Democratic revolution came to the Dutch Republic in two distinct phases in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. In the 1780s the self-styled Patriot movement challenged the Dutch republican regime at its base in the chartered towns and in the countryside of the seven United Provinces, whose representatives made up the Estates General. In the decentralized Republic, this early phase of the revolutionary conflict had a checkered, piecemeal quality that reflected the provincial and local diversity of Dutch politics. Yet the movement was strong and successful enough to provoke a determined counter-revolution sponsored by English funds and Prussian military intervention that restored the Prince of Orange and the old-regime oligarchy in the fall of 1787. Some seven years later, in January 1795, the northward march of French revolutionary armies unleashed a second wave of revolutionary conflict that decisively ended the old regime and established the Batavian Republic. In this second phase, provincial and local autonomies were replaced by a centralized, unitary state along French lines. French fraternity under the Directory gave way, however, to French domination under the Consulate, and finally between 1810 and 1813 the Dutch provinces were annexed to Napoleon’s Empire.

In the course of these two revolutions—the Patriot and the Batavian—extending over two of the most turbulent decades of European history, the political culture of the northern Netherlands was dramatically transformed. In the first place, the corporative, aristocratic pattern of old-regime politics was broken open; politics became the ongoing public concern and activity of a broad range of citizens engaged in elections, political clubs, and militias. At the same time, the old-regime language of political privilege rooted in history was
forced to make room for the more radical language of political equality rooted in natural rights. These shifts in Dutch political culture, though clear and decisive, were not immediately expressed in lasting constitutional victories as the revolutionaries had originally hoped, but neither did the Orangist restoration of 1787 or the expulsion of the French in 1813 serve simply to undo the changes that had occurred. By 1848, the transformation of Dutch politics begun by the Patriots in the 1780s was consummated by the adoption of a liberal constitution for the Kingdom of the Netherlands.\(^4\)

Within the context of this broad revolution in political culture, it is also possible to discern important changes in gender relations. In the first place, women gradually lost their influential old-regime political roles as leaders of crowds and wives of important political figures; the politics of the new active citizen became an essentially male preserve. At the same time, however, the traditional language of female subservience was countered for the first time by the language of gender equality and feminism. These shifts in gender roles and ideology, by contrast with the larger transformations in political culture noted above, are seriously understudied and little understood in Dutch historiography.\(^5\) Thus, it is our goal in this essay to explore the political dimensions of the shift in gender relations during the revolutionary period, to account for this shift in light of Dutch history—especially the history of women and of popular politics—and, in conclusion, to suggest its importance for the development of modern Dutch politics.

**Women and Revolutionary Conflict in the 1780s**

At first glance, the Dutch Patriot Revolution looks like an essentially male-dominated affair. Most of the leaders of the revolutionary movement, for example, were regents, public officials, and educated professionals who were almost by definition male. What's more, the Patriots' characteristic mechanism for popular mobilization—the revolutionary militia—excluded women from full membership.\(^4\) This is not, however, to say that women were not involved in the political conflicts of the 1780s. Many women played indirect and supportive roles on both sides of the conflict, while others were more directly involved, like Betje Wolff, as revolutionary Patriot publicists or, like Kaat Mossel and Wilhelmina van Pruissen, as leaders of the Orangist counter-revolution. But before we examine more closely the roles
these women played, we must survey the general course of events during this remarkable decade, when the Dutch staged the first major democratic revolution on the European continent.5

The Patriot movement was born of the political and social crisis that resulted from Dutch involvement in the American Revolutionary War.6 The Dutch were dragged willy-nilly into the war at the end of 1780 when the English learned of trade negotiations between the colonies and representatives of the city of Amsterdam. For the Dutch, the Fourth English War (1780–1784) was an unmitigated military and economic disaster, and it immediately set loose a torrent of internal bickering and mutual recrimination. On one side, the so-called Patriots attacked the Stadhouder, Prince William V of Orange, for his pro-English proclivities and his conduct of the war as commander of both the army and the navy. On the other side, the so-called Orangists attacked the traditional opponents of the Prince—the regents of Holland and the city of Amsterdam in particular—for provoking an unnecessary war with the Republic’s natural ally, England.

In the fall of 1781, this internal debate was crystallized and transformed by a remarkable pamphlet entitled Aan het Volk van Nederland (To the People of the Netherlands).7 In this long-winded pamphlet, J. D. van der Capellen, a dissident nobleman from Overijssel, managed to link the disastrous course of the war with a whole range of regional and local domestic political issues, claiming throughout that the current malaise in the Republic was all the result of the tyrannical and pro-English policies of William V. The chief conclusion that Van der Capellen drew from all this history was that the people of the Netherlands, like the people of America, had to organize and arm themselves and to seize control of their own affairs. Though Aan het Volk van Nederland can hardly be considered a blueprint for the Patriot Revolution, it nevertheless was instrumental in shifting the terms of the debate and laying the practical foundations for a popular political movement.8

The war with England was not officially ended until 1784, but issues of foreign policy quickly gave way to local and regional political problems. In particular, the Patriots seized on the alleged abuses of the elaborate patronage system through which William (as Stadhouder, he was technically only an appointee of the provinces severally) exercised considerable influence in the politics of the Republic.9 Gladly and to loud popular acclaim, many members of the old-regime oligarchy chipped away at the enormous influence of the
FIG. 1. Orangist caricature of a female supporter of the Patriots (1787): ‘Armed heroine or present-day benefactor’. (Foto: Rijksprentenkabinet Collection F. Muller 4897, Rijksmuseum Amsterdam.)
Prince's so-called lieutenants—that is to say, the local power brokers who in fact controlled access to political office. Eventually this encroachment on the prerogatives of the Stadhouder extended as well to the Prince's control of the system of military justice and even to his command of the military. By 1785, after he had been relieved of his command of the important garrison at The Hague, a very discouraged William abandoned his residence there and retreated to his estates in the province of Gelderland.

This early, anti-Orange phase of the Patriot movement was rooted in a broad range of regional and local grievances; it allied, however tentatively, disgruntled oligarchs with an increasingly organized and confident popular movement. As success was piled on success, however, the Patriots were faced with the more difficult and divisive issue of who and what would fill the political void left by the diminution of the Stadhouder's authority; and the enormous periodical and pamphlet literature of the period resounds with the cacophonous discussions of this central issue and the grievances that fed it. In this rhetorical battleground, Patriot publicists easily maintained the upper hand, drowning out the learned but lonesome voices of conservative writers like Adriaan Kluit, Rijklof Michael van Goens, and Elie Lusae.10

In the generally familiar eighteenth-century fashion, many Patriot writers argued that in order to make up for the mistakes of the past, government would henceforth have to be seen to proceed from the "sovereignty of the people," het Volk. Whereas in the earlier stadhouderless periods of Dutch history the "tyranny" of the Stadhouder had been replaced by the "true liberty" of the self-perpetuating regent oligarchy, the Patriots now demanded that the burgerij, the citizenry, be able to choose its own representatives so that the dependence of the regents or magistrates on the people could be institutionalized. After a hesitant start, the Patriots made considerable progress in creating new institutional arrangements at the local level, within more or less sovereign municipalities, where the principles of representative democracy could be most immediately realized.11 The first of these municipal revolutions was achieved at Utrecht in 1786 and was followed by a rapid series of Patriot coups in the many cities of the provinces of Overijssel and Holland in the course of 1787. When outside intervention cut this revolutionary process short in September, 1787, the Patriots were in control of three provincial governments and had created revolutionary governments alongside conservative originals in two others. Orangists were in control of just two of the seven provinces.
Within this broad pattern of conflict, the most immediately striking participation of women was on the side of Orangist counter-revolution. Indeed, two Orangist women are among the most famous actors in the revolutionary drama. At one end of the social scale, probably the most colorful and infamous figure of the whole Patriot period was Catherina Mulder, known generally as Kaat Mossel. A seller and official inspector of mussels, she was a well-known figure in the Achterklooster district of Rotterdam, a poor neighborhood known for its enthusiastic demonstrations of support for the House of Orange. In the beginning of 1784, Rotterdam was the scene of serious political unrest. After the government reluctantly gave permission for Orangist celebrations of the Prince’s birthday, Orangists molested Patriots who refused to contribute money. Moreover, after the Patriots’ militia unit was incorporated into the official Civic Guard (schutterij), this so-called Black Company—named for its black cocardes, a popular Patriot symbol—was harassed by Orangist crowds every time it kept the watch. On one such occasion in 1784, the Captain panicked and the men of his unit opened fire on the crowd, killing four people and wounding many others. An investigatory commission immediately arrested Kaat Mossel, accusing her both of bribing participants in the Orangist crowd and of leading the crowd herself.

