

Vulnerabilities, Cybersecurity,
and the Role of Law and Regulation herein

Kwetsbaarheden, cyberveiligheid
en de rol van wet- en regelgeving hierin

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In memory of Prof. Dr. Manfred Neumann (1933–2016)

Preface and Acknowledgments

This thesis originates from my observations about the important role played by software vulnerabilities in the increasing number of cyberattacks globally. Nowadays, it is not difficult to conjure up images of hacked power plants, remote-hijacked public transportation systems, etc. Shortly before the completion of this thesis, one of the United States' largest oil pipelines, Colonial Pipeline, was hacked and forced to pay the hackers a ransom of nearly \$5 million, according to the Wall Street Journal. By exploiting hidden vulnerabilities, hackers are plundering business secrets, stealing digital consumer records, and trying to reshape the world quietly.

Most of society lacks awareness of software vulnerabilities. Software vendors seem unlikely to discuss flaws in their products publicly, and the related markets of vulnerabilities are often opaque. My thesis tries to introduce to the readers a structured discussion and analysis of software vulnerabilities vis-à-vis the challenges of cyberattacks. I hope that my research will stimulate more contributions to this topic.

It has been a huge challenge to complete this thesis. The ongoing crises of COVID-19 has increased difficulties of my research work. It is with the support and assistance from many people that it has been possible to complete my thesis.

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English Summary of the Thesis

Nowadays, it is not difficult to conjure up images of hacked power plants, remote-hijacked public transportation systems, etc. By exploiting hidden vulnerabilities, hackers are plundering business secrets, stealing digital consumers' records, and trying to reshape the world inconspicuously. Most of society lacks awareness of software vulnerabilities. Software vendors seem unlikely to discuss flaws in their products publicly, and the related markets of vulnerabilities are often opaque. This thesis tries to introduce its readers to a structured discussion and analysis of software vulnerabilities vis-à-vis the challenges of cyberattacks.

This thesis focuses on an analysis of software vulnerabilities and their relevance to cybersecurity from an economic perspective, and it discusses the role of law and regulation designed to address problems of vulnerabilities and cybersecurity utilizing the law and economics approach.

A software vulnerability has its intrinsic value and a life cycle. There are people who search for these vulnerabilities - the bug hunters, and there are three markets for vulnerabilities - white, grey, and black. The assumption of profit maximization in traditional economics also applies to bug hunters. Moreover, this thesis finds that the nature of the white market vis-à-vis the grey or black market is much more competitive. Among the factors that influence the price level of a software vulnerability in the black market, the bounty price (white market price) is particularly worthy of attention.

This thesis finds that the practice of governments to retain vulnerabilities is acceptable in the short run for the purpose of legal enforcement or intelligence, given the advanced encryption and anonymization technologies used by criminals. However, in the long run, government agencies should avoid vulnerability transactions. Furthermore, government agencies should give the utmost attention to how to protect their vulnerability stockpiles from being stolen.

The empirical results of this thesis prove that a market failure exists at least to some

extent in relation to vulnerabilities. There was no significant market pressure upon the software vendor even when the software had been proved seriously risky by a severe cyberattack. Possible avenues to correct this market failure could be found in private law, administrative law, or other means of central intervention. This thesis advocates a solution of jointly using liability rules and safety regulation backed by a public fine (regulation backed by an administrative fine) for the harm caused by a vulnerability. More details are provided by means of an economic model. It is a combination of torts and regulation (ex-ante and ex-post), which is in line with the suggestions made in Shavell (1984), and Faure, Visscher & Weber (2016).

Samenvatting van de thesis

Vandaag de dag is het niet moeilijk om beelden op te roepen van gehackte energiecentrales, op afstand gekaapte publieke transportsystemen, etc. Door gebruik te maken van verborgen kwetsbaarheden, plunderen hackers bedrijfsgeheimen, stelen zij digitale consumentengegevens en proberen zij onopvallend de wereld om te vormen. De meeste mensen zijn zich niet bewust van de softwarekwetsbaarheden. Softwareverkopers zullen de onvolkomenheden in hun producten waarschijnlijk niet publiekelijk bespreken en de verwante markten van kwetsbaarheden zijn vaak ondoorgrondelijk. Deze thesis wil haar lezers laten kennismaken met een gestructureerde discussie en analyse van softwarekwetsbaarheden in relatie tot de uitdagingen van cyberaanvallen.

Deze thesis focust op een analyse van softwarekwetsbaarheden en hun relevantie voor cybersecurity vanuit een economisch perspectief en bespreekt de rol van wet- en regelgeving, ontworpen om de problemen van kwetsbaarheden en cybersecurity aan te pakken met behulp van een rechtseconomische benadering.

Een softwarekwetsbaarheid heeft zijn eigen intrinsieke waarde en levenscyclus. Er zijn mensen die op zoek gaan naar deze kwetsbaarheden, de zgn. 'bug hunters', en er zijn drie markten voor kwetsbaarheden: wit, grijs en zwart. De aanname van winstmaximalisatie in de traditionele economie is ook van toepassing op de bug hunters. Bovendien maakt deze thesis duidelijk dat er veel meer concurrentie is in de witte dan in de grijze en zwarte markt. Van de factoren die het prijsniveau van een softwarekwetsbaarheid op de zwarte markt beïnvloeden, is vooral de premieprijs (witte marktprijs) van bijzonder belang.

Deze thesis oordeelt dat de praktijk van overheden om kwetsbaarheden te handhaven acceptabel is op korte termijn ten behoeve van de rechtshandhaving of inlichtingendiensten, gelet op de door criminelen gebruikte geavanceerde versleutelings- en anonimiseringstechnologieën. Op lange termijn moeten overheidsinstanties echter kwetsbaarheidstransacties vermijden. Bovendien moeten

overheidsinstanties de grootste aandacht besteden aan hoe zij hun kwetsbaarheidsvoorraden tegen diefstal kunnen beschermen.

De empirische resultaten van deze thesis tonen aan dat er ten minste in bepaalde mate sprake is van een marktfalen in relatie tot kwetsbaarheden. Er was geen significante marktdruk op de softwareverkoper, zelfs niet als de software een aantoonbaar serieus risico liep op een ernstige cyberaanval. Mogelijke middelen om dit marktfalen te corrigeren zijn te vinden in het privaatrecht, administratief recht of andere middelen van centrale interventie. Deze thesis bepleit een oplossing voor het gezamenlijk gebruiken van aansprakelijkheidsregels en veiligheidsregulering ondersteund door een publiekrechtelijke boete (regulering ondersteund door een administratieve boete) voor de schade veroorzaakt door de kwetsbaarheid. Meer details worden gegeven door middel van een economisch model. Het is een combinatie van aansprakelijkheidsregels en regulering (ex ante en ex post), die in lijn ligt met de suggesties gedaan in Shavell (1984), en Faure, Visscher & Weber (2016).