The Role of Public Services in State- and Nation-Building: Exploring Lessons from European History for Fragile States

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About the authors

Steven Van de Walle is an Associate Professor of Public Administration in the Department of Public Administration at Erasmus University Rotterdam. vandewalle@fsw.eur.nl

Zoë Scott is a Research Fellow in the Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, International Development Department, University of Birmingham. z.c.scott@bham.ac.uk

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Abstract

Concerns about failed and fragile states have put state- and nation-building firmly on the academic and policy agenda. The crucial role of public services in this process has remained under-explored. The 1960s and 70s generated a substantial set of literature on state- and nation-building that is largely absent from current writings that focus on developing countries. This literature, mainly focusing on Western European countries, identified state penetration, standardisation, and accommodation as key processes in the state- and nation-building sequence. In this paper we analyse these processes of state- and nation-building in Western Europe in the 17th-19th centuries, and the role of public services therein, to explore how they may help us to understand the success and failure of state- and nation-building in developing countries and fragile states. We end with a number of key lessons and questions for international donors.

Keywords: state-building, service delivery, service provision, nation-building
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A renewed interest in state- and nation-building

Any cursory review of recent publications in the fields of development, politics or international relations will confirm that ‘state-building’ is currently experiencing a renaissance of interest (Berger & Weber, 2006; Dobbins et al., 2003; Etzioni, 2004; Fukuyama, 2004; Hopp, 2004; Lister & Wilder, 2005; Ottaway, 2002; Rondinelli & Montgomery, 2005; Šelo Šabić, 2005). It is the primary topic of several recent books, journal symposia and research initiatives, with an even larger literature that relates implicitly to the topic.

This renewed interest follows shifts in the literature and in practice in the 1990s towards a ‘rediscovery’ of the role of institutions and the state for development and democracy (Evans, Rueschemeyer, & Skocpol, 1999; North, 1990) after a decade of focusing on reducing the role of state and unleashing the market (Fukuyama, 2004). Effective institutions came to be seen as prerequisites for building a functioning democracy (Wang, 2003), and good governance made its entry in the development discourse. Recent examples of state fragility have emphasised the importance of public institutions for development (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2002; Brinkerhoff, 2005).

Despite the explosion in size of the literature on state-building, very little research explicitly addresses the question of what role public service provision can play in state-building ventures (Waldman, 2007). Much of the attention has gone to the political dimensions of state- and nation-building (democratisation, elections, etc.) (Wang, 2003), with notable exceptions such as Fukuyama’s (2004) book on state-building. Most of the published material available on services and state-building focuses on centralised activities rather than state-building at the decentralised or local level. It also focuses on the ‘how’ of delivering services in weak or fragile contexts, for example strategies for coping with weak infrastructure, handling spoilers or dealing with ethnically divided societies. Less attention is paid to ‘why’ public service provision should be included in state-building interventions, the unspoken assumption often being that effective public services are a good in themselves and therefore service delivery goals in fragile states are legitimate ends in themselves (Waldman, 2007). Most of the available literature omits to discuss the political impacts of state provision of services on governance, state capacity and legitimacy. Whilst the majority of authors emphasise a rosy picture, where service delivery has the potential to reduce state fragility and build state capacity and legitimacy, an alternative view is possible. Questions remain about the robustness of these assumptions when state-building interventions are played out in complex, messy political environments. The main lesson to learn from the literature is that donors should not assume that service provision is an apolitical, non-controversial starting point for state-building interventions (Batley, 2004). Instead, as the next section of this paper will explore, the delivery of public services is an inherently political issue that has been used for political ends throughout history.