Kaat Mossel’s public life was not ended, however, by her arrest and imprisonment. Her legal defense, led by the young and brilliant Orangist lawyer William Bilderdijk, kept her in the public eye, and for her own part, Kaat Mossel managed to celebrate loudly and publicly the Prince’s birthday even while in her cell. Finally, when in 1787 all Orangist political prisoners were given amnesty following the restoration, she refused to leave the prison, demanding that she be acquitted in an official trial and that she be given financial compensation. She actually got both, and when she was at last freed, a military honor guard accompanied her from The Hague to Rotterdam.

At the other end of the social spectrum was Wilhelmina van Pruisen, the wife of Stadhouder William V. In 1787, when the province of Holland was falling into radical Patriot hands, the province of Gelderland where the Prince and his family sought refuge was firmly under Orangist control as a result of William’s military repression of Patriot dissent. The Republic seemed to be on the brink of civil war, and at this point Wilhelmina forced the issue. Following a plan of her own making, unknown to the Prince’s principal advisors and against the opposition of the Prince, she traveled at the end of June toward Holland with the express purpose of provoking an Orangist revolt upon her return to The Hague. At the border of Patriot territory, she was stopped by Patriot militiamen, arrested, held
captive for one night, and then sent back to Gelderland. In the process, she was treated as a commoner, without special deference to her social position, and when her brother, the King of Prussia, heard of this offense, he demanded satisfaction from the province of Holland. Receiving none, he sent 20,000 Prussian troops to restore the Orangist regime everywhere in the Dutch Republic in September, 1787. In the end, then, Wilhelmina's decision to travel to The Hague turned out to be a critical moment in the Patriot Revolution.

As a result of their actions, Kaat Mossel and Princess Wilhelmina became important symbols of Orangist politics and objects of Patriot scorn. Numerous caricatures and political cartoons depicted Kaat Mossel as the Orangist rabble-rouser, par excellence, while Patriot pamphleteers typically attacked Princess Wilhelmina even more viciously than her husband. Both are outstanding examples of the roles women played in the counterrevolutionary movement, but neither stood alone. On the local level, for example, the Vrouw van Almelo, too, was a leading defender of the old regime; and, in her home province of Overijssel, she was an important object of Patriot derision. Likewise, in the city of Deventer, a 44-year-old woman was condemned to an exemplary six years in prison for leading and provoking an Orangist crowd in much the same way as Kaat Mossel. That the revolutionary governments took the political actions of Orangist women seriously is further indicated by the occasional over-reactions of Magistrates to servant girls wearing orange flowers or waitresses decorating tables with a few pieces of orange ribbon.

By comparison with the prominent leadership roles of women on the Orangist side, the Patriot movement afforded women relatively limited secondary roles. In some exceptional cases, women signed the Patriots' many political petitions; in others, they became "extraordinary members" and "donatrices" or sewed ceremonial banners for the Patriot militias. The Patriot women, especially the donatrices, were taken seriously enough to be mocked repeatedly in Orangist pamphlets and caricatures. Their actions, however, were largely indirect, and they were clearly subordinate to the large numbers of males whom the Patriots brought deliberately and directly into the political arena. In order to see evidence of more direct involvement on the Patriot side, we need to look at the contribution of female writers to the voluminous Patriot literature. Since, as we have already noted, the Patriots' battle against the old regime was fought out in the pages of pamphlets and newspapers as well as in the streets of its many cities and towns, it is significant that women appeared as the authors of articles and pamphlets supporting the Patriot cause.

Undoubtedly the most prominent example of a female author
who publicly supported the Patriot Revolution is Betje Wolff, whose wit and sharp pen had attracted many readers and caused many a controversy long before the politicization of the 1780s. She had taken part in several public controversies about church discipline, education, and the like, and in a work published in 1765, she argued specifically for better education for girls, which she saw as a necessary precondition for further emancipation for women.22 Though Betje Wolff had always insisted that politics was not an appropriate activity for women, by 1786, when the escalating conflict allowed little room for neutrality, she was induced to side openly with the Patriots’ political cause in a series of pamphlets.23 In these pamphlets, her primary concern was to praise the Patriot leadership and its political objectives while attacking the “aristocrats” whom she held responsible for the alleged tyranny of the old regime. Typically, her concern for female education and emancipation notwithstanding, she did not during the Patriot Revolution raise women’s issues explicitly, nor did she advocate specific rights for women within the new democratic constitutions.

It is extremely difficult to assess the role of female publicists during the Patriot Revolution, though it is clear that Betje Wolff was not a singular example. Most political writing was anonymous, so that even in Betje Wolff’s case we are not certain how much political writing she actually did. In any case, it seems to be true that women were visible as only a small minority in a large pool of writers. For example, in the Republikein aan de Maas, a Patriot weekly published in Rotterdam from 1785 to 1787, just one of forty-six letters to the editor was signed by a woman.24 In this case, “the wife of a Patriot shopkeeper—a tactful reminiscent of the not insignificant, but essentially secondary, role played by women in the American Revolution. We can find no evidence whatsoever of demands for direct engagement by women in the participatory and democratic politics of the Patriots.

Like thousands of other Patriots, Betje Wolff and her longtime associate Aagie Deken left the Dutch Republic for exile in France following the Orangist restoration in the fall of 1787.25 Unlike many of their compatriots, Wolff and Deken were not fleeing for their lives, but it is nevertheless clear that for them, as for the Patriots generally, the disillusionment caused by the Patriots’ failure was deep and enduring. Many Patriot refugees settled with French support in St. Omer or in Paris where they witnessed and were inevitably caught up in the collapse of the French monarchy and the ensuing struggles
for control of France's political future. If it is generally true that the French Revolution served to alter the very meaning of the word "revolution," it is not surprising that when the northward march of the French revolutionary armies precipitated the collapse of the Orangist regime, the Dutch revolution, too, should take on different forms and exhibit a different tone, not least of all with regard to women.

Radicalism and Emancipation in the 1790s

The Batavian Revolution of 1795 began, in a profound sense, where the Patriot Revolution had left off in 1787—in the cities and towns of the sovereign provinces that constituted the old Republic. Revolutionary governments at the local level dispatched delegates to create revolutionary governments at the provincial level, and thereby laid the groundwork for a transformation of the institutions of central government that clustered around the Estates General in The Hague. Very quickly, however, it was clear that the Batavian Revolution would be a very different political process, in part because the Orangists, in sharp contrast to 1786 and 1787, were immediately and decisively driven from the field. Stadhouders William V fled with his family and courtly entourage to England shortly after the French invasion began. Thereafter, except for an ill-fated plan for an Orangist uprising and invasion in 1799, the kind of organized and active counter-revolutionary agitation that had confronted the Patriots at every turn in the 1780s was conspicuously absent in the 1790s.

To say that the Batavian revolutionaries were quickly and decisively victorious is not, of course, to say that theirs was a revolution without struggle. Under the banner of liberty, equality, and fraternity, the revolutionary leaders of 1795 moved quickly to replace the last vestiges of old-regime political privilege with local and provincial institutions of representative democracy of the sort that had been advocated in the 1780s. Before 1795 was out, a popularly elected National Assembly had been called as well. As the Assembly moved to design a new constitution of national government, however, the delegates quickly divided into factions. Some of the formerly exiled Patriots now favored the creation of a centralized, unitary state to replace the venerable particularisms of the old regime; but their opponents, the so-called federalists who favored a more decentralized regime, prevailed in the constitution-writing committee of the National Assembly. After long and frustrating deliberation and national debate, a clearly federalist constitution was soundly defeated.
by the electorate in 1797. New elections did little to change the composition of the National Assembly, however, and amid sharpening divisions and conflicts, the future shape of the Dutch state remained in doubt. Finally a radical, French-sponsored coup d'état in January 1798 created a unitary national state that was quickly ratified by the electorate.

