, [...]' **becomes** (p. 370) '[...] car ie ne iuge pas volontiers de plus sçauant que moy. / M. La bonne Reyne *Constantia* pensoit estre bien obligée au Roy Robert son mary, de ce qu'il auoit fait mention d'elle en l'Hymne qui commence, *O constantia Martyrum*. Certain flusteur nommé *Princeps*, qui auoit eu *dum Pegma rapitur*, la cuisse rompuë, pensa mourir d'aise, au rapport de Phædrus, lors qu'estant retourné quelques iours aprés sur le

theatre, il se persuada que ce vers auquel le Peuple Romain faisoit tant d'acclamations, / *Lætare incolumis Roma saluo PRINCIPE*, (lib. 5 fab. 87) / n'estoit dit, ny applaudy qu'à son suiet, au lieu qu'il se deuoit entendre de l'Empereur. Ainsi *Jabolenus Priscus* dans Pline le Ieune (lib. 6 ep. 25), se trouuant aux Declamations serieuses de *Passienus Paulus* Cheualier Romain, [...]'

p. 282 alt.: '[...] & troubla ainsi toute la feste par sa folie, comme tu m'as maintenant troublé par la tienne: car cét apostrophe à ta personne, n'estant que pour orner mon discours, tu n'y deuois pas respondre, [...]' **becomes** (p. 370) '[...] & troubla ainsi toute la feste par sa folie. Imagine-toy donc que tu viens de faire quasi la mesme chose: car cet apostrophe à ta personne, n'estant que pour orner mon discours, tu n'y deuois pas respondre, [...]'

p. 283 add.: 'S. Hé que Diable sçay-ie si tu ne dégaines point encore quelque figure de ta Rhetorique, pour auoir occasion de me dire que ie suis vn double sot, en commettant vne double faute.' **becomes** (p. 371) 'S. Hé que Diable sçay-ie si tu ne dégaignes point encore quelque figure de ta Rhetorique, pour auoir occasion de me dire, quand tu la deurois faire venir d'aussi loin comme tu as fait les histoires precedentes, que ie suis vn double sot, en commettant vne double faute.'

p. 284 alt.: '[...] *Christos meos*. Et cela estant de la sorte vn Estranger ne peut-il pas plus facilement s'exempter de toutes ces cabales & intrigues, qu'vn naturel du païs, [...]' **becomes** (p. 372) '[...] *Christos meos*. Or cela estant de la sorte, vn Estranger ne peut-il pas plus facilement s'exempter de toutes ces cabales & intrigues, qu'vn naturel du pays, [...]'

p. 284 add.: '[...] & par mille autres causes quand il auroit puissamment resisté à toutes les precedentes; & s'il eut fallu, Sainct-Ange, que les instances des factieux contre le Cardinal eussent preualu, tu aurois veu les prodigieuses confusions que la nomination de quelque autre à sa place nous auroit apportées, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 372-375) '[...] & par mille autres causes, quand il auroit puissamment resisté à toutes les precedentes. Et si Monsieur le *Cardinal* n'eut point esté tel, crois-tu, *Sainct-Ange*, que la Maison Royalle se fut conseruée si long temps en l'vnion où elle a toûiours esté depuis la mort du Roy defunt. Crois-tu que le Duc d'Orleans & le Prince de Condé se seroient exposez aux perils les plus euidens, pour porter à l'enuy l'vn de l'autre la terreur aussi bien que l'honneur & la reputation de nos armes aux quatre coins de l'Europe: & n'est-ce pas à cause de cette independance qu'il iuge de tous les differents de la Cour, comme de choses qui luy sont tout à fait indifferentes; qu'il blasme & louë les personnes suiuant leurs merites; qu'il les employe suiuant leur capacité; qu'il dit & opine librement dans le Conseil ce qu'il iuge à propos pour les necessitez de l'Estat; qu'il tient la balance droite parmy les diuerses factions qui s'éleuent de fois & d'autres en ce Royaume; qu'il accorde les differents de nos Princes comme feroit vn bon pere ceux de ses enfans; qu'il conseille à la Reyne ce qui est de la raison, de l'honnesteté, de la iustice, & de la necessité de ses affaires; & en vn mot qu'il butte, sans auoir égard à personne du monde, à ce qui est seulement du bien & de la seureté de cét Estat, pour lequel l'on ne sçauroit nier qu'il ne soit tres-passioné, puis que au lieu du repos dont il pourroit ioüir à Rome, & des contentemens extraordinaires qu'il receuroit d'y viure entre ses parens & amis, dans la tranquillité que le dégagement des affaires luy donneroit, ou auec des occupations, s'il y en vouloit auoir, qui ne seroient peut-estre moins serieuses, ny moins honorables que celles dont il est maintenant chargé; il se resout genereusement d'obseruer la promesse qu'il fit au Roy defunt, & de recognoistre tant de temoignages d'affection que la France luy a rendus, en seruant nostre ieune Monarque son filleul, aux despens de sa reputation, puis qu'elle est tellement noircie par les factieux; au peril mesme de sa vie, puis qu'on l'abandonne à qui la voudra auoir; & en contribuant toutes les forces & toute l'industrie que Dieu luy a données plus liberalement qu'à beaucoup d'autres, pour affermir le throsne de ce *petit Dauid* au milieu des tempestes tant domestiques qu'estrangeres, dont il est menacé. Et cette resolution est si loüable & si genereuse, qu'elle a mesme forcé ceux qui en reçoiuent plus de dommages, à luy donner les plus grandes loüanges, / Por vos el niño REY esta seguro / Aña descansa en vuestra prouidencia, / S-iendo vuestro conseio vn fuerte muro, / Y mas que lanças mil vuestra prudencia / En vuestro pecho sabio, y braco duro / Consiste la animosa resistencia / Que dando exemplo viuo, y claro espeyo / Que vence mas que el braço el buen conseio / En suite dequoy ie te puis bien dire, *S. Ange*, [...] (false comma or missing part in this second edition?) / S. Au moins deurois tu me demander, puis que tu veux parler d'Espagnol, si ie suis homme à l'entendre, comme tu faisois tantost de l'Italien. / M. Ces deux langues sont maintenant si communes, qu'il se trouue peu de personnes, ou d'esprit ou de condition, qui n'en

ayent la cognoissance; ie te disois donc, que si les instances que l'on faisoit icy ces iours passez pour l'eloignement du *Cardinal* eussent preualu, tu aurois veu les prodigieuses confusions que la nomination de quelque autre à sa place nous auroit apportées, [...]'

p. 286 alt. + add.: '[...] aprés auoir esté mis à la coupelle du Cabinet, ne s'en defendirent pas si bien que Monsieur *l'Abbé de Beaumont*, Docteur en Theologie, pour des raisons que ie ne puis pas deuiner. Mais neantmoins la recherche que l'on fit de tous ces grands personnages, témoigne assez que l'intention de la Cour est tousiours bonne, qu'elle voudroit faire les choses pour le mieux, aduantageusement & suiuant que tout le monde desireroit qu'elles se fissent; [...]' **becomes** (p. 376) '[...] n'y resisterent pas si bien que Monsieur *l'Abbé de Beaumont*, Docteur en Theologie & maintenant tres-digne Euesque de Rodez, qui fut aussi preferé à vn autre des plus brillantes lumieres du Clergé, parce que n'estant inferieur à tous les precedens, il auoit encore d'autres qualitez qui firent pancher finalement la balance de son costé. Mais quoy qu'il en soit, la recherche si particuliere que l'on fit de tous ces grands personnages, témoigne assez que l'intention de la Cour est tousiours bonne, qu'elle voudroit faire les choses pour le mieux, aduantageusement & suiuant que tout le monde desireroit qu'elles se fissent; [...]'

p. 288 add.: '[...] *Nam qui famescit dum parlat tempora perdit*. / M. Mais encore qu'auois-tu à me dire?' **becomes** (p. 379) '[...] *Nam qui famescit dum parlat tempora perdit*: / comme tu me disois tantost, *atque vt reddam tibi voces tuas*. / M. Si tu n'es saoul depuis le temps que tu masche, iamais ne le puisse-tu estre: i'ay autresfois leu dans Athenée, qu'vn certain Stratonicus ne manquoit iamais de boire deux ou trois bonnes fois en se couchant, *non quod sitiret, sed ne sitiret*: si tu ne fais de mesme ie suis bien trompé. Mais encore qu'auois-tu à me dire?'

p. 292 add.: '[...] & si le Prince, Secretaire, ou Ministre d'Estat doit expedier dix affaires en vne matinée, [...]' **becomes** (p. 383) '[...] & si le Prince, Secretaire, Ambassadeur, Conseiller ou Ministre d'Estat doit expedier dix affaires en vne matinée, [...]'

p. 293 om.: '[...] à leurs comperes & commeres, & à tous ceux qui les sçauent langueier & caioller, comme ie m'efforce bien souuent de faire; En suite de quoy les Maistres sont quelque fois bien estonnez que tout le monde sçait, [...]' **becomes** (p. 383-384) '[...] à leurs comperes & commeres, & à tous ceux qui les sçauent langueier & caioller; En suite de quoy les Maistres sont quelque fois bien estonnez que tout le monde sçait, [...]'

p. 293 alt. + add.: 'S. Ie ne pense pas que le Cardinal en fasse de mesme, puis qu'à ton dire il est impeccable. / M. Et moy ie ne croy pas de m'estre iamais seruy de ces termes là en parlant de luy, car il est homme, & *humani à se nihil alienum putat*: [...]' **becomes** (p. 384) 'S. Ie ne pense pas que le *Cardinal* en fasse de mesme, puis qu'à ton dire il est impeccable. / M. Tu n'es pas si scrupuleux que ces Religieux dont parle S. Hierosme, qui n'osoient se seruir entre eux du mot, *impeccabilis*, au lieu duquel ils employoient celuy de *ἀναμάρτητος*, qui est le mesme, quoy qu'en langue differente: Mais pour moy i'ay encore encheri sur le scrupule de ces Moines, car ie ne me suis iamais serui ny de l'vn ny de l'autre en parlant du *Cardinal*, aussi est-il homme, & comme tel *humani à se nihil alienum putat*: [...]'

p. 293 add.: 'S. Pour faire ce que tu dis, il faudroit estre plus sçauant dans les affaires de France qu'il n'est pas; [...]' **becomes** (p. 384) 'S. Pour faire ce que tu dis, il faudroit estre non seulement plus affectioné, mais aussi plus sçauant dans les affaires de France qu'il n'est pas; [...]'

p. 294 alt. + add.: '[...] & que luy mesme l'aduouë en beaucoup de rencontres. / M. Cette calomnie est vne suite de ceux qui le veulent exclurre comme Estranger: car vn Ministre n'ayant besoin que d'estre fidel à son Maistre, & bien entendu en ses affaires, pour estre estimé le meilleur du monde; aussi ne luy peut-on opposer quel'ignorance & l'infidelité pour estre le plus meschant qui se puisse trouuer: [...]' **becomes** (pp. 384-403) '[...] & que luy mesme l'aduouë en beaucoup de rencontres. / M. Tu me iette dans vn discours, au milieu duquel ie ne voudrois pas estre interrompu, c'est pourquoy va t'en querir vn rechaud, puisque nostre plat se refroidit, & pense de m'escouter attentiuement, quand tu seras de retour. / S. On appelle cela en Italien de Prouence *Carite Pelose*, car si tu en veux dire la verité, tu ne cherche ces interualles, que pour mieux songer aux responses que tu me pourras faire: mais puis qu'aussi bien le pain nous manque, i'en apporteray par mesme moyen. / M. Va, & retourne viste, car ce que i'ay à te dire

est desia tout prest. / S. La sale est pleine de Colporteurs qui haussent le temps d'importance, Dieu sçait comme la Declaration ira tantost par les ruës. / M. Pourueu qu'elle aille droit c'est le principal, car ceux qui la portent feront sans doute de beaux parterres, mais neantmoins si *Petit* ne se haste, ie croy qu'il ne s'en distribuera gueres auiourd'huy. / S. Ie ne sçay ce qu'ils barboüillent de *deux Mazarins* qui sont à la boutique de Monsieur Cramoisy, il y en a qui les vont voir comme si c'estoit des lions & des elephants: Pour moy ie ne suis point badaut iusques à ce point là, car enfin il sont hommes comme les autres, & ie ne m'imagine pas que si d'auenture ils changeoient de maistre, cela leur fit charger de face. / M. Vrayment tu me donne là les meilleures nouuelles du monde, car peut-estre seront-ils suiuis de son Eminence, & puis qu'il ne se peut pas faire que ou l'vn ou l'autre, ou tous deux ensemble ne me soient conneus, ie veux aller voir s'ils ne m'apprendront rien de nouueau, entretiens-toy cependant auec ta bonne amie de laquelle vn bon Pere Celestin a depuis peu si bien chanté les loüanges. / S. Ie commençois à ne te plus attendre, car il y a pour le moins vne bonne heure que tu es party. / M. *Sainct-Ange*, mon enfant, ie suis le plus heureux homme du monde, ces *deux Mazarins* sont le sieur *Zongo Ondedei*, & le sieur *Alessandro Fabri*, tous deux Secretaires Italiens de son Eminence, fort honnestes personnes, & des meilleurs amis que i'aye dans la Maison, ils m'ont dit que toute la Cour reuiendroit à Paris aussi tost que l'on n'y parleroit plus de *Frondeurs*; que la Reyne ne songeoit non plus à la des-obeyssance du peuple que si iamais elle n'estoit arriuée; que pourueu que les esprits broüillons & ambitieux ne trauersent point ses bons desseins, elle nous donnera bien tost la paix, & remettra la France au plus florissant estat qu'elle ait iamais esté: ils m'ont dit aussi que le Roy se portoit bien, que toute la Maison Royalle estoit en bonne intelligence, & que le *Cardinal* se tuoit de trauailler à son accoustumée. / S. Ne t'ont-ils rien dit autre chose du *Bonnet Rouge.* / M. Nous n'auons quasi parlé de luy, ils m'ont mesme presté certaines attestations de la noblesse des *Mancini,* & des *Martinozzi*, qu'on leur a nouuellement enuoyées de Rome, afin que ie les puisse ioindre a ce petit recueil que ie leur ay dit en auoir desia fait: mais-c'est à la charge de les remettre demain entre les mains de Monsieur *Bluet* fameux Aduocat du Parlement, chez lequel ces deux Messieurs se trouueront à disner. / S. Pensez que ce ne sera pas sans me les monstrer. / M. Si tu veux nous lirons ensemble, car ie ne les ay pas encore desuelopées. // CONFALONERIUS ET PRIORES / CIVITATIS FANI. // *Vniuersis, & singulis ad quos præsentes nostræ Litteræ testimoniales peruenerint, notum facimus, & verbo veritatis attestamur, qualiter ex publicis libris existentibus tam in achriuo Referendariæ, quàm Cancellariæ, nostro publico Gubernio suppositis, apparet, Nobilem Familiam* de Martinozziis *continuò publico regimini adscriptam fuisse, primariósque honores & gradus, tam Ecclesiasticos, quàm sæculares, per nobiles tantùm frui solitos consecutam, & ad præsens frui & consequi. Etiam inter nobiles & primarios ab omnibus haberi & reputari; atque etiam inter plures huius Familiæ homines honorificis muneribus præfectos, adfuisse quondam reuerendum Domnum* B. Bernardum *Abbatem sancti Paterniani, huius ciuitatis Patroni, de anno Domini* 1346. *& de anno* 1430. *eiusdem Abbatiæ titulum insignitum* R.D. Philippum, *prout ex publicis monumentis existentibus vna cum insigni dictæ familiæ, in prospectu Ecclesiæ sancti Martini prope & extra murus huius ciuitatis; & in Ecclesia sancti Laurentij de Ceresia Diocesis Fanensis, ac in Prothocollis existentibus in Archiuo prædictæ Abbatiæ apparet, de quibus in nostra Cancellaria. Necnon per* Ghinolum *pluribus legationibus perfunctum, & præcipue de anno* 1264. *die* 25. *Septembris, nomine Senatus nostri, concomitasse nepotem Imperatricis tunc temporis Constantinopolitanæ, prout in libro rationum prædicti anni ad C.*12. *sub titulo delli Ambasciatori del Commune, &c. Et inter cæteros qui munus Confaloneriatus obierunt, nuperrimè adfuit* Comes Hieronymus, *qui fuit etiam Dux Equitum pro sancta Sede in hac ciuitate, in quorum fidem præsentes scriptas & subscriptas per nostrum Cancellarium nostro maiori sigillo muniri iussimus. Datum Fani, ex Palatio nostræ Residentiæ die …… Iulij 1649.* / IOAN. IACOMINVS Cancellarius // S. Il faut que cette piece soit originale, puis que le sceau de la Communauté de Fano y est attaché, il me semble qu'elle est encore plus difficile à lire que tes Griffonies. / M. Ce n'est pas qu'elle ne soit fort bien escrite, mais les abbreuiations ne sont pas à ton vsage: tu aimerois ie m'asseure autant veoir ces *siglades* anciens, que l'on appelloit ainsi *per contradictionem, quasi singula*, parce que chaque lettre valoit autant qu'vne parole entiere. / *Punctis peracta singulis,* / *Vt vna vox absoluitur.* / dit Ausone, & c'est vne chose assez remarquable en nostre siecle, que les Anciens n'ayant eu l'vsage de ces notes que pour exprimer certains termes de Droict, de Medecine, ou Mathematique, puis que celles de Tiron affranchi de Ciceron & Seneque, quoy qu'augmentées par les nouueaux Chrestiens, n'estoient pas de grand vsage. C'est dis-ie vne chose remarquable, que la pratique de cette escriture Stenographique soit maintenant si commune, & si familiere en Angleterre, qu'il ne s'y trouue quasi plus personne qui l'ignore, & qui ne s'en serue auec tant de facilité, que

c'est proprement d'eux que l'on peut dire, / *Currant verba licet, manus est velocior illis, / Nondum lingua suum dextra peregit opus.* (Martialis libr. 14, lem. 208) / Et pour moy ie croy que c'estoit de l'Anglois qui a le premier trouué ces notes, cent fois plus faciles que celles de Tyro, que vouloit parler le Poëte Manile (lib.4) lors qu'il a dit, / *Hic & erit felix scriptor, cui littera verbum est, / Quique notis linguam superat, cursumque loquentis, / Excipiens longas noua per compendia voces.* / S. Au nom de Dieu trefue de passages, & puis que tu m'as promis la lecture de ces nouueaux titres que ie suis plus curieux de voir, que toute ta bouquinerie, oblige moy de m'en faire lecture afin de retourner où nous en estions lors que tu es sorty. / M. Ne te fasche point, *Sainct-Ange*, nous auons assez de temps pour tout faire, car *Petit* m'a dit en passant qu'on n'auroit la Declaration que bien tard. // *In Dei nomine amen, infrascripta apparent in certis libris existentibus in archiuo Abbatiæ Sancti Paterniani huius ciuitatis Fani, per me infrascriptum Notarium visis, nempe, / In quodam libro nuncupato Memoriale cooperto charta pergamena ad c.* 16. *apparent infrascripta. / Pro Ecclesia & beneficio Sancti Laurentij de Coresia, quod supradicta Ecclesia & beneficium sit membrum Abbatiæ, probatur per verba in quodam lapide incisu, posito super portam prædicta Ecclesiæ, in Castro Ceresiæ, & sunt ista,* / MCCCXLVI. *tempore D. Clementis Papæ VI. ædificata est Ecclesia S. Laurentij, tempore* D. Bernardi *Abbatis Monasterij Sancti Paterniani de Fano, questo Abbate era di Casa* Martinozza *come habiamo detto di sopra, e per segno ui è in quella pietra larma Martinozza & ommissis &c. adsunt in dicta pagina infrascripta arma cum verbis,* Arma Martinozza. / *Item in Protocollo in 4° anno* 1436. *incipiente, & existente in supradicto Archiuo, sub sigillo Antonij Dominici de San Georgio, & inter multa instrumenta facta de anno* 1436. *sub die 6ª Junij, tempore PP. Eugenij, adest instrumentum & Protocollum intitulatum littera F, cum copertura pergameni scripti. / Ibique Reuerendus in Christo Pater Dominus Dominus* Philippus de Martinozzis de Fano, *Dei & Apostolicæ Sedis gratia Abbas Monasterij Sancti Paterniani extra muros Fanenses, &c. ommissis, &c. / Et ego Ioan. Franciscus Iacominus Fanensis, publicus Apostolica auctoritate Notarius, & Cancellarius illustrissimæ Communitatis ciuitatis Fanensis, qui supradicta omnia vidi, vt supra scripta, in prædictis libris, in fidem me subscripsi, & signum meum apposui, & pro legalitate mei Notariatus sigillum Ciuitatis hîc impressi.* // S. Examinons vn peu ces deux Escussons, ie dis celuy de la Ville & celuy des *Martinozzi*, pour le premier, quelle preuue me donnes te qu'il ne soit piont faux & inuenté à plaisir. / M. C'est qu'il ressemble aux Armes de la ville de Fano que l'on peut voir au commencement *de la Faneide del Nigosanti,* & dans le premier Tome de l'*Jtalia Christiana Ferdinandi Vghelli*, à l'endroit où il traite des Euesques de Fano. / S. Et de celuy des *Martinozzi* qu'en dis-tu? / M. Tu vois bien qu'il faudroit deuiner le metal ou la couleur, car ny la pierre ny le papier n'en disent mot, & puis ce n'est point mon faict que le Blason, ie ne l'enuieray iamais à Messieus *Doziere, Pietre, la Colombiere,* & autres Euclides de cette Mathematique: les *Martinozzi* à mon aduis portent quatre Fasces bretessées à double, de quatre pieces, & si tu en veux dauantage, il faudra t'en informer au logis de ces petites Harengeres du *Cheualier Georges* quand elles seront de retour. / S. Passons outre. / M. Voicy encore vn autre Escusson des *Martinozzi*, bien mieux fait que le precedent. / *In Dei nomine amen, Anno à Natiuitate Domini Iesu Christi* 1649. *indictione* 2. *sedente Sanctissimo D.N. Papa Innocentio Decimo, &c. / Supradicta arma nunc apparet, in prospectu Ecclesiæ Sancti Martini, prope & extra muros huius ciuitatis Fani in via Flaminia, super portam prædictæ Ecclesiæ sculpta in marmore, prout supra exemplata videtur; quæ quidem Ecclesia, est in propriis bonis Reuerendæ Abbatiæ Sancti Paterniani huius ciuitatis Fani, & arma prædicta est de familia* Martinozzia *huius ciuitatis, vt patet ex nomine prædicti domini Abbatis, & ex inscriptione eiusdem cognoscitur, & ab omnibus publicè pro tali tenetur, & reputatur, & ego infrascriptus vidi, legi, & similem esse inueni, & in fidem me subscripsi. Ego Ioan. Franciscus Iacominus Fanensis publica auctoritate, &c.* Ce sont les mesmes paroles que nous auons desia veuës, & le mesme Sceau de la ville de Fano, pour asseurer la legalité dudit Notaire. / S. Qu'appelles-tu legalité? / M. C'est vne attestation publique & authentique, comme celuy qui parle, ou qui porte témoignage de quelque chose, le peut faire legalement *ex officio*, qu'il est tel & authorisé pour ce faire, qu'on peut luy adiouster foy. Voyons maintenant ce que dira la derniere piece du sac. / *In Dei nomine Amen, Infrascripta apparent in quodam libro cooperto pergamino albo-, existente in Archiuo Referendariæ ciuitatis Fani, intitulato Vscita generale anni* 1364. *ad c.* 12. *per me infrascriptum Cancellarium fideliter extracta. / Salario delli Ambassiatori del Commune ad c.* 12. *& omissis cæteris sequitur. / Demo & paghamo a di* 25. *di Settembre anno* 1364. *a* Ghinolo de Martinozzo, *& a Guidaccio di Boglione, per loro salario di tre di, che andonno a Rimini, accompagnare il Nipote dell' Imperatrice di Constantinopoli, Ducati tre per vno.* Lib. XVIII. / *Et ego Ioan. Franciscus Jacominus Fanensis publica auctoritate Notarius & Cancellarius, &c.* / S. S'il faut iuger de la qualité de ces Ambassadeurs, par celle de la despense, qui leur est

alloüée par iour, ie dirois pour moy que c'estoit plustost deux faquins que deux Gentilhommes: Car qui est auiourd'huy l'honneste homme, qui voulust estre deputé à vne fonction si honorable, qu'estoit celle d'accompagner le Nepueu d'vne Imperatrice de Constantinople, & n'auoir qu'vn Ducaton par iour pour se faire honneur. I'ay ouy dire à vn de mes amis que toutes les courses d'auiourd'huy se payent à vne pistole par poste; le moindre laquais ou valet de pied qu'on enuoye aux champs, s'estimeroit traistre à son corps s'il ne despensoit la moitié d'vn Ducaton à chaque repas, & tu veux qu'vn Gentilhomme *di Casa Martinozzi*, qui est à ton dire vne des principales de Fano, ait fait des Ambassades à vn Ducaton par iour, il ne faudroit que donner communication de cette derniere piece au *Cheualier Georges*, & tu verrois beau ieu, *Sorex tandem suo indicio periit*. / M. Tout beau, *Sainct-Ange,* il n'est pas encore temps de chanter la victoire, *Distingue tempora & concordabis scripturas*, du temps qu'on ne donnoit qu'vn Ducaton par iour aux Ambassadeurs, la iournée d'vn artisan ou manouurier, comme a fort bien monstré Bodin en sa Response au Paradoxe de Malestroit, ne coustoit que deux liards ou six deniers, le mouton de Berry, plus beau & plus gras que ceux de Dindenaut, ne se vendoit que six blancs; l'on ne donnoit que cent escus en mariage aux filles de bonne maison: pour auoir droict de bourgeoisie en quelque ville il falloit y posseder vne maison de la valeur de soixante sols, qui deuoit estre sans doute quelque beau palais, puis que du mesme temps toute la ville de Lucque ne fut venduë que douze mille escus, & Florence la moitié moins, au rapport de Blondus, les Roys de France ne despensoient que dix-huit ou vingt mille liures par an, pour eux & leur famille, & ce qu'ils tiroient de leur Peuples alloit à proportion; c'estoit aussi en ce temps-là que, / *Luxus populator opum, cui semper adhærens* / *Jnfelix humili gressis, comitatur egestas.* / estoit banny de toutes les compagnies. Mais il commença neantmoins incontinent aprés de s'y glisser, & la despense de la Maison de *Louys XI.* qui n'estoit au commencement de son Regne que de vingt-huit & trente mille liures, monta sur la fin du mesme iusques à quatre-vingts mille six cens trois liures, suiuant la supputation qu'en fait Mathieu; les tailles pareillement qui n'excedoient pas soubs Charles VI. la somme de quatre cens mille liures, augmenterent soubs Charles VII. iusques à la somme de dix huit cens mille liures, au rapport de Monsieur de Sully, & consecutiuement soubs *Louys XI.* iusques à quatre millions sept cens quarante mille liures; soubs *Charles huictiesme* iusques à prés de six millions; soubs *Louys douziesme* iusques à sept millions six cens quarante mille liures; soubs *François premier* iusques à quinze millions sept cens trente mille liures: & toutes choses croissans de la sorte, & à proportion, *Henry second* commença le premier de son Royaume, à porter le bas de soye, on ne se moucha plus sur la manche; & lors que l'on enuoyoit des Ambassadeurs ou Deputez, on ne leur taxoit plus leur despense à vn Ducaton le iour, & ainsi tu peux bien iuger par le grand progrés qu'a fait le luxe depuis trois cens ans, que le Ducaton qu'on donnoit en 1364. aux Deputez de Fano, n'estoit pas moins considerable que les dix ou douze escus qu'on leur pourroit donner auiourd'huy. *Sed ô dij immortales*, comme s'écrioit Ciceron (Paradoxa postrem.), *non intelligunt homines, quàm magnum vectigal sit parcimonia.* / S. Tu m'as rendu aussi camus, que nous le serons tous deux d'icy à cens ans, par le beau discours que tu viens de faire, & i'ay suffisamment recognu par iceluy, combien l'ignorance est preiudiciable en toutes sortes d'affaires: Car auparuant que tu m'eusses si bien monstré mon bec-iaune, ie pensois de pouuoir establir sur ce Ducaton vne vraye & essentielle demonstration de la roture des *Martinozzi*. / M. Puis que ceux-cy sont à couuert pour la seconde fois de ta censure, & de celle du *Cheualier Georges,* voyons ce que nous trouuerons de celle des *Mancini* dans le seul papier qui nous reste. / *Nos Augustinus Caballettus. Eques Luduicus Aquilanus, & Horatius Bonioannes almæ vrbis Conseruatores.* / *Vniuersis & singulis has præsentes litteras nostras visuris, inspecturis, lecturis pariter & audituris salutem. Notum facimus & attestamur, Familiam* MANCINORVM *esse Romanam, antiquissimam, & nobilissimam, hominésque illius, pro tempore semper in hac alma vrbe, ac inclito Senatu Romano, omnia ea officia, gradus, dignitates, Magistratus, ac præeminentias etiam Conseruatoriam, quibus alij nobiles Patricij Romani potiuntur & gaudent, pluries atque pluries diuersis temporibus, ac iteratis vicibus, obtinuisse, & gessisse, eaque respectiuè obtinere, & gerere, potirique valuisse; in quorum fidem præsentes, per infrascriptum Secretarium nostrum fieri, & subscribi, sigillóque incliti Populi Romani communiri iussimus. Datum ex nostro Capitolio, &c.* MDCXLIX. / *Augustinus Caballettus Conseruator.* / *Eques Ludouicus Aquilanus Conseruator.* / *Horatius Bonioannes Conseruator.* / *Franc. Risius S.P.Q.R Secretarius.* / S. Voyons vn peu le sceau de quelle façon il est fait, certes il est bien plus maiestueux que celuy de Fano, & ces quatre lettres S.P.Q.R. qui font à mon aduis vne arme tres particuliere, remettent tousiours en la memoire de ceux qui les voyent, l'ancien estat de cette florissante Republique, lors qu'elle dominoit tout le monde. / M. Tu parles donc du temps que Petrone auoit raison de dire, / *Orbem iam totum victor Romanus habebat,* /

Qua mare, qua terræ, qua sidus currit vtrumque. / Mais à present les choses ont bien changé de face, si d'auenture tu n'as recours à l'empire qu'elle s'est conseruée sur les consciences, à l'occasion duquel on ne laisse pas de dire encore, / *Roma caput mundi quidquid non possidet armis.* / *Religione tenet.* / Au reste, ie te veux bien aduertir, que la ville ou plustost l'Empire de *Constantinople*, fait aussi quatre B Grecs, ou β, en ses Armes, dont la signification n'est que trop conneuë pour la rapporter, & que *Sulmo* petite ville au Royaume de Naples, porte cet Hemistique d'Ouide, *Sulmo mihi patria est*, abregé en ces quatres lettres capitales, S.M.P.E. pour monstrer combien elle repute à honneur, qu'vn si grandhomme l'ait aduoüée pour sa patrie. / S. I'ay encore vn petit scrupule à te proposer, & puis nous passerons outre, le bon homme Crucé, qui estoit aussi bon Latin qu'vn autre, disoit tousiours *inclutus*, & neantmoins tes Messieurs de Rome, qui doiuent mieux sçauoir les proprietez de la langue Latiale, que ne faisoit ce mien Maistre, qui n'estoit peut-estre iamais sorty du Cardinal le Moine, escriuent *inclitus*, lequel donc des deux a raison. / M. Ie te diray auec Martial, / *Cùm duo pugnarent victor vterque fuit.* / Car *inclutus* se peut dire *per Archaismum*, *hoc est, veterum inclutus*, & Lucrece, *inclute Memmi*; mais dautant que ce mot Grec *clutus* qui vient de *κλυτὸς, præclarus* a esté rendu bon Latin par le moyen de la preposition *in*, & que ces deux lettres *i*, & *n, cognatæ sunt*, & se changent facilement l'vne en l'autre: Virgile a dit *illa inclyta Roma*, Horace *inclytum Vlyssem*, & tous les modernes à leur imitation l'ont prononcée par *y* Grec, ou *i* Latin *simplicissima ortographia*, comme dit *Martinius in suo Lexico*, & ainsi l'on peut dire *inclutus*, pour *inclytus*, comme Monsieur d'Autruy disoit tousiours *ninsi*, pour *nisi*, sans offenser ny Donat, ny Priscian. / S. Voila qui est clair comme eau de roche, reuenons maintenant aux *Mancini*, desquels si tu ne produis d'autres memoires, i'auray belle occasion de te dire, / *Quid dignum tanto feret hic promissor hiatu:* / car il sembloit tantost à t'ouyr parler de leur Genealogie, que l'on pourroit mettre à bon droit sur le tombeau du premier de cette famille, qui donnera du nez en terre: / *Hic situs est quidam cuius genus extat ab Adam*. / & neantmoins tes Secretaires se reduisent maintenant à vne simple attestation de Cheualerie Romaine. / M. Tu es malicieux comme vn viel singe, mais le principal est que tu n'as pas à faire à vn niaiz, & que tu verras dans peu de temps, comme la famille des *Mancini* a tousiours esté tant en l'ancienne qu'en la moderne Rome, Patricienne & Consulaire. C'est à quoy ces deux Messieurs là m'ont dit que l'on trauailloit maintenant, & cela estant, pourquoy nous enuoyeroit-elle des eschantillons, puisque nous aurons bien-tost la piece entiere. Mais neantmoins pour te monstrer qu'outre ceux que ie t'ay donnez cy dessus, on en pourroit fournir beaucoup d'autres sans les faire venir de Rome. Le sieur *Allesandro* qui a grande connoissance de ladite famille, m'a dit qu'il auoit veu certaine donation faite à vne Chapelle de sainct Iean de Latran par vn *Mancini* de quelques droits, dont il iouyssoit en partie dés l'an 1177. Que s'il estoit besoin de faire l'arbre de cette famille iusques à 1300. il en viendroit bien à bout sans attendre les memoires de Rome; que la maison où elle a tousiours demeuré du depuis, fut achetée en 1375. qu'elle a diuerses sepultures & Epitaphes en l'Eglise de *sant Apostolo in piazza Colonna*, des années 1384. 1418. 1514. que dans leur Chapelle *in Ara cæli*, il y a vn grand Tableau auec l'inscription & le nom des *Mancini*, de 1447. qu'il y a des emancipations de 1318. & le mesme seigneur Alexandre Fabri m'a asseuré sur sa foy & sur son honneur que l'on peut voir, copier, & faire authentiquer toutes ces choses dans la ville de Rome, en moins de vingt-quatre heures, suiuant les addresses qu'il en pourroit donner: or si vn homme qui n'est pas de la maison des *Mancini*, & qui ne peut parler que de ce qu'il en a casuellement appris en diuerses occasions, en donne toutefois de si bons memoires, que ne doit-on point attendre du sieur *Lorenzo Mancini*, qui est maintenant le Chef de cette famille, lors qu'il fera espoudrer par gens à ce connoissans & entendus, toutes les vieilles paperasses soit de sa maison, ou de l'Archiue du Capitole, & des Communautez de Rome & lieux circonuoisins, pour descouurir, / *Famosos Equitum cum dictatore Magistros.* / S. Nous ferons donc mieux de laisser ce discours aux Genealogistes de Rome, qui nous en donneront quelque iour ce que bon leur semblera, pour retourner à l'ignorance du Cardinal *Mazarini*, car c'est là que nous en estions, lors que ie t'ay aduerty tout à propos pour les *Mancini* & *Martinozzi*, desquels tu as appris de fort bonnes nouuelles, qu'il y auoit deux *Mazarins* chez Monsieur Cramoisy. / M. Tu embroüille bien des choses en peu de paroles, car ces Genealogistes de Rome, ne sont pas moins fideles que ceux de France, ou d'ailleurs; personne n'a iamais accusé l'*Amirato*, ny le *Campanile*, ny le *Zazzera*, ny le *Sansouino*, ny le *Rossi* d'infidelité, & pour ce qui est des Genealogistes particuliers, ils n'aduancent gueres de choses importantes sans en auoir de bons memoires: c'est pourquoy lors qu'ils trauailleront sur la famille des *Mancini*, ie ne croy pas à te dire vray qu'ils la fassent si illustre que celle des *Fieschy, ex qua binos Pontifices maximos esse factos, Septuagintáque in Senatum cooptatos fuisse legimus*, dit le Protenotaire Cortesius (p. 17 lib. de Cardin.); ou qu'ils

l'estendent si loing, & luy donnent tant de nobles alliances, comme a fait Caramuel à celle des *Mello*, sinon en effet au moins par ce beau titre, *Excellentissima domus de Mello ab Imperatoribus Romanis, Constantinopolitanis, Hispanis, Francis, Saxonibus, Franconibus, Sueuis, Bauaris, Austriacis; à Regibus Castellanis, Legionensibus, Lusitanis, Algarbicis, Aragonibus, Siculis, Gallis, Anglis, Saxonibus, per Genealogicos gradus deducta, cum summis Jmperatoribus, Regibus, & Principibus Europæ composita, stylo Joan. Caramuel Lobkouuitz Louanij* 1643. non ie croy pas qu'ils en parlent si aduantageusement qu'on a fait des precedentes, *nullos enim hactenus comitata est purpura fasces*, en ne parlant toutesfois que des *Mancini* modernes: car pour les anciens & Republicains, ils en ont eu leur part autant que pas vn autre de ce temps-là: enfin des deux attributs que donne Aristote à vne vraye & excellente noblesse, *vetustas & splendor familiæ*, ie t'accorde que les *Colonnes* & les *Vrsins* & beaucoup d'autres Maisons d'Italie les surpassent en ce dernier: mais pour ce qui est du premier, & de l'antiquité de leur race, sans mesme la faire retrograder iusques *à l'ancienne*, du temps de la Republique, ie t'asseure qu'elle n'est inferieure, ny posterieure à aucune d'Italie. Ce n'est pas qu'elle n'ait eu beaucoup de principaux Chefs dans les armées, beaucoup de Prelats dans l'Eglise, beaucoup d'Officiers & de Magistrats dans les premiers Tribunaux de Rome, où elle s'est tousiours maintenuë tres-honnorablement: mais de Generaux d'armées, & de Cardinaux, ie n'ay point iusques à cette heure memoire qu'il en ait eu aucun: car de prendre ce vers de Iuuenal, que i'ay cité cy-dessus, à la lettre, & pour signifier autre chose qu'vne ancienne noblesse, ce seroit aller contre mon intention: *& vice versa*, ie ne croy pas que ces familles si illustres, soient pour la plus-part des plus anciennes, par la regle de Claudian, / --- *nunquam sincera bonorum / Sors vlli concessa viro.* / & de sçauoir lequel des deux est preferable à l'autre, *aut splendor vetustati, aut vetustas splendori*, c'est vne question sur laquelle il y auroit à discourir iusques à demain. / S. C'est pourquoy ie te prie bien fort de la laisser là aussi bien que les *Mancini* & *Martinozzi*, car ie t'accorderay plustost que / -- *vtroque Iouem de sanguine ducunt,* / que d'en vouloir ou pouuoir entendre parler dauantage, reuenons pour la derniere fois au peu d'affection que le *Cardinal* a pour la France, & à l'ignorance grossiere & honteuse qu'il tesmoigne en toutes sortes d'affaires. / M. Tu ne deurois pas décharger sur le *Cardinal* la colere que tu as contre moy, ou contre nos digressions, qui ne te peuuent estre que tres-vtiles & profitables. Ce que tu viens de dire auec des paroles si atroces & piquantes, n'est qu'vne suite des oppositions qui luy sont faites tous les iours par ceux qui le veulent exclure, comme *Estranger*, de la bonne part qu'il a au gouuernement de la France. Car vn Ministre n'ayant besoin que d'estre fidele à son Maistre, & bien entendu en ses affaires, pour estre estimé le meilleur du monde, aussi ne luy peut-on opposer que l'ignorance, & l'infidelité, pour estre le plus meschant qui se puisse trouuer. [...]'

p. 294 alt.: '[...] Et parce qu'ils veulent que le Cardinal soit tel, ils presupposent qu'estant Estranger, il ne peut estre suffisamment informé de nos affaires, & c'est ainsi qu'ils trompent le pauure peuple, & qu'ils luy font faire mille extrauagances, en luy cachant & déguisant ce qui est de la verité: [...]' **becomes** (p. 404) '[...] Et parce qu'ils veulent que le Cardinal soit tel, ils presupposent qu'estant Estranger, il ne peut auoir ny tant d'inclination pour la France qu'vn François, ny tant de cognoissance des Coustumes du Royaume que s'il auoit esté nourry en iceluy. Et c'est ainsi qu'ils trompent le pauure peuple, & qu'ils luy font faire mille extrauagances, en luy cachant & déguisant ce qui est de la verité. [...]'

p. 295 add.: '[...] *L'affare dell' agiustamento stabilito, &c.* Aprés lesquels tesmoignages, qui ne s'estonnera de la folie de ceux qui veulent maintenant faire passer le Cardinal Mazarin, pour vne beste, [...]' **becomes** (p. 406) '[...] *L'affare dell' agiustamento stabilito, &c.* Voila donc quel estoit l'esprit du *Cardinal* dans les actions & negociations d'importance. Que s'il est maintenant question de sa conduite ordinaire en toutes les autres, le sieur *Tristan l'Hermite* en rendit ce tesmoignage il y a plus de cinq ans. / *Vostre esprit agissant & fort / Ne doit point aux erreurs du sort / Son authorité non commune: / Et l'habit esclatant dont vous estes vestu / N'est point vn de ces biens que iette la Fortune, / Mais c'est vn de ces prix que donne la Vertu.* / Et Monsieur *de Balsac* ne fit point de difficulté enuiron ce temps-là de le comparer à tous ces grands hommes de l'antiquité, dont la memoire nous est si saincte & si venerable. / *Non ego te IVLI, sileam, quo Roma superbit, / Per te iterum Heroum credita Roma parens; / Nec magnos post Æneadas mihi nomina sancta, / Æneadum magnus prætereare nepos. / Et tibi par superum fauor excubat, & vigor alti est / Idem animi, & mundum tu quoque mente regis. / Augustique artes dominas, robustaque nosti / Consilia, & sciuit quidquid Ethruscus eques.* / Aprés tous lesquels tesmoignages, & vne infinité d'autres que ie pourrois rapporter, si ie n'aimois mieux te renuoyer

au Recueil que l'on en fera quelque iour à l'imitation de celuy que l'on a fait autrefois sur le Cardinal de Richelieu. Qui ne s'estonnera de la folie de ceux qui veulent maintenant faire passer le Cardinal *Mazarin*, pour vne beste, [...]'

p. 296 alt. + add.: '[...] & qu'auparauant la Regence il auoit negocié la paix de *Sauoye*, le Traitté de *Casal*, l'achapt de *Pignerol*, l'eschange de *Monaco*, & combien d'autres affaires importantes, desquelles ie ne suis pas informées? N'est il pas vray que personne n'entend mieux que luy, le démeslé des affaires estrangers d'auec les nostres? N'est-il pas vray que tous ceux qui l'ont entendu parler, [...]' **becomes** (p. 407) '[...] & qu'auparauant la Regence il auoit negocié la deliurance de *Casal*, l'achapt de *Pignerol*, & que coniointement auec les Ministres des autres Princes, il auoit conclud ce grand & important traitté de *Queraque*; que depuis il auoit empesché la surprise de la ville de *Thurin*, & de Madame de *Sauoye* qui estoit dedans; qu'il auoit détaché les Princes de cette Maison là d'auec l'Espagnol, pour les attacher à la France; qu'il auoit pratiqué l'eschange de *Monaco*, & de *Sedan*? & combien pense-tu qu'il ait fait d'autres affaires encore plus importantes, desquelles ie ne suis pas informé. Enfin n'est-il pas vray que personne n'entend mieux que luy le démeslé des affaires estrangeres d'auec les nostres? & que tous ceux qui l'ont entendu parler, [...]'