The focus of many recent publications on state- and nation-building is limited to a number of high-profile examples, such as the reconstruction of the state in post-War Germany and Japan, or, more recently, Bosnia. It is true, Germany and Japan “set a standard for post-conflict nation-building that has not since been matched” (Dobbins et al., 2003: xiii). Yet, much of the traditional literature on state- and nation-building is remarkably absent from the current writings that try to shed light on the situation in, for example, Iraq or Somalia. During the 1960s and 1970s, scholars devoted considerable attention to the processes of state- and nation-building in Western Europe in the 17th-19th centuries (Eisenstadt & Rokkan, 1973; Migdal, 2001; Rokkan, Urwin, Aarebrot, Malaba, & Sande, 1987; Tilly, 1975a). In Europe, the work of Stein
Rokkan was central to the development of new frameworks for analysis (Flora, Kuhnle, & Urwin, 1999), and Tilly has broadened our understanding of macro-historical processes and evolutions (Tilly, 1975a; Tilly, 1992). Much of this literature also extended to developing countries because decolonisation had created a need to build new nations (Bendix, 1964; Stone, 1965).

In this article, we will rely on a number of key concepts used in this European literature on state- and nation-building to reflect on the importance of public services in current state- and nation-building. We first show why it is important to specifically look at the role of public services in state- and nation-building processes. We then illustrate how public services played a role in state- and nation-building in Western Europe. More specifically, we will do so by describing three separate processes that have been identified by the literature: penetration, standardisation, and accommodation. Subsequently, we discuss the implications of these findings for current state- and nation-building in developing countries and in fragile states. We end by formulating a number of lessons for contemporary state- and nation-builders. Before we do so, however, we first need to clarify the meaning and use of the concepts state- and nation-building. We do so in the next section.
State- vs. nation-building

There is much confusion over the terms ‘state-building’ and ‘nation-building’ (Goldsmith, 2007; Hippler, 2004). A review of recent academic publications on the topic shows that many authors use the terms interchangeably, whilst others use them with completely different meanings. Historically, in a Western European context, the terms refer to different periods in time. State-building refers processes in 17th and 18th century Europe, when many of the contemporary states started to consolidate, requiring the development of modern bureaucracies (Tilly, 1975a). Nation-building mainly refers to 19th century processes further contributing to the psychological integration of states. In nation-building, states reached out to the masses, and public services have been an important instrument in this. The 19th century saw the emergence of conscription, obligatory schooling, as well as an improved communications and infrastructure network through new roads, railways, and postal services (Weber, 1976). These ‘agencies of change’ (Weber, 1976: 193 e.v.) completed the process of state-building, and contributed to the development of a nation.

In current development literature, most people use ‘state-building’ to refer to interventionist strategies to restore and rebuild the institutions and apparatus of the state, for example the bureaucracy. In contrast, ‘nation-building’ also refers to the creation of a cultural identity that relates to the particular territory of the state. In current approaches to state-building in developing countries and failed states, the focus is on making governance effective (Rondinelli & Montgomery, 2005). The literature generally neglects the ‘building a cultural identity’ aspects of nation-building, choosing instead to focus on the more technical aspects of building state capacity. Writers might therefore claim to write about nation-building, but in fact their emphasis is really on state-building.

There are historical reasons why external actors engaged in state-building activities might be cautious about their choice of terminology. Whilst state-building and nation-building are often used interchangeably in current debates, they have not always been perceived as synonymous. Nation-building was heavily discussed in the development literature of the 1950s and 1960s and carried a strong conceptual link to modernization theories of development (Dinnen, 2006; Hippler, 2004). During the Cold War, the US and the USSR both used ‘nation-building’ as a tactic to limit the reach of their enemy. However, by the 1970s the term fell out of favour having been linked with the US’ involvement in the Vietnam War. The recent willingness to discuss state-building in terms of ‘neo-imperialism’ or ‘neo-colonialism’ (Etzioni, 2004; Mallaby, 2002; Paris, 2006) has lead parts of the development community to distance themselves from this terminology for fear of being accused of ‘neo-colonialist’ activities.

