Policy Transfer and Translation of the Dutch Delta Approach in South and Southeast Asia

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Lay-out: Ellen Minkman
Building Bridges
Policy Transfer and Translation of the Dutch Delta Approach in South and Southeast Asia

Bruggenbouwers
Beleidsoverdracht en vertaling van de Nederlandse delta-aanpak in Zuid- en Zuidoost-Azië

Proefschrift

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“Building bridges” I cannot think of words which meaning has changed to me as much as these two. In 2007, I started a civil engineering degree to learn how to build bridges. Literally. In the years that followed I learned the principles of engineering with formulas, safety factors and materials. Fieldwork consisted of excursions to building sites or mixing concrete. The further I got in my studies, the more I realised that the world was not short of innovative ideas but rather struggled with embracing these innovations. Societal hesitation to adopt novel technology may be the result of misunderstanding, misalignment with rules and regulations or concern of the impact on society. As a result, I gained an interest in the figurative meaning of building bridges between science and society and between engineering and policy making.

Via science communication I learned the basics of social sciences and after graduation I ended up in Hanoi, Vietnam. Here I experienced myself how challenging it can be to introduce new technologies or ways of working but also how difficult it is to use ideas that work in one place to another place. While community-based water monitoring (whereby volunteers measure water quality or water height) was rapidly gaining terrain in the Netherlands, I ran into several problems when we were trying to set up a community-based monitoring network in Vietnam. My Vietnamese colleagues and I had different interpretations of the terms ‘volunteer’ and ‘citizen’ and the formal and informal rules we had to adhere to were completely different. As such, I quickly learned that we would have to organise a Vietnamese monitoring community in a very different way than we would have done in the Netherlands.

The questions how ideas from the Netherlands travel to elsewhere and what is needed to make it work could not be answered in the few months that I worked in Hanoi. I have spend the last four years working on the concept of policy transfer and translation of delta management. In these years, I discovered the world of public administration and policy studies. I learned new concepts and ways of thinking and even the word fieldwork gained new meaning, as it now consisted of travelling to Bangladesh, Indonesia and Vietnam to talk to people involved in project to formulate strategic delta plans. This dissertation is the result of this endeavour. I will bring up a third interpretation of the term ‘building bridges’ in its conclusion, which points out the importance of figurative bridges that connect transferred policy to local actors and policy issues.
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**Inleiding**

Het waterbeheer in Nederland is de afgelopen 20 jaar getransformeerd van preventiegericht (d.w.z. steeds hogere dijken bouwen) naar een risicogebaseerde aanpak die harde infrastructuur combineert met zachte bestuursmaatregelen. Deze beleidswijziging was nodig om de Nederlandse delta toekomstbestendig te houden met het oog op klimaatverandering. In de afgelopen tien jaar is deze ‘Nederlandse aanpak’ van deltamanagement door de Nederlandse overheid actief verspreid in het buitenland. Het gevolg is dat deze *Dutch Delta Approach* (DDA) model stond voor beleidsvorming in tientallen projecten over de hele wereld en vooral in ontwikkelingslanden. Deze verspreiding van de DDA naar andere landen is een proces van beleidsoverdracht (*policy transfer*), oftewel een proces waarbij kennis over beleid in één plaats en tijd doelbewust gebruikt wordt om elders beleid te formuleren (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; Evans & Davies, 1999).

Binnen de zogenoemde focusdelta’s zijn delta’s in Azië rijk vertegenwoordigd, de focusdelta’s zijn tevens de gebieden waarnaar de DDA overgedragen wordt. Dit onderzoek concentreert zich daarom op beleidsoverdracht van de DDA naar drie Azatische landen: Indonesië (Jakarta), Vietnam (Mekongdelta) en Bangladesh. Hierbij staan vragen over de effectiviteit van de overdracht van de DDA naar deze landen centraal: met welke aspecten moet rekening worden gehouden bij de overdracht van beleid van het ene land naar het andere? Maar ook: waarom wordt de DDA überhaupt overgedragen aan andere landen? Hoe beïnvloedt de lokale en internationale politiek deze overdrachtspogingen? En wanneer kunnen deze overdrachten als ‘succesvol’ of effectief worden beschouwd?

Dit proefschrift maakt gebruik van het concept beleidsvertaling (*policy translation*), een conceptualisering die de nadruk legt op de wijzigingen van beleid. Beleidsvertaling ziet beleidsoverdracht nadrukkelijk niet als een rechtlijnig overzetten van beleid van A naar B (Stone, 2012; Dolowitz, 2017). Er zijn, ondanks de hoeveelheid literatuur over dit fenomeen, drie theoretische lacunes geïdentificeerd: er is nog onvoldoende bekend over het activeren van beleid voor overdracht (*mobilization*), er is slechts gedeeltelijk inzicht in hoe het proces van beleidsvertaling verloopt en er is beperkt begrip over hoe macht, belangen en politiek het proces van beleidsoverdracht beïnvloeden. De eerste leemte in de literatuur werpt vragen op over hoe het beleid wordt gemobiliseerd voor internationale verspreiding. In de bestaande literatuur ligt de nadruk op de redenen
van ontvangers om tot beleidsoverdracht over te gaan, terwijl er minder aandacht is voor de promotie of het actief aanbieden van bepaald beleid door afzenders. De tweede betreft empirische inzichten in hoe actoren ideeën aanpassen om ze geschikt te maken voor de ontvangende context. Dergelijke vertaling wordt gedaan door zowel afzenders, ontvangers als andere relevante actoren. Om te begrijpen hoe overgedragen beleidsideeën in de praktijk worden vertaald moet men dus met alle actoren rekening houden. Ten derde gaat beleidsoverdracht over het formuleren van beleid, welke plaatsvindt in een context van bestaande instituties en politieke arena’s. Toch is er weinig bekend over hoe politiek en macht het overdragen en vertalen van beleid beïnvloedt. De rol van macht en politiek is daarom de derde kloof die centraal staat in dit proefschrift.

**Onderzoeksvraag**

Met dit proefschrift probeer ik deze theoretische leemtes te vullen, door de overdracht van de Dutch Delta Approach (DDA) te bestuderen en de volgende vragen te beantwoorden. De belangrijkste onderzoeksvraag is dan ook: “wat verklaart de (in) effectiviteit van pogingen om de ‘Dutch Delta Approach’ over te hevelen naar Zuid- en Zuidoost-Azië?” Effectief is hierbij gedefinieerd als: een proces voor beleidsoverdracht dat resulteerde in (a) toegang tot een geschikt beleidsnetwerk voor beleidsformulering, (b) een bij de ontvangende context passende vertaling van het overgedragen beleid en (c) het aannemen van de beleidsideeën door beleidsmakers in de ontvangende context.

Deelvragen die deze onderzoeksvraag ondersteunen zijn:

I. Door welke elementen wordt het proces van beleidsoverdracht gevormd?
II. Hoe is de DDA gemobiliseerd voor internationale beleidsoverdracht?
III. Hoe interpreteren en ‘vertalen’ betrokken actoren overgedragen kennis?
IV. Hoe beïnvloeden macht en politiek de effectiviteit van overdracht?

**Methodologie**

Deze vragen zijn beantwoord door middel van een literatuuronderzoek naar beleidsoverdracht en door het uitvoeren van een longitudinale onderzoek gedurende vier jaar. Centraal in dit onderzoek waren drie kwalitatieve casestudy’s van lopende pogingen om de DDA over te dragen naar Vietnam, Bangladesh en Indonesië. In totaal zijn 121 semigestructureerde interviews met 103 individuen en één groepsinterview gehouden en zijn 31 zogeheten Q sorts verzameld.

**Antwoord op de onderzoeksvragen**

De eerste deelvraag betrof de elementen die het proces van beleidsoverdracht vormgeven. In dit proefschrift heb ik het overdrachtsproces beschreven in een holistisch kader van factoren die van invloed zijn op de beleidsoverdracht. Dit kader (zie Figuur s1) is gebaseerd op bestaande empirische studies en wordt in
detail gepresenteerd in Hoofdstuk 2. Al met al wordt beleidsoverdracht gevormd door uiteenlopende factoren die gezamenlijk het verloop en de uitkomst van overdrachtsprocessen bepalen. Toch kunnen bepaalde patronen of ‘routes’ worden waargenomen, waarbij de opzet van het overdrachtsproces gekoppeld is aan bepaalde resultaten in termen van adoptie of niet-adoptie. In dit proefschrift worden vier van dergelijke beleidsoverdrachtroutes (*Policy Transfer Routes*) genoemd, namelijk beleidsoverdracht als gevolg van opportunisme, promotie, beperkte dwang, en leren (opportunistic, branded, pressured and learning transfer). Actoren kunnen proberen de richting te beïnvloeden waarin het overdrachtsproces zich beweegt, bijvoorbeeld door promotie van beleid of door netwerkmanagement.

![Diagram](image)

De tweede onderzoeksvraag ging over hoe de Nederlandse deltabenadering gemobiliseerd is voor internationale transfer. Dit onderzoek toont aan dat de Dutch Delta Approach geschikt werd gemaakt voor verspreiding door beleidspromotie (*policy branding*), waarbij een beleidsmodel is opgesteld en vervolgens is gepromoot. Dergelijke promotie van beleid is een specifieke vorm van beleidsvertaling. Promotie stimuleert de aantrekkelijkheid van en interesse in de beleidsideeën, maar een risico is dat de beperkingen van het beleid niet worden genoemd tijdens overdracht. Bovendien toont het onderzoek aan dat het nodig is om het beleidsmodel en de overdracht van dit model voortdurend bij te werken op basis van nieuwe inzichten en ervaringen in de praktijk.
Als derde bestudeerde dit onderzoek hoe actoren beleidsideeën daadwerkelijk vertalen. Beleidsvertaling werd gepresenteerd als een concept dat verder gaat dan overdracht, maar werd tegelijkertijd geconceptualiseerd als een enkele activiteit tussen het oorspronkelijke en aangepaste beleid. Dit onderzoek heeft echter aangetoond dat het vertaalproces niet kan worden vastgelegd door een dergelijk tweeetrapsmodel, maar dat het in plaats daarvan bestaat uit verschillende vertaalrondes die deels opvolgend en deels overlappend zijn. Beleidsvertaling vindt plaats gedurende het hele overdrachtsproces en bovendien vinden er meerdere vertalingen plaats tussen het oorspronkelijke beleid en het beleid dat uiteindelijk elders wordt toegepast. Ook kunnen er meerdere vertalingen naast elkaar bestaan, aangezien de vertaling van persoon tot persoon verschilt, zelfs als ze tot dezelfde actorcategorie behoren (afzender of ontvanger). Een visualisatie van het vertaalproces, uitgebreid op basis van deze conclusies, is te vinden in de figuur hieronder.

Figuur s2. Visualisatie van de meervoudige vertaalslagen en iteraties daarin die plaatsvinden tijdens beleidsoverdracht.

De vierde deelvraag betrof de invloed van macht en politiek op het proces van beleidsoverdracht. In dit proefschrift kwamen politieke belangen tot uiting in twee aspecten van de beleidsoverdracht, namelijk in de motivatie achter de beleidsoverdracht en tijdens het overdrachtsproces zelf. Dit proefschrift laat zien dat politiek een rol speelt tijdens de overdracht van de DDA. Zowel afzenders als ontvangers kunnen politieke redenen hebben om deel te nemen aan beleidsoverdracht en beleidsoverdracht kan dienen als diplomatiek instrument. Zo is de overdracht van de DDA het resultaat van beleid van de Nederlandse regering om de Nederlandse watersector internationaal te positioneren. Door het overgedragen beleid te koppelen aan een politieke visie en invloedrijke partijen aan de ontvangende kant, wordt de kans op het aanvragen van overgedragen ideeën bovendien vergroot.

Conclusie

Dit proefschrift concludeert dat er niet één enkele factor is waarmede effectiviteit van beleidsoverdracht te verklaren is. Effectieve overdracht is eerder het resultaat van een combinatie van factoren. Een bepaalde factor kan in het ene geval nogal onbeduidend zijn, maar in een ander geval een doorslaggevende rol spelen. Desalniettemin toont dit proefschrift aan dat het maken van verbindingen belangrijk
is voor effectieve overdracht, in het bijzonder het leggen van verbindingen met een geschikt beleidsnetwerk aan de ontvangende kant, het verbinden van het overdrachtobject met lokale beleidskwesties en het leggen van verbindingen met actoren met politieke invloed of macht.

Over het algemeen moet men zich in de praktijk bewust zijn van het veelzijdige en dynamische karakter van beleidsoverdracht en helpt het om projecten rondom beleidsoverdracht zo te ontwerpen dat opdrachtnemers die ter plaatse de kennisuitwisseling doen (transfer agents) sociaal robuust en flexibel kunnen handelen. Een praktische aanbeveling is dan ook om te werken met multidisciplinaire consortia, waarin zowel technische als sociale expertise wordt gecombineerd. Consortia uitrusten met sociale experts alleen zal niet voldoende zijn, aangezien zij vaak gebonden zijn aan enge mandaten die hun handelingsruimte inperken. Opdrachtgevers hebben vaak strikt vastgelegd wat een project moet opleveren, waardoor de consortia ter plaatse niet kunnen reageren op problemen die ze onderweg tegenkomen en gebonden zijn aan de afbakening van het project, zelfs als verandering dat zou leiden tot een meer adequate beleidsvertaling. Een mogelijke oplossing is om deze projecten doelzoekend in plaats van doelgericht te organiseren, waarbij men tijd reserveert om ter plaatse de institutionele context, de politieke arena en mogelijke beleidskwesties te verkennen om zo beter aan te sluiten bij de ontvanger.

Discussie
De bevindingen van deze studie generaliseerbaar zijn naar vergelijkbare pogingen tot beleidsoverdracht in ontwikkelingslanden. Daarnaast is het aannemelijk dat bevindingen over de mechanismen van beleidsoverdracht en -vertaling universeel zijn. Bovendien zijn de bestudeerde casussen uitgevoerd onder de vlag van ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Een deel van de uit deze studie getrokken lessen is tevens relevant voor ontwikkelingssamenwerking in het algemeen. Wetenschappelijk onderzoek dat voortbouwt op deze resultaten richt zich het beste op studies met een middelgrote-N om causale verklaringen voor effectieve beleidsoverdracht vast te stellen, op de rol van niet-elite-actoren, verbindende actoren (boundary spanners) en de impact van verschillende vormen van sturing (governance modes) op beleidsoverdracht. Over het geheel genomen levert dit promotieonderzoek nieuwe inzichten rondom het veelzijdige karakter van beleidsoverdracht en verdiept het de bestaande conceptualisering van beleidsvertaling. In het bijzonder heeft dit onderzoek het belang van verbindingen leggen met actoren, politiek en beleidskwesties ter plaatse voor een effectieve beleidsoverdracht aan het licht gebracht. Dit proefschrift heeft verder laten zien hoe het adequaat vertalen van de Dutch Delta Approach essentieel is als de Nederlandse overheid daadwerkelijk een bijdrage wil leveren aan het wereldwijd verbeteren van deltamanagement.
Introduction
In the past 20 years Dutch water management has been transformed from prevention-oriented (i.e. building ever higher dikes) to a risk-based approach that combines hard infrastructure with soft governance measures. This policy shift was needed to maintain the Dutch delta ‘future proof’ in the light of climate change. In the most recent decade, this ‘Dutch approach’ to delta management has been promoted abroad by the Dutch government. As a result, the Dutch Delta Approach (DDA) has served as a policy model in dozens of projects around the globe, and particularly in developing countries. This spreading of the DDA to other countries is in fact a process of policy transfer, which is defined as a process whereby knowledge about policies in one time and place is intentionally used to formulate policies elsewhere (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; Evans & Davies, 1999).

Given the prominence of Asia among the so-called ‘focus deltas’ to which the DDA is transferred, this research has concentrated on the transfer of the DDA to three Asian countries: Indonesia (Jakarta), Vietnam (Mekong Delta) and Bangladesh. The research concentrates on questions about the effectiveness of transfer of the DDA to these countries: which aspects should be taken into consideration when transferring policy from one country to the other? But also: why is the DDA transferred to other countries in the first place? Which role do local and international politics play in these transfer attempts? And, when can these transfers be considered ‘successful’ or effective?

This dissertation has adopted the notion of policy translation, a conceptualisation that emphasises modification of policies while they travel, rather than linear transplantation from A to B (Stone, 2012; Dolowitz, 2017). Despite a vast body of literature around this phenomenon, I identified three theoretical lacunas. These lacunas concerned mobilizing policy for transfer, the process of how actors translate policy ideas and the role of power, interests and politics. The first gap raised questions on how policies are mobilized for travelling and international application. The emphasis in existing literature is on the reasons of receivers to engage in transfer, while there is less attention for policy selling or an active transfer push by senders. The second gap in literature concerns evidence-based understanding of how actors modify ideas to make them suitable for the receiving context. Translation is done by both sender and receiver as well as other relevant actors, hence all actors should be taken into account to understand how policy is
translated in practice. Thirdly, policy transfer is about formulating policies, which takes place in a context of existing institutions and political arenas. The role of power and politics is therefore the third gap addressed in this dissertation.

**Research question**

I set out to address these lacunas by studying the transfer of the Dutch Delta Approach (DDA) by answering the following questions. The main research question was: “what explains the (in)effectiveness of attempts to transfer the ‘Dutch Delta Approach’ to South and Southeast Asia?” Effectiveness is hereby defined as a policy transfer process that resulted in (a) access to a suitable policy formulation network, (b) a translation of the transferred policy that fits the receiving context and (c) adoption by policy makers in the receiving context.

Sub-questions supporting this research question were:

I. Which elements shape the process of policy transfer?
II. How is the Dutch Delta Approach mobilized for international transfer?
III. How do engaged actors interpret and modify transferred knowledge?
IV. How do power and politics affect the effectiveness of transfer?

**Methodology**

These questions were answered by means of a longitudinal study over four years and by conducting a literature study on policy transfer. Central to the study were three qualitative case studies of ongoing efforts to transfer the DDA to Vietnam, Bangladesh and Indonesia. Over the course of four years, 121 semi-structured interviews with 103 individuals, one group interview and 31 so-called Q sorts were collected.

**Answer to the research questions**

The first sub-question explored which elements shape the policy transfer process. In this dissertation, I have made an effort to capture the transfer process in an evidence-based, holistic framework of factors that affect policy transfer. This framework (see Figure s1) is based on existing empirical studies on policy transfer and presented in detail in Chapter 2. All in all, policy transfer is shaped by a broad set of factors determines the course and outcome of transfer processes. Still, certain patterns or ‘routes’ can be observed, whereby the set-up of the transfer process is associated with certain outcomes in terms of adoption or non-adoption. Four of such Policy Transfer Routes were identified in this dissertation: opportunistic, branded, pressured and learning transfer. Actors may attempt to influence the direction of the transfer process, for example through branding or network management.
The second question inquired how the Dutch Delta Approach is mobilized for international transfer. This research showed how the Dutch Delta Approach emerged through policy branding, whereby a policy model was created and then promoted. This is a specific form of policy translation. Promotion boosted the attractiveness of and interest in the policy ideas, but also risks ignoring its limitations during transfer. In addition, this shows the necessity of constantly updating the policy model and its transfer based on experiences in practice.

![Diagram of factors of the policy transfer process.](image)

**Figure s1. Framework of factors of the policy transfer process.**

The third question of this research addressed how actors actually translate policy ideas. Policy translation was framed as something ‘beyond transfer’ and was described in the introduction as a single activity between the original and translated policy. The research has shown that the process of translation cannot be captured by such a two-stage model, but instead consists of several rounds of translation that are partly sequential and partly overlapping. Policy translation takes place throughout the transfer process and that multiple translations take place between the original policy and the policy eventually applied elsewhere.

Multiple translations may co-exist as translation varies between individuals, even when they are part of the same category (sender or receiver). An extended conceptualisation of the translation process, based on these conclusions, is proposed in Figure s2 on the next page.
Figure s2. Visualisation of the multiple translations and iterations that take place during policy transfer.

The fourth sub-question concerned the role of power and politics in policy transfer. In this dissertation political interests manifest in two aspects of the policy transfer, namely in the reason to transfer and during the transfer process itself. This dissertation shows that politics are present throughout the transfer of the DDA. Both senders and receivers may have political reasons to engage in transfer and transfer may serve as a tool for diplomacy. For example, the transfer of the DDA is the result of a Dutch policy on international positioning of the Dutch water sector. Connecting the transferred policy to a political vision and powerful actors at the receiving end even enhances the adoptability of the transferred ideas.

Conclusion
This dissertation concludes that there is no single factor that explains effective policy transfer. Rather, effective transfer is the result of a combination of factors. A certain factor may be rather insignificant in one case but play a decisive role in another case. Nevertheless, this dissertation showed the importance of making connections for effective transfer, in particular connection to the right policy network at the receiving end, connecting the transfer object to local policy issues and connecting to actors with political power.

Overall, practitioners need to be aware of the multi-faceted and dynamic nature of policy transfer, thereby designing transfer projects in such a way that transfer agents can act socially robust and flexible. As such, a practical recommendation is to create multidisciplinary consortia in which both technical and social expertise is combined. However, simply equipping consortia with social experts will not be sufficient, as narrow mandates also affect the policy transfer process. Present projects have strictly determined what the project should deliver, preventing the consortia on the ground from responding to issues they encounter along the way and from changing the scope if that would result in a more adequate translation. A potential solution is to organise these projects goal-seeking rather than goal-oriented, whereby time is reserved to explore the institutional context, political arena and potential policy issues to connect to.
Discussion

The findings of this study can be generalized to similar transfer attempts in the global south to large extent and conclusions related to the mechanisms of transfer and translation are believed to be universal. Furthermore, some of the lessons learnt from this study may be relevant for general development cooperation. Future studies may build on these results by setting up medium-N studies to establish causal explanations for effective policy transfer as well as by exploring the role of non-elite actors, boundary spanners and the impact of horizontal and vertical governance modes on policy transfer.

Overall, this research has provided new insights regarding the multi-faceted nature of the process of policy transfer and added depth to the conceptualization of policy translation. Most importantly, it revealed the importance of connections to actors, politics and policy issues for achieving effective policy transfer. This dissertation has furthermore shown how adequate translation is essential if the Dutch government wishes to contribute to improving delta management worldwide with the Dutch Delta Approach.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCING THE RESEARCH TOPIC
1.1. Introducing the research topic

The majority of the world’s population will be living in urban deltas in the near future (United Nations, 2018). Specially, most of us will be living in mega-cities in Asia. These cities will be located in urban deltas that are highly vulnerable to climate change (Nicholls et al., 2020). These deltas have attracted great numbers of people over the course of history because of their favourable conditions: flat and fertile lands with good connection to seas and rivers (NWP, 2011). However, the concentration of people in urban deltas brings along problems as well, such as environmental pollution or fresh-water scarcity. Other consequences of human interventions in the natural system include land subsidence following excessive groundwater extraction, overexploitation of the fertile lands and siltation or erosion as the result of changed hydrology after the construction of water infrastructure (Bucx et al., 2014). The processes set in motion by these human interventions are accelerated by climate change. These (human-induced) threats to urban deltas and an ongoing migration to megacities in the delta are a potential recipe for disaster. Most megacities are located in Asia and these urban deltas in Asia are particularly vulnerable to flooding and other water-related threats, like drought and waterborne diseases (Shatkin, 2019; Nicholls et al., 2020). In any case, countries worldwide feel an urgency to act due to the (future) threat from the consequences of climate change.

Traditionally, governments have relied on structural measures that consist of infrastructure, such as dikes (Wesselink, 2016). However, building ever higher dikes is considered no sustainable solution. Let us take the coastal city of Jakarta in Indonesia as an example. Following groundwater extractions, the city is rapidly subsiding and is flooded several times a year. The subsidence rate of 10-25 cm/year is so high, that the city will not be able to keep up with raising the existing coastal defence walls. In addition, flooding is not a purely technological problem, but the result of, exacerbated by or linked to social developments like economic growth or urbanisation. When dikes are not sufficient to address these complex issues, new solutions should be designed that are able to address this complexity. Overall the image thus arises that these deltas are in urgent need of novel solutions to transform their delta management, to ensure that their delta is future proof. Ideas for strategies and policies to address these challenges may be created within the country itself. In such a case, countries develop their own ideas and strategies to address challenges in deltas. Alternatively, governments may look to other deltas for ideas. They could identify deltas with similar issues and observe which solutions these deltas use. If they believe these solutions are applicable to their own delta too, governments may use these policy solutions themselves. Doing so, they use ideas from elsewhere to address issues in their own delta.
This use of ideas from elsewhere, a phenomenon referred to as policy transfer, is central in this dissertation. Policy transfer is a process whereby knowledge from one place and/or time is used to formulate policies in other jurisdictions at different moments in time (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000).

The phenomenon of policy transfer takes the centre stage in this dissertation. Given the urgency of delta management, the transfer object studied will be delta management as transfer object. As will be outlined in Section 1.2.2, the Netherlands is considered a frontrunner in water delta management and therefore the research concentrates on the Dutch attempts to transfer their approach to deltamagement. In this dissertation, I will examine the transfer of ideas about 21st century delta management from the Netherlands to three Asian countries.

1.2. Solutions from elsewhere: a study of policy transfer

The central theoretical concept in this dissertation is thus policy transfer. Governments worldwide are looking for solutions to problems threatening urban deltas and simultaneously try to adapt to climate change. Besides formulating their own ideas, these governments may also find inspiration in how other governments have addressed similar issues. This inevitably raises the question where countries may find inspiration for policies to address climate change, flooding and other issues in urban deltas and questions about how this transfer should be conceptualised. The concept of policy transfer has been used to describe processes of spreading policy knowledge (what is transferred, to whom and why?; Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996), to explain policy success or failure (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000) and relates to broader topics such as policy innovation and globalisation (Benson and Jordan, 2011). Several bodies of literature have studied policy transfer or related concepts such as policy diffusion, lesson drawing and policy mobility.

Taking policy transfer as a starting point, I will provide an overview of these related fields in this introduction; before introducing the Dutch approach to delta management (the ‘Dutch Delta Approach’ or DDA) and defining how policy transfer will be seen in this research. The introduction ends with identifying gaps in the literature.

1.2.1. A historical development of studies on travelling ideas

The study of spreading of ideas is not new and within this field policy transfer is not the only concept used by scholars. Since the 1960s scholars in the United States have investigated “trends in timing, geography and resource similarities in the diffusion of innovations between countries and, in the United States, between states in the federation” (Evans, 2009b, p. 244). Since the ‘60s, several bodies of literature are concerned with this phenomenon of policy ideas that travel from A to B, albeit under different names and with different prepositions. Among these
concepts, policy diffusion and transfer are most prominent. They developed independently though and have a different focus. Policy diffusion literature studies how policies spread due to country characteristics (Braun and Gilardi, 2006). Policy transfer on the other hand focusses on the motivation of actors and which channels they use to transfer (e.g. Benson & Jordan, 2011; Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996, 2000; Evans & Davies, 1999). In this very brief overview of the historical development of studies on travelling ideas, I will include policy diffusion and policy transfer and concepts associated with transfer: lesson drawing, policy mobility and policy translation. See also Figure 1. This overview is intended as a brief introduction to the evolution of the concept and is based on reviews (e.g. Dolowitz, 2017; Holzinger & Knill, 2005; Temenos & McCann, 2013).

As will be explained in the next section, the central question of this dissertation concerns translation of ideas while they are travelling. Although other, related concepts exist, this overview is limited to concepts that are linked to public policy analysis that allow for opening up the black box of translation on a microlevel. This means that related concepts like institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) or institutional transplantation (de Jong, Lalenis and Mamadouh, 2002) have been left out of scope.

![Figure 1. Timeline of the different concepts used to study the spreading of policy ideas. Based on Dolowitz (2017)](image)

Policy diffusion is the process whereby policy choices in one place are influenced by policy choices in other places (Maggetti & Gilardi, 2016). Diffusion studies often use quantitative methods to test hypotheses about why policies are diffused (Dobbin, Simmons & Garret, 2007). Diffusion scholars assume that ideas spread ‘spontaneously’ because of the success or attractiveness of the policy itself (Maggetti and Gilardi, 2016; Stone, 2016; Hasan et al., 2019). Studies have focussed on the mechanisms behind diffusion, thereby paying particular attention to structural factors (Shipan & Volden, 2006; Marsh & Sharman, 2009). Although diffusion acknowledges the role of communication channels, it fails to address the whole breadth of the adoption process as it neglects, among others, the efforts of actors in this process and the role of micromechanisms of politics, ideologies and personalities (Dolowitz, 2017).
These microprocesses taking place on the individual level are taken into account in studies on learning and lesson drawing, by focussing on the logics and mechanisms of borrowers (Dolowitz, 2017). The use of transferred knowledge inherently entails a learning process (Dunlop, 2009). Various studies thus address the role of learning, using various methods. Amongst others: by mapping lessons that were drawn by the receiving actors (Webber, 2015), by outlining the conditions for learning of the transfer (Marsden & Stead, 2011), or by evaluating the effectiveness of channels to convey information (Thomas & Bertolini, 2015). Scholars studying lesson drawing took the rational actor model as starting point and assumed that learning was the key mechanism driving transfer. They also broadened the binary outcome (adoption or non-adoption) to a range of outcomes, ranging from one-on-one copying of ideas to borrowing elements in a process of inspiration (Dolowitz, 2017). Lesson drawing also equals policy transfer to a voluntary, deliberate activity of borrowers. This identification has been criticised, as it omits the wide range of somehow coercive transfers (specially to developing countries) and the role of senders and contextual factors.

In the last two decades, the concept of policy transfer dominated. David Dolowitz’ and David Marsh’ seminal articles of 1996 and 2000 introduced an analytical framework on how similar policies are developed, based on knowledge of what works in other political systems (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996, 2000). Policy scholars have extensively studied which policies travel, where they came from and where they have inspired new policies, thereby trying to integrate meso- and microprocesses (Benson and Jordan, 2011; Dolowitz, 2017). They also studied who was involved. As a result, the phrase ‘Who learns what from whom’ has been used by generations of scholars (which was coined by David Dolowitz and David Marsh in 1996), as was the framework that accompanied the oneliner. However, most insights originate from the study of voluntary transfers (Dolowitz, 2017; a trend that also emerges from the literature review presented in Chapter 2 of this dissertation). Because transfer scholars focus on the voluntary and rational nature of transfer, they pay little attention to the political, ideological and tacit beliefs that determine motivation of actors to (dis)engage in transfer (Dolowitz, 2017). As a result, they seem to assume that policies travel as intact packages (Dolowitz, 2017), while in reality they are modified in every stage of the transfer.

While policy transfer and diffusion studies could not answer the question how transferred knowledge is used at the receiving end, more recent conceptualisations may fill this gap. Policy mobility and policy translation emphasise the need to modify policy to its new location. First, policy mobility is discussed. Where policy diffusion emerged from international relations literature and policy transfer from public policy, policy mobility is transdisciplinary (Marsh & Sharman, 2009; Peck, 2011). Although it is deepest rooted in (human) geography and urban studies, it
is also used in for example anthropology and sociology. Policy mobility highlights the role of geographic scales in travelling policies, thereby especially focusing on 'circulation of knowledge' between urban areas. As such, most studies from the field concentrate on the spaces where knowledge is shared (Prince, 2015). Policy mobility emphasizes locality, meaning both the need to tailor knowledge application to new contexts as well as how mobilities shape places (Temenos & McCann, 2013). Policy mobility further criticizes the rational approach of policy transfer and instead emphasizes social-constructivist models (Peck, 2011; Temenos & McCann, 2013). Policy mobility thereby pays attention to governance and points to the importance of networks, social relations and small ‘p’ politics in transferring knowledge (Temenos & McCann, 2013).

Similarly, policy translation has been introduced as a “something beyond ‘transfer’” (Freeman, 2009, p. 441) and originates from public policy studies. Scholars address questions on how actors transfer knowledge and how this knowledge is translated to inspire policies elsewhere (Stone, 2016). Policy translation is “the process of modification of policy ideas and creation of new meanings and designs in the process of cross-jurisdictional travel of policy ideas” (Mukhtarov, 2014, p. 6). This modification is continuous and takes place during all phases and stages of the policy transfer and policy making process. Policy translation can thereby address some of the criticism on linear transmission models of policy transfer, by conceptualising the transfer process instead as inherently dynamic and characterised by iterations (Lendvai and Stubbs, 2007; Freeman, 2009). This term thus refers to the translation that takes place when individuals connect the transferred knowledge to their own frame of reference. Doing so, these actors go through a process of meaning making (Loeber, Hajer & Levidow, 2011) whereby they interpret new information and create new meaning in the space between sender and receiver (Lendvai & Stubbs, 2007; Freeman, 2009). As such, there is a role for senders as well as receivers in policy translation. Where senders mobilize an idea for international travel by disconnecting the policy from its original context, receivers will interpret the communicated policy ideas and modify them according to their existing norms, identities and practice (Acharya, 2004; Beeson & Stone, 2013; Freeman, 2009; McCann, 2013; Ward, 2006; see also Chapter 3 in this dissertation). These actors include, but are not limited to, state actors. Transnational advocacy networks, epistemic communities, think tanks, consultants as well as other non-state actors have been reported to be involved in policy transfer (Benson & Jordan, 2011). In any case, during the transfer process, policies are constantly modified to ‘fit’ the existing institutional context (e.g. Freeman, 2009; Mukhtarov, 2014; Stone, 2012).

