

MAINSTREAMING INTEGRATION GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE

PROXIES AND TABOOS
IN A CONTESTED
POLICY CONTEXT

Ilona van Breugel

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**MAINSTREAMING INTEGRATION GOVERNANCE.
Proxies and taboos in a contested policy context**

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Proxies en taboes in een omstreden beleidscontext**

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CHAPTER **ONE**

Introduction

The summer of 2015 marked a sharp increase in the number of refugees arriving in Europe. The ongoing war in Syria initiated large migratory movements, first within the region and later to Europe. In the years preceding 2015, several European countries had severely restricted immigration and found themselves unprepared for the sudden increase in immigrants. Many countries, particularly in the South of Europe, struggled to process all the asylum applications. Subsequently, governments across Europe had to come up with quick policy solutions to accommodate and integrate refugees. National and local governments across Europe suddenly had to reinstate integration policies that had almost been completely dismantled. Citizens also became engaged in the issue. Protests were organized to object to the arrival of asylum seekers, while at the same time, numerous citizens' initiatives sprang up to welcome the very same asylum seekers.


This example illustrates the contested and volatile nature of immigrant integration governance. The case is complex in a demographic sense, as the diversification of both migrant populations and society complicates integration governance. What does integration mean in an increasingly diverse society? Who do integration policies target? Even these questions are contested. Since the early 2000s, former models of immigrant integration policies have been disputed. Impacted by the backlash against multiculturalism and the shift towards assimilationism (Joppke, 2004; Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010), this policy field has become highly politicized. This has led to the reconsideration of both models for integration and fitting policy measures, "foment[ing] a negative atmosphere surrounding immigrants, ethnic minorities and particularly Muslims" (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010). Due to increased diversity on the one hand and a high degree of contestation regarding how integration is to be defined and resolved on the other hand, immigrant integration governance can be considered a revelatory case of governance in both a complex and contested policy context.

In this thesis I study how and why immigrant integration governance is decentred and the implications of such a decentred approach. Decentring governance describes the move away from a central steering government. This may entail the decentralization to lower levels of government, the deconcentration of policy responsibilities to autonomous or quasi-autonomous organizations, or the delegation of public services to market or NGO actors (Rhodes 1997). While part of this literature is focused on the outsourcing of policy responsibilities to a broader network of actors outside of the government, I argue that this decentring approach is also visible *within* the government. The shrinking role of central government in immigrant integration governance has been accompanied by a decentring of policy responsibilities to lower levels of government (vertical) and the spreading of policy responsibilities across departments (horizontally).

This entails a transfer or division of policymaking over different levels and departments of governance, which also means a relocation of policymaking in multiple, different, policy settings. It is therefore relevant to move beyond the starting point that policies are decentred, and to look at why and how these policies are shaped within these different contexts. *Meaning making* plays an important role in policy formulation, particularly in the case of contested policy issues, such as immigrant integration. It is therefore important to take the variety of contexts of decentred policymaking into account. After all, the decentred governance approach means that questions such as what integration is, how it is best addressed and who it should target, are both shaped and

contested in each local setting. Building on the governance, mainstreaming and targeting literature, I critically assess both the coordination and content of immigrant integration governance. This enables me to theorize how immigrant integration is shaped and embedded across levels of government and policy domains.

Figure 1, Horizontal and vertical decentred governance



1.1 DECENTRED GOVERNING

This section discusses the theoretical framework for the study, situating it in the broader literature on governance, distinguishing the vertical and horizontal dimension of governance and linking it to mainstreaming as a decentred governance approach.

Governance

The decentred governance of immigrant integration addresses the literature on the shift from government to governance. The latter involves a shift to complex modes of coordination and inter-dependencies between multiple actors (across different policy areas and levels of government). The shift from government to governance entails a shift in the understanding of the traditional role of the government as a central node in policymaking and execution to a collaboration with non-governmental actors, 'shrinking' (Kooiman 2000) the role of the government to 'steering and guiding' rather than commanding (Stoker 1998 in Colebatch 2009). Introduced by Rhodes (1997), governance in the public administration literature came to focus mostly on the network character of governance. The concept of governance in public administration and European studies directed attention to the broader process setting, the rules of public policymaking and implementation (Kjaer 2004, p. 191), the actors involved, and their impact on national policymaking (p. 193).

This has led to various approaches to the study of governance arrangements over the past two decades, which either focus on the network of actors involved (complexity theory and network governance e.g. Klijn and Snellen 2009, Room 2011 in Peters 2017), the cross-cutting nature of the policy issue itself ('integrated' or 'joined up gov-

ernance' (Briassoulis 2005 in Rayner and Howlett 2009, Vince 2015, Molenveld 2016; Biesbroek and Candel 2016; Tosun and Lang 2017; Trein, Meyer and Maggetti 2018) or on 'whole of government' approaches (6 et al. 1999, Christensen and Laegreid 2007). However, most of these studies have a managerial focus and remain output-oriented, considering governance primarily as a means by which to increase efficiency (see i.a. Kjaer 2004; Peters 2005). The implications for policy content under such governance are rarely studied.

The focus on coordination and management has led to the literature being criticized for failing to pay attention to power and conflict (see i.a. Marinetto 2003; Marsh et al. 2003; Davies 2005 in Kjaer 2004, 107). Calling to focus not only on the involvement of different actors, but *"the extent to which organizations attempt to ensure that their activities take into account those of other organizations"* (Hall et al 1976, 459 in Peters 2015). Uncertainties are recognized in the coordination of governance (see e.g. Koppenjan and Klijn 2004 on substantive uncertainty). Building on this, an active effort is required to encourage different actors to work together on policy content or across different policy domains or levels of government. In the literature, however, there is scant criticism of the coordination between different actors and insufficient focus on conflict between networks, or failure to reach consensus (Peters 2005). While it is generally agreed that "horizontal reciprocity between actors in the network [is] essential" (Kjaer 2004, p.198), competition and allocation of values are ignored, as are the politics of decentralized policymaking (cf. Crowley et al. 2020).

Potentially, the governance approach with its holistic view and eye for multiplicity (of actors), has much in common with critical policy analysis, characterized by *"the recognition of the presence of multiple actors, meanings and sources of authority, the fluidity of the process and the ambiguity of the outcome .. policy [as] an exercise in the social construction of meaning"* (Colebatch 2009, p. 65). However the plea to understand governing *"not only in terms of specific actions and structures, but also on the shared meanings and contexts within which these actions 'make sense', and the recognition of the persons and processes which constitute these contexts"* (Colebatch 2009, p.64) is insufficiently addressed. This plea is especially relevant as governments are becoming more complex, and consequently, *"difficulties in tracking responsibility become all the more acute"* (Considine 2002 and Skelcher 2004 in Peters 2015 p. 140). It is thus important to study the implications of a decentred governance approach in order to contribute to a more in-depth understanding of governance.

Building on the governance literature and the observation of the increased importance of multiple governance actors, this thesis studies why and how decentred policies are governed, and the implications of such a decentred approach. In this thesis I explicitly speak of *decentred* governance to emphasize the move away from central government steering and to emphasize the multiplicity in which policymaking consequently takes place. In doing so, I distinguish between a vertical (between national and local levels of government) and a horizontal (across policy departments and domains) dimension. While these two dimensions are often studied separately, I argue that they are both characterized by a move away from central government and thus both lead to policymaking in multiple settings. While not necessarily related, developments along both dimensions may coincide, as is the case for immigrant integration governance. This makes it very relevant to study how policies are embedded both horizontally and vertically.

In the study of these decentred policies I explicitly combine an analysis of coordination and meaning making. In other words, besides studying the coordination mechanisms that are in place for the decentred governance of immigrant integration, I also look at how the content of these policies is constructed, perceived, represented and targeted (cf. Schneider & Ingram, 1997; Bacchi 2008 Yanow 2010). In doing so, I apply a constructivist approach to policymaking (this is dealt with in greater detail in Chapter 1.4, research methods and approach). While acknowledging the role of non-governmental actors in governance networks, this thesis focuses on the multiplicity of governance within the state. I argue that collaborations across different levels of government and between different policy departments can also be considered as a governance network, and that it is important to take the range of actors and settings into account here also.

In the next section I will discuss the literature on vertical and horizontal decentring, and argue why I use mainstreaming as an analytical lens to integrate the vertical and horizontal decentring of governance.

Decentring vertically

Firstly I distinguish vertical decentralization, referring to the transfer or dispersal of governance competencies to different levels of government, also known as multi-level governance (when policy responsibilities are dispersed across different levels of government) or (territorial) decentralization (when policy responsibilities are dispersed across lower levels of government).

The literature on territorial decentralization focuses on the decentralization of policy responsibilities to local levels of government. It is often assumed that local government is best able to tailor its policies to local needs and circumstances. Decentralization, or localization, is considered more effective, participative (democratic) and sustainable (Andreotti et. al. 2012). Local governments are furthermore often considered as being more innovative than central levels of government (Pollitt 2003), and are also often supposed to serve as a retrenchment strategy at the same time (Andreotti and Mingioni 2016). However, the studies on decentralization also emphasize that local policymaking does not happen in isolation and that external influences (from, *inter alia*, national government and networks of other cities) might hamper demands from the local context (Jans 2015, cf. Andreotti et. al. 2012).

Multi-level governance refers to policymaking between different, though interdependent, levels of government. The multi-level governance literature stems from European Studies, and is mostly applied to governance within the context of European Union nation state relations (Marks, Hooghe and Blank 1996; Hooghe and Marks 2001). In migration studies, however, it is also commonly applied to national and local governance relations (Caponio and Borkert 2010; Scholten 2013; Zapata et al 2017). Both the decentralization and multi-level governance literature have been criticized for being too descriptive and lacking a critical assessment of the content or effects of decentralized policies (see e.g. Klok et al. 2018; Roseanau 2004 and Piattoni 2009). However, decentralized policymaking does not necessarily mean successful multi-level governance. Scholten (2013), for example, distinguishes centralist, multi-level, localist and decoupled multi-level relations, in which the latter refers to a form of governance whereby there is no meaningful interaction between government levels, potentially leading to contradictory or conflicting policies at the different levels. Particularly in the case of contested policy topics, such as migrant integration, a strong level-specific character

might be present, complicating modes of governance in multi-level settings. On the other hand, the literature has shown that multi-level government interactions often have a depoliticized and functional orientation, falling back on solely technocratic collaborations (Rosenau 2004 in Scholten 2013). It is thus essential to critically assess not only the coordination structures but also the content of multi-level governance.

While the multi-level governance literature draws attention to decentralized governance, it focuses first and foremost on vertical collaboration. Although it also draws attention to horizontal collaborations between state and non-state actors (Piattoni 2009) or networks of cities (Bak Jorgensen 2012), it does not explicitly address the horizontal division of policy responsibilities between different policy departments within the government. I argue that the same principles of governance in multiple settings (varying from coordination to decoupling) might apply here, as decentralization across different policy departments horizontally resembles a similar plurality of settings. Smooth collaboration cannot be assumed, and decentred governance should be critically assessed in both the vertical and horizontal directions.

Decentring horizontally

Secondly, for my framework I distinguish horizontal collaboration *within* the government, resembling a division of policy responsibility and implementation across different policy departments. For example, in the case of immigrant integration governance this could refer to setting up migration diversity priorities in education or health care policies. Since the 1990s there has been increasing attention for 'horizontal governance' (see Tosun and Lang 2017). There has been a shift away from approaching policy issues as separate 'silos' or 'stovepipes', towards considering them as issues that cut across multiple policy domains. While the broader governance literature also implies horizontal collaboration, this has scarcely been operationalized.

Mirroring the multi-level governance literature, I position horizontal collaboration as an equal coordination challenge. Due to the specialist nature of policy, successful horizontal coordination cannot be assumed. Peters (2005, cf. Head and Alford 2015) emphasizes the importance of framing and sharing ideas for successful coordination. Distinguishing between coordination and collaboration, Peters (2005) distinguishes between the "*mechanistic conceptions of coordination through administrative action*" (Jordan and Lenschow 2010 in Peters 2005, p. 69) and *integration* of policies, emphasizing integration at the content level, and shared ideas at the policy formulation stage (p. 97). As in multi-level governance, the level/domain specific context is emphasized. When talking about governance across different policy domains, it is thus important to take the different contexts into account, by studying and comparing policy content horizontally.

To bring together the vertical and horizontal decentring of governance I look at mainstreaming as a strategy for achieving a holistic, decentred governance approach. Across different policy and academic fields, mainstreaming broadly refers to an amalgam of efforts to abandon group-specific policies and integrate gender, disability or environmental priorities as an integral part of generic policy domains. Building on the literature on, *inter alia*, gender and environmental mainstreaming, I will conceptualize mainstreaming to assess both the *coordination* and *content* of governance in a decentred setting.

Mainstreaming

The notion of mainstreaming as a policy strategy emerged in several policy domains, ranging from special education in the 1970s to more recent discussions on the mainstreaming of environmental policies. Within the different fields, mainstreaming broadly refers to an amalgam of efforts to abandon group-specific policies and integrate gender, disability or environmental priorities as an integral element across levels and domains of government. It is thus essentially an approach taken in order to decentre a policy both in content and coordination and to embed it integrally. The literature on mainstreaming developed in response to, *inter alia*, the 'Education for All Handicapped Children Act' of 1975 in the United States, the introduction of gender mainstreaming as a strategy after the UN Third World Conference on Women in 1985, and the first incentive to implement mainstreaming in environmental governance at the 1992 UN Earth Summit. These Acts included strategies to either focus on the transition of bringing a specific target group or policy issue 'in the mainstream', or an assessment of the inclusiveness of generic policy fields. Moreover, the ratification of these Acts and the academic literature on mainstreaming in these policy fields reflect a broader shift in the approach to issues of disability, gender and environment as part of the debate on inclusion and equality.

Most of the literature on mainstreaming focuses on strategies to either focus on the transition of bringing a specific target group or policy issue 'in the mainstream', or an assessment of the inclusiveness of generic policy fields. These changes thereby reflect a shift in approach from issues of disability, gender and environment, to broader debates of inclusion and equality, an element that is essential for bringing a policy issue 'in the mainstream'. Besides this focus on the transition towards a cross-sectional approach, the literature focuses on its importance in order to guarantee active engagement with the policy problem at hand.

For instance, disability mainstreaming reflects a shift from separately facilitating special needs for disabled people to an emphasis on inclusion in the mainstream (Barnes and Mercer, 2005; Bender, Vail and Scott 1995; Madden and Slavin 1983; Priestley and Roulstone 2009; Semmel, Gottlieb and Robinson 1979; Van der Torre and Fenger 2014). Gender mainstreaming on the other hand focuses more on an assessment of the inclusiveness of generic policy fields. A central element of gender mainstreaming is the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action ... "*in all areas and at all levels*" (UN ECOSOC 1997/2).

The literature on mainstreaming of environmental policies centres mostly on collaboration between different actors on issues of environmental concern: "*informed inclusion of relevant environmental concerns into the decisions of institutions that drive national, local and sectoral development policy, rules, plans, investment and action.*" (Dalal-Clayton and Bass 2009, 19). As with gender mainstreaming, there is a strong focus on collaboration, in this case primarily bringing together environmental issues and development assistance. Mainstreaming is considered as a "*deliberate process*" and one that "*should take place across multiple levels of government as well as across central government*" (Nunan, Campbell and Foster 2012, 263).

In sum, mainstreaming can be defined as a policy strategy to abandon group-specific policies and to integrate a topical priority – such as gender, disability or environmental concerns – as an integral element across levels and domains of government. This is relevant to the governance literature as it provides a strategy for decentred governance, fo-

cusing not only on decentring a policy topic but also on providing tools to embed these policy priorities integrally. Three key elements of mainstreaming can be identified in the literature. Firstly, mainstreaming is considered a process of transformation aiming for a more *integrated, cross sectional approach to specific policy issues*. Gender equality, for example, is rarely treated as a policy domain in itself but is rather addressed as a topic that affects men and women across policy domains. As such, mainstreaming is seen as a strategy to prevent gender or disability from being side-lined into a concern that is confined to specific actors; instead, it is brought into the mainstream as a concern for all actors and policy fields (Verloo, 2005).

Secondly, the emphasis on the transition from a specific policy field to a generic policy field is often combined with *an assessment of the inclusiveness of generic policy fields*. These characteristics form two sides of the same coin, as the balance between generic and inclusive policies has proven to be vital for successful mainstreaming. Mainstreaming thus requires an active effort to create both general awareness of the relevance of a specific policy topic, and to measure the equality of policy outcomes, for example in terms of gender.

Thirdly, the discussion of mainstreaming in the various fields of literature carries a clear reference to issues of *policy coordination*. In particular, this reflects the assumption that mainstreaming involves polycentric forms of governance with multiple actors. As a process of bringing these priorities into 'the mainstream', this approach requires strong and clear coordination of policy responsibilities in order to avoid the risk of "becoming everyone's responsibility, yet nobody's at the same time" (Caglar, 2013, 340).

The concept and implementation of mainstreaming have been critically discussed in the literature (see Booth and Bennett 2002; Eveline and Bacchi 2005; Lombardo 2005; Stratigaki 2005; Squires 2005). The main critiques concern the vagueness of the concept and its objectives, and the risk of 'becoming everyone's responsibility, yet nobody's at the same time', whereby there is a risk that the transformational potential of [gender] mainstreaming will be depoliticized and watered down (Caglar 2013, 340). Without a clear agenda (338) or political commitment (Nunan et al. 2012), mainstreaming tends towards a technocratic bias (Meier and Celis 2011). The mainstreaming literature thus calls for a critical reading of both the 'discursive' and 'institutional' dimension (Caglar, 2013) of governance strategies.

In this thesis, the concept of mainstreaming helps to structure an analysis of decentred governance as it provides the conceptual tools for an assessment of how decentred policies are embedded. At the same time, it also takes into account the underlying approach to the policy topic at hand, such as the transition from separately facilitating the needs of disabled people to inclusion in the mainstream, including the risk of such policies becoming watered down. In this thesis I will use mainstreaming as a lens to assess both the coordination and content of the decentred governance of immigrant integration.

1.2 IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION GOVERNANCE

This dissertation focuses on the development of immigrant integration policies¹ between 2000-2018, covering cases in the Netherlands, France, the United Kingdom and

Flanders (Belgium). As they have a direct impact on the collective identity of society, immigrant integration policies form an 'exemplary case' by which to study social imagination and meaning making (Schinkel, 2013). Ongoing immigration has made European societies even more diverse, with an increasingly diverse migrant population in addition to diversification of society as a whole. Migration-related diversity is hence a mainstream topic, primarily in large cities, while it is increasingly difficult to distinguish separate groups amongst the heterogeneous migrant populations (Vertovec 2007; Meissner and Vertovec 2015; Grzymala-Kazłowska and Phillimore 2018). At the same time, the political debate on immigrant integration has hardened, problematizing ongoing immigration and declaring that the integration of settled immigrants and their offspring has 'failed'. This has been accompanied by a growing emphasis on the symbolic dimension of integration, characterized by an overall politicization of the policy field (Entzinger 2006; Essed and Nimako 2006; Poppelaars and Scholten 2008, Joppke and Morawska 2003, Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). Due to increased diversity on the one hand and the high degree of contestation about how integration is to be defined and resolved on the other hand, immigrant integration governance can be considered a revelatory case of governance in both a complex and contested policy context. How does decentred policy-making work in such a 'wicked' policy context?

Although immigrant integration governance is often assumed to cut across different policy fields, it was traditionally studied centrally and primarily at the national level. National models for integration have been critiqued (see e.g. Glick-Schiller and Çağlar 2009) and studies nowadays often focus on the local or multi-level setting of immigrant integration governance. However, the variety of immigrant integration governance approaches is scarcely taken into account. The diversity in the governance approaches between cities is only taken into account to a small extent, and very few studies focus on the horizontal coordination of immigrant integration governance (Spencer 2011). While, due to its intractability, a study of how immigrant integration is governed in these different settings is highly relevant.

Immigrant integration policymaking has been increasingly decentralized to the local level, leading to a multi-level governance context with a growing emphasis on the local level. Local level governance is no longer considered merely a level of policy implementation, but is considered an independent level of policy development. In line with the literature on local level policy-making in other fields (O'Toole 2000; Pollitt 2003), some authors argue that there is a convergence of local immigrant integration policy-making across countries, stressing the typical pragmatic problem-coping character of local level policy-making (Caponio and Borkert 2010; Poppelaars and Scholten 2008; Bak Jørgensen 2012). However, while a 'local turn' has taken place in migration studies over the past two decades, the migration literature has primarily focused on capital and gateway cities (see e.g. Alexander 2003; Penninx et al. 2004; Poppelaars and Scholten 2008; Caponio and Borkert 2010; Scholten 2013). This does not fit the reality of migrant settlement, as immigrants arrive and settle in a much wider range of cities. Little is known about migration diversity management across cities of different sizes and in different situations. In this dissertation I thus look at how immigrant integration governance is decentred across different cities and policy departments.

In migration studies the concept of integration has been critiqued for its one-dimensional focus on adaptation by immigrants and reinforcement of national boundaries (e.g. Glick-Schiller and Çağlar 2009). While some authors are calling for the concept of

integration to be completely discarded (e.g. Schinkel 2018), others advocate a broadening of the concept to make it more of a two-way process (e.g. Phillimore, 2012, Mahendran 2013). Empirically, immigrant integration governance has become embedded across different policy domains. As the studies in this dissertation indicate, this means that integration is addressed under different terms, including diversity, inclusion, integration, participation, anti-radicalization and anti-discrimination (cf. Alexander 2005). How this concept has developed and is governed across these domains is the focus of this study (cf. Hadj-Abdou 2019).

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION

This thesis aims to gain a better understanding of decentred governance, by looking at how and why immigrant integration governance is decentred and the implications of such a decentred approach. It contributes to the literature by moving beyond the managerial side of governance, studying both the coordination and content of a decentred governance approach in a complex and contested policy context.

My research question reads as follows:

How and why is immigrant integration governance decentred and what are the implications of this decentred approach?

To answer this research question I have formulated three sub-questions that will be answered in the empirical chapters 2-6.

- *Why is immigrant integration governance decentred?*
- *How is decentred immigrant integration governance shaped?*
- *What are the implications of a decentred immigrant integration governance?*

Given this thesis' explicit focus on both the coordination and content of decentred governance I look at *how* decentred governance is shaped, as well as *why* a decentred governance approach is chosen and what the *implications* of such an approach are. This enables me to study the underlying perceptions of integration and how different governance actors shape their integration policies in these different contexts.

1.4 RESEARCH METHODS AND APPROACH

This dissertation's main focus is on how decentred immigrant integration policies are shaped, looking at both the coordination and content of these policies. Rather than focusing on policy implementation or output, this thesis focuses on the *designing* of policies as an integral part of policy development (Alexander 1982). The point of departure is the constructed nature of the policies (Dahl and Lindblom 1953; Schattschneider 1960; Lowi 1964 and Steinberger 1980), in which "*policymakers choose from among a*

variety of possible approaches to address[.] a particular problem" (Schneider & Ingram, 1997 in Schneider and Sidney 2009, p.105 implying that policymaking is a deliberative and selective exercise in which certain problem definitions and policy solutions are chosen over others.

Attempting to overcome the trial-and-error fashion of policymaking (Linder and Peters 1984), policy science (initially) developed as a discipline with a strong instrumental purpose. With their study *"Politics, Economics and Welfare"* (1953) Dahl and Lindblom were among the first to draw attention to the constructed nature of policies. Steinberger (1980) later applied the idea of social construction to policy meaning. Tracing this back to Schattschneider (1960), who noted that new policies create new politics, it is possible to distinguish a set of literature that focuses on the constructed nature of policymaking, and the feed-forward effects this generates. Departing from the complex and ambiguous nature of public policy, these studies focus on the contest over multiple meanings in policies (Greenberg et al. 1977 and Steinberger 1980). Policy and policy designs were thus no longer considered as being merely rational and neutral. Rather, studies started focusing on the construction and meaning-making inherent to the design and *"the characteristics created and shaped by the earlier activities of problem definition and policy design"* (Ingraham 1987, p. 611).

Building on the above, I apply a constructivist perspective on policymaking. Studying immigrant integration policymaking in different decentred contexts enables me to analyze and compare a variety of policy designs, providing insight into the underlying perceptions of integration. In Chapters two, three and four I focus on immigrant integration governance in different national contexts, comparing France, Flanders (Belgium), the Netherlands and the United Kingdom on different elements. In Chapters five and six I zoom in on the Dutch context, providing an in-depth comparison of local immigrant integration governance and developments in Dutch immigrant integration over past decades. I have done so mainly through qualitative policy analysis and interviews with policymakers. In the respective chapters, the methods of data collection and analysis are explained in more detail.

Controlled qualitative comparison can be very insightful when attempting to unravel complex processes like governance and policymaking, as it allows us to study what is unusual and what stands out, thereby providing insight into the underlying concepts. The rich context in which it takes place enables abductive discoveries that a quantitative comparison or a qualitative case study could not achieve. However, we should be critical about its causal explanatory value and the risk of reinforcing either national or conceptional boundaries (cf. Glick-Schiller and Çağlar 2009 on methodological nationalism). *"There is nothing intrinsically similar or dissimilar about any two things"* (Schaffer 2018, p. 20), therefore as researchers we should constantly ask ourselves *what* we are comparing (cf. Simmons, Smith and Schwartz 2018), and reflect on the boundaries we draw and comparisons we make. In a comparative study it is thus important to weigh which findings are context-specific, and which relate comparatively (cf. Ward 2010, Robinson 2016).

1.5 SOCIETAL RELEVANCE

In the preceding paragraphs, I have described the theoretical relevance of this thesis and its contribution to the literature on governance and migration studies. Building on that, this study shows the importance of studying the content of decentred governance, illustrating the heterogeneity of local immigrant integration governance. This dissertation thus shows that there is no ‘one local dimension’ of integration governance. In order to gain a better understanding of the different local approaches to integration, we must look beyond capital and gateway cities. What might be relevant in a highly diverse city like Rotterdam, might not be remotely relevant in a small-scale city like Cuijk. The research in this thesis shows that it is not so much city size, but rather the explicit frames that cities chose to position their integration policies that determine the content and embeddedness of these policies. Further research is necessary to gain a better understanding of the different clusters of cities in order to facilitate meaningful networks for policy exchange and policy learning amongst clusters of cities. This is particularly relevant in light of the upcoming decentralization of civic integration policies in the Netherlands (as of 2021), in which the municipalities will become responsible for the civic integration of immigrants, thus entailing a further decentralization of integration governance.

Furthermore, such research is also relevant in light of the broader popularity of decentralization as a governance strategy, as can also be observed in other policy domains such as youth care. While it is often believed that policy issues are best addressed from an integrated perspective (across policy departments) or in proximity to its subjects (at the local level), this thesis shows that this can lead to evasive policies that water down the original policy priorities. This dissertation thus shows the limitations of a decentred governance strategy in a contested policy context, which runs the risk of succumbing to the same policy taboos as at the national level. In this thesis I hence formulate conditions under which a successful embedded, mainstreamed approach can be achieved.

1.6 OUTLINE OF THIS DISSERTATION

This thesis consists of a range of national and local comparative studies on why and how immigrant integration policies are decentred and the implications of these decentred approaches. The chapters are based on papers that have been published or submitted to international peer-reviewed journals and one edited book (see table 1 for full overview of the publication details). They give an account of empirical studies of immigrant integration policies in the Netherlands, France, the United Kingdom (Chapters two and four), Flanders (Belgium) (Chapter three) and a selection of Dutch cities (Chapter five). Based on the findings on the Netherlands in Chapters two to five, I reflect on the overall policy developments in Chapter six. As mainstreaming addresses the embedding of migration-related diversity into generic policy domains, each study encompasses both immigrant integration policies and analyses of related policy fields, such as education, social cohesion and safety.

Table 1, Chapter overview

Research question: How and why is immigrant integration governance decentred and what are the implications of this decentred approach?

Why	Chapter 2	Mainstreaming in response to superdiversity? The governance of migration-related diversity in France, the UK and the Netherlands	This chapter was published as <i>Van Breugel, I., & Scholten, P. (2017). Mainstreaming in response to superdiversity? The governance of migration-related diversity in France, the UK and the Netherlands. Policy & Politics, 45(4), 511-526</i>
	Chapter 3	Mainstreaming or Retrenchment? Migration-related Diversity and Education Policies in the Netherlands and Flanders	This chapter has been revised and resubmitted to an internal peer-reviewed journal. <i>Van Breugel, I., Westerveen, L. Adam, I & Scholten, P. (under review) Mainstreaming or Retrenchment? Migration-related Diversity and Education Policies in the Netherlands and Flanders</i>
How	Chapter 4	Governance by proxy. A comparative policy analysis of the mainstreaming of immigrant integration governance	This chapter was published as <i>Van Breugel, I. & Scholten, P. (2020) Governance by Proxy: A Comparative Policy Analysis of the Mainstreaming of Immigrant Integration Governance, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 22:3, 207-225</i>
	Chapter 5	Towards a typology of local migration diversity policies	This chapter was published as <i>Van Breugel, I. (2020). Towards a typology of local migration diversity policies. Comparative Studies, 8(1), 1-16</i>
Implications	Chapter 6	Target group definitions. The dilemma of recognition in immigrant integration policy solution formulation	This chapter was accepted for publication as <i>Van Breugel (forthcoming) Target group definitions. The dilemma of recognition, in: Zittoun, P., Fischer, F. & Zahariadis, N. (eds) The Politics of Formulating Policy Solutions: Arguments, Arenas, and Coalitions. Bristol: Policy Press</i>

This first two chapters focus on why immigrant integration policies are decentred. Chapter two, “*Mainstreaming in response to superdiversity?*” assesses the drivers for mainstreaming as a governance strategy in immigrant integration governance in France, the Netherlands and the UK within the context of superdiversity. Based on a qualitative policy analysis (2000-2014), it shows that ‘mainstreaming’ is driven by political and economic motives rather than considerations of superdiversity. On a more

pragmatic level, mainstreaming is applied as an instrumental strategy for circumventing or avoiding targeting in superdiverse settings.

In Chapter three, “*Mainstreaming or Retrenchment?*” mainstreaming in the Netherlands and Flanders are compared. It illustrates that both countries are characterized by a similar polity and political context, the presence of sub-state nationalism in Flanders and the stronger influence of a neoliberal approach to integration in the Dutch context, leading to incomplete mainstreaming in the Netherlands, and the continuation of targeted and siloed integration policies in Flanders.