However, although ‘state-building’ is possibly a less controversial term than ‘nation-building’ for external actors to use to describe their interventions, there has, in recent years, been a tendency for the difference between the two terms to become less marked and for them to be used interchangeably by many in the international community. This is most common in non-academic circles, particularly in the media, donor circles and amongst NGOs. This has probably largely been influenced by the Bush administration’s (and, as a result, the media’s) tendency to use the term ‘nation-building’ for its interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result, the term ‘nation-building’ is increasingly being used for activities that could more accurately be described as ‘state-building’.
A further issue contributing to confusion is that the development community is undecided as to the extent to which all development activities can be categorised as state- and nation-building (Mallaby, 2002). Many aspects of mainstream development activity such as those focusing on good governance or anti-corruption and the increasing focus of development policy on politics and the state are actually state-building activities, albeit not explicitly labelled in that way. In general, development experts seem hesitant to adopt the language of state-building. This may be an attempt to distance themselves from the modernisation theories of the past and the aggressive foreign policies of the present, or it may be in recognition of what an extremely large and diverse topic state-building really is; development practitioners generally tend to specialise in aspects of building state capacity rather than claiming expertise in how to develop all aspects of a nation-state. Hence their tendency is to focus on specific aspects, for example service delivery measures, tax reforms, civil service reform, infrastructure development, democratisation, political party support, public financial management training, civil society support, peace building and conflict management, rather than tackle ‘state-building’ as one coherent concept.
The role of public services in European nation-building: Key processes and implications

Public services are what make the state visible to its citizens. Public services are citizens’ direct line to government. They make the state tangible through an almost daily interaction, direct or indirect. States are shaped by images and practices (Migdal, 2001: 16), and public services contribute to the creation of these images and practices. Public services have played a pivotal role in state- and nation-building in Western Europe (Barker, 1944). Several processes in 19th century European state- and nation-building contributed to this increase in visibility: post offices, town halls, police posts, hospitals, schools etc. were built in many localities; people were hired and paid as police officers, village teachers, railway station chiefs, town hall clerks etc., thereby creating a sense of loyalty and belonging to the state; public infrastructure works made the previously far away centres of power more accessible (Weber, 1976).

Territorial consolidation is one of the key characteristics of the development of the modern state (Finer, 1975: 87). A entirely decentralised approach to public services would make the state wither away and make it invisible (Paddison, 1983: 29; Fesler, 1965). The development of public services was part of a process of nation-building through coercion and homogenisation (Tilly, 1975b: 43). Institutions such as obligatory schooling or mass conscription contributed to the socialisation of the population into the values of the state, while the new physical networks (railways, roads) and networked services (post offices) contributed to a physical and mental integration of the national territory. Public services carried and diffused the values of the new nations. These institutions and networks created a visible distinction between ‘in’ and ‘out’ and helped to establish clear territorial boundaries. This definition of boundaries also happens through small things such as changes in road markings or traffic signs, in the same way that a presence or absence of certain commercial ‘brands’ indicates you have left a certain area or country. Public services in this way contribute to the bonding between the state and citizens.

Our thinking about the role of public services in state- and nation-building in fragile states may benefit from an analysis of processes of state- and nation-building in Western Europe. The literature and the conceptual writings of Rokkan and Tilly in particular, reveal three main processes that help us to explain how public services have played a role in state- and nation-building. These processes are penetration, standardisation and accommodation. Public services may contribute to the integration of peripheries and to the consolidation of a territory; they may contribute to a standardisation thereby facilitating exchange, mobility and equity; and they may be used as a tool for power-brokering, pacification, and accommodation.

Processes of penetration

Penetration refers to a process of establishing control and establishing the presence, authority and visibility of the state or the ruling powers. S. E. Finer defined it as “the ability of the government to act directly upon the population by its own agents, instead of through intermediate local bigwigs” (Finer, 1999: 1611). The aim of penetration is to contribute to the cohesion and legitimacy of the state through a process of political and territorial socialisation and, in Max Weber’s words, to establish the “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber, 1974: 78). Public services are an important instrument in this process of ‘penetration’ whereby states establish efficient presence in and control of the national
territory (Paddison, 1983: 9) and socialise its inhabitants (Newman, 2006; Duchacek, 1970). In 19th century Europe, this process has been clearly visible through the establishment of dispersed public services and the creation of infrastructure networks. It is in this period we saw in many states the building of town halls, post offices, railway stations etc. The development and modernisation of national administrations lead to the creation of a series of deconcentrated offices and services. This strengthened the presence of the centre in rural, remote, and peripheral areas, or even made it genuinely visible for the first time.