Though the radicals themselves were removed by a counter-coup six months later, the unitary state that they had created with French help remained a constant feature of the political landscape through the succession of regimes that followed. The moderate democratic regime of June, 1798, was eventually replaced in 1801, again with French help, by a far more conservative regime called the Staatsbewind that was, in turn, replaced by the Kingdom of Louis Napoleon in 1806. Even Louis Napoleon proved to be too resistant to French demands on Dutch resources, however, and finally in 1810, the provinces of the northern Netherlands were annexed to Napoleon's Empire. As the Napoleonic Empire was crumbling in 1813, the Dutch at last drove out the French as oppressors, but they retained the essential features of the newly centralized state under the new Kingdom of the Netherlands with William V's son ruling as King William I.29

During the Batavian Revolution, there was a decisive change in the visibility of women and the prominence of specifically women's issues within the revolutionary movement.30 This change was clearly signaled by a letter published in May, 1795, in the Oprechte Nationale Courant. Though the letter was unsigned, it was probably written by Etta Palm d'Aelders who, Dutch by birth, had risen to international prominence as a feminist voice in the French Revolution but had been forced to leave France under the Directory.31 Speaking of her experiences in the women's clubs in France and apologizing for her poor use of the Dutch language after so many years abroad,32 Palm d'Aelders argued for the creation of women's political clubs on the French model; she defended the exclusion of men because they would surely dominate, while women, no matter how intelligent, would be too timid to speak.33 Before the month was out, Etta Palm d'Aelders had been confined as a political prisoner by the Batavian authorities—not, to be sure, because of her feminism, but because she was suspected of being an Orangist spy. In any case, she was by no means the only activist of this sort. Though few archival records remain, there were, indeed, women's clubs created during the Batavian period.34 One of the principal activities of these clubs was the planting
of liberty trees, which, given the numerous revolutionary ceremonies of the day, could amount to a prominent role for women. In March, 1795, for example, revolutionary periodicals published the names of dozens of “Bataafse Meisjens” (Batavian Maidens), who dressed in festive clothing, danced, and sang as part of a revolutionary celebration. In Haarlem, where the records of a women’s club have survived, there was also a patriotic theater group with a woman as the dynamic force. Though women were not in this way directly involved in politics, these activities clearly promoted a greater political consciousness among women.

Equally striking during the Batavian Revolution is the appearance of specifically women’s political issues as part of the political debate. In 1795, for example, someone signing with the initials “P. B. v. W.” published a pamphlet entitled A demonstration that women should take part in the governance of the nation. Apparently unaware of Condorcet’s famous plea for women’s rights in 1789, the author argued that precisely because women had not been enfranchised in France, the Netherlands could serve as a good example for the French. France, the land of revolution, he wrote, might then cry out: “Holland, we broke the chains, but you, you establish liberty on her throne.” The well-known Patriot IJsbrand van Hemelsveld also pleaded for women’s rights in his periodical, the Revolutieaire Vraagel. And in 1795 he published an article entitled “Why should women not also be able to rule the nation?”—which was signed in the name of “our women’s council.” A year later, he also translated Mary Wollstonecraft’s Vindication of the Rights of Women into Dutch.

Two other well-known radicals also publicly championed women’s political emancipation in the 1790s. Lieuve van Ollefen, a professional publicist and a great admirer of Betje Wolff in his youth, not only published the letter from Etta Palm d’Aelders noted above, but wrote a play called The Revolutionary Household. In the play, a father teaches his six daughters occupations that are typically male; the father boasts, as a result, that he is revolutionary not only in his politics but also in his personal life. Meanwhile, Gerrit Paape called on his contemporaries not to do just half the job in their revolution. In his political testament from 1798, with the subtitle Revolutionary Dream, he describes how the ideal society will look in 1998. Men and women will then, according to Paape, be entirely equal.

In the 1790s, there was also an increasing number of women who openly published in political periodicals. In 1795, for example, Maria Paape, the wife of Gerrit Paape, wrote the “Republican Prayer
FIG. 2. Illustration for the pamphlet Heuglyk vooruitzicht of vaderlandsche droom ('Happy prospect or Patriotic dream'), a Patriotic pamphlet. Kaat Mossel is hanged together with other Orangist leaders. (Algemeen Rijksarchief Den Haag, Hof van Holland 5527.)
of a Patriotic Woman." The Nationale Bataafsche Courant published five pieces by women in 1797; the Oprechte Nationale Courant published no less than sixteen in 1798. These and other revolutionary periodicals are only incompletely preserved, so these are minimal numbers from a limited sample. But among the many female authors, two stand out as especially interesting: Petronella Moens and Catharina Heybeek. Petronella Moens was born blind, but as a successful author she dictated her work to a secretary. Together with her friend, the radical Patriot Bernard Bosch, she helped to establish a number of political periodicals in the revolutionary period, and in 1792, they had jointly produced a commentary on the new French constitution. In 1798 and 1799, she directed a periodical called De Vriendin van het Vaderland (The [Female] Friend of the Fatherland) in which she touched on a broad range of general political topics. With regard to the position of women in particular, Petronella Moens echoed the ideas of Bete Wolff: better training and education is the beginning of further emancipation.

Catharina Heybeek was, without a doubt, one of the most exceptional and colorful characters of the Batavian Revolution. Originally a wool spinner, she is reminiscent of the French sans-culottes whose radicalism and passion she easily matched. Lieuwe van Ollefen, with whom she lived, called her a "girl of exceptional talents" and predicted that she would become a "brilliant star . . . in the array of fine literature." Together Van Ollefen and Heybeek directed the Nationale Bataafsche Courant to which Catharina regularly contributed articles. She wrote, for example, a distinctly critical account of a visit to the National Assembly; but perhaps her most inflammatory work was a dialogue, published in August, 1797, between a "clubist" and his revolutionary wife, Kaatje, on the subject of the proposed federalist constitution. Noting that her husband is wearing his best pants, Kaatje suspects that he is once again going off to his political club. Kaatje immediately protests, but changes her mind when she learns that the radicals hope to vote down the proposed federalist constitution: "Bravo, young man . . . even if I got you back without your head, it wouldn't matter; for every Orangist whose neck you break, you'll get a shot [of gin] from me." When she and Van Ollefen were arrested by the authorities and accused of sedition, Heybeek defended herself saying that she had written the dialogue for the education of the "less discerning citizens" and was justified by the "state of revolution in which the Fatherland presently finds itself."

Undeterred by the arrest, she wrote another dialogue a month later in which Kaatje tells her husband: "You must admit women to the clubs."
Though the voices of female political writers and the arguments in favor of the political emancipation of women were clear, distinct, and generally on the side of the Batavian revolutionaries during the 1790s, there were still other avenues, distinctly reminiscent of the 1780s, for women’s involvement in the revolutionary process. On the side of counter-revolution, for example, the Freule van Dorth tot Holthuisen recalls the leadership role of Princess Wilhelmina. In 1799, an Orangist revolt in the east of the country was serious enough that French troops were required to put it down. In the aftermath, the Freule van Dorth tot Holthuisen (in the absence of her brother, the head of her aristocratic family) was one of two leaders who were sentenced to death for their part in the revolt and, by extension, one of only a few people who were executed for their political activities in the entire revolutionary period. Similarly, research in the judicial archives of Amsterdam indicates that, in the streets, women like Kaat Mossel could still be identified and arrested as leaders of popular Orangism. But these cases were exceptional during the 1790s, for on the whole Orangism remained weak—largely limited to sporadic street brawls—and, consistent with that trend, the role of Orangist women was nearly invisible, especially by comparison with the 1780s.