Summarizing, transfer should not be seen as “a simple sender-receiver relationship” (Harris et al., 2015, p. 489), but rather a multifacettted activity whereby actors
mobilise ideas, assign meaning to transferred policy ideas and adjust (‘translate’) them to the receiving context.

1.2.2. The Dutch Delta Approach
In this dissertation a policy model, which is labelled the Dutch Delta Approach (DDA), is considered the basis for transfer. This model thereby serves as the transfer object, i.e. the policies that are transferred. On the first page it was indicated that deltaic countries worldwide are in need of solutions to address the challenges they face. When countries are looking for delta management policies, it can hardly be called a surprise when they end up looking for them in the Netherlands, a country that is considered a frontrunner in water governance by the OECD (2014) and consequently a potential source of policy ideas. The Netherlands changed its water management over the past two decades so that it would be ‘future-proof’. At the start of the millennium, the Netherlands realised that relying on infrastructural measures to prevent flooding is no sustainable solution. Or in other words: that the limits were reached of the approach of ‘building ever higher dikes’. Over the past decades this prevention-based approach evolved into one based on adaptive planning and risk assessments (Van Buuren, Ellen & Warner, 2016). A specific Delta Programme was established as the result of this shift in policy. This programme’s main objectives are to protect the country from flooding and to safeguard the country’s fresh water supply (Rijksoverheid, 2010). This program combines ‘hard’ infrastructure (e.g. reinforcing dikes) with ‘soft’ governance measures (e.g. collaboration between government levels) (Wesselink, 2016). Spatial planning and environmental aspects have been included in programmes, such as Room for the River and Building with Nature (van Herk et al., 2013; Wesselink, 2016).

Delta and water management is thus inherently tied to the Netherlands and the Dutch. The role of water in Dutch culture is perhaps best illustrated through the remake of the popular song ‘Het land van’ (English: ‘The land of’, which can be viewed at www.youtube.com/watch?v=bybqtYL4OFO) by hip-hop artists Lange Frans & Baas B , in which they address the Dutch identity and current political issues. This song refers to the Dutch expertise on water management and engineering:

**Het land van**

“The land of water knowledge and building bridges”

Lange Frans & Baas B. (2019)

This ‘land of water knowledge’ is aware of its international reputation when it comes to water management and actively (re-)creates this reputation. In 2011 the Netherlands Delta Programme embraced the Delta Programme. Shortly after,
a strategy was devised to internationally spread the underlying ideas, associated programs and related policy instruments. In general, the DDA is characterized by a focus on long-term strategies, which consist of integrated and adaptive planning. In Chapter 3, a more extensive description of the DDA will be given. Overall, the image arises that the Dutch national government is actively spreading a set of underlying values for delta management as well as structural and non-structural measures to other countries.

1.2.3. Using policy transfer and translation in this dissertation
As the previous paragraphs illustrate, policy transfer is a dynamic, multifaceted process and conceptualising it as a linear A to B transfer would not do justice to its complexity. Studying policy transfer thus entails studying the perceptions, motivations and activities of all actors, during all phases of the policy transfer process. In this study, I will connect to the most recent insights and therefore embrace the notion of policy translation. I consider policy transfer to be the overarching term that refers to the entire process surrounding knowledge sharing about a certain policy idea, in this case the Dutch approach to delta management. Within this broader process, actors modify certain policy-relevant knowledge to mobilize, communicate and integrate a policy idea. Doing so, they construct new meaning and modify policy objects. I thereby incorporate both elements from the policy mobility, as well as policy translation literature. Given its origin in public policy, the term policy translation is used to describe the mechanisms through which policy transfer takes place.

Thus, in general, transfer is used to refer to the actual transmission of knowledge in the following chapters, while translation refers to the interaction with this knowledge. In this dissertation, policy transfer of the Dutch Delta Approach (DDA) is defined as an intentional and voluntary activity, in which actors interact with knowledge about 21st century delta management policies from the Netherlands. Dutch actors are considered ‘senders’ who share knowledge about the DDA. Non-Dutch actors are generally 'receivers' who receive this knowledge and who possess knowledge about the receiving context. These actors interpret and modify the transferred knowledge for a set of transfer activities: (a) mobilize the policy ideas for transfer, (b) communicate about these policy ideas, (c) receive and interpret this knowledge and (d) evaluate the suitability of these ideas. This process is dynamic and these activities do not necessarily evolve in a linear fashion and instead activities may overlap or an already performed activity may be iterated. Throughout this process policy translation takes place. Over time this results in an outcome that can range from (partial) rejection to (partial) adoption of policy ideas that are inspired by the DDA.
1.2.4. Existing puzzles in policy transfer and translation

The above illustrates that the transfer of the DDA should not be seen a copy-paste exercise, but instead inevitably requires modification to fit recipient contexts. Policy transfer is thus in practice a process of learning, meaning-making and translation. Despite a decade of policy translation research, there are still gaps in scholarly understanding of policy translation. These gaps can be summarized in three conceptual puzzles that will be addressed in this dissertation.

The first conceptual puzzle concerns scholarly understanding of how certain policies are made ready for transfer. Although some policies travel, others remain immobile. As illustrated in 1.2.2, diffusion studies assume that inherent characteristics of the policy determine which policy travels, while lesson drawing and transfer studies point to the role of policy questions from abroad. Policy transfer studies have listed reasons for governments to look for policies abroad (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996). These reasons can be summarized as dissatisfaction with the present situation, a need to legitimate policy plans and addressing public concerns over the present policy course (Benson and Jordan, 2011). Scholars have also aimed to identify variables that explain why certain models are selected. They observed that some ideas receive more attention than others and even that sometimes less ‘suitable’ ideas were selected over the more suitable ones (Dolowitz, 2017; Stone, 2016). An explanation for this apparent random selection of sources for policy, is that governments look for policies in countries with similar institutions or ideologies (Wolman, 1992). However, there seems to be a third option. One thing that makes Dutch delta management interesting from a policy transfer perspective, is that the Dutch government is not only passively waiting for interest from abroad, but actively promotes its policy approach. Such promotion of policy has been described by some scholars but has not become an integral part of policy transfer studies yet. For example, Harold Wolman illustrated that senders play an active role too by deciding what they show to receivers, thereby boosting the chances of being selected for certain ideas or models (Wolman, 1992). In the case of the DDA, the Dutch government is actively spreading the ideas, programs and technologies related to this approach to other countries. The ambition to spread the ideas were first articulated in the National Water Plan 2009-2015, the Dutch government noted that “The Netherlands has a lot to offer when it comes to flood prevention, improving water quality and the administration of water management ('governance'). Our position comes with responsibilities: a responsibility to place our knowledge and expertise at the disposal of less prosperous water countries, but also to create economic opportunities for our water sector.” (Rijksoverheid, 2008, p. 243). The question of why and how this knowledge is mobilized or ‘boosted’ for transfer deserves further attention. The
motivation of senders to promote their policies has nevertheless received less attention in the literature than the question why receivers engage in transfer. Similarly, the policy transfer literature focussed on the reception of a transfer object rather than its launch by the sender. In the case of the DDA, one wonders why the Dutch government decided to actively promote the DDA as well as how they organised this promotion. The literature on policy mobilities has partly filled this gap by examining how policy models are brought to the centre of attention (McCann, 2013) by capturing them in policy models (Peck & Theodore, 2010). This is a process that requires modification and translation of the original policy. However, the question how this translation process to mobilize policies takes place has not been satisfactory answered in the literature so far.

Secondly, this translation process in general remains some kind of a black box. Despite a surge in publications on policy transfer, recent innovation in conceptualising the process of transfer and translation is limited (Porto de Oliveira & Pal, 2018). Conceptual and empirical studies have previously and convincingly argued that policies cannot be copy-pasted, because of the risk of inappropriate transfer of ideas that do not fit the receiving context (e.g. Fawcett & Marsh, 2013; Stone, 2012). However, evidence-based understanding of how actors modify ideas to fit these to the receiving context is limited. As such, empirical studies can shed light on how actors actually interpret the transferred knowledge and the role of the (political) context in which they do so. The DDA provides opportunities for a comparative study on how actors translate policy ideas, as there are several projects initiated where DDA-inspired masterplans and long-term strategies are developed and presented to the government (Dutch Water Sector, 2018). Examples of such strategies include integral ‘delta plans’ in Vietnam, Bangladesh and Myanmar and ‘urban masterplans’ in amongst others Beira (Mozambique), Jakarta (Indonesia) and Manilla (Philippines). These examples are all characterised by close collaboration and knowledge exchange between the local or national government and Dutch experts, but applications vary from place to place (Zwarteveen et al., 2017). The literature on policy translation emphasises that empirical studies shall take into account both the perspective of the sender – how they translate their ideas to fit the receiving context – and the receiver. These receiving agents actively borrow and modify ideas within their own frame of reference, while intermediaries such as scholars and opinion leaders mutate policy ideas in the space between sender and receiver (Stone, 2016). All actors in the process use their own frame of reference (Freeman, 2009) to translate ideas and adjust it to fit the existing context (Stone, 2012). Overall, there is a need to open the black box of policy translation by exploring how actors actually connect new ideas with existing knowledge and practice.
Thirdly, it remains an open question how power, interests and politics affect policy transfer. Policy transfer and translation are no isolated processes of knowledge exchange, but take place in a context of political power play. Knowledge needs political patronage to become relevant for policy making and only becomes ‘true’ by back-up from political powers (Stone, 2016). Although several scholars acknowledge the role of politics and power in facilitating or inhibiting policy translation and adoption (see for example Stone, Porto de Oliveira and Pal (2019) on asymmetrical power relations between developed and developing countries), there is little insight in how politics shape the translation process at the receiving end (Dolowitz, 2017). That political dynamics indeed play a role is for example illustrated by Farhad Mukhtarov (2014), who showed how changes in the political government resulted in non-adoption of the idea of regional development administration in Turkey. This limited insight on the role of politics in policy translation is unfortunate as water governance – and thus delta management – inevitably entails making political choices about water distribution, authority and inclusiveness (Mehta et al., 2016; Zwarteveen et al., 2017). This will also be illustrated in Chapter 4, where the solution to protect the city of Jakarta from flooding with an off-shore dam also reflects an underlying choice for whose interest are prioritized in translating the DDA to Jakarta. For any interests to be taken into account, they need to be visible and on the table in the translation process. Policy translation thus is also political in the sense that the decision who gets a seat at the translation (or negotiation) table, also predefines whose interests are taken into account. As such, it will be relevant to identify “key actors and interests who were not incorporated into decision making or implementation processes. That is, the politics of exclusion.” (Stone, 2016, p. 8). This makes one wonder how actors become engaged in the transfer process in the first place and who gets to decide who gets a seat at the table. In the case of the DDA, the Dutch government aims to work with the highest administrative and political levels (WGC, 2013, p. 13). As the empirical cases of this dissertation will show, this raises the question of how outsiders to the local governance system, like the Dutch are in this case, can gain access to relevant or powerful political and administrative actors. Kim Taekyoon (2013) already stressed the importance of taking into account local politics in contextualising transferred ideas, by means of a study in South-Korea on the transfer of economic development models. A special issue on the politics surrounding the introduction of Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) in southern Africa also emphasises the role of domestic political culture in translating IWMR to these countries. In several instances international donors struggled with political interests and diplomatic relations between their country and the recipient country (Mehta et al., 2016). Summarizing, this raises the question how transfer agents deal with politics in the translation process, especially when those agents are non-state actors like in the transfer of the DDA. To date, there is insufficient insight in these ‘politics of translation’.
1.3. Objective of the research

1.3.1. Research questions

Following from these theoretical lacunas, concerning the mobilization, translation and reception of policy, this dissertation aims to open the black box of policy transfer and translation. By following an ongoing transfer process over the course of this PhD project, I aim to address the theoretical lacunas outlined above. The followed transfer concerns the Dutch Delta Approach (DDA). Given the prominence of Asian countries in the so-called focus deltas, I will concentrate on transfer of the DDA to three Asian countries between 2016 and 2019. As such, the main research question that will be answered in this dissertation is: What explains the (in)effectiveness of attempts to transfer the ‘Dutch Delta Approach’ to South and Southeast Asia?

This question is supported by four sub-questions. The first sub-question inquires “Which elements shape the process of policy transfer?”. The second concentrates on the question “How is the Dutch Delta Approach mobilized for international transfer?”, thereby attempting to find an answer to the first puzzle presented in 1.2.4. The third sub-question concentrates on the second puzzle by posing the question “How do engaged actors interpret and modify transferred knowledge?”. Finally, the question “How do power and politics affect the policy transfer process?” is raised to enhance insights in the third puzzle.

1.3.2. Relationship between the research questions

These questions build on the three conceptual puzzles as well as a general question on understanding the process of policy transfer. The order of the sub-questions is based on the order in which I will go to the bottom of the transfer process. First of all, I will investigate by which elements at all the transfer process is composed. This first step is important to know what should be taken into account when studying policy transfer. Without this overview, elements that can explain (in) effective transfer may be easily overlooked. Next, the process of transfer is broken down into two: the start of the transfer process, which will be investigated through the second research question on mobilization, and the reception of transferred policy ideas, which is studied through the third question. The final sub-question will be used to investigate which role politics and power played throughout the process. When increasing our understanding of the elements that form a transfer process, of how policy is mobilized and received and of the influence of politics and power on this process, I will be able to formulate an answer to the main research question of how to explain (in)effective transfer. How the remaining chapters of this dissertation contribute to answering these questions is outlined in Section 1.6.
1.3.3. **Effective transfer**

I have chosen here for the word ‘effective’ over ‘successful’. Success is in the eye of the beholder and bears the notion of being binary, something is successful or it failed. Despite the use of the words ‘failure’ and ‘success’ when it comes to policy transfer or implementation (see e.g. Dunlop, 2017; Marsh & Sharman, 2009; Rusu & Loblova, 2019; Stone, 2016), there is a world of options between failure and success (Colven, 2020). My intention is not to evaluate the suitability of these ideas, but to assess whether transfer is effective. One way of looking at it, is by assuming that a transfer is successful as long as there was some element of the policy transferred (e.g. Os, 2015). Alternatives are to assess the quality of the transfer process or evaluate which programmatic and political goals were achieved (Marsh & Mcconnell, 2010; Vinke-de Kruijf, 2013). Just focusing on what is transferred suggests that a smooth, fast process with little hindrances is “better”. There are however instances of policy transfer whereby the process was bumpy but the result was generally applauded in the end or where the transfer was fast, but with disappointing result. I propose to equal effective policy transfer not to a single indicator but consider it as a layered concept that comprises both the transfer object and the quality of the transfer process. Effective policy transfer is therefore defined as a transfer process that resulted in (a) access to a suitable policy formulation network, (b) a translation of the transferred policy that fits the receiving context and (c) adoption by policy makers in the receiving context.

1.4. **Methodology**

Methodologically speaking, this dissertation adopts two novelties in policy transfer research. First, it uses a critical realist approach. Second, it is a longitudinal study of policy transfer. As a result, the research is qualitative in nature and consists of three international, longitudinal case studies, a detailed exploration of how the Dutch Delta Approach is mobilized for international travelling, and a literature review.

1.4.1. **A critical realist study**

Over the years, the concept of transfer has been enriched by academics of various policy fields (Benson & Jordan, 2011). Similarly, policy transfer has evolved by incorporating concepts and ideas from human geographers who, among others, introduced the idea of ‘mobilities’ (Benson and Jordan, 2012). This evolution was accompanied by a call for bringing in interpretivist perspective in policy transfer, in the form of social constructivism (Johnson & Hagström, 2005; Peck, 2011). Despite initial hesitation, prominent scholars acknowledged that elements of social-constructivism may add our understanding of the transfer process (e.g. Dolowitz & Marsh, 2012). Such constructivist approaches are more pronounced in the notion of mobility (McCann and Ward, 2013) and is also reflected in the notion of policy translation that actors have different frames of reference (Park,
Wilding & Chung, 2014). Nevertheless, David Dolowitz notes that “one of the most difficult issues with adopting a translation perspective to the study of transfer is attempting to fit the analysis into a social constructivist analysis.” (2017, pp. 41–42). Although most translation studies acknowledge the importance of moving beyond a positivist perspective, they still fail to truly move beyond the “standard who, what, when, where and why found in other transfer studies” (ibid, p. 42).

With this study I wish to adhere to this call to move beyond these positivist approaches of policy transfer. At the same time, I do not consider fully fletched interpretivism (and thus social constructivism) the answer either. There is a reality ‘out there’ that exists regardless of social construction. However, I am critical towards the ability of science to capture that reality. Perception of these phenomena and reality is relative to its perceiver. As outlined in Secton 1.2, policy translation entails that actors interpret transferred knowledge and modify policy ideas to assign new meaning to it. In this study, I will reconstruct how actors from different parts of the transfer network perceive the transfer process. My research will therefore be incorporating a constructivist approach, but rooted in critical realism (Elder-Vass, 2012). Epistemologically speaking the information collected about the transfer of the Dutch Delta Approach will be perceived different by each individual involved. For me, this means that each individually creates a different, though biased, perspective on real world events, e.g. a flooding event, thereby creating the meaning they assign to these events.

To adhere to this critical realist stance, I will pay particular attention to the context that interacts with the mechanisms behind policy transfer (Bryman, 2012, p. 29) and will reconstruct events through different perspectives. Inclusion of respondents with different roles is thus needed, because a single perspective would not do justice to the variation in interpretations of these events. Instead different explanations given by different people shall be investigated and compared by the researcher.

1.4.2. Longitudinal case studies
Longitudinal research is relatively rare in policy transfer studies. Transfers are often studied ex post, hence relying on respondents’ memory to reconstruct the process. However, “longitudinal studies are required to capture the shifting motivations involved” (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000, p. 16). Studying the three selected cases over longer periods of time allows me to map the dynamics of transfer processes. The studied cases of this dissertation research thus evolved in real-time during the research period. This allows a unique opportunity to study these projects from ‘within’, but also comes methodological challenges. A disadvantage of studying ongoing transfers is that the outcome is still unknown. For example, the case presented in Chapters 4 and 5 concerns a case where decision making
has been in an impasse for over two years at the time of writing. However, no conclusions about the outcome can be done as this may change in the near future.

The three selected cases were studied through the collection of qualitative, empirical data. Empirical data was collected either from primary sources (e.g. through interviews) or from secondary sources, such as existing studies or documents (as is the case Chapter 4 and Chapter 6). Over the course of four years, 121 semi-structured interviews with 103 individuals, one group interview with 7 people and 31 Q-sorts were collected. Besides this material, 45 policy documents were reviewed. The sources have been used as follows: the interviews and Q-sorts were used for the studies in Chapters 3 to 6; the documents were used for the description of the DDA in Chapter 3; and Chapter 2 hosts an elaborate method description of the literature review.

1.4.3. Case selection
In Section 1.2.2 the Dutch Delta Approach (DDA) was introduced as the transferred policy central in this dissertation. The DDA is a suitable case for this study, because it has been transferred to numerous countries, both developing, in transition and developed. This dissertation particularly focusses on the transfer to developing countries. As Chapter 3 will specify, the nature of the transfer process of the DDA is different for developing and developed countries. In this dissertation, I will focus on the transfer to developing countries for two reasons. The first reason is practical in nature: the Dutch government articulated a focus on urban deltas and developing countries in the International Water Ambition (2016a). In so-called ‘focus countries’, knowledge exchange projects are funded by the Dutch government (Rijksoverheid, 2016a). The list is changing over time and includes in 2020: Indonesia, Bangladesh, Mozambique, Vietnam, Egypt, Myanmar and Colombia (Partners voor Water, 2020). For most of these countries, bilateral relations are shifting from an aid-based to a trade-based relation, which may “entail ‘trade facilitation with aid money’ or ‘trade sustaining aid results’” (Umans, 2016, p. 96). Secondly, and scientifically relevant, transferring policies from developed to developing countries is particularly challenging. Policy transfer is in general a complex process, but especially transfer to developing countries may risk inappropriateness (Rahman, Naz & Nand, 2016) or receivers may lack the resources to implement adopted policies locally (Bennett et al., 2015). For the DDA, the Dutch government itself acknowledges that friction may emerge between the motivation to contribute to a more sustainable world and to create access to foreign markets. A friction that is particularly apparent in countries that are in the transition from an aid-based to a trade-based relationship (Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, 2013). Combining the above with the notion that Asian countries are prominent in the list of focus deltas and
particularly vulnerability for climate change, the focus of this dissertation is on the policy transfer of the DDA to Asian countries.

Despite the existence of multiple cases in Asia, three of these focus countries are particularly interesting. These cases are primarily selected on the basis of their effectiveness and thus on the outcome on a range from non-adoption to adoption. The first criterion is thus that the transfer has resulted in an observable outcome. This automatically set a requirement to the time a particular transfer was already running: transfers are known to take several years to several decades before resulting in a final outcome (Dussauge-Laguna, 2012). A second criterion distinguishes between effective and ineffective transfers and there should be one case in each category. When combining these criteria, potential cases in Myanmar and Manilla (Philippines) are omitted and three cases were selected. One of these cases is that of ineffective transfer. Since 2007 the Netherlands is trying to develop a flood management strategy for the Indonesian capital city of Jakarta. In ten years, there has been no adoption or rejection of these ideas. This makes this case interesting and may help enhance our understanding of why transfer sometimes ‘fail’ (Stone, 2016). This case is discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. The other two cases can be typified as effective transfers because the transfer process has resulted in adoption of the ideas. These cases are the Mekong Delta Plan (MDP) and the Bangladesh Delta Plan 2100 (BDP2100). In Vietnam the Dutch government assisted with developing a delta plan for Mekong Delta and in Bangladesh for practically the whole country. Given the adoption of both plans, I will be able to evaluate the whole transfer process and identify how the involved actors managed to devise an effective translation that was deemed worth adopting. As such, in Chapter 6 I compare these two cases with a similar transfer object and a comparable outcome of effective adoption despite the highly different countries in which the transfer took place. The case of Jakarta is thus different from the two in Bangladesh and Vietnam, not only in terms of outcome (adoption) but also in terms of the scope of the transfer project (urban master plan versus strategic visions). The empirical studies on these three cases are presented in the second part of this dissertation.

1.4.4. General observations and detailed investigations
The analytical framework of Chapter 3 was used for an initial analysis of all three cases. This was done to ensure that in basis the same method was used to analyse all three cases. Chapter 4 presents the results of this exercise for NCICD in Jakarta, as this was the first case to which the framework was applied. Besides analysing the transfer case, this application was also used to illustrate the use of the framework from Chapter 2 in practice. Next, I zoomed in on an aspect of the framework that stood out in each case. Initially the framework is used to determine which interplay of factors lead to a certain outcome (adoption or non-adoption). The in-depth qualitative data that was collected to facilitate this
analysis, could also be used to identify elements of this framework that stood out. For instance, in Jakarta it was remarkable that all respondents pointed to the proposed NCICD strategy as ‘unsuitable’ for Jakarta and that not all relevant stakeholders were included in the process. This suggests the translation process was insufficient. Thus where Chapter 4 aims to explain how the impasse emerged using the framework, Chapter 5 focusses on the translation process by asking the question how actors perceive the way forward, out of the impasse. Similarly the involvement of key actors emerged as an important factor and where translation in Jakarta was considered insufficient, in Vietnam and Bangladesh respondents praised the result of this translation. This has lead to a focus on the question how the ‘right’ actors came on-board in Vietnam, as well as how this helped shape translation. As such, Chapter 6 adopts a network management perspective.

1.4.5. Data collection

Selection of respondents

To adhere to the critical realist nature of the research, I sampled respondents through snowball sampling and by balancing Dutch nationals and country originals in each case. Similarly, I attempted to include people involved at the very start of the transfer of the DDA and people who became involved more recently. This was done intentionally to prevent bias towards a certain perspective and to collect as many pieces of the puzzle as possible. In other words, as respondent #90 replied when I asked him a question that he could not answer: I need to speak with different people “because I know some part of the story, they know another part of the story. No one knows the whole plot.”

As such, I recruited respondents among the Dutch consultants and their Indonesian, Vietnamese and Bangladeshi counterparts as well as among civil society organisations, academics and government bodies in these countries. The Dutch government agencies had a coordinating or facilitating role for these international projects and include the Netherlands Water Partnership (NWP), the Dutch Enterprise Agency (RVO) and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Infrastructure & Environment. These ministries are currently called ‘Foreign Affairs and Climate Change’ and ‘Infrastructure and Water Management’. In this dissertation I will use their old names, as these were in use during most of the study period. Table 1 and Table 2 summarize the characteristics of the respondents. In each case study country, balance was sought between Dutch respondents and country originals. Overall this resulted in about half of the respondents being Dutch and the other half being non-Dutch. Given the focus of this research on transfer agents, most respondents were in fact directly involved in sharing knowledge, either as sender or as receiver. A sub-set of the respondents was only indirectly involved in the transfer process though. They came from various backgrounds, such as: (critical) NGOs, government bodies that were not at the table, international donor
organisations, from a panel of experts, or they were an independent reviewer of the drafted strategic plans. As a result, information about events was collected from different perspectives.

Table 1. Overview of respondents’ nationalities per case. Please note that the number of respondents adds up to 109 as this overview includes the group interview.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Dutch</th>
<th>Indonesian</th>
<th>Vietnamese</th>
<th>Bangladeshi</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The respondents are kept anonymous and were each assigned an identification number (1-103 for individual respondents and a separate indicator for the group interview). The group interview is included as one interview and was assigned a number as well (104). Numbers were assigned on the date the first interview was held and in cases where individuals were interviewed multiple times the original identification number was sustained. Of all respondents, nineteen individuals were interviewed twice and Respondent #2 was interviewed even three times. As can be seen in Figure 2, most interviews were held during fieldwork missions to Jakarta (I and II), Bangladesh (III) and Vietnam (IV). The interviews in Vietnam include one group interview with bureaucrats from eight different local government departments in Ben Tre province. Most interviews were held by me, but I also included six interviews held by research assistant Alex Lopez Alberola on the Mekong Delta Plan. These were interviews with Respondents #16, #40, #42, #44, #47 and #56. In Vietnam, six interviews were held together with Luu Thi Tang, Nguyen Hong Quan and Dung Duc Tran, researchers of the Centre for Water and Climate Change of Vietnam National University (WACC-VNU).

Table 2. Overview of the respondents’ type of organisation per case. Please note that the number exceeds 109, as some people were interviewed on multiple cases.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Consultants</th>
<th>Research</th>
<th>NGO</th>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCICD</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDP</td>
<td>19(^\d)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDP2100</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Participatory observations: own role and involvement

This evaluative nature of the analysis also means that I cannot remain completely external to the studied phenomenon. To operate in a critical realist tradition, it will be crucial to understand the context in which the phenomenon takes place and is observed (Bryman, 2012). As a result, I felt that, in order to be a good qualitative researcher, I needed to familiarize myself as much as possible with the context in which I would be doing research.
I had to familiarize myself with two components of the cases. The first was the country context in which I would be doing research. For this research it would also be vital to understand the three countries’ government structure and politics. See Box 1 on page 44 for a personal account of this process. Although I naturally could not match the intuitive knowing of country original people, these activities enabled me to have a basic understanding of the cultural, political and institutional context in which I would do my research. Next to the context of the three studied countries, there was another context that could be relevant for interpreting the data I was about to collect: the world of water management and hydraulic engineering. Understanding policy translation entails understanding how and why policies are modified the way they are. To do so, the researcher should understand the frame of reference of the key actors, being the transfer agents on the ground in this study. Most transfer agents (mainly Dutch consultants) and their local counterparts (mainly government officials) are engineers. Being trained as a water resource management engineer myself, I understand their jargon and – more importantly – way of thinking. This allows me to build rapport and to grasp the content of and the rationale behind the strategic plans these people were working on while I interacted with them.

Figure 2. Timeline of interviews. The horizontal axis shows the interview date, the vertical axis shows the identification number assigned to the respondents. Each interview is indicated with a green dot. Vertical lines demarcate four periods of field work.

An important aspect of this interaction with engineers concerned my collaboration with applied research institute Deltares. Senior advisors of Deltares and Twynstra Gudde acted as case ambassadors and granted me access to their network surrounding the project under investigation and legitimized my presence in their project offices. Also, I reflected with them on my observations and asked their input for follow-up research questions. Their familiarity with the case made them resourceful navigators, but throughout the process I remained in the driving seat. I critically evaluated their suggestions before following up on them and validating their claims with others where possible. This type of participant observation inevitably means that I interfered with the cases I was studying though. Nevertheless, there are no signs that my interaction with these senior advisors has resulted in significant changes in the course of events in the
projects they were active in. These communications were limited to some of the senior advisors, for others I was just one among several researchers interviewing them about their project. In addition, I closely worked with transfer agents on the ground, rather than those who sit at the controls of these projects in The Hague or at embassies. Although my interaction with these case ambassadors may have triggered new ideas and thoughts about their work, this has neither affected the scope of the projects they were hired for nor the larger political scope of the spreading of the Dutch Delta Approach. This interaction was highly valuable though for data collection for this dissertation as it allowed access to parts of the network otherwise hard to connect to.

**Box 1**

*So how did I familiarize myself with the three countries I would be doing research in? First of all, I had the benefit of being already familiar with Vietnam, as I resided in its capital Hanoi for three months in 2015 to work at two Vietnamese universities. I decided to first dive deeper into Indonesia. Initially from a distance, by reading De beste plek ter wereld by Roanne van Voorst about how slum dwellers in Jakarta live and deal with floods; and For Profit and Prosperity by Wim Ravesteijn and Jan Kop about civil engineering works by the Dutch in Indonesia between 1800 and 2000. I also enjoyed Soebatten, sarongs & sinjo’s by Joop van den Berg about Indonesian words in the Dutch language. So when I heard the Indonesian language is relatively easy to learn, I enrolled in an Indonesian language course at Volksuniversiteit Rotterdam. An additional benefit was that most other participants were either Indonesians or of Indonesian descent and were most eager to share their culture with me. I read grey literature and news articles to enrich my understanding of the history of Bangladesh and Vietnam, the countries’ relationship to the Netherlands, administrative and political culture and bio-physical characteristics of the delta. Since Vietnam has a (for outsiders) complicated administrative and political system, I worked together with researchers from Vietnam National University in Ho Chi Minh City and held expert interviews on decision making in Vietnam. In addition, I discussed the cases and the context in which they took place with Indonesian, Bangladeshi and Vietnamese students of the Institute of Housing and Urban Development Studies at Erasmus University Rotterdam (IHS), IHE-Delft Institute for Water Education and Wageningen University & Research (WUR).*
1.5. Relevance of this dissertation

1.5.1. Academic contribution

The scientific relevance of this dissertation can be summarized in a conceptual, theoretical and methodological contributions to the field of policy transfer and delta management. First of all, I aim to contribute to the policy transfer and policy translation literature, by addressing the three theoretical gaps outlined in Section 1.2.4. This means this I will focus on the mobilization of policy, on the role of receiving actors and politics in the transfer process and on the dynamics of the translation process at the receiving end. As such, I intend to contribute to the call by Osmany Porto de Oliveira and Leslie Pal (2018) to enhance our understanding and conceptualisation of policy transfer, in particular the role of consultants, resistance to transfer and innovating conceptualisations of translation. I will do so by investigating how policy actors mobilized and modified the Dutch Delta Approach to fit into the existing institutional, cultural and political context.

Next to conceptual contributions, policy transfer will be connected to relevant theories in this dissertation. David Benson and Andrew Jordan already noted how other scientific fields have embraced policy transfer and called the integration of other concepts and theories “promising”, thereby explicitly referring to multi-level analysis, social learning, constructivism, new institutionalist, network and governance approaches (Benson & Jordan, 2011). This dissertation will add to this by explicitly integrating the toolboxes that policy branding (Chapter 3) and network governance (Chapter 6) provide for the study of policy transfer.

Besides adding to the field of policy transfer, this dissertation also enriches our knowledge on delta management. Benson and Jordan (2011) have demonstrated that various fields have used the concept of policy transfer, such as urban planning, environmental management and development assistance. Delta and water management have a strong international component, among others due to the often transboundary nature of rivers and the prominence of water in the Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations. Nevertheless, delta management has a strong tradition in the natural or engineering sciences and worldwide flood management and other water issues are still predominantly addressed by dikes and other structural measures (Wesselink, 2016). This emphasis on the physical side of deltas is reflected in the scientific coverage of the subject. As is explicatd in Box 2, most studies have been published in environmental or earth sciences journals. As such, analysing delta management from a policy perspective will complement the existing knowledge on delta management from a social sciences perspective.

Finally, this dissertation is methodologically innovative. I will adhere to the call to adopt constructivist perspectives in policy transfer and introduce two new research
methods. Section 1.4.1 already outlined how this dissertation adheres to the need for constructivist perspectives and longitudinal studies in policy transfer. Chapter 2 uses the PRISMA method for a systematic literature review, a method suitable to systematically map the state-of-the-art insights about policy transfer, but not used before in policy transfer studies as can be seen in box 2. In Chapter 5 I will use Q methodology, a method only used before once, namely by Lynch, Adler and Howard (2014) on policy diffusion of arid basin management. Q methodology is suitable to identify which different perspectives exist in a population and can thus be used to gain insight in how transfer agents perceive the translation process. Both Q methodology and PRISMA are novel methods in policy transfer studies.

