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To cite this article: Maria Grever & Robbert-Jan Adriaansen (2019) Historical consciousness: the enigma of different paradigms, Journal of Curriculum Studies, 51:6, 814-830, DOI: 10.1080/00220272.2019.1652937

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00220272.2019.1652937

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Published online: 15 Oct 2019.

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Historical consciousness: the enigma of different paradigms

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ABSTRACT

To make historical consciousness beneficial for history education research we need to disentangle its multidisciplinary backgrounds so that contradictory approaches and outcomes can be avoided. The aim of this article therefore is to clarify the enigma of its different paradigms. We will discuss two interrelated paradigms: one interpreting historical consciousness as a collective phenomenon that is characteristic for modern Western society, and the other treating historical consciousness on an individual level as a cognitive-epistemological category. We will show that several misunderstandings in educational research about historical consciousness result from the conflation of both conceptualisations and its underlying paradigms. Yet, by highlighting Hans-Georg Gadamer’s notion of \textit{Wirkungsgeschichte} (historical effect) we will argue that both conceptualisations are not entirely mutually exclusive. Including historically effected consciousness in the notion of historical consciousness does offer a wide range of opportunities, for history education scholars as well as history educators.

KEYWORDS

Historical consciousness; historical culture; philosophy of history; hermeneutics; history education research

‘Salute to SS men? Never!’ This was a headline in the Dutch newspaper \textit{De Gelderlander} on 16 July 2018, referring to a commemoration by uniformed German military at the war cemetery in Ysselsteyn near the German border (Vogels, 2018). Every year soldiers from many countries walk the famous International Four Days Marches in Nijmegen. On their day off the Germans and other militaries from Canada, the UK and the Netherlands take the opportunity to commemorate their compatriots who had fallen during the Second World War. Ysselsteyn is the largest German military cemetery in the Netherlands: almost 32,000 Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS soldiers, war criminals and Dutch collaborators are buried there. The German commemoration at Ysselsteyn evoked conflicting responses. Dutch and German antifascist organizations protested fiercely. They argued that one does not salute ‘these SS soldiers and Dutch accomplices responsible for the deportation of 100,000 Dutch Jews’ (Vogels, 2018). The educator of the cemetery explained that this was not an official commemoration and pointed to the fact that 1,400 child soldiers—boys in their early teens—are buried there as well.

Whatever we think or feel about the dispute, it obviously reveals that the involved parties are clearly aware of the impact of World War II, but attribute opposing meanings to this commemoration. These attributions stem from different interpretative frameworks. Growing up in communities with specific stories, images, rituals and silences about the past, people seek for, create or adjust existing narratives they want to be part of while avoiding others. This whole process of becoming aware of any past in the present is dynamic and constantly changing, both on collective and individual levels, and is usually referred to as ‘historical consciousness’.

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Although the concept of historical consciousness is subject of an incredible amount of studies (see e.g. Clark & Grever, 2018, pp. 178–179), its meaning and empirical application remain vague and rather enigmatic. One of the reasons is that the concept is grounded in various philosophical, anthropological, historiographic and educational disciplines with different normative (political or didactic) agendas. Within the educational discipline, Körber (2016, p. 442) points to the diversity of conceptual uses and functions of historical consciousness, both nationally and internationally. Several education researchers also question the Western (Eurocentric) bias of the concept (e.g. Körber, 2016; Rüsen, 2002; Seixas, 2012). It is, however, precisely in this field that researchers tend to use the concept in ahistorical ways, leading to the perpetuation of a Western conception of history as linear development. Körber’s distinction (2016, p. 444) between a narrow and a broad definition of the concept of historical consciousness does not solve this problem either, as we shall show later in our argumentation. Hence, we urgently need to clarify the multidisciplinary backgrounds of historical consciousness and disentangle the paradigms and approaches that have shaped its conceptualization. Our aim is not only to gain a better understanding of the layered meanings of historical consciousness but most of all to enhance the opportunities of the concept for a more encompassing application in history education research and education practices. We also hope that our explanation can support history and museum educators when dealing with emotional responses of students and visitors like in the case of the military commemoration ritual in Ysselsteyn.

In this article we will disentangle two interrelated paradigms in the humanities: the first one considers historical consciousness as a collective phenomenon and studies its perceived rise as a pivotal moment in the genesis of modern self-understanding; the second one treats historical consciousness as an individual competence and use it for the training of cognitive capacities with which people can understand the past. Whereas the first paradigm is used in cultural, intellectual and conceptual history, the second is prominent in history education research. Next, we will discuss a third tradition in the humanities that links the two paradigms: the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer. We will show that this tradition is of particular value for educational research (Nixon, 2017), but that its opportunities have not been thoroughly explored.

We start in the first section with an explanation of the emergence of the concept of historical consciousness, conceived as a collective mentality in cultural and intellectual history. We will subsequently discuss the limits of this approach by pairing the concept of historical consciousness with the concept of historical culture. In the second section we will show how the meaning of historical consciousness in history didactics and history education research developed mainly as a cognitive-epistemological category. The third section focuses on Gadamer’s ontological approach of hermeneutics in order to show that both paradigms are not entirely mutually exclusive, and can—in some cases—be fruitfully combined. In order to reach the concept’s potential, we argue with Gadamer that a hermeneutic-ontological approach needs to be taken into account in conceptualizing historical consciousness, because one of the main reasons for historical consciousness perpetuating a Western bias is its treatment as a mere cognitive-epistemological category in history education practices and research. In the fourth section we explore a number of ways in which this hermeneutic approach can be beneficial for history education research, particularly for understanding and applying multiperspectivity.

