Food for Thought
Hieronymus Wolf Grapples with the Scholarly Habitus

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How should scholars lead their lives? In the sixteenth century, this was far from clear. Disagreement was not limited to confessional questions and competing ideals of learning. The scholars’ way of life was also at issue, as older institutional frameworks for leading the life of the mind such as universities and colleges were being challenged or transformed, and received images of the “man of reason” were called into question. As scholars renounced celibacy and founded family households in growing numbers, their otherworldly image had to be redefined. New ways of life had to be invented. It is no wonder then that an intensive discussion about how scholars should conduct their lives and shape their social relations was taking place. Guillaume Budé, Desiderius Erasmus, Thomas More, and Ulrich von Hutten, for instance, were intensively debating – among themselves and before the numerous readers of their published letters – the structure of scholarly households, ways of managing time and social obligations, and the proper technologies of the self a scholar should adopt. Narratives of scholars’ lives were another important medium for this discussion. Many of them were written in the first person.

One often deplores the fact that scholars are over-represented in early modern egodocuments. Yet, for my purposes, this is clearly an advantage. I am engaged in a research project focussing on the shaping of the scholarly habitus between the fifteenth and the seventeenth centuries.¹ In this context, scholars’ accounts of themselves seem to offer precious insights into an otherwise difficult to document process. I would like to explore their uses and some of their limitations by isolating two central themes running through the autobiography of a sixteenth-century scholar, Hieronymus Wolf. I shall argue that autobiographies and biographies were not only used by humanists to represent themselves, but also intimately appropriated in order to reconstruct their lives. Such practical uses by past actors underlie their retrospective scholarly use for studying the making of scholars’ habitus. To do this, I shall focus on two aspects of the scholars’ way of life – their ways with food and their model of sociability. Here I shall try to show that in order to account for them, we must go beyond their normative orientations (scholars’ ethos) and culturally codified images (their persona) and relate their practices to a system of underlying social dispositions, their distinctive habitus.

It is not the actual habitus of any particular person that I am looking for, but that considered distinctive of a whole group. The habitus is an explanatory concept designed to draw attention to the social dispositions that shape individual behaviour,
to those “deep structures” that underlie observable habits. One is therefore in search of general, though not necessarily explicit and codified, principles and models that underlie very different practices. This, I would argue, does not entail ignoring personal idiosyncrasies. The challenge consists rather in bringing out the structuring principles underlying them. The risks involved in such a venture are evident. The following case-study should at least make plausible that they are worth being taken.

THE USES OF EGODOCUMENTS

It is a commonplace that egodocuments do not provide us with faithful images of their authors’ lives. This is especially true for autobiographies, and more generally, for any retrospective accounts of one’s life or of any significant portion thereof. Retrospective narratives tend by nature to be teleological. As a rule, they are written toward a given resolution, known in advance. Hence they tend to leave out the roads not taken and obscure the open-ended and uncertain nature of situated action. In this sense, they are like historical models: they are written in order to explain a known result and organize heterogeneous and often unyielding materials for that
purpose. They gain coherence by leaving out the rest. Some of us make a living by picking up those rests and making sense of them. But retrospective personal accounts (and historical models) have their value. If we are not hunting for the particulars of a person’s life, but seek to discern the basic cultural models organizing individual trajectories and shaping behaviour, biographies and autobiographies provide excellent source material. From this perspective, they can be seen as narrative unfoldings of codified cultural models, and in this case, of the figure of the prototypical scholar.

Scholars’ accounts of themselves in the first person had a variety of functions, not the least among them being to construct intellectual genealogies and relations of patronage and to enhance the authority of their learned authors, as Gabriele Jancke has recently pointed out. But beyond self-representation, scholars used biographies and autobiographies in order to shape their own lives. By authoring first-person accounts, scholars provided their colleagues and successors with images for emulation and recipes for organizing their lives. One learned how to become a model scholar, among other things, by consuming biographies, a crucial moment in the process of incorporating one’s ancestors.

One often tends to disregard those best-sellers of the academic world since the thirteenth century which consist of large collections of examples and anecdotes,
some of them transmitted from antiquity (such as the collections of Diogenes Laertius or Valerius Maximus), others of more recent, late medieval origin, such as Walter Burley’s (1275–1345) enormously popular collection of summary Vitae. Such compilations provided scholars with recipes for conducting their own lives. Humanists’ particular contribution, however, seems to have consisted in adding ego-documents to this burgeoning literature. In this way, they inserted themselves into the existing tradition, extending and redefining it in the process. This move is clearly evident in Petrarch’s case. His programmatic tractate, *The Life of Solitude* (written between 1357 and 1371), an influential text which found many readers among scholars and merchants alike, is constructed as a series of anecdotes and short summaries of the vitae of prophets and philosophers. The materials are traditional. Their organization is not. They are now arranged as evidence for an argument in favour of a particular notion of solitude, an explicit model for conducting one’s life. Petrarch also deviates from the received tradition by inserting – in a series that ranges from ancient prophets, through early monks to Greek and Roman philosophers – fragments concerning his own life and experiences. This is an important strategy for redefining the scholarly persona. Here as elsewhere, the exceptional case of Christine de Pisan can bring into sharp relief implied assumptions and common procedures among scholars of her time. Christine’s *City of Ladies* can be seen as an attempt to construct for herself, as a woman scholar, a fictive genealogy in the world of learning. Christine inserts herself into a non-existing series. The book hence opens with a first person account of Christine in her study, which frames a revised genealogy of human knowledge constructed around female figures. The autobiographical mode comes into its own in the explicitly autobiographical sections of her writings.

Scholars’ biographies and their first person accounts were in demand. Think about the circulation of biographical and autobiographical sketches among humanists, to which one could add the deliberate diffusion of self portraits, notably studied by Lisa Jardine. It is Erasmus who provided Ulrich von Huten – and us – with a famous biographical sketch of Thomas More and his manner of life. Thomas More’s own case provides us with an occasion to study the use of biographical accounts more closely. At an important junction in his life, Thomas More produced a translation – or rather, an adaptation – of the life of Pico della Mirandola written by the latter’s nephew. It seems that by actively appropriating the written account of Pico’s life, More sought to clarify for himself some basic questions about his own way of life. This does not mean that he adopted the answers. Pico’s biographer portrays him as seeking to avoid both court life and marriage: “weddynge and worldly besynes he fled almost a lyke”. Thomas More did not skip this section in his translation; but he himself would eventually take another path: He would marry and become a prominent courtier on top of that. More found no ready answers in Pico’s vita, but he did find a kindred spirit, a similar stance toward the world, a set of questions to which he eventually gave very different answers. He did not adopt
Pico’s solution, but not from lack of sympathy with the basic problematic he found in Pico’s vita. Egodocuments and biographies were not read by scholars’ in search of ready solutions only. They provided a medium for thinking through one’s life, for appropriating and articulating deeper structures of feeling and mapping the repertoire of given cultural options.  