Box 2

A search in May 2020 showed that only 24 of 78 scientific publications on Scopus about ‘delta management’ were published in the field of social sciences. A similar image emerged on Web of Science. Of the 113 search results, studies on ‘delta management’ were mostly published in environmental sciences (31), water resources (31), geosciences (22), ecology (19) and meteorological sciences (10). Similarly, a search for (“policy transfer” OR “policy diffusion” OR “policy translation” OR “policy mobility”) AND “PRISMA” on Scopus and Web of Science resulted no results, thereby showing the novelty of applying PRISMA to policy transfer studies.

1.5.2. Societal relevance

Besides an interesting scientific concept, is policy transfer also a driver behind policy innovation. Globalisation has made it all the more easier to be aware of and learn about policies elsewhere while at the same time international organisations are global spreaders of policy models and standards. Ineffective transfer implies that a policy problem remains unaddressed or even that high costs have been made to adopt a policy that does not work. Knowing what contributes to effective transfer is therefore also of societal relevance.

Regarding the case of the Dutch Delta Approach, water is a key component of the Dutch economy and bilateral relations. According to the Netherlands Water Partnership (2011), 17% of the Dutch economy is connected to water. This percentage is relatively large compared to other countries (NWP, 2011). The Netherlands therefore appointed water as one of nine Top Sectors, economic sector in which the Netherlands is excelling and wishes to maintain a leading role (Topsector Water, 2013). The government invests in these Top Sectors to stimulate innovation and at trade missions certain Top Sectors may be placed
at the forefront. The transfer of the Dutch Delta Approach (DDA) is part of the international branch of the water sector and the economic contribution of these activities is steadily growing each year (NWP water export index 2018).

Besides the economic importance of the water sector, water is also a key topic in international relations. Although the budget of Partners for Water (a major source of funding for DDA-related projects) are some orders of magnitude less than official development assistance (ODA) budgets were before, these projects still cost one or several millions of euros each. Sharing knowledge under the flag of the DDA is often tied to broader larger bilateral agreements. Also, as was described in Section 1.4.3, the DDA is used to give substance to the transition from development aid to aid & trade. In the chapters on the case studies it will be shown how this takes shape through a broader Memorandum of Understanding regarding Water in Indonesia and delta plans as means to rejuvenate bilateral relations. The DDA is therefore part of ‘water diplomacy’, whereby the Dutch water expertise is used in order to achieve foreign policy goals (Van Genderen & Rood, 2011). The Dutch Delta Approach is thus worth studying given its economic and diplomatic importance. This dissertation’s question about what constitutes effective transfer is thus relevant for adequate public expenditure as well as efficacious foreign policy.

The lessons drawn in this dissertation may be used in the implementation of the NIWA (Netherlands International Water Ambition, (Rijksoverheid, 2019), which builds on the interim evaluation of the International Water Ambition (IWA). This interim evaluation executed in 2018 explicitly states that lessons learned from the implementation of the IWA should be used in future (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018, p. 3). However, this dissertation will not answer the question whether turnover increased over the years and neither will it judge the rightfulness of the ambition to transfer the Dutch Delta Approach. What it will do, is study in-depth how the DDA is promoted and translated as well as evaluating whether the transfer of strategic delta planning was effective.

1.6. Outline of the remaining chapters
These two introductory chapters are followed by two parts consisting of five research papers that each form a separate chapter. Chapters 2 and 3 host a conceptual exploration of the notion of policy transfer in the case of the Dutch Delta Approach (DDA). I will do so through a theoretical exploration and through an empirical exploration. The first took shape as a systematic literate review, which will be presented in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 is the result of an investigation to compose a demarcation of the Dutch Delta Approach and conceptualise how this policy was mobilized for international transfer. The DDA is translated ‘on the ground’ and these translations vary from place to place and between the people.
involved. The second part therefore zoom in on this transfer and translation on the ground by focusing on the efforts of Dutch consortia in Bangladesh, Vietnam and Indonesia. These three cases were selected based on the outcome in terms of adoption. As such, I compared the two most similar cases (adoption in Bangladesh and Vietnam) with a critical case of non-adoption in Jakarta. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 discuss the impasse in the transfer process in Jakarta, while Chapter 6 aims to explain why the transfer of the DDA to Bangladesh and Vietnam was effective. These chapters also connect to different parts of the transfer process. Chapter 3 concentrates on the mobilisation of the DDA as policy model, while Chapters 4 to 6 focus on the spreading of this model. The framework created in Chapter 2 covers all aspects of transfer.

Together these chapters contribute to answering the main research question and the four sub-questions. A breakdown of the chapters and their contribution to each research question can be found in Table 3. In answering the first sub-question, I will dive deeper into the process of policy transfer. The answer to the first sub-question is mostly covered by Chapter 2, where a conceptual framework will be developed based on existing literature. The application of the framework to a transfer in practice is presented in Chapter 4. The second sub-question refers to the first conceptual puzzle, namely mobilizing the policy ideas for transfer. As was discussed in Section 1.2.4, various scholars acknowledge the importance of promotion of policies for transfer, only few studies focus on promotion to explain (part of) policy transfer processes. In Chapter 3 I will adopt a branding perspective to explain how policies are disembedded from their original context to create a policy model or ‘brand’. The third question concerns the second conceptual puzzle, namely how policy transfer takes shape in reality. The answer to this question will be mostly obtained through Chapter 3 on the mobilization of the DDA and the case chapters 5 and 6 that dedicate attention to the translation of the DDA in the cases studies. Finally, the fourth sub-question on the influence of power and politics in policy transfer is not addressed in a particular chapter, but will be answered through the combination of all five studies.

Table 3. Contribution of each chapter to answering the research sub-questions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research sub-question</th>
<th>Ch. 2</th>
<th>Ch. 3</th>
<th>Ch. 4</th>
<th>Ch. 5</th>
<th>Ch. 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I Which elements shape the process of policy transfer?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II How is the Dutch Delta Approach mobilized for international transfer?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III How do actors interpret and modify transferred knowledge?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV How do power and politics affect the effectiveness of transfer?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
An answer to the main research question will be formulated in the final chapter, Chapter 7. To maintain flow in the chapters, stylistic changes have been made in Chapters 2 to 6. These chapters were originally written as articles and adopted here as chapters. See Table 4 for an overview. To keep the narrator consistent, the personal pronoun used in all chapters of this dissertation is “I”, even when the published article was co-authored and used “we”. In addition, numbering of respondents as well was tables, figures and headings has been continued. Headings have further been changed from “introduction” or “conclusion” to a short sentence to keep section titles unique throughout the dissertation. In Section 7.4.5 I will reflect on the choice for an article-based dissertation.

**Table 4. Outline of the chapters of this dissertation.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Chapter’s central question</th>
<th>Outlet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Introduction</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Policy transfer routes</td>
<td>Why are some mobilized policies adopted and effectively implemented while others are not?</td>
<td>Published in <em>Policy Studies</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Branding in policy translation</td>
<td>How to explain the translation of the ‘Dutch Delta Approach’ for international transfer by adopting a branding perspective?</td>
<td>Published in <em>Environmental Science and Policy</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Reconstructing the impasse in policy transfer</td>
<td>How to explain the existing impasse in transferring the Dutch Delta Approach to Jakarta?</td>
<td>Published in <em>Journal of Environmental Planning and Management</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Resolving impasses in policy transfer</td>
<td>Which perspectives do engaged actors have on breaking through impasses in policy transfer and how do these perspectives help explain the persistence of impasses?</td>
<td>Under review at an international peer-reviewed journal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Un-Dutching the Dutch Delta Approach</td>
<td>How and why can the dynamics and outcome of (in)effective policy transfer be explained as a result of the network management strategies that are applied?</td>
<td>Submitted at an international peer-reviewed journal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Conclusion &amp; Discussion</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When I started this research, I had no background in public administration, let alone policy transfer. In order to familiarize myself with the research topic, I started reading conceptual articles and reviews on policy transfer. While doing so, I noticed that most reviews focus on conceptual developments, including those written by Bennett (1991), Dolowitz and Marsh (1996), Benson and Jordan (2011) and Stone (2016). An evidence-based overview was missing, even though there were ample empirical studies available (e.g. Park, Lee, & Wilding, 2017; Ward, 2006). I therefore decided to review the body of literature in order to bring all this empirical knowledge together. The focus of the first study of this dissertation thus became a review of empirical studies to develop an analytical framework that would be able to capture the essence as well as the breadth of policy transfer. Chapter 2 details the methodological rationale and presents the findings of this review.

Despite the time-intensive nature of reviewing the literature, I will benefit from this exercise throughout the rest of this dissertation. Such a systematic review helps to gain in-depth understanding of how concepts like transfer and translation played out in practice. During the rest of the research, I could furthermore fall back on the structured overviews that form the basis for Chapter 2 and which list transfer objects, involved actors, and facilitators or hindrances to transfer. And indeed, while reviewing empirical studies I started to see patterns between how transfer was initiated and how transfer ended, which eventually resulted in the transfer routes that are presented at the end of this chapter.

ABSTRACT

Although studies on policy transfer have expanded, a general and comprehensive understanding of policy transfer is lacking. This study offers an evidence-based explanation of policy transfer processes. I extracted constraining and facilitating factors from 180 empirical studies using PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic reviews and Meta-Analysis) and aggregated these factors into a conceptual framework. I synthesize these findings in four ‘transfer routes’. Based on these routes, I conclude that actors could shape a subset of those factors by taking certain decisions regarding transferability, adoptability and process design, albeit within the boundaries of the environment.
2.1. Introducing the need for a systematic review of empirical studies

“The Netherlands has its water management adequately organised. [...] This approach is valuable to share with other countries and inspire the development of their climate adaptation strategies.” stated Wim Kuijken, the Delta Commissioner (a special government commissioner) in the International Water Ambition (Rijksoverheid, 2016a). With this ambition, the Dutch government articulates its ambition to transfer the celebrated Dutch water governance policy to other countries. Such occasions of policy transfer are believed to be increasingly occurring nowadays due to the popularity of evidence-based policy making (Marsden & Stead, 2011; Legrand, 2012) and the widespread use of modern information and communication means (e.g. the Internet) that allows access to information about policies elsewhere (Dolowitz, 2006). However, a comprehensive explanation of how this process of policy transfer works is still lacking.

Existing research is limited to one or a few cases or uses deductive approaches to investigate limited elements of the transfer process. Most studies focus on single case descriptions (e.g. Dolowitz & Medearis, 2009). This focus on individual cases limits the generalisability of findings. Furthermore, studies are usually deductive in nature: authors develop a theoretical framework and test this framework in a case study or apply an existing analytical framework to a different environment (e.g. Dixon, 2007). Such research is valuable, but cannot provide general explanations of the process of policy transfer. Aggregating individual cases and explanations might provide such answers. Yet, several reviews have been conducted on policy transfer in the past decade, but none of them systematically documented the factors that influence the policy transfer process and thereby the outcomes of this process. I will elaborate on this in the next section.

I aim to contribute to the understanding of the process of policy transfer, by conducting a systematic review in order to develop a more evidence-based framework of policy transfer. I will identify and aggregate evidence-based factors (i.e. that were empirically identified) that have an influence on policy transfer processes. By focussing on empirical research rather than new conceptualizations, I will be able to answer the question why some mobilized policies are adopted and implemented while others are not. This contribution can serve as a reference point for scholars studying policy transfer processes and aid practitioners in enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of policy transfer processes.

The remainder of this chapter consists of four sections. In Section 2.2, I will conceptually explore policy transfer, before introducing the PRISMA method that I used to review the literature systematically in Section 2.3. I present all identified factors in Section 2.4 by introducing a conceptual framework on policy transfer.
and discussing each factor’s contribution to transfer. The main added value of this
review lies in the subsequent deduction of policy transfer routes. In the discussion
(Section 2.5), I present four common routes that policy transfer processes can take
from initiation to outcome. Finally, I conclude that factors early in the process may
predetermine later transfer outcomes.

2.2. Conceptual demarcation of policy transfer
Over the past decades, the body of literature on policy convergence has expanded
and the number of terms describing policy spreading has increased concurrently.
In this section, I will explore the most important concepts and position of this
study.

Several terms exist to denote processes of policy spreading, such as policy
transfer, policy diffusion and policy mobility (Stone, 2001; Prince, 2012) and policy
adaptation and policy translation (Mukhtarov, 2014). These terms have overlapping
meaning but nuances can be found in their understanding of convergence (Marsh
& Sharman, 2009). This chapter focusses on the “action oriented intentional
activity” (Evans & Davies, 1999) of spreading a policy and the use of “knowledge
about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions, etc. in one time and/or
place” to develop policies in another time or place (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996, p.
344). Furthermore, I consider policy transfer to take place between autonomous
actors that can make sovereign decisions. To clarify this definition, I will compare
two examples of policy transfer in the European Union (EU). According to my
definition, policy transfer encompasses voluntary or pressured adoption of
non-obligatory European norms. In contrast, this study disregards adoption of
mandatory EU legislation by EU member states. This distinction is quite relevant,
given that various bodies of literature have addressed the coercive imposition of
standards on other, mainly developing countries. Examples include literature on
institutional transformation and studies on conditionality, including the structural
adjustments policy of the World Bank (Stone, 2016). Although I acknowledge
the existence and potential relevance of these studies, I will limit this review to
studies originating from the policy transfer, diffusion and mobility literature. I
elaborate on the choice for these fields in Section 2.3. Summarizing, I position
this study within the policy transfer tradition, but will incorporate studies using
related terms that match the chosen focus on action-oriented, intentional policy
transfer.

The body of literature on policy transfer has been reviewed several times before,
although these reviews did not provide satisfying explanations on how the
process of policy transfer is affected by internal and external influences. Some
early reviews focused on understanding the concept of policy transfer (e.g.
Bennett, 1991; Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996). In 2000 this resulted in Dolowitz and
Marsh’s famous framework of seven questions about policy transfer, coming down to questioning who engages in policy transfer for what reasons, defining what is being transferred from where to where and describing the process of policy transfer (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000). This latter topic concerns the different degrees of transfer, what restricts or facilitates the process and how this process relates to (in)effectiveness of transfer. More recent contributions aimed to describe the conceptual refinements (Benson & Jordan, 2011), innovations in the field (e.g. Peck & Theodore, 2010; Stone, 2012; Temenos & McCann, 2012) or re-assess influential contributions to the literature (Stone, 2016). Although these reviews provide a clear overview of the (conceptual) evolution in the scholarly field of policy transfer, they do not provide an overall explanation of policy transfer processes and outcomes.

Authors have listed (types of) factors that constrain policy transfer (e.g. Evans, 2009a), thereby addressing the question in Dolowitz and Marsh’s framework on factors facilitating or restricting transfer processes. However, a comprehensive, empirical overview of these factors is lacking, which is surprising given the crucial role that these factors play in explaining the effectiveness of policy transfer (Marsh and Sharman, 2009). In subsequent phases of the policy transfer process different factors play a role, as some authors identified (e.g. Gullberg & Bang, 2015; Kerlin, 2009). Moreover, certain factors become decisive during specific phases of a transfer process (Borges Sugiyama, 2008). Stone (2016) noted that some of these causes of adoption and non-adoption are recurrent, such as the role of context in transferability, the role of actors to improve or complicate the policy transfer process and the role of learning to establish the transfer of knowledge. Consequently, I wish to provide a comprehensive overview of factors that affect the process of policy transfer and, based on these factors, connect internal and external influences on policy transfer processes.

2.3. Method: PRISMA
This chapter aims to provide an overview of empirical studies since 1996 (when Dolowitz and Marsh’s seminal article was published) through a systematic literature review. This study makes use of the PRISMA method, an abbreviation of Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic reviews and Meta-Analysis (see Shamseer et al., 2015). In this section I will elaborate on the application of this method in this study, for a detailed explanation of this method please consult Shamseer et al. (2015).

2.3.1. Search strategy
I used the search terms policy transfer, policy diffusion and policy mobility to systematically review the literature. In the introduction, various alternatives to the term policy transfer were introduced, being policy diffusion, policy mobility,
policy translation, policy convergence and policy adaptation. These terms are often used interchangeably (Stone, 2001). However, the definitions of these six terms carry important nuances that increase or decrease the relevance of terms for this study. I compared definitions and randomly sampled twenty items per search term to evaluate whether this search term contributes to this study’s cause. Policy translation mainly co-occurs with policy transfer. The remaining unique items address translation of research findings into policy or translation of policy decisions at a higher administrative level to a lower, executing administrative level. The search term policy adaptation returned essentially noise, as most items concerned policies of climate change adaptation. Policy convergence is “the tendency of societies to grow more alike, to develop similarities in structures, processes, and performances” (Kerr, 1983, p. 3 via Bennett, 1991) and lacks the intentional and action-oriented nature of policy transfer. In addition, policy convergence focuses on results, rather than the processes that are central in policy transfer. As a result, I excluded policy translation, policy convergence and policy adaptation as search terms.

I applied four search strategies. First, I performed an electronic search in two online databases: Scopus and Web of Knowledge. I limited the searches to peer-reviewed articles only, to ensure a certain level of quality of included items. Only English-language articles were included. Dolowitz and Marsh’s seminal article (1996) unarguably has been influential (Benson & Jordan, 2011) and is therefore taken as a starting point for this review. Studies from 1996 up to and including 2016 are thus considered. Second, I entered the search terms in the databases of eight journals with a non-Anglophone geographic focus to compensate for a domination of items from the UK, USA and Western Europe in the search results. The decision to include English-language articles only potentially caused this domination. I selected the journals that focus on Latin America, Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe and that occurred most frequently in the list of journals returned by the database search. The latter criteria was introduced in order to ensure the journal had published about policy transfer. Third, relevant books and book chapters were identified using the electronic databases Web of Science and Scopus. Finally, I asked experts in the fields of policy transfer, diffusion and mobility to read through the selected references and asked them whether they missed any item. Three experts suggested 56 novel items. Figure 3 summarizes the four search strategies and presents the number of books and peer reviewed articles that were identified with each strategy.

The relevance of identified items was assessed using a list of five eligibility criteria. The first criterion is that only empirical findings are eligible for inclusion, given the goal to develop an evidence-based account of factors that affect policy transfer. The second criterion is that items should discuss agenda setting or policy
formulation phases. Implementation or effect evaluation of transferred policies are out of scope. With similar reasoning, I exclude implementation, spreading or enforcement at lower government levels (e.g. local level) of policy issued by higher levels of government (e.g. federation or union). The third criterion is that a study should identify factors as independent variables. This review serves to identify factors that influence the policy transfer process, hence policy transfer is considered the dependent variable in this review. The review is thus limited to articles that investigate independent variables (i.e. the factors that explain policy transfer). The fourth criterion is that the transfer should be taking place or should have taken place, excluding studies on transferability (i.e. export) and suitability (i.e. import) potential of policy. Finally, the studied transfer should be the result of an intentional process. An unintentional policy transfer includes the convergence of policies following changed global policy paradigms.

2.3.2. Item assessment
The resulting items were assessed in a two-step approach. Firstly, I assessed titles and abstracts and excluded items that did not meet the eligibility criteria. Items were always included in case of doubt. Items that passed this first stage were subjected to a full text read. A total of 78 publications ultimately failed the criteria and was rejected in this final stage after all. Figure 3 presents the flow chart of item selection.

2.3.3. Data analysis
All items were inductively coded and the final codes are the result of an iterative process of coding and re-coding in Atlas.ti software. I used a coding process that combined elements of selective and axial coding (Boeije, 2010). An initial set of codes was pre-determined following Benson and Jordan (2011), identifying the policy (i.e. transfer object), type of actors, the mechanism of transfer (voluntary, conditional or coercive) and the outcome (non-adoption, imitation, adaptation or inspiration). I also collected data about the study itself: the number of transfers studied, the methods used, the country of the first author’s institute and of the origin and destination of the transferred policy. I used an open coding approach to code factors, basing the initial codes on formulations of the item’s authors. In other words: factors that are included in the framework are not included because I found them relevant, but because they were identified by other authors in their studies. A phrase like “A lack of financial factors obstructed the transfer process.” would thus receive the code “constraining effect” alongside the original code “Lack of financial resources”. I checked for similar codes and aggregated these factors into one. The original code in this example was later aggregated into “Adoptability: resources”. In subsequent iterative rounds, the original factor-codes were divided, aggregated or renamed.
The results section is primarily based on the analysis of these codes. I present both a quantitative description of the data analysis and an explanation of policy transfer effectiveness in the form of a conceptual framework.

2.4. Results: overview and towards a conceptual framework
After presenting general results in Section 2.4.1, I move to the presentation and integration of factors into a conceptual framework in Section 2.4.2.

2.4.1. Describing the research focus of included items
A total of 180 articles is included in the review. See Appendix A for all references. These articles originate from 124 different journals. Although journals from diverse fields of research are included, such as Urban Studies (4 times), most frequently cited journals relate to policy analysis. These other journals are Policy Studies (8 times), The Policy Studies Journal (5), Journal of European Public Policy (5), Governance (4), Public Administration and Development (4), Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics (4) and Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice (4).

Policy transfer research in Western countries dominates the included items with Anglophone countries as its centre of gravity. A vast majority of the studies was conducted by first authors affiliated in Anglophone countries, headed by the UK (26%, N=180), USA (21%), Canada (9%) and Australia (6%), and in Western-European countries such as the Germany (6%) and Netherlands (5%). Moreover, the empirical studies included in the review focus on transfer from, to and between these countries as well. The UK and USA are studied most often, both as source and as destination of a transferred policy.

According to Benson and Jordan (2011), the field of policy transfer research diverged from its initial focus on transfer between nation states. Although such a divergence is observable on a conceptual level, only a small proportion of actual empirical studies involves non-state actors. Out of 180, 173 items discuss at least one state actor, while only 34 discuss one or multiple non-state actors (such as researchers, consultants or NGOs). State actors are generally national governments or international governmental organisations (IGOs, such as the OECD, EU or World Bank) in policy diffusion and transfer studies. Policy mobility literature added studies on transfer between local governments. The results further suggest that national governments are generally senders, receivers and initiators of transfer processes. They are rarely facilitators or transfer agents, while IGOs primarily act as senders and facilitators rather than receivers of policy.
The included items most often consist of in-depth analysis of policy transfer. Most authors study a specific instance of policy transfer (80%, N=180), although 20% of the articles compares multiple different transfer activities. The vast majority of studies is qualitative in nature, using interviews (57%), observations (15%) and document analysis (9%) as most reported research instruments. However, roughly one in four articles does not report on the methods used. Similarly, only 73% of the articles defines an analytical structure using a theoretical framework, model or concepts. One-third of the articles that specify their theoretical basis develop or test a new theoretical framework, while most built on existing concepts. Eleven studies do not even mention neither their methods for data collection nor the theoretical underpinnings of their analysis.

Figure 3. Flowchart from initial searches to items included in the PRISMA-based literature review.

Summarizing, the included body of knowledge in this review will be most representative to policy transfer between or originating from governments in Western cultures, although factors resulting from the presence of other actors and geographic areas are covered as well.
2.4.2.  Towards a conceptual model of policy transfer
The previous paragraphs described the results of the selective coding process. As described in Section 2.3, axial coding of factors was based on the original authors’ description of a factor and on the constraining or facilitating effect of this factor. I aggregated factors into four groups (see Table 5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Building block</th>
<th>Total times mentioned</th>
<th>Items mentioning this factor</th>
<th>Percentage*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transferability</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adoptability</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process design</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>583</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* N=180, please note that percentages might add up to above 100%.

The aggregated factors form the building blocks for a simple conceptual framework, see Figure 4. Environmental factors create the context that delimits the playing field for factors of the other building blocks, namely Transferability of the policy itself and the sending actor, Process Design of the interaction between sending and receiving actors and Adoptability of the policy in the adopting context and eventually the adoption (or non-adoption) of the transferred policy. The arrows indicate that outcomes of factors in these building blocks influence factors in other building blocks. In the following section, I will discuss the building blocks of this model and the associated factors in-depth.

![Figure 4. Simple conceptual framework of policy transfer.](image_url)

**Environmental factors**
The first building block concerns environmental factors. As discussed in the introduction, factors can be present in various phases of the transfer process. The environmental factors play a role in all phases. I distinguish between the policy arena, the subsystem and the general context. See Table 6.
Most environmental factors appeared in the *policy arena*. The policy directly shapes the freedom of movement of the key actors. This includes the Zeitgeist, existence or absence of competition with peers and the political climate (i.e. who forms the government). A policy might be at the right place at the right time (e.g. Cook & Ward, 2013) or make use of a policy window due to right timing (e.g. Busch, 2005). A change of government can change the policy arena in favourable ways and open up a transfer process (e.g. Delpuech & Vassileva, 2016), but may suddenly terminate nearly-completed transfers as well (e.g. Dussauge-Laguna, 2012).

The *subsystem* relates to the availability of alternative policies and the institutional and political context. Policy transfer can provide an alternative to an actor. An example is how the EU’s renewable energy policies provided an alternative to existing reliance on Russian gas in Eastern European countries (Ademmer, 2014). However, a transfer process may be disturbed by the availability of alternative policies to the transferred policy (e.g. in the case of competing health policies, see Clarke, 2013) or flourish in the absence of competing policies (e.g. in the case of IWRM, see Allouche, 2016).

The *general context* sets the boundary conditions for the policy transfer actors and is formed by biophysical (e.g. Attard & Enoch, 2011), cultural (e.g. Tsakatika, 2012) and socio-economic (e.g. Edwards & Beech, 2016) conditions. For example, the British and Australian Labour parties operated in similar neo-liberal systems but economic adversity required British Labour to adopt a dramatically different political position (Edwards & Beech, 2016).

Overall, nearly one in four articles mentions factors in the policy arena, which suggests that the policy arena might be the most important aspect of the environment to pay attention to in policy transfer processes.

**Transferability**

The second building block of the framework addresses the transferability of the policy. I identified several factors in the review data that relate to the transferability of the transfer object. Transferability-related factors dominate early stages of the transfer process, corresponding to the exploration phase. See also Table 7.
Table 7. Percentage of studies that mention factors related to transferability.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Total times mentioned</th>
<th>Items mentioning this factor Number</th>
<th>Percentage*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conveying ability</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor relations</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance - Receptivity</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Decision-making power</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative fit</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy features - Characteristics</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Reputation</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* N=180, please note that percentages might add up to above 100%.

Transferability is first determined by the **ability of the source actor to convey policies**. The source actor can have a positive image (e.g. Khirfan & Jaffer, 2014) or a less positive one (Bok, 2014), resulting in respectively stimulating and discouraging adoption of policies from this actor. Closely connected to a source actor’s reputation is its legitimacy to transfer. Authors especially reported legitimacy issues faced by the EU when transferring to neighbouring countries outside the Union (Radaelli, 2000; Xheneti, 2011; Vezirgiannidou, 2015; Onursal-Begül, 2016). Ademmer and Börzel (2013) provide yet an alternative explanation, namely that high compliance costs of adopting EU-policies may outweigh benefits for non-EU countries such as Turkey.

Transfer processes are more easily established when there are **existing relations** between source, adopting and third party actors. Relations increase the acquaintance with policies elsewhere through membership of an international organisations such as the EU or OECD (e.g. Ayoub, 2014; Oanc, 2015) and policy networks (Sloam, 2005), through colonial history (Smith et al., 2002) or through trade and cooperation relations (Randma-Liiv & Kruusenberg, 2012; Jinnah & Lindsay, 2016).

The **tolerance of the adopting actor** further determines transferability. This ability is determined by the receptivity and decision-making power of this actor. Receptivity denotes the openness of the receiving actor to consider policies from elsewhere. A lack of openness limits the potential for transfer from the start (e.g. Dolowitz & Medearis, 2009; Keating & Cairney, 2012). Openness is necessary but not sufficient, as actors may lack decision-making power. Adopting actors can be dependent on other states or donors (e.g. Ohemeng, 2010). Such dependency reduces their sovereignty and can benefit (coercive) policy transfer within or limit transfer to parties outside the spheres of influence (Ademmer, 2014). Vezirgiannidou (2015) further demonstrated that actors are less vulnerable to external pressures when they are able to make sovereign decisions.
Finally, *policy features* and *normative fit* determine transferability. Flexibility (Kerlin, 2009; Lavenex, 2014) and low context-dependency (De Jong & Bao, 2007; De Loë et al., 2016) of policies increases the range of possible applications. Especially infrastructure policies may be tailored to specific biophysical conditions, reducing their transferability (Michaels & De Loë, 2010; Attard & Enoch, 2011). On the contrary, transferability increases when the policy matches the values (e.g. Chapman & Greenaway, 2006) and political objectives of the receiving actor (e.g. Clavier, 2010). Then again, policies with a reputation of proven effectiveness and reputation of success are popular transfer objects for policy makers because such policies are justified by their (perceived) effectiveness (e.g. Metz & Fischer, 2016; Ovodenko & Keohane, 2012).

Summarizing, normative fit and policy reputation appear more often as factor in studies on policy transfer compared to for example the characteristics of the policy itself.

**Process design**

The third building block concerns the interaction between transfer actors, shaped by a particular process design. Process design concerns the set-up of interaction between actors exchanging knowledge and in adopting and implementing the transferred policy. See Table 8 for an overview.

*Table 8. Percentage of studies that mention factors related to process design.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Total times mentioned</th>
<th>Items mentioning this factor</th>
<th>Percentage*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actors - Key actors</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Coalition building</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual understanding &amp; adaptation</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management of the network</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer type - Exchange mechanism</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Level of coercion</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* N=180, please note that percentages might add up to above 100%.

Relations to various *actors* in the form of building coalitions and engaging all key actors are essential in the process design. Policy consensus enhances the ultimate adoption of a transferred policy, whether this support is built around a broad coalition of domestic stakeholders (e.g. Müller & Slominski, 2016) or external support (e.g. De Loë et al., 2016). An adopted policy can fail in the final implementation phase as well, because support from executive officials was not secured earlier phases (Šimić-Banović, 2015). Key players, such as policy entrepreneurs and political leadership, can control this transfer process. This leadership can follow from existing leaders’ characteristics, such as charisma (e.g. Ohemeng, 2010), or can be managed through strategic human resource
management. An example of such strategic management is the employment of experienced West-German policy officials in East-Germany after the latter adopted West-German institutions after reunification in the nineties (Welsh, 2010).

In the previous section, I introduced the need of openness to external policies by the adopting actor. While exchanging knowledge, actors engaged in the process need to be open to *mutual understanding of and adaptation* to values, practices and beliefs of the other actors. Transfer agents should look for both similarities and differences (Hoyt, 2006, p. 238). Insufficient adaptation of policies to the local context may result in inappropriate policy transfer. De Jong and Bao (2007) argue that mutual understanding of cultural differences is in fact more important than having a similar culture. This understanding can be achieved by two-way instead of one-way communication as Chung, Park & Wilding demonstrated (Park, Wilding & Chung, 2014; Chung, Park & Wilding, 2016). Language is an important factor in (preventing) miscommunication (Welsh, 2010; Xheneti & Kitching, 2011; Fawcett & Marsh, 2013). The role of language is disputed though, as Stadelmann and Castro found no positive influence of having the same language on climate policy diffusion in a large-N study (Stadelmann & Castro, 2014).

The *management of the transfer network* is important (Dolowitz & Medearis, 2009; Timms, 2011). The absence of a clear hierarchy may constrain the transfer (Vinke-De Kruijf et al., 2012). On the other hand, a flat organisational structure with high autonomy for transfer agents can be beneficial as it may stimulate innovation (Khirfan and Jaffer, 2014). Nonetheless, several studies stress the importance of having a dense policy network. Characteristics of such density include informal relations (e.g. Chien & Ho, 2011) and face-to-face interaction (Vinke-De Kruijf et al., 2012). The existence of a dense network ensures that resources can be mobilised (Rodgers, 2014). When reserving too little time for the exchange process, the resulting transfer may be superficial only (Pojani & Stead, 2015).

Regardless of how formal the exchange process is organised, the process evolves in a certain *transfer type*. Following existing typologies (Rose, 1991; Goldfinch & Roberts, 2013) I distinguish between imitation, adaptation and inspiration as adoption mechanisms. Imitation – also referred to as copying, mimicking or harmonisation – is considered a 'quick fix' for policy makers in urgent need of a solution and is associated with several forms of ineffective transfer (Toens & Landwehr, 2009; Crot, 2010). Adaptation refers to the incorporation of the basic model with changes and includes emulation along with the more recent terms of translation and assemblage. Bulmer and Padgett (2005) suggest that bargaining results in transfer that are the synthesis of several policies and rely less strongly on one source. Inspiration results in the creation of new policies that are based on (elements of) policies from elsewhere, such as the “hybrid system created that
drew on US and Australian examples for inspiration and copied selected aspects of policies and statutes.” (Michaels & De Loë, 2010, p. 501). Learning is often associated with effective transfers (e.g. Biesenbender & Tosun, 2014). Additionally, I include negative lessons in the category of 'other' adoption models. Negative lessons as outcome refer to the decision to seek alternatives because of limited effectiveness of the originally considered policy. Finally, the level of coercion has an influence on the policy transfer process. External pressures can enhance the acceptance of certain policy norms by other countries, for example when these norms are part of a trade agreement (Jinnah and Lindsay, 2016), but may initiate transfers that are inappropriate for the objectives of the adopter (Parnini, 2009) or transfers that are not completed (Webber, 2015). Conditional transfers are formally voluntary but in practice the result of external pressure. An example concerns the conditional loans from the World Bank (Larmour, 2002). I will discuss the relation between the level of coercion, the exchange mechanism and the adoption or non-adoption of the transferred policy in the subsection ‘Policy (non-) adoption’.

