World Security and EquityThis book provides a quantitative foundation for evaluating the conflicting aims of security and equality. Professor Tinbergen presents a number of econometric models which overturn many long-held beliefs about the relationship between military policy and development co-operation. His findings demonstrate that in order to achieve reasonable targets of welfare and security, military expenditure should be considerably reduced with development assistance being increased by amounts of the same order. |
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0.7 per cent a₁ a₂ alternative amount armament expenditures assumed average b₁ calculations capital-output ratio Chapter China coefficients column communist-ruled considered constitutes consumption country groups decile developed countries developed market economies development aid development assistance development co-operation disarmament discussed donor countries dynamic model equations figures Germany F.R. gestation period growth income distribution income of W1 India Kravis lacunae Leger Sivard LOGARITHMIC WELFARE FUNCTIONS lower macro market economies maximize world welfare maximizing welfare Milit military expenditures millions n₁ NATO needed negotiations Non-mil obtained official development assistance Optimal values optimum Parabolic welfare functions percentage problem real income restrictions satiation values Section security aid security assistance solution Soviet Union static models Third World total income transfers underdeveloped units utility function V₁ v₁₂ variables W1 and W3 Warsaw Pact Washington D.C. welfare of W1 welfare-cum-security welfare-in-security World Bank x₁ y₁ y₂