p. 297 alt. + add.: '[...] *parmáque inglorius alba*: / comme d'vn nouice de Conuent, comme d'vn potiron, comme de ces grenoüilles qui tombent auec les pluyes d'Esté, & qui ne sont pas si tost animées qu'elles sautent, & enfin comme d'vn Bemus & d'vn ignorant. / S. Ie ne sçay pas combien le Cardinal t'a donné pour si bien plaider sa cause; mais ie ne laisse pas de veoir que tu t'en acquittes fort bien.' **becomes** (pp. 408-421) '[...] *Parmaque inglorius alba*. / Ou comme d'vn Nouice de Conuent, & enfin comme d'vn Bemus, d'vn Lourdaut, d'vn ignorant. Ne se souuient-on plus comme il estoit couru par les petits enfans dans les ruës de cette ville, sur la fin de l'année 1630. & auec quelle passion chacun vouloit voir celuy qui auoit fait la paix de *Casal*, les deux armées estant en veuë l'vne de l'autre, nos enfans perdus en marche, & le feu commencé non seulement entre les troupes, mais contre luy-mesme. Pour moy il me souuient d'auoir oüy dire que feu *Bonneüil*, voyant ce grand empressement, demanda alors au feu Roy pour payement de toutes ses pretentions, la grace de pouuoir monstrer au Peuple le *Mazarin* dans vne chambre: & ie croy certes qu'il auoit raison, puis que ny le *Mansfeld* icy, ny M^{t} de *Toiras* à Rome ne furent iamais suiuis ny admirez de la sorte. Dequoy le Nonce qui estoit en ce temps-là à Paris pourroit bien rendre bon tesmoignage, puis que, comme i'ay souuent oüy conter au sieur *Vrbani*, encore qu'il fust logé chez luy, il n'y mangea toutesfois pendant six semaines qu'vne seule fois, à cause des personnes de condition qui l'auoient cognu aux occasions precedentes, & lesquels il ne pouuoit honnestement refuser. Or aprés cela qui ne s'estonneroit d'vn changement si extraordinaire, & quasi semblable à celuy qu'esprouuerent Sainct Paul & Sainct Barnabé, *in Lystra ciuitate Lycaoniæ*, où les habitans rauis de leurs miracles, disoient au commencement, *Dij similes facti hominibus descenderunt ad nos, & vocabant* Barnabam *Iouem,* Paulum *vero Mercurium, vixque sedauerunt turbas ne sibi immolarent*; Mais quelque temps aprés, *Superuenerunt quidam de Antiochia & Iconia Iudæi, & persuasis turbis, lapidantes Paulum traxerunt extra ciuitatem*: En suite dequoy si tu veux faire les applications conuenables de cette populace de Lystrie à la nostre, il ne tiendra qu'à toy, car le suiet en est beau, & puis dis que le Poëte Phocilies n'auoit pas raison de dire, / Λαῷ μὴ πίστευε πολύτροπος ἔστιν ὅμιλος / *Vulgo ne fide, mutabilis ingenij est turba.* / S. Ie le pourrois bien faire *nisi lapides metuerem,* mais en l'estat que sont auiourd'huy les choses, i'ayme mieux obseruer le Prouerbe qui dit que toutes comparaisons sont odieuses, & principalement des Chrestiens auec les Iuifs, puis que c'est vn peuple abandonné de Dieu & des hommes. Mais toy, *Mascurat*, apprens moy vn peu le détail de cette paix de *Casal* qui a tant fait de bruit, & de laquelle ie n'ay iamais entendu parler que *in globo* & en general. / M. Ie te le diray en deux mots, & tu verras que fut vn Traitté, d'vne façon assez nouuelle, & qui n'a possible point d'exemple dans toute l'antiquité. Les armées estoient si proches à s'entrechoquer que la mousqueterie auoit desia commencé à ioüer son ieu: Pendant cela le *Mazarin* sort de l'armée Espagnole, essuye quantité de mousquetades qu'on luy tiroit de la nostre, & auec vn coup de chapeau, comme l'on fait en Noruege, appaisa la tempeste! Il dit en suite que la Paix estoit concluë, fait aduancer les Generaux des deux armées, leur declare à cheual les conditions du Traité, & puis les fait embrasser, le tout auec vne merueilleuse diligence & industrie. Car s'il eust laissé parler les vns ou les autres, ou qu'il eust fallu prendre la plume pour dresser le Traité & le signer, il s'y fust rencontré cent difficultez qui l'eussent rompu, & qui eussent obligé necessairement les François à donner la bataille le mesme iour, parce qu'ils

n'auoient plus de pain. Et cela estant tu m'aduoüeras, *Sainct-Ange*, qu'il estoit bien extraordinaire, qu'vn ieune homme âgé tout au plus de vingt-six ans, eust seul entre les mains toutes les affaires non seulement d'Italie, & de ses Princes, mais on peut dire de toute la Chrestienté, puis qu'en ce temps-là les armes de France, d'Allemagne, & d'Espagne estoient en cette Prouince là, auec leurs principaux Ministres. Mais ce qui est plus estonnant, c'est que i'ay oüy dire à des personnes dignes de foy, qu'il se gouuerna dans ces grandes negociations, qui estoient de soy tres-épineuses, auec vne si merueilleuse adresse, & vne telle force d'esprit, qu'on n'eust sceu dire auec qui il estoit le mieux ny de qui il receuoit plus de caresses, & sur qui il auoit plus de pouuoir, ou du Cardinal de *Richelieu*, ou du Marquis *Spinola*, ou du Comte de *Collalto*, ou des feus Ducs de *Sauoye* Charles Emanuel ou Victor Amedée, ou du Duc de *Mantoüe*, ou du Marquis de *Saincte-Croix*, ou du *Picolomini*, ou du Mareschal de *Schombert*, ou de celuy de *Thoiras* qui le fut voir en Auignon, & luy dit qu'il vouloit aller à Rome comme il fit depuis, & ne pas partir des pieds du Pape qu'il n'eust obtenu vn chapeau de Cardinal, pour celuy qui auoit seul dans le salut de *Casal*, empesché l'Italie de tomber soubs l'esclauage des Espagnols: & aprés cela nos faiseurs de libelles --*qui delectantur Iambis / Quique Bioneis sermonibus, & sale nigro.* (Horat. 2. ep. 2. lib. 2) / peuuent-ils auoir l'effronterie de nous debiter ce *Cardinal* pour vn Franc ignorant, & inepte à tout bien? si tant de grands hommes en ont esté coiffez, & ne pouuoient quasi se deffendre, de tout ce qu'il entreprenoit de leur persuader. Mais dautant que ces Censeurs pour ne demeurer la bouche close, ont fait courir le bruit que c'estoit vn *Sachetti* & non pas luy qui estoit le Chef de cette negociation, laquelle à leur dire se trouua au bout du conte plus aduantageuse à l'Espagne qu'à la France, à cause que toutes les forces des Espagnols auroient esté deffaites sans ce Traitté qu'il fit: Ie leur nie premierement ce qu'ils disent de cette assistance imaginaire, parce que long-temps auparauant le sieur Giouan Francesco Sachetti auquel le Pape l'auoit adioint pour les negociations de la paix d'Italie, s'estant retiré à Rome, afin d'y prendre femme, toutes les negociations qu'ils auoient coustume de traiter conioinctement, demeurerent à luy seul, & ie desfie tout homme qui sera persuadé du contraire, de me produire aucun Historien de tous ceux qui ont parlé de cette affaire de *Casal*, qui dise que le *Mazarin* n'en fut pas le seul & absolu Ministre, & en effet chacun est suffisamment informé, que la gloire n'en est deuë qu'à luy seul & que personne du monde ne se peut vanter d'y auoir eu la moindre part, ou de luy pouuoir dire comme faisoit Vlysse à Aiax. / --- *modo ne communia solus / Occupet, atque aliquem nobis quoque reddat honorem.* / Et pour ce qui est du dommage que pouuoient receuoir les Espagnols d'vne bataille si nos trouppes l'eussent donnée, comme ils estoient bien en resolution de faire, ie te dis que c'est chymeriser en l'ait, que de se vouloir promettre lors qu'on donne vne bataille, de la gaigner, car il ne faut qu'vn accident impreueu, qu'vne terreur pannique, qu'vn ordre mal executé, qu'vn Officier ou traistre ou poltron, qu'vn escadron qui aura plié, qu'vne ruse bien conduite, pour la faire perdre; c'est pourquoy on ne sçauroit trop loüer *il signor Giulio* d'auoir sauué l'honneur de la France par vne voye plus certaine & asseurée. Car il estoit incomparablement plus douteux, qu'il n'estoit infaillible que nous peussions aprés vne marche de dix iours qui auoit extraordinairement fatigué nos trouppes desia incommodées par la faim; défaire vne armée plus nombreuse que la nostre de six mille hommes, & qui nous attendoit de pied-coy dans de bons retranchemens qu'il nous falloit forcer. Mais pour te monstrer que les intentions de *Mazarin* estoient entierement fauorables à la France, il te faut informer comme ce n'a pas esté cette seule fois là, ny par ce seul moyen qu'il a garanty *Casal* des pattes de nos ennemis; il l'auoit desia sauué en faisant conclurre la trefue, lors que la place estoit aux abbois, & manquoit de toutes choses necessaires, dequoy, si tu ne me veux croire, voila ce que le Mercure François en dit en son seizeisme Tome, *La suspension generale a esté accordée entre les armées de sa Maiesté Imperiale, des deux Couronnes, & de Monsieur de Sauoye, en tous les lieux tant de deça, que dela les monts, iusques au* 18. *iour d'Octobre prochain, sur l'instance qui en a esté faite de la part de sa Saincteté, par le sieur* Mazarini *son Ministre, pour faciliter les moyens de la paix, à laquelle les Ministres des susdites Maiestez ont declaré qu'elles sont entierement resoluës & disposées.* Or non content de ce bon seruice, il fit introduire pendant cette trefue, toutes les munitions de guerre & de bouche qui manquoient en ladite place, à quoy il n'éspargna non plus sa bourse que son industrie, & c'estoit principalement ce qu'entendoit le Mareschal de Toiras, en ce que ie te disois tantost. Finalement il sauua encore non seulement *Casal*, mais nostre armée mesme, lors qu'aprés le traitté conclud le 26. Octobre, & executé de part & d'autre, nos Generaux firent vne faute à la Françoise, c'est à dire, pour se trop confier, car ayant separé leur armée en deux corps, & mis mesme vne riuiere entre deux, & les troupes dormant paisiblement dans leurs quartiers sur la foy du Traitté, cela donna lieu aux Espagnols qui voyoient vne conioncture si fauorable, de remonter sur leur beste, en prenant

resolution de défaire l'vn de ces corps, aprés quoy il estoit hors d'apparence que l'autre peust subsister. Mais le sieur *Mazarini*, qui par vn bonheur singulier se trouua lors dans leur armée, ayant descouuert leur dessein, & veu desia les troupes Allemandes en marche, prit pretexte sur quelque autre chose, de passer dans nostre armée, où il aduertit confidemment le sieur de *Lauriere*, qui commandoit les troupes plus proches de l'ennemy, du peril où il estoit, de se bien teir sur ses gardes: & passant outre, il donna cet aduis à nos Mareschaux assez à temps, pour faire auorter le proiect des Espagnols, & leur rompre vn coup qui estoit si seur qu'on m'a dit autrefois qu'vn de nos Generaux eut tousiours la larme à l'œil, pour la faute qu'il connoissoit d'auoir faite iusques à ce qu'il vit qu'elle estoit reparée par la ionction des deux corps qu'il auoit imprudemment diuisez. Et si d'auenture tu ne me veux croire sans garand, ie te puis donner le sieur Bernard, qui ne s'éloigne gueres en son Histoire de *Louys XIII.* de tout ce que ie te viens de dire, car voila comme il en parle, *Toutefois les Allemans & les Espagnols indignez de ce que les François estoient entrez dans Casal, firent contenance de vouloir venir sur nos gens, les troupes Françoises estant desia bien dispersées, afin de viure auec plus de facilité; ce qui faisoit croire aux ennemis, qu'ils en auroient moins de vigueur. Alors le sieur* Mazarini *qui souhaittoit passionément d'acheuer ce qu'il auoit si bien commencé, alla vers les vns & les autres, pour les remettre en bon accord, & le huictiesme iour de Nouembre il aduertit les François que les Jmperiaux venoient contre eux, & qu'ils les auroient incontinent sur les bras, &c.* & aprés qu'il a parlé de beaucoup d'allées & de venuës, que fit le *Mazarin* pour mettre les deux armées d'accord, il adiouste, *En tout ce-cy le sieur Mazarin fit paroistre son excellent esprit, moderant les passions des vns & des autres, & comme il auoit plus grand soin de pacifier ces nations, l'on le tint pour vn vray Ange de paix, & l'on pouuoit de là tirer des augures de ce qu'il pouuoit faire vn iour pour le bien general de la France.* / S. Mais en conscience, *Mascurat*, estime-tu ce procedé du *Mazarin* legitime; pour moy, ie suis de l'aduis de certains libelles, qui ont maintenu que ce Mediateur ne deuoit pas tant se partialiser pour la France, & que possible en cela ne suiuoit il pas bien les intentions de son Maistre, qui estant pere commun deuoit tenir la balance iuste entre ces deux partis, puis qu'il les affectionnoit également. / M. Ie suis rauy de te voir reduit à reprocher au *Cardinal* son affection pour la France, à trouuer à dire qu'il en ait donné des marques si importantes, dans vn temps où il luy estoit libre de s'attacher à laquelle des deux Couronnes il eut voulu. Si ie croyois mon courage, tu n'aurois aucune response de moy, / *ne quis discat prodesse improbis.* / ou ie te dirois simplement aprés Phedrus, / *Qui fert malis auxilium post tempus dolet.* / Mais pus que i'ay entrepris la defense du *Cardinal*, ie te diray pour oster iusques à la moindre tache de sa reputation, ce que i'ay appris à Rome, sçauoir qu'il auoit le bonheur en cette occasion, de suiure fort ponctuellement les intentions du Pape, de qu'il seroit en son pouuoir, que *Casal* ne tombast entre les mains des Espagnols: parce que cette entreprise où ils estoient engagez dépendoit la liberté ou l'esclauage d'Italie, & ainsi on l'auoit chargé de fauoriser sous main, & auec addresse les François, puis qu'ils ne venoient que pour secourir vn Prince Italien, dont la ruine entrainoit auec soy celle de tous les autres. Mais ny les ordres du Pape, ny son inclination particuliere pour la France, n'eussent seruy de rien, s'il n'eut eu l'industrie de se rendre agreable à tous ceux auec qui il auoit à traitter, & s'il n'eut eu le corps bon, & la resolution d'entreprendre iour & nuit cent voyages, où il a couru mille perils de sa vie, à ce que i'ay sceu de ses domestiques, qui m'ont asseuré entre autres choses qu'il passa vingt & deux fois les Monts en dixhuict mois, & que la peste luy enleua deux fois quasi toute sa famille. Or comme ledit sieur *Giulio* auoit reconneu en diuerses rencontres, combien la conqueste de *Pignerol* par les François auoit esté agreable à sa Saincteté, & auec combien de passion elle souhaittoit qu'ils pussent conseruer cette porte, pour accourir lors qu'il en seroit de besoin, au secours des Princes d'Italie, quand l'Espagnol entreprendroit d'en opprimer quelqu'vn: cela fut cause qu'il appliqua tout son esprit, à en rechercher les moyens, quoy qu'ils parussent de prime abord purement impossibles: car nous auions à faire rendre *Mantouë*, & nous ne croyons pas mesme alors en France que la restitution de *Pignerol* pût suffire pour porter la Maison d'Austriche à se desaisir d'vne place de l'importance de *Mantouë*, & neantmoins il arriua tout le contraire de ce qu'on aouit pensé, puis que nous fismes sortir les armées ennemies de ladite Place, & que nous ne laissasmes pas de conseruer *Pignerol*, sans commettre aucune infidelité, veu que cela se fit auec le consentement de celuy à qui nous le deuions rendre, & les Espagnols aussi n'eurent que dire, ny dequoy se plaindre, voyant que nous auions satisfait par aduance le Souuerain à qui la Place appartenoit, & qui en pouuoit consequemment disposer à son bon plaisir. Voila donc comme le grand aduantage que la France a remporté de l'acquisition d'vn poste si considerable, est entierement deu au seul zele & à l'industrie du Cardinal *Mazarin,* qui en eut la premiere pensée, & qui fit pour cela vn voyage exprés à Paris, où le Cardinal de Richelieu, quoy qu'il fust assez ἐλπίδων

παρασιτος, *spei parasitus*, comme parle Nicephorus Gregoras, & qu'il sceut fort bien que / *Jnsperata accidunt magis, sæpe quam quæ speres.* / ne pouuoit toutefois en conceuoir l'esperance, qui fut quasi en mesme temps couronnée par l'heureux effet de la reddition de *Mantouë*, au Duc de Neuers, & de la conseruation de *Pignerol* à cette Couronne. / S. Si ie ne prenois bien garde à moy tu me ferois souuent passer Marte pour Renard, le *Mazarin, ex te*, n'executoit que les ordres du Pape, en tout ce que tu viens de dire, *ergo* nous en auons l'obligatoin entiere au defunt Pape, que i'ay toûiours ouy dire auoir esté tres-galand homme, & non pas à ton seigneur *Iules.* / M. Tout beau, mon enfant, *Mascurat* n'impose à personne, & ie te dis que l'obligation qu'on doit auoir de toutes ces affaires au *Cardinal*, n'est en rien diminuée par les ordres que i'ay dit, qu'il auoit de son Maistre: car outre que ces ordres n'estoient que generaux, ils n'estoient pas aussi tellement exprés & circonstantiez, que s'il eu voulu tant soit peu biaiser, ou au moins demeurer dans la pure neutralité & indifference, il ne nous eut bien fait du mal, sans que le Pape eut quasi peu luy en imputer aucune faute. Et ie t'aduouë que i'ay souuent admiré en moy-mesme, comment le *Cardinal* contre la coustume de ceux qui l'auoient precedé en des pareils emplois, auoit peu se resoudre de seruir la France, & de s'attacher à ses interest, plustost qu'à ceux d'Espagne, dans vn temps où la puissance de cette derniere à Rome, pouuoit d'vn seul mot faire sa fortune, au lieu que la France vraysemblablement n'auoit aucun moye de l'y aduancer. Et puis que tout ce que ie t'ay dit est si vray, que l'on ne peut le reuoquer en doute, pourquoy ne diray-ie pas maintenant, / *I verbis virtutem illude superbis.* (Æneid. 9.) / Va, *Sainct-Ange*, & dis auec les factieux que le *Cardinal* est peu affectionné à la France, & qu'il la veut sacrifier à ses interest particuliers, dis qu'il la volle, qu'il la ruine, qu'il est cause des desordres qui y sont à present, dis en vn mot tout ce que tu voudras, puis qu'autant vaudroit cracher contre le Ciel, que de penser noircir le *Cardinal*, ou d'ignorance és affaires, ou de peu d'affection enuers la France, aprés tant de si nobles experiences qu'il a données de contraire. Mais puis que le seul refuge de la médisance est de dire qu'en toutes ces actions le *Cardinal* n'a paru qu'en Courrier, qu'en Nonce-volant, n'a porté que des paroles, ny conclu que des affaires particuliers, & de peu d'importance, où la fortune de la France a eu plus de part que l'industrie de ce Ministre. Ie luy veux fermer la bouche par cette paix de *Querasque*, si solennelle à cause des grands hommes qui la traiterent, si importante à toute l'Europe, à cause des dissensions qu'elle appaisa, que nostre Mercure fut contraint d'en parler en ces propres termes: *Ainsi s'est passé tout ce grand trouble, que l'ambition Espagnole auoit fait naistre, que l'iniustice auoit conceuë, que le fleau de la guerre, de la peste, de la famine auoit terriblement fait éclatter. Ainsi s'est dissipé ce grand orage, qui sembloit menacer toute la terre, & faisoit mine d'enleuer à la France ses lys, à Mantouë ses forteresses, à l'Italie ses franchises, à la noblesse Françoise sa gloire, & à toute l'Europe sa liberté. Ainsi sont venus & sortis les Allemans & les Espagnols de l'Italie, auec plus de honte que de profit, ne restant de toute cette persecution faite à vn Prince Catholique, qu'vn memorial eternel à la posterité de cette iniquité, la plus extreme qui ait esté faite depuis huict cens ans entre Princes Chrestiens.* Et neantmoins le Seigneur *Iules* fut cause en partie de toutes ces merueilles, y interuint comme Ministre de sa Saincteté auec Monsignor *Pancirole*, la signa auec toutes les plus sages testes de l'Europe, quoy qu'il n'eust encore que vingt-sept ans: & si tu veux prendre la peine de feüilleter le dix-septiesme Tome de nos Mercures, tu verras à la fin des articles dudit Traité, les paroles suiuantes, *Tout ce que dessus promettent Monsieur* Panciroli *& le sieur* Mazarini *de la part ou au nom de sa Saincteté, le seigneur Baron* Galasso, *au nom de sa Maiesté Imperiale, & les seigneurs de* Toyras & Seruient, *au nom de sa Maiesté tres-Chrestienne, & pour asseurance ont signé la presente de leur main. A Querasque le* 19. *Iuin* 1631. I. IACQVES PANCIROLE, M. GALASSO, THOYRAS, SERVIENT, GIVLIO MAZARINI. Or aprés de si celebres Epoques, de la suffisance du *Cardinal* à manier les affaires, comme sont celles de la trefue de *Casal*, de l'accord des armées qui s'alloient entrechoquer deuant ladite ville, de la paix de *Querasque*, & de tout ce que i'ay desia marqué auoir esté fait par son *Eminence*, és dix-huict années subsequentes, l'on croit estre bien fondé à luy reprocher ou son ignorance és negociations, ou le peu d'inclination qu'il a pour les faire reüssir à l'aduantage de cette Couronne, ie ne sçay pas de qui l'on se pourra doresnauant asseurer, ny fier, & moins encore qui l'on pourroit mettre à sa place: peut-estre, *Sainct-Ange,* que le / *Quæritur interea quis tantæ pondera molis* / *Sustineat.* (25. Metam.) / ne donneroit pas moins de peine, à ceux qui voudroient trouuer vn nouueau Ministre, qu'en ont maintenant ceux qui veulent renuerser celuy qui a esté si solemnellement estably, & qui a donné tant de preuues de sa capacité & fidelité en toutes sortes d'occurences. / S. Ie ne sçay pas ce que le *Cardinal* t'a donné pour si bien plaider sa cause; mais ie ne laisse pas de voir que tu t'en acquittes fort bien.'

p. 298 add.: '[...] *Strauit iter*, &c. / Quand le Pape se dit *Seruus seruorum*, &c. que François premier se qualifioit *Seigneur de Gentilly*, [...]' **becomes** (p. 423) '[...] *Strauit iter*, &c. / & lors que Thomas de Messine se voulut preualoir de la confession que faisoit Sainct Augustin, d'estre inferieur à Sainct Hierosme, *Quid vero inquis, si Augustini aperta confessio est, sibi Hieronymum præferentis,* Petrarque luy repondit verdement, *quis non videt quid ad hæc dici debeat? hoc inquam vnum est, in quo sacratissimæ illius animæ testimonio non starem, cui insitum scio, vt de aliis gloriose, de se autem humiliter, & loquatur & sentiat.* Ainsi quand le Pape se dit *Seruus seruorum*, &c. que François premier se qualifioit *Seigneur de Gentilly*, [...]'

p. 299 alt.: 'Enfin si lors qu'vn homme dit à vn autre qu'il est son tres-humble seruiteur, celuy-là donnoit soudain ses bottes à nettoyer; [...]' **becomes** (pp. 423-424) 'Enfin si lors qu'vn homme dit à vn autre qu'il est son tres-humble seruiteur, celuy-là donnoit aussi tost ses bottes à nettoyer? [...]'

p. 300 alt. + add.: '[...] Celuy-là dis-ie cognoistra moins ce qui est de la France, des loix du Royaume, des interests de la Couronne, que quelque autre Ministre François quoy que de plus nouuelle date & erection. / *O Deus in dextra fulmen quid torques inane?* [...]' **becomes** (pp. 424-425) '[...] Celuy-là dis ie cognoistra moins ce qui est de la France, des loix du Royaume, des interest de la Couronne, que quelque autre Ministre François, quoy que de plus nouuelle date, quoy qu'éclos en vne nuict comme les champignons, ou en vn moment de faueur comme ces grenoüilles qui tombent auec les pluyes d'Esté, & qui ne sont pas si tost animées qu'elles sautent, / *O Deus in dextra fulmen quid torques inane?* [...]'

p. 300 add.: '[...] ou des impertinences si grossieres. / S. Iusques icy tu as fort bien raisonné sur le Cardinal, mais tu as à mon aduis tres-mal philosophé sur les grenoüilles. / M. *Quid Ranis cum Mazarino?* à quel propos me viens-tu parler des grenoüilles? [...]' **becomes** (pp. 425-430) '[...] ou des impertinences si grossieres? / S. *Mascurat* mon amy, tu m'as fait beau ieu sans y penser, car il me souuient d'vn prouerbe par lequel ton *Birague* est qualifié *Cardinal* sans titre, *Chancelier* sans Sceaux, *Prestre* sans benefice, & *Docteur* sans doctrine, ce qui peut verifier la raillerie du bon-homme Crucé, quand il deriuoit *Doctores à docendo sicut montes à mouendo*, & nous apprendre aussi que les Estrangers sçauent tousiours moins de nos affaires, que ceux qui en ont pris & succé la coignoissance auec le laict de leur nourrices. / M. Dupleix en son Histoire de Henry troisiéme rapporte ce beau quolibet que tu viens d'employer contre deux Cardinaux tout ensemble: Mais quoy que Monsieur de Thou, ait esté auparauant luy de la mesme opinion, touchant le Cardinal *Birague*, lors qu'il dit, *Is erat Renatus Biragus Cardinalis, nec multum eloquens, & iuris nostri pariter & antiqui parum sciens*, ie ne suis pas toutesfois si dénué de response, que tu puisse esperer aucun aduantage, de la deposition si formelle & si bien circonstanciée de ces deux tesmoins. Car outre qu'vn traict de plume, se donne quelquefois aussi bien qu'vn coup d'espée, assez legerement, par colere, ou bigearrerie; il sera peut-estre de l'ignorance du Cardinal de *Birague*, comme de celle du Cardinal *du Prat*, lequel fut accusé par Beze, de ce que le Roy François premier, ayant receu de Henry huictiesme vne douzaine de dogues d'Angleterre, la lettre portant *duodecin molossos*, il luy demanda vn des Mulets qu'il auoit receus de ce pays-là, & apprenant de la bouche du Roy, que c'estoient des dogues, il s'excusa disant, qu'il pensoit auoir entendu lire *duodecim muletos*: Mais aprés tout Monsieur *Aubery*, tres-fidel, & diligent Historien des Cardinaux, iustifie fort bien par les tesmoignages de *Feron*, qui le qualifie tres-docte & fameux Iurisconsulte, de *Sadolet* qui le choisit pour censeur de ses œuures Latines, & *d'Auton* qui le loüe d'auoir harangué tres eloquemment en Latin deuant l'Empereur Maximilian, que cette ignorance supposée par Beze, n'estoit qu'vne pure calomnie. Et ie croy pour moy, qu'on pourroit bien dire le mesme du Chancelier de *Birague*, puis que Renaud de Beaune Archeuesque de Bourges, remarque dans l'Oraison funebre dont il honnora les obseques dudit *Chancelier*, qu'il auoit fait ses estudes tant en Italie, qu'en Auignon, & que François I. luy donna vne charge de Conseiller au Parlement, puis vne de Maistre des Requestes, en suite dequoy il fut fait President au Parlement de Thurin; Il fut aussi enuoyé de la part du Roy aux Peres du Concile de Trente, & employé par luy en plusieurs Ambassades, desquelles vn ignorant ne se seroit pas demeslé si aduantageusement que luy: Et tant s'en faut que Bouchel, quoy qu'ennemy iuré des Chanceliers Cardinaux, ait blasmé cestuy-cy d'ignorance, qu'il dit au contraire *verbis expressis*, *Il satisfit estant par delà*, c'est à dire à Thurin, en qualité de President, *à l'esperance qu'on auoit conceuë de luy, appaisa les differents meus entre la gendarmerie, donna ordre que les viures ne manquassent, se monstrant en tout tres-fidel au Roy.*

Enfin l'oraison qu'il fit aux Estats de Blois, & de laquelle chacun peut iuger, puis qu'elle est imprimée, ne tesmoigne point qu'il fust si peu eloquent que dit Monsieur de Thou: Auquel quand i'accorderois qu'il estoit *Iuris nostri pariter*, *& antiqui parum sciens*, cela neantmoins se doit entendre de nostre Iurisprudence Françoise, de la pratique de nos loix municipales, de la chiquane du Barreau, & ne peut-estre tiré en consequence pour le Cardinal *Mazarin*, qui n'a que faire de toutes ces tricoteries, pour estre bon Ministre, pour entendre la Politique de ce Royaume, pour cognoistre les interests de cét Estat, pour en sçauoir les maximes, pour manier à propos les affaires publiques, pour conclurre la paix ou la guerre, pour seruir nostre Roy aduantageusement, iudicieusement, fidelement, comme tous les Historiens demeurent d'accord, que fit aussi le Cardinal *Birague*, quoy qu'*Estranger*, quoy qu'*ignorant* du stile, & de la façon de nos plaidoyries, & en vn mot, quoy que les bonnes langues de son temps les mescontents, les censeurs, & surueillants des affaires publiques, n'ayent non plus espargné sa pourpre, que l'on fait maintenant celle du Cardinal *Mazarin*. Et puis, *Sainct-Ange*, quand ie t'accorderois que le Cardinal *Birague* estoit ignorant de nos affaires, que dit Monsieur de Thou, pourrois-tu toutesfois inferer sans faire tort à ton iugement, que ce fust parce qu'il estoit *Estranger*, tous les François qui ont exercé cette charge estoient-ils sçauans comme du *Vair* & *l'Hospital*? estoient-ils aussi grands Legistes comme les *Moruilliers* & *Monthelons?* vn *Pierre Doriolle* qui fut fait de General des Finances Chancelier, vn *Adam Fumée* que Feron dit auoir esté Medecin, vn *Guillaume de Nongaret* qui pendoit les Sceaux à son espée, tant d'Ecclesiastiques *Abbez, Euesques, Archeuesques* qui ont esté Chanceliers, pouuoient-ils estre mieux versez & plus entendus *in vtroque iure*, ou en nostre Iurisprudence que ne l'estoit *Birague* aprés auoir porté la robe tout le temps de sa vie, & en trois diuers Parlemens. Et puis ne vois-tu pas le preiudice que cette opinion feroit à tant d'autres Ministres qui gouuerné si sagement & si heureusement des Estats, hors desquels ils auoient non seulement pris naissance, mais aussi passé vne bonne partie de leur âge: ne sçais-tu pas que nostre Poëte Bourdelois *Ausone* aprés auoir longtemps gouuerné les escholes de son pays, se rendit capable d'exercer le *Consulat* à Rome? Ignore-tu que la Reyne Catherine de Medicis, se voyant priuée d'vn si bon Ministre qu'estoit le Duc de Guise tué par Poltrot deuant la ville d'Orleans, s'estoit resoluë d'appeller vn Chrestofle de Witemberg grand Seigneur d'Allemagne, *qui res pace & bello, suo arbitrio moderaretur*, & quoy que Monsieur de Thou appelle ce conseil *absurdum, & vasto fluctuantis fœminæ ingenio dignum*, elle l'auroit neantmoins executé, & peut-estre luy auroit-il tres-bien reüssi, si ce Seigneur n'eust preferé le repos dont il iouyssoit en son pays, aux troubles qu'il preuoyoit bien de rencontrer en France. Et ainsi tu peux voir, *Sainct-Ange,* que la capacité d'vn Ministre d'Estat, ne consiste point au Code ny au Digeste, qu'il n'a que faire de sçauoir tant de paragraphes, ny d'auoir leu si soigneusement Barthole & Iason: que l'on peut bien entendre les loix & les coustumes de la France, quoy que l'on ignore celle de Loris ou de Vaugirard; que l'on peut heureusement manier les affaires d'Estat, sans estudier la stile des Requestes, les plaidoyez du Parlement, ou les chiquanes du Chastellet; enfin que l'ignorance vraye ou supposée qu'auoit le Cardinal *Birague* de toutes ces choses, ne l'a point empesché d'exercer tant de belles charges auec honneur & reputation singulier, iusques là mesme, que Monsieur de Thou aprés l'auoir, comme i'ay desia dit, taxé d'ignorer nostre Iurisprudence, l'appelle en vn endroit *virum bonum*, & dit en vn autre, que *Maiorum suorum æmulatione, fidam operam tota vita, quæ ei longissima fuit, Regibus nostris nauauit*, & non content de ces eloges il adiouste, que *quauis alia maxima dignitate, siue fidem siue prudentiam, & rerum vsum spectes, erat dignissimus*, qui sont à te dire vray des qualitez si excellentes, que tous les Ministres de France autant Estrangers que naturels, seront tousiours fort aduantagez, & tres-capables de bien seruir, quand ils en auront de semblables. / S. Iusques icy tu as fort bien raisonné sur ces deux Cardinaux, mais tu as à mon aduis tres-mal philosophé sur les grenoüilles. / M. Resue-tu? de quoy te souuiens tu? *Quid Ranis cum Birago, aut Mazarino?* à quel propos me viens-tu parles des grenoüilles? [...]'

p. 305 alt.: '[...] & verifiée en Parlement le 2. Auril par laquelle il declare sa volonté touchant Monsieur le Cardinal, [...]' **becomes** (p. 435) '[...] & verifiée en Parlement le vingt-vniesme Auril, par laquelle il declare sa volonté touchant Monsieur le *Cardinal*, [...]'

p. 306 add.: '[...] *fait cognoistre l'affection que nous auons que Dieu soit honoré en ce choix*. Or aprés tous ces establissemens si precis, ces declarations & confirmations si solemnelles, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 436-437) '[...] *fait cognoistre l'affection que nous auons que Dieu soit honoré en ce choix.* Et pour monstrer dauantage comme ce choix, & cette nomination du *Cardinal Mazarin* au Ministre de la France, n'estoit point faite à la haste, ny prematurée: C'est que la solemnité du baptesme de

Monsieur le Dauphin se deuant faire le mesme iour, Sa Maiesté nomma pour le presenter sur les sacrez Fonts, la tres-illustre Princesse de Condé Charlotte Marguerite de Montmorency, auec le Cardinal, *deslors premier Ministre d'Estat*, comme disent Messieurs de Saincte Mathe liure 26. page, si ie ne me trompe 234. où ils adioustent ces paroles bien contraires au procedé d'apresent, *Le Roy ayant declaré dans le choix qu'il fit du Parain, que c'estoit pour conseruer de plus en plus vn si excellent homme à son Estat, par ce puissant engagement.* En conformité dequoy, le Ceremonial François dit aussi au suiet de la mesme ceremonie, *Que le Roy tesmoigna de sa propre bouche ausdits Parain & Maraine, que c'estoit pour obliger encore plus estroitement le Prince de Condé, & son Eminence à son seruice, & à celuy de Monseigneur le Dauphin son fils, qu'elle leur faisoit cét honneur, qui est le plus grand qu'eux, ny autres pouuoiens iamais receuoir.* Or aprés tous ces establissemens si precis, ces declarations & confirmations si solemnelles, [...]'

p. 306 add.: '[...] par le premier & plus auguste Parlement qui soit en France, y a-t'il quelque exception, ou recision à faire, [...]' **becomes** (p. 427) '[...] par le premier & plus auguste *Parlement* qui soit en France, & confirmées par vne action & protestation si remarquable, y a-t'il quelque exception, ou recision à faire, [...]'

p. 310 add.: '[...] que l'on a si souuent remercié Rome de ce qu'elle nous l'auoit donné; que tant de Panegyristes luy ont dit, [...]' **becomes** (p. 441) '[...] que l'on a si souuent remercié Rome de ce qu'elle nous l'auoit donné; / *La France doit son lustre à la vertu Romaine; / La vieux Tybre a rendu ce qu'il doit à la Seine, / Et par vn de ses fils à l'Espagne fatal, / Luy redonne à son tour, vn bonheur sans esgal.* / que tant de Panegyristes luy ont dit, [...]'

p. 311 add.: '[...] les touche si fort? / M. La verité de toutes choses, les desordres de leurs maisons, les abus qui se glissent en Cour, le larrecin des Traittans & Monopoleurs, *quos / Confestim liquidus Fortunæ riuus inaurat*. / la tyrannie des Intendans & de leur Fuseliers, l'iniustice des Faiseurs d'affaires.' **becomes** (pp. 442-443) '[...] les touche si fort? / M. Ie leur dis la verité de toutes choses, ie les aduertis des desordres de leurs Maisons, ie leur descouure les horribles flateries dont on les berne continuellement, les faussetez qu'on leur rapporte, les mauuais offices que l'on rend aux vns & aux autres, & bien souuent à leurs meilleurs & plus affectionnez seruiteurs; ie les instruis des abus qui se glissent en Cour. Ie tasche de les rendre plus apprehensifs qu'ils ne sont pas; ie leur presche tousiours des disgraces futures, afin qu'ils prennent garde à les euiter, & qu'ils ne s'endorment dans les felicitez; ie leur dis que la Monarchie Françoise est extremement vieillie & valetudinaire, afin qu'ils la choient; bref ie les exhorte de remedier autant qu'il est possible, au larrecin des Traittans, & Monopoleurs, *quos / Confestim liquidus Fortunæ riuus inaurat*. / à la tyrannie des Intendans & de leurs Fuseliers, & à l'iniustice des Faiseurs d'affaires.'

p. 312 add. '[...] acquitter de vieilles debtes, creer de nouueaux offices, conferer des Benefices, obtenir des aubennes, demander des confiscations, & faire vne infinité de choses semblables, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 443-444) '[...] acquitter de vieilles debtes, creer de nouueaux Offices, conferer des Benefices, obtenir des aubennes, des dispenses d'aage pour entrer aux offices de Iudicature, demander des confiscations, conuertir les commoditez & decorations publiques au profit de quelque particulier, & faire vne infinité de choses semblables, [...]'

p. 312 add.: '[...] ie puis dire auec saint Paul, *Ego inimicus vobis factus sum vertum dicens*. / S. Et moy ie dis que tous ces discour là sont d'vn vray Parlementaire, tel que ie ne te croiois pas estre.' **becomes** (p. 444) '[...] ie puis dire auec S. Paul, *Ego inimicus vobis factus sum vertum dicens*. Mais si ie ne l'estois d'eux il faudroit que ie le fusse de ma conscience, en conniuant à toutes ces griuelées, que l'on peut qualifier voleries publiques & permises pour entretenir le Ieu, le Carosse, la Dame, ou la bonne table: car tout ce qui vient de la fluste s'en va tousiours au tabourin: & ce ne sont iamais ny les pauures honteux, ny les necessiteux qui font ces affaires, mais plustost des gens qui n'en ont que faire, & qui s'en pourroient fort bien passer. Or en cela comme en beaucoup d'autres choses, ie ressemble à ce vieux Poëte Lucile, qui disoit estre le propre de la vertu / *Hostem esse atque inimicum hominum morumque malorum*, / *Contra defensorem hominum morumque bonorum*, / *Commoda prætereà patriæ sibi prima putare*, / *Deinde parentum, tertia iam postremaque nostra.* / S. Et moy ie dis que tous ces discours là sont d'vn vray *Parlementaire*, tel que ie ne te croyois pas estre.'

p. 313-314 alt. + add.: '[...] s'il leur iettoit des liures à la teste, s'il leur bailloit des nazardes, s'il pissoit dans leur chapeau, s'il leur faisoit tous les iours des pieces nouuelles iusques à les faire démonter & déualiser par des voleurs attitrez, iusques à faire imprimer des fausses Gazettes contre eux pour les mettre en colere, & neantmoins c'estoient les diuertissemens ordinaires d'vn homme, qui passe auiourd'huy pour le plus grand Ministre qui ait iamais esté en France. Voudroient-ils vne telle attention en ce personnage, qu'elle fust sans relasche; seroit-ce la raison, que pour seruir l'Estat il negligeast sa personne, que pour se monstrer aux estrangers il se cachast à ses amis, [...]' **becomes** (p. 446) '[...] s'il leur iettoit des liures à la teste, s'il leur bailloit des nazardes, s'il les pinçoit, s'il les piquoit, ou chatoüilloit, s'il leur faisoit tous les iours des pieces nouuelles iusques à les faire démonter & déualiser par des voleurs attitrez, iusques à faire imprimer des fausses Gazettes contre eux pour les mettre en colere, & neantmoins c'estoient les diuertissemens ordinaires d'vn homme, qui passe auiourd'huy pour le plus grand Ministre qui ait iamais esté en France; ou s'il auoit des plaisirs aussi extrauagans que le *Valestain*, & qui toutesfois n'empeschoient pas qu'il ne fust estimé la meilleure Teste d'Allemagne. Voudroient-ils donc vne telle attention en ce *Cardinal*, qu'elle fust sans relasche; seroit-ce la raison, que pour seruir l'Estat il negligeast sa personne, que pour se monstrer aux Estrangers il se cachast à ses amis, [...]'

p. 315 add.: '[...] il cheuauchoit vn baston auec eux. Et quoy plus, l'Empereur Auguste [...]' **becomes** (p. 447) '[...] il cheuauchoit vn baston auec eux; ny *Jacques* Roy de Cypre de ce qu'il s'amusoit à deuider, *lanea glomerare fila*, dit Cortesius; ou nostre Roy *Charles neufiesme* de ce qu'il ferroit fort bien son cheual. Et quoy plus, l'Empereur *Auguste* [...]'

p. 315 add.: '[...] à prendre des mouches, *Honorius* aimoit si passionnément vne Poulle [...]' **becomes** (pp. 447-448) '[...] à prendre des mouches; *Alexandre Seuere* ne voyoit rien plus volontiers que le combat des Barbets auec de petits pourceaux; *Honorius* aimoit si passionément vne Poulle [...]'

p. 315 add.: '[...] *Simia quam similis turpissima bestia nobis*. / Certes il est bien aisé de cognoistre par ces accusations si friuoles, que l'on ne veut rien pardonner au Cardinal, & que quoy qu'il puisse faire, ses Censeurs y trouueront tousiours à redire: qu'il regarde vn Perroquet, qu'il se ioüe auec vn Chien, qu'il ait vn Rossignol dans sa chambre, qu'il manie ses glands, qu'il tortille ses gands, ce sera tousiours la mesme chose, on n'y trouuera pas moins de quoy le blasmer, & on luy dira à la fin, / *Nil tibi concessit ratio, digitum exere peccas*. [...]' **becomes** (pp. 448-449) '[...] *Simia quam similis turpissima bestia nobis*. / Certes il y a bien icy dequoy employer l'Epigramme de Martial, / *Si meus aurita gaudet* Lagopode *Flaccus*, / *Si fruitur tristi Canius* Æthiope*: / Publius exiguæ si flagrat amore* Catellæ*, / Si Cronus similem* Cercopithecon *amat*: / *Delectat Marium si perniciosus* Ichneumon, / Pica *salutatrix si tibi Lause placet*: / *Si gelidum collo nectit Glacilla* draconem, / Lusciniæ *tumulum si Thelesina dedit*. / Pourquoy le Cardinal *Mazarin* ne pourroit-il pas quelquefois ietter les yeux sur les plaisans soubresauts que fait vne Guenon? *Sainct-Ange* mon amy, il est bien aisé de cognoistre par ces accusations si fausses & si friuoles, que l'on ne veut rien pardonner au Cardinal, & que quoy qu'il puisse faire, ses Censeurs y trouueront tousiours à redire: Lors que le *feu Roy de Suede ce puissant fleau de la Maison d'Austriche, s'égayoit dans son particulier, à ioüer auec ses Colonels à Colin-maillart parmy ses plus grands triomphes*, cela passoit pour vne galanterie admirable; & si le *Cardinal* regarde vn Perroquet, s'il se ioüe auec vn Chien, s'il a vn Rossignol dans sa chambre, s'il manie ses glands, s'il tortille ses gands, ce sera tousiours la mesme chose, on n'y trouuera pas moins dequoy le blasmer, on en fera vn peché mortel, & on luy dira à la fin, / *Nil tibi concessit ratio, digitum exere peccas*. [...]'

p. 316 add.: '[...] tant s'en faut elle est honnorée des Princes, des Mareschaux de France, des Cheualiers de l'Ordre, des Euesques, & en vn mot de toute la Cour, [...]' **becomes** (p. 449) '[...] tant s'en faut elle est honorée des Princes, des Ducs & Pairs, des Mareschaux de France, des Cheualiers de l'Ordre, des Euesques, & en vn mot de toute la Cour, [...]'

p. 316 add.: '[...] ne sont iamais beaucoup considerables *posita ne cluditur arca*. Et toutefois cela maintient l'vnion des Princes les vns auec les autres, éuente beaucoup de cabales, empesche les querelles & dissensions particulieres, & remedie à vne infinité de petits inconueniens, qui sans doute en produiroient d'autres plus considerables.' **becomes** (p. 450) '[...] ne sont iamais beaucoup considerables *posita ne cluditur arca*. Que ces Ταβλίζοντες *tablissantes* dont parle

Diomedes, c'est à dire *qui per omnes dies ludere, forumque aleatorium calefacere consueuerunt*, comme dit Auguste dans Suetone, ne s'y rencontrent point. Que si le *Cardinal* ioüe quelquefois ou tient table, c'est plustost par complaisance, & pour la satisfaction des autres que pour la sienne, & qu'en tout cas lors qu'il y a des affaires qui pressent, des Courriers à expedier, des pacquets à ouurir, il sçait fort bien dire, & encore mieux executer ce vers de Martial, / *Hæc mihi charta nuces, hæc est mihi charta Fritillus.* / & aprés tout, ce ieu, cette table, ces diuertissemens, ne sont-ils pas vtils à l'Estat, puis qu'ils maintiennent l'vnion des Princes les vns auec les autres, puis qu'ils éuentent beaucoup de cabales, puis qu'ils empeschent les querelles & dissentions, & enfin puis qu'ils remedient à vne infinité de petits inconueniens, qui sans doute en produiroient d'autres plus considerables.'

p. 319 add.: 'L'on peut encore faire le mesme iugement de toutes ces lettres que ledit Cardinal ne lit point du tout, ou laisse sans response; car il est tres-certain que si elles estoient de consequence, il ne les traitteroit pas de la sorte, & que luy ou ses Secretaires prendroient bien la peine d'y respondre: [...]' **becomes** (pp. 453-454) 'L'on peut encore faire le mesme de toutes ces Lettres que ledit *Cardinal* ne lit point du tout: car cela est absolument faux, & il seroit à souhaitter, qu'il pust connoistre *intuitiue* comme les Anges, tout ce q'on luy veut dire ou escrire, afin de ne point tant perdre de temps à escouter ceux qui n'ont rien que des sottises à luy dire. Il est pareillement faux qu'il en laisse aucune sans response: surquoy ie voudrois que tu eusse entendu taroter tous ses Secretaires, qui ne se plaignent d'autre chose que de ces responses inutiles, & comme ils disent, indecentes: en quoy toutefois ie ne suis pas de leurs aduis, car ie tiens que c'est bien obliger vn homme, que de luy refuser promptement, soit de viue voix, ou par escrit ce qu'on ne luy peut accorder. C'est pourquoy ie ne sçay quel ancien disoit inter *Epigrammata vetera,* / *Cæsaris ad postes sedeo, sto, nocte, dieque,* / *Nec datur ingressus, quo mea fata loquar.* / *Jte Deæ faciles, & saltem nomine nostro,* / *Dicite diuini Cæsaris ante pedes:* / *Si nequeo placidas affari Cæsaris aures,* / *Saltem aliquis veniat qui mihi dicat abi.* / D'où vient donc qu'aprés vne si bonne volonté du Maistre, & vne si prompte executino des seruiteurs, il y a quelquefois des lettres qui demeurent sans response? c'est en vn mot qu'elles n'en meritent point; c'est qu'elles sont folles, extrauagantes & ridicules. Car il est tres-certain que si elles estoient de consequence, on ne les traitteroit pas de la sorte, & que le *Cardinal*, ou ses Secretaires prendroient bien la peine d'y respondre: [...]'