Other examples are the creation of national railway systems in Europe, which ‘froze’ the territorial structure of Europe (Flora et al., 1999: 157), or the building of major national roads. Eugen Weber referred to road-building in 19th century France as a way of linking the centre to the periphery; these roads could effectively be labelled “administrative highways” (Weber, 1976: 195), facilitating the movement of troops, tax collectors, school inspectors etc. The result, according to Weber, was a “system built to serve the government and the cities” that, due to its highly centralised nature and resulting lack of a “supporting network of secondary thoroughfares had little to do with popular habit or need” (Weber, 1976: 195). The much less centralised transport network system in Germany as opposed to the French one reflects the less integrated political situation in the area when these networks were established (see Paddison, 1983 for a graphic example).

The result of the modernisation of the state and the resulting state penetration, not only in 19th century European states, but also in the colonies of these states in the mid 20th century, was that, “Even in the most remote parts of a country, states have had a huge impact. […] Remote villages have state-financed police, roads, potable water, state tax collectors, credit, marketing cooperatives, schools, subsidized contraceptives, electricity, health care, and more” (Migdal, 2001: 55). The establishment of a field service apparatus greatly facilitated the execution of policies and the control over local jurisdictions (Paddison, 1983: 9).

A key process in this penetration is ‘boundary-building’, by which the scope and extent of the territory and of the state is clearly demarcated. In its territorial sense, boundary-defining is easy to imagine. In its social meaning, the boundary separates “the state from other non-state, or private, actors and social forces” (Migdal, 2001: 17). In a situation with mixed state and non-state provision of public services, and especially in situations where geographical boundaries are unclear, disputed, or changing, such boundary-building may be difficult (Anderson, 1991: 114), and have an adverse effect on penetration capacity, and thus, on state- and nation-building.

These examples show that the process of penetration is not a harmonious and uncontested one. It is about establishing control. It is noteworthy to mention that in his work on state-building, Charles Tilly has also used the word ‘statemaking’. It refers to a coercive process of penetration by attacking, eliminating and neutralising internal rivals (Tilly, 1992: 54; Tilly, 1999: 181). This may or may not include the introduction of merit-based bureaucracies to curtail the power and privileges of other dominant groups in the organisation of public services (Jacoby, 1973: 175). The frequent use of the terms ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ in the state- and nation-building literature implies a relation of subordination of the periphery to the centre (Gottmann, 1980: 17). It requires that the states supersedes or controls alternative sources of authority, or sources of authority that are or could become challenges to its supremacy.
Processes of standardisation

A second key process, different from but related to penetration, in state- and nation-building is standardisation. Standardisation, as exercised through public services, contributed to the creation of a common culture through the presence of similar and readily identifiable public services. This standardisation is expressed through similar administrative procedures for all citizens; the use of identification documents (Torpey, 2000); a statistical system for the classification of citizens, groups, and territories (Scott, 1998); integrated curricula for schools (Gellner, 1983: 52); networks of post offices; uniforms for certain public sector staff; national television (Dhoest, 2007); a common architecture for public buildings etc. In many cases encounters between citizens and administrations and public institutions such as schools or the army (conscription) also contributed to the creation of a common language. Riggs speaks in this context about state nationalism (Riggs, 1997: 351), where a state creates a nation. Public services diffuse cultural symbols of statehood and nationhood (Shils, 1975: 39). They are symbols of state presence. Through a process of homogenisation (Tilly, 1975a), this standardisation attempts to build a moral unity (Wang, 2003). The state, using its services, builds an imagined community (Anderson, 1991); it manufactures and nourishes imagery, and it communicates a package of ideals (Price, 1995: 46). In this way, public services are part of everyday nationalism.