Outlining the process design, it seems that actor relations received most attention in the body of literature studied, in terms of both networks, key individuals and coalitions formed.

**Adoptability**

The final building block is adoptability of the transferred policy and Table 9 presents its factors. These factors mainly occurred during later phases of the policy making process.

**Table 9. Occurrence of factors related to adoptability.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Total times mentioned</th>
<th>Items mentioning this factor Number</th>
<th>Percentage*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suitability - Institutional fit</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility of policy</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity - Policy evaluation</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expertise</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to change policy course</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* N=180, please note that percentages might add up to above 100%.

**Suitability** of the transferred policy plays a key role in policy adoption. In the first building block, I introduced the normative fit of a policy as part of its transferability. Besides this normative fit, the institutional fit plays an important role as well. A transfer object is adopted in a certain institutional context. If certain
pre-requisites are met, a smooth policy integration may be possible. For example, transfer of educational norms and reforms from the EU to Turkey was possible due to the America-based model of higher education in Turkey (Onursal-Beşgül, 2016). When actors fail to meet these pre-requisites, implementation failure is inevitable, as was the case in transfer to India of industry reforms due to the unforeseen lack of a regulatory agency in India (Xu, 2005). The flexibility of a policy can reduce the mismatch to a certain degree. Policies with a fixed core but high flexibility in implementation will be adopted easier at destinations with a reduced normative or institutional fit (Kerlin 2009). Moreover, simple or simplified policies will require less organisational capacity and are therefore less prone to complications in this phase (Lepinard, 2016).

This adopting capacity consist of the expertise to search and implement external policies and the organisational capacity to evaluate policies. Extensive policy evaluation will ensure that policy learning takes place and that only policy with a good fit is transferred (Fawcett & Marsh 2013). Such evaluation also enables negative lesson drawing (Timms, 2011). An important requirement is that destination actors are sufficiently equipped to organise the process of searching and implementing external policies (Randma-Liiv & Kruusenberg, 2012). Such organisation “requires significant commitment by politicians and, especially, public servants to investigating its operation (...)” (Fawcett & Marsh, 2013, p. 184).

Sufficient resources are needed to adopt and integrate a transferred policy. Such resources could be time and human or financial resources. These resources are required in all phases. However, a lack of resources is often mentioned to cause discontinuation in the adoption phase, especially lack of time and financial resources (e.g. Marsden et al., 2012).

Even with sufficient organisational capacity and favourable policy characteristics, the adopting actor should be able to change the policy course. Previously made policy decisions create path dependency. Path dependency can be beneficial to the transfer (e.g. Gullberg & Bang, 2015) or abort the transfer at any time due to inability to change the policy course (e.g. Zhang, 2012). In the final phases of the transfer, a lack of support from decision makers might be catastrophic. The transfer process itself may not have been hampered by this lack, but restricts the outcome of policy transfer. An example is the fruitful exchange of ideas between Dutch and Japanese train operators where the Japanese decision makers had decided on a different policy before the transfer was even completed (Van de Velde, 2013). Involving or ensuring access to decision makers early in the process facilitates the process (Kerlin, 2009).
The most cited factors to influence policy transfer in this building block concern the compatibility of the transferred policy, both with respect to integrating this policy in institutional structures and to its ability to intercalate with existing policy paths.

**Policy non-adoption**
The final element of the model concerns the outcome of the policy transfer process in terms of adoption or non-adoption. I distinguish between effective adoption, formal adoption and non-adoption of the transferred policy. Effective adoption refers to a completed transfer process where the receiving policy maker adopted the policy. Ultimately, for transfers to be called effective they should achieve political goals as well but that element is left outside the scope of this study. Non-adoption includes all transfers that were considered but never initiated or that were initiated but aborted along the way. Formal adoption finally describes policy transfers where the policy was formally adopted but was not implemented or enforced.

I counted how often adoption, formal adoption and non-adoption were specified in the studies and plotted the outcomes against types (Table 10) and the level of coercion of these transfers (Table 11). I based the distinctions between transfer types and between levels of coercion on the process design factors with the same labels. As could be seen in Table 10, most included articles described cases of effective policy transfer and the majority of review items concerns more voluntary transfer. A similar trend can be observed for the transfer type. Imitation and adaptation are most commonly studied, but imitation results more often in non-adoption when compared to adaptation and inspiration.

There are two explanations for this majority of effective and voluntary transfers in the studies. The first explanation is that such cases receive more attention, making them more feasible as study object and therefore create overrepresentation of such cases in empirical studies. A second explanation could be that voluntary transfers are more likely to result in adoption. The data supports previous claims (e.g. Ogden, Walt, & Lush, 2003) that coercive or conditional transfers are more likely to result in non-adoption or formal transfer than voluntary transfers. Webber (2015) even draws a direct relation between the coercive nature of the transfer and the resulting incomplete transfer. An explanation is that the receiving actor is merely interested in complying with the conditions for other purposes, rather than adopting policy out of genuine interest. However, especially in developing countries a lack of compliance might be the result of lacking infrastructure to implement a certain policy, rather than lacking the willingness to do so (Bennett et al., 2015).
Table 10. Outcomes of policy transfer cases by transfer type.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transfer type</th>
<th>Adoption</th>
<th>Non-adoption</th>
<th>Formal adoption</th>
<th>Total times mentioned (=N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imitation</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>46 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptation</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>47 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspiration</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>19 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>28 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11. Outcomes of policy transfer cases by force of initiation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transfer type</th>
<th>Adoption</th>
<th>Non-adoption</th>
<th>Formal adoption</th>
<th>Total times mentioned (=N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coercive</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>98 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional/other</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>17 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>143 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.5. Discussion and conclusions based on the review

2.5.1. General remarks on the framework

To address the lack of an evidence-based explanation of policy transfer processes, I based this review on empirical studies on policy transfer. These studies are dominated by Anglophone transfers and were usually conducted using interviews and document analysis to study one or multiple cases of policy transfer.

These cases predominantly involved state actors rather than non-state actors and I observed a concentration of voluntary transfer that resulted in policy adoption. I identified four clusters of factors (transferability, process design, adoptability, environmental factors) that influence this policy (non-)adoption. In Figure 5 I present the full conceptual framework based on the results, with more details regarding factors.

Two results stand out in particular. First, factors related to process design play a crucial role in policy transfer processes and the ultimate effectiveness of such a process. Especially the selection of the right actors, both individuals and coalition-wise, plays a key role. Second, previous studies attribute considerable value to similarities or differences in context (Stone, 2016). The review supports this claim, but also indicates that the policy arena is more often a decisive enabler or barrier for policy transfer. Related concepts such as normative and institutional fit are more important than the general context and so is policy reputation. These results suggest that the emphasis on context as explanation for policy transfer outcomes should be accompanied by actor selection, institutional and normative fit and the present-day political situation. More importantly, the involved actors can control these factors to a certain extent, in contrary to (general) context. Some factors are an important barrier when they are absent and a key facilitator when present, or vice versa. An example of such a factor is having sufficient resources. Control over
such factors is important for those involved in policy transfer, and the insights of this model pave the way for purposeful management of policy transfer processes.

I refrained from a phase-based model, but conclude that most factors in the transferability building block played key roles during earlier phases of the transfer, while factors related to adoptability became decisive during later phases. The temporal role of factors was suggested before (e.g. Gullberg & Bang, 2015; Kerlin, 2009) and this review systematically mapped them. This temporal element is interesting, because they may direct transfer agents’ attention during, for example, agenda setting.

In summary, I can conclude that some factors are more important than other factors and that actors can control the nature of these factors to a certain extent. Furthermore, conditions at the early phases of policy transfer may eventually affect the final results in terms of transfer and adoption mechanisms. As policy transfer processes require extensive resources, such as time, money and human resources, the framework can also help identify challenges in policy transfer that can be used to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness transferring policies, thus reducing the risk of inappropriate, incomplete or uninformed transfers (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000). Coming research could further analyse the nature of the relation between and the relative importance of factors.

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**Figure 5. Detailed conceptual framework, based on factors identified in the review.**
2.5.2. Route varieties of policy transfer

Based on the insights from the conceptual framework, I will discuss four policy transfer routes that policy transfer can take from initial conditions to final outcomes. The framework provides a comprehensive overview of factors that other authors have found, but this section reflects the deeper insights I gained by scrutinising their studies. When I combine the factors discussed in the framework with the policy transfer routes, I cannot neglect that the initial conditions of a policy transfer process influence the outcomes of that trajectory. These 'route varieties' include opportunistic, branded, pressured and learning policy transfer. In the next paragraphs, I describe these routes in detail. These details are summarized in Table 12 alongside exemplary references.

Opportunistic policy transfer is characterised by bounded searches, considering a single external policy that mainly serves to justify policy measures 'at home'. The adopting actor is usually the initiator of the transfer attempt. Political urgency to act can trigger opportunistic transfer, of which the imminent threat of a financial crisis is an iconic example. These 'quick fixes' usually rely on imitation as exchange mechanism, as time is highly constraint and a limiting factor (O'Hara, 2008). Constraining factors are usually found in the process design building block, as the exchange is characterised by unidirectional flow of information accompanied by limited knowledge about key issues and poor policy evaluation. Opportunistic transfers might result in inappropriate or uninformed transfer. Adoptability seems to be a strength of opportunistic transfers, making use of environmental factors, but poor process design limits its successes.

Branded policy transfer is initiated after policy marketing or relies on existing (bilateral) relations between source and adopting actors. Such strategies enhance the occurrence of transfer, but these strategies are not without risk. Actors' reputations can be improved by lists of excellence, for example by city ranking on various policy topics or policy promotion. The source actor plays a dominant role and is likely to act as transfer agent to influence formal adoption. These transfers depend on imitation and limited adaptation. Such framing can enhance the perceived normative fit and fuel diffusion, although such marketed policies risk ending up as inappropriate transfer due to limited evaluation of the policy. Similarly, Astrid Wood (Wood, 2015c) warns that existing contacts can increase the transferability but not necessarily result in the most suitable policy. Transferability is artificially propelled and challenges are mainly encountered in the adoptability building block.

Pressured policy transfer ranges from transfer through peer-pressure (Cohen-Vogel & Ingle, 2007) to transfers based on limited sovereignty or full dependency of adopting actors. Conditional transfers often involve third party actors, such
as international governmental organisations (IGOs). Such transfers benefit harmonisation and are a means for more powerful actors to influence decision making elsewhere. These transfers risk inappropriate transfer and associations with neo-colonialist influences. Several authors (e.g. Jinnah & Lindsay, 2016) mention limited financial resources as a major constrain, thus suggesting that financial support might be more effective than imposing financial inducements to laggards. Transferability is enforced in pressured transfer and major challenges are found in the adoptability block, although elements of the process design play a distinct role as well.

Finally, a process of mutual learning may result in policy transfer. Any actor can initiate learning transfers, but decision making remains exclusive to the receiving actor. The search for policies is usually bounded and extensive policy evaluation or piloting is part of the process, resulting in well-considered decisions and broad support coalitions. Consequently, this route requires considerable resources and is therefore not always attainable. A full learning process results in adaptation, inspiration or mutual influencing and is less vulnerable for incomplete or uninformed policy transfer. Learning can make pressured transfers result in motivated adoption, although a ‘learning paradox’ exist (Toens & Landwehr, 2009; Evans & Barakat, 2012). Unsuitable knowledge may be internalized, resulting in inappropriate transfer. Nonetheless, learning is generally associated with improved transfer because learning internalizes procedures of policy formation. The process design is the strength of learning transfer and requires attention throughout the exchange.

Table 12. Overview of policy routes, which links transfer type, enabling and constraining factors and anticipated outcome to transfer route.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Route</th>
<th>Opportunistic</th>
<th>Branded</th>
<th>Pressured</th>
<th>Learning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initiated by</td>
<td>Adopting actor</td>
<td>Source actor</td>
<td>Mediator</td>
<td>Adopting actor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer type</td>
<td>Imitation</td>
<td>Imitation</td>
<td>Imitation</td>
<td>Inspiration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enabling factors mostly in block(s)</td>
<td>Adoptability</td>
<td>Transferability</td>
<td>Transferability</td>
<td>Process design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constraining factors mostly in block(s)</td>
<td>Process design</td>
<td>Adoptability</td>
<td>Adoptability</td>
<td>Process design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anticipated outcome</td>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>Inappropriate</td>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>Effective</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.5.3. Limitations and a future research agenda

The developed framework is largely based on voluntary transfers that resulted in adoption. This skewness may be the result of the eligibility that excluded studies on implementation and enforcement of adopted policies, which may describe ineffective transfer cases. This study could be extended by including articles that focus on these steps of the policy cycle to increase scholarly understanding of the relations between factors and outcome by sharpening the framework and routes that I introduced here.

The PRISMA method proved to be effective in identifying a wide range of factors described in existing studies. The prescribed selection procedure lead to the inclusion of articles that would have remained unnoticed with other (systematic) review methods. However, I acknowledge that there are other bodies of literature ‘out there’ that may address the same phenomenon but use different labels, such as literature on transformation of institutions. The inclusion of non-English literature could further add to this review, as Anglophone studies now dominate the results.

During this review I noticed that the term transfer mechanism can refer to different phenomena: the model of reproduction (e.g. inspiration, Theobald & Kern, 2011), the voluntary or coercive nature of transfer (e.g. Keating & Cairney, 2012), the mode of exchange (e.g. policy learning, see Nicholson-Crotty & Carley, 2015) and the channels through which policies spread (e.g. Nazif-Muñoz, 2015). As described in the introduction, the same goes for the various terms for policy spreading. These terminological voids are problematic, especially given the continuous assimilation of policy transfer studies in other research fields (Benson & Jordan, 2011). I distinguished between transfer types and level of coercion to describe respectively the model of reproduction and the degree of coercion in transfer and encourage future studies to use consistent terminology.

Finally, actors engaged in transfer make decisions that result into distinct circumstances. These circumstances eventually induce various factors that line up for a certain trajectory. This study has indicated that several factors shape the circumstances of policy transfer and thereby leads transfer process to line up for certain policy routes. Thinking in terms of policy transfer routes highlights that there is a relation between the transfer type, mode of exchange and the ultimate policy adoption. Future studies can build on this framework and route varieties by further operationalization of factors and by establishing the added value of this framework in various case studies. Alternatively, research may focus on the ability to shift between policy transfer routes. The identified learning route further confirms the preference for ‘policy translation’ or ‘learning’ (e.g. Stone, 2001) over imitation and adaptation. A question that remains is how scientists
and policy makers in practice can use these insights to actively anticipate these circumstances in a policy transfer process.

This study increases understanding of how the process of policy transfer relates to certain degrees of adoption and what constraints or facilitates these processes. I conclude that actors could shape some of the identified factors by taking certain decisions regarding transferability, adoptability and process design, albeit within the boundaries of the environment. Professionals may use these insights in managing transfer processes and forms a conceptual departing point to study how these processes can be steered more consciously.
Now that the ins and outs of the policy transfer process are captured in Chapter 2, I started to compose a working definition of the Dutch Delta Approach. The first couple of interviews and the policy documents I reviewed showed that there was no uniform answer to the question ‘what is the DDA?’ As such, the search for a definition became a study in itself.

Building on the previous chapter, I asked myself the question how the DDA was mobilized: how does such mobilisation work in practice? In addition, I wondered which route the transfer of the DDA seemingly would follow, based on this mobilisation. A preliminary evaluation showed on the one hand that the rhetoric of the DDA pointed to learning, while at the same time examples from practice hinted at coordinated branding activities. There was for example a formal policy in the Netherlands, the home country of the DDA, to transfer the DDA for purposes of aid and trade and to promote the DDA in order to achieve the political ambitions behind this effort. Hence, the research focussed on two routes: learning and branding. As the promotional activities were not brought up naturally by respondents, I asked them to reflect on a small vignette. This was based on a quote of a water technology specialist who said something along the lines of: “Transfer of the Dutch Delta Approach? That’s not about government to government collaboration, but just a marketing vehicle to sell Dutch technology abroad”.

The further the study evolved, the more I realised that I should see the DDA as the result of a policy branding process as well as a translation process. As a result, the following chapter focusses on the mobilization of the Dutch Delta Approach for international transfer, using a policy branding perspective.
3
Chapter 3

Branding in Policy Translation
How the Dutch Delta Approach Became an International Brand

Abstract

This chapter explains the rise of the Dutch Delta Approach (DDA) as the Dutch trade-mark for exporting knowledge about adaptive delta management. I consider policy branding a specific tool for policy translation that can enhance scholarly understanding of how policy is mobilised for international application. Using the concepts of policy translation and branding, I analyse and explain the translation of the original Dutch policy regarding delta management and its mobilisation for an international audience.

I reconstruct how the DDA became the basis for an international policy brand and conclude that a strong brand was created because of a strong national network of stakeholders, sufficient resources, and the confluence of various developments that contributed to the perceived importance of developing such a brand. However, contrary to what the branding literature suggests, international application is ad hoc rather than the result of a keen strategy. The way the DDA is applied showcases many pragmatic strategies in which the brand is used as discursive camouflage or is used to legitimate cherry picking and opportunistic reframing. As a result, durable impact of the DDA brand is vulnerable due to weak brand maintenance. These findings demonstrate the relevance of branding for studying policy transfer process.
3.1. **Introduction the Dutch Delta Approach**

Delta areas are vulnerable to the effects of climate change and need to accommodate to the consequences that climate change brings (Bucx et al., 2014). The Netherlands is considered a frontrunner in this respect. Recently, the Netherlands has transformed its water management from a strictly prevention-based strategy to a more adaptive and risk-based one (Van Buuren, Ellen & Warner, 2016). This new strategy is based on the concept of Adaptive Delta Management (ADM), a policy development approach that “aims to achieve robustness of a map of pathways through the built-in flexibility to adapt and switch pathways” (Dewulf & Termeer, 2015, p. 760). ADM forms the basis of the Dutch Delta Programme, a national policy program for future-proof Dutch water management (Van Buuren & Teisman, 2014).

Interestingly, these developments in the Netherlands have also inspired policy and knowledge transfer to other deltas. The ‘Dutch Delta Approach’ (DDA) (Rijksoverheid, 2011) became an international label, used by Dutch experts to share not only ideas and knowledge about delta planning (Rijksoverheid, 2016b), such as the legacy of ADM, but also its underlying values (solidarity, flexibility, and sustainability - Slob & Bloemen, 2014), and technological innovations.

The Dutch government considers the DDA an export product (Topsector Water, 2013) that could aid other countries in updating their delta management as a form of development cooperation. However, this knowledge is also considered an economic asset that should generate foreign trade (Rijksoverheid, 2016a). This dual ambition fits the ‘aid for trade’ movement as part of a neo-liberal agenda (Holden, 2017). However, there is an inherent tension between the two goals (Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, 2013) and some fear that the economic ambition might generate ‘perverse incentives’ to develop universal, instead of context-sensitive solutions and focus on economic benefits rather than developing better policies (Younas, 2008; Karini, 2016; Zenker & Braun, 2017).

Literature so far has mainly addressed the translation of policy models to other contexts and hardly paid attention to how these policies were mobilised in the first place (McCann, 2013). There is limited insight into the role that the mobilisation of policy – in order to apply it elsewhere – plays in the processes of policy transfer. Therefore, I aim to reconstruct the birth of such a travelling policy.

The available studies on mobilising policy all refer to a form of policy branding or marketing; hence, I propose to integrate the policy branding and policy transfer literature. I believe that the policy-branding concept may provide answers to the question of how policies are translated into a travelling policy model. Several
authors have described branding in relation to (supply-driven) policy transfer and suggest that branding will increase attention paid to a policy model (Eshuis & Klijn, 2012; see also Chapter 2). However, others have warned of the risk of the inappropriate application of these models (e.g. Wood, 2015).

I will reconstruct how the DDA came into being, whereby, using a different conceptual angle, I explain the process of mobilizing a policy for transfer. I argue that policy branding should be seen as a specific tool for policy translation. I will not evaluate the DDA in terms of the effectiveness and sustainability of the policies it creates though. Instead, I will look into the management and maintenance of the brand and will touch upon some potential limitations, answering the question: “How to explain the translation of the ‘Dutch Delta Approach’ for international transfer by adopting a policy branding perspective?”

In the following section, I present a conceptual framework to analyse the dynamics of the DDA as a branding process. Section 3.3 describes the methods used for the empirical analysis, which I present in Section 3.4. I end by concluding that the created brand has facilitated policy transfer, but that real translation is hampered by the simplification inherent in creating a brand and by the static nature of this particular brand.

3.2. Theoretical framework to study mobilisation
I introduced policy branding as a tool for policy translation and elaborate on this process in this section (see Figure 6 for a visualisation).

Figure 6. Framework that links the sensitizing concepts to study the DDA. Arrows indicate processes and rectangles represent different translations of the policy.

3.2.1. Policy branding and policy translation
I conceptualise the DDA as a policy model based on the original delta management policies in the Netherlands. Actors ‘translate’ the ideas and concepts and thereby create “new meanings and designs in the process of the cross-jurisdictional travel
of policy ideas.” (Freeman, 2009; Mukhtarov, 2014, p. 6). Translation occurs when actors modify the policy model so that it fits into the ‘context of application’, but also when creating a generalized policy model based on the original ideas. I focus on the latter, the mobilisation phase (McCann, 2004).

I define policy branding as the process whereby an identity ("brand") is created for a policy object such as a concept, a strategy, or a paradigm. A brand is thereby the created identity for this policy idea, solidified in a policy model. During branding, meaning ‘emerges’ (Eshuis & Klijn, 2012; Van Hulst & Yanow, 2016) or is lost (Hajer, 2003). Branding can be applied to places such as regions or cities through place-branding (Kavaratzis & Hatch, 2013), but also to organizations or public policies (Marsh & Fawcett, 2011).

I first need to define the brand in this study because a universal definition of the DDA is lacking (Zwarteveen et al., 2017). I believe that this lack of a precise definition is due to the constant translation of the DDA by different actors in various contexts: ‘mobile policies rarely travel as complete “packages”, they move in bits and pieces—as selective discourses, inchoate ideas, and synthesized models—and they therefore “arrive” not as replicas but as policies already-in-transformation.’ (Peck & Theodore, 2010, p. 170). Furthermore, associations may have different meanings and importance in different contexts (Zenker & Braun, 2017).

3.2.2. Decomposing the branding process
Policy branding consists of three phases: first, developing a brand (Ogden, Walt & Lush, 2003); next, communicating the brand through brand management; and finally, continuously maintaining the brand (Marsh & Fawcett, 2011; Eshuis & Klijn, 2012).

**Brand development**
First, the original policy is disentangled from its context, objectified, and wrapped in a model (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Basu & Wang, 2009); hence, it is simplified to create a brand. Although there is no fixed recipe, strong brands include aspired brand values (e.g. honesty), the creation of congruent associations (so that the internal and external stakeholders easily understand the brand’s meaning), and unique, favourable, and coherent connotations to distinguish the brand from competitors (Eshuis & Klijn, 2012). Market research should further ensure targeting the right audience.

Interest and resources are needed to effectively place a brand in the spotlight. Sharing knowledge in policy communities, focussing events, and media attention can direct attention and create a window of opportunity (Ogden, Walt & Lush,
2003). Nonetheless, tapping into intellectual resources (i.e. a general agreement on policy challenges and solutions), into cultural resources (e.g. the ability to communicate to outside communities and behave professionally, appropriately, and persuasively), and into material resources is indispensable (McCann, 2013). Material resources include budgets to organise study tours and to facilitate actors who communicate and translate the brand to new environments.

**Brand management**

Next, brand communication encompasses the ways that are used to express and share the meaning of the brand (Basu & Wang, 2009) and reach the target audience (Eshuis & Klijn, 2012). Several marketing communication vehicles can be used simultaneously and various actors are involved in conveying the message. The influence of the brand manager on the brand identity is limited because “[m]ost communication about the brand (…) takes place independent of the brand manager.” (Eshuis & Klijn, 2012, p. 129). Managers need to rely on the network of stakeholders that communicates on their behalf (Hajer, 2003), which can be rather challenging (Donner et al., 2017). In light of policy translation, this means that stakeholders in the brand’s network interpret the brand and translate the policy idea to new administrative or geographical contexts (Freeman, 2009).

After conveying the message, advocacy (Ogden, Walt & Lush, 2003) and organisation (Basu & Wang, 2009; Eshuis & Klijn, 2012) are needed. This requires organisational resources, such as structures and arrangements for brand promotion, and managerial commitment to sustain the brand over time and across counties. The brand manager could include the stakeholders that are communicating the brand in strategic decisions (Freeman, 2009; Kavaratzis & Hatch, 2013), or could tighten the stakeholder network, for example, by facilitating trainings about the brand or creating environments where the brand is celebrated and brand visibility is enhanced (Eshuis & Klijn, 2012).

**Brand maintenance**

Policy translation and branding are continuous and iterative processes due to changing audiences, contexts, and interpretations (Mukhtarov, 2014). As such, the policy model needs updating to optimise the intended impact. The brand manager should monitor stakeholders who are translating the brand (policy model) to local contexts (Eshuis & Klijn, 2012) and collect their experiences to maintain the brand accordingly. When ill-maintained, a discrepancy between the reputation of the brand and what is realised (an image-reality gap) or differing perspectives among actors in the brand network can limit effectiveness (Prilenska, 2012; Christensen & Lodge, 2016).
Although there is no one recipe, several maintenance strategies exist and are summarised in Table 13. The brand manager could use a brand-oriented strategy (Eshuis & Klijn, 2012) that consists of adding or removing elements from the brand, for example, by introducing a new concept. In the case of an image-reality gap (Prilenska, 2012), the manager could reinforce existing services or products (e.g. by focussing on iconic, tangible realisations of the brand) or by terminating a service of the brand (Eshuis & Klijn, 2012). Besides re-developing brand elements, the brand manager could also add new stakeholders to the brand network or use new channels to communicate the brand. A more competitive alternative is to extend the brand into an area where another brand dominates. Similarly, new target groups or a market void can be identified. Once the brand decreases in relevance and effectiveness, a brand manager could also decide to let it ‘retire’.

Table 13. Overview of the phases of policy branding.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Sub-phase</th>
<th>Example activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brand development</td>
<td>Brand definition</td>
<td>Disembed policy from given context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brand development</td>
<td>Mobilise interest</td>
<td>Objectify and wrap in model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brand development</td>
<td>Mobilise resources</td>
<td>Market research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brand management</td>
<td>Brand communication</td>
<td>Focussing events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brand management</td>
<td>Brand advocacy and management</td>
<td>Brand identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brand maintenance</td>
<td>Defition-oriented</td>
<td>Organisational resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brand maintenance</td>
<td>Communication-oriented</td>
<td>Marketing communication vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brand maintenance</td>
<td>Management-oriented</td>
<td>Managerial commitment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3. Method: interviews and document analysis
In the theoretical section, I explored the elements of the branding process to be able to reconstruct the process for the case of the Dutch Delta Approach (DDA) on the basis of empirical data. I held semi-structured interviews with Dutch governmental, scientific, and private-sector experts and reviewed policy documents. I focussed on Dutch documents and respondents because of this study’s interest in endogenous mobilisation.
Interviews of typically 30 to 60 minutes were held in two series. From my network, I selected respondents that I knew were working with the DDA. I then asked them to suggest new respondents, which resulted in a snowball sampling for about half of the respondents. The first series of interviews took place in 2016 and 2017 and included three major themes. I first asked respondents to give their definition of the DDA and describe what elements of this DDA they recognised in other countries. I also inquired about the role of the respondents and their organisations in translating the DDA to other countries. Finally, I asked them what challenges they had encountered in this process and what lessons they had learned from it. However, the first analysis of the data did not provide a satisfying answer to how the policy model/brand was created. I then organised a second series of interviews between July and September 2017 with people who had held strategic positions during brand development. Two respondents of the first series fitted this profile and were interviewed again. I recruited four additional respondents through snowball sampling. I inquired about the existence of a ‘feedback loop’ of experiences and the managerial activities undertaken.

Eventually, I interviewed eight experts from various universities, eight government officials, and six private sector senior consultants or managers in international delta management projects. In addition to these interviews, I collected 45 policy papers, strategic plans, advisory reports, and other documents that reflect the changing discourse of Dutch delta strategy and the emergence of the DDA. See Appendix B for an overview.

All but one of the interviews were recorded and transcribed with Atlas.ti. For the remaining interview, a written report was created that was reviewed by the respondent, resulting in the correction of some dates and names. I operationalised the conceptual framework described in Chapter 2 and Section 3.2 by creating key indicators for brand development, management, and maintenance (see Table 13). These indicators functioned as starting points for coding of the documents and interviews in Atlas.ti. In vivo coding was used to determine how respondents describe the DDA. Subsequently, I created an empirical process description (see Section 3.4) and interpreted the empirical description in the Analysis (Section 3.5) and reflected on these results with Henk Ovink, the Special Envoy for International Water Affairs. The Special Envoy is an ambassador for the Dutch water sector. Other respondents consider him a key figure. As such, I considered him most suitable to reflect on the reliability of our preliminary results. This reflection did not lead to any major revisions of the results.
Creating and translating the Dutch Delta Approach

Lining up for export

The Delta Programme (DP) embodies the Dutch delta strategy, but international water-oriented collaboration occurred long before that. In the 1990s, the motivation to share Dutch expertise was initially driven by development cooperation and later, in line with international trends, extended to trade (Ministry of Transport and Water Management, 1994, 1998). This integration was later solidified politically (Minister of Development Cooperation, 2007). In 2011, ‘water’ (including delta technology) was designated as one of nine so-called Top Sectors, which are collaborations between the public and private sector in economic areas where Dutch companies and institutions are currently – and should remain – world class. In 2012, a minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation was installed with a single budget and integrated vision (Rijksoverheid, 2008; 2016a).

The Netherlands has “a responsibility to place our knowledge and expertise too at the service of less vigorous countries. But also to create economic opportunities for our water sector.” (Rijksoverheid, 2008, p. 243). This quote reveals that the creation of the DDA goes beyond policy transfer and includes economic motives, something that became even more apparent in the International Water Ambition (IWA). The IWA is a policy document of several ministries stating the ambitions and strategies of the Dutch government regarding water management in the international arena. The government aims to double the revenue of the Dutch Water Sector by 2020 to increase water safety, water security, and sustainability in urban deltas, and to enlarge international support for a “prevention-oriented water safety approach” (Rijksoverheid, 2016a, p. 9). Despite the ongoing convergence of objectives and programs, friction seems inevitable between the two objectives (Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, 2013; NWP, 2013; WGC, 2013).

This vision required intensified collaboration within government and the ‘golden triangle’ of businesses, government, and knowledge institutions (Rijksoverheid, 2008). As such, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Infrastructure & the Environment coordinate water-related issues in an inter-ministerial water cluster (IWC). Please note that this ministry used to be called the Ministry of Transport, Public Works & Water Management. From 2010 to 2017, the ministry was called Infrastructure & the Environment (Dutch: I&M). Currently it is known as the Ministry of Infrastructure & Water Management. Give this study’s time frame, I will refer to it as the Ministry of I&M. The same goes for the Ministry of Economic Affairs, which is currently called the Ministry of Economic Affairs & Climate Policy. Collaboration between public and private partners intensified as well, something that can be attributed to the establishment of nine ‘top sectors’ to foster innovation and economic growth in 2012. The
water sector was selected to become one of these top sectors, whereby Dutch
governments are the home market of the Dutch water sector, worth €7-8 billion
sales volume annually (Topsector Water, 2013). The DP has to serve as a ‘launching
customer’ for the Topsector Water to enhance the international market position of
the Dutch water sector (Topsector Water, 2013) and the Delta Commissioner will
have a ‘booster-role’ for liaisons abroad (Rijksoverheid, 2011, p. 53). To boost
revenues a “marketing plan” was developed for the Water Sector (Rijksoverheid,
2008; Claasen & Ellenbroek, 2011). Eventually 10 million euro from the national
budget was reserved for branding the water sector, installing water attachés at
embassies, and enhancing economic diplomacy (Topsector Water, 2013).

3.4.2. Creating the Dutch Delta Approach

The Dutch business community is committed to enhancing water business abroad.
Nevertheless, they believed that despite the Dutch reputation regarding water
management as being “rock solid”, the Netherlands failed to take a dominant
position in the world market (WGC, 2013). They insisted on international positioning
and branding of the water sector by the Dutch government to pro-actively create
these opportunities (Claasen & Ellenbroek, 2011; Ministry of Economic Affairs,
2011; Topsector Water, 2013). As a result, the delta approach was captured in
policy models by several actors. I will focus on three highly different actors that
were frequently mentioned by respondents, namely the Staff Delta Commissioner,
the Netherlands Water Partnership (NWP, a partnership organisation of the Dutch
water sector and international liaison office) and, to a lesser extent, the Water
Governance Centre (WGC, a former public-private knowledge network concerned
with water-related governance issues).