1. Historical consciousness as part of historical culture

Historians generally treat historical consciousness as that part of modern consciousness that is concerned with the past. In this view, historical consciousness emerged as a collective mentality closely linked to the rise of modernity and what has been called the ‘acceleration of history’ (Halévy, 1948; Koselleck, 1979/2000, pp. 63–64). The speeding up of historical developments in eighteenth-century Western society resulted in a view of history as a holistic process of progress aimed at an unknown, open future (Koselleck, 1979/2000, p. 143). This linear understanding of
history supplanted earlier ‘cyclical’ humanist notions of time, which understood the past as a reservoir of exempla that could serve as models for future action (Hartog, 2015, p. 72ff). The present was seen as a continuation of the past, and changes were interpreted as temporary disturbances of the natural state (Blaas, 1978). Reinhart Koselleck has famously proposed his idea of a Sattelzeit that stretches from approximately 1750 to 1850 in which these earlier understandings of history were gradually replaced by, or reinvented as modern historical consciousness (Koselleck, 1972, p. XXVI). It has, for example, been argued that the linear aspects of modern historical consciousness are the result of a secularization of Christian eschatology (Löwith, 1957). Modern historical consciousness understands the past to be essentially different from the present, and cannot accept tradition as a prescriptive guide for future action because contemporary demands are not the same as demands in the past (Clark & Grever, 2018, p. 179). For this reason, Wolfgang Reinhard has argued that ‘the “modern period” was the only age that ever existed, because it thought of and created itself as a historical period’ (Reinhard, 1997, p.291).

The entanglement of historical consciousness and historical reality—to which Reinhard refers—causes a dilemma, as only two options seem to be available: either modern historical consciousness invents historical reality through historical imagination and the ‘pastness of the past’ is just an effect of consciousness, or historical consciousness is the result of historical circumstances—e.g. the acceleration of history due to external societal developments—and thus a subjective awareness of an objectively existing distance. The ‘pastness of the past’ is then an attribute of historical reality and can be discovered in a learning process. Both options are not unproblematic as they raise many questions concerning the assumptions behind the semantics and conceptualisations of historical consciousness. Generally, history education scholars such as Shemilt (2000), Lee and Ashby (2000) and Rüsen (2004) have based their argument on the second viewpoint and assume that—according to didactic principles—this subjective awareness of a changing society can be enhanced by training (Körber, 2016, p. 446). We will elaborate on this issue later in our article.

For now, let us briefly focus on the first approach. When historians interpret historical consciousness as a defining feature of modern self-understanding, the question is raised about the relationship between historical consciousness and the cultural expressions thereof: historical culture. German scholars have argued that historical consciousness and historical culture are intrinsically related. They conceptualize historical consciousness as an individual and mental process, which is expressed in the construction of a shared, collective historical culture. Historical culture and historical consciousness then appear as two sides of the same coin (Rüsen, 1997, 2017, p. 168; Triepke, 2011). But if one interprets historical culture as an expression of historical consciousness, one assumes historical consciousness to exist outside of historical culture providing it with an essentialist and a-historical meaning.

Hence the issue is to historicize and dynamise historical consciousness. To tackle this, we have defined historical culture as a holistic concept that offers the possibility to investigate the different ways in which people give meaning to the past (Grever & Adriaanssen, 2017). Although all cultures have an understanding of the three temporal dimensions past, present and future, the meaning cultures attribute to these temporal dimensions is historically and culturally variable. For this reason, we have defined historical culture as an inclusive concept that tries to avoid a prioritization of a modern Western or Eurocentric understanding of history, as had been the case in many history didactics studies (Seixas, 2016a, p. 429). This concept encompasses not only the specific contents of collective memory and historical imagination, but also the ways in which relationships to the past are established in a dynamic interaction between human agency, tradition, performance of memory, historical representations and their dissemination, as well as the presumptions about what exactly constitutes history. For that reason, we have distinguished three mutually dependent and interactive levels of analysis in the study of historical culture: 1. historical narratives and performances of the past; 2. mnemonic infrastructures; 3. conceptions of history.
Now, in this approach historical consciousness is primarily related to the third level: the often implicit but no less influential conceptions of history which shape specific historical practices of historical cultures and vice versa. Conceptions of history are specific interpretations of the relationship between the three temporal dimensions past, present and future that determine on the one hand a degree of human agency and on the other the epistemological (im)possibilities to know the past (Grever & Adriaansen, 2017, pp. 81–82). They interpret and give meaning to the historicity of human existence, and can take many forms. In the modern conception of history, the configuration of the three temporal dimensions indicates an understanding of history as a ‘collective singular’ (Koselleck, 1979/2000, p. 51) comprising a unidirectional path from the past into the future that is carried by human (not divine) actions that create a chain of cause and effect. Although conceptions of history tend to proclaim universality, they are not universal. Instead, they vary in time and space; they overlap, entangle or conflict with other conceptions of history. Notions of human agency being the driving force of history may be at odds with, for example, the eschatologies of the monotheistic religions—such as Christianity—which conflict with the idea of time being infinite and with the notion of an open, unknown future. But even the conception of uni-directionality itself is not universal. For instance, the Aymara people in northern Chile use a spatial construal of time with a rather static mapping of past and future (Núñez & Sweetser, 2006). Metaphorically Aymara speakers place the known past in front before them, and the unknown and unknowable future behind their back. This approach is expressed in the word for future time, q’ipa pacha, of which q’ipa translates as ‘behind’ or ‘the back’. The impression is also that the Aymara seem uninterested in going ‘forward’ and progress (see for instance on this issue, situated in the context of the Greek island Naxos, also Stewart, 2012).