A bureaucracy is a means to control diverging tendencies in autonomous bodies, agencies and organisations, and thus to integrate these (Poggi, 1990: 31-2). Standardisation may therefore require the annihilation or suppression of alternative autonomous power centres or alternative delivery mechanisms (e.g. through local strong men) that compete for people's loyalty and identity (Wang, 2003). This may even mean changing, dismantling or neutralising well-functioning service delivery mechanisms (Braun, 1975). It may also lead to the suppression of diverging identities (the former French centralist approach geared towards the suppression of regional languages is a good example). This standardisation aids identification with the state, and, by doing so, also attempts to break down identification with alternative authorities (such as other states, regional or local interests, or competing leaders). The processes of modernisation with which 19th century European state-building is associated are characterised by intolerance of diversity (Billig, 1995: 130) and “enforced uniformity” (Poggi, 1990: 81). This extends to those employed in public services. It is insufficient that someone performs his/her duty in delivering a service. He/she also needs to identify with a wider state apparatus and show solidarity and connection with fellow public sector workers. Such a process of standardisation is probably relatively straightforward in a context of rapid modernisation when many of the public services are new rather than replacements of existing ones. Standardisation may be much more damaging in a context where efficient alternative service delivery mechanisms already exist.

Processes of accommodation

A last process we will discuss is that of accommodation. It adds a somewhat less coercive aspect to the processes of penetration and standardisation, and may act as a counterbalance. Public services may serve as instruments for dispute settlement and for the creation of political loyalty. Despite what NPM-style literature may lead us to believe, public services and public servants do more than delivering undisputed services in a neutral manner.
The vast scholarship on the role of politics, political appointments, spoils etc. in administrations demonstrates the extent to which the provision of public services and of positions within these public services is a key element in political power-brokering and accommodation. Accommodation may be a means of “binding critical elements of the population to the state” (Migdal, 2001: 77) and may act as a safeguard against the development of competing centres of power within the state (Migdal, 2001: 75). Public services are in such a case a tool to buy loyalty and to make disloyalty expensive. By providing a clear path for social mobility, public sector employment has contributed to social harmony and has promoted citizens’ identification with the state.

In divided societies, public services may contribute to the maintenance of a delicate balance between groups. Public services have had, and still have in the case of developing or post-conflict countries, a role in nation- and identity-building and pacification (Stillman, 2000: 18; Thompson, 1965: 208). Sharing out public sector jobs or a promise to provide certain facilities to certain individuals, groups or regions is an excellent instrument to cement political pacts. Such processes of accommodation are especially visible in ethnically divided societies where quotas are sometimes used in the distribution of public offices (Bangura, 2006). Public administration, public institutions and public services may help to resolve cultural conflicts between majorities and minorities. Bourgeois speaks in this context of “administrative consociationalism” (Bourgeois, 2007: 633), echoing Lijphart’s concept which has largely been applied to political structures at the central level (Lijphart, 1977), rather than to a more decentralised level of public service delivery such as schools and local public services. This shows that a distribution of resources in the modern state should not just be approached from an equity perspective, but that there is also a strong instrumental dimension to redistribution (Wang, 2003).

Accommodation and dispute settlement may require some decisions which may not always be well-received and may be criticised for their lack of democratic character. These processes of accommodation reveal an interesting paradox in state- and nation-building initiatives, especially when these initiatives also aim to promote democratisation. Elite pacts, including arrangements on public service delivery, in a way attempt to achieve the principles of the modern democratic state by using methods that would not generally be associated with such a polity. O’Donnell and Schmitter made a similar point when they introduced the concept of elite pacts into the political science literature though their study on transitions from authoritarianism in Latin America: ‘Ironically, such modern pacts move the polity toward democracy by undemocratic means’ (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986: 38).

Yet, the opposite case, while based on a similar principle, generally attracts much less criticism. We have seen several instances where certain groups have been removed from administrative and public service positions precisely for their lack of loyalty to, or even betrayal of the polity. This tends to happen in times of change and times of challenged power. Good examples are the lustration processes in several Central- and Eastern-European post-communist societies, especially in Czechoslovakia; de-nazification in post WWII Germany; or more recently de-Baathification in Iraq (David, 2006; Ellis, 1996). Yet, for the sake of completeness it needs to be mentioned that public services are less subject to such processes than, for example, the military or political bodies. Just as with other acts of accommodation, or of standardisation, such lustration processes may also have an adverse impact on the ability of public services to deliver, for example because all expertise has been weeded out (Dobbins et al., 2003: 13-14).
Public services and state- and nation-building: Lessons learned

