INTRODUCTION

In 2004, the region of Nariño in the southwest of Colombia was highly dependent on coffee farming. However, the region experienced migration from coffee farming families due to low socioeconomic development, the persistence of armed conflict and the limited capacity and restricted access to markets. After almost two years of exploring and designing a joint project, a partnership was set up between Empresas de Nariño (a local coffee exporter), the International Organization for Migration, Starbucks, Carcafe and the Dutch government to improve the living conditions of 1,160 vulnerable coffee-growing families in Nariño.

The partnership was designed as a 4-year project. The partners gained such value from the first project that they decided to replicate the strategy with a new group of 800 coffee-growing families from a different region in Nariño from 2009 to 2012. In both periods, the organizations involved remained the same, except for the bilateral development agency; the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) replaced the Dutch development agency in the second iteration of the partnership. After the second project was also successfully completed, the active collaboration formally ended. After almost 10 years of intensive collaboration, the following effects were observed: (a) at the community level, new small-scale coffee growers became empowered, (b) at
the organizational level, new structures and processes were inter-
nalized, and new collaborations were set up to address the grand
challenges in conflict-affected regions in Colombia and (c) at the in-
terorganizational level, the relationships between partners, farmers
and the development agency changed.

The Nariño case presents the practice of a cross-sector part-
nership for development (CSPD) as a temporary governance arrange-
ment that links commercial, social and development policy objectives in a
(post)-conflict region. It successfully managed to reduce two key ten-
sions of projects in development cooperation. First, it managed to build
successful relationships between partners, companies and small-scale
farmers despite short-term project designs. Second, it developed col-
laborative relationships and local ownership within control-oriented
partnering frameworks set by the development agencies.

CSPDs—as development projects—are confronted with the
interrelated tensions of stimulating long-term transformative rela-
tionships through short-term project design and transforming re-
lationships in the context of power imbalances. Practice shows that
CSPDs often face governance challenges in areas such as account-
ability, transparency, inclusiveness, risk sharing, monitoring and eval-
uation and ownership (Pfisterer, 2017). CSPDs put much emphasis
on formal governance mechanisms to prevent risks that business in-
terests override public development objectives. Companies are also
often required to move their corporate social responsibility (CSR)
strategies "beyond compliance" (Barkemeyer, 2009) with formal in-
stitutions—which presents them with some due diligence risks. At the
same time, however, partnerships for development are expected to
stimulate joint commitment to long-term interaction, equality, mutu-
ality and balance of power (Fowler, 2000; Miraftab, 2004; Visseren-
Hamakers, Arts, & Glasbergen, 2007). In particular in (post)-conflict
settings, fostering good governance, trust and peace through strong
community involvement and by addressing issues directly related to
conflict is, therefore, important elements that partnerships should stimulate (Abramov, 2009; Kolk & Lenfant, 2015a, 2015b).

Power dynamics are at stake, however, in CSPDs, and research
highlights that partnerships may even reinforce power imbalances
(e.g., Lister, 2000; Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2007). Power imbal-
ances may undermine the mutuality needed for effective partnering
(Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2004). Partnerships operating in context
emerging from conflict can be at risk of becoming “disintegrated into
patterns of mutual distrust, threats and accusations” as shown in a
Consequently, long-term sustainability and local ownership of part-
nerships after the project funding ends have been found to be rela-
tively weak. This limits the potential of CSPDs to fill the institutional
void that exists in most developing countries, conflict contexts and
global commodity chains, through the generation of proto-institutions
that can create positive effects long after the partnership (or the fund-
ing) has been terminated (cf., Vellema, Ton, de Roo, & van Wijk, 2013).

It is striking that partnerships between businesses, civil society
organizations (CSOs) and development agencies emerged in the late
1990s, especially in the realm of blurred boundaries between societ-
al actors and with the promise to address complex societal challenges
(e.g., Glasbergen, 2007). Partnering should help changing relations-
ships in the aid system (Fowler, 2000). CSR scholars frame and dis-
cuss partnerships as a novel form of governance undertaken by firms,
governments and other societal institutions (e.g., Crane, 2010). For
companies, partnerships are considered a way to make stakeholder
engagement more effective and to empower these stakeholders as
business partners (e.g., Jamali, Yianni, & Abdallah, 2011).

The gap between the promise of CSPDs as new governance
arrangements for development on the one hand, and the tensions that
may hamper the partnership effectiveness on the other, might
indicate that either the partnership approach as a new way of devel-
opment cooperation could be less effective, or that it is difficult to
design an appropriate governance approach to deal with fundamen-
tal tensions in these types of partnerships. The question emerges,
therefore, how successful CSPDs—as such the Nariño case—are
actually governed in challenging contexts, despite the tensions of
short-term project design and power asymmetries.

To address this question, we apply a longitudinal case study of
the Nariño partnership. While CSPDs, and development agency in-
volve are important in post-conflict settings, empirical insights
about their practices remain limited, particularly at the local level
(Kolk & Lenfant, 2015a; Pishchikova, 2014). Colombia provides some
innovative examples of CSPDs that could inform ongoing interna-
tional discourse and debate on the role of partnerships in (post-) con-
lict contexts (Godnick & Klein, 2009).

To understand the governance practices and mechanisms that
facilitate successful dealing with the tensions in CSPDs, we focus
on the interaction of formal and informal governance processes and
structures throughout the lifetime of the partnership (Hayes, Corno-
forth, & Vang, 2011). We examine the underlying practices and
mechanisms that develop in partnerships to study the evolution of
cross-sector governance tensions over a longer period.

Our insights contribute to discussions of partnerships as (effec-
tive) governance approaches for development in three ways.
First, using a case of consecutive partnership governance, we
identify that governance of CSPDs evolves over time and shapes ten-
sions. Unravelling mechanisms and practices in different phases of the
partnership allows us to better understand how such partnerships can
be governed towards development outcomes (Hayes et al., 2011) and
help companies to move their CSR involvement beyond compliance
with formal institutions (Barkemeyer, 2009) while engaging in entre-
preneurial, proactive and collaborative strategies to address structural
and (eco-)systemic origins of development challenges (Van Tulder,
2018). This adds to the call to better understand how relational quality
evolves during the partnering process (Walters & Anagnostopoulos,
2012). It does, however, have consequences for the degree of flexi-
ibility and adaptability of partnership governance practices, which
complements the increasingly important literature on developmental
evaluation (Patton, 2011; Van Tulder & Keen, 2018).