In the end, then, we can observe a decisive shift in the political roles played by women during the Batavian Revolution. On the revolutionary side, the role of female political writers, evident but weak and secondary during the 1780s, became clear and distinct on the side of the revolutionaries during the 1790s; simultaneously, specifically women’s issues for the first time emerged as part of the political discourse. Women writers and feminist issues were, to be sure, never dominant during this period. Indeed, these developments can be associated especially with a few prominent couples—teams like Catharina Heybeek and Lieus van Ollefen, Maria and Gerrit Paape, and Petronella Moens and Bernard Bosch—who were closely identified with the radicals who seized power only briefly during 1798. On the counter-revolutionary side, the leadership of Orangist women, so prominent and important during the 1780s, all but disappeared during the 1790s. To be sure, the execution of the Freule van Dorth tot Holthuisen and the prosecution of Orangist women for street disturbances suggest that the Batavian authorities still took Orangist women seriously, but during the Batavian Revolution, Orangist counter-revolution—whether male or female—was more spectral than real.

Viewed in a broader comparative context, these Dutch patterns are striking and problematic in several ways. The essentially secondary and supportive role of women in the Patriot movement of the 1780s is reminiscent of the role women played earlier in the American
Revolution; but the emergence of more strident, feminist voices in the Batavian period goes well beyond the American model and echoes, instead, the radicalism of the early years of the first French Republic. Though foreign examples—both contemporary and historical—undoubtedly played a role in the development of all the eighteenth-century revolutions, the distinctively Dutch shift in women's political roles we have suggested here needs to be understood in light of the peculiarities of Dutch history both during the old regime and in the course of the two democratic revolutions.

Gender and Politics under the Old Regime

The eighteenth century has long been associated in Dutch history with decline—cultural, political, economic, and social. For a time in the seventeenth century, during the Dutch "golden age," the Amsterdam market was the center of the expanding international economy of Europe; Dutch ships dominated the seas; Dutch artists and intellectuals set new cultural standards; and Dutch armies repeatedly fended off the attacks of Louis XIV and various allies. Clearly the miracle could not last, and the next stage of Dutch development was sure to disappoint. Foreign competition supported by aggressive state action in France and England ate away at Dutch commercial advantages; the waves of religious refugees, who had so enriched Dutch economic and cultural life, subsided; and the enormous financial burden of almost continual warfare took its inevitable toll. In comparison with the seventeenth century, the eighteenth century seemed like an unmitigated disaster: the Republic's policy of strict neutrality in international affairs belied a much diminished military capacity; the refined manners of the political elites betrayed the self-interest and corruption of the urban oligarchies; and the increasing burden of poor relief seemed the unmistakable token of economic decline.

Modern research has shown the Dutch Republic's eighteenth-century decline to be much more relative than absolute—relative especially to the expansion and maturation of the British and French imperial economies in the course of the eighteenth century. Still, the contemporary perception of decline is important and gives a special flavor not only to the historical literature on the period but to the political conflicts that emerged at the end of the century. Indeed, the perceived problem of decline—in various moral, political, and economic guises—was especially characteristic of the literature of the Dutch Enlightenment, which grafted a new vision of national rejuvenation onto the older traditions of Christian sociability and human-
ist scholarship. At the same time, a spate of new organizations such as literary, reading, and reforming societies engaged remarkably diverse segments of the Dutch population in this search for the renewal of the Fatherland. The result was that virtually everyone—Patriots and Orangists, Calvinists and dissenters, merchants and manufacturers, aristocrats and peasants—could agree that reform of some sort was necessary. The difficult question that had eventually to be confronted was, of course, what kind of reform?

Female writers were part of this wide-ranging discussion, which included the issue of gender roles; but like the Dutch Enlightenment as a whole, the writers were not politicized and the issues were not terribly divisive. Most of the literature stressed separate roles for men and women, and especially the so-called spectator literature promulgated an essentially bourgeois, domestic model for women as wives and mothers. To be sure, there were important eighteenth-century debates and disagreements between, for example, orthodox Calvinists and natural law philosophers; but women authors, like Betje Wolff, did not stake out strikingly different or radical positions with regard to women. Wolff, among others, pleaded for better education and training for women. As we have seen, however, she was herself reluctant to stake out a direct role for women in politics, and she did not develop aggressive demands for equal rights once she entered the political fray.

On the face of it, it would seem that eighteenth-century Dutch women had little motivation to agitate specifically for civil and political rights, for according to contemporaries, nowhere did women enjoy greater freedom than in the Dutch Republic. Indeed, some of women's gender-specific demands that emerged in the French Revolution were well-established rights in parts of the northern Netherlands. Already in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, foreigners were amazed at the independence of Dutch women: they engaged in trade, made distant business trips, managed shops, and were permitted to visit theaters and inns without accompaniment. Still, we cannot speak of the rights of women, as such. The Republic, after all, a country where the rights of citizens could vary greatly, depending on social class and place of residence; moreover, there was no clear distinction between private and public law. Thus, a woman who had come of age could not marry without the consent of her parents in the province of Overijssel but could do so in the province of Holland.

In general, the legal position of the mature unmarried or wid-
owed woman differed very little from that of men.27 She could enter into contracts, assume an inheritance, make labor agreements as either employer or employee, engage a notary, initiate legal proceedings, serve as a witness in criminal law, and so forth. The position of the married woman was different because she was considered to be under the custody of her husband. Still, she could retain a great deal of independence. If she were married according to the provisions of a marriage contract, she managed her own property; in addition, as a merchant she could enter into commercial contracts, incur debts or extend loans, and stand as a guarantor. Also, if her husband were absent for an extended period, a woman generally managed the joint property. Finally, in this officially Protestant state, she could divorce her husband on grounds of adultery or desertion.

The economic position of women during the old regime is more difficult to determine.38 In general, we can say that a large number of occupations were performed by both men and women, though we find few women in socially prestigious and well-paid positions. In Amsterdam, for example, where notarial archives for the first decade of the eighteenth century can serve as a guide,39 some 416 primary occupations were listed, of which 21 were practiced exclusively by women—retail flower merchants or knife sharpeners, for instance. Another 115 occupations were practiced by both men and women, while the remaining 280 were exclusively male. These figures do not indicate the proportions of women to men, but they do suggest that the possibilities for women were relatively diverse, including skilled occupations like bakers, beer brewers, printers, bookkeepers, cashiers, midwives, and metalworkers, as well as a number of marginal occupations like street singer or prostitute.

In many parts of the Dutch Republic, guilds remained important economic institutions with control over critical labor markets; most cities had 20 to 30 such organizations. Though some guilds excluded women from participation altogether, most guilds at least allowed a widow to continue her husband’s trade on the condition she hired a master craftsman.60 Some guilds allowed women to be full members; others allowed them to be gildekeepers—that is, to purchase the right to sell an article controlled by the guild. Besides these, there were some guilds that consisted entirely of women, such as (in Haarlem) wool seamstresses, barrelers of peat, and sellers of discarded or used clothing. Only in this sort of guild could women have leadership functions.

Although a large number of occupations were, thus, open to
women, only a few women were able to take advantage of the opportunities. Notarial archives in Rotterdam, for example, suggest only minimal participation by women in economic activities: just three to five percent of those listed as having an occupation were women. This impression of the economic marginality of women is confirmed by two additional considerations. Among the upper classes, there were many more women living as rentiers than men, and at the lower levels of society many more women than men were eligible for and depended on poor relief. Thus, at both social extremes, Dutch society made it relatively easy for women to withdraw from active participation in economic affairs. It is also possible that the independent economic activity of women declined in the course of the eighteenth century, especially as the woman as independent entrepreneur disappeared because of structural shifts in the economy. In Rotterdam in the first half of the eighteenth century, for example, there were several dozen breweries, a number of which were run by women. By the end of the century, however, only a few large breweries remained, all of them run by men. This trend, which is evident in Haarlem as well, would be consistent with what is often suggested for other European countries; a gradual withdrawal of women from direct participation in economic life between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries.

The old regime nevertheless provided Dutch women with two major avenues to political power, active influence in political affairs, and involvement in the political process. One was by birth and marriage. Since feudal law was quite favorable to women, aristocratic women could wield considerable power by inheriting noble or seigneurial rights. In the Netherlands, some fiefs, specifically manorial estates, could be inherited by women, and the seigneurial rights of a village or manor could consist, among others, of the appointment of sheriffs, village magistrates, and even preachers. A lady of the manor thus had considerable power at the local level and was permitted, remarkably, to appoint men to positions women could not hold. Since in the eighteenth century, many manorial rights were purchased by wealthy burghers, affluent women who were not of noble birth could also have such prerogatives at their disposal. Being married to a man with an important position could also give considerable informal influence to women, especially in the days of patronage, informal political bargains, and family networks. It is well known, for example, that several prominent regents were strongly influenced by their wives. Thus, among the political elites—in the circles of the Stad-
houder’s court or within the landed nobility and the urban patriciates—the political influence of women could be great, both formally and informally.