To summarise briefly, this paper has argued that public service delivery is not neutral but a highly political matter. We have demonstrated how service provision has been used in European history as a state tool for penetration (territorial consolidation and the integration of peripheries), for standardisation (homogenisation of the population and its experiences) and for accommodation (including pacification, buying loyalty and power-brokering). So what does all this mean for international donors keen to engage in service provision and state-building interventions in developing countries? Is this European experience, and are these European models and processes relevant or transferable to a different context?

Transferability

Whilst some international development researchers suggest that transferable lessons can be gleaning from the European example (Moore, 2004), others strongly assert that they cannot (Herbst, 2000). These contrary perspectives seem to centre on the question of the similarity of context. The European model grew out of a feudal system, and this has been regarded as a reason why ‘[T]he European state-building experiences will not repeat themselves in new states’ (Tilly, 1975b: 81). In a feudal system, with its dispersed power, suppressing the local power base that could challenge the state was relatively easy. Some, for this reason, suggest that Europe may have been the special case in history, rather than the model (Herbst, 2000). Another significant difference between European state-building and current state-building processes in developing countries is the involvement of many external and international actors in the latter, including multi- and bi-lateral donors, NGOs and private institutions, each with their own practices and political agendas (Zaum, 2007).

At the same time, Tilly (1985) emphasises the similarity between the political contexts of Europe in the 16th and 17th century and of many countries in the modern developing world, arguing that both are dominated by coercive, self-seeking, violent rulers.

So, given that there are significant differences and similarities between the contexts, can any lessons be learned? This article takes a middle ground. We do not propose that lessons from European history can be lifted directly and applied unquestioningly to the diverse contexts of developing countries where state-building ventures are taking place. However, we do propose that there are some broad principles that we can take from a backward glance at history to inform current and future practice. Learning about the European examples may facilitate analysis of the situation in other countries (Flora et al., 1999; Rokkan, 1975).

Donors and penetration, standardisation and accommodation

State governments in fragile environments often have weak or no control over large sections of their territory (Herbst, 2000: 19; Lister & Wilder, 2005). Governance in these areas can alternatively be provided by warlords, strong men and patronimialist networks or traditional tribal systems (Reno, Lister & Wilder, 2005; Jackson, 2003). In aiming to build states, donors are often keen to expand the control of the central government beyond the confines of the capital city. Therefore, the potential ability of service provision to act as a non-violent vehicle for territorial penetration is very
attractive to international donors aiming to build capable states that have controlling
presence, authority and visibility throughout their land.

Standardisation is a trickier concept to discuss in this context. It maps on to donor
aims if you can translate standardisation as being a process that creates equality of
access to public services; all citizens gain the same level of access to similar
standards of public services throughout the territory. Conflict inspired by grievance
over ‘horizontal inequalities’ (see Stewart) is therefore mitigated as no single group is
enjoying privileged access to basic services. However, the idea that donors engaging
in service provision are inherently creating a cultural identity is more contentious. In
some contexts donors might be pleased to assist in the creation of a cultural identity
that maps onto the governing state rather than identity exclusively being related to
ethnic identity. However, several authors emphasise that the development of cultural
identity should be an endogenous process and is not something that external actors
should seek to meddle with (Etzioni, 2004; Ottaway, 2002). An additional problem is
that the development community as a whole tends to promote social inclusion and
embrace cultural diversity rather than express intolerance towards it. And finally, the
question remains over what to do in contexts where alternative, non-state, systems of
service provision already exist (Lister & Wilder, 2005)?

Lastly, how does accommodation via service provision map on to donor ambitions?
Again, this is highly contentious. Whilst most development donors would be delighted
with the idea that service provision can be a method of dispute settlement and
generate political loyalty, the concept of explicitly using service delivery as a political
tool is extremely contentious. Openly using services as methods of ‘power-brokering’
as opposed to the more neutral idea of basing delivery design on principles of equity
and equality is a highly controversial idea. Donors, historically reluctant to admit to the
political role they play in the countries in which they work, are unlikely to fully
embrace the potential role of service provision in facilitating processes of
accommodation.