In chapters four and five I subsequently study how immigrant integration policies are decentred. Chapter four, “*Governance by proxy*”, illustrates the importance of strong horizontal and vertical coordination mechanisms and the distinction between universal and proxy targeting in mainstreaming. The analysis shows that faced with the complexities and contestation of integration governance, policies seem unable to develop a coordinated polycentric approach and resort to the use of proxies instead. Rather than an integrated approach, the mainstreaming of immigrant integration governance in France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom has led to further fragmentation due to the lack of a clear prioritization of the decentred approach.

Chapter five, “*Towards a typology of local migration diversity policies*”, analyses the commonalities and differences in migration-diversity policies across the local dimension. I inductively identify different policy types, distinguishing between pro-active and reactive governing and embedded and one-domain policies. This chapter illustrates the wide range of local migration diversity policies and shows that we need to move beyond the binary division between large and small cities to understand local migration policymaking, as demonstrated by the composition of different city clusters.

The sixth chapter, “*Target group definitions*” illustrates the implications of a decentred governance approach. The chapter reflects on policy developments in Dutch immigrant integration governance and highlights the role of target grouping and non-targeting as a discursive strategy. The conclusion of this dissertation finally, returns to the research question, reflects on the findings and main theoretical and societal contributions of this study, and draws up a research agenda based on these findings.

¹ The words immigrant integration policies and migration(-related) diversity policies are used interchangeably in this dissertation.

CHAPTER

TWO

Mainstreaming in response to superdiversity?

The governance of migration-related diversity in France, the UK and the Netherlands

ABSTRACT

This chapter examines mainstreaming as a governance strategy in immigrant integration governance. Diversity mainstreaming involves a whole society approach for raising awareness about migration-related diversity, mobilising a network of actors to embed diversity across policy areas. Bringing together the literature on superdiversity, policy targeting and governance mainstreaming this chapter examines empirically whether, and if so, why and how mainstreaming is applied as a governance strategy in France, the Netherlands and the UK. Based on a qualitative policy analysis covering the period 2000-2014, this study finds mainstreaming 'incomplete' and driven by political and economic motives rather than considerations of superdiversity.

Van Breugel, I., & Scholten, P. (2017). Mainstreaming in response to superdiversity? The governance of migration-related diversity in France, the UK and the Netherlands. Policy & Politics, 45(4), 511-526.

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Superdiversity challenges traditional modes of governance regarding migration-related diversity. It refers to multidimensional shifts in migration patterns (Vertovec, 2007; Meissner and Vertovec, 2015), that challenge policies directed at specific migrant 'groups' that would oversimplify the diversity within and between migrant groups and society. The increasing complexity that superdiversity refers to and the inadvertent effects of policy targeting were core elements of the so-called multiculturalism backlash in many European countries (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010). Furthermore, the deepening of diversity that is associated with superdiversity would complicate any policy oriented at the 'assimilation' of newcomers into the host society, as this host society itself is being transformed in response to migration as well (Crul, 2016). Although various studies have shown that superdiversity demands a rethinking of governance responses and government policies (Vertovec, 2007; Crul, 2016; Phillimore, 2015), little is known about what form or forms of governance and policy would best fit situations of superdiversity.

This chapter examines whether, and if so, how and why, governance mainstreaming forms a suitable policy response to situations of superdiversity. The concept of governance refers to problem-solving strategies that are developed and implemented in complex networks of actors (Teisman, van Buuren and Gerrits, 2009), including but certainly not limited to government institutions and government policies (Colebatch, 2009; Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2003). The concept of governance mainstreaming has been developed more broadly in other areas such as gender, disability and environmental governance (Dalal-Clayton and Bass, 2009; Nunan et al, 2012; Priestley and Roulstone, 2009; Verloo, 2005; Walby 2005). Building from this literature we define mainstreaming of migration-related diversity as the effort to embed diversity in a generic approach across policy areas as well as policy levels, to establish a whole-society approach to diversity rather than an approach to specific migrant groups, in complex actor networks.

This chapter analyses patterns in the policy approaches to immigrant integration in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and France from the conceptual lens of governance mainstreaming, and analyse how and why mainstreaming was developed as a governance strategy, and what role superdiversity played in the rationale for and the choice of strategy towards mainstreaming.

2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

To understand governance mainstreaming, we will speak to three strands of literature; superdiversity, policy targeting and mainstreaming. Based on these strands of literature, we build the theoretical expectation that in situations of superdiversity, mainstreaming may be an effective governance strategy to address the whole diverse population and to manage the complexity of diversity within the population. Examining whether this expectation holds will be central to the subsequent empirical analysis of our three case studies.

2.2.1 Superdiversity

Superdiversity is a key concept from the sociological and anthropological literature which describes the growing complexity of diversity in contemporary societies. It refers to the increasing diversity both within and between immigrant groups, and to the diversity of society as a whole. Labelling separate migrant groups is no longer considered suitable due to the diversification of migrant populations in terms of inter alia countries of origin, gender, religion and legal status (Vertovec, 2007), and differences between generations of migrants, within ethnic groups and differences in lifestyles (Crul, 2015). Other authors point to the phenomenon of 'majority-minority' cities (Alba and Nee, 1997; Kasinitz, Mollenkopf and Waters, 2002; Crul and Schneider, 2010) where the majority of the city population is made up of citizens of a first or second generation migrant background, thus making up a majority of different minorities.

In the literature on superdiversity it is often argued that the 'diversification of diversity' calls for a "*multidimensional reconsideration of diversity*" (Vertovec, 2007, 1050). This challenges the governance of diversity, as former multicultural- or assimilationist models for immigrant integration are considered overly rigid to describe the fluid nature of societies in Europe today, due to their focus on separate migrant groups and integration as a one-way process. While the call for a reconsideration of diversity policies seems to set root in policy circles too, judging from the references to (super)diversity in inter alia British and Dutch policies¹, it yet remains unclear how this impacts the broader process of policy making.

Superdiversity was originally launched as a descriptive sociological concept that called for methodological and policy reorientations taking into account the multi-dimensional character of superdiversity (Vertovec 2007; Meissner and Vertovec, 2014). This speaks to policy making in two ways: on the hand it speaks to the call for adequate representation and service provision of mainstream policies in a superdiverse society (cf. Phillimore, 2012; 2015), and on the other hand it speaks to the, relatively under exposed, questions of integration and identification this poses for a superdiverse society (Crul, 2015; Duyvendak, 2016). Since the early 2000's former models of immigrant integration policies have become highly contested. Marked by the multiculturalism backlash and assimilationist turn (Joppke, 2004; Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010) the policy field has become highly politicised, leading to a reconsideration of models for integration and policy measures, "*foment[ing] a negative atmosphere surrounding immigrants, ethnic minorities and particularly Muslims*" (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010). Some argue that it is precisely this dimension of conflict over diversity and contest over models for integration that is missing from the superdiversity literature by not making explicit how diversity is supposed to be 'accommodated' in the mainstream (Duyvendak, 2016). Does this entail diversity as the new mainstream? Or assimilation into the (existing) mainstream? Others have argued that superdiversity provides itself the contours of a policy model or even a political discourse or strategy towards diversity. For instance, if integration or diversity governance is understood as a two-way process, as implied in the superdiversity literature, research attention should be paid to the 'institutional adaption' (Phillimore, 2015) from the mainstream-side too.

2.2.2 Policy targeting

A key aspect of the challenge that superdiversity poses to governance involves policy targeting. Superdiversity involves a broadening and deepening of complexity amongst migrants that cannot be captured into demarcated target groups. Yet, defining clear target populations is a core aspect of policymaking, not only in migration and integration. While the definition of target groups is key in effectively addressing policies (Sen, 1995), target group constructions always carry social and political consequences for the group at stake, as well as for society as a whole (Schneider and Ingram, 1997). The way target groups are constructed in policy design resembles target group constructions that are dominant in society (Ingram et al 2007, 106). As such, policy targeting has played a particular role in the debate on migration-related diversity (De Zwart, 2005; Scholten, 2011; Yanow, 2015).

One of the issues imminent to the formulation of immigrant integration policies is the discussion whether migrant integration is best promoted by generic policies that are colour-blind, or by policies that separately target specific migrant groups. A dilemma between risking to sustain or reinforce inequalities in society when specific problems are not met with targeted policies (cf. Simon and Piché, 2012), and the risk of strengthening ethnic and cultural boundaries in society through the degenerative effect of targeted policies themselves (cf. Schneider and Ingram, 1997; De Zwart, 2005). De Zwart (2005) describes this phenomenon as the ‘dilemma of recognition’ and distinguishes three possible policy responses; accommodation (multicultural politics of recognition), denial (ideal-typical liberal solution, argues against the benefits of redistributive policies) and replacement (a compromise between denial and accommodation by introducing new social categories by the government).

Connecting the dilemma of recognition to the literature on superdiversity, a key question is what role targeting plays in policy making in the complexity of migration-related diversity. A politics of accommodation does not suit the superdiversity thesis because it is considered overly ‘rigid’ to do justice to the complexity of superdiverse settings. One expectation is that superdiversity requires a targeting of the ‘whole diverse populations’ rather than specific groups, what could be framed as the politics of ‘denial’ in De Zwart’s typology. Alternatively, target groups can be replaced by other types of targets (such as neighbourhood-oriented or needs-based targets) to prevent the degenerative logic of the old group targets. This approximates De Zwart’s type of replacement politics.

2.2.3 Governance mainstreaming

In the context of these tensions over targeting, ‘governance mainstreaming’ is increasingly referred to as a governance strategy to broadly address migration-related diversity. As a governance strategy, this clearly extends beyond the scope of formal policies and (central) government actors, it involves multiple types of actors from across various levels (Rhodes, 2000). Various studies have revealed the key role of NGO’s especially at the local level in migrant integration governance (Zapata-Barrero, Caponio and Scholten, forthcoming; Zincone, Penninx and Borkert, 2011). However, the notion of mainstreaming is best known from its application in the policy areas such as gender, disability and environmental policy. Deducing from the literature from these policy

fields, three central elements of ‘governance mainstreaming’ can be defined.

First, mainstreaming refers to a gradual embedding of former target group-specific policies into a generic cross-sectional and often also multi-level approach. This involves bringing target groups such as women, students in special education, or a specific topic such as care for the environment, ‘into the mainstream.’ Gender equality for example, is rarely treated as a policy domain in itself but is rather addressed as a topic that affects many policy domains, such as education, labour and culture. As such, mainstreaming is considered as a strategy to prevent topics like gender or disability to be side-lined into a concern for specific actors only; rather it is mainstreamed as a concern for *all actors* and policy fields (Verloo, 2005). We expect that the complexity of superdiverse social setting provides a fertile setting for such cross-sectional and multi-level approaches. Precisely when migration-related diversity deepens and broadens, it becomes more difficult to isolate it as a separate policy domain. In fact, various scholars (cf. Meissner, 2015; Crul, 2016) have argued that in a growing number of social settings, especially cities and neighbourhoods, diversity is becoming the norm.

Secondly, mainstreaming involves an active engagement in incorporating the policy issue at hand in the mainstream. Mainstreaming does not (at least not necessarily) mean government retrenchment, but rather an active effort to create general awareness of the relevance of a specific topic. For instance, in relation to gender and disability this active consideration is often framed in terms of inclusiveness of generic policies for women and disabled persons. In relation to superdiversity, this means that the complexity of diversity and the absence of clear target groups is a reason not to address diversity explicitly and to develop policy aims in terms of promoting the inclusion of migrants. Here there is an obvious link with the literature on interculturalism, which emphasises the need for policies to highlight the importance of diversity for instance in education, to train intercultural competencies and to provide opportunities for people with different backgrounds to be in contact and to interact (Meer, Modood and Zapata-Barrero 2016).

Thirdly, mainstreaming involves a complex and multi-actor governance strategy. In contrast to the traditional state-centric ideas on how governments can promote migration-related diversity, mainstreaming involves a more poly-centric view on how a broad variety of actors (including but not limited to ‘government’) should collaborate in order to address migration-related diversity. This poly-centricism (Rhodes, 2000) is also clearly manifest in gender mainstreaming, where government only plays a facilitating role in a much broader network of actors that seek to raise public awareness concerning governance issues. Furthermore, this poly-centricism also appears relevant in relation to topics that defy state-centric modes of problem resolution. This certainly applies to complex or ‘wicked’ policy problems such as gender but also superdiversity, where the role of government and the influence of state-centric policies may be rather limited.

However, limitations to the concept and implementation of (gender) mainstreaming have also been extensively addressed in the literature (Booth and Bennett, 2002; Eveline and Bacchi, 2005; Lombardo, 2005; Stratigaki, 2005 and Squires, 2005). The main critiques concern the vagueness of the concept and its objectives, the risk of ‘becoming everyone’s responsibility, yet nobody’s at the same time’ thereby risking to depoliticise and water down the transformational potential of gender mainstreaming (Caglar, 2013, 340). Without a clear operationalisation gender mainstreaming becomes “*an open sig-*

nifier that can be filled with both feminist and non-feminist meanings" (Lombardo and Meier 2006, 161) running the risk of reinvigorating old group distinctions and inequalities, instead of overcoming them.

2.3 METHODS

The data for this study were collected as part of a larger comparative research project (UPSTREAM project). The project involves an in-depth qualitative study of immigrant integration policies in five different European countries and at the level of the European Union. The data collection and initial analysis was commissioned by scholars in these respective countries. As mainstreaming speaks to the embedding of migration-related diversity into generic policies and policy fields we have selected both immigrant integration policy documents (as far as these are explicitly existent), as well as policy documents *related* to immigrant integration priorities. This covers policy documents from fields related to immigrant integration governance such as education and neighbourhood policies, as well as policies that were previously associated or linked to immigrant integration priorities, such as 'city-citizenship policies'. This includes national as well as local policy documents, records of parliamentary and council meetings, research and advisory reports and relevant secondary literature. Immigrant integration policies between 2000-2014 were analysed. The policy-analysis was complemented with 16 to 20 in-depth semi-structured expert interviews per country with policymakers, practitioners and (non-governmental) stakeholders involved in immigrant integration policy making. Following a fixed template every country analysis focused on the modes of targeting and coordination of immigrant integration priorities. The country studies are available online and are referred to explicitly in the text (Bozec and Simon, 2014; Jensen and Gidley, 2014; Maan, Van Breugel and Scholten, 2014).

Based on these country data, we selected the cases of France, the Netherlands and the UK for the current study. The countries each have very distinct histories of immigrant integration policies. Whereas the UK has been traditionally known for its more multiculturalist approach to race relations, France has rather developed an assimilationist approach against the background of the French Republicanist tradition (Favell, 1998; Bleich, 2003; Schain, 2008). The Netherlands is a country with experiences with both multiculturalist as well as assimilationist policies, but with perhaps the strongest and most explicit agenda of governance mainstreaming in relation to migration-related diversity (Scholten, 2011). As the cases cover different traditions of immigrant integration governance this allows for a most rigorous assessment of the trend of mainstreaming in Europe in different policy settings. However despite these different policy environments, the three cases do share a long and diverse history of immigration which makes them likely cases of superdiversity. Although the migrant-populations might differ per country, the "speed, spread and scale" (Meissner and Vertovec, 2014) of changes in migration patterns and thereby the diversification of the migrant populations in these countries qualifies them as superdiverse. This allows us for a comparison of policy responses to these circumstances of super diversity. Our research question is thus two-fold: how and why mainstreaming was developed as a governance strategy, and what role did superdiversity play in the rationale for and the choice of strategy towards mainstreaming?

2.4 DIVERSITY MAINSTREAMING IN FRANCE, THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UK

For the three selected countries, we have analysed to what extent and in what ways the governance of migration-related diversity has been mainstreamed over the last decade. Subsequently, we have explored in more detail what role superdiversity and the dilemma's involved in policy targeting have played in this development.

2.4.1 France

While France, along with the other two cases can be characterised as a country with a long history of immigration, this reflects very differently in the policies around migration-related diversity. Several waves of immigration have taken place since the mid-19th century, in which many immigrants with different countries of origin and different motives for migration (i.e. work or family-reunification) came to France (Kastoryano, 2002). Consequently, France has characteristics of a super-diverse society in terms of the diversity in countries of origin and different generations of immigrants. This diversity is however hardly represented in the statistics, since the French statistical system has not introduced categories related to ethnicity and origins (Amiraux and Simon, 2006; Simon, 2014). Descendants of immigrants are therefore practically invisible. This non-registration approach is a consequence of the French Republican strand of universalism with regard to migration-related diversity. The republican principle of equality is interpreted as a rejection of any form of recognition of groups defined along origins and ethnic lines which led consequently to colour-blind policies.

In certain aspects, this French Republicanist approach does have much in common with the theoretical ideal type of governance mainstreaming constructed above. Rather than an explicit immigrant integration framework, the emphasis in France is much more on generic policies, addressing all citizens alike. The French policy approach to migration-related diversity has however undergone several changes, particularly in the implementation of policies (Bozec and Simon, 2014). An important recent development in this regard is the demarcating of immigrant integration policies to immigrants upon their first five years after arrival in 2008. This meant a suspension of former programs, now falling outside the scope of the renewed immigrant integration policies. Former funds dedicated to integration have been suspended under the new demarcation of the policy fields, but these cutbacks have not been met with other funding at the national or local level, or networks to enhance the visibility or monitoring of integration after these five years, thus weakening the integration infrastructure. De-facto the separation means a decoupling of (long-term) immigrant integration priorities.

However, within the context of this 'generic' Republicanist approach, various replacement or 'proxy' strategies can be found, where immigrants (or French with a migration background) are targeted under different headers (Bozec and Simon, 2014). The 'priority zones' form an important proxy that disproportionately effect migrant groups. Area-based targeting, such as with the priority-neighbourhoods and priority areas in education, forms the most important proxy to indirectly target diversity in France. Many French policies are centred on priority neighbourhoods, for example the '*Zone Education Prioritaire*' that receive more staff and funding for education, and '*Politique de la*

Ville' as a strategy to address social cohesion. However, with the separation between integration policies and 'priority zone' policies since 2008, no form of monitoring or diversity awareness is present anymore. Although some of the diversity awareness of the former FASILD (Social Fund for integration and fight against discriminations) workers is preserved in their professional experience under the new area-based focus now executed by 'Acsé' (National agency for social cohesion and equal opportunities), this is no longer officially a priority under the new priority-neighbourhoods framework (Bozec and Simon, 2014, 49). One element that is integrated in the priority-neighbourhood policies are the anti-discrimination policies. Although these policies are directed at all sorts of discrimination, such as gender discrimination or class inequalities, in many cases anti-discrimination policies have led to ethnic discrimination being explicitly addressed as is particularly evident in Lyon (Bozec and Simon, 2014). This is however strongly dependent on the priorities of the specific city or municipality as integration and anti-discrimination policies are explicitly separated.

Finally, the poly-centric mode of governance that would be associated with mainstreaming, thus a decentralised and deconcentrated governance of immigrant integration priorities between different levels and departments of governance, is partly recognisable in France. Despite the fact that immigrant integration-related policies are mainly issued by the French national government, some elements of deconcentration and decentralisation can be distinguished. At the national level, the dispersed responsibilities are scattered amongst multiple policy domains. An inter-ministerial committee for integration was created in 1990 to reinforce coordination, but did not entirely succeedⁱⁱ. Acsé and its predecessors aimed at financing national and local NGOs in several policy fields and thereby increased the deconcentration of governance. PRIPI (*Programmes Régionaux d'Intégration des Populations Immigrées*) and PDI (*Programme Départemental de l'Intégration*) are examples of regional and local optional programmes aimed at adaptation to local needs and contexts of the nationally set framework and objectives. Cities can develop their own additional policies. However, municipalities have limited possibilities to influence how integration and diversity issues are handled in schools and in general these initiatives are confined within the general frame of the French Republican model. The limited levels of vertical coordination are best recognisable in educational policies. Educational policies are to a great extent organised in 'priority areas'. Organising these educational priority areas involves a great range of public actors at all levels and in different sectors, as well as non-state actors. However policies are often seen as stand-alone policies ordered by the national (governmental) actors and implemented by a specific school without much coordination. Therefore we can conclude that in case of generic policies, some forms of poly-centric governance can be distinguished, but the state-centric model is still dominant due to the importance of the national government in issuing social and educational policies.

We can conclude that mainstreaming applies to some extent to the French case. There is a clear cross-sectional and multi-level approach, but not with an orientation at diversity awareness and inclusion, furthermore this is characterised by a more state-centric than poly-centric approach. The governance strategy therefor does not seem to be a response to superdiversity nor to the dilemma of recognising target groups. Rather than driven by superdiversity, the French form of mainstreaming seems driven by the Republicanist model. However, behind the scenes of this Republicanist discourse, we do see several important governance strategies to superdiversity. The French case re-

veals particularly clear instances of replacement or ‘proxy’ strategies where instead of targeting policies at groups, policies are targeted at specific needs or neighbourhoods.

2.4.2 The Netherlands

The Netherlands also has a long history of migration, with a diversity of migrants coming from the former colonies, guest workers recruited from Southern-Europe and North-Africa, refugees and EU mobile workers. Based on the idea of ‘proportional participation’ the Dutch government keeps close track of immigrant participation in different fields. The Netherlands has an advanced statistical database, which in its data collection distinguishes between ‘*allochtoon*’ (Western and non-Western) and ‘*autochtoon*’ citizens: those born abroad or whose parents were born abroad, and native Dutch (Scholten, 2011). For the Netherlands the description of superdiversity applies perhaps most to the population of the two major cities of the Netherlands Amsterdam and Rotterdam that have received most immigration over the past decades.

Departing from its perceived multicultural past Dutch policies experienced a sharp assimilationist turn in the early 2000s, shifting away from a more pluralist approach to an approach focused on social and cultural integration, phrased in a generic message of social cohesion (Maan, van Breugel and Scholten, 2014; Scholten, 2011). A number of incidents nationally and internationally led to a further politicisation of the topic. Newly founded populist parties such as *LPF*, *Liveable Rotterdam* and the *Freedom Party* placed the topic high on the political agenda. While briefly calling attention to the increasing diversity of the Dutch population in 2007, the Cabinet explicitly distanced itself from its perceived multicultural past in 2011. Stating that increased plurality and diversity do not automatically lead to shared norms, but that this instead requires effort on the part of those who come to settle here, indicating a shift to a more assimilationist view on integration. The Integration Agenda (2013) of the current government continues the focus on ‘*Dutch society and its values*’ and strives for equal treatment of all its citizens.

Dutch immigrant integration policies are characterised by a strong decentralisation and deconcentration: sharing policy responsibilities both vertically between levels of government and horizontally, between departments (Scholten, 2013). Although this approach dates back to the early 1990s, it was since the 2000’s that the call for generic policies as part of a revision of immigrant integration governance came under renewed interest. The Dutch state played a role in launching the idea of mainstreaming at the EU and local level. At the national level the Dutch government explicitly distanced itself from the former multicultural years of governance in the 2011 Integration Memorandum, marking a strong decentralisation and ‘generalisation’ of immigrant integration governance whereby the national government largely withdrew itself from the field. The development was mainly directed at a movement away from former specifically targeted policies, which were now considered overtly rigid, costly and facilitating.

At the local level too, the outlook on diversity changed strongly. This led to a re-definition of immigrant integration policies to a generic ‘City Citizenship’ framework, directed at the entire city population. Instead of distinguishing different target groups on the basis of migrant background and spelling out models of integration, the emphasis shifted to the participation of *all* citizens in the city. In contrast to the development at the national level however the cities of Rotterdam and Amsterdam explicitly address

(ethnic-)diversity in their the city-citizenship frameworks.

In these developments at both the national and local level the emphasis was strongly focused on the 'generalisation' of policies, thus moving away from both specific immigrant integration policies as well as specific target groups. For example discarding former migrant specific measures and consultation structures. Although Rotterdam explicitly mentioned diversity as one of the pillars of the city citizenship framework, establishing it as one of the four knowledge centres with the framework, a lack of clear prioritisation and coordination seems to lead to a watering down of integration priorities altogether. The introduction of these generic frameworks were followed by retrenchment measures, which proved to have a decisive influence on the 'generalisation' of immigrant integration policies. Leading to a strong focus of dismissing policies. The retrenchment measures form part of larger retrenchment measures in the social sector, characterised by a withdrawal of the state and a focus on the individual responsibility and self-reliance of citizens. A framework that resonates in the revision of the immigrant integration governance too.

While former immigrant integration policies were 'mainstreamed' into generic city citizenship policies, a similar trend of 'generalisation' took place with regard to the target groups in generic policy fields like education and social cohesion (Maan, van Breugel and Scholten, 2014). In these areas we can discern a trend of 'proxy'-policies, rather similar to the French case. Policies formerly targeted by *inter alia* migration background are redefined under new categories, often largely overlapping with the old target groups. In the distribution of extra funds for students in primary schools for example, the migrant background of a student or his or her parents as a criteria for extra funding (along with other criteria) was discarded and reframed to the broader category of the level of education of the parents. In neighbourhood policies target groups are broadened to target groups based on level of income and education. Simultaneously however, in the monitoring of educational outcomes categories are redefined, no longer distinguishing for ethnicity or migration background, thereby making invisible how the generic approach works out for the immigrant population.

In terms of the implementation of the mainstreamed policies by the street level bureaucrats in education and especially in the neighbourhoods, the broad generic approach offered the discretionary room to address complex social problems, of which integration problems might form only one amongst several aspects. However, the ability to signal and address diversity related issues became strongly dependent on the experience of the individual 'frontline workers' and thereby becomes *ad hoc* and vulnerable (Maan, van Breugel and Scholten, 2014).

In sum, the Dutch case also reveals only impartial mainstreaming, similar to the French case. Dutch policies have clearly been mainstreamed in terms of fading attention to specific groups in combination with a gradual generalisation of integration governance intersectionally, as well as across levels. Much more than in France this also involves poly-centric governance. However, just as in France, this does not involve an explicit orientation promoting diversity awareness and inclusion in a whole society approach. This Dutch form of 'impartial mainstreaming' seems only very weakly related to superdiversity. Although the abandoning of group specific policies was partly based on the recognition of inadvertent effects of policy targeting, mainstreaming was also strongly driven by political and economic motives. At the national level the diversion from the perceived multicultural past formed an important driver for the redefinition

of integration priorities in a mainstreamed approach. The politicisation of integration as a consequence of the multicultural backlash made policy targeting problematic in the Dutch situation and in the context of the economic situation the budget for migrant integration was effectively reduced to zero. Retrenchment measures thus also formed an important incentive for the decentralisation of integration policies to the local level. Subsequently retrenchment measures in the social sector led to a further dismantling of immigrant integration priorities at the local level.

2.4.3 United Kingdom

In the United Kingdom, like in the Netherlands, immigrant integration policies have to a great extent always been embedded in other generic policy fields, particularly in the field of education and neighbourhood policies. The mainstreaming of immigrant integration, thus the generic embedding of integration priorities, can be traced back to the seventies with the development of the anti-discrimination policies. However, similar to the Dutch case, it was in 2001 that this approach was intensified, and translated into a discourse of community cohesion (Spencer, 2011). The policy emphasis shifted from separate and specific immigrant integration policies to the broader social inclusion and social mobility priorities, such as the local 'Community Cohesion' approach.

Sparked by civil disturbances in northern England towns, from 2001 on an emphasis on the strengthening of local bonds came to replace the former multicultural framework, inter alia stimulating local authorities to avoid group specific funding. Despite the generic frame the policies targeted the integration of specific 'dysfunctional (inward looking) communities'. However the 2005 London Bombings led to an entanglement of cohesion policies and homeland security and counter terrorism on the one hand, and an explicit superdiversity framework on the other hand. While the policy approach of the latter was generic, policies related to security came to focus on religious, particularly Muslim, groups. In the policy response to the bombings, Secretary of State at the DCLG Ruth Kelly, explicitly cited Vertovec (2007) to describe the uneven geography of superdiversity in Britain. Consequently, the concept of super-diversity was central to drafting the new guidelines for the management of diversity at the local governance level and establishing new funding streams (Jensen and Gidley, 2014). On the other hand however a turn to assimilationism is visible. The approach to strong borders is often accompanied by quotes such as 'British jobs for British workers' and increasing attention is being paid in education to the 'common island history', British norms and values, and British literature. In other words, an assimilationist perspective co-exists with the awareness and recognition of a diverse population (Idem).

The well-known 'British' multiculturalist model was a strong decentralised model that was developed and implemented mostly at the local level. 2001 however marked a multiculturalist backlash at the national level as evident in the avoidance of group-specific funding and translations into languages other than English. At the local level lingering multicultural practices and a more prominent pluralist mind-set can nevertheless be recognised (Jensen and Gidley, 2014). In 2012 the government launched the 'Creating the conditions for integration' framework with an emphasis on individual agency and responsibility and a limited role of the central government. The programme was implemented in the context of broader decentralisation and retrenchment programs (Big Society approach and Localism Agenda), marking one of the drivers for the

generic 'Community Cohesion' approach. In education a similar redefinition of target groups is visible, where targeted policies for educational backlogs are redrafted from EAL (English as Additional Language) to social economic indicators. At the same time there is a shift visible from facilitating measures to prescriptive measures, within an increasing emphasis on the duty to learn English and a reassertion of 'British values'. In neighbourhood policies, as part of the broader community cohesion approach, we see a similar trend, the 'generalisation' of integration priorities to community cohesion entails a 'culturalisation' of the field, with an emphasis on the 'excluded to join in' (Jensen and Gidley, 2014, 26).

Just like in the Netherlands, the UK case clearly reveals poly-centric governance. Responsibility for migrants and integration has typically fallen within two departments: the Home Office is charged with immigration and border control and the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) is in charge of community cohesion (Spencer, 2011). The principle of localism, connected to projects such as government through community and the neighbourhood renewal program, has had a strong influence on the early development of decentralised government in Britain. Since 2010, there has also been a perceivable increase in deconcentration. The emergence of the Big Society philosophy, increasingly addressing citizens' social responsibilities, and the 2012 policy framework for integration "*Creating the Conditions for Integration*" (by the DCLG) are important turning points for increasing governmental retrenchment. Civil society was inspired and stimulated to address issues that are important to them, instead of large-scale, centrally led and state-funded programs. This approach is also recognisable at the local level. Finally, the trend of deconcentration is also recognisable in the connection between the state and schools. Schools received more responsibilities and the requirements to target the needs of specific groups were reduced. However, the school curriculum was simultaneously centralised to increase attention to British elements of history and language.

In sum, all three dimensions of mainstreaming are recognisable in the UK to some extent. There is a generalisation of 'migrant integration' into generic policies, a diversity orientation in the form of community cohesion (although also criticised for its monist perspective on UK society) and its polycentric governance structure with networks of different national and local, and government and NGO actors. In contrast to France and the Netherlands, the UK does have an explicit approach at community cohesion, which at least to some extent involves a recognition of the role of diversity within community cohesion. Another contrast with the other countries is that superdiversity is indeed recognised much more openly and broadly, both at the national and local level.

