1. Market scoring rules can extract and aggregate information from multiple people about a verifiable event. Doing so for millions of people costs no more than doing so for one person (Chapter 2).

2. Market scoring rules continue to work well even if people repeatedly receive new information over time (Chapter 2).

3. Another type of markets, Bayesian markets, can elicit and sucessfully aggregate private information also about *unverifiable* events, such as counterfactuals, subjective experiences, or events in the long-term future (Chapter 3).

4. By matching answers to unverifiable events with answers about verifiable events, we can elicit information about unverifiable events which is more fine-grained than the one which can be received through Bayesian markets (Chapter 4).

5. The aggregation of personal opinions can be improved by asking people for meta-cognitive statements (Chapter 5).

6. Asking cognitively demanding questions to human crowds can be worth it, even if it leads to more errors in individual answers.

7. In the aggregate, a group of humans can show reasoning much closer to what Bayesian theory prescribes than the reasoning of each individual member of the group.

8. We should watch out for opinions held by more people than we would have expected; they may be correct.

9. What you believe about others can reveal a lot about yourself (and it should).

10. We should treat economic researchers as economic agents and design our scientific process accordingly.

11. There should be more predictions in economics but I have not made any (specific) predictions in this thesis because I was not incentivized to do so.