Lessons for international donors

There are three further findings of our analysis which deserve discussion. These are
merely stated here as questions that international donors must seriously ask
themselves when engaging in service provision as a state-building enterprise.
Donors need to be realistic about the political role that their interventions play. That
means analysing their role and the way they design programmes from a political
perspective and embracing that potential, rather than being too afraid to engage in
discussion over the political aspects of development interventions like service
delivery.

1. Is efficiency necessarily the best guiding principle for the design of public services
in fragile states?

This is a highly controversial question. Donors, with their accountability to the tax
payer, are understandably reluctant to admit that state-building is anything other than
a straight-forward, technocratic, apolitical undertaking. Unfortunately, in reality the
opposite is often the case. Obviously, service provision must be efficient enough that
it does not alienate the population and thereby undermine the legitimacy of the state,
or provoke conflict amongst different groups (Brinkerhoff, 2005: 5; Jackson & Scott,
2007). However, the above examples from Western Europe show that there may be
situations where a political decision could be made to sacrifice efficiency for the
‘greater good’ of furthering penetration, standardisation or accommodation. An
example may be establishing more health centres than strictly necessary in a given
area in order to raise the visibility of the state there or to pacify an aggrieved group
who have previously felt excluded from access to basic services. A more
controversial example would be buying off local elites with jobs in public services in
order to ensure their loyalty to the nascent state. The early European state building in
15th and 16th centuries showed a need first to make civil servants loyal to the ruler,
and only later to make them efficient and impartial (Fischer & Lundgreen, 1975: 457).
As long as the legitimacy of the state is contested, loyalty needs to be created.

2. Can we really think of state-building as a democratic process?

Much of the state-building process is about coercion and the accommodation of
certain groups or power factions. Processes of homogenization, standardisation,
boundary-defining and penetration are unlikely to be universally popular. The building
of states in Western Europe was costly and involved ‘death, suffering, loss of rights
and unwilling surrender of land, goods, or labor’ (Tilly, 1975b: 71). Many were forged
through blood and iron (Ottaway, 2002: 16). Populations often resisted the creation of
states. This was visible in tax rebellions, food riots, and resistance against
conscription (Tilly, 1975b: 71).

The creation of nations required homogenization of certain groups in society, and
sometimes the destruction of existing power structures. The process was dominated
by a desire for stability and security, not democracy. A second and related element,
therefore, is that much of the nation- and state-building was an elite-driven process.
Nationalist movements appealed to the masses, but they were very often initiated by
the societal elites. O'Donnell and Schmitter gave pacts between elites a central role
in transitions from authoritarian rule (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986), and
consociational arrangements are in a similar way an accommodation between elites
(Lijphart, 1977). We note Ottoway's observation that 'The world should not be fooled
into thinking that it is possible to build states without coercion' (Ottaway, 2002: 18).
Harsh compromises are often necessary, and these include military coercion and the
recognition that democracy is not always a realistic goal.' (Ottaway, 2002: 16).

3. Where is the line between nation-building and excessive nationalism?

State- and nation-building and nationalism are very closely related. Nationalism does
not always have a good name; a stimulation of nationalism combined with political or
even ethnic accommodation strategies may be difficult or risky. Certain processes
inherent to state- and nation-building such as socialisation through the school
system, army, media, or public services; or processes of boundary defining can
easily slip into forms of extreme nationalism. State- and nation-building may lead to
the destruction of existing identities and allegiances, and may come at a cost for
certain groups that are being assimilated. Processes of political socialisation, or the
instilling of desirable features in the population may be felt as very intrusive and
invasive (Miguel, 2004: 331). Nationalist approaches to the organisation of public
services may also lead to the destruction of well-functioning existing public services
and public goods, to be replaced by national ones, for the sake of it. The right
balance between public services that function effectively, efficiently, and
economically, and public services that reflect and propagate a national or a state
identity may be particularly hard to find.
Reference List