2.5 ANALYSIS: INCOMPLETE MAINSTREAMING AND PROXY-STRATEGIES FOR COPING WITH SUPERDIVERSITY

Taking from the literature on superdiversity, policy targeting and mainstreaming this chapter began with the expectation that mainstreaming could be a fitting governance response to superdiversity. This would provide a way to solve the dilemma of recognition in superdiverse settings by addressing the whole diverse population with a generic (rather than target group specific) approach and mobilising a broad governance net-

work (rather than a state-centric approach). Our analysis of France, the Netherlands and the UK shows that in most cases we observe only partial mainstreaming, or in other words ‘incomplete mainstreaming.’ In all three countries the trend towards more generic policies and away from group specific policies (if they have been there at all), was clearly present. The governance of migration-related diversity has clearly evolved into a topic that is addressed across various policy domains (such as education, labour, health, housing, etc.), and increasingly also across levels of government (localism in the UK and the Netherlands in particular). Although only to a limited extent in France, we also see a clear trend toward poly-centric governance in the other cases. The role of central government has diminished, shifting to a growing role of local governments, and collaborations with NGO’s and neighbourhood associations. This fits the broader development toward diversity ‘governance’ rather than state-centric diversity ‘policies.’

What we do not see however, is that these developments of decentralisation and deconcentration coincide with an explicit orientation at raising awareness about migration-related diversity across these new policy fields and levels of government. This appears to be a clear point of divergence with gender mainstreaming, where the explicit gender orientation is a central element in the mainstreaming approach. Only to some extent the UK community cohesion policies to some extent meets this criterion, although it is also criticised for its focus on British values rather than on diversity. We interpret ‘incomplete mainstreaming’ as a signal that mainstreaming also involves a degree of government retrenchment rather than active engagement with diversity governance. This can have consequences in terms of dilution of a clear policy vision or aim in terms of migration-related diversity, as evident in the Dutch and French cases.

Incomplete mainstreaming can be explained by our finding that superdiversity hardly played a role in the institutional adaption (Phillimore, 2015) of governance mainstreaming. In the UK there were some references to superdiversity, which may have contributed to more diversity awareness in its community cohesion discourse. However, in most cases (and to some extent also in the UK) mainstreaming was driven by political and economic motivations. Politically, responding to the multiculturalism backlash which has made any form of group specific policy to assist the integration of migrants problematic. Economically, as mainstreaming also revealed a degree of government retrenchment and hence cut-backs from integration spending in the past, as evident in the Dutch and French case which reduced their (national) budget for integration to zero. Our research does suggest that awareness and explicit recognition of superdiversity was much more present at the local level, especially large urban areas.

In terms of policy targeting, this suggests that mainstreaming does not simply ‘solve’ the dilemma of recognition in terms of diversity governance. Rather than targeting the ‘whole diverse population’, as in a superdiversity perspective, mainstreaming reveals clear traits of De Zwart’s (2005) ‘politics of denial.’ It is a strategy for not engaging with the contested issue of targeting specific migrant groups. This has as a consequence that the burden of incorporation is individualised and shifted to only those directly involved, the migrants themselves. Especially in France and the Netherlands the burden or obligation to integration is clearly placed one-sidedly with migrants and their individual responsibility to integrate, and ‘fit into the mainstream’ (cf. Van Houdt, Suvarierol and Schinkel, 2011 on responsabilisation of citizenship)

However, we do observe a tension between ‘incomplete mainstreaming’ on the one hand and the growing manifestation of superdiversity in these countries on the other

hand. This tension appears to be addressed by various replacement or ‘proxy’ strategies that target diversity but only indirectly so. The French *‘Politique de la Ville’* but also the various Dutch measures that are needs- or area-based rather than group-based, are clear examples of this. It enables a more pragmatic form of coping with diversity without needing to distinguish and address specific groups, whilst carrying the risk of completely diluting integration priorities, also referred to as depoliticising in the gender mainstreaming literature (Caglar, 2013, 340).

2.6 CONCLUSION

Studies of superdiversity have challenged traditional models of integration and diversity governance. However, unclear remains what mode of governance would be fitting in situations of superdiversity. This chapter engages with this debate in the literature by examining the current trend of mainstreaming migration-related diversity governance. It asks whether this trend is indeed fed by the ‘diversification of diversity’ that is captured by the term superdiversity, and whether mainstreaming indeed addresses the governance concerns that come with superdiversity.

Our analysis shows that although there is a theoretical connection between the literature of superdiversity, policy targeting and mainstreaming, this connection is not made in the practice of migration-related diversity governance in the cases studied in this chapter (France, the UK and the Netherlands). Superdiversity is hardly addressed as a motivation for immigrant integration mainstreaming. Rather than superdiversity, economic and political motives were more prominent in all three examined cases. On a more pragmatic level, we do see mainstreaming applied as an instrumental strategy for circumventing or avoiding dilemmas of recognition in superdiverse settings. This involves in particular the application of replacement or ‘proxy’ strategies that develop needs-based or area-based means rather than group-based means. We thus speak of ‘incomplete mainstreaming’ which involves a trend away from group specific to generic policies and from a state-centric to a poly-centric governance approach, but without an explicit orientation at creating diversity awareness and inclusion. Here lies a key difference between (migration-related) diversity mainstreaming and gender mainstreaming

ⁱ See for example the references to superdiversity by Commission on Integration and Cohesion in the UK (2008), and references to (super)diversity in the Dutch 2007 Integration Memorandum, or Amsterdam city-citizenship framework (2011).

ⁱⁱ It only met three times: starting in the early 1990s, once in 2003 and once in 2006 (Bozec and Simon 2014, 15).

CHAPTER

THREE

Mainstreaming or retrenchment?

Migration-related diversity and education policies in the Netherlands and Flanders

ABSTRACT

As a consequence of migration and the increasing diversification of society, the governance of migration-related diversity has become a mainstream policy issue. This chapter assesses how migration-related diversity is integrated into education policies in the Netherlands and Flanders. The analysis reveals a tension between mainstreaming and retrenchment when it comes to making migration-related diversity part of generic policy fields such as education. Based on a comparison of four indicators (targeting, monitoring, content integration, and diversity in the school system) this chapter illustrates that the mainstreaming of migration-related diversity leads to different policy trends in the two cases. Although the Netherlands and Flanders have similar educational systems and show similar degrees of politicisation of migration-related diversity, their approaches to the mainstreaming of migration-related diversity in education diverge. With the exception of ethnic monitoring, the focus on migration-related diversity largely faded in Dutch education policies in the period from 2000 to 2014, while in Flanders this trend towards 'migration-related diversity retrenchment' is less prevalent in the same period. In contrast to other studies that have pointed at the politicisation of migration-related diversity and the success of radical right-wing parties, this chapter illustrates that the diverging degree of retrenchment can be explained by the presence of sub-state nationalism in Flanders and the influence of a neoliberal approach to migration-related diversity in the Dutch context.

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3.1 INTRODUCTION

Migration-related diversity is increasingly considered a topic that cuts across all policy domains. Whereas immigrant integration has always been connected to policy fields such as employment and housing, a trend towards the further dispersal of immigrant integration governance to other policy fields is visible across Europe. In the literature, this is referred to as ‘mainstreaming’, a trend or a shift of responsibilities for the governance of migration-related diversity to other policy domains (Martinelli 2014; Scholten and van Breugel 2018; Galandini, Mulvey and Lessard-Phillips 2019; Westerveen and Adam, 2019; Grip 2020). Rather than treating immigrant integration as a separate institutionalised policy domain, within a mainstreaming strategy, the governance of migration-related diversity is addressed as an integral part of other policy domains, such as housing or education. Nevertheless, migration-related diversity is often still only studied in a centralised manner. Only a few studies focus on the horizontal coordination of immigrant integration governance (Spencer 2011, Scholten and van Breugel, 2017 and Westerveen and Adam, 2019) or explicitly address immigrant integration from a generic policy field (Phillimore 2017).

This chapter assesses the mainstreaming of migration-related diversity in education. Rather than studying mainstreaming from the perspective of (former) immigrant integration policy, we analyse specifically how diversity policies are mainstreamed into the field of education. Education offers opportunities for the transmission of language, culture, identity, and upward social mobility, and thereby plays a central role in immigrant integration (Rijkschroeff, ten Dam, Duyvendak et al. 2005). Furthermore, education is closely related to traditional notions of citizenship and thereby performs a clear role in forming a nation state’s citizens (Kymlicka 1997; Banks 2008). With the growing ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity in Europe, the question arises how this diversity is addressed and facilitated in education. Moreover, with the disappearing of centralised and group-specific integration policies and the aim to bring immigrant integration ‘into the mainstream’, it becomes important to study how migration-related diversity is addressed within the field of education.

This chapter explores whether, how, and why ‘migration-related diversity policies’ in the field of education have evolved between 2000 and 2014. With ‘migration-related diversity policies’ we refer to all policies that, in one way or another, address migration-related diversity. This can involve policies that target migrants or ethnic minorities directly, as well as policies that are related to immigrant integration or the diversification of society more generally. We study the cases of the Netherlands and Flanders (Belgium). Flanders and the Netherlands have historically gone through similar policy developments in the field of immigrant integration (Jacobs and Rea 2012). They are also characterised by similar educational systems, resulting from a tradition of pillarisation in which groups with different religious or philosophical convictions could establish their own schools (Loobuyck and Jacobs 2010; Franken and Vermeer 2019). We assess the mainstreaming of migration-related diversity in education by using four indicators: ‘*targeting*’, ‘*monitoring*’, ‘*content integration*’, and ‘*diversity in the school system*’. With these four indicators, we analyse how migration-related diversity is addressed in education policies and how this evolved over time, accounting for both the incorporation of migration-related diversity in mainstream policy fields as well as the adaptation of

mainstream institutions to migration-related diversity.

3.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.2.1 Assessing migration-related diversity mainstreaming in education: Four indicators

Since the early 2000s immigrant integration policies in Europe have been marked by the multicultural backlash (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010) and subsequent assimilationist turn (Joppke and Morawska 2003). Policies got an increasing (symbolic) emphasis on adaptation (Entzinger 2003) and support for group-based policies faded (Scholten and van Breugel 2018). More recently, scholars have pointed at a shift towards a 'mainstreaming' approach with a focus on broad immigrant integration or citizenship programmes, distributed over several policy areas (Martinelli 2014). This chapter empirically studies how migration-related diversity is integrated in educational policies and how this transforms the policy field.

We develop our definition of 'migration-related diversity mainstreaming' from the literature on gender and disability mainstreaming. First, mainstreaming involves a transition from separate policy measures that target specific groups to the incorporation of these target groups in mainstream policies. Second, mainstreaming requires that the policy programmes are adapted to accommodate the needs of specific groups in the mainstream. Moreover, the literature emphasises the need for active coordination of mainstreaming (e.g. Booth and Bennett 2002; Priestley and Roulstone 2009; Semmel, Gottlieb and Robinson 1979).

To operationalise migration-related diversity mainstreaming for the field of education, we borrow from the literature on multicultural education. The most widespread and well-known conception of multicultural education is the reform of school curricula to integrate content about ethnic minorities, known as content integration (Banks 1993; Bennett 2001). Furthermore, multicultural education can also comprise changes in teaching styles, teaching staff, and school structures. For example, multicultural education can entail granting equal rights to minority groups to establish private schools or allowing for reforms in the school system to improve education outcomes for disadvantaged groups (e.g. reducing academic tracking).

Bringing together these literatures on mainstreaming and multicultural education, we distinguish four different indicators for migration-related diversity mainstreaming in the field of education. First, we will look at the targeting of migrants and ethnic minorities within educational policies. Targeting is a central element of policymaking and essential for an effective redistribution of goods and services. A key question in targeting is which categories are defined (and which are avoided) to construct the target group of redistributive policies, a contested dilemma within immigrant integration policies and studies (see De Zwart 2005). For the targeting of migration-related diversity similar dilemmas arise, for example, should students be targeted universally, or should students with a migration background be distinguished? Moreover, if students with a migration background are considered a separate target group, which categories are used to distinguish them?

Second, we will look at the *monitoring* of migrants and ethnic minorities in education policies, as the reverse end of the targeting approach. This includes the presence or absence of ‘ethnic monitoring’, or the collection of data disaggregated by ethnic categories (such as birthplace, nationality, and language) as well as the monitoring of specific policy measures related to migration-related diversity, such as citizenship education. Together with targeting, the monitoring practices can shed a light on how migration-related diversity is addressed and assessed in the generic policy field of education (Simon, Piché and Gagnon 2015; cf. Booth and Bennett 2002).

Third, in line with the literature on multicultural education, we consider the extent to which content about migrants and ethnic minorities, such as minority religions or languages, are integrated into general school curricula. Within so-called *content integration*, different sub-approaches can be distinguished. Teachers can, for instance, utilise examples from different cultural groups (such as holidays and names) in their teaching, but leave the general curriculum intact, or they can reform the whole structure of the curriculum to inspire students to address social problems (Banks 1993).

Fourth, we will assess whether there is a focus on migration-related *diversity in the school system*, outside the curriculum. For this indicator, we evaluate to what extent changes are made in teaching styles, teaching staff, and other school structures to adapt to migration-related diversity in schools. For example, to what extent and how are teachers trained to deal with migration-related diversity in the classroom or how is migration-related diversity dealt with in the enrolment system of schools?

The first two indicators relate to how students with a migration background are addressed (or not) in the field of education, through targeting and monitoring. The latter two indicators look at how the education systems are adapted to accommodate the needs of students with a migration background, by assessing the integration of content about migrants and minorities in the curriculum and the focus on migration-related diversity in the broader school system. Together, these dimensions form a holistic framework for assessing migration-related diversity mainstreaming in the policy domain of education, encompassing both the incorporation of migration-related diversity in education policy, as well as the adaptation of educational institutions to migration-related diversity. The framework is portrayed in Table 1.

Table 2, Framework for assessing migration-related diversity mainstreaming in education policy

Indicators for migration-related diversity mainstreaming in education policy			
Incorporation in mainstream policy fields		Adaptation of mainstream institutions	
Targeting	Monitoring	Content integration	Diversity in the school system

We will use this framework with its four indicators to assess how migration-related diversity is mainstreamed into the educational sector in Flanders and the Netherlands. As described extensively in the mainstreaming literature, a clear prioritisation and ac-

tive coordination are important conditions for mainstreaming. However, in the case of immigrant integration, this explicit involvement of the state is increasingly contested. In the next section, we discuss the literature on interventionism, retrenchment, and sub-state nationalism to formulate expectations on how these settings might affect migration-related diversity mainstreaming in education in the Netherlands and Flanders.

3.2.2 Immigrant integration policy contexts

Immigrant integration forms a politicised and contested policy field, speaking directly to the (national) identity of the state. Besides the different forms in which migration-related diversity mainstreaming in education can take place, as depicted in Table 1, it is also important to take the context in which these policies are formed into account. To understand why governments would chose to mainstream migration-related diversity policies in education, it is important to understand what determines the position of the state, and the degree of state intervention in immigrant integration policies. In the literature on immigrant integration policy two relevant factors for state intervention can be distinguished. Below we describe the tension between ‘integrationism’ and retrenchment as one of these factors, and sub-state nationalism as a second, and intervening, factor to contextualise different forms of government steering in immigrant integration policies.

Integrationism

The policy context in which immigrant integration policies are formed may be a factor in how migration-related diversity is mainstreamed in education policies. The literature stresses a tendency towards interventionism that would be inherent to ‘integrationism’ (Favell 2014) and to ideas of state-led multiculturalism (Banting and Kymlicka 2013). This interventionism reflects a strong belief in what governments can do to solve ‘integration problems’. Favell (2014) argues that this interventionism is the foundation of the prevalence of ‘integration policy models’ in various European countries. He argues that immigrant integration policies are often constructed around a clear belief in the legitimacy of, and potential for, government intervention in the socio-economic and socio-cultural position of migrants, reflecting a strong belief in rational societal steering. Schinkel (2017) adds, that the very concept of ‘integration’ echoes a belief that ‘integration’ is a problem that can be associated with migrants in particular and requires state intervention. In terms of mainstreaming, interventionism would mean active coordination of the mainstreamed migration-related diversity policies in the field of education. From an interventionist perspective, we would expect continued use of group-specific policies and a clear adaptation of mainstream education policies to migration-related diversity.

In contrast, the migration literature also refers to the rise of more neoliberal approaches to immigrant integration (Favell 2014), suggesting less government steering. Instead, in this case immigrant integration would be left to society and, in particular, to the market. This neoliberal approach to immigrant integration is often associated with increasing global economic liberalisation as well as the growing influence of the EU internal market. In the field of immigrant integration, retrenchment is manifest in a declining belief in what government policies can or should do, and thus a deinstitutionalisation of integration policies. The responsibility for immigrant integration shifts

from the state to the individual migrant (van Houdt, Suvarierol and Schinkel 2011). In terms of mainstreaming, a retrenchment context would lead to decentralisation with a strong delegation of responsibilities to individuals, thereby avoiding group-specific targeting. It would also imply limited adaptation of mainstream education policies to migration-related diversity (cf. Galandini, Mulvey and Lessard-Phillips 2019).

Sub-state nationalism

A second factor in the mainstreaming of migration-related diversity in education is the presence or absence of sub-state nationalism (Adam, 2018). Immigration presents a specific challenge for sub-state nationalist movements, which can best be described by the so-called 'legitimation paradox' (Adam 2013; Jeram, Zwet and Wisthaler 2016). On the one hand, including migrants into the sub-state nation's community could reduce the cultural homogeneity that is needed to legitimise the claims for regional distinctiveness (Gagnon and Iacovino 2007) since migrants often seem to opt for integration into the majority language group (e.g. English in Quebec, Spanish in Catalonia, French in Flanders). Yet, excluding migrants could discredit the nation-building processes of sub-state nations because they could then be regarded as intolerant and illiberal (Kymlicka 2001). On the other hand, including migrants with a welcoming discourse and multicultural policies allows sub-state actors to highlight the liberal features of their community-building efforts. This accentuation of the tolerant credentials of the sub-state nationalist project is necessary for sub-state actors, as attributes like 'half-savage' (Mill 1972, 395), 'less advanced' (Durkheim 1964) and 'inherently ethnic' have continuously remained attached to conceptions of sub-state nationalism (Frank 1997; Hollinger 1995; Ignatieff 1993). Due to this stigma, sub-state nationalist movements have to demonstrate their liberal credentials if they want their autonomy project to appear legitimate to external actors (Barker 2010).

Beyond the need to legitimise the sub-state nationalist project externally, sub-state nationalists also need to legitimise their claims for autonomy internally, towards the own population. They need to show that they do something with the obtained autonomy and that they do things better than the policymakers at the central state level. This need for internal legitimacy stimulates public interventionism in all policy areas. One could, therefore, argue that sub-state nationalism offers a counterbalance against neoliberal retrenchment, as the region always needs to 'do' more (and better), and thus leads to interventionism rather than retrenchment. Besides the search for internal and external legitimacy as a driver for multiculturalist and interventionist policies, researchers have pointed at the relevance of historical narratives of past cultural oppression (Adam, 2013; Jeram and Adam, 2015). Jeram and Adam (2015) showed that Basque and Flemish sub-state nationalist actors used references to the historical cultural oppression by the Spanish and Francophone elites respectively, to delegitimise assimilationist policy choices and motivate pro-diversity policy choices. In terms of mainstreaming, we would expect more targeted policy measures and interventionism in education policies in cases where sub-state nationalism is present (Flanders) than in cases where sub-state nationalism is absent (the Netherlands)

3.3 METHODS

Cases, data and analysis

For this study, we have selected the cases of the Netherlands and Flanders, the Dutch-speaking region of Belgium. Even though the Netherlands is a unitary state and Flanders a region or community within a state, we consider these cases comparable for our study of education policies, since the Flemish Community (forming the Flemish Government together with the Flemish Region) has exclusive competence over education policy and immigrant integration policies, and, in that sense, is thus comparable to the Netherlands.

The Netherlands and Belgium (and consequently Flanders) are both considered typical consociational democracies (Lijphart 1969). Furthermore, the countries have experienced similar patterns of immigration and have developed comparable multiculturalist immigrant integration policies in the past (Vermeulen and Penninx 2000; Jacobs 2004). However, since the early 2000s migration-related diversity has become highly politicised in both cases as *inter alia* reflected in the growing success of radical right-wing parties (Coffé 2005; Pellikaan, de Lange and van der Meer 2007). Since the Netherlands and Flanders show similar degrees of politicisation of migration related-diversity, possible differences in the mainstreaming of migration-related diversity in education need to be explained on the basis of other factors.

Belgium and the Netherlands are often viewed as having a neo-corporatist political-economic system including considerable welfare entitlements for its citizens (van den Bulck 2007). Notwithstanding, neoliberal retrenchment seems to be more strongly present in the Netherlands than in Belgium (Kuipers 2006). In addition, an important difference between our two case-studies is that the Netherlands is a nation-state (in which sub-state nationalism is absent) while Flanders is a region with a sub-state nationalist project (Keating 2001). The presence of sub-state nationalism in the Flemish case and the accompanying search for external and internal legitimacy for its sub-state nationalist project leads us to expect more interventionism and less retrenchment with regard to migration-related diversity in Flanders.

By studying the integration of migration-related diversity in educational policies, we offer a novel perspective on how the mainstreaming of migration-related diversity works out in a generic policy field. The Dutch and Flemish educational systems are similarly organised. Both education systems are based on the principle of free choice of education for parents and in both cases subsidies are provided to faith-based schools (Franken and Vermeer 2019). Consequently, the Netherlands and Flanders are characterised by a pluralist school system in which education is largely considered a public task. We focus on primary and secondary schools as they form the two major, generic educational institutes.

For the analysis we have collected policy documents on education and migration-related diversity. Our data include all policy documents from the Dutch and Flemish governments that set out policy strategies for migration-related diversity in education between 2000 and 2014. This resulted in a sample of 62 documents (32 for the Netherlands and 30 for Flanders). Since we aim to study the attention for migration-related diversity in a context of immigrant integration mainstreaming and assess the role that education policies are expected to play in this process, we only analysed documents

that deal directly with education. The data for the Dutch case were collected as part of a European research project (Project Upstream). The content of the selected documents was analysed by the use of qualitative content analysis (Schreier 2014). We coded the relevant extracts of the documents according to a thematic coding scheme, based on our four indicators for migration-related diversity mainstreaming (i.e. targeting, monitoring, content integration, and diversity in the school system). We subsequently compared the patterns in coding throughout time and across the two cases to identify trends in the mainstreaming of migration-related diversity in education policies.

Migration-related diversity mainstreaming in Dutch and Flemish education policies

Below we will discuss the findings for Dutch and Flemish education policies. We structure this discussion according to our four indicators of migration-related diversity mainstreaming in education: targeting, monitoring, content integration, and diversity in the school system. This discussion is followed by a comparison and explanation of the main policy trends in each of the cases. Before presenting these findings, we will first sketch the institutional setting for education policies in both cases. In the Netherlands, the national Ministry for Education, Culture, and Science is the primary national body responsible for education. Over the past decades, immigrant integration has been coordinated from different Ministries such as the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, the Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations, and the Ministry of Justice, but never from the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science. While throughout the 1990s immigrant integration priorities were weaved into Dutch education policies, these have been increasingly dismantled since the early 2000s (cf. Rijkschroeff, ten Dam, Duyvendak et al. 2005; Stevens, Crul, Slootman et al. 2019). In Flanders, the regional Ministry of Education and Training is responsible for setting out the Flemish education policy. The Flemish government has also established an ‘Interdepartmental Commission on Integration Policy’ for the coordination of immigrant integration policy across policy areas. This Commission also designs the ‘Integrated Action Plans for Integration Policy’, which contain specific actions on education. These actions are mostly oriented towards the elimination of the ‘ethnic gap’, meaning the gap in educational performance between students with and without a migration background. Besides these actions, as we explain below, migration-related diversity is addressed in Flemish education policies through targeted measures mostly aimed at tackling language deficits, practices of ethnic monitoring as well as a limited degree of content integration. Although several discussions about the desirability of targeting have taken place, overall, the approach towards migration-related diversity in Flemish education policy does not seem to have changed significantly during the studied period (2000-2014).

3.4 FINDINGS

3.4.1 Targeting

The Netherlands

In the early 2000s, educational policies were targeted at dissolving the ‘educational disadvantage’ of students in a vulnerable position, targeting disadvantaged students

with and without a migration background. In this, a migration background, language command, the broader 'educational context' at home, and the approach to the children's development, were considered important factors that can lead to educational disadvantage of students (Staatssecretaris OCW 2000a; 2002). Parents with a migration background were also specifically targeted for language classes and special civic integration courses which were coupled to educational programmes for their children (Staatssecretaris OCW 2000b, 25). Furthermore, the schools themselves were required to *"adjust (...) to diverse nationalities and learning- and development needs of the students"* (Staatssecretaris OCW 2000a, 4). These educational disadvantage measures were considered to emancipate the students and thereby to indirectly foster integration. However, after the abolishment of the OALT mother tongue classes in 2003, the disadvantage policies were decoupled from migration background.

While previously the migration background of the student or his/her parents played into determining funding for schools, this was abolished as of 2004. Thereby targeted migration-related diversity policies in education were ended and the extra funds for schools were re-allocated to a broader defined target group. From 2006 onwards a further move from targeted to generic policies is visible. In 2006, the former disadvantage policies were replaced with a broad 'inclusive approach', explicitly targeted at *all* students and linked to a broader 'shared citizenship narrative' (Minister en staatssecretaris OCW 2006). Targeting is explicitly abandoned and replaced by a generic focus on quality (Minister OCW 2010). As of 2011, the finance structure for schools is adjusted. Instead of targeted financing, schools now receive a 'lump sum', meaning that the finances are not earmarked, and the definition of priorities and target groups is decentralised to the schools (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 2011). These reforms mark a further retrenchment of central state interventions on migration-related diversity in education.

Flanders

There are several measures in Flemish education policy that specifically target students with a migration background, albeit formally only through linguistic indicators. These targeted policies include extra Dutch language classes (i.e. on top of the normal curriculum) for those who do not speak Dutch at home (Vlaamse Overheid 2013, 7). Moreover, regular testing is introduced to assess the individual language capabilities of students (Vlaamse Overheid 2005a, 47-48). All these measures are aimed at avoiding language deficits and consequent unequal opportunities in education (Vlaamse Regering 2011, 5). Good knowledge of the Dutch language is considered a prerequisite for educational and professional opportunities as well as a *"condition for social self-sufficiency and integration (...)"* (Vlaamse Regering 2011, 14). Lastly, language is viewed not only as the common language of instruction but also as 'a language for a common identity' (Vlaamse Regering 2011, 14).

Related to this, is the discussion about mother tongue instruction ('Onderwijs in Eigen Taal en Cultuur', 'OETC') in Flemish education policies. Whereas originally it was aimed at facilitating guest worker families' return, later on, this policy continued to exist within a more multicultural framework. However, throughout time, the number of OETC projects as well as the number of schools that participate in these projects and the available funding, has declined. Moreover, in 2011 and 2014, the language policy for Flemish schools was revised. The 2011 language note ('talennota') stipulates that sec-

ondary schools can offer classes in a fourth foreign language (next to French, English, and German) in any of the official languages of EU countries as well as the BRIC-countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). From 2014 onwards, the restriction to languages from EU and BRIC-countries was lifted, whereby schools can choose themselves which foreign languages they want to offer in addition to French, English, and German.

A second type of targeted policies comprises the funding policies that apply to Flemish schools. In Flemish education policy, targeted funding is based on both socio-economic indicators and linguistic indicators. The financial resources of schools are based on a weighting system, which allocates extra teaching hours ('SES-lestijden') to schools on the basis of equal opportunity indicators ('Gelijke onderwijskansenindicatoren', 'GOK-indicatoren'). In primary education, these indicators are the language spoken at home as well as the attribution of a school allowance and the mothers' level of education (Vlaamse Overheid 2011, 55; Vlaamse Overheid 2009, 46). In secondary education, two more indicators are added, namely temporary or permanent placement of the student outside the family and a parent belonging to the travelling population.

As opposed to the targeted measures discussed above, from 2010 onwards documents also speak about an aim of 'non-targeting' every now and then. Instead of separate targeted policies for each relevant target group, the said objective is for the general Flemish education policy to become more inclusive towards all groups. This is referred to as 'explicit but no exclusive targeting' in which general policies should take the 'characteristics of minority groups into account' (Vlaams Parlement 2011, 15). From 2010 onwards, the policy discourse thus seems to slightly move away from policies that are specifically targeted towards ethnic minorities. However, in terms of concrete policies, specifically targeted policy measures such as the weighting system and the OETC programmes have not yet been abolished in Flemish education policy.

3.4.2 Monitoring

The Netherlands

Monitoring in Dutch education is primarily commissioned through the annual Education report ('onderwijsverslagen' published by the Inspectorate of Education). The annual integration report also includes a designated section on the educational performance of students with a migration background (alternately published by The Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) and Statistics Netherlands (CBS). In these reports, the performance of students with a migration background (first and second generation) is split out and compared to the overall student performance, along with socio-economic indicators and occasionally highlighting specific ethnic groups. Furthermore, the biennial 'PRIMA-cohort studies' are used to determine the disadvantage of students by random sampling. The outcomes are used to recalibrate the disadvantage policies. The Minister of Education, Culture, and Science refers to the PRIMA-Cohort studies as an indicator to readjust the targeted funding for schools (as reformed in 2003) if necessary (Minister OCW 2004b). Like in the immigrant integration monitors, in the PRIMA cohort studies ethnicity or 'allochthonous' background is continuously distinguished (cf. Stevens, Crul, Slootman et al. 2019). Finally, since 2006, the progress of the 'citizenship building' approach (see more under 'content integration' below) is monitored by the Inspectorate (Inspectie van Onderwijs 2006). The citizenship programme partly followed an advice from the same Inspectorate to develop education

that explicitly focuses on citizenship and societal development (Minister OCW 2011).

Flanders

The Flemish government monitors the educational performance of students based on different indicators and through different types of (international) studies. First, it collects data about the socio-economic background of students and monitors how this is related to their school career. Second, Flanders also monitors the educational performance of 'allophone' ('anderstalige') students by regularly assessing their level of Dutch (particularly those going to schools close to the 'language border' in Belgium) (e.g. Vlaamse Overheid 2013, 66). Moreover, it differentiates, in its administrative data, between students who speak Dutch at home and students who do not. The language spoken at home is collected through a questionnaire filled in by the parents of the student. Not only the number of allophone students is monitored, but language is also frequently referred to as an important explanatory factor in the educational performance of students (Vlaamse Overheid 2014, 13-14). Third, data about the nationality of students are also registered. This registration allows the Flemish government to monitor, among others, the participation of (a part of the) students with a migration background in pre-schooling and higher education.