Second, by analysing partnerships in development cooperation,
we broaden the current focus on the CSR literature on mainly dy-
adic relationships (CSO-business) (e.g., Watham & Warren, 2013;
Walters & Anagnostopoulos, 2012) towards tripartite partnerships
with the involvement of public development agencies. With the increasing attention on the role of governments in CSR (e.g., Dentschev, van Balen, & Hazendonck, 2015), the question emerges what role and influence public development agencies have in the governance of CSPDs, in which firms have a business interest that could guarantee the longer term financial sustainability of the partnership. These insights contribute to the plea for an “integrated research agenda” (Medina-Munoz & Medina-Munoz, 2020) aimed at enhancing the role of companies in development in general and in poverty alleviation specifically—in particular in interaction with the efforts of the United Nations in its Sustainable Development agenda (Van Zanten & Van Tulder, 2018). We identify that control enables relationship building, not only among partners but also between donor and partners. In doing so, we balance discussions in development studies that mainly focus on the negative aspects of control and power asymmetries in partnerships (Miraftab, 2004; Pischikova, 2014). We bring new insights into actual governance practices to the minimal body of literature on the role of development agencies in partnerships with the private sector (Pedersen, 2005; Stadtler & Probst, 2012).

Third, by examining the Nariño case, which was governed in a complex, fragile context, we contribute to current research that aims to understand CSPDs as a governance approach in fragile contexts (Kolk & Lenfant, 2015a), and in particular for the coffee sector in Colombia (Mikilan & Medina Bickel, 2018). Like many CSPDs, this case lacked the involvement of the target group (farmers) in the formal governance structure of the partnership (e.g., Bützer, Francken, & Glasbergen, 2008). The projects nevertheless managed to be locally embedded, in contrast to many internationally funded short-term interventions. Our case highlights that partnerships can employ governance mechanisms that can facilitate local ownership and contribute to the empowerment of small-scale farmers. This has an effect on (longer term) value chain relationships (Civera, de Colle, & Casaleng, 2019).

The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical background and further delineates part of the gap in the existing discourse. Section 3 discusses our methodology, describes our research context, data collection and analysis. We present our findings in Section 4, and Section 5 presents three interrelated discussion points that can help to address governance tensions that occur in these types of partnerships. In Section 6, we provide our thoughts on how the findings can be generalized and offer suggestions for future research.

2 | GOVERNANCE AND TENSIONS IN PARTNERSHIPS FOR DEVELOPMENT

2.1 | Partnerships for development

Cross-sector partnerships have received growing academic interest as innovative ways to promote both business and societal objectives. While increasingly scholars focus on partnerships implemented in developing countries, only few researchers focus on cross-sector partnerships that operate within the framework of development cooperation (except for e.g., Brinkerhoff, 2002; Brogaard & Petersen, 2018; Kolk, Tulder, & Kostwinder, 2008; Pedersen, 2005). Controversially, partnerships between civil society organizations and businesses are often funded by bilateral development agencies, but research has hardly examined these implications. Although CSPDs can differ in many aspects, including actor configuration, design and objectives, they do share several key characteristics. They are more or less formalized, temporary arrangements between actors from the public sector, private (for profit) sector and civil society organizations who enter into a joint project to accomplish long-term social and/or economic development in developing countries. This is done through sharing costs, risks, responsibilities, competencies and knowledge (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011; Brogaard & Petersen, 2018; Kolk et al., 2008; Manning & Roessler, 2014; Stadtler, 2015).

2.2 | Tensions in partnerships for development

CSPDs need to align (commercial) business interests, social interests of CSOs and policy interests of development agencies. In this context, CSPDs face two (interrelated) key tensions that may affect their effectiveness: (a) stimulating long-term transformative relationship through short-term project design and (b) transforming relationships in the context of power asymmetries. Both dimensions have not yet been the subject of extensive research in the area of CSPDs.

2.2.1 | Stimulating long-term transformative relationships through short-term project design

CSPDs are often designed as short-term projects but aim to transform relationships in the long term (Manning & Roessler, 2014). As in the example of the Nariño case, donor-driven partnerships for development often start as pilot projects, testing the partnering approach to deliver the desired results in a pre-defined period. Pursuing longer term development goals and relationships though concrete, time-limited projects, however, often brings about a critical tension for partnerships (Manning & Roessler, 2014). Development scholars stress that partnering is about developing relationships, therefore, the project should be considered as a vehicle to explore relationships (Fowler, 2000). From a collaboration perspective, the limited timeframe of projects leads to interrupted and discontinued relationships (Grabher, 2002). In temporary governance arrangements, collaborative teams are dismantled at pre-set times. Moreover, the inherent time pressure to deliver outputs in partnership projects challenges relationship building. In other words, it hinders the emergence of important partnership intangibles such as reputation, trust, relational capital, learning, knowledge, joint problem solving, communication, coordination and transparency, which are essential for value creation (Austin & Seitanidi, 2012). Cross-sector partnership research has highlighted that long-term relationships are a positive prerequisite for sustaining value creation (Murphy, Arenas, & Batista, 2015). The critical element for alternative livelihoods of conflict-affected
populations is sustainability in the long term (Abramov, 2009). A long-term approach might indeed be required to create new governance modalities and to achieve transformation in turbulent environments, such as in conflict-affected regions. One assumption about partnerships is, therefore, that bringing the domestic and international private sector on board and supporting both will contribute to sustainable solutions (Godnick & Klein, 2009). Although development cooperation can facilitate social transformation, the latter is thought to be a locally owned and driven process (Elbers, Knippenberg, & Schulpen, 2014).

### 2.2.2 | Transforming relationships in the context of power asymmetries

Partnerships in development cooperation are set up with the idea that they are effective governance mechanisms for inclusion and participation of key actors required for achieving sustainable change (Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2007). In general, however, actors in partnerships tend to differ in terms of their control over resources while their interests are diverse (Dewulf & Elbers, 2018). Power dynamics can have a range of undesirable consequences as low-power actors may be co-opted, ignored, overruled or excluded by dominant parties (Dewulf & Elbers, 2018, p. 1). Research on CSPDs highlights that actors with fewer resources, such as smallholders or local governments, are often not involved in the decision making of partnerships in the coffee sector (e.g., Bitzer et al., 2008; Kolk & Lenfant, 2015b). The focus on business engagement in CSPDs may even risk crowding out local governments; while they fill the void left by the state, they may also deepen existing regional inequalities in terms of state services and attention (Rettberg, 2004).

