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
**Strengthening community resilience in conflict:  
learnings from the Partners for Resilience programme**

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 **PARTNERS FOR RESILIENCE**



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**WOMEN IN MALI HAVE ORGANIZED THEMSELVES**  
to confront structural violence and work on issues such as administrative  
authorizations and ultimately women's access to agricultural land



Photo credits: CARE/Makmende

## List of Acronyms

CSO	Civil society organization
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
IDP	Internally displaced person
IRM	Integrated Risk Management
INGO	International non-governmental organization
ISF	Informal settler families (Philippines)
NGO	Non-governmental organization
PfR	Partners for Resilience
PME	Project monitoring and evaluation

## **Executive summary**

This report describes the main findings and recommendations of research carried out for the Partners for Resilience (PfR) alliance on how the PfR programme is affected by – or may affect – conflict. Although PfR works in different conflict-affected countries and contexts, it does not address conflict or insecurity explicitly. This is potentially problematic for PfR’s effectiveness. It is therefore important to consider whether PfR could or should address conflict more explicitly.

For this research, a qualitative analysis of the experiences within the ongoing PfR programme was conducted in all 10 countries: Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Mali, Philippines, South Sudan, Uganda and the regional programmes in Asia, Africa and Central America. The research was conducted by consultants and researchers from the International Institute of Social Studies, the Hague.

The core of the study consisted of an online survey, for which PfR staff and partners from all countries were invited, in addition to Skype interviews and a desk study. In all, 52 people participated.

The main research findings are summarised here.

### ***PfR experiences with conflict***

PfR alliance and CSO partners experience conflict in many forms and at all levels, whether between stakeholders in the PfR focus regions, or in the context of large-scale or structural violence and insecurity which hampers the entire environment in which partners work.

Resource-based conflicts and social tension are embedded in all aspects of Integrated Risk Management (IRM), occurring within and between communities (for example, those with differentiated status or entitlement), between different resource user groups, or between communities and the government or private companies. Most of these conflicts relate to access to or usage of natural resources such as land, water or forest resources, sometimes complicated by tensions between different ethnic or identity groups. Lack of government regulation or enforcement of existing legislation can also deepen such conflicts, as can inequalities related to wealth, power, gender and marginality.

In many conflicts, governments tend to favour the interests of private companies over those of communities. In some cases, the government itself is engaged in commercial resource exploitation. Weak governments often lack institutions that can resolve such conflicts. There is also often a lack of accountability from government towards local communities, which is particularly significant when the local government is a partner in PfR. This means that problems may be addressed and resolved within the network but can also lead to complications and dilemmas over how to address the issues.

### ***Effects of conflict on the IRM approach***

The work of PfR and the IRM approach are affected by violence in different ways. Some areas are difficult to access, leading to monitoring challenges. Beneficiaries and CSO partners are sometimes targeted and violated. In some areas, programmes have been downscaled or halted.

Threats of violence can lead partners to act with caution and avoid risks in addressing resource management, in particular the access to resources of marginal groups who suffer from structural and cultural violence. Threats are not uncommon but are not always reported on publicly as PfR does not want to expose their partners to further risk.

Structural violence similarly stands in the way of IRM effectiveness. This is an issue in all PfR countries: laws and policies pertaining to control of resources and other economic matters can sustain patterns of marginalization and vulnerability. Structural violence against women is found in all countries: women are excluded from economic opportunities as they lack access to productive resources like land. There are also many instances of cultural violence affecting PfR work, including discrimination against indigenous peoples in Guatemala, the caste system in India, and tribal communities in the Philippines. These issues skew dialogue, impede fair resource management and lead to conflict.

Civil society, core to the IRM approach, often finds itself at the heart of conflict. In some countries, the government criminalizes CSOs and advocacy groups and brands them as anti-government. Almost 25% of PfR partners experience 'negative pressures' from government officials and in some cases from private companies. This has serious consequences for programme implementation: in some cases, the governments prevent CSOs from working on 'sensitive' issues related to resource management.

### ***Does the IRM approach exacerbate conflict?***

Linkages between conflict and resource issues such as land-use planning make PfR partners a party in possible conflict. They are generally well aware of this and put great effort into navigating this to avoid exacerbating conflict. Many partners monitor evolving conflicts and assess the effects of their interventions on the conflict dynamics. They adapt programmes to changing realities on the ground.

Conflicts can occur within and between communities concerning their selection and participation in the programme: who will benefit and how will these benefits be distributed? PfR partners employ participatory consultations with communities, which can lead to agreement on public and shared benefits.

PfR partners indicate that engagement in IRM dialogues can sometimes be a risky business. The more large-scale and complex conflicts become – and the more interwoven with inequalities and identity politics – the more difficult it is to oversee the impacts of programme interventions.

### ***How is conflict experienced differently by women and minorities?***

Among the research participants, there was a broad understanding that women are affected by structural and cultural violence. There were many examples of community-level conflicts directly related to gender, inequalities and identity politics.

All research participants provided evidence on how they address gender inequalities in their programmes. There appears to be a PfR-wide deeply felt awareness that it is important to include women and make sure they have a voice in IRM. However, the attention to gender is not explicitly geared to the conflict dimensions and there was little evidence of using conflict-sensitive gender approaches. Survey responses also suggested insufficient attention to the question to how PfR addresses violence against other marginalized groups, for example ethnic minorities or lower castes.

A number of responses conveyed how the inclusive IRM approach of PfR, favouring a strategy of dialogue rather than confrontation, may lead to situations where partners refrain from explicitly addressing underlying conflicts and the ways these affect marginalized groups.

It also became clear that, even in programmes where specific attention was focused on the inclusion of women, these approaches may have unintended effects. For example, men sometimes reacted to feeling left out, or women ended up bearing the double burden for participating in ‘women’s’ programmes as well as carrying out their many other existing responsibilities.

### ***How does PfR deal with conflict?***

Addressing conflict is integral to the IRM approach. We distinguish three major aspects – monitoring conflict; addressing conflict in programme implementation; and conflict resolution – but in PfR practice they are often intertwined.

In all three aspects, PfR partners and CSOs rely on dialogue and participation. Most have a ‘do no harm’ policy and prefer a ‘non-confrontational’ approach based on facilitating stakeholder dialogue to deal with conflicting interests. Research participants say this gives the best results as it increases understanding between parties and can build bridges between communities and government and other stakeholders.

The trade-off of taking a non-confrontational approach is that it may hinder addressing root causes and explicitly advocating for marginalized groups. PfR and CSO staff seem to be well aware of this inherent dilemma and portray their work as a balancing act. Certain pieces of information do not surface during formal multi-stakeholder meetings. This can be dealt with by complementing the meetings with informal interactions.

PfR draws on many different participatory tools such as interest mapping, power analysis, survey and assessment tools, context analysis and conflict risk assessments. Many of these tools have been provided by the Dutch partners, but there is no shared set of tools at the level of PfR. The conflict-related tools are separately introduced from the IRM tools, even though some participants

observed that the IRM tools could be useful for conflict-related analysis. Some participants mention that having tools available does not mean that they are being used in practice. While there is a lot of knowledge and practice of conflict monitoring, conflict sensitivity and conflict resolution, it stems mainly from ‘learning by doing’ and many participants expressed a need for further capacity building, theoretical frameworks and guidelines.

In sum, there are many concrete examples of how PfR was able to defuse or resolve a conflict. The examples were mainly geared to community-level and resource-based conflicts based on small-scale diplomacy with authorities to protect the interests of marginalized or oppressed groups. Large-scale, escalated and structural conflicts are often beyond the scope of influence of PfR.

### ***Conclusions: opportunities for PfR***

Conflicts and violence form part of the realities that PfR seeks to change through IRM. This means that conflict monitoring, conflict sensitivity and in many cases conflict resolution are part of the everyday practice of the PfR programme. Yet in the first two phases of the PfR programme from 2010-2020, there has been no explicit attention to conflict, and as a result conflict-related activity has mainly been developed through ‘learning by doing’ and sensitive deployment of IRM tools.

A special challenge for PfR is that local-level resource-based conflicts and forms of structural violence occur between actors that are all included in the IRM approach of PfR, which is rooted in acceptance, dialogue and participatory multi-stakeholder activities. Whereas this inclusiveness is considered to be effective for PfR, it makes it challenging to directly confront the root causes of conflict. This creates operational dilemmas, and there is currently no space in PfR to report on dealing with conflicting interests within the programme, and hence there is no space for jointly discussing and learning from these dilemmas. A non-confrontational approach towards injustices may often be the best choice, but it is not the subject of policy discussion or reflection, and the question of how this affects the space to address the root causes of disaster risk remains largely unaddressed.

PfR partners already have ample experience in elements of conflict-sensitive programming, such as conflict risk analysis and assessments, inclusive planning and engagement in multi-stakeholder dialogues. The development of new PfR programming provides a good opportunity to integrate conflict dynamics in the overall resilience framework of PfR and to support partners and CSOs to advance their conflict-sensitive work and conflict risk reduction.

### ***Recommendations***

The overall recommendation for PfR is to address conflict more explicitly in its IRM approach and to integrate conflict in the design and programming of a new phase. This would entail acknowledgment by PfR that conflict is

impacting the goals of PfR work, and a commitment to support and train staff in addressing conflict.

More concretely, the report offers several recommendations and ideas for next steps. In line with suggestions of research participants, the key elements for conflict-sensitive programming for PfR partners are:

1. transparent communication towards all parties
2. facilitation of multi-stakeholder dialogues to increase parties' understanding of conflict dynamics
3. the creation of a safe spaces for stakeholders.

It is also suggested that Netherlands embassies play a role in addressing conflict and supporting PfR, for example by lobbying stakeholders and supporting partners financially or otherwise.

Moreover, PfR should create a conflict-sensitivity toolbox and develop guidelines for conflict-sensitive and inclusive policy and programming (not just including women, but also ethnic minorities) and training for its worldwide staff in the use of conflict risk assessment tools. We believe that these steps will make the work of PfR more effective and decrease the risk that interventions feed into conflict. A more detailed set of recommendations feature at the end of this report.

## **Keywords**

Resilience in practice, Disaster Risk Reduction, Conflict, Partners for Resilience, Do no Harm

# Strengthening community resilience in conflict: learnings from the Partners for Resilience programme

## 1 Introduction

Partners for Resilience (PfR) is an alliance of the Netherlands Red Cross with Cordaid, CARE Nederland, Wetlands International, the Red Cross Red Crescent Climate Centre and about 50 partner civil society organizations (CSOs) in Africa, Asia and Central America. PfR contributes to the resilience of vulnerable communities by integrating climate change adaptation and ecosystem management and restoration into Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). With this Integrated Risk Management (IRM) approach, communities strengthen their capacities to reduce the impact of disasters. More information can be found on the PfR website: [www.partnersforresilience.nl](http://www.partnersforresilience.nl).

Though PfR works in conflict-affected countries and contexts, it does not address conflict or insecurity explicitly. Even where it addresses conflict indirectly, this is rarely reported on. However, PfR work may be affected and even constrained by conflict, so the question arises as to whether PfR could or should address conflict more explicitly.

To get more insights into the extent to which PfR partner organizations are affected by different types of conflict, PfR commissioned a study on how the alliance encounters and deals with conflict in its Integrated Risk Management approach. This report presents the findings, conclusions and recommendations of this study.

The study was assigned to the research team of [When Disaster meets Conflict](#) led by professor Dorothea Hilhorst of ISS, Erasmus University, and also comprised independent consultant Marie-José Vervest and Isabelle Desportes, Samantha Melis, Rodrigo Mena and Roanne van Voorst of ISS.

The team wishes to take the opportunity to thank all 52 research participants for their extensive contributions to the research. Participants were very open in sharing their elaborate experiences and provided many useful inputs, examples and suggestions both to the survey and during the skype interviews. In addition, 30 people from PfR joined the final validation webinar. Thanks so much!

## 2 Research questions

The study investigated how IRM programming and implementation is affected by, influences, and could address conflict. It considered different types and levels of conflict, from micro- to macro-level, to develop a more nuanced understanding of what this means for IRM in general and for PfR programme specifically. The research was qualitative in nature, focusing on the analysis of the experiences of PfR and their local partner organizations in the PfR countries. This analysis led to the identification of some lessons learnt, key conclusions and a set of recommendations.

The PfR Project Working Group formulated the following research questions:

1. In what ways does PfR encounter conflicts and social tensions in its activities, both in the communities of intervention as well as in the IRM dialogues with government authorities and private companies at local, national and regional levels?
2. What are the effects of these conflicts and social tensions on our IRM approach?
3. How does an IRM approach affect conflict dynamics in intended and unintended ways?
4. How are these effects differentiated for men and women, other genders, people of different castes, ethnicities, livelihoods, etc?
5. What have been strategies of PfR to deal with conflict, and with what results?
6. What opportunities are there for better integrating a conflict-sensitive approach and/or conflict risk reduction approach in IRM?

### 3 Methodology

This section describes the research design and provides an overview of the participants.

The research focused on a qualitative analysis of the experiences within PfR's 10 country programmes (Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Mali, Philippines, South Sudan and Uganda) and its regional programmes in Asia, Africa and Central America.

The core of the study consisted of an online survey, for which PfR staff and partners from all countries were invited, in addition to skype interviews and a desk study.

The research started with a **review of PfR annual country reports** (2018) and some other key PfR documents to understand the context and identify what (if anything) PfR teams were reporting in relation to conflict and strategies to deal with it.

The next step was a **literature review** of the latest research on 'conflict intensity and scenarios' and linkages between the three components of the Integrated Risk Management approach: 'conflict and climate change', 'conflict and disasters' and 'conflict and (natural) resource management'. Literature on 'conflict-sensitive project implementation' was also reviewed, focusing on 'gender and minority groups', and 'strengthening of civil society organizations'.

Key findings from the literature review and the review of PfR documents were used to design an **educational survey**: an online survey developed for staff of PfR partners and CSOs. Each cluster of questions in this survey is introduced by explanatory text boxes. The purpose of the 'educational introductions' was twofold. They were meant to ensure that participants responded to the questions with a similar understanding of the concepts involved, and they were included to increase awareness of conflict-related issues that might be pertinent to PfR practice.

The educational survey was shared with the PfR Project Working Group for their feedback and suggestions and subsequently tested with one person from each of four PfR organizations in India, Mali, Guatemala and Indonesia. The survey was adjusted based on their feedback, finalized, and translated into Spanish and French.

At the end of November 2019 the survey was sent to the 10 PfR country leads and four PfR regional leads, who were asked to introduce the research and share the survey with their in-country PfR partners and other CSOs involved in the PfR programme. The response time was a little over two weeks.

This resulted in 52 survey responses provided by the different PfR partners in eight countries, comprising national Red Cross societies and national branches or partners of CARE, Cordaid and Wetlands International. In each country, one or more local civil society partner provided responses to the survey questions. No one from PfR partner the Red Cross/Red Crescent

Climate Centre filled in the survey. Despite several reminders, there were no responses from Haiti and South Sudan, possibly due to short response time. Examples from South Sudan in the report have been drawn from PfR reports and the survey response from the Horn of Africa.

Participants were requested to indicate their preference in relation to full or partial anonymity. To ensure their preferred level of anonymity, the ISS team decided to only mention the participants' country and not their names or the specific organization they work for (see Table 1).

**Table 1**  
**Overview of survey respondents per country**

Country/region	Number of surveys	Details
Indonesia	8	4 PfR partners, 4 CSOs
Uganda	10	6 PfR partners, 4 CSOs including parliamentary forum
Ethiopia	6	3 PfR partners, 3 CSOs
India	5	1 PfR partner, 4 CSOs
Mali	6	4 PfR partners, 2 CSO
Guatemala	4	3 PfR partners, 1 CSO
Philippines	5	4 PfR partners, 1 CSO partner
Kenya	5	4 PfR partners, 1 CSO partner
Central America regional program	2	CSO partners
Horn of Africa regional program	1	PfR partner

**Follow-up skype interviews** based on the survey forms were held with six participants – one each from Mali, Guatemala, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia and the Philippines. The aim of these interviews was to get further explanation, more specific examples and clarifications.

After drafting the report, a webinar was held with 30 participants from PfR (see annex) to discuss and sharpen the conclusions and recommendations.

## 4 Literature review on IRM

This section introduces core concepts and presents the latest research pertaining to the relationships between IRM and conflict. It reviews:

1. Concepts related to conflict and violence;
2. IRM, how it is impacted by conflict dynamics and impacts them in turn; and the interrelations between conflict and each of the three IRM components: climate change, disaster risk, and resource management;
3. How the implementation of IRM programmes can trigger and exacerbate conflict, and which approaches can help avoid these caveats.

### 4.1 What is conflict?

What do we mean by conflict? Conflict occurs when two or more parties find their interests incompatible and express hostile attitudes or take actions that damage the other party's ability to pursue their own interests.<sup>1</sup> Three main components thus characterize what is typically defined as conflict<sup>2</sup>:

1. Goal incompatibility between two or more parties;
2. Attitudes that arise from this perceived incompatibility;
3. Conflict behaviour that results from these attitudes.

The parties may be two countries in the case of inter-state conflict, or a national government and insurgent or other societal groups if one looks at intra-state conflict or civil war. More broadly, one of the parties might even be 'future generations' in the case natural resources issues.

The above definition of 'conflict' suggests a difference between social problems and social conflict. It is a social problem if actors agree that a specific issue, which could be poverty or the lack of access to proper irrigation infrastructure, needs to be addressed. A social conflict, on the other hand, is based on "disagreement between one or more groups due to the perception that another group is causing a social problem or preventing other groups from achieving their goals".<sup>3</sup>

Conflict is quite common in society, and not necessarily bad. Goal incompatibility will always exist, certainly in development endeavours. Parties with vested interests may feel threatened by bottom-up development. It is important to be cognizant of, understand and work on goal incompatibility, so that its effects may be handled as constructively as possible.<sup>4</sup>

Conflict studies follow very different strands. Depending on the approach, conflict analysis will focus on different scales, from the individual all the way

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<sup>1</sup> Christian Aid, 'Integrated Conflict Prevention and Resilience Field Guide'.

<sup>2</sup> Demmers, *Theories of Violent Conflict: An Introduction*, 5.

<sup>3</sup> Mena, 'Responding to Socio-Environmental Disasters in High-Intensity Conflict Scenarios: Challenges and Legitimation Strategies'.

<sup>4</sup> Cousens, Kumar, and Wermester, *Peacebuilding as Politics*.

up to the globalized world economy. The different levels at which conflict takes place must be acknowledged, as must the interrelations between them. Kalyvas<sup>5</sup> highlights how conflicts are simultaneously driven by local as well as overarching agendas, connected through actor alliances across various scales. Based on his study of civil wars, he warns against attaching too much significance to conflict dynamics at regional or national level in terms of how conflict is perceived and works out at the community level. Conflict manifests itself in different, semi-autonomous and evolving ways; different types of conflicts co-exist, each with its own dynamics, but also influencing one another.<sup>6</sup> It is thus important to take the specific dynamics of conflict at community level as the starting point, rather than conflicts at large.

### ***Violence***

Violence is part of conflict. It is most often associated with physical acts resulting in killings, injuries, kidnapping, forced displacement or destruction. But think tanks such as the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research also take into account the *threat* of violence when they determine conflict intensity.<sup>7</sup>

Moreover, Galtung directs our attention towards *structural* violence and *cultural* violence.<sup>8</sup> Structural violence refers to processes whereby one group oppresses another through structural means, such as an exclusion from educational or economic opportunities or restrictions of freedom of assembly and speech by a policy or a law. Cultural violence is the broader semi-permanent state through which some forms of physical violence and structural violence are considered as legitimate. Embedded in religion, ideology, language, art, and sciences, structural violence exerted by the majority is perceived as normal and acceptable, even when this concerns physical violence.<sup>9</sup> On the contrary, minorities' violence will be de-legitimized or even demonized, for instance by using the label of terrorism. This is where discourses and actors such as the media come into play, for instance further fuelling the conflict.