3.4.3 Content Integration

The Netherlands

In 2004, 'citizenship building' was introduced as an educational priority, assigning an explicit role to schools in the formation of 'active citizenship' (Minister OCW 2004a). Integration and the opportunity for students of different backgrounds to meet were formulated as part of the citizenship approach (Minister OCW 2004a; 2005). Although some (legal) parameters were set, the concrete development and implementation of the citizenship training is left primarily to the schools themselves. In 2006, a focus on the promotion of 'Dutch and European citizenship' and the counter-acting of radicalisation are added to the goals of citizenship education (Minister en staatssecretaris OCW 2006), alongside continued support for dialogue and anti-segregation. Furthermore, a 'societal internship' is introduced in secondary schools (Minister OCW 2009). In a 2009 evaluation, the inspection reports that, despite its early stage, many schools have made (first) efforts to develop a citizenship approach. In 2013, it is concluded that although meeting the legal minimum standards of the citizenship approach, the development has stagnated (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 2013). Thus, while 'citizenship education' is set-up decentrally, as a potential instrument for content integration, the implementation of the approach lacks behind.

Flanders

With regard to the integration of migration-related diversity in the curriculum, the Flemish government puts great emphasis on languages. More specifically, the promotion of multilingualism is presented as one of the objectives of Flemish education: *"In an ambitious language policy, the aim is that every child, every youngster speaks Dutch excellently, and in addition [has] a sound knowledge of two or more foreign languages"* (Vlaamse Overheid 2012, 30). However, this statement contradicts the common practice in Flemish schools of punishing pupils for using French or other languages (see

Agirdag 2017). A second focus in content integration is citizenship education. In Flanders, citizenship education has been part of the cross-curricular attainment levels since 1997. Different goals are set for citizenship education, including dealing with diversity and strengthening democracy and social cohesion (Vlaamse Overheid 2005b, 137-138). However, where and how citizenship education is integrated into the curriculum is largely left up to the school (cf. De Groof, Franck, Elchardus et al. 2010). Finally, there are also efforts to adapt the curriculum to a diverse classroom and enhance respect for diversity. The ‘interculturalisation of education’ is considered ‘a fully-fledged basis of the Flemish anti-discrimination policy’ (Vlaamse Overheid 2000, 37). However, it is not exactly clear what this interculturalisation would entail. Again, schools are given the freedom to give substance to this. The integration of cultural diversity in the Flemish curriculum might thus be limited to a policy on paper.

3.4.4 Diversity in the School System

The Netherlands

Throughout the years, different efforts to adapt to a diverse school environment are mentioned, by inter alia adjusting teacher training to educational disadvantages in schools (Staatssecretaris OCW 2000a). In 2004, the Ministry for Education observes that the strong language focus in education “*does not meet the specific learning needs of students with a migration background and native students with a weak language command*” (Ministers van OCW en VI 2004, 4). Furthermore, (all) teachers are trained to work with a diverse student population (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 2007). In 2006, mentors and role models are deployed to support students with a migration background (Minister en staatssecretaris OCW 2006). Later this is explicitly linked to diversifying the teaching staff by first attracting more teachers with a migration background (Full color 1) and, as a follow-up a project, improving the work- and learning climate at schools for teachers in training with a migration background (Full color 2) (Minister en staatssecretaris OCW 2006, 10).

In addition, education itself is considered as an anti-segregation instrument. Up to 2004, school admission policies were oriented at mixing students of different backgrounds in order to enhance immigrant integration (Minister OCW 2004a). In 2005, dispersal policies are still mentioned as an important immigrant integration measure, but now the Minister for education says this should be decided locally and can only be guided by educational disadvantage, not ethnicity, revising the former approach (Minister OCW 2005). Throughout the years, education and anti-segregation are slowly decoupled and in 2009 the government explicitly distances itself from anti-segregation as a priority in education policies (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 2009).

Flanders

When we move our focus from the curriculum to the broader school structures in Flanders, we detect some attention for language and migration-related diversity in teacher training. The Flemish policy puts emphasis on the handling of linguistic diversity and, more importantly, on ‘teaching proper Dutch’ (Vlaamse Overheid 2007, 60). Between 2002 and 2008, documents also speak of actions aimed at ‘diversifying the teacher force’. For example, it is mentioned that ‘allochthones’, people with a handicap and older employees are underrepresented among the teaching staff (Vlaamse Overheid

2005b, 104). To arrive at a better representation of these three groups in the teacher force, 'targeted actions' are planned. However, the responsibility is, again, delegated to the schools (Vlaamse Overheid 2005b, 104). After 2008, we no longer find mention of these actions, nor of the aim to diversify the teacher force. Lastly, documents also talk about an aim of countering segregation and arriving at a more 'balanced composition' of schools (Vlaamse Overheid 2011, 114). This balanced composition includes a social mix (i.e. students with different socio-economic backgrounds) as well as a cultural mix (referring to 'multicultural schools'). However, language seems to be the dominant focus here: "(...) [language] (home language) rather than ethnic origin is an important item here" (Vlaamse Overheid 2002, 33).

3.5 COMPARING AND EXPLAINING TRENDS IN MIGRATION-RELATED DIVERSITY MAINSTREAMING AND RETRENCHMENT

In the Dutch case, one can clearly observe a withdrawal of the national government's interventionism on migration-related diversity in education. Policies targeted at students with a migration background are discontinued, and the Ministry of Education eventually completely discards immigrant integration and de-segregation as priorities in education. Instead, immigrant integration priorities are devolved to individual schools and students, with the local implementation of 'citizenship education' and lump-sum financing to schools. This is also reflected in the renouncing of migration background in educational disadvantage policies and the move to a generic 'quality' approach in which students are individually held responsible for their emancipation and integration.

What becomes apparent for the Flemish case is that language, particularly the command of the Dutch language, is emphasized in all four elements of migration-related diversity mainstreaming in education (i.e. targeting, monitoring, content integration, and diversity in the school system). Policies mostly focus on countering language deficits and consequent gaps in students' educational performance. Despite discussion around the use of targeting, targeted policy measures such as mother tongue instruction and targeted funding have not been abolished in Flanders. Examples of minority content integration in the curriculum (with a focus on multilingualism and interculturalisation) as well as adaptation to migration-related diversity in the school system (mostly focused on teachers) are existent, at least on paper. Yet, there seems to be no clear vision of how this should be implemented and the responsibility for taking action in this regard is assigned to individual schools.

When comparing both cases, it becomes apparent that while in the Netherlands several targeted programmes in education have been dismissed since 2003, similar programmes stayed in place in Flanders. Furthermore, in the Netherlands, education and immigrant integration are decoupled entirely, indicating a declining state intervention regarding migration-related diversity in education. Although Flanders and the Netherlands develop different targeting strategies, remarkably they both have continuous ethnic monitoring practices in the period under research. This seemingly paradoxical trend has also been observed in other countries and in other generic policy fields (Westerveen and Adam, 2019).

In terms of adapting the school curriculum and broader school system to diversity, Flanders and the Netherlands adopt similar approaches. In both cases, citizenship education forms part of the curriculum. While prioritised at the level of the Ministry, the content and form of citizenship education is defined by the individual schools without explicit criteria defined by the government. It is thus hard to assess to what extent migration-related diversity is addressed in citizenship education, although it seems a bit more embedded in the case of Flanders with a focus on multilingualism as well as a limited focus on interculturalisation. With regard to the broader school system, both cases show similar efforts to inter alia diversify the teaching staff and adapt teacher training to the diversification of the student populations. However, in both cases, the focus is rather on deficits and the remedying of disadvantages than on how migration-related diversity can enrich schools. In both Flanders and the Netherlands de-segregation and mixing are mentioned as a policy objective. Nevertheless, the objective of de-segregation has been abandoned in the Netherlands in 2009, again indicating retrenchment rather than interventionism for the Dutch case. In Flanders, the aim of mixing and countering segregation (particularly of pupils with different mother tongues) is maintained during the studied time frame (2000 to 2014). Table 2 summarises the comparative findings for the Netherlands and Flanders.

Table 3, Comparative findings for migration-related diversity mainstreaming in Dutch and Flemish education policy

	Indicators for migration-related diversity mainstreaming in education policy			
	Incorporation in mainstream policies		Adaptation of mainstream institutions	
	Targeting	Monitoring	Content integration	Diversity in the school system
The Netherlands	Targeting discontinued	Continued monitoring	Limited content integration, citizenship education only	Limited adaptation to diversity, discontinued de-segregation goal
Flanders	Continued targeting	Continued monitoring	Limited content integration	Limited adaptation to diversity

Based on this comparison, it can be concluded that, in the period from 2000 to 2014, there is a trend towards retrenchment rather than the mainstreaming of migration-related diversity in Dutch education policies, while this trend is less prevailing in the same period in Flemish education policies. This diverging trend cannot be explained with the existing literature on immigrant integration policies. Contextual factors as well as im-

portant explanatory factors, such as the politicisation of migration and migration-related diversity and the success of radical right-wing parties, are similar in both cases. The diverging trend in the mainstreaming of migration-related diversity in the Netherlands and Flanders calls for new explanations. First, the varying degree of implementation of a neoliberal approach in the Netherlands and Flanders (Kuipers 2006) can help explain why the Dutch government has abandoned many of its targeted policy measures in education, while these continue to exist in Flemish education policy. A neoliberal approach would inform the Dutch government to retreat from redistributive policies targeting migrants and minorities. It shifts the focus away from state intervention and towards the individual responsibility of citizens to integrate and participate in society. This is reflected in the generic focus on qualitative education in which each student is individually responsible to benefit from the (qualitative) educational offer. The present but more limited influence of neoliberalisation in Flanders can explain that this shift in thinking has not yet resulted in significant policy reforms with regard to migration-related diversity in Flemish education.

Second, the presence of sub-state nationalism in Flanders can also help explain why the trend towards the retrenchment of migration-related diversity policies is more limited in Flanders than in a central nation-state such as the Netherlands. Flanders is a prototypical minority nation. Research has shown that such minority nations use education as well as immigrant integration policies to further their sub-state nationalist projects (e.g. Keating 2005). This would favour state intervention with regard to migration-related diversity in education policies rather than migration-related diversity retrenchment of the Flemish government in the field of education. Moreover, the search for external legitimacy of sub-state nations as discussed above might be even more relevant for Flanders than for other sub-state nations (like Scotland, Catalonia, and Quebec), as Flemish nationalism is still associated with past Nazi collaboration (Wauters 2005). In addition, discourses of past cultural oppression of Flemish citizens by the Francophone elites might have spurred the adoption of migration-related diversity policies in Flanders (Adam 2013). Yet, in the policy documents of the Flemish government on education studied here, no references towards historical cultural oppression as found in the past could be found anymore. Instead, we observed an overwhelming focus on the importance of the Dutch language in Flemish education. A good command of the Dutch language is considered both important for the educational success of individual students as well as for guaranteeing a cohesive Flemish society.

3.6 CONCLUSIONS

This chapter compared and analysed the mainstreaming of migration-related diversity in education policies in the Netherlands and Flanders between 2000 and 2014. Comparing on four indicators of migration-related diversity mainstreaming (targeting, monitoring, content integration, and diversity in the school system), our analysis shows that mainstreaming leads to different policy trends in the two cases. With the exception of ethnic monitoring, the focus on migration-related diversity has largely faded in Dutch education policies leading to migration-related diversity retrenchment. By contrast, in Flanders the approach to migration-related diversity has remained relatively

stable over the period 2000 to 2014, at least on paper. Rather than being driven by politicisation we claim that these diverging trends relate to the presence of sub-state nationalism in Flanders and the stronger influence of a neoliberal approach to immigrant integration in the Dutch political context (cf. Galandini, Mulvey and Lessard-Phillips 2019). In the case of the Netherlands this led to decreasing government interference on migration-related diversity in education, while in Flanders this rather led to continued government intervention on migration-related diversity in education.

Referring to the broader literature on the governance of migration-related diversity, our analysis reveals the tension between mainstreaming and retrenchment when it comes to embedding migration-related diversity in generic policy domains such as education. We contribute to the existing literature in migration studies by an explicit focus on migration-related diversity policies in a generic policy field, in this case education. Proposing a new multi-dimensional framework with four indicators of migration-related diversity mainstreaming, we detected a diverging trend between our cases. Although the Netherlands and Flanders have traditionally been viewed as similar cases when it comes to their immigrant integration policies, this chapter shows that in the context of immigrant integration mainstreaming the cases are characterised by a divergence in retrenchment. This confirms earlier research that has looked into the influence of the multiculturalism backlash, which has argued that formerly multiculturalist policies have largely been abolished in the Netherlands, while they have stayed in place in Flanders (Entzinger 2003; Jacobs 2004).

Furthermore, our comparison between a central nation-state and a sub-state nation allowed us to shed light on the drivers behind this tension between mainstreaming and retrenchment in the governance of migration-related diversity. In particular, sub-state nationalism seems to drive more interventionism regarding migration-related diversity and offer a counterbalance against neoliberal retrenchment. Yet, what must be noted is that our analysis only covers policy developments up to 2014. More recent developments, such as the fading focus on the diversification of the teaching staff, the 2018 reform of the Flemish enrolment decree (which abolished certain anti-segregation measures) as well as the growing contestation of the SES-funds and OETC programmes, indicate that Flanders might be moving towards a similar trend of migration-related diversity retrenchment in education as observed for the Netherlands. Nevertheless, Flanders seems to move in this direction at a different pace than the Netherlands, as might be explained by the interplay between sub-state nationalism and neoliberalism. While sub-state nationalism might not completely hold back neoliberal retrenchment, it does seem to slow down the process of retrenchment. Furthermore, while the broader focus on migration-related diversity diluted after 2014, the continued focus on language demonstrates the influence of sub-state nationalism on the remaining policies. Future research could analyse these recent developments and explore how the mainstreaming of migration-related diversity developed in other national and regional cases, and in other generic policy fields.

¹ Small exceptions include decisions over the start and end of the study year, the compulsory school age as well as some minimum requirements for diploma's and teacher pensions, which are federal competences.

² Even though the Flemings form a demographical majority in Belgium, Flanders is generally categorised as a minority nation because of the former cultural domination of Flanders by the Francophones, and the continuous strive of a substantial part of the Flemish political elites for more autonomy (Keating, 2001).

CHAPTER

FOUR

Governance by proxy.

A comparative policy analysis of the mainstreaming of immigrant integration governance

ABSTRACT

This chapter assesses mainstreaming as a governance strategy, that potentially addresses the call for a more integral governance response to wicked policy problems. The comparative qualitative policy analysis of the mainstreaming of immigrant integration governance contributes to the governance and mainstreaming literature by emphasizing the importance of strong horizontal and vertical coordination mechanisms and the distinction between universal and proxy targeting in mainstreaming. Although policy programs indeed seem to broaden to a universal mainstreamed approach, in practice they often operate by 'proxy'. Furthermore, horizontal coordination structures tend to be weak or not in place at all, again obstructing the embedding of immigrant integration as a mainstreamed cross-cutting governance issue.

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4.1 INTRODUCTION

Mainstreaming offers a polycentric and universal policy instrument for the governance of wicked policy problems that cut across society and cannot be confined to specific policy siloes or subsystems. Literature on the governance of complex or wicked policy problems, such as gender, disability and environmental change, has shown the policy challenges that come with this type of policy issues. On the one hand, studies have shown how complex issues require a cross-sectoral and universal approach rather than the development of a 'policy silo'. On the other hand, studies have shown that the development of such a mainstreamed approach often comes with complications, for instance of political nature or in terms of organizing a cross-sectoral policy approach.

This chapter looks into immigrant integration as a wicked policy problem in France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom and assesses whether mainstreaming is applied. We look at how and why mainstreaming develops (or does not develop) in the governance of this wicked policy problem. Due to continuous migration over time, societies have become increasingly diverse and integration has become less a concern for specific migrant groups only, but more an issue that affects mainstream society. Furthermore, it is a policy area marked by a high degree of volatility and contestation, both in how the problem is to be defined as well as on how it is to be resolved. Bringing together both the complexity of the governance networks and the contestation over the problem definition, this study connects different sides of wicked policy problems that are often studied separately (Candel and Biesbroek 2016; Hoornbeek and Peters 2017).

We develop mainstreaming as a conceptual model for an integral polycentric policy approach to immigrant integration, by distinguishing a targeting and coordination dimension in mainstreaming. Building on the governance and mainstreaming literature we will firstly assess whether mainstreaming is indeed applied as a governance approach to the wicked-policy problem of immigrant integration. Secondly, we will analyse what policy factor may either contribute to or inhibit mainstreaming by a multiple streams analysis. The key question we address in this chapter is *whether France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom responded to the complexities of immigrant integration in the form of a mainstreamed governance approach, and how differences between the countries can be explained.*

In the study we find that while a development away from centralised and group-specific immigrant integration policies can be observed across the cases this does not lead to a unified mainstreaming approach. Due to its contestedness, particularly in France and the Netherlands, immigrant integration is addressed by 'proxy' rather than bringing it into the mainstream. While programs seem to broaden to a universal mainstreamed approach, they operate by 'proxy' instead: targeting immigrants under a substitute category, as a means to circumvent the intractability around immigrant integration. Furthermore, horizontal coordination structures tend to be weak or not in place at all, again obstructing the embedding of immigrant integration as a mainstreamed cross-cutting policy issue.

4.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical ambition of this chapter is to contribute to the literature on the governance of wicked policy problems by an in-depth study of mainstreaming in immigrant integration policies. Building on the literature on wicked policy problems and polycentric governance, such as gender, disability, climate, we build a two-dimensional model of mainstreaming with coordination and targeting as its dimensions.

4.2.1 Coordination and targeting

Traditional state-centric modes of government fall short to address the complex nature of wicked policy problems. Instead, polycentric modes of governance merged that involve complex modes of coordination and interdependencies between multiple actors (across different policy areas, levels and types of actors). The increased attention for polycentricism led to the emergence of complexity theories in public administration, bringing broad networks of governance actors in the analysis (Klijn and Snellen 2009, Room 2011 in Peters 2017). Additionally, 'new governance arrangements' (Howlett and Rayner 2007), 'integrated' or 'joined up governance' (Briassoulis 2005 in Rayner and Howlett 2009, Vince 2015, Biesbroek and Candel 2016; Tosun and Lang 2017; Trein, Meyer and Maggetti 2018) and 'whole of government' approaches (6 et al. 1999, Christensen and Laegreid 2007) came up, calling for a coordinated approach to cross-cutting policy issues. Literature on multi-level governance (Hooghe and Marks 2001) and horizontal coordination approaches (Peters 2015) furthermore zoom in on the workings of these coordinated approaches vertically and horizontally.

Although the literature on governance focuses on the coordination of a multiplicity of (networks of) actors, the literature on wicked policy problems also explicitly addresses contestation over policy problems. What is to be defined as a policy problem in the first place? Who is entitled to do so and why does a certain problem definition prevail over another definition? As the complexity of policy problems and the networks around them increased, an understanding over the multiplicity of problem definitions grew too, drawing attention to the way policy problems are defined or framed (Rochefort and Cobb 1994, Schön and Rein 1994). This speaks to the broader literature in policy sciences following the so-called 'argumentative turn' or increased attention for the constructed nature of policies and thereby the increasingly contested nature of the policy problems (see i.a. Fischer and Forester 1993, Roe 1994, Yanow 1996, Hajer 1997). The focus in this study is therefore not only on how policies are coordinated but also at how they are defined. Bringing together both the complexity of the governance networks and the contestation over the problem definition, this study connects different sides of wicked policy problems that are often studied separately (Candel and Biesbroek 2016; Hoornbeek and Peters 2017).

4.2.2 Policy mainstreaming

We propose that these two sides of policy making come together in the mainstreaming literature. The notion of mainstreaming as a policy strategy emerged in several disci-

plines, ranging from special education in the 1970s and gender mainstreaming in the 1980s, to more recent discussions on the mainstreaming of environmental and disability policies (Booth and Bennett 2002, Barnes and Mercer 2005, Bender, Vail and Scott 1995, Madden and Slavin 1983, Priestley and Roulstone 2009, Semmel, Gottlieb and Robinson 1979, Dalal-Clayton and Bass 2009, Nunan, Campbell and Foster 2012, Verloo 2005, Caglar 2013). Across the different policy fields mainstreaming broadly refers to an amalgam of efforts to abandon group-specific policies and integrate gender, disability or environmental priorities as an integral part of generic policy domains. Besides the focus on the transition towards a cross-sectional approach, the literature emphasizes the importance to warrant an active engagement with the policy problem at hand. Emphasizing the need to address these policy issues from an integrated perspective, as a way to address the complex network around an issue like gender or environmental concerns. Mainstreaming is considered a strategy to prevent gender or disability from being side-lined into a concern for specific actors only, but rather to bring it into the mainstream as a concern for all actors and policy fields (Verloo 2005). Gender equality for example, is rarely treated as a policy domain in itself but is rather addressed as a topic that affects men and women across policy domains.

Table 4 Schematic representation of mainstreaming on the key dimensions of polycentric governance (coordination and targeting)

		Targeting	
		Group specific	Universal
Coordination	Centralised	Targeting discontinued	Limited content integration, citizenship education only
	Polycentric	Continued targeting	Limited content integration

Firstly, mainstreaming is considered a process of transformation aiming for a more *integral, cross-sectional approach to specific policy issues*. This entails an integrated approach both in terms of the *policy domain* and the *target groups*. The literature on mainstreaming speaks directly to the broader policy literature on polycentric governance on both dimensions. As on both dimensions, coordination and targeting, it brings the policy topic, to the mainstream, cutting across policy domains and –levels, making for example gender equality an integral part of all policy making. Mainstreaming as a governance strategy thus asks *how* and *who* need to be targeted by policies.

Mainstreaming thus requires an active effort to create universal awareness of the relevance of the policy topic at hand. Furthermore, the discussion of mainstreaming in the various fields of literature carries a clear reference to issues of governance coordination. This reflects in particular the assumption that mainstreaming involves polycentric forms of governance in which multiple actors are involved. As a process of bringing

these priorities into the mainstream, mainstreaming requires a strong and clear coordination of the policy responsibilities across different departments and levels of governance – both horizontally and vertically. To avoid the risk of “becoming everyone’s responsibility, yet nobody’s at the same time” (Caglar 2013: 340). In summary, on the two earlier identified dimensions of coordination and targeting, mainstreaming can be defined as a coordinated polycentric and universally targeted governance approach.

4.2.3 Multiple streams analysis of (non)-mainstreaming

Besides the empirical focus on whether and how immigrant integration policies are ‘mainstreamed’ in the three selected countries, we will also look at why this is (or is not) taking place. Our expectation is that a wicked policy problem like immigrant integration requires mainstreaming as this polycentric and universal approach can address both the contestation and complexity of immigrant integration by offering an encompassing governance approach. However, policy literature shows that there are many other drivers of policy processes that may inhibit (or promote) mainstreaming. Policy-making is not only a matter of finding the most efficient policy strategy, as the literature on wicked policy problems so aptly illustrates. In his famous multiple streams approach Kingdon (1984) distinguishes three streams or ‘families of processes’: the problem (which policy problems receive attention), policy (which policy solutions are available to the problem) and political stream (whether policymakers have the motive and opportunity to turn it into a policy).

We will search for drivers or inhibitors of mainstreaming in each of these streams. From the problem stream, we expect that mainstreaming is more likely to be initiated when there is an acknowledgement of the wicked nature of the policy problem, as this calls for an integrated policy response. In contrast, when the complexity of immigrant integration is denied, mainstreaming is unlikely to take place as siloed and targeted policy solutions will be preferred (Spencer 2011). From the policy stream, we expect that mainstreaming is more likely when there is a structure in place for horizontal and vertical coordination of policies as these structures will enable the implementation of mainstreaming (Verloo 2005; Caglar 2013). Finally, from the political stream, we expect that politicization of immigrant integration (both in terms of salience and polarisation, see van der Brug et al. 2015) hinders the development of a mainstreaming approach as this will call for a simplification of the policy problem and quick fixes (Boswell 2011).

4.3 METHODS

Immigrant integration can be considered a revelatory case of a wicked policy problem as both the policy definition and the coordination of this policy issue are complex and contested. Immigrant integration policies are any policies concerned with migration related diversity in society. These policies might entail explicit integration programs, but can also cover educational policies involved with either migration related diversity in the curriculum or reaching out to students or citizens with a migrant background, or broader neighbourhood programs targeting the broader social cohesion and belonging of its citizens. While formerly understood as an issue of immigrants only, contemporary

integration policies are increasingly understood as dealing with diversity as an issue the entire society. This chapter assesses how these (former) immigrant integration policies are mainstreamed. Although immigrant integration governance is often assumed to cut across different policy fields, it is nevertheless often studied centralised (Alexander 2007) and very few studies focus on the horizontal coordination of immigrant integration governance (Spencer 2011). Whilst, due to its intractability a study of how immigrant integration can be embedded across policy fields is an important subject of study.

Central in immigrant integration governance is the demarcation of who is in and out, a demarcation between the host society and those that need to integrate, and the discussion whether immigrant integration is best promoted by generic, colour-blind policies or by policies that separately target specific migrant groups. A discussion between the risk to sustain or reinforce inequalities in society when specific problems are not met with targeted policies (cf. Simon and Piché 2012), and the risk of strengthening ethnic and cultural boundaries in society through the degenerative effect of targeted policies themselves (cf. Schneider and Ingram, 1997), the so-called 'dilemma of recognition' (De Zwart 2005). De Zwart distinguishes different policy responses to the dilemma of recognition: accommodation, denial (as described above) and replacement, a compromise between denial and accommodation in which the government (or any other involved actor) constructs its own categories, replacing or broadening the dominant categories. Alternatively known as a veiled form of 'targeting within universalism' (Skocpol 1991).

As mentioned above, due to continuous migration over time, societies have become increasingly diverse and integration has become less a concern for specific migrant groups only, but more an issue that affects mainstream society (Vertovec 2007; Meissner and Vertovec 2015; Grzymala-Kazłowska and Phillimore 2018). Additionally, in the context of a broader rise of populism in Europe, immigrant integration policies are increasingly problematised as they are seen as benefiting migrants over other citizens, making it harder to justify policies specifically set up for immigrants (Mudde 2013). Also known as the 'logic of deservingness' (Schneider and Ingram 1997, 2012).

After the backlash against multiculturalism and the assimilationist turn that occurred throughout Europe in the early 2000s (Joppke and Morawska 2003, Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010), mainstreaming is now referred to as the latest trend in immigrant integration governance (Martinelli 2014, Joppke and Eule 2016, Scholten and van Breugel 2018, Meissner 2018). In 2004, mainstreaming was included as one of the eleven 'European Common Basic Principles on Integration' and, although in different forms and shapes, has been on the policy agenda in many European countries ever since. This chapter assesses what that mainstreaming development entailed and what drives the development to (non-)mainstreaming in immigrant integration governance.

Case selection

This chapter focuses on immigrant integration governance in France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Though characterised by different patterns of immigration, the cases can all three be characterised as countries with a long history of immigration and exemplary of early (modern) migration to Europe and the early development of policies on the incorporation of immigrants, as well as subject to the more recent assimilationist turn. Within that set of countries, France, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom form a dissimilar case study design in terms of the likeliness that main-

streaming will occur. The national contexts differ in the problem, policy and political context (Kingdon 1984). By a study of the governance of a wicked policy problem in these different contexts we aim to aid to a better understanding of how and why wicked policy problems are (not) mainstreamed. Below we will briefly sketch the policy context and brief history for each of the cases, up to the year 2000.

France

In France no explicit immigrant integration policies exist. The French approach to integration has traditionally been characterized by the so-called Republican Model (Favell 1998). In line with the French Constitution it is prohibited to distinguish French citizens according to race, origins or religion. Instead there is a strong focus on equality, citizenship and the obligation of individual citizens to participate in society. Furthermore, the Republican framework is characterised by a strive for cultural unity (Brubaker 1992). The recognition of immigrants or minorities is therefore contested in French policies. Integration policies tend to be indirect, implemented as area-based policies, centring around 'Politique de la Ville'ⁱ targeting priority neighbourhoods for development schemes. The area based policies are centrally coordinated by Acsé ('Agence nationale pour la cohésion sociale et l'égalité des chances')ⁱⁱ. While officially considered neighbourhood policies, the implementation contracts are also targeted at immigrants and integration.

Though de facto immigrant integration policies exist, the 'colour-blind' Republican approach has remained a corner stone of the French approach to integration, leading amongst others to a taboo of statistics on ethnicity or race. Rather than a recognition of the complex and contested nature of immigrant integration, the very subject of integration is considered a taboo in France and due to the absence of explicit policies and statistic data largely invisible on the policy agenda (Amiriaux and Simon, 2006). Due to its implicit nature of immigrant integration policies French integration policies are furthermore characterised by dispersion and fragmentation (Withol de Wenden 2011, 88). Overall, French immigrant integration policies characterised by weak coordination structures.

Given the dominance of the Republican narrative, the position of immigrants in French society is heavily debated (Castles, Miller and de Haas 2014, 276), fostered inter alia under the pressure of the extreme right during the mid-1980s when integration was turned into a question of national identity (Geddes and Scholten 2016, 61), debates on what it means to be French, and the questioning of allegiances and loyalty (Withol de Wenden 2011, 77-78). We thus label French immigrant integration policies as highly politicized. With this high politicisation, weak coordination structures and taboo on integration we expect that the mainstreaming of immigrant integration is least likely to take place in France.

The Netherlands

The Netherlands was one of the first European countries to develop a centralized national policy strategy aimed at the integration of 'ethnic minorities' in the 1980s. However, the Dutch approach changed significantly to a more socio-economic 'Integration Policy' in the 1990s and subsequently to a more assimilationist policy after the turn of the millennium. Since the early 2000s Dutch immigrant integration policies are characterised by the gradual de-institutionalization.

The problematisation of immigrant integration has shifted from a socio-economic to a social-cultural definition, with a certain level of recognition of the complexity of immigrant integration, though more so at the local than at the national level. The centrally coordinated Dutch immigrant integration policies have been typically horizontally embedded in other policy domains since the move to the broader 'integration policies' in the 1990s. Since the early 2000s integration policies have been furthermore decentralised to the local level, with the national government largely withdrawing from the field. The Netherlands thus has the coordination mechanisms that we expect to be aiding to the mainstreaming of immigrant integration governance.