Studies have shown that partnerships in the development context are challenged to equalize power and that there is even the danger that partners reinforce power asymmetries (Lister, 2000; Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2007). Traditionally, donors finance development projects and set the rules of the game for the partnership, for example, by defining the substantive scope and conditions of the partnership (Elbers & Schulpen, 2013). Business is another powerful actor in partnerships, and business logic may overshadow the development orientation of partnerships. CSPDs with public funding are, therefore, often characterized by procedures for ensuring public accountability, public value creation and fair value distribution within a predefined time frame (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011). Proper safeguards are required to ensure that public services are not compromised for the sake of private profits (Forrer, Kee, Newcomer, & Boyer, 2010). However, such controls based on administrative procedures and practices can undercut the full expression of partnership principles (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2004) and contradict the notion of "non-hierarchical relationships" as highlighted in several definitions of partnerships (e.g., Glasbergen, 2007).

To conclude, power imbalances within CSPDs are an almost unavoidable “fact of life”. Cross-sector partnerships in development cooperation are—and will remain—challenged by the tension of aiming to change relationships. At the same time the collaboration takes place in a context of existing resources and power asymmetries which are not offset through formal rules pertaining to decision making and representation (Bitzer & Glasbergen, 2015, p. 38).

### 2.3 | Understanding tensions and governance approaches of partnerships

CSPDs face governance tensions, but how should they address them? Tensions describe conflicting, contradictory or competing positions that partnerships are confronted with (Hayes et al., 2011). Tensions appear through formal and informal structures and processes and may change over time. Tensions are connected to partnership performance and directly affect those who carry out governance activities. Ultimately, tensions must be addressed to ensure the continuation and goal achievement of a collaboration (Das & Teng, 2001).

Research suggests that addressing tensions is a way of governing effectively (Provan & Kenis, 2008). However, there is no understanding as yet about the strategies, mechanisms and practices through which tensions in CSPDs are governed (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2015). To understand how tensions are addressed through governance, we follow the approach suggested by Hayes et al. (2011) to identify informal and formal governing mechanisms and their interactions throughout the lifetime of the partnership. They specify that the "governance of partnerships entails the design and use of structure and processes that enable actors to set the overall direction of the collaboration. It also requires coordinating and allocating resources for the collaboration as a whole as well as accountability for its activities" (Vangen, Hayes, & Cornforth, 2015, p. 1,244). Governance is carried out through structures and processes. Governance structures refer to the rules and resources people use, such as contracts or working standards. Governance processes cover the behaviour and actions of individuals (e.g., negotiating, committing). These structures and processes cover both formal and informal aspects. Formal governance outlines structures that define partners’ roles and obligations to each other (e.g., contracts). In contrast, formal processes are carried out through positions of authority (e.g., negotiations, steering or controlling) (Lynn, Heinrich, & Hill, 2000). Informal governance covers structures and processes relating to participants’ social behaviour and informal relationships (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Formal and informal governance mechanisms are distinct yet interrelated mechanisms (Rufin & Rivera-Santos, 2012) that interact throughout the partnership process (Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998). Therefore, we need to understand informal and formal structures and processes if we want to assess the effectiveness of partnerships (Bryson et al., 2015).

### 3 | METHODOLOGY

We take the above elaborated perspective of tensions and governance to explore how successful partnerships for development—such
as the Nariño case—are actually governed despite the tensions inherent in development projects. The paper focuses on the process of partnering to understand how tensions emerge, change and unfold over time in complex situations and settings (Langley, Smallman, Tsoukas, & Van de Ven, 2013). We apply a longitudinal case study approach of the Sustainable Development Programme for Coffee Growing Families in Nariño in Colombia case. This case was selected because it represents a temporary governance arrangement that managed to develop successful long-term relationships. The historical case provides a unique opportunity to consider the long-term effects of a still relatively new phenomenon.

3.1 | Research context

The department of Nariño in southwest Colombia seems to be far away from being a region of a middle-income country. In 2012, Nariño counted more than 30,000 smallholder coffee producers, most of them were highly dependent on farming income (Vellema, Casanova, Gonzalez, & D’Haese, 2015). Nariño is well suited for growth of high-quality specialty coffee, because of its unique agro-ecological conditions (Hernandez-Aguilera et al., 2018). Despite the opportunities that specialty coffee markets offer, the business conditions for and the coffee growing practices by small farmers in Nariño were hindered by three factors.

First, most small coffee growers in Nariño were poor. Access to education, water and energy is limited, and social security and health services were deficient. Unfulfilled basic needs decreased the coffee growers’ capacity to run their farms effectively. Infrastructure, such as paved roads, was scarce and inadequate. This hampered the logistics for coffee supply and prevented access to farms trying to build production capacity.

Second, global demand for high quality coffee that adheres to environmental conservation and fairtrade standards was increasing at the time of the research. Responding to this demand effectively depends on farmers’ adaptation of best practices and investments in improved farms. For Nariño’s small producers, such improvements were beyond their resources and technical capacity and as a result they were unable to join the coffee value chain and secure satisfactory prices.

Third, Nariño was affected by armed conflict between guerrillas, the state and paramilitary groups. At the end of the 1990s, the department of Nariño experienced an intensification of armed conflict closely linked to the increase in illicit cultivation in the region. Since then, Nariño has become the department with the greatest area of illicit crops under cultivation in Colombia. The region had strategic value for armed groups because of its proximity to national borders and isolated coastlines that facilitates illegal trafficking. As a result, coffee growing families were vulnerable to violence and some were forced to abandon their plantations and coffee production.

Maintaining and strengthening the livelihoods of conflict-affected populations during or after conflict was high on the agenda of development agencies in Colombia (Godnick & Klein, 2009). Partnerships provided a promising—and to a certain extent inevitable—approach for smallholder farmers to address the interlinked challenge of peace-building and sustainable development. The Sustainable Development Programme for Coffee Growing Families in Nariño in Colombia developed a multi-impact programme targeting vulnerable communities with high displacement risk (see Table 1 for project specifications). The main purpose was to contribute to the social and economic stability of the Nariño region.

3.2 | Data collection and analysis

Data collection was organized in three rounds between 2011 and 2013, which allowed us to follow the development of the partnership over a longer period. Data were sourced from (a) partnership documents (encompassing project proposals, partnership agreements and progress reports) (see Appendix A); (b) a total of 27 semi-structured (group-)interviews with 15 key actors involved in the partnership governance and management, ranging in their positions from company director to partnership project coordinator and external evaluator (see Appendix B); and (c) field visits to the Nariño region to meet with five coffee-growing communities involved in the project.