An exceptionally clear case, in which the writing of an autobiography is explicitly presented as part of a larger project for forming future generations of scholars, is Giambattista Vico’s autobiography. This is my only excuse for including an early eighteenth-century case in a discussion that focuses otherwise on the sixteenth century. Count Gian Artico di Porcia “conceived the idea of guiding young men with greater security in their course of study by setting before them the intellectual autobiographies of men celebrated for erudition and scholarship.” Vico refused to write the autobiographical sketch “out of modesty”, as he emphasized. He would write, however, “as a philosopher, meditating the causes, natural and moral, and the occasions of fortune”. It would be a story beginning with an account of his earliest inclinations as a child and culminating in his New Science “which was to demonstrate that his intellectual life was bound to have been such as it was and not otherwise.” Later Count Porcía initiated the publication in print of a Proposal to the Scholars of Italy. Prominent scholars “should write their intellectual autobiographies in such fashion as to promote a new method in the studies of the young, which would make their progress more certain and efficacious.” Vico’s autobiography was to be included as a model, “a perfect realization of this idea.” Vico protested, but finally agreed. He also did not fail to relate both episodes, the high praises and his modest protests, in the subsequent, fuller version of his autobiography. By then, his only complaint was about the printer, “who bungled the typesetting and made numerous errors.”

Vico first insists on writing his autobiography “as a philosopher, meditating the causes.” Learned authors often sought to distil some general principles and norms from their narrated lives, but biographical and autobiographical anecdotes – short narrative units focusing on remarkable episodes or exchanges, on facta et dicta – still played a key role in transmitting a scholarly way of life. They merit more attention than they are usually accorded. Anecdotes were, of course, eminently memorable. Their value, however, resided not only in their capacity to express the same message contained in full-scale tracts more effectively, but to convey more ambivalent and differentiated messages. Anecdotes and stories are not an inferior form of knowledge. When it comes to conveying a social stance, a way of being, of getting on with oneself and with others, short narrative units may be more effective than the formal enumeration of principles and rules for conducting one’s life. One learns how to be in love by appropriating love stories; one learned how to be a scholar under the impression of memorable exempla. There is a further reason for their importance. Anecdotes and narrative accounts did not only exemplify the declared principles; they could embody half-articulated models and get across deep-
er ambivalences. They said more than could be spelled out in other cultural regist-
ters. First-person accounts of scholars’ lives and deeds were thus modelling devices
for shaping one’s own life. In the sixteenth century, they had a particularly impor-
tant role to play in the process of re-figuring the scholars’ persona.

FOOD FOR THOUGHT

Steven Shapin has recently provided us with a useful review of scholars’ asceticism
from antiquity to the modern period, structured around the theme of their relation-
ship to food. The evidence consists of a series of anecdotes, exemplary stories
and memorable sayings from antiquity to modern times, exemplifying scholars’
proverbial disregard for food – from ignoring how it tastes, through forgetting one’s
meals, to the complete rejection of bodily needs. This engrained disposition was
reversed, Shapin suggests, only in our times, as hedonism and self-fulfilment have
taken command.¹⁸ This sounds reasonable enough. But is it the whole story? By as-
sembling anecdotes and exemplary stories that seem to corroborate these images,
are we not reproducing scholars’ image of themselves? The concept of habitus
makes sense only if it can serve to go beyond the discourse of social actors, beyond
their cultivated self-image. It draws attention to the tensions between cultural
models, social conditioning and individual appropriations.

Scholars have often defined their ethos as ascetic and conceived of themselves as
solitary creatures, self-sufficient and austere.¹⁹ From the wealth of examples, let me
quote the depiction of the model philosopher in an anonymous fourteenth-centu-
ry tract, probably from the milieu of the university of Paris. The philosopher “eats
little, that is, is content with a few necessaries of life. For he does not seek to be a
ruler of land and sea but to have someone to cook his herbs for him, which is little
enough compared to his magnitude, since the loftiness of his sciences requires by
natural law that he be the master of all foolish and common people.”²⁰ I shall ignore
here the question, who is to cook for the philosopher and how these gendered im-
ages of domestic division of labour are connected to scholars’ conception of them-
selves as masters over “foolish and common people”?²¹ It is rather the menu that I
am interested in: No meat, no fancy foods, fixed times for meals: These are all clas-
sical recipes for leading what the Greeks had termed a theoretical life. They were
codified in the discourse of dietetics which provided scholars with rational models
for austerity and self-sufficiency.²²

My point, however, is not to debunk this image – to show that scholars, although
believing themselves to be ascetics, were actually steeped in luxury. By analysing
some aspects of scholars’ ways with food and sociability, first by drawing on some
blueprints for leading a scholarly way of life, and then by focussing on the autobi-
ography of a sixteenth-century German scholar, Hieronymus Wolf, I shall try to
point to the limitations of the ethos as an explanatory concept. Scholars might have
cultivated an ascetic ethos. But in order to account for their ways with food, we
need to go beyond their normative orientations and codified cultural attitudes and reconstruct their underlying habitus. The second point is closely related to the first. It is tempting to understand scholars’ ways with food as an expression of their relationship to their body. But much more was at stake. Modern preoccupation with “the body” and its apparent concreteness may prevent us from perceiving the complexity of its cultural encoding, and more importantly, from noticing that “the body” often functioned as a code for social relationships. By controlling their own consumption, I would argue, scholars were in fact structuring their social relations, constructing themselves as self-sufficient male subjects of knowledge while making the social relations required to sustain them invisible.