The Netherlands is a typical example of the symbolic and restrictive turn in integration (Entzinger 2014). Dissatisfaction with effectiveness of previous immigrant integration policies stirred debates on the conditions of integration and belonging. This period also saw the rise of new populist parties such as Lijst Pim Fortuyn (founded in 2002) and the Partij voor de Vrijheid (founded in 2006) who have been very influential on the immigrant integration debates (Scholten, 2013). The Netherlands thus scores relatively high on the politicisation of immigrant integration. In summary, with relatively strong coordination mechanisms and partial recognition of the complexity of integration, but with rather high political contestedness, we expect that mainstreaming is more likely to take place in the Netherlands than in France.

The United Kingdom

Like France, the United Kingdom does not have an explicit immigrant integration strategy, integration related policies instead appear in two policy fields. Due to the historical links with the Commonwealth, immigrant integration policies in the United Kingdom initially tended to speak of ethnic minorities rather than migrants, and integration measures were targeted under 'race relations' and equality legislation. In the 1990s a separate set of policies were developed to target new groups of immigrants, these policies still target early arrivals such as recognised refugees. In the early 2000s a community cohesion approach was developed, shifting the focus of the broad integration approach from race relations to the promotion of a shared sense of belonging. These policies explicitly targeted longer residing migrants and their children (Spencer 2011, Geddes and Scholten 2016) and typically developed locally and decentralised.

In terms of the problem dimension, immigrant integration policies in the United Kingdom are broadly framed, from civic integration policies for new arrivals to a broader social cohesion issue. The Commission on Integration and Cohesion played a specific role in emphasizing the 'wickedness' of immigrant integration, by arguing against a 'one size fits all' approach to immigrant integration in 2007, instead advocating adaptive local policies (Geddes and Scholten 2016). The United Kingdom thus scores relatively high on the recognition of the wickedness of the policy problem. With the embeddedness in the community cohesion approach and the strong local, decentralised development of policies, the United Kingdom contains the horizontal and vertical coordination structures we expect to be important for the development of mainstreaming. Although overall the European trend is towards more restrictive and adaptive integration policies, in the United Kingdom it is more migration policies than integration that are politicised (Carvalho, Eatwell and Wunderlich 2015, n.p.). While new immigration is heavily debated, there is relative consensus on the integration of the current population. We thus label the United Kingdom as low level politicisation of integration. With the recognition

of the wickedness of immigrant integration, the presence of coordination structures and the relatively low level of politicisation we consider the United Kingdom as a most likely case for the mainstreaming of immigrant integration governance.

Table 5, Schematic representation of cases

	The United Kingdom	The Netherlands	France
Problem stream Recognition wickedness	+	+/-	-
Policy stream Presence Coordination structures	+	+	-
Political stream Low politicization	+	+/-	-
	More likely to lead to mainstreaming		Less likely to lead to mainstreaming

Data collection and analysis

The data for this project were collected as part of a larger research project (project Upstream)ⁱⁱⁱ. The empirical analysis of this chapter is based on the data collected as part of this project by scholars in the respective countries and published in different country and comparative reports^{iv}. The studies are based on an analysis of policy documents over the period 2000-2014. As mainstreaming speaks to the embedding of immigrant integration into generic policies and policy fields we have not limited our analysis to immigrant integration policy as an institutional policy domain alone, but have taken a broader lens on generic policy areas that focus on immigrant integration. Besides the (former or indirect) policy field of immigrant integration we have thus also included policies in the field of education and social cohesion in our analysis, as two policy fields closely related to immigrant integration. The policy analysis was complemented with 54 in-depth semi-structured interviews with policymakers, practitioners and stakeholders involved in immigrant integration policy making and related fields^v. Following a fixed template every country analysis focused on the modes of targeting and coordination of immigrant integration priorities at the national and local level. The country studies are available online. This chapter is based on a meta-analysis of the Project Upstream findings.

We mapped and analysed the developments on the targeting and coordination dimension for the 2000-2014 period. In this we identified and assessed the applied methods of targeting and coordination, as depicted in table 1. Are the policies specifically targeted at immigrants or generically addressing the entire population, and is integra-

tion governance centrally or decentrally coordinated between the policy domains of immigrant integration, education and social cohesion on immigrant integration? Secondly, we assessed why mainstreaming had (or had not) taken place by an analysis of the problem, policy and political streams of the respective cases.

4.4. FINDINGS

4.4.1 France

French immigrant integration policies are implemented as area-based policies. This consists of the so-called 'Politique de la Ville'. These area-based policies were coordinated by Acsé ('Agence nationale pour la cohésion sociale et l'égalité des chances'). Originally established^{vi} to facilitate the integration of Algerian male workers during the colonial times, the organisations scope was broadened to increasingly larger target groups including family members and migrant descendants, later also including generic anti-discrimination policies. While originally (indirectly) intertwined with immigrant integration policies, Acsé's policies are now officially disconnected from any integration policies. In education we see similar area-based forms of targeting. Educational policies are centrally organised by the ministry of Education, and are linked to other policy areas, particularly via the 'Urban Contracts of Social Cohesion' and the neighbourhood approach. Educational policies are now mostly targeted by socio-economic indicators and via area based policies such as the 'Zone d'Éducation Prioritaire', receiving additional staff and funding. While originally including the number of pupils with a foreign nationality as one of the criteria, this criterion has been decoupled, as we saw for the other neighbourhood policies.

Finally, there are also some more (explicit) targeting within the French approach. As of 2000 the focus of integration policies shifted to new arrivals, by introduction of the reception and integration contracts ('Contrat d'Accueil et d'Intégration' (CIA), explicitly linking immigration to integration. In 2008-2009 integration policies under this 'Programmes Régionaux d'Intégration des Populations Immigrées' (PRIPI)^{vii}, aimed at promoting immigrant integration issues cross-sectionally, with inter alia language training, social and professional integration and health, became further demarcated to newly arrived immigrants, for the first five years after their arrival. In education and social cohesion, these targeted measures are aimed at a quick mastering of the French language, and secondly focus on Republican values. After these five years everyone is considered a French citizen alike and former long term integration programs are decoupled from the neighbourhood policies.

In addition to the new distinction between short- and long term integration, a national Ministry was established for 'Immigration, Integration and National Identity'. At the same time, following the impetus from the European race directives, a framework to fight (ethnic) discrimination was established and run by the equality body 'La haute autorité de lutte contre les discriminations et pour l'égalité' (HALDE). Under the new government in 2012-2013 French integration policies were revised and again came to centrally focus on anti-discrimination, moving away from the focus on assimilation, instead focusing on 'equality for all'. For this the 'Interministerial Delegate for Integra-

tion and Republican Equality' was established. A delegate with a permanent status, though without a dedicated budget, instead relying on the collaboration with the other ministries. To strengthen the universality of the equality priority, the integration and anti-discrimination policies were disconnected from the focus on disadvantaged neighbourhoods, targeted at all areas instead.

In summary, while always implicit in the French case, policies have been further decoupled from immigrant integration priorities. While the labels were thus further broadened, many policies continued as they were. While long term integration policies became more implicit, short term integration policies were highlighted and separated as an explicit target. We thus see a polarising development in terms of targeting, highlighting short-term targets while dismissing long term integration targets, reinforcing the French Republican ideal of full adaptation. The distinction we made between specific and universal targeting does not fully cover our findings, given the distinction between short and long term targeting. Furthermore, besides the recent effort to install an inter-ministerial coordination mechanism for integration and equality, policies in the field of immigrant integration are fragmented. We thus conclude that we cannot speak of mainstreaming in France.

4.4.2 The Netherlands

In terms of policy coordination, the Netherlands has significantly decentralised its immigrant integration policy approach. Since 2008 policy responsibilities have been decentralised to the local level with the 'Gemeenschappelijke Integratie Agenda' (2008). This collective integration agenda consists of a series of meetings and guidelines to facilitate the decentralisation of policy responsibilities from the national to local level. In the second phase this decentralisation coincided with a further horizontal decentralisation of immigrant integration governance, as the program then very explicitly propagated a generic approach and moved away from integration governance as a separate field ('Gemeenschappelijke Integrale Aanpak' 2012). Immigrant integration policies have been further dismantled from the national level in 2011 when the focus shifted to individual responsibility and adaptation to Dutch society, to be coordinated from the local level. The decentralisation came to entail an almost complete withdrawal of the national government. As of 2011 the national government is only involved with short-term civic integration programs, while withdrawing from long-term integration goals, similar to the development observed in France.

While the decentralisation of immigrant integration governance to the local level was guided by the 'Collective Integration Agenda', such a coordination strategy was absent in realising this envisioned decentralisation horizontally across policy sectors and actors. While the former immigrant integration programs were dissolved into broad, generic programs no specific strategies were developed to involve colleague departments horizontally in immigrant integration issues. Instead the development can be characterised as a one-sided focus on a generalisation of immigrant integration governance without a coordination of the embedding of immigrant integration priorities in the 'mainstream'.

In terms of targeting, the Dutch approach also shows a gradual shift towards a more universalist approach. In several cities a generic citizenship approach emerged in the 2000s (see e.g. Amsterdam and Rotterdam). Rather than speaking of immigrant integration the policies were reframed in generic city citizenship-terms. The goal of the

generic city-citizenship framework was twofold: on the one hand dismissing specific (targeted) policies while striving to make migrant diversity, along with gender, sexual diversity and anti-discrimination integral priorities for the entire city. However here too, little effort was made to embed these priorities horizontally, the shift to city-citizenship primarily came to entail a dismantling of integration policies. Financial reforms and a broader change in the role of the government further enhanced the withdrawal of the local government from (explicit) immigrant integration policies.

This shift comes with the use of implicit targeting, like in the France case. In generic policy fields such as education and neighbourhood policies a development towards indirect targeting is visible, addressing integration issues without framing and targeting these explicitly. While the first immigrant integration policies in the Netherlands developed at the neighbourhood level in Rotterdam, this explicit link between housing and neighbourhood policies and (targeting of) integration was gradually decoupled. While immigrant integration is often discussed as a policy priority in housing and neighbourhood policies to combat segregation and improve the 'liveability' in the neighbourhood, it is seldom targeted directly. Dissolving segregation in the neighbourhood remains an undiminished priority throughout the years, but is instead targeted in socio-economic terms. In education a similar trend away from targeted policies and towards targeting by proxy is recognisable, in which the policy priorities shifted from anti-segregation to educational quality alone, no longer decoupling educational policies from integration priorities. Another example of this is the weighing indicator for extra funding in primary education. While previously the country of origin and the level of education of the student's parents were taken into account to allocate extra funding, in 2006 this was restricted to the parent's level of education alone.

So, when taking stock of the Dutch case, mainstreaming entailed the withdrawal of national government from the area of immigrant integration, both in terms of coordination and targeting. What stands out here is the focus on vertical decentralisation, but lack of horizontal coordination mechanisms. In our model we distinguished centralised and polycentric forms of coordination, as the Dutch case illustrates it is important that the coordination is assured both vertically and horizontally. Moreover, similar to the France case, we see the use of implicit targeting or proxies, especially needs- and area-based in the form of education and social cohesion policies. While the Netherlands moved away from a siloed and targeted approach to integration, it can at best only be labelled as incomplete mainstreaming as targeting still happens indirectly and horizontal coordination structures are largely absent. Both hindering a mainstreamed immigrant integration approach.

4.4.3 The United Kingdom

Immigrant integration policies in the United Kingdom have typically developed decentralised, particularly at the local level, and are developed under the header of community cohesion, by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG). In 2010 the 'Big Society' program was launched as part of the broader localism agenda. This meant a shrinking state and a shift to civil society to deliver services at the local level. Feeding into the existing 'community' framework, the Big Society philosophy also coincided with large retrenchment measures. In contrast to earlier policies in the field that developed at the local level, the community cohesion frame was initi-

ated and coordinated from the Home Office at the national level. While there is still a strong emphasis on implementation at the local level, the policy is coordinated from the national level. In 2012 the 'Creating Conditions for Integration' framework was launched, mostly emphasizing the individual agency and responsibility of the migrants, decentralising immigrant integration to the level of civil society and local areas. Like France, the United Kingdom also has several area-based programs, such as the Health and Education Action Zones.

Over the years however the United Kingdom immigrant integration policies developed a more explicit focus on national identity, integration outcomes and the promotion of neighbourhood cohesion in response to different (inter)national incidents, such as the Milltown riots in 2001 and the 2005 terrorist attack in London. Rising concerns about the risks of alienation led to an explicit rejection of the former focus on multiculturalism, replacing it by a focus on stronger local bonds and values, but also launching a superdiversity framework in 2005. As of 2000 language acquisition came to play a more central role in immigrant integration debates with a twofold emphasis on language as an important facilitator of integration and an emphasis on the duty of migrants and minorities to learn English. Furthermore national identity and diversity came to play a more central role in education.

This led to a twofold response in terms of targeting. On the one hand, in line with France and the Netherlands we see the reflex that group specific funding is avoided, and policies are rather targeted at communities at large. On the other hand, so called 'dysfunctional' communities were targeted, defined on ethnic and religious grounds. Furthermore indirect forms of targeting are recognisable. In education for example the 'Ethnic Minority Achievement Grant' was mainstreamed in the wider 'Dedicated School Grant', additionally the 'Pupil Premium' was introduced in 2010 as part of the equality strategy, aiming to support the poorest students, targeted by socio-economic indicators (Free School Meal) rather than the former migration related indicators (English as Additional Language). Both are examples of indirect targeting, as we have also seen in France and the Netherlands.

In conclusion, like in the France and Dutch case, in the United Kingdom too, a withdrawal of the central government is visible in the 'Community Cohesion' and the 'Creating Conditions for Integration' framework. Although coordinated centrally, the policies are locally implemented and focus on the individual responsibility of the migrants and citizens involved, while the (central) government takes a facilitating role. Although in comparison to France and the Netherlands immigrant integration policies are relatively well embedded (both horizontally and vertically) in the Community Cohesion Framework. Also in targeting, integration is partially mainstreamed in a universal approach to integration in the Community Cohesion Framework. However, indirect forms of targeting are visible in education and social cohesion policies too, indirectly targeting immigrants as we have seen in France and the Netherlands. Although the universal targeting and polycentric policy coordination are present in the United Kingdom, we cannot speak of full mainstreaming, as part of the targeting shifted to targeting by proxy rather than universal targeting, and the polycentric coordination structures weakened rather than strengthened in the period under research.

4.5. ANALYSIS

Our analysis shows that immigrant integration governance in France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom does not qualify as an integrated mainstreaming approach. Although we saw a clear trend in terms of both the coordination and targeting dimension away from centralised and group targeted policies, this trend remained rather fragmented. In fact, we observed that coordination mechanisms weakened (particularly the Netherlands) and targeting happened indirectly via proxies rather than universal (France, the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom).

Our analysis shows that in the case of a clear wicked policy problem, like immigrant integration, there are various factors that inhibit the development of a mainstreamed approach that would do justice to this type of policy problem. While decentralising policy responsibilities to (lower) levels of government and partner departments (both nationally and locally), we saw that the immigrant integration policy objectives were not sufficiently embedded in their new environment. This applies in particular to the horizontal decentralisation (e.g. across policy departments). In the Dutch case for example the decentralisation of integration to the local level was facilitated by a dedicated program, but when integration policies were further decentralised across policy departments such programs were absent. Instead efforts mostly focused on dismissing programs rather than embedding these priorities horizontally. In the United Kingdom immigrant integration policies always developed decentralised, at the local level and in the field of community cohesion. However under retrenchment pressure (like in the Netherlands) we see this involvement erode, further decentralising integration responsibilities to the individual level and the local community. Although compared to the Dutch case more explicit coordination is involved here. When viewed from the generic policy fields such as education we see a dismantling of integration priorities both in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, with the replacement of former group specific policies, as will be explained below. French immigrant integration policies were always indirect, mostly implemented via area based policies. However as of 2008 a twofold development took place. While coordinating integration priorities for new arrivals (up to their first five years in France), all former integration priorities for long term residents were dissolved in universal policies, targeting all French citizens alike.

Immigrant integration is strongly problematised across the cases, however, we coincidentally see a move away from (explicitly) targeted policies (for long term integration). A clear development away from group specific immigrant integration policies is visible, both in (former) integration policies and in generic fields like education and housing. Both the United Kingdom and France have a tradition of indirect, area based policies. As described above, in France these policies came to focus strictly on new arrivals only. In the United Kingdom several programs previously targeting pupils with a migration background were replaced by programs targeted by socio-economic indicators, though largely covering the same group. In the Netherlands we see a similar development of indirect targeting in both housing and education. Following the logic of 'deservingness' (Schneider and Ingram 1997; 2012) it is considered not politically opportune to explicitly target immigrant groups, instead the group is targeted indirectly. We call this targeting by proxy: targeting under a substitute, as a means to circumvent the intractability around integration. While policies, particularly in France and the Netherlands

thus might seem universal, it is rather ‘targeting within universalism’ (Skocpol 1991) we see here, without explicitly targeting immigrant *or* explicitly bringing immigrant integration into the mainstream. By separately targeting short-term integration and only addressing long-term integration by proxy, France and the Netherlands avoid bringing integration into the mainstream.

While we distinguish targeting and coordination as dimensions of mainstreaming, our findings illustrate the importance of very precisely defining the conditions under which this leads to an integrated mainstreaming approach. The distinction we made between specific and universal targeting does not fully cover our findings, as we found that proxy-targeting is applied as an important targeting strategy to circumvent this distinction. Furthermore the split between short- and long term residents illustrates new demarcations of target groups. We furthermore distinguished between centralised and polycentric forms of coordination, however as particularly the Dutch case illustrates it is important that the coordination is assured both vertically and horizontally.

How then can we explain these cases of non- or partial mainstreaming? From a problem perspective, it seems that the absence of data on migrant minorities in France helps to substantiate the colour-blind approach. Due to this absence, the French case seems to lack a full comprehension and recognition of the wickedness or complexity of immigrant integration governance. Also, French integration policies are furthermore strongly centralised and closely related to the national Republican discourse. The strong identity debates in France seem incompatible with a mainstream prioritisation of immigrant integration. Therefore, the use of proxies was required to uphold the idea of a clear central approach.

Also in the Netherlands, the development of a mainstream approach remained partial, albeit for different reasons. While in the Netherlands immigrant integration policies have to some extent always been horizontally embedded, the horizontal coordination weakened with the withdrawal of the national state from (most) integration policies. Like in France short term (civic-)integration is coordinated centrally but longer term integration priorities are dismantled and indirectly targeted. This too coincides with a politicisation of integration and a focus on identity debates in which a similar ‘dilemma of recognition’ emerges as in France. More focused on substituting former targeted policies by proxies and avoiding to speak about integration altogether.

Finally, in the United Kingdom a broader problem definition of immigrant integration, embedded in the Community Cohesion Framework, dates back to a broader inequality and race relations approach to integration. Furthermore, as integration was less perceived as a threat to the national identity in the United Kingdom there seems more room to address integration as a mainstream issue, concerning all citizens. Nevertheless, here too, policy reforms are also driven by retrenchment, leading to a dismissal of former group targeted policies that are replaced by proxy policies, like in the Netherlands. But where the retrenchment and political context in the Netherlands led to very limited forms of mainstreaming the political context in the United Kingdom seems to leave *more room* to prioritise an integrated mainstreaming approach.

The mainstreaming literature emphasizes the need for an integral perspective, to actively bring a policy priority into the mainstream as a concern for all actors and policy fields (Verloo 2005, see also Tosun and Lang 2017). As a process of bringing these priorities into ‘the mainstream’ this approach requires a strong and clear coordination of the policy responsibilities across different departments and levels of governance –

both horizontally and vertically. To avoid the risk of “becoming everyone’s responsibility, yet nobody’s at the same time” (Caglar 2013: 340). It is exactly this prioritisation and coordination that is absent in the case of immigrant integration. Particularly in the French and Dutch case, and to lesser extent in the United Kingdom. We argue that this is the case primarily due to the intractability immigrant integration governance in which rather than a recognition of the complexity of today’s immigrant integration, under political pressure mainstream debates on integration are avoided altogether.

4.6. CONCLUSION

This chapter examined mainstreaming as a governance strategy toward wicked or complex policy problems, taking immigrant integration as a revelatory case study. Our analysis shows that faced with the complexities and contestation of integration governance, policies seem unable to develop a *coordinated* polycentric approach such as in an ideal-typical mainstreaming approach. This sets this area apart from policies on other wicked policy problems where more progress was made in terms of mainstreaming, such as in the area of gender.

Rather than an integrated approach the mainstreaming of immigrant integration governance in France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom led to further fragmentation, as a clear prioritisation of the decentralised approach was lacking. Horizontal coordination structures tend to be weak or not in place at all and policies were increasingly targeted by proxy, only indirectly targeting integration and people of a migrant background. Rather than facing and addressing the complexity of integration governance, the policies we have analysed seem avoid addressing integration altogether. The politicised identity debates around integration seem incompatible with mainstreaming as there is no room to prioritise integration as an encompassing concern across society and its citizens. This is particularly present in France and the Netherlands and to lesser extent in the less politicised case of the United Kingdom.

Our comparative analysis shows that when faced with wicked policy problems, there are various obstacles to developing a mainstreamed approach. Even though the conditions for mainstreaming were largely met in all three different countries, this led to a fragmented and proxy-approach to immigrant integration. In particular, politicization, a lack of clear awareness of the wicked or complex nature of the problem situation, and retrenchment (or the lack of a coordinated vision) formed clear obstacles to come to a polycentric and universalist immigrant integration approach.

ⁱ Later ‘Zone Urbaine Sensible’, now ‘Quartiers Prioritaires’

ⁱⁱ Later ‘Commissariat Général à l’Égalité’ (CGEAT)

ⁱⁱⁱ Funded by the European Commission under the AMIF scheme

^{iv} See: Maan, X, van Breugel, I, Scholten, P, 2015, The Politics of Mainstreaming - A comparative analysis of migrant integration governance in Europe, UPSTREAM report; Bozec, G, Simon, P, 2014, The politics of mainstreaming, immigrant integration policies: Case study of France, UPSTREAM report;

Jensen, O, Gidley, B, 2014, The politics of mainstreaming, immigrant integration policies: Case study of the United Kingdom, UPSTREAM report; Maan, X, van Breugel, I, Scholten, P, 2014, The politics of mainstreaming, immigrant integration policies: Case study of the Netherlands, UPSTREAM report.

^v 20 in France, 18 interviews in the United Kingdom and 16 in the Netherlands

^{vi} Then operating under the name FAS, later FASTIF and FASILD

^{vii} Later 'Programme Départemental d'Intégration' (PDI)

CHAPTER

FIVE

**Towards a typology of local migration diversity
policies**

ABSTRACT

This chapter contributes to the migration studies literature by a comparative analysis of local migration diversity governance in large, mid-sized and small cities, analysing the broader scope of the local dimension of migration-diversity policies. While a 'local turn' has taken place in migration studies over the past two decades, the literature has primarily focused on capital and gateway cities. Yet immigrants arrive and settle in a much wider range of cities. Little is known about what forms migration-diversity governance across cities of different sizes and positions. This chapter therefore conducts a comparative analysis of migration diversity governance across the local dimension. Based on a qualitative, comparative analysis of migration diversity policies in sixteen Dutch municipalities between 2014 and 2018, I distinguish between different local migration diversity policy approaches: 'proactive pluralist', 'proactive monist', 'reactive embedded' and 'reactive one-domain'. This illustrates the variety of local approaches to migration diversity and thus argues against 'a local dimension' of migration diversity governance, rather arguing for different types of local approaches. The proactive cities explicitly chose their own framing for their migration diversity policies, in contradiction to the supposed 'paradigmatic' character of the local level, instead showing that cities position their own framing of migration diversity. The types of migration diversity policies I distinguish provide an analytical framework and starting point for further research on the variety of local migration diversity approaches.

Van Breugel, I. (2020). Towards a typology of local migration diversity policies. Comparative Migration Studies, 8(1), 1-16.

5.1 INTRODUCTION

In the study of immigrant and diversity governance the focus has shifted from the national to the local level, known as the 'local turn'. Local level governance is no longer considered merely a level of policy implementation but is considered an independent level of policy development (see e.g. Alexander 2003, Penninx et al. 2004, Caponio and Borkert 2010, Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2003, Zapata-Barrero et al 2017, Caponio and Scholten 2017). However, studies on local migration diversity governance primarily focus on capital and gateway cities, while policy responsibilities for migration diversity have been distributed between local governments across the entire spectrum, from capital cities to smaller towns and villages, implying a variety of demographic, social and political contexts for migration policies. While some studies address migration diversity policy making in smaller cities, these are hardly considered in comparative local research. An analysis of different local types of migration diversity governance is thus missing.

This chapter qualitatively explores the policy approaches to migration diversity across a selection of cities in the Netherlands. Based on a policy-analysis of immigrant migration diversity governance in these municipalities, the chapter illustrates how migration diversity policies are developed in the decentralised context of the Netherlands building a typology of local migration diversity policies beyond the capital cities. This chapter thus re-assesses the local turn by changing the focus of the research to municipalities in a variety of local settings, adding both empirically and theoretically to the understanding of local migration diversity governance. The following section starts with the theoretical framework that positions this chapter's contribution to the literature on local migration governance and introduces the conceptual framework that is applied for the policy analysis. After the theoretical framework, the methods for data selection, data analysis and case selection will be described. In the findings and analysis I present the four types of local migration diversity policies that I have identified. In the conclusion, finally, I reflect on the implications of these findings for the study of local migration governance.

5.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

5.2.1 Local turn in migration studies

Since the early 2000s the focus in migration studies shifted to the local level. Resulting in a great number of studies on local level policy making in immigration and diversity, with competing interpretations of the so-called 'local level' (Dekker et al. 2015). In line with the literature on local level policy making in other fields (O'Toole 2000) some authors argue there is a convergence of local migration diversity policy making across countries, stressing the typical pragmatic problem coping character of local level policy making (Caponio and Borkert 2010; Poppelaars and Scholten 2008; Bak Jørgensen 2012). Other authors argue for 'paradigmatic pragmatism' claiming that local governments rather pragmatically combine different ideological beliefs in their diversity pol-

icies (Schiller 2015), while yet others argue that policy making at the local level is determined by its unique local political and policy context, making policy making in each, local setting different (Mahnig and Wimmer 2000; Caponio and Borkert 2010; Morales and Giugni, 2013, Barbehön and Münch 2016; Martínez-Ariño et al. 2018).

Most migration diversity literature initially focused on big cities and their supposed distinctive open character (see e.g. Alexander 2003; Penninx et al. 2004; Poppelaars and Scholten 2008; Caponio and Borkert 2010; Scholten 2013). Smaller cities and towns on the other hand are considered a separate category, characterised by inter alia their relatively homogeneous demographics (Leitner 2012), consequently low intercultural competences (Glorius 2017), an overall low degree of policy activity in immigration affairs (Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010 in Filomeno 2016) and lack of ethnic networks (cp. Miksch and Schwier 2000; Schader-Stiftung 2011; Gruber 2013 in Glorius 2017). Furthermore small scale or rural cities are associated with “higher degree of social control, exclusionary practices against newcomers and .. [a strong] perception of cultural differences” (Glorius 2017, p. 117). Whereas urban, large scale cities are often associated with accommodation of cultural diversity, in small-scale towns it is assumed that assimilation ‘into small town society’ dominates (Kreichauf 2015).

The claim of capital cities as free havens of tolerance and cultural diversity, is now often disputed, instead calling attention to e.g. politics of exclusion (Ambrosini 2013) or ‘scales of global salience’ (Glick-Schiller and Çağlar 2009). Furthermore, a growing number of studies call to explore the broader spectrum of local migration diversity policies (Ellis 2006; Varsanyi 2008; Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010; Walker and Leitner 2011; Leitner 2012; Ambrosini and Boccagni 2015; Bonizzoni and Marzorati, 2015; Kreichauf 2015; Filomeno 2016; Glorius 2017; Trivino-Salazar 2018; Desille 2018). Nevertheless, research on local migration diversity governance remains biased towards large cities. When studies do take different local contexts into account, these are studied rather separately and tend to position large and small cities in binary terms. By my knowledge little comparative research has been conducted across a variety of cities in different local settings. This chapter therefore undertakes such a comparative study of the local level migration-related diversity policy making in the Netherlands. I do so by an application of Ward’s (2010, see also Filomeno 2016) relational comparative approach that calls for ‘studying cities through each other’, without presuming fixed positions in hierarchical orders. Thus, departing from a content analysis of immigrant and diversity governance responses across different cities I inductively identify possible clusters of cities, explicitly driven by the comparative analysis of the different cases, rather than by presuming a hierarchical and scalar order between the cities (cf. Alexander 2003; Glick-Schiller and Çağlar 2009; Bell and Jayne 2009).

5.2.2 Conceptual framework

The key question of this chapter is how local governments across a variety of local settings respond to migration related diversity. I study this through an analysis of the official policy documents on migration diversity in the selected cities. These narratives help me to reconstruct the local responses to migration diversity. I analyse the policies through a three-dimensional lens, distinguishing a problem definition, policy measures and targeting dimension. This layered lens enables me to capture an integrated picture of local diversity policies across different domains.

Policy making starts with the identification of a public problem that calls for a policy response (see e.g. Bacchi 2008). The way an issue is problematized shows the deviation between the existing and desired state of affairs (Hoppe, 2010). An analysis of defined policy problems thus provides insight in the government's perception of (ideal) integration and diversity. Building on this problem dimension, how then, are policies subsequently formulated? The literature distinguishes different cultural orientations in government responses to migration diversity. In how far is migration diversity considered a permanent feature of society and how is this captured in policy measures (cf. Hammar 1985, Castles and Miller 2009 [1993]; Koopmans and Statham 2000, Alexander 2003)?

Finally, targeting sub-groups of the population is an essential element of policy making in defining government interventions and the redistribution of goods and services (Stone 1988, see also Schneider & Ingram, 1993; Sen, 1995; Yanow 2003 De Zwart, 2005). By targeting, people are classified and categorised in policy-relevant categories (see Yanow 2003; De Zwart 2005), unveiling who the government identifies as part of, or responsible for the policy problem or solution, and how policies are justified (Sniderman et al. 1996). Taking these three dimension together enables me to systematically and coherently analyse (variations of) local migration-diversity policies across different domains.

5.3 METHODS

This chapter aims to both empirically and theoretically enhance the understanding of the local level migration-diversity policies. Given the limited number of studies on the broader local dimension of migration-diversity policies I have chosen a combination of a qualitative analysis of the policies from a relational comparative approach (Ward 2010) to identify different types of policy responses to migration-related diversity across the local dimension. This way I inductively build an analytical framework for the analysis of local migration diversity governance. Below I will discuss the approach to data selection, data analysis and case selection.

Data selection – Studying local migration diversity governance

The key question of this chapter is how local governments across a variety of local settings respond to migration related diversity. I study this through an analysis of the official policy documents on migration diversity in the selected cities. These official narratives help me to reconstruct the local responses to migration diversity. In the Netherlands migration diversity policies are almost completely decentralised to the local level (Scholten and van Breugel 2018), this means local governments are responsible for integration programs and related subsidies. Furthermore, they implement anti-discrimination and anti-radicalisation policies locally, as well as the housing and integration of refugees.