Interviews and field visits formed the main source of our primary data, with documents serving as an important triangulation and supplementary source for understanding the process. Documents that were not publicly available were accessed through the development agency and the project partners. This study focuses on the relationships between the actors involved in the partnership, witnessed from the accounts of participants who were directly involved. All formal partners involved throughout the different phases of the partnership were interviewed in several rounds, except for partners from one organization, which was mainly represented in the partnership by its business partner. In addition, during the interviews two key stakeholders were suggested for interviewing, who happened to know the partnership at the strategic and management levels (a local government representative and an external evaluator). Interviews lasted between 45 and 90 min, and the initial interview protocol was mostly standardized across informants, with some customization for position in the partnership and phase of involvement. Initial questions focused on the partnership formation, the roles and contributions, the partnering process, the value of the partnership, the differences between the projects and the context in which partnership activities were implemented. Subsequently, the interviews became more focused as the themes related to various relationships within the partnership, their emergence in the process of partnering over the period of two projects, governance structures and processes and the key challenges and mechanisms for dealing with them.

We visited five coffee growing families and associations; three that participated in the first phase (PPP1) and two that participated in the second phase (PPP2). We had focus group meetings with these farmers and we showed the farms. These conversations were more
TABLE 1 Overview of project specifications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PPP1: Sustainable development programme for coffee growing families in Nariño</th>
<th>PPP2: Sustainable development programme for coffee growing families, victims of the armed conflict in Nariño</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Organization for Migration, Empresas de Narino, Starbucks, Carcafe, Dutch government</strong></td>
<td><strong>International Organization for Migration, Empresas de Narino, Starbucks, Carcafe, USAID</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1,080 coffee growing families in Northern part of coffee growing region</strong></td>
<td><strong>800 families in Western part of coffee growing area</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>October 2004-June 2007</strong></td>
<td><strong>May 2009-October 2011</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COP$ 6.231.634.197 (50% funded by Dutch government and 50% by private partners)</strong></td>
<td><strong>COP$2.400.000.000 (50% funded by USAID and 50% by private partners)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic: Formation of value chain (promote associations; provision of technical training for best practices in coffee production; improvement of production facilities</strong></td>
<td><strong>Core components</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environmental: Implementation of environmentally friendly agriculture (e.g., water treatment, preventing erosion); training for production of organic compost; installation of clean water supply</strong></td>
<td><strong>Technical: Technical assistance for sustainable growing; installation of water treatment systems; promotion of environmental protection plans</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social: Community-building (access to public utilities); family training (e.g., household economics); investment in public goods (education centres)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Infrastructure: Productive infrastructure (drying patios); implementation of reward-based system for providing infrastructure</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1,160 coffee growers certified</strong></td>
<td><strong>Entrepreneurial: Formation and commercialization of associations; entrepreneurial capacity through training (organizational management; accounting practices)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1,211 capacity building workshops</strong></td>
<td><strong>Main results</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>25 associations created for 442 farmers</strong></td>
<td><strong>600 infrastructure projects completed</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2,133 infrastructure projects completed</strong></td>
<td><strong>25 associations newly formed</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1,080 water tanks delivered to families</strong></td>
<td><strong>238 farmers certified</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2,133 infrastructure projects completed</strong></td>
<td><strong>111 farms received new water treatment systems</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


unstructured and followed a narrating method. Farmers were invited to tell us about how they had become involved in the programme, how they had contributed, what value they had gained, but also what challenges they had faced during and after the implementation of the activities. We also asked questions related to their relationships with partnership partners.

Out of the 27 interviews and 5 focus group meetings, 31 were audio-recorded and then transcribed verbatim and, if held in Spanish, translated into English. In one case, we were not allowed to audio-record the interview, therefore detailed notes were taken during the interview. The interaction of the researcher with the interviewees over several periods of time allowed us to validate the findings.

The partnership documents and the interview transcripts were analysed in two rounds with the support of the AtlasTI software. In the first round, the partnership process was deconstructed by constructing the partnerships as a sequence of formal and informal governance events (Langley, 1999; Langley, Smallman, Tsoukas, & Ven, 2013). Coding was focused on understanding the process of partnering and providing insights into formal governance events (such as signing the partnering agreement, submitting the final report or external evaluation), and activities that are titled as informal governance events (such as the first partner contact, project formulation or making use of each other’s network). Descriptive codes were used to provide insights into the “history” and sequence of the partnership activities. This first round of analysis aimed to understand how formal and informal governance each continually inform and define the other. Due to the dynamic and evolutionary nature of the partnership, governance evolved over the partnership’s life cycle rather than being implemented from the beginning (Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998). The result was mapped in a process flowchart where the drawing presents an event chronology of formal and informal codes. The form of the boxes indicates whether the event described represents a formal governance event (sharp-cornered rectangles) or an informal governance event (flag-shapes). The process mapping allowed us to define two successive partnership phases (PPP1 and PPP2) and to analyse how the changing context from the previous period impacted subsequent events in the later period (Langely et al., 2013) (Figure 1).

Deconstructing the process reveals the structure of events of the case but does not tell us about the underlying forces driving them. In a second round of analysis, therefore, inductive theorizing occurred through a thematic analysis. Thematic analysis aimed to track the governance throughout the process of partnering, and to identify the practices of dealing with the tensions in the repeated collaboration. Thematic analysis is a particularly useful method of identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The analysis started by coding interesting features of data in a systematic fashion across the entire data set. Such initial codes that appeared interesting allowed us to identify repeated patterns across the data set. Next, codes were collated into potential themes, gathering all data relevant to each potential theme. In this interpretative analysis, the data were approached with
specific questions in mind related to the (interplay) of mechanisms and practices of governing the tensions (see Table 2). The paper offers quotes where relevant and they have been used primarily for illustrative purposes.

4 | FINDINGS

The two successive partnership phases suggest that various formal and informal governance mechanisms were at (inter)play throughout the partnering process (Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998). This had implications for how tensions and governance arrangements emerged and evolved throughout the two phases of the partnership.

4.1 | Phase 1: Relationship building supported by control

The interrelation of challenges for small coffee farmers in the Colombian department of Nariño (see the section on research context), and the potential for linking commercial and development interests, were the reason to form a partnership between Empresas de Nariño, Starbucks Co., Carecafe Foundation, and the International Organization for Migration in 2004. The organizations developed a project proposal and submitted it to the Dutch Embassy in Bogotá for potential funding under the tender "Call for Ideas" that aimed to involve the private sector more actively in development cooperation (Van Tulder & Pfisterer, 2008). The "Call for Ideas" fund was based on the idea of shared project financing: 50% of the required project fund was to be invested by the applicants and 50% by the development agency. The development agency's predefined programme criteria set the framework for fine-tuning the project design. Project partners and development agency staff designed the project together as a multiple-impact programme for vulnerable coffee-growing communities. It eventually consisted of three core components, including economic activities (e.g., certification, association formation), environmental activities (e.g., preventing erosion, water treatment) and social activities (e.g., community-building programmes, training in household economics and investments in education centres). During the partnership formation, the development agency's criteria provided guidance for the organizations on how to develop the partnership project. However, due to the associated pressure of the criteria, the process was at risk of undermining the space for building relationships.