Take the first part of Marsilio Ficino’s *Three Books of Life*, which circulated in manuscript form since 1480.2 This is arguably one of the most thorough early attempts to provide scholars with a detailed blueprint for organizing their life and keep their health. To combat melancholy and to restore their spirits, Ficino offers them special recipes. Several of these contain outlandish ingredients, such as silk, gold, or white pearls. But especially prominent among them are sweets and confections: white sugar, sweet almonds, rose-water, sweet fruits, and sugar-candy. Here is one recipe:

Next comes the second confection, somewhat more wholesome and certainly much more pleasant. Take four ounces of sweet almonds, two ounces apiece of pine-nuts which have been washed for a day and cucumber seeds, four ounces of that hard sugar which they call “candy”, i.e. “white” [candituri], and one and one-half pounds of the other kind of sugar, but very white. Infuse all these in rose-, lemon-, and citron-water in which red-hot gold and silver have been extinguished; boil it all gently. Finally, add one dram apiece of cinnamon, red ben, red sandalwood, and red coral, one-half dram apiece of the brightest pearls, saffron, and raw scarlet silk which has been pounded up very fine, twelve grains apiece of gold and silver, and one-third dram apiece of jacinth, emerald, sapphire, and carbuncle. But if anyone does not have gold, silver, amber, musk, and precious stones, these confections can be of much help even without them.25

Now, ignore for the moment the medical explanations that Ficino gives for the choice of particular ingredients; ignore also the label “medication”, and read “drugs” or simply “food” instead, and you will see Ficino sketching the figure of a model scholar paying close attention to his precious body, cultivating it rationally by prescribing himself drugs of the finest and most expensive ingredients, taking calculated amounts if undiluted red wine and very sweet pills to give a boost to his melancholic spirit.

The preference for sweetness could be rationalized medically, but was basically part of a general transformation of European taste.26 There are good grounds for questioning the distinction between medical theory and culinary preferences, between medicines and foods. Scholars were no different from others in consuming sweets to the extent they could afford them. They differed, however, in claiming to
consume them “rationally”, not as articles of luxury, but as part of a dietetic program for enhancing their health and productivity.

Ficino’s recommendations might sound outlandish. His views – on inspiration, for instance – were not generally shared among scholars. But, in a less exalted tone and not without irony, Erasmus was quoting similar advice. In one of the sections of his dialogue *The Ciceronian*, published in 1528, he sums up and parodies common counsel for scholars working in their studies. Nosoponus, the workaholic scholar, advises his listeners to avoid heavy dinners in the evening, in order “to prevent any gross substance from invading the seat of the limpid mind”. “My head swims if I go without food,” objects his interlocutor Hypologus, and Nosoponus answers: “I don’t go without food altogether. I take ten very small raisins, the Corinthian sort. They are not really food or drink, but yet they are in a way.” Bulephorus, his other interlocutor, is eager to supply the proper scientific rationale: “I understand – they exude moistures slowly, and stimulate brain and memory.” But Nosoponus continues: “I add three sugared coriander seeds.”

One can only imagine what boosting effects the consumption of candies and coriander seeds with sugar coating on an empty stomach could have in a world where sweetness was just making its first steps. Note that by consuming sweets alone without leaving their study, scholars were not only avoiding heavy food but also a proper meal, that is, other people’s company. We shall encounter later further cases of culinary advice indirectly structuring patterns of social interaction.
A RATIONALE FOR DRINKING WINE

Are these ambiguities of scholars’ ways with food – proclaimed asceticism combined with the cultivation of outlandish preferences – perhaps a figment of our imagination? Couldn’t they be perceived by contemporaries as a matter of rationally pursuing one’s health? How did scholars actually come to terms with these prescriptions? Turning from blueprints for leading a scholar’s life to an autobiography may perhaps help turn half-articulated intuitions into more grounded observations. I shall therefore turn to Hieronymus Wolf’s autobiography.10 Wolf, one of the prominent scholars of Greek in the sixteenth century, was born in Oettingen in 1516 and died in 1580.31 He studied with both Philip Melanchthon and Joachim Camerarius. He owed his reputation to his exemplary editions of the Isocrates (1548) and Demosthenes (1549). From 1551 to 1557 he was employed as secretary and librarian to the Fuggers in Augsburg and embarked upon an ambitious project of publishing the works of the Byzantine historians. He left the service of the Fuggers to become director of the Protestant school in Augsburg and city librarian. Wolf began his Commentariolus de vita sua ratione, ac potius fortuna in 1564, but seems to have written most of it between 1568 and 1570.32

At a first glance, Wolf seems to display a scholar’s proverbial attitude toward food and drink: he says that he has always been happy to have just a roof over his head and the basic necessities in order to lead an autarchic life.33 Commenting on his move from court service as a chancery scribe to the school, he describes himself as having left behind the delicate cuisine and abundant wines of the court, which he now exchanged for the plain food and the water served at school, although it was harmful for his “sensitive stomach.” But it was the pleasures of the mind he had been seeking, he writes, not culinary delights.34 Similarly, he prefers the austere life of a scholar to the luxuries and fine food served at the Fuggers.35 His simplicitas scholastica, writes Wolf, makes him unsuitable for court life.36 His way of life resembles that of Zeno or Xenocrates, known for their temperance and frugality.37 At another point he contrasts his own poverty as a hard-working student in Tübingen, “gaining his living through decent labour” as a servant, with the lifestyle of the aristocratic students, their lavish clothes and fine foods, the enormous amounts of wine they consumed and their frequent vomiting.38

Wolfs’ autobiography, however, is brimming with references to food, especially to wine. At court, he tells his readers, the fish are not so well prepared.39 In a poem dedicated to his brother he wrote that fine food debilitates the mind and weakens the body. His critics asked whether healthy and delicious food was not to be preferred to “beef and port, onion, garlic or crude vegetables.” They criticized Wolf for being inconsistent: didn’t he complain about the bad food served at schools and universities? Wolf had to defend himself. He had nothing against good food as such, he claimed. He feared rather that in hard times he would yearn for such unattainable luxuries and not be able to stand simple food.40 This can still be understood as
part of the scholarly, stoic ethos of disciplining desire: Self-control is at stake, not the quality of the food itself. But Wolf has a special proclivity for good wine. He warmly remembers one of his devoted pupils in Nuremberg, who crossed the river in order to bring him his favourite wine.\(^4\) He keeps complaining about the quality of the unripe wines of the Neckar region,\(^5\) and he simply must consume only very good wine. For a scholar who considers himself autarchic and frugal and compares his way of life with Zeno’s, who is known to have taught his pupils to drink water instead of wine, this preference requires an explanation. Some people consider me a drinker, writes Wolf, but I only drink the best wines because my stomach cannot stand others. His health is at stake, he explains and tells a story about how his special problem began. Someone who avoids things benefiting his health and prefers inferior ones should not be considered sober or temperate but an idiot and a fool, he concludes.\(^6\) Wolf, a learned and wise man, knows better.