Instead of seeing historical culture as an expression of historical consciousness, we recognize historical consciousness as a part of historical culture. Historical consciousness is not just an individual mental process, but is also understood as a mode of relating to the past that is characteristic for a particular historical culture—namely of modern Western historical culture. Seeing historical culture as the expression of historical consciousness would hamper a historicizing and dynamic approach towards historical culture, as it would presuppose a modern conception of history behind all historical cultures. By emphasizing that historical consciousness can entail different things in different historical cultures (Schott, 1968; Assmann, 2007, p. 66ff.) and in order to grasp these dynamics, it is important to study historical consciousness in relationship to the conceptions of history of a particular historical culture (Grever & Adriaansen, 2017). The fact that this variability in the meaning of historical consciousness has been somewhat overlooked in history education research has led to a conceptual confusion that we would like to clarify by disentangling the second, educational, paradigm that understands historical consciousness as an individual competence of historical understanding from the paradigm that understands historical consciousness as a collective mentality we have just discussed.

2. Historical consciousness and history education

In the past decades, historical consciousness has become one of the central concepts of history education and didactics. Strengthening historical consciousness was the innovative educational approach of new history education curricula in Sweden in the 1990s (Thorpe, 2014), somewhat later also in the Netherlands (Wilschut, 2002), and currently in sixteen German state history curricula (Kölbl & Konrad, 2015, p. 23; cf Seixas, 2017, p. 61). In history education scholarship the concept is treated quite differently compared to the aforementioned intellectual and conceptual historians who investigated historical consciousness as a shift in historical mentality on a collective level. Scholars in didactics and history education research do not question the conceptual origin of historical consciousness; its relevance is more or less taken for granted—certainly within the context of Western societies. Initially, this field broadly used the concept in reference to the awareness that people live in time and that societies and institutions have historically developed
and have a future that awaits them (Jeismann, 1988). Later history education researchers stressed a competency approach concerning the cognitive and epistemological aspects of historical consciousness, with the aim of thematising historical understanding as something that is not isolated, but serves students in contemporary life. Nevertheless, within this field there are both differences and parallel developments that have emerged in specific national and linguistic contexts (Seixas, 2015).

In the UK the empirical research of Lee and Ashby (2000), Shemilt (1980, 2000), and others has been very influential in the 1970s-80s focus on a more discipline-oriented approach of history education. In their view history education involves more than telling stories and learning factual knowledge, it also means advancing students’ capacity to apply historical skills and meta-historical concepts, such as ‘evidence’ or ‘continuity and change’ (Seixas & Morton, 2013). In 1980 the Cambridge History Project developed a curriculum based on so-called second order concepts (e.g. evidence, explanation, historical account), while Lee and Ashby (2000) identified a six-staged model of historical learning (Levesque & Clark, 2018, p. 121). Some years later Lee provided a list of seven historical consciousness criteria to determine students’ capacity to historicize and understand their own relationship to the past, such as field (the ability to incorporate wider areas and longer time-spans) and coherence (the ability to make internal connexions, including explanatory ones, within strands). The expectation was ‘that there would be progression in these areas as students moved through school’ (Lee, 2004b, p. 13; cfr. Clark & Grever, 2018, p. 191).

In Germany, research into historical consciousness has been far more inspired by the philosophy of history. Hans Jürgen Pandel (1987) published on the dimensions of historical consciousness in an attempt to operationalise the concept for history education research and its application in teaching practices. He distinguished no less than nine dimensions, of which the awareness of time, historicity and reality are considered crucial (Grever & Van Boxtel, 2014, pp. 83–84). Jörn Rüsen (1989, 2004) further elaborated the competency approach by stressing first of all the competency to orient oneself in time related to daily practical life. Conceptualizing historical consciousness as a synthesis of moral and temporal consciousness, he developed a theoretical model that could reveal ‘the procedures of historical consciousness’ (Rüsen, 2004, p. 79). This model entails a sequence of four types or stages of historical consciousness leading to an increasingly critical historical understanding: 1. the traditional stage recognizes the continuity of tradition—historical inheritance becomes a sort of prescription; 2. the exemplary stage uses the past to instruct contemporary action and belief; 3. the critical stage deconstructs any necessary continuity of tradition; 4. the genetic stage recognizes that time has changed and historicizes difference across time as a process of dynamic development. Although Rüsen has argued that his model is not prescriptive, it undeniably demonstrates a certain ontogeny. In his view this model is a tool to ‘construct a theory of ontogenetic development of historical consciousness’ (Rüsen, 2004, p. 78). Rüsen (2005, p. viii) also opposes a hierarchical approach, but what that means in practice is unclear. Despite the fact that Rüsen has stimulated international research on history education tremendously, his model of historical consciousness has also been criticized, particularly for not including the development of students’ ideas about the nature of history as a discipline (Lee, 2004a, p. 140–141).

In the 1990s, similar to the UK, American and Canadian scholars investigated the practical aspects of history education and less the theoretical principles of historical consciousness (Seixas, 2015, p. 4). In the USA, the ‘cognitive revolution’ in learning and teaching—introduced by Jerome Bruner (1960)—resulted in a shift from memorizing unquestioned historical narratives in history classes to ‘acts of meaning and sense making’ (Stearns, Seixas, & Wineburg, 2000, p. 4). Particularly Sam Wineburg’s famous book Historical thinking and other unnatural acts (2001) pays attention to reading sources (e.g. documents, newspapers) historically so that students become aware of, for instance, the document’s identity (e.g. who produced it, when and where) and its context (the circumstances). Instead of presenting a trajectory of stepping stones he basically considers historical thinking as dealing with the tension between the familiar and the strange past, ‘between
feelings of proximity and feelings of distance in relation to the people we seek to understand. Hence the importance of the capacity ‘to change the basic mental structures we use to grasp the meaning of the past’ (Wineburg, 2001, p. 5–7).