Because what our experience in both partnerships shows is that the actual start-up of the project is the most difficult. And generally, donors put a lot of pressure on that,
they are the ones who put in the resources, they also generate pressure because they have pressure from above at the same time and need to focus on results. Those things take time. And many times, in their urge of looking at results, which is normal and happens with all donors, there is no space in the project for a process that may get the people really committed to and involved in the strategy. (interview quote, IOM, 2011)

The tension between the accountability requirements and the time required for relationship building was managed by several governance mechanisms and practices. Formal accountability requirements included the partnership agreement, implementation schedules, committee structures, reporting and feedback schemes, which provided platforms for discursive interactions between partners. Six-monthly reporting included financial accounting as well as an evaluation of the collaboration between partners. Well-run procedures and a clear definition of activities and objectives ensured a straightforward follow-up by partners with a supervisory role, mostly by the development agency. Co-funding of the project, joint project formulation, jointly writing monitoring reports and receiving and giving feedback provided the partners with control over the content and process of the project and stimulated the development of collaboration mechanisms, such as mutual confidence and commitment. The joint responsibility of the project facilitated confidence building and commitment towards each other, the joint project and the development agency.

If you accomplish the formal structure at the beginning of the project, that is a way to build more trust and confidence, and at the same time this helps create a way to report to the donors for example. (interview quote, IOM, 2013)

Committees were highlighted as crucial mechanisms for synthesizing accountability requirements and relationship building. Committees were designed at various levels of the partnership: the executive partnering committee with the involvement of all partners was mainly responsible for assessing progress, dealing with financial issues and developing the strategy of the partnership. Operational committees discussed the day-to-day activities. These committees had a formal and informal governance function. On the one hand, they provided a mechanism for holding each other accountable. By participating in the executive committee meetings, the development agency was better able to monitor the project and to detect underlying problems and challenges between partners. On the other hand, such committees were the place where mutual understanding developed. In addition, the output and management mechanisms of such committees (e.g., operative reports and action plans) provided a basis for discussion and ultimately led to relationship building.

I highlight this as a key learning point for all of us in both experiences. We were able to share information and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interplay</th>
<th>Practice/mechanism</th>
<th>Formal element</th>
<th>Informal element</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accountability framework facilitated trust building what evolved in increased responsiveness towards each other</td>
<td>• Funding criteria</td>
<td>Set the frame within which project and collaboration can evolve and unfold</td>
<td>Trust-building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect donor control was perceived as commitment and evolved in active donor engagement</td>
<td>Facilitate meetings and negotiations at the embassy</td>
<td>Host of meeting; setting agenda; location</td>
<td>Coordination: create order and overcome conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field visits</td>
<td>Accountability: “see” what happens on the ground</td>
<td>• Empathy and interests for the project</td>
<td>• Deeper understanding for each other’s needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular interactions created understanding &amp; trust as well as helped keeping each other accountable to each other</td>
<td>• Weekly (and later) monthly face-to-face meetings</td>
<td>Keep each other accountable through updates on progress and negotiate issues</td>
<td>• Talk with each other, exchange &amp; take time to come towards agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Spend time in the same office</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Work together; see and experience how an organization is working and its daily struggles (stepping into the other’s shoes)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual responsibility facilitated confidence</td>
<td>• Joint project formulation</td>
<td>• Responsiveness</td>
<td>Design, organize and deliver as one</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Jointly writing monitoring reports</td>
<td>• Discuss feedback from and with donor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Co-funding the project</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>Field visits</td>
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<td>• Jointly writing monitoring reports</td>
<td>• Discuss feedback from and with donor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Co-funding the project</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
make each other part of the decision-making because only like that you can truly share the victories and accomplishments but also the risks and difficulties. It is a way to make partners feel part of the same team, an important and active part of the dialogue and the process. (interview quote, IOM, 2013)

The development agency had an important role in facilitating these spaces for interaction. During partnership building, the development agency created a neutral atmosphere for developing an understanding of each other’s positions (e.g., through weekly meetings that were held at the embassy). In addition, the development agency used its position for conflict resolution by bringing in the ambassador as a last resort, if necessary. The formal and informal control and facilitation by the development agency during the intensive and prolonged negotiation phase resulted in the development of collective agency by the partners.

We jointly designed a proposal, and the proposal has always been presented by the partnership. (interview quote, Empresas de Nariño, 2013)

The partners perceived the frequent and regular interaction with the development agency staff as a commitment towards the partnership. During field visits, the tension of control and collaboration became evident. The development agency is accountable for the project to parliament (and ultimately the taxpayers) and, therefore, requires evidence of how well the money is spent during the project. Field visits provided an additional control mechanism for the development agency to understand what was happening at the project sites. However, jointly organizing and performing a formal field visit also created a personal bond between the partners and the development agency staff. The participation of the development agency in the field made project partners and farmers proud that the development agency showed interest in the situation on the ground and cared for the project. When farmers were visited by the partners and the development agency, it gave them a feeling of pride and a sense of belonging to the partnership. In that sense, field visits had an important interrelated accountability and relationship-building function.

The development agency’s active role and engagement were necessary for facilitating relationship building, and at the same time, its accountability requirements were necessary for developing a framework for collaboration. Working through this tension required an intensive trajectory of facilitating the partners and working differently than diplomats are used to doing.

Nariño’s small-scale farmers were not represented in the committees or any formal governance fora. They were not a formal partner in the partnership. After the selection of targeted communities, farmers were invited to join information sessions and to sign up. Several selection criteria decided who could participate in the activities. In PPP1, the interactions between partners and farmers were characterized by relationship building, mainly through formal governance structures and processes. In the initial phase of the project, farmers had a low level of trust in the project, which slowed down implementation and made it difficult to gain commitment. These difficulties were influenced by farmers’ previous disappointments about development initiatives.

At the beginning, we did not believe we were going to receive all these benefits without anything in exchange. We even thought the person from IOM was from the guerrilla. (interview quote, coffee grower, PPP1)

On the one hand, the project deadlines put pressure on the execution of activities. However, on the other hand, the quick results stimulated the farmers’ confidence in and commitment to the project. In addition, there were formal requirements for farmers, such as participating in training programmes. By being actively involved in the activities and receiving information about the project, they also developed a sense of belonging as a part of the value chain.

Before the project, we only knew that Empresas de Nariño was buying our coffee. After being involved in this, we came to know where our coffee is heading, that Empresas de Nariño sells our coffee to Starbucks. We are delighted that our coffee can be enjoyed all over the world and that people like it. This is our interest day after day: the more they like it, the better. (interview quote, coffee grower, PPP1)

A lesson learned from PPP1 was that farmers’ commitment can increase if they are not merely considered as aid receivers but as business partners. During this project, Empresas de Nariño developed direct relationships with the coffee farmers. Farmers started to sell their product directly to the company. However, they also sold their coffee to other exporters as they did not wish to be dependent on one exporter.