Beyond acts of direct violence, laws, policies and discourses, authors such as Hilhorst<sup>10</sup> also highlight the everyday politics – the “quiet, mundane, and subtle expressions and acts that are rarely organized and direct” – through which actions can be obstructed. Access to specific areas can for instance be bureaucratically reduced by losing track or delaying travel authorization processes, as has occurred for instance when humanitarian actors have tried to operate in non-government held areas in Myanmar.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> ‘The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity in Civil Wars’.

<sup>6</sup> Demmers, *Theories of Violent Conflict: An Introduction*.

<sup>7</sup> HIIK, ‘Conflict Barometer 2018’.

<sup>8</sup> ‘Part II: Conflict Theory’.


<sup>9</sup> Herman and Chomsky, ‘A Propaganda Model’.

<sup>10</sup> *Disaster, Conflict and Society in Crises*, 232.

<sup>11</sup> Desportes, ‘Getting Relief to Marginalised Minorities’.

## ***Conflict intensity and scenarios***

Conflict can be categorized in a multitude of ways, for instance depending on the parties involved, the level at which conflict plays out (micro/meso/macro-level conflict, local/regional/national/supra-national conflict), and the intensity or impact of violence. Humanitarian actors have found a differentiation between high-intensity, low-intensity and post-conflict scenarios useful to distil key challenges and strategies to engage with local realities in conflict settings.<sup>12</sup> While physical violence and lack of state control over larger parts of the territory characterize high-intensity conflict,<sup>13</sup> societal polarization and structural violence are prevalent in low-intensity conflict settings.<sup>14</sup> For post-conflict, an agreement or political settlement has been established and a period of institutional transitions and changes has begun, but tensions may still linger where not all conflict parties and topics have been included in the settlement.<sup>15</sup> It goes without saying that the intensity of conflict may be experienced differently on the ground. The Palestinian conflict for instance may be qualified as ‘low-intensity conflict’ because annual casualties are under 1000, a threshold commonly used by think tanks such as the Human Security Report Project.<sup>16</sup> Yet, the population living under occupation perceive the conflict as a dominant factor in their lives.



<sup>12</sup> Voorst and Hilhorst, ‘Humanitarian Action in Disaster and Conflict Settings Insights of an Expert Panel’.

<sup>13</sup> Mena, ‘Responding to Socio-Environmental Disasters in High-Intensity Conflict Scenarios: Challenges and Legitimation Strategies’.

<sup>14</sup> Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases*.

<sup>15</sup> Melis, ‘The Fragile State of Disaster Response: Understanding Aid-State-Society Relations in Post-Conflict Settings’.

<sup>16</sup> ‘Human Security Report Project: Our Work’.

<sup>17</sup> Christian Aid, ‘Integrated Conflict Prevention and Resilience Field Guide’, 3.

## *Summary*

- Conflict differs from social problems: in the case of conflict, parties disagree based on perceptions of other groups being the cause of problems, and they act to hamper the each other's interests.
- Conflict goes hand in hand with violence, which can take the form of physical violence, structural violence and cultural violence, as illustrated in Figure 1.
- Conflict unfolds at different scales, showing different but inter-related dynamics. Community-level conflicts are influenced by conflict at other scales but have their own dynamics.
- Conflict is of varying intensity: high-intensity war-like situations, low-intensity situations where structural and cultural violence overshadows physical violence, and post-conflict situations characterized by lingering tensions.

## **4.2 Conflict and IRM**

Originating in business studies and further developed in environmental and development studies, IRM stresses the importance of treating risk not in terms of particular uncertainties, but as interrelations between several uncertainties.<sup>18</sup> It hinges on in-depth systematic analysis of socio-environmental dynamics across various interdependent scales.<sup>19</sup> When applied to strengthen community resilience, it specifically consists in the integration of climate change adaption and environmental management and restoration in DRR. Past research on the PfR programme in Ethiopia illustrates how this translates in the following core activities, listed in Table 2.

Climate change, disasters and resource management are inter-related with conflict. Conflict and instability contribute to people's vulnerability to disasters and environmental degradation, and vice versa. Furthermore, projects on DRR, climate change adaption and environmental management and restoration themselves have the potential to create or worsen conflict, but also to make a positive contribution.

The following sub-sections focus on how implementation of IRM projects in conflict-affected settings can be affected by and can feed back into conflict dynamics.

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<sup>18</sup> Miller, 'A Framework for Integrated Risk Management in International Business'.

<sup>19</sup> Berkes and Ross, 'Community Resilience'.

**Table 2**  
**PfR Ethiopia categories of interventions**

Intervention	Examples
1. Ecosystem management and restoration	Rangeland rehabilitation through enclosures, hillside rehabilitation through terracing, soil and water conservation with soil band and check dams
2. Livelihood diversification	Setting up savings and loan associations; cooperatives producing aloe vera soap, honey or energy-saving stoves; distributing goats or chickens; providing irrigation infrastructure such as ponds, dams, canals, or drip irrigation; distributing seed and farming tools
3. Establishing and strengthening community institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Committees responsible for managing disaster risk in their kebele, with some also acting as local early-warning committees</li> <li>• Committees managing specific PfR interventions (e.g. an irrigation committee)</li> <li>• Environmental school clubs</li> </ul>
4. Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Theoretical and practical skill transfer, for instance concerning farming, meteorological forecasts, and accounting (including specific capacity training for the newly established community institutions)</li> <li>• Training in the form of exchanges between (implementing) partners, government officials, and communities, with joint risk assessment and development of action plans</li> </ul>

Source: Hilhorst et al. <sup>20</sup>

### ***Conflict and climate change***

Many scholars have found the relationship between climate change and conflict to be significant. Climate change and increasing climate variability lead to resource competition, with the potential to increase conflict.<sup>21</sup> Hsiang et al.<sup>22</sup> and Hsiang and Burke<sup>23</sup> found that extreme rainfall and temperatures increase conflict and decrease social stability. Migration is another key factor.<sup>24</sup> Environmental changes can force people to migrate as a coping mechanism,<sup>25</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Hilhorst, Desportes, and de Milliano, 'Humanitarian Governance and Resilience Building'.

<sup>21</sup> Buhaug, 'Climate Change and Conflict'; Burrows and Kinney, 'Exploring the Climate Change, Migration and Conflict Nexus.'; Ide, 'Why Do Conflicts over Scarce Renewable Resources Turn Violent?'; Mach et al., 'Climate as a Risk Factor for Armed Conflict'.

<sup>22</sup> Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel, 'Quantifying the Influence of Climate on Human Conflict'.

<sup>23</sup> Hsiang and Burke, 'Climate, Conflict, and Social Stability'.

<sup>24</sup> Burrows and Kinney, 'Exploring the Climate Change, Migration and Conflict Nexus.'

<sup>25</sup> Henry, Schoumaker, and Beauchemin, 'The Impact of Rainfall on the First Out-Migration'; Laczko and International Organization for Migration, Migration, Environment and Climate Change.

as for instance happens following worsening conditions of wetlands in the Sahel.<sup>26</sup> Spill-over effects from mass migration can exacerbate existing intra- and interstate disputes,<sup>27</sup> for example when mass migration compounds perceptions of resource scarcity in receiving areas, leading to ethnic tensions and marginalization of certain groups.<sup>28</sup>

Recent years have yielded a wealth of empirical evidence on conflict and climate change. Looking at 46 African countries<sup>29</sup> and looking at the Philippines,<sup>30</sup> scholars found that weather shocks affecting agriculture increased the number of (local) conflicts.

However, the nexus between conflict and climate change has also been highly debated by scholars and practitioners. The field of conflict and climate change research is still evolving, and at the moment seems to focus especially on civil wars and high-intensity violence, rather than for example conflict at the local level.

Some evidence shows no direct relationship between climate change and conflict.<sup>31</sup> These authors are not so much arguing against a link but have shown that the relationship is more complicated than a direct causality. In an encompassing assessment of research made up to 2019, multiple scholars<sup>32</sup> agree that drivers other than climate change are substantially more influential, including “low socioeconomic development and low capabilities of the state”. Socio-political variables, such as economic and political instability, strongly influence the relationship between climate change and conflict.<sup>33</sup> This is also why climate change affects regions differently. If a country is more politically stable, it is more likely to peacefully resolve resource shortages.<sup>34</sup>

Therefore, understanding and addressing conflict dynamics and political instability is crucial when working on climate and environment related projects in fragile socio-political contexts. Climate change adaptation responses have

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<sup>26</sup> Wetlands International, ‘Water Shocks: Wetlands and Human Migration in the Sahel’.

<sup>27</sup> Reuveny, ‘Climate Change-Induced Migration and Violent Conflict’; Abel et al., ‘Climate, Conflict and Forced Migration.’

<sup>28</sup> Raleigh, Jordan, and Salehyan, ‘Assessing the Impact of Climate Change on Migration and Conflict’; Brzoska and Fröhlich, ‘Climate Change, Migration and Violent Conflict: Vulnerabilities, Pathways and Adaptation Strategies.’

<sup>29</sup> Harari and Ferrara, ‘Conflict, Climate, and Cells’.

<sup>30</sup> Crost et al., ‘Climate Change, Agricultural Production and Civil Conflict’.

<sup>31</sup> Bernauer, Böhmelt, and Koubi, ‘Environmental Changes and Violent Conflict’; Buhaug et al., ‘One Effect to Rule Them All?’; Salehyan, ‘From Climate Change to Conflict?’; Scheffran et al., ‘Climate Change and Violent Conflict’; Theisen, Gleditsch, and Buhaug, ‘Is Climate Change a Driver of Armed Conflict?’; van Weezel, ‘On Climate and Conflict’.

<sup>32</sup> Mach et al., ‘Climate as a Risk Factor for Armed Conflict.’, 193.

<sup>33</sup> Gleditsch and Urdal, ‘Ecoviolence? Links Between Population Growth, Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict in Thomas Homer-Dixon’s Work’; Hauge and Ellingsen, ‘Beyond Environmental Scarcity’; Koubi, ‘Climate Change and Conflict’; Urdal, ‘People vs. Malthus’.

<sup>34</sup> Koubi, ‘Climate Change and Conflict’.

the potential to exacerbate conflict.<sup>35</sup> Sovacool warns that adaptation projects have been co-opted and are trapping people in insecurity, increasing inequalities.<sup>36</sup> Furthermore, when climate change instigates more extreme weather events in regions that are already challenged socio-politically and economically, the impact and response crystallize and exacerbate socio-political factors.

### ***Conflict and disasters***

Research has shown the intricate relationship between conflicts and disasters, with disasters causing conflict and conflict contributing to the creation of disasters. Drury and Olson<sup>37</sup> found a relationship between conflict and political unrest. And although some argue these relationships are weak,<sup>38</sup> the co-occurrence of disasters and conflict is strong. Between 1998 and 2004, 140 disasters occurred in complex emergencies.<sup>39</sup> Between 2005 and 2009, over 50% of people affected by disasters lived in fragile and conflict-affected states.<sup>40</sup> More recently, these findings have been confirmed by Peters and Budimir,<sup>41</sup> who show that 50% of disaster casualties and 30% of disaster affected people are in the top 30 of fragile and conflict-affected states.

The effect of disaster on conflict (including a possible reduction in conflict, as happened in Aceh after the 2004 tsunami), depends on a variety of factors. Notable among these are the strength of the government response<sup>42</sup> or the level of DRR investment.<sup>43</sup> Factors such as weak government capacity and political instability underlie both the likelihood of disasters and conflict. For example, Flint and De Waal<sup>44</sup> showed that the Darfur crisis exacerbated slow-onset disaster. It is important to understand the socio-political and economic factors that put people at risk,<sup>45</sup> and to realise that conflict can exacerbate vulnerability to disasters as it erodes response capacity over time.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Hunsberger, Work, and Herre, 'Linking Climate Change Strategies and Land Conflicts in Cambodia'.

<sup>36</sup> Sovacool, 'Bamboo Beating Bandits'.

<sup>37</sup> Drury and Olson, 'Disasters and Political Unrest: An Empirical Investigation'.

<sup>38</sup> Bergholt and Lujala, 'Climate-Related Natural Disasters, Economic Growth, and Armed Civil Conflict'; Nel and Righarts, 'Natural Disasters and the Risk of Violent Civil Conflict'; Omelicheva, 'Natural Disasters'; Slettebak, 'Don't Blame the Weather! Climate-Related Natural Disasters and Civil Conflict'.

<sup>39</sup> Kellet and Sparks, 'Disaster Risk Reduction: Spending Where It Should Count'.

<sup>40</sup> Buchanan-Smith and Christophos, 'Natural Disasters amid Complex Political Emergencies.'

<sup>41</sup> Peters and Budimir, 'When Disasters and Conflict Collide: Facts and Figures'.

<sup>42</sup> Gawronski and Olson, 'Disasters as Crisis Triggers for Critical Junctures?'

<sup>43</sup> Cohen and Werker, 'The Political Economy of "Natural" Disasters'; Oliver-Smith, 'Anthropological Research on Hazards and Disasters'.

<sup>44</sup> Flint and De Waal, *Darfur*.

<sup>45</sup> Wisner et al., *At Risk: Natural Hazards, People's Vulnerability and Disasters*.

<sup>46</sup> Bankoff, Frerks, and Hilhorst, *Mapping Vulnerability*.

Research has further shown that different types of conflict affect disaster response and DRR in different ways.<sup>47</sup> In *high-intensity* conflict areas, the population is often impoverished, vulnerable and sometimes even displaced following years of stagnating development and state negligence. Disaster management and humanitarian aid is challenged by insecurity, reduced access, and the difficulties of reaching people in need.<sup>48</sup> In *low-intensity* conflict settings, key challenges encountered by disaster responders are bureaucratic access and project restrictions, and blame and legitimacy games relating to the politicization and instrumentalization of aid. These settings offer greater possibilities for local action compared to high-intensity conflict settings, but also certain pitfalls related to that, because local actors are also positioned within the conflict.<sup>49</sup> In *post-conflict* areas, the history of conflict has increased vulnerabilities whereas the present is characterized by institutional instability and post-conflict politics. Aid actors working in these contexts are confronted with coordination challenges, bureaucracy and corruption and find it difficult to support the state in its response; this undermines its legitimacy and potentially aggravates tensions between the state and society, and enduring institutional vulnerabilities.<sup>50</sup>

### ***Conflict and resource management***

Many scholars have argued that resource scarcity and competition can increase the likelihood of conflict.<sup>51</sup> Others have shown that changes in natural resource availability or environmental degradation contributed to complex emergencies,<sup>52</sup> and that violence over land and water resources is widespread.<sup>53</sup> Ide, for example, argues that the higher the level of resource appropriation, the higher the likelihood of conflict.<sup>54</sup>

Resource scarcity does not always create conflict, however. Societies that are able to adapt can find different modes of livelihood, with conflict being one of the outcomes, but not the only one.<sup>55</sup> Therefore, contextual factors are, again, important in understanding the relationship between resources and

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<sup>47</sup> Hilhorst et al., 'Disaster Response and Humanitarian Aid in Different Conflict Scenarios.'

<sup>48</sup> Mena, 'Responding to Socio-Environmental Disasters in High-Intensity Conflict Scenarios: Challenges and Legitimation Strategies'.

<sup>49</sup> Desportes, 'Getting Relief to Marginalised Minorities'; Desportes, Mandefro, and Hilhorst, 'The Humanitarian Theatre – Drought Response in 2016 Low-Intensity Conflict Ethiopia'.

<sup>50</sup> Melis, 'The Fragile State of Disaster Response: Understanding Aid-State-Society Relations in Post-Conflict Settings'.

<sup>51</sup> Homer-Dixon, 'Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict'; Kahl, *States, Scarcity, and Civil Strife in the Developing World*; Peluso and Watts, *Violent Environments*.

<sup>52</sup> Flint and De Waal, *Darfur*.

<sup>53</sup> Gleick, 'Water and Conflict'; Heijmans et al., 'A Grassroots Perspective on Risks Stemming from Disasters and Conflict'.

<sup>54</sup> Ide, 'Why Do Conflicts Over Scarce Renewable Resources Turn Violent?'

<sup>55</sup> Hendrix and Glaser, 'Trends and Triggers'.

conflict. Socio-political and economic factors make conflict over resources more likely.<sup>56</sup> In a socio-political context with high inequalities, ‘resource capture’ can allow elites to control resources at the cost of others.<sup>57</sup> The co-management of resources can provide opportunities for dealing with resource conflicts, but can also create new conflicts, worsen old ones, or result in strengthening control instead of sharing power.<sup>58</sup> Conflict mitigation is therefore a crucial component in resource management programmes.

### ***Summary***

- The relationships between conflict, climate change, disasters and resource management are significant but highly debated, with causalities rarely being direct.
- The following aspects highlight that attention to conflict is crucial for IRM programmes:
  - Climate change increases risk for conflicts, mostly via resource competition and migration. Social, political and economic factors influence how the linkage takes form.
  - Disasters and conflict often co-occur, leading to ‘complex emergencies’. Conflict exacerbates vulnerabilities to disasters and erodes response capacities. Conversely, disasters can exacerbate conflict, but in some cases have led to conflict resolution.
  - Lack of resources, especially of land and water, leads to conflict and violence. But again, the socio-political and economic context matters. Elite capture of resources exacerbates the risk of conflict, but providing alternative livelihood opportunities and co-managing resources can avert this. In all cases, it is important to scrutinize power-relations at a micro-level.

### **4.3 Conflict-sensitive project implementation**

Development projects impact the places and communities where they are implemented. Often beneficial, they can also have adverse consequences, such as producing or exacerbating social conflict.<sup>59</sup> Some of these conflicts relate to disputes over the benefits of the projects and how they will be distributed – which members of the community will take part in the project, or where infrastructure will be built. In other cases, projects do not take into account the social history and dynamics of the places where they intervene, thus exacerbating existing conflict. Sometimes, projects can create new conflicts.

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<sup>56</sup> Buhaug et al., ‘One Effect to Rule Them All?’

<sup>57</sup> Homer-Dixon, ‘Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict’.

<sup>58</sup> Castro and Nielsen, ‘Indigenous People and Co-Management’.

<sup>59</sup> Homer-Dixon, ‘Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict’; Ide, ‘Why Do Conflicts over Scarce Renewable Resources Turn Violent?’; MacFarlane, ‘Humanitarian Action and Conflict’; Wisner, ‘Violent Conflict, Natural Hazards and Disaster’.

For example, by building infrastructure that reduces the risk of floods for one community, a project could modify the course or availability of river water for others, risking conflict between up- and down-stream communities.<sup>60</sup>

### ***Setting project content and modalities***

Research shows that although many aid and development actors are aware of social conflict in the places where projects are implemented, they may be less aware of the conflicts that their own projects can produce or exacerbate.<sup>61</sup> This is often linked to how projects are planned or prepared. Development actors may have been working in an area for years and trust their ‘gut feeling’ when it comes to managing and preventing conflict.<sup>62</sup> Yet, participatory and consultation strategies tend to create a sense of agreement, especially when they lead to projects that create public and shared benefits, and may not predict the divisions that can arise.<sup>63</sup> When engaging in such activities, it is also important to take into account existing power relations within a community and with other stakeholders. Communities are not homogeneous places: “Axes of inequality, differences of identity, and power relations make places subject to multiple experiences, not a unitary, evenly shared ‘sense’. Within any one place, social actors become subjected to multiple matrices of power”.<sup>64</sup> This should be taken into account, for instance, when setting up community committees in charge of project co-design and implementation – does the committee represent the diverse interests and experiences of community members, or does it not reinforce existing inequalities?<sup>65</sup>

### ***Conflict-sensitive programming and conflict risk reduction***

Many humanitarian and development programmes adhere to a ‘do no harm’ approach that aims to be sensitive to conflict in order to avoid having a negative impact.<sup>66</sup> Often, development projects take this a step further and aim to reduce conflict risks, or even resolve ongoing conflict (see Box 1).