In 2002, Peter Seixas founded the Centre for the Study of Historical Consciousness in Vancouver, marked by an international conference, which resulted in the publication of the volume Theorizing historical consciousness (Seixas, 2004). This volume is in fact the first encounter between on the one hand the German discourse on Geschichtsbewusstsein represented by Rüsen and on the other hand the empirical research of British, US and Canadian scholars on the practical use and operationalization of the term historical consciousness, as represented by Lee (Seixas, 2016a, p. 429). The Centre stimulated and explored various aspects of historical consciousness, such as visualizations and different narratives (Anderson, 2017; Seixas, 2004). Most important is that this Centre contributed to a large-scale empirical research project in Canada about the role history plays in contemporary society and how people engage with the past in daily life (Conrad et al., 2013). Moreover, the Centre also organized the Historical Thinking Project, which published a practical guidebook, The big six. Historical thinking concepts (Seixas & Morton, 2013). Seixas implicitly assumes a correlation between the development of historical consciousness and students’ capacity for historical thinking. Inspired by Megill (1994), he designed a history/memory matrix to clarify the various roles of history education. The matrix bridges historical practices based on the historical discipline with its emphasis on developing competencies and mnemonic beliefs embedded in the (overlapping) public memories of larger and smaller communities students bring into the classroom (Seixas, 2016b). In this matrix the significance of competencies is somewhat reduced.

At the same time, German researchers have taken much effort in the elaboration of Rüsen’s theoretical model into a set of concrete skills. As part of the collaborative HiTCH (Historical Thinking – Competencies in History) project, Körber and Meyer-Hamme have developed the ‘FUER-model’ as a framework for assessment and attainment in historical consciousness, consisting of four competencies of historical consciousness: 1. competence in questioning, or enquiry; 2. methodological competence; 3. orientational competence (in relation to time); 4. disciplinary competence (in using the concepts of historical practice) (Körber & Meyer-Hamme, 2015). Particularly Körber (2015, p. 19) considers historical consciousness a competence—‘a competence to think historically’. In his view historical thinking affects a number of dispositions such as norms, values, identities, and ideas about the nature and purpose of history. As these interrelated dispositions support students’ temporal orientation and identification, it is the complex of abstract dispositions infused by historical thinking that Körber calls historical consciousness. Similar to Rüsen’s four stages of historical consciousness, Körber’s approach indicates a development from a mental tabula rasa state to a state of full historical consciousness. Departing from a tabula rasa-like state of ignorance and indifference towards the past, historical consciousness progresses through a second state of uncritical appropriation of the past, to a third state of knowledge-based understanding of the past, to a final stage of full historical consciousness that equals a critical understanding of one’s own historicity.

Recently, based on Rüsen’s theoretical framework, similar debates developed in Spain, Portugal and Latin America. For instance, Miguel-Revilla and Sánchez-Agustí (2018) discussed the relation between historical consciousness and second order concepts of historical thinking, and Barca and Schmidt (2013) investigated students’ historical consciousness in a qualitative study carried out in Brazilian and Portuguese schools.

In the context of this article, the above account of reflections on historical consciousness in different countries is necessarily concise. Nevertheless, the observed close connections between historical consciousness and historical thinking competences with complex schemes and matrixes of increasing historical consciousness tends to mimic the supposed pattern of the past. The risk is that the road to consciousness is explained as a model of progressive development, more or less similar to how modern historical consciousness understands history in general, a model that is characterized by a particular Hegelian rationale with all the problems
that it brings. We could agree that a toddler, with no understanding of chronology, displays ‘historical ignorance’, but should we deny decades of postcolonial criticism by characterizing non-Western cultures as such?

3. Historical consciousness and hermeneutic philosophy

The reason for modelling the development of historical consciousness after the modern conception of history could be that it explains how it is possible that an understanding of the past equals an understanding of the self. In any case a theory of understanding must somehow link the subject of understanding to the object of understanding. Historically, however, the ties between the past and the understanding thereof have been rooted differently. It has been argued that the concept of historical consciousness stems from Hegelian philosophers who used the term to describe Hegel’s philosophical system (Von Renthe-Fink, 1971). To Hegel, history is the expression of the developing self-consciousness of Spirit (Geist). Spirit reflects a principle of thought that signifies the unity of human individual consciousness and a pantheistic form of general or divine consciousness. Spirit is imagined as an absolute Spirit that expresses itself both in human subjectivity as well as ‘objectively’ in culture and society in terms of institutions and ideas. In Hegel’s view, history is the growing self-consciousness of Spirit, which means that through human subjectivity Spirit establishes the understanding that history and culture are no objectively existing entities that somehow call upon the individual, but that this objective world is the product of Spirit (Sedgwick, 2015). It is relevant for our investigation to note that the Hegelian framework does provide an intrinsic link between historical reality and the understanding—or consciousness—thereof, namely by detaching the Spirit from the individual and subordinating individual consciousness to that of a pantheistic, supra-temporal (i.e. eternal) Spirit of which historical reality is also an expression. For Hegel individual historical consciousness is not a consciousness of a relationship of the individual to a past that objectively existed—i.e. a consciousness of continuity and discontinuity, of cause and effect or of historical distance—rather it is a consciousness of the fact that history itself is the product of Spirit (Hüffer, 2002).