Outside the political aristocracy, the formal prerogatives and rights of women rapidly diminished. Roturier women could obtain the citizenship rights of a city, but these were devoid of political meaning. Municipal governing functions and offices were, meanwhile, exclusively the prerogative of men. A second avenue to political involvement did open up, however, as lower-class women were nevertheless able to become involved in the political processes of the Dutch Republic through their informal leadership of urban neighborhoods and, by extension, through their organization and leadership of traditional collective protest. To be sure, the traditional historical wisdom often suggests that the Dutch Republic was an oasis of domestic tranquility in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but this view needs to be revised. Here we will focus on the special roles played by women within the overall patterns of popular protest and collective action.

Throughout the history of the Republic, there were, with a certain regularity, popular protests and disturbances of various kinds. In general, the patterns of popular protest in the Dutch Republic did not differ greatly from the general European pattern, and the repertoire of Dutch collective political action includes the now familiar range of elements—from petitions expressing collective grievances to the plundering of houses and taxation populaire. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, religious conflicts, especially, entailed popular mobilization, while in the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries tax protests and food riots were more common, particularly in the urban and commercial western provinces. What is more, during the Republic’s most important political crises around 1617, 1672, 1702, and 1747, a variety of popular protests dovetailed with serious divisions within the ruling aristocracy. The result, in various parts of the Republic, was fundamental changes in the oligarchic regime—changes not only in the personnel of local governments but also in the rules under which the regents governed.

Within this rich and extensive history of popular protest and collective action, the role of women is striking and significant. Of the hundreds of popular protests and upheavals in the province of Holland during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there were no less than 50 demonstrations and 26 larger riots that involved
women exclusively; in addition, where both men and women participated, women sometimes acted as a separate group. More specifically, of the twelve food riots for which we have information about the participants, ten were the work chiefly of women; of the 38 tax riots for which information on participation exists, women played leading roles in ten. But perhaps most impressive is the participation of women in collective action revolving around explicitly political demands, especially in the three waves of Orangist demonstrations and riots in 1653, 1672, and 1747. In 1672, for example, women were at the forefront of major riots in The Hague, Alkmaar, Hoorn, and Rotterdam, while eleven of seventeen lesser crowd demonstrations on behalf of Prince William III either predominantly or exclusively involved women.

During these riots and demonstrations in Holland, women generally had quite specific tasks. Frequently they were initiators and leaders; they beat drums and waved banners. Screaming above the tumult, they often communicated the grievances that animated the crowd. The actual violence of plundering or stone-throwing was usually left to the younger males who were nevertheless urged on by female leaders. Compared with their male counterparts, the women in Dutch crowds were relatively old, generally between 30 and 50 years of age, but sometimes even older. Often the leaders were women who were well-known because of their highly visible occupations, typically in fish and fruit marketing.

The prominence of women in the history of popular protest in the Dutch Republic can be explained in a variety of ways. In the food and tax riots—especially those involving the heavy excises of Holland—the role of women as housekeepers undoubtedly was important. They were the first to be confronted with high prices and scarcity, and thus they were naturally the first to take action. In addition, one may point to the contemporary view of the character of women: women were often seen as naturally inclined to rebellion and disobedience; riotous conduct flowed from their very nature. Moreover, it was a common opinion that the authorities would be less aggressive in dealing with women than with men; women could count on less severe repression and on more lenient treatment from judges. Thus, it was a more or less accepted fact that women stood in the front line of riots.

All of these considerations may have played a role, but the most important factor seems to be that women stood at the center of the social networks of urban neighborhoods and rural villages because
most Dutch riots appear not to have been rooted in formal organizational structures, such as guilds and civic guards (schutterijen). In the late Middle Ages, especially in the southern Netherlands, guilds had been important in mobilizing the middle groups of urban populations for concerted action against local elites; but from the sixteenth century onward, in the province of Holland especially, authorities had been able to prevent or reduce the independence of guilds. Thus, only in a few cities—for example, Dordrecht in Holland or Deventer in Overijssel—did guilds retain sufficient autonomy to play an important role in the organization of popular protest during the Republic. Similarly, the civic guards, which in principle mobilized all able-bodied adult males in the maintenance of public order, either had fallen into disuse or were controlled sufficiently by local authorities to prevent them from directly challenging the established order. In exceptional circumstances, such as 1672 and 1747, they did threaten the municipal regents by demanding, in some cities, popular election of militia officers or refusing to follow orders to repress crowds. Even so, few schutters show up as crowd participants.

But if formal structures were not generally at the root of popular mobilization, even relatively spontaneous tax and food riots required a certain amount of preparation. Collective grumbling about taxes in the marketplace or political discussions in cafés could, in some cases, lead to protest demonstrations and even collective violence. Still, for the mustering of a large number of people—a crowd—a minimum of organization was always necessary. People often organized impromptu parades with improvised banners and wooden barrels used as drums. Indeed, within such crowds there often emerged a structure that imitated the military or the civic guard—the leaders were often called captains, their comrades were called officers, and there were always drummers and standard-bearers. The social-organizational foundations of this kind of action can best be seen, as Craig Calhoun argues, in traditional communities.66 Within established communities, neighborhood and kinship networks offered lines of communication and allegiance and helped to recruit individuals for collective action.

The networks of kinship and friendship that facilitated popular mobilization in Holland were strongest at the neighborhood level in cities and at the village level in the countryside. In 1747, for example, a tax protest involving several villages appears to have been organized by a single family; in other cases, we find the participation of four or five members of a family. But neighborhood networks were undoubt-
edly more important in the many cities of Holland. In some lower-class neighborhoods in the larger cities—for example, the Jordaan and Kattenburg districts in Amsterdam and the Achterklooster in Rotterdam—we can even see the development of traditions of popular protest and collective action that lasted from the seventeenth century well into the twentieth.

What is critical for our purposes is the fact, generally accepted by contemporaries, that Dutch neighborhood and village life was very much influenced by women. In moralistic tracts, for example, clergymen impressed upon the population that maintenance of the community was the special familial responsibility of women. Men and women had separate spheres of existence, and the management of household finances and relations with relatives and neighbors were the exclusive domain of women. Women also organized neighborhood assistance, passed on oral traditions, and, especially in the cities, dominated the social education of the laboring classes. Thus, when a community's interests were threatened, women were in the best position to mobilize the population in the short term. As the first to be mobilized, women were particularly active in the beginning of riots, bringing the crowds together as did two women in Delft in 1616: With one beating on a kettle and the other on a box, they proceeded through the city, assembling a crowd of women and boys, one of whom carried a banner made from a blue apron. We must also remember that women often dominated the public spaces of Dutch communities, hawking fish, vegetables, fruit, and many other types of merchandise. These women in particular could count on the solidarity of a city quarter or village, mobilize its inhabitants, and channel collective dissatisfaction into a demonstration or riot; they were the bearers of traditions of popular protest and collective action.