p. 327 om. + alt. + add.: '[...] comme cette maxime n'est pas tousiours veritable: car pour la perte de Courtray, si tu en veux blasmer le Cardinal, il faut auparauant iustifier qu'il ait donné les ordres au Baron de Paluau d'en sortir pour aller deuant Ipre; ce que peut-estre ne pourras-tu pas faire si facilement, veu qu'en Cour *adhuc sub iudice lis est*; & quand bien ç'auroit esté luy, ne pourroit-il pas legitimer cét ordre, sur le grand circuit de la ville d'Ipre, & sur la difficulté qu'il y auoit de la bloquer tout d'vn coup auec l'armée de Monsieur le Prince, sans le secours emprunté de Courtray, pour trois ou quatre iours seulement, pendant lesquels il n'y auoit pas d'apparence que l'ennemy peust rien entreprendre contre ladite ville? & au cas qu'il l'assiegeast, ne pouuoit-on pas esperer que Monsieur le Prince y feroit promptement rentrer le Gouuerneur, auec les forces qu'il en auoit tirées, & de nouuelles s'il en eust esté besoin; ou que la prise d'Ipre qu'on ne croyoit pas deuoir tant durer, causeroit le secours de Courtray; ou que cette ville tiendroit plus long-temps qu'elle ne fit pas; ou enfin que l'on y pourueoiroit par quelque autre moyen, lequel sans doute auroit reüssi, s'il n'en eust esté empesché par le Chapitre des Accidents, qui est à dire vray le plus fascheux de toute la Logique? Mais quand ie t'aurois accordé que nous auons perdu *Courtray*, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 462-465) '[...] comme cette maxime n'est pas tousiours veritable: car pour la perte de *Courtray*, il ne pouuoit tomber dans l'esprit de qui que ce soit, que cette ville si bien fortifiée, & pourueuë de toutes choses necessaires, peust estre emportée d'emblée; & d'y former vn siege à la maniere accoustumée, pendant celuy d'*Ipre*, il estoit aussi comme impossible, parce que nostre circonuallation estant desia en sa perfection, on pouuoit auant que les Espagnols eussent esté retranchez, sortir de nos lignes, auec plus de troupes qu'ils n'en auoient deuant *Courtray*, & les combattre aduantageusement. Cela fit donc resoudre dés Paris, que Monsieur de *Paluau* inuestiroit *Ipre*, auec partie des trouppes de la garnison de *Courtray*, comme c'est l'ordinaire presque à tous les sieges, de faire inuestir les places qu'on attaque, par les garnisons de celles qui sont plus voisines, & qui s'en retournent aprés, quand toute l'armée y est arriuée. Or si cette pratique est bonne ailleurs, elle estoit absolument necessaire en cette entreprise d'*Jpre* pour la faire reussir: puisque si Monsieur le *Prince* qui auoit à passer la *Lye*, eust pris droit sa marche vers *Jpre*, auec toute son armée, sans

auoir fait inuestir la place, les ennemis eussent eu tout le temps requis, & toutes les facilitez qu'ils pouuoient desirer pour ietter dedans autant de monde qu'il en falloit pour la deffendre, auparauant que Monsieur le *Prince* y eust pû estre: ce qui auroit rendu son entreprise inutile, laquelle au contraire luy reussit fort bien. Et si cela se fit aux dépens de Courtray, ce ne fut pas toutesfois par sa faute, ny par celle du *Cardinal*, ou du Baron de *Paluau*, puis qu'il auoit laissé prés de quinze cens hommes & deux cens cheuaux en ce lieu garny d'vne bonne Citadelle, & où il croyoit retourner auparauant que l'ennemy pût songer d'y venir. / S. Si tu veux dire que ce fut par la mienne ie ne m'en soucie guere, car aussi bien ne sommes-nous pas en vn temps où l'on fasse le procés à personne; mais neantmoins cela ne iustifiera pas le Baron de *Paluau*, ou le conseil de cuex qui luy firent abandonner vn poste de telle importance. / M. Si l'on ioüyt d'vne amnistie generale aprés tant d'actions violentes & déreglées, c'est plustost signe de la bonté, & de la misericorde de la *Reyne* qui fait mentir à son égard le prouerbe rapporté par Iuuenal (Satyr. 13), / --- *quod vindicta / Nemo magis gaudet quam femina*. / que de l'innocence de beaucoup de François dénaturez, qui ne buttent qu'à renuerser tout le Royaume par leur ambition, & ausquels on pourroit dire auec raison, / *Si genus humanum & mortalia temnitis arma / At sperate deos memores fandi, atque nefandi.* / Mais aprés tout, ie ne croy pas que personne soit coupable de la prise de *Courtray*, car comme ie t'ay desia dit, il n'y auoit nulle apparence, que l'ennemy pust rien entreprendre contre ladite ville, pendant que le Baron de *Paluau* en seroit absent: & au cas qu'il l'assiegeast, ne pouuoit-on esperer que Monsieur le *Prince* y feroit promptement rentrer le Gouuerneur, auec les forces qu'il en auoit tirées, & de nouuelles s'il en eust esté besoin; ou que la prise d'*Ipre* qu'on ne croyoit pas deuoir tant durer, causeroit le secours de *Courtray*, ou que cette ville tiendroit plus long temps qu'elle ne fit pas: ou enfin que l'on y pouruoyroit par quelque autre moyen, lequel sans doute auroit reussi, s'il n'en eust esté empesché par le Chapitre des *Accidents* ou de la *Fortune*, qui est à dire vray le plus fascheux de toute la Logique, parce que / *Centum doctûm hominum consilia, sola hæc deuincit dea / Fortuna, atque hoc verum est*. / comme dit Plaute *in Pseudolo*: Mais quand ie t'aurois accordé que nous auons perdu *Courtray*, [...]'

p. 328 add.: '[...] *Nicolo Piccinini* quoy qu'il perdist ordinairement toutes les batailes qu'il donnoit, ne laissoit pas d'estre estimé l'vn des meilleurs Capitaines qui fut de son temps en Italie; [...]' **becomes** (p. 465) *'Nicolo Piccinini, quem claudum, ac trium pedum & dodrantis fuisse ferunt*, au rapport de Cortesius, quoy qu'il perdist ordinairement toutes les batailles qu'il donnoit, ne laissoit pas d'estre estimé l'vn des meilleurs Capitaines qui fust de son temps en Italie; [...]'

p. 330 add.: '[...] ie conclus auec Lipse (In Notis Politic.), *en ludibria vitæ & iactationes hominum! quibus nihil vsquam per vllam sapientiam est certi*. / S. Ie renie celuy-là qui vendit Dieu, [...]' **becomes** (p. 467) '[...] ie conclus auec Lipse (In Notis Politic.), *en ludibria vitæ & iactationes hominum! quibus nihil vsquam per vllam sapientiam est certi.* Mais puis que ces bons amis du *Cardinal* parlent si volontiers des affaires qui ne luy ont pas reussi, pourquoy ne disent-ils mot de *Porto-Longone*, *Piombino*, *Dixmude*, & la *Bassée*, qu'il fit attaquer quasi en mesme temps & auec vn succés par tout si aduantageux à la France? Pourquoy ne parlent-ils point de la prise de la *Motte*, & de *Roses*, sans y employer de grandes armées, mais auec la rognure & raclure, s'il faut ainsi dire, de ie ne sçay quelles trouppes ramassées çà & là? Pourquoy finalement se taire de tant d'autres actions remarquables que son *Eminence* fait tous les iours au profit & à l'honneur de cette Monarchie? Pour moy ie n'en sçay point d'autre raison sinon celle que donne Symmaque (lib. 6, epist 1), *Peruicax liuor non sinit fateri, quod cogit veritas iudicare*. / S. Ie renie celuy-là qui vendit Dieu, [...]'

p. 330 add.: '[...] si tu auois veu ce que Paule Manuce tesmoigne estre veritable, [...]' **becomes** (p. 468) '[...] si tu auois veu ce que Alde fils de Paule Manuce tesmoigne estre veritable, [...]'

p. 333-334 alt.: '[...] Car le Baron *de Paluau* a esté recompensé du gouuernement d'Ipre pour deux raisons: la premiere, parce que la bonne Politique ne permettoit pas que Monsieur de *Chastillon* en fust Gouuerneur: & la seconde, parce que tent s'en faut que le Baron de Paluau est conniué tant soit peu à la prise de Courtray, qu'au contraire outre vn tres-bon Gouuernement qu'il perdoit en cette place place, [...]' **becomes** (p. 471) '[...] Car le Baron *de Paluau* a esté recompensé du gouuernement d'Ipre pour deux raisons: la premiere, parce qu'il auoit obey ponctuellement aux ordres, qu'on luy auoit donnez, ce que beaucoup d'autres frappez de la maladie du temps, qui est la des-obeïssance, n'auroient peut-estre pas voulu faire: & la seconde, parce que tent s'en

faut que le Baron *de Paluau* est conniué tant soit peu à la prise de *Courtray*, qu'au contraire outre vn tres-bon Gouuernement qu'il perdoit en cette place place, [...]'

p. 334 alt.: '[...] & cela estant, pourquoy ne l'eust-on pas recompensé d'vne perte si notable, arriuée sans qu'il y eust de sa faute veu que soubs pretexte de ce dédommagement, on pouuoit remedier à vn autre inconuenient si considerable, qu'il n'y a que ceux qui sont dans le secret des affaires, qui puissent bien iuger de sa consequence. / S. Me voilà fort bien guery de la fausse imagination que i'auois conceuë de Courtray. [...]' **becomes** (p. 472) '[...] & cela estant, pourquoy ne l'eust-on pas recompensé d'vne perte si notable, arriuée sans qu'il y eust de sa faute? Pourquoy auroit-on sacrifié son innocence à la passion de ses ennemis, ou à l'ignorance de ceux qui blasment tout ce qu'ils ne voyent ou n'entendent point? pourquoy ne pas donner à vn bon & fidel suiet, à vn homme de cœur & de conduite les moyens de seruir aussi bien son Prince aprés cette disgrace comme il auoit fait auparauant. / S. Me voila fort bien guery de la fausse imagination que i'auois conceuë de Courtray. [...]'

p. 337 alt.: 'C'est à dire d'vne fatalité à vne autre, car quoy que l'armée de Monsieur le Prince fust foible, plûtost par la difficulté, que par le peu de volonté que le Cardinal auoit de la faire plus grosse; il est certain que la ville se fust renduë dans quinze iours, si l'on n'eust point leué le siege, & il ne fut leué que crainte de quelques accidents encore plus considerables, que la prise de Lerida ne pouuoit estre aduantageuse. En quoy outre que Monsieur le Prince témoigna autant de prudence & de bonne conduite, comme il auoit fait ailleurs de courage & de resolution; [...]' **becomes** (p. 475) 'C'est à dire d'vne fatalité à vne autre, car quoy que l'armée de Monsieur le Prince fust tres-belle, que le siege eust esté prudemment concerté, que les premieres attaques eussent reüssi à merueille, le costé toutesfois où l'on auoit commencé les mines, s'estant trouué à l'espreuue des pics & hoyaux, & de l'obstination memse de ceux qui y trauailloient; & la crainte de quelque accident beaucoup plus considerable, que la prise de *Lerida* ne pouuoit estre auantageuse, estant suruenuë sur ces entrefaites, il fallut leuer le siege. En quoy outre que Monsieur le Prince tesmoigna autant de prudence & de bonne conduite, comme il auoit fait ailleurs de courage & de resolution; [...]'

p. 338 add.: '[...] *ita quum res postulat, regibilem & consultam*. De dire aussi que l'on ait esté bien aise en Cour de la mort de Gassion, & que l'on ait pris plaisir à le broüiller auec Ranzau, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 475-476) '[...] *ita quum res postulat, regibilem & consultam*. Et il est à croire que si ces belles qualitez, / --- *labor improbus, aspera virtus*, / *Vis animi excellens, ardor, violentia, cura.* / luy eussent peu donner cette victoire, comme elles luy en auoient desia donné tant d'autres, il n'auroit pas quitté cette ville, qu'aprés y estre entré par la bresche: mais comme i'ay desia remarqué, le Chapitre des accidens ne seroit pas en si bonne intelligence auec la Fortune, s'il n'estoit ennemy de la vertu. De dire aussi que l'on ait esté bien aise en Cour de la mort de *Gassion*, & que l'on ait pris plaisir à le broüiller auec *Ranzau*, [...]'

p. 338 alt.: '[...] & s'il l'auoit fait comme dit le *Factum*, pourquoy seroit-il allé comme dit le mesme, d'Amiens à Dourden pour les accomoder? [...]' **becomes** (p. 477) '[...] & s'il l'auoit fait comme dit le *Factum*, pourquoy seroit-il allé comme dit le mesme, d'Amiens à Dourlans pour les accomoder? [...]'

p. 340 add.: '[...] il te faut aduertir que c'est vne vieille opinion, & de laquelle nous auons mesme des tesmoignages *in Catalectis*, quoy qu'en termes vn peu plus honnestes & plus ciuils que les tiens, [...]' **becomes** (p. 478) '[...] il te faut aduertir que c'est vne vieille opinion, & de laquelle mesme nous auons des tesmoignages dans l'Epigramme rapporté *in Catalectis*, comme aussi dans les fragments de Petrone le Grammairien, *& inter Epigrammata vetera*, quoy qu'en termes vn peu plus honnestes & plus ciuils que le tiens, [...]'

p. 340 alt.: 'S. Tu aymerois mieux auoir perdu vn bon disner, qu'vn seul mot de ta pedanterie ordinaire; ie m'en vais querir vn réchaud, afin qu'au moins pendant ce temps-là tu ayes loisir de remplir vn peu le mousle de ton pourpoint, & de songer aussi à ce que tu me pourras respondre. / M. L'on appelle cela en Italien *Carita pelosa*, car tu ne cherches ces interualles que pour mieux songer aux obiections que tu me veux faire. / S. Toute la sale est pleine de Colporteurs qui haussent le temps d'importance, Dieu sçait comme la Declaration ira tantost par les ruës. / M. Pourueu qu'elle aille droit c'est le principal, car ceux qui la portent feront sans doute de beaux

parterres. / S. Ils ne tomberont pas tousiours de si haut que ton Cardinal. / M. Il faut doncque sçauoit de quel lieu tu le voudras precipiter. / S. Commençons par celuy de la *Sur-Intendance de l'education Royale*, & voyons vn peu quel besoin il a eu de ioindre ce nouueau titre, à tant d'autres qu'il auoit dés le commencement de la Regence.' **becomes** (p. 479) 'S. Tu aimerois mieux auoir perdu vn bon disner, qu'vn seul mot de ta pedanterie ordinaire. / M. Ie ne sçay qui est plus pedant de moy qui parle auec raison & verité d'vn *Cardinal*, d'vn *Ministre*, d'vn Homme qui gouuerne heureusement toutes nos affaires, ou de toy qui n'as cessé tout auiourd'huy d'en mesdire. / S. Parbleu me voila bien relancé, ceux qui nous doiuent nous demandent, ie pensois t'auoir bien obligé en te donnant de si belles occasions comme i'ay fait, de iustifier le *Cardinal*, & vuider tes tablettes, mais il n'y a remede, ie suis trop auant pour ne pas auoir tout la reste des esclaircissemens que ie desire: commençons donc par celuy de la *Sur-Intendance de l'education Royale*, & voyons vn peu quel besoin il a eu de ioindre ce nouueau titre, à tant d'autres qu'il auoit dés le commencement de la Regence.'

p. 342 alt.: '[...] *vexat censura columbas.* / Or pour ce qui est du dernier de ces tiltres, i'ay tousiours crû que le Cardinal estant obligé à faire de grandes despenses, & de défrayer souuent vne bonne partie de la Cour, il auoit voulu augmenter son reuenu des gages qui sont affectées à cette charge: car pour ce qui est de l'authorité qu'il pouuoit pretendre, non moins sur le Gouuernement, que sur le Gouuerneur de sa Maiesté, il en auoit plus comme premier Ministre, que cette Sur-Intendance ne luy en pouuoit donner, & c'est par la mesme raison qu'on disoit de quelque autre qui estoit en pareille posture, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 480-481) '[...] *vexat censura columbas*. / Or pour ce qui est du dernier de ces tiltres, i'ay tousiours crû que la Reyne par le mesme principe, que le Roy defunt d'heureuse memoire fit le Cardinal *Parain* de son fils, l'auroit aussi tres-volontiers fait son *Gouuerneur*, afin que ces deux titres ioints à celuy du premier *Ministre*, seruissent comme de ce *funiculus triplex qui difficile rumpitur*, pour l'attacher autant que faire se pouuoit, aux interests d'vn *Filleul*, d'vn *Disciple*, & d'vn *Maistre*, si digne d'estre aimé, instruit, & respecté comme est le *Roy* d'apresent, sur lequel Dieu verse toutes sortes de benedictions. I'ay pensé aussi qu'outre ces considerations, la Reyne qui cognoist mieux que personne du monde, les soins qu'il faut apporter à l'instruction d'vn Prince semblable au nostre, / *Tu modo quos in spem statuis submittere gentis, / Præcipuum iam inde à teneris impende laborem*. / Ie veux croire dis-ie, qu'elle auoit vne infinité d'autres raisons fondées sur le merite de son *Eminence*, pour luy commetre cette charge de *Gouuerneur* de sa Maiesté: Mais comme elle cognut bien que les affaires d'vne si grande succession qu'est celle du Royaume de France, ne pouuoient pas s'accorder auec les soins particuliers d'vne education Royale; elle iugea à propos de les commettre à celuy qu'elle en cognoissoit tres-capable, & qui en effet s'en acquitte auiourd'huy si dignement, quoy que soubs la direction de sadite *Eminence*; afin que comme elle auoit soin de toutes les affaires de France, celle de l'education de ses Princes qui est vne des principales, ne deconcertast point par sa separation d'auec les autres, l'harmonie tres-aduantageuse pour l'Estat, que produit l'vnion & l'assemblage de toutes ces affaires en vn mesme centre, ou pour mieux dire en la teste d'vn mesme *Ministre*. Car de croire qu'on ait donné cette charge au *Cardinal* pour luy conseruer l'authorité qu'il deuoit auoir, non moins sur le gouuernement, que sur le Gouuerneur de Sa Maiesté, c'est ce qui ne me semble pas raisonnable, veu qu'il en auoit plus comme premier *Ministre*, que cette Sur-Intendance ne luy en pouuoit donner. Et c'est par la mesme raison, que l'on disoit de quelque autre, qui estoit en pareille posture, [...]'

p. 342 add.: '[...] *Reges in ipsos imperium est Iouis*. (Horace – Ode 1. lib. 3) / S. Et vn, venons aux autres, ce n'est pas fait qui commence. Pourquoy a-t'il despensé tant de millions, assiegé Orbitel, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 482-483) '[...] *Reges in ipsos imperium est Iouis*. / Or comme la resolution de ioindre ces trois titres de *Parain, Jntendant* de l'education Royale, & premier *Ministre*, auoit esté meureent concertée, aussi la declaration qu'en fit la Reyne fut incontinent suiuie d'vne approbation vniuerselle, on luy en dressa des Panegyriques & remerciemens, les Poëtes donnerent carriere à leurs plumes sur vne matiere si digne de les occuper; & quoy que des Sonnets qui furent imprimez à cette occasion, pas vn n'estoit à rebutter, ie ne te reciteray toutesfois que celuy de Monsieur *Colletet*, puis que l'approbation qu'il eut dés ce temps-là, fit que i'en chargeay ma memoire plus volontiers & plus facilement en suite, que tous les autres, / REYNE *que le Ciel aime, & que Dieu fauorise / De tous les grands succés que demandent tes vœux, / Qui domptant les ennuis d'vn vefuage espineux, / Es le tableau viuant des vertus d'Arthemise; // Graces à tes nobles soins que la Muse eternise,* / LOVIS *est fleurissant,* LOVIS *est vigoureux; / Et*

pour le rendre Auguste, & pour le rendre heureux, / La Sagesse l'instruit, la Vertu l'authorise, // Si pour conduire Achille au temple de l'Honneur, / Thetis luy destina ce sage gouuerneur, / Ce Phœnix si fameux, & si grand dans la fable; // REYNE *qui pour mon* ROY *fis vn choix plus parfait / Luy donnant* MAZARIN *qui n'a point de semblable, / Tu donnes à* LOVIS *vn Phœnix en effet. //* Et si les factieux tiennent maintenant vn autre langage, s'ils aduisent de blasmer cette élection de *Sur-Intendant* de l'education Royale, comme ils ont fait celle de premier *Ministre*, ie suis d'aduis qu'on leur dise, que par la loy *Imperatores. ff. de Decurionibus*, ceux qui ont droict de ce faire, doiuent proposer contre vn homme lors de son installation, & establissement, ce pourquoy ils le veulent reietter, & ce auec grand' raison, puis que / *Turpius eiicitur, quam non admittitur hospes,* / & qu'eux n'ayant rien dit lors que le *Cardinal* a esté pourueu de ces deux charges; & n'ayans pas mesme droit de rien dire en semblables occurrences, bien moins doiuent-ils estre maintenant receus à se plaindre, que la personne qui en a esté pourueuë, ne leur soit pas agreable. / S. Voila vn poinct assez clairement decidé, venons vn peu aux autres, car ce n'est pas fait qui commence. Pourquoy a-t'il dépensé tant de millions, assiegé Orbitel, [...]'

p. 343 alt.: '[...] & en suite si mal espaulée du Cardinal son frere, que si ledit Archeuesque, la Reyne, & quelques siens Ministres & Secretaires, ne s'en fussent meslez plus obstinément que luy, elle ne seroit pas encore faite. I'aduouë bien que cet Archeuesque a manié vne affaire qui luy estoit si importante, [...]' **becomes** (p. 484) '[...] & en suite si mal espaulée du *Cardinal* son frere, que si ledit *Archeuesque d'Aix*, la *Reyne*, & sous son authorité Monsieur *de Lionne*, qui est parfaitement bon amy, & qui n'a pas moins pressé cette promotion que Messieurs de *Villeroy*, & *Sully* firent celles des Cardinaux *d'Ossat*, & *du Perron*, ne s'en fussent meslez plus obstinément que luy, elle ne seroit pas encore faite. I'aduouë bien que cet Archeuesque a manié vne affaire qui luy estoit si importante, [...]'

p. 347 add.: '[...] mais cette entreprise n'ayant pas reüssi de la façon que l'on s'estoit imaginé, à cause de la mort de Monsieur le Duc de Brezé, & aussi par la faute de certains Chefs, qui l'esuenterent de trop bonne heure, on employa le reste de la campagne, & de l'auitaillement de l'armée nauale, à la conqueste de *Piombino* & de *Portolongone* deux autres places assez considerables; Et si les affaires de Naples ne fussent point suruenuës, [...]' **becomes** (p. 488) '[...] Mais cette entreprise n'ayant pas reüssi de la façon que l'on s'estoit imaginé, à cause de la mort de Monsieur le Duc de Brezé, & aussi par la faute de certains Chefs, qui l'ésuenterent de trop bonne heure, le *Cardinal* fixa en ce rencontre par vne resolution tout à fait heroïque, la legereté des François, leur faisant employer le reste de la campagne, & de l'auitaillement de l'armée nauale, à la conqueste de *Piombino* & de *Portolongone* deux autres places assez considerables qu'*Orbitello*; ce qui rendit la reputation entiere aux armées de sa Maiesté, & fit connoistre aux Estrangers que les derniers efforts des François ne sont en rien inferieurs à leurs premieres boutades: Et si les affaires de Naples ne fussent point suruenuës, [...]'

p. 349 add.: '[...] Mais sans attendre si long-temps, nous pouuons dés à present veoir quel profit la France reçoit de cette vnion, par les soins extremes que le Cardinal Barberin prend de toutes nos affaires en Italie, iusques à y employer ses biens, ses soins, & son auctorité, auec autant d'affection & de promptitude, qu'il pourroit faire pour les siennes propres. Mais pourquoy passer si facilement d'vn contraire à l'autre? [...]' **becomes** (p. 491) '[...] Mais sans attendre si long-temps, nous pouuons dés à present veoir quel profit la France reçoit de cette vnion, par les soins extremes que le Cardinal *Barberin* prend de toutes nos affaires en Italie, iusques à y employer ses biens, ses soins, & son auctorité, auec autant d'affection & de promptitude, qu'il pourroit faire pour les siennes propres, & comme il est homme de cœur & fixe en ses resolutions, il ne faut pas craindre qu'aprés s'estre donné à nous, il ne s'acquitte tres-promptement de tout ce que l'on pourra desirer de son seruice. Mais pourquoy passer si facilement d'vn contraire à l'autre? [...]'

p. 350 add.: '[...] enfin parce que le Roy a voulu monstrer qu'il estoit assez puissant pour chastier ceux qui l'auroient deseruy, & assez bon pour leur pardonner quand il iugeroit à propos de le faire. De dire maintenant que [...]' **becomes** (pp. 491-492) '[...] enfin parce que le Roy a voulu monstrer qu'il estoit assez puissant pour chastier ceux qui l'auroient deseruy, & assez bon pour leur pardonner quand il iugeroit à propos de le faire. Et enfin parce que le Cardinal *Mazarin* ne s'est point voulu souuenir des occasions esquelles il auoit esté assez mal traitté par le Cardinal *Francesco*, du temps qu'il negotoit à son desceu par ordre exprés du Pape *Vrbain VIII*. & en

d'autres rencontres assez considerables; pour tesmoigner qu'il n'a point de volonté, d'amour, de haine, ny d'interest particulier, dont il ne se departe tres-volontiers, lors qu'il est question de le faire pour le bien & vtilité de cette Couronne. De dire maintenant que [...]'

p. 350-351 om. + add.: '[...] Les Catelans estoient en défiance qu'on ne les voulust ou laisser perdre, ou abandonner, pour conclurre plus facilement nostre Paix auec l'Espagnol, il falloit doncques leur enuoyer vn Vice-Roy si bien appuyé en Cour, qu'il leur fist perdre cette opinion là, par la continuelle assistance qu'il en pouuoit tirer, & qui fust aussi de moindre charge aux Finances que n'auoient esté les deux derniers Vice-Roys, parce qu'en effect le desordre s'y faisoit desia remarquer. On iette doncque les yeux sur le Cardinal de Ste Cecile, & comme Religieux, & comme frere du premier Ministre, on le presse de partir de Rome lors qu'il pensoit & vouloit absolument s'y establir, il retarde & differe le plus qu'il luy est possible: il va en fin en Catalogne, où à peine est-il arriué qu'il traitte de son retour, il expedie en Cour pour obtenir son congé, & ne defere rien ny aux prieres, ny aux instances de son frere. [...]' **becomes** (pp. 492-493) '[...] Les Catelans estoient en défiance qu'on ne les voulust ou laisser perdre, ou abandonner, pour conclurre plus facilement nostre Paix auec l'Espagnol, il falloit doncques leur enuoyer vn Vice-Roy si bien appuyé en Cour, qu'il leur fist perdre cette opinion là, par la continuelle assistance qu'il en pouuoit tirer. Cela fit ietter les yeux sur le Cardinal de Saincte Cecile, & comme Religieux, & comme frere du premier Ministre, on le presse de partir de Rome lors qu'il pensoit & vouloit absolument s'y establir; il s'excuse, il retarde, il differe le plus qu'il luy est possible, & par vne infinité de pretextes vrays ou supposez, il declare assez qu'il n'a aucune volonté de faire ce voyage; enfin pressé par son frere, qui le menaçoit de rompre auec luy, & de le traitter doresnauant *tanquam Ethnicum & Paganum*, s'il n'obeyssoit aux ordres tres-precis de Sa Maiesté: Il va en Catalogne, où à peine est il arriué qu'il traitte de son retour, il expedie en Cour pour obtenir son congé, & ne defere rien ny aux prieres, ny aux instances de son frere. [...]'

p. 352 add.: '[...] il auoit encore esté Maistre du Sacré Palais, qui n'est pas vne charge que l'on ait coustume de conferer à des personnes de peu de capacité; outre ce il estoit actif, resolu, prompt, subtil, capable de reüssir en tout ce qu'il entreprenoit; [...]' **becomes** (p. 494) '[...] il auoit encore esté Maistre du Sacré Palais, qui n'est pas vne charge que l'on ait coustume de conferer à des personnes de peu de capacité, veu qu'elle sert comme de planche pour arriuer plus facilement au Cardinalat; outre ce il estoit actif, resolu, prompt, subtil, capable de reüssir en tout ce qu'il entreprenoit; [...]'

p. 358-359 om.: '[...] & pour ne pouuoir contenter tout le monde, de se communiquer à fort peu de personnes, quelle raison a-t'il de les tromper, de ne rien tenir de ce qu'il leur promet, de les entretenir de vaines esperances, de ne rien donner que de mauuaise grace, de faire nacqueter ceux qui ont à traiter auec luy, [...]' **becomes** (p. 501) '[...] & pour ne pouuoir contenter tout le monde, de se communiquer à fort peu de personnes, quelle raison a-t'il de ne rien tenir de ce qu'il leur promet, de les entretenir de vaines esperances, de ne rien donner que de mauuaise grace, de faire nacqueter ceux qui ont à traiter auec luy, [...]'

p. 359-360 alt.: '[...] Mais quand ie t'aduoüerois que c'est mon mestier & celuy des autres Pedants comme moy, de citer tous ces Autheurs anciens & modernes aussi, quand le cas y eschet, le proces en seroit plustost finy: car comme a dit S. Thomas en ses Commentaires sur la Consolation de Boece, [...]' **becomes** (p. 502) '[...] Mais quand ie t'aduoüerois que c'est mon mestier & celuy des autres Pedants comme moy, de citer tous ces Autheurs anciens & modernes aussi, quand le cas y eschet, le proces en seroit plustost finy: car comme a dit non Sainct Thomas, quoy que le vulgaire des lettrez en dise, mais Thomas Anglicus, ou quelque autre en ses Commentaires sur la Consolation de Boëce, [...]'

p. 361 alt.: '[...] là où le *Cardinal Mazarin* ne peut auoir qu'vne authorité totalement soubmise à celle de la Reyne Regente, & contrepesée par celle des Princes, qui sont Ministres nez & nommez auparauant luy; [...]' **becomes** (p. 503) '[...] là où le Cardinal *Mazarin* ne peut auoir qu'vne authorité totalement soumise à celle de la *Reyne Regente*, & contrepesée par celle de son *Altesse Royale*, & de *Monsieur le Prince*, qui sont Ministres nez & nommez auparauant luy; [...]'

p. 361 alt.: '[...] Et de là il s'ensuit que le *Cardinal de Richelieu* pouuoit faire tout ce qu'il vouloit, & comme il vouloit, puis qu'il n'estoit contredit de personne du monde; où au contraire le *Cardinal*

Mazarin ne peut rien faire, qu'aprés auoir essuié mille empeschemens, & surmonté mille contradictions.' **becomes** (p. 504) '[...] Et de là il s'ensuit que le *Cardinal de Richelieu* pouuoit donner & oster à qui bon luy sembloit, enrichir les siens & appauurir les autres, agir ou par raison ou par caprice, tailler & rongner à sa phantaisie, faire & défaire comme bon luy plaisoit, puis qu'il estoit Plenipotentiaire absolu de toutes les affaires de France, qu'il auoit tout le pouuoir en main, qu'on luy pouuoit dire, *Sit fatum quodcunque iubes*: & en vn mot puis qu'il n'estoit contredit de personne du monde; où au contraire le *Cardinal Mazarin* ne peut rien faire, qu'aprés auoir essuyé mille empeschemens, & surmonté mille contradictions.'

p. 361-362 alt.: '[...] mais comme l'on ne peut disposer en Cour d'vn Benefice de cent liures, qu'il ne soit demandé & recommandé par cent personnes, il arriue bien souuent, qu'aussi ne peut-il pas estre le maistre des graces qu'il a faites, soit que la Reyne & Messieurs les Princes en veüillent gratifier quelque autre; ou que la personne qu'il a obligée ait des exceptions notables; [...]' **becomes** (p. 505) '[...] mais comme l'on ne peut disposer en Cour d'vn Benefice de cent liures, qu'il ne soit demandé & recommandé par cent personnes, il arriue bien souuent, qu'aussi ne peut-il pas estre le maistre des graces qu'il a faites, soit que la Reyne, ou les Puissances qui l'approchent en veuille gratifier quelque autre, ou que la personne qu'il a obligée ait des exceptions notables, [...]'

p. 363 alt.: '[...] mais aussi cela ne conclud pas que les Ministres ayent tort, que la Reyne ne soit la meilleure Princesse du monde, & que le Cardinal ne soit homme de bien, obligeant, & bien-faisant quand il peut, & à qui il peut, plus que personne du monde: [...]' **becomes** (p. 505) '[...] mais aussi cela ne conclud pas que les Ministres ayent tort, que la Reyne ne soit la meilleure Princesse de la terre, & que le *Cardinal* ne soit homme de bien, obligeant, & bien-faisant quand il peut, & à qui il peut, plus que personne du monde.'

p. 367-368 add.: '[...] ie croy que beaucoup suiuroient l'exemples des Empereurs *Domitian*, & *Charles V*. qui renoncerent tous deux aux grandes affaires, pour gouster le plaisir & la seureté qu'il y a de ne vaquer qu'aux petites.' **becomes** (pp. 510-511) '[...] ie croy que beaucoup suiuroient plustost l'exemple des Empereurs *Diocletian*, *Lotaire*, & *Charles cinquiesme*, qui renoncerent tous trois librement aussi bien qu'*Amurath deuxiesme* pere de Mahommet qui prit Constantinople, & sept ou huict Empereurs Grecs nommez par Monsieur de Thou (Hist. lib. 16. sub finem), aux richesses, aux grandes dignitez, & pour toucher le poinct qui plus les pressoit, à ces occupations serieuses, à cause desquelles Antigone au rapport de Plutarque, appelloit la Royauté *splendidam seruitutem*. Que celuy de *Philippe second*, lequel eut quelquefois enuie, comme rapporte Monsieur de Chiuerny en ses Memoires (p. 293), de changer sa Couronne en vn Chapeau rouge, & celuy-là à vne Thiare, afin d'assouuir son ambition demesuré, & se rendre superieur par les loix de la conscience, à tant de Princes & de Monarques qu'il n'auoit pû s'assubiettir par les armes. Car tout estant bien consideré, il est impossible à ceux qui sont chargez de ces grandes affaires, de gouster le plaisir & la seureté qu'il y a de ne vaquer qu'aux petites.'

p. 370 alt.: '[...] si tu crois cela, Sainct-Ange, tu es autant esloigné de la verité, / *Quantum Hispanis torto dissidet Oceano.* / Car la Reyne en a témoigné tout le déplaisir possible, [...]' **becomes** (p. 513) '[...] si tu crois cela, *Sainct-Ange*, tu es autant esloigné de la verité, / *Quantum Hipanis veneto dissidet Eridano*. / Car la *Reyne* en a témoigné tout le déplaisir possible, [...]'

p. 373 add.: '[...] rigueurs d'vne Regence; & si l'on relegue vne personne qui gastoit & infectoit toutes les autres, / *Sicut grex totus in agris* [...]' **becomes** (p. 516) '[...] rigueurs d'vne Regence; on croira qu'aprés auoir espargné tant de coupables, on ait voulu opprimer des innocens: qu'aprés auoir sauué tant de miserables, on ait songé à perdre tant de personnes de naissance illustre, ou de qualité releuée: & si l'on relegue ceux qui gastoient & infectoient tous les autres, / *Sicut grex totus in agris* [...]'

p. 373 add.: '[...] si l'on en met quelque autre en prison, on croira que c'est à tort, que c'est vn effet de vengeance, plustost que de Iustice ou de necessité, que la passion & non la raison l'a fait faire: car de vouloir reduire toutes choses à vne indulgence pleniere, de ne songer qu'au pardon, de n'affecter qu'vne douceur preiudiciable à l'Estat, ce seroit passer d'vne grande vertu à vne extrême folie: [...]' **becomes** (pp. 516-517) '[...] si l'on en met quelques'vns en prison, on croira que c'est à tort, que c'est vn effet de vengeance, plustost que de Iustice ou de necessité, que la

passion & non la raison l'a fait faire. Quoy plus, si d'aduenture quelqu'vn de ces releguez qui n'eust pas esté immortel à Paris, s'en va de Pignerol, ou d'ailleurs, / *Quo pius Æneas, quo tullus diues & Ancus*. / sont allez auparauant luy, on dira que ce n'a pas esté sans passeport, *non sine artibus Locustæ*, ou que *l'offa medicata* en aura esté cause, comme si Monsieur de *Malissi* estoit vn grand empoisonneur, ou que Monsieur le Coadiuteur ne peust rendre vn asseuré témoignage de ce que le Cheualier de *Seuigny* luy en dist à son retour de Pignerol, & en fin comme si l'on n'éprouuoit pas tous les iours que ce dire de Martial (Lib. 4. epigram. 60) est veritable, / *Nullo fata loco possis excludere, cum mors / Venerit in medio Tibure Sardinia est. / Sainct Louys* mourut-il pas en mer deuant la ville de Thunis, *le Roy Iean* en Angleterre, *Charles VIII.* à Amboise, *François premier* à Ramboüillet, & pourquoy donc se faut-il estonner qu'vn homme de Paris est mort à Pignerol. Certes ie ne pense pas que l'on ait iamais chastié des troubles & des des-obeissances manifestes par des voyes plus douces que celles dont l'on se seruit pour lors enuers ceux que l'on estimoit coupables de ces desordres. Car de vouloir reduire toutes choses à vne indulgence pleniere, de ne songer qu'au pardon, de n'affecter qu'vne douceur preiudiciable à l'Estat, ce seroit passer d'vne grande vertu à vne extreme folie: [...]'

p. 377 add.: '[...] & de l'embarras qu'il y auoit tout alentour: aussi n'estoit-il non plus permis aux Lombards d'abandonner cette Machine, que l'*Aigle* aux Romains, l'*Auriflamme* aux François, & le grand *Estendart* à ceux de Gand. / S. Voila bien du mystere pour trouuer quelques sortes d'armes plus vieilles, & plus surannées que le Morion. [...]' **becomes** (pp. 521-523) '[...] & de l'embarras qu'il y auoit tout alentour: aussi n'estoit-il non plus permis aux Lombards d'abandonner cette Machine, que l'*Aigle* aux Romains, l'*Auriflamme* aux François, & le grand *Estendart* à ceux de Gand. / S. Tu n'as rien oublié de ce *Caroccio*, qu'à marquer le temps auquel il estoit en vsage. / M. Fais ton conte qu'il a duré iusques à l'inuention de l'artillerie, laquelle n'ayant esté introduite que peu à peu, & par des additions & accommodations assez éloignées les vnes des autres; (ce que n'a pas fait l'Imprimerie) il est à cause de cela plus difficile, d'establir au iuste le temps de l'inuention du Canon que des Presses, comme a fort bien monstré *Naudé* en son Syntagme *de Studio militari*. Mais neantmoins l'effet de ces deux choses, que i'ose dire prodigieuses, n'a pas laissé d'estre tout à fait semblable, car l'Imprimerie ayant banny la barbarie des escholes, le canon l'a aussi chassée des armées; si d'aduenture tu n'aimes mieux dire qu'il luy a plustost introduite, par le carnage épouuentable que font ces armes à feu: car auparauant que l'vsage en fust introduit, & pendant que les cheuaux bardez, les hommes armez iusques aux dents, & ce beau *Caroccio* composoient les armées, il se donnoit des batailles qui duroient des iournées entieres, & que l'on estimoit bien furieuses, sans que personne, s'il faut ainsi dire, y mourust; les soldats frappoient les vns sur les autres comme sur des enclumes, ils se charpentoient à grands coups, ils se meurtrissoient, & blessoient en cinquante endroits, & s'assommoient plustost que de se tuer. Dequoy ie te pourrois donner vne infinité d'exemples, mais pour me tenir à celuy qui est le plus remarquable, voila comme Ioan Antonius Campanus *in Historia Bracchij Perusini* (Libro I. clos finem?) parle d'vn combat, le plus celebre qu'ait donné ce grand Capitaine: *Nec de sunt qui affirment hoc prælium, si numerus vtrinque spectetur, omnia quæcumque in Italia gesta sunt, periculo & magnitudine superasse, cæsi ex hostibus duodecim, equi confossi fere omnes, Bracchiani omnes vulnerati, inter quos Spinta quidam, qui sub bracchio, iam inde a puero militauerat, vna cum equo, centum & quinque confossus vulneribus; Guillelmus Mecha duobus & septuaginta; res omni posteritate memorabilis.* Mais puis que ce n'est pas de cette barbarie là que ie veux parler, ie retourne de nouueau à te dire, que les canons ont banny des armées tout ce qui y estoit bon du temps des Arbalestes, & le *Caroccio* par consequent. / S. Voila bien du mystere pour trouuer quelques sortes d'armes plus vieilles, & plus surannées que la Morion. [...]'

p. 377 add.: 'M. Tu as bien fait de dire les Ministres, & tu aurois encore mieux fait d'adiouster subalternes ou inferieurs au premier, & ordonnez pour le soulager; Car comme le Cardinal est seul chargé des negociations de Munster, des affaires Estrangers, de la guerre & des armées que l'on enuoye tous les ans aux quatre coins de l'Europe, comme aussi de rapporter au Conseil secret tout ce qui se passe en France, & ailleurs, de remedier aux intrigues & caballes de la Cour, & de mille autres occupations qui le pressent de telle sorte, que l'on peut à bon droit dire, [...]' **becomes** (p. 523) 'M. Tu as bien fait de dire les Ministres, & tu aurois encore mieux fait d'adiouster subalternes ou inferieurs au premier, & ordonnez pour le soulager; Car comme le *Cardinal* est seul chargé des negociations de Munster, des affaires estrangeres & domestiques, de toutes sortes de dépesches, des audiences de tous les Ambassadeurs, de la guerre & des

armées que l'on enuoye tous les ans aux quatre coins de l'Europe, comme aussi de rapporter au Conseil secret tout ce qui se passe en France, & ailleurs, de remedier aux intrigues & caballes de la Cour, & de mille autres occupations qui le pressent de telle sorte, que l'on peut à bon droit dire, [...]'

p. 378 add.: '[...] Prens toy doncque à Monsieur d'*Emery* de tout le mal qu'ont fait en France les Fuseliers & Intendans, puis que c'estoit luy seul, ou le Conseil à sa requeste, & sollicitation, qui les enuoyoit pour faire le deub de sa charge, en pensant par ce moyen là faciliter au Roy le recouurement de ses Finances; en quoy certes il n'auroit pas esté trompé, s'il eust pû en donnant l'employ, donner aussi la discretion, & la moderation, qui estoient requises pour l'executer auec Iustice, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 524-525) '[...] Prens toy donc à Monsieur d'*Emery* de tout le mal qu'ont fait en France les *Fuseliers* & *Intendans*, puis que c'estoit luy seul, ou le Conseil à sa requeste, & sollicitation, qui les enuoyoit pour faire le deub de sa charge, en pensant par ce moyen là faciliter au Roy le recouurement de ses Finances; Mais plustost ne t'en prens à personne, qu'au malheur de la France, & à la corruption qui s'est insensiblement glissée depuis des centaines d'années en toutes sortes d'Offices & d'Officiers: Car l'enuoy de certaines personnes en diuerses Prouinces, auec l'authorité d'*Intendant* pour y faciliter les affaires du Roy, n'est point vne inuention de ce Regne-cy, ou du precedent; Monsieur de *Sully* ce fidel Thresorier de Henry IV. cette ame & ce Genie de l'Espargne, s'en estoit seruy heureusement, quasi dés son entrée aux Finances, car voila comme il en parle luy-mesme (Tome I de son œconomie Royale page 497.), ou plustost à soy-mesme, quoy que soubs le nom emprunté d'vn de ses Gentilshommes, *Vous enuoyastes peu aprés Monsieur de* Maupeou *Maistre des Comptes en Bretagne, pour l'obseruation des reglemens en Finances que vous y auiez faits, pour faire valoir les Fermes du pays, & faire venir à l'Espargne les deniers dont vous auiez fait le fonds: Monsieur de* Champigny *és Generalitez de Tours & Orleans, pour regler les Peages des Riuieres, le sieur* Coësnard *Auditeur des Comptes en Poictou, & le sieur de* Bizouze *en Guienne:* Et si le temps d'auiourd'huy estoit pareil à celuy-là, ou que Monsieur d'*Emery* pour remedier à la corruption qui s'y est glissée, eust pû en donnant l'employ à ces nouueaux *Intendans*, leur donner aussi discretion, & la moderation, qui estoient requises pour l'executer auec iustice, [...]'

p. 378 add.: '[...] *Respice quid moneant leges, quid curia mandet?* / Or si Messieurs les Intendans ont voulu faire le contraire, en faut-il pour cela blasmer la Cour & les Ministres? [...]' **becomes** (p. 525) '[...] *Respice quid moneant leges, quid curia mandet?* / il n'y auroit pas maintenant lieu de faire toutes ces plaintes. Or si Messieurs les Intendans ont voulu faire le contraire, en faut-il pour cela blasmer la Cour & les Ministres? [...]'