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<sup>60</sup> Desportes, ‘Learning from and about Partners for Resilience Ethiopia’; Heijmans, ‘Risky Encounters’; Mena, Hilhorst, and Peters, ‘Disaster Risk Reduction and Protracted Violent Conflict: The Case of Afghanistan’.

<sup>61</sup> Mena and Afghanistan Resilience Consortium (ARC) ‘Understanding and Preventing Social Conflict While Implementing Community- Based Disaster Risk Reduction in Afghanistan’.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.; Mena, Hilhorst, and Peters, ‘Disaster Risk Reduction and Protracted Violent Conflict: The Case of Afghanistan’.

<sup>63</sup> Moser and Stein, ‘Implementing Urban Participatory Climate Change Adaptation Appraisals’.

<sup>64</sup> Moore, *Suffering for Territory: Race, Place and Power in Zimbabwe.*, 21.

<sup>65</sup> Desportes, ‘Learning from and about Partners for Resilience Ethiopia’, 45.

<sup>66</sup> Anderson, *Do No Harm*; Desportes, ‘Learning from and about Partners for Resilience Ethiopia’; Mena, Hilhorst, and Peters, ‘Disaster Risk Reduction and Protracted Violent Conflict: The Case of Afghanistan’.

**Box 1**  
**Conflict-sensitive approach vs conflict risk reduction**

Conflict sensitivity refers to the ability of an organization to:

1. Understand the conflict dynamics in the context in which they operate, particularly with respect to intergroup relations;
2. Understand the interaction between the intervention and the conflict dynamics in the specific context;
3. Act upon this understanding in order to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts of the intervention (on the conflict dynamics).

To work on conflict risk reduction, a fourth ability is needed:

4. To make deliberate efforts to address drivers of conflict and to contribute to stability and conflict risk reduction.

This can be translated into two different programming strategies:

- a) A focus on doing no harm (avoiding negative impacts by working, for example, in an inclusive manner), or on maximizing the positive effects on stability without changing the primary objectives of the project/programme;
- b) Deliberately designing objectives of the project/programme to have an impact on improving stability (i.e. work on conflict risk reduction, peace dialogue).

Source: Based on USAID definitions, cited by Cordaid <sup>67</sup>

These approaches need to be taken in all the phases of projects, from proposal, to planning, implementation and evaluation.<sup>68</sup>

Multiple strategies can be used to develop a conflict sensitivity or conflict risk reduction strategy. One is to develop and include conflict analysis tools in project planning and implementation.<sup>69</sup> Mapping stakeholder relationships, the conflict tree, or the connectors and dividers analysis are some example of tools that seek to enable the collection of sufficient information to avoid, mitigate and reduce the risk of conflict.<sup>70</sup> Another strategy is to include conflict risk reduction strategies or even a conflict resolution mechanism in the project.

On this matter, however, the literature warns about not confusing peacebuilding processes with conflict risk reduction, sensitivity, or resolution strategies (see Box 1).<sup>71</sup> Although all these processes are related, peacebuilding

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<sup>67</sup> Cordaid, 'Enhancing Resilience in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Contexts'.

<sup>68</sup> CARE International, 'Applying Conflict Sensitivity at Project Level'; Garred, 'Conflict Sensitivity En Emergencies: Learnin from the Asia Tsunami Response'; Mena, Hilhorst, and Peters, 'Disaster Risk Reduction and Protracted Violent Conflict: The Case of Afghanistan'.

<sup>69</sup> GPPAC, 'Conflict Analysis Framework: Field Guidelines & Procedures'; Mena and ARC, 'Manual on Conflict Analysis Tools: Preventing, Mitigating and Reducing the Risk of Social Conflict in Civil DRR Projects'.

<sup>70</sup> See for example the Massive Online Open Course (MOOC) on 'When disaster meets conflict'; <https://www.coursera.org/learn/whendisastermeetsconflict>

<sup>71</sup> Woodrow and Chigas, 'A Distinction with a Difference: Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding'.

and the resolution of major conflict requires specific techniques to address conflict, as opposed to preventing or being sensitive to working in conflict scenarios. Some distinguish between how conflict sensitivity aims to support working *in* conflict, while peacebuilding enables working *on* conflict.<sup>72</sup> Peacebuilding usually requires organizational experience and staff specialized in peacebuilding, which most aid and humanitarian aid organizations may not have. Taking a peacebuilding approach may even clash with their mandate.<sup>73</sup>

In relation to conflict-sensitive programming, engaging with issues such as gender, minority groups and CSOs deserves particular attention.

### ***Gender and minority groups***

Vulnerability to disasters and climate change is different for men and women; it also varies within different social groups which collectively identify around core characteristics such as ethnic origin, religion, culture, class or language.<sup>74</sup> Indeed, different groups and individuals have differential access to land, water and other resources that are vital to integrated risk management, and may be treated differently by the state and society (especially in conflict contexts). In most societies, women are subordinated to men and have less access to resources. Their specific vulnerabilities can be compounded through ‘gender-blind’ disaster policies and practices.<sup>75</sup> Similarly, marginalized groups such as landless people, single parents, or discriminated minorities present different vulnerabilities and often have less access to resources. This impacts, and often lowers, their coping capacities at crisis moments such as disasters or sudden eruptions of violence.<sup>76</sup> As a result, resource-based conflicts may emerge within households or communities, which become even more problematic as women and marginalized groups may be less capable to assert their rights and interests.

### ***Civil society strengthening***

Building on decades of in-country experience, CSOs are commonly more knowledgeable and better versed in navigating conflict contexts than their international NGO counterparts.<sup>77</sup> They often know how to read community conflict dynamics and interact with state officials.<sup>78</sup> They are also impacted by conflict in different ways, particularly where they aim to change the status quo or redress situations of suffering and injustice, where they take a strong stance

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<sup>72</sup> Goodhand, A Synthesis Report; Mena, Hilhorst, and Peters, ‘Disaster Risk Reduction and Protracted Violent Conflict: The Case of Afghanistan’.

<sup>73</sup> Woodrow and Chigas, ‘A Distinction with a Difference: Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding’.

<sup>74</sup> Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases*.

<sup>75</sup> Enarson and Fordham, ‘From Women’s Needs to Women’s Rights in Disasters.’

<sup>76</sup> Scheper-Hughes, ‘Katrina’.

<sup>77</sup> Matelski, ‘Constructing Civil Society in Myanmar: Struggles for Local Change and Global Recognition’.

<sup>78</sup> Desaine, *The Politics of Silence*.

or perhaps face repression and authoritarian state practices. As a result of conflict, violence or restrictions, CSO staff members can face trauma and personal risk,<sup>79</sup> yet they are embedded in their social and professional networks and so 'just leaving' when the security situation warrants their exit is not straightforward.

International NGOs (INGOs) working in partnership with CSOs need to be aware of these differentiated dynamics and risks and support CSOs in dealing with them. Aid organizations are increasingly vocal about unequal treatment of international and national staff concerning risk transfer, risk exposure, security provision and insurance.<sup>80</sup> Also, there can be a gap between field realities and the plans aid actors might devise in sheltered offices, sometimes thousands of kilometres away. As a Myanmar CSO staff member states (cited in De Geoffroy and Grunewald),<sup>81</sup> "While the international community is guided by deadlines and guidelines, local actors here are caught between front lines and ethnic lines." This gap is compounded by the power imbalances which often characterize the relations between international and national staff.<sup>82</sup>

### ***Summary***

- Development projects can trigger or exacerbate conflict as they are implemented in communities and their ecosystems. Disputes over project benefits deserve particular attention.
- Development projects can engage with conflict in different ways, from working *in* conflict (conflict-sensitive programming) to working *on* conflict (conflict resolution). The latter necessitates specific approaches and skills, which development organizations do not necessarily have, or which might even clash with their mandate.
- Conflict-sensitive programming is to be applied to all project phases, from design to monitoring. Specific conflict analysis and participatory tools support the process but must be implemented bearing in mind existing power (im)balances.
- Conflict-sensitive programming necessitates particular attention to gender and minorities. These are differently impacted and most often more vulnerable to disasters and climate change. Programmes must take into account their needs and their lower capacities to assert their interests.
- CSOs and INGOs engage with conflict differently: CSOs are more directly embedded in the conflict which means they can navigate it better, but their staff are also much more at risk of physical harm and pressure.

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<sup>79</sup> Drew, 'Myanmar Case Study: Impact of Conflict on CSOs'.

<sup>80</sup> Egeland, Harmer, and Stoddard, 'To Stay and Deliver. Good Practice for Humanitarians in Complex Security Environments'; Pauletto, 'The Shocking Inequity In Foreign Aid Nobody Talks About'; The Guardian, 'Secret Aid Worker'.

<sup>81</sup> 'More than the Money - Localization in Practice', 1.

<sup>82</sup> Fassin, 'Humanitarianism as a Politics of Life'; Shutt, 'Power in Aid Relationships'.

INGOs need to support CSOs in dealing with these risks. This this means attending to risk prevention and security measures, insurance, and unequal power relations between INGO and CSO staff.

## 5 Findings

In this chapter we present our findings based on an analysis of the survey outcomes complemented by the skype interviews and information from the ‘conflict diary’ (from PfR annual country reports).

The findings are clustered according to the different thematic sections of the educational survey, which relate in turn to the research questions.

Section **5.1, resource-based conflicts in PfR areas**, reports on experiences of PfR with conflicts over natural resources, within and between communities, and between communities and government or private companies. Section **5.2, violence**, provides the findings on the different types of violence (large-scale, physical, threats, structural and cultural violence) experienced by PfR and how this impacts IRM. These sections address the first two research questions:

1. In what ways does PfR encounter conflicts and social tensions in its activities, both in the communities of intervention as well as in the IRM dialogues with government authorities and private companies at local, national and regional levels?
2. What are the effects of these conflicts and social tensions on our IRM approach?
3. They also partially relate to research questions 3 and 4:
4. How does an IRM approach affect conflict dynamics in intended and unintended ways?
5. How are these effects differentiated for men and women, other genders, people of different castes, ethnicities, livelihoods etc?

Section **5.3, gender and marginalized groups**, reports findings on how PfR partners ensure inclusion of women and marginalized groups and what challenges or unintended side-effects they experience in doing so.

This section partially relates to research questions 3 and 4.

Section **5.4, conflict sensitivity in PfR**, describes how PfR monitors ongoing or recurring conflicts, what methods and tools they use and which challenges they encounter when using these methods. It also reports on how PfR country teams deal with conflict, how they work on conflict resolution and conflict sensitive programming, and what challenges they encounter. Finally, this section reports on the impact of PfR on conflict and vice versa, the impact of conflict on the PfR programme.

This relates to research questions 5 and 6:

1. What have PfR’s strategies been for dealing with conflict, and with what results?
2. What opportunities are there for better integrating a conflict-sensitive approach and/or conflict risk reduction approach in IRM?

Finally, **section 5.5, discussing, reporting and seeking support for**

**conflict-related challenges**, describes PfR partners' experiences with reporting on conflict and discussing this with NL-based partners and the NL Embassy in their country or region. This section also lists recommendations provided by research participants on what the NL Embassy could do to support them in case of conflict. It ends with recommendations provided by PfR on how to better integrate conflict in the PfR programme, including how to increase programming on conflict resolution and peacebuilding within the overall resilience framework of IRM.

This section addresses research question 6 and provides inputs for the recommendations of the study.

## **5.1 Resource-based conflicts in PfR areas**

The first cluster of findings concerns the resource-based conflicts encountered in PfR areas.

### ***Conflicts related to natural resources within and between communities***

More than 40 research participants provide examples of conflicts within and between communities related to the access, availability and usage of natural resources such as land, water and forest resources. Examples are provided from all the countries represented in the survey.

A very common type of conflict in the examples provided is conflict between different types of users of natural resources. In Mali, conflicts between farmers, pastoralists and fishermen over land and water resources are apparently common, and in Uganda similar conflicts between farmers and pastoralists are reported. In Ethiopia, as well as in Kenya and Mali, there are also conflicts among pastoralists of different communities competing over the use of grazing lands. Examples from the Philippines include conflicts between upstream mining communities and downstream communities experiencing water pollution from the mines. In India, conflicts mainly concern water use, for example fishing communities accusing farmers of excessive water exploitation for irrigation. In Indonesia, multiple examples concern conflicts between upstream and downstream communities over water use.

Most of the examples presented in the survey responses concern conflicting interests that did not lead to physical violence. Yet, in some PfR areas, physical violence does play a role. For example, a participant from Mali relates a land dispute between two villages in the commune of Nema Badenya Kado which left many people dead or imprisoned.

Many examples show that these conflicts are usually more complicated than merely competing interests over natural resources. Conflicts can become sharper when they happen between groups with different ethnic or other identities, like in the example above on Mali.

**Table 3**  
**Examples of conflicts**

Countries	Types of conflict
Mali	Conflicts between farmers, pastoralists and fishermen over land and water resources
Uganda	Conflicts between farmers and pastoralists
Ethiopia, as well as in Kenya and Mali	Conflicts among pastoralists of different communities competing over grazing lands
Philippines	Conflicts between upstream mining communities and downstream communities experiencing pollution from the mines
India	Conflicts mainly concern water use, for example fishermen accusing farmers of excessive water exploitation for irrigation
Indonesia	Multiple examples concern conflicts between upstream and downstream communities over water use

A number of responses pay specific attention to inequalities, gender and marginality as factors that can play a role in resource-based conflicts. Power inequality plays a role, such as in India, where

there is often conflict between communities with respect to the distribution of and access to water resources. [...] People with more resources, access that water excessively for agriculture, while those with no resources have no way to access the water.

Rich people here, the participant says, “have a greater access and control over government (subsidy) schemes, even within the same community. The voice of the poor has never reached the policy and decision-making level.”

An example from Ethiopia concerned how flower-producing communities extracting water from the fast-drying lake affect local communities in the Rift valley basin. In Guatemala, for example, a participant reports that “machismo/violence against women and problems with gender equity are very common in the communities, and conflict is generated when the women start to participate in decision-making processes”.

Many of the conflicts have layers relating to communities with a different legal status or differentiated entitlements. In Ethiopia, there are examples where conflict was exacerbated because different communities belonged to different administrative regions. This is especially complicated as one participant explains, because “there is no clear borderline between villages. This creates conflict during resource mapping. The pastoral grazing system boundary doesn’t coincide with government administrative boundaries.”

In the Philippines, one example concerned a city where urban poor communities and formal gated and titled communities are in close proximity.

Often they have differing and opposite interests, as the latter views the former as nuisance and hindrance to a more secure and safe environment. Since informal settlements are located in high risk areas in communities like riverbanks, they are blamed for clogging the river ways and worsening flooding in the communities.

In Kenya there has been conflict in the recent past within communities in Laikipia County (a PfR focus area) arising from inequitable water allocation and distribution. “This coupled, with clanism and poor governance of water projects, has led to conflicts when available water is insufficient to meet needs of communities.”

Another example from the Philippines concerns Lumad communities in Mindanao who “have evacuated to municipal centres due to forced displacement, and are treated as outsiders by locals and looked down upon”. However, as one of the participants from Uganda relates, situations of displacement can have different outcomes. This person refers to long-lasting conflicting interests between pastoralists and agricultural communities: while in two communities the pastoralists were chased away, others opted to accommodate them and devised rules and regulations for living. “So the pastoralists sold milk and the host community sold other food items. In some cases they exchanged goods”.

There are a number of examples in which the conflict is not about material user interests but rather about different views on the importance of natural resource management, sometimes intertwined with government conservation policies. A complex case from the Philippines concerns conflict between fishermen engaging in sustainable fishing and other fishermen who want to continue destructive fishing practices. In this case, the conflict escalated when the “folks leading the protection strategy reported the destructive fishing practices to ‘sea wards’ of the local police; after which they had to pay fines. The fishermen then became violent and started threatening with guns.” In this case, PfR was able to mediate to avoid further escalation.

In Uganda, conflicts happen “when the host community of a (natural) resource would like to exploit them... while other communities advocate for ecosystem management and environmental conservations.” One specific example concerns a conflict between timber traders and conservationists in the Karamoja region:

Timber traders cut trees to make charcoal to sell in Kampala and even as far as Kenya. In one case, Community-based trainers started to monitor and report charcoal traders. The charcoal traders did not want their business to end as CBTs were campaigning against illegal and indiscriminate cutting of shea nut trees in Otuke.

A final element that recurs in a number of responses is the importance of government regulations – highlighted more often in their absence. One participant from Mali implied that violent outcomes were related to a lack of institutions that could resolve such conflicts: “conflict can occur in case the Peulh grazes their animals in the fields of Bambara; and there will be conflict because justice is often hardly done”. A participant from the Philippines states that

conflict in different communities...arises when community/local government mitigation actions are done separately with no coordination. For example, rampant waste disposal in river ways from upstream areas and lack of regulations will negate any actions and programmes done by downstream communities for rehabilitation.

An example from Indonesia concerns a village fund that was managed by the head of the village who discriminated between different farmer groups in the allocation of the funds. A conflict from the Central America Regional Programme concerns a “women’s association that has been assigned caretaker of a protected area by the Ministry of Environment and the local people continue to practice tree cutting and pollution of the watershed.”

### ***Conflicting interests between communities and government or private companies over natural resources***

There are many incidences where communities compete with private companies over resources. In Guatemala, for example, there are recurring conflicts between communities and companies of extensive agriculture that engage in river diversion and poorly disposed agrochemical waste. In Ethiopia and Kenya, flower companies compete for water with communities, and in Mali participants relate how “fishermen want to open a dam to let fish pass, whereas the industrialists close the valves for professional purposes”.

A key issue in the stories concerns the roles of the government.

Many examples from the different countries convey that governments tend to favour the interests of private companies over those of communities. In a number of these cases, the government itself is engaged in (commercial) resource exploitation, such as in India where governments’ mining of rare minerals causes pollution in communities, whereas in most cases the government is seen to side with private companies.

In Guatemala, communities protest the government’s continued issuing of permits to private companies to cut down trees in a nature reserve or water catchment area. In the Philippines, in Manila Bay, the government has approved the building of an airport which will negatively affect the livelihoods of communities in the area. In Navotas City, fishermen are denied access to their livelihoods as a result of a coastal infrastructure project of the city government in partnership with the private sector.

In Indonesia, there was a resource-based conflict in Fatuleu Mountain where the Tourism sector of the district government allocated a large amount of money to build infrastructures for tourism without involving the communities. In India, land or forest is often allocated to industries, whereas local communities are denied access to the forest, or are even prosecuted for entering their nearby forest area. In Ethiopia, communities living in the Abijata-Shalla Lakes National Park clash with the park management. In Uganda, pastoralist dry-season grazing areas near the Awash river have been allocated by the government to large-scale sugar cane plantation.