In 2010, Wim Kuijken started as Delta Commissioner (DC) to prepare and implement
the Delta Programme in the Netherlands. The delta approach is summarised in
five policy instruments, the “5 Ds”: the Delta Programme and Delta Commissioner,
but also the Delta Act, the Delta Decisions, and the Delta Fund (WGC, 2013; Delta
Commissioner, 2014; Alphen, 2016). The DP itself is considered innovative – as
this kind of adaptive and long-term planning is uncommon in delta management
– but it also aims to apply innovative measures. Accordingly, the DC and DP have
not only inspired the policy model DDA, but will also contribute to the export
of new technologies by being a launching customer that can showcase best
practices, thereby reinforcing the competitiveness of Topsector Water (Topsector
Water, 2015).

The WGC described the process of ‘the Dutch Delta Approach’ in a workshop
in 2012. First, a problem analysis and strategic explorations to develop master
plans take place, funded by the Dutch government. Next, these (infrastructural)
plans should be implemented with external funds to create this market for “typical
Dutch services, infrastructure and products” (WGC, 2013, p. 14). This process clearly shows how economic motives drive the creation of the DDA, although all respondents stress that, in practice, they tailor solutions to the local situation abroad instead of favouring ‘typical Dutch' solutions.

In 2014, NWP and the Ministry of I&M developed twelve building blocks for sustainable delta management, targeting foreign governments. These building blocks (see Figure 7) were captured in the brochure ‘The Delta Approach’ by the Dutch Government (Rijksoverheid, 2014). In 2016, the building blocks were supplemented with 18 ‘fiches’ that summarized key concepts to enhance the knowledge of Dutch embassies (Water Internationaal, no date).

![Figure 7. The Twelve Building Blocks for a Delta Approach. (Rijksoverheid, 2014, p.11)](image)

3.4.3. Communicating the brand

The figure above describes the ‘paper model’ of the DDA, but, in practice, I observe that actors use their own translation of the DDA. Virtually all members of the Dutch Water Sector (which consists of all those private companies, government agencies, knowledge institutes, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) engaged in water management) are spreading the DDA. This water sector consists of individuals (e.g. consultants, scientists or government officials) and several networks. The largest network is the Netherlands Water Partnership (NWP) that acts as “the
platform for international branding of the water sector” (Staten-Generaal, 1999; NWP, 2013, p. 18). The NWP plays a major role in developing and diffusing the DDA by organising events (e.g. the Holland Pavillion at international water conferences) and coordinating various governmental programmes (e.g. the Partners for Water country partnerships). To support these activities, NWP established a branding line that “consists of several means: the website www.dutchwatersector.com, the twitter stream @hollandwater as well as various publications and an international film” (NWP, 2013, p. 17). The network represents all corners of the golden triangle, with scientific and governmental sub-networks. In 2012, the Delta Alliance was formed as a network for scientific institutions from various deltaic countries. An intergovernmental sister organisation the Delta Coalition followed in 2016.

Actors of the Dutch Water Sector communicate information about the DDA through various channels. This can be demand-driven or supply-driven. For example, according to respondent #38, the Delta Commissioner and his staff only engage in foreign requests “[i]f there really is a need for knowledge and experiences of people that were actually involved in that whole process [of developing the DP] and nobody else can do this.” On the contrary, engaged individuals (often based abroad) advocate Dutch assistance to foreign governments and thereby initiate projects. Embassies play a brokering role and to facilitate this role, Henk Ovink, was appointed as the Special Envoy for International Water Affairs in 2015. His main task is to raise awareness for water issues and introduce possible (Dutch) solutions around the globe. In this role, “he contributes to boosting the international market position of Dutch know-how and expertise” (Rijksoverheid, 2015). Furthermore, academics and government officials present the Dutch approach at conferences (see Van Alphen, 2016) or during trade missions. Dutch Risk Reduction (DRR) and Surge Support (DSS) teams may be formed after such missions to provide expert advice to foreign governments (RVO, no date). These teams consist of experts, both from the public and private sector. The DRR teams advise foreign governments on how to resolve urgent water issues, while the DSS teams are flown in when there is a water-related disaster.

Besides these coordinated channels, consultants and other individuals ‘in the field’ convey the key messages of the DDA. To capture whether communications converge or diverge, I asked respondents to describe the DDA. Although all groups use similar language (“What stands out to me is that all consultants who come here, even if they are from different companies, use the same terminology in general.” – Respondent #2) I extracted three broad descriptions that illustrate the diversity of the communications of the DDA. Firstly, most respondents refer to direct translation of the Delta Programme. Secondly, others refer to the building blocks defined by the Netherlands Water Partnership (NWP) as ‘the’ DDA. See Figure 7. “In principle we simply agreed on what that is. There is an image, […] with
various elements that form the Dutch Delta Approach.” - Respondent #3. Thirdly, some do not consider the Dutch Delta Approach to be anything standardised or elaborated, but rather a set of philosophies (e.g. looking far ahead in time and bringing parties together for discussion) without specified tools to do so.

Communications target foreign governments and international governmental organisations (e.g. the OECD, UN and EU). Relationships with foreign governments are either aid-based, transition-based, or trade-based and preferably long-term to achieve sustainable development (Rijksoverheid, 2008; Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, 2013). Previously, response to foreign requests was ad hoc, whereas now country selection is based on existing political, economic, or historical relations. Respondents illustrate this by pointing to the USA as an ‘odd one out’, in which collaboration is based on historical relations instead of sustainable development cooperation. Recently, the NWP has started to collect and assess requests systematically. With this new approach, once a request has been approved, a mission of the Dutch Risk Reduction Team (DRR-Team) will explore the issues and potential solutions. This exploration is followed by a decision on whether to initiate (extra) activities in this country; however, whether the DDA actually contributes to improved governance in the selected countries remains unclear. “There has never been a truly objective, strategic analysis of where we have added value.” – Respondent #34. Recently, the international donor community and International Financial Organisations were added to the brand’s target group. Above all, communications remain targeted at administrative and political levels “as high as possible” (WGC, 2013, p. 13).

I also observed a division between experts that operate from the Netherlands and Dutch expats abroad. Most stakeholders translating the DDA to local contexts on the ground are permanently based there, while others leave the Netherlands only for short visits. According to respondents, there is little overlap between these groups, which limits the exchange of knowledge and learning from experiences abroad.

Nonetheless, the Dutch government considers the branding campaign ‘a success’ (Rijksoverheid, 2016a) because it has generated numerous projects and requests of foreign governments via the Special Envoy for International Water Affairs, embassies, or one of the other networks.

3.5. **Analysis: policy translation from a branding perspective**

3.5.1. **Brand development**

All key elements of brand development were observed. Government organisations created the Dutch Delta Approach (DDA) by disembedding the policy model from its Dutch context. For example, the 5Ds of the Delta Programme were translated
to abstract concepts such as ‘finance and implementation’. Also, the DDA was formally documented, thereby ensuring that stakeholders communicate a more or less coherent message.

Organisations branding the DDA have had adequate resources at their disposal, including a sufficient national budget for foreign activities, several policy networks, and a coherent message. Private partners were involved early in the translation process, and all stakeholders in the network allocated time and human resources. For example, staff members of the Delta Commissioner can spend some weeks per year, at home and abroad, on communicating to foreign delegations about the DDA.

Furthermore, Dutch actors have established various national and international networks to create lasting partnerships with other countries. For example, the Delta Alliance was initially considered useful as a “Trojan horse” for the Dutch to set foot on foreign ground and create relationships that could eventually generate business (WGC, 2013, p. 10). At the same time, the Netherlands engaged in global policy networks, such as the OECD and the UN (Rijksoverheid, 2012, p. 99). Access to the target audiences was enhanced by translating key documents, including those from the Delta Programmes (since 2010) and from the National Water Plan, to English and other languages.

Likewise, timing plays a crucial role in diffusing the DDA. Droughts and flooding function as focussing events where attention is directed towards the DDA. However, respondents stress the importance of long-term partnerships with countries. “At some point you generate a sort of momentum and a kind of critical mass, which makes many of the Dutch ideas endure and return.” – Respondent #1.

3.5.2. **Brand management**

Delta management in the Netherlands itself is mainly controlled by bureaucrats, while embassies (acting as ‘brokers’) and (engineering) consultants in the private sector play a dominant role in translating the DDA abroad. This is reflected by the fact that private companies account for over 50% of the Netherlands Water Partnership (NWP) members.

Although the branding literature describes purposeful steering, in the case of the DDA, I could not identify an individual or organisation that acts as the brand manager; which element is highlighted in the branding process depends on the background of the actors and the context in which they operate. However, this does not rule out the existence of coordinating mechanisms. The NWP, for instance, continues to serve as a platform for international branding of the water sector, to coordinate the network of its members, and to organise activities where ‘the brand
can become true’ (NWP, 2013). Furthermore, three Dutch ministries cooperate in the Inter-ministerial Water Cluster (IWC) to coordinate the international export of water expertise: between the ministry and stakeholders there “is a constant dialogue about whether everyone is playing the right role.” – Respondent #37.

Finally, managerial activities are also performed by the Dutch Enterprise Agency (RVO), which is a government agency that is part of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. RVO supports and stimulates innovative, sustainable and international business. There are programmes in which RVO provides funding to stimulate business in emerging markets. This international support is commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As such, RVO is tasked with executing the International Water Ambition, and, in this role, it often acts as the formal client of Dutch consortia abroad by providing the funding through one of their programs.

3.5.3. Maintenance

Recent policy papers have celebrated the popularity of the DDA abroad (e.g. Rijksoverheid, 2016a), but two points should be made. First, brand manifestations are based on a form of cherry-picking. Government-to-government partnerships emerge after an arbitrary country selection and are often the result of a push by the Dutch government. A country’s requests might be turned down when there is limited political importance or a lack of capacity, whereas passionate (Dutch) policy entrepreneurs may successfully mobilise resources. Second, there is limited follow-up after the master-planning phase. Respondents fear that a reality gap might occur if activities under the DDA-flag have not yet been implemented. Also, funding for follow-up projects is lacking – to date, only the Mekong Delta Plan (Vietnam) has resulted in follow-up projects, which were, in fact, initiated by the World Bank – and, consequently, the aspiration to generate business remains limited.

The literature suggests brand maintenance could tackle these issues. However, there is no consensus on who should take the lead. Respondents point to various brand managers, but no one has been formally or informally appointed as such. As a result, there is no redevelopment of the brand content. Nevertheless, the brand network as a whole gradually adjusts the translation process based on lessons learned.

I report the observed maintenance in the following paragraphs and Table 14. I observed little re-definition of elements of the brand. Most remarkable was removing business generation from the brand identity following questions and criticism on the drivers behind the Dutch eagerness to help develop strategic master plans. Likewise, other elements of the brand were placed on the forefront. In early master-planning projects, the emphasis was on exporting (technological) solutions abroad, but consortia on the ground struggled with translating the
DDA to new environments, in particular, because of different administrative and institutional contexts. As a result, local processes of interaction and deliberation are becoming more important in the translation process. However, currently consortia consider these processes as something that they “can do on the side” (Respondent #34) rather than the core business of the DDA.

Table 14. Overview of observed maintenance of the DDA as brand.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maintenance type</th>
<th>Maintenance on</th>
<th>Observed in empirical data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definition-oriented</td>
<td>Brand definition</td>
<td>Not observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Products and services</td>
<td>Emphasis shifted to governance of the DDA and integration with other policies. The ‘third step’ of generating business was removed from the (communicated) brand identity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication-oriented</td>
<td>Distribution</td>
<td>New channels were added, such as the Delta Coalition and the Special Envoy. Existing channels were maintained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management-oriented</td>
<td>Competitive strategies</td>
<td>Not observed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Target group</td>
<td>New target audiences, namely international organisations and donor communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brand retirement</td>
<td>Not applicable.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, new target audiences are addressed. The respondents believe support from the World Bank and other donors for the Mekong Delta Plan was crucial for providing continuation after the master-planning phase. Such organisations were thereby added as target audience and are involved early in the process in newly initiated activities. Consultants are deployed at international organisations to acquaint them with the Dutch idea of sustainable delta management.

Despite moving the spotlight, the core of the DDA brand remains unchanged. Respondents indicated that such themes as learning occur frequently on the agenda, although lessons learned are rarely implemented or shared. Lessons learned are mostly communicated to direct successors, but not centrally managed or shared with other organisations.

3.6. Discussion and conclusion
In this study, I analysed the translation of the Dutch Delta Approach (DDA) from a branding perspective. This perspective helped to explain why Dutch delta management successfully draws attention worldwide, but also demonstrated the deliberate (and debatable) merging of the aid discourse with economic motives. Finally, I identified future caveats to continuous policy translation of the DDA.
Branding helped assemble a coherent message and initiate transfer of the DDA. A tight network of stakeholders and sufficient resources to communicate the DDA helped to create a strong brand with congruent communications of its core principles. This contributed to effective translation of the Dutch policy into the DDA and placed the DDA on international policy agendas. It was effectively disembedded from the Dutch context and is pragmatically re-translated by consortia in other jurisdictions. Branding transformed communications about the DDA into a strong, coherent message.

On the other hand, creating the brand required simplification and, in reality, ‘discursive camouflage’ looms. The congruence in terminology is contradicted by vagueness in its meaning, as the content of the DDA became oversimplified and stakeholders become lost in translation. Also, the tight network is in fact fragmented. Only a small proportion of the network was directly engaged in developing the Dutch policy, while others were involved in developing the DDA as a brand and policy mode, and yet another subset is actively translating this model abroad. This fragmentation explains not only why there are significant differences between the original policy and the transferred messages, but also the chameleonic character of the ultimate brand. A lack of conceptual precision (Mosse, 2004) leads to dilution where only “bits and pieces” (Peck & Theodore, 2010) travel and where meaning may be lost or altered (Eshuis & Klijn, 2012). Sometimes the DDA-brand has been used to advocate long-term and adaptive strategies, and at other times, the brand has been used to promote Dutch technology for hard flood infrastructures. The question arises whether the branded policy could be inappropriate to some receiving contexts (Wood, 2015c; see also Chapter 2). Although activities do not only target developing countries, an over reliance on the brand may hamper learning in development contexts (Ellerman, 2002). I did not collect empirical material on this question, but future research should investigate whether the DDA-brand meets its expectations – hence, enhancing water governance – or whether it is a primarily commercial vehicle serving Dutch economic interests. A further limitation is that I focused on the creation of the brand from a Dutch perspective. As a result, I do not know how the brand resonates, and it would therefore be interesting to collect brand experiences in the targeted countries.

Additionally, the literature suggests having a brand manager is important, but in the case of the DDA there is no single manager in the brand network that feels responsible for guarding the brand. This is reflected by the enduring reliance on the small group that can share first-hand experiences with adaptive delta management in the Netherlands. However, maintaining a coherent brand within a widespread network of stakeholders requires additional capacities and
maintenance strategies, for example, joint learning processes as part of network management (Eshuis & Klijn, 2012). I also observed that the required maintenance to address these issues is limited in the case of the DDA. Lessons learned progress slowly through the network as there is nearly no internal coordination and exchange. As a result, experiences are not used to collectively re-define the core elements of the policy model, but only lead to ad hoc adjustment of procedures. Future research should investigate which capacities and strategies are needed and how they influence the policy translation process.

With this study I contribute to understanding how the DDA was created as a policy model to foster foreign export of Dutch delta expertise. This study adds to the limited set of literature on the under-analysed phase of preparing a policy model for export (McCann, 2013). In addition, scholars in other fields have also hinted at linkages between branding, trade interests and policy transfer, see for example Anna Hult’s work on the transfer of the Swedish sustainable urban development and its marketing by the Swedish Trade Council (Hult, 2017). I demonstrated that branding a policy fuels interest in this policy and, as such, creates opportunities for transfer to other countries. Analysing policy mobilisation and translation from a branding perspective helps identify actions that are necessary to create a coherent and convincing message that can facilitate policy transfer. What stands out is the discrepancy between the purposeful branding process laid out in the theory and the rather ad hoc practice of the reality of this case. In general, therefore, I learned that applying a branding perspective opens up a new and overlooked toolbox to improve processes of policy transfer. By analysing the legitimacy and impact of such a brand in targeted countries, the agenda for brand management can be redefined.

Finally, using a branding perspective makes clearly visible that economic interests lie behind processes of policy transfer. The branding campaign is used as a tool for ‘market penetration’: by attracting attention the DDA can be ‘sold’. Where its ambiguity can be seen as a problem for transferring policies (because of the problems of misunderstanding and misinterpretation), it is an opportunity from an economic point of view: many different types of expertise can be sold under the same umbrella. The DDA case thus also shows the downside of developmental aid of the 21st century. Assistance is offered to delta areas, but there is an unconcealed economic agenda, and, as such, it seems that more effort is put into the marketing than in the assistance.
As became clear in Chapter 2, the body of existing empirical studies is dominated by accounts of effective adoption, i.e. a completed transfer process where the receiving policymaker adopted the policy. Transfers that resulted in non-adoption (i.e. transfers that were considered but never initiated or that were initiated but aborted along the way) are less frequently studied. Although adopted transfers help explain why transfer is effective, studying a case where serious resistance is met can aid understanding the course of processes that result in ineffective transfer. These ineffective or at least not-yet-effective cases are underrepresented in the literature, because they are hard to get access to, because insiders do not want to communicate about ineffective cases, and because they are less easy to recognise. In order to make an empirical contribution to the field, I therefore study a case whereby the transfer of the DDA faced serious resistance along the way and had not (yet) resulted in adoption. NCICD in Jakarta hence emerged as a suitable case to apply the framework of Chapter 2 and at the same time tests the framework by applying it to an ongoing case in practice. As such this case will contribute particularly to the first research question on characterizing the process of policy transfer. The framework will be used in this chapter to capture the course of events in the transfer process in Jakarta and explain why it stagnated.

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Chapter 4
Reconstructing the impasse in policy transfer
Evaluating the translation of Dutch water management strategies to Jakarta, Indonesia

Abstract

This study takes the stagnation in the transfer of knowledge about strategic delta planning as a starting point and identifies the interplay of constraining factors. I conclude that the way the process of policy transfer is executed is crucial. The Dutch government aims to transfer the Dutch approach to delta planning (labelled ‘the Dutch Delta Approach’) to other – often developing - countries. However, policy transfer is a complex process that depends on a variety of factors. Deadlocks can occur when the transferred knowledge and the corresponding policy ideas are neither adopted nor rejected. Taking the impasse in the transfer process in the NCICD project in Jakarta as a case study, I demonstrate that fundamental policy change is needed to adopt strategic delta planning in Jakarta and present three interrelated explanations, related to the policy transfer process, that illustrate why this change is not yet observed.
4.1. Introducing the impasse in Jakarta

Deltas around the world have to deal with the consequences of climate change. In 2010 the Dutch Delta Programme was initiated to enhance climate robustness of the Netherlands (Rijksoverheid, 2010). This approach forms an example of the ‘adaptive’ or ‘strategic’ delta management currently advocated in global flood risk communities (Klijn et al., 2015). The Dutch government realized the export potential of this ‘Dutch Approach’ (Rijksoverheid, 2014) and strategic plans became an export product (Zegwaard, 2016) serving two purposes: aiding other countries to adapt their delta planning to climate change and generating business opportunities for the Dutch water sector (Rijksoverheid, 2016a). Examples include the formulation of delta plans developed for Vietnam and Bangladesh (Zegwaard, 2016) and strategic master plans for cities like Beira (Mozambique) and Jakarta (Indonesia) (NWP, 2013). These activities are caught in the umbrella term ‘the Dutch Delta Approach’ (DDA) and can be seen as a form of policy transfer. Policy transfer is an action-oriented intentional activity (Evans and Davies, 1999) where “knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions, etc. in one time and/or place” is used to develop policies in another time or place (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). In the case of the DDA this means that knowledge about delta planning and management in the Netherlands is considered a policy model that is transferred to the selected focus deltas.

However, the various attempts of transferring the Dutch Delta Approach show varying results. Most studies point to stagnation after decision making or implementation failure at the end of the day. But also impasses during the policy transfer process can easily emerge when the actors engaged in policy making no longer agree on core problems and solutions (Biesbroek et al., 2014). An illustrative case can be found in Jakarta, Indonesia. In the National Capital Integrated Coastal Development (NCICD) project, a consortium of Dutch private-sector actors prepares a strategy to reduce the city’s vulnerability to flooding (Deltares, 2016). These actors are transfer agents that “facilitate the exchange between a number of polities.” (Stone, 2004, p. 549). However, they experience several challenges in translating the DDA to the new environment, such as a different institutional context and disagreement over problem causes. I observe that the recipient Indonesian policy makers remain reluctant to utilize the transferred ideas for a strategic plan as a basis for political decision making. As such, an impasse emerged.

The impasse that occurred in the transfer of the Dutch Delta Approach to Jakarta is a snapshot of an ongoing process and could in theory resolve before the NCICD2 phase ends. I aim to explain the emergence of the impasse, thereby taking into account the interrelatedness of factors at play in transfer processes.
(e.g. Stone, 2016) and the dynamic nature of the interaction where the impasse occurs (Biesbroek et al., 2014). The research question addressed in this chapter is therefore: How to explain the existing impasse in transferring the Dutch Delta Approach to Jakarta, by adopting a policy transfer perspective?

In the next section, I will present a framework where I conceptualise the DDA, the kind of impasse that occurred and factors influencing the policy transfer process. Core assumption is that the impasse at least is related to the organization of the policy transfer process. In the third section of this chapter I describe the methodological approach. I introduce the case in Section 4.4, before presenting potential explanations for the impasse in Jakarta in Section 4.5. In the sixth and final section three (interrelated) explanations for the impasse are derived.

4.2. Theoretical framework based on Chapter 2
To explain how the impasse came into being in Jakarta, I need to look at factors that constrained the policy transfer process. The focus in policy transfer research is shifting from describing policy transfer processes (who transfer what from where) to understanding policy transfer and adoption (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996). Over the years, numerous factors have been identified. In this study, I will look at the interplay of factors and their influence on stagnation of the transfer process. In this theoretical framework I will first explain what is being transferred and elaborate on the concept of policy transfer, before presenting a summary of the conceptual model of factors from Chapter 1.

4.2.1. What is transferred?
When mobilizing the ‘Dutch Delta Approach’ for international export, the original policy ideas, programs and instruments are translated into a policy model (see Chapter 3). There is no single definition of this policy model. “When looking more closely at the precise contents of Dutch delta knowledge, it appears difficult to precisely pin down what characterizes it. [...] When travelling to other countries, Dutch Delta knowledge also seems to come in many shapes and forms.” (Zwarteveen et al., 2017).

In the Netherlands the delta approach materialized in policy instruments like a Delta Programme and establishing a Delta Fund (Alphen, 2016). The Delta Programme combines measures like new flood risk norms, adaptation pathways and strategies to ensure freshwater supply, but also embraces collaboration, integrated and long-term oriented planning and adaptive delta management (Alphen, 2016), thereby combining ‘hard’ infrastructure measures and ‘soft’ governance (Wesselink, 2016). Besides the Delta Programme, other policy programs characterise how the emphasis in Dutch water management transformed from total flood prevention to
risk assessments and adaptive planning (Van Buuren, Ellen & Warner, 2016) as the result of a fundamental change in Dutch water management (Verduijn, Meijerink & Leroy, 2012; Van Buuren et al., 2018).

I can define the DDA in the transfer of underlying – more abstract – concepts. Dutch experts fuel projects abroad with substantial expertise about delta technology, but also with typical building blocks derived from the DDA: about flood risk management in general, adaptive and integrated planning, and participation (Rijksoverheid, 2014). For the purpose of this study, I will consider the Dutch Delta Approach to be a policy model consisting of a set of structural and non-structural measures that are used to ensure adaptive, integrated and long-term oriented delta planning. Core values are flexibility, sustainability and solidarity (Slob & Bloemen, 2014), but collaboration between state actors and non-state stakeholders is emphasised as well (Rijksoverheid, 2014).

4.2.2. **Conceptualising the policy transfer process and impasses**
The transfer in Jakarta took off in 2007 and thereby fits the description of policy transfer as a dynamic, long-term process (Dussauge-Laguna, 2012; Wood, 2015b).

**Policy transfer as a social process of change**
I conceptualise policy transfer as a social or interactional process (Vinke-De Kruijf, Augustijn & Bressers, 2012; Khirfan, Momani & Jaffer, 2013) whereby knowledge is exchanged at the individual level and is used in different degrees at the organisational level (Khirfan, Momani & Jaffer, 2013; Van de Velde, 2013; Jinnah & Lindsay, 2016).

Policy transfer always requires change of existing policy norms, goals, assumptions and instruments. This required change can be viewed as a form of policy learning (Dunlop, 2009). Depending on the required change a different degree of policy learning is needed. Although terms vary, authors generally distinguish between three levels of learning: instrumental or single-loop learning, double-loop learning and triple loop learning. The first level focusses on instrumental learning, whereby the action strategy is questioned and new policy instruments are considered (O’Donovan, 2017). Modest organizational adjustment occurs, but underlying goals and values remain intact (Bennett & Howlett, 1992). The second level concerns learning about the problem and reassessing existing policy goals (May, 1992). At third level learning, rethinking of underlying ideas and core values occurs (Hall 1993; Bennett & Howlett 1992). Such a fundamental change requires shifts in dominant political ideas and can be considered a change of paradigm (May, 1992; Pahl-Wostl, 2009).
Adoption, adaptation, reluctance and rejection as effective transfer
Since I conceptualise policy transfer in the light of knowledge exchange, I am not interested in comparing Dutch and Indonesian flood policies and checking a list of similarities before and after the knowledge exchange. I consider the policy transfer process to be ‘effective’ when the decision makers in the receiving context actively take a decision regarding the transferred ideas, because such a decision implies that they took notice of the transferred knowledge. As a result, policy transfer is effective when it leads to adoption (i.e. local practices becomes aligned with imported ideas) or forms of adaptation (i.e. the imported ideas are altered to fit local practice) (Rose, 1991; Heiduk, 2016). Moreover, this means that resistance and rejection of external ideas are potential outcomes as well (Heiduk, 2016). Resistance occurs when there are gradual changes in local practice (i.e. a majority of practices is not altered) and rejection implies that local practice is not altered by the imported ideas.

Impasses
I speak of an impasse, when the actors engaged in policy making no longer agree on core problems and solutions (Biesbroek et al., 2014) and the decision-making process stagnates at times or needs an extra iteration (Wood, 2015b). Impasses can occur in every policy process, but the diffusion of global ideas and norms, like adaptive or strategic planning in flood management, is particularly vulnerable for impasses. These norms cannot be effectively transferred when they collide with domestic interests or when implementation is costly, ill-suited or perceived unnecessary (Eccleston & Woodward, 2014). This holds especially for a transfer from a developed country to developing countries (Rahman, Naz & Nand, 2016), like in this case with transfer from the Netherlands to Indonesia. A dominant role of donor countries in setting the agenda for the transfer process could result in a lack of ownership of the receiver (Ostrom & Gibson, 2001) or an overly focus on resource-intense knowledge and technology (Stead, De Jong & Reinholde, 2008; Rahman, Naz & Nand, 2016).

4.2.3. Factors constraining the policy transfer process
This brings me to discussing what may cause problems with policy transfer. In this study I build on the conceptual model of constraining and facilitating factors that was developed in Chapter 2, see Figure 8. In this model I clustered the factors around four elements of the transfer process: the broader environment or context in which the policy transfer takes place, transferability (i.e. how suited is the policy for transfer?), adoptability (i.e. how suitable is the transferred knowledge for adoption?) and process design (i.e. how is the transfer of knowledge organised?). All these factors are relevant to explain the rise of impasses in transfer processes.
Environment
First, the importance of the wider context in which transfer takes place has been frequently acknowledged (e.g., Warren, 2017). Hence, differences between the institutional, social-economic, ideological, political and institutional contexts (e.g., Benson & Jordan, 2011; Evans & Davies, 1999; Mukhtarov et al., 2015; Vinke-de Kruijf & Pahl-Wostl, 2016) of the Netherlands and Indonesia might constrain the transfer. The environment affects policy transfer at three different levels (as was established in Chapter 2). The political climate can open or close a window of opportunity (Busch, 2005). As such, this policy arena directly shapes the space of transfer agents. The subsystem covers the institutional contexts and potential policy alternatives (Allouche, 2016).

Figure 8. Conceptual framework of factors that affect the policy transfer process (adopted from Chapter 2).

Transferability
Second, there are factors related to the transferability of the policy. The sender can be disqualified as a legitimate source for policy transfer when the actor where the policy originates from or the transferred policy itself have a flawed reputation (Onursal-Beşgül, 2016). Alternatively, compliance costs to adopt the policy can be too high for the adopting actor (Ademmer & Börzel, 2013). The programmatic nature of the transferred policy thereby plays a role in its transferability and adoptability (Benson & Jordan, 2011). Policies with a high level of uniqueness are more difficult to transfer, for example when solutions are tailored to local biophysical circumstances (Michaels & De Loë, 2010). As a result, when policy
models are transferred they should be “flexible enough to be adapted to a new environment yet fixed enough in key areas to maintain program integrity” (Kerlin, 2009, p. 485). Differences in ideological perspective may end in incompatibility of the transferred ideas with the dominant values and ideas of the recipient (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; Chapman & Greenaway, 2006).

Disruptions in the policy transfer process may emerge at the demand side as well (Benson & Jordan, 2011). Especially in cases of policy export (i.e. when an actor is pro-actively spreading its policy; Stone, 1999) the targeted audience may be unwilling to move beyond the status quo. Unexpected events such as floods can trigger demand (Hall, 1993), but demand can be artificially created as well. Artificial demand can be created by coercion, but also declaring the policy transfer a condition for something else, like a loan (Larmour, 2002). However, coercively created demand struggles with sustainability, because actors lack ownership (Ostrom & Gibson, 2001) or the resources (Bennett et al., 2015) to adopt and implement the policy.

**Adoptability**

Third, adoptability-related constraints may hamper adoption. One important aspect is the scale of the required change. Adoption of the transferred policy requires a form of policy change. The more far-reaching the necessary changes are, the more difficult they are to realise. Apart from the scale of the change, the presence or absence of local institutions might conflict with adoption (Xu, 2005). Also, the adopting government should have the capacity to evaluate the transferred ideas, to ensure that the policy contributes to policy objectives and matches the recipient context (Fawcett & Marsh, 2013). Path dependency may restrain policy makers from changing the policy course (Zhang, 2012). Naturally, a lack of resources can be a major constraint for the evaluation, adoption and implementation process (Marsden et al., 2012).

**Process design**

Finally, the set-up of the process influences policy transfer outcomes. Most of the literature on policy transfer takes a quasi-rational, phase-based policy making model as starting point, thereby assuming that a suitable policy and well-organised knowledge transfer will result in adoption (James & Lodge, 2003a; Mukhtarov, 2014). However, research into translation of policy stresses the role of actors and how they construct meaning (Freeman, 2009; Vaughan & Rafanell, 2012). As such, policy transfer becomes more of a social and political process. The organizational set-up is characterized by the formal and informal interactions between the actors involved in the transfer process. Ambiguity about these relations or who can take decisions could seriously constrain the process (Van de Velde, 2013). It is crucial to understand the values, practices and beliefs of the other actors and,
even more important, to adjust the transferred policy to these beliefs to prevent inappropriate transfers (De Jong & Bao, 2007). Similarly, clashing actor coalitions (Bennett & Howlett, 1992; Marsh & Mcconnell, 2010) or the absence of key actors may result in rejection of the transferred policy in the end, just like the absence of support from key actors. political champions (Attard & Enoch, 2011), decision makers (Kerlin, 2009) or policy entrepreneurs (Milhorance de Castro, 2014).

4.3. Method to apply the framework

I acknowledge the importance of historical events and context for explaining the impasse. As such I reconstruct the transfer process from 2007 (when transfer was initiated), relying on public documentation (e.g. the project website or news items), detailed case knowledge of the second author (who works as knowledge manager in NCICD), and interviews with involved actors and internal project documents (e.g. the inception report of a knowledge management project). A detailed case summary is shared in Section 4.4.

4.3.1. Inquiring Individual Factors

I operationalized the theoretical framework by translating the abstract factors into interview questions. See Appendix C for an overview. I supplemented this basic interview guideline with open questions (‘what else did affect the process?’) to solve the issue of overlooking factors by following this deductive approach.

The second author (of the article that is published based on this chapter) selected respondents from his network. His role as an ‘insider’ ensured access to respondents and detailed case information. I took two measures to include other (‘outsider’) perspectives in the data as well. First, I recruited five respondents outside the NCICD project from my network through snowball sampling. At a Dutch event on NCICD I met people that asked critical questions on the project. They connected me to their network and three NGO employees and two civil servants of Jakarta’s provincial government agreed to a formal interview (see Table 15). Second, all 21 formal interviews were held and analysed by the me only.

Additional information was gathered in informal interviews, being “…the spontaneous generation of questions in a natural interaction, typically one that occurs as part of ongoing participant observation fieldwork” (Borg & Gall, 2003, p. 239). The informal interviews took place during the fieldwork in Indonesia (May 2017) at practically any time and place, i.e. whenever there was an opportunity to do so. This includes talking to participants of meetings at the Ministry of Public Works and a symposium. I would ask what someone thought of the meeting/symposium. During such conversations, the author introduced the study as well and asked for a formal interview. Sometimes people agreed and an appointment was made for the formal interview. Other times they did not have time for a formal
interview, but were willing to answer some ‘quick questions’. These questions were mainly used to verify (or falsify) observations or claims made by other respondents. These conservations were also used to specify topics for the formal interviews and create an in-depth understanding of the nature of interactions. An additional advantage was that I could include people that were not available for a full formal interview in the dataset.