It [the project] made the company more visible to the farmers; it brought us closer... many farmers have decided to increase the share of their produce that they sell to us. (interview quote, Empresas de Nariño, 2013)

4.2 | Phase 2: Less donor control, more partner autonomy, more emphasis on farmer engagement

In 2007, most activities were completed, suggesting that the partnership was ending. At that time, partners were convinced that positive results had been achieved and that their expectations had been exceeded. PPP1 managed to expand the outreach of the project and certified 1,160 coffee-growing families in 10 municipalities in the northern part of Nariño. Moreover, the partnership was recognized as a successful development initiative by other institutions in public, private and civil sectors. As a result—and conscious of the potential
for reaching out to even more families in Nariño—the partners decided to extend their collaboration in a second project. However, the Dutch Embassy did not provide further financial assistance due to question marks about the added value of replication strategies. However, the other partners had built an apparently effective collaborative relationship, were committed to the idea of continuing the collaborative work and had the knowledge to do so. Thus, after the exit of the Dutch embassy, USAID entered the partnership as co-founder in 2008 (PPP2).

The change of development agency brought differences in the partnership dynamics and reporting mechanisms and resulted in a partnership agreement with adjusted collaboration terms. Partners initially devised a large project for the second phase, but plans had to be adapted due to a lower budget. The selection of target groups was adapted, and operational activities were reorganized. The second project was launched in May 2009, 18 months after PPP1 formally ended. USAID’s participation focused on the project’s attention on farmers located in areas with a higher incidence of armed conflict. As such, the second phase of the partnership concentrated efforts in the more vulnerable western region of Nariño, and its name was changed into “Sustainable Development Programme for Coffee Growing Families Victims of the Armed Conflict in Nariño”. Due to a lower budget and shorter project time, activities were redesigned to focus on improving production and gaining certification for 800 farms (see Table 1 for an overview). Because of these boundaries due to the donor’s requirements, the partners adapted the design, which was experienced as an improvement to the project. The change also prevented a “lock-in situation” where partners replicated a project with little deviation in relation to the preceding project (Manning & Sydow, 2011) but stimulated a transfer of learning about the partnership process.

*I think that the donor can always bring new blood, new ideas and support that can contribute to the project, new interests that can be discussed and talked over. (Interview quote, Empresas de Nariño, 2013)*

Partners highlighted that they did not accept all the project adaptations suggested by the development agency but emphasized their ownership of the project and experience with the strategy and on-the-ground knowledge. They had developed agency due to their partnering experience gained in PPP1.

The development agency’s tension was less obvious in PPP2 compared with PPP1 for two reasons. First, the lead partner had autonomy over the disbursement of resources due to the long-term and institutionalized relationship with the development agency. As such, USAID’s role was more external in the partnership, compared with the active and internal role of the Dutch Embassy. As a result, USAID found it easier to balance the tension between being a partner and a funder. Control was situated at a different level: the development agency had sufficient funding links (and, therefore, control) through the institutionalized relationship with the lead partner, which resulted in a high level of autonomy for the project management.

Second, in PPP2 there was less need for facilitation by the development agency. Relationships between the partners had matured, and fewer meetings were required because the partners had developed confidence in each other and the underlying formal governance mechanisms. The previous partnering experience in PPP1 had resulted in an increased understanding of each other’s needs and requirements. The quarterly reporting mainly focused on the technical aspects of the project. Reports were prepared by the lead partner and shared/requested input from others. Because there was less interaction with the development agency, transparency mechanisms became more important in PPP2. The reporting in the second phase focused solely on describing outputs and outcomes of project activities.

*Sharing information is definitely important, that partners share in the decision-making process because it makes them common owners of the risks involved. (Interview quote, IOM, 2013)*

PPP2 operated in a highly vulnerable context, and the persistent conflict hindered the implementation of activities. For example, transportation of materials to the field was hampered by lengthy procedures to ensure secure access. Partners were forced to change the specifics of activities during implementation because of security threats. This led to unexpected costs and delays. However, thanks to their confidence, all partners showed flexibility.

A lesson learned from the PPP1 was that changing Nariño’s growers’ culture of distrust and motivating them to work together requires more attention in a possible next project. Therefore, PPP2 emphasized the need for a more proactive attitude of the farmers. PPP2 introduced a competitive instrument to increase the commitment of coffee-growing associations and developed a series of capacity-building workshops with clearly defined practical objectives for farms and associations. After completing these workshops, farmers and associations were evaluated and scored on their performance and progress in achieving the objectives (e.g., implementation of best agricultural practices, increasing the amount of coffee sold, achieving quality standards). The most successful associations were rewarded with a quality-enhancing infrastructure for member farms. This tool was successful, but not all associations were still in operation after the project ended, suggesting that the project duration was too short to consolidate relationships in newly formed associations. In addition to this, the competition for Nariño coffee supply empowered farmers to choose the best-paying buyers. This competitive pricing put a strain on unconsolidated relationships between Empresas de Nariño and some farmers.

## 5 DISCUSSION

What does the governance narrative of the case study reveal about how the two selected tensions were governed? Moreover, what can we learn from this for further theory building on the governance of CSPDs in conflict-affected areas?
5.1 | Stimulating long-term transformative relationships through temporary and short-term projects

Formal governance structures and the processes of the first phase made it possible to build relationships that instilled confidence and showed how to replicate partnerships in communities with higher risks of armed conflict. Formal governance facilitated relationship building in the early stages of the partnership. The project increased responsiveness and helped participants "deliver as one" by promoting mutual responsibility that facilitated confidence building, and by joint project formulation, jointly written monitoring reports and co-funding. The importance of trust building was evident. This enriches our understanding of how formal control measures could help build relational quality rather than undermine trust (Walters & Anagnostopoulos, 2012). Other research on collaboration supports this argument, indicating that processes and structures work closely together to foster cross-sector collaboration (Bryson et al., 2015). Joint responsibility through reporting and monitoring mechanisms are often highlighted as critical formal implementation structures for ensuring ongoing efforts (Clarke, 2014), but are equally important for learning purposes. In PPP2, partners required fewer formal governance mechanisms because of the experience gained from PPP1. Another factor that facilitated successful governance was that "values and interests of partners become preserved because, over time, all the major actors involved remained part of the power structure" (Jimenez & Pasquero, 2005). Over time, relationships matured. Diplomatic relationships were established between partners and the development agency, and private sector actors developed commercial relationships. Individuals involved in the partnerships still make active use of both their working relationships and their personal contacts with one another. The gradual shift from formal towards informal governance mechanisms helped the partners manage the tension created by stimulating long-term transformative relationships through temporary and short-term project design. These insights help to understand how and what helped the partnership to ensure its endurance beyond the project deadline (Jimenez & Pasquero, 2005).