In the course of the nineteenth century Hegel’s idealist framework—primarily the a priori assumptions on which it rested—was scrutinized, but the concept survived in the late nineteenth century philosophy of history of Wilhelm Dilthey (De Mul, 2004; Dilthey, 2002). Dilthey recognized historical consciousness constituting the historical worldview of the modern West, but unlike Hegel he situated the possibilities of knowing the past not in an abstract notion of Spirit, but in a notion of life experience (Erlebnis). Through using our own life experiences, it is possible to reconstruct the type of experiences of which a particular source is an expression, and hence to understand its meaning. This approach may have revitalized the concept of historical consciousness, but it had not eradicated the problem of resorting to some type of metaphysics to connect past to present—in this case the universal validity of experience was assumed. This is what Hans-Georg Gadamer strove to solve.

At first glance, Gadamer’s understanding of historical consciousness appears to be ambiguous. On the one hand, Gadamer does recognize historical consciousness to be a consciousness of the finitude and relativity of all historical phenomena, as it arose in the late 1800s (Makita, 1993, p. 323), firmly in line with the mentality approach. He argued that the development of the hermeneutical method in the modern period culminated in the rise of historical consciousness (Gadamer, 2006, p. 175), marking a radical rupture with former centuries. Yet in his view the broken relationship with a self-evident tradition may not hamper our awareness of its impact. He agrees in this respect with other hermeneutic philosophers such as Paul Ricoeur who summarized this transition by his statement that people in earlier epochs had thought of themselves as having a history, that they did not think of themselves as ‘making history’ (Ricoeur, 2004; White, 2007, p. 243).

But on the other hand, Gadamer’s attitude towards historical consciousness also approximates the competency approach, albeit in very critical way. The problem Gadamer identifies concerns the
type of understanding historical consciousness implies. The acknowledgement of the historical relativity of the past has resulted in an epistemological dilemma that became increasingly visible during the so-called ‘crisis of historicism’ in the first decades of the twentieth century. The problem is that if one acknowledges historical consciousness to be an insight in the relativity of the past, it also implies the relativity of the present. How then, can one escape one’s own relative historical horizon in order to understand the past on its own terms? Gadamer thus questioned the epistemological foundation of Romantic hermeneutics and historicism, which accounted for the alterity of the past, but not for the historicity of the contemporary observer. It was highly problematic, Gadamer noticed, that historical consciousness required the absence of prejudice, whereas the prejudices with which one approaches the past are a main characteristic of human historicity (Makita, 1993, p. 322).

Building on the legacy of Heidegger’s phenomenology, Gadamer arrives at the position that historical consciousness cannot escape its own historicity, that it cannot entail a normative supra-historical understanding of or an orientation to the past. Historical consciousness had been falsely understood as such as it had denied the interpreter’s own historicity by requiring the methodological removal of prejudices and a leap out of one’s own historical position in order to think historically, that is, thinking on and in the terms of the historical text that is analysed. Rather than acknowledging the historical position of the interpreter, historical consciousness demanded it be annulled. Comparing the interpretation of a historical source text to a conversation, Gadamer identified a central problem. What happens is that the interpreter claims to understand the opinion of the conversational partner by bracketing his own opinion. In a true conversation, however, both conversation partners display a fundamental openness to each other’s truth claims. Then the interpreter does not bracket his own historically situated pre- or fore-understanding of the text, but utilizes it in order to make the text meaningful to oneself. This means, that the conversation can also alter the opinion of the interpreter, when one—for example—is grasped by remarks that one did not expect based on the preunderstanding of the text. What both conversation partners share is the subject matter (die Sache) of the conversation, which both approach from within their own horizons of understanding.

The true conversation, Gadamer states, corresponds with what he calls *wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein*—translated as ‘historically effected consciousness’ (Gadamer, 2006, p. 336)—a consciousness that is both aware of the historicity of the past, and of the historicity of the conceptual and interpretive framework of the subject. Historically effected consciousness includes a meta-historical dimension, meaning an awareness of the relativity and limitations of one’s own historicity. To Gadamer, historically effected consciousness is not a concept that ought to replace historical consciousness as a better theory of historical understanding, it is simply historical consciousness becoming aware of its own historicity. It is a historical consciousness that understands the necessity of an open conversation with the past and the impossibility of bracketing the pre-understanding of the interpreter without violating the horizon of the text (Makita, 1993, p. 325). It acknowledges the traditions of interpretation and understanding in which the interpreter finds himself, but does not utilize this as a fixed frame of interpretation. Rather, it displays an openness to other, unexpected voices that may challenge the interpreter’s horizon. We can thus conclude that to Gadamer true historical consciousness is historically effected consciousness.

There are at least two problematic aspects to Gadamer’s theory. First, in his hermeneutic model of understanding Gadamer pays little attention to social power relations (Habermas, 1990). Understanding implies being able to identify and to articulate—mainly verbally—various perspectives on the same (historical) subject matter or situation (Grever, 2012). Language discloses the world we share with others, allowing us to understand each other. From early childhood we learn to speak and to write, hence we learn to participate in a linguistic community. Because languages are translatable into one another, we can also understand foreign people, cultures and worlds (Gadamer, 2006, p. 386–389). Although Gadamer makes an important statement here, disclosing the world through language does not guarantee a common reference point of dialogue (Vasterling,
Without a common reference point it is difficult or even impossible to have a genuine dialogue. Certainly if we realize that a necessary condition for any dialogue is a commitment of the interlocutors to treat each other as equals in a spirit of mutual respect (Lefstein, 2006).