Table 15. Overview of respondents. The columns indicate the number of people interviewed per category, the number of transcribed and analysed interviews so far (i.e. which are used for this chapter) and the respondents’ organisations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th># of respondents</th>
<th>Represented organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian government</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Works (PUPR); Project Management Unit (PMU); provincial government (DKI Jakarta)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian NGOs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Indonesian Center for Environmental Law (ICEL); fisherman association (KNTI); Rujak Center for Urban Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch consultants</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Deltares; RH-DHV; SWECO; Witteveen+Bos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch government</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Dutch Embassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other consultants</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA); Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3.2. Data Analysis: Linking Factors

I recorded the interviews and transcribed and coded them using Atlas.ti software. I followed a deductive approach, using the factors from the theoretical framework as codes (see Appendix C). I made a summary per factor and assessed whether the factor contributed to stagnation (constraining factors) or helped resolve disagreement (facilitating factors). A neutral assessment was given when there was no influence or a balance between constraints and facilitators. Finally, I noted ‘unclear’ when I could not define the direction of effects. I confronted respondents with anonymized claims from other respondents and used other data sources (literature, media, observations) for triangulation. When in doubt I followed the respondents’ assessment of the facilitating or constraining nature. Finally, I looked for connectedness of factors. To give an example: the factors ‘lack of expertise to evaluate strategies’, ‘limited human resources’ and ‘complexity of the strategy’ seemed to be reinforcing each other, which was confirmed by quotes extracted from Atlas.ti for these factors. I will present these sets in the results (Section 4.5) and use them to draw the conclusions.
4.4.  Case Description
This section first sketches how transfer of the Dutch Delta Approach (DDA) is organised before introducing the problem Jakarta faces and describing subsequent phases of the Dutch-Indonesian collaboration.

4.4.1.  Transferring the Dutch Delta Approach
Dutch consortia of private and public organisations translate the Dutch Delta Approach to strategic master plans worldwide (Rijksoverheid, 2014). Currently Bangladesh, Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, Myanmar, Mozambique and Vietnam are considered ‘focus countries’ (Rijksoverheid, 2016a). The Dutch government formulates a problem description in consultation with the receiving government. Next, the Dutch government formulates an assignment in a tender and acts as the formal client of the winning Dutch consortia until the masterplans are finalised. Then, the recipient government becomes responsible for implementation of the delta plan, which should create business opportunities for the Dutch water sector (WGC, 2013). As such, transfer of the DDA is the result of an active policy of the Dutch government to apply the DDA abroad.

4.4.2.  Policy transfer in Jakarta
Like other urban deltas (Syvitski et al., 2009; Wesselink, 2016) Jakarta is suffering from rapid land subsidence and especially North Jakarta is sinking below sea level at staggering rates of over 10 cm/year (Bucx et al., 2014). The resulting flood risk is threefold: coastal, fluvial (rivers can easily flood the low-lying city) and pluvial (precipitation has nowhere to go) (Abidin et al., 2011). Experts disagree about the cause of this subsidence. The most commonly accepted explanation blames the, often illegal, groundwater extractions in the city. Other explanations include compaction due to urban development, natural compaction and tectonic movements (Abidin et al., 2011). WHATSOEVER the cause of subsidence; Jakarta is sinking.

In 2007, a Kings Tide surprised Jakarta and caused severe human and economic damage. Following this flooding, the Indonesian government requested advice from the Dutch government. They initiated a process where Dutch experts would share their knowledge with Indonesian officials. This exchange evolved over time into advising on strategic planning. The process became one of policy transfer, whereby Dutch experts introduced policy norms, practices and policy objectives to the Indonesian government. These include prevention of future flooding, integration with other policy objectives (such as transportation and urban development) and keeping an eye on longer-term issues (Kops, 2012). This transfer process has formally been divided into three phases: Jakarta Coastal Defence Strategy (JCDS), NCICD1 and NCICD2.
4.4.3. Phases of policy transfer

Before 2007

The Dutch-Indonesian history goes back until around 1600 when Dutch trading companies gained power in the Indonesian archipelago. From the 19th century the Dutch government ruled the “Dutch East Indies” until Indonesian independence after World War II. Despite diplomatic tensions, Dutch experts continued to transfer (water) infrastructure technology and knowledge to Indonesia (Ravesteijn & Kop, 2008) diplomatic relations improved in the late 1990s. In 2001, the Dutch and Indonesian governments signed a Memorandum of Understanding in which they committed to collaboration and knowledge exchange regarding water issues, in short the ‘MoU Water’ (NWP, 2016).

JCDS (2007-2010)

Soon after the 2007 flooding the Jakarta Flood Management program (JFM) was set up to develop the Jakarta Coastal Defence Strategy (JCDS). This was part of the renewed MoU Water. JCDS started a decision-making process and aimed to formulate effective, feasible and sustainable strategic solutions for Jakarta’s coastal defence by mapping the joint interests of all stakeholders and developing a shared vision (Deltares, 2016).

JCDS identified three strategic alternatives for Jakarta (Kops, 2012). The first alternative is to ‘do nothing’ and eventually abandon north-Jakarta. This would imply resettling some 4.5 million inhabitants, which is considered infeasible (Bakker, Kishimoto & Nooy, 2017). The second alternative is to focus on structural measures on-shore. This includes strengthening the existing sea walls and dikes. Relying on on-shore measures has the condition of stopping land subsidence by non-structural measures such as ending (illegal) ground water extractions in the city by strict enforcement and providing alternative water supplies (Colven, 2017). Experts believe there is limited time before this alternative ‘expires’ as it takes considerable time (10-15 years) to effectively halt subsidence. The third option is to turn Jakarta into a large polder using dikes, pumps and a large off-shore reservoir. This option requires extensive spatial planning to find locations for the dikes and reservoirs. The advice of the Dutch consortium emphasises the importance of the second option but believe this option expires soon. Instead, they focus on artificial lowering of the sea level by turning Jakarta Bay into a water retention lake.

In order to keep momentum the process was continued between 2011 and 2012, until the master planning phase (NCICD1) started. During this ‘bridging phase’ the abovementioned alternative strategies of JCDS were outlined and an action plan was drafted for land subsidence in cooperation with Dutch and Indonesian academic experts.
Master Planning Phase, also known as NCICD1 (2013-2015)

The JCDS report was well received. Its follow-up, the National Capital Integrated Coastal Defence Strategy (NCICD1), aimed to prepare a long term strategy to protect Jakarta from tidal flooding. The two focal policy topics of this phase were flood management and urban development. This phase ended with the drafting of the Master Plan, also known as the ‘Great Garuda’, due to its shape of Garuda, the national symbol of Indonesia. The outputs of this phase can be summarized as technical feasibility studies. The Indonesian Ministry of Economic Affairs coordinated the process, while the Dutch government funds the process and acts as client for the Dutch consortium.

NCICD2 (2016-2019)

In 2015 the Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs seemed ready to adopt the preferred alternative of NCIC. The Dutch-Indonesian MoU Water was renewed and extended to a triparty memorandum between the Netherlands, Korea and Indonesia. These countries would collectively work on the detailed design of the preferred conceptual alternative of NCICD1. As such, the Ministry of Public Works and Housing (PUPR) took over the coordinating role.

The Indonesian president Joko Widodo (‘Jokowi’) did not approve the masterplan, because he believed it failed to address the implementation of short term flood measures, the (negative) impact on the livelihood of coastal communities and synchronisation with ongoing programs for upstream measures, water quality and piped water supply. In 2016 he demanded a revision of the master plan with more attention to these issues. This meant the masterplan had to be revised and the process of drafting a strategy was repeated. Hence, the transferred ideas were rejected at first, but the transfer continued in a second iteration.

The president ordered the national planning agency (Bappenas) to lead the revision process. Bappenas organised focus group sessions with 69 stakeholders and engaged the Indonesian Ministries of Maritime Affairs, of Environment and of Fisheries that were not involved in NCICD. The Dutch and Korean experts were largely not involved in this process. This masterplan also takes a polder as starting point but relies on dikes closer to the main land instead of closing off Jakarta Bay. Moreover, Bappenas proposes to focus on land subsidence first, thereby postponing the final investment decision for the sea wall to 2030.

The consortium also updated NCICD1 to NCICD2. The updated masterplan stands for National Capital Integrated Coastal Development Strategy, whereby (urban) development replaced (flood) defence. Also, the Great Garuda Wall lost its bird-like shape and became ‘just’ an Outer Sea Wall in the updated plan. NCICD2 states
a final investment decision should be taken in 2018, so that the Sea Wall will be operational in 2030. In addition, NCICD shall be integrated with the existing plans for 17 artificial islands for property development. This integration could create financial leverage and prevent competition over reclamation in Jakarta Bay. Especially the integration with the artificial island triggered opposition. Since 1995, when the plan for the 17 artificial islands was first introduced, local communities and organisations opposed their construction (Bakker, Kishimoto & Nooy, 2017). Since both plans have been associated, the opposition also affects the flood protection component of NCICD.

The Ministries of Maritime Affairs, of Environment and of Fisheries believe the negative social and environmental impact collides with their ministries’ interests. Concurrently, several Dutch and Indonesian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) – among others representing the interests of fishermen and the environment – unite in the Save Jakarta Bay coalition to protest the NCICD plans (Bakker, Kishimoto & Nooy, 2017). Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (‘Ahok’) of the province DKI Jakarta still supported NCICD but in the early 2017 he suddenly disappeared from the political arena and the impasse was complete. His successor Anies Baswedan actively campaigned against reclamation in Jakarta Bay. Involved actors believe the president is still supportive of the proposed strategy, although he refrained from further engagement in the discussion.

I take May 2017 as a cut-off point; later developments are not included in this study. The Dutch consortium is reviewing the feasibility of Bappenas’ masterplan. The results of this review were not conclusive yet in May 2017. In August 2018 the status quo had not changed much: the impasse was still present. Insiders expect that political decisions will only be taken after the presidential elections in Indonesia in 2019.

4.4.4. Summary of Results: Discussing Constraining Factors

Environment

I observe a highly dynamic and polarized policy arena. Although the political tide was favourable in JCDS, i.e. the early stages of transfer, opposition to the transferred ideas increased during NCICD1 and NCICD2. Jakarta’s governor, a political champion for NCICD, disappeared from the arena. Also, NCICD 1 and 2 have had three different project leaders in four years, representing different ministries. There is no shared vision between these ministries and they can block each other’s plans, for example by refusing to issue a permit. “Well, what you see is a bit of a polarised country, without a sort of common norms and knowledge level.” – Dutch consultant. Currently the Ministry of Public Works is acting as project leader, but responsibilities for flood management are dispersed: “In principal the government is decentralised, some responsibilities are legally
assigned to local governments, others to provinces and again other ones to the national government." In combination with the emergence of an alternative strategy originating from high policy levels during NCICD2, the resulting political environment contributed to the impasse. Important key players (such as governor Ahok) could no longer use their influence to create a support base and other influential parties used their influence to create an alternative (“And then the Ministry of Bappenas, national planning (...), said and now we’ll step in. They started to make an alternative plan”. – Dutch consultant, Respondent #20) or opposition, like the new governor, who “is not the one who fancies making big infrastructure. (...) He is more into the people power thing.” – Respondent #31 from an Indonesian NGO.

**Transferability**
The transferability seemed to be facilitating to policy transfer, at least in earlier phases of transfer. The Dutch consortium relied on a strong reputation of the Netherlands as legitimate source when initiating the transfer in 2007. “This kind of comprehensive and integrated coastal water resources and land resources development project, you know, there are three big countries in the world I think. One is the Dutch.” – Respondent #18 from KOICA. This reputation concerned the Dutch delta management and planning as best practice policy and the involved organisations as trusted advisors to Indonesia. In 2007, the Indonesian government was open to Dutch advice and all parties agreed that short-term, 'no-regret' measures were indispensable to protect Jakarta to imminent flood risk. However, a serious mismatch between objectives became visible once this original focus shifted to long-term flood protection during NCICD1. The emphasis on long-term orientation, adaptive planning and integrated policymaking by the Dutch consortium is a far end from Indonesian practice (Blomkamp et al., 2017). Indonesian policies are made for administrative divisions instead of the natural landscape entities that are required for effective delta management (Bucx et al., 2014). Also, long term orientation collides with the ad hoc practice of planning processes in Jakarta. The Indonesian government is furthermore considered to respond to yesterday’s issues, instead of addressing challenges ahead. This low institutional fit constrains the transfer.

At the same time objectives became ambiguous. The consortium has formulated the goal to make Jakarta ‘flood free’ by 2030 and frames damage as result of flooding in both humanitarian (i.e. lives and homes lost) and economic terms. Besides the heavily affected slum-dwellers (Van Voorst, 2016), most Jakartans perceive annual small-scale floods to be a nuisance rather than the disastrous event the Dutch consultants consider them to be. Also, the original goal of flood protection became intertwined with secondary goals of urban development and prestigious infrastructure development, when the land reclamation was associated
Chapter 4: Reconstructing the impasse in policy transfer

with NCICD2. Critics of the proposed NCICD claim that the Dutch consortium is mainly interested in a ‘good’ solution for their own interests: a solution that generates business in the implementation phase. The consortium argues that there is no hidden agenda. “My commercial interest is now to make this project, now matter how, (...) a success. Success means: there is a decision and [flood] safety is ensured and the Netherlands is involved. (...) If the Dutch government believes they’ll get a bad product (...) then we have delivered a bad product and we won’t get a follow-up”. – Dutch consultant. A ‘good’ solution would thus imply that the Dutch government is satisfied with the solution and the Dutch government is only satisfied when the Indonesian government is. Nevertheless, concerns of conflicting (Dutch) commercial and (Indonesian) public interests prevail.

**Adoptability**

The suitability of the proposed policy remains disputed. Indonesian academic and government experts continue to doubt the contribution of ground water extractions in land subsidence. Dutch experts argue time is running out for stopping subsidence and that a sea wall is needed instead. However, critics argue that the consortium does not address the real issue (being land subsidence) because it is not part of the scope of their assignment from the Dutch government (Colven, 2017). Local NGOs criticise the Indonesian government since NCICD1 for basing their decisions on engineers only, instead of involving a broader set of advisors. As a result, the necessity and suitability of the proposed strategy remain debated. The strategy presently on the table (NCICD2) is called “megalomaniac” in interviews and has a scale and complexity that is unprecedented in Indonesia (Colven, 2017). This complexity is reflected by the amount of reports and technical details produced by the consortium in the past ten years. Both Indonesian and foreign consultants consider the limited experience of the Indonesian government with such large scale projects a risk for proper evaluation of the proposed strategy and related decision making. In addition, the government lacks experience with equivalent projects and capacity to implement the complex strategy if it were adopted. An official of DKI Jakarta explains: “There are many public-private partnerships on developing for example toll roads (...). There is experience, but not to manage very big projects.” Finally, although the organising capacity of the Indonesian government is limited, respondents admit that the Indonesian government has displayed vigour in previous infrastructure projects once a decision has been taken. Despite this, concerns are increasing about the ability of the Indonesian government to properly maintain the structural measures and enforce regulations required for the proposed strategy.

Moreover, although the Dutch government provides sufficient financial resources for the transfer until 2019, time and human resources are constrained. The Dutch consortium had vacancies for a delegated representative and CEO advisor.
for significant time during NCICD2 and the Indonesian Project Management Unit is underpopulated with just three full-time junior positions. Higher-level policy officials, such as the Head of Project Management Unit (PMU), are responsible for several projects at the same time and can allot limited time to keep up with the consultants. To compensate, Dutch consultants took up policy-advising tasks, although they considered it a side-job rather than the core business of the consortium. They also took over tasks that were the formal responsibility of the Indonesian counterparts, such as communicating about the justification of NCICD to communities.

On top of this comes the (perceived) time pressure, caused by the tight time schedule of the Dutch consortium. A Dutch consultant explains that “we see it as something very urgent, because a few times a year the dikes fail already and we know that there will be another King Tide in 2025 at last.”

**Process design**

Several factors that triggered the impasse emerged in the process design. These factors mainly concern building and maintaining a broad domestic support base for policy adoption. Engagement in NCICD used to be limited to counterparts and ministries. The initial support base for NCICD is rapidly losing ground to a powerful opposition that emerged since NCICD1. The masterplan became highly controversial when the proposed solution for flood protection was integrated with the reclamation of 17 artificial islands (Bakker, Kishimoto & Nooy, 2017). Three Indonesian ministries, who thereby directly collided with NCICD’s supporting ministries, were involved in creating the Bappenas masterplan in 2016. As a result, the Indonesian government’s stance is ambivalent (Colven, 2017). Besides domestic support, external (international) support is another factor that is currently unclear, as the project is limited to the tri-country MoU without support from international financial organisations, such as the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank.

A high density of formal and informal relations characterizes the exchange process itself in 2017. Consultants and high-level Indonesian policy makers interact informally outside meetings. Both the foreign consultants and the Project Management Unit are accommodated in the building of the coordinating Ministry of Public Works. This physical proximity of actors supports close ties in the network. However, the working culture is rather different. The international consultants are considered disciplined and fast-paced. As a PMU member describes it: “Yes of course, there are many differences. [The Dutch consultants] are very disciplined. (...) The Indonesian [government], we start to be professional, (...) we start to be more responsible.” While his colleague explains: “So the speed of the work of consultants and in the ministry, it is not the same, it is not similar. In the ministry,
Indonesian ministry, it takes more time than the consultants.” The Indonesian government is also described as somewhat ignorant to her responsibilities, due to differing views on what exactly these responsibilities are and the required level of commitment of actors. The foreign consultants believe that involvement of Indonesian officials in drafting a strategy is essential, while other actors believe that the Indonesian officials should not be involved in the strategic planning, but only in the following steps of detailed engineering design. Indonesian bureaucrats wait for an official request of higher administrative levels (e.g. a minister) before engaging in the transfer process. Lastly, when Indonesia could not provide their part of the required resources, the transfer could further tap into Dutch resources. These latter efforts have paid off as involved actors agree that the process is ‘somehow drifting in the right direction’, although they are perceived as a policy-push as well. Nonetheless, learning is limited to tactical (first-level) learning. Indonesian actors have learned about policy instruments deployed in the Netherlands, but underlying goals (such as the level of flood risk that should be allowed) was not openly re-evaluated.

4.4.5. Relating factors: three interrelated explanations for a deadlock
From the factors described in the last paragraphs, I extracted three interrelated explanations for the emergence of an impasse, related to the practical feasibility, the rise of opposing coalitions and the execution of the transfer process. These explanations incorporate various factors mentioned in the framework described in Chapter 2/Section 4.2.

The first explanation concerns the feasibility and compatibility of the created strategy and thereby relates mainly to issues of transferability and adoptability as outlined in Section 4.2. The DDA-based strategy is based on a different conceptualisation of flood risk management than the Indonesian practice, thereby risking incompatibility. The Dutch consortium takes integrated, long-term oriented and adaptive planning as starting point, while planning in Indonesia is sectoral, decentralised, ad hoc and responsive in practice. Despite efforts of the Dutch consultants in the process design (to adjust their advice to values, practices and beliefs of their Indonesian counterpart) the ideological gap is not bridged yet, contributing to the impasse.

Secondly, the content of the NCICD masterplan collides with the interests of a powerful actor coalition. This explanation emphasises the role of actor coalitions as crucial part of the process design (as was outlined in Section 2.4). The Bappenas masterplan relies on stopping land subsidence, thereby responding to criticism on NCICD by NGOs and part of the Indonesian ministries (Bakker, Kishimoto & Nooy, 2017). However, the other coalition (consisting of the Dutch consortium and another set of Indonesian ministries) considers stopping subsidence in time to be
unrealistic and focusses on a solution involving the outer sea wall. This coalition values the opportunities that NCICD2 offers for raising Jakarta’s allure and for property development (Colven, 2017). The fact that there are now two dominant discourse, whereby actors do not engage in a process of frame reflection or policy-oriented learning, is an important contribution to the current impasse. The more paradigmatic policy beliefs between these two coalitions differ especially when it comes to the belief about the extent to which the physical system of the subsurface can be influenced by human behaviour. The more instrumental beliefs differ on the issue whether it is possible and desirable to focus on policy measures to stop subsidence and what its consequences could be.

Thirdly, the design of this process contributes in another way to the implementation impasse as well. It seems the Indonesian government cannot take an informed decision yet because of the way the strategy was created and communicated to Indonesian actors. The Dutch government aims to transfer the DDA directly to policy levels “as high as possible”. This aim seems legit as it ensures access to decision makers, which is a crucial condition for adoption (Kerlin 2009). At the same time, this approach results in (technology) consultants who transfer knowledge to top level bureaucrats. Two issues arise. Dutch consultants stress the importance of rational, evidence-based policy making, emphasising the importance of linear policy making and joint fact-finding, while Indonesian policy making is based merely on power relations (Blomkamp et al., 2017). Indonesian top-level bureaucrats have neither the technological knowledge to assess the consultants’ advice nor the time to read all the detailed reports. A lack of human resources and expertise constrains the Indonesian government to evaluate the given advice. As a result, the transfer of the Dutch knowledge remains limited and no decision is taken yet.

4.5. Conclusion and discussion
This study aimed to explain how an impasse emerged in the transfer of the Dutch Delta Approach (DDA) to Jakarta, Indonesia. I identified several constraining factors in the theoretical framework and captured these in three explanations. The first explanation points to differences between the Dutch advice and Indonesian practice, thereby highlighting constraining factors of suitability (transferability) and feasibility (adoptability). The second explanation describes the presence of actor coalitions that advocate different strategies and confirms the necessity of a broad support base among actors. The third explanations points to the role of the knowledge exchange process’ set-up. Each of the explanations demonstrates that an interplay of factors, rather than a single factor, explains why transfer results in resistance instead of adoption or adaptation (Heiduk, 2016). None of the explanations alone seems sufficient to explain the impasse, thereby stressing the dynamic nature of policy transfer and learning process (Biesbroek et al.,
A striking example in this study was the transition of the political climate from facilitating adoption to triggering stagnation. I thereby adhere to a group of scholars that advocates for considering longer time periods when reviewing a policy transfer process (Dussauge-Laguna, 2012; Wood, 2015a).

The complexity and required level of change of the NCICD masterplan illustrate that paradigmatic learning is needed: the norms, objectives and practices that inspired NCICD collide with the dominant norms, objectives and practices in Indonesia. However, the requirements for such learning (Hall, 1993) were all absent: there is no broad domestic support base and the Indonesian government has limited expertise to evaluate the conflicting opinions of experts regarding the strategy. A lack of human resources at the project management unit and limited financial resources amplify this. Moreover, at the moment there is no sense of urgency at the Indonesian government to change current practice. As a result, the status quo is maintained and actors are trapped in an impasse.

The absence of third level learning seems to be related to the uneven power-relation between the sender and receiver. The Dutch government provides most resources for the transfer process and the Dutch consortium overrules the Indonesian recipients in terms of level of technology and knowledge, resulting in the inequality of partners described by Stead, De Jong and Reinholde (2008). The set-up of the knowledge exchange process has a central role. This and other studies (e.g. Colven, 2017) reveal that the consortium experiences less commitment from the Indonesian government to the process of knowledge exchange than anticipated and required for in their work plans. I observed great efforts to compensate for this. Nevertheless, it seems that these efforts have the paradoxical effect that they reinforce the apathy of the Indonesian government to take ownership of the process and fuel resistance against the Dutch proposal. This observation reflects what Ostrom and Gibson (2001) call the contradiction between control and ownership of the project, whereby consultants are inclined to keep control over the process to achieve (short-term) progress, but fail to ensure (long-term) ownership. This crowding-out effect deserves further attention.

The knowledge transfer is predominantly targeted at instrumental and tactical learning. The advising consultants focus on detailed design of the strategy (as a way to keep progress nonetheless the controversial underlying issue) and thus give insufficient attention to creating consensus about the underlying values of the DDA. As a result, the impasse seems to have emerged because of rather than despite the way the transfer process is executed.

Impasses have been reported (and sometimes solved) in other instances of transferring the DDA and issues with policy transfer from developed to developing
countries have been reported more frequently (e.g. Rahman et al., 2016). A comparative case study analysis might enhance generalisability of this single case study when identifying similar patterns in other cases or, alternatively, could highlight potential alternative paths. If transferring the DDA is to accommodate or trigger third level learning, future research could address how the process should be set up to achieve this. Future research may also focus on potential interventions to overcome these impasses (Biesbroek et al., 2014).

At the moment, the policy transfer process is still ongoing. I paused at May 2017 and rewind the process back to 2007. This gave valuable insights in how to explain the existence of the impasse in the transfer process at this time. Nonetheless, this impasse might be solved in the remainder of NCICD2. Whether or not the impasse persists, it would be interesting to study what caused this impasse to resolve/persist and what I can learn from that for the design of future policy transfer processes.

The Jakarta case reveals two other lessons about policy transfer. First of all, processes of policy transfer ask for changes in existing policies and thus for policy learning. Facilitating these learning processes requires a range of policy competencies, including managing attention, detecting and using policy windows, organizing joint fact-finding, and safeguarding political support. Since policy transfer processes are often dominated by experts (who know much about the content of the policies), these skills are often underrepresented. Designing effective policy transfer processes thus also requires that these competencies are available.

The diffusion of the DDA is targeted at other deltas as well, both aiming to enhance delta management in those countries in an era of climate change and to increase revenues of delta technology export (Rijksoverheid, 2016a; Zwarteveen et al., 2017). This study onto the emergence of the impasse in developing a strategy for Jakarta, Indonesia, revealed that this impasse might be result of a more structural issue, namely that of the unequal partnership (Stead, De Jong & Reinholde 2008) between the Netherlands and the receiving countries. The current process prevents third level learning to occur and results in Dutch ownership and control over the project. Strategic delta planning is being advocated (Wesselink 2016), but in order to effectively introduce strategic delta planning to the targeted transition countries, Dutch government officials and consultants should pay attention to the more fundamental differences in interests, (technological) knowledge and resources when translating the Dutch Delta Approach and have to be aware of these structural imbalance and the consequences it could have.
Chapter 4 showed the scientific applicability of the framework of Chapter 2, but it may be useful for practice too. Respondent #26 even jokingly asked whether I had a crystal bole, because the conclusions of Chapter 4 had ‘predicted’ the key issues that plagued the process in 2018. Although the application of the framework unravelled what “went wrong” in Jakarta, it intrigued me that the process had seemingly not progressed in nearly a year.

However, the empirical material collected also made me realize that ineffectiveness is not that black-and-white. Although there was no paradigm shift in Jakarta, the process was – as Respondent #20 expressed – “somehow drifting in the right direction” and could thus not be considered completely ineffective. This triggered a second, follow-up research question of how to break through an impasse. Chapter 4 has already illustrated how actors assigned different meaning to the various aspects of the strategy like flood protection, urban development or social and environmental impact and therefore had a different perspective on suitable policy solutions. As such, the explanation for a second question had to be found in the translation process. The next chapter is therefore explicitly tied to the second and third conceptual puzzle of how actors interpret and modify transferred knowledge and how power and politics affect this translation process. In order to study what actors involved in the transfer process consider a solution out of the impasse, I adopted a Q methodological approach, a method hitherto rarely used in policy transfer research.
Abstract

This chapter’s study explains how contrasting perspectives on resolving impasses in policymaking exist among all relevant actors in a case of transferring Dutch flood management policy to Jakarta, Indonesia. It does so by introducing Q methodology as a novel method in policy transfer and policy mobility studies. International policy transfer requires a continuous, iterative process of policy translation where stagnation may occur following disruptions on the policy, polity or political dimension. This study assumes that each actor goes through a unique process of sense-making. Using Q methodology, two contrasting perspectives are identified in the case of transferring the ‘Dutch Delta Approach’ to Jakarta, Indonesia. One perspective emphasises the need for direct implementation, while the other advocates further modification of ideas. These contrasting perspectives cut through existing sender-receiver categorizations and prevent strategic alignment needed for a breakthrough. Furthermore, they suggest a lack of political leadership from Indonesia and potential conflict of interests of the Dutch government as policy sender as other causes for prolonged stagnation. Finally, I conclude that the outsourcing of strategy making and planning to consultants delimits the space for translation.
Pages 124 - 141 are under embargo
5.6 Epilogue Jakarta
When I visited Jakarta in 2018, the consortium was roaring of arousal as they were exploring a new idea. This eventually resulted in a new design of the off-shore coastal protection. In this design, the dam would initially be a bridge, with water flowing freely in and out Jakarta Bay. Emphasis would be on mobility with a toll road on top of the dam instead of urban development (like the Great Garuda).

The new design would integrate the best of plans proposed by the consortium itself and BAPPENAS. It adhered to more stakeholders, as it would not be closing off the bay, thereby limiting social and environmental impact. This design also retreats from the integration of 17 islands, which had added to the controversy around the ‘Great Garuda’. In addition, it would be more adaptive. The new bridge-based design could be turned into a dam by closing the gaps in the bridge, but this is only considered a ‘last resort’ in case other strategies fail. The remaining time of the NCICD project was used to develop ‘road maps’ to accelerate the reinforcement of the on-shore coastal defense and urban water supply (as alternative to groundwater extraction that had previously contributed to rapid land subsidence). The latter also allowed for re-establishing collaboration between the NCICD consortium and DKI Jakarta, as reducing groundwater extraction had become a key topic of governor Anies Basdewan as well. In addition, emphasis was placed on capacity building in the Indonesian water sector.

As such, the impasse in Jakarta lasted for several years, but eventually the involved actors managed to break through it. It seems that the decision to move on was to a large extent due to the ‘dead blow’ for the Outer Sea Dike/Great Garuda Sea Wall played, which came in 2019 when governor Basdewan announced that he would permanently withdraw the permits for the 17 islands. In any case, the Dutch government, the consortium and their Indonesian partners have found common ground in their objectives over the last years. Goals of actors and stakeholders became aligned in the new design, which thereby seems to be an iteration of the initial translation. This once more confirms that there is space between policy transfer adoption and rejection (Stone, 2016; Colven, 2020). In Jakarta the initial resistance of Indonesian actors had, at the end of the road, resulted in a design that was more integrated and more adaptive. I even dare to say that the resulting design does more justice to the Dutch Delta Approach then the initial strategy of hard infrastructure measures that only served flood prevention.

It seems fair to conclude that the resistance to adopt the first idea eventually led to ‘failing forward’, whereby initial failure facilitated improvement of the proposed policy. However, the project is not implemented yet and time will tell whether this new translation indeed proved to be the joint image of the future of Jakarta or that future events may cause stagnation or even termination of the plans.
In this last empirical chapter I focus on the transfer of the Dutch Delta Approach to Bangladesh and Vietnam. These cases are considered effective transfers, both according to respondents and the definition used in this dissertation. As such, these cases can be contrasted to the not (or not yet) effective transfer in Jakarta. Doing so, Chapter 6 focuses on the question how these cases became effective and what this means to those involved.

As outlined in Chapter 1, I applied the analytical framework of Chapter 2 in early stages of this study, using information available upfront about the cases in Vietnam and Bangladesh. This exercise was useful as application of the framework showed again that no single factor could explain the outcome of the process. In these cases, there was an interplay of facilitating factors. Although simply testing the framework again is useful in itself, I decided to take the study one step further in this chapter. When applying the framework, one aspect had surfaced in which these cases differed from NCICD in Jakarta: the nature of the collaboration with Bangladeshi and Vietnamese counterparts and other key actors. Where translation of the Dutch approach in Jakarta was considered insufficient, in Vietnam and Bangladesh several actors played an active role in translating the DDA and praised the result of this translation. As Chapter 5 concluded, actors translating ideas need a political vision to connect to and these actors need to be able to affect the policy course. This lead to a focus on the question how the ‘right’ actors came on-board in Vietnam and Bangladesh and how this helped shape translation. In line with the third research question, I also paid included how this served (political) interests of Dutch and non-Dutch actors and how these interests in turn affected the transfer process. As such, Chapter 6 adopts a network management perspective on policy transfer.
Chapter 6
Un-Dutching the Delta Approach
Network Management and Policy Translation for Effective Policy Transfer

Abstract

This chapter identifies network management as a facilitator of effective policy transfer. I reconstruct the unconventional collaboration between Dutch private-sector experts and national governments of Vietnam and Bangladesh to explain how policy ideas from the Netherlands inspired multi-sectoral, long-term strategies ('delta plans'). I identify the network management strategies used by the Dutch actors, to analyse how state and non-state actors were aligned in defining the problem and solution pathways. Based on the case comparison network analysis is introduced as a tool for policy transfer. The chapter further concludes that the soft nature of the transfer object in these cases enhanced its transferability.
Pages 148 - 163 are under embargo
Chapter 7
Conclusion and Discussion
'Once upon a time, there was a small country located at the coast of the North Sea. For centuries this tiny country had conquered the floods and waves of the sea. It had even reclaimed its own land between the rivers and sea arms in the delta they live in, or as people proudly stated: “God created the world, but the Dutch created the Netherlands”. The Dutch were always willing to share their water knowledge and policy ideas about managing a delta. Doing so, they were able to help other countries to improve their water governance and therewith lives of their inhabitants in the delta.'

