

### *Propositions*

1. Evidence-based policy practices should seek a proper balance between pragmatic and epistemic values of appealing to scientific evidence.
2. A good guiding principle for resolving normative questions in evidence based policy is to transparently distinguish between the questions pertaining to the proper sources of value judgments and the questions pertaining to the proper role of value judgments that inform policy-relevant empirical research.
3. The “value free ideal of science” provides us with one prominent way to respond to the authority and the legitimacy problems of values in science.
4. Rejecting the “value free ideal of science” is not equivalent to rejecting the epistemic authority of science.
5. The “inductive risk framework” successfully describes how regulatory scientists such as toxicologists properly make value-laden scientific judgments in the face of epistemic uncertainty.
6. Empirical and historical studies of scientific practice can suitably complement the inductive risk framework and are indispensable for describing the sources and the content of scientists’ value judgments.
7. A pluralist view of science (i.e. the inquiry practiced by different groups of researchers pursuing distinct research questions and (non-)epistemic projects) is well-suited to evaluate the evidence based policy’s fit-for-purpose and pragmatic value.
8. An argument regarding the authoritativeness of a given value judgment does not necessarily imply an argument regarding the function of that value judgment, and vice versa.
9. Contemporary approaches to values in science (especially the analytical feminist approaches) suitably advance how evidence based policies can be made more accountable and progressive.
10. A judgment-formation procedure would better promote “experiments in living” through interactionist, pluralist, and non-intransigent practices.
11. Less is more.