Another, second, problematic aspect in Gadamer’s hermeneutics is that by presenting historically effected consciousness as an advanced form of historical consciousness he implicitly assumes a kind of linear progression by not detaching historically effected consciousness from the rise of historical consciousness in modernity. Gadamer sees historically effected consciousness not as an understanding of an objective past, but as a mediation of past and present, and does acknowledge that such mediation also took place prior to the rise of modern historical consciousness (Gadamer, 2006, p. 295, p. 305). Yet on a closer look, the problem of linearity is not that problematic as Gadamer’s theory does not entail a return to a premodern understanding of history, precisely because one cannot erase the legacy of historicism from one’s Wirkungsgeschichte. The linearity that constitutes modern historical consciousness cannot and need not be annulled, because it is part of the tradition that constitutes the fore-understanding of any Western interpreter. Yet, this very fact should be reckoned by historical consciousness.

Thus, despite the limitations, Gadamer opens up a notion of historical consciousness that is aware of the historicity on which it operates. This meta-historical consciousness is not always required for historical understanding—most often an understanding of the subject matter is reached based on a formal and content-wide reading of the text without any challenges to the preunderstanding of the interpreter. But when the text speaks to the interpreter in ways unforeseen or when the difference between interpreter and text dominates the conversation, then this difference can only lead to understanding on the basis of a historically effected consciousness that takes the historically given metahistorical assumptions of the interpreter into account. This also highlights the ontological dimension of Gadamer’s hermeneutics: understanding changes our disposition in the world and affects the ways in which we approach whatever is familiar or unfamiliar to us.

This perspective solves the epistemological issues historical consciousness faces, particularly the risk of assuming the Western conception of history to have universal validity when operationalizing the notion of historical consciousness. Instead, incorporating historically effected consciousness into the notion of historical consciousness would force scholars to reflect on these assumptions and would also force them to include this meta-reflection in their models of historical understanding. This is also where the challenge lies for history education. How to operationalize such a notion of historical consciousness remains the question. We will now outline some possibilities to promote inclusive and nuanced historical understanding in contemporary history education by using this elaborated notion of historical consciousness.

4. Opportunities for historically effected consciousness in history education

Although sometimes history education scholars do refer to Gadamer (e.g. Wineburg, 2001, p. 10; Seixas, 2004, 2017), and although Gadamer was one of the sources of inspiration for Rüsen and other history didacticians, they did not necessarily build their didactic models on his hermeneutics. Rüsen for example stands much closer to Habermas than to Gadamer in ultimately relying on an authoritative notion of universal rational science (Megill, 1994). His most recent book only mentions Gadamer in two footnotes (Rüsen, 2017). Notwithstanding the lip service to Gadamer, most contemporary scholars often rely on the competency approach. This enables them to conceptualise historical consciousness in reference to how people use the past, how they learn and engage with historical knowledge (Clark & Peck, 2018). Hence various models and matrixes with didactic stepping stones for developing ‘historical understanding’, ‘historical reasoning’, ‘historical thinking’, ‘historical thinking concepts’ and ‘understanding first-order and second order concepts’ (Carretero & Lee, 2014; Seixas & Morton, 2013; Van Boxtel & Van Drie, 2018) have been developed within the competency framework. This is also the case with Körber’s broad definition of historical
consciousness. Although this definition includes ‘the cultural, social, temporal and individual diversity of relating to the past’, acknowledging that there are no ‘backward’ (i.e. ‘non-Western’) cultures, Körber (2016, p. 446) insists on striving for an integral concept of ‘better or more elaborate’ historical consciousness. Yet, Gadamer conceptualizes historical consciousness in a much broader way as an ontological category, relating to and affecting being. He argues that the hermeneutic circle of understanding is not a ‘methodological circle’ or a procedure of understanding, it primarily means clarifying ‘the condition in which understanding takes place’ (Gadamer, 2006, p. 295).

We seem to encounter a contradiction here. Can we speak of strengthening or enhancing historical consciousness in the practice of history education if it relates to being? Lee (2004b, p. 5) already had his doubts about a model of historical consciousness that represents a ladder-like progression with different stages, succeeding one stage and displacing another. In his view historical consciousness is not a learning approach but a theory for understanding the ways in which people turn to the past to understand their societies and themselves. To what extent is such a broader hermeneutic approach in history education based on normative assumptions? The emphasis on understanding and, more particularly, the aim of history education that students will acquire knowledge about different perspectives on the past as part of historical thinking skills, is typical for a pluralist democracy (Barton & Levstik, 2004). Not for a totalitarian state. It could be argued that a narrow definition of historical consciousness—which tends to concentrate on historical content knowledge (Körber, 2016) and does not include an understanding of the historicity of the self but mainly aims at understanding the past on its own terms—could actually be achieved in totalitarian states. After all, totalitarian states are eager to establish a sense of discontinuity with the past as a means of self-legitimization (Zerubavel, 2003, p. 101–110). But these states do not want students engaging in a discussion with the past and the traditions of interpretation that make up the Wirkungsgeschichte, as this could lead to an unwanted revaluation of the present. The aim of totalitarian states not to challenge the pastness of the past, but to totally control over and ossify the Wirkungsgeschichte is clearly illustrated in George Orwell’s 1984 (1949).

For this reason, we argue that when talking about strengthening historical consciousness in democratic societies the dimension of historical consciousness Gadamer called ‘historically effected consciousness’ should be explicitly incorporated in history education. This will generate both challenges and opportunities for creatively teaching history.