I am not interested here in the strictly medical issue. It is important to note that Wolf does not simply say that bad wine is detrimental to his health. In his view, wine is his real medicine. In describing his frail constitution, he mentions two effective recipes ordained to him by a physician, only to return to his favourite remedy — good wine. For basically, he writes, “my suffering comes from consuming unripe, adulterated and spoilt wine. If I only had lived somewhere else, where there is good wine — as most wines of the Rhine region are,” he assures his addressee, the printer Oporinus of Basel — “I would surely have lived a life free of all disease.” If you would give me good wine to drink, “noble and mild”, as Horace said, “you will find your Wolf high-spirited, his body vigorous, his mind alert and vital. But if you serve me some “Scythian vinegar”, you will notice the opposite: I have, bodily and spiritually, an alert nature, but in both respects frail, easily disturbed by slight causes.”\(^7\)

Wolf is not the only one who likes good wine. But his insistence that he can only consume the best wines is exceptional, especially for someone who defines his social identity by rejecting luxury. Nowhere in his autobiography, in which wine is mentioned at least 17 times, does he say that good wine tastes better. His health is invariably at stake. It is the combination of a taste for luxury that conceives of itself as the rational pursuit of health that is significant and distinctive. Wolf’s body is “a collapsing house” which he must fortify through “a scrupulous diet and exquisite medications.”\(^8\) Wolf’s preference for good wine becomes meaningful against the background of the above prescriptions for scholars’ consumption of sweets as drugs. It gains further significance when additional cases of scholars’ way with food and drink are taken into account.\(^9\) For the moment, however, I would like to leave it as a suggestion in order to turn to Wolf’s analysis of himself.
“I ALMOST HATE MY OWN NATURE”

In the course of his narrative, Hieronymus Wolf comes to the circumstances of his father’s death. His father, who had advanced through court service and some knowledge of administration to become a bailiff (Landvogt) of the county of Oettingen in Bavarian Swabia, falls ill. He moves into his daughter’s house to find some care, and summons Hieronymus – now a student in Tübingen – in order to find some relief in his son’s company. But Hieronymus’ thoughts are somewhere else. “I did diligently everything I was asked to do,” he says, “but I did not possess the good sense (prudentia) to do on my own accord anything else that would do the ill person good or cheer up his spirits, because my mind was constantly occupied with the trifles of my studies.” Instead of asking his father about his life and experiences, Hieronymus is doing exercises in rhetoric and composing Latin poetry: He is a philologist. He longs to go back to Tübingen, to return to his studies. The memory is painful. “I almost hate my own nature (naturam meam),” he writes, “which had made me a man more fitting for monastic than for social life.” This brings Wolf to reflect on his character:

Even now, there is nothing I really care about apart from my books and that which pertains to my office (as a teacher at St Anna’s Gymnasium in Augsburg): This is why I usually ignore what happens to other people in their private or public life, except if I hear about it accidentally on some occasion; even in this house, in which I stay day and night, I am often too clumsy in ordinary encounters and laughed at by mischievous people.

He used to think that the more learning and virtue he would gain, the more respected and beloved he would be. He was mistaken. For now, having left the service of the Fuggers to settle down in Augsburg as a teacher.

I go to see no one except when I am called for or forced to do so; no one comes to see me, except if someone needs my help: But these are “aeropagitic” exchanges, without much overtures, sentiments or diversions. Hence I learn too late what everyone in town has known for long. Children are born, they fall ill and die, some marry in the city, some marry outdoors people from outside the city, they increase their status or gain property: But since they tell me nothing, I know what happens to them no better than what happens beyond the pillars of Hercules. And so, in this swarming city in the midst of its hustle and bustle, I lead the life of an anchorite. In this way I earn condemnation, I think, and suffer disadvantages both in the management of my household and because this has alienated many people from me.

Note how self-reproach glides into apology:

I am considered to be not dutiful enough because I seldom take part in funerary processions, I don’t visit the sick when there is nothing I can do to do them good (aegrotos, quibus commodare nihil possum, non inuisam), because I don’t cleverly feign some great interest in
other people's business, because I don't give empty promises, and finally, because being rather too frank than flattering, I don't behave according to "the custom of the place". But what can I do? Usually I learn that someone had been ill only when he is led to the grave. Perhaps I deserve some forbearance for avoiding funerals just as I avoid dinners or weddings, except if I am expressly invited to participate. For these reasons, if there are people who disapprove of me, let them bear with my nature as I have described it, with a solitary life among strangers, with my resulting ignorance [of other people's affairs] – which is not feigned – and with my being engrossed with better things, as well as with my "impius piety", which unfortunately means that one cannot please one of the parties [in confessional strife] without being fatally hated and accused of impiety by the other side.56

The possibility that "some people" would disapprove of his way of life turns into certitude and Wolf's apology is transformed into open rebuke for his detractors:

Let them take an example from my own withdrawal and mind their own business, leave me in peace and stick their noses in their own affairs rather than those of others, instead of slandering and lurking me in secret.57

The whole section can of course be read as a rhetorical move which begins with self-reproach and ends in a reaffirmation of the superiority of Wolf's way of life. But I tend to think that the text also follows closely the psychological movement of Wolf's thoughts, as the painful memory of his own behaviour toward his father triggers his reflections about the particularities of his nature.58 Wolf's critical view of himself is gradually transformed into other people's imagined or real reproach, in a manner starkly reminiscent of Rousseau being haunted by other people's reproving glances, brilliantly analysed by Jean Starobinski.59 Wolf's isolation reinforces his projections. As other parts of his autobiography make plain, Wolf feels himself persecuted and hated. He risks his reputation by openly claiming to be under some bad spell, haunted by malign people whose names he does not disclose.60 As the internal conflict – "I almost hate my own nature" – is externalised, the likelihood of guilt turns into the certitude of condemnation by others. In the face of this external enemy, the figuration of Wolf's internal self changes and he regains his face.61 He now comes to identify himself again with his other, scholarly self. Learned tradition provides him with powerful models to identify with in order to confront social censure: He lives a vita solitaria among strangers (peregrini). In the midst of a swarm- ing city (in frequentissima urbe et mediis turbis), he "lives the life of an anchorite": The phrase is strongly reminiscent of Petrarch's.62 This is a learned disposition of the learned, one that scholars such as Petrarch, Christine de Pisan or Ulrich von Hutten prided themselves on.63 Wolf hence resolves the inner conflict through a double movement: by externalising self-reproach and attributing it to malevolent others, and by reintegrating his threatened self through incorporating received cultural images of the scholar. By taking up the scholar's persona again, he can reassemble his person: he is not indifferent, unconcerned by other people's lives, but
simply minding his own business; let others imitate his way of life and do the same. And finally, he is right to neglect his social duties and ignores other people's fate because he is "engrossed with better things," with learning. The passage began with Wolf's describing himself as too absorbed in the "trifles of his study" and ends up with a renewed identification with superior learning.