p. 379 add.: '[...] & n'as tu pas veu il n'y a que trois iours qu'vne Ordonnance de Police fondée en raison, & qui deuoit & pouuoit estre obseruée, pour obuier à la cherté du pain, nous a plus apporté de desordre, de troubles, & de confusion en vn iour, que l'armée de S. Germain n'auoit fait en trois mois, & ainsi comme dit l'Italien *ogni vno sela becca*, & lors que Dieu nous veut chastier *perdit sapientiam sapientum, & prudentiam prudentium reprobat*. [...]' **becomes** (pp. 526-527) '[...] n'as tu pas veu aussi il n'y a que trois iours qu'vne *Ordonnance de Police*, fondée en raison, & qui deuoit & pouuoit estre obseruée, pour obuier à la cherté du pain, nous a plus apporté de desordre, de troubles, & de confusion en vn iour, que l'armée de S. Germain n'auoit fait en trois mois, & qui sçait que tant d'autres personnes que l'on a substituées aux *Jntendans*, n'eschoüeront point aussi bien qu'eux, au mesme escueil de l'interest particulier, & s'ils ne donneront point occasion aux peuples, de dire comme faisoient les Indiens faschez qu'aprés que les Religieux auoient ruiné tous leurs Idoles, les Espagnols les contraignoient d'en acheter d'autres, & de se seruir de ceux qu'ils leur apportoient des pays circonuoisins, *y por que nos aueys quemado nuestros Dioses, pues nos traen a vender otros Dioses, de otras pruincias vuestros Christianos? por ventura non eran meiores nuestros Dioses, que los de las otras naciones.* (Barthelomeo de las Casas) Et ainsi comme dit l'Italien *ogni vno se la becca*, l'on met souuent la piece auprés du trou, & l'emplastre auprés du mal, & lors que Dieu nous veut chastier *perdit sapientiam sapientium, & prudentiam prudentium reprobat*. [...]'

p. 380 add. + om.: '[...] *Qua morbi duxere manus*. / Mais quoy qu'il en soit, le Cardinal est exempt du blâme que tous ces libelles luy en donnent; car comme ie t'ay desia dit, il est tous les iours accablé de tant d'autres affaires, qu'il ne pourroit pas quand il voudroit se mesler du détail des Finances, & des moyens particuliers pour trouuer de l'argent, / *Non vacat exiguis rebus adesse*

Ioui. / Lors qu'il conseilla à la Reyne [...]' **becomes** (p. 527) '[...] *Qua morbi duxere manus*. / C'est pourquoy il falloit necessairement remedier à ce mal, & il semble que le plus court chemin & le plus prompt remede estoit de plustost chastier & casser aux gages les intendans frippons, & trop interessez, que de changer la face des choses par les establissemens d'vne quantité innombrables d'Officiers qui ne seront peut-estre pas meilleurs que les precedents. Mais quoy qu'il en soit, le *Cardinal* est exempt du blâme que tous ces libelles luy en donnent; car comme ie t'ay desia dit, il est tous les iours accablé de tant d'autres affaires, qu'il ne pourroit pas quand il voudroit se mesler du détail des Finances, & des moyens particuliers pour trouuer de l'argent. Lors qu'il conseilla à la Reyne [...]'

p. 381 alt.: '[...] & les prodigieuses necessitez de l'Estat ausquelles on ne pouuoit remedier plus promptement, [...]' **becomes** (p. 528) '[...] & les prodigieuses necessitez de l'Estat ausquelles il estoit impossible de remedier plus promptement, [...]'

p. 382 add.: 'Quand on est tombé dans vn bourbier, il arriue souuent que plus on veut s'en retirer & plus on s'y enfonce. Si l'argent est si rare en France, pourquoy le Cardinal en fait-il vn si grand degast? pourquoy fait-il bastir des *Palais à Rome*, aussi beaux, & aussi somptueux que celuy du Pape? [...]' **becomes** (pp. 529-530) 'Quand on est tombé dans vn bourbier, il arriue souuent que plus on veut s'en retirer & plus on s'y enfonce. Si l'argent est si rare en France, que toutes les affaires y eschoüent pour cette seule raison; que la cuisine du Roy y est bien souuent renuersée, & qu'il est contraint d'auoir recours à la table de la Reyne ou de son Gouuerneur pourquoy le *Cardinal* en fait-il vn si grand degast? pourquoy fait-il bastir des *Palais à Rome*, aussi beaux, & aussi somptueux que celuy du Pape? [...]'

p. 382 add.: 'Pourquoy ne pas mettre en ligne de compte, qu'il fait venir *deux mille Elephans* de Calicut, qu'il trafique en pierreries auec le *Grand Mogor*, qu'il fait rebastir l'*Amphitheatre* de Rome, & qu'il fait ouurir *vn grand chemin* depuis Lanebourg iusques à la Noualaise, pour passer le mont Senis en poste, [...]' **becomes** (p. 530) 'Pourquoy ne pas mettre en ligne de compte, qu'il fait venir *deux mille Elephans* de Calicut, qu'il trafique en pierreries auec le *Grand Mogor*, qu'il fait rebastir l'*Amphitheatre* de Rome, qu'il tient vn Serrail à *Porto-longone*, de plus *de vingt mille esclaues*, & qu'il fait ouurir *vn grand chemin* de Lanebourg iusques à la Noualaise, pour passer le mont Senis en poste, [...]'

p. 383 alt.: '[...] car toutes ces oppositions sont aussi veritables les vnes que les autres, autant valent les premieres comme les dernieres, & il faut dire de toutes ensemble, ce que disoit le Iurisconsulte Vulpian, *qui crimina non probarit temere accusasse videatur*. Et à dire vray toutes les preuues qu'on nous a données iusques à cette heure des despenses superfluës du Cardinal sont si foibles, qu'elles doiuent passer sinon pour nulles, au moins pour vaines & ridicules, enuers ceux qui peuuent dire, / *Non obtusa adeo gestamus pectora Pœni:* / *Nec tam auersus equos Tyria Sol iungit ab vrbe*, / que de nous laisser surprendre à des impostures si grossieres. Car pour ce qui est de ces despenses prodigieuses du Cardinal, ie croy qu'on auroit bien de la peine à les cotter; s'il fait bastir vn Palais pour se loger, s'il tient bonne table, s'il a beaucoup de domestiques, s'il iouë quelquefois, pourquoy veut-on que ce soit plustost aux despens du Roy, qu'aux siens? n'a-til pas vn reuenu asseuré de plus de deux cens mille liures, ou pour mieux dire ne l'auoit-il pas auparauant que les affaires du Roy eussent ruiné les siennes, & qu'il se fust engagé pour le seruice du public, iusques à n'auoir plus rien en son particulier? [...]' **becomes** (pp. 530-564) '[...] car toutes ces oppositions sont aussi veritables les vnes que les autres, autant valent les premieres comme les dernieres, & il faut dire de toutes ensemble, ce que disoit le Iurisconsulte Vulpian, *qui crimina non probarit temere accusasse videatur*. Mais neantmoins dautant que tu me pourrois dire auec Seneque, *quam stultum est*, *cum pugnæ signum dederis ventilare, remoue ista lusoria arma decretoriis opus est.* Quand ie considere serieusement toutes les preuues qu'on nous a données iusques à cette heure des despenses superfluës *du Cardinal*, elles me semblent si foibles, tellement frelatées, si mal establies & prouuées, que ceux qui font gloire de dire, */ Non obtusa adeo gestamus pectora Pœni:* / *Nec tam auersus equos Tyria Sol iungit ab vrbe.* / les doiuent plustost considerer comme vaines & ridicules, que de se laisser surprendre à des impostures si grossieres: car pour ce qui est premierement de ces deux suppositions, que toy, ou plustost les Factieux mettent en teste de ces gros escadrons de médisances, qu'ils font marcher à la ruine du *Cardinal*, quelle raison y a-t'il de se plaindre, que les affaires soient eschoüées, puis que nous sommes encore aussi bien en Capital contre les

Espagnols, que nous ayons iamais esté? ne sommes nous pas tousiours les plus forts en *Flandre*? n'auons nous pas la *Catalogne* à nostre deuotion, le *Portugal* pour amy & associé, *Monaco, Porto-longone, Piombino* pour retraites asseurées à nos vaisseaux, sur la mer mediterranée, & *Dunkerque* sur l'oceane? nos troupes en *Piedmont*, ne tiennent-elles pas le Milanois en bride? la Declaration que nous deuons publier dans deux heures, ne fera-t'elle pas reuiure nostre faction dans *Naples*? & si le chetif sécours *des Hollandois*, & qu'il nous failloit payer si cherement, nous manque, toutes les forces de l'*Empire* n'ont-elles pas abandonné le Roy d'Espagne? nostre armée n'est-elle pas à la veille de faire vn grand effort en *Flandre*? six mois de paix domestique & sans *Fronderie* ne peuuent-ils pas remedier aux desordres des finances? le siege de Paris a-t'il mis toute la France ç'en dessus dessous, comme beaucoup s'imaginoient qu'il deuoit faire? Pourquoy donc nos affaires seront-elles eschoüées, & celles des Espagnols en meilleur estat, si d'auenture ce n'est reculer, que de ne pas tousiours aduancer, & prendre quelque ville, ou gagner quelque victoire sur l'ennemy, comme le Poëte Chrestien *Alcimus Auitus* disoit en parlant de la chasteté, / *Si vires nullas virtus acquirit eundo,* / *Amittit rediens paulatim extincta priores*. / Mais pour le prendre de cette sorte ne faut-il pas estre beste? ne faut-il pas ignorer qu'il n'y a si sorte santé qui ne soit trauersée auec le temps de quelque petite maladie, ny iour si beau ny si lumineux, qui soit sans nuages; si la victoire estoit tousiours d'vn costé, les guerres seroient bien tost finies, & Næuius n'auroit pas dit, *vicissitatim voluitur victoria:* si les euenemens de la guerre estoient asseurez, le Dieu Mars ne seroit pas appellé ἀλλοπρόσαλλος, *anceps & dubius*, Ouide n'auroit pas dit, / --- *victique resurgunt,* / *Quosque neges vnquam posse iacere, cadunt.* (I Amor. eleg. 9) / *François Premier* n'auroient pas escrit dans la chambre où il estoit prisonnier à Madrit, *Hodie mihi, cras tibi*; on n'auroit pas dit à *Charles V.* lors qu'il assiegea la ville de *Mets*, aprés tant de signalées victoires, / *Siste pedem Metis, hæc tibi meta datur.* / qui fut vn pronostic bien contraire au *plus vltra*, dont il se seruoit pour deuise; & si, comme disoit quelque Historien (Nicetas in Balduino), *Cæsaris Fortuna*, quoy qu'il fust le plus grand guerrier, & les plus heureux homme du monde, *non caruit offesionibus*: Pourquoy faut-il trouuer estrange, pourquoy faire tant de bruit, si celle de la France, parmy tant de palmes & lauriers qu'elle moissonne tous les iours, rencontre quelquefois des espines, si quelque pierre ou roche luy rebrousse sa faux; si le gain qu'elle fait iournellement, est accompagné de petites pertes, & si aprés tant de prouinces & de villes que nous auons ostées par force à nostre Ennemy, il en reprend quelqu'vne par finesse, & par surprise. Ie sçay veritablement qu'il seroit beaucoup plus glorieux, & plus auantageux de pouuoir tousiours battre l'ennemy, que de luy donner quelque relasche; & que si par exemple nous eussions peu poursuiure les fuyards de la bataille *de Lens*, iusques dans *Bruxelles,* comme Theagenes vouloit qu'on poussast certaines desroutes des Macedoniens, iusques dans la ville de Sparte: ou que si nous pouuions donner sans receuoir, & charmer les armes de l'ennemy, afin qu'elles ne nous fissent point de mal, nostre condition en seroit beaucoup meilleure, mais à quoy bon demander l'impossible, puis que, comme dit Lucain,

--- *vsis Marte secundo* / *Tot dubiæ restant acies, tot in orbe labores,* / *Vt nunquam fortuna labet successibus anceps*. / que la moindre disgrace peut regarder de bien grandes affaires. Mais le principal est, que par vn effet bien extrauagant, il n'y a que ceux qui voudroient diuiser la France, qui la voudroient perdre, & exposer s'ils pouuoient en proye à l'ennemy, qui se plaignent maintenant de ce qu'elle n'est pas assez florissante; & qu'il n'y a que ceux-là mesme qui sont cause du retardement de nos victoires, qui se mettent si fort en peine du peu de succés de nos armes: Car posé le cas qu'elles soient dans la confusion qu'ils disent, à quoy s'en peut-on prendre, sinon au defaut d'argent, puis que c'est le seul nerf de la guerre, νεῦρα μὰχης ὀ πλοῦτος (Pisides apud Suidam.), & d'où vient ce defaut d'argent? sinon du retardement des Tailles, subsides, Gabelles, impositions, entrées, droicts Royaux, domaniaux, traittes foraines, gosses Fermes, emprunts, & autres droicts semblables, que les Roys & Princes Souuerains ont coustume de tirer de leur peuples, *neque quies gentium sine armis, neque arma sine stipendiis, neque stipendia sine tributo haberi queunt*, disoit Petilius Cerialis dans Tacite (Lib. 4 Annal.): & de là il s'ensuit, que la recepte de tous ces payemens, le recouurement de tous ces deniers, n'ayant piont souffert de difficulté que depuis que les cabales & factions ont commencé dans l'Estat, ceux-là par consequent doiuent estre estimées les principales causes du retardement de nos victoires qui ont esté les premiers autheurs de toutes ces broüilleries & diuisions. / S. Tu fais bien de te seruir de la regle du Despautere, / *Supprimit orator quæ Rusticus edit inepte*. / Car si tu descendois aussi bien sur le particulier, comme tu demeures finement sur le general, i'ay peur que tu n'en serois pas bon marchand; Mais neantmoins i'appelle à ta conscience de tout ce que tu viens de dire, car tu ne peux pas ignorer la peine que l'on auoit auparauant ces troubles de leuer tous ces deniers Royaux, tu sçais bien aussi que la campagne estoit ruinée, &

beaucoup d'habitans des meilleures villes reduits à la besace. / M. I'en sçay encore plus que tu n'en viens de dire, & i'en croy mesme plus que ie n'en sçay, car l'on ne sçauroit tant amasser d'argent durant vne longue paix, que l'on n'en consomme dauantage pendant vne courte guerre; dequoy il ne faut point reietter la faute sur la milice corrompuë de ces derniers siecles, puis que du temps mesme de Xenophon la guerre ne coustoit pas moins à entretenir qu'elle fait à present: Qui considerera bien, dit ce grand Capitaine (Lib. de vectigalibus), l'estat de nostre ville, *is reperiet quondam in pace permultum pecuniæ in ærarium inuectum, quæ omnis pecunia, bello consumpta est*, & cela estant, les Princes ne peuuent pas moins faire que d'augmenter les Tailles & subsides à proportion des frais & dépenses extraordinaires qu'ils sont contraints de soustenir. Et d'ailleurs la guerre ne se faisant auiourd'huy, ie ne diray pas en France, mais en aucun lieu d'Europe, comme elle se faisoit autresfois entre Cyrus & le Roy des Assyriens, lesquels au rapport du mesme Xenophon (in Pædia Cyri) estoient demeurez d'accord, *vt cum agricolis pax esset, cum armatis bellum*. Ce n'est pas de merueille si les peuples qui sont d'vn costé persecutez à outrance par les soldats ennemis, mal traittez de ceux qui les defendent, & obligez pendant cela de payer les Tailles, & impositions ordinaires & extraordinaires, se trouuent à la fin reduits à vne extréme misere & pauureté: aussi n'est-ce pas mon opinion que les esprits remuants & factieux soient cause de la pauureté des peuples, mais bien de celle du Roy, en luy ostant le moyen par ces nouueaux troubles, de receuoir le secours & l'assistance qu'il pourroit sans cela esperer de ses suiets. / S. On ne laisse pas de dire dans Paris que tous ces desordres ne viennent que de la volerie des Officiers de l'armée, des Tresoriers, Financiers, Intendans, & en vn mot de tous ceux qui manient les Finances du Roy, car de l'argent il y en a assez s'il estoit bien mesnagé, & à te dire *inter nos*, ie croy pour moy qu'il en est quelque chose, attendu ce qu'ils disent par Paris, qu'vn certain Monsieur *Grilincon* fort versé dans la leuée & conduite des troupes, a calculé que pour tant de mille liures, on peut entretenir tant de soldats, en leur donnant tant à chacun par iour, & qu'aprés auoir fait vn semblable compte pour la Caualerie, & Artillerie, il conclud que l'on peut entretenir des armées de cent mille hommes bien lestes & fournies de tout l'équipage necessaire, pour cent fois moins d'argent que l'on n'en leue tous les ans en France. / M. I'ay ouy dire aussi bien que toy cette fable ou histoire il y a plus de deux ans, & pleust à Dieu, *Sainct-Ange*, que le premier qui a diuulgué vne proposition si sotte, ou malicieuse, eust esté muet tout le temps de sa vie, car tu ne sçaurois croire le mal qu'elle a fait parmy le peuple, & combien de retardement elle a apporté aux affaires du Roy, & combien aussi elle a preiudicié à la reputation de ses Ministres; en dépit desquels i'ay souuent veu des personnes la debiter pour veritable, quoy qu'ils eussent assez d'esprit pour connoistre qu'elle estoit entierement fausse, impertinente, & ridicule. Pour moy ie ne l'ay iamais ouy faire que ie ne me sois en mesme temps souuenu de celle des Predicateurs de la Ligue, qui persuadoient aux Parisiens, que puis qu'il y auoit dix-sept cens mille clochers en France, dont Paris n'estoit conté que pour vn, si chaque clocher vouloit donner vn homme, qui n'estoit pas grand'chose, on auroit en deux ou trois mois vne armée de dix-sept cens mille hommes. Et puis que nous sommes sur ces calculs imaginaires, ie t'en veux dire encore vn autre au suiet de la milice composée des habitans de l'Estat Ecclesiastique, qui ioüyssent de beaucoup de priuileges & d'immunitez, à la charge de prendre les armes & de seruir par tout où ils seront commandez, quand les Papes en auront besoin: Car l'on faisoit estat de mon temps, que toutes ces troupes ramassées pouuoient faire vne armée de six vingts mille hommes; & neantmoins lors que cinq ou six ans aprés, il fut question d'assieger *Castro*, Messieurs les Barberins ne peurent iamais tirer de ce grand & prodigieux nombre, plus de deux ou trois mille hommes de seruice, encore fut-ce par force, & en les bien payant. Mais pour reuenir au calcul de nostre Monsieur *Grilincon*, cét ancien Capitaine Archidamus, quoy qu'il entendist la guerre aussi bien que luy, & peut-estre mieux, n'estoit pas de son opinion, lors qu'il répondit à ceux qui luy demandoient iusques où pouuoient monter les frais d'vne guerre que l'on vouloit entreprendre *ὁ πόλεμος οὐ τέταγμενα ζητεῖ bellum ordinata* (Rhodig. lib. 26 c. 26), ou comme parle Synesius, *dimensa non quærit*; Et il est certain que Gonsalue Fernand de Cordoüe surnommé *le grand Capitaine*, se seroit encore plus franchement mocqué de luy, qu'il ne fit des Commissaires que le Roy Ferdinand luy donna, pour reuoir ses comptes aprés les guerres de Naples qu'il auoit faites durant dix ou douze années, auec vn pouuoir absolu, & des felicitez nonpareilles; quand il leur presenta pour premiers articles de la dépense les deux suiuans, *Erogata in egentes cucullatos piosque sacerdotes & sacratas virgines, qui perpetuis supplicationibus vacarent, aureorum numum ducenta millia supra septuagintos & triginta sex, & regales argenteos nouem:* Secundo, *Sexcenta millia supra quadringentos & nonaginta quattuor, secreta manu speculatoribus data, quorum beneficio exploratis hostium consiliis, multas victorias, & denique liberam Regni Neapolitani*

possessionem esset adeptus. N'est-ce pas là monstrer en peu de mots comme la guerre *neque dimensa neque ordinata quærit,* comme il est impossible de luy tailler ses mesures, de prescrire sa dépense, de peser auec tant de iustesse ses munitions, de regler ses faux frais, & en vn mot d'y apporter cette belle œconomie dont ce maistre Songe-creux s'est finalement aduisé. Et qu'ainsi ne soit, ie voudrois bien sçauoir s'il a tiré en ligne de compte les pension, *agiuti di Costa*, aduances de gages, gratifications, & autres passedroicts, qu'il faut faire tous les iours tant à la noblesse qu'à tous les Officiers, si l'on en veut tirer quelque seruice; S'il a parlé de ce qu'vne partie de ces mesmes Officiers met dans sa bourse, au lieu de l'employer au profit de leurs troupes, & de ce que l'autre dérobe effectiuement; d'où vient que si l'on veut auoir dix mille soldats effectifs, il faut en leuer quinze ou vingt mille; S'il a pris garde combien coustent les trauaux de la moindre ville qu'on assiege; S'il a songé à tant de recreuës qu'il faut faire, à la difficulté de Conuoys qui ne se font qu'à graisse d'argent, à l'armement de mer qui est vn gouffre, à l'artillerie qui en est vn autre; S'il a bien calculé où peuuent monter les appointemens de tant d'Officiers principaux, qui ne tiennent de si grand'table, ny de si beaux équipages, qu'aux dépens du Roy; S'il n'a point oublié les quinze millions que l'on iustifia fort bien il y a deux ou trois ans estre passez de France en Catalogne; S'il a compris pareillement ceux que l'on donnoit tous les ans aux Hollandois, aux Hessiens, aux Suedois, à quelques Princes d'Italie, & à beaucoup de Seigneurs & Ministres Estrangers pour les auoir à nostre deuotion. Ie voudrois aussi sçauoir s'il a fait vn chapitre des nonvaleurs, & accidents; & aprés tout si Messieurs les *Parisiens* ne sont entierement persuadez de la sottise de ce nouueau calcul, ie les prieray de iuger par les dépenses extraordinaires, dispendieuses, & ausquelles ils ne s'attendoient pas de leurs procés & bastimens, si l'on peut regler comme vn papier de Musique, ou à la mode du supposé *Grilincon* tous les frais d'vne guerre si longue, & si vniuerselle comme est la nostre, & des armées si grandes & si puissantes comme sont celles que depuis si longtemps, nous mettons tous les ans en campagne. Mais à quoy bon chercher tant de raisons, puis que nous auons l'experience, & Messieurs de *Paris* n'ont-ils pas veu à l'occasion du blocus de leur ville, qu'aprés auoir tant crié contre les profusions des armées Royales, ils n'ont pû éuiter d'en faire encore de plus grandes, puis que pour *trois millions cinq cens mille liures* à peine en ont-ils pû leuer vne de six mille hommes de pied, & de trois mille cheuaux, lesquels on ne pouuoit entretenir longtemps, ny fournir de munition, artillerie, & carriages sans en depenser quasi vne fois autant. Et puis fiez-vous à l'Arithmetique du sieur *Griloncon* pour faire le procés aux Ministres, & à tous ceux qui manient les finances du Roy, *quasi / Non Tartessiacis illos satiaret arenis / Tempestas pretiosa Tagi, non stagna rubentis / Aurea Pactoli*. / & qu'ils eussent la liberté ou plustost l'effronterie d'en prendre par tout où ils en trouuent. Mais puis que l'Espagne est encore plus pauure & plus necessiteuse que n'est la France; puis que ses armées cheminent bien plus lentement que les nostres; puis que faute d'argent ils n'ont peu tirer le moindre auantage de nos diuisions, ny mesme occuper ce qu'elles nous auoient contraint de leur abandonner, & que neantmoins l'on n'en iette point la faute sur l'auarice ou le peu de soin de leur Ministres, parce qu'en effet chacun void bien que ce sont les suites, & les effets d'vne longue guerre, pourquoy voulons nos quitter cette cause qui est commune à eux & à nous, pour chercher vne particuliere. Et cela estant tu vois, *Sainct-Ange*, que la premiere de tes preuues pour iustifier le desordre des finances, & en donner la faute au *Cardinal*, est fausse, & qu'encore qu'elle fust veritable, on en pourroit accuser beaucoup d'autres plustost que luy. Venons maintenant à la seconde, touchant la *table du Roy*, de laquelle tu as parlé auec aussi peu de respect, comme Ouide faisoit de celle des Lapithes, quan il dit au 12. de la Metamorphose, / *Protinus euersæ turbant conuiuia mesæ.* / & cependant il est tres-faux, sans neantmoins te desmentir, que la table du Roy ait iamais esté renuersée. / S. Tu peux bien sçauoir que ie n'y estois pas pour seruir de tesmoin oculaire, mais il y a enuiron six mois, que l'on ne parloit à Aix d'autre chose, & ie croy que les nouuelles en estoient venuës de cette ville, où ie l'ay ouy dire encore depuis mon arriuée. / M. Il me souuient auoir leu dans les Lettres de Matthieu Bossus que l'on auoit escrit de Rome à Padouë, pendant qu'il y estoit, que le Pape *Alexandre VI.* estoit mort d'vn coup de tonnerre, *hac sub hora Augustine ad te dum scribo, ecce rumor aures implet ciuitatis, solemni Petri Apostoli die, paulo post vigesimam horam, Alexandrum Romanæ Ecclæsæ magnum Pontificem ictu fulminis interiisse, & de periucundis suis Pileatis vnum tactum, pariter suum dominum parentasse, populares in armis esse, vias vrbis obliquas parum tutas, Curiales quati timoribus, Hispanos infestos & hostes haberi:* Qui ne diroit donc aprés toutes ces circonstances que cette relation, ce bruit qui s'espandit lors par tout estoit veritable, & neantmoins il n'y auoit rien de plus faux: car Bossus escriuit cette lettre en 1500. & Ciaconius auec tous les autres Escriuains tesmoignent que *Alexandre VI.* mourut de fiéure, ou comme veulent quelques vns de poison en 1503. imagine toy donc qu'il en aura esté de mesme

de la *Table du Roy* renuersée, & que les Factieux se seront seruis des menaces qu'auront peut-estre fait les Officiers qui la seruent, d'en venir à cette extremité, si on ne leur donnoit de l'argent, afin de decrediter par vn accident si inopiné, & si ridicule, les actions & le gouuernement de ceux qui leur desplaisent. Et en effet si tu considere bien les circonstances de cette affaire, tu iugeras soudain qu'elle ne pouuoit pas arriuer sans que la Reyne, son Eminence, ou Mr le Marquis de Villeroy en eussent esté premierement aduertis: & cela estant, peut-on croire sans estre fol, que pas vne de ces trois personnes-là n'y auroit donné ordre: pour moy ie t'auolie que cela ne peut pas entrer dans mon esprit. Mais posons le cas que ce desordre ait esté si grand que l'on a dit, & qu'effectiuement la *Table* de sa Maiesté ait manqué vne fois seulement d'estre seruie à l'ordinaire, voudrois tu inferer de là que toutes les affaires de la France eussent esté reculées au mesme temps, & de mesme façon? voudrois-tu dire que ce fut vne chose si criminelle, si honteuse, si preiudiciable à ceux qui gouuernent, ie ne le pense pas, *Sainct-Ange*, car cela feroit tort à ton iugement, & à la connoissance que tu peux auoir, que les Maisons des Grands & des petits, des riches & des pauures, des Princes & de leurs suiets se gouuernent *data proportione*, quasi de mesme sorte, & qu'elles sont quelque fois suiettes aux mesmes inconueniens, de pertes, de debtes, de souffrance & de pauureté. / S. Tu es si accoustumé à traitter auec des gens doctes, que tu ne t'imagine iamais de parler aux ignorans tels que ie suis; pens-tu que ie n'aye rien autre chose à faire qu'à lire Froissard ou Monstrelet, pour sçauoir si tous nos Roys de France estoient aussi pauures que *Louys XI.* qui faisoit mettre des manches neufues à son vieil pourpoint, & portoit ordinairement vn chapeau de meschant drap tout chargé de graisse & de babiolles. / M. Ce que tu viens de dire, ne tesmoigne pas que tu sois si ignorant, car nous ne sçauons rien de ces babiolles, que par la lecture de Comines, ny de ces manches & chapeau gras, que par celle de Bodin, qui adiouste encore au mesme endroit, que les Registres de la Chambre des Comptes sont chargez de vingt sols qu'auoit cousté cette paire de manches, & de quinze derniers pour vne boëte de vieux oing à graisser ses bottes: à quoy l'on peut adiouster ce que dit Matthieu (Liure 11. de l'histoire de Louys XI.) *Que l'on voyoit encore de son temps*, c'est à dire en 1620. ou 25. *à Paris en la maison d'vn Conseiller d'Estat le lict où couchoit ledit Roy, & que l'on ne le peut voir sans s'estonner du luxe de ce siecle, & de la simplicité de celuy-là, parce qu'il est de damas iaune & incarnat, sans clinquant ny passement, & les franges sans façon:* & neantmoins ce n'estoit ny la pauureté comme tu dis, ny l'auarice, comme d'autres pourroient croire, qui obligeoit ce grand Roy à viure de la sorte, car au mesme endroit où Bodin le taxe de cette negligence, il l'accuse aussi de prodigalité en beaucoup d'autres actions, entre lesquelles on pourroit mettre la recompense de mille escus qu'il donna, comme rapporte Gilles Corozet en ses Apophtegmes, à certain Paysan pour vne grosse raue ou naueau qu'il luy apporta de Bourgogne: & ie croy en effet qu'il faisoit plustost ces actions-là par principe de sagesse qu'autrement, car *Marc Antonio Ciappi* nous tesmoigne en la vie de *Gregoire XIII.* (Chap. 21, pag. 203) que ce grand homme, & que i'estime en effet en auoir esté le plus vertueux Pape qui ait siegé depuis sainct Gregoire, en faisoit souuent de mesme, comme tu pourras bien iuger par deux histoires tres-singulieres, & remarquables, dont i'ay autrefois chargé ma vacquette, *Haueua gusto anco tal' hora* Gregoire XIII. *d'andar nella guardarobba Palatina, a riueder le cose, che giornalmente vi si portauano, di presenti, o spoglie die Prelati morti, doue fatta semper vna scelta delle robbe, che giudicaua superflue, le mandaua a donare a luoghi pij: & vna tra l'altre volte, hauendo fatto vna scelta di molte robbe di gran valore, venute nella guardarobba per la morte delli famosi Cardinali di Ferrara, di Trento, & Morone, & distribuite le tutte à Cardinali poueri, & Vescoui, Collegij, & altri luoghi bisognosi: dopo dando d'occhio ad vn suo paro di calce vsate, togliendole le consegno, al Signor Pietro Vetrice suo guardarobba con dire, che gliele facesse assettare, perche li seruirebbono per tutta la futura inuernata: Al che non volendo replicare il discreto officiale, che ben sapeua l'humore del suo signore, tanto si commosse da quell' attione, che non potendo sene contener, ando a trouare il signor Maestro di Camera, & gli disse, hor che le pare del nostro Papa, che hoggi dopo hauer donato via robba per* 12. *millia scudi, mi ha dato le calce sue di tre anni, per che le facci rapezzare? non sene merauigli v.s. rispose il Maestro di Camera per che a questi giorni passati, hauendo sua Santita distribuito per l'amor de Dio secretamente scudi quindece millia, et hieri in particolare cinque millia per mano mia, non si sdegno il Papa leuar due pezzi di legna, dal focolare, del suo Camerino, di sei, che ne n'haueua posti Nicolo Santa Maria scopatore per far fuoco.* Il se peut faire aussi que *Louys XI.* vouloit imiter la parcimonie tres-loüable des *Augustes, Vespasians, Tacites, Charlemagnes, Alphonses d'Arragon, & Charles Quint*, qui n'estoient en rien differentiez par les vestemens du moindre de leurs suiets: ou qu'il iugeoit à propos de remedier par son exemple au luxe qui se glissoit de son temps dans les habits, au moyen des soyes & des riches fourrures, que l'on apportoit de dehors

en son Royaume, comme a remarqué Seissel: ou enfin qu'il fit cela suiuant la coniecture de Fulgose, *vt cum inter Christianos Reges, omnium maximus, liberalissimusque haberetur, qui viderent eam habitus humilitatem mirarentur.* Quoy qu'il en soit il a pour luy l'exemple des plus sages, qui ne tirent vanité de ce qu'ils peuuent mieux & plus facilement faire que tous les autres. Et la definition que Seneque donne de la parcimonie au second liure des Benefices, où il dit que, *est scientia vitandi sumptus superfluos.* Mais pour te monstrer, *Sainct-Ange*, que la pauureté non volontaire, comme estoit celle de *Louys XI.* mais incommode & forcée, regne quelquefois aussi bien chez les grands que chez les petits; & que ce n'est pas la premiere fois qu'elle a attaqué les plus puissans, & les plus glorieux de nos Roys, sans neantmoins que cela ait gueres retardé le cours de leurs victoires: ie te veux apprendre vne histoire remarquable, & que ie n'ay iamais leuë autre part que dans le discours des choses aduenuës en Lorraine depuis le deceds du Duc Nicolas iusques à celuy du Duc René, sçauoir que le *Roy Charles septiesme estant à Bourges, & y essayant vn iour vne paire de bottes neufues, en ayant ia chaussé vne, il fut contraint de se la faire tirer, pource que le Cordonnier ayant appris de luy qu'il n'auoit lors argent pour les payer, ne les luy voulut laisser aller.* & neantmoins il ne laissa pas de trouuer gens & argent pour recouurer quasi tout son Royaume, que ses predecesseurs, quoy que plus riches, auoient perdu. Ainsi encore que *Charles huictiesme* fut si despourueu d'argent lors qu'il entreprit le voyage de Naples, qu'il fut contraint de donner les principaux de ses domestiques, & *Philipes de Comines* entre autres, pour pleiges d'vne somme de cinquante mille Ducats qu'il emprunta d'vn Marchand Milanois resident à Lyon; & de s'en faire prester vne autre de cent mille francs, par la Banque des *Soli* de Gennes, comme aussi d'engager pour deux parties de douze mille escus chacune, les bagues & ioyaux de Madame de *Sauoye*, & de la Marquise de *Monferrat*; ces difficultez toutefois ne luy osterent l'enuie, ny le moyen de trauerser / *Ocyor ceruis, & agente nimbos* / *Ocyor Euro.* (Horat. lib. 2 Ode 17) / toute l'Italie, pour ioindre la Couronne de *Naples* à celle de France: il est bien vray aussi pour ne rien dissimuler, que *François Premier* aprés auoir donné lieu au prouerbe qui dit, tu as fait comme le Roy François deuant Pauie, parce qu'il y tira iusques au dernier sol, ne fut pas si heureux que ces deux Charles, mais y a-il chose plus incertaine que le gain d'vne bataille, & s'il n'eust point perdu celle qu'il donna deuant ladite ville assez inconsiderement, & contre l'aduis de tous les principaux Chefs, ne seroit-il pas venu à bout des Espagnols au mesme temps qu'il estoit le plus court d'argent. Ces necessitez toutesfois ne sont rien à l'esgard de celle, que le Parangon des Roys, & de tous les grands Capitaines *Henry IV*. confesse luy mesme à son bon amy, & fidel officier & seruiteur Monsieur de *Sully* d'auoir endurée deuant Amiens, d'où il luy escriuoit és termes suiuants. *Ie vous veux bien dire l'estat où ie me trouue reduit, qui est tel, que ie suis fort proche des ennemis; & n'ay quasi pas vn cheual sur lequel ie puisse combatre, ny vn harnois complet que ie puisse endosser; mes chemises sont toutes deschirées, mes pourpoints troüez au coude, ma marmite est souuent renuersée, & depuis deux iours ie disne & soupe chez les vns & les autres, mes pourvoyeurs disant n'auoir plus moyen de rien fournir pour ma table, dautant qu'il y a plus de six mois qu'ils n'ont receu d'argent.* Aprés cela, *Sainct-Ange*, voudrois tu faire capital du bruit qui courut il y six mois de *cette table* renuersée, quand mesme il seroit veritable; & si celle de *Henry IV.* le fut par sa confession mesme, lors que la France estoit paisible, & qu'il ne luy restoit pour finir les guerres estrangeres, que de reprendre la ville d'Amiens sur les Espagnols, comme en effet il la reprit, nonobstant cette pauureté si pressante, quelle merueille seroit-ce? quand celle de *Louys XIV.* auroit couru pareil accident, lors qu'il n'estoit aagé que de dix ans, & que son Royaume estoit espuisé par les guerres, qui n'ont iamais cessé durant le Regne de son Pere le Roy *Louys XIII.* d'heureuse memoire, quoy qu'il ait duré plus de trente ans. Or parce que tu me pourrois dire que i'ay oublié la principale cause qui est celle de la volerie des Financiers, & Monopoleurs, ie ne te veux pas dissimuler que c'estoit à ceux-là principalement que *Henry IV*. se prenoit de ce que sa table ne cheminoit pas à l'ordinaire, car voila ce qu'il adiouste au mesme endroit, *partant iugez si ie merite d'estre ainsi traitté & si ie dois plus long-temps souffrir, que les Financiers & Thresoriers me fassent mourir de faim, & qu'eux tiennent des tables friandes & bien seruies, que ma Maison soit pleine de necessitez, & les leurs de richesses, & d'opulences:* Mais tu ne dois pas pourtant crier victoire, ny t'imaginer qu'il faille proscrire, emprissoner, pendre, & ruiner indifferemment tous ceux qui manient les Finances, pour remedier à ces voleries, puis que Henry IV. n'y proceda pas auec tant de precipitation. Or pour reprendre l'affaire vn peu plus haut, voyons ie te prie qui sont ceux desquels il se plaignoit dans la mesme lettre, & qui le seruoient en effet si mal: *L'on m'a donné,* dit-il, *pour certain, & c'est on fait fort de le verifier, que ces huict personnes que i'ay mises en mes Finances (pensant bien faire, pource que l'on m'auoit fait croire, que la ruine de mes reuenus n'estoit prouenuë, que de ce qu'vn seul en disposoit auec authorité absoluë) ont encore*

bien pis fait que leur deuancier; & qu'en l'année derniere, & la presente, que i'ay eu tant d'affaires sur les bras faute d'argent, ces Messieurs là, & cette effrenée quantité d'Intendans qui se sont fourrez auec eux par compere & par commere, ont bien augmenté les griuelées. Les voila nombrez à peu prés, il ne reste plus qu'à sçauoir leurs noms, de Monsieur de *Sully*, qui auoit desia dit en vn endroit de ses Memoires, *Que le Roy au lieu d'establir vn Jntendant auec absoluë authorité, forma vn Conseil des Finances, dont Monsieur de Neuers fut estably Chef, assisté de Messieurs le Chancelier de Chiuerny, Duc de Retz, de Bellieure, Sansy, Schomberg, Maisses, Fresnes, & la Grange le Roy:* & le mesme Monsieur de *Sully* adiouste vn peu aprés comme s'il y eust eu du changement à cette premiere direction, *que le Roy voulant faire vn voyage à Lyon & en Bourgogne, il choisit Monsieur le Prince de Conty pour Chef du Conseil qu'il laisseroit pour la direction des affaires & des Finances, & establit pour tenir ce Conseil des Finances Monsieur de Retz, Messieurs de Schomberg, & de Fresnes, Monsieur de Maisses, Monsieur de la Grange le Roy, & les Intendans Hudicourt, Marcel, & Guibert, auec Meillian pour Secretaire*, ausquels trois iours aprés ledit Sieur de *Sully* fut pareillement adioint, quoy que pour certaines pretensions & ialousies il n'entrast point en exercice, ny à ce Conseil, sinon quelque temps aprés que le Roy luy eut fait tant de plaintes de sa table renuersée; & encore cela se fit-il peu à peu, auec beaucoup de souplesse & de patience, tant de la part du Roy que du nouueau Sur-Intendant des Finances, afin de ne rien faire de violent, & de ne choquer personne. En suite dequoy ie veux, *Sainct-Ange*, que tu fasses auec moy *trois reflexions* lesquelles ie m'asseure ne te seront pas inutiles, pour parler & iuger de beaucoup d'affaires plus à propos que ne font ceux auec qui tu pratiques tous les iours. / S. Tu ne me sçaurois faire tant de bien que ie ne l'endure, & puis que tu m'as fait iusques à cette heure si bonne part de ta doctrine, quelles obligations ne t'aurois-ie point si tu me pouuois donner vn peu de iugement pour m'en bien seruir. / M. Tu as bien raison de le demander en don puis Seneque a dit que *bona mens non emitur*, il faut que le nature en fournisse les premieres dispositions à nostre esprit, c'est pourquoy ceux-là en sont exclus de plein abord, / *Sinistra quos in lucem natura extulit.* / & que par aprés quelque homme sage, quelque bon amy les cultiue, comme faisoit parmy la ieunesse d'Athenes vn *Socrate*, qui pouuoit bien passer pour vn excellent Maistre en cét art là, puis qu'Apollon le iugea tel, & qu'il eut de si bons disciples que *Platon, Xenophon, Alcibiade, Critias, Antisthene, Cebes, Aristippe, Phœdon, Euclide,* & beaucoup d'autres qui ont tous esté les plus sages de leur temps. Pour moy comme ie n'ay point de plus hautes pretensions que d'estre Philosophe, c'est à dire amateur de la Sagesse, & de tous les Sages de l'antiquité, tout ce que ie puis faire pour toy, c'est de te renuoyer à ces viues sources dont ie viens de parler, ou à ceux qui leur ressemblent parmy nous, / *nam* / *Purius ex ipso fonte bibuntur aquæ.* / & les originaux valent tousiours mieux que les copies. / S. Puis que tu me renuoyes aux Sages de ce temps-cy, tu me ferois bien plaisir de me dire quels ils sont, & où ie les pourrois trouuer. / M. Ie n'aurois pas grand' peine à te rendre vn seruice bien considerable, si comme dit Petrarque (Libr. de vera sapientia), *tot essent sapientes quot sapientiæ professores*, mais *Sainct-Ange,* il y a bien à dire, *rara auis est sapiens, non vndique aduolat, non vbique nidificat:* les Hebreux n'en ont iamais eu qu'*vn*, encore deuint-il fol à la fin; toute la Grece n'en a conté que *sept*; Lælius & Caton chez les Romains n'ont point eu de troisiéme, comment voudrois-tu donc que ie t'en monstrasse des douzaines en France. / S. Bon Dieu ne voudrois-tu pas que depuis douze cens ans que nostre Monarchie a commencé, & que la France est France, il n'y ait pour le moins eu *sept* hommes sages, puis qu'ils ont bien esté en Grece. / M. Ie croy pour moy qu'ils y ont esté, & peut-estre en plus grand nombre. / ---- *sed omes illacrymabiles* / *Vrgentur, ignotique longa* / *Nocte* (Horat. lib. 4. Ode 9.) / soit ou parce qu'ils n'ont rien laissé par escrit des bons preceptes & documents, qui seroient maintenant tesmoins de leur sagesse, ou plustost que par ie ne sçay quelle enuie ou retenuë trop circonspecte pas vn de tant d'Escriuains n'ait voulu ou n'ait ozé les nommer, & celebrer pour tels qu'ils estoient: Car par exemple *Horace, Iuuenal, Seneque,* l'Empereur *Marc Antonin*, le petit *Caton* supposé que l'on fait apprendre aux enfans, *Boëce & Petrarque* pourroient bien passer pour sages chez les Latins, tout de mesme que parmy nous le bon Roy *Sainct Louys*, à cause des beaux preceptes qu'il obserua durant sa vie, & qu'il enioignit en mourant à Philippes troisiesme son fils de pratiquer, *Claude Seisel,* Monsieur du *Vair*, *Montagne, Charon, Pibrac,* auec quelque autre pour faire le septiesme, deuroient tenir la mesme place. / S. Grand-mercy, *Mascurat*, tu m'as fait vne declaration beaucoup plus ample que ie ne l'attendois pas, & doresnauant i'en sçauray bien faire mon profit, n'aye pas peur que ie t'en demande vne autre: venons ie te prie à ces trois reflexions, car pour les hommes sages ausquels tu me conseillois d'auoir recours, ie sçay maintenant où les trouuer. / M. Encore que ie t'aye nommé les precedens sans y beaucoup songer, tu peux neantmoins les receuoir pour legitimes, puis qu'ils sont tels en effet, & qu'aprés mesme y auoir bien pensé ie ne t'en pourrois