One key challenge for the partnership was managing the transition towards long-term relationships with farmers. In Colombia, we experienced a high level of distrust towards institutions and their standards. Colombians are known for their loyalty, pride and cohesiveness in their organizations or families (Paez & Salgado, 2016). The time pressure inherent in the short-term project design was a key challenge in overcoming the farmers’ distrust of the programme.

5.2 | Transforming relationships in the context of power asymmetries

The framework of accountability established by both donors facilitated the partners’ trust building which, in turn, evolved into increased responsiveness towards each other. Funding criteria, funding contracts, monitoring requirements and reporting set the frame within which the project and collaboration evolved and unfolded. In the context of a low-trust society, the donor-driven control framework provided a safe space in which relationships between partners could develop. Indirect donor control was perceived as commitment and evolved into active donor engagement. Coordination increased by holding meetings and negotiations at the embassy while informal governance mechanisms had a control emphasis (such as location (embassy), and agenda setting). Moreover, the case highlighted that partners, as well as farmers, gained agency during the partnership. The partners came across as more mature and confident during the formalization of the second phase. In the case analysed, it was apparent that the partners had become empowered to negotiate about and contest the content and activities of the partnership throughout the process of partnering. Smallholders were empowered in the value chain as a result of the partnership.

5.3 | Three discussion points

The analysis of how tensions could be addressed by governance leads to three interrelated discussion points about the governance of CSPDs in conflict settings.

First, formal and informal governance in CSPDs changed, evolved, complemented and facilitated each other throughout the implementation of the two projects. This finding stresses the importance to broaden the approach of extant partnership studies that mainly focus on governance as structural mechanisms but not as processes (e.g., Walters & Anagnostopoulos, 2012) and focus on trust as key informal mechanism (e.g., Das & Teng, 2001). Formal and informal governance interplayed both simultaneously and consecutively over a longer period. From a decision-making point of view, therefore, it becomes relevant to consider which governance mechanisms are time dependent and which can be considered cumulative. Formal governance appears to have facilitated relationship building throughout the process of partnering in some instances. This provides more nuance to the discussion of whether formal and informal governance complement or substitute each other (e.g., Poppo & Zenger, 2002). The tendency towards formal governance was particularly evident in the formation phase of both partnerships. We recognized similar patterns of reoccurrence of governance mechanisms throughout the two life cycles of the Nariño case as described by, for example, Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) and Bryson et al. (2015). Nevertheless, our case emphasizes the importance of prior relationships (Murphy et al., 2015), as it is often through these that partners and farmers feel committed to and responsible for the joint project beyond the funding deadline. It is interesting to note that similar formal and informal governance structures and processes shaped both tensions at the same time. This builds upon and enriches Hayes et al. (2011) suggested approach to understanding tensions and governance approaches of partnerships.

Second, we argue that accountability can be instrumental in promoting more cooperative approaches among partners. Kolk and
Lenfant’s (2015b, p. 294) research on partnerships in fragile states showed a donor’s support goes beyond “risk sharing”, and that a funding mechanism also facilitates the partnering process and can help companies in going beyond compliance with formal contract arrangements. In contrast to other studies on partnership dynamics with donor involvement (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2004; Pishchikova, 2014), our case shows that donor control can facilitate the development of collaborative governance. Governance structures such as formal committees that facilitate both joint accountability and interactions are examples of mechanisms that emerge both control and collaboration. Moreover, the donor’s engagement in the partnership was highly perceived as collaborative and not as control by partners. Therefore, our case partly disproves the proposition by Rufin and Rivera-Santos (2012) that trust-based governance will play a minimal role in the governance of partnerships between private and public actors. The partners developed trustful relationships with the donor representative that also extended beyond the partnership project. However, the level of engagement by the development agency was different. This can partly be explained by the importance the development agency attaches to the partnership and the level of experience of facilitating partnerships. Dutch development cooperation has a smaller budget and project portfolio and fewer staff in Colombia than USAID. The Nariño project was one of the first CSPDs facilitated by the Dutch Embassy in Colombia, but there were many projects under the institutional funding agreement between USAID and IOM. PPP2 required less intensive facilitation by the development agency because the partners had prior experience. Case-dependent facilitation, therefore, appears most suitable for CSPDs. The findings highlight that development agencies can actively shape the governance and relationships of CSPDs throughout the partnering process. However, the influence development agencies have on partnership governance, and their new role as “partners”, leads to questions about their responsibilities after their project funding ended. These insights contribute to the literature on the role and engagement of public development agencies in driving corporate citizenship (Pedersen, 2005), and brokering partnerships (Stadtler & Probst, 2012).

Third, in spite of some shortcomings in the inclusion of farmers and associations in the formal governance of the partnership, farmers, in general, felt they were a part of the partnership. The partnership uplifted their position in the coffee market. They were not dependent on one exporter; on the contrary, they continued to sell their coffee to the exporter that paid the best price. Our study adds empirical evidence to the study by Civera et al. (2019) on the empowering of smallholders. Like Civera et al. (2019), our study emphasizes the importance of the quality of relationships that eventually benefit the whole value creation process. Long-term relationship development requires relationships that need to be nurtured beyond the project’s lifetime through technical support, revising certifications and referring to project impact during interactions. This can only be achieved with a long-term, inclusive governance approach by companies and the partnership. In this case study, the partner organizations internalized the lessons learned and gained partnering capacities. One example of this was a local coffee exporter who further developed their Corporate Social Responsibility policy and practice beyond compliance (cf., Barkemeyer, 2009) with the original governance contract. The fact that the local exporter was deeply embedded in the Nariño region also helped to develop ownership and sustain relationships beyond the project deadline.