This resolution reinforces a fortiori the ambiguities of Wolf's preceding critical description of his way of life. Each self-critical statement now seems to have implied a counter-question: Is Wolf avoiding people — or do they seek to exclude him, to avoid telling him what is happening? Is his isolation due to his nature — or to the fact that his erudition and virtue do not earn him the love and recognition which he longs for and deserves? And why do people come to see him only when they need his help, and then — reduce interaction to the bare minimum? The tension increases in the next section, when Wolf lists all the reasons why people consider him a person neglectful of his social duties: "I am considered to be not dutiful enough... because I don't cleverly feign some great interest in other people's business": Is Wolf implying that he, because of his own "nature" which prevents him from truly identifying with other people's predicament, is incapable of at least faking interest in other people's condition — or that other people are in fact faking when they seem to be concerned about the suffering of their fellow men? "I don't visit the sick when there is nothing I can do to do them good": Can others do them any good? Is Wolf simply rationalizing his incapacity for empathy or offering an indirect critique of seemingly rational social conventions? Wolf uses here the very same expressions he had used earlier in order to describe his incapacity "to do good" to his ailing father.

The whole description is an excellent example of free indirect speech: It begins with a statement of fact that seems to express others' view of Wolf's behaviour (his avoidance of funerals). But in the next statements, which still look as if they convey others' perspective, his own view resurfaces again, subverting the reproaches in the very process of reporting them (others condemn him for not giving false promises: This is surely not the way his critics would put it). The ambiguity is resolved toward the end of the long sentence, when Wolf suggests that he, unlike others, is not blandior, flattering, but liberior — "outspoken", "open", or simply "free". He thus claims for himself liberty from the "custom of the place". The fact that he claims such freedom from social convention in Latin embellished with chosen Greek expressions only underscores this message. The liberty he claims for himself is that of the scholar. Striking parallels for both the accusations and for Wolf's response can be found, for instance, in the way Mutianus Rufus (1470/1-1526) described himself in a letter to a close friend: People reproach him for neglecting his social duties (civilita officia), such as attending weddings and social gatherings. Yet Mutianus, too, asserts that he prefers tranquillity, for "nowhere do I live more freely than at home." As we follow the movement of the text, we can see Wolf gradually reconstructing his own person with the help of the received models of the scholar's way of life.
Note, however, that nowhere in his self-critical reflections has Wolf rejected the scholarly model completely. The ambivalence was there all along, even at the moment of far-reaching self-reproach. True to himself and to the literary conventions of a scholar’s autobiography that require a full enumeration of one’s works, in describing his behaviour at his father’s bed, Wolf does not forget to note carefully which Latin literary exercises he was actually occupied with: “A War between Cats and Dogs in Hexameters, a description of the defeat of the Black Army after the death of Mathias Corvinus (a story I had heard from my father), and a Complaint of the Muses in elegiac couplets, more than 600 verses long”. All of them are now lost, he adds; “I wish I would have preserved them better.” He surely preserved the exact memory of the texts.

The autobiographical account brings into view several elements that are missing in general prescriptions on how to lead a scholarly life. It brings into focus the social censure such a form of life (genus vitae) might entail. What scholars would describe as concentrating on essentials, others would interpret as neglecting social duties. While they believe themselves to be studying better and higher things, they are liable to be perceived as ignorant of that which any ordinary person should know. They would like to consider themselves special, unbound by social convention, but in order to enjoy the lenience of their audiences, they have to accept being considered strange, if not ridiculous. In this way, at the intersection of these conflicting perceptions of the persona of the scholar ambivalent figures emerge, the favourite protagonists of innumerable jokes and anecdotes. Wolf takes care to emphasize that his ignorance of other people’s concerns is not affectation, but real, caused by his preoccupation with “better things”. Scholars like him could indeed be suspected of simulating the figure of the inattentive scholar. Though a measure of affectation may well have played a role, it does not exclude intimate appropriation of the codified persona: scholars’ acquired dispositions could well merge with the received models they emulated. Wolf’s reconstruction of his person with the help of the scholarly persona is a case in point.

Indeed, the relation between Wolf’s scholarly work and his self-fashioning goes even deeper than this. Wolf, famous for his exemplary editions of Greek texts, began his self-analysis with the evocation of two classical prototypes. He finds himself not unlike the figure of the laughable philosopher described by Socrates in Theaetetus. This is a key allusion intended for his humanist readers, for the passage invoked contains in fact the famous depiction of the model philosopher – ignorant of political affairs, of family fortunes and legal disputes: He “does not keep aloof from them for the sake of gaining reputation, but really it is only his body that has its place and home in the city.” Whoever recognizes the allusion would not fail to recognize that the following description of Wolf’s daily life as an anchorite in the midst of the city who ignores social affairs and is derided for his awkwardness resonates with the classical text. It even anticipates the resolution of the conflict by insisting that the mind of the philosopher rightfully disdains small things. He is “de-
ried by the common herd partly because he seems contemptuous and partly because he is ignorant of common things and is always in perplexity.”

Yet Wolf leaves all this unsaid, close beneath the surface of his text, and invokes immediately his next example: “It would have been not modest enough of me to ascribe to myself what Plato ascribes to our Isocrates in Phaedros, namely that “there was something philosophical in my disposition.”76 This quotation reveals an even more intimate elective affinity. Hieronymus Wolf devoted an essential part of his scholarly life to editing and translating Isocrates’ works. His edition of Isocrates played a crucial role in the making of his reputation.77 He also compiled the biography of Isocrates from ancient sources.78 This, then, is his exemplum, the person he brought back to life through his philological efforts and which he believes to embody, at least in part, in his own person.79

RATIONALIZING SOCIABILITY

Having explained why he has to consume only the best wines, Wolf immediately turns to answer a related reproach: his well-known hilarity and licentious joking in banquets and gatherings in the company of his friends. This time, he moves immediately to counter-offensive: “In this city,” he writes, “such feasts take place much too seldom for the requirements of my health and my studies.”80 For there are good reasons for his behaviour:

Those who reproach me do not want to see that I, living in my study (museum) and in my bed (lectulum) more austerely than Zeno and Xenocrates, allow myself, as if by right, to dispel the wrinkles from my forehead in a convivial circle where hilarity is appropriate, and to loosen my tongue, which at home is accustomed to Pythagoras’ tacturnity.