pas cotter de plus sages, ny chez les Romains, ny parmy nous; Mais pour m'acquitter des *trois reflexions* desquelles ie te parlois auparauant que nous fussions dans cét embaras de *Sagesse*, ie considere pour la *premiere*, combien il est difficile en la pluspart des affaires, & en celles de la Cour principalement, de rencontrer le biais necessaire pour les faire à propos; & cela fut cause que le *P. Lancelotto secundi* de Perouse, qui estoit bien de mes amis, fit imprimer vn assez gros liure à Venise, sous le titre de *chi Lindouina e Sauio*, parce que comme il monstre fort bien par vne infinité d'exemples, lors que la prudence humaine croit d'auoir le mieux pris ses mesures, pour venir au but qu'elle se propose, c'est alors que la Fortune ambitionne dauantage de renuerser tous ses desseins; lors qu'elle croit d'auoir bien preueu & remedié à tous les accidents, c'est alors que quelque petite circonstance qu'elle aura ou ignorée ou negligée, produira vn effet tout contraire à celuy qu'elle s'estoit promise; comme au faict de la nauigation, vne seule rame mal gouuernée, peut empescher l'effet de toutes les autres, & cependant il n'y a que Dieu seul, qui puisse voir & preuoir toutes ces choses; c'est pourquoy il ne faut pas s'estonner si les petites affaires estant si difficiles, les grands aussi le sont sans comparaison dauantage; & si ceux qui les manient ne sçauent quelquefois à quoy se resoudre, s'ils sont bien souuent *inter sacrum & saxum,* s'ils ne sçauent quel party prendre, *Cibus enim auidum strangulauit, abstinentem frugalitas,* & comme adiouste Petrone, *Si bene calculum ponas, vbique naufragium est.* Et cette verité est telle, que nous auons veu cy-dessus, dans les passages que i'ay rapportez des Memoires de *Sully,* comme le plus sage de nos Roys en demeuroit d'accord, aprés l'auoir recognuë par sa propre experience: Pendant qu'vn seul homme gouuernoit ses finances, il n'auoit point d'argent, tous ses fonds estoient diuertis, chacun déroboit impunément, tout le monde crioit *tolle, tolle,* & lors qu'il pense remedier à tous ces inconueniens, par vn Conseil composé de ceux qu'il estimoit les plus honnestes gens de son Royaume, les moins interessez, les plus affectionnez au bien public, le voila precipité en des necessitez plus pressantes & plus honteuses qu'auparauant, puis que *sa table estoit renuersée, ses manches troüées, ses chemisse déchirées,* & ses affaires en si piteux estat, qu'il fallut encore rompre ce Conseil, licentier tous ses Medecins, ausquels on pouuoit bien adapter le dire du Poëte tragique rapporté par Plutarque, / Ἄλλων ἰατρὸς, αὑτὸς ἕλκεσιν βρύων. / c'est à dire, *Aliis medens, at ipse vlceribus scatens*, & retourner enfin à vn seul *Sur-intendant*, mais plus homme de bien que les autres n'auoient esté. Car de proscrire ceux que auoient mal geré, de les emprisonner, d'establir vne Chambre de Iustice, pour leur faire rendre gorge, c'est ce que le Roy, ny son Conseil ne iugerent pas à propos de faire; mais au contraire, soit que le temps de la guerre ne fust pas propre à telles recherches, soit que la pluspart des Seigneurs de sa Cour fussent interessez dans les partis, comme il est iustifié au second Tome des Memoires de Sully, soit qu'il fust trop difficile de chastier les coupables, sans ruiner aussi les Innocens; ou pour d'autres causes qui me sont inconnuës: tant y a que ce grand Prince, tout informé qu'il estoit de la maluersation de ses Financiers, quoy qu'il fust reduit à vne pauureté honteuse, se resolut de dissimuler, de les souffrir encore quelque temps, de remedier peu à peu Monsieur de *Sully*, & de pousser ainsi le temps comme l'on dit auec l'espaule, en attendant que la tempeste des guerres ciuiles & estrangeres fut appaisée; & que les affaires se remissent quasi d'elles mesmes, auec vn peu d'aide, & sans violence, en leur bon estat. Et nous au contraire en la conioncture où sont auiourd'huy les choses, pendant vne minorité si longue, au milieu de tant de guerres, de troubles, de factions, lors qu'il est hors le pouuoir des hommes de faire subsister le Roy, & par consequent la France, sans emprunts & sans aduances: nous ne parlons que de ruiner les *Financiers*, nous monstrons au doigt ceux qu'il faudroit perdre, & nous ne songeons pas que c'est faire en mesme temps le procés à toute la France, puis qu'il importe à son bon gouuernement, & qu'il est du bien du Royaume, non point qu'on les espargne s'ils sont coupables, mais qu'on attende le lieu, le temps, & les moyens plus propres pour remedier à ces chancres, qui rongent l'Estat, afin de le pouuoir faire sans passion, sans violence, sans precipitaton, auec connoissance de cause, aprés l'instruction de leur procés bien & deuëment faite, aprés en auoir separé les innocens des coulpables, & sans que les affaires publiques particulieres en puissent receuoir aucun detriment: car nous suiurons en cela la methode de Henry IV. laquelle luy a si bien reüssi, que ce seroit à nous d'en chercher vne meilleure. Et c'est aussi sur la difference que nous y voulons apporter, que i'ay fondé cette *seconde reflexion*, pour te monstrer par l'exemple d'vn si grand Monarque, la verité du dire de Claudian, / --- *peragit tranquilla potestas* / *Quod violenta nequit, mandataque fortius vrget* / *Jmperiosa quies.* / Cette parfaite idée de la Royauté, *Sainct-Ange,* gouuernoit son Royaume comme vn bon pere doit faire sa famille, ou comme vn bon Maistre ses domestiques; il tesmoignoit de n'auoir rien plus à cœur, que le repos de ses peuples; il aimoit ses seruiteurs, & ne les pouuoit souffrir en mauuaise

intelligence les vns auec les autres; il caressoit ses parens, & ne faisoit rien s'il pouuoit, qui les pût choquer; & à cette occasion il dissimuloit souuent, & recommandoit à ses Officiers d'agir secretement, & de ne leur pas faire cognoistre ce qui leur pourroit déplaire; il ne mal-traittoit iamais personne, ne s'ombrageoit pas facilement, s'accomodoit aux affaires, plioit, biaisoit autant qu'il pouuoit, & remedioit à tout par le benefice du temps, de la patience, & de la moderation, & clemence qui le faisoient aimer & admirer d'vn chacun. Et pourquoy donc, puis que la *Reyne* a cheminé iusques à cette heure sur les mesmes pistes & auec pareil succés, voudroit-on qu'elle allast faire vn horuaris, & mettre tout ç'en dessus dessous par la ruine prematurée des Partisans & Financiers, comme tant de libelles luy veulent tous les iours persuader qu'elle deuroit faire: non non, *Sainct-Ange*, le Roy a encore besoin de leur assistance iuste & reglée, iusques à ce que la Paix luy donne moyen de remedier aux desordres de sa Maison. Et ce sera pour lors qu'il verifiera le prouerbe Italien, *chi mangia l'occa del suo signore cento anni doppo ne restituisse la piuma*, sauf toutesfois à abreger vn si long terme, & à faire mesme dés maintenant bonne & briefue iustice aux *Larrons effectifs*, si tant est qu'il y en ait dans leurs compagnies, afin de distinguer les griuelées dont ils sont responsables à la Chambre de Iustice, des vols & larrecins qui sont punis par le Chastelet. Or, *Sainct-Ange*, comme ie me suis seruy cy-dessus de la comparaison du Royaume auec vne famille, pour ce qui est de l'administration, aussi faut-il maintenant fonder ma *troisiesme reflexion* sur la difference qu'il y a entre ces deux especes de gouuernement, pour ce qui concerne les debtes, emprunts, engagemens, fautes d'argent & autres pareilles necessitez de l'vne & de l'autre: car toutes ces incommoditez ruinent insensiblement les petites familles, ou par procés & chicanes, ou par ventes, & subhastations, ou par emprisonnemens longs & fascheux, ou par quelque autre façon. Mais pour ce qui est des grands Seigneurs, des Princes & Monarques, tu ne trouueras iamais qu'aucun ait esté ruiné de cette façon là, car il suruient tousiours quelque chose, au moyen de laquelle ils sortent de tous ces embarras. L'on disoit à Rome du temps que i'y estois que la Princesse de *Stigliani*, quoy qu'elle fust riche de trois ou quatre cens mille liures de reuenu, n'auoit pas quasi dequoy viure, tant elle estoit oberée & engagée de tous costez: mais à la fin qu'en a-t'il esté? le Duc *Medina de la Torre* Vice-Roy de Naples l'espousa auec toutes ses debtes, qui ne l'empescherent pas long temps de dormir. La Maison *de Neuers* à la mort du dernier Duc, ne deuoit-elle pas à Dieu & au monde, & ie croy neantmoins que la *Reyne de Pologne* n'en souffre maintenant aucune incommodité. *Charles VII.* nonobstant qu'il n'eust pas vn iour dequoy payer ses bottes, ne laissa pas quelque temps aprés d'estre plus puissant, & plus respecté que beaucoup de ses predecesseurs: le mesme aussi se peut dire d'*Henry IV.* & quand il seroit vray que la table de *Louys XIV.* son petit fils auroit esté renuersée, au moins faut-il aduouër qu'elle n'a pas esté long temps à se redresser. Enfin ce n'est pas de ce costé là que les Royaumes perissent; il faut des causes plus violentes, des maladies plus promptes & plus aiguës pour abbatre de si grands corps: aussi n'est-ce pas à dire vray ce qu'apprehendent nos Factieux, ny pourqouy ils font tant de bruit, c'est la table *du Cardinal*, & non pas celle du *Roy* qui les chagrine, & si celle-là estoit à bas, ils ne se soucieroient gueres de l'autre: au moins voudroient-ils que par ie ne sçay quelle sympathie elles eussent eclypsé toutes deux ensemble, pour auoir au moins cette satisfaction deux ou trois heures durant, de voir le *Cardinal* en l'estat auquel ils souhaiteroient fort volontiers qu'il demeurast tout le temps de sa vie. Mais puis que cette supposition de la table du Roy renuersée est entierement fausse, & que les souhaits des Factieux pour celle du *Cardinal*, n'ont point eu de lieu, *neque tu horum in numerum voto ruis* (Horat. in Epist.), ce seroit à mon aduis mal employer le temps que d'en parler dauantage. Venons plustost à ces despenses si prodigieuses *du Cardinal*, que tu cottois tantost aussi distinctement, comme si tu auois esté dix ans son œconome. / S. Si tu veux epiloguer aussi long temps sur toutes ces despenses en particulier comme tu viens de fair sur deux simples paroles, que ie t'ay dit seulement par forme de *verbi gratia*, & quasi sans y songer, tu feras bien de moüiller de bonne heure, car tu as encore assez dequoy filer. / M. Peut-estre plus que tu ne pense, puis que c'est mon deuoir aussi bien que mon intention de m'opposer / *Dum res, & ætas, & sororum* / *Fila trium patientur atra* / à tout ce qui choquera la verité des actions de son *Eminence*. / S. C'est tout ce que pourroit faire le meilleur & le plus affectionné de ses domestiques, & Terence mesme n'en donne point d'autre marque, quand il dit, *Js mihi profecto seruus spectatus satis, cui dominus curæ est:* mais puis que tu as mis ces trois Sœurs en ieu, fais-moy souuenir ie te prie d'vn certain vers qui comprend l'office de chacune en particulier. / M. Ie n'en sçay point d'autre que celuy dont fait mention *Eilhardus Lubinus*, sur la troisiesme Satyre de Iuuenal, / *Cloto colum portat, Lachesis trahit, Atropos occat*. / S. Si ces trois petites carongnes là eussent voulu nous filer vne vie aussie longue que celle des Cerfs & des Corbeaux, elles auroient bien meilleure part

au grand *Olympe* des Poëtes, que ces douze grandes Deitez tant masles que femelles, desquelles on fait tant de bruit. / M. Il ne se faut pas prendre à elles, de ce que la vie des hommes est courte, car elles ne sont que les instrumens d'autres causes & puissances superieures: mais au reste ie te puis bien asseurer, qu'elles ne sont pas ennemies du genre humain, & qu'elles ont mesme trouué sept Lettres de l'Alphabet Grec, afin de contribuer quelque chose à prolonger la memoire de ceux, desquels elles ne pouuoient moins faire que d'abreger les iours. / S. Vrayment ie leur sçay bon gré, & puis que *le Cardinal* est si grand amateur de peintures, ie ne voudrois pas qu'il oubliast de mettre sur quelque cheminée le portrait de ces trois bonnes filles. / M. Enfin de petites carongnes elles sont deuenuës bonnes filles. / S. C'est parce que tu m'as fait voir qu'elles ne nous font du mail que par contrainte, contre leur gré, propre volonté, & bonne inclination: mais au reste qu'elles nous obligent, & soulagent en ce qu'il leur est possible, comme l'inuention de ces lettres le tesmoigne suffisamment. / M. Imagine toy donc qu'il en est de mesme de la pluspart des Ministres, & *du Cardinal* principalement: car si ces necessitez de l'Estat, si ces longues guerres, si les cabales & factions qui ont mis la France à deux doigts de sa ruine, ne l'empeschoient de remedier à la pauureté des peuples, crois tu qu'il n'aimeroit pas mieux estre obiet des benedictions que de la haine publique? l'estime-tu si ennemy de soy-mesme, qu'il ne preferast pas la vie douce & paisible, à tant de soucis & d'inquietudes qu'il luy faut tous les iours essuyer, & à tant de crimes, dont ceux-là mesmes qui sçauent bien en conscience qu'il en est innocent, ne laissent pas de le charger; entre lesquels ie ne voy pas comment ceux que tu cottois tantost peuuent si fort interesser le public: car s'il fait bastir vn Palais pour se loger, s'il a beaucoup de domestiques, pourqouy veut-on que ce soit plustost aux despens du Roy, qu'aux siens? n'a-t'il pas vn reuenu asseuré de plus de *deux cens mille liures*, ou pour mieux dire ne l'auoit-il pas auparauant que les affaires du Roy eussent ruiné les siennes, & qu'il se fust engagé pour le seruice du public, iusques à n'auoir plus rien en son particulier? [...]'

p. 385 add.: '[...] & dont ceux-là pourroient mieux que tous autres rendre bon témoignage, *qui diuiserunt sibi eius vestimenta, & super vestem miserunt sortem*. Quant aux Diamans achetez en Portugal, c'est vne inuention digne du Secretaire de Sainct Innocent, qui l'a premierement trouuée & publiée en ses Lettres, & pleust à Dieu qu'elle fust veritable, puis que le Cardinal auroit maintenant sur quoy emprunter de bonnes sommes d'argent; [...]' **becomes** (pp. 565-569) '[...] & dont ceux-là pourroient mieux que tous autres rendre bon témoignage, *qui diuiserunt sibi eius vestimenta, & super vestem miserunt sortem.* Et ie croy certainement que si la guerre eut duré encore vn mois toutes ces belles statuës & toutes ces excellentes peintures que le *Cardinal* a fait venir de Rome, afin d'espargner à la ieunesse Françoise, les longs voyages qu'il luy faut faire en Italie pour se perfectionner en la sculpture & peinture; les liures memse, qu'il a ramassez auec tant de soin és quatre coins du monde, pour faire que *Rome*, *Oxfort*, & *Milan* ne se puissent aduantager sur *Paris*, au moyen de leurs Bibliotheques publiques: ie croy dis-ie que toutes ces beautez, toutes ces decorations, qui ne peuuent venir que d'vn esprit bien né, & parfaitement bien intentionné, auroient couru pareille fortune que les autres meubles, & que nous ferions maintenant les regrets du Pasteur Melibœe dans Virgile, / *Impius hæc tam culta noualia miles habebit? / Barbarus has segetes? en quo discordia ciues / Perduxit miseros; en queis conseuimus agros?* / Et ie te prie, *Sainct-Ange*, n'est-ce pas vne chose bien estrange, que le Cardinal *Mazarin* voulant embellir Paris d'vn Palais qui soit plus beau & plus magnifique que celuy de la ville d'*Vrbain*, descrit neantmoins auec si grand appareil par l'Abbate Baldo; que celuy du Cardinal *Madruzze* celebré par vn gros Poëme Italien du fameux Matthiole, que *Domus Valentina*, *Ædes Barberinæ*, *Galeria Giustiniana*, desquelles nous auons de si gros liures, que tous les Palais de *Genes*, de *Florence*, & de *Venise*, qui sont toutesfois si vantez dans les Histoires; il luy soit arriué au lieu de la recognoissance & gratitude qu'il en esperoit, la mesme disgrace qui arriua à ce grand Orateur *Dion* surnommé *Chrysostome*, duquel (outre que luy-mesme se plaint en l'oraison quarante-sixiéme, de la sedition qui s'émeut contre luy à cause de ie ne sçay quels bastimens qu'il faisoit faire) nous auons encore ce passage dans Photius, *Porro Ciuium aduersus eum excandescentia fuit, ex eo quod domum collabentem in melius instaurasset*. Mais pour passer de la *Maison* à ceux qui l'habitent, c'est à dire à la famille de son *Eminence*, ie te puis dire aprés auoir sceu de Monsieur le *Normand* en quoy elle consiste, qu'elle n'excede point de quinze ou vingt personnes, celle que le Cortesius donnoit il y a plus de cent quarante ans à tous les Cardinaux, quoy que par vn reglement que l'on parloit lors que i'estois à Rome, d'y faire reuiure, comme tres-vtile & honorable, il ne leur assignoit à chacun que douze mille escus de reuenu; *Itaque,* dit-il, *iure ex famulantibus, sexagenos in maiorum, & octogenos in minorum gentium numerum conscribi debere censemus, quo, & negotiorum rationi, & virtuti vtendæ fiat satis.* Et i'ay

obserué en effet que tel Cardinal de ceux qui viuoient à Rome pendant le seiour que i'y ay fait, ne ioüyssoit pas de cinq ou six mille escus de rente, qui ne laissoit d'auoir ses dix Palefreniers ou Valets de pied, ses trois Cochers, ses quatre Cameriers ou Valets de chambre, ses deux Scopateurs, autant d'Escuyers de Cuisine, ses Garderobes, & tous les autres domestiques tant de la haute que de la basse famille, pour parler à leur mode, iusques au nombre de soixante, & soixante & dix personne, lesquels doublent souuent chez les Cardinaux Princes, ou qui sont plus accommodez des biens de Patrimoine ou d'Eglise que ne sont les autres. Nonobstant quoy leur œconomie est telle qu'elle n'a rien de commun auec ce Tigellius d'Horace, lequel / --- *habebat sæpe ducentos* / *Sæpe decem seruos.* / Car ils ne sçauent en ce pays-là ce que c'est de dédamer, ny de changer le train d'vne vie loüable & honorable, quand ils l'ont vne fois commencée. Ce que le Cardinal *Mazarin* fait aussi à leur imitation, en cette ville; où il n'a rien estalby touchant sa Maison & son Train, qu'il ne voulust faire à Rome s'il y demeuroit; & cela estant, puis que nous ne sommes plus au temps, où suiuant l'opinion du Poëte Crates rapportée par Athenée, on pouuoit dire / --- *Heus mensa instrue te ipsam,* / *Mortariolum Mazam pinse, Cyathe vinum effunde,* / *Vbinam calix es, teipsum diligenter laua.* / & que la bien-seance, quand mesme cela seroit possible, ne luy permettroit pas d'en vser de la sorte, ie croy aussi que personne ne luy doit reprocher, qu'il ait plus de seruiteurs qu'il n'en peut occuper. Quant aux *Diamants* achetez en Portugal, c'est vne inuention digne du Secretaire de S. Innocent, qui l'a premierement trouuée & publiée en ses *Lettres*, & pleust à Dieu qu'elle fust veritable, puis que le *Cardinal* auroit maintenant sur quoy emprunter de bonnes sommes d'argent; [...]'

p. 388 add.: '[...] & i'ose dire quasi en presence de toute la France, auec l'approbation, voire mesme le transport, & admiration de tous ceux qui faisoient profession de s'y cognoistre. Claudian voulant representer la felicité du Consulat de *Manlius Theodorus*, dit fort à propos à nostre suiet, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 572-573) '[...] & i'ose dire quasi en presence de toute la France, auec l'approbation, voire mesme le transport, & admiration de tous ceux qui faisoient profession de s'y cognoistre. Et en effet l'on n'entendoit rien autre chose sur la fin d'icelle, que les exclamations de ceux qui en loüoient extraordinairement ce qui auoit le plus fait d'impression sur leurs esprits. / --- *Quæ quisque videbat* / *Attonitus loquitur, pars Orphea tollit in astra* / *Pars dolet Eurydicem, Erebi pars altera Regem* / *Arguit, ille Iouem commendat, Apollinis alter* / *Dicta notat, Venerisque dolos, pars maxima laudat* / *Mirandas operum moles, faciesque Theatri* / *Exhibitas, versasque occulto pondere frontes*. / Car voila de quelle façon en a parlé de le R.P. *Macedo* Cordelier Portugais, sur la fin d'vn ouurage entier qu'il a composé à la loüange de cette *Comedie*; de laquelle ie m'asseure qu'il n'auroit pas voulu si hautement loüer la representation, si la composition n'en eust esté tres-modeste, & retenuë. Mais venons au faict, puis qu'il n'est pas question si elle a bien ou mal reussi, mais plustost s'il la falloit faire, ou n'y point songer. Claudian voulant representer la felicité du Consulat de *Manlius Theodorus*, dit fort à propos à nostre suiet, [...]'

p. 389 add.: '[...] mais quand il a fallu trouuer de quoy proscrire le Cardinal Mazarin, on luy a mis cette piece en ligne de compte, comme si elle auoit esté faite hors de temps, par son aduis seul, & pour sa satisfaction particuliere. Or comme cela est tres-faux, ne plus moins que toutes les autres calomnies dont les enuieux & factieux le chargent continuellement, Dieu a permis aussi qu'ils ayent esté payez de mesme monnoye, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 573-574) '[...] mais quand il a fallu trouuer de quoy proscrire le Cardinal *Mazarin*, on luy a mis cette piece en ligne de compte, comme si elle auoit este faite hors de temps, par son aduis seul, & pour sa satisfaction particuliere, on luy a donné suiet de dire aprés Ouide (I. de arte & 2. de remed.), / *O nimis exitio theatra meo*. / L'on a voulu qu'vne despense de trente mille escus pour vn entretien de la Cour, & d'vne si grande ville que Paris, ait esté vne chose bien extraordinaire: & l'on a fait vn crime de voir vne seule Comedie de respect pendant la Regence, au lieu qu'auparauant c'estoit galanterie d'en voir toutes les années, & de iouër bien souuent des Balets, dont la despense estoit quasi tousiours plus grande que n'a esté celle de la Comedie d'*Orphée*. En suite de quoy tous ceux qui ont esté les Autheurs ou fauteurs de ladite calomnie, ne pourroient-ils pas dire à ceux qui les blasment, ce que disoit Politian (7. Epist. 25) en pareil suiet, / *Sed qui nos damnant histriones sunt maximi*, / *Nam Curios simulant, viuunt Bacchanalia*. / Et pour ce qui est du *Cardinal*, comme cette calomnie est tres-fausse ne plus ne moins que toutes les autres, dont les enuieux & factieux le chargent continuellement, Dieu a permis aussi qu'ils ayent esté payez de mesme monnoye, [...]'

p. 390 add.: '[...] Mais sa destinée est telle, que s'il arriue quelque bien à l'Estat par ses conseils, ou par son addresse, sa modestie, ou la deference qu'il doit aux autres personnes, empeschent que le public n'en ayt cognoissance; [...]' **becomes** (p. 575) '[...] Mais comme à la guerre *prospera omnes sibi vendicant, aduersa vni imputantur*, aussi sa destinée est telle, que s'il arriue quelque bien à l'Estat par ses conseils, ou par son addresse, sa modestie, ou la deference qu'il doit aux autres personnes, empeschent que le public n'en ayt cognoissance; [...]'

p. 394 add.: 'M. Tout beau, Sainct-Ange, encore que ie n'aye pas tant estudié les prologues de Bruscambille, & les bouffonneries de Rabelais & Veruille comme toy, [...]' **becomes** (p. 579) 'M. Tout beau, *Sainct-Ange*, ie te seruiray du prouerbe Italien, *i Paperi voglion menare a ber l'oche*. Car encore que ie n'aye pas tant estudié les prologues de Bruscambille, & les bouffonneries de Rabelais & Veruille comme toy, [...]'

p. 397 add.: '[...] que celle de tous les millions transportez hors de la France par le Cardinal, sans qu'il y ait voulu toucher, lors qu'il perissoit faute d'argent. Car est-il croyable, que s'il eust pû faire la paix, & se deliurer par ce moyen là des horribles peines, & soucys, des fascheux emplois, des contraintes & necessitez épouuantables, des maledictions de tant de peuples, des conspirations contre sa personne, & des factions contre l'Estat, que luy apporte la guerre, il prist plaisir à la continuer? [...]' **becomes** (p. 582) '[...] que celle de tous les millions transportez hors de la France par le Cardinal, sans qu'il y ait voulu toucher, lors qu'il perissoit faute d'argent. Car pourquoy n'auroit-il pas voulu la paix, puis qu'il pouuoit affermir au moyen d'icelle, cette haute reputation qu'il s'estoit acquise par des grandes negociations heureusement acheuées, des conquestes & batailles gaignées, & vne minorité renduë si glorieuse? Pourquoy dis-ie ne vouloit pas vne paix, laquelle auec l'agrandissement de l'Estat, auroit esté suiuie des benedictions non seulement de toute la France, mais aussi de toute la Chrestienté, qui estoit la plus grande gloire, & le plus seur establissement qu'il pouuoit desirer. Et ie m'estonne certes que ceux qui escriuent tous les iours contre luy, le fassent auec si peu de iugement que de le rendre en ce point là fol à porter marotte, & ennemy iuré de son propre bien, & de soy-mesme. Et en effet, *Sainct-Ange*, est-il croyable, que si le *Cardinal* eust pû faire la paix, & se deliurer par ce moyen là des horribles peines, & soucis, des fascheux emplois, des contraintes & necessitez épouuentables, des maledictions de tant de peuples, des conspirations contre sa personne, & des factions contre l'Estat, que luy apporte la guerre, il prist plaisir à la continuer? [...]'

p. 398 add.: '[...] *Vhe tibi tu nigræ dicebat Cacabus ollæ*. / S. Si l'on que tu tiens des discours si releuez dans le cabaret, il y auroit presse à t'y mener. [...]' **becomes** (p. 584) '[...] *Vhe tibi tu nigræ dicebat Cacabus ollæ.* / Cas ie maintiens que sans toutes les broüilleries suruenuës depuis vn an, la France auroit desia reduit l'Espagnol à condescendre aux articles d'vne Paix raisonnable, ou peut-estre mesme à les receuoir tels que nous les aurions voulu donner. / S. Si l'on que tu tiens des discours si releuez dans le cabaret, il y auroit presse à t'y mener. [...]'

pp. 400-408 alt.: '[...] mais neantmoins ils s'ébaïssoient tous de ce que l'*Espagnol* voulant la Paix, comme tout le monde est assez persuadé, & les *François* estans aussi tres-contens de la faire, on n'auoit toutesfois pû iusques à cette heure venir à bout, ny trouuer moyen de la conclure. / M. Tu peux croire que cela vient de l'artifice des *Espagnols*, plustost que de celuy des François, & ie m'en vais t'expliquer comment; tu cognois assez l'orgueil de cette nation recuite & basanée, & combien il luy fait mal de souffrir que cette heaute reputation qu'elle s'estoit acquise par toute l'Europe, soit le moins du monde flestrie ou diminuée? qu'a-t'elle doncque fait pour la conseruer en cette Assemblée de Munster, que l'on peut *meriteuolmente*, comme dit l'Italien, appeller ἐπιτομὴν τῆς οἰκουμενὴς, l'*abregé du monde*, ou pour mieux dire en face de toute la Chrestienté? elle a consideré les articles de la Paix, & aprés s'estre reserué les six plus importans à son faste, & à sa reputation, aprés auoir protesté qu'elle ne les accorderoit iamais, & qu'il n'estoit pas raisonnable qu'elle s'en departist, elle nous a abandonné tous les autres, soit qu'ils luy fussent de peu ou de nulle importance, ou qu'on ne peust nous les refuser auec iustice, ou pour d'autres considerations que le temps découurira. Cependant elle ne laisse pas de publier par toute l'Europe qu'elle auoit accordé aux François tout ce qu'on luy auoit demandé, qu'elle leur abandonnoit toutes leurs conquestes, & qu'eux seuls seroient d'oresnauant responsables de tous les maux que produiroit la guerre. En suite de cela qu'arriue-t'il, *les arbitres du Congrez* qui ne peuuent accorder les interests de leur Princes, auec la foiblesse des Espagnols, & la puissance des François, & qui sont naturellement obligez d'espauler le plus foible, se mettent du costé de

l'Espagnol. Tous les *Ambassadeurs des Princes* d'Italie, soit pour maintenir la balance de ces deux grands Empires, ou pour le peu de bien qu'ils veulent à nostre nation, ou pour estre plus promptement secourus contre le Turc, approuuent le procedé des Espagnols; les *Hollandois* qui ne se sont accordez auec eux, qu'aprés en auoir obtenu tout ce qu'ils en ont desiré, & aussi pour trauerser nos conquestes, le loüent hautement. Et ainsi voilà les *François* chargez par le commun consentement de toute l'Europe, d'estre les seuls perturbateurs de son repos, & le *Ministre* qui les gouuerne, accusé de trahir les interests de son Roy pour fauoriser les siens, de ruiner le Royaume pour establir sa maison, & de refuser la Paix pour s'enrichir dans les desordres, & dans les confusions de la guerre. Pendant quoy l'Espagnol qui a tousiours esté plus fin que nous, *gaudet in sinu* de cette tromperie, il expose vn Ministre le plus fidel à la France, & le plus contraire à l'Espagne qui ait iamais esté, à la rage d'vn peuple que les longues guerres on épuisé; & il fait son compte que si la France se relasche de ces six articles, outre qu'il semblera auoir plustost donné les conditions de la Paix au vainqueur, que de les auoir receuës de luy, ou des arbitres, il en remportera encore tous les aduantages qu'il desiroit; ou que si d'auanture elle ne se relasche point, il faudra necessairement qu'elle succombe dans les necessitez d'vne longue guerre, à cause des factions internes, des seditions & rebellions domestiques, dont elle est menacée par les cabales, & par les menées qu'il entretient auec les mécontens de cet Estat, auquel cas il aura tout moyen non seulement de se remplumer, mais aussi de profiter du débris de la France, *quam spe iam deuorat ipsa*. Voilà à peu prés tout le secret de la *Politique Espagnole*, voilà les pieges & les rets que nous tend ce *grand chasseur*; afin que *Incidat in casses præda petita suas*. / Voilà les preparatifs de cét *Erisichthon* de l'Europe,

In quo furit ardor edendi, / *Perque auidas fauces, immensaque viscera regnat*, / *Plusque capit quo plura suam demittit in aluum*. (Ouid lib. 8. Metamor.) / & voilà en vn mot, toutes les ruses & finesses dont l'Espagnol se sert pour mettre tousiours l'aduantage de son costé, ausquelles si vn Ministre de France se laissoit pipper, ne seroit-il pas accusé de peu de suffisance? & s'il donnoit les mains, ne seroit-il pas coulpable? Certes il deuroit plustost ménager les aduantages que toutes ces dernieres guerres nous ont donnez sur l'Espagnol au profit & à l'honneur de la France, afin de verifier le dire de T. Liue (Lib. I.), que *magnas victorias magna & diuturna pax sequi solet.* Il pourroit aussi mettre l'Espagne en pareil estat que s'est mis la France, aprés la prise de François premier, ou aprés d'autres pertes signalées, qui l'obligeoient à desirer la paix à quelque prix que ce fust. Mais bien loin d'auoir ces pretentions, il ne demande qu'à se parer du tort & des surprises qu'on luy veut faire, il met en arbitrage ce dont il pouuoit disposer absolument, il cherche d'establir vne Paix qui soit ferme & asseurée, il veut que les six articles reseruez par l'Espagnol, soient aussi bien arbitrez comme les autres, & pourueu qu'ils en modifient quelques-vns, il offre de leur quitter des villes, & des Prouinces qu'eux-mesmes nous abandonnent; enfin il ne cherche pas tant à s'acquerir des loüanges en cette negociation, qu'à s'exempter du blasme qu'on luy pourroit donner, s'il auoit abandonné mal à propos les interest de son Maistre, s'il auoit abusé de sa minorité en faueur de l'Espagnol, & s'il s'estoit laissé pipper à vne paix de laquelle on pourroit legitimement dire, / *Mars grauior sub pace latet.* (Claudian. de 4. Cons). / Et neantmoins l'artifice des Espagnols a esté si grand, la ialousie qu'ils donnent de nos forces à tous les Princes Chrestiens si puissante, les intrigues & factions de nostre Cour si extrauagantes, qu'il est maintenant contraint de defendre son innocence, au lieu qu'on la deuroit couronner, & que bien loin de s'estre acquis l'amour & l'affection des peuples, en conseruant si bien l'aduantage qu'ils ont de ne rien quitter à l'Espagnol, ils le veulent proscrire & lapider, & peu s'en faut qu'il ne dise, / *Cum sim sine crimine vitæ*, / *A populo saxis prætereunte petor*, (Ouid. de Nuce.) / comme Ouide faisoit dire aux noyers des grands chemins, qui pourroient en vn besoin passer pour emblemes & symboles des bons & fidels Ministres, & de ceux qui sont employez aux grandes affaires, puis qu'on traitte les vns & les autres auec pareille ingratitude. Mais il y a bien dauantage, Sainct-Ange, car comme le Cardinal se fut apperceu que l'Espagnol couuroit si industrieusement son mauuais ieu, que tout le monde y estoit trompé, & que l'on applaudissoit tous les iours aux feintes qu'il faisoit de vouloir la Paix, & de tout donner, de tout quitter, pour l'obtenir, il iugea à propos de iustifier son procedé deuant le plus Auguste Conseil qui ait iamais esté tenu en France, puis que outre tous les François qui pouuoient y assister, Monseigneur le Nonce de sa Saincteté, & tous les Ambassadeurs des Princes estrangers furent appellez: là nos raisons furent mises sur le tapis, elles y furent examinées six heures durant, auec tant de liberté, que Monseigneur le *Nonce*, & Monsieur l'*Ambassadeur de Venise*, ne laisserent rien à dire de ce qu'ils estimoient raissonable. Enfin la pluralité des voix prefera la continuation de la guerre à la d'vne Paix mal asseurée, & encore moins honorable; Monsieur le *Duc d'Orleans*, protesta que le Roy estant maieur, auroit

iuste raison de se plaindre du tort qu'on luy auroit fait pendant sa minorité, en accordant vne Paix si dommageable à la France: Monsieur le *Prince* dit qu'il craindroit d'en estre chastié, & les autres publioient ouuertement qu'il y alloit de leurs testes: le Surintendant promet dequoy faire les deux campagnes suiuantes; le Cardinal en tout cela n'opine qu'à son rang, la pluralité des voix resould de faire encore la guerre, pour obtenir vne Paix plus asseurée, moins honteuse, & moins preiudiciable à la France. Ce resultat aussi bien que l'Assemblée où il fut arresté, est cogneu de tout le monde, ceux qui y assisterent sont encore à Paris, & dans les affaires, tout le monde en peut parler, & neantmoins personne n'en veut rien dire, & chacun se taist, ou dissimule, pour auoir plus de subiect de blasmer le Cardinal, de ce dont, si tant est qu'il y eut du mal, il ne pourroit toutesfois estre coulpable qu'en partie. Mais ie voy bien d'où cela procede, c'est que l'on peut aussi bien dire de ce temps-cy, que le Poëte Comique faisoit du sien, / *Ædepol nostra ætas non multum fidei gerit*, / *Tabulæ notantur, adsunt testes duodecim*, / *Tempus locumque scribit actuarius*, / *Tamen inuenitur Rhetor qui factum neget*. / Neantmoins le principal est que l'innocence du Cardinal, & la sincerité de ses intentions en cette affaire, comme en toutes autres, sont fort bien cogneuës de ceux qui n'ont pas moins de pouuoir pour le chastier de ses tromperies, si dauanture il en commettoit quelques-vnes, que de bonne volonté pour recognoistre comme ils font tous les iours, & pour proteger contre tant d'enuieux & de factieux, la fidelité de ses seruices. Mais pour te faire veoir clairement comme les Espagnols n'ont desiré la paix qu'autant qu'ils croyoient que nous ne pouuions ny deuions raisonnablement la faire; & que toutes les instances qu'ils en faisoient par leurs Plenipotentiaires, ou faisoient faire par les arbitres, n'auoient autre but que de nous rendre odieux à tous les Princes, & d'en tirer cependant quelque aduantage; c'est que la Reyne leur ayant enuoyé depuis six sepmaines Monsieur de *Vaultort*, pour les asseurer que le Roy son fils, se deporteroit tres volontiers de beaucoup de iustes pretensions qu'il auoit debatuës iusques à cette heure, & qu'il estoit prest de consentir à vne bonne paix, ils respondirent franchement, qu'ils n'estoient plus à Munster; que les affaires de France auoient changé de face; qu'il falloit faire cecy & cela, iusque là mesme qu'ils n'eurent point de honte de tromper Monseigneur le *Nonce & l'Ambassadeur de Venise*, en les desaduoüant des asseurances qu'ils auoient données peu de iours auparauant au Roy & à la Reyne, que les Epsagnols estoient tousiours dans les mesmes offres qu'ils auoient faites à Munster, & qu'ils estoient si desireux de les executer, que leur Plenipotentiaire *Pigneranda* faisoit la mesme marche que l'Archiduc. Aprés quoy peut-on douter que l'Espagnol n'ait eu intention d'imposer à tout l'Europe, & de se mocquer particulierement des François, en leur proposant vne paix si desauantageuse, qu'ils ne pouuoient l'accepter auec honneur, & laquelle luy-mesme n'auoit pas enuie, quand bien mesme ils l'auroient acceptée, de leur accorder, puis qu'en effet il l'a refusée, quand on l'a pris au mot? Et cependant quand nos Ministres disoient qu'ils sçauoient certainement que l'intention des Espagnols estoit de ne vouloir point de paix; que toutes les mines qu'ils faisoient n'estoient que pour sonder nostre foiblesse, que leur dessein estoit de prolonger la guerre iusques à ce que les desordres qu'ils preuoyoient deuoir arriuer en France, leur donnassent occasion de la rauager, partager, & destruire entierement. Quand dis-ie nos Ministres parloient de la sorte, on se mocquoit d'eux, ils vouloient eux-mesmes la guerre pour pescher en eau trouble; l'Espagnol estoit vn Sainct, & eux des Diables, & sans auoir égard qu'ils ne parloient & n'aggisoient en ce rencontre qui suiuant les resolutions prises dans vn Conseil si celebre, que celuy dont nous auons cy deuant parlé, & où toutes ces choses auoient esté si librement & si serieusement examinées, on les charge de blasmes & d'opprobres, on les couure de maledictions, on les condamne, on les proscript, on les expose à la furie d'vn Peuple, le tout sans cognoissance de cause, & auec encore moins de Iustice, puis que suiuant l'aduis de Cassiodore, *nimis iniquum est vt ille patiatur dispendium, qui imperium fecit alienum*. Et cela est d'autant plus vray en la personne de Monsieur le Cardinal, que les resolutions de ce Conseil celebre, suiuant lesquelles il agissoit, auoient esté aussi iudicieusement prises, comme le temps a fait cognoistre que les motifs en estoient veritables, veu le procedé des Espagnols & la negatiue qu'ils nous ont donnée, sur l'esperance qu'ils ont tousiours eu de profiter de nos desordres, quoy qu'ils deuroient bien cognoistre quelle folie c'est à eux que de s'y attendre dauantage, *sed qui amant sibi somnia fingunt,* aussi pourra-t'on bien dire d'eux ce que disoit Horace d'vn butort de Païsan, / *Rusticus expectat dum defluat amnis, at ille* / *Labitur & labetur in omne volubilis æuum*. / Or cela estant, Sainct-Ange, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 586-597) '[...] mais neantmoins ils s'ébahissoient tous de ce que l'*Espagnol* voulant la Paix, comme tout le monde est assez persuadé, & les *François* estans aussi tres contens de la faire, on n'auoit toutesfois pû iusques à cette heure venir à bout, ny trouuer moyen de la conclurre. / M. Veux-tu que ie te parle franchement, il y a icy du *noli me tangere,* du *noli altum saper, sed time*, car cette matiere

est si releuée, qu'elle passe ta portée & la mienne, & il n'y a que les acteurs mesmse de la negociation, qui puissent en discouurir auec fondement; Vne proposition escourtée, vne petite circonstance oubliée, quelque parole mise l'vne pour l'autre, changent bien souuent vn *cas* du blanc au noir, & font paroistre en public que tel souhaitte passionnément la Paix, qui est celuy-là mesme qui l'empesche de tout son possible en particulier. Ie te diray pourtant en peu de mots, ce que i'ay recueilly il n'y a pas quinze iours ou trois semaines, d'vne conuersation où ie me rencontray fortuitement, dans laquelle Monsieur *Boulenger* Secretaire de l'Ambassade de *Munster*, discourut amplement sur la maniere frauduleuse dont les Espagnols s'y estoient seruis, depuis le commencement iusques à la fin. / S. Puis que tu n'ignores pas le precepte d'Horace (ad Pisones), ------ *breuis esse laboro, / Obscurus fio*. / ne sois point chiche ie te prie, de paroles, en vne matiere que tu aduoües toy-mesme, estre de si grande consequence. / M. Il nous prouuoit par raisons concluantes, que le but du Comte de *Pegnaranda* n'auoit iamais esté autre, dans tout le cours de la negociation, que de separer les *Prouinces vnies* d'auec la *France*, pour pouuoir aprés continuer la guerre plus fortement auec celle-cy, & auec plus d'apparence de bon succés, comme ayant vn ennemy de moins: Le mesme nous fit aussi remarquer, que dés que l'accomodement particulier des Hollandois fut conclu, *Pegneranda* ne songea plus qu'à rompre auec nous, qu'a difficulter non seulement les articles dont l'on n'estoit point encore conuenu, mais ceux-là mesme où il n'y auoit plus de difficulté, iusques là qu'il sortit de *Munster*, où il ne laissa que le nommé *Brun*, sans aucun pouuoir, dont toute l'Assemblée demeura d'autant plus scandalisée, que quand mesme il eust esté muny de bons pouuoirs, personne ne s'imaginoit que le Roy d'Espagne voulust confier ses plus importans interests à vn *Bourguignon*, ny faire conclurre ce grand ouurage, traitté durant tant d'années & au milieu de cette assemblée de *Munster* que l'on peut *meritouolmente*, comme dit l'Italien, appeller ἐπιτομὴν τῆς οἰκουμενὴς, l'*abregé du monde*, ou pour mieux dire en face de la Chrestienté, par vn homme de si mediocre qualité, & en mesme temps qu'il retiroit son principal Plenipotentiaire, à qui *Brun* auoit coustume d'obeïr comme vn valet fait à son Maistre. Or comme les Ministres d'Espagne n'auoient autre but que de separer les Prouinces vnies d'auec cette Couronne, aussi faut-il aduouër qu'ils y ont procedé auec de merueilleux stratagemes: Car comme ils ont veu, de ne pouuoir auec bienseance, nous refuser le poinct de la retention de nos conquestes, parce que les *Hollandois*, à qui ils offroient liberalement la retention des leurs, croyoient la chose si iuste, qu'ils auroient continué la guerre pour nous la faire obtenir; ils s'aduiserent d'vn moyen, par lequel ils retiroient d'vne main ce qu'ils nous donnoient de l'autre, preuoyant bien comme il est arriué, que l'impatience qu'auoient les Prouinces vnies de conclurre promptement leur Traitté, les feroit lasser de la longueur des contestations qu'ils formeroient auec nous, sur des points essentiels, & que nous ne deuons ny pouuons relascher, sans perdre tout le fruict de nos conquestes. Ce moyen donc estoit, de nous ceder à la verité les places que nos armes ont occupées, mais de nous y tenir en prison, c'est à dire que tout le plat pays des enuirons leur demeurast, que les Chastellenies qui en dependent fussent à eux, & que nous n'eussions rien autre chose pour nous que l'enceinte des murailles, ou tout au plus le vol du chappon; contre ce qui a esté pratiqué en tous les autres Traitez, & en celuy des *Hollandais* particulierement, nonobstant qu'il deust estre signé le mesme iour que le nostre. Dequoy comme nous asseura ledit sieur *Boulenger*, toute l'assemblée auoit esté surprise & estonnée, veu les grands aduantages que nous auions remportez durant toute cette guerre, & que c'estoit mesme à nos dépens, que ceux-cy auoient fait tous leurs progrés. Mais ce n'estoit pas là la seule pierre d'achopement par où ils pretendoient arrester la conclusion de nostre Traitté, pendant qu'ils passeroient outre à la signature de l'autre. Et en effet ils auoient bien laissé d'autres queuës plus difficiles à escorcher, car ils n'auoient iamais parlé nettement sur la retention des ports de *Toscane*; ils ne s'estoient point expliquez sur les fortifications de *Catalogne*, ny sur les limites à establir dans ce pays-là, pendant la *Trefue*; & ils gardoient pour dernier retranchement le poinct de *Lorraine*, où ils declarerent qu'il falloit pour faire la paix, que la France restituast au Duc *Charles*, non seulement tout le plat pays, mais aussi toutes les places generalement, en l'estat qu'elles se trouueroient, & sans en pouuoir démolir les fortifications, qui estoit plus que le Duc mesme n'auoit demandé. Enfin ils firent voir aux *Hollandois* tant de difficultez insurmontables dans nostre Traitté, que cette opinion iointe aux artifices dont *Pau* & *Knut* corrumpus par l'argent d'*Espagne*, se seruirent pour faire croire à leurs Superieurs, que la France n'auoit pas grand' disposition à la Paix, fit enuoyer l'ordre de Hollande à leurs Ministres, de signer leur Traitté sans nous attendre: Aprés quoy l'*Espagne* n'a plus songé à autre chose, qu'aux moyens de pouuoir reuoquer tout ce qui auoit esté arresté à nostre esgard pendant cinq années entieres. / S. Quand ie voudrois adiouster foy entiere à tout ce que tu viens de dire, cela