**Popular Mobilization, Democratic Revolution, and Gender Roles**

Returning, then, to the revolutionary era, we can see that the prominent leadership of women on the side of the Orangist movement is an obvious extension of typically old-regime political patterns. Princess Wilhelmina, by virtue of her marriage to William V and her family ties to the kings of Prussia, was in a unique position to take bold, decisive action on behalf of the Orangist cause. Likewise, the Vrouw van Almelo could be an influential force in Overijssel politics as a consequence of her inherited seigneurial rights. Meanwhile, Kaat Mossel serves as an especially vivid example of old-regime crowd
leadership by virtue of her position within the Achterklooster district of Rotterdam. Indeed, her indictment and trial records provide invaluable inside information: on how old-regime crowds were mobilized; how news was passed secretly but quickly through the neighborhood; how women came to be on the front lines of the demonstrations against the Patriot militia; and how, in this case, Kaat Mossel’s leadership was rooted in her special connections with Orangists outside the neighborhood. These connections allowed her freely to provide songbooks, pamphlets, decorative Orangist symbols, and even, as the authorities charged, bribes to young men who executed the violence that led to the panicky response of the Patriot militiamen in 1784.\(^97\)

On the other side of the revolutionary political divide, we might, in principle, expect that such a rich tradition of popular protest and collective action would be of great comfort to the leaders of a political movement that sought to institutionalize the principle of popular sovereignty. Such was not, however, the case with the Dutch Patriots of the 1780s. On the contrary, the political discourse of the Patriots exhibits a strong undercurrent of fear and suspicion of that tradition. This is most clearly evident in the language of *het grauw* and *het gepeuvel*—both collective nouns with obviously pejorative connotations, roughly equivalent to the English “rabble” or “mob”—that was frequently used by Patriot writers, including Betje Wolff, to describe their political enemies.\(^88\) Given the fact that this kind of pejorative language to describe popular collective action most often proceeds from the mouths of established authorities, it is indeed striking that it was present in the popular literature of the Patriots long before they seized power anywhere.\(^69\)

To some extent, the Patriots’ obvious fear of *het grauw* may reflect the fact that disgruntled oligarchs were an important part of the Patriots’ revolutionary coalition, but it more clearly represents the important and not unreasonable lessons that the Dutch Patriots had learned from their own history. In particular, the recent history of the crisis of 1747–50 taught them that crowds were a very imperfect instrument of popular sovereignty, for in that fateful period *het grauw* had, in the name of political reform, launched the House of Orange into an unprecedented position of hereditary power.\(^70\) Yet the crowds had eventually disappeared, and the Prince of Orange very quickly made his peace with the oligarchy. Thus, the political reforms that the crowds had demanded were never implemented, and in the end, *het grauw* had shown itself to be undisciplined and ephemeral.
Against the backdrop of this reading of Dutch history, the mobilization of the Patriot movement in the 1780s can be seen as a series of attempts to reform popular politics as well as aristocratic politics—as a deliberate attempt to replace the essentially defensive or reactive politics of the crowd with a new kind of aggressive or proactive politics invested in revolutionary committees and militias. These objectives had clear and profound implications for gender roles in the politics of the future. As early as 1782, the Patriots transformed the venerable tradition of humble petition for redress of grievances into an aggressive tactic to pressure reluctant (and largely defenseless) Magistrates into favorable action on important political issues. In order to draft petitions and organize petition campaigns, the Patriots often created citizens’ committees (burgercommissies), modeled on the American committees of correspondence, which were especially useful in the larger cities. The citizens’ committees also had great symbolic value because they offered the opportunity to thrust political outsiders, like religious dissenters who were specifically excluded from holding public office, onto the center of the political stage.

In the end, however, the preferred mechanism by which the Patriots mobilized their popular movement was the voluntary militia—what they usually called the vrijcorps, the exercitie genootschap, or the genootschap van wapenhandel. Once again seizing the American example, the Patriots sought to create a permanent political vigilance among an activist citizenry by creating voluntary associations with the explicit purpose of defending against both foreign and domestic tyranny. Unlike the old-regime civic guard (schutterij), the independent vrijcorps could be deliberately tolerant and inclusive of everyone regardless of religion or social position; still, it would be uniform and harmonious in that presumably only those good citizens who truly supported the Patriots’ cause would join. Indeed, as J. D. van der Capellen suggested, the voluntary militia could be considered an experiment in self-government, a microcosm of the new democratic ideal: Free and equal individuals would join together, draw up a mutually acceptable compact to govern their affairs, elect their leadership; but in the end be orderly, disciplined, and obedient to the decisions of their chosen officers.

It is, of course, generally true that the stated intentions of revolutionaries can be considered only a very imperfect guide to the reality of revolutionary situations. Still, the apparent determination of the leadership of the Patriot movement both to democratize the oligarchy and to organize and discipline popular politics is reflected
in the general characteristics of the revolutionary conflict that developed in the 1780s. Thus, to a remarkable extent the popular Patriot movement followed the prescriptions of the new proactive democratic model, while the popular Orangism of the 1780s reflected the generally reactive characteristics of the older political tradition. It was equally evident, however, that these differences tended to diminish in the course of two decades of political conflict.

However much the leaders of the Patriot movement might have considered theirs an entirely new sort of mobilization, it is nevertheless clear that they had to rely on typically old-regime solidarities in order to put together a viable revolutionary coalition. In cities like Deventer and Zwolle, the elders of relatively independent guilds organized the most successful petition campaigns, and when the Patriots created new citizens' committees there, they explicitly incorporated the leaders of the guilds. In Utrecht, the burgerhoflieden—neighborhood or district officers—remained important leaders alongside the citizens' committee and the voluntary militia; in Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and Dordrecht, the Patriots built with variable success on the traditional schutterijen. In the countryside, of course, the patterns were different, but the structures of the old regime were nevertheless visible in the mobilization of the Patriot movement. In Bathmen (Overijssel), for example, the Patriots built on local resistance to land enclosures within the communal mark organization to mobilize a clear majority of the adult males in a voluntary militia.

By contrast, in Friesland, where there were no less than 48 militia units in the countryside, the powerful officials of the grijzenijen (rural districts) were apparently able to use their clientele networks either to promote or to obstruct the Patriot movement.

Likewise, however much the Patriot leadership might have wished to avoid the tumult of het grauw, they discovered from bitter experience that crowd actions were virtually indispensable in their rise to power. In the city of Utrecht, during the first of their municipal revolutions, the Patriots demonstrated remarkable reluctance, even timidity, in the use of force; but in the end they repeatedly organized massive demonstrations, during which terrified Magistrates were not allowed to leave the Stadhuis, in order to remove Orangist regents and to implement their new electoral system. In Zwolle, too, the Patriots eventually mobilized angry crowds to seize control of the municipality. By the time the Patriots came to power in Holland, all reluctance to use force had been abandoned, for in Amsterdam Patriot crowds not only forced the removal of Orangist
FIG. 3. Konstalmanak 1781. Depicted is a riot in Groningen in 1748, with women waving a banner and beating a drum. (Universiteitsbibliotheek Amsterdam)
regents, but systematically plundered the Kattenburg district where their popular opposition was most clearly concentrated.\textsuperscript{81}

In reality, then, the Patriots found that they could not do away with the past entirely. Indeed, the old regime provided them with powerful, even indispensable, resources with which they could bring in the new. Yet as the struggle developed, the new creations—the specifically political, voluntary organizations—increasingly set the tone and provided the leadership of the movement. Especially the Patriots' militias, coming together in provincial and national associations, bound an otherwise diverse and localized movement into something like a national whole. The increasing importance of the vrijcorps was facilitated as well by the escalation of the level of the conflict in 1786 and 1787; local political initiatives finally gave way, of necessity, to broader provincial and national military strategies.\textsuperscript{82} Thus by 1787, when it is necessary to speak of an emerging civil war within the Republic, the deliberately new, proactive elements of the Patriots' mobilization were overshadowing the essentially reactive remnants of the older, popular political traditions.

But to a certain extent, the same could be said of the Orangist or counter-revolutionary coalition as it developed in the course of the 1780s. Although the first signs of popular Orangism looked to the Patriots like simply a rehash of 1748, as the conflict intensified the Orangists came to look more and more like their antagonists. First, on the feast of St. Nicholas in 1782 and thereafter regularly on March 8, William V's birthday, there were rowdy Orangist demonstrations, the most famous of which occurred in Den Haag, Rotterdam, and Leiden. Essentially reactive to the sudden explosion of the Patriot movement, these demonstrations bore all the earmarks of traditional crowd protests in Holland, and the pointed reminders of the Orangist victories of 1747 were by no means lost on the Patriots.\textsuperscript{83} Recounting the demonstration in Rotterdam in March, 1783, for example, an influential Patriot weekly remarked that these "riotous excesses and seditious impudences" were started and perpetuated "with the very same signs, symbols and slogans by which in former times the Fatherland was brought into the most violent upheaval."\textsuperscript{84}

After the initial shock, however, it became obvious that the Patriots could use their political influence to forbid the public display of Orangist symbols; more important, they could use their militias to defeat the less-disciplined Orangist crowds in the streets. Thus, the leaders of the Orangist movement found that they had to adapt their strategy to the radically changed circumstances in which het gruwel was being out-organized and out-hustled by "the respectable citizenry," which the Patriots claimed rhetorically to represent. Indeed, spurred on by an enormous infusion of British cash, a small but well-con-
ected group of Orangists began a concerted attempt to beat the Patriots at their own political game—creating Orangist clubs, organizing mass petition campaigns, electing citizens' committees, and, where possible, arming Orangist militias. At all costs, these Orangist leaders wished to avoid the undisciplined tumult of the crowd that had merely become, in many places, an excuse the Patriots gladly used to discredit and repress the Orangist movement.

