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A note on endogenous transfers

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Abstract

In a competitive and Walrasian stable world with two goods transfer paradoxes are very robust to endogenization (relating the size of the transfer to either the donor's or the recipient's GNP). Donor enrichment and/or recipient impoverishment occur in very general formulations of endogenization if and only if they occur in the model in which transfers are exogenous (as is usually assumed). Endogenization in practice will probably cause a dampening effect (smaller price and welfare changes than in the case of pure exogenous transfers).

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Brakman, S., van Marrewijk, C. A note on endogenous transfers. Zeitschr. f. Nationalökonomie 54, 171–178 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01227084

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01227084

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