ne conclud pas que le *Cardinal* ait voulu la paix, car peut-estre rioit-il sous la cappe de la conduite des Espagnols, comme estant fort proportionnée aux soins qu'il a de perpetuer la guerre. / M. Si le *Cardinal* auoit eu l'intention que tu dis, ie serois le premier à luy en faire des reproches, & à luy adapter ces vers de Phædrus, / *Plerumque stulti risum dum captant leuen,* / *Graui distringunt alios contumelia*, / *Et sibi nociuum concitant periculum.* / Mais ce Monsieur *Boulenger* nous disoit là dessus vne particularité, qui t'ostera bien cette folle croyance de la teste, & à ceux qui l'ont comme toy, s'ils en considerent bien les circonstances & le temps. Car il nous apprit que les Messieurs du *Parlement* deputez pour faire les Remonstrances par escrit à la Reyne, estant allez trouuer Monsieur *de Longueuille*, afin d'auoir des Memoires de luy, qui leur donnassent lieu de charger & conuaincre le *Cardinal* d'auoir empesché la Paix: ce *Prince* leur respondit qu'ils pouuoient bien croire qu'il n'estoit pas amoureux des actions du *Cardinal*, & qu'ayant en son particulier grand suiet d'estre son ennemy, ce seroit auec plaisir qu'il leur fourniroit les moyens de le ruiner, mais que sa conscience, & son honneur luy estoient plus cheres que toute autre consideration, & qu'il estoit obligé de rendre ce tesmoignage à la verité, qu'il luy auoit tousiours paru par ses instructions, & par tous les ordres venus de la Cour, que non seulement le *Cardinal* auoit souhaitté passionnément la Paix: mais de plus, qu'il auoit fait de sa part tout ce qu'il auoit pû pour l'obtenir: ce qui estoit demeuré sans effet, parce que les Espagnols n'ont iamais eu vne veritable intention de la conclure, & ont tousiours laissé quelque queuë pour rompre, sans qu'il ait iamais esté possible, quelque soin qu'on y ait apporté, de leur tirer ces paroles de la bouche, *Moyennant cela ou cela, nous signerons le Traitté.* Or aprés vn tesmoignage si authentique, rendu par vn Prince, qui peut estre appellé en ce fait-cy principalement, Ἀττικος μαρτυς, *Atticus, & fide dignissimus testis* (Diogenian. centur. 3. adag. 2.), puis qu'il a l'entiere connoissance de tout ce qui s'y est passé, & dans vn temps où il ne celeroit pas les fautes, ou les artifices du *Cardinal*. Ie ne sçay pas quelle plus grande iustification on pourroit desirer de la sincerité de sa conduite: Mais ie pretens te pousser encore plus auant, & te reduire *ad metam non loqui*, à ne sçauoir que dire. / S. Il ne te sera pas difficile, car comme certain Chrysalus chez Plaute disoit, *profecto de auro nihil scio, nise nescio* (In Bacebidib.), aussi te diray-ie le mesme du détail de cette Paix traittée à *Munster*. / M. Le Traitté d'vne action si importante, consiste en *quarente-quatre* articles, aiustez & signez par les Secretaires des deux Ambassades, & en *six* autres qui sont encore indecis. Quant à ceux qui sont aiustez, il n'y a qu'à les transcrire dans le Traitté en la forme qu'ils sont à present. Pour les indecis la France ne s'est pas contentée de proposer diuers expediens que toute l'Assemblée a iugez fort raisonnables, pour sortir d'affaires; elle n'a pas voulu s'en tenir à ses propres sentimens, elle a plusieurs fois solemnellement offert d'en passer par l'arbitrage ou de la Reyne de Suede seule, sur vn proposition, dont *Brun* auoit flatté ses Plenipotentiaires, mais qu'il reuoqua aussi tost; ou de la Reyne de Suede iointe à tous les Estats de l'Empire; ou des Estats de l'Empire seuls; ou de Messieurs les Estats des Prouinces vnies seuls; ou desdits Sieurs Estats conioinctement auec Monsieur le Prince d'Orange; ou dudit Prince d'Orange seul: tous lesquels partis ont esté refusez par l'*Espagne*, quoy que pour gagner la bonne volonté des *Hollandois*, elle auoit offert la premiere de soumettre les six points indecis à leur iugement. Mais elle s'en dédit formellement, lors qu'elle fut prise au mot. Aprés quoy m'aduoüeras tu pas, *Sainct-Ange*, que celuy qui veut bien subir le iugement d'vn tiers, qui fait luy mesme les propositions de s'y soumettre, qui demande cinq ou six iuges de son different, qui parle clair & net *sine require*, sans queuë, ny reserue; ne m'aduouëras-tu pas dis-ie, que celuy là ne se deffie pas de son bon droit, ny ne fuit l'accommodement, & que l'on ne luy peut en suite raisonnablement rien imputer si la querelle continuë, si les desordres d'vne si longue guerre se font sentir de tous costez, & si toute l'Europe gemit sous la pesanteur d'vn si rigoureux fleau, qu'est celuy dont Dieu a commencé de nous chastier il y plus de quinze ans. Mais nonobstant cela l'*Espagnol* ne laisse pas de continuer dans ses reculades, il a d'assez grandes aureilles pour receuoir toutes ces plaintes, sans que le cœur en soit touché: & pendant qu'en vertu d'vn cabinet fait à Rome, d'vne bourse de iettons trouuée en Lorraine, il dit & imprime que *Francia est orbiuorai,* il ne laisse pas de trauailler sous main à mettre toute l'Europe ç'en dessus dessous, afin de profiter de ses ruines, & afin de verifier, s'il peut, cette inscription que i'ay veu en diuers endroits d'Italie, *Philippo IV. quatrimundiferenti Atlanti potentissimo,* &c. & c'est en effet, à ce dessein là que ce grand Chasseur, que cet Erisicthon de l'Europe, / --- *Jn quo furit ardor edendi,* / *Perque auidas fauces, immensaque viscera regnat,* / *Plusque capit, quo plura suam demittit in Aluum*. / nous dresse tant de pieges, nous sert de tant de ruses, de finesses, de dissimulations, de remises, & de reserues; ausquelles si vn Ministre de France se laissoit pipper, ne seroit-il pas accusé de peu de suffisance, & s'il donnoit les mains, ne seroit-il pas coupable? Certes il deuroit plustost menager les aduantages que

toutes ces dernieres guerres nous ont donnez sur l'*Espagnol*, au profit & à l'honneur de la France, afin de verifier le dire de Tite Liue (Lib. I.) que *magnas victorias, magna diuturna pax sequi solet*, il pourroit desirer que l'*Espagne* se mit en pareil estat qu'a fait autrefois la France, aprés pertes signalées: Mais bien loin d'auoir ces pretentions, il ne demande qu'à se parer du tour, & des surprises qu'on luy veut faire, il demande que tout ce qui est en different soit iugé par des arbitres, il les propose *per turbam & saturam*, & peu s'en faut que ie ne dise à poignée; il offre & proteste de s'en tenir à ce qu'ils voudront resoudre; enfin il ne cherche pas tant à s'acquerir des loüanges en telle negociation, qu'à s'exempter du blasme qu'on luy pourroit donner, s'il auoit abandonné mal à propos les interest de son Maistre, s'il auoit abusé de sa minorité en faueur de l'*Espagnol*, & s'il s'estoit laissé pipper à vne Paix, de laquelle on pourroit legitimement dire, / *Mars grauior sub pace latet:* (Claudian de 4. Cons.) / Et neantmoins l'artifice des *Espagnols* a esté si grand, & les factions & intrigues de nostre Cour si extrauagantes, qu'il est maintenant contraint de defendre son innocence, au lieu qu'on la deuroit couronner, & que bien loin de s'estre acquis l'amour & l'affection des peuples, en conseruant si bien l'aduantage qu'ils ont de ne rien quitter à l'*Espagnol*, ils le veulent proscrire & lapider, & aprés auoir dit, / --- *cum sim sine crimine vitæ*, / peu s'en faut qu'il adiouste, / *A populo saxis prætereunte petor*, / comme Ouide faisoit dire aux noyers des grands chemins, qui pourroient en vn besoin passer pour emblemes & symboles des bons & fidels Ministres, & de ceux qui sont employez aux grandes affaires, puis qu'on les traitte les vns & les autres auec pareille ingratitude. Il a toutefois cette consolation parmy tant de trauerses, que son innocence, & la sincerité de ses intentions en cette affaire, comme en toutes autres, sont fort bien conneuës de ceux qui n'ont pas moins de pouuoir pour le chastier de ses tromperies, si dauenture il en commettoit quelques vnes, que de bonne volonté pour reconnoistre comme ils font tous les iours, & pour proteger contre tant d'enuieux & de factieux, la fidelité de ses seruices. Mais pour te faire voir clairement comme les *Espagnols* n'ont fait mine de desirer la paix qu'autant qu'ils croyoient que nous ne pouuions ny deuions raisonnablement la faire, & que toutes les instances feintes & simulées qu'ils en faisoient par leurs Plenipotentiaires n'auoient autre but que de nous rendre odieux à tous les Princes, & d'en tirer cependant quelque auantage; c'est que la Reyne leur ayant enuoyé depuis six semaines Monsieur de *Vaultort*, pour les asseurer que le Roy son fils se deporteroit tres-volontiers de quelques vnes des iustes pretensions qu'il auoit debatuës iusques à cette heure, & qu'il estoit tousiours prest de consentir à vne bonne paix: ils respondirent franchement, qu'ils n'estoient plus à *Munster*; que les affaires de France auoient changé de face, qu'il falloit faire cecy & cela, iusques là mesme qu'ils n'eurent point de honte de tromper Monseigneur le *Nonce* & l'*Ambassadeur de Venise,* en les desauoüant des asseurances qu'ils auoient données peu de iours auparauant au Roy & à la Reyne, que les *Espagnols* estoient tousiours dans les mesmes intentions qu'à *Munster*, & qu'ils estoient si desireux de les executer, que leur Plenipotentiaire *Pegneranda* faisoit la memse marche que l'Archiduc. Aprés quoy peut-on douter que l'*Espagnol* n'ait eu intention d'imposer à toute l'Europe, & de se mocquer particulierement des François, en leur proposant vne paix si desauantageuse, qu'ils ne pouuoient l'accepter auec honneur, & laquelle luy mesme n'auoit pas enuie, quand bien mesme ils l'auroient acceptée, de leur accorder, puis qu'en effet il l'a refusée, quand on l'a pris au mot? Et cependant quand nos *Ministres* disoient qu'ils sçauoient certainement que l'intention des *Espagnols* estoit de ne vouloir point de paix; que toutes les mines qu'ils faisoient, n'estoient que pour sonder nostre foiblesse; que leur dessein estoit de prolonger la guerre iusques à ce que les desordres qu'ils preuoyoient deuoir arriuer en France, leur donnassent occasion de la rauager, partager, & destruire entierement. Quand dis-ie nos *Ministres* parloient de la sorte, on se mocquoit d'eux, ils vouloient eux-mesmes la guerre pour pescher en eau trouble; l'*Espagnol* estoit vn Sainct, & eux des Diables; on les couure de maladictions, on les condamne, on les proscript, on les expose à la furie d'vn Peuple, le tout sans connoissance de cause, & auec encore moins de Iustice, puis que suiuant l'aduis de Cassiodore, *nimis iniquum est vt ille patiatur dispendium, qui imperium fecit alienum*. Et cela est d'autant plus vray en la personne de Monsieur le *Cardinal*, qu'il a tousiours fort bien reconneu comme le procedé des *Espagnols*, & la negatiue qu'ils nous ont tant de fois donnée, n'estoit fondé sur autre chose que sur l'esperance qu'ils ont eu il y a long temps de profiter de nos desordres, quoy qu'ils y ayent esté si souuent trompez, qu'ils deuroient bien connoistre quelle folie c'est à eux que de s'y attendre dauantage, *sed qui amant sibi somnia fingunt*: aussi pourra-t'on bien dire d'eux ce que disoit Horace d'vn butort de Païsan, / *Rusticus expectat dum defluat amnis, at ille* / *Labitur & labetur in omne volubilis æuum*. (Lib. I, epist. 2) / Or cela estant, *Sainct-Ange*, [...]'

p. 409 alt.: '[...] il y a dix ans qu'ils nous amusent à *Munster* pour donner temps aux apostumes qu'ils croyent nous deuoir estouffer, de meurir & de se former; [...]' **becomes** (p. 598) '[...] il y a six ans qu'ils nous amusent à *Munster* pour donner temps aux apostumes qu'ils croyent nous deuoir estouffer, de meurir & de se former; [...]'

p. 409 alt.: '[...] pendant cela ils n'ont rien oublié pour separer nos Alliez d'auec nous, parce que c'estoit en cela que consistoit le nerf de leur negociation, & comme ils ont veu qu'ils demeuroient tous fermes dans les veritables interests de leurs affaires, & dans les sentimens d'honneur & de vertu, [...]' **becomes** (p. 598) '[...] pendant cela ils n'ont rien oublié pour separer nos Alliez d'auec nous, parce uqe c'estoit en cela que consistoit le nerf de leur negociation, & comme ils ont veu que les *Suedois* demeuroient fermes dans les veritables interests de leurs affaires, & dans les sentimens d'honneur & de vertu, [...]'

p. 409 add.: '[...] pendant cela nous nous sommes accommodez honorablement auec l'Empereur, nous n'auons point commis lascheté; on ne nous peut rien reprocher; [...]' **becomes** (pp. 598-599) '[...] pendant cela nous nous sommes accommodez honorablement auec l'Empereur; puis que ç'a esté pendant la guerre de Paris, & auec des conditions si aduantageuses, qu'au lieu que du viuant du feu Roy, nous ne pretendions pas retenir vn poulce de terre en Allemagne, nous y auons maintenant les deux Alsaces, le Santyau, Brisac, & Philisbourg, qui sont deux villes des plus considerables; que les trois Eueschez, du consentement de l'Empereur, & de tous les Estats de l'Empire, ont esté reünis à la Couronne, & que le Parlement de Metz est conserué, quoy qu'auparauant la Regence on songeoit à le supprimer, afin de contenter l'Empereur sur cét article, & faire que la Iustice de cette ville en laquelle le Roy n'est pas auiourd'huy moins absolu que dans Paris, releuast de la Chambre Imperiale de Spire, comme elle faisoit il y a quelque temps: & ainsi nous n'auons point commis de lascheté, au contraire nous sommes en capital de ce costé là, on ne nous peut rien reprocher. [...]'

p. 410 add.: '[...] parce que c'est le propre du François d'aimer & de caresser son Prince plus que nation du monde. Respectons la Reyne pour sa grande bonté, pour l'assiduité & la fidelité qu'elle apporte au gouuernement du Royaume, en des temps si fascheux, & si difficiles; [...]' **becomes** (pp. 599-600) '[...] parce que c'est le propre du François d'aimer & de caresser son Prince plus que nation du monde, tesmoin ce qu'en dit Ioue au premier de son Histoire, *Gens mirum in modum dedita Regibus suis, quibus diuinum quendam animi vigorem inesse, persuasum habent*. Respectons la Reyne pour sa grande bonté, pour l'assiduité & la fidelité qu'elle apporte au gouuernement du Royaume, en des temps si fascheux, & si difficiles; [...]'

p. 410 add.: '[...] Finalement donnons nous la paix à nous mesmes, & nous l'aurons bien tost auec les Estrangers, craignons nostre Roy, & il se fera craindre de tout le monde, [...]' **becomes** (p. 600) '[...] Finalement donnons nous la paix à nous-mesmes, & nous l'aurons bien-tost aussi aduantageuse auec l'*Espagnol*, que nous l'auons desia auec l'Empereur, craignons nostre Roy, & il se fera craindre de tout le monde, [...]'

p. 414 add.: '[...] *Extat adhuc nemo saucius ore meo!* / & par consequent ie croy estre fondé sur la bonté de son naturel, pour promettre vne inmpunité generale & particuliere à ceux qui ont pris comme à tasche de l'offenser, pendant toutes ces hostilitez de la guerre Parisienne. La seconde raison.' **becomes** (pp. 604-605) '[...] *Extat adhuc nemo saucius ore meo!* / Ce n'est pas à te dire vray, que i'approuue cette douceur; & si ie luy pouuois parler à loisir, ie le ferois souuenir de ce beau dire de Seneque, *Corrigendus est qui peccat, & admonitione & vi; & molliter, & aspere; meliorque tam sibi quam aliis faciendus, non sine castigatione, sed sine ira; quis enim cui medetur irascitur?* Mais quoy, de la façon que ie le connois, & que i'en ay ouy parler à tous ses domestiques, quelque impression que la raison luy fasse, pour conseiller le chastiment, son naturel y repurgnera, & le fera tousiours pancher du costé de la clemence & du pardon: & par consequent ie croy estre fondé sur la bonté de son naturel, pour promettre vne impunité generale & particuliere à ceux qui ont pris comme à tasche de l'offenser, pendant toutes ces hostilitez de la guerre Parisienne. La seconde raison.'

p. 416 alt. + add.: '[...] & il n'y a rien si odieux, ny si ennuyeux, que quelque art que ce soit, lors qu'on le porte iusques à ses dernieres differences, ou qu'on l'examine auec trop de subtilité, comme *Brassauolus* a fait les differences du mal de Naples: *Guillemeau* les maladies de l'œil, & *Struthius*

celles des pouls ou battemens d'arteres; car alors cette doctrine estant hors de termes de la pouuoir prattiquer, aussi ne sert-elle rien; [...]' **becomes** (p. 606) '[...] & il n'y a rien si odieux, ny si ennuyeux, que quelque art que ce soit, lors qu'on le porte iusques à ses dernieres differences, comme *Brassauolus* a fait les differences du mal de Naples: *Guillemeau* les maladies de l'œil, & *Struthius* celles des pouls ou battemens d'arteres; ou qu'on l'examine auec trop de subtilité, & qu'on ne traitte pas de la chose mais de l'idée de la chose, comme a fait *Xenophon* du Prince, *Ciceron* de l'Orateur, & *Castalion* du Courtisan; car alors cette doctrine estant hors de termes de la pouuoir prattiquer, aussi ne sert-elle rien; [...]'

p. 416 add.: '[...] on y en a adiousté mille autres, qui ne seruent plus de rien, comme sont la *Metoscopie*, la *Chiromantie*, la *Geloscopie*, l'*Idemgraphie* tant pour ce qui est du charactere, [...]' **becomes** (p. 607) '[...] on y en a adiousté mille autres, qui ne seruent plus de rien, comme sont la *Metoscopie*, la *Chiromantie*, la *Geloscopie*, l'*Ophtalmoscopie*, l'*Idemgraphie* tant pour ce qui est du charactere, [...]'

p. 417 add.: 'S. Tu as donc bonne opinion des prouerbes.' **becomes** (p. 607) 'S. Tu as donc bonne opinion des prouerbes, que tant d'autres mesprisent.'

p. 417 alt.: 'M. Il ne faut qu'en rapporter quelques'vns pour te faire comprendre ce qui est aussi de tous les autres. / *Distortum vultum sequitur distorsio morum*, / *Intima per mores cognoscimus exteriores,* / en voyla deux qui parlent de la Physiognomie en general, & desquels ie ne cognois point d'autre autheur que le peuple: [...]' **becomes** (p. 608) 'M. Ie n'insisteray pas tant sur l'explication de cette parole, que font les Philosophes sur celle du *syllogisme Physionomique*: si d'aduenture elle ne t'est agreable sers toy du *verbum vetus* de Plaute, ou de l'*adagio* de Varron, ou de *Paroemia & Gnoma* des Grecs, *ou du refranes* des Espagnols, ou de telle autre que tu iugeras plus à propos: Pour moy qui sçay bien que *longum est iter per præcepta, breue & expeditum per exempla:* Ie te rapporteray quelques-vns de ces prouerbes, afin de te faire mieux comprendre ce qui est aussi de tous les autres. / *Distortum vultum sequitur distorsio morum*, / *Intima per mores cognoscimus exteriores,* / en voila deux qui parlent de la Physiognomie en general, & desquels ie ne cognois point d'autre Autheur que le peuple: [...]'

p. 427 om.: 'M. Prens les plustost pour toy mesme, Sainct-Ange, car pour moy, & pour le Cardinal i'ay tant d'autres raisons que ie n'ay pas besoin d'en faire venir de la chambre dorée. / S. Ventre sainct Gry tu serois bon pourceau de pauure femme, car tu fleurerois ton desieuner de bien loin. / M. Tu ne tiens rien mon enfant, car aprés t'auoir guary de la galle comme ie fis à Aix, ie puis bien me ranger du costé des Medecins & dire auec eux, / *Nobis sunt signa, vobis sunt prandia digna*. / Mais laissons là ie te prie ces mots de gueule, & adioustons pour consolation du Cardinal, que tous les plus honnestes gens du monde, n'ont pas esté mieux traittez que luy, lors qu'on a soubmis leurs actions au syndicat d'vn Iuge si extrauagant & si passioné comme est la populace; ou que les affaires publiques ont cheminé d'vn biais contraire à celles des particuliers. [...]' **becomes** (p. 618) 'M. Prens les plustost pour toy mesme, *S.Ange*, car pour moy, & pour le *Cardinal* i'ay tant d'autres raisons que ie n'ay pas besoin d'en faire venir de la chambre dorée. Mais laissons là ie te prie ces mots de gueule, & adioustons pour consolation du Cardinal, que tous les plus honnestes gens du monde, n'ont pas esté mieux traittez que luy, lors qu'on a soubmis leurs actions au syndicat d'vn Iuge si extrauagant & si passioné comme est la populace; ou que les affaires publiques ont cheminé d'vn biais contraire à celles des particuliers. [...]'

p. 428 add.: '[...] ne fut-il pas en suite baffoüé & vilipendé par les Atheniens, lesquels traicterent encore plus mal *Demetrius Phalereus* aprés luy auoir dressé trois cens soixante statuës, puis qu'ils les rompirent toutes pour se venger de ie ne sçay quel pretendu déplaisir, qu'ils disoient auoir receu de ce grand Orateur & Capitaine. Mais pour venir à des exemples de plus fraische datte, *Paul IV*. si l'on considere bien ses actions, [...]' **becomes** (p. 619) '[...] ne fut-il pas en suite baffoüé & vilipendé par les Atheniens, lesquels traicterent encore plus mal *Demetrius Phalereus*, que Suidas dit auoir esté ainsi appellé *à Phalero Atticæ portu*, & que Victor, Rittershusius, & beaucoup d'autres, prennent mal à propos *pro Rhetore quodam Alexandrino eiusdem nominis apud Laërtium*; puis qu'aprés luy auoir dressé trois cens statuës, ils les rompirent toutes pour se vanger de ie ne sçay quel pretendu déplaisir, qu'ils disoient auoir receu; & le contraignirent de se refugier en Egypte, où il deuint en peu de temps l'vn des plus riches hommes du pays, & des plus confidents Ministres du Roy *Ptolomée*, auquel mesme il persuada de faire traduire la

Bible par les Septante, comme nous l'auons maintenant. Mais pour venir à des exemples de plus fraische datte, *Paul IV*. si l'on considere bien ses actions, [...]'

p. 437 add.: '[...] pourquoy voudroit-il estre exempt de ce que tous les plus grands hommes, tous les meilleurs Ministres n'ont pû éuiter? y a-t'il iamais eu de meilleures testes en France, ny de meilleurs Conseillers que les *Barbons* de Henry IV. & neantmoins qu'est-ce que les factieux & mécontens n'en disoient point? Et si le Cardinal de Richelieu se fut trouué dans vne Regence, trauaillée de guerres estrangeres, & de factions domestiques comme celle d'apresent, que n'auroit-on point dit de luy, mais que n'auroit-on point fait contre luy, s'il n'eust eu le pouuoir de se faire craindre, & d'obseruer ce conseil de Saluste, *in hac colluuie morum, habendus metus, aut faciendus*, aussi bien que cet autre de Ciceron, *salutaris seueritas vincit inanem speciem clementiæ*? Mais puis qu'il est impossible au Cardinal Mazarin *sub Jove nondum barbato*, de penser à de si grandes affaires, & qu'encore bien qu'il en eust le pouuoir, il est trop bon & trop facile pour en auoir la volonté; [...]' **becomes** (pp. 628-629) '[...] pourquoy voudroit-il estre exempt de ce que tous les plus grands hommes, tous les meilleurs Ministres n'ont pû éuiter? y a-t'il iamais eu de meilleures testes en France, ny de meilleurs Conseillers que les *Barbons* de Henry IV. & neantmoins qu'est-ce que les factieux & mécontens n'en disoient point. *Charles de Lorraine* surnommé le grand Cardinal, ne fut-il pas contraint d'essuyer les beaux contes de sa *Legende*, & d'vne infinité d'autres Libelles diffamatoires, au suiet desquels il dit publiquement en l'Assemblée de Fontainebleau, *qu'il en auoit sur sa table vingt deux faits contre luy, qu'il gardoit tres-soigneusement, comme le plus grand honneur qu'il sçauroit iamais receuoir, que d'estre blasmé par tel meschans, esperant que ce seroit le vray eloge de sa vie pour le rendre immortel*: car ce sont les propres termes dont *la Popeliniere* asseure qu'il se seruit pour decrediter toutes ces inuectiues. Et si le Cardinal *de Richelieu* se fut trouué dans vne Regence, trauaillée de guerres estrangeres, & de factions domestiques comme celle d'apresent, que n'auroit-on point dit de luy, mais que n'auroit-on point fait contre luy, s'il n'eut eu le pouuoir sous l'authorité d'vn Roy si grand & si victorieux qu'estoit *Louys Treziesme*, de se faire craindre, & d'obseruer ce conseil de Saluste, *in hac colluuie morum, habendus metus, aut faciendus*, aussi bien que cet autre de Ciceron, *salutaris seueritas vincit inanem speciem clementiæ*? Mais neantmoins quoy que le Cardinal *Mazarin* ne puisse pas faire de mesme *sub Jove nondum barbato*, & que bien qu'il eust le pouuoir, il est trop bon & trop facile pour en auoir la volonté; [...]'

p. 438 add.: '[...] que *Iulian* est celebré pour vn Prince tres-vertueux par Ammian Marcellin, & par Montagne, & pour tres-vitieux par beaucoup d'autres: que Dion condamne l'action de *Brutus* & de *Cassius*, au lieu que Plutarque en dit tout le bien possible: & finalement qu'Alexandre VI. aiant vescu de la sorte [...]' **becomes** (p. 630) '[...] que *Iulian* est celebré pour vn Prince tres-vertueux par Ammian Marcellin, & par Montagne, & pour tres-vitieux par beaucoup d'autres: que Dion condamne l'action de *Brutus* & de *Cassius*, au lieu que Plutarque en dit tout le bien possible: que la Reyne *Brunehault* nonobstant les loüanges que luy donne S. Gregoire, ne laisse pas d'estre l'oppobre & la honte de nostre Histoire: que *Boucicault* vanté par la mesme comme l'honneur de la France, est descrit pour vn bestial & stupide, par Cortesius: & finalement qu*'Alexandre VI*. aiant vescu de la sorte [...]'

p. 439 alt.: '[...] il y en a aussi d'autres, qui se plaisent naturellement à la Satyre, qui ne trouuent rien de bon, qui ne peuuent loüer personne, & desquels on peut raisonnablement dire / *Et si non aliqua nocuisses, mortuus esses*. (Virgilius Ecloga 3.) / C'est pourquoy il faut cheminer entre ces deux extremitez la bride en main, & suppleer par vne iuste moderation, par vn iugement rassis, [...]' **becomes** (p. 631) '[...] il y en a aussi d'autres, qui se plaisent naturellement à la Satyre, qui ne trouuent rien de bon, qui ne peuuent loüer personne, & desquels on peut raisonnablement dire / *Semper hyems, semper spirantes frigora Cauri*. (Virgilius 3. Georg.) / C'est pourquoy il faut cheminer entre ces deux extremitez la bride en main, & suppleer par vne iuste moderation, par vn iugement rassis, [...]'

p. 447 add: 'S. Or bien, Mascurat, / *Iuro ego per sanctum pura tibi mente Quaternum*, / que d'oresnauant ie feray bien mon profit de tous ces bonnes preceptes; mais crainte que la Declaration ne soit acheuée auparauant nostre discours, reuenons ie te prie à la troisiesme raison que le Cardinal Mazarin a de ne se vouloir point ressentir de nos libelles.' **becomes** (pp. 629-641) 'S. Or bien, *Mascurat*, / *Iuro ego per sanctum pura tibi mente Quaternum*, / que d'oresnauant ie feray bien

mon profit de tous ces bonnes preceptes; mais prens garde, voila vn Billet proche de ton assiette, qui est infailliblement tombé de ta vaquette, quand tu l'ouure pour me reciter quelque passage. / M. I'auray bien tost veu ce que c'est: *Nota Mancinum quendam perstringi à Martiale, Epigrammate 44. lib. 1. quod incipit, / Bis tibi triceni fuimus* MANCINE *vocati*, / *Et positum est nobis nil here præter aprum, &c.* / *& Epigrammate 61. lib. 4. quod incipit, / Donasse amicum tibi ducenta* MANCINE, / *Nuper superbo lætus ore iactiasti, &c.* / *ac denique eiusdem lib. Epigr. 37. ad Afrum.* / *Centum Coracinus, & ducenta* MANCINVS / *Trecenta debet Titius,* &c. / Vrayment tu m'as infiniment obligé de me faire prendre garde à ce petit Bulletin que i'ay quasi perdu, comme ie l'auois desia oublié en parlant de la famille des *Mancini*, à laquelle neantmoins il est absolument necessaire, pour conioindre sinon parfaitement, au moins en quelque façon, les anciens *Mancini* auec nos modernes. Car tu peux bien te souuenir, qu'en parlant ce matin des vns & des autres, i'auois laissé vn *Hiatus*, depuis la 135. année auparauant la Natiuité de nostre Seigneur, où finissent les preuues que i'ay apportées des *Mancini* Consulaires, iusques enuiron l'an 800. aprés ladite Natiuité, que commencent les tesmoignages des *Mancini* modernes, sans rien auoir que ie pusse mettre entre deux. Or ie puis maintenant remedier à cet inconuenient, par le moyen de ce *Mancini*, qui viuoit à Rome du temps de *Martial*, c'est à dire, sous les Empereurs *Nerua, & Traian*, comme font foy plusieurs Epigrammes du liure 12. qu'il leur addresse: & ainsi puis que suiuant le commun axiome des Chronologistes, *Annus primus Traiani fuit centesimus Christi*, nous pouuons tirer plus bas les *Mancini* Consulaires, & les approcher de deux cens trente années de nos *Mancini* modernes, desquels i'ay desia produit quelques dates de l'an 1177. en attendant celles que i'ay promises de trois cens ans auparauant, afin de remonter, s'il est possible, iusques à ce *Mancini* de Martial, ou à quelqu'vn de ses descendans, que les histoires & le temps, & peut-estre l'exacte diligence qu'on en fera, nous pourront descouurir. Tant y a que tu peux bien auoir reconneu, comme ie procede franchement en mes affaires, puis que ce Billet m'estant eschappé de la memoire, ne plus ne moins qu'il s'estoit aussi esgaré dans mon repertoire, i'ay confessé ingenuëment de n'auoir point dequoy remplir vn si grand espace, vn *Hiatus* si profond comme est celuy qui se trouue entre ces deux familles; & que ie me suis contenté de dire, que ces anciens *Mancini* n'estoient pas manquez tout d'vn coup, ny que ces modernes n'estoient pas venus au monde en vn instant, c'est à dire sans auoir eu des ancestres, comme en effet ce *Mancini* de Martial, peut aussi bien seruir de queuë à ceux-là, comme de teste à ceux-cy. / S. Tu es le plus heureux homme du monde en fait de Genealogie, car sans auoir receu aucuns memoires de celle des *Mancini*, tu l'a renduë *tuo proprio Marte*, vne des plus illustres du monde. Mais crainte que la Declaration ne soit acheuée auparauant nostre discours, reuenons ie te prie à la troisiesme raison que le Cardinal Mazarin a de ne se vouloir point ressentir de nos Libelles.'

p. 450 add.: '[...] Et cela estant, nous pouuons conclure qu'il a bien fait de pratiquer le conseil que donnoit Æschines à son amy Ctesiphon touchant les médisances d'vn certain Leptines, *quod si ille nos aliquo sigat maledicto, conare tacere si possis ac ridere*. / S. I'ay bien compris en gros ce que tu as dit de cette impunité, [...]' **becomes** (p. 644) '[...] Et cela estant, nous pouuons conclure qu'il a bien fait de pratiquer le conseil que donnoit Æschines à son amy Ctesiphon touchant les médisances d'vn certain Leptines, *quod si ille nos aliquo sigat maledicto, conare tacere si possis ac ridere*. Et encore mieux d'euiter l'inconuenient, duquel ceux qui suppriment de semblables Pasquinades sont menacez par *Sainct-Amant* sur la fin de sa Rome ridicule, / *En marbre en airain on les graue, / Quand on les efface en papier; / Et iusqu'au Merle d'vn Frippier / Il les sifle alors & s'en braue, / Qu'on me defende on me lira, / Par cœur vn chacun me sçaura, / Si le conclaue me censure; / Le ieusne est vn iour de banquet, / La chasteté fait la luxure, / Et le silence le caquet*. / S. I'ay bien compris en gros ce que tu as dit de cette impunité, [...]'

p. 452 add.: '[...] Car en a-t'on veu vn seul parmy ce grand nombre de sept ou huict cens, qui ressemblast au *Catholique Anglois*, au *Banquette du Comte d'Arete, & des sept Sages*, au *Catholicon d'Espagne*, à l'*Anticoton*, à l'*Horoscopus Anticotonis*, à la *Francogallia*, au *Fulmen Brutum*, aux *Vindicæ contra tyrannos*, au *Dialogue du Manant & du Maheustre*, c'est à dire qui fust ingenieux ou solide? [...]' **becomes** (pp. 646-647) '[...] Car en a-t'on veu vn seul parmy ce grand nombre de sept ou huict cens, qui ressemblast au *Catholique Anglois*, au *Banquette du Comte d'Arete, & des sept Sages*, au *Catholicon d'Espagne*, à l'*Anticoton*, à l'*Horoscopus Anticotonis*, à la *Francogallia*, à la *Seruitude volontaire*, au *Fulmen Brutum*, aux *Vindicæ contra tyrannos*, au *Dialogue du Manant & du Maheustre*, c'est à dire qui fust ingenieux ou solide? [...]'

p. 457 add.: '[...] car tous les enuieux de Balsac l'ont attaqué auec vne telle quantité de censures & d'inuectiues, qu'il a esté mesme contraint de mettre ces deux vers soubs son portrait, / *Nam quid feci ego, quidve sum locutus*, / *Cur me tot male perderent libellis*? / Mais au moins le faisoient-ils auec vn peu de iugement & de conduite: [...]' **becomes** (pp. 651-652) '[...] car tous les enuieux de Balsac l'ont attaqué auec vne telle quantité de censures & d'inuectiues, qu'il a mesme esté contraint de parodier ces deux vers de Catulle, *ex Epigramm. ad Licin. Caluum*, pour les mettre sous son portrait, / *Nam quid feci ego, quidve sum locutus*, / *Cur me tot male perderent libellis*? (Epigr. 14) / Mais au moins le faisoient-ils auec vn peu de iugement & de conduite: [...]'

p. 458 alt.: '[...] C'est aussi pourquoy il ne se faut pas estonner si ces pieces multiplioient de la sorte, & si chaque semaine en fournissoit des trentaines; si le Pont-neuf en estoit couuert, & si le vent pourroit facilement emporter les plus grosses & les plus longues, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 652-653) '[...] C'est aussi pourquoy il ne se faut pas estonner si ces pieces multiplioient de la sorte, & si chaque semaine en fournissoit des centaines; si le Pont-neuf en estoit couuert, & si le vent pourroit facilement emporter les plus grosses & les plus longues, [...]'

p. 461 add.: '[...] & ce d'autant plus que pour ne point perdre le respect au *Roy* ny à la *Reyne*, ils se sont contentez de choquer, & charger simplement leur *Ministre* de tous les malheurs de cette guerre, ce qui s'appelle *vnum pro cunctis dabitur caput*. Pour ceux qui ont esté faits pendant les deux Conferences, [...]' **becomes** (p. 656) '[...] & ce d'autant plus que pour ne point perdre le respect au *Roy* ny à la *Reyne*, ils se sont contentez de choquer, & charger simplement leur *Ministre* de tous les malheurs de cette guerre, ce qui s'appelle *vnum pro cunctis dabitur caput*: & c'est aussi en ce sens là que l'Empereur *Tibere* disoit, que *Seianus* luy estoit plus vtile en sa domination, que son Bouclier ne luy auoit esté dans les combats: Car disoit-il, si ie fais bien c'est de moy que l'on le tient, si ie fais mal c'est Seianus que l'on accuse. Pour ceux qui ont esté faits pendant les deux Conferences, [...]'

p. 462 alt.: '[...] Ie ne croy pas toutefois qu'ils le soient *in Foro Poli* & deuant Dieu, à cause des mauuaises intentions qu'ils ont eu de prolonger la guerre, de broüiller la France, de seruir aux factieux, & de tant de ruses, tromperies, & impostures, desquelles ils se sont seruis à ce dessein, [...]' **becomes** (p. 657) '[...] Ie ne croy pas toutefois qu'ils le soient *in Foro Poli* & deuant Dieu, à cause des mauuaises intentions qu'ils ont eu de prolonger la guerre, de broüiller la France, de fauoriser les factieux, & de tant de ruses, tromperies, & impostures, desquelles ils se sont seruis à ce dessein, [...]'

p. 471 add.: '[...] mais / *Turba superba* DVCVM *morbum perpessa caducum* / a esté la seule cause de tous ces desordres, & de grace Sainct-Ange, ne m'oblige pas à en dire dauantage, car à moins de prattiquer icy le / *Quos ego, sed motos præstat componere fluctus* / de Virgile, i'aurois de quoy t'entretenir iusques à demain au matin sur la mauuaise conduite de cette guerre tant actiue que passiue.' **becomes** (p. 666) '[...] mais / *Turba superba* DVCVM *morbum perpessa caducum* / a esté la seule cause de tous ces desordres; non, non il n'y en a point eu d'autre, *Turba Medicorum Imperatorem, multi Duces Cariam perdiderunt*: & de grace, *Sainct-Ange*, ne m'oblige pas à en dire dauantage, car à moins de prattiquer icy le / *Quos ego, sed motos præstat componere fluctus* / de Virgile, i'aurois de quoy t'entretenir iusques à demain au matin sur la mauuaise conduite de cette guerre tant actiue que passiue.'

p. 471 alt.: '[...] & ie croy que le *R.P. Marin Mersenne* nasquit aux premieres de 1572. & mourut pendant celles de l'année passée.' **becomes** (p. 666) '[...] & ie croy que le *R.P. Marin Mersenne* nasquit aux premieres de 1588. & mourut deux ou trois iours aprés celles de l'année passée.'

p. 472 add.: '[...] mais quoy que toute cette Academie, & vn certain *Claude Menestrier* de Besançon que l'on disoit auoir esté grand Naturaliste, comme aussi le *Medecin* du Cardinal de Lyon, eussent iugé que ce bois estoit fossil, [...]' **becomes** (p. 668) '[...] mais quoy que toute cette Academie, & vn certain *Claude Menestrier* de Besançon que l'on disoit auoir esté grand Naturaliste, ou plustost grand Fabuliste, puis que tout luy estoit bon, comme aussi le *Medecin* du Cardinal de Lyon, eussent iugé que ce bois estoit fossil, [...]'

p.473-474 add.: '[...] ie recogneus dis-ie que tout ce bois venoit de quelque forest écrasée soubs la cheute & le renuersement des terres plus hautes & plus voisines dans les furieuses secousses &

agitations d'vn tremble-terre, comme a esté de nos iours celuy de la ville de *Pleurs* aux Grisons, & que par laps de temps il y auoit acquis vne dureté, accompagné d'vne noirceur & de certaines veines qui se font aussi remarquer au bois de chesne; lors qu'il a esté des centaines d'années enseuely soubs les eaux ou dans terre, comme l'on peut veoir és pilotis de *Venise* & d'*Amsterdam*. / S. Tout beau Mascurat, tu es si plein de notions & de conceptions differentes, que tu ne cherches qu'à t'en descharger, tu ressembles ces cuues où la vendange regorge de tous costez, *spumat plenis vindemia labris*; mais auec tout cela il n'est pas encore temps de quitter *Sainct Germain*, pour nous promener à Venise ou à Amsterdam; il me semble que Monsieur Petit commence à distribuer la Declaration, & pour acheuer le temps qui nous reste, iusques à ce que la presse de ceux qui demandent soit escoulée, dis moy ie te prie quel iugement peut-on faire de tous ces libelles qui l'ont precedée, & qui sont ceux de la vente desquels on se peut mieux asseurer la pietrerie est la ruïne de nostre mestier. / M. Ie pense de t'en auoir desia dit quelque chose ce matin, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 668-672) '[...] ie reconnus dis-ie, que tout ce bois venoit de quelque forest écrasée soubs la chantiers & magasins qui estoient en icelle, sous la cheute & le renuersement des terres plus hautes & plus voisines, dans les furieuses secousses & agitations d'vn tremble-terre, comme fut l'an 1618. celuy qui escrasa sous le renuersement d'vne montagne la ville de *Pioury* aux Grisons, & que par laps de temps il y auoit acquis vne dureté, accompagné d'vne noirceur & de certaines veines qui se font aussi remarquer au bois de chesne; lors qu'il a esté des centaines d'années enseuely soubs les eaux, ou dans terre, comme l'on peut veoir és pilotis de *Venise* & d'*Amsterdam*. Mais neantmoins cette inclination qu'ont les hommes à croire facilement les choses *Physiques* & *naturelles*, est bien moins dangereuse, que lors qu'elle est appliquée aux *Morales* & *Politiques;* & c'est aussi de celle-là que la pluspart des Tragedies les plus sanglantes, des histoires les plus funestes prennent leur argument. Muret chapitre douziesme du premier liure de ses diuerses leçons en rapporte huict, & Canterus cinq (Lib. 6 c. 2 nouæ lect.), lesquelles encore que bien differentes les vnes des autres, ont toutefois commence par des faux rapports, & finy par des catastrophes extrauagantes. Pour moy ie n'en produiray maintenant que deux, sçauoir celle de *Joseph*, que la femme de son Maistre Putiphar accusa d'vn crime dont la Saincte Escriture nous tesmoigne qu'il estoit innocent, & elle seule coupable: & vne autre, d'vn *Pere* qui tua son fils, & puis s'esgorgea soy-mesme, pour auoir adiousté trop de foy aux relations d'vn seruiteur malicieux ou ignorant, laquelle Phædrus nous a rapportée dans ses Fables, non pour estre telle, mais comme histoire veritable arriuée de son temps, & sur laquelle il presse de telle sorte, qu'il falloit bien que ce vice *de croire trop facilement* fut bien en vogue de ce temps-là, puis qu'il a tant peiné sur le remede: car voila de quelle façon il la propose, / *Periculum est credere, & non credere* / *Vtriusque exemplum breuiter exponam rei.* / *Hippolytus obiit, quia nouercæ creditum est.* / *Cassandræ quia non creditum, ruit Ilium.* / *Ergo exploranda est veritas multo prius,* / *Quam stulta plane iudicet sententia.* / Il raconte en suite l'Histoire tragique dont ie t'ay desia parlé, sans rien oublier de ses circonstances, & puis il conclud: / *Quod si damnanda perscrutatus crimina* / *Paterfamilias esset, si mendacium* / *Subtiliter limasset a radicibus,* / *Non euertisset funere scelesto domum.* / Or *Sainct-Ange*, si ce vice là a lieu chez les particuliers, tu peux croire qu'il regne, & qu'il domine absolument en Cour, témoin ce qu'en a dit le Chancelier de *Chiuerny*, qui l'auoit assez hantée & pratiquée pour sçauoir asseurément de quelle façon on s'y gouuerne. *I'ay recognu,* dit-il, *que les Dames & fauorits peuuent tout ce qui leur plaist, & que les moindres Officiers de la Cour, qui peuuent entrer dans leurs chambres & cabinets, doiuent estre craints & considerez, pour les bonnes & mauuaises impressions, qu'ils peuuent donner des plus grands du Royaume.* Et si telle iniustice s'exerce en Cour contre les grands, que penses-tu qu'il se fasse contre les petits: certes il me semble d'auoir obserué par toutes les bonnes maisons où ie pratique assez familierement à cause de la Gazette, que la pluspart du temps, les bons seruiteurs qui vont serieusement en besogne, qui ne sçauent ce que c'est de flatter, de trahir, de tromper leur maistre, qui parlent librement & veritablement de toutes choses, qui ne secondent pas ses mauuaises humeurs, si d'aduenture il en a quelqu'vne; il me semble dis ie, que ces personnes là sont d'ordinaire, ie ne diray pas seulement mal recognuës, mais negligées & bien souuent mal-traitées & persecutées contre droit & raison, & auec la plus grande iniustice du monde: non tant à mon aduis par la malice de ceux qui les blasment, qui les calomnient, qui en disent mille menteries, que par la foiblesse des Maistres qui ne voyent rien bien souuent que par les yeux d'autruy, qui ressemblent à ces Philosophes *Potamoniques*, la principale maxime desquels estoit de ne rien iuger bon ou mauuais, que ce qui estoit estimé tel par d'autres, & qui pensent en estre quittes à la fin, pour dire auec Ciceron (Ad Quint. fratr. lib. 1. epist. 1), *Nullum est meum peccatum nisi quod iis credidi, a quibus nefas putaram esse me decipi:* au lieu qu'ils deuroient plustost obseruer

le conseil que leur donne ce digne affranchy d'Auguste, Phædrus, / *Nil spernat auris, nec tamen credat statim,* / *Quandoquidem & illi peccant quos minime putes:* / *Et qui non peccant impugnantur fraudibus.* / S. Ie ne sçay si tu plaides ta cause, ou celle des autres, mais au moins suis-ie bien certain que tu as laissé dormir pendant tout cela celle du *Cardinal*, laquelle neantmoins le temps nous presse d'acheuer. / M. Tu trompe, mon enfant, si tu n'auois point la veuë aussi courte que le nez, tu verrois bien que le *Cardinal* a esté donné de Dieu au Roy, à la Reyne, à Monsieur le Duc d'Orleans, à Monsieur le Prince, à tous les Grands de France, à tous les principaux Officiers de cette Couronne, pour remedier aux inconueniens remarquez cy-dessus par Monsieur de *Chiuerny*, car s'il n'y estoit point pour leur parler solidement, veritablement, affectueusement, auec vn esprit iuste, equitable, desinteressé, parfaitement zelé, & bien intentionné pour la gloire de ce Royaume, qui penses-tu qui le voulust ou qui le pust faire aussi adroitement & agreablement que luy? Pendant qu'il y sera, *Sainct-Ange*, ie sçay bien que les factieux diront qu'il s'en trouuera des centaines; mais s'il n'y estoit plus, ils seroient bien empeschez d'en produire vn seul; qui n'eust soudain des exceptions, voire mesme des oppositions manifestes d'vn costé ou d'autre: & ainsi nous pouuons dire auec vn certain Demetrius cité par Laërce (in eius vita lib. 5) / *Oderunt viuum, quem mox post funera quærent.* / ou auec Horace (Libr. 4 Ode 24), / *Virtutem incolumem odimus,* / *Sublatam ex oculis quarimus inuidi.* / ou auec Ciceron (Pro Archia.), *est ridiculum ad ea quæ habemus nihil dicere, quærere quæ habere non possumus*, ou [sentence stops abruptly, remains unfinished] / S. Tout beau, *Mascurat*, tu es si plein de notions & de conceptions differentes, que tu ne cherches qu'à t'en descharger, tu ressembles ces cuues où la vendange regorge de tous costez, *spumat plenis vindemia labris*: Mais auec tout cela si tu pensois m'enfiler vne cinquantaine de ces authoritez-là tout de suite, tu te tromperois fort. Pour moy i'en sçay vne qui est à mon aduis plus à propos pour le *Cardinal* que toutes celles que tu viens de dire, quoy qu'elle ne vienne pas de si bon lieu; mais il faut, si tu la veux sçauoir, que tu m'entretiennes iusques à ce que nous allions prendre la *Declaration*, du iugement que l'on peut faire de tous ces libelles qui l'ont precedée, & que tu me marques ceux de la vente desquels on se peut mieux asseurer, car la pietrerie est la ruine de nostre mestier. / M. Si i'ay esté si complaisant lors que tu estois contraire au *Cardinal*, que ne seray-ie point quand tu diras quelque bon mot en sa faueur. / S. Tout ce que tu as dit & harangué cy-dessus aboutit là, que les François ne s'apperceuront iamais des seruices que leur rend le *Cardinal*, iusques à ce qu'ils l'ayent obligé par tant de calomnies & de médisances, à se retirer des affaires; comme le bœuf ne cognoist iamais combien sa queuë luy estoit necessaire, iusques à ce qu'il l'ait perduë, / *Quid valeat cauda, noscit bos cum caret ipsa.* / M. Belle comparaison de la France à vn bœuf, & du *Cardinal* à sa queuë. / S. Si elle n'est belle, au moins est-elle bonne, & plus à propos que toutes les tiennes: mais ne commence point à fuir l'eschole, venons ie te prie au iugement des libelles, & à ceux qui sont de meilleure vente. / M. Ie pense de t'en auoir desia dit quelque chose ce matin, [...]'