The fairy tale like narrative above is my own version of a narrative that I came across many times during my research. Especially non-Dutch respondents framed the Netherlands as a heroic country that first created polders from the sea, protected by democratically elected water boards with a 1000-year history, and that now is helping other countries. Although this is of course a romanticised version of reality, it captures how the Dutch attempts to introduce their approach to other countries are framed. This transfer of the Dutch Delta Approach (DDA) as a policy model was central in the previous chapters. In this concluding chapter I will refresh the reader’s memory about the rationale behind this research and its research questions, before answering the research questions and drawing conclusions based on the findings. Finally, this concluding chapter will discuss the conclusions in light of the limitations of this research and implications for practice. The chapter will end with a research agenda.

7.1. Problem statement of this dissertation
In the past 20 years Dutch water management has been transformed from prevention-oriented (i.e. building ever higher dikes) to a risk-based approach that combines hard infrastructure with soft governance measures. This policy shift was needed to maintain the Dutch delta ‘future proof’ in the light of climate change. In the most recent decade, this ‘Dutch approach’ to delta management has been promoted abroad by the Dutch government. As a result, the Dutch Delta Approach (DDA) has served as a policy model in dozens of projects around the globe, and particularly in developing countries. As was outlined in Chapter 1, this spreading of the DDA to other countries makes it a process of policy transfer, a process whereby knowledge about policies in one time and place is intentionally used to formulate policies elsewhere (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; Evans & Davies, 1999).

Given the vulnerability of Asian urban deltas to climate change, this research concentrated on the transfer of the DDA to three Asian countries: Indonesia (Jakarta), Vietnam (Mekong Delta) and Bangladesh. This raised questions about the effectiveness of transfer of the DDA to these countries: which aspects should be taken into consideration when transferring policy from one country to the
other? But also: why is the DDA transferred to other countries in the first place? Which role do local and international politics play in these transfer attempts? And, when can these transfers be considered effective?

This dissertation has adopted the notion of policy translation, a conceptualisation that emphasises modification of policies while they travel, rather than linear transplantation from A to B (Stone, 2012; Dolowitz, 2017). Despite a vast body of literature around this phenomenon, I identified three theoretical lacunas. These lacunas concerned mobilizing policy for transfer, the process of how actors translate policy ideas and the role of power, interests and politics. The first gap raised questions on how policies are mobilized for travelling and international application. The emphasis in existing literature is on the reasons of receivers to engage in transfer, while there is less attention for policy selling or an active transfer push by senders (e.g. Wolman, 1992). The second gap in literature concerns evidence-based understanding of how actors modify ideas to make them suitable for the receiving context. Translation is done by both sender and receiver as well as other relevant actors (Stone, 2016), hence all actors should be taken into account to understand how policy is translated in practice. Thirdly, policy transfer is about formulating policies, which takes place in a context of existing institutions and political arenas. The role of power and politics is therefore the third gap that was identified in Section 1.2.4.

I set out to address these lacunas by studying the transfer of the Dutch Delta Approach (DDA) by answering the following questions. The main research question was: “what explains the (in)effectiveness of attempts to transfer the ‘Dutch Delta Approach’ to South and Southeast Asia?” Repeating the definition from Section 1.3.3, effectiveness was defined as a policy transfer process that “resulted in (a) access to a suitable policy formulation network, (b) a translation of the transferred policy that fits the receiving context and (c) adoption by policy makers in the receiving context.”

Sub-questions supporting this research question were:
V. Which elements shape the process of policy transfer?
VI. How is the Dutch Delta Approach mobilized for international transfer?
VII. How do engaged actors interpret and modify transferred knowledge?
VIII. How do power and politics affect the effectiveness of transfer?

I did so through a longitudinal study over the course of four years, by performing a literature review on policy transfer and three qualitative case studies of ongoing attempts to transfer the DDA to Vietnam, Bangladesh and Indonesia. The results of these studies were presented over the course of the previous chapters.
7.2. **Summary of the previous chapters**

Here, I will first summarize the findings of the previous chapters, before drawing conclusions.

The literature review of Chapter 2 showed how decisions early in the transfer process line up for certain outcomes. Four possible ‘routes’ for policy transfer were identified: demand-driven opportunistic transfer, supply-driven branded transfer, pressured (semi-coercive) transfer and learning. The first three routes are characterised by imitation and limited adaptation, thereby risking inappropriate and uninformed transfer. Transfers based on learning are based on adaptation, inspiration and mutual borrowing and most often result in adoption of the transferred ideas. In Chapter 3 I examined which policy transfer routes are most applicable for the DDA by examining how the policy is mobilized for transfer. I noticed that the discourse surrounding the transfer of the Dutch Delta Approach suggests a learning route, while the DDA seems a clear example of policy branding in practice. Branding the DDA helped to create a coherent message and to initiate transfer, but risks oversimplification, limited brand maintenance and economic interests pose threats to the sustainability of the brand. Chapter 4 showed how a combination of factors resulted in the stagnation of the DDA transfer process in Jakarta, Indonesia. A misfit of the transferred ideas with the receiving context, the emergence of a broad domestic support opposition and inability of the Indonesian government to evaluate the proposed policy ideas meant the conditions for a paradigm shift were absent. Chapter 5 illustrated how actors deal with stagnation in policy transfer. In absence of a political vision to connect to, transfer agents develop their own strategies to resolve the impasse. These perspectives of how to move on cut through traditional sender-receiver divides, showing these entities are not as fixed as assumed before. Finally, Chapter 6 explained the adoption of a ‘delta plan’ in Bangladesh and Vietnam through effective network management strategies. This network management resulted in ‘adequate translation’ by a network of Dutch and domestic actors. The Dutch actors gained access to the core governance of both countries by making effective use of network management strategies and by framing the core ideas of the DDA in terms of existing policy priorities in Bangladesh and Vietnam.

7.3. **Conclusion**

Based on these results, I will answer the sub-research questions and formulate conclusions that form an answer to the main research question.

7.3.1. **Answer to the sub-research questions**

**(RQ 1) Elements shaping the policy transfer process**

The first sub-question explored which elements shape the policy transfer process. In this dissertation, I have made an effort to capture the transfer process in an
evidence-based, holistic framework of factors that affect policy transfer. This framework, presented in Chapter 2, was based on a review of 180 empirical studies and is composed of four factor groups. The first factor group describes the broader environment in which the transfer takes place, such as the policy arena, the sub-system of existing institutions and policies and the general social, economic, cultural and biophysical context. The second group of factors describes the transferability of the policy. Transferability describes how well sending actors are able to convey the message, but also the openness to new ideas and a normative fit at the receiving end. These may depend on existing actor relations and features of the transferred policy. The third group concerns the adoptability of the policy, namely the suitability of the policy for the receiving context. These factors concern the ability of the receiver to thoroughly evaluate these ideas and the available capacity and resources to implement them. Also, this receiver should be in a position with decision-making power to be able to actually change the policy course. Finally, the review showed that process design matters. Process design includes the actors involved in the transfer, the management of this transfer network and type of transfer (voluntary vs. coercive and imitation vs. adaptation). This framework may be used to evaluate why policy transfer results in adoption or non-adoption.

As outlined in the method section (Section 1.4), this framework has been applied to all three cases. This application leads to three conclusions. First, policy transfer is multi-faceted and there is not a single factor that determines whether transfer will be effective or not. The application to the case of NCICD (Jakarta) was presented in Chapter 4 and shows, as was concluded there already, that the ineffectiveness of the transfer to Jakarta was the result of an interplay of factors. Nevertheless, some factors proved to be more constraining then others, such as the lack of support from key political actors. Similarly, the application of the framework to Vietnam and Bangladesh shows that an interplay of factors led to policy adoption in the end. As Chapter 6 established, involving key actors proved beneficial for the process in both countries, but the existence of windows of opportunities was equally important. However, this does not mean that the transfer process cannot be steered or managed at all.

The second observation about policy transfer is therefore that the transfer process – within certain limits – can be managed in an attempt to steer the course of events. Two most illustrative example of such steering attempts are the creation of demand for the Dutch Delta Approach through branding the policy (see Chapter 3) and network management strategies to shape and influence interactions of a receiving policy network at the receiving end (see particularly Chapter 6).
Thirdly, this dissertation has also revealed patterns in the characteristics of transfer processes and their outcomes in terms of adoption. The review in Chapter 2 showed that studies of voluntary transfer more often report adoption than coercive transfers. Also, transfers based on adaptation and inspiration resulted more often in adoption than transfer based on imitation. Four possible ‘routes’ for policy transfer were identified: demand-driven opportunistic transfer, supply-driven branded transfer, pressured (semi-coercive) transfer and learning. The first three routes are characterised by imitation and limited adaptation, thereby risking inappropriate and uninformed transfer. Transfers based on learning use mechanisms of adaptation, inspiration and mutual borrowing and most often result in adoption of the transferred ideas. This suggests that decisions early in the transfer line up for certain outcomes. This conclusion based on the literature review was observed in the studied cases too. Chapter 3 showed how the transfer of the DDA is surrounded by rhetoric of a learning transfer in policy documents, but resembles branded transfer in practice. Branded transfer is initiated by the sender and enabling factors concern transferability, while factors concerning adoptability and process design are less advantageous, thereby potentially resulting in limited adaptation of the original policy and thus inappropriate transfer. Learning is co-initiated by sender and receiver and the transferred policy is heavily adapted or only used as inspiration. This resource-intensive collaboration has potential to result in effective transfer. The transfer of the DDA seems to be a mixture of both. For example, formally the receiver takes initiative to transfer but it was noted how the Dutch senders have created this demand (see e.g. Section 6.5). Chapter 3 showed that the DDA was clearly branded, but the Dutch gradually realized the need for a thorough process design after the initial rejection of their ideas in Vietnam and the impasse in Jakarta.

All in all, the answer to the first sub-question is that policy transfer is shaped by a broad set of factors determines the course and outcome of transfer processes. Still, certain patterns or ‘routes’ can be observed, whereby the set-up of the transfer process is associated with certain outcomes in terms of adoption or non-adoption. Four of such Policy Transfer Routes were identified in this dissertation: opportunistic, branded, pressured and learning transfer. Actors may attempt to influence the direction of the transfer process, for example through branding or network management.

(RQ 2) Mobilizing the DDA for international transfer
The second question inquired how the Dutch Delta Approach is mobilized for international transfer. As Chapter 3 shows, the Dutch Delta Approach did not automatically end up in the international spotlight. The Dutch government issued a branding campaign, whereby an uncritically, sophisticated version of the ‘Dutch Delta Approach’ was created as a brand in itself. Three Dutch
ministries collaborated in creating and spreading the DDA. These ministries – being Foreign Affairs, Infrastructure and Environment, and International Trade and Development Cooperation, jointly formulated the ambitions in the National Water Plan and set up an Inter-ministerial Water Cluster (IWC) in which they jointly coordinate activities abroad. In 2014 they produced a brochure in which they defined the DDA in twelve ‘building blocks’ and illustrated this approach with international examples (Rijksoverheid, 2014). These ministries also re-established the ambitions of spreading the Dutch approach in their International Water Ambition (IWA) (Rijksoverheid, 2016a). This approach is characterized by “the integrated approach, preventive and participatory methods and (international) water governance” (Rijksoverheid, 2016a) and core values include flexibility, sustainability and solidarity (Slob & Bloemen, 2014). This brand was brought to light via policy networks and at water conferences. As was seen in Chapter 6, the ‘Dutch Delta Approach’ was proposed as a new direction for bilateral relations with Vietnam and Bangladesh in the context of aid-and-trade development cooperation.

This empirical account shows four things about mobilizing the DDA. First, it shows how the DDA was actively transferred to other countries by creating a policy model, of which the attractiveness was boosted through a marketing campaign. Second, it shows that this branding is both advantageous and disadvantageous to the transfer of the DDA. Branding is advantageous as it places the policy in the spotlight, thereby boosting its perceived attractiveness and thus transferability. This was also observed in Chapter 6, where demand was created for ‘a delta plan’ in Vietnam and Bangladesh. However, Chapter 3 also highlighted the potential limitations of branding. Although Dutch actors use similar terms, what constitutes the DDA exactly remains vague and the circulated models are an oversimplification of reality. Branding exemplifies the qualities of a policy, while covering potential pitfalls and limitations. As such, branding may prevent an open evaluation of the suitability of a policy model for another context, especially when the sender intentionally or unintentionally ignores of downplays limitations or pitfalls of the policy ideas. Chapter 3 suggested that effective branding of policy ideas may even hamper policy learning, especially in a developing context where receivers often lack resources to evaluate the suitability of the ideas. This expectation was confirmed in Chapter 4, which revealed how an overestimation of the suitability of the Dutch ideas in combination with a lack of in-house expertise prevented the Indonesian government to properly assess the fit of the transferred Dutch ideas with the Indonesian context. Thirdly, a mobilized policy is not a fixed model, but requires constant updating. Chapter 3 showed how communications about and the target audience of the DDA were adjusted ad hoc and in Chapter 6 it became clear that the Dutch adjusted their way of working in Bangladesh, based on lessons learned in Vietnam. Finally, this dissertation has shown how policy
branding is a specific form of policy translation. Although previous studies on policy mobility had pointed to the notion of ‘boosterism’ (McCann, 2013) or policy branding (Eshuis & Klijn, 2012), this dissertation shows how this is a form of policy translation. The creation of the policy model requires modification of the existing policy in the Netherlands, whereby this policy is captured in broad, abstract terms. This model is a simplification of reality, which facilitates consistent and clear communication about the model (brand). The abstract nature furthermore allows for a second round of policy translation ‘on the ground’ to create a fit with existing institutional context.

The answer to the second sub-question is thus that the Dutch Delta Approach emerged through policy branding, whereby a policy model was created and then promoted. This is a specific form of policy translation. Promotion boosted the attractiveness of and interest in the policy ideas, but also risks ignoring its limitations during transfer. In addition, this shows the necessity of constantly updating the policy model and its transfer based on experiences in practice.

(RQ 3) Policy translation: creation, dissemination and interpretation of policy knowledge

The third question of this research addresses how actors actually translate policy ideas. Policy translation was framed as something ‘beyond transfer’ and was described in the introduction as a single activity between the original and translated policy. The research has however shown that the process of translation cannot be captured by such a two-stage model, but instead consists of several rounds of translation that are partly sequential and partly overlapping.

The empirical chapters showed how the DDA is translated throughout the transfer process and that different actors play a role in different phases of the transfer. Making use of the decomposition of the transfer process by Lendvai and Stubbs (2007), I will distinguish between three ‘phases’ of translation: creation, dissemination and interpretation. In the case of the DDA the original policy consisted of a practice of managing the Dutch delta that had grown over centuries (e.g. the water boards) but also includes new elements such as spatial planning and climate change adaptation. As such, there is no single program or policy instrument that could be transferred. The first translation thus took place when the Dutch practice was translated into a policy model. This translation can be typified as simplification of the existing practice and describing the Dutch approach in general, abstract terms to disconnect it from its Dutch context. As Chapter 3 illustrated, this can be considered a coordinated activity on the one hand, as the Dutch government simplified the Dutch Delta Approach to 12 building blocks. On the other hand, ‘the’ DDA does not exist and not all actors in the Dutch water sector agree that these building blocks represent the DDA.
Despite the disagreement over whether a policy model exist, all actors seem to agree on some key elements of the DDA and use more or less consistent terms to describe them. However, they emphasise different things in their communication and therewith a second translation takes place. In this second translation, Dutch experts, diplomats and consultants interpret the policy model and modify it so that it fits the receiving context. In Chapter 4 it became apparent that this is not always as deliberate as presented here, but in any case these transfer agents project their ideas of proper delta management to the context in which they work. This is not an exercise they can do alone. Chapters 4 to 6 have shown how this requires insight in the local context, including policy issues, domestic politics and existing policy making practice. A third translation then takes place by the receiver, possibly in collaboration with the senders. They will interpret the Dutch ideas and are best able to evaluate their suitability to address policy issues in their country and to what extent the transferred ideas will ‘fit’ here. The results of this study show how not only receivers, but also senders translate policy and both actor categories do so at different moments in time.

In addition, actors use their frame of reference to interpret and modify ideas, which may be different between individuals in the same actor category. As such, actor categories of sender and receiver cannot be considered fixed entities. For example, Chapter 5 showed that Dutch consultants of the NCICD-consortium in Jakarta had different ideas about the way forward. Some considered the proposed solution suitable, while others saw need for an iteration of the existing translation. The above implies that conceptualising policy translation requires acknowledging the multi-faceted nature of this translation process. This dissertation has shown how multiple translations take place sequentially or simultaneously. Also, there is not ‘one’ translation process going on and not one translated policy. Based on this dissertation, I propose the following conceptualisation of how actors interpret and modify policy. This conceptualisation is visually presented in Figure 11, where it has been simplified into a stage-based model given the limitations of two-dimensional visualisations. This dissertation has illustrated how the original policy cannot be transferred directly but needs to be simplified and captured in a policy model that can be communicated. This is the first translation (creation in Figure 11). Although a formal model may have been created (as Dutch governmental actors did for the DDA through branding), at the same time multiple ‘models’ likely exist with different stakeholders. In addition, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 show how the policy model cannot be presented directly for adoption. Instead, the Dutch transfer agents translate the policy model to the recipient context (dissemination in Figure 11) by interpreting the policy model and modifying it to fit the recipient context. However, especially in Indonesia and Vietnam the initial attempt of translation-to-fit-context was resisted and further modification was required to get sufficient political support in all three cases. This further modification
requires a more active role from the receiving actors, as this is the part where the transferred knowledge is internalized by local policy actors and prepared for institutionalization (interpretation in Figure 11). Only then can the transferred (and several times translated ideas) be adopted and implemented. Each of these three translation steps can have multiple iterations, as well as multiple versions of the policy model, proposed policy and applied policy. Naturally boundaries between these translation steps are indistinct and steps may overlap now and then. Moreover, as policies travel in bits and pieces, the translation of some of these pieces may need further adjustment, while others are not iterated any more.

Summarizing, the answer to the third sub-question entails that policy translation takes place throughout the transfer process and that multiple translations take place between the original policy and the policy eventually applied elsewhere. Multiple translations may co-exist as translation varies between individuals, even when they are part of the same category (sender or receiver). An extended conceptualisation of the translation process, based on these conclusions, is proposed in Figure 11.

![Figure 11. Schematic overview of the policy transfer and translation process and the role of power and politics](image)

(RQ 4) The role of power and politics
The fourth sub-question concerned the role of power and politics in policy transfer. In this dissertation political interests manifest in two aspects of the policy transfer, namely in the reason to transfer and during the transfer process itself. This became already apparent in the framework of Chapter 2. First of all, present-day politics may affect the receptivity to transferred knowledge or it may enhance transferability. Political urgency to act can trigger transfer when receivers are looking for an existing solution to apply to their situation. Without such interest, transfer may lead to opportunistic transfer, which risks being uninformed, inappropriate or just a formal adoption without actual implementation. Chapter 2 thus already concluded that “transferability increases when the policy matches the values (...) and political objectives of the receiving actors (...)” (see page 64).
Although the above has largely focussed on matching the transfer object with political objectives of the receiver, Chapter 3 shows that transfer itself can also be a political objective of the sender. In the case of the DDA, promoting Dutch expertise was an explicit objective of the International Water Ambition (Rijksoverheid, 2016a) in accordance with the policy shift from aid to aid-and-trade. Hence, the spreading of the DDA should serve the creation of business opportunities for the Dutch Water Sector in ‘upcoming markets’ and could be used to rejuvenate bilateral relations. In the case studies, we have seen that the DDA was used to strengthen the collaboration with Indonesia and Bangladesh on the theme of water, while it was used to give a new impetus to the bilateral relation with Vietnam. Respondents from embassies and Dutch ministries furthermore indicated how collaboration on the non-controversial topic of ‘water’ may boost the overall reputation of the Netherlands and thus facilitate collaboration or business on other topics as well. Policy transfer of the DDA is thus an instrument of foreign policy instrument (Stone, Porto de Oliveira & Pal, 2019) and diplomacy, used to achieve foreign policy objectives. This dissertation thereby confirms the linkages between policy branding and diplomacy (Szondi, 2008; Govers, 2011) and adds policy transfer as a diplomatic tool. The relation between policy branding and diplomacy has been further outlined in the article “Emotional policies: introducing branding as a tool for Science Diplomacy” by Alexander Raev and myself, see Raev and Minkman (2020).

In addition to the reason to transfer, politics are also present while the transfer actually takes place. We have seen in Chapter 4, 5 and 6 that a political vision to connect to is indispensible for creating a broad domestic support base and for a direction for translation. Adoption of foreign policy namely requires political commitment, both in terms of political leadership in endorsing the transfer as well as political commitment for organising the implementation. In Chapters 4 and 5 we have seen how NCICD became highly politicised when it was connected to the controversial plans of building 17 artificial islands out of the coast of Jakarta. Stopping these reclamations (and thus NCICD) even became a campaign promise of a candidate (and later winner) of the governmental elections in 2017. In Jakarta, the required support base was thus lacking, while in Vietnam and Bangladesh political visions existed or were created where the DDA could connect to. As such, actors engaged in the transfer had a political frame of reference and a dot on the horizon to work towards. Chapter 6 furthermore also showed how network management aided the Dutch actors to cope with domestic power structures at the receiving end. Although transfer agents, like the consultants in this study, may not have any formal power themselves, they operate in a broader context of power and politics where the translation is guided by recipient politics and adoption is facilitated when transferred knowledge is backed by powerful actors.
Next to political support of the receiver, intermediary or international actors may prove powerful partners too. In Chapter 6 the delta plans that resulted from the transfer were used to shape international donor agendas. In Vietnam, the international donor community even embraced the Mekong Delta Plan as framework for future development of the region before the Vietnamese government had done so. This brings in the notion of power. In the case of the DDA, there is an uneven relationship between the Dutch government and recipient government, reflecting the power asymmetries reported in policy transfer in development cooperation context (Stone, Porto de Oliveira & Pal, 2019). In Dutch there is a saying “wie betaalt, die bepaalt” which translates to ‘who pays gets to decide’. This applies to the DDA to some degree, as the Dutch government is creating demand for the DDA and is paying Dutch consultants to transfer the DDA to these countries. The transfer of the DDA is thus somewhat conditional, as the Dutch government is funding projects for which they created demand themselves. They thereby push receiving countries to move in a certain direction with their water management, hoping that this will result in business opportunities for the Dutch water sector. Branding is used to further enhance the attractiveness of this direction. In addition, within the transfer project, the Dutch consultants did not have the freedom to change the scope of the transfer from ‘building a dam to prevent flooding following land subsidence’ to ‘addressing the root cause of land subsidence’. Similarly, altering part of the scope of the Bangladesh Delta Plan was not self-evident. In Chapter 3 the question was already posed whose interests are served by transfer of the DDA, given the unconcealed economic agenda that is behind it (see also Chapter 5 where respondents raised the issue of doubts about the Dutch as ‘trusted advisor’ given the emphasis on Dutch economic benefits). In any case, soft power is exercised by the Dutch government with the transfer of the DDA.

A surplus or lack of power may also affect the transfer. In Vietnam and Bangladesh the central government was able to take decisions top-down as both countries are governed highly hierarchal. Vietnam is a socialist republic ruled by the Vietnamese communist party and both countries have a planned economy. This facilitated the adoption of the transferred ideas, as there was limited opposition possible once the plans were embraced by the central governments. The contrary was observed in the Indonesian democracy, where a broad domestic opposition emerged against the plans in Jakarta, where ministries can block decisions of other ministries and where the local government is quite powerful due to decentralization. The counterparts of the Dutch consultants lacked political power to create the required consensus within the national government and among these government levels.

Thus in short, the answer to the final sub-question shows that politics are present throughout the transfer of the DDA. Both senders and receivers may have political
reasons to engage in transfer and transfer may serve as a tool for diplomacy. For example, the transfer of the DDA is the result of a Dutch policy on international positioning of the Dutch water sector. Connecting the transferred policy to a political vision and powerful actors at the receiving end even enhances the adoptability of the transferred ideas.

7.3.2. Answer to the main research question
The main research question concentrated on explanations for the (in)effectiveness of attempts to transfer the ‘Dutch Delta Approach’ to South and Southeast Asia. Effective was hereby defined as senders who gain access to a suitable policy network, a translation of the policy that fits the receiving context and adoption by decision makers. The answer to the research sub-questions shows that the question of what explains effective transfer does not have a straightforward answer. The transfer process is multi-faceted and there are numerous factors to take into account. Consequently, explanations of why transfer is (in)effective are thus also multi-faceted. Nevertheless, there are some conclusions that can be drawn about the effectiveness of transfer.

The answers to the sub-questions have shown how certain actions affect the policy transfer process. What these have in common, is that they all point to the set-up of the transfer process as a design question. In all empirical chapters the importance of the exchange process became apparent. For example, process design emerged as one of four major categories of influencing factors in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 showed how the DDA was mobilized through a deliberate branding process and the case chapters showed the effect of certain actions. Translation is thus the result of making connections. This links to the conclusion that policy transfer should be politically sensitive and concern a salient issue. The case studies showed how the choice for a particular policy issue could make (agro-business in Vietnam and sustainable development in Bangladesh) or break (urban development in Jakarta) acceptance of the translated ideas. This entails that effectiveness is facilitated by connecting the transferred ideas to a salient policy issue and that powerful political actors rally behind the proposed translation of the policy ideas. However, the policy making network consists of more actors than politicians. A diverse set of stakeholders is needed to formulate policies, even in countries where policy making is dominated by hierarchical governance modes. What kind of network is needed is highly context specific. Actors engaged in transfer need to have an understanding of existing policies, the political arena and current policy making practice in order to engage all relevant actors in the policy transfer network, determine rules of the process and identify the need to establish special organizational arrangements to facilitate transfer. The nature of the transfer object hereby also influences what kind of policy network is needed. For a ‘hard’ transfer of a specific program or instrument a different policy network
is needed than for a ‘soft’ transfer of ideas or norms. This does not mean though that the policy transfer process can be completely steered. What this conclusion does mean is that the course of events can be influenced to a certain degree.

Ultimately, adequate translation plays a crucial role in achieving this effectiveness. Impasses may occur as temporary stagnations when the available translation is inadequately tailored to local institutions, politics and policy problems. Temporary, because they may be resolved when the translation is iterated and becomes adequate or when the transferred ideas are definitely rejected. I therefore conclude that next to being informed, appropriate and complete (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; Stone, 2016), policy transfer should result in adequate translation to be effective. In order to achieve adequate translation, two conditions should be met. First, the sender needs to understand the receiving context, including decision-making practice, political arenas and alternative policies. At the same time, the receiving actors should understand the rationale behind the transfer object along with the context in which this policy was created. Second, there should be room for multiple iterations. The translation may be adequate the first time (as was more or less the case in Bangladesh in this dissertation) or multiple iterations may be needed (as was the case in Jakarta and Vietnam). When, like the case of the DDA, the policy transfer process is confined in a project, with a strict scope, budget and timeline, there will be limited space for such iterations. Transfer agents may then lack the freedom to change the scope, connect to a different policy project or extend the collaboration. In such cases, the transfer will be rushed and not enough time is taken for translation (Johnston, 2005). Governments could create this room for translation, by adopting a flexible process design and avoiding narrow mandates for transfer agents that prevent reacting to new insights or changing circumstances. The above does not mean that any transfer will be effective as long as there is translation. Transferred ideas may be rejected in the end, for example when windows of opportunity close (e.g. following elections) or when alternative policies emerge that are more suitable. Nevertheless, within the sphere of influence of transfer agents, the notion of (in)adequate translation, whereby mutual understanding of actors results in a locally relevant translation, is central to explanations for the (in)effectiveness of transfer.

Summarizing, this dissertation concludes that there is no single factor that explains effective policy transfer. Rather, effective transfer is the result of a combination of factors. A certain factor may be rather insignificant in one case but play a decisive role in another case. Nevertheless, this dissertation showed the importance of building bridged, i.e. making connections for effective transfer, in particular connection to the right policy network at the receiving end, connecting the transfer object to local policy issues and connecting to actors with political power.
7.4. Discussion

Based on the conclusions, implications for practice are given, followed by a reflection on the contribution to literature and used methods. Next, a discussion of the research limitations is presented, as well as a reflection on doing research article-based.

7.4.1. Implications for practice

Besides theoretical insights, the conclusions of this dissertation on the policy transfer in case of the Dutch Delta Approach may also provide lessons for practice. These lessons are based on the DDA but might be relevant for broader international cooperation and development cooperation in particular (as is further discussed in Section 7.4.3).

As outlined in the introduction, the Netherlands International Water Ambition (NIWA) will use lessons from the International Water Ambition 2016-2021 (IWA) for future implementations in practice. The NIWA focusses on five key topics, two of which are particularly relevant in light of the transfer of the Dutch Delta Approach under the flag of the IWA. Both “institutionalisation of a prevention-based approach to water crises” and social inclusiveness by aspiring “an equal role for women and deprived groups in water management” (Rijksoverheid, 2019) were central themes in the conclusions of this dissertation.

Critical promotion of policy ideas

The first lesson for practice presented here relates to the uncritical promotion of the Dutch Delta Approach. Although all respondents in this dissertation acknowledge the potential of the DDA to improve water governance and related policy fields in other countries, there are concerns over the long-term results of the current approach. In Chapter 3 we have seen that the transfer of the DDA was boosted by a branding campaign. This sorted effect on the short term, as numerous projects were initiated. However, branded transfer risks challenges on the longer run. Although the initial reception of branded policies may be positive and fast, mismatches between the branded ideas and the receiving context manifest only during adoption or implementation of the ideas (see also Chapter 3).

It was already noted that there is a risk for transferring inappropriate ideas, especially for policy transfer resulting from a ‘policy push’ (e.g. coercive transfers, see Evans & Barakat, 2012) or in transfer from developed to developing countries (Stone, 2012). This dissertation has added that policies that are artificially put in the spotlight also risk inappropriate transfer and creates unrealistic expectations about what this policy will offer. In order to judge the merits of a policy idea, receiving countries should have sufficient knowledge and capacity to do such an evaluation from the start. A practical recommendation would thus be to move...
away from a policy push and work more demand driven. This could for example be achieved through open conversations with potential receivers of a policy model, in which the limitations and potential pitfalls of this policy are openly discussed.

**Be aware of the adverse effects of trade interests**

The second lesson concerns the friction between aid and trade interests. The promotion of the DDA was prompted by the dual ambitions of the International Water Ambition of combining aid and trade. The potential friction identified by the Dutch government itself (see e.g. Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, 2013), became apparent in the cases studied here. Although those involved firmly deny that the economic agenda is prevailing over the interests of the receiver, Chapter 5 showed that solely the suggestion that this is the case may undermine the role of the Dutch water sector as ‘trusted advisor’. As a result, acceptance of transferred Dutch water ideas may be less. These adverse effects of trade interests observed in this study may exist in other policy transfer too, especially in a context of international cooperation.

**Take into account the political nature of policy transfer**

The third lesson concerns the political nature of policy transfer. The Dutch approach to delta management is presented as a-political. However, the motivation of the Dutch government to transfer the DDA are political and in general politics are entangled with the transfer process. Political aspects can be facilitating or constraining. Examples of both have been described throughout the case study Chapters 4 to 6 in this dissertation. For example, support from powerful political actors for the transfer of a particular policy can be facilitating, while a lack of political interest or connecting the transferred ideas to a controversial topic may be constraining. As such, the key message of this dissertation is to acknowledge the political nature of policy transfer processes in order to anticipate changing circumstances, such as hidden agendas, responses of stakeholders or a negative reception of the transfer object. When transfer is approached as purely rational, those managing these processes may be surprised by politicization of the process.

**Multidisciplinary transfer teams with flexible mandates**

The fourth lesson concerns the transfer agents ‘on the ground’. The decision to transfer policy ideas often results from government-to-government agreements, but bureaucrats and private consultants do the actual exchange of knowledge. In case of the Dutch Delta Approach, Dutch public-private consortia work on projects in other countries. These consortia are not only sharing their knowledge about delta management from the Netherlands to another country, but they are also responsible for the translation of these ideas and ultimately have to formulate policy proposals for this country. This means that they are in fact the ‘transfer agents on the ground’, whose expertise on the content (delta management) has
to be ‘socially robust’ (Dunlop & Radaelli, 2018). These transfer agents need to facilitate a policy formulation process, in which they should pair their knowledge with social, political and economic preferences in the receiving context. This study has shown that policy transfer is entangled with politics, from the reason to initiate transfer (e.g. ambition of the IWA, bilateral relationships) to the acceptance of delta planning ideas (e.g. politicisation of the Great Garuda in Jakarta). As Chapters 5 and 6 also showed, a political vision to connect the ideas to is essential for proper translation of foreign policy ideas and network management strategies are vital in identifying a suitable policy issue to connect the ideas to. At the moment, it is questionable whether consortia are always up to this job. First of all, because most involved individuals are technical experts and as such management or social expertise is limited in most consortia. Second, these projects are confined in strict terms of reference. Hence, they often lack the mandate to anticipate on new insights gained during translation.

Overall, practitioners need to be aware of the multi-faceted and dynamic nature of policy transfer, thereby designing transfer projects in such a way that transfer agents can act socially robust and flexible. As such, a practical recommendation is to create multidisciplinary consortia in which both technical and social expertise is combined. However, simply equipping consortia with social experts will not be sufficient, as narrow mandates also affect the policy transfer process. Present projects have strictly determined what the project should deliver, preventing the consortia on the ground from responding to issues they encounter along the way and from changing the scope if that would result in a more adequate translation. A potential solution is to organise these projects goal-seeking rather than goal-oriented, whereby time is reserved to explore the institutional context, political arena and potential policy issues to connect to.