In a number of cases, these conflicts turn violent. In Guatemala, competition between companies and communities comes with “criminalization of community leaders, damage to private property, threats and contracting cuts of local labour”. In Kenya, when pastoralists in Laikipia invaded private ranches to search for water and pasture during a prolonged drought, the national security police shot and killed over 300 cattle.<sup>83</sup> In the Philippines, the conflict between Lumad indigenous communities and multinational companies has taken the form of a total conflict. The Lumad seek to defend their ancestral land against the encroachment of multinational corporations engaged in mining, logging or large plantation activities. These companies are supported by national and local government units including the state security forces, as well as paramilitary units. The government frames the resource conflicts as an ideological fight between democracy and communist terrorism, demonizing the legitimate claim of Lumad to their ancestral land. The conflict also creates divisions within communities, as many Lumad are recruited, often under threat, to become members of paramilitary units, creating fear and violence.

Where governments have policies for resource management, this can work for or against communities. In India, communities may feel dispossessed from their forest-based livelihoods. A complicated issue arises in the Philippines where urban poor communities reside in unsafe locations, such as riverbanks, that have been identified as no-build zones. Relocation programmes are not participatory and lead to people being located far from livelihood opportunities, and so families tend to return to the city and resume living in at-risk places. There are a number of examples in which the government does not uphold its resource management policies. In Guatemala, “it is common that, in the absence of law enforcement people or companies take advantage of the inaction of the authorities responsible for nature protection leading to degradation of the forest through encroachment of agriculture and livestock”. A participant from Mali refers to “corruption of judges, slow return on verdicts, and poor governance”.

Some participants point to a lack of accountability towards local communities. Somebody from Guatemala notes that “the most common conflicts [result from] big decisions on the use of natural resource...taken at a desk at the central level and away from the real priorities and needs of the communities”. In Uganda, a participant reports that “the state of emergency declared by the communities is not taken serious by the government. This is because such information blown to the outside may have political implications on the serving government.”

There are some positive examples. In the Philippines, an example is given where a mayor intervened when government officials condoned illegal fishing in a protected area. In Kenya, protest against the large-scale dam built as part of the Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia Transport Corridor project led to a court order to financially compensate communities for destruction of their

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<sup>83</sup> <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001259299/hundreds-of-cattle-killed-in-police-operation-in-laikipia>

livelihood sources, while in Isiolo County the government had to put on hold the Construction of a ‘mega dam’ on the Ewaso Ngi’ro River.

There are also examples where PfR interventions succeeded in resolving conflicts, such as in Indonesia, where the conflict around tourism referred to above was resolved through the development of a village tourism action plan based on the landscape approach, a point we will come back to below.

Finally, survey respondents from Ethiopia, India, the Horn of Africa, Guatemala and Indonesia mention that conflicting interest between factions, government agencies or political parties have spilled over to the communities and led to conflicts.

### ***Summary***

- PfR mainly experiences conflicts in relation to access, availability and usage of natural resources such as land, water and forest resources. These resource-based conflicts occur between different communities (e.g. farmers, pastoralists and fishermen) or between local communities and government or the private sector. Many of these conflicts have layers relating to communities with a different legal status or differentiated entitlements. Inequalities related to wealth, power, gender and marginality fuel resource-based conflicts.
- Governments tend to favour the interests of private companies over the interests of the community in natural resources. In some cases, the government itself is engaged in (commercial) resource exploitation. Lack of government regulation or law enforcement can exacerbate resource-based conflicts.

## **5.2 Violence**

This section focuses on the intensity and types of conflict with violence as experienced by PfR: large-scale violence, incidents of physical violence, threats of violence and associated uncertainty, structural violence, and cultural violence.

### ***Large-scale violence***

All countries and regions represented in the survey presented different types of violent conflict interacting with or affecting PfR work. However, in countries like Mali, Guatemala and South Sudan, PfR suffers the most from large-scale violence occurring at the national or regional level leading to overall insecurity which hampers everything. In these countries, large-scale violence and insecurity “have diminished the possibilities for movement of the PfR team, which inevitably gives rise to a monitoring problem”. This also restricts the general implementation of the programmes.

Generalized violence can also create tensions in the governance structure at the regional and local level, resulting in levels of uncertainty with regard to

authorization or support that threatens the sustainability of programmes. This is the case in Mali, Guatemala and the Philippines. In this last case, an example is presented where local elections have “created a level of uncertainty in this period of transition to regional autonomy”.

Sometimes, large-scale violence does not affect the programmes directly, but shifts the focus of governments and the context in which projects are implemented such that there is little room left for IRM. For example, in South Sudan, the authorities are prioritizing programmes that contribute directly to peacebuilding, or the general violence in the country has degraded markets and the wider economy to levels that make it difficult for communities to focus on IRM projects.

### ***Incidents of physical violence occurring in areas where PfR works***

While large-scale conflict is a reality in a number of countries, a greater number of examples relate to incidents of physical violence in areas where PfR works. Examples can be found in every country where PfR is working, but with differences. In Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, the Philippines and India, violence usually occurs between communities based on ethical, religious or political differences. In Mali and Guatemala, on the other hand, the examples are related to organized crime and armed conflict. For instance, “incidents of violence in the Mopti region (Mali) have prevented certain activities of the PfR. Incidents of violence have also disturbed environmental education in the department.” In the case of Guatemala, death threats and killings are common. As mentioned in the survey and follow-up interview, two community leaders from where the PfR programme is implemented have been murdered.

None of the examples provided are about violence against PfR staff members or project implementors but rather the affects on community partners and people in areas where projects are implemented. For instance, in India:

Chennai community members were very violent as they did not have water for their daily consumption. When the local authorities, NGOs, tried to supply the community groups with water using delivery tanks, there were reportedly a number of acts of violence in order to get more water.

A typical consequence of physical violence is forced migration, which further affects the implementation of projects. In Ethiopia, for example, “conflict between different ethnic groups led to internal displacement in different parts of the country. Over 1 million people are internally displaced.” The Philippines also has a similar situation: “Lumad communities are forced to leave their homes and farmlands and evacuate to neighbouring municipalities for months (some even years) at a time, until it is safe for them to return.” In India and South Sudan, displacement has also been a regular issue.

In the case of India and the Philippines, disasters such as cyclones, earthquakes, floods and droughts are also mentioned as a factor producing displacement or aggravating the effects of violent conflict.

### ***Threats of violence***

The presence of the threat of violence can also severely affect PfR work and the communities where projects are implemented. Although these threats do not target PfR projects directly, the mere presence compels the programme to act carefully, primarily when it relates to partners that have been threatened. For instance, in the Philippines:

CARE and partner ACCORD have been vilified by the military and in social media by unknown groups as supporters of the Communist Party of the Philippines and its armed wing the New People's Army... Many NGOs and INGOs have been included in the most recent list published by the military. This threat is attributed to humanitarian assistance being extended by NGOs and INGOs to IDPs perceived as supporters of the communists.

In other places, like in Guatemala, death threats often play a role and PfR members need to be careful not to become a target, as one participant notes. An example shows how threats work: "In most cases, they are anonymous, to intimidate people who exercise their right to protest. These [threats] are so frequent that in many cases they manage to paralyse the protest over the levels of insecurity in the region."

### ***Structural and cultural violence***

The notion of structural violence resonated with many participants and is seen to play a role in most countries where PfR is active. This type of violence usually concerns processes by which a group oppresses another through structural means, such as exclusion from education or economic opportunities or restrictions of freedom of assembly and speech.

Most examples of structural violence point to the general legislation of a country, including regulations and laws at the local level, which usually affect the most marginalized. In the case of the Philippines, a participant notes there are a lot of laws and policies that maintain or aggravate marginalization:

Laws on control of resources and economy are for the benefit of big businesses and the small group of the most powerful and wealthiest in the Philippines. This is of national scale but has everyday effects on the most vulnerable in PfR areas as this perpetuates the state of poverty that they have been experiencing for many decades.

India and Mali also present examples of legislation detrimental to the most marginalized groups.

A form of structural violence mentioned in every country is that which affects women. In Uganda, this especially harms women "who lack access to productive resources like land and are thus excluded from economic opportunities from agriculture". Structural violence against women is also presented as a typical example of cultural violence. Cultural violence is a semi-permanent state through which some forms of physical violence and structural violence are considered as legitimate, especially by the majority; for example,

through ideology, religion or social stratification. Minority violence in reaction to these structural problems will often be considered illegitimate.

Mali presents an excellent example of the interrelation of cultural and structural violence. A participant mentions how the imposition of Sharia law has overtaken national legislation in some areas, “imposing the use of veils by women, the prohibition of playing music to young people and also the prohibition of wedding festivities”. A response from Indonesia provides an example of how violence against woman has a cultural aspect, as “the Timorese generally live in a patriarchal culture, which places women in the position of second class [citizens], which has an impact on access and participation in decision making”.

Other examples of cultural violence that indirectly affect PfR work are the caste structure in India, the violent imposition of tribal norms in parts of the Philippines, or discrimination against indigenous people in Guatemala.

Forms of violent conflict affect the implementation of PfR projects in every country, directly or indirectly. Several participants stressed the importance of carefully managing the reality that the work of PfR can itself be a source of threat or direct violence. This also has implications for the issues that can be raised, and some issues need to be avoided despite the impact they have on IRM. For example, a participant from Guatemala, notes that the pervasiveness of gang violence and gang structures in a community prevents people from participating in awareness-raising processes.

This can also lead to exclusion of relevant stakeholders, like in the Philippines, where the current government administration is accused of branding civil society activists and advocates as terrorists or communists: “Due to this, many of these organizations are targeted for intimidation and more often than not have little to no opportunity to be involved in the consultation and participatory processes that the government has.”

### ***Summary***

1. PfR partners in all countries experience violent conflict interacting with or affecting PfR work.
2. Mali, Guatemala and South Sudan suffer the most from the kind of large-scale violence that leads to generalized insecurity; this constrains PfR staff movement and restricts the general implementation of the programmes.
3. Violence affects PfR community partners and others in PfR areas, but there were no examples of violence against PfR staff.
4. Disasters producing displacement can aggravate the effects of violent conflict.
5. Structural and cultural violence, mainly against women, is experienced by PfR partners in all countries.

### 5.3 Gender and marginalized groups

This section describes how and to what degree PfR ensures the inclusion of women and marginalized groups in the programme and what challenges are encountered. It also examines how interventions might have unintended effects that exacerbate social problems or conflict.

As mentioned in the section above, PfR in all countries experience 'structural violence' against women through 'structural means', such as exclusion from education or economic opportunities.

Research participants were strongly convinced of the importance of bringing out women and marginalized groups' voices, given that needs and interests differ. In Guatemala for instance, water access in wetlands is particularly important for women (and benefit the entire household), whereas men emphasize their interest in farming. In Mali, women are traditionally excluded from landownership and in India lower castes are not allowed land titles and are discriminated against over-use of resources.

The bulk of the statements relates to specific programme approaches and tools which allow for marginalized groups and women to be involved throughout project management cycles. Such approaches and tools were cited by members of all eight countries and Horn of Africa regional programme participants. Some PfR partners use specific methods and tools from their 'mother organizations' such as the Gender Action Learning System (CARE International, implemented by PfR Uganda) or the Protection, Gender and Inclusion minimum standards (International Federation of the Red Cross, implemented by PfR Indonesia). Other partners, such as in Kenya, rely on Participatory Disaster Risk Assessments to analyse risks for different social, economic, gender and age groups. All these tools enable projects to apply a specific gender lens, to work out 'family visions' (as reported in Uganda), to break down how each group is rendered vulnerable in different ways and can be included.

A Ugandan participant notes the importance of balancing male and female PfR staff and training staff on gender issues and tools. A participant from Mali highlights the importance of frequently emphasizing the need to have all voices heard, including when doing baseline surveys and engaging at field level. Results should be frequently monitored, according to a Horn of Africa staff member.

One common approach is to make sure that women and marginalized groups with special interests are present in the meetings where needs are assessed and decisions taken. In Mali for instance, the issue of "gender and marginalized groups was taken into account in the composition of the various committees". Women are part of the various livelihood groups (agriculture, livestock, fishing, forest), in accordance with the national gender law quota of 30%. But in Mali there also is a specific women's group, which works on issues such as administrative authorizations and ultimately women's access to agricultural land.

Participants report very practical steps to make that sure women, young people and marginalized groups attend and speak at these meetings: ensure physical access to meeting locations (the Philippines), pay increased attention to information flows (the Philippines), invite participants in a targeted deliberate way, allocate speaking time (Kenya), use attendance sheets which disaggregated biodata with gender and age (Uganda), and work with quotas (Mali). Concerning quotas, a Kenya participant also says: “In all our meetings, workshops and training, we make sure that 30% of the participants must be women and other marginalized group like persons living with disabilities.”

Participants also detail facilitation techniques which help to bring out usually silent or weak voices. Separate meetings are often held with women only, sometimes as first step before mixed meetings. At these follow-up mixed meetings, women can then bring their perceptions and priorities forward more clearly, as a participant from India explains:

Including women and marginalized groups in PfR programme is important as both have different needs. At the initial level...we separate household meetings and later hold group meetings...with these groups. That makes their priority and perception clearer.

Similarly, in the Philippines, it is acknowledged that pre-engagement results in women being “better recognized for their contribution and engagement in men-led activities, which range from income generation to decision making”. In Indonesia, women developed Women Community Action Plans, which were then presented at the village development plan meeting. But follow-up meetings can also be of use. This was applied in Indonesia, where “special classes” were held to accommodate women and other marginalized groups who were less vocal in large meetings.

Respondents suggest that capacity-building of marginalized groups and especially women is often a necessary pre-step for effective participation. Training and information sessions are thus conducted in Guatemala, Kenya and Mali on topics as diverse as women’s rights, self-advocacy, IRM advocacy and land rights. In Mali, youth groups are specifically involved on the issue of climate, via the ‘Y Adapt’ and the ‘Y Adapt for Scouts’ educational modules developed by the Red Cross Climate Centre.

Another way to make sure women’s voices are heard is to have women placed in policy and management positions and on decision-making bodies from the local to regional scales, as reported in Mali, Kenya, Guatemala, Indonesia and South Sudan. Such bodies included the formulation team of village development plans (Indonesia), water resource user associations (Kenya), or the Kinnaite Technical Wetlands Working Group (in South Sudan – the secretary of that working group was a representative of a war widow’s group).

However, men and non-marginalized groups should certainly not be left aside in these endeavours, as reported for India and Indonesia. In Indonesia, the *Laki-laki Baru* or ‘new male’ movement aims to “maximize women’s roles in public sphere as well as domestic issues” while men are to be “more

sensitive to women's involvement in development". Trainings are also offered to men and boys on the topic of gender.

Another strategy indicated by participants is related to advocacy and policy work in order to influence government work plans and budgeting. In Kenya, the PfR team advocated the development of the Youth, Women and Persons with Disability Bill, now in place for Isiolo county. In Mali, women's access to land was a central point of advocacy efforts. Policy and advocacy work is done by training government officials on 'gender responsiveness' or through gender working groups, such as in Indonesia. But a participant from India also explained how marginalized women were involved as much as possible. Women were to interact with decision-makers, either directly or through consensual video recording, which were then shared in various fora.

Further strategies mentioned by some included: appointing 'community champions' to "assist in mobilization of marginalized groups and actively involving them in dialogues" (India); engaging in partnership building (India); and engaging in more 'symbolic' activities to overcome gender stereotypes, such as "involving the men in the weaving of the purun [grass] mat with the group" (Indonesia). A Philippine participant highlights how, in work with farmers and cooperatives, it was not only important to involve men and women equally, but also to ensure that the farm earnings were equitably split between them.

While gender-inclusive approaches are thus widely adopted, two further findings stand out. First, only one participant from Kenya pointed out how representing different interests and voices was particularly important in situations of conflict, while no other responses made reference to conflict-sensitive gender approaches. Second, participants' statements predominantly focus on women. Ethnic groups and castes are mentioned only rarely. The more extensive lists of "women and men, boys and girls, older people, persons with disabilities, and other vulnerable groups (e.g. pregnant and lactating women)" and "women, girls, persons with a disability, minority groups" were mentioned for Indonesia and the Philippines respectively. The latter is particularly important in view of the findings on conflict, where many examples highlighted socio-economic and cultural inequality as conflict dynamics.

### ***Challenges and negative unintended side-effects of involving women and marginalized groups***

As presented in Table 4, 15 of the 52 participants reported challenges and/or negative consequences. The responses can be grouped into four major challenges or unintended side-effects.

A first difficulty is that partners may try to involve women, but **women often lack the voice, literacy and language skills to participate and speak for their own interests**. Difficulties are heightened when women are also part of an ethnic group with lower socio-economic status, as reported in Mali.

Relying on interpreters and facilitators can partly help resolve these issues, but participants also explained how such means were expensive, time-consuming, and not always effective: “some messages get lost in translation” (Kenya participant). Facilitation suited to the specific context and situation – including splitting up groups for discussions and bringing them back together, as put forward by a participant from the Philippines – also necessitates special skills.

**Table 4**  
**Countries with participants reporting challenges and/or negative consequences of involving women and marginalized groups**

Country/region	Number of participants reporting challenges and/or negative consequences
Mali	3
Philippines	2
Uganda	2
India	2
Indonesia	2
Kenya	2
Guatemala	1
Central America	1

A second reported side-effect of women’s empowerment and skills-building was women taking over ever more responsibilities and tasks. One Uganda participant expressed it **as women becoming “victims of burden”**:

The women perform well and have increased knowledge, income and started to invest in construction of permanent houses or better houses. Some of their husbands take advantage of them and load them with more responsibilities of paying school fees, medical bills among others.

Third, in the Philippines and Guatemala, participants working with specific community groups reported **increased defiance by authorities and/or communities**. This makes it harder to build relationships with communities and increases security risks. In the Philippines, participants reported dealing with such risks and restricted movement as follows:

Stricter security protocols are put in place in areas and projects that is identified as high risk in terms of safety, and close coordination with the local government and other civil society organizations in the area are ensured.

Fourth, in Mali, Kenya and Guatemala, it was reported that **men felt left out after women-only meetings were held**. In reaction to this, special meetings were held explaining why women-only spaces were necessary. These discussions focused on the specific conditions of men and women and how these result from societal structures (Guatemala). Such exchanges could be tense but overall led to increased acceptance, although in Kenya they also

ended up allowing some men to participate in previously women-only meetings.

### ***Summary***

1. Research participants were convinced of the importance of bringing out women and marginalized groups' voices, given that needs and interests differ.
2. They recommend context-appropriate tools and programme approaches that enable projects to apply a specific gender lens and allow for marginalized groups and women to be involved throughout project management cycles.
3. The most commonly mentioned approaches include: reaching a balance between male and female PfR staff and training them on gender issues and tools; making sure all voices are heard, such as in baseline surveys and during field trips; regularly monitoring results; making sure that women and other marginalized groups are present in meetings throughout decision-making process.
4. Building the capacity of marginalized groups, especially women, was presented as a necessary pre-step for effective participation, as was advocacy and policy work to influence government work plans and budgeting.
5. Another way to make sure women's voices are heard is to have women placed in policy and management positions and in decision-making bodies from the local to the regional scales, and to engage men and non-marginalized groups in training on gender topics.
6. While gender-inclusive approaches are widely adopted, less attention is generally given to ethnic groups and castes.
7. While most organizations are aware of the need to focus on women, less attention is given to the gender dimensions of conflict. Only one participant (Kenya) pointed out how representing different interests and voices was particularly important in situations of conflict. Responses did not refer to conflict-sensitive gender approaches.
8. Four major challenges or unintended side-effects of gender-inclusive programmes emerged:
9. women often lack the voice, literacy and language skills to participate and speak up for their own interests.
10. A side-effect of women empowerment and skills building was that women took over ever-more responsibilities and tasks. They become "victims of burden".
11. Participants working with specific community groups reported increased defiance by authorities and/or communities.
12. in Mali, Kenya and Guatemala, it was reported that men felt left out after women-only meetings were held.