First of all, we have to acknowledge that history education needs to methodologically reflect on its own traditions, that is, the tradition of interpretation in which it stands. In the hermeneutic circle—which describes understanding as the interplay of movement of tradition and the movement of the interpreter (Gadamer, 2006, p. 293)—tradition is not a precondition or something that develops separately from us. We participate and co-produce the evolution of tradition. The task is to discover and to clarify this condition in which understanding takes place. A total understanding of this tradition can never be completely achieved, just as it is impossible to completely free from tradition (Gadamer, 2006, p. 301). Historical consciousness always involves a form of self-reflection and an openness of the interpreter to the various narratives and voices as part of tradition (Gadamer, 2006, p. 289), which are important goals of many history education curricula. Yet, although Gadamer focuses on understanding tradition and emphasizes its historicity, he does not deny the possibility of acquiring knowledge. Human beings are part of pre-existing traditions (that determine the preunderstanding of any act of interpretation), which they try to understand, but they can also reinterpret them actively according to future desires (Meyer, 2006, p. 329). Regarding educational settings, this means that students—often guided by their teachers—can acquire knowledge, norms and stories about the past that circulate in the transmitted stream of historiography, their families, communities and society, while at the same time reinterpreting the transferred body of knowledge and insights. This also means that it is crucial to make students aware of plural perspectives on the transferred body of knowledge and to make them aware of the significance of unfulfilled possibilities in the past, because in any given historical situation there have been multiple potentialities.
Then they might realize that the course of history is not fixed and that the outcomes could also have been different.

This is not an easy task, as several studies have shown that having a debate in multicultural classrooms can be very demanding (Grever, 2012; Gross & Terra, 2018; Grever, 2018; Savenije, van Boxtel, & Grever, 2014). Students with different cultural backgrounds often have other, sometimes opposing, world views and conceptions of history. This opposition can evoke strong emotions when discussing sensitive topics. The aim then is, first of all, that students listen to each other and reflect on what they hear, and how they see themselves related to these differences. This is in itself already a challenging task. In this way teachers can stimulate self-understanding and respect for other worldviews. An important condition to achieve this is to make students aware of the fact that it is possible to understand each other’s perspectives without necessarily consenting to them. For instance, a dialogue between Jewish-Israeli and Arab-Israeli high school students about the Israeli War of Independence—which Israelis consider as the birth of their nation—can be rather strenuous. Goldberg (2016, p. 255–256) shows that when studying this narrative based on conflicting sources, these minority and majority students come to different conclusions and uphold different views. However, engaging them in this multiple-perspective teaching approach can also result in understanding of how one’s own perspective on the conflict is shaped by transmitted frames of interpretation. Possibly this approach can even promote intergroup dialogue and mutual understanding.

In the second place, historical consciousness taken as historically effected consciousness, presumes the treatment of multiperspectivity in history education. Multiperspectivity does not imply a full understanding of the intentions of multiple historical actors or authors, but it relies on a fundamental hermeneutic openness towards other perspectives that might challenge one’s assumptions about the past (Meyer, 2006; Grever, 2012, p. 80–81). In this sense multiperspectivity is as much about learning about the past as it is about learning about the limits of your own assumptions and prejudices. But understanding primarily means to understand the content of what is said, and only secondarily to understand and identify someone else’s meaning or perspective as such. For this reason the most basic hermeneutic precondition is, as we have noticed in the previous section, the fore-understanding of people, as this fore-understanding will—when concerned with the same subject—determine ‘what can be realized as unified meaning’ (Gadamer, 2006, p. 294).

In the case of the aforementioned commemoration at the military cemetery in Ysselstein, the antifascist organizations and the educator of the cemetery have opposite opinions about whether or not a commemoration in the presence of uniformed German soldiers is appropriate, but they only can hold different views because they share the same subject matter: i.e. the impact of remembering large-scale violence during the second World War. Both also largely share the same Wirkungsgeschichte, and share an interpretive framework with which they approach the subject matter. However, they lack or perhaps refuse a common point of reference. The attitudes with which they approach it differ significantly: the antifascist organizations categorically renounce any commemoration at the cemetery because Nazi war criminals are buried there (van Kasbergen, van Griensven, & van Graaff, 2018). In doing so they avoid the necessity to review their own interpretive framework of World War II as a war between good and evil. They display a degree of historical consciousness in the narrow sense, but no historically effected consciousness. To others the interesting situation of Bundeswehr soldiers commemorating fallen German soldiers of World War II may give rise to a more investigative attitude towards the situation, leading not to interpreting it in terms of a fixed moral frame of interpretation, but to challenging such frameworks in favour of a more nuanced approach. In this sense the Ysselstein cemetery offers educational opportunities (and limitations) to make young people aware of their own historicity and to enhance (critical) historical understanding.

Translated to history education practice this means that for a group of young students (say 15–17 years) to really understand the discussion about the military ritual at the Ysselstein cemetery,
it requires at least four conditions: 1. access to information about the subject matter, including the various involved perspectives; 2. someone who facilitates a dialogue—e.g. a museum educator or history teacher—and provides time for studying the perspectives; 3. the willingness of the conversational partners—in this case fellow students—to engage in a dialogue about the subject matter; 4. the recognition that a joint agreement on the discussion topic between students is not necessary, and is not the goal of understanding.