In the end, then, the Patriots were remarkably successful in transforming the nature of popular politics in the Dutch Republic. Though it was not the only means by which Patriots mobilized their popular movement, the voluntary militia nevertheless became the most common and effective weapon in the Patriots' arsenal. With regard to gender roles, the implications of this tendency toward the military organization of the popular movement are obvious: women were, ipso facto, excluded from full political participation. Clearly, as we have already seen, women were not shunned entirely; rather, they were encouraged to take up honorary, albeit peripheral, roles as "donatrices" to the militias. On the other side, the Orangist movement visibly embraced the leadership of women like Kaat Mossel, not as a matter of positive principle, but as a proven expedient. Consequently, as the Dutch political process was transformed by the infusion of a constantly vigilant, disciplined, and armed Patriot movement, the Orangist leaders, too, were ready to abandon the tactics of the old-regime crowd.

At the same time, the Patriots took some important steps toward the institutionalization of some form of representational democracy to replace the oligarchical structures of the old regime. Like so many other eighteenth-century revolutionaries, the Dutch Patriots found that the concrete realization of the principle of popular sovereignty was no easy task; but in both the pamphlet literature and in the actual construction of electoral systems within specific communities it seems clear that they were generally moving toward individualist and essentially male notions of active citizenship. Patriot publicists and constitution-writers, like the Americans before them, often linked active citizenship with the right and obligation to bear arms, which was considered an exclusively male affair. Likewise, only those burghers who paid a minimum amount of direct taxation would be considered active, that is, enfranchised citizens. This clearly implied the political disenfranchisement of both collectivities, like self-perpetuating town councils and guilds, and those who were considered to be dependent persons, like servants, children, convicts, and, of course, women. To be sure, the exclusion of women was not explicitly a matter of public discussion; rather, it seems to have been assumed that women, gen-
erally dependent on fathers and husbands, would not play an active political role in the future, just as in the past only men had been formally admitted to the ranks of the municipal oligarchies.

Under the Orangist restoration, the Patriots' militias were abolished, houses of leading Patriots were plundered, magistracies were purged, and, not surprisingly, it was Patriot rather than Orangist women who were arrested for political offenses in the streets. But neither the political processes that had been set in motion nor the political education of those who had participated in the struggle could be so easily undone. In Amsterdam, for example, the explicitly political vrijcorps gave way to more subtly political leesgezelschappen (reading societies), where mobilized citizens could continue to discuss issues of mutual and public concern. Likewise, the popular press was bridled and censored under the restoration regime, but it continued to be political nevertheless under the cover of transparent literary conventions and imaginary worlds. Meanwhile, those groups that, in the thick of the revolutionary struggle, had been recruited and organized to bolster the Orangist cause did not necessarily vanish immediately from the political stage like the old-regime crowds. In Deventer, for example, guildsmen who had abandoned the Patriot coalition to form the basis of a popular Orangist movement continued to agitate for a more thoroughgoing counter-revolution and a more permanent place in the political life of the community; in Gouda, members of the newly created Orangist club not only continued to attack old Patriot enemies, but rallied numerous protests against the restoration regime in the hope of securing the political rewards they thought their due. In neither case, however, did the agitation of the Orangist faithful have its desired effect, for like his father in the crisis of 1747, William V finally chose the regent oligarchy, not the popular movement.

Gender and the Genesis of Modern Dutch Politics

The resumption of the revolutionary process with the Batavian victory of 1795 had, as we have already seen, a distinctly different outcome; but it is clear that, in a profound sense, the Batavian Revolution merely completed the reform and transformation of popular politics that the Patriots had begun in the 1780s. The explicitly political voluntary associations—committees, clubs, societies—that were uprooted by the Orangist restoration sprouted in even greater numbers after 1795. Meanwhile, a national militia to defend the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity took up where the Patriots' inde-
pendent *vrijcorps* had left off. A new feature of the democratic restructuring during the Batavian Revolution was the creation (even before the centralization of the state) of a system of *wijk* or *grondwergaderingen* (neighborhood assemblies), similar to the French *sections*, which served further to regularize and channel popular politics at the local level. As a result of these changes, the crowd, which, just 25 years earlier, had been the hallmark of popular politics, largely disappeared from the political stage. Simultaneously, the destruction of old-regime privilege and patronage resulted in the formalization and bureaucratization of Dutch government as never before.

As was the case with the Patriots' program in the 1780s, one obvious result of these Batavian reforms was that women were wilfully excluded from direct political participation. The rejection of the politics of the crowd entailed, of course, the elimination of the important roles that women had played as organizers of and participants in the popular politics of the old regime. The rejection of old-regime privilege entailed as well the elimination of the kinds of formal authority and informal influence that aristocratic women had achieved through inheritance or marriage. And to the extent that the structure of the Batavian state remained even after the expulsion of the French in 1813, these developments clearly implied that in the future Dutch women would have a good deal less space in which they could be actively and directly engaged in political action. This is not to suggest, however, that women became politically invisible. On the contrary, as we have seen, some Dutch women were able to develop a new kind of political voice that was well-adapted to the political culture of the new regime.

In the torrent of words that was so characteristic of the revolutionary era, it is not at all surprising that women should join the rhetorical fray as journalists and pamphleteers. In the last pre-revolutionary decades of the Dutch Republic—which was surely one of the most literate countries in early modern Europe—several Dutch women already had distinguished themselves as gifted writers. Though the exclusively male Society for Netherlandic Literature (founded in 1766) would not admit them to membership, authors like Betje Wolff, Aagje Deken, and Belle van Zuylen (Madame de Charriere) attained not only considerable immediate popularity but lasting literary reputations. As we have already seen, Betje Wolff first had to overcome her reservations about direct political involvement for women, but by 1786 she clearly had chosen the side of Patriots in a series of political pamphlets. Indeed, as the conflicts intensified, it became difficult for anyone, male or female, to remain
politically neutral. Still, because so much of the political writing was anonymous or pseudonymous, it is difficult to measure the extent of female participation in the Patriots' battle for the rhetorical high ground in the 1780s.

In any case, during the 1790s female publicists became more visible. Thus, while the crowd politics of Kaat Mossel might overshadow Bette Wolff's support of the Patriot Revolution, the radical politics of a journalist like Catherina Heybeek can be considered more characteristic of the Batavian Revolution than the occasional street slogans that were shouted in support of the House of Orange. Paired with the increased visibility of female authors was the emergence of specifically women's issues in the political debate. As had been the case earlier in France, a fluid and unpredictable revolutionary situation in the Netherlands provided a unique opportunity for radical publicists, whether male or female, to develop a critique of the trend toward exclusively male politics that was visible under the Batavian regime.

By the turn of the century, however, the tide had once again turned. The women's clubs had disappeared along with most of the female publicists. Catherina Heybeek stopped publishing in 1798; Aagie Deken and Bette Wolff died in the same year; Etta Palm d'Aelders died in 1799, three months after she was released from prison; Petronella Moens involved herself exclusively with domestic and educational issues after 1799. A notable exception was Aletta Hulshoff, who was involved in the publication of anti-Orangist pamphlets in 1804. She was arrested, and though she denied being the author, she was sentenced to two years in prison. In 1809 she published another seditious pamphlet attacking Napoleon and was again arrested. This time she escaped from prison and fled via England to New York where she continued her career as a publicist and translated the French constitution of 1793 into English. Finally, in 1817 Aletta Hulshoff returned to the Netherlands, but like so many others, male and female, she turned away from direct political involvement.