## 5.4 Conflict sensitivity in PfR

This section deals with policies, approaches, methods and tools that PfR partners use to monitor evolving or recurring conflicts and what challenges they encounter in doing so. It also reports on how PfR partners work on conflict-sensitive programming and conflict resolution. Finally, it reports on the impact of PfR on conflict and vice versa.

We first asked participants if their organizations had a ‘do no harm’ policy. A majority (31 of 44) of participants who responded reported that they did (see Table 5). Most of these (26) are national country offices or branches of CARE, Cordaid and the Red Cross, the other five are in-country CSO partners. Only seven respondents reported they did not have such a policy. Six participants didn’t know whether there was a policy, which could either mean their organization has not communicated its policy sufficiently or that such a policy does not exist.

Organizations with a do-no-harm policy use it as a guiding principle for their programme development and implementation. For example, in the Philippines the policy is integrated into the organization’s overall code of conduct. In Mali partners work on the basis of “fundamental principles of do-no-harm in humanitarian intervention”.

**Table 5**  
**PfR partners per country with a do-no-harm policy**

Country	Yes	No	Maybe	No answer
Mali	7			
Indonesia	5		1	
Uganda	5	2	1	
Ethiopia	3	1	2	
Philippines	4			
India	3	1		
Guatemala	1	1	1	
Kenya	2	2	1	
Central Africa	1			
<b>Total</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>8</b>

We asked further questions on their methods and tools for monitoring (evolving) conflict, if and how they do conflict-sensitive programming, and if and how they work on conflict resolution. The survey responses show that in practice, many such tools and methods overlap.

### ***Monitoring conflict through consultation with stakeholders at different levels***

Participants elaborated on how evolving conflicts are monitored and addressed. The main approach used across the board, with different nuances, is participatory, involving consultations and dialogues.

Dialogue is seen as yielding the best results, as it creates empathy for the other party's stance, and may dissipate escalation. This preference was expressed in Guatemala, for example: "there is very little tolerance towards a confrontational method. Instead, community meetings or stakeholder dialogues are used to reach agreement." A staff member in the Philippines explains:

The process is protracted but not confrontational. The capacity building of vulnerable sectors as well as local government authorities allows the creation of larger spaces for participation where duty-bearers and rights-holders are able to resolve some, but not all issues. Capacity building as an advocacy strategy opens doors that allow for more sustained dialogue, which is not possible in more confrontational type of advocacy activities.

The participant notes, however, that this approach takes time and does not always result in positive outcomes. A line needs to be drawn when the interests of the vulnerable groups are harmed, and a more confrontational approach is mandated.

Community meetings and stakeholder dialogues can strengthen relationships between different users of natural resources, such as up- and down-stream communities, or between officials who might need to "put everything on the table and start having an open discussion amongst themselves", as noted in Indonesia. Dialogue is often used to connect communities with officials, as in Ethiopia: "We connected the community organizations to the relevant government authorities and investors to discuss their issues. Enabling, accompanying and connecting were used as a strategy to influence the relevant stakeholders."

Dialogue meetings are seen as crucial to increase understanding between parties: "It is important to know what each of the parties thinks and to understand that not only do they have a problem, but that there is another party that also feels affected." Dialogue can enable parties to "move forward in synergy" (Guatemala), but they need to take place regularly in order to pay attention to sensitivities (Indonesia).

Dialogues are generally held with different types of stakeholders: ethnic groups, local councils, resource users' associations, CSOs, village savings and loans groups, community leaders and institutions, and government officials. Sometimes these take place within the formal sectors, at other times connecting the communities with the authorities. But they are also crucial to strengthen relationships between and within communities. In some countries, dialogue is held between the IRM coalition and formal authorities, such as in Mali.

Meetings and dialogues are often about understanding the other parties, finding common interests and seeking agreement (Mali and Indonesia), ensuring that conflict parties both benefit from programmes (Kenya and Uganda), or highlighting laws and policies (Uganda). In the Philippines, much focus is given to knowledge sharing to enhance the understanding of the relationship between natural resources, hazards, climate, livelihoods and risk for future. The meetings and dialogues are generally found to be quite successful. For example, in Indonesia, “After the consultation process, tension between the related stakeholders began to ease, resulting in better and participative conference of DRR Forum.”

Other methods to further the dialogue between groups include exchange visits for community learning (Uganda), and media talk shows to discuss issues (Uganda), consultations leading to signed agreements between armed groups or with the population (Mali), and meetings between user groups in resource conflicts (Ethiopia and Uganda). Sometimes these activities culminate in a forum or advocacy day. In Uganda, an inter-district forum is organized to set terms and conditions for seasonal migration.

An interesting observation was provided from Mali, where PfR enabled dialogue by grouping stakeholders according to their livelihoods to avoid them primarily identifying themselves along ethnic lines. For instance, fishermen discussed their interest together and negotiated with other livelihood groups. This put ethnicity into the background and highlighted instead what people have in common across ethnic divides.

It is considered important to link informal discussions to formal ones, seeing them not as separate islands but as building blocks. Shifting between informal and formal methods decreases the risks related to powerful voices overshadowing the less powerful ones:

Constant discussion and coordination with PfR partners help identify the conflicts (and updates) that the communities face. Formal and informal discussions provide information that we need, and most of the time results from informal discussions support/verify the formal ones. In formal activities, discussions are often led and hoarded by the highest official or eldest participant in the group, thereby limiting the flow of information. To bring out the concerns and voices of those not in power, it is healthy to engage them in informal discussions where they can freely express their thoughts and experiences without the fear of being shut down or disenfranchised. (Philippines)

This consultation, the participants stress, needs to happen continuously.

### ***Assessments, monitoring and continued discussions***

Surveys, assessments, consultations and monitoring are used in the planning phase of a project to better understand and increase participation of the communities and stakeholders. In areas where there is a lot of activism, such as in India, or during particularly conflict-prone seasons, such as the Ethiopia’s dry season, these assessments help to understand community perceptions. Community risk assessments are also done to identify hazards, assess

vulnerabilities and capacities, and devise an action plan. In the Philippines, this includes consultations with the national counterpart organizations to understand emerging conflicts.

Evolving conflicts are also monitored through local capacity strengthening and increasing understanding by discussions with local partners and PfR partners on how to take a ‘do no harm’ and conflict-sensitive approach, and how to involve community groups and support community structures to resolve conflicts. In Indonesia, these discussions are organized at a national-level forum with other IRM partners. Policies and frameworks at an organizational level “encourage dialogue among members” (Kenya), and brainstorming project monitoring and evaluation sessions were found useful to continue to address the conflicts as they emerge (Uganda).

### ***Complaint procedures***

Complaint procedures have become an essential part of the organizational toolbox. Some tools are more informal, such as giving contact information to community groups so they can contact PfR partners directly, such as in India and Uganda, or having staff in the field “collect any emerging issues from community and district” as in Uganda. More formal tools include complaint procedures shared among different partners (India). PfR provides support for organizations to have a complaint procedure, such as in Uganda:

PfR established the community-based monitoring process. This is a process where communities are trained on rights, entitlements and obligations. The ‘community-based monitors’ collect information through monitoring ‘service delivery’ and other aspects of resource-based conflict. The findings are shared with duty bearers through a dialogue and recommendations and actions are agreed upon.”

Communities can appeal to the project or to local government. In conflict situations, police and the judiciary are often involved, but in certain areas these functions are taken over by rebel groups.

But while these procedures are in place, they are not always used successfully. In Indonesia, a participant reports that “So far, no complaints have been made either from the community or programme implementation partners.” In other countries, the complaint procedures remained limited to the level of meetings and raising issues through the local self-governance structures, such as in India. Generally, it is an aspect that still requires strengthening, as noted by participants from Guatemala and, in the following quote, the Philippines: “Complaints procedures are applied in community projects, but this is an area we should strengthen as a part of PfR 3 to improve staff/partner understanding and application as a basis of capacity building.” Remoteness can pose a challenge to these procedures, such as in Uganda:

Some people are deep in the village and may not have reported their grievances due to distance and language or even opportunity to get to staff directly.

## ***Conflict-sensitive programming***

Many participants are familiar with a number of tools that enable conflict-sensitive programming.

Context analysis, conflict risk assessments and power mapping are important tools to generate baseline information for conflict-sensitive programming, and some participants include and use ‘conflict risk assessment’ as part of their standard assessments for programme design and development.

CARE has developed a conflict sensitivity toolkit for use in country offices and by PfR partners. A ‘community scorecard’ is included to assess conflict-risks. Staff from PfR Uganda have been trained in the do-no-harm methodology and taken through tools of conflict-sensitive programming.

Based on the needs expressed by field staff and partners, in 2019 Cordaid developed a toolkit for conflict risk analysis and risk reduction, which will be introduced to local staff and partners in 2020. This toolkit can support conflict risk analysis at the start of a project and conflict risk reduction planning, implementation and monitoring.

Participants mention that *context analysis* through community risk assessment and stakeholder mapping is key to better understanding different actor’s roles and engagement in the programme. Conflict risk assessment helps PfR partners to anticipate possible situations that may arise and formulate contingency plans to help address them.

Importantly, some participants note that ‘normal’ risk assessment tools and methods used for IRM also enable them to understand conflict dynamics in the context in which they operate. These include: context analysis; hazard, capacity and vulnerability assessments; stakeholder analysis; and the ‘pressure and release model’.

Almost all participants mention the importance of *participatory* analysis. In Ethiopia, participatory risk assessments help to identify “the connectors and dividers in the community” and participatory mapping exercises, including with relevant government offices, help to identify key resources and resource users. Power mapping in Indonesia is done through stakeholder and conflict mapping, including special village meetings for women groups. A participatory advocacy training manual is seen to promote “inclusive processes that address risks that often lead to conflicts either of interest or over resources” in Kenya. A participant from the Philippines mentions the use of free, prior and informed consent – a specific right that pertains to indigenous peoples and is recognized in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples allowing them to give or withhold consent to a project that may affect them or their territories. When there is a new project in Uganda, common planning and strategy formulation is done through development of Community Action Plans which “clearly address most of the would-be concerns of members within the community, such as sharing of responsibilities and benefits.”

Many organizations employ local staff who understand the local context and power relations between communities. They carry out the stakeholder

analysis that includes understanding the communities' culture, language, political and socio-economic settings.

### ***Practices and issues with the use of tools***

Mapping tools and power analyses are mostly seen as useful in the planning phase:

This process of power mapping has been the foundation for planning; we have been able to work with community structures to engage the leadership following understanding of power dynamics. The interest and power mapping is done to ensure the advocacy is well targeted. (Uganda)

Community and interest mapping is done during training, for example by using problem trees, and plans are developed based on the results (Mali).

Respondents find the tools especially useful for knowledge building and in the development of strategies. Interest mapping and power analysis in advocacy plans are developed in a participatory, inclusive manner, such as in Guatemala: "This is important to elaborate in order to understand that maybe there are other actors that were left out but may have a decisive role in resolving the conflict."

Some participants say there is still limited expertise and experience in the use of conflict assessment tools and insufficient understanding of the interaction between resilience interventions and conflict dynamics.

Though many apply conflict mapping, implementation needs strengthening at different levels. As one participant from the Philippines says: "Our practice is not based on experience or strong theoretical foundation, but mainly through 'learning by doing'."

Tools are not always used consistently, or their use is too limited scope. Power analyses are mostly done at village level, but as one participant recognized, "it's not sufficient as it needs to look inter-village and zonal strategies". Some participants observed that it would be useful to use these tools beyond the planning phase. In Kenya, a yearly risk analysis and stakeholder mapping is conducted to reflect on – and adjust if necessary – the theory of change.

Research participants mention a number of issues related to conflict-sensitive programming that help them to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts with regard to conflict dynamics. A participant from Ethiopia says:

The focus is on maximizing positive effects on stability without changing the objectives of the resilience programme and deliberately designing objectives of the resilience programme to have an impact on improving stability. The focus is on doing-no-harm by working in an inclusive manner.

Many participants agree that the tools can facilitate programming but note that inclusive planning and engagement in multi-stakeholder dialogues remain key.

## ***Key elements of conflict-sensitive programming***

*Transparent communication* is an important element of conflict-sensitive programming as it is key to building trust among parties. For example, in Uganda, where partners work through common planning with all involved groups, a participant advises providing adequate information to all groups, and being transparent and accountable: “Help them understand opportunities of cooperation in the short and long term.”

This is echoed by a participant from the Philippines: “We are open, transparent, and collaborative, which builds trust. When trust is present, community members are more inclined to share their views and observations. In this manner, we are able to see where conflicts may arise.”

Transparent communication helps avoid misinformation with any of the stakeholders and to explain trade-offs between communities:

If you have a project in area X, then make sure that you reach out to the next area and explain thoroughly what the project means and what reasons are behind the location. Otherwise, it may become difficult for them to embrace it and instead harm or cause delays in execution which affects quality of work. (Uganda)

Another important element is *facilitating engagement in multi-stakeholder dialogues*. For example, in Mali PfR partners facilitate dialogues between stakeholders in various stages of programme development and implementation. Government and local communities are facilitated to participate in multi-stakeholder platforms to air opinions and enable understanding and empathy: “Empathy is the key to resolving a conflict: make clear that there are not always people who win or lose but rather actions that allow normalizing a situation.”

Understanding conflict dynamics helps communities in conflict to engage in dialogue. In India, PfR initiates consultative dialogues between conflict groups and assigns arbiters in consultation with those groups. The arbiter is oriented to include the needs of lower castes and other marginalized groups. In Uganda, dialogues between stakeholders are organized through ‘community barazas’ where government officials meet local communities and engage on issues that require policy direction from the government. In this process, participants say, it is important that organizations “step back and give room for the community leaders to engage – this may take time”.

In the Philippines partners seek dialogue with the government and other ‘duty bearers’ by looking for spaces to participate in governance, for example in the local Peace and Order Council. PfR ensures there is local government involvement in the programme. In Kenya, partners strive to understand the cultural and political aspects of conflict dynamics through providing a platform that is seen as a ‘safe space’ for dialogue. Dialogues are facilitated between local communities and government institutions such as the National Water Resources Management Authority.

### ***Taking it a step further: working on conflict resolution***

In theory and policy, a distinction is made between conflict-sensitive work and programming for conflict resolution (see chapter 4). The distinction is not always clearly demarcated in practice, and many participants consider their work as conflict risk reduction, conflict resolution or even peacebuilding activities between different groups in the area they work. This can be at village or district level, at the level of a landscape such as Ewaso Nyiro River Basin in Kenya or in a whole region, for instance the Inner Niger Delta in Mali. The following examples from the practice of PfR are derived from the ‘conflict diary’ based on PfR annual country reports and from the survey responses.

Two examples from different villages in Indonesia illustrate how PfR partners work to resolve conflicts:

the conflict started during the election process of village chief where there was misunderstanding on the number of votes. PfR’s approach was building dialogue and communication with all groups in the village. PfR perpetually communicated with higher authorities who were responsible to resolve the conflict. Although it took time finally all parties involved in the conflict agreed to ‘hand over’ the problem to the district level government who assigned a staff to act as village chief until a new leader was elected. Now, all is back to normal again.

There was conflict in the forest area in Oelbiteno, a Pfr village in Kupang district which was resolved by Pfr: the forest area was categorized as Industrial Forest (Hutan Tanaman Industri) managed by government sector at provincial level. The villagers could access firewood and cattle fodder from the forest area but could not expand their farming in the forest area. This created conflict. Pfr introduced ‘breeding cattle in the stall’. The community needed to plant some forest plants that could be used for cattle fodder. Pfr also encouraged community to plant coffee, guava and sweet potato to optimize production. This was quite successful as the conflict was seriously reduced.

In Kenya, the Partners for Resilience organize each year a ‘Camel Caravan’ in the Ewaso Nyiro River Basin to bring the conflicting ethnic groups together to stand up for their common interests. The Camel Caravan promotes more equitable water allocation among all water users (tourist lodges, agro-business, farmers, pastoralists) along the river and raises awareness on unsustainable water extraction and pollution by mid- and upstream users. Pfr partners together with county governments facilitate “community peace awareness dialogues and campaign on conservation of Ewaso Nyiro River upstream, mid- and downstream”.

Kenya Pfr has also conducted inter-community dialogue with different stakeholders and managed to facilitate the inter-county peace strategy for Isiolo, Laikipia, Samburu and Marsabit counties.

Warring communities signed a traditional peace accord at Nesarge village in the border of Laikipia, Isiolo and Samburu, as a traditional conflict resolution mechanism. Signing of the peace agreement among these pastoralist communities is crucial in managing risks from inter-community conflicts like cattle rustling

especially during droughts. PfR CSO partner together with other CSOs and the peace elders from Laikipia, Isiolo and Samburu held a meeting to plan and sensitize the communities on the importance of signing the peace accord.

In Mali, PfR actively works on conflict risk reduction and facilitated the establishment of an 'IRM coalition' by the different water user groups, farmers, fishermen, pastoralists and forest product users in the Inner Niger Delta. These groups joined forces to prevent internal conflicts on water and land resources and to promote a joint vision in their dialogue with the government to advocate sustained water inflow in the Inner Niger Delta (in relation to existing and planned hydropower dams upstream).

Members of this IRM coalition are trained in the IRM concept and disseminate criteria and regulations to change water and land use practices at community level. PfR has noted that the number of conflicts between different water users and conflicts over land has decreased. PfR Mali partners are attentive on the cohesion between members of different unions and associations and within the IRM coalition.

In the Philippines:

In Surigao, through the climate risk assessment exercise with the communities, the relationship between mining operations, pollution, water resources, hazards and poverty, disasters became crystal clear. PfR partner and local government in their aim to reduce conflict started a dialogue with the mining company on strategic zoning (protection of water resources and high risk zones, against landslides, floods) and to stop mining in certain areas that are most at risk and would have greatest impact now and in the future of the municipality. It also included looking at the issue of restoration that mining companies are supposed to do but often don't.

Finally, an example from Uganda shows how media can be used:

Through our extended work in the media where we do our advocacy, for example in mining work, we use mass media to provide information to the public that is relevant to conflict resolution.

### ***Challenges to conflict monitoring and conflict-sensitive programming***

Pro-active monitoring through consultation and dialogue appears the favourite and most effective strategy to monitor and address conflict but is not without challenges.

One challenge observed is that conflict-sensitive tools are usually adjusted to the local level, whereas PfR works at different levels. PfR partners tend to adjust to the situation as it emerges, such as in the Philippines, where the programme was able to scale up when working at the village level was not sufficient; it was then taken to inter-village and multi-stakeholder level.

An important limitation of working through dialogues is that PfR often cannot address conflicts directly. It was noted that this makes it even more

important to combine formal and informal methods of working, as informal conversations can yield information about conflict that stay hidden in public meetings.

Methods can be *time consuming* and therefore *costly*. For example, in Guatemala key challenge is the available time within a workplan to assess potential conflict and work on risk reduction: “It can lengthen community processes”. In the Philippines, the scattered locations of communities are challenging. Participants say that in their initial IRM programme there was no budget explicitly allocated for doing conflict risk assessments or engaging in risk reduction activities. As a result, conflict risk assessments are not done in all PfR areas due to limited funds. In Kenya “mobilization of people to share their views is costly in the bid to reach many in far places”.