For each of the municipalities I have collected and subsequently selected all the official policy documents (memoranda, policy plans) on migration diversity for the Coalition Period 2014-2018 via an online city-council information system (ris or ibabs-online) and/or the municipal website. I have selected all relevant policy documents on

migration and diversity, including coalition agreements, integration or diversity memoranda and policy programs, letters from the council or relevant Alderman or Commission, policy framework, implementation plans, memos and action plans. As many cities do not (longer) have explicit migration diversity policies (see van Breugel and Scholten 2019) the search and selection of policy documents was broadened to all policies related to migration diversity, in any policy field (see also Alexander 2003).

Based on previous research on Dutch migration diversity governance (idem) the key search terms were defined as: 'integration', 'diversity', 'anti-discrimination' and 'polarisation'. The list of search terms was expanded iteratively throughout the data search. One search-term that was added in this process was for example 'refugee', as many municipalities developed new migration diversity policies in response to the increased arrival of asylum seekers as of 2015¹. Based on the final list of selected search terms 255 documents were collected. From this, 89 documents were selected as relevant¹ and applicable to the selected time-period, these 89 documents were used for the analysis of this chapter.

Policy analysis – A three dimensional lens

As mentioned above, the policies were analysed along three dimensions 'problem definition', 'policy measures' and 'target group'). The coding was done in Atlas.ti. Based on the literature I defined sensitizing categories for the coding in each of the three dimensions that enabled me to systematically and coherently analyse local migration-diversity policies via a set of categories, while inductively identifying different variations within these categories. I will explain the sensitizing categories below.

The dimension of the problem definition illustrates the governments perception on integration and diversity, as it shows how integration is perceived by the government (Bacchi, 2008; Hoppe, 2010). Within the problem definition dimension I distinguish between different policy domains: the socio-economic, socio-cultural, legal-political or spatial policy domain, as distinguished by inter alia Alexander (2003) and Penninx (2005). Policies in the social-economic domain focus e.g. on labour market and education and refer to a structural approach to integration. Policies in the cultural religious domain relate to cultural representation, of e.g. minority (religious) groups on the one hand and more broadly speaking a public awareness of ethnic diversity in mainstream society on the other hand. Spatial policies, furthermore, relate to the spatial organisation of diversity, inter alia in relation to housing and use of place. Policies in the juridical-political domain, finally, relate to the civic status of migrants and participation and representation, and relate to integration as (political) participation (Alexander 2003 and Penninx 2005). During the process of coding I for example defined participation memoranda as a socio-economic integration definition, I furthermore defined anti-radicalisation policies as a category within the juridical-political domain.

Building on this problem definition I distinguish the proposed policy measures as the second dimension of my analytical framework. Through a study of the proposed policy measures the content of the policies can be determined, in particular the government's cultural orientation. In how far is migration diversity considered a permanent feature of society? How do governments perceive and address the migration diversity in their societies? Culturally monist policy measures are aimed at cultural adaptation to the host society while pluralist policy measures aim to cater cultural diversity as part of the local city identity (cf. Hammar 1985, Castles and Miller 2009 [1993]; Koopmans and

Statham 2000, Alexander 2003).

Figure 2, Analytical lens



Targeting finally, classifies and categorises people in policy-relevant categories (see Yanow 2003; De Zwart 2005), unveiling who the government identifies as part of, or responsible for the policy problem or solution, and how policies are justified (Sniderman et al. 1996). For the targeting dimension I distinguish between ‘non-targeting’; ‘universal targeting’, i.e. targeting integration or diversity policies at a wider audience; and ‘specific targeting’, i.e. specifically addressing immigrants as target group (Schneider and Ingram 1997, De Zwart 2005 and Simon and Piché 2012). During the process of coding I complemented these categories with framing strategies, such as framing policies targeted at migrants explicitly as temporary or open to other citizens too.

While models for integration create the impression of coherent sets of policies (cf. Glick-Schiller and Çağlar 2009), my proposed three-dimensional lens enables researchers to systematically and coherently analyse local migration-diversity policies, and its internal variation and contradictions that determine policy making (at the local level) (cf. Alexander 2003), facilitating an inductive clustering of different migration diversity approaches.

Table 6, Conceptual framework

	Sensitizing categories			
Problem definition	Socio-economic	Juridical-political	Socio-cultural	Spatial
Policy measures	Cultural pluralist	Cultural monist		
Targeting	Non-targeting	Universal targeting	Targeting migrants	

In the analysis below I will identify the different problem definitions, policy measures and targeting strategies applied in the migration diversity governance in studied cities. Subsequently I will identify links between the dimensions coming to four types of local migration diversity policies.

Case selection – A relation comparative lens

This chapter focuses on local integration policies in the Netherlands. Dutch migration diversity governance always has had a clear multi-level character (Scholten 2013), characterized by the interaction between the national and local level policies. In fact, the first national policies for ethnic minorities were developed in response to local policies in Rotterdam that dealt with interethnic tensions in the 'Afrikaanderwijk'-neighbourhood (Veenman 2000, Dekker and van Breugel 2018). This study takes a selection of Dutch municipalities as a starting point, working towards a typology of local migration diversity policies that can be applied and refined universally in the study of local migration diversity policies.

For this chapter I have chosen to select a wide range of cases, distinguishing six different scales of city sizes by the number of inhabitants (see table 7). From these different segments I have selected the top three municipalities (where applicable) resulting in a selection of sixteen municipalities: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Den Haag, Utrecht, Eindhoven, Tilburg, Groningen, Deventer, Sittard-Geleen, Helmond, Rijswijk (ZH), Weert, Houten, Albrandswaard, Sliedrecht and Cuijk. The cities in the top two categories are considered 'large cities', the cities in the two middle categories 'mid-sized cities' and the cities in the two last categories 'small cities'. I apply a relational comparative perspective (Ward 2010), 'studying cities through each other', without presuming fixed positions in hierarchical orders. The division and selection of cities by scale-size is thus merely meant to serve as a tool to come to a broad selection of cities, which will later be inductively categorised based on the outcome of the policy analysis.

Figure 3, Map with overview of the cases. Adapted from Silver Spoon / CC BY-SA



Table 7, Overview cases

	Municipality	Number of inhabitants	# (Seize, NI)*	% inhabitants with migrant background	# (% inhabitants with migrant background)
	>500.000			[49,8-52%]	
1	Amsterdam	833.624	1	51,7%	2
2	Rotterdam	629.606	2	48,8%	3
3	Den Haag	519.988	3	52%	1
	500.000-250.000			33%	
4	Utrecht	338.967	4	33%	10
	250.000-100.000			11,6-40%	
5	Eindhoven	224.755	5	32,6%	12
6	Tilburg	212.941	6	25,5%	35
7	Groningen	200.952	7	23%	58
	100.000-50.000			5,8-39,7%	
8	Deventer	98.869	32	21,3%	69
9	Sittard-Geleen	93.555	33	21,7%	67
10	Helmond	90.127	34	24,8%	44
	50.000-25.000			4-41,9%	
11	Rijswijk (ZH)	49.328	78	32,6%	13
12	Weert	49.100	79	20,2%	76
13	Houten	48.765	80	14,3%	159
	<25.000			3,3-48,7%	
14	Albrandswaard	24.985	219	19,3%	86
15	Sliedrecht	24.968	220	13,3%	180
16	Cuijk	24.608	221	18,8%	91

As a brief illustration of the variety between the cases (without presuming that these are explanatory distinctions) the cases show variety in the percentage of inhabitants with a migrant background (varying between 13.3-52% of the total city population). Furthermore, the cities are spread over the different provinces in the Netherlands (covering seven out of twelve provinces, see table 1 and map above)ⁱⁱ.

5.4 FINDINGS – FOUR TYPES OF LOCAL MIGRATION DIVERSITY POLICIES

What stands out in the analysis of the local migration diversity policies is that at the start of the coalition period in 2014 only a few cities have an explicit integration or diversity agenda. Most cities do not separately address integration at all. Rather, migration diversity is addressed ‘mainstreamed’ (Scholten and van Breugel 2018), as part of other policy domains, such as anti-discrimination or anti-polarisation policies. In 2015 the increase in the number of refugees arriving in the Netherlands led to a demand for quick governance responses for the accommodation, housing and integration of refugees, leading to a new range of migration diversity policies in all the analysed cities. I thus differentiate two core moments of policy development. The start of the coalition period and the response to the increased refugee influx which led to the development of new local policies in all the studied cities in 2015.

In this I distinguish between cities that proactively develop these policies on their own initiative and policies that develop their policies reactively, implementing national guidelines. Different levels of embeddedness, cultural orientation and targeting strategies can be discerned. Below I will elaborate on this classification based on the findings of the problem definition, policy measures and targeting analysis of the of the migration diversity policies in the studied local cases.

5.4.1 Problem definition – Embedded and one-domain

The socio-economic approach to migration diversity is most dominant across all the studied cities, with policies that portray integration as a matter of participation and self-sustainability in almost all cities. However, there are vast differences in how these are embedded across different policy domains. In Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Den Haag, Utrecht, Eindhoven, Groningen and Weert for example, integration is addressed proactively, prioritizing labour market integration in relation to a broader socio-cultural integration or diversity agenda, (also) emphasizing the accessibility and inclusiveness of the labour market and anti-discrimination programs. Tilburg, Deventer, Helmond, Rijswijk and Houten only developed these policies reactively in response to the refugee influx (policies since 2015/2016), positioning the refugee integration primarily as a socio-economic issue, concerning labour market integration and educational participation. The policies are considered to be of temporary nature, aimed at rapid integration in generic facilities and striving for self-sustainability.

In the juridical-political domain too, a distinction can be made between one-domain and embedded policy approaches. This concerns primarily anti-radicalisation policies. A distinction can be made between municipalities that problematize radicalisation

strictly as a safety issue (Deventer and Sittard-Geleen) and broader definitions that link radicalisation to segregation and polarization in society. The latter focus on prevention as well as repression, through dialogue and resilience training programs (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Den Haag, Utrecht, Tilburg, Groningen, Helmond, Rijswijk and Weert). An example of the latter is Utrecht's anti-segregation program, a tiered approach that focus on connecting people, early signalling, guiding and where necessary repression. The approach explicitly connects anti-radicalisation to a broader approach combatting segregation and polarisation as a breeding ground for radicalisation, and thereby focus on segregation as an issue for the entire city.

In the spatial domain too different levels of embeddedness can be distinguished. This concerns policies on (spatial-)segregation and the composition of neighbourhoods (Rotterdam and Utrecht). As of 2016 spatial policies furthermore came to focus on the housing of asylum seekers. Based on a national target, municipalities get assigned a number of refugees that they need to house in their municipality. These range from mere accommodation (Albrandswaard), to more embedded approaches linking the housing assignment to integration and broader support structures (Rotterdam, Den Haag, Utrecht, Tilburg, Groningen, Deventer, Helmond and Houten). Furthermore in Rotterdam, Den Haag and Utrecht the municipality explicitly calls for dispersal policies or 'mixed housing' to avoid segregation (Rotterdam, Den Haag and Utrecht). Except for Rotterdam and Utrecht spatial policies are only addressed reactively in relation to refugee policies.

In contrast to the political and public debate, the cultural-religious domain is the least addressed of all. Den Haag, Groningen and Weert have an explicit 'diversity' agenda, Utrecht has a very elaborate anti-radicalisation approach, focusing explicitly on diversity in the city too. Utrecht, Groningen and Weert focus on cultural diversity as a value and an asset to the city, explicitly making diversity (migration diversity along with other forms as diversity such as sexual diversity) an issue of the entire city. Rotterdam and Den Haag take a much more cautious approach. While acknowledging the diverse make-up of the city they 'problematize' this very different. Den Haag has a two-fold approach, while it does emphasize that it strives to be an open city in which everyone can feel at home, together with Rotterdam it also focuses on adaptation to shared norms and values.

Based on the above Albrandswaard and Sittard-Geleen can be distinguished as cities with a limited approach to migration diversity, as they are the only cities in which integration is only addressed in one domain. After that follow the cities that although approaching integration broader, do so from one specific angle, making this the priority of the city. For example, in Amsterdam diversity as such is not explicitly addressed at all, rather all policies are built around a framework of human rights. Eindhoven on the other hand explicitly positions itself with an approach focused on participation, with a broad anti-discrimination strategy. In a similar vein Tilburg, Helmond and Rijswijk focus on (an embedded) anti-radicalisation approach. The most elaborate and embedded integration approached are found in Rotterdam, Den Haag, Utrecht, Groningen, Weert. Of these cities Groningen, Weert and Utrecht focus on diversity most explicitly. This illustrates how cities take different positions in their migration diversity approaches, either proactively with an explicit diversity agenda, or reactively, developing embedded or one-domain programs combating polarisation or facilitating the housing of refugees. While the larger and mid-sized cities tend to have more extensive migration diversity

programs, their respective positioning differs. Below I will look at the policy measures the cities adopt to explore these positions further.

5.4.2 Policy measures - Monist and Pluralist

For the analysis of the policy measures I have assessed whether the proposed policy measures were targeted at cultural monism or pluralism. Cultural pluralist policies are present in Den Haag, Eindhoven, Tilburg, Deventer, Helmond, Rijswijk, but most explicitly in Utrecht, Groningen and Weert. The policies can be recognized by an explicit orientation on all citizens, as seen with inclusive citizenship approaches in Utrecht, Groningen and Weert; the accessibility of generic policies and institutes, or diversity awareness of generic institutions, as seen in Den Haag, Eindhoven, Tilburg, Groningen, Deventer and Weert, and finally the broad embedding of specific programs like anti-radicalization or refugee integration programs. Measures focused on cultural monism focus on cultural adaptation and can be recognised in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Den Hague, Utrecht, Deventer, Rijswijk and Houten. In Amsterdam for example citizens with a 'non-Western' background are explicitly targeted for the 'pink agenda' and the 'women-emancipation' memorandum.

In the previous section I distinguished between proactive and reactive policies. Here I refine this distinction by looking at the content of those policies. What stands out from the analysis is that most cities only address migration diversity indirectly. As described in the previous section policies are rather framed in socio-economic terms. A small number of the cities does not address migration diversity at all, unless required by implementation of national guidelines on for example refugee housing. While the reactive cities tend to less explicitly address the cultural dimension of migration diversity, the proactive cities can be split up in culturally monist and pluralist.

5.4.3 Target groups – Direct and indirect

Finally, I have looked at the target groups that are defined in the policy measures. First of all, in line with the earlier observed trend of implicit references to migration diversity, a trend of generic, non-targeted, policies is clearly visible across the cities. In many cities a broader audience is targeted for migration diversity or social inclusion policies. On the one hand there is a group of cities that aims to inclusively address all its citizens via an explicit diversity (Den Haag, Groningen, Weert) or participation agenda, addressing the entire city (Rotterdam, Eindhoven), or a broadly embedded anti-radicalisation approach (Utrecht, Helmond, Rijswijk). In Den Haag all citizens that 'withdraw' from society are explicitly targeted, but 'Hagenaars' who do not feel comfortable with the diversity in the city are targeted too. On the other hand there are a few cities that have explicitly denounced group-based policies altogether (Amsterdam and Weert). While in Weert the former targeted integration policies are replaced by an inclusive diversity agenda, Amsterdam has reshaped its entire agenda around a human rights frame, explicitly denouncing group-based policies for citizens with a migration background. Nevertheless in both cities targeted policies are applied in certain subdomains, such a refugee integration policies and (lgtbi) emancipation programs. In Cuijk no targeted migration diversity policies were observed at all.

Secondly, despite the emphasis on generic framing, most cities combine generic and

targeted policies. In combining generic and targeted policies, different framing strategies can be distinguished, such as framing targeted policies as temporary, or open to other target groups too. Both forms of framing primarily occur around the housing and integration programs that were set up for refugees as of 2015. Several cities emphasize that the integration programs they set-up for refugees are of a temporary nature only, aimed at the eventual self-sustainability of the refugees (Rotterdam, Den Haag, Utrecht, Tilburg, Deventer, Helmond, Houten, Albrandswaard). The temporary-framing frequently coincides with a combined targeting of migrant and non-migrants groups. In Tilburg and Houten for example policies focus on increasing the accessibility of the facilities for all citizens and (thereby) increasing the public support for inter alia refugee integration measures. The cities emphasize the accessibility of these facilities for non-immigrant citizens or emphasizing the need to maintain public support for these measures (Rotterdam, Den-Haag, Utrecht, Tilburg, Deventer and Houten). This can also be observed in EU labour-migrant policies in Rotterdam which mention the importance of 'creating a level-playing field' for the Rotterdam workforce. Also with refugee housing policies, several municipalities connect this to a wider target group by drawing attention to the pressure on the housing market (Rotterdam, Utrecht, Tilburg, Helmond and Houten), again linking migration diversity measures to public support.

Finally, targeted policies appear in an interesting set of cities. In contrasted to the broad approaches described above, in Houten and Albrandswaard refugee integration policies are targeted at refugees only. In Slidrecht 'allochtonous' youngsters are targeted for sports programs, while Rotterdam and Den Haag have policies specifically targeted at citizens with a Moroccan, Antillean and Turkish background and EU labour migrants. Non-Western youngsters, girls and 'isolated women' are targeted within generic participation and emancipation programs (Amsterdam, Rotterdam).

Based on the analysis above a distinction can be made between direct and indirect forms of targeting. An emphasis on generic targeting is dominant across a large share of cities. Despite this generic framing in many cities targeted policies coexist, though these are framed as temporary or explicitly target non-migrant groups too. In line with the observed trend of policy measures only indirectly addressing migration diversity, targeting too occurs directly and indirectly. The 'proactive pluralist' cities tend to explicitly target directly and inclusively, while both 'proactive monist' and 'reactive embedded' target indirectly through the temporary and combined framing. The 'reactive one-domain' cities finally also target directly, however only in a few separate policies.

5.5 ANALYSIS

First, I will reiterate some of the trends in migration-diversity strategies that can be recognised across the different cities and discuss how trends across the different dimensions interact. Secondly, I will discuss policy characteristics of clusters of cities identify different city types.

A first thing that becomes apparent across the cases is the focus on generic or mainstreamed policies. Most municipalities have departed from explicit integration policies, rather addressing migration diversity indirectly, as part of other policies and across different policy domains. This can be observed in indirect forms of targeting too. How-

ever how these policies are embedded differs between the cities, varying between participation programs, diversity agendas and refugee integration programs. In the policy period under study two core policy moments stand out. The beginning of the coalition period in which a small selection of the cities phrased explicit migration diversity programs, and the increased refugee influx in 2015 in response to which all cities later developed migration diversity policies for refugee integration.

Based on an analysis of the problem definition, policy measures and target groups of local migration diversity policies I have inductively identified four types of local migration diversity policies. I distinguish between cities that proactively and independently developed migration diversity policies at the start of the coalition period, such as a diversity agenda, and the cities that formed these reactively, in response to the refugee crisis or other national guidelines on for example anti-discrimination or anti-radicalisation. The policies in the 'proactive cities' are typically developed as embedded approaches, cutting across different policy domains, such as programs linked to an embedded diversity agenda or anti-polarisation approach. Although these cities fall apart in a cluster of cities with policy measures aimed at cultural adaptation (cultural monism) and a cluster of cities that explicitly target cultural plurality.

The cities that developed their policies reactively on the other hand do not explicitly address their cultural orientation, rather these cities can be distinguished by an embedded and one-domain approach. Such as policy responses limited to the housing of refugees, or more holistic and integrated refugee integration approaches, where housing and integration policies are linked to a broader program on self-sustainability, in the domain of education and the labour market. The 'reactive embedded' and 'proactive monist' cities both apply indirect forms of targeting, such as targeted approaches that are framed as temporary, or combining different target groups to broaden the public support for these measures. 'Proactive pluralist' and 'reactive one-dimension' cities both target directly, although addressing different target groups.

Table 8, City types

Proactive pluralist	Proactive monist	Reactive embedded	Reactive one-domain
Proactive		Reactive	
Embedded		Embedded	One domain
Cultural pluralism	Cultural monism	-	-
Direct targeting	Indirect targeting	Indirect targeting	Direct targeting
Utrecht, Groningen and Weert	Rotterdam and Den Haag	Amsterdam, Eindhoven, Tilburg, Deventer, Helmond, Rijswijk and Houten	Sittard-Geleen, Albrandswaard, Sliedrecht and Cuijk

The first cluster of ‘proactive pluralist’ cities consists of the large, mid-sized and small cities Utrecht, Groningen and Weert, with proactive diversity policies, embedded across different policy domains and an explicit orientation on cultural diversity, such as the Groningen diversity agenda. The second cluster of ‘proactive monist’ cities consists of the two large cities Rotterdam and Den Haag, also characterised with a proactive diversity approach that is embedded over different policy domains. This cluster of cities however, is defined rather by a cultural monist orientation, with a focus on cultural adaptation such as the Rotterdam integration memorandum. Policies operate by a mix of generic and targeted policies, however the most remarkable trend in this regard is the use of indirectly targeted policies, framed temporary or combined targeting.

The third cluster of ‘reactive embedded’ cities consists of the mid-sized and small cities Eindhoven, Tilburg, Deventer, Helmond, Rijswijk and Houten, that form a set of reactive policies, that are nevertheless embedded across different policy domains. Like the equal opportunities approach in Eindhoven or the broad anti-polarisation approach in Tilburg. Like the ‘proactive monist’ cities the policies are characterised by targeted measures that are temporary and explicitly targeting non-migrant groups too. The last cluster of ‘reactive, one-domain’ cities consists of the mid-sized city Sittard-Geleen, and the small cities Albrandswaard, Sliedrecht and Cuijk, who are defined by reactive and one-domain approaches to integration, typically by targeted policies, such as the refugee housing policies in Albrandswaard or sport policies for children with a migration background in Sliedrecht.

The analysis shows the variety between cities in their local migration diversity policies, and the different policy moments they seize formulate these policies. While there is a rough distinction between the larger cities with proactive policies, and smaller cities that tend to develop their policies reactively, the large-small city variation does not explain borderline cases and outliers like capital city Amsterdam as reactive, or the mid-sized and small cities of Groningen and Weert as proactive. Furthermore, when looking at the clusters within the proactive migration diversity policies, the cluster of large, mid-sized and small cities of Utrecht, Groningen and Weert are characterised by their cultural pluralist approach while the larger cities Rotterdam and Den Haag classify as cultural monist. The larger cities seem to have moved away from (former) accommodative policies, by explicitly denouncing this former pluralist approach (Rotterdam) or replacing migration diversity altogether for a human rights framework (Amsterdam), perhaps having reached a different policy phase (cf. Alexander 2003). However, further research is necessary to explain the cluster of large, mid-sized and small cities that adopted a proactive pluralist approach.

5.6 CONCLUSION

Based on an analysis of the problem definition, policy measures and target groups of local migration diversity policies I have inductively identified four types of local migration diversity policies: ‘proactive pluralist’, ‘proactive monist’, ‘reactive embedded’ and ‘reactive one-domain’. This illustrates the variety of local migration-diversity policies, and thus argues against a ‘local dimension’ of migration diversity policies (Caponio and Borkert 2010; Poppelaars and Scholten 2008; Bak Jørgensen 2012), rather illustrating

the variety of local approaches. This study also invalidates the claim of the ‘pragmatic’ local level (Caponio and Borkert 2010; Poppelaars and Scholten 2008; Bak Jørgensen 2012), as it shows that that cities position their own framing of migration diversity.

This emphasizes the importance of taking the full local dimension into account when studying local level migration diversity governance. The different clusters of cities show that we need to move beyond binary division between large and small cities to understand local migration policy making. My findings reject the claim that larger cities would be more open and accommodating to migration than smaller cities (see e.g. Alexander 2003; Penninx et al. 2004; Poppelaars and Scholten 2008; Caponio and Borkert 2010; Scholten 2013). Further in-depth research on the respective policy types is necessary to explain the different clusters of large, mid-sized and small cities across the policy.

The three-dimensional lens to study migration diversity, as applied in this chapter, enables a systematic and coherent analysis of local migration diversity policies across different domains. It enables researchers to ‘study cities through each other’ as proposed in Ward’s relational comparative approach (2010), equipping an inductive clustering of different multi-layered migration diversity approaches that move beyond integration models. The types of migration diversity policies I distinguish here provide an analytical framework and starting point for further research on the variety of local migration diversity approaches.

ⁱ Final list of search terms: Integratie, diversiteits-, diversiteit, diverse samenleving, inclusief, inburgering, vluchtelingen, participatieverklaring, radicalisering, extremisme, anti-discriminatie, polarisatie, statushouders, nieuwkomers, asielzoekers, AZC, arbeidsmigratie, achterstelling, jihadisme, migrant

ⁱⁱ Filtering for ‘false positives’ among the search results that did not concern immigrant integration policies or the defined time period

ⁱⁱⁱ Covered provinces and number of cases per province: Noord-Holland (1 city); Zuid-Holland (5 cities); Utrecht (2 cities); Noord-Brabant (4 cities); Groningen (1 city); Overijssel (1 city); Limburg (2 cities)

CHAPTER **SIX**

Target group definition.

The dilemma of recognition in immigrant integration
policy solution formulation

ABSTRACT

By studying how people are classified and categorised as target groups in Dutch immigrant integration policies this chapter illustrates how the formulation of policy solutions is constrained by the taboos on the political and public agenda. By avoiding group-based policies for immigrants and applying indirect or generic policies instead, policy makers anticipate the public and political approval in the stage of policy solution definition. Like the policy stage of problem definition, the construction of policy solutions too, is marked by conflict, critique and opposition. This chapter illustrates how policy makers cope with the 'conflictual nature' of solution definition through different discursive strategies and taboos for targeting. These interchanging strategies aid policy makers to navigate contestation and policy taboos, both within the administration as in the broader public and political debate. The policymakers anticipate the public approval of their policy solutions in the selection of target groups and policy instruments. Based on a policy analysis of different targeting strategies in the Dutch immigrant integration policy making between 2010-2018, and interviews with policy makers this chapter illustrates how policy taboos influence the process of binding policy problem and solution.

Van Breugel (forthcoming) Target group definitions. The dilemma of recognition, in: Zittoun, P., Fischer, F. & Zahariadis, N. (eds) The Politics of Formulating Policy Solutions: Arguments, Arenas, and Coalitions. Bristol: Policy Press

6.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter looks at targeting as an essential and insightful step in the policy solution process. Targeting forms an essential element of policy making, defining the ‘who’ in policy solution making. However, while many studies have written about the performative effects of targeting, this chapter focuses on targeting in the policy solution making process itself. Rather than a straight forward or neutral process this chapter illustrates the contested nature of policy solution making in immigrant integration governance. Through an analysis of the interplay between *policy targeting* and *justification*, this chapter illustrates how policy makers cope with the ‘conflictual nature’ of solution definition, through different ‘discursive strategies’ for targeting. These interchanging strategies aid policy makers to navigate contestation and policy taboos, both within the administration as in the broader public debate, and thus form coalitions in support of their proposed policy solution, *anticipating* the public approval of their policy interventions in the selection of target groups and policy instruments. By a policy analysis of different targeting strategies in the Dutch immigrant integration policy making between 2010-2018 and interviews with policy makers this chapter contributes to an understanding of how policy makers ‘chain’ policy tools and solutions through different targeting strategies.

6.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Targeting sub-groups of the population is an essential element of the formulation of policy solutions, addressing the ‘who’ in the Lasswellian question of “who gets what and how” in policy solution formulation, defining how goods and services are redistributed (Stone 1988, see also Schneider & Ingram, 1993; Sen, 1995; Yanow 2003 De Zwart, 2005). The more accurate a policy reaches its target group, the less wastage along the process maximizing the efficiency in reaching its policy goals (cf. Sen, 1995, p.11-12). By targeting, people are thus classified and categorised in policy-relevant categories (see Yanow 2003; De Zwart 2005), unveiling who the government identifies as part of, or responsible for the policy problem or solution, and how policies are justified (Sniderman et al. 1996). Deborah Stone claims public policy is “centrally about classification and differentiation”, politically reasoning being “primarily a reasoning of sameness and difference” only secondarily a “reasoning of more or less” (1988, p. 295).

However, more than merely a cost-benefit analysis of effective redistribution, targeting forms an important selection moment in solution formulation and carries significant social and political effects. Much has been written on classification and categorization in policy literature pointing at the stigmatising effect of group distinctions (see Jeffers, 1967; Tajfel, 1981; Wilson, 1987; Rogers-Dillon, 1995; Sen, 1995; Tilly, 1998; Brubaker & Cooper, 2000; De Zwart, 2005).

A large body of literature writes about the performative effects of target groups, reifying and sustaining social groups in society, as policy making requires “*definition, recognition, and even mobilization of the groups concerned, which accentuates caste, ethnic, and racial distinctions*” (De Zwart, 2005, p.137). Beyond the direct effect the catego-

rization has in highlighting and setting apart a group, influencing the perceptions of others, several authors also claim that target group constructions effect the citizens themselves. Building from labelling theory (Akers 1997 in Moncrieffe and Eyben 2007) they claim target group constructions in policy can shape citizens' own identities and perceptions about themselves (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003; Soss 1999 both in Harrits and Møller 2011) and their willingness to participate or contribute to society (Schneider and Ingram 1997). Although we should not lose sight of the agency of the involved citizens here (see e.g. Moncrieffe and Eyben 2007 and Harrits and Møller 2011 for on critique of labelling theory) it is important to take into account the performative effect of targeting in policies, both on society as a whole as well as on the subjects of targeting. Targeting in policy thus requires a balance between the costs and benefits of the (re)distributed goods and regulations and the potential stereotyping and stigmatising consequences thereof for the group involved (De Zwart 2012,313).

6.2.1 The degenerative effect of targeting

A theory that zooms in specifically on targeting in policy making is Schneider and Ingram's (1993, 1997) framework on the degenerative effects of target grouping. The social construction of target groups refers to the recognition of shared characteristics that distinguish a target population as socially meaningful (Schneider & Ingram 1993). Key in Schneider and Ingram's theory is that policy design is not a neutral or value free process, but that policy makers constantly choose from a variety of approaches, interpretations and definitions in the targeting of their policy solutions. Policymakers respond to, perpetuate, and help create social constructions of target groups in anticipation of public approval or approbation (Ingram et al. 2007: 106). Schneider and Ingram's theory thus goes beyond the performative effect of targeting and explains how the policy categories stem from public perceptions about perceived groups and how policymakers anticipate on this in policy solution formulation (Schneider and Ingram 1993).