On balance, then, the transformation of Dutch political culture under the aegis of democratic revolution brought no lasting political reward for Dutch women. On the contrary, the shift in the political roles that women played during the two Dutch revolutions highlights the fact that the modernization of the Dutch state and the transformation of popular politics that attended it effectively eliminated the paths by which women had come to exercise political power and influence in the past. Meanwhile, the new centralized and rationalized political structures afforded women no comparable or compensating
political space. Revolutionary publicists, to be sure, had developed a
new kind of political voice and urged the creation of new political
opportunities for women, but the radical democratic experiments of
the 1790s turned out to be as ephemeral as the old-regime crowds.
As a final reprise in 1813, Dutch women again played an important
role in the anti-French crowds that attended the collapse of the Napo-
leonic regime in the Netherlands; but in this essentially reactive role,
they were unable either to reverse the political processes of the last
decades or to carve out new political opportunities for the future.
Only toward the end of the nineteenth century, with the liberal con-
stitutional monarchy setting the framework for modern democratic
politics, did Dutch women collectively reenter the political arena,
making forceful proactive claims for the new kind of political equality
and opportunity that the radicals had first anticipated in the 1790s.

Notes

The authors wish to thank Lisbeth Sassen for her assistance with the research.
This collaboration was made possible by joint funding from the Netherlands-
America Commission for Educational Exchange and the Nederlandse Organisatie voor Zuiver-Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek.

1. The best survey of the entire period is Simon Schama, Patriots and Liberators: Revolution in the Netherlands, 1780–1813 (New York, 1977). For a
critical review of the literature since 1945, see E. O. G. Haitma Mulier, “De
geschiedschrijving over de Patriottentijd en de Bataafse Tijd,” in Kantelend

2. The most forceful statement of the thesis of continuity from the
Patriots of the 1780s to the liberals of 1848 is C. H. E. de Wit, De strijd tussen
aristocratie en democratie in Nederland, 1780–1848 (Heerlen, 1965); cf. E. H.

3. An important exception is an unpublished paper by Dini Helmers
and Marja Koster, “Idee en werkelijkheid: Speurtocht naar veranderingen
in de ideeën over de maatschappelijke positie van de vrouw in de Republiek
aan het einde van de 18e eeuw” (Amsterdam, 1985). See also Anke Pouw,
“De ‘waare verlichting’ van de vrouw,” Comenius, September, 1986; H. E. van
Gelder, Feministische Bataven,” in Fragmenten Vrouwengeschiedenis, ed.

4. Cf. Wayne Ph. te Brake, “Popular Politics and the Dutch Patriot Revo-

5. On the broader context of the Patriot Revolution, see R. R. Palmer,

6. On the Republic’s international military and diplomatic position, see


11. Te Brake, “Popular Politics.”


14. See, for example, the print entitled “Heuglijk vooruitzicht van vaderlandsche droom” in which Kaat Moszel is pictured hanging from the gallows (Algemeen Rijksarchief, Den Haag, Hof van Holland, 5927); see also the play entitled *Kaat Moszel voor den thron van Belshub* (Utrecht, n.d.), Universiteit Bibliothek Amsterdam (UBA), 691 C 108. See also the gossip about one “Moeder Trago,” an Orangist leader in Leiden: *Politieke Krager*, 7:747–48.

15. See, for example, the thinly veiled attack on Princess Wilhelmina in J. A. Schas, *Het land der wilde keurigen* (Amsterdam, 1789); this work indicates how easily these attacks on particular Orangist women could shade into a more general antifemale prejudice, since in Schas’s “land of despots” it is women who rule. Cf. Peter Bakker, “Literair-politieke pamfletten tussen 1787 en 1795: Een tereinverkenning,” unpublished thesis, Instituut voor Neerlandistiek, Amsterdam, no. 2911.


19. See, for example, a massive petition in Deventer in the fall of 1782: Gemeentearchief Deventer, Republiek II, no. 138.


23. Ibid., 234–43.

24. Similarly, in the long-running Post van den Neder-Rijn, 12 vols. (1780–87), there were just six letters and four poems signed by women; in the Politieke Kruyer (9 vols., 1781–87), there were seven letters and three poems by women.


27. For examples of the sequential character of the reforms, see R. E. de Bruin, Burgers op het kussen: Volksverteveniteit en bestuurszamenstelling in de stad Utrecht, 1793–1813 (Zutphen, 1986); J. Theunisz, Overijssel in 1795 (Amsterdam, 1943).


30. For the purposes of this analysis, we have dated the Batavian Revolution from the beginning of 1795 to the end of 1800 on the grounds that in 1801 the Staatsbewind brought the end of radical democratic or republican experiments and a concomitant decline in popular mobilization and collective action, at least on the national level. In Burgers op het kussen, a local study of Utrecht, R. E. de Bruin argues for the vitality of democratic processes at the local level through 1803.

32. The same apology for her awkward Dutch appears in a petition signed by Etta Palm in 1795 shortly after her return from France.
33. Oprechte Nationale Courant, May 6, 1795; it was signed “Vriendinne van de waarheid.” She published another letter the next week: ibid., May 13, 1795.
35. See, for example, Oprechte Nationale Courant, March 13, 16, and 25, 1795.
44. Nationale Bataafsche Courant, July 6, 1797.
45. Ibid., August 5, 1797.
46. Gemeenearchief Amsterdam, Rechterlijk Archief, 480, Confessieboek 1797.
47. Nationale Bataafsche Courant, September 30, 1797.
50. Johan de Vries, *De economische achtersligging der Republiek in de achteinde eeuw* (Amsterdam 1959); James C. Riley, “The Dutch Economy after 1650: Decline or Growth?” *Journal of European Economic History* 13 (1984): 521–69. At a recent conference on eighteenth-century Dutch history at the Folger Library in Washington, D.C., the notion of decline was all but discarded by the participants.


52. Mijnhardt, “The Dutch Enlightenment,” and the literature cited there.


54. Cf. De advocaat der vrouwelijke kunnen en wel voornaamelijk der jonge dochteren en weduwnaren met artikelen van bezwaar . . . (n.p., n.d.), UBA, Broch. CLXXVII, 9, which not only advocates better education, as did Betje Wolff, but argues that women should be allowed to be members of learned societies. The only exceptions to this moderate rule seem to be two aristocratic women with international connections: German-born Charlotte-Sophie Bentinck, who was married to William Bentinck, and Belle van Zuylen, who as Madame de Charriere became an important francophone author. Cf. Joanne Boeijen, et al., “Nostre miserie est generale: Gedachten van Charlotte-Sophie Bentinck over de positie van de vrouw,” *Documentatieblad Werkgroep Achttiende Eeuw*, no. 44 (1979): 3–29; C. H. E. de Wit, “De historische realiteit van Belle van Zuylen ten aanzien van de Republiek in 1787,” *Documentatieblad Werkgroep Achttiende Eeuw*, nos. 27–29 (1975): 51–61.


59. Gemeentearchief Amsterdam, Index Notariële Archiven.


61. Unpublished research results from a working group in the Department of Social History, Erasmus University Rotterdam.


63. R. M. Dekker, Holland in beroering, oproeren in de 17e en 18e eeuw (Baarn, 1982).

64. Cf. Te Brake, “Provincial Histories.”


69. The contrast with the rhetoric of the American Revolution, in the early days of which crowds were often glorified as the “people out of doors,” is striking. On the shifting attitudes toward crowds in the American Revolution, see, for example, Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1969). See also Colin Lucas, “The Crowd and Politics between Ancien Régime and Revolution in France,” Journal of Modern History 60 (1988): 421–57.

70. See, for example, De Friesche Patriot 1 (1786): 397. On 1748–50, see also J. A. F. de Jongste, Onrust aan te spaarne (‘s Gravenhage, 1984); F. Geyl, Revolutiedagen te Amsterdam (‘s Gravenhage, 1936).

73. Ibid., 209–10.
79. Van Hulsen, Utrecht in de Patriotentijd; Schama, Patriots and Liberators, 88–100.
84. Post van den Neder-Rhijn 3:1080.
89. Te Brake, Regents and Rebels, 171–73.