As in his account of his social isolation, apologia turns into invective: “I would rather starve than come as a guest to people who make grim faces and persevere in such dismal silence, as if they had just come from the burial of their parents and children.”81 The solitary industrious scholar needs company and recreation: “Exhausted by the labours of my studies and plagued by the constant pains in my stomach”, he continues, “I should… refresh myself from time to time and grant my soul some amusement (iucunditas).” In Wolf’s autobiography, health and studies form a recurring combination: time and again he attributes his actions, habits and decisions to the particular demands of his bodily constitution and scholarly work.82

To reinforce the second point, Wolf adduces at this point a classical example. When someone said that Cato spent entire nights in drinking, Cicero answered him: “You don’t mean he also spends his entire days throwing dice.” Cato’s friends used to say that the cause of Cato’s habit of drinking wine and throwing dice was “his civic and public activities; he was occupied with these all day, and so prevented from literary pursuits. For that reason he would hold intercourse with the philosophers at night and over the cups.”83 Cato’s example hardly applies to Wolf’s
philological efforts, which have very little to do with matters of state. The image of
the pursuit of knowledge embedded in Plutarch’s anecdote as a social activity in-
volving conversation and conviviality also does not apply to Wolf’s form of work.
But what is important for Wolf is the regular oscillation between work and leisure
that he recognizes in Plutarch’s exemplum, between labor and something for
which he has no name yet, but later generations of scholars would call “distraction”.
For here again, Wolf ends up by re-embracing his “nature”:

I thank God for endowing me with such a nature which can support the constant effort [or:
tension] of the soul and the mind (contentionem animi atque ingenii constanter ferre possit),
but can also relax from time to time, as if I could constantly bathe in all sorts of amusements,
forgetting that which occupies my mind (oblitus occupationum) and rejecting any thoughts
about the pains in my liver and stomach ...

Is this the same person? Helmut Zäh, to whom we owe the excellent edition of the
autobiography, notes the apparent contradiction between the image of the solitary
scholar, evoked in the previous section, and the party-going Wolf that emerges
here. He sees here “merely another aspect of Wolf’s complex personality.” Wolf is
no doubt a complex and singular person, but I believe that more is at stake. Both
the image of the solitary scholar and the predilection for feasts and distractions are
elements of received cultural models, of the scholarly persona. More importantly,
they can both be understood as seemingly incompatible but intimately related
manifestations of the same scholarly habitus.

Wolf leaves his study and turns to look for society not when people need him, but
when he needs their company. His social exchanges are structured neither by com-
munal rhythms, as those of people involved in various sorts of collective labour;
nor by generally accepted social obligations, for he expressly says he ignores such
duties as much as he can. Wolf chooses when to avoid people and when to see
them. This is a privilege (something he allows himself “as if by right”), and some-
times a scandal; it is something that even Charles Darwin could hardly allow him-
self to do in nineteenth-century middle-class England.

Scholars not only embodied new and not always acceptable norms of self-cen-
teredness, absorption and concentration. They also put forward a peculiar model
of work and of its opposite, recreation. For the uninitiated, their work looked like
leisure; their leisure, however, they handled with care and considered essential for
their work. Scholars’ notion of work differed significantly from the common view.
Their was often invisible – and often incomprehensible – work which required
special conditions, social and material, to sustain it. They also claimed the right to
ignore the collective labour involved in producing their seemingly self-sufficient
existence. It was work obeying its own rhythm, deviating from common divisions
of time and imposing its own rhythm on others.

Scholars’ concomitant notion of non-work, of leisure, was no less peculiar. On
the one hand, they took the liberty to avoid uninvited visitors – one thinks of Pe-
trarch’s dislike for unsolicited visits by his friends in Vaucluse or Montaigne’s special arrangements for taking refuge in his library. But on the other hand, scholars’ recipes for conducting their lives included planned distractions. Taking walks, seeing people, holding conversations and feasting were not new, but they now appeared as prescribed elements of a methodical way of life.97

Both through their style of work and their way of seeking distraction, scholars were rationing and rationalizing their social relations. This does not mean that the rational arguments they adduced in support of their particular way of life should be taken at face value. Like their reasons for consuming outlandish foods, such arguments may be rationalizations for needs that go much beyond the planned use of prescribed doses of recreation. But even if scholars’ need for company was not as controlled and premeditated as they pretended, they did seem to have attained control over others in this way. Their precious self and their special calling required and justified a deviation from accepted forms of behaviour.

From this perspective, Wolf’s life of solitude and his predilection for parties and drinking are two aspects of the same habitus. They cannot be reduced to an ethos, to a normative orientation such as asceticism. On that level, they seem contradictory. But as manifestations of an underlying habitus they seem perfectly consistent: Wolf uses sociability as a medication which he prescribes for himself “from time to time”. The two themes – foods and sociability – merge, for they obey the same logic: Wolf can and must be choosy and demanding with regard to the kind of people he meets, the occasions on which he chooses to see them, and the kinds of liquids he consumes – all for rational reasons. He is engaged in a particular form of souci de soi, the deliberate care of the learned self, significantly different from both aristocratic indulgence and monastic asceticism.

By viewing Wolf not only as a singular individual, but as exemplifying some aspects of the scholarly habitus, the combination of studied solitude and occasional partying is transformed from an individual idiosyncrasy to an element in a system of dispositions. This also requires a different research strategy. Beyond a close reading of any single autobiography or even the comparative consideration of several egodocuments, we need to locate Wolf in the series, in scholars’ serial biography. Beyond cursory references to Petrarch or Montaigne, this task cannot be undertaken here. To make the suggestion somewhat more plausible, however, let me adduce a fragment of a biographical account. It is taken from John Aubrey’s Short Lives – a collection of biographical fragments prepared by the seventeenth-century English antiquarian – and concerns Thomas Hobbes. This is admittedly a different cultural and religious context, yet in the light of the preceding discussion, Hobbes’ ways with food in Aubrey’s account become recognizable and perhaps comprehensible. Aubrey notes what was particular about Hobbes: Unlike other scholars, he was not a woman-hater,
neither had he an Abhorrence [abhorrence] to good wine but he was, even in his youth (generally) temperate, both as to wine and women. I have heard him say that he did not beleve he had been in excesse in his life, a hundred times; which, considering his great age, did not amount to above once a year. When he did drinke, he would drinke to excesse to have the benefit of Vomiting, which he did easily; by which benefit neither his witt was disturdt longer then he was spuing [spewing out] nor his stomach oppressed; but he never was, nor could not endure to be, habitually a good fellow, i.e. to drinke every day wine with company, which, though not to drunkennesse, spoilles the Braine.88

Two things I find significant about Hobbes’ use of wine, both strikingly reminiscent of Hieronymus Wolf. First, he drinks wine the way one uses a medicine: For the sake of regularly discharging his stomach. He does it for the sake of his stomach, like Wolf, but for the sake of an empty one. He may enjoy wine – Aubrey’s careful formulation is that he does not abhor good wine. But the whole passage is structured not around enjoyment, but the methodical use of excess. For Hobbes is said to have managed to bring excess under control not by completely banning it, but by unleashing it regularly and integrating it into a methodical way of life. Second, this entails – or is perhaps inseparable from – Hobbes’ refusal to be “a good fellow”, to “drinke every day wine with company”. To become a medicine, wine has to be divested of all its social associations and consumed in a particular way. Hobbes’ social relations are hence subjected to a special set of rules. By carefully structuring his mode of consuming of wine, Hobbes is also reshaping and rationalizing his social relations. What may appear at first as the scholars’ attitude to himself, to his own body and his food, reveals itself as a social strategy that reshapes social relationships and the precious scholarly self in its midst.

