

Propositions

1. It is necessary to reconcile the methods of private and public enforcement because private actions are an integral part of the EU competition enforcement regime.
2. Attempting to ensure deterrence only by means of public enforcement without taking into account the effects of private enforcement will most likely lead to over-deterrence.
3. Determining the share of contribution based on the cartelists' relative responsibility can be achieved in a way which ensures deterrence of future infringements and guarantees compensation of victims while at the same time taking sufficient account of the infringer's role in the cartel.
4. An increase of civil liability negatively affects the incentives for cartelists to 'blow the whistle' and to cooperate with competition authorities. This negative impact can be overcome by granting leniency applicants immunity or a reduction from damages in the same proportion that the leniency applicant receives immunity or a reduction from fines.
5. The potential civil liability of infringers of EU competition rules must be integrated in the methodology for calculating fines to prevent over-deterrence. The estimation of the civil liability should, however, not over-burden the administrative system.
6. Many of the behaviours that influence consumer choices for high energy consumption and environmentally harmful products are habitual. Such environmentally harmful choices can initially be discouraged with high taxes until a new consumer behaviour has emerged.
7. By pricing the environmental externalities, for example through a carbon tax, in competition cases efficiencies in terms of sustainability could be measured and translated into improvements of consumer welfare.
8. The state sets incentives for innovating new technologies through regulation and subsidies. With a lack of regulation that prohibits harmful technologies and subsidies for old and polluting technologies R&D efforts will be limited to technologies that are harmful for social welfare.
9. Trade encourages the exchange of ideas and has positive effects on growth. However, not all members of society benefit equally from trade. The state needs to redistribute from the beneficiaries to the losers of trade.
10. It's a myth that because of existing preferences most consumers would always choose the cheapest products and accept poorer animal welfare and a greater environmental impact in return. If consumers had full knowledge about the externalities of their choices, consumer preferences would shift to products with a lower environmental impact.

11. Writing a PhD when working full-time also has its perks: you'll always have a plan for the weekend!