Another challenge is to *get conflicting parties together*. Participants explain that some who are unwilling to engage in dialogue or mediation processes. This can be for different reasons. In India, for example, some segregated communities do not want to engage in dialogue with each other. “PfR had to revise its strategy as these heterogeneities have existed for decades. Root causes cannot be easily dealt with.” Some research participants mention challenges with the village government: “they are sensitive, there is suspicion” (Uganda).

Many participants flag the challenge of *limited or inadequate staff knowledge and capacity* on conflict-sensitive programming. There is a need to improve staff capacities to promote and implement conflict sensitive methods. Some staff lack personal skills and abilities for mediation and conflict resolution. Research participants mention that they are ‘learning by doing’ and became engaged in conflict mitigation and resolution ‘when the need arose’. In addition to capacity and skills, *neutrality of staff* is important when engaging in conflict-sensitive programming. A Philippine participant mentions that “staff maybe be influenced by the power dynamics and struggle to be able to maintain neutrality in process facilitation. We need strong tools and training to assist staff and partners.”

*Safety and security risks for staff* when they travel to conflict-affected areas present another challenge. This was mentioned, for example, by a Philippines participant who stressed the importance of ‘staff readiness’ to face and be exposed to risks. Staff have to be well informed of the risks that come with the work and the organization’s capacity to ensure their safety. Work in conflict areas is dynamic and volatile, situations may change any time, so the staff and organization “must be flexible, adaptable and have presence of mind”. A participant from Mali also notes that staff face many difficulties travelling to PfR focus areas due to insecurity.

*High turnover of employees*, both in the government and in CSOs, is mentioned as a constraint. Institutional memory and carefully nurtured relations are easily lost. For example, from Kenya: “In conflicts that involve the local government, high staff turnover, replacement or transfers result in loss of momentum gained from engaging said officials”.

In the Philippines the high turnover of organizations’ staff has been difficult, not only in relation to IRM capacity “but also on how to deal with the

pressures on them, considering that staff are quite young and mostly women, and in building the institutional memory on the behaviour in the communities and the effects of the project”.

In Ethiopia, the fast-changing nature of some conflicts require *organizational flexibility and adaptiveness*. During drought periods there can be resource-based conflicts; in periods of floods, conflicts can be related to the relocation of affected communities. During national election periods there can be violent political conflict.

In relation to this, some participants mention as a constraint the *lack of donor flexibility* in adapting programmes to the realities on the ground.

In some cases, conflict-sensitive programming alone is not sufficient to address conflict dynamics. In Kenya, militia activity is a difficult problem:

Some ‘normal’ conflicts have become sophisticated, for instance cattle rustling becomes a booming business and is supported by powerful people. The NGO interventions are not always fruitful; this requires a more strategic engagement than a stand-alone programme for peacebuilding and conflict transformation.

Many indicate that they face *resistance from stakeholders* “sometimes out of ignorance or fear of dis-empowerment (of the dominant party) and there is sometimes limited appreciation by stakeholders who think we are being too diplomatic in handling the situation” (Indonesia).

In Guatemala PfR partners experience resistance from some sectors of society “due to ignorance or because there are no previous experiences of applying conflict-sensitive methods in these communities. The misinformation of the people we work with can be a great challenge.”

Sometimes resistance is rooted in culture: for example, pastoralists communities in Kenya, the Samburu, consider cattle rustling as an important element in their culture which they don’t want to change. “For a man to marry, he must steal cattle.”

### ***Challenges with conflict resolution***

Challenges in working on conflict resolution are largely the same as those encountered in relation to conflict-sensitive programming, such as: limited financial resources because partners have not budgeted for conflict resolution activities; lack of adequate staff capacities and skills; the challenges of bringing conflicting groups together. There are also specific challenges, in particular the risk that solutions don’t last.

Participants from Uganda and Kenya say they have limited reach because the activities for conflict mitigation and resolution were not originally planned and therefore not budgeted for. There was no budget to organize important meetings between specific sub-region community leaders, which resulted in increased tension.

Some research participants say that even when a negotiation results in an agreement endorsed by all parties, it may not be long-lasting, and conflict may break out again after short period.

The challenge has been in sustaining results. Conflicts transform and change face. For instance, with the migration of cattle keepers to Otuke, different ones keep coming, not the same whom you worked with in the previous year or season are involved in negotiations ... Sometimes it's very difficult to bring together the two conflicting parties, and some resolutions may not be implemented as planned since the two conflicting parties may have a change of mind. (Uganda)

The Red Cross seems to face some specific challenges in relation to its mandate. It is 'auxiliary' to the government but in the IRM programme it works on empowerment of communities to defend their needs and interest even "in case this is against the government policy" (Kenya).

### ***Impact of PfR on conflict and vice versa***

One of the questions is whether and PfR interventions can contribute to conflict dynamics. This question is difficult to answer, because there is rarely a direct causal relation between the interventions and conflict. Nonetheless, interventions may contribute indirectly to the conditions that underlie conflict. Participants note several of these effects.

Partners in Ethiopia regularly assess the potential effects of their interventions on the dynamics of the conflict, for example by checking if an activity is "strengthening the connectors or the dividers in the community". They monitor and adapt the programme to the oft-changing realities on the ground, using their Theory of Change.

One of the PfR partners in Guatemala explains how their IRM programme affects conflict dynamics as it touches on sensitive issues such as land-use planning and allocation of resources.

IRM works on promoting spatial planning policy, which is a sensitive issue in the country due to the lack of legal certainty of land ownership ... The conflict in Guatemala is based mainly on organized crime. PfR wants to empower people, and that can put them in danger. You have to be careful with those good intentions, seeking to empower community leaders and women, and inviting them to raise their voice. Of course, this is necessary, but it is also very, very dangerous.

The participant adds that "it is important not to stop implementing the programmes, but to conduct carefully, so the programme does not affect the beneficiaries or the members of our organization."

In Mali, leaders of the IRM coalition facilitate the relocation of people from jihadist-controlled villages. They face many challenges, including the people's mistrust of them, which can lead to increased conflict risk.

In the Philippines, local CSO partners discuss with PfR staff what they encounter in the field and what the 'tendencies' of the communities are in relation to the PfR programme. In Surigao, South Philippines, they see negative responses to some of the interventions: "we have to be cautious in explaining the programme and not creating false expectations. We need to ensure that the interventions are not creating conflicts between communities."

This was also the case in Indonesia, where limited funding for the programme caused conflicts between communities.

Some conflict contexts can be very complex, making it difficult to oversee the impacts of programme interventions. A participant from Ethiopia explains:

In pastoral communities employing conflict-sensitive methods is risky by itself. It can produce dangerous consequences in many ways as everybody might understand differently. Some will politicize and some others will associate with ethnic and the like. So we should work systematically and in collaboration with the community based on their interests.

A case from the Philippines illustrates how programme interventions to support local participation in large scale government programmes have to be evaluated regularly to prevent unintended negative effects on vulnerable groups:

In the case of the Manila Bay Sustainable Development Master Plan, PfR is confronted with highly controversial issues like forced displacement of informal settler families (ISFs) from high-risk zones. These displaced families are deprived of housing and related basic services (in the name of risk reduction) despite existing legislation ensuring rights of ISF and urban poor subjected to resettlement. The issue of land reclamation in Manila Bay is a highly contentious issue, pitting the ISF and small fishermen against private sector interests working with national government. PfR has committed to facilitate community and local government units' participation ensuring their voices are heard in the planning process. But participation so far has been token and appears to be used to rubber-stamp the plan. If having a place at the table and having their voices heard prove impossible, the question to ask would be: is the strategy being used by PfR still valid, or should other strategies be put into play?

A participant from Uganda mentions that PfR can get into 'conflict' with partners when people engage in activities that PfR considers unsustainable, such as charcoal trade and bush burning.

#### *Negative pressure on PfR partners*

We asked if PfR partners or the local CSOs faced increased negative pressure from government, the private sector, or other actors as a result of their IRM related activities. Of the 52 participants, 48 answered this question.

When negative pressure was experienced, it mostly derives from government institutions and officials with diverging interests. In Guatemala, this happened during the revision of the risk management law, where the government and the deputies changed the law giving power of civil protection to the army. In one part of the Philippines, the government is preventing a CSO working at the request of a private company and other stakeholders. In Indonesia, the CSO alliance had to step back as it was threatened by government elites: an official pressured senior management to withdraw staff. Threats to the programme and staff are not uncommon among PfR partners, but they are not always reported. Since in Kenya some of these threats might originate from government officials, and reports are often shared with these

institutions, it is understandable that they limit sharing of these experiences in reports.

**Table 6**  
**Participants who have experienced negative pressure**

Country	Yes	No
Mali	2	4
Indonesia	1	6
Uganda	1	8
Ethiopia	0	6
Philippines	3	3
India	0	4
Guatemala	1	3
Kenya	0	4
Central America	1	1
Total	9	39

Programmes need to be careful how to deal with these pressures, especially when it comes from the government:

In balancing the interests of poor communities or vulnerable groups, and the interest of the local government unit (or the economic interests of the local chief executive), we need to be very careful as the local chief executive might close the door to us (including literally) if he feels his interests are threatened. This could lead to a premature termination of the engagement or dialogue. Meanwhile, capacity building of communities will continue, so that they will be capable, on their own, to engage the local government unit or chief executive in dialogue on specific matters of their interest. (Philippines)

In Indonesia, while it was considered “a huge step back”, they were able to make revisions and have backchannel communication with other government officials.

Another type of negative pressure was seen in harassment from the military or militarized groups in the Philippines:

Staff have been targets of military harassment and intimidation because of working with local organizations of marginalized sectors that the government has red-tagged. Staff are followed by military forces in plain clothes, suppliers such as service providers are interrogated, services and community activities are restricted or put on hold, which affects the timeliness and efficiency of delivery.

To resolve this, the team sought audience with government and military officials to explain the projects and activities that will be implemented in disputed areas:

It is important to maintain a civilian and independent status in providing its services to those in need, in accordance to the International Humanitarian Law, so access to communities while ensuring staff security is important. Security protocols are also put in place for monitoring of staff's whereabouts, efficient work planning and setting up alternative plans.

Militarized harassment was also found in Mali, as there is “poor law enforcement, pressure and ‘roquettes’ from natural resource users”. Resource managers are seen to be part of the state and therefore targeted by jihadists.

Awareness that pressures can mount can lead to framing of the programme in a certain way to avoid conflict, as a Philippines participant notes: “we are trying to keep a safe space as we dig more into power dynamics of water and other natural resources. We have to anticipate, it’s a risky business.”

#### *When challenges stand in the way of the IRM programmes*

In some cases, the problems faced can severely affect a programme’s effectiveness or lead to its abandonment. Research participants from countries including Guatemala, the Philippines and Mali indicate that conflict contexts can be too threatening, too large-scale or too complex to address. Some indicate that their only option was to downscale or withdraw from a region. In Guatemala, after the killing of two community leaders in 2018, the CSO partner applied the principle of ‘total caution’ and suspended its staff and all activities in the area. The PFR partner stayed in remote contact with the communities and with the municipal authorities to ensure that other parts of the PFR policy programme were still implemented.

Contexts of large-scale violence can be too complex for organizations to address: “These challenges go beyond the capacity of our organizations as they relate to a lack of governance, of law enforcement and the existence of criminal structures in the region” (Guatemala).

Sometimes the long history of violence has resulted in a culture of fear among local residents who are wary of speaking out, organizing themselves or being involved in any dialogue with other stakeholders. This constrains PFR partners from engaging with or mobilizing local communities. In Central America, participants see a “widespread culture of violence which does not allow a culture of peace to develop effectively, even after more than 25 years of peace agreements that ended armed conflicts in the region”.

Widespread violence can be too threatening for some organizations to act upon. As a participant from the Philippines reports:

In the current political climate of strident anti-human rights rhetoric, shrinking democratic space and vilification of human rights, environmental, humanitarian and other organizations’ involvement in highly contentious issues such as land reclamation, mining, logging, plantation operations can be literally fatal.

Participants from Uganda mention that in some cases NGOs are being targeted for political reasons which leads them to refrain from any involvement

in conflict resolution. Some others from Horn of Africa region mention that in extreme cases of conflict between stakeholders they refrain from getting involved and leave it to the authorities to intervene.

PfR partners working in these threatening conflict contexts describe 'mitigation measures', such as strengthening partnerships with local government units, or ensuring close collaboration with international NGOs and with multi-stakeholder alliances. They also put stricter staff safety and security measures in place.

A number of organizations do not have the legal or organizational mandate to address conflict-related issues. For example, in Ethiopia, until 2018, CSOs were legally not allowed to work actively on conflict resolution. However, this legislation has been revised and now civil society actors are allowed to engage in and facilitate conflict resolution processes. In some cases engagement in conflict resolution can be beyond the mandate of their organization or the programme and/or they do not have adequate staff capacity, human and financial resources.

In India, working on conflict resolution can be too sensitive. As a participant notes, "civil society actors do not want to offend state governments by integrating sensitive matters on conflict in their programmes".

Sometimes an organization has to work through a partner on conflict resolution, such as in Indonesia: "We know the root causes, the constraints and to some extent, the culprits, but we have to work through partner organization as we lack confidence to deal with it directly."

Participants from Kenya mention that their organization needs to build its reputation in conflict resolution as their core business is disaster management and community resilience building.

A Guatemalan participant stresses that PfR partners "far away" do not know what is going on in relation to conflict dynamics: "in-country partners and CSOs on the ground are the forefront ... It might be useful to make a guide and be able to teach (PfR partners) how to handle these programmes at all levels. They need to learn from us, from the ground, how things need to be addressed."

A participant from the Philippines reflected:

In the case of large-scale violence, it always involves a lot of parties and stakeholders and the conflict has been standing for several years or decades. It is a challenge for CSOs to address this with limited time and resources as socio-economic factors and issues way beyond the organization or the project's mandate must be resolved. The IRM approach can be a tool for conflict analysis and strategies how to address these but ultimately, it is the duty bearers that should be the main actor in resolving it.

## *Summary*

- The majority of PfR partner organizations have a ‘do no harm’ policy.
- PfR partners use a participatory approach with consultations and dialogues to monitor conflicts.
- Surveys and assessment tools are applied to complement consultations and increase participation of communities and other stakeholders.
- PfR partners use context analysis, conflict risk assessments and power mapping to generate information for conflict-sensitive programming; some include conflict risk assessment as part of their standard assessments for programme design and development.
- Key elements for conflict-sensitive programming are transparent communication towards all parties and the use of multi-stakeholder dialogues to increase parties’ understanding of conflict dynamics and create safe spaces for stakeholders. Examples of initiatives by PfR partners include establishing a coalition of different water users (Mali), an annual multi-stakeholder event along a river (Kenya), or multi-stakeholder dialogues (Philippines, Indonesia).
- The challenges experienced by PfR partners in conflict monitoring, conflict-sensitive programming and conflict resolution are many, including: inconsistent use of various tools, or their use is too limited in scope; methods can be time consuming and costly; difficulties bringing conflicting parties together; limited or inadequate knowledge and capacity of staff; safety and security risks; high turnover of employees both in government and CSOs; resistance from stakeholder out of ignorance or fear of disempowerment. Last but not least, partners flagged the challenge of sustaining results. The fast-changing nature of conflicts requires flexibility and adaptiveness from organizations.
- PfR can have a negative impact on conflict either directly or indirectly as it promotes IRM which in some countries relate to sensitive issues such as planning policies or land ownership. Building advocacy capacities among local communities can put them in danger in some contexts. PfR programme implementation can create conflict with communities when false expectation are raised about project benefits.
- Nine PfR partners experienced negative pressure from government or the private sector as a result of their IRM-related activities. In some cases, violence, threats or harassment can lead to the withdrawal of staff, a less effective programme or even the abandonment of the work.

## 5.5 Discussing, reporting and seeking support on conflict-related challenges

Given the lack of space to talk openly about conflict issues in many settings, we asked whether PfR actors discuss or report on conflict-related issues with actors like CSOs, PfR colleagues, government officials, communities, and donors.

Most PfR partners discuss issues of conflict and violence related to the programme with their colleagues, the communities involved, CSOs and local government. This is an opportunity to ask for advice and support from others. A research participant from Mali says, “yes, it happens to discuss conflicts because it is always in the discussions that the light shines”. Many partners use the opportunity of half-yearly PME workshops with in-country PfR partners to discuss conflict dynamics and issues related with violence. In India, for example, conflict around mining operations is repeatedly raised for discussion at these workshops.

However, in some cases these matters cannot be discussed publicly for fear of increasing the threat of violence. In Guatemala, partners decided to be very prudent in sharing information so as not to trigger further violent actions:

Although it is thought that we must act and intervene immediately and directly, from personal experience this can trigger violent actions and even the murder of other people in the team. The communities and CSOs are mentioned with much caution because they are the people who are in the first line (in direct contact or closest with the conflict).

In most other contexts, partners feel that discussing conflict-related issues can itself contribute to the reduction of conflict risk. For example, in Mali, such discussion has “the aim of contributing to the reduction of social tension in order to be able to implement the programme while developing suitable strategies”. PfR partners discuss issues of conflict and violence with programme stakeholders specifically when this can affect the achievement of objectives and goals of the programme. “In some cases, [stakeholders] are part of the conflict or otherwise they can be part of the solution, so it is necessary to take all actors into account.”

In some countries, partners have to be cautious in discussions with government. For example, in Ethiopia PfR engages “sometimes with scepticism”, wary of the possible consequences for the programme. In Guatemala partners are hesitant to talk with government officials as: “it is known that by levels of corruption and/or state bureaucracy it can be counterproductive”. In the Philippines, PfR presents the conflict to the government from the perspective of ‘problem resolution’: “they know many of the issues but government position is different and their engagement in processes is very important. ‘Conflict’ is not a good term in the Philippines so has to be communicated carefully”.

Another participant from the Philippines adds, “We discuss only based on appraisal about the openness of the government official to such discussion and

the specific topic on conflict”. In Indonesia, partners can discuss these issues only with ‘open minded’ government officials.

Thanks to its ‘neutrality principle’, the Red Cross has much better access to senior government officials than many CSOs. In Ethiopia, the Red Cross can put issues of conflict on the agenda of the government.

Many partners put conflict-related issues and violence in their project reports, which they share with PfR partners and the donor and in some countries also with in-country programme stakeholders. In Kenya, CSO partners were threatened during a campaign in which they were facilitating dialogues with local stakeholders on a planned hydropower dam upstream in the Ewaso Nyiro river. As it was not clear who made the threats, they decided to not report on this in the annual report to the donor and PfR partners, so as to not put their CSO partners in further jeopardy. In Guatemala, partners report to the donors only after analysing the situation, including the potential impact of sharing the information.

### ***Support from higher-level actors, in particular the Netherlands Embassy***

Research participants provide many suggestions on the supportive role they see for the NL Embassy in their country or region.

Participants indicate that NL Embassies could support PfR through ‘humanitarian diplomacy’ and other dialogue with government officials. In their diplomacy activities with the government, the embassy can advocate specific conflict resolution or peacebuilding approaches. As a participant from Mali says: “the Embassy can advocate for peace so that the state accelerates and opens the dialogue”. The embassy can also push governments to address systemic issues that cause conflicts. It can issue statements on the Netherlands’ position in relation to the conflict or – as it did in Kenya – can bring the issue to the attention of the Council of Governors.

Participants from the Philippines suggest that the NL Embassy could help to counteract the vilification and criminalization of civil society organizations by promoting the added value of these organizations and partnerships: “[With diplomatic partners] not counteracting the vilification, the Philippine government is emboldened in its targeting of CSOs”.

Another suggestion provided is that the embassy can play an active role in mediation between government and local stakeholders: “they have access to the appropriate ministries in the country and can engage with them to address conflict ... In the event that the political landscape is not facilitating consensus, they can come in” (Uganda).