CONCLUSION

Biographies and autobiographies were used by late medieval and early modern scholars both in order to represent themselves and to shape their own lives. Consuming past texts and appropriating the figures of dead ancestors were not merely a matter of self-representation. It was also, as the case of Hieronymus Wolf exemplifies, a way of reconstructing the self. What Wolf describes as his particular “nature” can be made sense of in terms of such a process of shaping a scholarly habitus, discovered in past texts and reworked in the process of writing new ones. At least in Wolf’s case, it can plausibly be shown that the codified scholarly persona was not a mask to be worn on top of the “real” person, but an essential cultural device that enabled Wolf to reassemble himself.

The apparent contradictions of this “nature” can be made sense of if we take them not as mere personal idiosyncrasies, but as manifestations of a system of collective dispositions, of a specific habitus. This habitus, however, at least in the sixteenth century, was not an accomplished fact, the habitual product of pre-existing
social conditions and established cultural traditions. There was a cultural work involved in constructing it, social processes of negotiating it and studious personal attempts to appropriate it. Such processes are particularly evident in Wolf’s autobiography. To study the history of the habitus, we can take scholars as our example. Scholars are good to think with.

The scholarly habitus in question can be described as a methodical way of life, “rational” in three different senses: it claimed to be rational, grounded not in uncontrolled desires or affects, but in a particular instrumental rationality as a means to an end, presumably distinguishing the “men of reason” from ordinary people. It also had to do with rationalising – rationing precious time, rationalizing away social obligations, economising on social relations. Finally, it could be seen as a rationalization in the psychoanalytic sense, not a planned method for constructing scholarly selves, but a way of rationalizing scholars’ own inner contradictions and unresolved inner tensions.

NOTES
13 Here is the continuation: “notwithstanding these who he was axed ones in sporte wherby of those two burdeynes semes lyghter & whiche he wold chaue yf he sholde of necessite be driven to that one and at his elecysyon: whiche he sithed thereat a wyle but at yf last he shole his heed and a lyelly smyllynge he answered yf he had lever take hym to marage, as yf drenge in whiche was lesse servitude & not so much jeere.” J. M. Bigg ed., Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: His Life by His Nephew Francesco Pico... Translated from the Latin by Sir Thomas More (London: David Nutt, 1890), 22.
14 On a similar case of translating and rewriting a model scholar’s life while reflecting on one’s own, see Theodor E. Mommsen, “Rudolph Agricola’s Life of Petrarch,” Traditio 8 (1952), 367-386, esp. 376-381.
24 Red ben: ben-nut or a plant known in Arabic medicine; red sandal: the reddish heartwood of the Indian tree (editors’ note).
27 Note the final sentence, which allows potential users to do without most of the exotic ingredients and content themselves with all shades of sweetness combined with some spices.
30 Wolf’s autobiography is quoted from Helmut Zäh’s recent edition, which supplements all earlier ones: Die Autobiographie des Hieronymus Wolf (Hieronymus Wolf – Commentarius de vita sua) (Donauwörth: Schaller-Mikrofilm, 1998), 1-122.
FOOD FOR THOUGHT

Oography has been recently analysed by Hans Rudolf Velten, *Das selbst geschriebene Leben: Eine Studie zur deutschen Autobiographie im 16. Jahrhundert*, [Frankfurter Beiträge zur Germanistik, 29] (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag, 1995), 94-102 and passim.

