

## **Stellingen behorende bij het proefschrift van Maria C. de Campos**

1. Nudges can be designed and implemented by different actors, giving rise to three fundamentally distinct types of nudges: private, public and regulatory nudges.
2. Using an iterative experimental process to design regulatory nudges – a widespread design practice for nudges outside regulation – is possible, but it imposes a disproportionate burden on regulators given what these tools can achieve.
3. It is possible to introduce both dimensions of iterative experimentation (trial-and-error and nudge renewal) when nudging is a regulatory tool; however, this increases design costs, as the most recent EU tobacco labelling legislation illustrates.
4. Several reasons justify the need to explore an alternative design process for regulatory nudge design, among which the emergence of nudging in regulation.
5. Designing nudges for regulation calls for different stages and evidence sources that can be integrated in preparatory and evidence gathering stages of regulatory processes.
6. By questioning revealed preferences, behavioural economics poses a problem for welfare analysis.
7. As a rationale for public intervention, behavioural biases can be seen in isolation, but also in their interaction with exploitative market practices.
8. Market failures are not the only rationale for regulatory intervention
9. Full policy analysis should not be limited to measures that preserve freedom of choice.
10. Explanations of public economics on the excessive growth of the public sector – and even behavioural biases – can justify why regulators might not pursue efficiency values.
11. Clarity for the reader is an arduous and never-ending endeavour for the writer; but a finished thesis in the hand is worth two in perfection land.