It also suggested that they help in further strengthening CSOs’ capacity in mediation and conflict resolution. Additionally, they “can support civil society partners in conflict situations in other ways such as through financing of micro projects and direct activities with community groups to support the revival and sustainability of livelihoods and that continue to generate conflicts” (Guatemala).

In some cases, embassies have established platforms for dialogue at national level and facilitated “safe spaces where different actors can talk to each other without fear of harassment” (Ethiopia). Respondents suggest they can set up meetings with international organizations to discuss conflict issues. In the case of large-scale violence, embassies can facilitate a “‘hotline’ to share information at the shortest time possible”.

In Indonesia, the NL Embassy focal point stationed at the Ministry of Public Works “was very helpful and really knows about the difficulties we faced on the ground due to emerging conflicts”. In Mali, the NL Embassy sometimes participates in the Partners for Resilience Steering Committee, including to discuss conflict dynamics.

NL Embassies can provide crucial information to help reduce conflict risk: “In one fact-finding activity, when a conflict was about to brew, the Dutch Embassy clarified our role in projects” (Philippines). Embassies can discuss the conflict in its contacts with other embassies so they can jointly engage in dialogue to influence the government. Embassies can help through providing technical and financial support to conflict prevention or risk-reduction processes, or by providing funding to develop strategies and methods for conflict resolution, for studies on root causes of conflict, or to support the negotiations among conflicting parties.

A number of participants suggest the NL Embassy be a “flexible” donor: agree a certain level of flexibility in budgets and implementation of the programme to enable the partners to better navigate conflict and security issues.

While there is abundant evidence of enabling roles for embassies, and suggestions for more support, there is also caution. A PfR partner in Guatemala emphasizes that seeking support from the NL Embassy should be done with much caution to prevent further escalation of the conflict or exposure of the involved CSOs and communities to violent actors.

### ***Recommendations for PfR from research participants.***

Research participants from all countries provide a variety of suggestions, with the exception of a participant from the Philippines who says nothing is needed as the “PfR Landscape Approach provides sufficient guidance for knowing the stakeholders, the powers of the actors, issues to be conflict sensitive”.

One cluster of recommendations focuses on **integrating conflict in the core of PfR**, including:

- Adjust the programme design so that “PfR has the mandate to work in the area of conflict resolution” (Indonesia).
- The IRM approach should focus more on resource-based conflict and expanding livelihood options.
- A new theory of change and programme strategy should be developed for PfR phase 3, integrating conflict dynamics and enabling partners to be conflict-sensitive and work on conflict risk reduction. This can be adapted for each country.

- Making the IRM approach conflict-sensitive requires a good ‘conflict risk analysis’. This needs to be done during the proposal development phase for PfR 3, suggests a Ugandan participant, “with deeper involvement of the country team as compared to development from the global perspective only”. Conflict risk assessments need to be integrated in the initial context analysis and should include conflict mapping and power dynamics. Programme strategy and approaches can be designed based on this ‘conflict risk analysis’. A participant from Ethiopia feels it important that “pre and post analysis of risk is informed by conflict mapping”.

Other participants suggest **increasing programming on conflict resolution and peacebuilding** within the overall resilience framework of IRM:

- *Further analysis is needed on root causes and drivers of conflict* and on “how best to be ‘conflict-proof’ at various levels” (Uganda). Coupled to this should be more attention to conflicts generated by internal mobilization, displacement and migration.
- Reflection on trends of conflicts and how they relate with climate change and disasters could help to develop guidelines for integrating conflict sensitivity in IRM.
- Many indicate the need for *capacity building and the development of specific tools and methods* – for example, a capacity-building package on conflict management combined with IRM, including case studies on conflict risk reduction and resolution. Games and indicators on conflict sensitivity linked to IRM should be developed. An Indonesian participant says that their ‘do no harm’ policy is a good start but should be extended with a ‘peacebuilding toolkit’. Cordaid and Caritas seem to have developed such toolkits.
- *A training module on conflict risk reduction and peacebuilding* could be developed as an annex to the existing IRM training manual. Staff should be trained on conflict mitigation and peacebuilding. A Ugandan participant suggests building the capacity of practitioners who can then build an army of facilitators, while an Indonesian participant suggests the “formation of local peacebuilders at the community level”.
- *A specific outcome for conflict prevention and management could be added in the new PfR PME framework.* The framework should enable the monitoring of conflict dynamics and the effects of the IRM interventions.
- Other suggestions refer to the need for flexibility to adapt interventions to changing needs on the ground. This includes flexibility in spending the PfR budget: the IRM approach should not only focus on policy advocacy but also some of the critical basic needs of vulnerable communities.

### **Summary**

- In most contexts, partners feel that they can discuss conflict-related issues at all levels. This in itself can contribute to the reduction of conflict risk.

- Most PfR partners discuss issues of conflict and violence related to the programme with their colleagues, the communities involved, CSOs and local government.
- Many partners use the opportunity of half-yearly PME workshops with PfR partners to discuss conflict dynamics and issues related with violence. In India, for example, conflict around mining operations is repeatedly brought up during these workshops.
- In some cases, such as Guatemala, conflict cannot always be discussed openly as this could increase the threat of violence against communities and CSOs.
- In several countries, partners have to be cautious about discussing issues with the government: examples are Ethiopia, Guatemala, the Philippines and Indonesia. There, partners use neutral language, only talk with trusted officials, avoid government communication about this topic altogether, or work through the Red Cross.
- Many but not all partners put conflict-related issues and violence in their project reports, which they share with PfR partners and the donor and in some countries also with in-country programme stakeholders.
- Research participants had varying experiences with the NL embassy. In some contexts, the embassy proved knowledgeable and helpful to their work.
- Participants provided many suggestions and for the role the NL embassy could play in their country or region to support them in conflict situations. Some examples are:
  - Lobbying and diplomacy: NL embassies helping PfR through ‘humanitarian diplomacy’ and other advocacy with government officials, in which peacebuilding or the counteracting of criminalization of CSOs could be a main focus.
  - Support and resources: especially support in strengthening CSOs’ capacity in mediation and conflict resolution. NL embassies can help through providing technical and financial support to conflict prevention or risk reduction processes; funding to develop strategies and methods for conflict resolution; funding for studies on root causes of conflict; or financial support for negotiations among conflicting parties. A number of participants suggest the NL embassy should be a ‘flexible donor’, agreeing a certain level of flexibility in budgets and implementation of the programme to enable the partners to better navigate conflict and security issues.
  - Mediation and prevention: NL embassies can help through providing technical and financial support to conflict prevention or risk-reduction processes. In some cases, embassies have established platforms for dialogue at national level and facilitate “safe spaces where different actors can talk to each other without fear of harassment” (Ethiopia). They can set up meetings with international organizations to discuss conflict issues.

- Aid and communication: in the case of large-scale violence, the embassy can facilitate a 'hotline' to share information quickly or provide crucial information to the population.
- Research participants made recommendations around integrating conflict in the core of PfR and on increasing programming on conflict resolution and peacebuilding within the overall resilience framework of IRM.

Let us conclude this chapter with some final remarks provided by participants

Conflict is ever-present in many forms. Within communities, among social classes, between communities and powerful economic interest, between communities and government, and so on. In the end, all these can be traced back to the question of who holds political and economic power, and who doesn't. Where conflict is intense, the elements of control over natural resources are present. Moreover, the vulnerabilities resulting from long-standing and unresolved conflicts are being exacerbated by natural hazard events and climate change. Conflict-affected IDPs in Mindanao for example had to contend with drought during the first quarter of the year and floods during the third quarter. The situation calls for more focused attention on IRM work in conflict settings, made more complex by the interaction with natural hazard events and climate change. (Philippines)

Personally, I believe that to adapt the IRM approach in communities, it is through learning by doing. People are thirsty, hungry, they are migrants, women or vulnerable young people ... they need to learn and do something that helps them understand what they are doing. important of the integral approach in the search for their resilience and to have their livelihoods guaranteed. (Guatemala)

## 6 Conclusions

Before reaching some general conclusions, we present conclusions with regard to the different research questions.

1. In what ways does PfR encounter conflicts and social tensions in its activities, both in the communities of intervention as well as in the IRM dialogues with government authorities and private companies at local, national and regional levels?

PfR experiences conflict in many forms and at all levels: between stakeholders in the PfR focus regions, in other areas, or generalized across the country. In particular in Mali, Guatemala and some parts of the Philippines, there is *widespread, large-scale, structural violence*, leading to overall insecurity which hampers the entire environment of PfR. But in many other settings we found examples of violent incidents, threats of violence, structural or cultural violence.

All PfR alliance partners and CSO partners encounter resource-based conflicts and social tension in programme activities: within and between communities (for example, those with differentiated status or entitlement), between different resource user groups, or between communities and the government or private companies.

The vast majority of these conflicts are resource-based and relate to access, availability and usage of natural resources such as land, water or forest resources. Such conflicts are embedded in all aspects of IRM. These conflicts become sharper when they happen between different ethnic or identity groups. Lack of government regulation or lack of enforcement of existing legislation can deepen conflicts over resources between communities. Other factors that tend to increase conflict are related to gender and marginality.

In many conflicts, governments tend to favour the interests of private companies over those of communities. In some cases, the government itself is engaged in commercial resource exploitation. Weak governments often lack institutions that can resolve such conflicts. Where governments have policies for resource management, this can work for or against communities. There is often a lack of accountability from government towards local communities, which is particularly significant when the local government is a partner in PfR. This means that problems may be addressed and resolved within the network but can also lead to complications and dilemmas over how to address the issues.

**Conclusion: All PfR organizations and their CSO partners experience social tension and conflicts with regard to different interests in many forms and at all levels, between and among stakeholders in the PfR focus regions, other areas or generalized across in the country. The vast majority of the conflicts encountered by PfR are resource-based. In these cases, governments tend to favour the interests of private companies over the interests of the community.**

2. What are the effects of these conflicts and social tensions on our IRM approach?

The work of PfR and the IRM approach are affected by different forms of violence, both generalized and local. Some areas are difficult to access, leading to monitoring challenges. Beneficiaries and CSO partners are targeted and violated, and in some areas the programme has had to be downscaled or halted.

Threats of violence hamper the effectiveness of PfR, causing it to act with caution and avoid risks in addressing resource management, in particular the access to resources of marginal groups who suffer from structural and cultural violence. Threats to programme and staff are not uncommon but they are not always reported as PfR does not want to expose their CSO partners to further risks where reports may subsequently be read by government actors.

Structural violence similarly stands in the way of IRM effectiveness. This is an issue in all PfR countries: laws and policies pertaining to control of resources and other economic matters can sustain patterns of marginalization and vulnerability. Structural violence against women is found in all countries: women are excluded from economic opportunities as they lack access to productive resources like land. There are also many instances of cultural violence affecting PfR work, including discrimination against indigenous peoples in Guatemala, the caste system in India, and tribal communities in the Philippines. These issues skew dialogue, impede fair resource management and lead to conflict. Natural resource issues often intertwine with structural and cultural violence related to inequalities and identity politics.

Civil society, core to the IRM approach, often finds itself in the heart of conflict. In some countries, the government criminalizes CSOs and advocacy groups and brands them as anti-government. As a result, some CSOs are threatened and intimidated, including by military and militarized groups. Almost 25% of PfR partners experience these 'negative pressures' from government institutions and officials and in some cases from private companies. This has serious consequences for programme implementation: in some cases, the government is preventing CSOs from working on 'sensitive' issues related to resource management.

**Conclusion: A core tenet of PfR – strengthening civil society for IRM – brings about conflict and social tension. Natural resources are often a major cause of contention and the role of civil society is often contested. PfR often finds itself in a difficult position where it has to balance avoid further conflict against finding the space to address the root causes of unfair and unsustainable resource management.**

3. Does PfR's IRM approach exacerbate conflict dynamics?

Links between conflict and resource allocation issues such as land-use planning make PfR by definition a party in possible conflicts. PfR partners are generally well aware of the fact that their IRM programme touches on resource-based conflicts and they put great effort into navigating this reality to avoid exacerbating conflict dynamics.

Many partners monitor evolving conflicts and assess the effects of their interventions on the conflict dynamics. They adapt programmes to changing realities on the ground using their theory of change.

Conflicts can occur within and between communities concerning their selection and participation in the programme: who will benefit and how will these benefits be distributed? PfR partners employ participatory consultations with communities, which can lead to agreement on public and shared benefits.

PfR partners indicate that engagement in IRM dialogues can sometimes be a risky business and the more large-scale and complex conflicts become – and the more interwoven with inequalities and identity politics – the more difficult it is to oversee the impacts of programme interventions.

**Conclusion: We have found no indication that the IRM approach of PfR exacerbates conflict. PfR appears to be largely successful in addressing the risk of doing so, for example through community dialogues and a patient approach based on building broad acceptance of PfR.**

4. How are these effects differentiated for men and women, other genders, people of different castes, ethnicities, livelihoods, etc?

Among the surveys, there was a broad understanding that women are affected by structural and cultural violence, and there were some examples of community-level conflicts that directly related to gender. There were also very many examples of how community-level conflicts are related to inequalities and identity politics.

On the questions on how PfR deals with women and marginalized groups, it was striking that all research participants provided evidence on how they address gender inequalities in their programmes. There appears a PfR-wide and deeply felt awareness that it is important to include women and make sure they have a voice in IRM. However, the attention to gender is not explicitly geared to conflict.

By comparison, there was less attention in the responses to this question to how PfR addresses conflict and forms of violence against other marginalized groups, for example ethnic minorities or lower castes, and in particular those groups that are disadvantaged in their access to resources.

A number of responses conveyed how the inclusive IRM approach of PfR, favouring a strategy of dialogue rather than confrontation, may lead to situations where partners refrain from explicitly addressing underlying conflicts and the ways these affect marginalized groups.

It also became clear that, even in programmes where specific attention was focused on the inclusion of women, these approaches may have unintended effects. For example, men sometimes felt left out, or women ended up bearing the double burden for participating in ‘women’s’ programmes at the same time as being responsible for household chores.

**Conclusion: The PfR programme has a strong and positive attention to issues of gender, although some problems are encountered where this has some negative side-effects. The attention for addressing conflict and**

**forms of violence against other marginalized groups is less systematic and can be complicated in striking a balance between avoiding conflict and addressing injustice.**

5. What have been strategies of PfR to deal with conflict, and with what results?

Addressing conflict is integral to the IRM approach of PfR. We distinguish three major aspects – monitoring conflict; addressing conflict in programme implementation; and conflict resolution – but in PfR work they are often intertwined.

In all three aspects, PfR partners and engaged CSOs rely on dialogue and participation. Most have a “do no harm” approach, preferring a ‘non-confrontational’ approach and to facilitate stakeholder dialogues to deal with conflicting interests between different users of natural resources. Research participants say this gives the best results as it increases understanding between parties and can build bridges between communities and government and other stakeholders.

The trade-off of this non-confrontational approach is that it may complicate addressing root causes and explicitly advocating the interests of marginalized groups. PfR and CSO staff seem to be well aware of this inherent dilemma and portray their work as a balancing act. Certain pieces of information do not surface during formal multi-stakeholder meetings. This, as some research participants clarified, can be dealt with by complementing the meetings with informal interaction. Furthermore, as staff members usually come from the areas where PfR works, they can provide a lot of background knowledge.

PfR further draws on many different participatory tools. These include interest mapping, power analysis, survey and assessment tools, context analysis and conflict risk assessments. Many of these tools have been provided by the Dutch partners, but there is no shared set of tools at the level of PfR. Similarly, many research participants work for an organization that has a do-no-harm policy that has been introduced by the Dutch partner, in particular Cordaid, CARE and the Red Cross. The conflict-related tools are separately introduced from the IRM tools, even though some participants observed that the IRM tools can be made useful for conflict-related analysis. Some participants mention that having tools available does not mean that they are being used in practice. While there is a lot of knowledge and practice of conflict monitoring, conflict sensitivity and conflict resolution, it stems mainly from ‘learning by doing’ and many participants expressed a need for further capacity building, theoretical frameworks and guidelines.

In sum, there are many concrete examples of how PfR was able to defuse an evolving conflict or resolve a conflict. The examples were mainly geared to community-level and resource-based conflicts based on small-scale diplomacy with authorities to protect the interests of marginalized or oppressed groups. Large-scale, escalated and structural conflicts are often beyond the scope of influence of PfR.

Conclusion: Conflict sensitivity is widely adopted in PfR, but without a standardized in approach. There are many examples where PfR is successful in mitigating or solving local-level conflicts over resource use. Large-scale, escalated and structural conflicts are beyond the scope of influence of PfR.

**Our final conclusion concerns the question what opportunities there are for better integrating a conflict-sensitive approach and/or conflict risk reduction approach in IRM.**

Conflicts and violence form part of the realities that PfR seeks to change through IRM. This means that conflict monitoring, conflict sensitivity and in many cases conflict resolution are part of the everyday practice of the PfR programme.

In the first two phases of the PfR programme, there has been no explicit attention to conflict, and as a result conflict-related activity has mainly been developed through ‘learning by doing’ and sensitive deployment of the IRM approach and tools.

A special challenge for PfR is that local-level resource-based conflicts and forms of structural violence occur between actors that are all included in the IRM approach of PfR, which is rooted in acceptance, dialogue and participatory multi-stakeholder activities. Whereas this inclusiveness is considered to be effective for PfR, it makes it challenging to directly confront the root causes of conflict. This creates operational dilemmas, and there is currently no space in PfR to report on dealing with conflicting interests within the programme, and hence there is no space for jointly discussing and learning from these dilemmas.

Because PfR doesn’t want to do harm, and is based on a multi-stakeholder approach, it usually takes a non-confrontational approach towards injustices done to marginalized groups. Whereas this may often be the best choice, it is not the subject of policy discussion or reflection, and the question of how this affects the space to address the root causes of disaster risk remains largely unaddressed.

PfR partners already have ample experience in elements of conflict-sensitive programming, such as conflict risk analysis and assessments, inclusive planning and engagement in multi-stakeholder dialogues. The development of a new PfR programme provides a good opportunity to integrate conflict dynamics in the overall resilience framework of PfR and to support partners and CSOs to advance their conflict-sensitive work and conflict risk reduction.

**Conclusion: PfR is very practised in conflict sensitivity and its methods are largely in line with a conflict-sensitive approach. However, conflict sensitivity is not systematically applied nor incorporated in the programme objectives, guidelines or toolboxes.**

## 7 Recommendations

Overall recommendation:

For PfR to become more conflict-sensitive, it is recommended that the alliance acknowledges conflict more explicitly in analysis and approach and ensures conflict-sensitivity in the design and programming of its future activities.

Specific recommendations:

### 1 Adopt a ‘do no harm’ approach

- Focus on doing no harm (avoiding negative impacts) by working in an inclusive manner and maximizing positive effects of the programme on stability. In order to do this properly:
  - All PfR organizations and their country offices should have a ‘do no harm’ policy
  - The do-no-harm policies of the individual PfR organizations should be reviewed to develop a generic PfR do-no-harm policy and guidelines. All PfR partners should be trained to apply these.
  - Do-no-harm policies should take into account the position of marginalized groups to ensure that PfR does not lead to further marginalization.