Building from Edelman's (1960) emphasis on symbolism and Lowi's (1972) distinction between distributive, redistributive, regulatory and constituent policy types, Schneider and Ingram distinguish between different policies (benefits and burdens) and different ways of policy *delivery* (overt or sub rosa) as types of policy tools. Schneider and Ingram's framework illustrates *how* and *why* social categories are turned into policy categories, emphasizing the political consideration of legitimation in both the target group and policy tool selection and how this leads to uneven (degenerative) distribution of policy goods, rooted in public perceptions of deservingness. Hereby Schneider and Ingram illustrate how policy distribution is an interplay of the social perceptions and power position of groups in society, rather than their actual needs as it exposes the political logic by which target groups and policy tools are connected, as an essential and interrelated step in the policy solution definition.

Besides the type of policies and different types of target groups, Schneider and Ingram make the distinction between overt and sub-rosa policy delivery, pointing at the room for manoeuvre and the power of ambiguity (Yanow 2003) as a way to accommodate the 'conflictual dimension' of policy solution making (chapter 1, this volume). When targeting negatively perceived, but powerful groups for burdening policies for example they write that these can best be met with 'hollow sanctions' as to not affect the group too much, when targeting this group for beneficial policies on the other hand these are

best ascribed sub-rosa, this way not drawing attention to the resource allocation. Benefits for dependents (weak though positively viewed groups) are considered too costly, instead rhetoric measures are considered the best fit (Schneider and Ingram 1997). Essentially Schneider and Ingram point at the effect of visibility in itself, besides the content of the policy measure, and thereby indicate an important justification strategy in policy solution definition. In this chapter I will focus explicitly on these types of policy delivery as an integral part of the policy solution process.

6.2.2 Non-targeting as a discursive strategy

While Schneider and Ingram, and the majority of studies in this field, focus on different types of target groups and how these are (degeneratively) aligned with dominant group perceptions in society, they *overlook* the question whether targeted policies are the desired policy solution in the first place. Building on the idea of policy delivery, and the distinction between sub-rosa and overt targeting, I argue that we should take non-targeting into account too as an optional policy solution.

The so-called universalist frame is extensively written about in literature on race and social class (Jeffers 1967, Wilson 1987, Katz 1990), mainly in the US in the 1980s and 1990s and migration studies (Alexander 2003, Yanow 2003, De Zwart 2005; Simon and Piché, 2012, Schinkel 2010 and Mügge and van der Haar 2016). Wilson (1987) describes the logic of particularism versus universalism. Based on the principle of self-interest of citizens Wilson writes that the more particular (e.g. targeted) a measure, the less support you can expect for this measure, as fewer people can benefit from it. Vice versa, the more universal a policy is framed the more public support can be expected. Although several authors have nuanced this point (see e.g. Bobo and Kluegel 1993), the consideration of self-interest does raise the question whether targeted policies are (politically) desirable at all. These authors argue that targeted measures always require extra persuasion, convincing those left out not only that the targeted citizens get what he or she deserves but also why this group gets something others do not get.

In migration studies too, the distinction between universalist and targeted policies is debated, and illustrates the normative nature of targeting strategies. Immigrant integration policies focus on the incorporation of migrants in society, speaking directly to questions of identity and boundary making (see e.g. Alexander 2003, Mügge and van der Haar 2016, Schinkel 2010, Yanow 2003). How these immigrants are to be labelled is contested in itself and group-specific, redistributive policies have become even more contested over the last years (Mudde 2013).

In immigrant integration the definition of target groups not only speaks to the perceptions held in society of the groups themselves, but also mirrors the underlying perceptions and models for integration and the society. In the migration literature it is debated whether migrant integration is best promoted by generic policies that are colour-blind, or by policies that separately target specific migrant groups. A dilemma between the risk to maintain or strengthen inequalities in society when specific problems are not met with targeted policies (cf. Simon, 2005; Grigolo, Hermanin & Möschel 2011, Simon and Piché, 2012), and the risk of reinforcing ethnic and cultural boundaries in society through the degenerative effect of targeted policies themselves (cf. Schneider and Ingram, 1997). De Zwart (2005) describes this phenomenon as the 'dilemma of recognition', illustrating the choice between different targeting strategies in the policy

solution process.

This thus goes beyond how policies are distributed but looks at what groups are distinguished in the first place, and why (not), bringing an extra normative dimension to the discussion on target grouping. In this chapter I argue that to understand the policy formulation process it is important to distinguish different targeting strategies in a policy analysis, including the consideration for a universal approach, placing this very distinction between policy targeting and justification more central in our analyses.

6.3 METHODS

This chapter is based on data collected for the European research project ‘Upstream’ on the mainstreaming of migration diversity policies (see also Scholten and van Breugel 2018; Van Breugel and Scholten 2019) and an additional study of Dutch local migration diversity policies (Van Breugel forthcoming). The studies consisted of a combination of policy analysis and interviews with policy makers, focusing on Dutch national and local migration diversity policy making between 2000 and 2018. An analysis of the official policy documents on migration diversity enabled me to identify different targeting strategies and thereby reconstruct (part of) the policy solution formulation process.

At the national and local level (a selection of sixteen cities) I have collected and subsequently selected all the official policy documents (memoranda, policy plans) on migration diversity between respectively 2010-2014 and 2014-2018. As part of the policy analysis different targeting strategies were coded. I started with the distinction between targeted and non-targeted policies, but later inductively identified targeting by proxy, and temporary and combined targeting as targeting strategies too. Additionally interviews with policymakers at the national and local level were conducted to reflect on the process of policy solution formulation and the dilemma’s encountered and strategies that were applied in this process. Below I will first briefly introduce the case of Dutch immigrant integration policies before moving to the policy analysis and interviews with the policy makers.

6.4 TARGETING IN DUTCH IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION POLICY SOLUTION MAKING

While migration policies determine whether someone is allowed to enter or stay in a given territory, immigrant integration policies focus on the subsequent incorporation of migrants in society. These policies can have a spatial, political, socio-economic or cultural focus, and can focus on both recently arrived migrant, longer residing citizens with a migrant background as well as the broader community or society. Examples of such policies are civic integration and language tests for newly arrived migrants, anti-segregation measures or intercultural community programs aimed at developing a shared identity of all neighbourhood citizens. Speaking directly to questions of identity and boundary making, immigrant integration policies are increasingly contested. If the very nature of the policy problem is contested it can be assumed that the formulation

of its policy solutions are not a self-evident or neutral process either. Rather one would expect these disputes to take place in and over the process of policy formulation too. The immigrant integration policies changed rapidly and frequently over the past twenty years. This indeed indicates that the policy solution formulation is not a self-evident process indeed, but rather the outcome of conflict and debate. This makes it an interesting case to study the process of policy formulation.

As of the 1980s Dutch immigrant integration policies were coordinated nationally, from different ministries, such as the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Affairs and (most recently) the Ministry of Social Affairs. Initially Dutch integration policies were focused on preservation of the homeland culture and tended to be group based. The next decade the focus of the policies shifted to integration and adaptation. However informed by the principle of ‘proportionality’ group-specific (mostly targeting ethnic groups), targeting and monitoring played a persistent role in Dutch integration policies up to the early 2000s. At the start of the new millennium the Netherlands departed from its (perceived) multicultural past. In response to (inter-)national events of terrorism the focus of the former facilitating, group oriented integration policies shifted to cultural adaptation. This initiated a further move away from specifically targeted policies, a development that would take different forms in the following years. Specifically targeted policies were problematized, as they were believed to ‘have failed’ and it was no longer considered politically opportune to invest in migrant groups, mirroring the underlying shift in perception of immigrants as ‘undeserving’.

Building on the above, this chapter zooms in specifically on integration policies between 2000 and 2018. In this policy period notable changes in the integration policies are visible. First of all, formerly targeted policies were replaced by generic policies. Between 2000 and 2015 integration policies were largely dismantled, leading to clear taboos that determined at least influences the process of policy solution formulation, illustrating the political dynamics of this process and the anticipation of public approval of policy solutions. After a description of these policy developments and the evolution of the targeting strategies I will present the policy makers’ reflections on the process of policy solution formulation, and policy taboos and alternative strategies in framing policy solutions. Finally then, I will look at the most recent period of policy development. Different forms of ‘sub-rosa’ refugee integration targeting strategies, such as targeting by proxy, and temporary and combined targeting, illustrate how policy makers deal with persisting taboos and seek coalitions to overcome these when faced with sudden external policy challenges, such as the steep increase in the arrival of refugees in the Netherlands.

6.4.1 Move to generic and indirect policies

The policy period between 2000-2015 is marked by a move to generic and indirect policies. This is visible in two developments: the decoupling of integration from policies in generic fields such as housing and education; and the move from targeted to non-targeted or targeting by proxy. While this period was marked by a high prioritisation of immigrant integration on the political and media agenda, policy making on integration to a large extent disappeared. The policy period is marked by letting go of former (benefiting) targeted policies, which are primarily replaced by generic or proxy

policies. So while the framing of integration on the political and media agenda became more explicit, policy making on integration became less explicit.

In the early 2000s a number of incidents nationally and internationally led to the politicisation of the topic. Newly found populist parties such as Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF), Leefbaar Rotterdam and Leefbaar Nederland and the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) placed immigrant integration high on the political agenda, declaring integration as 'failed' and shifting the focus from socio-economic participation to socio-cultural adaptation. The 'guest-workers' that arrived in the Netherlands in the 1960s and 1970s were initially expected to stay in the Netherlands only temporarily and thus the policies that were eventually developed focused on socio-economic participation rather than socio-cultural integration. In fact, policies were targeted at maintaining ties with the home country rather than integration in the Netherlands. Eventually a large share of the 'guest-workers' did stay in the Netherlands and immigration further increased due to family reunification and new flows of refugee migration to the Netherlands in the 1980s and 1990s. Issues of supposed temporary residence transformed into issues of permanent residence, the issue of participation eventually developed in an issue of adaptation. In the early 2000s then the public and political debate shifted the focus to the socio-cultural dimension of integration. While previously left largely unaddressed, immigrant integration now became a matter of socio-cultural adaptation. In 2011 the Cabinet explicitly distanced itself from the its (perceived) multicultural past, stating that *".. integration .. is about integration in Dutch society... Dutch society in all its diversity is the society in which those who come to settle in the Netherlands, have to learn to live, to which they will have to adapt and have to fit in"* (Ministerie BZK, 2011, p.5).

The Dutch government explicitly distanced itself from the former multicultural years of governance, marking a strong decentralisation and 'generalisation' of immigrant integration governance whereby the national government largely withdrew from the field. As of 2011 the national government is only involved with civic integration programs (red. obligatory integration and language programs and exams primarily for new arrivals that were introduced in 2006) right after arrival, while withdrawing from long-term integration goals. While immigrants are expected to assimilate in Dutch society these policies rely mostly on individual responsibility. Integration policies developed away from former group-targeted policies, which were now considered overtly rigid, costly and facilitating. Under the motto 'future over descent' policies come to focus on individuals rather than groups, and policies are from then on *"addressed through generic policies only"* (Ministerie BZK, 2011).

In generic policy fields such as education and neighbourhood policies a development towards indirect targeting is visible too. While the first immigrant integration policies in the Netherlands developed at the neighbourhood level in Rotterdam, this explicit link between housing, neighbourhood policies and integration was gradually decoupled. While dissolving segregation in the neighbourhood remains an undiminished priority throughout the years, it is instead targeted in socio-economic terms addressing deprived neighbourhoods rather than (ethnic)-segregation as a policy goal in itself.

In education a similar trend away from explicit integration policies is recognisable. Policies shifted from a focus on education and anti-segregation to a focus on educational quality alone, decoupling educational policies from integration priorities. In the early 2000s, educational policies were targeted at dissolving the 'educational disadvantage' of students in a vulnerable situation, targeting 'disadvantaged' students with and

without a migration background. In this, a migration background, language command, the broader 'educational context' at home and the approach to the children's development, were considered important factors that can lead to educational disadvantage of students. However in 2003 the abolishment of the group-targeted mother tongue language classes marked the beginning of the decoupling of educational disadvantage programs from migration background and integration in general. While previously the migration background of the student or his/her parents was considered in allocating funding for schools, this was abolished in 2004. Thereby targeted migration-related diversity policies in education were ended and the extra funds for schools were re-allocated to a broader defined target group. From 2006 onwards a further move from targeted to generic policies is visible. Targeting is explicitly abandoned and replaced by a generic focus on quality. As of 2011, the financial structure for schools is adjusted. Instead of targeted financing, schools now receive their funding 'lump sum', meaning that the finances are not earmarked, and the definition of priorities and target groups is decentralised to the schools. These reforms mark a further retrenchment of central state interventions on integration in education.

This generic framing is also apparent at the local level. While previously coordinated from the national level, as of 2011 integration policies are almost completely decentralised to the local level. The decentralisation to the local level was facilitated through the 'Collective Integrated Approach', which facilitated a universalist approach to integration. At the local level integration policies were reframed in generic city citizenship-terms. Policies were no longer targeted on the basis of migrant background but the emphasis shifted to the participation of all citizens in the city. In these developments at both the national and local level the emphasis was strongly focused on the 'generalisation' of policies. In many cities a broader audience is targeted immigrant integration or social inclusion policies, while some cities have explicitly denounced group-based policies altogether. In the end the shift to city-citizenship primarily came to entail a dismantling of targeted integration policies as the sector was subject to retrenchment measures which formed part of larger retrenchment measures in the social sector. This came to entail a withdrawal of the state and a focus on the individual responsibility and self-reliance of citizens. Up to 2015, in many cities integration had thus to a large extent disappeared of the policy agenda altogether.

At the national level the diversion from the perceived multicultural past formed an important driver for the redefinition of integration priorities in a mainstreamed approach. Remarkable in this is the dominant move to generic targeting. Rather than moving from benefiting to burdening integration policies, immigrants as a target group were entirely discarded. Although more obligatory policies were formulated for example in the restricting civic integration programs, notably these were reframed at an individual rather than group level, making the immigrant individually responsible for (financing) their civic integration programs. Group-based targeting as a policy instrument seems to have become a taboo altogether in integration policy making, determining the political dynamics in which the process of policy making takes place. Below I will discuss how this taboo on targeting defines the process of policy solution formulation, through reflections of policy makers at the national and local level.

6.4.2 Dilemmas of recognition

In the interviews with policy makers, both at the national and local level, the stark shift to generic policies is brought up. The shift to generic policies is so strong that policy makers remark that they struggle to address integration altogether. *"It [was] like a dogma, to not have targeted policies"* a policy maker at the Ministry of Social Affairs comments. This perception is also widely shared at the local level, where targeted policies came to be considered a taboo: *"migrant groups were not to be mentioned at all anymore"*. The policy makers all talk about how targeted policies have become hard to justify under the generic framing. While the policy makers in some cases consider targeted policies most fitting to address a very specific policy goal, they describe the pressure to formulate the policies generically at all costs. Targeted policies [for immigrants] are perceived as disproportionately benefitting immigrants over the rest of the population and thus rather than considering the most fitting or efficient policy measure for the issue at hand, the policy makers explicitly take into account the public and political approval to form coalitions to support their policy solution.

While immigrant integration remains explicitly problematised on the political and media agenda, policy makers struggle in binding targeted policy solutions. Several policy makers remark how targeted integration policies are *"hard to sell"*. The policymakers mention different examples of 'failed' 'policy solutions or suggestions that were dismissed because of a lack of public support. A policy maker from the Ministry of Social Affairs for example reflects on the abolishment of ethnic targeting in education. A few years later the Educational Council advised to re-install the targeted policies as some groups were at the risk of falling behind. *"But there is simply no public support for this. This might be based on effectiveness studies, but such an advise will simply not be picked up on. Even if it would work, it goes so much against the current policies, that it won't even be considered. ... Such an advise does not stand a chance in the current political establishment"*. This thus illustrates how policy makers are restricted in their policy formulation, as certain policy options are considered taboo and thus a priori excluded from the 'relevant solutions one can choose from' (chapter 1 this volume). A local policy maker from Rotterdam additionally comments on the Alderman for sustainability and environment that had printed flyers about recycling in different languages after it turned out that certain groups in the city were not reached with the generic communication strategy on recycling. Subsequently this led to a lot of commotion in the city council as targeted policies were to be avoided. To avoid such contestation most policy makers stay away from targeted policies altogether, anticipating the public disapproval of the measures. So while the formulation process might be 'hidden from sight' (chapter 1 this volume),

"Knowledge is not the only factor for policy development. It is also about the ideology from which the politicians operate, by which they have been elected, the sphere and tone of the public domain, the political power, which is more focused on the short term and the political colour of the coalition ... The Minister will not pick it up ... if it does not fit the broader frame and view."

vice versa the 'public eye' proves to be very much present in the process of policy solution formulation – illustrating the political dynamic in which it takes place.

Here a policy maker from the Ministry of Social Affairs explicitly refers to the polit-

ical context in which the policy making takes place and how the political context (and frames) completely determine the ‘what question’ in policy solution formulation.

While these conditions limit the policy making process, policymakers do not simply follow these limitations. Like in the public space, the policymakers themselves also engage with the ‘conflictual dimension’ of policy making. In the interviews several coping strategies were mentioned to deal with the policy taboos. Several policymakers stress the need to ‘frame’ and formulate their policy solutions in a certain way to form broader coalitions. A local policy maker from Rotterdam comments on how programs with a repressive outlook, can be used to include more stimulating and supportive, targeted, policy measures too, *“it just depends on what you mention and where you put the emphasis”*. In this the policymaker explicitly mentions the autonomy of policy makers to navigate the changing political circumstances, finding a balance between the political context and some stability and continuation of policies.

Policy makers furthermore mention strategies of creating (public) support and coalition forming within the public administration. A local policy maker from Amsterdam mentions how operating in such a politicized field requires to constantly *“seek consensus and build support. It requires constantly telling the same stories”*. Besides the politicization the policy makers also operate within a context of retrenchment. *“Within those restrictions you look at the agenda and seek collaborations. ... You look at what is most necessary ... and set up your own agenda”*.

The policy analysis and interviews with policy makers show how policy taboos of targeted integration policies emerged and how policy makers attempt to work with and around these policy taboos when attempting to bind their envisioned policy solution to the policy problem at hand. The analysis shows that while the policy making is more hidden from the public eye than the problem definition stage, the ‘public’ is present in the hidden stage of policy formulation. The reflections of the policy makers clearly show how the policy makers anticipate the public and political approval of the policy solutions by avoiding certain (targeted) measures, or through alternative framing seek the desired coalitions to support their policy solutions. In the final section of this chapter I will give an overview of some additional alternative framing strategies that are applied in binding the policy solutions and problems in the wake of the increased refugee arrival in the Netherlands (and large parts of the world) in the ‘summer of 2015’.

6.4.3 Re-installing (refugee) integration policies locally

While policy solution formulation between 2000-2015 was marked by a move away from targeted policies, in 2015 the increase in the number of refugees arriving in the Netherlands led to a demand for quick policy solutions for the accommodation, housing and integration of refugees. New policies had to be set-up for the refugees while integration policies had been largely dismantled. The policy taboo on targeting (partly) persisted but faced with this new policy problem, a new range of policy solutions comes up to bind these together. In line with the binding strategies the policymakers described in the previous section, local refugee integration policies too show that when faced with a new policy challenge different strategies to bind policy solutions occur. Below I will discuss two framing strategies that stood out in the analysis of the refugee integration policies that were developed in this period.

Firstly, targeted policies are framed as temporary. Several cities emphasize that the

integration programs they set-up for refugees are of a temporary nature only, aimed at the self-sustainability of the refugees. The targeted policy solutions are justified as a temporary investment, necessary to speed up the process of participation and thus for the refugees to become independent of social benefits, as the municipality of Deventer writes explicitly. In fact, in addition to the obligatory national civic integration program extra integration policies are set-up 'to speed up participation'. The municipalities of Houten and Rijswijk for example advocate temporary extra targeted language programs to speed up the process of participation and to avoid an extra burden on regular school classes when refugee students would participate with a language deficit (Rijswijk).

Another strategy is broadening the target group to seek broader coalitions in support of the policy solutions, in this case combining the targeting of migrant and non-migrants groups. Whilst the targeted policies above were framed as benefiting all, by speeding up participation and thereby avoiding extra costs, the second observed strategy entails broadening (or justifying) the target group for the policies altogether. In Tilburg and Houten for example facilities for refugees are explicitly accessible to other groups (e.g. job seekers or welfare recipients) too, attempting to increase the public support for inter alia refugee integration measures. The cities emphasize the accessibility of these facilities for non-immigrant citizens or emphasize the need to maintain public support for these measures. With refugee housing for example, several municipalities connect this to a wider target group by drawing attention to the pressure on the housing market in general, again linking immigrant integration measures to public support.

The above shows how policy makers 'redefine' the policy problem by seeking broad coalitions in favour of their proposed policy solution, by broadening the very subject of the policies or justifying these as temporary. In contrast to the policy trend between 2000-2015 in which targeted policies were considered a taboo altogether, in the policies of 2015 the perceived need to act is balanced with the persistent taboos, balancing between targeting and justifying these measures under broader or temporary framing. In some cases this now even means *extra* investment in language classes for example, though justified as temporary investments or serving a broader group than the refugees alone. These 'justification' strategies can be considered policy solution 'binding' strategies too.

6.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown the political dynamics of the policy solution process in Dutch immigrant integration policies. It illustrated how a reconsideration of immigrants as 'undeserving' led to a trend of generic policies, and how this taboo on targeted policies determines the policy formulation process. It shows how policy makers anticipate the public approval of their proposed policy solutions, and how certain (targeted) policy alternatives are excluded from this a-priori. However, the policy makers also engage with the 'conflictual dimension' of policy making, reframing their policies to seek broader coalitions in support of their proposed policy solutions. The different discursive strategies illustrate the interplay between *policy targeting* and *justification* in policy solution formulation, navigating contestation, both within the administration as in the broader

public debate. This chapter calls to consider targeting an essential element of policy formulation, and to explicitly take non-targeting or sub-rosa strategies into account too as coalition strategies.

CHAPTER **SEVEN**

Conclusion

In this thesis I have studied the decentred approach to immigrant integration governance to understand why and how policies are decentred, and to uncover the implications of taking a decentred approach within a complex and contested policy case, such as immigrant integration. While many studies in public administration have focused on decentred forms of governance, they mostly focus on managerial or coordination aspects. This dissertation contributes to the literature by moving beyond the coordination of governance to study both the coordination and content of a decentred governance approach. I have found that there is a risk that a decentred governance approach within a complex *and* contested context will succumb to an evasive strategy, watering down a policy topic rather than embedding it integrally, or addressing its contestedness. This study contributes to an understanding of how such a decentred integration governance approach is shaped in multiple settings, between ministries at the national level and between different cities and departments at the local level. I will first answer the research question before addressing some of the overarching conclusions of this thesis, followed by a discussion of the limitations of the study and recommendations for future research.

7.1 ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The research question addressed in this thesis is:

How and why is immigrant integration governance decentred and what are the implications of this decentred approach?

The research question was broken down into three sub questions which will be answered on the basis of the empirical studies referred to in the preceding chapters.

- *Why is immigrant integration governance decentred?*
- *How is decentred immigrant integration governance shaped?*
- *What are the implications of decentred immigrant integration governance?*

7.1.1 Why is immigrant integration governance decentred?

The first two studies look at the drivers for a decentring integration governance. Addressing the first research question “*Why is immigrant integration governance decentred?*” Chapter two assessed the extent to which governance is decentred to accommodate the increasing diversity that characterizes the cases in France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The study finds that the complexity behind immigrant integration is hardly addressed as a motivation for decentring immigrant integration. Rather, economic and political motives for decentring were prominent in all three examined cases. While conceptually, mainstreaming as a broad, embedded governance approach is well suited to addressing the increased complexity of immigrant integration, this connection is absent in the practical implementation of migration diversity governance in the cases studied.

In Chapter three, Dutch and Flemish educational policies on migration diversity are compared to further analyze the drivers for decentring integration governance. This study assesses how integration governance is embedded horizontally in the field of education. Marked by similar levels of politicization, the comparative study illustrates that the diverging degree of retrenchment can be explained by the presence of sub-state nationalism in Flanders and the strong influence of a neoliberal approach to migration diversity in the Dutch political context. In the Dutch case this led to a withdrawal of government steering on integration in education, as neither explicitly targeting nor funding integration were considered politically opportune.

While the first study illustrated how decentring is used to circumvent the dilemma of recognition in France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, the second study highlights that this, in combination with retrenchment policies, is leading to a further withdrawal of government steering on integration. In answer to the first research question “*Why is immigrant integration governance decentred?*” these studies point to a combination of politicization and retrenchment as drivers for decentring immigrant integration governance, rather than the complexity of immigrant integration as visible particularly in the Dutch case.

7.1.2 How is decentred immigrant integration governance shaped?

Chapters four and five focus on the second research question “*How is decentred immigrant integration governance shaped?*” Bringing together the content and coordination side of decentred governance, Chapter four assesses mainstreaming as an integral governance strategy for immigrant integration in France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The study shows that faced with the complexity and contestation of integration governance, policies seem unable to develop a coordinated polycentric approach such as an ideal-typical mainstreaming approach. Rather than an integrated approach, the decentred approach to immigrant integration governance has led to further fragmentation in all three countries due to the lack of any clear prioritization of the approach. In particular in the Dutch and French case, horizontal coordination structures tend to be weak or absent and policies were increasingly targeted by proxy, only indirectly targeting integration and people with a migrant background.

This has led to a fragmented, proxy approach to immigrant integration. The politicized debates around integration seem incompatible with mainstreaming as there is no room to prioritize integration as an encompassing concern across society and its citizens. Explicitly targeted policies are not considered politically opportune; instead policies are formulated indirectly and targeted by proxy. In Chapter six, I zoom in on how Dutch policymakers at the national and local level struggle with these evasive strategies and the taboo on targeted policies. Even when policymakers considered targeted policies the most suitable for addressing a specific policy goal, they described the pressure to formulate the policies generically at all costs.

Chapter five looks at the local development of immigrant integration policies in the Netherlands to further analyse the vertical decentralization of immigrant integration governance. While the preceding studies looked at immigrant integration governance at both the national and local level, this study specifically looks at the broader local level of immigrant integration governance, studying sixteen local cases in the Netherlands. What stands out from this study first, is that ‘mainstreaming’ is also a dominant trend

locally. This was particularly the case in 2014, when only four out of the sixteen cities had dedicated integration policies, while all of the other cities used a mainstreamed approach. As at the national level, explicit integration or diversity policies no longer exist in most cities and integration issues are addressed primarily as part of generic policy programs, if they are addressed at all.

The increased influx of refugees in the summer of 2015 led to a demand for swift governance responses in order to house and integrate the refugees. This was a recalibration moment in which integration policies were reinstalled in many cities. The study shows that cities did this differently, illustrating a range of local approaches. Based on an inductive study of local policies, I distinguish pro-active and reactive cities. While the latter only developed or redeveloped integration policies in response to specific policy challenges, such as housing refugees, or in response to national guidelines on anti-discrimination, the first group of cities pro-actively developed integration policies around a self-selected theme, with a diversity agenda for the city or integrated anti-polarization programs.

In answer to the research question *“How is decentred immigrant integration governance shaped?”*, my studies of national and local immigrant integration governance show that this is done in a fragmented manner. With weak or absent coordination structures and lacking any clear prioritization of integration, policies at the national level were split up into separate measures, operating mostly by proxy. At the local level the variety of approaches between the different cities is evident. While national taboos were reproduced locally, some cities set up an embedded diversity program. This illustrates that when linked to a clear frame, decentred policies can also be developed as an embedded approach.

7.1.3 What are the implications of a decentred immigrant integration governance?

The final research question *‘What are the implications of a decentred immigrant integration governance?’* is addressed throughout the various chapters. As described above, immigrant integration governance has become increasingly fragmented and indirect. Characterized by a withdrawing state, it does not clearly embed immigrant integration in other domains or levels of government. While on the one hand integration policies are being watered down, on the other hand immigrant integration continues to feature prominently in political and public debates, as the contestation around integration is left largely unaddressed. Building on this, Chapter six explicitly illustrates how policymakers engage with the dilemmas and taboos of the decentred integration governance approach. Their reflections illustrate the one-sided focus on moving away from targeted policies. The shift to generic policies has been so pronounced that policymakers struggle to address integration at all. Targeted policies in any shape or form have become a taboo. Rather than taking an embedded approach to integration, migrant groups are not to be mentioned at all anymore. Policymakers talked about the pressure they are under to formulate policies generically at all costs, even when considering policies targeted at a specific migrant group or when they thought it necessary to address integration explicitly. Targeted policies are perceived as disproportionately benefitting immigrants over the rest of the population and are therefore a policy taboo.

In answer to the research question *‘What are the implications of a decentred immi-*

grant integration governance?” the studies in this thesis show how in the case of immigrant integration a decentred governance approach has led to fragmented and indirect policies and non-policies. Policymakers either succumb to evasive strategies to avoid the contestation around integration and stay away from targeted policies altogether, or resort to indirectly targeted policies, framed in a way that enables the formation of broader coalitions. These dilemmas at the microlevel are illustrative of the broader dilemma of recognition engrained in the tension between politicization on the one hand and government withdrawal on the other hand, in which the governance of immigrant integration is positioned. In the following section I will discuss the further implications of this situation.

7.2 THREE MAIN CONCLUSIONS

7.2.1. Conditions for successful mainstreaming

In this thesis I found that mainstreaming is failing as a decentred strategy in immigrant integration governance. Due to the contestedness of immigrant integration, policies are failing to address and embed integration integrally. Instead, it leads to fragmentation and indirect, proxy approaches to evade the complexity and contestation surrounding this topic, resulting in a watering down of integration policies. Based on my findings I have defined a range of conditions for successful mainstreaming, contributing to both the mainstreaming literature and the broader public administration literature by illustrating the importance of policy contestation in shaping governance approaches.

Building on the literature of gender, educational, disability and environmental mainstreaming (see e.g. Booth and Bennett, 2002; Priestley and Roulstone, 2009; Semmel, Gottlieb and Robinson, 1979), I define mainstreaming as a policy strategy to abandon group-specific policies and integrate a topical priority – such as gender, disability or environmental concerns – as an integral part of all generic policies domains. In the literature on mainstreaming, authors warn that without a clear agenda or political commitment mainstreaming tends towards a technocratic bias (Caglar 2013; Meier and Celis 2011 and Nunan et al. 2012). Mainstreaming is furthermore critiqued for the vagueness of the concept and its objectives, and the risk of ‘becoming everyone’s responsibility, yet nobody’s at the same time’, thereby risking depoliticization and watering down of the transformational potential of [gender] mainstreaming (Caglar, 2013, 340). At the national level my studies show that without clear prioritization and political commitment, mainstreaming tends to result in a fragmented approach to integration. Rather than embedding integration priorities across different policy fields, which is the core of mainstreaming, it leads to a superficial or incomplete form of mainstreaming (cf. Westerveen and Adam 2019). Incomplete mainstreaming is not only due to a lack of economic and political support: based on the studies in this thesis, I argue that mainstreaming is actually applied as a way to *evade* politicization and the dilemma of recognition (de Zwart 2005), by outsourcing policy responsibilities to other departments and levels of government (cf. Scholten 2020).