### 7.4.2. Additions to the literature

This research is shaped as a research on policy transfer and translation and thus mainly contributes to this body of literature. The main addition to the literature consists of addressing the three theoretical gaps that were identified in the Introduction. The answer of this dissertation to these gaps were discussed in detail in Section 7.3.1 already. Here, I will share how these answers contribute to innovate conceptualisation of policy transfer (as was called for by amongst others Porto de Oliveira & Pal, 2018).

First of all, I have tried to contribute to advancing existing conceptualizations. Most notable additions are the holistic framework of Chapter 2 and the conceptualization of translation in this concluding chapter. Building on the premise that policy transfer does not equal linear transplantation (Stone, 2012; Fawcett & Marsh, 2013; Dolowitz, 2017), this research has broken down transfer...
into a broad set of factors that influence the process. These factors account for microlevel as well as macrolevel dynamics (Evans & Davies, 1999) and cover both rational and non-rational aspects of the policy transfer process. Similarly, I have proposed a new conceptualisation of the translation process, which reflects the multiplicity and iterative nature of translation. Although the iterative nature of policy transfer was already acknowledged (e.g. Walt, Lush & Ogden, 2004; Fawcett & Marsh, 2013), they had not found their way into conceptualisations of translation yet. Noémi Lendvai and Paul Stubbs (2007) described the translation process already as a series of modifications in between creation, dissemination and interpretation. The conceptualisation proposed in this dissertation builds on this notion of translation as a series of modifications and has explicated the diverse activities that enable this modification in these spaces that shape policy translation. As such, it allows for a more holistic view on policy transfer than the dominant focus on the travelling policy itself or the state actors that formally engage in transfer (Porto de Oliveira & Pal, 2018; Stone, Porto de Oliveira & Pal, 2019).

In furthering our understanding of policy transfer, scholars have already broadened their view beyond formal state actors that engage in policy transfer and pointed out how non-state actors may be senders, receivers or intermediaries of ideas (Stone, 2010; Benson & Jordan, 2011). In the transfer of the DDA, private consultants were travelling along with the policy that was being transferred, hired to translate the travelling policy to fit new destinations. This phenomenon of a limited set of private sector consultants who travel the world as a sort of ‘travelling circus’ (i.e. promoting and applying a certain planning approach worldwide) has been described by policy mobility scholars before, see e.g. Rapoport and Hult (2017). This research has however shown that boundaries between sender and receiver and between state and non-state are not fixed but fluid. Using a critical realist approach was crucial to coming to this conclusion, as it allowed me to view each individual as such by acknowledging that each individual has a unique perception of reality. This means the role of consultants is ambiguous to some degree: on the one hand they are clearly non-state actors, but at the same time they act as representatives of the state-actors that formally lead the transfer. Next to private-sector consultants disseminating ideas themselves, acting as lobbyists or implementing transferred ideas (Porto de Oliveira & Pal, 2018), this research adds that they may act as translators as well.

The empirical cases focussed on transfer agents on the ground has illustrated the decisive role that individuals can play in initiating transfer or steering the transfer process. Individuals may act as policy entrepreneurs or political champions (as was noted before by e.g. Attard & Enoch, 2011; Appel & Orenstein, 2012; Ball, 2016) and this research has demonstrated how not having such entrepreneurs
or champions complicates policy transfer (see also Chapter 5 and Chapter 6). These chapters also showed how individual transfer agents may activate certain actors by engaging them into the policy formulation network (Chapter 6), thereby boosting the potential effectiveness of the transfer. The focus of this dissertation on transfer agents has thus confirmed that transfer agents should be studied on individual level (Porto de Oliveira & Pal, 2018) rather than at group level.

7.4.3. **Methodological reflection**

This dissertation is methodologically innovative for policy transfer studies. I responded to calls for different perspectives (Peck, 2011; Dolowitz, 2017) and longitudinal studies (e.g. Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; Björkdahl et al., 2015) in policy transfer. For this dissertation I have predominantly opted for a longitudinal, qualitative case study approach, rooted in the critical realist tradition. As I explicated in Section 1.4, this was a deliberate choice given the ambition to explain the effectiveness of transfer. Nevertheless, the choice for the focus on a single transfer object (the DDA) and a small set of qualitative case studies has prevented me from testing causal relations that are broadly applicable (see also the next paragraphs on generalizability and the future research agenda in 7.5).

In addition, I used two research methods still rather unconventional in the policy transfer domain. Chapter 2 introduced the PRISMA method for a systematic literature review of empirical studies, a method that was suitable to systematically map the state-of-the-art insights about policy transfer, but not used before in policy transfer studies. In Chapter 5 I used Q methodology, a method only used before once, namely by Lynch, Adler and Howard (2014) on policy diffusion of arid basin management. Q methodology is suitable to identify which different perspectives exist in a certain population and can thus be used to gain insight in how transfer agents perceive the translation process. Both Q methodology and PRISMA have not been used for policy transfer studies before, but were helpful in gathering the different perspectives on the policy transfer process in existing studies (PRISMA) and among transfer agents (Q methodology). This allowed me to present a more balanced account of the translation process from different levels of analysis.

7.4.4. **Limitations of the research**

In this section I will discuss the limitations of the research and the consequences of these limitations for the findings and conclusions. These concern the focus of the dissertation along with conceptual and methodological choices.

**Focus on transfer agents**

A first limitation of this dissertation is the focus on transfer agents. Although these are the actors that are sharing knowledge on a day-to-day basis and can thus
be considered the ‘inner circle’, there is a considerable ‘outer circle’ of people that are somehow involved in the transfer, e.g. high-level policy advisors, ministers or heads of governments. As such, the study has provided a detailed account the microlevel dynamics of policy transfer but macrolevel dynamics preceding and during the transfer are only taken into account indirectly.

A second limitation resulting from the focus on transfer agents is the implicit study of politics and power. I have taken notice of their relevance and touched upon power and politics during the research, but they were always implicitly incorporated in the research questions of Chapters 2 to 6. This raises questions to what extent I was able to fully reveal their role. For example, the importance of bilateral relations emerged in all three case studies but their impact on the transfer could have been a study on its own. More explicit inclusion of power and politics in studying policy transfer could thus have established more convincingly how deeply rooted politics and power are in transfer.

Thirdly, policy transfer networks often consist of elite decision-makers (Evans & Barakat, 2012) and this dissertation has also concentrated on such elites. As a result, bottom-up initiatives concerning the policy issue addressed central in the transfer process were omitted from the analysis. Taken into account bottom-up policy ideas next to the top-down transferred ideas could have enriched our understanding of existing alternatives to the transferred ideas and the dynamics leading to the preference of the one over the other.

**Soft transfer object**

This dissertation has mainly focussed on a soft transfer object, which has a particular need for an adequate translation process. Chapter 6 concluded that the soft nature of the transfer object facilitated joint image building, while at the same time suggesting that soft transfers depend more on interactions between agents and translation than hard transfers (see Section 6.6). It might therefore be that active management of the policy transfer network is particularly needed soft transfers, while other factors are decisive when other types of policy are transferred.

**Context**

I have noted that the effectiveness of policy transfer is affected by context, although this has only been implicitly addressed in the dissertation. This was a deliberate choice, as this topic could have bene a dissertation on its own. Although I have not explicitly evaluated how context influences policy transfer, at times the the results pointed to the influence of certain institutional settings, governance modes and cultural differences. For example, Chapter 6 concluded that hierarchical governance facilitated decision making following policy transfer
of the DDA, while Chapter 4 pointed to the challenges that occurred in transferring the DDA to Jakarta following different perceptions on flood risk in the Dutch and Indonesian culture. Yet, the question remains through which mechanisms these and other contextual factors affect the translation and the reception of the DDA.

Generalisability to the broader literature
The empirical research of this dissertation has focussed on a particular instance of policy transfer to a specific geographic region. Chapter 3 furthermore established that there is a difference between transfer of the DDA to developing and developed countries, namely a principle-agent relationship in the first and a co-worker relationship in the second. This means that the conclusions should be interpreted in this context of the Dutch Delta Approach in the three studied countries. At the same time, these three cases do not stand alone. On the contrary, several similar transfers have been executed in the past or are still ongoing. These examples include but are not limited to, formulating urban masterplans for Beira in Mozambique and Manila in the Philippines (Brackel, 2019; Shannon, 2019) and other projects under the flag of the International Water Ambition (e.g. in Mexico, see Leal Lara, 2020). Research results of these cases show parallels with the findings of this study. In addition, the individual transfer agents studied in this dissertation sometimes resemble a traveling circus, as they circulate between projects internationally. To give a few examples, people involved in the Beira Masterplan later engaged in NCICD in Jakarta, a key figure involved in NCICD became team leader in Manila and a driving force behind the Mekong Delta Plan is now involved in the implementation of the Bangladesh Delta Plan. Similarly, thematic water experts circulate between embassies in the delta focus countries. Hence, it is justified to assume that the conclusions and recommendations for practice from this dissertation bear insights relevant for other transfers under the flag of the International Water Ambition, as these policy transfers are based on the same principles, executed under the same flag and involve the same people.

This dissertation and above cases concern the global south. Although not identical, the transfer of the DDA to South and Southeast Asian countries shares some key characteristics with development cooperation. The asymmetric power relations, narrow mandates and lack of recipient ownership encountered in this research resonate with issues in the field of development aid (see e.g. Ostrom & Gibson, 2001). As such, some lessons of this dissertation may be of value for this field. These include for example the conclusion that policy branding risks inappropriate transfer or how network management can support translation by connecting ideas to relevant policy issues and powerful actors.

This does raise the valid question to what extent the empirical results of this dissertation can be generalised to policy transfer in the global north. Given the
more balanced partnership that exists in transfers between countries in the
global north (as was shown in Chapter 3), some conclusions are less applicable.
For example the conclusions related to the aid-and-trade agenda are hardly
applicable for transfer in the global north. Nevertheless, the need to translate
transferred policies is universal. One should not forget that the Policy Transfer
Routes framework was largely based on transfer between western countries and
still proved to be useful in studying the transfer of the DDA from the Netherlands
to Asian countries. As such, conclusions related to the translation process are
likely to be universal too. This includes conclusions regarding the limitations of
branding and the notion of translation as a multi-faceted process whereby the
transfer object needs to be connected to policy issues, actors and politics.

Thus, the findings of this study can be generalized to similar transfer attempts
in the global south to large extent and conclusions related to the mechanisms
of transfer and translation are believed to be universal. Furthermore, some of
the lessons learnt from this study may be relevant for general development
cooperation.

7.4.5. An article-based dissertation
Nowadays, doctoral degrees in the Netherlands are more often based on a set of
peer-review journal articles than on monographs. Both text types have their own
merits and disadvantages; and mentioning all those goes beyond the scope of this
chapter. Still it seems fair to at least mention the consequences of my choice for
an article-based dissertation here. Most importantly, an article-based thesis allows
for a more even spreading of writing over the four years. I had the comfortable
position of having three articles-to-be-chapters accepted at the start of the fourth
and final year. This meant that more than half of the core chapters (namely 2, 3
and 4) were finished by that time and thus allowed me to focus on ‘wrapping up’
rather than ‘writing up’ in the final year.

At the same time, I see two clear limitations of me doing this research article based.
First, using peer-reviewed articles as chapters meant that later insights could not
be included in the initial chapters. Somewhere halfway the empirical research I had
the insight that policy translation was a more appropriate core concept (rather than
policy transfer). Some of the puzzles I encountered when collecting the empirical
material could not be addressed fully with the transfer concept. Around the same
time translation moved to the forefront when some key scholars in policy transfer
studies embraced translation (e.g. Stone, 2016) and panels on policy translation
emerged at conferences such as the International Conference of Public Policy
(which I attended in 2017 and 2019) and the conference on Policy Diffusion and
Development Cooperation (which I attended in 2018). I have included this insight
in the introductory chapter and where possible in the articles. However, two

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papers were already ‘out there’ and as a result especially Chapter 4 more or less neglects translation. This alteration of transfer and translation may add ambiguity to the dissertation and requires readers to read ‘between the lines’. Second, the articles-as-chapters approach comes with repetition and divergence. Each article (and thus chapter) has an introduction that is at best a variation of the others. At the same time, articles require a conceptual angle that distinguishes themselves from other publications that are part of the same research process. While the latter has its merits too – I learned a great deal from connecting policy transfer to other concepts such as branding, diplomacy and networks – this repetition and divergence among chapters reduces reading flow in this book. I have tried to minimize these adverse effects by adding intermezzos that link the chapters and grant readers access to my thinking process and progression of insights.

Perhaps even more ironically, I now see parallels between the transfer of the Dutch Delta Approach and an article-based doctoral research. By pre-defining the deliverables (respectively a delta plan or a number of articles), both become projects with the corresponding focus on deliverables and deadlines typical to project management. As a result, the ultimate goals that lie behind these deliverables risks fading into the background.

In hindsight, I still support my choice for an article-based dissertation: publishing is a valuable skill for 21st century researchers and therefore part of academic training. Despite the limitations outlined above, the articles-as-chapters approach streamlined the process and forced me to keep progressing. I am also sure that writing a monograph would not have stimulated me as much to expand my conceptual horizon the way I did now.

7.5. Future research agenda on policy transfer
In this near-final section I will present a research agenda, consisting of four suggestions for future research. The first is a suggestion to extend the scope of the current study, while the others are suggestions for policy transfer research building on the conclusions of this research.

Causal explanations for effective transfer
This dissertation has shown that policy transfer is a multi-faceted process whereby numerous factors play a role. Which factors play a key role varies from case to case. In this research, I have treated each factor identified in Chapter 2 as equally important. However, as Chapters 4 to 6 have shown, some factors played a decisive role in multiple cases whereas others were of limited influence. Future research may explore which causal patterns exist in explaining effective transfer.
For this purpose, a medium-N study would be most effective. This study established that policy transfer research is dominated by qualitative case studies and creating a consistent dataset large enough for traditional quantitative statistical analysis seems practically impossible given the countless variables. Such a medium-N analysis may use a set of transfers in the same policy field or geographical region. Yet, it could also concern multiple transfer attempts of a specific policy. In fact, some policies are never mobilized, while others travel the world. Focussing on such a set of transfers would imply fixing the transfer object and part of the actors involved, thereby minimizing the degrees of freedom in the equation. I therefore propose to conduct a medium-N study on causal patterns explaining effectiveness, using the widespread attempts to transfer the Dutch Delta Approach (DDA). A suitable method for such an analysis could be Quantitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), which has previously been used successfully to study complex relations in a meta-analysis on the measurement of policy diffusion mechanisms (Maggetti and Gilardi, 2016). Such a QCA study may thus result in a causal explanations of the position of certain factors in explaining effective policy transfer.

**Boundary spanning**

Boundary spanning is a key research theme within public administration (see e.g. Meerkerk and Edelenbos, 2018). This dissertation has focussed on transfer agents and concluded that policy transfer is all about making connections to content, actors and sentiments. As such, these conclusions point towards transfer agents as boundary spanners. The transfer agents that were central in this dissertation operate between two different settings and as such have to bridge the boundaries between their own and other organisations. Studies that explicitly link boundary spanners to the policy transfer discourse are performed in other scientific fields (e.g. education studies, see Ball, 2016; Adhikary & Lingard, 2018). While the notion of policy entrepreneurs has been embraced (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; Petridou & Olausson, 2017), insights from studies on boundary spanners have not found their way into policy transfer research. Given the results of this dissertation, future studies may benefit from exploring the applicability of theories on boundary spanners for understanding the process of policy transfer.

**Beyond elite policy making**

A focus on elite decision makers is a limitation of this research. In recent years, scholars have increased attention to the integration of bottom-up and top-down policy making for complex topics such as water governance or climate change (Homsy, Liu & Warner, 2019). Similarly, practitioners and social scientist are concerned with social inclusiveness of policies (Rijksoverheid, 2019). However, despite a recognition of participatory approaches, inclusion of all social groups can be challenging in practice. Which groups are marginalized and how participation is organized differs between countries. This poses a challenge for
policy transfer, as senders and intermediary actors may have limited sight and influence on participatory processes in receiving countries. This is particularly disturbing when foreign models of participation put those who speak up at risk in their own country (e.g. activists were endangered when they participated in Dutch co-creation sessions in Manila, see Nauta, 2018). Similarly, ideas might be used for ‘greenwashing’, justify policies that disadvantage certain groups. An example in this dissertation is the use of the NCICD-project by the Indonesian government to justify urban development and land reclamation in Jakarta Bay, thereby disadvantaging poor fishing communities who have limited access to policy makers. Future research may concentrate on to what degree social inclusiveness is taken into account and which role non-elite groups can play in such processes.

**Interaction between horizontal and vertical governance modes**

Literature on governance hybrids already established that whether vertical or horizontal steering dominates in governance modes varies with country and policy field (Meuleman, 2010; Yoo & Kim, 2012). Chapter 6 of this dissertation concluded that horizontal governance through network management facilitated translation, while actual adoption seemed to be the result of hierarchical modes. This raises questions about the influence of governance modes on the transfer process. For example, which differences exist between the transfer process from a hierarchically governed country to an equally hierarchical country and to a country where horizontal steering dominates? And does transfer between countries with highly different governance modes complicate the transfer process or does it boost the transferred policy? Future research may examine which governance modes facilitate translation, adoption and implementation of transferred ideas and how the optimal hybrid varies between different senders, receivers and transfer object.

### 7.6. Closing remarks

New policies and programmes like NIWA (follow-up of IWA), WaterWorx (improving water supply) and the Blue Deal (improving water governance) illustrate the ambition of the Dutch government to continue the transfer of Dutch water expertise for at least another decade. This dissertation has provided valuable lessons on spreading the Dutch Delta Approach. The results have shown that adequate translation is essential if the Dutch government truly wishes to improve delta management and water governance worldwide. More importantly, it revealed the importance of connections to actors, politics and policy issues for achieving effective policy transfer. In order to contribute to sustainable delta management abroad, the Dutch government should take into account the lessons learned from the past decade.


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WGC. (2013). *De Nederlandse Delta-aanpak* [The Dutch Delta Approach].


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Appendix E. Literature review of empirical studies on the cases
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Altogether now... understanding the role of international organizations in ICCM policy transfer. *Health Policy and Planning*, 30 Suppl 2, ii26–ii35. http://doi.org/10.1093/heapol/czv071


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Park, S., & Berry, F. (2013). Successful Diffusion of a Failed Policy: The case of


Appendices


Appendix B. List of documents and interviews to define DDA

Table B1. Overview of respondents and their organisation, categorized by the corners of the ‘golden triangle’ (government, knowledge, and business). The numbers are used in the main text to refer to respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government respondents</th>
<th>Research respondents</th>
<th>Private sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dutch embassy *</td>
<td>Delft University of Technology **</td>
<td>Deltares*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch embassy *</td>
<td>Delft University of Technology</td>
<td>Deltares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch embassy **</td>
<td>VP Delta</td>
<td>Sweco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water board</td>
<td>WUR/Delta Alliance**</td>
<td>Sweco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands Water Partnership **</td>
<td>Wageningen University &amp; Research</td>
<td>Royal HaskoningDHV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Enterprise Agency (RVO) **</td>
<td>University of Amsterdam</td>
<td>Royal HaskoningDHV *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-ministerial water cluster</td>
<td>National University of Singapore*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Delta Commissioner **</td>
<td>IHE Delft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* These respondents are Dutch, but live and work abroad.
** Respondents who were (also) interviewed in the second series.
WUR = Wageningen University & Research; VP Delta = Valorisation Programme Delta Technology & Water

Table B2. Overview of the documents analysed in this study. English titles are translations, except underlined documents, which are to some extent available in English. Only main documents were reviewed, leaving appendices and technical elaborations out of the scope. (presented on next page).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Document name (in English)</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Author</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Cabinet’s agenda 2015: on the realisation of the MDGs</td>
<td>Letter to Parliament</td>
<td>Ministry of Development Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Working with water together</td>
<td>Advisory report</td>
<td>Second Delta Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009; 2014; 2015</td>
<td>National Water Plan</td>
<td>1st plan; update 1st plan (2014); 2nd plan</td>
<td>Joint publication of several ministries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2017</td>
<td>Delta programme</td>
<td>Annually in September</td>
<td>Delta Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>To the Top: the commercial sector in action(s)</td>
<td>Report</td>
<td>Ministry of Economic Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>International Marketing Plan Water Sector</td>
<td>Preparatory investigation</td>
<td>Claassen and Ellenbroek (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Advice by Top Sector Water: Water deserves it</td>
<td>Advisory report</td>
<td>Top Sector Water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Delta Act</td>
<td>National law</td>
<td>Dutch Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Water for development</td>
<td>Letter to Parliament</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-2016</td>
<td>Annual reports of Netherlands Water Partnership</td>
<td>Annual report</td>
<td>Netherlands Water Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>The Dutch delta approach</td>
<td>Report</td>
<td>Water governance Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>What the world deserves</td>
<td>Letter to Parliament</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Building blocks for good water governance</td>
<td>Including update in 2016</td>
<td>Water Governance Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>The Delta Approach</td>
<td>Brochure</td>
<td>Netherlands Water Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Core values of the Delta Programme</td>
<td>Essay</td>
<td>Slob and Bloemen (2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>The Delta Programme and updated flood risk management policies in the Netherlands</td>
<td>Conference paper</td>
<td>Van Alphen (2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Dutch Delta Solutions: innovation agreement delta technology 2014-2015</td>
<td>Report</td>
<td>Topsector Water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Evaluation report Kennis voor Klimaat</td>
<td>Evaluation report</td>
<td>Kennis voor Klimaat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>International Water Ambition (IWA)</td>
<td>Policy brief</td>
<td>Ministry of Infrastructure &amp; the Environment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table C1. Operationalisation of the framework of factors that influence the process of policy transfer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Factor group</th>
<th>Brief description</th>
<th>Example question&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Policy arena</strong></td>
<td>Zeitgeist/timing/policy window</td>
<td>What is the effect on NCICD of the change in governor of DKI Jakarta?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Existence or absence of competition with peers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The political climate (i.e. who forms the government)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Subsystem</strong></td>
<td>Availability of alternative policies</td>
<td>What alternative strategies were available for NCICD in 2007?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The institutional and political context</td>
<td>What alternatives are there now?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>General context</strong></td>
<td>Bio-physical context</td>
<td>What are the main differences between the Dutch and Indonesian context?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cultural context</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Socio-economic conditions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Ability to convey</strong></td>
<td>Positive or negative image of source actor</td>
<td>What do you think of the Dutch consultants? Will the Indonesian government follow their advice?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Legitimacy to transfer of source actor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Height of compliance costs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Existing relations</strong></td>
<td>Occurrence or absence of existing relations between source, adopting and third party actors&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Why was the collaboration between the Netherlands and Indonesia initiated in 2007?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Tolerance</strong></td>
<td>Receptivity/openness of adopting actor</td>
<td>Why are the Dutch (and Korean and Japanese) consultants working on Jakarta’s flood problem instead of other consultants?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Decision-making power of adopting actor (e.g. taking into account dependency and degree of sovereignty)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Normative fit</strong></td>
<td>Degree of matching values and political objectives</td>
<td>What are the main objectives of NCICD?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Policy features</strong></td>
<td>Low context dependency</td>
<td>What do you think about the Dutch Delta Approach in relation to Indonesia?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reputation of effectiveness/success</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>1</sup> This is a non-exhaustive list of example questions. Respondents were asked to elaborate on answers to closed questions.

<sup>2</sup> Examples include membership of an international organisations; policy networks; colonial history; trade and cooperation relations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Factor group</th>
<th>Brief description</th>
<th>Example question¹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mutual adaptation</td>
<td>Understanding values/practices/beliefs of other actors</td>
<td>Which differences exist in working approach?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Adapting to values/practices/beliefs of other actors</td>
<td>How do you deal with these differences?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Management and networks</td>
<td>Clarity of (hierarchical) organisational structure</td>
<td>How is the exchange of knowledge organised?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Density of policy network</td>
<td>Informal relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transfer type</td>
<td>Adoption mechanism</td>
<td>Level of coercion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actors</td>
<td>Policy consensus (broad coalition of domestic or external support)</td>
<td>What do you think about the NCICD plans?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Support from executive officials</td>
<td>Key actors (policy entrepreneurs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Political leadership</td>
<td>Pre-requisites needed to be met</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Policies with fixed core, flexibility in implementation</td>
<td>Do you think NCICD can be implemented in Jakarta?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Simplified policy</td>
<td>Expertise to search and implement external policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Organisational capacity to evaluate policies</td>
<td>Path dependency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>Ensuring support from decision makers</td>
<td>Time</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ This is a non-exhaustive list of example questions. Respondents were asked to elaborate on answers to closed questions.
Pages 236 - 247 are under embargo
Acknowledgements

One of the most common replies when you tell someone you are doing a PhD is: “what is it exactly that you do?”. To end up with this dissertation, I needed to combine many different activities: reading literature, making research plans, collecting data, analysing data, discussing findings at conferences and with fellow researchers and endless re-writing of texts. However, although this book has been written in first person, I could not have done this alone. In this section, I would like to thank a number of people who played an important role in establishing this research. The first person I should thank is Michael Witter. Michael, you planted the seed for this endeavour by posing the question why on earth there were only engineers and no social scientists involved in transferring water management from the Netherlands to Vietnam and for encouraging me to apply for this position.

Secondly, I would not have been here if my supervisors Arwin van Buuren and Victor Bekkers had not dared to work on this project with an engineer who knew nothing about public administration. Arwin en Victor, your tips and advice have guided me in the past four years and you succeeded in transforming me into a public administration scholar. I cannot stress how much I appreciate the freedom you gave me to follow my own path though. You even gave me the opportunity to join the National Water Traineeship. I feel grateful that you trusted me in being able to combine the two. I had the pleasure of getting this trust also from the program management of Natuurlijk Talent. Thank you for having me as the first PhD researcher who worked as trainee. NWT15, thank you for the great time we had during those two years.

The reason I enjoyed my time at Erasmus University Rotterdam is mostly due to my colleagues. Especially the after-lunch walking crew and all ladies (and Robbert and Vincent) who were ‘living’ in our office T17-53 helped me stay sane and enjoy the hard work. A special thanks to Ewoud, Jules, Hans, Iris and especially Babs and Reinout for organising PhD Days, Peer Review Platform sessions and a PhD trip together and therewith providing the functional distraction I needed from time to time. Despite all welcome distraction, the reason that I am writing this section is of course not the research that was done. Rianne, thank you for both offering distraction and for delving into my cases. It was very valuable to have a sparring partner with knowledge on the cases and this makes you a logical choice as one of my paranymph.
Collecting data on three cases in far-away countries would not have been possible without Deltares. I am therefore glad that Frans Klijn, who also happens to be a colleague at TU Delft now, has agreed to join the doctoral committee. Gerald Jan Ellen, thank you for helping us shape the research and your endless enthusiasm about it. I would not have been able to access all the respondents in these case studies without the support of Peter Letitre (Deltares), William Oliemans (Deltares), Jaap de Heer (TwynstraGudde) and Nguyen Ngoc Quan (WACC) who all mobilised their network for interviews. Peter and Jaap, I really enjoyed working with you in Jakarta and Dhaka. You have been very welcoming to me and I am glad we could solidify our discussions by co-authoring a paper. Other people who contributed to this research are the interns Alex López Alberola, Nathan Kars and Lucy van Eck. Thank you for your hard work! Alex, thank you in particular for delivering such great work on the Mekong Delta Plan even though I left you alone to collect data myself in Jakarta.

This research would also not have been possible without the Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies (IHS). I have benefitted a lot from discussions with staff and students. Jurrian, thank you for acting as link to IHS, giving me the opportunity to present my work and for taking part in the doctoral committee. A special thanks to Yulia, you gave me the feeling that I was meeting an old friend even though we met for the first time in Jakarta. The same goes for Rachel von Gerhardt, Luu Tang and Dung Duc Tran, thanks to you I felt at home in Ho Chi Minh City and at WACC. Quan, Tang and Dung, I really enjoyed doing interviews together and we all know I would not have been able to do them on my own.

During the research period, I benefitted a lot from discussion with fellow researchers. From the start I was able to mirror my findings with the NWO Urbansing Deltas of the World project of amongst others IHE Delft, TU Delft and WUR. I enjoyed sharing views and ideas with all project members and in particular Shahnoor Hasan and Vo Thi Minh Hoang. Shahnoor, my time in Dhaka became most enjoyable thanks to your tips and suggestions.

Besides the people of UDW, I am happy that Martijn van Staveren and Arjen Zegwaard shared their lessons learned on writing a dissertation on delta management from a social science perspective. There were others whose ideas, remarks and suggestions have helped me during the research. A special thank you goes to Joanne Vinke-de Kruijf, Diane Stone and David Dolowitz, who helped me explore the topic of policy learning and took plenty of time to read my work and advise me on how to proceed the research. Farhad Mukhtarov, I am glad we met during this research and that you, Shahnoor and I were able to discuss policy transfer and the Dutch Delta Approach every now and then. I am therefore glad that both you and Margreet Zwarteveen were willing to join the doctoral
committee. Martin de Jong also provided me with some valuable feedback, which has definitely raised the quality of the final manuscript. The same goes for Jeroen and Simon who were so kind to hunt for spelling mistakes (and the ones left are certainly my responsibility).

This research would not have been possible without the 100+ respondents who freed time to talk to me, some of which even two or three times. At some point I held an interview with someone and directly after me a master student walked in for an interview on the same topic. Thank you all for your patience and willingness to talk to the so-many\textsuperscript{th} social scientist about your work, motivation and thoughts on the international spreading of the Dutch Delta Approach!

Finally, I would not have been here without the encouragement of my family and friends. Several of you shared newspaper articles, links and other documents that reminded you of my research. I am glad that you supported me and my work that way. As long as I can remember several family members have imprinted me that I should not drop out of school and pushed me to finish a degree after secondary school. I think I have overdone it a bit and guess we can agree that I have collected enough degrees now. Papa, mama, Maarten en Evelien, thank you for your interest in what I was doing and your continuous support to go for it. Jeroen, thank you so much for being as supportive as you have been. You endured my complaints during the hard times and did not complain yourself when I announced that I was going to Asia for two months. Your support has helped me to reach the finish line and I am glad you will accompany me literally too as one of my paranymphs.
About the author

In 2010 Ellen obtained a Bachelor of Science degree in Civil Engineering at Delft University of Technology. After completing masters in Water Management and Science Communication in 2015 (also from TU Delft), Ellen briefly worked for VP Delta to set up a citizen monitoring network for the Red River in Hanoi, Vietnam.

From 2016 to 2020, she worked at Erasmus University Rotterdam on her PhD research, focussing on policy transfer of delta management practices from the Netherlands to Asian countries. By the time of completing this manuscript, three chapters of this dissertation and two related articles have been published in international peer-reviewed journals (see next page for an overview). This research was furthermore presented at several international scientific conferences, in workshops co-organised with Deltares, a discussion night organised by Jonge Democraten regio Haaglanden and a lunch lecture at the Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies (IHS).

In the past years, Ellen has also attended a summer school of the the International Public Policy Association and completed 30 ECTS of courses at the Erasmus Graduate School of Social Sciences and the Humanities, the Wageningen School of Social Sciences and the Netherlands Institute of Governance. She has taught practical courses on presenting, project management and qualitative data analysis as well as courses on the principles of public administration, on qualitative research methods and on network governance. In addition, she has given guest lectures at TU Delft and IHE Delft, supervised interns and was a member of the graduation committee of two master students. Ellen was a member of the organising committees of the annual PhD Day at the Department of Public Administration and Sociology in 2017 and 2018 and the PhD trip to the Eastern Scheldt Storm Surge Barrier and Vlissingen in 2018. During her PhD trajectory, Ellen furthermore contributed to a research project on citizen participation in the energy transition and worked part-time as water trainee at the National Water Traineeship for two years.

Since August 2020, Ellen works as researcher and lecturer at the Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management of Delft University of Technology.


This dissertation focusses on policy transfer, whereby public actors use ideas from elsewhere to formulate policies. Although such ideas may be suitable, transfer could also be uninformed, inappropriate or incomplete, causing the transfer to be ineffective. To date, holistic explanations of effective or ineffective policy transfer are lacking.

This study composes an evidence-based framework from existing research to comprehensively capture the policy transfer process. To establish explanations for (in)effective policy transfer, attempts to transfer adaptive delta management from the Netherlands to South and Southeast Asia are investigated through three longitudinal case studies. This study shows that the Dutch government is actively promoting this ‘Dutch Delta Approach’ abroad.

In conclusion, there is no single factor that explains effective policy transfer as this is the result of a combination of factors. Nevertheless, the dissertation highlights the importance of connections to actors, politics and policy issues for achieving effective policy transfer. The results show that adequate translation is essential if the Dutch government wishes to contribute to improving delta management worldwide with the Dutch Delta Approach. As a result, it proposes a conceptualization of policy translation that takes into account the multiple translations that take place throughout the transfer process. Future studies may build on these results by setting up medium-N studies to establish causal explanations for effective policy transfer as well as by exploring the role of non-elite actors and the impact of different governance modes on policy transfer.