The transfer system in European football: A pro-competitive no-poaching agreement?
International Journal of Industrial Organization , Volume 75
We assess the proclaimed pro-competitive effects of the “transfer system”, the no-poaching agreement governing the European football (soccer) labor market. A major argument to legitimize this system is that transfer fees, which hiring clubs pay to release players from their current clubs, redistribute revenues from large market to small market clubs. This would strengthen small clubs’ financial clout and their ability to compete in sporting terms. Player transfer fees represent over 10 billion Euros in asset value in the financial statements of the 202 clubs we analyze. Still, small market clubs rarely obtain substantial revenues from the transfer market. The main beneficiaries are clubs around the middle of the market size distribution. A select group of large market clubs makes significant transfer losses, but this does not undo their initial financial advantage. Overall, the transfer system therefore leads to a very minor reduction in revenue inequality.
|Antitrust, European football, No-poaching, Revenue redistribution, Transfer system|
|Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets (jel J41), Contract Law (jel K12), Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices (jel L41), Sports; Gambling; Recreation; Tourism (jel L83)|
|International Journal of Industrial Organization|
|Organisation||Department of Econometrics|
Hoey, S. (Sam), Peeters, T.L.P.R, & Principe, F. (Francesco). (2021). The transfer system in European football: A pro-competitive no-poaching agreement?. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 75. doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102695