Part of the literature on mainstreaming focuses on power relations, and warns against the dilution of policy priorities in a mainstreamed context due to an unclear

embedding of the policy topic or accompanying policy responsibilities. However, the contested case of integration governance shows that mainstreaming is also applied as an evasive strategy to avoid addressing a contested topic. Instead of being used to 'fundamentally challenge' integration, it is used to circumvent it. Mainstreaming as an evasive strategy fails, as it reinforces rather than overcomes the dilemma of recognition, given the dogmatic focus on a non-targeted approach as is evident in particular in the Dutch and French case.

As the mainstreaming approach in the Netherlands also entailed a shift to the local level, I looked further into the variety of local approaches to integration in Chapter five. While contestation and indirect policymaking play a role in many of the cities I studied, I also found examples of more embedded and direct approaches to integration and diversity. First of all, the study showed that the nationally propagated shift to a generic, horizontally dispersed approach to integration was effective at the local level. In 2014 most municipalities had abandoned explicit integration policies and were addressing migration diversity indirectly, as part of other policies and across different policy domains. An integrated, cross-sectional policy strategy emerged in some of the studied cities. These were framed differently, varying between generic participation programs, diversity agendas and embedded refugee integration or anti-polarization programs. While the cities also struggled with the contestedness of migration diversity, as was made apparent in indirect forms of targeting, cities that chose a clear frame for their migration diversity policies managed to set up an embedded set of policies. Examples include a diversity agenda, or more indirectly a participation or anti-polarization program. While the cities chose different framings, the explicit choice for a policy frame, seemed vital to the implementation of an embedded policy approach.

The studies at national level, in particular in the Dutch and French case, showed that mainstreaming was incomplete, as it did not manage to address or overcome the politicized context in which it took place, but was instead used to depoliticize immigrant integration. At the local level, on the other hand, it is exactly the local variation, the local politicization you could say, that allows for an embedded approach. The cities that chose an explicit theme or label, be it diversity, anti-polarization or participation, managed to coherently link integration policies across different policy domains. The cities that chose a clear approach to integration showed how this enabled the political commitment that a mainstreamed approach requires. While mainstreaming at the national level seems to fail when applied as a depoliticizing and evasive strategy, at the local level some cities have shown that by politicizing and explicitly positioning themselves around their own integration frame, such as anti-discrimination or diversity, they were able to successfully develop an embedded, mainstreamed, integration approach.

7.2.2 Local variation – arguing against the local dimension

The study of migration diversity governance at the local level illustrates a variety of local approaches. In contrast to studies on decentralization in other policy fields, I argue that in the case of immigrant integration governance, variation in governance approaches is visible at the local level. Even though some of the national taboos are reproduced at the local level, policies are also redefined locally. As described above, in contrast to the national level, some of the local cases also managed to develop an embedded mainstreamed approach to integration. Both reproduction and innovation at the local level

are a consequence of the broader dilemma of recognition (de Zwart 2005) engrained in the tension between politicization on the one hand and government withdrawal on the other hand, which goes hand-in-hand with the decentering of immigrant integration.

While some cities explicitly and proactively framed universalist or inclusive policies, other cities only developed or redeveloped integration policies in response to external events, such as the increased influx of refugees in the summer of 2015. This illustrates the range of local migration diversity policies, and thus argues against one 'local dimension' as positioned in the migration- (Caponio and Borkert 2010; Poppelaars and Scholten 2008; Bak Jørgensen 2012) and public administration literature (O'Toole 2000). The local study in this thesis also invalidates the claim of the 'pragmatic' local level, as it shows that cities position their own framing of migration diversity (cf. Belabas 2020). Rather than pragmatic problem-coping strategies, each city chose its own framing, explicitly positioning itself and its view on integration or migration diversity in an integrated equal opportunities approach or society-wide anti-polarization framework (cf. Schiller 2015).

I have inductively identified different types of policy responses amongst the cities, distinguishing between what I label as 'proactive pluralist', 'proactive monist', 'reactive embedded' and 'reactive one-domain' approaches. These clusters of cities show that we need to move beyond the binary division between large and small cities to understand the diversity of local migration policymaking, as the clusters are made up of a variety of small and large cities. My findings reject the claim that larger cities are more open and accommodating to migration than smaller cities (see e.g. Alexander 2003; Penninx et al. 2004; Poppelaars and Scholten 2008; Caponio and Borkert 2010; Scholten 2013). In fact, the cluster of pro-active pluralist cities with an explicit diversity agenda consists of a combination of mid-sized cities and smaller cities, while the largest cities have a remarkably assimilationist approach.

My findings also argue against the decentralization literature which finds that despite decentralization, local authorities tend to operate in a rather homogeneous manner. I argue that the contested nature of integration policies sets this field apart from the other studies on decentralization. Several studies in the decentralization literature show that due to, *inter alia*, risk-averse behaviour and horizontal policy networks (Jans 2015) or the continued influence of national level framing and regulating (Kazcpov 2010 in Andriotti et al. 2011, p. 1936), local policy innovation shows little variety (see also Denters et al. 1999; Gilsing 2005). In contrast to existing decentralization studies, I argue that the decentering of migration diversity governance leads to a variety of local approaches. This heterogeneity of local approaches stems from the lack of national framing and regulation, since decentering is applied as an evasive strategy to delegate a contested policy topic to lower levels of government.

7.2.3. Indirect targeting as a discursive strategy

As the studies in this thesis have illustrated, targeting is a crucial dimension of immigrant integration governance, and the decentering of immigrant integration policies go hand-in-hand with a shift towards a generic reframing of formerly targeted integration policies. Speaking directly to questions of identity and boundary making (see e.g. Alexander 2003, Mügge and van der Haar 2016, Schinkel 2010), the 'dilemma of recognition' (de Zwart 2005) is at the core of immigrant integration governance. The studies

in this thesis have shown that mainstreaming in immigrant integration has entailed a shift away from targeted policies. Instead, indirect forms of targeting have been introduced that only address integration or migrant groups by proxy or under broader, more generic, headers. The literature on targeting illustrates the performative and degenerative effects of targeting (Schneider and Ingram 1997; De Zwart 2005), but most studies focus on explicit forms of targeting. The findings of this study, however, illustrate the importance of also taking indirect forms of targeting into account.

This goes beyond how policies are distributed, and looks at what groups are distinguished in the first place, and why (or why not). The studies in this thesis have shown that besides decentring, indirect forms of targeting are applied as evasive strategies. Non-targeting and indirect targeting strategies are applied at both the national and local level. At the national level, governments have very explicitly moved away from targeting and now only target integration and people with a migrant background indirectly. Rather than facing and addressing the complexity of integration governance, the analyzed policies seem to avoid addressing integration altogether. At the local level, some cities have explicitly distanced themselves from former targeted integration policies, applying a universalist frame instead. Furthermore, various indirect targeting strategies can be distinguished, such as framing targeted policies as being temporary or also open to other target groups. Several cities, for example, emphasized that the integration programs they set up for refugees are of a temporary nature only, and are aimed at making the refugees self-supporting in the long-term. Furthermore, non-migrant citizens are also explicitly targeted, making public support an explicit goal of the policies. These indirect forms of targeting illustrate the difference between policy targeting and justification (Sniderman et al. 1996 and Wilson 1987). Groups are targeted indirectly, or by proxy as a way to avoid the 'dilemma of recognition' in integration governance. This shows the importance of taking indirect forms of targeting as a discursive strategy into account.

7.3 DECENTRED GOVERNANCE IN A COMPLEX AND CONTESTED POLICY CASE

This thesis shows that while immigrant integration governance is addressed through decentred governance, it fails to address and engage with the complexity and contestation of immigrant integration. While conceptually, a decentred governance approach lends itself well to addressing the increased complexity of immigrant integration, this dissertation shows that policy contestation obstructs the development of an embedded governance approach. Rather than engaging with this complexity, evasive strategies are applied. Due to a lack of prioritization and coordination, the decentred policies came to entail dissolving former policies without clearly embedding them in other domains or levels of government, leading to a watering down of integration policies.

While decentred governance is often perceived as the answer to the steering of complex cases, this thesis shows that there is a real risk that contestation over the policy problem and policy solutions risks will instead lead to evasive governance. Horizontally, policies are poorly embedded, and decentring seems to be more focused on dissolving former (targeted) policies, without integrating these 'in the mainstream'. At the vertical

dimension, local innovation does take place, but only to a limited extent, as national taboos are reproduced in many cities, limiting the room for local innovation.

Watering down integration policies leads to a neglect of policy steering on integration. The decentred approach is failing as a transformative strategy to integrally embed integration, or even address the complexity and contestedness of the policy topic. The responsibility to integrate is being decentred to partner departments or ministries and local governments, but due to the reproduction of national taboos these responsibilities are only being met to a limited extent. Without engaging with this, the problematization of integration is left unanswered. The public and political debate on integration is becoming increasingly restrictive and demanding, yet integration policies are indirect and evasive.

This study illustrates that despite the strong emphasis on decentred forms of governance in the literature, we should be critical of this trend as effective, embedded governance cannot be assumed. Rather, a contested policy context increases the risk of evasive strategies that circumvent both the complexity and contestation of the policy issue. It is thus important to take the coordination as well as the content of policies, and contestation over the policy explicitly into account, both in policy development and policy research. Rather than assume that decentred governance solves contestation, this thesis has shown that policy options for decentred governance are in fact limited due to the perpetuation, wholly or in part, of policy taboos and dilemmas.

7.4 LIMITATIONS

This thesis focuses on the decentred governance of immigrant integration. I have studied this topic primarily through policy analysis, supplemented by interviews with policymakers. This entails several important demarcations of the scope of the research. First of all, the research focuses on the phase in which policy is developed 'on paper'. Policies can change significantly in the implementation phase, and for a full understanding of policies and their implications, it is essential to also study policy implementation. However, I argue that the policy development phase is also a relevant topic to study in order to gain insight into how governments perceive and deal with migration diversity in their national or local community. In doing so, policy-makers, quite similar to street-level bureaucrats, have room for manoeuvre for shaping policy. As I have shown in this dissertation, these policymakers actively balance political and policy interests in this process, trying to formulate what they consider as suitable policy solutions within the given restrictions. As such, the study of policymaking and policy analysis as a study of policy output is an insightful exercise in meaning making.

Secondly, while applying a governance perspective my study only focuses on actors within the government. In future research the role of other actors, such as migrant organizations or other civil society actors as well as private actors, such as the civic integration schools that have been in charge of civic integration courses and exams in the Netherlands for the past seven years, should also be taken into account. This could lead to a broader understanding of the full scope of immigrant integration governance. I would argue that in the cases studied, the role of most of these actors had been severely diminished due to retrenchment and the backlash against targeted policies. Neverthe-

less, it would be interesting to study how these actors have (or have not) continued to shape immigrant integration governance under these changing circumstances. Furthermore, I would argue that it is also valuable to apply the governance lens *within* the government, given the multiplicity of actors and departments, and as I have shown, their different ways of operating.

Thirdly, this thesis focuses on immigrant integration governance as a complex and contested case of governance. Although I studied how integration is embedded in other policy domains, such as education, the studies in this thesis are all restricted to integration governance. For future research it would be interesting to compare integration governance to decentred governance in other contested policy cases, to see in how far these dynamics apply in different policy contexts.

7.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Building on the findings and limitations of my study I will now discuss avenues for future research. My study of local level immigrant integration governance illustrates the variety of local approaches to integration as well as the limitations municipalities face in formulating their local policies within the confinements of the national narrative and taboos. Further research is necessary to obtain a better understanding of what drives policymaking in these different local contexts and to explain the different clusters of local migration diversity approaches I have identified. How come such seemingly different cities come up with similar policy approaches? Why do some cities proactively define their own framework for integration and migration diversity, while other cities only follow national directions when developing their local integration policies? What drives policymaking in these different local contexts? Furthermore, while the research in this dissertation focuses on the decentred governance of integration from the perspective of policymaking, in future research this could be compared and contrasted to the *implementation* of integration governance. Furthermore, future research should focus on the broader range of governmental and non-governmental actors involved in the process of integration governance, adding to a broader picture of the multiple contexts in which integration governance takes place, as this is one of the central premises of this thesis.

Immigrant integration governance as a contested case of policymaking, illustrates the importance of a critical analysis of both policy content and coordination. Coordination structures tend to be weak, due to the politicized nature of the policies. In combination with indirect forms of policies, this can lead to a watering down of integration altogether. The contestedness of integration thereby obstructs the transformative potential of mainstreaming, as decentred governance strategies lead to evasive rather than embedded policies. Mainstreaming here fails as a strategy to overcome this contestedness, instead perpetuating the gap between policy and politics by leaving the problematization of integration in the political and public debate largely unanswered. Future research is necessary in order to understand the mechanism of local policy innovation on the one hand and the reproduction of national taboos on the other hand.

Building on the qualitative comparative approach applied in this thesis I would advocate a mixed-methods approach to study the governance of integration in different

local contexts in parallel. A qualitative in-depth study on the drivers behind the decentred integration approaches combined with a broader quantitative assessment of the various forms of decentred governance in a large number of cases, would contribute not only to a better understanding of the different types of local integration approaches, but would also contribute to a better understanding of policymaking in general as it would allow for a comparison between the different policy contexts in which this takes place. This would lead to more insight into the extent to which local demographic or political contexts, or perhaps completely different conditions, matter in local policymaking. The types of local migration diversity policies I have inductively identified in Chapter five of this study can provide an analytical framework and starting point for further research on the variation in local migration diversity policies.

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ABOUT **THE AUTHOR**

Ilona van Breugel (1988) studied Anthropology at the Radboud University in Nijmegen. After finishing her bachelor degree in 2010, she successfully completed a master's degree in Anthropology and Law at the London School of Economics. After her graduation she did an internship at The Dutch Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs (Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken, ACVZ) and started as a PhD candidate at the department of Public Administration and Sociology at the Erasmus University Rotterdam in 2014. In November and December 2019 Ilona joined the Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies at Universität Osnabrück as a visiting researcher.

Ilona's research focuses on decentered forms of immigrant integration governance. During her PhD Ilona worked on two comparative European research projects. Project Upstream (funded by the European Integration Fund) on mainstreaming in immigrant integration governance and project Volpower (funded by the Asylum and Migrant Integration Fund) on youth volunteering as a mechanism for social inclusion. In both projects she worked as a researcher and project manager. Besides these research projects Ilona taught several bachelor and master courses at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. In particular, she was actively involved in the launch and coordination of the 'Governance of Migration and Diversity' master program, a collaboration between Leiden University, Delft University of Technology and Erasmus University Rotterdam.

Over the course of her PhD, Ilona has presented her work at different international conferences and was invited as a speaker to a number of public events. Ilona published her work in international peer-reviewed journals in public administration and migration studies, such as *Policy and Politics*, *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis* and *Comparative Migration Studies*. Furthermore she published an edited volume (together with Peter Scholten) on mainstreaming with Palgrave Macmillan. She also contributed to a number of edited books, and Dutch academic and non-academic outlets such as a publication for The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR).

As of September 2020 Ilona works as a lecturer and researcher in Urban Planning at the Hogeschool Rotterdam.

NEDERLANDSE **SAMENVATTING**

In 2015 zagen gemeenten door heel Nederland zich plots geconfronteerd met een grote vraag naar de opvang van asielzoekers. Het integratiebeleid was de afgelopen jaren juist uitgebouwd en lokale overheden zagen zich nu genoodzaakt snelle en creatieve oplossingen te bedenken voor (nood)opvang, en later voor de huisvesting en integratie van vluchtelingen. De ad-hoc-organisatie van deze maatregelen leidde echter ook tot publieke onrust door het hele land. Dit werd gekenmerkt door protestacties bij (beoogde) locaties voor asielzoekerscentra en drukbezochte inspraakavonden bij de gemeenten. Aan de andere kant verenigden zich ook mensen met acties om de asielzoekers te verwelkomen in hun gemeente.

Deze voorbeelden illustreren het omstreden en veranderlijke karakter van integratiebeleid. In verschillende Europese landen is een trend richting een 'gedecentreerde' aanpak van integratie zichtbaar. Dat wil zeggen dat de beleidsverantwoordelijkheid voor integratie zowel verticaal (naar lokale overheden, ook wel 'decentralisatie') als horizontaal (over verschillende departementen en ministeries) gespreid wordt. Dit betekent dat we dus niet meer kunnen spreken van 'het integratiebeleid' van een land, maar dat dit op veel verschillende plekken vormgegeven wordt. Hoe wordt het integratiebeleid dan vormgegeven op deze verschillende plekken? Hierop bestaat geen pasklaar antwoord. Integratiebeleid richt zich van oudsher op het 'integreren' van immigrantengroepen in een samenleving. Maar wie deze groepen dan zijn, op welke manier integratie vormgegeven 'moet' worden, of wat precies de samenleving vormt waarin men wordt geacht te integreren is constant onderwerp van discussie. Dit heeft enerzijds te maken met de veranderende samenstelling van Europese samenlevingen, waarvan migratiediversiteit een steeds groter onderdeel uitmaakt. Anderzijds is het debat over integratie sinds begin jaren 2000 onder steeds meer politieke druk komen te staan. Het voormalige multiculturele beleid werd mislukt verklaard en integratiebeleid dat specifiek gericht was op immigranten werd in de ban gedaan (zie o.a. Essed & Nimako, 2006). Terwijl de beleidsverantwoordelijk voor integratie dus steeds breder gespreid wordt is de manier waarop integratiebeleid vormgegeven moet worden tegelijkertijd steeds heviger onderwerp van discussie geworden.

In dit proefschrift bestudeer ik hoe en waarom integratiebeleid gedecentreerd wordt en wat de implicaties van zo'n gedecentreerde aanpak zijn. Hoewel er veel bestuurskundig onderzoek is gedaan naar gedecentreerde vormen van beleid, richten deze studies zich met name op de coördinatie en management van gedecentreerd bestuur, zonder daarbij in te gaan op de inhoudelijke consequenties van gedecentreerd beleid. In dit proefschrift bestudeer ik zowel de coördinatie als de inhoudelijke kant van gedecentreerd beleid aan de hand van het begrip 'mainstreaming' als integrale beleidsstrategie. Op basis van vijf empirische studies naar integratiebeleid in Frankrijk, Nederland, Vlaanderen (België) en het Verenigd Koninkrijk, laat dit proefschrift de tekortkomingen van een gedecentreerde beleidsstrategie zien. Vanwege het omstreden karakter van integratie leidt een gedecentreerde beleidsstrategie namelijk tot fragmentatie en indirect beleid.

Beantwoording van de onderzoeksvragen

In hoofdstuk twee van dit proefschrift gaat ik in op de vraag in hoeverre het mainstreamen van integratiebeleid wordt toegepast in reactie op de toenemende diversiteit van de samenleving in Frankrijk, Nederland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk. De studie laat zien dat de toenemende diversiteit nauwelijks wordt geadresseerd en dat daarentegen econo-

mische en politieke motieven een prominente rol spelen in de motivatie voor het gedecentreerde beleid. In hoofdstuk drie heb ik het Nederlandse en Vlaamse educatiebeleid met betrekking tot migratiediversiteit vergeleken om de horizontale inbedding van integratiebeleid te analyseren. Hier blijkt het substaatsnationalisme in Vlaanderen de belangrijkste verklaring te zijn voor het verschil in het beleid met Nederland. Hoewel de Nederlandse casus vooral in het teken staat van de ontmanteling van het voormalige integratiebeleid leidt het substaatsnationalisme in Vlaanderen juist tot een explicietere menging van de Vlaamse overheid op het gebied van integratie.

In hoofdstuk vier laat ik zien hoe het integratiebeleid in Frankrijk, Nederland en Verenigd Koninkrijk vooral indirect vormgegeven wordt. In plaats van een integrale aanpak leidt het gedecentreerde beleid tot een verdere fragmentatie, doordat een duidelijke prioritering en inbedding van het integratiebeleid ontbreken. Horizontale coördinatiestructuren blijken zwak of helemaal afwezig en beleid richt zich slechts nog indirect op integratie en migrantengroepen. In hoofdstuk vijf ga ik verder in op de verticale dimensie van het gedecentreerde integratiebeleid aan de hand van een studie van zestien Nederlandse steden. Hoewel nationale taboes deels worden gereproduceerd op lokaal niveau, leidt lokale innovatie tot een breed scala aan beleidsaanpakken, variërend van indirect en tijdelijk participatiebeleid tot expliciete diversiteitsagenda's. De diversiteit in het lokale beleid illustreert het heterogene karakter van het lokale beleidsniveau.

In hoofdstuk zes ga ik, tenslotte, verder in op de manier waarop Nederlandse beleidsmakers omgaan met de taboes en dilemma's in het vormgeven van gedecentreerd integratiebeleid. De reflecties van beleidsmakers illustreren de eenzijdige focus op de ontwikkeling richting generiek beleid. Doelgroepenbeleid wordt hierin als disproportioneel in het voordeel van immigranten gezien en vormt zodoende een taboe. In plaats van een ingebedde aanpak van integratie, leidt het beleid in deze gedecentreerde context er vooral toe dat migrantengroepen helemaal niet meer genoemd worden. Beleidsmakers blijven zodoende helemaal weg van doelgroepenbeleid of wenden indirecte strategieën aan waarin ze het beleid onder een generiek raamwerk formuleren om een breder draagvlak voor het beleid te creëren. Deze dilemma's van de beleidsmakers zijn illustratief voor het 'dilemma van herkenning' (de Zwart 2005), dat centraal staat in de spanning tussen de politisering van integratie aan de ene kant en het terugtrekken van de overheid aan de andere kant.

Voorwaarden voor succesvol mainstreamen

Op basis van bovenstaande bevindingen over het gedecentreerde integratiebeleid formuleer ik verschillende voorwaarden voor succesvol mainstreaming. Ik definieer mainstreaming als een beleidsstrategie gericht op de *generieke en inclusieve adoptie van integratieprioriteiten in diverse beleidsdomeinen*. De studies in dit proefschrift illustreren dat zonder duidelijke prioritering en politiek draagvlak, gedecentreerd beleid dreigt te leiden tot fragmentatie. In plaats van het 'in de mainstream brengen' van integratie leidt de decentrerende van integratiebeleid slechts tot zeer beperkte vormen van mainstreaming. Op basis van mijn bevindingen betoog ik dat hier niet alleen sprake is van een beperkte vorm van mainstreaming, maar dat mainstreaming juist expliciet wordt aangewend om de politisering rondom integratie en de dilemma's rond het benoemen van doelgroepen te vermijden. Dat gebeurt door het uitbesteden van verantwoordelijkheden naar andere beleidsdepartementen en andere beleidsniveaus, zonder duidelijke agenda of verantwoordelijkheden. Op lokaal niveau zijn er wel voorbeelden

van succesvol mainstreaming. De steden die hun integratiebeleid formuleerden rond een expliciet thema zoals inclusieve arbeidsmarkt, anti-polarisatie of een diversiteit-sagenda slaagden er in integraal beleid te formuleren. Op het lokale niveau was het dus juist de duidelijke positionering die sommige steden innamen wat leidde tot een duidelijk ingebed en gemainstreamed beleid.

Lokale variëteit, een argument tegen 'de' lokale dimensie

De studie van integratiebeleid op lokaal niveau laat een grote variëteit aan lokale beleidsaanpakken zien. Hoewel sommige nationale taboes op lokaal niveau worden gereproduceerd, vindt er binnen deze kaders toch ook lokale beleidsinnovatie plaats. Dit illustreert de variëteit aan lokaal integratiebeleid en verwerpt het idee van 'één lokale dimensie' zoals vaak beschreven in de literatuur (O'Toole 2000, Caponio and Borkert 2010; Poppelaars en Scholten 2008; Bak Jørgensen 2012). Op basis van mijn onderzoek onderscheid ik inductief verschillende typen beleidsreacties van de steden: 'pro-actief gericht op een plurale samenleving', 'pro-actief gericht op aanpassing', 'reactief en ingebed' en 'reactief en één domein'. Mijn bevindingen verwerpen de claim dat grote steden opener en meer faciliterend zouden zijn ten opzichte van migratie dan kleine steden (zie bijvoorbeeld Alexander 2003; Penninx et al. 2004; Poppelaars en Scholten 2008; Caponio en Borkert 2010; Scholten 2013). Het cluster van pro-actieve steden gericht op een plurale samenleving wordt juist gevormd door een selectie van middelgrote en kleine steden (zoals Groningen en Weert), terwijl de grote steden een opvallend assimilationistisch karakter hebben.

Verschiedende studies in de decentralisatie literatuur laten zien dat door onder meer risicomijdend gedrag, horizontale beleidsnetwerken (Jans 2015) en de invloed vanuit nationale 'framing' en regelgeving (Kazcpov 2010 in Andriotti et al 2011, p. 1936), lokale beleidsinnovatie vaak weinig variëteit laat zien (zie ook Denters et al. 1999; Gilsing 2005). Ik betoog dat, in tegenstelling tot deze studies, lokaal integratiebeleid juist illustreert dat wanneer beleid gedecentreerd wordt als 'ontwijkende' strategie, dit juist wel leidt tot een variëteit aan lokaal beleid, precies vanwege het gebrek aan nationale 'framing' en regulatie, wat ruimte laat voor, of misschien zelfs wel vraagt om, lokale beleidsinnovatie.

Indirecte vormen van beleid als discursieve strategie

De studies in dit proefschrift laten zien dat het mainstreamen van integratiebeleid naast de decentrerende van het beleid vooral de afschaffing van het voormalige doelgroepenbeleid behelsde. In plaats daarvan werden indirecte vormen van beleid geïntroduceerd, die integratie of migrantengroepen alleen indirect (middels een 'proxy') of onder een bredere noemer benaderen. In de literatuur over doelgroepenbeleid wordt het performatieve en degeneratieve karakter van doelgroepen beschreven (Schneider en Ingram 1997), maar de meeste studies richten zich hierbij op expliciete vormen van doelgroepenbeleid. De bevindingen uit deze studies illustreren echter ook het belang van indirecte vormen van doelgroepenbeleid.

Zowel op nationaal als lokaal niveau worden indirecte doelgroep-strategieën toegepast. Op het nationale niveau is heel expliciet afgestapt van doelgroepenbeleid en wordt het beleid alleen nog maar indirect in verband gebracht met integratie en mensen met een migratieachtergrond. In plaats van de complexiteit van integratie aan te gaan, blijkt uit de geanalyseerde beleidsstukken vooral dat het onderwerp integratie helemaal ver-

meden wordt. Op het lokale niveau distantiëren sommige steden zich ook van gericht doelgroepenbeleid door in plaats daarvan een expliciet generiek en universalistisch beleidsframe te kiezen. Daarnaast zijn er verschillende indirecte beleidsstrategieën te herkennen, zoals het expliciet formuleren van tijdelijk beleid of het benadrukken dat aangeboden voorzieningen ook open zijn voor andere inwoners. Door de indirecte aanpak kan het beleid onder een bredere noemer gelegitimeerd worden en gaat het daarmee het 'dilemma van herkenning' uit de weg. Dit illustreert het belang van indirecte vormen van doelgroepenbeleid als discursieve strategie.

Gedecentreerd beleid in een complexe en omstreden casus

In dit proefschrift laat ik zien dat het gedecentreerde integratiebeleid er niet in slaagt de complexiteit en het omstreden karakter van integratie goed te adresseren. Hoewel een gedecentreerde aanpak zich conceptueel goed leent voor deze opgave, laat dit proefschrift zien dat de controverserend rondom integratie het ontwikkelen van een goed ingebedde gedecentreerde aanpak verstoort. In plaats van het aangaan van de complexiteit worden er ontwijkende strategieën toegepast. Door een gebrek aan prioritering en coördinatie komt dit vervolgens vooral neer op een afbouw van voormalig integratiebeleid, zonder dat dit duidelijk ingebed wordt op andere beleidsdomeinen of andere bestuursniveaus. Dit leidt uiteindelijk tot een verwatering van het integratiebeleid.

Hoewel gedecentreerd beleid vaak wordt gezien als een antwoord op het besturen van complexe beleidsproblemen, laat dit proefschrift zien dat dit in het geval van een controversieel beleidsthema juist dreigt te leiden tot verwatering van beleid. Wat betreft de horizontale dimensie van het beleid, blijkt dit vaak te leiden tot slecht ingebed beleid, doordat het decentreren zich meer richt op het ontbinden van voormalig (doelgroepen) beleid, dan op het inbedden hiervan 'in de mainstream'. Op de verticale dimensie vindt er lokale innovatie plaats, hoewel deze in veel steden wel beperkt wordt door het reproduceren van nationale taboes die de ruimte voor lokale innovatie beperken.

Het verwateren van het integratiebeleid leidt tot een verwaarlozing van het sturen op integratie. De verantwoordelijkheid voor integratie wordt uitbesteed aan partner-ministeries, departementen en lokale overheden, echter zonder duidelijke coördinatie en verantwoordingsmechanismen. Bovendien wordt deze beleidsverantwoordelijkheid door de reproductie van nationale taboes slechts ten dele opgepakt. Hoewel het publieke en politieke debat over integratie steeds restrictiever en veeleisender worden, is het beleid op dit gebied indirect en ontwijkend. Deze studie laat zien dat, ondanks de sterke nadruk op gedecentreerde vormen van beleid in de literatuur, we ons kritisch moeten verhouden tot deze trend, aangezien een effectieve en goede ingebedde aanpak niet zomaar verondersteld kan worden. In tegenstelling, een controversiële beleidscontext versterkt het risico van ontwijkende beleidsstrategieën die voorbijgaan aan de complexiteit en beladenheid van het beleidsthema.

DANKWOORD

*'Weet je,' zei de wandelende tak tegen de eekhoorn in de top van de beukeboom,
'als je helemaal alleen bent kun je niet goed nadenken.'*

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While many studies of public administration have focused on decentred forms of governance, they mainly stay within the boundaries of its managerial or coordination aspects. This doctoral dissertation contributes to the literature by moving beyond this, to study both the content and coordination of a decentred governance approach. After studying immigrant integration governance within a range of national and local contexts this dissertation concludes that in a complex and contested policy context, such as immigrant integration, there is a real risk that a decentred governance approach will end up as an evasive strategy due to the perpetuation of policy taboos and dilemmas.