### 2 Ensure conflict sensitivity in analysis, approach and interventions of PfR

- Acknowledge that conflict is common and widespread in the PfR countries and among its stakeholders and that this affects the IRM approach and results of interventions – and vice versa.
- Ensure conflict dynamics are integrated as a cross-cutting issue into the overall context and stakeholder analysis of the new Theory of Change and in the programmatic approach.
- Explicitly address conflict sensitivity in the objectives, guidelines and toolboxes of PfR.
- Conflict sensitivity is highly context-dependent and hence the country-level ToRs and decision-making should be in the lead as to how conflict sensitivity is adhered to in practice, taking into account the balance between conflict sensitivity and the objective of addressing the root causes of disaster risks.
- As part of conflict sensitivity, countries need to review their strategic choices with regard to non-confrontational or more confrontational approaches and monitor the impact of these choices on the balance between the objectives of conflict sensitivity and addressing root causes of disaster risks.

- The PME framework needs to include monitoring of conflict dynamics and their impact on IRM, and vice versa – IRM’s impact on conflict dynamics.

### **3 Report explicitly on conflicts and violence**

- Incorporate conflict sensitivity in the reporting format of PfR.
- Provide a ‘safe reporting channel’ and space to reflect on conflict-related issues.

### **4 Strengthen capacities of PfR partners on conflict sensitivity**

- Increase organizational knowledge and understanding: make sure PfR partners’ staff (in the Hague, in the countries, regions) have adequate theoretical knowledge and understanding on conflict dynamics in the context in which they operate (particularly with respect to inter-group relations), how this interacts with IRM programme, what conflict-sensitive programming entails and the different concepts used: conflict risk reduction, conflict sensitivity, conflict resolution and peacebuilding.
- Adopt guidelines for conflict-sensitive programming and where possible integrate these in existing PfR guidelines, principles and criteria. Guidelines can be adjusted in-country to adapt to the specific context.
- Adopt a conflict-sensitive toolbox and where possible integrate the tools into existing IRM tools that are used in PfR, for example the Conflict Risk Analysis tool developed by Cordaid. A conflict risk analysis is a first key step to be taken for conflict sensitive programming.
- Strengthen accountability to communities in PfR programmes through strengthening complaint procedures and other means.
- Strengthen staff capacities and skills:
  - Train relevant staff in the use and implementation of conflict risk assessment tools, such as community risk assessments, power analysis, and stakeholder analysis.
  - Train relevant staff in skills needed to implement do-no-harm policies and a conflict-sensitivity toolbox as mentioned above.
  - Integrate conflict sensitivity into IRM training manuals and other training materials.

## Appendices

### Appendix 1: References

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## **Appendix 2: Terms of Reference research IRM & Conflict**

### Stakeholders and lines of communication

The assignment is commissioned by CARE Nederland, on behalf of the PfR Programme Working Group. The primary contact person for the researchers is Bart Weijts (PfR Programme Manager at CARE). The PfR Programme Working Group has jointly agreed on the ToR and will be responsible for decisions about the direction of research and feedback to the draft report.

During the research period, the researchers will be in regular contact with the PfR alliance members Netherlands Red Cross, CARE Nederland, Cordaid, Red Cross Red Crescent Climate Centre and Wetlands Internationals to collect input and discuss proposals and progress.

### On PfR and IRM

The Partners for Resilience alliance consists of Cordaid, CARE Nederland, Wetlands International, The Red Cross Red Crescent Climate Centre and the Netherlands Red Cross, and about 50 partner civil society organizations (CSOs) worldwide. PfR contributes to the resilience of communities by integrating climate change adaptation and ecosystem management and restoration into Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). With this Integrated Risk Management (IRM) approach, communities strengthen their capacities to reduce the impact of disasters. More information can be found on our website: [www.partnersforresilience.nl](http://www.partnersforresilience.nl).

### Purpose of this study

The study will investigate how IRM programming is affected by and can deal with conflict, leading to identification of lessons learnt/best practice and a set of recommendations, by analysing the experience in the current PfR programme.

Though PfR works in conflict-affected countries and contexts, we focus on Integrated Risk Management and do not address conflict explicitly (e.g. in our baseline context and power analysis, or in our Theories of Change). We do take it up in some of our work, but we don't report on it because it isn't part of our ToC, and we may miss opportunities for addressing conflict and instability. Our work is affected and even constrained by conflict in some contexts, and we might be able to do something about this if we would address conflict more explicitly.

### Scope

The study will consider different types and levels of conflict, to develop a nuanced understanding of what this means for IRM. We are encountering different types of conflict in different countries, both in terms of the source (e.g. gang wars or social tensions related to decreasing access to natural resources / livelihood options) and the level, from micro-level conflict at community level, to higher-level conflict like the conflict in Mali or Ethiopia.

The study will target all PfR countries: Guatemala, Haiti, Mali, Ethiopia, Uganda, South Sudan, Kenya, India, Indonesia and Philippines.

### Research questions

7. In what ways does PfR encounter conflicts and social tensions in its activities, both in the communities of intervention as well as in the IRM dialogues at local, national and regional levels?
8. What are the effects of these conflicts and social tensions on our IRM approach?
9. How does an IRM approach affect conflict dynamics in intended and unintended ways?
10. How are these effects differentiated for men and women, other genders, people of different castes, ethnicities, livelihoods etc?

11. What have been strategies of PfR to deal with conflict, and with what results?
12. What opportunities are there for better integrating a conflict-sensitive approach and/or a/peace-building (conflict risk reduction) approach in IRM?
13. What can PfR learn from other good research /reports/best practices on using an integrated IRM-like approach to strengthening resilience in conflict-affected settings?

#### Approach

The study will primarily be conducted through desk research, a survey, skype interviews, and a validation workshop. Reports are available for the previous years of PfR, and PfR partners are used to comfortably talk through Skype. Where relevant, local researchers can be engaged to conduct additional research and interviews.

This leads to the following sequence of steps:

1. Reading of relevant reports from PfR.
2. Developing a comprehensive, theory-informed and educational survey.  
Because questions will be introduced by small essays (of one paragraph) on the importance of the question, the researchers will add depth to the answers and as well provide some food for thought for PfR staff on how they can deal with the nexus between conflict and disaster in their immediate work.
3. Make the survey into an E-based instrument, and personally invite a large number of PfR partners to fill in the survey. This can be done throughout all the countries.
4. The response to the survey can be analysed, in conjunction with the findings from step one.  
Based on this, the researchers can select several participants to interview in-depth over Skype
5. As part of the interviews, the researchers will ask who among the participants likes to be involved in reading the report and recommendations.
6. Analysis and draft report
7. Soliciting feedback and recommendations, through a workshop / webinar
8. Produce a final report.

#### Deliverables

1. Refined ToR/research questions
2. Survey
3. Analysis and lessons learnt/best practice/recommendations

#### Budget

Up to 25,000 euros (see elaborate budget attached)

### Appendix 3: Survey

The PfR Programme Working Group has assigned a research on how PfR has encountered and dealt with conflict in its Integrated Risk Management programme.

Though PfR works in conflict-affected countries and contexts, it focuses on Integrated Risk Management and does not address conflict or insecurity explicitly. Even where PfR addresses conflict, it is rarely reported on. However, PfR work may be affected and even constrained by conflict, and the question is if PfR should and could address conflict more explicitly?

The assignment is commissioned to a team of the ISS of Erasmus University, led by professor Thea Hilhorst. Marie-José Vervest long-familiar with PfR and now an independent consultant, is part of the team, together with PhD candidates from ISS.

This survey aims to collect your experiences with conflict, insecurity or social tension and your views on how PfR should deal with this. The report that the survey feeds into, will be used for the new PfR proposal. The survey follows on from a literature review and findings will be complemented with a limited number of follow-up interviews. A draft report will be produced in December 2019. The research participants and the PfR Programme Working Group will be asked to provide feedback.

The questions of the survey are introduced by explanatory text-boxes. Reading these boxes, thinking about your current practice and experiences and answering the questions will take you approximately between **60 – 90 minutes**.

The survey is designed for individual responses, but you are more than welcome to consult and discuss with your PfR team or other colleagues the survey topics and questions.

You can interrupt filling in the survey at any moment and continue completion in a later stage.

The questions in the survey may touch on sensitive issues. Please feel free to skip a question in case you are uncomfortable with it.

We will treat your responses confidentially and with utmost care. Your answers will only be used for the purpose of this study, will only be read by the researchers and will not be shared with PfR organizations. The research team may use general insights from the study in its academic publications, but this does not comprise the citation of specific answers unless you consent otherwise.

If you have questions or complaints regarding this survey, you can contact the project leader at [hilhorst@iss.nl](mailto:hilhorst@iss.nl), or the contact person of PfR for this research: Bart Weijs, from CARE Netherlands at [weijs@carenederland.org](mailto:weijs@carenederland.org)

By flipping to the next page and start to respond to questions, you acknowledge that you have read the above and that you are participating in the survey on a voluntary basis. You consent to have the data collected during the

study, i.e. your views regarding conflict in IRM and the implementation of PfR, processed for the report.

As we fully respect your decision about the anonymity of your replies, at the end of the survey you can fill in more options regarding confidentiality.

For the purpose of the research, we ask you to state your name, country and organization.

Name:

Country:

Organization:

## Cluster 1: Conflict

This survey is about how PfR deals with conflict, but what do we mean when we talk about conflict?

Conflict occurs when two or more parties find their interests incompatible, express hostile attitudes or take actions that damage the other party's ability to pursue their interests<sup>84</sup>.

Conflict is quite common in society, and not necessarily bad. There are always goal incompatibilities and competing interests, certainly in development endeavours and (natural) resource management. Whenever people seek social change, there is bound to be some kind of opposition that needs to be resolved. The question is if these can be addressed constructively or if this will lead to conflict.

Different types of conflicts co-exist, each with their dynamics, and many will influence one another. Conflict dynamics at the regional, national or district level can affect local communities. Within communities other types of conflict may also occur that may or may not be connected to conflict at other levels of society.

### Question 1.

*Can you give concrete examples of how you encounter **'interest-based conflicts'** between different groups or stakeholders in your PfR program? (please give at least 1 example each)*

- Within communities
- Between different communities
- Between different resource user groups in the landscape (for example, agro-business, (local) government, farmers, pastoralists)
- Between communities and (local, district, national) government authorities
- Other?

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<sup>84</sup><https://www.christianaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/2018-06/Conflict-Prevention-Field-Guide-June-2018.pdf>

Conflict may or may not be accompanied by physical violence, and whether or not something is considered a conflict partly depends on interpretation of the people involved. There are different types of conflict, depending on the level and type of violence. In reality, we see that many conflicts have multiple types of violence:

1. **Large-scale violence** that leads to overall insecurity and hampers everything
2. **Incidents of physical violence**, such as assault, killing, kidnapping, or forced displacement.
3. **Threat of violence** and associated uncertainty.
4. **Structural violence**, concerning processes by which a group oppresses another through structural means, such as exclusion from educational or economic opportunities or restrictions of freedom of assembly and speech.
5. **Cultural violence**. This is a semi-permanent state through which some forms of physical violence and structural violence are considered as legitimate, especially by the majority; for example, through ideology, religion or social stratification. Minority violence to counter these structural problems will often be considered illegitimate.

## **Question 2**

*Which of these types of conflict with violence do you encounter in your daily PfR work? Can you please give 1 concrete example per type if applicable?*

- Large-scale violence at national level or in parts of the country
- Incidents of violence in PfR focus area
- Threats of violence and associated uncertainty by known or unknown groups
- Structural violence (e.g. embedded in policies and legislation)
- Cultural violence (e.g. embedded in religion, ideology, language)

## **Cluster 2: Conflict & Integrated Resource Management (IRM)**

Conflicting interests are part of IRM and any work on Disaster Risk Reduction, Climate Change Adaptation and Environmental Management and Restoration. Climate change can lead to resource competition and migration and therefore has the potential to increase conflict. The relationship between climate change and conflict is highly influenced by other factors and socio-political variables, such as economic and political instability.

Climate change affects regions differently, precisely due to these socio-political factors. If a country is more politically stable, the more likely it is to peacefully resolve resource shortage and competition. Environmental degradation due to over-exploitation of land and water resources or harmful practices such as water pollution can also lead to more pressure on resources and can force people to migrate as a coping mechanism. This could lead to more conflict in

the receiving areas due to resource scarcity, ethnic tensions and increased marginalization.

Scarcity of natural resources and competition can increase the likelihood of conflict, but not always; societies that are able to adapt can find different modes of livelihoods. Therefore, contextual socio-political and economic factors are important to understand the relationship between resources and conflict. In a socio-political context with high inequalities, 'resource capture' can allow elites to control resources at the cost of others. The co-management of resources can provide opportunities for dealing with resource conflicts, but can also create new conflicts, exacerbate old ones, or result in strengthening control instead of sharing power.

There are also links between disaster and conflict. Natural hazards only turn into a disaster when people are vulnerable and unprepared. When working to increase disaster resilience, it is crucial to understand the socio-political and economic factors that put people at risk. The vulnerability to disasters is increased by conflict as it erodes response capacity over time; different conflict contexts will affect DRR and disaster response in different ways. Disasters can also aggravate conflict. Whether a disaster negatively impacts conflict depends on a variety of factors; for example, low DRR investments or a weak government response. These factors in turn increase the likelihood of disasters, as weak DRR, government capacity and political instability increase vulnerability and compromise disaster preparedness.

### **Question 3**

In question 1, you gave examples of how you encounter 'interest-based conflicts' between different stakeholders in your PfR programme.

Here we like to know HOW you monitor and/or address evolving conflicts (of interest) of communities with other stakeholders?

*3.1 Can you give an example using (one of) the following methods? Only give an example for methods you have actually used in practice. We like to know your experiences: did you have results? did you experience challenges?*

- Discussion-based methods with PfR partners, CSOs, communities (formal or informal)
- Consultation with stakeholders at different level
- Interest mapping, power analysis and other participatory knowledge building tools
- Complaint procedures
- Other
- No methods at all, there are constraints which prevent us from monitoring (evolving) interest-based conflicts

PfR strengthens capacities of civil society actors to lobby and advocate for Integrated Risk Management including a fair allocation of (natural) resources to different user groups. Where conflict is already present or conflicting interests play out strongly, this can lead to situations where CSOs become targets of negative pressure, in some cases violence, from other actors in society.

#### **Question 4**

*Have you or your partners/ local CSOs faced increased negative pressure from specific actors (government, private sector, or other actors) as a result of strengthened capacities and improved knowledge?*

No

Yes

If 'yes' can you please elaborate or give an example? How do you deal with it?  
Do you have any further suggestions how to mitigate these negative pressures?

### **Cluster 3: Gender and Marginalized Groups**

The vulnerability for disasters and climate change are different for men and women, as well as for different social groups. Different groups also have different access to land, water and other resources that are vital to integrated risk management. In most societies, women are subordinated to men and hence have more vulnerabilities and less access to resources. Similarly, marginalized groups such as landless people, single parents, or discriminated minorities, have more vulnerabilities and less access to resources. As a result, there may be interest-based conflicts, where women and marginalized groups may be less capable to assert their interests.

Integrated risk management programmes can have different impacts on resource-based conflicts and power relations that relate to gender and social groups:

- a. Programmes can ignore gender and social relations, and thereby unwittingly reproduce and strengthen existing conflicts and power relations.
- b. Programmes can address gender and social relations, and result in more inclusive risk management and more empowerment of women and marginalized groups.
- c. Programmes can have unintended side-effects when they stir up social tensions and evoke negative responses, backlashes or even violence. For example, economic empowerment of women sometimes goes hand in hand with an increase in domestic violence. Or, special attention to minority ethnic groups may provoke violence from majority groups.

#### **Question 5**

*What are your methods to ensure inclusion of women and marginalized groups in your program?*

*Have you experienced negative unintended side-effects when involving women and marginalized groups, including indigenous groups, youth or casts*

- If yes: what happened and how did you deal with it?
- If not: did you prevent it in a specific way?

### **Cluster 4: How can we make PfR more conflict-sensitive?**

The implementation of projects always has an impact on the communities. They can bring benefits, but also produce, exacerbate, or create the condition for social conflict. Multiple examples, including from PfR, show that this is common. Sometimes conflict relates with disputes over the benefits of the projects, the social history and dynamics of the places where they intervene, or

perceived biases for or against certain parts of the community. The implementation of the project in one community can be a problem to another group. Conflicts related to the project, or the places where they are implemented, can result in delays, extra costs, or even the cancellation of the programmes.

Beyond the development of participatory mechanism during the planning and implementation of the projects, projects can be active in assessing and reducing the risk of conflict. Multiple tools and strategies exist for this, most of them aiming to understand the general context and history where projects are implemented, the diversity of stakeholders involved, and the impacts that the project can have. Having a conflict-sensitive approach aligns with the ‘do no harm’ strategies that most aid and development organizations adhere to. It also links up to peace building processes, although building peace is not the same as conflict sensitivity or conflict risk reduction.

**Conflict sensitive approach vs Conflict risk reduction (based on USAID definitions)**

Conflict sensitivity refers to the ability of an organization to:

1. Understand the conflict dynamics in the context in which they operate, particularly with respect to intergroup relations;
2. Understand the interaction between the (Resilience) intervention and the conflict dynamics in the specific context;
3. Act upon this understanding in order to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts of the (Resilience) intervention (on the conflict dynamics).

To work on Conflict Risk Reduction, it is needed to add a 4th ability:

4. Make deliberate efforts to address drivers of conflict and to contribute to stability / conflict risk reduction.

This can be translated into 2 different programming strategies:

- a) a focus on doing-no-harm (avoid negative impacts), e.g. by working in an inclusive manner; or a focus on maximizing positive effects on stability without changing the primary objectives of the Resilience project / program;
- b) deliberately designing objectives of the Resilience project/programme to have an impact on improving stability (i.e. work on conflict risk reduction, peace dialogue)

**Question 6**

*Does your organization have a do no harm policy?*

Yes

No

*What methods do you use to be conflict-sensitive?*

*What are constraints you face in employing conflict-sensitive methods?*

**Question 7:**

*Does the way you implement Integrated Risk Management in your programme affect conflict dynamics in intended and unintended ways?*

*Can you give some examples?*

*Some PfR partners actively work on conflict resolution in their PfR programme. Can you give some examples?*

*What challenges you encounter when working on conflict resolution?*

**Question 8:**

Some conflict contexts might be too sensitive or maybe too threatening for local communities or civil society organizations to address. In other cases, CSOs might feel they cannot address conflict because of insufficient backing-up from higher levels. Some organizations may lack the mandate to address evolving conflicts between parties.

*What are the challenges for you to address or integrate conflict (sensitivity) in your IRM approach?*

**Cluster 5: Discussing and reporting**

Conflict and violence cannot be talked about openly in every context, sometimes including with colleagues and donors. This makes a difference for possibilities to address conflict and seek help.

**Question 9:**

*Do you discuss conflict-related issues with the following actors: CSOs, PjR colleagues, government officials, Communities, Donors (e.g. in your reports), other. If not, why not?*

**Question 10:**

*In what way can higher level actors (e.g. embassy, Dutch PjR partners) support you when you encounter conflict?*

**Last but not least**

**Question 11:**

*Which concrete suggestions do you have to adapt the IRM approach to make it more conflict-sensitive?*

**Question 12**

*Do you have any other remarks or issues that have not been addressed in previous questions?*

**Question 13**

The research team may need to do some additional interviews on Skype to deepen the insights from the survey.

*Would you be available to share more of your experience during a follow-up individual skype interview?*

If yes, pls give your skype name:

Now that you know the questions we have asked, we would like to ask you now to specify what you like to consent to:

I hereby consent to having my answers quoted in research publications without mentioning my name. YES/NO

I hereby consent to having my actual name stated with the quotes referred to above. YES/NO

I hereby consent to having my research data stored and used for future publications of the research team of ISS/EUR YES/NO

Thank you very much!