p. 478 alt. + add.: '[...] D'*ignorance*? il y a vingt-deux ans qu'il est dans les affaires, & depuis sept ou huict tout le bon-heur de nos armées ne se peut attribuer qu'aux soins qu'il en a pris: D'*ingratitude*? [...]' **becomes** (p. 678) '[...] d'*Ignorance*? il y a vingt six ans qu'il est dans les affaires, & depuis sept ou huict il a eu grand part au bon-heur de toutes celles de France, à cause du grand soin qu'il en a pris: / *Ipse gubernaclo rector subit ipse Magister*, / *Hortaturque viros, clauumque ad littora torquet*. / d'*Ingratitude*? [...]'

p. 478 add.: '[...] il n'y a pourtant que luy, & trois ou quatre Secretaires, qui expedient toutes les affaires tant de paix que de guerre, tant du dedans que du dehors du Royaume.' **becomes** (p. 678) '[...] il n'y a pourtant que luy, & trois ou quatre Secretaires auec dix ou douze personnes sous eux, qui expedient toutes les affaires de paix & de guerre, tant du dedans que du dehors du Royaume.'

p. 478 add.: '[...] les aduantages que nous auons eus sur l'Espagnol, & sur l'Empereur tesmoignent le contraire. *De n'auoir point fait la Paix*? [...]' **becomes** (p. 678) '[...] les aduantages que nous auons eus sur l'Espagnol, & sur l'Empereur tesmoignent le contraire, & les negociations auantageuses que l'on fait par tout, font bien voir, à quel point l'authorité du Roy a esté releuée: *de n'auoir point fait la Paix*? [...]'

p.478-479 om.: '[...] & sans les factions de l'Estat il nous l'auroit demandée: & dauantage ce ne fut point luy, mais le Conseil assemblé à cét effect, qui forma la deliberation de continuer la guerre. *D'auoir*

fauorisé les Maltotiers, Partisans, Financiers? [...]' **becomes** (pp. 678-679) '[...] & sans les factions de l'Estat il nous l'auroit demandée: *d'auoir fauorisé les Maltotiers, Partisans, Financiers*? [...]'

p. 479 alt.: '[...] *D'auoir enleué le Roy hors de Paris*? la Reyne & les deux premiers Princes du sang le déchargent du blasme de cette action, si dauanture il y en a. [...]' **becomes** (p. 679) '[...] *d'auoir enleué le Roy hors de Paris*? la Reyne & son Altesse Royale, & Monsieur le Prince de Condé le déchargent du blasme de cette action, si dauanture il y en a: [...]'

p. 479 alt.: '[...] De quoy doncques le pourroit-on plus iustement accuser, de n'auoir pas gouuerné *in virga ferrea*, comme faisoit son predecesseur; [...]' **becomes** (p. 679) '[...] De quoy doncques le pourroit-on plus iustement accuser, de n'auoir pas gouuerné *in camo & fræno*, comme faisoit son predecesseur; [...]'

p. 481 add.: '[...] Enfin il nous seroit plus honneste de demander à Dieu qu'il enuoyast vn Ange pour gouuerner cette Monarchie, que de souhaitter ou de le prier, comme ils semble que ce soit nostre intention, qu'il donne toutes les qualitez & toutes les perfections d'vn Ange à ceux qui la gouuernent. / S. Tu ne sçaurois mieux parler si tu ne recommences, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 681-689) '[...] Enfin il nous seroit plus honneste de demander à Dieu qu'il enuoyast vn Ange pour gouuerner cette Monarchie, que de souhaitter ou de le prier, comme ils semble que ce soit nostre intention, qu'il donne toutes les qualitez & toutes les perfections d'vn Ange à ceux qui la gouuernent: Car ce miracle seul pourroit deliurer le *Cardinal* du blasme, & des calomnies qu'ont souffert tous ceux qui auparauant luy, & en mesme posture que luy ont gouuerné ce Royaume: & à propos de cette commune destinée des Ministres, il me souuient d'auoir autrefois extrait d'vn discours inseré au 3e Tome du Mercure François certaines remarques, qui semblent n'auoir esté mises là, que pour seruir maintenant de iustification à son Eminence. *Chacun*, dit ce autheur (p. 397), *a contribué du sien à trouuer cette faute de fonds, dont on se plaint, & de toutes les contributions estrangeres, on n'accuse pourtant que les Ministres ou Fauoris. La France n'a pas vn Grand qui ayant eu le pouuoir de se faire craindre, n'ait eu celuy de se faire donner: pas vn Officier de marque, qui n'ait fait acheter ses diligences: pas vne Communauté qui n'ait fait diminuer ses taxes, ou augmenter ses priuileges: & cependant les Fauoris sont accusez tous seuls de ce que tous les autres font ensemble. Ainsi par vne accusation commune* Tanneguy du Chastel *& le President* Louuet *de Prouence, estoient la pierre de scandale, du regne de Charles VII. Ainsi* Adam Fumée, *qui de Medecin fut fait Chancelier par Louys XI. &* Antoine de Chasteau-neuf, *grand Seneschal de Guienne, rendoient ce Roy cruel, pour s'enrichir de confiscations. Ainsi* Estienne de Vers *Seneschal de Beaucaire, &* Guillaume Briçonet *Cardinal, desapointoient qui bon leur sembloit auprés de Charles VIII. & l'entretenoient en desbauches, pour gouuerner sans contredit. Ainsi* Florimond Robertet, *&* Iacques de Beaune, *corrompirent le bon naturel de Louys Douziesme. Ainsi* Anne de Montmorency, & *l'Admiral* Chabot, *emportoient tous les biens, & toutes les charges que François Premier pouuoit donner. Ainsi le Mareschal* de Strosse *causoit les despences que Henry II. faisoit en Italie. Ainsi le Mareschal* de Rets *espuisoit les coffres de Charles IX. Ainsi les Ducs* de Ioyuese, *&* d'Espernon *inuentoient les nouuelles creations d'offices, & constitutions de rentes sous Henry III. Ainsi le Duc de* Sully *prenoit sur tout le monde pour remplir ses coffres, aussi bien que ceux du feu Roy Henry le Grand. Et bref c'est ainsi que l'on dit, que les Fauoris du temps tournent à leur profit toutes les facultez de l'Estat: c'est la commune accusation contre ceux qui possedent l'oreille des Princes.* Mais ce qui est le plus fascheux pour le *Cardinal*, c'est que tous ces Ministres qui l'ont precedé n'ayant esté blasmez qu'à cause de certaines actions, luy au contraire ne peut rien faire qui ne soit censuré de tout le monde: il est ignorant, il vole le Roy, il iouë, il ne veut pas la paix, il n'expedie personne, il est inuisible, & pourquoy ne pas dire tout d'vn coup, / *Solus habet scelerum quidquid possedimus omnes.* / Certes l'on disoit en Flandre la mesme chose du Cardinal *Granuelle,* & la brigue de ses ennemis fut assez puissante pour obliger le Roy d'Espagne à le retirer d'vn lieu où il esoit absolument necessaire. Mais qu'en arriua-t'il? rien autre chose sinon que les factieux n'estant plus retenus par l'authorité d'vn si grand homme, commencerent d'acheminer les affaires des *Pays-bas* au point qu'elles sont à present. Et l'*Angleterre* n'a-t'elle pas depuis trois mois finy sur la sacrée personne de son Roy, cette horrible Tragedie qu'elle auoit commencée quelque temps auparauant par la mort de son plus intime Conseiller & Ministre. Ie dis horrible, pour n'auoir point de termes plus significatifs pour exprimer l'execution faite par les main d'vn Bourreau, & par iugement de ie ne sçay quelle populace armée, du meilleur Roy, & du plus affectionné enuers ses suiets qui ait iamais esté. Certes, comme disoit Ciceron, *ita est inusitatum Regem capitis reum esse, vt ante hoc tempus non sit*

auditum. (Pro Sextio) / S. N'est-ce pas chose estrange que Nostradamus ait predit la mort de ce pauure Prince, par ce vers que i'ay leu asseurément dans quelques vnes de ses Centuries, / *Senat de Londre à mort son Roy mettra*. / M. Il est encore plus estonnant qu'il ait marqué celle du *Prince Prefect*, ou si tu veux, de l'aisné de *Barberins*, qui mourut icy l'année passée, par cet autre, / *À Ponterosse Chef Barberin mourra.* / S. Ces deux experiences là, quand il n'y en auroit iamais eu d'autres, peuuent establir la verité de l'Astrologie iudiciaire, contre tous ceux qui la mesprisent comme vaine & ridicule. / M. Nous voila bien appointez contraires, puis que ie tiens pour certain que telles & semblables experiences sont capables de la destruire entierement: car la connoissance de ces deux effets si bien circonstantiez ne pouuant venir des Astres, il faut par consequent qu'elle vienne de quelque autre cause, & de celle-là principalement à laquelle Naudé en son *Judicium de Cardano* (Ante vitam Cardani Parisius editam), prouue fort bien que l'on doit rapporter toutes les sortes diuinations. Ce qu'estant vne fois estably, Messieurs les Astres auront tout loisir de se promener, puis que l'intendance qu'ils auoient sur nos actions ne leur donnera plus tant de peine comme elle a fait iusques à present. Mais ie croy neantmoins que auparauant de terminer ce procés il sera bon que le Philosophe *Auerroës* soit aussi receu à produire comme partie interuenante, & ayant droit sur le principal: ce qui n'est pas vne affaire à conclure dans la presse où nous sommes maintenant, pour en acheuer d'autres plus importantes à cet Estat, que ne sont celles de Messieurs les Astromantes & Genethliaques. / S. Ie ne sçay si tu veux parler de celles d'Angleterre ou de France. / M. Ie t'entretiendray volontiers, si le temps me le permet, de tous les deux ensemble: car l'*Angleterre* nous est si voisine, que la contagion de ce pays-là ne peut estre que preiudiciable à cettuy-cy, / *Tunc tua res agitur, paries cum proximus ardet.* / & non seulement la France, mais toutes les Monarchies du monde, deuroient coucher de leur reste & faire vn dernier effort, pour étouffer promptement vne nouueauté qui leur est si preiudiciable. Car pourquoy permettre à vne Chambre basse de supprimer la haute, à des peuples d'entreprendre contre la Noblesse, & à des suiets armez d'emprisonner leur Prince legitime & naturel, de luy faire son procés, de le condamner, de le faire mourir par les mains infames d'vn bourreau, & le tout pour des fautes si peu considerables, qu'il n'y auroit pas eu dequoy mettre à l'amende, ou bannir le moindre particulier qui en auroit commis de semblables; si toutesfois il faut donner le nom de fautes à vne legere reformation, que ce bon Prince iugeoit à propos d'introduire en son Estat. Mais ie veux que la barbarie de *Fairfax*, & l'enthousiasme ou folie intermittente de *Cronuel*, soient les deux causes principales de cét trompé, & seduit par les cabales, & par l'authorité de ces deux Chefs, ie veux que tout ce Royaume ait pleuré auec des larmes de sang, l'excés criminel qu'on luy faisoit commettre, ie veux mesme qu'il soit honteux de l'auoir souffert: Quelle excuse aura-t'il maintenant, de permettre que la rage de ces factieux enueloppe l'innocence des enfans auec celle du pere: que l'heritier legitime soit priué de sa succession: que ceux qui ont tué le Roy fassent perir l'Estat: & qu'vne Monarchie si belle, si grande, si ancienne, soit changée en Republique, ou en Anarchie; puis que la diuersité de tant de Religions, l'ambition & la ialousie de tant de nobles familles, *& spiritus ille vertiginis*, duquel Dieu les punira tost ou tard, ne peuuent manquer de les reduire à des confusions si grandes, qu'à peine se les pourroit-on imaginer. / S. Il me semble veritablement que cette exclusion du fils à la succession du pere est accompagnée d'vne si grande iniustice, *vt* / *Non ipse toto magnus Oceano pater,* / *Tantum expiarit sceleris*. (Senec. in Hippolyto.) / M. Ie te veux rapporter à ce suiet le passage d'vn celebre Iurisconsulte Espagnol *Francisco de Balboa* en son liure *de Monarchia Regum* (Quæst. 2 part 9 pag. 27), pour te monstrer que cette procedure des Anglois n'est pas moins contraire aux exemples de la Saincte Escriture, qu'à toutes les histoires ciuiles & prophanes: *Proinde & pluries contingit, quod cum populus tyrannice occidit suum Regem, postea vero idem populus constituere solet in Regem suum filium Regis mortui, eo ipso quod patri Regi futurus successor erat, vt contigit in Ioas rege Iuda, quem eius subditi occiderunt, & statim filium eius Amasiam regem constituerunt, libr.* 2. *Paralipom. cap.* 24. *& cap.* 25. *in fine. Similiter in ciuitate Hierusalem facta fuit coniuratio contra prædictum regem Aziam eius filium, libr.* 2 *Paralip. cap.* 25. *in fine, & cap.* 26. *in princip. & lib.* 4. *Regum cap.* 14. *post medium, & capite* 15. *in princip. Proinde & in ciuitate Hierusalem coniuratio fuit facta contra Ammon regem Juda, quem similiter occiderunt, eoque defuncto in regem Iuda constituerunt sibi Iosiam filiu eius, lib.* 4. *Regum cap.* 2. *in fine, &* 2. *Paralip. cap.* 33. *in fine. Hariarathes rex Cappadociæ insidiis occisus fuit per Gordium, populo instante, fratrem suum in regem constituerunt, vt legitur apud Iustinum libr.* 38. *verum & inter Tyrannos hoc idem vsitatum est, quia postquam in Sicilia fuit extinctus quidam Tyrannus rex, milites in loco eius maximum natu ex filiis eius cognomento Dionysium elegerunt, vt habetur apud dictum Justinum in principio.* Voila donc pour ce qui est des affaires d'*Angleterre*. Maintenant pour reuenir aux nostres, ie te

diray que si la Reyne eust abandonné son *Ministre*, comme le Roy d'Angleterre fit le sien, par vne faute de laquelle seule il se confessa sur l'échaffaut, tu aurois peut-estre veu quelque iour la *France* en pareil estat que sont maintenant la *Hollande* & l'*Angleterre*. Car encore que les factieux en fussent demeurez là, ce qui n'est pas croyable, ie t'ay desia monstré que le choix d'vn autre auroit esté presque impossible, tant pour la difficulté d'en trouuer vn qui fust également agreable à toutes les Puissances superieures, qu'aussi pour n'y auoir homme en France qui ait plus de routine, de connoissance de nos affaires, ou qui les puisse demesler plus facilement que le *Cardinal*: & comme tu sçais fort bien que disoit l'ancien Caton, *Non viribus, aut felicitatibus, aut celeritate corporum, res magnæ geruntur, sed consilio, & auctoritate, & sententia.* C'est pourquoy Aristote disoit sagement, que *consilium dare, eorum quæ inter homines diuinissimum:* Et Vlysse au troisiéme de la Metamorphose ne pretendoit de surmonter Aiax en la contestation des armes d'Achilles, que par les aduantages que la sagesse, la bonne conduite, & l'industrie ont coustume de remporter sur la force & le courage, / --- *Tu tantum corpore prodes* / *Nos animo, quantoque ratem qui temperat, anteit* / *Remigis officium, quanto dux milite maior,* / *Tantum ego te supero*. / Et auec tout cela cette grande *Nauire* de Paris n'a pas laissé de se mutiner contre celuy qui la gouuerne, & sous la sage conduite duquel / *Prona petit maria, & pelago decurrit aperto.* (Æneid. V.) / pour arriuer à des victoires glorieuses, & par le moyen d'icelles, a vne paix également certaine & honorable; comme il est hors de doute qu'elle y paruiendra, pourueu toutesfois qu'elle ne se precipite pas d'elle-mesme dans le plus grand mal que tous ses ennemis luy puissent desirer. Car *si Vitellio*, & pourquoy ne dirons-nous pas, afin de parodier ce passage de Tacite, *si Hispano, & satellitibus eius, eligendi facultas detur, quem vobis animum, quas mentes imprecentur, quid aliud quam seditionem & discordiam optabunt.* (I. Historiar.) / S. Tu ne sçaurois mieux parler si tu ne recommences, [...]'

p.482-483 add. '[...] & cela estant ie me persuade que si le Cardinal *Mazarin* vouloit fournir de defenses pour le sien, il y employeroit des *Sillons*, des *Rigaulds*, des *Preissacs*, des *S. Germain*, qui sont les plus fameux Apologistes de ce temps, plustost que d'aller chercher vn pauure diable d'*Imprimeur*, qu'il sçait veritablement estre assez bien intentionné pour escrire sur ce suiet, s'il en auoit la capacité, mais aussi n'ignore-t'il pas la portée de mon esprit, & que / *Serpit humi, tutus nimium timidusque procellæ*. (Horat. de arte Poët. / Et ie te puis iurer aussi foy d'homme de bien, que tant s'en faut que le Cardinal ou aucun des siens m'ait parlé d'estudier cette cause, ou que l'on m'ait informé à dessein de me la faire defendre, des moindres particularitez & circonstances dont ie me suis seruy dans le discours que nous auons eu ensemble, que ie ne croy pas mesme qu'il leur soit venu en phantaisie, que ie deusse iamais songer à le faire. / C'est pourquoy ie voudrois que quelqu'vn de ces Anges dont tu viens de parler, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 690-692) '[...] & cela estant ie me persuade que si le Cardinal *Mazarin* vouloit fournir de defenses pour le sien, il y employeroit des *Sillons*, des *Rigaulds*, des *Priesacs*, des *S. Germains*, qui sont les plus fameux Apologistes de ce temps, plustost que d'aller chercher vn pauure diable d'*Imprimeur*, qu'il sçait veritablement estre assez bien intentionné pour escrire sur ce suiet, s'il en auoit la capacité, mais aussi n'ignore-t'il pas la portée de mon esprit, & que / *Serpit humi, tutus nimium timidusque procellæ*. (Horat. de arte Poet.) / S. Il ne faut point que tu mette en auant ta qualité d'Imprimeur, pour monstrer que le *Cardinal* n'auroit garde de te choisir pour defendre sa cause; car ces quatre ou cinq Libraires, que tu m'as nommez ce matin, sont des témoins plus que suffisans, pour deliurer l'Imprimerie du blasme qu'on luy pourroit donner, & de n'estre exercée que par des ignorans. / M. Ce que tu dis est si vray, que *Henry Estienne* Imprimeur de la portée, & de la capacité qu'vn chacun sçait, a publié vn petit Poëme intitulé, *Artis Typographicæ querela, de illiteratis quibusdam Typographis, propter quos in contemptum venit:* & puis que sur la fin d'iceluy, il a mis des Epitaphes tant Grecs que Latins, sur quelques-vns des plus doctes Imprimeurs, tu pouras remarquer, qu'il nomme entre ceux-là, *Alde Manuce,* les deux *Badius*, *Conrard Neobard, Louys Tiletan, Guillaume Morel, Iean Oporin, Iean Froben, Robert Estienne*, & le plus sçauant Humaniste qui ait iamais esté en France, & peut-estre ailleurs *Adrian Turnebe,* duquel Pasquier remarque en ses recherches, qu'en beaucoup d'Vniuersitez d'Allemagne, lors que les Professeurs nomment *Turnebus* ou *Cuias*, tous leurs Auditeurs ne manquent iamais de mettre la main au chapeau, tant est grand l'honneur & le respect qu'ils portent à leurs memoires. Voila donc comme Henry Estienne tres-docte Imprimeur parle d'vn homme qui estoit beaucoup plus docte que luy, / *Musarum multis iam functus honoribus ille* / *Turnebus, sacri maxima cura Chori,* / *Ferre Typographica voluit quoque nomen ab arte,* / *Nomen ei potius sed dedit, atque decus.* / *Callipe inuidit prela hanc gestare coronam:* / *Protinus ergo artem desinat ille iubet.* / *Mox eadem toti Turnebum inuidit, & orbi* / *Sic cum vita artem desiit ille*

suam. / Or si tu adiouste à tous ces grands Personnages vn *Paul Manuce,* vn *Frederic Morel*, vn *Geofroy Tory*, vn *Estienne Dolet,* vn *Hierosme Commelin*, vn *Iean Amerbach*, vn *François Raphelinge*, vn *Michel Vascosan*, vn *Simon Millange*, tu me forceras asseurement d'aduoüer que l'art d'Imprimerie n'exclud point ceux qui l'exercent, du rang des hommes doctes & sçauans. Mais neantmoins soit que le *Cardinal* ne fust point de cette opinion là, ou qu'il conneust mon peu de merite, ou qu'il pust donner cette commission à vne infinité d'autres; ie puis iurer aussi foy d'homme de bien, que tant s'en faut que luy ou aucun des siens m'ait parlé d'estudier cette cause, ou que l'on m'ait informé à dessein de me la faire defendre, des moindres particularitez & circonstances dont ie me suis seruy dans le discours que nous auons eu ensemble, que ie ne croy pas mesme qu'il leur soit venu en phantaisie, que ie deusse iamais songer à le faire. / S. C'est pourquoy ie voudrois que quelqu'vn de ces Anges dont tu viens de parler, [...]'

p. 483 add.: 'M. Fi fi, Sainct-Ange, ne me parles point de rien faire pour de l'argent; ce n'est pas mon naturel, ma langue n'est point mercenaire, [...]' **becomes** (p. 692) 'M. Fi fi, *Sainct-Ange*, / *Rusticus es Corydon, nec munera curat Alexis*: (Virg. ecl. 2.) / ne me parles point de rien faire pour de l'argent; ce n'est pas mon naturel, ma langue n'est point mercenaire, [...]'

p. 484 alt.: '[...] Si i'auois voulu me seruir des artifices que l'on pratique en Cour, & auprés des grands Seigneurs, pour en obtenir quelques graces, pour se mettrer en consideration auprés d'eux, peut-estre que le Cardinal m'auroit plus estimé & consideré qu'il n'a pas fait; mais par la grace de Dieu ie suis guary d'*ambition*, & d'*auarice*, qui sont les deux pestes de la belle gloire, & de l'honnesteté, & quand ie deurois mourir enueloppé dans mon pauure lange comme tu m'as trouué ce matin, ie ne commettray iamais les bassesses que commettent tous les iours ceux qui sont esclaues de ces deux vices: [...]' **becomes** (pp. 693-694) '[...] Si i'auois voulu me seruir des artifices que l'on pratique en Cour, & auprés des grands Seigneurs, pour en obtenir quelques graces; si i'auois voulu aposter cinq ou six personnes de qualité, pour dire au *Cardinal*, separément l'vne de l'autre, que *Mascurat* est honneste homme, qu'il est bien affectionné à son *Eminence*, qu'il est pauure, & a besoin d'estre assisté, peut-estre qu'il m'auroit plus estimé & consideré qu'il n'a pas fait; mais par la grace de Dieu ie suis guary d'*ambition* & d'*auarice*, qui sont les deux pestes de la belle gloire, & de l'honnesteté, & quand ie deurois mourir enueloppé dans mon pauure lange, comme tu m'as trouué ce matin, ie ne commettray iamais les bassesses que commettent tous les iours ceux qui sont esclaues de ces deux vices: [...]'

p.484-485 add.: '[...] car telles gens ne sont bons que pour eux, & ne valent du tout rien pour leurs Maistres, ausquels ils n'oseroient rien dire qu'ils ne les flattent; i'y ay doncque vescu en vieux *Gaulois*, en *Philosophe*, en *homme desinteressé*, [...]' **becomes** (pp. 694-695) '[...] car telles gens ne sont bons que pour eux, & ne valent du tout rien pour leurs Maistres, ausquels ils n'oseroient rien dire qui ne leur soit agreable, rien qui ne les flatte, rien qui les contredise, ou qui choque tant soit peu leur inclination, non pas mesme quand ils verroient asseurément qu'il y va de leur perte, & que faute de les tirer par le manteau, faute de leur crier *ex formula antiqua* CAVE CANEM, ou HOC ABE, ou MENTEM ADVORTE, ils se vont ietter dans des gouffres & precipices. I'y ay donc vescu en vieux *Gaulois*, en *Philosophe*, en *homme desinteressé*, [...]'

p. 486 add. + alt.: 'M. Tu deurois plustost souhaiter de ne me ressembler ny en l'vn ny en l'autre, car au temps où nous sommes la pauureté nuit beaucoup, & la doctrine ne sert de rien du tout, peu s'en faut que ie ne dise auec Martial, / *At me literulas stulti docuere parentes.* / Mais neantmoins puis que le Ciel mesme a separé les biens du corps d'auec ceux de l'esprit, ce ne seroit pas vne petite folie à toy & à moy, de vouloir posseder les vns & les autres tout ensemble.' **becomes** (p. 696) 'M. Tu deurois plustost souhaiter de ne me ressembler ny en l'vn ny en l'autre, car au temps où nous sommes la pauureté nuit beaucoup, & la doctrine, la probité, la franchise, le zele, & l'affection pour les choses bonnes & honnestes ne seruent de rien du tout: peu s'en faut que ie ne dise auec Petrone, / *Virtus medio iacet obruta cœno*, / *Nequitiæ classes candida vela ferunt*. / Mais neantmoins puis que le Ciel mesme a separé les biens du corps d'auec ceux de l'esprit, ce ne seroit pas vne petite folie à toy & à moy, de vouloir posseder les vns & les autres tout ensemble.'

p.489-490 alt. + om. + add.: '[...] & le second en l'Epistre à l'Empereur Frederic, *Soli Reges vtpote constituti supra leges, diuino examini reseruati, sæculi legibus non cohibentur, vnde & illud tam Regis quam Prophetæ, Tibi soli peccaui*, suiuant quoy nous lisons aussi dans Seneque le Poëte que *Rex est qui*

metuit nihil. Or toutes ces opinions, Sainct-Ange, ne doiuent elles pas non seulement te persuader, mais aussi te forcer de croire, que les Anglois ne se pourront iamais lauer, de l'horrible attentat qu'ils ont commis en la personne de leur Roy? Et si i'adiouste encore que par les mesmes Loix Romaines (lib. 1. de constit. principum), *Quod Principi placuit, legis habet vigorem;* que Guntherus a dit, / *Pro lege voluntas / Principis esse solet, quicquid decreuerit ille / Esse ratum mos est, & legis habere vigorem*. (Ligurini 8.) / Que Bodin asseure, *Quant à la voye de Iustice, le Subiet n'a point de iurisdiction sur son Prince, duquel depend toute puissance & authorité de commander, & qui peut non seulement reuoquer tout le pouuoir de ses Magistrats, mais aussi en la presence duquel, cesse toute la puissance & iurisdiction de tous les Magistrats, Corps, Colleges, Estats, & Communautez* (Liure 2. ch. 5. de Rep.); & ce qu'il adiouste en suite. Cela ne sera-t'il pas plus capable de te persuader quelle deference les Subiets doiuent à leur Prince, que si ie passois soubs silence toutes ces belles authoritez, pour te conuaincre seulement par la mienne, qui te lairroit peut-estre aussi froid comme elle t'auroit trouué? [...]' **becomes** (pp. 699-701) '[...] & le second en l'Epistre à l'Empereur Frederic, *Soli Reges vtpote constituti supra leges, diuino examini reseruati, sæculi legibus non cohibentur, vnde & illud tam Regis quam Prophetæ, Tibi soli peccaui*: suiuant quoy nous lisons aussi dans Seneque le Poëte que *Rex est qui metuit nihil:* comme aussi dans Martial, / *Qui Rex est, Regem, Maxime, non habeat.* Et i'adiouste encore que par les mesmes Loix Romaines (lib. 1. de constit. principum), *Quod Principi placuit, legis habet vigorem;* que Guntherus a dit, / *Pro lege voluntas / Principis esse solet, quicquid decreuerit ille / Esse ratum mos est, & legis habere vigorem*. (Ligurini 8.) / Que Bodin asseure, *Quant à la voye de Iustice, le Suiet n'a point de iurisdiction sur son Prince, duquel depend toute puissance & authorité de commander, & qui peut non seulement reuoquer tout le pouuoir de ses Magistrats, mais aussi en la presence duquel, cesse toute la puissance & iurisdiction de tous les Magistrats, Corps, Colleges, Estats, & Communautez* (Liure 2. ch. 5. de Rep.). Et si outre cela ie viens à monstrer que la pratique ordinaire est aussi de ce costé là, puis que l'Empereur *Theodose*, ayant fait mourir par vn excés de colere, sept ou huict mille personnes, entre lesquelles il y en auoit beaucoup d'innocentes, il n'y eut, au rapport de Theodoret, que *S. Ambroise* Archeuesque de Milan, qui eut la hardiesse de luy reprocher ce peché là, & de l'exhorter ou plustost forcer à en faire penitence: Que le Roy *Iean* s'estant fait accompagner de cent hommes bien armez & embastonnez, surprit luy mesme, comme remarque Nicole Gilles, à vn beau matin, dans le Chasteau de Roüen, les mauuais Conseillers de son fils aisné *Charles* Dauphin de Viennois, & Duc de Normandie, & deux heures aprés fit couper la teste, sans autre forme de procés, à quatre d'iceux, sçauoir le Comte d'*Harcourt*, le Seigneur de *Granuille*, le Seigneur de *Maubué*, & *Colinet Doublet:* Que *Louys XI.* suiuant la remarque qu'en fait *Meyerus in Historia Flandriæ, Cum subditis a quibus desertus & proditus fuerat pacem inire coactus, omnes paulatim trucidari, aut alia via e medio tolli curauit:* Que *Charles Neuf* commanda la iournée de la *Sainct-Barthelemy*, sans l'auoir concertée, qu'auec trois ou quatre personnes de son Cabinet: Que *Henry IV.* fit marier sa sœur, quoy qu'elle fit profession de la Religion pretenduë reformée, auec le Duc de Bar Catholique, par vn Euesque auquel il fit abbreger beaucoup de ceremonies, parce que comme il disoit, sa presence estoit plus que toutes les solemnitez ordinaires: Et finalement que *Philippes Second* Roy d'Espagne, comme l'a remarqué Monsieur de Chiuerny, faisoit seul le procés à ceux qui auoient failly en matiere d'Estat, & les faisoit punir: A ton aduis, *Sainct-Ange*, toutes ces raisons & Histoires ne seront-elles pas plus capables de te persuader quelle deference les suiets doiuent à leurs Prince, & combien le pouuoir des Roys est absolu, que si ie passois sous silence toutes ces belles authoritez & remarques, pour te conuaincre seulement par le simple narré de mon opinion, qui te laisseroit peut-estre aussi froid comme elle t'auroit trouué? [...]'

p. 490 add.: '[...] En suite de quoy si tu veux mettre ces dernieres raisons, auec les precedentes que i'ay desia rapportées pour iustifier mes Citations, tu trouueras sans doute, qu'elles ne seront iamais blasmées, sinon par ceux qui n'en pourroient fare de semblables, / *iuxta illud, Cauillari facilius est, quam æmulari*. / S. Tu me dis de si belles choses que ie quitterois volontiers le gain que m'apportera la Declaration, pour le profit que ie ferois en demeurant encore deux ou trois heures auec toy: Mais puis que tu dois estre las de parler, & que tes affaires ne te permettent point de demeurer icy dauantage; ie te remercie de tres bon cœur, de tant de belles choses dont tu as pris la peine de m'instruire: Et ie te supplie pareillement de vouloir excuser les plaisanteries, & sornettes dont ie me suis quelquefois seruy, pour eluder la force de tes responses solides & pressantes, & quelquesfois aussi pour te resioüir, comme faisait *Perse* auec le bon homme *Cornutus* qui auoit esté son Maistre, *Saturnumque grauem nostro Ioue frangimus*

vna. [...]' **becomes** (pp. 701-714) '[...] En suite de quoy si tu veux mettre ces dernieres raisons auec les precedentes que ie t'ay desia rapportées, pour iustifier mes citations, tu trouueras sans doute qu'elles ne seront iamais blasmées, sinon par ceux qui n'en pourroient fare de semblables, / *iuxta illud, Cauillari facilius est, quam æmulari*. / S. Ce que tu viens de dire de l'authorité & de la puissance absoluë des Roys, est bien éloigné de l'opinion de beaucoup de personnes, qui leur veulent faire rendre compte dans trois iours, ou dans trois mois au plus tard, de tous ceux qu'ils font mettre en prison, sans adueu, ny participation des Iustices & Tribunaux ordinaires. / M. Cette opinion qui est abusiue & mal conceuë a esté peu à peu introduite, pour remedier à vne autre, qui estoit fort bonne, mais tres-mal executée: & parce que suiuant le dire d'Horace (2. Serm. satyr. 3) / *Nil agit exemplum, litem quod lite resoluit.* / aussi est-il vray de dire, que l'authorité du Prince sur les Prisonniers d'Estat, ne doit estre ny si rigoureusement exercée, qu'elle l'a esté du viuant du feu Roy d'heureuse memoire, ny tellement relaschée comme on veut qu'elle soit à present: / *Altius egressus cælestia tecta cremabis,* / *Inferius terras, medio tutissimus ibis.* / comme disoit Phœbus à son fils Phaëton. C'est pourquoy afin de regler cette affaire suiuant les necessitez de l'Estat, & du nostre principalement, il faut considerer, qu'il n'y a lieu au monde où le Prince absolu soit moins dispensé du droit commun, que les Roys sont en France: On les plaide, on les cite & adiourne, on les condamne à payer ce qu'ils doiuent au tiers & au quart, à Pierre & à Guillaume, & l'on exerce contre eux toutes les procedures de Iustice, desquelles on se pourroit seruir contre les plus miserables & abandonnez de leur Royaume; ce qui n'est pas difficile à croire, puis qu'on le voit tous les iours par experience, & que *Henry IV.* le confesse luy-mesme, en escriuant à Mr de Sully. *I'ay destiné,* dit-il, *la finance qui en prouiendra, au Sieur de Fontrailhas, au payement de certaine somme de derniers, en laquelle (comme Comte d'Armagnac) i'ay cy deuant esté condamné enuers luy par Arrest de ma Cour de Parlement de Paris:* & le mesme dit encore en vn autre endroit, *Mon amy, il y a quelque temps que i'ay fait poursuiure en Iustice, le partage qui se doit faire de la Forest de l'Aigle, entre Monsieur le Connestable & moy, ce qui a esté tellement acheminé, que les prisées & les deux lots estant faits, il ne reste plus que d'en passer le contract.* Voila donc comme le Roy n'a point d'auantage sur le moindre de ses suiets, en ce qui est du droict commun, & des causes que l'on peut decider promptement & ouuertement: Mais pour ce qui est du droict & de la *raison d'Estat*, il en faut discourir d'vne autre sorte. Car encore que les Roys ne veüillent point se dispenser de la Iustice, encore qu'ils ne veüillent s'exempter des formalitez ordinaires, ny porter leur authorité au point où beaucoup s'imaginent: il se rencontre toutesfois des affaires si embroüillées, si épineuses, si compliquées, & de telle nature & consequence, que ce seroit découurir à tout le monde, ce qu'il est expedient que fort peu de personnes sçachent, & vouloir, comme l'on dit, prendre les lieures au son du tambour, que de les manier à la façon de beaucoup d'autres qui ne sont pas circonstantiées de la sorte. Et c'est en ce cas là principalement que les Roys se peuuent seruir de leur authorité absoluë, pour emprisonner ceux dont ils iugent à propos de s'asseurer, sans que pour cela ils soient obligez d'en rendre compte à personne. Et pour te faire cognoistre euidemment, que l'on ne sçauroit oster ce pouuoir au Souuerain, sans faciliter le chemin aux reuoltes, seditions, trahisons, & semblables entreprises, qui sont capables de ruiner son Estat: Ie mets pour exemple, comme il arriua au faict de *l'Hoste,* que l'Ambassadeur de France escriue au Roy qu'il faut qu'on le trahisse, parce qu'il trouue tousiours les Ministres d'Espagne tres-bien informez de tout ce qu'il leur propose de la part de Sa Maiesté: En suite dequoy l'vn desdits Ministres pensionnaire secret de France, aduertit aussi de son costé qu'vn nommé l'*Hoste* découure au Roy d'Espagne tout ce qui se passe dans le Conseil secret de celuy de France: que faut-il donc faire en suite de ces aduis? Si l'on procede contre l'*Hoste* par voyes ordinaires, il faut que ce pensionnaire d'Espagne soit nommé dans le procés, & cela ne se peut pas faire, sans que son Roy le fasse tirer à quatre cheuaux contre la promesse qu'on luy a faite icy, de ne le iamais deceler pour quelque occasion que ce soit, ny aussi sans que le Roy perde l'auantage qu'il pouuoit tirer des aduis importans qui luy venoient de ce costé là. C'est pourquoy il faut necessairement que le Roy couche de son authorité, pour faire mettre l'*Hoste* dans la Bastille, & pour l'y tenir si long-temps que bon luy semblera, ou au moins iusques à ce qu'on ait trouué des preuues suffisantes pour luy faire son procés, sans auoir recours à celles d'vn pensionnaire que le Roy tient en Espagne. Et si d'aduenture quelqu'vn s'en formalise, ce sera assez de luy dire que le Roy le fait tres-iustement, puis qu'il a pouuoir de le faire, & qu'il a la *raison d'Estat* de son costé, à laquelle il faut que toutes les autres cedent: & ainsi ie te pourrois proposer vne infinité d'autres occasions, desquelles il est impossible de se débroüiller, que par cette *raison d'Estat*: Mais puis que nous en auons eu vne depuis deux mois assez remarquable, pourquoy en chercher d'autres? Personne n'ignore, & beaucoup mesme ont

blasmé le Cardinal *Mazarin*, de ce qu'il portoit si fort les interests de Monsieur de *Ranzau*: que de simple Mareschal de Camp qu'il estoit, il luy procura vne Lieutenance generale: luy fit commander separément des corps d'armée: le fit honorer du Baston de Mareschal de France, & du gouuernement de Dunkerque, auec des regimens de Caualerie & Infanterie: luy fit obtenir de Sa Maiesté plusieurs dons & pensions tres-considerables: le soustint contre ceux qui le vouloient perdre aprés l'affaire de Tutlinguen: le remonta plusieurs fois d'équipage, & luy fit vne infinité d'autres seruices tres-considerables: quoy qu'au dire de ceux qui l'ont blasmé de ces bonnes actions, Monsieur de *Ranzau* fust estranger, quoy qu'il eust de fort mauuaises qualitez, & qu'il fust capable de tout ruiner ce que l'on commettroit à sa direction. Mais ces Messieurs ont en fin changé de langage: car soudain que le *Cardinal* a donné les mains à la detention dudit sieur de *Ranzau*, on l'a accusé d'estre violent, & on luy a reproché qu'il auoit peu d'affection, & encore moins de fidelité pour son amy. Aprés quoy, *Sainct-Ange*, ne vois-tu pas l'iniustice manifeste, & l'aueglement entier de ces Censeurs? & ne vois-tu pas au contraire, combien le zele que le *Cardinal* a pour cette Couronne est grand, puisque lors qu'il est question de la seruir, il ne considere ny ses ennemis, comme l'on a veu dans l'affaire du Cardinal *Barberin*, ny ses amis, comme l'on peut remarquer en cette derniere de *Ranzau*; les traittez duquel auec l'Espagnol, par l'entremise du *Prouincial des Recolects* de Gand, & du nommé *Grimié* Bourgmestre de Furnes, à dessein de leur remettre *Dunkerque* & toutes les places voisines entre les mains, moyennant quatre cens mille liures, ne furent pas si tost penetrez en Cour, que le *Cardinal* baissant la visiere à l'amitié passée, donna tous les ordres necessaires, non seulement pour rompre vn coup de si grande importance; mais encore pour s'asseurer comme il fit tres-adroitement, de celuy qui en estoit l'autheur: auquel si l'on ne fait pas le procés comme l'on a fait au Duc de Montmorancy, au Mareschal de Biron, & à tant d'autres, qui estoient encore plus considerables qu'il n'est pas; ie te répondray que les Ministres à mon aduis, n'ont pas toutes les preuues necessaires pour le mettre en estat, parce que le Bourgmestre de Furnes, à ce que m'a rapporté l'homme qui auoit sceu le détail de cette affaire, aux premieres Conferences de Ruel, n'est point reuenu d'auprés les Chefs Espagnols, enuers lesquels il auoit desia fait plusieurs voyages auec les lettres de creance de Monsieur de *Ranzau*, sous ombre de moyenner à son nom le rachapt de quelques prisonniers; & aussi que ce Prouincial des Recolects de Gand n'est point en estat de seruir à l'instruction de ce procés là: Mais quoy que s'en soit, le *Roy* & son Conseil secret ont assez de connoissance de cette affaire, pour y proceder suiuant ce que la *raison d'Estat* leur dicte, & ce que le bien & repos du Royaume permettent que l'on en fasse. Et le peuple en cette occasion aussi bien qu'en beaucoup d'autres, n'a rien autre chose à faire sinon d'approuuer tous les soins, & tous les reglemens de ceux qui gouuernent, & qui vray-semblablement n'auroient pas esté commis à de telles charges, s'ils n'en estoient plus capables & s'ils ne s'en pouuoient acquitter mieux que beaucoup d'autres. Et c'est en effet ce que phon l'vn des plus sages Politiques d'entre les Grecs nous conseille de faire, par l'exemple des malades qui obeïssent aux Medecins, & des passagers qui se laissent entierement gouuerner au Pilote: *Quauis in re,* dit-il, *parere homines illis maxime volunt, quos existimant esse præstantissimos: nam in morbo potissimum illi parent, quem Medicæ rei putant esse peritissimum: & in naui qui nauigant, ei quem gubernandi putant esse peritissimum: aut in agricultura quem agricolandi peritum in primis arbitrantur.* (3. Memorabil.) Mais d'autant que tu me pourrois dire que les Ministres abusent bien souuent de cette *raison d'Estat*, pour emprisonner qui bon leur semble, & qu'il est expedient de remedier à l'abus qui s'est commis sous de semblables pretextes, pendant le regne de *Louys Treiziéme*, ie te répondray premierement auec Ouide: / *Firma valent per se, nullumque Machaona quærunt, / Ad Medici dubius confugit æger opem.* / C'est pourquoy si le regne de son successeur *Louys Quatorziéme* n'est point entaché de cette maladie, à quoy bon proposer & obstiner vn remede duquel on n'a que faire, / --- *data tempore prosunt, / Et data non apto tempore, multa nocent*. / Et pense tu quand mesme les prisons regorgeroient de miserables, qu'il n'y eust qu'à ruiner cette loy fondamentale de la Souueraineté, pour tomber en suite dans d'autres inconueniens qui seroient beaucoup plus preiudiciables au salut des peuples, & au repos des Estats & Empires? Pense-tu que la faute des Ministres doiue ruiner ceux qui les employent? Pense-tu qu'il n'y ait qu'à supprimer des loix sagement instituées, à cause de quelques Iuges qui en abusent? / *Et latro, & cautus præcingitur ense viator, / Jlle sed insidias, hic sibi præstat opem.* (Ouid. 2. tristium.) / Il faut donc corriger l'abus des bonnes choses, & en permettre l'vsage; chastier les yurognes, comme l'on fait en Angleterre, & conseruer le vin, puisque l'on en reçoit des commoditez si manifestes: & se plaindre des Ministres, si d'aduenture ils sont si necessaires. Car pour conclure en vn mot auec Quintilian (Lib. 2. instit.): *Non est æquum id haberi malum, quo bene vti licet*. / S. Tu me dis de si