32 Zäh, v.
33 Wolf, 28; cf. 111.
34 Wolf, 43. His brother Heinrich also expresses aversion to court life: Wolfram Brechtold, *Dr. Heinrich Wolff* (Diss. med. Würzburg, 1959), 72.
35 Wolf, 48; cf. 92.
36 Wolf, 91. Elsewhere he mentions his *fragilitas* (69).
38 Wolf, 46-47. Wolf appends here a complaint about the students of his time and their penchant for luxuries and delicacies.
39 Wolf, 63 (cf. 85). Even Wolf’s comment on Melanchthon’s table, where no culinary delights but witty conversations could be found (67), can be read as an indirect comment on the quality of the food served.
40 Wolf, 88.
41 Wolf, 71.
42 Wolf, 57.
43 Wolf, 57. For a different analysis of the relevant passages, see Velten, *Das selbst geschriebene Leben*, 321.
44 “Non dubitare, quin Wolffum tuum visurus sis animo hilarem, corpore alacrem, ingenio promptum et excitatum. Propina tum mihi cras Sycichum acetum (esti te, mi Oportine, potius de interiore nota Faleri nem deprompturum scio), contraria videbis omnia, et quidem congruentia fatis meis, quae mihi dedentur naturam et corpore et animii alacrem, sed vitamque imbecillum, et leuissima quaque re debilitandam.” (Wolf, 59).
45 Wolf, 103.
46 Erasmus also attributes his maladies to heated rooms and German wines (Ep.no. 1352, lines 13-19); Burgundian wines, he believes, help him recover (Ep.no. 1489, lines 16-19). Melanchthon cannot stand bad wines and often receives wines as a present (letter to Veit Dietrich, 4-5.1530; Corpus Reformatorum, vol. 2, 40). Princes send him Hungarian and Italian wines (Corpus Reformatorum, vol. 9, 544; vol. 24, 534).
47 Wolf, 4-5, 54-55.
48 As Hieronymus himself would do when he would fall ill (Wolf, 64).
49 “Quod non fuisse tale, quale oporiter, non sine molestia recordor. Praesistam enim sedulo quidem, quae ubebar, sed ea prudens non eram, ut videro facerem, quae aegrotus commodarent, eiusque animus oblectarent, nugas studiorum meorum perpeuo intussem, neque reputans, quid rest, quid locus, quid temporum postularet.” (Wolf, 50). On several occasions, Wolf emphasizes that he lacks *prudentia*, unlike his younger friend Abraham Loescher (80) or Wolf’s successful younger brother, Heinrich (26, 80).
50 Wolf, 30 (“non sine molestia recordor”).
51 “Ac naturam meum pene oederim, quae me hominem fecere, monasticae vitae, quam politicæ multitudo apriorum.” (Wolf, 51).
52 Wolf, 51.
53 Erasmus (*Adag. I*, lx, 41) explains the adjective “Aeropagitic” as “gloomy”, “severe.”
54 Wolf, 52.
55 Aristophanes, *Plu*. 47. Earlier on, Wolf quotes the same phrase when contrasting himself with his brother Heinrich, who has the benefit of “ingenii morumque dexteras” and knows how to “behave according to the custom of the place” (27). On the close, life-long relationship between the brothers, see Brechtold, *Heinrich Wolff*.
56 Wolf, 53; I rely here on Wolfgang Zäh’s rendering of the text. Wolf objected to attempt to give the teaching at St Anna-School a confessional content (106). The funeral sermon for Wolf seems to allude obliquely to his avoidance of directly committing himself to confessional positions. For it praises him as a truly “Christian philosopher”, but does add, apologetically it seems, that in general, only seldom do “sharp-witted and learned people” adopt a “correct and pure” position on religious issues. Georg Mylius, *Funerary sermon for Wolf*, 11.10.1580, reprinted in Zäh, 296-302, here 299.
57 Wolf, 53. Wolf emphasizes elsewhere that it is “his nature and custom” to mind his own business only (108), since no one listens to his advice (70).
58 Hieronymus is troubled by “gloomy thoughts” both because there is little hope that his father would recover and because his stay causes him to neglect his studies (Wolf, 53). His father notices it and tries to cheer him up. As the doctor predict that his illness would drag out until the autumn and he comes to recognize the real reason for his son’s preoccupation, he finally sends him back to the university. Wolf takes his leave and goes back to Tübingen, only to learn three days later that his father had died in the meantime (54).
59 Jean Sarrôbînski, “Jean-Jacques Rousseau et le père de la réflexion,” in: L’œil vivant (Paris: Gallimard,
61. In Goffman’s analysis of social interaction, each participant depends on others’ cooperation in order to uphold his or her “face.” Wolf, in contrast, intensifies the conflict with imagined concrete others, turning his contemporaries into a direct threat to his endangered self, only in order to dispel them by summoning alternative players – his learned ancestors. With their help, he can re-erect his face by defining it in terms of a different self-image, one which entails a break with common social conventions. Accepting Goffman’s suggestion that rules of social interaction can be seen as a means for upholding the image of each participant as a fair player, we can gauge how radical is Wolf’s move. For he in fact rejects both the game and his co-players by repudiating the self-image they sustain. This is his way to become “free”; See Erving Goffman, “On Face-Work,” in: Interaction Ritual (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), 5–46, esp. 11, note 5.


64. Compare the quotation he borrows from Demosthenes. 96.

65. “sed ea prudentia non eram, ut vixat facerem, quae agresti commodarent, eiusque animum oblectarent” (Wolf, 50): “...agrestos, quibus commodare nihil possum, non inuisam.” (52). Wolf also quotes his father telling him that he cannot actually help him recover, before sending him back to the university (54).


67. Wolf mentions elsewhere his harsh manners were (58) and his “unrestrained tongue” (“libertas linguæ”, 26). He has always been “unfettered in his answers” (“in respondendolo liberissum semper fut,” 27; cf. 35, 107).

68. Veit Hen, Das selst geschriebene Leben, 97.


70. Wolf, 52. Wolf should be referring to the loss of many of his letters and personal belongings in 1550 (68, 87).

71. Wolf, 81 (ridiculus); cf. also 28.


73. Wolf, 53.

74. Plato, Theaetetus, 173c.

75. Plato, Theaetetus, 173c-175b (with the story of Thales and the Thracian servant-girl referred to above).


77. Wolf presents the first edition his translation, published by Oporinus in 1548, as a turning point in his career and presents all his later achievements as proceeding from this publication (78-79). He also mentions the translation at the very beginning of his Commentariolus (1).

78. Wolf, 78. The parallels can be extended even further. Isocrates (436-338bc) apparently did not possess enough self-confidence to develop a rhetorician’s career and turned to instructing others. Wavering between rhetoric and philosophy, he remained aloof of public life. Because he lacked the voice and self-assuredness, he wrote (Phil. 81), and since he loved peace and the quiet life (Antid. 151), he became a writer
and a teacher. For textual and formal parallels between Wolf’s autobiography, Libanius’, Isocrates’ and Wolf’s accounts of themselves, see Zähl, 278-283.

79 This does not mean that Wolf’s scholarly “nature” was of one piece, a system of stable and coherent dispositions. On the contrary, the movement of rejection and renewed acceptance of his scholarly nature is repeated in the text several times. Wolf’s account of his life is filled with references to missed opportunities, which he often both laments and rejects in retrospect. This is but one indication of his fractured nature, his constant wavering between different forms of life. Wolf’s invocation of the particularities of his “nature” in order to account for his behaviour at his father’s deathbed should also not be taken at face value. The appeal to an established, though reproachable, system of dispositions seems to conceal a deeper conflict. Both issues should be discussed in a separate paper focussing on Wolf’s acquired nature.

80 Wolf, 56.

81 This might be a common turn of phrase, but still strike readers, coming just a few pages after Wolf’s description of his father’s death and his avoidance of both funerary processions and the homes of the sick. It is as if a parent’s death keeps surfacing in the text. Note that Hieronymus and his brother, students in Tübingen, did not perform rites of mourning and wore no mourning dress, for they heard, he writes, that these were superstitions and a waste of time. (55)


84 Wolf, 58. Wolf often uses animus to refer to his psychological dispositions and ingenium to refer to his capacities and mental powers.

85 Wolf also mentions his amusements with colleagues in Nuremberg (65).

86 Zähl, 177.

87 In the process, they seemed to have transformed the meaning of distraction from an impediment to concentration, to an integral element of a way of life involving high concentration. Wolf only uses the term distraectus in its early, negative sense, to denote a state of being torn in different directions (19); for his need for recreation he speaks of “relaxing” and of granting his soul some insenditutio (56, quoted above). See Eugen Lerch, “Zersetztheit: Zur Geschichte des Begriffes,” Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie 111 (1943), 388-460.