6 | CONCLUSIONS

One governance gap in extant partnering arrangement became particularly evident in the Nariño case: how do partnerships that aim to create links between commercial and development objectives coordinate their activities and approaches with competitors in the region? Small coffee farmers in Nariño were confronted with the problem of securing their livelihoods in a conflict-affected region. An integrative, collaborative approach was required that encompasses poverty reduction and changing value chain relations between business and farmers by empowering farmers and providing long-term economic perspectives. However, development projects in general, and partnerships with business and development agency involvement specifically, are often short term and are challenged to change relationships and ensure local ownership due to persistent power imbalances (Pishchikova, 2014; Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2007). Our study illustrates that governance approaches such as CSPDs can yield innovative ways of developing mutual accountability. They can implement transparency practices in post-conflict contexts that may be characterized by low trust between societal actors. Our study shows that power asymmetries and short-term project design might remain a key challenge for partnerships in development cooperation, but that governance mechanisms and practices need to be dynamic: they can emerge, change and unfold over time in order to effectively deal with the unavoidable tensions that appear in CSPDs. Understanding how governance works in CSPDs can assist the design and management of future partnerships by dealing more consciously with tensions in order to develop sustainable partnership project approaches for addressing grand challenges. This also helps to better understand the conditions when partnerships with business involvement can represent new governance modalities in (post-)conflict settings (Kolk & Lenfant, 2015b) and can help companies to move out of a reactive—risk-oriented—CSR approach that they would normally adopt when faced with institutional voids (Van Tulder, 2018).

Our study focused on a unique case but yields relevant lessons for a broader range of partnerships and collaborative governance arrangements with business involvement in complex settings. In this line, we propose three possible future research avenues related to the conflict context, the actor configuration and research approach.

First, CSPDs can work in a variety of conflict types. Partnerships, such as the one we describe in this paper, use temporary partnership projects to gain longer term effects by, for example, involving private sector investments that can help create longer term (proto) institutions. The historic nature of the case is relative, due to the
consideration that other (conflict-ridden) regions around the world that are engaged in comparable CSPDs (such as in the eastern Republic of Congo or the island of Mindanao in the Philippines) are more comparable to the situation in Colombia in 2012 than at present. In addition, the Nariño case is an example of a transformative partnership that managed to introduce (institutional) change at the local level. Future research could explore how partnerships for development in (post-)conflict settings are governed at national or international level. Do these types of partnerships experience similar tensions, and what type of practices do they develop for governing the collaboration over a longer period? Comparing the tensions and governance approaches of partnerships in different conflict settings, types of conflict and conflict stages would be an interesting research avenue. It would add to the typology of partnerships in (post-)conflict areas as developed by Kolk and Lenfant (2015a).

Second, the case study primarily addressed the governance tension in tripartite partnerships for development in which public development agencies and private companies play a leading role in funding the partnership. In our case, the criteria and decision for funding, as stipulated by the development agency, created power asymmetries. Power asymmetries and temporary project design are also at stake in other types of cross-sector governance arrangements. These tensions may play out differently if only one organization provides the funding, as is often the case in service delivery relationships. Or if, in cases with more private parties—with less need for public accountability—only one organization participates or even takes the lead. The question emerges how tensions are governed by partnerships with various partner configurations.

Finally, the importance of a more dynamic approach to governance issues also suggests that other monitoring and evaluation techniques are required. A promising way to deal with governance tensions in multistakeholder processes can be learned from development evaluation techniques (Patton, 2011) in which, for instance, joint action research projects are set up, in which practitioners and researchers participate on a more continuous basis. To recognize, accept and consciously work through tensions is not easy and requires both adaptation and flexibility from organizations. Cross-sector governance arrangements add an additional layer of complexity to working with and through tensions. A paradox lens to get above and beyond the two analysed tensions may be an interesting step towards developing a practice-oriented theory on collaboration, as suggested by Siv Vangen (2016).

FUNDING INFORMATION
This work was made possible by funding of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors would like to thank particularly Nasim Payandeh, who was actively involved in this project in 2013 and Judith Fraats and Jimena Samper for their support in data collection in 2011. The authors would like to thank all the interviewees, whose valuable insights contributed towards the elaboration of this paper.

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ENDNOTE
1 Bilateral development agencies are government agencies based in a single country, while the agency provides development aid following its national development policy. The tendency in literature is to cluster multilateral and bilateral agencies and even international nongovernmental organizations under the term “donor”. There is, however, a call for a more heterogenic view on donors, because the roles of “donors” and emerging governance challenge are expected to be different depending on the type of development agency involved in the partnership (Pischikova, 2014).

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Stella Pfisterer is a research fellow at the Partnerships Resource Centre, Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University in the Netherlands. Her research focuses on the effectiveness of cross-sector partnerships in international development cooperation. Her areas of expertise and skills include: development policy analysis; governance, management, monitoring, evaluations and learning of/in partnerships, public management; (policy) advice; brokering; facilitating; training and workshop design. Stella bridges academic knowledge and practice insights and has extensive experience in researching on collaborative projects with and for businesses, governments, international organizations, knowledge institutions and civil society organizations. She has researched collaborative projects in diverse sectors such as agriculture, energy or health care, in a wide range of countries (e.g. Colombia, Indonesia, Kenya, Ethiopia, The Netherlands, and Germany). Stella's latest publication focuses on Public-Private Partnerships for Development (https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/978-1-78714-493-420171005/full/html).


## APPENDIX A. ANALYSED DOCUMENTS

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## APPENDIX B. LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

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<td>June 19, 2013 (Telephone interview)</td>
<td>October 21, 2013 (Interview in Bogota)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empresas de Nariño</td>
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<td>March 17, 2011 (Interview in Bogota)</td>
<td>June 17, 2013 (Skype interview)</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>June 14, 2013 (Skype interview)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1 &amp; 2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>June 18, 2013 (Skype interview)</td>
<td>October 24, 2013 (Interview in Pasto)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empresas de Nariño</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>June 24, 2013 (Skype interview)</td>
<td>October 24, 2013 (Interview in Pasto)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Nariño</td>
<td>1 &amp; 2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>October 24, 2013 (Interview in Pasto)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>October 22, 2013 (Interview in Bogota)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>October 22, 2013 (Interview in Bogota)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Starbucks Coffee Trading Co.</td>
<td>1 &amp; 2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>June 19, 2013 (Telephone interview)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>June 26, 2013 (Telephone interview)</td>
<td>October 30, 2013 (Interview in Bogota)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Embassy Bogota</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>August 05, 2013 (Interview in The Hague)</td>
<td>November 08, 2013 (Interview in The Hague)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continues)
### APPENDIX B. (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Spring 2011 (Date, type, location)</th>
<th>Summer 2013 (Date, type, location)</th>
<th>Autumn 2013 (Date, type, location)</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Dutch Embassy Bogota</td>
<td>End of phase 1</td>
<td>Several interviews and personal communications March–May 2011</td>
<td>August 14, 2013 (Telephone interview)</td>
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<td>Fundación Konrad Adenauer</td>
<td>Review of 1 &amp; 2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>November 06, 2013 (Skype interview)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
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<td>2 coffee growing families and</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>October 25, 2013 (field visit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 association</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 coffee growing associations</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>October 26, 2013 (field visit)</td>
</tr>
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