belles choses, que si elles estoient imprimées, on ne s'imagineroit iamais qu'elles vinssent du cabaret, ny qu'elles eussent esté dites par deux Libraires ou Imprimeurs, & ie ne croirois pas moy-mesme que tu en eusse pû tant dire en vn iour, & si facilement, si ie ne les auois entenduës de mes propres aureilles. / M. C'est ainsi que beaucoup de choses veritables sont reputées fabuleuses, à cause de l'ignorance ou du peu d'experience de ceux qui les lisent dans Pline & autres Historiens, ou qui les entendent reciter à ceux qui les ont veuës. Mais pour respondre aux trois difficultez que tu viens de me proposer, ie n'ay iamais ouy dire, qu'il fut defendu de parler des choses serieuses, sinon en des lieux destinez à ce faire, comme tu pourrois dire des Colleges, des Academies, des maisons de Presidens, & Euesques, des Palais de grands Seigneurs, & autres lieux semblables: au contraire ie voy dans Plutarque & Athenée, que les plus doctes de ce temps-là tenoient des propos aussi serieux entre la poire & le fromage, & ayant le verre à la main, comme nous l'auons maintenant, que tous les Academistes de Ciceron en ses plus delicieuses Vignes, *in Tusculano, in Cumano, in Arpinati.* Et ce grand homme Platon, qui n'est conneu parmy nous qu'à cause des beaux dialogues, qu'il a pris la peine de recueillir, n'a pas negligé ceux qui auoient esté faits par les premieres testes de l'antiquité, tantost au milieu des ruës, comme celuy de *Gorgias;* tantost *in ædibus Cephali in Piræo,* comme celuy *de Republica*; tantost *in porticu Iouis Liberatoris*, comme celuy *de sapientia*; tantost *extra Athenas ad flumen Ilissum*, comme celuy *de pulchro*; tantost *in porticu Regis, in qua negotia tractabantur*, comme celuy *de sanctitate*; tantost in *Palæstra*, comme celuy *de amicitia*; & qui sçait que parmy ceux que nous n'auons point tant de luy que de *Lucian*, & d'autres graues personnages, quelques vns n'ayent point esté faits *in Tabernis, in Cauponis & Popinis*, qui estoient les Tauernes, & les Cabarets du temps passé? ne sçait-on pas que la pluspart des Philosophes anciens, à cause de leur pauureté, & des Poëtes, soit sur la mesme raison, ou à cause de leur humeur desbauchée, ne bougeoient gueres de ces lieux là, tesmoin ces *Florus*, lequel ayant enuoyé ces vers à l'Empereur Adrian, / *Ego nolo Cæsar esse,* / *Ambulare per Britannos,* / *Scythicas pati pruinas.* / receut du mesme response, / *Ego nolo Florus esse,* / *Ambulare per tabernas,* / *Latitare per popinas,* / *Culices pati rotundos.* / Et pourquoy donc voudroit-on qu'ils en sortissent pour philosopher, ou parler d'affaires de consequence? & s'il estoit permis à Symmaque de dire, *Vbique vitam agimus Consularem, & in lucrino serij sumus* (Lib. 8 epist. 23), pourquoy sera-t'il defendu à des Philosophes, à des gens de bien, vertueux, & sçauans de l'imiter. *Homini*, dit Plutarque, *felicitatem nullus locus adimit, vt neque virtutem, neque prudentiam, itaque & Anaxagoras in carcere quadraturam circuli descripsit, & Socrates venenum bibens philosophabatur:* (Lib. de exilio.) & pourquoy donc, Mascurat, *non quidem venenum, sed vini boni & veteris florem bibens* (Maxim. Tyr. dissect. 12), ne fera-t'il pas de mesme? Iamais les *Perses* ne discouroient d'affaires serieuses qu'au milieu des Festins, & ils ne laissoient pas d'y rencontrer aussi bien que les Atheniens, quoy qu'ils y apportassent beaucoup plus de ceremonies. Et qui empeschera donc de croire que *Mascurat* n'ait fait auiourd'huy vne chose semblable? car de me reprocher l'ignorance des Imprimeurs, & la mienne par consequent, tu sçais bien que i'ay desia tellement rabatu ces estocades, qu'il n'est plus de question d'en parler. Reste donc le scrupule qu'on pourroit auoir, que des personnes ordinaires & mechaniques, comme nous sommes, ayent parlé si auant des affaires d'Estat. Mais si tu auois remarqué comme moy l'humeur des Italiens, tu verrois que la Politique des Sauetiers de ce pays là est encore plus raffinée que celle des Imprimeurs de cettuy-cy. Et puis c'est vn commun dire, *qu'en fait de Religion, de Medicine, & de Gouuernement, chacun se picque d'estre sçauant.* En tout cas ceux qui auront veu dans les Colloques recueillis par Erasme, *Lanios & Salgamarios de rebus diuinis tanquam Theologos disputantes* (6. Poet. 7.): ce que toutefois Scaliger le Pere ne pouuoit comprendre; ou qui auroit obserué qu'vn Carabin *Maheutre*, c'est à dire du party du Roy de Nauarre, & un pauure *Manant* Ligueur, ont mieux discouru au milieu d'vn champ, des secrettes intrigues & cabales de la Ligue, & des interests de ces deux partis, & qu'ils en ont fait des Colloques si serieux & si amples, que l'on n'a rien veu au iugement des mieux entendus en ces matieres, qui fust de meilleure trempe. Ceux-là dis-ie, ne trouueront point si difficile, que nous ayons discouru, sinon auec tant de suffisance, au moins auec assez de verité, de ce qui se passe maintenant en cette ville. Finalement pourquoy trouuer estrange que nous ayons dit tant de choses en vn iour, puis que nous voyons tant de Tragedies nous representer en pareille espace de temps des Histoires, que l'on ne iugeroit iamais, à cuase d'vne infinité de rencontres & accidens, auoir esté faites dans l'espace de vingt-quatre heures, quoy qu'elles ne puissent pas en auoir duré dauantage, si tous nos Poëtes tragiques ne sont des menteurs, aussi bien que des ignorans en vingt-quatre carats. Et puis si le *Timée,* le *Gorgias*, le *Phædon*, & les Dialogues *de Republica, & de legibus* de Platon, quoy qu'ils soient bien plus longs que les nostres, ont bien esté faits en vn iour, car s'ils en

auoient duré plusieurs, il est sans doute que les entreparleurs se seroient donné le bon soir, & le bon iour: Pourquoy ne voudra-t'on pas que nous ayons dit depuis cinq heures du matin, iusques à sept heures du soir, ce que s'il estoit imprimé, il ne faudroit gueres dauantage de temps pour lire? Mais quoy, tel blasme & condamne des choses veritables, parce qu'elles sont modernes, qui dissimule ou ne s'apperçoit pas des fautes ou faussetez anciennes, telles que sont celles de Platon, tout galant homme qu'il soit, quand il fait parler *Parmenides* en vn endroit, & *Timée* en vn autre auec *Socrates*, encore que le premier deuoit estre decrepit, lors que *Socrates* n'estoit encore qu'vn enfant, & qu'entre luy & *Timée* il y ait difference de plus d'vn siecle: ce qui tesmoigne bien, *Sainct-Ange*, que si nous examinions les anciens auec autant de rigueur que nos faisons les modernes, ils ne se trouueroient gueres plus sçauans, ny moins fautifs les vns que les autres, nonobstant le preiugé de certaine sorte de personnes, / *Quæ redit ad fastos & virtutem æstimat annis, / Miraturque nihil, nisi quod Libitina sacrauit.* (Horat. ep. I. lib. 2.) / S. Ie t'asseure *Mascurat* que ie quitterois volontiers le gain que m'apportera la *Declaration,* pour le profit que ie ferois en demeurant encore deux ou trois heures auec toy: Mais puis que tu dois estre las de parler, & que tes affaires ne te permettent point de demeurer icy dauantage; ie te remercie de tres bon cœur, de tant de belles choses dont tu as pris la peine de m'instruire: & ie te supplie pareillement de vouloir excuser les plaisanteries, & sornettes dont ie me suis quelquefois seruy, pour eluder la force de tes responses solides & pressantes, & quelquesfois aussi pour te resioüir, comme faisait *Perse* auec le bon homme *Cornutus* qui auoit esté son Maistre, *Saturnumque grauem nostro Ioue frangimus vna.* [...]'

p. 490 add.: 'M. Tu te mocques Sainct-Ange de me faire ces compliments là, tu veois que ie m'en suis seruy aux occasions aussi bien comme toy, & ie croy que nous auons tous deux fort bien-fait; puis que les faceties ne sont pas tousiours hors de saison, que Ciceron disoit au second des Tusculanes, *Lectionem sine vlla delectatione negligo*, & que suiuant l'opinion d'Horace *Ridiculum acri / Fortius & melius magnas plerumque secat res*. / Au reste comme nous sommes amis de longue main, & qu'il y a long-temps que ie ne t'auois veu, i'ay esté rauy de pouuoir passer cette iournée auec toy, & de te détromper des fausses opinions que tu auois conceuës du Cardinal Mazarin, parce que tu en pourras d'oresnauant desabuser beaucoup d'autres, & seruir par ce moyen autant qu'il te sera possible au repos de la France. [...]' **becomes** (pp. 714-715) 'M. Tu te mocques, *Sainct-Ange*, de me faire ces compliments là, tu veois que ie m'en suis seruy aux occasions aussi bien comme toy, & ie croy que nous auons tous deux fort bien-fait; puis que les faceties ne sont pas tousiours hors de saison, que Ciceron disoit au second des Tusculanes, *Lectionem sine vlla delectatione negligo*: & qu'à cette occasion, il a fort bien traitté *de iocis & ridiculis, quorum ei modum, Demostheni vero facultatem defuisse, notat Quintilianus:* lequel adiouste, *quod risus tristes affectus soluit, & animum ab intentione rerum, & à fatigatione renouat:* C'est pourquoy suiuant que remarque vn autheur moderne, *Tertullianus salibus, ac dicteriis risum subinde mouet, & Tertullianum plus satis imitatus Hieronymus:* Et puis que Symmaque disoit en escriuant à vn de ses amis, *Memoriam malorum ioci venustate frangamus*, pourquoy ne ferions nous pas de mesme, en vn temps, qui est encore plus fascheux que celuy de Symmaque? & aprés tout Horace n'a-t'il pas eu raison de dire, / -- *ridiculum acri, / Fortius, & melius magnas plerumque secat res.* / Pourquoy donc trouuerois-ie estrange, que tu aye fait comme Pomponace, *qui sæpe ancipiti & cornuto Achillini enthymemate circumuentus, superfuso facetiarum sale, aduersarij impetum, ex illis gyris & mæandris explicatus eluderet.* Mais plustost pourqouy toy & moy ne nous seruirons nous pas de la mesme excuse, de laquelle l'Autheur du liure assez serieux intitulé la *Diablerie*, & imprimé à Paris il y a cent cinquante ans, se seruit à la fin de son ouurage. / *Et ne se faut esmerueiller, / Si i'ay voulu pour resueiller, / Les entendemens des lisans, / Vser souuent de mots plaisans*, / *Et de termes assez ioyeux; / Afin d'estre moins ennuyeux: / Car les rimes entrelardées / Communement plus volontiers, / Voire & notées mieux le tiers / Quand pour l'oreille resioüir / Sont bien plaisantes à oüir; / Comme Esopet en vn beau metre / Le dict bien qui est Pentametre / Il n'en faut point faire de doute.* / / Au reste comme nous sommes amis de longuemain, & qu'il y a long temps que ie ne t'auois veu, i'ay esté rauy de pouuoir passer cette iournée auec toy, & de te détromper des fausses opinions que tu auois conceuës du Cardinal *Mazarin*, parce que tu en pourras d'oresnauant desabuser beaucoup d'autres, & seruir par ce moyen autant qu'il te sera possible au repos de la France. [...]'

p. 491 add.: 'S. Pour toy ie veux croire que tu es sobre & retenu par sagesse, mais pour moy si ie ne me réiouys pas si souuent que ie voudrois bien, c'est la seule misere du temps qui en est cause.'

becomes (p. 716) 'S. Pour toy ie veux croire que tu es sobre & retenu par sagesse; parce que / *Oderunt peccare boni virtutis amore*: / mais pour moy si ie ne me réiouys pas si souuent que ie voudrois bien, c'est la seule misere du temps qui en est cause.'

p. 492 add.: 'S. Touche là Mascurat, il n'y a tantost plus que nous deux à prendre la Declaration, ie suis ton seruiteur, & de bon het.' **becomes** (pp. 716-717) 'S. Touche là Mascurat, il n'y a tantost plus que nous deux à prendre la *Declaration*, mais puis qu'il est si tard, ie croy que nous ferions mieux d'attendre à demain matin, & de souper où nous auons disné; si tu le veux i'ay encore vn teston à ton seruice, & tu m'obligeras extremement, sinon ie suis ton seruiteur, & de bon het.'

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DIGITAL TOOLS

- *Arkyves*. An online research tool by Koninklijke Brill that among other uses can be employed to search for specific Printer's Devices. URL: www.arkyves.org
- *Correspondance de Pierre Bayle*. URL: http://bayle-correspondance.univ-st-etienne.fr/
- *Correspondance française de Guy Patin*, edited by Loïc Capron Paris: Bibliothèque interuniversitaire de santé, 2015. URL: http://www.biusante.parisdescartes.fr/patin/
- *Dictionnaires d'autrefois*, an online research tool that allows to query simultaneously Jean Nicot's *Thresor de la langue française* 1606, Jean-François Féraud's *Dictionaire critique de la langue française* 1787-1788, Émile Littré's *Dictionnaire de la langue française* 1872-1877 and the *Dictionnaire de L'Académie française* 1694, 1762, 1798, 1835, and 1932-5 editions.
  URL: https://artfl-project.uchicago.edu/content/dictionnaires-dautrefois
- *Projet Mazarinades*, online scientific edition of the *mazarinade* pamphlets conceived by the research group Recherches internationales sur les Mazarinades RIM which allows keyword queries of circa 2000 *mazarinades* out of 5000-6000 pamphlets in total, URL: http://www.mazarinades.org/
- *Heritage of the Printed Book Database* established by the Consortium of European Research Libraries [CERL]. This research tool can be used to find all extant editions of a printed work held by a European library. https://gso-gbv-de.access.authkb.kb.nl/
- CERL Thesaurus "accessing the record of Europe's book heritage". A research tool to find information on imprint places, imprint names, and personal names found on printed material pre-1850. URL: https://thesaurus.cerl.org

Summary

This PhD-thesis researches the nature and function of the rhetoric of 'reason of state' in a transforming French monarchy. This fashionable political idiom is approached anew by studying and comparing the work of two important French thinkers – Henri de Rohan (1579-1638) and Gabriel Naudé (1600-1653) – in light of recent historiographical developments. The purpose of this study in intellectual history is to provide a reassessment of early seventeenth-century uses of the terminology of political prudence, a body of family-resemblant catchphrases like '*raison d'état*' and 'interest'. The reassessment was prompted by revisionist studies in political and social history of early modern rule. The early modern French monarchy frequently stared into the abyss and periodically experienced a total breakdown of order. The *topos* of political prudence belonged to the early seventeenth-century period of 'crisis-management' and is here studied in the context of the often haphazard political solutions practised by the Cardinal-ministers Richelieu and Mazarin.

Traditionally historians have considered the early seventeenth century, in particular the period under Louis XIII and his *premier ministre* Richelieu, as the heyday of French 'reason of state'. This pragmatic political thought would be the practical counterpart of the political theory of 'absolutism', that in itself provided the blueprint for the 'absolute monarchy' under construction. In the last three decades, however, the historiography of 'state-building' in early modern Europe and the mechanisms of political power in late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century France has seen considerable revisions. Current views of the French 'state' deviate in important ways from earlier representations by emphasising the mutual dependence and social collaboration of the Crown and its elites.

Historians have shown political praxis to have been rather more complex than the alleged tyrannical omnipotence of Richelieu led their predecessors suspect. Traditional views saw Richelieu motivated by his own interests to curb and destroy the power of the rebellious aristocracy, to persecute the Huguenots, and to repress and suck dry French populations in the provinces to finance his own bellicosity. Revisionist views rather emphasise the limitations of existing power structures, such as networks of patronage, on which the Cardinal-minister and his successor Cardinal Mazarin depended, as well as the contingency of political events that restricted their power to control the monarchy's machinery. In the end, they could do not much other than attempt to stretch the fairly traditional practices and make-shift solutions possible in these power structures to their very limits. The current consensus on the French 'absolute monarchy' is that of a complex power system of social collaboration and cooperation, in which the king and his ministers and old and new elites depended on one another. As public order could instantly turn into disorder when this system failed, the importance of 'opinion' grew irreversibly. The government, but other political elites as well, needed to mobilise the support of important groups in French society for policies and political action. 'National' rhetoric and the rhetoric of political prudence were indispensable in the battles of opinion.

Even more than ninety years on any intellectual history of political prudence must start with considering the seminal work (1925) of Friedrich Meinecke on 'reason of state'. In what he called *die Idee der Staatsräson* the German historian saw the kernel of the modern Western state, whose definitive rise in the late nineteenth century he experienced first-hand. 'Reason of state' embodied the dynamic struggle between power and morality that for Meinecke was the motive force in (political) history. A veritable tradition of scholars followed in the footsteps of the German historian, each adding something to the 'state-building' view of political prudence. Two decades ago Maurizio Viroli approached the topic inspired by the Cambridge school's contextualism. He saw it as a language that brought about a revolution in political thought. According to the Italian historian the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century was an ideological turning point that constituted a shift between politics as the preservation of the *res publica* – consisting in the art of ruling a community according to justice – and politics as the preservation of state power, i.e. control of public institutions by an individual or a ruling group. Viroli presents this transition as an ideological conflict between fundamental Christian norms and a new notion of politics that lacked a foundation in divine law and the crucial

features of which were force and coercion. For Viroli, the ideological struggle represents a process of secularisation in early modern political thought.

In contrast to these two major works interpreting expressions of political prudence as mirroring processes of state-building and secularisation, this study builds upon recent contributions that approach the terminology as an elusive, fashionable and provocative rhetoric. No longer are the uses of these political catchphrases interpreted as a modernising ideology or a political theory that created an autonomous sphere for political decision-making. Following historians like Harro Höpfl, Horst Dreitzel and Conal Condren, this dissertation rather emphasises the practical uses by various individuals and factions with as many diverging interests. The flexible, vogue terminology of political prudence was a rhetorical tool that mobilised people and precipitated action in polarized and turbulent times, as well as it consisted of a cynical and disillusioned view of political practice. Religious considerations were not so much absent from these new political approach to the political. However, the traditional Christian-Aristotelian framework no longer sufficed to comprehend the scale, problems, and needs of the seventeenth-century French monarchy. Once it was common in French political discourse by the 1610s, the popular terminology allowed thinkers to come to grips with the turbulent political developments of the age. As the British historian Noel Malcolm has established the fashionable rhetoric fits in a the broader context of the upsurge in the interest and dispersion of current affairs literature, political commentary and the 'invention of the news' in the early seventeenth century.

Apart from a reassessment this thesis provides an important addition to the existing historiography of both 'reason of state' and the individual authors. As the terminology historically appeared in many forms, this thesis researched the applications of two authors in the specific circumstances they were employed. Instead of a history of French 'reason of state' in broad brush strokes, the purpose is to provide a detailed interpretation that takes the biography, intellectual formation and network of the authors, the book historical dimensions and argumentation of the work into account. In contrast to the existing body of literature Rohan and Naudé are not considered as a token of some historiographical construct or historical process. Neither of the authors should be presented to embody militant Protestantism, libertinism and freethought (*libertinage*), secularisation or the rise of the modern state. Rather Rohan is placed in the context of aristocratic rivalry and competition for royal favour proper to the transforming French monarchy, and the ambitions befitting a *grand* noble dynasty. Furthermore, Naudé appears to have been an independent and eclectic thinker, a Gallican Catholic rather than the radical erudite libertine he is often presented to have been. By embedding the writings of the authors in their biographical, social, intellectual, material and political contexts, the authors' intentions are taken into account more empirically than before.

This study focusses on the political writings of both authors, if possible both in manuscript and printed forms. In the case of Rohan his main work, *De l'Interest des Princes et Estats de la Chrestienté* (1638) is the foremost object of analysis. Alongside this treatise two hitherto unknown pamphlets or 'Discours d'État' written by the duc in his Venetian exile in the early 1630s, are of more importance than the posthumously published *Discours politiques* (1646), pieces from the decades after the death of Henri IV. These 'Venetian discourses' were Rohan's first attempt to a European-wide analyses of the geopolitical situation with specific attention to Northern-Italy. In these anonymously published pamphlets the duc displays the danger the House of Habsburg reaps for diverse political entities. Importantly, he exhorts the French king to protect freedom in Europe against Spanish designs toward 'universal monarchy'. Before Rohan decided upon publication, he sent a manuscript of the discourses to various important correspondents, among whom were princes and diplomats. The duc applied the same procedure to many of his other writings, the manuscript of *De l'Interest* and, around the same time, his apologetic *Mémoires*. This displays his primary publication strategy, that of manuscript circulation. This study tentatively reconstructs the initial dispersion of the manuscript of *De l'Interest* from the moment Rohan presented it to Cardinal Richelieu in August 1634. Furthermore, a publication history of this main work establishes that the printing process was well ahead before the duc's demise and the book publication should therefore not be considered posthumously as has often been argued.

In the case of Naudé a book-historical approach sheds similar new light on the most important sources, the *Considérations politiques sur les coups d'Estat* ('1639') and the *Mascurat* (1649-1650). The first edition of the infamous work on 'reason of state' and 'extraordinary political action' was plausibly printed in Paris in 1648 by Sebastien Cramoisy and associates. This hypothesis replaces the still broadly historiographically accepted, but irrefutably feigned information on the title-page that reads 'Rome, 1639'. Cramoisy – the 'king' of the Parisian neighbourhood of printers and printer to the king – also printed the two editions of the *Mascurat* in summer 1649 and spring 1650. This means that both books are not only printed in closer proximity to each other than is normally acknowledged, they also come from the same printshop. Furthermore, a comparison of the *Mascurat*'s two editions lays bare that the heavily revised and amended second edition contains more 'considérations politiques'. The addition and specific use of *raison d'état*-argumentation in Naudé's political apology of Cardinal Mazarin should therefore be studied together with the Parisian's application of the fashionable terminology in his other political writings, most importantly the *Bibliographia politica* (1633) and the *Considérations politiques*.

The specific applications of the terminology by Rohan and Naudé confirm the fluid and interchangeable nature of political prudence. Whereas their work is often considered to have been a theorisation of an ideology, this study rather brings the particular, particularistic and context-bound uses of the idiom by two widely diverging personalities. This does not mean that solely particularistic motives played a role. However, both authors ingenuously tied their proper interests to the greater good of the French kingdom in the specific debates into which their publications intervened. In the intellectual context of his Venetian exile and from his position as a recent rebel and rival to Cardinal Richelieu Rohan used the term 'interest' to support the war faction at the French court and exhorts the cardinal-minister to engage in an open war effort against Spain. The apparently 'objective' analysis of the interests of European princes and estates rhetorically constructs an image of enmity that silently and on a secondary plain is consistent with the (transnational) Protestant interests the duc fought for in the 1620s. Rohan shows how Spanish geopolitical efforts are designed to bring Europe under Habsburg domination and, as he did in his 'Venetian discourses', urges the French king to counter them by military and diplomatic means.

Naudé also wrote his extensive political considerations on *raison d'état* in an Italian context, albeit that his thinking was equally and undeniably directed at France. In the turbulent period of unrest and the breakdown of order of the *Frondes* the learned Parisian applied the rhetoric in his political defence of his patron, *premier ministre* Mazarin. The addition of the *raison d'état* argumentation was probably prompted by the escalating faction struggle at court and the arrestation of the prince de Condé in January 1650. In the pamphlet war that raged in the streets of Paris and in the *Parlement* the 'prisoners of state'-debate came back with a vengeance, criticising any possibly arbitrary incarceration by the government. Naudé presents *raison d'état* as a fundamental law of sovereignty; whenever political authority is established, its mere existence demands its preservation at all cost. The royal encroachment of legal procedure in the case of a dangerous faction or insurrection does not serve to punish more severely or speedily, but to protect political and social order. In an apparently perpetual period of disorder the actions of a prince in line with the exigencies of 'reason of state' actually create precedent and make law. Naudé provides the Queen-regent, Anne of Austria, and her *premier ministre* Mazarin with the largest possible space for political manoeuvring, even though he councils prudence and moderation.

In the broader context of the burgeoning interest in current affairs literature and political commentary Rohan and Naudé reflected upon geopolitical developments in the maelstrom of European warfare and how they affected great political powers as the French monarchy. Both authors attempted to show how contemporary political really worked. In their analyses they describe in a rather cold and cynical style what the great play of interests consists of and matter-of-factly consider the political action that stems from them. Rulers follow interests; to Rohan and Naudé alike, this is evident and morally unproblematic. Blended with a more empirical, historical approach, the idiom of political prudence becomes a legitimate form of political analysis. French authors like Rohan and Naudé neither employed the terminology theoretically, nor ideologically.

Both were 'intellectual mediators' between the Italian and French contexts. They facilitated the transition of the application of the vogue terminology from the skirmishes of small political entities like the Italian city-states toward the analysis of the situations of the large, dynastic agglomerates, the European superpowers of the day. Vividly aware of the grim possibility of the sudden total breakdown of political order these authors used this rhetoric to unite people and mobilise them in support of policies designed to ward off these omens. The importance and dangers of 'opinion' were evident to them, albeit that the readers they primarily consisted of the French king and his ministers, other rulers, and diplomatic and learned circles. Only afterwards did the authors consider the wider dispersion of their work among an ill-defined public of readers.

In contrast to what Meinecke thought, these specific applications of French 'reason of state' from the Fall of La Rochelle to the *Frondes* do not display a body of political thought that mirrors the rise of the modern state. These seventeenth-century authors simply had no modern notion of the 'state' as a legal person. They did, however, take an important step in moving away from considerations of the moral persons and virtues of the prince and his ministers. In this way their thought not so much reflected the rise of political autonomy. Instead their analyses focused on the political leeway and the specific action the war- and arms race with the Spanish Habsburgs required. The French situation simply demanded a particular way of action that no French ruler could neglect. In other words, the geographically and historically-determined position of the French monarchy among other European powers and its internal power dynamics forced the French king to act in this and not in another way. This situation, these interests, gave political praxis its own directionality and seemingly inherent morality. The interests of the French monarch are therefore neither personal or dynastic interests, nor are they the interests of 'France'. The rhetoric of political prudence could be seen as an arsenal of arguments to show how power relations should be maintained stable in the face of gigantic political and military pressure.

Nederlandse titel
Franse 'staatsraison' vanaf de val van La Rochelle tot de *Frondes.* Politieke prudentie in de geschriften van Henri duc de Rohan en Gabriel Naudé

Nederlandse samenvatting

Deze dissertatie behandelt de vraag naar de aard en de functie van de retoriek van 'staatsraison' in de zeventiende-eeuwse, Franse monarchie, die sterk aan verandering onderhevig was. Dit wordt gedaan door een tweetal toonaangevende Franse denkers – Henri de Rohan (1579-1638) en Gabriel Naudé (1600-1653) – en hun werk op een nieuwe wijze te benaderen en voor het eerst te vergelijken. Het doel van deze studie op het gebied van intellectuele geschiedenis is het vroeg-zeventiende-eeuwse denken in termen van politieke prudentie opnieuw te belichten en te interpreteren in het licht van recente historiografische ontwikkelingen in de politieke en sociale geschiedenis. Dit *topos* was in die dagen sterk in zwang in het Franse koninkrijk dat om diverse redenen herhaaldelijk op de rand van de afgrond balanceerde en past bij deze tijd van 'crisismanagement'.

Traditioneel beschouwen historici de vroege zeventiende eeuw en de periode onder het bewind van koning Lodewijk XIII en kardinaal Richelieu in het bijzonder als de hoogtijdagen van het Franse 'staatsraison' denken. Dit pragmatische politieke gedachtengoed zou de praktische pendant zijn van de politieke theorie van het absolutisme, die de blauwdruk vormde voor de absolute monarchie in aanbouw. De historiografie over staatsvorming in vroegmodern Europa en de mechanismen van politieke macht in eind-zestiende- en zeventiende-eeuws Frankrijk heeft de afgelopen decennia verscheidene ontwikkelingen doorgemaakt waardoor het huidige beeld van de Franse 'staat' in die tijd steeds verder af komt te staan van de traditionele kijk.

De dagelijkse praktijk blijkt na uitvoerige studies een stuk weerbarstiger dan de vooronderstelde tirannieke almacht van de kardinaal-minister deed vermoeden. Richelieu zou zichzelf ten doel hebben gesteld de opstandige hoge adel en de Hugenoten te onderdrukken in het belang van eerst zichzelf en de kroon, en de bevolking in de Franse provincies hebben laten creperen in dienst van zijn oorlogszuchtigheid. Het revisionistische beeld legt de nadruk op de machtsstructuren zoals patronage-netwerken en de contingentie van gebeurtenissen waarvan Richelieu en zijn opvolger kardinaal Mazarin afhankelijk waren. Uiteindelijk konden de kardinaal-ministers niet meer dan trachten de grenzen van deze structuren tot het uiterste te rekken. Het huidige beeld van de Franse 'absolute monarchie' is dat van een complex machtssysteem van sociale collaboratie en coöperatie, waarbij de koning en zijn ministers en de oude en nieuwe elites wederzijds afhankelijk waren. Aangezien de publieke orde opeens kon instorten wanneer dit systeem faalde, groeide het belang van 'opinie', het mobiliseren van steun van vooraanstaande groepen in de Franse samenleving voor bepaalde beleidskeuzes.

Deze breed gedragen herziening van traditionele aannames met betrekking tot de werking van de macht noopt tot een hernieuwde studie van het politiek denken dat de constructie van de 'absolute monarchie' zou spiegelen. Dit onderzoek naar het denken van Rohan en Naudé – twee sterk uiteenlopende persoonlijkheden en denkers – poogt een nieuwe interpretatie te bieden van de retoriek van politieke prudentie, waarbinnen het gebruik van de termen 'staatsraison' (*raison d'état*) en staatsbelangen (*intérêt*) kan worden gevat.

Een intellectuele geschiedenis van dit onderwerp kan ook ruim negentig jaar na dato niet om het standaardwerk (1925) van Friedrich Meinecke heen. De Duitse historicus ontwaarde in de opkomst van *Die Idee der Staatsräson* de kern van de moderne Westerse staat, die aan het einde van de negentiende eeuw volledig tot wasdom was gekomen. 'Staatsraison' belichaamde de dynamische strijd tussen macht en moraliteit, die volgens Meinecke de drijvende kracht in het historisch proces is. Vele historici volgden in de voetstappen van de Duitse historicus. Twee decennia geleden benaderde Maurizio Viroli het onderwerp als een taal die een revolutie in politiek denken teweegbracht. De Italiaanse historicus ziet aan het eind van de zestiende en begin van de zeventiende eeuw een ideologisch kantelpunt, een overgang tussen politiek als het behoud van de *res publica* – de kunst van het besturen van een gemeenschap in het kader van rechtvaardigheid – en politiek als het behoud van staatsmacht in de zin van de beheersing van publieke instituties door een of meerdere personen. Hij presenteert deze transitie als een

ideologisch conflict tussen fundamentele Christelijke waarden en normen enerzijds, en de nieuwe notie van politiek anderzijds, die niet alleen een basis in goddelijk recht ontbeert, maar waarin machtsvertoon en onderdrukking leidend zouden zijn. De ideologische strijd toont voor Viroli daarmee een seculariserende tendens in het politiek denken in de vroegmoderne tijd.

In tegenstelling tot deze twee ijkpunten in de historiografie, die 'staatsraison' bezien in het licht van staatsvormings- en seculariseringsprocessen, bouwt dit onderzoek voort op recente bijdragen van historici die de terminologie benaderen als ongrijpbare, modieuze en opruiende retoriek. Niet langer wordt het gebruik van deze politieke slagzinnen geïnterpreteerd als een moderniserende ideologie of een politieke theorie die een autonome sfeer creëerde voor politieke besluitvorming. De nadruk komt meer te liggen op het praktisch gebruik door vele verschillende individuen en facties met even diverse belangen. De flexibele terminologie van politieke prudentie was zowel een retorisch instrument dat mensen kon mobiliseren en aanzetten tot handelen in sterk gepolariseerde en onrustige tijden, als dat het een bepaalde gelouterde en cynische kijk behelsde op de gang van zaken in de politiek. Het is niet zozeer dat religieuze overwegingen geen plaats hadden in de nieuwe kijk op politiek. Het traditionele, Christelijk-Aristotelische raamwerk was echter niet langer toereikend voor de schaal, de problematiek en behoeften van de zeventiende-eeuwse Franse monarchie. Eenmaal gemeengoed in de Franse politiek maakte de populaire terminologie het mogelijk enige grip te krijgen op turbulente politieke ontwikkelingen. Zoals de Britse historicus Noel Malcolm heeft vastgesteld past de populaire retoriek in een bredere context van een sterke toename in de verspreiding van politiek nieuws, commentaar en informatievoorziening in de vroege zeventiende eeuw.

Naast een herinterpretatie biedt dit onderzoek een belangrijke toevoeging aan de bestaande historiografie van zowel het denken over 'staatsraison' als van de individuele auteurs. Aangezien het gebruik van de terminologie vele historische verschijningsvormen heeft, wordt zij in dit onderzoek bestudeerd in het licht van de specifieke omstandigheden waarin zij werd ingezet. In plaats van een brede beschrijving van 'Franse staatsraison' is het doel hier een gedetailleerde interpretatie te bieden die de biografie van de auteurs, de invloed van hun intellectuele vorming en omgeving, de boekhistorische dimensie van en argumentatie in hun werk samen brengt. In tegenstelling tot voorgaande studies worden Rohan en Naudé niet benaderd als personificatie van een historiografisch concept of geschiedkundig proces. Geen van beide auteurs kan worden gezien als de belichaming van militant protestantisme, vrijdenken (*libertinage*), secularisering of de opkomst van de moderne staat. Rohan wordt bezien in de context van de rivaliteit en competitie voor koninklijke gunsten onder de Franse hoge adel en de ambities die passen bij een groot adellijk geslacht. Naudé lijkt bij nader inzien een onafhankelijk en eclectisch denker, die eerder als een gallicaans katholiek dan een radicale vrijdenker kan worden gekenschetst. Op basis van een inbedding van de geschriften van de auteurs in de biografische, sociaal-intellectuele, bibliografische en politieke context komen de intenties van de auteurs op een nadrukkelijker empirische wijze naar voren.

In deze studie staan de politieke geschriften van beide auteurs centraal, waar mogelijk zowel in manuscript als in gedrukte vorm. In de casus van Rohan is zijn hoofdwerk *De l'Interest des Princes et Estats de la Chrestienté* (1638) het voornaamste onderwerp van analyse. Daarnaast zijn echter twee tot op heden onbekende pamfletten ofwel 'Discours d'État' uit de vroege jaren dertig van groter belang dan de postuum (1646) gepubliceerde politieke verhandelingen uit de eerste twee decennia na de dood van Hendrik IV in 1610. Deze korte verhandelingen, geschreven in 1630-1631 in ballingschap in Venetië, waren Rohans eerste poging tot een brede analyse van de geopolitieke situatie in Europa en in het specifiek in Noord-Italië. In deze anoniem gepubliceerde pamfletten toont hij het gevaar dat het huis van Habsburg vormt voor verschillende politieke entiteiten in Europa en roept hij niet in de laatste plaats de Franse koning op de vrijheid in Europa te beschermen tegen het Spaanse streven naar een 'universele monarchie'. Voordat Rohan tot publicatie overging, stuurde hij de pamfletten in manuscriptvorm naar verschillende hooggeplaatste contacten. Dezelfde handelswijze paste de hertog vervolgens ook toe met het handschrift van *De l'Interest* en andere werken zoals zijn apologetische *Mémoires*. Dit toont de primaire 'publicatie'-strategie van Rohan; manuscript-circulatie. In het bibliografische intermezzo hoofdstuk bij de casus van Rohan is getracht de initiële verspreiding van het

manuscript van *De l'Interest* te reconstrueren vanaf het moment dat de hertog het aanbood aan kardinaal Richelieu in augustus 1634. Daarnaast behandelt dit boekhistorische hoofdstuk de publicatiegeschiedenis van dit hoofdwerk, waarbij het drukproces in tegenstelling tot eerdere interpretaties niet als postuum wordt beschouwd.

In het geval van Naudé komen de belangrijkste bronnen, de *Considérations politiques sur les coups d'Estat* (1639) en de *Mascurat* (1649-1650), eveneens in een ander licht te staan door een boekhistorische benadering. De publicatie van het beruchte werk over 'staatsraison' en 'buitengewone machtsingrepen' blijkt naar alle waarschijnlijkheid in Parijs in 1648 gedrukt te zijn door Sebastien Cramoisy en familie. Deze hypothese neemt de plaats in van de historiografisch nog altijd breed geaccepteerde, maar ontegenzeggelijk gefingeerde informatie op de titelpagina, die 'Rome, 1639' te lezen geeft. Cramoisy – de 'koning' van de drukkersbuurt in Parijs en drukker van de *Imprimerie royale* – drukte in 1649 en 1650 ook de twee edities van de *Mascurat*. Niet alleen blijken beide boeken korter na elkaar gedrukt en stammen ze uit hetzelfde atelier, ook toont de vergelijking van de twee edities van de *Mascurat* aan dat de tweede, aanzienlijk uitgebreide editie meer 'considérations politiques' bevat. De toevoeging en het specifieke gebruik van 'staatsraison'-argumentatie in de *Mascurat* moet daarom bezien worden in het licht van Naudé's gebruik van de modieuze terminologie in zijn andere politieke werken, de *Bibliographia politica* (1633) en de *Considérations politiques*.

De wijze waarop Rohan en Naudé de terminologie inzetten bevestigt de fluïde en inwisselbare aard van politieke prudentie. Hoewel hun werk vaak is aangezien voor het theoretiseren van een bepaalde ideologie komt hier juist het specifieke, particularistische en context-gebonden gebruik naar voren dat de auteurs maakten van het idioom. Dat wil niet zeggen dat slechts particularistische motieven een rol speelden. Wel wisten beide auteurs op ingenieuze wijze eigen belangen te verbinden aan de belangen van het Franse koninkrijk in de specifieke kwesties waarin zij intervenieerden met hun publicatie. In de intellectuele context van zijn Venetiaanse ballingschap en zijn positie als recente rebel en oude rivaal van Richelieu gebruikte Rohan de term 'interest' om de oorlogsfactie aan het hof te steunen en de kardinaal-minister tot openlijke oorlogsvoering tegen Spanje te bewegen. De ogenschijnlijk 'objectieve' analyse van de belangen van vorsten en andere Europese politieke machten bouwt een vijandsbeeld op van de Habsburgers dat stilzwijgend en op de achtergrond strookt met de Protestantse belangen waarvoor de hertog in de jaren twintig vocht. Rohan laat zien hoe de Spaanse geopolitieke inspanningen geënt zijn op het onderwerpen van Europa aan Habsburgs gezag en roept de Franse koning op militair en diplomatiek tegenwicht te bieden, zoals hij eerder in de 'Venetiaanse verhandelingen' deed.

Naudé schreef zijn uitgebreide overwegingen over 'staatsraison', de *Considérations politiques*, eveneens in een Italiaanse intellectuele context, hoewel zijn denken ontegenzeggelijk gericht was op Frankrijk. In de turbulente periode van onrust en politieke wanorde van de *Frondes* paste de Parijse geleerde het denken toe in de verdediging van zijn *mecenas*, kardinaal-minister Mazarin. De aanleiding voor de toevoeging in de tweede editie van de *Mascurat* lijkt te maken te hebben met de escalatie van de factiestrijd aan het hof en de arrestatie van de prins de Condé in januari 1650. In de pamflettenoorlog in de straten van Parijs en in het *Parlement* laaide het 'staatsgevangenen'-debat weer op met als inzet het tegengaan van willekeur in het opsluiten van arrestanten. *Raison d'état* wordt door Naudé gepresenteerd als fundamentele wet van soevereiniteit; wanneer macht eenmaal is gevestigd dwingt het bestaan tot het behoud ervan. Het doorbreken van rechtsprocedures door de vorst in het geval van een gevaarlijke opstand of factie dient niet zozeer om sneller te straffen, maar om de politieke en sociale orde te beschermen. In de schijnbaar oneindige periode van wanorde verandert de buitengewone in de normale situatie; in een situatie van quasi-permanente politieke noodzakelijkheid maakt het handelen van de vorst in lijn met 'staatsraison' wet. Naudé verschaft de regentes, Anna van Oostenrijk, en haar eerste minister Mazarin op deze wijze de grootst mogelijke politieke bewegingsruimte. Desalniettemin pleit de Parijzenaar voor gematigd gebruik van dit politieke wapen.

In de bredere Europese context van een toename in interesse in actualiteitsbeschouwingen en politiek commentaar beschreven ook Rohan en Naudé hun bevindingen over geopolitieke ontwikkelingen in de maalstroom van de Europese oorlogen en de weerslag die ze hadden op

grote politieke machten als de Franse monarchie. Beide auteurs willen laten zien hoe het er aan toe gaat in de politiek. In hun analyses beschrijven zij op vrij kille, cynische toon wat het grote belangenspel inhoudt en beschouwen zakelijk welk politiek handelen daar uit volgt. Machthebbers volgen belangen, dat is voor hen een gegeven en niet moreel problematisch. Het idioom van politieke prudentie wordt in combinatie met een meer empirische, historische benadering een legitieme politieke beschouwingsvorm. Franse auteurs als Rohan en Naudé gebruikten de terminologie van 'staatsraison' noch theoretisch, noch ideologisch. Beiden waren in zekere zin 'tussenpersonen' tussen de Italiaanse en Franse context. Zij faciliteerden de overgang van de toepassing van dit denken op de schermutselingen van kleine politieke entiteiten als de Italiaanse stadsstaten naar de analyse van de situatie van Europese grootmachten. Zich volledig bewust van de mogelijkheid van de plotselinge ineenstorting van de politieke orde gebruikten deze schrijvers de retoriek om mensen te verenigen en mobiliseren achter het beleid van een belangrijke stroming in de regering om dit angstbeeld te voorkomen. Het belang van 'opinie' was voor hen evident, al bleef het publiek dat ze adresseerden in eerste instantie voornamelijk beperkt tot de Franse koning en zijn ministers, andere vorsten, diplomatieke en geleerde kringen. Slechts in tweede instantie bereikte hun werk een mogelijk breder lezerspubliek.

In tegenstelling tot wat Meinecke beweerde, tonen deze specifieke uitingsvormen van het Franse gebruik van 'staatsraison' vanaf de val van La Rochelle tot de *Frondes* geen politiek denken dat parallel liep aan de opkomst van de moderne staat. Deze zeventiende-eeuwse auteurs kenden de moderne notie van de 'staat' als rechtspersoon niet. De denkbeweging waarmee deze denkers afstand namen van overwegingen omtrent de morele persoon en deugden van de vorst en zijn ministers had niet zozeer te maken met de zogenaamde opkomst van de autonomie van politiek. Hun analyses besloegen juist de politieke bewegingsruimte en het handelen waartoe de oorlogs- en wapenwedloop met de Spaanse Habsburgers noopte. De specifieke Franse situatie vroeg simpelweg om een bepaalde manier van handelen, daar kon geen enkele Franse vorst of bestuurder omheen. Door de geografische en historisch-gegroeide positie van het Franse koninkrijk tussen andere Europese machten en haar interne machtsdynamiek werd de Franse koning zogezegd gedwongen een bepaald beleid te voeren. Deze situatie, deze belangen geven het praktische bestuur daarmee richting en lijken een eigen inherente moraliteit te hebben. De belangen van een Franse monarch zijn daarmee niet zozeer persoonlijke of dynastieke belangen, noch zijn het de belangen van 'Frankrijk'. De 'staatsraison'-retoriek kan worden gezien als een argumenten-arsenaal om te betogen hoe machtsrelaties onder grote politieke en militaire druk zo stabiel mogelijk konden worden gehouden.

Curriculum Vitae

Jesper Schaap (1987) was born in Rotterdam. He began his studies in History at Erasmus University Rotterdam in 2006. In 2009 he completed a thesis on the American Beat poet Allen Ginsberg's role in the counterculture of the 1960s. After briefly studying Philosophy at the same university, he received a BA in History in 2010. That year he attended a summer school at the University of California in Berkeley, USA to follow up on his interests in beat and sixties culture. Back in Rotterdam, Jesper started the next academic year with a research master focused on his other great research interest, Early Modern Intellectual History. The MA-thesis he wrote on Gabriel Naudé (1600-1653) would become one of the foundations for his PhD research on French 'reason of state' and 'interest' thinking in the first half of the seventeenth century. This culminated in a dissertation entitled *French 'Reason of State' from the Fall of La Rochelle to the* Frondes*: Political Prudence in the Writings of Henri duc de Rohan and Gabriel Naudé* in 2019. Besides his academic endeavours Jesper enjoys sports – soccer and running –, (live) music, poetry and conversations over drinks with friends.