Abstract
We reconsider the allocational invariance of equilibria to different formulations of market completeness. We identify the so-far neglected assumption of sophisticated behavior as being crucial. First, the Arrow–Debreu setting is considered, where markets do not reopen in the future. Second, sequentially complete markets are analyzed, where goods on the spot markets and all contingent one-period ahead commodities can be traded in every state. Finally, complete markets are analyzed, where all possible contingent commodities can be traded at every state. Preferences may be time-consistent or time-inconsistent. A distinction is made between naïve and sophisticated behavior.
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The author would like to thank the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) for financial support.
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Herings, P.JJ., Rohde, K.I.M. On the completeness of complete markets. Econ Theory 37, 171–201 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0291-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0291-y