Regarding the first condition, it is obvious that a conversation about a subject matter has to be based on accessible and reliable information, inspired by stories that should be available to individuals to form social identities through which they 'learn to subjectively read the world' (Den Heyer, 2018, p. 227). The storage and retrieval of information in communities and organizations prevents societal amnesia. Students have to learn where to find and how to assess information. The second condition requires educators who are capable of supervising the conversation. Their task is to support the translation of direct experiences of the students ('Erlebnisse') into cognitive experiences ('Erfahrungen'). Translating direct experiences—for instance evoked by a military ritual at a German war cemetery—into cognitive experiences, requires teaching students a basic respect for communication rules (listening to the other, using clear and decent language) and giving them time for reflection. Gadamer explains this process as 'the ongoing integrative process in which what we encounter widens our horizon, but only by overturning an existing perspective, which we can then perceive was erroneous or at least narrow' (Gadamer, 2006, p. XIII). By creating a dialogue about different viewpoints students acquire knowledge of historical contexts and become aware of tradition, achieved in history educational settings (museums, schools, sites of remembrance like a cemetery). However, without the third condition—the willingness of the conversational partners—a dialogue will be impossible. Lastly, but no less important: understanding does not necessarily mean achieving a common outcome of the discussion. Such a condition can be threatening to students who may fear that their identity is being compromised or even denied. It would block a dialogue between the interlocutors, hampering them to identify and understand other perspectives (Grever, 2012; Vasterling, 2002). On the other hand, being inquisitive with the subject matter over time might change the perspectives or horizons of the students (De Mul, 2009).

Currently, the application of multiperspectivity in history education has become one of the main goals of educational curricula in many Western countries (e.g. Grever, 2012; Nygren, Vinterek, Thorp, & Taylor, 2017; Seixas & Morton, 2013; Stradling, 2003). In some countries this approach has even become an obligatory part of the history curriculum (Wansink, Akkerman, Zuiker, & Wubbels, 2018, p. 22). In the context of their research, Wansink et al. (2018, p. 3–4) describe three temporal layers of multiperspectivity, which are relevant to our argument: 1. perspectives of subjects who are contemporaries of the historical object represented by primary sources describing for instance the liberation of an occupied country; 2. a diachronic layer with perspectives changing in the course of time, for instance different views of a historian in 1945 compared to a view of a historian in 2010; 3. perspectives referring to the present with subjects who take different positions towards a historical object. All three layers reflect on various and perhaps divergent perspectives in past and present, linked to the impact of tradition, the historical effect (Wirkungsgeschichte). But only the second layer has the potential of including historically effected consciousness (wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein) in history education practices. In fact, this layer reveals the historicity of various perspectives, whether historiographic or popular and could be connected to reflecting upon the traditions and perspectives (Den Heyer, 2018) that determine the interpretive framework of the student. In that case students can also revaluate their own position in the present.

5. Conclusion

Historical consciousness is an enigmatic concept employed in historiography, history didactics and educational sciences in different ways. In order to disentangle the various meanings attributed to
the concept, we have discerned two paradigms in its contemporary use. The first is promoted by intellectual and conceptual historians, such as Reinhart Koselleck (1979/2000) and François Hartog (2015), and studies the rise of historical consciousness as a collective mentality or attitude towards the past historically. However, by studying it as a historical phenomenon, a modern conception of history and modern forms of historical representation are already assumed in their analyses (Grever & Adriaanssen, 2017). The second paradigm is prominent in history education studies and translates historical consciousness as a set of skills that enables individuals to understand the past on its own terms. This set of skills is something that needs to be developed in history education through historical thinking and reasoning. Acquiring historical consciousness is often presented in terms of a stadial progression towards consciousness. In such conceptualisations historical consciousness appears as a universal trait, with the past appearing as an object that is to be understood on its own terms without any immediate implications for the interpreter.

In order to mediate between the two paradigms, we have turned to Gadamerian hermeneutics. With Gadamer we acknowledge both paradigms, but signal weaknesses in both when conceptualizing them independently from each other. The main weakness of the educational paradigm is that it misacknowledges the full implications of the fact that historical consciousness is historically embedded in Western modernity. Treating it solely as a cognitive-epistemological category results in overlooking the historicity of the interpreter, that is: the embeddedness in an interpretive tradition that may or may not align with the historical interpretive framework and tradition of modern historical consciousness as it has developed since the late eighteenth century. A more encompassing notion of historical consciousness involves the consciousness of the historicity of the interpreter in the Wirkungsgeschichte of (Western) historical thought. Such consciousness entails the realization that a modern conception of history defines the pre-understanding with which we approach historical representations, such as primary sources, history textbooks, or heritage sites. History educators’ firm belief that the past is distant and ‘behind’ us is effectuated by this pre-understanding. It is not a universal principle as this conception of history has only been constituted with the rise of modern historical consciousness. We have to acknowledge this in order to be able to recognize and understand traditions of thought that are alien to Western historical consciousness without forcing them into a model of historical thought as belonging to an earlier stage of consciousness yet to be developed.

We have discerned two focal points for our broadened notion of historical consciousness in history education research. First, meta-historical reflection on the Wirkungsgeschichte should be acknowledged, as too often in educational research an objectivity of the past is falsely—often implicitly—assumed, as are the possibilities to think historically. Second, we have stressed the possibilities to thematize multiperspectivity as a central element of historical consciousness. Multiperspectivity not only implies the identification of different historical vantage points, but above all an understanding of how these vantage points are embedded in the stream of transmitted traditions and how they are related to one’s pre-understanding of the past. The openness to listen to unexpected voices, we argued, is a central tenet of a pluralist democracy.

Including historically effected consciousness in the concept of historical consciousness does offer a wide range of opportunities, for history education scholars as well as history educators. It can include an understanding of processes of remembering and thereby increase possibilities to connect history education to heritage education. It can enhance attempts to use history for peace building and multicultural integration processes by acknowledging that creating a shared narrative will not suffice as long as conflicting traditions of interpreting historical narratives are not addressed and reflected upon. It acknowledges that there is no fixed and universal pathway to historical consciousness, nor that historical consciousness only entails a cognitive skillset. As our traditions and frameworks of historical interpretation continually change and are continually challenged, so too are the parameters we set on the cognitive competencies of our students born out of specific contemporary demands. This means that we should reflect upon the adaptability of our didactic models to specific hermeneutic contexts and situations.
Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

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